Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia: Analysing India and Pakistan’s nuclear strategies

Abstract

This thesis explores the nuclear deterrence strategies of India and Pakistan, two nuclear-armed neighbours with a long history of conflict. The study focuses on understanding the distinct deterrence strategies employed by each country, the mechanisms they use to maintain credible deterrence, and the effectiveness of these strategies, particularly in the context of the 1999 Kargil War. India's strategy is characterized by a No First Use (NFU) policy and Credible Minimum Deterrence (CMD), which emphasize restraint and the maintenance of a stable regional security environment. In contrast, Pakistan's strategy is driven by a posture of Asymmetric Escalation, supported by a First Use policy, aimed at deterring India's conventional military superiority.

The analysis identifies that both nations have developed sophisticated methods to ensure the credibility of their nuclear deterrence. India relies on a nuclear triad, technological advancements, and consistent policy adherence, while Pakistan emphasizes missile development, integration of conventional and nuclear forces, and strategic alliances, particularly with China. The Kargil War serves as a critical case study to evaluate the effectiveness of these strategies. The conflict highlighted the strengths and limitations of each country's deterrence approach: while India's strategy effectively prevented nuclear escalation, it failed to deter conventional aggression under the nuclear shadow. Conversely, Pakistan’s strategy constrained India’s military response but struggled to maintain the credibility of its nuclear threats in the face of international pressure.

The findings underscore the complex dynamics of nuclear deterrence in South Asia and the challenges both nations face in adapting their strategies to prevent future conflicts. The study concludes that continuous dialogue, confidence-building measures, and strategic stability are essential to avoiding escalation to the nuclear level in this volatile region.

This thesis explores the nuclear deterrence strategies of India and Pakistan, two nuclear-armed neighbours with a long history of conflict. The study focuses on understanding the distinct deterrence strategies employed by each country, the mechanisms they use to maintain credible deterrence, and the effectiveness of these strategies, particularly in the context of the 1999 Kargil War. India's strategy is characterized by a No First Use (NFU) policy and Credible Minimum Deterrence (CMD), which emphasize restraint and the maintenance of a stable regional security environment. In contrast, Pakistan's strategy is driven by a posture of Asymmetric Escalation, supported by a First Use policy, aimed at deterring India's conventional military superiority.

The analysis identifies that both nations have developed sophisticated methods to ensure the credibility of their nuclear deterrence. India relies on a nuclear triad, technological advancements, and consistent policy adherence, while Pakistan emphasizes missile development, integration of conventional and nuclear forces, and strategic alliances, particularly with China. The Kargil War serves as a critical case study to evaluate the effectiveness of these strategies. The conflict highlighted the strengths and limitations of each country's deterrence approach: while India's strategy effectively prevented nuclear escalation, it failed to deter conventional aggression under the nuclear shadow. Conversely, Pakistan’s strategy constrained India’s military response but struggled to maintain the credibility of its nuclear threats in the face of international pressure.

The findings underscore the complex dynamics of nuclear deterrence in South Asia and the challenges both nations face in adapting their strategies to prevent future conflicts. The study concludes that continuous dialogue, confidence-building measures, and strategic stability are essential to avoiding escalation to the nuclear level in this volatile region.