dc.contributor.author | Kaushal, Kevin R. | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-11-21T20:19:48Z | |
dc.date.available | 2021-11-21T20:19:48Z | |
dc.date.created | 2020-03-28T10:07:02Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2020 | |
dc.identifier.citation | Strategic Behavior and the Environment. 2020, 8 (2), 131-167. | en_US |
dc.identifier.issn | 1944-012X | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/11250/2830590 | |
dc.description.abstract | The allowances in an emission trading system (ETS) are commonly allocated for free to the emission-intensive and trade-exposed sector, e.g., in the form of output-based allocation (OBA). Recently an approach combining OBA with a consumption tax has been proposed to mitigate carbon leakage. This paper evaluates the potential outcome in a game of climate policies, by examining the Nash equilibrium outcome of a non-cooperative policy instrument game between regions that regulate their emissions separately. We construct a computable general equilibrium model and investigate the case when regions can choose to supplement their ETS with OBA and/or with a consumption tax, in the presence of another regulating region. In the context of the EU and China, we show how regional interests combined with a national climate target, may lead to different climate policy combinations. | en_US |
dc.language.iso | eng | en_US |
dc.title | Optimal Climate Policy in the Presence of Another Country's Climate Policy | en_US |
dc.type | Peer reviewed | en_US |
dc.type | Journal article | en_US |
dc.description.version | acceptedVersion | en_US |
dc.source.pagenumber | 131-167 | en_US |
dc.source.volume | 8 | en_US |
dc.source.journal | Strategic Behavior and the Environment | en_US |
dc.source.issue | 2 | en_US |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1561/102.00000093 | |
dc.identifier.cristin | 1804058 | |
cristin.ispublished | true | |
cristin.fulltext | postprint | |
cristin.qualitycode | 1 | |