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dc.contributor.authorKaushal, Kevin R.
dc.date.accessioned2021-11-21T20:19:48Z
dc.date.available2021-11-21T20:19:48Z
dc.date.created2020-03-28T10:07:02Z
dc.date.issued2020
dc.identifier.citationStrategic Behavior and the Environment. 2020, 8 (2), 131-167.en_US
dc.identifier.issn1944-012X
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/11250/2830590
dc.description.abstractThe allowances in an emission trading system (ETS) are commonly allocated for free to the emission-intensive and trade-exposed sector, e.g., in the form of output-based allocation (OBA). Recently an approach combining OBA with a consumption tax has been proposed to mitigate carbon leakage. This paper evaluates the potential outcome in a game of climate policies, by examining the Nash equilibrium outcome of a non-cooperative policy instrument game between regions that regulate their emissions separately. We construct a computable general equilibrium model and investigate the case when regions can choose to supplement their ETS with OBA and/or with a consumption tax, in the presence of another regulating region. In the context of the EU and China, we show how regional interests combined with a national climate target, may lead to different climate policy combinations.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.titleOptimal Climate Policy in the Presence of Another Country's Climate Policyen_US
dc.typePeer revieweden_US
dc.typeJournal articleen_US
dc.description.versionacceptedVersionen_US
dc.source.pagenumber131-167en_US
dc.source.volume8en_US
dc.source.journalStrategic Behavior and the Environmenten_US
dc.source.issue2en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1561/102.00000093
dc.identifier.cristin1804058
cristin.ispublishedtrue
cristin.fulltextpostprint
cristin.qualitycode1


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