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# **The Recognition Struggle over Climatizing the Security Council during Norway's term**

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Declaration

I, Mikkel Sofus Kristmoen, declare that this thesis is a result of my research investigations and findings. Sources of information other than my own have been acknowledged and a reference list has been appended. This work has not been previously submitted to any other university for award of any type of academic degree.

Signature.....

Date..... 15 Mai 2024

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## Abstract:

Using Axel Honneth's conceptualization of recognition, this thesis analyses the debate surrounding Niger and Ireland's draft resolution on climate change and security proposed in the Autumn of 2021. It shows that Norway and Ireland both push for a climatization of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), but do so with different constructions of the relationship between climate change and security. Norway's construction of this relation constitutes climate as a variable in a 'climate-security nexus', where the effect on security is dependent on political decision-making, whereas Ireland articulates climate change as directly increasing international insecurity. These different constructions justify different UNSC engagements with climate change: Norway's is more pragmatic and controlled, seeking to mainstream climate change into the UNSC's pre-existing toolkit, whereas Ireland's justifies a more expansive engagement, which could include the development of new tools and possibly the use of its Chapter VII powers. These constructions appeal to different states within the United Nations: the pragmatic approach appeals to developing countries, because of scepticism of the UNSC's hierarchical nature, whereas the more expansive construction appeals to Small Island Developing States, because climate change is an existential emergency for them. The thesis shows how the different constructions are articulated as authoritative.

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# Introduction

## Norway and International Climate Politics

“How would you find meaning, except by chance?

But people don't believe in the order of chance or order from within.”

- Mei-Mei Berssenbrugge, (2013, p. 8)

In fifty years, Tuvalu may no longer exist. Perhaps the people will be able to find new homes, and continue to practice their traditions, but as Eliuta (2024) writes: “The spectre of displacement and the ever-present threat of climate-related devastation loom large, provoking deep-seated concerns about the sustainability of life on the island”.

The reality facing Tuvaluans and other Pacific Islanders reflect the visceral consequences climate change has: in other contexts, it has unexpected and unpredictable outcomes. In Greenland, warmer weather is causing the seasonal blooms to be shorter, and fewer insects visit to help pollinate (Høye et al, 2013).

These statements are construction of climate change, depicting it as a devastating reality. These constructions create what Dunn (2008) refers to as a truth-effect, constructing a social norm which future action can be justified for conforming to. Depending on how we talk about climate change, we will understand the way we should respond to it differently.

Discourse produces the preconditions for action, shaping “the possibilities for action” (ibid, p. 81). This is why Deleuze and Guattari (2015) stress the importance of concepts in ‘What is Philosophy?’, arguing that the creation of concepts is the aim of philosophy: concepts bring new ways of understanding the world, challenging existing frameworks for thought, and subsequently generating new possibilities for action. It is also why Roberto Mangabeira Unger (1997) stresses the importance of ideas in his work, as ideas bound what is thought possible. Unger explains that failing to think radically leads to the illusion of ‘false necessity’, where the existing social order is justified as a historical necessity, when in reality it is a consequence of chance and political decisions (ibid). For example, the concept of

'securitization' captures the process whereby issues are framed in terms of security, leading to mobilization around these issues as perceived threats (Williams, 2003).

For the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), the highest organ of the UN, this means what it engages with has to be framed as acceptable within the perimeters of its mandate (Gifkins, 2021). Maertens (2021) explores how the UNSC has been undergoing a process of 'climatization' since it hosted its first debate on climate change and security in 2007, under the presidency of the United Kingdom. This debate drew a record 55 United Nations (UN) member states, though the debate yielded no formal outcome (Conca et al, 2017). The United Kingdom justified hosting the debate by referencing resolution 1625, which commits the Council to preventing "conflict and addressing root causes" (ibid, p. 4).

Because of this failure in 2007, Pacific island states brought the issue before the General Assembly in 2009, the outcome of this being Resolution 63/281 which invites the "relevant organs of the United Nations" to intensify their efforts and consideration of climate change on the issue "including its possible security implications" (A/Res/63/281, p. 2). Germany brought the issue before the UNSC again in 2011, as talks at the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) were stalled (Conca et al, 2017). At this meeting a new record number of 65 member states spoke, though China, Russia, and India nearly blocked discussion (ibid).

Maertens (2021) refers to these efforts of placing climate change on the UNSC's agenda as 'climatization', which is a process whereby issues are framed by their relation to climate change. In this thesis, I draw from her concept, and argue the efforts to put climate change on the UNSC's agenda can be understood in relation to Axel Honneth (2015)'s articulation of the concept of a 'struggle for recognition'. Investigating the debate surrounding the draft resolution S/2021/990, which was proposed by Ireland and Niger in the Autumn of 2021, and ultimately vetoed by Russia in the UNSC on December 13<sup>th</sup> in 2021 (Romita et al, 2022).

In the period 2021-2022, Norway and Ireland were both on the UNSC, voted in by the United Nations (UN) General Assembly to represent the Western European and Others Group (WEOG) (McQuinn, 2020; Götz, 2008). While I have chosen a comparative lens to gain insight



by seeing their different constructions of climate change as part of a recognition struggle, the main focus of my analysis is on Norway's diplomacy regarding climate.

My research objectives are to see how Norway and Ireland construct climate change. Inspired by Adler-Nissen and Zarakol (2021), I identify Norway and Ireland's constructions of climate change as constituting with two different 'strains' of how the UNSC should be climatized. The concept of a recognition struggle captures the fact that all 'selves' must put forward an idea of what they take themselves to be, which another 'self' then recognizes.

Because the UNSC's mandate is contested, what is understood to be within it is dynamic and under interpretation – it is not static (Scott, 2015). My goal with this thesis is to explore how states articulate different positions on how and by what means the UNSC should engage with climate change. My choice of discourse analysis as method was made as the documents produced for the UNSC debates are carefully written – Conca et al (2017, p. 3) calls it a UNSC "debate", because it is really a ritual performance consisting of "sequential, scripted monologues".

As will be outlined in the concepts section below, Honneth (2015) notes how states' articulations are careful claims to recognition, where it can be difficult to separate normative from strategic factors from the claims to recognition states make. This also makes looking at climatization in terms of a recognition struggle interesting, as it allows the strategic elements – understood here as a state's desire for the UNSC to engage with climate change in a given way – to be difficult to separate from the intersubjective, normative appeals states make towards other states, and the constituent populations of other states. In this sense, a recognition struggle lens allows me to capture how states might try to appeal to other states, to try to convince them that the position they are taking is the right one.

To help me guide my research, the research questions I asked myself are: How do Norway and Ireland construct climate change's relation to international security differently? How do these constructions justify different UNSC engagements with climate change? Who might these different engagements appeal to? What may be some elements that play a part in this

recognition struggle? How are these positions justified, how do states try to make their positions authoritative?

This thesis argues the debate on climate change's links to security on the UNSC can be understood by seeing it as a recognition struggle, where states articulate standpoints with the hope of being perceived in a particular manner by other states, as well as by the state's own domestic audience, and the constituent populations of other states. In this sense we can see how different articulations of climate change's effects on international security (or different ways the UNSC can be 'climatized') may appeal to some states, and less to others.

One of the reasons a recognition lens was chosen is because Honneth places emphasis on the relationship between interstate politics and domestic populations. In this way, the statements states make are understood to need a connection to the desires for recognition of the constituent population.

### Categorizing UNSC engagement with climate change

Scott (2015) notes that the debates on whether the UNSC should engage with climate change has been muddled by assumptions that this would necessarily side-line the UNFCCC-Kyoto protocol regime. She points out that what a UNSC response to climate change might look like is not very clear, and that what is often framed as a binary choice – should the UNSC respond to climate change? – is in fact more complicated. Scott outlines a series of variables which would inform how the UNSC can respond to climate change, including .. The first variable is whether a UNSC response to climate change would need to make specific reference to climate. The second variable is whether the UNSC needs to address climate mitigation or adaption, where adaptation is adjusting to projected effects of climate change, and mitigation is taking efforts to reduce or limit warming itself. These two are interrelated, and failure to mitigate warming means adaptation-limits may be exceeded; Scott notes that adaptation likely falls closer to what the traditional role of the UNSC has been understood to be (ibid).

A third variable is whether the UNSC's response to climate change should be based on adapting existing tools, or whether the Council should develop new ones (ibid). Few of the UNSC's tools are outlined in the charter, and Scott writes that while peacekeeping is as old as the UN, it has evolved significantly over time, while ad hoc criminal tribunals is a post-Cold War era innovation (ibid). A fourth variable is the use of recommendary versus compulsory powers. This is a question of whether the UNSC should use its power to make 'Chapter VII' decisions, which are legally binding, to compel states to act. For a 'Chapter VII' resolution to be passed, it has to meet the legal threshold outlined in article 39 of the UN charter, meaning it is "determined the existence of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression" (ibid, p. 1320). For the UN to take 'Chapter VII' level action, climate change would have to be understood to in some way threatening or breaching international peace.

By applying her four variables, Scott outlines four different categories of possible UNSC responses to climate change (ibid, p. 1321). The first of these is rejection of involvement with climate change, which would be a direct expression that climate change is unrelated to international peace and security; the second is a 'climate change non-response', which would not explicitly respond to climate change but would deal with the complications arising from climate change in specific UNSC operations, and may arise from an understanding that the UNSC is not the appropriate forum for grappling with climate change for example. Scott calls the third form of response a 'conscious but measured response', which acknowledges the effects of climate change on international security, and seeks to adapt the pre-existing UNSC toolset to help grapple with climate change (ibid).

Scott emphasizes that this would likely entail mainstreaming climate change into existing tools. The final, fourth category entails recognizing climate change as reaching the threshold of article 39, legitimating the use of 'Chapter VII' resolutions. This would mean existing tools would be adapted for grappling with climate change, alongside possibly introducing new ones. In this construction, the UNSC is justified in taking wide-reaching actions, so it can "address the threat at its source and to minimize its harmful impacts". In this thesis, the discursive constructions of climate change which states put forward have a corresponding UNSC response which is understood to be "appropriate". Following Hansen (2007), we can describe these constructions of climate as discursive narratives telling a story about what

climate change is, and how climate change should be appropriately responded to. States care about these constructions, because they legitimate certain policy responses from the UNSC, and so statements states make on the UNSC in official documents should reflect a construction they are pushing for.

## Theory and Concepts

### Recognition and why we Struggle to get it

As Adler-Nissen and Zarakol (2021) explain, the most common use of 'recognition' in international relations scholarship refers to the legal acknowledgement of sovereign entities. Another conception draws from the philosophy of Hegel, to whose philosophy a different understanding of 'recognition' plays a foundational role (Honneth, 1996). For Hegel, the idea of a 'self' emerges from the act of recognition, which identities of a self and an 'other' (ibid). Ringmar writes that according to Hegel, in order for humans to distinguish ourselves from nature, we need confirmation of who we are (Ringmar, 2002, p. 120). Self-identification is not enough, as one's "self-description may be too fanciful, too demanding or simply false" (ibid, p. 120). As Ringmar explains, because another's recognition is never forthcoming, individuals have to put forward what they take themselves to be, so they will be recognized by others. This constitutes the 'struggle for recognition', as selves are always putting forth articulations of their own identity, and always recognizing others (Honneth, 2015). As Adler-Nissen and Zarakol (2021) say, "the struggle for recognition is continuously ongoing and performed by all actors".

Honneth (1996, p. 31) explains that Hegel's conceptualization of Geist, which is foundational to his philosophical system, became clearer to himself when he realized that it had the ability to "be both itself and the other to itself". This processual nature of recognition is thus what constitutes a 'self', recognition is not just a single act, but a "form of movement found in processes", wherein consciousness is both a 'self' to itself and an 'other' which recognizes this self (ibid, p. 31). This makes recognition the process by which things become known (Ranci re, 2016). Honneth and Margalit (2001, p. 133) note that recognition has inherent asymmetries, as one person may recognize more, and further there may be an inherent

asymmetry in their social status, but this “social super-structure is grafted onto an ontological base that is based on symmetry: each person has a point of view”.

Moving the concept of a recognition struggle from the interpersonal to the collective realm is not so difficult, Honneth (2015, p. 27) writes, as we view the collective identity as “the higher-level equivalent of personal identity or relation-to-self.” The difficulty emerges when we try to move from the concept of collective groups to the nation-state, as the nation-state encompasses cultural and social sub-groups, making the “illusion of a nationally homogeneous population disappear for good” (ibid, p. 27). There are thus multiple collectives, sub-groups, and narrative streams which constitute the state’s population, and statesmen must interpret their disparate population’s collective desires for security and prosperity into a “narrative synthesis of the diffuse expectations of the population” in shaping foreign policy (Honneth, 2015, p. 33).

Honneth (2015) explains that a state’s foreign policy must be legitimized in the eyes of its constituent population. “The manner in which a government defends the nation’s security, political clout, and economic prosperity must be made dependent upon the consent of the nation’s citizens, if only to demonstrate the government’s operational capacity” (ibid, p. 29). In this sense, the political representatives of other countries are to recognize the features of what constitutes the nation’s collective identity (ibid). Honneth stresses that this is not to be conflated with nationalism, as the desire for international recognition of what constitutes the nation’s self-respect is directed to other states’ involvement, not exclusion; without this kind of collective recognition, a nation’s identity could not be maintained (ibid). In Honneth’s phrasing, political leaders always define their interests within what they “presume their citizens to have in the form of diffuse desires for the recognition of their own collective identity or that of another collective” (ibid, p. 31). He stresses that statesmen have a degree of leeway in how they choose to interpret the diverse and unorganized sentiments of their population; this also differentiates democratic states from undemocratic ones, as the statesmen of democratic states are compelled, in accordance with their constitutional principles, “to obey certain guidelines in the fulfilment of such collective strivings for recognition” (ibid, p. 31).

As Honneth (ibid, p. 30) notes, statesmen are also aware of the aspects of their countries which deserve recognition, and seek to display these features “while carrying out their functionally defined tasks. Therefore, the collective striving for recognition is not just one particular function within the spectrum of a state’s tasks”. Recognition operates not only between states, but also between statesmen and the state’s constituent population (ibid).

Adler-Nissen and Zarakol (2021) stress that misrecognition is an important factor in recognition struggles, misrecognition being the gap between a desired self-identity and how an individual or group is experienced being seen by others. Misrecognition is an inherent part of the process of identification (Adler-Nissen and Tsinovoi, 2019). This is one reason why identities are inherently unstable.

Honneth (2015, p. 25) writes that the revival of the Hegelian term was driven by “the desire to return to a stronger moral vocabulary in analysing the comportment of collective agents and social groups, thereby extracting this behaviour from the dominant paradigm of purely purposive-rational, strategic action”. Benjaminsen et al (2021) for example uses the concept to analyse climate injustice.

Honneth (ibid, p. 30) notes that there are a number of meanings beyond their “expressly formulated content, and which are communicated through the manner of their implementation.” As examples, he mentions the conscious manipulation of facial expression, the use of metaphors, and the use of historically trained rituals (ibid). Honneth emphasizes that most claims to recognition occur through such indirect means, as there is a “desire to maintain the appearance that one’s own nation is unaffected by other nations’ opinions, the aim of avoiding public embarrassment, and the etiquette of diplomatic encounters”, which lead the recognitional dimension of international relations to be “expressed indirectly and symbolically” in most cases (ibid, p. 30). Further he notes that behaviour serving “to express a state’s interest in self-assertion is staged so as to implicitly convey a finely calculated game in which respect and disrespect, desires for recognition, and experiences of humiliation find expression” (ibid, p. 30). Because of this, Honneth highlights that it is problematic to separate the normative dimension of recognition from the strategic dimension of self-assertion, as statesmen always frame the strategic goals of the state within what they take

to be the normative expectations for recognition of the constituent population, or another collective's (ibid, p. 31).

In their analysis of how two different groups are undermining the Liberal International Order (LIO), Adler-Nissen and Zarakol (2021) identify these groups as belong to two different 'strains' in the recognition struggle against the LIO. I choose to follow this terminology, as Norway and Ireland are both pushing for the UNSC to engage with climate change, but that their articulations justify two different types of engagement (different 'categories' of engagement, as I have shown Scott's (2015) articulation above).

### Status, Hierarchies, and Moral Standing

Long underappreciated, in the past decade status has been recognized by a growing number of scholars in IR (MacDonald and Parent, 2021). Status, in this literature, can be understood as the positioning of a state in a hierarchy (Neumann and de Carvalho, 2014). For example, in the case of status as being measured in a state's membership in elite clubs (MacDonald and Parent, 2021), it is straightforward to identify Ireland and Norway as holders of status in that they were both elected to be temporary members of the UNSC, and that they in this sense hold higher status than Canada, which lost the General Assembly election on which countries would represent the WEOG country group (McQuinn, 2020).

Neumann and de Carvalho (2014) note that status emerges from a process whereby a state is recognized as an actor. They emphasize that status is inherently social, and that status in international relations are ordered into informal hierarchies based on their status (ibid). Because status is an inherently social category, it needs to be recognized to exist (ibid). The consequence of this is that status seeking, and improving its "image", is an important goal for the majority of states within the international system. Neumann and de Carvalho (2014) note that recognition and status go together, as recognition of status is the desired outcome of status seeking, but they especially emphasize its importance for small states, who don't have access to power in the traditional sense (ibid). They emphasize the importance of becoming a 'good state', which is gaining a reputation as a moral actor (ibid).

The former Norwegian Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland headed the World Commission on Environment and Development, which published the Brundtland Report in 1987, which coined the term 'sustainable development' (Lahn and Rowe, 2014). Rosendal (2007) highlights that in 1989, following the Report's publication, it became official government policy for Norway to become a global leader in climate governance. Lahn and Rowe (2014) also highlight that Norway articulated an explicit goal of being a 'front-runner country' in the lead-up to the adoption of the UNFCCC. They further highlight that while cutting green-house gas emissions became politically controversial domestically in the 1990s, the aim of being a 'front-runner' in international climate policy has remained stable over the years (ibid). In interviews with Norwegian climate officials, they also find that that the international recognition Norway gained from the Brundtland Report has remained a major inspiration for Norway's continued commitment to international climate policy (ibid, p. 131). This shows that recognition can affect what states choose to prioritize in their foreign policy; in the case of Norway, the identification as a climate-friendly nation is positive, thus spurring on the engagement, as Norway had gained a positive reputation.

Lahn and Rowe (2014) further highlight Norway's engagement with REDD+, which is an international framework intended to incentivize developing countries to reduce deforestation. They highlight that Norway has become a major supporter of the scheme, and that Norwegian domestic media "reported on the recognition reaped by foreign actors as a result of the country's REDD+ contributions and role" (ibid, p. 138). Lahn and Rowe also remark that Norway is one of the most frequent hosts of UNFCCC negotiations, and remark that their interviewees argued this was a reflection of Norwegian support for the UNFCCC's processes – that it was an "acknowledgement of or return on investment in supporting the process – not part of the original investment itself" (ibid, p. 140). Lahn and Rowe conclude that Norway seeks status through its engagement with climate and environmental matters, but that it does so in ways reflexively adapted to fits its size (ibid). From a recognition perspective we can see that Norway's engagement with climate change internationally has been articulated in domestic discourse too, thus being represented as a way Norway's identity as an 'environmental frontrunner' being recognized. Norway's historic engagement with climate change has also served to grant it a reputation as a climate



Leira (2014) shows that the idea of the Norwegian people as peaceful was part of the national-romantic construction of the Norwegian identity prior to independence, and how being a peaceful small people was constitutive of a Norwegian “we”. The peoples of the world were constructed as peaceful, in contrast to the élites who were seen as focused on power-politics and thus war; in this way, being recognized as peaceful was a way for the population of Norway to see the eventually emergent Norwegian state as ‘theirs’, as it finally held the values of the people. This example shows how the collective identity of a state affects how states might choose to pursue status. For another example, Rosendal (2007) notes that Norwegian interest in multilateral environmental agreements was partly influenced by the experience of acid rain in the 1980s and early 90s (ibid). When Norway, as the first in the world to do so, established the Ministry for the Environment in 1972, this decision had broad support across the political spectrum (Lahn and Rowe, 2014).

An example could be when the Nordic countries, including NATO members Norway and Denmark, went against the US’ official stance of support for Salazar’s Portugal in the Portuguese colonies by supplying the liberation movements with humanitarian assistance, becoming what Schmidt (2013, p. 82) calls “the most significant liberation supporters”. This is an action which may be understood to have given the Nordic countries moral standing. Foreign political goals must be justified to the population with a narrative, and if these narratives are not considered credible, they will not legitimate the foreign policy (Honneth, 2015).

Bially Mattern and Zarakol (2016) explore hierarchies in international relations, emphasizing that they are an inherent part of the international system, but also stress that they are dynamic and constantly evolving. They note that norms and institutions play a role in perpetuating certain hierarchies – regarding the UNSC, the obvious example is the inherent power of the veto-holding permanent five, relative to the other members of the UNSC for example. Further they note that there are multiple, overlapping hierarchies, and that actors in the international system constantly contest and negotiate their positions in these hierarchies (ibid).

Ekengren (2022) for example highlights how Russian attempts to frame a 'collective West' or North Atlantic Treaty Organization as an offensive actor may harm Norway's reputation as a neutral peacemaker. For the UNSC, Haugevik et al (2021) emphasizes the role reputation-building played in Estonia and Norway's time on the UNSC. They highlight that, for small states, it is important that their reputation and "reputation and status-building to be seen to work for the greater good and the efficiency of the Council as a whole" (ibid, p. 4).

Carré cites Bourdieu in his study on the Kabyle in Algeria, where Bourdieu concludes "struggles for recognition are a fundamental dimension of social life and that what is at stake in them is the accumulation of a particular form of capital, honour in the sense of reputation and prestige" (Bourdieu, 1990, p. 22, as quoted in Carré, 2019). With regard to international relations, we can recall Honneth's application of recognition in international politics, and see status as connected to the collective wishes of states' constituent populations. Presumably just as they desire recognition, they desire status or positive reputations to be attached to their collective identities.

On the matter of climate change, Lahn and Rowe (2014, p. 128) note that "international climate politics has a rich innovative vocabulary when it comes to the categorization of states", with identifiers such as "big emitters" or "most vulnerable", which have "implications for the roles they are expected to play".

Pouliot (2014) for example analyses how the multilateral process leads to the emergence of a 'pecking order', which is a hierarchical ordering of diplomatic practitioners, where some speakers gain prominence due to perceived competence, and others do not. This is a relevant hierarchy for this thesis, as such a pecking order might have arisen on the UNSC, but it is not possible for me to analyse, as this kind of hierarchy would not be emergent from documents, as the 'pecking order' is an interpersonal process (ibid). Nonetheless, we can briefly hypothesize a link between reputation, a hierarchical ordering based on the perceived competence of a diplomatic practitioner, and recognition.

Norway's Permanent Representative to the UNSC was Mona Juul, who is famous for her role in the negotiation of the Oslo Accords (Pace, 2018; S/PV.8851). Her competence, experience,

and reputation as a peace negotiator might affect how other state representatives perceive the statements she makes on the UNSC, which may affect how they report the Norwegian statement back to their capitals. This is not to say that an individual has an instrumental role with regard to the intentions of a state, but rather to highlight that just as states are constituted by a constituent population, the state structure is constituted by practitioners, and the skill of those practitioners effects both how states function, and (when public-facing) how the functioning is perceived. Now we are getting astray though: for the intents of this thesis, it is worth highlighting that the main statements analysed are uttered at a ministerial-level UNSC meeting, and so it can be assumed the content of the document is highly intentional on the part of the states articulating them.

Honneth (2015, p. 34) considers that “perhaps we could say that states indirectly codetermine the foreign-political conduct of other states because the symbolic means with which they convey respect and recognition for other nations constitute an instrument for influencing the formation of public opinion and mood in other countries.” In this sense the status and moral authority attached to states

Beyond status, the historical categories attendant by histories establish narratives about states, which shape their relations and identities; Whelan et al (1994)’s history of Ireland’s engagement with the ‘third world’ in its foreign policy is an interesting example. They highlight that Ireland’s history of being under British colonial rule led them to have a shared history with many developing countries. This is not a form of ‘status’, but an identifier which affects who Ireland may desire recognition from, and creates a narrative of shared experience between the Irish population and other postcolonial states (ibid).

With regard to recognition, status should be understood as an element constituting the identity states wish to see recognized. In this sense, the different reputations, status-markers, and other facets constituting a state’s identity can be imagined as the ever-changing colours in a kaleidoscope, with states seeking to emphasize certain elements, and downplay others, to ensure the prismatic identity shifts in a manner its manifold constituents find desirable. With the question now being how we can investigate how states do this, we turn to the methods section.

For theory section, also point out I had a hard time finding any articles talking either about recognition struggles re: international climate politics, as well as convincingly describing the ‘groupings’ of states on climate internationally. I wanted to see not just how Norway and Ireland articulate their positions, but how those articulations are connected to the positions of other states. This is why I chose to go with Scott’s (2015) categories, and look at constructions with regard to these categories, as this lets me see how states articulate the prospects of UNSC engagement with climate change differently. In other words, it lets me look at states’ discursive engagement with climate change’s effects on security from a consequentialist perspective, seeing how the different positions on how the UNSC *should* engage with climate change are articulated, and who they might appeal to.

Nightingale (2017) looks at climate adaptation in Nepal through a recognition lens, arguing adaptation efforts should consider peoples need to claim authority and rights as political and cultural citizens to be successful. Benjaminsen et al (2021) argue recognition should be given more attention in climate discourse, and that misrecognition leads to climate injustice. While Maertens (2021) identifies the different methods which are used to climatize the UNSC, she does not look at how states may be trying to articulate different ‘climatizations’. Scartozzi (2022) is the closest to doing this, using natural language processing tools to analyse a large number of documents, to see how the UNSC’s discourse on climate has changed over time. He concludes that the UNSC is moving toward a de facto “climatization of security and riskification of climate change in daily practices, procedures, and peace operations” (ibid). His findings show how different states have articulated their positions on climate differently. There are no articles trying to bridge the gap between recognition struggles and climatization, and that is the gap this thesis hopes to help address.

## Methods

As Honneth (2015, p. 31) emphasizes, “it is unwise to assume a certain bundle of interests that refer exclusively to a state’s desire for self-assertion, in order to then subsequently add a diffuse “need” for recognition.” Given this, how can I be sure recognition really plays a role in the discourse of the UNSC? I am assuming they can be found in the documents chosen for analysis, as these documents were produced for a ministerial-level debate at the UNSC. This means they have an important role for showing states’ positions on the subject of the debate. This is perhaps the greatest strength of the discourse analysis of the UNSC documents I have selected, as I am analysing very intentional and tightly controlled statements.

As already mentioned, Honneth (2015, p. 31) stresses that only the statesmen of democratic states are compelled to follow certain guidelines in interpreting the constituent population’s collective desire for recognition. In this sense, the choice of Ireland and Norway makes analysis through a recognition struggle lens easier, as they are both constitutional democratic states. In this sense, there is an expectation that the documents will reflect the collective desires for recognition of Norway and Ireland.

A direct comparison between the two countries will also be instructive for the reasons that they are relatively similar, which means any differences will be more interesting.

The choice of Norway and Ireland was made because they are well-studied small states. To be clear, Norway is the main focus of the thesis, and Ireland serves the function of being compared to Norway. Beyond this, Neumann and de Carvalho (2014) also note that Ireland and Norway are among the small states recognized by President Obama as “punching above their weight”.

The convenience of which countries were actually on the Security Council in the period I’m looking at are also relevant. Following Hansen (2007, p. 69), the debate in September 2021 can be described as a discursive ‘moment’, as it has “a striking character” and is “the subject of intense political concern”. Hansen emphasizes that ‘single moment’ studies, as I am

undertaking, can gain in complexity by the expansion of the dimension of research. In my case, this means the expansion of 'selves' being investigated to two, so we get a comparative perspective by looking at Norway and Ireland.

The comparison between Ireland and Norway is relevant as they are both from the Western European and Others Group (WEOG) country group within the UN, and competed with one another, as well as Canada, to win their non-permanent seats in the chosen time period. Hansen (2006) points out that discourse analysis entails a comparative element as it requires a comparison of selves over time. The comparative element is made more relevant, as I am using the concept of recognition, and thus understanding the process of expressing a state's identity to be reliant both on the state's population and the population of other states, and statesmen.

This thesis elects to focus on Ireland and Norway because this allows for a comparative research design, where we can analyse similarities and divergences in how these relatively similar states construct climate change's relationship to security in their statements (Hansen, 2006, p. 67). Hansen (*ibid*, p. 69) notes that "the discourses of the Self are trying to stabilize the Self's identity, yet that this is an inherently unstable and often contested project produced and reproduced through foreign policy discourse".

Hansen (2006, p. 75) notes that the importance of language in discourse analysis makes knowing the language of the texts you choose imperative. She mentions that focusing analysis on texts produced for international institutions, and thus an international English-speaking audience makes this more possible. This is what I have done, as I am looking at official UNSC documents, which have official translations into the 6 official UN languages, one of which is English.

To supplement this, I also briefly look at how the Irish and Norwegian engagement on the UNSC is represented in domestic news, and I can read Irish language media as most of it is in English, while I speak Norwegian.

Another commonality is that both countries chaired the Informal Expert Group of Members of the Security Council on Climate and Security, Ireland alongside Niger in 2021, and Norway alongside Kenya in 2022 (Romita et al, 2022, p. 8). In the words of Neumann: (2008, p. 62) “When people who mouth the same representations organize, they make up a position in the discourse. Like representations, positions may be dominant or marginalized in various degrees”. We can see from the get-go that these four countries’ membership of the Informal Expert Group means they take on the same position in the discourse, which is being in favour of climatization of the UNSC.

This thesis does not deal with the content of the thematic resolution the debate is about. Being legislative documents, they score “high on formal authority” in Hansen’s (2006, p. 76) words, but is “not very explicit in” its “articulation of identities”. Hansen emphasizes using documents which more clearly articulate identities, for example “debates within international institutions, or statements by heads of states and prominent politicians on the meaning and importance of the adopted legislation and resolutions” (ibid, p. 76). The main texts referenced in my analysis are the statements made at the 8864<sup>th</sup> meeting of the UNSC on the 23<sup>rd</sup> of September. This meeting is a ministerial-level meeting, taking place during the United Nations General Assembly High Level Week so the statements cover both of these.

As Neumann (2008) states: “a good discourse analyst should also be able to demonstrate. that where the carriers of a position see continuity, there is almost always change. Because of the nature of politics as a structured activity between groups, a discourse is politicized precisely through the evolution of two or a few patterns of meaning, which is the discourse analyst’s task to uncover. It is possible to distinguish between the basic traits of such a meaning pattern (what unites the position) and varieties of it (what differentiate it)” (p. 71). The comparison of Norway and Ireland allows for the comparison of two countries who both want the UNSC to engage with climate change. What (hopefully) makes this thesis interesting is the difference between their articulations of this desired engagement, and how these different perspectives have different consequences, which may appeal more to some countries, and less to others. The subject of the analysis is not just states’ positions on the draft resolution, but the question of how the UNSC will deal with climate change in the future, and how different states articulate their positions on this question. As my analysis

section argues, Ireland and Norway construct climate change differently, and this difference is the real content of my analysis.

The timeframe I choose to investigate is of course an important part of the narrative. Due to the constraints of length which the master's thesis imposes, I am limited in how much I can investigate, which means that the temporal limits on what I analyse become important. The chosen timeframe is made to capture the debate on the draft proposal, which begins in September and ends with the vote in December, where Russia ultimately vetoed the draft resolution put forward by Niger and Ireland (Romita et al, 2022). I can't cover everything, "here remains endless work of specification on different constitutive relations, close-ups of specific time periods, tailor-making of the analysis to illuminate specific (types of) action, and so forth" (Neumann, 2008, p. 75)

I have chosen to focus in on Norway and Ireland in order to show the discursive context and how different countries articulate their positions of support or opposition to the draft resolution, and how this can be analysed through the recognition lens. To show that Norway and Ireland's positions can be understood as aligning with different strains of a recognition struggle over climatizing the UNSC, I also look at the positions of Fiji, Kenya, and briefly China. I cannot claim that my analysis will be exhaustive of the discourse on climate and security, but I aim to provide some analytical insight to how two small, highly developed states, who have historically been on the periphery of Europe, seek to be recognized in the recognition struggle over climate on the UNSC in the Autumn of 2021.

As Leander (2008, p. 12) notes, the first thing to consider about a method is whether it will help me answer my research question. A discourse analysis allows us to see how states are articulating their positions in official documentation.

Because the meanings attached to perceptions are socially reproduced, they are referred to as representations by discourse analysts (Neumann, 2008). Representations which are repeated over time "become a set of statements and practices through which certain language becomes institutionalized and 'normalized' over time" (ibid, p. 61).



Neumann (2008, p. 63) emphasizes that discourses maintain “a degree of regularity in social relations” and produce preconditions for action. In the context of the UNSC, this could mean providing a legal basis for the UNSC to take a particular course of action for example.

As pointed out in the concept section above, Honneth highlights that states have to make their claims for recognition within a degree of acceptability internationally. In this sense, they will not explicitly say what their strategic goals are, but will mix them with normative statements, making the extraction of the one from the other challenging. This makes a discourse analysis centered on analysing a recognition struggle a bit easier, though, as the normative and strategic articulations go together.

Additionally, states have to ensure their statements do not serve to delegitimize them in the eyes of their constituent population. This itself is a strength of discourse analysis for analysing recognition, as it allows us to see how the state is legitimizing itself and its actions, and we can interpret artefacts (documents) it produces. We can ask ourselves who the documents have as an audience, and what this means. In the context of the UNSC and the chosen documents, because they are produced at the high political level they are (and are articulated by politicians in many cases) we can take it for granted that the statement appeals to the constituent population to a degree, as well as the international members of the UNSC.

Because recognition requires statesmen to appeal to and recognize the core constitutive facets of a state’s identity, my approach requires a degree of “cultural competence”, as Neumann (2008) terms it, of the states I am investigating. This is a principal reason I am focusing on Ireland and Norway, as I (believe that I) have a greater degree of understanding of how the populations of these nations perceive their identities than I do of other members of the UNSC, being Norwegian. I also grew up in Kenya, which adds some cultural competence for the analysis of their statements too. Finally, I also interned at the UN Secretariat in the Autumn of 2023, which may provide a (somewhat surface-level) degree of cultural competency, which might help in the analysis there too.

Dunn (2008) highlights that researchers produce discourses, and likewise I acknowledge that I am not and cannot be a “neutral” actor, as that is impossible in a socially mediated world. As Hansen (2007, 187) states “Those formulating foreign policy usually present identities as though they were objectively given, but these instantiations of objectivity are themselves necessary reproductive performances.”

Neumann (2008, p. 72) highlights that there are formal and informal practices which limit what kind of representations can be added to the discourse. In the case of the UNSC, diplomats tread into the role of representing their states, where their statements are guided by the specific foreign policy goals for the UN set forward by their governments. There may be variation between states in how specific the foreign policy goals are between given topics, as states have differing levels of resources available to use. The reality of official statements made by an individual state at the UNSC adds another layer to this, as what a state puts into words is tightly moderated, often going through multiple diplomats, and perhaps also needing to be signed off on politically.

Additionally, Antonio Gramsci (1999) identified the role intellectuals play in reproducing the dominant narratives in society. He highlighted that the ruling class’s worldview becomes dominant in society, with ideas from it disseminating into the rest of society, becoming hegemonic and internalized as ‘common-sense’ positions (ibid). This makes it so the existing social structures are ‘naturalized’ and taken as inevitable (ibid). This is valuable to consider, as I do not wish to simply reproduce pre-existing narratives by using recognition as a lens. It is especially important as the analysed documents are produced by statesmen, who hold relative positions of power within their societies. I have used a self-reflexive approach to remain critical of my interpretations throughout my analysis, and in the process of writing I would write critical comments on my points. This had the goal of making me consider whether what I am writing is really true, or whether I am falling in a narrative trap. Ultimately it is difficult for me to identify success (as I am ultimately trapped in my subjectivity), but I believe this approach has for example allowed me to see the nuances between the Kenyan and Pacific Islanders’ positions.

The use of Honneth's theory of recognition should allow for the desires of Bull's (2002) "world society" to emerge, as states refer to their constituent populations. However, statesmen interpret the desires of the disparate wishes of their diverse constituent populations, and this interpretive act will favour some groups over others. This is important to highlight, as the statements of states can never be exhaustive, and represent the wishes of their entire spectrum of their population. Marginal (or in Gramscian terms 'subaltern') positions within states may not be selected for recognition by statesmen at the UNSC. The marginalization of these communities will not be apparent in the documents, as states have an awareness that their "collective identity must be internationally acceptable" (Honneth, 2015, p. 26). These inequalities may thus not be apparent in the documents, as states seek to downplay or abstain from articulating them.

## Which Documents?

Symbol	Document title/Agenda	Date (context)	Notes
S/PV.5663	Security Council Sixty-second year 5663rd meeting	17 April 2007	First UNSC debate on effects of climate for Security. Agenda was put forward by the United Kingdom
A/Res/63/281	Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 3 June 2009	3 June 2009	General Assembly resolution on climate change and its possible security implications
S/2021/756	Letter dated 24 August 2021 from the Permanent Representative of Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General	Published 26 August 2021	Letter including concept note for S/PV.8851, the UNSC debate on peacekeeping transitions
S/PV.8851	Security Council Seventy-sixth year 8851st meeting	8 September 2021	UNSC Debate on UN peacekeeping operation transitions. Unanimously approved by the UNSC.
S/2021/782	Letter dated 9 September 2021 from the Permanent Representative of Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General	9 September 2021	Letter including concept note for (S/PV.8864), the UNSC debate on climate and security
S/PV.8864	Security Council Seventy-sixth year 8864th meetin	23 September 2021	UNSC debate on climate and security, main focus of the thesis
S/2021/990	Draft Resolution	13 December 2021	Draft resolution on climate change and security. This is what S/PV.8864 centers on.
S/2022/999	Letter dated 26 December 2022 from the Permanent Representatives of Kenya and Norway to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council	27 of December 2022	Letter from Norway and Kenya to UNSG, including concept note on Arrian-formula debate on “Climate, peace and security: opportunities for the United Nations peace and security architecture”

Figure 1: UN Documents referred to in analysis.

A substantial question for my investigation was selecting documents was finding and selecting the right documents. Conveniently, the UN operates documents.un.org, which is a digital document system hosted online, where all public documents produced by the UN are deposited. The UN uses a symbol classification system, where a string of symbolic components classify a document's origin (Dag Hammarskjöld Library, 2024). Relevant to the documents I selected are the first component, indicating the UN organ the document originates from; there may be a secondary component indicating a subsidiary body which has created it; and ending the string, there is a year and session component. The symbol for the SC is S, which makes finding documents produced by the SC fairly simple. Because the documents I analyse use these strings to refer to other documents, I have elected to use the symbols in my referencing of documents. This was decided upon as it may otherwise be difficult to distinguish documents from one another in the Harvard style referencing I employ, as the documents are generally from the same 2-month period. Because the string of symbols includes the year the document was produced, the string is given exclusively.

To find appropriate documents, I used the symbol for the Security Council (S) to search for relevant documents in the timeframe I was investigating (January 1<sup>st</sup> 2021 to December 31<sup>st</sup> 2022), when Norway was on the SC. This gave me 3920 documents, which would be impossible for me to analyse in the appropriate timeframe. To narrow down my search, I used the site's in-text "phrase" search function to find documents which discuss climate change. This narrowed my search down to 422 documents; still too many for me to thoroughly investigate, but it may be worth noting to the reader that approximately 1 in 10 SC documents in the period 2021-2022 mention climate change. Finally, I narrowed my search to the 4-month period, looking only at documents published from 1st of September to 31<sup>st</sup> of December, 2021. This is the period during which Ireland and Niger's proposed resolution was being discussed, dating from Ireland's letter to the UNSG S/2021/78 on 9<sup>th</sup> of September, in which they announce their intention to host an open debate on climate and security in their capacity as President of the UNSC on 23<sup>rd</sup> of September 2021, until the end of December, the month in which Ireland's proposal was vetoed.

In terms of data collection, this means I am using purposive sampling, wherein I narrow the documents down to those which contain the most relevant information (Palinkas et al, 2015). I hope to saturate my analysis by improving my initial selection of documents with documents which are mentioned in discussions, and which appear relevant, enriching my selection. This is similar to the approach I am taking to the specific statements contained within the documents, where my focus is on Norway and Ireland's statements. The concept of a recognition struggle is meaningless without someone to recognize you, and this is why I purposively select other statements to code and analyse where appropriate. The selection of these other statements is based on a skim read of the document, in an attempt to gouge statements which "stick out". Palinkas et al (2015) calls this deviance sampling, which is one of the purposive sampling techniques they discuss and highlight its value in showing what unusual and usual in the data. One of my other sampling strategies is snowball sampling, this being my following up on other documents which are being referred to in the discourse (ibid). Figure 1 shows the documents which are referenced in the thesis.

## Analysis

### The Climatization of the United Nations Security Council

In April 2007, the UNSC held its first open debate on the links between international security and climate change (Maertens, 2021). The debate on climate and security within the UNSC has continued with four more official UNSC open debates, in addition to a series of informal 'Arria-formula' sessions looking at the links between climate change and international peace and security (ibid). Despite the debates having drawing increasing numbers of participants, an agreement on a resolution has yet to be reached (Hardt, 2021). As Maertens (2021) writes, these debates have been extensively studied, and she identifies two main trends among this scholarship: the first being those looking at the institutional debate on the role and functions of the UNSC, and the second looking at the securitization of climate at the UNSC.

Much of the institutional debate centres around normative arguments on how and why the UNSC can integrate climate change into its operations. Securitization is a concept originating from the Copenhagen school on the "discursive construction of security threats" and looks at how speech acts construct climate change as a security issue (ibid, p. 641). In these debates, the UNSC is both considered a securitizing actor "producing securitizing moves", and a securitization arena where other actors discursively construct climate change as a security issue (ibid, p. 641). Drawing on the concept of securitization, a more recent tendency in scholarship is climatization, which looks at the process whereby discourses in the "domains of world politics are framed through a climate lens and transformed as a result of such a translation" (Maertens, 2021, p. 642). Maertens argues that climatization supplements the two aforementioned trends, as it asks the questions: "What drives the continuous efforts to place climate change on the UNSC's agenda and to what extent do the UNSC's debates illustrate an ongoing process of climatization?" (ibid, p. 642). Maertens argues climatization has become a dominant framing in international relations, and that the debates at the UNSC follow a "logic of expansion of climate politics" (ibid, p. 642).

On the 25<sup>th</sup> of January 2019, the fourth UNSC debate on climate and security was held, and despite the growing engagement of member states, neither an agreement on a presidential

statement nor a resolution could be agreed upon (Hardt, 2021). In 2020, for the first time 10 UNSC member states made a joint statement on climate and security, spearheaded by Germany, which called for the UNSC to address climate-related security risks in its work (ibid). Hardt also notes that Germany was reportedly drafting a draft resolution on climate and security, which they chose to withhold after being told by the Trump administration that America would veto it if it reached the UNSC (ibid).

Why is there no agreement? My argument, which is put forward in the following sections, is that Maertens is correct that climate is an inescapable framing in international relations. Because different states represent different collectives, they are incentivized to construct climate in different ways, so as to be able to put forward their voices in international relations and be able to justify their positions. I argue that there is a recognition struggle between states over how climate should be represented, because these different constructions have different consequential levels of UNSC engagement with climate change, which appeal to different groupings of states. To differentiate these levels of UNSC engagement I follow Scott's (2015) identification of different possible 'categories' of UNSC engagements with the issue. For example, one important question is whether the UNSC could be justified to use its Chapter VII powers to engage with climate change. The different groupings which align with these different categories of responses I refer to as two different 'strains' in the recognition struggle over climatizing the UNSC. To reiterate, both these 'strains' are trying to climatize the UNSC, but those climatizations have different degrees of UNSC engagement.

### *Appealing to Effectiveness and Expert Authority*

We begin our analysis with the document that initiated the discourse over Ireland and Niger's proposal, which is Ireland's letter to the UNSG on the 9<sup>th</sup> of September 2021, with the identifier S/2021/782. The letter announces that Ireland, in its capacity as President of the UNSC in September 2021, will host a high-level open debate on 23<sup>rd</sup> of September, under the theme "Climate and Security", with the title "Maintenance of international peace and security" (S/2021/782, p. 1). Attached to the letter is Ireland's concept note, which outlines



Ireland's goals in hosting the debate, as well as the debate's guiding questions and a background for the debate (S/2021/782).

On the 23<sup>rd</sup> of September in 2021, the United Nations convened an open debate on "Maintenance of international peace and security: Climate and Security". The meeting was organized by Ireland, and presided over by the Taoiseach of Ireland, Micheál Martin. He was joined by the Presidents of Estonia, and Vietnam, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of France, India, Kenya, Mexico, Niger, Norway, Tunisia, and the United States of America, high ranking statesmen from St Vincent and the Grenadines, and the United Kingdom, and the Permanent Representatives of China and Russia to the United Nations, representing the other countries on the UNSC. Taking place in September, this meeting took place with the twenty-sixth Conference of the States Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP 26) in mind, as it would take place two months later, in November. Additionally, it took place during the UN General Assembly High Level Week.

At the UNSC debate on the 8<sup>th</sup> of September, which was about peacekeeping transitions, Norway chose to mention climate change's effects for peacebuilding (S/PV.8851). Norway's statement mentions that "country presence should incorporate the implications of climate-related security risks in its reconfiguration strategy" (S/PV.8851, p. 14)". Contextually, Norway's reputation as a peacekeeping and peace brokering state (de Carvalho and Lie, 2014) makes Norway's statement more authoritative, as it feeds into the perception of Norway as an authority on peacekeeping. The argument for a systematic response to climate change echoes the statement made at the debate on climate and security later in the month, where Søreide states that "Climate change, conflict, displacement and hunger exacerbate one other", in the next line calling climate change a 'threat multiplier' (S/PV.8864, p. 13).

The representation of climate as a 'threat multiplier' is a discursive norm on climate, and as is the conception of climate as exacerbating socioeconomic inequalities, these inequalities then causing conflict (Scartozzi, 2022). Scartozzi (2022), looking at the discursive production of climate by France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, shows that these three countries use this discursive norm to make securitizing and climatizing moves. Scartozzi comments that the use of 'threat' has become less frequent over time, with the discourse

from the three veto-holding states increasingly focusing on 'risk' instead (ibid). This discursive shift has included proposals to include climate related risks in the UNSG's reports to the UNSC, "the use of climate-risk assessment in the SC and field missions, the creation of an early warning and early action financing system, the integration of climate forecasting with conflict-prevention measures, the support of the international climate regime, and the mainstreaming of climate change in decision-making and humanitarian work" (ibid, p. 303). These elements are also emphasized in the statements delivered by many states on the 23<sup>rd</sup> of September.

Interestingly, in his comparison of the three countries' discourses on the UNSC, Scartozzi identifies the United Kingdom's emphasis on gender and women in its statements as something which distinguishes the United Kingdom's statements from those of France and the United States; Norway emphasizes gender in their statement, whereas Ireland does not (S/PV.8864, p. 5 and p. 13). Norway appears to align more closely to the discursive construction of the United Kingdom than those of France and the United States. Scartozzi (2022) emphasizes that France has prioritized biodiversity, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, while the United States mentions water more frequently. While both Norway and Ireland mention 'drought', gender features more prominently in Norway's statement, being emphasized in a paragraph on the adverse effects of climate change on women and children in 'extremely-high risk countries'. In contrast, Ireland's statement does not mention women nor gender at all. Biodiversity is also not mentioned by either.

Both Norway and Ireland use the language that climate change is the most defining challenge of our time (S/PV.8864, p. 5 and p. 13), but express climate's relation to security slightly differently. Ireland begin their statement with "Climate change is the defining challenge of our generation", following up with statements such as "our collective security is at risk" and "We must move past theoretical debates and respond to the reality that climate change is exacerbating conflict globally" (S/PV.8864, p. 5 and p. 6). These statements construct climate change as an urgent matter. Ireland is more overt in the link between climate change and conflict, by stressing climate change as having a more direct, albeit less specific effect on conflict. What does this difference mean, why is it relevant? The construction of climate change as increasing "risk" and insecurity is distinct from a direct construction of climate

change as causing conflict because the construction using 'risk' and 'insecurity' constructs climate as an empirical issue for specific security policymaking 'on the ground', whereas the direct link between conflict and climate change Ireland is constructing makes it a larger issue, possibly requiring more expansive engagement to resolve.

In Norway's construction, climate change is a variable within a climate-security nexus, meaning that the consequences climate change has for security is dependent on political decision-making. Here climate change is not a direct 'cause' of conflict, but it is one variable which may (alongside other factors) affect security. This discursive construction of climate serves to justify implementing the specific policies Norway puts forward, like including climate risks in the UNSG's reports, and wanting climate change to be addressed in mediation and preventive diplomacy (S/PV.8864, p. 13). While Norway does stress that the UNSC approving a thematic resolution on climate and security "is a matter of conflict prevention", Norway is presenting conflict prevention as the Council adding climate as a dimension in its security analyses, i.e. as a dimension of analysis for the specific contexts the UNSC deals with (S/PV.8864, p. 13).

Ireland calls for many of the same policies as Norway, but also says "The Council can — and must — do more. It has the mandate, and it has the tools. The failure to use them is an abdication of our responsibility" (S/PV.8864, p. 5). The statement immediately follows up calling for the Council's work to "identify" and "integrate climate-related security risk" into its peacebuilding work, just as Norway calls for, but Ireland's construction of climate change also leaves open the possibility of broader UNSC action. Ireland calls for the appointment of a special representative on climate-related security, and for the SG to submit periodic reports on how climate is affecting international peace and security to the Council, while also leaving open the possibility of further action (ibid). This is evinced by the statement that "Such actions are just the beginning of what is necessary for the Council to begin to fulfil its obligations" (S/PV.8864, p. 5). These statements make it clear that Ireland may be constructing the climate change → conflict link so clearly because this justifies the UNSC's use of wider-reaching tools. Norway does not call for the Council to make similarly radical decisions, instead arguing acknowledging climate change's effects is instrumentally

important for the UNSC's work and argues for mainstreaming climate change into the existing UNSC toolset (S/PV.8864, p. 13).

In the introduction I outlined Scott's (2015) categorizations of UNSC responses to climate. Recalling her categories, the distinction between Norway and Ireland's constructions of climate can be identified as the difference between the third and the fourth categories Scott outlines. Ireland is explicitly stating that the UNSC needs new tools to make it able to adequately grapple with climate change. As Scott (2015) notes, a category 4 response to climate change would justify developing new tools for the UNSC, which is what Ireland is suggesting. The construction of climate change as a broad international security issue constitutes it as a threat to international peace and security, which would provide the legal basis for expanding the UNSC's toolset with regard to climate, and possibly even using Chapter VII powers. Norway's construction is more measured and provides a legal justification for a category 3 engagement, where the existing UNSC toolset would be adapted to deal with climate change (ibid). This constitutes a more pragmatic engagement with climate, as climate change is seen as an 'input problem' for security and complicates it. For this reason, climate change is constructed as something which the UNSC needs to engage with for pragmatic reasons.

I should emphasize that neither Norway nor Ireland are alone in their constructions. The countries who could be said to be constructing climate change in line with a category 4 response includes Tunisia, the United Kingdom, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, who all refer to climate change as constituting an "existential threat" (S/PV.8864, p. 14-15, p. 15-16, p. 18, respectively). Additionally, I will discuss the constructions of the Pacific islands and Kenya in a later section.

As Norway's construction of climate as a 'variable in the security matrix' also makes UNSC implementation reliant on identifying what these climate risks are, and how the climate variable affects security in a given context. Norway's statement mentions this, emphasizing that the Council needs "timely and actionable information on the climate risks for the specific situations on the Council's agenda" (S/PV.8864, p. 14). This necessity could be seen

to justify why Norway mentions its funding of research, which grants Norway authority by showing that Norway is already funding a knowledge base which can be used by the UN. Norway's statement mentions its financial support for "independent research undertaken by the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute and Adelphi, in close cooperation with local expertise" (ibid, p. 14).

Ireland also states: "The link between climate and instability has been recognized by the African Union, the European Union and the Pacific Islands Forum. Sea-level rise, displacement and competition over resources are contributing to tensions" (S/PV.8864, p. 5). This statement functions as a discursive move both making another link between climate change and increased insecurity, and also establishing Ireland's position as one which has already been acknowledged by other international organizations. This legitimizes Ireland's framing of climate change as a threat to international security, as it presents it as something which has already been acknowledged by other entities.

Norway's construction of climate change's effects on security represents it as something to be resolved in policy and implementation. This is made clear by the introductory section of the concept note of the Norwegian-Kenyan co-chaired Arrian debate, which was held a year later, in November 2022, which states: "While climate change may worsen existing vulnerabilities, the decision whether to respond in ways that increase cooperation or conflict will always remain a human choice" (S/2022/999, p. 6). The distinction between the climatizations of Norway and Ireland is the consequences of each understanding: if climate increases risk, and the meaning of that risk is dependent on the resilience of social systems and communities, the UNSC should engage with climate change by creating policy and engagements on the ground which improve this resilience.

Meanwhile, if the link between climate change and conflict or insecurity is direct, and represented as something experienced across the globe, the UNSC is justified to take more expansive action, possibly using its Chapter VII powers to compel states to reduce emissions, for example (Scott, 2015). This is also reflected in Ireland statement that "The instability that is being driven by the adverse effects of climate change is being felt across the globe — in Europe, Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, the Middle East, South Asia and many of

the world's small island developing State" (S/PV.8864, p. 5). Ireland overtly states that climate change is causing more conflict in the world and increasing instability, using urgent language calling for action.

While both constructions of climate justify action to be taken by the UNSC, Norway's construction is more specific, and represents climate's effects on security as something to be resolved pragmatically. Ireland's construction is broader and provides a legal justification for the UNSC to engage with climate change more expansively, through the development of new tools, and possibly even using its Chapter VII powers.

### Unequal Development and Climate Resilience

Scott (2015, p. 1332) highlights that 'climate change' as terminology may "engender polarizing positions and emotive attitudes", as the term has become inseparable from the question of who is responsible for causing it, so it is not necessarily a bad thing that the UNSC has not established a clear approach to the issue yet. From a recognition standpoint, it is also possible that 'climate change' becomes an inflamed political issue domestically for some states, which affects how they may respond to the issue on the UNSC. A case in point for this is Trump's presidency, which told Germany they would veto the climate resolution Germany had been working on if it reached the UNSC, because climate change has become a contentious political issue within the United States (Hardt, 2021). The question of responsibility also has relevance within the recognition struggle over climate, as it touches on the different capabilities of states to adapt to climate change.

As Scott emphasizes in her categorization of possible UNSC responses, climate change's "impacts are greatest for those who lack the resilience that development affords" (Scott, 2015, p. 1321). The unequal climate resilience between developed and developing states consequently becomes a bone of contention between the developed and developing world, as some developing countries wish to see the developed countries paying for the adaptation developing states are forced to implement due to the problem's advanced state. As Hansen (2006, p. 59) writes, for politicians to take power it is not only a question of claiming knowledge, but also of taking responsibility and deploying power, and different states seek to

deploy power to different ends. The population of a country have a collective expectation, which statesmen have to remain attached to in their foreign policies (Honneth, 2015).

A facet of the recognition struggle worth considering is Hegel's point that selves seek recognition from their equals (Lauer, 2012). Part of the recognition struggle for states is choosing who is considered an equal, but as Lauer (2012) highlights there can never be a truly equal comparison, as recognition is always comparative. Lauer highlights that for Hegel, "If what is recognized is an individual's equal right to develop a self by positing her own ends, then what matters is neither the individual nor the good as such, but the relation between them" (ibid, p. 33). In international politics, this could be understood as what Adler-Nissen and Zarakol (2020) refer to as a 'recognition hierarchy'. One such recognition hierarchy which is apparent in the recognition struggle over climatizing the UNSC is that between developed and developing states. Prys-Hansen et al (2019) find that, after the establishment of the Kyoto Protocol, the once prominent discursive divide at the UNFCCC between the developing and developed world became more nuanced, especially with the emergence of the BRICS. This this section will argue, this is also reflected on the UNSC.

Honneth (2015) highlights that foreign policy is determined by statesmen's interpretation of what their constituent population's interests and values are. In the words of Honneth (2015, p. 34) "This interpretation must coordinate the functional requirements for maximizing security and prosperity with the public's expectations about other states' recognition of its own collective identity." For developing countries, the emphasis on development is based on this desire to secure the material well-being for their constituent populations. Likewise, when developing countries choose to articulate the effects of climate change for security in their foreign policy, this is also because this is perceived as a cogent concern for the well-being of the domestic population, as is also the case for developed countries. As Honneth highlights, the articulation of these desires in foreign policy is always tied to how other countries will recognize the country (ibid).

An example illustrating this is Kenya's statement to the ministerial-level debate. Kenya calls for the UNSC to take a "pragmatic approach" to addressing climate change, stressing that climate change must not compromise "the ability of countries to develop rapidly"

(S/PV.8864, p. 14). Kenya further stresses that climate action must be “fair and must be seen to be fair for it to draw the support of the vast majority of States”, emphasizing that, as the majority of resources which will be invested in climate adaptation will come from the domestic economy, developing countries will need to have access to growing economies to be able “to respond adequately in a fashion that protects peace and security” (S/PV.8864, p. 14). The idea that climate change should not compromise development is also known as ‘climate equity’ (Morgan and Waskow, 2014). Hermville et al (2017), written prior to the 2015 Paris Climate Conference, highlighted that many developing countries were concerned with ‘carbon’ or ‘development space’, as much economic activity has historically been tied to greenhouse gas emissions, and they consequently argue climate change is fundamentally a development issue.

Regarding the construction of climate change’s effects for international security, Kenya’s construction aligns with Scott’s (2015) Category 3 response, using some of the same language as Norway. Kenya emphasizes that the “growing body of evidence on the climate-security nexus” should be developed alongside experts in the Global South, to ensure it is inclusive (S/PV.8864, p. 14). Further Kenya states “Given its primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security, the Council should also take a pragmatic approach to dealing with climate change, particularly in conflict situations” (ibid, p. 14). Further Kenya calls for the development of early warning systems, emphasizes the need to acknowledge indigenous knowledge for climate resilience, and calls for climate-action mandates in peacekeeping and peacebuilding, “especially those situated in Africa” (ibid, p. 14). Kenya is thus arguing that climate change should be adapted into the UNSC’s toolset, to ensure that toolset is able to perform their designated functions, which puts Kenya’s argument in the same vein as Norway’s. Kenya and Norway have the same construction of climate change’s effects for security, and both argue for Scott’s “category 3” response to climate change, though this does not mean their articulations are entirely the same. Kenya’s emphasis on development is one difference, for example.

To return to the point on the recognition of equals highlighted above, Kenya’s statement can be interpreted as seeking recognition from African states in particular. Kenya states they “will remain a strong and consistent voice for Africa, the Global South, including small island



developing States, in the pursuit of representative climate and security solutions” (ibid, p. 14). Highlighting climate equity is notable because developing states are less resilient to the effects of climate change (Singh and Chudasama, 2021), as Kenya also points out when they emphasize climate change “increasing the fragility of states” (S/PV.8864, p. 14). Kenya also mentions UNEP’s being “domiciled in Nairobi” and argues that the institution should be strengthened if the “battle against climate change, particularly in the South, is to be won” (ibid, p. 14).

In their statement, Kenya also stresses that “climate action must be fair and must be seen to be fair for it to draw the support of the vast majority of states”. As Conca et al (2017, p. 13) point out about developing countries, “a key consideration is the limited capacity of many states to protect and fulfil their citizens’ rights” regarding the expansion of UNSC powers on climate possibly encompassing the ‘responsibility to protect’ section of the UNSC mandate. Conca et al state this imbalance raises questions about the moral implications of the international system (ibid). Conca et al (2017, p. 5) mention that many developing countries prefer the Economic and Social Council and UNFCCC to “the hierarchical, opaque Council”. This is not a new criticism of the UNSC – the African Union has levelled it for decades, and it is represented in the “Ezulwini Consensus”, which outlines the African Union’s position on UNSC reform: “It is important to reiterate the obligation of states to protect their citizens, but this should not be used as a pretext to undermine the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of states” (African Union, 2005, p. 6). In this sense there may be scepticism among African states in particular over justifying Scott’s (2015) Category 4 UNSC engagement with climate change, as the UNSC is seen as hierarchical and opaque, as Conca et al (2017) say.

Honneth (2015, p. 32) emphasizes the role feelings of collective humiliation have played in international politics. Tourme-Jouannet (2013) explains how colonization, and the countless injustices attached to, constitute centuries of humiliation and denial of recognition. He further states this denial of recognition was “born of contempt for a common or specific identity, for the value of a culture, a way of life, for the dignity of individuals, and for their physical integrity” (ibid, p. 671). Having been on the receiving end of this treatment, it is unsurprising that developing countries may prioritize development. China is an illustrative

example of this, and China's emphasis on economic development (and corresponding rise in the 'recognition hierarchy') could be interpreted as an attempt to overcome collective feelings of shame and resentment.

Zhu (2022) argues that China's domestic legal framework for climate governance is centered on a developmentalist approach, as climate-related policymaking is focused around industrial and energy policy. Zhu further argues that this goal of shaping climate governance around a developmentalist approach was motivated by domestic anxieties surrounding industrial development. Dirlik (2012) traces China's emphasis on economic development to its experience of political colonialism in the 20<sup>th</sup> century, which domestically in China is referred to as the 'century of humiliation' because of this legacy. At S/PV.8864 (p. 20) China states: "it is essential for developed countries to earnestly fulfil their international obligations and commitments. Developed countries bear a historical responsibility for climate change." This is an appeal to climate inequity, and a call for developed countries to do their part. Here China is also mobilizing a 'historical humiliation', but flips it on its head, as they argue the developed world should make amends for having benefitted from causing climate change, and thus benefitted from causing the ills that come along with it.

In Norway's statement at the ministerial-level debate on climate change's effects on international security, Norway states they are channelling "more and more of our development aid" toward "climate financing and investment in renewable energy in developing countries" (S/PV.8864, p. 13). After this they list examples of how climate change is affecting communities in Afghanistan, Iraq, and South Sudan (ibid). The Group of Friends on Climate and Security, which Norway and Ireland are both members of, also submitted a joint statement to this debate (Norway.no, 2021). In this statement the effects on developing countries are also emphasized: "This is especially evident in vulnerable countries and regions, particularly those that are often least responsible for climate change, but no country is immune: developed countries have suffered unprecedented floods, heat waves, drought, desertification and fires in recent months, and will continue to do so" (Norway.no, 2021). These statements constitute appeals to developing countries, recognizing that climate change especially affects developing countries, while also emphasizing that the effects of climate change are felt by both developed and developing countries. This constructs climate

change as an experience which is shared by both developed and developing countries. By emphasizing its investments in developing countries, Norway also constructs itself as an altruistic state and a moral authority, especially with regard to developing countries.

In their analysis of documents and interviews attendant to the Bali climate conference in 2007 and Doha climate conference in 2012, Lahn and Rowe (2014) find that many actors emphasize Norway's role as a 'bridge-builder' between the developed and developing world. As they write, "This entails acting as a facilitator to promote consensus among negotiating parties and helping to bring about agreement on common goals rather than pushing a particular agenda" (ibid, p. 133). Norway's construction of climate change aligning more closely with Kenya makes sense in this regard, given that Norway has long perceived itself as a 'bridge-builder' between the developing and developed world. This role is also emphasized in official Norwegian policy, which state "we will be a bridge-builder between different groups of countries and peoples" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011, p. 5). Norway's more pragmatic construction of climate change (compared to Ireland's), and emphasis on the shared nature of climate change, could be seen as a way of trying to build consensus on the matter in this way.

To recap, Conca et al (2017, p. 3) find that the "Council's tendency toward reactivity and its hierarchical structure, poor information dynamics, and chronically weak monitoring and follow-through all bode poorly for both its effectiveness and the avoidance of political controversy". The Kenyan/Norwegian emphasis on a pragmatic inclusion of climate-related security risks into the UNSC's operations can be understood as a construction of climate change's effects on security in line with Scott's (2015) category 3 UNSC engagement. In his analysis of discourse on climate and security on the UNSC, Abdenur (2021) finds the global "North-South" divide has become less productive the past 15 years, as a more diverse set of positions has developed. We can argue this is true on the UNSC too, where there are two 'strains' in the effort climatize the UNSC, while the Chinese position of opposition overlaps with some of the Norwegian/Kenyan position in favour of UNSC climatization.

As Scott's (2015) point on the possible politicization of climate change if the UNSC engages with climate change more overtly, it is reasonable to mention some critiques of the UNSC, as this affects how UNSC engagement with climate is recognized by states. One such critique is mentioned by Conca et al (2017, p. 7), where an interviewee states the UNSC is not structured well for disseminating information throughout the UN structure, and lacks "staff to aggregate and systematize information" (Conca et al, 2017, p. 7)

As we have already mentioned China's position on climate change as a development issue, it is also worth noting that Conca et al (2017) China has stated discussion on climate change's meaning for security should occur within a framework which is accessible to all parties (ibid). This again is an implicit critique of the hierarchical structure of the UNSC. The articulation of a desire for equitable participation in resolving the issue of climate is not unique to China but is also reflected in Norway's statement: "Yet, sustainable peace and development cannot be achieved without the inclusion of all relevant stakeholders" (S/PV.8864, p. 13). The difference between these statements are again hierarchical, as China is speaking of equal participation of all states, whereas Norway is talking about local stakeholders, but the point remains that both mobilize the language of inclusion (and as highlighted above, this also emphasized in Kenya's statement), showing that the language of inclusion is and can be mobilized differently.

As Honneth (2015, p. 32) puts it, "The manner in which states react to each other, and the forms of relation they maintain with each other, derive from a fusion of interests and values brought about by both sides. This fusion consists in the disclosure of foreign-political goals from the perspective of the hypothetical community that joins together a population, and which is interpreted as a collective that is striving for recognition. Therefore, the psychological terminology I recommended avoiding above has a place after all – not as an element of our theoretical language, but as one of the objects of that language in political reality. And in that reality, state actors must interpret the population's moods, making use of concepts related to strivings for recognition and historical humiliation." Our analysis thus far shows that Honneth is correct in identifying recognition as not just a theoretical concept for analysis in International Relations, but indeed as a real phenomenon and part of the functioning of the international system, as the English school term it. In this sense

recognition could be said to bridge world society into the international system (from the world's population to the dynamics between states).

### Climate Change as Continuation of Pre-existing Engagement

“This high-level open debate will deepen substantive awareness of how climate security risks are relevant to the work of the Security Council and explore what tangible actions can be taken. The session will illustrate how climate change is affecting peace and security and discuss practical actions the Security Council can take to address climate-related security risks” (S/2021/782, p. 2). This is how the concept note Ireland's delivered to the Secretary-General outlines the debate over climate change; as Hansen (2007, p. 187) explains, the goals of the debate are outlined as objective, but this is itself a performance for presenting Ireland's intentions.

The concept note's background shows this, stating the failure to include climatic concerns in peacebuilding efforts could “impair” efforts to improve security (ibid, p. 2). It additionally highlights that regional organizations “including the African Union, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the European Union and the Pacific Islands Forum have recognized the implications of climate-related security risks.” (S/2021/782, p. 2). As mentioned already, the mention of other international organizations' acknowledgement of the link between climate change and security serves to represent it as something which is already a widely held ‘fact’.

It is interesting to note that the language in the concept note is somewhat different from that of the Taoiseach's statement, specifically using the term “climate-related security risks” (ibid). The concept note lists three ways the UNSC can “engage more strongly and consistently on climate-related security risks”, which are by considering climate-related security risks in peacekeeping, conflict prevention, and conflict mediation (ibid, p. 3). In other words, the concept note is suggesting mainstreaming climate-related security risks into the current UNSC toolset. The gap between the construction of climate within the concept note and Ireland's statement may mean that Ireland considers the current resolution a first step before further UNSC engagements with climate. The last and fourth of the guiding questions

included in the concept note is “What concrete actions can the Security Council take on this issue?”, which could be interpreted as a desire to explore these other, further-reaching UNSC engagements with climate change.

The concept note includes a mention of the Pacific Islands Forum’s 2018 Boe Declaration, stating that it identifies climate change as the greatest threat to the peoples of the Pacific (S/2021/782, p. 2). However, the full paragraph ends with calling the Boe Declaration a “call for an enhanced understanding of security risks”, linking it to recent UNSC debates on marine security (ibid, p. 2). Further supporting the argument that climate change is already used by the UNSC, the concept note notes the UNSC has already emphasized climatic and ecological changes in risk assessments and risk management strategies (S/2021/782, p. 3). This serves to have climate change be recognized not as a new engagement, but a furtherance of the UNSC’s pre-existing engagements.

Another statement pointing toward this is Ireland mentioning its role in the UNSC’s Informal Expert Group on Climate and Security, which Ireland co-chaired with Niger in 2021 (ibid). This Group “provides a platform for members of the Security Council to hear how we can integrate climate-related security risks into our conflict prevention, peacekeeping, conflict resolution and post-conflict stabilization work” (ibid, p. 5). Ireland mentions that the group “has a membership of almost 60 countries from around the world. That further illustrates the priority placed on the issue by the United Nations membership” (ibid, p. 6). Just as the reference to other international institutions’ acknowledgement of the link between climate change and security represents this as a widely held belief, the mention of the Group’s large membership represents climate as something many UN member states are engaged with.

By stating that “The mandate of the Council is to consider threats to international peace and security” (S/PV.8864, p. 6), Ireland justifies its position as within the UNSC’s mandate. This frames the argument concerning climate and security in the terms that the UNSC is not taking on new responsibilities but would be dealing with the responsibilities the body has always had. Scott (2015) emphasizes that this is an important element to justifying a category 4 response, as it represents climate change as a matter for international security (and therefore in the purview of the UNSC’s responsibilities).

This point is supported by the statement in the next few lines, “The Council can — and must — do more. It has the mandate, and it has the tools. The failure to use them is an abdication of our responsibility” (S/PV.8864, p. 6). This statement attributes responsibility for grappling with climate change to the UNSC, while stating that doing so is within the bounds of the UNSC’s mandate. Maertens (2021) identifies the attribution of responsibility for climate change as a climatizing move, and in this view, Ireland is making a climatizing move. The different ways of constructing climate change are all painted as within the UNSC’s mandate, and various oppositions are painted as outside it – as Scott (2015) notes, the UNSC’s operations have never been static, and that what the mandate includes or excludes has always been under reinterpretation. Functionally speaking, this constitutes the establishment of a legal basis for greater UNSC engagement with climate change (ibid).

“The international community looks to us for guidance. By working together in a spirit of common purpose, I hope that we can reach a shared understanding of how the Security Council can meet that challenge.” (S/PV.8864, p. 6). This constitutes an appeal to the idea of the UNSC as a collective body, who collectively come to an agreement. While the UNSC is functionally very hierarchical, in that the five permanent members can veto any resolution, the emphasis on a ‘shared understanding’ can be seen as a discursive performance, which is part of the UNSC’s rituals. Just as performed objectivity is used when uttering foreign policy goals (Hansen, 2007, p. 187), at the UNSC we could say that performed equality affects how statements are made at the UNSC. ‘Performed equality’ could also be said to be reflected in the UNSC’s presidency rotating to all members on a monthly basis, and that all UNSC member states make their statements in an equal capacity at UNSC debates – functionally, these states are hierarchically ordered, but the UNSC’s role as the highest organ of the UN means it has to perform equality.

After thanking Ireland for convening the meeting, and the Secretary-General and Ms Elman for their statements, the Norwegian Foreign Minister, Ms Ine Sørensen, states that the IPCC has “issued a very clear warning.” (S/PV.8864, p. 13). This clear warning is that we can expect climate change to become much worse; the Minister further states that the impact of this can already be seen in many situations the UNSC is already dealing with (ibid). Referring to

the IPCC constitutes an appeal to authority, as the IPCC is recognized as the foremost expert authority on climate change. Arguing that the UNSC is already seeing the consequences of climate change on resolutions, Norway is making the same argument as Ireland, that bringing climate to the UNSC is not adding something new to the UNSC's plate.

As mentioned, Norway's construction of climate change's effects on security are framed as an instrumental question, and climate change should be mainstreamed into the UNSC's toolset in order to improve their ability to function as they should. This again sees the UNSC's engagement with climate framed as having continuity with what the UNSC is already doing. This is reinforced by the last paragraph of the statement too, with Ms Søreide saying the Council must "fulfil its responsibility as set forth in its mandate" (S/PV.8864, p. 13). This argument appeals to the *raison d'être* of the UNSC as an authority in international security, and to its legitimacy. Ms Søreide also states that: "The intention is not for the Council to take on the tasks of other United Nations organs. It is a matter of conflict prevention. It is a matter of addressing climate risk and resilience as part of our common responsibility to maintain international peace and security" (ibid, p. 13) Here we again see an appeal to the Council's mandate to policing international security, with climate being identified as relevant as a "matter of conflict prevention" (ibid, p. 13)

The appeal to the effectiveness of the UNSC is meaningful, as it appeals to the legitimacy of the UNSC. Stephen (2018) identifies three ways in which an international organization's legitimacy can drift (and he uses the UNSC as his case study): first is what he calls "broken promises", which is the failure to live up to pre-existing standards. For the UNSC this would mean not following the UN charter and the resolutions the UNSC has agreed on (ibid). The second is changes in the standards of legitimacy by which the international org is assessed (ibid) – this thesis is investigating one such case, as some states, such as Norway and Ireland, argue that climatic concerns have to be considered part of the UNSC's charter. Norway and Ireland's appeals to the charter and to effectiveness are a way to signal that the standards the UNSC's effectiveness is assessed by is changing, and acknowledging climate as an important element of security and peacekeeping is the way for this to be remedied and the UNSC's effectiveness to be ensured. The third way an international organization's legitimacy



can drift is through having an audience shift, i.e. the relevant public judging whether the organization is legitimate has changed (Stephen, 2018).

### UNSC Engagement and Legitimacy

Honneth (2015, p. 34) highlights that the tools for signalling recognition employed by states also function as a means to cast doubt over other states' narratives of justification, by signalling doubt over those states' collective identity. Recalling Stephen (2018)'s concerns on international organizations, we can couple Honneth's point with the legitimacy of international organizations, as the UNSC needs to be perceived as a moral authority to justify its position as the preeminent international organization in international relations. In their analysis of UN General Assembly debates on the UNSC from 1991-2009, Binder and Heupel (2015) find the UNSC have a legitimacy deficit in the eyes of UN member states, as its procedures are called into question. This legitimacy deficit is why UN reform has remained a hotly debated topic the past decades, as the make-up of the UNSC is considered insufficiently representative of the international community (ibid). This point was also touched on in the section on developing states above, for example.

Binder and Heupel (2015) also highlight that states express disappointment in the UNSC's handling of matters, and this subject also undermines the UNSC's legitimacy. Specifically, these legitimacy deficits are tied to the UNSC being perceived to be going beyond its charter (ibid), which is highly relevant to the matter of engagement with climate change, as the question of whether this engagement would be within the UNSC's mandate is mobilized in the debate, as discussed above. They argue that the political power an institution wields in setting rules and applying competences must be justified to those subjected to that political power for it to be considered legitimate, and as more politically powerful institutions are able to constrain the autonomy of the collectives constituting it, they will come under greater scrutiny (Scherz and Zysset, 2020). Because the UNSC is the most powerful institution in international relations, in that it can make use of its Chapter VII powers to make legally binding decisions all member states must adhere to (Scott, 2015), it is especially important for the UNSC to be recognized as a legitimate entity in IR.

Drawing from the work of Brunneé and Toope, Thomas (2014) argues legitimacy is formed through the development of “communities of practice in which adherence to the criteria of legality generates shared understandings about the law”, which “carry with them a sense of moral obligation to comply with the law” (ibid, p. 17). Brunneé and Toope (2011, p. 313) emphasize that a “community of practice” does not need to be homogenous ‘international community’ with a shared vision, but rather needs to have a shared understanding of “what they are doing and why”. They use the example of the international climate regime to explain their point; “The various participants pursue diverse and often competing objectives,” but do so using a shared “repertoire of ‘climate expertise’, encompassing the technical and legal language of the climate regime, at least working knowledge of scientific background information, and an understanding of the main negotiating and policy issues” (ibid, p. 314). Even if the participants in the debates of the climate regime disagree, they agree what the debate is about, and why it is important; they may disagree on what are the debate’s priorities are. They continue “although the climate regime has spawned resilient procedural practices of legality, its substantive elements remain works-in-progress” (ibid, p. 314). This thesis is essentially an exploration of that work-in-progress.

Thomas (2014) shows how Brunneé and Toope’s ‘interactional account’ of international law incorporates legal, moral, and social legitimacy. He argues that the concept of legitimacy requires the permutation of three elements which constitute legitimacy, these being the legitimated object, the legitimating subject, and the basis of legitimacy, which enables the differentiation “between when legitimacy is applied to actions, actors, norms, and systems” (ibid, p. 18). Because of the links between objects of legitimacy, they will often affect one another, and he highlights that a specific decision which may have been “considered controversial on its own terms may be justified on the basis that it was issued by a legitimate individual or institution, or because it claims to accord with a legitimate norm, or to have been produced according to a legitimate procedure, notwithstanding its substantive content or its practical effects. Legitimacy can therefore, often problematically, provide a discursive space for the displacement of responsibility for decisions” (ibid, p. 18). With regard to the UNSC, we can link this point to making statements within UN procedures, the role a state has in making a statement (perhaps holding that month’s presidency of the UNSC). A relevant example concerning climate change and the UNSC are the Secretary-General’s remarks,

which do not functionally have any power, but due to the forum and SG's position of authority within the UN still have a legitimating function.

Concerning the legitimacy of actions, this question is highly relevant to thesis' analysis. As highlighted, a category 4 engagement with climate change by the UNSC may be considered controversial by some states, especially more 'extreme' engagement such as using Chapter VII powers. Such an engagement would require the UNSC to have international legitimacy, and legitimacy is a facet of how the UNSC is recognized by states and their constituent populations.

Thomas (2014) emphasizes that social legitimacy is only relevant insofar as it relates to an audience and is constructed from moral and legal legitimacy. Social legitimacy has to be projected by an actor, and there must be a social group judging the legitimacy of that projection, based on the group's common standards. He notes that certain legitimating communities may be given a normatively privileged status, such as the voting public in most democratic communities (ibid). We can recall Honneth's (2015) conception of recognition and draw parallels between Thomas's ideas about legitimacy and Honneth's ideas about recognition. In the same way that statesmen must select which values within the disparate constituent population to put forward in the recognition struggle, they must also prioritize which legitimating community to seek legitimacy from.

Thomas (2014) acknowledges that institutional arrangements play an important role here, and differentiates between procedural, substantive, and input/outcome-based legitimacy. Procedural legitimacy is concerned with the institutional/formal mechanisms ordering power, substantive legitimacy is concerned with representing the values of the institution's stakeholders, while input/outcome legitimacy is concerned with whether the institution's stakeholders have a say in the input of the institution's operations, and whether the stakeholder's best interest is reflected in the outcome of those operations (ibid).

Social legitimacy is tied to normative legitimacy (ibid). Thomas argues that a direct link between legitimacy and compliance can become problematic when compliance is seen as an end in itself. He highlights that this "undermines opportunities for critical reflection on the

values and purposes of international law” and undermines opportunities to consider alternative approaches to solving global problems (ibid, p. 25).

As Honneth (2015) highlights, conventional purposive-rationalist international relations scholarship consequently restricts itself to “compromises and agreements under international law, even though the history of international conflict teaches us that collective feelings of recognition or humiliation by other states play a much more significant role.” (ibid, p. 35). This is touched upon in the development section above, which explored how historical humiliation may play a role in the perspectives of developing countries, and how it plays a role in China’s emphasis on development. Returning to this point, constraining the autonomy of states by following Ireland’s construction of climate may leave a sour taste for developing states. This could lead to what Scott (2015, p. 1330) also highlights that, as the UNSC has no military of its own, it is reliant on being seen as legitimate for states to enforce any Chapter VII decisions it makes. As she puts it, a “Chapter VII decision would be unlikely to be broadly acceptable to the international community unless the record of the P5 on climate change were perceived to be close to impeccable and the Council viewed as acting solely in global best interests rather than as an extension of the US State Department” (ibid, p. 1331)

### Authority from Practice – Expert Authority

Following an introductory statement by Secretary-General Guterres, Ms Ilwad Elman, the CEO of a Mogadishu-based peacebuilding organization, spoke (S/PV.8864, p. 4). Ms Elman is introduced with the President, the Taoiseach’s, formal words, indicating the civil society speaker is speaking in accordance with the procedural rule 39; this serves as a reminder and a way to frame that the civil society speaker is there as the result of UNSC arrangements made behind the scenes, as Cook (2016) notes. Procedural rule 39 outlines that the UNSC has the right to invite speakers it considers competent for the purposes of a meeting.

The concept note mentions that a civil society briefer will partake (S/2021/782, p. 4), which is in line with the common procedures for UNSC open debates. Cook (2016) writes that the “woman-in-conflict” is a recurring figure in UNSC debates on gender and conflict, where they

are often represented as victims, with the international community and especially West presented as their protectors and saviours. Within this discourse, there is “little space for understandings of women as, for example, soldiers, peace negotiators, holders of political office or perpetrators of horrific violence” (ibid, p. 361). Ms Elman as a speaker contests this construction, literally being a peacebuilder and peace negotiator (S/PV.8864, p. 4). Her speech thus reflects a challenge to the traditional representation of conflict, which is further supported by her experience which she recounts in her statement. Being invited by Ireland, she is granted procedural legitimacy to make her statement on peacekeeping, the content of her statement also containing substantive legitimacy in that she is a peacekeeping practitioner, and consequently has expertise in the subject she is speaking on.

In their analysis of UNSC debates, Eckhard et al (2023) finds that UN bureaucrats help shape the discourse on an issue, despite not having the formal power of state representatives. Critically they find that, although points brought up by UN bureaucrats may not lead to a direct outcome in the debate they are speaking in, points they bring up may shape how the topic evolves (ibid). In this sense, while Ms Elman has no formal power on the Council, her statement may still have an effect later on, which is worth highlighting.

Ms Elman’s construction of climate change is a middle-way between Norway and Ireland’s constructions of climate change, perhaps because she is not a state actor, and is therefore not preoccupied with arguing a legal basis for any particular UNSC engagement with climate change. Her main interest in speaking is not constructing climate change in a way that conforms with any state’s foreign policy interests, but rather seeks to emphasize her own work, and the work of other peacebuilders. She is not trying to create a construction of climate change which will convey a specific understanding of the UNSC’s mandate but is speaking to the community she represents in her capacity as an expert briefer, which are (civil society) peacebuilders. This is reflected in the first paragraph of her statement, which declares that “we are in a planetary emergency” which is affecting “every aspect of life”, and that “international peace and security is no exception” (S/PV.8864, p. 4) – the metaphor of a ‘planetary emergency’ is grand, but Ms Elman does not specifically link this to making the world less secure, as Ireland does.

She goes on to laud the UNSC's debates on climate, lamenting that the UNSC's progress on the issue is too slow (S/PV.8864, p. 4). She then explains that the existing "toolkits, recommendations and research that are being produced primarily target Governments, United Nations peacekeeping missions and, at times, large international non-governmental organizations" and that there is less investment in the technical capabilities of civil society organizations (ibid, p. 4). She states: "discourse around climate change and security still fails to adequately meet the needs of affected communities, or to represent the voices of those who are disproportionately affected by climate-related security risks" (ibid). This statement is similar to both Norway and Ireland's constructions of climate change, as they both emphasize the unequal vulnerability to climate change between developed and developing countries, and Norway also stresses that many of the most climate change-prone countries are experiencing conflict (ibid).

Because of this, Elman's statement grants both constructions of climate change legitimacy, even if her own construction is somewhat different. That difference is linked to her position as an expert authority on peacebuilding, and her statements on climate change are linked to peacebuilding specifically. She does not make any statements about climate change leading to insecurity, but rather emphasizes that climate change is making the work of peacebuilders more challenging on the ground. This 'professionalism', in that she does not default to polemicizing, adds to her authority and legitimacy as an expert.

Ms Elman stated that in the work of the Peace Center, they see that the local communities "are confronted with the realities of climate-related security risks every day and are fighting for survival" (S/PV.8864, p. 4). The reference to the 'realities of climate-related security risks' recalls Norway's construction of climate, and grants legitimacy to it, as Ms Elman is using the same terminology Norway uses. The metaphor that they are 'fighting for survival' further reinforces this legitimation, as it grants moral legitimacy to a UNSC resolution on climate security risks (because such a resolution would help Ms Elman and her colleagues, who are 'fighting for survival'). Ms Elman states that the workers at the Elman Peace Center, who are "not scientists or academics", began working on the security implications of climate change "because our lives and daily realities are at the nexus of climate change and security. We realized that our peacebuilding goals and our mediation efforts could not succeed or be

sustained unless we addressed the broader environmental issues related to security.” (ibid, p. 4).

As examples, she points to the locust swarms which have plagued East Africa in recent years, droughts increasing inter-clan conflicts, and decreasing tuna swarms, which drive Somali fishing communities toward piracy (ibid). Further she states that the environmental changes brought on by climate change also makes peacebuilding more precarious, stressing the need for available information for such practitioners (ibid). She also expresses that she knows peacebuilders are eager to integrate climate-related security risks into their peace-making processes under the guidance of the UNSC (ibid).

These facets are part of what Honneth (2015, p. 30) highlights as meanings beyond “their expressly formulated content”, where the ritual of inviting a civil society speaker provides Ireland with a means to support its goals with the debate, and helps Ireland be recognized as the authority of the debate, as the UNSC’s monthly president. The statements made by Ms Elman also give Norway and Ireland, as well as the other states arguing for a UNSC climate resolution, legitimacy in this regard, as her testimony shows that the links between climate change and security are not merely abstract or academic.

Following Ms Elman’s statement, the Taoiseach made his statement on behalf of Ireland. He began by thanking Ms Elman for her statement (S/PV.8864, p. 5). Cook (2016, p. 363) notes that “the power of the Council presidency also affects the significance one attaches to the substantive theme put forward to frame the debate”. Ireland’s decision to be represented, and host this debate at the high-level meeting, shows they consider this a significant and important topic. Ms Elman correspondingly is inherently constructed as a holder of expert authority in being invited to speak at a ministerial-level UNSC meeting, the procedural legitimacy following from this being reinforced by the substantive legitimacy attached to the professionalism of her statement (as mentioned above, her statement not falling into polemicizing, but substantively revolving around the links between climate change and peacebuilding as experienced by peacebuilders).

It is possible that Ireland may have invited Ms Elman to speak on behalf of the Elman Peace Center so that her statement would show climate and security is already understood as interlinked by peacekeeping practitioners. Adler-Nissen and Pouliot (2014, p. 893) argue competence as a “fundamental process of power emergence”, and the ‘professionalism’ of Ms Elman’s could be understood as one form of such competence. We can thus see that the competence of third-party speakers, or non-state actors, can add legitimacy to statements made by states. As Adler-Nissen and Pouliot additionally point out, the performance of a practice implies a claim to authority: Ireland having convened this meeting in the first place serves to constitute Ireland as an authority on climate and security, and by inviting a practitioner of peacekeeping Ireland aims to be recognized as someone “in the know”, who is in contact with those carrying out the ideals of the UNSC on the ground; Ireland aims to be recognized as an expert authority, through having Ms Elman speak.

This is evinced by Taoiseach Martin’s claim that Ms Elman’s statement contributed “to ensuring that the international community can understand better the insecurities that climate change is creating in vulnerable communities” (ibid, p. 5). This statement shows Ms Elman’s expert briefing is intended to add legitimacy to the link between climate change and (in)security. Ireland’s goal to be recognized as an expert authority is mediated through Ms Elman’s statement, which is understood by observing and participating nations to be made at the invitation of Ireland. An additional piece of context, which contributes to constructing Ireland as an authority on peacekeeping is the UNSC resolution 2594, which was unanimously adopted on September 9<sup>th</sup>, which followed the annual UNSC debate on reforming UN peacekeeping (McDonagh, 2022).

Ms Elman’s statement may be granting legitimacy to Ireland’s construction of climate change’s relation to security, but her speaking to the UNSC also serves to grant legitimacy and recognition to the Elman Center. This again reflects that recognition goes both ways. As mentioned, Ms Elman’s statement is not a perfect ‘match’ for Norway or Ireland’s constructions of climate but reflects the Elman Peace Center’s experience of climate change’s connection to (in)security. It may be that, beyond intentions around her statement providing Ireland with legitimacy, the Irish diplomatic corps has a belief in the work of the Elman Peace Center. If this is so, that would be a form of recognition held among the Irish corps, and



granting Ms Elman's the role as an expert briefer would be a practical reflection of this conviction.

I point this out to highlight that the third-party speaker's role in granting legitimacy to the UNSC president's arguments is not purely a reflection of mechanistic power games, but that, the UNSC and state bureaucracies being inhabited by subjective human persons, is an inherently intersubjective process. Just as Honneth emphasizes that states' constituent populations desire to see their values reflected in the state's struggle for recognition (even through the disapproval of states with diverging values), it may be that state bureaucracies wish to see their values reflected in decisions around who are granted procedural authority to make statements as third-party speakers. This may be why third-part speakers are often individuals who are perceived to have some moral 'core', such as Ms Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf in S/PV.8851. 'Negative' recognitions may however be moderated, at least as far as the permanent five are concerned, because the pentarchy has ultimate control over what the UNSC formally approves.

Another element which adds expert authority to Norway and Ireland's articulations in favor of climatizing the USNC is their participation in working groups at the UN. The Group of Friends on Climate and Security was founded in August 2018 by Germany and the Pacific Island state Nauru, and boasted 27 members from its foundation (Maertens, 2021, p. 650). By the time of the UNSC debate on climate and security on the 23<sup>rd</sup> of September 2021, their statement boasts that they are "a broad and diverse group of now almost 60 countries and the EU from all regions of the world" (Norway.no, 2021). Hardt (2021) writes that the Group of Friends on Climate and Security work closely with pushing for the UN Climate Security Mechanism. The Climate Security Mechanism (CSM) was "established by a joint initiative of the United Nations Department of Political Affairs, the United Nations Environment Programme, and the United Nations Development Programme to further dialogue and exchange on the linkage between climate change and security among UN institutions" (ibid, p. 9).

The CSM is an inter-agency mechanism, working to collect and integrate information on the links between climate change and security into the UN's prevention, peacebuilding, and

adaptation efforts (Romita et al, 2022). In 2021, the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations joined the CSM as the fourth UN entity which is part of the CSM. The CSM is funded by voluntary contributions by UN member states, that funding in 2021 being composed of donations from Sweden, Germany, Norway, and the United Kingdom (ibid, p. 21). The CSM was founded by Sweden in 2018, and the three other countries have supported the CSM financially since 2019 (ibid). Norwegian support for the CSM helps Norway present itself as an expert on climate change and provides Norway with a reputation for engagement with the issue.

Additionally, the CSM is as the name suggests a mechanism looking at climate-related security risks, which is how Norway represents climate change as discussed above. Norway mentions the mechanism in its statement, but is not the only state to do so: Saint Vincent and the Grenadines “commend the work” of the CSM, saying it “has enhanced the capacity of the United Nations system to address climate-related security risks in an efficient and logical manner” (S/PV.8864, p. 18). The Secretary-General also mentions the CSM in his statement (ibid, p. 3), and the United States also mentions the creation of the CSM as a “very positive example” of the UN system integrating climate-security risk analysis into its work (ibid, p. 10). Through its engagement with the CSM, Norway is recognized as an engaged state on climate security, which may help its engagement with climate be recognized, providing Norway with authority on the matter.

In the paragraph specifying how the UNSC should grapple with climate-related security risks, Norway also state that “We have to strengthen coordination and ensure a coherent and whole-of-United Nations response. The Climate Security Mechanism and the Informal Expert Group on Climate and Security will be important platforms in that regard” (S/PV.8864, p. 13).” Alongside Norwegian financing of scholarship on climate-related security risks, already mentioned above, Norway thus gains expert authority on the matter of climate change through its continued engagement with the issue. Mainstreaming climate change within the UN system is emphasized by both states, Ireland’s stating the response to climate change must involve all organs of the UN (S/PV.8864, p. 5)

## Recognition from the Domestic Population

Fiji and Lebanon are the only states to mention climate change in their statements in S/2021/783, which are attendant to the UNSC debate on the 9<sup>th</sup> of September about peacekeeping transitions (not about climate change). While it is difficult to link Lebanon's statement with a clear strategic motivation, or domestic reason for desiring a foreign political emphasis on climate, it could be that Lebanon aims to convey expertise on peacekeeping matters. Lebanon hosts the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, one of the oldest UN peacekeeping operations, which the statement points out (S/2021/783, p. 28), which points to this possible motivation. Pouliot (2015) notes the importance of individual representatives at multilateral international organizations, and it's possible there is a diplomat at the Lebanese mission who has special expertise or an interest which caused climate to be added to Lebanon's statement. Fiji and Lebanon's statements are notable because the concept note Ireland shared on the 24 of August, which the statement is in relation to, does not mention climate once (S/2021/756).

Fiji is easier to understand, climate having been emphasized in Fiji's foreign policy for the past decade, and especially since the Paris Climate Agreement in 2015 (Winkler and Depledge, 2018). Fiji is a member of the Pacific Island Forum, whose member states have been pushing for emphasizing climate change as a security threat since the first UNSC debate on climate change's consequences for security in 2007 (S/PV.5663, p. 26). The Pacific Island Forum construction of climate has aimed to construct it as a concern for international security at the same level as wars and conflicts (ibid). When Papua New Guinea spoke on behalf of the forum to the UNSC in 2007, they emphasized that "According to the findings of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Pacific Island countries are facing extreme risks to their survival as nations" (ibid, p. 26). Sea level rise will make many island states in the Pacific uninhabitable, which explains why they place emphasis on the issue. In S/2021/783 (p. 16), Fiji uses the peacekeeping transitions debate to argue for climate mainstreaming, and while they are not on the UNSC, France uses Fiji as an example of an area where the French have engaged in the aftermath of Cyclone Winston in 2016 (S/PV.8864, p. 11).

Given that the islands, where Pacific Islanders have lived for millennia in many cases will become uninhabitable (Connell, 2015), it is obvious why rising sea levels is distressing to Pacific Islanders. They will lose the land where their identities have evolved, where their ancestors have lived, and in many cases where their indigenous Gods can be found in the physical world (Hermann, 2020). Rising Sea Levels threatens to force Pacific Islanders to move, which threatens to disrupt (and possibly destroy) their identities. With this in mind, it would be strange if the Pacific Island states did not emphasize climate in their foreign policy, as it is literally an existential matter for many of these states' survival. From the perspective of Honneth's (2015) recognition, it is clear why Pacific Islander statesmen choose to emphasize climate change. For these statesmen as well, the question is about whether the state they are representing will survive the rising tide.

Hermann and Kempf (2017) discuss the emergence of a new discourse in the Pacific, after Kiribati purchased land in Fiji. Fijian politicians have also "held out the prospect of granting refuge to the inhabitants of neighboring atoll states like Kiribati and Tuvalu" (ibid, p. 233). This introduces an interesting element to a Honnethian perspective, as the Fijian identity, as part of a broader Pacific Islander and Oceanian identity, is perhaps expanded in the future. Fiji's choice to mention climate change is both a reflection of the region they are part of, but also prospectively their future citizens, as Pacific climate refugees will end up being resettled in Fiji. Even if the Kiribatian citizens living on Fiji in the future retain Kiribatian citizenship, the two identities would come into closer contact.

Pushing for an understanding of climate as a major threat thus reflects domestic politics in Fiji, as well as the broader region Fiji is part of. This explains why they wish to emphasize climate change as a security matter at the UNSC. The Pacific Islands, since the first debate in 2007 (S/PV.5663), have had the most 'radical' conception of climate as a security issue, and have been pushing for the most militant version of climatization on the council in that time. In 2007 Papua New Guinea explained the Pacific position: "The Security Council, charged with protecting human rights and the integrity and security of States, is the paramount international forum available to us. We do not expect the Security Council to get involved in the details of discussions in the Framework Convention on Climate Change, but we do expect the Security Council to keep the matter under continuous review so as to ensure that all

countries contribute to solving the climate change problem and that their efforts are commensurate with their resources and capacities” (S/PV.5663, p. 29).

Papua New Guinea further stated, “climate change is undermining the very basis for the existence of 12 independent Pacific island countries, as well as seven Pacific island territories” (S/PV.5663, p. 27). This construction of climate change, in pointing out the existential threat it has for the Pacific Islands, aligns more closely with Ireland’s construction of climate change. This being said, it should be noted that this was the first meeting on climate change at the UNSC, and fourteen years later the discourse around it has changed, and the discourse has evolved, so it may be a mistake to say the Pacific Islands had ‘the same’ construction of climate change as Ireland. Rather it should be understood to be reflecting the realities of what the Pacific Islands are facing. As Papua New Guinea’s representative states, they are not saying the UNSC should become the main international forum for climate change, but that it should keep it under review, as the effects of climate change “on our populations are as likely to cause massive dislocations of people as past and present wars.” (S/PV.5663, p. 28). The goal with the climatization of the UNSC, for the Pacific Islanders, is to have the UNSC – as a legally binding entity in international relations – there to hold countries accountable in their efforts to combat climate change and thus limit the disappearance of Pacific islands.

### Domestic Links

At the ministerial-level meeting on the September 21<sup>st</sup>, Ireland mentions these threats to the Pacific in their statement: “Sea-level rise threatens to submerge Pacific Island States” (S/PV.8864, p. 6). This is in a paragraph where Ireland states that climate change affects all continents, highlighting the unequal effects of climate change: in emphasizing this, Ireland is constructed as a state speaking for smaller states, thereby being constructed as a moral actor. This representation is also reflected in domestic discourse: in an article reflecting on Ireland’s tenure on the UNSC, published by The Irish Times, the Irish politics professor Donnacha Ó Beacháin is quoted: “Ireland is not taking a seat on the UN Security Council just for Ireland. In many respects it represents small states”. Additionally, it quotes Trócaire, a

major Catholic civil society aid organization in Ireland, on the climate proposal, who called it “commendable and far-sighted”. It said it was “the second highest supported draft in the history of the UN Security Council” (Wall, 2022). McQuinn (2020), writing in the Irish Independent, states the Irish government had been courting “tiny Pacific and Caribbean Island nations whose one vote is equal to huge countries like China and India”. Ireland’s choice to mention the threat to the Pacific Island states could therefore be interpreted as a way of recognizing their role in getting Ireland elected to the UNSC, while also constructing Ireland as a ‘good state’ acting for other small states for Ireland’s collective population. For democratic states like Norway and Ireland, it

Concerning the admission of Ireland to the UNSC, it quotes Ó Beacháin again, saying: “it was not a vanity project for Ireland to seek a place on the security council and that it is now becoming almost practice for Ireland to do so every 20 years. Ireland’s success in winning the place against bigger, more powerful countries illustrates the international regard for the country” (Wall, 2022). Winning a place on the UNSC is thus constructed as other states recognizing Ireland for its identity. Ireland being a “good state” is thus not only meaningful vis-à-vis other states, but also for the population: it shows the connection between the domestic perception of the state, and how this is linked to how other states recognizes Ireland. This is true across the political divide, as the leader of Sinn Féin, which was in opposition during Ireland’s UNSC tenure, was quoted concerning Ireland’s position as acting on behalf of smaller states: “it was not a vanity project for Ireland to seek a place on the security council and that it is now becoming almost practice for Ireland to do so every 20 years. Ireland’s success in winning the place against bigger, more powerful countries illustrates the international regard for the country, he says” (Wall, 2022).

In an article in the Irish state broadcaster RTE after Ireland won the UNSC election, the speaker of the Irish parliament was quoted saying much work would be done on gender equality, environmental sustainability, and a fairer distribution of the world’s resources (Lehane, 2020). In the Irish Independent, Ireland’s win is tied to international prestige again, as the UNSC is described as “the top table in international diplomacy” (McQuinn, 2020). This statement echoes that of the Taoiseach, who is quoted saying the election win sees Ireland

“taking our place among the nations of the world and sitting at the top table» (McQuinn, 2020). He is further quoted saying that the Irish win represents countries electing Ireland for its values, a claim that is further emphasized by referring to the election rivals Norway and Canada as constituting a “group of death” (McQuinn, 2020). The article further describes Canada as a “major player in the diplomatic circuit in the past”, and that Norway is a “world-leader in supporting aid programmes” (McQuinn, 2020).

The Taoiseach is quoted in the Irish Independent as saying Ireland “does a lot of good in the world” (McQuinn, 2020). One dimension worth mentioning is that the Irish Independent and Aftenposten are both considered conservative newspapers by domestic standards. These articles were selected, because there were limited articles generally concerning the countries’ participation on the UNSC, and these were the most comprehensive articles I could access. Dellmuth (2016) looks at how aware the population in 17 European and Asian countries are of the goings-on at the UNSC and finds awareness of the UNSC’s operations to correlate with education, income level, and cosmopolitan identity.

Norwegian public discourse points out that the Norwegian government has appealed to small island states in the Pacific and Caribbean by highlighting Norway’s commitment to sustainable oceans (Hansen, 2020; Rønneberg, 2020).

In Norwegian discourse leading up to the General Assembly vote, Norway was likewise framed as a country which would be valuable on the UNSC because it was a ‘good’ state. Even in Rønneberg (2020)’s article on the UNSC election which is somewhat critical of the Norwegian efforts to secure the position is critical because Norway is not being firm enough on its values: Rønneberg criticizes that the Foreign Ministry’s documents outlining Norway’s goals on the UNSC for not mentioning “human rights” due to its political sensitivity. Further, Rønneberg compares Norway’s campaign to join the UNSC to that of Sweden, leading up to their tenure in 2017-2018, arguing that Norway is not making their stance as clear as Sweden was, and was not as daring as Sweden, pointing to the Swedish government describing themselves as feminist during their campaign, and having put human rights first on their agenda during the campaign (ibid).

Rønneberg further claims that Norway must be willing to ‘tread on the toes’ of the great powers, like China and the USA, if their time on the UNSC will be as productive as the Swedish was (ibid). While Rønneberg’s tone is polemical, it is notable that his main complaint is Norway not taking a firm enough political stance on sensitive issues. This signifies that, to the part of the Norwegian population one can assume he speaks on behalf of, there is a desire for Norway to be recognized as embodying its values firmly. In Honneth’s (2015) terms, the collective population has expectations the statesmen must remain connected to, in this case that the Norwegian population has an expectation of what Norwegian values are and that they should be represented by the Norwegian state apparatus in international contexts.

Writing for the national broadcaster NRK, Hansen (2020) highlights that there is international prestige in being elected to the UNSC. This shows that the perception of a state having international status is also a part of how a state justifies its foreign policy to the domestic population, as Honneth (2015) highlights, as status, in being a social function, is both part of how a state is recognized inter other states, as well as intra itself. Hansen (2020) also quotes a government statement that the Norwegian government believes Norway’s commitment to peace building is one of its stronger cards in pulling support. This shows that the international reputation a state can accrue can also provide the state legitimacy from the population, as the domestic population can see the state as ‘doing good’ in the world. As the state is dependent on some consent from the domestic population, this ‘doing good’ can be seen to mirror back on the domestic population, whose collective identity is affirmed by ‘Norwegianness’ or ‘Irishness’ being affiliated with do-goodery.



## Final Considerations

As touched on in the introduction, we can use Scott's (2015) categorizations of possible UNSC responses to climate change to clarify the different ways states might want to see the UNSC 'climatized'. These different positions can be understood as 'strains' of the recognition struggle over climatizing the UNSC, following Adler-Nissen and Zarakol (2021). This thesis has focused on how Ireland and Norway's constructions of climate change in the UNSC statements differ. We have identified Norway as adhering to Scott's category 3 UNSC response, and Ireland's being in line with a category 4 response. This difference is that Norway articulates a wish to see the UNSC mainstream climate change into existing tools, and articulating climate change's effect for international security as contingent on political and social factors before becoming a security issue. Ireland constructs a more direct link between climate change and increased conflict and insecurity, which would justify the UNSC to develop new tools (which Ireland also says the UNSC should), and possibly even using Chapter VII powers.

Importantly both Norway and Ireland are *in favour* of the UNSC involving itself with climate change, but their articulated constructions of climate change justify different types of UNSC responses. Kurtz (2012, p. 680) quotes Palau at a General Assembly debate in 2009 calling for the UNSC to use its Chapter VII powers to enforce emission targets. I have already touched on the Pacific Islands' engagement with climate change, and as they have constructed climate change as an "existential threat" since the first UNSC debate in 2007, they align more closely with Ireland's 'strain'. Conca et al (2017) point to this international element of recognition being at play, as they highlight that the 'SIDS dilemma' has become a discursive norm of sorts, with even India (which has remained an opponent of moving climate change to the UNSC) voicing it. Kurtz also quotes the Secretary-General of the Arab League, who had been "some of the fiercest opponents of securitization of climate change" calling for a recognition of the effects of climate change on international security in January 2010 (Kurtz, 2012, p. 680). One interpretation of why this happens is that it is to avoid misrecognition.

Adler-Nissen and Tsinovoi (2019) argue that, because identity in international relations is inherently unstable and incomplete, misrecognition is an inherent part of identification.

From this they argue if the misrepresentation of a state's identity is too great, it can be destabilizing to that identity, which is why states are incentivized to close this 'gap' (ibid). In Honneth's (2015, p. 26) phrasing states have a "latent awareness" that their collective identity "must be internationally acceptable". In this sense, it may be internationally unacceptable to be recognized as a state which is *willingly* complicit in the "sinking" of the Small Island Developing States/Pacific Islands, which is why India, and the Arab League chose to articulate a position somewhere slightly beyond a category 2 (again in reference to Scott, 2015). Scott (2015) identifies a category 2 response as a "climate change non-response", which does not explicitly acknowledge any links between climate change and security. The Arab League acknowledges such a link (Kurtz, 2012), while India does not. India, alongside China and Russia, all opposed the UNSC thematic resolution proposed by Ireland and Niger, all contest the link between climate change and security (Romita et al, 2022). In this sense, they align with either a Category 1 or Category 2 construction of climate change.

One part of the question of how these strains interact is questioning its consequentialist logic. Ireland may be articulating the basis for a more expansive UNSC engagement with climate change, but that does not mean Ireland will necessarily push for a more expansive engagement after the draft resolution is accepted. I believe this is one question which highlights the strength of Honneth's conception of recognition in international politics, as the articulation of this more expansive engagement necessarily colours the perception of the draft resolution among other states. Ireland is of course only one of many states, and this is not to say that Ireland is "to blame" for the draft resolution's failure. But given that some states may be less overtly positive to the expansion of the UNSC's powers, the question of "scaling up" or "scaling down" articulations emerges. This is one of the strengths of the Norwegian approach I believe, as the self-professed Norwegian claim of being a 'bridge-builder' perhaps led it to take a more 'pragmatic', and less radical approach in its articulations of climate change's relationship to security. This position may align with what Conca et al (2017) call the 'pragmatic transformative' agenda, which aims to use climate change as a means by which to foster reform of the UNSC.

Another element to consider is the role hierarchy has in the recognition struggle. Adler-Nissen and Zarakol (2021) argue that the hierarchical nature of the international system has

an effect on recognition struggles, highlighting the contradictions the Liberal International Order leads to in the core and semi-periphery. In the question of climatizing the UNSC, there is also a hierarchical question: Lahn and Rowe (2014, p. 128) note the identifiers and status-markers which are attached to some states in international climate discourse, mentioning the examples of being especially “vulnerable” or a “big emitter”. We also see this in the UNSC’s discourse, as the Pacific Islands’ dramatic reality of being ‘sinking states’ has made them a referent. Another hierarchy, which is always attendant in international relations, are the hierarchies of political economy: the world’s states have unequal levels of development, and their citizens consequently have unequal standards of living (Phillips, 2017). Statesmen must bear their constituent population’s desires for recognition, as well as their desires for prosperity and security, in mind when articulating statements which will be recognized (Honneth, 2015). This is why it only makes sense that developing countries will emphasize development, and this is only reinforced by the fact that underdevelopment also makes states and communities less resilient to climate change’s effects.

Another consideration is that it will be easier to ‘scale up’ UNSC engagement with climate change than it will be to ‘scale down’ the UNSC’s powers. As Conca et al (2017) note, one of the most controversial aspects of the climate debates is the disagreement over what the UNSC’s mandate is – arguing for a ‘higher-level’ response, in the sense of Scott’s (2015) categorizations, is more controversial. This also has bearing on the legitimacy of the UNSC, which as discussed is fundamental to its successful functioning (and especially so if its powers were to be scaled up). Because of this, even if a state has the long-term wish to see UNSC engagement with climate change at Scott’s ‘category 4’ level, as Ireland does, it may be more pragmatic to underplay this in their statements at the UNSC. This is because there is significant controversy attached to such a scaling-up of its powers. This is perhaps another interesting element on the question of recognition contra functioning, as the UNSC needs to be recognized as legitimate to be able to function.

Regarding the UNSC’s climatization, if the Norwegian and Irish climatizations are compared, it could be argued that the Pacific states may be likely to support category 3 engagement with climate change, as this would at least be engagement with the matter. The same may not be true about developing or African countries and a category 4 climatization; and it is

even less likely that Russia or China would be in favour of this. The danger of politicization of climate on the Council is also relevant, especially due to the constraints imposed by the veto-holders on the content of resolutions (Robert and Zaum, 2007). America's threat of vetoing Germany's proposed resolution (Hardt, 2021), likewise represent that the danger of politicization is not theoretical.

This may be a consideration worth bearing in mind in future efforts to climatize the Council. Conca et al (2017, p. 3) emphasize that climate change being a "fact on the ground" will keep the UNSC engaged with the matter going forward, which provides an avenue for reforming the UNSC into a better version of itself. Carré (2019) points out that Honneth outlines criteria for distinguishing "truncated" or "ideological" forms of recognition from "true" forms of recognition. He explains that systems of recognition are ideological "when the morally positive qualities it promises are not fully realized in the institutional context in which the promises have been made" (Carré, 2019, p. 12). Importantly, Honneth notes that these systems can be overcome, and that overcoming the gap between an institution's 'evaluative promises' and the 'material fulfilment' of those promises is the condition for structural progress (ibid, p. 12). In the words of Wiener (2004, p. 218) about her case study, "successful compliance is not prevented but delayed by contestation". The Council is already engaging with climate change in specific contexts, so it may be that it is somewhat inevitable that this will be scaled up – though to what remains to be seen.

## Conclusion

This thesis has shown that Norway and Ireland constructed climate change's relationship to international security differently in the debate over the draft resolution S/2021/990. We can identify these two constructions as representing different 'strains' in the efforts to climatize the UNSC. These different strains provide legal justification for different degrees of UNSC engagement with climate change, though both 'strains' articulate justifications on UNSC engagement, and overlap on some points. The strain Norway represents recognized climate change as a variable in a 'climate-security nexus', which argues the effect of climate change on security as dependent on human choices. In this sense Norway's position is pragmatic, seeking to adapt the existing UNSC toolkit for engaging with climate change. This approach is in line with Norway's goal to be a 'bridge-builder' internationally.

The 'strain' Ireland's construction can be said to be part of makes a direct link between climate change and international security. This justifies the development of new UNSC tools for engaging with climate change, and possibly even using the UNSC's 'Chapter VII' powers to compel states to make efforts to combat climate change. Ireland's construction can be said to 'go beyond' Norway's construction in this sense.

These 'strains' appeal to different groupings of states. The Norway's pragmatist position may appeal more to developing countries, as represented in the analysis by Kenya, while Ireland's more expansive vision for UNSC engagement with climate change may appeal more to Small Island Developing States, some of which are disappearing because of rising sea levels.

Axel Honneth's theory of recognition can be used to see how these different positions may be informed by the domestic politics of states and see why developing countries may be more likely to align with Norway's 'strain', while small island states are more likely to align with Ireland's 'strain'. This reflects the states' constituent populations desires for prosperity, security, and recognition.

The thesis shows how claims to authority, especially expert authority, is used to legitimate these different positions. Claims articulating that including climate-related considerations in

peace-making work are used. Additionally, both strains of the recognition struggle articulate that their positions are not expanding the mandate but can be taken as continuations of the UNSC's mandate. This is not new – the UNSC's mandate is up to interpretation, and has never been static, but it is interesting to note.

Because the UNSC is dependent on being seen as a legitimate entity in international relations, it is important that its engagement with climate change be seen as legitimate too. This adds a danger if the UNSC's engagement becomes politicized or controversial, as it may cause the UNSC to lose legitimacy. These concerns are mainly due to the UNSC's perception as opaque and hierarchical.

This raises a question which articulation is normatively better. It may be that 'scaling up' the UNSC's engagement with climate change is easier than 'scaling it down', and this sense taking a more gradual approach may be more justifiable.

## Some Considerations on the Findings

Some take-aways from this thesis are knowing its limits, and knowing what could shed more light on the recognition struggle over climatizing the UNSC. The first is triangulation: conducting interviews with diplomats and statesmen could shed light on bureaucratic functioning, as well as 'behind the scenes' elements which are not public, which could provide additional insight. Additionally, of course, a more in-depth analysis of other states' participation in the recognition struggle could be enlightening and reveal details and perspectives which taken together can more closely approximate a 'truth' of how states are trying to see the UNSC climatized.

While I believe a benefit of my methods is a concentration of representations within a singular, specific discourse, as mentioned in my methods there were hundreds of UNSC documents from 2021-2022 mentioning climate change. An interesting possibility for future research may be using artificial intelligence or an algorithm to map more common language use, as Urbinatti et al (2020) do a discourse analysis of texts on the governance of water, energy, and food using machine learning algorithms and text-mining. Given the large amount

of documents attendant to the UNSC, such an analysis could provide valuable insight. Scartozzi (2022, p. 292) does something like this, combining an “automated content analysis informed by a discourse analytic approach”. This lets him see the development of the UNSC’s discourse on climate change (ibid).

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