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Make a U-turn if Possible: The GPS Voice and its three Advisory Comrades in Climate Policymaking

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International Environmental Studies

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
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Declaration

I, Bror Kristian Raanaas Tandberg, declare that this thesis is a result of my research investigations and findings. Sources of information other than my own have been acknowledged and a reference list has been appended. This work has not been previously submitted to any other university for award of any type of academic degree. All remaining errors are my responsibility alone.

Signature.....
Ås, May 2023

Abstract

Climate Advisory Bodies have been established in more than 40 countries as an instrument to help policymakers reduce greenhouse gas emissions. This thesis investigates the influence of climate advisory bodies on policymaking by looking at key stakeholder perceptions. Nine semi-structured interviews were conducted with stakeholders with insight into the climate policymaking process. By doing a structured focused comparison, this study compares empirical findings of climate advisory bodies in two Nordic countries; Norway and Denmark. Applying the Climate Policy Integration Framework, this study adds novel insight into the policy process by applying four lenses to study the influence of advisory bodies, namely the legitimiser, knowledge broker, policy entrepreneur, and GPS voice. The results indicate that the Danish Council on Climate Change (DCCC) is perceived to be a pronounced GPS voice both through publicly guiding the government and in providing independent advice to a broad range of actors who use this to push climate politics. The DCCC also functions as a broker of knowledge, as well as an entrepreneur on the policy ambitiousness level. The Norwegian advisory structure seems suited to providing specific innovative advice to the policy process, but it lacks the structure to function as a GPS voice or a knowledge broker, limiting its potential to contribute to decarbonisation.

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In the end, I would like to thank the Norwegian Minister of Climate and Environment, Espen Barth Eide, for giving me the idea to write this thesis. This thesis is for you.

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List of Acronyms

CAC	Climate Advisory council
CPF	Climate Policy Framework (in Sweden)
CPI framework	Climate Policy Integration Framework
DCCC	Danish Council on Climate Change (DK: Klimarådet)
KEFM	Danish Ministry of Climate Energy and Utilities (DK: Klima-, Energi- og Forsyningsministeriet)
KLD	Ministry of Climate and Environment (NO: Klima- og miljødepartementet)
NOU	Official Norwegian Reports (NO: Norsk offentlig utredning)
TBU Klima	Norwegian Commission for Estimating Emission Effects of Climate Measures (NO: Teknisk Beregningsutvalg for Klima)
UK CCC	The United Kingdom Climate Change Committee

Chapter 1 Introduction

Climate change threatens to devastate human well-being and planetary health unless urgent action is taken (IPCC, 2023). “We need climate action on all fronts and we need it now” Secretary-General of the United Nations, Antonio Guterres said leading up to COP27 in November 2022 (UNEP, 2022). Transformational societal change will be necessary to achieve deep decarbonisation (Dubash et al., 2021; IPCC, 2023, p.6). Climate Advisory Councils (henceforth CACs) are purpose-built institutions that may contribute to such decarbonisation.

Since 2008, CACs have been established in more than 40 countries (Averchenkova et al., 2021b), an institutional development of increasing interest to researchers. Even though the effect of CACs have been modest so far (Dubash, 2021), they may contribute to ratcheting up climate policies (Dubash et al., 2022). Nine European countries house independent and scientific CACs: the United Kingdom (UK), Denmark, France, Sweden, Finland, Germany, Switzerland, Ireland, and Greece (Evans et al., 2021). Some studies have categorised CACs based on their institutional features, such as whether they are independent, scientific, or government-appointed (Elliott et al., 2021; Evans et al., 2021; Miljand & Bäckstrand, 2021; Weaver et al., 2019), while other scholars have investigated the composition of these councils (Abraham-Dukuma et al., 2020). Other scholars have investigated the legal frameworks in which these councils are typically embedded (Averchenkova et al., 2021a; Dubash, 2020; Duwe & Evans, 2020; Eskander & Fankhauser, 2020; Mawdsley et al., 2020; Nash & Steurer, 2019; 2021). A literature review of 27 articles about the effect of CACs shows how a quarter (7) of the papers support, another quarter (7) somewhat support, and the last half (13) are neutral towards a statement that CACs «facilitate ambitious national climate policy responses» (Dudley et al., 2021, p.1).

There are few empirical studies undertaken to investigate how CACs influence climate policymaking, and most of them have focused on the UK Climate Change Committee (UK CCC) (Averchenkova et al., 2018; 2021b; Dudley et al., 2022; Lockwood, 2013). The UK CCC was established under the UK Climate Change Act in 2008 as the first CAC of its kind (Averchenkova et al., 2018). This study aims to contribute to filling this empirical gap in

the literature. It does so by comparing one country with a purpose-built standing climate advisory body with a country having a more loosely organised set of ad-hoc expert commissions mandated to provide advice on climate policies.

The Danish Council on Climate Change (*Klimarådet*, henceforth: DCCC) is considered one of three CACs possessing the most wide-ranging powers in advising governments on climate policies (Evans et al., 2021), The two others being the UK CCC and the French ‘High Council on Climate’. There are few empirical studies of the DCCC, but Lockwood (2021) compares the CACs in Denmark and the UK, assessing whether they contribute to ‘credible commitment’ to climate action. He finds that the DCCC provides little ‘credible commitment’ in Denmark. However, measuring the influence of the DCCC by contribution to credible commitment seems somewhat strict since “governments have primarily tasked them [CACs] with advisory and monitoring roles” (Averchenkova et al., 2021b, p.1221). Nash and Steurer (2022) don’t study the DCCC’s influence on climate policy, but compare the emergence of the Danish Climate Change Acts of 2014 and 2020 using Kingdon’s Multiple Streams Framework to show how the momentum for climate policies shifted. Karttinen et al. (2023) map the Danish, Finnish and UK CACs in a recent report to the Norwegian Commission for Estimating Emission Effects of Climate Measures (*Teknisk Beregningsutvalg for klima*, henceforth: TBU Klima) to evaluate its relevance in a Norwegian context. To my knowledge, there are no other empirical studies of the political influence of the DCCC.

To strengthen the robustness of the findings, the influence of the DCCC will be compared with the effect of the ad-hoc advisory institutional structure in Norway. In Norway, ad-hoc advisory commissions, called Official Norwegian Reports (*Norsk Offentlig Utredning*, henceforth: NOUs), are a central institution in formulating policy advice (Christensen & Holst, 2017, p.821). The comparison is not a direct one-to-one comparison, but similar to the one Christensen and Serrano Velarde (2019) make between the NOU structure in Norway and the standing advisory commission in Germany on innovation policies. The two Nordic countries provide an interesting case for comparison, as they share many historical and institutional traits, and both countries are often mentioned as climate and environmental frontrunners (Andersen & Nielsen, 2016; Boasson & Lahn, 2016). Even though the emissions from both Norway and Denmark are minuscule on a global level, and by some argued to be nearly indifferent, studying domestic emission-reducing policy innovations is important as they may showcase both a will and a way to curb emissions (Stoknes & Rockström, 2018).

1.1 Research Question and Objective

To properly restrict the research focus, this study will concentrate on answering the following research question: **In what ways do climate advisory bodies influence climate policymaking in Denmark and Norway?**

Some clarifications are necessary. This thesis will investigate policymaking by focusing on stakeholder perceptions and experiences of actors within and close to the policy (-making) process. The policy process refers to Easton's (1957) framing of the political system as inputs, outputs, and what is often-times called the *black box*. By interviewing actors with deep insight into the 'black box' of climate policymaking, this thesis reveals their perception of the influence of the climate advisory bodies (inputs) in the two countries on climate politics and policies (output). When analysing the policy process, this thesis will build on the climate policy integration framework in Matti et al. (2021), but also add four analytical lenses related to the advisory and watchdog functions of CACs as depicted by Evans et al. (2021). These four lenses are the legitimiser, knowledge broker, policy entrepreneur, and GPS voice, as will be elaborated upon in chapter 2.2. An important distinction will be made between climate *policies* and climate *politics*. Climate policy refers to the content of political initiatives. This thesis separates *policy* in two, makes a distinction between overarching policies aimed to shape the direction of the climate agenda, which I will call *policy ambitiousness*, and detailed policies, including specific policy instruments, which I have called *specific policies*. *Politics* will be defined as the process of political negotiations and exercise of power associated with trying to get influence over the content (policies).

This study responds to several calls for more research on the domestic level of politics (Purdon, 2015, p.5). Scholars have emphasized the need to understand the political process, what is happening inside the 'black box' (Mildenberger, 2020), "the most glaring omission" in the Comparative Politics literature (Peters, 2014, p.44). Christensen and Serrano Velarde (2019) ask for more research into policy advice in cross-cutting sectors, climate change being a prominent example. Finally, Lockwood (2021) addresses the need for studying CACs in countries with proportional representation and traditions for political settlements, which is a typical trait of Nordic institutions (Rommetvedt, 2017). By looking into stakeholder preferences, this thesis reveals how advice from climate advisory bodies is seen from the receiving end.

This thesis starts with a background section to clarify some key terms and present Norwegian and Danish climate policies and institutions. It then moves on to present the theoretical framework, developing the four analytical lenses. Moving on, the thesis will present the methods, research design, research process and some reflections about qualitative research. I will then present the findings before discussing them in light of the four theoretical lenses. The analysis is split in two chapters, based on the advisory and watchdog functions of an advisory body.

1.2 Background

In this study, the term ‘advisory bodies’ will be used to cover both the DCCC in Denmark and the NOU-structure in Norway. CACs will refer more specifically to persistent and independent bodies, what some scholars call Independent Climate Advisory bodies (ICABs). With this definition, Norway does not have any CACs (Tandberg, 2022). The rest of this chapter provides relevant background information on climate institutions and central climate policies in Denmark and Norway.


This study pragmatically looks at production-based emissions as that is the conventional way of measuring emissions, similar to what Stoknes and Rocktröm (2018) do. If one were to look at consumption-based emissions, the picture would look bleaker for both countries.

1.2.1 Danish climate institutions and policy

The Danish Climate Act was adopted in 2014, establishing the DCCC, a semi-independent and scientific body (Klimaloven, 2014). In 2019, the Social Democrats resumed power after an election marked by a Citizens’ Initiative and a massive public engagement demanding stronger climate policies (Nash & Steurer, 2022). Consequently, the Climate Act was rewritten in 2020 to include an emissions reduction target of 70% by 2030 (Klimaloven, 2020). In addition, the position of the DCCC in the Danish climate institutional landscape was strengthened (Johansen, 2021, p.377-378). Both of the Climate Acts were supported by broad political settlements (Nash & Steurer, 2022), a central feature in Danish politics (Lockwood, 2021). The formal relationship between the government and the DCCC is shaped

by the annual climate cycle (figure 1). The government puts forward its Climate programme in September each year and in February, the DCCC publishes its Status Outlook as a response to the climate programme and other initiatives. In addition, the DCCC comments on the Energy Agency’s (*Energistyrelsen*) Climate Status and Outlook in June (Klimarådet, 2022a). The annual climate cycle is meant to ensure that the government must “take a position on recommendations by the [DCCC]” (Duwe & Evans, 2020, p.32). A response to the DCCC’s annual status outlook is designated a separate chapter in the government’s Climate Programme (KEFM, 2022).

Figure 1. The Yearly Climate Cycle of the DCCC (Klimarådet in Karttinen et al., 2023).



In Denmark, climate policies have been subject to fluctuations in priority, from being considered a frontrunner in the 1990s to reversing many of the policies in the early 2000s, to again pushing for ambitious reductions leading up to the COP15 in 2009 in Copenhagen (Bird, 2017; Boasson, 2013; Lahn & Leiren, 2016). Climate policies in Denmark have seen a major focus on renewable energy development as well as improving energy efficiency (Lahn & Leiren, 2016, p.9). The renewal of the energy system by transitioning from fossil fuels towards renewables, particularly wind power has been remarkably rapid (ibid.). According to figures from OurWorldInData, Danish emissions decreased by 52% from 1990 to 2021 (Ritchie et al., 2021). Following the renewal of the Climate Change Act in 2020, the DCCC has evaluated that the government has not demonstrated (*‘anskueliggjort’*) how to reach Denmark’s international commitments and national targets three years in a row (Klimarådet, 2023). The council assessed that there are too large risks associated with the plan, particularly with regards to relying on virgin technologies such as Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) and

in transforming Danish agriculture, as well as uncertainties regarding the proposed tax reform. In addition, the DCCC finds that the Danish government will have to do more to reach its commitments to the EU, particularly in the transport, agricultural and household sectors (Klimarådet, 2023). At the same time, the DCCC commended the government for presenting a plan on how to reach the 70 per cent target and for having concretised emission reduction plans since its first status outlook since the renewal (Klimarådet, 2021).

Simultaneous with the inception of the DCCC, a Citizens' assembly on Climate Issues (*Borgertinget på Klimaområdet*), a Youth Climate Council (*Ungeklimarådet*), and the Green Business Forum (*Grønt Erhvervsforum*) were established. The latter is a corporatist body with members from the government, business organisations, labour unions, think tanks and NGOs to reduce conflict in the green transition (Erhvervsministeriet, n.d.). Both the citizens' assembly and the youth council are mere advisory bodies without a formal mandate, so it is worth mentioning that the formality of the DCCC exceeds that of the three mentioned initiatives. It is important to note that the DCCC comes not at the expense but in addition to ad-hoc advisory commissions in Denmark, such as the Expert Group for a Green Tax Reform (*Ekspertgruppen for en grøn skattereform*). Even though the number of ad-hoc commissions has decreased, they are by some called a part of the "consensual Nordic model" (Christensen & Holst, 2017, p.821)

1.2.2 Norwegian Climate policy institutions

The Norwegian Climate Act was implemented in 2018 and set a 50-55% emission reduction target by 2030 (Klimaloven, 2021). In contrast to its Danish equivalent, the Norwegian climate act establishes no CAC. Neither is there a council established in separate legislation, like in Sweden (Nash & Steurer, 2021). During the preparatory work of the Climate Act in Norway, an independent council was proposed by a minority in parliament made up of the Socialist Left Party (*SV*) and the Green Party (*MDG*) (Stortinget, 2017). Instead, the TBU Klima was established. TBU Klima has a secretariat placed within the Norwegian Environment Agency (*Miljødirektoratet*) which again reports to the Ministry of Climate and Environment (*KLD*). This commission gives technical advice on how to calculate emissions and mitigation measures (TBU Klima, 2022), but is not supposed to give political advice.

In addition, several ad-hoc commissions (NOUs) have produced advice on climate policy for the Norwegian government. The Commission on Climate Risk and the Norwegian economy (*Klimarisikoutvalget*, henceforth: Climate Risk Commission) advised on how to ameliorate the financial risks (Regjeringen, 2018b) and the Green Tax Commission (*Grønn skattekommissjon*) on climate and environmental taxes (Regjeringen, 2018a). The Expert Commission on Ecological Condition (*Ekspertrådet for Økologisk Tilstand*) evaluated the conditions for biodiversity (Regjeringen, 2017), while the 2050 Climate Change Committee (Klimautvalget 2050) will deliver their recommendations on how to become a low-emissions society in 2023 (Klimautvalget 2050, 2022). In addition, an advisory council called Klimarådet¹ was established as a broad corporatist advising body led by the former Minister of Climate and Environment with members from labour unions, business organisations, and NGOs (Regjeringen, 2022a). With the current Climate minister for the Labour Party (AP), the previous Klimarådet was decommissioned and a Council for Equitable Transition in the Workforce (*Rådet for rettferdig omstilling i arbeidslivet*) was established in 2022, this time excluding NGOs, but including labour unions and business organisations (Regjeringen, 2022c).

A few initiatives that are not ad-hoc commissions are also worth mentioning. In 2022, the Government also established what they called the “Green Book”, an initiative to ensue carbon accounting in all ministries, as well as giving the KLD a coordinating role (Regjeringen, 2022b). Climate Cure (*Klimakur*) was a report led by the Environment Agency that gave input into the policymaking process that delivered their report in 2020 (Miljødirektoratet, 2020).

Central to Norwegian institutionalisation of climate policies are the two climate settlements (*klimaforlik*) that were adopted in Parliament in 2008 and 2012 that were signed by all the parties except the right-wing Progress Party (FrP) (Regjeringen, 2020). Since the mid-1990s, the main focus of Norwegian climate policies has been to achieve cost efficiency by cutting emissions through international policy mechanisms (Boasson & Lahn, 2016; Hovden & Lindseth, 2004). For instance, Norway has contributed substantially to global emission reduction programs such as REDD+ (Svarstad & Benjaminsen, 2017). Domestic policy measures such as substantial electric vehicle subsidies and a gradually increasing carbon tax of up to 2000 NOK per tonn of CO₂ have been implemented (Regjeringen, 2021),

¹ No to be confused with the DCCC which bears the same name in Danish.

but there is not a systematised revisioning of climate politics in Norway like the climate cycle in Denmark. According to figures from OurWorldInData, Norwegian CO₂ emissions were reduced by 8,5% from 1990 to 2021 (Ritchie et al., 2021).

Chapter 2 Theoretical Framework

This thesis contributes to the literature on climate institutions. Institutions are the most fruitful tool to analyse the political process, according to Peters (2014). There is in general too little knowledge about the way states organize institutions to combat climate change (Dubash, 2021, p.2).

This analysis draws on the literature from the Historical Institutional tradition in Comparative Politics, a literature that emphasizes the importance of past institutional structures for explaining changes in current institutions. Following Hall and Taylor (1996), I will define institutions as a set of procedures, norms and conventions that shape the governing structures of society. In Norway, the structure of the NOUs is an institution that defines both formal and informal procedures, norms and conventions related to climate policymaking processes. In Denmark, the DCCC is a more formalised climate institution compared to Norwegian NOUs because of its permanent role in the annual climate cycle. An important concept within historical institutionalism is path-dependency. Path-dependency shows how political development is locked into a policy trajectory long after the policy was adopted (Thelen, 1999, p.383-384). In this way, some critical junctures determine the development of policies a long time into the future. In addition to institutions, scholars in Comparative Politics also tend to emphasize explanatory variables such as ideas and interests (Purdon, 2015). Some also add individuals, the international environment, and interactions (Peters, 2014). Due to time limitations, this thesis will focus on the institutional explainers.

This chapter starts with presenting the literature on CACs. It then moves on to operationalize the Climate Policy Integration Framework to be used in this thesis step by step.

2.1 Characteristics of Climate Advisory Councils

Evans et al. (2021) see well-functioning CACs to have three formal functions; a watchdog, an advisor, and a convenor of climate policies and politics. The (1) advisory function refers to a standing body advising on how to reach the politically set goals and international

commitments, both on demand and on its own initiative. The (2) watchdog function refers to an independent body that has the formal role of annually overseeing the climate initiatives put forward by the government. While CACs lack a sanctioning mechanism, they are typically designed to ‘name and shame’ the government (Lockwood, 2021). A formal role in the policy cycle gives the CACs credibility in doing so. For instance, the UK CCC relies on a combination of political embarrassment if their advice is not followed, and the constant threat of external parties issuing a judicial review using the analyses of the UK CCC as proof (Averchenkova et al., 2018, p.4). The convenor role refers to the facilitation of a corporatist dialogue forum between i.e. the government, labour unions, business organisations, think tanks and environmental NGOs. The convenor function will be looked away from in this thesis as both Norway and Denmark have corporatist structures embedded in their ‘Nordic model’ (Rommetvedt, 2017).

2.1.1 Criteria for being a strong Climate Advisory Council

Much of the literature on Climate Advisory Councils (CACs) has focused on what constitutes ‘strong’ CACs. There are particularly five criteria for defining a strong CAC that reappear throughout the literature, namely that the CACs are; persistent, independent, government-appointed, scientific, and operational.

The first criterion raised frequently in the literature is persistence (Crowley & Head, 2017; Evans et al., 2021). An ad-hoc commission that is established to deliver only one report does not have the same ability to address long-term problems (Groux et al., 2018). Moreover, naming and shaming is more difficult when councils or committees are decommissioned after delivering one report.

Second, scholars seem to agree that independence from government is essential (Abraham-Dukuma et al., 2020; Dudley et al., 2021; Elliott et al., 2021; Evans et al., 2021). For instance, the UK CCC’s reports hold a high level of trust and authority among the public (Averchenkova et al., 2018). With regards to independence, the distinction is typically made between the CACs that have an autonomous secretariat and those that have secretariats embedded in a ministry or agency, or whether government officials are represented in the councils or not. When that is said, there is a conflicting interest between the function of being a watchdog and that of being an advisor. The advising function might be easier to conduct as

a part of the bureaucracy, since the advice may then be better coordinated with the requested questions and thus appear more policy-relevant (Crowley & Head, 2017; Dudley et al., 2022). However, the integrity of the watchdog function may be impeded by having an in-house council, for instance within the Environment Agency. As implied by Groux et al. (2018, p.4) independence is a relative concept, and it is more useful to see it as an axis from high to low independence, rather than either fully independent or not. Although CACs are typically state-funded, their independence is determined by the CACs having an autonomous budget and the ability to initiate projects themselves.

The lack of financial independence ties to another criterion that is frequently highlighted, namely that CACs should be government-appointed (Crowley & Head, 2017; Dubash, 2021), have a formal role in the policy framework (Miljand & Bäckstrand, 2021), be legally enshrined (Elliott et al., 2021; Evans et al., 2021) or at least be in a unique position vis-à-vis the government (Evans et al., 2021). One way this comes to light is whether there is an obligation for the government to respond to the CACs' advice or reports. Relatedly, CACs that are established by law are harder to reverse than those that are set down by executive orders (Dubash, 2020; Evans et al., 2021; Nash & Steurer, 2019). According to Duwe and Evans (2020, p.32), all climate acts except the Swedish version «establish or include mention of an independent expert advisory body on climate policy matters». Even though Norway is one of the countries they mention in their study, the climate act does not establish a CAC in Norway (Klimaloven, 2021). Since a central criterion for effective CACs are that they are government appointed, it seems warranted that CACs are state-funded.

A fourth criterion is whether CACs should be scientific (Elliott et al., 2021; Evans et al., 2021) or expert-based (Crowley & Head, 2017; Dudley et al., 2021). There seems to be a clear preference in the literature for having scientific members rather than representatives from interest organisations such as labour unions, business organisations, and NGOs. When that is said, some scholars define 'experts' more widely than others. The definition of expertise has implications for how relevant the advice the CACs can give. Crowley and Head (2017) emphasize that the advisory councils should be set down in areas requiring technical and/ or scientific analysis, similar to what Christensen and Serrano Velarde (2019) would call cross-cutting policy issues. It is therefore a precondition that the CACs are composed of members with relevant knowledge.

The fifth criterion for strong CACs is that they are operational. The ability to initiate projects is restricted by the size of the budget which varies from around 500.000 to 1 million

Euros in countries such as Sweden, Finland, and France, to 3- 4 million Euros in Denmark and the UK (Evans et al., 2021, p.33). Operationality may also depend on the composition of advisors and how the budget is distributed. Abraham-Dukuma et al. (2020) emphasize the characteristics of the members of the panels, both their personal abilities to make their voices heard, but also the combined multidisciplinary backgrounds of the members of the CACs. Several scholars have argued that CACs should be small (Abraham-Dukuma et al., 2020, p.16; Dudley et al., 2021; Weaver et al., 2019). While Miljand and Bäckstrand (2021) argue for between 8 and 10 members, Averchenkova and Lazaro (2020) argue for 5 to 15. The balance is delicate. While a large CAC can draw on more expertise, a smaller one is more flexible (Crowley & Head, 2017). Size, composition and budgetary restrictions all affect the operational abilities of the CAC.

In addition to the five criteria, a CAC should also be dedicated to climate change, and not more generally to environmental issues to be the most effective (Evans et al., 2021). Considering the time constraints of the project, this paper will focus on climate-specific councils, and not environmental or sustainable councils more broadly. In addition, some CACs are tasked with both looking into climate mitigation and adaptation. This study will focus on advice related to mitigation policies only.

2.2 Operationalization

2.2.1 Climate policy integration framework

This study builds on and expands upon the Climate Policy Integration (CPI) Framework in Matti et al. (2021) to investigate how embedded climate policies and politics are in the political system. The framework elucidates how purpose-built institutions can contribute to integrating climate policy across policy sectors, and thus contribute to a more dedicated effort towards deep decarbonisation. Matti et al. (2021) study climate policy integration in Sweden, analysing the Swedish Climate Policy Framework (CPF). The Swedish CPF differs slightly from the model in Norway and Denmark. The CPF's closest comparison is probably the Danish Climate Act, but the system in Sweden is more fragmented (Matti et al., 2021, p.1147). For instance, the Swedish Climate Policy Council, an advisory body which generally resembles the DCCC, is established by a separate government decree (Evans et al., 2021). Even though Matti et al. (2021) applied the CPI framework to the Swedish CPF and not to the

Climate Policy Council, this study will draw on the framework to explore the role of advisory bodies in Norway and Denmark.

Matti et al. (2021) use the CPI framework to investigate how embedded climate policies and politics are in the policymaking structure. They do so by conducting expert interviews, asking whether the CPF has affected the 1) policy process, 2) output, and 3) outcome of Swedish climate policies, all of which refer to Easton's concepts. Outcome refers to the step after output in Easton's (1957) political system, to the effect the policies (output) have on the environment. Matti et al. (2021) operationalize the policy process by asking to what degree internal and external debates, opinions, coordination, and prioritization within the ministry/ parliament have been altered by the CPF in Sweden. Their main emphasis in the policy process is policy learning. When operationalizing output, they investigate whether the Swedish CPF altered the implementation of political initiatives. To explore outcome, they asked the interviewees whether they had the perception that the changes resulting from the CPF had any effects on emissions. Even though Matti et al. (2021) argue that several interviewees believed the CPF will have an effect with time, their operationalisation offers little precision in how and how much the CPF affects the outcome. While this is certainly not the most accurate way to measure emission reductions, it was not (and is still not) possible to accurately measure the emission reductions technically.

Following the advice of Matti et al. (2021), this thesis draws on the CPI Framework for comparative analysis. However, since there is little precision in the perceptions of outcome at this early stage of climate policy development in Denmark and Norway, it is not meaningful to compare the outcome level of the two countries. I will therefore not address the outcome level in this thesis. When it comes to the operationalization of output in Matti et al. (2021), it is important to investigate not only if, but also how the Swedish CPF influenced the implementation of political initiatives. I would argue the 'how' is a question of policy process more than output, since it highlights the mechanisms inside the black box that yields the output. For that reason, this thesis will omit the output level and instead focus fully on the policy process of the CPI framework. To scrutinize the policy process, it is useful to add some analytical tools to the policy process. Averchenkova et al. (2021b) employ three concepts that can fruitfully be applied to expand the investigation of the policy process. The expansion of the CPI framework is an attempt to contribute to investigating how purpose-built institutions strengthen climate policy integration, as proposed by Matti et al. (2021).

2.2.2 The Policy Process – Advisor

My comparative analysis of the influence of climate institutions in climate policy processes builds on three analytical lenses developed by Averchenkova et al. (2021b, p.1222-1223). These lenses were used to study whether the UK CCC influenced policymakers by being a legitimiser, knowledge broker, or policy entrepreneur. In their study, Averchenkova et al. (2021b) analysed how the UK CCC influences political debates in the UK. In doing so, they studied the written interventions in parliament, coded pieces in the debate, and investigated whether UK CCC-authored ideas spilt over into the broader debate. The combination of statistical data, content analysis and process tracing in their study enabled Averchenkova et al. (2021b) to triangulate the findings and give strong reasoning for how the advisory bodies are being used in political debates in the UK.


When operationalising the three lenses, Averchenkova et al. (2021b) see the *legitimiser* as an institution giving a scientific disguise to political decisions already taken. The lack of independence particularly, enables the use of an advisory body as a legitimiser. The *knowledge broker* is a body that has broad recognition among different political parties, that can put forward academic arguments that all parties take seriously. I will particularly emphasize independence and persistence as important to ensure a knowledge broker function. A *policy entrepreneur* is a highly recognised actor that can expand the option space for mitigation policies and come up with new framings on political issues. Here I find the operability of the advisory bodies and the policy relevance of their advice as key elements. I argue that the learning effect in Matti et al.'s (2021) policy process is part of the advisory function, mostly in the knowledge broker lens. While useful for shedding light on the advisory role of the CACs, neither of these lenses go beyond the advisory function.

Averchenkova et al. (2021b) study the influence of the UK CCC on policies and politics by investigating how they have been used in political debates. In this study, I will examine how the advice from the advisory bodies has been perceived by key actors in the policymaking process, instead of how they have been used politically. Even though less detailed on how CACs are being used, this study provides valuable insights into how the advisory bodies are perceived from the inside. More importantly, the analytical framework employed in this study makes it possible to go beyond the advisory function and detect the perception of the watchdog function of the advisory bodies, one of three functions in Evans et

al. (2021). I have therefore added a fourth analytical lens to the analysis, which I have called the ‘GPS-voice’. In addition, drawing on the historical institutionalist literature, I have added a feedback effect.

Figure 2. The Policy Process

The advise of the advisory bodies are prised through its institutional structure to determine how they may be perceived by policymakers. In the end, the perception of the role of the advisory bodies affect the institutional structure through feedback effects.



2.2.3 The Policy Process – Watchdog

The GPS-voice is a body akin to the media and the general public that pushes the government into ratcheting up their effort. It does so by telling the government where to drive and where to make a U-turn. The GPS-voice continuously sheds light on their driving in full publicity to everyone in the car. If the car is not geared to reach its targets and commitments in time, the GPS-voice embarrasses the government so that everyone in the car can hear it². The embarrassment is done by what in the political science literature is called ‘naming and shaming’ (Lockwood, 2021). If the government chooses not to listen to where the GPS-voice recommends driving, the government will be constantly reminded and needs to legitimise why it chooses to drive where it does. When that is said, the GPS-voice does not have a

² Imagine a mechanical and terribly annoying GPS-voice, not always perfect, but in general pointing you in the right direction.

sanctioning mechanism and the government may, although to its public embarrassment, turn down the volume if it wishes to, for instance by reducing the funding to the CAC.

Parts of the institutional literature tends to focus on whether the advisory bodies function as credible committers (see e.g. Brunner et al., 2012; Lockwood, 2021). The GPS-voice I have sketched is not as binding as a credible committer. A credible committer is a device binding the policymakers to the mast, ensuring that they stick to the commitments already made as well as “avoid[ing] backsliding and the creation of stranded assets” (Lockwood, 2021, p.1235). The commitment device is particularly relevant for investors, who need long-term predictability. Nonetheless, analysing whether CACs are credible committers may oversee some of the nuances in how CACs affect climate policies and politics. The UK CCC is to my knowledge the only CAC that has extraordinary powers in that it can recommend policies. Otherwise, this power is reserved for the executive branch of government. When Lockwood (2021) compared the DCCC with the UK CCC it is therefore not surprising that the UK CCC appears to have the ability to ensure more commitment. In Denmark, Lockwood argues, the settlement tradition in parliament does have a more significant role in ensuring credible commitment. Even though the DCCC will not be able to ensure similar credibility to investors as if all (almost) political parties come together and bind themselves to the mast, it doesn’t necessarily mean that the DCCC is insignificant and superfluous. The DCCC may influence policymakers even though it is not the first tool for investors to look to. Therefore, I find the credible commitment criterion too strict to categorise CACs meaningfully. I suggest using a concept that is something between a policy entrepreneur and a credible committer. I will argue the watchdog function developed by Evans et al. (2021) is such a concept which I have operationalised as the GPS voice.

2.2.4 The Policy Process – the Feedback Effect

The feedback effect relates to how institutions affect policies and politics which again shape the institutions. While the early literature on feedback effects focused on how policies feed back on politics (Pierson, 1993), more recent studies have also looked at how institutions (which are a result of policies) feed back on policies and politics (see i.e. Lockwood et al., 2017). In a seminal paper on policy feedbacks, Pierson (1993, p.598) distinguishes between feedback effects through resources and incentives. The resource feedback effect refers to the

direct effect the institution has on the ability to influence policy and politics, for instance, whether the institutional change gives the institution access to decision-makers, or the ability to raise their concern publicly. The incentive effect is an indirect effect that “help[s] to define the alternatives available to individual actors” (Pierson, 1993, p.598). The incentive effect may affect the probability of different actions, but may also draw on sociological institutionalist perspectives to shape the imagination of what institutional structure is conceivable and reasonable (Thelen, 1999, p.386).

Lockwood (2013) investigates a feedback mechanism related to whether the UK CCC created a policy lock-in after its inception in 2008. He argues that there was, at least at the time, little evidence that the UK CCA had created a policy lock-in mechanism that ensured its future existence and created a credible commitment for investors. This study will draw on the revealed perceptions of the interviewees to investigate how institutions fed back on policies and politics in Denmark and Norway. I will focus on the incentive feedback to investigate how the advisor function fed back on *policies* and the resource feedback to investigate how the watchdog function’s feedback on *politics*.

Chapter 3 Methods

The methods chapter first explains the research design and the methods of structured, focused comparison. I then elaborate on the research process, the sampling methods used and the thematic coding. Finally, I reflect on the trustworthiness of the study, the limitations and the ethical considerations involved.

3.1 Research Design

The objective of this study has been to contribute as a building block to theory development. It is therefore pertinent to apply the method of structured, focused comparison (George & Bennett, 2005). The analysis is focused because it is restricted to analysing the perceptions of the influence of climate advisory bodies among key stakeholders in Norway and Denmark. It is structured because it is asking the same questions and addressing the same aspects in all interviews. The study does not test hypotheses but instead employs theoretical concepts to guide the coding. Even though it is not irrelevant whether the concepts used are useable, the main purpose has been to use the theory to explain the occurring patterns.

When designing a case study, George and Bennett (2005, p.73) argue that researchers must carefully choose a research design that fits the purpose of their study. This study has a two-fold purpose. It uses theory to investigate empirical findings in Norway and Denmark, but it also contributes to theory-building in comparative politics. By doing what George and Bennett (2005, p.76) call “building block theory”, I take the theory one step further by developing some of the concepts in the literature by investigating how CACs influence the policy process. Hence, the dependent variable in this study is the perception of advisory bodies’ influence on climate policymaking among insiders and stakeholders close to the “black box” in Norway and Denmark. The independent variables are the institutional structures of two different systems of advisory bodies in Norway and Denmark. This study investigates four ways the institutional structures influence the dependent variables, using the four lenses; legitimiser, knowledge broker, policy entrepreneur, and GPS voice as tools.

This study was designed to identify and map the perceptions of relevant policymakers and stakeholders involved in designing climate policy. I conducted expert interviews with individuals close to the decision-making process in Denmark and Norway. Interviewing key stakeholders about their perception of the effect of CACs made it possible to get novel insights into the decision-making process. Nine interviews were conducted between February 9th and March 10th 2023. The interviews lasted 45 minutes on average, the longest lasting 71 and the shortest 28 minutes. Six interviews were done in person, while three were for practical reasons conducted online using Microsoft Teams. While in-person interviews allow for more gestures and implicit nuances, there is little evidence that video-interviews are much less detailed (Clark et al., 2021, p.440). All interviews were recorded and transcribed.

To ensure both flexibility and consistency, the interviews were semi-structured with fairly open-ended questions. To increase the comparability of the data across interviews and countries, all questions from the interview-guide have been covered in all interviews, except the questions that have been clearly irrelevant for that specific interviewee. One exception was made with interview 8 (no_cs3), where I chose to ask slightly different questions to clarify some uncertainties that had come up during the other interviews. Questions were moderated depending on the position of the interviewee. Even though it is preferable to keep the wording similar throughout the interviews, the wording was changed somewhat due to learning how to ask the questions more accurately. During the interviews, I used a wide variety of the nine different types of questions posed by Kvale (in Clark et al., 2021, p.429-431). For some interviewees, I sent a few questions to clarify uncertainties by e-mail after the interviews.

In fact, this study goes further in interviewing insiders than previous studies on the DCCC. While Karttinen et al. (2023) interviewed one secretariat member, one council member and two from the ministry, Lockwood (2021) interviewed three academics, one from a Danish NGO and one from the ministry. I interviewed one insider with first-hand experience from the government, one DCCC secretariat member, one ministry official and one external expert. This has given me a comprehensive overview of relevant perceptions, with added insights from within the decision-making machine. Nash and Steurer (2022) did something similar but focused on how the DCCC was created and renewed, instead of its influence. In Norway, I interviewed one politician with insider experience from the government, three ministry officials, and two commission members. One interview was conducted with two interviewees present, thus ten interviewees were interviewed in total.

Several of the interviewees have experience from multiple relevant positions and three out of ten interviewees were leaders.

The interviews were conducted in Norwegian and Danish. This was a perk as it allowed both the interviewees and the interviewee to talk in their mother tongue. Having done some interviews in Norwegian with Danish respondents might give room for misunderstandings, but these instances appeared to be limited. Transcription was done using the transcription function in Microsoft Word and then corrected manually. Interviews were coded in the original language and then only relevant quotations were translated into English. Abfalter et al. (2021) argue transparency and rigour are important when working with translations in qualitative research. To do so, I have sent the transcripts for correcting quotations to the interviewees both in the original language and in English. I have also added the full list of quotations in the original language in appendix 4 and 5. Even though some meaning might be lost in translation, I found it important that respondents could answer in their mother tongue, leading to more clarity and less confusion.

3.2 The Research Process

In this study, I conducted what Clark et al. (2021, p.382) call generic purposive sampling. This is a form of non-probability sampling where you choose respondents strategically to answer your research question (Clark et al., 2021, p.377). In my case, I actively chose which organisations to reach out to. The political insiders were what Clark et al. (2021, p.379) call critical case samples since they are crucial to this analysis. Since the advisory bodies are fairly new, there were only a limited set of political administrations that it was relevant to contact. Therefore, I stopped with one internal/ political interviewee in Norway and one in Denmark. There was therefore an element of opportunistic sampling in that it was difficult to get in touch with political insiders with relevant knowledge (Clark et al., 2021, p.379). I then decided to interview other groups based on stratified purposive sampling (ibid), focusing on finding interviewees that could represent a particular sub-group that could then be used to compare with the other sub-groups to peek into the black box from different angles. I was able to interview all the sub-groups I found the most important and interviewed more than one interviewee in some of these groups.

Some interviewees recommended me to interview parliamentarians as well as civil servants from other ministries. I decided not to interview the former, in an attempt to avoid interviewing active politicians where it would be difficult to distinguish their honest perceptions from political answers referring to their party's programme. I also figured that if interviewing parliamentarians, it would be preferable to cover several different parties, something time did not allow. In that way, this study differs from the analysis of Matti et al. (2021) which is based on the perception of parliamentarians. To interview civil servants from other ministries than the respective climate ministries in the two countries, such as the finance ministries could have been fruitful to the discussion, but again due to time constraints, I decided to focus on the sub-groups I found the most crucial first.

Before writing this thesis, I did a 10 credits special syllabus course, writing a literature review about Climate Advisory Councils (CACs) (see Tandberg, 2022). Inspired by Knopf (2006), the review was a narrative review meant to reveal some patterns in the literature, but not systematically going through all the literature on the topic (Clark et al., 2021). I then categorised the Scandinavian councils in relation to the patterns revealed in the literature. Such an unstructured narrative review is a good way to start a thesis, according to Ridley (2012). Adding to that, I have experience working with i.e. climate politics in the Royal Norwegian Embassy in Copenhagen, making me familiar with Danish climate policies and politics.

The questions in the interview guide (see appendix 2) were to a large extent inspired by the interview guide used by Matti et al. (2021). When that is said, I did not ask yes/no questions but rather encouraged the interviewees to elaborate on their perceptions. In addition, I added some questions about the perceived room for manoeuvring for policymakers to get more insight into how the different functions of the advisory body worked. I also added some contrafactual questions to investigate whether the advisory body would have been perceived differently if the advice was prised through a different institutional structure. The contrafactual method is a known method within political science (see i.e. Hovi et al., 2003), although not without its critics (Young, 2003). The contrafactual questions were carefully formulated using the criteria developed in chapter 2.1.1 one by one to get insights into i.e. how a persistent climate commission would appear in Norway. The answers to the contrafactual questions have also been used with care in the analysis.

3.2.1 Coding – A Thematic Analysis

In this thesis, I performed a thematic analysis, following the six steps outlined by Braun and Clarke (2006). Before I explain the six steps, a few elements that Braun and Clarke (2006) find crucial will be highlighted. Since I had already conducted a literature review before the coding process, the coding was conducted in what Braun and Clarke (2006) call a theoretical or deductive manner. The codes were generated while having relevant theories and conceptualizations in mind. This fits the design of the interview guide which was theoretically driven. The perk of doing it this way is that it enabled me to ask questions and look for patterns that have been identified as important from previous research, thus being more aware of the specific issues of interest (Braun & Clarke, 2006). Compared to an inductive approach, the theoretical approach is not making codes fully bottom-up, and may therefore potentially oversee certain patterns (Braun & Clarke, 2006, p.84). When that is said, I found the ability to draw on the literature for useful concepts more important. In line with the theoretical approach, I focused on the specific elements that I found relevant when coding, instead of assigning the whole text into codes. The focus in the coding was on the semantic level, where I coded the explicit replies from the interviewees, and to a large extent avoided interpreting their statements (*ibid*). Even though theory drove the coding it was an iterative process of going through the data repeatedly to look for patterns. In that way, the coding also involved an inductive element when repeatedly trying to detect patterns arising from the data to see if I had overseen something essential.

Braun and Clarke's (2006) six steps were essential when looking for new patterns. When coding, the first step I did was to read through all interviews, noting down the issues that came to my mind. In stage two, I constructed initial codes based on the notes I had made in step one. Then I started coding the text using these codes and at the same time generating codes as I progressed. For this, I used the coding software MAXQDA. In the third step, I assessed the codes I had created to determine overarching themes. Then I moved the codes around to fit the themes in categories and sub-categories. In this stage, it was useful to employ previous literature to guide the creation of themes, making the analysis more relevant. In the fourth step, I revisited the themes and focused on removing internal incoherences and making the themes externally distinct. In the fifth step, I named the themes, before writing out the results in step six.

During the coding, the design of the analysis was shaped. As Berg and Lune (2014, p.55) note, this is not something that can be done entirely in the early process but rather shaped en route. Since the coding was conducted alone, it might result in biases. Berg and Lune (2014, p.155) argue that having several scholars coding the same data separately and then comparing the results afterwards improves the validity of the results. If the results don't match, they would recommend redoing the relevant coding. Since multiple coders haven't been possible in this study, I have carefully gone back and forth in the coding process to re-evaluate the themes constructed. When that is said, George and Bennett (2005, p.71) argue that for a structured focused comparison, it is essential that the same researcher conducts the research so that the same focus is applied consistently throughout the research.

3.3 Reflections on qualitative research

Lincoln and Guba's (in Clark et al., 2021, p.363-366) four criteria for trustworthiness are widely referenced in qualitative research. 1) Credibility, which parallels internal validity in quantitative research, refers to whether the results are acceptable. The degree to which the relationship between the variables is convincing and the researcher's representation of the research is in line with the interviewees' elaborations. Krefling (1991)p. 215) sees credibility as the truth value of the findings. 2) Dependability, relating to reliability in quantitative research, concerns whether the data is collected and used consistently and transparently in the research so that the reader can follow the reasoning. Since it is not possible to replicate a qualitative study and get the same results, the objective is to provide thick descriptions so that the reader can follow the steps that were made in the process and make up their minds about the dependability themselves. 3) Confirmability, paralleling objectivity, addresses whether other researchers could read the paper and come to the same conclusions. This includes that the study is value-neutral and done in good faith. All three criteria suggest a rigorous audit trail so that the reader can decide whether the conclusions appear sound. In addition, triangulating the findings will strengthen both the credibility and the confirmability of the findings. The fourth criterion, (4) transferability, which parallels external validity, refers to whether the findings apply to other similar cases. For the other Nordic countries and highly developed western countries, this study will be of interest in terms of the relationship between decisionmakers and independent advisory councils.

In an attempt to make a rigorous audit trail, I have added tables with an overview of key quotations from the interviews. As suggested by (Eldh et al., 2020, p.3-4), I have provided rich context to quotations in the analysis so that it is not up to the reader to decipher the intention behind the quote. In addition, quotations have been used to give life to the text and provide readability. I am not too concerned with representing all the interviewees equally, but I am concerned with avoiding cherry-picking eye-catching phrases that appear as outliers of the data collected. I have tried to be faithful to their words and present them in the best meaning.

3.3.1 Limitations

A challenge with this study is that it is based on key stakeholder *perceptions*. Since perceptions are a subjective matter, the *perceived influence* of an advisory body will not necessarily align with its *influence*. When that is said, the perception among policymakers matters for policy creation, but one should be careful in transferring from perceptions to actual influence. One way to strengthen this relationship would be triangulation. However, stakeholder perceptions have proved difficult to triangulate, particularly the insider perspectives. The political insiders give a look into the policymaking machine, but there are limited other sources to look to compare with the findings. One way could be to process trace certain recommendations by the DCCC, whether they seemed to spill over into the political debates and policy documents. Such a process is time-consuming and was not possible to combine fully with conducting interviews within the confines of a master's thesis. I chose to pursue interviews with key stakeholders instead as I saw it as a way to get novel insights into the policy-making 'black box'.

Another way to strengthen the robustness of the findings could have been to conduct more interviews. Obviously, conducting more interviews with political internals would make the results more robust. Interviewing more sub-groups could also give fruitful addition to the views presented. For instance by including parliamentarians and civil servants, one would be able to reveal the perception of the political opposition. This would for instance be fruitful to add to the discussion about advisory bodies as knowledge brokers in chapter 5.2. With only 10 interviewees, one could argue that the results will be prone to the individual fallacy, meaning that the study is exposed to concluding the whole population based on wrongful individual findings, or findings that cannot be meaningfully transferred (Keman, 2014, p.58).

When that is said, the individual fallacy will always be a potential issue with qualitative research.

3.3.2 Ethical considerations

The data collection, processing and storage have been in line with NMBUs guidelines. The Norwegian Agency for Shared Services in Education and Research (Sikt) have prior to the data collection approved the research plan in terms of processing and storage of personal information. All interviewees have been subjected to prior informed consent, and all quotations have been sent to the interviewees to ensure that they were quoted correctly. Even though the data collection is based on personal information, most of it is not private. I have avoided quoting the interviewees if the information seemed to breach the interviewees' anonymity as good conduct require (Eldh et al., 2020, p.5).

Chapter 4 Results

This chapter starts by presenting the code-generation process more in detail. Then it describes the findings in brief, assessing the main results from the nine interviews that were conducted. Further elaboration of the results will be done in the analysis chapter while discussing. This chapter starts with the Danish respondents and presents the Norwegian ones afterwards. Inspired by Trencher et al. (2020), a table with descriptive quotations will follow the text section in both subchapters 4.2 and 4.3. The number of quotations related to each theme should not be seen as a direct indication of the theme's importance. Instead, it reflects important elements within each theme that reveals perceptions of CAC's influence. All interviewees have been assigned a code, which I will consistently refer to throughout the thesis. The first two letters stand for country, either "dk" or "no". The latter code stands for political insider (pol), civil servant (cs), commission/ council member/ secretariat (com), or external expert (exp).

4.1 Thematic Coding

While coding the interviews I looked for patterns in the Danish and the Norwegian transcripts separately. Two initial overarching themes, a 'watchdog' and 'advisor' could categorize many of the reflections of the interviewees (See appendix 6 for the coding matrix in MAXQDA). The watchdog theme covered mechanisms that were perceived to push the policymakers, for instance by limiting policymakers' room for manoeuvring. As I went through the literature again, I elaborated on the advising function, adding the legitimiser, knowledge broker, and policy entrepreneur as a sub-category. I also created a theme called the feedback effect, which I added to both the watchdog and advisory functions.

4.2 Perceptions of Danish Stakeholders

This chapter refers to several quotations (q) in table 1. Regarding the advisory function, there seemed to be little backing to categorise the DCCC merely as a legitimiser for the government among the Danish interviewees. The DCCC seemed to be a broker of knowledge

through its authoritative voice, which it got through being considered persistent and independent (q.1-3). With regards to the policy entrepreneur, the DCCC's advice did not always appear particularly policy-relevant, at least not at the more specific level (q.8-12). When that is said, several interviewees argued the DCCC put a floor on the policy ambitiousness, in that way ensuring some policy entrepreneurship (q.5-7). The policy feedback refers to the perception of the role of the advisory body. The perception of an ideal advisory body seemed to be determined by the institutional structure one perceived possible, and a distinction between Norway and Denmark was visible (q.13-15).

The GPS voice was evident among Danish interviewees directly through being a loud navigator that warranted a response from the ministry and government (q.16-18). When asking the contrafactual questions to the Danish respondents, it almost felt like stating the obvious. All Danish interviewees saw the independent, expert-based and persistent structure of the DCCC as crucial to constitute the watchdog function, and for the existence of the DCCC. The feedback effect on politics gave authority to actors not having a ministry to support themselves, changing the dynamics (q.19-20).

Table 1: Perceptions of Danish Stakeholders

Category	Theme	Quote	Interviewee
Knowledge broker (1)	Legitimacy. Independence	And we did a reputation analysis not so long ago, where we asked questions (...) about the role of the DCCC. And there was a lot of emphasis on the fact that the DCCC is independent, has this expert role, and that there is a lot of support for the DCCC in general.	Dk_com1
Knowledge broker (2)	Legitimacy. Alternative institutions:	So you could say that the Prime Minister also created business committees [the Green Business Forum] in Denmark. But they had no influence in reality. So I would say that if you had done that, if you had brought business people into it [the DCCC], then you would have had such a public affairs lobbyist all-you-can-eat buffet.	Dk_pol1
Knowledge broker (3)	Persistence	It is clear that it does contribute, that the feedback you get from the DCCC from year to year pulls in the same direction, where you could fear that if there were several independent committees that in different contexts should make statements, that you would then pull in one direction in one year, and another direction the next year.	Dk_cs1
Policy entrepreneur	Independent agenda-setter	They [DCCC] said we should make plans for when things were coming. Then we made plans. Then they make sure	Dk_pol1

(4)		to publish an analysis before then. So in that way, they become the most important problem-defining body in many ways.	
Policy entrepreneur (5)	Policy ambitiousness	To a large extent, they [the DCCC] helped to ensure that there was a floor on the ambitions all the time. That you couldn't be situated too far away from what the DCCC said without being penalised politically. So in that way, I think they played a major role concerning the design.	Dk_pol1
Policy entrepreneur (6)	Policy ambitiousness	So, moving the window for what is sensible climate policy: Yes. Moving the concrete climate politics? Then it perhaps requires that they [the DCCC] become even more concrete about how to do it.	Dk_exp1
Policy entrepreneur (7)	Policy ambitiousness	I don't think I immediately feel that it's because they [the DCCC] narrow the room for manoeuvring so much. I believe they contribute to making sure that there is always something happening, and contribute to pushing the pace up. But it's not because I experience that the DCCC narrows the choices that politicians or the ministry have	Dk_cs1
Policy entrepreneur (8)	Policy relevance	[T]he perception is that many of the recommendations have been followed. Most of them have been partially adopted, where the DCCC has made some recommendations and said, this is how it ideally should look like. Typically some political priorities have been made after that, resulting in the recommendations not fully being implemented as the DCCC had recommended.	Dk_com1
Policy entrepreneur (9)	Policy relevance	The DCCC could have played a bigger role if they had more political musicality or political understanding.	Dk_pol1
Policy entrepreneur (10)	Policy relevance	[A]t the same time, the good thing about it is that sometimes we [the DCCC] can make recommendations that are a little more general and systemic, rather than if you were sitting within a ministry. Then it would have to be more concrete on exactly how it should be designed and how high the subsidy should be.	Dk_com1
Policy entrepreneur (11)	Policy relevance	[W]ith independent experts, you could say, you get different advice. Then it's more, a higher degree of certainty that it's in the interest of the society. On the contrary, it may sometimes be a little further away from reality. Some academics have a more academic approach and deal with it more on a principal level.	Dk_exp1
Policy entrepreneur (12)	Bottleneck. capacity	The process with the Council's analyses and reports is that all nine members of the Council must be involved in all analyses, and all recommendations are discussed and approved by the Council. This ensures high quality and sets a natural limit to the number of analyses we can publish in a year.	Dk_com1
Policy feedback (13)	Deliberative democracy	[T]herefore, the DCCC also has an important role in thinking long-term and delivering recommendations for the long-term transition. And that's why they [politicians] also have to take a position on the DCCC's long-term advice, which they might not necessarily have done if we	Dk_com1

		hadn't been there. Precisely because they only sit there for four years at a time.	
Policy feedback (14)	Expert definition	There is a civil service that has a pretty clear idea of what they want. And who then only listens to a limited extent to whoever provides the input.	Dk_exp1
Policy feedback (15)	Expert definition	[T]hen it is also if we [the civil service] ultimately assess that the things they come up with, whether they can be used and whether they make sense, based on the overall picture we see, which is decisive for whether we listen, or whether we follow it or not.	Dk_cs1
GPS voice (16)	Push on government	It would have become a completely different debate and much more subdued and a completely different direction and a different force if they [the DCCC] had not existed.	Dk_pol1
GPS voice (17)	Push on the ministry	[W]e can't just be indifferent to those [the DCCC's] ideas, and if we really think that some of the things they come up with are not legitimate, we are also forced to justify it differently than if it had been a smaller actor who came up with it.	Dk_cs1
GPS voice (18)	Alternative institutions: EU policy	It [EU policy] affects it rather strongly. I believe that's something that the civil service emphasizes, to say, that we have to comply with the objectives coming from the EU, so they have a different weight than the ones adopted [through political settlements]. There is not a similar conception [by the civil service] that one can get away with them [EU regulations].	Dk_exp1
Politics feedback (19)	Media/opposition push	So you could say that it became extremely difficult to navigate the debate with something that is a very academically strong council, which then gets picked up by some journalist or an opposition party, and which interprets what the Guardian Council says.	Dk_pol1
Politics feedback (20)	Push on NGOs	And in reality, it forced all the NGOs to step up. (...) if the DCCC was on the scene, then the NGOs should preferably be on the scene even sooner, or if afterwards, they should be even sharper to kind of have a market.	Dk_pol1

4.3 Perceptions of Norwegian Stakeholders

As evident in the interviews with the Norwegian interviewees, it was difficult to generalise on behalf of the Norwegian NOU structure. How far-reaching an NOU is depends on the mandate of that specific NOU, therefore, I asked the interviewees to provide examples of those NOUs they found the most relevant or they had the most experience with (see Table 2)

In terms of the perceived advising function among Norwegian interviewees, all interviewees pointed out that the commissions contribute to the knowledge base. This knowledge base includes elements of all three advisory functions, perhaps most prominently the policy entrepreneur. Particularly on the specific level, it seemed that the Norwegian

NOUs contributed with relevant expertise (q.7-8). The NOU’s potential for contributing on the ambitiousness level appeared somewhat smaller (q.5-6). There was little talk about the knowledge broker function in Norway, and mostly in a contrafactual setting discussing how it would be if the commission structure was designed differently (q.3-4). The learning effect did neither seem prevalent, and no arguments that the NOUs had ramped up the prioritization and coordination were detected. There were some indications of the NOU structure functioning as a legitimiser in that the NOUs are government-appointed, but several interviewees pointed out that the Climate NOUs in Norway were not merely legitimisers (q.1-2). The policy feedback effect showed a different view on expertise and independence than what was evident in Denmark (q.9-10). When it comes to the watchdog function, there was little evidence that the informal GPS voice made a major difference in Norway, neither directly (q.11-14), nor indirectly.

Table 2: Perceptions of Norwegian Stakeholders

Theme	Sub-theme	Quote	Interviewee
Legitimiser (1)	Advise given upon gov’t request	[I] think that when you appoint a public committee, it is because the government wants or (...) wants to achieve results in an area, and then there is a political mandate in it that has a high chance of being followed up if you make clear recommendations.	No_com2
Legitimiser (2)	Contrafact. delegitimise	The only way to achieve this 48.7 million tonnes emissions target was biofuels, and [the government] adopted a requirement of 20% inclusion [of biofuels in fuels] in 2020. (...) I don’t think an independent council would have entered those controversies. Since the professional advice would be unequivocally against it.	No_pol1
Knowledge broker (3)	Contrafact. persistence	I think that the systematics, which you build up over time (...) can have an impact on how established they [a committee] become in a decision-making structure.	No_com2
Knowledge broker (4)	Knowledge base	[T]here are several proposals in the public debate that may seem very straightforward and reliable, why don't you just do it? But then there are a lot of reasons why it is not possible to implement it in that way (...) and getting it established with an academic basis will help to steer the discussion onto a more constructive track.	No_cs2
Policy entrepreneur (5)	Policy ambitiousness	I think that they [the knowledge provider] would have come to much the same conclusion. (...) the enquiries in [Climate Cure] are good and they have been independent. So I don't think the basis [of knowledge] would have been very different	No_pol1

Policy entrepreneur (6)	Policy ambitiousness	You wouldn't have the gradual increase in the CO2 tax up to 2000 NOK in 2030, which is one of the areas on which there is broad agreement (...), but the CO2 tax up to 2000 NOK is part of the Climate Cure, which means that we now have a broad majority in favour of it.	No_pol1
Policy entrepreneur (7)	Policy relevance	So you can see the trails from the large climate risk committee to the small expert committee [In the 'oil fund'] that makes very specific recommendations and then into the mandate of the oil fund.	No_com2
Policy entrepreneur (8)	Policy relevance	[F]irst of all, it depends on what kind of advice and recommendations they [the council] are to give, if they are to give professional advice, then I think it would be strange if there were no independent academics in the council. At the same time, I think that if you had gone to the complete opposite end, that it had only been academics, then you would have risked getting advice that is very far removed from reality.	No_cs31
Policy feedback (9)	Independence Definition	But I think that when it comes to policy proposals, if you have a secretariat from the ministry that has clear views on it [formulation of policies], then I think it can affect the recommendations a bit.	No_com1
Policy feedback (10)	Independence definition	[T]he Ministry of Climate and Environment is funding it, but they are still independent committees. It consists of independent experts, so even though the committees are subordinate to a ministry and funded by a ministry, they are still independent.	No_cs3
GPS voice (11)	Pressure through media	Because when you have, for example, a concrete proposal with a recommendation [from a committee], the opposition or the media or others may ask why don't you follow up on this?	No_cs1
GPS voice (12)	Knowledge base	[NOUs] can impose some limitations in the sense that measures that were politically thought to be effective are not perceived as effective by the committee. And so it kind of undermines a measure that you might have wanted to implement. But it also brings more agreement on which measures are effective and which are not, and that's an advantage when attempting to get a broad majority.	No_com2
GPS voice (13)	Contrafact. Degrees of freedom	[An independent permanent committee] could have given an academic assessment of the Green Book that has now been published. (...) does it deliver what it should or not? Right, is this good enough compared to other countries? Does it provide enough direction for the future? Are there enough instruments in the proposal to achieve the goals it says?	No_pol1
GPS voice (14)	Alternative institutions:	The EU decisions that we are obliged to reach. It is not a situation to negotiate.	No_pol1
GPS voice (14)	Alternative institutions: Climate Act	[The Climate Act] has done that the climate goals have stood firm. (...) there has never been a discussion about whether to go in the opposite direction to a smaller, less ambitious goal.	No_cs1

Chapter 5 Analysis - the Advisory Function

I have divided the analysis into two chapters, referring to the functions of advisor in chapter 5 and watchdog in chapter 6. This first chapter of the analysis will discuss the findings in light of the three advisory lenses used in this thesis, followed by a discussion of the policy feedback effect related to the advising function.

5.1 Legitimiser

My findings comprise no evidence that the DCCC functions merely as a legitimiser in Denmark. As emphasised by all interviewees, the DCCC is an independent body that sets its own agenda and focus. The DCCC is not obliged to only assess the aspects the government would like to shed light on. Throughout the interviews, it was evident that the DCCC were free to choose its focus by itself, sometimes to the frustration of the interviewees that thought it made the DCCC less specific on the issues policymakers found the most relevant. Even though the government may use the DCCC to back up a policy, the DCCC is not only recognised by the government. According to dk_com1, the DCCC holds respect among a broad range of actors. Both the minority government's supporting parties and the opposition used DCCC information to put pressure on the government (see i.e Folketinget, 2022). Therefore, there seems to be little empirical backing to argue that the DCCC serves as merely a legitimiser.

In Norway the question of whether the advisory bodies act mainly as legitimisers is more ambiguous. No_com2 added that NOUs are established at the government's request to assess issues where there already is political interest. Thus, questions of no interest to the government are rarely considered within the Norwegian NOU structure. NOUs could potentially be used tactically by politicians to answer only a set of questions or questions framed in a certain way. In fact, J.G. Christensen, Mouritzen and Nørgaard³ (in Christensen et al., 2017, p.251) indicate that ad-hoc advisory commissions have increasingly gone from

³ J.G. Christensen, Mouritzen and Nørgaard (2009) did their study on Danish ad-hoc advisory commissions. I find their of critique of strategic use more transferable to similar Norwegian ad-hoc commissions than to a standing advisory body like the DCCC in Denmark.

being an institutional norm to a strategic instrument for the government. NOUs are also restricted by their mandate, which is defined by the government and the civil service in collaboration (Christensen & Holst, 2020, p.99-100). As some interviewees point out, the mandate may sometimes restrict the commissions from setting their own agenda or framing an agenda in a way they would prefer, an experience that is shared with commission members in Wernø and Aarseth (2023). When that is said, even though limiting the mandate to some extent, one would not know what the NOU's advice will be in the end. As several interviewees pointed out, the opposition and media are attentive to the commissions' advice and recommendations, so the NOU structure certainly does not free the government from all critique.

Several interviewees argued that the NOUs are independent, with expert members recruited typically from academia, business organisations, labour unions, NGOs and the like. In this way, the independence of the members of the NOU in terms of not being governmental employees will ensure that their report does not only pay lip service to the government. While the number of ad-hoc commissions has declined in Norway (and in Denmark) since the 1970s, NOUs have become less corporatist and more academic (Christensen et al., 2017, p.251). However, the NOU members are selected by the government, sometimes even "cherry-picked" to serve as professional proponents for the views of the politicians (Christensen & Holst, 2020, p.53). The commission leader will typically be selected extra carefully. Even though the members are formally independent of the government, the collection of commission members is not random and affects its recommendations. Although none of the climate NOUs were highlighted as only legitimisers by any of the interviewees, no_com1 and no_com2 argued this might be a weakness of the ad-hoc commission system in general.

In the end, a lot depends on the specific mandate of the individual NOU. In comparison, the DCCC has a set of permanent 'guiding principles' instead of a government-assigned mandate. This ensures more flexibility and freedom for the DCCC to set their own agenda (Karttinen et al., 2023, p.24). At the same time, it ensures that the DCCC follows some overarching principles set by the government to ensure some kind of relevance. Even though the Norwegian NOU system has the potential to be more of a legitimiser for the government than the DCCC, it is not necessarily the case that NOUs act only as legitimisers.

5.2 Knowledge broker

The questions relating to the learning effect proved difficult for the interviewees to answer. Nobody mentioned an increased awareness of climate issues as a result of the advisory bodies. The extent to which civil servants or politicians recognized a change in coordination between ministries, nobody attributed this specifically to the advisory bodies. This was neither the case in Denmark nor in Norway. Dk_cs1 mentioned specifically that the DCCC did not contribute to the coordination between ministries. This contrasts with the findings of Matti et al. (2021) who found an increasing learning effect among politicians in Sweden as a result of the Swedish CPF. Matti et al. (2021) studied parliamentarians that are typically more generalists and therefore less schooled in the specifics within i.e. climate policies than civil servants and government representatives. Instead, when looking at the Knowledge broker function, this thesis revolves around the independence, persistence and composition of the advisory bodies.

5.2.1 Independence

All Danish interviewees perceived the DCCC as an independent council and argued that independence is crucial for its legitimacy. As shown in Chapter 5.1, the DCCC has received an authoritative status and holds respect among a broad range of actors. Dk_pol1 argued that the DCCC works as “the highest academic verification” of whether the government is doing enough to combat the climate crisis and that this authoritative status is used by rival parties to lend legitimacy to their arguments. Furthermore, when the DCCC has come up with recommendations that delegitimise the proposals put forward by opposition parties, the opposition has moderated their critique, since they cannot argue against the DCCC (dk_pol1). This view strengthens the DCCC as a knowledge broker across the political spectrum. Similarly, in cases where the civil service disagreed with the DCCC, it required a rigorous explanation if the ministry were to go against the DCCC’s advice (dk_cs1). While the government has expertise to lean on within the ministry, the DCCC provides reliable and independent advice for everyone to use.

Interestingly, two distinctly different views of independent expertise prevailed in the two countries. In Denmark, interviewees emphasised that to ensure legitimacy, the advisory

council had to be independent of the government. This included the secretariat, where the DCCC would not be seen as independent if the secretariat was embedded in the Energy Agency. In fact, “then it might as well just be the Energy Agency” (dk_cs1). Another interviewee saw it as a paradox, “we have a government that says we are on the right track, (...) it is difficult to imagine an internal, non-independent climate council would come and say the opposite” (dk_exp1). On the contrary, Norwegian interviewees pointed out that the NOUs are independent despite their secretariats being placed within the realms of government ministries and agencies. Only one interviewee meant the secretariat could potentially influence the content of the report. Several others were convinced that self-regulating social dynamics would prevent the secretariat from pushing their ministry’s agenda within the commission. While Evans et al. (2021) seem to be more in line with the prevailing understanding of independence in Denmark, where an emphasis is made on the independence of the secretariat, Weaver et al. (2019) argue that an in-house secretariat will not impede with the independence of the council.

When that is said, Christensen and Holst (2020, p.83) argue that the civil service has an unsettled role in advisory commissions, divided between defending its ministry and contributing constructively to the discussion. In fact, secretariats often have a more active role than the official division of labour would indicate (Christensen & Holst, 2020, p.102). Both Grødem, Hesstveit, and Holst (in Wernø & Aarseth, p.9) argue that the secretariats influence commission reports, they may for instance downplay certain issues. When that is said, the secretariat’s influence on commissions is often more subdued than simply pushing the agenda of the ministry. For instance, professional background – e.g. economist vs. political scientist – is of importance for how secretariat members argue and what is emphasised in the report (Christensen & Holst, 2020). NOUs appear to be more independent if the secretariats represent more than one ministry (Holst in Wernø & Aarseth, p.10). When that is said, no_com1 argued you then risk getting conflicts of interest between secretariat members from different ministries, which may impede the productivity of the commission. Although not black or white, the larger degree of independence of the DCCC than in the NOU structure allows for more legitimacy and a larger potential to broker knowledge across stakeholders.

5.2.2 Persistence

Persistence is also essential for the knowledge broker function. A standing advisory body, like the DCCC, can give consistent advice, something several Danish interviewees pointed out. Persistence also creates a relationship with the government, as well as the media and other stakeholders. Persistence also made the DCCC into a body many Danes, and everyone within climate policy knows about (dk_com1). As long as the advisory body is perceived as relevant, persistence strengthens its ability to be trusted also in the next run. Karttinen et al. (2023, p.13) argue that the DCCC has managed to stay relevant compared to other countries' CACs. Overall, persistence seems to make it easier to broker knowledge, since the advisory body may build up trustworthiness and recognition over time.

The lack of persistence in the Norwegian commission structure makes it more difficult to be a consistent knowledge broker. Whenever a new commission is established by the government, the independence and legitimacy of that particular commission must be evaluated all over again. Even though the system is supposed to be based on independence, there is a major focus regarding who the commission is made up of, something several interviewees pointed out. In addition, the system of ad-hoc commissions might be prone to more interest group critique. One interviewee argued the Norwegian Green Tax Commission received heavy critique from interest groups after the report was launched. Such a critique may polarise the political debate about a commission, again making the commission less likely to influence policies. A standing advisory body that already has a reputation and authority will be more difficult to delegitimise, and may thus be more resistant towards critique from specific interest groups. Additionally, the average duration time of commissions in Norway is 1,5 years, half the time commissions spent in the 1970s and 1980s (Christensen & Holst, 2020, p.86). Less time might indicate a smaller ability to follow issues over time and may give less room for providing rigorous advice.

5.2.3 Composition

The composition of the members is another feature of trustworthiness, leading to knowledge brokerage. Abraham-Dukuma et al. (2020, p.2) argue that more multidisciplinary councils provide more effective advice because it “improves fluidity in research and deepens the

understanding of complex climate issues”. Although the DCCC leans heavily on economists⁴ (Klimarådet, 2022a), dk_com1 argued that the DCCC is multidisciplinary because the council also includes several professions, such as a behavioural scientist, one life cycle expert and three technical/ natural scientists. According to Abraham-Dukuma et al. (2020, p.9), some potential for improving multidisciplinary remains for the DCCC. Nonetheless, the DCCC holds a high reputation among a broad audience of policymakers, non-state actors, and the public according to the DCCC’s reputation survey (table 1- dk_com1). The academic composition of the council is also clearly contributing to an understanding of the DCCC as independent and trustworthy (dk_pol1; dk_exp1). The perception of a legitimate composition of members seems to strengthen the function as a knowledge broker in the public debate around climate policy in Denmark.

The perception of what composes a legitimate advisory body seems to be different between the Norwegian and Danish interviewees. Several interviewees in Norway highlighted that broad expert membership in commissions is important to ensure legitimacy. Broadly composed commissions implied that representatives from i.e. business organisations, labour unions, and NGOs were represented, according to the interviewees in line with the Nordic tradition (Rommetvedt, 2017). This is seen to increase the legitimacy of the knowledge and expert advice provided in NOU reports since various types of knowledge from a broad range of actors with different types of expertise would be included. Such co-produced knowledge would be representative of a cross-section of important Norwegian interest groups. When that is said, no_com2 argued that whether NOUs can come with unison advice without dissent impacts the legitimacy of the NOU’s report. If there are many dissents, the NOU typically become more polarised, thus making it more difficult to act as a knowledge broker between stakeholders. If the advice is unison, on the other hand, it strengthens the authority of the NOU and creates a better foundation for knowledge brokerage.

Interestingly, the Danish stakeholders perceive broad commissions to undermine the legitimacy of the council. Including interest groups in the council would turn it into a “public affairs lobbyist all-you-can-eat buffet” as dk_pol1 expressed it. Although the literature seems to be split between whether councils preferably should be academic (Elliott et al., 2021; Evans et al., 2021) or expert-based (Crowley & Head, 2017; Dudley et al., 2021), it certainly

⁴ Currently, four out of nine members are economics professors, including the leader. Up until 2023 there were five out of nine, all of them with different focus and expertise.

depends on how far you stretch the ‘expert’-definition. While a broader definition of expertise may have a larger potential to ameliorate conflicts over climate change measures, an academic composition of members independent of interest groups makes advice that is more trustworthy in contributing to climate change mitigation, and not also to the interests of particular interest groups.

5.3 Policy entrepreneur

When it comes to policy entrepreneurship, an important element is the advisory body’s ability to shape the agenda. In Denmark, the DCCC was mostly seen as giving recommendations on the climate ambitiousness level, and to a lesser extent proposing specific policy instruments. According to dk_poll and dk_exp1, the DCCC lifted the level of ambition by creating a floor (or window) for climate policies, that it became politically challenging to be situated too far away from. According to dk_poll, the timing of topical reports, in combination with the formal reports in the annual Climate Cycle made the DCCC “the most important problem formulating organ”. This resonates with Dudley et al. (2022, p.7) that argue that timing may be more important than merely repeating an advice over and over. Thus, seen from the inside, the DCCC had a rather strong impact on the formulation of ideas. Christensen et al. (2017, p.251) argue that standing advisory bodies typically come in later in the policy cycle than ad-hoc advisory bodies. Based on the interviews, this does not seem to be the case for the DCCC. Instead, it seems to have played an important role on the climate policy ambitiousness early in the policy cycle.

Independence gave the DCCC freedom to distance themselves from political battles and focus on the issues they found the most important instead of being dictated by the government to focus on certain issues (dk_com1). This opened a room for innovative thinking. According to dk_cs1, the DCCC’s status outlook in 2022 started directing more attention to the implementation of policies, and the risks associated with the implementation. As a result, the government’s climate programme in 2022 includes risk assessments on all the sector-specific roadmaps for CO₂ reductions (KEFM, 2022, p.36). While one would need more solid results to fully attribute this change to the DCCC, it supports the other statements in that the DCCC seems to play a role as an actor being able to push the policy ambitiousness.

In Norway, the potential for policy entrepreneurship by the NOUs are not necessarily smaller than in Denmark. As dk_exp1 pointed out, sector-specific advisors may be beneficial to ensure more relevant advice. Expert commissions have the opportunity to give more specific advice and have the professionally more narrowed sector-specific expertise to go more in detail on e.g. financial risks, transportation, waste, or agriculture. Several interviewees highlighted the importance of the Climate Risk Commission both in influencing the Ministry (of Finance) (no_com2) and policymaking on financials related to the climate (no_poll1; no_com2). During the negotiations leading up to the Jeløya-platform in 2018⁵, it was important for the government to emphasize the need to wait for the conclusions from the Climate Risk Commission before writing up related policies (no_poll1). The Climate Commission 2050, which will deliver its report in November 2023 is expected to create attention (no_com2; no_cs3) as well. In addition, the constant renewal of the members in the commissions allows new commission members to bring in fresh ideas about how an issue may be resolved.

Several interviewees mentioned the importance of the Climate Cure in Norway. For instance, the Climate Cure contributed to the decision to set a carbon tax on 2000 NOK in 2030 (no_poll1; Miljødirektoratet, p.xxiii). An interviewee in Handberg et al. (2022) highlight that the Climate Cure was successful in bringing different technical environments together, something that could contribute to coming up with innovative policy ideas. Although the Climate Cure was not an independent advisory body, its ability to provide specific useful advice indicates that ad-hoc constellations indeed have the potential to produce entrepreneurial solutions. The Norwegian NOU structure seems to have functioned, at least to some degree as a policy entrepreneur on the policy ambitiousness level.

5.3.1 Policy Relevance

Another important element in policy entrepreneurship is policy relevance. Policy relevance is a balance between independence and connectedness between the advisor and the receiver (Salacuse, 2018). Most interviewees argued the DCCC could have had a bigger impact if it engaged more with proposing sector-specific policy designs and gave advice that was easier

⁵ A political document between the coalition partners in government. The Jeløya-plattform was finished in January 2018 and included the Parties H, FrP and V.

to adopt directly (dk_pol1; dk_cs1; dk_exp1). The interviewees saw the DCCC as being disconnected from the implementation of policies. On the contrary, Dk_com1 argued that most of the DCCC's recommendations have been followed, at least partially, as visualised in the DCCC's statistics over advice given (Klimarådet, n.d). While this could be seen as an indication that the DCCC has a major influence on the formulation of specific policies, the perception of the other interviewees argues for the opposite.

The reluctance to meddle with politics increases the legitimacy of the DCCC, hence limiting the potential to politicize the council, but it also limited its actual influence on the specific policies. Dk_pol1, Dk_cs1, and Dk_exp1 all saw the limited relevance for specific policies as expressing a limited ability to act as a policy entrepreneur, coming up with innovative solutions to specific climate issues. For instance, dk_exp1 noted that the DCCC rarely give consultation responses and when they do, they come with general remarks and few concrete proposals on i.e. specific formulations. Dudley et al. (2022, p.6) argue that advice from CACs should include a specific addressee, and target a specific sector with clear and operational targets and timescales. In that way, it is hard to see that the DCCC has a major impact as a policy entrepreneur on specific policies.

The debate about policy relevance is interesting to note in relation to Sundqvist et al.'s (2018) conceptualisation of two different worldviews on the science-policy relationship. The DCCC is designed as an independent advisory institution, in line with the "two worlds" view where science production is separated from policymaking. It seems that many interviewees diagnose the problem of the DCCC to be a too far disconnect from policies. Sundqvist et al. (2018, p.453) observe a paradox where the problem in the "two worlds" is the solution in the "one world" and vice versa. In that way, one could argue that it is impossible to fully be independent, ensuring conditions for a knowledge broker and at the same time be positioned close enough to the government to give specific and detailed policy advice on what the government find relevant. While the DCCC has placed itself leaning towards the "two worlds", the Norwegian commission structure leans towards the "one world". According to Sundqvist et al. (2018), none of advisory bodies may be both "one world" and "two worlds" at the same time.

In Norway, since commissions are set down on government request, it is a precondition that their mandate is considered relevant. It was evident among the interviewees that most of the commission reports were considered relevant. For instance, the Climate Risk Commission was highlighted by several interviewees to give concrete advice that later spilt

over into concrete policies, for instance in the ‘oil fund’ (no_com2). In-house secretariats may ensure more policy-relevant advice due to the closer connection between the advisors and the ministry (no_cs1/2; com1). TBU Klima for instance, seems to have been able to provide more relevant advice due to its close ties to the ministry (no_com1), than it would if it was fully independent from the ministry. Even though the Norwegian system of commissions lacks persistence, it does not impede the possibility to provide innovative advice.

It is worth mentioning the Danish Expert Group on Green Tax reform that was commissioned by the government as an addition to the DCCC to give more concrete advice on how green taxation may be implemented. This commission, which delivered one report last year and will deliver its final report in the autumn of 2023, is designed to be more detailed than the DCCC. The expert group resembles the Norwegian NOUs more. It is composed of experts in the field and the secretariat is an in-house one. One could see this expert group as a supplement to the DCCC that has more of an ability to act as an entrepreneurial player on the more specific tax policies, taking on more of a “one-world” position.

5.3.2 Operationality of the Advisory Body

The ability to be a policy entrepreneur is also limited by the operationality of the advisory body. In the DCCC, the budget did not prevail as a limitation, but the working capacity of the council members was mentioned as a potential bottleneck. The council only works a few hours a week (Karttinen et al., 2023, p.11), and several interviewees pointed out that this may limit how much the DCCC can produce, despite its rather big secretariat and budget (table 1 – dk_com1; dk_exp1). Limited time may make the DCCC have to focus on their main tasks, limiting the possibility to i.e. send consultation responses. The multidisciplinary composition of the council also makes the DCCC more of a generalist council lacking the expertise to give sector-specific advice (see Chapter 5.2.3), for instance on how to reduce emissions in the construction sector.

Neither in Norway did the budgets of the NOUs seem to pose restrictions, based on the perceptions of the interviewees. Whether the councils lack operationality did not come forth in the interviews, but it is worth highlighting that the specific mandates of each different

NOUs give a possibility to commission an NOU that can come with quite specific and detailed advice. The operationality of the advisory body is important for its ability to reach out with relevant and innovative advice.

5.4 The Policy Feedback Effect

The different views of independence and expertise in Norway and Denmark (Chapters 5.2.1 and 5.2.3) may reflect different normative views on democracy. In the hearing proposal leading up to the Norwegian Climate Act, the majority in the Energy- and environment committee in parliament found it “unfortunate with solutions that lift the responsibility and decision making out of the elected body” (Stortinget, 2017, p.12. My translation). The (at the time) Minister for Commerce repeated a similar view two years later when he argued that a “council elevated above politics” would be undemocratic and dangerous (Isaksen, 2019). The argument was raised in a heated debate with 25 Norwegian public figures (Ambjørnsen, 2019). This despite “[CACs] are designed to support – not challenge – democratic control mechanisms and they do not prescribe specific policies” (interviewee 8 in Coen et al., 2020, p.75). The official Norwegian position seems to resonate with a view of ‘participatory democrats’ that cherish lay participation and broad representation as a favourable model of democracy (Christensen & Holst, 2017, p.829). In such a perspective, the increasing academisation is problematic and undemocratic

In Denmark, no interviewees expressed a view that the DCCC infringes on the principles of democracy. Instead, dk_com1 expressed the DCCC contributed with more long-term thinking into a short-term political landscape. Karttinen et al. (2023, p.13) also found that it is seen as important to have an external party that can evaluate the Energy Agency’s Climate Status and Outlook, and thus give legitimacy to the numbers developed by the Energy Agency, that otherwise more easily could have been criticised for being partisan. In that way, the DCCC represents a deliberative stance on politics. Deliberative democrats would generally see more reason-driven policies as positive, arguing that bringing relevant information and analyses to the table contributes to binding the policy preparation process to more consistent and reasoned scientific advice (Christensen & Holst, 2017, p.829). This is also in line with Crowley and Head (2017) and Christensen and Serrano Velarde (2019) who

emphasize the need for purpose-built advisory bodies on cross-cutting policy issues such as climate change.

Drawing on historical institutionalist theory, one way to see the different views on expertise and independence is that the creation of the institutions shaped the understanding of the role of advisory bodies. Following Thelen (1999, p.386), the creation of the DCCC in Denmark may have shaped the imagination of what an advisory body is. The views of independence, democracy, and expertise are not disconnected from the institutional structure. When that is said, the interpretive feedback effect is quite diffuse and hard to point to and it would also require a longitudinal study to conclude whether the institutional structure has shaped a view on institutions through an interpretive feedback effect. One could mention that Denmark has had an Economic Council, a standing advisory body on economic affairs since 1962, so standing advisory bodies seem to be less unfamiliar to the Danes than to the Norwegians. Simultaneous with the amendment of the DCCC, the Danish government instituted other institutional innovations, like a Citizens' Assembly on Climate Issues, a Youth Climate Council, and the Green Business Forum. Even though, based on the interviews, none of these seems to have had a major influence, particularly not the former two, the moment these were created might be seen as a moment of willingness to change the institutional structure. This argues in favour of Nash and Steurer's (2022) argument, using the Multiple Streams Framework to explain a window of opportunity when an institutional shift could take place. Nonetheless, historical institutionalists would emphasize that the different understandings of the role of the advisory bodies in the two countries will shape the institutional structure with time. The interesting feature is whether the institutional system in itself embeds the ideas around what independence and expertise are.

Chapter 6 Analysis - the Watchdog Function

6.1 GPS voice

The perception among the interviewees seemed to be that ‘naming and shaming’ affects climate policies, at least to some degree. All Danish interviewees recognised, either explicitly or implicitly, that the DCCC has a watchdog function, emerging after the amendment of the Climate Act in 2020. Following the DCCC’s Status outlook, the Climate Minister in Denmark is required by law to ensure that the next Climate Programme puts forward new initiatives to demonstrate that the climate targets and commitments are met. In addition, the Climate Minister has been summoned to a question time in Parliament following each of the DCCC’s status reports, where he has been asked to account for how the government plans to demonstrate reaching the 70 per cent target after the DCCC’s evaluation. This pressure by the opposition, in combination with the media attention received contributes to a ‘naming and shaming’ following each status report.

Dk_com1 argued that no other institutions are holding similar leverage over climate policymaking in Denmark as the DCCC. While the three other Danish interviewees were careful with comparing the DCCC to other institutions, dk_pol1 also argued that “[i]t would have become a completely different debate and much more subdued and a completely different direction and a different force if they [the DCCC] had not existed.» The Minister appeared to be frustrated with the DCCC at times, due to its apparent lack of policy relevance and sometimes unfair critique (dk_pol1). In relation to the implementation of a CO₂ tax in the agricultural sector, the Climate Minister asked the DCCC to come up with specific recommendations on how it should be designed, and according to dk_pol1, the DCCC came up with advice that contradicted the recommendations they had given the year before. In that way, the DCCC could be seen as “Armchair Generals”⁶ (dk_pol1), giving overarching recommendations that weren’t necessarily possible to transform into policies. When that is said, the frustration with the DCCC within the government shows that the ‘naming and

⁶ Referring to generals with little experience from the war zone giving general advice on tactics that appear irrelevant to the ones on the ground.

shaming' did concern the government. This appears as a GPS voice, where the DCCC, perhaps unfair or annoying at times, or not recommending the road the government most wanted to take, did in full publicity show a direction towards decarbonisation that the government could not disregard. It is also worth noting that the DCCC has recognised progress since 2021, indicating that there has been movement in Danish climate policies since the renewal of the Climate Act.

Dk_com1 argued that the institutional structure ensures that the government is being held accountable for its own climate policies. dk_cs1 expressed this in more moderate terms, saying that the DCCC contributes to a general push towards more action on climate change but that it is difficult to distinguish their push from that of other institutions. The DCCC does not limit the choices and freedoms of policymakers in pursuing climate policies, according to dk_cs1. In 2022, the DCCC ramped up their focus on a CO₂ tax (Klimarådet, 2022b). Although the DCCC was far from the only actor talking about a CO₂ tax, it was a solid voice in the debate. The formality of the DCCC in the climate act warranted a different response to critique from the DCCC than from other NGOs or interest groups (dk_cs1).

Despite seeing the GPS voice as fairly prevalent for the political administration, the civil service in Denmark seems to be quite autonomous, taking only the advice it finds useful.

The Ministry of Finance has announced a price on CO₂ to be used in economic analyses, and the DCCC (...) have been out saying that it should reflect the fact that we have a 70% reduction target. In response, they [the ministry] have insisted on saying yes, but that is a politically adopted target. It is not an international agreement that we have implemented, so we are therefore not bound as such. The agreement may be cancelled tomorrow, therefore we still include an economic price of CO₂ that is equivalent to the EU's quota price, because that's the price we have to pay if we choose to emit CO₂ in Denmark. (dk_exp1)

One could see this as a ministry that only listens to the DCCC if it finds the advice worthwhile. However, the DCCC's authoritative status warranted a well-reasoned response from the Climate Ministry if it was to go against their advice. There might be several reasons for the DCCC not being perceived as having a similar influence over the ministry as over the government. It might indicate that the 'naming and shaming' affects the government and that such a critique would not affect the less personalised civil service structure. It could also be an indication that the DCCC's recommendations are not always relevant for implementation. When that is said, there is high pressure on the employees in the Climate Ministry, a Ministry

that has seen a turnover of around one-fourth of its employees annually since the renewal of the Climate Act (Bahn, 2023). Although this certainly cannot be attributed to the DCCC alone, it shows an increasing pressure on climate action in Denmark, of which the DCCC is part.

In Norway, there is no systematic GPS voice function. Nonetheless, there is an informal GPS voice, where media attention may ‘force’ the government to act following a commission report (no_cs1; no_cs3). However, only a few NOUs have since 2008 assessed and recommended changes to climate policies, so the pressure media attention gives is at best limited. In addition, NOUs are only focusing on specific issues, so the media’s scrutiny will similarly be revolving around that same specific topic, for instance, the Norwegian Climate Risk Commission which mostly focused on the financial risks of climate change (Regjeringen, 2018b). It is therefore difficult to see how the media attention could create momentum pushing the government similar to the dynamic in Denmark.

In addition, the ad-hoc nature of Norwegian commissions makes NOUs less embedded in a decision-making structure than the DCCC is in Denmark. While the DCCC can create a relationship with the government, the NOU structure does not allow for a similar consistent relationship (No_com2). While no_com1 questioned whether persistence necessarily would strengthen the advice from advisory commissions, no_pol1 argued persistence could provide a more detailed account, that enabled elaboration and follow-up over time. There was also some support that embedding a council legally could make it more robust to changing priorities from different governments (no_cs3). No_pol1 argued that if Norway had a council similar to the DCCC, it could have given an academic evaluation of the government proposals, for instance, the recent “Green Book” and warned against measures that have little professional backing such as increasing the level of biofuels in the fuel mix.

A similar ratcheting mechanism that the DCCC put forward, which was mentioned by some Danish interviewees, was not highlighted in Norway. A floor on climate policies in Norway was mentioned once during the interviews, and that was in relation to the Norwegian Climate Act. no_cs1 argued that the legally embedded reduction target ensured that reduction goals were set, and could be scaled upwards, but never downwards. When asked about other institutions that are important in shaping Norwegian climate policies, EU policy (no_pol1;

no_cs3), as well as the oil and gas industry's lobby apparatus (no_com1; no_poll) was mentioned more than once.

Christensen and Serrano Velarde (2019) show how the purpose-built institutional design of a standing advisory body in German innovation policies was able to break through compartmentalisation between the different ministries. This was a permanent, formalised and independent body reporting directly to the chancellor. Norway, which saw a number of ad-hoc commissions on innovation policies, but no similar institutionalisation of the advisory bodies, was not able to breach the compartmentalisation between Norwegian ministries. The findings in this study resonate with Christensen and Serrano Velarde (2019), in that even though the NOU structure has delivered advice to the Norwegian government, it has not been considered a GPS voice in the way the DCCC was seen. As Christensen and Serrano Velarde (2019) argue, cross-cutting issues generate more advice, but this does not necessarily translate into more policies.

6.2 Feedback on Politics

When it comes to the GPS voice, the feedback effect appears mostly through Pierson's (1993) resource effect. The resource effect gave the DCCC an effect on climate politics.

[T]here are so many councils. There is the Ethical Council. There are all sorts of councils (...) that most people find indifferent. (...) but they don't shape politics or play a big role in the media. (...), and that does not apply to the DCCC. It suddenly became a kind of Guardian Council. It became a hyper-politicising institution against its will. (Dk_poll)

With a smile and a portion of humour, dk_poll1 referred to the Iranian Guardian Council saying the council members considered themselves as "god's selected instrument" and an institution elevated above politics. From the perspective of dk_com1, the DCCC sketched different policy scenarios but stayed away from politics. Nonetheless, from the inside the DCCC was seen to influence climate politics indirectly through other actor's active use of the DCCC.

As mentioned in Chapter 5.3, the status that the DCCC received through its independence, persistence, and policy relevance on the ambitiousness level, made the DCCC an authoritative body that became widely respected. According to dk_poll1, this authoritative

voice made the DCCC step into politics indirectly, in that it was used by media, NGOs and opposition parties as arguments for the lack of effort by the government. For instance, the fact that the government had “not demonstrated” how to reach the climate targets and commitments (Klimarådet, 2023) has typically been interpreted as the government failing the climate exam three years in a row (see i.e Sæhl, 2023). Dk_pol1 argued that the 200-page long status report of the DCCC could not be reduced into a “pass or fail”, and that this polarised the debate with its lack of nuances. It seemed clear from the interviews that the shaming did not pass unnoticed by the government. The indirect pressure on politics gave the DCCC a substantial influence over climate politics.

Dk_pol1 also argued that the DCCC put pressure on the environmental NGOs to constantly revise their agendas to stay relevant and push the climate agenda. The DCCC, with its fairly large budget and 30 employees in the secretariat gave them the ability to produce extensive analyses (Klimarådet, 2022a). The additional pressure the DCCC could exert on Climate NGOs is another way the GPS voice indirectly pressured the government through a feedback effect. Even though the DCCC was designed as a policy institution, it played a role in politics indirectly in that it was used by other actors to put pressure on the government. In that way, not only did the DCCC appear as a loud GPS voice, but the other passengers in the car also raised their voices more as a result of the DCCCs appearance.

In Norway, the feedback effect on politics through the GPS voice appears limited. As argued, the GPS voice itself did not appear prevalent in Norway. The commissions are also used by opposition parties, but a major effect on the government was not recorded in this thesis. One cannot rule out such an effect completely, but due to the lower GPS voice effect, it is reasonable to assume that the indirect feedback effect also will be lower. In Norway, the awareness around the ‘Norwegian model’ seems to be prevalent in a way that reinforces the Norwegian NOU structure. For instance, the Council for Equitable Transition in the Workforce, established last year was a corporatist body resembling the view of expertise and a ‘participatory democracy’ in the NOU structure (see chapter 5.4). Several interviewees saw the commissions as providing advice and leaving the decisions solely to the policymakers. “And that's kind of what politicians are, right, or the government, they're decision-making machines. So we feed them with information and then they make a decision” (no_cs1). This left an impression that the ad-hoc advisory commission system in Norway embeds itself. Such an institutional system cannot be seen as likely to add to transformational change and the new initiatives taken rather seems to indicate a strengthening of the already tight bonds

between labour unions, business organisations, and the government (Mildenberger, 2020). A GPS voice in the Norwegian institutional system could have appeared as an authoritative counterweight to such a dynamic.

As Hall in Lockwood et al. (2017) observes, institutions that give a stronger voice to the government's favoured policies are more likely to spur rapid execution than institutions that lay the foundation for pushing a reluctant government. The way the DCCC was used indirectly by the opposition to pressure the government is not necessarily the institutional structure leading to the fastest progression of climate initiatives. One could argue that advisory bodies functioning as legitimisers might produce political output faster than those getting an indirect GPS voice function pressing the government from multiple directions. One could also see Hall's observation in relation to policy relevance, an argument in favour of designing policy advice adaptable for the government. The indirect effect on politics seems to have influenced policies, but it remains to see the outcome of the policies.

In both countries, the institutional structure seems to be taken fairly for granted. Among the interviewees, the independence and permanence seemed to be self-evident. It seems that the DCCC has gained a position, that strengthens its reputation. As an interviewee in Karttinen et al. (2023) points out, the DCCC has succeeded in being policy relevant. When that is said, the government recently proposed cutting app. three-fifths of the DCCC's budget for 2024, and it was only after a broad budget settlement that the DCCC received funding on the level of previous years (Øyen, 2023). There also remains to see the impact and role of the DCCC in the current majority government in Denmark. It is plausible that the leverage the DCCC got over the government was partly due to that it was a minority government giving the opposition, as well as the government's budget partners more influence over politics.. At least the noted indirect GPS-voice influence on the political level might be a result of this. Perhaps a DCCC under a majority government will have less influence on the government, which again may limit the authority of the DCCC with time. At the same time, the settlement tradition appears strong in Denmark, so it remains to see what position the DCCC gets under the current majority government.

6.3 Summary of the Four Lenses

In this summary, I show how the climate advisory bodies in Norway and Denmark have influenced climate policymaking through four different lenses. I have provided a table to

illustrate the effect of advisory bodies in a simplified way using an ordinal scale from ‘no’ to ‘major’ influence. The ordering is not exact but indicates the degree of influence based on the discussion (table 3).

When it comes to the advising function, both climate advisory bodies provide some influence on policymaking. The Norwegian NOU structure has the potential to serve as a legitimiser since it is set down by the government with a specific mandate and composition. When that is said, the members are independent experts, many of them academics. While none of the interviewees argued that any of the ad-hoc climate commissions were merely functioning as a legitimiser, the NOU system does not entirely rule out such a function. There were fewer indications of the NOU structure working as a knowledge broker in Norway. The commission structure lacks persistence and its independence may be questioned. When that is said, interviewing more oppositional voices would be fruitful to get a broader view of the outsider perspective. The Norwegian NOU structure seems to have functioned as a policy entrepreneur at times. The close ties to the ministries allows it to come up with innovative views and detailed advice on issues requested by the government. On the ambitiousness level, the ability to provide advice cannot be ruled out, but it seems somewhat less likely due to its limited ability to step back and look at the situation from a distance.

In Denmark, the system is somewhat different. The DCCC seems convincing in brokering knowledge across partisan lines and between different stakeholders, and there is little evidence to see the DCCC merely as a legitimiser. When it comes to the policy entrepreneur, the persistence of the DCCC makes it able to come up with more consistent advice than the Norwegian structure allows, but it is not necessarily more innovative. The DCCC seems to have pushed some overarching ambitions, such as a high CO₂ tax, but the broad expertise and relatively low operationality of the DCCC limit its ability to come up with specific recommendations on topics identified by the policymakers as relevant. When that is said, policy ambitiousness and specific policy relevance require two different positions in the science-policy relationship that are not necessarily compatible with each other (Sundqvist et al., 2018). Thus doing both kinds of policy advice may in practice be impossible, or at best difficult. Even though this study has not looked into ad-hoc advisory commissions in Denmark, such as the Expert Group on Green Taxes, it is worth remembering that the institutional structure in Norway provides nothing the Danish structure does not have already. The opposite does not seem to be the case. The DCCC provides a unique function that has no parallel to the Norwegian climate institutional structure.

When it comes to the watchdog function, the DCCC seems to have had a distinguished GPS voice. While the GPS voice itself seems to have annoyed and pushed the government, it is not the only loud voice in the car. Those actors have gained a more authoritative voice by relying on the information from the DCCC. The DCCC has also pushed climate NGOs into stepping up their game. This indirect feedback effect has created a substantial push on the government. Such a push does not seem prevalent in Norway, neither directly through the commission structure nor indirectly via other stakeholders.

Table 3: The perceived influence of the advisory bodies on climate policies through the four lenses on a scale from - - - (no influence) to + + + (major influence)

	Legitimiser	Knowledge broker	Policy entrepreneur	GPS voice
Norway	+	--	++	---
Denmark	---	+++	+	+++

Chapter 7 Conclusion

This thesis improves the understanding of the policy process, one of three elements in the Climate Policy Integration framework, used by Matti et al. (2021). By conducting interviews with key stakeholders, I have been able to collect perceptions about the dynamics of the policy process. Drawing on Averchenkova et al. (2021b), three lenses have been added to the policy process, all of them relating to the advising function of an advisory body, namely the legitimiser, knowledge broker, and policy entrepreneur. In addition, a GPS voice referring to the watchdog function has been added. Investigating the GPS voice creates a novel insight into how CACs affect climate policymaking that is not captured by using stricter tools such as Lockwood's (2021) credible commitment. For future research, it would be fruitful to test the GPS voice as an analytical lens further. For instance by looking at whether other countries with advisory bodies have experienced similar dynamics as with the DCCC. It would also be fruitful to investigate the robustness of the findings in this study by further investigating the DCCC. All the while outcome is difficult to measure since the renewed DCCC is not old enough, process tracing specific ideas raised by the DCCC or conducting more interviews with political insiders could provide interesting findings to compare with the results in this study.

Even though the two different institutional systems of advisory bodies may influence climate *policies* through the advisory role (although in different ways), only the GPS voice function in the Danish institutional system feeds into climate *politics*. The DCCC adds an element to the climate policymaking process that current institutions in Norway are not able to capture. Even though the institutional design of the DCCC in the Danish policy process is not necessarily transferable to countries outside Western Europe, it is possible to foresee a GPS voice being implemented in different ways. The GPS voice can i.e. contribute to decarbonisation by creating awareness to reconsider the institutional landscape. An independent body has the ability to propose authoritative advice, whether that is a slight left turn or a full U-turn, if possible.

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Appendices

Appendix 1 – Overview of Interviews

Number	Country	Interview code	Main relevant experience	Duration (min)	In person/online	Date
1	Norway	No_com1	Commission member	34	In person	09.02.2023
2	Norway	No_pol1	Political insider	49	In person	17.02.2023
3	Denmark	Dk_com1	DCCC secretariat	61	In person	20.02.2023
4	Denmark	Dk_cs1	Civil servant (KEFM)	38	In person	21.02.2023
5	Denmark	Dk_pol1	Political insider	71	Online	22.02.2023
6	Norway	No_cs1 No_cs2	Civil servants (KLD)	41	online	01.03.2023
7	Norway	No_com2	Commission member	29	In person	02.03.2023
8	Norway	No_cs3	Civil servant (KLD)	35	In person	07.03.2023
9	Denmark	Dk_exp1	External expert	49	Online	10.03.2023

Appendix 2 – Interview guide

Are you of the opinion that...
Policy process:
the advisory body contributes to changing internal or external political debates?
Policymakers/ stakeholders have changed perceptions, priorities, and/ or coordination of climate policy as a result of the advisory body?
the advisory body has affected the room for maneuvering for policymakers? If so, how?
Output:
the advisory body strengthens or contributes to the implementation of political initiatives?
Outcome:
these initiatives (output) have had an effect on emissions?
Contrafactual:
Would the advice be considered different if it came from a CAC that...
- Was independent/ non-independent?
- Was permanent/ non-permanent?
- Was legally embedded/ Government appointed/ non-government appointed?
- Was an expert body/ corporative body?
- Had a bigger/ smaller budget?
Are there other institutions you think have a larger effect on climate policymaking?

Appendix 2 – Interview invitation

Ås, 30.01.2023



Masteroppgave om handlingsrom i klimapolitikken

Min masteroppgave handler om hvordan beslutningstakere oppfatter handlingsrommet i utformingen av klimapolitikk. Jeg er interessert i om institusjoner som Klimaloven eller Klimarådet/ Teknisk beregningsutvalg for klima legger begrensninger på eller føringer for ens oppfattede handlingsrom. Blant annet om man som aktør i beslutningsprosessen tar aktivt høyde for disse institusjonene når man fremmer klimapolitiske forslag. Studiet er en komparativ studie av beslutningstaking i Norge og Danmark hvor jeg ønsker å sammenligne ulike institusjoners innflytelse på oppfattet handlingsrom innen klimapolitikktutforming i de to landene.

Jeg ønsker å intervju personer som har vært tett på utformingen av klimapolitikk i Norge og Danmark de siste årene. Jeg søker å komme i kontakt med nåværende/ tidligere ministre eller deres rådgivere, embedspersoner som har innsyn i beslutningsprosessen og medlemmer av institusjoner som Teknisk beregningsutvalg for klima (NO) og Klimarådet (DK). I tillegg vil jeg ta kontakt med enkelte parlamentarikere og forskere/ eksperter på området. Jeg sikter på å gjennomføre rundt fem intervjuer i hvert land.

Det er frivillig å delta i prosjektet. Hvis du velger å delta, kan du når som helst trekke samtykket tilbake uten å oppgi noen grunn. Alle dine personopplysninger vil da bli slettet. Det vil ikke ha noen negative konsekvenser for deg hvis du ikke ønsker å delta eller senere velger å trekke deg. Dersom du velger å delta i prosjektet, innebærer det et intervju på 30- 60 minutter. Jeg vil, i den grad du tillater, gjøre lydopptak av intervjuet og ta notater underveis. Dersom du ønsker det, vil jeg anonymisere opplysningene. Alle dine data vil bli behandlet konfidensielt. Av hensyn til å plassere uttalelsene i en kontekst vil jeg spørre om samtykke til å oppgi informasjon som land, arbeidssted og stillingsnivå. Jeg gjør oppmerksom på at noen uttalelser da vil kunne være mulig å identifisere indirekte. Alle referanser til intervjuet vil bli sendt til intervjuobjektet for sitatsjekk før endelig innlevering.

Informasjonen vil kun bli brukt til formålene omtalt i dette skrevet, og den blir oppbevart og lagret i henhold til universitetets retningslinjer. De som vil ha tilgang til denne informasjonen er student og veileder. Prosjektet vil etter planen avsluttes i juni 2023. Etter prosjektslutt vil datamaterialet med dine personopplysninger anonymiseres. Lydfiler og andre dokumenter som ikke fullt ut kan anonymiseres vil bli slettet.

Jeg håper du ønsker å delta i prosjektet. Ta kontakt dersom du har spørsmål om personvern, datalagring eller dine rettigheter.

Vennlig hilsen,


Bror Kristian Raanaas Tandberg

Student, Institutt for internasjonale miljø- og utviklingsstudier
Norges Miljø- og Biovitenskapelige Universitet
e-post: brta@nmbu.no
Tlf: +47 41797711

Appendix 3 – Consent form

Samtykkeerklæring – Deltakelse i forskningsprosjekt

Ytterligere om dine rettigheter:

Så lenge du kan identifiseres i datamaterialet, har du rett til:

- innsyn i hvilke opplysninger vi behandler om deg, og å få utlevert en kopi av opplysningene
- å få rettet opplysninger om deg som er feil eller misvisende
- å få slettet personopplysninger om deg
- å sende klage til Datatilsynet om behandlingen av dine personopplysninger

Hvis du har spørsmål til studien, eller ønsker å vite mer om eller benytte deg av dine rettigheter, ta kontakt med:

- Veileder Guri Bang, Norges Miljø- og Biovitenskapelige Universitet (NMBU): guri.bang@nmbu.no/
[+4767232660](tel:+4767232660)
- NMBU sitt personvernombud: Hanne Pernille Gulbrandsen på personvernombud@nmbu.no

Har du spørsmål knyttet til Personverntjenester sin vurdering av prosjektet, kan du ta kontakt med:

- Personverntjenester på epost (personverntjenester@sikt.no) eller på telefon: +4753211500.

Med vennlig hilsen

Prosjektansvarlig

Professor Guri Bang



Samtykkeerklæring

Jeg har mottatt og forstått informasjon om prosjektet Handlingsrom i klimapolitikken, og har fått anledning til å stille spørsmål. Jeg samtykker til:

- å delta i intervju
- at lydfil opptas under intervjuet
- at opplysninger om meg publiseres
- at opplysninger om meg publiseres slik at jeg kan gjenkjennes indirekte
- at opplysninger om meg anonymiseres så jeg ikke kan bli gjenkjent

Jeg samtykker til at mine opplysninger behandles frem til prosjektet er avsluttet

(Signert av prosjektdeltaker, dato)

Appendix 4 – Quotations original language – Danish respondents

No.	English translation	Original language
1	And we did a reputation analysis not so long ago, where we asked questions (...) about the role of the DCCC. And there was a lot of emphasis on the fact that the DCCC is independent, has this expert role, and that there is a lot of support for the DCCC in general.	Og der har vi lavet en omdømmeanalyse for ikke så lang tid siden, hvor vi stilte spørgsmål (...) omkring klimarådets rolle. Og der var nemlig stor vægt på, at det her med, at klimarådet er uafhængig, har den her ekspertrolle, og at der er meget opbakninger til klimarådet generelt.
2	So you could say that the Prime Minister also created business committees [the Green Business Forum] in Denmark. But they had no influence in reality. So I would say that if you had done that, if you had brought business people into it [the DCCC], then you would have had such a public affairs lobbyist all-you-can-eat buffet.	Altså man kan sige, at statsministeren skabte jo også sådan erhvervsudvalg [Grønt Erhvervsforum] i Danmark. Men de havde reelt ingen indflydelse. Så altså jeg vil sige, hvis du havde gjort det, du havde draget erhvervsfolk ind i det [Klimarådet], så havde du haft Sådan en public affairs-lobbyist ta-selv buffet.
3	It is clear that it does contribute, that the feedback you get from the DCCC from year to year pulls in the same direction, where you could fear that if there were several independent committees that in different contexts should make statements, that you would then pull in one direction in one year, and another direction the next year.	Det er klart, at det jo trods alt hjælper på, at den feedback, man får fra klimarådet år til år, den trækker i samme retning, hvor man jo godt kunne frygte, hvis det mere blev flere uafhængige udvalg der i forskellige sammenhænge skulle udtale sig, at man så ville trække i den ene retning for det ene år, og den anden retning det næste år.
4	They [DCCC] said we should make plans for when things were coming. Then we made plans. Then they make sure to publish an analysis before then. So in that way, they become the most important problem-defining body in many ways.	De [Klimarådet] sagde vi skulle lave planer for hvornår tingene kom, så laver vi planer. Så sørger de for at komme med en analyse inden da. Så på den måde så bliver de på mange måder det, det sådan det vigtigste problemdefinerende organ.
5	To a large extent, they [the DCCC] helped to ensure that there was a floor on the ambitions all the time. That you couldn't be situated too far away from what the DCCC said without being penalised politically. So in that way, I think they played a major role concerning the design.	De satte i høj grad, de var med til at sikre at der var et floor, altså på ambitionerne hele tiden. At man kunne ikke ligge for langt væk fra det Klimarådet sagde, uden at blive straffet for det politisk. Så så på den måde synes jeg de spillede en stor rolle i forhold til udformningen.
6	So, moving the window for what is sensible climate policy: Yes. Moving the concrete climate politics? Then it perhaps requires that they [the DCCC] become even more concrete about how to do it.	Så flyttet vinduet for hvad der er fornuftig klimapolitik: Ja. Flytte den konkrete klimapolitik? Kræver det måske at man man bliver endnu mere konkret, hvordan man gør.
7	I don't think I immediately feel that it's because they [the DCCC] narrow the room for manoeuvring so much. I believe they contribute to making sure that there is always something happening, and contribute to pushing the pace up. But it's not because I experience that the DCCC narrows the choices that politicians or the ministry have	Jeg tror ikke umiddelbart at jeg føler, at det er fordi, at de indsnævrer handlerrummet så meget. Jeg tror, at de er med til at sørge for, at der hele tiden sker noget, og de er med til at presse tempoet op. Men det er ikke fordi, at jeg oplever det som, at Klimarådet indsnævrer de valg, som politikerne eller ministeriet har
8	[T]he perception is that many of the recommendations have been followed. Most of	[O]pfattelsen er at der er mange af anbefalingerne der er fulgt. De fleste er delvist fulgt, hvor at

them have been partially adopted, where the DCCC has made some recommendations and said, this is how it ideally should look like. Typically some political priorities have been made after that, resulting in the recommendations not fully being implemented as the DCCC had recommended.

Klimarådet har lavet nogle anbefalinger og sagt, det her er sådan det skal se ud ideelt set. Så ofte har der været nogle politiske prioriteringer efter det, som så gør, at den anbefaling ikke er fulgt helt som Klimarådet havde anbefalet det.

9	The DCCC could have played a bigger role if they had more political musicality or political understanding.	[Klimarådet] kunne have spillet en større rolle, hvis de havde haft mere politisk musikalitet eller politisk tæft [gehør].
10	[A]t the same time, the good thing about it is that sometimes we [the DCCC] can make recommendations that are a little more general and systemic, rather than if you were sitting within a ministry. Then it would have to be more concrete on exactly how it should be designed and how high the subsidy should be.	[S]amtidig at det gode ved det er, at nogle gange kan vi [Klimarådet] lave nogle anbefalinger, som er lidt mere overordnede og systemiske. Fremfor hvis man måske satt i et ministerium. Så skulle det være mere konkret på præcis hvordan skal det udformes, og hvor højt skal tilskuddet være
11	[W]ith independent experts, you could say, you get different advice. Then it's more, a higher degree of certainty that it's in the interest of the society. On the contrary, it may sometimes be a little further away from reality. Some academics have a more academic approach and deal with it more on a principal level.	[M]ed nogen uafhængige eksperter får du nogle andre råd, kan man sige. Da er det mere, si, skal en højere sikkerhed for at det med, hvad hedder det, samfundets interesse som, men omvendt kan man sige, så gør jo det måske også at det, det kan nogle gange komme lidt længere væk fra virkeligheden. Det er jo universitetsfolk der har en mere akademisk tilgang til. Der altså beskæftiger sig med det mere på det principielle niveau
12	The process with the Council's analyses and reports is that all nine members of the Council must be involved in all analyses, and all recommendations are discussed and approved by the Council. This ensures high quality and sets a natural limit to the number of analyses we can publish in a year.	Processen med Klimarådets analyser og rapporter er, at alle Klimarådets ni medlemmer skal være inde over alle analyser, og alle anbefalinger diskuteres og godkendes i rådet. Det sikrer en høj kvalitet og sætter en naturlig begrænsning for, hvor mange analyser vi kan udkomme med i løbet af et år
13	[T]herefore, the DCCC also has an important role in thinking long-term and delivering recommendations for the long-term transition. And that's why they [politicians] also have to take a position on the DCCC's long-term advice, which they might not necessarily have done if we hadn't been there. Precisely because they only sit there for four years at a time.	[D]erfor har Klimarådet også en vigtig rolle i at tænke langsigtet og levere nogle anbefalinger ind til den langsigtede omstilling. Og derfor bliver de [politicians] også nødt til at tage stilling til Klimarådets anbefalinger på langsigtethed, som de måske ikke nødvendigvis havde gjort, hvis vi ikke havde været der. Netop fordi de kun sidder der i fire år av gangen.
14	There is a civil service that has a pretty clear idea of what they want. And who then only listens to a limited extent to whoever provides the input.	Der er et embedsværk, som har en ret klar ide om, hvad Det er man gerne vil. Og som så kun lytter i et begrænset omfang til, uanset hvem det er der kommer med indputen.
15	[T]hen it is also if we ultimately assess that the things they come up with, whether they can be used and whether they make sense, based on the overall picture we see, which is decisive for whether we listen, or whether we follow it or not.	[S]å er det jo også, om vi i sidste ende vurderer, at de ting, de kommer med, om de kan bruges, og om de giver mening ud fra det billede, vi ser samlet set, som der er afgørende for, om vi lytter, eller om vi følger det eller ej.

<p>16 It would have become a completely different debate and much more subdued and a completely different direction and a different force if they [the DCCC] had not existed.</p>	<p>Det var blevet en helt anden debat om og meget mere afdæmpet og en helt anden retning og en anden styrke hvis de ikke havde eksisteret.</p>
<p>17 [W]e can't just be indifferent to those [the DCCC's] ideas, and if we really think that some of the things they come up with are not legitimate, we are also forced to justify it differently than if it had been a smaller actor who came up with it.</p>	<p>[V]i kan jo ikke bare være ligeglade med de idéer, og hvis vi vidterlig synes, at nogle af de ting, de [Klimarådet] kommer med ikke er berettiget, så bliver vi jo også aftunget at skulle begrunde det på en anden måde, end hvis det havde været mindre aktører, der kom med det.</p>
<p>18 It [EU policy] affects it rather strongly. I believe that's something that the civil service emphasizes, to say, that we have to comply with the objectives coming from the EU, so they have a different weight than the ones adopted [through political settlements]. There is not a similar conception [by the civil service] that one can get away with them [EU regulations].</p>	<p>Det [EU-politik] påvirker det jo ret skarp. Jeg tror det er noget af det som man i embedsværket har fokus på, at sige, hvad er det for nogle målsætninger der kommer fra EU og sige, dem er vi nødt til at overholde så de har en anden vægt enn dem man har, man har vedtaget, dem kan man ikke, dem er der ikke på samme måde en forestilling om at man potentielt kunne slippe ud af.</p>
<p>19 So you could say that it became extremely difficult to navigate the debate with something that is a very academically strong council, which then gets picked up by some journalist or an opposition party, and which interprets what the Guardian Council says.</p>	<p>Så man kan sige at det blev jo også enormt svært, at ligesom at navigere i debatten for noget, som er et meget fagligt stærkt råd, som så bliver hevet af en eller anden journalist eller et oppositionsparti, og som ligesom fortolker på, hvad vogternes råd siger.</p>
<p>20 And in reality, it forced all the NGOs to step up. And which, because if the DCCC was on the scene, then the NGOs should preferably be on the scene even sooner, or if afterwards, they should be even sharper to kind of have a market.</p>	<p>Og tvang i virkeligheden også alle NGOerne til at steppe op. Og som altså, fordi hvis Klimarådet var på banen, så skulle NGOerne allerhelst på banen endnu før eller når hvis de bagefter, så skulle de være endnu skarpere for ligesom at have et marked.</p>
<p>(21) [T]he minister did so by asking the DCCC to help come up with some recommendations for the agriculture [regarding a CO₂ tax]. And there, they ended up making some recommendations that went (...), because they were the chairs of the committee and they had to take responsibility for some of the recommendations made by the committee, which went against the recommendations they had made a year before.</p>	<p>[D]er gjorde ministeren jo så det at han han bad Klimarådet om at være med til at komme med nogle anbefalinger til landbruget [angående CO₂ skat]. Og der kom de jo så til at lave nogle anbefalinger, som gik (...), fordi de var formænd for det udvalg så og måtte de stå på mål for nogle af de anbefalinger som udvalget lavede, som gik imod de anbefalinger, de selv havde lavet et år før.</p>
<p>(22) The Ministry of Finance, for example, has announced a price on CO₂ to be used in economic analyses, and the DCCC (...) have been out and said that it should reflect the fact that we have a 70% reduction target. In that case they have insisted on saying yes, but it is a politically adopted target. It is not an international agreement that we have implemented, so therefore we are not bound as such. The agreement can be cancelled tomorrow, therefore we still include an economic price of CO₂ that is equivalent to the EU's quota price [ETS], because that's the price we have to pay if we choose to emit CO₂ in Denmark.</p>	<p>Finansministeriet for eksempel har udmeldt en pris på på CO₂, som man skal bruge i samfundsøkonomiske analyser og den pris har Klimarådet (...) været ude og sige, den bør afspejle, at vi har et 70%-mål. Og der har man jo fastholdt at sige ja, men det er et politisk vedtaget mål. Det er ikke noget vi har indgået en international aftale om fra Danmarks side, så derfor er vi ikke bundet som sådan. Den kan opsiges i morgen den aftalte, så derfor så regner vi fortsat med en samfundsøkonomisk pris på CO₂, der er svarende til EUs kvotepris, fordi det er de penge vi skal betale, hvis vi i Danmark vælger at udlede co 2.</p>

Appendix 5 – Quotations, original language. Norwegian respondents

No.	English translation	Original language
1	[I] think that when you appoint a public committee, it is because the government wants or (...) wants to achieve results in an area, and then there is a political mandate in it that has a high chance of being followed up if you make clear recommendations.	[J]eg tenker at når du oppnevner et offentlig utvalg, så er det fordi at regjeringen vil eller (...) ønsker å oppnå resultater på et område, og da ligger det et politisk mandat i det som har jo stor sjanse for å bli fulgt opp hvis man kommer med klare anbefalinger.
2	The only way to achieve this 48.7 million tonnes emissions target was biofuels, and [the government] adopted a requirement of 20% inclusion [of biofuels in fuels] in 2020. (...) I don't think an independent council would have entered those controversies. Since the professional advice would be unequivocally against it.	Eneste måten da å ha mulighet til å nå dette utslippsmålet på 48,7 millioner tonn var biodrivstoff, og det vedtok [regjeringen] innblandingskrav med 20% i 2020. (...) Jeg tror ikke et utvalg ville gitt det rådet.
3	I think that the systematics, which you build up over time (...) can have an impact on how established they [a committee] become in a decision-making structure.	Jeg tror, at den systematikken, som man opparbeider seg litt over tid (...) kan ha betydning for hvor etablert de blir i en beslutningsstruktur.
4	[T]here are several proposals in the public debate that may seem very straightforward and reliable, why don't you just do it? But then there are a lot of reasons why it is not possible to implement it in that way (...) and getting it established with an academic basis will help to steer the discussion onto a more constructive track.	[D]et kommer en del forslag i offentligheten som kan virke veldig sånn greit og tilforlatelig, hvorfor gjør man ikke bare det? Men så finnes det en hel del grunner til at det ikke går an å gjennomføre det på den måten (...) og da vil jo det å få det etablert i et faglig underlag være til hjelp for å spore diskusjonen inn på et mer konstruktivt spor.
5	I think that they [the knowledge provider] would have come to much the same conclusion. (...) the enquiries in [Klimakur] are good and they have been independent. So I don't think the basis [of knowledge] would have been very different	Jeg tror at de [the knowledge provider] ville kommet til mye av det samme. (...) utredningene i klimakur er gode og de har vært selvstendige. Så jeg tror ikke grunnlaget ville vært veldig annerledes
6	You wouldn't have the gradual increase in the CO2 tax up to 2000 NOK in 2030, which is one of the areas on which there is broad agreement (...), but the CO2 tax up to NOK 2,000 is part of the Climate Cure, which means that we now have a broad majority in favour of it.	Du vil ikke hatt sånn som opptrappingsplanene i CO2 avgiften for eksempel fram mot 2000 kroner i 2030 som er en av de områdene det er bred enighet om (...), men akkurat CO2 avgiften opp til 2000 kroner er en del av den klimakur-utredningen som gjør at vi nå har et bredt flertall for det.
7	So you can see the trails from the large climate risk committee to the small expert committee [In the 'oil fund'] that makes very specific recommendations and then into the mandate of the oil fund.	Så der ser du liksom et veldig sånn spor fra det store klimarisikoutvalget til den lille liksom mer ekspertutvalget som kommer med helt konkrete anbefalinger og så inn i mandatet. For oljefondet da.
8	[F]irst of all, it depends on what kind of advice and recommendations they [the council] are to give, if they are to give professional advice, then I think it would be strange if there were no independent academics in the council. At the same time, I think that if you had gone to the complete opposite end, that it had only been academics, then you would	[A]ltså for det første så det kommer jo an på liksom hva slags råd og anbefalinger de [rådet] skal gi da, hvis de skal gi, som faglige råd, så synes jeg kanskje det ville vært rart hvis det ikke satt noen uavhengige fagpersoner i det rådet. Samtidig så tror jeg at hvis du hadde gått helt på motsatt side, at det bare hadde vært fagpersoner,

	have risked getting advice that is very far removed from reality.	så ville du risikert å ha fått råd som er liksom veldig frarevet virkeligheten da.
9	But I think that when it comes to policy proposals, if you have a secretariat from the ministry that has clear views on it [formulation of policies], then I think it can affect the recommendations a bit.	Jeg tror nok det at når det kommer til politikkforslag da er det nok, hvis du har et sekretariat fra departementet som har klare synspunkter på det, så tror jeg nok det kan skape litt, at det kan påvirke rådene noe.
10	[T]he Ministry of Climate and Environment is funding it, but they are still independent committees. It consists of independent experts, so even though the committees are subordinate to a ministry and funded by a ministry, they are still independent.	[D]et er klima og miljødepartementet som finansierer det, men det er fortsatt uavhengige utvalg. Det består av uavhengige fagpersoner, så selv om det er, de utvalgene er underlagt et departement og finansieres av et departement, så er de fortsatt uavhengige.
11	Because when you have, for example, a concrete proposal with a recommendation [from a committee], the opposition or the media or others may ask why don't you follow up on this?	For når man da har et, for eksempel et konkret forslag med en anbefaling [fra et utvalg] så kan opposisjonen eller media eller andre stille spørsmål ved hvorfor følger dere ikke opp akkurat dette?
12	[NOUs] can impose some limitations in the sense that measures that were politically thought to be effective are not perceived as effective by the committee. And so it kind of undermines a measure that you might have wanted to implement. But it also brings more agreement on which measures are effective and which are not, and that's an advantage when attempting to get a broad majority.	[NOUer] kan legge noen begrensninger på den måten at tiltak, som man politisk trodde var effektive ikke oppleves som effektive fra fra utvalget. Og dermed så slår det litt beina under et tiltak man kanskje hadde lyst til å gjennomføre. Men det bringer jo også mer enighet om hvilke tiltak som er effektive og ikke da, og det er jo en fordel når man skal på en måte få et bredt flertall da.
13	[An independent permanent committee] could have given an academic assessment of the Green Book that has now been published. (...) does it deliver what it should or not? Right, is this good enough compared to other countries? Does it provide enough direction for the future? Are there enough instruments in the proposal to achieve the goals it says?	[Et uavhengig permanent utvalg] kunne gitt en faglig vurdering av denne grønne bok som nå ble gitt ut. (...) Leverer den på det den skal eller gjør den ikke? Ikke sant, er dette er bra nok sammenlignet med andre land? Gir den nok retning framover? Er det nok virkemidler i forslaget til å nå målene man sier?
14	The EU decisions that we are obliged to reach. It is not a situation to negotiate.	EU-vedtakene som vi er forpliktet til å nå. Det er ikke en forhandlingssituasjon.
15	[The Climate Act] has done that the climate goals have stood firm. (...) there has never been a discussion about whether to go in the opposite direction to a smaller, less ambitious goal.	[Klimaloven] har jo gjort at klimamålene har stått støtt. (...) man har jo aldri hatt en diskusjon om man skal på en måte gå motsatt vei til mindre ambisiøse mål.

Appendix 6 – MAXQDA coding table⁸

Document System	
Documents	230
no_dep3	21
no_com1	15
no_pol1	22
no_dep1 og no_dep2	19
no_exp1	23
dk_dep1	20
dk_pol1	49
dk_com1	34
dk_exp1	27
Sets	0
Code System	
Code System	230
advising function	16
legitimerende (kunnskapsgrunnlag vs. beslutning)	0
politikere	11
embedsverk	2
learning	5
ekspertdefinisjon	9
mandat (TBU f.eks)	2
operationality (uavhengighet vs policy relevance)	22
Klimarådet påvirkning (watchdog?)	41
budsjett	5
intern klimarådet debatt forbedre	6
legal role	8
permanence	7
uavhengighet	22
handlingsrom	19
output/ implementering	7
outcome	7
Andre institusjoner/ konkurrerende forklaringer	41
Sets	0

⁸ Since I lost editing rights to the coding program during stage four of the coding process, I finished the revisioning and editing of the codes manually



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