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Violence Against Brazilian Indigenous Peoples During Jair Bolsonaro's Administration

Beatriz Henna
International Environmental Studies

Declaration

I, Beatriz Henna, declare that this thesis is a result of my research investigations and findings. Sources of information other than my own have been acknowledged and a reference list has been appended. This work has not been previously submitted to any other university for award of any type of academic degree.

Signature: 

Date: May 15th, 2022

Abstract

Violence against the Brazilian Indigenous peoples has increased significantly since the end of 2018. It is well-known that minorities face exclusion, marginalization, and violence daily; the situation with the Indigenous peoples in Brazil is not different. Since the arrival of the colonizers, they have been expelled from their original lands, slaved, and mistreated. However, the situation became alarming after the election of the current Brazilian President, Jair Bolsonaro. This thesis aims to analyze the connection between Jair Bolsonaro's actions and rhetoric, and the violence escalation toward the Indigenous population.

To assess the relationship between a leader's speeches and the actual acts of violence, I used a violence framework, which categorizes violence into three: direct, cultural, and structural. The latter has a sub-category: institutional. Due to the Covid-19 pandemic, collecting in-situ data was impossible, therefore the data used for this thesis was drawn from secondary sources. The main data was collected through the Violence Against Indigenous Peoples in Brazil reports from a recognized organization called Cimi (Missionary Indigenist Council). Additionally, data from newspapers, social media, and interviews were gathered to deeply determine the association between the President's rhetoric and substantial acts of violence against the Indigenous peoples.

The results from the analysis show an evident increase in violence (i.e., murders, territory invasions, lack of health care, illegal resource exploitation, racism, among others) toward the Indigenous peoples since the election of President Jair Bolsonaro. I argue that his hate speeches have encouraged people to commit such acts of violence. Furthermore, I claim that through his actions of trying to pass anti-constitutional law proposals, he has violated Indigenous rights, and advocated for others to do the same.

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List of abbreviations

Bolsonaro	Jair Bolsonaro
CCT	Conditional Cash Transfer
Cimi	Missionary Indigenist Council (<i>Conselho Indigenista Missionário</i>)
Dilma	Dilma Rousseff
Funai	National Indigenous Foundation (<i>Fundação Nacional do Índio</i>)
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
Inpe	National Institute of Spatial Research (<i>Instituto Nacional de Pesquisas Espaciais</i>)
LAI	Law on Access of Information (<i>Lei de Acesso à Informação</i>)
Lula	Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva
Marés	Carlos Frederico Marés de Souza Filho
MPF	Federal Public Mistry (<i>Ministério Público Federal</i>)
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
Paulino	Paulo Paulino Guajajara
PIN	National Integration Plan (<i>Plano de Integração Nacional</i>)
PL	Law Proposal (<i>Projeto de Lei</i>)
PMDB	Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (<i>Movimento Democrático Brasileiro</i>)
PT	Worker's Party (<i>Partido dos Trabalhadores</i>)
Sesai	Special Secretariat for Indigenous Health (<i>Distrito Sanitário Especial Indígena</i>)
Temer	Michel Temer
TI	Indigenous Territories (<i>Terra Indígena</i>)
UN	United Nations (<i>Organização das Nações Unidas</i>)

1. Introduction

This thesis aims to analyze the relationship between the current Brazilian President's, Jair Bolsonaro, actions and rhetoric, and the rise of acts of violence against the Indigenous peoples. I argue that through hate speeches and anti-constitutional behavior, the President has encouraged and decriminalized attacks on the Indigenous peoples' rights. This research desires to demonstrate how a political power can influence different types of assaults, making the minorities feel even more discriminated against and marginalized.

Establishing democracy is a turbulent process. While some countries are still fighting for freedom, others, have been democratic for decades and are facing authoritarian policies that threaten their established rights. The world is facing a reinforcement of far-right authoritarian movements. Powerful public figures have inflated their opinions as facts, supporting violent forces through governmental campaigns that discredit any other version of the reality that contradicts their goals. Far-right authoritarians produce and legitimize human hierarchies, promote anti-intellectualism with anti-science attacks, try to achieve racial and religious purity, attack the media's credibility by launching false information, and cultivate militant patriarchy that is anchored in past top-down laws (Pascale, 2019).

For instance, this can be seen in the United States of America, with Donald Trump. Warren-Gordon and Rhineberger (2021) claim that "The Trump Effect" is due to Trump's discriminatory rhetoric, which encouraged parts of the population to be more racist, leading to an increase in violence and hate crimes in the country. Pascale (2019) lists Brazil as one of the countries where far-right authoritarian movements have gained power in democracies, with Michel Temer's administration and Jair Bolsonaro's election campaign and government. Politicians use the media and social media to spread false information, intentionally misleading the population, to consolidate power.

Since the arrival of the Portuguese in Brazil, the Indigenous peoples have faced exclusion and discrimination (dos Santos, 2020). During military dictatorship, their situation became worse, with mass murders, persecution, and torture (Ditadura, s.a.). However, in 1988 a new Constitution was enacted, where Indigenous rights are guaranteed. The next years seemed to be improving for them, with a strong democratic cycle, and the election of the left-sided

president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva in 2003 (Anderson, 2011). Nonetheless, in 2018, with the election of Jair Bolsonaro, the Indigenous peoples saw a step back in their rights (Da Silva & Rodrigues, 2021).

The marginalized and oppressed minorities face, more than others, the effects of violent rhetoric. There is an increase of fear if the oratory comes from powerful political leaders (Byman, 2021). Far-right authoritarian movements use hateful language that humiliates, discourages, and sometimes confuses. For instance, with the election of Jair Bolsonaro, a strong ultraconservative policy was established in Brazil. The Indigenous peoples are facing an unprecedented attack since the military dictatorship, which places them in an even more critical situation (Tourneau, 2019). The Indigenous peoples are part of the Brazilian population as much as any other Brazilian, thus they cannot be left as a marginalized species. Hence, it is essential to assess the relationship between speeches and actual violence, so future policies can be designed to prevent this situation from happening again.

Existing literature on Jair Bolsonaro's effects on Indigenous peoples' rights, such as Carmo (2019); Da Silva and Rodrigues (2021); Ferrante and Fearnside (2021); Rapozo (2021); Stewart et al. (2021); Tourneau (2019); Urzedo and Chatterjee (2021); Watts (2019) mainly focus on how Bolsonaro has violated Indigenous constitutional rights, the impacts on the minorities of his interviews and social media posts, and the false information he has spread. Stewart et al. (2021) show that environmental crimes and aggressions against the Indigenous peoples are a solid characteristic of Bolsonaro's administration. Additionally, both Stewart et al. (2021) and Da Silva and Rodrigues (2021) mention that Bolsonaro's authoritarianism, with the weakening of environmental protection and social policies, can decimate the Indigenous communities in Brazil. Furthermore, Ferrante and Fearnside (2021), Rapozo (2021), and Urzedo and Chatterjee (2021) agree that President Jair Bolsonaro has implemented an extensive process of land dispossession to the Indigenous peoples, restricting them of their constitutional rights, which has enabled invasions in their lands, violent attacks, exploitation, and violation of human rights.

While all mentioned studies recognize that the Indigenous peoples need to regain power to control their traditional territories, there is a need for holding the President accountable for the crimes and attacks the Indigenous peoples have been suffering since his election campaign. A connection between Bolsonaro's oratory and acts of violence is missing. This missing piece is

required to attribute the President to the violent situation that has been happening to the Indigenous peoples and the environment in Brazil.

Yet, there is a lack of investigation connecting the President's rhetoric to the rise of actual violence the Indigenous peoples have been facing since he got elected. I argue that through his hate speeches and actions, Bolsonaro has influenced and encouraged, directly and indirectly, structural, institutional, cultural, and direct violence towards the Indigenous peoples in Brazil. Moreover, I believe that investigating the connection between his rhetoric and *how* it has impacted others to commit crimes will provide a better understanding of the power of leaders in indirectly persuading all four types of violence to arise. Therefore, this thesis will connect acts of violence that the Indigenous peoples have suffered to Bolsonaro's legal moves and hate rhetoric.

Moreover, the Indigenous peoples must have their voices and concerns heard. Their exclusion, marginalization, and violence need a stopping point. Therefore, understanding how Jair Bolsonaro has affected Indigenous lives is extremely important. This thesis provides an overview of Jair Bolsonaro's, current Brazilian President, administration, and its effects on Indigenous Peoples in the country. It uses qualitative methodology through the application of concepts from a framework developed by de Carvalho et al. (2021), which included concepts introduced by (Galtung, 1969). The concepts are related to violence and its different types, direct, structural, institutional, and cultural.

This analysis will enlighten the relevance of a president's rhetoric, and how it reverberates in every member of the society. With this, the main object of this thesis is to describe the current situation in Brazil regarding what violations the Indigenous peoples and their rights have suffered since Bolsonaro's election campaign. Later, Jair Bolsonaro's rhetoric and actions since his election campaign, in 2018, will be discussed. Finally, the following research question will be assessed: What is the connection between Jair Bolsonaro's actions and the increase of violence toward the Indigenous peoples' rights in Brazil?

In order to answer the research question proposed, data were collected from the Violence Reports Against Indigenous Peoples in Brazil from the *Conselho Indigenista Missionário* (Cimi) and media coverage, and the analysis thereof was made with the use of the framework

developed by de Carvalho et al. (2021), which was initially proposed by Galtung (1969); (1971; 1990), with the approach of direct, structural and institutional, and cultural violence.

The outline of this thesis consists of eight chapters. Chapter 1, the current chapter, introduces the larger context of authoritarian governments, and how minorities, as the Indigenous peoples, are affected by this administration. Moreover, it covers the purpose of this thesis, presents the research question, and why the subject is relevant. Chapter 2 presents the methodology of the study, explaining the reasons behind the use of secondary data, where the data were collected from, and the type of research conducted. Then I present the types of data analyzed. Chapter 3 aims to introduce the theoretical framework used, where I explain the logic behind the development of the framework and describe in-depth the concepts used to analyze the data. Chapter 4 gives an overall picture of the historical background of the Indigenous peoples in Brazil from the colonization of the country until the current time. Chapter 5 showcases the findings from the data collection. Chapter 6 discusses the findings from Chapter 5 in accordance with the research question and thesis statement, using the framework from Chapter 3 and the methodology presented in Chapter 2. I divided Chapter 6 into three subchapters, i.e., 6.1, regarding structural and institutional violence, 6.2 covering cultural violence, and 6.3 encompassing direct violence. Chapter 7 summarizes and concludes the thesis, highlighting its main idea and relating it to the larger global context. Finally, Chapter 8 contains the references I have read and used during the whole process.

2. Methodology

In this thesis, I will analyze secondary data to provide an insight about the research answer. The reasons behind the choice of methodology will be detailed and explained further in this chapter, which are the pandemic of Covid-19 and the lack of resources and time, therefore becoming incapable of executing in-situ research. In the secondary data analysis, the researcher relies solely on existing data from different sources – the internet, peer-reviewed journals, textbooks, government archives, and organization archives (Hox & Boeijs, 2005; Johnston, 2017; Pederson et al., 2020). Secondary data analysis is a systematic research method with a flexible approach (Johnston, 2017).

To deeply understand all perspectives of the topic to be researched, and due to the lack of reliable official governmental resources, the main research will be made using reports from a non-governmental organization called Cimi (*Conselho Indigenista Missionário*). Through the reports, both qualitative and quantitative data can be assessed. Cimi launches every year, since 1996, the Violence Report Against Indigenous Peoples in Brazil. The reports use data from Cimi regional registers, indigenous arraignments, occurrence bulletin, press news, and official information from the Special Secretariat for Indigenous Health (Sesai), which is obtained through the Law on Access to Information (LAI), from the Federal Public Ministry (MPF) and the National Indigenous Foundation (Funai), among other public bodies. Finding reliable government-produced statistics in Latin America countries is complicated, due to the lack of economical capital and labor (Divides, 2010), I have chosen to use the reports from Cimi as the main data collection.

To confirm the credibility and reliability of the Cimi reports, de Carvalho et al. (2021) analyzed and compared official and unofficial data available to them. They were able to evaluate the accuracy of the Violence Report Against Indigenous Peoples in Brazil. The data from the report and other sources overlap, indicating a good validity. Furthermore, Cimi's data collection and results are transparent, every step of the way is documented and traceable, thus the reports can be considered trustworthy.

Moreover, I will assess media coverage and news through discourse analysis, to sense how the language used in speeches is used to legitimize and lead to acts of violence. The main goal of the discourse analysis in this research is to deeply comprehend the power of a speech, which

in this case can put lives at risk. I will conduct this research through the ‘research question-driven’ approach, in which I had a priori question and will look for data that suit my study to answer the proposed question. Overall, the news will be chosen due to certain criteria: the reliability of the newspaper and the number of other news about the same subject. Sources with such high trustworthiness in Brazil are O Globo, CNN Brasil, BBC Brasil, El País Brasil, Folha Press, G1, and official Plenary Sessions. I will search the president’s social media to analyze the type of news he shared and his rhetoric. Finally, the news websites will be also used as additional data for some information that might not be found in the Cimi reports. The history of the newspapers will be considered, making sure not to choose biased sources or underreport an event.

Using secondary data can have advantages and disadvantages. It can be advantageous, especially during the Covid-19 pandemic times we are facing, where traveling to conduct fieldwork has become complicated. Travel restrictions were put in place to control the pandemic and entering Indigenous communities has become forbidden, making the use of secondary data a feasible option. Additionally, using already collected data has lower costs than collecting primary data in-situ, hence benefitting researchers with limited time and resources (Cheng & Phillips, 2014; Hox & Boeijs, 2005). Conducting online interviews for this study was not an option, since most indigenous communities are secluded, having no access to internet connection or mobile devices. Besides, all information published is detailed and unbiased. Using secondary data enables the researcher to test different approaches to the study. Finally, the researcher can cross-link data from different sources, which can provide an important contribution to the subject studied (Cheng & Phillips, 2014; Pederson et al., 2020).

In contrast, using pre-existing data can be questionable for reasons such as overuse or unawareness of nuances, since the researcher was not involved in the data collection, and information can be missing (Cheng & Phillips, 2014; Hox & Boeijs, 2005; Pederson et al., 2020). Pondering the pros and cons of using secondary data, I decided to use this strategy. First, due to the pandemic sanitary barriers, it was out of the question to conduct fieldwork research; second, to ensure the data are reliable, I will use high-quality studies already published, and well-known newspapers with high creditability.

This study is qualitative. According to Berg et. al (2012), qualitative research seeks answers by analyzing patterns in cases, which allows an understanding of perceptions. The authors also

mention triangulation as a method of using different data-collection techniques, different researchers, and different notes to investigate the same issue, having, therefore, confirmation and validation. However, since this study will be handled by one researcher only, triangulation will be conducted by using different notes and techniques, such as unofficial data reports cross-checked with official data from the government, and media coverage to understand the issue in-depth.

Furthermore, the research approach used here is an instrumental case study, in which a specific group of people will be studied to acquire a broader perception of the topic. This approach has the advantage of focusing on the particular instead of the general (Crowe et al., 2011).

I will proceed with the analysis in three steps: (1) gathering data from NGO reports and media coverage; (2) developing the theoretical framework based on relevant literature, and (3) analyzing and discussing the data collected based on the framework chosen, to deeply understand the issue.

3. Theoretical framework

I will use the theoretical framework developed by de Carvalho et al. (2021), which was inspired by the approaches of direct, symbolic, and structural violence, initially proposed by Galtung (1969; 1971; 1990) and further developed by Del Olmo (1975).

According to Galtung (1969), violence was too focused on direct harm to an individual, therefore he introduced the concepts of cultural and structural violence, which to him underlies the root causes of direct violence. Structural violence is defined as indirect harm, in which the responsible is unclear, and it is caused by a vast combination of rules that govern the society, known as social injustice. Cultural violence, in turn, is used to legitimize the other two types of violence, making them look and feel right, and being claimed as aspects of culture. Galtung (1990) presented in a lecture at the University of Melbourne Peace Studies Group in March 1989 the concept and definition of cultural violence: “(...) those aspects of culture, the symbolic sphere of our existence – exemplified by religion and ideology, language and art, empirical science, and formal science...” (Galtung, 1990, 291). In addition, he defines direct violence as that committed by a concrete person or actor. Galtung (1969) goes further, by taking a systemic approach to violence. He gives an example to differentiate between direct and structural violence: direct violence is destroying a machine-human body – directly, while structural is preventing the machine from working, by denying a source of energy or denying movement.

Furthermore, to make the different types of violence more understandable, Galtung (1990) developed the triangle of violence, in which each type of violence – direct, structural, and cultural – is on one corner of an equilateral triangle. Structural and cultural violence are the sources of direct violence; therefore, they stand at the bottom of the triangle. An act of violence can start at any corner of the triangle. He defines direct violence as an event, structural violence as a process, and cultural violence as an invariant (figure 1).

Figure 1 – Galtung's violence triangle




Figure created inspired on Galtung (1990)

Later, inspired by Galtung's concepts, Del Olmo (1975) added another type of violence: institutional, referring mainly to legal omission. The focus of her study is on Latin America and the differences regarding violence between southern and northern countries. She mentions that the main difference is that in the south, the most practiced violence is structural. Del Olmo goes further, explaining that in southern countries, only direct or guerrilla violence was criminalized, while structural and institutional violence was not acknowledged. Therefore, she defines institutional violence as a corollary of structural violence, where both are products of economic, political, and cultural dependence. Rupesinghe et al. (1994) added to the definition of institutional violence as an invisible and passive type of violence, which is illegitimate. Thus, it is a violence that is embedded in the institutions and accepted by the people.

In addition, de Carvalho et al. (2021) combined the concepts by Del Olmo (1975) and Rupesinghe et al. (1994) and used three types of violence in the analysis: direct, symbolic, and structural, which the latter including the institutional violence as a subtype (see figure 2). By having these typologies, the concept of zemiology is included, hence it englobes the social harm approach to violence.

Figure 2 - Framework




Figure created inspired on del Olmo (1975) and Galtung (1990)

Using this framework will give the research some insight. Brazil is a developing country located in South America, thus using del Olmo's concept of institutional violence fits the purpose of the analysis. Also, the use of different concepts and types of violence can demonstrate that not only physical actions are considered and can lead to corporal conflicts. In the end, structural, institutional, cultural, and direct violence influence one another.

For this research, violence will be categorized into four types: direct, cultural, structural, and structural-institutional. As figure 2 shows, direct violence is visible and the actor easier to identify, while the other three types are invisible, and are the roots of direct violence. According to Galtung and Fischer (2013) "threats of violence are also violence", and its target can be anyone, from a person to a whole group. Additionally, the one committing the violence can be a specific actor, in the case of direct violence, or a structure that threatens basic human needs, in the case of structural violence, or the legitimation of violence, as in cultural violence. I will also add institutional violence, inspired by Del Olmo (1975), who categorizes legal omission. Even though the violence can start at any point of the triangle, the general flow, according to Galtung and Fischer (2013), starts with cultural violence, which is permanent and has remained unchanged for long periods, proceeding to structural and institutional violence, which are part of a process, and lastly, becoming an act of direct violence, that is an event.

3.1 Direct Violence

Direct violence is the one on top of the violence triangle, the most visible of all acts of violence. This violence kills quickly, it has a trackable author, and cruelty is carried out by human beings on each other. Direct violence directly attacks basic human needs, and it is usually measured in the number of deaths. For example, if we think about the main four human needs in society, i.e., survival, wellness, freedom, and identity, direct violence can be represented in each one of them in different ways. In survival, an act of direct violence would be killing or through sanctions, which is a slower but intentional killing. In wellness, we can mention illness and misery, which are not the direct cause of the killing but results in death. Repression and detention can be examples of freedom violence, while alienation and second class can be considered identity direct violence (Galtung & Höivik, 1971).

3.2 Cultural Violence

Cultural violence is the violence that is usually used to legitimize the other types of violence, using aspects of culture, such as religion, ideology, language, art, or empirical and formal science. It is the first one in the prevailing violence flow, which derives from the others. Some examples of cultural violence are military parades, ubiquitous portraits of a leader, inflammatory speeches, machismo, and fascism (Galtung, 1990).

In the religious aspect, we can mention the belief that some are closer to God, and are the chosen ones, while the others are considered the unchosen by God, or chosen by Satan. In many religions, the clergy is an upper class that has a special talent to communicate with God. This can perpetuate violence, in which God chooses some, and leaves the other to Satan, which can result in ecocide, sexism, nationalism, racism, exploitation, and persecution. Another way that sexism is executed is through language; in some Latin languages, the word for male is the same as for the entire human species, which makes the women invisible and less important (Galtung, 1990).

Another practice of cultural violence is the neo-classical economic doctrine, which believes that each country should enter the market with the products they have with a comparative advantage. This belief is a justification for exploitation, in which the rich countries with high technology process the raw materials from the poorer countries. This is a classic example of how empirical science can be part of cultural violence (Galtung, 1990).

3.3 Structural Violence

Structural violence is an attack on basic human needs, it is a type of violence that also kills, but gradually, and less dramatically than direct violence. Thus, there is not one person responsible for the violence, but a whole anonymous structure. Structural violence is not directed against a person, but it is exerted through influences. It influences resources, income, education, and health to a degree that negatively affects the underdogs' standard of living. In the same ways as direct violence, structural violence can be represented in the four basic human needs: survival, wellness, freedom, and identity. In survival and wellness, structure violence is represented by exploitation. To be able to survive, a human being needs food; restricting food to them leads to starvation and later death from the deficit. In freedom, we can mention marginalization, by keeping the underdogs outside: they cannot unite and rebel against the system. And in identity, the main type of violence practiced is segmentation, in which the underdogs are given only a partial view of the reality, so it prevents consciousness formation.

To conclude, in structural violence exploitation is the key piece. It is an unequal exchange, in which the top dogs always get much more out of the structure, while the underdogs are being exploited and ignored. It is a type of violence that is deeply rooted in a system, therefore, it is not easy to reverse (Galtung, 1969; Galtung & Höivik, 1971).

3.4 Institutional Violence

Institutional violence is a sub-category of structural violence. It is violence that is understood as means of force, not only acted upon, but well organized and administrated through legitimate means (Cooper & Whyte, 2017). Also, it is rooted in the system, and it is specifically for the violence committed by the state, which is a top-down type of violence, done through measures and regulations, which are structural arrangements. The difference between institutional violence and structural violence is that institutional violence is practiced by mediating the rules that govern social behavior (law-making and law-keeping), while structural violence is not simply mediating violence, but are the rules themselves. Institutional violence uses authorized forces to sustain the already established system and reinforce authority. Institutions can be social or formal. Social institutions are customs, norms, and behaviors, while formal

institutions are the government and public services, that are responsible for political and economic rule-making and enforcement (Drymioti, 2019).

4. Historical background

4.1 Controversial Brazilian history

Indigenous minorities face exclusion, marginalization, and discrimination on a daily basis, which places them in a vulnerable position in society. The federal government has the responsibility to protect all its population; however, in many countries, the Indigenous population is invisible (Coimbra Jr & Santos, 2000). In Brazil, Indigenous peoples have had their rights violated for a long time. Since the “discovery” of the country Indigenous peoples have been suffering marginalization and abuse (dos Santos, 2020).

The history of Brazil begins way before its “discovery” in the 1500s. When the Portuguese discovered the Brazilian territory, between one and five million Indigenous people already inhabited the land. They used to live off hunting, fishing, and agriculture (Oliveiri, 2014; Porto, 2017). The first encounter with the European explorers was calm. The explorers were in low numbers and, instead of conflicting with them, they abused the Indigenous peoples’ innocence by doing unjust trading. As an example, the Europeans would trade low-value goods, like mirrors and spices, for Brazilian gold and Pau-Brasil wood (Oliveiri, 2014; Porto, 2017).

Later, Indigenous peoples began to be looked at as hindrances to the explorers’ craving for land; at the same time, explorers needed cheap labor work. Therefore, the Europeans expelled Indigenous peoples from their territories and enslaved them (Oliveiri, 2014; Porto, 2017). The locals tried to fight during the colonization for their rights, security, and liberty. However, since many were murdered and enslaved during the battles, they decided to step back. Then, the Indigenous peoples that survived moved to interior and inhospitable areas, to preserve their unity and life integrity (Oliveiri, 2014; Porto, 2017). After this tumultuous period, the Indigenous numbers went down to less than 150,000 (Ditadura, s.a.).

The recent Brazilian history with the Indigenous peoples can be divided into three important moments: military dictatorship, democratic cycle, and the current government (Barretto Filho, 2020). The first moment was the military pre-constitution dictatorship when Indigenous peoples had no rights and were mostly disrespected. The second moment is the democratic cycle, which encompasses liberalism and social democracy. Liberalism is seen during the years that Fernando Collor de Mello was president, which was a time of Indigenous resistance to

violence. Social democracy developed mainly during Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva's first mandate and half of the second. It was a bureaucratic time when Indigenous rights were implemented. The third and last period is the current government, which starts at the end of the second mandate of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, goes through Dilma Rousseff's, her impeachment, Michel Temer as an acting president, and now Jair Bolsonaro. This whole period is marked as a campaign in order not to get the Indigenous rights vanished (Barretto Filho, 2020). For the sake of this study, the movements will be divided into three, in which the first will be considered the military dictatorship, the second will be Lula and Dilma, and the third will be Temer and Bolsonaro.

Today, In Brazil, there are around 896,917 Indigenous peoples, belonging to different communities. Each community has different cultures, histories, languages, and habits. More than 56% live in rural zones, while the rest live in urban (Funai, 2020; Socioambiental). Brazilian Indigenous people is a descendant of the people that habituated the continent before the arrival of the Europeans. They identify themselves with an Indigenous community and are seen by the community as members of it. Moreover, an Indigenous community is a group of people that maintain kinship or neighborhood among them (Socioambiental). They are also called original or native because they lived in the region before the Europeans "colonized" the continent.

4.2 First Movement: the Military Dictatorship

The period from 1964 to 1984 was one of the worst in Brazilian history. In 1964 the military, with the support of the elite, forced a coup d'état, taking over control of the country (Barretto Filho, 2020). This conservative and high-purchase power side was worried about the president's socialist acts (Starling, 2015). The military dictatorship in Brazil was marked by indirect elections for the presidency, rights violations, anti-democratic processes, murderers of the opposition, media censorship, torture of Indigenous peoples, social inequality, high inflation, and environmental devastation. And, during this time, around eight thousand Indigenous people were murdered (Barretto Filho, 2020).

The military regime implemented the National Integration Plan (PIN), intending to expand Brazilian borders, create cities, amplify the business, and roadways, and explore as many raw-material as possible (Ditadura, s.a.). Its results were clear: individual and mass murders,

persecution, detention, and torture of the opposition leaders that fought for their rights and territories (Ditadura, s.a.). The main goal during this period was construction, and to “develop” the country, Indigenous lands became obstacles to this (Ditadura, s.a.). The Transamazonica highway was constructed, which tragically affect the lives of 29 indigenous groups. At the same time, two enormous hydroelectric plants, Itaipu and Tucuruí, were built in Indigenous territories. Indigenous Xavante were expelled from their communities and many were murdered when trying to protest the construction (Ditadura, s.a.).

In addition, during the dictatorship, with the discourse of protecting and assisting the Indigenous population, the government created, in 1967 Funai, the National Indigenous Foundation. However, in practice, the Indigenous politicians were militarized and treated as a matter of national safety, and the organization was run by the military forces. The foundation was supposed to protect the Indigenous peoples, but in fact, it only put them in a vulnerable position. During these times, Funai tried to “civilize” the Indigenous peoples, and the president of the organization during the time, Ismarth Araujo, stated that “integrated Indigenous people are the ones that are converted to manpower” (Ditadura, s.a.). Furthermore, in 1969, the Krenak Indigenous Agricultural Reformatory was created as a “rehab” center for Indigenous people that were convicted of crimes during the dictatorship, such as disrespect, hooliganism, alcohol consumption, and homosexuality. All of which in fact, was torture (Ditadura, s.a.).

4.2.1 Transition to the democratic cycle

Still in the dictatorship period, in the 1980s, the GDP of Brazil increased by only 3%, much lower than in 1979, when it was more than 8%. Besides, the external debt duplicated and reached 113 billion dollars. During the same decade, the political parties created by the dictatorship were banished and a law was enacted that favored the creation of new parties. And in 1984, a popular movement took the streets of the country, asking for “*Diretas Já*”, which demanded direct elections for the presidency of the republic.

However, the Congress voted for an indirect election to be conducted by the electoral college. At the end of 1984, Tancredo Neves became the president. He did not come into power because of a sudden illness that resulted in his death. The vice-president, José Sarney, took the presidency. It was only in 1989 that the civil society had a chance to directly vote for the President of the country. Finally, in 1988, the new Constitution was enacted, with liberal,

democratic, and nationalist characteristics. The Constitution was a product of confrontations and transactions, where left-wing parties, although in the minority, initially assumed the initiative. In that year's election, Fernando Collor de Mello was elected, with Luis Inácio Lula da Silva reaching the second position. The election represented the last act of the long transition into democracy (Marini, 1991).

4.2.2 Indigenous rights in the Constitution

This chapter will briefly introduce some of the important acts of the Constitution that will be crucial for the later analysis of the Bolsonaro government in the Indigenous constitutional rights. In the Brazilian Constitution, there is a specific chapter for Indigenous rights. Before the Constitution of 1988, the Indigenous peoples were considered a transitory social category, doomed to disappear. Also, the Constitution states that Indigenous rights over their territories are original rights before the creation of the State itself. This recognizes the historical fact that they were the first occupants of Brazil (Socioambiental).

Racism is voiced when the Constitution explains its historical nature. It states that Indigenous social organization, costumes, languages, beliefs, and traditions must be respected. The Union has the duty to protect, and respect their assets, including their original rights over the territories, and one of the most important topics is the delimitation of Indigenous territories. According to the Constitution, the inalienable possession of their lands is guaranteed to the Indigenous peoples. They have the right to exploit, not only the natural richness but also the mineral richness of their community's areas. Exceptionally, by act 231 §3 the Union has the privilege of conducting non-profit research on mineral resources in the land when there is a relevant national interest for the country, or if they can be used for national consumption when economically sustainable, and only if they have the approval from the affected Indigenous community (Cunha, 2018; Socioambiental).

Land delimitation is the result of the recognition made by the State. It is the country's obligation to protect Indigenous lands, which, as per act 231 §2 are of permanent ownership of the Indigenous peoples, and only they can make use of the soil, rivers, and lakes. Act 231 §4 states that the lands are inalienable and unavailable, and the right over them is imprescriptible. Moreover, the delimitation of every land should have been done within five years of the

Constitution (1988); however, the deadline was not met, and delimitations are still a pending matter (Socioambiental).

4.2.2.1 Land delimitation process

According to the Brazilian Constitution of 1988, the steps of Indigenous land delimitation are categorized into seven. The first step is the identification of the land made by Funai. The second is its approval; Funai has 15 days to approve or disapprove it considering the identification report. Third comes the contestation, after the approval, for 90 days, whereby any person or organ can contest the authorization. If contested, Funai must explain the reasons and interests and forward them to the Ministry of Justice to judge it. The fourth step is the limit declaration, in which the Ministry of Justice must declare the limits of the areas to be delimited or disapprove of the identification. Fifth comes the physical delimitation of the territory promoted by Funai. The sixth step is the approval, in which the delimitation process is submitted to the President of the Republic for approval. Lastly comes the registration, when the territory is approved and registered in the county real estate office.

4.3 Second Movement: Democratic Cycle

Former presidents Lula and Dilma are considered the most left-sided governments Brazil has had, due to their liberal, just, and civil policies (de Carvalho et al., 2021). Lula's story is emblematic in that he went from an illiterate factory floor worker to the highest power in the country. During the dictatorship, Lula started a strike, and in 1979, was arrested. In 1980 he founded the Partido dos Trabalhadores, PT (worker's party), the first leftist party in Brazil (Anderson, 2011). Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva was president from 2003 until 2010, being the first leftist popularly elected president. The hopes for his government were extremely high. And even though he disappointed the population in many aspects, his achievements are undeniable. It was only after Lula that the minorities were seen (Anderson, 2011).

Lula created successful social programs, such as Fome Zero (Zero Hunger). Fome Zero is a local policy created to guarantee human rights through access to adequate food for those who lack it (Hossain, 2017; Turdó, 2010). The program included 30 subprograms to achieve progress, such as food stamps, popular restaurants, technical assistance, credit for smallholder farmers, universal school meals, and the most important one: Bolsa Família, which means *Family Grant* (Margolies, s.a; Turdó, 2010). The program simultaneously tackles different

areas at once: food supply, family agriculture, agrarian development, health, social development, education, and work, which are essential pillars for a country's growth. Bolsa Família is a national program of conditional cash transfer (CCT), in which families with low to non-incomes receive monthly payments to guarantee the minimum family wage to meet their basic needs (Turdó, 2010).

When elected for the first time, in 2003, President Lula's main goal was to eradicate poverty in Brazil. Even though the Fome Zero Program was a success, he knew that the CCT program was not enough to solve the problem in the long run but it was a progressive step toward eradicating hunger (Turdó, 2010). The Bolsa Família Program was created with two main objectives: combating poverty and social exclusion and promoting the emancipation of the poorest families in Brazil (Weissheimer, 2018). To be part of the program, the families had to follow some guidelines: commitment to keeping the children of the family in school, with a minimum of 75% frequency, commitment to keeping the children updated with vaccination and nutritional support, and commitment to prenatal care for pregnant women. For families to be eligible to enter the CCT program, they had to live in poverty or extreme poverty situation, with a maximum monthly income of R\$89 (\$16) per person in the household, or between R\$80.01 (\$14.4) and R\$178 (\$32) monthly income if in the family there were children or teenagers (*Bolsa Família*, 2021).

The impacts of Lula's social programs are found in many studies, such as Duarte et al. (2009), Silva (2010), Silva (2016), Wood and Felker-Kantor (2013), and Monteiro (2003). All studies have similar results, showing the programs have decreased social inequality and hunger in the poorest families' households in Brazil. Moreover, Lula, in between both of his elections, managed to control inflation, decrease unemployment rates, increase economic growth, have total control during the world crisis of 2008, which had little impact on Brazil, increase school levels, and get 20 million people out of the poverty zone.

The Indigenous peoples, like the rest of the minorities in the country, had high expectations for Lula's mandate. And even though what Lula achieved was somehow satisfactory, the hopes were too high for him to fulfill. Environmentally risky investments were constant, and the construction of hydroelectric dams started without consent from the Indigenous groups affected by it, which goes against the Constitution of the country (Tauli-Corpuz, 2016). After Lula's

two mandates, his successor, Dilma Rousseff was elected. She was president for one mandate and a half when she was impeached.

Dilma Rousseff was the first woman President in Brazil. She began her political life fighting against the dictatorship in 1964. In 1969 she was convicted of “subversion” and spent three years in prison. In 2010 she was elected President. Dilma continued Lula’s policies, keeping the successful social programs. However, that year the global economic recession was stronger than it had ever been, which affected the national economy and weakened her government. Dilma tried to reverse the crisis by increasing investments in the country’s infrastructure in 2011, reducing the interest rates, and simplifying credit for companies and individuals. These measures, however, were not enough to prevent the crisis, which led to a political crisis.

However, in 2013 many protests happened in Brazil against the precariousness of life in general, with the high cost of public transportation being one of the main issues. Her popularity decreased rapidly. Nevertheless, Dilma was reelected in 2014. In her second mandate the economic situation worsened, GDP was negative, unemployment rates were high, and inflation escalated. Protesters took the streets of Brazil demanding her impeachment. In 2016, the Senate opened the impeachment process against the president, for the crime of tax liability. The senators and the majority decided in favor of the impeachment. The vice-president, Michel Temer, then took power (*Dilma Rousseff Biografia*).

Dilma’s government towards the indigenous peoples was similar to Lula’s, with low rates of land allocation (de Carvalho et al., 2021). Both Lula and Dilma exerted mainly institutional violence against the Indigenous population. The government's omissions can be seen in the lack of responsibility to help Indigenous peoples prevent invasions and secure their territories.

4.4 Third Movement: Current Government

4.4.1 Michel Temer

Michel Temer took power as the President of Brazil after the impeachment of Dilma Rousseff in 2016. He was in power until December 31st, 2018. And in March 2019 he was arrested for corruption; however, four days later the judge ordered his release.

Temer is a politician from the Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (PMDB), which is a right-wing party. Due to the party coalition between PMDB and PT, he was chosen to be Dilma Rousseff's vice-president. However, in the second year of the mandate, Temer wrote an open letter complaining of being excluded from government decisions, which caused an impact on the alliance of the two parties.

During his two years as President, he faced political and economic challenges, and his popularity was low (Bezerra). Michel Temer had a different administration from Dilma Rousseff. He started a strong privatization program of public companies and performed a labor reform. Temer did not have a positive impact on the Indigenous population's rights, approving the delimitation of only one indigenous' land. In addition, fires in the Amazon had high levels, in which 1,185,000,000 trees were destroyed. Moreover, direct violence against the Indigenous people was high, with many murders happening.

In Temer's first year as President, 2017, the Indigenous peoples witnessed their territories being invaded and exploited more than in any other year. One of the reasons, according to Rangel and Liebigott (2017), is due to Funai, an important Indigenous organization, beginning to be guided and led by divisions that are historically anti-Indigenous. Also, Temer had a close relationship with the ruralist bench, which had an important impact on the Indigenous lives. In sum, the years of his mandate were characterized by the omission of Indigenous land regularization and direct violence against Indigenous people (Cimi, 2018).

4.4.2 Jair Bolsonaro

October 28th, 2018 is a date that will be forever in every Brazilian memory. Jair Bolsonaro was elected president of the Brazilian Republic with 55% of the total valid votes (Gonçalves, 2018). During his electoral campaign, Bolsonaro had a liberalist doctrinal guideline regarding economic and social issues, with an authoritarian agenda, socially conservative, and economically neoliberal (Da Silva & Rodrigues, 2021).

Analyzing Bolsonaro's speeches, he could fit into Mudde's (2019) definition of *authoritarianism*, which believes that society should be strictly ordered, and violations should be punished. Under this perspective, social problems, such as "sexual deviation" and drug addiction are seen as threats to the natural order (Da Silva & Rodrigues, 2021). Moreover,

corruption is another central theme in his election campaign. Political elites, in this case, the “left-sided”, were accused of stealing from the population (Da Silva & Rodrigues, 2021).

Jair Bolsonaro is a retired military officer born in 1955. He graduated from the Agulhas Negras Military Academy in 1977 and served in the army until he decided to follow a political career in 1988. In the same year, he was elected a city councilor in Rio de Janeiro. His mandate was mainly used to give visibility to military causes (Bolsonaro, 2017). Between 1990 and 2019 Bolsonaro was a congressman, and in each of his mandates, he was part of different political parties.

His speeches were always conservative, dictatorial, and hateful. In 2003, Bolsonaro defended the dictatorship period, mentioning that the human rights policy is a coward’s policy (Bolsonaro, 2003). Later, in 2016, he directed his hate at the minorities, gay and black people (Bolsonaro, 2016). Furthermore, Bolsonaro is known for his close relationship with the neo-Pentecostal religion. Having several preachers as supporters and political leaders reinforces his conservative and traditional alliances (Da Silva & Rodrigues, 2021). Also, his decrees have some interventionist features, emphasizing expansions of the State in favor of specific segments of the economy and society – the military and the middle and upper classes (Da Silva & Rodrigues, 2021). Besides Bolsonaro’s appreciation speeches about the dictatorship years in Brazil, he has implemented authoritarian policies during his years as President.

4.4.2.1 Authoritarian policies

The first act of Bolsonaro in 2019 was proposing Act 9.690/2019, Act that reconsiders the Access to Information Law (LAI), and would allow governmental companies, and directors of organizations to impose ultra-secret opacity on public data. The LAI Act was created by Dilma Rousseff in 2011; according to it, any person could request and access information about public agencies without bureaucratic processes. Yet, Act 9.690/2019 could affect public transparency. Thankfully, after one month of press pressure, Bolsonaro published a new Act to revoke the previous, Act 9.716/2019 (Da Silva & Rodrigues, 2021).

Then, the second authoritarian and unconstitutional act of his government was implemented by the Education Minister, Ricardo Vélez Rodríguez in January 2019. An e-mail was sent to every public school in Brazil requesting the students, teachers, and employees to read a letter with

Bolsonaro's slogan – “Brazil above all. God above all.” They were also requested to sing the national anthem and record themselves through the reading and singing. Nonetheless, with negative backlash, Véléz abdicated his request (Da Silva & Rodrigues, 2021).

Furthermore, the Minister of Justice and Public Safety, Sergio Moro – a former judge who accused and convicted Lula – was involved in an authoritarian act. In early 2019, he presented his anticrime act, which contained the “exclusion of illegality” for police officers. This means police officers involved in armed conflicts would be exempt or have penalty reductions, which was a project of high relevance for Bolsonaro. Yet, the project found high resistance from the society and the National Congress, and in September 2019 it was rejected (Da Silva & Rodrigues, 2021).

Moreover, in 2014, former president Dilma Rousseff created the National Policy for Social Participation, which encourages civil society's participation in the formulation, execution, and evaluation of public policies in Brazil. However, Bolsonaro views this social participation system as an open space of social union influence in the government. Therefore, with Act 9.759/2019, he tried abolishing this social participation. For this act, however, it was not the government that backed it off due to social pressure. The act was not passed through by the judicialization of the process that managed to ensure limits to the Decree. The opposition's party, PT, immediately filed the Direct Action of Unconstitutionality 6.121 in the Federal Supreme Court (Da Silva & Rodrigues, 2021).

4.4.2.2 Bolsonaro and the Indigenous Peoples in Brazil

The relationship between Bolsonaro and the Indigenous population in Brazil goes way back to his presidential election in 2018. Earlier, in 1998, some Indigenous peoples united in the Council for the Articulation of Indigenous Peoples and Organizations of Brazil and asked for the removal of deputy Jair Bolsonaro because, in that year, Bolsonaro declared that “the US cavalry was competent enough to eliminate their Indigenous population in the past, and nowadays have no problems with them”. However, their request was not heeded (CIMI, 2019).

As mentioned, Indigenous Land is a term that refers to a territory reserved by the Federal State for the exclusive use of indigenous peoples according to the Brazilian Constitution. The teaching of their languages and the guarantee of their land rights are the most important rights

they have secured in the constitution (Tourneau, 2019). Moreover, Tourneau (2019) mentions that the only safety guard for the Indigenous peoples during Bolsonaro's government is their rights transcript in the Federal Constitution of 1988, which the government cannot annul.

In fact, since the dictatorship period, the Indigenous peoples have not been attacked in such an intense manner as they are under Bolsonaro's rule (Tourneau, 2019), what with the catholic evangelicals wanting to "save" the Indigenous souls, the agriculture bench wanting to expand their activities in Indigenous protected lands, and different actors that believe the indigenous peoples are part of an international conspiracy to steal the Amazon forest from Brazil (Tourneau, 2019). Since his election, Bolsonaro's government has been renowned for violence and attempts to deprive traditional Indigenous communities of minimum physical and cultural subsistence conditions (CIMI, 2019).

For instance, the Ruralist Bench is the most powerful articulation of the National Congress with 226 deputies out of a total of 513, and 27 senators, out of 81 in total. Its members, most agribusiness men, have always set themselves against the delimitation of Indigenous Territories (Tourneau, 2019) and the agribusiness believes indigenous lands take space from their development. Another strong opposition force to the indigenous lands comes from some military, especially army officers and generals. They believe the Amazon is vulnerable to "foreign interest", and consider Indigenous lands an open location for this international activity (Tourneau, 2019).

4.4.2.3 Bolsonaro and the environment

Jair Bolsonaro removed the department of Environmental Education from the Ministry of Environment and incorporated it into the Secretariat of Ecotourism. Environmental education is essential to keep conservation areas to be exploited by the tourism sector (Carmo, 2019). As a result, the fires in the Amazon region increased by 84% from 2018 to 2019 (Watts, 2019) and Bolsonaro even called himself "captain chainsaw" (Lima, 2019).

The Brazilian Forest Service is the responsible body to promote the preservation of public forests. Bolsonaro transferred it from the Ministry of Environment to the Ministry of Agriculture, which threatens the body to be oriented by the priorities of agricultural production (Carmo, 2019). Bolsonaro has a clear intention to intensify the exploitation of lands where

there are environmental, mining, and water resources, as well as identifying potential productive areas to implement more cattle on pastures and transgenic soy (CIMI, 2019). Therefore, in this context, it seems essential for the government to promote arson in the Amazon region, as well as illegal logging, and land grabbing.

In August 2019, the National Institute of Spatial Research (Inpe) registered 30,900 fires in the Amazon – which is three times greater than the same period in 2018. Before this catastrophic event, the alerting deforesting system, Deter, from Inpe, had alerted governmental environmental inspection bodies (CIMI, 2019). August 10th was known as the “Fire Day”, in which farmers around the highway BR-163 in the state of Pará set the forest on fire. They felt supported by the words of Bolsonaro and stated they “needed to show the President that we want to work and the only way was to set the forest on fire, to clear our pasture lands” (CIMI, 2019).

5. Bolsonaro's acts against indigenous rights

The main source of data for this research are the Cimi reports from 2019 and 2020. Cimi stands for *Conselho Indigenista Missionário*, which means Missionary Indigenist Council. It was created in 1972, during the military dictatorship in Brazil, and it has as general objective that of denouncing the structures of violence and injustice. In 2003, Cimi created the Observatory of Violence Against Indigenous Peoples in Brazil, which launches an annual report on the violation of rights and violence against the indigenous. The data used in the reports are collected from different sources: the regional Cimi records, the accusation from Indigenous peoples, police reports, news published by the press, and official information from Sesai (Special Secretariat for Indigenous Health), Funai, and other public bodies (Missionário). After the data from the reports are presented, some news published by the press will be added to support the hypothesis that hate speeches can lead to direct violence and exemplify structural and institutional violence.

5.1 Types of Violence against the Indigenous Peoples in Brazil

Even though the violence is current and absorbed by the Indigenous peoples, it cannot be trivialized, nor seen as normal. The Indigenous population in Brazil is resilient. They create survival strategies and recreate the meaning of life, always integrating the environment (Cimi). The Cimi Report uses the concept of violence that is not restricted to the obvious violent practices, such as murders, physical aggression, or threats. It goes beyond, involving racism, discrimination, denial of the identity of native peoples, invasion of their territories, illegal exploitation of natural resources in their territories, and omission from the public power regarding health, education, and regularization and protection of Indigenous lands. All these violent acts are not always evident but are still harmful (Cimi). Therefore, the framework chosen can be applied to the reports from Cimi. The “obvious violent practices” from the report can be defined as direct violence, while racism, discrimination, and denial of identity can be classified as cultural violence, and last, invasion of territories, illegal exploitation, and omission from the public power is an example of structural-institutional violence. This thesis discusses the two reports, from 2019 and 2020, dating from when Jair Bolsonaro was elected President.

5.2 The Evidence

5.2.1 Violence against Indigenous Peoples in Brazil Report from CIMI 2019

The CIMI (2019) report reaffirms the perverse and worrisome reality of the Brazilian Indigenous peoples during the first year of Jair Bolsonaro's government as President. It shows an intensification of expropriations of indigenous lands, invasion, land grabbing, and subdivision at a rapidly growing rate throughout the whole national territory.

Having the indigenous presence in their territories has shown an increase in resilience, forest protection, and ecosystem enrichment. Indigenous people work as a barrier to deforestation. In 2019, traditional indigenous territories have encroached more than ever before. Moreover, illegal fires have been set in forests in a criminal scheme whereby extensive areas are "cleaned" to, among other reasons, enable the implementation of agricultural enterprises.

Briefly, the report points out that 16 out of the 19 categories of violence have increased, especially in the category "possessory invasions, illegal exploitation of resources, and property damage", which went from 109 cases in 2018 to 256 in 2019. Moreover, the number of cases has doubled, when compared to 2018, in five other categories: "territorial conflicts", "death threat", "various threats", "intentional bodily harm", and "deaths due to lack of assistance".

5.2.1.1 Violence against Indigenous territories: structural-institutional violence/cultural violence

Indigenous territories are symbolic spaces of identity, production, and cultural reproduction. They are sacred lands that contain the Indigenous identity, and it is where they make and reproduce life and culture. TIs (indigenous territories) is a collective property; the territories are owned by a community, not by an individual. The types of violence in this section are the ones against patrimony, including "omission and delay in land regularization", "conflicts relating to territorial rights", and "possessory invasions, illegal exploitation of natural resources and various damages to property". In sum, in 2019, there were a total of 1,120 cases of violence against indigenous territories in total.

Apart from keeping his promise not to demarcate any Indigenous lands, Bolsonaro, with the help of the Ministry of Justice, sent back 27 ongoing processes to the National Indigenous

Foundation (Funai) to be revised. And, in 2019, Funai was fragilized by resource cutting and dismantling of its structure. In its presidency, the government nominated agents external to indigenism. Therefore, all demarcation procedures were suspended and completed procedures went back to be reviewed. What is more, there was an increase of 134.9% cases of indigenous land invasion when compared to 2018. The reasons for the invasions differ, with most cases being due to simple invasion, followed by illegal exploitation of wood and deforestation, mineral exploitation, and expansion of agricultural farms, among others.

It is important to note that 41.80% of the invasions produced damage to either the environment or their lands, as denounced by the indigenous peoples. Furthermore, even the most isolated Indigenous territories were illegally set on fire during the year of 2019. There are six TIs (indigenous territories) in this category, and out of them, four were affected by fire, with a 52% increase from 2018. To conclude, Bolsonaro has, since his election campaign, stated that the Amazon Forest needs to be exploited and developed. And his first year in power only proved that he was capable to do so, regardless of how many Indigenous lives would be lost or how many trees would be cut.

5.2.1.2 Violence against a person: direct violence

In 2019 there were a total of 277 cases of violence against an indigenous person. This number is more than double than the previous year, 2018. The types of violence in this section include “power abuse”, “death threat”, “various threats”, “murders”, “premeditated murders”, “willful bodily harm”, “ethnic-cultural racism and discrimination”, “attempted murder”, and “sexual violence”.

Also, in 2019 that Paulo Paulino Guajajara was murdered from an ambush by loggers on his land, the Arariboia Indigenous Land in the state of Maranhão. His murder caused enormous national and international repercussions. Paulino was 26 years old and had his life taken violently when trying to protect his people’s territory by five armed loggers. He was known to try to strengthen the indigenous rights by learning how to use technology to monitor their lands from invasion. His death goes beyond Bolsonaro’s genocidal agenda and discourses; it showed how the system in Brazil relies on the exploration of minorities (Marçal, 2019).

Afterward, the Indigenous peoples continued to be a target of constant violent attacks, which included even child torture. Violation of human rights has been increasing since Bolsonaro's election, due to his violent profile and policies based on old manners and traditions.

5.2.1.3 Violence by omission of the Public Power: structural-institutional violence

A total of 267 cases of violence by the omission of the public power were registered in 2019, including 133 homicides, 32 more than in 2018. Child mortality (between 0 and 5 years old) has also risen, from 591 in 2018 to 825 in 2019. Among these, there was an increase in other categories, such as "death from lack of health care", "lack of health care", and "lack of Indigenous education".

It is, indeed, the federal government's duty to protect the Indigenous peoples and their lands. However, in 2019, more than any previous year, the Indigenous peoples had to protect themselves and their homes. While satellites registered alarming data, many Indigenous peoples mobilized to fight the fires. This was the case of the TI Khrahô-Kanela, in the state of Tocantins, in the North of Brazil, where the Indigenous leaders stated that 95% of their 7,612 hectares of land were destroyed by the fires. However, they managed to restrain 22 km of fires, that were only two km from their village.

In sum, 2019 was a year marked by the increase in the government's omission, regarding the Union's obligations in the Constitution concerning the Indigenous. Furthermore, the weakening of Indigenous services acted as a pervasive way to keep the Indigenous peoples marginalized. In the end, there is an intention from the President of promoting the deconstitutionalization of Indigenous rights.

5.2.2 Violence against Indigenous Peoples in Brazil Report from CIMI 2020

The second year of Jair Bolsonaro's government was marked by a continuous and deeply worrying period for Indigenous peoples. Apart from everything indigenous must always fight for, like human rights, territories, and their lives, 2020 brought the Covid-19 pandemic. Brazil as a whole showed deficient management of the pandemic; thus, the number of deaths was one of the highest in the world. In most cases, the Indigenous peoples had their first exposure to the virus through illegal invaders due to the lack of surveillance and protection, which should be done by the Executive power according to the Brazilian constitution (no Brasil, 2020).

Moreover, invasions in indigenous territories increased when compared to 2019, when the numbers were already alarmingly high. In general, the invaders are loggers, illegal hunters and fishermen, farmers, and land grabbers. And they act with – sometimes explicitly – connivance of the government. The former Minister of the Environment, during the pandemic, declared it was the time to take advantage of the pandemic to push the deregulation of laws. There were more than 43,000 indigenous persons contaminated by Covid-19, and at least 900 deaths related to the virus in 2020.

Finally, another important landmark of 2020 was the Law Proposal PL 191, presented by the president of the Republic to the National Congress. The PL 191/2020 aims the opening indigenous territories to mining, gas, and oil exploitation, and construction of hydroelectric plants, among other activities (no Brasil, 2020).

5.2.2.1 Violence against Indigenous Territories: Structural-institutional Violence/Cultural Violence

The interruption of indigenous lands demarcation announced by President Jair Bolsonaro during his electoral campaign continues to be a guideline. Of the 1299 indigenous territories in Brazil, 64% are still pending regularization. Of these, 65% are claimed by indigenous peoples, but with no plan from the Estate to begin the administrative process of identification and delimitation (no Brasil, 2020).

Furthermore, crimes towards Indigenous peoples and their lands increased significantly with immeasurable damages. Apart from encouraging forest fires, the government has promoted the illegal invasion of different territories. For instance, the Yanomami and Munduruku tribes were heavily invaded by miners. The illegal miners performed all types of violence toward the Indigenous peoples, and their sole intention was to exploit economically the territories without environmental, legal, social, political, or juridical restrictions.

5.2.2.2 Violence against a person: Direct Violence

There were a total of 304 cases of violence practiced against an indigenous person in 2020, which is higher than the 277 cases in 2019 when there were two important cases of military

action, the “Abacaxis’ river massacre” and the Chiquitano action. The “Abacaxis’ river massacre” conflict was started by tourists that illegally entered indigenous and *ribeirinhos* territories around the Abacaxis’ River to fish. Military police action resulted in the death of two indigenous people from the Munduruku tribe and at least four *ribeirinhos*. In the state of Mato Grosso, four indigenous persons from the Chiquitano community were murdered by police officers while hunting in the Indigenous territory. Finally, it is important to highlight that many cases of power abuse, various threats, and ethnic-cultural racism and discrimination happened in 2020 while indigenous people looked for treatment due to Covid-19, besides the deaths and hunger that affected many vulnerable communities during the sanitary crisis (no Brasil, 2020).

5.2.2.3 Violence by omission of the Public Power: Structural-institutional Violence and Cultural Violence

There was no increase in violence by omission of the Public Power from 2019 to 2020; crimes remained unchanged but still, the number of cases was high when compared to the pre-Bolsonaro years. Many of the cases in this section are directly related to the Covid-19 pandemic and the lack of public power assistance towards the indigenous population (no Brasil, 2020).

In fact, the President of the Republic of Brazil, intentionally, contributed to the disastrous situation of the pandemic in the country, through his denialist speeches, disbelief in science, conspiracy theories, and changing the policy and the direction of the Health Ministry, having important positions occupied by people devoid of commitment to science and human dignity (no Brasil, 2020).

“Never before, in the history of this country, the government has acted in such a scandalous and presumptuous way, in the sense of stimulating deforestation and destruction of (...) indigenous lands and environmental areas.” (Paloschi, 2020). To illustrate, the Indigenous territory Kanamari Do Rio Juruá was affected by the Covid-19 infection and the omission of the federal government. The territory was kept invaded by non-Indigenous people that practiced crimes such as deforesting, illegal logging, and predatory fishing.

5.2.2.4 Covid-19: Direct, Structural-institutional, and Cultural Violence

The first wave of Covid-19 in Brazil started in March 2020, and it overwhelmed the public health system, with crowded hospitals. Jair Bolsonaro had an important role during the pandemic, always denying the gravity and existence of the virus. The president's ultraliberal economic politics of favoring the market and reducing the State made the situation worst, putting to test the public health system. For the indigenous peoples in the country, the consequences had bigger proportions. They were already weakened before when Bolsonaro disrupted the *Mais Médicos* social program, which brought foreign doctors to act in isolated areas. The indigenous peoples had to, by themselves, put up physical barriers around their villages to try to prevent the proliferation of Covid-19. Without their self-organization, the situation could have been much worst. However, Funai disagreed with their attitude, and launched the slogan campaign, "Brazil cannot stop". What was supposed to be a public organ to protect the indigenous peoples' rights turned against them (no Brasil, 2020).

Later, the situation aggravated when President Jair Bolsonaro, through his positions, encouraged invasions into indigenous territories. Budgets for indigenous emergency protection were cut during the pandemic (Oliveira, A. n. E. C. d., 2020). In 2020, 900 indigenous died due to Covid-19 and 43,524 were contaminated. The pandemic affected, very particularly, communities that do not have delimited lands. According to Rangel and Liebgott (2020), the virus also affected the indigenous traditions, beliefs, cultures, and their social relations with the society. Funeral rituals were prohibited in some regions, and in some cultures, they are necessary for the deceased's transition from the earthly to the spiritual dimension. In addition to this catastrophe, the prejudice toward the indigenous peoples increased (Rangel & Liebgott, 2020). In June 2020, some messages were spread in group chats inciting hatred against the indigenous people who were being treated in hospitals in big cities and blaming them for spreading the virus (Bonin, 2020).

5.2.3 Media coverage

5.2.3.1 Hate speeches: Cultural Violence

Hate speeches invalidate the difference between indigenous communities and diminish their personhood and legitimize the violence directed at them. From Bolsonaro's election campaign to 2022, his rhetoric has always been controversial. For instance, he has spread false

information on his social media about other parties and also during the Covid-19 pandemic, stating the pandemic was not anything to worry about.

5.2.3.1.1 The election campaign in 2018

During his election campaign in 2018, Jair Bolsonaro criticized how Europeans defend the environment and indigenous peoples. He always claimed indigenous peoples should be integrated into society. Bolsonaro, in the same interview, reaffirmed that he would end the environmental fines that national organs applied (Rodrigues, 2018). It was always clear that Bolsonaro did not want to protect indigenous lands. In November 2018, he affirmed that he would end the delimitation process. He believed that the indigenous peoples needed to “evolve” and have more contact with civilization, molding themselves in a “civilized” way of living. Bolsonaro also mentioned that indigenous peoples in reserved lands are like animals in the zoo and that indigenous people are human beings just like us. Moreover, he criticized the number of reserved territories, by saying that it is too large for a small number of indigenous people (AFP, 2018; G1, 2018).

5.2.3.1.2 The first year of government 2019

After his election, Jair Bolsonaro, apart from official acts against the indigenous population, still disseminated hate through his numerous speeches and social media. As early as his second day as President, on January 2nd, 2019, he used his Twitter account to continue with the affirmations that there is too much delimited territory for too few indigenous people. He stated that 15% of the national territory is delimited as indigenous and *quilombola* lands, but only less than half a million people live in these isolated places, and they are exploited and manipulated by NGOs. Bolsonaro mentioned that the solution is to integrate them into civil society (@jairbolsonaro, 2019).

Likewise, Bolsonaro declared “who delimitates indigenous lands is me! Not a minister. I am the boss” (Folhapress, 2019). He also expressed a wish to revise the areas inhabited by the different tribes in Brazil due to his suspicions of frauds in the delimitations and the supposed directly selling of lands from the indigenous peoples to foreigners (Iglesias & Said, 2019). Additionally, he explained that he was ready to start ore exploitation in indigenous territories (Peduzzi, 2019).

Once again, Bolsonaro made sure to make explicit his ultra-conservative, right-wing, and anti-indigenous lines during his United Nations speech in New York. He used the opening speech at the UN's General Assembly to state that the Amazon fire numbers are inflated by the world media to attack him. Anew, Jair Bolsonaro repeated there would not be new indigenous lands delimitation, and that indigenous peoples are used as a maneuver piece by foreign governments to invade the Amazon forest (ElPais, 2019).

Also, during his first year, Bolsonaro was accused of encouraging genocide of indigenous peoples. He was blamed of weaken control and inspection institutions, firing researchers, and being glaringly remiss in the response to environmental crimes in the Amazon. A group of lawyers presented a case against the President affirming there is power omission towards the investigations of crimes committed by him. According to the lawyers, there is an incentive for violence from the President against the indigenous population and the social and environmental rights defenders. They also mention the various indigenous persons that have been murdered since Bolsonaro was elected (Benites, 2019). Agreeing with this discourse, the former governor of Amapá, João Capiberibe, says Bolsonaro drives a wave of attacks by defending the ones that illegally invade indigenous territories and by attacking their rights. The tribe Wajãpi denounced the homicide of their *cacique*, Emyra Wajãpi. Emyra was 68 years old and was murdered due to a violent attack from 15 illegal miners with fire guns in his territory. The miners wanted to take over the tribe. On the same day of the homicide, President Jair Bolsonaro defended mining in indigenous lands. Cimi stated on the date that hate and aggressive speeches from the President and other government representatives encouraged the invasion, territorial dispossession, and violent acts against the indigenous peoples (*Assassinato de liderança indígena revela: Bolsonaro 'cria ódio contra essas populações'*, 2019). The case is still under investigation and the murderer is unknown to date, May 2022.

5.2.3.1.3 The second year of government 2020

In one of Jair Bolsonaro's first public speeches in his second year of government, the President affirmed over and over again that the indigenous peoples are human beings just like us. The assertion was used to justify his wishes of integrating the isolated indigenous peoples into civil society (G1, 2020). In another moment, Bolsonaro, sitting next to the regional superintendent of the Federal Police in Amazonas, deputy Alexandre Silva Saraiva, blamed, again, the indigenous peoples for the deforestation in the Amazon Forest. He stated that "some trade

wooden logs for Coca-Cola and beer” (Bolsonaro, 2020). Again in the United Nations’ speech, Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro blamed the indigenous peoples for the fires that devastated much of the Amazon, Cerrado, and the Brazilian Pantanal (Cimi, 2020).

Moreover, Basso (2020) cites the evaluation from jurist Carlos Frederico Marés de Souza Filho, professor of Agrarian and Social Environmental Law at the Pontifical Catholic University of Paraná, who was president of the National Indigenous Foundation (Funai) between 1999 and 2000. “There was also disapproval in the previous governments in Brazil to punctual actions, regarding traditional peoples, however, in the Bolsonaro government, criticism is directed at so many areas that the indigenous issues end up diluted among greater and more general disapproval”. In the same interview, Marés says some of Bolsonaro’s propositions are racist and genocide. He further states that the Indigenous peoples want liberty, not to open their territories to white people, but to prevent exploitation; Marés claims the president wants liberty of the indigenous so people can violate their lands.

Furthermore, according to Marés (Basso, 2020), the delimitation of indigenous territories became a political process instead of a technical one. And with the government not following the Constitution, approving new land delimitations, and protecting the indigenous people from invasions, a state deputy used a chainsaw to break down the blockade on a protected territory (Poder360, 2020). Jeferson Alves, state deputy of Roraima, used pliers and a chainsaw to break the block from an indigenous community. The chains were removed, and tree trunks were cut down by him while claiming the President would support him.

Subsequently, during the Covid-19 pandemic, Bolsonaro’s approach to the severity of the virus was denialist. Back in March 2020, the president stated the world was overestimating the destructive power of the virus, affirming it was a “small flu”. With thousands of deaths in the country, Bolsonaro kept his denialist speech regarding Covid-19, always spreading fake news about the disease and the vaccine (Queiroz, 2022). It was not surprising when, during the pandemic, he rejected the government’s obligation to guarantee access to emergency drinking water, food supply, and hospital beds for the indigenous population. The President declared there was no budget for this proposal decreed by the Congress (Oliveira, J., 2020). Indigenous leaders blamed the president for not taking the necessary emergency measures to protect their people from the disease. They also argue their communities were even more vulnerable to the pandemic due to actions from the government before Covid-19 started, such as the reduction

of doctors in isolated areas and lack of territory protection. Apart from the most exposed villages, the isolated indigenous peoples have also been affected by Covid-19, with some contamination coming from illegal mining workers in their lands (Schreiber, 2020).

5.2.3.1.4 Third and fourth years of government

The following years, 2021 and 2022 were not different in Bolsonaro's and his supporters' attitudes and speeches about the indigenous peoples. As early as January 2021, the unemployment rates were high, the economy was facing a crisis period, and the pandemic of Covid-19 was taking over the country, killing thousands of people. The federal government abandoned the population during Covid-19, especially the indigenous population. Their mortality rate due to the virus was double the rest of the Brazilian population (Motta, 2021).

According to the attorney-in-law, Eloy Terena (2021), Bolsonaro should be impeached for different objective reasons. He believes Bolsonaro denies indigenous rights, especially the right to land, and the right of habitat preservation unique to each indigenous community. Eloy Tenena affirms Bolsonaro is facilitating the legalization of illegal occupation in indigenous territories. Additionally, the lawyer unquestionably trusts the attack on the fauna and flora of Brazil would alone be a reason to support and engage in the request for impeachment.

In April 2021, the President had a meeting with indigenous leaders and the president of Funai, when Bolsonaro encouraged the Indigenous peoples to promote mining and agribusiness in their territories. The president of Funai, in the same meeting, oriented a logger to file a popular action against any indigenous association that does not agree with mining (Angelo, 2021). Later, in August 2021 the Federal Court of Justice began to judge the *marco temporal* act. This Act establishes that indigenous areas could only be recognized and delimited by communities that occupied the areas before the promulgation of the Brazilian Constitution, in October 1988. Bolsonaro is one of the main heads of this proposal, believing that it needs to be approved "not to hand Brazil to the Indigenous peoples". However, many indigenous communities were not in their original lands in 1988, because they had been expelled from their territories during the colonization of Brazil. Even though it has not been approved yet, the Act has been used since the government of Michel Temer, in 2016. It has been exploited by farmers and ruralists to prevent the delimitation of new Indigenous lands. If approved, some Indigenous leaders believe

new delimitations will be rare, and many that have been already approved might be lost. The case will be judged on June 23rd, 2022 (Fernandes, 2021; Neves; Poder360, 2021).

Then, in 2022, after two years of the beginning of the Covid-19 pandemic, Bolsonaro decided to finally create a committee to help the Indigenous peoples against the virus (G1, 2022). At the same time, he cut funds for Indigenous peoples. In the federal budget for 2022, the president cut back BRL 3,18 billion (USD 627 million) that would go to Indigenous people, research, rural settlements, agrarian reform, land regularization, equality policies, and combating violence against women (Martello, 2022).

Once again, President Jair Bolsonaro encouraged the exploitation of protected areas by miners and landowners. With the tragedy happening in Ukraine, he defended the approval of Act 191, stating that it would lower Brazilian dependency on Russian fertilizers, especially potassium. Brazil imports more than 90% of the fertilizers used in agribusiness, and Russia is the most important partner. According to the Constitution, it is allowed to exploit minerals in Indigenous areas if the affected communities are listened to and agree with it. The Yanomami Territory is rich in minerals, and illegal miners want to explore the area. However, experts question the President's argument, declaring that only 11% of the reserves are inside Indigenous lands (Noblat, 2022; Watson, 2022).

5.3 Comparison from Previous Years

Even though the past ten years before Bolsonaro were not satisfactory in guaranteeing indigenous' rights when comparing data from 2009 until 2020, it is obvious that Bolsonaro has done more harm than expected. Table 1 shows the situation of indigenous territories in Brazil from 2009 until 2020. The data was gathered from indigenous communities, Cimi, and Funai.

Lands marked as registered are the ones where demarcation was concluded and registered at the Real Estate Registry Office of the District. Approved lands are the ones that have an official Presidential Decree and are waiting for registration. Declared are the ones with the Declaratory Ordinance of the Ministry of Justice and are waiting for approval and Identified territories are the recognized traditional territories by Funai awaiting declaration. Lands to be identified are included in Funai's program for future identification. No action refers to territories that are claimed by indigenous communities without any administrative action for regularization.

Reserved areas are demarcated as indigenous reserves by the Indigenous Protection Service (SPI). Lands with restriction ordinances are the ones that received ordinances from the Presidency of Funai, restricting their use from outsiders. And Domain lands are owned by indigenous communities.


Table 1 - Situation of Indigenous territories' delimitation in Brazil by year

Situation		Registered	Approved	Declared	Identified	To be identified	No action	Reserved/ Domain	With restriction	TOTAL
Year										
LUIZ INACIO LULA DA SILVA (LULA)										
2009	Quantity	354	44	61	22	146	324	36	2	989
	%	35.79	4.45	6.17	2.22	14.76	32.76	3.64	0.20	100
2010	Quantity	360	43	60	27	156	322	35	5	1008
	%	35.71	4.27	5.95	2.68	15.48	31.94	3.47	0.50	100
DILMA ROUSSEFF										
2011	Quantity	363	37	64	30	159	342	40	5	1040
	%	34.90	3.56	6.15	2.88	15.29	32.88	3.85	0.48	100
2012	Quantity	361	44	59	36	154	339	40	6	1039
	%	34.74	4.34	5.68	3.46	14.82	32.63	3.85	0.58	100
2013	Quantity	359	45	62	39	154	337	40	6	1042
	%	34.45	4.32	5.95	3.45	14.78	32.34	3.84	0.58	100
2014	Quantity	361	43	62	38	164	334	48	6	1056
	%	34.19	4.07	5.88	3.60	15.53	31.63	4.55	0.57	100
2015	Quantity	398	15	63	47	175	348	61	6	1113
	%	35.75	1.34	5.66	4.13	15.72	31.35	5.48	0.53	100
MICHEL TEMER										
2016	Quantity	401	16	62	53	169	530	59	6	1296
	%	30.94	1.23	4.78	4.09	13.04	40.86	4.55	0.46	100
2017	Quantity	400	19	61	55	169	537	59	6	1306
	%	30.63	1.45	4.67	4.2	12.94	41.12	4.52	0.46	100
2018	Quantity	408	14	62	49	162	528	61	6	1290
	%	31.63	1.09	4.81	3.8	12.56	40.93	4.73	0.47	100
JAIR BOLSONARO										
2019	Quantity	408	14	63	48	162	536	61	6	1299
	%	31.43	1.08	4.85	3.70	12.48	41.29	4.70	0.46	100
2020	Quantity	408	14	63	52	161	536	59	6	1299
	%	31.43	1.08	4.85	4.00	12.38	41.31	4.53	0.46	100

Table developed with data from Cimi (2010)

During the first two years of Bolsonaro’s government, not a single piece of land was registered, approved, or declared. Graph 1 goes further back in time, showing the approvals of indigenous territories by the presidential administration from 1985 until September 2021, the data was gathered from Cimi.

Graph 1 - Approvals of Indigenous Territories by President



Graph developed with data from Cimi (2020)

Bolsonaro’s annual average is zero, the lowest in more than 36 years in the history of the country. These numbers show that structural-institutional violence against the indigenous has been increasing throughout the years.

6. Discussion

6.1 Structural/Institutional Violence

Institutional and structural violence are both products of economic, political, and cultural dependence. In fact, institutional violence is a sub-category of structural violence. In most of my findings, the violence committed under a structure also has an institutional influence, and vice-versa.

During Bolsonaro's two first years in power, according to the 2019 and 2020 Cimi reports, Bolsonaro has not approved any new Indigenous territories. Indeed, the ongoing processes, have been either retreated or frozen, no progress has happened on them (CIMI, 2019; no Brasil, 2020). Worse than that, he has stated several times, that he wants to open their territories for mining and land exploration (AFP, 2018; Folhapress, 2019; G1, 2018; Iglesias & Said, 2019; Peduzzi, 2019). In 2018, when compared to the previous year, there was an increase of 134.9% in Indigenous lands invasion, followed by illegal exploitation and deforestation. These actions go against the Brazilian Constitution from 1988, which clearly states that the Country must protect their original rights over territories. It also states that the Union has the privilege of conducting research and mineral exploration in their lands, only if the affected Indigenous community approves it (Cunha, 2018). Not following the constitution, not approving any new Indigenous territories, not protecting them against invaders, and even encouraging the opening of the Indigenous lands is an act of top-down institutional violence, in which Bolsonaro reinforces authority by the established system. Moreover, it attacks the Indigenous basic needs, it is in their reserved territories that they live, produce their food, and find their wellness and freedom. Restricting their basic needs is structural violence that prevents them from satisfying survival needs.

President Jair Bolsonaro believes the Indigenous peoples sell their lands to foreign countries encouraged by NGOs. Therefore, he has expressed, many times, that he wants to revise the areas different tribes already have secured. In an interview, Bolsonaro declared that he is the one who delimitates indigenous lands because he is the "boss" (Folhapress, 2019; Iglesias & Said, 2019). Again, Jair Bolsonaro reinforces his authority and attacks the Indigenous peoples by accusing them of illegally selling their territories, without any reliable proof.

Furthermore, PL 191 is an actual example of structural-institutional violence. The Law Project aims to open Indigenous territories to mining, gas and oil exploitation, construction of hydroelectric plants, and other activities (no Brasil, 2020). The PL 191 is the law itself, therefore it falls within the concept of structural violence. But it is, also, committed specifically by the state, thus institutional violence. Passing this law, Bolsonaro will keep the Indigenous peoples on the outside, taking away their rights and feelings of belonging, without the power to rebel against the system.

Finally, Funai, the National Indigenous Foundation, has been fragilized in the past years. Resources have been cut down and its structure has been dismantled. The foundation was created to protect and assist the Indigenous peoples. Funai is responsible for the first steps in territory delimitation, therefore an important Indigenous organization. However, after Temer became president, and especially with President Jair Bolsonaro, Funai has begun to be guided and led by divisions that are historically anti-indigenous (Cimi, 2018). Its current president has close relations with Bolsonaro and has even oriented a logger to file an action against the indigenous associations that do not agree with mining (Angelo, 2021). The unit that is there, technically, to protect the Indigenous' rights and their territories, has been doing the opposite. Funai has been attacking their basic needs by influencing resources and protection that affect the Indigenous peoples in a negative matter.

These findings are aligned with results from other studies, that indicate land dispossession against indigenous peoples is not only an event but a structure that is maintained over different political configurations. Bolsonaro's administration has been acting in a way that legitimizes invasions and land exploitation, by preventing land delimitation. Moreover, findings in the studies show that there has been a strengthening of agribusiness, which has led to an increase in invasions, illegal exploitation, and land clearing (Oliveira & Buzatto, 2019; Rangel & Liebgott, 2020; Rapozo, 2021; Urzedo & Chatterjee, 2021).

In 2019 the Deter, alerting about the deforesting system from Inpe, alerted governmental environmental inspection bodies that a catastrophic fire would destroy huge parts of the Amazon Forest. However, no action was taken. In August Inpe registered 309,000 fire focuses there, three times more than in 2019. Bolsonaro even called himself the "captain chainsaw". What is worse, feeling supported by the President's words, farmers set fire illegally in a forest in Pará, to clear out their pastures. These events show how omission by the public powers and

encouraging speeches can lead to disastrous events. Through influences, structural violence is committed, attacking the Indigenous standard of living, by having their houses and lands on fire (CIMI, 2019; Lima, 2019; Watts, 2019).

Again, during his speech at the United Nations General Assembly in 2019, Jair Bolsonaro stated that the fire numbers shown in the media were incorrect. He believed they were inflated to attack him. Furthermore, he blamed the Indigenous peoples for the fires that deforested the Amazon, Cerrado, and Pantanal (Cimi, 2020; ElPais, 2019). These actions from the President weaken institutions and research. More than not helping combat fires, the government has encouraged them. The Indigenous peoples had to fight the fires themselves with no professional training or equipment.

Other studies have also shown that deforestation during Bolsonaro's government has increased significantly, with the highest rates in 11 years (Rangel & Liebgott, 2020; Rapozo, 2021; Stewart et al., 2021). The authors agree this is due to a lack of governmental policies, empowerment of the agribusiness' interests, and the undermining of environmental protection, which has led to the destruction of Indigenous basic needs.

Structural and institutional violence are also committed when the government neglects assistance to its population. I argue President Jair Bolsonaro is liable for structural violence when cutting back from the 2022 federal budget BRL 3,18 billion (USD 627 million) for Indigenous support, research, agrarian reform, land regularization, rural settlements, equality policies, and combating violence against women (Martello, 2022). When cutting out resources, the power authorities keep the Indigenous peoples from having the four basic human needs met: survival, wellness, freedom, and identity.

Another extremely important program that underwent cuts from Bolsonaro's government was the *Mais Médicos* program. This social program brought foreign doctors to isolated areas where there were no doctors before. The number of doctors acting in Indigenous communities more than doubled after the program was installed. Right after his election, Bolsonaro ended the agreement with Cuba, from where most doctors came from. The results were catastrophic, in the first month without the doctors, in January 2019, there were 77 deaths of Indigenous babies – the highest number since 2010 (Fellet, 2020; no Brasil, 2020; *Programa leva mais atendimento à saúde dos povos indígenas*, 2015). Through legitimized orders, the government

intercepts health care for the Indigenous peoples, ending social programs and cutting back funds. This has caused an increase in violence by the omission of the public power, with a high index of death from lack of health care (CIMI, 2019).

Furthermore, already weakened by the lack of health professionals available to them, during the Covid-19 pandemic the situation worsened for the Indigenous peoples. If they had not self-organized to put up physical barriers to prevent the proliferation of the virus and take care of each other, the circumstances could have exacerbated even more. However, instead of supporting them, Funai dismissed their protection by launching a slogan campaign during the pandemic: “Brazil cannot stop”. The campaign disagreed with the Indigenous self-organization, asking them not to block the access to their tribes. Moreover, the situation aggravated when Bolsonaro did not approve extra budgets for Indigenous emergency protection (no Brasil, 2020; Oliveira, A. n. E. C. d., 2020; Oliveira, J., 2020). Instead of helping the Indigenous peoples during the Covid-19 pandemic, institutions were dismantled, and resources were cut down. When influencing resources and health care, the government has deeply affected the Indigenous communities during Covid-19 times, which resulted in thousands of deaths due to the lack of support. And this type of exploitation is rooted in the Brazilian system, where resources are commonly restricted, and the marginalized population is not properly considered.

In sum, these are classic examples of structural and institutional violence, as they attack the Indigenous basic needs, as does direct violence, it kills, but slower. It does not have a specific person responsible, but a whole institutional structure that influences the health care system. Other studies have similar findings to mine, showing there has been a lack and inefficiency of state policies that impact the Indigenous lives, similar to the cut of resources. These are violations of their constitutional rights that affect their well-being and social assistance, leading to silent violence becoming part of their daily life. Studies have also shown that Indigenous peoples in lands that are not delimited are more vulnerable to intrusion, hence Covid-19 spread. The authors also state that the end of the social program *Mais Médicos* has impacted negatively Indigenous health care, with an increase in undernourished children and child mortality (Pacheco, 2011; Rangel & Liebgott, 2020; Rapozo, 2021).

Besides not having new delimited Indigenous territories and suspending ongoing processes, Bolsonaro is one of the main heads of the *marco temporal* act. He has even made a public

appeal for the Federal Supreme Court to recognize its validity (Fernandes, 2021). This act establishes that Indigenous territories could only be recognized and delimited by tribes that occupied the areas before the promulgation of the Constitution in 1988. Jair Bolsonaro believes that if not approved, we will be “handing Brazil over to the Indigenous peoples”. But many Indigenous communities were not in their original territories in 1988, due to the dictatorship period and the colonization, in which they were expelled and tortured (Fernandes, 2021; Neves; Poder360, 2021). Again, through legal means, by influencing law-making, the current government, instead of protecting the Indigenous peoples, is attacking their constitutional rights.

To conclude, structural and institutional violence are seen daily in Bolsonaro’s administration. By legal means, under well-established structures, he has influenced institutions to prevent the Indigenous people’s access to basic needs. Through acts and laws, dismantling of protection institutions, cutting resources, and not following the constitution, this top-down type of violence is affecting the Indigenous peoples’ well-being, safety, access to basic needs, and freedom. This unequal exchange, in which the minorities are exploited and ignored, while the top dogs get much out of the structure, is deeply rooted in the system. Thus, reversing the situation requires a lot of effort and new complex challenges.

6.2 Cultural Violence

Cultural violence, together with structural and institutional violence, is the root of direct violence. It is violence that is used to legitimize the other types of violence, using aspects of culture (Galtung, 1990). The main findings of this study are based on inflammatory speeches from the current Brazilian President, Jair Bolsonaro. I argue that his hate speeches incite, promote, and even justify violence. I believe that the line between freedom of speech and hate speech was crossed by the President and others through the numerous acts of violence and conflicts they have encouraged.

Since his election campaign, Bolsonaro has had polemic speeches regarding the Indigenous people’s rights. He has mentioned several times that he believes there is too much territory for a small number of Indigenous peoples and even said the ones in reserved lands were like animals in a zoo. He guaranteed that during his government there would not be new Indigenous lands delimitation. This was a promise he kept, according to the reports from Cimi (2018; 2019;

2020), there was not a single new land area registered, approved, or declared. With an annual average of zero approvals, Bolsonaro breaks a record with the lowest approvals in more than 36 years (AFP, 2018; ElPais, 2019; G1, 2018).

Moreover, the President encourages mining, logging, and land opening for agribusiness in Indigenous territories (ElPais, 2019), which has led to direct violence against the Indigenous peoples, resulting in murders and invasions. A state deputy used a chainsaw to break the block and cut trees in an Indigenous community, claiming Bolsonaro would support him (Poder360, 2020). This clearly shows how the President's behavior and discourses can influence and legitimize violence. With the tragedy happening in Ukraine, Jair Bolsonaro defended, once again, the approval of Act 191, which endorses the opening of Indigenous territories for mining, oil and gas exploration, and agriculture on a large scale. He argues that approving this Act would lower the country's dependency on Russian fertilizers (Noblat, 2022; Watson, 2022).

Later, in 2020, with the Covid-19 pandemic, Bolsonaro used his power to worsen the situation of the disease in Brazil. Through his denialist speeches and disbelief in science, he has spread fake news about the vaccine and self-isolation. Apart from the speeches, the President directly acted into weakening the health system in the country, by changing policies and the direction of the Health Ministry many times, having important positions occupied by people that deny science (no Brasil, 2020; Queiroz, 2022). These speeches and the spread of fake news made thousands of Brazilians believe in his words, not follow regional restrictions, and not believe in the gravity of the disease, which has led to a disastrous situation in Brazil, with thousands of deaths a day. For the Indigenous population, the situation was worst, their mortality rate was double the rest of the population, and Bolsonaro disregarded the government's obligation to guarantee access to emergency drinking water, food supply, and hospital beds for the Indigenous people (Motta, 2021; Oliveira, J., 2020). I argue the Covid-19 situation in Brazil is an example of all types of violence, not only cultural. It can be also direct, by the numerous invasions Indigenous territories suffered the pandemic with no protection from the government, and thousands of deaths, and, structural and institutional, due to its restrictions on their basic needs and by being top-down violence.

Also, Bolsonaro believes that Indigenous peoples are used as a maneuver piece by foreign governments and NGOs to invade the Amazon Forest and that the only solution is to integrate

them into civil society (@jairbolsonaro, 2019; ElPais, 2019). Moreover, he blames them for the fires that devastated much of the forests (Cimi, 2020).

Studies have also shown that Bolsonaro's inflammatory and hate speeches promote a sense of impunity to criminal acts of violence. Moreover, they argue that his speeches, complemented by practical political actions, encourage attacks towards the Indigenous peoples, violating their territorial and human rights, and towards the environment. Furthermore, the authors agree that through discursive artifices, the president has legitimized violence against the Indigenous peoples, placing them at an inferior social level as a group that needs to be integrated and developed. These discourses hide cultural racism from a country that does not admit its plurality, and thus does not accept that people with different traditions and cultures can live in the same nation (Ferrante & Fearnside, 2021; Pacheco, 2011; Rangel & Liebgott, 2020; Urzedo & Chatterjee, 2021).

In sum, these micro and macro-aggressions by the president, regardless of his intent, have an immense negative impact on Indigenous peoples. The hate speeches are indirect violence and lead to direct violence against these already marginalized populations.

6.3 Direct Violence

Direct violence is the one that is the most visible and whose author can be tracked. A public figure, such as the President, would most likely not commit direct violence toward someone. However, I argue that direct violence can be influenced by speeches, acts, and attitudes from a public figure. When a higher power, such as the President, legitimizes violence against a group of people, in this case, the Indigenous people, it encourages others to execute violent acts towards them. The reports from Cimi show that the cases of direct violence against an Indigenous person have doubled from 2018 to 2019 when Jair Bolsonaro got elected, and it kept on increasing in 2020. These cases include power abuse, death threat, murders, attempted murder, sexual violence, ethnic-cultural racism, premeditated murders, and willful bodily harm (CIMI, 2019; no Brasil, 2020). And, according to Benites (2019), the murders of Indigenous persons have increased since Bolsonaro was elected due to his violent discourse against them.

It was in 2019 when Paulo Paulino Guajajara was murdered from an ambush by loggers inside his land, in Maranhão. He was a well-known person that always fought for Indigenous rights,

he learned how to use technology to monitor their territories from invasion. He was only 26 when his life was violently taken by five armed loggers. Paulino's murder caused national and international repercussions (Marçal, 2019).

Power abuse is also a form of direct violence and, during 2019 and 2020, many military actions resulted in the deaths of Indigenous people, such as in the “*Abacaxi*'s river massacre” and the *Chiquitano* action. Cases of power abuse and ethnic-cultural racism and discrimination increased during the Covid-19 pandemic when Indigenous persons tried to get treatment in hospitals (no Brasil, 2020).

In fact, the murder of Emyra Wajãpi is an example of how Bolsonaro's actions and words influence acts of direct violence. Emyra was 68 years old when murdered in a violent attack from 15 illegal miners in his territory. The miners wanted to take over the tribe; on that day, President Jair Bolsonaro defended mining in indigenous lands (*Assassinato de liderança indígena revela: Bolsonaro 'cria ódio contra essas populações'*, 2019).

Different studies have similar findings to the ones presented in this section. They all show high rates of direct conflicts against Indigenous peoples, which have more than doubled during Bolsonaro's administration, becoming, therefore a characteristic of his government. Some argue that the inefficiency of the judicial system and irresponsibility of the state have led to impunity in murder cases against the Indigenous peoples and in environmental conflicts. They conclude that this transitional governmental period is a project of extermination against the Indigenous peoples in Brazil (Ferrante & Fearnside, 2021; Rapozo, 2021; Stewart et al., 2021).

To conclude, even though there is no evidence that President Jair Bolsonaro has committed direct violence against the Indigenous peoples, I argue that his actions and speeches have encouraged and facilitated the increase of aggression toward this already marginalized population. Moreover, power abuse especially from the military has been a characteristic of Bolsonaro's administration.

7. Conclusion

This study provided an overview of Jair Bolsonaro's administration's effects on Indigenous peoples in Brazil, through the analysis of Cimi's reports and media coverage, using the concepts of cultural, direct, structural, and institutional violence proposed by the framework chosen. This qualitative research answered the main research question showing a connection between Jair Bolsonaro's actions and rhetoric and the increase of violence towards the Indigenous peoples' rights in Brazil.

The results from the study show that the situation for the Indigenous peoples in Brazil has always been one of disadvantage; however, with the election of Jair Bolsonaro, in late 2018, the problems were exacerbated. Through his rhetoric and actions, Indigenous peoples saw their constitutional rights being negatively impacted, and thus, acts of violence towards them have risen. The violent scenery and dispute over territory use became more evident with the far-right conservative representative, Bolsonaro.

For instance, with hate speeches, denialist movements, and anti-science behavior, Bolsonaro has promoted and justified cultural, structural, institutional, and direct violence. The President's micro- and macro-aggressions, regardless of his assumed intent, have led to violence toward this already marginalized population. Moreover, with his powerful position, Jair Bolsonaro has, by legitimized means, influenced institutions to prevent the Indigenous peoples' access to their basic human needs, such as clean water, sanitation system, health care, and even housing. Under his structures, Bolsonaro dismantled Indigenous institutions and cut their resources, which is evident top-down violence.

Nevertheless, this research presented a connection between Bolsonaro's administration and the rise of Indigenous violence. The lack of public policies and the institutional dismantling made for economic interests, with the Amazonia crisis, led to political violence. Furthermore, his rhetoric against delimiting Indigenous territories, wanting to review all the past approved territories, stating the Indigenous peoples need to be civilized, promising to open their territories for mining, oil and gas exploitation, and the agribusiness, treating them as inferior human beings, spreading false information, and hate speeches towards them, has encouraged some to perform all types of violence against the Indigenous peoples. Aggressors, murderers, invaders, exploiters, and farmers have relied on Bolsonaro's speeches when committing crimes

against Indigenous communities. Additionally, the reports show that violence against the Indigenous peoples in Brazil has risen significantly since Bolsonaro's election campaign.

It is, indeed, important to hear Indigenous voices and keep researching and the debate alive. Because direct violence over years becomes structural violence that produces and reproduces cultural violence. Direct violence is eventually forgotten, their murders, invasions, and attacks are forgotten. Then, it becomes structural violence in the form of discrimination and cultural violence in the form of prejudice.

In Brazil, structural, institutional, direct, and cultural violence are interlinked. And the line between freedom of speech and hate incitement might not be easy to estimate. However, when it escalates into a public safety matter, with murders, invasions, tortures, and threats, it becomes clear that the line has been crossed. Moreover, as presented, the Brazilian democracy was established not a long time ago, in 1989, thus having an authoritarian President, can threaten the democracy once again. The period Brazilian Indigenous peoples are living in is one of instability and fear. Never before, after the dictatorship period, did they face such a tyrannical President, that does not act for the people, but only for the economic sector.

Certainly, national commotion, public pressure, and media tension have not impacted the President enough to halt him from spreading false information, hate speeches, and unconstitutional actions. However, I argue that the biggest restrictive factor would be international pressure against agricultural products, due to Brazil being one of the world's largest beef and soy exporters.

Furthermore, it is important to note that during the research process, I tried unsuccessfully to find articles showing the positive impacts of Jair Bolsonaro's administration on Indigenous rights. Indeed, this corroborates, alongside the premise and findings from this thesis, that Bolsonaro has affected the Indigenous peoples in Brazil negatively. Nonetheless, Jair Bolsonaro's election is a recent event in Brazilian history, thus there is still a lack of reliable published materials on the subject. Therefore, future research on how Bolsonaro's administration has affected the Indigenous peoples in Brazil is recommended to build an even stronger argument and push for political changes.

8. References

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Norges miljø- og biovitenskapelige universitet
Noregs miljø- og biovitenskapelige universitet
Norwegian University of Life Sciences

Postboks 5003
NO-1432 Ås
Norway