The Department of International Environment and Development Studies, Noragric, is the international gateway for the Norwegian University of Life Sciences (NMBU). The university comprises of eight departments, associated research institutions and the Norwegian College of Veterinary Medicine in Oslo. Established in 1986, Noragric's contribution to international development lies in the interface between research, education (Bachelor, Master and PhD programs) and assignments.

The Noragric Master thesis are the final theses submitted by students in order to fulfil the requirements under the Noragric Master program "International Environmental Studies", "Development Studies" and other Master programs.

Acknowledgements

Declaration

I, Pål Røren, declare that this thesis is a result of my own research investigations and findings. Sources of information other than my own have been acknowledged and a reference list has been appended. This work has not been previously submitted to any other university for award of any type of academic degree.

Signature:

Date:

Abstract

Norway's status is puzzling. Traditionally, Norway has been conceived of as a small power with limited foreign policy alternatives at its disposal due to the constraints of the international system. However, Norway's newfound wealth coupled with its explicit focus and leading figure in multilateral cooperation, diplomacy, international law and peace promotion suggest that Norway is something more than a small power. This thesis applies a modified neoclassical realist framework for conceptualising and analysing status and middle powers. This approach emphasises both the materiality and social aspects of status. It seeks to overcome the bias' that arise from drawing on a singular approach laden with researchers pre-conceptions, this study triangulates the alternative methods measures to pioneer a more rigorous and balanced metric of status measures than has been used before in the status and middle power literature. The thesis shows that Norway's material capabilities, operationalised as hierarchical status resources, have risen significantly the last 40 years, but fail to reach the levels of established middle powers such as Canada and Australia. Norway's behaviour, operationalised as moral authority output, is either larger or equal to that of the established middle powers. Measuring the level of international recognition, however, the thesis shows that despite the increase in hierarchical status resources and consistently high moral authority output, Norway's standing in the international system is actually decreasing. This discrepancy is puzzling given the strong empirical and theoretical link between material capabilities and behaviour on the one hand and status on the other. The thesis suggests that Norway's recognition discrepancy stems from three potential sources: (1)Norway's foreign policy does not stand out compared to the other 'like-minded' countries Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden; (2) Recognition is likely to follow a regional pattern, suggesting that states will recognise countries that they perceive are regionally dominant; (3) Recognition and status attribution tend to lag behind the actual hierarchical status resources and moral authority output, suggesting that Norway's low recognition is a direct consequence of low historical standing.

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Abbreviations

CIA - Central Intelligence Agency
CINC - Composite Index of National Capabilities
COW - Correlates of War
DAC - Development Assistance Committee
DIPCON - Diplomatic Contacts Database
EEA - European Economic Area
ESDP - European Security and Defence Policy
EU - European Union
GBOARD - Government Budget Appropriations or Outlays on Research and Development
GDP - Gross Domestic Product
GNI - Gross National Income
GNP - Gross National Product
HITS - Hyperlink-Induced Topic Search
IGO - Intergovernmental Organisation
IMF - International Monetary Fund
IR - International Relations
MP - Member of Parliament
MSTI - Main Science and Technology Indicators
NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NBIM - Norges Bank Investment Management
ODA - Official Development Assistance
OECD - Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PPP - Power Purchasing Parity
PR - Page Rank
R&D - Research and Development
SIPRI - Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
SIT - Social Identity Theory
UIA - Union of International Associations
UN - United Nations
UNDP - United Nations Development Programme
WB - World Bank

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Chapter 1: Introduction

Norway's foreign policy has historically been marked and constrained by its smallness in size, population, wealth, and military strength. As Norwegian foreign policy analyst Johan Jørgen Holst (1967, p.24) suggested in the late 60s: "small countries' opportunities to cause changes in the international environment is of course quite limited and its security policy must to a large extent represent an adaption to the dominating conditions." Some of Norway's attributes however, have changed drastically. Most notably, Norway has become one of the wealthiest countries in the world, and secured its place as a leading economic force in Europe in the areas of oil and gas.[1] In addition, due to the Law of the Sea Convention, Norway controls the 13th largest territory in the world. Thus, labelling modern Norway as a small country, deprived of influence, with narrow interests, and left reacting to the pressures of the international system, is a questionable description at best. The status does not fit.

Whether status is used to indicate rank in a social hierarchy or to depict the role a state may play in the international sphere, the concept continues to puzzle International Relations (IR)-theorists. Indeed, theorists find it hard to decipher its epistemological character. Status is on the one side a social phenomenon relating to a country's standing, position or role in an intersubjective social hierarchy. It is a nominal phenomenon that is continuously contested and rearranged on the basis of the peer's view of a particular actor's reputation, role and prestige. On the other hand, there is quite often, but not always, a correlation between a country's material possession and its status. States with great wealth, power and influence often possess great power status. Tiny, poor and und unimportant countries do not. Thus, status is often reduced to a series of positivist indicators, such as wealth, power and available resources, which consequently decide which status group an actor belongs to. Needless to say, these two epistemological positions also guide researchers' methodological stances, which more often than not fall into either a positivist-quantitative category or an interpretivist qualitative category. In IR, a discipline heavily marked by philosophical debates, status continues to fascinate and provoke researchers.

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[1] By 2012, The Norwegian Sovereign wealth fund, based on the income from oil and gas, owns an astonishing 1,25% of all the stocks in the world, and around 2,5% of all the stocks within Europe (NBIM 2012); Norway claims sovereignty of approximately 30 % of Europe's continental shelf (Harbo 2008); Norway has become the 14th largest oil producer, the 7th largest producer of natural gas, the 5th largest oil exporter and the second largest exporter of natural gas in the world (CIA 2013); Norway has also become the European Union's (EU) fourth most important import partner in trade and goods (European Commission 2013)

Status is not, however, only an analytical criteria. It also refers to a certain mode of behaving in international politics. The IR-literature has shown to a great extent that categories of states - be they micro powers, small powers, middle powers, great powers, or super powers - have different material attributes and foreign policy priorities. Indeed, looking away from the material capabilities, Norway has gone to greater lengths in order to secure a good reputation as a global actor. This empirical observation aligns well with portions of the IR-literature which claims that when states acquire such a vast amount of wealth and power "they try to convert them into something that can have more value to them than the mere possession of material things: social status"(Wohlforth 2009, p.35). Norway's past *status* as a small power in the international system does not align with its material capabilities. Nor does it align with the state's extroverted and vigorous behaviour when dealing with other states directly, or in international organisations.

Indeed, Norway's newfound wealth coupled with its explicit focus on reputation in areas of multilateral cooperation, diplomacy, international law and peace promotion suggest that the state might have sought, or will seek, status as a middle power. Middle power status, however, just as any other form of state status category, is an ambiguous analytical category. Even more so than its larger and smaller siblings, scholars are far from reaching a consensus of what a middle power really is. Some even question whether the term bears any analytical fruitfulness in that it was created only to serve a specific function (see Chapnick 1999; Chapnick 2000). Nevertheless, premature and nihilistic conclusions regarding the term do not correspond with logic. It is, for instance, absurd to claim that no space exists between great powers and small powers where countries may seek status. Moreover, some countries, most notably Canada and Australia, have even gone to great lengths in order to establish themselves as a middle power with all the foreign policy behaviour which is associated with such a status. Indeed, despite the ambiguity surrounding the middle power category, most academics and foreign policy practitioners accept that middle power status is distinct from both great power and small power status.[2] Given that the middle power status is the closest of the available statuses Norway might seek, it makes sense to understand the criteria for reaching middle power status and to see whether Norway fulfils these. With this in mind, this thesis seeks to answer the following interlinked research questions:

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[2] As one Canadian scholar put it: "the impression that there really are certain powers of secondary rank with similar capabilities and similar minds, and with a similar approach to the maintenance of the international system, seems somehow to survive the 'real-world' observation that things are in fact a jumble" (Stairs 1998, p.282).

To what extent has Norway's increased material capability and pro-active foreign policy moved Norway up in the social status hierarchy? Does Norway now receive the recognition befitting that of a middle power?

The research questions assumes that material capabilities and foreign policy behaviour are closely associated with status. Thus, understanding how status works and what characterises middle powers is a prerequisite for analysing Norway's position in the status hierarchy. Therefore, building on previous literature on status and middle powers, I apply a modified neoclassical realist framework for conceptualising and analysing status and middle powers. This approach emphasises both the materiality and social aspects of status. It seeks to overcome the bias' that arise from drawing on a singular approach laden with researchers pre-conceptions, this study triangulates the alternative methods measures to pioneer a more rigorous and balanced metric of status measures than has been used before in the status. The material capabilities are here viewed as *hierarchical status resources*, being the key indicator for countries' position in the status hierarchy. Based on the middle power literature, I conceptualise *moral authority* as a mode of behaving that countries must perform in order to be a middle power. The potential moral authority is measured as *moral authority outputs*. However, possessing middle power characteristics is not enough for determining whether Norway is a middle power. Status is a social phenomenon which is fully dependent on the recognition of Norway's material capabilities and foreign policy behaviour by other countries. In order to capture this, I conceptualise international diplomatic recognition as capturing the social and perceptual aspects of status which is the best option available of quantitatively capturing patterns of status attribution. I also draw upon the best available algorithms for measuring the diplomatic outreach (moral authority output) diplomatic recognition of countries. These new methods, I argue offer qualitatively superior means of getting at status than anything that has gone previously. Thus while, this thesis takes aim at Norway's status, the tools developed to do so, have a much wider application to status research. Taken together, this study seeks to set a benchmark for methodologically pluralistic, rigorous, and reflective quantitative research on status and middle powers.

The analysis shows that the accumulated material capability and foreign policy behaviour of Norway is similar to that of established middle powers, but the recognition it has received for this is not enough to move Norway up the social status hierarchy. Expanding on this, the analysis reveals three important things. First, Norway's hierarchical status resources have risen significantly the last 40 years, but fail to reach the levels of Australia and Canada.

Norway's moral authority output is either larger or equal to that of established middle powers. Second, the analysis reveals a discrepancy between the hierarchical status resources and moral authority output on the one hand and achieved diplomatic recognition on the other. Despite Norway having increased its material capabilities over the last 40 years and having a strong moral authority output, it has yet to receive recognition for this. Third, this thesis argues that this discrepancy results from three interrelated factors. First, the continued delivery of high moral authority output may have increased Norway's prestige and reputation among its close peers, but Norway's foreign policy has not stood out compared to the other like-minded countries. Second, diplomatic recognition and status is likely to follow a regional pattern, being that states will recognise countries that they see as regionally dominant, regardless of whether those countries in the region have equal hierarchical status resources or the same moral authority output. Third, status is 'sticky'. The recognition discrepancy suggests that status tends to lag after the actual hierarchical status resources and the moral authority output, meaning that diplomatic recognition is not a signal of low standing, but rather a consequence of a low historical standing.

1.2 Thesis outline

The remainder of this thesis is organised as follows. The next chapter reviews the research conducted on Norway's status in the international system as well as the scholarly work on status in general. This review reveals the lack of research on Norway's position in the world and the problems that researchers have had with conceptualising status. Chapter 3 settles the study's theoretical approach by reviewing literature on status and middle power and integrating them into a neoclassical realist framework. The theory chapter also distinguishes between hierarchical status resources and moral authority output, which are inextricably linked, but demand methodologically different operationalisations and measures. Chapter 4 draws on the theory chapter and outlines and critically discusses the methodological approach. This includes reflections, problematisation and justification for the research design, sample approach data collection and sources, as well as issues regarding the study's validity and reliability. The thesis then moves into the analysis section in Chapter 5 which is separated into three. First I examine Norway's hierarchical status resources represented by power and wealth. Second, I measure moral authority output, here operationalised into diplomatic and organisational outreach as well as humane internationalism. These concepts are furthermore operationalised into indicators: single and aggregate measures of military capabilities; various

economic indicators; embassies established in other countries; participation in international organisations; contributions to United Nations (UN) peacekeeping and the UN Development Programme (UNDP) as well as the level of development assistance. Third, I employ the Google PageRank (PR) algorithm – a network centrality measure – for measuring Norway's diplomatic recognition. This measure, which is arguably the best single indicator for capturing the perceptual side of status, is subsequentlycompared with Norway's score on the indicators for hierarchical status resources and moral authority output. The discrepancy between Norway's actual diplomatic recognition and the indicators are in turn discussed offering three explanations and deriving some theoretical implications. Chapter 6 concludes the thesis by summarising the main findings and suggest the empirical, theoretical and methodological implications of this study.

Chapter 2: Literature review

Systematic thinking about Norway's position in the world and of the country's foreign policy in general has been relatively scarce compared to its Scandinavian neighbours. IR as a scholarly subject experienced its humble start in Norway during the early 20th century, and gained momentum with a growing institutionalisation of an academic discipline during the interwar years (Leira & Neumann 2007). Still, Norwegian foreign policy has long resided at the margins general political debate, and IR continues to be a marginal discipline at the mercy of Political Science's prerogative. Therefore, conducting analysis on Norway's status is not a well-trodden path.[3] However, scholars have implicitly touched upon themes that are related to status due to the wide various overlaps status has with for instance power, wealth, position and reputation. Much of the early contributions, and even more so in the literature after the Cold War, contains implied assumptions of Norway's standing in the world. Furthermore, Norway is occasionally represented in international journals or volumes as an example of a small (or middle) power in international politics. This review will trace the main development of how Norway's status has been studied in domestic and international academia and thus effectively situating the thesis' position in the literature on Norwegian foreign policy.

2.1 Previous work on Norway's status, position and reputation in the world

The first explicit semi-academic approaches to Norway's position in the international world came prior and during the First World War (Castberg 1917a; Castberg 1917b; Lange 1910a; Lange 1910b). When talking of Norway position in the First World War, the lawyer Johan Castberg (1917b, p.211) emphasised the significance of small powers in that "no country, no matter how powerful it is, in the long run without losing, can do without the other's sympathy. Not even the smallest country's goodwill is worthless." However, Castberg (1917b, p.213) realised that the smallness of Norway put severe limitations on Norway because "a good relationship with the large neighbour in the east is necessary for a peaceful and safe future in Norden". The journalist and MP, Carl Johan Hambro, claimed that Norway had a duty as a small state to uphold the rules given by the League of Nations, but that it was reasonable to

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[3] One notable exception is Carvalho & Neumann (2015b). More on this volume below.

think that a great power "may have interest in breaking the pact and attack a small state" (Hambro 1936, p.219-220). These authors were important predecessors for the post-war academics in the sense that they started a narrative which highlighted the duality of Norway's position in the world: as a small power with severe limitations on issues regarding security and warfare, but with opportunities and duty to mitigate the tense international climate, often through multilateral institutions. Most notably, the historian and Foreign Minister Halvdan Koht's (1937; 1941; Koht 1944; 1945; 1957) scholarly work represented further institutionalisation of International Politics as an academic subject. Although recognising the long peace tradition in Norway as a variable influencing Norwegian foreign policy, Koht still recognised the brute effect of *realpolitik* on Norway's decision-making and status. This is because small powers, Koht (1937, p.287) argued, "have had to admit to themselves that they would hardly be able to defend their own independence in a war with one of the greater Powers." (also see Koht 1941, p.21-2).

The Cold War saw the emergence of a number of Norwegian scholars working empirically and theoretically on Norway's position in the world as a small power (Brundtland 1971; Gleditsch 1970; Gleditsch 1988; Sjaastad 1970; 1971; 1975; Ørvik 1962). Scholars such as Johan Jørgen Holst (1967; 1974a; 1982; 1983) focused on the military and strategic challenges of being a small state in alliance with the US while being neighbour to the Russian bear. Indeed, most of the academic work on Norwegian foreign policy during the Cold War works within a geostrategic scope where the inferiority of Norway's capabilities, or hierarchical status resources as they are conceived of in thesis, are emphasised. However, this period also saw the emergence of an academic body which highlighted Norway's roles in the world, as a petroleum exporter (Angell 1974; Bergesen & Malnes 1984; Godec & Allard 1987; Holst 1974b); as a constructive NATO-ally (Frydenlund 1974; Graver 1968; Hansen 1968); as a contributor to the UN (Holst 1978; Jacobsen 1967; Mykletun 1976; Treholt 1972) and as a foreign aid-agent (Stokke 1989b). All these roles were seen as complementary for a small power. Thus, the scope gradually shifted from Norway's hierarchical status as a small power and towards Norway's reputation and the eventual benefits and disadvantages associated with the roles Norway embraced.

The focus on *omdømme* (reputation) rather than hierarchical status was amplified in the academic works of the late 80s and throughout most of the 90s. This process largely stems from the seminal work of Jan Egeland (1988) which maintained that Norway had acquired extraordinary qualities for playing the role as a human right activist in the world. Egeland did

not dwell on the disadvantages of being a small power, but rather maintained that small power status was beneficial for engaging in humanitarian issues and thus improving the country's reputation (also see Egeland 1996; Frydenlund 1988; Godal 2003). Following Egeland's success, the academic environment reinforced the advantages of being a small power until the early 21st century. This consolidation phase echoed and reinforced a strong liberal-institutional approach to the case of Norway's standing and reputation. At the same time, scholars also employed more reflectivist theories for analysing Norway's role in the world, effectively downplaying Norway's positional status and accentuating its beneficial roles (Ingebritsen 2002; Ingebritsen et al. 2006). Thune & Larsen (2000, p.81) for instance, viewed the role-seeking behaviour by Norway in a constructivist light, showing that its success was due to a "positive relationship between, on the one hand, the conducted policy, and on the other hand, status and position". Recent literature has begun to speak of Norway as something larger than a small power (Carvalho & Neumann 2015b; Haaland 2008; Leira & Lodgaard 2007; Leira & Sending 2013; Neumann 2011) In a book debating Norway's place in the world, Leira & Sending (2013, p.31) persist that Norway is "a medium-sized state, with global interest in both maintaining the system and economic development through massive investments". However, this direction has been, until very recently, a rather marginalised area of academic work (see for instance Toje 2012 for an opposing view).

Caravalho & Neumann's (ed.) recently published book *Small State Status Seeking: Norway's quest for international standing* (2015b) is the first work to explicitly deal with the concept of status in relation to Norwegian foreign policy. In many ways, the book aligns well with the aim of this thesis, namely to show that also small powers can seek status and that status also matters in areas other than great power war and conflict (Carvalho & Neumann 2015a).[4] The various contributors to the book do not consider the actual status category of Norway (small, middle or great) but rather focus on how Norway seeks status and how *status seeking* has been a prominent feature in: nation and state building (Leira 2015); relations to great powers (Haugevik 2015); peacekeeping, mediation and the politics of involvement (Carvalho & Lie 2015); in multilateral settings (Schia & Sending 2015); defence and security policy (Græger 2015); the Nobel Peace Prize institution (Johnsen 2015); as well as the climate and environmental field (Lahn & Rowe 2015). This book confirms the recent consensus in Norwegian foreign policy scholarship by asserting that Norway has become more than a small power. Haugevik (2015) for instance, suggests that Norway during the 70s and 80s began to

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[4] The theoretical considerations in this book will be elaborated upon in the theory section below because it aligns with many of the central tenets of this thesis.

align itself with great powers and aspire to become a middle power with its newfound petroleum resources. De Carvalho & Lie (2015) claim that Norway has performed like a great power, and has sought to compete with other middle powers such as Canada. The book reiterates the dominating narrative in Norway, namely the claim that Norway outperforms its size.[5] Despite these hints that Norway is moving closer to middle power status, none seem to deal with the conceptual and empirical puzzle of status transition.

According to several international articles and edited volumes, Norway has long been considered a middle power (Behringer 2005; Cohen & Clarkson 2004; Fischer 2009; Helleiner 1990; Stokke 1989c). The international literature therefore argues, implicitly, that Norway became a middle power when it started to *act* as a middle power. But as shown, and as will be expanded upon later, Norway had incorporated the roles of a middle power by the 1970s which per definition means that Norway was already a middle power during the Cold War. The distance between these analyses prompts the question: has Norway transitioned to a middle power, and if so, when did this transition occur? Norwegian scholars use the concept of status as a reflection of the state's reputation and the roles it has embraced in the world. In contrast, some international scholars use the same criteria and end up labelling Norway as a middle power. No work deals with this question explicitly. The authors of *Small State Status Seeking* are the closest, but as the editors assert: "Whether Norway counts as a small state or a middle power in this respect is less relevant, as long as it is not a great power, and as long as its foreign policy is generally characterized by institutional cooperation with other states and not by conflict" (Carvalho & Neumann 2015a, p.15). Although this thesis in large parts builds on *Small State Status Seeking* it does not agree with the authors that the distinction between small powers and middle powers do not matter in relation to middle powers. Norway may very well seek status as a good power as the anthology presumes, but the hierarchical element of status seems sometimes forgotten. Given the significant increase in Norway's material capabilities in junction with its persistent role as a good power, Norway may well be more like a middle power than a small power. Indeed, the most important status category countries may seek status is in the space between hierarchical status categories (e.g. small powers, middle powers, great powers) (Paul et al. 2014a; Wohlforth 2009). As will be shown later, and starting in the next chapter, which status category a state belongs to matters. In particular, moving from one category to another involves not only change in instrumental capacity (the

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[5] Throughout the last 40 years, the phrase "as the richest country in the world" frequently appears in the public debate as an argument for various foreign policy directions such as human rights, environmental issues, defence and security and development aid (Balsvik 1994; Flaa 1997; Flachenberg 1983; Jagland 2001; Sommerfeldt 2005; Storvik 1995)

degree to which states can use their status for something tangible), but also has intrinsic value for the state in question (Carvalho & Neumann 2015a; Dafoe et al. 2014; Paul et al. 2014a).

2.2 Status as an academic subject

Several landmark texts in the realist literature use many concepts related to status. Hobbes (Hobbes & Macpherson 1968, p.185) for instance saw "three principal causes of quarrel. First, competition; secondly, diffidence; thirdly, glory". In contrast to the many (neo) realist pieces that draw upon Hobbes for an analogy to synonymise power with capabilities, Hobbes also claimed that "reputation of power is power; because it draweth with it the adherence of those that need protection" (*ibid.,* p.150) This seminal author saw no irrationality behind the lust for honour, prestige, glory or reputation. Rather, it was seen as a basic human predisposition and should be dealt with on equal basis with the lust for power (Markey 1999). For instance, when speaking of a Spartanian setback during the Peloponnesian war, Thucydides argued that the Spartans would look for "any possible means of dealing us a blow which will restore their good name - the more so since they have invested so much for so long in cultivating a reputation for courage (Thucydides & Hammond 2009, p.314). Turning to the 20th century, it is often forgotten that Hans Morgenthau, dedicated considerable space to ideational factors as well as power. Morgenthau (1985, p. 90) identified *prestige* as a state's "reputation for power" which accordingly was "an important and sometimes decisive factor in determining success of failure of its foreign policy". It should be noted that the classicists differ from the 20th century realist as the latter realists view prestige as instrumental for human's lust for power. The classicists, in contrast, see prestige, honour and status as basic intrinsic motives for war (Markey 1999). In the realist tradition, this process of undermining the autonomous influence of prestige, honour and reputation on world politics, climaxed when Waltz (1979) discarded status concerns as drivers of state's foreign policy. However, this is not to say that structural realists have disregarded the notion of status entirely. Rather, Waltz and other neorealists (Layne 1993; Mearsheimer 2001; Walt 1987) tend to agree that states are assigned their status depending on their "size of population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength, political stability and competence" (Waltz 1979, p.131). Thus, structural realists shifted the meaning of status from an instrumental or intrinsic motive to a material depiction of *rank* in the international anarchy.

The perception of a certain rank among great powers infused interest amongst scholars to classify powers according to their position in the international system. Origins of this

classification can be traced back to Giovanni Botero (1956, p. 2), a teacher of philosophy which in 1589 established that "some dominions are small, others are large, others of middle size, not absolutely but comparatively, and with respect to their neighbours". Botero's definition often corresponds with a materialist notion of power, in which those powers with the greatest capabilities are commonly known as possessing great power status and those with limited capabilities are known as either small or middle powers (Handel 1990; Holbraad 1984; Kennedy 1987; Keohane 1969; Neack 1993; Organski 1958; Vital 1967; Wight 1978b).[6] However, this description is rather simplified; not all these authors only saw material variables as exclusive in determining status. Martin Wight (1978b, p.26), along with members of the eclectic tradition of the English School saw "moral cohesion" as a decisive factor in deciding those who belonged to a certain rank among powers. Furthermore, Hedley Bull (2002, p.196) insisted that great powers have rights and duties in which states who "are military powers of the front rank, but are not regarded by their own leaders or others as having these rights and responsibilities, are not properly speaking great powers". Thus belonging to a rank of states became for some scholars also associated with taking on an expected *role* in world politics (Dafoe et al. 2014).

A group of scholars in the Cold War were dedicated to revealing the effects of status on conflict. These Causes of War theorists systematically studied the effects of "status inconsistency" – the gap between ascribed and achieved status – on the probability of conflict escalation (Galtung 1964; Hernes 1969; Volgy & Mayhall 1995; Wallace 1971). Though sharing a positivist epistemological outlook with Waltz, these authors, in contrast, engaged in large-N analyses to try to establish a correlation between diplomatic underrepresentation, excessive material capabilities and conflict. Thus, in contrast to Waltz, these quantitative analyses sought to establish a bridge between status as *rank* in material capabilities and *social status*. The Causes of War tradition has also lately invoked prestige as a determining variable of weapon proliferation among some scholars preferring a wide arrange of qualitative approaches (Ahmed 1999; Eyre & Suchman 1996; Levite 2003; Sagan 1996). Rank is here dependent upon *prestige*. For instance, when analysing the French acquisition of nuclear weapons after the Second World War, Sagan (1996, p.78) argues that the state sought nuclear prestige to "return France to its historical great power status". In contrast to neorealism, many of these authors saw material capabilities as instrumental for achieving *rank*, which of course then became the intrinsic goal.

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[6] Note that many of these authors have already been labeled structural behaviouralist in the middle power literature review.

On the more non-materialist examinations of prestige and status in world politics Larson & Shevchenko (2003; 2010) have applied Social Identity Theory (SIT) to states quest for status in which "people form part of their image of who they are from their social group", consequently leading to a collective status seeking agent (Larson & Shevchenko 2003, p.79). Specifically, the founders of SIT posits that: (1) Individuals will strive to achieve or maintain positive social identity; (2) A large part of the individual self is derived from membership in social groups; (3) Individuals form their collective identity by negative and positive comparison to out-groups (or the *other*) (Tajfel 1978, p.63-64; Tajfel & Turner 1979, p.40-41). The SIT-approach to status has been especially inspiring for the recent upswing in status literature, often providing a starting point and the connection between individuals, groups and the state in the hunt for status (Lebow 2008; 2010a; 2010b; Mercer 1995; Mercer 1996; Rhamey & Early 2013; Schweller & Pu 2011; Volgy et al. 2011b; Volgy et al. 2014; Wohlforth 2009) Thus, SIT scholarship has shifted the scope from status as *rank* towards a relational definition, in which status is seen as an *identity* or a *social role*. As in the classical realist notion, this group of authors understand status as an intrinsic end goal in which material capabilities are downplayed in favour of ideational or cognitive factors. Also downplaying status' material base, but not necessarily following a psychological base for analysing status is a group of scholars applying what might be labelled as a post-structuralist or a 'thick' constructivist approach to status. This group use discourse as a method of understanding analysing status in various settings, often opting to view discourse as a precondition for maintaining and seeking status (Græger 2015; Johnsen 2015; Leira 2015; Neumann 2014; Pouliot 2014). These authors avoid any preconceived notion of what status consists of, suggesting that status is contextual, perceptual and social, and that analyses must be inductive and interpretive to *understand* the phenomenon.

2.3 Conclusion

This short review reveals two problems related to the study of status in IR and Norway's current status. First, great powers and superpowers are prioritised over small and middle powers in the literature. The study of status could be called, with a few exceptions, the study of great power status. This is paradoxical given that a vast majority of states in the world do not possess great power status. Second, and related to the second, status and status-seeking behaviour is far too often viewed in relation with war and conflict. Great powers are the main actors of world politics, and since great powers often are associated with war-proneness,

status is far too often related to war. Although the security sphere is an important field for states' status-seeking, it is certainly not the only one. These two problems were given attention in *Small State Status Seeking,* and are further developed here. Third, the latter book only deals with Norway's status as a 'good power' without considering Norway's eventual transition from small power to middle power status. This thesis ameliorates the lack of Norwegian (and international) scholarly work on Norway's transition from small power to middle power status by drawing inspiration from the established middle power literature and merging this with a neoclassical realist take the systemic patterns of status. Fourth, while the quantitative status literature has managed quite well to theoretically fathom status as an analytical concept, few attempts have been made to see how both material capabilities and behavioural patterns influences a country's status. The positivist literature reveals the consequences of status dissatisfaction (low status compared to large material capabilities) being war, but does little on how the material capabilities directly relates to the social status. Likewise, it also shuns from analysing how and whether behavioural patterns can increase or decrease a country's status. Rather, the quantitative literature tends to focus only on equating diplomatic recognition with status and then deriving correlations for when a certain phenomenon is likelier to occur. This does not help us understand the connection between material capabilities and behaviour on the one hand and social status on the other. This thesis develops a quantitative framework which looks at how material capabilities and behavioural patterns relate to status, suggesting that neither of them determines a country's social status but are likely to influence it.

Chapter 3: Theory

This thesis employs a neoclassical realist approach to the case of Norwegian status and status seeking. The reasons for taking this approach are threefold. First, neoclassical realism is an evolving theory with its adherents open for new concepts to be included in the framework. Second, drawing insights from both neorealism, classical realism as well as partially from liberalism and constructivism enables neoclassical realism to epistemologically emphasise the material *and* non-material factors required to holistically comprehend status as a research subject. Third, scholars connected to the neoclassical realist research project have produced some of the most insightful, theoretically challenging and empirically vivid research on status.

Before I embark on the task of situating status in a neoclassical realist framework, I will say something on how I conceive of status and how it is treated in the remainder of this thesis. Status is an ambiguous term. IR-scholars tend to blend status with concepts such as prestige, reputation, face, honour, roles, position, class, rank, power, standing and recognition. This semantic discrepancy makes a coherent dialogue between scholars difficult to achieve since they often are arguing on different terms. Renshon has already done the groundwork of sorting out semantic discrepancies that surrounds status. This thesis follows the work of Renshon with some minor alternations.

Reputation is a set of expectations country A holds over country B, based on country B's past behaviour. Observers note for instance that Switzerland does not participate in security alliances or wars. Based on individual observations, Switzerland gains a reputation for neutrality. *Prestige* is an extension of reputation in that it is a social belief of that an actor has a reputation for a positive trait or a desirable quality. However, it is also distinct, in that prestige is not gained unless there is a widely held belief that the particular actor has this desirable quality. For instance, country A may seek prestige by behaving in a certain manner, and country B may say that country A has a reputation for that behaviour. However, country A does not gain prestige unless country C, country D and country E also holds the belief that country A has a reputation for that behaviour and that type of reputation is a desirable feature. Thus, states who acquire nuclear weapons gain reputation for proliferation, but it also enhances the state's prestige since it is a common belief amongst some states that this particular state possesses nuclear weapons and that this possession will benefit the security of

the state in question. *Roles* are here defined as a projection of a state's reputation often materialised participation in activities, institutions or organizations that would reaffirm that particular state's reputation. It follows therefore that states seek to pursue social roles that align with their reputation. In the case above for instance, Switzerland's reputation for neutrality inhibits the state from pursuing a role in security institutions that would deprive its reputation. *Power*, is here viewed as synonymous with the sum of material resources that a state has at its possession, and the ability of governments to extract those material resources. It should be noted here that great powers do not enjoy great power status merely because they possess a great amount of material resources. Although it necessary to have a certain amount of capabilities to gain a certain status, material capabilities do not define what status is attributed to certain states. *Rank* is an analytical criteria based on power, in which states are given a rank in a hierarchy based on their power. *Standing* is a manifestation of rank, *and* also a second order belief, in that it is an informal projection of a state A's rank which allow a state to persuade, convince or subdue state B and C to behave in a manner which benefits state A[7]. *Identity* or in this context *state identity* is here defined as the qualities, beliefs, traits and culture that make a particular state different from other states. Thus, identity has a domestic source in that it is "relatively stable, role specific understandings and expectations about self" (Wendt 1992, p.397). However, as many interpretivists have pointed out, the formation of a state identity is inextricably linked to the notable Other(s) (Campbell 1992; Neumann 1999). Identity is thus situated at the *nexus* between domestic and foreign policy.

These concepts may seem to be used interchangeably, but never arbitrary. I conceive of status something distinct from the aforementioned concepts, as similar to what (Paul et al. 2014a) does, namely as "collective belief about a given state's ranking on valued attributes (wealth, coercive capabilities, culture, demographic position, sociopolitical organization, and diplomatic clout)." Thus, the type of status which is studied here is of relative nature. Absolute status, sovereignty, has all been solidified for Norway and the other countries that are considered here (Leira 2015). Status is furthermore perceptual, social and totally dependent on a particular country's peers. In order to capture status quantitatively, I operationalise status into hierarchical status resources and moral authority output. Hierarchical status resources are here sources for which countries may be recognised for or may mobilise to seek status. Moral authority output is the attempts made by countries to portray themselves as a moral authority facing the international system. A high moral

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[7] Hence the saying "to pull rank on someone".

authority can translate into status. A closer explanation regarding how status is operationalised and the relationship between hierarchical status resources and moral authority output is elaborated upon below and in the methods chapter.

In what follows I first set out the main tenets of neoclassical realism and discuss some of the theory's adherents' willingness to establish a dialogue with more interpretive approaches. Next, I establish a neoclassical realist framework to analyse the case of status and status seeking. This is done by sorting and giving priority to some of the concepts that are similar to status as well as explicitly merging parts of the middle power literature to fit within the neoclassical realist framework. This approach to status is, I argue, intuitively clear, philosophically consistent and methodologically feasible.

3.1 Neoclassical realism

Neoclassical realism is situated in the *nexus* of liberal theories of *innenpolitikk*, neorealist theories of structural constraints and constructivist theories of identity formation. In his review article, Gideon Rose (1998) identified a common framework used by this new breed realist scholars[8] which sought to reintroduce foreign policy analysis to realism. These authors saw (i) The anarchic international system as the independent variable; (ii) The domestic society – including the quality of institutions, elites, political system and ideology – as the intervening variable, and; (iii) Foreign policy outcome as the dependent variable. Insofar, neoclassical realism delineates itself from, but still incorporates the insights of neorealist analysis of systemic pressures. Since Rose labelled neoclassical realism in 1998, scholars have increasingly expanded the scope of the approach to foreign policy analyses and have included concepts which have been seen as incompatible to most neorealist analysis: ideas (Brooks & Wohlforth 2000; Kitchen 2010a; Kitchen 2010b; Kitchen 2012); identity (Sterling-Folker 2009); the formation of grand strategies (Dueck 2006; Kitchen 2010b; Taliaferro 2004); status-seeking and status wars (Schweller & Pu 2011; Taliaferro 2004; Wohlforth & Kang 2009); domestic groups (Dueck 2009; Ripsman 2009; Sterling-Folker 1997); international organisations (Dyson 2010; Holden 2012; Toje 2011); humanitarian interventions (Gegout 2012); and ideology (Schweller 2009; Taliaferro 2006).

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[8] The books under review were those of Randall Schweller (1998), William C. Wohlforth (1993), Michael E. Brown (1995) Fareed Zakaria (1998) and Thomas J. Christensen (1996).

One of the most crucial distinctions between the neoclassical and the structural version of realism lies in their divergent views on power. Although recognising the importance of capability distribution in the system, neoclassical realist put great emphasis on the double pillars of power. National power, they argue, is the sum of material resources. State strength on the other hand, is the ability of governments to extract national power (Schmidt & Juneau 2012, p.70; Taliaferro 2006, p.213-222; Zakaria 1998, p.38-39). The degree to which states can extract or mobilise domestic resources depends on: how centralised the state institutions are; the social cohesion of the domestic society and; whether or not the state ideology facilitate or inhibit leaders to extract resources (Taliaferro 2006). Moreover, we might infer from neoclassical realism that this power, rank and standing are a mean to an end: influence maximisation (Schmidt & Juneau 2012; Zakaria 1998). In other words, once a state's power, rank and standing increases, it will "try to expand its economic, political, and territorial control" because the objective of states is to "increase their influence over the behaviour of other states" through the means of "threats and coercion, the formation of alliances and the creation of exclusive spheres" (Gilpin 1981, p.94-95; 24). States will expand their influence on the international system when foreign policy actors perceive an increase in state power (Zakaria 1998). Schmidt and Juneau (2012, p.73) suggest that how states practically expand their influence depends "on the specific circumstances of the case under study, and should be determined empirically."

3.1.1 Neoclassical realism and the (semi) reflectivist turn

Neoclassical realism seeks to find a balance between rational and reflexive assumptions. Neoclassical realism "values theory and seeks at least some kind of predictive capacity, while at the same time recognising that the world is complex, and that events in international politics reflect the interaction of multifarious factors" (Kitchen 2010b, p.118). As a result of integrating reflexive concepts in general, and including several factors in the intervening variable while still holding on to the 'realist' label, the program has been criticised for being too eclectic, and not settling on a single methodological framework (Tang 2009; Walt 2002). Although the program's three sets of variables do establish a framework, the methods used for analyses vary from case to case.

It is in this vein I suggest that neoclassical realism, at least a considerable part of the theory's contributions, have moved towards a more interpretive understanding of the concepts of

international relations at the expense of a strict positivist epistemology and a materialist ontology. It is here where I, along with a few other neoclassical realists, suggest a philosophical bridge between constructivism and neoclassical realism may emerge.[9] It specifically answers requests for neoclassical realism to contemplate that "a state's specific interest are not given but constructed by elites through a discourse" which consequently means that "neoclassical realists may have to dip into the murky water of individuals and identities" (Tang 2009, p.802). The reasons for pursuing this path may at first seem destructive for neoclassical realism as it opposes the very fundament of positivist analysis; namely that realism should retain its predictive capacity (Rose 1998, p.166; Walt 2002, p.211). However, as Sterling Folker convincingly argues, neoclassical realism is but an analytical starting point in which authors may choose their own philosophical (epistemological and ontological) foundation. She suggests that realism as an IR-theory:

> "is instead an imagined analytical community, which is socially constructed by its participants and which evolves, adapts, and changes according to the preferences and interactions of its participants, the institutional constraints they face, and the external events which they are confronted with throughout their careers in the academy"(Sterling-Folker 2007, p.10-11)

Indeed, if scholars belonging to other traditions were to criticize neoclassical realism for its philosophical eclecticism they should first get their own affairs in order. Defensive and offensive realists for instance differ essentially on human nature,[10] which subsequently produces different predictive outputs. Furthermore, conventional constructivists (Adler 1997; Katzenstein 1996; Wendt 1992) embrace a positivist epistemology and a social ontology, while critical constructivists (Hopf 1998; Kratochwil 2000) discard any notions of causality due to their interpretive epistemology.[11] The point is that most successful IR theories contain authors with different views of the philosophy of science and authors with different analytical and methodological priorities. Instead of fighting this trend, scholars are better off embracing

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[8] The neoclassical realism proposed by Jennifer Sterling-Folker and Amelia Hadfield (2010) suggest a transit towards a philosophical critical realism with an ontological foundationalism and an interpretive epistemology (Marsh & Furlong 2002). Critical realism suggest that there is a ontological real world out there, but the matter in which the world epistemologically can have knowledge of is socially constructed (*ibid.*). However, Jennifer Sterling Folker explicitly stakes out a ontological merger with Wendtian (thin) constructivism, which according to Jorge Rivas (2010) is distinctively different from critical realism.

[10] Even though scholars as Waltz and Mearsheimer claim to eradicate any predispositions of human nature, Schuett (2010) shows that neorealism is grounded in an implicit conception of human nature which creates the branches of offensive and defensive realism.

[11] Conventional and critical constructivism is also known as 'weak' and 'strong', 'thick' and 'thin', as well as 'American' and 'European'.

the theoretical eclecticism[12]. According to Sterling Folker (2007, p.10) if one views choice of epistemology and ontology as a consequence of "social milieus and philosophical traditions, the future of any realist variant (or any other theoretical category for that matter) has little to do with its own internal logic, core assumptions, novel findings, and superior external predictions." The research of strict positivist neoclassical realist such as and Asle Toje (2008; 2011) Jeffrey Taliaferro (2004; 2006) has yielded great results. But so has the work of not-so-strict positivists such as William Wohlforth (Brooks & Wohlforth 2008; Wohlforth 2009) and Randall Schweller (Schweller 2009; Schweller & Pu 2011) along with non-positivist scholars such as Sterling Folker (2007; 2009) , Hadfield (2010) and Williams (2005) The natural step for neoclassical realism is for its authors to discard any presumptions that their approach may one day be completely cohesive[13]. It will not. In fact, it would be destructive to demand cohesion when the tradition's strong analytical results have surfaced in an era of internal eclecticism.

3.1.2 Middle powers, status and neoclassical realism

The reason for arguing that neoclassical realism should strive for eclecticism is not arbitrary. Status demands a great deal of theoretical leniency and philosophical pluralism. As will be shown, status has distinct material and non-material sources that are intersubjectively connected, but at the same time must be treated as analytically distinct. What follows is a theoretical discussion regarding the literature on middle power status and the role that neoclassical realism can play in uniting these concepts and their internally confusing contents. I first divide the existing scholarly strands into three distinct camps. In the wake of this preliminary discussion I give clear priority to those sides of the middle power literature that are most compatible to neoclassical realism.

In the middle power literature, a strand of scholars align well with those relating status with these concepts. This position may be called *structural behaviouralism* because they often assert that middle power are states "occupying an intermediate position in a hierarchy based

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[12] These are just two examples of debate within the theories of IR and amongst scholars belonging to the same theoretical tradition. One could also say the same about liberalism (Moravcsik 2003) and the English school (Jørgensen 2010). Even sub-theories within the discipline such as securitization theory have experienced dramatic debates over its philosophical foundations (Balzacq 2011; Taureck 2006).

[13] Indeed, the emergence of a theory started when Gideon Rose, an outsider, saw theoretical coherence between the works he reviewed. However, even back then the authors belonging to the theory were not coherent in their philosophical underpinnings, relation to neorealism or the scope of their analyses. The paradox here, is that the criticism for theoretical eclecticism has mainly been produced externally (Tang 2009; Walt 2002).

on power [...] a country much stronger than the small nations though considerably weaker than the principal members of the states system" (Holbraad 1984, p.78). Organski (1958) constructed a typology of a world consisting of superpowers, great powers, middle powers and small powers based upon their relative material capabilities such as geography, population, military, wealth, industry and technology. Structural behaviouralists all share a view in which middle powers are given their status due to their standing in the international hierarchy of capabilities (Ehteshami & Hinnebusch 1997; Fox 1959; Fox 1977; Glazebrook 1947; Handel 1990; Keohane 1969; McLin 1967; Rothstein 1968; Spero 2004; Spero 2009; Vital 1971; Vital 2006; Wood 1990). The structuralist element in this approach is first and foremost not a methodological approach, but rather a positivist epistemological starting point in which scholars can deduce hypotheses. Hence, structural behaviouralism has a lot in common with realism, in that the starting point for all analyses is the distribution of capabilities among states (Waltz 1979). Structural behaviouralists also suggest that certain behavioural patterns can be deduced from the distribution of capabilities (Larsen 1997, p.191). A majority of the scholars working under a structural behaviouralist approach contend that middle powers seek to mitigate the international system in their favour, not through military power, but through manoeuvring between the greater powers. Handel (1990, p.257) concludes his analysis of the weaker states, saying that the strength of these states is that they can "obtain, commit, and manipulate, as far as possible, the power of other more powerful states in their own interest." Because their inferior military capabilities, early structural behaviouralists like Glazebrook (1947) and McLin (1967) deduced that middle powers often act through multilateral institutions like the UN because their material capabilities could not manage greater powers alone. The ontology of structural behaviouralism is thus characterised by a profound belief that middle power statecraft directly follows by necessity from their structural position in the international hierarchy, and can therefore be studied objectively.

The next approach, *behavioural normativism*, shares many similarities with structural behaviouralism in that its adherents accept that middle power status is generated by its structural position in the hierarchy of capabilities. Furthermore, a definitive line between those who adhere to a normative approach and those who endorse a structural position cannot be established. Scholars like Glazebrook (1947), Holbraad (1984), and Wood (1990) all overlap the two positions. Nevertheless, the name *behavioural normativism* is given because its adherents assert that middle powers "have an intrinsic impulse to act as good international citizens" which accordingly produces a foreign policy based on altruism which "reflect the

interest of the international community as a whole rather than an individual state's own national or alliance interest" (Cooper 2011, p.321). In defining middle powers, most behavioural normativists shift the scope from the objective distribution of capabilities towards a study which defines middle powers as those states who adhere to a middle power behaviour (Belanger & Mace 1997; Cooper et al. 1993; Cooper 1997a; Higgott & Cooper 1990; Hocking 1997; Neack 1992; Neack 1993; Neack 1995a; Pratt 1990a; Wood 1990). This shift of scope involves scholars concentrating on the "middlepowermanship" of middle powers, turning their attention to themes such as: humanitarianism, development aid and human security (Behringer 2005; Pratt 1990a; Shawki 2008; Stokke 1989c); diplomacy (Cooper et al. 1993, p.33-49; Cooper 1997a; Neumann 2011); economic cooperation and globalisation (Cohen & Clarkson 2004; Cooper et al. 1993, p.50-115; Helleiner 1990; Higgott & Cooper 1990; Kaplinsky 1990; Løvbræk 1990; Wood 1990); security cooperation and peacekeeping (Cooper et al. 1993, p.116-143; Fischer 2009; Hayes 1997; Henrikson 1997; Spero 2004); and international law (Cameron 1999; David & Roussel 1998; Flemes 2007).[14] Naturally, these groups of scholars focus their work not on the balance of power and the international structure, but rather the matters in which middle powers have played a pivotal role, effectively analysing what reputation and prestige countries have built up, most often with their behaviour and the roles and the eventual privileges they get after working in multilateral settings.

Whilst behavioural normativists acknowledge the material foundations of middle power status, the third and final approach, *post-functionalism* disputes both an objective concept of middle powers and that certain behaviour is associated with it. In contrast, they argue, middle powers are nothing more than "empty categories" (Hynek 2007, p.149) which gives states "a title that encourages the international community to forget that they are small" (Chapnick 1999, p.75). Functionalism, as understood in the middle power literature, stems from early Canadian statesmen's attempt to improve Canada's standing in international politics (see Fraser 1966; Gelber 1945; Holmes 1967) The early functional attempt from Canadian statesmen "identifies states which are capable of exerting influence in international affairs in specific instances, and differentiates them from all the rest" (Chapnick 1999, p.74). The post-functionalist approach invalidates any objective material characteristics or certain shared normative beliefs as criteria for middle power status since the idea of middle powers is a result of key actors' entrepreneurial ability to construct a distinct category (Chapnick 1999;

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[14] This is not an exhaustive list, although it covers most of the behavioral normativist literature.

Chapnick 2005; Gecelovsky 2009; Hurrell et al. 2000; Hynek 2007; Stairs 1998; Ungerer 2007b). This critical perspective shifts the focus towards an anti-foundationalist ontology in which the forming of the middle power-category relies upon an intersubjective process between matter and ideas. Methodologically, middle powers (most notably Canada) are scrutinized by tracing the origins of the discourse on middle powers and by showing how this discourse has proved to serve the interest of some states.

The neoclassical realist tradition has yet to embrace middle powers as an analytical category in IR[15]. This might be due to its ancestral neorealist heritage which aimed to only understand "a small number of big and important things (Waltz 1986, p.329). Because big powers are concerned with big stuff, an excessive amount of neorealist scholarly work is primarily concerned with the behaviour of great- and superpowers. In many cases, the statuses of small- or middle states are defined by the negative: the absence of greatness. It should therefore come as no surprise that neoclassical realism, which arguably is going through its teenage period, have yet to develop a common understanding of middle powers' place in the international system. However, drawing upon this ongoing review of middle powers and the few neoclassical realist pieces on status in general, it becomes apparent both structural behaviouralism and behavioural normativism are compatible with the core of neoclassical realism. This compatibility stems from neoclassical realism's structural heir and the tendency of its adherents to be inspired from both liberalism and constructivism.

As mentioned briefly earlier, neorealism has a lot in common with structural realism. Both view the international system as constraining state behaviour, making smaller powers less able to exercise power than greater powers (Lobell et al. 2009). As Cooper (2011, p.318) suggests, this side of the middle power literature "represents a subset of theorizing about the significance of national attributes [...] which in turn generally aligns with structural realist assumptions." Furthermore, albeit not directly comparable, both see relative differences in capabilities as deciding which status category countries belong. This characteristic resides in the portions of the structural behaviouralist literature that apply a positivist epistemology in their conception of middle powers. Holbraad (1984, p.8) for instance, although also relying on

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[15] A notable exception is Schweller's (2014) unpublished manuscript. This should not come as a surprise due to middle powers' overall subordinate position within the IR-discipline and the problem of distinguishing between small powers, middle powers, great powers and superpowers. For an illustration how confusing the process of attributing status to countries really is, this map porn reddit thread exemplifies my point perfectly:
http://www.reddit.com/r/MapPorn/comments/18j143/countries_categorised_by_their_degree_of_power/

a historical inductive approach, suggests that the international system "produces a set of constraints and incentives likely in some way to influence their [the middle powers] response to the situation." He continues saying "it is possible to formulate hypotheses about the types of role most likely to be attempted. These hypotheses then may be tested against the actual behaviour of middle powers in relevant historical situations" (*ibid.*). In other words, middle powers are identified based on their relative lack of power vis-à-vis the great powers, which produces international constraints and then forms foreign policy behaviour. Neoclassical realism pertains that the international structure, materialised in the distribution of capabilities, is the single most important variable in their equation. Likewise, neoclassical realists insist that status, although multifaceted, is a zero sum game, because if everyone has high hierarchical status, no one does (Schweller 1999; Wohlforth 1999; Wohlforth 2009). Thus, for a country to have middle power status a precondition is that the specific state has the relative material capability to belong to that category.

Behavioural normativism also shares similar bonds with IR theories. Particularly, behavioural normativisim focuses on the same issues as liberalism and conventional constructivism. Behavioural normativism's link to structural behaviouralism is thus a puzzle since these are often regarded as stark opponents in the IR theory spectrum. However, behavioural normativists focus on middle powers' institution and norm building along with a great deal of diplomatic activism, while still being located in a structural behaviouralist frame. This results in "a liberal institutionalist outcome from within a structural realist paradigm" (Cooper 2013, p.321). The link between neoclassical realism and liberalism is vague. Very few neoclassical realists would admit any distinct relationship with liberalism. However, neoclassical realism along with behavioural normativism and liberalism all incorporate, albeit to a different extent, domestic structures to explain foreign policy. Furthermore, the close link between liberal institutionalism and conventional constructivism also opens up for neoclassical realism (Barkin 2004; Coetzee & Hudson 2012; Sterling-Folker 1997; Sterling-Folker 2009). As Jennifer Sterling-Folker has shown, neoclassical realism is compatible with constructivism and the interaction with classical realism allows for analyses that illuminate how the system, the state and the national identity determines national interest (Sterling-Folker 2009, p.103). A holistic neoclassical realist perspective on middle powers would thus entail acknowledging that the identity of a state plays a great a big role in deciding whether and how countries seek status, and what status states actually have. Randall Schweller admits for instance that objective criteria can be no more than starting points for an analysis of who constitutes a

middle power (Cooper & Jongryn 2012; Schweller 2014). It is here behavioural normativism can contribute to a holistic neoclassical realist theory and suggest that to be a middle power, a country also needs to act as a middle power.

In contrast to the two aforementioned approaches to middle powers, post functionalism does not fit in a neoclassical realist framework. While neoclassical realism may have taken a semi-reflectivist turn in recent years, merging neoclassical realism with conventional constructivism, it is just not feasible to include critical theories in this framework. Many have questioned the characteristics that both neorealist and non-realist scholars have ascribed classical realism, often saying the founding theorists were more lenient than what many think nowadays (Parent & Baron 2011). However, even considering merging two radically different ontologies seems detrimental. Not only would this probably be futile, it should not be necessary given critical theory and realism's large impact on our understanding of international relations. This is not an attempt to discredit the scholarly work coming from the post-functionalist literature. Indeed, the empirical richness of the work of for instance Chapnick (1999; 2000; 2005) and Hynek (2007) is well beyond many of the more orthodox pieces, and the arguments they put forward are very hard to counterclaim. Nevertheless, while some of the key arguments of post-functionalism may be compatible with neoclassical realism, questioning whether middle powers exist, does not align well with the fundamentals of the realist approach, nor would it be productive when the foremost aim of this piece is understand where Norway stands in the status hierarchy. In addition, even if we were to apply a post-functionalist approach to the case of middle powers, any broad patterns of a middle power category could not be deduced given that post-functionalism demands in depth research on few units without any sort of generalisation (see for instance Chapnick 2000; Hurrell et al. 2000)

3.1.3 Hierarchic status, moral authority and status resources

Hierarchical position is indeed the most important aspect of status. It is an intrinsic value to be a great power rather than a middle power. It is also instrumentally favourable in that countries that are held in higher regards are more likely to have greater influence on world politics (Aron 1966, p.95 ; Gilpin 1981). Moral authority is indeed also a central aspect of status (Carvalho & Neumann 2015b). But in slight contrast to the edited volume of Neumann and Carvalho, this thesis sees moral authority as subordinate to hierarchical position. This is because the principal way of depicting states' relative status is not by level of moral authority,

but in which position they have in the global hierarchy of states. There are certainly exceptions to this rule. Belgium is perhaps considered a small power, but generates more status due to its geographical meeting point for international organisations. North Korea is not thought of as a regular small power, but rather as a laggard due to its erratic behaviour and unwillingness to follow international legal rules and norms. In other words, moral authority may alter the status of a particular country and might be used as a way of tilting the status of a country slightly up or down. However, moral authority by itself is never sufficient to determine a country's status. A country may disguise itself as a great power by performing the duties associated with status, but it will never be recognised as a great power unless it has the hierarchical position similar to that of established great powers. The primary indicators of this position, as I will argue further below, are material capabilities. Thus, this thesis seeks to show how material capabilities and the level of moral authority influences Norway's status.

The previous section contended that middle powers exist and that they get their status from two sources and with analytically distinct outcomes. Material capabilities, most notably power and wealth, determine a certain objective position in the hierarchy of states. A country is either wealthier or militarily stronger than another country. From a world rank, those countries occupying the middle of the hierarchy of material capabilities are candidates for middle powers. To have the middle power position in the hierarchy of states, however, countries also need recognition from other countries, meaning that the country in question is recognised by its peer states as a country possessing the hierarchic position of a middle power. In many cases, the material capabilities of a state tend to align well with the hierarchical status of a country. For instance, a preliminary and intuitive list of today's countries with superpower and great power status would include the US, China, Russia, Germany, France, the UK with possibly Japan and India as potential candidates. These eight countries are in the top ten on military expenditures and top nine on Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (SIPRI 2013; World Bank Data 2014a). Thus, while most would deny that material capabilities are synonymous with status attribution, and this paper does so as well, the significance of the correlation between material capabilities and ascribed status is hard to neglect (Paul et al. 2014a, p.13).

However, as Wohlforth (2014, p.121) points out, "status claims are related to the resources or capabilities at a given states disposal, but the relationship between status and specific resources is always contestable." The discrepancy between the actual material standing of a country and its attributed status can be significant. One might discredit this discrepancy as

simply being a case of statistical outliers, which per definition is a valid claim. But if we want to know how status works, and especially how status interacts with material capabilities, these discrepancies are crucial. Italy between late 19th century and the turn of the 20th century was considered a great power despite its decreasing influence and severely deteriorating economy (Kennedy 1987). Likewise, Austria-Hungary outlived its great power status despite not having sufficient material capabilities to be considered one (Volgy et al. 2011a, p.6). Countries might be under- or over achievers in light of their material capabilities which mean basing status solely on material capabilities would be a misleading oversimplification. In light of this, it might be helpful to think of these material capabilities as status resources. Here, capabilities are considered resources that countries will mobilise to seek or maintain its status. Hierarchical status resources may influence the status of a country in two ways. First, country A may have increased its hierarchical status resources vastly in the last decades. The peer group of country A (whether this is a regional setting, an organisation, or the world in general) recognises country A's increased material capabilities and thus perceives it to have higher status than before. Secondly, and slightly more complicated, countries with high hierarchical status resources may attempt to convert these resources into higher status. If country A has significantly more material capabilities than other countries it is likely that the status-seeking will be more intense and comprehensive than other states' status seeking. Given that the status seeking is more intense and comprehensive from one state, it is also likely that this effort will lead to more recognition from the peer states, and therefore lead to a higher status for the country in question. How well these resources are translated into actual recognition depends on the country's peers and how well the peers think the status resources correspond with the status the country wants to seek or maintain. The peers' acceptance in turn depends on how well a country can play the status game. Consequently, an increased value of +1 status resources may not lead to +1 unit of status recognition. However, whether this relationship between status resources and recognition is not perfectly linear, it is fairly safe to assume that +1 status resources would increase rather than decrease a country's status. This means that it is very likely that a wealthy and military powerful country would also have high status (in either the form of great or superpower status).

Increasing hierarchical status resources is not the only way of increasing a country's status. As most behavioural normativist suggests, middle powers receive their status not only from mere material capabilities, but also how they act, the roles and the moral authority they may possess. As Bernard Wood pointed out in his quantitative piece on middle powers:

"It is also important to recognize that there are important qualitative and even ideological elements in much of the traditional thinking about middle powers [...] Rather than identifying middle countries primarily by their capabilities, selection is based on appraisals of a state's international behaviour or 'positioning.'" (Wood 1990, p.93).

All countries, and perhaps even more so middle powers, must earn their status through a certain moral authority. Having moral authority indicates that a country may have influence on international politics by projecting a positive image of itself that fits with its hierarchical status resources. Moral authority resources are the main characteristic of a country's self-image, its identity and its culture. A country might for instance represent itself as 'destined to lead' such as the US, or it might represent itself as neutral such as Switzerland. Moral authority resources here represent the willingness of a country to produce global public goods which sometimes might be in direct contradiction with its national interest. Moral authority is not, however, just for middle powers and small 'do-gooders'. Great powers may use it either to solidify their great power status or to be the best amongst the great powers. Even emerging powers, who reside between middle and great powers, may crave status to assist them in climbing the hierarchical ladder (Carvalho & Neumann 2015a). Moral authority is not a prerequisite for international recognition for a status between the minor and the major powers. Certain countries in the current world system are recognised as middle powers but do not share the moral authority of many of the small powers. Conceptually, these are often labelled as 'new middle powers' because they have more than enough hierarchical status resources to be recognised as such, but do not share the similar moral authority as the 'traditional middle powers' (Jordaan 2003; Watson & Pandey 2014). However, for small powers who want to become middle powers, having enough moral authority helps a lot. Thus, if Norway's hierarchical status resources are identical with those associated with established middle powers, the window of opportunity for pursuing middle power status opens. If Norway's hierarchic status resources are slightly below that of the established middle powers, it may try, depending on their moral authority resources, to bridge that hierarchical gap by increasing its moral authority. In this light, moral authority has two functions. First, country A may attempt use its status resources (moral or hierarchical) to instrumentally increase its moral authority, because it sees that having high moral authority might bridge the distance between its relatively low hierarchical status resources and the status it wishes to possess. Secondly, if country A has no realistic opportunity to pursue higher hierarchical status, it may still mobilise its status resources to pursue moral authority because of its intrinsic value. Moral authority represents a field where states can compete within their status peer group. Having

high moral authority is a key separator between those having higher status and lower status within a particular status group (for instance small powers). Whether or not that attempt to bridge the gap in hierarchical status resources works, being recognised as having a middle power status, depends upon recognition from the countries in the international system.

This theoretical interplay between hierarchical status resources and moral authority suggests that the position in a social hierarchy is the element that influences status the most. If a state could choose between enjoying middle power status or small power status, it would likely go for the former. But material constraints (or hierarchical status resources) often prohibit countries from receiving recognition for its bid for higher hierarchic position, which means they are left competing for moral authority. In this view, hierarchical status resources and moral authority are not to be confused with relative and absolute gains. Indeed, they are both relative gains. While moral authority might seem more open to absorb new members without the others losing too much that is not to say that competing for moral authority is a positive sum game. Small powers for instance frequently compete over who has the most moral authority (Wohlforth 2015). While it might be more difficult to statistically compare that does not mean it does not happen. Furthermore, a world full of do-gooders who stress peace promotion, international law and give a lot of international aid would simply make it impossible to discern who has the highest moral authority. Like with hierarchical status resources, if everybody has moral authority, no one does.

3.2 Conclusion

In this chapter, I have shown that neoclassical realism is well equipped to empirically explore status, and how a status lens can shed light on the behaviour of middle powers. Middle powers are firmly located between great powers and small powers due to their material capabilities. These capabilities are best thought of as hierarchical status resources which are likely to translate into actual recognition from the international system. Viewing material capabilities as hierarchical status resources fits perfectly with neoclassical realisms focus on the distribution of capabilities being the main characteristic differentiating between units. This independent variable constrains what type of foreign policy a state may pursue. Thus, certain exogenous forces such as the distribution of capabilities are essential in enabling what status states may or may not seek. For a state to seek status for instance from small power to emerging middle power, a certain precondition is that this specific state has the relative material capability to challenge for a higher status. The theoretical eclecticism of neoclassical

realism also, however, allows for more than just structural explanations. Whether states chose to seek moral authority is essentially not dependent on the status of states. But moral authority can be a pivotal component of middle power status in that it can tilt a country that has small to medium hierarchical status resources either up or down in the hierarchy. Neoclassical realism suggests that the foreign policies of countries are not just shaped by the international structure, but also depends on the identity and domestic culture of a specific country. Thus, neoclassical realism provides a theoretical scope where one can see what type of moral authority a country possesses and what type of moral authority resources a state mobilises to increase or maintain its status. Utilising liberal and constructivist insights and by incorporating analysis of the intervening variable, neoclassical realism allows for the theoretical simplicity of neorealism whilst still pertaining elements that are crucial for investigating status seeking that fall outside the distribution of capabilities. Chapter 4 puts this theoretical scope into practice, especially focusing on how the hierarchical and moral authority recourses are operationalised into quantifiable indicators.

Chapter 4: Methodology

This thesis attempts to capture Norway's past and current hierarchical status and moral authority quantitatively. For the former it measures Norway's hierarchical status resources which, as stated above, are likely to be converted into recognised hierarchical status. For the moral authority, there is no sense in measuring the moral authority resources directly. How and whether a state seeks moral authority is dependent on the identity of that particular country. This cannot be measured. However, what this thesis does is to measure the moral authority output: the attempts made by Norway to portray itself as a moral authority when dealing with the international system. If Norway has a certain moral authority on themes such as the desire to participate in reducing global inequality, it is likely that Norway will spend a lot on development aid. From this it is possible to deduce that Norway is likely to have a lot of moral authority resources that it will seek to convert into moral authority.

This thesis does not only seek to capture the *most likely* hierarchical and moral authority that Norway seeks. It also seeks to quantitatively capture the international recognition Norway has received for its hierarchical status resources and its moral authority outputs. As Wohlforth suggests, "Although it [status] is related to material capabilities and observed capacities, status is socially constructed in that it achieves meaning through intersubjective beliefs and social processes" (Wohlforth 2014, p.120). This is done by measuring the diplomatic exchanges between countries where more embassies located in a particular country represents both high hierarchical status and moral authority.

It makes little sense to measure the hierarchical status resources, moral authority outputs and the diplomatic recognition of Norway in isolation. Instead, the thesis works under the assumption that Norway would appreciate a middle power status. Thus, in order to understand how close Norway is to reaching middle power status, the thesis applies these measures on several countries, ranging from established middle powers to perceived small powers. Since "middle power" is an elusive status category, a comparative approach allows for broad comparisons between those who are generally recognised as middle powers and those who are most likely not. Seeing how the hierarchical status resources, their moral authority outputs and the diplomatic recognition these countries have received, should help determine the distance Norway is from the established middle powers and the obvious small powers.

This chapter continues by first settling the research design based on the neoclassical realist framework of analysis. The chapter then discusses the sample method used for deciding which countries that will feature in the analysis. The main part of this chapter revolves around operationalising hierarchical status resources, the moral authority outputs and diplomatic recognition into quantifiable indicators. These three status-related concepts are not directly operational due to their abstract nature. Therefore, the chapter forms sub-indicators which consequently are operationalised into one or more quantifiable measures. This chapter also illuminates the various sources of which these measurements are based on and the different formulas and algorithms used to improve the accuracy of the measures. The chapter then discusses the validity and reliability regarding the thesis' approach to capturing social status and derives some important caveats especially with regards to the validity of the performed measures. Lastly, I conclude the methodology chapter by summing up and setting the premises for the analysis chapter.

4.1 Research design: A quantitative neoclassical realist framework

Most neoclassical realist pieces on world politics do not employ a purely quantitative approach (Lobell et al. 2009). Instead, The neoclassical realists, by focusing on historical analysis and opening up the 'black box' of the state by incorporating elements from neorealism, constructivism and liberalism. This analysis breaks with this pattern by developing a novel new quantitative approach for capturing both status seeking and status recognition. In contrast to many previous quantitative pieces which lack breadth in their scope, this thesis opposes any analysis that only employs single measure with the claim of capturing status. In contrast, it develops a holistic understanding of status which relies on a series of indicators which all illuminate different sides of status. Together, they give an indication of Norway's status in the world. Although neoclassical realist pieces tend to favour qualitative methods, its positivist foundations certainly allows quantitative methods to explore social phenomena. While this analysis is first a quantitative approach, the statistics will mean little if they are not contextualised with the nuances that resides in Norwegian foreign policy. While I am hesitant to label the following analysis as "mixed methods", a rigid quantitative approach would lack depth, and leave gaps that would undermine the findings unnecessarily.

Neoclassical realism suggests that the making of a foreign policy is best analysed viewing the international system as the independent variable, the domestic society as the intervening variable and foreign policy output as the dependent variable. This analytical roadmap is better viewed as interlinked sequences that vary in timing without following a particular chronological order.[16] While the analysis focuses both on the structural constraints, most notably the distribution of capabilities amongst the sample countries, Norway's domestic society and the status outputs, it makes little sense to view these sequences in isolation. Norway's relative hierarchical status resources may very well be filtered through Norway's domestic society and then through its moral authority resources to create a moral authority output. This can be transferred to the following hypothetical but still plausible scenario. Norway's relative increase in wealth compared to other nations is perceived by Norway's foreign policy leaders as an incentive for pursuing many foreign policy goals. Norway's history as a strong peace identity and strong sense of humanitarianism leads Norway to pursue foreign policy goals that are consistent with this identity. In this case, that output may be development aid. This process certainly resembles the neoclassical realist transmission belt. In real life, these variables have a tendency to overlap and intersect each other each other, but for the sake of analytical clarity, it makes sense to keep them separated.

In the analysis that follows, Norway's relative hierarchical status resources are explored first because it illustrates Norway's potential status position relative to other small and middle powers. Practically, such an approach is almost identical to neorealist analysis of the distribution of capabilities amongst powers. However, as stated above, this analysis differs fundamentally on the purpose of such an illustration. Whereas neorealists would equate this distribution of capabilities with power, I merely state that these relative differences in capabilities are hierarchical status resources that may indicate whether Norway could conceivably be considered a middle power. While this might seem like a semantically constructed manoeuvre to escape neorealism's inherited determinism, many neoclassical realist pieces also refrain from equating the distribution of capabilities with actual power (Lobell et al. 2009; Wohlforth 1987; Zakaria 1998). Furthermore, neoclassical realists consider power as well as status to be constructed intersubjectively, meaning that the distribution can only be a (necessary) starting point of analysis with a subsequent comparison to the recognition Norway has received.

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[16] Indeed, viewing this 'transmission belt' chronologically is not done on a regular basis by those who adhere to the neoclassical realist approach (Haine 2012; Schweller & Pu 2011; Wohlforth 2009).

Next, moral authority outputs are then measured and examined to give an indication of Norway's efforts at bettering its moral authority vis-à-vis the other middle and small powers. This illuminates two additional aspects. First, and similar to the relationship between hierarchical status resources and status, those who invest a lot in bettering their moral authority are also likelier to have higher status. Thus, while the relationship between actual moral authority output and status is not linear, an increase in moral authority output is likely to result in a degree of moral authority which consequently may influence Norway's status positively. Secondly, moral authority outputs also reveal the extent of Norway and the other sample countries' moral authority resources, being the willingness of the country to pursue and improve its moral authority and status. This indication of Norway's available status resources is complemented with a qualitative contextualisation of these resources where I argue that Norway's identity, culture and tradition of practicing foreign policy is highly compatible with the pursuit of moral authority.

In the next segment, I investigate the actual recognition of Norway and the other sample countries' status resources and its moral authority outputs. It is not possible to discern between the two aforementioned concepts effect on the recognition. In other words, it is not possible to say whether it is the moral authority output or the hierarchical status resources that has led to each country's particular level of recognition. Thus, a combination between the sample countries' relative hierarchical status resources, their moral authority output and the eventual recognition of these will be analysed in order to paint a picture of the state's hierarchical and moral authority. While not definite, measuring the recognition through exchanges of diplomats and embassies between countries is the best way of quantitatively inferring and indicating the actual status of a country. Furthermore, the algorithm I employ the dataset of exchanges of embassies, inspired by Renshon (2013), discriminates against the sending country effectively taking the sender's status into consideration. In contrast to many other status attribution-pieces, this measure is the most accurate way of depicting the distribution of international recognition.

Finally, putting this all together I analyse the discrepancy between the sample countries' hierarchical status resources and moral authority outputs on the one hand, against international recognition on the other. First, this novel measure captures the interplay of material capabilities and attributed status which allows us to accurately see the differences in countries relative rank on their material capabilities on the one hand, and recognition on the other. Secondly, the measure also captures the differences in countries' moral authority and

recognition, which in this case allows us for the first time to analyse the discrepancy between what countries try go get recognition for vis-à-vis what they actually get recognition for.

4.2 Sample method

Using medium to large N-analyses gives a broad base for indicating Norway's status because there are many quantifiable indicators that may serve as a precondition for status. Take for instance wealth and military capabilities, which can both be used to position a particular country on a ranking scale. To see whether middle power status is even a possibility, Norway's quantifiable indicators need to be compatible with that of the wealth and military capabilities of established middle powers (see discussion below for definition). Their hierarchical status resources need to be close to that of the established middle powers. Likewise, middle powers have distinct sets of behaviours, roles and reputations all of which can be operationalised into quantifiable indicators. If Norway scores similar on these factors, this should indicate that Norway's behaviour, roles and reputation aligns with that of middle powers. Their moral authority output matches.

This study takes a *via media* approach between structural behaviourists and behavioural normativists to develop an internally coherent and transparent mechanism for determining which countries to use as sample middle powers. It seems almost impossible to produce an unbiased sample selection procedure for the middle-tiered countries. One can select countries by face validity, being that it intuitively makes sense to conceive of certain countries as middle powers (see for instance Bolton & Nash 2010; Pratt 1990a; Stokke 1989a). The second method is to choose a selection method based on a specific criteria where the countries are selected because they score middle on the criteria or because are thought to score high on a criteria which middle powers are suspected to score high on (see Handel 1990; Holbraad 1984; Neack 1993; Wood 1990). Both these methods are indisputably biased because they are either based upon the authors' pre-conceived notion of what middle powers are; or because they arbitrarily chose a criteria which to the author seems useful for classifying middle powers; or a combination of these two (Cooper 2011). This study does not fully overcome these biases. However, in order to mitigate the worst excesses of each alternative, this study combines the selection methods from structural behaviouralism and behavioural normativism. First, Canada and Australia are selected because they feature prolifically in all the aforementioned theories. In terms of their structural position, they both fall just below the great powers and the emerging powers, they typify middle power behaviour, and they are

explicitly self-proclaimed middle powers. Second, Sweden Denmark, the Netherlands and Malaysia are chosen because they, similar to Norway, figure vividly in behavioural normative literature on middle powers. Third, Mexico, South Africa and Poland are chosen because they rank just below the greats capability-wise. Lastly, Ireland is chosen because the literature on middle powers fails to identify Ireland as a middle power. Its theoretical exclusion in combination with the country's low rank on key hierarchical status resources, means that it is very likely the state is currently a small power. Ireland thus serves as a control state. The selection criteria are illustrated in table 1 where I have pinpointed each country's rank on GNI, military expenditures and military personnel. This is accompanied by a number of references that have associated the country with a type of middle power behaviour. These references are by no means an exhaustive list, but as a supplement to the hierarchical status resources rank, I would suggest that it paints a fair picture of the scholarly field's perception of traditional middle powers, new middle powers and non-middle powers.

Table 1 Selection criteria

a.   Material capabilities rank (2012)

Criteria	Norway	Sweden	Denmark	Netherlands	Poland	Ireland	Canada	Mexico	Australia	Malaysia	South Africa
Gross National Income	23	22	33	18	25	53	11	14	12	35	29
Military expenditures	25	31	40	21	22	66	15	26	14	41	39
Military personnel	89	100	108	77	51	132	65	20	68	78	61

b.   Self proclaimed middle power status or behavioural tendencies

Country	Self proclaimed middle power	Academic referrals for Traditional and New Middle power behaviour (after 1980)
Norway	No	Traditional: (Bolton & Nash 2010; Carvalho & Neumann 2015b; Cooper 2011; Jordaan 2003; Nolte 2010; Pratt 1990b; Stokke 1989c; Watson & Pandey 2014)
Sweden	No	Traditional: (Bolton & Nash 2010; Cooper 2011; Jordaan 2003; Nolte 2010; Pratt 1990b; Rudengren et al. 1995; Stokke 1989c)
Denmark	No	Traditional: (Bolton & Nash 2010; Cooper 2011; Jordaan 2003; Nolte 2010; Pratt 1990b; Stokke 1989c; Watson & Pandey 2014)
Netherlands	Partly	Traditional: (Bolton & Nash 2010; Jordaan 2003; Nolte 2010; Pratt 1990b; Stokke 1989c; Watson & Pandey 2014)
Poland	No	N/A
Ireland	No	N/A
Canada	Yes	Traditional: (Bolton & Nash 2010; Carr 2014; Cooper et al. 1993; Cooper 1997b; Cooper 2013; Cooper 2011; Efstathopoulos 2011; Gecelovsky 2009; Hornsby & van Heerden 2013; Jordaan 2003; Leith & Pretoruis 2009; Nolte 2010; Patience 2013; Ungerer 2007b; Watson & Pandey 2014)
Mexico	No	Traditional(Belanger & Mace 1997; Bolton & Nash 2010): New: (Cooper 2013)
Australia	Yes	Traditional: (Beeson 2011; Bolton & Nash 2010; Carr 2014; Cooper et al. 1993; Cooper 1997b; Cooper 2013; Cooper 2011; Cotton 2013; Efstathopoulos 2011; Hawksley 2009; Jordaan 2003; Leith & Pretoruis 2009; Nolte 2010; Patience 2013; Ungerer 2007b; Watson & Pandey 2014)
Malaysia	No	Traditional: (Saravanamuttu 2010) New: (Jordaan 2003; Ping 2005)
South Africa	Yes	Traditional: (Bolton & Nash 2010; van der Westhuizen 2013): New:(Hornsby & van Heerden 2013; Jordaan 2003; Nolte 2010)

Sources: Gross National Product (United Nations 2013) Armed forces personnel and military expenditures (International Institute for Strategic Studies 1997-2014; SIPRI 2013; World Bank Data 2013)

Canada and Australia are those countries that are most referred to when scholars attempt to classify traditional middle powers behaviourally. Therefore, it seems logical to suggest that countries that are very similar to Canada and Australia should be considered middle powers. Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Netherlands, on the other hand, are also considered pure traditional middle powers and are often mentioned in the same sentence as Canada and Australia. Interestingly, Mexico, Malaysia and South Africa are somewhat inconsistently

considered both as new and traditional middle powers in behavioural terms. This is probably due to some confusion regarding Jordaan's (2003) seminal classification of middle powers. However, for the purposes of this study, these new types of middle powers should be included in order to situate them in relation to Norway's own status. Lastly, the literature on Poland as a middle power is very often based on structural terms (Handel 1990; Holbraad 1984; Spero 2004; Spero 2009), and I have not been able to find any literature links Poland to the traditional notion of middle power behaviour. Nonetheless it should still be included in an analysis of middle powers because its rank on military expenditures and wealth surely suggest that it could be reaching a middle power threshold for what hierarchical status resources goes. Moving forward, one should also note that every continent is represented in the sample. There is a tendency for scholars to only focus on western middle powers because the somewhat accepted behavioural definition - which is that middle powers are those countries adhering to a distinctive middle power behaviour - has a clear bias towards western countries (Ping 2005). Nonetheless, I acknowledge that this sample is still skewed towards western countries. Despite this obvious caveat, the modern founders of the term, Canada and Australia, have created a set of practices which are closely connected the middle power status and to western values, which subsequently leads to a distinct foreign policy middle power behaviour.

4.3 Operationalising status resources, output and diplomatic recognition

As stated in the research design section above, it is the goal of this analysis to measure Norway and the other sample countries' hierarchical status resources, their moral authority output and the diplomatic recognition these countries have received. In order to do so I need to operationalize a series of abstract concepts. I start by operationalising hierarchical status into two sub categories: power and wealth. Drawing on traditional realist conceptions of these categories, I use the measures of military power and GNI. The measures used in the military power are primarily based on established datasets on military expenditures, military personnel and national capabilities datasets. The military expenditures and military personnel are furthermore aggregated using formulas for capturing the complete strength and sophistication of each country's military. Next, I operationalise moral authority outputs into two sub categories: diplomatic and organisational outreach, and humane internationalism. Diplomatic outreach is operationalised by applying a network algorithm on the diplomatic exchanges amongst the world's countries for sorting out the sample countries level of presence in the

world. This data is also supplemented with a measure on membership in international organisations. Humane internationalism is also indicated by three measures: ODA, contributions to the UNDP and UN peacekeeping contributions. Lastly, the diplomatic recognition is similar to the diplomatic outreach. Here I operationalise diplomatic recognition applying Google PR's algorithm for sorting out those sample countries with highest international diplomatic presence within its territories.

4.3.1 Hierarchical status resources

Military capabilities, sophistication and national power

Two recurrent indicators of military capabilities tend to form the basis for most mainstream measures of military capabilities and national power.[17] These two measures echoe a very narrow view of power, namely "to denote what essentially military capability - the elements which contribute directly or indirectly to the capacity to coerce, kill and destroy" (Claude 1962, p.6). Armed forces personnel are usually counted as active military personnel as well as other types of personnel as long as they may support the regular military forces. Military expenditures is a more uncertain measure. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) for instance, emphasises three severe issues with their data: First, the official data contains reliability issues as many of the countries' official data (which is what the measure is based upon) only covers a part of the military budget. Second, although military expenditures are a prerequisite for military capabilities, there are severe validity issues relying solely on military expenditures as an indication of military capabilities. This is so because military expenditures alone cannot say anything about the technological level, equipment and the security environment the expenditures are used for. Third, the comparability of the data is limited because countries have different definitions of their official spending and because the exchange rates in which most data is converted to for cross country analysis are sub-optimal (Stalenheim et al. 2009, p.214-215).[18] These deficiencies, however, do not preclude the use of military expenditures in this study, mainly because it still resides as the single most important

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[17] Examples of seminal works in IR that use these two measures of military capability, either singularly, in combination which other, or with another measure include Waltz (1979),Jervis (1976) Ikenberry, Mastanduno &Wohlforth (2011) and Mearsheimer (2001). For a review of the role of military in power see Morgenthau (1973, p.126-130) and Edmunds (2006).

[18] A minor debate amongst military capability scholars has been whether they should look at military expenditures in terms of purchasing power parity or official exchange rates (Höhn 2011). Also see the SIPRI FAQ on military expenditures http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/copy_of_faqs as well as Jeff Colgan's (2011, p.548-549) excellent critique of the measure.

measure of indicating military capabilities due to the fact that greater military powers tend, in the long run, to spend more money on their military than lesser powers. Furthermore I mitigate as far as possible the problems associated with the military expenditure measure by combining the measure with military personnel as well as expenditures on military Research & Development (R&D). Taken together, I argue these also indicate the level of technological advancement of the countries' military forces.

Three broad sets of data are used to indicate each country's military capabilities. First and second, the data on armed forces personnel and military expenditures from 1960 to 1988 is gathered from the Correlates of War (COW)-dataset on military expenditures (Singer et al. 1972) while the data for the period 1988 to 2013 is gathered from World Bank (WB) (2013) and SIPRI (2013). The data from the WB on armed forces suffers from some major inconsistencies due to semantic differences regarding the status of paramilitary forces. These were therefore triangulated using the original source, the *Military Balance* (International Institute for Strategic Studies 1997-2014) in the period 1996-2013. Third, military R&D was gathered in two steps. First, I gathered the Government Budget Appropriations or Outlays on R&D (GBOARD) from the various volumes of Main Science and Technology Indicators (MSTI) from the OECD (1989; 1997; 2000; 2002; 2005; 2008; 2012; 2013). The military expenditures were all converted into constant 2011 USD. Second, the amount on military R&D was collected by first extracting the percentages used on Military R&D (also listed in the aforementioned sources) of the total GBOARD for each specific year. Subsequently, these numbers were converted into constant 2011 USD, Power Purchasing Parity (PPP) using OECD's own conversion rates listed in the different volumes.

In the following paragraphs, I present two formulas used to capture different aspects of military capabilities: The widespread Composite Index of National Capabilities (CINC) intended to capture national power, and the measure M intended to capture military sophistication. However, given that the main goal is to indicate as accurately as possible Norway's holistic military capabilities in the world, it is necessary to explain why formulas are given priority. According the Höhn (2011, p.1) the aim and advantage by power formulas "is complexity reduction: to transform a multifaceted 'something' into unidimensional values, which in turn approximate national power." A theoretical formula is a mathematical calculation which strives towards combining two or more variables into a single indicator of national power. For instance, we can have two variables such as military strength and size of

the economy. An operationalised version of this would for instance then be Military expenditures + Gross Domestic Product (GDP) or some other quantifiable measure of the theoretical indicators. *M* is based on the previous listed sources for military expenditures and military personnel. The CINC-data is based on the COW-dataset on national power (Singer et al. 1972).

CINC was launched by David J. Singer and Stuart Bremer (*ibid.*) as an aggregate calculation of how the distribution of capabilities, along with uncertainty, affects the onset of war. The aggregate measure consisted of six equally weighted variables which were standardised as ratios of world totals:

(eq.1)
$$CINC_{i,t} = \frac{\frac{milex_{i,t}}{wmilex_t} + \frac{milper_{i,t}}{wmilper_t} + \frac{steelpro_{i,t}}{wispro_t} + \frac{ergcon_{i,t}}{wergcon_t} + \frac{urbpop_{i,t}}{wurbpop_t} + \frac{totpop_{i,t}}{wtotpop_t}}{6}$$

The six variables were meant to cover three dimensions of national power: (1) Military expenditures and military personnel to cover the military dimension; (2) steel production and energy consumption to cover the economic dimension; as well as (3) urban population and total population to cover the demographic dimension (Höhn 2011)[19]. It is important to notice that the CINC measure is an aggregate measure of national power, as Singer & Bramer (1972) states, not military strength. In the National Material Capabilities-Codebook[20], the authors suggest that power "here defined as the ability of a nation to exercise and resist influence – is a function of many factors, among them the nation's material capabilities." Subsequently, they argue that although power and material capabilities are not identical, "it is essential that we try to define the latter [material capabilities] in operational terms so as to understand the former [Power]." Bremer (1980, p.60) later argued that CINC does not always reflect current power: "Military resources stand for realized power, economic resources for intermediate potential, demographic resources for long-range potential."

The obvious objection to the aggregate index is that it is somewhat outdated (Cohen & Chiu 2014, p.18). Constructed in the Cold War stalemate between two superpowers, certain indicators such as steel production, energy consumption and the two population measures do not reflect the modern nature of national power. Furthermore, CINC has very little to say about pure military capabilities. If we were to increase a country's population by 50 million

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[19] The formula bears striking resemblance to Morgenthau's view of power which included geography, natural resources, military preparedness, industrial capacity population, national character, national morale, the quality of diplomacy and the quality of government (Höhn 2011; Morgenthau 1948)
[20] http://www.correlatesofwar.org/

people with no form of military training, this would not increase the actual military power of that particular country. The CINC score, however, would rise drastically.[21] To weigh up for this problem, I use an unpublished formula for aggregate military capabilities made by Phil Arena entitled "*M*"[22]. *M* solely rely on military expenditures and military personnel to calculate a military sophistication index. Thus, the *M* score excludes any intermediate or long range potential for countries' military strength, and focuses solely on the current military power. The basic formula is as follows:

(eq.2)
$$M_{i,t} = P_{i,t}Q_{i,t}$$

Where $M_{i,t}$ is the M score for any country i in year t. $P_{i,t}$ is the discounted (5 years) measure of military personnel in country i in year t $Q_{i,t}$ is the discounted measure of quality ratios of country i in year t. Thus,

(eq.3)
$$P_{i,t} = \frac{milper_{i,t}}{milper_{i,t}+\delta_t^P}$$

Where $milper_{i,t}$ is the military personnel for country i in year t based upon the CINC data (Singer et al. 1972), SIPRI (2013) The Military Balance (International Institute for Strategic Studies 1997-2014) and the World Bank (2013). δ_t^P is the discounted element in the equation which is a 5-year moving average. Specifically,

(eq.4)
$$\delta_t^P = \frac{\overline{milper_{i,t-1}}+ \overline{milper_{i,t-2}}+\overline{milper_{i,t-3}}+\overline{milper_{i,t-4}}+\overline{milper_{i,t-5}}}{5}$$

Where $\overline{milper_{i,t}}$ is the global average military personnel in year t:

(eq.5)
$$\overline{milper_{i,t}} = \frac{1}{n} * \sum_{i=1}^{milper_n} x_i$$

Similarly to equation 3,

(eq.6)
$$Q_{i,t} = \frac{qualrat_{i,t}}{qualrat_{i,t}+\delta_t^Q}$$

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[21] In the debate of China's ongoing rise to great power status the CINC has proved irrelevant. Due to China's enormous population and giant industrial sector the country has, according to the CINC score, already surpassed the US in terms of national capabilities. Few would, however, argue that this is the case (Beckley 2011; Ikenberry 2011)

[22] http://fparena.blogspot.no/2012/11/once-more-on-military-capabilities.html. I am in debt to Professor Arena for helping me understand the calculations made in the formula. Eventual errors are of course my own.

Where δ_t^Q is a 5-year moving average of the average quality ratio as in equation 4 and 5. $qualrat_{i,t}$ is the quality ratio for country i in year t. The quality ratio is done by dividing a country's military expenditures by its military personnel (expenditures per head):

(eq.7)
$$qualrat_{i,t} = \frac{milex_{i,t}}{milper_{i,t}}$$

M ranges from 0 to 1, with values closer to 1 indicating that a country has much more military power than the standards for that particular year. A valid objection to *M* is that quality is not necessarily captured by the quality ratio (military expenditures per troop). Indeed, there are plenty of examples where massive military expenditures have only resulted in minor changes in actual military power. However, like CINC, *M* is not based upon any arbitrary weighing scheme which makes it particularly useful in determining absolute military strength amongst potential middle powers. Furthermore, the formula captures an aspect of the military sector that had been left overlooked by the CINC formula, namely the quality and sophistication of a country's military strength. Moreover, the sheer size of a country's army is not lost in the measure, as military personnel and the quality ratio is weighted equally.

Wealth

The second hierarchical status resource, wealth, is easier to operationalise. Most structural behaviouralists tend to include indicators of economic strength. In fact, while realists usually differentiate by military capabilities in defining great powers and super powers, structural behaviouralists prefer wealth for sifting out potential middle powers (Levy 1983, p.16; Mearsheimer 2001; Wood 1990, p.70). Specifically, structural behaviouralists tend to view, "The case for GNP [...] as [...] particularly strong. This quantity reflects most of the material and moral factors that make up power, including population, areal, location, resources, organization and leadership" (Holbraad 1984, p.75).[23] An important digression of note is that wealth tends to be measured in absolute values when determining countries' relative positions in an economic hierarchy. High GDP per capita does not determine the size of the economy. However, the countries that normally feature in behavioural normativist analyses tend to have a wealthy population because the surplus allows the country to be a 'good international citizen'. Wealth, although primarily a liberal variable, also features extensively in neoclassical

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[23] Bernard Wood (1990, p.73) echoes Holbraad: " the literature suggest the availability of a remarkably simple and accessible single objective indicator of the relative power of nation-states that yields results consistently very close to those of the most intricate composite indices. That indicator is gross national product (GNP)"

realism in which scholars do suggest that once there is a rise in wealth, the state will try to maximise its influence in the world (Gilpin 1981; Zakaria 1998).[24]

The difference between GDP and GNI is not trivial. GDP is the market value of all services and goods within the borders of a nation, while GNI is GDP plus the income from other countries such as interests and yields. Because of this distinction, both measures are represented in the analysis. I am sceptic towards using GNI or GDP as single denominators for middle power status because of the multidimensional perspective this thesis subscribes to. However, GNI in particular, and this should be stressed, might play an even more important part than military capabilities in the hierarchical status resources when examining potential middle powers. Scholars prioritise military capabilities over wealth because military capabilities are so essential for great powers and polarity.[25] In the spirit of structural behaviouralism and behavioural normativism, however, a considerable country GNI could be considered pivotal for middle powers as they are dependent upon a stable, egalitarian and relatively large economy in order to put their policy of 'good international citizen' in to practice (Jordaan 2003). Wealth indicators such as these additionally form the basis for exclusive clubs such as the various "G's" which normally consists of the leading economies in the world.[26] Furthermore, GNI and GDP have both higher validity and reliability than military expenditures because countries do not have any incentive to lie about their figures and there a strict rules on how to count and measure both GNI and GDP.[27].

GDP and GNI data is gathered from UN statistics (United Nations 2013; United Nations 2014). Both of these measures were converted into constant 2012 USD. Additionally, I included three measures that nuance GNI and GDP which accordingly may indicate the health of a country's economy. These three are: Account balance and unemployment rate (International Monetary Fund 2014); and GDP per hour (The Conferanse Board 2014).

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[24] These authors draw upon Morgenthau which claimed that it was "inevitable that the leading industrial nations should be identified with the great powers, and a change in industrial rank, for better or for worse, should be accompanied or followed by a corresponding change in the hierarchy of power." (Morgenthau 1973, p.125)
[25] See for instance Monteiro (2011)
[26] Historically there have been many such groups. For instance, G3, G5, G7, G8, G10, G20, G24, G77 (see Postel-Vinay 2013)
[27] Colgan (2011, p.548) claims that "countries have a strategic incentive to dissimulate in their official figures" which consequently means that "the reliability and validity of these data require a degree of analytical caution beyond what is normally expected for other quantitative datasets (e.g. measures of GDP)".

4.3.2 Moral authority output

Diplomatic and organisational outreach

A range of scholarly literature largely relies on the number of diplomatic missions received to equate with status or recognition. This is not however, the only good use of diplomatic datasets. Indeed, the number of diplomats or embassies 'sent' out in the world, tells us something about the diplomatic outreach of a country as well how states wish to portray themselves as well as securing prestige for themselves (Kinne 2014). For instance, if country A has more diplomats or embassies in other countries' than country B, country A could be said to have a broader diplomatic scope than country B. This is in line with middle power theory which suggests that middle power countries attempt to establish diplomatic ties with others in order to do system maintenance or lay the grounds for multilateral solutions(Beeson 2011; Cooper 1997a; Hawksley 2009). Thus, the number of diplomatic representatives sent illustrates to what extent states choose to be an active player in the international system.

There are primarily two datasets that cover diplomatic exchange amongst countries. The COW Diplomatic exchange database (Bayer 2006) which covers exchanges on all levels of diplomatic representatives and Thomas J. Volgy's (Rhamey et al. 2013) Diplomatic Contacts Database (DIPCON) which only focus on the exchanges of embassies. Naturally, the COW dataset is much more susceptible to changes in the relationship between countries and is thus much more volatile from year to year. However the DIPCON dataset is severely more reliable than COW's diplomatic exchange. While the latter recorded the level of representation from Ambassadors all the way down to 'other' representatives, the DIPCON only counts embassies in the capital of another state and that the staffing is headed by diplomat with at least the ranking of an Ambassador (Volgy et al. 2013, p.17-18). In addition, the creators of the dataset have taken on a series of measures to provide reliable and consistent data (*ibid.*).[28]

Having a diplomat or an embassy in the US indicates a more serious attempt to be an important player in the world than having one in Palau (Kinne 2014). This could be sorted out by giving each state a starting value and then calculate the countries' outreach based on this starting value. However, this approach suffers from a huge bias in which the countries have to be listed on an arbitrary scale. A network centrality measure may solve the problem of biased starting points as multiple iteration sequences makes starting points irrelevant. As shown

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[28] This included inter-coder reliability checks, correlation checks between original and secondary check as well as re-coding when the reliability check correlation was lower than a value of 95 % . See: http://www.u.arizona.edu/~volgy/data.html

below in the diplomatic recognition section, these network centrality measures have sporadically been used to measure diplomatic recognition, being the number of embassies or diplomats received (Kinne 2014; Maoz 2006; Maoz 2011; Renshon 2013). On the other hand, it is also possible to disaggregate the centrality measures and apply them to the number of embassies 'sent' to another country. The Hyperlink-Induced Topic Search (HITS) represents such a network centrality measure. HITS was developed by Jon Kleinberg (1999) and is a link analysis algorithm based upon authority and hub scores. Pages with high hub scores are web pages that send many links to important pages (also known as authority nodes). Pages with high authority scores are web pages that receive many connections from important pages (hub nodes). The main advantage of using the HITS-algorithm is that we get a disaggregated result, authority and hub, in which the latter may serve as an indicator for degree of diplomatic outreach and thus a moral authority output. A good hub points to many good authorities, and a good authority is linked to by many good hubs. Authorities and hubs thus have a mutual reinforcing relationship. Likewise, countries with high hub scores are countries that have many embassies in countries of importance (countries with high authority scores). Hub scores thus give a good indication of influence seeking as countries wishes to portray themselves as being important by associating with countries that have higher status. The basic algorithm for the disaggregated authority score is as follows,

(eq.8) $$A(p) = \sum_{i=1}^{n} H(i)$$

And for the hub score,

(eq.9) $$H(p) = \sum_{i=1}^{n} A(i)$$

Where $A(p)$ is the authority score for a country and N is the total number of embassies in $A(p)$. i is a random country with an embassy in $A(p)$. The authority score is thus the sum of all hub scores of countries with embassies in $A(p$. Likewise $H(p)$ is the hub score for a country and N is the total number of embassies that $H(p)$ has sent. i is a random country that $H(p)$ has sent an embassy to. The hub score is thus the sum of all authority scores of all the countries which $H(p)$ has embassies in. This iterative process can also be illustrated as follows,

Figure 1. Iteration sequence: HITS-algorithm

In the first iteration sequence, the hub countries sends its embassies to authority countries, in which the total number of embassies that each authority country receives is summed up as the preliminary authority score. In the second part of the first iteration, the authority scores of the countries which the hub countries have embassies in, are summed up which results in a new preliminary hub score. Now, in the second iteration, the authority countries receive its new authority score based upon the summed hub scores in part 2 of the first iteration sequence. Consequently, the new hub scores are calculated on the basis of the new authority scores and those new hub scores form the basis of the new authority score and so on. After every iteration sequence the computer normalises[29] all the countries' hub and authority scores and after enough iterations, depending on the number of countries and number of embassies, the score converges, and ultimately results in an index ranging from 0 to 1 for that year.

In addition to diplomatic presence, countries are also 'diplomatically' present in international organisations. Some roles and clubs exemplify a high degree of foreign outreach. After the Cold War, the UN Security Council for instance is generally considered to be a club where only great powers are allowed. Consequently, obtaining the role of being a permanent member in this club is a seen as the ultimate goal for emerging powers. This is why emerging powers such as the Brazil attempt to delegitimize the Security Council's moral authority and

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[29] Normalisation by scaling the value into a number between 0 and 1. The equation for normalizing the authority score $NA(p)$ is:

$NA(p) = \frac{A(p) - A(p)_{min}}{A(p)_{max} A(p)_{min}}$ Likewise, the formula for normalised hub score $NH(p)$ is $NH(p) = \frac{H(p) - H(p)_{min}}{H(p)_{max} H(p)_{min}}$

eventually change the membership policy.[30] In contrast, no such highly institutionalised roles for middle powers currently exist. We cannot say that participation in certain organisations or adapting to certain roles either qualifies or disqualifies a country for middle power status. Nonetheless, the status literature indicates that middle powers, especially traditional middle powers, normally play an active role in these organisations by pursuing multilateral solutions wherever they can (Neumann 2011). A high degree of participation in Intergovernmental Organisations (IGOs) could be considered the ideal role of a middle power. This does not say anything of how countries work within these organisations and whether they really do promote multilateral solutions. However, we can deduce that countries that have many memberships also tend to adapt to the role of a country that prioritises multilateralism and this would thus indicate a strong moral authority output. Number of memberships a state has in international organisations can be accurately gathered from various volumes in the *Yearbook of international organisations* from Union of International Associations (UIA 1994; UIA 2009; UIA 2013).

Humane Internationalism

Development assistance (aid), however, is often suggested to be an altruistic act of solidarity. However, the literature has also considered two instrumental gains that arise from providing developmental assistance. First, so-called humane internationalists are convinced that a more equal world would be in the long-term best interests of those Western industrialised countries (Stokke 1989a). Secondly, and even more important for this thesis, a number of status and middle power literature pieces have suggested that countries do gain prestige from building a reputation as a humane internationalist (Anwar 2006; Lavergne 1989; Morgenthau 1962, p.304; Sandal 2014; Schia & Sending 2015). Countries, especially small and middle powers, compete for the position of the best humane internationalist, hopeful of reaping the reward of higher moral authority (Carvalho & Lie 2015). Countries mobilise their moral authority resources in order to portray themselves as humane internationalists. In other words, the policy of performing humane internationalism represents a strong moral output because states expect to receive recognition from adopting such roles. Again, this is not to say that countries immediately would receive status from conveying humane internationalism. Indeed, in addition to the danger of a discrepancy between moral authority output and actual status,

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[30] See for instance the declaration and the fourth BRICS summit in New Delhi: http://www.cfr.org/brazil/brics-summit-delhi-declaration/p27805

states also risk the danger of their humane internationalism policy failing [31]. Nevertheless, an overwhelming amount of middle power literature confirms the strong link between middle power status and pursuing a policy of altruism and human internationalism (Carr 2014; Cooper 1997b; Holbraad 1984; Neack 1992; Pratt 1990b; Stokke 1989c). Therefore, it still makes sense to operationalize humane internationalism as a measure of moral authority output. The three indicators selected are ODA[32], contributions to the UNDP and contributions to peacekeeping missions. These indicators align well with the middle power literature which claims that middle powers often work and channel their activities through the UN system (Behringer 2005; Stokke 1989c; Wood 1990). ODA is gathered from OECD's (2014) statistics section, while contributions to the UNDP is gathered through various reports on the financial situation of the UNDP and the UN in general (United Nations Development Programme 1985; United Nations General Assembly 1994; United Nations General Assembly 1998), 2005 (United Nations Development Programme 2006; United Nations Development Programme 2014). UN military troop contribution, police contributions and observer contributions is gathered from the International Peace Institute (International Peace Institute 2014).

4.3.3 Diplomatic recognition

As noted above, Hierarchical status resources and moral authority outputs can only be indicators of status. Although they either symbolise an objective position in a material hierarchy or real efforts aiming at moral authority, they are not social indicators. Status is, in contrast, definitively social. All the measures as stated above depict the objective situation[33], not depending on any sort of social recognition. To measure a minimum recognition, which arguably is the closest we can get to measuring status, there has to be at least an action and a reaction from two or more actors.

One feature that can capture this process in the international system is the diplomatic exchanges between countries. A diplomat from country A to country B is a vote for country B's importance in the world. If country B receives more diplomats than country A, the former

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[31] However, (Chandler 2003) convincingly argues that states like ethical foreign policies because, unlike its domestic policies, they are never really judged by their results, but by their intent. While Chandler backs up his bold statement, Norwegian foreign policy has recently received criticism for the lack of concrete results on its development aid (Toje 2012; Tvedt 2009)

[32] The ODA is only available for those countries in the DAC which is a branch of the OECD.

[33] Or as Renshon puts it: "The zero'th level of beliefs is the objective situation, e.g., the number of tanks in the U.S. army."(Renshon 2013, p.9)

could be said to have a higher diplomatic rank than country A. Diplomatic recognition is thus a measure that potentially can capture the recognition of increased hierarchical status resources and moral authority outputs. For instance, a rise in wealth and military capabilities would in the long run be likely to result in a higher diplomatic recognition (Volgy et al. 2011a). Likewise, increased participation in world politics through a large diplomatic and organisational outreach, as well as generous policies of human internationalism would also in the long run lead to a higher recognition from the world (Kinne 2014; Lavergne 1989; Shimizu & Sandler 2002). Thus, while the previous indicators showed the objective position of the country, diplomatic recognition here, seeks to capture the *second order belief* by other states about their relative positions in the social hierarchy: whether they perceive their particular position to be either of high, middle or low status (Dafoe et al. 2014; Renshon 2013).

Status-dissatisfaction theorists tend to equate status with world rank. Here, great powers are those with most diplomatic missions within their borders while small powers have the least amount of received diplomatic missions. This operationalisation has several problems. First and foremost, a lack of diplomatic representation in a country does not necessarily mean that a state does not recognise the importance of that state. Indeed, diplomatic rank correlates well with an intuitive status ranking, meaning that great powers tend to have more country diplomats than lesser powers. However, to base status solely on diplomatic contacts makes certain anomalies unexplainable. Belgium for example, receives abnormally more diplomats than what scholars would suggest their 'real' status warrants. Indeed, Belgium may receive many diplomats due to their central organisational position in international politics, but few would call Belgium a great power, which the diplomatic rank measure suggests.[34] Nevertheless, diplomatic rank enables us to measure a degree of social recognition, which is a rarity in IR. For instance, one book proclaims: "The creation of diplomatic infrastructure in the home of the major power is one indication of the salience of that state to other states" (Volgy et al. 2011a, p.13). Although these scholars go on equating foreign embassies in a country with status, the message is still clear: Diplomatic representatives received are an important and necessary, but not exhaustive, indicator of status in international politics.

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[34] In 1980s for instance, Belgium had 107 embassies within their borders while the great (or super) power Soviet Union only had 100 embassies (Rhameyy et al. 2013)

As with measuring diplomatic outreach, one way of operationalising diplomatic recognition is to count how many diplomats or embassies each country has within its territories. This has certainly been the most common way of calculating recognition which is especially prevalent in the status-dissatisfaction literature (Galtung 1964; Renshon 2013; Volgy et al. 2011a; Wallace 1971). However, as Renshon (Renshon 2013, p.19) shows: "*who* sends diplomats to an actor matters as much as (perhaps more than) the raw number of diplomats the state receives. In other words, all diplomats are not created equal."[Original emphasis] Having an embassy from the US indicates higher status than having a Finish embassy located in the country. Indeed, having a US embassy located within your border might be worth more than Finland, Denmark and Norway put together. We could solve this issue by giving each country an initial starting status value, but as Renshon (*ibid.*) claims this would risk that the measure would become arbitrary and overly dependent on the researcher's own opinion. In order to address this caveat, I imitate the (rather clever) approach by Renshon (2013) of using Google's PR algorithm to sort the diplomatic rank of the world's countries (Page et al. 1998). The algorithm shares many similarities with the HITS algorithm as used in the diplomatic outreach measure, but is considered even better at finding the most important internet sites, thus explaining some of Google's enormous success. Although some details of the algorithm remain secret, the basic purpose and application is known. What PR assumes is that a link sent from site A to site B is a vote for B's importance. If site B links to site C, B's vote is worth more than it was before site A linked to site B, and thus increasing the importance of page C. Transforming the algorithm to a measure for world politics is not hard. Imagine we were to denote the PR score of country A in a small region consisting of countries B, C and D. If all the latter countries had an embassy in country A, PR (PR) for country A would be:

(eq.10) $$PR(A) = PR(B) + PR(C) + PR(D)$$

Then additionally imagine that country B has an embassy in country C, and country D also has embassies in C and B. This means that country B has to split its vote of importance in two, and country D's vote of importance into three:

(eq.11) $$PR(A) = \frac{PR(B)}{2} + \frac{PR(C)}{1} + \frac{PR(D)}{3}$$

With several more countries, the algorithm can be expressed as:

(eq.12) $$PR(A) = (1 - d) + d \times \sum_i \frac{PR(T_i)}{C(T_i)} + \ldots \frac{PR(T_n)}{C(T_n)}$$

$PR(A)$ is the PR of country A. $PR(T_i)$ denotes PR of country T_i which has connections to country A. $C(T_i)$ denotes the total number of diplomats sent from country T_i. The algorithm clarifies that that the PR of country A is weighted by the total number of diplomats sent from country T. This means that the more total embassies that T has in other countries, the less will Country A benefit from receiving an embassy from T. T_i is, however, also dependent upon the PR of the additional countries, expressed as $PR(T_n)$ and the total number of diplomats sent $C(T_n)$ by them to other countries. d is a dampening factor normally set between 0 and 1. PR require this factor in order to deal with sites (countries) that have incoming, but no outgoing diplomatic representation. This dampening factor was initially set to 0.85. However, the dampening factor does not have any impact on the result shown in table 14[35]. The measure calculates all the countries' importance for each year iteratively. The definition is recursive, meaning that there no arbitrary starting point. The algorithm starts from the assumption that each node (country) is equally important, and then adjusts the scores after each iteration until the measure eventually converges. Countries will gain a higher PR from receiving embassies from countries with higher PR than those of lower PR. In the end, it ends up with a scale value for each country in each given year. Additionally the measure is also converted into an ordinal rank which illustrates the positional/hierarchical element of status (Renshon 2013). As with diplomatic outreach, the diplomatic recognition is also gathered using Rhamey et.al. (2013) dataset for exchanges of embassies between countries.

This novel measure captures the interplay of material capabilities and attributed status which allows us to accurately see the differences in countries relative rank on their material capabilities on the one hand, and recognition on the other. The measure also captures the differences in countries' moral authority and recognition, which in this case allows us for the first time to analyse the discrepancy between what countries try go get recognition for vis-à-vis what they actually get recognition for. This method of capturing recognition is superior to normal way of measuring recognition that equals status with diplomatic recognition. Instead, because it allows for a deeper understanding of how status works specifically focusing on the discrepancies that emerges from the recognition and material capabilities.

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[35] The damping factor tweaks the behaviour of the random surfer. When the dampening factor is 0,85, it means that with the probability of 0.85, the random surfer will follow a random link on the current webpage. However, with the probability of 0,15, the surfer jumps to an entirely new, randomly chosen, webpage. In practice, most dampening factors will change the absolute values of the PageRank scores, but not their ordering

4.4 Assessing validity and reliability

Being that the methodological approach of this thesis is to quantitatively grasp a highly inter-subjective and indeed social phenomenon, the classic fallacies of quantitative approaches to social sciences become relevant. At the same time, this methodological approach does not attempt to correlate any to given variables, and furthermore does not seek to measure the statistical tendency for a specific outcome. This means that many of the orthodox checkpoints normally done in evaluating the reliability and validity of a study become irrelevant. Nevertheless, in this section I first consider the reliability of the study which I argue is relatively high, especially to quantitative analyses that rely on single measure to capture status. After that, I reflect upon and offer responses to objections that could be raised to the internal and external validity of the present study.

Reliability deals with the consistency of a measure. All the measures performed in the analysis section have been repeated at least two times in order to control for errors in processing the datasets. In what might seem as a quick job - extracting the data from the datasets - this in fact is more time consuming and delicate process. For those measures demanding formulas or algorithms, the measure was performed at least three times in order to ensure high replicability. In certain cases (see in the tables below) some of the data was supplemented with other datasets that listed the same data but were considerably more thorough. I cannot guarantee that all the errors in the various datasets were replaced with more reliable numbers since the process of error checking largely was performed by checking for outliers in the datasets. However, all the datasets used in the thesis have been replicated multiple times in various peer-reviewed journals and formed the basis for several seminal books. Moreover, the datasets have all underwent a series of reliability tests to ensure high consistency. Beyond the reliability the datasets themselves, when operationalising hierarchical status resources, moral authority output and recognition, I have ensured high inter-item reliability by offering two or more measures to capture the phenomena. In other words, multiple measures have been applied to measure a single concept. For hierarchical status resources, for example, I have applied 11 different measures divided in the sub-categories 'wealth' and 'military capabilities, sophistication and power'. Likewise, in the operationalisation of moral authority output, I have applied 10 measures divided into sub-categories *diplomatic and organisational outreach* and *humane internationalism* which captures various sides of the moral authority output. For international recognition I have used two measures which are both based on the DIPCON-dataset. While I could have

supplemented the DIPCON-dataset with COW dataset, there are strong reliability concerns of the latter dataset that suggests it is better to use the DIPCON dataset to capture recognition (Rhamey et al. 2013). [36]

While the reliability of the measures should be ensured, there are several potential validity issues connected with the present study. Validity is "concerned with whether operationalization and the scoring of cases adequately reflect the concept the research seeks to measure" (Adcock & Collier 2001, p.13). Validity is furthermore often divided into: internal validity, the degree to which a correlation between two variables are causal; construct validity, the degree to which the collected empirical information captures the concepts and theories which are to be studied and; external validity, the degree to which the study can be generalised. First, this is not a study which seeks to infer a causal relationship between two or more variables. This means that internal validity is not relevant for the measures applied in this thesis. However, in contrast to internal validity, the number of issues regarding construct validity issues almost seems endless. This is mainly due to the theoretical and empirical ambiguity that surrounds status and middle powers. From an anti-foundationist ontological perspective (or post-functionalist) it makes little sense to presume that the measures used to approach status and middle powers are temporally and spatially universal. To assume that for instance military capabilities means the same today as it did somewhat 40 years ago demands a logical leap of faith. Similarly, the exchanges of diplomats did surely mean something different now than what it did before, and exchanges between diplomatic representations back and forward in Europe might very well mean something completely different in South America and Africa.

Contextualisation matters. However, I hold that the best way of studying status and middle powers, as well as all those concepts related to them, is to apply different theoretical and methodological approaches in order to illuminate the various sides of the social phenomenon. The recent rejuvenated literature on status is very much aligned with such an eclectic approach for understanding the concept (Paul et al. 2014b; Volgy et al. 2011b). If the research on status and middle powers is to bear any analytical fruits, compromises and theoretical syntheses have to be made. This involves for structural behaviouralists (neorealists/neoliberalists) to acknowledge that power is not synonymous with status; for behavioural normativists (liberal institutionalists and constructivists) to accept that behaviour cannot by itself solidify status; and for post-functionalists (post-structuralists) to admit that

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[36] See the DIPCON codebook for further explanation at http://www.u.arizona.edu/~volgy/data.html

middle powers are a legitimate ontological concept with real-world implications which are often highly correlated with the distribution of capabilities.

Third, the external validity is connected with the construct validity on many points. Due to the level of abstraction that status requires, there are near endless way of categorising status. This means that any sort of generalisation claim one might have regarding the middle power status of Norway is likely to be contested. As will be shown in the analysis chapter, however, I do not attempt to deterministically attribute Norway or the other countries' a certain status. Status is too much of a complex issue to be solely studied qualitatively. What I do, however, is to indicate Norway's position in comparison with those countries who are frequently mentioned in the middle power literature, a literature that employs a wide arrange of techniques and methodologies to categorise and situate middle powers theoretically and empirically. From this point of view, it is possible to make certain generalisations plausible. If we accept that middle powers and status exists and that the scholarly literature are all attempts at capturing the components of these phenomena, then we can logically assume that the techniques used here, which are a reflection of those previous approaches, are applicable in the world 'out there'. In summation, the validity concerns regarding the empirical and theoretical scope of this thesis, and especially its methodological approach, are potentially endless. However, just because status eludes easy analysis, does not imply that we cannot generate useful insights about it. Rather, I would suggest the best way to proceed is through encouraging a plurality of lenses to investigate this important, but slippery phenomenon. Further, as I have attempted to do here, we must ensure openness in our methodological choices to enable constructive criticism of the knowledge produced through such approaches Status and middle powers are inherently prone to validity complaints and will likely continue to be so. Rather than dwelling on these caveats, I have focused on the eclecticism that one needs in order to understand middle powers, and that this eclecticism, which I show below, can both be theoretically challenging and empirically fruitful.

4.5 Conclusion

This chapter has dealt with the methodological framework applied in the subsequent analysis of the thesis. First, it has situated the methodological approach within the neoclassical realist framework analysis. Next, it has explained the sample method for the analysis of middle powers in the international system. Subsequently, the chapter has devoted considerable space to describe as accurately as possible the operationalisation process of hierarchical status

resources, moral authority outputs and diplomatic recognition. Lastly, the chapter has discussed the validity and reliability of the thesis in general and in specific the methodological approach.

While concerns might be raised regarding the internal and external consistency of the study, hierarchical status resources, moral authority output and diplomatic recognition are all versions of previous approaches to middle powers and status, respectively. What separates this study from the many of the others, however, is that it first does not claim that the methodological approach is universally applicable in time and space. Such a fluctuating social phenomena as status demands scholars to be humble in their analysis. The methodological techniques sketched out above provide both an empirical base for further analysis as well as opening a window for new theoretical insights, especially with regards to the way the material world interacts with the social world. These two advantages will be illuminated in the next chapter.

Chapter 5: Analysis

In light of the theoretical perspective set out in chapters 3 and 4, the analysis starts by first providing a short but necessary historical review of Norway's foreign policy. Secondly, since neoclassical realism is the main analytical starting point of this study, it makes sense to start with the independent variable: the distribution of capabilities, which is treated as hierarchical status resources. In order to get a better idea of Norway's position and to see whether seeking middle power status has been even possible, this data is constructed quantitatively and comparatively with countries that could plausibly be located in the same spectrum. Subsequently, Norway's moral authority output, the way Norway seeks to portray itself in the world, is also illustrated quantitatively by examining the degree of diplomatic and organisational outreach, as well as the level of humane internationalism of the sample countries.

5.1 Background: The main tenets of Norwegian foreign policy

Any short introduction about a country's foreign policy is per definition inadequate. What it can strive for, however, is to outline the main features of any foreign policy's principal tasks. The security oriented IR-discipline often forgets that security policy is not foreign policy. Foreign policy comprises of many things, amongst them security policy. However, areas such as trade, participating in international organisations, and diplomacy, just to name a few, are also significant tasks within many countries' foreign policy. Indeed, the etymological origins of 'foreign', meaning literally meaning "out of doors" or "outside", consists first and foremost of a country's political interaction with other countries. Thus, while security policy is an essential part of a country's foreign policy, it is far from exhaustive for the category. Additionally, status-seeking or status signalling is likely to be visible in all aspects of foreign policy as recognition from the world society can be harvested from diplomacy and wealth as well as military capabilities (Schweller & Pu 2014). In order to account for the multifaceted aspect of Norwegian foreign policy, the following segment is divided into a security and defence section, international organisation and system maintenance section and economic/development section.

5.1.1 War, security and defence

Norway declared its independence from Sweden in 1905, and immediately sought to avoid international security arrangements and obligations as it wanted to consolidate its independence (Larsen 2005). Between 1905 and towards the Second World War, Norway followed a neutralist path, avoiding international entanglements but remaining an indirect protectorate of Great Britain. This allowed Norway to enjoy "the protection of a great power, while indulging in a neutralist stance and a moralistic criticism of great power politics." (Lunde Saxi 2010, p.20) In the aftermath of Hitler's invasion and Nazi Rule during the Second World War, Norway became one of the founders of NATO. During the Cold War, Norway's security policy was heavily influenced by the super power rivalry. The Nordic region was marked by this rivalry in that Norway and Denmark were under influence by the US-led NATO, Finland was subject to Soviet influence, and Sweden remained fairly neutral (Bones 2009; Brundtland 1985).[37] Norwegian security policy during the Cold War was marked by a bandwagoning behaviour towards the US whilst still mitigating tensions between the two super powers. Norway took a formal stand by joining NATO while they did everything in their power not to provoke the Soviet bear (Holst 1986; Skogan 1985). Because of its geopolitical strategic position, Norway remained an important stepping stone in NATO through its maritime facilitation and especially in providing intelligence services for the alliance (Njølstad 1997; Tamnes & Eriksen 1999). A stable alliance partner notwithstanding, the geopolitical position of Norway meant that it could not afford to become an instrument for US provocation. This balancing was maintained by establishing an alliance-based defence which in case of a Soviet attack, "immediately would be deployed and delay the enemy until NATO could counter-attack" (Knutsen 1997, p.26; also see Tamnes 1997, p.61). Historically speaking, Norway remained in a 'trilemma ' between the US and USSR, with the former being Norway's most important ally (Holst 1974a; Holst 1985; Neumann & Ulriksen 1997). Despite the tense military pressures from the bipolar structure, Norway contributed heavily to the limited UN peacekeeping operations during the Cold War. This, along with the national conscription and invasion defence, constituted the dual focus of the Norwegian defence policy throughout the Cold War and well in to the 21th century. Both these areas of the Norwegian defence policy had a definite instrumental value.

During the end of the Cold War, a view emerged which saw peacekeeping operations as beneficial to Norwegian security (Skånland 2010, p.45-46). Likewise, the large number of

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[37] This delicate situation was commonly known as the Nordic balance (Steinbock 2008, p. 198)

conscripts was, in addition to constituting a defence against and invasion from the east, also served as a way of doing nation building (Ulriksen & Neumann 1996). However, Norway was rather slow to restructure its defence after the Cold War. Bureaucratic stagnation along with habitual leadership and continued geostrategic insecurity halted the reformation process significantly (Lunde Saxi 2010, p.61-117). While NATO reinvented itself, Norway continued to lag behind and became somewhat of a thorn in the alliance's foot throughout the 90s (*ibid*.). Eventually Norway restructured its forces internally by building a modern flexible defence and drastically reducing the size of conscripts. In accordance with this new approach, Norway willingly joined the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) program without even being a member of the EU. In recent years, Norway has also increased its support for the NATO-project with increased contributions solidifying its role as a constructive NATO-ally (Lunde Saxi 2010).

5.1.2 International organisation & system maintenance

The rather hesitant attitude towards giving NATO an out of area-mandate resides partly in the strong Norwegian emphasis on international law. Although Norway has somewhat realigned itself away from the UN and towards NATO, Norwegian foreign policy still emphasises that any use of force should be rooted in international law. Indeed, the strong UN alignment has perhaps been the most consistent trend in Norwegian foreign policy. At its ambitious beginning, the UN was seen as tool for endorsing and sustaining international law. Consistent with the semi-neutral stance, Norway's engagement in the UN was partially "rooted in a desire to strengthen the norms for peaceful conflict resolution and partly […] justified by the desire to play the role as a mediator between East and West" (Fermann 1997, p.212). As a small state in the hotspot between two superpowers, the normative preference of a global international peace framework seems obvious. However, the strong emphasis on the UN in Norwegian foreign policy is not restricted to the security sphere. Indeed, Norway views the UN as the best instrument for securing laws regarding liberal trade regimes, securing territorial boarders for the potential extraction of natural resources, as well as satisfying a domestic desire for global equality and human rights (Svenbalrud 2012).

This internationalist approach to NATO and the UN contrasts with Norway's more reticent behaviour to the EU. Norway has said no to the EU twice, in 1972 and 1994 respectively, in which sovereignty, self-determination, democracy and rural economic support were pivotal for Norway's decision to decline (Riste 2004, p.252). Remaining outside the EU whilst still

becoming a member of the European Economic Area (EEA) and with various other sub-agencies within the union, exemplifies well the balance between isolationism and internationalism which underpins Norwegian foreign policy. For the Norwegian public, it is the political equivalent of having your cake and eating it too.

However, in dealings with international organizations in general, the EU still remains a special case for Norwegian introversion. The strong focus on system maintenance through diplomacy features prominently in Norwegian foreign policy and certainly helps to tip the scale towards extroversion rather than introversion. As the Cold War subsided, Norway took the opportunity to expand its peace and reconciliation work, drawing on its peaceful heritage from Nansen to Koht. Peace facilitation and peacebuilding became central to Norwegian foreign policy with involvements in the Middle East, Yugoslavia Sri Lanka, Colombia, Philippines, Sudan, Haiti, Colombia and Guatemala. Norway and other small and middle powers "have a clear self-interest in systems maintenance, and particularly in the peaceful reconciliation of conflicts" because if "other forms of conflict resolution such as forceful coercion, military intervention, and war take over, they are stumped" (Neumann 2011, p.578).

5.1.3 Development aid & economic policy

The peace and reconciliation efforts by the Norwegian government are also reinforced by a vigorous aid policy. Indeed, since its humble beginnings, starting with a fishing project in India 1952, Norway has invested considerable effort and resources in development assistance to less fortunate countries. The driving factors are complex and multifaceted (Stokke 1989b): A moral obligation rooted in the strong peace tradition; a Christian conviction based on solidarity and altruism; as well as a self-centred persuasion that, in the long run, Norway could benefit economically from establishing economic ties with developing countries and secure future exports and import partners. Aid was also viewed as a pulling factor in that aid was seen as strengthening the UN which again could contribute to stability in the Cold War stalemate, essentially underpinning the system maintenance argument of Neumann (Neumann 2011). In the later years, Norway has increased its development efforts but also experienced some changes. First and foremost, Norwegian aid has become tightly knitted with Norwegian interest, in that several development areas or projects were seen to either promote global public goods or directly benefit Norway.[38]

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[38] Erling Tjønnesland (2013, p. 121) for instance mentions that Yugoslavia and Palestine, in which Norway was heavily invested in during the 90s, where amongst the largest receivers of aid. Likewise Afghanistan received aid in order to

As in the case of Norway's divergent foreign policy towards the UN and the EU, Norwegian development aid also has its counterweight in a protectionist economic policy. Norway has deliberately raised its toll barriers in order to shield the domestic markets with the agricultural sector as its prime target. However, the protection of Norwegian markets should not be over emphasised, as the high toll barriers has more often than not been a result of anti-EU control over the market. The discovery of oil in the late 1960s led Norway to become heavily integrated in the international market system. Being the fifth largest oil exporter and the third largest gas exporter demands an international oriented economy. The large sea resources, including fish, oil and gas, and following the Dutch disease phenomenon, led Norway to create a sovereign wealth fund which today stands as the world's largest, owning 1,25% of all the stocks in the world, and around 2,5% of all the stocks within Europe (NBIM 2012). This has solidified Norway's wealthy position in the world, but it has also created a sense of urgency and guilt, suggesting that parts of this wealth is to be used on helping those less fortunate than Norway. This sharp increase in material capabilities and how it can be understood in terms of status resources is discussed in the next section.

5.2 Hierarchical status resources

Norwegian foreign policy is the subject of some political tension. According to Olav Riste (2004) the historical trends in Norwegian foreign policy are constituted in neutrality, isolationism, moralism and internationalism. Rolf Tamnes (1997) claims that Norwegian foreign policy has been marked by an internal balancing between morals and *realpolitik*, while Knut Frydenlund (1982, p.201) claims that there is a "tension between the introverted and extroverted, between the provincial and the international. We have the missionary who wants to preach and the hunter who wants to reap." Given that many of these tensions have been visible throughout the history of Norwegian foreign policy, we cannot hypothetically infer any causal relationship between rapid transformation in hierarchical status resources and moral authority output on the one hand and realignment of foreign policy on the other. However, that is not to say that the foreign policy of Norway has not developed during the period. And a changed material base may very well have served as a precondition enabling that change.

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contribute to the war on terror and Brazil, Congo, Indonesia and Guyana has received development aid in order to stop the deforestation.

5.2.1 Military capabilities, sophistication and national power

Without venturing far beyond the scope of this study, power is the backbone of any realist analysis, and naturally it becomes a pivotal part of the hierarchical status resources. The lust for power, or the *animus dominandi* as Morgenthau (1947, p.167) phrased it, pervades classical realist analysis because it guides states in their quest for survival. Rooted in the behaviouralist revolution, Waltz suggested that power was the sum of the "size of population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength, political stability and competence" without really operationalising the concept for measurement. Neoclassical realists tend not to equate power (the sum of material capabilities) with status, but they still hold on to a dialectical materialism in which the distribution of material capabilities creates an exogenous system which pushes and pulls countries, which in turn determines the relative position of a country (Wohlforth 2009, p.35-38). This certainly echoes parts of the structural behaviouralist position for classifying middle powers (Handel 1990; Holbraad 1984). For instance, Martin Wight (1978a, p.65) claims that middle powers were countries that had sufficient military strength and resources "that in peacetime the great powers bid for its support, and in wartime, while it has no hope of winning a war against a great power, it can hope to inflict costs on a great power out of proportion to what the great power can hope to gain by attacking it." Huge portions of the IR scholarly work, although not the entire discipline, conceive of military capabilities as a pivotal prerequisite for power. And just as military capabilities serves as an important indicator for power, so is power an important hierarchical status resource.

Table 2. Changes in distribution of national capabilities

a. Military expenditures, total (in millions constant 2011 USD)

Year	Norway	Sweden	Denmark	Netherlands	Poland	Ireland	Canada	Mexico	Australia	Malaysia	South Africa
1960	1123	4251	1224	3483	7134	196	13190	621	3184	326	466
1970	2253	6456	2134	6350	15194	301	11139	1264	6874	715	2080
1980	4555	10372	4389	14385	26299	914	11977	2250	9842	3718	7804
1990	5906	8428	4747	13550	7415	1082	20582	2644	15330	1807	6876
2000	5676	8190	4532	11267	6349	1373	15651	4131	17994	2441	3394
2005	6365	7053	4422	11821	7731	1410	17811	4081	21414	4543	4580
2012	7189	6424	4679	10395	9912	1235	22382	7103	25555	4662	4785

b. Armed forces personnel, total (in thousands)

Year	Norway	Sweden	Denmark	Netherlands	Poland	Ireland	Canada	Mexico	Australia	Malaysia	South Africa
1960	37	29	32	151	200	13	121	50	47	20	22
1970	35	75	45	115	314	8	95	80	86	58	40
1980	40	70	33	107	408	19	82	120	71	83	70
1990	51	65	31	104	313	13	87	175	68	130	100
2000	27	53	22	57	239	12	69	208	52	116	68
2005	26	27	21	53	162	10	71	204	53	130	55
2012	26	21	17	43	121	9	66	332	56	134	78

c. Military R&D expenditures, total (in millions constant 2011 USD, PPP)

Year	Norway	Sweden	Denmark	Netherlands	Poland	Ireland	Canada	Mexico	Australia	Malaysia	South Africa
1985	72	511	3	93	.	0	376	.	205	.	.
1991	62	706	6	105	.	0	252	0	242	.	.
1996	65	554	7	129	.	0	233	0	260	.	.
2002	104	454	7	77	.	0	236	.	218	.	.
2008	110	391	12	100	72	0	274	.	291	.	.
2012	126	314	8	102	242	0	251	.	335	.	.

Sources: Armed forces personnel and military expenditures 1960-1988 (Singer et al. 1972). Armed forces personnel and military expenditures 1988-2013 (International Institute for Strategic Studies 1997-2014; SIPRI 2013; World Bank Data 2013). Military R&D expenditures (OECD 1989; OECD 1997; OECD 2000; OECD 2002; OECD 2005; OECD 2008; OECD 2012; OECD 2013) *Notes*: In a, Conversion to constant 2011 USD in the COW-dataset was done using the Consumer Price Index Inflation Calculator: http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl. PPP is purchasing parity exchange rates. In c. Ireland and Mexico did not have any expenditures on military R&D according to OECD. Malaysia and South Africa are not members of the OECD.

Norway's military expenditures have increased almost linearly the last 50 years (Table 2). The table also shows the so-called Cold War effect in which especially those directly affected by armaments lowered their military expenditures after the structure changed. Furthermore, all countries except Ireland drastically reduced their army sizes. This was partly due to the end of the Cold War, but also because the latest part of the 20th century to a certain extent changed the character of modern warfare with new actors, goals, methods and financing forms changing the ways in which capabilities play a role in deciding power (Kaldor 2013, p.2-3).[39]

Despite the linear increase, Norway is in the lower tier of the sample countries with regards to military expenditures, along with its Nordic counterparts and the new middle powers Mexico, Malaysia and South Africa. Poland and the Netherlands form the middle tier, whilst prime examples of middle powers, Canada and Australia, have the largest military expenses of the sample. Poland spends 1,8 % of its GDP on the military, highest of all the sample countries. Norway here spends 1,4 % of its GDP on the military, coming in at fourth place overall (World Bank Data 2014b). Viewed in relation to its population, however, Norway currently spends the most money on its military of the sample countries with 1328 USD spent per person (SIPRI 2013). While this does not tell us something about the absolute military strength of Norway, it tells us something about the willingness of Norway to play an active

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[39] For a realist take on how technology changes the nature of military capabilities see Ikenberry et.al (2011) and Wohlforth (1999).

military role in the world. Indeed, Norway's post-cold war approach to its military was to convert force contributions into political influence in NATO and in the EU (Græger 2002). As for the military R&D, the numbers are more volatile than military expenditures and armed personnel. But excluding South Africa and Malaysia, we can still separate the countries into different tiers. Norway can be put in the middle tier along with the Netherlands. Denmark, Ireland and Mexico fall below the middle tier with Ireland and Mexico spending, probably, a very little amount or nothing on military R&D. Sweden with its strong tradition on military equipment production has spent the most on military R&D from 1985 to now and can be put in the same tier as Canada and Australia.

The Nordic region also have the lowest number of military personnel, with the Netherlands, Canada and Australia occupying the middle tier and Poland, Mexico, Malaysia and South Africa having the largest available armies. The broad difference of the sample countries in both military expenditures and military personnel exemplifies the difference between new and traditional middle powers. All the countries that have one time or another been characterised as a new middle power tend to have a higher number of armed forces and either middle or low military expenditures. Norway, Mexico and Malaysia are interestingly the only countries to still have obligatory military conscription which might explain why Norway's armed forces are still relatively high compared to its Nordic neighbours.

Summing up, only Mexico, Australia, Malaysia and South Africa increased military expenditures faster than Norway from 1960 to 2012 which signifies the considerable increase in Norway's military capabilities.[40] Overall however, these single indicator variables suggest that Norway is in the lower tier where traditional military capabilities are concerned. That is not to say that Norway is not within plausible reach of what could be conceived of as military middle powers. In 2012 Norway had 32 % of Canada's military expenditures, and 39 % of its armed forces. And given that Canada must be considered the prime example (i.e. the peak of middle powers), the gap between Norway and a potential middle power status is that wide. Turning to various power formulas in the following paragraphs, this gap seem even smaller.

Table 2 provides a solid base to begin power analysis as military expenditures and armed personnel represents the principle component of military capabilities. However, it is also worth applying other measures of military power since the military expenditures and armed forces personnel tend to vary a lot. As stated in the methods chapter, the aim is to transform

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[40] Increase 1960-2012 Norway: 640%, Sweden 151 %,, Denmark 382 %, The Netherlands, 298 %, Ireland 630%, Canada 169%, Mexico 1143%, Australia 802 %, Malaysia 1430 %, and South Africa 1026 %.

multifaceted data into unidimensional values. As shown in section 4.3.1 in the methods chapter, this thesis applies two such formulas which all address two different faces of military capabilities: CINC intends to capture national power and the measure *M* intends to capture military sophistication. These measures, which are illustrated in the methods chapter from equation 1 through 7, are pictured in table 3 below as percentage of Canada.

Table 3. Aggregate measures of National Capabilities

a. Composite Index of National Capabilities *CINC* as percentage of Canada

Year	Norway	Sweden	Denmark	Netherlands	Poland	Ireland	Canada	Mexico	Australia	Malaysia	South Africa
1965	11	34	13	53	109	5	100	64	57	10	42
1975	14	36	12	55	124	4	100	82	60	14	53
1985	14	35	13	57	123	5	100	103	56	19	66
1995	17	37	15	61	80	5	100	108	66	32	62
2005	16	.	14	55	62	6	100	112	66	39	62
2007	15	28	14	53	65	6	100	115	67	41	59

b. Military sophistication *M* as percentage of Canada

Year	Norway	Sweden	Denmark	Netherlands	Poland	Ireland	Canada	Mexico	Australia	Malaysia	South Africa
1965	36	70	44	85	120	8	100	33	57	25	44
1975	52	93	49	114	181	14	100	61	91	57	66
1985	45	77	36	93	123	14	100	48	84	63	70
1995	48	79	47	92	65	18	100	53	85	52	63
2005	45	47	36	79	101	17	100	68	85	76	63
2012	46	39	32	68	101	15	100	74	92	69	67

Sources: a. Composite Index of National Capabilities (Singer et al. 1972). b. Armed forces personnel and military expenditures 1960-1988 (Singer et al. 1972). Armed forces personnel and military expenditures 1988-2013 (International Institute for Strategic Studies 1997-2014; SIPRI 2013; World Bank Data 2013). Military sophistication calculations procedure available at Phil Arena's (2012) blog. c. Armed forces personnel and military expenditures 1960-1988 (Singer et al. 1972). Armed forces personnel and military expenditures 1988-2013 (International Institute for Strategic Studies 1997-2014; SIPRI 2013; World Bank Data 2013) *Notes*: Measure in b. is presented with permission from Phil Arena. Arena's data set of the *M* score based upon the national military capabilities data set is available here http://filarena.weebly.com/data.html.Data in c. is based upon numbers in table 3c (see table to for description) and the *M* score in b. Data used in b converted to USD 2011 constant.

The fact that the CINC score does not pick up on any Cold War-effect tells us something about the main features of the measure. CINC is much better off in determining the national base for current and potential power than say single variables such as military expenditures and armed personnel. The CINC measure is not subject to any modest fluctuations in national power. This may be considered good if we want to holistically pin down the national power, because national power, in contrast to military capabilities, does not tend to be volatile. Most of the sample countries have fairly stable CINC-scores, with notable exceptions such as Mexico, Poland and Malaysia. In the lower tier we find Ireland along with the Nordic countries which are well behind the CINC-scores of the middle tier such as the Netherlands, Poland, Australia, Malaysia and South Africa. The top tier consists of Canada and Mexico, where the latter have a higher national baseline for power, largely due to its very large population. The CINC score actually correlates exceptionally well with population measures, with Mexico at the top and the Nordic countries along with Ireland at the very bottom. According to the CINC-index one might suggest that Norway has reached a peak, given that it is not likely that the economic dimension (energy consumption and steel production) or the demographic dimension (urban and total population) will change drastically relative to other countries. Thus the CINC score, which is a comprehensive measure seeking to illuminate

countries' realised, intermediate and future potential, solidifies Norway's position as a small power. It is obvious that Norway's ability to increase its CINC score is severely limited . The CINC measure picks up on aspects that might have in the past disqualified Norway from status as a middle power. Whilst steel production and military expenditures largely are within the grasp of small powers to excel at, military personnel, total energy consumption, urban population and total changes incrementally. Primarily this is so because they all to a certain extent reflect the total population of a country. Total population is the one factor that often excludes Norway from getting rid of the small power label amongst middle power theorists (as well as Norwegians themselves) (Handel 1990; Vital 1967). To a certain extent, the CINC score highlights an extremely valuable point in overall military capabilities: the ability of a country to withstand an attack solely relying on its own capabilities (Rothstein 1968). It is very likely that countries like Mexico and Canada would be able to fend off an attack from a great power, or at least withstand that attack for long time. Countries like Denmark, Norway, Ireland, and to a certain extent Sweden, would –without any external help—be unlikely to be able to fend off any sort of great power encounter.

However, the CINC measure dilutes some of the stuff we are interested in, namely military capabilities. As stated in the methodology section, increasing a country's population would not automatically increase a country's actual military power. The *M*-measure paints a far more accurate picture of current military capabilities which is far better for tracing fluctuations in military investment, but also in explaining long term trends given the 5 year moving average. In the lower tier we find the small power Ireland with a considerable gap up to the Scandinavian countries, Malaysia, South Africa and Mexico which arguably make up the middle tier. On top we find the military power Poland along with the prime examples of traditional middle powers Australia and Canada. Norway and Australia are the only countries which have been considered as solely traditional middle powers that have increase their military sophistication relative to Canada in the period. In fact, in the period from 1965-2012 Norway actually went from being the weakest amongst the Nordic countries in 1965 to becoming the strongest in the region. Despite not having half of the military sophistication to that of Canada, *M* indicates that Norway has a higher military sophistication than what the single variables military expenditures and armed forces suggest. Those who benefit from the M measure compared to the CINC score are those countries with high quality ratio: those countries with high military expenditures relative to their number of soldiers. All countries except Mexico, with Norway at the helm, benefit from the quality ratio relative to Canada.

Although remaining cautious of drawing tautological conclusion, *M* seems to capture something essential amongst our sample of potential middle powers since it is that military measure that best concentrates the scores of the countries that are thought to be similar.

M also exemplifies two qualitative traits of Norway's military capabilities. First, as stated in the introduction of the analysis, Norway was slow to restructure its defence after the Cold War. This was very much needed, especially for those states either members of affiliated with NATO (Lunde Saxi 2010). The countries which have been labelled traditional middle powers such as Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands and Canada along with most of the western world all underwent a radical transformation of its armed forces (King 2011). This is certainly picked up by the *M*-measure which depicts military capabilities dropping into the 90s for all the sample countries. Secondly, it also picks up on Norway's actual increase in military capabilities. After the Cold War, Norway decided to play a more active role in European security and in NATO (Græger 2002; Græger 2015; Lunde Saxi 2010).

Summing up, the two aggregate measures of military capabilities suggest at least two discrepancies. First, the CINC-score suggests that Norway's future potential national power is rather limited, its rather low population being the central cause for this. Second, and almost in direct contrast to the CINC-score, the *M* measure suggests that Norway is within reach of the mix of established of middle power military capabilities. Being close to countries such as Sweden, the Netherlands and South Africa whilst still being considerably stronger than Ireland, suggests that Norway's military capabilities are indeed stronger than many small powers. However, neither of the measures suggests that Norway has definitely reached let alone surpassed the threshold for middle power military capabilities. While the gap between Norway and established middle power Canada has certainly closed during the last 40 years, Norway still has less than 50 % of the military capabilities of Canada if we take *M* into consideration. As stated in the theory chapter, Norway's hierarchical status resources might be translated into status in two ways. Either a country sees that Norway's resources have increased, or that Norway's resources are actively used for active status seeking which in turn are likely to be recognised. Thus, while Norway's increase in material capabilities might not have lead to a direct recognition from the peer countries, the relative increase also suggests that Norway might seek to use its military gain more status (Græger 2015). This dynamic heavily relates to the moral authority output and especially to the humane internationalist policies which will be elaborated upon in section 5.3.2.

5.2.2 Wealth

Another hierarchical status resource that is usually prominent when scholars of all stripes (including status scholars) attempt to categorize states, is the economic size of a country that matters (Holbraad 1984). For instance, the literature on the various emerging powers' 'potential to overtake the US as the global hegemon, have increasingly focused, on the size of a country's economy (Layne 2006). This potential overtake is not just an analytical expression of power, but represents a shift in standing and status. A rising economy sparks immediate interest among other countries, and in the long run is likely to lead to a higher status. Furthermore, as suggested with military power, the more wealth a state has in its possession, the more likely it will seek to improve its status by different status seeking means. However, wealth and status are not inseparable concepts, meaning that an economic strata does not necessarily match with a status group. As seen earlier though, they can often correlate significantly. As Weber put it:

> "Of course, material monopolies provide the most effective
> motives for the exclusiveness of a status group; although, in
> themselves, they are rarely sufficient, almost always they come
> into play to some extent.'" (Weber et al. 1958, p.191)

Weber held that status groups were distinguishable from economic classes which were purely determined by their wealth. He still held that status was sometimes inseparable from economic classes because one gains access to privileged status positions by belonging to a higher economic class. This is transferable to the international system where states often compete amongst themselves over areas that sometimes seem highly unimportant. Take for instance the Olympic Games, where countries, most notably great powers, compete amongst themselves to gain some form of status or prestige. The Games are a perfect example "of a self-referenced status-seeking behaviour in which states attempt to leverage Olympic success to garner greater *deserved* status." (Rhamey & Early 2013, p.249) [original emphasis]. A precondition for seeking this type of status is wealth. As the international system, rich countries can tilt their odds in their favour of winning by spending incredible amounts on developing equipment, training facilities and so on. Rich countries in world politics also have the privilege of doing stuff only for prestige gains. Now, as shown in the middle power literature, these countries excel mostly in the indicators of moral authority output, as shown in section 5.3. Middle powers need hierarchical status resources such as wealth to compete for the roles and prestige that middle powers are thought to excel at. Many countries may have

the requisite moral authority resources in place—the identity and willingness of a country to pursue a new status—but without a reasonable amount of wealth, their willingness would probably fall short.

Thus, wealth is a necessary starting point for any analysis on status and middle powers that seeks to discern the different levels of hierarchical and moral authority. As described in the methods chapter, GDP and GNI tend to capture the absolute size of an economy well. The GNI and GDP of the sample countries are illustrated in table 4, expressed in constant USDas well as the countries' respective world rank on both measures.

Table 4. Wealth

a. Gross domestic Product (in milliards constant 2012 USD)

Year	Norway	Sweden	Denmark	Netherlands	Poland	Ireland	Canada	Mexico	Australia	Malaysia	South Africa
1970	75,4	213,9	98,2	209,3	.	25,6	510,9	210,4	244,7	25,3	106,0
1980	177,8	376,1	194,5	504,3	148,4	59,6	750,2	542,3	418,4	69,6	224,7
1990	207,0	437,2	239,1	519,0	113,6	85,2	1025,6	462,4	548,1	77,5	197,1
2000	223,8	328,9	212,9	512,1	227,8	129,5	964,1	920,6	552,2	124,7	176,7
2010	442,3	486,0	328,8	816,0	493,2	219,9	1655,9	1099,7	1198,9	259,9	381,4
2012	500,0	523,9	315,2	770,1	489,8	210,6	1779,6	1178,1	1532,4	305,0	384,3

b. Gross Domestic Product, world rank

Year	Norway	Sweden	Denmark	Netherlands	Poland	Ireland	Canada	Mexico	Australia	Malaysia	South Africa	N
1970	24	13	21	15	.	48	9	8	11	49	19	130
1980	29	16	24	13	31	48	7	10	15	42	21	147
1990	25	17	24	14	35	39	7	16	13	43	29	185
2000	26	20	28	15	25	40	8	9	14	42	29	198
2010	25	23	32	16	22	44	10	14	13	36	30	189
2012	23	22	34	18	24	47	11	14	12	35	29	185

c. Gross National Income, (in milliards constant 2012 USD)

Year	Norway	Sweden	Denmark	Netherlands	Poland	Ireland	Canada	Mexico	Australia	Malaysia	South Africa
1970	74,3	214,6	98,6	213,4	157,9	26,9	511,1	288,7	265,1	21,6	102,1
1980	172,3	374,3	193,4	508,6	155,5	59,4	742,1	702,7	483,0	71,5	215,4
1990	201,1	430,5	232,9	515,1	109,5	78,3	1004,2	559,6	548,2	80,6	189,6
2000	220,8	326,1	208,4	523,2	227,0	111,9	957,0	888,0	530	119,5	172,5
2010	447,2	497,1	336,5	803,5	474,4	182,6	1661,9	1091	1300	251,3	373,8
2012	509,7	535,5	324,3	777,3	469,3	173	1788,8	1166,4	1522,5	293,1	375,8

d. Gross National Income, world rank

Year	Norway	Sweden	Denmark	Netherlands	Poland	Ireland	Canada	Mexico	Australia	Malaysia	South Africa	N
1970	31	14	23	15	18	53	9	11	12	57	22	187
1980	31	17	28	14	33	53	9	10	15	48	24	187
1990	28	19	25	16	37	47	8	14	15	45	29	216
2000	26	20	27	15	25	43	8	9	14	42	29	210
2010	24	22	31	16	23	47	10	14	13	37	29	212
2012	23	22	33	18	25	53	11	14	12	35	29	211

Sources: Gross Domestic Product and world rank (United Nations 2014) Gross National Income and world rank (United Nations 2013)
Notes: Conversion to constant 2012 USD in the datasets was done using the Consumer Price Index Inflation Calculator: http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl.World Rank in b. and d. were based upon these results. N in d. includes various semi-autonomous entities which consequently makes the total N number a bit high. None of these entities has a serious impact on the rank measure in d. Data for Poland in 1980 in a. and b. is from 1985

Note that in the latter part of the period, both the GDP and GNI rank are practically identical for the sample countries. A GNI result below the GDP result indicates that a country has a negative result from net foreign inflows and outflows. At the very bottom we find Ireland which constitutes a category of its own. Above it, but still in the lower tier we find Malaysia, Denmark and South Africa. The middle tier consists of Poland, Norway, Sweden and the Netherlands, while Canada, Mexico and Australia constitutes the top tier. Norway is the only country that has experienced constant increase in GDP and GNI, measured in USD constant, with all the other countries experiences decrease in either GDP, GNI or both in the given

years. From the 1970s, Norway has also passed considerable powers such as Poland, South Africa and Denmark by 2012 and currently is competing with its neighbour Sweden to become the largest economy in the Nordic region. Consequently, Norway is three spots away from the loose boundaries of the G20 in which sample countries Canada, Mexico, Australia and South Africa are members. Some scholars that have excluded Norway from the middle power category would by today's standard have to consider Norway being a middle power (Carr 2014, p.72; Holbraad 1984, p.85-86; Vellut 1967). Certain Norwegian and international scholars have also picked up this trend, starting to emphasise not only the wealth per capita, but the absolute measure of economic wealth (Carvalho & Neumann 2015a; Leira & Sending 2013; Wohlforth 2015). While the narrative since the onset of the discovery of oil has been dominated by Norway as a small country populated by rich people, this narrative has now slightly tilted towards seeing Norway as a both a country which is rich per capita and in absolute economic size.

This development underpins the very base for the thesis, namely that Norway's extraordinary rise in wealth, only beaten in percentage by Malaysia[41], could create a space for seeking a higher status. This wealth was made possible (but not inevitable) by the discovery of oil, but also through a mixed economy and high productivity which also underpins a very healthy economy. The sample countries' account balance (surplus), GDP per worked hour and unemployment rate is illustrated in table 5.

Table 5. Health of economy

a. Account balance (in in constant milliards USD 2013)

Year	Norway	Sweden	Denmark	Netherlands	Poland	Ireland	Canada	Mexico	Australia	Malaysia	South Africa
1980	3,1	-12,2	-3,1	-5,1	-24,9	-6,5	-17,3	-29,4	-11,0	-0,8	9,3
1987	-9,0	0,6	-7,4	8,0	-13,7	0,0	-27,5	8,6	-14,8	5,3	10,5
1994	5,8	3,8	3,6	27,9	8,6	2,8	-21,8	-46,6	-24,8	-8,8	0,0
2001	36,3	15,0	6,6	13,7	-7,8	-0,9	20,7	-23,4	-10,3	9,6	0,4
2008	78,2	47,4	10,7	40,5	-37,8	-16,2	1,9	-21,8	-55,4	42,6	-21,2
2013	54,4	32,9	21,8	83,2	-9,3	14,4	-58,9	-22,3	-44,2	11,8	-20,4

b. GDP per hour USD (in 2012 PPP)

Year	Norway	Sweden	Denmark	Netherlands	Poland	Ireland	Canada	Mexico	Australia	Malaysia	South Africa
1970	27	26	23	28		12	28	15	27	4	.
1980	41	33	31	41		18	33	17	32	7	.
1990	52	36	41	48	11	27	38	14	38	9	.
2000	69	45	50	55	17	43	45	15	45	12	.
2010	74	53	55	61	23	53	49	16	52	15	.
2013	75	55	56	60	26	56	50	17	53	16	.

c. Unemployment rate

Year	Norway	Sweden	Denmark	Netherlands	Poland	Ireland	Canada	Mexico	Australia	Malaysia	South Africa
1980	1,7	2,0	5,3	3,4	n/a	7,3	7,5	1,2	6,1	n/a	9,2
1987	2,1	2,2	5,0	6,3	n/a	18,8	8,8	3,9	8,1	8,2	16,6
1994	5,4	9,4	7,7	6,2	11,4	15,1	10,4	3,7	9,7	2,9	22,9
2001	3,5	5,8	4,5	2,5	18,3	3,9	7,3	2,8	6,8	3,7	26,3
2008	2,6	6,2	3,5	3,1	7,1	6,4	6,2	4,0	4,2	3,3	22,5
2013	3,5	8,0	7,0	6,9	10,3	13,0	7,1	4,9	5,7	3,1	24,7

Sources. Unemployment rate and account balance (International Monetary Fund 2014) GDP per hour (The Conferanse Board 2014)
Notes: Data for Poland in 1990 in b. is from 1992.

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[41] Percentage rise in GNI 1970/2012: Norway 686 %, Sweden 249%, Denmark 329%, The Netherlands 364 %, Poland 297 %, Ireland 643 %, Canada 350 %, Mexico 404 %, Australia 574 %, Malaysia 1356 % and South Africa 368 %.

A healthy economy does not define the size of economy, and the subsequent ranking of economies, but it may nuance these rankings modestly. For instance, the account balance of a country tells us something about the export structure in the sample countries. Nations with consistent account surpluses tend to be net exporters. Norway and the Netherlands, and to a certain degree Denmark, have all, albeit in various degrees, reaped the benefits of petroleum and oil. Sweden's trade surpluses derive from a multifaceted export system including, but not limited to, machinery, vehicles and pharmaceuticals. That is not to say that countries such as Poland, Canada, Australia and South Africa are in bad shape; it can mean that a country is investing abroad as long as the account deficit does not last for too long.[42] Accompanied with the two other measures, however, we get a better image of the countries' economies. GDP per hour worked is a measure of productivity of a country which indicates to a certain extent the technological development and efficiency a country is at. We see a distinct divide in the sample countries between the new and traditional middle powers. The latter, spearheaded by Norway, tend to generate higher wealth per worked hour than the new middle powers. Norway also has the lowest level on unemployment besides Malaysia, owing a lot to the benefits from petroleum and gas exports, but also smart governing (Harbo 2008; Holden 2013). The average unemployment rate for Norway is below any of the sample countries' average in the given time period. Thus, by 2012 in relation to the sample countries, Norway has the second largest account surplus, the highest productivity per capita, and the second lowest unemployment rate. This underpins the initial classification of Norway being in the middle tier of economic ranking amongst the sample countries.

In summary, Norway's independent increase in wealth is unquestionable. The relative increase is also significant, and if wealth were the sole indicator of middle power status, one could certainly argue that Norway is reaching the threshold of becoming a middle power. However, Norway is still considerably smaller compared to countries such as Canada, Australia and Mexico. Norway is actually closer to these countries in military capabilities than in absolute wealth, which underpins the argument that Norway's increase in wealth in the period is extraordinary, but the relative position in comparison with the sample countries is middle at best.

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[42] See for instance Atish Ghosh and Uma Ramakrishnan's (IMF) great introductory review on this matter:
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2006/12/basics.htm

5.3 Moral authority output

While the hierarchical status resources depicts a position in an informal hierarchy based on what may be considered objective criteria, the moral authority output does not depict any definite position in a social hierarchy. Rather, the moral authority output is influenced, and to some extent determined by, the hierarchical status resources in which countries carve out their particular area of expertise within the range of what is possible. It is for instance very rare to claim great power status without having hierarchical status resources approximating that of a great power. Although middle power status is a much more open status category, it is still impossible for very small powers, such as Ireland (as we have seen), to be considered as a middle power even though the country has a very similar moral authority output as the established middle power (as we shall see).

However, to disregard countries' moral authority output as a pure consequence of hierarchical status resources is to disregard a key characteristic defining countries' status. It is still possible to see which countries excel on typical middle power moral behaviour, which is not predetermined by its hierarchical status resources. For some small and most traditional middle powers status is indeed a zero-sum good. According to Carvalho and Neumann (2015a), the peer groups of "like-minded countries", being first and foremost, Canada, the Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Finland and Switzerland, compete emphatically for moral authority. Five of these like-minded states are included in this thesis partially for this reason. When a country excels in one or more of its moral authority outputs, that country would not only be envied and recognized amongst the like-minded countries. I would also hypothesise that being the 'best of the best' or the most 'moral of the moral', will likely be recognised by the international system at large.

With this in mind, this section proceeds as follows. The section on moral authority output starts by examining the level of diplomatic and organisational outreach of the sample countries in which middle powers are thought to excel. The analysis then moves on to examine to what extent these countries are promoters of humane internationalism in questions of development aid contributions to the UN and contributions to UN peacekeeping missions.

5.3.1 Diplomatic and organisational outreach

All countries wish to have diplomatic representation abroad. Countries must, however, choose their diplomatic contact because they have limited resources to spend on their diplomatic

missions (Kinne 2014; Neumayer 2008). Thus, the number of diplomats or embassies sent or established tells us something about the degree to which a state wants to dedicate resources to their diplomatic presence in the world. This is consistent with the middle power and diplomatic literature which state that these powers use their diplomatic tools to do good in the world (Barston 2006; Cooper et al. 1993; Neumann 2011; Sharp 1999; Ungerer 2007a). Of course, a large part of diplomatic practice involves pursuing the national interest of a country, and as such could be seen to have few altruistic goals (Morgenthau 1948, p.419-421). Nevertheless, paying particular interest to countries such as Norway, Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands, Ireland, Australia and South Africa, which undertake behaviour consistent with the so-called middle power diplomacy, it is safe to say that a large diplomatic presence in the world for these states would indicate high moral authority output. Thus, the number of diplomatic missions established illustrates to what extent countries chose to act as a moral middle power. Table 6 shows the number of embassies that the sample countries' have established in other countries from 1970 to 2010.

Table 6. Diplomatic outreach

a.   Number of embassies in other countries (DIPCON)

Year	Norway	Sweden	Denmark	Netherlands	Poland	Ireland	Canada	Mexico	Australia	Malaysia	South Africa	N
1970	41	63	49	72	49	14	59	41	45	18	16	
1975	46	69	54	75	60	20	68	48	51	26	20	
1980	47	70	56	75	75	24	72	58	64	32	23	
1985	50	74	55	75	60	27	74	59	67	37	23	
1990	53	72	54	79	66	26	76	57	66	42	21	
1995	57	76	61	82	68	32	81	58	64	46	37	
2000	64	77	70	88	66	31	90	59	63	51	61	
2005	78	84	71	98	82	39	96	65	68	62	73	
2010	80	78	76	105	81	55	92	66	74	71	95	

Sources. Embassies in other countries {Rhamey, 2013 #687}
Notes: Published with permission from Thomas J. Volgy. Microstates with populations fewer than 200 000 are not included in the data set. According to the codebook of the data set, a value is added if the country in question has an embassy in another country (and vice versa) if: (1) the diplomatic structure is listed as an embassy; (2) Its physical residence is in the capital of the host country; (3) there is either an ambassador, or a high commissioner listed with a name and address and residing at the embassy. . The table differs significantly from Bayer (2006) as the data from Rhamey et al. (2013) only counts official embassies listed. After 1980, the sources of the dataset do not report multiple accreditations (only resident accreditation) Thus, the data before 1980 is much more inclusive which leads to the drop in number of representatives for many countries post-1980.

Table 6 shows, in light of structural behaviouralism and behavioural normativism, that Norway fulfils the requirement of a middle power in terms of diplomatic activity. Norway is at par or ahead of most countries in the sample from the '70s and onwards. Norway here occupies the middle tier along with the other Nordic countries, Poland, Mexico, Australia and South Africa. Ireland and Malaysia could be said to occupy the lower tier while Canada and the Netherlands are in the top tier. Norway and Canada are the countries amongst the traditional middle powers that have increased their number of embassies in the world the most. The table above does not, however, discern where the sample countries sent their diplomatic representations. Having a diplomat in a country with high number of embassies within its territory means more than having an embassy where no embassies are. This is because "highly or 'prestigious' partners […] act as information hubs and put senders into

direct contact with diplomatic, political, and economic actors from multiple third parties" (Kinne 2014, p.247). Thus, in table 7 the network centrality measure HITS is applied to the world exchanges of embassies dataset (equation 15 and 16 in chapter 4). Countries with high hub scores are countries that have many embassies as well as having those embassies in countries of importance (countries with high authority scores).

Table 7. Diplomatic network centrality measures

a.   Diplomatic influence seeking (HUB score)

Year	Norway	Sweden	Denmark	Netherlands	Poland	Ireland	Canada	Mexico	Australia	Malaysia	South Africa	
1970	0,01277	0,01702	0,01492	0,01841	0,01368	0,00494	0,01579	0,01190	0,01157	0,00564	0,00571	
1975	0,01116	0,01534	0,01291	0,01601	0,01378	0,00576	0,01439	0,01076	0,01086	0,00626	0,00494	
1980	0,01025	0,01381	0,01184	0,01418	0,01408	0,00583	0,01348	0,01111	0,01158	0,00700	0,00487	
1985	0,01050	0,01369	0,01096	0,01371	0,01119	0,00620	0,01316	0,01104	0,01135	0,00719	0,00450	
1990	0,01029	0,01287	0,01017	0,01328	0,01177	0,00572	0,01304	0,00985	0,01086	0,00783	0,00407	
1995	0,60275	0,74694	0,64660	0,79826	0,66485	0,39582	0,77169	0,58586	0,59721	0,12450	0,36357	
2000	0,01012	0,01162	0,01066	0,01288	0,01008	0,00609	0,01269	0,00902	0,00867	0,00829	0,00955	
2005	0,01046	0,01118	0,00958	0,01241	0,01069	0,00652	0,01193	0,00896	0,00875	0,00858	0,00974	
2010	0,00959	0,00903	0,00912	0,01152	0,00985	0,00713	0,01038	0,00801	0,00813	0,00851	0,01014	

b.   Hub rank in the world (HITS)

Year	Norway	Sweden	Denmark	Netherlands	Poland	Ireland	Canada	Mexico	Australia	Malaysia	South Africa	N
1970	27	11	17	6	23	77	14	28	30	72	71	133
1975	31	11	24	10	20	67	16	36	34	63	81	139
1980	38	17	28	13	14	70	19	32	29	65	81	155
1985	38	15	35	14	31	66	18	32	29	59	82	161
1990	40	19	41	16	26	71	18	42	35	55	94	163
1995	34	18	28	13	25	59	16	39	35	134	64	184
2000	30	19	23	11	31	62	12	41	44	51	36	187
2005	24	19	34	11	20	63	14	40	42	44	32	187
2010	28	35	31	11	23	56	18	47	45	40	20	190

Sources: DIPDCON data set (Rhamey et al. 2013). The dataset has the *Europa Yearbook* as its primary source along with various web pages of states. The table builds the calculations upon Jonathan Renshon's (2013) working paper. *Notes*: Published with permission from Thomas J. Volgy. Microstates with populations fewer than 200 000 are not included in the data set. According to the codebook of the data set, a value is added if the country in question has an embassy in another country (and vice versa) if: (1) the diplomatic structure is listed as an embassy; (2) Its physical residence is in the capital of the host country; (3) there is either an ambassador, or a high commissioner listed with a name and address and residing at the embassy. Rhamey's et.al .(2013) is thus much more strict when counting number of diplomatic contacts than the COW-database. The utmost important benefit from using the Google Page Rank measure on the DIPCON data set is the consistency in the period which aligns fairly well with the 'stickiness' of diplomatic representation. Volgy, Cramer, Hauser & Bezerra (2013), however, do not use any form of network centrality measure in their analysis and claim that the stripped version , being the numbers of listed embassies a country, has great face validity when operationalising status attribution.

Table 7 confirms the initial finding, Norway's diplomatic outreach has grown substantially since the Cold War. While, from 1970 to 1990, Norway's diplomatic outreach decreased, from the 1990s and onwards, Norway's diplomatic outreach intensified and by 2010 it had almost the same diplomatic outreach rank as it had in the 1970s. All countries except Ireland, Malaysia and South Africa saw their diplomatic outreach decrease significantly more than Norway in this period. In the lower tier, we find Ireland, Mexico, Australia and Malaysia. In the middle tier, we see the Nordic states, Poland and South Africa, while the top tier is occupied by the Netherlands and Canada. By 2010, Norway has a more extensive, in terms of the quality (where the embassy is located) and quantity (how many embassies) diplomatic corps than sample countries such as Sweden, Mexico and Australia. Norway has only lost one place on the hub rank in the period, which is unique for the traditional middle power countries. This shows that not only does Norway attempt to spread its diplomatic entities around the world, it also makes sure that these entities are put in important countries.

As suggested in the methods chapter, participation in international organisations complements the diplomatic outreach measure above because it tells us whether states actually pursue multilateral solutions in their foreign policy. Small and middle powers, especially the rich ones, see that having an international system built on laws and norms for the conduct of foreign policy instead of anarchic tendencies is beneficial for those not capable of defending themselves individually. This is probably not an altruistic impulse, but rather that, in the long run, these states might find them in situations where a call for enforcement of international law might help them (Kaeckenbeeck 1945; Neumann & Gstöhl 2006). Whatever the motive, nevertheless, pursuing multilateral solutions is a basic trait for middle powers and a signal of foreign policy 'outreach' (Cooper 1997a; Pratt 1990a). The more present one country is in international organisations, the more active system maintaining role it can be said to have. Therefore, table 8 presents the number of formal memberships the sample countries have in international organisations.

Table 8. Organisational outreach

a. Number of formal memberships in intergovernmental organisations, total

Year	Norway	Sweden	Denmark	Netherlands	Poland	Ireland	Canada	Mexico	Australia	Malaysia	South Africa	Total
1960	56	54	61	76	35	34	43	47	43	25	32	154
1977	61	62	66	77	41	40	58	56	50	31	28	252
1986	68	70	76	84	43	49	75	61	70	47	38	369
1994	90	88	90	78	48	51	63	57	60	51	31	263
2008	81	85	81	78	69	55	63	61	54	54	54	240
2012	82	89	84	84	76	57	63	63	57	60	58	265

b. Number of formal memberships in intergovernmental organisations as percentage of Canada

Year	Norway	Sweden	Denmark	Netherlands	Poland	Ireland	Canada	Mexico	Australia	Malaysia	South Africa
1960	130,2	125,6	141,9	176,7	81,4	79,1	100,0	109,3	100,0	58,1	74,4
1977	105,2	106,9	113,8	132,8	70,7	69,0	100,0	96,6	86,2	53,4	48,3
1986	90,7	93,3	101,3	112,0	57,3	65,3	100,0	81,3	93,3	62,7	50,7
1994	142,9	139,7	142,9	123,8	76,2	81,0	100,0	90,5	95,2	81,0	49,2
2008	128,6	134,9	128,6	123,8	109,5	87,3	100,0	96,8	85,7	85,7	85,7
2012	130,2	141,3	133,3	133,3	120,6	90,5	100,0	100,0	90,5	95,2	92,1

Sources: 1960-1994 (UIA 1994); 2008 (UIA 2009); 2012 (UIA 2013).
Notes: Data presented with permission from UIA. Data in b based on data in a. The different types of international organizations are coded as such: (A) federations of international organizations; (B) Universal membership organizations; (C) Intercontinental membership organizations; (D) Limited or regionally defined membership organizations. The Yearbook has several more types of international organisations, but only A-D represents "conventional IGOs. The total in a. is also based upon types A-D. In order to be considered a conventional IGO, the basic criteria is that there needs to be at three or more countries represented in the organisation.

An important caveat is in order when interpreting table. Europe has long been, and to a certain degree still is, the organisational capital of the world. However, although the membership concentration is skewed towards the European countries in the sample, discarding the results all together would omit an important aspect of middle powers' characteristics. The rules of status are to a certain extent set by the West. In some sense, capturing this bias is captures something essential about distribution of roles in the world. Additionally, at first glance it might seem that participation in international organisation might not be a zero-sum game. For those "like-minded countries", however, I hypothesise that being a member of the most international organisations does matter. This does not mean that Norway's state practitioners continuously worry whether they are members of fewer organisations than Sweden. But it

means that if Norway sees that Sweden, Canada or Denmark is part of an organisation that Norway is yet to feature in, they will attempt in some way to enter that organisation.

Leaving the justification aside, table 8 shows some interesting patterns. First to note is that the Cold War effect led some organisations to cease to exist. This saw a drop in the number of memberships for the Netherlands, Canada, Mexico Australia and South Africa. Second, we find Ireland, Malaysia and South Africa located in the lower tier in terms of membership compared with the other sample countries. This is perhaps predictable since Ireland is a small power and both Malaysia and South Africa are in regions that have yet to develop a strong organisational capacity. In the middle tier we find the definite middle powers, but non-European countries, such Canada and Australia, along with the new middle power Poland. The top tier consists of the Nordic states along with the Netherlands. The latter is interestingly in the world's top tier concerning the countries with most memberships in IGOs. This reflects some of the common characteristics of these countries. For instance, the Nordic countries, along with selected countries in Western Europe and the Benelux countries, have a strong institutional base, which has led scholars to claim that some of these countries may be labelled "norm entrepreneurs" (Ingebritsen 2002). These norm entrepreneurs follow a typical middle power behaviour, when they are able to diffuse norms to the bigger powers through the usage of international organisations and sometimes curbing the major powers' national interests (*ibid*.).

5.3.2 Humane Internationalism

As with the previous section, the countries that pursue humane internationalism are often those like-minded countries competing for who could be the best do-gooder. They keep close tabs on each other "trying to spend more on development and humanitarian aid than the others" (Carvalho & Lie 2015, p.60). It is fairly obvious that those rich small and middle powers have an altruistic motive, maybe sparked by internal moral resources, that deem them willing to provide international assistance.[43] But this cannot only be reduced as a pure act of solidarity. As shown in the methods chapter, the policy of performing humane internationalism represents a strong moral output because it is expected that this will result in

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[43] Thune & Lunde (2013) would here argue that official development aid given by the state is a narrow way of measuring altruism. They among other things find that Norway is quite average in personal donations. I still keep this measure because I find it to be the only reliable measure for development aid. Moreover, the state is ultimately the arm of the people, meaning that the state has in some ways to be reflected by the society.

recognition both from the close peer states and from the greater powers. As Belgrad (1997, p.6) put it: "The ability to render humanitarian aid is a mark of prestige. Those who have surplus resources to give to those in want thereby establish for themselves a high status in the community of nations." Development aid is here measured in ODA by countries in the DAC. Mexico, South Africa and Malaysia are thus not featured in table 9. The remaining sample countries are all members of the DAC and their contributions are listed in the table from 1965 to 2013 expressed in total millions and as percentage of Canada.

Table 9. Official development assistance (ODA) by countries in the Development Assistance Committee (DAC)

a.   ODA, total (in millions constant 2012 USD)

Year	Norway	Sweden	Denmark	Netherlands	Poland	Ireland	Canada	Australia
1965	166	288	148	762	.	.	782	1395
1975	1012	1794	842	2316	123	36	3557	2608
1985	2361	2280	1527	3609	49	118	4296	2764
1995	2886	2301	2287	4270	.	224	4075	2759
2005	4237	4217	2571	5789	246	729	5291	2903
2010	4975	4930	2871	6322	370	880	5643	4459
2013	5534	5568	2795	5181	457	793	5007	5158

b.   ODA, as percentage of Canada

Year	Norway	Sweden	Denmark	Netherlands	Poland	Ireland	Canada	Australia
1965	21,2	36,8	18,9	97,4	.	.	100,0	178,4
1975	28,4	50,4	23,7	65,1	3,4	1,0	100,0	73,3
1985	55,0	53,1	35,5	84,0	1,1	2,7	100,0	64,3
1995	70,8	56,5	56,1	104,8	.	5,5	100,0	67,7
2005	80,1	79,7	48,6	109,4	4,7	13,8	100,0	54,9
2010	88,2	87,4	50,9	112,0	6,6	15,6	100,0	79,0
2013	110,5	111,2	55,8	103,5	9,1	15,8	100,0	103,0

Sources. ODA (OECD 2014)
Notes: Conversion to constant 2012 dollars in a done by using the CPI inflation calculator: (http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl?cost1=1.00&year1=1980&year2=2011). The DAC defines ODA as the flows to countries which is officially provided by state governments. Private donations are thus excluded from the database.

It is more difficult to create tiers for ODA contributions than in the other measures. However in the lower tier we find Poland and Ireland as well as Denmark, behind what could be considered the middle tier consisting of Norway, Sweden and Australia. Although not far ahead of Norway and Sweden in 2013, Canada and the Netherlands make up the top tier mostly because of their large contributions in previous years. This underscores the behavioural normativist claim that the Nordic countries, especially Norway and Sweden, along with the Netherlands and Canada are middle power internationalist that have been significantly more responsive to poorer countries than other rich nations (Pratt 1990a). That is not to say that these like-minded countries give most in development aid. Indeed in all the countries listed above, the US, UK, Japan France and Germany has given the most overall to development assistance. These countries do, however, give more than other countries that have relatively higher GDP than themselves. Nevertheless, Norway being the forerunner in development aid is also apparent in a narrower measure, namely contributions to the UN Development Programme (UNDP) which is illustrated in table 10.

Table 10. United Nations contributions

Contributions to the United Nations Development Programme (in constant milliards 2013 USD)											
Year	Norway	Sweden	Denmark	Netherlands	Poland	Ireland	Canada	Mexico	Australia	Malaysia	South Africa
1976	87	207	160	214	4	2	118	4	15	0,4	.
1985	102	101	91	104	1	2	112	2	30	0,9	.
1993	137	158	165	209	0,3	2	60	.	20	.	.
1997	107	86	121	107	0,4	4	39	1	.	0,5	.
2005	130	118	74	133	.	22	56	2	6	.	.
2013	133	85	57	74	.	11	94	.	23	.	.

Sources: 1976 and 1985 (United Nations Development Programme 1985), 1993 (United Nations General Assembly 1994), 1997 (United Nations General Assembly 1998), 2005 (United Nations Development Programme 2006), 2013 (United Nations Development Programme 2014).
Notes: Data for Denmark in c in 1994 is from 1993. Data for Australia in c for 2013 is from 2012. Converted into constant 2013 USD using CPI inflator calculator (http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl). Blank cells indicates that data for that year was not available or that country did not contribute to the UNDP. South Africa, Malaysia and Mexico are receivers of UNDP funds.

Norway along with Sweden, the Netherlands and Denmark are the top contributors here with Canada a bit behind them again and Australia as well as Ireland ahead of the new middle powers which all have one time or another received funds from the programme. In Norway, this trend of providing a lot of money to less developed nation has strong root in the dominating representation of the foreign policy discourse. Throughout the period shown here, foreign policy analysts, foreign ministers, commentators and the public have in general shown strong commitment to 'making an effort' in the humanitarian field and that this in some ways can be translated into some form of reputation or prestige (Egeland 1988; Frydenlund 1988; Godal 2003; Vollebæk 2003).

Strongly connected with Aid contributions is effort in peacekeeping missions. Neack (1995b) puts forward the argument that traditional middle powers were exceptionally active in peacekeeping contributions during the Cold War. Nowadays, this is not the case. Bangladesh, India, Pakistan and Ethiopia make up the top four of countries contributing most peacekeepers showing that the troop burden has been shifted from the wealthy Western countries to the developing countries (Krishnasamy 2001). Where table 8 *might* indicate competition among the like-minded countries, however, participation in various peacekeeping forces definitely does. In other words, for the like-minded countries it matters less whether *some* countries are ahead of them, as long as it's not one of the 'like-minded' ones. As Carvalho and Neumann put it: "Norway may compete with Fiji and Nepal over troop contributions to UN peace operations, but the competition that matters is with the its recognised peers [sic] (Carvalho & Neumann 2015a, p.13). Additionally, playing the role as a stable ally and showing willingness to contribute in peace missions is viewed as elevating status. As Græger argues in her chapter on military capabilities and status: "status is about being perceived as a trustworthy ally, one that can be counted on when the going gets tough in strategic matters or operational theatres of importance." (Græger 2015, p.13). Table 11 thus puts forward the number of UN peacekeeping contributions of the sample countries from 1990 to 2014.

Table 11. UN peacekeeping contributions

a.   UN military troop contributions

Year	Norway	Sweden	Denmark	Netherlands	Poland	Ireland	Canada	Mexico	Australia	Malaysia	South Africa
1990	924	720	374	15	165	814	1002	.	15	15	.
1994	1600	1220	1278	1811	2097	690	2688	NA	312	2679	.
1998	108	106	45	101	984	640	350	.	NA	NA	.
2002	3	1	4	NA	596	226	198	.	842	14	153
2006	143	73	85	163	660	489	15	.	9	128	1057
2010	6	3	152	3	n/a	9	21	.	9	828	2005
2014	15	6	15	126	n/a	325	21	.	11	853	2105
Mean 1990-2014	400	304	279	370	900	456	614	.	200	753	1330

b.   UN police contributions

Year	Norway	Sweden	Denmark	Netherlands	Poland	Ireland	Canada	Mexico	Australia	Malaysia	South Africa
1990	NA	18	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	.	26	NA	.
1994	35	47	42	13	29	35	65	4	35	81	.
1998	27	68	39	54	48	49	54	.	20	66	.
2002	35	58	29	NA	125	20	45	.	70	98	NA
2006	34	66	26	19	128	18	85	.	63	210	NA
2010	29	33	NA	19	3	18	142	.	75	281	154
2014	37	35	NA	18	3	12	88	.	15	26	61
Mean 1990-2014	33	46	34	25	56	25	80	4	43	127	108

c.   UN observer contributions

Year	Norway	Sweden	Denmark	Netherlands	Poland	Ireland	Canada	Mexico	Australia	Malaysia	South Africa
1990	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	.	NA	NA	.
1994	57	67	46	65	43	44	58	.	13	88	.
1998	18	34	33	12	21	27	18	.	12	23	.
2002	20	36	34	13	20	31	20	.	28	62	7
2006	35	25	52	23	23	24	32	.	23	59	33
2010	30	21	23	24	12	20	35	.	25	54	28
2014	17	21	16	16	9	17	13	.	21	27	20
Mean 1990-2014	30	34	34	26	21	27	29	#DIV/0!	20	52	22

d.   Total personnel contributions (a. b. and c. combined)

Year	Norway	Sweden	Denmark	Netherlands	Poland	Ireland	Canada	Mexico	Australia	Malaysia	South Africa
1990	924	738	374	15	165	814	1002	.	41	15	.
1994	1692	1334	1366	1889	2169	769	2811	4	360	2848	.
1998	153	208	117	167	1053	716	422	.	32	89	.
2002	58	95	67	13	741	277	263	.	940	174	160
2006	212	164	163	205	811	531	132	.	95	397	1090
2010	65	57	175	46	15	47	198	.	109	1163	2187
2014	69	62	31	160	12	354	122	.	47	906	2186
Mean 1990-2014	453	380	328	356	709	501	707	4	232	799	1406

Sources: Un military troop contributions, UN police contributions, UN observer contributions (International Peace Institute 2014).
Notes: The IPI peacekeeping database is based upon UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations internal records. Mean is only taken from the selected years.

Consistent numbers of peacekeeping contributions in the Cold War could unfortunately not be retrieved. This shortcoming nevertheless, we should be able to extract something on the post-Cold War peacekeeping effort by the sample countries. Troop contributions to various international operations in table A is arguably the most important measure of the entire table because it entails the total country effort that these sample countries might use as a morality marker. Here is Australia and Mexico in the lower tier with Mexico having severe constitutional restrictions on military operations abroad (Motta-Allen 2008). The middle tier consists of the Nordic countries along with the Netherlands and Ireland while Malaysia and especially South Africa occupy the top tier. There are minor variations amongst the countries and their respective efforts in table b and c which shows similar patterns of troop contributions. Mexico and Australia again occupy the lower tier and the Nordic countries along with Denmark, the Netherlands, Ireland and Canada is in the middle tier. The top tier consists of Malaysia, Poland and again South Africa. Among the like-minded countries, Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands and Canada, Norway comes quite well off. It is placed right behind Canada on the mean of total personnel contribution from 1990 to 2014. It is

above its Nordic competitors and ahead of notable countries such as the Netherlands and Australia. However, in comparison to the new middle powers such as Malaysia, South Africa and Poland it is in the low spectrum of the scale. These numbers have, however, to be balanced with an accompanying story. Norway has indeed built a powerful moral authority output in the area of peacekeeping, although it is not reflected in the official numbers. Carvalho and Lie (2015) suggests for instance that Norway has worked with a series of projects outside the UN framework, making it possible for Norway to build its own brand whilst still being seen as a reliable UN contributor.

While humane internationalism cannot be operationalised the same way as diplomatic outreach - mostly because such a data set with the necessary information is yet to be created - it is fair to claim that moral authority output may be inferred from efforts in both peacekeeping operations and especially development assistance. A solid contribution to these humane internationalist goals creates a strong moral authority output. Middle powers are, through the 'good international citizen' prism, expected to be an active advocate for peace and stability (Cooper et al. 1993, p.19). This altruistic claim can also be complemented with a structural behaviouralist claim that for middle powers "it is unrealistic to imagine completely revising the world system to better serve their interest" (Neack 1995b, p.184). This section confirms this claim. This should also mean that Norway's moral authority output of peacekeeping and humanitarian aid contributions ideally should translate into a heightened moral authority in the last decades. The question is if this moral authority output and the other measures considered here indicators have actually materialised into a social recognition from the other countries in the world and if this recognition could stack up to the established middle powers and the other sample countries. This will be shown in the next section.

5.4 Status recognition

The reason for separating hierarchical status resources and moral authority output is first and foremost for analytical purposes. Although they are distinct, they are both inextricably linked. However, as indicated earlier, neither hierarchical status resources nor moral authority output can depict the intersubjective element of status. Status is perceptual, positional and social (Renshon 2013, p.6). This thesis has come close to the positional aspect where countries compete and evaluate themselves based on either their hierarchical status resources or their moral authority output. However, status is also perceptual and social, being that it is based on beliefs and these beliefs require some sort of consensus (or majority) in order to solidify a

country's certain status. Thus, in order to understand whether the increase in Norway's hierarchical status resources and the strength of its moral authority output has had any effect on its small power status, it is of unequivocal importance to see the recognition Norway has received during the last 40 years.

The diplomatic recognition measure as explained in chapter 4 (section 4.3.3) captures both the perceptual, social and partially the positional elements of status. It is perceptual in that because it is ultimately other states who decide whether to establish diplomatic contact with another state or to withdraw their contact. As explained more in detail in section 5.5.1, it takes a lot for a country to both establish and withdraw an embassy, which corresponds with status in that it tends to 'stick' (Volgy et al. 2011a). It is also social in that whether one country decides to establish or withdraw its embassy from a country, this does not change overall recognition of that particular country. Thus, the diplomatic exchange best captures the most up to date social perceptions of the world's countries of how much recognition a particular country 'deserves'. Given the social and perceptual aspects of status, any systematic approach that seeks to compare two or more countries needs to rely on proxy-measures. Diplomatic exchange seems, at least for now, to be the most holistic and accurate measure of social and perceptual recognition of countries. The simple version of this measure counts how many embassies have established themselves in the sample countries using the DIPCON-database (table 12)

Table 12. Diplomatic recognition

a.   **Number of embassies in host countries (DIPCON)**

Year	Norway	Sweden	Denmark	Netherlands	Poland	Ireland	Canada	Mexico	Australia	Malaysia	South Africa
1970	32	56	43	53	39	18	60	51	40	12	15
1975	35	61	42	56	47	21	73	50	52	27	17
1980	37	71	50	57	54	22	89	61	54	40	17
1985	37	71	48	66	51	24	94	61	59	37	19
1990	43	71	45	67	55	27	89	62	59	41	18
1995	39	81	53	67	59	31	97	63	65	41	53
2000	47	85	58	79	63	35	105	57	66	51	84
2005	50	90	66	83	81	40	125	72	83	81	98
2010	56	98	70	100	84	53	130	71	93	85	110

Sources. Diplomatic representative received (Bayer 2006). Number of embassies in host countries (Rhamey et al. 2013)
Notes: Diplomatic representatives is here defined as chargé d'affaires, minister or ambassador or any other form of representation. The table differs significantly from table b as the data from Rhamey et al. (2013) only counts official embassies listed. After 1980, the sources of the dataset do not report multiple accreditations (only resident accreditation) Thus, the data before 1980 is much more inclusive which leads to the drop in number of representatives for many countries post-1980.

According to table 12, Norway's diplomatic recognition has deteriorated viewed in light of the other sample countries. The table illustrates the rather stable diplomatic relations between countries. In the 1970s, Norway was among the countries with the least diplomatic recognition recognised countries in the sample, with only Malaysia, Ireland, and South Africa beneath it. However, this ranking changed during the 90s, which saw both Malaysia and

South Africa surpass Norway, and by 2010 Norway is barely ahead of Ireland in terms of embassies located within the borders, and well behind its Nordic neighbours. This trend is counter-intuitive, given that the other measures, military capability and wealth, suggest that Norway is more important now than it was in the 60s and 70s. Taking these two tables together and focusing on the 70s and onwards, Norway along with Ireland could be said to belong in the lowest tier. Denmark, Poland, Mexico, Malaysia and South Africa make up the middle tier, while Sweden, the Netherlands, Canada and Australia make up the top tier.

The presentation of diplomatic rank in table 12 is the normal way of depicting diplomatic recognition of countries. However, what the formula fails to incorporate is the diplomatic recognition of the sending state. As shown in the methods chapter, we should control for the world's recognition of the sender state. Using Google PR's algorithm each countries' PR-score is illustrated in table 13 both in their original PR score and their world rank based on that score.

Table 13. Diplomatic network centrality measures

a.   Diplomatic Rank score (Google Page Rank)

Year	Norway	Sweden	Denmark	Netherlands	Poland	Ireland	Canada	Mexico	Australia	Malaysia	South Africa
1970	0,00794	0,01359	0,01084	0,01291	0,00903	0,00519	0,01620	0,01212	0,00999	0,00386	0,00438
1975	0,00663	0,01205	0,00809	0,01081	0,00881	0,00471	0,01536	0,00992	0,00969	0,00578	0,00405
1980	0,00607	0,01246	0,00809	0,00985	0,00899	0,00424	0,01564	0,01013	0,00949	0,00679	0,00373
1985	0,00561	0,01182	0,00726	0,01021	0,00758	0,00429	0,01732	0,00957	0,01007	0,00631	0,00382
1990	0,00612	0,01110	0,00659	0,01024	0,00783	0,00436	0,01450	0,00910	0,00951	0,00634	0,00345
1995	0,00559	0,01248	0,00782	0,00953	0,00826	0,00448	0,01513	0,00906	0,01003	0,00612	0,00869
2000	0,00621	0,01169	0,00790	0,01044	0,00815	0,00489	0,01524	0,00797	0,00949	0,00766	0,01215
2005	0,00602	0,01101	0,00805	0,00988	0,00935	0,00495	0,01700	0,00867	0,01090	0,01102	0,01227
2010	0,00615	0,01051	0,00764	0,01064	0,00878	0,00617	0,01504	0,00784	0,01112	0,00949	0,01290

b.   Diplomatic rank in the world (Google Page Rank)

Year	Norway	Sweden	Denmark	Netherlands	Poland	Ireland	Canada	Mexico	Australia	Malaysia	South Africa	N
1970	51	16	30	19	39	76	11	24	32	88	83	133
1975	62	18	49	27	39	84	11	30	33	69	97	139
1980	69	17	48	29	39	90	10	26	33	60	98	155
1985	74	17	54	22	50	89	8	31	24	63	98	161
1990	66	19	58	23	45	93	11	34	30	62	106	163
1995	69	13	43	25	36	85	8	28	21	61	33	187
2000	60	16	39	20	34	79	9	38	24	42	14	187
2005	63	17	37	22	27	73	7	31	18	16	13	187
2010	62	21	41	20	30	61	9	38	18	25	14	190

Sources: DIPDCON data set (Rhamey et al. 2013). The dataset has the *Europa Yearbook* as its primary source along with various web pages of states. The table builds the calculations upon Jonathan Renshon's (2013) working paper. *Notes*: Published with permission from Thomas J. Volgy. Microstates with populations fewer than 200 000 are not included in the data set. In contrast to table 6. According to the codebook of the data set, a value is added if the country in question has an embassy in another country (and vice versa) if: (1) the diplomatic structure is listed as an embassy; (2) Its physical residence is in the capital of the host country; (3) there is either an ambassador, or a high commissioner listed with a name and address and residing at the embassy. Rhamey's et.al .(2013) is thus much more strict when counting number of diplomatic contacts than the COW-database. The utmost important benefit from using the Google Page Rank measure on the DIPCON data set is the consistency in the period which aligns fairly well with the 'stickiness' of diplomatic representation. Volgy, Cramer, Hauser & Bezerra (2013), however, do not use any form of network centrality measure in their analysis and claim that the stripped version , being the numbers of listed embassies a country, has great face validity when operationalising status attribution.

PR does a good job in separating the countries with very high diplomatic standing from those with a very low diplomatic standing. However, one should view sharp increase in the world rank with caution as small changes the diplomatic world may make a country jump disproportionately on the world rank (Renshon 2013). Having said that, the results confirm, and perhaps even amplify, the results in table 12: Norway's diplomatic recognition is low. According to the PR measure, Norway is actually the lowest ranking country of the sample in

2010. This puts Norway, along with Ireland within the very lowest tier. Denmark, Mexico, Poland and Malaysia occupy the middle tier, while Sweden, the Netherlands, Canada, and Australia and following the end of apartheid, South Africa, occupy the top tier. Thus, it may very well be that Norway's diplomatic standing in comparison to the other potential middle powers is lower and that Norway's rise in hierarchical status resources and with persistently high moral authority output have yet to materialise in heightened diplomatic recognition.

This measure a puzzle for Norwegian foreign policy. How is it that Norway's increase in hierarchical status resources and constantly high moral authority output has left such a small impression in world politics? To fully comprehend this seemingly surprising result an analysis of all the status data acquired so far needs to be compared. In the next section I illuminate how big this recognition discrepancy really is by applying a method for comparing it directly to the hierarchical status resources and moral authority output.

5.5 Recognition discrepancy

Norway has increased its material capabilities during the last 40 or so years. Section 5.1 suggested this increase was sufficient to make Norway a plausible candidate for middle powerdom on material indicators compared to the sample countries. Parallel to the increase on hierarchical status resources, Norway also invested heavily in its middle power roles and behaviour while also attempting to build a reputation for humanitarianism and peacekeeping. More so than in Norway's status resources, the analysis suggested Norway's moral status outputs position it squarely in the middle power peer group. However, the one measure in this analysis designed to capture the social recognition of Norway's peers suggests that Norway is yet to receive an international embrace of social recognition as a middle power from the world. One easy way of discrediting the argument is to say that the diplomatic recognition measure does not capture status as well as the hierarchical status resources and moral authority output. The problem is that it does. Although diplomatic recognition cannot be equated with status, we should take this measure seriously as out of all the other available measures, it captures the perceptual and social aspect of status the best. Indeed, its reliability is boosted by the fact that for the other middle powers it seems to mirror relatively closely the hierarchical status resources, which is what we would expect. For instance, South Africa seems to boost the measure's credibility. South Africa's recognition during apartheid was way below that which its economic and military capabilities resources would indicate. This shifted abruptly after the end of the regime. This seems to vindicate that this measure can capture the

flexibility of status recognition well. Thus, Norway's anomalous discrepancy cannot merely be written off as a methodological fallacy. While a methodological err could account for a small discrepancy, as the following analysis will suggest, the discrepancy between what Norway is and what Norway is recognised as, is so large it seems both puzzling and in need of explanation. In other words, the hierarchical status resources and the moral authority output Norway has accumulated and created during the last years have yet to materialise into increased diplomatic recognition.

Visualizing Norway's respective rank on the different measures illustrates the discrepancy sharply (Renshon 2013). First, all the countries are ranked on the basis of their PR score in each year. Next, the countries are ranked on the basis of their *M*-score, their GNI and their Hub-score. Subsequently, the countries' rank on the PR measure is subtracted from their respective rank on military capabilities, wealth and diplomatic outreach. This results in a rank discrepancy measure – the difference between countries' 'real' rank on military capabilities, wealth and diplomatic outreach and their diplomatic recognition rank. This discrepancy is then standardised using the standard deviation between the ranks and subsequently plotted in a simple diagram for each of the discrepancy models in the 1970-2010 time frame. A number closer to zero suggest that there is high correlation between a country's actual rank on a particular measure and the social recognition rank it has received. For instance, for most of the years, the USA has had the greatest diplomatic recognition in the world and also the largest economy and military strength which puts them at a perfect zero. The Soviet Union, in contrast, had very high military strength but comparatively low diplomatic rank which, in an ideal world, would make them dissatisfied with their social recognition in the world. A positive number suggests that countries are, or at least should be, satisfied with their place, given that their social recognition is higher than what their military capabilities, wealth or diplomatic outreach should suggest. We start by comparing Norway's degree of military recognition discrepancy in figure 2.

Figure 2. Military recognition discrepancy

Norway has yet to reach contentment equilibrium during the entire period despite increased military capabilities compared to Canada while other sample countries such as Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands and Poland have lost ground to Canada. Despite the substantial increase in military capabilities, Norway's diplomatic recognition rank has not increased in a similar fashion. Indeed the discrepancy, while peaking at some points (1990), has remained fairly stable during the period, which should leave Norway rather dissatisfied with its position. Sweden, in contrast to Norway, had a sharp decrease in military capabilities during the period. Sweden also lost some diplomatic recognition during the period, but not nearly as much as it reduced its military capabilities, which may have led Sweden to be highly content with its situation. Indeed, out of all the sample countries only Mexico has more reason to be dissatisfied with the lack of social recognition than Norway. Given that military capabilities was the area in which Norway's increase was most modest, the GNI rank illustrates an even larger deficit for Norway in figure 3.

Figure 3. Economic recognition discrepancy

Figure 3 confirms the traditional conception of middle powers that they are wealthier than what their recognition should imply. However, Figure 3 also confirms the initial hypothetical suspicion that Norway's reason for being discontent with its social recognition in comparison to its economic rank can be warranted. While many of the sample countries have reason to be slightly dissatisfied with the lack of social recognition in portions of the time frame, Norway's potential dissatisfaction is substantial. Norway's lack of social recognition is in fact more compatible to autocratic South Africa before their democratic revolution than any of the other potential middle powers. In contrast to South Africa, however, Norway did not receive any more social recognition despite its increase in wealth. Indeed, the social recognition that Norway has received is far lower than the two hierarchical status resources, suggesting a that Norway should be dissatisfied. How then does the social recognition stack against Norway's moral authority output, here operationalised as diplomatic outreach? This is illustrated in figure 4 below.

Figure 4. Moral authority output discrepancy

Figure 4 shows about the same discrepancy as the two foregoing; Norway's diplomatic recognition is not in proportion to its level of diplomatic outreach. Indeed, while countries such as Sweden and Australia received the same recognition as their diplomatic outreach should suggest in the '80s and '90s, Norway never came close to be considered content with the situation. The result of figure is even more baffling considering that Norway establishing an embassy in another country should ensure a close bilateral relationship. In Norway's case, however, this is definitely not the case.

However, strange as it may seem, Norway's actual recognition is in fact highly consistent with the discourse of Norway's position in the world for large parts of the 40 year period. The phrase 'a small country in the world' was repeated consistently in Norway from the 1960s and well on to the mid 2000s in all layers of society. It was Norway's small country identity that enabled Norway to help produce legitimacy for the UN when it was claimed that "it is in a small state's interest to strengthen expand the UN authority and give it broader mandates to act as world police in order to protect the interest of small states." (Treholt 1972,p. 424).[44] Even though the top politicians in Norway saw some key characteristics and opportunities in

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[44] A similar and somewhat overlapping view was proposed by former Defence and Foreign Minister Johan Jørgen Holst (1974b, p.560) by claiming that the international law has a 'objectivising' function in that "it is based on the notion of state equality" as it "provides opportunity for solutions to disputes regardless of differences in the party's strength."

Norwegian foreign policy, these were always constrained by size. As Frydenlund (1982, p.206) sums it up, Norway is:

> "A country that is one of the richest in the world when it comes to income per capita, but also one of the smaller in terms of population; a country that is allied with one of the world's superpowers, the United States, and has a common border with the other superpower, the Soviet Union; a country where half of what is produced is exported to foreign countries, while half of what is consumed is imported from abroad and where 80% of this trade takes place in the countries of the Western industrialized part of the world; a country that is a 'superpower' in some areas such as shipping and fisheries, but that must import all its grain; a country that has greater influence then what its resources and size would suggest, but where this influence is less than what we think."

Although there was a growing tendency for Norwegians in the '80s and early '90s to consider themselves more important than their size would suggest, the smallness, or small power status, was cemented in the foreign policy discourse. Even Jan Egeland's seminal work on Norway's exceptionalism did not shy away from Norway's small power status. While there was talk of doing something relatively more than other states would expect, it was with little doubt that Norway was inferior vis-à-vis the bigger powers. This was often suggested to be complementary, in that the smallness gave Norway an advantage. Former Foreign Minister Knut Vollebæk (2003, p.17) exemplifies this when he on the one hand stated that, "Norway is a small country without great power interest and without a colonial past," and a couple of sentences below suggested that, "One should also not ignore that the fact that Norway hosts the Nobel Peace Prize [and this] has given us a reputation as a promoter of peace." Throughout the 90s and the beginning of the 2000s, even Norway's economic wealth did not lead to a shift in the discourse of Norway's small power status. Former Foreign Minister Bjørn Tore Godal (2003, p.183) said for instance in his memoirs: "it is always an advantage for a small country to be in the situation that one can back up its policy by having significant economic resources to initiate and bear the costs of foreign policy initiatives." The recognition discrepancy measure can thus be said to capture something sedimented about Norway's self-image as a small power and the image that the world has of Norway.

The 'foreign policy initiatives' Godal talks about, which often overlap the moral authority output in this analysis, did not lead to more recognition from the world. On the contrary, and counter-intuitively Norway's recognition seems rather to be dwindling than increasing. Furthermore, being that Norway's hierarchical status resources rose significantly during the

period, one would assume that Norway would get direct recognition for this. The next sections hypothesises reasons for Norway's recognition discrepancy.

5.5.1 Sources of Norway's recognition discrepancy

Norway has lost ground with regards to diplomatic recognition in the period despite increase in wealth and military capabilities and continuous high level of moral authority output. I here hypothesise three complimentary explanations for this discrepancy. First, the continued delivery of high moral authority output may have increased Norway's prestige and reputation among its close peers, but moral authority is not sufficient to elevate one's global status. In other words, Norwegian foreign policy has not stood out compared to its like-minded compatriots. Second, there is a tendency for countries to have embassies and consulates in a region rather than in every country. Diplomatic recognition is heavily dependent on regional patterns and since countries already have established embassies in either Denmark or Sweden, having an embassy in Norway is sometimes redundant. Third, status is 'sticky'. The recognition discrepancy suggests that status tends to lag after the actual hierarchical status resources and the moral authority output, meaning that diplomatic recognition is not a signal of low standing, but rather a consequence of a low historical standing.

First, Norway competes with its like-minded compatriots in who can be the best of the good powers (Carvalho & Neumann 2015a). In these measures, Norway leads the pack. However, the difference between the like-minded countries' effort is more often minimal. This suggests that while Norway may gain some initial recognition from its close peers, the world will have severe difficulties separating them and claiming that one particular country is the best of the good powers. Furthermore, the results of Norway's moral authority output, as suggested earlier, are not a given to translate into increased status. In other words, having a large diplomatic and organisational outreach whilst promoting humane internationalism seems not to have translated into international status recognition for Norway. Various reputation surveys and measures supports these hypotheses to varying degrees, indicating that the relationship between moral authority output and increased recognition might be more complex than any simple measure can capture. On mission from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Synovate, a survey company, performed a qualitative mapping of Norway's reputation in 19

countries where Norway was thought to have a national interest in.[45] It suggested that some of the moral authority output seems to have increased Norway's reputation in some countries, but did not have the systemic impact it had hoped to achieve. Areas where Norway received positive reputational scores included energy resources and technology, high standard of living, environmentalism, fish farming, the maritime sector, aid contributions and the role as a human rights advocate. On the other hand, the reputation weaknesses included a small population, isolationism, passive embassies, and lack of international leadership. Thus, two of the moral authority outputs do not seem to translate into a good reputation, because both of them contain qualitative weaknesses according to the respondents. First, the Norwegian embassies, which according to the diplomatic outreach measure are plenty and strategically well placed, are described as "anonymous and passive in the promotion of Norway, Norwegians and Norwegian industry – particularly when compared to their Scandinavian counterparts." (Synovate 2013, p.31) Secondly, whilst Norway's diplomatic outreach is visible, the respondents find "Norwegian peace diplomats a bit naïve and the results of these efforts [promote peace and solve conflicts] insignificant" (*ibid*., p.30). What is also interesting is the contradictory reputational effect that the combination small and rich produces. Whereas Norway gains reputational points for a high standard of living, the fact that Norway has a small population is seen as a reputational weakness. It is puzzling given that the small population has made it easier for Norway to be one of the richest countries in the world per capita which is subsequently seen as a reputational strength. This also, however, reflects how lacking some key—yet unflexible— hierarchical status resources, such as population, makes it difficult for Norway to reach middle power status. In addition to the qualitative research, Norway was also analysed through Nation Brand Index which quantitatively surveys the citizens of 46 countries' perception of other countries. The Index lists Norway in 13th place for overall reputation. If we list these countries' GNI in 2013, Norway is number 22 of the total 46. Norway thus has a positive rank of +9 compared to its GNI. While this is certainly the effect of a high moral authority output, similar countries, such as Canada are in 5th place, while Australia is in 9th and Sweden in 10th. Similarly, the Good Power Index, initiated by the same institute of the Nation Brand, suggests that Norway is 8th overall behind states such as Ireland, the Netherlands and Sweden, but ahead of the other sample countries. Indeed, what this research shows is that Norway's moral authority has to a certain extent been converted

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[45] These countries were Brazil, Canada, China, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Holland, Iceland, India, Italy, Japan, Poland, Russia, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, the UK and USA.

into reputation, but that it falls in between or even behind its like-minded competitors. The lack of diversification from Norway seem too little to elevate one's status.

Second, the Google PR-measure does not capture regional status since the aim is to depict global status. However, countries have a strong tendency to establish embassies and consulates in regions rather than in individual countries. This does not, however, reduce the validity of the operationalisation of recognition, since attributed status also is dependent on regions. South Africa scores lower than many smaller countries on the hierarchical status resources and especially in the moral authority output. However, the literature and other states consistently depict South Africa either as a middle power, emerging power or as a regional power (Cooper & Flemes 2013; Nolte 2010; Westhuizen 1998). The explanation is almost certainly that South Africa is significantly stronger than the other countries in its region and also has a relatively high moral authority output compared to other African states. This is reflected in the diplomatic recognition measure where South Africa gained tremendous recognition after the fall of Apartheid, even more so than its hierarchical status resources and moral authority output should suggest. Scandinavia follows the same pattern as South Africa. According to the DIPCON dataset for 2010 for instance, there were 58 cases where one or more embassies were not located in Denmark, Sweden and Norway. Only 6 countries preferred to have an embassy in Norway and either none or just consular representation in Sweden or Denmark. A total of 39 countries preferred to have an embassy in Sweden and/or Denmark rather than in Norway. Recognition is not only based on the hierarchical status resources and the moral authority output, but also relates to how countries view the status dynamics of a region. Sweden has historically been the most dominant states in terms of power, wealth, cultural export and global leadership, which naturally makes it a candidate for regional leadership, at least in Scandinavia.

The regional dimension of recognition brings us to the third and final source of discrepancy, namely status lag. As mentioned, Sweden's dominant role in Scandinavia stems not from its current moral authority output or their current hierarchical status resources but from its former high recognition and dominant position. The 'stickiness' of status is evident in many empirical examples. Take post-Cold War Russia for instance, which materially had lost all its competitiveness to compete with the great powers along with the loss of territory and the moral defeat of communism. Despite this, Russia more or less retained its great power status. Not only did Russia manage to keep its recognition due to its seat in the Security Council, but also because Russia's great power status was still recognised by state leaders. The same

dynamics also appear when countries acquire both hierarchical status resources and moral authority output but in a reversed fashion. Beliefs of state leaders are only updated sporadically, and while Norway's status resources and output may have changed significantly during the last 40 years, it has happened so quiet and incrementally that other state leaders have yet to recognise the increase. Shleifer (2000, p.113) for instance, suggests that these beliefs suffer from cognitive conservatism in that they only change when actors are constantly reminded from different sources that this information needs to be updated. Likewise, there is also considerable evidence that leaders will not change their beliefs until a major event takes place (Renshon 2013). But even here, as was the case with Russia, it is not certain that any given state will consider the event to either decrease or increase a country's status.

Whether the discrepancy is a result of low diversification, regional patterns or status-lag is hard to prove. More than likely, all of these phenomena have contributed to solidifying the discrepancy shown above. A plausible explanation is that the status lag has occurred due to Sweden (and partially Denmark's) dominant position in Scandinavia, where Norway has yet to distance itself from neither its Nordic neighbours nor its like-minded compatriots. However, as we shall see in the next section, this discrepancy was picked up on the mid-2000s in Norway, where an active policy for bettering Norway's recognition and reputation was initiated and spearheaded by former Foreign Minister Jonas Gahr Støre.

5.5.2 The Norwegian response to its recognition discrepancy

The status dissatisfaction literature tends to claim that when great powers are faced with severe status deprivation they challenge the current status quo of the international system by waging war (Dafoe et al. 2014; Renshon 2013). Norway does not have the military capabilities to challenge the status quo nor any genuine interest in changing the status quo after the Cold War. Rather, from the mid 2000s, the Norwegian foreign ministry seemed to have noticed the discrepancy and sought to do something about it. Not through waging war, but by mapping its current reputation and status, strategically identifying where Norway could increase its reputation and officially proclaiming explicitly and implicitly its middle power status. This section is dedicated to show how Norway systematically made efforts to mitigate its recognition discrepancy.

From the 2000s and onwards, a range of foreign policy initiatives were put in motion to increase Norway's reputation. It all started in 2004 when the Ministry of Foreign affairs established a 'reputation committee' to develop a strategy for increasing Norway's reputation.

The committee founded Norway's recognition and reputation-seeking for the next ten years and justified the reputation seeking by pointing out the instrumental gains by increasing Norway's reputation the following way:

> " By strengthening our national reputation, Norway will emerge as a more active participant and contributor internationally. A positive and strong reputation will also promote the internationalisation of the Norwegian society. A positive reputation has implications for Norway's industrial sector - for the export industry and for tourism. It is possible to increase the demand for Norwegian goods and services by providing customers with better awareness and greater knowledge of Norway. A clear and attractive image of Norway is a prerequisite for both retaining and attracting innovation, investment and tourists alike, and it will be an important impetus for Norwegian art and culture's attraction in international artistic and cultural scientific contexts." (Omdømmeutvalget 2004, p.5)

This justification was linked to the troubling recognition that many see Norway as a "country without profile without any particular strong or weak sides that few thinks about or has any connection to" (*ibid*., p.6). In other words, the Norwegian foreign policy elite and experts had growing concerns during the early 2000s that Norway's standing, status and reputation was virtually non-existent, and that a significant increase in these areas would have several instrumental benefits. The work of the reputation committee culminated in the so- called 'reputation forum' where different members from all layers of Norway's public and private sector met. Through four meetings, the forum reinforced what the reputation committee had said a couple of years before, namely that Norway needed a better international reputation to reach its foreign policy goals. The forum established that Norway should focus on the great powers, the rising powers and the like-minded countries.[46] The Ministry also issued a guideline for the Embassies and consulates for strategic improvement of Norway's reputation. This reputational effort suggests that Norwegian politicians were not pleased with the recognition Norway had achieved through its moral authority output. The two committees and the successive initiatives were and still are attempts to mitigate that discrepancy.

However, this policy not only focused on getting recognition from countries on Norway's moral authority output through more reputation, but was also a bid for countries to recognise Norway's hierarchical status resources, most notably its wealth. During his time as Foreign Minister, Støre deliberately and consistently refrained from labelling Norway as a small power. This was a huge break from the dominating narrative in Norwegian foreign policy discourse of the last 40 years (see section 5.5.2). Støre sometimes even made his bid for elevated status explicit: "Norway is, with its resources and political reach, a middle power in

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[46] These countries were Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Germany, The Netherlands, France, Spain, Poland, the UK, Italy, Turkey, Russia, the US, Canada, Brazil, Japan, China and India.

the world" (Støre 2010b, p.17).[47] This was accompanied by an explicit focus on the G20, often referred to as the middle power club (Cooper 2013). Støre on the one hand set out to delegitimize the institution by claiming that "the G-20 is a grouping without international legitimacy - it has no mandate and it unclear which functions it actually has"(Der Spiegel 2010). On the other hand, Støre directly criticised the arbitrary membership criteria along with a bid for Norwegian (and Nordic membership): "a range of non-members, including the Nordic countries, are among the heavy contributors in development aid and to the Bretton Woods-institutions, and they have greater 'systemic impact' and greater GDP than many G20-countries." (Støre 2010a) He reiterated this perspective in a correspondence to the Swedish foreign minister Alexander Stubb: "

> "The Nordic countries as a whole is among the world's ten largest economies [...]The Nordic countries have solid experience in solving their own banking crises, and the supervisory and regulatory architecture has stood well throughout the crisis. Moreover, the four Nordic countries have, both during the crisis and earlier, contributed with substantial financial resources at the disposal of the international financial institutions [...] There are many good arguments for the why the Nordic region, represented by one of the Nordic countries on a rotating basis, should be a relevant participant in the G20." (Støre 2009)

This tactic is well known in the status literature and well known to both SIT and neoclassical realism. Tajfel and Turner (Tajfel & Turner 1979) claim that if groups do not find their identity is favourable, they will seek certain strategies to amend this discrepancy. Larson & Shevchenko (2010, p.66-67) specifically transfer these strategies to status-seeking in international relations, saying that states may either use: social mobility to imitate states with higher status; Social competition to surpass or equal a state with higher status on areas where the higher status rests on; or social creativity to reframe a negative feature of self into a positive feature of another domain. Similarly, Randall Schweller & Xiaoyu Pu (2014, p.53) proclaim that China has "worked within the current international system to expand its economy and increase its visibility and status as a global player" and thus uses social creativity to avoid actions that directly challenge US hegemony. On the other hand, Jeffrey Taliaferro (2004, p.203) suggests that states sometimes chose social competition in that "central decision-makers' aversion to losses to their state's relative power, status, or reputation (relative to their expectation level) leads to the adoption of risk-acceptant intervention strategies." Thus, Støre's bid for elevated status was a combination of social mobility and social competition in that he attempted to portray Norway (and the Nordic

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[47] Støre used the term "mellomstort" to describe Norway which literally translates to "medium-sized". The connotation, however, suggests that middle power is more appropriate. Also see Carvalho (2013).

states) as equal to those of the G20 as well as at the same time attempting delegitimize the institution's membership policy credibility (Pouliot 2014).

Støre and his ministry are probably not aware of Norway's PR in the world. However, the measure captures something that has been reflected in the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign affairs' practices over at least the last 10 years, namely that Norway has actively tried to mitigate its status discrepancy. The creation of various ad-hoc institutions and strategic attempts by the ministry to amend Norway's reputational gaps along with several bids for the international community to recognise Norway's increased hierarchical status resources underlines this trend. How does this attempt fit in to the dynamics of Norway's actual status? The next section puts this effort, the recognition discrepancy in general, hierarchical status resources, and moral authority output into a holistic framework of status categories, especially focusing on the nexus between small and middle power.

5.5.3 Great small power? Theorising middle power dynamics

Four overarching conclusions can be drawn from the quantitative section. First, middle powers are a very heterogenic group. Apart from the obvious divide between the traditional and new middle powers, which differs slightly on the hierarchical status resources indicators and differ a lot on the moral authority output, it is hard to find one common denominator of those that have previously been mentioned as middle powers. First, Norway is definitively in the middle of the middle powers concerning the hierarchical status resources of the sample groups. Established traditional middle powers, such as Australia and Canada, are still ahead of Norway in terms of military capabilities and wealth. This should mean that Norway's rise on both the military and economic scale, although substantial, is still bit behind the leading middle powers. Norway also has a moral authority output that is either greater or on par with the established middle powers. Norway has the diplomatic and organisational outstretch and promotes humane internationalism in a manner and scale required for middle power status. Second, despite all this, Norway has a huge recognition deficit. The country has yet to be recognised for its increase in hierarchical status resources and/or moral authority output. Thus the discrepancy between the social recognition on the one hand and the hierarchical status resources and moral authority output on the other, suggests that Norway is still a small power but possess many of the characteristics of middle powers. Third, as shown in the last section, Norway has attempted to mitigate the recognition discrepancy by working strategically over the last 10 years by mapping and attempting to increase Norway's reputation in the world; it

has attempted to both deligimize the G20 while also attempting to gain entry into the club. This conclusion begs the question: What is Norway's status?

The heterogenic nature of the middle powers, illustrated in this quantitative section, along with Norway's precarious position suggests that there is need for some theory building. Figure 5 incorporates the multifaceted elements of status by including the hierarchical status resources and moral authority output. The base of the figure is built in a triangle with the breadth of the outer lines indicating how many countries belong to each status category. Of the somewhat 200 countries in the world, the fewest are superpowers. The second least common powers are the great powers and micro states with the former being what we might call an exclusive club. A few more states could be middle powers or potential middle powers while small powers are the most common grouping in the world. The figure is based upon the two foregoing axes of status in which the countries may either score low or high. Moral authority output is seen as binary with countries either having high or low moral authority output. Hierarchical status resources have five different categories, low, medium to low, medium, medium to high and high. The figure thus prioritises hierarchical status resources over moral authority output, as countries with low hierarchical status cannot be middle powers, and those with medium hierarchical status resources cannot be great powers. However, moral authority resources may be the defining arbiter when countries fall between status categories, which ultimately make it very important for depicting a country's status.

Figure 5. Status order

High hierarchical status resources

Low hierarchical status resources

Superpowers

Great powers

Small great powers (1) | Small great powers 2

Great middle powers (1) | Great middle powers 2

Threshold for discourse on status seeking

Ideal middle powers

Small middle powers (1) | Small middle powers (2)

Great small powers (1) | Great small powers (2)

Threshold for discourse on status seeking

Small powers

Micro states

Low moral authority output

High moral authority output

Microstates do not feature in this thesis, but they are normally considered states with very limited territory, population and influence. Countries such as Luxembourg, Lichtenstein, Monaco and Andorra along with small Islands such as Fiji, Tuvalu, Micronesia, Madagascar and Antigua Barbuda are normally considered to tiny to even count as a small power (see Dumienski 2014; Warrington 1994). Just above them are the small powers, the largest status category, both have low hierarchical status resources and moral authority output. Great small powers consists of countries with medium to low hierarchical status resources and low moral authority output (1), and countries with low hierarchical status resources and high moral authority output (2). Small middle powers are countries with medium hierarchical status resources but low moral authority output (1) and countries with low to medium hierarchical

status resources and high moral authority output (2). Great middle powers are countries with medium to high hierarchical status resources but low moral authority output (1) and countries with medium hierarchical status resources and high moral authority output (2). The countries falling between the great middle powers and small middle powers are the ideal middle powers which do not fit in the aforementioned categories, but still within the thresholds of middle powers. Small great powers are countries with high hierarchical status resources but low moral authority output (1) and countries with medium to high hierarchical status resources and high moral authority output (2).

Norway here fits between being a small middle power and a great small power. Having definite medium to low capabilities - greater than Ireland, a small power, but substantially smaller than the traditional middle powers Canada and Australia - puts Norway in this nexus. However, the very low diplomatic recognition that Norway possesses suggests that Norway is more on the side of great small powers than a small middle powers, in which even its moral authority output cannot make up for. In comparison, Sweden shares almost identical wealth and military capabilities as well as the same high moral authority output. In contrast to Norway, however, Sweden has still held onto and even increased its diplomatic recognition which arguably would push Sweden more towards being a small middle power rather than a great small power. The other sample countries all fit in the status pyramid. Denmark falls just below Norway on the hierarchical status resources and just below the other Nordic countries on the moral authority resources indicators. However, it has a greater diplomatic recognition than Norway which leads us to believe that it is also between a great small power and a small middle power. Malaysia has a medium to low hierarchical status resources similar to the Nordic states but scores far below the Nordic states on the moral authority output which puts it in the small power category. Ireland is also in this category, having scored the lowest on nearly all the indicators. Mexico has medium hierarchical status resources but low moral authority output which easily puts them in the small middle power category. Poland falls just short of Mexico's hierarchical status resources but has a higher moral authority output and the same diplomatic recognition. Thus, Poland also falls in the small middle power category. South Africa, somewhat surprisingly has about the same hierarchical status resources as Norway and Sweden but much lower moral authority output. It has a higher diplomatic recognition than Norway which overall puts it, as Norway, in between the great small powers and the small middle powers. However, due to its special regional position, it can be put in between the ideal middle power and small middle power category. Australia has medium

hierarchical status resources but, similar to Mexico, has a surprisingly low moral authority output. However, Australia is at the top concerning diplomatic recognition which puts it in the ideal middle power category above Sweden and Mexico but below Canada. The Netherlands is also in this category as it has higher hierarchical status resources than the Nordic states but isstill below Australia. Similarly to Australia, it has a high diplomatic recognition but has perhaps the highest moral authority output of all the sample countries. Canada has medium hierarchical status resources and a high moral authority output, accompanied with by far the highest diplomatic recognition from the world community amongst the sample countries. This puts it in the great middle power category, definitely above Australia and the Netherlands but probably below the small great powers.

The dashed lines in figure 5 indicate the potential threshold for discourse on seeking new status as we have seen from Norway from the mid 2000s and onwards. Countries closer to middle power status are more likely to seek status as middle powers than countries with both low hierarchical and moral authority output. Small middle power countries are likely to attempt to solidify their position as middle powers by claiming that they are middle powers. However, there are some differences to note here. Sweden and Denmark have both lost relative grounds, most prominent in the hierarchical status resources sphere, to other countries in the system while states such as South Africa, Poland and Norway have done the opposite. This momentum is not to be underestimated as countries can see their own country moving up the ladder and would therefore attempt to talk up their own position. In contrast, countries that are losing ground to other countries are not that likely to have a salient international orientated discourse on their status because they would not want their loss to be brought to everyone's attention.

The quantitative analysis also reveals some of the fallacies of pure structural behaviouralist approaches to middle power theory in which tend to include one or more anomalies.[48] South Africa and to a certain degree Australia represents the anomalies in this analysis. The former has traditionally figured in the regional and emerging powers literature which ideally would put it in the great middle powers/small great powers category. Although South Africa has not been able to follow its compatriots in the BRICS-acronym, it most definitively has a higher status than Norway and Denmark. This fallacy, nevertheless, also stresses the importance of

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[48] For instance Neack (1993) uses cluster analysis to delineate status categories and ends up with Denmark, Sweden, Belgium Norway and Switzerland as great states while China and India are labeled small states.

an additional analysis besides quantitative analysis whilst still recognising the importance of the countries' hierarchical status resources and moral authority output. This should spark curiosity as to what may explain the discrepancy between the status indicators and the status scholars and statesmen intuitively conceive other countries to have.

5.6 Conclusion

In this analysis, I have shown how Norway ranks vis-à-vis the other potential middle power countries on a wide range of indicators. As for the hierarchical status resources, Norway has increased its wealth and military capabilities significantly compared to many other nations. Despite this significant increase, however, Norway's hierarchical status resources are yet to come close to that of established middle powers such as Canada and Australia. Norway's moral authority output, on the other hand, shows Norway leading the pack on several indicators compared to the potential middle powers. Here, Norway's output is either greater or equal to that of Canada or Australia. Next, I have shown that despite Norway's relative increase on hierarchical status resources and its constant high moral authority output, it has yet to receive recognition from the international community. Indeed, while Norway's hierarchical status resources and moral authority output have increased over the last 40 years, its diplomatic recognition has actually dropped. I have suggested the sources for this discrepancy, indicating that it may either be due to lack of visibility vis-à-vis the like-minded countries, that regionalism plays a huge part in countries' status attribution, or that status tends to be 'sticky' in that it is perceptual and not constantly updated. As a response to the discrepancy, I have shown that Norway has tried to mitigate the gap by persistently and deliberately attempting to increase its reputation as well as delegitimizing the G20 whilst still making a bid for membership. These findings have been incorporated into a holistic framework which suggests different nuances for the status categories, including small powers, great small powers, small middle powers, ideal middle powers and great middle powers. Here, Norway is analytically situated as a great small power.

Chapter 6: Conclusion

From an international perspective the Norwegian empirics investigated here might make this thesis appear peripheral or even trivial at first glance. This would, however, be deceptive. The results from this investigation, the methodological inventions used have far-reaching implications for status research. Indeed, besides challenging conventional wisdom in Norwegian literature, the thesis developed more rigorous proxies for both the different ways scholarship has sought to quantify status that could and should be used by other status scholars. In addition, by utilising neoclassical realism's epistemological flexibility, this thesis has developed the conceptual apparatus that can avoid the pitfalls of seeking to equate status from material attributes, while still utilising the advantages of quantitative methods. This chapter gives an overview of the outline and the main findings of this thesis. It starts with reiterating the research question and answering it. It then moves on to outlining the empirical, theoretical and methodological implications of this investigation, showing how this pluralistic approach to status and middle powers may drive future research on similar cases. This thesis asked the following research questions:

To what extent has Norway's increased material capability and pro-active foreign policy moved Norway up in the social status hierarchy? Does Norway now receive the recognition befitting that of a middle power?

Norway is *not* a middle power. While its increase in key measures such as wealth and military capabilities along with a strong role as a classic do-gooder in the international community, it is not enough to be a middle power. Canada and Australia ranks way above Norway in its hierarchical status resources, whilst Norway's moral authority output, although high, is matched by like-minded countries such as Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands, Canada and Australia. More importantly, however, Norway's diplomatic recognition is even lower than its hierarchical status resources and its moral authority output would suggest. This is the key denominator for indicating actual middle power status.   However, Norway is also something more than a small power. Compared to Ireland, the control country in this sample, Norway is bigger on near all indicators in this analysis. This thesis thus suggested that Norway is better thought of as a great small power. The scholarly and public discourse regarding Norway's standing constantly reiterated the narrative of Norway as a small power in large parts of the 40 year period. That narrative however, has shifted in recent years, suggesting that Norway might try to improve its status in the coming years.

The analysis presents a puzzle for Norwegian foreign policy. How is it that Norway's increase in hierarchical status resources and constantly high moral authority output has left such a small impression in world politics? The lack of visibility vis-à-vis the like-minded countries, the structural constraints that the region induces and the 'stickiness' of status, are all plausible sources of Norway's recognition discrepancy. Despite these sources indicating that Norway's recognition might not be up to Norway to change, they do offer novel suggestions on how Norway can act to improve its recognition.

While Norway's high moral authority output the last 40 years has been significant, so has the output from the Netherlands, Sweden and Canada. The 'status' as a like-minded country may be an advantage for countries when strong multilateral actions are needed, but it also hinders countries to stand out. Recent research has shown that Norway's status-seeking efforts on various policies has been intense and multifaceted (Carvalho & Neumann 2015b). Until now, however, no research has shown the systematic effect of Norway's status seeking behaviour. This thesis shows that Norway is an underperformer, a label that probably sits unwillingly with most Norwegian foreign policy actors and scholars. Norwegians reacted with joy when Obama said Norway 'punches above its weight' (Carvalho & Lie 2015). But as Wohlforth (2015, p.153) rightfully suggests, "[G]iven Norway's outstanding performance on so many levels, it would be surprising if it did not 'punch above its weight'". This analogy works compared with many other small powers in the world, but compared to the many heavy hitters out there Norway's punches have failed to sway its audience.

Norway's recognition is effectively hindered by the dominance of Sweden and partially Denmark position in the region. The label of a like-minded country is reinforced by the Scandinavian label in which Norway quite often is viewed as subordinate to that of Sweden. Sweden is the country that is most associated with Scandinavia. Not only through its historical position in world politics, but also through its cultural export which has left an imprint especially in countries throughout the Western world. Like the like-minded label, Norway would need to follow policies that are different from the Swedes. Leaving Scandinavia is not an option nor a wish from Norwegian authorities. But pursuing policies that only reinforce the image as the subordinate power in the Scandinavian region is not optimal for status-seeking.

Recent calls within the ministry of foreign affairs backed by research have affirmed the realignment of Norwegian foreign policy to focusing on the areas where Norway has had a competitive advantage (Mølster et al. 2013; Thune & Lunde 2013). What the measure above

suggests, however, is that countries are likely to experience a status lag when either their hierarchical status resources or moral status output changes. If Norway can rebrand itself away from the like-minded countries and Scandinavia's moral authority output whilst still maintaining its economic growth and military capabilities, its recognition and indeed its status is likely to grow in stature. While this is a significant task by itself, this also needs to be maintained for a long time in order for other countries to update their perception of Norway.

As this thesis has reiterated throughout its chapters, this approach to status and middle powers is not all encompassing. Indeed, the main findings suggest areas where other approaches might be more suitable. Most importantly, the analysis concluded with showing how Norway has sought to amend the discrepancy in between its hierarchical status resources and moral authority output vis-à-vis its lack of diplomatic recognition. However, a further venture into how the narrative of status mitigation has been performed is needed in order to understand how status is perceived and dealt with. Likewise, the various ways in which countries are perceived are not covered in this thesis. While embassies established in a country might represent a vote for that country's importance in the world, it says little about how that decision was and on what grounds. Tracing the great power discourse of how power dynamics in regions such as Scandinavia would give good indications as to why Sweden is perceived as the dominant player and Norway the subordinate.

The methodological and theoretical implications of this thesis are intertwined. This investigation has sought to increase the quality of the measures and the conceptualizations of status. The existing research tends to overemphasise their favoured metric. Behavioural normativists suggest it is what you do that counts. While structural behaviouralists base their argument on the distribution of capabilities. However, as chapter three argued, both approaches suffer too many anomalies for comfort. This thesis has drawn on neoclassical realist theory to pioneer a via media approach. The analysis showed that relying solely either material capabilities and foreign policy behaviour as semi-proxies for status is detrimental for understanding middle powers. Cases such as Norway. Sweden, and South Africa shows the need for a pluralist approach. Sweden lost ground to its like-minded competitors throughout the 40 year period sketched out above, but did not lose as much recognition. South Africa increased its recognition by distancing itself from the apartheid-regime, but also gained excessively much recognition that what its hierarchical status resources and moral authority output would suggests. This should confound the expectations of structural behavioralists and behavioural normativists which both fail to include these discrepancies in their analyses.

By applying three indicators of status - hierarchical status resources, moral status outout and diplomatic recognition, this thesis made it possible to derive concrete conclusions whilst still maintain the multifaceted nature of status. Hierarchical status resources as wealth and military capabilities were here thought of as potential resources that states may use for active status seeking or receive direct recognition for. Moral authority output was conceived of as the degree to which states have actively sought to participate in international politics similar to that of traditional middle power's behaviour in the international system. In addition, chapter 3 suggested that Norway's hierarchical status resources and moral authority output should be compared with the recognition Norway has received. This pluralist approach allows for identifying the discrepancies that what occur during status attribution which until now has been absent in middle power literature. It also allows for categorising small powers and middle powers in a more nuanced manner, showing that it analytically makes sense to introduce categories such as great small powers and small middle powers.

On a more technical note, the measures used in this thesis, most notably the HITS algorithm, PR and the formula M, are all novel and extremely useful ways of quantifying attributes linked to status. The M measure for instance, captures the military breadth and sophistication of a country in a single indicator which is useful for those wanting to indicate middle power military capabilities as well as those status theorists wanting to compare the level of discrepancy between military capabilities and status attribution. Along these lines, the PR-measure offers a new and intriguing way of indicating which countries that possess and do not possess middle power recognition. This is not to say that the PR-measure is the ultimate indicator of country's status. Analysing status, and even more so middle power status, requires a multidimensional approach. Diplomatic recognition, however, should be a welcomed indicator to the middle power literature which measure something that the tradition has yet to cover: the perceptual and social part of middle power status. Likewise, along the lines of behavioural normativism, diplomatic outreach, here measured using the HITS-algorithm, allows for new insight into the level of diplomatic presence middle powers seek to maintain the international system.

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