



The Department of International Environment and Development Studies, Noragric, is the international gateway for the Norwegian University of Life Sciences (NMBU). Eight departments, associated research institutions and the Norwegian College of Veterinary Medicine in Oslo. Established in 1986, Noragric's contribution to international development lies in the interface between research, education (Bachelor, Master and PhD programmes) and assignments.

The Noragric Master Thesis are the final theses submitted by students in order to fulfil the requirements under the Noragric Master programme "International Environmental Studies", "International Development Studies" and "International Relations".

The findings in this thesis do not necessarily reflect the views of Noragric. Extracts from this publication may only be reproduced after prior consultation with the author and on condition that the source is indicated. For rights of reproduction or translation contact Noragric.

© Kingsley Emeka Emordi, May 2015

E-mail: emordikingsley@gmail.com

Noragric

Department of International Environment and Development Studies

P.O. Box 5003

N-1432 Ås

Norway

Tel.: +47 64 96 52 00

Fax: +47 64 96 52 01

Internet: <http://www.nmbu.no/noragric>

Declaration

I, Kingsley Emeka Emordi, declare that this thesis is a result of my research investigations and findings. Sources of information other than my own have been acknowledged and a reference list has been appended. This work has not been previously submitted to any other university for award of any type of academic degree.

Signature.....

Date.....

Acknowledgement

First of all, I want to thank God for making it possible for me to achieve my study goals. I also want to express my profound gratitude to Noragric department and NMBU in general for giving me an opportunity to study my dream programme. Professor Tor A. Benjaminsen and Camilla Houeland played a major role in making this study possible. They supervised my thesis and they have been of great help to me. I express my profound gratitude to you all, through your comments and our discussion during the process of my thesis. I became an abstractive thinker. I also want to express my profound gratitude to Ingunn Bohmann for been an amazing study coordinator.

Dedication.

I dedicate this thesis to my amazing family and to my sweet mother in heaven.

List of Abbreviations and Acronyms	8
Abstract.....	10
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION	12
1.1 Setting the scene	12
1.2 Problem statement	14
1.4 Research questions and Objective	17
1.5 Research questions.....	17
1.6 Rationale for political ecology.....	18
1.7 Structure of thesis.	19
CHAPTER TWO: CONCEPTUAL AND ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK.....	19
2.1 Political ecology	19
2.2 Antecedents of Political ecology.....	20
2.3 Critical political ecology	21
2.5 Discourse and Narrative analysis	22
CHAPTER THREE: CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND	24
3.1 Pre-History of Nigeria economy	24
3.2 Descriptive area of Niger Delta.....	26
3.3 Ecologic and Regional Geologic setting.	26
3.4 Oil	29
3.5 Bunkering.	30
3.5.1 Large scale-tapping of pipelines to fill large tankers for export.....	31
3.5.2 Excess lifting of crude oil beyond licensed amount.....	32
3.5.3 Small scale pilfering for local markets.....	32
CHAPTER FOUR: THE NIGER DELTA RESISTANCE	33
4.1 History of local's resistance against the state	33
4.2 Pre-Colonialism Legal Framework	34

4.3 Post-Independence resistance	39
4.4 Non-Violence resistance tactics.....	40
4.5 Emergence of Militant resistance	41
4.6 The militants groups and their resistance tactics.....	43
CHAPTER FIVE: METHODOLOGY	46
5.1 Research Methodology	46
5.2 Research strategy.	47
5.2.1 Qualitative research approach.....	48
5.2.2 Ontological and Epistemological position.....	49
5.3 Data Collection	50
5.3.1 Data Analysis	50
5.3.2 Limitations and challenges.....	51
5.3.3 Criteria for accessing trustworthiness	52
5.3.4 Credibility	53
5.3.5 Transferability.....	53
5.3.6 Dependability.....	53
5.3.7 Confirmability	53
5.4 Research Ethics	54
Chapter Six: RESULT AND FINDINGS	54
6.1 The Narratives.....	54
6.2 The Niger Delta Narratives (Oil Bunkering Narrative)	55
6.2.1 Marginalization and degradation.....	56
6.2.2 The local communities are weak.....	59
6.2.3 Increasing level of poverty and unemployment	59
6.2.5 Threat to traditional economic activities and cultural values	66
6.2.6 Niger Delta environment is threatened	67
6.3 NARRATIVE 2: Multinational oil companies narratives.....	69

6.3.1 Environment	71
6.4 Narrative 3: Nigeria government narrative	73
6.5 Comparing the three actor’s narratives	75
6.6 Victims, Villains and Hero?	76
6.7 Oil bunkering narrative (local’s narratives) vs State and MNOCs (national)...	76
6.7.1 The local communities are powerless and national.	76
6.7.2 Increasing level of poverty and unemployment and national.	77
6.7.3 Self-determination and national.	78
6.7.4 Threat to traditional economic activities, cultural values and national	79
6.7.5 Niger Delta environment is threatened and national	79
Chapter Seven: Discussions, Conclusion and Recommendations	80
7.1 Discussion	80
7.1.1 Who are the locals of the Niger Delta?	80
7.1.2 Who is right or wrong?	81
7.1.3 Question of legal vs legitimacy?	82
7.1.4 Question of criminality?	83
7.1.5 Ownership and control of oil in the Niger Delta?	84
7.1.6 Legitimate grievance or greed?	85
7.1.7 Corruption and weak institution	86
7.1.8 Consequence of oil bunkering?	87
7.1.9 Conclusion	87
Recommendations	89
Political will and leadership	89
References.	91
Appendix 1.	103

List of table

Table 1 Estimated Population of the Niger Delta 27
Table 2 Nigeria: Federal revenue allocation to states, 1999-2007 103

List of figure

Figure 1, 29

List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

CSR	Cooperate social responsibility
FCT	Federal Capital Territory
FNDIC	The federated Niger Delta Ijaw communities
IPA	Ijaw people's assembly
IYC	Ijaw Youth Council
MEND	Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta
MNOCs	Multinational oil companies
MOSOP	Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People
NDPVF	The Niger Delta People Volunteer Force
NDVS	Niger Delta Volunteer Service
NNPC	Nigeria National petroleum cooperation
OPEC	Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
UNDP	United Nations Development Program me
UN	United Nations.

Abstract

Grounded on a political ecology approach, this study sheds light on oil bunkering activity that is done by local militants in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. Such oil bunkering is used as a euphemism for oil theft in Nigeria. The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the perception of oil bunkering that is done by groups (militants) of the local communities of the Niger Delta. By collecting and comparing the narratives of the three actors linked to so-called illegal oil bunkering. The three actors are the locals of the Niger Delta, the Nigerian government and the multinational oil companies (MNOCs). Such Oil bunkering that is done by the local militants of the Niger Delta has dominated the local politics since the 1990s. Through narrative analysis I have identified three different stories from the three different actors.

The government and the Multinational oil companies (MNOCs) operating in the Niger Delta perceives, such oil bunkering is seen as illegal activity that affects the nation's economy, as well as causing environmental degradation in the Niger Delta. However, oil have contributed enormously to the national economy since the inception of oil exploration in the Niger Delta. To many people, such as the government agencies and its allies, these growth have brought income opportunities and growth to the local communities of the Niger Delta. In contrast to the inhabitants of the Niger Delta such economic growth is yet to translate to economic development, and an appreciable increase in the standard of living. Despite being the goose that lays the golden egg. This is coupled with certain fundamental issues such as continuous neglect by state, political marginalization and the failure of state interventionist efforts at ameliorating the suffering of the inhabitants of the region. The consequence of this is reinforcing the option of resistance and violence, as against peaceful engagement with the state. This is manifested in the increasing violence and lawlessness epitomized by the incidence of kidnapping of oil workers, seizure of MNOCs oil facilities, destruction of oil installations, as well as oil bunkering which is the focus of this study.

By using narrative analysis, I found that the local communities sees oil bunkering as an integral part of their protest against the state and the multinational companies operating in the Niger Delta. This is an approach within political ecology, and narrative analysis offers a way of obtaining a rich understanding of the main ways that locals of the Niger Delta experience and perceives oil bunkering. As well as the state and MNOCs approach towards the locals, by means of their presentations of relevant narratives. By doing this I also aim at contributing trend of political ecology to the Niger Delta region. The local communities of the Niger Delta have been

embroiled in resistance against the federal government and the multinational oil companies (MNOCs). Multilayered issues such as lack of control, participation, revenue allocation, resources control and more, institute the main grievances against the oil companies and the government. Cognizant of these issues, the state and MNOCs have not applied a more holistic approach, for this reason the local communities in the Niger Delta lost confidence in both the state and MNOCs. Hence these led to the issues the Niger Delta is facing today. Such Oil bunkering activities done by the local militants of the Niger Delta is a classic example of the perceived struggle and resistance of the Niger Delta militants over control of the natural resources in their region. The local's militants are indigenes of the Niger Delta, they represent the resistance group and they are the main figure in oil bunkering.

This study carried a more in-depth analysis of the local communities' narratives on oil bunkering than other stakeholder's narratives. However, this study also presented extensive position of other actors narratives linked to oil bunkering in the Niger Delta. My reason for doing this is that, as a researcher for this study I find the local communities of the Niger Delta to constitute the most challenging task to understand. The locals are more challenging to understand, because my main interest is to understand the local's community's perceptions. Therefore deeper focus on these, whilst to understand the context of other narratives are pertinent to identify the narrative landscape to compare and contrast. This study further argues that oil bunkering activities in the Niger Delta emerged due to grievances by the people of the Niger Delta, which is attributed to the failure of the state and the multinational oil companies (MNOCs) to comply with the demands of the local community of the Niger Delta. This thesis further shows that, the current oil bunkering activities in Niger Delta have become a mixture of genuine grievance and greed as well as opportunism.

Keywords: Oil bunkering, Niger Delta, Nigerian state, Multinational oil companies, local communities, narrative analysis, marginalization, neglect, militants.

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Setting the scene

The Niger Delta is the region that provides 80% of the revenue to the Nigeria government, yet the people of the region has a strong perception of neglected and marginalization by the Nigerian government. Indeed, saying that the region have been neglected by the states does not necessarily means that the state has not been giving out allocations to develop the Niger Delta. However, if one compares the enormous revenues derived by the state from oil resources in the Niger Delta, to the 13% allocation the state gives to the Niger Delta, at this stance the Niger Delta is said to be neglected and marginalized or rather not benefiting enough from the state. Cyril Obi (2007) in his article noted that the share of oil revenue allocated to oil producing states in the Niger Delta was initially 50percent in the 1960s but later on fell to 1.5 percent in the mid-1990s.

Consequently, the locals of the Niger Delta claims that the slashing of their revenue allocation from 50percent to 1.5 and later to 13percent was because they were minority ethnic group in Nigeria. Furthermore, the transition from military to democratic regime in 1999 increased the allocation to 13percent, prior to response to international campaign and reigniting of locals protest as well as a strategic process of perceiving the new democratic regime as legitimate to the grievance of the Nige Deltas (C. I. Obi, 2007) . Hence, some non-oil producing states in the ethnic majority northern part of Nigeria gets higher allocation than oil producing ethnic minority in the Niger Delta. This was systematically done by the top northern political elites who were majority in top government positions in Nigeria. The African Network for Environmental and economic justice (2004) noted that a state called Kano (a non-producing oil state) in the northern part of Nigeria has forty-four local government councils whilst Delta state (a major oil producing state) has twenty-five local government councils. Due to the constitutional provision which was partially and systematically enacted by top government majority northern elites, Kano state will therefore get a higher revenue allocation than Delta state, regardless of the fact that Kano state is a non-oil producing state.

Above all, the means of livelihood of the Niger Delta inhabitants have been destroyed, through oil exploration and exploitation caused by the Multinational oil companies (MNOCs) and later by sabotage and bunkering. The state has allowed this to happen to the locals. Majority of the

20 million inhabitants of the Niger Delta remain poor and unemployed, this has led to unrest in the region. The people of the Niger Delta are frustrated by lack of benefits from oil production, it have triggered the local communities to resist the operations of MNOCs, demanding better public services, compensation from the MNOCs over environmental degradation and a greater share of government revenues. The agitation of the Niger Delta communities has turned into what is perceived to be a worrying criminal activities such as oil bunkering.

Thus, in the words of Obi (2004) ``the Niger Delta have become a home of oil insurgency, which is embroiled in resistance against the Nigerian government and the Multinational oil companies''. The locals of the Niger Delta resistance against the state, have triggered the locals militant group to implore militancy resistance tactics by taking up arms against the state and MNOCS (C. I. Obi, 2004). The militants are heavily armed and well-organized groups. They attack oil and gas facilities in the region, shut down operations, kidnap foreign expatriates, staffs of the MNOCs and blow up oil pipelines. However, the debate on oil bunkering activities done by militants of the local communities in the Niger Delta, involves different views and narratives from different stakeholders and actors who position themselves and interest. Thus, oil bunkering have reduced the amount of oil produced, it have created environmental problems from oil spills and reduced government revenue that could be used to develop infrastructure and services(Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Limited, 2010).

Through applying a political ecology analytical framework this study investigates the perception of the local communities of the Niger Delta on oil bunkering done by some groups of the locals communities of the Niger Delta, these groups are known as militants. Oil bunkering is one of the resistance tactics that is used by the local militant's communities of the Niger Delta, it is seen as a criminal act by the Nigeria government and the multinational oil companies. This study argues that oil bunkering emerged due to the neglect and marginalization of the inhabitants of the Niger Delta by the state and the multinational oil companies. As described by (United Nations Development Programs, 2006) the inhabitants of the Niger delta have witnessed unending neglect, marginalization, mass unemployment and poverty, and have lived without basic social amenities, prior to this they have developed a feeling of relative deprivation¹. Oil exploration and production have had a destructive effect on the farmland and

¹ Refer to: Relative deprivation is defined as the conscious experience of a negative discrepancy between legitimate expectations and present actualities. Relative deprivation also means the process of being deprived of something to which one believes oneself to be entitled to have. Schaefer (2008) further went on to reiterate that relative deprivation occurs when a particular set of people feel discontented, when their positions is compared to others and realize that they have less than them.

livelihood of the Niger deltas, yet the locals in the region have no input in decisions about allocation of land and distribution of the wealth generated from oil ((Augustine Ikelegbe, 2006; K. Omeje, 2006). At the first glance, oil bunkering activities done the by local militants of the Niger Delta being perceived as a struggle towards control of the oil resources in their region may be puzzling (T.A. Benjaminsen & Svarstad, 2008). To the state and MNOCs oil bunkering is a criminal act by the Niger Delta militants that is affecting the state's economy and causing environment issues in the Niger Delta. Looking for explanations for this struggle, this empirical study demonstrates how oil bunkering done by the Niger Delta local communities may be understood as grounded in marginalization and degradation. Whereby marginalization is embedded on issues such as; self-determination, locals are powerless and increasing level of poverty and unemployment. Whilst the degradation is embedded with environmental issues such as; Traditional economic activities are threatened, Niger Delta environment is threatened.

Adopting a qualitative research method to gather the information's needed for this study, with emphasis on inductive approach (Bryman, 2004) this study presented various narratives from the three stakeholders, the state, MONCs and the local communities. The narratives from the MNOCs and the state counters the narratives of the local communities, the local's narrative represents the oil bunkering narrative whilst the state and MNOCs narratives represents that national narratives. This study also examine how the local communities of the Niger Delta, use different resistance tactics and approach against the state and the multinational oil companies operating the Niger Delta in making demands and showing their interest in development of their region.

1.2 Problem statement

Oil bunkering that is done by the locals of the Niger Delta is causing a continuous insurgency in the Niger Delta region, it has claimed many lives as well. Oil theft has enhanced armed conflict in the region, providing the militants groups with funds to purchase all forms of weapon, it has led to instability in oil prices on the world energy markets. According to Katsouris and Sayne (2013), cited in USIP (2013) report, oil theft does not only pose a threat to the Nigeria state but also to the international community. The trade of bunkered oil could come to erode the stability of Nigeria's legal oil sector. For the past ten years alone, oil revenues that is worth over \$3 billions of dollars have been effectively locked in, due to instability and crime in the Niger Delta. Oil theft (bunkering) has been known as the biggest threat to Nigeria's economy. It has several socio-economic impacts such as loss of economic activities, loss of

revenue to the government, increase in criminal activities in the Niger Delta, environmental degradation, and lack of security. These illegal activities, scare international investors and portrays the country with a bad image in the international community.

The future of the Niger Delta is threatened by both the states, MNOCs activities and the incident of militancy, oil bunkering, kidnapping and insecurity which have deeply affected the major potential for economic growth and sustainable development in the area. According to Nnoli (2003) "violence, provoked by conflicts, has often turned the people's attention from creative production to creative destruction" (Nnoli, 2003). With the experience of various events, such as the peaceful protest and later on the continuous confrontations between the militants groups and the state, it have shown that the situation in the Niger Delta is such that the people's condition continues to deteriorate. Violence is therefore almost the only viable option to cope with the perceived unfair treatment to the minority oil producing states (Banigo, 2005).

Concomitantly, a total of 70 foreigners were kidnapped in 2006, there were several reasons for kidnapping foreign oil workers. Such as drawing international attention to the reality of the locals of the Niger Deltas livelihood, to get funds to buy arms and fund their activities and to scare oil companies from investing in the Niger Delta. Hence, this was the peak period of the insurgency. The 2009 amnesty program and the emergence the current president of Nigeria Goodluck Ebele Jonathan (an Ijaw) from the Niger Delta region has led to decrease in violence, but it did not lead to decrease in oil bunkering. Furthermore, majority of those kidnap victims were not Nigerians, they were foreigners working in the oil industry. The local communities agony is "exacerbated by unending state neglect and discriminating practice, which has accounted for the amplification of frustration and aggression among a high population of the poor who incidentally constitute more than three-quarters of the entire population of the region" (Dan-jumbo, 2006)

The Niger Delta region of Nigeria is an epitome of contradictions. In as much as the region is characterized by oil deposits that have made the country one of the leading oil producing Nations, it is among the poorest region not only in Nigeria but also in the world (Ikporukpo, 2002). Niger Delta is complex and conflictual, despite vast resources it has poverty. There are high levels of environmental degradation such as gas flaring in the Niger Delta. The level of gas flared in the Niger Delta alone is documented as one of Africa's greatest man made environmental disasters ((Nigeria, 2004; WorldBank, 1995).Nigeria is a signatory to United Nations Agencies 21 and Kyoto Protocol and other international agreements and policies on environment and climate change, this statistics show that Nigeria breaches the agreement it is

a signatory to. However, the pollution does not only affect the Niger Delta region, it also affects the health of the inhabitant of the Niger Delta. Local documentation on gas flaring in Niger Delta imply that some children living next to the gas flares might never have known dark nights even though they have no electricity (Bloemink, 2000) .

Similarly, the elderly are said to experience strange noises and smells created by gas flaring that never existed before (Frynas, 2000; Manby, 1999). “Moreover, the flares burn at temperatures of thirteen to fourteen thousand degrees Celsius, and not only bring about air and noise pollution but, contribute to acid rain that has rotted corrugated roofs and generated sulphur emissions” (Bloemink, 2000). Thus, such oil is supposed to improve the life of the local communities of the Niger Delta and Nigeria in general, but it has become a curse to the local communities where oil extraction and exploitation is done whilst it has become a blessing to Nigeria economy, the corrupt government officials and the MNOCs.

Furthermore, the locals of the Niger Delta claims that the agreement with the federal government and the MNOCs regarding environmental laws and dividends from the resources are not always recognized. This is may be due to weak institutions in Nigeria, set up by corrupt officials who prioritize their personal interest before the national interest, this is one of the reasons why they are unable to curtail the crisis. According to Acemoglu et al. (2009) the real reason why some nations fail to distribute their resources efficiently lies in the role of political and economic institutions.

1.3 Purpose of this research

The purpose of this thesis is to deepen our understanding of the reality confronting the locals of the Niger Delta, seen through narratives of oil bunkering .As described by Anup shah (2010), the global discourse on Niger Delta oil exploration is that the state and the MNOCs are positive force in Nigeria, both the latter and the former have provided much needed economic resources for the locals of the Niger Delta. Anup further stated that the reality that confronted their delegation when they visited the Niger Delta was quite the opposite. Anup and his delegated noticed that major oil companies that were operating in the Niger Delta were employing inadequate global environmental standards, public health standards, human rights standards and relations with affected areas (Shah, 2010)

My aim in this study is to investigate the perception of local community in the Niger Delta on oil bunkering. To do this, I adopted narrative analysis, to make it possible for me to identify

and compare various perspectives of the local communities of the Niger Delta, the state and MNOCs. Narrative analysis gives a framework to identify underlying power structures and moral positioning .Do they see oil bunkering done by them as illegal? Are bunkers grievance driven legitimate fighters for resource sovereignty, or as greed driven criminals or as opportunist? One assumption to oil bunkering is that it emerged due to failure of the government and the MNOCs to recognize the demands of the local communities of the Niger Delta. Why are the locals regarded as criminals (militants) by both the Nigeria government and MNOCs? These issues will be discussed also, from the narratives gathered in this study I was able to identify the actors that fits in the position of the Heroes, Victim or Villains.

1.4 Research questions and Objective

The objective of this study is to deepen our understanding of the motivations behind oil bunkering, I am mainly interested in the perception of the local community on oil bunkering in Niger Delta, within a context of struggle over control of resources. However, for a holistic understanding we will need to explore the narratives of other main actors; state and oil companies to enable me compare which of these actors' narratives counters the local's narrative.

1.5 Research questions

Thus the main research questions are:

- What are the narratives on oil bunkering by the local community and local militants (the bunkers) of the Niger Delta?
- What are the narratives of oil bunkering by the multinational oil companies?
- What are the narratives of bunkering by the Nigerian government?

Narrative analysis will reveal an underlying perceptions of who are the relevant actors: what are their motives, interest and responsibilities in problem field. Thus, the guiding sub questions are;

- A) Do the local community see oil bunkering as morally legitimate or illegitimate?
- B) What are the motives for reason of oil bunkering?
- C) Are there underlying causes or is oil bunkering itself the cause?

- D) Who are the real actors and what is their real moral positions (i.e. victims, heroes or villains)?
- E) What is consequences for oil bunkering?

1.6 Rationale for political ecology

Rationale for applying political ecology as my analytical framework is because this study is focused on political and environmental issues in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria .Hence, current approach in political ecology is focused on power relations in land and environmental management at various geographical levels such as local, national and global and also how these levels are connected (T.A. Benjaminsen & Svarstad, 2008). Recently, this approach has been strongly established as a dominant field of human-environmental research in geography (Walker, 2005) . Within the bounds of political ecology that is maintained by powerful actors, there is a particular interest in the ways that power relations are reinforced or contested in environmental discourses (Stott & Sullivan 2000; Robbins 2004). “The study of local and global discursive environmental representations is one trend within current Third World political ecology, the links or contrasts between them, and how they relate to policy narratives “(Bassett & Crummy 2003; Forsyth & Walker 2008)

Political ecology fits in better for analyzing the statement of various actors that have a role to play in oil bunkering activities in the Niger Delta, by accessing their narratives using narrative analysis which is an approach within political ecology. Political ecology deals with the use and access to natural resources such as oil which is a focus of this study. Political ecology recognizes power relations over struggle for natural resources such as the crude oil in the Niger Delta, it brings out narratives from different actors involved in contestation over access to natural resources, and it deals with environmental issues and can have good recommendations for justice.

Narratives about issues concerning the unprecedented struggle and grievances, environmental and development programs is strong, with consequences for environmental practice, policies and the overall outcome. As stated earlier on, in this study I collected narratives from the three actors (state, MNOCs and local communities) concerned with oil bunkering activities in the Niger Delta, and then analyzed their narratives, hence it is on the basis of the foregoing rationale of political ecology that I adopted political ecology as my analytical framework.

1.7 Structure of thesis.

For convenience of organization and presentation, this study is structured into seven different parts, in addition to the forgoing introduction which constitutes **Chapter one**. **The chapter two** is focused on conceptual and analytical framework and how political ecology is linked to my study. **Chapter three** highlights the pre-history of Nigeria and conceptual background of the Niger Delta region which is the study area. **Chapter Four** presents the resistance tactics and struggle that was implored by the local militants of the Niger Delta, as against the state and its allies the MNOCs. **Chapter Five** presents the Methodology, the research design adopted for this study, the type of data that was used for this study and how this study was done. **Chapter Six** sheds light on my results and findings from the research questions and various narrative of each actors, whilst **Chapter Seven** is based on discussion of my findings and conclusion, followed by references used for this study.

CHAPTER TWO: CONCEPTUAL AND ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

This chapter provides the analytical and conceptual framework for this thesis.

2.1 Political ecology

The term Political ecology was coined in the 1980s to signify efforts to combine the concerns of ecology and a broadly defined views on power relations focusing on the dialectic between society and natural resources (Blaikie & Brookfield, 1987). However, the root of political ecology in ecological and social science as propounded by (Watts & Peet, 1996), first emerged in 1970s. The first contributions to political ecology emerged in the 1970s and echoed a Marxist critique of Malthusianism (Enzensberger, 1974). Hence, Robbins (2004) further stated that political ecologist sometimes trace their discipline back to the 19th century Russian geographer and anarchist Peter A. Kropotkin. Thus, one notion about political ecology is that politics should be put first in an attempt to understand how human environment interaction may be linked (Bryant, 1998). It positions people, places and practices in relation to broader processes of social and economic change at different scale such as the local, global and intermediate scale (Jarosz, 1996). Political ecology is a multilayered approach to understanding access to resources by different people, the environmental condition and institutions through which access to resources is mediated, and also sort the environmental changes that this system may cause (Paul

Robbins, 2004). A factual assumption in political ecology is that it identifies how politics shapes human knowledge and interactions with the physical environment. Scholars such as Bryant (1998) stated that as a theoretical tradition, political ecology was influenced by the scholarly contributions of the cultural ecology in 1970s and 1980s. Bryant (1998) further noted that since the emergence political ecology as a theoretical tradition, its position is primarily to become knowledgeable of the political dynamics surrounding material and discursive struggle over the environment in most developing countries.

Within the field of political ecology, its position is focused in the ways that power relations are reinforced in narratives, about the environment maintained by powerful actors. Political ecology is reigniting a new theoretical perspective of man's relation to nature. It is argued that the use of natural resources by man was not merely a question of knowledge, and ignorance did not suffice as an explanation for degradation. Rather, social relations, access to and control over resources and power to control institutions were brought into the scene as areas for analysis. However, the issues that were seen as a technical problem requiring technical solutions was now seen as highly political as well. Later works have built on this perspective and expanded the area even further. Peet and Watts (1996) and Bryant and Bailey (1998) made significant contributions linking the question of power to theories of state, social movements and narrative.

2.2 Antecedents of Political ecology.

Political ecology has its roots in radical and critical theory and emerged as a reaction to Neo-Malthusianism which accounts for Eco-scarcity and modernization (Paul Robbins, 2004). Thus, the ground from which political ecology first emerged in the 1970s was often traced back to Wolf 1972, it was described by merging of cultural ecology (Steward, 1955). This merging linked the human strategies of ecological success to cultural adaptation, with community ecology, cybernetics and system theory (Bateson, 1972). However, Political ecology was influenced by hazard school with its position on perception, modifying and governing of environmental destructions. Robbins (2004), proceeds by calling political ecology apolitical ecology. Apolitical ecology has focused on explaining where the poor are blamed for processes such as overpopulation, deforestation and waste of resources.

Although, this assumption was further challenged by several political ecology researchers and they have shown that there are levels and power relations that lead to pressure the poor people (Blaikie, 2000). However, to fully understand how political ecology emerged one need to look at other disciplines such as the Marxist theory, common pool resource theory and peasant

studies, where the former has been conclusive for the development of political ecology (Paul Robbins, 2004). Thus, several decades ago, since 1970s concerns about the environment started rising steadily. This was because large developed regions around the globe became aware of the threat posed by environmental degradation and pollution. This rising field attracted several generations of scholars from fields of anthropology, forestry development studies, environmental sociology, environmental history and geography (Paul Robbins, 2004). These are scholars of both security, development and conflict studies in the developed and western region, focused on the environment by trying to conceptualize and understand its impact on human life and vice versa. Hence, the question became how should one assess changes in the environment and their impact on society? Thus, this assessment on human-nature interaction prompted several new approaches within different fields, each ending up with different outcomes and policy recommendations.

Furthermore, the multitude of different theories on human environment interactions attracted a critical review on current state of art, so as to facilitate future research on sustainable development, resource conflict and natural resource management (Paul Robbins, 2004). In this regard political ecology emerged, and since then it has been the most promising theory. As described by Paul Robbins (2004),

“the emergence of a wide range of crucial theoretical concepts in the recent decades drawn from common property theory, green materialism, feminist development studies, peasant studies, discourse theory, post-colonial theory and critical environmental history constitute a new and robust toolkit to directly tackle the pressing multiscale question of development era environmental change, they together form the electric equipment of political ecology”.

Therefore, these inspiring theoretical tools have led to the constitution of Political ecology as a field of critical research which has been progressively completed by other critical approaches (Paul Robbins, 2004).

2.3 Critical political ecology

Critical political ecology holds an intermediate position between realism and constructivism (Tor A Benjaminsen & Svarstad, 2010b). The realist view is that reality exists independently of individual actors and can be directly obtained by sedulous empirical observation. For constructivism, reality is socially constructed through the perceptions and actions of social

actors and can only be indirectly accessed. Radical constructivists argues that no claim about reality is more valid than any other (P . Robbins, 2012). Thus, for a political ecologist such position mean that only the discourses that construct environmental characteristics are valid for explaining environmental issues. In this regard Non-human processes consequently become irrelevant (P . Robbins, 2012).

Thus, in view of critical realism it can be a useful approach for this study because it makes it easy to recognize both social construction that shape people's perception and independent reality. Applying a critical realist approach helps the researcher to study the competing perspectives of different actors and at the same time perform individual empirical observations (Tor A Benjaminsen & Svarstad, 2010b). In view of foregoing critical political ecology, it will be of great help to this study, since this study is on competing narratives of different actors that are responsible for oil bunkering , several political and environmental issues confronting the Niger Delta.

2.5 Discourse and Narrative analysis

Discourse and narratives analysis are interlinked but different in terms of approach. For the purpose of analysis it imperative to differentiate between the former and the latter. This implies first of all that we make a clear difference between 'discourse' and 'narrative (Svarstad, 2002). Narrative analysis is a term subjected to various definitions, several authors have defined narratives in various forms, and however their definitions are of the same directions. I will use several authors' concept of narratives analysis just to give a better overview of the meaning of narrative analysis. Hence, Discourse and narrative analysis is an important critical tool within political ecology. Discourses and narratives are understood to be representations of reality, but at different levels. While narratives is focused on specific cases, discourses are basic structure for understanding more abstract and general phenomena, often understood as 'truth regimes (Adger, Benjaminsen, Brown, & Svarstad, 2001). Discourses are constantly being redefined by the actors involved, thus forming new narratives, while at the same time providing a set of conditions within which actions and explanations may occur (Buch-Hansen & Nielsen, 2005). One of the characteristics of discourses is homogeneity in terms of message and expressive means (Adger et al., 2001). Discourse analysis thus implies a study of claims, claims makers and the claims-making processes.

Narratives can be defined as stories with a beginning, middle and end, or when cast in the form of an argument, with premises and conclusions. As described by Svarstad (2009) narrative is

defined as a story that contains a course of action and involves one or more actors. Roe (1991, 288) further describes narratives as stories with ‘a beginning, middle, and end (or premises and conclusions, when cast in the form of an argument)’. Adger et al. (2001) show that narratives often include a cast of actors, such as archetypical heroes, villains and victims. Hence, in accordance with this explanation, individual accounts are not treated as narratives. Hence, narratives is understood to be the underlying patterns in stories told by individuals. Narratives is treated as one example of expressive means within a discourse, and thus narrative analysis and construction can be seen as a first step in discourse analysis. While discourses provide a structure for explanation of events, narratives are one of the mechanisms that constantly work to redefine the discourses (T.A. Benjaminsen & Svarstad, 2008) .

Narrative is seen as the phenomenon that people tend to use in order to organize their knowledge and views in the form of stories. Johansson (2005), denotes narratives as the crucial form in expressing culture as well as knowledge. Narrative producers create and recreate the narratives and employ structural frames of norms in terms of how to narrate. The course of action encapsulated by a narrative entails that events are interlinked together with claims of causality (Elliott, 2005).

Narratives is also described by Hinchman and Hinchman (1997) as a storied ways of knowing and communicating. Narrative analysis is a form of analyzing stories told chronologically, concentrating on how elements are sequenced, how the past shapes the perception of the present, how the present shapes perception of the past and how both shape the perception of the future. Some elements are evaluated differently from others; narrative analysis is an in-depth alternative to survey research through using psychological scales (Hinchman & Hinchman, 1997) .It is an empowering qualitative methodology that gives the respondents the venue to express different point of views and evaluate standard. It is the preferred method for exploratory purposes, sensitizing the researcher.

Furthermore, according to Adger et al (2001) narrative analysis is an important tool for a researcher, it is understood to be a representative of reality and treats specific cases. Adger et al (2001) further describes narrative analysis to be the underlying patterns in stories that are told by individual. However, based on the forgoing description of narrative analysis by several scholars, this study adopted Emery Roe definition of narrative analysis. My reason for anchoring on Roe description of narrative analysis is because his description is more focused on social science analyses on development and natural resources (Roe, 1991) .This study is focused on the perception of members local communities on oil bunkering and relates to the

reality they experiences, in light with articulate (Roe, 1991) description of narrative analysis. In this study narratives treated as one example of expressive means within a discourse, and thus narrative analysis and construction can be seen as a first step in discourse analysis. While discourses provide a framework for interpretation of experiences, narratives are one of the mechanisms that constantly work to redefine the discourses. It is pertinent to note that this study is focused more on narrative analysis than discourse analysis, this is because this study is focused on a specific case of oil bunkering in the Niger Delta community in Nigeria and is not focused on a global scale.

This study contributes to knowledge about local perceptions on oil bunkering activities that is done by the local militants of the Niger Delta. Narrative analysis offers a way of obtaining a rich understanding of the main ways that local people experience and perception on oil bunkering by means of their presentations of relevant narratives. The sources of empirical data for this study are predominantly secondary sources and primary data such as government and MNOCs reports collected online, Although some of the reports were not directly on oil bunkering but the general situation that are the underlying issues of perceived illegal oil bunkering activities. Narratives plays a key role in this study. Hence, based on the data that I gathered, I constructed two types' narratives from the three actors that is linked to the issue of oil bunkering in the Niger Delta. I called the two types of narratives the

CHAPTER THREE: CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND

3.1 Pre-History of Nigeria economy

Nigeria is the most populous country in Africa, it is located in western part of Africa, it occupies a total area of 923,768km², which consists mainly of 910,768 km² land and 13,000 km² water (Dublin-Green, Awosika, & Folorunsho, 1999) . “Nigeria is blessed with abundant natural resources such as fossil fuels (petroleum, natural gas, coal, lignite), metallic minerals (tin, columbite, iron, lead, zinc, gold), radioactive minerals (uranium, thulium, monazite), non-metallic minerals (limestone, marble, gravel, clay, shale, feldspar, etc.) and arable land”.(Dublin-Green et al., 1999). It is the largest oil producer in Africa, and the sixth largest in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), the oil Nigeria accounts for 2.6 per cent of global production (Orogun, 2010).Nigeria contributes to about 14 percent of US oil for the past 10years (K. Omeje, 2006). Nigeria’s economy is largely dependent on oil, Oil resources presently account for nearly 40 percent of GDP, more than 90 percent of foreign

exchange earnings, and roughly 80 percent of government revenues (Energy Information Association, 2005).”The discovery of oil reserves in the deep and ultra-deep water was to increase the reserve base from 37.2 to 40 billion barrels by the end of 2010. In addition to oil wealth, an estimated 5.3 trillion cubic metres (TCM) of gas, reserves make Nigeria the world’s seventh largest holder of natural gas reserve and the largest in Africa”(United States Energy Information Administration, 2010).

Thus, Davenport (2010) asserts that apart from oil and gas, the expansion of solid minerals mining has the potential to contribute 15per cent to Nigeria’s GDP by the year 2015.Apparently, “the solid minerals mining sector, in contrast to oil, is non-developed, non-productive and currently contributes less than 0.5 per cent to Nigeria’s GDP, as against 35 per cent from oil and gas in 2009” (Statistics., 2010) .However, the vast oil resources in Nigeria are located in the onshore and offshore areas of the southern volatile region of Nigeria called the Niger Delta. Oil rich Niger Delta is located along the Gulf of Guinea, it is home to more than 20 million people from more than 20 ethnic and language groups with several dialect. These ethnic nationalities comprise more than 1,600 autonomous communities spread out all over nine state which comprise of the Niger Delta, out of Nigerian federation’s 36 states(Energy Information Association, 2006)

Olatubosun (1975) noted that before oil was discovered in Nigeria, the State witnessed high economic growth from several natural resources. There was a period when the Nigeria economy derived enormous revenue from exploitation of agricultural cash crops such as palm oil, timber, rubber and more (Olatubosun, 1975). When oil was discovered in the Niger Delta in 1956, it did not play a significant role in the Nigerian economy until the early 1970s (Robinson, 1996). In the words of Robinson, “in the early 1960s, revenue from oil accounted for less than 10 per cent of Nigeria’s revenue base”. For example, oil revenue contributed only 4.1% and 5.9%, respectively, of the country’s total revenue in 1963 and 1964”(Graf, 1988; Robinson, 1996). Whilst the major source of Nigeria’s revenue was from agriculture and more than 70% of the population were employed in the Agricultural sector(Robinson, 1996) .Few years later the outcome in agriculture began to reduce, oil became the mainstay of the nation’s revenue as the outcome began to increase. Indirectly, Nigerian economy slowly and systematically became more dependent on oil, for this reason, there was gradual neglect of other sector of the economy particularly the agricultural sector which was the major contributor of the state’s National Income. In spite of the country’s vast oil resources, several studies have estimated that over

80 percent of the revenue accruing from oil benefit about 1 percent of the population (Energy Information Association, 2005).

Since oil was discovered in Nigeria, the outcome in economic growth and development has been very slow, in spite of the enormous revenue accruing to the federal, state and local governments from the exploitation of oil. For instance, Oyefusi (2007) noted that nations like Norway earned the United Nations Human development ranking from the use of economic benefits of oil production (Oyefusi, 2007). Arguably, it is because the Norwegian institutions were strong before oil was discovered in Norway. To corroborate this Mehlum and Moene (2006) “asserts that countries rich in natural resources constitute both growth losers and growth winners, the reason for these diverging experience is differences in the quality of institutions” (Mehlum, Moene, & Torvik, 2006). Indeed, the discovery of oil has transformed Nigeria’s political economy, and oil has for the past decades provided approximately 90% of foreign exchange earnings and 80% of federal revenue. However, instead of turning Nigeria into one of the most developed country with good economy on the African continent, these natural resources have enriched a circle of top political elites who are in the majority ethnic groups, as well as the MNOCs, whilst the vast majority of people have become increasingly impoverished, with a per capita gross national product of only US\$260 a year (WorldBank, 1995)

3.2 Descriptive area of Niger Delta

The Niger Delta is a large region of the River Niger. Occasionally, it is called the Oil Rivers because it was once a major producer of palm oil. The region was the British Oil Rivers Protectorate from 1885 until 1893, when it was expanded and became the Niger Coast Protectorate (Mifflin, 2000). Niger Delta is Africa’s largest delta and one of the world’s largest wetlands, covering some 70 000 km² (Badmus, 2010; Eyinla & Ukpo, 2006; Okaba, 2007). The region is blessed with both renewable and non-renewable natural resources such as oil, gas, bitumen, non-timber forest products and timber forest products and wildlife. The Niger Delta is a densely populated area in Nigeria (Asakitikpi & Oyelaran, 2000). The Niger delta is the hub of oil industry in Nigeria that generate most of the Nations revenue. According to (Brisibe, 2001) 95 per cent of the total revenue for the Nigerian government is generated from oil and gas exploration in the Niger Delta. The Niger delta has good ecology and geological settings.

3.3 Ecologic and Regional Geologic setting.

The Niger Delta Basin is situated in the Gulf of Guinea in equatorial West Africa, it lies in the Atlantic coast of southern Nigeria, and within the Ibo Plateau and cross river valley. It is

between latitudes 3 N and 6 N and longitudes 5 E and 8 E (Ndubuisi & Asia, 2007; Reijers, 1996). The Niger delta has an extremely delicate and sensitive ecosystem(Nseabasi, 2005). The regions ecosystem is deeply diverse and it sustains numerous species of terrestrial and aquatic flora and fauna. Due to the delicate nature of the Niger Delta eco-system, it is vulnerable to environmental degradation. However, about 2,370 square kilometers of the Niger Delta area consist of rivers, creeks and estuaries while stagnant swamp covers about 8,600 square kilometers.

Thus, the name Niger Delta is normally referred to as the region or area limited to the geo-political zone that is mainly occupied by the minority of the southern Nigeria. Previously, it consist of six states but in recent years it was politically redefined to include three more states making it nine states, which are Delta, Bayelsa, Rivers, Cross Rivers, Imo, Abia, Akwa-Ibom, Edo and Ondo state with 185 local government areas, divided into more than 2000 communities (Chinweze & Abiola-Oloke, 2009; NDDC, 2006; Tamuno, 1972).Thus, Ibaba (2005), noted that the inclusion of Abia, Imo,and Ondo States in the definition is wrong because the scope of the region should be defined not by politics, but by geography. The motive behind this grouping were inherently political and they include administrative convenience, political expedience, and development objectives(UNDP, 2006). Hence, the population of the nine states of the Niger Delta in 1991 census was 20.5 million. The projected total population for 2005 was 28.9 million, rising to 39.2 million by 2015 and 45.7 million by 2020. Among these states Delta, Rivers, Akwa-Ibom and Imo has the highest population size (Ibaba, 2005). With the possible exception of Bayelsa and Cross River States, there are probably no significant differences in population sizes among the states(Centre for Population and Environmental Development 2003).The area accounts for more than 23% of Nigeria’s total population (NPC, 2006), and has one of the highest population densities in the world, with 265 people per square kilometer ,Current estimates from government sources put the total population of the region at 27 million in 2005 (Balouga, 2009; NDDC, 2005; Nyananyo, 2007)

Table 1 Estimated Population of the Niger Delta

State	2005	2010	2015	2020
Abia	3,230,000	3,763,000	4,383,000	5,106,000
Akwa-Ibom	3,343,000	3,895,000	4,537,000	5,285,000

Bayelsa	1,710,000	1,992,000	2,320,000	2,703,000
Cross-River	2,736,000	3,187,000	3,712,000	4,325,000
Delta	3,594,000	4,186,000	4,877,000	5,681,000
Edo	3,018,000	3,516,000	4,096,000	4,871,000
Imo	3,342,000	3,894,000	4,535,000	5,283,000
Ondo	3,025,000	3,524,000	4,105,000	4,782,000
Rivers	4,858,000	5,659,000	6,592,000	7,679,000
Total	28,856,000	33,616,000	39,157,000	45,715,000

Source: Niger Delta Region Survey Based on National Population Commission Data (cited by Ibeanu 2006)

As indicated earlier on in the introduction, the Niger Delta is defined as consisting of the area covered by the natural delta of the Niger River and the areas to the East and West, which also produce oil. The natural limits of the Niger River Delta can be defined by its geology and hydrology. Its approximate northern boundaries are located close to the bifurcation of the Niger River of Aboh, while the Western and Eastern boundaries are around the Benin River and Imo River, respectively. “The broader Niger Delta region, which includes all oil-producing areas and others considered relevant for reasons of administrative convenience, political expedience and development objectives, extends the land area to 75,000 square kilometers “(UNDP 2006:19). It is this definition that will be used in this study.

However, the inhabitants of the Niger Delta have settled in the region for several centuries, in fact the oldest group is said to have lived in the Niger Delta for about 7000-10,000 years (Alagoa, 2005).According to Atakiti (2004), (as cited in Saiyou 2006), the Niger Delta consisted mostly of agrarian communities before the 15thcentury. Those communities produced commodities such as oil palm, rubber, sugarcane and fruit trees like mango, banana, plantain, and pawpaw. They also engaged in fishing, handicraft and trading, hence below is the map of Nigeria showing the locations of the nine oil producing states.




Figure 1,

Source: Map of Nigeria and the Niger Delta. (Idemudia, E. Ite, 2006)

Thus, **Fig 1** represent the map of Nigeria, each names on the map represent the states in Nigeria. Nigeria is made of 36 states and the FCT Abuja as you can see in the map. The names highlighted in the map represent the nine Niger Delta states, they are the states were oil bunkering activities takes place, but it is more rampant in Delta, Akwa-Ibom, Bayelsa and Rivers state because these states produce the highest volumes of crude oil per day.

3.4 Oil

Oil comes in different forms, but in the contest of this study the oil that is referred here is crude oil. Crude oil is sometimes referred to as black gold, it has ranging viscosity and varies in color to various shade of black and yellow depending on the composition of its hydrocarbon. Crude oil however, is a mixture of hydrocarbons that exist in liquid phase. It is found mainly in natural underground reservoirs and remains liquid in atmospheric pressure after passing through different process of refining. Crude oil is the type of oil that is refined to produce a wide array of petroleum products which includes heating oil, diesel, gasoline, jet fuels, lubricants, asphalt,

ethane, propane, butane and many other products used for their energy or chemical content.

3.5 Bunkering.

Human rights Watch (2003), describes bunkering as the process of filling up a ship with oil (or coal), its illegality, is a euphemism for theft. It is premised on the constitutional provision that the ownership and control of all minerals and mineral oil, in, under and upon any land, and of rivers, streams and watercourses in Nigeria are vested in the federal government, under Section 44(3) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria as originated in the 1946 Mineral Ordinance, (Human rights Watch, 2003). Thus, In Nigeria, Oil bunkering is used as a euphemism for oil theft, to understand what bunkering is, it is imperative to first understand the meaning of “Bunker”.

Bunker may sometimes vary in different context but in the context of this study, it means stolen crude oil. Bunker however means, the fuel that is consumed by the engines of a ship or the compartments of tanks in a ship for storing fuel or fuel used to power a ship or ships fuel. Thus, bunkering is the oil industry’s related activity, it means a legitimate trade where licensed operators are authorized to replenish the ship and other vessel with fuels, water and lubricants (bunkering service). Until recent times bunker fuel remains the most popular firing power for all vessels, this is why the demand and supply for bunker fuel has helped to develop many economies around the globe. In the Niger Delta, most bunkering activities are done by the authorized agencies, but since the 1990s it have become an activity that is also carried out by the local militants of the Niger Delta. The type of oil bunkering that is done by the local militants of the Niger Delta is perceived by the state and authorized agencies as illegal oil bunkering (oil theft), for this reason the word oil bunkering appears to be a Nigerian colloquialism which has nothing to do with the normal legitimate bunkering.

In the context of this study illegal oil bunkering means oil theft. In essence, oil bunkering is necessary for maritime shipping within the maritime sector, as indicated earlier on it is seen as illegal oil bunkering by the Nigerian government and the MNOCs, when it is carried out without due process or valid documents, or in violation of the Nigerian Maritime Sector and the guidelines made by the statutory institutions regarding it. On the other hand, it may be seen as legitimate from the local community perspective because, they claim they are collecting what rightfully belongs to them. The local’s claims that the lands, oil, lakes and any resources that is found around their environment belongs to them since the authorities have neglected them. Perhaps this can be said to make sense as a counterculture, in the sense whereby it negates

formal processes of achieving a legitimate profits from economic activity.

Thus, oil bunkering is not a new phenomenon in Nigeria, but since the involvement of local militants in oil bunkering, it gave it a new dimension which took the attention of the state and its allies. The current Nigerian minister of finance Dr Ngozi Okonjo Iweale in a press statement, stated that about 100,000-400,000 barrels of crude oil is been stolen on a daily basis from the Niger Delta, although there is no accurate statistics, the stolen oil is valued for about \$1billion in revenue lost to oil bunkering. The Nigerian Economic Summit Group (NESG) further asserts that a daily theft of about 100,000 barrels of crude oil valued at about \$2.8 million is been stolen on a daily basis (Subair & Adesanmi, 2003). This is a disturbing trend considering the fact that Nigerian economy relies on oil which contributes more than 80% to the country's revenue (Lawal, 2004). An SDN (2013) report further asserted that the vast majority which is about 75% is been sold internationally, but approximately 25% of it stays in the Niger Delta to be refined and sold locally (SDN, 2013). In the words of Katsouris and Sayne (2013) ,Nigerian crude oil products are stolen in large scale, and exchanged for heavy arms or exported illegally abroad with few of the quantities consumed locally.

However, the business of illegal oil bunkering, involves players far beyond the shores of Nigeria, the number of oil thieves has risen to an unimaginable level. The bunkers tap directly into pipelines away from oil company facilities, and connect from the pipelines to barges that are hidden in small creeks with mangrove forest cover (Human rights Watch 2003). “The business of oil bunkering is as opaque and murky as the many gaps in analysts’ knowledge of its operations” (Asuni, 2009b) .However, information gathered from the field, and also confirmed by a recent study by (Asuni, 2009b),reveal three types of illegal bunkering. Asuni (2009) further describes the three different players of oil theft in the Niger Delta as: (1) high profile international (large-scale tapping of pipelines to fill large tankers for export) (2) national syndicate (excess lifting of crude oil beyond the licensed amount) and then (3) the local actors (small-scale pilfering for the local market).These three types of illegal oil bunkering will be elaborated in other to get an overview of oil bunkering operations.

3.5.1 Large scale-tapping of pipelines to fill large tankers for export.

The first is the high profile international (large scale-tapping of pipelines to fill large tankers for export). This form of oil theft is done by either hacking directly into the pipeline or by tapping the well head. The top structure of the pipeline called the Christmas head is removed, this is done to enable them insert a hose in which they will use to siphon the oil (Asuni, 2009a).

At this point the oil is placed in small barges and taken out to the sea, to be transferred onto large ships to be exported lurking out of sight of the authorities (Asuni, 2009a). In most cases the bunkers are being given both money weapons in return for their oil. They are later exported to other countries to be refined, this type of oil theft is much more significant not because of the monetary aspect involved, but rather because of the exchange of weapons and drugs the bunkers get in return. This type of operation involves high syndicate, from outside Nigeria, they involve high profile businessmen who are mainly from the developed world. While the tapping and loading of illegal oil is done by the youths in the Niger Delta, the transport, finance and laundry of money is done by the international players. These types of large ships carry about 30,000-400,000 barrels of crude oil; they can even take more if needed.

3.5.2 Excess lifting of crude oil beyond licensed amount

The second type of illegal oil bunkering is the national syndicate (excess lifting of crude oil beyond licensed amount). This type of oil theft involves national players such as staff of the oil company, top government officials. It is done by using forged bill of lading. Bill of lading is a document that is issued by a carrier to a shipper, listing and acknowledging receipt of goods for transport and specifying the terms and delivery on it (Asuni, 2009a)

3.5.3 Small scale pilfering for local markets

The third type of illegal oil bunkering is the local actors (small-scale pilfering for the local market). This type of illegal oil bunkering is the oldest type of oil theft in the history of oil theft in Nigeria, it is also the most controversial type, this is because the stolen oil is not exported outside Nigeria, it is rather refined in the Niger Delta and sold locally (Asuni, 2009b). It is this type of oil bunkering that is said to cause more environmental degradation. This is because, it is refined in the Niger Delta by the locals who have no experience in following the due process to reduce oil spillage which causes environment degradation. Hence, Just like other players small scale operations also requires a litany of accomplices, in most cases the bunkers have an informant working inside some of the oil companies who provide the bunkers details about the company's security patrols, in exchange for a significant payout. To maintain secrecy the communities must be paid off and a local militia or security force is hired to patrol the area. Hence, when the crude oil is refined by the locals, the oil is sold at a cheaper rate than the normal market price in Nigeria, this type of oil bunkering is minor and it is conducted by some members of the local community called the militants.

Hence, at various level of illegal oil bunkering it is possible to identify the different players, at the international level it involves people from outside Nigeria, some corrupt political elites and youths of the Niger Delta. At the national level it involves the military, staffs of the oil companies, top government officials, retired military men and also some members of the Niger Delta. Whilst at the local level which is the least and most significant of them, it involves the local militants who are mainly youths. Some of the oil company 'staffs, some community leaders such as chiefs and the kings as well as some political elites are also among. There are high profile Nigeria politicians that covertly works with the local militants, they have allies with international ship owners, and this makes oil bunkering to be a complex issue. Can this complexity be one reason why it is difficult to curb the increasing issue of oil sabotage in the Niger Delta unilaterally?

Thus, in accordance with the forgoing description of the three types of oil bunkering, this study is focused on the third type of oil bunkering (small scale pilfering for local market) that is done by the local militants. This type of oil bunkering is arguably illegal because it is a theft, and theft in a common sense is illegal. Hence, the locals of the Niger Delta are not disputing the fact that it is illegal, but they claim that it is legitimate because it is part of their resistance struggle. As indicated earlier on, the oil in the Niger Delta is the key player and sustainer of Nigeria economy. It is indisputable that the oil is god`s gift to the Niger Delta region. In a common sense the Niger Delta region is supposed to have unwavering benefit from the oil revenue in terms of structural and socio-economic development as the region that feeds the Nation. But this has not been the case, thus, the next slide sheds light on the resistance tactics that was employed by the locals of the Niger Delta.

CHAPTER FOUR: THE NIGER DELTA RESISTANCE

4.1 History of local's resistance against the state

Sharp et al. (2000, 3) defines resistance as any activity that “attempts to set up situations, groupings, and actions which resist the impositions of dominating power,” which can range from “breaking wind when the king goes by” to “violent actions” with transformative goals (Thrift, Sharp, Routledge, Philo, & Paddison, 2000). In the Niger Delta, the reason for the local's resistance against the state are multilayered. However, the obnoxious policies and laws that were systematically enacted by the state, neglect and marginalization by the state is said to

be the primary reasons. Thus, the policies enacted by the state gave the state complete control and ownership of any area (onshore and offshore) within the Niger Delta where crude oil is discovered. Majority of these areas are farmlands and rivers in which the locals of the Niger Delta depend on, as their means of livelihood. Hence, it should be noted that the state is controlled by majority ethnic northerners whilst the locals of the Niger Delta are in the minority ethnic southerners.

The locals of the Niger Delta often adjudge the transfers to be done so unfairly that the north with apparent control of political power and, as such, resource-sharing power is unduly favored (Joab-Peterside, Porter, & Watts, 2012; Uzodike, Allen, & Wetho, 2010). As described by Suberu (1996), these processes legitimized ‘the expropriation of the resources of the oil-producing communities as part of the official strategy of centralized cake-sharing (Suberu, 1996). Thus, this chapter examines the local’s resistance and how the state laws were structured to favor the political elites and its allies. Perhaps it may be due to the state’s political and economic interest, thereby alienating the locals.

4.2 Pre-Colonialism Legal Framework

However, the Policies and legal framework guiding petroleum development in Nigeria, which is one of the reason for the local’s resistance, is embedded in the colonial oil and mineral laws of 1887, 1907 and 1914 (C. I. Obi, 2010), when the British colonial administration enacted the Mineral Oils Ordinance No. 17 (1914) and the Mineral (Amendment) Ordinance No. 1 (1925) (K. C. Omeje, 2006). Thus, the 1914 Mineral Oil Ordinance was enacted “To regulate the right to search for, win and work mineral oil” These ordinances granted Britain a total right of alienation or disposition of all crude oil discovered in Nigeria.² The period of mineral concession regime gave the British a monopoly covering the whole Nigerian territory and consequently restricted outsiders that were non-British from having access to the mineral-oil rights.

The laws on control and ownership of natural resources that was enacted by the British was the inception of the legal regime that has shaped the ownership of oil in Nigeria. The outcome of all these laws was to vest in the Crown/State the absolute right and control over oil resources

² Section 6(1) (a) of the Mineral Oils Ordinance No. 17 of 1914 provided that: "No lease or license shall be granted except to a British subject or a British company and its principal place of business within Her Majesty's dominions: the Chairman and the Managing Director (if any) and the majority of the other directors of which are British subjects. »

(K. S. A. Ebeku, 2001). By subsequent further amendment, the entire offshore areas of Nigeria's territorial areas were vested in the crown. Following the transfer of political power to Nigeria at independence in 1960, ownership of mineral resources under the authority of the British Crown, became vested in the government of Nigeria. Hence, the amendment of the Mineral Oils Ordinance No. 17 (1914) and the Oil Mineral (Amendment) Ordinance No.1 (1925) by the Mineral Oils (Amendment) Act of 1958, paved the way for the entry of foreign (non-British) companies, such as Shell petroleum into the Nigerian petroleum industry. Shell petroleum became the first MNOCs to start operations in Nigeria after the amendment of this act.

Few years after independence the government amended the constitution in 1969 and 1978. The 1969 Act, marked the blueprint in the history of petroleum legislation in Nigeria. Thus, in accordance with Degree 51 of 1969 act, it states "that all the petroleum in Nigeria is vested in the Federal Government, whose sole responsibility it is to control the resources and only permit their exploitation under license, whilst In 1978, the Land Use Act⁴⁹ states that "subject to the provisions of this Decree⁵⁰, all the land comprised in the territory of each state of the federation are hereby vested in the military governor of the state and such land shall be held in trust and administered for the use and common benefit of all Nigerians in accordance with the provisions of this decree".

The land act was however enacted with the result that land right was linked with oil right thereby abolishing the pluralistic land tenure system in Nigeria and replacing it with a uniform land tenure system. The land Act reduced the strength on communal ownership, it implies that customary land owners have lost their communal land ownership derivable from the customary land tenure system. These acts by the states were as a result of the interest of some corrupt political elites who have influence in the state's decision making, their motives was to acquire and monopolize the locals of the Niger Delta rich and endowed natural resources.

Furthermore, Cavanag and Benjaminsen (2015) noted that Marx (1995) asserted in eight chapters of Part Eight in Volume One of capital, such approach of commonly owned property constitute a form of 'primitive accumulation,' or a ' historical process of divorcing the producer from the means of production', albeit one that 'forms the pre-history of capital'(Marx, 1995). To corroborate this Harvey (2007, 34) describes accumulation by dispossession "as the ways assets, wealth and income are transferred from the mass of the population toward the upper classes or from vulnerable to richer countries" Thus, dispossession occurs when the elites (the capitalist) directly or indirectly takes away the rights of the locals or indigenous people over control of their natural resources.(David Harvey, 2007).

Indeed both Marx and Harvey's view on accumulation by dispossession aptly captures the situation of the Niger Delta. As the rich political elites from the majority North that dominates the Nigerian government, have enriched themselves with the oil revenues that is derived from the Niger Delta. These elite's controls 80% of oil blocks that are in the Niger Delta, thereby dispossessing the locals of the Niger Delta of the natural resources that rightfully belongs to them. As a result of this, the locals of the Niger Delta protested against this marginalization, yet nothing was done about it by the state, they filed complaints through the court process and became choice less since the state did not comply with them through a diplomatic court process, violent conflict became the end game of struggle over control of the oil in the Niger Delta. As Obi (2010), stated that "in this context of struggle is the quest to redress perceived injustices embedded in the separation of those that profit from, and enjoy the benefits of oil production and commoditization (the transnational alliance of petro-state, oil multinationals, and ruling elites), from the others (the dispossessed in local communities from under whose lands and waters the oil is extracted)"(C. I. Obi, 2010).

However, anchoring on examples of conservation (cited in Cavanagh, Connor Joseph Benjaminsen, Tor A,2015), several scholars have rightfully noted that the states approach to locals is also intimately related to ongoing processes of primitive accumulation or 'accumulation by dispossession' (B. a. R. F. Büscher, 2014; D Harvey, 2005), whereby the rents and incomes derived from the environment are steadily appropriated in addition to land and resources themselves (Tor A Benjaminsen & Bryceson, 2012; B. Büscher, 2009; Corson, 2011; Corson & MacDonald, 2012; Kelly, 2011).). Thus, several empirical studies from East Africa shows that, when benefits from natural resources actually do exist and are designated for redistribution, access to these is often highly unequal and reproductive of existing social inequalities (Mackenzie, 2012; Tumusiime & Sjaastad, 2014; Tumusiime & Vedeld, 2012; Vedeld, Jumane, Wapalila, & Songorwa, 2012).

Consequently, "Revenues derived from the oil resources and payments for ecosystem services (such as carbon offsets) can be seized by the state, by private enterprises, or by corrupt officials, with little 'trickling down' to the communities that bear the opportunity cost" (C. Cavanagh & Benjaminsen, 2014; Nel & Hill, 2013).As described by these forgoing scholars, it is captures the situation in Nigeria. Whereby the revenues that are budgeted by the state to compensate the locals of the Niger Delta over environmental degradation, ends up in the pockets of the same government officials and some chieftains in the Niger Delta. Consequently, "when the

expropriation of farmland or resource access rights remains uncompensated, and when indirect benefits is not properly shared or not shared, rural populations arguably subsidize both the territorialisation of protected areas by the state and its allies more broadly “(Tor A Benjaminsen & Bryceson, 2012).

The restriction of access to lands and sea for oil production in the Niger Delta by the state, is indeed applicable to the practice of protected areas PAs. However, protected areas is now central not only to ongoing processes of accumulation by dispossession, but also to more-than human forms of global bio-politics (Baldwin, 2013; Braun, 2014; Connor J Cavanagh, 2014; Grove, 2010; Smith, 2011). Hence, the concept of bio-politics is described by Foucault’s (1990, 2003),” as the ways in which the classical sovereign power to ‘take life or let live’ gradually became complimented by mechanisms for ‘making live or letting die’ at the level of the population, as evidenced by the rise of disciplines and institutions of demography, public health, and humanitarian intervention” (Duffield, 2007; Li, 2010). “Presently, contemporary bio-power functions not only through the ‘racist’ (*Foucault* 2003: 254-255) categorization of human populations”. “Rather, bio-politics now also depends on ideas that favors certain groups and nonhuman species to prosper under rapidly changing political-economic and environmental conditions, thereby restricting others from access to the means of prosperity and subsistence or ‘let die” (Connor J Cavanagh, 2014; Cupples, 2012; Smith, 2011; Youatt, 2008). Thus, as Biermann and Mansfield (2014, 2) asserted, “modern conservation science is shaped by a bio-political logic that emphasizes distinctions between bio-political kinds and develops interventions based on these distinctions a logic that also informs racial, biological distinctions among humans”(Biermann & Mansfield, 2014).

Rejecting the idea of environment and development projects that marginalize them, the dispossessed locals often counters the legitimacy of conservation as an acceptable land use, and go against its fulfillment by applying different forms of tactics both violent and non-violent tactics (Norgrove & Hulme, 2006). There are several examples of such cases in most African countries, these range from the continuation of banned livelihood practices (Tumusiime et al. 2011), to intentionally killing of protected wildlife(Western, 1994), to other violence approach such as harassing the conservation authorities (Paul Robbins, McSweeney, Waite, & Rice, 2006). In spite of the increasing practice of these violent activities in different case studies of conservation, different scholars believes that it is on probability if the locals are indeed a major hindrance to conservation governance(Connor Joseph Cavanagh & Benjaminsen, 2015).

However, as indicated earlier on, oil is the mainstay of Nigeria's economy, the state is highly dependent on oil from the Niger Delta. The state has therefore ensured to protect its source of income through repression and through the laws mentioned above at the detriment of the locals of the Niger Delta. In this regard, any group seeking to openly resist the government laws will likely face swift and heavy-handed repression from states, often with financial or ideological support from donors and nongovernmental organizations abroad (Brockington & Scholfield, 2010). Thus, government gains authority not only by establishing and enforcing laws in a country but specifically through the deployment of the state of exception, a time and space where others must follow laws but the sovereign can operate outside the legal system if it perceives a threat to its authority (Agamben, 2005; Agamben & Hiepko, 1998). Edkins and Pin-Fat (2004), argued that this idea of sovereign power precludes meaningful resistance because any perceived threat can be neutralized through the use of the exception, a time and space where power relations are replaced by violence relations (Edkins, Pin-Fat, & Shapiro, 2004). In this puzzling scene, the locals right that is been protected by laws starts dwindling, as Edkins and PinFat (2004, 9) stated, "we have all become homines sacri or bare life in the face of a biopolitics that technologizes, administers, and depoliticizes, and thereby renders the political and power relations irrelevant."

Furthermore, as I go on, I will discuss several resistance tactics that was implored by the locals of the Niger Delta, as against the state and its allies (MNOCS). For example, Holmes' (2007) meta-analysis shows how protected area-neighbors used these tactics in 34 case studies from across the developing world" (cited in Cavanagh and Benjaminsen 2015). An interesting fact about these case studies, are the repeating patterns and similarities in the resistance tactics in which the locals adopted in 27 of these case studies, the threat to livelihood practices creates the main form of resistance. Some other more direct resistance tactics to conservation involves the intentional killings of wildlife or destruction of forest cover, as observed in selected cases from Uganda" (Adams & Hulme, 2001), Tanzania (Sunseri, 2005), and Kenya (Collett, 1987; Western, 1994). "That said, in its most extreme incarnations, anti-conservation resistance can also take the form of threatened, attempted, or actual assault, murder, or torture of conservation personnel" (Tor A Benjaminsen, 2000; Brockington, 2004). Thus, the resistance tactics applied in the foregoing examples strikes a great similarity with the case of the Niger Delta. Hence, the difference is the type of natural resources involved and the mixed agendas in the local's militants.

4.3 Post-Independence resistance

Obi (2010) asserted that the Niger Delta region is not new to resistance politics, in fact as far back as 18th and 19th centuries the inhabitants of Niger Delta resisted the early moves of the European investors to gain access to the central of Atlantic coast where the goods were sourced. The resistance by the locals' main figure (monarch) was subdued by the British few years later, laying the foundation for colonizing Nigeria (Obi, 2010). The British forcefully brought the Northern and Southern protectorate to form a union called Nigeria in January 1st January 1914. Cyril Obi (1997) contends that, by forcefully integrating Nigeria to be a union, they also integrated Nigeria into a global capitalist system, this was done because of the British self-interest to gain access to supply of cheap raw materials and a ready market for end products from the global centers of industrial capital (C. I. Obi, 1997). By forcefully integrating Nigeria with different ethnic groups that are absolutely different in terms of their religion, their culture and their ways of life gave the factions of certain more populated ethnic groups an edge in sharing of spoils within Nigeria (C. I. Obi, 1997). This in turn gave them role in exercising power in the state as well as giving them effective role to control cash cropped based accumulation at the period when Nigeria economy was dependent on agriculture.

Cyril Obi (2007) noted that "In the equation of colonial patrimonialism and the game of numbers, the ethnic minorities often lost out, or were marginalized in the process of accumulation". The British divided Nigeria into three geo-political zones corresponding with the three major ethnic group in Nigeria (Igbo, Yoruba and Hausa-Fulani). This zoning of the region instituted the ethnic division and political instability, as well as the agitation of minority groups against perceived ethnic majority domination. Obi further noted that the 1960 Nigeria independence gave different direction of the struggle for self-determination. Changing the direction of the struggle, the locals of the Niger Delta who are in the minority groups sought to have their own sovereign state, to avoid continuous perceived marginalization and neglect by the larger groups. "Their response was one of using ethnicity to push for self-determination, usually expressed in the form of demands for exclusive space, state creation, which would give them room to exercise autonomy over resources, and protection from having these resources taken away by powerful factions from the majority ethnic groups" (C. I. Obi, 1997).

As indicated earlier on, the activities of the government and the MNOCs have always been challenged by the locals of the Niger Delta. Few years after Nigerian independence in 1960, the earliest act of armed resistance of the locals was led Isaac Jasper Adaka Boro. He was from the ethnic Ijaw, he was an activist and a police officer. In the words of Tebekaemi (1982:119-120),

“early hours of February 23, 1966 (just a decade after the discovery oil in the Niger Delta) Adaka Boro and his 59-man Niger Delta Volunteer Service (NDVS) declared “The Niger Delta Republic, distinct and separate from Nigeria” (Adaka Boro and his compatriots’ “12-Day Revolution” was provoked by what they saw as social neglect, ethnic chauvinism, political marginalization and economic deprivation, orchestrated by Nigeria’s post-independent ruling elites”(Tebekaemi, 1982). This much was made clear by Boro, while addressing his men:

“Let us examine with some latitude whether the state of development is to any extent commensurate with a tint of the bulk of already tapped mineral and agricultural resources...Therefore, remember your seventy-year-old grandmother who still farms before she eats; remember also your poverty stricken people; remember too your petroleum which is being pumped out daily from your veins, and then fight for your freedom” (Tebekaemi, 1982:116).

The resistance that was instituted by Isaac Boro was however crushed by federal troops after twelve days. Boro and his men were subsequently arrested, on trump of treasonable felony, the court found them guilty and sentenced to death (Tebekaemi, 1982). Isaac Boro was later released but died when the Biafra civil war broke out. Indeed, Omotola (2009: 134) noted, “that Isaac Boro led revolt was a wakeup call for the ethnic consciousness of the minorities of the Niger Delta as much as the genesis of several civil society groups of various types such as the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP)”(Omotola, 2009).

4.4 Non-Violence resistance tactics

After the death of Isaac Boro, there was a calm and peaceful period. However, between the periods of 1980s there was collapse in global oil price, this affected the Nigerian economy.” In the context of the socioeconomic crisis, prolonged misrule, and the continued neglect of the Niger Delta by the state and MNOCs, it reignited the spirit of resistance in the Niger Delta ”(Omotola, 2009). The local communities resumed their agitation against the state and the MNOCs, this time they started with a peaceful agitation, this was to draw the attention of the federal government to their plight and find a quick solution. First through legal process to make the multinational oil companies (MNOCs) pay compensation to the host community, over the damages caused to their environment as a result of oil installation and production. The failure of these legal actions led to several peaceful protests by Ken Saro-Wiwa, a writer, activist, businessman and environmentalist.

Ken Saro-Wiwa founded a grass-root movement in early the 1990s called “Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People” (MOSOP). MOSOP campaigns as a grass-root organization demanded local autonomy for the Ogoni people, and Ogoniland (K Saro-wiwa, 1993). They also clamored for the recognition of the economic contributions of Ogoni to the Nigerian State, and alleviating poverty in Ogoni. MOSOP also protested the marginalization of the Ogoni and its people at the federal and state levels demanding equal citizenship rights as other groups in Nigeria (CLO, 2002; Okonta & Oronto, 2001; Ken Saro-Wiwa & Boyd, 1995). The Ogoni demands are detailed in the “Ogoni Bill of Rights”, presented by MOSOP to the Nigerian government in 1990. The demands contained in the Bill of Rights were ignored by the federal military government. These protest triggered the state to harass and intimidate Ogoni leaders, which was aided by Shell because the state and MNOCs felt threatened and angered by MOSOP (Okechukwu Ibeanu, 2000).

The state security forces raided the Ogoni community to subdue the unrest, by doing this, 27 villages were allegedly raided, resulting in the death of 2000 Ogoni people and the displacement of 80,000 (C. Obi, 2009). The Ogoni struggle was continuously repressed by the state, on the 21th of May 1994 Saro-Wiwa and eight of his colleagues were found guilty of inciting Niger Delta youths to murder four opposition Ogoni chiefs and, consequently, sentenced to death by hanging (Agbibo, 2011). The execution of Saro-Wiwa was a deliberate act by the Nigerian government to weaken the main figure of the resistance around which a united Niger Delta front could emerge, (Soyinka, 1996). Thus, prior to Saro-Wiwa’s death, the Ogoni struggle was weakened, aided by state repression and leadership bickering. “The establishment of MOSOP, the hanging of the top 9 Ogoni leaders and the militarization of the region between 1990 and 1998 represented a fundamental watershed”(Agbibo, 2011). “It marked not simply the proliferation of a large number of forms of ethnic mobilization across the region but by a passing of the political torch to a generation of more militant and activist youth” (Joab-Peterside S, 2012).

4.5 Emergence of Militant resistance

Following the death of Saro-Wiwa and 8 other leaders, in December 1998 the Ijaw Youth Council (IYC) was formed at a meeting of Ijaw activists and representatives from 40 Ijaw clans from across the Niger Delta states in Nigeria(Omotola, 2009). The Ijaw youth council is a formation of youth from Ijaw ethnic group of the Rivers, Bayelsa and Delta states of the Niger Delta. Its major objective was to ‘fight against the marginalization, neglect, underdevelopment,

militarization, and repression of the minorities in the Niger Delta by the federal government and multinational oil companies (Omotola, 2009: 136). Agbiboa (2011) asserts that, at this meeting the IYC issued the Kaiama declaration. About 5000 youths drawn from 500 communities, 40 clans, and 25 organizations, held at Kaiama in Bayelsa State (Agbiboa, 2011). The Kaiama Declaration insisted that ‘we cease to recognize all undemocratic decrees that rob our people of the right to ownership and control of our lives and resources, which were enacted without our participation and consent’ and demanded the ‘Ijaw control of Ijaw oil’(A Ikelegbe, 2005). For the IYC, ‘any oil company that employs the services of the armed forces of the Nigerian State to “protect” its operations will be viewed as an enemy of the Ijaw people’ the motto of IYC was” resource control by any means possible “ (Agbiboa, 2011; A Ikelegbe, 2005).

Hence, rather than engaging diplomacy or responding to the demands made in the Kaiama Declaration, the military government sent in troops backed by warships that forcefully subdued the protests in January 1999(C. Obi, 2009). Few months later, Nigeria became a democratic nation, the transition from military rule to a democratic system gave the locals of the Niger Delta a high expectation that their plight will be addressed better under a democratic rule. The locals’ expectation however, was not the reality, revise was the case, rather the issues intensified when Nigeria became a democratic nation. The level of human rights abuses in the region by the state security became higher. Simultaneously, the locals adopted a violent tactics in reprisal of the human right abuses inflicted on them by the Nigeria security force. However, In some cases, entire oil-bearing communities were razed to the ground after the military were informed by oil companies that protesting communities were threatening oil facilities or staff (Courson, 2006).

The government, during the regime Olusegun Obasanjo adopted a standard state response mechanism of deploying soldiers to shoot and kill protesting indigenes, and to raze down communities. The invasion of Odi (a town populated by the Ijaws) by state security forces, is a prime example of the state response mechanism. However, the state security forces invaded Odi in revenge for the murder of 12 policemen by youths in the town on 20 November 1999. Over 2000 Odi inhabitants were killed and several thousand displaced in the state-sanctioned massacre (Omotola, 2009). Sadly, the ex-president Obasanjo justified this dastardly action by arguing that the brutal measure was necessary to deter communities from killing security officials as a way of pressing for their demands (OMCT & CLEEN, 2002). The continued standard state response mechanism in the Niger Delta region contributed to the feeling in some

circles, the state and the MNOCs would neither listen to the demands of the local people nor respect their human rights(Omotola, 2009). Such views were informed by the apparent ‘failure’ of peaceful protest to effect any meaningful change (Omotola, 2009).

4.6 The militants groups and their resistance tactics

Indeed, the locals of the Niger Delta were left with no choice but to return to violence in the Niger Delta. The locals backed their revolt against the state and MNOCs on the Kaiama Declaration. The declaration is used to evade laws and regulations enacted by the state that criminalize their struggle, it set the scene for armed resistance, Kiama declaration gave birth to several local groups, in which the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) being the most formidable (Obi, 2009). These groups are made up of different Ethnic groups in the Niger Delta such as Ijaw, Urhobo, Itsekiri and more, they use violence, they are predominantly youths, and the nature of being popular movements seeking fundamental change in the status quo.

As noted by Otite (2009), locals who are fighting for the emancipation of the Niger Delta are organized in several groups which include Ijaw people’s assembly (IPA).The federated Niger Delta Ijaw communities (FNDIC), the Niger Delta People Volunteer Force (NDPVF), Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) and other armed group from Delta, Bayelsa and River state (Ukiwo 2007; Okonta 2007; Coventry Cathedral 2009:123-124). MEND`s modus operandi was said to more brutal, they attack on oil facilities and the abduction of expatriate and local oil workers (family members in some cases) , oil bunkering by insurgents has been on the rise. Thus, the activities of this and other groups operating in the region resulted in the shutting-in of about a quarter of the nation’s daily oil production. As indicated earlier on, the resistance is however, the direct culmination of largely unaddressed grievances such as land dispossession and pollution, marginalization and political repression(C. Obi, 2009).

Of course, the locals of the Niger Delta militants are drawn to violent tactics in response to both the direct violence suffered at the hands of Nigerian military and the security forces, as well as the intimidation that they face when attempting to rectify these injustices through legal process. In directing the complex terrain of survival in the Niger Delta, the locals embraced violent and resist the unfair approach towards them by the state and its allies as well as its local allies. Although the state have made little efforts in addressing the grievance of the Niger Delta. Thus, the violent approach by the locals led into a rapid increase in numbers of militias and criminal

gangs in the region (Coventry Cathedral 2009, iog-i31), this development that partly made it unclear to differentiate between genuine resistance and criminality (Cathedral., 2009)

As mentioned above, a second objective is also to publicly frame resistance tactics primarily as a livelihood strategy, rather than as criminal activity or open rebellion against state authority. Indeed, the resistance tactics that was adopted by the local militants have been able to help the locals set up some development project as well as enriching several members of the locals, but by the very nature of these tactics, it covers the sound between subsistence and improvement as well as between economic opportunism and those who are genuinely fighting because of their political grievance. As Reno described such situation, “there is a triumph of greed over grievance in the causation of conflicts” (Reno, 2003 :45). The locals, use rebellion and violence as an instrument deployed to acquire in the circumstance of economic crisis and decline, and an opportunity to loot and illegally trade in primary commodities and minerals (Allen, 1999:372). However, Some self-centered members of the local militants might be hiding under the aegis of resource control, as an opportunity to covertly satisfy their financial interest. Thereby deviating from the tent of the struggle which was the major reason for them to become members of the militants groups.

Let me emphatically state that the Niger Delta locals militants groups varies in terms of how genuinely their struggle is. They are categorized into genuine and non-genuine resistance group. I will therefore proceed to identify and discuss the typologies of militants groups and how genuinely they are, to help decipher the issues of criminality and fighting for justice. The genuine resistance groups are those who dissociate themselves from any criminal act. Ikelegbe (2008) differentiated the militias group into three types of militias in the Niger Delta. They are: insurgent, deviant insurgent, and criminal armed groups. Ikelegbe further asserted that the insurgents are the genuine fighters of ethnic minority mobilization against the state and MNOCs. They are those who openly and legalize their resistance as against the state and its allies, examples of these **insurgents** as described by Ikelegbe are MEND, MOSIEND, FNDIC and NDPVF. They are all officially connected to the Ijaw Niger Delta resource control. The second type of militia group called the insurgent **deviant groups**, these groups emerged mainly from the universities confraternity, and they are led by the local henchmen who controls some major stronghold in the community. They in some cases opportune to have influence with the ruling elites in the government. They are used by these influential elites to achieve issues that are personal and of self-interest to them such as the oil bunkering and selling of arms as well as

rigging elections. As described by Paul Collier³, people rebel not because of the existence of historical and social grievance but because of the opportunities they get to enrich themselves during conflict period. The third of militia group as described by Ikelegbe are the **criminal armed groups**, these groups arguably indulge in insurgent purposefully to enrich themselves and per-take in criminal activities (Augustine Ikelegbe, 2008). Hence I have described the divergent factors and reasons that motivated or compelled the locals youth to become militants. This included: desire to protect their land, communities and ethnic groups; to protest against government and oil companies' political and economic marginalization of their communities; fear for their personal safety following threats by members of other armed groups or government security agencies; being hired by politicians to help rig elections, intimidate voters, and attack opponents; to make money through criminal activities, and so on.

Furthermore, as often indicated, because of the activities of the MNOCs coupled with the state approach towards the locals of the Niger Delta and the legal frame work enacted by the state, they have affected the local's means of livelihood negatively. The locals have for the past decades endured these effect as well as the marginalization by the state ruling elites against the locals of the Niger Delta. The locals have employed different resistance tactics in other to maintain their means of livelihood, which have been a practice to them for several generations.

However, acknowledging the negative impact of these militant groups, MEND in particular. The state under the leadership of Olusegun Obasanjo began to make concessions to the people of the Niger Delta. By these concessions, in 2006 the ruling in Nigeria (PDP) brought out an indigene of the Niger Delta (Goodluck Ebele Jonathan an Ijaw) as its vice –presidential candidate, he was later sworn in as vice-president of Nigeria in 2007(Ukiwo, 2007). Following this development the federal government showed the desire to dialogue with the militants. They finally came to an agreement after the federal government gave the locals most of their demands such as releasing one the leaders top leader Asari Dokubor, as well as granting amnesty to all militants who have agreed to drop down their weapons(Ukiwo, 2007). The government under the leadership of Late President Umaru Yaradua promised the locals that the government will do everything to ensure that the reasons that made the locals take up an against the state shall be addressed and ameliorated. One of these commitment was to change the states perception of the locals as criminal. The government criminalized the Niger Delta militants due to their alleged involvement in covert or illegal economic activities, such as hostage-taking, protection

³ Paul Collier, 'Doing well out of war: an economic perspective' in M. Berdal and D. Malone (eds. Greed and Grievance: Economic agendas in civil wars (Lynne Rienner, Boulder, CO, 2000), pp. 91–112

rackets, political thugs, theft of crude oil or illegal 'oil bunkering' and weapons proliferation (Human Rights Watch 2002, 2003, 2004; International Crisis Group 2006a: 6, 2006b: 8–10; Asuni 2009; Davies 2009).

Amidst these development peace relatively came back to normal in the Niger Delta, although there were still existence of some security issues. Hence, by making a member of the local's indigene the vice-president of Nigeria who later became the president of Nigeria, the locals felt that the government have begun to recognize them in the Nigeria political dispensation. However, with the recent concluded election in which the incumbent president Goodluck Ebele Jonathan was defeated, it have changed the perception back to is previous view that made the locals resist the state, the locals have threatened that they are going back to the creeks. The locals through an ex-militant leader Asari Dokubo have threatened that they will resume their activities by blowing off oil facilities, this is because they believed that the election was not free and fair. The locals believe that the north and the west conspired with the INEC⁴ chairman to oust the sitting president out of power because he is from the minority group. Asari Dokubo stated that some top northern political leaders have formed alliance with the some top western political leader to conspire with the INEC chairman to relinquish power back to North. The next chapter is based on the methodology that was used in this study.

CHAPTER FIVE: METHODOLOGY

This chapter will discuss the methods that was employed in gathering the data and analysis for this study, it will also discuss the reason for the choice of the study area, stating the procedures and guidelines that was observed before, during and after this study. Research is a systematic way of collecting, analyzing and interpreting of data to generate new knowledge and answer a certain question or solve a problem. Research method is the technique used for collecting data about a phenomenon.

5.1 Research Methodology

Research methodology is a way to systematically solve research problem. According to Silverman (2000:88) methodology involves the general approach to a research topic. To elaborate this, it means that every research work needs to have a procedure based on a chosen technique. This could be in the form of interviews, completion of questionnaires or participant

⁴ INEC is the electoral body that oversees all election in Nigeria

observation in which case the researcher takes part in an event being studied while taking records or through documents. This research work made use of predominantly secondary documents from different sources related to the study.

Thus, it is imperative for every research work to adopt a methodology that will give it credibility. In light with this, data collection are done in various ways and from different sources and then analyzed with various tools that are recognized and approved within the academic field. Thus, within the social science field take an essentially interpretative or hermeneutic methodological approach. The object of study of natural and social world are different that they require different methods of investigation (Benton, 1997). In essence, there are two main types of research strategy namely: qualitative and quantitative research strategies. This chapter is based on the research methods, research design, and research strategy that was used in gathering and analyzing data's that were collected for this study.

5.2 Research strategy.

For every research done, the choice of the research strategy adopted will determine how the research will be conducted, such as theoretical framework that fits in better with the research and how data for the research will be collected and analyzed. Bryman (2004:19) asserts that research strategy is a general orientation to the conduct of social research. The purpose of this study is to investigate the perception of the local community of the Niger Delta on oil bunkering activities which is a common phenomenon in the region. Against this backdrop I have therefore anchored on qualitative research strategy. My reason for this, is because Qualitative research has been identified as the most suitable means of conducting a study which addresses any phenomenon dealing with human perspectives or perceptions. The overall research approach for this study is based on qualitative research, Bryman (2004) asserts that qualitative research is based on an inductive approach to the relationship between theory and research, in which emphasis is placed on the generation of theories. Whilst Quantitative research involves the collection of data to enable information's to be quantified and subjected to statistical treatment in order to support or refute alternate knowledge claims (J. Creswell, 2003). Also noted by Creswell (2002) quantitative research originated in the physical sciences, particularly in chemistry and physics. The researcher uses mathematical models as the methodology of data analysis. Three historical trends pertaining to quantitative research include research design, test and measurement procedures, and statistical analysis (John W Creswell, 2002).

Furthermore, quantitative research also involves data collection that is typically numeric and the researcher tends to use mathematical models as the methodology of data analysis. Quantitative research is also described by the terms ‘empiricism’ (Leach, 1990) and ‘positivism’ (Duffy, 1985). Cormack (1991) describes it as been derived from the scientific method used in the physical sciences. Quantitative research approach is an objective, formal systematic process in numerical data findings. It describes, tests, and examines cause and effect relationships (Burns & Grove, 1987), using a deductive process of knowledge attainment (Duffy, 1985). Quantitative methodologies test theory deductively from existing knowledge, through developing hypothesized relationships and proposed outcomes for study. In accordance with both definition of qualitative and quantitative research, this study fits in better with qualitative research strategy.

5.2.1 Qualitative research approach

Qualitative research is a holistic approach that involves discovery. Qualitative research is also described as an unfolding model that occurs in a natural setting that enables the researcher to develop a level of detail from high involvement in the actual experiences (J. W. Creswell, 1994). One identifier of a qualitative research is the social phenomenon being investigated from the participant’s viewpoint. Thus, there are different types of research designs that use qualitative research techniques to frame the research approach. As a result, the different techniques have a dramatic effect on the research strategies explored (J. W. Creswell, 1994)

Furthermore, other scholars such as Denzin (1994) contends that researchers who adopts qualitative research methods by collection of primary data, study things in their natural settings, attempting to make sense of, or to interpret, phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring to them. Punch (1998: 4) also describes qualitative research as an empirical research where the data are not in the form of numbers. Qualitative research has several methods in focus, involving an interpretive, naturalistic approach to its subject matter(Punch, 1998). This implies that qualitative researchers study things in their natural settings, attempting to make sense of, or interpret, phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring to them. Another definition of qualitative research as described by Lincoln and Denzin (1994) is that “qualitative research involves the study and use collection of a variety of empirical materials such as case study, personal experience, life story, interview, observational, historical, interactional, and visual texts that describe routine and problematic moments and meanings in individuals' lives” (Lincoln & Denzin, 1994).

Qualitative research aims to produce rounded understandings based on rich, contextual and detailed data. It is focused with the study of people in their natural settings (Bryman, 2008) . Qualitative researchers use a variety of tools and techniques in order to develop deep knowledge of how people perceive their social realities and in consequence, how they act within the social world. They seek to make connections between events, perceptions and actions so that their analyses are holistic and contextual. Beyond these broad assumptions, qualitative researchers are very careful to stress the multiplicity and variety of qualitative approaches. In accordance to various definition of qualitative research by several authors stated above, their definitions are identical. However, this study adopted a qualitative research method, my reason for choosing qualitative research is because it fits in better than quantitative research, since my study will not be based on numerical figures and deductive strategy.

5.2.2 Ontological and Epistemological position

Research methods can be identified, through methodology and epistemology, to an ontological position. It is pertinent to engage in any form of research by committing to ontological and epistemological positions. Thus, researchers' differing ontological and epistemological positions often lead to different research approaches towards the same phenomenon (Grix, 2004.). This will become evident as the scientific, interpretive, and critical paradigms are explored. This study adopted a qualitative research as the overall approach, According to Bryman (2008) qualitative research is often associated with the ontological position called constructivism. As noted by Mathews and Ross (2010), in contrast to the objectivist view, which holds that the reality of the social world exists independent of social actors involved (Matthews & Ross, 2010), constructivist researchers believe that reality is a social construct, made up by social actors who reflect on it. Also noted by Forsyth (2003) ontology is the theory of underlying structures in biophysical or social entities. This implies to various ways of understanding the relationship between social or natural phenomena and social actors. Here, the two opposing positions are objectivism and constructivism (Forsyth, 2003).

In the words of Bryman (2008) epistemology is the theory of knowledge and concerns the question of what is, or should be regarded as acceptable knowledge in a discipline. Bryman (2008:16) asserts that, drawing from the induction approach, the concept of interpretivism under the epistemological philosophy is grounded in the subjective meaning of social action in line with or from the viewpoint of the actor.” Interpretive methodology is directed at understanding phenomenon from an individual’s perspective, investigating interaction among individuals as

well as the historical and cultural contexts which people inhabit” (JW Creswell, 2009). Interpretive is usually grounded (inductive), being generated from the data, not preceding it (Cohen, 2007).

Thus, the above philosophical considerations has its stance with the research strategy called qualitative research. By virtue of approach this study adopted qualitative research, it also anchored on the interpretivist and constructionist approach. This implies that, it is assumed that the world as socially constructed and acknowledged that social interactions are often complex and thus needed an interpretivist epistemology (Magilvy & Thomas, 2009).

5.3 Data Collection

This research is a desktop research in this regards it is predominantly secondary data that were collected from different archives, by accessing several database that are relevant for my study. Secondary research is defined by Bryman (2008, p.698) as the process whereby researchers who will probably not have been involved in the collection of those data for purposes that may not have been envisaged by those responsible for the data. In the words of Bryman (2008, 514-527), one of the criteria in qualitative research is to use documents as source of data. By virtue of the purpose of this study, data collected for this study were mainly secondary data that were related to my study. These are data that have already been collected by other researcher who did their study in oil related crisis in the Niger Delta. Data were collected through scholarly articles, journals, NMBU library database, political ecology class literature notes Books, reports by various organization in the Niger.

The study also collected data such as, newspaper reports, government database, MNOCs reports on oil issues in the Niger Delta. In essence, information were gathered from various sources related to my study in order to enable me triangulate for credibility. One interesting thing I found out about desktop research was that it is less time consuming than doing a field study, also at a point when I was doing my research and reading online, it gave me more access to other sources which in turn made me more knowledgeable of my study.

5.3.1 Data Analysis.

Narrative theory was used for my data analysis, it is an approach with political ecology. Narrative analysis was used to answer the three main research questions and sub-research questions for this study. The data gathered from the three main research questions were secondary data, although some government reports on oil issues that were accessible online

.The sub-research questions were also analyzed by the same narrative analysis. I collected different narratives by the locals of the Niger Delta. Based on the data that I gathered, some of the respondents from the locals of the Niger Delta were the militants who do oil bunkering, some were farmers, market women, students, fishermen, pastor. Some of the respondents were from different communities and states in the Niger Delta.

Thus, the narratives that I gathered from the MNOCs were mainly Shell reports on oil bunkering and oil related issues. Although there are several oil companies in the Niger Delta, but I used Shell reports to represent MNOCs in the Niger Delta. My reason for doing this is because Shell plays the leading role in oil extraction in Nigeria. Also because, Shell was the first MNOCs to start oil operations in the Niger Delta since oil was discovered in 1956 in the Niger Delta. The Nigeria government narratives that I gathered were government reports on oil bunkering and oil related issues in the Niger Delta. It is important to note that this study did not gather much data from the state and MNOCs because the purpose of this study is to deepen our understanding on the locals' perceptions on oil bunkering. Another reason was that there were not much narratives about the state and the MNOCs. Hence, my reason for subsequent extension of the research to state and MNOCs narratives was to allow me to do a comparative narrative analysis. By doing a comparative narrative analysis, it enabled me to identify which of these narratives counters the local's narratives or *Vis a vis*. As described by Emery Roe's definition of narrative analysis, Roe argued that each local's case should be judged on its own merits due to its complexity. Roe recommended de-narrativising the main views on specific cases and establishing a counter narrative (Roe, 1999, p.2).

5.3.2 Limitations and challenges.

This study is predominantly Secondary data. Secondary data are data collected by other researcher before the current study and the purpose is for other needs not for the current research (Harris, 2001). Secondary data are usually historical and do not necessitate the access to respondents or subjects (Ember & Levinson, 1991). One weakness about secondary data is in the fact that care should be taken when using secondary sources because the data were not collected with the present study. It might therefore not meet the present researcher's needs (Cowton, 1998). However, in this study I ensured that all efforts were made to remove bias as humanly as possible.

Prior to conducting this study, I encountered a major challenge which led to the delay of this thesis. Initially the planned data collection for this thesis was primary data. I have carefully planned

my research and was ready to travel on the 9th day of January 2014. Bryman (2008) asserts that the whole research strategy has to be carefully planned out before one starts the data collection, I ensured that I stick to Bryman (2008) view on carefully planning a research before embarking for field work. I planned on going for field work in three communities in the Niger Delta .Ogoni, Bori and Okirika. Oil bunkering activities are rampant in two of the communities (Okirika and Bori). Whilst the other community (Ogoni) oil bunkering activities is said to be relatively low after several local protest which made MNOCs to shut down their operations. Unfortunately I was not able to travel to Nigeria to do interview in the aforementioned communities in the Niger Delta after paying for my flight ticket. This was because I had unprecedented delay in my Visa, by the Norwegian Immigration authority. I waited for several months hoping that my visa would be ready so I can travel for me field work. Thus after waiting for six months from my presumed departure date, I spoke with my supervisors and they advised me to improvise by switching my research to a desktop research from my initial plan of going for field work and doing face-to-face interview.

5.3.3 Criteria for accessing trustworthiness

Research is deemed good if it provides rich evidence and offers credible and justifiable accounts (internal validity/credibility), can be made use of by someone in another situation (external validity/transferability),and the research process and findings can be replicated (reliability/dependability) (Cohen, 2007; Ritchie & Lewis, 2003). In the words of Lincoln and Guba (1985) an alternative way of assessing qualitative research is with ‘trustworthiness’ and ‘authenticity’ as criteria. Trustworthiness entails four criteria: credibility, transferability, dependability and confirm ability.

This study is a qualitative research study, in contrast the principles related to trustworthiness are different from quantitative research, and in quantitative research the principles related to trustworthiness are reliability and validity. Against this backdrop this study would rather discuss the principles applied in relation to trustworthiness in qualitative research since it is a qualitative research study. As indicated earlier on, this thesis is a desktop research, this implies that it based on secondary data from other people’s research and literature that are relevant to my research. I ensured that I considered the source relevance and credibility by placing multiple sources against each other(Kjeldstadli, 1992; Yin, 1994, 2003).My purpose for doing this was to strengthen the credibility of the thesis.

5.3.4 Credibility

Credibility is similar to internal validity in quantitative research. In the words of (Bryman, 2008), credibility deals with what degree the study is following a good practice and that to what degree the results are opened for others in the social world so that they can control if the researcher has understood the social world. Relating to credibility is procedures such as triangulation, thick descriptions and respondent validation (Bryman 2012). Triangulation is the process of using data from different sources. This is a way of cross-checking information, strengthening the truthfulness of the sources (Locke, 2007). To strengthen the credibility of this study, I ensured that I gathered data from different sources and cross-checking them to strengthen the truthfulness of my sources. This was one I have always used several definitions from different authors to ensure that they are on the same direction and to ensure that I am on the right tract.

5.3.5 Transferability.

Transferability is related to external validity in quantitative research. Bryman (2008) asserts that transferability deals with the way in which the research has deep and broad description of the details of a culture that can be used to be transferable to other settings.

5.3.6 Dependability.

Dependability is concerned to reliability in quantitative research. Bryman (2008) asserts that dependability is the process of keeping complete records of all phases of the research process, it helps the researcher maintain an 'auditing' approach, enabling other researchers to repeat the same research, though different results might be gained. To ensure dependability in the overall research, I cited and referenced every sources I used for my study. I also ensured that I saved all my sources for easy accessibility.

5.3.7 Confirmability

Confirmability relates to objectivity in quantitative research, I ensured that the personal values do not intervene with the research. According to (Bryman, 2008), it is pertinent to always strive for neutrality even though complete objectivity is not possible in social research . The research should not be reflected by the researcher's bias, motivation or interests (Robert Wood Johnson Foundation 2011). During the overall approach of my study, I was aware of my preconceptions, this was to ensure it did not affect my research. Although, I was more on the side of the locals

than the state but I ensured that I did not take it personal since I grew up in the Niger Delta region.

5.4 Research Ethics

According to Bryman (2008, pp.113,), ethics and politics in social research, ethical consideration must be included in social research, especially in the main political dimensions of research. To corroborate this Kvale pointed out, ethical and cultural sensitivity is very important during research (Kvale, 1996). Thus, this study is predominantly based on secondary data's, in contrast to primary research, secondary research seems more straightforward than primary research with regard to ethical issues. This is because the researcher is investigating text rather than human subjects. Hence, this did not involve face-to-face contacts with human subject, therefore issues associated with risk and benefits and intervention does not pose problems to secondary research. Although some primary data such as, government, NGOs and MNOCs reports were used in this study. This research has therefore ensured that all secondary and primary information gathered is properly acknowledge with proper citation and referencing.

The study also ensured that it applied honesty, truthfulness and openness in the overall research. As described by Scheyvens, Nowak et al. (2003), researchers must present his or herself and the purpose of her research in an open and honest way. Since most of my data are predominantly secondary data, this study ensured that it avoids plagiarism (Scheyvens, Nowak, & Scheyvens, 2003). I ensured that other people's idea that I got on line were always properly cited. As noted by (Locke, 2007) ,plagiarism implies theft of other people's ideas, by failing to credit material found in other scholars' work. Examples are omission of citation and quotation marks, or carelessness in preparing a reference list (Locke, 2007) Thus it is pertinent to reflect on one's own role as a researcher in the research. This study also ensured that sensitive data on government organization, companies, individual and communities are not made public without getting approval from the necessary agents.

Chapter Six: RESULT AND FINDINGS

6.1 The Narratives

In a general sense, narratives as described by Roe (1991, 1995, 1999) are stories with a beginning (when there were no problems) middle (outsiders, MNOCs and state have come in and started oil operations) and end (there have been negative effects of oil operations in the Niger Delta community) and or when cast in the form of an argument, with premises and

conclusions. Thus, based on the data collected in this study I constructed several narratives from the three actors that are responsible for oil activities in the Niger Delta. The first narrative is called the oil bunkering narrative, the oil bunkering narrative represents the local community's narratives on oil bunkering whilst the second narrative is called the national narratives, and the nation's narrative represents both the state and the MNOCs narrative. My reason for using nation's narrative to represent both narratives is because both the state and the MNOCs narratives are similar, their stories as regard to the issue of oil bunkering in the Niger Delta are closely related.

Thus, this was done to enable me to compare the narratives of the three actors. Hence, starting with the narratives of the local communities of the Niger Delta, I identified core issues from different data that I gathered through several sources. However, my reason for using different sources was to enable me triangulate to ensure that they were indeed credible. Consequently, in developing the narratives, my aim was not to collect data whereby each person will be able to identify all aspect in the narratives, what I did was that each narrative should represent the main arguments in the data collected with each groups of actors. The narratives applied in this study is a collective narratives, this is because the issue that is been addressed involves the Niger Delta communities and not a single individual (Svarstad, 2009). However, having done that, the core issues identified from the narratives of the local communities will be elaborated below, as well as the state and MNOCs narratives.

Concomitantly, the oil bunkering narratives comprises of marginalization and degradation narratives. Based on the data that I gathered, the stories told by locals were closely related, some fits in the marginalization category whilst the rest fits in degradation category. Thus, it is from the data that I built up the scenario of Marginalization and degradation. Under marginalization and degradation narratives are embedded with sub-narrative, whereby marginalization is embedded on issues such as; self-determination, locals are weak and increasing level of poverty and unemployment, whilst the degradation is embedded with environmental issues such as; Traditional economic activities are threatened, Niger Delta environment is threatened .Hence, after presenting the narratives, this study will be able to identify the victims, villains and heroes.

6.2 The Niger Delta Narratives (Oil Bunkering Narrative)

In the following, I present the findings of my empirical study from the local community's narratives on the perception of oil bunkering activities in the Niger Delta. There were strong

local narratives shared by different groups such as student, farmer, militants, elderly, local administrators, market women, community leaders and more, which shows that the main cause of oil bunkering done by the local militants is due to the multilayered issues such as marginalization by the state and the MNOCs coupled with environmental degradation caused by the oil companies during oil production. In respect to the data that I gathered from other study, I identified that majority of the locals respondent were very much negative towards the state and the multinational oil companies. I found out that the local's narratives (oil bunkering narratives) entails multilayered elements. Initially the locals had a positive notion about oil when oil was discovered in the Niger Delta, this was because oil have developed and had a positive impact in other nations that discovered oil. Since this was not the case for the locals of the Niger Delta, they expressed a very strong disappointment from the state and its allies. The disappointment are multilayered and will be discussed below.

6.2.1 Marginalization and degradation.

Thus, based on the data collected there were strong local narratives on marginalization and neglect by the state and the MNOCs. The locals of the oil producing state have been marginalized by the government for so long .The local's argued that the state take the oil revenue derived from the Niger Delta and develop other region where they have their own personal interest, neglecting the region that feeds the country. Marginalization have been an issue of the ethnic minority since the British protectorate brought the north and southern region to become Nigeria. Since then, the ethnic minority have been marginalized, neglected and even oppressed by the state. James (2012) interviewed a Niger delta militant who stated that:

“We must see this struggle to its logical conclusion. Look at the People in the Northern part of the country; they always have Fuel all year round. We do not have job then why not fight and die so that our children will not suffer as we are now suffering and they will regard us as heroes. Please remember this is not a military regime when Saro Wiwa was killed, we are now in the civilian dispensation”(Olusoji. James. George 2012).

It is crystal clear that the local militants of the Niger Delta are not ready to back out from their resistance against the state and its allies. As described by the statement of the local militants they are very angry with the state because of several issues he stated, and they have fully made

up their mind to fight till the end, as they have claimed that there is continuous neglect of the Niger Delta compared to the majority northern region that is non-oil producing region. On the other hand, a study by Ifeka shows that members of the local communities are in support of the local militant's resistance tactics against the state. According to community respondent in Ifeka's interview:

“Our brothers have joined the liberation army/swamp guerillas to protect our collective ancestral heritage; we are the legitimate owners of all oil lying under our soil, creeks, and off-shore Ocean, and have been cheated of our rights all these years. We love our youth for their bravery in protecting us against enemies by standing up to companies and government forces, our boys give their lives for us to be free from suffering” (Ifeka, 2001).

The local's respondent from Ifekas interview claims that they are the legitimate owners of the oil in the Niger Delta. Consequently, from her story it shows that the locals perceives the state and MNOCs as their enemies. The respondent argues that they have been cheated for too long and that they are happy that their youths who are the local militants have taken up arms to fight the state and MNOCs, even at the detriment of their lives.

Furthermore, Akinwale (2009) interviewed a member of the locals, from the respondent narrative it strikes great similarity to other local's respondent. The locals here argues that they have been marginalized by the MNOCs, they argued that the oil companies management do not like them, they further argued that the companies only prioritize their staffs who are foreign workers and refused to take care of the local indigenes. The respondent stated:

“Oil companies have been stealing our oil resources for several years .Many of them are here we have the likes of Shell, Exxon Mobile, Total and so on....I can go on and on you see!! These companies do not like our people at all, they take good care of their staffs, they take good care of themselves and they are enjoying very well. They take good care of their staffs especially those who are foreigners ”(Akinwale, 2009)

Another respondents quotes:

“The government have neglected us here [Niger Delta]. We have continued to suffer huge losses in our farmlands and fishponds because of the activities of oil-prospecting companies. Oil spillage have rendered almost completely useless our economic life lined
“(Newswatch, 1990: 15–19).

Another respondent who is an engineer from the Niger Delta:

“What we have is a situation in which the states producing the oil wealth go cap-in-hand and the non-producing far-flung states enjoy the wealth” (Newswatch, 1990).

Another respondents from the Niger Delta quotes:

“God of vengeance will deal with all those whose hands are dripping with the blood of Ogonis. He will raise up soldiers who will resist native colonialism.” (Tribune, 1995b).

Hence, from the above respondent it is obvious that they all share similar views about oil bunkering and the Nigerian government, the MNOCs as well the resistance the resistance tactics of members of the militants groups. One interesting fact about the locals narrative is that, in respect to the data that i gathered, they were all research that were done by different authors at different time, but they tend to have similar statements from different groups of the locals. This means that majority of the locals of the Niger Delta have similar perception of the oil bunkering activities in the Niger Delta. Thus I will go on to describe various sub-issues that are embedded in the marginalization and degradation narratives .Thus, the marginalization and degradation

narrative is embedded on political and environmental issues such as, local are weak, increase level of poverty and unemployment, self-determination, threat to local's economy and cultural values, local's environment is threatened.

6.2.2 The local communities are weak

There were several local narratives on power against them. The locals were worried that the state and the MNOCs have more power than them, for this reason they hardly have an opportunity for decision making. This is as a result of laws enacted by the state. Thus, the agitation of the Niger Delta evolved largely due to increasing centralization of the ownership and control of oil, as well as the politicization of the revenue allocation system by the federal government to the detriment of the local minorities. In the words of Obi (2008), In seeking to fund the war and sourcing money for running the economy, the federal government (still dominated by the now transformed Northern and Western factions of the ruling class) legislated, via decrees, the collection and sharing of oil revenues to itself. Since Nigeria came to rely totally on oil revenues the hegemonic factions of the majority nationalities now had control over the fiscal basis of the state, to the exclusion of the oil minorities.

Akinwale interviewed a member of the locals, they argued that it is because they are not as powerful as the state, that is the reason they are been marginalized by the state and the MNOCs. The respondent further argued that without the hard way it would have been difficult for them to make the MNOCs heed to their demands. This however means that, he is in support of the violence resistance tactics that is implored by the local militants of the Niger Delta . As stated by the respondent:

“Oil companies are very powerful set of people, they are controlling everywhere. They can tell the government what to do. Do they even trust the government? I don't think so because after government have given them soldiers and police to protect them they still use their security gadget to intimidate us. Without iron hand it will be difficult to face them”.(Akinwale, 2009).

6.2.3 Increasing level of poverty and unemployment

The locals of Niger Delta region are highly dependent on their environment (land, water and forest) for sustenance. The locals have been attached to their environment for thousands of years

and they made a comfortable living from the exploitation of its resources as farmers, fishermen, hunters and forest product gatherer (Alamieyeseigha 2005:3). Due to environmental degradation that is caused by the oil companies, the economic activities of the locals soon became dislocated due to the pollution from crude oil substance on their farmlands, rivers and forest. Ojehe (2010) did a study on the Niger Delta living condition by examining the social and environmental condition that have angered the locals of the Niger Delta. The study revealed “that their main occupations of farming and farming no longer persist because of their rivers and farmland have been destroyed from spillage resulting from oil exploration” (Ojehe 2010:33). The study “concludes that due to long years of economic exploitation the region is now a contaminated habitat leaving the locals with high level of mortality rate and loss of pregnancy”(Sunny, 2010).

In another interview by Akinwale, he interviewed a local respondent who narrates on the issue of poverty in the Niger Delta. The respondent shared similar view with other respondent on the issue of oil in the Niger Delta. They blame the government and the MNOCs for causing poverty in their region by not creating jobs for the people. He further argued that, the locals that were offered jobs were not given a better job and that it was the foreigners that were been given better jobs. He further stressed that these are one of the reasons the region has no peace. According to a local respondent in the Niger Delta:

“They gave better jobs to their own people, they only serve petty jobs for few of our own people. They give better jobs to workers who are foreigners. All their technical jobs go to their foreign workers it is this foreign workers who knows the secret of the oil industry and they will not tell anybody. Even our people working with them are only doing menial jobs and they will never allow our people to move to certain areas of operations. How can there be peace if there are no trust? Our people are suffering, the politicians do not live here so they are pretending .But if you go down to water side you will see that people are left to fend themselves. There is no good water to drink, our children die of diseases, and our youths don’t have sound education. Everybody is frustrated” (Akinwale, 2009).

In as much as some of the local narratives were always similar, some of the local's narratives where as well countered by different set of the locals. On the other hand a religious leader in the Niger Delta expressed a different opinion as follow:

“The oil companies work hand in hand with the communities to promote development in the region. They set up skills acquisition centers to train youths in different vocations. The problems is with the youth themselves many of them are not ready to work. In some cases the oil companies gives employments to natives. They give them slots of jobs, sometimes the oil companies ask the communities to bring names of applicants for immediate employment. The major problem is that many of the youths that are causing violent do not want to work. They already have money, even if they are given employment on a platter of gold, rather than resume for work they prefer to sell their slots to non-indigenes by collecting ransom depending on the type of job and the salary. In some cases they give their jobs to other people and reach an agreement with their beneficiary so that they can get their own share of the salary every month”(Akinwale, 2009).

In respect to the empirical data collected for this study, in section it shows that the locals expressed their views of the issues of poverty and they blame the states and the MNOCs for such outcome.

6.2.4 Self-determination

Different groups of locals in the Niger Delta have led the agitation for self-determination and resource control. This was supported by some environmental/human rights groups protesting against the exploitation, neglect and pollution of the region by successive governments and oil companies. The locals perceive that the control of their oil resources by outsiders was akin to 'internal colonialism' and demanded for the right to control their own resource, oil. Thus such demand have been strongly ignored by various military administrations by means of repression as against the locals. However, Self-determination refers to the choice of a nationality to live together in their own way, determine its own political fate, preserve its own affairs and develop itself or even democratize as it may deem it. (Okwu – Okafor 1994: 89). Self-determination connotes the desire of some group of people such as the locals of the Niger Delta who feel marginalized with the state and MNOCs approach towards them, for self-existence, self-management, self-development and sovereignty over resources. Self-determination refers to the right or freedom of a people that are subordinated, oppressed, dominated, colonized or even marginalized to assert and constitute itself into a separate state.

A respondent who is the spokesman for a militant group narrates on self-determination, he stated that they are fighting for self-determination because the locals have relatively not benefited from the oil resources in their region. They express a great disappointment in the state and the oil companies. They put the blame on the state and the MNOCs, it for this reason and other issues that they are fighting for self-determination. In 2007 Brian Ross interviewed Jomo Gbomo, the spokesperson of MEND, he elucidated on the objectives of the group:

“The Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) is an amalgam of all arm bearing groups in the Niger Delta fighting for the control of oil revenue by indigenes of the Niger Delta who have had relatively no benefits from the exploitation of our mineral resources by the Nigerian government and oil companies over the last fifty years.”(C. Obi, 2009).

Another respondent who is not a member of the militant groups also express great disappointment in the state and the MNOCs. He has a similar statement to the other respondent who is a member of the militant group. His statement express support of self-determination for the locals of the Niger Delta.

The locals hoped that as oil brought growth and income opportunities for other countries that discovered oil, it will be the same case for them. Sadly reverse was the case for the locals, the oil only brought economic growth for the state and majority ethnic political elites such as the Hausas, Yoruba and Igbos. To make things worse, in the 90s when some group of the locals were invited by the former president of Nigeria (Dictator Sani Abacha) to federal capital of Nigeria. For a peace talks, the locals came there and they saw how the federal government developed the capital (Abuja), was filled with modernized structure as compared to that of the developed world, modernized hospitals, good roads, no pollution caused by oil production, beautiful cars and all good things they have always imagined to get in their communities. According to a respondent called Jordan from the Niger Delta states:

“I went to the university in Abuja (capital of Nigeria) and have equally lived in Abuja. I have seen the affluence displayed by politicians in Abuja, I have seen the wealth across the city. I have seen the road, bridges and how constant they have electricity. Those things are not available in our communities even in the smallest measure. Yet, it is from here Chevron Oil company pumps thousands of barrels of oil every day. Again, apart from lately that we have clamored for a petroleum minister and Madueke (referring to the current Minister of Petroleum in Nigeria, Allsion Mudueke) was appointed, do you realize that most ministers of petroleum has always come from other regions? Do you realize that Abuja, Nigeria state capital was built with our resources? Do you realize that our resources have provided millions of jobs to non-Niger Deltans? You think poverty is all about how much you have in your pocket? Compare the kind of development you see around you here with what you see elsewhere outside Niger Delta and tell me if we are being treated fairly in spite of the resources available in our land”(Mbah, 2013).

Another respondent from Ijaw:

“The Ijaw are not engaged in an ethnic struggle against ethnic majorities. But against the government and oil companies, they owe

my community development, and not treat us as ‘lepers’ in our own land.”(Takon, 2013).

Indeed, there is high level of relative deprivation felt by the locals of the Niger Delta, those who live in the Abuja are said to be more prosperous to the locals of the Niger Delta, and despite the latter being the goose that lays the golden egg. This is as a result of the unfair distribution of the oil benefit in the Niger Delta. The funds that were used to erect these structures and all the good things in Abuja were derived from the oil revenue in the Niger Delta. If the state can make the capital look this beautiful why can’t they make the Niger Delta look the same? This is a case of neglecting the goose that lays the golden egg. Thus. Many locals view oil bunkering as their opportunity to have a taste of a commodity that built Nigeria’s sterile central capital of Abuja, a city of gleaming towers and massive highways. Amid the neglect, locals rationalize the thefts with a simple question:

“In Diebu, the locals pointed out a large clinic of empty rooms without medicine and a local doctor’s quarters that appeared to have squatters inside. The dilapidated schools had large holes where windows were supposed to be. If governors, politicians and everyone else stole the money, why shouldn’t they steal a taste as well? (Prince an illegal oil bunker” (SDN, 2013)

Another respondents stated:

“Oil bunkering is the only job we are doing,” said an illegal refiner who gave his name as Ibeci. “There is no other job” (SweetCrude, 2014)

Another respondent, local oil refiner:

“The business oil bunkering is a very profitable one; I can pay staff even better than Chevron and Shell Petroleum Development

Company, SPDC, if given license to operate. We will create jobs and can stop sea pirates as a lot of youths will be gainfully engaged in the refining business. I believe strongly that kidnapping, prostitution and armed robbery will also become a thing of the past. Our business has the ability to engage both skilled and unskilled persons, no one will risk his life when there is genuine means of livelihood. We pay per drum refined and it is daily payment. Before the destruction, we made good money”.(SweetCrude, 2014).

Consequently, the above statement from several respondent shows that majority of the locals are in support of the militants actions towards the state. This means that the locals share similar stories to their experience regarding oil issues in the Niger Delta. However, self-determination is one of the driving force of the locals struggle against the state and the MNOCs.

Hence, in as much as some locals are in support of oil bunkering as a right for them to collect what they perceived rightfully belongs to them, some are also at odds with oil bunkering that is done by the local militants. An elderly respondents stated that:

“Militant youths are many nowadays. There are in different groups, some are more organized groups while some are just operating on the own. Among the group that is not well organized their members are not many because we see them. They are here with us but we can’t say this is where they live. You only see them when they are parading in the water (an elderly)”(Akinwale, 2009)

Another respondents from Ijaw, who is in support of oil bunkering stated that:

“Criminal gangs are supported in their communities because they channel their ‘loot’ into filling the social gaps abandoned by various

governments' responsibility to its citizens. For example, the militants support community healthcare centers with financial resources, they fund students to sit for university entry examinations, and award scholarships to individuals to study for university degrees in Ghana and Western universities (and interviewee from Ijaw)(Takon, 2013).

Another respondent:

“There is nothing criminal about bunkering. Oil theft is a counterstrategy aimed at redeeming our people from slavery and recouping what had been taken from oil companies. High ranking army officials, naval officers, politicians, and oil industry big shots use for oil bunkering. Look at the stinking and dirty toilet directly behind us, this is the only gain we got from such dangerous enterprises and criminal liaisons with “Big Men”(Ugor, 2013 :11).

Furthermore, it is obvious that the locals share the same view about oil bunkering and other activities of the militant groups.

6.2.5 Threat to traditional economic activities and cultural values

Local communities of the Niger Delta are very traditional in their ways of life, in that their cultures are central to their lives and guide their everyday activities and interactions. According to, Jike (2004:698), “the once-revered values have become supplanted by fads, and the prospects of institutional continuity have become more cumbersome”. Suddenly, the safety value and the social control for orderly individual conduct and group behavior have snapped and society is worse for it. “The locals of the Niger still practice their ancestral law which was passed to them from several generation. Any disruption of such customary practice is unwelcome as it could sever the link between the living and the pantheon of forbears in such communities and their worldview” (Jike, 2004). In light with this, the activities of oil companies in the Niger Delta became a violation of many communities' rights, as ancestral homelands have been desecrated and forcefully converted to a place of oil business(Jike, 2004).

In an SDN (2013) report, they interviewed a local respondent who shared similar view of other respondent. The respondent stated that the oil belongs to them and that it is their right to control it. He however blames the state for destroying their economic activities through oil spill. According to the local respondent of the Niger delta community stated:

“The government and the multinational oil companies are collecting our oil, they have destroyed our traditional means of livelihood which is fishing and farming. We have no more means to sustain ourselves, no money so we have to take back our oil, refine them and sell them ourselves”(SDN, 2013).

6.2.6 Niger Delta environment is threatened

Niger Delta inhabitants are highly dependent on their environment for their source of livelihood. The region has been described as the richest wetland in the world and the home of numerous species of aquatic and terrestrial plants and animals. Before the inception of oil in the Niger Delta, the people depended so much on the resources from their natural environment. They made their living from the exploitation of the resources of their land, water and forest as farmers, fishermen and hunters. They were attached to their environment. The economic activities of the people were soon distorted as a result of the environmental degradation caused by climate change and exploration and exploitation activities of multinational oil companies. These devastating effects on their farmlands, crops, creeks, lakes, economic crops and rivers are so severe that the people can no longer engage in productive farming, fishing and hunting as they used to do. Oil spill caused by oil companies in the Niger Delta have made the environment of the Niger Delta. The factors that best describe the environmental, social, and economic problems facing the Niger Delta arise from the near extinction of the means of subsistence that served the inhabitants of the Niger Delta for centuries (Odoemene, 2011). The people of the Niger Delta depend on the environment for survival, as they are farmers, fishermen, and hunters (C. J. Obi, 2011). The inability of the Nigerian government to enforce those laws that would protect the environment and promote the success of its citizens only deepens the state of underdevelopment and consequence of poverty experienced by the people of the Niger Delta (C. J. Obi, 2011)

There was strong local narrative on environmental issues they are facing as a result of oil production. The locals complained that their environment has become a threat. This is because many of the locals are having health issues as a result of oil spill and gas flaring in their environment. However, several studies have shown that exposure to hazardous air pollutants emitted during incomplete combustion of gas flares affect human health, which includes cancer, neurological, reproductive, and developmental effects. (Adelana, Adeosun, Adesina, & Ojuoye, 2011).

A study done by Olusoji, he interviewed a local of the Niger Delta who is a fisherman, he complained that the invasion of the government and the MNOCs in their environment have become a nightmare to them. He expressed a great disappointment in the state for becoming a threat to their lives and their means of livelihood. He however stressed that, their lives has changed since the government took over their region. The local fishermen states:

“We were here one day, when some white men came and asked for the house of the village head, weeks later we saw a brand new car in the house of the village head. I will not forgive the MNOCs for what they have done to our environment. My great grandfather was a renowned fisherman, same as my father. But for me the case is different, not to talk of my children because all the fishes in the river have been killed by the oil spillage (a village fisherman in the Niger Delta)”.(Olusoji. James. George 2012).

Thus, the next slide is the oil sector narratives, however before presenting the oil sector narratives it is pertinent to mention that from all the data I collected on local narratives, majority of the local narratives countered the state and oil sector narratives. Many of the locals stressed that Oil bunkering is not an illegal act. Rather they claimed that it is the state and the MNOCs oil companies act against them that is illegal. Although some of the locals did not emphasis on oil bunkering per se, rather they claimed that they are in support of any approach against outsiders who have come to invade their resources. Indirectly, their perception on oil bunkering done by the local is legal. The argument is, however that the state and the MNOCs must acknowledge the locals narratives for peace to reign in the Niger Delta.

6.3 NARRATIVE 2: Multinational oil companies narratives

Thus, there were not much data on the MNOCs and state narratives on oil bunkering that is done by the locals. However, both the state and MNOCs narratives on the locals of the Niger Delta oil bunkering were closely identical. The government and MNOCs so far do not seem to have any “counter discourse(s)” (Linnros & Hallin, 2001) this could be because of the joint venture between Shell and the government. However, both the state and the MNOCs seem to have a counter narrative on the responsibility of the locals. The MNOCs argues that activities of the local communities of the Niger Delta against them were for selfish reasons.

In respect to the data gathered for MNOCs narrative, the oil companies argues that they have employed several locals into the oil sector with juicy positions. The oil companies further argued that they have spent more on security than on development of their region, because of the activities of the locals. An oil company’s staff stated that:

“We employ hundreds of naval officers, we employ hundreds of soldiers and we spend on security daily and we give allowance to our security personnel. The daily allowance we spend on security personnel can be used for better things in the community if there peace”.(Akinwale, 2009).

Indeed, it is quite evident that the MNOCs acknowledge the fact that an atmosphere of peace is needed in the Niger Delta for them to be able to carry out a better cooperate social responsibility. However, Shell claims that they have done their best for the locals. Hence, Shell narratives shows that oil bunkering done by the local is seen as a criminal activity that they are against it. A report by Shell stated:

“We have tried our best for these ‘rebels’, we build schools for their children, feed the children, and buy uniforms for them. We tar their road and even give their Chief’s brand new cars what else do they want us to do. We give them electricity light without them paying. Let them go to Lagos and see how NEPA is dealing with you people. They are just trouble makers and not grateful. After all we pay taxes

to the Federal Government, the State Government and the Local Governments “(Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Limited, 2010).

Indeed , it is evident that what shell claims to have been doing for the locals of the Niger Delta, in terms of cooperate social responsibility counters, the locals narrative which claims that the oil companies have neglected them. Thus, further statement by Shell shows that Shell perceives oil bunkering as a criminal act that they are against. Shell focus is to urge the state to help stop the Niger Delta crisis and the perceived oil theft. A statement by:

“Mutiu Sunmony, Chairman of Shell Companies in Nigeria said, “We find it difficult to safely operate our pipelines without having to shut them frequently to prevent leaks from illegal connections impacting the environment. While SPDC continues to play its part in combating crude oil theft the experience of the past few months requires more concerted efforts by all stakeholders, including government and communities” (Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria, 2013).

Another respondents from oil sector:

“Shell’s position is that [the company is] not legally bound to provide social infrastructure. What they offer may stem from altruism “ (News watch, 1990: 15–19).

Another respondent of the oil company:

“We seek only to 'do business in a peaceful environment' by peaceful means, we do not interfere in the internal affairs of sovereign states. It is others (i.e. the communities) who are violent; we struggle daily against global competitors for 'market survival' and have to somehow 'maintain our competitive edge' while upholding 'proper processes' of financial management to avoid 'misconduct'(Times., 16 January 2004).

6.3.1 Environment

In this section, Shell (MNOCs) focus seems to be on the environment. Shell's narrative in environmental issue shows that Shell acknowledge the negative impact of its oil activities in the Niger Delta .Shell in its narratives expresses awareness of the environmental damage their activities are causing in the Niger Delta and expresses plan of action to work more cautiously, exploring, exploiting and producing crude oil with the least of impacts on the environment. Shell's respondent states:

“Our environmental performance saw improvements in energy efficiency and in reducing the number of operational spills “From: Shell sustainability report 2010 pp 1.

Another report of shell:

”We continue to work on improving operational performance and energy efficiency to reduce GHG (greenhouse gases) emissions”. “In 2010, we met the voluntary target we set in 1998 for our direct GHG emissions from facilities we operate to be at least 5% lower than our comparable 1990 level. Shell's GHG emissions in 2010 were around 25% lower than our comparable 1990 level” From; Shell sustainability report 2010 pp 3.

Further narratives by Shell shows that shell detached itself, but placed the cause of the environmental degradation on oil theft. This claim by shell counters the local's narrative which blames the MONCs for the negative impact of the social, economic, and environmental situation of the Niger Delta. Also noted in Shells statement is that there are several conflicting narratives in which Shell admits its irresponsibility in environmental action. The above narrative by Shell states:

“Shell has long acknowledged the damage cause by oil spills. However, the real tragedy of the Niger Delta is not caused by oil

companies, which contribute billions of dollars to government revenue and millions in direct support of community development, but by the action of criminals”(Shell. Royal Dutch Shell PLC, 2014).

Shell claims that it has done a lot for the community, by emphasizing on co-operate social responsibility in which they have been involved in for several years. Shell in its annual 2006 report stated that:

“It spent the sum of \$53 million on community projects in the Niger Delta in 2006 (Shell2007). It also contributed over \$44 million to the Niger Delta Development Commission, plus paying over US\$34 billion to the Nigerian state in taxes and royalties between 2006 and 2010 alone “(Tribune., 2010).

Shell further stated that:

“This is one of the biggest corporate responsibility portfolios operated by the private company in Sub-Saharan Africa, and it shows that we care for the wellbeing of the communities in which we do business” (Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria, 2011).

Consequently, Shell narratives continues to counter the locals narrative in various section, in this part Shell claims that they have been engaged in cooperate social responsibility (CSR) in the Niger Delta more than any other region in Africa. This statement however, counters the local’s narrative in which the local’s argues that shell does not like their people, and that shell have refused to take care of them. Thus shell wants peace in the Niger Delta but it believes that it is not its responsibility. Shell places the responsibility in the government and approaches the community’s lack of benefits from oil revenue as something from the past:

“SPDC agrees that, in the past, not enough oil revenue has been returned to the oil producing areas for development purposes. SPDC

and other Shell companies in Nigeria pay tax and royalties each year into the federal budget. The government then decides how to spend and distribute this money among the states” (Shell. Royal Dutch Shell PLC, 2014).

Another report by shell whereby Shell detached itself from the responsibility of the Niger Delta. Shell stated that:

“Shell sees itself as an external player in the Niger Delta. It constantly stresses that the region “is chiefly the responsibility of the government, but SPDC has a role to play”(Shell. Royal Dutch Shell PLC, 2011).

However shell stated bluntly that oil companies are losing so much as a result of oil bunkering done by the local militants.

“Royal Dutch Shell plc said oil companies are losing as much as \$1.6 billion of crude a year to theft in Nigeria. As many as 100,000 barrels a day are stolen by thieves boring holes pipelines or taking oil directly from wellheads on a “commercial scale”. The stolen oil is exported by barges as far as Brazil and Eastern Europe” (Pagnamenta, 2009).

6.4 Narrative 3: Nigeria government narrative

Based on the empirical materials gathered for the Federal government of Nigeria, the state discourse is focused in the issue of the Niger Delta, their discourse is ensuring that peace returns to the Niger Delta .The government is focused on increasing its development in the Niger Delta and the in Nigeria as a whole

“The Nigerian government intends to use the revenue generated from crude oil export to develop the entire nation. The government’s narrative is “National resources will be effectively utilized for national development”(Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2012).

The state narrative on the struggle of the Niger Delta shows that they have identical narratives with the MNOCs. But they both detach themselves in some instance .For example the MONCs claims that it is not responsible for the situation of the Niger Delta. The state have the same claim, it rather claims that the MONCs are responsible for the issues in the Niger Delta. Nigeria First State House of Abuja. Official website of the office of public communication. Mar 4, 2010, here, the government is also focused on the development of the Niger Delta region. The government states:

“We are on top of the situation in the Niger Delta. The problems in the region, being human and development-related, are such that require time to be addressed. I encourage the Niger Delta people and major companies in the region to keep faith with Government, as we are determined to reinvigorate post-amnesty plans and programmes for the region.” From: Nigeria First State House Abuja. Official website of the Office of Public communication. Mar 15, 2011.”

The Nigerian government’s explanation of the oil crisis in the Niger Delta shows that the state also detached itself from the responsibility and solutions of the situation in the Niger Delta. The state argues that poor cooperate relations with the locals by the MNOCs is the reason for the crisis in the Niger Delta. This statement counters the MNOCs which claims that they have been engaged in CSR in the Niger Delta more than any other region in Africa. According to the official site of the Niger Delta Government.

“Poor corporate relations with the indigenous communities, vandalism of oil infrastructure, severe ecological damage, and personal security problems throughout the Niger Delta oil-producing region continue to plague Nigeria’s oil sector.” (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2012).

Indeed the state however, argues that its act of continuous repression against the locals is justifiable because they are protecting the mainstay of the countries revenue .According to a government official: ”

“We are protecting the country's financial 'life blood'. In the Niger Delta, as in southern Sudan, corporations, community guerillas and state rulers interact through apparently unending political violence. The Khartoum government hired mercenaries to destroy and displace thousands of nomads from their homelands” (Human Rights Watch, 2003).

Thus, the empirical data gathered for the three actor’s narratives that have a role to play as regard to the underlying issues of oil bunkering activities , shows that the locals narratives in various sections of the narrative chapter, counters the national narratives(state and MNOCs narratives). I will move to the next slide to compare the narratives and also examine other underlying issues that are related to oil bunkering in the Niger Delta. Let me also indicate that I termed the locals narrative as oil bunkering narrative whilst the state and multinational oil companies narratives as (agency narrative) .I did this to make it easy for me to compare the narratives.

6.5 Comparing the three actor’s narratives

Interestingly, narrative analysis have been able to make it possible for me to identify the main issues which shapes the perception of the Niger Delta inhabitants on oil bunkering. However, I have been able to elaborate the main issues in which the narratives of the locals are focused on as well the narratives of the state and the MNOCs. From the data that I gathered the locals shared strong narrative on the issues of Marginalization and degradation. Thus, marginalization and degradation narratives is embedded with sub- issues such as; self-determination, locals are weak and increasing level of poverty and unemployment, Traditional economic activities are threatened, and Niger Delta environment is threatened. Both the state and the MNOCs narratives are closely identical. Hence, from all indications, it is crystal clear that the locals narrative on the perception of oil bunkering counters both the state and the multinational oil companies narrative on oil bunkering activities in the Niger Delta .I will compare both narratives to give an overview on how both narratives counters each other, but first of all I will examine which of the three actors fits in the archetypical role of Victims, Villains and Hero. Thus as indicated earlier on the locals narratives represents the oil bunkering narratives whilst the state and the MNOCs narratives represents the national narratives.

6.6 Victims, Villains and Hero?

Indeed, the oil bunkering narrative (local's narrative), tells a story of how the government and the MNOCs started with oil activities from the inception of oil production in the Niger Delta till today. The stories are detailed on how these oil activities have affected them negatively rather than positively. Thus, the locals of the Niger Delta play a major role in the oil bunkering narrative. From the overall stories told by the locals of the Niger Delta, they have portrayed themselves be the victims based on their experience from the oil activities carried out by both the state and the MNOCs. The locals are portrayed as Victims because victims are people who are overwhelmed by their predicament, life seems to be unfair to them, they do not have access to abundant resources, and they are powerless. Hence, the locals future expectations is that every issue detailed on Kaima declaration and Ogoni Bill will be addressed, this will in turn enable them have a major benefit of oil revenue. Thus, Victims can actually find a way to become their own heroes, but in most cases, it can take a long time.

However, having identified the locals of the Niger Delta as the Victims in this study, the Villains therefore have been identified as the Nigerian government. Based on the narratives, the federal government attracts the major blame. Villains intimidate its victims, it has more power than its victims, it tortures its victim, and it is intolerant. Thus the MNOCs does not represent the victims or the heroes, they closely represent the Villains due to their alliance with the state over steady repression of the locals. Thus, this repression has been the case of the Nigeria government as against the locals of the Niger Delta since the British formed the forced union called Nigeria. Let me go on by making a comparison between the oil bunkering narrative and the stakeholders.

6. 7 Oil bunkering narrative (local's narratives) vs State and MNOCs (national).

From the data I gathered, I examined quiet clearly that the oil bunkering narratives in most cases deviates from the national narratives. Majority of the locals are disappointed with the state and the MNOCs for their present economic and environmental situation. In comparing the narratives I will by highlighting on the issues as described by the locals and compare them with the state and MNOCs statement.

6.7.1 The local communities are powerless and national.

The locals complained that they have no power over the government and the MNOCs, as against the continuous neglect towards them. The state enacted laws such as petroleum act and Land

act law as indicated earlier on, to control all areas in Nigeria, particularly the Niger Delta region. These laws rendered the locals powerless, to fight over their farmland that was forcefully taken from the state. Hence, in most instance when the local's files a report through the judiciary, the courts judicial system may take several years and in most cases the verdicts are always passed in favor of the case. According the UNDP report, "the state's judicial institutions do not assist matters: while land disputes between communities may be submitted to court, litigation is a very slow process: it may take up to ten years to obtain a judgment from the High Court and even longer for subsequent appeals through the Appeals Court and the Supreme Court" (UNDP 2006, p. 118).

Few alternatives to the use of force remain in asserting even legitimate rights. The locals have no role to play in decision making, the government can decide to allocate the locals farmland to oil companies without compensation and without consulting the locals who are the real owners of the land. In some cases the government allocates most oil block to its close political allies who are from the North. From example, ex-militant Asari Dokubo in several press interview have criticized the government for allocating 80percent of the oil blocks to those from the North. Whilst those from the south are left with almost nothing in terms of oil block allocation.

On the other hand, MNOCs detached itself from the issue of allocation and decision, they claim that they are only a business organization trying to me make profits. The state allocates farmlands to them because the state believes they (MNOCs) will in turn provide the state with huge revenue derived from the oil production. As for the state, it claims that its action against the locals is to protect nation's source of income. But, then my question here is that since the state claims it is protecting the nations lifeblood why have the state neglected the locals who were using the farmland in which these oil resources that feeds the nation are derived. Perhaps the political elites who are in control of the state have a political and economic interest as described by Marx and Harvey that it is accumulation by dispossession. The state use protection of the nation's life blood to dispose the locals off their resources. However, both the state and MNOCs seem to acknowledge the importance of the locals in decision making, to enable a peaceful environment.

6.7.2 Increasing level of poverty and unemployment and national.

The locals have argued that, they have become poorer than ever since oil production started in the Niger Delta. As indicated earlier on, the local's major source of sustenance is farming and

fishing, as a result of oil spillage that is caused by the MNOCs during oil production, it is have destroyed their fertile farmland as well as destroying the rivers, thereby making it impossible for them to fish or farm. . As described by Omoweh, about 80 percent of the Niger Delta inhabitants engages in fishing and farming occupations, but environmental abuse by oil companies affects these livelihoods and exposes the local populace to poverty and misery (Omoweh 2005).

The locals also argued that the MNOCs don't like to employ their indigenes, they stated that they prefer to employ foreign workers, thereby leaving their youths unemployed. Coupled with their lands that have been forcedly taken by the state and allocated to the MNOCs and the political elites. The MNOCs have however argued that they are not responsible for the level of poverty in the Niger Delta, they as well argued that they provide job opportunities for the locals and that because some of the locals are not educated they are not qualified for the positions. On the other hand the state argued that its major agenda is to develop the Niger Delta, reduce the level of poverty as well as reducing the level of unemployment in the Niger Delta. The state have always promised to develop the Niger Delta for several decades but yet it has not fulfilled its promise. As described by Linnros and Hallin (2001) "the state and MNOCs are both focused on a form of caution about the state of the Niger Delta and they expressed a readiness to improve upon the state of the situation in the Niger Delta but we can say here that the locals seems to perceive this action as deceitful and there is no form of trust for the government and Shell by the locals" (Linnros & Hallin, 2001)

Although some efforts have been made by the state, but when you compare the effort of the state to the benefit of the state from the Niger Delta then it is arguable to say that the locals are been marginalized. However, drawing from Ovwasa (1999:93) "It is however, worthy to note that the responses of the state and oil companies to the agitation and demands of oil producing communities have always ranged from double talk, unfulfilled promises and arm-twisting strategy "(Ovwasa, 1999).

6.7.3 Self-determination and national.

The locals argued that they are fighting for self-determination because of the injustice that have been perpetuated on them since the independence. The local's further argued that they have been marginalized for too long and their plight have always been ignored. The local's argued that the control of the resource in their farmland by outsiders is akin to internal colonialism. They have however also argued that it is their right to control their resources and that the

MNOCs should leave their lands or face continuous destruction of oil facilities A statement by a member of the resistance group called MEND cited by Howaden

“It must be clear that the Nigerian government cannot protect your workers or assets. Leave our land while you can or die in it. Our aim is to totally destroy the capacity of the Nigerian government to export oil (part of MEND’s message to oil multinationals in the Niger Delta, statement) (Howden, 2006).

The locals also argued that oil bunkering is not a criminal act, they are taking what belongs to them to help their people. The locals asserted that oil bunkering is part of their resistance struggle. On the other hand the state and MNOCS argued that it is a criminal act to sabotage oil pipelines for oil bunkering. Both the state and the MNOCs further argued that they lose revenue on a daily basis as a result of oil bunkering. The government further argued that the locals have no grounds to fight for self-determination.

6.7.4 Threat to traditional economic activities, cultural values and national

The locals of the Niger Delta on like other ethnic group in Nigeria are very traditional. They believe so much in their traditional culture and values, the locals argued that apart from the negative effect of oil production to their economy. It have destroyed their traditional and cultural values, for example some of the locals worship some specific type of trees in their farmlands as well as the rivers in their region. They regard them as their gods that is their belief, they go to their farmlands and make sacrifices to the trees and rivers. On the other hand both the state and the MNOCs acknowledged that oil spill have had a negative effective in the Niger Delta region, but from the narratives gathered the MNOCs in some cases blames the locals for the environmental degradation. The MNOCs however, admitted that they are also part of the environmental degradation and that they are upgrading their facilities to ensure that there is reduction in oil spill during oil production. As for the state it blames the locals for the oil spill, the state argued that the local are the major cause of environmental degradation.

6.7.5 Niger Delta environment is threatened and national

The locals argued that their environment is threatened as a result of oil exploration by the MNOCs. The locals have suffered several health issues as a result of the toxic substance from the crude oil spills. Thus, life expectancy in the Niger Delta, as indicated earlier on several studies have shown that exposing crude oil to human can cause health issues such as :Cancer, development effect, night blindness and more. Some members of the locals have suffered these

health issues. On the other hand the MNOCs argued that it have put millions of dollars in the Niger environment to ensure that they meet the green house emission (GHM) target of 1998. They further stressed that they met the GHM target in 2000 and that they have compensated the locals by engaging in environmental cleansing, building schools, hospitals and tarring roads for the locals.

The MONCs further argued that they are also complying with the environmental laws in Nigeria. The oil companies blames the locals for the environmental threat in the Niger Delta. As usual the state on the other hand enjoys playing a defensive game. The state further argued that both the locals and the MNOCs should be patient with them and that they are doing everything necessary to ensure a peaceful environment where both parties can live in harmony. One interesting thing about the overall narratives is that majority of the locals shared both marginalization and degradation narratives by blaming both the state and the MNOCs whilst the state and MNOCs explicitly blames the locals, in cases where the state or the MNOCs were to blame each other, they employ a defensive approach by asserting that they want a peaceful environment or that they are not responsible for the situation. However I will move on to the next chapter where I will discuss the findings and examine the sub-research questions.

Chapter Seven: Discussions, Conclusion and Recommendations

7.1 Discussion.

Thus, having examined the issues that shaped the locals perceptions of oil bunkering in the Niger Delta, this paper will discuss which of the three actors have their flaws as regard to the issues of oil bunkering in the Niger Delta. I will begin by discussing several steps taken by the locals before using violence as their resort. My reason for doing this to examine if there is justifiable grounds for the local's grievance and their actions in expressing such grievance.

7.1.1 Who are the locals of the Niger Delta?

The locals of the Niger are the original inhabitant of the Niger Delta. They are the original settlers of the region, they have lived in the Niger Delta for several centuries before Nigeria was amalgamated by the British. They control all natural resources in the Niger before the British came and forcefully colonized them and enacted several laws to restrict them from access to their resources. Sagay (2008:350) noted that initially there was nothing like a nation called Nigeria, Sagay further stated that

“There were Kingdoms like Oyo, Lagos, Calabar, Brass, Itsekiri, Benin, Tiv, Bornu, Sokoto Caliphate (with loose control over Kano, Ilorin and Zaria etc), Bonny, Opobo etc. Prior to the British conquest of the different nations making up the present day Nigeria, these nations were independent nation states and communities independent of each other and of Britain.(Sagay, 2008) .

The British later on transferred power to the majority ethnic groups when Nigeria had its independence. Since then the locals of the Niger Delta have been marginalized and neglected in several ways as I have discussed earlier on. It was based on perceived marginalization and neglect that the locals have been at odds with the state for decades. Thus, reflecting on the narratives gathered for this study and several resistance tactics by the locals as against the state and the MNOCs, it has compelled me to ask who among these actors are wrong.

7.1.2 Who is right or wrong?

Looking at the three actors involved in the Niger Delta oil violence, it might be puzzling to determine who is wrong. Concomitantly, looking at it from the local's point of view, as stated by one of the local respondent, the state and the multinational oil companies are their enemies, he argued that the state came, took their God-given gift and cheated them of their oil resources. He further argued that they are fighting to take back what rightfully belongs to them. On the other hand from the state point of view it believes that the locals are wrong with their actions regardless of any reason to justify their actions. From my own point of view, in as much as the state approach towards the locals have not been properly addressed by the state, the locals are still a subject to the state. Therefore, I will suggest that a more holistic approach should be employed by both parties to enable a peaceful environment. However, since the locals are still part of Nigeria, they should abide by the laws of the state and apply diplomacy by going through proper channel which is the court process, by fighting for their demands. Although initially the locals have used the court process but there were no tangible outcome, they should keep on using the court process until their demands are met. I would therefore indicate that, the local's actions are wrong.

However, let me also point out some fact, from a realist point of view the locals were already settling in the Niger Delta before Nigeria became a union. They controlled the resources in the region, it was their means of livelihood. The British came and made Nigeria a union “by force”, few years later oil was discovered in the Niger Delta, the government enacted obnoxious laws to restrict the locals of the Niger Delta access to oil resources. These laws in effect restricted

the local's access to their means livelihood, but gave the MNOCs power to control the local's resources. To be candid, this is unfair treatment to the locals of the Niger Delta. The government and the MNOCs have benefitted billions of dollars from the oil revenue that is derived from the Niger Delta, but the people of the Niger Delta whom are the real owner of these resources have not benefited that much. Majority of the locals have actually become poorer since oil was discovered in their region for reasons indicated earlier on.

They filed complains on several occasions about the government approach towards them and what they want the government to do. A local respondent in the Niger Delta states:

My brother, let me tell you what you need to know. Now we have told you what our problems are. Our demands from the government are so simple and did not start today. It's not enough to export our oil and live us without jobs. It is not enough to destroy our environment through pollution and live us without any means of livelihood. Develop our region, give us good roads, good healthcare, 66 build schools, empower us, and give us jobs. Until the government decides to take those issues seriously, we will not stop fighting them. Aluta continua! (general laughter)(Mbah, 2013).

Amidst the locals request, there have been continuous lack of political will from the government to address the crisis, perhaps may be because the locals are in the minority group. It was at this stance that the locals had no choice but to prompt the militant groups to adopt a violent approach by mounting series of violent attacks on oil facilities, workers and state agencies particularly the armed forces. It should however be noted that the spate of violence in the region should not be taken to mean that, violence is the only strategy utilized by the people of the region in the struggle for justice. The locals have utilized various options ranging from dialogue, litigation, peaceful protest and lately open violence (Ogbogbo, 2005; Ovwasa, 1999). It should also be noted that the state have made various effort to grant some of the locals request, but these efforts are said to be little compared the locals demands.

7.1.3 Question of legal vs legitimacy?

In the narrative section, one of the locals claims that the oil belongs to them and that they are the legitimate owner of the oil resources, he further stated that their struggle is legal and legitimate because the state and the MNOCs have been enriching themselves with the oil in their region, at the same time neglecting them despite the fact that they are the goose that lays the golden egg. On the other hand the state claims that the locals actions are illegal based on the laws of the states. From my point of view, when it comes to question of legality and

legitimacy, in reality the locals are the legitimate owners of the resources, but since the locals are part of Nigeria, they are subject to the government laws, therefore they should in all situation abide by the rules. At this stance I would state that the government have the legal and legitimate grounds compared to the locals.

Hence, let me also reflect on some factual issues, crude oil is indeed a veritable source of wealth to any nation, the fact that it was discovered in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria which falls in the minority region prompt the Nigerian state that is controlled by majority ethnic groups, into the promulgation of some questionable legislations, which were specifically used for the disempowerment and exploitation of the Niger Delta (Victor Ojakorotu & Gilbert, 2010) Victor and Gilbert further asserts, that the federal government enacted the petroleum act of 1969 and the land use decree 1978 to transfer the ownership of the totality of products in the delta region to the Federal government of Nigeria as well as ownership in the Federal government and its accredited agents, thereby dispossessing the delta people of ownership and occupancy rights to their farmlands. This captures Marx and Harvey view on accumulation by dispossession. Thus, to counter the state laws that disposed the locals from accessing the oil resources in their region, the locals collectively presented the kaima declaration and the Ogoni bill as indicated earlier on. It is on the basis of the articles in kaima bills that the locals are justifying their actions.

7.1.4 Question of criminality?

In respect to the local's narratives some of the local's respondent's claims that they are not criminals, they further argued that the real criminals are the state and the multinational oil companies. The locals expressed disappointment in the state and its allies for stealing their oil resources to enrich themselves. On the other hand the state claims that the local's actions to the government is criminal. The states and the MNOCs claims that the locals are criminals for breaking oil pipeline to steal oils. From my own point of view the question of criminality here is crystal clear. It is true to say that various members of the locals have become poorer due to oil activities in the Niger Delta. Since some of them have not received any form of help from the state, they have no choice but to do what they can do to sustain themselves. According to Caleb a local respondent in the Niger Delta.

“I agree we break oil pipes to steal oil but that is a way of survival. Don't you know we have responsibilities? In place of no jobs, no income, family to cater for and also presents of such resources in our mist, what do you want us to do? Sit down and die of

hopelessness? And if you call us criminals, how will you describe those men that provide us with cover, sponsors our operation and those that buys the oil? You need to understand that this is not one man business. It is not even MEND business alone. It won't stop now, not even in the future provided we have those men (referring to military officers, local political elites and TNCs employees) as being part of the business”(Mbah, 2013).

Thus, the reality is that some members of the locals enjoy per-taking in criminal activities because their agenda is to loot. It is also true to say that top political elites that controls the government have enriched themselves in all forms, from the revenue derived from oil resources in the Niger Delta, but the government have also done several effort to meet the demands of the locals by compensating the locals for environmental damages. Therefore both some members of the locals and some corrupt top political elites that are in the government can be regarded as criminals because of their agendas.

As described by Grass (1986) the continuous criticisms between the states, MNOCs as against the locals of the Niger Delta who are deeply overwhelm by their present and unending predicament that is caused by both the former and latter, remains static. The Nigeria government perceives or perhaps labels anyone or group who intentionally violates the state's laws or authority as criminals. On the other hand the locals of the Niger Delta whom have been deeply impoverished as a result of corrupt Nigeria political practice perceives the government and its laws which were systematically enacted to favor the majority ethnic and top political elites as the real criminals. A statement by Ogoni groups:

“For a multi-billion dollar oil company, Shell, to take over 30 billion US dollars from a small defenseless Ogoni people and put nothing back but degradation is a crime against humanity. For the Nigerian government to usurp the resources of Ogoni and legalize such theft by military decree is armed robbery”. (TELL, 1994a: 13).

7.1.5 Ownership and control of oil in the Niger Delta?

As stated by the local respondent in the narrative section, the local's claims that they are the real owners of the oil resources, the locals argued that they were there before the white men came and made Nigeria a union. The union gave the Nigeria government power to use laws to dispose the locals off their rights. On the other hand the state and the MNOCs claims that the resources belongs to the state based on the Nigeria constitution. From my own point of view, regardless of the fact that Nigeria is said to be a forced union, the laws still prevails. It is true that the laws were obnoxious laws but, it still supersedes the locals of the Niger Delta.

Therefore, when it comes to ownership and control the state is the legitimate owner and controller of the oil resources based on the state laws.

A report by Blackfriars (2010) stated “ that, section 44 (3) of the 1999 constitution of the Federal republic of Nigeria ,vested in the federal government , the ownership and control of minerals, minerals and natural gas in ,under upon any land in Nigeria , its territorial waters and exclusive economic zone”. The state power over petroleum industry are usually exercised through other governmental bodies (Blackfriars, 2010) such as the Ministry of petroleum, the Department of petroleum resources (DPR) and the Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC).

7.1.6 Legitimate grievance or greed?

When it comes to question of legitimate grievances, the real indigenes of the locals of the Niger Delta such as the popular resistance groups as indicated earlier on, Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), the Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force (NDPVF), the Niger Delta Vigilante Service (NDV), Iduwuni Volunteer Force (IVF), Butcher Squad, Martyr Brigade, Coalition of Militant Action of the Niger Delta (COMA), Movement of the Niger Delta People (MONDP), Expedition Force (NDEEF), and many more (Tuodolo, 2008) 2008). These groups are said to have legitimate grievance. As described by a member of the respondent, she stated that there are lots of people claiming to be fighting for the locals, some are not real resistance groups whilst some are real. However, some members of these resistance groups are not in any form connected to the locals of the Niger Delta, but they became member of the militant groups due to their personal interest.

Ukiwo 2009 gave a better description of this situation by stating that “the unholy mix of insurgency and criminality evidenced by the involvement of armed groups in hostage-taking, illegal oil bunkering, illegal oil refining and trading, as well as the proliferation of criminal groups disguised as militants, has promoted the view in some circles that militancy in the Niger Delta is driven by the greed of the *dramatis personae*” (Ukiwo, 2009) which necessitates critical analysis of the process by which militants were created”. Some of them may ostensibly be pure opportunists who use the issues of the Delta as cover for their bunkering and other criminal activities. Some of them may also not even have any family background in the Delta. Some might be genuinely motivated by grievance agenda, but may support their efforts through what is perceived to be criminal ventures. However from my own view I think, some of the local groups mentioned above are genuine resistance, for example after the government gave the locals amnesty, the government further gave them job contracts to protect the pipelines and

arrest any member of the locals who further claims that they are member of the resistance groups. This shows how genuine the recognized resistance groups are.

7.1.7 Corruption and weak institution

The local's claims that the government is corrupt, due to this fact they have been stealing major part of the oil revenue to enrich themselves. They further claims that if the government have been stealing from them why won't they steal. Thus, I would like to point out that it is a well-known fact that corruption is a daily practice that is common between top Nigeria government officials as well as the middle and low class Nigerians. I would therefore indicate that both the locals and the government officials are corrupt. But it should also be noted that corruption easily thrives when the institutions are weak. Nigeria's institution are weak, it made it easy for corruption to spread across the country like cancer. As indicated earlier on in the introduction, Norway used its oil revenue to earn its positions in the United Nations UN, because its institution were strong to manage the revenue before oil was discovered in Norway. Thus, the World Bank estimates that (Igbikiowubo, 2004), "about 80 per cent of Nigeria's oil and gas revenues accrues to just one per cent of the population" (Igbikiowubo, 2004:15). Thus, it has been estimated that a greater chunk of the \$18-20 billion that the Nigerian state earns annually from oil and gas revenue feeds political venality (Ifeka, 2004).

Several scholar have noted the corrupt character of Nigeria politics, (Okey Ibeanu & Luckham, 2007; Okecha, 2009), it is the same corrupt practice that have been employed in the case of the Niger Delta whereby huge revenue inflows into the neo-patrimonial sub-national units have resulted in power tussle by the elite who engage in zero-sum competition to capture the disbursements (Collier, 2007; Suberu, 2008). The Nigeria political Godfathers called the Cabals and some influential heavy weight Nigeria politicians manipulates the economy in their own personal interests. Recently, a government official disclosed that about N600 billion out of government subsidy on fuel every year "goes to the pockets of just a few persons who constitute the cabal" (Ogbodo, 2009 :21). Thus, Nigerian institutions are weak as a result of corruption, the institutions such as the Judiciary have been known to be compromised in Nigeria. They work in favor of those in power that is why they have not been able to address the issues of the Niger Delta through the judicial process. It is on the grounds of corruption, weak judicial system coupled with multilayered issues indicated earlier on, that the locals justifies their resistance.

7.1.8 Consequence of oil bunkering?

It will be untrue to say that there are no consequences as a result of oil bunkering activities in the Niger Delta. Looking at it from both the state and the MNOCs perspective as well as from the local's perspective oil bunkering has an immense negative effect. Although, the locals claims that oil bunkering has helped improve their economic lives, what about the damage it has caused to their environment? In as much, as the local's claims that oil bunkering is not the cause of environmental issues in the Niger Delta, the fact remains that oil bunkering is a major cause of environmental degradation in the Niger Delta region. Therefore, the locals should stop the blame game on MNOCs as the actor responsible for continuous oil spill in the region.

Concomitantly, it is factual that the MNOCs are major players in environmental degradation. Therefore the MNOCs should take into considerations, to obey the environmental law and upgrade their standard of operation in Nigeria to a global standard to reduce the amount of oil spill in the Niger Delta. However, oil bunkering has continued to fuel insurgency in the Niger Delta, this is because it makes it easy for the locals to acquire arms in exchange for crude oil. The locals use these arms to rebel against the state and sometimes even against themselves. Furthermore, cleaning of oil spill on soil and in the rivers may take more than ten years that is if the cleaning is done. Oil bunkering has caused the locals several health issues, as indicated earlier on, life expectancy has reduced in the Niger delta region as a result of environmental degradation that is caused by oil spillage. Oil bunkering poses an immense challenge to the Nigeria government, because it harms the nation's economy. The Nigeria government is deeply dependent in oil as its major sources of revenue, therefore oil bunkering is a major threat to the nation's economy. Oil bunkering adds to instability in the global oil market because it is been sold below the standard global price.

71.9 Conclusion

The purpose of this study was to investigate the locals of the Niger Delta perception of oil that is done by the militants. Consequently, this study have been able to shed light on the issues that forms the perceptions of the locals as well the state and the MNOCs. As described by Idemudia (2007) ,community perceptions often gives ground for community approach to either support or disrupt corporate activities in the Niger Delta. Consequently, identifying community perceptions and the various issues that shapes and positions these perceptions present a fertile ground for a better understanding of community actions (Idemudia, 2007). Based on the data gathered for this study, it is evident that the local's perception of oil bunkering that is done by

the militants, is that oil bunkering is part of their legitimate resistance struggle against the state. Let me also reiterate that, in view of the three types of oil bunkering that was described in chapter three, this study focused on the third type of oil bunkering (small-scale pilfering for the local market) that is done by the local militants of the Niger Delta. However, the locals gave multilayered issues that formed the basis of their grievance and their actions against the state. However, this study argued that the reason for the local's resistance against the state and the MNOCs is due to the negative approach by the state and the MNOCs towards the locals of the Niger Delta. In respect with my findings, the argument goes in line with the basis of the local's resistance.

Also notably is that, this study have been able to confirm that the locals grievance have been a mixture of agendas. Based on the narratives, the local's grievances that was initially a genuine grievance have become a mixture of agendas because some self-interest individuals have joined the local militants in guise of fighting for the locals. Whilst their main agenda is to loot as much as they can. Furthermore, the overall approach in this study been able to make it possible for me to identify several actors and their roles in the Niger Delta oil issues. The study adopted a qualitative research method, based on secondary data. Qualitative research was best suitable for this study because it me solved the research question without using numerical figures to analyses my data. As noted by Bryman (2004), qualitative research has been identified as the most suitable means of conducting a study which addresses any phenomenon dealing with human perspectives or perceptions. This helped me address the issues that shaped the perception of oil bunkering by the locals of the Niger Delta.

Furthermore, Political ecology framework has played a major role in the overall approach in this study. By using political ecology, I have been able to bring political ecology to the Niger Delta. I have also been able to identify issues in the Niger Delta both from the political view and from the ecological perspective. The political views such the obnoxious laws that were deliberately and systematically enacted by the state, to dispose the locals of the Niger Delta off their right to access to their god given resources. And the ecological views on issues pertaining to the environment, such as the environmental degradation. Political ecology helped shaped my idea of power relations. Political ecology always goes in line with qualitative research methods. As described Bryman (2008) qualitative research is often associated with the ontological position called constructivism. Constructivist researchers believe that reality is a social construct, made up by social actors who reflect on it. As indicated earlier on, I anchored on the ontological position called constructivism and epistemological position called interpretivist.

This implies that, it is assumed that the world as socially constructed and acknowledged that social interactions are often complex and thus needed an interpretivist epistemology. Both position from a critical political ecology served as a good guiding tools for this study.

Narrative analysis was indeed an important critical tool for this study, it is an approach within political ecology that played a role for me to understand the representation of reality. Although i talked about discourse analysis at the beginning, but I adopted narrative analysis because I was more focused on a specific case which is the local's perceptions of oil bunkering and i did not go more into the global scale in this study. Discourse analysis fits in better for study's that are more abstract and general phenomena of global discourse, both discourse and narrative analysis are important critical tools within political ecology framework. I described both narratives and discourse analysis just to differentiate between both as described by (Svarstad, 2002). Narrative analysis helped me analyze each actor's experience as regards to oil bunkering and oil related issues in the Niger Delta. It helped me bring out the reality from the locals experience as well as the state and MNOCs. This made it possible for me to compare the three actor's statement and identified the counter narratives.

However, several actors' ideas such as Marx and Harvey's theory on accumulation by dispossession also played a role in this study. It helped deepen my understanding in reality why state enact some obnoxious laws to dispose to locals from access to their right. However, the examples from conversations in which I borrowed from (Tor A Benjaminsen & Svarstad, 2010a) served as a guiding tool for basis of understanding the locals of the Niger Delta resistance against the state. I would conclude by saying that I have been able to identify the local's perceptions of oil bunkering in the Niger Delta and the issues that shaped the perceptions of the locals. If I were to this study all over again, I will use primary data by going to do interview with snowball sampling in the Niger Delta regions. Primary data collected by a researcher for the purpose of the study is more concrete that secondary data collected by other researchers. In as much as I triangulated my data, certain considerations should also be considered as regards to my data.

Recommendations

Political will and leadership

Nigeria is blessed with abundant resources that is supposed to make, every Nigerian citizen have access to good life just like the developed world .But due to lack of political will and bad

leadership in Nigeria, the nation is portrayed as a rich country with poor citizens. Since independence, the same circle of corrupt leaders have been ruling the nation till today. These are some of the reasons why several issues remained unsolved, because these set of “cabal” have always put their personal interest before the national interest. They have enriched themselves with the oil resources in the Niger Delta, they are still continuously enriching themselves. This should not be the case, the Nigeria leaders should have a rethink in their system of leadership to enable a peaceful environment in the Niger Delta and Nigeria in general. Nigeria leader should engage more in their political will to improve the standard of living for every Nigerian.

Consequently, this means that the issue of corruption needs to be deeply addressed. Corruption is the major problem in Nigeria today, it is an issue that has hindered development in Nigeria. The Niger Delta region would have not been a violence region if not because of corruption. The revenues derived from the oil resources are enough to improve the lives of every Nigerian. For example nations like Norway have used their oil revenue to make Norway a better place for every Norwegian and even immigrant like me. Although, some might argue that Nigeria is more populated than Norway, therefore Nigeria should not be compared to Norway. But then, it should be relatively close to the developed world standard of living. However, these issues should be critically looked into or else the Nigerian government will continue to face continuous insurgency in the nation. This will in turn make the government spend more revenue in fighting the insurgency. Thus, the amnesty programme that was given to the militants was indeed a good development, but more needs to be done. The government and the multinational oil companies should engage more in cooperate social responsibility and address the demands of the locals of the Niger Delta.

Arguably, in a real sense the locals do not enjoy violence in their region, they themselves wants a peaceful environment. But because of the state approach towards them, violence became their last resort. According Ebeku (2008), an environmental lawyer and a leading activist member of Ijaw youth council called Douglas stated that:

“There is a big debate in the Niger Delta right now about what is the best means of removing the yoke of oppression visited on our people, and the overwhelming position is that non-violent struggle is preferred... But the government has adopted a very violent strategy of suppression that angers people like Dokubo, who see the strategy of negotiation [non-violence] failing woefully and are crying out for armed struggle.”
(Ebeku, 2008: 27)

Thus, the government should apply a more diplomatic and holistic approach to the demands of the locals, by recognizing the fact that the locals need to benefit more than they are getting from the state. To be candid, it is unfair that a state in the north that is a non-oil producing state will get higher allocation than an oil producing state see **appendix 1**. This is an unfair treatment to be oil producing states, these issues should be looked into by the state. The state should increase the allocation of oil producing states and ensure that the governors of these states use the allocation funds appropriately.

Environment issues should be tackled as well, the environment is an integral part of our lives, and it is the responsibility of the state, the MNOCs and everyone in general to ensure that we live in a conducive environment. The state institutions need a reform to enable it stronger, good and strong institutions make life easy for their citizens. With good and strong institutions people will obey the laws, the corrupt government officials will always have a rethink whenever they have an agenda of stealing the state funds. With good institutions the MNOCs operating in Nigeria will obey the environmental laws, this will in turn reduce the level of degradation in the Niger Delta. These issues should be looked into.

The state should as well ensure to educate the locals but building more schools in the Niger Delta. The state should develop the oil producing states, the same way it has developed the FCT. This will change the perception of the locals that they have been marginalized, the state should ensure that the locals are engaged in every decision-making. The state should as well ensure that they recognize the locals as major players in the Nigeria political dispensation. For example the emergence of the current president of Nigeria who is an Ijaw by tribe, and indigene of the Niger Delta has helped reduce the issues of insurgency in the Niger Delta.

References.

- Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., Robinson, J. A., & Yared, P. (2009). Reevaluating the modernization hypothesis. *Journal of Monetary Economics*, 56(8), 1043-1058.
- Adams, W. M., & Hulme, D. (2001). If community conservation is the answer in Africa, what is the question? *Oryx*, 35(3), 193-200.
- Adelana, S., Adeosun, T., Adesina, A., & Ojuroye, M. (2011). Environmental pollution and remediation: challenges and management of oil Spillage in the Nigerian coastal areas. *American Journal of Scientific and Industrial Research*, 2(6), 834-845.
- Adger, W. N., Benjaminsen, T. A., Brown, K., & Svarstad, H. (2001). Advancing a political ecology of global environmental discourses. *Development and Change*, 32(4), 681-715.

- Agamben, G. (2005). *State of exception* University of Chicago Press. *Chicago IL*.
- Agamben, G., & Hiepko, A. (1998). *Homo sacer: Pre-Textos*.
- Agbibo, D. E. (2011). *The Internationalisation of an Internal Resistance Ethnic Minority Conflicts and the Politics of Exclusion in the Niger Delta*. University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg.
- Akinwale, A. A. (2009). Curtailing conflict in resource endowed Niger Delta Communities of Nigeria. *Department of Sociology, University of Ibadan, Nigeria. Ibadan Journal of Social sciences, march 2009., Volume 7, number 1*.
- Alagoa, E. J. (2005). *A history of the Niger Delta. Port Harcourt, Nigeria: Onyoma Research Publications*.
- Allen, C. (1999:372). Warfare, endemic violence & state collapse in Africa. *Review of African Political Economy, 26(81), 367-384*.
- Asakitikpi, E., & Oyelaran, A. (2000). Oil extraction and the socio-cultural impact on peoples of the Niger Delta. *Environmental problems in the Niger Delta, 173-188*.
- Asuni, J. B. (2009a). *Blood oil in the Niger Delta (Vol. 229)*: United States Institute of Peace Washington, DC.
- Asuni, J. B. (2009b). Understanding the armed groups of the Niger Delta. *New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 215-219*.
- Badmus, I. A. (2010). Oiling the guns and gunning for oil: Oil violence, arms proliferation and the destruction of Nigeria's Niger-Delta. *Journal of Alternative Perspectives in the Social Sciences, 2(4), 323-363*.
- Baldwin, A. (2013). Vital ecosystem security: Emergence, circulation, and the biopolitical environmental citizen. *Geoforum, 45, 52-61*.
- Balouga, J. (2009). The Niger Delta: Defusing the Time Bomb. *First Quarter, 8-11*.
- Banigo, A. (2005). *Issues, Affecting the People of Niger Delta*: Ekeremo Press: Port-Harcourt.
- Bateson, G. (1972). *Steps to an ecology of mind: Collected essays in anthropology, psychiatry, evolution, and epistemology*: University of Chicago Press.
- Benjaminsen, T. A. (2000). Conservation in the Sahel: Policies and people in Mali, 1900–1998. *Producing Nature and Poverty in Africa. Elanders Gotab, Stockholm*.
- Benjaminsen, T. A., & Bryceson, I. (2012). Conservation, green/blue grabbing and accumulation by dispossession in Tanzania. *Journal of Peasant Studies, 39(2), 335-355*.
- Benjaminsen, T. A., & Svarstad, H. (2008). Understanding traditionalist opposition to modernization: narrative production in a Norwegian mountain conflict. *Geografiska Annaler: Series B, Human Geography, 90(1), 49-62*.
- Benjaminsen, T. A., & Svarstad, H. (2010a). *The death of an elephant: Conservation discourses versus practices in Africa*. Paper presented at the Forum for Development Studies.

- Benjaminsen, T. A., & Svarstad, H. (2010b). *Politisk økologi: miljø, mennesker og makt*: Universitetsforlaget.
- Benton, T. (1997). *Philosophical Foundations of the Three Sociologies* (London:Routledge & KeganPaul).
- Biermann, C., & Mansfield, B. (2014). Biodiversity, purity, and death: conservation biology as biopolitics. *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*, 32(2), 257-273.
- Blackfriars. (2010). Ownership and control of Nigeia petroleum resources. *retrieved fromfile:///C:/Users/kingsley/Downloads/Energy_and_Mining_Law_Newsletter_Feb10_En%20(1).pdf*, 24(Issue 2).
- Blaikie, P. (2000). Development, post-, anti-, and populist: a critical review. *Environment and Planning A*, 32(6), 1033-1050.
- Blaikie, P., & Brookfield, H. (1987). Approaches to the study of land degradation. *Land degradation and society/Piers Blaikie and Harold Brookfield with contributions by Bryant Allen...[et al.]*.
- Bloemink, I. (2000). Victims of their own fortune. *Miie udefensie, The Netherlands, October*.
- Braun, B. (2014). A new urban dispositif? Governing life in an age of climate change. *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*, 32(1), 49-64.
- Brisibe, A. (2001). African Tradition "The Identity of a People: With special Focus on Globalization & Its Impact in the Niger Delta" COOL Conference. *Boston, USA*.
- Brockington, D. (2004). Community conservation, inequality and injustice: Myths of power in protected area management. *Conservation and society*, 2(2), 411.
- Brockington, D., & Scholfield, K. (2010). The Conservationist Mode of Production and Conservation NGOs in sub-Saharan Africa. *Antipode*, 42(3), 551-575.
- Bryant, R. L. (1998). Power, knowledge and political ecology in the third world: a review. *Progress in physical geography*, 22(1), 79-94.
- Bryman, A. (2004). *Social Research Methods* Oxford University Press. *New York*.
- Bryman, A. (2008). *Social research methods*: London: Oxford university Press.
- Buch-Hansen, H., & Nielsen, P. (2005). *Kritisk realisme [Critical realism]*. *Fredriksberg, Roskilde Universitetsforlag*.
- Burns, N., & Grove, S. (1987). *The practice of nursing research* Philadelphia: WB Saunders.
- Büscher, B. (2009). Letters of gold: Enabling primitive accumulation through neoliberal conservation. *Human Geography*, 2(3), 91-93.
- Büscher, B. a. R. F. (2014). Accumulation by conservation. *New Political Economy*, DOI: 10.1080/13563467.2014.923824.
- Cathedral., C. (2009). The potential for peace and reconciliation in the Niger Delta. <http://www.coventrycathedral.org.uWdownloads/publications1.pdf> (accessed July 10, 2009).

- Cavanagh, C., & Benjaminsen, T. A. (2014). Virtual nature, violent accumulation: The 'spectacular failure' of carbon offsetting at a Ugandan National Park. *Geoforum*, 56, 55-65.
- Cavanagh, C. J. (2014). *Biopolitics, Environmental Change, and Development Studies*. Paper presented at the Forum for Development Studies.
- Cavanagh, C. J., & Benjaminsen, T. A. (2015). Guerrilla agriculture? A biopolitical guide to illicit cultivation within an IUCN Category II protected area. *The Journal of Peasant Studies*, 1-21. doi: 10.1080/03066150.2014.993623
- Centre for Population and Environmental Development , C. (2003).
- Chinweze, C., & Abiola-Oloke, G. (2009). *Women Issues, Poverty and Social Challenge of Climate Change in the Nigerian Niger Delta Context*. Paper presented at the 7th International Conference on the Human Dimension of Global Environmental Change (IHDP Open Meeting), UN Campus, Bonn, Germany.
- CLO, O. C. L. (2002). *Blood Trail: Repression and Resistance in Niger Delta*: Civil Liberties Organisation (CLO).
- Cohen, L. M. (2007). L. and Morrison, K.(2007) *Research methods in education* 6th edition: London: Routledge.
- Collett, D. (1987). Pastoralists and wildlife: image and reality in Kenya Maasailand. *Conservation in Africa: People, policies and practice*, 129-148.
- Collier, P. (2007). *The bottom billion: Why the poorest countries are failing and what can be done about it*: Oxford University Press.
- Corson, C. (2011). Territorialization, enclosure and neoliberalism: non-state influence in struggles over Madagascar's forests. *Journal of Peasant Studies*, 38(4), 703-726.
- Corson, C., & MacDonald, K. I. (2012). Enclosing the global commons: the convention on biological diversity and green grabbing. *Journal of Peasant Studies*, 39(2), 263-283.
- Courson, E. (2006). Odi Revisited? Oil and State Violence in Odioma, Brass LGA, Bayelsa State. *Economies of Violence Project, Institute of International Studies, University of California, Berkeley, Working Paper*(7).
- Cowton, C. J. (1998). The use of secondary data in business ethics research. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 17(4), 423-434.
- Creswell, J. (2003). *Research design: Qualitative, quantitative and mixed methods approaches* (2nd ed.). . *Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications*.
- Creswell, J. (2009). *Research design: qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods approaches.*, 3rd edn.(Sage Publications: Thousand Oaks, CA).
- Creswell, J. W. (1994). *Research design: Qualitative and quantitative approaches*. *Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications*.
- Creswell, J. W. (2002). *Educational research: Planning, conducting, and evaluating quantitative*: Prentice Hall.

- Cupples, J. (2012). Wild globalization: the biopolitics of climate change and global capitalism on Nicaragua's Mosquito Coast. *Antipode*, 44(1), 10-30.
- Dan-jumbo, K. P. (2006). Oil and Oil Spillage in the Niger Delta. *Unpublished M.sc Dissertation. Port-Harcourt: Rivers State University of Science and Technolog.*
- Dublin-Green, C., Awosika, L., & Folorunsho, R. (1999). Climate Variability Research Activities In Nigeria. *Nigerian Institute for Oceanography and Marine Research, Victoria Island, Lagos, Nigeria.*
- Duffield, M. (2007). *Development, security and unending war: governing the world of peoples: Polity.*
- Duffy, M. E. (1985). Designing nursing research: the qualitative-quantitative debate. *Journal of Advanced Nursing*, 10(3), 225-232.
- Ebeku, K. S. (2008). Niger Delta Oil, Development of the Niger Delta and the New Development Initiative Some Reflections from a Socio-Legal Perspective. *Journal of Asian and African studies*, 43(4), 399-425.
- Ebeku, K. S. A. (2001). Oil And The Niger Delta People: . *The Injustice Of The Land Use Act'. CEPMLP Journal. November 18. <http://www.dundee.ac.uk/cepmlp/journal/html/vol9/article9-14.html>. [Accessed 18 October, 2004].*
- Edkins, J., Pin-Fat, V., & Shapiro, M. J. (2004). *Sovereign lives: power in global politics: Psychology Press.*
- Elliott, B. J. (2005). Using Narrative in Social Research. *Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches, Los Angeles, CA: Sage Publications.*
- Ember, C. R., & Levinson, D. (1991). The substantive contributions of worldwide cross-cultural studies using secondary data. *Behavior Science Research.*
- Energy Information Association, E. (2005). OPEC revenues: Country details. *Available online at REPORT FROM AFRICA • POPULATION, HEALTH, ENVIRONMENT AND CONFLICT 49 <http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/orevcoun.html>.*
- Energy Information Association, E. (2006). Nigeria country analysis brief. *Available online at <http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Nigeria/Full.htm>.*
- Enzensberger, H. M. (1974). A critique of political ecology. *New left review*, 84(3), 3-31.
- Eyinla, P., & Ukpo, J. (2006). Nigeria; The Travesty of Oil and Gas Wealth. *Lagos: The Catholic Secretariat of Nigeria.*
- Federal Republic of Nigeria, N. (2012). Nigerian Economy. *About Nigeria. Retrieved from <http://www.nigeria.gov.ng/2012-10-29-11-05-46/economy>.*
- Forsyth, T. (2003). *Critical political ecology: the politics of environmental science Routledge. London Forsyth Critical political ecology: the politics of environmental science 2003.*
- Frynas, J. G. (2000). *Oil in Nigeria: Conflict and litigation between oil companies and village communities (Vol. 1): LIT Verlag Münster.*

- Graf, W. D. (1988). *The Nigerian state: political economy, state class and political system in the post-colonial era*: Heinemann.
- Grix, J. (2004.). *The foundations of research*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Grove, K. J. (2010). Insuring “our common future?” Dangerous climate change and the biopolitics of environmental security. *Geopolitics*, 15(3), 536-563.
- Harris, H. (2001). Content analysis of secondary data: A study of courage in managerial decision making. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 34(3-4), 191-208.
- Harvey, D. (2005). *The New Imperialism*. . Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Harvey, D. (2007). Neoliberalism as creative destruction. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 610(1), 21-44.
- Hinchman, L. P., & Hinchman, S. K. (1997). *Memory, identity, community: The idea of narrative in the human sciences*: SUNY Press.
- Howden, D. (2006). Shell may pull out of Niger Delta after 17 die in boat raid’, . *The Independent*, 17 January; <http://news.independent.co.uk/world/africa>.
- Human Rights Watch. (2003). *The price of Oil. Corporate Responsibility and Human Rights Violations in Nigeria's Oil Producing Communities, New York; (2003a), Sudan, Oil and Human Rights Brussels: Human Rights Watch; (2003b), The Warri Crisis: Fuelling Violence, 17 December; (2002), Vol. 15, No. 18 (A)*.
- Ibaba, S. I. (2005). *Understanding the Niger Delta Crisis*. Port Harcourt: Amethyst and Colleagues Publishers.
- Ibeanu, O. (2000). Oiling the friction: Environmental conflict management in the Niger Delta, Nigeria. *Environmental change and security project report*, 6, 19-32.
- Ibeanu, O., & Luckham, R. (2007). Nigeria: political violence, governance and corporate responsibility in a petro-state. *Mary Kaldor, Terry Karl and Yahia Said, Oil wars, MacMillan*.
- Idemudia, U. (2007). Community Perceptions and Expectations: Reinventing the Wheels of Corporate Social Responsibility Practices in the Nigerian Oil Industry,DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8594.2007.00301.x. *Business and Society Review, Volume 112,(ssue 3)*, pages 369–405.
- Ifeka, C. (2001). Oil, NGOs & youths: struggles for resource control in the Niger delta.
- Ifeka, C. (2004). Violence, Market Forces & Militarisation in the Niger Delta. *Review of African Political Economy*, 144-150.
- Igbikiowubo, H. (2004). Just 1 percent of Nigeria’s Population Gets 80 percent Oil/Gas Revenue– World Bank. *Vanguard*, 26, 15.
- Ikelegbe, A. (2005). The Economy of Conflict in the Oil Rich Niger Delta Region of Nigeria. *Nordic Journal of African Studies*,14 (2): 208-234.

- Ikelegbe, A. (2006). Beyond the threshold of civil struggle: youth militancy and the militia-ization of the resource conflicts in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. *African Study Monographs*, 27(3), 87-122.
- Ikelegbe, A. (2008). *Popular and Criminal Violence as Instruments of Struggle: The Case of Youth Militias in the Niger Delta Region*. Paper presented at the Nordic African Institute, Post Conflict Program Workshop, Oslo, Norway August.
- Ikporukpo, C. O. (2002). *Spatial Engineering and Accessibility: An Inaugural Lecture, 2002*: University of Ibadan.
- Jarosz, L. (1996). Defining deforestation in Madagascar. *Liberation ecologies: Environment, development, social movements*, 148-164.
- Jike, V. T. (2004). Environmental degradation, social disequilibrium, and the dilemma of sustainable development in the Niger-Delta of Nigeria. *Journal of Black Studies*, 34(5), 686-701.
- Joab-Peterside S, P. D. a. W. M. (2012). Rethinking conflict in the Niger Delta: . *Understanding conflict dynamics, justice and security Economies of Violence Working Paper No. 26: Niger Delta. Washington DC: The United States Institute of Peace; Berkeley, CA: University of California, Institute of International Studies.*
- Joab-Peterside, S., Porter, D., & Watts, M. (2012). Rethinking conflict in the Niger Delta: Understanding conflict dynamics, justice and security. *United States Institute of Peace*, 1-33.
- Johansson, A. (2005). Narrative teori och metod: Med livsberättelsen i fokus [Narrative theory and method: With the life-story in focus]. *Lund: Studentlitteratur.*
- Katsouris, C., & Sayne, A. (2013). Nigeria's Criminal Crude: International Options to Combat the Export of Stolen Oil. *Chatham House, September.*
- Kelly, A. B. (2011). Conservation practice as primitive accumulation. *Journal of Peasant Studies*, 38(4), 683-701.
- Kjeldstadli, K. (1992). Fortida er ikke hva den en gang var,(The Past is not What it Once Was): Universitetsforlaget.
- Kvale, S. (1996). Interviews: an introduction to qualitative research interviewing. *Thousand Oaks, California.*
- Lawal, Y. (2004). Economic Crimes Panel now try oil theft cases. *The Guardian, Monday, 19.*
- Li, T. M. (2010). To make live or let die? Rural dispossession and the protection of surplus populations. *Antipode*, 41(s1), 66-93.
- Lincoln, Y. S., & Denzin, N. K. (1994). The fifth moment. *Handbook of qualitative research*, 1, 575-586.
- Linnros, H. D., & Hallin, P. O. (2001). The discursive nature of environmental conflicts: the case of the Öresund link. *Area*, 33(4), 391-403.
- Locke, L. F., W. W. Spirduso, A. J. Silverman (2007). Proposals that Work. *A Guide for Planning Dissertations and Grant Proposals.*

- Mackenzie, C. A. (2012). Accruing benefit or loss from a protected area: Location matters. *Ecological Economics*, 76, 119-129.
- Magilvy, J. K., & Thomas, E. (2009). A first qualitative project: Qualitative descriptive design for novice researchers. *Journal for Specialists in Pediatric Nursing*, 14(4), 298-300.
- Manby, B. (1999). *The price of oil: corporate responsibility and human rights violations in Nigeria's oil producing communities*: Human Rights Watch.
- Marx, K. (1995). *Capital: A Critique of Political Economy. Volume One. S. Moore and E. Aveling (Trans.); F. Engels (Ed.). Moscow: Progress Publishers. Available from: <http://marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1867-c1/index.htm> [accessed on 16 February 2014.*
- Matthews, B., & Ross, L. (2010). *Research methods: A practical guide for the social sciences*: Pearson Education.
- Mbah, C. E. (2013). Is It Always the Economic Stupid?: Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND) and Petroviolence in the Niger Delta of Nigeria. *Master's Thesis in Peace and Conflict Transformation Faculty of Humanities, Social Sciences and Education University of Tromsø Spring 2013* retrieved from <http://munin.uit.no/bitstream/handle/10037/5238/thesis.pdf?sequence=2&isAllowed=y>.
- Mehlum, H., Moene, K., & Torvik, R. (2006). Institutions and the resource curse*. *The economic journal*, 116(508), 1-20.
- Mifflin. (2000). *The American Heritage Dictionary. (4th Edition). Houghton: Mifflin Company.*
- NDDC, N. D. D. C. (2005). Niger Delta Regional Development Master Plan. *Port Harcourt: Nigeria, 2005b - See more at: <http://www.mdpi.com/1660-4601/3/1/98/htm#b16-ijerph-03-00098>.*
- NDDC, N. D. D. C. (2006). NDDC Acts.
- Ndubuisi, O., & Asia, I. (2007). Environmental Pollution in Oil Producing Areas of the Niger Delta Basin, Nigeria: Empirical Assessment of Trends and People's Perception. *Environmental Research Journal*, 1(1-4), 18-26.
- Nel, A., & Hill, D. (2013). Constructing walls of carbon—the complexities of community, carbon sequestration and protected areas in Uganda. *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 31(3), 421-440.
- Newswatch. (1990). 'Sticky, Oily Problem', 2 July: 15–19.
- Nigeria, S. i. (2004). Oil and Gas Reserves Crisis and Political risks: shared concerns for investors and producer communities. *A briefing for Shell Stakeholders', Jointly published by Christian Aid, Friends of the Earth, Platform and Stakeholder Democracy Network, June.*
- Nnoli, O. (2003). Ethnic Violence in Nigeria: A historical perspective. *Communal Conflict and Population Displacement in Nigeria.*
- Norgrove, L., & Hulme, D. (2006). Confronting conservation at Mount Elgon, Uganda. *Development and change*, 37(5), 1093-1116.

- Nseabasi, A. (2005). Conflicts in Nigeria's Niger-Delta: Issues on Response and Management. *International Journal of Social Sciences*, 4(1), 161-175.
- Nyananyo, B. (2007). Global Warming and the Niger Delta Environment. *A paper presented at the 2nd History Concourse on the Future of the Niger Delta: The Search for a Relevant Narrative, Department of History and International Studies, University of Calabar, Calabar, Nigeria (5 May).*
- Obi, C. (2009). Nigeria's Niger Delta: Understanding the complex drivers of violent oil-related conflict. *Africa Development*, 34(2).
- Obi, C. I. (1997). Globalisation and local resistance: The case of the Ogoni versus Shell. *New Political Economy*, 2(1), 137-148.
- Obi, C. I. (2004). The oil paradox: reflections on the violent dynamics of petro-politics and (mis) governance in Nigeria's Niger Delta.
- Obi, C. I. (2007). The struggle for resource control in a petro-state: A perspective from Nigeria.
- Obi, C. I. (2010). Oil extraction, dispossession, resistance, and conflict in Nigeria's oil-rich Niger Delta. *Canadian Journal of Development Studies/Revue canadienne d'études du développement*, 30(1-2), 219-236.
- Obi, C. J. (2011). Oil gender and agricultural child labor in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria: Implications for sustainable development. *Gender and Behavior*, 9, 4072-4101. Available from <http://www.ajol.info/index.php/gab>.
- Odoemene, A. (2011). Social consequences of environmental change in the Niger Delta of Nigeria.
- Ogbodo, A. (2009 :21). Democracy, Governance and the Cabal Theory. *The Guardian*, May 17.
- Ogbogbo, C. (2005). The Niger Delta Peoples and the Resource Control Conflict, 1960-1995: An Assessment of Conflict Handling Styles. *Albert, IO (Edited)'Perspectives on Peace and Conflict in Africa: Essays in Honour of General (Dr) AbdulSalami A. Abubakar', Ibadan: Peace and Conflict Studies Programme.*
- Okaba, B. (2007). *Petrodollar, the Nigerian state and the crisis of development in the Niger Delta region: challenges and the way forward.* Paper presented at the Conference on the Nigerian state, oil industry and the Niger Delta, Organised by the Department of Political Science, Niger Delta University and Centre for Applied Environmental Research, University of Missouri.
- Okecha, S. (2009). Leadership, ethics and accountability in office. *Aghayere and Iyoha (eds.) Ethics, Standard and Accountability in Governance.*
- Okonta, I., & Oronto, D. (2001). *Where Vultures Feast: Forty Years of Oil in the Niger Delta. Ibadan: Kraft books Limited.*
- Olatubosun, D. (1975). *Nigerian Neglected rural majority. Ibadan, Nigeria, Oxford University Press.*
- Olusoji. James. George , O. L. K. U. C. O. (2012). Corporate Social Irresponsibility (CSI) a Catalyst to the Niger Delta Crisis: The Case of Nigerian Oil Multinational Companies versus the Militants of Niger Delta Region of Nigeria *Journal of Management Research ISSN 1941-899X retrieved*

from <http://pakacademicsearch.com/pdf-files/ech/127/1-11%20Vol%204,%20No%202%20%282012%29.pdf>, 4(2).

- OMCT & CLEEN. (2002). A Report on Impunity and State-Sponsored Violence in Nigeria (2002), issued by World Organization Against Torture (OMCT) Switzerland, and Centre for Law Enforcement Education (CLEEN), Lagos, Nigeria. *Policemen were killed in Odi (Rivers State), while*, 19.
- Omeje, K. (2006). Petrobusiness and security threats in the Niger Delta, Nigeria. *Current Sociology*, 54(3), 477-499.
- Omeje, K. C. (2006). *High stakes and stakeholders: Oil conflict and security in Nigeria*: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd.
- Omotola, J. S. (2009). "Liberation Movements" and Rising Violence in the Niger Delta: The New Contentious Site of Oil and Environmental Politics. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 33(1), 36-54.
- Orogun, P. S. (2010). Resource control, revenue allocation and petroleum politics in Nigeria: the Niger Delta question. *GeoJournal*, 75(5), 459-507.
- Ovwasa, L. (1999). Oil and the minority question in Saliu. *Issues in contemporary political economy of Nigeria, Sally and Associates*.
- Oyefusi, A. (2007). *Oil and the Propensity to Armed Struggle in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria* (Vol. 4194): World Bank Publications.
- Pagnamenta, R. (2009). Energy and Environment Editor :*Shell puts cost of crude oil theft in Nigeria at as 1.1 bn a year. TIMESONLINE February 21, 2009.*
- Punch, K. (1998). Introduction to Social Research Quantitative and Qualitative approaches—SAGE: London.
- Reijers, T. J. A., S.W. Petters and C.S. Nwajide. (1996). The Niger Delta Basin, . in: *T.J.A. Reijers (ed.), Selected Chapters on Geology: SPDC corporate reprographic services, Warri, Nigeria, pp. 103-114.*
- Reno, W. (2003 :45). Political Networks in a Failing Stage The Roots and Future of Violent Conflict in Sierra Leone. *Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft*(2), 44-66.
- Ritchie, J., & Lewis, J. (2003). Qualitative research practice London: Sage Publications.
- Robbins, P. (2004). Critical introductions to geography: Political ecology: Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.
- Robbins, P. (2012). Political ecology. *Oxford Blackwell*.
- Robbins, P., McSweeney, K., Waite, T., & Rice, J. (2006). Even conservation rules are made to be broken: implications for biodiversity. *Environmental Management*, 37(2), 162-169.
- Robinson, D. (1996). Ogoni: The Struggle Continues (Geneva & Nairobi: World Council of Churches and All African Council of Churches).
- Roe, E. M. (1991). Development narratives, or making the best of blueprint development. *World development*, 19(4), 287-300.

- Royal Dutch Shell PLC, S. (2011). Sustainability Report.
- Royal Dutch Shell PLC, S. (2014). The Ogoni Issue. Environment and Society. . Retrieved March 30, 2014, from <http://www.shell.com.ng/environment-society/ogoni.html>.
- Sagay, I. (2008). Federalism, the Constitution and Resource Control. In *Oil, Democracy, and the Promise of True Federalism in Nigeria* edited by A.A. Ikein, D.S.P. Alamiyeseigha, and S. Azaiki. Lanham, MD.: University Press of America. .
- Saro-wiwa, K. (1993). These we demand. *Newswatch*, 17(4).
- Saro-Wiwa, K., & Boyd, W. (1995). *A month and a day: a detention diary*: Penguin books London.
- Scheyvens, R., Nowak, B., & Scheyvens, H. (2003). Ethical issues. *Development fieldwork: A practical guide*, 139-166.
- SDN. (2013). Communities not Criminals:Illegal Oil Refining in the Niger Delta. *retrieved from* ,<http://www.stakeholderdemocracy.org/uploads/SDN%20Publications/CommunitiesNotCriminals.pdf>.
- Shah, A. (2010). Nigeria and Oil. *global issues:Social, Political, Economic and Environmental Issues That Affect Us All*. retrieved from <http://www.globalissues.org/article/86/nigeria-and-oil>.
- Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Limited, S. (2010). Annual report. *TELL Magazine, Special Edition, February 18, 2008*.
- Smith, M. (2011). *Against ecological sovereignty: ethics, biopolitics, and saving the natural world*: U of Minnesota Press.
- Soyinka, W. (1996). *The Open Sore of a Continent: A Personal Narrative of the Nigerian Crisis*. New York: Oxford UP.
- Statistics., N. B. o. (2010). Revised 2009 and estimates for Q1- Q3, 2010 Gross Domestic Product for Nigeria, . Abuja, NBS Headquarters. .
- Steward, J. H. (1955). *Theory of culture change: The methodology of multilineal evolution*: University of Illinois Press.
- Subair, D., & Adesanmi, A. (2003). Armed militias steal \$2.8 million daily in Niger Delta Ibadan. *Nigerian Tribune, Monday, 15*.
- Suberu, R. T. (1996). *Ethnic minority conflicts and governance in Nigeria*: Spectrum.
- Suberu, R. T. (2008). The supreme court and federalism in Nigeria. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 46(03), 451-485.
- Sunny, O. (2010). Interview with Amaize Emma : "It is a Scandal Niger Deltans live below \$1 per day". *Apapa-Lagos Vanguard -July 18*.
- Sunseri, T. (2005). 'Something else to burn': forest squatters, conservationists, and the state in modern Tanzania. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 43(04), 609-640.
- Svarstad, H. (2002). *Analysing Conservation—Development Discourses: The Story of a Biopiracy Narrative*. Paper presented at the Forum for Development studies.

- Svarstad, H. (2009). Narrativitetens sosiologi. *Sosiologi i dag*, 39(4).
- SweetCrude. (2014). A Review of The Nigerian Energy Industry. *We can make petrol sell below N97 per litre – Titi Governor*.
- Takon, N. (2013). Non-State Violence, State Responses, and Implications for Human Rights and Security in the Niger Delta *Journal of Human Rights in the Commonwealth*. •retrieved from <http://sas-space.sas.ac.uk/5185/1/1698-2197-1-SM.pdf>.pp.38–55..
- Tamuno, T. N. (1972). *The Evolution of the Nigerian State: the southern phase, 1898-1914*: Longman London.
- Tebekaemi, T. (1982). The Twelve Day Revolution. *Benin, Nigeria: Umeh Publishers*.
- Thrift, N., Sharp, J. P., Routledge, P., Philo, C., & Paddison, R. (2000). Entanglements of Power: geographies of domination/resistance.
- Times., F. (16 January 2004). Shell Chief Explains Silence. <http://story.news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=story&cid=1106>.
- Tribune, S. (1995b). Uncle Bola’s Column’, 19 Nov.: 3.
- Tribune., N. (2010). Shell Paid \$34bn Taxes. *Royalties to FG in 4 Years” March 2*.
- Tumusiime, D. M., & Sjaastad, E. (2014). Conservation and Development: Justice, Inequality, and Attitudes around Bwindi Impenetrable National Park. *Journal of Development Studies*, 50(2), 204-225.
- Tumusiime, D. M., & Vedeld, P. (2012). False promise or false premise? Using tourism revenue sharing to promote conservation and poverty reduction in Uganda. *Conservation and society*, 10(1), 15.
- Tuodolo, F. (2008). Generation. *Curse of the Black Gold*, 50.
- Ugor, P. (2013 :11). The Niger Delta Wetland, Illegal Oil Bunkering and Youth Identity Politics in Nigeria. *Postcolonial text*, 8(3).
- Ukiwo, U. (2007). From “Pirates” To “Milicans”: A Historical Perspective On Anti-State and Anti -Oil company mobilization among the Ijaw of warri, western Niger Delta. *African Affairs*, 106/425, 587–610 doi: 10.1093/afraf/adm057 :The Author [2007]. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of Royal African Society.
- Ukiwo, U. (2009). Causes and cures of oil-related Niger Delta conflicts.
- UNDP, U. N. D. P. (2006). Retrieved from <http://web.ng.undp.org/documents/nigeria-niger-delta-hrd.pdf>.
- United Nations Development Programs, U. (2006). Niger Delta human development report. Retrieved December 1, 2011,.
- United States Energy Information Administration, U. (2010). International petroleum (Oil) production: OPEC. *countries crude oil excluding lease condensate, Energy Information Administration, Washington DC*.

- Uzodike, U., Allen, F., & Wetho, A. (2010). Making Nigerian federalism work: Fixing the democracy deficit. *Loyola Journal of Social Sciences*, 24(2), 161-185.
- Vedeld, P., Jumane, A., Wapalila, G., & Songorwa, A. (2012). Protected areas, poverty and conflicts: A livelihood case study of Mikumi National Park, Tanzania. *Forest Policy and Economics*, 21, 20-31.
- Victor Ojakorotu , & Gilbert, L. D. (2010). Checkmating the Resurgence of Oil Violence in the Niger Delta of Nigeria.
- Walker, P. A. (2005). Political ecology: where is the ecology. *Progress in Human Geography*, 29(1), 73-82.
- Watts, M., & Peet, R. (1996). Towards a theory of liberation ecology. *Liberation ecologies: Environment, development and social movements*, 260-269.
- Western, D. (1994). Ecosystem conservation and rural development: the case of Amboseli. In: D. Western and R.M. Wright and S.C. Strum, eds. *Natural Connections: Perspectives in Community-based Conservation*. Washington, D.C.: Island Press, pp 15-52.
- WorldBank. (1995). Defining an Environmental Development strategy for the Niger Delta. . Washington DC: World Bank. WRI, World Resources Institute 1992. *World Resources 1992–93*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Yin, R. K. (1994). Case study research: design and methods. Thousands Oaks. *International Educational and Professional Publisher*.
- Yin, R. K. (2003). Case study research, 3. Aufl., Thousand Oaks.
- Youatt, R. (2008). Counting species: Biopower and the global biodiversity census. *Environmental Values*, 393-417.

Appendix 1.

Table 2 Nigeria: Federal revenue allocation to states, 1999-2007

S/NO	States	population 2006	Allocation 1999-2007N	per capital allocation	Ranking
1	Abia	2 833,999	180,913,356,049.45	63,836.78	14th
2	Adamawa	3,168,101	200,358,588,269.	16 63,242.49	15th
3	Akwa-Ibom	3,920,208	495,266,604,843.58	126,336.82	4th
4	Anambra	4,182,032	183,439,623,354.30	43,863.75	34th
5	Bauchi	4,676,465	227,082,096,536.85	48,558.49	31st
6	Bayelsa	1,703,358	452,260,540,942.94	265,511.15	1st
7	Benue	4,219,244	221,639,773,288.79	52,530.68	27th
8	Borno	4,151,193	242,143,511,536.62	58,331.07	23rd

9	Cross River	2,888,966	190,394,175,888.13	65,903.92	12th
10	Delta	4,098,391	561,421,465,722.84	136,985.82	3rd
11	Ebonyi	2,173,501	149,606,220,047.59	67,911.73	11th
12	Edo	3,218,332	196,650,837,309.93	61,103.34	18th
13	Ekiti	2,384,212	152,866,276,435.50	64,116.06	13th
14	Enugu	3,257,298	172,943,975,753.31	53,094.31	26th
15	FCT, Abuja	1,405,201	193,027,632,752.09	137,366.56	2nd
16	Gombe	2,353,879	146,500,259,934.10	62,237.80	16th
17	Imo	3,934,899	231,384,556,606.10	58,803.18	22nd
18	Jigawa	4,348,649	225,625,079,684.13	51,883.95	29th
19	Kaduna	6,066,562	256,110,734,255.77	42,216.78	35th
20	Kano	9,383,682	370,935,172,516.81	39,529.81	36 th
21	Katsina	5,792,578	280,544,163,809.26	48,431.66	32 nd
22	Kebbi	3,238,628	196,139,911,137.47	60,562.66	19 th
23	Kogi	3,278,487	195,125,198,336.31	59,516.84	21 st
24	Kwara	2,371,089	165,588,098,911.35	69,836.31	10 th
25	Lagos	9,013,534	311,928,495,035.61	34,606.68	37 th
26	Nasarawa	1,863,275	145,006,177,121.79	77,823.28	6 th
27	Niger	3,950,249	237,369,691,547.30	60,089.81	20 th
28	Ogun	3,728,098	195,378,106,884.06	52,406.91	28 th
29	Ondo	3,441,024	257,395,751,810.07	74,802.08	9 th
30	Osun	3,423,535	210,051,538,274.76	61,355.16	17 th
31	Oyo	5,591,589	263,298,045,707.53	47,088.23	33rd
32	Plateau	3,178,712	155,194,100,865.61	48,822.95	30 th
33	Rivers	5,185,400	621,996,274,440.22	119,951.46	5 th
34	Sokoto	3,696,999	214,300,345,320.76	57,966.03	24th
35	Taraba	2,300,736	176,332,044,844.11	76,641.58	7 th
36	Yobe	2,321,591	177,230,732,544.09	76,340.02	8 th
37	Zamfara	3,259,846	182,989,541,536.86	56,134.41	25 th

NIGERIA	140,003,542	9,056,438,699,855.15	64,687.21
----------------	--------------------	-----------------------------	------------------

Source: compiled by the authors from government revenue allocations. Nigeria's N1 is equivalent to about US\$160



Norwegian University
of Life Sciences

Postboks 5003
NO-1432 Ås, Norway
+47 67 23 00 00
www.nmbu.no