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A blind eye?
A discourse analysis of Norwegian Police Security Service, 2004-2014

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International Relations

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Declaration

I, Mahira Sahar Karim, declare that this thesis is a result of my research investigations and findings. Sources of information other than my own have been acknowledged and a reference list has been appended. This work has not been previously submitted to any other university for award of any type of academic degree.

Signature  .....

Date.....

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Abstract

In the past two decades, Norway has witnessed two right-wing terrorist attacks. On July 22, 2011, Anders Behring Breivik detonated a car bomb near the Government Quarter in Oslo. He then traveled to the Workers' Youth League summer camp at Utøya island. In a police uniform, he opened fire and started shooting. That day, 77 Norwegians lost their lives. July 22 is remembered as the deadliest day in Norwegian history since the war. The second terrorist attack was carried out by Philip Manshaus on August 10, 2019. While he was successful in killing his first target, his step-sister Johanne, the second target, a mosque outside of Oslo, was averted by three elderly men present at the time of the attack. Right-wing terrorists are not simply overrepresented in the statistics of terrorists who have carried out attacks in Norway. They are in fact the *only* kind of terrorists who have carried out terrorist attacks in Norway in the past two decades. Yet, for the past two decades, the Norwegian Police Security Service (PST) has dominantly constructed extreme Islamists as the greatest terrorist threat to Norwegian peace and security. This study problematized this 'truth' constructed by PST and aimed to analyze *how* it was possible for PST to construct such a truth.

This study's primary focus was to analyze the truth construction of terrorist threats in PST's annual threat assessments in the timeframe 2004-2014. The study met this aim by analyzing *critically* how the meaning of terrorism, terrorists and terrorist threats are socially constructed in discourse. The main finding of this study was that the truth of extreme Islamists being the greatest threat to Norway was possible due to the power of the discursive construction of the global campaign of War on Terrorism (GWT), launched by the USA in the aftermath of 9/11. It found that GWT constructed terrorism as something carried out by international extreme Islamists who targeted international peace and security. This construction was so strong that PST assumed extreme Islamists to be a terrorist threat to Norway as well. The study concludes that because of this truth, PST turned a blind eye to right-wing extremism between 2004-2014, downplaying the threat from right-wing terrorists.

Contents

1. Introduction

On Friday, July 22 2011 around 3.26 p.m, a car bomb went off near the Norwegian Government Quarter in the center of Oslo. Within seconds, blood, smoke, shattered glass, and people running from fear took over the otherwise peaceful streets of Oslo. Eight people lost their lives as a result of the bombing (Gjørv, 2012). About two hours later, a man opened fire at the annual Workers' Youth League Norway summer Camp at Utøya, an island owned by the youth party since 1950. 69 people were killed as a result of the shooting. Within seconds, the image of Norway as a safe country was disrupted. A great need arose among the Norwegian people to understand and interpret what had just happened, to give meaning to the event, and to make sense of why and who would do something so horrific. Norwegians across Norway turned to their TV screens, friends and family to make sense of it all.

Before the perpetrator was identified, one particular assumption was communicated in the media; that what had just happened was a terrorist attack carried out by 'international extreme Islamists': "[i]f it is an international terrorist attack *as it seems to be* [emphasis added], it is very disturbing that no one has had any suspicion and could avert it"[1] (Dagbladet, 2011)[2]. Particularly events in the aftermath of the attacks on USA on September 11 (9/11) were referenced to, such as the "caricature controversy," "Afghanistan," and "Libya" as possible explanations for why Oslo and Utøya were targeted (Grydeland, 2012, p. 95). The caricature controversy is a well known controversy about the Danish newspaper, *Jyllands-Posten*, who printed cartoons of Muhammad, the holy prophet of Muslims, in 2005. The cartoons provoked violent reactions among some in the Muslim community in Denmark. Shortly after, the Norwegian newspapers, Aftenposten and Dagbladet among others, published a facsimile of the cartoons printed in Jyllands-Posten. Afghanistan and Libya were countries where Norway had a military presence in the fight against 'international terrorism'. Evaluating the events of July 22nd, the July 22 Commission published a report a year later in 2012 and stated that:

[1] All quotes and literature in Norwegian are translated to English by the author of this study. The translation is done in such a way that the original meaning and term is kept. Error may occur.
[2] Without a byline, 2011, 22 July. Retrieved from ATEKST(accessed 2.March).

> "Even if outwardly one was careful not to wonder what had happened, there was one widespread assumption, both in the government apparatus and within agencies responsible for terrorist preparedness in Norway, that it was most likely a terrorist attack. Most were probably also inclined to believe that the attack was carried out by an extremist Islamist group, and that the motive had context with Norway's role in the ongoing conflicts in the Middle East, Afghanistan or Libya" (Gjørv, 2012, p. 22).

Also several terrorist experts suspected 'international extreme Islamists' of being behind the attacks. The Swedish terror expert Magnus Ransport claimed that "it is probably al-Qaeda" (NRK, 2011). While being open to other possibilities, another Norwegian terrorist expert claimed that " [i]t is natural to believe that this can be linked to a conflict between the West in general and radical Islam, as well as Norway's involvement in Afghanistan" (ibid). It is clear that when the bomb went off in Oslo Sentrum Friday, July 22, 2011, the dominant assumption was that it must be a Muslim, and most probably an 'international extreme Islamist' organization such as al-Qaeda, behind the attack. However, when the perpetrator was caught later that evening, the reality was rather different. The prepetrator was not an Islamist, nor was the extreme Islamist terrorist group al-Qaeda behind the terrorist attacks. Instead, it was a middle-class white Norwegian with 'extreme right-wing' attitudes, Anders Behring Breivik.

The case of July 22, 2011, (or 22/7), is a telling example of the power of discourse. It illustrates how a constant production and re-production of connotation between certain signifiers (e.g. 'Islam' and 'terrorism') in politics can create meanings of our social reality, a 'truth', without necessarily uttering or enunciating what something is. It illustrates the power of discourse to produce and re-produce representations over and over again, so much that they come to be known as objective truths. This power of discourse and the construction of the meaning of 'terrorism threat' is present in the annual threat assessment written by the Norwegian Police Security Service (PST). They hold the power to construct the dominant discourse on the 'terrorist threat' to Norway.

1.2 Research questions

Annually, PST provides an overview of the expected developments of future threats that may affect Norwegian security and harm national interests. One of the main focuses in their reports is to forecast any potential 'terrorist threat' that may weaken or damage Norway if not

counteracted (PST, 2012). Within the timeframe of 2004 - 2014, PST established that the 'terrorist threat' from 'extreme Islamists' alone is the greatest 'terrorist threat' to Norwegian security and interests (PST, 2004 -2014). 'Extreme right-wing' activity, on the other hand, was considered "[not]...a real threat against national interests" (PST, 2007). However, this has not always been the case. In 1999, PST actually feared that "fanatical sects and right-wing extremist groups will be behind terrorist acts in the transition to the year 2000" (Dagbladet, 1999).

This fear, however, was suppressed and ignored at the beginning of the 21st century. This study argues that the construction of the global campaign of 'War on Terrorism' (GWT) by the United States in the aftermath of 9/11 shaped the 'truth' of what the 'terrorist threat' was to Norway in the annual threat assessments written by PST in the timeframe 2004-2014. The study further argues that the discursive power of 'terrorism threat' from 'extreme Islamists', as constructed by GWT, was so great that the 'truth' of 'extreme Islamists' as the greatest 'terrorist threat' also became powerful in Norway. Because of this construction, the 'terrorist threat' from 'right-wing terrorism' was marginalized. The objective of this study is to make sense of this 'truth' and, in extension, the marginalization of 'terrorist threat' from 'right-wing terrorism'.

To make sense of it all, the study asks the following research question:

How was it possible for PST to discursively construct 'extreme Islamism' as the greatest 'terrorism threat' to Norway in the timeframe 2004-2014?

1. *How was the discourse on 'terrorism' and the identity of 'terrorists' socially constructed in the annual threat assessments?*
2. *What were the main causes of 'terrorism' and how were these causes discursively constructed in the annual threat assessments?*
3. *Where did the 'truth' of 'extreme Islamism' as the greatest 'terrorist threat' to Norway descend from?*

These questions are important for several reasons. Firstly, by focusing on discourse and asking a '*how-possible'* question, the research opens the door for an analysis of how certain constructions of reality gain dominance over other constructions, to the extent that the former

become taken-for-granted and the latter marginalized (Longuenesse, 2008). In the case of this research, the '*how-possible*' question paves the way for understanding how the construction of the 'terrorist threat' from 'extreme Islamism' gained dominance over the construction of the 'terrorist threat' from 'right-wing terrorism'. Moreover, by focusing on the discursive construction of 'terrorism' and 'terrorists', a platform is given to study these phenomena empirically. By analyzing *how* PST constructed what 'terrorism' was, who the 'terrorists' were, and what caused 'terrorism', the study is able to answer *how* it was possible for PST to construct 'extreme Islamism' as the greatest terrorist threat in the given timeframe. Instead of being committed to taken-for-granted definitions and limiting the study to secondary data, the study accesses the 'truth' by analyzing the very source of social reality, language (Jackson, 2007). At first sight, therefore, it may look strange to look into how PST define or construct, e.g 'terrorism' - because, will not the legal definition rule? This research, however, suggests that there is no such thing as an objective definition of 'terrorism' or 'terrorists', or objective causes to 'terrorism'. Instead, all is socially constructed. Thirdly, the questions offer the right tools to perform genealogy. Tracing the emergence of a discourse on 'terrorist threats' will allow the researcher to pay special attention to how the productive nature of power leads to what is considered as social and political 'truths', and whether these 'truths' are unfortunate. By doing so, it allows the researcher to suggest alternatives and possible normative changes. Lastly, the questions are anchored in discourse theory, pointing this research towards the post-positivist scholarship. This means that this study has a *critical* view of social reality. It aims not to arrive at a generic explanation of certain events but to demonstrate how our social and political reality is cultural and context specific, conditioned by the operation of power [3].

1.3 The choice of Norway as a case

In relation to other countries in Europe, Norway is a peaceful country. While countries such as France, United Kingdom, and Spain have experienced several terrorist attacks carried out by international extreme Islamists in the past decades (Kirk, 2017; Vidino, 2018; Reynié; 2019) extreme Islamist terrorism is a rare case in Norway. In fact, no terrorist attacks were carried out by extreme Islamists in Norway between 1995 and 2019 (FFI, 2020). Having no

[3] As the reader may have noticed, I have used inverted commas together with terms such as 'international extreme Islamism', 'extreme Islamism', 'terrorism', 'terrorists', 'terrorism threat', 'truth', and 'right wing terrorism'. I have done so to indicate that I acknowledge their political and social nature, that they are not "'out there' in real life that is independent of time, place and borders" (Staun, 2010, p. 403), but socially and politically constructed. From now on, however, I stop using these inverted commas as I assume that the reader understands that in this study, these terms are considered socially and politically constructed. I use quotation marks (") as traditionally known for indicating direct citation.

experience with an extreme Islamist terrorist attack, Norway *has* assumably averted two extreme Islamists attacks in Norway during that time. In 2010, Mikael Davud and Sawad Sadek Sajeed Bujak were sentenced for terror planning. However, the terror attack was not planned to be carried out in Norway, but in Denmark, targeting the Danish newspaper *Jyllandsposten* (NRK, 2012). The second time was in 2017 when a 17-year-old-man with a foreign background and Russian citizenship was arrested on suspicion of having made a homemade bomb. In 2019, the man was deported from Norway on the basis that PST believed that he was a threat to "basic national interests" (TV2, 2019). Besides these numbers, some cases have received a great deal of media attention, such as the Islamist Arfan Bhatti and Mullah Krekar[4]. Although considered threats to Norwegian security, they have never been convicted of terror-related cases in Norway (NRK, 2008, NRK, 2012).

Activity from extreme Islamists in Norway, targeting Norway, has been almost none. Yet, in the past two decades, two terrorist attacks have been carried out. All by right-wing extremists. On 22 July 2011, as already introduced, right-wing extremist Anders Brehing Breivik managed to carry out a two-sequential attack killing 77 people all together, making 22/7 the bloodiest day in Norwegian history since the war (Stoltenberg, 2011). Eight years later, on 10th August 2019, Philip Manshaus carried out two attacks, first targeting his step-sister, then a mosque outside of Oslo (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2020). While he managed to be successful with his first mission, the second mission was averted by three elderly men present in the mosque at the time of the attack (ibid.). The statistics show that right-wing extremists are not simply overrepresented in the statistics of terrorists who have carried out terrorist attacks in the past two decades in Norway. They are in fact the *only* terrorists who have carried out terrorist attacks in Norway in the past two decades. The fact that Norway has experienced two terrorist attacks by right-wing terrorists, and none by an extreme Islamist terrorist in the past two decades, makes Norway an interesting case to study. It becomes an ethical matter to understand how it was possible for PST to construct extreme Islamism as the greatest threat to Norwegian peace and security, when in reality, right-wing terrorism has shown to be the greatest threat.

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[4]NRK: *Derfor er Bhatti farlig for Norge.* NRK: https://www.nrk.no/norge/_-derfor-er-bhatti-farlig-for-norge-1.12151366
NRK: *Frifunnet for oppfordring til terror. NRK:* *https://www.nrk.no/norge/mulla-krekar-domt-for-trusler-1.9709288*

1.4 Methodology and data selection

To meet the purpose of this research, the research subscribes to *discourse analysis* anchored in discourse theory. This approach brings several advantages to this research. Discourse analysis is a mapping exercise and aims to make sense of how the world came to be as it is over a period of time (Jørgensen & Philips, 1999). By mapping the discourse activity taken place between 2004-2014 in PST's annual threat assessments, discourse analysis assists in identifying how one construction of a terrorist threat became dominating and another marginalized. It also assists in identifying potential changes or discursive battles, or alternatively how the constructions of terrorist threats are discursively maintained. Followingly, discourse analysis comes with tools to analyze how social identities and the meaning of terrorism and terrorists are constructed in discourse (Jørgensen and Phillips, 1999, p. 80). This is necessary for this research as it is curious to understand how the truth of terrorism and terrorists are constructed through discourse. Additionally, discourse analysis is an appropriate approach as it concerns itself with uncovering hidden power structures and putting a critical light on dominant perception of social reality. It helps in grasping how meanings are created and power exercised through language and discourse, directing society in a certain direction. The method also contributes to illuminating how certain meanings are produced and others not, how political agenda is shaped through meaning-making and others not, as well as how "some issues are organized into politics while others are organized out" (Mathisen, 1996, p.71). Moreover, when conducting discourse analysis, special attention is given to the power/knowledge nexus. This allows the study to trace where truth claims are descending from.

In discourse theory, language is ontologically and epistemologically significant (Jørgensen & Philips, 1999). This means that discourse analysis is concerned with studying language where it occurs, which is in the talk itself. Here, talk is understood in its extended form - talk being other forms of communication than just oral (Bryman, 2012, p. 528). Texts in the form of newspapers, speeches, and reports, TV commercials, and movies are all forms of talks. In this study, the primary source of data is text.

When selecting data material, the study subscribes to what is referred to as *Model 1* (Hansen, 2006). The model suggests that text for analysis should be selected based on the following

three criteria: “that they are characterized by a clear articulation of identities and policies; that they are widely read and attended to; and that they have the formal authority to define a political position” (Hansen, 2006, p. 85). The data material selected for this research are PST’s annual threat assessments. As already mentioned, every year PST provides an overview of the expected developments of threats that may affect Norwegian security and harm national interests, of which terrorist threats are one of their main priorities. Other priorities are, for instance, threats against Norwegian interests outside of Norway, threats against government officials or threats from weapons of mass destruction (PST, 2012). In Norway, PST has the main responsibility to develop threat assessments for the use of political authorities (Politiloven, 1995). It is they who have the responsibility to give advice on measures to the safety of Norway to the Ministry of Justice (ibid.). More importantly, they have the legal responsibility to uncover and prevent hostile acts among Norwegian citizens. In this way, PST has the power to construct the terrorism discourse in Norway. As such, PST’s annual threat assessments are in line with the criteria of Model 1, and are therefore appropriate texts to analyze in order to make sense of the construction of terrorist threats in Norway: 1) their annual assessment consists of clear articulation of identities of who they consider as terrorists, 2) they are widely read by authorities and Norwegian citizens, and 3) they have formal authority that set the scene of the terrorist threat to Norway. Additional material is used to make intertextual references.

Neumann insists that the delimitation of both text and timespan is vital as there is an ocean of texts out there (Neumann, 2010). Moreover, because discourse analysis is a mapping exercise of how the world came to be as it is over a set of time, delimitation of text and timespan is necessary (ibid.). The selected assessments are therefore from the period 2004-2014. The period chosen is appropriate. Firstly, studying a decade is a manageable timeframe for a master thesis of this scope. Studying two decades, for instance, would need more time and space. Secondly, the decade chosen allows the study to look for discursive battles or potential discursive changes prior to and post 22/7. The timeframe makes it possible to analyze to what degree if any, there was a discursive battle between the construction of terrorist threat from extreme Islamists and terrorist threat from right-wing terrorism in the assessments. Did the events of 22/7 challenge the understanding PST had of what the terrorist threats were? In addition to the date of 22/7, the time frame is also close to the events of 9/11 and GWT, which allows the study to analyse any influence on threat assessments in light of these events. Moreover, the researcher is aware that different findings would become known if threat

assessments from before 9/11 were also analyzed. The study may have been able to understand how PST went from considering right-wing terrorism as a terrorist threat to Norway at the turn of the 21st century, as briefly introductory mentioned, to considering extreme Islamism as the greatest terrorist threat instead. However, PST did not start publishing publicly available reports until 2004.

Moreover, this is the first time I have written an academic paper of this magnitude. While the journey has been rewarding, it has also posed challenges. The first challenge was met from an early stage; the limited access to academic literature. Due to the pandemic and multiple lockdowns, libraries were closed for the majority of the time of writing. While alternative online platforms were used to meet the needs, the lack of access to physical books and literature caused difficulty in getting a comprehensive overview of relevant literature. A second challenge was how to deal with the changes in terms used in the literature. The literature used *extreme-right terrorism, right-wing terrorism,* and *far-right terrorism* interchangeably. I address confusion in academia also in Chapter 2. Similarly, the literature used *extreme Islamism*, *Islamist terrorism*, and *jihadi terrorism* interchangeably. To avoid confusion, I decided to not distinction between these terms, and instead to simply subscribe to *right-wing terrorism* and *extreme Islamism* consistently throughout the study. This is so as PST uses these terms widely in their annual threat assessments. As the aim of the study is to understand the discourse on terrorist threats as constructed by PST, I made a decision not to problematize the many terms that are applied to the same phenomenon, other than briefly in Chapter 2. This issue should comprehensively be addressed in a study of its own. Lastly, as a Pakistani-Norwegian Muslim, my own position within the discourse I am analyzing may have affected the analysis. Nevertheless, when entering the world view of critical studies, I am aware that I am as influenced by the social, cultural, economic, and political motives around me as the empirical data chosen for analysis.

1.6 Thesis outline

Following the introductory chapter, **Chapter 2** gives a brief background on the emergence of international terrorism. It also gives the reader a short summary of the academic conversation on what terrorism is, how the literature in the aftermath of GWT has dominantly focused on extreme Islamism, and in effect, marginalized an academic conversation on what right-wing terrorism is. The chapter concludingly introduces this study's approach to the definition of

terrorism, which is examined in detail in chapter 3. **Chapter 3** discusses the theoretical and conceptual framework. It presents theory and methodology in the same chapter as the matters of theory and methodology in discourse theory are related. It also establishes the ontological and poststructural epistemological premises of this thesis and argues for a social constructivist view on social reality. Moreover, the chapter explains thoroughly concepts that are important for the analysis in chapter 4. Discourse, language, meaning, and intertextuality are discussed in sections 3.1 and 3.2, identities and security in section 3.3, power/knowledge nexus in section 3.4, and nodal points and articulation in section 3.5. Considering the premises of discourse theory and analysis, section 3.6 presents in detail the critical view the thesis holds on terrorism. In **Chapter 4,** PST's annual threat assessments are analyzed and findings are discussed. The chapter is structured as such that it aims to answer the three sub-research questions in three separate sections (sections 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3). The final section asks whether the construction of truths discovered in the discourse on terrorism threat to Norway in the given timeframe are sensible representations. Finally, **Chapter 5** concludes the study by emphasizing the need for an alternative representation to the existing discourse as constructed by PST.

2. The many faces of terrorism

On September 11, 2001, Bush famously launched the global campaign of "War against Terrorism" (GBW) (Bush, 2001). The terrorist attacks on 9/11 were considered "a new kind of evil" (ibid.) that market the advent of international terrorism that threatened international peace and security (UN, 2001). This chapter gives a brief historical background on the emergence of international terrorism and how GWT created a sense of collective understanding of who the terrorists were. The chapter also addresses the lack of scholarly attention to right-wing terrorism in the light of GWT. Lastly, the chapter aims to define terrorism and concludingly introduces a critical view on terrorism.

2.1 Emergence of international terrorism

Historically, international terrorism as a phenomenon was born long before the events of 9/11. According to Rapoport (2002), modern international terrorism began in Russia in the 1880s which in only a few decades spread to Western Europe, the Balkans, and to Asia (p. 47). The terror was initiated by anarchists who used assassination campaigns against prominent officials as their strategy, a strategy later adopted by the Balkans and India. Anarchists in Russia were driven by the aim of destroying conventions which they believed were historical creations for private gains, to which assassinations seemed the most effective way to destroy these conventions. Anarchists were such in kind that they called themselves "terrorists" (Rapoport, 2002, p. 51), deliberately wanting to be associated with someone who created terror, striking directly at the political sentiment to sustain the enemy, rather than just being remembered as a killer. Vera Zasulich, a Russian anarchist, started this process when she wounded a Russian police commander who abused political prisoners. While throwing away her weapon, she proclaimed that she was a "terrorist, *not* [emphasis added] a killer" (Ulam, 1977, p. 269) Thus, terror was used as a strategy rather than as an end itself. Russian rebels were influential and powerful across national borders and encouraged and trained also other groups, even those with different political aims. Moreover, many anarchists who were persecuted found refuge in Russian diaspora colonies and launched terrorist attacks that were cross-border in character:

“The Terrorist Brigade in 1905 had its headquarter in Switzerland, launched strikes from Finland...got arms from an Armenian terrorist group Russians helped train, and were offered funds by the Japanese to be laundered through American millionaires”
(Rapoport, 2002, p. 52).

The Russian terrorists' strategy inspired Armenian and Polish nationalist groups to commit assassinations also in their own countries. The Balkans used assassinations within their countries, unsatisfied with the boundaries of the state torn out of the Ottoman Empire. The assassination campaign had also ripple effects in India. In the 1890s, the highest point of international terrorist activity occurred when monarchs, prime ministers, and presidents were assassinated, one after another, usually by terrorists who moved easily across international borders. In Rapoport's words, this was the first “truly international terrorist experience in history” (ibid.)

Since then, the world has seen international terrorism come in different shapes and forms. For instance, anticolonial terrorist organizations emerged in the aftermath of World War I, such as Irgun, a Zionist paramilitary organization that targeted the British colonialists and local Palestinians in Palestine. The British saw them as terrorists, while the Irgun leader referred to his people as “freedom fighters” in the struggle against political liabilities (Rapoport, p. 2002, p. 54). Also this time, the diaspora communities internationally were active. Edward Said (1978) noted that terrorism had become central in Western media coverage of the Middle East with the emergence of terrorism as a strategy used by Palestinian nationalist movements in the 1960s and 70s, and was excavated by the Iranian revolution in 1979 and the Lebanese civil war in 1975. Even though the world had seen waves of international terrorism activities in modern times (for more see Rapoport, 2002), and the West was aware of the issue of international terrorism from the 1960s, it was not until the attack on the United States on September 11, 2001, that international terrorism was for real considered as a serious threat and danger to international security (UN, 2001). With the events of 9/11, terrorism was arguably considered the most important security issue for Western states in the 21st century (Meeteren, et al. 2018). Academically, terrorism studies went from being a relatively small and marginal field of study to becoming a growing research area. An early study shows that of articles written on terrorism between 1971 and 2002, as much as 54% of the articles were published in 2001 and 2002 (Sherley et al. 2006, p. 491 – 92).

2.2 Who is a terrorist?

Literature written on terrorism and terrorists in the 21st century has focused dominantly on terrorism of the kind witnessed on 9/11 (Jackson, 2005). The mass production of literature post 9/11 on terrorism showed one particular trend; that since 9/11, Muslims have been constructed as a suspect community as a response to GWT (Jackson, 2007; Bartolucci, 2010; Veen, 2014; Kunst et.al 2018 Norris, 2020). Also counter-terrorism legislations have been globally focused on a so-called "suspect community": the "Muslim community" (Meeteren & Oostendorp, 2018, p. 525). The literature argues that in the aftermath of 9/11 and GWT, the media, politicians and, scholars spoke of a wave of terrorism where 'Islamic' was a common key dominator. Meeteren & Oostendorp do a study in the Netherlands and demonstrate how the political discourse in the country has constructed Muslims as terrorists and Islam as the enemy of the West, and thus responsible for the problem of terrorism in Netherlands. Similarly, Bartolucci (2010) analyzes and discusses how the Moroccan government's representation of the terrorism discourse is shaped by the global understanding of who terrorists are and what terrorism is. Jackson (2007) problematizes how the discourse of GWT has contributed to demonizing Muslim communities within their shores (p.9).

Moreover, it has come to be known that there is a sense of hesitance of labeling an act as terrorism or someone as terrorist when the terrorist is non-Muslim. Norris address this issue in his article *When (and where) can right-wing terrorist be charged with terrorism?* and problematize the neglection of US authorities of right-wing terrorism and US' overwhelmingly focus on the potential terrorism offenses by Muslims, despite the recent spike of right-wing terrorism in the US[5] (Norris, 2020, p. 519). He looks into the US federal law and asks whether right-wing terrorists "can be charged with terrorism offences - that is, criminal statues specifically labbeled as terrorism?" in US state court and in non-US jurisdictions. Similarly, van der Veen (2014), in his study of counterterrorism discourse in Sweden, Norway and the Netherlands, found that powerful framing of terrorism as somethng committed by Muslims caused terrorist attacks by non-Muslim to seldom be characterised as terrorism. By looking at the case of terrorist attacks by non-Islamist loner in Sweden (the murder of the leading politician of the Social Democrats, Anna Lindh September 10-11, 2003), Norway (attacks by Anders Behring Breivik July 22, 2011) and the Netherlands (the

[5] See also Infographic by Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism: https://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_ECDB_IslamistFarRightHomicidesUS_Infographic_Feb2017.pdf

murder of the political Pim Foruyn May 6, 2002), he showcases the power of framing. Van der Veen found that in the case of the Netherlands, the killing of Foruyn was identified as an act of political assassination rather than terror (Van der Veen, 2014, chap. 3, para. 20). In the case of Sweden, the murderer of Lindh was found to have neo-Nazi ties and was planned. Even though terrorism requires specific premediation, the case was never identified as terrorism. Lastly, in the case of Norway, Van der veen identifies the strong resistance of identifying the events of 22/7 as terror attacks from policy-makers. He finds that even though the events of 22/7 were called terrorists in the aftermath of the events, it didn't go without discussing extreme Islamist terrorism. Another study shows that in Norway, there is a tendency of labeling extreme Islamist terrorism to ideology and non-extreme Islamist terrorism to mental illness (Kunst et al. 2018). Due to this, terrorists labeled as mentally ill are judged as less guilty for alleged terrorist activities.

There is also another tendency in Norway. A data set on right-wing terrorism and violence in Norway show that there have been registered 27 cases of "severe forms of violent attacks and plots" by right-wing terrorism and violence between 1990 - 2019 (Ravndal, 2020). The data set shows that violence from right-wing extremists that led to fatal, or near-to-fatal outcomes, has been widely present on Norwegian soil since the 1970s. For instance, in 1977, a leftist bookstore in Tromsø was attacked by a neo-Nazi group. In 1979, a neo-Nazi group attacked a Labor Day Parade, and in 1985 a mosque in Oslo was bombed by a right-wing extremist (Gjørv, 2012, p. 46). Moreover, in 2001, Benjamin Hermansen, only 15 years old, was killed by two young men and one young woman with right-wing attitudes (ibid.). However, such violent attacks and plots have dominantly been labeled as "hate crimes" (Ravndal & Bjørgo, 2018, p. 133) instead of terrorist attacks. Only in recent times have attacks such as 22/11 and the attacks in 2019 been considered terrorist attacks. This shows that there is also a hesitance today in labeling violent right-wing attacks prior to GWT as right-wing terrorism. Instead, they were most often labeled with "hate crime". As Europe and the United States have in recent years seen an emergence of a terrorist threat from right-wing terrorists, there has become a growing need to make sense of such events. "However", as Ravndal & Bjørgo notice, "the nature of this threat and the conditions shaping it [right-wing terrorism] remain poorly documented and understood" (2018, p. 5).

2.3 Right-wing terrorism

This illustrates a gap in the literature on right-wing terrorism. The literature on right-wing terrorism has both had its golden age and its dark age. In the 90s, extensive literature was written on right-wing terrorism. For instance, a whole Special Issue in the academic journal *Perspectives on Terrorism* was dedicated to right-wing terrorism in 1995, aimed to produce knowledge to understand "which circumstances, and for what motives, extremists turn from radical right politics – or from just harboring racist or right-wing attitudes – to violent action" (Ravndal & Bjørgo, 2018, p. 11). This was also a period in which Norwegian researchers engaged in extensive research on right-wing terrorism in Norway (Bjørgo e.g 1988; 1989;1993; 1994; 1995; 1997; 1998; 2003; 2005), Carlsson et.al (eg. 1995, 1997, 1999, 2004), and Fangen (eg. 1993; 1995; 1997; 1998). For instance, there were systematic research efforts and production of knowledge on preventing violent extremism from 1991 until 2005, focusing on right-wing extremism, racial violence, and gangs. However, since the attacks on the US on September 11, 2001, right-wing terrorism has received far less scholarly and political attention (Ravndal & Bjørgo, 2018). In Norway, from the period of 2005 until the 22/7 terror attacks, there was almost no academic research on right-wing extremism (Bjørgo & Gjelsvik, 2015, p. 6-7). Moreover, the literature reviewed show that while at times, such as in 1995, a Special Issue was dedicated to right-wing terrorism, most of the literature on this topic was mostly diverse, unorganized, and discontiuous.

Furthermore, the definition of right-wing terrorism and violence is so little debated in academia, that the early scholars have just simply avoided defining it explicitly altogether (see Kaplan, 1995; Merkl, 1995; Weinberg, 1995; Welsh, 1995). Yet, while a definite definition does not exist, according to Ranvdal & Bjørgo, Sprinzak provides two characteristics of right-wing terrorism: "(1) they operate with a double set of enemies: a non-governmental or external threat (e.g immigrants and communist), and the internal enemy (e.g. the "traitor" in government and the political establishment); and 2) they are "particularistic" in their ideological orientation, as opposed to being oriented by universal values" (Sprinzak, 1995 in Ravndal and Bjørgo, 2018, p.6). Even though Sprinzak provides characteristics that may apply to right-wing terrorism, they are not considered sufficient enough as a definition. Besides, instead of defining right-wing terrorism, scholars conceptualize different right-wing terrorism by referring to cases of specific groups, movements, or countries (Lööw, 1995). Moreover, not is the term right-wing terrorism only

poorly conceptualized, terms such as “racist violence”, “neo-fascist violence”, “radical-right violence” and “far-right violence” (Ravndal and Bjørgo, 2018, p.6) are applied for cases addressing issues on right-wing terrorism, illustrating the lack of shared understanding on what the object of inquiry, and the object of conversation, really is. Moreover, the most challenging of them all is perhaps the clarification of the differences between extreme/radical/far-right categories, concepts that are related yet different. Up until 1995, there was no consensus on these concepts. However, the article of Cas Mudde, *Right-Wing Extremism Analyzed. A comparative Analysis of the Ideologies of Three Alleged Right-Wing Extremist parties,* in 1995 on this matter became the most influential article on right-wing extremism that paved the way for a conceptualization of far/right/extreme right for decades to come (Mudde, 1995) which Ravndal & Bjørgo summarizes as:

> “*radical* actors who operate within democratic boundaries...*extreme* right actors who openly reject democracy, and favour violent or other non-conventional means to generate political change. The *far right* may thus be used as a collective term for both (democratic) radicals and (anti-democratiic) extremists, who all share three features: acceptance of social inequality, authoritarianism, and nativism” (2018, p.6).

2.4 What is terrorism then?

The very concept of ‘terror’ originated with the terror that followed in the wake of the French Revolution in 1789. At the time, the state used “la terrur”, or terrorism, to establish order during the transient anarchical period (Hoffman, 2017. ch. 1, para. 7). The state system was known as “regime la de terreur” (ibid) of 1793-1794, in which terror was used as an instrument of the government designed to consolidate the power of the government, and intimidate counterrevolutionaries and those who considered the government as “enemies of the people”. However, since then, terrorism as a phenomenon has come to be extremely complex phenomenon to manage. When trying to define terrorism, it is not an exaggeration when claiming that defining terrorism is a circuiting and exhausting exercise which will need a thesis of its own. In 2002, Silke claimed that more than 200 definitions of terrorism have been identified by researcher (p.2). As such, many academic and political conversations have taken place, trying to make sense of the phenomenon for decades.

One conversation, for instance, has been on whether terrorism is reserved only for non-state actors, or whether states can also commit terrorist acts. Blakely (2007) argues that state terrorism is often forgotten in the emphasis of terrorism being conducted by non-state actors. Similarly, Jackson, Smyth and Gunning (2009) argue that academia has a tendency to ignore state terrorism (p.78), which only emphasizes that it is possible for states to carry out terrorism. Inspired by Jackson (2009), Wright defines state terrorism as "the use or threat of violence, intimidation or frightening by a state or their proxies towards a broader audience" (Wight, 2020, p. 204). This kind of terrorism is regarded as the most dangerous form of terrorism (Rummel, 2011) as it can be performed in various ways, such as thorough policy decisions and military. In practice, we can see that while the European Union definition of terrorism highlights the intentional act of serious damage committed by a specific individual or a group, in this way excluding state-based terrorism, the US define an act as terrorism as something that can also be sponsored by states (Schmidt, 2011).

Another conversation is on whether there can be an accepted definition of terrorism at all, as "one man's terrorism is another man's freedom fighter" (Laqueur ,1987, p. 7). Ganor (2002) responds to this argument by stating that this argument puts an emphasis on the perspective and worldview of the one doing the defining. He states that freedom fighters who are involved in terrorism, murder, and indiscriminate killing cannot at the same time mobilize a movement of national liberation. The labels of "terrorist" and "freedom fighter" are therefore not mutually contradictory. Instead, what they mean depends on who is doing the labeling. To him, the definition should be based on actions committed by terrorists, not the labeling. He, therefore, argues that political will is the key to defining terrorism through "accepted international laws and principles regarding what behaviors are permitted in conventional wars between nations" (Ganor, 2002, p. 287.)

Also whether, and when, hate crime is terrorism has been a topic of conversation. According to Krueger and Malečkov, terrorism and hate-crime are close cousins (2002). They argue that both terrorism and hate-crime select target of an offense based on his or her group identity, "not because of his or her individual behavior, and because the effect is to both wreak on a greater number of people than those directly affected by violence" (2002, p. 28), terrorism and hate-crime can therefore be considered analogs. Deloughery, King, and Asal on the other hand argue that "[t]errorism is often an upward crime," involving a perpetrator of lower

social standing than the targeted group. By contrast, hate crimes are disproportionately "downward crimes," usually entailing perpetrators belonging to the majority or powerful group in society and minority group victims (2012, p. 663). They reject that both concepts are cousins or analogous. Instead, they argue that they are distant relatives. This conversation is important as whether an event is labeled as an act of terrorism or as an act of hate crime makes great difference, as there are, for instance in Norway, different penalties for terrorism than for hate-crime[6].

Even though there is no consensus on what terrorism is, or isn't, researchers and governments have in recent times seem to have come to some sort of agreement on the core meaning of terrorism, terrorism being "the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of violence in the pursuit of political change" (Hoffman, 2016, ch. 2, para, 96, see also Bjørgo, 2005. p. 22-25). This definition implies that terrorism is four things 1) the terrorist act is deliberate, well planned, and premediated, 2) have political aims and motives, 3) violent, or threatens to carry out violence and 4) is "designed to have far-reaching psychological repercussions beyond the immediate victim or target" (ibid.). Similarly, the definition on terrorism given by UN Security Council includes these four core elements in their definition, a definition widely used. Resolution 1566 of 2004 describe terrorism as:

> "criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or serious body injury, or taking hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstrain from doing any act, which constitute offences within the scope of and as defined in the international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism" (UN, 2004)

Yet, despite development of a somewhat core understanding of terrorism, Sweeney & Perlinger argue that also spontanous attacks could qualify as terrorism when, and if, they promote political objectives by utilizing violence to generate fear and anxiety within some target group (2018). This intervention in many ways showcases how circuting and complex the exersicse of defining terrorism can be.

[6] Main provisions for terrorism is addressed in the Penal Code § 147a. Main provisions for hate crime are addressed in Penal Code §185 and Penal Code §186. See also Penal Code § 174, § 272, - § 274 and § 352 for additional penal provisions for hate crime.

Nevertheless, while scholars have traditionally aimed to define terrorism as an objective fact, critical terrorism scholars have dominantly viewed terrorism as a phenomenon that is language-contingent. Critical terrorism scholars such as Jackson (2004, 2007, 2012), Gunning (2007) and Zulaika & Douglass (2016), argue that there is no one definition of terrorism as language is always changing (see Chapter 3, section 3.2). To Zulaika & Duglass, for instance, terrorism is printed text. To them, terrorism is "an event, a news story, a social drama, a narrative" (Zulaika & Douglass, 2016, ch. 3, para 2). In other words, terrorism is something that is *created* or *brought to into being* by language through printed text. Critical terrorism scholars have a critical view on social reality and terrorism alike, which shape their understanding of what terrorism really is. Instead of lending itself to a pregiven definition of terrorism, this study subscribes to a critical view on terrorism. This perspective on terrorism is developed further and in detail in chapter 3 section 3.6.

In sum, this chapter gave a brief historical background of the emergence of international terrorism and how the events of 9/11 created a sense of collective understanding of who terrorists were. The chapter demonstrated how Muslims were more often considered a suspect community and non-Islamic terrorist attacks, such as right-wing terrorist attacks, were seldom. The chapter also addressed the lack of scholarly attention on right-wing terrorism in the light of 9/11 and the inablity of the literature to properly define right-wing terrorism. Moreover, the chapter demonstrated that despite being a contested topic, there is to some degree an agreement on the core meaning of terrorism. Nevertheless, while traditional terrorism scholars have been aiming to define terrorism as if it is an objective truth, critical terrorism scholars view terrorism as language-contingent and argue that terrorism as a phenomenon is brought into existence through discourse and narration, not something that already exists. The following chapter establishes the theoretical and conceptual framework of this study. Concludingly, the chapter presents the way in which this study descides to approach terrorism.

3. Theoretical and conceptual framework

The research questions upon which this study is built comes from the curiosity of understanding how it was possible for PST to construct extreme Islamism as the greatest terrorist threat to Norway between 2004-2014. Theoretically, this is a concern of how the meaning of terrorism and terrorists are created in the social world. Addressing this concern, the following chapter presents the theoretical and conceptual framework which the study refers to as *discourse theory* and *discourse analysis,* anchored in poststructural International Relations (IR). The chapter is based on the premise that theory and methodology are intertwined and not separate matters. It is what Jørgensen & Phillips (1999, p. 12) call "pakkeløsning", or a package deal, in which ontological and epistemological premises, theory and methodology cross. Thus, in the following chapter, methodological matters are dealt together with theory, somewhat intermeshed.

Several theoretical and methodological insights on discourse theory and analysis in this chapter are inspired by Micheal Foucault (Foucault, 1972; 1977; 1980). Foucault was a prominent french thinker who has for decades inspired scholars to embrace discourse analysis when doing social research, such as Laclau & Mouffe, (1985), Fairclough (1995), Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999), Hansen (2006), Selby (2007) and Nabers (2015), and who's critical attitudes are found in poststructural IR tradition (Cambpell & Bleiker, 2013, p. 206). While he himself had little to say about international politics, his critical thinking has inspired poststructuralist literature greatly. As a full appreciation of his approach to discourse, theory can only be achieved by a thorough reading of a number of his works, and due to the scope of this study and limited hours on the watch, this chapter lends itself to poststructural literature that provides an introduction to discourse theory as well as gives crucial insights to Foucault's work that are pivotal to the theoretical and methodological framework for this study.

Moreover, this study does in no way present an absolute discourse theory, nor does it conduct discourse analysis in already developed steps. Jørgensen & Phillips (1999, p. 12) point out that there is no one way of conducting discourse analysis. Instead, it is possible to make one's own package by combining elements from different discourse analytical perspectives, keeping in mind that the researcher does not base its work on competing or contradictory perspectives. Thus, the following chapter presents a tailored discourse theory that will give

the study what Leander (2008) calls the right "thinking tools" for the forthcoming analysis. It starts by looking at the worldview of discourse theory followed by the conceptualization of discourse. The subsequent four sections discuss central concepts within discourse analysis, i.e language, meaning, intertextuality, identity, power/knowledge nexus, nodal points, and articulation. The final subsection approach terrorism from a discourse theory perspective and compares discourse theory to positivist approaches to illustrate why the approach of discourse theory to terrorism is the best fit for this study.

3.1 A world discursively constructed by discourse

Discourse theory's view on social reality is that social reality is *socially constructed*. This means that instead of viewing reality as something that exists by its own, it argues that the subject and object of reality is brought into being, and would otherwise not exist if they were not (Fierke, 2013, p. 188). For instance, the phenomenon of terrorism only exists because it has been brought into being, otherwise, it would not have existed. This view rejects the idea that there exists any material or objective reality. In other words, there does not exist any reality outside discourse. Instead, the world we live in is given meaning through the ontological significance of language (see section 3.2). Thus, to discourse theory, the social world is socially and discursively constructed by discourse. Adhering to the general social constructivist premise, Foucault defines discourse as:

> "…. a group of statements insofar as they belong to the same discursive formation (…Discourse) is made up of a limited number of statements of which a group of conditions of existence can be defined. Discourse in this sense is not an ideal, timeless form (…) it is, from beginning to end, historical – a fragment of history (…) posing its own limits, its divisions, its transformations, the specific modes of its temporality" (Foucault, 1972, p. 117).

His definition gives insights to the social constructivist view on social reality; 1) the social reality is not material but discursive, 2) discourses consist of statements that determine the existence and constraints in social reality. By stating something, the statement brings one social reality into existence and constrains an alternative social reality to exist. Medicine discourse, terrorism discourse, or economic discourse are all discursive formations conditioning what can exist, and they can only exist within discoures, everything outside the

discourse is nonsensical, and 3) reality is temporary. Moreover, while Foucault provides a definition that gives a crucial insight into what kind of world we are dealing with, this study engages with an additional definition on discourses provided by Cambpell and Bleiker (2013). Discourse is: "a series of representation and practices through which meanings are produced, identities constituted, social relations established and political and ethical outcomes made more or less possible" (p. 211).

This definition captures additional important elements crucial for this study: firstly, discourse defines the object of reality, which are the socially constructed "truths"; or *representations.* In the case of this study, we already know that the socially constructed truth, or representation, is that extreme Islamism is the main terrorist threat to Norwegian security in the given timeframe. This representation of the terrorist threat is the dominating representation and is a manifestation of the power/knowledge nexus who through the exercise of exclusion creates our reality (see section 3.4). By creating the truth of extreme Islamists being a threat, this representation marginalizes other representations. This implies that according to discourse theory, social reality contains a series of representations, and that the terrorist threat from extreme Islamists is only *one* of many representations. Secondly, a discourse is political in that it (re)produces identities, social and political relations, and meaning systems (Fairclough, 2003, p. 23). Finally, the definition paves way for accessing the social world through interpretations of how the world came to be as it is and unearthing the possibilities of the world that is excluded. In sum, discourses represent aspects of the world through which representations of the world are articulated and the society is then turned into a certain direction (Skrede, 2017). Using discourse as a theory and method is a strength in this thesis as it allows us to deconstruct the dominant representation and bring into light the marginalized and alternative representations.

3.2 Language, meaning and intertextuality

The main objective of discourse theory is to study meanings. It aims to analyze how meanings are created. According to discourse theory, meanings are a production of social interaction. Thus, it is important to study social interactions where they take place, which is in the *language* itself (Neumann, 2010, p. 80). Thus, language becomes ontologically significant because it is through the empirical analysis of language that we can access the world of meaning. Language is thus a *structure* in which meanings are actualized and

knowledge made possible (Campbell & Bleiker, 2013, 187). However, while poststructuralism is structural, it is also *post*. This means that meaning can never be fixed due to the fundamental instability of language. This also gives us an additional understanding of language, that it is fundamentally unstable and changes with time (Jørgensen & Philip, 1999, p. 15). In other words, social reality and the meanings in it are always in flux.

As already mentioned, the main concern of discourse theory is to study how meanings are created over time. This, for instance, is not the main concern within positivist scholarship, as they believe that meanings are obvious as the world is unchanging and timeless (Waltz, 2000, Kurki & Wight, p. 20). They, therefore, use traditional means to make sense of the social world. To discourse theorists, this is awkward, precisely because positivists approach meaning as if there is such a thing as a true meaning. Here, it is important to make a distinction between natural and social science. Fierke (2004) points out that, "[t]he natural scientists have freedom to impose meaning on natural science" (p.38). And they do this rightly, precisely because they relate to the mineral kingdom . In social science, however, this is different; "[t]he social does not [have the freedom to impose meaning] because the subjects of analysis are meaning creating creatures" (ibid). The human world is a world of power struggles and meanings. Therefore, the researcher must identify, document, and criticize factual conditions, not take it for granted (Kalleberg, 2013, p. 69). Though a cliché argument, it illustrates that natural science is different from social science, and interpretation is necessary. The human world is filled with meaning, making it critical to study meanings empirically.

Moreover, discourse theory draws on history. According to Foucault "[t]here can be no statement that in one way or another does not reactualise others' (Foucault, 1972, p.98). This means that no discourse has a beginning, as signs of language will always build on the past (Jørgensen & Philips, 2002; Neumann, 2010, Hansen 2006). This is known as *intertextuality*. Discourse theory assumes that language is a re-presentation of historical material. No word or language can exist independently, instead, they draw on historical events. While uncovering intertextuality during discourse analysis can be an infinite process, identification of intertextuality is purposeful as it uncovers how and where discourse finds its reference point and where the language is descending from. Intertextuality makes discourse and language in the present meaningful, making *genealogy* (see section 3.4) central to discourse analysis As will be shown in the analysis, the re-production of past texts in terrorism discourse is

particularly evident, as 9/11 rhetoric is used to legitimate the construction of a terrorist threat it Norway.

However, though reality and meaning are always in flux, this does not mean that a degree of fixity does not exist. Even though there is no true meaning, one representation of reality can be more dominating, appearing as common sense. Thus, some discursive construction can be far more stable than others. It is when a representation is fixed over time that meaning is created (Neumann, 2010, p. 61). In this way, one representation can be so dominating that it can present itself as an objective reality, precisely because meanings can be successfully stabilized and appear as objective. However, it is only so because there is a temporary *closure* of a particular meaning that is being taken for granted (Jørgensen & Phillips,1999, p. 51). Meanings become so discursively dominant that they become commonsensical. Poststructuralism is often criticized for emphasizing that everything is language and reducing social reality to discourse. The critique is that it neglects that materiality exists. However, considering social reality as constituted of discourse and language does not mean there is a rejection of materiality. Materiality does exist.

For instance, to Naumann, language has a material expression (2010, p. 80). Discourses present themselves materially through structures such as the institution of PST. The existence of such an institution will re-produce the representation that there is a defined and general phenomenon called terrorism and that someone is working to prevent it. It is because of a long and hard work of discursivity that institutions such as PST come to be developed from an idea of an actor needed to protect and research the risk of threat to the interests of Norway, to the construction of a material building where PST employees sit and do their work.

Thus, this is what is meant by that materiality exists, that it exists only to the extent it is given meaning to and has political effects through, and with the power, in discourse (Campbell & Bleiker, 2013, p. 209). A repeated critique on this view is that no discursive understanding can help when faced with something as material as a bullet in the head (Krasner, 1999: 51; Wendt, 1999; 113; Zehfuss, 2002 in Campbell & Bleiker, 2013, p.209). However, this critique is short-sighted. The argument of poststructuralists is not that materiality does not exist. In discourse theory, materiality is given meaning through language in discourse. For instance, if one was to find a dead man in a room, we would not automatically know what that means. The event does not have any meaning itself and

interpretation is needed. However, when located within a discursive condition, the event can be located in suicide discourse, or manslaughter discourse, or murder discourse, or a genocide discourse, and so on. This will make us understand the larger ethical and political issues, depending on the discourse. Similarly, when Anders Behring Breivik denoted a fertilizer bomb outside a government building and opened fire on Utøya, poststructuralists would not argue that the materiality of the actions did take place, however, what his actions mean depend on discourse. Focusing only on the materiality would not provide sufficient nor political understanding of the event. Instead, representation of the event is able to construct identity and political actions are made more or less possible. Thus, locating the event in the terrorism discourse would allow us to identify the event as a terrorist act and the man firing the gun a terrorist, making social identities and social events more or less possible.

3.3 Identity and security

Language in discourse is what constructs our reality. This is also the case with security and what a state considers as a threat. According to discourse theory, security politics should be analyzed as one of the most important practices through which a state constructs its own identity (Hansen, 2006). Instead of simply viewing security politics as strategies for defending a state or an alliance of state, security should be viewed as something discursive, constructed by the state as a manifestation of its own national identity. In fact, according to Cambell (1998, p. 12-15), danger, or security threat is even necessary for a state so that it can tell who it is and where it comes from, so as to differentiate from what it is not. Thus, to discourse theory, the matter of security politics is a matter of identity politics.

Also here, it is important to remember that danger is viewed by discourse theory as socially constructed. A state can discursively "securitize" (Wæver, 1998) a threat and give it a heightened priority for the state to deal with. Security then becomes practice through the state's own discursive articulation of a particular event or action as a 'threat' to its security By doing so, a threat "...come to be ascribed as such only through an interpretation of their various dimensions of dangerousness" (Campbell, 1998, p. 2.) Thus, a threat is never fixed, but exists through interpretation and is context-specific. In Norway for instance, as Chapter 4 will show, the perceived threat of extreme Islamists was not crystallized before *after* the declaration of the War on Terrorism on 9/11. While the US securitized the matter, Norway interpreted the terrorist attack as a threat to Norwegian security.

Following this logic, identities in discourse theory are characterized by two elements; 1) that they are relational, and 2) that they are processes (Naumann, 2010). Firstly, identities are relational in the sense that they do not exist independently but through human interaction. In other words, identities are not pre-given by nature or God, but are given meaning as e.g 'terrorists' in relation to something/someone else e.g. 'law-abiding citizens'. This is strongly connected to the second point that identity is a process. This means that identities are constructed through a process of exclusion, or through a series of juxtaposed signs in the language (Hansen, 2010, ch. 2, para. 9). These juxtaposed signs privilege one sign over the other, include one and exclude the other, distinguish between the inside and the outside. Hansen calls these processes in which identities are constructed for the *process of linking* and the *process of differentiation* (Hansen, 2013, ch. 2. para. 10). Firstly, the process of linking is connected to the association with a subject. She gives an example of how 'woman' through a *positive* process of linking is associated with being emotional, motherly, reliant, and simple. Secondly, this series of links are juxtaposed to the male series of links through a *negative* process of differentiation. In this way, while the 'woman' becomes emotional, motherly, reliant and simple, the 'male' becomes rational, intellectual, independent, and complex (ibid). Similarly, the articulation of an external threat from the 'insane' or 'terrorists' Other would construct the identity of 'sane' or 'law-abiding citizens' Self, *linking* the outside to insane, and thus *differentiating* Self from Other. Thus, identity construction becomes a matter of dualism between Self/Other and inside/outside or a matter of deconstructing and "reversing the original order of the binary pair of terms to demonstrate how the exclusion of the second term is central to the first" (Culler, 1982 in Campbell & Bleiker, 2013, p. 234). Furthermore, when a terrorist action is criminalized, it is done so in the effet to normalize a moral order in which certain behaviors are excluded, such as behaviors that a state does not confine with a state's identity or to the identity of the society as a whole. Thus, by analyzing identity as relational, the study will be able to identify how identities are constructed in relation to Self/Other and how these represent the dominating idea of who a terrorist is, and whether alternative discourses and identities are needed.

3.4 Power/knowledge nexus

As discussed above, a threat to a state is a state's own discursive articulation of a particular event which they view as a threat or danger to their security, anchored to its national identity. This can be captured by the power/knowledge nexus. In discourse theory, the matter of knowledge is a matter of power. What a threat is, is thus a matter of power/knowledge nexus. To Foucault, power is what constructs the knowledge we have of what reality is and how societal and political matters go about (Foucault, 1980). This understanding of power radically differs from the traditional understanding of power. Traditionally, the social and political world is known to be driven by the force of power, whether power is perceived as a means to an end, or an end goal itself (Kurki & Wight, 2013). However, this view of power is poor and does not allow the study to investigate how knowledge of what terrorism is and who terrorists are, and how some representations of terrorism are accepted over others. To discourse theory, the social and political world is surrounded by power, but that power is neither material nor possessive. Though Foucault acknowledges the idea of power being repressive, to him, power is first and foremost *productive*. Power does not *impose* limits and constraints but is the *reason* why there exist limits and constraints in the first place (Cambpell & Bleiker, p. 208). Because power is productive, it creates knowledge. This is known as the power/knowledge-nexus; where there is power there is knowledge. Power is thus denoted to the force and processes which create our social world and make meanings in our world possible (Skrede, 2017, p. 26).

Moreover, Foucault's power/knowledge nexus is closely connected to the matter of truth. Firstly, Foucault claims that it is never possible to arrive at *the* "truth" (Foucault, 1980, p. 131). This does not mean that there is no purpose in doing social inquiry. Instead, what he meant with this was that he rejected the search for origins of the truths in history, but instead insisted on a focus on where the truths *descended* from (Barrett, 1991, p. 131-3). His work on genealogy is central in order to capture the power/knowledge nexus. He claimed that one has to do "analysis which can account for the constitution subject within a historical framework. And this is what I call genealogy, that is, a form of history which can account for the constitution of knowledge, discourses, domains of objects etc.." (Foucault, 1980, p. 117). To him, genealogy was to trace the "history of the present" which meant to trace "how contemporary practices and institutions emerged out of specific struggles, conflicts, alliances, and exercises of power, many of which are nowadays forgotten" (Garland, 2014, p. 372).

Hence genealogy is meant to create awareness on how the knowledge we take for granted today is actually problematic, or even dangerous, than they otherwise appear to be (ibid.). In the case of this study, it is expected to find PST's failure to avert 22/7 somewhat may lie in the lack of awareness of the knowledge on the terrorist threat they produce. This power/knowledge nexus may be the reason how it was possible for PST to overlook right-wing terrorism. This study looks for power struggles and power domination between knowledge production and discourses, on right-wing terrorism and extreme Islamist terrorism, and any possible rupture and change in the history of the present.

Thus, tracing genealogy is an important exercise as it assists in investigating how it was possible for PST to construct extreme Islamism as the greatest terrorist threat to Norway and overlook terrorist threat from right-wing terrorism, hence look for a discursive power struggle between 2004-2014. The power/knowledge nexus draws attention to the extent to which contemporary practices are reproductions of historical power/knowledge configurations (Gleeson, 2016, ch.1, para. 26). In this way, power/knowledge nexus becomes a theoretical tool for understanding *how* the dominant regimes of truth came to be prevailing (such as 'terrorist', 'community', or 'failed state') and in which way discourse achieve stability through the symbiotic creation of power through appeals to knowledge and vice-versa (ibid.). It is to remember that the "truth is a thing of this world" (Focault, 1980, p. 131) and not something objective. Hence, while doing genealogy, it is therefore important to locate the power/knowledge nexus, as it assists in denaturalizing hidden power structures and sheds light on taken-for-granted truths about the world. Finally, Foucault's power is then not simply productive, but in his own words "*disciplinary"* (ibid.), precisely because it disciplines the society to adhere to the dominant representation that is then considered as the accepted truth. In this way, power becomes durable and acceptable as it is not experienced as a force to which we are obliged to say 'yes' to (Jørgensen & Philips, 1999, p. 21-24). Instead, it disguises itself as the truth, naturalizes itself while simultaneously excluding other knowledge. It leads to knowledge, or the *truth.* Power in this way becomes a hidden structure, invisible, and needs to be criticised to be captured. In the analysis chapter, the study will explore the way in which power/knowledge works to shape the truth of what terrorism is, who the terrorists are, and what the terrorist threat is.

3.5 Nodal points and articulation

As already mentioned, discourse analysis is concerned with how meaning is produced. And as illustrated, while there is no one true meaning, and reality is always in flux, there do exist some degrees of regularity. Hence, we know the meaning of something when it is fixed. Some words can fluctuate and have competing meanings. However, when in discourse, that fluctuation and competing meaning are fixated temporarily and into *one* meaning (Jørgensen & Philips, 2002, ch. 2 para. 14). As already presented, the theoretical concern of this thesis is to make sense of how the meaning of terrorism, terrorists, and terrorist threats are created. The previous section showed that this will be studied by looking for relational identity production as well as by doing genealogy and locating the power/knowledge nexus. However, additional methods will be applied focusing on the wording and the structures of the sentences. Thus, in addition to looking for representations and locating power, some attention will also be paid to the language in more detail. Therefore, I will locate signifiers (nodal point and articulation) within discourses. I understand signifiers as words that are presented as commonsensical. Looking for such signifiers will strengthen the analysis by reasoning backwards to the structure from its empirical manifestation and question how retrodiction is empirically made possible.

While discourse theory stresses the ultimate contingency of all social identities, it nonetheless acknowledges that partial fixations of meaning are both possible and necessary. Thus, discourse is formed by the partial fixation of meaning around certain *nodal points*. A nodal point is a privileged sign around which the other signs are ordered (Jørgensen & Philips, 2002, ch. 2 para. 16). For instance, in political discourse, a nodal point is 'democracy' where signs such as 'state' and 'freedom' are linked for it to serve any meaning. Nodal points thus serve as reference points in a discourse that binds together a particular system of meaning. In the case of this study, the main nodal point is "international terrorism" from which meaning such as 'extreme Islamism' and 'radicalization' drives out. 'International terrorism' is used as a reference point for giving meaning to other signs, such as 'extreme Islamism' and 'radicalization' which create a system of meaning evolving around these nodal points, thus producing meaning of terrorism. By identifying nodal points in the analysis, the researcher is able to study how meaning is shaped.

By *articulation*, the study refers to the practice of linking signifiers in associative chains where the first modifies the identity of the second, thus establishing meaning (Jørgensen & Philips, 2002, ch. 2 para. 15). For instance, 'the body' has many competing meanings while standing alone, it does not give one particular meaning. It needs to be discursively articulated as well as positioned in relation to another word to do so. It is when 'the body' is linked to, for instance 'the soul' that the practice of articulation takes place and 'the body' is given meaning to (or identity) in a discourse. More relevant examples, 'state' can be articulated to 'sovereign', 'terrorism' to 'ideology', or 'security threat' to 'al-Qaeda' as will be illustrated in the analysis. In order to discover articulations, one has to look for representations that Laffey and Weldes refer to as the "main signifying elements of the discourse" (2004, p.29). When one has discovered articulations, one then has to identify the "chains of connotation" (ibid.) that articulate them together. By doing so, the analysis will be able to locate the dominating themes in the discourse. Laffey and Weldes note that "investigating articulations also involves examining power/knowledge relations" (Laffey & Weldes, 2004, p.29). This is so because articulation holds the mechanisms of revealing naturalized relations of power.

3.6 The construction of terrorism

The above sections have established the theoretical and conceptual framework of this thesis. One of the central elements established is that the social world, the truth, and the knowledge we have of our reality is a social process that is constructed through language, discourse, and inter-subjective practices. This perspective is further applied to the way this study conceptualizes terrorism. This study views the knowledge of terrorism as a work of social-cultural context within which it emerges. It agrees with Jackson (2007) and argues that "[t]errorism is fundamentally a social fact rather than a brute fact" (p. 17). For instance, while terrorism in today's context has a negative connotation, the term had a rather positive connotation during the French Revolution (1974). During the Revolution, the revolutionary leader Mazimilien Robespierre firmly believed that "terror is nothing but justice, prompt, severe and inflexible…." (Cited in Hoffman, 2017, chap. 1, para. 9). Similarly, the Assyrians in 1100 BCE used the word *melammu* to express purposeful terror and necessary political tools (Fine, 2010 p. 272). This illustrates the knowledge of terrorism as "situated knowledge"(Kurki & Wight, 2013, p. 30) . This does not mean that the materiality of extreme physical violence terrorism cause is denied. Extreme physical violence is a brute fact, however "its wider cultural-political meaning is decided by social agreement and

inter-subjective practices - a social fact" (Jackson, 2007, p. 17). Chapter 2 showed that there is a failure in the traditional studies on terrorism to agree on the definition of terrorism. By having a critical view on terrorism, and seeing it as a social fact - or a representation of many representations - the study grasp a way of understanding issues related to terrorism that traditional terrorism studies don't manage to address. By having this critical view on terrorism, the study is given the right tools to capture how PST classifies different forms of political violence, what they consider as a terrorism threat and what they do not consider as a terrorist threat, which is an important element in trying to answer the main research question of this study. A critical approach to terrorism is in addition also important to shed light on dominant representations of it, and of terrorist identity. Discourse theory thus offers a vantage point for going beyond the given and predefined reality of terrorism and terrorists, and analyze the terms discursively and the change in the meaning of it across time. Thus, this study finds strength in not defining terrorism, and instead finds strength in seeing it as representation constructed, following Barrinha in that "the discourse on terrorism, rather than the contested phenomenon" (2010, p. 168) is more relevant.

Here, it is important to pause and acknowledge that there are two main ways to approach terrorism studies: 1) through a critical approach (which this study subscribes to) and 2) through a traditional approach. The two approaches to terrorism are incompatible as the first one falls under post-positivism tradition and the latter under positivism tradition. Within International Relations (IR) discipline, the contrast of the two is debated under the so-called "fourth debate" (Kurki & Wight, 2013, p. 20) The debate is dominantly about how social inquiry should go about, and how to make sense of the world we live in. There are significant differences between the two traditions. Because the debate is comprehensive and complex, only a short presentation will be given here in order to justify the post-positivist approach as the best one for this study.

The positivist and post-positivist approaches differ in that the first one has an "explaining" approach to social reality, while the latter has an "understanding" approach (Kurki & Wight, 2013, p. 20). The explaining approach assumes that the world we live is pregiven, that it is possible to arrive at an objective truth about reality and that reality is static and unchanging. The approach relies on an empiricist epistemology and belief in unity between natural sciences, hence relying on methods common to natural sciences (ibid.) To access the social reality, positivist approaches ask why-questions, expecting to find an objective answer as if

the truth is out there waiting to be discovered. To the post-positivist approach, more specifically to discourse theory, this is problematic - and even awkward. To discourse theory, you cannot treat the natural world and social world as if they were the same. To explain the way, we must first have an "understanding" approach. It is only when we first understand the social world that we can explain it (Bryman, 2013). According to discourse theory, we cannot treat the social world as if it was a pre-given world. Because it is filled with meaning, language, and discourse, the social world should be accessed through interpretation.

Discourse disagrees with positivists' approaches that there is an objective and pregiven world out there. It instead argues that all that is 'true' and 'pregiven' are taken-for-granted truths about the world we live in. Therefore, it makes no sense to ask *why* an event took place, instead, it makes more sense to ask *how* it was possible that the world came to be as it is. Hence, discourse analysis is a mapping exercise of events taking place over a period of time, aiming to capture how meaning came to be constructed discursively and through the power/knowledge nexus. Moreover, while positivist approaches such as neorealism and neoliberalism have a scientific agenda, grounded in post-positivism discourse theory have a normative agenda (Skrede, 2017, Jørgensen, 1999). This makes discourse theory a *critical* approach to social inquiry. Fairclough explains this *critical* aspect as follows:

> […] focuses on what is wrong with a society (an institution, an organization and so on.), and how "wrongs" might be "righted" or mitigated, from a particular normative standpoint. Critique is grounded in values, in particular views of the "good society" and of human well-being and flourishing, on the basis of which it evaluates existing societies and possible ways of changing them. […] The crucial point, however, is that critique assesses what exists, what might exist and what should exist on the basis of a coherent set of values (Fairclough, 2010, p. 7).

This divides discourse theory from positivist approaches. While positivist approaches favor 'facts', discourse theory favors 'values'. These values are socially constructed facts that determine politics in a certain direction. To positivist approaches then, these facts are only observable and what reality consists of. Discourse theory, however, regards the un-observable as a unit of analysis. While positivists do not reject the un-observable, they do not pay attention to it as they argue that traditional scientific methods cannot be used to discover them (Kurki & Wight, 2013, p. 20). Finally, while positivist accounts seek to reveal

regularities that explain the general law and categorizing in already made categories, discourse theory in contrast looks at regularity in a given timeframe. It is concerned with how regularity takes place within the context given.

In sum, discourse theory attempts to understand *how* the world came to be as it is, in order to understand *why* specific events came to take place as they did. As mentioned in section 3.2 discourse draws on history (intertextuality) and looks for building blocks of truths and representations in the history of the present instead of generalizing why the world is the way it is. Hence, discourse theory is the most suitable theory and method for this study as it brings us behind the scenes on taken-for-granted truths and allows us to deconstruct the assumptions we have of the reality we live in. This specific study, it allows us to capture discursive battles, dominant representation of the reality within terrorism discourse in PST's annual threat assessment, and look critically and how power in discourse constructs the knowledge we have of the world.

4. An analysis of PST's annual threat assessments

The following chapter presents the analysis and results of PST's annual threat assessments from the timeframe 2004-2014. The analysis is approached by the theoretical and methodological considerations made above; that there is no such thing an ultimate truth. The truth is always changing and in flux. However, when something is regarded as truth, it is so because meaning is fixated over time. The following analysis will uncover hidden power structures and truth claims about who and where the terrorist threat is from by analyzing language and the representations of the taken-for-granted social reality of terrorist threats in PST's threat assessments. The chapter is structured in such a way that it answers and covers the sub-research questions of the study. Each section aim to answer the three sub-questions covering PST's annual threat assessments from the timeframe 2004-2014; *How was the discourse on 'terrorism' and the identity of 'terrorists' socially constructed in the annual threat assessments?* (section 4.1), 2) *What were the main causes of 'terrorism' and how were these causes discursively constructed in the annual threat assessments?* (section 4.2), and 3) *Where did the 'truth' of 'extreme Islamism' as the greatest terrorist threat to Norway descend from?* (section 4.3). Though in separate sections, the chapter shows how, in PST's threat assessment in the given timeframe, language, meaning and power construct the truth of what terrorism is, who terrorists are, and what causes terrorism. By dividing chapters in the order of sub-research questions, this chapter aims to answer the main research question: *How was it possible for PST to discursively construct 'extreme Islamism' as the greatest terrorism threat to Norway in the timeframe 2004-2014?* The chapter concludes with an additional section, section 4.4, assessing whether the representations found are sensible[7].

4.1 The construction of terrorism and terrorists

During the analysis, it was found that one representation was dominant, that terrorism to PST was "international" (PST, 2004-2014). Chapter 2 showed that international terrorism was believed to emerge in the modern time in Russia in the 1880s with the anarchist wave. International terrorism was believed to be cross-border, global network-based in which training of the terrorists was carried out in one state, financial support was received from another state by sympathizers in diasporas or by other powerful actors, and the attacks were launched elsewhere, terrorists crossing borders from one state to another. In the annual threat assessments within the timespan 2004-2014, PST constantly re-produced the representation

[7] As already mentioned, discourse analysis draws on history. Therefore, throughout this chapter, intertextuality found will be referred to as "(intertextuality)".

of terrorism as “international terrorism” (ibid). For instance, in 2004, PST wrote that “international terrorism still characterizes the security policy situation in and outside of Norway” (PST, 2004). This representation was regularly re-produced either directly or indirectly every year. In their 2005 report, they wrote that “[t]he terrorist attack in Madrid on March 11, 2004, which killed 190 people and injured about 1800, showed that European countries are also targets of international terrorism" (PST, 2005). In 2006 they wrote on terrorist attacks in London; “[t]he terrorist attacks in 2005 show that extreme Islamists still have the capacity to carry out actions against Western targets” (PST, 2006); “international terrorism will continue to be a threat in Norway in 2010 (PST, 2010). By referring to international events (intertextuality), PST indirectly socially constructed terrorism to be international in characteristic. This means that to PST, international events characterized what terrorism was, and in its extension - what was considered a terrorist threat to Norwegian security. Based on terrorist attacks in 2004 and 2005, terrorism was when bombs and explosives were involved, and when the attacks were well planned and coordinated. In the annual report of 2004, PST highlighted actions by al-Qaeda, or groups inspired by al-Qaeda as terrorism, having the following common features: 1) “the actions are based on the use of simple and conventional methods, such as the use of cars, bombs, handguns and hand grenades that are mainly used by suicide activists, alone, several together, or in combination with armed personnel, to ensure a successful outcome the actions have borne characterized by high precision and has been well planned and coordinated”, and 2), “al-Qaeda's business is further characterized by long-term, patience, and perseverance. Operation teams have on several occasions shown that they have time to wait with actions, sometimes over several years, until the chances of success are as great as possible” (PST, 2004). Hence, terrorism became associated with actions that were carried out by a large number of deadly methods that were well planned to ensure successful outcomes such as by al-Qaeda (intertextuality).

Moreover, to PST, terrorism was not just international or the acts of al-Qaeda, it was also something that was conducted by extreme Islamists. In the assessments, we see that there is a continuity of articulation of international terrorism to extreme Islamists in the given decade. In 2004, PST wrote that “[t]he terrorist attacks in 2003 showed that international extremist Islamists still have the intention and capacity to carry out terrorist attacks against Western and other targets” (PST, 2004). Another example is in the 2008 report. PST wrote that “[e]xtreme Islamist terrorism is cross-border and development trends in Europe also affect the situation in this country (PST, 2008). Similarly, in 2011, PST wrote that “[s]ome extreme Islamist

today appear to be globally oriented, and it is mainly these that could pose a direct threat to Norway in the coming year" (PST, 2011). Thus, PST socially and linguistically constructed terrorism to be "international" and something committed by "extreme Islamists" inspired, by actors who had carried out terrorist attacks abroad (intertextuality).

When doing analysis, close attention was given to the way in which the reports were structured. It was observed that in their annual assessments, PST had one section in which they addressed terrorism and a separate section where they addressed other kinds of threats, such as threats directed to government officials and threats from weapon of mass destruction. From 2004 and up until 2006, terrorism threats were addressed under the heading "international terrorism"(PST, 2004; 2005; 2006). Other kinds of threats, such as from right-wing extremism or left-wing were addressed under the heading "Political extremism" (ibid.). In 2007, PST kept the heading of "international terrorism" where terrorism threats are addressed but changed the heading of "Political extremism" to "Politically motivated violence" where right-wing extremism was addressed. From 2008, PST changed both headings and wrote on terrorism under the heading "Politically motivated violence – terrorism" and right-wing extremism and other kinds of threat under "Politically motivated violence – extreme nationalism" (PST, 2008; 2009; 2010; 2011; 2012). In 2012 the headings were again changed. Terrorism threats were now written under "Politically motivated violence – extreme Islamism" with "Radicalization" as one of the subheadings, and right-wing threats under heading "National extremism" with "Right-wing actors" as one of the subheadings. In 2013 and 2014, the headings for terrorism threats remained the same while other threats were under "Politically motivated violence: right-and leftwing extremism" instead of "National extremism" (PST, 2013; 2014). The analysis shows that during the decade, though the headings and structures of the reports were changed and edited, terrorism threats were articulated separate from other kinds of threats, and continued to be articulated to international terrorism. This illustrates the privileged sign of "international terrorism" as a terrorist threat for a whole decade, from which "extreme Islamism" sprung out. "International terrorism" becomes a nodal point used as a reference point when chained together with "terrorism threat", "radicalization", "extreme Islamism" and "politically motivated violence". It showed that even though the structure of reports are changed, the meaning remained fixed on terrorism being international conducted by extreme Islamists..

As mentioned in the theory chapter, a discourse often has one dominating representation and at least one or several alternative representations. If not, then the discourse is politically closed. This of course does not mean that the discourse is not political but that a great deal of discursivity exists for the maintenance of the representation which cannot be challenged (see section 4.3 on genealogy). This is interesting for a discourse analyst as discourse analysis research is concerned with how meanings are produced. The assumption is that reality is in flux and so are meanings. If a discourse is closed, meaning there is only *one* representation of something, then the discursive work is so powerful that it can almost not be challenged and is considered objective and pregiven. It is interesting for the discourse analyst because it gives him/her a case to study how in a world of unstable language, a meaning becomes so dominant that it is considered objective.

During the analysis, it was noted that up until the 2012 annual report, there was only *one* representation in the annual reports on terrorism as already presented, that terrorism is international, conducted by extreme Islamists. No other representation of terrorism existed. Analysis showed, however, that this dominating representation was discursively challenged in 2012. In 2011, the most horrific and brutal terrorist attack took place on Norwegian soil. Anders Behring Breivik, an ethnic Norwegian right-wing extremist, successfully managed to conduct a two-sequential attack in Oslo, which came as a surprise to PST and which they failed to avert. In the annual threat assessment in 2012, PST addressed the attacks of 22 July as "terrorist attacks". The analyze shows that this was the first time in eight years that PST articulated terror or terrorism to anything else but international terrorism or extreme Islamists. Right-wing extremism and anti-Islamic groups were for the first time articulated to terrorism: "[t]he terrorist attacks on 22 July have so far not led to any change in the threat from organized national extreme environments in Norway. Support for organized right-wing extremist and anti-Islamic groups is expected to be relatively small in 2012 as well" (PST, 2012). In the following two years, PST started using terror in relation to right-wing extremism slightly more, challenging the already well-established meaning of terrorism; "Anders Behring Breivik will continue to be an inspirer for individuals, both in Norway and internationally. Although most sympathizers in Norway seem to distance themselves from the *terrorist* [emphasis inserted] attack on Utøya, there are several who support the attack on the government quarter and the government." (PST, 2013). And in 2014 "A potential threat of violence and *terrorism* [emphasis inserted] from right-wing extremists in Norway will first and foremost be linked to individuals who act alone or in small independent groups." (PST).

In 2013, PST mentioned that attack on Utøya was a "terrorist attack" and in 2014, right-wing extremism was once articulated to "violence and *terrorism* [emphasis inserted]" (PST, 2013). However, even though PST referred to attacks of July 22 as "terrorist attacks" and articulated it to "right-wing extremist" and "anti-Islamic groups", the alternative representation was left at that. From 2012, right-wing extremism and extreme Islamism continued to be addressed separately, articulating that while right-wing extremism activities *could* be terrorism, terrorism was first and foremost reserved for international terrorism and extreme Islamists. Additionally, PST assessed that the terrorist attack by right-wing extremist Breivik had "so far not led to any change in threat" and conclude that they expect support to right-wing extremist and anti-Islamic groups to be small in 2012, and thus insisted that "(e)xtreme Islamism will continue to be the biggest terrorist threat to Norway in 2012" (PST, 2012). Due to this assessment, extreme Islamism kept being the greatest terrorist threat in 2012, 2013, and 2014, despite 2011 being the bloodiest year Norway had witnessed since the Second World War (Stoltenberg, 2011).

The right-wing extremist terrorist attack seemed to be forgotten in the assessments in 2012, 2013, and 2014. Even though PST was now articulating right-wing extremism to terrorism, they were only doing it moderately. Moreover, at one point PST seemed to have forgotten that 22/7 even took place. For instance, in PST's annual report of 2017, six years after 22/7, PST wrote that "Norway has so far not been hit as hard by Islamist and right-wing extremism violence and terrorism as several of other European countries" (PST, 2017), even though a larger proportion of Norway's population was affected by right-wing extremism than the proportion of the US population affected by 9/11 (Herbjørnsrud, 2019). Here, it is important to highlight that in the aftermath of 22/7, demand for more knowledge on right-wing extremism was made. It was argued that Norway had in the past decade focused dominantly on extreme Islamism and that there had been little knowledge production on right-wing extremism (Bjørgo, 2015). Finally, on February 1st, 2016, a center for right-wing extremism research was opened, *Center for Research on Extremism* (C-REX). Even though knowledge started to be produced by experts on right-wing extremism and more focus was given to right-wing extremism, PST continued to dominantly focus on extreme Islamism as the biggest terrorist threat to Norway. It was not until 2020 that PST for the first time equated the terrorist threat from right-wing extremism with extreme Islamism, almost a decade later after 22/7. How come it was possible for PST to continue in the same footsteps also after 2014 and up until 2020, is a thesis of itself.

Moreover, the analysis found that the representation of right-wing extremism and extreme Islamism differed significantly between 2004 and 2014. Firstly, as already mentioned, right-wing extremism was addressed in a separate section than where terrorism was addressed. Moreover, the analysis found that while extreme Islamism activity was articulated to "international terrorism", "terror threat", "threat to Western interests" and "terror actions", right-wing terrorism was articulated to "threat of violence" and "problem of order" that are "violent", "racist", "antisemitic", "anti-state" and create "fear" and use "violence". In their 2012 annual report, assessing the horrific terrorist attack of 22 July, PST concluded that right-wing extremism was still first and foremost a "problem of order". With this, the threat of terror committed by right-wing extremists disappeared from the terrorism discourse and one representation of reality became dominating, appearing as commonsensical. Terrorism was thus understood as being international, committed by extreme Islamists. This representation of the reality of terrorism threat being international and from extreme Islamists became so dominant between 2004 and 2014 that it appeared as fixed, and the meaning of terrorism as international and by extreme Islamists taken for granted.

An 'Othering' discourse

The above findings on the construction of what terrorism was and who the terrorists were to PST can be analyzed as an 'Othering' discourse, in which 'our' positive attributes were contrasted with the negativity of 'theirs'. It was the matter of a binary of 'good' and 'evil' and the process of positive linking and the process of negative differentiating (see section 3.3 in Chapter 3). Within this context, PST constructed Norway as positively linked to the interests of the 'West', 'Europe', 'non-Islamists, 'law-abiding citizens' which were good and acceptable, contrasting with the negative process of differentiating from the evil which was 'non-western', 'non-European', 'terrorists' and 'extreme Islamist''. It is to note that Norway did not *only* write of interests of the West but also of 'Norwegian interests'. PST articulated international terrorism as a threat that targeted Western and Norwegian interests, as if they were the same, or at least analogos. Hence a collective identity was constructed where Norway and the West became the same. By doing, so there was constructed a polarization between Norwegians, Westerners, Europeans, non-Islamists, law-abiding citizens and terrorists, Muslim fundamentalists and Arabs. This further created an 'us' and 'them' where *they* were terrorists and *we* were not, hence constructing Muslims as a suspect community of

carrying out a terrorist attack and other communities, for instance, Norwegian and Western communities, not.

Moreover, when PST understood terrorism to be “cross-border”, “international” and having a “European network” (e.g PST, 2006), having first constructed who *they* were and what *we* were not, the counter-terrorism preventive measures were can then be said to be aimed at *them* (Muslim community and non-Westerners) within Norway. PST thus became concerned with investigating communities in Norway that could be linked to international organizations and networks. Hence, the dominant representation of terrorism being international influenced PST’s knowledge of terrorist threats. Furthermore, in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks in London in 2005, it came forth that the attacks were carried out by “second-generation immigrants” who had “Western European citizenship” (PST, 2006). To PST this meant that there was now “growing concern that Europe will be hit by more terrorist attacks carried out by people with Western European citizenship (ibid). For Norway and PST, it meant to focus on “people and communities in Norway who sympathize with extreme Islamist ideology and who support terrorist acts” (2007). This also made PST conclude that those who could carry out terrorist acts in Norway were “foreign citizens who have come here as asylum seekers or through other types of immigration” However, PST also wrote that they “must also be prepared for increased radicalization among people born and raised in Norway.” With this, PST constructed potential terrorists in Norway to be ‘foreigners’ and ‘Muslims’ who sympathize with ‘extreme Islamist ideology’, who are different from *us* who are Norwegians, non-Muslims, and law-abiding citizens. So, *if* there were terrorists in Norway, the terrorists were considered to be fundamental Muslims even though they may have Norwegian citizenship or may be foreigners, hence following the discourse of terrorists being extreme Islamists.

Moreover, it is to remember that this has not always been the case. As briefly mentioned in the introduction, in 1999, PST (at the time known as “Overvåkningspolitiet" or the Surveillance police) feared that “fanatical sects and right-wing extremist groups will be behind terrorist acts in the transition to the year 2000” (Dagbladet, 1999). Up until then, Norway had witnessed a number of violent attacks by right-wing extremists. For instance, in 1977, a leftist bookstore in Tromsø was attacked by a neo-Nazi group. In 1979, a neo-Nazi group attacked a Labor Day Parade, and in 1985 a mosque in Oslo was bombed by an extreme right (Gjørv, 2012, p. 46). Moreover, in 2001, Benjamin Hermansen, only 15 years

old, was killed by two young men and one young woman with extreme right attitudes (ibid.). Recruitment to right-wing and neo-Nazi groups was intense with severe violent potential. Terrorism and violence from the right-wing was considered as such a threat to society that rehabilitating programs known as "exit-programmes" (Hansen, 2020) were initiated, aimed to exit right-wing extremists from such groups and activities. However, in the aftermath of 9/11 and the GWT, the threat of right-wing terrorism and violence was never properly addressed. Experts and scholars focused dominantly on extreme Islamist terrorism. One may wonder whether the lack of focus on right-wing terrorism has been almost non-existent due to the lack of fixed meaning on right-wing violence as terrorism. Chapter 2 demonstrated the hesitance of labeling non-Islamist violence as terrorism as well as a lack of understanding of what right-wing terrorism really is. It also demonstrated that right-wing violence has in Norway been dominantly constructed as "hate-crime" (Ravndal & Bjørgo, p. 133, 2018) rather than terrorism[8]. Examples given above of the numbers of right-wing extremists attacks were all labelled as "hate-crime" (ibid.) Chapter 2 also problematized this relationship between hate-crimes and terrorism. It demonstrated that there is a lack of agreement in the academia on whether hate-crime is, or *can* be terrorism. This can be used to understand that, somehow, the meaning of right-wing violence, in Norway, has been more stabely articulated to hate-crime rather than to terrorism, excluding right-wing violence from terrorism discourse and locating it instead in the hate-crime discourse. In this way, the meaning of terrorist threat as extreme Islamist becomes somewhat true, and the meaning of terrorist threat as right-wing terrorism somewhat false.

To answer the following question *How was the discourse on 'terrorism' and the identity of 'terrorists' socially constructed in the annual threat assessments?*, based on the analysis above and the representations identified, PST first and foremost considered that the danger of a terrorist attack to come from *outside* of Norway, not inside. By doing so, they externalized the terrorist threat. What happened outside was considered a terrorist threat, and what was happening *inside* of Norway, apart from July 22 terrorist attacks, was considered violence. Activities from right-wing extremism were considered a problem of order, violent, racist, antisemitic, anti-state and create fear. Activities of international terrorism committed by extreme Islamists were considered terrorist threats that carry out terror acts. More

[8] As there is little research done on right-wing extremism in Norway, Ravndal and Bjørgo are considered experts on right-wing extremism. I therefore use only them to make my point on the relationship between hate-crime and terrorism in Norway.

dominantly**,** PST defined terrorism as something that is characterized by international terrorism and international groups and networks like al-Qaeda. They also defined terrorism as actions that are carried out and are well planned and coordinated and meant to be successful. The actions were deadly and bombs and other explosives were common features. The terrorist threat then was also something that was first and foremost from outside of Norway, not inside, as terrorism was international. Because the characters of terrorism are international, cross-border, and have European networks, PST constructed this as the truth, keeping an eye on whether terrorists from *outside* are coming to Norway, either as immigrants or asylum seekers, or have maybe already come. Moreover, the findings also say something about who PST believed to be terrorists. Terrorists were first and foremost not Norwegians nor Westerners, it was not *us*, but *them,* the extreme Islamists, non-Norwegians ,and non-westerns. However, if, and when, the terrorist threat had come home, then the terrorist threat was from those who sympathize with extreme Islamists within Norwegian borders, not Norwegians. Hence, because there was one dominant representation of what terrorism was and who the terrorists were, this meaning of terrorism, terrorists, and terrorist threat became fixed and commonsensical between 2004-2014 within PST's threat assessments.

4.2 The construction of causes of terrorism

The above findings illuminated what and who PST considered to be terrorism and terrorists. In this section, the aim is to present findings that answer the second sub-question; *What were the main causes of 'terrorism' and how were these causes discursively constructed in the annual threat assessments?* During the analysis, it was found that PST constructed two main causes of terrorism in Norway within the timeframe 2004-2014. The first cause was "terrorism-related support activities" (PST, 2008). In their reports, PST identified three main activities as such activities; 1) "money transfer to individuals or groups who are believed to be affiliated with extreme Islamist' organization abroad" (PST, 2005; 2007; 2008; 2009; 2010; 2011; 2012; 2013; 2014), 2) document forgery and forgery of identity, 3) people from Norway traveling to conflict areas to gain training, combat experience and meet international contacts (ibid.) PST wrote that these activities are taking place in small extreme Islamist societies in Norway.

The second cause is “radicalization” (PST, 2008). Radicalization is a term that was first popularized in the aftermath of the London bombings in 2005. Since the event, the term entered the mainstream political, media, and academic discourse (Reinares et.al, 2005). Though there was no clear definition of what was meant by radicalization, European Commission saw radicalization as a process of “embracing opinions, views and ideas which could lead to acts of terrorism” (Reinares et.al., 2008 p. 5). Another definition of radicalization has been provided by Bonsi et.al, adding the use of violence in their definition, arguing that radicalization is “a process forming though strategy, structure, and conjecture, and involving the adoption and sustained use of violent means to achieve articulated political goals” (Bosi et.al 2014, p. 2). Nevertheless, what radicalization really is and whether radicalization necessarily leads to violence is blurry and contested and leads to a distinction between violent and non-violent radicalization (Bartlett & Miller, 2012). Simply put, violent radicalization then means “radicalization that leads to violence” while non-violent radicalization is “the process by which individuals come to hold radical views in relation to the status quo but do not undertake, aid, or abet terrorist activity” (Bartlett & Miller, 2012, p. 2). It is not just the definition of radicalization that makes the term difficult to conceptualize and a source of confusion. The term is used in at least three different contexts with three different agendas, giving radicalization different characters; 1) security agenda: where radicalization is considered as a security threat, 2) integration agenda: where the main concern is with political polarization about immigration politics, and 3) foreign policy, where ‘radical’ and ‘radicalization’ labels are used to justify certain policies by state actors, such as “suppressing national opposition, aligned to International discourse, e.g. the GWT” (Segdwick, 2010, p. 479, in Koehler, 2020, para. 5).

In the PST report, however, the construction of radicalization as a cause of terrorism first appeared in the threat assessments in 2006. PST wrote that “developments in Europe towards more independent and autonomous terrorist networks are likely to continue (…) The use of the Internet as an arena for *self-radicalization* [emphasis inserted] and communication is becoming increasingly widespread. The alleged perpetrators of the terrorist attack in London in July 2005 were *radical* [emphasis inserted] second-generation immigrants. The London campaign supports a growing concern that Europe will be hit by more terrorist attacks carried out by people with Western European citizenship”. Furthermore, due to the event in London, PST concluded that also Norway must be “prepared for increased *radicalization* [emphasis inserted] among people born and raised in Norway" (PST, 2006) and that a particular

challenge for PST's counter-work regarding identifying radicalization was that "there are people with unknown or false identities in Norway. These are primarily foreign citizens who have come here as asylum seekers or through other types of immigration" (ibid). In 2007, radicalization became a more rooted term in the assessments: "today's terrorist threat in Europe consists primarily of people with permanent residence in Europe and who have become *radicalized* [emphasis inserted] while living here. The vast majority in Norway, who can be linked to extreme Islamist' activities, were *radicalized* [emphasis inserted] before they came to the country. There are currently no indications that *radicalization* [emphasis inserted] of people living in Norway represents a significant factor in the Norwegian threat picture. At the same time, the *radicalization* [emphasis inserted] process can take place very quickly" (2007). In 2008, PST wrote that "[t]he bulks of extreme Islamist' activity in Norway is linked to support activities abroad, but there are also indications of increasing *radicalization* [emphasis inserted]" (2008).

Moreover, as of the annual report 2006, there was a slight *change* in the terrorism discourse when they introduced the term "radicalization" for the first time in the assessments (see the previous section). By 2009, however, the narrative changed completely as radicalization was given its own section in the reports. As mentioned in the earlier section, PST has over the years addressed terrorist threats separately from other kinds of threats, most often under the "International terrorism'" headline. However, after 2009 most of the statements on Islamism terrorism that used to be under the "International terrorism'" headline was moved to the "Extreme nationalism" headline. With this, the danger that was first international was now considered national. The threat had now come home. Hence, the finding found in the previous section that terrorism was first and foremost international and came from *outside* of Norway. By articulating one of the causes of terrorism to radicalization, the terrorism threat is brought home; because if there are chances of Westerners being radicalized in London, the chances can be the same in Norway. From 2009 and 2014, while Norway continued to state that "international terrorism still characterizes the threat scene in Norway" (PST, 2010), international terrorism was in more debt started to link directly to the situation in Norway and PST started identifying the possibility of young people in Norway becoming radicalized.

According to PST, when they used the word "radicalization" they meant "a process in which a person increasingly accepts the use of violence to achieve political goals. Radicalization can take place in any political direction and is not unique to Islamism." (PST, 2006). While doing

inventory, the analysis found that PST articulated radicalization to extreme Islamism activity more than 60 times in their assessments between 2004 and 2014. In contrast, PST articulated radicalization to right-wing extremism less than five times. This is an important observation. It brings forward that while PST stated that radicalization is not unique to Islamism, radicalization was still first and foremost reserved for extreme Islamism activity. For instance, when PST addressed extreme Islamism activity in Norway, they wrote that people were becoming "radicalized", but when they addressed activities in right-wing extremist environments, PST used the word "recruitment" to illustrate the increased acceptance of violence in the right-wing environment in Norway. According to PST, right-wing extremism activity "carried out in Norway by people who use or encourage the use of violence as a tool to achieve political goals" (2010). Yet, when PST wrote about right-wing extremism, the term "radicalization" is close to non-existent. Instead, "recruitment" is used; "[t]he levels of activity in parts of the right-wing extremist environment has been significantly higher in 2003 than in 2002. Several groups have worked purposefully to recruit new members, and it is expected that this *recruitment* [emphasis inserted] activity will continue in 2004 as well." (PST, 2004); "In 2005, some right-wing extremist groups will probably maintain active *recruitment* [emphasis inserted] work" (PST, 2005); "It is expected that right-wing extremist groups will continue to engage in active *recruitment* [emphasis inserted] work, and that in part very young people will be recruited into the environment. Several of these groups are believed to be in possession of firearms (PST, 2006); "…fight against terrorism and Islamist terrorist acts seems to have a polarizing effect on the environment and can, in special cases, strengthen *recruitment* [emphasis inserted] to and cohesion in the national extremist communities." (PST, 2007); "the right-wing extremism environment in Norway has been weakened due to low *recruitment* [emphasis inserted], weak management, poor finances, and low activity levels (PST, 2009); "right-wing extremist groups in Norway appear to be disorganized and are weakened due to weak *recruitment* [emphasis inserted] and low activity levels (PST, 2010). Instead of fear of radicalization, there was a fear of people being "recruited" to right-wing extremist groups. It is to note that even though PST started articulating "radicalization" to "right-wing extremism" in 2011, they only did it moderately. Because radicalization is addressed under the heading "Politically motivated violence – extreme Islamism"[1] with "Radicalizations" as one of the subheadings, radicalization was still dominantly associated with extreme Islamism, not right-wing extremism. It is to note that PST did write about "recruitment" about extreme Islamism, however, when they did so, they always articulated it to "radicalization" as well; "extreme Islamist ideologies and charismatic

leaders use these conflicts as a basis for legitimizing and inspiring terrorist acts. The Internet has also become an important propaganda tool in the context of *radicalization* [emphasis inserted] and *recruitment* [emphasis inserted]" (PST, 2009); "An increasing number of people in Norway with connections to these organizations may lead to increased support activities from Norway for terrorist actors abroad. This could also exacerbate the challenges associated with *radicalization* [emphasis inserted] and *recruitment* [emphasis inserted]" (PST, 2010). In this way, radicalization was constructed as one of the main causes that lead to terrorism. It is important to note that this representation of terrorism creates a chain of articulation that does not only say something about the causes of terrorism but also more about *who* can be radicalized. As illustrated in the previous section, the fear of who may be radicalized was not Norwegian, Westerners or Europeans, but foreigners, asylum-seekers, Muslim fundamentalists. Thus, it is only "people with Western citizenship" and "people who are born and raised in Norway" who can become radicalized, people who are not ethnic Norwegian nor ethnic Western for that matter. In contrast, right-wing extremists are simply being "recruited", in this way constructed *out* of the terrorism discourse in PST reports.

4.3 Tracing genealogy

The above findings showcase how PST constructed what terrorism was, who the terrorists were and what cased terrorism between 2004 and 2014. With this, the study looked at how PST made possible the construction of terrorism as international and carried out dominantly by extreme Islamism from the timespan of 2004 and 2014. Further analysis will do genealogy and look at where these dominating representations descend from. As mentioned in the theory chapter, representations are socially constructed facts, or "truth claims" (Foucault, 1980). They are discursively formatted and a result of history and language. The previous section presented truth claims and representations of the social reality that were taken for granted in the given decade. The following exercise will allow the study to investigate where these truth claims are descending from, thus deconstructing the naturalized truth about what terrorism was, who the threat were and what PST thought caused terrorism. Special attention will be paid to the power/knowledge nexus and how this nexus produced powerful truths. The section will use additional texts to make intertextual references. It will look for genealogy based on the findings above. As mentioned in the introduction, the social reality is nothing but representation and discursive formation. This is also in regards to terrorism, terrorists, and terrorism threats and what is considered a danger to Norwegian interests and security. This,

thus, does not mean that danger does not exist, it does or may do. But it is only possible to know of this danger when, and if, linguistically articulated.

The first truth claim found in the analysis was that terrorism was considered international, committed by extreme Islamists. Where did this truth of international terroris and extreme Islamism descend from? Chapter 2 showed that according to Rapporto, international terrorism first emerged in modern times in Russia in the 1880s. In the PST reports, however, the truth of international terrorism is referenced to 2001. In PST reports, the four-sequential terrorist attacks on the United States at the turn of the 21st century would come to define the truth of terrorism threat for the decade to come. Following the attacks on the US on September 11, 2001, George W. Bush drew clear lines between the terrorists (Other) and the US (Self), and launched a global campaign to eradicate international terrorism. Addressing the international community, he stated in one of his speeches the following:

> *"This new enemy seeks to destroy our freedom and impose its views. We value life; the terrorists ruthlessly destroy it. We value education; the terrorists do not believe women should be educated or should have health care, or should leave their homes. We value the right to speak our minds; for the terrorist, free expression can be grounds for exclusion. We respect people of all faiths and welcome the free practice of religion; our enemy wants to dictate how to think and how to worship even to their fellow Muslims" (Bush, 2001).*

With this, he famously declared a global "War on Terror" (GWT) (Bush, 2001). It was not only the Bush administration who acknowledged that terrorism was an international threat, also the UN and NATO were early out to designate the terrorist attack as a military attack on the US. As early as 12th September 2001, the United Nations Security Council responded to the attack by describing it as a "threat against international peace and security" (UN, 2001), and declared that military force could be used in self-defense against international terrorism. Resolution 1368 (2001) was adopted by the Security Council, "(d)etermined to combat by all means threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts", and called "on all States to work together urgently to bring to justice the perpetrators" and expressed "its readiness to take all necessary steps to respond to the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, and to combat all forms of terrorism" (UN, 2001). Similarly, NATO considered the attack as an attack against "all Allies" (NATO, 2021), paving the way for NATO to invoke Article 5 of the Atlantic Treaty for the first time in history since its inception. The cornerstone of Article

5 was that the countries part of NATO were allies, and an "attack on one Ally" is thus considered an attack against all Allies, and collective defense is activated.

International terrorism came to be seen in the light of securitization where the issue of terrorism was taken out of its traditional domain and raised at the security policy level. As mentioned in the theory chapter, this means that the problem of international terrorism is defined as something vital for the state and the international community as such and that the problem of terrorism could be handled with instruments that would not otherwise be considered acceptable at the political level. For the US, UN, and NATO it meant that they saw the 9/11 attacks as an act of war that had to be responded with a counter-attack. To them, the matter of international terrorism became a matter of war and self-defense.

However, unlike the US, Norway had a rather pragmatic stance on this issue (Hansen, et. al, 2006, p. 14) To Norway, and most of the European countries, the approach to terrorism had to a greater extent fallen under the heading of "fight against crime" rather than "fight against terrorism" (ibid.). While a number of verbal outbursts and military force were used to support the United States, the fight against international terrorism was mainly initially conducted within the usual political and legal framework (ibid). To EU countries, Afghanistan was the only country that was considered the place where military power had a central role to play in the fight against international terrorism. This was because of the invocation of Article 5 by NATO, to which Norway responded by sending its soldiers to counter-attack and fight international terrorism in Afghanistan in the aftermath of 9/11.

Hence, while Norway was taking part in combating international terrorism militarily in Afghanistan, within Norway, it was the police who had the main responsibility to tackle international terrorism. Yet, even though Norway did not securitize the matter of international terrorism to the extent the US did, international terrorism was still constructed as the most serious threat to Norwegian interests.

Moreover, it was not only PST's annual treat assessments that were influenced by the political rhetoric of GWT. The construction of 9/11 as a security threat to all allies, to all Western countries, also set the legal agenda in Norway, and a great need for regulation in this area became evident in order to deal with the causes of terrorism. Norway took the terrorist attack seriously and paved the way for a terrorism paragraph to accommodate the terrorism

scene taking place internationally (Engene et.al, 2007). As a response to GWT, there came an urgency for a terrorism paragraph that did not exist before 9/11. In 1993, the Norwegian Security Committee examined whether Norway needed to develop special criminalization laws to accommodate terrorist acts. However, it was concluded that Norwegian criminal law already contained penalties that would affect all types of acts that terrorists could conceivably commit (NOU, 1993:3, p. 20), such as Penal Code chap. 21, that covered violence, Penal Code chap. 22 that covered kidnapping and threats. However, in the aftermath of 9/11 and with the inception of a collective international response (intertextuality) to terrorism, Norway immediately put in force a provisional arrangement on 5th October 2001, prohibiting the financing of terrorism[9]. This provision implemented the UN Convention on 9 December 1999 on Combating Terrorist Financing and UN Security Council Resolution 1373 (UN, 2001). Thus, the origin of the coming laws in Norway had international instruments. As Norway had affiliated to the UN Terrorist Financing Convention, and as already mentioned, to the UN Security Council Resolution of 1973 (intertextuality), it showed that Norway was under the influence of the discursive power of GWT. As the UN Security Council pointed out, the need for international and national regulation of terrorist acts following the terrorist attack on the United States in 2001 was evident. Moreover, not only did Norway put in force a provisional arrangement to prohibit financing terrorism, Norway also introduced the terrorism clause into Norwegian law in 2002 (Nilsen, 2012). This illustrates how the Norwegian laws meant for the country and to ensure safety within its borders were not driven by the scene of terrorism *within* Norway. Instead, Norwegian laws regarding terrorism were being developed and socially constructed by the international scene on terrorism.

Since 2002, there have been several changes in the legislation on terrorism, and the laws have become more and more comprehensive and sharpened. The analysis show how these changes of legislations were constructed parallelly with the international scene on terrorism. The development of changes can be referred to as various "terrorpakker" or terrorpackages (Færaas, 2013, Wessel-Aas, 2014). The packages and the changes they bought mirrored the international scene on terrorism and the urgency to put in measures to combat international terrorism attacks that were now threatening international peace.

[9] Ot.prp. nr. 61 (2001-2002)

Terrorpackage I came in 2002 following the UN Security Council call for national regulations of terrorist acts. That is when the "terrorparagrafen" or the paragraph on terror was introduced in the Norwegian law; Penal Code. 1902 para.147a criminalized terror actions and para. 147b criminalized terrorist financing. In the paragraph, several penalties were listed and collected under the term "terrorist act". Hence, no new acts were criminalized. What made terror act a terror act was whether the act was intended as terror. Terrorpackage II came four years later in 2005. Here the police and PST were in the law given expanded access to use cohesive measures both during an investigation completed by criminal actors and preventive measures, such as tapping (Wessel-Aas, 2014, p. 86). Terrorpackage III came in 2008 with another change in the law in regards to terrorism in order to ratify the Council of Europe Convention of 16 May 2005 on the Prevention of terrorism, Article 5 to 7, and new acts were criminalized (intertextuality)[10]. With Penal Code para 147 a and b, it became a criminal offense to recruit, encourage and train in methods and techniques particularly suitable for terrorist acts, entering into alliance between two or more persons, but also if preparation took place in an individual alone. According to Engene and Nordenhaug, the motivation behind ratifying the Council of Europe Convention on Preventing terrorism was to fulfill international obligations "in what the Government claims is a "clear and loyal" way (2007)[11]. In 2013 came the latest terrorpackage, package IV, of the decade this analysis is concerned with. The most notable contribution in this package was the criminalization of participation in a terrorist organization. Three types of participation were criminalized; 1) anyone who forms a terrorist organization, 2) anyone who recruits a member to a terrorist organization and 3) anyone who provides financial or other material support to a terrorist organization (Penal Code. 1902 para. 147d og Penal Code. 2005 para.136a). The sharpened law came after several legislative amendments from PST. In a letter dated 1. November 2011[12] PST proposed a number of legislative amendments to the Norwegian Ministry of Justice and Public Security concerning terrorist legislation and methods PST can use in their preventive work. The proposals were based on an assessment that the penal provisions regarding terrorism in the preparation phase are deficient, especially in relation to solo terrorists and people who go to training camps (PST, 2012). 22/7 terrorist attacks had created an urgency within PST to criminalize participation in a terrorist organization (intertextuality). In addition, they noted

[10] Explanatory Report to the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism: https://rm.coe.int/16800d3811
[11] Norsk terrortiltak: Styrt av symbolpolitikk eller trusselnivå: Retrieved from ATEKST (accessed 4.March).
[12] Innst. 207 S (2011–2012)

that young people were traveling abroad to receive training and hence wanted to work with prosecution and investigation in order to prevent young people from traveling to conflict-affected areas. Besides, since the launch of GWT, there had been strong international pressure to make planning and preparation of terrorist acts criminal. The fact that it took so long for Norway to criminalize terror acts was because it was argued that the already legislations covered that (NOU, 1993:3). However, the construction of international terrorism as an international threat with GWT given increased attention on this from the authorities. This shows the powerful discursive work of GWT that shaped terrorism discourse in Norway, both in PST's annual threat assessments but also in the Norwegian law, developing a dominant truth of what the terrorist threat is. PST and the laws hold both a dominant power to construct a truth of what terrorism threat is. The events of July 22 2011 only strengthened the justification for the changes in the penal code at this point and as PST saw it. However, it was, and is, important to emphasize that the focus remained on radicalized extreme Islamists and extreme Islamist terrorism in the reports despite their justification for stricter laws found support in the events of July 22. Hence, the terror packages, like PST's annual threat assessments, were mirroring the international scene. This was also further strengthened further because the international community was seeing an international terrorism threat emerging, such as the well-known terrorist attacks such as in Bali (2002), Madrid (2003), and London (2005).

Moreover, the laws did not just accommodate the international scene but also those who were considered to be doing the act of terrorism. As was found in the earlier section, terrorism was not just international but also carried out by extreme Islamists. The laws seemed to be tailored for and shaped by, the characteristics of extreme Islamism terrorism. Hence, GWT really marked the way for terrorism legislation that also set the scene in Norway of how serious terrorism threat was. This is also visible in PST's annual threat assessment. This illustrates the power/knowledge nexus and the construction of the truth through language. The political rhetoric of GWT was so powerful that it set both the legal agenda in Norway, as well as constructed the dominant discourse on the terrorist threat in PST's threat assessment between 2004-2014. This finding can be also be found in this statement of Engene, "the legal agenda and Norwegian measures against terrorism in the period 1993-2004 showed Norwegian measures against terrorist was a result of what the Government sees as international obligations from the UN and the EU as well as its desire to lead symbol politics, that is, to show action on the inside and solidarity with terrorist-affected countries on the

outside." (intertextuality) (Engene, 2007). This seemed to be the case also after 2004 and up until 2014 where Norway had still not been the victim of a terrorist attack carried out by extreme Islamists, yet Norway continued to develop sharpened laws to accommodate the fear for extreme Islamist terrorism. This shows the discursive power GWT had on both the legislations and PST's threat assessments alike in the timeframe 2004-2014

Genealogy and 'Othering discourse'

This section demonstrates how the matter of symbolic politics and Norway being loyal and showing solidarity to terrorist-affected countries are matters of identity politics constructed through language. Earlier, the analysis found that matters of what terrorism is and who terrorists are can be understood as an 'othering discourse'. By doing genealogy, this section looks closer into where this construction of Self as good, Norwegian, Western and European law-abiding and non-westerners and non-Europeans, terrorists and extreme Islamists as evil descend from. As one can do genealogy endlessly, the analysis primarily focuses on identity construction after the launch of GWT. To get a comprehensive understanding of identity construction, we would need to look at where the rhetoric was coming from. What do Western interests have to do in the context of Norway and Norwegian threat assessment? How come Norway and its association to the West was imperative here? To make sense of this relational identity, we need to see it in the light of how the international community responded to the GWT.

An important source of analysis here was the speech of Bush referenced earlier that was held in the aftermath of 9/11 that pivoted international terrorism discourse and GWT campaign. Addressing the international community, Bush positively linked the US to those who "value life…we value education…we value the right to speak our minds…we respect people of all faiths and welcome the free practice of religion". By doing so, he negatively differentiated terrorists to those who wanted death, who enjoyed inequality and cherished oppression and dictatorship. In another speech addressing the nations of the world, he stated that "either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists" hence positively linking those who are with the US as 'friends' and differentiating the nations who do not choose to respond with the US as 'enemies'. These wordings had a strong effect – particularly because it was coming from a world leader, from the strongest and most powerful state; the hegemony itself. Thus, in the extension of these speeches, the UN declared that 9/11 was a threat to "international peace and security" while NATO stated that the attack was an attack on all allies. This can be

understood as where the discourse of “othering” is descending from; namely the aftermath of 9/11 and the rhetoric of GWT where it was the international community against the terrorists. Hence the terrorist attack was not only on the US but on every state, who considered these actions of terrorists as evil and unspeakable. Hence, Eastern countries, including Norway, responded to the attack in solidarity. International terrorism was globally threatening to all countries and to everyone. This influence in Norway is evident when the Norwegian Prime minister, Jens Stoltenberg stated that “Norway strongly condemns this. Such terror is a violation of our values” (Stoltenberg, 2001) (intertextuality). Moreover, he continued to distance Norway from the events of 9/11: “On behalf of the Norwegian government, I would like to take the strongest distance from the terrorist acts that have been carried out," and describes the attacks as "evil set-in motion"; and “what is happening in New York, Washington and elsewhere in the United States, indicates an act of terrorism the world has never seen before. We are witnessing an unimaginable catastrophe that is shaking and upsetting the whole world”; “We all react with disgust and shock" he said (Stoltenberg, 2001). In 2006, the foreign Minister, at the time Jonas Gahr Støre, claimed that “[t]he fight against terrorism is ultimately a struggle over values. Our efforts to combat terrorism will only succeed if they are in full accordance with the principles of the rule of law and universal human rights” (intertextuality) (Støre, 2006, p.4). He addresses the international laws under the United Nations as well as the dominant perception on what terrorism had come to be. The fight against terrorism hence became a matter of a collective identity of those who cherish the good, equality, education to all, democracy, fundamental human rights; Norwegian interests, Western interests, and the interests of the UN, NATO ,nd the EU. Terrorists on the other hand were evil-doers who stood against democracy and fundamental human rights who need to be stopped. It was also stated by Stoltenberg that “it is important that we do everything we can to fight terrorism” (Stoltenberg, 2001). In this way, the terrorist attack became an attack also on Norway and a threat to Norwegian interests, a truth that was never questioned by PST in their threat assessments until briefly in 2012. As a result, this ‘othering discourse’ became dominant.

Here we see that social identities construct political events. Such as counter-terrorism strategies and law regulations, accommodating the construction of extreme Islamism as terrorists and terrorist threat. The analysis found that it was the moral West that was in a fight against the immoral international terrorism phenomenon. It also indicated that whoever was an enemy of the West was an enemy of Norway. For instance, in the annual report of 2008

PST stated that "(e)xtreme Islamist terrorism is cross-border and development trends in Europe also affected the situation in this country. The potential threat to Norway had to therefore be seen in a European perspective (PST, 2008), as well as in an "international perspective" (PST, 2007). In this way, Norway between 2004-2014 constructed what terrorist threat to Norway is based on what is happening in the West. They constructed similarities and ties based on what is happening outside of Norway.

Looking for power/knowledge nexus

This section looks more closely at the power/knowledge nexus in PST reports and the emergence of terrorism as something international in the reports. In the PST report of 2004 PST wrote that "the terrorist attacks in 2003 showed that international extremist Islamists still have the intention and capacity to carry out terrorist attacks against Western and other targets. Western targets in the core areas of the extremist Islamist groups are likely to be particularly vulnerable. Furthermore, European countries will still be attractive to international extremist Islamists, both as a haven for various support groups and as an arena for new actions." (PST, 2003). The statement of find support in "the terrorist attacks in 2003" (intertextuality) to produce the truth of international extreme Islamist being a threat to the West. The 2003 Casablanca bombings were one of these terrorist attacks that PST referred to. The bombings were a series of suicide bombings in Morocco carried out by "Islamists" (Bright et.al, 2003). In addition to this reference, PST wrote in the same report that "the threat from al-Qaeda in May 2003 marked that Norway is also in the group of countries that al-Qaeda believes are legitimate and appropriate to target." (PST, 2003). Here PST was referring to an audiotape where al-Qaeda's second leader Ayman al-Zawahiri said the following:

> "After dividing Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Syria, and Pakistan will come next (...) O Muslims, take matters firmly against the embassies of America, England, Australia, and Norway and their interests, companies, and employees (...) Burn the ground under their feet, as they should not enjoy your protection, safety, or security. Expel those criminals out of your countries (...) Do not allow the Americans, the British, the Australians, the Norwegians, and the other crusaders who killed your brothers in Iraq to live in your countries, enjoy their resources, and wreak havoc in them. Learn from your 19 brothers who attacked America in its planes in New York and Washington and caused it a tribulation that it never witnessed before and is still suffering from its injuries until today" (Hegghammer, 2005, p. 32-33).

The threat was a recorded tape that was broadcasted by the Arab television channel al-Jazeera. It was assumed that the threat came as a result of Norway's participation in the fight against international terrorism. However, this threat seemed to come after the USA's invasion of Iraq that year which Norway did not take part in. According to the director of the Norwegian Department of Peace Research, Stein Tønneson, a theory was put forward about a possible confusion of Scandinavian countries (NTB, 2003). The theory received support from Lars Erslev Anderson, a Danish terror export, who claimed that "the threat must be directed at Denmark" (ibid) who was part of one of the 46 countries which had actively supported the US war against Iraq where Denmark had been an obvious coalition partner, in which Norway was not one of the countries. Nevertheless, PST took the recorded tape seriously and interpreted it as a direct terrorist threat to Norway.

Moreover, the following year, in 2004, Norway is again mentioned in one recorded tape of Ayman al-Zawahiri. He said:

> "Defending Palestine is a duty for all Muslims. You should never give up Palestine even if the whole world let it down. In Palestine we don't face the Jews only, but the anti-Muslim world coalition led by America the Crusader and the Zionist (...) We should start now. The interests of America, Britain, Australia, France, Norway, Poland, South Korea and Japan are everywhere (...) Oh young men of Islam, here is our message to you, if we are killed or captured, you should carry on the fight (Hegghammer, 2005, p. 63).

Due to these statements, several Norwegian embassies were temporarily closed for two years. PST wrote in their report that "The threats from al-Qaeda's deputy leader Ayman al-Zawahiri in May 2003 and October 2004 were directed directly at Norway and Norwegian interests abroad. Norwegian interests will therefore be perceived as legitimate targets by extreme Islamists. Several Norwegian ambassadors have in the last two years been temporarily closed after terrorist threats" (PST, 2005). Even though the threats were turned out to be empty and no terrorist attack was carried out, Norway had been targeted. This gave PST reasons to believe that extreme Islamists were a legitimate threat to Norwegian interests. In PST's annual threat reports, PST saw these threats as serious threats from 2003 and up until 2007 in which they finally assessed that "there is currently no direct threat to national security." (PST, 2007). In that same year, PST wrote about another terrorist attack which they used to produce knowledge about the terrorist threat to Norway. They write that "the terrorist attack in Madrid

on 11 March 2004, which killed 190 people and injured about 1800, showed that European countries are also targets of international terrorism (...) It is first and foremost groups with an extreme Islamist' ideology that have been behind the implemented or planned actions, and these environments currently pose the greatest threat to Western countries and interests" (PST, 2005). In 2006, a similar reference is found in PST's reports: "The terrorist attacks in 2005 show that extreme Islamists still have the capacity to carry out actions against Western targets. The conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq, Kashmir, Chechnya, and the Palestinian Authority, which are used in the ideological rationale for action, continue. The probability of extensive terrorist attacks is considered greater in western countries with large extreme Islamist' groups, but the threat from extreme Islamism is global and can also affect Norway." (PST, 2006).

Moreover, within Norway, several individuals have been identified as extreme Islamists (Dagbladet, 2013). Instead of reciting all of them, the analysis mentions one specific case, the case of Arfan Qadeer Bhatti. Bhatti had been considered a terrorist threat as he was considered a "charismatic leaders" (PST, 2012) within the extreme Islamist networks in Norway (NRK, 2015). Though born in Norway, Bhatti spent several years in Pakistan. As a child, he was taken care of child protection and placed in a child welfare institution (Aftenposten, 2015). Bhatti started getting involved in criminality from a young age and had since been convicted for several serious cases. In 2006 in Norway there was a shooting at a synagogue in Oslo which came to be known as "terroristsaken" or "the terrorist case" in the media (Dagbladet, 2006; NRK, 2008; VG, 2006). On the night of September 17, 2006, 13 shots were fired with automatic rifles at the building. Four people were arrested. Bhatti, known as a Norwegian Islamist, was among the preparators. The police interpreted this as an act of terrorism and charged for committing a terrorist act. They also charged him for planning a terrorist attack on the American and Israeli embassies in Oslo for which PST claimed they had evidence for. According to them, they had taped a conversation in which PST believed they had caught him planning a terrorist attack. However, in 2008, Bhatti was acquitted of terrorist charges and Aftenposten wrote that "There is no evidence of concrete terrorist plans, according to the court, which also does not find it proven that Bhatti planned concrete attacks on embassies. Nor is the shooting at the synagogue on St.Hanshaugen considered an act of terrorism." (Aftenposten, 2008). Thus, Bhatti was acquitted of all terrorist charges but convicted of shooting at the synagogue which was instead considered gross vandalism (ibid). In the coming years, he was considered to be a person that was feared and a mentor of "Profetens ummah" (or Ummah of the Prophet). Ummah of the Prophet was

an extreme Islamist network in Norway. The network was known as having “antidemocratic and to some extent violent rhetoric” (Lia, 2013, p. 105). The designation was first used in autumn in 2012 in connection with the mobilization of a protest demonstration in Oslo against “Innocence of Muslims”, a famous film trailer with strong blasphemous content and which provoked strong reactions worldwide. As PST wrote in their report “The people in the extreme Islamis' networks are involved in activities of a more operational nature than before” (PST, 2012). For instance, on January 20, 2012, just under 40 people attended a demonstration against Norwegian military forces in Afghanistan, while somewhere between 60 to 100 people attended the demonstration at the US Embassy, September 21, 2012 (Lia, 2013, p. 105). PST refers to networks like Ummah of the Prophet as “multiethnic” (2013) that use “al-Qaeda-inspired rhetoric, which is placed in a Norwegian context to radicalize and recruit more to the environment. We also see that Norway, Norwegian interests, and symbols are part of the enemy picture for many. Norwegian actors were made responsible for the suffering of Muslims. Among other things has Norway's military involvement in Muslim countries and the caricature case have been important radicalization factors for some of those who are currently in the environment” (PST, 2014). Hence the emergence of understanding of terrorism emerging from GWT started getting much more rooted in the Norwegian context and the truth of terrorism threat from extreme Islamists more powerful and taken-for-granted. The international phenomenon of terrorism became with the years more concrete in Norway with specific cases in which PST linked to extreme Islamists networks.

Moreover, as mentioned, up until 2011, there was *one* understanding of what terrorism is and who terrorists are in the PST annual threat report. However, after the events of 22/7, that dominating representation of terrorism was challenged and the genealogy of terrorism threat being extreme Islamists alone was disrupted. Already addressed, in PST’s annual reports from 2012, PST for the first time articulated terrorism to other than extreme Islamist terrorism. Addressing July 22, PST used the articulation of “terrorist attacks” and “terrorism” for the first time. This represents a rupture and disturbance in the legacy of what terrorism is and where terrorism threat is considered to be from since 2004. Suddenly, a different representation of terrorism was born in the reports from 2012; and that is that terrorism is right-wing extremism. The dominating power of the knowledge of extreme Islamism was challenged. The analysis brings to light that what terrorism was, was a matter of representation. As briefly mentioned in the introduction chapter, when the events of 22/7 took place, a sudden need for interpretation and understanding of what was going on appeared.

Terrorist experts and media houses were all assuming that it was a terrorist attack carried out by international terrorism and extreme Islamist; a foreigner, maybe an asylum-seeker or an immigrant. However, when it turned out to be an ethnic-Norwegian right-wing extremist, the dominance of this truth was challenged in the PST threat assessment from 2012. A marginalized and excluded interpretation of terrorism was brought to light. Nonetheless, the rupture and change was short-lived, and terrorism being extreme Islamism continued to prevail. The bloodiest attack on the Norwegian soils since WWI was assessed by PST as something that did not "lead to any change in threat" and "(e)xtreme Islamism will continue to be the biggest terrorist threat to Norway in 2012" (PST, 2012), and the following years. This is very alarming and showcases the power of knowledge to create truth and how oppressive this power denoted to the truth of terrorism being extreme Islamist really is. What is more striking, which illustrates the discursive power of this truth, is found also in the July 22 Commission report (2012). The report was meant as an evaluation of the way PST and other authorities responded to the attacks of 22/7. Chapter 4 in July 22 Commission report, an attempt was made to present the recent history of political and terrorism incidents and lessons relevant to the events of 22 July committed by a right-wing terrorist (Gjørv 2012, p. 45). However, what was presented was history of extreme Islamism terrorism as presented in PST annual threat assessments. de Van notes about Chapter 4 of the July 22 Commission report, "the emphasis throughout this chapter on Islamist terrorism is striking, especially in the light of Breivik's identity" (2014, para. 39). The report was an important report at the time as it was ordered by the Norwegian government to evaluate the responses of Norweigan intelligence services during the attacks of 22/7. Nevertheless, this shows that both PST annual threat assessments prior to and post 22/7, and the July 22 Commission report were under the influence of the GWT discourse, shaping the narrative of the terrorist threats in Norway. The power of the discursive construction of extreme Islamists as a terrorist threat to Norway was so strong that despite the right-wing terrorist attack on 22/7, right-wing terrorism was not considered a real threat against Norwegian national interests (PST, 2012 - 14).

4.4 A sensible representation?

The objective of the following study was to answer the following research question: *How was it possible for PST to discursively construct 'extreme Islamism' as the greatest terrorism threat to Norway in the timeframe 2004-2014?* The research question has been attempted answered by the following subquestions: *1) How was the discourse on 'terrorism' and the identity of 'terrorists' socially constructed in the annual threat assessments? 2) What were the main causes of 'terrorism' and how were these causes discursively constructed in the annual threat assessments? 3) Where did the 'truth' of 'extreme Islamism' as the greatest 'terrorist threat' to Norway descend from?*

From 2004-2014, PST constructed their truth of what terrorism was, who the terrorists were, and what the terrorist threat was based on the powerful construction of terrorism threat internationally, securitized by the United States in the aftermath of 9/11, and with the launch of GWT. In the given timespan, PST constructed *one* dominating representation of what terrorism was and who was capable of carrying out a terrorist act; and that was that terrorism was international, carried out by radicalized Muslims, or as they wrote consistently over that decade, extreme Islamists. They were terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda or organizations that were inspired by organizations such as al-Qaeda. In their reports, they articulated terrorism consistently to extreme Islamists, al-Qaeda, and international terrorism. The analysis found that this was a matter of identity politics, and a matter of the construction of an 'othering discourse'. The analysis showed that by giving positive attributes to Self, PST constructed a negative Other, where Self was good and Other was evil. Within this context, PST constructed Norway as positively linked to the interests of the 'West', 'Europe', 'non-Islamists' and 'law-abiding citizens' which were good and acceptable, while 'non-Norwegians', 'non-Western', 'non-European', 'terrorists' 'extreme Islamists' were evil and dangerous and were possible of carrying out a terrorist attack. Moreover, the 'othering discourse' was also a matter of inside/outside. First of all, by constructing terrorism as international by, terrorism threat was said to be coming *outside* of Norwegian borders, not inside. By doing so, the threat was externalized. However, over the years, PST started writing about groups who are *outside* of Norway to have come *inside* as immigrants or asylum seekers, as well as people born and raised in Norway who were showing sympathy for the acts of extreme Islamists and groups such as al-Qaeda. Thus, fear of threat was now not only from 'non-Norwegians', 'non-Western', 'non-European', 'terrorists' 'extreme Islamists', but

also ‘foreigners’, ‘asylum-seekers’, ‘people with Western citizenship’ and ‘people who were born and raised in Norway. All these constructions of identity marginalized and excluded the construction of an ethnic Norwegian to be a terrorist. By doing so, PST constructed the truth of terrorist threat of which extreme Islamists, Muslim fundamentalists, foreigners, immigrants, and asylum seekers became the dominant group who were capable of doing something so horrific.

Secondly, the analysis found that the causes of terrorism were linked closely to PST’s construction of what terrorism was and who terrorists were. Two main causes of terrorism were identified: 1) terrorism-related support activities such as a) money transfer to individuals or groups who are believed to be affiliated with extreme Islamist organization abroad b) document forgery and forgery of identity, and c) people from Norway travelling to conflict areas to gain training, combat experience and meet international contacts, and 2) radicalization. The analysis found that while radicalization was articulated to extreme Islamists over 60 times, it was articulated to right-wing extremism under five times. In this way, it was possible for PST to construct extreme Islamism as the greatest terrorist threat to Norway, and marginalize the threat from right-wing extremism, as it was only extreme Islamists who were involved in terrorism-related support activities and could be radicalized.

Lastly, by doing genealogy from 2004 up until 2014, the paper traced the emergence of this way of understanding terrorism, who terrorists were, and what the causes of terrorism were for PST in the given timeframe. Here, special attention was paid to the power/knowledge nexus. The analysis found that since 2004, PST’s perception of terrorism and terrorists were influenced by the interpretation of the events of 9/11 by the US, the UN, NATO , and the rest of the Western world, including Norway. The attacks were first and foremost interpreted as a terrorist attack in which the attack was considered to be an act of war, in which the US administration responded with the launched GWT. While the UN claimed that international terrorism was a threat to international peace and security, NATO claimed that the attacks of 9/11 were attacks on all allies. These interpretations of the events had great power which created the truth of this threat and were to produce the truth on what terrorism is and who terrorists were for the decade to come. In Norway, the threat of international terrorism became so fixed and taken for granted, that it became the ultimate truth. The strong discursivity the following years made this truth even more unchallengeable. The fact that also Norwegian laws were being shaped by this truth of international terrorism and extreme

Islamism made this threat even more objective. The findings also showed that the construction of the threat was also a matter of identity and Othering. The US, the West, and Norway were something that the terrorists were not. *We* (Self) valued life, education, the right to speak our minds, and respected people of all faiths and welcomed the free practice of religion, while *they* (Other) wanted death, enjoyed inequality, and cherished oppression and dictatorship. Joining this *we*, Stoltenberg said, "Norway strongly condemns this. Such terror is a violation of our values" (Stoltenberg, 2001), hence the truth of treat from extreme Islamist became understood as a naked reality.

Moreover, this response had also a material consequence. Norway started developing laws in 2001 to accommodate the international scene which in later years generated more laws as international threat was also considered a national threat. Analysis showed that it was not the increased level of terrorist threat in Norway that made the authorities prioritize stricter laws on terrorism, but the pressure from the international community to do so, which also made PST request for stricter changes in the law. Hence, the laws constructed terrorism discourse, and discourse on terrorism constructed the laws. Additionally, GWT discourse dominated the production of knowledge on the terrorist threat in Norway. The attacks in Bali (2002), Madrid (2003), and London (2005) were interpreted as terrorist threats from extreme Islamists, also to Norway. Even the events in 2006 with the shooting against a synagogue in Oslo were even referred to as a terrorist attack due to this truth. However, police lacked proof that Bhatti was planning a terrorist attack and, Bhatti was never evicted for terrorism. Moreover, even though PST managed to avert what they believed were plans of a terrorist attack in Denmark, Norway was never the target of the terrorist attack. Despite a dominant focus on extreme Islamist terrorism in Norway, there had been no attacks carried out be extreme Islamists in Norway between 2004-2014.

Genealogy showed that there was a disturbance by an alternative understanding of terrorism in 2012 in PST reports after the events of 22/7. However, the truth of terrorism being first and foremost extreme Islamist was too powerful that it suppressed the alternative representation of terrorism threat from right-wing terrorism. PST, therefore, concluded that the biggest threat to Norway was still terrorism from extreme Islamists. By doing genealogy and looking for power/knowledge nexus, it was found that PST was able to overlook the threat from right-wing terrorism because the discourse on terrorism being extreme Islamist and international in character were more dominating, hence oppressing alternative meaning of

terrorism. Hence, there was an influx of knowledge production of terrorism threat articulated to international extreme Islamists and foreign-looking terrorist so that the truth of terrorism threat from right-wing being a terrorist became false. Because of this, the study argues that the representation of terrorism threat dominating 2004-2014 has not been a sensible representation. In fact, the representation has been problematic, even harmful, as PST privileged extreme Islamism as a terrorist threat, ignoring the threat from right-wing terrorism. The study has shown that the social construction of terrorist threats can have material and operational consequences. In this case, the power of the construction of international extreme Islamism as a terrorist threat may have led to PST's failure to prevent 22/7, as they from 2004-2014 constructed the terrorist threat from extreme Islamism as the ultimate truth and right-wing terrorism as a terrorist threat as ultmate false. Hence, the construction of GWT was so powerful that it influenced who PST believed was a terrorist threat to Norway for a whole decade. This has been an unfortunate construction of truth as this has caused an exclusion of terrorist threat to be anything but this truth. This study concludes that by constructing this truth, PST was turning a blind eye to right-wing extremism, downplaying the threat from right-wing terrorists.

5. An alternative representation

This study has argued that the construction of GWT in the aftermath of 9/11 shaped the construction of terrorist threats to Norway in PST's annual threat assessment in the timeframe of 2004-2014. It further argued that the discursive power of terrorism threat from international extreme Islamists was so great that it constructed the truth of extreme Islamists as the greatest terrorist threat to Norway in the given timeframe. Because of this construction, the terrorist threat from right-wing terrorism was ignored and marginalized. The marginalization of an alternative representation of terrorism threats in PST's threat assessments from the timeframe 2004-2014 had shown to be a dangerous matter in Norway. The productive nature of power had done such a great discursive work that the dominant threat of extreme Islamism was taken as if it was objective. While this study covered the timeframe 2004-2014, it is evident that the truth of the terrorist threat of extreme Islamists has remained present in PST's threat assessment. Up until 2019, PST continued to consider extreme Islamism as the greatest terrorist threat to Norway. However, in the aftermath of the terrorist attack on August 10, 2019, PST considered terrorism from extreme Islamists and right-wing extremists as equally great (PST 2020; PST 2021). What is striking, though, is that despite a continuity of no extreme Islamist terrorist attack in Norway the past three decades, and with an increase in terrorist attacks from right-wing terrorism in Norway in the same decades, PST does not seem to consider the threat from extreme Islamist as lower than from right-wing terrorists. It is strange that despite establishing a resource center on right-wing violence and terrorism (C-REX), it seems to be little discursive battle between the already established discourse on terrorism as constructed by PST. It is almost as if discourse on the terrorist threat being extreme Islamist does not want to give up its hegemonic power. This study thus suggests further research on this topic, and a great need of an alternative representation on terrorist threats to Norway. It calls for scholarly attention on how come, now after two terrorist attacks carried out by right-wing terrorists, PST has not lowered the assumed threat from extreme Islamists in relation to right-wing terrorism. Moreover, as chapter 2 showed, little research is generally done on right-wing terrorism. Ademia still suffers from a sense of insecurity on what is meant by right-wing terrorism. The study thus calls for scholars to address the issue of right-wing terrorism *critically* and get curious on *how* instead of *why* this is the case. With this, the author of this study hands over the baton to the next scholar.

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

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