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Counter Currents: A Case Study of Wind Power Resistance at Frøya, Norway

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Abstract

Wind power development has been widely contested in large parts of the world for reasons ranging from environmental causes to visual noise and lack of co-determination in the licensing process. With an increasing focus on reducing greenhouse gas emissions, Norwegian wind power licenses were given out in an exponential pace starting ten years ago. This was leading to the same dissatisfaction and large-scale opposition from environmental organizations, local communities and the Saami population as in other parts of the world. This thesis uses a qualitative single-case methodology to investigate the underlying reasons for resistance towards wind power development (WPD) and how internal and external mobilizing factors have changed and contributed to the resistance throughout the years at the Norwegian island Frøya. A small group of people gathered in opposition to the plans for a wind park on the island as early as 2002 and has survived to this day. 11 stakeholders with an active role in the case were interviewed for the study: opponents, people with positive attitudes towards WPD, officials from the municipality and political parties working with the case from different periods of the resistance. In order to explore how the resistance to wind power has developed, I use concepts from social movement (SM) studies that have proven to be useful in previous studies of energy siting, with a focus on framing, resources, contentious repertoires and political opportunity. The thesis finds that nature preservation was the main reason for the resistance towards the wind park development and has been formative for both what kind of collaborating partners they got, and what kind of action repertoires they focused on. The findings suggest that the four mobilizing factors were influencing each other, where it was the totality of factors that was decisive for the continued mobilization. In addition to these factors, the analysis also identifies threat and trust as essential mobilizing factors in different periods of the resistance. However, the findings show that the factors were dependent on dedicated individuals to thrive.

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List of abbreviations

EIA	Environmental Impacts Assessment
MoLGM	Ministry of Local Government and Modernisation
MoPE	Ministry of Petroleum and Energy
NFWP	National Framework for land-based Wind Power
NVE	The Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Directorate
PPT	Political Process Theory
SA	Social Acceptance
SM	Social Movements
SWM	Stadswercke München
TE	TrønderEnergi
WPD	Wind power development

1.0 Introduction

"(..) many see it as a popular uprising (..) it is both a climate crisis and a nature crisis (..), what do we do with a good climate if we have no nature?" (Interview 8).

This thesis examines resistance towards siting of wind power projects in Norway. The study uses qualitative methodology, and specifically applies concepts within social movement theory to study the different dynamics and causes of resistance against the Norwegian Frøya wind park. My findings suggest that nature preservation is the main reason for the attitudinal resistance, where mobilizing factors like framing, resources, political opportunity, repertoires of contention, threat and loss of trust together are crucial for the continued mobilization. However, it appears that neither of these factors would have had any decisive power if it was not for dedicated individuals.

Renewable energy has increasingly become the most prominent energy substitute for fossil fuels due to climate change, and because of that, the world has set steadily more ambitious goals to reduce emissions (Barry, Ellis & Robinson, 2008, p. 67; Karlstrøm & Ryghaug, 2014, p. 656). In Norway, 98 per cent of the power generated in the country comes from renewable energy sources, hydroelectric power being the most common energy source (Regjeringen, 2014). In a white paper from 2006 on climate change, the Norwegian government set out goals for developing more wind parks (NOU 2006: 18). These goals were in line with those of the European Union, aiming for an increase in the production of renewable energy (Skjølsvold, Ryghaug & Dugstad, 2013). In 2019, 5,5 TWh was produced from land-based wind power in Norway, standing for nearly four per cent of the total power production in the country (NVE, 2019b). This nearly doubled to 9,9 TWh in 2020 (NVE, n.d-b) and is anticipated to surpass ten per cent by the end of 2021 (Inderberg, Rognstad, Saglie & Gulbrandsen, 2020).

Despite the Norwegian governments' efforts to stimulate the production of wind power, there have been strong protests opposing the development of land-based wind turbines and wind parks around the country the past years. Storheia wind park (Trøndelag) and Davvi wind park (Finnmark) are contested due to Saami rights, where the Storheia case is being brought to the Supreme Court due to claims of deprivation of important grazing areas for reindeer herding (Kleven & Danielsen, 2020; Larsen, 2020). In other places, like Sørmarkfjellet wind park

(Trøndelag) and Haramsfjellet wind park (Møre and Romsdal), it is nature preservation and biodiversity that have been the most outspoken reasons for contestation (Trana, Saw-Khow & Nilsen, 2019; Sunnmørsposten, 2021). The totality of these disputes resulted in a national halt in the granting of new licenses in 2019-2020 (Ghaderi, 2020; Hagen, 2020, TU energi, 2019; Barstad, 2020). These different protests have been organized by environmental activists, indigenous people, municipal authorities and ordinary citizens alike. There are striking similarities with the resistance against hydro power development in the 1970s (NRK, 2010; Naturvernforbundet, 2011; Karlstrøm & Ryghaug, 2014).

Existing literature on wind power and local resistance has mainly focused on explaining why local resistance against wind power projects develops and less on the process and dynamics of resistance (Maher, Martin, McCarthy & Moorhead, 2019). I believe that investigating the link between *why* and *how* will provide us with a better understanding of the reasons for local resistance against wind power. To be able to say something fruitful about this link, the island Frøya will be the case study for this thesis. Wind power development (WPD) at Frøya stands out as one of the strongest and longest-lasting disputes in Norway's wind energy history, starting in 2002 (Holstad, 2020). Almost 20 years later, the resistance group at the small island is still working hard to evidence the injustice they feel the local nature and themselves have been subjected to with the construction of 26 windmills in 2020. Community resistance has proved to be a highly contextual phenomenon, and as there has been a limited focus on this in Norway (Rygg, 2012; Solli, 2010), this study will provide further empirical insights to broaden the understanding of community resistance in the Norwegian context.

Thus, the main concern of this study is to gain a better understanding of how and why local resistance against the wind energy project at Frøya developed, and to explore its current dynamics. Within this scope, I firstly identify internal and external mobilizing factors to establish what is triggering the continuation of the resistance. Secondly, I investigate what kind of organizational support the resistance group "No to wind power at Frøya" has gained, and to the extent it has received support, whether it has strengthened their case and if so how.

Using concepts from the social movement (SM) literature to explain the causes and dynamics of resistance, my key research questions are:

- How has resistance against wind power changed through the years, since the first application of development was sent out in 2002 until today, and what are the mobilizing factors?
- What kind of alliances are found, what is the nature of these alliances and how does this impact the social resistance mobilization?

1.1 National acceptance vs. local resistance

Norway is far from the only country that has seen conflict around wind power development in recent years. Although less conflictive than fossil fuels, the resistance against wind power has in several countries caused a headache for national authorities aiming for a greener energy production (Temper et al. 2020, p. 17; Dunlap, 2018, p. 567). In a study of preferences of participation methods in wind power developments in Germany, Langer, Decker & Menrad (2017) used seven gradations between active opposition and enthusiastic involvement. In this thesis *resistance* refers to what Langer et al. (2017) calls 'active opposition' as this study mainly concerns the actions done in resistance to the development of the wind park at Frøya and the mobilizing factors leading to these actions. Active opposition, contestation and resistance will be used interchangeably throughout the thesis. What I consider as actions will be discussed later in the introduction chapter under repertoires of contention.

The local resistance against wind power came as a surprise to 'everyone', as most opinion polls around the world have shown that people in general favor wind power (Bell, Gray & Haggett, 2005; Fraune & Knodt, 2018; Karlstrøm & Ryghaug, 2014, p. 658). This gap also exists in the Norwegian population, where a yearly opinion poll in the project ACT 'From targets to action: public responses to climate policy instruments', highlighted that 51 per cent of the participants supported the claim "increase production of land-based wind power" wholly or partly in 2019 (Aasen, Klemetsen, Reed & Vatn, 2019, p. 14). Other polls have shown that more people are opposing wind power development when it destroys pristine nature (60 per cent) or animal life (71 per cent) (Moe, Hansen & Kjær, 2021, p. 294). Nevertheless, 2019 was the year with most resistance against WPD in the country. This gap in attitudes, called the 'social gap' (Bell et al. 2005) or 'attitude-behavior-gap' (Barry et al. 2008), has been subject of academic debate the past thirty years (Avila, 2018, p. 600). This is one of the main problems that is being

addressed in social science studies on wind power together with concerns on how to gain social acceptance of wind power (Ellis, Barry & Robinson, 2007; Breukers & Wolsink, 2007).

Leiren et al. (2020, p. 2) define social acceptance as "a favorable or positive response (including attitude, intention, behavior and - where appropriate - use) relating to a proposed or in situ technology or socio-technical system by members of a given social unit (country or region, community or town and household, organization)." Wüstenhagen, Wolsink & Bürer (2007, p. 2684-2685) conceptualize social acceptance into three dimensions where market acceptance refers to the acceptance of wind power technology by for instance investors or consumers. Socio-political acceptance refers to the acceptance of policies and technology and is the broadest acceptance sphere, and it is usually this part of the acceptance term that is used for questions in opinion polls. The third sphere considers community acceptance and is the sphere I will focus on in this thesis. The terms 'community resistance' and 'local resistance' are used as synonyms in this study. In this sphere, local communities (inhabitants and authorities) are considering their acceptance of specific WPDs in their local communities. Thus, it is the mismatch between the socio-political and community acceptance dimensions in opinion-polls that has led to the confusion around wind power acceptance.

Several theories have been suggested to explain the lack of local acceptance over the years. NIMBY (Not-in- my-back-yard) has been one of the most discussed theories but has in recent years been discarded as a too simple explanation of the problem. Shortly explained, the theory states that the reason for the conflicting attitudes nationally and locally is that one understands the value of increasing renewable energy sources in the country in total but would rather see that someone else took the 'bill' - called the free rider problem (Aitken, 2010; Wolsink, 2000; Van der Horst, 2007).

Lack of information has been proposed as an alternative explanation to the NIMBY theory, without anyone finding evidence for such a link between resistance and lack of information (Aitken, 2010, p. 1835; Fraune & Knodt, 2018). If anything, the past years resistance in Norway shows the opposite – the more knowledge they acquire about wind power, the more contested the wind parks have become (Interview 1).

Moreover, focusing on justice has also been one of the approaches that has been lifted in the discussion around local resistance towards WPD, referred to as energy justice. The literature has focused on different types of justice to explain resistance, where procedural and distributive

justice are the justice-approaches that have been connected to the level of community acceptance of wind energy projects (Segreto et al. 2020, p. 14; Wüstenhagen et al. 2007; Leiren et al. 2020).

Procedural justice refers to the decision-making process in a wind energy project, and how it is conducted. Has the process been fair, transparent, and were everyone able to speak their mind (for example through a referendum)? Hence, public participation is key when it comes to these processes of siting a project, as well as the importance of local ownership to the case (Ellis & Ferraro, 2016, p. 45; Clausen & Rudolph, 2019). One needs to step carefully, and make sure that everyone is heard, and if the proceedings does not take the concerns into the conclusion of the siting case, it is more likely to see resistance against the wind energy development (Cowell, 2010; Ellis et al. 2007; Aitken, McDonald & Strachan, 2008). This shows that it is not necessarily the wind power development that is the problem, but rather the process of how it was decided (Gaventa, 2009).

Where procedural justice covers the *process,* distributive justice concerns the *outcome* of a wind power siting case. What will the allocation of wind turbines in the local arena mean for people? Who will gain on the development, and who will lose? The SA literature has found several concerns that fits under distributive justice: concerns around health issues (Shepherd, McBride, Welch, Dirks & Hill, 2011), visual impacts (Wolsink, 2007; Betakova, Vojar & Sklenica, 2015), landscape and effects on property values (Bond, 2010; Ladenburg & Dubgaard, 2007; Meyerhoff, Ohl & Hartje, 2010). Biodiversity and nature preservation are however the factors that has been found to be of importance in most cases (Ellis & Ferraro, 2016, p. 3; Borch, 2018). However, many of the above-mentioned concerns are in many occasions unfounded concerns based on fear and threat of the unknown (Shepherd et al. 2011). The development of large-scale wind parks is a relatively new phenomenon, which might explain the range of concerns; there are few examples that provide proof that the perceived impacts will not occur.

This can be connected to the study field of socio-technical imaginaries, where how one imagines the future with wind power is of importance. Resistance to WPD has increasingly been looked at within this field. The future with wind parks can be imagined in different ways, depending on the actor. For example, the resistance movement in Norway has a completely different imaginary or framing of WPD than the Norwegian government. Earlier, the study field of socio-technical imaginaries mainly focused on the framing from the governmental side, but as

WPD has become increasingly contested, the focus has changed to the imaginaries of the opposing parties (Ballo, 2015).

Moreover, trust is seen as the third factor mainly influencing community acceptance (Wüstenhagen et al. 2007; Leiren et al. 2020). Trust is important throughout the wind power development process, from the siting of the project as well as other parts of the decision-making process, until the WPD is finalized. Thus, this factor is intertwined with procedural and distributive justice, and also depends on the imaginaries of the local community. Temper et al (2020, p. 17) found in their study mapping 649 contested energy projects (39 of them concerning solar or wind power), that different forms of justice as well as democracy affects conflicts surrounding siting of renewable energy projects, particularly in rural areas.

With such a diverse and multidimensional problem, it becomes more likely that all of these factors will not be present in all cases. Some factors might be present in one context, and completely absent in others, which makes the list of possible impacts on SA long, depending on the context of the wind power project. Resistance might be due to historical reasons if the local community has been in similar conflicts before or if there are special emotional bonds to the siting area. Local political factors might also play a role: a positive municipality board makes the road to a successful development easier (Segreto et al. 2020, p. 14). In their review of 6 acceptance cases internationally, Leiren et al. (2020) found 34 factors that explained resistance to the wind power projects, where it was highly context-dependent which factors were present in each case.

Considering all of these factors, I would argue that they especially have one thing in common: community acceptance is more likely to increase where the residents are given an important role in the whole process. This should be the case in the instances where the residents are in favor of wind power per se but have several concerns about installing windmills in their local community. This also fits with what has been found in Denmark, where local acceptance was particularly strong when the local communities were highly engaged in the projects through cooperatives (Jørgensen, Anker & Lassen, 2020).

1.2 Social acceptance in Norway

Most of the reasons and arguments against wind energy described above, are present in the Norwegian debate around wind power development as well, according to a policy note on

wind energy from Norway (Vasstrøm & Lysgård, 2020). In addition, reasoning based on "national romance" and the beautiful nature surrounding Norwegians are added to the debate. Norway is known for its stunning nature, and opponents of wind energy and windmills are afraid that WPD will negatively affect tourism. Local ownership has also been raised as a concern in the Norwegian context. In order to develop large-scale wind power, the Norwegian companies have depended on foreign capital, where there usually are power companies from Europe who owns the wind plants together with Norwegian ones. At Frøya, only 30 per cent of the wind park is owned by the Norwegian power company TrønderEnergi, while the remaining 70 per cent are owned by the German power company Stadtwercke München. As mentioned earlier, Norway has also been fortunate to have most of its current power needs covered by hydropower, and questions are being raised if there is an actual need for developing wind power in the country, or if it is done just for the European market (Korpås, 2019).

With a simple Retriever search using the search word "wind power" in Norwegian news outlets between 2012-2021, the years 2019-2020 stand out as the years with the most news articles including the search word. 18561 articles were written in 2019 and 14615 articles in 2020, compared to a maximum of 5022 articles each year between 2012-2018. The arguments in the wind power debate in Norwegian media have to a large extent evolved around many of the same problems as Vasstrøm & Lysgård's (2020) policy note highlights: nature conservation, loss of biodiversity, the windmills threatening birds and animals like reindeer herding in Saami areas and visual littering (Birkenesavisa, 2017; Gjelsvik, 2019; Randa, 2017). However, people that favor wind power development argue that we will need more energy in the future, and to achieve climate goals, wind power development is the only reasonable alternative (Willoch & Aasheim, 2019). Opponents of wind power development, on the other hand, emphasize that not only will much of the wind power be exported, but there are also foreign companies that owns major shares of the wind power projects as well as most of the jobs in the industry also are found outside of Norway's borders, as the windmills are produced outside Norway (Eggen & Solbakken, 2019; Morken, 2019).

As shown above, the literature on what causes attitudinal resistance and acceptance of wind power projects is extensive, and except for the wider use of procedural and distributive justice as a framework, there has not been a unifying framework to investigate this through (Giordono, Boudet, Karmazina, Taylor & Steel, 2018, p. 120; Devine-Wright, 2005). As

attitudinal opposition does not necessarily equal behavioral opposition, there is a need to examine this through a different lens (Lober, 1995). Concepts from the social movement (SM) literature have been used increasingly the past years to explain what the social acceptance literature has been lacking – the dynamics of the active resistance against energy projects (Boudet, 2016; Boudet & Ortolano, 2010; Giordono et al. 2018, p. 121; Ellis & Ferraro, 2016, p. 3; Temper et al, 2020).

1.3 Social movement theory

Social movement theory cannot be said to be one theory, but rather a research and study field consisting of many different theories. But they all have the same goal; finding ways to explain different questions around social movements such as their uprising, existence, actions and the outcome of these movements (McAdam, 2017). The field of social movements have usually been a field of study in the sociologist department, but as the field have become more "popular" and well researched, other research traditions have tagged along, such as political science and law - researching social movements in their own ways (della Porta, 2014).

The wish to explain organized protest in a scientific manner was a consequence of the many demonstrations and civil groups in the 1960s and 1970s. In Europe, the famous 1968-ers are well known for their demonstrations, and in the US the civil right movements must be said to be a prime example of collective action and protest triggering the research on social movements (Aslanidis, 2015; Maher et al. 2019).

The social movement field has moved and evolved since its scarce beginning with the classical theories within SM – mass society theory, collective behavior and relative deprivation. The classical theories were all deeply focused on psychological and affective factors as means to explain mobilization, and especially *why* social movements appear. The classical theories, the two first in particular, also considered joining a social movement and protesting as an irrational thing to do (Jenkins, 1983, p. 528). In the relative deprivation theory, Gurr (1970) states that it is not just people who are dissatisfied that take to the streets, but above all those who have lost something. If you are part of the middle class and you start to lose money it is more likely that you would go out in the street than if you had nothing to begin with – because then you have something to fight for. Relative deprivation thus sees protesters as a more rational group than the two former theories.

Resource mobilization theory was the first theory to consider mobilization and protest as something rational, focusing on the macro and meso level. Influenced by Olson (1965) and his studies of collective action and rationality, scholars started to build a new paradigm, moving away from the collective behavior approaches. Protesters were understood to be rational actors, fully able to determine by themselves whether to engage in protests or not. Resource mobilization theory, as the name suggests, considered the act of assembling resources as crucial for the mobilization and success of movements, together with organization and networks which are important to keep up the speed and enthusiasm in protests (Carmin, 2003). The resources can be anything from human, cultural, social, moral to informational, material and social-organizational. This broad scope of what can be considered as resources is also one of the flaws of the theory (Cress & Snow, 1996; Edwards & McCarthy, 2004). Where the classical theories had seen grievances as crucial for mobilization, resource mobilization theory regarded grievances as something always present in society. If grievances were crucial for protest, and always present in society, protest would always have been present everywhere. Thus, there had to be other factors that were of more importance for mobilization.

Drawing on resource mobilization, political process theory (PPT) model was first developed by the sociologist Douglas McAdam in the 1980s (McAdam, 1982). Political opportunity is the most important factor, while resources are seen as a secondary factor, named “mobilizing structures” in the model. Critics of the model meant that there was something lacking, and by the mid-90s, another concept was added to the model to increase the explanation rate; framing (McAdam, 2017). McAdam, McCarthy & Zald (1996) identify framing as "conscious strategic efforts by groups of people to fashion shared understandings of the world and of themselves that legitimate and motivate collective action". For a movement to succeed, a group needs to be triggered enough and believe that going together as a group will make a difference (Caren, 2007).

Despite the wide use of the PPT model in the field of social movements, critics stress that these are three different approaches put together to make more sense of the political opportunity structure, which was the emphasis of the model, with the two other concepts on the side (Aslanidis, 2015, p. 10). There have also been critical voices arguing that political opportunities are not as important as the model suggests. Political process theory argues that political opportunities are necessary for mobilization to happen, which have been proved wrong several

times. It can certainly have an impact, as the other theories we have looked at until this point, but it cannot be said to be the decisive factor deciding if mobilization will happen. These explanations have been criticized for being too structuralist, despite incorporating framing from the micro level (Aslanidis, 2015, p. 12). Ancelovici (2019, p. 162) proposes a broader concept named *field of opportunity structure* (FOS), where political opportunities can be one of many fields of opportunity of importance for social movements, but not necessarily the most important one.

After being preoccupied with macro explanations for mobilization such as political opportunity and resources, the focus shifted back again to more of a micro psychological level with social constructionism. Culture and within this – symbolic elements, grievances, emotions, framing and collective identity are important factors in this paradigm, acknowledging the fact that the macro, meso and micro levels needs to be linked together. But in contrast to the behavior school, the focus of social constructionists was to construct the grievances – framing (Aslanidis, 2015, p. 12-13).

Framing is seen as one of the most important concepts explaining mobilization and actions in social movement studies (Devlin, 2020) and in contrast to McAdam, Snow & Benford (1992, p. 137) explain framing as:

"an interpretive schemata that simplifies and condenses the "world out there" by selectively punctuating and encoding objects, situations, experiences, and sequences of actions within one's present or past environment."

This means that for mobilization to happen, someone must have constructed a common idea of what the problem is, suggest who the antagonist in the case is (a movement always needs someone to fight against), the solution of the problem, and a reasoning around why action is the aim that is needed in the case, as suggested by Snow & Benford (1988).

For social constructionists, creating a collective identity is a central task for social movements to succeed (Aslanidis, 2015, p. 16). Melucci (1988, p. 343) sees collective action as "a process in which the actors produce the common cognitive frameworks that enable them to assess the environment and to calculate the costs and benefits of the action." The goal in this approach is to construct a well-functioning collective identity in order to succeed as a movement.

Without this collective identity, the movement might end up with different fractions, seeing itself not as one, but as several and less powerful groups or movements.

This brief literature review shows that there are numerous theories within the social movement literature, which is a necessity in a field as broad as social movement theory. I believe that is an advantage, as researchers of social movements can choose the concepts best fit for their study. As concluded earlier in the introduction chapter, attitudinal opposition is highly contextual and hence, so will active opposition towards wind energy siting also be. But I also believe the flexibility can be a disadvantage in the way that depending on which factors one chooses to focus on, the answers might be completely different.

However, in the study of wind power resistance, I see the complementarity between the concepts of SA literature and SM literature as an advantage. Many of the different terms and concepts that have been viewed as important in explaining attitudes and active opposition towards wind energy projects are referring to the same. For instance, the SM literature talks about gaining political opportunity as an important factor towards getting a positive outcome (for example stopping a wind energy project), while the SA literature sees procedural justice as one of the main impacts on social acceptance. Thus, procedural justice and political opportunities are both referring to the opportunity to influence decision-making processes - if procedural justice is low, political opportunities are also low. Other concepts that are similar in the two theoretical fields is grievances in SM theory and the focus on threat and injustice in SA theory and energy justice – both seen as crucial to mobilization. This shows us that SM theory brings about *additional* concepts working as supplements, when the main aim is to look at how the group evolves through different mobilizing factors.

1.4 Social movement theory and wind power

Wind power resistance has to my knowledge barely been subject to research through a social movement lens but have been more thoroughly conducted on other industrial facilities – which shows the need for further exploration (Wright & Boudet, 2012; Boudet & Ortolano, 2010; Carmin, 2010; Boudet, 2016; Giordono et al. 2018, p. 120). However, Giordono et al. (2018) show in their qualitative comparative analysis of 53 propositions for WPD in the US that the use of concepts from SM literature also is useful when considering siting of wind energy projects and will be further explored in this thesis. Most of the studies of community

mobilization against energy developments have been conducted in the United States and have concerned themselves with cases lasting for shorter amounts of time than the conflict at Frøya (Boudet & Ortolano, 2010; Boudet, 2016; Karmazina, 2016). Considering the few studies that have been conducted on the matter of active opposition to WPD in Norway (Rygg, 2012; Solli, 2010), this study will contribute with empirical evidence to this gap in the growing literature.

Inspired by Giordono et al. (2018) I will utilize the factors framing, political opportunities and resources. In addition, I will also add the concept repertoires of contention, which has proved to be important for explaining opposition in the literature on siting of industrial projects (Wright & Boudet, 2012; Boudet & Ortolano, 2010; Boudet, 2016; Kircherr, 2018). The resistance against the wind park at Frøya is a political case where decisions have been made on a political level. The population is also able to engage in the same conventional political sphere, but at the point where those opposing the wind park realizes that they will not be heard through conventional politics – they turn to contentious politics (Gomza, 2014, p. 56). Repertoires of contention or repertoires of collective action as defined and evolved by Tilly (1986) are the context- and actor-specific types of action and tools available for those engaging in the sphere of contentious politics. Each social movement will always have a restricted number of opportunities to act, even though a movement technically have unlimited ways of acting (Caren, 2007, p. 3457). The repertoires of a movement can evolve and are constrained by the experience and growth of the said movement. The movement can in other words do whatever it is able to do and will in most cases continue with repertoires that have proved successful in the past (Tarrow, 1993, p. 283). As Tilly (1986), I will use a broad definition of repertoires of contention – it could be anything from writing letter-to-the-editors, signature campaigns and sit-ins to more visible repertoires such as demonstrations and torchlight processions (Hess, 2018).

Repertoires of contention are seldom used in a stable pace, and it is plausible that since the conflict at Frøya has lasted for nearly twenty years, the tension has fluctuated, with peaks of tension and valleys with less tension – called cycles of contention or protest cycles in the literature. Maher et al. (2019) states that in the social movement literature, few have their focus on how movements are changing as time goes by and how this affects activities. Cycles of contention was originally used to explain protest cycles that involved more than one movement but is also fruitful to use when studying one specific group like “No to wind power at Frøya” (Tarrow, 1998; Maher et al. 2019). The main point of the concept of protest cycles is to explain

why protest moves in cycles, i.e., how and why the activity of social movements change over time. Tarrow (1998) believes that this is due to several factors, such as the political opportunities that exists or resources. In other words, the repertoires of contention might change due to several factors – a change in political opportunities might change the behavior in one way or another, increased resources such as social networks might evolve the repertoires of a group, as well as how the case is framed.

Referring to social movements and resistance groups as synonyms might be confusing, but the term social movement is more like a collective name of different groups with unpredictable sizes. Some movements are big groups working for several decades, like the women's movement, the environmental movement, or the Civil rights movement in the United States, while others are smaller movements that exist for a more limited time and might as well fit better in the description "group" within a bigger social movement (Maher et al. 2019). The resistance group "No to wind power at Frøya" is such a group. In Norway today there exists more than 20 local resistance groups against wind power, where we can see the totality of the opposition as a movement, particularly after the national resistance group Motvind Norway was founded in 2019 (Motvind Norge, n.d). However, this does not mean that it is unfruitful to examine the resistance group at Frøya through the lenses of social movement theory as the main goal of the 'movements', regardless of their size, is to bring about change.

To summarize, we have seen that the SM and SA literature can complement each other. The SA literature has found a breadth of reasons for why people have negative attitudes towards wind power development, and the SM literature can give a framework to further understand how these attitudes develop towards active resistance. This thesis will contribute with empirical evidence to two gaps in the literature: 1) increasing the understanding of active resistance towards wind power development in the Norwegian context, and 2) provide further insight to the use of SM concepts in wind power siting projects.

1.5 Outline of the thesis

Chapter 2 presents the methodology of the thesis. The chapter starts by outlining the analytical framework of the study, explaining the logic behind the concepts chosen for the analysis. Moving on, a brief description of the study area Frøya is given before I present the

research design and aims to explain the choices made regarding sampling and data collection. The chapter ends with a reflection around the possible limitations and ethical considerations.

Chapter 3 aims to give an overall picture of the historical background of siting of energy projects in Norway, as well as an overview of the proceedings of the case at hand – Frøya. The chapter highlights the history of wind power policy making and the development of the licensing process, finding possible links between the developments of these themes and the resistance boom seen in 2018-2019.

Chapter 4 showcases the empirical findings, taking use of the analytical framework from chapter 2, using the four concepts framing, resources, repertoires of contention and political opportunities. The analysis also identifies two additional factors – threat and trust.

Chapter 5 discusses the findings from chapter 4 in accordance with the research questions, aiming to give a holistic picture of the findings. First will the two research questions be discussed separately, before I make conclusions around the importance of the different factors.

Chapter 6 summarizes and concludes the findings and comes with suggestions for follow-up research surrounding wind power development and resistance in Norway.

2.0 Methodology

The choice of topic for this thesis is inspired by the time I have spent in Colombia. The granting of mining licenses to multinational companies is a significant problem for the local communities resulting in the contamination of drinking water sources and appropriation of valuable land from peasants that already have little land (González-Martínez, Huguet, Pearse, McIntyre & Camacho, 2019; Vélez-Torres, 2015). When the pandemic hit in March 2020 it became obvious that fulfilling field work in Latin America would be unfeasible, and I started to look closer to home. There are several similarities between the community resistance against locally unwanted land uses (LULUs) such as power plants, wind parks and mining in Latin America and the resistance against WPD in Norway. These similarities caught my interest and inspired the basis for my thesis.

This study will take use of a qualitative research approach, conducting both primary and secondary data collection. The use of qualitative research approach fits well with the aims of this

study as it allows for a more profound and rich description and analysis of the research questions of study. To be able to get an in-depth analysis, a case study design will be used, investigating one single case which will be presented in this chapter. Qualitative methods, and case studies in particular, have been widely used in studies using social movement theory (della Porta, 2014).

2.1. Analytical framework

Social movement theory is the basis for the analytical framework of this study due to its combability with the chosen case, allowing for a broader perspective. What is special about social movement theory is that it focuses on the different traits of the movement/group investigated, a good fit for this study when the aim is to establish how the resistance group has developed.

As the literature review showed, several theories discuss the most important aspects of explaining mobilization of social movements. Devlin (2020) showed the importance of including concepts both from a macro/meso level and micro level. In the SM research field, there are two distinctive strands. Firstly, the American strand, often associated with macro/meso level explanations such as resource mobilization and PPT, and secondly, what has been called the New Social Movement theories, mostly associated with social constructivist explanations of social movements in Europe (Snow & Oliver, 1995; Devlin, 2020). As Devlin (2020) explains in his book on natural resources and social movements, this distinction of fields is exaggerated.

> *"The distinction between old and new SMs is thus less helpful since it is clear that all movements require an ideational foundation, and the distinction between values that are 'material' and values that are not, or goals that are political or not political are difficult to draw in practice"* (Devlin, 2020, p. 5).

Instead, Devlin (2020, p. 3-10) splits the research on SMs into three stages: emergence, processes and outcomes. He explains that it is hard to distinguish between the emergence and the processes, and as I look at both the actions and what motivates these actions (mobilizing factors), an analysis of the emergence of the movement is necessary to find out how the motivations changed and developed through time (Devlin, 2020, p. 5).

As Devlin (2020) does, this study will analyze this within both the external and the internal space of the anti-wind park group "No to wind power at Frøya".

Devlin (2020) states that external conditions can influence the internal ones, and thus is important to look at to explain the actions of the movement and how these changes. External factors that will inform this case will thus be political changes, mainly on a local level, such as possibility for contact with decision-makers and elections – which is seen to increase political opportunities. Resources in a movement can also be internal or external, and as is evident in RQ 2 I am especially interested in social networks and how they have influenced the work of the resistance group (Devlin, 2020, p. 2).

In the internal sphere I will look at three concepts that are important analyzing and explaining strategies. As mentioned, it could be difficult to distinguish between the emergence and the processes of a movement, and Devlin (2020, p. 5) thus suggests using the concept framing *"to understand how the ideas and values that are foundational to the emergence of the movement have been mobilized through action."* Looking at framing strategies and how they have developed can help me identify the *why* in the study: why local residents are opposing the wind park development. The actions of a group - repertoires of contention, as discussed in the introduction chapter, is thus important in combination with framing. Internal resources are of crucial importance for a group such as "No to wind power at Frøya" together with framing. At the core you have the ideas and meanings of the group which are of importance to attract new members and supporters. Increase in members is a resource on its own, which might coincide with acquisition of valuable knowledge for the resistance group if the right member base is acquired. A group needs to be working at a minimum on their own to be able to attract external resources such as support from other social networks, seizing political opportunities or to be able to acquire new repertoires of contention. In other words, all of the factors are intertwined and influence each other.

2.2 Research design – case study

This thesis aims to empirically examine the phenomenon of mobilization and development of local resistance to wind power development, with an special emphasis on mobilizing factors and social networks. This study makes use of a single unit case study research design, where the main advantage is that it allows one to go into depth of a case, focusing "its

attention on a single example of a broader phenomenon" (Gerring, 2004, p. 341; Bryman, 2012, p. 12). In order to do so, interviews are some of the most common methods to use (Bryman, 2012, p. 68), and is also what I see as most beneficial in this specific case due to restricted access to secondary sources from the whole period, as well as a wish to get deep into the case.

The case of Frøya will be used as case in this study. Looking for cases for this thesis, some criteria were particularly important: due to the overall theme, I was looking for an extreme case, where contention had been high over a longer period, or several periods, to be able to identify specific trends. The local resistance at Frøya fits this description. This case study is what Gerring (2004, p. 342) would call a "type 1" case study – where the aim is to investigate "variation in a single unit over time." The aim of a case study research design is to be able to say something about how other similar cases will develop (Grant, Wolf & Nebeker, 2019). The use of qualitative case studies is also commonly used in the field of social movement theory (della Porta, 2014).

2.2.1 Study area

The study setting where the analytical framework will be used is the island of Frøya. TrønderEnergi Kraft AS (TE) and the German power company Stadtwerke München (SWM) started the installation of a wind park consisting of 26 wind turbines with the height of 180 meters in April 2019 after several rounds of complaints and postponements (TrønderEnergi, n.d.). TrønderEnergi owns 30 per cent of the wind park and Stadtwerke München owns 70 per cent, which has caused fury among the local population as TrønderEnergi is among others owned by 18 municipalities in the region, the municipality of Frøya being one of them (Jørgensen, 2019; NVE, n.d-a.; Frøya kommune, 2020; Skaug, Moe & Kampevoll, 2019; TrønderEnergi, n.d; Hovland, 2019).

Frøya has around 5000 inhabitants and is situated in the southern part of the county Trøndelag (Frøya kommune, n.d). The island is rather flat, where the highest top is only 74 meters above sea level (Kartverket, 2021). The first wind park in Norway was set up in the neighboring island Smøla in 2002, south of Frøya (Statkraft, n.d). In 2004, a wind park was also installed in the other neighouring island Hitra, which was upgraded in 2019 (Fosen vind, n.d-a). Frøya is also close to the peninsula Fosen, which has Europe's biggest land-based wind energy

project allocated in their area (Fosen vind, n.d-b). In other words, Frøya is surrounded by wind parks.

2.3 Data collection

2.2.2 Sampling approach

The initial sampling took use of generic purposive sampling, which means to select "units with direct reference to the research questions being asked" (Bryman, 2012, p. 418). This is one of the more common sampling strategies in qualitative research, ensuring that the study gets relevant respondents, much due to the few respondents in a qualitative study (Bryman, 2012, p. 418).

The initial interviewees were found in the process of collecting secondary data from online newspapers and going through the Facebook-group "Nei til vindkraft på Frøya". Having in mind that it might be difficult to visit Frøya during the spring of 2021 due to the pandemic, an extra emphasis was made in going through secondary sources to find appropriate interviewees. However, this selection strategy had limitations: the group of people from the resistance group commenting on the case in the newspapers through letters-to-the-editor etc. were a limited group, and I was afraid that I would not be able to identify sufficient key stakeholders from the "no-side" through this selection strategy. It should also be noted that most of the news articles/letters-to-the-editor were interviewing or written by people *resisting* the wind park. To be able to understand the different dynamics and opinions of the wind park, it was desired to have representatives from the "yes-side" as respondents as well. This led to an emphasis on snowball sampling further in the sampling process, as it was likely that not everyone that was of interest to talk to had been written about or written letter-to-the-editors in the newspapers. I ended up with 11 sampling units. My goal was to speak to representatives from Motvind Norway as well to ensure perspectives from the different bigger collaborative partners in the resistance but proved to be difficult to conduct due to lack of answer from representatives of the organization. Initial contact was made with different representatives, but the appointments got cancelled close to the set dates each time. I made an assessment that I had adequate information about the organization and how they had contributed to the resistance at Frøya through the other respondents as some of

the respondents have been active in the board of Motvind Norway since the initial phase of the organization and were able to provide valuable insight to the role of Motvind Norway.

2.2.3 Sources and data

Together with the qualitative semi-structured interviews, I have also gone through secondary data. Reports and official documents have been used in the thematical background to give more context to the case.

As mentioned above, another important source for the study is online newspaper articles, where this study utilizes the newspapers *Hitra-Frøya* and *Adresseavisen.* The newspapers were chosen due to different criteria: the number of news articles containing the search words 'wind power' and 'Frøya' in Atekst/Retriever, and the geographical proximity of the case (Boudet & Ortolano, 2010). A regional newspaper included views from outside the "heat" (Adresseavisen), giving different perspectives than the local newspaper (Hitra-Frøya).

As well as giving input on who I should talk to in the case, the newspapers were also used as additional data sources for information that was not found in the interviews based on the theoretical concepts. Sampling newspaper records is a popular sampling strategy, but there are also problems that needs to be considered: issues around selection bias, as well as being aware that the media also select what kind of events they want to focus on, leaving the possibility that not all events are covered, as well as some events are overreported (Maher et al. 2019). Using online newspapers, I would also say that it is of importance to look at the history of the newspapers as well as the general content to help assess and narrow down the professional newspaper outlets.

2.2.4 Participants

The interviews in the study were conducted with people that have been involved in the local wind development case or still are, such as municipality officials, people in the resistance group, people with more positive attitudes towards the wind park as well as collaborating organizations. To get more background information on the case, a representative from the licensing authorities was also interviewed. This approach was chosen to get perspectives on the wind power resistance from different sides of the conflict.

2.2.5 Qualitative interviews

I conducted most of the interviews through video calls, and some through phone calls, based on the preferences of the interviewees. I used semi-structured qualitative interviews that lasted between 30-90 minutes each. The interviewees received an overview of the themes we would cover during the interview prior to the interview together with the information/consent sheet. All interviewees were contacted through e-mail or phone calls.

Before starting with the questions in the interview, all interviewees were asked whether it would be ok to record the interview for further transcription purposes and told that they had the right to withdraw from the study whenever they wanted to. The interviewees were also asked to not include third parties' names', but rather use names of groupings – such as municipality officials, wind power opponents etc. due to concerns around dealing with recordings containing information about third parties that had not been consenting to be part of the study.

2.3 Data analysis

I recorded all my interviews and tried out different recorders beforehand to find one with the best compatibility and quality with digital interviews. In the video conferences, the in-built record-function of Zoom was used, together with a phone recording. The reason why I chose to record the interviews was the length of the interviews – and being able to be more present in the conversation than I could have been using manual noting. However, the interviewees had the option of saying no to being recorded, and I had a notebook ready in case of this.

2.3.1 Coding

Two sets of codes were used in the analyzing part of the study: color-coding based on the research questions and color-codes based on the theoretical concepts they fit in to. Color-coding was chosen due to the limited size of the study, where color-coding is seen as a satisfying coding strategy (Linneberg & Korsgaard, 2019). I color-coded the different sections of the interviews to be better able to analyze my findings. By going through each interview and giving different sections a color based on the concept or RQ they represented, also made it much clearer which sections did not fit into my in pre-made codes. These sections were compared to see whether there was a thematic connection between them that could be used to make new codes (Bryman, 2012, p. 580). The secondary sources were also organized in a table with date and newspaper

outlet and color coded in the same way. Bryman (2012, p. 580) diversifies between coding and thematic analysis, where the first is the most developed analysis method. All quotes in this paper have been translated from Norwegian to English by the author.

2.4 Limitations and ethical considerations

2.4.1 Covid-19

The day before I was going to start collecting interviewees for the thesis in January 2021, the Norwegian government announced a two week "lock down" due to the corona virus pandemic that had been worsening throughout the Christmas holidays. To stay according to the time schedule for the thesis, and to follow the infection control regulations, it was necessary to conduct the interviews over digital solutions such as Zoom or Teams, as well as over the phone. Telephone interviewing is normally used in quantitative interviews than qualitative (Bryman, 2012, p. 488). An important part of conducting interviews is not only to see people and have eye contact, but also to look at the body language of the interviewee when they are talking (Bryman, 2012, p. 488).

However, I considered it more important to get interviews done than having to conduct them through video calls, which is why I saw phone interviews as a good option. This might also have made it easier to get interviewees over a certain age that might be more skeptical towards video calls. However, using digital solutions meant I lost the opportunity to get to know people a bit better before conducting the interviews, making the interviewees more relaxed and confident in me. Luckily, digital video solutions have become the new normal after a year with the pandemic and worked very well.

On the other hand, one might think of digital interviews as an advantage as well, as one does not have to go somewhere to be interviewed, one can do it in between other work tasks during the day. But then again you can find the problem with interviewees having to rush to another meeting, making the interview feeling rushed and maybe not as good as it could have been. It could also be easier for the interviewees to reschedule the meeting when it is a virtual one rather than a physical meeting, which were the case with some of the people I asked.

Another limitation was that I initially wanted to go physically to Frøya to conduct interviews to get a feeling of how it was – as well as a look at the wind park to see how it had developed. Going there would possibly lead me to other respondents than those interviewed in

this study. I have been in constant contact with different interviewees at the island throughout the spring, where we have agreed that it would be unreasonable to conduct a field trip to Frøya due to infection control measures. I live in Oslo, the city that has had the highest infection pressure in the country for most of the pandemic as well as the general advice from the government has been to avoid unnecessary travels. A second factor is that many of the interviewees in the study are in the risk group for Covid-19, where I considered it unethical to conduct such a field trip.

2.4.2 Translation

Another possible limitation to this study is the translation between languages. As I am Norwegian conducting a study in Norway, interviewing Norwegians, while this thesis is written in English, issues of translation could occur. My initial research was conducted reading and reviewing mostly English literature, and especially the theoretical approach has mostly English literature. This becomes a challenge when I want to base my questions on these concepts, and at the same time make these clear and understandable in Norwegian. Sometimes some of the meaning gets "lost in translation", and this posed as a challenge when creating the interview guide, as well as when using direct quotes from the interviews in the analysis, translating the answers from Norwegian to English. These questions were present when I developed the interview guide and translated the interviews. However, I feel the translation went well and that it has not limited my research to a great extent.

3.0 Historical background

3.1 The history of resistance to energy projects in Norway

The siting of energy projects has also been contested in Norway historically. After several years with increasingly bigger hydropower projects, the national environmental movement started to question the effects of the developments on the environment in the 1960s. The Mardøla conflict in Mid-Norway in 1970 became the first big action taking use of civil disobedience and changed the debate and influenced the further discussion around developments in untouched nature (Auestad, Nilsen & Rydgren, 2018).

A hydropower project in the most northern part of the country became one of the most controversial siting projects, lasting 12 years, until 1981. The environmental movement and

indigenous activists got together to save the Alta-Kautokeino River, using civil disobedience, petitions and demonstrations (Andersen, Midttun & Andersen, 1985). The resistance made sure this became the last large-scale hydropower project in Norway and increased the focus on Saami rights and culture (Karlstrøm & Ryghaug, 2014; NRK, 2010; Naturvernforbundet, 2011).

Moving fast forward until today, there are several similarities between the contested hydropower projects of the 1970s and 1980s, and the immense resistance seen against WPD the past years. The active opposition at Frøya was one of the first active groups, but after several WPDs started, the resistance groups around the country have increased as well, from the county of Agder in the south to Troms and Finnmark in the north. With a long coastline and great wind conditions, most of the wind parks are situated along the coast. According to NVE, over 53 wind parks has been installed until today (NVE n.d.-b). In the book "Vindmøllekampen - historia om eit folkeopprør" - *the windmill battle – the story of a popular uprising,* the Norwegian author and journalist Anders Totland finds that it was the proposal for a new national framework for wind power by NVE that made the opposition explode. Moreover, he finds that if the politicians had been more open and honest about their plans from the beginning, we could have avoided much of the friction around the subject (Totland, 2021; Solvang, 2021).

The steady increase in opposition led to the founding of Motvind Norway in October 2019, a national interest group consisting of the many local resistance groups around the country. The aim of the national group is to support the different local groups in their resistance, as well as lobbying towards national authorities, making their views known (Motvind, n.d.).

Of the few studies that have been conducted on the theme in Norway, attitudes toward WPD have been studied at Frøya's neighboring island Smøla, where much of the opposition was based on the protection of the Eurasian Eagle Owl (Solli, 2010). Studies have been conducted on questions concerning visual impacts on cultural heritage (Jerpåsen & Larsen, 2011), as well as issues regarding Saami rights and reindeer herding (Normann, 2020).

3.2 Resistance against wind power development at Frøya

3.2.1 The small beginning in 2002

The story of wind power development at the island started already in 2002 when the first notifications and messages sent about construction of a wind park in the area was sent to the national regulator NVE. In 2004, NTE Energy and TrønderEnergi Kraft AS (TE) applied for a

license for 63 turbines in the municipality. Meetings with regional and local authorities were conducted, as well as public meetings to inform the local residents. The result of the meetings and hearings was that the municipality demanded additional studies in order to accept the license application. The municipality of Frøya had several concerns that they saw as necessary to investigate; how would a wind park affect drinking water sources on the island, the red-listed Eurasian Eagle Owl and other vulnerable species, as well as worries concerning the effects for the tourism industry, which is important in a small community like Frøya. The municipality also wanted to conduct a referendum to get the opinion of the population on the matter and saw the need for the wind park to be smaller than the application stated and wanted an environmental follow-up program incorporated in the plan (Frøya kommune, 2020).

In this first period, a resistance group called "Perikum" was founded at Frøya, which became the foundation and first step in an almost twenty-year long struggle (Grønskag, 2019).

3.2.2 Referendum in 2005

An advisory referendum was held in 2005, where 1177 voted in favor of the construction, and 1114 votes against, a very close race. In 2012 the developers sent a plan change application to the national regulators NVE, applying for the construction of 26 turbines with the effect of up to 60 MWh followed by new meetings locally and regionally, where the municipality decided to recommend the granting of a license to the developers, which at this point was the energy company Sarepta Energi AS. The company renewed their construction license in 2016, while the construction did not start until 2019 due to issues around financing and profitability (Frøya kommune, 2020; Grønskag, 2019). By the time construction started, the planned wind park was much smaller than the original plan from 2004, with 14 turbines with the height of 180 meters, contra the original plan of 64 turbines with the height of 150 meters. It made it possible to achieve the same effects with fewer wind turbines, which was seen as beneficial (TrønderEnergi, n.d.).

3.2.3 A contested wind park

Based on interviews, a study from Rygg (2012) showed that Frøya was the only municipality with a resistance group working actively against the WPD by 2009, showing the novelty of the opposition there. The main arguments used against wind power was birds and wildlife, tourism, pollution and use of area, interventions and cultural monuments. The study

showed that the resistance against the wind power development at Frøya managed to move the planned wind park to another part of the island due to the risk of the islands' water source being polluted. The study also points at the fact that people in the administration and political positions at Frøya showed their personal opinion early on, putting more wood on the fire for the opponents of the park – this was even before the impact assessment was finalized (Rygg, 2012, p. 171-172).

There has been a lot of protest against the wind park construction at Frøya. After Sarepta Energi AS got the license in 2012, a complaint was sent to the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy (MoPE), demanding to withdraw the license, but the complaint was declined. A signature campaign was made and handed in to the municipal council, demanding a new referendum in 2013, without success (Grønskag, 2019). The municipal council justified their decision on the fact that there had already been a referendum in 2005 (Frøya kommune, 2020). Perikum changed their name to "No to wind power at Frøya" and gained more activists and followers.

The mobilization and opposition against the wind park escalated specifically after the construction work was supposed to start on April 1st, 2019. Actionists were hindering the developers to reach the building site. The day after, on April 2nd, a new referendum was conducted after a massive push from the resistance group, where 78 per cent of those who voted, voted against the wind park (Løvås, 2019). However, this did not have any consequences for the already approved wind park but were to be used as a reference point for future wind power projects at the island, which caused fury among the opponents (Rasmussen, 2019).



Figure 1: Map outlining the wind park at Frøya. Source: NVE

In the same time period, there was also a halt in the preparation work on the development site, where the municipality of Frøya stated that the dispensation for the construction of the wind park had expired. The dispensation stated that the deadline for starting the construction work was

on April 7th, requirements the opponents and others meant the developers did not meet. The case was brought to the Ministry of Local government and Modernization (MoLGM), who denied the claims of the municipality. The case caused a ten-week postponement of the construction work (Skaug et al. 2019; Løvås, 2019). The active resistance against the WPD continued strongly throughout 2019 and 2020 but could not prevent the installation of the wind turbines, starting in August 2020 (Jørgensen, 2020b).

3.3 Development of onshore wind energy policy in Norway

To understand the opposition against wind power in Norway, looking at how energy politics in Norway has developed is helpful. As part of the *Windplan* project at the Univeristy of Agder, Vasstrøm & Lysgård (2020) have developed a policy note on "movements in Norwegian wind power policy". They are dividing Norwegian wind power policy into three phases with 1998-2008 as the initial phase. However, the first grid-connected turbine came as early as in 1987, and Norway started a R&D program already in 1978, that was supposed to map the possibilities for wind energy production in the country, but slowly died out due to lack of policies to follow up and further develop wind power technology. Nonetheless, there was a slow increase in new turbines until 1998, much due to the Energy Law from 1991, ensuring more privatization and deregulation of the Norwegian power sector (Buen, 2006, p. 3889-3897).

What I would call the second phase from 1998-2008 policy making was still moving slow, and few wind park constructions had started. The government meant that wind power development had great potential, and even though the profitability was still low, they saw a promising future for wind power development in Norway. To facilitate this, a support scheme for wind power development was formed, lasting from 2000-2011. Applications for wind power licenses took off from 2003, and an assessment around the consequences for wind power development were formed by several state institutions like the Directorate for Cultural Heritage (Riksantikvaren), the Norwegian Environment Agency (Miljødirektoratet) etc. In 2008 it was also decided that energy development was going to be put under a state licensing authority – NVE – to make the case processing around wind power licenses as efficient as possible (Vasstrøm & Lysgård, 2020, p. 4-5).

In the third phase from 2009-2018 Vasstrøm & Lysgård (2020) focus on how Norwegian policy making was trying to connect to the energy policy of the European Union, linking wind

power development with climate goals. El-certificates were implemented to increase the production of renewable energy in 2012, and succeeded in their mission (Moe, Hansen & Kjær, 2021, p. 283). From 2012 and onwards there was a more positive attitude to the profitability of wind power development, due to increased demand in Europe, as well as a development in international treaties on climate. In 2016 came the first Energy note since 1998, stating that there had been too many unnecessary conflicts locally regarding wind power development.

This Energy note led to MoPE requesting the national regulator (NVE) to draft a suggestion for a national framework for wind power in Norway (Vasstrøm & Lysgård, 2020, p. 6). In summary, the aim was to gain more and updated knowledge on how land-based wind power could affect the environment and societal interests, and which areas wind power development would be feasible and to best use taken the updated knowledge into consideration, divided into 21 thematic reports (NVE, 2019a). The second part of the analysis consisted of a map with thirteen areas that NVE suggest as feasible areas for wind power development in the future (NVE, 2019a).



Figure 2 Outlined in green are the 13 areas where NVE see future wind park development as feasible. Source: NVE

Even though the said intention was to ensure less friction and opposition to wind power building in the future, the report had quite the opposite effect. A lot of the noise around wind power in Norway exploded when NVE presented their suggestions 1st April 2019. In October 2019 it became clear that the government decided to not go forward with the suggested framework. This decision was based on the feedback on the plan given by 56 municipalities in Norway, where 49 of them said no to wind turbines in their municipality (Solberg, Skei & Befring, 2019).

2018-2020 is the third phase outlined in Windplan's policy note and was besides the mentioned national framework a phase when many of the long-planned wind parks were built. 28 wind parks were finalized within these two years, where eight of them are situated in the region Trøndelag (NVE, n.d.-b).

3.3.1 Norwegian licensing process

The licensing process looks a bit different from country to country and getting an overview over this is beneficial to be able to analyze the actions of the opponent groups as many of the reactions to the wind power development are connected to the different phases of this process.

In Norway, it is the national energy regulator NVE that gives out licenses. In order to obtain a license, it is mandatory to send in a first notification of the intentions and presenting the plans. A public hearing is conducted in the aftermath of the notification, looking at the Environmental Impacts Assessment (EIA). At this stage, feedback is allowed, and is taken into account by NVE when approving the EIA program. NVE decides what the impact assessment should focus on, such as impacts on birdlife, reindeer herding etc., and should be handed in with the formal license application. The final application and the EIA go to a second round of hearing, where everyone can give input. A final decision is taken based on the impact assessment, the inputs collected throughout the process, looking at whether the positive sides of the projects are greater than the negative sides. If a license is given, and someone protests and appeals, it is MoPE that does the second evaluation and makes a final decision. After a final license is given, more details on the project needs to be provided (Inderberg et al. 2020, p. 2).

Based on the suggestion for a national framework for land-based wind power, came the white paper "Wind power on land – changes in the licensing process" in 2020. This report states that the Government will not go forward with the suggested areas pointed out in the NVE report from April 2019. The white paper states that the intention is to move on with WPD around the country in the future as well, despite the contention around the theme the past years. They believe that WPD will always have some negative consequences, but the aim is to reduce these to the minimum, both for humans and environment. To ensure this, changes in the licensing

process was suggested, giving the municipalities and county municipalities more power and responsibility in the process. Their presence and opinions are going to be met more in future licensing processes through further consultations. Moreover, the specific terms for the wind park developers are changed, considering important environmental values, maximal turbine height and minimum distance to inhabited areas together with a tighter schedule for the licensing process. These changes are done to make sure that there is less leeway to postpone decisions are suggested to cut time used on this process, and to make sure that there will not be big changes in the suggested plans (Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, 2020, p. 5-6). The changes made are getting to the core of the conflicts that have been seen the past years – and it will be interesting to see whether this will ensure less contention around WPD in the future.

The siting of energy projects in untouched nature and important cultural areas for the Saami people have been a contested theme since the big hydropower developments in the 70s and 80s. In the case of wind power, it seems like the sudden rapid increase in built wind parks along with insufficient participation of the local level in licensing processes have been important for the 'boom' of resistance. In this case that fits well with my interpretation of the main reasons for attitudinal resistance, as positioned in the introduction chapter. This is also shown by the new measures taken by the Government to ensure less friction in future wind power siting cases. However, this is a complex issue, and as concluded in the introduction chapter, attitudinal and active opposition does not necessarily come from the same factors. It usually takes more to reach active opposition than attitudinal opposition, where the empirical findings will shed light on some of the complexities in the development of active resistance.

4.0 Empirical findings

In this chapter I will present and analyze the findings in accord with the theoretical concepts that were used to make questions for the interview guide: framing, resources, repertoires of contention and political opportunity. Moreover, new factors identified from the findings will be presented, and discussed further in the discussion part. Additional second-hand data from the newspapers *Hitra-Frøya* and *Adresseavisa* will also be presented and analyzed alongside the interview findings.

4.1 Framing

According to Snow & Benford (1988) mobilization is the goal of framing. They describe three different framing strategies that are necessary to achieve success as a social movement: diagnostic framing, prognostic framing, and motivational framing. Diagnostic framing and motivational framing, which will be defined further down, are the main frames that are seen in the work of the resistance groupgroup and will be the basis for the analysis of the findings.

4.1.1 Abundancy and nature preservation

The central problem and main reason for the opposition to the wind park building at Frøya is nature preservation or rather what they see as a lack of preservation. This is part of the diagnostic framing of the group, which refers to what problems the group identifies and who is to blame for these problems. Diagnostic framing seems to be the most important frame for the resistance group at Frøya, looking at the empirical evidence.

Six interviewees bring up nature preservation as a reason for the resistance against wind power development at Frøya and is also the theme that occurs the most in the newspapers. Several respondents point out that this fight is bigger than just opposing the building of the wind park at Frøya, it is about seeing the bigger picture (Interview 1, 6, 8):

> *"..Are many who see it as a popular uprising - is both a climate crisis and a natural crisis - what do we do with a good climate if we have no nature"* (Interview 8).
>
> *"It is not only about wind power, it is more about preserving nature – it is about all interventions in nature really. It is about the establishment of commercial space, infrastructure, living space, measures at sea, restricting access to the beach zone - and I experience that taking nature seriously is a trend these days"* (Interview 6).

Some respondents see the building of wind parks and use of wind power as a blind spot in the work for the 'green shift', where green energy through wind power becomes an excuse for increased consumption and profit making (Interview 1 and 3; Hovde, 2019).

4.1.2 Perceived environmental impacts

Together with biodiversity and nature preservation, other reasons for the resistance have also been present. As one respondent states:

> *"If you want to find one reason for the resistance that is common for all of the opponents, that might be difficult (..)"* (Interview 1).

There are however several reasons that have been mentioned both in the interviews and in the newspapers between 2002-2021:

- Lighting/light pollution from the windmills: the light that comes from the wind turbines is strong and disturbing for the neighbors (Interview 1, 3, 6, 7, 10; Hammervik, 2020b).
- Noise/infrasound from the wind turbines: this has been one of the most important selling points from the resistance group ahead of the set-up of the windmills, where researchers are unsure whether this is an actual problem or not (Interview 1, 2, 6, 10; Hammervik, 2021).
- Proximity to the wind park: the closer people live to the wind park, the more severe would the visual disturbance be, together with noise and lighting (Interview 1, 3, 6, 10).
- Water reserves and fishing water: the resistance group has been afraid that the building of the wind park would cause damage to the water reserves in the area (Interview 1, 3, 4, 7)
- Eurasian Eagle Owls and other species: people are afraid that red listed species are threatened because birds might crash with the windmills, and the disturbances in the siting area from the development might have negative effects on the species living there (Interview 1, 3, 5, 6; Karlsen, 2013; Rønningen, 2019).

Among these reasons, lighting/light pollution, noise/infrasound and the problems this causes for the Eurasian Eagle Owl and other species in the area have been mentioned the most (Interview 1, 3, 4, 10; Sandvik, 2019b).

This shows us that there is an abundance of themes that have been lifted as important for the resistance group. The list, however, shows us that there is room for several problems and reasons to oppose the wind park building, called *frame extension* in the framing literature (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 625). The more flexible the group is to welcome people into the "community", the more likely it is to increase mobilization. This is of utter importance in a small

community like Frøya. The list above also matches the perceived impacts found in the SA literature.

We also need to consider the intimacy of the case - it becomes very personal for everyone on a small island like Frøya, where the diagnostic framing also can work as motivational framing due to the closeness of the case.

4.1.3 Local democracy

The interviews revealed what kind of role lack of participation in the licensing process meant in the case of Frøya. This became expressly clear from the point where the municipality board refused to hold a new referendum in 2012 to vote over whether Frøya was going to build a wind park or not. The refusal of a new referendum in 2012 became one of the main arguments for continuing the struggle after this and can in this sense also be seen as part of the motivational framing, based on procedural justice.

Several interviewees opposing the wind park have mentioned this without specifically being asked questions around the theme – where they find the case process questionable, much because the municipality board refused to hold a new referendum in 2012. It can also seem like this got even worse in 2019 when the municipality board actually said yes to hold a referendum, the "no-side" got the majority of the votes, but the wind park still got built.

One interviewee states:

> *"I myself have been a municipal politician - have all my life had high confidence in a system around me that takes care of everyone and that is transparent, and which is in accordance with the legislation we have - while the process here has shown me that it was not like that. The trust I have had is gone - in terms of the police as an authority, our national authorities – this is perhaps the strongest experience I have brought with me - I am suspicious of everything I encounter" (interview 10).*

The empirical findings show that there is more than one antagonist in the case. In letters to the editor as well as interviews, it becomes clear that both the developer, the municipality as well as national authorities are in the eyes of the opponents to blame for the WPD at Frøya. When the conflict escalated in 2019, a loss of trust in the police is also highlighted by four

interviewees. They are accused of corruption and siding with the developers (Interview 1, 3, 6, 10). This becomes especially clear in the discussions around democracy. However, it is the municipality that is the main antagonist alongside the developer throughout the conflict.

Another interviewee talks about how the opponents must have changed how they work:

"We have had to get tougher at least when it comes to written things [letters-to-the-editor] over time (..) we were too naïve in the beginning, we thought too well about democracy" (interview 1).

Two other interviewees think that the process that took place surrounding the wind park case has been a good one, and that the municipality board could not have done anything differently, because they were bound from the decisions made in 2005 (interview 5 and 7).

These opposing thoughts on the process, show that procedural justice works as a powerful driving force within the resistance group, and can be seen as a major factor in the framing as well – they are continuing to move on because of the *injustice* they have experienced and the *lack of trust* in democratic institutions. Action is needed because the governing institutions do not take responsibility for listening to the people.

However, alongside their diagnostic framing, the empirical findings showed several other factors that might affect their framing in a positive way:

4.1.4 Groups Dynamics

The resistance group had to organize themselves in a better manner as the numbers grew in 2018-2019. They split the group in two; one responsible for the actions and one responsible for media and contact with politicians. They also saw the necessity of making one or two people a spokesperson to the media and politicians, which is a common framing strategy (Interview 1, 3 and 10; Morris & Staggenborg, 2004, p. 186). As we have seen and discussed above, there are several reasons why people oppose the wind park building, and to at least give the impression of frame alignment to the antagonists and the bystanders, speaking with one voice is necessary.

4.1.5 Social arena

Several respondents also mention the importance of social activities not directly connected to the case . This was something that developed through the years – some of the activists had been part of the resistance group since the very beginning in 2002 and the social activities became a natural part of the activism they were doing. They arranged for instance Christmas parties, concerts and a National Day parade. This of course could have positive impact on both the activists as well as bystanders, framing the group as something more than a resistance group – people became friends as well (Interview 3 and 7).

4.2 Resource mobilization and cooperation

The second concept from social movement theory in use in this thesis is resource mobilization. I would like to see to what degree resources matter to the resistance group, as well whether they became better at using the resources they had at hand. My hypothesis is that having in mind the size of the island and the number of inhabitants, it is not too likely that a resistance group survived all those years, and had the force they had, without external resources, such as collaborating partners. We will however look at both internal and external resources.

My findings suggest that the resistance group at Frøya have two different types of resources: material resources through money/funding, and human resources through knowledge and manpower (Edwards & McCarthy, 2004).

4.2.1 Monetary support

As for the material resources the most apparent one has been money. Several interviewees mention economical support as an important contribution to the work that the resistance group has done, and states that has been of great importance for the developments in the case in 2019 when they finally got through with their demand of a new referendum (Interview 1, 4, 6, 7, 8, 10):

> *"The judicial help we got in 2019 made it possible to actually take the fight – it is a very specific law field, and the lawyer thought that we had a good case"* (Interview 3).

The judicial help was obtained due to a disagreement with the municipality over a definition of what it meant to start the construction phase at the construction site in Nessadalen: the developers and the municipality meant originally that it was enough that the developers had brought the machines into the construction site before the deadline of the construction start, 7th April. The resistance group disagreed and engaged a lawyer to look into the case. The municipality changed their mind, sending the case to the regional municipality and MoLGM, making a halt in the construction phase for the developers, slowing down the process, a big win for the resistance group.

Facebook and digital solutions have been important assets here as well – allowing the group to reach more people in their crowd funding to cover the expenses for bailing people out of jail and paying legal assistance for some of the activists (Jørgensen, 2020a).

Besides the crowdfunding done by themselves, a bigger single donor was particularly important for the developments in 2019. If it were not for the financial aid paying for a lawyer at that point, the referendum in April 2019 would probably never have happened.

4.2.2 Knowledge

According to the interviewees much of the knowledge about wind power development and its consequences for nature and human beings have been present in the group all the time. As several activists have been active in the resistance group since 2002 until today, they have been able to build on the original information and gain a wider knowledge base. Three respondents see this as an important resource for the groups work.

Several interviewees talk about this as a crucial part of their work – both to spread knowledge to others, but also to gain enough knowledge about the case in the group to get through with their work, where social media became an important tool of collective action. Together with the dissemination of knowledge, they were also able to mobilize wider by reaching out to a younger generation, which also is positive for their mobilization goals (Interview 3 & 10; Rønningen, 2012).

"It [social media] has been important for "No to wind power at Frøya", and almost crucial in terms of establishing a both more regional and national knowledge base. Without it, I

would have lacked a lot of knowledge. Traditional media as a knowledge base has been very limited" (Interview 10).

Several respondents also reveal that they started early to gain more knowledge about land-based wind power by talking to people with knowledge on the field. The group also attracted people with different important fields of expertise such as biologists and nature photographers, as well as pensioners with different forms of expertise: teachers, lecturers from universities within different subjects (Interview 1, 3, 6 & 10).

4.2.3 Manpower

One important factor for movements and groups are numbers, where the SM literature states that the more members a movement has, the more likely is the movement to succeed (Edwards & Marullo, 1995). The number of people that have been interested and involved in the resistance group at Frøya has changed a lot during the years. In the early days of the resistance group (2002 onwards) there were few eager people that were active, but it really exploded after the referendum in 2019 with between 60-80 more or less active members, where people started to believe that they could actually change the decision around the wind park (Interview 7, 8 & 10). Even though not all of the new activists were as active as the core members that had been active since day one of the resistance, showcasing the strength of their local support was valuable for the resistance group, mostly because they earlier had been accused of representing a very small fraction of the inhabitants at Frøya (Interview 2, 7).

"The case had been sleeping since 2015, and I don't think that people believed that the wind park was going to be built (..) It was like when they saw the machines that they understood the seriousness in the situation (..)" (Interview 7).

Several respondents point out how important the people have been for the resistance group and how many resources they have as a group, which also shows how well the group managed their framing strategies:

> *"The people are the resources - that one should be able to obtain finances for the documentation center to come into place (..) many of those who have been in the frontline over time, have become better and more confident - they have grown with the tasks. Orally and in writing better to stand in the fight"* (Interview 1).

Here we also see the relevance of who decides to spend their time on the case as well – many of the members in the resistance group are people that have a large amount of time, which makes it easier to run a resistance group in the intense way they have managed at Frøya.

4.2.4 Collaboration

Talking about collaboration in this case needs clarification – since everyone is collaborating at all times. This point is connected to RQ 2: *"What kind of alliances are found, what is the nature of the alliances and how does this impact the social movement mobilization?"* To answer this question, the main question in the interview guide was: "Does the resistance group collaborate with other groups locally, regionally and nationally, and if so: who?" Follow-up questions here were what the collaboration consisted of, when the collaboration started, and what the outcome of the collaboration was.

The respondents mention several groups they consider as important alliances. Below I have gathered the different groups, organizations and other collaborating partners the resistance group at Frøya has worked with over the years:

Table 1 Collaborating partners on different levels

Local	**Regional**	**National**
Friends of the Earth Hitra-Frøya *(Naturvernforbundet Hitra-Frøya)*	Friends of the Earth Trøndelag *(Naturvernforbundet Trøndelag)*	Green Warriors of Norway *(Norges miljøvernforbund)*
Norwegian Ornithological Society *(Norsk ornitologisk forening)*	Norwegian Trekking Association Trondheim *(Trondheim turistforening)*	Norwegian Ornithological Society *(Norsk ornitologisk forening)*

	Green Warriors of Norway - Trøndelag *(Miljøvernforbundet Trøndelag)*	Institute of Marine Research *(Havforskningsinstituttet)*
		Motvind Norge
		Other local wind power resistance groups

4.2.5 Environmental movement

The different collaborating partners have different fields of expertise, and have thus been used to different tasks, where the organizations the Green Warriors of Norway and Friends of the Earth have been of remarkable importance (Interview 1, 10).

> *"I think the Green Warriors of Norway is the group I experience that has been most important (..)The Green Warriors of Norway is important because I experienced that they were the group that had the most experience in carrying out and preparing the actions, how to behave - the regular inhabitant of Frøya does not a clue about how to behave when being stopped by the police (..) gave us - or made me very confident in how to behave to able to participate (..) They were available to us, they were on the site several times, but also helped us complete things without them being here (..) Made us able to do things [actions] better"* (Interview 10).

A representative from the Green Warriors explains that their way of conducting civil disobedience is different from the traditional way of 'chaining themselves together' - *civil disobedience 2.0*. They focus on civil disobedience in a legal way, which they consider as much more effective – makes it possible to continue the resistance for a longer period of time than with 'normal' civil disobedience. The point of this is first and foremost to delay the work on the site as much as possible while others are working with the law parallelly – to make sure that the nature does not get ruined while they are waiting for the judicial system to take a stance (Interview 11).

Where the Green Warriors helped out mostly with preparations for actions, Friends of the Earth had a broad knowledge base they shared with the resistance group together with resources such as lawyers, writing newspaper articles and contacting different institutions such as NVE (Interview 3, 4 and 8).

A news article also shows what kind of support the environmental movement and others have been for the resistance group. The CEO of TrønderEnergi states in an interview that he considers Frøya as a special case – saying he believes that there were others than the Frøya people that made the strategy for the actions (Holstad, 2020).

4.2.6 Motvind Norway

As mentioned earlier in this thesis, Motvind Norway is an important organization for the anti-wind power movement in Norway – consisting of all the local initiatives against wind power in the country. The interviews revealed that individuals in the resistance group at Frøya were major driving forces in forming the national organization (Interview 10).

The representative from the Green Warriors also explained that he did not believe that Motvind Norway would have been founded if it was not for the "Frøya action" in 2019 due to the media coverage and inspiration the action at Frøya brought forwards (Interview 11).

Motvind Norway has also been an important support for the resistance group at Frøya:

> *"Important that we were able to start Motvind - the struggle at Frøya has had quite an impact in itself, but we knew that we needed a "state battery" that could recharge (..) the commitment elsewhere in the country differed a lot (..) Got some important people connected to us"* (Interview 1).

4.3 Repertoires of contention

Repertoires of collective action immediately gives associations to demonstrations with angry protesters, but as conceptualized by Tilly (1986) repertoires of contention can really be a "whole set of means [a group] has for making claims of different types on different individuals" (1986, p. 2), not only classic demonstrations.

That is shown well in the case of Frøya. One interviewee describes how the case was fronted by the opponents in the early days of the talks from 2002 about whether to approve building of a wind park at the island:

> *"The case was fronted very neatly - no actions, etc., but spoke to the municipal council and had many written contributions - many who got involved (...) The way it turned out one noticed so much resistance and writing and that's why you had a vote in 2005 - hardly a majority said yes (...) 64 votes that separated it here"* (Interview 7).

In other words, the first period of resistance took place within the sphere of conventional politics, which shows that the resistance group still had faith in the system (Gomza, 2014) but also a limited repertoire of action alternatives.

4.3.1 Documentation

5 respondents focus on what the resistant group has used most of their time on: find information and research on consequences of land-based windmill development, and after the development started at the island, more focus on documenting the different consequences:

> *"Other forms of action have been actualized from the approach of development - it was about being present, documenting, uncovering things that were not as they should be, reporting what is not in line with the regulations, without us experiencing that it has led any way. Documentation has been our main focus - to be present, and if not prevent, then at least delay - within legal frames"* (interview 10).

This has also worked as an important framing strategy, where academic references give their arguments better hold. Referring to the UN and other legitimate sources gives them increased credibility in their opposition and is a way of delegitimizing the ground where the decision for allowing the wind park liesf (Interview 1, 10; Tvedt, 2019; Granviken, 2019).

4.3.2 Signature campaigns

The signature campaigns have been an important tool for the resistance group since 2012 when they demanded a new referendum. Even though the referendum in 2012 was rejected, the numbers of signatures have been an important selling point for the resistance group, giving them and their case more credibility in meeting with media, politicians and dissenters. Despite all the signatures, some respondents say that the signature campaign in 2012 did not really give a representative view of how many at Frøya that wanted a new referendum:

> *"In the signature campaign they got 2000 signatures – many of them from cabin owners from all over the country, and really not that many from Frøya. The opponents mobilized the whole country with relatives and friends(..)"* (interview 7).

One important tool here to make sure that the signature campaign got spread all over the country has been the Facebook-group "Nei til vindkraftverk på Frøya", which they have used to mobilize, share and spread information all over the country (Interview 7).

4.3.3 Demonstrations and illegal actions

However, in the secondary data material from *Hitra-Frøya* and *Adresseavisen*, the main focus has been on the more visible activism the group has conducted:

- Protested on the National Day outside the construction gate 8th May 2019 (Sandvik, 2019a, p. 15).
- Support march against wind power development 12th September 2019 (Rasmussen & Granin, 2019, p. 11).
- The opponents are not only protesting in the streets but are also using strategies like sending complaints against decisions made on ministry-level in Norway (Husby, 2019).
- The newspapers have also reported on sabotage after the developers started the work on the wind farm:
- 10 000 liters of diesel and lockers on construction machinery destroyed (Sagbakken, 2020).

- Several illegal sabotage attempts after TrønderEnergi started the construction work (Husby & Skogseth, 2019)

No one wants to take responsibility for the illegal actions, and the resistance group has been in the newspaper denying they had anything to do with it and apologizing for the events (Eide, 2019, p. 2; Hammervik, 2020a, p. 10). The illegal actions started when the building started at Frøya, in 2019 (interview 7).

This showcases well the differences between the first periods of contention and the last one from the end of 2018, and is also mentioned by two interviewees (Interview 3 & 6):

> *"The difference between now and 2012 is that in 2012 the important thing was to find information and gain knowledge about the things - and when the work started in 2019 it was more physical - go to the construction site to find things there that could speak our case – we found sea eagle nests they [the developers] had not found just 200 meters away from where they were going to use explosives"* (Interview 3).

One interviewee says that when it became clear that TrønderEnergi was looking for a CEO for the wind park in the end of 2018, they understood that a group had gathered to resist the construction again. Leading up to 7th April 2019, the deadline for TrønderEnergi to start working on the construction site, the opponents had a wider range of repertoires they were able to use than earlier in the conflict, which will be discussed further in the discussion section later. These repertoires included arranging a torchlight procession, gathering around 3-4000 people, including cabin owners (Interview 7). Other contentious repertoires that the respondents mention is cairn burning, signature campaigns, walk-slow actions, demonstrations locally and outside the Parliament, walking around in the construction site and seminars for opponents from all over the country. With the preparations at the construction site in Nessadalen, the opponents also set up a permanent camp right outside the fence to show their resistance (Interview 2).

> *"It was connected to the construction – we tried to make it hard to transport materials from shore to the construction area by blocking the road and have walk-slow actions"* (Interview 6).

"When they got the start signal, it was just to get there with cars and be in the area at all times and be in their way" (Interview 3).

One respondent was negative to the actions of the opponents at Frøya, but more positive to what they have done nationally:

"I think it is fair that they stand outside the Parliament to do something about the license conditions - I think that is the right way to work and that they have achieved a lot, they have made key politicians look closer at the case. I wish it was where they put their energy- instead of destroying a community [Frøya]. It has gone too far - one cannot stop it at Frøya, but you can do something about it nationally" (Interview 5).

4.3.4 The future

Several interviewees states that the thought is to continue working and documenting the developments in the wind park; *"The commitment is still quite big today, and that is what amazes me the most - people are still looking for ways to do things(..)"* (Interview 1).

"People have become good at bringing out their strong sides - they are creative and have a lot of energy to invent things – they have decided that Nessadalen [where the wind park is] *will be a documentation center: everything that happens in the next 25 years will be documented from hour to hour, and from day to day (..) They will look at airborne dust in connection with the construction, they will have divers down to look at particles in the water that are destroyed, nesting areas and birds (..)*(Interview 6).

Another interviewee says that the focus now maybe has shifted a bit from focusing on themselves and what they can do in their local community, to what they can do for other communities struggling the same battle that they have already done.

"(..) we now have to document the damage we have tried to warn against. (..) birds, nature, documentation of pollution... we have drinking water that we are dependent on for the food industry. In addition, we should contribute to everyone else who have not

come as far as us with completed facilities - I think that is still just as important" (Interview 10).

4.4 Political opportunities

4.4.1 Political impact

In order to change something, opportunities to do so is important – which is the essence of what 'political opportunities' means. Here we will go through the political opportunities the interviewees highlighted. McAdam (1996, p. 27) states these elements are important for political opportunities: "1) the relative openness or closure of the institutionalized political system; 2) the stability or instability of a broad set of elite alignments; 3) the presence or absence of elite allies; 4) the state's capacity and propensity for repression". An opportunity is an opening that one still has not seized, and this could be the case with political opportunities as well and depends to a large extent on the resistance group's ability to see the opportunities. The resistance group could in this sense have had an abundance of political opportunities throughout the years without being aware of them. This is not as easy to investigate in retrospect, and my main focus here will be on the political opportunities they managed to seize.

In the case of Frøya, we have seen that the resistance group has reached out to politicians on local, regional and national level. It is a highly political case where decision-makers are the most important antagonists, making the political work of the resistance group extremely important to achieve their goals. The closest antagonist is however the municipality as we have seen earlier in this thesis and is also easier to affect than to change policy on a national level. Nevertheless, Frøya have been part of an important process within a bigger group to change national policy (Interview 3 & 7):

*"Around central politicians, it turns out that what we have done has had something to say (..) - We feel we have lost a lot, but that we have to pat ourselves on the back because we can have something to say for other opponent*s" (interview 3).

4.4.2 Inclusion in the decision-making process

"The relative openness or closure of the institutionalized political system" (McAdam, 1996, p. 27) is one of the elements that traditionally has been seen as important for increasing political opportunities for a social movement. The political system in Norway is generally open and transparent for the public, but it is relevant to have a look at the openness in the decision-making process of the wind park development to see what people felt about the openness of the process.

Several respondents talk about what they see as a rather closed decision-making process with few real opportunities to influence the decision and get proper information. Information meetings were held both in 2015 when the building was planned the first time, as well as in 2019 (Interview 3, 10).

> *"I would say that the process has been a rather closed one, there have been public meetings from 2002 until today, but they have not listened to the opponents"* (Interview 3).

The knowledge base needs to be addressed with regards to openness in a case like this. In 2005 when the first referendum was held, information and research was not as easily accessible through the internet as it was later in the process, as well as the knowledge base around wind power in general was limited, as this was in the very beginning of the wind power development in the country. So even though the municipality and developers held the meetings they were supposed to, it does not mean that the inhabitants had all the information they should have had to make this decision. On the other hand, it is logical that representatives from the resistance group are dissatisfied with the decision-making process as they feel that they have not been consulted in a satisfying way.

However, the resistance group has not completely been talking to deaf ears: a representative from the developer TrønderEnergi says that the cosntinuous work the opponents have done, have made the wind park developers focus even more on safeguarding the environment than they normally do (Skogseth, 2020), implying that they were able to seize some opportunities through their tireless work.

The resistance group has also had access to elite alignments in the sense that several of the activists became local politicians post 2012, which gave them direct links between the group and decision makers (Interview 4; Boudet & Ortolano, 2010, p. 15). In another way, the interviews showed that many decision makers were tired of the subject by 2019, making the room smaller for elite alignments.

4.4.3 Referendums as outcomes of political opportunities

It is natural to examine the attempts of getting through the two referendums in 2012 and 2019 to get an idea on the status for the political opportunities of the resistance group. The call for referendum got approved in 2019, and there might be several reasons for this. According to the literature on SM, election years are important for the political opportunities of a group, as political elites get an incentive to please the electorate in important issues (Kriesi, 2004, p. 75). As 2019 was an important year in the wind power debate at Frøya (and nationally), and a local election year, this became an important theme in the election campaign and gave the resistance group an advantage (Interview 3). This was seen in the sudden interest in the wind park-case from the different political parties.

As we have seen in other sections of the findings, the resistance group also developed a lot throughout the years, and were significantly stronger, had more capacity and experience in 2019 than in 2012, which also seems to have contributed in a positive way for the increased political opportunities (Interview 4, 5 & 7). This was also the point where the resistance group got help from the Green Warriors of Norway to hold good and legal actions which ended up with increased media attention and more attention from the politicians.

An interviewee also points at what they learnt from the call for referendum in 2012 to 2019:

> *"At the time we were not at the same level as the leading politicians – they had information through TrønderEnergi and NVE (..) We were not that conscious at the time on how things worked. When we got a lawyer in 2018 we understood we had an opportunity: he brought a lot of knowledge to us, made us understand that it was important to understand how the system works: what is NVE, MoPE and the county municipality? (..)"* (Interview 1).

This shows that not only are political opportunities important for gaining resources and increasing actions, but the importance of the other qualities of the resistance group were at least as important for increasing the political opportunities in 2019, illustrated in figure 3 under.



Figure 3 Factors influencing political opportunities in 2019

5.0 Reflection on Empirical Findings

This chapter will discuss the findings in accordance with the existing literature, aiming to answer the two research questions outlined for the thesis: 1) *How has resistance against wind power changed through the years, since the first application of development was sent out in 2002 until today, and what are the mobilizing factors?* And 2) *What kind of alliances are found, what is the nature of the alliances and how does this impact the social movement mobilization?*

The discussion is organized after research questions, followed by a section seeing the research questions together.

5.1 How has resistance against wind power at Frøya changed through the years, since the first application of development was sent out in 2002 until today, and what are the mobilizing factors?

We can split the resistance into three periods or protest cycles as called in the SM literature. As introduced in the introduction chapter, a protest cycle is a period with higher levels of active opposition, i.e., periods where the resistance group had an increased level of activity (Maher et al. 2019). As discussed in the analytical framework, I am looking at both internal and external mobilizing factors. Internal factors are framing, resources (manpower, knowledge etc.) and repertoires of contention, while the external factors influencing mobilization are political opportunities, resources (social networks etc.), as well as the triggering elements that makes the resistance group react with increased resistance. The analysis also revealed two other mobilizing factors that have been highly relevant for the resistance group – trust and threat, which will be further discussed in this chapter.

As visualized in figure 4 below, I define the first period of protest from when the resistance group 'Perikum' was formed in 2002 until the first referendum in 2005. The second period started with Sarepta receiving the construction license in 2012 until the local politicians declined the call for a new referendum in 2013. Last protest cycle lasted from November 2018 until the first windmills were installed in August 2020. These cycles represent the periods with the highest levels of resistance at Frøya. It is however important to note that the intention is not to disregard that there has been resistance between the cycles. This is merely a picture of the periods with most resistance.

I will now go through the three cycles and look at the combination of the different factors that were used in the analysis to get a better picture of how the resistance has changed throughout the years.

5.1.1 First protest cycle - 2002-2005

The main external mobilizing factor for this first cycle was the first application of development of a wind park at Frøya in 2002, or what the SM literature refers to as *threat.* Threat is seen as an important factor for mobilization in the SM literature and can be defined as: "the probability that existing benefits will be taken away or new harms inflicted if challenging groups fail to act collectively" (Almeida, 2003, p. 347). Boudet & Ortolano (2010, p. 7) refer to this as an "exogenous shock" in their study of mobilization against the siting of two liquefied natural gas terminals in California. It is this shock or threat that triggers the whole conflict, making the founding of the resistance group a direct reaction to the application.

In the first protest cycle the resistance group had a narrower look on how to deal with the suggestion for a wind park at Frøya, compared to later in the process. This was extremely early in the wind power development period in Norway with only one wind park being built at the time, at the neighboring island Smøla. The rather small group resisting WPD at Frøya focused on acquiring knowledge about the issue but had from the start a clear opinion on what the problem was - nature destruction (diagnostic framing). They got through with their message in a simple way, focusing on writing letters to the editor (repertoire) and had meetings with local politicians (political opportunity).

As we will see in the next cycles, the trust in local authorities became problematic with time. In this first cycle however, it is worth noticing that the resistance group to a great extent are working in the same political sphere as their main antagonists, the municipality. This implies that the resistance group still had faith in the local democracy and trusted the politicians with the case.

5.1.2 Second protest cycle – 2012-2013

The hard and continuous work acquiring more information and knowledge concerning wind power development and their risks for wildlife and biodiversity, that the resistance group started on in the first protest cycle, had positive implications for the second protest cycle. For resources to count, it does not suffice to only possess them, the group also needs to know *how* to use them (Edwards & McCarthy, 2004, p. 116). The knowledge base is one of the resources that has been stably present throughout the conflict, much due to a committed core of activists. This stable but steady increasing resource has made it easier to be a credible stakeholder in the wind power debate.

2012 was the beginning of the 'golden era' of social media, which became extremely important for the resistance group in several ways. First of all, my findings showed that the resistance group used Facebook to spread their diagnostic framing – reaching out to younger and other audiences than they had been able to reach before. The Facebook group acquired 18000 members from all over the country, which made it easier to influence and share knowledge in between the different areas threatened by WPD. Moreover, social media was also used to share their new action repertoire – the signature campaign – mobilizing 2000 signatures for the call for referendum. The resistance group was still quite small at this point, so these extra numbers gave the group more credibility, showing that they were speaking for a much bigger group. In this sense, the use of social media channels worked as a support in their more traditional collective activism by adding an extra level to their actions, which Van Laer & Van Aelst (2010) refers to as internet-supported repertoires, in their typology of a "new digitalized action repertoire".

The trust in local politicians and democracy lowers dramatically when the municipality rejected the call for referendum in 2012. This decision had implications for the rest of the conflict and is regarded as one of the decisive mobilizing factors ensuring continued resistance in the years to come. This becomes one of the main arguments of the resistance group as to why they are continuing to fight the WPD. As well as lack of trust in local democratic institutions, this also fits into the sphere of injustice that has been widely researched earlier in the SA literature, and especially procedural justice, where the main issue surrounds the process leading up to the decision about WPD (Segreto et al. 2020, p. 14; Wüstenhagen et al. 2007; Leiren et al. 2020).

5.1.3 Third protest cycle - 2018-2020

Analyzing the findings, I would argue that *threat* is one of the main external mobilizing factors in this cycle besides loss of trust and the four we are already focusing on. The threat of wind power development has at this point (in 2018) been present for sixteen years, and because of the long time that had passed by since the developer got their contract in 2016, people started to believe that nothing was going to happen, decreasing the notion of threat. When the resistance group saw the call for a CEO for the wind park at Frøya in 2018, they understood that this time, something was going to happen, i.e., the threat came extremely close (Interview 3). A co-factor

here was the investment of the German power company SWM, owning 70 per cent of the wind park. For a resistance group that already had hard times understanding the value of the wind park as they believe that Norway has sufficient hydro power, this increased the loss of trust in the developers. The pristine nature of Frøya would be ruined due to a demand of more renewable energy in Germany given by a Norwegian power company which is co-owned by the municipality of Frøya. This loss of trust has also been seen in Denmark in the instances where external companies have increased their ownership (Hvelplund et al. 2017; Olsen & Anker, 2014; Sovacool, 2013).

This made sure that the period saw more actions, and bigger variation of actions than earlier. There are some logical reasons for this, one of them is that they in the two former cycles did not have any specific place to protest as the development at the island had not started yet. In 2019 they started to prepare the development site for the building of the park, which gave the activists a physical place to go to for their actions. The resistance group set up a protest camp outside the development site in Nessadalen, making it easier to follow each step of the development process as well as working as a base for new repertoires to slow down the development process. McCurdy, Feigenbaum & Frenzel (2016) states that protest camps has been an important repertoire as well as 'place for repertoire making' in the history of social movements. In other words, one of the antagonists (the developer) that had been difficult to discuss with earlier due to physical distance were now at the site, giving more incentives towards physical actions rather than writing in the local newspaper.

Political opportunities were higher in form of the resistance groups' possibility to navigate the system. Several of the activists had become local politicians over the years, giving them the possibility to decide much of the focus of the debates. The resistance group also had the momentum on their side. The analysis of the newspaper *Hitra-Frøya* showed a remarkable increase in politicians and different political parties taking a stand in the wind power debate, most of them opposing the WPD, caused by the nearby local election. The extra mobilization caused by the increased sensation of threat in late 2018 made the wind power debate more relevant than ever, lifting the case to a new platform.

Other factors that might have affected the political opportunities and the mobilization could also have been the media – the media attention to the case was immense at this point (as well as all over the country), much due to the suggested framework for future wind power

developments. The combination of more visible actions, media attention, more resources such as judicial help as well as more political opportunities ended up with the municipality council saying ‘yes’ to a new referendum. This correlates with the findings of Carmin (2003) and her study of Czech communities’ responses to projects such as landfills, incinerators, highways and development of protected areas. Political opportunities and resources such as the media and local environmental organizations were found as key mobilizing factors.

Despite this successful mobilization in 2019, it quickly became evident that the politicians had no aspirations of stopping the WPD at the time. Their focus was on possible *future* questions about WPD at the island. In this sense, allowing the referendum would not mean any binding obligations from the politicians at the time, but could be beneficial in form of easy votes in the local elections the same year. The tactics of the resistance group had also changed in form of the tone that was used in the debate. It had been a long conflict, where some interviewees suggested that the politicians did not dare to reject the referendum because they were afraid of the harassment they might have faced in the aftermath of the vote.

In spite of the apparently increased political opportunities in the third protest cycle, looking more closely at the licensing process, the resistance group's best chance to change the outcome of the case was before the developer Sarepta signed the license contract in 2012. After this point, the case was no longer in the hands of the municipality, making it much harder for the resistance group to voice their concerns. However, the group continued to push the municipality council.

What also can be discussed as a reason for the power of execution and visibility the resistance group had, was that there was no active group supporting the wind power development at the island. Many were in favor of the development but were not as active as the resistance group.



Figure 4 Timeline presenting the different protest cycles and the different action forms preferred in each period

5.2 What kind of alliances are found, what is the nature of the alliances and how does this impact the social movement mobilization?

Collaborating partners or *social networks* as called in the SM literature, goes into the category of social resources (Abromaviciute, Seebruck & Edwards, 2019) and have been extremely influential in the case of Frøya. Social networks have been seen as an important contribution to small SM groups in the existing literature on the field, for not to say the survival of small groups (Edwards & Marullo, 1995; Edwards & McCarthy, 2004). As mentioned earlier, my hypothesis is that taken into consideration how long the conflict has lasted, the relatively small size of the resistance group as well as the impact and media attention the resistance group has had in the case, it is likely to believe that they have had help from other organizations and groups outside of the resistance group, which my findings also have revealed is the case.

As we have seen, the findings suggest that the resistance group at Frøya have three broader groups they have been collaborating with: the national 'environmental movement' (The Green Warriors and Friends of the Earth), different specific institutions with expertise on fields relevant to their case (Institute of Marine Research and Norwegian Ornithological Society) as well as allies within the national wind power resistance movement (Motvind Norway and other local wind power resistance groups around the country).

We can see that much of the resources that the resistance group has, comes from the social networks they have been able to create throughout the years, suggesting that the social networks have meant a lot for the opposition and hence also the mobilization. Maher et al. (2019, p. 414) also found that collaborating with other organizations seems to have positive effect on the time span of protest in the Civil rights movement in the United States. Time is also of importance in another way: the collaborating partners came at different periods of time throughout the years of resistance, giving the resistance group opportunity to make bonds with different and more groups as they were in need of them.

All of the collaborating partners were helping the resistance group out with different types of resources, where the diversity of partners can be seen as one of the advantages of the group. The local branch of the Norwegian Ornithological Society helped out in the knowledge acquisition in the background work of the resistance group, looking at the effects the development would have on fauna in the area and above all red-listed birds. The Institute of Marine Research borrowed the resistance group marine instruments to investigate the effects the

wind park would have on drinking water and under-sea animals (Interview 1). As we have seen, the environmental movement assisted the group with knowledge, experience and repertoires, and the broader national resistance movement also contributed with support and knowledge. These collaborations found place when they were needed by the resistance group: the 'expertise institutions' were of special importance in the early days of the resistance, as knowledge acquisition was the main repertoire at the time. The two latter groups became more important in the last protest cycle from late 2018 onwards.

As mobilizing factors, the environmental movement and the national resistance movement were of great importance in different ways. When it became clear that the WPD was going to become a reality, the action help from the Green Warriors became of uttermost importance, giving the resistance group the tools to slow down the preparations for the construction work while working to get through a new referendum and make official complaints.

The longer time that passed, the more did their repertoire look like the repertoire of the environmental movement, and especially the Green Warriors. This also fits the framing of the movement from the small start in 2002, when the resistance group was named Perikum (Norwegian for Hypericum, also known as perforate St John's-wort), that grows on the island (Grønskag, 2019). This suggests what kind of influence particularly the Green Warriors had on the resistance group.

Monetary aid to pay judicial help from private donors was irreplaceable and was one of the resources that made the resistance group gain the number of political opportunities as they did in the spring of 2019. Finally, the resistance group was able to push the municipality to have a look at the case again: was the developer right to continue working on the development site when they only had started with preparations by the date they were supposed to have started the actual work? The municipality hired their own lawyer, and finally agreed with the resistance group to make a halt in the development at the site in Nessadalen, bringing the case to the regional authorities as well as MoLGM. Even though both authorities declined the claim, this shows well the power the resistance group suddenly had through help from their partners.

Considering the importance of the national resistance movement, I would argue that support and solidarity were among the most important contributions to the Frøya case. Motvind Norway was founded as late as October 2019, where the findings suggest that the resistance group were crucial in the founding, and we have also seen what kind of inspirational source the

'Frøya action' has been for other local resistance groups around the country. However, I believe the notion of being in the fight against WPD together, also helped the motivation of the activists at Frøya. National demonstrations had become normalized by 2019, getting extra fuel from the national framework proposed by NVE in April.

5.3 Summary

Looking at the three protest cycles above, it is evident which one had most success. However, the third cycle could not have gained the success it did if it had not been for the groundwork that had been carried out in the past cycles, making sure that the resistance group was ready to act when the situation became urgent in the beginning of 2019. This shows us that time is a crucial element strengthening the significance of framing, resources, political opportunities and repertoires of contention for a small and local resistance group like "No to wind power at Frøya".

But what ensured that the resistance group was able to move forwards the first years of the resistance, when external resources were more restricted as well as the repertoires of contention? Yes, political opportunities were existent in this first years, and a good foundation for framing was also laid down, but what the analysis findings suggest has been of most importance is the manpower. Not the numbers, but the significance of dedicated individuals. The core of the resistance group has been stable throughout the years, which has been of great value for the continuation and evolvement of the group and their resources such as knowledge and social networks, making way for new repertoires of contention and political opportunities. Former literature has also found that a core of enthusiastic and dedicated individuals signifies just as much as a big member base (Edwards & Marullo, 1995; Edwards & McCarthy, 2004).

This is also shown from the many different interviewees stating the importance the resistance group had for the founding of Motvind Norway and leading the opposition from a local political fight to a national political struggle, where it has been a core of very few people on the frontline.

As to what has had the most mobilizing effect, I would argue that trust and threat are core external mobilizing factors. As discussed above, a loss of trust in local democratic institutions, and the increased feeling of injustice that followed the rejection of the referendum in 2012 had

great impact on the continuation of the work of the group. However, as the local community realized that the wind park was going to be installed in 2019, threat took over as the main mobilizing factor. The notion of urgency made the resistance group utilize all of the knowledge, contacts and manpower they had obtained over the years to show the municipality and developers that they were still interested in taking the fight.

These factors also show well 'what went wrong' from the municipality's side, where it mainly was the flaws in the process that led to the continuation of the active opposition towards the WPD.

In figure 5 below, I have tried to visualize what factors that have been influencing which over the years. Several of the factors have mattered in different periods of time during the case, but I have tried to simplify it by including each factor one time – when they were of most importance. The resistance group started with a few dedicated individuals that had a clear vision of what the problem was (diagnostic framing) back in 2002. Their vision and framing of the case attracted knowledgeable people with a multitude of resources in form of contact network, professional skills and time. The environmental framing led the resistance group to the important collaborating partners in the environmental movement, which had important implications for change in repertoires and increased media attention. It is a widespread thought among scholars that resources are important for obtaining news media coverage for social movements (Andrews & Caren, 2010). This, including the increased sensation of threat, which led to more monetary and judicial resources in the spring of 2019 and the fact that 2019 was an election year, gave the political opportunities that made the referendum and halt in the preparations at the wind park site possible.



Figure 5 Factors influencing the dynamics of resistance

6.0 Conclusions

Wind power development in Norway is and has been an extremely polarized topic, where the case of Frøya shows off as one of the most contentious cases in Norway. This qualitative study answers the two main research questions 1) *How has resistance against wind power at Frøya changed through the years, since the first application of development was sent out in 2002 until today, and what are the mobilizing factors?* and 2) *What kind of alliances are found, what*

is the nature of the alliances and how does this impact the social movement mobilization? The study conducted semi-structured interviews over phone or videoconference with 11 respondents representing different stakeholders in the case. The data was analyzed using concepts from social movement theory: political opportunities, framing, repertoires of contention and resources.

The almost twenty-year long-lasting resistance against WPD at Frøya saw three protest cycles or peaks of contention, where the four mobilizing factors increased for each cycle, much due to experience and time. Together with the four factors from the analytical framework, I identified two other factors that have been crucial for the continuation of the resistance: threat and trust. These have been seen as important factors in both the SA literature and the SM literature on siting of energy projects. The loss of trust in democratic institutions fits well with the overall message in the SA literature: the importance of including the residents into the whole siting process. The analysis reveals that the four original factors have been of importance at different times during the resistance, but it is plausible that it is the combination of the different factors that has had the most impact on the progress and success of the resistance group. Thematically, the thesis finds that nature preservation is the main reason for the resistance and has been formative for both what kind of collaborating partners they get, and what kind of action repertoires they focus on.

My findings also suggest that alliances became an important resource for the resistance group, with especial effect in the last protest cycle from 2018. The Green Warriors of Norway must be highlighted as the most influential alliance, giving the resistance group the tools needed to persevere in the fight against the wind park development at the most crucial point in 2019, highly dependent on However, the findings indicate that all of these factors have been dependent on the passion of few dedicated individuals that have been present throughout the whole case, being able to further develop and continue the work of the resistance group “No to wind power at Frøya”.

The increased resistance towards WPD in Norway the past years has ensured reevaluations of the way wind power licenses are given and on what and who's premises. However, the government has no plans to stop WPDs, their goal is merely to ensure that the expensive local resistance towards the energy transition decreases (Ministry of Petroleum and

Energy, 2020). As nature preservation and the lack of procedural justice have been important motivations for both attitudinal and active opposition against the WPD at Frøya, it will be interesting to see whether the times for local unrest surrounding WPD is over. This depends highly on the effectivity of the measures taken by the state and should be of interest for future research.

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Appendix A

INTERVIEW GUIDE
Resistance group

Historical backdrop

1. Can you describe how you got involved in the wind power case at Frøya?
2. How long have you been engaged?
3. How would you describe the situation around the wind power development at Frøya from the start of the project until today?
    - How did it start?
    - When did it turn around?

The opposition group

4. Do you want to characterize the opponents of wind power at Frøya as a group? Why, why not?
    - If yes; how long has it been around?

5. Can you tell us about how the No to wind power group is put together and how it works?
    - How many are active?
    - How have most people been recruited? Have most been active for a long time?
    - When did the group get most new members - why?
    - Is the Facebook group No to wind power at Frøya part of the same group? How is it used? Has it been important?

Framing

6. What are the main points that make you negative about wind power?
    - Has it changed over the years?
    - Would you say that most of the group agree on the main points or are there different reasons among the group for the wind power resistance?

7. How many actively contribute to the group's work? Would you say that this has evolved over time?
8. Who do you want to say is the "opponent" or the person(s) you are working against?
9. Does the group do other things together besides the resistance work? Social activities?
10. Have you noticed changes in the group from the beginning until now? Exemplify
11. Would you say that you have been trying to find "sympathizers" for your cause to develop the group? Exemplify.
12. How do you think others see you as a group?
13. What would you say is the main message of the proponents - and how has this changed over time?
14. Is this a unified group?

Political opportunity

15. What kind of room have you had to influence decision-making?
16. Would you say that the political possibilities of the group have changed over the years? How?
17. What kind of changes have there been in political leadership in the municipality, and what kind of opportunities has it given you?

The follow-up of the case from the municipality / county municipality / NVE's side

18. Can you describe your view on how the politicians / municipality / county municipality have worked with the wind power issue?
19. How was the decision-making process regarding the wind power development?
    - Was it open? Who was included?
    - How were people included?
    - How was the knowledge base among the population?
    - Do you feel that you have been heard in the process?

Resource mobilization

20. What kind of resources has the group acquired over the years? Have there been more resources? (Time, money, skills). Have the proponents gained more resources?

21. Has the group become better at using the resources you have available? What about the proponents?
22. Can you tell us about how the wind power group works with other organizations / groups - both local / regional / national? What about the proponents?
    - what have they had to say?

Contentious repertoires

23. How have both opponents of wind power and champions shown their commitment to the wind power issue? (Demonstrations, use of social media, writing in the newspaper, etc.)
24. Have you ever been surprised by the reactions to various events?
25. Do you have any examples of individual incidents that have led to stronger reactions from the locals?
26. Can you describe the activism of the opponents of wind power now and 10 years ago?
    - what has changed?
    - what do you think is the reason this has changed?
    - can you describe how the wind power opponents work to achieve their goals? What methods are used? Why? What has been the response to the various methods that have been used?
    - Why do you use the methods you use?
27. Are there individual incidents in the wind power case over the years that have had an impact on how the case has been handled?
    - If so, what kind and how?
28. Is there a point in the wind power case that you think turned the wind power case in the favor of both the champions and the opponents?
29. Is there anything I have not asked that you would like to add?

INTERVIEW GUIDE

Respondents outside the resistance group

1. What is your relation to the wind power development case at Frøya? Are you, or have you been involved in any way?

2. How would you describe the situation around the wind power development at Frøya from the start of the project until today?
    - How did it start?
    - When did it turn around?

The opposition group

3. Do you want to characterize the opponents of wind power at Frøya as a group? Why, why not?
    - If yes; how long has it been around?

Framing

4. In your opinion, what would you say is the main message of the resistance group No to wind power at Frøya?
    - Has it changed over the years?
5. Would you say that most of the group agree on the main points or are there different reasons among the group for the wind power resistance?
6. What is your perception of who the resistance group sees as their main opponent?
7. Would you say that the group has tried to find "sympathizers" for their cause to develop the group? Exemplify.
8. How do you see the resistance group?
9. To your knowledge: are there any proponents working actively in favor of the wind power development at the island?
10. What would you say is the main message of the proponents - and how has this changed over time?
11. Is this a unified group?

Political opportunity

12. What kind of possibilities to influence decision-making would you say the resistance group has had, if any?

The follow-up of the case from the municipality / county municipality / NVE's side

13. Can you describe your view on how the politicians / municipality / county municipality have worked with the wind power issue?
14. How was the decision-making process regarding the wind power development?
    - Was it open? Who was included?
    - How were people included?
    - How was the knowledge base among the population?
    - Do you feel that you have been heard in the process?

Resource mobilization

15. What kind of resources would you say the group has acquired over the years? Have there been more resources? (Time, money, skills). Have the proponents gained more resources?
16. Has the group become better at using the resources they have available? What about the proponents?
17. What is your impression of how the wind power group works with other organizations / groups - both local / regional / national? What about the proponents?

Contentious repertoires

18. How have both opponents of wind power and champions shown their commitment to the wind power issue? (Demonstrations, use of social media, writing in the newspaper, etc.)
19. Have you ever been surprised by the reactions to various events?
20. Do you have any examples of individual incidents that have led to stronger reactions from the locals?
21. Can you describe the activism of the opponents of wind power now and 10 years ago?
    - What has changed?
    - What do you think is the reason this has changed?
22. Can you describe how the wind power opponents work to achieve their goals? What methods are used? Why? What has been the response to the various methods that have been used?

23. Are there individual incidents in the wind power case over the years that have had an impact on how the case has been handled?
    - If so, what kind and how?
24. Can you tell me about your relationship to the resistance group against wind power at Frøya?
    - Has it changed over the years?
    - Got better / worse?
    - If so, why?
25. Is there a point in the wind power case that you think turned the wind power case in the favor of both the champions and the opponents?
26. Is there anything I have not asked that you would like to add?

INTERVIEW GUIDE

Decision-makers

Background

1. Can you start by telling us a little about how the wind power case has developed over the years?
2. What is your role in the wind power development on Frøya?
3. What kind of resistance has come in connection with the wind power development? Which groups have been negative to the project? Which have been positive?
4. What is your impression is the main reason(s) for the resistance? Which arguments come up the most? Has this changed over the years?
5. Why are people positive about wind power at Frøya? Which arguments are used the most? Has this changed over the years?
6. Can you tell us about their relationship to the resistance group against wind power on Frøya?
    - Has it changed over the years?
    - Got better/worse?
    - If so, why?

7. What kind of resources have opponents acquired over the years? Have there been more resources? (Time, money, skills). What about the proponents?
8. Have opponents become better at using the resources they have available?
9. How have the proponents used their resources?
10. Would you say there is a difference between how the proponents of wind power and the opponents work in the wind power case? What is the difference and why?
11. Can you tell us about your impression of how the resistance group (s) work with other organizations/groups - both local/regional/national?
    - What do you think they have had to say for the impact of the resistance group
12. How has the municipality reacted to the wind power project at Frøya? Has this changed over time? Why?
13. How was the decision-making process regarding the wind power development and what form did it take? Example: public meetings, information meetings, municipal board meetings etc.
    - Was it open?
    - Who was included?
    - How were people included?
    - How was the knowledge base in the population?
    - When did the meetings take place?
    - Did all parties have the opportunity to express themselves freely?
    - Were there any groups that were left out of the decision-making process?
14. How have both opponents of wind power and proponents shown their commitment to the wind power issue? (Demonstrations, use of social media, writing in the newspaper, etc.)
15. Is there a point in the wind power case that you think turned the wind power case in the favor of both the proponents and the opponents?
16. Is there anything I have not asked that you would like to add?



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