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Winning the Battle but Losing the War: Why the Lomonosov Ridge and Svalbard Continental Shelf Disputes Will Remain Peaceful

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
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Declaration

I, Jennifer Ciasullo, declare that this thesis is a result of my research investigations and findings. Sources of information other than my own have been acknowledged and a reference list has been appended. This work has not been previously submitted to any other university for award of any type of academic degree.

Signature.....

Date..... June 1st, 2021.....

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Abstract

With the annexation of Crimea, militarization, and opening of resources, the Arctic's perceived status of exceptionalism is quickly fading. As military and economic cooperation declines, the debate on whether the Arctic will submerge into conflict or continue as a zone of peace is heightening. The purpose of this thesis is to add to this discussion. The Arctic is home to various maritime territorial disputes that could be potential triggers for direct conflict; however, this thesis argues that this will not be the case. By looking into the cases of the Lomonosov Ridge and Svalbard continental shelf disputes, this study has discovers several mechanisms that keep these two disputes peaceful. In using the neorealist, neoliberal, and social constructivist approaches, this thesis finds not only what the peace mechanisms are, but also why they continue to work as cooperation falters. This thesis also discovers how the peace mechanisms affect if and how the disputes should be settled. In adding to the discussion on if conflict or cooperation is the future of the Arctic, the findings in this study explain why the Lomonosov Ridge and Svalbard continental shelf disputes remain peaceful.

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Abbreviations

CLCS	Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf
EEZ	Exclusive Economic Zone
FPZ	Fisheries Protection Zone
LOS	Law of the Sea
UNCLOS	United Nations Commission on the Law of the Sea

1. Introduction

The Arctic is synonymous with the “High North, low tension” region (Stravridis, 2013 in Gjørsv, Lanteigne, &, Sam-Aggrey, 2020: 2), yet for the past two decades, tension has risen and its former exceptionalism status is fading (Gjørsv and Hodgson, 2019). Despite advancing disputes, the opening of resources, and increasing military activity, the Arctic is still a peaceful region. This thesis explores why peace prevails in regards to the many maritime territorial disputes in the region. Rather than taking the approach of looking at the causes of the disputes, this thesis studies their conditions of peace. Peace in maritime disputes is not uncommon, as there is an international legal framework- the United Nations Law of the Sea Convention (UNCLOS) -which states tend to follow, as it provides suggestions on dispute settlement. Compared to land disputes, maritime disputes seldom result in direct conflict, since deciding jurisdiction through “pure power” dissolved after World War II (Baker, 2013). However, as the Arctic “heats up”, observers are concerned that increasing economic and military issues can affect the disputes (Clote, 2008; Aerandir, 2012). Although conflict over the disputes is possible, this thesis demonstrates why two disputes– the Lomonosov Ridge and Svalbard – will remain peaceful. Conflict would result in a Pyrrhic victory, in which the victory comes at too high a cost. Therefore, although a state may win the “battle” it would lose the economic and military “war” (Mohammed, 2019).

Five of the eight Arctic states have coastal territory in the Arctic that allows them to claim the Arctic for themselves, as decided unilaterally through the Ilulissat Declaration (The Ilulissat Declaration, 2008). These states include Canada, the United States of America, Denmark (Greenland), Norway, and Russia; all of which have one or more overlapping claims. Although the states have agreed to abide by international law in solving these disputes, three concerns have arisen in making countries weary when looking towards the North. First, with the melting of the Arctic, many of the resources that have once been unobtainable are now accessible, such as oil, hydrocarbon, and sea routes that cut off hundreds of miles of international shipping (Emmerson, 2011). Gaining access to larger amounts of territory where these resources lay could be potentially critical not only for states’ economies but also for the environment. Second, since the Cold War, the Arctic has fluctuated as grounds for militarization by the two superpowers. High tensions arose during war decades, quickly followed by de-escalation in the

1990s, with Mikael Gorbachev dubbing it a “zone of peace”. In the late 2000s, however, Russia began increasing its militarization once again to begin its journey on reestablishing itself as a great power. Causing alarm, the other states followed, making tension in the Arctic almost as intense as it was during the Cold War (Gjørsv et al, 2020; Melino and Conley, 2020). Although debated, Russia and the other states have claimed this militarization as an act of defense. As militarization grows, so too may the need for larger buffer zones between states (Gjørsv et al, 2020). Lastly, concerns for the Arctic’s future came forth from Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014. Considered a turning point in international relations with Russia, the Arctic states’ cooperation and unity faltered. If war were to break out in the Arctic, scholars have agreed it would be a spillover effect from this event (Huebert, 2019).

Discussion on whether the Arctic will succumb to war or stay cooperative is a frequent debate among Arctic scholars. Therefore, this thesis will add to the discussion by assessing the peace mechanisms within two maritime disputes: the Lomonosov Ridge and Svalbard. The purpose of this thesis is to evaluate the peace mechanisms that inhibit conflict from emerging from these two disputes. This study wants to know what these peace mechanisms are and why they work. Lastly, this thesis will discuss if and how the status of these disputes should change. Understanding the peace mechanisms that deter the states from engaging in an outright war over maritime disputes not only adds to the discussion of the Arctic’s future, but the findings may be relevant outside the Arctic as well. As maritime disputes seldom result in war, the peace mechanisms in this study can provide research on other global maritime disputes.

In studying the Arctic, it was once commonly viewed as an area of exceptionalism (Exner-Pirot and Murray, 2017) where international law and cooperation reigned. Now, however, there is rising debate on whether the time for peace has passed and if the Arctic will advance into war (Shea, 2019; Heininen, Sergunin, and Yarovoy, 2014; Young, 2009; Borgerson, 2008). When countering this argument, literature (Roberts, 2015; Zarubina, 2019) tends to view the Arctic as a whole, stating why peace will prevail despite militarization, the accessibility of resources, and external pressures from Crimea. These scholars acknowledge the contributing peace factors, but few look into what factors of peace sustain territorial disputes from advancing conflict. This study wants to take this step and look into what peace mechanisms are put forth specifically when reviewing the Lomonosov Ridge and Svalbard continental shelf disputes. It aims to find not only what the mechanisms are for these areas, but also why they

prevail. By looking at peace mechanisms from the neorealist, neoliberal, and social constructivist perspectives, this research promotes the common enablers for cooperation. Furthermore, research on solving Arctic disputes is typically done once again by studying the Arctic as a whole with international legal mechanisms resolving conflict (Watson, 2008 and Scolamiero, 2015).

Cooperation may be a key component in the Arctic, but it is unlikely for states to sign regional treaties or protocols to solve jurisdiction arguments any time in the near future. Therefore, to truly understand how disputes can be resolved, it is important to look at them on an individual basis to know how and if they can be settled.

Understanding and maintaining peace in territorial disputes is essential for several reasons. In wake of Crimea which has caused cooperation to decrease, maintaining peace in the territorial disputes shows that despite differences, Arctic states will not be quick to escalate conflict (Huebert, 2019). Due to the external pressures of Crimea, Russia's actions have left the Western states pulling out of military and economic projects, with both sides advancing military missions and claiming the other is acting offensively as they, themselves, are responding defensively (Byers, 2017). The Arctic has an estimated 25% of the world's known oil and gas reserves and is thought to have 25% of its unknown (Olje og gass i Arktis, 2011). Along with trade routes, exposure to natural resources, and tourism, an Arctic conflict that slows, or even stops, cooperation could entail tremendous damage to the world economy. With so much at stake, the Arctic states would be wise to not engage in conflict caused by the want of certain territory.

There is a history of a lack of direct conflict from disputes in the Arctic. Maritime disputes in the Arctic have existed since the 1920s when Canada and the Soviet Union both claimed sovereignty over Wrangel Island. Though Canada later backed down from said claim, it was the beginning of polar disputes reigning over the Arctic region (Head, 1963). However, as other disputes emerged, the world witnessed countless times as peace was maintained. Towards the end of the Cold War, the US and Soviet Union agreed upon their maritime boundary in the Bering Sea. When the Soviet Union established its boundaries in 1926, a part overlapped with territory given to the US in the cession of Alaska from Russia in 1867. It took nine years of negotiating, but the two states were able to compromise - though it is debated on what incentives led its settlement (Konyshev and Sergunin, 2014). Even more impressive, in 2010, Russia and Norway settled the boundaries of the Barents Sea --the tensest dispute in the region-- that started

in 1974 over different approaches to dividing territory. Prior to its resolution, the two had agreed on a “gray zone” in 1978 that regulated fishing and third party ships, showing that despite the tension, for the sake of resources, the two were willing to work together (Kříž and Chrášťanský, 2012). Lastly, in 2020 when Russia sent the Norwegian Foreign Minister a letter on the 100th anniversary of the Svalbard Treaty detailing Russia’s criticism against Norway’s restrictions, escalation was not found. Russia claims Norway is not abiding by the treaty, thus rejecting international law; however, despite the sharp tone of the letter, Norway and Russia have not increased their chances of going to war over the situation (Jensen, 2020).

There is a historical precedent that denies the Arctic disputes from becoming catalysts for war in the Arctic. Although the Arctic is “heating up”, this study discovers why territorial disputes have yet to cause direct conflict despite tensions. Crimea may have threatened cooperation in the region, but the Lomonosov Ridge and Svalbard disputes will remain peaceful and deny playing a part in the increased instability in the Arctic.

1.1 Research Questions and Objectives

1. What are the peace mechanisms in the Lomonosov Ridge and Svalbard disputes?
2. Why are these peace mechanisms able to deter direct conflict?
3. If and how can these disputes be resolved?

In answering these research questions for the thesis, the following objectives are to:

1. Identify the peace mechanisms for the two disputes
2. Aim to understand why the peace mechanisms function
3. Assess if and how the Lomonosov Ridge and Svalbard disputes should be resolved.

1.2 Structure Overview

The structure of this thesis is as follows: background, theoretical framework, methodology, analysis of findings and discussion, and conclusion. Chapter 2 defines the Arctic and reflects on the peaceful status of general maritime disputes. After, the background details the history and legality of maritime disputes. The chapter then specifies how the Lomonosov Ridge and Svalbard disputes came into being, who the actors in each dispute are, and why each side believes their position is correct. In establishing the theoretical framework, Chapter 3 reviews neorealism, neoliberalism, and social constructivism, the most commonly used approaches in studying the Arctic in regards to the stability of peace. Concepts from these theories are used to study what possible peace mechanisms are currently in practice. Chapter 4 details the methodology and goes into depth about research strategy and process. Chapter 5 reports the findings and uses concepts from the neorealist, neoliberal, and social constructivist theories to analyze the peace mechanisms in both the Lomonosov Ridge and Svalbard maritime disputes. These findings also give insight into the settlements of the disputes. After the analysis, there is a discussion on the significance of these findings. Lastly, Chapter 6 concludes with a summary and makes recommendations for future work on Arctic territorial claims and maritime disputes.

2. Background

2.1. What is the Arctic?

The Arctic can have many definitions, depending on which discipline is defining the region. For the purposes of this chapter, the Arctic is viewed through a political lens. The basic definition of the Arctic is that it is an area situated at the top of the northern hemisphere, described as a semi-enclosed ocean almost completely surrounded by land. Young and Einarsson define it in more detail as:

“all of Alaska, Canada North of 60°N together with northern Quebec and Labrador, all of Greenland, the Faroe Islands, and Iceland, and the northernmost counties of Norway, Sweden and Finland... [and in Russia,] the Murmansk Oblast, the Nenets, YamaloNenets, Taimyr, and Chukotka autonomous okrugs, Vorkuta City in the Komi Republic, Norilsk

and Igrska in Krasnoyarsky Kray, and those parts of the Sakha Republic whose boundaries lie closest to the Arctic Circle” (2004: 17-18 in, Gjørsv et al, 2019).

Although this standard definition gives a detailed overview of the region, it is much too broad for this study of maritime disputes; therefore, to narrow it down, this research considers the definition of the Arctic through the Ilulissat Declaration. In 2008, Denmark, the US, Canada, Russia, and Norway met in Ilulissat, Greenland to declare that they would have a dominant role in Arctic affairs due to their “unique position” (The Ilulissat Declaration, 2008). This declaration is used to counter thoughts of an Arctic treaty that would decrease the control of the Arctic countries in the region. This research defines the Arctic as these five coastal states did, as a region for states “bordering on the Arctic Ocean” (Rahbek-Clemmensen and Thomasen, 2018: 17). The Arctic Ocean is hinted at being “. . . the ocean surrounding the North Pole but excluding at least parts of the connecting seas.” (Rahbek-Clemmensen and Thomasen, 2018:18). This definition allows for the exclusion of Iceland¹ from this research. Although Iceland has land in the Arctic Circle, the Arctic Five consider it to be in the Greenland Sea rather than the Arctic Ocean; therefore, it is not an Arctic coastal state. Likewise, since the Arctic Five are concern with maritime activity, including delineation of the continental shelves, this study must exclude the two non-coastal states, Finland² and Sweden, as they also do not border the Arctic Ocean and, therefore, have no direct interests (Rahbek-Clemmensen and Thomasen, 2018). Although these states may be relevant in other Arctic research, for this study, only the five coastal states are necessary. Using this narrow definition of the Arctic Ocean allows for a more focused study pertaining to the Arctic Five, as they are the states involved in Arctic maritime disputes³.

2.2. The Legal Basis of Maritime Territorial Disputes

Since 1950, 157 countries have participated in a disagreement on maritime boundaries (Ásgeirsdóttir and Steinwand, 2016). From these countries, Prescott and Schofield (2004) believe there to have been 427 active disputes at the turn of the century, which has increased to 512

¹ Iceland adamantly disagreed with the format of the declaration; therefore, the five states purposely excluded Iceland from qualifying as a coastal state (Rahbek-Clemmensen and Thomasen, 2018).

² It should be noted that Finland was a coastal state before 1944. As part of the Moscow Armistice, the Soviet Union ceded Petsamo Province, blocking Finland’s access to the Arctic Ocean (De Gadolin, 1952).

³ Although the US does have disputes with other Arctic states, it cannot make continental shelf claims as it has not ratified UNCLOS; instead, it accepts it as customary law.

according to Newman (2018) or 640 following Cannon's research (2016). States with more coastline (China, Canada, and Russia) are bound to have more disputes due to the likelihood of having more neighboring states with overlapping claims (Ásgeirsdóttir and Steinwand, 2016). States with dependencies and colonies also have more disputes (France, UK, and the US), as do areas in the Caribbean and Mediterranean where states are clustered together in small spaces (Ásgeirsdóttir and Steinwand, 2016). These disputes exist because the law does not grant legal rights to one state as it does in land disputes. Instead, Law of the Sea (LOS) acknowledges that all disputing states can have valid claims, so it is up to the states to make a "reasonable sacrifice" in dividing the area (Weil, 1989). With validation from international law, there are three types of disputes: 1) boundary demarcation, 2) control of sea lines of communication (SLOC) and straits, and 3) distinction of the continental shelf (Kříž and Chrást'anský, 2012).

To legally solve these disputes, states can use bilateral agreements, third-party arbitration, or international courts and tribunals. (Byers and, Østhagen, 2018). Bilateral negotiations are the most common dispute resolution, – accounting for 90% of settlements- as states are given more freedom, with less cost and uncertainty than when using courts or arbitration (Østhagen, 2020). In the Arctic, only a few disputes are resolved (for example Russia v. Norway in the Barents Sea and the US v. Russia in the Bering Sea.); however, there are still numerous remaining. This section looks into two remaining Arctic disputes, explaining the legality of Svalbard (a boundary demarcation dispute) and the Lomonosov Ridge (a continental shelf distinction).

From 1956 to 1958, the United Nations held the first conference for the law of the sea (UNCLOS I). From its establishment, four treaties were agreed upon: Convention on the High Seas; Convention on the Continental Shelf; Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone; and Convention on Fishing and Conservation of Living Resources of the High Seas. The Convention on the Continental Shelf entered into force in 1964 and established the sovereign rights of coastal states. Article 6 highlighted the settlement of boundary disputes, declaring states to come to an agreement. If an agreement could not be reached, the Convention introduced two boundary principles. First, the median line principle is used when two or more states' coasts are opposite of each other. With the two states facing each other, the continental shelf is divided, so that each point from the baseline is the same. Second, if two states are adjacent with an adjacent continental shelf, they should abide by the equidistance principle. As with the median line

principle, the equidistance principle divides the water at a mid-point, creating equal boundaries on both sides (Convention on the Continental Shelf, 1958).

In 1960, UNCLOS II commenced, but after six weeks, talks ended without any new agreements. From 1973 to 1982, UNCLOS III convened to discuss concerns with territorial claims, environmental protection, navigational rights, and resource exploitation (Von Glahn and Taulee, 2013). In 1994, the treaty came into force with its 60th ratification, setting the current rules for how nations are to utilize both internal and international waters. The layout of the maritime zones is as follows: 12 nm for territorial sea; 12 nm for the contiguous zones; 200 nm for Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ); and 200 nm for the continental shelf that leads into the high seas. Within the territorial zone, the nation-state has full sovereignty, with foreign countries having the right of innocent passage (Von Glahn and Taulee, 2013). In the contiguous zone, the state still has the right to full sovereignty and can enforce laws against illegal activities, such as smuggling or illegal immigration. In the EEZ, a state has rights to economic gains, but it cannot militarize the area. In the seabed of the EEZ, states have access to the continental shelf, which Part VI of UNCLOS III defines as:

. . . [T]he seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond its [the states] territorial sea throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin, or to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured where the outer edge of the continental margin does not extend up to that distance. (United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea, 1982: 53).

If disputes occur in this 200nm area, UNCLOS III introduces the equity principle as means of delimitation. This principle not only takes into account the coastal geography of the state but also the position of natural resources and security interests (Østhagen, 2020). It surpasses the equidistance principle⁴ of UNCLOS I, which is the former general rule for delimitation, as it is objective and boundaries are established with scientific research (Beazley, 1978).

⁴ Under UNCLOS III, the median and equidistance principles fall under the same definition for delimitation of boundary, disregarding whether states are opposite or adjacent. Any usage of the equidistance principle henceforth in this study does not distinguish between the median and equidistance principles of the 1964 Convention.

However, the former principle is not flexible and cannot account for special circumstances; thus UNCLOS III's resolution process is established “. . . in order to achieve an equitable solution (United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea, 1982: 56).

After the 200nm of the continental shelf, states can claim an additional 150nm as an extension of their continental shelf. To claim this additional territory, the UN created the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS), where states must submit a request for the area. A state must submit a claim in ten years from ratifying UNCLOS III and also show that the territory is “a natural prolongation of its continental shelf” (Watson, 2008: 312). The CLCS deals with delineation, the process of finding the boundary between the outer limits of the shelf and the international seabed, and consists of 21 experts - geologists, geophysicists, and hydrographic scientists- who view the submission for approval (Watson, 2008). CLCS has two main purposes, which are to “provide scientific and technical advice to nations preparing submissions and to review submissions and make recommendations regarding the breadth of a coastal nation's continental shelf.” (Watson, 2008: 353). When a claim is submitted, a subcommission is assigned to review the said claim and then delivers its recommendations to the Commission. In the instances of disputed territory, all involved states must have consented to the submission. Annex I states “In cases where a land or maritime dispute exists, the Commission shall not consider and qualify a submission made by any of the States concerned in the dispute. However, the Commission may consider one or more submissions in the areas under dispute with prior consent needed by all States that are parties to such a dispute” (Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, 2001). The Commission reviews the submission and delivers its findings to the state(s) and the UN Secretary-General. If the coastal state does not accept the recommendations, the Commission allows the state to reevaluate its data and revise its previous submission. The Commission's purpose is to simply recommend to states where the outer limit of the shelf is scientifically located. The Commission cannot determine the boundaries of a coastal state, as most states have overlapping claims and, therefore, they must debate their boundaries among themselves (Salpin, 2015). The Commission is seen as a “legitimizing” because although the Commission cannot solve disputes if a state is in agreement with the CLCS on its boundaries, its claim is seen as more legitimate than a state that does not (Watson, 2008).

2.1.1. The Lomonosov Ridge Dispute

This dispute over the Lomonosov Ridge is originally caused by Russia, Canada, and Denmark submitting claims that overlap by 54,850 square nm around the North Pole (see appendix 1). Russia's claim is solidified as an extension of Franz Josef Land, while Canada's is an extension of Ellesmere Island, and Denmark's is legalized through an extension of Greenland (Henriques, 2020). Russia's central Arctic claim was submitted in 2001 by claiming 460,800 square miles of the Arctic, including the Lomonosov Ridge up to the North Pole (Gunitskiy, 2008). The CLCS reported that Russia did not have enough evidence for them to accept the bid. In 2007, Russia once again focused on the continental shelf, conducting more research to provide missing evidence. On August 2nd, 2007, Russia planted the Russian flag at the bottom of the ocean, causing outrage from the international community (Burdina, 2018). In 2015, Russia provided more evidence to the Commission, resulting in the Russian Minister of Natural Resources declaring in 2019 that the UN agrees that the areas of the Lomonosov Ridge, Mendeleev Ridge, and Podvodnikov Basin are all extensions of Russia's continental shelf. The Commission does agree that the data presented for the geology of the shelf seems to be in Russia's favor; however, the official statement provided by the Commission does not comment on the claim (Staalesen, 2019). In 2021, Russia extended its claim up to Canada's and Greenland's EEZs and now encompasses 70% of the central Arctic (Breum, April 2021).

Canada submitted a claim for the shelf in 2013, the same year it ratified UNCLOS. Prior to the submission, Canada only took its claim up to the North Pole as “a means of facilitating a political settlement. . .” (Quinn, 2019); however, in the same year, Canada pulled the claim, stating “We are determined to ensure that all Canadians benefit from the tremendous resources that are to be found in Canada's far north” (John Baird in Henriques, 2020). In 2019, Canada resubmitted its claim, this time including the North Pole, thus, overlapping a section of the ridge that Russia wants. Likewise, Denmark joined in on the dispute in 2014, claiming the entire ridge as its own (Henriques, 2020). Denmark has laid claim to 900,000 square kilometers of Arctic waters, overlapping with Canada to the west of Greenland and Russia north of the North Pole, as its claim extends to the Russian EEZ (Burdina, 2018).

2.1.2. The Svalbard Dispute

Svalbard is a Norwegian archipelago located in the Arctic (see appendix 2). Prior to Norwegian ownership, Svalbard was *terra nullius*, with multiple states using the area for hunting, mining, and fishing. During the Swedish-Norwegian Union, Svalbard's sovereignty came into question, but Russia deeply discouraged the islands' annexation. When the Union dissolved in 1905, Norway once again brought up the question, promoting discussion between Norway, Sweden, and Russia in 1910. During the discussion, the three agreed on a rotating chairmanship between themselves, with a Commission; though Svalbard would remain a no-man's land. Germany and the US opposed, as Germany wanted more influence in the region and the US was not keen on the governing model proposed. A revision of this proposal was made in 1912 and 1914, but objections remained the same. Norway, once again, set up a conference for 1915; however, World War I broke out, halting discussion on Svalbard (Jensen, 2020).

After the war, Norway was rewarded for being a neutral ally and gained control of Svalbard as part of the means to a "lasting peace in Europe" (Jensen, 2020: 83). A Spitsbergen Commission was held from July 18 to October 22, 1919, hosting members from the UK, France, Italy, Japan, and the US. When asking other interested countries about Norway's sovereignty, most (Denmark, UK, the US, and France) responded positively. Sweden and the Netherlands wished for the international community through the League of Nations to govern, a proposition that the Commission did not consider (Jensen, 2020). With agreement from the relevant states, the treaty was signed on February 9th, 1920. Left out at this time, however, was the newly established Soviet Union, whose predecessor was deeply involved in Svalbard talks. Non-recognition from the Western states combined with internal political turmoil from its transition kept the Soviets from participating in negotiations. It was not until 1924, when Norway formally recognized the Soviet Union, that, in turn, the Soviets agreed to Norwegian sovereignty over Svalbard (Offerdal, 2016). On August 14th, 1925, the Svalbard Treaty entered into force and remains in force in its original form. (Jensen, 2020).

In the establishment of the Svalbard Treaty (1920), three key points were agreed upon: Norway has complete sovereignty over the archipelago, no country can build bases or militarize, and signatories of the treaty benefit from its nondiscrimination principle. With the nondiscrimination principle, all 46 signatories enjoy equal economic rights, regardless of

nationality (Jensen, 2020). It is with this principle that issues arise, as Norway has been and is presently, being accused of failing to abide by it. Svalbard's treaty was ratified in a time before the acknowledgment of the continental shelf, meaning the treaty does not mention how to govern the sea beyond Svalbard's territorial water (Jensen, 2020 and Pedersen, 2006). The dispute, therefore, is created by the various interpretations of the treaty, with Norway and a number of other states on opposing sides of the argument.

Norway maintains that the treaty is not enforced outside of territorial waters because it is not explicitly stated in the treaty. In its most recent White Papers (2016), Norway says:

The special rules stipulated in the Treaty do not apply on the continental shelf or in zones that were created in accordance with the provisions in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea governing exclusive economic zones. This follows from the wording of the Treaty and is underpinned by the Treaty's prehistory and by its development and system (Meld. St. 32, 2015–2016: 20).

Norway holds that because the treaty predates modern international law, it has complete control of Svalbard's EEZ and continental shelf. In 2006, Norway submitted its claim to the CLCS for the Norwegian continental shelf, encompassing the Banana Hole in the Norwegian Sea, the Loop Hole in the Barents Sea, and the West Nansen Basin ("Submission by The Kingdom of Norway", 2009). This submission included a large part of the waters around Svalbard. Norway holds that Svalbard sits on the Norwegian continental shelf and is naturally under Norwegian sovereignty despite the treaty. Russia, Iceland, Spain, the UK, and the Netherlands have publicly protested this approach to the disagreement, believing that Norway should not have sovereignty because its authority over Svalbard was founded by the treaty and not customary law. These states believe that Norway should be restricted based on the restrictions of the treaty, thus modern law should be taken into account. Russia's Defense Ministry has even gone as far as to declare the dispute rising from these two interpretations as a potential risk of war. (Nilsen, 2017). Others believe that Svalbard actually has its own continental shelf and the nondiscrimination principle should come into play, allowing all signatories to profit off of whatever the waters of the continental shelf hold because the shelf is not Norwegian. Meanwhile, Canada, Sweden, and Finland have previously shown support for Norway in its endeavors for authority over all waters outside of the territorial seas. Pedersen, 2006 and Jensen, 2020).

2.3. Rising Tensions in the Arctic

In the past decade, the relationship between the Arctic states has shifted. The Arctic has always been praised for being an example of pristine international cooperation, but since the annexation of Crimea, cooperation between the states has decreased and tensions are now comparable to those during the Cold War (Huebert, 2019). This situation has left researchers and scholars uneasy about the Arctic's future. Russia's actions of supporting the rebel groups in Donetsk and Luhansk left the Western states pulling out of military and economic projects. The world saw as Russia refused to participate in the Arctic Security Forces Roundtables and as exercises between NATO and Russia depleted. Both sides, instead, began practicing their individual exercises. In 2015, nine western countries conducted exercises from Finland, Sweden, and Norway; meanwhile, Russia began investing more time into its Air force and Arctic Brigade situated on the Kola Peninsula. Norway, Denmark, Iceland, Sweden, and Finland also explicitly stated that they were increasing their defensive capabilities as a direct response to Crimea; while Canada, in 2015, increased its patrol ships and began constructing a refueling facility for its navy (Byers, 2017). Both NATO and Russia increased flights over the region, with the head of the US Northern Command stating "[the Russians have] been very aggressive . . . in the Arctic. . . Aggressive in the amount of flights, not aggressive in how they fly" (LaGrone, 2015 in Byers, 2017). Of course, the intentions behind these actions are debated; as for the military flights, Russia did increase its amount, but never entered Canadian or American airspace. The Western states are also seen as becoming more aggressive, since last year, Norway began temporarily housing US submarines in Tromsø. Russia declared this to be "against the previous practice of neighborly relations" (Falk, 2019), but Norway declined these allegations by stating that the Bratelli Doctrine (1975) was not violated because there were no nuclear weapons and the US's involvement was simply a standard activity among allies. Both sides have been advancing their military exercises and practices, but both deny that it has been done for offensive reasons (Byers, 2017). Unfortunately, it seldom matters how the West or Russia meant for their actions to be taken; both sides have determined the other to be an aggressor against their own security, thus lessening trust in the region.

In the economic sphere, states adopted sanctions against Russia in the aftermath of the invasion. The EU, the US, Canada, and Norway established travel bans on Russian officials and

restricted access to arms, technologies, and Western markets. Meanwhile, Russian offshore oil projects struggle to function, as they lacked Western companies' goods and services. In retaliation, Russia forbade food imports from the EU (Byers, 2017). Russia is suffering from these sanctions despite Putin's reassurance that they are impacting the Western states more. Its economic development is reducing with its gross domestic product decreasing by 1- 1.5 percent and its growth rate lowering by 0.2 every year (Rainne, 2020). These sanctions are not only creating an economic problem for mainland Russia but for the Arctic as well. Without technologies from Western countries, Russia is limited in its exploration of resources (Rainne, 2020). Since Russia's supposed mission is to control the Arctic, these sanctions are a setback, causing frustrations to build.

Although the events in Crimea intensified the potential for war in the region, the melting of ice and exposure of resources already caused the Arctic Five to consider the Arctic a prime area for expansion.⁵ Navigation, trade, oil, gas, and fishing are areas that can be exploited as they become accessible (Emmerson, 2011). Oil, gas, and mineral reserves in the continental shelves were once too expensive to extract or were completely inaccessible due to ice. Although little leeway was made due to extraction still being costly with little technology to access it, states hold firm to the potential ability to exploit these resources in the future. It is thought that the Arctic holds 25 percent of the world's known oil and in a 2009 US Geological Survey, the US discovered 83 billion barrels of oil and 44 trillion cubic meters of natural gas north of the North Pole-- estimated to be three years' and fourteen years' worth of global supply, respectively (Byers, 2009). With such vast numbers, of course, countries have their eyes on accumulating this and surrounding territory for their national usage. In the waters around Svalbard, there is estimated to be a value of ten billion USD, a significant price to fight for and worth it for Russia, which continues to debate Norway on the interpretation of the Svalbard Treaty (Berglund, 2020). In 2020, on the 100th anniversary of the treaty, Russia attempted to persuade Norway to comply with Russia's demands for Svalbard. Written in a letter from the Russian Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov, to the Norwegian counterpart, Ine Eriksen Søreide, Russia claims that Norway is

⁵⁵ In the early 2000s, there was a "scramble for the Arctic" so to speak. The coastal states' interest in the opening of oil and gas reserves and demands for increased global energy causes for a surplus of offshore development. However, in the mid-2010s, Arctic oil production was too costly to operate and many of the projects were abandoned (Ebinger, Banks, and Schackmann, 2014).

in violation of the treaty for abusing its authority, and has declared that Norway is “. . . limit[ing] economic activity in the archipelago.” (The Maritime Exclusive, 2020). Although territorial disputes themselves have not been at the forefront of these rising tensions, because of weakening confidence in the peacefulness of the Arctic, they can potentially serve as a trigger for greater conflict (Laruelle, 2020).

3. Theoretical Concepts of Peace

To answer the research questions of what are the peace mechanisms of the Lomonosov Ridge and Svalbard continental shelf disputes, and why they are implemented, it is imperative to know what peace mechanisms are. This section of the study introduces and explains the theoretical concepts for conditions of peace from a neorealist, neoliberal, and social constructivist perspective. These three theories are a part of the three major schools of international relations and can help explain the world in which we live. To understand world politics, Nye states “we must understand both the realist and liberal view of world politics and be alert to social and cultural changes that constructivists emphasize” (2000: 222). Using these three theories allows for a much fuller understanding, as neorealism and neoliberalism are two views of the same approach; while constructivism serves as the middle ground between them (Keohane and Martin, 1995 and Richmond, 2008). Neorealism and neoliberalism differ on specific issues -such as causes of peace-, but they both fall under the rationalist approach and view states as the main actors in an international system of anarchy (Powell, 1994). Meanwhile, constructivism agrees that the international system is anarchical, but says state behavior is caused through social interaction (Wendt, 1992).

Using these three theories, this research discovers what international relations says about maritime disputes and their impact on conflict in the Arctic. It examines the approaches as they apply to the Lomonosov Ridge and Svalbard disputes and identifies the peace mechanisms for each state. In the debate on whether conflict or cooperation will prevail in the Arctic, scholars have taken a neo-neo stance, with neorealists believing that conflict may be increasing, while neoliberals believe states will overcome the tensions. As the Arctic becomes a hotspot, the neorealist approach sees states becoming greedy for resources. A weak institutional structure combined with “selfish and security-anxious states” (Keil, 2014: 165) creates more competition

and less cooperation, thus the potential for war is heightened (Keil, 2014; Wilhelmsen and Lundby Gjede, 2018; and Lucas, 2014).

On the other hand, this study includes neoliberalism to counter neorealism. Neoliberals view cooperation and reliance on institutions as a constant, thus major conflicts are prevented. The various institutions help regulate Arctic affairs and have been successful in settling previous Arctic disputes. Cooperation from institutions and interdependence keep the Arctic peaceful, as scholars agree it is not in the best interests of states to delve into conflict (Keil, 2014; Kapyla and Mikkola, 2013). As neorealism focuses on the pessimistic side of world politics and neoliberalism counters with optimism, constructivism views how society influences the status of the Arctic. Constructivism disputes and builds upon the neo-neo debate, adding to the mix that institutions and actors' interests can change, thus the rising of tension in the Arctic is what the states make of it (Stephen, Knecht, and Bartsch, 2018).

By using these prominent theories to review peace mechanisms in the maritime disputes and discover why they exist, this study can contribute to the discussion of conflict versus cooperation in the Arctic. In finding the peace mechanisms in the Lomonosov Ridge and Svalbard disputes, this thesis takes the stance that the theories are not mutually exclusive, thus mechanisms from all three theories can be at work at the same time. By using these three theories, this study contributes to the already prominent Arctic neo-neo debate and add a social constructivist view on the role of continental shelf disputes in the Arctic.

To structure this chapter, this research begins with reviewing the neorealist approach and its views on peace and cooperation, before examining Kenneth Waltz's contributions of global stability to the theory. After, the same process is conducted from the neoliberal perspective, by looking into a liberal idea of peace and the role of cooperation. The concept of peace examined is Keohane and Nye's concept of complex interdependence, with a specific look at interdependence through international institutions and economics. Lastly, this study takes the Wendtian approach to constructivism, to discover how social interaction influences states.

3.1. Neorealist Peace Mechanisms

Drawing upon the works of Waltz, this section demonstrates how neorealists deter conflict through negative peace. As the founder of neorealism, Waltz contributes significantly in demonstrating this negative peace in the formulating of the balance of power. A balance of

power is perhaps the most well-known neorealist peace mechanism so reviewing Waltz's work is necessary. His emphasis on survival, security, and alliances through a balance of power contribute greatly to the understanding of peace in an anarchical system. Waltz also emphasizes the stability of conventional and nuclear deterrence. Nuclear deterrence defined the Cold War era, and although we are no longer in the Cold War, it is still readily used in the Arctic, thus this concept is taken into consideration. Using Waltz's peace mechanisms show that although neorealists see conflict in the Arctic as inevitable, the approach also creates peace under the right conditions.

3.1.1. A Neorealist Peace

Neorealists concern themselves more with the concept of war than peace. This is not to say that realists do not believe in peace; but rather, peace is simply the absence of violence (Galtung, 1967). Violence is defined as "present when human beings are being influenced so that their actual somatic and mental realisations are below their potential realisation" (Galtung, 1969: 168). An absence of violence is described as a negative peace, as peace is created through coercion to stop something unfavorable (Richmond, 2008). A negative peace never fixes the underlying problems to resolve disputes between states, and since disputes are never outright resolved, there is always the potential for a hot war to emerge (Miller, 2010). As Mearsheimer writes, although there is not outright war, there is "relentless security competition with the possibility of war looming in the background" (1994: 9). War exists within neorealism due to the anarchical system. Anarchy creates suspicion and security dilemmas, causing a state's basic preference to be survival. Waltz points out that the anarchical system creates a world of competition that states must combat in order to "provide for their own security and provide for threats or seeming threats to their security abound" (Waltz, 1988). An anarchical system also sees peace as delicate because of existing structures and distrust; therefore, war is a normal reaction in the international arena. (Waltz, 1988 and Miller, 2010).

Because of this distrust, cooperation to obtain peace in neorealism is minimal, with cooperation being a coincidence at best (Richmond, 2008). As with peace, neorealists do not deny the concept; however, cooperation is difficult in a world where states prioritize maximizing their relative power over absolute (Jackson and Sørensen, 1999). This is due to the self-help system that creates a "condition of insecurity--at the least, the uncertainty of each about the

other's future intentions and actions--works against their cooperation . . . A state worries about a division of possible gains that may favor others more than itself" and because "a state also worries lest it become dependent on others" (Waltz, 2010:105-106). The division of gains is concerning because if one state gains more than the other, it can use its gains against the other. Waltz adds, "Even the prospect of large absolute gains for both parties does not elicit their cooperation as long as each fears how the other will use its increased capabilities." (1979: 105). Mearsheimer (1995) says that states need to also watch out for cheating, as global anarchy creates a system of competition, and a friend one day can be an enemy another. Because of cheating and a focus on relative gains, states are reluctant to cooperate; therefore, as long as distrust and self-reliance exist, peace mechanisms in neorealism are concerned with state survival. If state survival is in jeopardy, neorealists ascribed to two ways in which states can stabilize the situation: a balance of power and deterrence.

3.1.2. Balance of Power

Balance of power is not often seen as a peace mechanism, but rather a catalyst for war, with Vose Gulick stating that war is a ". . . corollary of the balance of power" (1955: 88). Because distrust is prevalent, states try to maximize their security, creating a security dilemma⁶. Fear of exploitation drives the security dilemma; leading to less cooperation among states if the cost is too high (Waltz, 2010). Trying to pursue a balance to counter this security dilemma can sometimes lead to a worsening of the security dilemma; however, it can also stabilize the international system, thus under the right conditions, it is perceived as a peace mechanism. A balance of power can only be achieved under two conditions: when anarchy is seen as the world order and survival is the key wish for all units involved. Neorealism believes anarchy to be the world order; therefore, there is no differentiation between states which ". . . implies their sameness. . . [S]o long as anarchy endures, states remain like units."(2010: 93). States are autonomous and therefore they face similar situations, allowing for potential balance.

⁶ Jervis defines it as a situation that is present when "many of the means a state uses to increase its security decrease the security of other states" (Taliaferro, 2000: 129). It creates a chain reaction of events where if one state increases its military buildup, others will feel less secure, thus leading them to increase their power too, and thus creating a vicious cycle.

When it comes to survival, Waltz says “Internationally, the environment of states' action, or the structure of their system, is set by the fact that some states prefer survival over other ends obtainable in the short run and act with relative efficiency to achieve that end.” (2010: 93). According to neorealists, the strain for survival is considered high politics. Policy issues in a self-help system focus on survival because it is the most important, beating out low policy issues such as trade, economic gain, and social policies. High politics dwell on state security, extending past internal problems, and instead focuses on interstate relations (Hodman, 1966). High politics take precedence, as states are more likely to take notice of security issues that threaten the state. Because the survival of the state is threatened, states take action to stop the problem, sometimes through intervention, but more likely through conflict. When high political concerns are created there is more chance for conflict to ignite: opposed to low politics that seldom advance because they are not important enough (Nilsson, 2012).

If states decrease cooperation and are only concerned with their individual interest, how are we not in constant war? The answer is to create a power balance. States can do this by balancing internally or externally. Internally, states increase their capabilities through military spending or economic growth. Externally, states form alliances. Through the formulation of alliances, states can deter war by “checking” the power of other states. Weaker and smaller states can do this by either joining other smaller states to combat a larger or by joining a more powerful state to counter another powerful state (Rana, 2015). States join alliances because their survival is in jeopardy, thus an alliance against a rogue state is the safest tactic to deter domination (Waltz, 1985). Though not typically willing to cooperate, to deter a more powerful state, the incentives to come together are heightened.

War is less likely if there is a balance of power due to two common assumptions: states will not start a war if they will not be successful and states will be less successful if they have less relative military power (Claude, 1962). Wagner says that there is a common assumption that there are only two outcomes of war: winning and losing. If this is the case, then as one state's success and power increases, the other decreases in a zero-sum game. Thus if one state's incentive to not start a war decreases because of a balance of power, then another state's will increase, leading to an imbalance of power and war (Wagner, 1994). Peace can be found, however if it is not assumed that there were only two outcomes. Instead, there is winning, losing, and a stalemate. By adding a third option, a balance of power is more likely to create a stalemate,

thus minimizing a state's chances of winning a war. Since states' probability of winning decreases, they may look towards negotiations to solve their conflict (Wagner, 1994).

A second factor that affects peace is the number of states impacted by the outcome of the war. When conflict emerges, expectations are created by how the power is distributed and who is participating. In a bipolar world, the conditions of the above paragraph apply where an equal distribution of power creates less conflict. In a world with more actors, more states will join a side or coalition when there is cause to defend their sovereignty. The more their sovereignty is threatened by an opposing state or alliance, the more likely they too will join and influence the outcome of the conflict. Schroeder writes that a balance of power is equipped “. . . for managing and restraining both opponents and allies” (1994: 159) When there is a multipolar world, the balance of power can create peace if power is distributed unequally. There is bound to be a dominant power, and thus a coalition of weaker states will be created to stabilize the greater power (Wagner, 1994). If states are willing to increase cooperation in a self-help system, balancing power through negotiations and alliances can create less conflict. Although the balance of power is consistently used as a mechanism that causes war, under certain conditions, this paper also argues that it is an established condition for peace.

3.1.3. Deterrence

If there is a balance of power, it can create deterrence because a power balance lessens the chances of winning while heightening the costs of war. This causes states to act in ways that do not disturb the balance, thus states can “induce others to do things or not to do things which they would not otherwise do or refrain from doing” (Snyder, 1960: 163). Through deterrence, the defending state can dissuade the aggressor states from acting by threatening it with force. This threatening force is known as second-strike capability, meaning that after the initial attack from the aggressor state, the deterrent state can strike back in a way that “let[s] the punishment fit the crime” (Waltz, 1990: 733). With deterrence, a defending state always attacks back as its main purpose is to “. . . damage or destroy things that the aggressor holds dear” (Waltz, 1990: 733)⁷. States can conventionally deter in two ways: denial and punishment. The first is deterrence by

⁷ This is assuming that the defending state has credibility in its deterrence policy. A threat is credible if the defending state's second-strike capabilities can produce substantial costs and if the aggressor believes that the defending state will strike back (Huth, 1999).

denial, where an aggressor state tries to make territorial gains, but fails due to the defending state's military forces. This deterrence is used to counter an aggressor state that tries to use its military force quickly, as means to catch the other state off-guard and lower casualties. Mearsheimer (1983) and Glaser and Kaufmann (1988) state that in deterrence by denial, the defending state must have fast-acting military capabilities that stop the aggression from the onset (in Huth, 1999). These military capabilities create zero benefits while heightening the costs, thus it is too risks to take action. The second type of deterrence is deterrence by punishment, where the aggressor state has access to gains, but the costs are more than the benefits of the gains. In some situations, these 'punishments' may not be military, but rather economic, as states impose trade sanctions and establish a "threat of deprivation" that is too great for aggressor states to ignore (Snyder, 1960). Deterrence makes attacking too costly because potential gains can be rejected and economic and military consequences can be inflicted. Therefore, if either method of deterrence is utilized and credible, then deterrence is successful as a peace mechanism.

However, with the creation of nuclear weapons, the relationship between conventional deterrence and peace changed. Previously, deterrence was achievable because would-be offending states needed to account for conventional fighting and defensive tactics. When attacking with nuclear weapons, however, conventional fighting is unnecessary and defense is impossible. If deterrence failed, one or more states could be annihilated because of the immense power of nuclear weapons, thus deterrence is not only difficult but also extremely costly (Schelling, 1966). According to Waltz, however nuclear weapons create deterrence when there is potential for large-scale aggression; with nuclear deterrence countering war in three ways. First, although war is still possible with nuclear weapons, the gains diminish as the costs increase, with aggressive states risking their survival if the defending state strikes back. War becomes too dangerous, as states fear retaliation, and the costs of using nuclear weapons become so extreme that no state can gain from attacking first (Waltz, 1999). Second, since states know the costs are high, they act with more care and caution, and ask themselves "why fight if you can't win much and might lose everything?" (Waltz, 1981). Lastly, it is assumed that the will of defending state is higher than the aggressor's, thus diminishing the likelihood of winning. In sum, going to war in a world of nuclear weapons coincides with enormous costs and little gains. Waltz says "if countries armed with nuclear weapons go to war, they do so knowing that their suffering may be unlimited." (Waltz, 1981). It is because of this unlimited suffering that deterrence is still

effective in an age of nuclear power. Waltz believes that nuclear weapons can lessen war; therefore, deterrence is equipped at maintaining peace.

3.2. Neoliberal Peace Mechanisms

Drawing upon the works of scholars such as Keohane and Nye, this research looked into the prominent peace mechanisms employed in a neoliberal approach. Neoliberalism is useful in this research because it shares similar epistemology, ontology, and methodology to its counterpart, neorealism (Powell, 1994). However, as neorealists envision a negative peace in the Arctic, neoliberals see a positive peace. Positive peace mechanisms are used to change the national and international structure (Galtung, 1969); therefore, this section looks into the best neoliberal ways to do so. Keohane and Nye are important in investigating liberal peace mechanisms as they shaped the idea of complex interdependence. They discovered that the concept can be used in oceans (Keohane and Nye, 1989), thus it is a perfect concept to apply to the Arctic. Complex interdependence also incorporates both international institutions and economic interdependence, two of the most prominent methods of cooperation; therefore, Keohane and Nye's concept is valuable in discovering peace mechanisms in the Arctic disputes.

3.2.1. A Neoliberal Peace

If neorealists view the world through negative peace, then neoliberals advocate for positive peace. Positive peace is the absence of structural violence. It is more than simply taking away an unwanted problem; but rather, it promotes peace through changing the system in which violence was allowed (Galtung, 1969). To establish peace, neoliberals acknowledge that conflict paves a way for a peaceful world. To eventually create such a world where war is unlikely or even unimaginable, states must cooperate (Miller, 2010). Neoliberals declare war to hold no incentive if states believe that “. . . harmony and cooperation, political pluralism, democracy, and a broader distribution of rights and responsibility are crucial to peace.” (Richmond, 2008: 23).

Cooperation as a key to peace is not a new concept, as it is found in the works of Enlightenment thinkers, such as Locke and Kant. By cooperating, individuals and states secure their interests, as seen in Locke's emphasis of the social contract - an agreement between citizens and the state, in order to protect life, liberty, and private property. Kant believes peace prevails

when the system's structure is changed to one of international law, trade, and democracy; stating that peace is generated when social and economic processes are reformed (Richmond, 2008). In more recent years, Keohane defined cooperation as “. . . when the policies actually followed by one government are regarded by its partners as facilitating realization of their own objectives, as the result of a process of political coordination” (1984: 52). Keohane emphasizes that to create peace, states must have similar and compatible needs. A neoliberal peace, therefore, shows not only how cooperation is enhanced, but also how neoliberal peace mechanisms are used to change structural violence. To understand how such peace is created, this study looks into how complex interdependence plays a role.

3.2.3. Complex Interdependence

Interdependence is the reliance on other actors when pertaining to political economics and the military. In the creation of political agendas, state and non-state actors are conscious of the costs they impose on other members. In response, these other members will try to adjust to these costs if they have the capabilities as a way to maintain mutual cooperation. Under unique conditions, complex interdependence - an extreme form of interdependence- can exist and stabilize peace (Keohane and Nye, 1989). In this form of interdependence, although there is still an asymmetrical system of powerful states and weak states, complex interdependence gives these weaker states more opportunities to be influential. Due to such an extreme form of interdependence, the risk of war is lowered because of the heightened chance of interfering with various other state interests (Byers, 2017). Keohane and Nye comment “. . . in many contemporary situations, the use of force is so costly, and its threats so difficult to make credible, that a military strategy is an act of desperation” (2012: 15).

Complex interdependence is specifically created to counter the realist idea of what interdependence was. It does not reject the notion of realism, but rather expresses concerns with its assumptions, particularly those perceiving states as the dominant actors and the use of military force necessary (Rana, 2015). Instead, complex interdependence is defined by three characteristics: 1) there are no hierarchical issues and state policies will ‘trade off’ policies for a different subject when needed 2) states operate through multiple channels of contact that lessen states from interfering with other's foreign relations 3) Military force is unnecessary and irrelevant against other states. With no hierarchy, there is a world where the security agenda is

not at the forefront, lessening the use of military force against other states (Keohane and Nye, 1989). The importance of multiple channels also heightens, as transgovernmental and transnational actors bring into question how states can act within their own interests as cooperation increases, making Keohane and Nye ask: “which self and which interest?”(1989: 34).

3.2.3.1. International Institutions

The multiple channels of complex interdependence leads to an increase in importance for international institutions. As discussed before, these channels can be transgovernmental and transnational organizations that are not limited by state boundaries. With these channels, governments can try to succeed by bringing agencies- both governmental and nongovernmental- in as allies for decision-making processes. This creates transgovernmental policy networks that question the fact that states act within their self-interest. Although not important in the realist approach, the increasing importance of international institutions is a founding mechanisms for liberals.

Neoliberals place international institutions as the pinnacle of the creation of a stable world. Lisa Martin points out that neoliberalism is compatible with realism, but institutions simply play a larger role than scholars like Mearsheimer give them credit for. Mearsheimer, like many other realists, believes that international institutions cannot be a peace mechanism because they are only an extension of great power’s self-interests. Keohane counters this claim by emphasizing that institutions are necessary because they hold three advantages: reduce cost for cooperation, increase costs for cheating, and information diffusion. In a world of uncertainty, institutions can ease costs by relaying information and strengthening decentralization by creating a system of reciprocity. Institutions alter transaction costs, which are “costs of specifying and enforcing the contracts that underlie exchange” (North, 1984: 256). If these costs were considered negligible, institutions would not need to exist, but because rationality never views these costs as negligible, institutions continue to exist when the costs of enforcement, communication, and monitoring are low (Keohane, 1984). Kinsella and Russett (2002: 1052) add that international institutions create peace because they are conflict suppressors. For these authors, peace is “...caused by both the absence of inducements to conflicts and the presence of conflict-suppressing conditions”. They believe conflict is caused by major power status and

geographical proximity, but can be deterred through increased membership in international institutions and trade dependency (Kinsella and Russett, 2002).

International institutions are found to have a significant decrease in conflict. Older studies (Vasquez 1993, Jacobson, Reisinger, and Mathers, 1986) show that though this is true, it may be more correlation than causation. Institutions tend to be set up during the peaceful period directly after a war, creating a positive relationship between peace and themselves (Russett, Oneal, and Davis, 1998). Other research has found that if participation in international institutions is increased from the 10th percentile to the 90th, fatal conflict is decreased by 43% (Oneal, Russett, and Berbaum, 2003). A similar study suggests that there is a positive feedback loop between peace and institutions due to findings indicating that states revoke their memberships of institutions in light of a military dispute (Russett, Oneal, and Davis, 1998). If this is true that international institutions are a peace mechanism, it is because they instigate peaceful relations and cooperation among states. Institutions can promote peace by possessing the capabilities to use force needed to enforce rules, by pursuing interests that are compatible with mutual interests, and by teaching norms that change state preferences, so they are more in line with the liberal view (Russett, Oneal, and Davis, 1998).

Furthermore, under complex interdependence, international institutions are not just norm setters and mediators, but also have the significant ability to “. . . set the international agenda, and act as catalysts for coalition-formation and as arenas for political initiatives and linkage by weak states” (Keohane and Nye, 1989: 35). In ocean politics, Keohane and Nye found that institutions have more influence in agenda setting than they do in the international monetary arena. They also find that they are important in rulemaking, as seen with the UN and UNCLOS, where even non-coastal states participate. They allow for less developed countries to be influential in ocean politics, despite these states not having the capabilities, while simultaneously decreasing the power of greater states. Multiple channels, along with linkage and agenda setting in the oceans can create an ideal situation of complex interdependence. When viewing oceans, direct policy interdependence is not only found, but also increased through international institutions, allowing the ocean area to be the ideal situation for cooperation (Keohane and Nye, 1989).

Yet, even though institutions can act as peace mechanisms in the above ways, even liberal scholars can admit it is difficult to have power of enforcement. Indeed, international

institutions thrive better by dealing less with coercion and more with cooperation. Decentralized institutions can create peace in six ways; by “. . . coercing norm breakers; mediating among conflicting parties; reducing uncertainty by conveying information; problem-solving, including expanding states’ conception of their self-interest to be more inclusive and long-term; socialization and shaping norms; and generating narratives of mutual identification.” (Russett, Oneal, and Davis, 1998: 444-445). Although the idea of coercion spawns from realist theory rather than liberal, institutions act as a collective security system against both members and nonmembers. A collective security system creates a greater incentive for states to cooperate and prevent military intentions because an attack against one is an attack against all. If a state goes “rogue”, the institution -in theory- has the ability to suppress the conflict. (Miller, 2010 and Russett, Oneal, and Davis, 1998). Institutions can also act as mediators that lessen the costs of conflict and allow for communication between the adversaries. They can also reduce uncertainty by diffusing information because “. . . information-rich institutions . . . may help governments pursue their own interests through cooperation” (Keohane, 1984: 146-47). By communicating information, states can more easily catch rogue states and punish them in a timely fashion. In the same breath, institutions can solve problems by altering state perceptions. They can link issues and conduct payments and trade-offs to settle agreements. In shaping norms, Caporaso (1992) compares institutions to a chessboard for their ability to make a move and have states react to said move. Participating in institutions entails states creating common interests that become shared norms and establish cooperation among their members. Lastly, by building a mutual identity, states will have similar values and states will integrate others’ self-interests (Russett, Oneal, and Davis, 1998). Not every institution will use all six functions to facilitate cooperation, but by using one or more, international institutions are mechanisms for peace in an anarchic world.

3.2.3.2. Economic Interdependence

An increased economic interdependence is one of the pillars of complex interdependence for the creation of peace. This is acknowledged through Genest’s definition of complex interdependence when he defines it as “an economic transnationalist concept that assumes that states are not the only important actors, social welfare issues share center stage with security

issues on the global agenda, and cooperation is as dominant a characteristic of international politics as conflict.” (1996: 140). For this research, economic interdependence corresponds specifically to trade interdependence, as it does not only reduce conflict, but it is also thought to be more influential than economic growth, democracy, and alliances in their quest to deter disputes (Gartzke, Li, and Boehmer, 2001). Economic interdependence creates peace because unlike in neorealism where there is a hierarchy of high and low politics, the economic sector in neoliberalism is just as important as the security (Rana, 2015). As Hirschman (1977) writes, “. . . international commerce, being a transaction between nations, could conceivably also have a direct impact on the likelihood of peace and war: once again the interests might overcome the passions, specifically the passion for conquest.”

This common interest of interstate trading keeps cooperation afloat, as scholars have found that they help lessen war. (Oneal, Russett, and Berbaum 2001; Polachek, 1980). Gasiorowski (1986) also adds that although trade lessens the likelihood of war, short capital flow actually increases it. Barbieri, on the other hand, finds that trade heightens conflict, while Doruseen states that trading interdependence only functions positively if there are only a few states with little barriers. According to Doruseen, the more trading partners and barriers there are, the more incentives there are to participate in war (Gartke, Li, and Boehmer, 2001). Hoffman (1965) agrees, believing that economic interdependence “. . . breeds not only commendation and harmony, but suspicion and incompatibility.” (in Oneal, Oneal, Maoz, and Russett, 1996: 13). This incompatibility can be found if there are asymmetric relations, with trade acting as a political influence; however, if this is not the case, Gilpin’s research is correct in rejecting other scholars’ studies on the increased amount of important influence trade relations have on war (Gilpin, 1987).

To show how economic interdependence can maintain peace, Roserance introduces two types of states: territorial and trading states. Territorial states believe war is more valuable, while trading states acknowledge that they can benefit through economic cooperation (Roserance, 1986). Through economic interdependence, the value of war decreases as both free trade and the division of labor increase. The incentives for war simply become more costly than trade. It is monetarily expensive for states to build up their military, transportation, and technologies. War also is costly because it interferes with free trade. When war erupts, trade is halted, impacting the economies of both the aggressor and non-aggressor state. For states willing to indulge in war, it

is a zero-sum game at best and a negative-sum game at worst (Rosenance, 1986). On the other hand, if states engage in economic interdependence, they usually play a positive-sum game. Free trade becomes a sufficient option, leading to a decrease in states' self-reliance. Although autonomy is valued among states under normal conditions, with the benefits of interdependence there is less to no incentive to continue to be a territorial state (Rosenance, 1986).

Interdependence causes state preferences to change and, through it, cross-national partnerships are formed, enhancing the power of international institutions. When these two are combined, Domke (1988) and Russett (1993) both agree that incentives for war are further decreased because policy is created to uphold these economic benefits. Because war is too costly and states have incentives to cooperate, conflict is lessened during economic interdependence. As Keohane and Nye point out, "economic interdependence is not inherently costly, thus does not lead to war" (1987: 40)

3.3. Social Constructivism Peace Mechanisms

Social constructivism is a social theory rather than strictly one found in international relations. It critiques the pessimistic view of the world that neorealists proclaim, while at the same time challenges the critics to the post-positivist approaches. It is viewed as a compromise between the neo-neo debate, as the world is what states make of it (Richmond, 2008). As the founder of constructivism, Wendt's ideas of identity and interests contribute greatly to the understanding of peace. How states identify and are identified influence their interests, leading to a system of competition or cooperation. It is important to know on the basis of what constructivism is founded so looking into Wendtian constructivism is necessary. This section looks into how identity and interests can create cooperation in what Wendt describes as a Kantian system (Wendt, 1999). To further this idea of peace and cooperation from a constructivist perspective, it is imperative to review Adler and Barnett's security community concept. As a region where states work together, the Arctic can qualify as an area for a security community. A security community is "as imaginable as the wars they are designed to overcome" (Adler and Barnett, 1998), so they play a prevalent role in discovering relevant peace mechanisms in social constructivism.

3.3.1. A Social Constructivist Peace

Constructivism is considered the middle ground between the neorealist and neoliberal approaches; therefore, in its consideration of peace, it does the same. As with neoliberalism, constructivism sees peace as more than just an absence of violence; however, it acknowledges that how states view peace depends on the individual state, thus negative peace can also exist in a constructivist world (Richmond, 2008). States can choose different forms of peace because the structure of an international system is more social rather than material as neorealists and neoliberals would say. Through viewing the system as social/intersubjective over material, states' identities⁸ and interests⁹ are key in understanding why states behave the way they do. A state's identity tells who they are, not only to themselves but also to others. A state's interests let actors know what a state wants. Wendt says "interests presupposed identities because an actor cannot know what it wants until it knows who it is, and since identities have varying degrees of cultural content so will interests" (1999: 231). As states form their identity and interests, they also construct peace that is fitting for such an identity and interests. States are limited to a peace that is consistent with their agency, which is founded on their resources. Likewise, peace not only comes from a state's identity but also from the anarchy that states create and control (Richmond, 2008).

Wendt agrees that world politics is built upon an anarchical system; however, he declares that there are multiple anarchies in which states can engage. This is because the world is not based upon a structure of self-help as neorealists believe; but rather, from a "structure of identity and interest", with states acting on "the basis of the meanings that the objects (or other actors) have for them" (Wendt, 1992:397). As identities and interests create the structure of the world, Wendt recalls three systems of anarchy. First is the Hobbesian structure, in which states are enemies, with no sense of collectiveness or limitations to their violence during conflict. Peace

⁸ States have four kinds of identities. First is personal or corporate, in which states form a sense of "I" and separate themselves from others. Second is type identity, derived from Fearson (1997), where a social label is placed upon states who have one or more same characteristics. Third is role identity, in which the identity depends on other states, shared experiences, and culture. Lastly, there is collective identity where the distinction between Self and Other is blurred, and states act altruistically as they are one and the same (Wendt, 1999).

⁹ There are two types of interests: objective and subjective. Objective interests are those that are needed in establishing the fur identities. Subjective interests are those that actors strive for to meet the needs of their identity (Wendt, 1999).

and cooperation in this system is extremely unlikely, as “life is nasty, brutish, and short” (Wendt, 1992:415). Second, the Lockean structure upholds that states see each other as rivals, as they have some shared ideas. States abide by sovereignty and although there is competition, their mission is not to conquer other states. Cooperation in such a system is possible if joint gains are recognized and interdependence is not exploited. States would be willing to limit their violence as they mutually recognize sovereignty and view security as egoistical rather than competitive (Wendt, 1992). Lastly, the Kantian anarchical structure creates neoliberal cooperation that conjures up a constructivist peace. States in a Kantian system see each other as friends, as they share institutions, fight as one, and diminish the usage or risk of war (Wendt, 1999). Such a system creates socialization among the states, contributing to a constructivist peace that “rests on institutional, constitutional and civil components” (Richmond, 2008: 82). In constructivism, a state’s view on peace develops from its identity and interests. As states create and control the anarchical system, so, too they control peace.

3.3.2. Security Community

Constructivism believes that the world is socially constructed and, therefore, social relationships define the structures that exist. These structures come about through shared knowledge, material resources, and practices. If there is shared knowledge within a system, actors know and understand expectations of themselves and other actors. This shared knowledge creates meaning for material resources. Constructivists believe that resources are only considered resources if actors use shared knowledge to put meaning behind them. Material power in and of itself is neutral but gains influence if actors allow. This is why practices are important, as social structure needs to be in process in order to exist and make meaning out of interests. It is these practices that establish which social structure is put in place (Wendt, 1995).

When a Kantian system is put in place through shared knowledge and ideas, shared norms are institutionalized in regimes, with member states complying with the rules as they socialize (Richmond, 2008). In such a system, actors create security communities, in which “states act in groups to establish a community with its own institutions aimed at providing a stable peace” (Richmond, 2008: 83) Security communities are a special kind of political communities, according to Deutsch in his coining of the concept. They are regional creations whose borders may or may not correspond with geographical borders (Bellamy, 2004); and

whose members use institutionalized processes to resolve internal disputes without violence. Deutsch says that the community is “a belief on the part of individuals in a group that they have come to an agreement on at least this one point: that common social problems must and can be resolved by processes of ‘peaceful change’” (Deutsch et al., 1957: 5). Peaceful change is “the resolution of social problems, normally by institutionalized procedures, without resort to large-scale physical force” (Deutsch et al, 1957: 5).

There are two types of security communities. The first is an amalgamated community where formally independent actors come together to form a single unit - such as in the US. The second is a pluralist security community, in which independent states come together - i.e. the Arctic states (Deutsch et al, 1957). In introducing the concept of security communities into constructivism, Adler and Barnett (1998) tell of three phases of community development: nascent, adolescent, and mature. The first is a nascent security community, in which members do the minimum of what is needed for a security community and have “dependable expectations” of creating peace. Meanwhile, a mature security community is one in which states aid each other, creating “a system of rule that lies somewhat between a sovereign state and regional, centralized . . . government (Alder and Barnett, 1998). This community forms a collective security system¹⁰, thus creating a neoliberal peace in the region.

In developing pluralist security communities, Alder and Barnett state that there are three key elements that contribute to creating conditions of peace. First, security communities develop from shared identities, values, and meanings. Charles Taylor says:

common meanings are the basis of community. . . intersubjective meaning gives a people a common language to talk about social reality and a common understanding of certain norms, but only with common meanings does this common reference world contain significant common actions, celebrations, and feeling. These are objects in the world everybody shares.

¹⁰ A collective security system directly counters a self-help system. It claims to create stability through an all against one mantra, with states “agree[ing] to abide by certain norms and rules to maintain stability and, when necessary, band together to stop aggression” (Kupchan and Kupchan, 1995: 52-53).

This is what makes community (Simmel, 1971 in Adler and Barnett, 1998: 31).

Anderson (1990) refers to this as “imagined community”, because these shared values span across a community whose members may have never met. These communities rely on the shared identities, values, and meanings to fuse together members who may otherwise have nothing in common (Adler and Barnett, 1998). Shared norms of the community are created through international institutions that help states discover their mutual interests and build a common identity. Here, it should be noted that in a security community, states do have an overarching identity between themselves; however, this should not be confused with a collective identity where the Self and Other are conjoined. Actors keep their own sense of self but are influenced by the values of the community (Richmond, 2008).

Second, security communities have many-sided direct relations with other members of the community. Direct relations allow for states to learn the motivations and behaviors of the other member states to strengthen trust between them. When states interact, it should be done face-to-face and through multiple channels as relations do not benefit from only taking place in isolation (Adler and Barnett, 1998). Combined direct relations with the third element - common long-term interest- and a stable security community can be established. Acharya agrees with this third element, saying that a security community “. . . implies a fundamental, unambiguous and long-term convergence of interests among the actors in the avoidance of war” (2009: 201) Member states are willing to establish reciprocity and invest in long-term interests because of prior interactions that teach states about the others. With long-term interests, states feel a sense of responsibility and obligation to act altruistically, as all benefit from doing so. Long-term interests and many-sided direct relations show that even in a security community, states can still prioritize interests. Ferdinand Tönnies (1955) claims that states in a community relinquish their own interests when granted membership, as these individual interests cause competition and, therefore, conflict. To counter this, security communities should have diffused reciprocity, rather than immediate, and increase the number of interchangeable interests with others in the community. Competition still exists but is lessened to such a degree that disputes are settled non-violently (Adler and Barnett, 1998). If states can maintain a security community, then common interests, direct relations, and shared identities can create peace in a region.

3.4. Summing Up the Peace Mechanisms

Neorealism, neoliberalism, and social constructivism all have unique mechanisms in their consideration of peace. Neorealism views states as selfish and distrustful, with the use of force and fear driving states into accepting peace. It is likely to be short-lived, with states able to balance and deter each other. Neoliberalism, on the other hand, works to create peace by stabilizing the world through social and economic systematic changes. Complex interdependence enhances these liberal ideals through its heightened cooperation through international institutions and economic interdependence. Each pillar of complex interdependence creates reliance and diminishes the uncertainty in an anarchical system. A social constructivist considers peace to reflect a state's identity and interests. States create a security community when their identities and interests are compatible and maintain peace within their unit of states. As seen, there is no one way to create peace; therefore, this thesis uses multiple theories to demonstrate the various techniques states use to keep stability in the Svalbard and Lomonosov Ridge disputes.

Table 1: Arctic Dispute Peace Mechanisms Summary

Theory	Peace Mechanisms		
<p>Neorealism The world is a self-help system, in which the only peace is a negative peace that deters violence for the moment, but not indefinitely. States are untrusting and never know what other states are thinking, leading to a perspective concerned with survival, security, and relative gains.</p>	<p>Balance of Power To create stability in the system, states join together against an offending state.</p>	<p>Deterrence States use force to dissuade potential aggressor states from taking action. The costs outweigh the gains; with the offending state either being denied said gains or punished militarily and/or economically.</p>	
<p>Neoliberalism States can create a positive peace by changing the structure. It is in the best interest of states to cooperate and reform social and economic processes.</p>	<p>Complex Interdependence States are so intertwined that there is missing incentive to commence war. There is no hierarchy of issues, states engage in multiple channels, and military force is unneeded in a world deprived of a security agenda.</p>	<p>International Institutions States come together through transgovernmental and transnational means to create shared norms and interests</p>	<p>Economic Interdependence States' economies rely on each other to trade; therefore, everyone suffers in war.</p>
<p>Social Constructivism The world is what states make of it. States can create either positive or negative peace depending on which system of anarchy is presented. Identities and interests form the system, with states more concerned with the social rather than material resources.</p>	<p>Security Community State used shared identity, values, and meaning, along with many sided direction relations and common long-term interests to create peace</p>		

4. Research Methodology

This study examines the peace mechanisms in the Lomonosov Ridge and Svalbard continental shelf disputes. There is a consistent debate on whether the Arctic will engage in more conflict or if cooperation will prevail. Fears of increased militarization, resource exploitation, and spillover from the Ukrainian Crisis have led researchers to ask if the Arctic is “heating up”. The main objective of this study is, therefore, to add to this discussion by asking why disputes remain peaceful. This research assesses that the ongoing maritime territorial disputes will not advance into conflicts because cooperation to maintain peace still plays a large role in Arctic politics. The study also concerns itself with answering the question of solving the disputes. A second objective is knowing if and how these two disputes can be solved. This chapter describes the research process to answer the above objectives. First, it describes and justifies the qualitative approach. Data collection, sample selection, and method of analysis are then explored, with clarification for why each specific component was picked. Lastly, this chapter assesses the research ethics and concludes with a discussion on the trustworthiness of this project.

4.1. Methodological Approach

This thesis aimed to understand the peace mechanisms in the Lomonosov Ridge and Svalbard continental shelf disputes. To do so, a qualitative approach was used, as this method is concerned with the underlying motivations, opinions, and reasonings of a problem (DeFranzo, n.d.). Using qualitative research allowed for the research questions to be answered appropriately, in order to add to the discussion on whether there will be more or less conflict in the Arctic. This approach is important in not only examining phenomena but also in diving deeper and understanding them in context. This is relevant to this study because the peace mechanisms found are influenced by the social context of the world’s political affairs, and to understand why or how they were put in place, it is important to understand the real-life context in which they were created (Esterberg, 2002). Politics does not exist in a vacuum, and in the case of the Arctic, domestic affairs, and outside and historical events contributed to the creation of disputes, thus acknowledging the context outside the specific disputes is necessary.

This research also benefited from qualitative research because it evaluated the states’ official positioning and was conducted through the perspective of the respondents, rather than the

researcher, as with quantitative. Therefore, the analysis corresponded directly with the peace mechanisms that the states implemented and the experts deemed important. As this study was understanding the perspectives of the disputing Arctic coastal countries, it was interested in the point of view of experts, and their thoughts on the motivations behind the states' interactions. The qualitative approach also allowed for a deeper understanding of these mechanisms. By using an approach that is known to be more unstructured, this study was able to receive richer data because it was able to learn not only what the peace mechanisms were, but also why the states employ them (Bryman, 2016). Quantitative data would not allow for this, as it is more structured and less concerned with words than it is numbers. If quantitative research were to be used, the research would have found out which mechanisms and solutions were appropriate, but it would have lacked the "why" and deeper understanding of state behavior, values, and interests that are important when examining the research questions (Bryman, 2016).

This qualitative research was interested in understanding the perspectives and motivations of why states remain peaceful in the Arctic. In such subjective research, there are tools to help collect and analyze this information. One of these tools that is appropriate and justify the usage of the qualitative approach is a case study. There is no single definition or understanding of a case study; however, it can be described as an "intensive examination of an event in a particular group, organisation or situation (Boodhoo and Purmessur, 2009: 5) or an "intensive study of a single unit for the purpose of understanding a larger class of (similar) units . . . observed at a single point in time or over some delimited period of time (Gerring, 2004: 342). More so, this research was a multiple case study -as each dispute was one unit- with a purpose in analyzing data both in and across situations to find peace mechanisms that span across disputes (Yin, 2003). Using a multiple case study was valuable because it not only observed a subject intensively, but it also "shows how things occur in practice" (Boodhoo and Purmessur, 2009: 5). This thesis was concerned with examining the peace mechanisms of the Lomonosov Ridge and Svalbard continental shelf disputes as relations in the Arctic are changing. In doing so, it hoped not only to thoroughly achieve its objectives but also provide insight into other maritime disputes, which are similar units of analysis. As this research not only wanted to understand what the peace mechanisms are but also why they occur in practice, a case study was useful.

4.2. Data Collection

The data for this study was collected through semi-structured interviews and governmental official documents/statements. Combined with secondary data, using both interviews and governmental records created triangulation, which not only increased the trustworthiness of this research but also heightened the understanding of the raw data (Noble and Heale, 2019). Semi-structured interviews were used because they allowed for a set of generalized questions that could become more detailed depending on the participant's background and how they had responded to previous questions. It was important to not have fully structured interviews that did not allow for a divergence from the material because some topics would not have been able to be further explored. Semi-structured interviews created leniency to ask spontaneous questions, in order to figure out concepts that had not previously been thought about; therefore, adding to this research's inductive approach. This technique also benefited the researcher, as semi-structured interviews can expand on issues that were found to be interesting and allowed for the ability to ask these questions on these issues (Bryman, 2016). The interviews also allowed for participants to speak freely with the ability to emphasize the topics they felt the most comfortable. For the semi-structured interviews, data was collected online, over Zoom or Microsoft Teams, or through phone interviews, depending on the participant's preference. The questions asked in these interviews can be found on the Interview Guide (see appendix 3). They took place in the bedroom of the apartment, with the door shut and headphones in, to ensure as much privacy as possible. The interviews were recorded with a recording device and/or through the video call application if the application allowed. Both methods of recording were used as a safety measure in case there was a malfunction. After recording, the interviews were transcribed on the same day in Word documents on a private computer.

When collecting official documents to triangulate the data, historical methods was used to make sure they were the most relevant to the study to enrich the interviews. Historical methods uses both primary and secondary data to recount an event because scholars "can't understand a situation without some perception of where it fits into a continuing process or whether it has happened before." (Tosh, 2015: 1). Primary sources are raw data, which are first-hand accounts of an event, including original and legal documents; newspapers; speeches, letters, and interviews. Secondary sources are one step removed from being first-hand accounts and aim

to interpret and analyze primary sources (“Primary and Secondary Sources”, modified 2021). Historical methods poses a hierarchy of sources, with primary sources as the most important, because they allow scholars to understand what observers thought was happening rather than what happened. Using primary sources also disinvites narration and bias from a second party that may reinterpret the primary sources (Tosh, 2015). Because of this hierarchy, it was important to pick sources that were primary and showed an accurate depiction of states’ thoughts and behaviors. To do this, the official government websites of Norway, Denmark, Canada, and Russia were used, along with press conferences and other media sources, in order to obtain documents and statements relevant to the cases. This data was selected because it was the best for collection, as it examines the official positions of the disputing states. The interviews and official documents/statements were then combined with secondary sources as means to create a triangulation of data. Triangulating the data not only allowed for this research to review how the different data sets backed up or refuted one another, but it also established the best-rounded findings.

4.3. Sample Selection Approach

In beginning the search for respondents, the population was driven by two criteria: the participants needed to be knowledgeable on one of the four disputing countries, and they needed to have written or commented on Arctic maritime disputes to show a level of expertise on the subject. Within this criteria, this study was interested in finding academics in the legal or political departments, Arctic researchers in a relevant field (security studies, legal studies, political science, or international relations), and governmental officers. From this population, this research was interested in 10-15 participants who are experts on Arctic maritime disputes. Originally, more interviews were wanted, as scheduling online interviews are easier than in-person; however, because of at-home office, participants may have had a plethora of emails and emails about this study remained unanswered; therefore, it was decided that 10 respondents were practical. As this research involves four disputing states, it wanted to have multiple experts for each country’s perspective and felt that two to three experts on each state was sufficient. The reasoning for limiting these participants to these fields is because they are informed primary sources. These experts are not only living through the events that are shaping the

cooperation/conflict debate in the Arctic, but they are key actors who are actively participating in, writing about, and educating themselves on the events. Likewise, in selecting the official documents, it was imperative that they were also primary sources relevant to the situation. The chosen data was used as historical sources to determine the four states' past and current relationships and policies in the Arctic. Selecting experts who were close to the event - combined with the primary sources of official documents- was key in establishing findings that had as much raw data as possible.

In using historical methods, generic purposive sampling was conducted to establish a repertoire of respondents who were relevant to Arctic disputes. Purposive sampling was necessary because it takes an a priori approach and relies on the judgment of the researcher for the selection process (Bryman, 2016). Although it is known for its bias, this research benefited from purposive sampling because it not only saved time, but also was “effective when only limited numbers of people can serve as primary data sources” (Dudovskiy, n.d.). As historical methods has a hierarchy of data, seeking people who classified as primary data was of the utmost importance. It was up to the researcher's judgment when reviewing potential candidates in order to create a well-balanced collection of interviews for each of the four states. Because the states needed to be as equally represented as possible, convenience sampling was not appropriate for the study. Since convenience sampling is available by chance (Bryman 2016), it would not allow for a diversity of experts to be specifically selected. The easiest experts to find were those in Norway who specialized on Svalbard. Because of this, this research had to make sure that it did not rely too heavily on this perspective, thus convenience sampling was avoided. Instead, when picking respondents, they were judged not only on their knowledge about the specific continental shelf disputes but also on which country's perspective they specialized in and their proximity to the events of the Arctic. Due to the importance in historical methods of creating an accurate picture of the disputing states' perspectives, purposive sampling was used, as means to have a diverse set of participants in nationality.

The interviewees were Arctic researchers, political scientists, and law professors from Norway, Denmark, Russia, and Canada. As this research failed to get in contact with government officials, it uses official documents/statements instead. This not only produced a governmental perspective on Arctic events, but also helped establish triangulation of the data. For these documents, this study interested itself in Canada's, Norway's, Denmark's, and Russia's Arctic

policy papers, as well as white papers, CLCS submissions, official letters (i.e. the Svalbard letter), memos, and press conferences. Having this range of documents as well as a diverse group of participants allowed for this research to discover each country's perspective on the disputes. Each country has its own reasons for acting in the manner it does, thus purposely choosing Arctic documents/statements and talking with experts interested in the four states allowed for a deeper understanding of the research question and the peace mechanisms employed.

To begin collecting the necessary data, Thor Larsen, a professor at NMBU who has experience with the Arctic from a natural science perspective, was contacted. He suggested three contacts consisting of two political researchers on Svalbard and a geologist focusing on the North. After getting in touch with the two researchers, 12 other informants were found via the internet. Many of these emails remained unanswered, and after a follow-up email was sent with still few responses, the number of respondents was changed to 10. From those originally emailed, four experts emailed back agreeing to an interview. These four key informants consisted of two Norwegians, one Russian, and one Danish researcher. After these interviews were conducted, the second round of selection took place. This time, seven emails were sent out, with Canadian and Danish experts agreeing to interviews. Although more Russian experts were contacted to keep a balance, these lines of contact remained unresponsive. Not only did this lead to having one more Danish and Canadian expert compared to Russian for the Lomonosov Ridge, but also a four to one ratio of Norwegians to Russians in discussing the Svalbard dispute. Fortunately, most of the experts were specialists on their own countries and Russia; however, this study made sure to counter this diminished national category through triangulation with documents and secondary sources in order to get an accurate depiction of the Russian perspective. In historical methods, those closest to an event are the most important data, so the experts emailed and interviewed were chosen because of their knowledge. Therefore, to collect the most relevant data, purposive sampling was used for both the interviews and documents.

4.4. Method of Analysis

To better understand and support the research questions of this study, a thematic analysis was used. This research was interested in the peace mechanisms that support the status quo of the Lomonosov Ridge and Svalbard continental shelf disputes; therefore it was important to look at

patterns found within the interviews and official documents (Thematic Analysis: A Reflective Approach, n.d.). These patterns were found by reviewing the data and recognizing repetition, transitions, theory-related material, and similarities and differences in how participants discuss a topic (Bryman, 2016). When choosing the analysis method, it was known that patterns were important to discovering the peace mechanisms; therefore the decision was narrowed down to thematic and content analysis. Both analysis methods are concerned with words and making sense of the different perspectives through themes. However, context analysis is interested in the trend and the frequency in which they are found. Thematic analysis, on the other hand, invests more time into not only describing the trends but also interpreting patterns in-depth through the subjectivity of the researcher (Vaismoradi and Snelgrove, 2019). Because this research was not interested in the repetition of themes, but rather why they exist, thematic analysis was more appropriate for this study

To find these patterns, first, the interviews were transcribed verbatim, with any uncertainty indicated by a colored question mark. After the interviews were transcribed in Word documents, the data was organized into two groups: one for Svalbard and the other for the Lomonosov Ridge. Once the transcripts were divided, the interviews on Svalbard were read first, followed by the Lomonosov Ridge. While reading the interviews, each reason for stability mentioned was highlighted and became a code, such as UNCLOS or US involvement. After examining the individual codes, the codes were combined and categorized into corresponding basic assumptions of neorealism, neoliberalism, and social constructivism, such as military strength, institutions, or identity. These categories were relabeled into the theoretical concepts which became the themes. These themes became the peace mechanisms of the disputes. This same process was conducted for the official documents. To further interpret these peace mechanisms found in the interviews and documents, this research analyzed what was discussed about them in the surrounding data to find significance in why they were implemented in the two disputes.

4.5. Research Ethics

To determine that this study was conducted ethically on a national level, the data collection commenced after completing an application for the Norwegian Centre for Research

Study (NSD). This application ensures that the researcher is abiding by Norway's research policies and has explicit permission to move forward with the study. If the content in the application does not satisfy NSD, the researcher must redo it until it is approved. When the application for this study was submitted, permission to begin was granted four days later, thus beginning the data collection process.

When in contact with experts who agreed to participate, the informed consent form -- which was also approved by the supervisor and NSD—was sent. In it, it described the study in detail and asked permission to record, use names, and employers. The majority of participants did not sign the consent form, however; and therefore, before the interview began, they were asked if they had read it. If they confirmed they had read it but did not sign, oral confirmation was asked for and accepted. If they had not read the form, a brief description of the project was explained, letting them know that this research wanted permission to record and use limited personal data, before asking them to orally confirm. If at any point during or after the interview they wanted to retract their agreement, their request would be granted and data would be erased. Because this research requested participant's names, there was supposed to be no autonomy in this study. Originally, this study planned on interviewing a few government officials so their names would be used as they were stating the opinion of the state; however, as these interviews did not take place, the data was rebranded as anonymous. Because these participants were now discussing their thoughts on the disputes, it was decided to only address them by their title and nationality to keep confidentiality to a higher degree.

To maintain data protection, after recording the interviews, the files were uploaded to a private computer. While the project was ongoing, the data was stored on the private computer under the guidelines of the University of Oslo's data storing guide, which allows data on private devices if it is in small amounts and classified as green or yellow. Security restrictions were abided by, as the account was locked with a password and the researcher was the sole person who used the computer.

4.6. Study Trustworthiness

4.6.1. Credibility

The credibility of this study is of the utmost importance, as it makes sure that the findings are believable. To make this project more credible, triangulation was used in both theory and data collection. As explained before, triangulation creates a more comprehensive understanding of why peace mechanisms work in the disputes. This research began by triangulating theory by using neorealism, neoliberalism, and social constructivism concepts. Using different theories allowed the Arctic to be viewed through different perspectives, thus increasing the number of peace mechanisms. If only one theory was used, say neorealism, this thesis might have missed mechanisms that were mentioned because it would have only focused on realist concerns (Hales, 2010). This research also used triangulation for its data collection by not only interviewing experts but also reviewing formal statements made by the disputing states. This allowed for compensation when the study failed to produce thorough enough answers from its participants.

Although triangulation of the data did occur, respondent validation was not asked for before submitted the thesis. Since the participants are the only ones who truly know what they said, there is a chance of misinterpretation. This was also hard because sometimes the recordings were unclear; and although this study tried to be accurate in its transcribing, there may be rare instances where the interpretation is wrong. The credibility may also be impacted by a respondent bias. Although this research tried to incorporate an even number of experts; almost half of the participants were Norwegian, working for The Fridtjof Nansen Institute. This may have skewed the reasons for peace mechanisms for the Svalbard dispute since there was a bias against Russian actions in the archipelago. To avoid this, the population may have had to be increased; however, this may have jeopardized using historical methods. The research subject on these specific disputes is so specialized that it may have even been fruitless to contact others, as there were issues already in contacting those who were key specialists. Due to this, the credibility of the study may have been compromised when it comes to the Svalbard continental shelf dispute.

4.6.2. Transferability

Transferability in a qualitative study is considered difficult to support because the projects are unique with smaller samples (Bryman, 2016). The first way to counter this issue of transferability, however, comes from analytic generalization. Analytic generalization does not question if the findings of a study can be generalized (the main issue with having small samples), but rather if a theory can be found from the findings. Transferability is established because “a previously developed theory is used as a template with which to compare the empirical results of the case study. If two or more cases are shown to support the same theory, replication may be claimed.” (Yin, 2003: 32-3). This research is using the theories of neorealism, neoliberalism, and social constructivism for the two cases in the Arctic. As previous research has shown that these theories can apply to maritime disputes (Yee, 2011; Raditio, 2015; Ásgeirsdóttir and Steinwand, 2015); replication through analytic generalization is supported in this study.

Likewise, although the findings of qualitative research are difficult to generalize, this can be countered with thick description. Thick description is not only about describing something in detail (Bryman, 2016). Rather “to thickly describe social action is actually to begin to interpret it by recording the circumstances, meanings, intentions, strategies, motivations, and so on that characterize a particular episode. It is this interpretive characteristic of description rather than detail per se that makes it thick.” (Schwandt, 2001: 255). In the analysis, this study made sure to not only identify the peace mechanisms but also understand where they came from and why they exist. It was important to know the context surrounding the disputes to be able to interpret the data correctly. If thick description in this study is successful, others may be able to use it to find similar peace mechanisms in other maritime disputes.

4.6.3. Dependability

Dependability questions how readily one can replicate this study and come to the same conclusion of which peace mechanisms are present in the Arctic disputes (Bryman, 2016). To try to make it as easy as possible to replicate this study, extensive notes were taken on every decision made during the research process that served as a record. In these notes, there are reformulations of the research questions, the interview transcripts, the different theories originally studied, as well as every draft of the thesis sections.

Although decisions were logged and this research tried to create a thick description in its analysis in order to provide others with the means to replicate this study, there may be issues with dependability because Arctic relations continue to change. As this study took place, Russia became head of the Arctic Council, tested the Poseidon Torpedo, and extended its shelf claim (Breum, April 2021 and Ungureanu, 2021). Meanwhile, US and Russian officials are meeting late May, while Biden and Putin have agreed to a Summit in June 2021 (Bodner, May 2021). It is unknown how these events will change peace dynamics in the near or far future; therefore, although these mechanisms work now, they can change. Although this research could be replicated to a certain degree, the timing may impact which mechanisms are at play.

5. Peace Mechanisms in the Lomonosov Ridge and Svalbard Disputes

As the Arctic “heats up”, the Lomonosov Ridge and Svalbard disputes remain symbols of cooperation. Previous research has shown that maritime disputes rarely end in war (Baker, 2013) and this thesis is interested in knowing the specific reasons this is true for the two disputes. The findings of this study answer the research questions of not only what helps these disputes remain diplomatic, but also explain the motives behind these peace mechanisms. In knowing the peace mechanisms and understanding why they work, this study then answers the question of if and how the disputes should be resolved. This study does not look into all the peace mechanisms of the disputes, but rather focuses on those in the commonly applied neo-neo debate with social constructivism as a middle ground. In analyzing the findings, it was discovered that not all are equally important and that although some peace mechanisms are specific to the disputes, other mechanisms are for the Arctic as a whole.

This chapter is divided into five sections. The first two look into the neorealist peace mechanisms of a balance of power and deterrence. These two mechanisms not only apply to the disputes but demonstrate why conflict in the Arctic is dangerous in the larger discussion. After, the neoliberalism approach is presented, by reviewing complex interdependence and its subthemes of international institutions and economic interdependence, which are found in both the disputes and the Arctic as a whole. Lastly, this study analyzes the makings of a social constructivist's security community, which is only applied to the Lomonosov Ridge and Svalbard

disputes. The final section discusses the peace mechanisms and shows how they influence one another. This section finishes with a short discussion of how this thesis contributes to the debate on whether conflict or cooperation is the future of the Arctic.

5.1. NATO versus Russia- a system of balancing

Russia's adversaries in the disputes are Canada, Denmark, and Norway; which, by themselves, are not a threat to Russia's security. However, together, they counter Russia through NATO. NATO is a classic example of external balancing, in which an alliance is created between weaker states with other weak states or another powerful state (Rana, 2015). The three states balanced with the US during the Cold War to oppose the Soviet Union and this balancing stays strong today. Norway declared that "NATO is the cornerstone of Norway's security, and the Alliance's area of responsibility extends right up to the North Pole." (Regjeringen, 2021). NATO is a military alliance and Norway is the most vocal about using it as a defense policy. This is because Norway is Russia's neighbor and the most vulnerable to attacks. It sees the Arctic as "the alliance's unguarded flank, and constantly prompt[s] other member states to be well-informed and combat-ready." (Cross, 2019). As Crimea halted Arctic defense exercises with Russia, Norway has begun to conduct more with NATO as Russia continues to become a larger threat. Norway is hosting Cold Response 2022, a NATO military exercise, which General Eirik Kristoffersen says is the "largest military exercise inside the Arctic Circle in Norway since the 1980s," (Nilsen, 2021). Norway is allowing Russia to observe the event as means of good relations, but the exercise is letting Russia know that Norway is prepared to balance Russia in Svalbard.

Denmark also is an advocate for NATO, as it abided by NATO's request to deploy the Dkr750m surveillance drones and the Dkr390m Faroese radar station in the Arctic (Milne, 2021). It sees itself as having a special responsibility to defend the Arctic and, therefore, it not only works with the alliance but also bilaterally with the US. As Defense Minister Trine Bramsen says, Denmark and the US "have the same view on the Arctic and the threats", so they cooperate (Milne, 2021). Canada, on the other hand, is hesitant about NATO in the Arctic. Canada's Arctic policy emphasizes its own role in the Arctic, with no mention of NATO (Canada's Arctic and Northern Policy Framework, modified 2019). According to one expert, it would rather rely on its bilateral alliance with the US. The expert says "Canada has the US to

deal with to have ways to level the balance" because "the US is like Canada's big buddy." (Interview 9, 8/3/21). As the expert says, the US and Canada have a special relationship, as seen in the creation of the only bilateral military organization in the world, the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) (Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, 2020). Because NATO and the US have these relationships with the states, alliances help the weaker states create a balance of power against Russia.

The reason why NATO deters war is that it lessens Russia's likelihood of winning. Claude (1962) says that war is preventable if a state does not think it will win. As the three states are prepared for rising tensions, they have the backing of multiple NATO nuclear powers that are active in the Arctic. One is the UK, which had joint training exercises with Norway in March 2021 that contributed "to increased safety and preparedness in our immediate areas", says Lars Larrson, the Commander of one of the frigates. (Nilsen, Mar 2021). Even more pressing for Russia is that the US is a NATO Arctic state; making Russia and the US the only Arctic states with nuclear weapons, with Russia armed with 6,375 and the US with 5,800 (Davenport, 2020). A Norwegian expert says that "there is one area in which the US and Russia are peers and that is in the nuclear domain. . . and those nuclear weapons are very largely placed in the Arctic, with the Northern Fleet on the Kola Peninsula." (Interview 7, 27/2/21). However, the nuclear domain is heating up for Russia, as it is refurbishing its weapons and preparing the Poseidon 2M39 missile nicknamed "Doomsday" (Ungureanu, 2021). This has caused great concern for the US and NATO states; however, the US stated "We're committed to protecting our U.S. national security interests in the Arctic by upholding a rules-based order in the region" (Pentagon Press Secretary John F. Kirby, April 5, 2021). To balance Russia, the NATO states have continued to match Russia militarily and Russia hints in its nuclear deterrence policy guidelines that it will only attack if NATO begins conflict first; therefore balance is maintained (Nilsen, Feb 2021). One expert says that "neither of those two nuclear powers is interested in a high conflict level in the Arctic Ocean." (Interview 5, 16/2/21). This is because not only would war be detrimental to all the states, but also because a stalemate is a feasible option. Wagner (1994) points out that adding a stalemate as a result of war decreases a state's chance of winning. As nuclear powers, the incentive for peace not only increases because of the threat of mass destruction but also because there would be no winner. Because of the US's and other NATO members' relationship with the weaker countries, NATO looms in the background of the disputes balancing Russia's

power. Russia and NATO are balanced due to the threat of nuclear power and a stalemate, thus making war unfavorable and peace stable.

5.2. Detering Through Nuclear Threats and Economic Consequences

Deterrence is the ability of one state to control another by threatening it with force (Waltz, 1990). This threat of force is one reason why Denmark and Canada maintain peace on the Lomonosov Ridge. As a textbook small state, Denmark cannot deter Russia, however, Russia can deter Denmark because of its power. One Danish expert says "I don't think my fellow Danes are stupid enough to step on the toes of the big bear." (Interview 7, 27/2/21). Another says that because of Russia's power "it makes total sense for Denmark to downplay all tensions and have everyone get along." (Interview 3, 16/2/21). Not only is Russia 39,577% larger than Denmark geographically, but it ranks second for Navy Fleet strength (with 603 warships and submarines), while Denmark ranks 35, with 74 vessels (Navy Fleet strength by country, 2021). If Denmark were to become assertive on the ridge, Russia could easily overpower it with force, thus "Denmark is not going to do anything outside the rules" (Interview 7, 27/2/21). These comments may seem to counter Denmark's recent \$240 million increase in military activities in the Arctic; however, the Defense Minister says "We see the Russian military building up and having more activities in the Arctic. That's why it's important to have more capabilities in the Arctic. It's not about escalating conflicts. This is about the risk we see in the future if we don't have the capabilities if we don't see what is happening," (Milne, 2021). Denmark is increasing its presence not because it wishes to challenge Russia; but rather, because Denmark is concerned for its safety. Even as Denmark's safety becomes jeopardized, however, it will not react because Russia still deters through denial. The sheer size of Russia's navy can stop Denmark before it gained any territory (Huth, 1999). As a side note, although it can be thought that Denmark could attack with the backing of the US to overpower Russia, the US will not become involved unless Russia acts first. Until the dispute becomes "hot", the US will refrain from entering the discussion because it has not ratified UNCLOS (Interview 8, 10/3/21). Because of this, the US is forced to keep a low profile on the shelves; with a former ambassador the law of the sea conference saying "The United States has gone from the leader in the world in oceans policy -- and make no mistake, we were the leader throughout this process -- to simply observer status."

(Borgenson, Watkins, and Moore, 2008). Because it never ratified the treaty, the US has no say in the disputes, thus it is not certain if the US would help the states bypass Russia's deterrence.

The same is true for Canada, as the US will not back its neighbor until conflict has emerged. If conflict emerged, the US would interfere as Canada's "Big Brother" (Goodwin, 1972); however, Russia will not attack because the US and its allies cannot only balance Russia but also deter it with nuclear force. NATO's policy "is to continue to bolster deterrence as a core element of our collective defense and to contribute to the indivisible security of the Alliance" (NATO's nuclear deterrence policy, modified 11 May 2021). This combined with the recent militarization makes it known that NATO will not easily accept a Canadian defeat in the Arctic because it is a security issue for all (Ungureanu, 2021).

Meanwhile, Canada will not start conflict because although it is one of the largest states in the world, Canada is not a military state. This makes it easy for Russia to deny it territory. One Canadian expert exclaims that "Canada is a peacekeeping state . . . Canada doesn't have much of a military and our citizenry is quite passive. We aren't a military force.", therefore, "what bargaining position is Canada in?" (Interview 9, 18/3/21). Canada ranks 40th in its naval capacity, with 64 vessels; not enough to threaten Russia (Navy Fleet strength, 2021). Another expert adds that although Canada is an Arctic state, it is not as invested as Russia. One reason is that "becoming more assertive is expensive. The construction of the six Arctic offshore control vessels is probably 6-7 billion." (Interview 8, 10/3/21). Indeed, Canada is less concerned with its Arctic forces because the majority of Canadians live in the south, so the "federal government doesn't want to spend any expenditures up north because those expenditures are better spent elsewhere." (Interview 8, 10/3/21). Canada's current priorities are not up North; however, experts agree that the previous Harper administration was more assertive, as it withdrew its original claim to the CLCS to go past the North Pole (Interview 7, 27/2/21; Interview 8, 10/3/21; Interview 9, 18/3/21). Harper stated "Canada has a choice when it comes to defending our sovereignty over the Arctic. We either use it or lose it. And make no mistake, this Government intends to use it." (Kroeker, 2020). If the previous administration was still in effect, perhaps Canada would have more of a military presence in the Arctic; however, because it currently is concerned more with indigenous peoples' rights and international cooperation, the threat of Russia's military capabilities stopping the onset of an attack deters the large state. (Government of Canada, 2019).

As with Denmark and Canada, the threat of deterrence from Russia is one of the reasons Norway stays civil over Russia's alleged misinterpretation of the Svalbard Treaty. However, Russia is deterred because of the strategic location of Svalbard. Although Norway is "little Norway, who is sitting there in Svalbard in the far North with big Russia" (Interview 10, 13/3/21); Norway holds an advantage through its sovereignty over Svalbard. Svalbard is located in Russia's Bastion defense, and "a fundamental concept is that the Bastion area for the nuclear submarines has to be defended at all costs, so Russia has to keep its enemies away from the enemy here." (Interview 10, 13/3/21). Russia is concerned with its survival, but Norway itself is no threat to Russia. However, advancing conflict could bring in the US. In deterrence by punishment, Russia could gain access to the territory and resources, but the costs (war/sanctions) outweigh the benefits (temporary access to Svalbard's waters) (Snyder, 1960). These costs are multiplied because of nuclear weapons. Russia is threatened by the US's nuclear arsenal; and although the US would not enter a diplomatic dispute, it would step forward to defend its allies. A Danish expert says "let's say Russia really pushes . . . of course Norway would have to lean more towards the US in Svalbard." (Interview 10, 13/3/21). Russia already fears this, as one expert mentions that a few months ago the US stationed bombers in Norway as a routine visit; however, next time, these bombers could be carrying nuclear weapons (Interview 4, 23/2/21). This fear is probable because not only would this protect its ally, but also defend its interests, as it is concerned with "competition with China and Russia as the principle challenge to long-term US security and prosperity." (Office of the Under Secretary, 2019). US involvement makes war too costly because the US has second-strike capabilities. As Waltz says, "why fight if you can't win much and might lose everything?" (Waltz, 1981). The punishment from nuclear weapons in the Kola Peninsula deters Russia, and the threat of denial does the same for Norway, thus neither will act upon the Svalbard dispute.

Deterrence by punishment is not only militarily, but also economically. This is known as a "threat of deprivation" (Snyder, 1960). The most common form is through economic sanctions. The US, EU, and Norway already placed sanctions against Russia for its actions in Crimea; it could tighten these and cause even more hardship for Russia's economy. Meanwhile, Norway can deter by punishment, too; as Russia may gain access to the continental shelf, but would most likely lose access to the joint fisheries in the Barents Sea. The joint fisheries hold the world's largest cod stocks, with a quota of 885,600 tons (Grønnevet, 2015 and Bates, 2020). An expert

adds "that fishery regime is not zone-specific; Norway and Russia have a regime that they agree on, which they have cooperation on . . . that's in Russian interest to have a successful or sustainable management of that stock." (Interview 4, 23/2/21). The fisheries provide Russia with enormous stocks that Russia and Norway have negotiated since the 1970s (JointFish, n.d.); if Russia asserts itself, it risks being economically deterred in the fisheries and upsetting historical cooperation between the two neighbors. As of now, Svalbard is low politics, with high politics looming in the background. Svalbard is an economic dispute; however, if the US becomes involved, Russia's security in the Kola Peninsula is threatened and, therefore, it will need to take action (Hodman, 1966). If Norway became closer to the US from Russia's pushing, Russia would react to the threat, which would lead to the US or NATO retaliating with second-strike capabilities. Russia does not want this dispute to become high politics and that is why it stays cooperative on the shelf. With all these negatives in advancing conflict, one expert sums it up by saying that peace will last as long as "we [Norway] understand your [Russia's] concerns and we take them seriously and they need to signal back that we understand that you understand our concerns; and because you understand our concerns and take them into consideration, we reciprocate." (Interview 10, 13/3/21).

5.3. The Promise of Complex Interdependence: UNCLOS, Joint Fisheries, and Trade

Although weakened by Crimea, the findings indicate that complex interdependence is present in maintaining the peacefulness of the continental shelf disputes. Complex interdependence is indicated by three characteristics: multiple channels, an absence of military hierarchical issues, and unneeded use of the military. Multiple channels are both transgovernmental and transnational, leading to increased importance in international institutions, and providing ways for states to communicate. The more outlets in which states can talk, the less likely war will occur, and the more likely cooperation and interests are intertwined (Keohane and Nye, 1989). An absence of security hierarchy occurs when the economic sector is just as important as the military. When economic interdependence is present, states are willing to cooperate because their shared interests are center stage; and these interests "might overcome the passions" (Hirschman, 1977). In the Arctic, two areas that still function after the events in Crimea are the fisheries and trade; therefore, cooperation will remain. Lastly, because the

economic issues are as important as security, there is less need for the military. Complex interdependence is relevant in the Lomonosov Ridge and Svalbard disputes because of its international institutions and economic interdependence, as shown by the abundance of UNCLOS, the Joint Fisheries, and interstate trading.

5.3.1. International Institutions

One of these channels in which states can communicate is UNCLOS. Russia, Canada, Denmark, and Norway are all members of LOS and proclaim that they are satisfied with using it as a framework to govern the Arctic (Ilulissat Declaration, 2008). One Canadian researcher states ". . . everyone was amazed that the law of the sea applied to the Arctic . . . but everybody has been following exactly what the law of the sea has said." (Interview 8, 10/3/21). Another Canadian expert agrees, saying "they [Canada] are still under international law and the notion of 'good neighborliness'" (Interview 9, 8/3/21); while a Russian informant says that "the current legal regime of UNCLOS is enough and is very good" (Interview 2, 15/2/21). The reason why UNCLOS is followed and creates peace is that it allows states to negotiate disputes. Article 83, says that disputes dealing with the delimitation of the continental shelf shall find an "equitable solution" and if this cannot be done in a timely fashion, states should refer to Part XV, where they can solve "a dispute between them concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention by any peaceful means of their own choice." (United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982: 127). UNCLOS allows states to settle disputes through whatever method they wish and encourages negotiations to take place. "One expert says that UNCLOS and other institutions "create mutual expectations and decrease uncertainty." (Interview 7, 27/2/21). This results from its transparency in its proceedings for settlement, which not only lessens uncertainty for how states should react but also heightens costs because states know exactly what they must do to abide by international law (North, 1984).

Canada, Denmark, and Russia not only abide by UNCLOS, but they strengthen their interdependence through their submissions to the CLCS for the Lomonosov Ridge. Another channel for states to communicate through, the Commission established a formal process for states to follow to claim an extension of the continental shelf. As previously described, Denmark, Canada, and Russia have submitted claims to the Commission for the Lomonosov Ridge. The fact that all three produced formal submissions shows the increased importance of international

institutions because, under complex interdependence, they also are agenda setters (Keohane and Nye, 1989). The CLCS makes recommendations and legalizes claims through scientific evidence. (Iuchi and Usui, 2013). Because of the evidence, each state can have absolute gains, as geologically the shelf can be connected to each country. This denies the extended continental shelf from being a zero-sum game; in fact, as one Danish expert expresses "I suspect it is as much Greenlandic as Siberian" (Interview 7, 27/2/21). Because of this, each state can profit from establishing a cooperative agenda in the Lomonosov Ridge. This agenda is already evident in Russia's case as it submitted its claim from 2001 after it was declared insufficient. A Norwegian expert explains:

The experts say that the data to hand in did not suffice the needs for their claim. Then Russia says okay we'll do more research and they continue to do more research, which implies that they do not use force to get it their way. On the contrary, they try to apply international law and international procedure to set boundaries that will not be disputed after they have been drawn (Interview 5, 16/2/21).

Once its claim was rejected, Russia had the choice to act out of term and claim sovereignty in the area anyway, or it could have continued to use the CLCS. It chose the latter because following the CLCS's agenda is much more beneficial for Russia to maintain good relations and receive its territory in the long run.

Likewise, the Commission not only sets agendas but also diffuses information and builds trust, thus heightening the costs of cheating (Keohane, 1984). When submitting claims, they must be formally written with exact geographical coordinates. Each state, therefore, knows where another state's claim begins and ends, and where they overlap. The states were aware of these overlaps as Russia's submission states that "when one State makes submission to the Commission, the other State shall immediately forward the secretary-general of the UN a diplomatic note." ("Partial Revised Submission", 2015: 11). In the diplomatic note, the states agree to not object to each other's submissions, signifying that they will cooperate with the extended continental shelf. The states are made aware of each other's claims, and instead of becoming assertive, the states agree to disagree, thus keeping the peace (Interview 8, 10/3/21.) Because of these submissions, the CLCS diffuses information and creates transparency.

Transparency is the public's ability to have access to information (Grigorescu, 2007). The more states know, the less uncertainty there is and the more they are willing to cooperate. Because they have access to all this information and continue to show that they respect the CLCS, cheating is heightened. Not only would it be a violation of international law, but cooperation in all parts of the Arctic could suffer even more than they already have.

The CLCS is an objective, scientific committee, thus states trust its recommendations and are not likely to disregard them. Because it is based on scientific evidence one expert says ". . . we can trust this Commission because they have the proper expertise, legal and geological, to make judgment." and "all countries respect this Commission on a non-political basis. . . They [Commission members] come from Japan and countries which are far from the Arctic and which are neutral, so they come from all over the world. The best experts." (Interview 2, 15/2/21). The more trust states have in institutions, the more they are willing to abide by them (Gambetta, 1988). Of the 48 claims the CLCS has established subcommissions for (meaning they are under evaluation), a majority have abided by the recommendations provided (Submissions, 2021). This shows that states respect the recommendations and trust the Commission's judgment since it is non-political and purely based on evidence. And yet, one expert says that the CLCS's trustworthiness might be failing because "what's not being written on it, behind the scenes . . . that there are reports that the Commission is becoming more politicized." (Interview 8, 10/3/21). Another adds that if Russia's submission is rejected once again, it could claim politicization, saying ". . . well the West is controlling the UN, it corrupted the UN, and the West is cheating us" (Interview 7, 27/2/21). Harald Brekke, a former member of the Commission, hints that this might be true, as he calls for the Commission to maintain precedence because "it is crucial for the global acceptance of the outer continental shelf that states feel they are treated equally." (Busch, 2020: 237). This research is limited in collecting data that confirms these findings, as current Commissioners were not informants. Even so, despite thoughts of politicization, Russia is showing that it is willing to maintain peace, as it revised its claim with the CLCS earlier this year (Breum, Feb 2021).

The CLCS allows states to peacefully claim and establish their boundaries. However, it cannot solve overlapping claims, and therefore states again look towards UNCLOS. Using UNCLOS allows for a peaceful settlement of boundaries because its framework tells states how to negotiate boundary disputes. In solving the Lomonosov Ridge, Russia, Canada, and Denmark

can negotiate trilaterally, with a Canadian expert stating "I think a trilateral is much more realistic just because of the geography of the issues" (Interview 8, 10/3/21). Even with Russia's massive extension, Martin Lidegaard, the Danish chairman of the Foreign Policy Committee of parliament, says "I assume that we are heading towards difficult negotiations under all circumstances." (Breum, Feb 2021). Some experts believe that the states should use UNCLOS's principle of equidistance to settle the dispute (Interview 9, 8/3/21; Interview 4, 23/2/21). Equidistance divides the territory evenly among the states, so Denmark, Russia, and Canada will have equal amounts of the central Arctic, as it is assumed the CLCS will find all their claims valid. However, these experts disagree on how to deal with the North Pole. One Russian expert and Martin Lidegaard agree that they should create a 'zone of peace' around the North Pole. "The smart solution would be to make a 100 nm zone around the North Pole which would be put under the UN trust issue." (Interview 2, 15/2/21). Although the North Pole is not likely to have massive amounts of oil, as a 2008 survey estimated discovery to be less than 10% (Schlanger, 2019); it is symbolic. The North Pole has a history of importance for philosophers, scientists, and explorers (Roots, 2017); while it currently is Russia's symbol of owning the Arctic. Owning the North Pole would be a status symbol; therefore, it should stay no man's land. Another expert suggests that the states need to meet at the North Pole so a tragedy of the commons does not occur, with no state looking after it (Interview 9, 8/3/21). This expert believes that if the surrounding areas of the North Pole are given to the international community as a global commons, the area will be over-exploited. A tragedy of the commons entails "detrimental effects of unregulated access to a resource, promoting enclosure (privatization) and public regulation" (Ranganathan, 2016). Still, other scholars believe that instead of abiding by the equidistance principle, the states should follow solving the disputes through "peaceful means of their own choice" (United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982: 127). If the equidistance principle is used, the North Pole falls into Denmark's area (Kemeny, 2019). The Danes might sacrifice some of their potential territory at the North Pole to satisfy Russia because it means more to Russia than Denmark (Interview 7, 27/2/21). Another says that "I think Danish policymakers are very conscious of keeping Russia happy." and "there is enough continental shelf for everyone; I think that would be the best outcome" (Interview 3, 16/2/21). From a Danish perspective on trilateral negotiations, Denmark seems to be willing to give up some of the shelf to keep the peace when solving the dispute. Although recommendations are not thought

to come out for another few years, UNCLOS gives the states various outlets in which they can peacefully settle the dispute.

5.3.2. Economic Interdependence

Although the above institutions are legal in nature, some channels are economic. In the Barents Sea, Russia and Norway established the Joint Fisheries, which not only creates another method of communication between the two states but also enables economic concerns to overtake security; therefore, there is no military hierarchy. Since the 1970s, Norway and Russia (then the Soviet Union) have worked together in the Barents Sea through the Joint Norwegian-Russian Fisheries Commission. The Commission agreed on a 50/50 distribution of cod and haddock stock, with a 60/40 split on capelin, in Norway's favor (Joint Fish, n.d.) Norway benefits from these fisheries, as they enable Norway to receive a quota of 397,635 tons of cod, including 21,000 tons of coastal cod, and 113,348 tons of Haddock (Nilsen, 2020). As the second-largest exporter of fish in the world, these numbers matter to Norway; therefore, keeping the area peaceful is of the utmost importance. (The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture, 2020). Meanwhile, the Arctic accounts for 33% of Russia's fishing stock, thus Russia agrees that the fisheries need to be maintained (Rumer, Sokolsky, and Stronski, 2021). Russia and Norway depend on each other to act cordially in the Barents Sea so that they both economically benefit. Because of the fisheries, the two established economic interdependence in which the value of war decreases. Instead of behaving like a territorial state, Russia acknowledges the benefits of economic cooperation and thus is characterized as a trading state in the Barents Sea. (Roserance, 1986). Having this status keeps Russia from acting more assertively on Svalbard because the entire area would face consequences.

With economic interdependence, state autonomy decreases because there are fewer gains from being a territorial state (Roserance, 1986). This can be seen in the fisheries, as Norway and Russia are less concerned with where the fish are caught and more with how many. A Norwegian expert says "they had cooperation since the 1990s of joint management of the fish stocks, and where you catch the fish is completely irrelevant. No one cares as long as you don't exceed your quota." (Interview 4, 23/2/21). Plus, although Russia certainly has the capabilities to indulge in full-out coercion, this would "undermine the bilateral joint fisheries that Norway and Russia have in the Barents Sea. And that fishery regime is not zone-specific; Norway and Russia have a

regime that they agree on, which they have cooperation on . . . that's in Russian interest to have successful or sustainable management of that stock." (Interview 4, 23/2/21). Another adds:

We share one of the world's richest cod stocks with Russia . . . the cod moves across the delimitation lines which to a certain extent is what Russia really is favorable of because to a certain extent they can bilateralize harvest of a fish stock that moves across the delimitation line . . . And that is something Russia would really like to happen in other policy areas as well. . . so their primary interest is to exercise as much influence as possible in the whole of the Barents Sea (Interview 5, 16/2/21).

The delimitation lines that the expert speaks of were set in 2010 when Russia and Norway settled a 40-year-old dispute in the Barents Sea. Russia deviated from the sector principle, which it had applied since 1926, in favor of compromising with Norway. It gives Russia access to water outside its 200nm, partly fulfills Norway's goal in defining its northern boundaries, and benefits both in the economic sphere ("Treaty between the Kingdom of Norway and Russian Federation", 2010 and Neumann, 2010). With the treaty and the fisheries, Norway and Russia demonstrate that they rely on each other to remain peaceful. As Russia's Arctic policy states that the economic sector is as important as the military sector (Klimenko, 2020), it cannot afford to ruin relations. Domke (1988) and Russett (1993) say that when institutions and economic interdependence are combined, they create policy that decreases the incentive for war. The Joint Fisheries Commission is both an institution and established interdependence between the two states, thus the 2010 treaty was created to not only promote peace but maintain transboundaries in the Barents Sea. Pursuing direct conflict in Svalbard is, therefore, disadvantageous for all parties involved.

The fishing stocks are not the only area in which Russia relies on the Arctic, as the region also accounts for 80% of Russia's natural gas and 17% of its oil production (Anthony and Klimenko, 2021). In 2019, the Russian ambassador to the US said "As Russian President Vladimir Putin repeatedly stated, our country's primary tasks in developing the Arctic region include promotion of nature-friendly technologies and introduction of the most modern environmental standards in industry, transport, and energy."(The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 2019). Because of these resources, Russia wants to promote

development in the Arctic. To do so, however, Russia needs to trade with the other states. Scholars say that cooperation is more apparent when there is interstate trading (Oneal, Russett, and Berbaum 2001; Gartzke and Jo 2000; Polachek, 1980). Herein lies the problem, as the events of Crimea led to economic sanctions against Russia by the other Arctic states. These sanctions are affecting Russia's goals of developing the Arctic because almost all cooperation but oil is halted (Byer, 2017). This peace mechanism is weakening, as Doruseen says that interdependence only lasts if there are few barriers (Gartzke, Li, and Boehmer, 2001). However, because of the other international institutions and globalization, the states still rely on each other. Despite the sanctions, the EU is Russia's 5th biggest trading partner; while Norway imported \$2 billion from Russia in 2018 (European Commission, updated 2021; Trading Economics, updated 2021). Russia is the most interdependent however, as one expert admits "Russia needs Western capital and technologies to get resources" (Interview 3, 16/2/21). This is because Russia's partners are Western companies and on many occasions development has stopped. This was seen when Exxon-Mobil partnered with Russia's Rosneft for a \$3.2 billion investment in the Kara Sea; however, Exxon-Mobil was forced to abandon the project in 2014 (Rumer, Sokolsky, and Stronski, 2021).

Even though trade has depleted, "Russia keeps tension low because they are interested in the economic industry and military tension isn't good for economic development." (Interview 1, 29/1/21). War would hinder; therefore, it is willing to cooperate because there is "a chance of alleviating the sanction regime put against their oil and gas following the invasion of Crimea, and by playing nicely, they might replicate with what they did with the Norwegians back in 2010." (Interview 8, 10/3/21). Norway and Russia were able to peacefully solve a dispute and ratify a treaty that enables transboundaries. As Russia is trying to regain its position as a great Arctic state, it would benefit Russia immensely to create a regime where it can develop its resources in other states' territories. However, to do this, it must strengthen its economic interdependence, because engaging in direct conflict would tighten sanctions, impact the economies of all the states, and hinder Russia's goals of using Western capital (Roserance, 1968). As one expert puts it: "when you depend on the nation that you are in conflict with in several different kinds of issue areas, then you are more motivated to find solutions in the areas where you disagree." (Interview 5, 16/2/21).

5.4. A Security Community in the Arctic?

It is thought that the Arctic was once heading towards a security community; however, Crimea has halted the process (Schaller, 2015). The findings in this study show that although a mature security system does not exist, perhaps there are signs that can encourage further community development. To have a security community, Adler and Barnett (1998), say that a group of states need to have three things: a common identity and values, many-faced direct relations, and long-term interests. These aspects are found in the two disputes, even though they are not for the purpose of creating a security community. In the Lomonosov Ridge, Canada, Denmark, and Russia created a conformist identity through their abidance of UNCLOS. In a conformist identity, states accept established practices and social norms "as intersubjective objects [that] stabilize expectations" (Hoffmann, 2010). The three states have conformed to UNCLOS and have shown that they accept the CLCS and its practices on the ridge. For Canada and Denmark, this is because they are not military powers and therefore, conform to UNCLOS because intentional law is "the friend of the weak". (Kaeckenbeeck, 1945: 307). As Wendt (1999) believes that identity influences interests; identifying as non-military powers lead to an interest in playing by the rules of international law.

Meanwhile, Russia is a military power but still conforms to UNCLOS on the ridge. A Danish expert comments that Russia could have chosen not to cooperate because the "Lomonosov Ridge is named after the famed Lomonosov and he was a great Russian intellectual, great Russian scientist. So Russia may also say it's named after Lomonosov so it has to be Russian. It would have been better if it has just been called the Central Arctic Ocean Ridge (Interview 7, 27/2/21). However the expert also says that his Russian and Canadian colleagues cannot see this area diving into conflict (Interview 7, 27/2/21); because Russia wants the Arctic to be "an indicator of cooperation versus a sea of disorder." (Interview 8, 10/3/21). This is because the Arctic is key to Russia's survival; therefore, as mentioned before, conflict would hurt Russia. It benefits Russia more to strive for a Kantian system of anarchy, which "rests on institutional, constitutional and civil components" (Wendt, 1992; Richmond, 2008). Russia, Canada, and Denmark use UNCLOS and the CLCS as guidelines on how to act. This institutionalism is why Denmark and Canada are not concerned with Russia's recent extension, even though it now covers 70% of the central Arctic (Breum, April 2021). Denmark says

"security-wise this doesn't mean much", while a Canadian Research Chair states "I am not alarmed" (Breum, Feb 2021). Another expert says that they are acting civil through joint expeditions for mapping, and even meet once a year to talk about their results and "get each other's views on it, which is a very peaceful way to do things." (Interview 3, 16/2/21). Because the CLCS does not have legal power, diplomacy has to be present to guarantee Russia's economic and state security; therefore, Russia will maintain a conformist identity on the ridge (Henriques, 2020).

Interestingly, although Russia is not always cooperative in the Svalbard region, experts say that Russia can have a conformist identity here, too. Russia has tried to open bilateral negotiations with Norway, as seen in the Svalbard Treaty when the Minister of Foreign Affairs stated "Our Norwegian partners are invited to conduct bilateral consultations" (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 2020). Norway rejects these negotiations, however, stating "Norway does not consult other states about its exercising of sovereignty on any part of Norwegian territory" (Trellevik, 2020). This is not the first time Russia has tried to negotiate on Norway's actions in and around Svalbard. As a consequence of rejection, Russia continues to taunt Norway on the Fisheries Protection Zone (FPZ) that regulated fishing around Svalbard. However, experts agree that this is just principle over practice and Russia will continue to remain civil in the dispute. A Danish expert says: "they protest against the principle, but in practice, it serves Russia quite well because it is an area where Norway has a non-discriminatory regime." (Interview 10, 13/3/21). The Svalbard Treaty allows equal economic access to all its signatories; therefore, although Russia protests Norway's interpretation, it will not become aggressive because it benefits from this regime. On the other hand, it also will not initiate judicial diplomacy. A Norwegian expert says "What is very interesting . . . is that although many of Norway's allies do not agree on the Norwegian interpretation . . . none of them have taken Norway to the court." (Interview 5, 16/2/21). If this was done, Russia and the other states have a chance of losing, and if they lose, Norway's interpretation becomes legitimate. Russia would then lose its ability to "pressure Norway politically to give concessions" (Interview 5, 16/2/21).

On the other hand, if Russia were to win, the continental shelf and FPZ would be opened to all parties. Russia wants to continue having special treatment in the areas because "Russia gets a fairly large share of the quota", but if the nondiscrimination principle came into play "they would have to accept that all these other third party countries come in and take their part of the

quota" (Interview 4, 23/4/21). The quotas from the Joint Fisheries also encompass the zone, with Norway and Russia allocating the quotas for third parties. Without Norway's interpretation, these parties could fish as they wanted in the international waters (Østhagen, Jørgensen, and Moe, 2020). Therefore, "Russia is perfectly happy and satisfied with keeping the situation in limbo and sometimes probing Norway with it" (Interview 4, 23/2/21). Norway and Russia both know that keeping Svalbard in limbo is the best case scenario, hence why neither is pushing for its resolution. This is because they have shared knowledge, in which they understand what is expected of each other (Wendt, 1995). Although the two disagree, it is understood that Russia will maintain a conformist identity, so both can benefit economically.

By having a conformist identity, the states value UNCLOS so it is within their interests to stay cooperative. Not only is the abidance by UNCLOS a shared belief, but there is also a shared belief the disputes are not important enough to fight over, thus the disputes remain peaceful. Deutsch says that in a security community there is "a belief on the part of individuals in a group that they have come to an agreement on at least this one point: that common social problems must and can be resolved by processes of 'peaceful change'" (Deutsch et al., 1957: 5). Lomonosov Ridge and Svalbard can be resolved by peaceful change because they lack economic opportunity. The Arctic is thought to hold almost 25% of the world's resources (Turunen, 2019); and yet, for the Lomonosov Ridge and Svalbard continental shelves, a simple lack of interest is keeping them stable. Although the states are interested in resources, for the continental shelves, one Norwegian expert says "we don't see any clear economic interest so far. We see this notion that perhaps in the future this part of the Arctic might be more economically profitable. . . they are struggling to develop the resources." (Interview 4, 23/2/21). A Canadian expert adds, "The economic reality of the extended continental shelf is that it will still be a long time before anyone economically can even search if there will be any resources" and that these searches will be conducted by the Norwegians and Russians because Canada "more or less decided for a whole host of reasons that we weren't going to do offshore oil and gas." (Interview 8, 10/3/21). A Russian expert declares "What we know is 85% of all natural resources- which are proven by scientific data or by some explore work- all this is located in EEZ of that Arctic states, not in the continental shelf. The arctic powers, they can't develop these natural resources because again it's very difficult." (Interview 2, 15/2/21). Indeed, a map of oil and gas prospects shows that the shelves have less than a 50% chance of having significant reserves (Turunen, 2019: see appendix

4). A Danish researcher agrees and jokes: "I'd normally say that I don't believe that we have any profitable industry on the continental shelf in my lifetime and I plan to become very old." (Interview 3, 16/2/21). From these comments, it is clear that the shelves are not prosperous and, therefore, do not warrant immediate action.

However, despite this lack of economic interest for the shelves, the states also stand by the belief that in years to come the areas may be profitable. A Russian researcher says that for the Lomonosov Ridge "you cannot use this shelf for extraction of natural resources because it is too deep and we don't have technologies" (Interview 2, 15/2/21); however, "if you're Russia or Denmark or some other country you shouldn't acquiesce now because who knows if you will lose out 40 years down the line." (Interview 4, 23/2/21). Many of the experts agree that the ridge could be profitable in the future so the three states will not willingly give up the territory. A Canadian expert says that there is a fear of the unknown: "What happens if there is a resource that we haven't thought of and we discover that the best place is the continental shelf? We don't know what it will be like when the ice continues to melt. So it's the unknown that is a big issue." (Interview 8, 10/3/21). This belief creates long-term interest in the shelves. The states will interact with each other more throughout the years due to these interests; therefore they will act more responsibly and avoid war (Adler and Barnett, 1998).

As with the Lomonosov Ridge, Russia has long-term interests in Svalbard. Svalbard is historically, militarily, and economically important to Russia (Staalesen, 2020). As of now, Russia does not have access to the continental shelf because Norway maintains that the waters and subsoils are Norwegian and, therefore, "the continental shelf issue hasn't been "taken to the wire" because the continental shelf hasn't been open." (Interview 1, 21/1/21). Interestingly, all the Svalbard experts agree that the FPZ is more desirable than the continental shelf, but "if they have it [rights] on the shelf they will also have it in the fisheries protection zone surrounding Svalbard and of course, the FPZ does have rich stocks of fish." (Interview 5, 16/2/21). If Russia gains access to the continental shelf, it also can increase its fishing stocks. Russia and the EU have tried to increase their economic gain in the area, as seen with the EU handing out illegal fishing licenses, disregarding quotas, evading Norwegian fishing inspections and coast guards, and hunting snow crabs (Gulliksen Tømmerbakke, 2019 and Bye, 2021). On the issues of the snow crabs, one Danish expert says:

Of course, nobody cares about crabs around Svalbard, but my understanding is that crabs live on the bottom. Having a right to the animals on the bottom and the subsoil, that is the same right. That's why if the EU could trick or pressure Norway into admitting that the EU has the right to fish those crabs, that would be the same as saying the European countries and companies have equal access to the subsoil (Interview 10, 13/3/21).

Even if states have access to the subsoil, however, the economic interest is declining, as Russian companies did not bid on the latest round for licenses on the 'Svalbard box' (Staleesen, 2021). Although there is long-term interest in Svalbard, it most likely will come from the resources above the seabed. As with the Lomonosov Ridge, there is a lack of economic opportunity on the Svalbard shelf, but it may be more prosperous in the future; hence Russia continues to hold off for economic gains.

Along with shared identity, beliefs, and long-term interests, this study has already touched upon many-sided direct relations through the means of multiple channels. These direct relations help states trust each other through learning each other's motivations and reasons for behavior (Adler and Barnett, 1998). The states can directly communicate through the CLCS, Joint Fisheries, and bilateral negotiations when specifically addressing the disputes. They also use other forums for Arctic relations as a whole, such as the Arctic Council. Russia chairs the Arctic Council in May 2021 and has already commented that not only will they work together for economic development, but also have "close cooperation and dialogue on the Arctic matters in different formats" (Bykova, 2021). As seen, the Arctic is not lacking in many-sided direct relations. Although there is no regional security community in the Arctic, for the Lomonosov Ridge and Svalbard disputes, there are aspects as the states keep tensions low and cooperate to secure their interests.

5.5. Final Discussion

This research was conducted to add to the larger discussion of whether the Arctic will remain cooperative or dissolve into conflict. This thesis's aim was not to pick a side of the debate but rather, to look into the Lomonosov Ridge and Svalbard maritime territorial disputes to show that previous research on the stability of maritime disputes is true in the case of the Arctic.

As maritime disputes seldom result in war, this thesis finds the reasons why the two disputes remain peaceful even as tensions rise. It proves that engaging in conflict may win the “battle” (temporary territory or security) but cost states the “war” (economic and military consequences); therefore, the disputes hold strong. By applying the neo-neo debate and social constructivism, this study was able to determine that a balance of power, deterrence, complex interdependence, and aspects of a security community take part in creating peace in the disputes. The findings show that there is a relationship between these peace mechanisms and that they are not mutually exclusive.

A balance of power is created between Russia and the smaller states because they are members of NATO and have the backing of more powerful allies. This balance causes deterrence from both sides because both can conduct nuclear war. Russia can also deter the individual states of Denmark, Canada, and Norway conventionally because of its military power. Meanwhile, the NATO states can deter Russia through economic consequences. If Russia became aggressive, the West could tighten sanctions, hindering Russia's economy even more. Russia is reliant on Western technology to develop the Arctic and is only trading oil at this time. The threat of stopping this oil trade and tightening the previous sanctions keeps Russia in line. Russia would also impact its relationship with its neighbor Norway, in the fisheries in the Barents Sea. The Fisheries show an overlap between the neorealist and neoliberal peace mechanisms. They act as an economic deterrence, but also demonstrate economic interdependence because both states rely on the transboundaries of the fisheries to maximize their profit. If either were to aggravate the Svalbard dispute, cooperation in the joint fisheries could cease, leaving both states economically vulnerable. This also plays a large role in why the two wish for the dispute to remain status quo, as the fisheries are too important to upset for potential economic gain on the shelf in years to come.

Likewise, there is a connection between complex interdependence and a security community. Complex interdependence emphasizes the role of international institutions, which in the case of the disputes are UNCLOS and the CLCS. The importance of these institutions helps create a shared identity of conformity. Although this study cannot claim there is a mature security community, because of the institutions, characteristics of a community are still present in the Arctic despite Crimea. Before Crimea, one could see the formation of a security community, but it was lost as military and economic cooperation decreased. However, the

countries still conform and express that they will abide by UNCLOS. In the Lomonosov Ridge, Canada, Denmark, and Russia demonstrate conforming to the CLCS, as they submitted their claims and are waiting on the decision. Because of the importance of the institutions, the three countries plan on using UNCLOS's equidistance principle or trilateral negotiations to solve the Lomonosov Ridge. UNCLOS creates shared norms and values, which in turn creates an identity that values UNCLOS.

The states also share a belief that the disputes lack economic opportunity and, therefore, are not important enough to engage in conflict. This is perhaps one of the most significant findings in keeping the disputes peaceful. Unlike the other peace mechanisms that overlap for both the disputes and the Arctic as a whole, the states agreeing that the disputes are not important enough is unique to these cases. The technology is not advanced enough to explore the Lomonosov Ridge, while Norway has not opened the continental shelf for other states. Because of this, there is no economic profit at this time so there is nothing to gain. Since there is no opportunity for oil and gas, the states will not risk a war for the tiny bit of prestige that is bound to fail because of military and economic deterrence. This thesis cannot predict how states will react when the opportunity becomes available, but as of now, the costs are high with no gain.

Another key finding is that this thesis shows that the neorealist approach can be used to find peace. As stated in Chapter 3, neorealism is more frequently used as a theory of war rather than peace; however, its concepts of balance of power and deterrence add to the stability in the disputes. When tensions are high, a security dilemma can be created that causes states to engage in war, but in the instance of the Arctic, because of nuclear weapons and economic disadvantages, the costs outweigh the benefits of war. Because of a balance of power and deterrence, the states are constantly at a stalemate, with each move countered by the other side. A security dilemma is forming as the Arctic is militarized, but neither side can react without the other responding, thus the disputes remain peaceful.

With that being said, however, a negative peace does not last forever; therefore, if states want these disputes to remain peaceful they need to promote positive peace. To do this, international institutions need to take precedent in the Arctic. UNCLOS needs to remain a framework that is followed. When it comes to solving continental shelf disputes, the states should continue to abide by the CLCS and welcome negotiations when the CLCS makes its recommendations. Although their claims may not be granted in full, each state will gain territory

so they should work together to distinguish boundaries. Peace in the whole region relies on the institutions to stay strong; therefore, states should use them to their full extent. Meanwhile, economic interdependence is found in the fisheries but has weakened, and will be difficult to return to what it once was. To increase interdependence, the West would have to lift the sanctions, but Russia could react in two ways. It could either use the new freedom to finish what it started in Crimea or it could be grateful and try to begin economic and military cooperation again. States should consider lifting sanctions to help establish positive peace for the Arctic's future, but they should be cautious of how Russia would react. Lastly, the states can promote positive peace by creating policies for a security community. Although the states have some qualities of one now, they should purposely seek out a shared identity and interests. Although this may not be possible for the Arctic as a whole, the states can agree on securing the peacefulness of the disputes, to lessen one area of disagreement. Starting with this could lead to potential agreements in other policies that can eventually establish a security community in the upcoming years. Although the states are not as cooperative as they used to be, the peace mechanisms of the Lomonosov Ridge and Svalbard disputes show that cooperation is still valued. The relationship that the states have in the disputes can be used to encourage the states to act the same in other areas of the Arctic to keep the Arctic the "High North, low tension" region.

Overall, the purpose of this study is not to address whether the Arctic is going to engage in conflict or not, but rather, to show why these two disputes will not play a part. Through the use of interviews, government statements, and secondary data, this research was able to discover the peace mechanisms that stabilize the disputes. The research acknowledges, however, that these mechanisms found may not be the only ones, and different approaches may reveal more. The scope of this thesis is limited to the public knowledge known now about the disputes, and cannot predict how the states will react when the CLCS recommendations and technologies are available. The results cannot confirm if the stability of the disputes may change in the future, but as of now, even as the status of the "High North, low tension" region depletes, the Lomonosov Ridge and Svalbard continental shelf are following the historical precedent of disputes remaining peaceful in the Arctic. Instead, this study can offer peace mechanisms that stabilize maritime disputes. Although not all the findings may be relevant to other cases, perhaps some mechanisms can be found in other continental shelf disputes across the world. Further research can be done to investigate these continental shelf disputes and the peace mechanisms they possess.

6. Concluding Remarks

As tensions rise due to the annexation of Crimea, militarization, and the opening of resource, this thesis aimed to contribute to the discussion on whether the Arctic is heading for war or if cooperation will continue. As a region plagued with maritime territorial disputes, this study was interested in what the conditions for peace were in the Lomonosov Ridge and Svalbard disputes. By focusing on the continental shelf disputes, a case study was conducted that found the two disputes remain peaceful in the Arctic because although the “battle” could be won, the “war” is too costly.

To find the mechanisms, this research was conducted through a qualitative approach, in which interviews, governmental statements/documents, and secondary sources were used to establish a historical methods. Historical methods prioritize primary sources (Tosh, 2015); therefore, data was collected from Arctic experts who specialized in the disputes, as well as documents that publicized states' official positioning. This data was conceptualized into a thematic analytical framework that derived from the neorealist, neoliberal, and social constructivist theories. This study found that a balance of power, deterrence, and complex interdependence have a large presence in keeping the peace; meanwhile, there is no present security community, however, there are characteristics that can potentially form one. Through uncovering the peace mechanisms, this research assessed why they work and if and how the disputes should be resolved.

The Arctic is commonly viewed as a West versus Russia arena; therefore, NATO balances Russia. Denmark, Canada, and Norway are NATO members and the threat of NATO looms in the background if Russia escalates the disputes. As equals in the military realm, a balance of power creates a stalemate, thus lowering the benefits of war. Deterrence is used by Russia to counter the smaller states, while the smaller states look towards the US to provide nuclear deterrence. Economic deterrence is also a factor, as the fear of tighter sanctions and the loss of fishery quotas keep Russia cooperative. Complex Interdependence is found through international institutions and economic interdependence causing states' interests to intertwine. Lastly, the ghost of a pre-Crimea security community still exists. A shared conformist identity along with direct relations, long-term interest, and a belief that the shelves are not economically profitable stabilize the disputes. In answering the third research question, the states believe that

the Lomonosov Ridge should be solved through trilateral negotiations using the equidistance principle or through their own custom delimitation lines. Meanwhile, the Svalbard dispute should not be solved because Russia is content with its economic profits, while Norway still reserves sovereignty over the shelf.

The peace mechanisms show stability in the disputes and hinder them from causing war. Knowing the Lomonosov Ridge and Svalbard disputes are stable allows for states to look elsewhere and for more research to be done on areas of the Arctic where peace may not prevail. As the region is home to various other disputes, further peace research can be conducted on these disputes to understand their stability. In studying the Lomonosov Ridge and Svalbard disputes, they demonstrate two areas where peace remains, thus showing the world that the era of cooperation is not over yet.

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
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
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Appendix 1: The Lomonosov Ridge Dispute



Source: Milne, R. (2016). Denmark rejects Russia call for swift talks on Arctic rights. *Financial Times*. <https://www.ft.com/content/d1810bd4-77e5-11e6-97ae-647294649b28>

Appendix 2 The Svalbard Dispute



Source: Yerkes, A. (2016). Whose fish? Looking at Svalbard's fisheries protection zone. *Polar Research & Policy Initiative*. <https://polarconnection.org/svalbard-fisheries-protection-zone/>

Appendix 3: Interview Guide 2021

RQ 1&2: What are the mechanisms that create peace in the Arctic disputes? Why has peace been maintained in the Arctic despite maritime territorial disputes?

1. Why are there maritime disputes in the Arctic?
2. Has Crimea changed the dynamics of the states in the Arctic? If so, how
3. How has the availability of resources in the region affected states?
4. How has cooperation in the Arctic been affected by Crimea and resources?
5. Russia holds the presidency of the Arctic Council in 2021, how could this affect the Arctic?

Svalbard

1. Svalbard's surrounding waters has been discussed since the 1970s, why are Russia and the other countries interested in the continental shelf?
2. What disagreements have emerged from the continental shelf dispute?
3. What actions and policies has Norway taken to maintain peace in the Svalbard dispute?
 - a. Why are these actions and policies important in maintaining peace?
 - b. What are the consequences if they fail?
4. What actions and policies has Russia taken to maintain peace?
 - a. Why are these actions and policies important in maintain peace?
 - b. What are the consequences if they fail?
5. Why are Russia and Norway cooperating over Svalbard even though Russia and most other countries agree that Norway is in violation of the Svalbard treaty?
 - a. Since Russia believes Norway is misinterpreting the treaty and thus international law, would Russia be justified in becoming assertive over the waters?
 - b. Could this dispute cause conflict to emerge due to the other tensions in the Arctic?
6. How does the US's increasing involvement in the Arctic affect Norway's and Russia's actions?


Lomonosov Ridge

1. Russia has once declared the North Pole as Russian, how did the other 4 arctic countries react?
2. Why are Canada, Denmark, and Russia disputing the area and what are the advantages of claiming said area?
3. What role, if any, does the US play in the Lomonosov Ridge?
4. How would each country react to another one becoming more aggressive?
5. Why has conflict not broken out from the dispute?
6. In what ways are the three countries working together?
7. How are Denmark and Canada countering Russia's growing power/presence in the area?
8. What policies and actions are taken to maintain peace?
 - a. Russia, Canada, and, Denmark
9. Although declared by states that the Arctic is an area of peace, how well are these peace mechanisms been maintaining?

RQ 3: How can these mechanisms for peace create solutions for the disputes?

1. How should the disputes be solved?
2. What would happen if the disputes were solved in Russia's favor?
 - a. What would happen if Denmark, Canada, or Norway legally won the disputes?
3. What peace mechanisms can be used to help solved the disputes?
4. Would there be more or less tension in the Arctic if disputes were solved right now?
5. How has Crimea changed the way the states view dispute resolution?
6. If and when disputes can be solved, what is the best outcome for them?

Appendix 4: Resources in the Arctic



Source: Turunen, E. (2019). Resources in the Arctic 2019.

Nordregio. <https://nordregio.org/maps/resources-in-the-arctic-2019/>



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