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## **Flaunting tax defiance:**

A critical discourse analysis to  
advance understandings of  
undocumented capital accumulation in  
Pakistan's marketplace context from  
2008 to 2018

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*For Omar, who is never far.*

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I dedicate this thesis to Pakistan's invisible wage labourers, who remain uncompensated and unarticulated. I hope that scholarly insights influence policy and praxis and bring dignity and change to their lived experience.

## **Abstract**

This study problematises the overt, persistent defiance to tax and regulation policy by business communities in Pakistan's retail marketplaces as a reflection of state-society distance and an expression of power and dominance. This thesis builds on the understanding that the state-society distance, manifested in endemic informal business practices, persists when elite owners of undocumented capital become wedged between the state and society through processes of domination, subjugation and patronage. In seeking to advance understandings of the regime of undocumented capital accumulation legitimating itself as a norm of business activity, this study employs a discourse-analytic viewpoint. Through critical discourse analysis of selected political party election manifesto texts from the election years 2008, 2013 and 2018, the study identifies how consensus of political parties around specific representations of governance normalises aspects of the organisation of society. Additionally, it identifies how representations of social actors imply specific relations of power. The study finds that in representations of governance and in constructions of identity for social actors, conditions conducive to informality are discursively construed. Broadly, these include a valorisation of capital, a subordination of citizens to capital-owners, and a denigration of state institutions. In order to suggest explanations of how the discursive mediates to the manifest aspect of the social context where undocumented accumulation persists barely-resisted, the conceptual lens of 'embeddedness' of the social with the economic is utilised. The overarching argument of the thesis is that a logic of social organisation is produced discursively in political party texts, and society is brought into this logic by structural practices such as institutionalised patronage and discriminatory labour laws. This logic of social organisation achieves hegemony in the discursive field that this study has analysed and in the contingent social context, but counter-logics may emerge in other discursive fields, or in non-discursive domains.



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## *Chapter 1*

### **Introduction**

Like many contemporary developing countries struggling to generate tax revenue from their citizens, the Pakistani state has also long contended with significant and growing informality within its economy. While many business owners, workers and self-employed labour among Pakistan's 220 million-strong population don't earn enough to be able to be taxed, there is nevertheless a recurrent phenomenon of overt, boisterous resistance to successive tax policy. As scholars have pointed out, the struggle to tax is also a reflection of state-society distance (Bräutigam, 2008). In Pakistan's case, this distance takes on a confrontational nature, opening up questions of power, dominance, and hegemony.

Successive Pakistani governments have faced gritty, bristling confrontation to taxation and regulation from strongly allied business fraternities<sup>1</sup>. The most visible of these tight-knit business communities are wholesale retail traders, who have effectively been able to form what are known as 'trader (or merchant) associations' across the country (Wilder, 1999; Amirali, 2017; Javed, 2018). Committed to keeping economic activity outside the radar of taxation and regulation, businesses across Pakistan that affiliate with trader associations overwhelmingly remain undocumented, defiantly so, and attempts to bring them into the tax net have resulted in recurrent countrywide 'shutter-down' strikes and protests.

It is worthwhile to cite some examples from newspaper reports to illustrate the mobilisation capacity of these trader associations. Most recently, in October 2019, traders were irked by documentation requirements introduced by revenue authorities, including one that necessitated them to attach a copy of their National Identity Card with every sale and purchase exceeding rupees 50'000 (approximately USD 400<sup>2</sup>). Answering the call to strike by association leaders, traders padlocked their storefronts, bringing everyday exchange countrywide to a grinding halt. In these enactments of resistance, ultimatums are given—except that the ultimatums come from the business

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<sup>1</sup> See newspapers reports, for example:

- 'Countrywide traders' strike on 28<sup>th</sup>, 29<sup>th</sup>' Dawn, October 10, 2019. <https://www.dawn.com/news/2510020>
- 'Traders observe countrywide strike against withholding tax', Dawn, September 10, 2015. <https://www.dawn.com/news/1206047>
- 'Traders observe strike against new law', Dawn August 2, 2015. <https://www.dawn.com/news/1197943>

<sup>2</sup> 'Countrywide traders' strike on 28<sup>th</sup>, 29<sup>th</sup>' Dawn, October 10, 2019. Retrieved February 3, 2021, from <https://www.dawn.com/news/2510020>

communities. In this particular instance, trader representatives warned of dire consequences if the documentation conditions were not revoked. As news reports describe, a sizeable delegation demonstrating outside the barbed wire-guarded Federal Bureau of Revenue (FBR) building in the capital Islamabad demanded that negotiations, if any, would be with none other than the FBR Chairman.

A withholding tax in 2015 (subsequently revoked) was aimed at encouraging registration of business activity<sup>3</sup>. It meant that businesses that have not filed tax returns would face a deduction of 0.3 percent on all banking transactions exceeding rupees 50'000—the equivalent of one US dollar surrendered to the government on every transaction through banking channels worth about 400 US dollars. The deduction would be reimbursed once tax returns were filed. Tax filers would remain unaffected. “Extortion,” cried a trader association leader<sup>4</sup>; traders countrywide brought down their shutters and staged demonstration rallies in parts of the country. “We cannot promise peace in the future,” the government was warned, with demands that the tax be completely revoked<sup>5</sup>. In 2012, a consumption audit aimed at identifying unreported income was successfully thwarted by protesting traders; in 2010, countrywide protests blocked a value-added tax which was intended to widen the tax base (Amirali, 2017, p. 19).

‘Economic informality’ in this paper refers to the part of the economy which is outside the regulatory control of the state, a phenomenon endemic to contemporary developing countries (Harris-White, 2010). Harriss-White's (2010) description of how informality manifests in the economy corresponds with the situation in Pakistan, and with how I conceptualise informality in this paper. As Harriss-White describes, developing country informality has two types of manifestations:

first, self-employment (with some wage-work) in unregistered or unincorporated small enterprises; second, unregistered and unregulated activity and workers inside and around

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<sup>3</sup> ‘Traders observe countrywide strike against withholding tax’, Dawn, September 10, 2015. Retrieved February 3, 2021, from <https://www.dawn.com/news/1206047>

<sup>4</sup> Mr. Naeem Mir, the then-Secretary General of the All Pakistan Anjuman-i-Tajran (All Pakistan Association of Traders), reported in Dawn, September 10, 2015. Retrieved February 3, 2021, from <https://www.dawn.com/news/1206047>

<sup>5</sup> ‘Traders observe strike against new law’, Dawn August 2, 2015. Retrieved February 3, 2021, from <https://www.dawn.com/news/1197943>

large registered organisations such as firms, public sector enterprises, and the state itself (Harriss-White, 2010, p. 170)

While unregistered and unregulated activity along with various forms of tax evasion and avoidance practices prevail in Pakistan's formalised corporate sectors, these are largely covert activities. As I will make apparent, my concern in this paper is with *overt defiance*, and so the concern of this study is the informality persisting in self-employment and wage-work in unregistered enterprises predominantly found among traders in wholesale and retail marketplaces, i.e. among the *taajir tabqa* (in Urdu: تاجر طبقہ) or 'merchant class', as the collective of traders is colloquially known in Pakistan.

There has been periodic friction to economic informality from the tax administration, but its attendant trope of extraction, and recourse to measures that have said to "lack imagination" (Kazi, 2016), only seem to strengthen the resolve of businesses committed to defending the opacity of their practices. Importantly, the narrative of association leaders seems to resound compellingly with big and small producers across the length and breadth of the country. The 'call' to strike by association leaders has a sanctified feel to it; indeed, like a call to prayer, it is answered by millions of retail traders and business owners who lose billions of rupees in revenue when halting business activity<sup>6</sup>. Hundreds of trader associations, while in some manner of competition with each other, present an incredibly consolidated front to the tax administration, leaving little doubt about the resolute nature of informal capital in the country.

A question that arises, and one that Besley and Persson (2014) ask is: do all businesses, big or small, benefit equally from this situation? Implicit in Besley and Persson's (2014) analysis and a direct concern in the study by Acemoglu et al. (2020) is that a small firm's decision to formalise or not is a cost-benefit evaluation of the advantages to the firm of aligning with the state's institutions versus aligning with the informal mechanisms (financial, dispute-related, social) that sustain the working of the informal economy. Certainly, there are costs to informality also, and given the internal hierarchies found within trader associations in studies from Pakistan (Amirali, 2017; Akhtar, 2018; Javed, 2018), not all individual business owners or self-employed traders may benefit equally or universally from informality. Shutting down business activity during strikes, for example,

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<sup>6</sup> 'Billions lost as traders protest against bank transaction tax', Dawn September 10, 2015. Retrieved February 3, 2021, from <https://www.dawn.com/news/1205996>

would be significantly costlier for smaller businesses and poorer business owners than for thriving marketplace elites who are calling the strikes.

Also noteworthy is that when business fraternities resist being *known* to the state, they not only present a tax problem hindering the state's capacity to operate the state and deliver welfare, they also obscure processes of subjugation and domination taking place within society (Akhtar, 2011). The International Labour Organisation (ILO) reports that of the two billion people working in informal employment globally, "the majority lack social protection, rights at work and decent working conditions" (ILO, 2018). Pakistan fares notoriously on this count, as detailed by ILO, Human Rights Watch and Pakistan Institute of Labour Education and Research (PILER) reports (Zhou 2018; Ijaz, 2019; PILER, 2010; 2011; 2016; n.d.) and scholarly research (Upadhyaya, 2008; Hassan & Azman, 2014; Akhtar, 2011). In addition to harsh daily conditions, a consistent detail that stands out in these studies is the pervasive practice of hiring labour verbally without written contracts, effectively divesting workers of any rights or minimum wage mandates, and importantly, creating a wedge between their relationship with the state.

Voices have been raised by Pakistani civil society and international organisations against this treatment of informally employed labour<sup>7</sup>, but there is a conspicuous absence of concern from the government. The friction to economic informality in Pakistan over the last decade has come from successive tax administrations, but there has barely been any objection to the alleged exploitation of informally employed labour from successive governments. On occasions when workers have protested against inhumane working conditions, the government's posture has been significantly derogatory. In striking contrast to the deference shown to demonstrating business owners, workers have been baton-charged by police personnel when protesting for increase in daily wages and old-

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<sup>7</sup> See, for example:

- 'On death's door: trade unions in Pakistan', Dawn May 1, 2016. Retrieved February 3, 2021, from <https://www.dawn.com/news/1255333>
- 'Protesting laborers booked under extortion charges' The News, March 24, 2012. Retrieved February 3, 2021, from <https://www.thenews.com.pk/archive/print/352804-%E2%80%98protesting%E2%80%99-labourers-booked-under-extortion-charges>
- 'NTUF to protest against convictions in Faisalabad power loom case', The News November 4, 2011. Retrieved February 3, 2021, from <https://www.thenews.com.pk/archive/print/329865-ntuf-to-protest-against-convictions-in-faisalabad-power-loom-case>
- 'Pakistan: Labour Leaders killed for forming union in Faisalabad,' Europe Solidaire Sans Frontieres, July 7, 2010, from <http://www.europe-solidaire.org/spip.php?article17949>
- 'Blood on the path of love: the Striking Workers of Faisalabad, Pakistan', Monthly Review December 1, 2010. Retrieved February 3, 2021, from <https://monthlyreview.org/2010/12/01/blood-on-the-path-of-love/>

age benefits<sup>8</sup>. There have also been reports of arrests and sentencing on the pretext of anti-terrorism laws for insisting on legal entitlements<sup>9</sup>.

It would be difficult to demonstrate an *absence* of concern on behalf of the government from newspaper reports, but the following is an indication of the posture of successive Pakistani governments with respect to businesses and workers. Candland (2007) points out that restrictive laws regarding labour unionisation have resulted in a context where labour is barely unionised in Pakistan, with only 0.7 percent of the country's economically active population participating in unions in the year 2000 (Candland, 2007, p. 46). Conversely, Wilder (1999) notes how retail marketplaces serve as important hubs of power, with political parties collaborating with marketplace traders to strengthen their mobilisation capacity and utilise them for electoral advantages. This observation has remained consistent in findings by Amirali (2017), Javed (2018), Liaquat et al. (2020) *inter alia* who report that political parties support and strengthen trader associations and commonly turn to marketplace elites (thriving businessmen in urban and rural marketplaces) to recruit lower-tier party members to garner vote banks for the party.

The indirect and arguably coercive attempts by successive tax administrations to cast the tax net wider reflect the Pakistani state's struggles with effective engagement with society. Scholars have noted how the state's access to information about the society is closely related to the state's ability to tax and to its legitimacy for citizens (Jerven, 2013). James C. Scott (1998) has documented how obscurity of the society for the state has resulted in tragic failures of state intervention. Access to information and the ability to tax is about shaping ties to society, and if the ties are consent- rather than coercion-based, states are able to build authority and legitimacy (Bräutigam, 2008). Bräutigam (2008) among other scholars, asserts that once a state is able to negotiate a bargain between taxation and representation, there is a move towards effective two-way accountability through institutions, and thus greater legitimacy of the state. The understanding is that today's advanced states have enabled better governance through tax-bargaining, and that a combination of historical, economic and institutional factors common to many developing countries leads to more coercive approaches towards taxation (Bräutigam, 2008; Moore, 2008).

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<sup>8</sup> 'Power loom workers hold protests', Dawn, July 28, 2004. Retrieved February 3, 2021, from <https://www.dawn.com/news/365728/faisalabad-power-loom-workers-hold-protests>

<sup>9</sup> 'Misrule of law', Dawn, February 23, 2016. Retrieved February 3, 2021, from <https://www.dawn.com/news/1241363>

It would appear from the confrontational response of Pakistan's business communities to taxation and regulation that these businesses choose to shun the state. Much like India's 'call-centre enclaves' (Sharma, 2006), defiant informality may be seen as a retreat by businesses into undocumented enclaves of economic activity, and an assertion that they can operate in isolation to state infrastructure. This retreat implies that a lot of business practices are carried out using methods undocumented by the state and without recourse to state infrastructure. Javed (2018) and Amirali (2017) in their recent ethnographic studies of urban wholesale traders in Lahore, Pakistan, and agricultural middlemen in Pakistani Punjab, respectively, find evidence of these practices. Javed (2018), for example, finds that in addition to employment, marketplace elites are able to provide many services to smaller-scale, poorer traders and workers—services that are in the ambit of the state to provide, given capacity and access. These include moneylending, security, and also protection from harassment by government officials (Javed, 2018; Amirali 2017).

Various scholars have nuanced Bräutigam's (2008) understanding of the deadlock in state-society relations by noting that a manner of transaction and bargaining does indeed take place between undocumented businesses and state agents. It is argued that far from being state-shunning enclaves, undocumented businesses do rely on transactional relations forged with state agents. Judith Tandler, for example, forthrightly called out what she termed the 'devil's deal'. In her words, it is:

a kind of unspoken deal between politicians and their constituents—myriad small-firm owners, many in the informal sector. If you vote for me, according to this exchange, I won't collect taxes from you; I won't make you comply with tax, environmental or labor regulations; and I will keep the police and inspectors from harassing you. (Tandler, 2002, p. 2)

Javed (2018) finds evidence of trader association elites in urban Lahore, Pakistan, building transactional, reciprocal relations with local politicians in exchange for 'ease of business' and for a forum to advance their own political ambitions. As Tandler points out, the problem with such a bargain is that it encourages informalisation to the extent of discouraging formalisation. From a social policy perspective, it becomes legitimate to support small firms by not taxing them in the interests of their own welfare and the services they provide to society by way of employment. The politics of this, as Tandler points out, is that it helps incumbents and office-aspirants (usually those aspiring for provincial or district-level seats) in handing over the responsibility of "social

peace” (Tendler, 2002, p. 3) to the informal sector. An outcome of this is that on the one hand, small-firm sectors become unused to paying anything at all (as was the case with the cluster of small garment firms in Brazil studied by Tendler), and on the other hand, it becomes difficult for either party to get out of the bargain once it has become embedded.

The present study builds on the understanding that the state-society distance, manifested in endemic informal business practices, persists when elite owners of undocumented capital become wedged between the state and society through processes of domination, subjugation and patronage. When state agents engage reciprocally with some segments of society over others, they alienate the state from a significant part of society, while also undermining the state’s legitimacy in the process. When Pakistan’s producers strengthen this wedge by siding with the narrative of trader association leaders, it may be explained by the extractive and arguably coercive posture of the state as represented by successive tax regimes and policies. However, when workers, who are many millions more, remain passive to a status quo fraught with exploitation and rights abuses, it is a reflection of a lack of political articulation and access, and reflective of the real failing of the state-building project. From this understanding, the boisterous defiance of trader association representatives to taxation and regulation is not a politics of *revolt*, but rather a politics that signals *opposition to any change* in the status quo (Akhtar, 2018).

Building on recent ethnographic studies from Pakistan, I view the persistence and defiance of undocumented economic activity in Pakistan as a signal of *dominance*: of business fraternities over workers, of business association leaders over smaller business owners, and, central to this study, *of a regime of undocumented capital accumulation buoyantly legitimating itself as a norm of business activity*. This study is motivated by conjectures that undocumented economic activity not only *masks* processes of domination and subjugation in society, but also *relies on* them for its preservation (Akhtar, 2018; Amirali, 2017; Javed, 2018). I understand economic informality in Pakistan to be a social *wrong* (emphasised normatively) (Fairclough, 2009), which is likely to endure, defiantly so, as long as processes of domination and subjugation within society are not addressed.

In this respect, I engage in a critical study and ask, broadly: could the government’s posture towards different segments of society by *construing* a social structure where unequal power relations persevere? Could social inequality, which enables the dominance of some segments of society over



others, have become so entrenched and normalised in society that it has come to be taken for granted? Are institutions and practices of governance *colluding* in the establishment of norms where informality persists barely-resisted? Could economic informality, as a regime of capital accumulation, have become *hegemonic* in Pakistan?

By asking these questions, a foundational assumption I am making is that there is indeed a relationship between what I have called *posture* (attitudes) and *structure* (social practices) (Fairclough, 2009). I assume social structures can be *construed* (both represented and constructed) by the actions of social actors (Wood & Kroger, 2000). These assumptions are the realm of discourse theory: it is in discourses and discursive practices that the attitudes of elite groups are seen to play a role in the “maintenance of the social world” (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 62). My overarching curiosity revolves around *dominance* and *power* and around norms sedimenting into entrenched social practices (Van Dijk, 1993). The ambition of this study is to further an understanding of the dominance of Pakistan’s trader association leaders, understand it critically, i.e. while envisioning change, and employ discourse analysis as a point of entry.

I turn to discourses to identify how the above processes are manifested. *Where* to find discourses is at the core of this study: I turn to political parties as agents of the state, and specifically to political party communication texts. I discuss this choice in detail below. *What* I look for in political party discourses is the ways in which governance has been represented, and consequently how the organisation of social life has been both represented and idealised. This focus allows insights into the underlying assumptions regarding the organisation of society, on the consensus and contestations around these within the texts, and particularly on how identities and relations in the social world may be construed.

Manifesting this ambition, the research questions guiding my study are:

[1] *How is governance represented by Pakistan’s mainstream political parties in selected political communication texts, and how are these representations reproduced or contested over time and across political parties?*

[2] *How do these representations construe positions with which social actors can identify, and how does this enable specific relations of power within society?*

### ***1.1 'The primacy of politics'***

I turn to political party communication, namely election manifesto texts, having reasons to do so both contextually and theoretically. As has been conjectured above, political parties in Pakistan have strategic interests in establishing power at the marketplace and co-opting social actors for transactional, reciprocal gains. I have also conjectured defiant stability of informal business practices in Pakistan to be a hegemonic project. Hegemony, as Fairclough (2013) describes it, is understood as:

leadership as well as domination across the economic, political, cultural and ideological domains of a society. Hegemony is the power over society as a whole of one of the fundamental economically defined classes in alliance (as a bloc) with other social forces, but it is never achieved more than partially and temporarily, as an 'unstable equilibrium'. Hegemony is about constructing alliances, and integrating rather than simply dominating subordinate classes, through concessions or through ideological means, to win their consent. (Fairclough, 2013, p. 61)

I am interested in the notion of the impermanence of hegemony, and of alliances in maintaining hegemony. I understand that when it comes to preserving the dominance of undocumented economic activity, the alliances in place are covert and many involve 'informal state' at work. In the present study, the alliance I am interested in is that between politicians and trader association leaders, i.e. in the collusion or complicity of political parties in the conjectured hegemony of informality.

Theoretically, the "primacy of politics" (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 43) has been recognised in the discourse-analytic tradition with respect to the construal of identities and relations in the social world (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002; Wood & Kroger, 2000; Fairclough, 2009; 2013). Laclau and Mouffe use this phrase to refer to the idea that discourses and the identities produced through them are intrinsically political (Howarth & Stavrakakis, 2000), but here I use it also to mean that the utterances of politicians are important and consequential. As Van Dijk notes, "power and dominance are usually organised and institutionalised" (1993, p. 225), and that "critique of discourse implies a political critique of those responsible for its perversion in the reproduction of dominance and inequality" (Van Dijk, 1993, p. 153). Political parties' endorsement of power relations has important

implications for the *normalising* of processes of domination and subjugation such that they begin to be taken for granted and come to appear as ‘common sense’.

In this study, following the significance given to politicians as ‘organic intellectuals’ by neo-Gramscian theory (Filippini, 2016; Crehan, 2016; Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002), I call out the political party system as a currently overlooked and understudied source of the endorsement and particularly the *naturalisation* of power-laden relations within the Pakistani society. I seek to identify the dominant discourses in political communication that normalise and even strategically endorse social relations ideal for economic informality to persist. However, while I focus on discourses produced by political parties, as Van Dijk (1993) says, such a choice “is not motivated by the wish to picture these elites as the villains in a simplistic story of social inequality” (p. 280). Rather, the idea is to “focus on the unique access of the elites to public discourse, and hence on their role in the discursive management of the public mind” (Van Dijk, 1993, p. 280).

Here, I make clear how I understand the relationship between the state and political parties. This study diverges from approaches that speak of the state as one entity. The state theorist Bob Jessop notes the difficulty of defining the state incontestably, but suggests how it can be theorised into its *aspects*—state as territory under state control; state as population under state authority; state as a decision-making apparatus. Foucault’s view of the state was in terms of its social *relations*; what Foucault called *governmentality*, for example, was envisaged as:

a set of practices and strategies, government projects and modes of calculation, that operate on something called the state. This something is terrain of a non-essentialised set of political relations, however, rather than a universal, fixed, unchanging phenomenon (Jessop, 2017, p. 7)

In this study, I adopt Foucault’s non-essentialising and relational conception of the state. Thus, state agents are actors taking action on behalf of an abstract entity called the state, and all actions characterised as governance—and specifically all failures of these actions—are seen as principal-agent problems (Holcombe and Gwartney, 1989; World Bank, 2016). Political party members, for example, are agents to the state, which is the principal. I turn to my selected data material texts with a view to understanding how political actors acting on behalf of the state have contributed to the

production and reproduction of ‘macro structures’ of the social world (Fairclough, 2013) over the last decade, with implications for power relations within society and between state and society.

## **1.2 The discourse-analytic perspective**

More than a set of analytic tools, discourse analysis is a perspective with its own meta-theory (Wood & Kroger, 2000). Employing this perspective commits the discourse analyst to a specific worldview. This allows for insights into specific aspects of the social world, but there are fundamental differences compared to other qualitative methods of research (Wood & Kroger, 2000). The differences are in terms of what it is that can be accessed about the social world, and consequently, what becomes the focus of the research inquiry (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002; Fairclough, 2013).

The most fundamental aspect of the discourse lens is the premise that the meanings that social actors associate with social objects and actions derive from specific systems of rules (Wood & Kroger, 2000). An understanding is that these systems of rules are rooted in the language used for social objects and actions (Wood & Kroger, 2000). Thus, implicit is the integral idea that language is not only a mode of transmitting information, but a force that confers meaning to the social world. Social reality exists, but what it *means*, or comes to mean to people, derives from how the social world has been represented through language in text and talk (Wood & Kroger, 2000), though also in visual representations or in institutions, depending on how the *discursive* has been conceptualised. So, objects and actions in the social world are *objects of discourse* (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002), and the discursive representation of the social world has the faculty to constitute what social actors accept as ‘real’ (Wood & Kroger, 2000; Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002). As Heidegger noted, “human beings are thrown into and inhabit a world of discourses and practices, and cannot conceive or think about objects outside of it” (Wood & Kroger, 2000, p. 3).

Wood and Kroger (2000) conceptualise discourses as “systems of meaningful practices that form the identities of subjects and objects” (Wood & Kroger, 2000, p. 4). But since social objects are conceived as objects of discourse in the discourse-analytic perspective, then if a particular discourse dominates, it is possible for objects to acquire specific meanings, and by that same logic, possible also for other meanings to fade away. This understanding allows discourses and the language they comprise of to be invested with power (Wood & Kroger, 2000). This faculty of language allows text and talk to be used strategically and deliberately to “dominate or organise a field of meaning so as

to fix the identities of objects and practices in a particular way” (Wood & Kroger, 2000, p. 3). Thus discourses are intrinsically *political*. The power that language wields is that it can establish relations among objects and practices in society and provide positions with which social actors can identify (Wood & Kroger, 2000).

Along with power, language also allows for the *possibility* to understand social life (Wood & Kroger, 2000). The methods used to analyse language and tap into the possibilities to understand social life is called discourse analysis (Wood & Kroger, 2000). The premise is to view language as action; the task is to look for what language *does* in text and talk rather than what the text and talk is *about*. The idea is to “go beyond content and to see how it is used flexibly to achieve particular functions and effects” (Wood & Kroger, 2000, p. 6).

Given this understanding of the power and intrinsic politics of discourses in general and particularly of discourses employed in political party communication, I turn to my data material with a focus on examining what the language is *doing*. Either strategically or inadvertently, text and talk is action (Wood & Kroger, 2000), and its usage produces outcomes. I embark on the present study seeking to locate discourses that are leaned on by political leaders in representations of governance in election manifestos of selected political parties over three election years. I examine the representations over time and across political parties with the view to understanding how the underlying assumptions or objectifications are reproduced or contested. This allows insights into how assumptions are sedimented into ‘givens’ or ‘normalisations’ or ‘common sense’, and therefore into how *discursive stability* of specific representations, identities and relations is achieved. At the same time, contestations in the form of differentiations and alternative expressions allow for insights into how this stability may be weakened. After all, hegemony is never complete and only vies for stability through reproduction and self-legitimation (Fairclough, 2013).

I believe that the questions asked by this study and the findings yielded by the selected data material have important implications. Understanding the stability of undocumented accumulation practices becomes an exploration of capitalism in contemporary developing countries such as Pakistan. An ambition of this thesis is also to enable the right questions to be asked and facilitate an empathetic, sensitive understanding of social phenomena: informality, and especially its overt defiance in Pakistan, reflects pressing social issues of state capacity, state legitimacy and processes of dominance within society. As Van Dijk (1993) notes, discourse analysis offers a lens to better

understand the normalisation of dominance, subjugation and inequality in society. If indeed political party communication is predominantly reproducing constructions of identities and relations in the social context that enable unequal power relations in society, then the alleged subjugation of citizens at the hands of powerful social actors is a consequential matter, worthy of illumination. I have problematised the topic of this study so that insights can be gained into the stability and defiance of informality, but insights on governance, state legitimacy and domination processes in society can shed light on other manifestations of state-society distance, such as the proliferation of terrorist outfits. It is also important that contestations to dominant discourses are identified, because those are the gaps where change can come from, and where an effective state-building project may begin to take shape.

This thesis is organised in the following way. In Chapter 2, I lay out the methodology that I use, and explain my use of theoretical concepts and selection of data material. In Chapter 3, I provide a brief historical background of the organisation of political parties in Pakistan in order to situate the selected data material texts in the context of democratisation in the country. I present the findings of the discourse analysis in Chapter 4. Finally, in Chapter 5 I discuss how my findings address the research questions that guided this study and examine the implications of these findings for the stability of undocumented capital accumulation in Pakistan. In my discussion, I lean on Polanyi's embeddedness concept implicit in insights offered by the Regulation Approach and in Barbara Harris-White's understandings of undocumented accumulation, to suggest explanations of how the discursive is mediated to undocumented economic practices manifest in the social context. Lastly, I conclude by presenting the overarching argument of this thesis.

## Chapter 2

### Methodology and Theoretical Lens

My concern in this study is about the defiance and stability of informality among business communities in Pakistan's marketplaces. The ambition of this thesis is to advance an understanding of this phenomenon by deploying a discourse-analytic viewpoint. I turn to discourses in selected political party texts to look for representations of the social context, and potentially for the *discursive stability* of this regime of capital accumulation.

In this chapter, I will describe my methodology. Theory and method in discourse analysis are interwoven (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 13; Fairclough, 2009). The use of the discourse-analytic perspective prescribes the entire design of the study, from the framing of the research questions, to the employment of theoretical concepts, to the selection and treatment of data material (Fairclough, 2009). The specific world-view, epistemology and ontology associated with this perspective also influence the criteria of evaluation of the findings yielded, as this perspective differs meta-theoretically from other forms of qualitative methods (Wood & Kroger, 2000, p. 27).

This chapter is organised in the following manner. First, I lay out the foundational assumptions and the premise of discourse analysis. Second, I describe the specific approach within discourse analysis that I adopt. Third, I explain the concepts and theoretical frameworks that I have made use of in my approach. Fourth, I describe the selection of my data material, before, finally, discussing some limitations of my chosen methodology.

#### 2.1 *The premise of discourse analysis*

Firstly, what is discourse? There are multiple approaches and traditions in discourse analysis, implying diverse understandings of what constitutes as discourse or discourses (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002; Wood & Kroger, 2000). I start by referencing a preliminary idea about the meaning of discourse offered by Jørgensen & Phillips (2002), which is that “discourse is a particular way of talking about and understanding the world (or an aspect of the world)” (p. 11). But how we talk about things is never neutral (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002). In the discourse-analytic world-view, how we talk about things has two fundamental implications: it reflects our underlying assumptions, and it constructs meanings. These two features lend talk and text—and other ways of representing

conceptualised as discursive—with power (to construct the social world) and possibility (to understand aspects of the social world) (Burchell et al. 1991; Wood & Kroger, 2000).

The starting point of discourse analysis is its *social constructionist* epistemology (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 12). There is a specific understanding of language (with respect to its function in the construction of the social world), and of social actors (with respect to their capacity of being constructed) (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 12). This is premised on the notion that the meaningfulness of the social world is never objective, but rather a product of being constructed in representations. Therefore, our knowledge of the world can never be an objective truth (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 14), but always a version imbued with meaning. This derives from Foucault's conception of our relation to the social world, that "it is impossible to talk from a position outside discourse" (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 24), leaving us with access only to versions of a 'truth'.

Reality is only accessible to us through representations of it, and particularly through language, and representations are never neutral, nor are they fixed. Rather, representations are contingent on historically and culturally given contexts (Burr, 1995 quoted in Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 14; Wood & Kroger, 2000). Both these insights, i.e. that representations of the social world are not neutral and that they are contingent on context implies also that representations are never stagnant. This reflects a non-essentialist and post-structuralist view of social reality (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 15): since representations play a part in constructing the world, then the manifest world of social practices, identities and relations is also not fixed in a rigid structure.

The question then arises: why are representations of the social world then always *not* in flux? Here is where the ontological premise of discourse analysis comes in: language is understood to be not just a means of transmitting information, but an active, performative force that has functions (Wood & Kroger, 2000). The idea is that in principle, representations of the social world and of subjects within the social world are contingent, but they become fixed and inflexible in specific situations, or within specific discourses. As Jørgensen & Phillips (2002) say, "specific situations place restrictions on the identities which an individual can assume and on the statements which can be accepted as meaningful" (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 15). The Foucauldian notion is that discourses are "relatively rule bound sets of statements which impose limits on what gives meaning" (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 15). In Foucault's words:



Discourse in this sense is not an ideal, timeless form [...] it is, from beginning to end, historical—a fragment of history [...] posing its own limits, its divisions, its transformations, the specific modes of its temporality” (Foucault, 1972, quoted in Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 22)

The premise is that all objects and actions in the social world are meaningful, but with their meaning conferred by historically specific systems of rules (Wood & Kroger, 2000) that then “delimit what it is possible to say” (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 23). But also, this delimitation is never permanent. ‘Truth’ is created discursively, and there is indeed a constant struggle between representations of the social world (discourses) in order for a particular version to dominate. This could be called the *discursive struggle* to achieve hegemony (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 43). This is possible because language is social practice, and can be used deliberately and politically in order to dominate some representations over others. The implication of this domination of discourses is that some representations become fixed into apparent common sense. In the present study, I seek to locate evidence of discursive struggle and potentially of discursive stability in representations of the social world, while focussing on social conditions conducive to informality. In the formulation of my research questions, I am therefore not seeking an ‘objective truth’; I am not interested in what the discourses are *about*, but rather in what they *do* (Wood & Kroger, 2000). I seek to identify how “effects of truth” (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 24) are created in representations, and how these effects of truth may be competing for domination.

Discursive representations have implications for the construction of identities (known as *subjects* in discourse theory) and relations in the social world (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 24). Foucault’s view was that “subjects are created in discourses” (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 24), and are also therefore non-essential entities. The concept of *interpellation* (Althusser, 2006) provides the mechanism by which the construction of identities takes place in discourses. The premise is that language “constructs a social position for the individual and thereby makes him or her an ideological subject” (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 24). The necessity of ideology in this conceptualisation is important to some discourse theorists, though not to all, but the premise is that representations construct “imaginary” relations in the social world (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 24). In my analysis, I identify, for example, how texts in my selected data material interpellate capital-owners as indispensable to society only by virtue of owning capital, and how ‘the common man’ is interpellated as one whose struggle is essential for nation-building.

This is not to imply that *agency* of social actors has no place in the social world, and that discursive interpellations and the associated concept of ideology fix social identities. On the contrary, propositions such as Gramsci's theory of hegemony, for example, acknowledge agency among social actors in the production of these meanings and also in how they appeal to social subjects (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 26; Hall, 1980; Gramsci, 2007). In my study, I do not ascribe a linear relationship between the discursive creation of identities and relations and how they manifest in Pakistan's marketplace contexts. Rather, I am seeking to understand how versions of representations in the texts may be inclining towards consensus. Since discourses are both reflections and constructions of the social world, a potential consensus becomes significant and of interest. Resistance to discursively-constructed subject positions may come from non-discursive sources, but also important is how contestations or reproductions may be occurring in discursive representations. I am interested in patterns of dominance and subjugation among social actors that may be reflected and/or construed in discursive representations in my data material.

## **2.2 Critical discourse analysis and dialectical relations**

The approach within the discourse-analytic perspective that fits my research interest is Fairclough's critical discourse analysis (CDA). There are several reasons for this. Firstly, this approach is critical. I approach my chosen topic not as an 'objective' observer (though the notion of objectivity is already negated in the discourse-analytic perspective), but with strong normative assumptions about how the world should be. I build on findings from existing literature that the social context I focus on is fraught with processes of domination, subjugation and patronage, and I am ambitious that insights into this topic and social context will facilitate change.

Secondly, Fairclough's CDA approach defers to both discursive and non-discursive dimensions of the social world. I am interested in relating stability in structural practices to discursive stability, and Fairclough finds a way to relate these by utilising a transdisciplinary methodology (Fairclough, 2009). Fairclough refers to a *structure* where the social wrong under question is manifested. Additionally, he recognises two aspects (or dimensions) of social reality: the discursive or semiotic aspect that consists of discourses that he calls *communicative events*, and the non-semiotic aspect, which consists of social practices and institutions. He envisions a dialectical relationship between the manifest structure and communication events, a relationship that is mediated by social practices.

In my study, I start by recognising a problem (defiant informality) in the manifest structure of social reality (the physical space of Pakistan's wholesale marketplace contexts). Relying on findings consistent in existing literature that point to processes of domination and subjugation in these contexts, I regard this problem as a manifestation of social inequality and, normatively, as a social wrong. My primary focus in this study is firstly to identify how representations in my selected data material construct idealisations of social reality, specifically of governance. This is reflected in my research question: *How is governance represented by Pakistan's mainstream political parties, and how are these representations reproduced or contested over time and across political parties?* Secondly, my focus is to identify within this data material how these representations construct identities and relations among social actors such that conditions conducive to informal capital accumulation are articulated, reproduced or contested. This is reflected in my second research question: *How do representations of governance by political parties construe positions with which social actors can identify, and how does this enable specific relations of power within society?*

Fairclough theorises that the discursive aspect of the social world becomes manifest in the structural aspect through the mediation of social practices. I present the results of my analysis of the discursive aspect in Chapter 4: Analysis and Findings. How these are understood to be mediated to the manifest social phenomenon of informal capital accumulation is through social practices which I discuss in Chapter 5: Discussion and Conclusion. In my discussion, I rely on insights from Karl Polanyi's conception of 'embeddedness' (Polanyi, 1957 in Jessop, 1997; Jessop & Sum, 2019; Webster et al., 2011; Krippner et al., 2004), on the Regulation Approach (Jessop, 1997), and on Barbara Harriss-White's (2010) understandings on 'what brings order' to unregulated economic activity in developing world contexts. For empirics, I rely on findings by recent studies conducted on the Pakistani marketplace context and its nexus with political parties, and on contextual material such as labour laws, industrial relations ordinances and the Constitution of Pakistan.

Here, I present the theoretical insights I focus on in my Discussion; in the subsequent section, I will describe the discourse-theoretical concepts I employ in my analysis of texts. Integral to the Regulation Approach (RA) is the insight that the economy is "embedded in a complex array of social relations, extra-economic as well as economic institutions, and in specific social configurations" (Jessop, 1997, p. 296). The 'embeddedness' concept, as formulated by Karl Polanyi, has as its premise the idea that markets are socially embedded, and that "the economy is not autonomous, but subordinate to social relations" (Webster et al., 2011). Polanyi's conception is thus

transdisciplinary, “explicitly intended to undermine incipient disciplinary boundaries by portraying social processes in terms of a fluid mixing of ‘economic’ and ‘non-economic’ factors” (Krippner et al., 2004, p. 111). The premise is that there is no dichotomy between the economic and the social in processes of capital accumulation, nor between the state and society, and that the economy is not regulated only through the law and the state, but rather through a wide range of mechanisms, which Jessop (1997) indicates as ‘economic and extra-economic’. Among the ‘extra-economic’ institutions are included: “collective identities, shared visions, common rules, norms, conventions, networks, procedures and modes of calculation” (Jessop, 1997, p. 316).

In trying to explain the persistence of unregulated economic activity, Harris-White (2010) asks whether informal economic activity is really just obeying the logic of the market economy. After all, while on the one hand, a state-centred view of industrialisation states that “considerable state-regulative infrastructure” (Harriss-White, 2010, p. 170) has been integral to industrialisation and marketisation in both developed and developing countries; on the other hand, neoclassical economics is premised on a minimal role of the state, with *only* property rights and public legal order as the conditions “necessary and sufficient for free, self-regulating markets” (Harriss-White, 2010, p. 170). In a sense, the ability to escape documentation and regulation is not only a developing world phenomenon, but is a significant practice in the advanced world regime of multinational corporate empire (Zucman, 2014). After all, with business practices emerging from post-Fordism, today’s non-state empires like Google, Facebook and Microsoft are really just ‘informal’, barely-regulated, barely-taxed businesses because of their ability to elude taxation by international loop-holes (Zucman, 2014) and escape regulation by flexible accumulation practices (Mosley & Singer, 2015).

In the developing world context, Harriss-White (2010) distinguishes between *small-scale informality* (SSI) (p. 171) comprising of activity that is below the threshold of taxation, and the *interstitial informal economy* (IIE) (p. 171). In the latter, the post-Fordist, flexible accumulation regime takes various forms. As Harriss-White describes, mainly in the context of but not exclusive to India, the informal sector has a *function* for both the formalised sector as well as for state actors. For example, formal businesses may be shifting market or environmental risks to the informal sector, reducing costs by avoiding employers’ obligations and wage floors, incorporating low-cost workers such as rural, female, child and immigrant workers, and avoiding conditions where labour might be unionised (Harriss-White, 2010, p. 170). The incentives of state actors, as Tandler (2003)

also pointed out, are that welfare responsibilities towards labour can be deflected to capital, and that the state's infrastructural responsibilities towards capital can be reduced (Harriss-White, 2010, p. 170; Tandler, 2003).

Thus, the notion that the informal economy is "*deliberately developed*" (Harriss-White, 2010, p. 170) aligns with the premise of my study, but its stability and persistence is theorised in terms of an "institutional embeddedness" (Harriss-White, 2010, p. 170), by demonstrating that "out of the formal reach of the state, economic behaviour cannot avoid the influence of social institutions normally thought to be rooted in, or relegated to, aspects of social life *outside* the economy, and conceived in terms of constructs of *identity*" (Harriss-White, 2010, p. 171). Thus identity-creation, where, for example, labour and capital are construed as differentiated (Harriss-White, 2010, p. 171, 172) and in an unequal relation of power with each other, are consequential, as they constitute norms and social institutions that mediate the discursive to the material. In Chapter 5, I combine insights from the discursive construction of identities and norms in my analysis of the data material with evidence of social practices, networks and procedures from studies of Pakistan's marketplace context, in order to suggest explanations of the stability of undocumented accumulation.

### 2.3 *Concepts in discourse analysis*

In this section, I describe the discourse-theoretical concepts that I employ, and explain how I use these to address my research questions. Paraphrased from Jørgensen & Phillips (2002, p. 33, 34), I will first present a generalised understanding of the processes that occur in discursive meaning-making, presenting the concepts in italics, and will then move on to provide formal definitions of these concepts.

The idea is that a *discursive field* contains *discourse(s)*. A *discourse* consists of *linguistic signs*. Many of these signs do not at first have fixed meanings within the discourse; signs without fixed meanings are referred to as *elements* or *floating signifiers*. But some signs do acquire meanings, which they do so through *articulation*. Articulation is "every process that establishes a relationship between elements such that the identity of elements is modified" (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 36). When elements acquire meanings in the discourse through articulations, they are now called *moments*. *Moments* are thus linguistic signs within a discourse that have acquired meanings through articulations. The additional notion is that as a discourse starts to organise itself around some of these signs, these signs become privileged in the discourse and can be labelled as *nodal points* when

identified. Again, it is through articulations that nodal points would acquire meanings. The idea is that through articulations which construct meanings for signs, and through the use of nodal points, also articulated as meaningful, discourses come to provide fixations of meaning within discursive fields (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 34).

I will now present the formal definitions of these concepts before I move on to some further integral ideas that I use in my analysis and interpretation of the texts. The concept *discursive* refers to “a theoretical horizon within which the being of objects is constituted” (Howarth & Stavrakakis, 2000, p. 3), and the implication of this is that “we are always internal to a world of signifying practices and objects” (Howarth & Stavrakakis, 2000, p. 3). *Articulation* is “any practice establishing a relation among elements such that their identity is modified as a result of the articulating practice” (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 33). A *discourse* is “the structured totality resulting from the articulatory practice” (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 33). The definition of discourse comes from Foucault’s definition, which was “practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak” (Foucault, 1972 in Howarth & Stavrakakis, 2000, p. 4). *Moments* are “differential positions insofar as they appear articulated within a discourse” (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 33), while an *element* is “any difference that is not discursively articulated” (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 33). A *sign* refers to a symbol in semiotics, and a *nodal point* is “a privileged sign around which the other signs are ordered; the other signs acquire their meaning from their relationship to the nodal point” (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 35).

The concept of *intertextuality* is also important here. Just as signs acquire meanings, the meaning of texts is also to be understood as “a product of other readings and interpretations” (Hansen, 2013, p. 55). Texts utilise disparate discourses in order to import meanings, and the meanings of texts are dependent on the associations that have been made before (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 17). Intertextuality can therefore work to *legitimate* not only the representations in the current text, but also in the previous intertextually referred texts, through the act of reproducing it (Hansen, 2013, p. 57). Thus, “through analysis of intertextuality, one can investigate both the reproduction of discourses whereby no new elements are introduced *and* discursive change through new combinations of discourse” (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 17).

When relationships between nodal points and signs are established, asserted or reproduced in discourses, then this fixation of meanings is to the exclusion of other meanings that the signs could

have had. This is an important insight, because we are then able to see that “discourses are a reduction of possibilities” (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 34). Following from this, articulation within discourses are “an attempt to create a unified system of meaning” (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 34), attempts which are intrinsically political and involve the exercise of power (Wood & Kroger, 2000; Van Dijk, 1993).

At the same time, recognising that discourses are contingent and historical constructions, it follows that they are vulnerable to the very political forces that are excluded in their production. Here is where the idea of hegemony comes in: discourses are not permanent, rather there is the element of strategy involved in maintaining their dominance. I have referred to the concept of *interpellation* earlier, the discursive process that construes identities in the social world. Indeed, “a political project will attempt to weave together different strands of discourse in an effort to dominate or organise a field of meaning so as to fix the identities of objects and practices in a particular way” (Howarth & Stavrakakis, 2000, p. 3). However, when contingency is forgotten through intertextuality, through reproductions, and through “the historical outcome of political processes and struggles” (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 45), then the discourses appear objective (Laclau, 1990 in Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 45). Objectivity, as Jørgensen & Phillips (2002) describe, is “*sedimented* discourse” (p. 45), or “sedimented power where the traces of power have been effaced, where it has become forgotten that the world is politically constructed” (p. 46).

Van Dijk (1993) has referred to this sedimentation into objectivity as a “subtle and persistent portrayal of social relations in specific ways that influences the minds of the dominated and naturalises these social conditions” (p. 255). Objectivity is thus understood as the generation of ‘consent’ to domination. In order to dig beneath the surface of seeming objectivity, the discourse analyst needs to focus on “the discursive strategies that legitimate or otherwise ‘naturalise’ the social order” (Fairclough, 1985, quoted in Van Dijk, 1993, p. 254). In the following section, I describe my choice of data material and the analysis methods I use in order to dig beneath the surface of my data material.

#### **2.4 Choice of data material**

My data material comprises of election manifesto documents. Political parties in Pakistan produce party programmes called Election Manifestos before every general election. These are produced in both English and Urdu and are available both in printed copies and in online versions on respective

party websites or on the Election Commission of Pakistan website. My sample consists of a total of eight election manifesto documents in their English versions, of three political parties from the election years 2008, 2013 and 2018. The three selected political parties are: the Pakistan Muslim League—Nawaz group (PMLN), the Pakistan's People's Party (PPP) and the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf (PTI). For the election year 2008, the PTI boycotted the elections and so for this year my data material consists of the PMLN and PPP manifestos (Appendix 1 and 2). For the election years 2013 and 2018, I have included the manifestos of PMLN, PPP and PTI (Appendices 3 to 8). I was able to procure online versions of the texts from 2013 and 2018. Both texts from 2008 that I used are scanned versions of printed copies. This data material consists of 8 distinct documents, totalling 336 pages.

#### *Selection of election manifestos as a political communication document*

The chosen genre of political communication, i.e. election manifestos, comprises my discursive field or order of discourse. As I note in Chapter 4, this order of discourse involves the import of different elements from other discourses, for example from 'the family' and 'social contract' along with neoliberal ideas about freedom from regulations. I view these documents as 'treatises' on governance and on the organisation of society, i.e. as an order of discourse comprising of discourse(s) on governance and discourse(s) on the organisation of social life.

Admittedly, the democratic tradition is still fledgling in Pakistan; ideological distinctions between parties don't hold much meaning especially when there is considerable party-swapping by party members and election candidates (Siddiqui et al., 2020) and, as discussed below, voters in Pakistan are not inclined to vote on ideological lines. Also, election manifestos are unlikely to be used by voters to make voting decisions, much less ever read by them at all. Nevertheless, there is merit in turning to them as texts for the purpose of my study and the objective of my analysis. Political parties take the time and effort to communicate values, concerns, policies, ambitions and promises in these documents. While the overt purpose of these documents is to position the parties as worthy of getting votes, these texts provide representations and idealisations of what governance should be and how society should be organised, providing the discourse analyst with a canvas of latent meaning-construction in 'best-case' formalisations rather than in the contextual urgency of, say, political party speeches. Moreover, as documents designed to appeal and persuade, election manifestos utilise a range of rhetorical commonplaces, political rhetoric, and persuasion (Van der



Does & Statsch, 2016), linguistic devices that provide the discourse analyst fruitful material to analyse.

Inclusion of other forums of political party communication with the public would have considerably enriched my analysis. Political party leadership speeches, for example, would serve as superior discursive data, because of the potential to include non-verbal discursive elements such as body language and intonation. However, while I had initially aimed to focus on speeches, sampling of this selection of potential data material along with procedures of acquiring them proved to be problematic. In data-scarce Pakistan, there is no digital or other forum for the compilation of this material, and so I was able to find only a sporadic, non-systematic sample of speeches. Party websites are a recent phenomenon, and the fact that YouTube had been banned in Pakistan in 2012 for three years also greatly limits access. Social media communication material would also serve as a potential order of discourse as political parties in Pakistan are now increasingly mobilising on social media platforms and SMS networks. However, this tendency is very recent and therefore does not yield sufficient data material for my purpose. I therefore limit my analysis to the eight selected election manifesto documents.

#### *Selection of the three election years*

Pakistan has had a turbulent relationship with democracy. Since the birth of Pakistan in 1947, the country has experienced four military coups and ten general elections (Siddiqui et al., 2020). The year 2013 marked the first time in the country's history that power was transferred from one civilian government to another. In 66 years of Partition (Pakistan's Partition from India and Independence from Britain) this was the first time an elected government had completed full term in office; 2018 marked the second successful transfer of power. This history of democracy in Pakistan positions 2008 and 2013 as two years of democratic success, with the current government elected in 2018 still in office. My choice of this time period is therefore significant in that it represents the country's first era of democracy or democratic consolidation.

Another reason why my selection of the time period is significant is that in the post-global financial crisis scenario of 2008 and now Covid-19-related contractions of developed world economies, Pakistan's traditional loan and aid donors are increasingly tight-fisted about contributing to developing country budgets. There is a recognition by scholars that bothering with taxation of undocumented economic activity is likely to depend on how independent developing countries are

of domestic taxpayers for revenue (Moore, 2008; Besley and Persson, 2013; 2014). Rents from foreign aid and from natural resource wealth dampen these incentives. While aid and loans, particularly in the Structural Adjustment era were also accompanied by the pressure to reform taxation (Fjelstad & Moore, 2008), the shrinking of aid and loans regardless of conditions is a pressure likely to be faced not only by tax administrations but by the state as a whole. The selection of this time period is therefore significant as it represents the imperative for developing country states to turn to their own populations to finance budgets through taxation.

### *Selection of the three political parties*

There is no shortage of political parties in Pakistan. In 2018, there were 127 political parties registered with the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) (Election Commission of Pakistan, 2021), 216 parties in 2013 and 49 in 2008 (Waseem, 2016). However, in 2018 only 12 parties won at least one seat (Siddiqui et al., 2020). While Pakistan has a multiparty democratic system, effectively there are only a few parties that are able to gain an electoral following.

Siddiqui et al. (2020) classify Pakistan's political parties into three cleavages: mainstream, ethnic and religious. In this study, I have focused on the three mainstream parties. From 1988 to 2013, only the PMLN and PPP were dominant in political competition, with the PTI joining this rank in 2018 by gaining the highest number of votes in this election year. My choice to restrict this study to the three political parties is based firstly on the premise that the topic of my study, undocumented business practices, is a country-wide phenomenon and 'macro' in nature. I therefore privileged a focus on political parties that were not limited to a regional electorate or an ethnic- or religion-based following.

Moreover, the PMLN, PTI and PPP have formed the government in each of the selected election years, with the PPP winning elections in 2008, the PMLN in 2013 and the PTI in 2018. It is also helpful for my analysis that each of these parties are known to be ideologically distinct: the PMLN is far-right, the PTI is right-leaning, and the PPP is Pakistan's only effective left-leaning party (Siddiqui et al., 2020). Ideological lines in Pakistan, however, are not as distinct as they are in advanced democracies such as the US, as voters have not been shown to be ideologically motivated (Wilder, 1999; Javid, 2011; Khan Mohmand, 2019). Rather, voters have consistently been shown to vote on local issues such as provision of services, or what are locally known as *thana-katchery* (police and courthouse) matters. Nevertheless, the three political parties do have distinct programs,

policies and promises that they convey in their election manifestos (Shafqat, 2020; Jones, 2020; Khan, 2020). This selection of parties therefore provides diversity in the data material and yet represents material that holds relevance on the country-wide, macro scale of my study. Lastly, I have endeavoured discourse analysis with an in-depth analysis on linguistic meaning-making. While the texts range from a length of 24 pages to 64 pages each, the tradition in this analytical approach privileges depth of analysis rather than length of the discourse material (Wood & Kroger, 2000).

### *Analysis methods*

My initial review of all eight texts was an analysis of content. I read the texts in their entirety and coded the overt position and prescriptions of each text with respect to the distinct issues emphasised. The codification was done manually rather than with computer-aided tools. The texts are commonly organised into sections, but content on Labour would, for example, be mentioned in several sections. Thus, I gave each text its own distinct codes. To prepare for discourse analysis, I allowed the texts to guide me in my selection of nodal points. As Howarth & Stavrakakis (2000) recommend, I did not apply pre-existing theory for this purpose because by limiting my codes to, for example, a theory of society or of governance, I would reduce and essentialise them and also risk predetermining the outcome of analysis (Howarth & Stavrakakis, 2000). Instead, I allowed my topical interest to give sensitivity to my identification of these nodal points, which after a series of iterations, came to be identified as *democracy*, *welfare*, and *development*.

I subsequently made a visual constellation of signs, elements and moments and how they related to each other and to these nodal points. *Democracy*, for instance, was articulated predominantly with the signifier *devolution* and also increasingly with *trust*, *power to people*, and *social contract*. *Welfare* was predominantly associated with *women*, *minorities* and *youth*, for example, while the meaning of *development* took on the language of *economic growth* and *employment*, among other signifiers. In this analytical process, *exclusions* of meanings also became conspicuous.

As a second level of analysis, I analysed how articulations were repeated over time and across parties. I started with the texts from 2008, and progressed to the subsequent years. This method allowed insights into how specific signifiers became intertextually more fixed in meanings and associations, but also how certain discourses faded away even from the same party's subsequent text. *Ownership of assets* was a signifier, for example, that was voiced by the PTI, in association

with *welfare* and *development*, though this did not feature in the party's subsequent texts, nor by any other party.

As a next level of analysis, I endeavoured to locate how categories of social actors such as capital-owners, citizens, state actors, and political parties were represented, how articulations were interpellating these social actors, and how they were being differentiated from each other. This analysis comprises of my interpretations regarding what the representations and associations in the texts could imply for capital-owners and workers particularly in informal contexts, and for other social actors.

### **2.5 *Limitations and reflexivity***

Discourse analysis of my selected data material has largely been an interpretive exercise. The objective of the analysis was not how to get *behind* the discourse, but was the discourse itself (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002; Wood & Kroger, 2000). The task was to explore the patterns in the language of the texts to discern latent meanings, to follow how meanings and representations vied for ascendancy, and then interpret what the social consequences of these linguistic patterns would be.

Since I am a Pakistani, having lived and worked in Pakistan all my life, I may not have been able to uncover all the 'givens' and the 'common sense' or have been able to see through the façade of objectivity in the texts. This would constitute a major limitation in my analysis. Perhaps what helped was that I was living in Norway for the most part of the analysis and writing of this thesis, a geographical distance that may have served me well in my analytical connections. The abstract distance that proved most helpful was that I viewed the texts stringently through the conceptual lens of discourse analysis, i.e. as a system of signs, elements, moments and nodal points rather than as words and sentences. I talk of 'distance', but genuine distance would be a quixotic ambition; as Howarth & Stavrakakis (2000) point out, the discourse analytic tradition "rejects the rigid separation of facts and values, accepting that the discourse theorist and analyst is always located in a particular historical and political context with no neutral Archimedean point from which to describe, argue and evaluate" (p. 7).

This study has certainly not done justice to the theory available and relevant to this topic, that could enrich analysis, interpretation and discussion. Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999) and Fairclough

(2009; 2013) propose a dialectical relational approach (DRA) in critical discourse analysis that advocates transdisciplinary research. They assume a dialectical relationship between the discursive (the ‘semiotic’ dimension of the social world, to use Fairclough’s terminology) and the manifest (the non-semiotic dimensions), and by implication an analytical distinction between the two aspects of the social world. Thus, theoretical frameworks and empirical research to analyse capital accumulation strategies and stability within specific retail marketplace contexts in Pakistan, combined with findings from discourse analysis, would greatly enrich the understanding of informality in Pakistan.

I have leaned on Karl Polanyi’s conception of ‘embeddedness’ (Jessop 1997; Jessop & Sum, 2019; Webster et al., 2011; Krippner et al., 2004), on the Regulation Approach, and on Barbara Harriss-White’s (2010) insights into how social institutions legitimate flexible accumulation. I use these insights as the conceptual lens through which I read empirical studies from Pakistan, and thus make sense of the dialectical relationship between the meaning-making I have found in discourse analysis and the practices manifest in Pakistan’s social context. While I would call this a multi-perspective approach which is helpful in the argument that I make, a truly transdisciplinary study would potentially lend significant power to this analysis. Another limitation to acknowledge is that while my study is ‘macro’ in nature, the empirical studies I have relied on are predominantly from Punjab, and so the argument I submit is relevant to Pakistani Punjab, and may not apply to other provinces where the social context may vary.

In the opening paragraphs of my Introduction, I refer to ‘strongly allied business *fraternities*’: indeed, this study is predominantly and latently focused on the male demographic that constitutes the face of Pakistan’s marketplace and political domains. This constitutes another limitation, as significant changes may already be taking shape among Pakistan’s sprinkling of female entrepreneurs, politicians and political workers. The Women Chamber(s) of Commerce and Industry in Pakistan’s major cities, for example, are the counterpart *sororities* of female-led businesses; insights into their business practices and engagement within the society may potentially yield insightful findings for the researcher.

### *Chapter 3*

#### **Pakistan's Political Machinery: A Contextual Background**

In Pakistan's turbulent and volatile backdrop of power tussles since the country's birth in 1947, a chapter on contextual background can go in a number of tangential directions: from the role of the military-bureaucratic historical bloc (Alavi, 1971 in Akhtar, 2018) to the political articulation of conservative Islamist ideology (Siddiqui et al., 2020). I therefore filter this background information with respect to the role of the political party institution in Pakistan's experience of democratisation, and with respect to how Pakistan's political parties engage with citizens.

Politics and politicians have a position of primacy in the shaping of society, as discussed earlier. In Pakistan's case, it is particularly noteworthy that the country came into existence as a result of electoral politics (Wilder, 1999), i.e. as a result of a nationalist anti-colonial movement led by the Muslim League and the Congress Party in British India. Subsequently, however, owing to what Lupu and Reidle (2013) call regime, institutional and economic uncertainty, and with the military vying for a dominant role in governance, the political context in Pakistan is such that parties are left trying to carve out a political space for themselves (Siddiqui et al, 2020). This has meant that democratisation in Pakistan has been very different to the experience of today's advanced democracies (Gunther & Diamond, 2003). It has been suggested that Pakistan's political parties carve out this space not by appealing to individual voters on ideological lines, but rather through fulfilling voters' immediate needs (Cheema et al., 2017). In this context, a proliferation of parties appealing to voters on the basis of ethnicity and religion has also emerged (Siddiqui, et al., 2020).

My focus in this study is on Pakistan's 'mainstream' parties: the Pakistan Muslim League—Nawaz group (PMLN), the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) and the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf (PTI). From 1970 to 2013, only two parties, the PMLN and PPP, commanded political competition in the country (Siddiqui et al., 2020, p. 7). These two parties are what Kirchheimer termed 'catch-all parties' (Krouwel, 2003): they abandon an ideological compass in favour of a wider electoral base and more immediate electoral success, and thus appeal to voters across social, ethnic and regional groups (Siddiqui et al., 2020). As I will note later in this chapter, the PMLN, the PPP and the PTI all started out as strongly ideological, but evolved into Kirchheimer's catch-all parties.

Before I focus on a historical background of the three selected parties, here is a brief note on how the contemporary political party in Pakistan looks like and how it functions. Broadly, parties consist of a 'lower-tier' and a 'higher-tier' (Liaqat et al., 2020). The higher-tier consists of party leaders who compete for higher positions in government such as the office of the Prime Minister, the provincial Chief Minister and for seats in the National Assembly. Party leadership has typically been dynastic in Pakistan's mainstream parties, with a central personality heading the party, and his or her family members sharing important positions or being groomed to be the next leader. This has specifically been the case with PMLN, where power is shared by the two brothers Nawaz Sharif and Shahbaz Sharif (the former assuming position as the Prime Minister while the latter taking over as Chief Minister, Punjab province, whenever the party has formed government). With the brothers currently deposed on money laundering and corruption allegations, their respective offspring are assuming party leadership positions. Likewise, the PPP was founded by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, succeeded by his daughter Benazir Bhutto following his judicial hanging in 1979, and is currently headed by Benazir Bhutto's son Bilawal Bhutto-Zardari, following her assassination in 2007. While the PTI, relatively new to the scene, has no tradition of dynastic leadership, the party revolves around the persona and celebrity of its founder Imran Khan, the erstwhile sportsman and philanthropist.

Party leaders recruit lower-tier members. The lower-tier consists of district-level politicians who contest elections, and 'brokers' who may or may not contest elections (Liaqat et al., 2020; Siddiqui et al., 2020). These lower-tier party members "articulate and interpret the party's manifesto (and) determine the reach of the political party on the ground" (Siddiqui et al., 2020, p. 14). Local politicians who contest elections for the party consist of two kinds of members: those who are popular in the constituency, and those who are loyal to the party (Siddiqui et al., 2020). The former are known to hop across parties, a practice that suggests that ideological differences between parties are not particularly distinct.

Commonly, parties rely on 'brokers' to mediate between party leadership and constituents. Brokers are known as 'party workers' and are predominantly local land-owning notables, local business owners, lawyers or government employees (Liaqat et al., 2020). The predominance of marketplace elites as brokers for political parties has been consistent in studies from both urban and rural contexts (Javed, 2018; Amirali, 2017), who note that thriving business owners who can afford to spend time away from the shop or hire help to manage their business, turn their ambitions to politics

and aim to be recruited as party workers. Liaqat et al. (2020) note that “for some, such as shopkeepers, their occupation involves a fair amount of public dealing, which can be integrated into their role as political workers” (p. 132). Liaqat et al. (2020) further note that shop-owners derive rents from their involvement in politics: “this rent may come in the form of direct payments from politicians, but more frequently it comes in the form of indirect payments from projects in their areas and also in the form of heightened social standing” (p. 132).

In the following sub-sections, I situate the three political parties, PMLN, PPP and PTI, in historical context before moving on to an analysis of their election manifestos in the following chapter.

### *PMLN, Pakistan Muslim League—Nawaz group*

Like many political parties in post-colonial countries, the PMLN (formerly known as the Muslim League in British India) emerged through a nationalist, anti-colonial movement. The party operates in a dynastic leadership style (Shafqat, 2020). The eponymous Nawaz Sharif has a large-scale business based in Punjab, and receives support for the party from “business houses, trader merchants, corporate lawyers, media houses, journalists and a segment of landowning elites” (Shafqat, 2020, p. 30). As is apparent in a reading of the party’s manifestos, the party is unabashed about support for businesses, about its partiality as a ‘business-friendly’ party, and about the *valorisation* of capital.

The PMLN has had three tenures in government: 1990—1993, 1997—1999, and 2013—2018. The first two tenures were cut short by military takeovers in 1993 and 1999 respectively. The 2013—2018 period was the first time the party completed its tenure, even if the Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was dismissed in 2016 on allegations, via the Panama Papers leaks, of his involvement in tax evasion and offshore wealth. 2013 had also marked the country’s first-ever democratic transition since 1947.

### *PPP, Pakistan People’s Party*

The PPP was founded in 1967 by the Oxford and Berkeley educated and superbly effective orator Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (Jones, 2020). It was established as a nationalist party, identifying with the post-colonial left in the developing world (Jones, 2020, p. 45) and with a populist narrative (p. 44). The party rose to power driven by a popular movement to get rid of the military dictatorship of Ayub Khan. It is well-acknowledged that this movement facilitated articulation of the common man into



the political arena, even though protests were marred by considerable violence (Jones, 2020, p. 46). The demand from citizens for democratic rule was such that the military bowed down and announced elections in 1970. The PPP's loyalists and party workers were predominantly comprised of the 'common man', though landowning elites also rallied with the party; the common man or the working class still constitutes "an essential part of the PPP vote bank" (Jones, 2020, p. 47).

The PPP has had four tenures in government: 1972—1977, 1988—1990, 1993—1996, and 2008—2013. While elections were held in December 1970, PPP's government was formed in 1972 because of the civil war of 1971, which led to the succession of East Pakistan and the birth of Bangladesh. During this tenure, Z. A. Bhutto's violent pursuit of power and resort to fascism became his undoing (Jones, 2020, p. 51). He was tried and hanged in 1979 for ordering the murder of a political opponent. Thereafter, the leadership of the party was assumed by his daughter, Benazir Bhutto. She became Pakistan's first female Prime Minister in 1998, a tenure that was cut short by a vote of no confidence in 1990. Her subsequent tenure was also marred by corruption charges, and a dismissal of her government in 1996. She remained in exile from Pakistan, and was assassinated in 2007 (allegedly by a terrorist group) on her return to contest the 2008 general elections.

The PPP, led by Benazir Bhutto's husband, formed government again in 2008. However, with alliances with local notables to secure votes and a reliance on relations of patronage with citizens, the party had turned from populist to 'pragmatic' (Jones, 2020). The party's heavy defeat in the 2018 general elections suggests to some commentators that the party is turning into more of a regional party with a following limited to the province of Sindh (Jones, 2020).

#### *PTI, Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf*

The PTI is another example of a party that started as a grassroots movement and evolved into a catch-all party. While the party was founded in 1996, up till 2011 it was less of a political party and more of a movement around the celebrity persona of its founder Imran Khan. In 2011, the party began to gain traction as a political party with a social democratic leaning (Khan, 2020, p. 65, 66). It promised a change from the dynastic style of the PMLN and the PPP; loyalists consisted of philanthropists, successful businessmen, overseas Pakistanis and particularly urban women and youth from the upper and middle classes (Khan, 2020, p. 64).

Following the 2013 general elections, the PTI was able to form government only in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) province. Thereafter, the party leadership changed strategy, and to gain power at the centre, it began to recruit “electables” (Khan, 2020, p. 61). As Khan (2020) suggests, it became a ‘top-down’ party, and a distinction between its ideologically-motivated workers and ‘professional politicians’ began to emerge (p. 63). In the 2018 general elections, the PTI received the greatest number of votes country-wide and formed government, with its leader Imran Khan currently occupying the office of Prime Minister.

In this chapter, I presented an overview of Pakistan’s mainstream political parties with a view to situating the data material texts in Pakistan’s democratisation context. In the following chapter, I present my analysis of the data material and summarise my findings.

## *Chapter 4*

### **Analysis and Findings**

In Chapter 2, I delineated the discourse-analytic perspective that I adopt through which I look at the conjectured hegemony of informality as a regime of business practice and capital accumulation in Pakistan's wholesale marketplaces. I understand the stability and defiance of this regime as an issue of *dominance* and I conjecture that this dominance is discursively endorsed. In the present chapter, I analyse specific texts. Fairclough's approach in critical discourse analysis presumes a dialectical relationship between discursive representations and structural practices, with discursive representations both reflecting as well as construing practices manifest in society (Fairclough 2009; 2013). In my selected texts, I seek to discover if, and how, the dominance and power of capital finds discursive stability.

For my data material, I have turned to eight political communication texts, namely election manifestos of Pakistan's three mainstream political parties, spanning the election years 2008, 2013 and 2018. Election manifestos produced by Pakistan's political parties are a specific genre of political communication, and can be viewed as contemporary 'organic' treatises on governance. Through pledges and promises made, they represent what governance ought to be, and often through adversarial jabs at political competitors and previous regimes, they also offer illustrations of 'bad governance'.

In my analysis of this data material, I am interested in identifying how governance has been represented. In representations of 'good governance', I aim to locate nodal points around which the representation and idealisation of governance is organised. I seek to gain insights into how these representations are reproduced over time and across political parties. In doing so, I seek to discover, or uncover, how certain representations and associations have sedimented into objective 'truths' or unquestioned 'common sense'. Also, contingent on context, representations are able to construe relations and identities among social actors (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002). I seek to gain insights into how social actors in the context of Pakistan's wholesale marketplaces are represented, and particularly into what these representations imply for relations between capital-owners, citizens, the state, and its institutions.

As I started reviewing the selected texts for analysis, I allowed for the data to speak, i.e. for themes to emerge from the data. Guiding me in the selection of these themes have been two primary foci: a) representations of governance and the implications for the construction of identities and relations in the social world, and b) reproductions of these representations over time and across parties. I was able to identify three nodal points that the idea of governance is predominantly organised around by all three parties across all election years. These nodal points are presented as themes that constitute the organisation of this chapter. As I present my analysis, I refer to the election manifesto texts in in-text citations. The manifestos of PMLN and PPP for 2008 were scanned copies of printed documents, and are therefore appended as Appendices 1 and 2. The PTI manifesto for 2013 is no longer available on the party website and is therefore appended as Appendix 3. The remaining five manifestos are available online, and links are provided in the Reference list.

I start by discussing how *democracy* is represented as an ideal of state-society engagement, and how the notion of devolution comes to be persistently articulated in the texts in chains of association with democracy. I find that the association is articulated to the point that there arises tone deafness in the texts regarding the understanding of power and how it operates in Pakistan's marketplace context. A second nodal point that emerges is the notion of *welfare* as a responsibility of governance. Representations around welfare have significant implications about how identities in the social context are constructed and how relations are validated. Thirdly, the idea of *development* takes precedence as a nodal point around which representations of governance revolve. The articulation of development is unequivocally in neoliberal terms, and specific signifiers that come to be subsumed with the idea of development work to privilege specific relations and processes of domination and subjugation in the social context.

Discourse theory is premised on the non-essentialist idea that rather than a singular 'true' actuality of the social world, there are versions of 'reality' (Wood & Kroger, 2000). The analysis presented in this chapter is likewise a version, one among possible many. In the following pages, I present my *interpretation* of the data material; seen through a theoretical lens and interwoven with the context as surveyed in existing literature, I pursue both authenticity and plausibility in the narrative that I present. I have tried to use "a shared language of explanations and interpretation" (Howarth & Stavrakakis, 2000, p. 2) so that further examinations or comparisons can be carried out. I have prioritised faithfulness to the data, and I find myself challenged by contradictions. Rather than smoothing out my narrative, I embrace the messiness; in the focus of my study, the messiness only

drives home the idea that hegemony is never complete (Fairclough, 2013). It is these very contradictions that will allow contestations and alternative discourses to edge in, and make way for change.

#### 4.1 *Democracy*

Devolution or decentralisation comes to be represented unequivocally as a synonym for democracy in all the texts. This is theme that illustrates well how contestations and nuanced acknowledgements of local power structures that were voiced in the earlier texts progressively fade away. We are able to see how differentiations in representation become overshadowed as associations between democracy and devolution acquire legitimacy through reproduced articulations. Any contestations are smothered by this reproduction and process of legitimation through intertextuality. Moreover, the reiterated representations of governance as devolution also have implications for relations and identities in the social context.

The texts from the election year 2008 illustrate that the existence of unjust power structures in the social context is not only indicated in academic studies from Pakistan, but are also well recognised by political parties. The PMLN acknowledges, for example, that “the majority of people spend an inordinate amount of time at police stations (thanas) and lower courts (katchery) where they have no alternative but to buy justice though the vicious and endless circle of sifarish<sup>10</sup>, bribery and blackmail” (PMLN 2008, p. 7). This is recognised also by the PPP (PPP 2008, p. 15). In order to address this recognition, both texts from this year advocate a monitoring role for the Centre. Both texts mirror the proposal that provincial governors would be appointed by the Prime Minister (PMLN 2008, p. 9 and PPP 2008, p. 15). The PMLN additionally proposes to set up a Commission that will “suggest amendments in laws that recognise the ground realities in each province and are also suited to the needs of the people” (PMLN 2008, p. 10).

The idea of power to the people is evoked by the PPP in the 2008 text, with the assertion, “Only the people have the right to determine their destiny and chart the course of their Nation” (PPP 2008, p. 22), though devolution is not explicitly mentioned as a mechanism for this ‘transfer’ of power. It is in the subsequent year that devolution of powers to the district administrative levels (called ‘local government’) through district-level elections becomes a recurring, repetitive trope. Governance and

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<sup>10</sup> *Sifarish* is the Urdu word colloquially signifying ‘bribery’, but literally means ‘petition’ - Ferozesons Urdu-English Dictionary (n.d.)

devolution begin to be represented in chains of association, with devolution as a nodal point around which articulations of governance revolve. The PMLN, for example, talks of “strengthening Pakistan through devolution” (PMLN 2013, p. 2), and that “decentralisation is the key to governance” (PMLN 2013, p. 2), and also that “a major task of local government is interaction between the citizen and government” (PMLN 2013, p. 2).

Interestingly, in a section on judicial system reforms in the PMLN 2013 document, an acknowledgement is made once again about the workings of power and about how parallel judicial systems are “an instrument of the powerful against the weak” (PMLN 2013, p. 24). The parallel judicial systems referred to are utilised customarily in informal marketplace contexts as dispute settlement mechanisms (Acemoglu et al., 2020). Their mention in the manifesto text recognises the potentially unjust exercise of power in these social contexts. A similar acknowledgement of potential abuses of power where lower-tier politicians interface with marketplace business elites is made by the PTI in the allegation that “local government institutions have been turned into a political tool in the hands of the government” (PTI 2013, p. 7).

Yet, as additional signifiers such as ‘trust’, ‘sovereignty’, ‘agency’ and ‘the social contract’ begin to be included in associations with devolution, democracy and governance, these recognitions of marketplace power structures weaken. They no longer feature in representations so as to break or nuance the articulations of governance with devolution. The PTI, for example, evokes the idea of “trust between the government and the people” (PTI 2013, p. 2) and through this, the idea of credibility in leadership: “PTI is determined to provide a credible new leadership that can restore Pakistan’s political sovereignty” (PTI 2013, p. 2). The PPP likewise professes how “the party believes that power belongs to the people” (PPP 2013, p. 11) and that “local government is essential for responding quickly and effectively to the immediate and basic needs of the population” (PPP 2013, p. 57). The idea of local government becomes equated with “bringing good governance to the doorstep of the people” (PPP 2013, p. 8) and propositions of “devolved power closer to the grassroots” (PPP 2013, p. 8) increasingly obviate the need to address local power structures.

Instead of more nuanced acknowledgements of power at the nexus of the marketplace and lower tiers of political recruitment, and proposals to address them, there arises a tone deafness to this nexus in subsequent representations. In an apparent contradiction, the PTI now envisions that “Panchayat systems” (PTI 2013, p. 5) which are yet another term for parallel informal dispute

resolution mechanisms, will bring justice to the common man. The mechanism by which trust and engagement will be fostered is also in terms of devolution, again by obviating the need to address power: “The PTI shall strive towards creating a set of local institutions in which people can repose their trust and confidence” (PTI 2013, p. 8). The PPP likewise associates engagement with society in term of “devolving power to the provinces” (PPP 2013, p. 2).

I note that through these articulations, the idea of devolution gets subsumed into democracy and by a chain of association with ‘social contract’ and ‘trust and confidence’ and with the notion of ‘good governance’. Thus I contend that when the ‘obviousness’ of devolution equating good governance comes to be taken for granted, there appears little contestation or even differentiation in representations of this association. There appears a ‘common sense’ to the ‘transfer’ of power to the ‘grassroots’ through this mechanism. So much so, that the understanding of power also assumes an element of naivety: decentralisation is seen, for instance, as a “giving away of our powers” (to the people) (PPP 2013, p. 5) and, again, about “transferring power and rights to women and labour” (PPP 2013, p. 10).

In the 2018 manifesto texts, the articulation of governance with devolution subsuming democracy as a nodal point now appears universal and unequivocal. The following are telling illustrations: “PTI also delivered on its commitment to devolve decision-making and financial power to the village level through its Local Government law” (PTI 2018, p. 17). Interestingly, in this statement and in a subsequent one, “Empower people at the grassroots through local government” (PTI 2018, p. 12), the acknowledgement of societal power structures that did feature in earlier texts by the same party have now disappeared. A new motif of votes is also evoked, with ‘ballot’ becoming an additional signifier of the idea of ‘power to the people’ along with the persisting idea of devolution. The “sanctity of ballot” (PMLN 2018, p. 1 and p. 2), and “power of the ballot” (PMLN 2018, p. 2) are now increasingly evoked. Rather than an evolution into a more thorough debate about how local power structures could be reformed, there is instead vagueness regarding the ‘transfer of power’ mechanisms. Just the word ‘devolution’ now appears enough to signify empowerment of citizens. Also important is the consensus that exists between the parties, suggesting an accepted common sense about this issue.

The common sense idealisation of devolution with governance not only mutes contestations, but also works to privilege certain social actors over others. The PMLN unabashedly endorses these

social actors: “For PMLN leadership, the greatest asset is the rank and file worker” (PMLN 2013, p. 1). In the given context, where power brokerage occurs at marketplaces with thriving business-owners predominantly recruited as the rank and file workers for political parties, (Amirali, 2017; Javed, 2018; Ali, 2020), the articulation of governance in association with devolution works to obscure the power of capital-owners by obviating the need for this power brokerage to be discussed.

### *Politics is a bad word*

Another significant motif that emerges around articulations of democracy is the denigration of state institutions and of rival political parties, a theme that emerges as an entrenched aspect of these manifesto texts. While adversarial politics may be an integral part of this genre of political communication among the selected political parties, an implication of this denigration and adversarial inclination is that it leads to a delegitimisation of state institutions and actors.

This delegitimisation is an obvious aspect of these texts and is quickly apparent even in a skimming of the texts. I will rather focus my attention on another underlying tendency that is suggested through these delegitimising representations. By using language in ways that evoke paranoia, by the use of the passive voice, and by additional negative signifiers, a problematic representation of *politics* as something negative is suggested. I argue that this apoliticises significant issues, subverts the meaning of democracy, and discourages contestation and change.

The following examples illustrate this. In phrases like “the consensus building role of leadership is recognised as having buffeted democracy against political onslaughts” (PMLN 2013, p. 1) and the idea of “diffuse(ing) crises through negotiations”, there hides the implication that in the absence of disagreement lies good democracy. This is also apparent when the PMLN refers to itself as “victim to the politics of conspiracies, confrontation and conflict” (PMLN 2018, p. 1). When ‘confrontation’ and ‘conflict’ are used in a chain of association to mean the same thing, and this negativity in the signifiers is transferred to the word ‘politics’, then this has the same effect of representing contestation of the status quo as something bad. The negative connotation regarding ‘politics’ likewise appears in other instances, for example: “For PTI, it is not just politics” (PTI 2018, p. 6), and more directly, “PTI has a mission to change the status quo destructive politics in Pakistan” (PTI 2018, p. 6). A denigration of the idea of politics also appears to be underlying in the PPP texts: “the system of Local Government introduced by the military regime, which has been manipulated for political ends, will be revamped to bring it in line with the Party’s Devolution Plan” (PPP 2008, p.



17). Similarly, the PPP 2013 text mentions the President “voluntarily giving away his powers for the sake of investing in a future where the public good trumps politics” (PPP 2013, p. 2). Then again, a “non-partisan, non-politicised social safety net for the poor and vulnerable” (PPP 2013, p. 2) is promised, suggesting that usually the politics around that issue would be something negative in nature.

Moreover, when a discourse of ‘family values’ is introduced, mainly by the PTI, it fixes societal roles in a specific way. The idea of “keeping the social fabric intact” (PTI 2013, p. 3) is glorified, and with it, deference to the status quo is extolled, thus suggesting a negativity to the notions of voice and agency. I argue that this works in combination of the negation of the notion of ‘politics’ to smother or at least associate a negative connotation to new voices and new discourses.

#### **4.2 Welfare**

The notion of welfare is another nodal point that represents the idea of governance for all three political parties. The signifiers ‘protection’, ‘underprivileged’ and ‘the poor’ are predominantly articulated in association with welfare. The categories of ‘women’, ‘minorities’, ‘youth’ and occasionally ‘the disabled’ subsume categories that deserve welfare. I argue that in these fixations of meaning, there is an insufficient presence (particularly in the PMLN and PTI texts) of ‘the common man’ in general, and particularly the common man whose social life predominantly exists in informal sectors. Moreover, when ‘the common man’ is present in the texts (particularly in the PPP texts) representations of his identity are articulated with signifiers that glorify his struggle, toil and resignation in the face of adversity.

When I refer to ‘the common man’, I am referring to the demographic (men and women, but predominantly men in the social context) earning their living as self-employed or employed workers, or else unable to earn a living. In the context of the topic of this study, I am interested in this demographic within informal business communities as the citizen whose potential agency would challenge power structures of thriving, politically-connected business-owners in Pakistan’s urban marketplaces. In locating representatives of this demographic in these texts, I am interested in understanding how their potential agency is supported or smothered. I find the tendency towards rendering them ‘invisible’ in some texts, though not in all. What is consistent, however, is a problematic rendering and a tone deafness to their condition.

The following are some examples of how the texts achieve this. There is promise of “protection of the rights of women, minorities and underprivileged” (PMLN 2008, p. 9, 10), reference to “youth, women and peasants” (PMLN 2013, p. 2) among the underprivileged, a list that comprises of “the marginalised and the poor” (PMLN 2013, p. 4), a reference to “the marginalised” (PMLN 2013, p. 5) in context of education, and a prioritisation of “respect and rights of minorities, respect for women” (PMLN 2018, p. 2). The signifier ‘underprivileged’ and ‘the poor’ is predominantly articulated under the specific categories of ‘women’, ‘youth’, ‘minorities’, and ‘disabled’, rendering the literal demographic of the ‘common man’ invisible in the PMLN texts.

The texts are also particularly quiet regarding welfare in the informal sectors. In the PMLN 2013 manifesto, a single reference is made to unregulated business practices in a section on Social Protection: “the recent massive destruction and loss of lives in the workplace draws attention to the importance of occupational health and safety laws” (PMLN 2013, p. 28). It is telling, however, how the reference stops there, and the text does not elaborate on informal business practices and the unregulated nature of employment conditions, even though this would be a relevant point to address the concern. It is notable that this is the time frame when trader protests were on the rise, as referenced in the opening paragraphs of Chapter 1: Introduction. Instead, the regime of informal employment appears as a ‘given’, as a normal and accepted state of affairs; it is only the particular incident, and within that incident, ‘occupational health and safety laws’ that need to be addressed.

The only instance of direct acknowledgement of informally employed labour by the PTI is in a section on Labour Reforms. The text mentions trade union activities along with the need for “repeal in repressive labour laws” (PTI 2013, p. 26), “amendments of trade union act” (PTI 2013, p. 26), and importantly “extension of scope of labour laws to include labour hired by contractors under the *Thekedari*<sup>11</sup> system” (PTI 2013, p. 26). What is unfortunate about this highly commendable acknowledgement is that it stands out as an exception, fading away even in the subsequent manifesto of the same party.

The PPP texts stand out with respect to the differentiation in articulation that occurs in these texts and a voice for the working classes emerges. It is particularly commendable that a language of rights is evoked: “To protect the basic rights of workers, PPP will initiate the following practices”,

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<sup>11</sup> *Thekedari* refers to the contractor economy, exclusively informal in Pakistan and comprising of wage labour

and among them, “the Industrial Relations Ordinance 2002 will be reviewed to bring it in conformity with the ILO Conventions” (PPP 2008, p. 8). The PPP also makes commendable acknowledgements about the need for labour reform, and claims, for example that “our government has abolished a number of restrictive labour laws, restored trade unions, devised a new labour policy, promulgated the Industrial Relations Act 2012 and withdrawn special powers to remove employees from office” (PPP 2013, p. 22). In the subsequent manifesto, however, the party mentions the need for labour policy reform, but only specifically with reference to mine workers: “Mine workers, whether contract or permanent, will be brought under the ambit of labour legislation and provided with the same protection as other workers” (PPP 2018, p. 33).

A problematic aspect is that representations of the ‘common man’ that do feature in these texts are evoked using specific signifiers that glorify qualities of passiveness and resignation. Particularly telling in this regard is the evocation of ‘family values’: “Despite the grinding poverty and injustice that beset us today, it is the structure of the family that provides the net that keeps the social fabric intact” (PTI 2013, p. 3). I contend that the idea of family suggests compromise, and the idea of keeping the social fabric intact suggests non-contestation and reproduction of the status quo, rather than a striving for change. In contexts of informality fraught with relations and processes of patronage, this representation implies a glorification of struggle and strife, with contestations and complaints suggestive of ‘breaking a family’.

Likewise, the signifier ‘toiling’ is used in connection with the common man: “PTI is the party of the ordinary Pakistani toiling hard to make a better future for himself/herself and his/her family” (PTI 2018, p. 6). The present tense used in this statement insinuates an inevitability to the struggle. The toil and struggle appear as normalisations, suggesting that it is not the toil and struggle that needs to be contested; rather the issue of debate is the competition among the political parties regarding which party ‘identifies’ more closely with those who struggle and toil.

Moreover, the self-identity of political parties is also constructed with reference to the toil and struggle of social actors. This is particularly true with PPP, who profess that:

We are the only party that is identified with the underprivileged, the downtrodden, the marginalised and those who are discriminated against. We are the voice of the tillers of the

land, the workers who toil in factories and on farms, and the wage earners who construct our roads and bridges. We will continue to speak for their rights.” (PPP 2013, p. 11)

I argue that in the suggestion of pride taken in being the distinguished party that ‘identifies’ with those who toil, a glory is suggested in the work that the labour do, and a necessity in their toil, further evoked as an inevitability owing to the present tense of the sentence. I argue that in this conflation of identity, the party is more comfortable advocating rather than doing: “We will continue advocating for and supporting wage earners, factory workers and day labourers” (PPP 2013, p. 16). In the rhetoric of being their ‘voice’, what is taken away is concrete assertion of change.

### **4.3 Development**

Development is another prominent theme that emerges from the texts as a nodal point for the representation of governance. In these texts, the idea of development is unequivocally envisioned by employing representations from neoliberal discourse. A language of ‘freedom’ and ‘sovereignty’ pervades these representations, suggesting an endorsement of the freedom from regulation that marketplace traders are defiant about. I argue that a clear precedence given to capital subordinates other governance imperatives and also works to position social actors as subordinate to capital-owners.

The following are illustrative examples of how development is articulated as economic development and subsumed with the health of businesses. The association with thriving capital is reproduced invariably in all PMLN texts. The PMLN’s own achievements in a previous tenure, for example, are listed exclusively in terms of economic indicators in the 2008 manifesto (PMLN 2008, p. 7) decisively suggesting that business success is a proxy for governance success. Conversely, when mentioning failures of a rival party, “sustained economic growth” (PMLN 2008, p. 3) takes precedence, and mentioned alongside political stability and national solidarity, suggests that other governance concerns are secondary to this. “A programme of vigorous industrialisation” (PMLN 2008, p. 23) is prioritised as an aim of governance, and the ambition to “develop an enterprise culture” (PMLN 2013, p. 4) takes precedence as a pledge.

Admittedly, income disparities are mentioned by PMLN (PMLN 2008, p. 4). However, I argue that in the solution presented, which is that “the reversal of this trend is only possible through a change

in approach in policy formulation and implementation and by making the reduction of the rich-poor divide as integral part of a new policy thrust” (PMLN 2008, p. 4) there is no contestation or concrete proposal. The absence of the idea of redistribution or any other mechanism to deal with income disparities suggests the element of rhetoric and the inclination to skirt around the issue.

In terms of commitments and promises, the suggestion that everything else is subservient to this primary goal of business success persists in subsequent texts and works to glorify the indispensability of capital: “Maximum exploitation of domestic sources of energy, namely coal” (PMLN 2013, p. 8) and also the proposal, “in oil and coal sector, encourage local private sector in extraction through joint ventures with foreign companies” (PMLN 2013,p. 13). The ideal of industrialisation extends also to agriculture when it is proposed to “turn agriculture into a fully viable economic industry” (PMLN 2008, p. 25) and “adopt social forestry on a commercial scale” (PMLN 2008, p. 26). The association between good governance and thriving capital continues to be reproduced in the 2018 text: when listing their own progress, it is “progress we have made in terms of energy, economy and extremism” (PMLN 2018, p. 4) and when faulting a rival regime, “PMLN inherited an economy that was in shambles” (PMLN 2018, p. 5), suggesting that any other shortcomings of that regime are of secondary concern.

The PPP is a party that professes “being the voice the poor, the working classes and the middle classes” (PPP 2008, p. 2), and that “the growing gap must be bridged by supporting the underprivileged, the downtrodden and the discriminated” (PPP 2008, p. 1, 2). Even so, governance successes are articulated in terms of economic growth indicators (PPP 2008, p. 6) and by employing neoliberal ideals. When praising their own previous regime, for example, a claim is that “the country was hailed as an emerging capital market of the world” (PPP 2008, p. 3), and that “small and medium enterprises serve as the engine of growth for the economy” (PPP 2013, p. 36) and that “we will facilitate businesses by increasing the availability of energy and improving governance with the goal of making Pakistan a business destination” (PPP 2013, p. 36).

There is an insistence that “our policies, while dedicated to the underprivileged, created conditions that enabled the business and trading classes to compete in the open market” (PPP 2008, p. 2), reproducing the articulation that good governance rests in facilitating business. The PPP synthesises their concern for the underprivileged with their ambitions to facilitate businesses by proposing that “the Party will foster a social market economy, a partnership of the public and private sectors,

predicated upon a synthesis of economic liberalism with a strong social democratic agenda of State responsibilities” (PPP 2008, p. 2). In the absence of any concrete proposals of how the budget and capacity would be managed, such as through redistributive taxation, I argue that this appears as political rhetoric and a utopian dream at best.

Once again, when it is alleged that “the PPP is the only party with a coherent vision of a welfare state for Pakistan where market forces are balanced with safety nets for the underprivileged and the poor” (PPP 2008, p. 2), there is a problem with this. Mainly, the party makes itself out to be a ‘Robin Hood’ party, where the ‘underprivileged and poor’ category is one that is ‘needed’ by the party in order to validate its own identity. I argue that when governance is predicated on a ‘heroic’ transfer of resources, and the need for a rhetorical distinction between the rich and the poor, then the identity of the party as ‘saviours’ problematically rests on the identity of the ‘underprivileged’.

### *Capital, unshackled*

There is a language of efficiency and speed pervading representations of capital, fuelling a trope of freedom from regulations. The PMLN for example promises “to promote a major explosion in industrial investment and employment” (PMLN 2008, p. 27), and “a programme of vigorous industrialisation” (PMLN 2008, p. 23) is articulated as an aim of governance. Using Rostowian language regarding the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) agreement, the economy was said to be “on the verge of takeoff” (PML 2018, p. 1). There is also a hint of dismissiveness for example when “a system for weeding out non-performers” (PMLN 2013, p. 4) is envisioned.

This motif of freedom is particularly dominant in the PMLN manifestos. Restrictions in general are phrased as annoyances. For example, “curbs on democratic freedom remain draconian” (PMLN 2008, p. 4). The idea of sovereignty is evoked, with internationally imposed restrictions represented in a language of paranoia: “America’s proxy war” (PMLN 2008, p. 4) and its “legacy” (PMLN 2008, p.15). “Reducing regulatory burden” (PMLN 2018, p. 7) is unabashedly mentioned, it is proposed that the “market will be deregulated in favour of innovation-driven FDI and investment-friendly regimes” (PMLN 2018, p. 25), and a proposal is advanced to “adopt social forestry on a commercial scale rather than depend on restrictive laws for this purpose” (PMLN 2008, p. 26).

With respect to taxation, references to the tax system are also in terms of “tax concessions” (PMLN 2008, p. 23), in terms of tax holidays “to transform Pakistan rapidly into a modern, industrial

society” (PMLN 2008, p. 27) and as a facilitation to businesses: “the taxation system will be modified to encourage rapid growth in investment, particularly in employment intensive activities” (PMLN 2008, p. 23). Similarly, a neoliberal understanding pervades the PTI’s vision: “Our economic policy will be based on limiting the role of government to create an environment conducive for wealth creation through legal means and removing bureaucratic and other impediments which inhibit investment” (PTI 2013, p. 20). I argue that the way development is articulated in association with capital has direct implications for informally organised capital. It is noteworthy that in all three election years, there is barely a mention of the redistribution prerogative of taxation. Instead, it appears as an underlying assumption by all three parties that redistribution occurs through a trickle-down process.

### *Trickle-down and taxation*

As I have noted earlier, concerns for the welfare of the common man are emphasised as a priority of governance, but there invariably underlies the presumption in all texts that prosperity will trickle down from businesses to their employees. With the PMLN, the prioritisation is clear: “While continued economic growth and infrastructural development are and will remain central tenets of the PMLN’s mission [...] this can now allow for similar prioritisation to be allocated to [...] alleviating poverty and improving the lives of the common man” (PMLN 2018, p. 5). The party promises to “focus on sustainable growth to ensure the growing benefits are fast tracked to reach the poor” (PMLN 2013, p. 9). And again, “the PMLN envisions a Pakistan with the capital necessary to bring the poor out of poverty and improve the standard of living of the common man” (PMLN 2018, p. 11).

The PTI does make an acknowledgement that “economic growth does not always benefit the poor” (PTI 2013, p. 11). However, this is explained using a logic of economics: “if the growth in output is achieved through capital-intensification of the production process, employment growth is unlikely to match output growth” (PTI 2013, p. 11). This suggests the ‘common sense’ of the need for healthy, unrestricted capital accumulation.

Taxation features in the PMLN texts, but fraught with vagueness, and conspicuous absence of the redistribution prerogative: “a practical and effective mechanism” (PMLN 2013, p. 9) of taxation is envisioned by the party and “a system to curb tax evasion” (PMLN 2013, p. 9). Also, there is deflection of blame of taxation on the Federal Bureau of Revenue, Pakistan’s revenue authority,

thus working to delegitimise state institutions: “FBR will be revamped” and “efforts will be made to eliminate all corrupt and unethical practices from FBR” (PMLN 2013, p. 9).

Taxation is likewise addressed by the PTI, but predominantly in the sense that the regime of indirect taxes should be amended (PTI 2013, p. 12). There remains a conspicuous absence of redistribution mechanisms. The only time redistribution is suggested is in terms of taxation of wealth and capital gains (PTI 2013, p. 12). However, this is in context of the overall theme of the manifesto, which is about the hidden wealth of political rivals and specifically with reference to the PMLN leader Nawaz Sharif’s implication in the Panama Papers leak. There is no stepping on the toes of informal capital.

The PPP texts mention taxation, but it is likewise in the context of the top of the pyramid: “Our plan to expand the tax net to 5 million by 2014 will be operationalised with the use of NADRA tax database<sup>12</sup> we built, even if we have to target tax evaders at the top of the pyramid” (PPP 2013, p. 4). I note that there is a latent acknowledgement of power, and also deference to the ‘top of the pyramid’ in the muted threat, “even if we have to”. In addition to the deference to capital in general, this also signifies tone deafness to where tax defiance actually exists: the most obvious problem is that informality has no presence in NADRA, the national database authority being referred to.

### *Employment as an end-goal*

Employment is another signifier around which development is articulated. My contention is not with employment as a goal of governance, but rather with its articulation in specific ways. Unequivocally, by all parties and across all election years, employment is presented as an end-goal, invariably represented quantitatively and as a lowest denominator to gauge the success of governance with regard to citizens. Work conditions, when addressed, are in vague terms at best, and barely in terms of a responsibility of governance. These representations also serve to indicate an indispensability of employment providers, endorsing the precedence in governance imperatives for capital to thrive. I argue that this has implications for unequal power relations between capital owners and citizens as their potential subordinates in the social context.

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<sup>12</sup> NADRA is Pakistan’s National Database and Registration Authority



The following examples from the texts illustrate how commitments regarding employment appear unequivocally as a prerogative of governance. In the 2008 manifesto, the PPP updated their traditional left-inclining slogan from ‘*Roti, Kapra Aur Makaan*’ (food, clothes and shelter) to a more jingly “*Ilm, Roshni, Sab ko Kaam; Roti Kapra Aur Makaan, Maang Raha Hai Har Insaan*” (education, light/energy, work for all; food, clothes and shelter, is the demand of all<sup>13</sup>) (PPP 2008, p. 4), with a noticeable inclusion of ‘work for all’ as a priority. A commitment to this slogan is reiterated by the PPP by emphasising their “unique emphasis on full employment” (PPP 2008, p. 2). Very linear connections are evoked between employment and the eradication of despair by asserting, for example, that “the PPP’s mission is to transform the lives of our people from one of despair and poverty into one of hope and opportunity through employment, education, energy, environment and equality” (PPP 2008, p. 4). The indispensability of business success is also evoked: “PPP fully recognises that high growth will be the main driver of Full Employment” (PPP 2008, p. 7).

Moreover, achievements with respect to employment are predominantly mentioned in terms of quantity. The PPP avers, for example, that “the International Labour Organisation noted that the largest job-generation in the history of Pakistan took place under the PPP” (PPP 2008, p. 3). The PMLN similarly refers to employment in quantified terms rather than with a nuanced concern for the quality and conditions of employment: “it is estimated that 36 million new jobs will be needed” (PMLN 2013, p. 18, 19). Likewise, the PTI articulates quantified representations of employment as a priority of governance: “highest priority to poverty alleviation through policies aimed at creating more job opportunities” (PTI 2013, p. 3) with a suggested preoccupation with ‘more’ rather than, say, ‘better’, and through the pledge to “create 10 million jobs and strengthen the labour market” (PTI 2018, p. 27).

Prioritisation of employment is a desirable aim of governance. I argue, however, that when referred to exclusively in quantified terms, there appears a) a naivety regarding employment conditions, and b) an objectification of the representation of potential employees. I contend that both these implications combine to position ‘the common man’ as a burdensome citizen, or a problem needing to be ‘dealt with’. Conversely, employment providers, for only their function of providing employment, are positioned as valorised. Also, when representations of employment continue to be

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<sup>13</sup> My translations from the original Urdu

articulated and reproduced as objective quantifications of governance goals, then these reproductions acquire a legitimacy such that reasons to go beyond numbers into the nuanced aspects of employment are obviated.

Furthermore, the inclination to gauge successes by quantified objective indicators becomes unreliable in contexts fraught with informal practices that are largely obscure to statistical assessment (Jerven, 2013). The language of “mass employment” (PMLN 2018, p. 9; p. 13) used repeatedly emphasises this point; the idea of obscurity beyond that mass is evoked, thus working also to obscure the underlying domination and subjugation practices that may be hidden behind the façade of employment in informal contexts.

Achievements and ambitions with respect to employment are also referred to in terms of social policy goals. A telling example of this is when the PPP notes.

National policy frameworks have, to date, accorded primacy to economic policy goals, with social policy goals not pursued aggressively. Even within economic policy-making, Employment has not been a major objective. Resultantly, social and human development indicators have continued to lag behind woefully. The very first objective of Development has remained unfulfilled. (PPP 2008, p. 4, 5)

I argue, reiterating Judith Tendler’s (2002) and Barbara Harriss-White’s (2010) observations, that the problem with articulations of employment in association with social policy goals is that employment becomes a social policy prerogative and, by implication, the success of businesses and their employment capacity become associated with the success of governance. This association lends discursive stability to capital as long as the act of employment is being taken care of.

Specific language usage in the texts also works to provide discursive stability to capital in general and capital-owners in the context of Pakistan’s undocumented marketplaces. The following are telling illustrations. The PMLN 2008 manifesto talks of “a programme of vigorous industrialisation” one of the purposes of which will be to “absorb unemployed labour” (PMLN 2008, p. 23). The use of the word ‘absorb’ (occurs twice) suggests the absorption of something unsightly lying around; the presumption that citizens are ‘unemployed labour’ implies that citizens exist in order to become labour inputs for capital. This representation has implications for the fixation of identity and the endorsement of relations between social actors.

Metaphors of ‘harnessing’ labor and ‘unleashing’ capital likewise suggest the construal of positions for social actors. Use of the phrase “harness the capacity of citizens” (PMLN 2019, p. 7) and “harness the youth potential” (PMLN 2018, p. 19) contrast jarringly with “unleashing of entrepreneurship” (PMLN 2018, p. 9) used on several occasions. Admittedly, the PTI phrases this relation in terms of “unleash the Potential of the Youth” (PTI 2018, p. 46), which lends some needed balance to the capital-labour relationship. Nevertheless, representations that pit citizens as potential inputs to capital, for example as an “engine of growth” (PMLN 2018, p. 18, 19), appear liberally in the texts without contestation. The representations, reproduced thus, gain the momentum to become ‘truisms’, for example when phrased thus: “Sustained and inclusive economic growth provide equal opportunities to citizens and improves their standard of living” (PMLN 2018, p. 7).

There also appear suggestions of a pandering to capital and a ‘race to the bottom’ in promises that “social welfare of workers will be ensured by the state without putting additional burden on businesses” (PTI 2018, p. 27). The PPP likewise promises a policy where “reducing the employers’ contribution to EOBI scheme<sup>14</sup> from 6 percent to 5 percent of the minimum wage to facilitate employers in cutting costs” (PPP 2013, p. 16). The suggestion of a ‘race to the bottom’ regarding the ‘absorption’ of labour also appears in the claim that China would find Pakistan attractive for investment because of “high labour costs” (in China) (PMLN 2018, p. 13), something that Pakistan is able to bid against. It is commendable that responsibility of workers’ welfare is proposed to be assumed by the state. However, in the context of a) informality where business and employment practices remain obscure to the state, and b) the absence of income redistribution mechanisms and state capacity concerns in the texts, these statements serve more to suggest the removal of regulatory ‘burden’ from business owners, and validate them simply for being owners of capital.

#### **4.4 Summary**

In the selected texts, I find that the idea of governance is organised around three nodal points, *democracy*, *welfare* and *development*. Democracy is predominantly associated with the signifiers ‘social contract’ and ‘trust’, suggesting the ambition of state-society engagement. However, despite initial reservations expressed in the texts regarding processes of power consolidation by marketplace elites in the local government context, there evolves a consensus around ‘devolution’

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<sup>14</sup> EOBI is ‘Employees’ Old-Age Benefits Institution’, the Pakistani government’s pension programme

as a representation of democracy. A process of intertextual associations legitimise devolution as an ideal of democracy, increasingly synonymizing democracy with devolution. In this process, state institutions and rival political actors are overtly delegitimised. Importantly, the notion of ‘politics’ is denigrated in various representations, and through associations that construct ‘contestation’ negatively as ‘conflict’.

Moving on, *welfare* emerges as another nodal point with the signifiers ‘protection’, ‘underprivileged’, ‘the poor’, ‘women’, ‘children’, ‘youth’, ‘struggle’ and ‘toil’ articulated with it. Welfare is unequivocally imbued with the signification of ‘protection’, an association that I argue evokes passivity among subordinate social actors. Conspicuously absent is the informally employed worker by all but one party. It is commendable that the language of rights is evoked, at least by one party. However, signifiers of ‘struggle’ and ‘toil’ with glorification of struggle, resignation and deference prevail in these texts, accompanied by the deployment of the discourse of ‘family values’ by one party.

Lastly, *development* as a nodal point for governance is unequivocally framed in a neoliberal economic language by all three parties across all texts. Employment features as another predominant signifier fixing meaning to the idea of development. However, employment is articulated in language that presents it as an end-goal rather than a means, and in numerical rather than qualitative terms. In representations, the differentiation between employers and the employed are clear across the texts, a dichotomy that suggests a political formation of groups (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 44) and lends an already valorised capital with superiority over workers.

## Chapter 5

### Discussion and Conclusion

I started out by noting that the mode of undocumented capital accumulation in Pakistan's retail marketplace contexts is characterised by its stability and its defiance of tax and regulation policies. Following insights from Jerven (2013) and from Scott (1998), I problematised informality as a phenomenon that obscures society from the state. This has implications: for Jerven, statistics become unreliable in contexts where undocumented activity is pervasive; for Scott, state interventions become a matter of fitting square pegs in round holes. Scholars like Bräutigam (2008), Besley and Persson (2013; 2014), Fjelstad and Moore (2008), and Moore (2008; 2015) *inter alia* view states' inability to tax as a symptom of the failure of state-society engagement. In the present study, I combine these insights along with empirical findings from Pakistan by Akhtar (2011; 2018), Amirali (2017), Javed (2018), Liaqat et al. (2020) and others, and view informality in Pakistan's retail marketplace context as a hegemonic practice that positions marketplace capital-owners as a wedge between the state and citizens, and both obscures and relies on relations of domination, subjugation and patronage for its stability.

Taking my cue from the premise that domination and power can fruitfully be understood in discourses, I apply discourse analysis to the empirical phenomenon of informality and turn to selected political party communication texts as my data material. This data material (election manifesto texts of Pakistan's three mainstream political parties over three election years) serves as a fertile resource. Specifically, these political party texts serve as a discursive field that employs various discourses to represent idealisations of governance and the organisation of society. In Pakistan's context, political parties are particularly important. As Siddiqui et al. (2020) point out, the very turbulent history of democracy in the country, rife with parliamentary dismissals and military take-overs, suggests indeed a well-recognised and feared potential influence of politicians in the shaping of society. Moreover, political parties in Pakistan have been implicated in transactional relations with thriving marketplace traders, and in sanctioning processes that position marketplace elites as a wedge between state and society.

I have directed discourse analysis at key political issues, particularly at the political construction of social identities, and at hegemonic struggles of articulations and meaning-making regarding governance. Methodologically, I looked at the texts through a stringent conceptual lens, i.e. not as

words and sentences strung together but as signs, elements, moments, nodal points and articulations. So as not to let preconceived notions pre-dictate my findings, the only code of analysis that I started with was that I viewed the election manifesto texts as a set of discourses on governance or on the organisation of society. This distinction is not important; what is important is that this initial code serves to give sensitivity to how I identify the signifiers that aid in discourse analysis.

In this chapter, I will first present how my research questions were addressed as a result of my analysis. I will weave this discussion with theoretical insights that attempt to explain modern regimes of capital accumulation in order to suggest explanations of how the discursive dimensions of the social world mediate to the manifest. Insights from Polanyi's embeddedness concept, from the Regulation Approach, and from Harriss-White's understandings of the stability and perseverance of capital in developing world contexts, point out the lack of dichotomy between the economic and the social. This suggests that undocumented capital accumulation regimes and their logic and stability can be explained by 'extra-economic' mechanisms which include norms and collective identities. Indeed, my discourse-analytic findings demonstrate the 'normalisation' of certain fixations of meaning into apparent objectivity, and of certain representations of social actors which construct group identities and group differentiations.

The specific signs around which the notion of governance or organisation of society is envisioned in these texts were *democracy*, *welfare* and *development*. Admittedly, these are not *identifications* of nodal points, but rather my *constructions*; another analyst may select a different set of signifiers. I justify my choice because a) these themes are faithful to the data material, emerging consistently across all texts, b) the themes are fairly distinct, allowing for distinct fixations of meaning, and c) they allow me insights into the constructions of identity and relations. Given the fledgling nature of democracy in Pakistan, and as Siddiqui et al. (2020) point out that the meaning of democracy in Pakistan's context is different from what it would mean in the West, I did not turn to theories of governance or of the state to guide me in the choice of these codes; rather I allowed the signs to emerge from the texts. The findings of my analysis, summarised in the previous chapter, yielded several consequential insights.

### 5.1 *Insight A: Consensus breeds objectivity*

I find that while there is a lot of adversarial expression in these texts, this is only to the extent of political rhetoric. It is used to fulfil the overt function of these texts which is to position the party as superior among competitors and position the institution of democracy as superior among other state institutions. However, with respect to the meaning-fixation of signifiers, there emerges significant consensus across the parties and over time. Several meanings are rarely contested; rather, they have stability. Some examples of stable meaning-fixations are: democracy articulated as devolution, accompanied by the denigration of state institutions; state institutions and rival political parties articulated as ineffective and corrupt; development articulated in the language of economic growth and in terms of the number or ‘mass’ employed; and welfare articulated in terms of protection and employment. These associations valorise capital, glamorise the struggle and toil of labour, presume ‘trickle-down’ as a redistribution mechanism, and subordinate citizens (who are not capital-owners) firstly to capital and secondly to state handouts. Informality is the elephant in the room that the texts have barely acknowledged (with one rare exception), whether it is in terms of regulation or in terms of taxation.

Discourse theory thrives on variation (Wood & Kroger, 2000) and “social antagonisms are central for discourse theory” (Howarth & Stavrakakis, 2000, p. 9). Social antagonisms, as is argued, “reveal the limit points in society in which meaning is contested and cannot be stabilised” (Howarth & Stavrakakis, 2000, p. 9). Howarth & Stavrakakis (2000) further assert a point that I find important to repeat: “Antagonisms disclose the *lack* at the heart of all social identity and objectivity” (p. 10). In my findings, I note the absence of this *lack*; instead, meanings are secure, owing to *closures* in meaning-making, achieved by articulations which reproduce and legitimise meanings intertextually. The implications of this are problematic. The consensus in meaning and the lack or frailty of contestations work to sediment articulations into objectivity. I argue that this seeming objectivity discursively normalises conditions that sanction informality.

Laclau and Mouffe theorise that two conditions, namely the “existence of antagonistic forces” and “instability of political frontiers that divide them” (Howarth & Stavrakakis, 2000, p. 15) are necessary for the practice of hegemony. What Laclau and Mouffe call ‘hegemonic formations’ are equivalent to Gramsci’s conception of the ‘historic bloc’ (Howarth & Stavrakakis, 2000, p. 23). In the examples I have mentioned above, any antagonistic forces that existed in alternative articulations in the earlier texts ultimately fade into consensus. I argue that these meaning-fixations

are hegemonic projects that stabilise nodal points. This consensus around the nodal points affords discursive stability to the representation of governance and the idealisation of social organisation. Put differently, beneath the rhetoric of adversarial politics, all three parties are really trying to organise social life in the same way.

Yet, Laclau and Mouffe's theory is premised on the "ultimate impossibility of societal closure" (Howarth & Stavrakakis, 2000, p. 15), something that makes agency and the introduction of new discourses possible. Therefore, this is temporary closure, because "it fixes meaning in a particular way, but it does not dictate that meaning is to be fixed exactly in that way forever" (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 37). Indeed, other signs do vie for meaning and association, such as the language of rights. However, in the data material I use, these remain weak and vague. It remains to be seen how these articulations strive for domination in the future.

## **5.2 *Insight B: Representations, contingency and 'political subjectivity'***

I now turn to the second research question guiding my study: how social identities and relations are positioned in these texts, and what implications this positioning has for the phenomenon of undocumented capital accumulation. When identifying representations in the discourses, I am identifying subject positions; in Foucauldian terms, locating how the positionings of subjects in the discursive field are designated (Howarth & Stavrakakis, 2000, p. 13). As I have presented in Chapter 4, I interpret from these designations in the texts that capital-owners are glorified as indispensable to society. Also indispensable to society is the common man, but in terms of his struggle and toil.

Howarth & Stavrakakis (2000) point out that any individual can have a number of subject positions (p.13). In my reading of the texts, I have noted that signifiers equivalent to 'unleash' and 'freedom' and 'no shackles' are directly associated in many places with capital, but not necessarily always with capital. For example, the idea of 'freedom' and 'sovereignty' is glorified independently also, for example in terms of validating the institution of democracy. Likewise, 'struggle' and 'toil' are frequently articulated in chains of association with the common man, but also independently: passivity and resignation is glorified when the general metaphor of family is evoked. Why then, it can be argued, do these ideas of freedom, sovereignty, and by association, agency, not provide the common citizen with subject positions to identify with? Why do I say that resignation and deference to authority are values only associated with the common man and not with capital-owners?



Here, the notion of ‘political subjectivity’ comes in. As Laclau theorises, “actions of subjects emerge because of the contingency of those discursive structures through which a subject obtains its identity” (Howarth & Stavrakakis, 2000, p. 13). This is the concept that I use to explain how the contingency of the context determines ‘political subjectivity’.

Primarily, I argue that it is the flexibility of accumulation, combined with the primacy of social norms and collective identities in accumulation processes, that provides the context that lends contingency to discursive representations. Here, I take insights from Harvey (1990):

flexibility with respect to labour processes, labour markets, products, and patterns of consumption...[which signals a] move away from regular employment towards increasing reliance upon part-time, temporary or subcontracted work arrangements...[which in turn] open up opportunities for small business formation, and in some instances permit older systems of domestic, artisanal, familial (patriarchal), and paternalistic (‘godfather,’ ‘guv’nor’ or even mafia-like) labour to revive and flourish as centrepieces rather than as appendages of the production system.... [C]lass consciousness no longer derives from the straight class relation between capital and labour, and moves onto a much more confused terrain of inter-familial conflicts and fights for power within a kinship or clan-like system of hierarchically ordered social relations” (Harvey, 1990, p. 147–52)

Evidence from Pakistan reveals a) the institutionalisation of patronage into a social norm, and b) the skewed nature of labour legislation. Both of these social practices point to the fragmentation of businesses, and the flexibility of relations with labour, and as I argue, produce a social imaginary where capital is valorised, citizens are subjugated, and state institutions are denigrated.

### *Patronage*

To start with, there is an immense surplus pool of labour in Pakistan’s 220-million strong population, which pits labour with a lower bargaining power against employers (Akhtar, 2011). Moreover, relations of patronage between employers and workers are documented consistently in studies from Pakistan, many of which enquire into marketplaces using ethnographic methodologies. Javed (2018), for example, proposes that when workers are faced with harsh working conditions, relations of patronage forged with employers become a solution to dealing with their condition. With state services unable to penetrate into the obscurity of undocumented marketplaces,

resourceful marketplace elites become the only source for services and welfare. Marketplace elites sustain this relationship of patronage as they are able to accumulate both capital (for material assistance) as well as power (for help in property rights and dispute-related matters) through transactional relations with politicians and lower-tier state officials (Javed, 2018, p. 160).

Akhtar (2011) likewise finds that in the contractor economy, patrons are thought of simultaneously as both benefactor and tyrant. Workers are well aware regarding their exploitation, yet “consent” (p. 168) to a relationship of domination and patronage owing to a lack of alternatives for employment, but also owing to a lack of articulation with the state, including with political parties. Relations with patrons take on a ‘personalised’ nature, where the worker “feels he has to abide by established social regulations and ‘pay back’ the contractor (as well as his kin who put him in touch with the contractor) for providing him with stable work” (Akhtar, 2011, p. 176). Akhtar asserts that this is a “hegemonic state of affairs insofar as capital valorises and reproduces its domination of labour” (p. 160), a hegemony that is mirrored in the order of discourse represented by my data material.

The norm of patronage extends also to the relationship between political parties and voters, with implications for relations within society. Wilder (1999) and Khan Mohmand (2014) find that Pakistan’s political parties are predominantly driven by the incentive to dole out patronage in the form of targeted goods; this patronage is offered to those citizens who are able to reciprocate by supporting the politician. As Ali (2020) notes, “the provision of non-targeted or public goods (health and education provision by the state, for example) is less useful to the politician: if everyone benefits from the services the state is providing, the politician cannot claim credit for it nor use it to appeal for support” (Ali, 2020, p. 182). I argue that this incentivised institution of patronage serves to differentiate between citizens, favouring business elites over working class citizens because of the ability of business elites to be useful to politicians.

### *Legislation*

Many significant aspects of Pakistan’s legislative framework governing industrial relations with workers also serve to valorise capital and subjugate workers. At the Federal level, the following laws are currently in place: *Factories Act 1934*, *Industrial Relations Act 2012*, *Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance 1968*, *Workman Compensation Act 1923*, *Payment of Wages Act 1936*, *Employees Security Ordinance 1965* and the *Constitution of Pakistan 18th Amendment Act 2010*. At the provincial level, there is the *Punjab Industrial Policy*

2003 and the *Punjab Industrial Relations Act 2010* which replaces its federal counterpart<sup>15</sup>. It is telling that many of these laws and ordinances are from British-colonial times, suggesting a neglect and disregard of industry-worker relations by successive Pakistani governments. I will focus on a few aspects of this legislative framework.

According to the *Constitution 18th Amendment Act 2010*, which gives autonomy to provinces, provincial departments are tasked with the enforcement and promotion of employment standards (Mohammed, 2011). However, their incapacity to do so is evident from reports that there is a single inspector available for 250'000 workers<sup>16</sup>, and the inspector is expected to assess a range of issues such as health and safety, minimum wage and working hour compliance. This lack of capacity is also discernible in the International Labor Organisation (ILO), Human Rights Watch (HRW) and Pakistan Institute of Labour Education and Research (PILER) reports cited previously.

Regarding unionisation of workers, the *Punjab Industrial Relations Act 2010*, states (Section 9) that registration of trade unions is mandatory, and all members of the trade union must be employed in the specific industry, with a minimum of ten formally employed workers participating in the union (Akhtar, 2011, p. 171). However, given the fragmentation of labor, discussed below, registering a second or third union is virtually impossible since it is mandated that one-fifth of the total workforce of the factory must register as members. In a very telling extract, the *Punjab Industrial Policy 2003* states the following, clearly valorising capital and maligning unions:

'Truck Unions' in Punjab have emerged as a highly restrictive force on the free movement of goods within and outside the State, which is a pre-requisite for healthy growth of industry and trade. Such unions have no authority to impose freight rates on industry and trade. In most parts of the State, commercial transportation is almost completely at the mercy of these unions and the rates charged by them, and other terms & conditions imposed by them, are way beyond market terms. This has severely hampered the growth of industry in several parts of the State. State Government will take suitable and effective measures to

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<sup>15</sup> Links to the online versions of all listed Acts and Ordinance are referenced under 'Industrial and Labour Laws' in the References section of this paper.

<sup>16</sup> 'Only one labour inspector 250,000 workers' Dawn, December 13, 2014, Retrieved February 3, 2020, from: <https://www.dawn.com/news/1150581>

check exploitation of Industry by Truck Unions so that the freight rates are market determined rather than these being dictated by the truck unions. (p. 3)

It is also alleged in a newspaper report<sup>17</sup> that the Labour Department has to issue a month's notice to factory management mentioning the exact day of inspection. Such deference shown to businesses clearly positions all social actors including not only workers but also state employees in positions subservient to capital owners.

Moreover, specific framings of industrial and employment laws are clearly tone deaf to the condition of informal employment. For example, the *Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance 1968* states that workers should be provided a written employment letter explaining the terms and conditions at the time of hiring, promotion and transfer. However, the absence of a written contract makes it difficult for workers to establish employment in courts and thus file a claim. Similarly, the Schedule Standing Order 12 states that in case of termination, a one-month notice is mandatory for permanent employees; workers other than permanent employees do not receive this entitlement, thus providing employers to bypass this legislation by hiring labour on contract. Moreover, Section 2(f)(iv) states that the 'establishment of a contractor' is a separate establishment, thus encouraging this mode of employment.

### **5.3 *Towards formulating the argument of this thesis***

Thus far, I have endeavoured to provide an explanation of how norms of patronage and laws concerning labour lend contingency to the 'imaginaries' created discursively in political party texts. To recap, I have argued that these imaginaries, contingent on context, valorise capital-owners and subjugate citizens (and, as shown earlier in Section 5.1, denigrate the state and its institutions). I now relate this idea to Polanyi's embeddedness concept, utilised explicitly or implicitly by the Regulation Approach (Jessop, 1997) and by Harriss-White (2010), in order to formulate the overarching argument of this thesis.

I understand from Polanyi that:

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<sup>17</sup> 'Chief Minister directed me to stop the inspection of factories: Labour Minister,' Express Tribune, September 13, 2012, Retrieved February 3, 2020, from: <https://tribune.com.pk/story/435713/chief-minister-directed-me-to-stop-the-inspection-of-factories-labour-minister>

“[t]he human economy [...] is embedded and enmeshed in institutions, economic and non-economic. The inclusion of the non-economic is vital. For religion or government may be as important for the structure and functioning of the economy as monetary institutions or the availability of tools and machines” (Polanyi, 1957, p. 250 in Jessop & Sum, 2019, p. 156).

I argue that *a logic of society* has been produced discursively where the valorisation of capital exists alongside an ‘imaginary’ that capital accumulation must take place before other social goals, and that capital accumulation may even be necessary for the other social goals. The rest of the society is brought into this logic *discursively* (through the construction of identities and through non-articulation), but also *in praxis*, through processes of fragmentation, institutionalised patronage and discriminatory laws. These are the “social motives” (Jessop & Sum, 2019) that sustain this imaginary and create the non-economic mechanisms that lend stability to the regime of undocumented accumulation.

Polanyi talked of the unity and stability of economic activity also (Jessop & Sum, 2019, p. 157). While not employing the concept of discourse, he nevertheless referred to “household truths”, “elementary truths”, and “common sense attitudes” (Jessop & Sum, 2019, p. 160) in defining a social logic that sustains the accumulation process. Importantly, Polanyi also talked of “different belief systems in consolidating or *resisting* specific institutional arrangements” (Jessop & Sum, 2019, p. 161, italics added). The idea is that if society has been dragged into this logic, “attention must be paid to how, and how far, ‘society’ acquires a relative unity and cohesion in resisting capital’s unhampered logic” (Jessop & Sum, 2019, p. 164). In my analysis of political party texts, I could find only frail counter-logics, for example in the language of rights, and the idea of ownership of assets to the poor. Yet, counter-logics may exist in other (non-political party) discourses, or may be articulated non-discursively. When and where these counter-logics may appear, are the questions I leave with.

#### **5.4 Conclusion**

In this study, I have endeavoured to advance understandings of the regime of undocumented capital accumulation defiantly and overtly practiced in the physical space of retail marketplaces in Pakistan. I argue that this regime finds its stability and defiance from the hegemony of specific discourses regarding governance and the organisation of society in political party communication.

Through critical discourse analysis of selected political party communication texts, I find discursive stability of specific meanings associated with governance and of specific representations of social actors, the implication of which is that conditions conducive to informality are discursively constructed. Premised on insights from Polanyi's concept of embeddedness, from the Regulation Approach, and from Harriss-White's understandings, and following a review of specific social practices evidenced in Pakistan, I argue that a dialectical relationship between the discursive and the manifest dimensions of the social context sustains a hegemonic stability of undocumented capital. This hegemony is only weakly contested in my data material texts, but it remains to be seen if contestations emerge in other (for example, non-political party) discourses, or in non-discursive domains.

I have endeavoured to put forward a "plausible and empirically justified explanation" (Howarth & Stavrakakis, 2000, p. 1) of this phenomenon pervasive in Pakistan, but also endemic in many contemporary developing countries. Following insights from scholars (Bräutigam, 2008; Moore, 2008; Fjeldstad & Moore, 2008 *inter alia*), I have framed informality not in terms of the potential monetary loss to the state treasury, but in terms of a futile state-building exercise. The findings and insights produced may thus also further the understanding of state-society engagement and of state legitimacy.

I conclude on a positive note. While discourses in my selected data material work to produce power among certain social actors, discourses also offer the possibility of change. As Van Dijk (1993) says, "social power is based on privileged access to socially valued resources, such as wealth, income, position, status, force, group membership, education or knowledge" (p. 254). If *access* in discourses is likewise considered a valued resource, then privileging the articulation of subordinate social actors in discourses can offer possibility for change in the domination and subjugation processes obscured in informality, and for a state-building project to take shape.

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## **Appendices**

## **Appendix 1**

*Election Manifesto*

Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz group

*General Elections 2008*

*PMLN 2008*



# Election Manifesto 2007

Pakistan Muslim League (N)

December 2007

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## Foreword

In Pakistan's chequered history no elected government has been allowed to complete its term of office. Frequent military interventions have done colossal damage to the integrity and solidarity of the country. As a consequence, Pakistan has failed to achieve political stability, sustained economic growth and a clear sense of national solidarity. The 1973 constitution, which has the consensus of all the federating units, has been amended by the autocratic rulers beyond recognition. What we see today is continuing military rule, with a façade of democracy.

The three main pillars of a sustainable democratic order are: a sovereign parliament, an independent judiciary and a free and fair electoral process. All the three institutions have been greatly weakened in the past 8 years:

- The Parliament had been denied its due role in policy making and virtually reduced to a rubber stamping body. It could not even discharge its constitutional responsibility of electing a Prime Minister.
- The unconstitutional removal of the Chief Justice of Pakistan in March 2007, and the forced retirement of 55 additional Judges of the Supreme Court and the High Courts after 3 November 2007, dramatically exposed the game plan of Military rulers to have a pliable judiciary that will sanctify the continuation of Musharraf's rule under a civilian façade.
- The manner in which the general elections of 2002 and local bodies polls of 2005 were manipulated and rigged has virtually destroyed the credibility of the electoral process in Pakistan.

In these 8 years, Military has taken control of almost all the vital economic sectors of the country and most important positions are now occupied by retired or serving army officers. The process of accountability has been focused on politicians, businessmen and bureaucrats. Army and judiciary have been deliberately kept out of its purview. In fact the National Accountability Bureau has been blatantly used as a political tool to coerce turn-coat politicians into playing second fiddle to military ascendancy in matters which are purely



civilian in a democratic country. Curbs on democratic freedom remain draconian. To justify the military take over and forestall the emergence of strong political alternatives, the military regime has been vigorously pursuing a systematic campaign to malign politics and politicians and divide and pressurize all the mainstream opposition parties.

The military government has totally failed to achieve any of the objectives announced as its seven (7) point's agenda in October 1999. There has been a sharp increase in prices and unemployment. Governance and law and order are at their worst in Pakistan's history. Car thefts, burglaries, bank robberies, political and sectarian violence have increased by the day ever since the military government has taken control of the country. The centre – province relationships have been deteriorating especially on the issue of water and distribution of financial resources under NFC. Baluchistan has reached a point where an armed confrontation is taking place between the Federation and the local leadership. Because of the mishandling by the present government and the brute use of force, there is great disillusion in the NWFP and the Tribal areas.

The present government has explicitly recognized that the income disparities in the country have increased during the last few years which are sad news for the people of the country. Although the consumption inequality has increased both in urban and rural areas, the inequalities in urban area have grown at a higher rate. Sectors like rural development, rural electrification and low cost housing performed dismally and have shown declining trends. The inequality reflects distortions in the availability and quality of health, education and infrastructure services. These are alarming trends. The poor in the country are getting poorer while the rich are getting richer. The reversal of this trend is only possible through a change in approach in policy formulation and implementation and by making the reduction of the rich-poor divide as integral part of a new policy thrust.

In these 8 years the government was a one-man show and the President-cum-Chief of Army Staff wanted to perpetuate his hold on power but was forced by the political opposition and a civil society movement led by the lawyers to shed his uniform. In the aftermath of 9/11, the only superpower patronized this set-up because it was fighting America's proxy war on more than one front. The backlash of this plan is now mounting in



the form of terrorist activities and bomb blasts in different parts of Pakistan. The issue of nuclear proliferation hangs like an albatross round the neck of the Nation.

People in Pakistan are losing faith in the manifestos of most political parties because they are disillusioned by the actual implementation of such Manifestos. But by God's grace, PML(N) was able to implement its Manifestos to a substantial degree during its two terms from November 1990 to July 1993 and from February 1997 to September 1999, despite many internal and external difficulties. If PML(N) governments had been allowed to complete its 5 years tenures, the country would not be in such dire straits as it is today.

It is in this scenario that PML(N) would like to unfold various facets of its manifesto. Top of the agenda will be a coherent strategy to restore the Judges who refused to take oath under the P.C.O. promulgated on 3 November 2007. This will also ensure a sustainable democratic order free of military interference. It is equally necessary to ensure a free media as the fourth pillars of a democratic system, after a sovereign legislature, an independent judiciary and a law abiding executive.

The lawyers movement that started in March 2007, to uphold the rule of law has been transformed by the powerful media and other segments of the civil society, into an historic battle for fundamental rights and genuine democracy. The forthcoming elections provide a golden opportunity to win this battle by voting for parties fighting for democracy and rejecting those that only provide a civilian façade to military rule.

**Nawaz Sharif**

**Quaid**

**PML(N)**

12 December 2007



## 1. Revival of Genuine Democracy

Pakistan came into existence through a democratic struggle. Pakistan can survive as a unified and strong federation only through a viable and sustained democratic process. PML(N) is fully committed to democracy. It will:

- strengthen all democratic institutions, and traditions in all spheres of national life and improve the economic condition of the common man.
- re-establish the supremacy of Parliament and its Committees to perform the rôle assigned to it under the constitution;
- promote unity among the federating units through maximum provincial autonomy and decentralization of administrative and financial powers to provincial and lower levels;
- fully recognize the rights and privileges of the opposition and the importance of internal party democracy and free speech;
- ensure that the armed forces perform only such functions as are assigned to them under the constitution;
- guarantee, subject to law and public morality, all the fundamental rights including equality of status and opportunity, freedom of thought, expression, belief, faith, worship and association and equality before law;
- ensure that elections at all levels under a neutral caretaker government are free and fair and the sanctity of the vote is fully respected. All election cells in intelligence and military establishments will be closed.
- PML(N) will appoint the Chief Election Commissioner in consultation with the leader of the opposition in the National Assembly. While the Chief Election Commissioner will be a retired Chief Justice or judge of Supreme Court or High Court, its members will be appointed from among retired judges of the supreme Court or High Courts, distinguished retired civil servant with impeccable service record, or eminent jurists of national stature. The number of members will be increased to five so that the election petitions are decided within a reasonable period of time.



- Hold elections for the national and provincial assemblies on the same day.

## **2. Independent Judiciary and the Rule of Law**

The judicial crisis that erupted on 9 March 2007, with the removal of the Chief Justice of Pakistan, was an historic turning point in the political life of the country. The manner in which members of the bar launched a massive agitation campaign, with strong support from the civil society and all the political parties in the opposition, to uphold the independence and dignity of the superior judiciary was unprecedented. The decision of the full court on 20 July 2007, to set aside the reference and to reinstate the Chief Justice, has become a milestone in the nation's struggle for democracy and the rule of law.

The Chief of Army Staff tried to undo this judgement of 20 July through a Provisional Constitutional Order (PCO) on 3 November 2007, under which he suspended the constitution and removed 55 Judges of the Supreme Court and High Courts who refused to take oath under the PCO, so that he could get a favourable verdict on his eligibility for the office of the President. Judicial atrocity on this scale is unthinkable in today's world.

PML(N) is fully convinced that with such overwhelming support from the lawyers and the civil society, these Judges will be restored and the judicial institutions will see a qualitative revolution in the coming years. This regeneration of the judiciary will not only bury for ever, the infamous law of necessity under which military take overs have been sanctified in the past 5 decades, but also ensure that justice, which is the corner stone of any civilized society, is available to every citizen in all parts of the country. Today the majority of people spend an inordinate amount of time at police stations (thanas) and lower courts (katchery) where they have no alternative but to buy justice through the vicious and endless circle of safarish, bribery or blackmail. This culture has to be ruthlessly uprooted.

PML(N) solemnly pledges to take effective steps to protect the independence and dignity of the judicial system, through the following specific measures:

- Appoint a judicial commission comprising eminent jurists, Judges, parliamentarians, representatives of lawyers, and civil society to recommend and supervise restructuring and reforms of judicial system.



- The system of appointment of judges will be reformed to ensure appointments on merit alone and in a transparent manner.
- Judicial information system shall be put in place for the efficient functioning of judiciary.
- Lower judiciary will be strengthened for speedy delivery of justice in order to protect the life and property of ordinary citizens.
- Alternative dispute resolution mechanisms shall be developed to facilitate social cohesion.
- All discriminatory laws shall be abolished.
- Fair and across the board application of law shall be ensured in the fight against crime so that criminal elements are unable to misuse the judicial system to their own advantage.
- Police will be made a community oriented service, and reformed to become a modern crime-fighting machine with better training and equipment.
- Narcotics trade and sectarian/religious violence will be eliminated from the society.
- Special monitoring cells will be set up in the center and the provinces to check heinous crimes, and heinous crime cases and criminals will be dealt with an iron hand.
- Crime fighting agencies will be trained in the modern investigation and crime prevention techniques and provided adequate tools.
- Citizen and Police liaison committees will be set up at all levels.
- Pakistan Penal Code, Law of Evidence, and the Criminal Procedures Code shall be revised to bring them in line with the present day requirements of the society.

The concept of freedom and democracy is inseparable from the rule of law. In Pakistan many political and social problems have remained unresolved because we as a nation have not been able to establish the rule of law. PML(N) will endeavor to lay down solid foundations for the rule of law through the following specific measures:



- The appointment of the governors, services chiefs and the CJCSC shall be made by the chief executive who is the prime minister, as per the 1973 Constitution.
- No judge shall take oath under any Provisional Constitutional Order or any other oath that is contradictory to the exact language of the original oath prescribed in the Constitution of 1973.
- Administrative mechanisms will be instituted for the prevention of misconduct, implementation of code of ethics, and removal of judges on such charges brought to its attention by any citizen. All special courts including anti-terrorism and accountability courts shall be abolished and such cases tried in ordinary courts.
- A Federal Constitutional Court will be set up to resolve constitutional issues, giving equal representation to each of the federating units, whose members may be judges or persons qualified to be judges of the Supreme Court, constituted for a six year period. The appointment of judges shall be made in the same manner as for judges of higher judiciary. The Supreme and High Courts will hear regular civil and criminal cases.
- The ban on a 'prime minister not being eligible for a third term of office' will be removed.
- A Commission shall also examine and identify the causes of and fix responsibility for the Kargil crisis of 1999.
- The press and electronic media will be allowed its independence. Access to information laws will be further improved.
- The chairman of public accounts committee in the national and provincial assemblies would be appointed in consultation with the leaders of the opposition in the respective assemblies.

### 3. Good Governance

The crisis of governance in Pakistan is extensive. Pakistan has to be made a modern and healthy Muslim state, as envisaged by the founding fathers, which is in peace with itself, its neighbors, and the international community. We have to revitalize the Pakistani society



so that it successfully integrates itself with the international community; a society in which there is mutual respect, protection of the rights of women, minorities and under-privileged.

Governance in Pakistan is almost in a state of collapse. The performance of bureaucracy at various tiers of the government is ineffective and inefficient (corruption notwithstanding) mainly on account of inappropriate and whimsical appointments, postings and promotions to various assignments. Immediate measures are required to correct the situation, restore the confidence of the bureaucracy and to ensure that they work with complete commitment. This will require elimination of the dead wood, de-politicization and encouragement to the qualified and competent.

It has been claimed that the plan for devolution of power to local bodies has been carried out to empower the impoverished and strengthen the local governments. But actually it has undercut mainstream political parties, left widespread corruption unchecked and shifted power away from the provinces as a means to bolster military rule. What is required to develop institutions that will promote a democratic culture and provide moderate political forces an opportunity to serve the nation.

The key to good governance in Pakistan lies in the separation of powers: the legislature should legislate, the executive should execute laws and policies and the judiciary should interpret the constitution and laws. As the Supreme Court had observed in 1996, "the success of the system of governance can be guaranteed and achieved only when these three pillars of the state exercise their powers and authority within their limits without transgressing into the field of the others and by acting in the spirit of harmony, cooperation and coordination."

(PLD1996 – 324 at 399).

Such a system cannot tolerate the overbearing presence of the military with its uncontrolled access to the power and resource base of the nation.

With this paramount objective in view PML(N) will set up a high level Commission to look at the entire governance structure including the devolution/decentralization process and to suggest amendments in laws that recognize the ground realities in each province and are also suited to the needs of the people.



Good Governance is a cross cutting theme and must apply to all institutions that form part of the Government. There cannot be any exception to this rule. It is imperative, therefore, to select/appoint people of integrity to head all government institutions. PML(N) will take following specific measures in this regard:

- In order to depoliticize bureaucracy, government servants shall be given security of service through constitutional amendments.
- All discretionary power at all levels will be withdrawn and all government decisions will be governed by law and merit.
- The records of courts, land revenue and police stations will be computerized. These institutions will be provided with all necessary wherewithal and training so that they function effectively and efficiently to meet the requirements of the citizens at the grass root level without *sifarsih* and *rishwat*.
- Kalashnikov culture, drug trafficking and smuggling shall be eliminated through a systematic and effective reform programme.
- Reforming the system of administration to ensure that merit prevails over contacts and there are generous rewards for efficiency and honesty.

#### **4. Corruption and Accountability**

The evil of corruption has increased in the past 8 years and Pakistan now ranks among the seventh most corrupt country in the world. Corruption not only destroys the confidence of the people in the system of governance, but is responsible for many other social and economic evils in the country.

PML(N) will give top priority to the objective of eliminating corruption from all segments of the society. For this purpose:

- The National Accountability Bureau will be revamped. It will not be an organization to be used (misused) by the government for victimizing its opponents. Military and judiciary will not be excluded from its purview.
- The National Accountability Bureau (NAB) will be replaced with an independent accountability commission, whose chairman shall be nominated by the prime minister in consultation with the leader of opposition and confirmed by a joint



parliamentary committee with 50 percent members from treasury benches and remaining 50 percent from opposition parties.

- Prescribing the criteria of integrity as a basic qualification for all senior appointments and strict observance of the process of accountability at all levels without any discrimination on the basis of rank or seniority.
- District Ombudsmen offices shall be set up in all districts to provide relief to other common man against injustice and bribery.
- Bureaucracy will be depoliticized and government officials given security of tenure.
- The administrative system will be further streamlined to reduce discretion and misuse of power.

## 5. Civil Military Relations

The crux of Pakistan's failure in developing sustainable democracy lies in the repeated interference of military leadership in the political affairs of the country, which has destabilized the country to a point that further continuation of this pattern has become a serious threat to the Federation. We lost East Pakistan on this account, and voices of dissent from smaller provinces are once again emerging. PML(N) feels it is about time that military, which is a prestigious national institution, resumes a pure professional role as in other countries of South Asia:

- National Security Council will be abolished. The Defense Committee of the Cabinet will be reconstituted as the Cabinet Committee on Defense and National Security and will be chaired by the prime minister. It will have a permanent secretariat under a national security adviser to the prime minister. The efficacy of the higher defense and security structure, created two decades ago, will be reviewed.
- The Joint Services Command structure will be strengthened and made more effective.
- Military's honour and respect as a professional and apolitical institution shall be restored. Highest professional standards in the armed forces shall be maintained.



- Pensions and other facilities for armed forces shall be improved and special programmes launched for the well being of disabled soldiers and their families.
- Defense budget will be brought within the preview of the National Assembly for approval.

## 6. Tolerant and Pluralistic Society

Prolonged periods of military rule in Pakistan have also led to increased polarization along provincial, religions, ethnic and political lines. The law and order situation in all parts of Pakistan is not only threatened by extremism but also by large scale insurgency as a reaction to the policy of using force in the tribal belt and in Baluchistan, without adequate political support from all the stakeholders. There is growing alienation among the smaller provinces and between the urban and rural areas. This growing polarization has shaken the very foundations of the Federation. PML(N) will strive to arrest this trend and intensify efforts to create a more tolerant and pluralistic society through the following measures:

- Supremacy of the Constitution and Parliament shall be restored through making parliamentary institutions effective, accountable, and responsive to the people.
- A new political order shall be enforced in consultation with the opposition, whose guiding principles shall be the following:
  - The 1973 Constitution as on 12 October 1999 before the military coup shall be restored with the provisions of joint electorates, minorities, and women reserved seats.
  - The Legal Framework Order, 2000 and the Seventeenth Constitutional Amendment shall be repealed.
  - The Concurrent List in the Constitution will be abolished or drastically curtailed. A new NFC award by consensus will be announced regularly at 5 yearly intervals and the principle of provincial autonomy fully respected.
  - The reserved seats for women in the national and provincial assemblies will be allocated to the parties on the basis of the number of votes polled in the general elections by each party.



The strength of the Senate of Pakistan shall be increased to give representation to minorities in the Senate, and senate seats will be allocated to parties in proportion to total votes secured by them in most recent provincial elections on the basis of lists of candidates filed along with the nomination papers for general elections.

FATA shall be brought into the mainstream of the country's political, economic and cultural life.

Northern Areas shall be developed by giving it a special status and further empowering the Northern Areas Legislative Council to provide people of Northern Areas access to justice and human rights.

Local bodies elections will be held on party basis through provincial election commissions in the respective provinces and constitutional protection will be given to the local bodies to make them autonomous and answerable to their respective assemblies as well as to the people through regular courts of law.

A Truth and Reconciliation Commission will be established to acknowledge victims of torture, imprisonment, state-sponsored persecution, targeted legislation and politically motivated accountability. The Commission will also examine and report its findings on military coups and illegal removal of governments in the past two decades.

Ensuring mutual respect and tolerance for a pluralistic society, and the constitutional right of all citizens to profess and practice their religion and develop their cultures.

Promoting good governance on the basis of principles of equality and social justice.

Simplicity shall be enforced at all levels of the state machinery and VIP culture shall be eliminated.

The size of national and provincial cabinets shall be curtailed and the number of Ministers and Ministers of State will not exceed a certain percentage of seats in the National and Provincial Assemblies.



## 7. Extremism and Terrorism

Extremism and its dreadful manifestation in the form of terrorism and suicide bombing, is a very complex phenomena whose nature must be clearly understood. It is a lethal combination of traditional nationalism rising against foreign occupation or foreign domination, a mindset that believes in Islamic revival through force and coercion and belatedly the symbolic manifestation of a new class war against local, regional and global elites.

Most of the problems afflicting Pakistan and Afghanistan today are the legacy of the proxy war which USA fought against Russia in the 1980s, with the help of Pakistan, after Russia invaded Afghanistan in December 1979. The number of people with an extremist mindset in Pakistan is very small, but there is a much larger number of people, especially in NWFP and the Tribal areas, which are very sympathetic to their world view and their struggle against foreign domination. Wherever possible, they provide shelter and sustenance to those who need them, like the Taliban who escaped from Afghanistan after the American occupation in October 2001, or their Al-Qaeda supporters who were initially foreign volunteers, who were brought to Afghanistan to help the Afghan mujahideen (holy warriors) in the war against Russia. Only after 9/11 these foreign militants joined a loose network called Al-Qaeda.

The use of force is and will remain necessary against foreign and local terrorists who take innocent lives and also to prevent infiltration across the Pakistan border, but it is even more important to win the hearts and minds of people who support them through a process of political engagement.

PML(N) is committed to pursue this dual track approach and take resolute steps to eradicate the menace of extremism and terrorism which is becoming a serious threat to life and property in Pakistan.

During its previous tenure from 1997 to 1999, the PML(N) government took a series of measures to control terrorist groups and counter their activities. It also supported the efforts of the international community to deal with this threat to peace and stability. In keeping with this policy PML(N) will intensify these efforts by:



- Strengthening the capacity of law enforcing agencies to detect and control terrorist groups and their supporters;
- Influencing the groups which directly or indirectly support terrorism, through political intermediaries and civil society organizations to adhere to basic Islamic principles of peace, moderation and justice.
- Promoting the rule of law, tolerance and mutual respect in the country to overcome the sense of desperation which pushes certain segments of society towards extremism.
- Intensify diplomatic efforts to deal with the underlying causes like Kashmir and Palestine and the continuing presence of foreign military forces in other lands.

## 8. Education

With knowledge becoming the key driver of economic and social progress in future, education must become number one national priority. Education is also the greatest single equalizer of society and mass education can help to solve most of our problems. A well educated, technological advanced and progressive society is the aspiration of all the people of Pakistan. During its previous tenure, the PML(N) government took several important initiatives in this sector. These will be supplemented by the following policies and programmes. To ensure decisive movement towards this vital objective, PML(N) will take the following steps:

- Ensure that education in all public sector institutions upto higher secondary will be free of cost. The system will work through provision of transferable voucher scheme to encourage competition in the public sector educational institutions.
- Achieve 100% enrollment in middle school education by 2012, 100% enrollment in secondary education (Matric) by 2015; and 80% enrollment in higher secondary education (Intermediate) by 2020.
- Guarantee that all students who get first division in both Matric and Intermediate examinations are ensured of a place in a public sector college in their respective tehsil/taluka/sub-division. This target will be achieved by 2010.



- A National Education Corps will be set up to employ all graduates without jobs and they will be employed in literacy and adult education programmes with the objective of achieving 100% adult literacy by 2010, 100% adult education up to middle level by 2015, and 100% adult education up to Matric by 2020.
- The Federal Government will fund 50% of the public sector education program up to higher secondary level through grants to provinces and 100% of all public sector universities and higher education institutions through grants. The Federal Government will also fund the National Education Corp.
- Provide maximum facilities for science education and vocational training for all middle and high school students.
- Provide fiscal and other incentives for private investment in schools, colleges and universities, including straight line tax deduction for private endowment contribution to education institutions.
- Pay special attention to the development of libraries at national, provincial and district levels.
- Promote several centers for professional excellence in various scientific disciplines by providing highly qualified teachers, generous scholarships for training abroad, and liberal grants to science laboratories.

PML(N) resolves to implement the National Education Policy 2010 to break the monopoly of elitist education system and to create equal education opportunities for all by reviving delivery of quality education in the public sector. A participatory approach will be adopted to achieve key targets through public private partnerships. Strategies shall be made to optimally harness and utilize the existing education facilities by improving governance, efficiency, monitoring, and effectiveness.

To improve the quality of education for the poor, Education Foundations will be set up in each Province and eventually at the district level to take over and manage education facilities through high level professionals. As described in the section on poverty, they will be received grants on per student basis.

National curricula will be standardized and adopted at all levels to eliminate multi-class system based education in the country. Sharp focus will be put on academic content in science and mathematics. Curricula will be enriched by putting more emphasis on



acquisition of practical skills, along with theoretical perception, and environmental education.

Teaching profession will be made more attractive by grant of higher salaries to teachers who possess qualifications higher than the prescribed level. Additional increments for better performers and best teacher awards shall be introduced at all levels of education. National medals and awards will be given to nation's best teachers every year. Principals/Heads of educational institutions/teachers will be given special status in local areas. Female teachers will be posted as close to their homes as possible.

Ethics and values based curriculum and teaching systems with a focus on character building to develop honesty, perseverance, tolerance, discipline, wisdom, innovation, respect, and team play, as enshrined in Islam, will be introduced at all levels. The teaching of Quran with translation will be compulsory for all Muslim students in secondary schools.

## 9. Health

Without a healthy nation, there can be neither development nor progress. Pakistan has lagged behind other developing countries in terms of its social development. In the last ten years, due to Social Action Program, initiated by PML-N government in 1992, there has been considerable progress in improving the social indicators and controlling the population growth rate as it mandated the provincial governments to make significant allocations for the social sectors, despite the financial problems they faced.

PML-N remains committed to social sector development and will inter-alia pursue the policy of providing quality health care to all citizens in all parts of the country through the following specific measures:

- Main Teaching Hospitals both in the Federal Capital and Provincial headquarters will be modernized and equipped with the state of the art medical equipment and facilities especially in the field of Cardiovascular surgery, Cancer, Organs transplant, Brain surgery and Burn and Dialysis units, so that people do not have to seek expensive medical treatment abroad.
- Production of quality generic medicines will be encouraged to provide cheaper medicines to the common man.



- Cardiac clinics and facilities shall be extended to district level hospitals, and institutes will be provided more advanced technology and modern equipment. Incentives will be provided to Cardiac clinics and institutes in the private sector.
- To provide better services and coverage, District and Tehsil Hospitals will be improved and upgraded by appointing DHOs on merit basis, and providing sufficient financial and administrative powers and better living facilities.
- All out efforts will be made to provide clean drinking water and basic hygiene facilities to the rural population.
- AIDS is an incurable, fatal but preventable disease. A national campaign will be launched to make people aware about its prevention and dangerous consequences.
- Effective measures to control Hepatitis, which has become a serious health problem in Pakistan, will be taken and coverage against Hepatitis extended to at least two third of the population.
- A new anti TB program, DOTS (Directly Observed Treatment Short Course), against Tuberculosis will be implemented to control Tuberculosis. Massive vaccination against Poliomyelitis, Neonatal tetanus, Malaria and a cluster of childhood diseases will be carried out, and immunization coverage will be increased to 75-80%.
- Homeopathy and Tibb will be promoted after they meet the criteria of desired standards for medical education by making amendments in the law.
- Senior citizens will be provided special health care facilities like eye glasses, hospitalization and treatment at favourable fee rates, and pharmacies will be instructed to provide medicines at discounted prices. Free medical care will be provided to deserving patients.
- Free medical care will be provided to poor and deserving patients through Zakat fund assistance ear-marked for health care.
- Special health education centers shall be opened in all districts.



## 10. Science & Technology

A modern S&T infrastructure will be put in place including:

- PhD scholarships in local universities and world's top universities in areas of priority for human resource development.
- Reorienting S&T infrastructure towards economic needs of Pakistan for creating sustainable competitive advantage in exports.
- Strengthening the S&T organizations by providing research grants and competent management.
- Developing competencies in the future technologies.
- Strengthening Quality and Productivity infrastructure in the country through launching a national campaign in partnership with the private sector.
- Promoting indigenous solutions and applied technology for solving our economic and technical problems.
- Offering incentives to outstanding Pakistani scientists and engineers to return to Pakistan and contribute to national development.
- Promoting local talent and manpower in consultancies.
- Giving role to professional bodies in national policy and decision-making.

## 11. Reducing Poverty

Poverty in Pakistan has assumed alarming proportion. Despite government's claims that it has reduced poverty, at least 50 million people are still living in abject poverty, without adequate food, clothing, education or shelter. The pattern of growth adopted by the present government is pro-rich and the benefit of the higher rates of economic growth achieved as a result of larger external flows after the events of September 11, 2001, have accrued largely to higher income groups and have hardly touched the bottom one third of the country's population particularly those living in rural areas. Report by the international financial institutions have confirmed that increasing inequality has overshadowed poverty reduction, as income distribution has largely benefited the urban population while adversely affecting the rural inhabitants.



PML(N) will evolve a comprehensive package of pro-poor policies, institutions and programmes. The overall approach on which this package is based is holistic and its different elements are mutually reinforcing:

- The processes through which causes and solutions of the poverty problem are explored must involve the poor themselves. A participatory poverty assessment programme will then generate the awareness and the energy for participatory solutions. Most poor people, if asked, will point to the inadequacy of the justice system, harassment by police, discrimination by powerful individuals or groups in the locality, lack of water and other essential services and absence of dependable means of livelihood. These problems facing the poor cannot be resolved unless and until we develop the human capital of the poor through education and training, social capital of the poor through formal and informal institutions and political capital of the poor through inclusion in decision making at different levels.
- The basic foundation of a pro-poor policy framework is to recognize and operationalize the fundamental rights enshrined in the constitution by ensuring equal rights under the law, universal access for all citizens to public services, and equitable access to economic opportunities. These rights can be safeguarded only under a genuine democratic dispensation.
- The process of mainstreaming the poor, as opposed to helping them at the margin through micro credit or different employment promotion schemes, will require a series of institutional innovations that can bring together the poor as the main beneficiaries with support from professional managers.
- In this context PML(N) will set up Education Foundations for the poor in each province. The foundations managed by qualified professionals will take over existing under utilized public school buildings or build new schools exclusively for the poor. The Provincial Government will give them annual grants on per student basis. These provincial foundations will gradually set up district education foundations. The foundations may receive additional funding from local and international donors.
- Similar foundations can be set up in the health sector at the provincial and district level to manage basic health units and rural health centres and expand these



facilities for the benefit of the poor. The Foundation can provide quality health services by using electronic services.

- These institutional mechanisms for mainstreaming the poor will also be extended to investment and income earning opportunities by creating manufacturing and service enterprises which are owned by the poor but run by the professional managers. The poor will be given bank loans to buy equity in these enterprises and pay back the loans through dividends earned by the enterprise.
- Similar mechanisms will be establishment in other sectors, like land development and agro services. Reclaimed land or state land brought under cultivation through irrigation schemes will be allotted primarily to poor and landless households, and Land Development Corporations established in different districts with majority equity holdings for the poor, contributed in kind or in cash through bank loans. In urban areas, these corporations will establish housing schemes for low income families.
- These foundations for the poor will play a major role in scaling up the micro credit operations in the country by improving access and ensure effective utilization and timely repayment.
- In addition PML(N) will maintain reasonable food prices throughout the year in all parts of the country and protect wages in real terms for urban and rural areas.

## **12. Employment**

A major aim of the socio-economic policies of PML(N) will be to expand employment opportunities in order to reduce poverty and at the same time ensure a fuller utilization of the country's human resources for productive purposes, through the following programmes:

- A National Manpower Plan will be prepared to match the demand and supply of manpower and to provide a basis for periodical adjustments in the programmes of education and training.
- New employment opportunities will be provided to over three million persons in the public and private sectors.



- The minimum wage for workers will be enhanced to Rs.5000 per month and the role of collective bargaining agents will be made more effective keeping in view the relevant ILO Conventions.
- A programme of vigorous industrialization and small and medium enterprises will be undertaken in the urban and rural areas to absorb unemployed labour.
- Maximum emphasis will be placed on the programmes of rural development to provide gainful opportunities for income and employment within the rural areas and prevent the tendency of migration from urban to rural areas.
- The taxation system will be modified to encourage rapid growth in investment, particularly in employment intensive activities.
- A National Employment Fund will be created to assist qualified and skilled youth to set up their own business or professional practice. Self employment on individual or cooperative basis will be given maximum support.
- A National Education Corps will be recruited from among the educated unemployed to spread literacy in the country.
- Employment opportunities for qualified doctors will be provided by constructing more hospitals; extending soft term, easy installment loans on personal surety to doctors to establish them in private practice; and giving tax concessions for establishment and expansion of private hospitals.
- A comprehensive programme will be implemented for the full absorption of engineers, scientist and other skilled manpower, including a new National Consultancy Policy for the use of national consultants, strengthening and expansion of existing scientific institutions, creation of new institutes for modern technologies and making it obligatory for the private industrialists to hire adequate expertise in their respective fields.
- A programme for the development of technical skills to produce technically trained and employable manpower will be implemented. For this purpose the intake of polytechnics and vocational schools. Initially this can be achieved by introducing double shift in existing institutions.



- Para medical training institutions for females will be attached to each district and tehsil hospital and facilities for the training of female teachers will be expanded in all districts to meet the large demand for these personnel, particularly in rural areas.

### 13. Controlling Inflation

Inflation has become one of the most serious problems for the common man, since the prices of most essential items have gone up from 80 to 150 percent in the past 8 years. This is partly the result of a liquidity driven and consumption based growth strategy under which the unprecedented inflow of external resources after 9/11 has gone into real estate, the stock market and large scale consumer financing by the Banks. At the same time, the relative neglect of agriculture, created serious shortages of different commodities at different times in the country, and did not allow adequate supply response to the growing demand created by excess liquidity.

PML(N) will tackle this back-breaking problem through a multi pronged strategy by:

- Giving top priority to the agriculture sector and within agriculture to high value and minor crops, like fruits, vegetables, pulses, vegetable oil and spices.
- Improving the post harvest, marketing storage and transport systems for these crops to reduce crop losses and ensure reasonable prices in different parts of the country.
- Expanding processing facilities for high value crops to even out seasonal fluctuations in prices.
- PML(N) will pay special attention to food prices, which have more than doubled in the past 8 years to ensure that items like wheat, rice, sugar and edible oils are available to the common man at reasonable prices.
- PML(N) will also adopt a pro-poor and inclusive growth strategy to increase the incomes of poor people by diverting resources from the consumption to investment through appropriate fiscal and other policies.



#### 14. Agricultural and Rural Development

Pakistan Muslim League (N) believes that prosperous agriculture is the real basis of national prosperity and diversification of the rural economy by expanding non farm rural employment is critical for the alleviation of poverty. To accelerate the pace of agricultural and rural development, the Pakistan Muslim League (N) shall:

- Turn agriculture into a fully viable economic industry by changing the policy framework and terms of trade in favour of agriculture.
- Focus on the small farmers as the real back bone of the rural economy and assure his access to knowledge, inputs and markets. Development of the livestock sector will be given high priority.
- Revitalize the cooperative movement to meet the real needs of the rural population by setting up agri service corporations with majority equity of the poor and managed by professional managers.
- Reform the agricultural credit system to ensure that at least 50% of the total is provided to the small farmers and land owners are able to obtain credit on the basis of the market value of the land rather than outdated produce index units.
- Adjust support prices for major crops in line with increasing domestic costs and international price trends.
- Move rapidly towards national self-sufficiency in oil seeds.
- Convert Pakistan into a large net exporter of food and high-value crops and remove restrictions on agricultural exports.
- Building consensus on the basis of the 1991 Water Accord on the distribution of Indus System to allow new water projects to be undertaken and extension of irrigation facilities to additional areas.
- Ensure full utilization of available water resources by expanding the on-farm water management programme.
- Initiate schemes for crop insurance through private insurance companies to protect the farmer against the vagaries of weather.



- Encourage ecologically sound development policies to preserve and develop the country's natural and forest resources to counteract the impact of global warming.
- Provide incentives for farmers to adopt social forestry on a commercial scale rather than depend on restrictive laws for this purpose particularly in border areas.
- Expand the programme to fight the cancer of water-logging and salinity.
- A major programme of aquifer recharge in arid and semi arid areas of Cholistan, Thar and Balochistan to ensure that water flow from tubewells installed in these areas can be sustained.
- Immediate updating of the revenue and property records using Information Technology will be undertaken. Based on the information so generated 'benamis' can be done away with property rights of female members protected and access to credit by the poor assured.
- Policy shift in agriculture from commodity based agriculture to product based agriculture. As an example 22 products can be produced from corn.
- All agricultural research organizations will be completely revamped to ensure that the benefits of research actually reach the farmers.
- Agricultural education in general and curriculum of agriculture universities in particular will be modernized.
- Mafias and monopolies in case of major agriculture products will be done away with by putting in place appropriate agricultural marketing strategies.

Under its land reform programme, PML(N) will reclaim and irrigate additional land for allotment to landless haris and tenants. It will also undertake a land consolidation programme to create viable units for modern agriculture.

## **15. Industrial Development**

The manufacturing sector in Pakistan is in a state of crisis because of rising costs of utilities and credit and low labour productivity. Its industrial structure is stuck in low value sectors and its ability to compete is shrinking. The survival of any nation in today's world depends upon its ability to absorb the technological progress of this age and improve its



competitive edge. Planned industrial development along with sustained progress in agriculture must be the two important pillars of our economic policy.

To transform Pakistan rapidly into a modern, industrial society the Pakistan Muslim League (N) will extend in addition to existing tax holiday facilities a complete tax holiday to all new industries for the first three years after they go into production, to promote a major explosion in industrial investment and employment.

Industrial growth is essentially linked with the development of infrastructure facilities. We pledge to introduce immediate measures to remove existing imbalances by adopting the following specific measures:

- Provide the full energy needs of an expanding industrial sector through maximum exploitation of domestic sources of energy namely coal, gas and hydro to reduce the country's dependence on imported energy, combined with measure for the conservation of energy and more efficient use of energy.
- Provide improved means of communications including telecommunications and port facilities to meet the growing needs of our industry.
- Improve the transportation systems in major industrial zones and urban centers and complete the network of motorways initiated by the PML(N) government in the 1990's.
- Chambers of Commerce and Industry will be encouraged to develop industrial zones in suitable locations with access to as for electricity generation.
- Industrial estates, equipped with electricity, gas, telephone, and sewerage will be developed, especially in backward areas and along the motorways, for the convenience of domestic and overseas investors. Efforts will be made to put in place standard factory buildings ready for occupation, without any waiting period. Multinational companies with expertise in the field will be invited to develop infrastructure facilities in collaboration with local companies.
- Streamline the procedure for industrial sanctions and other facilities required in line with the principle of "one window facility".



- Improve the system of industrial credit and enable land owners to borrow funds on the basis of the market value of agricultural land and rural property.

## 16. Women

In Islam, women enjoy place of honor and dignity that is unparalleled in history. The talents of both men and women are acknowledged equally in Islam. It is for the same reason that acquiring knowledge has been ordained for both equally. PML-N shall:

- Ensure respect, dignity, and protection granted by Islam to women.
- Promote participation of women in national development and their social, political and economic empowerment.
- Give preference to women teachers in primary education.
- Promote female education and health care programs to overcome gender gaps.
- Effective representation of women in all key policy/decision making bodies shall be ensured.
- Special legislation on violence against women and child abuse shall be enacted.
- Micro credit for female borrowers will be expanded substantially as a part of the process of their empowerment.

## 17. Youth

Youth is Pakistan's future. More than 52 percent of our population is less than 19 years of age. PML-N believes that it is the youth, which can change the destiny of the nation.

- Youth training program shall be started to create 100,000 positions for apprenticeship in trade and industry. These opportunities shall be created in collaboration with the private sector.
- Self-employment loans shall be extended to those who complete training/apprenticeship.
- Inter-province visits of youth shall be organized.
- Youth shall be provided special sports facilities in all educational institutions.
- Anti-addiction campaign shall be launched to stop youth from drugs abuse.

## **18. Labour**

No economy can prosper without fair and equitable treatment of its work force. PML-N developed a Labour friendly policy during its earlier tenure. It shall be continued with special attention to the following measures:

- Safety at work and proper compensation for industrial injuries shall be legislated.
- Total prohibition of child labour through effective monitoring and strict enforcement of law shall be ensured.
- Laws against bonded labour and unpaid labour shall be strengthened and effectively enforced.
- Quality of labour force shall be improved through technical training and apprenticeship.
- Parks / community centers shall be developed near labour colonies.
- Incentives shall be given to employers for offering scholarships for the talented children of workers.

## **19. Minorities**

Minorities are an integral part of our nation as announced by the founder of Pakistan Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah. An Islamic society is obliged to protect the social, religious, and economic interests of minorities. PML-N shall steadfastly guard these interests and ensure their absolute and fundamental rights of freedom, security, equal opportunity, and equality before law.

- A commission shall be set up to look into complaints of religious discrimination.
- Scholarships for higher education shall be offered for talented children of minorities from low income families.
- Minorities shall be integrated in the mainstream of national development through active participation at different levels.

## **20. National Security and Foreign Policy**

The independence and sovereignty of the country and the freedom of its people will always be the supreme guiding principle in the conduct of the country's foreign policy. It



will, therefore, be formulated and executed in a manner to strengthen the country's sovereignty as well as to ensure the well-being of its citizens.

To this end, the highest priority would be accorded to strengthening the nation's defenses, while promoting peace and stability in the country and the region.

Pakistan succeeded in acquiring nuclear and missile capability in the teeth of stiff opposition from outside powers. This is a trust of the people of Pakistan and we remain committed to preserve, protect and enhance it. No proposal or initiative would ever be considered if it compromises, weakens, reduces or diminishes this capability.

While actively supporting all UN and global initiatives for curbing the menace of international terrorism, Pakistan must seek to promote a just and fair international political and economic order, based on the Charter of the United Nations UN and the principles of peaceful co-existence.

Every effort would be made to resolve the issue of Jammu and Kashmir, in accordance with the provisions of the relevant UN resolutions and in consonance with the aspirations of the people of the territory for their inherent right of self determination.

A peaceful settlement of all outstanding issues with India, in a spirit of fairness and equity would be accorded special priority by the Party.

Unity and solidarity amongst the member states of the Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC) would be promoted and efforts made to strengthen the effectiveness and credibility of the organization. Special attention will be accorded to strengthening relations with the brotherly Islamic states, given our historic commitment to promoting fraternal relations with them.

China has been a time tested friend of Pakistan. Every effort would be made to strengthen and enhance this relationship, so as to make it truly strategic, by imparting greater substance and depth to it.

The proposed Cabinet Committee on Defence and National Security will be fully utilized to establish political and civilian control over foreign policy. The foreign policy will be re-oriented in such a manner that there is greater commercial and economic content in our ties with friendly powers.



As a developing, non-aligned country, Pakistan's foreign policy shall endeavor to strengthen its relations, particularly in the economic sector, with other developing countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America.

Special measure would be taken to promote the global trading regimes, with emphasis on protecting the interests and requirements of developing countries.

## **21. Our Vision for the Future**

Pakistan today stands at a cross road. The beginning of twenty first century marks a new landmark in the history of human civilization. If we act together, a new history can be written. It is time to look forward and harness the nation's positive energies. The Pakistan Muslim League (N) will seek national reconciliation, national dialogue, and national consensus on the future agenda for Pakistan. PML(N) believes that besides politicians, the judiciary, the bureaucracy, businessmen, media, professionals, ulema, farmers, workers, youth, women, and civil society are stake holders of Pakistan's future. PML(N) possesses both the experience and competence to steer the country towards economic prosperity. It will seek broad based consultation and participation of all sectors of society in implementing its vision for creating a society with democratic institutions, the rule of law and prosperity for all, regardless of gender, religion, region, or language. This is our "Pledge with the Nation".

## The Manifesto Committee

The Policy Planning Committee (Think Tank) of PML(N) served as the Manifesto Committee for the preparation of this Manifesto:

- |                                  |                  |
|----------------------------------|------------------|
| 1. Mr. Sartaj Aziz               | Chairman         |
| 2. Mr. Ahsan Iqbal               | Member           |
| 3. Senator Mehtab Ahmad Khan     | Member           |
| 4. Senator Sadia Abbasi          | Member           |
| 5. Khawaja Muhammad Asif, MNA    | Member           |
| 6. Mr. Parvez Malik, MNA         | Member           |
| 7. Rana Tanwir Hussain           | Member           |
| 8. Engineer Khurram Dastgir Khan | Member           |
| 9. Sultan Ali Chaudhry           | Member           |
| 10. Khawaja Qutbuddin            | Member           |
| 11. Mr. Siddique-ul-Farooque     | Member           |
| 12. Mr. A.Z.K. Sherdil           | Member           |
| 13. Mr. Saeed Mehdi              | Member           |
| 14. Mr. Tariq Fatemi             | Member           |
| 15. Mr. Farogh Naveed            | Member           |
| 16. Mr. Ghafoor Mirza            | Member/Secretary |



**Appendix 2**

*Election Manifesto*

Pakistan People's Party


*General Elections 2008*

*PPP 2008*

# Towards peace and prosperity in Pakistan



Manifesto 2008



*“We will build a society in which the old values of greed and advancement will be replaced by a common concern for the welfare of the whole community.”*

**Quaid-e-Azam Shaheed Zulfikar Ali Bhutto,  
Founder Chairman of Pakistan Peoples Party,  
President and Prime Minister of Pakistan**

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# PART I

Manifesto 2008

## PREAMBLE

This Manifesto is our sacred pledge to the people of Pakistan, and most importantly to the children of Pakistan who are our future.

Pakistan faces a choice between Quaid-e-Azam's vision of a vibrant, tolerant and strong federation, and obscurantism and fragmentation

Pakistan faces a choice between Quaid-e-Azam's dream of a just society, and growing inequalities

Pakistan faces a choice between hope and despair

Pakistan faces a choice between strength and uncertainty

Pakistan faces a choice between moving forward and looking back

Pakistan faces a choice between progress for all and prosperity for a few

We choose Quaid-e-Azam's vision of tolerance, vibrance and harmony among provinces

We choose Quaid-e-Azam's dream of a just society

We chose hope

We chose strength

We choose moving forward

We choose progress for all

## Basic Principles of the Party

The first principle of the Party is: Islam is our Faith. Islam teaches brotherhood, love and peace. Our Faith places a responsibility on each citizen to reach out in a spirit of accommodation and tolerance to all religions and sects and to treat people of all faiths with respect, enabling them to enjoy religious freedom and equality before the law.

The message of Islam is the message of Peace. It is a message of brotherhood and tolerance. These are symbolised in the words and verses of Data Sahib, Shah Abdul Latif of Bhattai, Baba Farid Ganj Shakar and Lal Shahbaz Qalander.

The sufi saints adopted a life of simple living and high thinking. It's time we did the same. By no means did they use or preach the use of force.

The PPP commits itself to religious tolerance. Religious beliefs of individual citizens have little

to do with the business of the state, as the Founder of the Nation declared in his inaugural address to the Constituent Assembly on 11 August 1947.

The second principle of the PPP is: Democracy is our Politics. The PPP's commitment to freedom and fundamental rights, including freedom from hunger and want, is written in the blood of its martyrs and in the red marks of lashes on the back of its workers. It is written in the suffering and sacrifice of Quaid-e-Azam, who faced the gallows refusing to bow before tyranny, defending the human rights of our citizens to the last breath.

In every age, including today, the PPP leaders and office bearers have been behind bars, in exile, facing political persecution, defending their Party at great personal cost to their families and themselves.

The third PPP principle is: Social Democracy is our Economy. The PPP aims at creating a just and equitable society with equal opportunity for all its citizens. The growing gap between the rich

# PART I

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and the poor must be bridged by supporting the underprivileged, the downtrodden and the discriminated. The PPP is proud of being the voice of the poor, the working classes and the middle classes. Our policies, while dedicated to the underprivileged, created conditions that enabled the business and trading classes to compete in the open market. The Party will foster a social market economy, a partnership of the public and private sectors, predicated upon a synthesis of economic liberalism with a strong social democratic agenda of State responsibilities for satisfying basic human needs: full employment, national health, universal education, water supply and sanitation.

The PPP reiterates its firm commitment to provide Food, Clothing and Shelter (*Roti, Kapra Aur Makaan*) to every poor family in Pakistan through our unique emphasis on full employment. The PPP is the only party with a coherent vision of a welfare state for Pakistan where market forces are balanced with safety nets for the underprivileged and the poor.

The final principle of the PPP is All Power to the People. Only the people have the right on earth to determine their destiny and chart the course of their Nation. All organs of State must be answerable to the Court of the people in an election or through their legitimately elected representatives in Parliament.

To the people of Pakistan we make the following Promises:

- We Promise to rid Pakistan of violence, bigotry and terror
- We Promise the youth of Pakistan gainful employment, hope and opportunity
- We Promise to lower inflation
- We Promise to provide quality education and health care, and clean drinking water, to the masses
- We Promise to bring progress to the doorstep of the workers, farmers and small businesses
- We Promise to protect and support the disadvantaged and the vulnerable
- We Promise to make Pakistan a business-friendly country
- We Promise to give high priority to empowerment of women and ensure their equal rights
- We Promise to put Pakistan on a sustainable high growth path
- We Promise to ensure sound macro-economic policies
- We Promise to ensure a strong Defence
- We Promise to ensure that energy shortages are eliminated
- We Promise to protect the Environment
- We Promise to ensure a world class irrigation system and sound use of scarce water
- We Promise to enhance Provincial Autonomy
- We Promise to put in place a citizen-centric government
- Finally, We Promise Good Governance



# PART I

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## State of the Nation

Under the PPP Government, the country was hailed as an emerging capital market of the world. Since the dismissal of the PPP Government in 1996, Pakistan has been associated with terrorism, militancy and extremism. The crisis that began with the dismissal of the PPP government can only end with the return of the PPP, and through the masses, to government.

During the first Decade of the 21st Century, the country has suffered:

- Dangerous increase in terrorism and suicide bombings
- Very high levels of poverty, unemployment, and inflation
- Failed poverty reduction program, and severe exclusion of poor from the benefits of growth and progress
- Undermined national integration with the increased level of discord among Provinces
- Abuse of institutions and the judiciary
- Obscurantism and hate among religious and ethnic groups
- Huge power shortages and increasing water scarcity
- Increasing crime and suicides

The present regime has eroded all national institutions. Its repression and oppression have created a culture of lawlessness and tyranny, inflicting misery in the lives of the people of Pakistan. There is no justice for the weak and the poor. The youth are unemployed, the farmers

neglected, labour retrenched, stock markets manipulated, public sector units plundered, national resources squandered, the media muzzled, civil society attacked, judiciary crushed, and political leaders exiled, imprisoned and maligned.

Different areas of the country have been parcelled out to violent militant groups whose influence is spreading like a cancer throughout society.

To stop the slide into lawlessness, extremism, anarchy, chaos, poverty and hunger, the restoration of genuine democracy, through free and fair elections is essential. The PPP symbolises the empowerment of the people of Pakistan.

The PPP governments served the people. The World praised its energy program as a model for the developing countries. The World Health Organisation gave the PPP government a Gold Medal in recognition of its contribution to the health of its people. The International Labour Organisation noted that the largest job-generation in the history of Pakistan took place under the PPP.

As the voice of the people, the PPP is viewed with hostility by the anti-people forces who have rigged elections and destabilized governments to seize power and exploit the People and the Provinces of the country.

The social and living standards of the people are pathetic. While poverty decreased under the PPP government, poverty has increased over the years, as reported by the Economic Survey of Pakistan 2007.

Quaid-e-Awam made education compulsory for children, and built schools, colleges and universities. He took the literacy rate up to 26% where it stagnated for a decade. Then Mohtarma

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Benazir Bhutto was elected and the literacy rate doubled to over 50%. After the dismissal of the PPP government in 1996, education once again stagnated.

## What is to be done?

The PPP promises change through

- Employment
- Education
- Energy
- Environment
- Equality

The PPP believes in every individual's right to food, clothing, housing and an adequate livelihood. Our commitment to the people of Pakistan is that their basic rights are our responsibility. The Party has, and will always, strive for the rights of the People.

*The PPP slogan is Ilm, Roshni Sab Ko Kaam, Roti Kapra Aur Makaan, Maang Raha Hai Har Insaan.*

## Why choose the PPP?

It is not just an election between the PPP and other parties. It is a clash of sharply competing values and ideologies.

The PPP is a Party truly born out of the hearts and minds of the workers, peasants, small business, and the vast majority of citizens who support the Islamic spirit of tolerance and social justice, and not a Party that is born out of backroom deals in agency offices.

We are the Party that derives its strength from each and every section of a pluralistic society

We are the Party whose philosophy is rooted in combining sustainable economic growth with

social justice

We are the Party that recognizes that this is a moment to consolidate all the forces that subscribe to the true spirit of Islam, and fundamental values of federalism and democracy.

## The Mission Before Us

The PPP's mission is to transform the lives of our people from one of despair and poverty into one of hope and opportunity through employment, education, energy, environment and equality.

We have a clear and coherent vision of what needs to be done and will muster all the resources to get it done.

We will take a new approach marked by a determination to challenge the threats and not ignore them.

We renew our commitment to build a hopeful future for the poverty stricken.

We will strive for a Pakistan where all, rather than some, live in comfort and plenty.

We will strive for a Pakistan where everyone is included in the expanding circle of development. We will, with vigour and determination, assure basic needs for all citizens

We will strive to have a responsive, responsible and representative government at all levels.

Social and Economic Justice is the defining objective of the PPP's policy framework. We will reduce social and economic inequalities between various classes, between Provinces, within Provinces, and Genders, establishing a just society.

National policy frameworks have, to date,

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accorded primacy to economic policy goals, with social policy goals not pursued aggressively. Even within economic policy-making, Employment has not been a major objective. Resultantly, social and human development indicators have continued to lag behind woefully. The very objective of Development has remained unfulfilled.

The Pakistan Peoples Party proposes to reverse the order of priorities; whereby social policy objectives drive economic policy. Development shall be measured in terms of the welfare of the people, rather than in terms of financial statistics

that do not reflect the state of the nation. Employment and Social and Human Development shall be specific targets in policy-making and economic policy measures will be geared to achieve social goals.

The twin menace of Inflation and Unemployment are to be specifically tackled.

The PPP will help individuals set up small businesses and provide the framework for a vibrant middle class. It will address the basic needs of low-income persons.



## GROWTH WITH EQUITY

PPP governments since 1967 gave birth to boom economies. In its last tenure, the PPP tripled economic growth rates, doubled taxation receipts and took agricultural growth rates from zero to seven percent annually. It reduced the budget deficit and paid off principal debt while investing in a massive socio-economic program. The PPP, as a modern and moderate Party, attracted four times more direct private sector investment in three years than all of Pakistan's previous governments, creating jobs and wealth for the people of Pakistan.

The PPP computerized the State Bank of Pakistan and the Stock Market, introduced the National Identity Cards scheme and deregulated, decentralized and privatised the economy. The PPP power projects and mass telephone system enabled ordinary people to set up businesses when previously power shutdowns and twenty year delays for telephones prevented them from success in private initiatives.

Open Minds, Open Markets, Open Opportunities is our slogan as we change IOUs into MOUs. We believe that markets, not missiles, are the measure of might.

The PPP Government will accelerate growth, for only with high growth can the social policy objectives of poverty reduction and high employment be achieved.

The key pillars of the equitable and pro-poor growth agenda comprise: Rapid Economic Growth; Combating Unemployment; Targeted Poverty Programs; Just Labour Policies; Private Sector as Engine of Growth; Accelerating Agricultural and Rural Growth, and Ensuring Water Security and Energy Infrastructure.

## Rapid Economic Growth

PPP will be a fiscally responsible government, ensuring that taxpayers get their full value for the taxes they pay.

### A Sound Debt Policy

We will ensure that we do not burden future generations with excessive debt. With that in mind, we will ensure that domestic and external debt is maintained at sustainable levels.

PPP was the first government in the history of Pakistan to retire Pakistan's principal debt through the proceeds of privatisation. The PPP will stop raising domestic and foreign debt for wasteful projects and use the fiscal space provided by the rescheduling of loans and the international assistance for fighting the war against terrorism for the national benefit. Where needed, the PPP will aggressively seek to use the fiscal space to retire expensive domestic and foreign debt. The aim of the PPP is to make Pakistan into a self respecting, self reliant nation whose citizens are honoured universally.

### Containing Inflation

High Inflation is a major economic problem of Pakistan, especially hurting the low income groups. At the macro level, containing inflation will be achieved through prudent Monetary and Fiscal Policies. In addition, the following specific measures will be considered:

- Special steps to increase production of food grains, including creating an enabling environment so that greater private sector credit flows towards these sectors.
- Enhancing competition, in both manufacturing and domestic trade, and reducing supply chain constraints so that costs of essential goods are



reduced. To this end, the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP) will be strengthened to unleash competitive forces, and aggressively combat monopolies and cartels

- Create effective institutions at Federal, Provincial and District levels to monitor supply positions of essential commodities to ensure prompt remedial measures.
- Maintain strategic stocks of wheat and other essential commodities to overcome shortages, while ensuring that fiscal costs are manageable and waste/corruption is eliminated.

### Establishing a Fair Tax System

The Party is determined to overhaul the taxation system and bring about changes which will lead to fair practices, rational tax slab, curtailment of discretionary powers and growth of business and industry. The tax system will be made taxpayer-friendly so that voluntary compliance is enhanced.

The PPP commits itself to rationalizing the taxation system so that the burden of tax on the poor and low income groups is reduced, while at the same time Tax/GDP ratio is increased. PPP recognizes that Tax/GDP needs to be increased to provide adequate resources for providing good quality services to all people and for Pakistan to have the necessary infrastructure to sustain high growth. To that end, bold initiatives will be taken emphasising better collection and expanding the tax net, especially to those that can afford to pay.

### Combating Unemployment

The PPP will put in place bold and innovative programs to create jobs in the public and private sector. PPP fully recognizes that high growth will be the main driver of Full Employment. At the same time, the PPP will establish programs to help

those who are unable to find gainful employment.

A four-pronged strategy will be used to provide income earning opportunities to the poor as well as unemployed youth.

The strategy comprises:

#### Public Works Programme (PWP)

A labour-intensive PWP will be put in place so that there is guaranteed employment, of at least one year, to one working member of the poorest 25 per cent families of Pakistan.

The PWP will expand labour-intensive civil works in infrastructure, sanitation, road works, water and irrigation; with a view to providing large-scale employment in rural and urban areas. These schemes will be community-driven and managed.

#### Literacy and Health Corps (LHC)

Unemployment amongst educated youth has assumed alarming proportions. With twin objectives of providing short-term employment to educated youth, and to assist with social policy goals, a Literacy and Health Corps Scheme will be established. Under the scheme, there will be an employment guarantee of two years to all youth completing Intermediate, Graduation and Post-Graduation in a given year. A large proportion of the jobs will be in the social sectors (elementary education and basic health-care) and will form part of the PPP's programme for the expansion of social services. This will constitute a basic literacy and health corps in the service of the Nation.

#### Vocational Training

The PPP will put in place programs, which offer the youth Vocational Education and Technical Training in those service sectors where there is a shortage in the market.



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### Microfinance

The PPP government under Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto introduced microfinance institutions in Pakistan to provide self employment. This programme will be doubled. Appropriate micro-finance policy and institutional reforms will be put in place so that Commercial Banks, Micro-Finance institutions and NGOs aggressively increase their outreach to meet the goal of 5 million beneficiaries on a sustainable basis.

### Targeted Poverty Programs

The PPP is committed to assist those that are bypassed by growth and development, especially the vulnerable and disadvantaged. It will put in place a comprehensive Targeted Anti-Poverty Program, comprising the following strands:

- Conditional Cash Transfers, which transfer cash subsidies to poor families in return for sending children (especially girls) to school and getting children inoculated.
- Strengthening and expansion of social protection programs, such as Zakat, Social Security, Baitul Mal, worker-retraining and mobility
- Special Program for the least developed (lowest 50%) Districts to improve access to social services
- The PPP will look after the senior citizens of our land; amongst other measures, we will provide financial support to all Senior Citizens above the age of 65 years who have no source of income.
- The PPP will establish a database of the poorest 25% of families, so that these programs can be properly targeted.

### Just Labour Policies

For high levels of Employment, equitable growth is crucial and Pakistan needs to have a labour policy that is in line with the ILO standards.

To protect the basic rights of workers, the PPP will initiate the following policies:

- The Industrial Relations Ordinance 2002 will be reviewed to bring it in conformity with the ILO Conventions, ratified by Pakistan, and Fundamental Rights guaranteed by the Constitution of Pakistan.
- The EOBI and other labour welfare programs will be strengthened and Public-Private Partnerships established, so that labour and their families have access to quality education, health care and affordable housing.
- Review of the President's Special Powers of Removal from Service Ordinance 2000 with regards to trade union activities.
- Elimination of child labour, forced labour and bonded labour, and education and rehabilitation of those children once withdrawn from the workplaces.
- Enforcement of statutory labour laws, through effective inspection systems.
- Regularly holding National Tripartite Labour Conference to formulate labour, economic and social policies and to devise mechanisms for their effective implementation with a view to promoting social justice, decent work and raising the dignity of labour.
- Developing a safety culture for making work safe and prevention of accidents at workplaces and occupational diseases of workers.

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- Minimum wage will be enhanced to meet the escalating needs of labour.

### Private Sector as Engine of Growth

The PPP is committed to ensuring that Private Sector and export-led development will be the main engine of growth. The government will embark on an aggressive Investment Climate Reforms Programme to establish a favourable and enabling environment so that all businesses, foreign and domestic, flourish. The Party will improve the investment climate especially for Small and Micro-Businesses, initiate programs to reduce cost of doing business and increase Pakistan's competitiveness, streamline government business interface through aggressive deregulation, and seek Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in export manufacturing.

The Pakistan Peoples Party will confine the role of the Public Sector in Health, Education and Infrastructure. The role of the State will be restricted only to those areas where the Private Sector is not forthcoming.

A special program will be developed to attract the financial resources and special skills of Pakistani Diaspora and overseas workers, with a view to contribute to the national development efforts. Privatisation was introduced by the first government of Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, elected in 1988. This will be continued in a transparent manner, ensuring that labour is a beneficiary of the process. The PPP will vigorously pursue a policy of diversification of industrial exports and manufactured products. The emphasis will be on adding value to primary products and raw materials. The PPP Government will provide market-based and fiscally affordable incentives to develop non-traditional exports.

We will also provide incentives to raise the level of technology in our industries

An important pillar of our private sector development will be an aggressive program to foster and encourage Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs), recognizing that these provide the bulk of employment. Programs and Policies will be put in place to reduce the regulatory burden on SMEs and enhance the voluntary flow of credit to these businesses.

### Accelerating Agriculture and Rural Growth

Agriculture is the mainstay of the National Economy of Pakistan. As a farmer-friendly party, the PPP will help farmers boost production and obtain fair prices. Farmers got the best prices when the PPP was in government. The key to agricultural exportable surpluses is to augment the output per acre and productivity per farmer

Aggressive Agriculture and Rural Development will be another central pillar of our growth and poverty reduction strategy. Our efforts will be focused on improving productivity and crop diversification, agricultural markets and exports, and special programs for small farmers to reduce risks faced by them. Moreover, with advances in technology the desert can be made green.

The Pakistani peasant, mired in poverty and debt has to be rescued from the morass of despair by a bold policy which ensures that the private sector provides key inputs and services -such as credit, fertilizer, pesticides, extension, marketing, seeds, tractors-in a timely manner and at competitive prices.

Special attention would be given to encouraging Banks to expand rural lending, while maintaining sound credit policies.

Special capacity-building programs for agricultural support services will be put in place to revitalize key institutions of research and extension.

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A sustainable program of farm to market roads will be put in place to ensure that perishable and valuable agricultural products like fruits; vegetables and milk can reach markets to enable better incomes for farmers and for the benefit of urban consumers.

Peoples Party commits itself to providing all surplus electric power during off peak hours for tube-wells free of cost

### Ensuring Water Security

The PPP government is committed to ensuring water security for irrigation and availability of clean drinking water

Pakistan is now a water scarce country. Scarcity will increase with time, with a burgeoning population and climate change. The PPP will put in place a bold and comprehensive program to ensure water security for future generations. Key elements of the strategy would consist of: water conservation, additional storages, farmer-managed irrigation systems, rehabilitation of the ageing canal and barrage system, an effective drainage system, enhancing water productivity, strengthening water rights and protecting the lower delta eco-systems.

In respect of the Arid Zones, a program will be developed to harness water from rain and flash floods, promote drip irrigation and crops that need less water.

Clean drinking water is a basic need. The PPP shall create a legal framework to ensure availability of clean drinking water for all.

### Ensuring Energy Infrastructure

The consumption of electricity is an index of economic prosperity. Pakistan's per capita electricity consumption is about one tenth of the world average. The last power station established in the public sector was the PPP's Ghazi Barotha 1450MW hydro electric power project which went online in

2004. The PPP also obtained a 500 MW nuclear power station at Chasma. The PPP government inducted over 5000MW of private power generation, ending shutdowns. Now Pakistan needs another 8000 MWs by 2010 to meet the energy requirements of the people. This will be met by utilising coal, solar, hydro and wind power.

The PPP is committed to establishing a comprehensive and credible program that ensures Energy Security and Adequacy of Supply. Key elements would include: maximum use of indigenous water and hydrocarbon resources, energy conservation, proper pricing to ensure proper use while protecting the life line consumers.

Specific actions and interventions will include encouraging and attracting private sector energy projects, fast tracking of exploration and development of indigenous hydro carbon resources, including the Thar coal project, accelerating development of alternative energy, including wind and solar energy, reviving the Keti Bunder project, establishing an energy corridor from Central Asia to Balochistan, and a sustainable program to bring energy to the doorstep of the poor.

### Fisheries

The PPP will establish programs that will provide training and micro-credit facilities to the fisher folks and ensure proper facilities, infrastructure to increase export potential of this sector in keeping with international standards.

### Growth-Inducing Transport Infrastructure Development

The PPP will develop and implement a national transport development program, to sustain high growth, improve access to rural areas and to reduce internal logistics costs and downtime, especially for exports. In particular, it would establish a world class North South Transport corridor.

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## MEETING BASIC NEEDS

Empowerment and Social Change will be another cornerstone of the PPP's Agenda for change. Using the full resources of the Government, Private Sector and Community Organizations, a social transformation program will be ushered.

### Education

The Peoples Party built 48,000 schools in its two tenures between 1988 to 1996; it recruited and trained 100,000 teachers in three years alone, thereby doubling literacy.

The PPP increased the education budget by many billions in its last two recent tenures of power, a testimony to the top priority it gives to education.

The PPP commits to its sons and daughters of Pakistan an education system that enables a brighter future than that of their parents so that they can hold their heads high in the comity of Nations.

Quaid-e-Awam introduced free and compulsory primary education, promoted Centres of Excellence, created Institutes of Science and Technology and took Pakistan to the cutting edge of Nuclear Physics, establishing centres of Nuclear Medicine. He set up a chain of new Universities, Medical and Engineering Colleges in the neglected areas as a harbinger to a Muslim Renaissance.

The PPP will focus on providing computers progressively for every Secondary School and College in Pakistan. The Party will install at least one computer in each School so that the new generation can enter the digital age.

To universalize basic education, every child in government primary schools will be provided a stipend.

Universal enrolment by 2015 of all children between the ages of 5 to 10 is the target of the Party.

The Pakistan Peoples Party believes in providing quality higher education in all regions of Pakistan through both Public and Private Sector Colleges, Universities and Institutes. The quality of existing Colleges and Universities will be improved and the number of Public Universities and Colleges, particularly in Science and Engineering, Medicine and Agriculture will be increased. Funding will be regulated and monitored through Quality Assurance Boards of the Higher Education Commission. Funding to Private Sector Universities will be enhanced through a competitive programme.

### Madrassah Reforms

We are in the process of sowing the seeds of national disintegration of a new generation of alienated young people bred on hate and paranoia. Educational extremism thus represents the greatest danger to Quaid-e-Azam's vision of the federation.

The funding of groups during Afghan Jihad of the '80s has led to the rise of political madrassahs. Many of them are not schools but irregular army recruitment centres for militants as well as arm depots holding rocket launchers and Kalashnikov guns. No militia will be allowed to seek refuge under the name of madrassahs for militant activities. Madrassahs will be reformed to be Madrassahs that impart knowledge to children

The PPP had planned to build '*Apna Ghar*' (Our Home) as a free boarding school for socially or economically disadvantaged children. The plan initially adopted by the PPP in the budget of 1996, but dropped by subsequent governments, will be revived.



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### Student Militancy

The PPP will lift the ban on Student Unions as it has done in all its tenures. It will not permit arms on campus.

### Health of the Nation

All PPP Governments have made health a high priority, believing that the welfare of People flows from investing in the health of the people. Basic Principles of the Health Policy are: First, the Guarantee of Access to a Doctor for every Citizen of Pakistan via a National Health Service; Second, the Prevention of Disease; Third, the Guarantee that Affordable Medicines are available to the sick and needy; Fourth, the provision of good Medical Education and Training.

The Lady Health Workers (LHW) programme initiated by the PPP government has been the most successful initiative in the preventive health sector in the last two decades; it increased contraceptive prevalence and reduced mother and child mortality ratios. The PPP will further consolidate this programme and take the number of LHWs up to 200,000 in the next 5 years, extending it to *Katchi Abadis* in urban areas. A scheme for inducting 10,000 male health workers will be introduced in parts of NWFP and Balochistan.

The party will initiate a media campaign on various aspects of preventive health measures to increase awareness on health, safe motherhood, hygiene and nutrition.

Access to quality drugs has eluded the poor citizens of this country. The Pakistan Peoples Party will initiate a pro-people Drugs policy for the Public Sector Health System and maintain prices within the reach of the common man for the WHO- approved list of 300 essential drugs.

The PPP will introduce competitive measures to ensure parity with regional price levels.

As in other Muslim Countries, including Iran, Bangladesh and Indonesia, Pakistan aims to protect the health and care of both Mother and Child through Planned Parenthood.

### Census

The PPP will hold a census every ten years and ensure that the Census results are accurate, enabling resource distribution equitably in the country.

### Human Settlements

Historically, Town Planning is a concept developed by the ancient Indus Valley Civilization. To keep up with its glorious legacy, the PPP will invest in providing clean drinking water, sanitation and planning.

The Pakistan Peoples Party will set up a Human Settlements Commission to prepare a Master Plan of Human Settlements for the Whole Country including the needs for housing, roads, parks and playgrounds.

The Pakistan Peoples Party will assist Provincial and District Governments with establishing liveable cities and human settlements. The urban degradation that is taking place will be reversed with the provision of resources and capacity support.

### Housing Policy

A house for every family is a key part of the PPP slogan *Maang Raha Hai Har Insaan, Roti Kapra Aur Makaan*.

A comprehensive and credible program will be developed and implemented to enable low and middle income families to own their own homes. Such a program will comprise releasing government urban land, changes in zoning and





land titling, changes in foreclosure laws, provision of long-term credit which is sustainable, and establishment of needed institutions, in the Private and Public Sector, to make the dream of home-ownership a reality for the masses.

## Empowerment of Women

The Pakistan Peoples Party has an unflinching commitment to the cause of Gender Equality ever since it was founded in 1967. It is also the only Party in Pakistan that is headed by a Woman. Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto was the first elected Woman Head of Government in the Muslim World.

- The Party shall enunciate a national employment policy for Women, facilitating job creation and Women's participation in the economy. The 10% affirmative action job quota for Women in public service initiated by Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto's government will be increased to 20%.
- Effective legislation to enable legal ownership of assets and resources for Women will be enacted to facilitate their financial independence.
- The Party will take institutional initiatives to prevent crimes against Women in the name of tribalism, such as honour-killings and forced marriages.
- Family Courts will be presided by Women Judges to hear Family Law Cases. Right of Maintenance and child custody according to law will be implemented.
- Women will be appointed to the superior judiciary.
- Ministry of Women Development will be part of important policy-making bodies to ensure that gender priorities are reflected in all policy initiatives.

## Human Rights

As the Party that introduced a Ministry for Human Rights, the PPP will respect the life, liberty, property, livelihood and right to freedom of association, expression and movement of every citizen. It will honour the International Human Rights Declaration in both letter and spirit. The PPP will protect the rights in particular of the weak and oppressed, the discriminated and the downtrodden.

## Minorities

To uplift and empower minorities, a job quota for minorities in the services of Pakistan, including the operational services like Army, Police, Intelligence Agencies, Judiciary and Foreign Affairs will be allocated.

An independent permanent National Commission for Religious Minorities will be instituted, with the powers of Tribunals which can entertain complaints and provide redress on urgent basis.

Minorities will be given administrative control of their places of worship and a person belonging to a minority group will be made head of the Evacuee Trust Property Board.

The statutes that discriminate against religious Minorities, and are sources of communal disharmony, will be reviewed.

## Information and Media

The Pakistan Peoples Party recognizes that a Free and Vibrant Press is the greatest guarantor against tyranny and oppression. In accordance with this principle, the PPP liberated the Press in 1988 by allowing free import of newsprint, the abolition of government permission to establish

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newspapers and journals, and by introducing Private Radio and Television Stations.

Each ministry will set up its own media cell to put across the point of view of the Ministry. Journalists from the private sector will be eligible for induction on contract basis and on competitive market rates.

A Press Complaints Commission will be established on the basis of the British system of Press Complaints.

The Private Sector will be allowed to freely establish television and radio stations subject to their operating within a legal framework. FM stations licenses will be given to the Political Parties.

### Information and Communication Technologies

The PPP heralded the information age into Pakistan with colour television, fax machines, e-mails and satellite television. It laid fibre optic lines in 1989 and digitalised telecommunications. In 1993, it began computer literacy programs to herald the computer literate generation. Software technology parks were to be established in the major cities by the PPP.

The PPP fully supports the United Nations Information and Communication Technology Task Force (UNICTF) goals. Working with the UN, the PPP will create an enabling environment to map UN's Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). We believe that ICTs play an important role in development, poverty reduction, empowering women, reducing gender gap and communicating and practicing democratic values. We will replicate the best practices in Pakistan and will develop a comprehensive e-Government Strategy.

The PPP will implement an ICT policy and program to bridge the digital divide and to enable

Pakistan to join the ranks of world leaders in IT.

A comprehensive program will include: expanding telecommunications bandwidth capacity, expand training institutions for IT professionals, promotion of IT and software exports.

### Science and Technology

The PPP gave the best science and technology institutions to the country. Science and Technology Hubs will be established in major urban areas, much like the science cities in the developed world.

### Culture

The Pakistan Peoples Party will promote National Heritage and Culture of Pakistan. We will increase funding for the Arts, and support artists and their institutions.

### Environment

We have inherited the earth to nourish and treasure, not to plunder and destroy.

The PPP will follow environment-friendly policies to build a cleaner, healthier environment for our children. Curriculum on environment will be introduced in schools.

The PPP supports the Kyoto protocol on climate change.

The PPP will accelerate programs which will ensure Clean Air, Land, and Water for All.

The PPP will introduce CNG units in major cities to reduce vehicular pollution.

The PPP will set up a new National Calamities and Disaster Management Authority and make the Pakistan Environmental Protection Agency (PEPA) an autonomous authority.

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## GOOD GOVERNANCE

### Magna Carta of Pakistan

The Pakistan Peoples Party reaffirms its commitments to implement the Charter of Democracy; the veritable Magna Carta of Pakistan.

As early as 1949, the Public Representatives Officers Disqualification Act (PRODA) was used for the ulterior purpose of driving out the stalwarts of Muslim Leaders from the arena of Politics. The scythe of the Electoral Bodies Disqualification Order of 1960 decapitated the entire Founding Fathers of Pakistan. Ziaul Haq promulgated the Martial Law Order 17 of 1977 in order to victimize and disqualify the leadership of the Pakistan Peoples Party. In the most heinous deed of our tormented political history, Ziaul Haq physically murdered his benefactor on April 4, 1979.

The so-called accountability measures since 1996 were used to incarcerate Senator Asif Ali Zardari for eight long years, although he and Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto were never sentenced for any crime. False cases were used in a conspiracy in an attempt to break their will to fight for the people of Pakistan and also to deceive the people of Pakistan about their legitimate democratic leadership.

The Supreme Court of Pakistan rightly observed in 1958: "When politics enters the Palace of Justice, Democracy, its cherished inmate, walks out of the backdoor. A Judge's duty in a given case is to adjudicate on the right or liability and this function he must discharge according to law. The Constitution entrusts the interests of the Country, in the appointment of a Prime Minister, to the members of the Parliament and if the country is ruined by the wrong choice of a Prime Minister, the responsibility is that of the people and their

representatives and not of the Judge. The Judge's duty is to administer the law and not to lay down the moral or political standards for the choice of a Prime Minister."

The Charter consists of the following 36 points in brief:

1. The 1973 Constitution as on 12 October 1999 shall be restored save for the provisions of Joint Electorates, reserved seats for Minorities and Women, lowering of the voting age to 18, and increase in seats in Parliament.
2. The appointment of Governors, three service Chiefs and the CJ SC shall be made by the Prime Minister who will be the Chief Executive.
3. The appointments of Judges to Superior Judiciary will be made with the advice and consent of a Joint Parliamentary Committee consisting of equal representatives of the Treasury and the Opposition on the recommendation of a Commission headed by former Chief Justice who has not taken oath under the PCO.
4. A Federal Constitutional Court with equal representation to each Federating Unit will resolve Constitutional issues.
5. The Concurrent list will be abolished.
6. Reserved seats for Women will be allocated in proportion to percentage of votes polled by each contesting Party.
7. The strength of the Senate will be increased.
8. FATA will be merged into NWFP in consultation with the Tribal Areas.
9. Northern Areas will be given a Special Status and Empowerment.
10. Local Body elections will be held on Party Basis.

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11. National Security Council will be abolished and replaced by Defence Committee headed by the Prime Minister.
12. The “ban” on Third term for Prime Minister will be scrapped.
13. Truth and Reconciliation Commission will be established.
14. Politically motivated NAB will be abolished and replaced by an Independent Accountability Commission whose Chairman will be appointed jointly by the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition with the advice and consent of Joint Parliamentary Committee with parity between Treasury and the Opposition parties.
15. The Media will have freedom of access to Information regulated by Law.
16. The Chairman of the Public Accounts Committee will be appointed by the respective Leaders of the Opposition in the House.
17. Nuclear Command and Control will be placed under the Defence Committee of the Cabinet.
18. The future of Kashmir will be determined according to the aspirations of the people of Kashmir and UN Resolutions.
19. Good Governance will include quality Health, Universal Education, Price Stability Employment Generation and Austerity by Government Officials.
20. Women, Minorities and under-privileged will be provided equality of opportunity.
21. Electorate mandate will be respected and extra constitutional ways will not be adopted for undermining the rights of the Government or Opposition.
22. Signatories to the Charter will not join Military regimes or sponsored Governments.
23. All indirect elections will be by open ballots.
24. All Military and Judicial Officers will file annual statements of Wealth and Income.
25. National Democracy Commission will promote Democratic Culture.
26. Terrorism and militancy will be vigorously confronted.
27. Impartiality and independence of the Election Commission will be guaranteed.
28. Elections will be held on a level-playing field.
29. Local Body Elections will be held within three months of General Elections.
30. Neutral administrators will be appointed by the Competent Election Authorities during the Conduct of elections.
31. Elections will be conducted by a neutral Caretaker Government.
32. All Security Agencies including ISI and MI will be answerable to the elected Prime Minister.
33. All indemnities promulgated by military regimes will be reviewed.
34. Defence Budget will be placed before and approved by Parliament.
35. Military Land and Cantonments will be controlled by the Ministry of Defence.
36. Rules of Business will be reviewed to conform to Parliamentary Traditions.

## Provincial Autonomy

The Pakistan Peoples Party proposes to establish



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a true Federal Democracy in theory and practice by enacting the following reforms in order to make Provincial Autonomy meaningful.

The unanimous Constitution of 1973 authored by Quaid-e-Awam introduced Provincial Autonomy to the Country's Federal System. The PPP will take the following measures:

- The Concurrent Legislative List will be abolished.
- Provinces will be given their due share in their Natural Resources.
- Distribution criteria for NFC award will take into account contribution to revenues, geographic size, backwardness and level of development as well as population.
- The Natural Gas rates and Royalty formula will be as determined by the Constitution of 1973.
- All Companies engaged in exploration and extraction of Natural Resources will be required to train local people and allocate funds for social development.
- Provinces will be given part of the sale proceeds in the sale of federal assets in their province.
- Octroi will revert to local governments and be collected by them.
- Sales tax will be progressively returned to Provinces.

## Local Government

The Pakistan Peoples Party believes in a three-tier system of Government: Federal, Provincial

and Local. Each will enjoy autonomy and function under the law.

The system of Local Government introduced by the military regime, which has been manipulated for political ends, will be revamped to bring it in line with the Party's Devolution Plan.

Primary Education, Basic Health, Water Supply, Sanitation and Population Welfare will be looked after by the Local Governments. The Deputy Commissioner will perform the functions of the DCO. Local Government will be based on modern patterns such as those that exist in the established democracies of the world. Caretaker district governments would be established during elections.

## Civil Service Reforms

No modern state can function without an impartial, honest and efficient bureaucracy. The Pakistan Peoples Party will initiate the implementation of broad-based Civil Service Reforms. Security of service, fixed tenures, merit-based appointments, barriers to lateral entry and a ban on inductions from other state institutions are required for an effective bureaucracy.

Training of civil servants will be conducted to make the Civil Services citizen-friendly and responsive to the needs and demands of the public.

## Police Reforms

The PPP government will embark on a meaningful Police Reforms Program. The aim of the reforms will to provide security to citizens by creating a crime-free society. The PPP will be tough on crime and the causes of crime. It will foster a professional police force owing allegiance to the Constitution and rule of law, and stop the



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practice of using the police force for political purposes.

The PPP will expand law enforcement and equip it with modern means to combat crime and maintain security. A strong police force is necessary to combat the forces of internal terrorism.

In the previous PPP Government, Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto instituted a revolutionary programme of Women's Police Stations headed by Women Police Officers to encourage Women to report crimes of domestic abuse. This highly successful programme was dismantled by subsequent administrations. It will be immediately reconstituted under the PPP government.

### Prison Reforms

The PPP prison reforms aim at reforming prisoners enabling them to integrate into society as responsible citizens. The concept of hard and rigorous labour will be abolished. Prisoners will be encouraged to take classes to learn skills and earn points towards good behaviour early release. They will be paid proper wages for work undertaken and be entitled to purchase facilities for themselves including television, computers and other products. Common rooms will provide Internet access to selected sites as well as reading material in libraries. Medical attention will be given promptly. Proper seating arrangements for interviews will be made.

Prisoners will have the right to make available transport for going to Court hearings in the event of vehicle shortage. Prison administrations will be given rules within which to function and will be autonomous in their functioning. An Ombudsman will be appointed to hear complaints of Prisoners against the violation of jail rules.

Female prisoners will be housed in separate quarters and looked after by female staff. No male staff will be permitted entrance to the female quarters. Female quarters will have similar facilities as male quarters with additional child-care areas.

### Rule of Law

The basis of a civilised society lies in the rule of law. In developed countries, those who undermine the majesty of law go to prison. In our country, too often the victims of those who perpetuated injustices are sent to prison. Each elected leader of Pakistan left office brutalized and criminalised while none of the military dictators paid a price even when they disintegrated the Nation and mutilated the Constitution.

When the state apparatus perverts the course of justice, evil consequences flow which undermine the premise on which civilised society can be based.

The PPP will establish a Truth and Reconciliation Commission to investigate how the so-called National Accountability Bureau tried to pervert the course of justice by torturing witnesses to commit perjury and wasted national resources to politically re-engineer Pakistan.

### Judicial Reforms

The Pakistan Peoples Party is committed to a neutral independent judiciary free of political manipulation. Justice must be fair and blind. From the lower courts to the Supreme Court, the PPP commits its government to a truly independent judiciary.

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## FATA Reforms

Quaid-e-Awam introduced development for the people of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and the PPP Government, headed by Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto, continued those policies.

The PPP will restore the authority of the Government in the Tribal Areas and stop the pro-Taliban forces from using its territory to mount attacks on neighbouring Afghanistan.

The current situation in the FATA represents a clear danger to the national security. The military regime has given up Pakistan's sovereign territory in the Tribal Areas to foreigners. Consequently, FATA has become a safe haven for militancy and extremism.

The PPP will reclaim Pakistan's territory and re-assert the authority of the government

The PPP will facilitate the extension of the Laws of Pakistan to FATA, including the Political Parties Act.

As a first step, it will bring amendments in the

Frontier Crimes Regulation to enable a right of Appeal to the Peshawar High Court and further to the Supreme Court of Pakistan against all convictions.

The seats in the NWFP Provincial Assembly will be enhanced to accommodate representatives from the FATA directly elected by adult franchise, according to the population of each Agency.

The PPP will push forward schemes for the educational advancement and economic uplift of FATA, creating job opportunities, increasing quotas in Colleges, Universities and Government.

In order to expedite investment and create jobs, the FATA will be made into a tax-free zone on items manufactured in these areas.

## Northern Areas

The PPP government will actively pursue policies that promote education, development, and peace in the Northern Areas.

# PART V

Manifesto 2008



## PAKISTAN AND THE WORLD

The guiding principles of the Pakistan Peoples Party shall be the universal principles of peace, reciprocity and flexibility in its foreign relations. The Party is opposed to all forms of terrorism and seeks to build bridges in the world community and promotes inter-faith harmony after the polarities arising from September 11. The Party believes that civilizations and democracies do not go to war, and will not allow extremists to hijack a progressive agenda. The PPP will endeavour to add depth and substance to Pakistan's relations with regional, economic and social organisations. The PPP believes in good neighbourly relations with Afghanistan, India, Iran and the Peoples Republic of China. The Party also believes in further strengthening relations with the USA, Canada, European Union, Japan and the Commonwealth. Pakistan is at the hub of Central Asia, the Gulf and the GCC, hence the PPP will provide a fresh impetus to the trade and cultural ties with these regions. Our special relations with Bangladesh will be strengthened.

### Self-Determination

The Pakistan Peoples Party supports the right of self-determination for all people.

### Kashmir

The Pakistan Peoples Party supports the rights of the Kashmiri people and will pursue the composite dialogue process agenda that it initiated with India including Kashmir and Indo-Pak issues. It will not allow lack of progress on one agenda to impede progress on the other.

The PPP, without prejudice to the UN Security Council Resolutions, supports open and safe borders at the Line of Control to socially unite the Kashmiri people. It notes that India and China have a border dispute and yet enjoy tension-free relations.

## Relations with India

The Simla Agreement of 1973 provides a framework for relations between the two Countries. It seeks to reduce tensions with India through peaceful negotiations to outstanding disputes and issues, and recalls the great progress in bilateral relations that took place under the government of Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto. During the December 1988 SAARC Summit, the proposal of Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto to transform SAARC from a cultural organization into an economic one was accepted by the SAARC countries.

The PPP government will work for a regional economic framework for the countries of South Asia to benefit all its people through economies of scale. Such a regional economic group has the potential to turn into a global economic powerhouse, attracting investment, creating jobs and eliminating poverty.

Under Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto's governments, the PPP has consistently pushed to replace the infrastructure of conflict with the architecture of peace.

The PPP believes that a prosperous Pakistan is a prosperous South Asia. Maintaining peaceful ties with India is imperative if we wish to achieve these goals. When elected to power, the PPP intends to tackle the social and economic malaise infecting the region by promoting an Asian Common Market that can attract investment, create jobs and build bridges of peace and trade through all of South Asia.

### Afghanistan

Military dictators have used Pakistan's proximity to Afghanistan and its strategic importance to the world community to perpetuate dictatorship.

# PART V

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The PPP will not allow Pakistan's territory to be used for cross-border terrorism against Afghanistan. The Party firmly adheres to the principle of non-interference in Afghanistan's internal affairs and favours no group, faction or tribe. The PPP government will engage the Afghan government for an overall understanding on border security, exchange of intelligence, flag meetings between sector commanders, exchange of information, and non-use of force in one another's territories.

The PPP will seek to sign a Treaty of Peace and Cooperation with Afghanistan based on the following principles:

- Respect for fundamental human rights and for the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.
- Settlement of all disputes by peaceful means, such as negotiation, conciliation, arbitration or judicial settlement.
- Promotion of mutual interests and cooperation.
- Respect for justice and international obligations.
- A commitment to the restoration of close cultural, economic and trade ties with Afghanistan
- The PPP will set up joint working groups with Afghanistan to enhance and rationalize trade between the two nations.
- The PPP will commit its government to using its resources in Balochistan for the mutual benefit of the energy needs of Afghanistan and Pakistan's largest Province.

## Terrorism

Terrorism was born in the bowels of dictatorship, which recruited, trained, armed and financed

extreme factions while marginalizing the moderate, democratic and pluralistic forces.

History teaches us that Democracies do not wage war with each other nor do Democracies promote international terrorism.

The PPP will dismantle militant groups who seek to take hostage the foreign policy of the country and impose their writ through force on the tribal areas of Pakistan and elsewhere.

Distinctions between, and amongst terrorist groups will no longer be maintained.

## Defence

The PPP believes that a sound economic base promotes a strong Defence. It seeks to identify Pakistan's core Defence needs to enable the country to meet its defence targets.

The educational curriculum in Defence institutes was prepared to train an officer cadre that could uphold the forces of military rule. That curriculum will be revised to ensure respect for Democracy, Democratic institutions and elected officials. In addition, all newly appointed Service Chiefs will be given a public oath of office, similar to the one taken at commissioning, prior to their taking up their assignment.

The PPP gave Pakistan a strong defence to safeguard its territorial integrity and national independence. Quaid-e-Awam gave Pakistan the nuclear program to achieve nuclear parity with India. Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto gave Pakistan missile capability to enable the country to deter aggression.

The PPP will ensure that our armed forces are amongst the best in the world in so that they earn the love and respect of the nation as a Defender of our Motherland free of political involvement and controversy.

## PART VI

Manifesto 2008

### CONCLUSION: TOWARDS A NEW PAKISTAN

The Pakistan Peoples Party makes a sacred pledge to the people of Pakistan that it will lead our Nation to peace and prosperity. It will build a tomorrow better than any of the yesterdays we have known by following in the footsteps of our heroic leaders, Quaid-e-Azam and Quaid-e-Awam to build a federal, democratic, egalitarian Pakistan. The PPP believes that the key to the advancement of Pakistan lies in focusing on employment, education, energy, environment and equality.

From Khyber to Karachi, from the mountains that Alexander the Great crossed to the desert sands of Sindh where Mohammad Bin Qasim brought the Message of Islam, under the banner of Pakistan and the tri-colour flag of Quaid-e-Awam, there will be one nation, one leader, one mission, one programme, one destination, and one voice reflecting the hopes, the desires, the wishes and the aspirations of our great people.

*Ilm Roshni, Sab Ko Kaam  
Roti Kapra Aur Makaan  
Maang Raha Hai Har Insaan*



## **Appendix 3**

*Election Manifesto*

Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf

*General Elections 2013*

*PTI 2013*

# **AN AGENDA FOR RESURGENCE**

## **The Manifesto Of Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf**

## **PREAMBLE**

### **A New Beginning**

The PTI agenda of resurgence articulates the long neglected aspirations of our people and spells out the vision of a modern Islamic republic that advocates tolerance, moderation and freedom to practice the religion of one's choice. We look to the future with hope and confidence as we set Pakistan on a course to political stability, social harmony, and economic prosperity for all.

The PTI is not merely a political party; it is a broad based movement that embraces the interests of all Pakistanis. A people whose cultural and ethnic diversities blend into common goals and aspirations for a just society based on a democratic culture and the rule of law.

The PTI is determined to provide a credible new leadership that can restore Pakistan's political and economic sovereignty through building a new bond of trust between the government and the people. Only through the active participation of the people can we collectively mobilize our human and material resources to forge ahead on the road to a confident and self-reliant nation.

### **Our Ideology**

Pakistanis crave dignity and self-respect. Any hope of recovery from the multifaceted crisis engulfing the nation remains illusory without reviving the self-esteem of the people and restoring their confidence in the political leadership. **We can achieve this by following the Principles of "Unity, Faith and Discipline" as expounded by the Quaid-e-Azam.**

PTI is committed to transparency in government and an across the board accountability. It believes in federalism and functional autonomy of the provinces, based on the spirit and fundamental principles of parliamentary democracy as envisaged in the 1973 Constitution.

Our strength lies in our people. Human development would thus remain our highest priority. Pakistan has rich and diverse cultures including those of the minorities. We must nurture and allow every opportunity for this diversity of culture and traditions to flourish.

Our family values bind our society. Despite the grinding poverty and injustice that beset us today, it is the structure of the family that provides the net that keeps the social fabric intact. The present dismal state of women and children in terms of their access to health care, nutrition, and education can not be ignored. Investment in women and children would ensure that the family structure remains intact and future generations are brought up in a healthy and secure environment.

### **Our Mission**

Whilst establishing the rule of law and ensuring protection of human rights through an independent and honest judiciary, strive for the social development and economic prosperity of **our citizens, especially the poor and underprivileged masses.**

### **Our Goals**

- Establish Pakistan as a truly independent and sovereign state that becomes a source of pride for our people.
- Strengthen state institutions to promote democracy and complete political, economic and religious freedom for the people.
- Provide an accountable and efficient government that ensures the protection of life and property of its citizens.
- Launch an Education Revolution to promote universal literacy and raise the standard of education in our schools, colleges and universities.
- Ensure the availability of adequate Healthcare services for all citizens.
- **Highest priority to poverty alleviation through policies aimed at creating more job opportunities and enabling ownership of assets to the poor.**
- A merit based system that provides equal opportunity for employment and upward social mobility for all, specially the working classes

- Create an environment which encourages the private sector to grow and create greater wealth and employment opportunities.
- End the VIP culture by setting an example in simple living and an austere lifestyle.
- Eliminate draconian laws that give unchecked power to Police and the Agencies or which limit the rights of Citizens.
- A self reliant economy which is free of dependence on foreign aid.
- Promote regional peace and strengthen our relationships with friendly countries.

## **INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS**

The fundamentals for a free democratic society and democratic culture cannot flourish without strengthening the vital state institutions which are-the Executive, the Legislature, and the Judiciary. In Pakistan the credibility of these institutions to deliver has been undermined by successive governments while corruption at the highest levels has made them a focus of public scorn and ridicule. The PTI would restore the credibility of vital state institutions and their moral authority to govern through a process of reform.

### **Constitutional Reforms**

The 1973 constitution is a unique and historic document, because it was passed unanimously by the Parliament representing all political parties in the country. The subsequent battering that it took has left it in tatters. There is a need to go back to the beginning and revive the Constitution in letter and spirit, by doing away with the amendments and laws which go against the basic structure and spirit of the federation and the vision of the Quaid-e- Azam.

By promoting a culture of tolerance and co operation amongst the political parties, within and outside the assemblies, we shall strive for priority to legislation benefiting the common man and curtail the Presidential powers of promulgating ordinances that benefit only a few.



## **Judicial Reforms**

Repeated interruptions in the democratic process have a lot to do with the failure to strengthen the judiciary. The PTI proposes to take following measures to strengthen the judicial system:

- Set up a Judicial Commission to recommend and approve judicial appointments in the High Courts and the Supreme Court and to draw up a code of ethics for judges and to undertake their accountability;
- Vacancies in the superior courts would be filled up and sufficient number of courts and judges provided at the lower levels for easy access to justice and to clear the backlog of cases pending in courts.
- The parallel judicial systems such as special judges will be dispensed with;
- The appointments to subordinate judiciary will be made only through Public Service Commissions, which will be made autonomous.
- In order to attract the best lawyers to accept judicial appointments, emoluments of judges will be raised and appropriate facilities provided.
- A Panchayat System, with specific rules and regulations, would be introduced at the local level to perform primarily as arbitration forums and as Small Causes Courts;
- The legal aid system for impoverished litigants with good causes will be strengthened;
- Additional court buildings and facilities will be provided where required and the existing facilities improved and modernized.
- Court procedures will be simplified and streamlined to avoid unnecessary expenditure and delays in settlement of cases.
- The legal education system will be reformed to raise standards and facilities for higher legal education.

## **Electoral Reforms**

Elections in a democratic society are critical milestones to further strengthen the democratic process. They provide a sifting course through which the quality of leadership progressively improves. Without major reforms, there is little hope that more elections under the present institutional framework can ever propel an

honest leadership that this country so desperately needs. To ensure free and fair elections with maximum turnout, the PTI proposes to institute the following electoral reforms:

- Strengthen the Election Commission's capacity to enforce electoral rules and regulations by ensuring complete administrative and financial autonomy. Appropriate administrative powers across the country shall be given to the chief election commissioner for the election period.
- Provide for easy registration of voters instead of the current cumbersome process.
- Easy access to voters list for people to check their votes, by putting these online and displaying at convenient places.
- Ban appointment, transfers, and promotions of civil servants after the announcement of the election schedule without the permission of the Election Commission;
- A person convicted of any genuine criminal offence and sentenced to imprisonment would be barred from contesting elections even if an appeal is pending in any court of law;
- Those who have had loans written off and resorted to deliberate loan defaults would be barred from contesting elections.

### **Strengthening the Federation**

Federalism by definition means a form of government in which the constitution distributes powers between center and provinces including the power to promulgate laws, collect and share revenues, and maintain law and order. True devolution of power can only start with giving due autonomy to the provinces as envisaged in the Constitution.

The PTI believes that citizens of the four federating units have equal rights to education, health care, economic growth opportunities, and justice. To date, the revenue sharing criteria for all finance awards was based purely on population. In a federation where the federating units differ widely in terms of per capita income, population density, administrative infrastructure, ability to raise taxes, and fiscal discipline, it is not fair to base the revenue sharing formula on population only.

The present resource distribution formula deprives the people of some regions and provinces of their self sustenance needs and condemns them to perpetual poverty and poor quality of life. The bulk of provincial resources come from taxes collected and distributed by the federal government. Without equitable sharing of resources between provinces, the impact of devolving powers to the provinces and the districts would be of little consequence. The PTI intends to strengthen the federation by introducing following reforms;

- Provincial autonomy as envisaged in the constitution will be adhered to in letter and spirit.
- Allow greater administrative autonomy to the provinces in the appointment of key civil servants such as; Chief Secretaries, IGs etc.
- The outdated FATA administrative system will be done away with through appropriate amendments in the FCR based on the wishes of the people of FATA. Powers in FATA shall be devolved to lower level in conformity with the system in the settled areas. Party Act shall also be made applicable to FATA areas.
- The NFC shall have a permanent secretariat with sufficient financial resources to conduct independent economic and other surveys as may be required from time to time
- Level of human development in each province would be an additional criteria for determining provincial share of the divisible pool;
- The Federal Share in the net proceeds of divisible pool taxes would be reduced in line with requirements determined through studies and surveys
- The task of assessing royalties for provinces will be entrusted to an independent body;
- Provincial finance commissions would be strengthened for fiscal discipline, resource mobilization, and resource distribution within each province

### **Local Government**

The newly created local government institutions have been turned into a political tool in the hands of the government. The system perpetuated by giving total power to one individual; the District Nazim, who is not directly elected by the

people, will be reviewed and replaced by a system that is equitable and is in accordance with the aspirations of the people.

PTI shall strive towards creating a set of local institutions in which people can repose their trust and confidence. Citizen's and Community boards would be created to monitor the delivery of services. This will bring government closer to the people and make it more responsive and accountable. The PTI proposes the following specific reforms.

- Local government institutions will be accountable to the Provincial assemblies;
- District Nazim will be elected from amongst the Town and union Nazims who are directly elected by the people;
- Responsibility and authority of each tier of the local government will be clearly defined;
- PFC's in all the provinces will be required to allocate and provide the required funds directly to all the local governments instead of routing these through the district nazims
- Financial transparency will be ensured in awarding and implementation of projects.

### **Administrative Reforms**

The reform of the bureaucracy is essential for efficient service delivery and implementation of socio-economic development agenda. Civil service reforms would be instituted to provide all necessary support to the civil servants to perform and live a life of dignity and respect. Necessary checks and balances would be put in place to hold them accountable for their acts as custodians of public trust. The PTI would introduce the following reforms in the civil service:

- Public Service Commissions (PSC's) would be made fully autonomous administratively and financially. Political appointments in PSC's will be discontinued. Such appointments will be made purely on merit and in a transparent manner.
- Appointments to the civil service at all levels would be made by the public service commissions. No exceptions will be allowed;

- System of examinations conducted by the public service commission shall be reviewed to ensure that equal opportunity was provided to all candidates from all parts of the country. The present system that tends to give preference to those who come through the educational systems that is largely available to the elites will be eliminated..
- PTI shall ensure that the Government undertakes appropriate career planning exercise for the civil servants in order to improve the fast deteriorating levels of governance at all levels and ensure that the bureaucracy delivers the required services to all sections of the society effectively and efficiently.
- Introduce minimum tenures for senior civil servant posts such as federal and provincial secretaries, chief secretaries, IG and DIGs etc;
- Enhance access of information to the general public to the maximum extent feasible by reviewing and revising laws and regulations concerning confidentiality;
- Give constitutional protection to public servants to perform their official functions and protect them against political interference;
- Re-train the bureaucracy to meet new challenges.

### **Police Reforms**

The security of life and property of citizens is one of the primary responsibilities of the state. Without this fundamental protection, investment and economic growth is not possible. The police system in Pakistan has suffered due to political considerations over-riding merit and due process of law.

The PTI proposes to transform the police system, which is based on coercion to a service oriented police by instituting the following reforms:

- Set up a Permanent Public Safety Commissions at the Federal and Provincial levels to reform the police system;
- Legislate to expunge or modify laws which give unfettered power to the **police to arrest citizens**.
- Ensure recruitments on merit and develop a training system that orientates the police towards helping citizens.



- Legislate to provide security of service to police officers and thus free them from political interference. At the same time set up a system of accountability to ensure that the police do not violate the law or the rights of citizens.
- Increase salaries and facilities commensurate with a decent standard of living.
- Equip police with modern arms and communication facilities;
- Give greater importance to setting up of CPLCs, to increase interaction of the police and citizens;
- Modernize and upgrade police stations to become user friendly centers for help to needy citizens;
- **Improve the conditions in our Jails to make them function as Correction Centers and eliminate the practice of police torture;**
- Rationalize and reform the intelligence gathering agencies to refocus on intelligence gathering against crime rather than chasing political opponents.

### **Corruption and Accountability**

Corruption is endemic in our society because it flows from the top. A major reason for this is the centralization of authority in the hands of the top administration officials. Discretionary funds at the disposal of top political officials are misused for political patronage and to oblige supporters. Lack of transparency in government and increasing defence and administrative expenditure create greater opportunity for corruption. The accountability mechanism is not only weak but is being used for political ends.

To reduce corruption and make the accountability process more credible, the PTI shall:

- Revise the National Accountability Bureau (NAB) ordinance to make NAB a completely independent body. The head of the NAB would be a person of unquestioned integrity while other members would be from the higher judiciary, retired civil servants, eminent lawyers and citizens with

unblemished records. The post of chairman NAB shall be provided constitutional protection.

- NAB shall function under the administrative control of the JUDICIAL COMMISSION.
- Strengthen the role of Public Accounts Committees in monitoring government financial transactions;
- Discretionary funds at the disposal of high officials will be subjected to proper audit by the PAC
- Make the government contract awarding system transparent by making the concerned regulatory authorities autonomous, effective and efficient.
- Reduce the role of government by revising rules and regulations and doing away with ineffective and unproductive government departments.

## **HUMAN DEVELOPMENT**

Poverty prevails among the masses and there is little improvement in the social indicators. Universal primary education is an elusive dream. Access to basic health care remains poor with infant mortality rate one of the highest in the world. The present population growth rate of 2.2 percent is still amongst the highest in the world. An estimated 8 million children suffer severe malnourishment. The government's estimate that 63 percent of population has access to safe drinking water is unrealistic. Social sector development would thus receive the highest priority from PTI.

### **Poverty Reduction**

Independent estimates place poverty incidence in Pakistan at between 30 to 35 percent. Government claims about poverty reduction and that economic growth has trickled down to the poor is not credible. Economic growth does not *always* benefit the poor. If the growth in output is achieved through capital-intensification of the production process, employment growth is unlikely to match output growth. Further, if growth occurs in sectors that provide salaried as opposed to wage employment, the poor are not likely to benefit.

Various microfinance schemes have been launched, but there is no evidence that microfinance has led to reduction of poverty. On the other hand, research has shown that ownership or access to assets is the single most powerful variable that reduces poverty and contributes to economic empowerment of the poor. Rural poverty incidence among families owning some land – even as low as one acre – is 17 percent, which rises to 32 percent for families that own no land. Similarly housing and employment are important poverty reduction variables in urban areas.

In terms of poverty reduction strategy, it is shown that in rural areas ownership of assets (land and/or cattle) reduces the chances of being poor by 55 percent. In urban areas, employment is shown to reduce the chances of being poor by 45 percent.

Fiscal policy also plays a very important role. The current fiscal policy structure is unjust in the sense that the poor are subsidizing the rich by carrying a much larger responsibility of tax payments through indirect taxation. The tax structure shall be made more equitable.

Our poverty reduction strategy will focus on:

- Rural land reforms, such that the maximum numbers of rural households own a minimum-specified area of land.
- Urban land policy, such that state and military controlled land in urban areas is allocated for development of housing estates, with on average 3 marla/80 square yards plots.
- The share of direct taxes in total tax revenues is raised through taxation of wealth and capital gains.

### **Education for All**

The quality of public sector education at all levels has degenerated. Children from households in the top 20 percent in urban areas showed gross enrollment two and half times greater than children from the poorest 20 percent of rural

households. Overall the gross enrollment rates for middle level (classes 6-8) have decreased. It is indeed shameful that only 16 percent of children aged 10-12 attend middle level schooling. There are approximately 175,000 Government schools in Pakistan that offer substandard education, inadequate teachers, facilities and materials. A cost effective model is needed to raise the level of education across this massive school network.

Unregulated growth of private sector primary education has led to a system of educational apartheid. Quality education has become an exclusive preserve of the elite thus forcing the majority to perpetual ignorance and poverty. While the rich send their children to expensive English medium schools, the majority poor are forced to send their children to antiquated Urdu medium public schools or Madrassahs. As a result, despite the huge increase in population, the proportion of students attending government primary schools declined, particularly in the urban areas where the private sector now accounts for almost half of primary enrollments.

Quality of higher education has also deteriorated with exodus of qualified professionals and continues to decline in the professional capacity of faculty members. Applied research is almost non-existent. For a country of 160 million, there are only 85 universities with approved charters, of which only 8 in the public sector and 18 in the private sector, are degree awarding institutions.

The PTI is determined to launch a national education movement based on equity to achieve increased access and improved quality of education at all levels. PTI proposes to:

- Abolish educational apartheid by introducing a common core syllabus for all schools;
- Progressively increase state spending on education from less than 1.5% to five percent of the Gross Domestic Product;
- Lay emphasis on teacher training by setting up standard facilities in all districts to ensure the availability of sufficient number of local teachers in each district

- Launch a national literacy campaign by mobilizing all segments of society including, fresh graduates, unemployed youth and retired educationists to achieve 80 percent functional literacy;
- Ensure access to primary education for all children by adding schools managed by local councils.
- Reduce the drop out rate at elementary level by offering incentives in the shape of free text books, nutrition support through mid-day meals, and stipends;
- Set up an elite education service by offering market salaries to government teachers at all levels to attract the best and make teaching the most sought after profession again;
- Make universities fully autonomous to be managed by boards comprising educationists, philanthropists, and eminent citizens and ensure academic freedom to faculty members;
- Establish a public university in collaboration with the private sector in each district.
- Design and implement a scholarship scheme for top students from each board examination;
- Formulate a policy to encourage greater public-private partnership in expanding the network of educational institutions and in improving their standards;
- Create an autonomous monitoring authority to check and provide feedback on the quality of education at all levels;
- Offer tax incentives to industry in general and agri-based industry in particular for investment in vocational and technical education in the rural areas.

### **Healthy People - Healthy Nation**

The PTI plans to revamp and upgrade the public health care system in Pakistan in line with its slogan "healthy people, healthy nation." by putting in place following reforms:



- Progressively double state spending on health, establish a threshold for setting up of basic health units in order to extend the facility to the village level.
- Target to achieve 100 per cent immunization of children against preventable diseases;
- Policy emphasis on preventive healthcare particularly in communicable and infectious diseases, reproductive health care, pre and post-natal health care to drastically reduce infant mortality rate and under-five mortality rate;
- Ensure universal access to clean drinking water in all villages and urban slums by setting up water filtration plants;
- Improving sanitation through better sewerage and drainage schemes in urban areas
- Decentralization of healthcare services with greater management and monitoring role of local councils over basic healthcare centers particularly with facilities for mother and child care;
- Introduce tele-medicine in upgraded rural health centers and hospitals using Internet and telecommunications infrastructure;
- Revise the pricing policy for drugs including import duties and levies to ensure that essential drugs are available at affordable prices;
- Encourage private-public partnership under a policy which provides affordable healthcare services;
- Institutionalize the autonomy of Government hospitals
- Introduce low-cost health insurance schemes and concessional health care schemes for the elderly and poor
- Bring accountability of doctors, para-medical and non-medical staff in their professional duties at Government and private hospitals and healthcare centers by formulating a policy in consultation with their representative associations.

## **Population Welfare**

The continuing high population growth rate is a major national concern and strain on national resources. Rapid population growth means greater development needs and stress on the existing physical infrastructure.

The PTI will launch a national campaign on population welfare and make it an integral part of the national health policy. Greater access to quality education would go a long way creating greater awareness on population related issues. PTI will:

- Launch public awareness campaigns on population welfare and reinforce Programmes to reduce the population growth rate from 2.2 percent to 1.6 percent;
- Introduce integrated comprehensive population welfare Programmes to improve the impact of existing projects by expanding coverage and improved management;
- Introduce modern family planning methods that allow women increased options on family planning services;

## **Housing**

Adequate shelter is a fundamental human need. Ever increasing migration of the rural population to urban centers and inadequate resources for housing has made planned housing development critical to provide adequate housing for all. Almost 40 percent of the urban population, lives in slums without basic amenities such as access to clean drinking water, sanitation, drainage, and solid waste disposal, because of a lack of proper town planning. PTI plans to initiate major low cost housing programmes in urban areas through following measures:

- Under a revised national housing policy facilitate shelter to all in urban slums and initiate construction of 5.0 Lac. new housing units each year;
- Develop a policy of leasing and mortgage of property.
- Review the urban building codes and construction bye laws and ensure compliance; and
- Make credit available for housing on friendly terms.

## **Youth**

Youth would be in the vanguard of PTI's national revival efforts. The energies and idealism of the youth shall be harnessed to act as the locomotive of national change. The youth would be the focus of PTI's education, health care, and economic plans. Under a national youth policy, they would be actively involved in rural reconstruction, drainage and sanitation, social forestry, public health awareness campaigns, environment protection and adult literacy.

Competitive sports can play a critical role in improving the health, leadership qualities, discipline, and building team work attributes in the youth. Greater sports activities also prevent the youth from pursuing social evils such as drugs etc. A national youth policy will be introduced with emphasis on a comprehensive sports policy for setting up in each district international level facilities for cricket, hockey, football and other sports..

## **Empowerment of Women**

The PTI is determined to introduce and implement new laws, policies, and programmes to provide a level playing field for the social, political, and economic growth of women. Empowerment of women is directly linked to their greater economic role, which is dependent on increased access to education and skill development. The PTI will bring women in the mainstream of national social and economic development. It aims to

- Provide free education to girls up to Matric;
- Introduce scholarships for graduation in pursuit of higher education in computer sciences, medicine, management, and engineering;
- Create social awareness against un-Islamic customs and cruel practices such as Sawarra in NWFP and Karo Kari in Sindh and enforce laws to eradicate such practices;
- Provide housing and child care assistance to working women;
- Encourage the active involvement of women in the management of community based rural development initiatives;

- Develop a national programme for vocational and skill-based training for income generation;
- Design and implement special functional literacy programmes for women;
- Legislate and enforce laws for in-camera trial of molestation and rape cases;
- Establish separate "women support cells" in each police station at tehsil level which are managed and run by women to support and process criminal cases in which women are the accused; and
- Legislate and enforce a special law on violence against women.

## **Environment**

The reckless policies of the past without due regard to environmental concerns has put considerable pressure on the environment and natural resources, so vital to the future generations of Pakistan. Inappropriate and ill-conceived projects have put under extreme stress our land, soil, water, forests, and wildlife. High population growth rate is an additional source of environmental degradation. Our forests are dwindling, leading to erosion of valuable topsoil threatening the livelihood of people living in the mountains. The uncontrolled growth of urban areas with poor sanitation conditions is threatening natural ecosystems.

The PTI commits itself to a sustainable development through an equitable use of resources for meeting the needs of the present and future generations;

- Expedite the implementation of the national environment action plan (NEAP);
- National/Public parks will be set up across the country
- Enforce the Environment Protection Act 1997 which provides a framework for conservation of wildlife and biodiversity, establishment of environmental tribunals and magistrates, inclusion of environmental issues in school curriculum, and public awareness;
- Design national guidelines and modules for the development of towns and cities as a planning and implementation tool for urban development;

- Introduce and enforce byelaws to control land, air and water pollution by industry and urban centers.
- Eliminate timber Mafia and ensure transfer of economic benefits to the local inhabitants from legal logging;
- Ban import of hazardous chemical wastes for recycling by any industry or for dumping;
- Launch a national campaign of forestation;
- Develop and implement community based programmes for conversion of degraded forests and wasteland into quality forests;
- Deny exploitation of offshore resources, especially marine life, by big trawlers;
- Offer incentives to the private sector to invest in research and development in environment-friendly technology for application in agriculture, industry and the services sector; and
- Develop programmes to clean our river systems, streams and other water bodies.

### **ECONOMIC REVIVAL**

The most serious aspect of our dire economic situation is the growing debt that limits the fiscal space to invest in human development and infrastructure. Nearly 50 million Pakistanis, a half of our population, live in extreme poverty and sub-human conditions, and their number is growing rapidly.

The challenge is the mobilization of local resources including local investment opportunities to surmount low investment, poor productivity and degrading physical and social infrastructure. Only when local investors feel safe and confident to invest will overseas Pakistanis followed by Strategic foreign investors invest in the economy. Local investment would result in growth that will generate employment, remove poverty and create prosperity. Agriculture is the mainstay of our economy and investment in agriculture would help to eliminate



poverty as studies have shown that extreme poverty is more prevalent in rural areas compared to urban centers.

### **Economic Policy**

Our economic policy will be based on limiting the role of the government to create an environment conducive for wealth creation through legal means and removing bureaucratic and other impediments, which inhibit investment. To reverse the cycle of ever increasing poverty, the PTI aims to formulate policies for a sustainable at least 8 per cent annual GDP growth rate.

Agriculture would receive the greatest attention as poverty is more acute in the rural areas and the potential for growth in agriculture and agri-based industry far surpass any other sector of the economy. We plan to achieve macro-economic stability and rapid growth by following economic fundamentals of fiscal balance, investment in human and physical infrastructure, stable rupee, moderate inflation, easy availability of credit to agriculture and business, and promotion of small to medium business enterprises and industry. The major economic policy planks will be to:

- Implement a long-term debt management strategy and divert savings from debt servicing to human development;
- Conduct an international audit of all loans secured by Pakistan to establish their utilization;
- Negotiate a long-term debt management strategy with the donors to limit the annual debt repayment to a percentage of the foreign exchange earnings.
- Enact and enforce laws to establish broad policy guidelines for new loans including a limit for new debt and stop the policy of seeking loans at commercial rates;
- Negotiate debt swap and mobilize resources for investments
- Reduce non development government expenditures.
- Rationalize the Defence expenditure and subject the defence budget to a parliamentary scrutiny committee.

- Investment priority on sectors with greater potential for employment generation, including small to medium scale rural industries, infrastructure, housing (urban and rural), agriculture, and forestry;
- Encourage investment in industry by removing bureaucratic hurdles and by improving the efficiency of the capital market to attract investment from small investors;
- Revamp and divest non-strategic public sector organizations to Pakistani investors.
- Rationalize subsidies to protect weaker sections of society;
- Introduce institutional mechanisms to interact on a daily basis between the industry and the government;
- Plan for the timely provision of good seeds and unadulterated pesticides;
- A water conservation and equitable distribution plan that maximizes agricultural production;
- Revamp and reinvent the tax collection machinery of the Central Board of Revenue; and

### **Tax Reforms**

The complexity of the tax law is the single most important factor responsible for most of the revenue losses. The current tax system is indefensible. It is complex, burdensome, and severely limits economic opportunity. Our tax philosophy is to encourage and motivate citizens to create wealth and share part of their hard-earned income by paying tax at a lower rate. PTI envisions to:

- Introduce a tax system that is fair, flatter, and simpler;
- Progressively reduce federal taxes to five in all at reasonable rates;
- Professionalize tax administration and make CBR autonomous;
- Change source of revenue from indirect to direct taxation thus reducing the burden on the common citizen;
- Simplify the tax system by eliminating unnecessary paperwork;
- Eliminate exemptions through SROs that only benefit special interest groups;

- Provide incentives to raise savings rate from 12 percent to 20 percent of GDP;
- Introduce a tax system that allows people to compute their taxes easily, for example on the Internet, without the need for a lawyer or an accountant

### **Agriculture - Backbone of Our Economy**

Investment in agriculture is the quickest and surest way for rapid economic recovery and reducing poverty as it accounts for 25 percent of the GDP and employs 45 percent of the country's labor force. Agriculture cannot just be viewed as a source of food. Gross agricultural production in Pakistan can be increased 2 to 3-fold by an efficient, scientifically planned use of the existing resources. It requires relatively simple innovations and would depend mainly on more efficient management of the complex agricultural enterprise, comprising the following:

Resource Use Planning

Improved Post Harvest Processing and Marketing

Improved Crop Modeling and Support Price Mechanism

Strengthening of Agriculture Institutions

Introduction of Urban Agriculture

Developing Agro-climatology

Harnessing Additional Water Resources

There is no effective substitute to building additional large storage dams on the Indus. The process of developing a political consensus on this issue should be started without delay. Simultaneously, efforts should be made to use irrigation water in response to crop needs. The present method of flood irrigation thru a fixed wara bundi system is highly wasteful and results in only about 20% efficiency of water use for actual crop production. Water use efficiency in some of the middle-eastern countries (Cyprus, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Jordan) is close to 75-80% of the theoretical application efficiency. Since we are now a water-scarce country, we must reflect this fact in price fixation of irrigation water and develop improved methods for water application to increase efficiency. Simultaneously

the huge wastage of water thru leakage/seepage from canals and watercourses should be reduced, especially in saline areas. The PTI commits itself to reforming agriculture by:

- Linking prices for agriculture produce to input costs;
- Introducing a nationwide crop and livestock insurance scheme;
- Allocating 65 per cent of ADP funds for agricultural and rural development to improve the rural physical and social infrastructure such as, irrigation, roads, transport, power, telecommunication, credit facilities, access to safe drinking water, education, health-care, sanitation and housing;
- Allowing free movement of food grains throughout the country;
- Introduce corporate agriculture by encouraging private sector investment in farming;
- Encouraging social forestry, horticulture, vegetable growing, floriculture, sericulture, mushroom farming;
- Encouraging inland fisheries, and bee-keeping;
- Encouraging small-scale rural cottage industry by providing easy access to credit at low interest rates;
- Set up a network of service centers for farmers at tehsil level and introduce Tele-Agriculture to feed vital information to farmers;
- Reforming land acquisition laws and computerize land records, ownership and all other relevant information;
- Boosting export of high value and processed agriculture produce;
- Investing more in barani agriculture productivity;
- Introducing weekly Mandis in rural towns and villages;
- Introducing wind and solar energy wherever feasible for supplying power exclusively to villages that have no electrification.
- Introducing special credit schemes for drought hit farmers to reinvest in livestock and farming;
- Reform education in villages and rural towns to incorporate agriculture related subjects in the curriculum in rural schools.

### **Irrigation**

PTI will undertake the following reforms measures in the field of irrigation:

- 50 percent increase irrigation area in 10 years through construction and optimal use of small, medium and large irrigation projects;
- Provide incentives for the use of alternative sources of irrigation such as drip and sprinkler irrigation systems, and.
- Develop a 20 year master plan for water storage including construction of dams including utilizing floodwaters for irrigation.

### **Land Reforms**

The PTI is committed to introduce following land reforms:

- Monitor the ownership and use of distributed state land and ensure credit and agriculture support services to farmers;
- Computerize land records
- Initiate separate monitoring mechanisms to monitor the settlement of land ceiling disputes and to improve the timely settlement of cases and enforcement of verdicts; and
- Expedite distribution of cultivable state land among landless farmers.

### **Development of Industry**

Revival of industrial growth is essential for the revival of the economy. The PTI will:

- Provide special incentive and credit package to support small to medium scale industry.
- Encourage efficient and healthy capital market for facilitating investment and allowing profitable investment opportunities to small investors;
- Improve the regulatory efficiency of the Security and Exchange Commission in particular its role in ensuring timely dividends to investors;
- Promote venture capital;
- Bring equity and streamline merger, liquidation, and take-over rules and regulations and monitor the performance of the SECP in implementing the rules; and
- Develop framework for pension fund investment in the capital market.



## **Small and Medium Enterprises**

Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) are the growth engines of the economy and account for 94% of growth in developed economies of the world. In Pakistan these businesses account for 30% of our GDP but provide employment to approximately 70% of our labour force. The SME sector has been long neglected and has not been able to play the role that they have the potential of playing in the country's economic development.

Although, some strides have been made in the past years to provide SMEs access to finance, we feel that this is not enough. What the SMEs require is business support services to enable them to profitably and productively access this financing. Such services will provide the SMEs with the knowledge of approaching banks, improving processes and quality of goods and accessing new markets, especially export markets. Moreover, the financial institutions themselves need to re-orient themselves and create a capacity of being able to cater to the SMEs. PTI will follow a strategy to:

- Encourage the setting up of Business Support Services (BSS) Providers in the private sector. These BSS providers will engage with SMEs in a hand-holding exercise to improve their awareness of global issues that effect businesses and to raise them to the next level of international best practices;
- Encourage creation of linkages between SMEs and large businesses to ensure markets for their goods; and
- Improve the working of financial institutions so that they, too, have the capacity of assessing SME risk, designing products suitable to them and providing timely financial assistance.
- Recognizing the absence of suitable professionals for SME lending and development, we will introduce curriculum in leading business (and other) schools, wherein this will be taught as a subject. This will then ensure that in future, the country has a cadre of individuals who are well versed in SME lending techniques and in SME development issues.

## **Labor Reforms**

PTI intends to rationalize, simplify, and enforce labor laws to ensure:

- All rights associated with trade union activities;
- The implementation of the already guaranteed profit sharing system;
- The repeal of repressive labor laws, and amendments in the trade unions act and other laws to bring these in line with provisions of the Convention of the International Labor Organization to which Pakistan is a signatory;
- The extension of the scope of labor laws to include labor hired by contractors under the "Thekedari system" so as to protect their rights to bargaining;
- The reorganization of existing Social Security institutions to eliminate corruption and ensure that the funds paid by employers to the Employees Old-age Benefit Institution and other social security institutions reach the employees;
- The provision of job security to workers and insurance and social security/unemployment cover, and strengthening of 'safety net' in consultation with economic experts and Trade Unions;
- Representation for working classes in the National and Provincial Assemblies and local bodies; and
- Improved vocational training opportunities for labor to raise their technical skills, productivity and incomes.

## **Privatization Policy**

We believe that privatization has an important role to play in the development of our country, but disposing off national assets must be done in a planned and transparent manner, with the proceeds being used for debt retirement or for other clearly stated national priorities. Indiscriminate privatization under the present military government because of its insatiable need for cash to finance its spending sprees, has led to tremendous abuse and corruption. Examples in this regard are the aborted sale of the Steel Mills, the handover of the KESC to private parties and that of PTCL, whose new owners have been given extraordinary concessions to the detriment of other local competitors. The new owners of banks such as HBL, Allied, UBL and some energy companies have

made manifold returns on equity for their new owners in very short periods. A significant contribution to these profits has been the enormous spreads between deposit and lending rates of banks during the last two to three years. It also shows how little concern has been given to the plight of the ordinary depositor who is their major customer.

PTI believes that privatization must take place under clear policy guidelines by an independent privatization commission that is professionally run and under the strict surveillance of parliament. Our policy will ensure that privatization is held with all possible transparency and with full public consultation. We intend to put in place the following principles:

- Strengthening of all respective Industrial Regulators (NEPRA, OGRA, SBP etc) and to give them full (not token) independence to ensure that the consumer's interest is fully protected.
- A transparent and public consultative process on the assets that are to be privatized.
- A transparent and public process for the sale of assets.
- Preference will be given to local investors or sales through the stock exchanges.
- A detailed quarterly report on the privatization process to parliament to ensure that the process remains open and transparent.

## **Tourism**

Tourism would be encouraged as a means for generating employment and investment in the local economy. The PTI will:

- Promote domestic tourism to forge national cohesion;
- Develop a national policy for tourism to encourage small to medium investors in promoting domestic tourism; and
- Prepare a comprehensive policy with the allocation of necessary resources to protect national heritage;

## **Energy Sector**

The PTI will re-focus investment in the energy sector from thermal and furnace oil to hydel, coal, and gas for power generation. The de-regulation and liberalization policy would aim to develop local energy resources for consumption at affordable rates.

- Restructuring of WAPDA would be expedited to improve the efficiency of power generation, transmission and distribution;
- Develop a commercially viable power tariff structure that protects the weaker sections of society from unbridled increase in utility rates and yet generates enough resources for future investment;
- Expediting rural electrification so that 80 percent of the villages have power;
- Encourage CNG use-Introduce policy for conversion of all public commercial vehicles to CNG;
- Introduce a policy with time bound objectives for the promotion of non-conventional sources of energy such as wind and solar power;
- Nuclear power programme will be expanded; and
- In the oil and coal sector, encourage local private sector in extraction and encourage joint ventures with foreign companies.

## **Communication Infrastructure**

Pakistan's physical communication infrastructure is antiquated and impedes economic growth. The road network requires major investment for rehabilitation and upgradation while the railway system continues to suffer the ill effects of years of neglect and mismanagement.

- A comprehensive restructuring plan would be prepared to upgrade the physical communications infrastructure.
- Introduce public-private partnership in improving the efficiency of the railway system;
- Railway cargo services with container transport will be encouraged;
- The National Highways Authority will identify the most heavily used sections of the national highway system to formulate and implement an up-gradation plan;

- All the four provincial capitals would be linked with four lane (two lane each way) highway;
- Streamline cargo flights based on commercial requirements with seasonal fluctuations-initiate cargo flights from Quetta for export of high value fruits;
- Invest in improving the efficiency of the ports for cargo handling to reduce turnaround time; and
- Gwadar port would be upgraded and linked to national highway grid.

### **Telecommunications and Information Technology**

Modern telecommunication services are essential pre-requisite for human and economic development. The recent progress in the access to Internet facilities would be sustained and expanded. Already, about 500 cities, towns, and villages have access to Internet. The PTI will initiate the following reforms in the telecom sector:

- The PTA would be made more autonomous.
- Rules and regulations would be streamlined to eliminate discrimination and provide a level playing field between government-owned and private telecom companies;
- Increase foreign currency holding ceiling for software exporters from 35 percent to 75 percent; and
- Provide free Internet connections all private recognized IT institutes and universities.

### **NATIONAL SECURITY**

To achieve our Aims of economic prosperity and Human development, we need to ensure peace in our region. Conflicts within or across our borders will only divert the national resources and energies. The external threat to our country has been minimized by our nuclear and deterrent capability, but the conflict in Afghanistan is already having an adverse impact in our western border areas. We must arrest this spread of militancy through effective diplomatic measures and a show of force where necessary.



## **Foreign Policy**

Our foreign policy has been susceptible to manipulation because of internal political instability and weak leadership. The events since September 11 have reinforced the need for an independent foreign policy that has the backing of the people and can withstand the pressures brought to bear by external interests. As a free and sovereign state we must not bend to the dictates of alien interests and buckle under economic blackmail.

The present campaign against terrorism runs the risk of polarizing the world and raising the specter of a clash of ideologies. The shortsighted policies of the present government have pitted the Army against our own people, creating a national crisis for the sake of petty political gains. The PTI rejects all forms of political and economic hegemony. Our foreign policy will:

- Promote regional peace with all neighboring countries based on sovereign equality, mutual benefit and non – interference in each other’s internal affairs.
- Pursue our political and economic interests more proactively
- Work towards peaceful co-existence with India based on sovereign equality, and a just solution of outstanding disputes;
- Resolutely support the Kashmiri freedom struggle and promote resolution of the dispute on the basis of their right of self-determination, on the basis of UN resolutions;
- Establish a new paradigm of mutually beneficial relations with the USA based on shared interests and common values;
- Consolidate further the close traditional friendship with the Peoples Republic of China by substantially increasing cooperation in commerce, trade, and security areas;
- Actively promote unity and closer economic and security ties among Islamic States, in particular with our neighbours Iran, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states

- Support efforts for rapid return to normalcy in Afghanistan by strengthening the unique and close relations with Afghanistan;
- Seek improvement of relations with Russia and enhance cooperation for mutual benefit
- Maintain traditionally cordial relations and mutually beneficial collaboration with Europe, in particular the EU.
- Seek broader avenues of economic interaction with ASEAN, Japan, Africa and Latin America.
- Seek full membership of the SCO – the Shanghai Cooperation Organization
- Closely coordinate our negotiating position on WTO matters with like minded country

## **Security**

The PTI recognizes the necessity of maintaining and developing an effective capacity for the defense of sovereignty and territorial integrity.

PTI are committed to:

- Strengthen country's nuclear deterrent;
- Continue to test and deploy ballistic missiles with a view to increasing their range and accuracy;
- Rationalize the size and structure of our armed forces in view of the strength gained from our deterrence capability
- Initiate urgent measures to strengthen the air and naval arms of the armed forces in addition to focus on modernizing the army;
- Pay special attention to the needs of the retired military personnel.



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