



Norwegian University of Life Sciences
Faculty of Landscape and Society
Department of International Environment
and Development Studies

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A Global Agenda Meets Local Practices: An Ethnographic Study of the Introduction of REDD+ in Zanzibar

En global agenda møter lokale praksiser:
Et etnografisk studie av introduksjonen av
REDD+ på Zanzibar

Grete Benjaminsen

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
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PART TWO: Compilation of Papers

Paper 1: Benjaminsen, G. and R. Kaarhus, 2018. Commodification of forest carbon: REDD+ and socially embedded forest practices in Zanzibar, *Geoforum*, 93: pp. 48-56.

Paper 2: Benjaminsen, G., 2017. The bricolage of REDD+ in Zanzibar: from global environmental policy framework to community forest management. *Journal of Eastern African Studies*, 11 (3), pp. 506–525.

Paper 3: Benjaminsen, G., 2014. Between resistance and consent: project-village relationships when introducing REDD+ in Zanzibar. *Forum Development Studies*, 41 (3), pp. 377–398.

Paper 4: Benjaminsen, G. Access to land and forest resources in a REDD+ context in Zanzibar, Submitted here as draft paper.

Annex 1: List of informants (formal interviews)

Annex 2: Errata

SUMMARY

This thesis discusses REDD+ as an example of a highly ambitious global environmental policy framework conceived at international levels and implemented at local levels in forest communities across the Global South. The main objective is to investigate the encounter between the REDD+ global agenda, that is, the effort to reduce forest-based CO₂ emissions and thereby mitigate climate change, and the pre-existing social contexts to which REDD+ is introduced, and which REDD+ aims to regulate, modify and change. Inspired by scholars working within two partly overlapping fields of research, Political Ecology and the Anthropology of Development, this investigation of REDD+ explores both the discursive powers inherent in REDD+ and the assumptions on which REDD+ is based, as well as the particularities of existing socially embedded practices, meanings and relationships at local level in Zanzibar.

The analysis is based on long-term ethnographic fieldwork in Zanzibar investigating the REDD+ project known as HIMA at multiple levels - both at the level of Mitini - one of the local communities invited by HIMA to join the REDD+ scheme, as well as at policy levels among project staff and policy makers in Zanzibar Town. Data was collected through observation at about 45 project-related meetings; and through numerous informal and more than 100 formal interviews with informants before, between and after these meetings. The researcher's fluency in colloquial Swahili made direct data collection and participant observation possible. An investigation at multiple levels allowed for following the HIMA project at different stages in the implementation process, that is, from before its initiation in 2010 until after its end in 2014.

The four individual papers that form part of this thesis provide insights into different elements and aspects of the REDD+ policy framework, and the different stages of the process of introducing REDD+ in Zanzibar. By discussing both how the various elements of the REDD+ policy framework are incorporated into practice and at times subverted by local actors, the four papers offer valuable insights into how REDD+ is both 'constituted' and 'contested' by the actors involved in its implementation. The papers demonstrate how the REDD+ policy framework is not introduced into a vacuum. When introduced to Zanzibar, REDD+ is conditioned and affected by historical and socio-political relations and experiences, local realities and embedded practices. These factors all have implications for the implementation of REDD+, and the level to which practical implementation is in line with the policy design and intentions. At a more general level, the thesis thus advances our understanding of why various interventions and development initiatives often do not deliver as planned.

The papers also show that certain elements of the REDD+ policy framework have constituting and disciplining effects on the HIMA project. The procedure of carbon accounting, that is, the process of calculating changes in forest cover and carbon stocks, and furthermore translating these into measurable carbon units, was considered a technical necessity. Carbon accounting could hence not be discarded by the project, despite local project staff's serious reservations about this type of practice.

The thesis argues that by not taking into account the existing historical and socio-political context of local livelihood struggles, the HIMA project not only risks failing to achieve its expected goals of reduced forest loss and CO₂ emissions, it also risks consolidating existing structural inequalities, exacerbating conflicts, and, moreover, creating new ones. Further, since the validation of the HIMA Carbon Project is still pending, and since HIMA has still not sold any

carbon, the 45 local communities that have signed Community Forest Management Agreements with the Zanzibar government risk finding themselves in the precarious situation of having signed away their rights to use forest resources while receiving little or no revenues or compensation in return. In this way, REDD+ in Zanzibar has created new uncertainties and relations of dependence at local levels. I argue that the ethnographic material presented describing these processes provides new and empirically grounded insights into the broad variety of dilemmas project managers - as well as local communities - face when implementing PES-based REDD+ projects at local level.

SAMMENDRAG

I denne avhandlingen diskuteres REDD+ som et eksempel på et ambisiøst globalt miljøpolitisk rammeverk utviklet på internasjonalt og implementert på lokalt nivå i ulike skogssamfunn i det globale sør. Avhandlingen har som hovedmål å utforske interaksjonen mellom REDD+ som en global agenda - der REDD+s ambisjoner om å redusere skogsrelaterte CO₂-utslipp og dermed også klimaendringene står sentralt - og de sosiale kontekstene hvor REDD+ blir introdusert, og som REDD+ har som mål å regulere, tilpasse og endre. Inspirert av forskere innenfor to delvis overlappende forskningsområder - politisk økologi og utviklingsantropologi - utforskes REDD+-relaterte diskurser, med de antagelser og tatt-for-gittheter som REDD+ rammeverket baseres på, samt egenskaper og særtrekk ved eksisterende sosiale praksiser, relasjoner og mening på lokal nivå.

Analysen er basert på langsiktig etnografisk feltarbeid på Zanzibar. Et REDD+ prosjekt ved navn 'HIMA' studeres på flere nivåer; i Mitini - et av de lokalsamfunnene HIMA inviterte til å delta i REDD+, samt blant prosjektansatte og politiske beslutningstakere i Zanzibar Town. Data ble samlet inn gjennom observasjon av omlag 45 prosjektrelaterte møter, og gjennom en rekke uformelle og mer enn 100 formelle intervjuer med informanter før, mellom og etter disse møtene. Forskerens gode Swahili-kunnskaper muliggjorde direkte datainnsamling og deltakende observasjon. Ved å studere REDD+ på flere nivåer var det også mulig å følge HIMA-prosjektet på forskjellige stadier i gjennomføringen, det vil si fra før oppstart i 2010 til etter prosjektets avslutning i 2014.

De fire papere som sammen utgjør denne avhandlingen gir innsikt i ulike elementer og aspekter ved REDD+-rammeverket, samt i de ulike stadiene av prosessen med å introdusere REDD+ til Zanzibar. Ved å både diskutere hvordan de ulike policyelementene ved REDD+ innlemmes i praksis og til tider undergraves av lokale aktører, gir de fire papere verdifull innsikt i hvordan REDD+ både blir *konstituert av* og *konstituerende for* aktørene involvert i implementeringen. Papere viser hvordan REDD+-rammeverket ikke blir introdusert i et vakuum, men at introduksjonen av REDD+ i Zanzibar betinges og påvirkes av historiske og sosiopolitiske forhold, lokale realiteter og sosiale praksiser. Disse faktorene har implikasjoner for den praktiske implementeringen av REDD+, samt for i hvilken grad implementeringen er i tråd med REDD+-rammeverkets design og intensjoner. Ved å bidra med innsikt om disse faktorene gir avhandlingen dypere forståelse av hvorfor ulike tiltak og utviklingsinitiativer ofte ikke når planlagte mål.

Videre viser papere at enkelte elementer ved REDD+-rammeverket har konstituerende og disiplinerende effekt på HIMA-prosjektet. Prosessen knyttet til karbonmåling, det vil si prosessen med å beregne endringer i skogdekke og karbonlagre, og videre konverteringen av dette til målbare karbonenheter, ble ansett som en 'teknisk nødvendighet'. Karbonmålingen kunne derfor ikke forkastes av prosjektet til tross for utstrakt skepsis til denne type praksis blant den lokale prosjektstaben.

Avhandlingen hevder at uten hensyn til eksisterende historiske og sosiopolitiske kontekster og lokale levekår, mislykkes HIMA-prosjektet ikke bare med å nå forventede mål om redusert avskoging og CO₂-utslipp, det bidrar også til å konsolidere eksisterende strukturelle ulikheter, forverre konflikter, og dessuten skape nye. Siden HIMA som karbonprosjekt fortsatt ikke er

godkjent, og følgelig fortsatt ikke har solgt noe karbon, risikerer de 45 lokalsamfunnene som har inngått avtaler om vern av lokale allmenninger å befinne seg i en situasjon der de har signert bort egen rett til naturressursene, men mottar lite eller ingen inntekter eller erstatning i retur. REDD+ i Zanzibar har dermed bidratt til ny usikkerhet og nye avhengighetsrelasjoner på lokal nivå. Avhandlingen argumenterer for at det etnografiske materialet som beskriver disse prosessene gir vesentlig ny og empirisk innsikt i et bredt spekter av dilemmaer prosjektledere og lokalsamfunn stilles overfor i implementeringen av PES-baserte REDD+-prosjekter på lokalt nivå.

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GLOSSARY

Choyo - a jealousy that can be harmful

Diwani - member of the District Council, elected at ward level

Eid - Muslim festivals, in particular Eid al-Fitr or Eid al-Adha

Jimbo - constituency, the level from which members of the House of Representatives are elected

Kanga - light, colorful fabric worn by women

Kiambo - homestead/family managed land

Konde - a piece of communal land cultivated on a basis of individual user-rights

Kuchangia - to contribute/to help each other

Kuni kavu - dried/dead wood

Kustahamili - to be patient

Kuvumulia - to tolerate hardship

Mabalozi ya nyumba kumi – ‘ambassadors of ten houses’, replaced the *shehas* at local level after the 1964 Revolution

Maeneo ya jamii - community areas

Mashamba binafsi - private land

Maulidi - the celebration of the birth of Prophet Mohammed

Maweni - coral rag area (literary, ‘in the stones’)

Mgeni - individual not originating from the local community (literary, ‘guest’ - sing. of ‘wageni’)

Misitu ya jamii - community forests

Mkubwa - ‘big person’/person with influence (sing. of wakubwa)

Mwenyeji - a local (literary, ‘the owner of the town’, sing. of wenyaji)

Ndugu - sister(s)/brother(s)

Ngoma ya shetani - a spirit possession ritual

Shamba - typically, an agricultural plot or garden with permanent crops often surrounding peoples’ houses

Sheha - currently, centrally appointed government official at shehia level. The colonial administration also appointed shehas as their representatives at local level

Shehia - the lowest administrative level in Zanzibar

Sheikh - a Muslim scholar

Sikukuu - celebrations marking important Muslim holidays

Uchawi - witchcraft

Udugu - brotherhood/sisterhood

Uganga - sorcery

Ukili - a narrow strip of dried palm fronds

Ukoo - kin group

Uwanda - savannah-like bush and grassland typically used for animal grazing

Visheti - coconut donut

Wageni - individuals not originating from the local community (literally ‘guests’ - plur. of mgeni)

Wakubwa - people with influence (literary ‘big people’, plur. of mkubwa)

Wananchi - ‘locals’ (literally ‘owners of the country’)

Waraka - document

Watu wanne - local council of elders (literary, ‘four persons’)

Wenyeji - locals (literary, ‘owners of the town’, plur. of mwenyeji)

ACRONYMS AND ORGANISATIONS

ASP - Afro-Shirazi Party

CCB - Climate, Community and Biodiversity (standards)

CCBA - Climate, Community and Biodiversity Alliance

CCM - Chama cha Mapinduzi

CDM - Clean Development Mechanism

CIFOR - Centre for International Forestry Research

COFMA - Community Forest Management Agreement

CUF - Civic United Front

DCCFF - Department of Commercial Crops, Fruits and Forestry

FCPF - Forest Carbon Framework Program (under the World Bank)

FPIC - Free, Prior, Informed Consent

JUMIJAZA - Jumuiya ya Uhifadhi Misitu ya Jamii Zanzibar (Association for conservation of traditional forests in Zanzibar)

GCS - Global Comparative Study (on REDD+ - conducted by CIFOR).

HIMA - Hifadhi ya Misitu ya Asili (conservation of traditional forests)

HoR - House of Representatives

IPCC - Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change

NICFI - Norwegian International Climate and Forest Initiative

NSD - Norwegian Social Science Data Service

PES - Payment for Ecosystem Services

REDD - Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation

REDD+ - Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation, including the enhancement of forest carbon stocks, forest conservation, and sustainable management.

SMOLE - Sustainable Management of Land and Environment (project under the Ministry of Land, Housing, Labor and Environment in Zanzibar)

TANU - Tanganyika African National Union

UNFCCC - United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

UN-REDD - United Nations program on REDD

VCS - Verified Carbon Standards

ZNP - Zanzibar Nationalist Party

ZPPP - Zanzibar and Pemba Peoples' Party

ZSTC - Zanzibar State Trading Cooperation

'Bi Grete, I tell you this often. This country is not governed by law - it is governed by power ('nguvu')'.
(Male informant, Mitini, Zanzibar)

1. INTRODUCTION

This thesis examines the introduction of the policy framework known as Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+) into local realities in Zanzibar. As a mechanism negotiated under the auspices of United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC),¹ REDD+ was developed to mitigate climate change through the reduction of CO₂ emissions caused by deforestation and degradation of tropical forests. Since its inception, REDD+ has emerged as a key strategy in the global agenda to mitigate climate change.

1.1. REDD+ and the global agenda to mitigate climate change

The emission of greenhouse gases from human activities is a significant contributor to climate change, which many consider to be one of the most pervasive and challenging problems of our time (IPCC, 2013). Global warming, causing changes in precipitation patterns and bringing more extreme weather, including hurricanes, flooding and droughts, is expected to have unprecedented and far-reaching impacts on both the natural environment and the societies we live in (IPCC, 2014). With the adoption of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) at the Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, international cooperation on handling climate change as a global environmental problem was formalized.

Each year, the 197 countries that have ratified the UNFCCC meet to discuss appropriate measures to address reductions of greenhouse gas emissions (e.g. Lahn and Wilson Rowe, 2015). The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)² has estimated that the energy sector - and more specifically the burning of fossil fuels, such as coal, oil and gas used in industrial development, transportation and private consumption - is the economic sector that contributes most to greenhouse gas emissions (IPCC, 2014). However, for countries with high levels of fossil fuel consumption (or production, such as in the case of Norway), cutting emissions in the energy sector is associated with high domestic costs and objections from an often powerful

¹ UNFCCC's main objective is 'to stabilize the greenhouse gas emissions in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interferences with the climate system' (Wiesmeth, 2012:36).

² IPCC is the international body that assesses scientific work on climate change.

emission-intensive lobby (see e.g. Hermansen and Kasa, 2014). National policy makers in these countries have therefore put a lot of effort into exploring alternative policy options that could enable - and justify - emission cuts in other sectors, and abroad (ibid, see also Long et al, 2010). The idea of reducing emissions from deforestation in tropical forest is one such option.

The potential of forests to store carbon has been recognised by the World Commission on Environment and Development since 1987 (WCED, 1987). In the early 1990s, several scientific studies pointed to carbon emissions originating from deforestation in tropical forests, estimating that these contributed to between 20 and 40 percent of global carbon emissions (see Bäckstrand and Lövbrand, 2006: 57).³ With deforestation conceived as a source of carbon emissions, the link between forests and climate change gained increasing prominence in international negotiations (Allan and Dauvergne, 2013). Nevertheless, to the disappointment of many forest-rich countries that for decades had lobbied for international attention and recognition of their efforts to protect forests (Humphreys, 2009), efforts to reduce deforestation in tropical forests were not included in the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) of the UNFCCC Kyoto Protocol of 1997.

During the UNFCCC negotiations in Montreal in 2005, a coalition of rainforest nations, led by Papua New Guinea and Costa Rica, presented a proposal that reintroduced the role of forests in carbon sequestration. The proposal urged the creation of: (1) a mechanism that would assign a monetary value to forests for their ability to sequester carbon, and (2) an international market for the trading of carbon credits. The proposal generated significant positive responses from various actors and delegates (Allan and Dauvergne, 2013), and received a gentle push forward when, shortly after the Montreal negotiations, the British government published a report presenting combating deforestation as a low-cost climate mitigation option (Stern, 2006). In subsequent years, the report became an authoritative reference for those arguing that combating deforestation in tropical forests is the most cost-effective means to cut greenhouse gas emissions, and thus mitigate climate change. The report also had great influence on the conceptualization of REDD during its early stages. In Bali, during the UNFCCC negotiations in 2007, this global initiative for combating

³ In 2007, IPCC estimated greenhouse gas emissions originating from deforestation to be 17%. This estimate has since been challenged in the scientific literature. Studies published towards the end of 2012 estimated that tropical deforestation only accounts for about 10 percent of the world's greenhouse emissions (e.g. Baccini et al, 2012). In policy circles, however, 17% is a commonly used estimate.

deforestation and forest degradation was formally launched as REDD. Later a ‘plus’ was added (REDD+) to indicate the inclusion of additional objectives, such as the enhancement of forest carbon stocks, forest conservation, and sustainable management.

The initial concept of REDD+ is strongly informed by the Payment for Ecosystem Services (PES) model (Angelsen and McNeill, 2012). In conventional terms, REDD+ would facilitate voluntary, performance-based market transactions of climate mitigation services provided by forests (see e.g. Wunder, 2005). By attaching a market value to the ecosystem services provided through sequestration and storage of forest carbon, REDD+ was established to enable countries with high emissions to buy carbon credits from developing countries with tropical forests (Leach and Scones, 2015; see also Long et al, 2010). Through the process of converting local forests into a source of a single commodity for sale (‘forest carbon’), REDD+ also belongs to a range of neoliberal conservation initiatives (e.g. Fletcher et al, 2016). The process of commodifying carbon, and the way this process is at odds with local forests practices in Zanzibar, is discussed in Paper 1 of this thesis.

1.2. Translating REDD+ into practice

While REDD+ has been conceived internationally, it is implemented at local levels in forested communities across the Global South. Since the 2010 climate negotiations in Cancun, the UNFCCC has established a process that enables institutions in developing countries, including in forest-protecting communities, to qualify for sale of carbon credits through REDD+ (UNFCCC, 2010). Developed countries are requested to provide financial and technical support to this preparation phase, which is commonly referred to as the ‘REDD+ readiness process’.

With support from UN-REDD and the World Bank’s Forest Carbon Program Framework (FCPF), about 70 developing countries across three continents (Africa, Asia and Latin-America) have entered into REDD+ readiness processes.⁴ These processes entail the development of national strategies to align existing policies with REDD+, competence building on REDD+ within responsible institutions, and identification of the drivers of deforestation. They also

⁴ The UN-REDD supports 64 readiness processes, while the FCPF have entered into agreements with 44 countries. Some countries are however supported by both initiatives.

include the development of so-called ‘carbon accounting systems’ to monitor, measure, report and verify changes in forest cover and carbon stocks (see e.g. Angelsen and McNeill, 2012: 44).

Thus far, more than 500 local REDD+ pilot projects have been implemented worldwide (Fletcher et al, 2016). The contexts in which these projects have been introduced vary considerably - in terms of, for example, forest and landscape types, land tenure practices, socio-economic status and the history of prior interventions. The type of projects also vary greatly, as they emphasize different elements of the REDD+ policy framework, in terms of what actors are involved and what funding sources are either in planning or exist (see Sills et al, 2014; Sunderlin et al, 2014).

Approximately US\$ 10 billion was pledged in support of REDD+ between 2006 - 2014 (IIED, 2015), but the pace of REDD+ implementation has been slow. The practical and methodological complexities of the REDD+ policy framework, in particular as related to carbon accounting, have made the implementation process much more challenging than first anticipated (e.g Angelsen et al, 2012). Moreover, after the UNFCCC Paris Agreement of 2015 ‘failed to create the binding national caps needed to boost demand for global carbon trading’, it has become increasingly clear that the global carbon market as first envisioned will not materialise (Angelsen et al, 2017: 718). Funding thus constitutes a key challenge for many REDD+ projects (see also Sills et al, 2014). Nevertheless, REDD+ as a mechanism for offering payment (or other types of result-based compensation) to countries and/or communities in the Global South that are able to demonstrate progress in the reduction of forest-related CO₂ emissions is still promoted as a key international response to the global problem of climate change (see e.g. Van Hecken et al, 2015; Lund et al, 2017).

1.3. The introduction of REDD+ in Tanzania and Zanzibar

Tanzania was among the first countries to enter into a so-called REDD+ readiness process. Primarily funded by the Norwegian International Climate and Forest Initiative (NICFI), the first measures to prepare Tanzania for forest carbon trade began in 2008.⁵ A REDD+ secretariat was established at the University of Dar es Salaam’s Institute of Resource Assessment. Its main role

⁵ The NICFI’s budget in Tanzania was estimated at NOK 500 million over five years (equivalent to about USD 60 million). NICFI was thus by far the largest contributor to the REDD+ readiness process in Tanzania. The UN-REDD and the government of Finland also supported process.

was to facilitate a national consultation process in preparation of a REDD+ strategy for Tanzania, and, further, to coordinate, implement and monitor REDD+ processes in the country on behalf of a national REDD+ task force.⁶

In February 2009, the Norwegian embassy to Tanzania launched a call for proposals for REDD+ pilot projects. These pilot projects' main objective was to test different elements of the REDD+ policy framework at different sites across the country. From the 45 proposals received, nine NGOs were invited to prepare fully-fledged proposals.⁷ One such project was proposed by CARE International in Tanzania in collaboration with the Department of Commercial Crops, Fruits and Forestry⁸ under the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Environment in Zanzibar. Under the name of 'Hifadhi ya Misitu ya Asili'⁹ (HIMA), the project aimed to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from deforestation and forest degradation, and to generate carbon income as an economic incentive to local communities in Zanzibar to manage forests sustainably (CARE, 2009: 5). As a REDD+ pilot project funded by the Norwegian Embassy to Tanzania, HIMA commenced its activities in April 2010, and closed down in December 2014.

At the project's inception, the HIMA pilot project was divided into three main clusters. Community Forest Management - and more particularly the facilitation of community-level consultative processes to define the areas that would be set aside for carbon sequestration and storage in Zanzibar - was key (CARE, 2009). As part of these processes, Zanzibar forest authorities were to negotiate - and potentially sign - Community Forest Management Agreements (COFMAs) with the local communities identified by HIMA as potential REDD+ communities. COFMA negotiations entailed the drawing of community borders and the zoning of areas in order to determine areas to be set aside for 'conservation', 'utilization' and 'alternative use'.

⁶ Members of the task force primarily included technical staff from the Vice President's Office of Tanzania and the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism - the two agencies in Tanzania having political authority relevant to REDD+, as well as one delegate from Zanzibar. From 2012, the task force was expanded to include more sectors, one extra delegate from Zanzibar, and one representing civil society.

⁷ An old corruption case complicated the relationship between the Norwegian embassy and certain government agencies in Tanzania, and became imperative for the Embassy's decision to give the responsibility for the implementation of REDD+ pilot projects in Tanzania to national and international NGOs (See Jansen, 2009).

⁸ From now on referred to as the Department of Forestry.

⁹ In Swahili: 'the conservation of traditional forests'. I was told that the acronym 'HIMA' forms an Arabic word, which means 'an inviolable zone or boundary.' In Islam, the term 'hima' refers to 'a system of environmental protection'. In Swahili, 'hima' also means 'haste, urgency, focused forward energy'.

(Paper 3 in this thesis discusses in detail the COFMA negotiation process in one selected community). Before the negotiations could begin, HIMA oversaw the election of the local conservation committees that would represent local communities during the COFMA negotiations. Initially, the aim was to work with 12 new and 17 existing COFMAs (CARE, 2009: 5), but at project closure, the number of COFMAs had increased significantly. A total number of 45 agreements had been signed - establishing that the rights to the benefits from the sale of sequestered carbon would lie with the local communities. The signed COFMAs committed the local communities for the next 30 years, and provided the basis for the future validated REDD+ carbon project in Zanzibar (see Map 1).

Land-use planning, through zoning and the designation of specific areas for conservation under the COFMA agreements, was expected to increase the areas slated for conservation, and reducing forest loss at local levels. Measures were also taken to reduce local communities' dependence on forest resources, and to prevent increased pressure on neighboring forests (in REDD+ parlance, 'leakage control'). Project activities included the introduction of improved stoves; the establishment of local woodlots for fuelwood and building materials; as well as the promotion of alternative income-generating activities. An 'energy switch' strategy, primarily entailing the promotion of bottled gas for cooking in the urban and semi-urban areas, and thus the reduction of the overall demand for wood fuel on the islands, was also designed. In Paper 2 of the thesis, I discuss how and why certain of these components were emphasized, while others were marginalized or excluded from the REDD+ readiness process.

With assistance from the US-based Consultancy firm Terra Global Capital, HIMA opted to adhere to the carbon accounting framework known as the Verified Carbon Standards (VCS).¹⁰ HIMA also aimed to implement the Climate, Community and Biodiversity (CCB) Standards¹¹ - a set of standards intended to improve carbon projects' social and environmental benefits, hence safeguarding against potential negative impacts (CARE, 2009: 8). In order to successfully

¹⁰ VCS presents itself as 'the world's leading voluntary greenhouse gas program ...founded by a collection of business and environmental leaders who saw a need for greater quality assurance in voluntary carbon markets' (Verified Carbon Standards, 2015).

¹¹ The CCB Standards were developed by the CCB Alliance, which was founded in 2003 by a consortium of international non-governmental organizations (including CARE International). The CCB Alliance aims 'to stimulate and promote land management activities that credibly mitigate global climate change, improve the well-being and reduce the poverty of local communities, and conserve biodiversity' (CCB Alliance, 2013). Since November 2014, CCB has been managed by VCS.

comply with the CCB standards, HIMA staff invested a great deal of effort into the collection of necessary data, and developing procedures for managing the VCS/CCB requirements. However, due to Zanzibar's semi-autonomous system of governance, which differs distinctly from that of mainland Tanzania, in order to become eligible for sale of carbon, HIMA also had to undertake separate and additional REDD+ readiness activities from those undertaken at the level of the Union Government of Tanzania. This included the facilitation of the revision of policies and the establishment of systems, institutions and capacities necessary for REDD+ in Zanzibar. As such, HIMA became by default the facilitator of a REDD+ readiness process at the level of Zanzibar.

In 2009, when CARE Tanzania responded to the Norwegian Embassy's call for proposals for REDD+ pilot projects, I was working for CARE Norway in Oslo. As part of CARE Norway's focus on 'women's empowerment and gender equality', and as CARE Norway's advisor on Tanzania, I was invited into the process to develop the HIMA project proposal, and in particular to provide advice on how the planned HIMA project could ensure 'gender mainstreaming'. This was my first encounter with REDD+. Already knowing Zanzibar well¹², as I learned about the REDD+ policy framework's onerous technical requirements, I became intrigued both by HIMA's high ambitions, and the simplistic way REDD+-related issues were being debated by politicians and other REDD+ proponents in Norway. I decided to develop a PhD project that would explore these complexities in depth. One of the last events I took part in before leaving CARE for PhD studies at the Norwegian University of Life Sciences was the HIMA inception workshop that took place in Zanzibar in June 2010. During the workshop, I shared my interest in doing the PhD on the HIMA project with the leadership of CARE Tanzania. They immediately supported my suggestion of combining an investigation of the implementation of HIMA at the community level with an exploration of how HIMA staff - and other policy actors in Zanzibar - received and experienced the introduction of REDD+. CARE also offered to grant me access to REDD+-related activities organized by the project.

¹² As a student of Swahili, I visited Zanzibar several times in the mid-1990s. In 1997, I conducted my first fieldwork in Zanzibar - spending five months in two different villages on the East coast of Unguja as part of my MSc degree. In subsequent years, I continued to return to Zanzibar frequently, and I developed fluency in colloquial Swahili. I was hence already well-acquainted with Zanzibar society and with the Swahili language before embarking on this PhD project.

Map 1: Map of Zanzibar indicating the areas included in the Carbon Project, submitted for validation and verification in December 2014. Source: VCS Project Database (2017)



1.4. Critical investigations of climate mitigation through forest conservation

Since the inception of REDD+ more than a decade ago, research on REDD+ has been extensive.¹³ Aiming to contribute to the design and implementation of the REDD+ policy framework, much of the research conducted has discussed REDD+ based on insights from previous research on related topics (see e.g. Angelsen et al, 2009; Angelsen et al, 2012). Critical scholars have cautioned against REDD+ as part of the neoliberal trend of promoting technocratic and market-based - rather than political - solutions to global environmental problems (e.g. Fletcher et al, 2016; McAfee, 2016). Studies have also pointed to the practical and methodological complexities involved in implementing REDD+, and the ways in which these complexities complicate the actual achievement of REDD+'s defined goal of reducing forest loss and greenhouse gas emissions (e.g. McAfee, 2014; Leach and Scoones, 2015; see also Angelsen et al, 2017). Drawing on long-term research on forest conservation in Tanzania, Lund et al. (2017: 125) have argued that REDD+ has become a 'discursive commodity' that policy makers, and other actors within the 'development and conservation industry' may convert into financial resources to sustain their livelihoods (see also Koch, 2017). Lund et al (2017) further refer to REDD+ in Tanzania as a 'conservation fad', which, despite its promises and the enthusiasm REDD+ generated in its early phases, produces little but continuity and business-as-usual scenarios. In this thesis, I investigate how the various actors involved in the introduction of REDD+ to Zanzibar encounter, interpret and give meaning to REDD+. The investigation includes an attention to how REDD+-specific policy models are translated into practical implementation.

An increasing number of scholarships are also empirically investigating how specific REDD+ projects have evolved on the ground in the communities where REDD+ is implemented. This research has made it increasingly clear that, rather than generating livelihood benefits in the local communities, localized REDD+ projects have inflicted social costs on local women and men, also causing uncompensated dispossessions (see e.g. Nel, 2016; Chomba et al, 2016; Asiyambi, 2016). In Tanzania, similar observations have been made by Svarstad and Benjaminsen (2017; see also Beymer-Farris and Bassett, 2012). Other studies have discussed how REDD+ projects

¹³ A search in Google Scholar in April 2018 gave almost 7700 hits on 'REDD+'.

have triggered local contestations and resistance-like behavior of various kinds (e.g. Cavanagh and Benjaminsen, 2015; Asiyambi et al, 2017; Nathan and Pasgaard, 2017). This thesis builds on and seeks to contribute to critical scholarship on REDD+. Based on long-term ethnographic fieldwork across multiple scales in Zanzibar, this thesis, more specifically, offers an in-depth, empirically based analysis of the phenomenon of REDD+ in Zanzibar - at different levels and in different stages of the REDD+ implementation process.

Thus far, research on REDD+ in Zanzibar has been limited.¹⁴ This thesis does however draw on insights from the writings of several geographers and political ecologists who have worked in Zanzibar. Finnish scholars Niina Käykhö and Nora Fagerholm have published widely on landscape, land and forest use and change in rural Zanzibar (Unguja Island) (e.g. Käykhö et al, 2011; Fagerholm et al, 2012; Fagerholm et al, 2013; Käykhö et al, 2015). Stefan Gössling has explored the political ecology of tourism, including its effects on natural resources (e.g. Gössling, 2001, 2003). Several scholars have written about environmental governance and the politics of natural resource conservation in Zanzibar - on marine resource management (see e.g. Leville, 2004; 2007; Saunders et al, 2010; Shinn, 2014), as well as on biodiversity and forest conservation (e.g. Chachage, 2000; Myers, 2002; Saunders et al, 2008; Salum, 2009; Saunders, 2011). Focusing on the urban political ecology of Zanzibar, Myers (2002; 2008) has emphasized the importance of understanding existing power relations and underlying social and political structures when exploring how environmental initiatives evolve. Through an ethnographic study of the introduction of REDD+ on multiple levels in Zanzibar - also exploring the historical and socio-political contexts shaping the realities and practices of local livelihood struggles, this thesis seeks to take on such a challenge.

¹⁴ Apart from my own work, I am aware of one other peer-reviewed article that explicitly deals with REDD+ in Zanzibar. Andrews and Borgerhoff-Mulder (2018: 93) intend to examine the design and ongoing implementation of REDD+ on Pemba Island 'to determine the extent to which the features of REDD+ might allow for the endogenous adoption of sustainable forest management institutions'. The article does however demonstrate limited understanding of REDD+ and the complexities and politics involved in its implementation. The HIMA project has also been part of Centre for International Forestry Research (CIFOR)'s Global Comparative Study (GCS) on REDD+. This multi-year study covers nine countries and a large number of project sites, and has produced dozens of publications. However, since few of these present disaggregated HIMA-specific findings, they provide marginal insights into how REDD+ evolved in Zanzibar. Neither do they help in understanding the local effects of REDD+.

1.5. Objectives and Research Questions

The research on which this thesis is based combines an interest in REDD+ as a highly ambitious, internationally conceived global environmental policy framework with an examination of its practical implementation at local level in Zanzibar. The main objective of the thesis is *to investigate the encounter between the REDD+ policy framework - with its efforts to reduce forest-based CO₂ emissions - and local realities and practices at both the local community and policy levels in Zanzibar*. The thesis follows Li (2007: 27) in seeking to offer insights into both how the REDD+ policy framework is both ‘constituted’, and ‘contested’ by the actors involved in its implementation. Throughout the thesis, the focus is on the encounter between the REDD+ policy framework as a global agenda and the existing local realities and practices REDD+ aims to regulate, modify and change. The investigation considers both REDD+ as a global agenda with specific goals, logics, strategies and techniques, and as processes of translation - and giving meaning to - the various elements of REDD+ policy framework. As such, the thesis also contributes to and advances the discussions of why and how development - and environmental - initiatives, such as REDD+, often do not work as planners and policy makers intend. My analysis is based on long-term ethnographic fieldwork in Zanzibar. To address the overall research objective, this thesis explores a set of specific - and interlinked - research questions with sub-questions. These questions are addressed in four separate research papers.

Paper 1: *How has the process of converting local forests into a source of a single commodity for sale framed REDD+ practices in Zanzibar, and what implications has ‘the commodification of forest carbon’ had for social relationships and forest-based practices at the local level?*

Responding to these questions, I - together with co-author Randi Kaarhus - present in this paper an empirically-based and critical investigation of the specific ways in which the HIMA project in Zanzibar takes steps to establish the systems that - in line with the Payment for Ecosystem Services model, and Castree’s (2003) elements of commodification - seek to produce a forest carbon commodity eligible for sale at the global carbon market. Inspired by scholars such as Mauss (1966 [1925]) and Polanyi (1958), we furthermore discuss how socially embedded forest practices at the local level in rural Zanzibar, including local conceptions, norms and relationships, are at odds with these commodification processes.

Paper 2: *How did REDD+ proponents and policy-makers in Zanzibar receive and experience the introduction of REDD+, and to what extent were they in a position to adapt and modify the REDD+ policy framework in accordance with local contexts and needs?*

In order to respond to these questions, the paper provides an empirically grounded account of what happened when the REDD+ policy framework was translated into practical implementation in Zanzibar. The paper explores how REDD+ proponents and bureaucrats in Zanzibar received and experienced the introduction of REDD+. It discusses how these actors interpreted and gave meaning to REDD+, and the various elements of the REDD+ policy framework. Building on Francis Cleaver's (2012) concept of 'institutional bricolage', the paper identifies the factors that provide REDD+ with legitimacy at the policy making level in Zanzibar. In discussing why certain aspects of the REDD+ policy framework were incorporated into practice while others were rejected, I also draw on theoretical contributions from scholars such as anthropologists Ferguson (1990) and Green (2003), as well as on Foucault's notion of 'governmentality'.

Paper 3: *How did people in local rural communities in Zanzibar respond to a pre-REDD+ consultation process whereby community representatives and forest authorities negotiated a Community Forest Management Agreement (COFMA), and what factors contributed to shaping their responses?*

To address these two questions, the paper explores the introduction of REDD+ in one of the local communities invited by HIMA to join the future REDD+ scheme in Zanzibar. Drawing on ethnographic fieldwork that followed the COFMA process from start to end, and scholarly literature on 'agenda setting' (Mosse, 2010) and 'everyday resistance' (Scott, 1985; Holmes, 2007), I investigate rural villagers' possibilities for exercising social agency and influencing REDD+ at local level. The paper explores the multiple local responses to the project, as well as the factors that contributed to shaping these responses. Inspired by Foucault's conception of power and the tensions between different logics and practices at project vs. village level, the paper discusses the distinction between consent and non-consent to REDD+.

Paper 4: *Through what mechanisms do women and men in rural Zanzibar gain and maintain access to - and benefits from - land and forest resources; and how do these mechanisms shape the ways local community members are enabled to - and constrained from - benefiting from HIMA's effort to formalize carbon rights?*

To respond to these questions, the paper draws on Ribot and Peluso's (2003) 'theory of access', and discusses both the 'right-based' and 'structural and relational mechanisms' that govern resource access, use and management of land and forest resources in rural Zanzibar. In light of the broader scholarly debates about the limitations of efforts that seek to formalise tenure rights (Berry, 1993; Peters, 2004; 2013; Sjaastad and Cousins, 2008), the paper discusses implications when the REDD+/HIMA project seeks to formalise carbon rights, and thus - arguably - to ensure that local communities become the primary beneficiaries of potential future carbon revenues generated in Zanzibar.

1.6. Structure of the thesis

The thesis primarily consists of four scholarly papers that respond to the research questions enumerated above. Three of these papers are published. The fourth is here submitted as a draft paper. The four papers are presented in full in section 7. Sections 1-5 introduce the four papers by providing the thesis' overarching approach setting the stage for the research, and outlining the theoretical influences and methodological stances, results and broader conclusions of the thesis as a whole. Above in section 1, I provided the background to the global agenda for mitigating climate change through reducing forest-based CO₂ emissions, the evolution of the REDD+ policy framework, and its introduction to Tanzania and Zanzibar. I briefly accounted for the available knowledge relevant to the topic, and outlined the objectives and research questions of this thesis. In section 2, I describe the local context into which the REDD+ HIMA project was introduced. I give particular attention to the historical events and developments that have shaped land and forest use and control - and local realities and practices - in the Zanzibar archipelago. In section 3, the research approach is outlined. I begin by laying out my epistemological position of soft constructivism, and explain how I draw on insights from political ecology and anthropology to respond to the research questions. Next, I present the methodology: I describe the case study, as well as the ethnographic approach I have used to bridge theoretical and epistemological concerns. I provide details on the methods used for data collection also discussing pertinent

issues of research ethics, data analysis and questions of validity. I then present summaries of the four research papers, and conclude with a brief synthesis of the main findings and their implications.

2. THE LOCAL CONTEXT: ZANZIBAR AND FOREST MANAGEMENT

Zanzibar is an archipelago in the Indian Ocean, consisting of two major islands - Unguja and Pemba - and dozens of smaller islets. The archipelago is situated off the coast of today's mainland Tanzania. Zanzibar town, in West-central Unguja, is Zanzibar's capital and its administrative and commercial center. With a population of approximately 1,3 million on 2461 km² of land, Zanzibar is one of the most densely populated areas in Africa. Today, Zanzibar is a part of the United Republic of Tanzania, which, consisting of Zanzibar and the former Tanganyika, is the longest existing union on the African continent. This union provides Zanzibar with some degree of autonomy. Zanzibar has its own government - with a president, parliament and executive offices responsible for managing so-called 'non-union matters'.¹⁵ Zanzibar also has its own constitution and legal code. While natural resource management (including that of forests) is a non-union matter, foreign policy issues such as international aid and climate change are managed by the Union government.

Today constitutionally linked to mainland Tanzania, Zanzibar has historically been closely connected to the wider Swahili coast of East Africa, that is, to the Swahili-speaking and largely Muslim belt of settlements that stretches from Mozambique to the South and Somalia to the North. Carried by the monsoon winds, people of the Swahili coast have for centuries engaged in a flourishing Indian Ocean trade, in which Zanzibar has functioned as a regional center. As Zanzibar grew into a prosperous mercantile society, it attracted increasing foreign interest. The interventions of foreigners of various backgrounds have at times triggered dramatic changes in the use and ownership of land and natural resources, ultimately making the question of land and access to it a highly contentious and politicized one. To provide some background on this society - and the policy environment into which the HIMA REDD+ project was introduced - I will here revisit some key developments in the turbulent history of the Zanzibar archipelago. In the

¹⁵ In the first constitution of Tanzania, 11 political issues were designated for collaboration as 'Union matters', i.e. issues to be dealt with by the Union government (Tronvoll, 2006). After several amendments, Union matters now number 22. Key matters include trade, immigration and security. See complete list in Tronvoll (2006: 228). The Union has, however, since its inception in 1964, been highly controversial, and it has been portrayed by scholars as an 'elephant in the room' (Sheriff, 2009), that is, an obvious issue for those who know it, but - since it remains unaddressed - it has had the potential to paralyze reforms or other political or developmental initiatives in Zanzibar.

analysis, I draw in particular on the writings of historian Abdul Sheriff (1987; 1991; 2001), one of (if not the most) renowned Zanzibari scholars of today. I also draw on various contributions from the broader ethnography and political ecology of Zanzibar, and to some extent of the Swahili coast.

2.1. A short history of land - use and control - in Zanzibar

Zanzibar under foreign rule

Around the turn of the seventeenth century, the Sultan of Oman, Seyyid Said al-Busaid, seized control of much the Swahili coast, including Zanzibar. In the 1830s, the Sultan shifted his seat of power from Muscat to Zanzibar Town. In particular, the Sultan offered land to Omani investors in agriculture for the establishment of clove and coconut plantations in the deep and fertile soils along the Western and central parts of the islands (Shao, 1992: 7). A highly labour-intensive plantation system quickly became the dominant form of land-use. Slaves were brought in from Malawi, Mozambique and Zaire, as well as from what today constitutes mainland Tanzania. Immigrants from Yemen and India, as well as the Comoro Islands, Madagascar, Ethiopia and Somalia, also settled in Zanzibar. Towards the end of the nineteenth century, Zanzibar was a multi-ethnic society ‘where Islam represented the ideas and values of an encompassing lifestyle’ (Larsen, 2008: 27). As Zanzibar grew in influence and wealth, Europeans also arrived - as explorers, missionaries and, with the establishment of Zanzibar as a protectorate under British rule from 1890, as colonial administrators.

During the first half of the 20th century, ethnic categories coincided to a large extent with social and economic categories.¹⁶ The majority of the large-scale plantation owners were Omani Arabs. The Arab landowning class, involved in high-level administrative matters, constituted the political elite. The majority of people of Arab origin were, however, not part of the ruling class. Rather, they were ‘poor and middle peasants’ (Sheriff, 2001: 303), or worked as porters or small shopkeepers in both urban and rural areas of Zanzibar. Indians were typically merchants and civil servants - and moneylenders. Some were enormously rich, but the majority ran small-scale

¹⁶ Note however Sheriff’s (2001) critical discussion of the relationship between race and class in Zanzibar, which offers more nuances to the overall scholarly tendency. For example, from the 1920s, poorer plantation owners struggled to sustain their farms economically, and therefore had no other option but to sell parts of their land (see also Chachage, 2000). This contributed to a diversification of plantation ownership.

businesses or worked as clerks in the businesses of others (ibid.). Among people of African origin were descendants of freed slaves, who, after the abolition of slavery in the Protectorate in 1897, moved to Zanzibar town to work as urban labourers. Freed slaves often continued to stay on the plantations, however, cultivating their own crops in between the plantation trees. This practice helped plantation owners to keep the land free from regrowth, weeds and pests, and ensured the availability of paid labor during the picking seasons (Sheriff, 1991: 118). In addition to freed slaves, immigrants from the mainland also moved on their own initiative to Zanzibar, taking seasonal work on the plantations.

The ‘indigenous’ population - the Shirazi - was however never enslaved.¹⁷ They had for centuries sustained themselves as predominately small-scale agriculturalists and fisherfolk. In Pemba, some owned clove plantations. In Unguja, Shirazi groups who formerly had populated the western parts of the island were - with the establishment of the plantations - pushed eastwards into the rocky and shallow coral rag soil in the eastern and southern parts of the island (Sheriff, 1991; Shao, 1992). The coral rag soil was generally unsuitable for tree plantations, and shifting cultivation - in combination with fishing and animal grazing - were the most common sources of inhabitants’ subsistence-based livelihoods. As a means of supplementing their constrained livelihoods, some of the Shirazi population reluctantly travelled to the plantations to sell their labour during picking seasons (Sheriff, 2001). Others were forced to do so (Sheriff, 1991: 120).

In the coral rag areas, land has traditionally been communally managed, and access to land and resources is gained through clearing and planting of ground crops on ‘unoccupied’ coral rag soil. Inhabitants tended to build houses on deeper soil; surrounding these houses was the family-managed *kiambo* land. Here, the planting of permanent crops (trees) was customarily permitted (Sheriff, 1987: 55-56; Shao, 1992: 7). Local councils of elders (*watu wanne*, i.e. ‘four persons’), representing the principal local kin groups (*ukoo*), did however have some control over allocation of land to locals (*wenyeji*), and collected fees from individuals not originating from the

¹⁷ The ‘indigenous’ Shirazi population of Zanzibar ‘result from interrelations between a minority of traders of Arabian or Persian origin and a majority of African peasants, fisherfolk and traders (Myers, 2000: 433). The colonial authorities in Zanzibar preferred the sub-categories (Hadimu, Pemba, Tumbatu) for the ‘indigenous’ inhabitants of Unguja, Pemba and Tumbatu islands respectively (Sheriff, 2001).

local community (Sheriff, 1991) - locally known as *wageni*.¹⁸ Under the authority of the *watu wanne*, land management in the coral rag areas also had a feudalistic character (Shao, 1992: 5-6).

While the British colonial government treated the Arab, Indian and British land holdings largely found in the plantation area as 'private', they formally put the coral rag areas under government control (Jones, 1996). At the local level, *shehas* were appointed from among the local population to function as representatives of the central government (Topan, 1998). As part of a system of indirect rule, the *shehas* enjoyed 'considerable unofficial influence' (Middleton and Campbell, 1965: 30). They exercised land control, i.e. they managed the system of rent and lease of land, and collected fees on behalf of the central government (Sheriff, 1991; Shao, 1992).¹⁹ They were also responsible for dispute resolution (Middleton and Campbell, 1965). Yet, despite the central government's attempts to incorporate customary authorities into the governmental apparatus - and in this way, ensure governmental control over the land - the coral rag areas were, for decades, of relatively little interest to both government and investors, largely due to their rough bushes and soil, which made them unsuitable for tree crops. Customary practices through which locals acquired access to land through planting on cleared land continued to dominate the coral rag areas long into the 20th century.

Post-revolutionary Zanzibar: The coming of a new political elite

On 10 December 1963, Zanzibar was declared independent from Britain. Zanzibar's new government was led by the Zanzibar Nationalist Party (ZNP) in alliance with the Zanzibar and Pemba Peoples' Party (ZPPP). During the elections earlier that year, the ZNP/ZPPP alliance had secured majority seats in the government, although the Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP) had won the popular vote (Sheriff, 2001).²⁰ The ZNP/ZPPP government did not last long. On January 12

¹⁸ *Wageni* means 'guests' in Swahili. In his historical ethnography of peoples of the Swahili coast, based on two fieldworks in 1958 (in Zanzibar) and 1986 (in Lamu), Middleton (1992: 83) translates the term '*wageni*' as 'strangers' or 'tenants', as opposed to '*wananchi*' and '*wenyeji*' - meaning the 'owners of the land' and 'owners of the town', respectively (both terms are used for 'locals').

¹⁹ As elsewhere in Africa (see Berry, 1993: 16), the colonial governments in Zanzibar (both the Omani and the British) tried to incorporate customary institutions into the colonial administration. *Shehas* had existed as part of the Shirazi local level governing structures in several communities across the islands. In some communities, the *sheha* was included as one among the *watu wanne* (see for instance Ingrams, 1967 [1931]; Topan, 1998).

²⁰ Multiparty elections were introduced in Zanzibar in 1957. The ASP was founded prior to the elections in 1957 by primarily urban workers of mainland African origin and the poorer peasantry of Unguja (Sheriff, 2001). The ZNP was originally established in 1955 by Shirazi peasants from Unguja. Soon after, land owners - many of whom had been 'impoverished and reduced to peasants and small shopkeepers' - joined the party (ibid: 310). The ZPPP mainly

1964, it was overthrown in a violent revolution orchestrated by a group of men claiming to represent the African majority, fighting against a minority Arab landowning and ruling class (Glassman, 2011: 3, see also Sheriff, 2001).²¹ Immediately after the revolution, a new government led by the ASP banned all other political parties, including the ZNP, which was perceived as ‘Arab dominated’ and ‘sultan-friendly’ (Tronvoll, 2006: 226-7). In April 1964, without consulting others in Zanzibar, Zanzibar president Abeid Karume surrendered the new country’s sovereignty by consenting to the union of Zanzibar with Tanganyika - an arrangement that gave birth to the United Republic of Tanzania, under the authority of Tanganyika president Julius Nyerere (Tronvoll, 2006; Keshodkar, 2013).

In Zanzibar, the revolutionary government quickly introduced numerous reforms meant to ‘eliminate previously privileged categories’ of the population (Larsen, 2008: 28). Free health-care and free schooling - with specific quotas for ‘Africans’ - were introduced. ‘Africans’ replaced non-Africans in governmental positions. The government also declared full and complete control over all land (Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar, 1964), and initiated a land reform process supposedly aimed at giving land ‘back to the tiller’ (Bader, 1981: 1). During the years that followed, land holdings of people of ‘Arab’ and ‘Indian’ origin were confiscated and redistributed as three-acre plots to ‘peasant’ families of mainly ‘African’ origin (Törhönen, 1998: 36). The political discourse of ethnic essentialism adopted by the post-revolutionary government did however resonate poorly with the reality of most Zanzibaris, to whom ethnic categories were - partly due to intermarriages - ‘extremely porous and spongy’ (Sheriff, 2001: 307). At the same time, these categories were deliberately applied by Zanzibaris of different backgrounds as a strategy to maneuver changing conditions in post-revolutionary Zanzibar. However, for most Zanzibaris, other factors, such as demonstrating devotion to the values and ideals of their Muslim faith, were thus equally - or more - important than ethnic categories. For this reason, some potential recipients of land ended up declining the offer to receive land, arguing that the land acquisition process was *haramu*, that is, against Islamic law (see e.g. Cameron, 2004).

represented the Pemban peasantry (ibid).

²¹ The estimated casualties vary greatly. According to Sheriff (2001: 314), between 3000 and 11000 - mostly people with Arab origin - died during the revolution. In addition, thousands were detained and up to 100 000 exiled (ibid.). The Sultan and his family managed to escape.

While the land distribution process was largely positively received by the poorer rural population, in particular in Unguja where land ownership had been considerably less diverse than on Pemba, it was a highly uneven and politicized process (Myers, 2008). In many cases, it was not clear why some properties were confiscated, whilst others were not. Moreover, land was primarily distributed to people associated with the ASP and the ruling government. Rather than eliminating existing socio-economic inequalities, old patterns of unequal patron-client relationships and unjust access to land and resources were reproduced - only with a new privileged political elite as patrons (see also Sheriff, 2001). '*Wakubwa*' (i.e. 'big people', a concept commonly used with reference to a political elite) came to control party-state networks, as well as economic and political differentiation in Zanzibar more in general (Cameron, 2004).²² In Paper 4 (and to some extent paper 1 and 3) of this thesis, I discuss how these *wakubwa* relationships shape access to and control over resources, and benefits from these, in contemporary Zanzibar.

In line with the new government's socialist ideals, the Zanzibar economy was centralized. The government established the Zanzibar State Trading Cooperation (ZSTC) and quickly monopolized the clove production. Farmers were encouraged to grow cloves and forced to sell the harvest to the government for a price set by the ZSTC. With a price constituting only 12% of the international market rate (Keshodkar, 2013, referring to Askew, 2006), the revenues from the clove sector served as the government's principal source of foreign exchange (ibid.). The strong focus on the clove sector did, however, undermine other agricultural activities. This led to shortages of basic foodstuffs such as rice, and increased dependency on imports from mainland Tanzania (Keshodkar, 2013; Cameron, 2004). Resisting the monopoly, farmers reverted to burning down their clove trees, leaving them unpicked, or even smuggling the cloves to sell at the market in Mombasa (Cameron, 2004: 111). As a result, in the 1970's, the Zanzibar government saw a serious decline in revenues from the clove sector, and thus also in the general economy (Keshodkar, 2013), which in the early 1980s was further exacerbated by the collapse of the international clove market.

²² See also Sheriff (2001: 314), who argues that, rather than redressing the various imbalances that existed, the revolution did in fact contribute to the exacerbation of some - in particular the imbalances between urban and rural areas, as well as between Unguja and Pemba.

Entering a neo-liberal era

With the economic decline of the 1970s, the Zanzibar government turned to the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund for support. In the mid-1980s, conforming to the conditionalities set by international donors, the Zanzibar government - after 20 years of socialism - entered into a process of liberalization. A number of economic and political reforms were introduced. The Trade Liberalization Act of 1986 opened up the economy to foreign investment (Myers, 2002). The effects of this law have been particularly noticeable in the tourism industry, which has since experienced massive growth.²³ With the gradual reintroduction of free enterprise, ordinary Zanzibaris regained their rights to passports and to travel, and the archipelago slowly reclaimed its position as a regional trading centre. The clove industry, still considered a major potential earner of foreign exchange, remained under governmental control.

In 1992, Tanzania, under pressure from international bodies, agreed to move toward a multi-party political system. This shift had an almost immediate impact in Zanzibar. Among the new political parties established was Civic United Front (CUF), which quickly emerged as a major challenger to the ruling party, Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM).²⁴ According to official tallies, CUF, when it has participated in elections, has received just below 50% of all votes on Zanzibar. And, ever since the reintroduction of multiparty elections in 1995, elections in Zanzibar have been controversial. Both the opposition as well as international observers have cited the manipulation of voter registration, ballot tampering, discrimination, intimidation and violence against - and the outright killings of - individuals associated with the opposition (see e.g. Human Rights Watch, 2002; Rawlence, 2005; Tronvoll, 2006; Mosse and Tronvoll, 2014). Nevertheless, after each election, CCM has declared itself the winner.²⁵ Cameron (2004: 111) asserts that CUF's massive support, particularly on Pemba, is centrally due to the failure of the clove monopoly, which (still) marginalizes the Pemban peasantry. Liberalization of the clove sector,

²³ Tourism is today the largest economic sector in Zanzibar (Keshodkar, 2013). In 2017, more than 430 000 tourists visited Zanzibar <http://www.ocgs.go.tz/> (Accessed February 10, 2018) compared to about 9000 in 1984 (see e.g. Gössling, 2010).

²⁴ In 1977 the ASP party merged with what was then the only operating party in mainland Tanzania, the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), to form the CCM. Since then, CCM has been the dominant ruling party in the two polities that comprise the United Republic of Tanzania.

²⁵ The 2010 election does however constitute an exception. A referendum in July 2010 enabled changes in the Zanzibar constitution that guaranteed power-sharing between CCM and CUF. Since the election in 2015, and a highly controversial re-run election in March 2016 boycotted by all but one opposition party, CCM is once again governing Zanzibar alone.

including peasants' right to decide for themselves whether or not to produce cloves, and where to sell their harvest, has been critical to the CUF platform during elections.

In the early 1990s, the Zanzibar government also reinstated the local administrative post of *sheha*.²⁶ The *shehas* were to ensure the adherence to laws and government orders at the local level. They were put in charge of *shehia*²⁷ councils and their sectoral sub-committees, and tasked with keeping records of marriages and divorces, births and deaths, and providing permits for the transportation of crops, livestock and charcoal. They also regained their role in conflict resolution and settlement of local disputes, as well as local immigration control (Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar, 2014). Although local councilors have been elected in local elections since 1995, the authority and influence of these are by far outstripped by that of the centrally appointed *sheha* (Myers, 2008: 278). As almost all *shehas*, without exception, represent the ruling CCM party, the position of the *sheha* is often regarded as 'an extended party agent at local level' (Tronvoll, 2009: 2).

The liberalization process also entailed the passing of a series of new land laws. The Land Tenure Act of 1992 aimed to provide individuals and groups with the opportunity to achieve holdership rights to land by receiving the Right of Occupancy (Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar, 1992). The Act stipulates that a Right of Occupancy can be obtained through either 'a grant from the Minister', adjunction and subsequent registration, inheritance, purchase or gift (ibid: 10). With the Land Tenure Act, land in Zanzibar, which since the revolution had been fully controlled by the government, became formally subject to transfer. If registered, the Right of Occupancy was further assumed to provide individuals and groups with 'secured' ownership to land (see e.g. Krain, 1998: 41). However, since the majority of occupancy rights have been allocated to 'the big people and to people in their Ministry' (Myers, 2008: 282, quoting an informant), the reform has been associated with a high degree of elite capture. Questions related to elite capture are also pertinent to forest resources, which are the focus of this study.

²⁶ After the revolution, the *mabalozi ya nyumba kumi* (literally 'ambassadors of ten houses') had replaced the *shehas* at local level (Topan, 1998). *Shehas* are appointed by Regional Commissioners and answerable to the District Commissions (RGZ, 2014).

²⁷ *Shehias* are the lowest administrative level in Zanzibar.

2.2. Management of forest resources in Zanzibar

Forest-related policies and interventions

Since forest management in Zanzibar is classified as a non-union matter, it is legislated from Zanzibar by the House of Representatives, which is responsible for making the laws and regulations governing forest resources on the isles. The Department of Forestry, under the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Environment, serves as forest administrator and advises the Zanzibar government on all issues related to forest management, including the formulation, implementation, and enforcement of forest policy.

Forest management in Zanzibar has historically reflected the political ideologies and needs of various prevailing power holders, and has simultaneously been informed by scientific discourses dominating international debates about forests and forest management. The colonial economy was highly dependent on the extraction of natural resources (Chachage, 2000: 150). The colonial government harvested timber to supply the boat industry and other needs in Zanzibar Town (see also Finnie, 2003). Nevertheless, the British administration made rural dwellers responsible for forest destruction (Chachage, 2000). They ignored existing local management systems; introduced a Wood Cutting Decree in 1946, and passed the first forest reserve decree in 1950. In an effort to meet the demands for building poles and fuelwood, they also established various afforestation programs, including tree plantations (Nahonyo et al, 2002). After the revolution, the afforestation programs initiated by the colonial administration were intensified. Throughout the 1980s, a Finish-funded project aiming ‘to blanket Zanzibar with forests of fast growing trees for the supply of forest products’, spearheaded the establishment of tree plantations of primarily exotic species.²⁸ Today, these plantations are still in existence under the management of the Department of Forestry.

During the 1990s, the extinction of species resulting from the destruction of forests across the Global South was high on the international environment agenda - so also in Zanzibar. With reference to the exceptional concentration of endemic species and arguably ‘extreme threat’ of loss of habitat, Zanzibar forest (as a key component of the Coastal East African Forest) was in

²⁸ <http://www.forestryznz.or.tz/index.php/forest-reserves/plantation-forests/forest-plantations>. Last accessed June 27, 2018.

2005 classified as a ‘global biodiversity hotspot’, that is, one of ‘Earth’s biologically richest places’.²⁹ The increased focus on biodiversity conservation also brought new sources of foreign funding to Zanzibar (Levine, 2007; Saunders, 2011). In 2004, Zanzibar’s first National Park - managed under the Department of Forestry - was established with funding from CARE International.

With the focus on biodiversity conservation, forests were not only conceptualized as sources of wood and timber, but also as ‘a basis for a wide range of ecosystem services’ (see e.g. Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, 2010: 8). The forests were thus not only conceived as important for the daily life of forest-dwelling communities, but also as fundamental to ‘ecosystem services’ that thus far had been ‘undervalued’ (ibid: 16): the filtering of water; climate regulation; soil stabilization; coastal protection; as well as - in the case of REDD+ - carbon sequestration and storage. In great part due to the HIMA project, discourses emphasizing ecosystem services, and in particular forests as sources and sinks of CO₂, are gaining ground in Zanzibar.

Informed by neoliberal win-win discourses (e.g. Igoe and Brockington, 2007), community-based forest management was introduced to Zanzibar during the 1990s. The Forest Resources Management and Conservation Act of 1996 (Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar, 1996) provided the legal basis for the devolution of forest-management powers from central forest authorities to local communities (ibid.). The Forest Act allowed for the establishment of community forest management committees, as well as the development - and later signing - of Community Forest Management Agreements (COFMAs) between local communities and the Director of the Department of Forestry. With the delegation of tasks such as patrolling to local communities, community forest management was seen as an effective strategy for a financially constrained Department for Forestry (Levine, 2007). Responding to international obligations to involve local communities in forest management and protection, the new focus also attracted

²⁹ <https://www.cepf.net/sites/default/files/eastern-arc-mountains-coastal-forests-fact-sheet-english.pdf> Accessed March, 2018. In 2014, however, the annual forest change rate on the islands was estimated to be -0,46% (Kukkonen and Käykhö, 2014). In comparison, the official deforestation rate in Tanzania between 2005-2010 was estimated to be 1,1% per year (United Republic of Tanzania, 2013). Most policy documents developed in the course of the last decade, including the HIMA project proposal, have, however, operated on the assumption of an annual deforestation rate of 1% (CARE, 2009).

new international donors. CARE International has played an important role in supporting the establishment of COFMAs. A total number of 54 such agreements exist today across the island,³⁰ of which 45 were signed with the HIMA project's support. In Paper 3 of this thesis, I discuss the process of negotiating a COFMA in Mitini - one of the local communities invited by the HIMA project to join the REDD+ scheme - as well as how various historical forest-related interventions have contributed to local conceptions of land and forest management.

Mitini³¹ - a local community dependent on forest resources

With approximately 1300 inhabitants, Mitini is an average-sized rural *shehia* in Unguja Island. The area around Mitini has historically consisted of a mixture of high-standing natural forests, coral rag bushes and thickets, locally known as *maweni* ('in the stones'), and *uwanda* land, savannah-like bush and grass typically used for animal grazing. As elsewhere in rural Zanzibar, forest resources have been and still are key to local livelihoods. A combination of shifting cultivation and agroforestry has traditionally been practiced. The forests are sources of medicinal plants and handicraft material. Visitors come from all over the archipelago, and from mainland Tanzania, for spiritual and medical healing in sacred forest caves. Although electricity is available in most villages across Unguja (Winther 2012), only a small percentage of the houses in Mitini are connected to the grid. Due to high electricity prices, the vast majority of the households use fuelwood as the main source of energy (OCGS, 2010). The local population typically live in smaller settlements of 5-10 houses. The houses are traditionally built of wooden poles and coral stones dug out of the surrounding forest soils. Often, extended families of several brothers with their wives and children - all belonging to one *ukoo* (local kin group) - form each settlement.

The segregation of women and men into separate social spheres is a moral ideal in Zanzibar (Larsen, 2008: 34). The segregation is closely tied to the local notion of complementarity between women and men (*ibid.*). In Mitini, it is observed in the organization of time and space and in the division of labor. The segregation is particularly noticeable in public life (see also Dean, 2013: 25). Men are mainly responsible for decision-making and the management of family

³⁰ <http://www.forestryznz.or.tz/index.php/forest-reserves/community-forests>. Last accessed June 27, 2018.

³¹ Mitini means 'among the trees' in Swahili. Since this PhD project addresses partly sensitive topics, I have - in consultation with key informants - decided to use an invented name for the community.

and community affairs. Men have hence historically dominated the governing bodies of the *shehia*, including the position of the *sheha*, the *shehia* council and its sub-committees.

As part of the HIMA project - and the project's strategy to ensure gender mainstreaming - special efforts were made to ensure the election of women into the *shehia* conservation committees. During my fieldwork, 14 out of the 29 members of the conservation committee in Mitini were women.³² Although men in general attended meetings more frequently, and talked more during meetings (including project meetings in Zanzibar town and elsewhere on the islands), a few women from Mitini did emerge as relatively active and (internally) influential participants in the COFMA negotiations. The sex-segregation was however maintained through divided seating for women and men during meetings.

While men tend to dominate public spheres, women have more influence in household affairs. Spending most of the day at home or in the close vicinity of the house - doing the laundry, tending to cooking pots or small children, most women in Mitini would only take short trips to the forest. When need arose for forest products that require going deeper into the forest, women would get - and customarily have a right to - assistance from their male relatives: sons, brothers or husbands (see also Larsen, 2008). Furthermore, women who are involved in small-scale businesses would try to organize these from the house (see also *ibid*; Wallevik, 2012), and if the marketing of their products required transport out of the *shehia*, most women would rely on their male relatives to do so.

According to Zanzibari customs, it is the responsibility of husbands to provide for the household. This includes the provisioning of rice, cassava, beans, vegetables - and sometimes fish - for the main meal per day. Generally, men have central responsibility for agricultural production - both temporary and permanent crops. Sometimes crops are used for subsistence, but most are sold at the market in Zanzibar town. Women may assist in cultivation, but they may also have their own land to cultivate. Since women have the right to be supported by their husbands and his family (Larsen, 2008: 34), women who have their own land to cultivate are - customarily - permitted to manage the income themselves. The same applies for income from other types of activities.

³² The attendance of women would normally require permission from their husbands.

During fieldwork, I observed how income was invested in local saving clubs, from where the women later took loans to cover a child's school fee, to contribute to a wedding, or to invest in a new business. I also witnessed how the money was used to reduce the dependency on their husbands, or simply saved for 'a tougher day'. However, in most cases the little surplus gained 'disappeared' into regular expenses, was used to cover daily needs such as cooking oil, soap for washing, tea or sugar, or a bus fare to town.

For both women and men, the five daily Muslim prayers frame the organization of the day - from dawn to dusk. However, while most men take part in the prayers in the mosque, women generally prefer to pray at home. Both women and men also take part in other religious duties and practices, such as the fasting during Ramadhan and *maulidi* - the celebration of the birth of Prophet Mohammed (see also Larsen, 2008: 36). The latter also often involves contribution to and the sharing of food. In Zanzibar, both women and men also take part in spirit possession rituals (*ngoma ya shetani*) (see Larsen, 2008). Although, I did not witness these rituals myself during the fieldwork, I did on a few occasions overhear villagers discuss spirits and spirit possession. Discussions commonly emerged after an unexpected misfortune or suffering - economic, health-related or relational (see also *ibid*: 42). I did also observe how the threat of *uchawi* (witchcraft) and *uganga* (sorcery) influenced individual's behavior and practice, who - for example - could choose to 'tie up' (*kufunga*) a group of particularly productive mango trees to protect it from *choyo* (a jealousy that can be harmful) from others.

Mitini is not an isolated place. Close ties exist between inhabitants of Mitini and other places on Zanzibar, and there is an abundant in and out migration. The original Hadimu population has overtime intermarried with Zanzibaris of different backgrounds. The main road to Zanzibar town runs through the *shelia*. Here, local buses pass several times an hour, carrying passengers who have errands to run in town, at public offices or hospitals, for example, or are visiting relatives or friends. Often, the buses are loaded with agricultural crops and sacks of fuel wood bound for the island's main market. In search of livelihoods elsewhere, young men especially leave for Zanzibar town, where money is considered more easily available. Many parents in Mitini also choose to send their children to relatives in town for schooling there. Girls raised in town are thought to have a greater possibility of being married there. As rural life is considered harder

than life in town, having children and relatives in town - who could help in case of need - is considered an advantage.

Despite the significant out-migration, the population in Mitini is increasing, in part due to a high fertility rate. However, because of the soil's suitability for agriculture, the area is - and has for decades been - popular among immigrants (Middleton 1992). In January 2013, 86 adults were registered in Mitini as *wageni* - short-term migrant workers from the Tanzanian mainland, who stay for a year or two, primarily for farming and for working in the forest (pers. communication, the local *sheha*). Several of the migrant workers have also been invited to cultivate in the government plantation in between the growing seasons. In a system reminiscent of the one common in the years following the abolition of slavery, the migration workers keep plantations clean and free from weeds, and provide the plantation owner - the government - with easily available and inexpensive labor when needed. As discussed in paper 4 of this thesis, existing patron-client relationships - in addition to gendered norms - constitute important underlying social dimensions of the society in which the REDD+ HIMA project was introduced.

The area of Mitini has a long history of external interventions. This includes conservation activities, the establishment of (government) tree plantations, and various community forest management efforts. Although during my fieldwork people in Mitini generally considered local forests to be in a fairly good state, they also described access to resources as increasingly constrained by these interventions, as well as by an unplanned and incremental process whereby formerly community-managed land is now either controlled by the government or by individuals. In paper 3 and 4 of this thesis, I discuss some of the implications of introducing REDD+ into a context with a long history of previous - and often disputed - interventions.

Due to the repeated failure of political and economic reforms over the past 50 years (Sheriff, 2001; Larsen, 2008), many Zanzibaris question whether the state can be of much help. In a situation of recurrent policy change and interventions - and thus of high unpredictability (Larsen, 2008: 28) - they consider themselves to be coping despite, not because of, the state. However, while expressing considerable skepticism towards government interventions, they are still hopeful that their livelihoods will - one day - improve. This may explain the largely positive expectations towards the arrival of the HIMA project in its initial stage.

3. RESEARCH APPROACH

The research design process for this thesis was highly iterative. An iterative approach implies that, in contrast to more linear research approaches, the key research components - that is, the formulation of research goals and questions, and the choice of theoretical perspectives and methods used to collect data and to ensure its validity - are not treated as distinct and separate processes (Maxwell, 2013: 3). As part of an effort to ensure learning throughout the research process, the components of this research were instead interlinked and undertaken more or less simultaneously. Research goals and questions, theoretical perspectives, and to a certain extent, methods were thus reconsidered and refined during the process of data collection and analysis. In addition, factors such as researchers' skills and experience, the availability of resources, ethical standards and research settings have contributed to the design of this research project (Maxwell, 2013: 6). In this way, reflexivity has been sought throughout the research process.

Crotty (1998: 2) identifies four basic - interlinked - elements to any research process: Epistemology, theoretical perspective, methodology and methods. In the following sections, I reflect on how these four elements have informed my research project and each other, and further elaborate on how the positions and approaches adopted have influenced decisions made during both research design and implementation.

3.1. Epistemological position

Epistemology refers to our theory of knowledge (Smith, 1998) - the way we understand and explain how we know what we know. Epistemological issues 'tend to emerge together' with ontological issues (Crotty, 1998: 10). Ontology relates to the study of 'theories of being' and 'the questions we ask about what can really exist' (ibid: 279). Together, the two inform the theoretical perspective and the methodology of a research project (Crotty, 1998: 3).

Epistemologically, this thesis is informed by the stance referred to as 'soft constructivism' (Robbins, 2012: 128), or 'a third position' (Proctor, 1998, cited in Neumann, 2005: 50).³³ This

³³ Robbins (2012: 128) claims that most political ecologists 'tacitly cling to' the soft constructivism position, although Political Ecology is more often linked to the critical realism associated with British philosopher Roy Bhaskar (e.g. Neumann, 2005: 50). Along with Neumann (2005: 51), I consider the two positions - 'soft constructivism' and 'critical realism' - as sharing a common ground, as both positions 'reject both positivism and extreme relativism, and therefore opens up for a political ecology that engages social constructivism while maintaining the ability to judge the relative

means that I accept the existence of an external or material world of global biochemical cycles, including the carbon cycle, as independent of our categorization, perceptions and consciousness. Our knowledge about this external world is however 'situated, contingent and mediated' (Neumann, 2005: 50). However, by contributing my empirically-grounded and critical account and discussion of the introduction of REDD+ in Zanzibar, I offer my own data and analysis up for interdisciplinary scrutiny from others.

The thesis is further inspired by the anthropologists Moore and Sanders (2005: 19) who stress that 'the way we imagine others as human beings', and social agency in general, is central to our epistemological stance and how we claim to know what we know. Conceiving human beings as socially and politically situated, that is, as embedded in webs of meanings, social practices and relationships specific to local contexts (see also Geertz, 1973) is key to this thesis. Such a stance also considers the possibility of multiple rationalities. As a researcher I am not immune to these socially and politically embedded practices, relationships and rationalities. Accordingly, researching REDD+ in Zanzibar, I cannot position myself outside of, or independent from, the social realities I study (and in which I also participate). This has implications for epistemology and the way I understand questions of validity and quality of data. Any claim of 'truth' has to be conceived as incomplete and potentially biased (Nanda, 1998; see also Olivier de Sardan, 2015).

From the 1970s and onwards, we have however seen, especially within anthropology itself, an at times intense internal debate about the epistemological problems linked to ethnographic authority and representation. In particular, critics have pointed to the problems inherent in writing *the* account of the lives of 'others'. The ethnographer's perceptions and description will, due to language and researcher's background, always to some extent deviate from that of 'the others' (Fangen, 2010; see also Clifford and Marcus, 1986; Geertz, 1973). This debate generated a renewed focus on reflexivity, on the ways in which the act of observation inherently affects what is observed, and thus the need for systematic consideration of the process of knowledge construction throughout the entire research process. This has further resulted in a newfound focus on providing the 'others' with 'a voice of their own' (Rabinow et al, 2008: 5). For Geertz (1973: 10), one of the most influential voices in anthropology over the last decades, ethnography is 'thick description', that is, a detailed account of field observations describing not only people's

validity of various representations of nature' (ibid: 51).

behavior, but also the cultural and social context, thereby enabling the reader to grasp its ‘meaning’. Related epistemological issues are discussed in more detail later in this thesis, in particular under sections 3.5 (under ‘researcher’s positionality’) and 3.7 (questions of validity).

3.2. Bridging Political Ecology and the Anthropology of Development

Scholars working within two partly overlapping fields of research, Political Ecology and the Anthropology of Development, have been particularly useful in shaping my investigation of REDD+. Political ecologists study environmental change and its consequences at multiple scales, including how specific policies and various types of environmental interventions influence human-nature relations (Benjaminsen and Svarstad, 2017). Studies within the Anthropology of Development typically offer ethnographic investigations of ‘development interventions’ or ‘aid’, conceived both as ‘discourse’ and as ‘practice’ (see Mosse, 2013). While the Anthropology of Development is a sub-field within anthropology, with a methodology and epistemology that are both specific and inextricably intertwined, Political Ecology encompasses the work of scholars from various academic disciplines (including anthropology), and explores a wide range of topics, employing different theoretical approaches and methodologies (Neumann, 2005; Robbins, 2012). The relationship between the two fields of research is however highly fluid, and specific works by individual scholars can also be viewed as contributing to both.

Central to the emergence of Political Ecology in the 1970s was the critique of at-the-time highly influential neo-Malthusian thinking, with its notion of population growth as a key cause for environmental degradation. This essentially Marxist-inspired critique, formulated in particular by ‘radical’ development geographers (Bryant, 1998: 80), pointed to the neglect of political economic analysis in environmental research in favor of demographic factors (Biersack, 2006). The critique further linked the emergence of local environmental problems to the expansion of the market economy at the global level (see also Benjaminsen, 2015). In the context of deforestation and forest management, a political ecological approach would - instead of blaming and putting restrictions on rural forest-dwellers (an arguably unavoidable implication of neo-Malthusian policies) - typically focus on how the specific forms of (capitalistic) production create inequalities, new victims and marginalized populations at the local level.

Piers Blaikie's 1985 book *'The Political Economy of Soil Erosion in Developing Countries'* further advanced the development of a Political Ecology that combined the conceptual and theoretical perspectives of an - at the outset - Marxist political economy with a 'rigorous natural science' (see Benjaminsen and Robbins, 2015: 192). In his critical discussion of the application of environmental conservation policies in the Global South, Blaikie (1985) argued that since scientific environmental data in most cases is highly uncertain, policies and interventions are inherently political. Moreover, since environmental interventions inevitably have implications for the management of natural resources, these interventions will above all affect access and control over resources. A critical task for political ecologists is hence to explore the 'politics' of environmental interventions, and to identify winners and losers in these processes.

Blaikie's perspectives were further developed in the 1987 book *'Land Degradation and Society'*, co-published with Harold Brookfield. Central to Blaikie and Brookfield's argument is the presentation of land degradation as a 'perceptual term' (Benjaminsen and Robbins, 2015: 192), perceived differently by different actors, whose perceptions are conditioned by their position and role in the management and use of land. Although natural scientists often claim objectivity and neutrality in their analyses of land degradation, the physical processes analyzed 'interact with [the] human perception, biases, and interests' of those behind the analyses (Benjaminsen and Robbins, 2015: 192). Thus, land management, and environmental management more generally, is inherently political and subject to contestation. In relation to REDD+, Blaikie's position would challenge the notion that 'forest degradation', perceived as 'reduced forest quality', can be measured in objective terms. In the case of REDD+, this can be illustrated with the following example: Since REDD+ project staff focus on carbon-sequestering capacity as they assess forests' use-value, they may fail to recognize the multiple, largely non-market functions that community forests serve. In Paper 1 of this thesis, I discuss this more in detail.

We must also recognize the profound influence of post-structuralism on such debates, and, in particular, the implications of Foucault's work on power and knowledge (1980) for Political Ecology (see also Neumann 2005: 93). Foucault was generally concerned with 'the production of discourses of truth', and more specifically, with the types of power that contribute to the production of such discourses (1980: 93). Relevant questions include 'who does the classifying, who determines categories of thought, and how do these categories and classifications impact

peoples' understanding of themselves and others, on their actions and aspirations?' (Moore and Sanders, 2005: 14). Political ecologists have in particular focused on the power of certain epistemic communities, with their specific value systems and discourses, in establishing 'environmental truths' (Hajer; 1995; Agder et al, 2001; see also Haas, 1992). Moreover, political ecologists have studied the role of these environmental truths in the framing of scientific debates and policy agendas, and - ultimately - in the design and implementation of specific types of policies and environmental interventions (see also Leach and Mearns, 1996; Fairhead and Leach, 1996).

A focus on discourses is also found in American anthropologist James Ferguson's seminal contribution to the Anthropology of Development, 'The Anti-Politics Machine' (1990). As part of anthropology's increased consideration of how 'the West', through the initiation of new development interventions, exercises control over 'processes of global change in a postcolonial world' (Yarrow and Venkatesan 2012: 3), Ferguson, together with other anthropologists such as Escobar (1995) and Grillo and Stirrat (1997), investigated the relationships between various actors involved in 'development'. Exploring Western development interventions in Lesotho, Ferguson (1990) argued that development problems are systematically portrayed in technical terms in order to match the tools and solutions available within development institutions. Under the pretext of solving specific problems, be they poverty or unsustainable natural resource management, the application of ostensibly neutral technical tools has far-reaching implications for 'target' populations (Ferguson, 1990). 'Locals' are commonly portrayed as passive and undifferentiated, and the development problems 'erroneously attributed to the actions of the people living there' (Yarrow and Venkatesan, 2012: 2). Moreover, particular development discourses are applied as a means to justify - or in Escobar's terms (1995: 45) 'normalize' - the endless initiation of new interventions through which the Global North has obtained - and maintained - control over large areas in the Global South, including the daily lives of the people living there (see also Said, 1978).

The process of rendering political problems technical has further led to the occlusion and depoliticization of complex social and environmental problems, as well as to the potential cementing of existing inequalities at the local level or between the 'project' and the 'communities' (Olivier de Sardan, 2015.; see also Fairhead and Leach, 1996; Li, 2007). By

exploring the presumably 'neutral' REDD+ intervention and its translation into practice in Zanzibar, this thesis explores the assumptions, ideas and logics on which the REDD+ policy framework is based, and investigates the power inherent in these interventions, as well as their potential ramifications on local forest practices and relationships. Ferguson's perspective, and post structural perspectives more generally, are useful for analyzing why certain ideas about climate change mitigation are accepted by policy makers, and become dominant in environmental governance, while others do not.

Through the notion of governmentality, Foucault (1991) elaborates on his conception of power and the intimate relationship between power, knowledge and politics. He further points to the ways in which people become subject to the knowledge-based enactment of power. Governmentality refers to 'governmental rationality' and the ways in which, through organized practices (mentalities, rationalities and techniques), 'governments' - conceived as 'attempts to shape human conduct by calculated means' (Li 2007: 5) - manage and discipline populations to fulfill specific policies (Foucault, 1975). With its specific goals, rationalities, and associated techniques, the 'governmental intervention' is internalized by 'subjects' who behave in certain ways to fulfill the predefined goals and policies (Foucault, 1991). Since power, according to Foucault, is an omnipresent, pervasive aspect of social life (Gordon, Burchell et al, 1991), it is found in a wide range of interventions applied by wide ranges of actors, and in the relationships between these interventions and their actors. The notion of governmentality has inspired both Political Ecology and the Anthropology of Development, and thus the investigations of both environmental and development interventions.

Although emphasizing the structural dimensions of power, Foucault did, in fact, in the course of his career, become more interested in exploring processes of individual agency and resistance. In *'The History of Sexuality'*, he reminded his readers that 'where there is power, there is resistance' (Foucault, 1979: 95). Thus, when faced with domination, such as an intervention, individuals may begin 'to formulate their needs and imperatives' (Gordon, Burchell et al., 1991: 5). According to Foucault (1979), the internalization of certain knowledges may create new forms of knowledge, logics and practices, and potentially bring about creativity, processes whereby subjects formulate their desires and needs as a basis for resistance and dissent. However, according to Foucault, as subjects, we are all formed by practices of which we may be

unaware; the desires of subjects may be 'brought into being as an effect of subjection to disciplinary institutions and norms' (Armstrong 2008: 20). In other words, according to Foucault, power is exercised through social relations, and can thus only be fully grasped through empirical investigation - an investigation that needs to address both 'the level of individual practices', as well as 'the level of patterns that are institutionalized' (Moore and Sanders, 2005: 13).

Building on Foucault, the REDD+ policy framework is in this thesis conceived as a 'governmental intervention'. The 'subjects' of the introduction of REDD+ in Zanzibar include actors at both the project and policy-making level, as well as those at the local community level. As part of the analysis of the process of translating REDD+ into practice in Zanzibar, I will in this thesis explore the relationships between the 'policy framework' and the 'project', and the 'project' versus the 'community'. Further, when analyzing the introduction of REDD+ in Zanzibar, both the repressive and creative aspects of Foucault's notion of power are useful for exploring the local actors possibilities for influencing the REDD+ implementations at various levels in Zanzibar.

In *'The Will to Improve'* (2007), anthropologist Tania Murray Li explores the factors that enable people to take a critical stance towards a new development intervention. Discussing what she refers to as 'the limits to governmentality' - and the notion that societies and people's conduct may be improved by taking certain technical and institutional measures - she points in particular to two limits that are relevant here. The first limit is posed by the practice of politics: All policies and interventions risk being opposed by 'critics rejecting its diagnosis and prescriptions' (Li, 2007: 17). Here, Li draws on Gramsci's analysis of why and how particular situated subjects mobilize to contest their oppression. Gramsci held that subjects would always occupy multiple positions and encounter diverse powers (Li, 2007: 22). Following Gramsci, Hall (1990) has argued that 'new interests, new positioning of self and others, and new meanings emerge contingently in the course of the struggle' (cited in Li, 2007: 22). Inspired by the perspectives of Gramsci and Hall, this thesis explores the positionings that enable local actors in Zanzibar to engage in a critical practice of politics in relation to the introduction of the REDD+ policy framework, including to what extent their positions and practices changed as the policy framework was translated into local practice.

According to Li (2007: 17), the second limit to governmentality is also posed by the targets of the intervention. Populations and groups of individuals are not necessarily passive objects that can be refigured to suit a government or donor's plan. Rather, these groups should be conceived as dynamic and potentially creative and capable of constantly surprising those trying to manage them. Political ecologists have explored how local populations mobilize to resist top-down, externally introduced interventions, especially those related to conservation (Benjaminsen and Robbins, 2015, see also Cavanagh and Benjaminsen, 2015; Hall et al, 2015). Several of these studies are influenced by James Scott's (1985, 1990) writings on everyday resistance. Scott (1985) claims that, since rural populations rarely have the resources to engage in open resistance, they employ various covert strategies. In the research presented in this thesis, the responses, views and perceptions of different social groups and individuals in Zanzibar towards the coming of REDD+ are key. I explore how various actors make use of various tactics (open and covert) to shape REDD+ processes, examining the extent to which they challenge the application of new environmental restrictions and rules. Inspired by governmentality perspectives, the thesis shows how the ability of different social groups and individuals to actively challenge and resist rules and regulations, or in other ways contribute to the shaping of the REDD+ processes in Zanzibar, will vary (see paper 3).

Over the past decade especially, another body of anthropological literature offering detailed ethnographic accounts of the everyday practice of 'development' has gained importance. Inspired by the 'interactionalist' Manchester School (see e.g. Long and Long, 1992), anthropologists such as Olivier de Sardan (2005; 2015) have promoted the study of the encounter between development policies and interventions (including the actors promoting these), on one hand, and the local societies and social contexts into which these interventions are introduced on the other. A series of so-called 'aidnographies' (see for example Mosse, 2005; Fechter and Hindman, 2011; Bierschenk and Olivier de Sardan, 2015) have through detailed anthropological accounts of 'what actually happens, what people think happens, and finally what people think ought to happen in terms of their political and moral values' (Lund, 2010: 23). By giving greater attention to the interpretation of the perceptions and logics of various actors, these studies have shown development practice to be the outcome of translation processes in which, in addition to discursive power and existing social structures, actors' diverse interests and the meanings they assign to such processes, play important roles.

This thesis explores the encounter between the REDD+ policy framework and the pre-existing social contexts to which REDD+ is introduced, paying attention to both the discursive power inherent in REDD+ and the assumptions on which REDD+ is based, and the particularities of existing socially embedded practices, meanings and relationships at local level in Zanzibar. The aim has been to bring together a focus on local factors and contexts in Zanzibar with an interest in exploring the more structural and discursive power inherent in REDD+ as a highly ambitious global environmental policy framework. Inspired by the concept of Institutional Bricolage (Cleaver, 2012), I study how the new arrangements - the REDD+ Policy Framework - as well as local norms and embedded practices have shaped social agency, and thus the potential of local actors to influence the practical implementation of REDD+. I thus allow for the possibility that external influences may be both incorporated into practice and at times subverted by local actors (ibid.). In this way the thesis also seeks to contribute to our understanding of why various interventions and development initiatives often do not deliver as planned.

3.3. Methodology

Case study design

The research presented in this thesis was designed as a case study. Gerring (2004: 342) defines a case study as ‘an intensive study of a single unit for a purpose of understanding a larger class of (similar) units’. By defining my case as ‘the process of introducing REDD+ in Zanzibar’, the study presented in this thesis seeks to provide an in-depth and rich understanding by developing ‘an adequate description, interpretation, and explanation’ of the emerging and evolving phenomenon in question (Maxwell, 2013: 79). The case study approach invited comparison with similar phenomena elsewhere. At the overall level, the case investigated here is a case of the more than 500 REDD+ projects that have been implemented worldwide. Due to Zanzibar’s semi-autonomous status within the United Republic of Tanzania, and since Zanzibar - in order to become eligible for REDD+ - had to establish systems and policies for REDD+ independently from mainland Tanzania, this case is also an examination of ‘a case of a REDD+ readiness process’.

The case study moves between scales, as it follows the REDD+ process from the global to the local level, that is, from the arrival of the global REDD+ policy framework in Zanzibar to its

actual translation into local practices at community level. As such, the research also includes an ‘embedded case’ with a sub-unit of analysis (see Yin, 2013), which here is ‘the case of Mitini’ as a case of ‘the introduction of REDD+ at the local community level in Zanzibar’. Conducting fieldwork across multiple scales in Zanzibar permitted studying the HIMA REDD+ project at different levels and different stages in the implementation process, that is, from before its initiation until its conclusion. In this way, I believe this empirically based analysis of the phenomenon of REDD+ in Zanzibar is unique, as it is so far the only of its kind.

Understanding a specific case in all its particularities can also yield theoretical insights into broader issues (Mjøset, 2009). By comparing one specific case to similar cases in different settings, and by feeding back insights gained in the specific case into more general knowledge, one may contribute to the development of new theoretical concepts and understandings of the social phenomenon under investigation (ibid.). A case study based on qualitative methods should however not be understood as ‘a sample of one drawn from a wider universe of such cases’ (Maxwell, 2013: 137, referring to Bryman, 1988). Instead, unique or extreme cases may, in fact, provide useful - and interesting - insights into both theory and practice (Maxwell, 2013). An extreme case may be a most-likely case, i.e. if a social phenomenon occurs (or does not occur) in a specific case or situation, it will most likely do so (or not) in other related cases as well. Extreme cases may thus provide a persuasive argument for why a phenomenon does or does not occur (ibid: 137-138). The case investigated in this thesis may be considered an ‘extreme case’ for two reasons. First, the forest in Zanzibar is considerably smaller, and natural resources are conceived as more scarce, than in most other REDD+ project sites, and secondly because Mitini, the community at the center of the study, was not included in the list of *shehias* that eventually were part of the HIMA Carbon Project sent for validation in December 2014. I elaborate further on this in Paper 1 (see also Paper 3).

As accounted for in section 1.3 of this introduction chapter, the decision to study REDD+ in Zanzibar was key to my research project from the start. Since, when embarking upon the PhD in September 2010, I already had extensive knowledge about Zanzibar society, strong language skills, and good contacts within CARE, I considered conducting a study of the introduction of REDD+ in Zanzibar feasible - particularly in terms of being able to establish and maintain

research relations that informants found natural (Maxwell, 2013: 99). It moreover constituted an excellent opportunity to contribute to important learning about REDD+.

The selection of Mitini, the embedded case, was also purposive (Bryman, 2012). While selecting the local community where I would do fieldwork, I visited six different *shehias*. Accompanied by Mariam Khatib, a secondary school teacher from Zanzibar Town who recently had conducted fieldwork in the HIMA project area for her Masters degree, I met with *shehas* and local conservation committees, to whom I introduced myself and the research project. Prior to the visits, I had decided that the following factors would influence the choice of field site: 1) That the *shehia* was identified by HIMA as a potential site for REDD+, 2) that the local conservation committee expressed willingness to talk and to spend time with me, and 3) practical feasibility (in particular, the availability of a place for me to stay). Mitini fulfilled all three criteria. In addition, I was intrigued by the positive expectations expressed by the members of the conservation committee in Mitini, including the way they made jokes about all the money they would get from REDD+ since they ‘had the biggest forest of all in Zanzibar’.³⁴ Moreover, despite their expressed willingness to ‘host’ me, they were concerned about never having hosted a researcher before. This I regarded as an advantage.

Ethnography

In this thesis, ethnography represents an overall approach that can bridge theoretical and epistemological perspectives with practical data collection methods. In classical anthropology, ethnographic fieldwork has been seen as the ideal means of grasping the ‘natives’ point of view. In more recent studies of environmental and development interventions, ethnography has been particularly useful in unveiling differences between discourse and practice, and to distinguish between ‘front stage’ and ‘back stage’ behaviors or attitudes. Ethnography has also been helpful in accounting for - and understanding - the often unintended effects of different types of interventions.

In the context of an increasingly globalized contemporary world, anthropologists have further expressed concern about classical ethnography’s traditional repertoire, typically thought of as single-site fieldwork conducted in rural settings, and its capacity to address new, emerging issues

³⁴ None of us realized at that stage that what they referred to - the areas of the *shehia* that lay within the borders of the Jozani National Park, and the governmental forest plantation - would not generate any REDD+ funds.

- such as those related to science and technology, social movements, international organizations and development (see Marcus, 1998; Buroway et al, 2000; Rabinow et al, 2008). These concerns have led to calls for - and the development of - alternative ways 'of being an ethnographer' and of 'practically producing ethnographic knowledge' (Rabinow et al, 2008: 5-6). It has also generated the conduct of more mobile fieldwork, through which one could study wide-ranging, macro-processes that transcend national borders, including what Marcus calls 'multi-cited fieldwork' (1998) - in which the researcher follows an unfolding process, evolving phenomenon or social issue through different geographical and/or social sites or levels.³⁵

French anthropologist Olivier de Sardan (2005, 2015), however, holds that an anthropology of development, bureaucracies or the state implies a selection of sites and actors that brings 'a kind of a dissolution-delocalization of the site itself (and more so, the local arena)' (Olivier de Sardan, 2015: 208). Warning us about the tension between global and local foci, he argues that studies focusing on issues of globalization have 'contributed to an evaporation of the relevance of localized sites of inquiry' (ibid.). Investigating how countries in (West) Africa, and in particular their public services, both are influenced by - and reject - Western development aid, he insists on the use of 'classical' long-term ethnographic fieldwork - conducted in the local language and with an attention to the emic - or 'actors' point of view, to local realities, everyday representations and practices (Olivier de Sardan, 2015: 22).

In this thesis, the process of introducing REDD+ in Zanzibar, with selected actors and relationships, constitutes the principal object of this study.³⁶ The actors include, on one side, women and men in the local community of Mitini, and on the other, the HIMA staff (as well as governmental administrators and policy-makers) in Zanzibar town responsible for translating the REDD+ policy framework into practical implementation. I conducted ethnographic fieldwork at two levels (the local community and policy-making levels) in order to ensure that I investigated rather than 'assumed' what was going at the other scale. The ethnographic investigation thus followed REDD+ across scales, aiming to grasp the experiences and points of view of diverse actors involved in the process of translating REDD+ into practice.

³⁵ Another alternative concept is 'global ethnography' (Buroway et al, 2000).

³⁶ Other ethnographers prefer 'subject' of the study to 'object' of the study (see for instance Olivier de Sardan, 2005; Li, 2007a). I have however here chosen to follow Marcus (2002) and use of the term 'object', mainly to prevent confusion with the term 'research subjects' and 'subjectification' in the Foucauldian sense.

3.4. Methods of Data Collection

Participant observation

As common in ethnographic fieldwork, my methods included participant observation in combination with other qualitative methods, such as informal and formal interviews, as well as document review. Since I could operate without an interpreter, I regarded this as a feasible research strategy.³⁷ The combination of different methods provides access to different sources (e.g. informants) of various backgrounds and in different settings, as well as insights into different aspects of the phenomenon under investigation (Maxwell, 2013: 102). Typically, participant observation is well suited to obtaining information about events, settings and behavior - what people do - while interviews may provide insights into peoples' perspectives and goals - what people say they do, as well as their aspirations (Maxwell, 2013). Qualitative interviews are however also useful for exploring issues that emerged in the past. By combining methods, one may achieve a greater depth in the understanding of the phenomenon under investigation.

Participant observation formed the basis for primary data collection. Pader (2006: 163) describes participant observation as 'the process of living, working and/or otherwise hanging out with a defined group of people'. Participant observation also involves systematic recording of observations made in field diaries. In addition to grasping 'the actors' point of view' (Olivier de Sardan, 2015: 22), participant observation is useful for grasping tacit understandings and knowledge, as well as aspects of the issue under study that informants may either be reluctant to state in an interview (see for instance Maxwell, 2013), or even unable to express. In this study, I view participant observation as particularly useful, as it enables an investigation of differences in meaning, realities, as well as of multiple rationalities, insights that cannot fully be grasped through the use of more standardized methods. Participant observation may also provide

³⁷ Swahili is the national language in Tanzania and the mother tongue of most Zanzibaris. In the HIMA project, Swahili was the main language for communication. Only when non-Swahili speakers were present would those staff members who could switch to English. Project documents were normally in English. In Mitini, Swahili was the only spoken language. With a few exceptions, when I talked to foreign members of CARE staff or senior governmental officials, who were fluent in English, all interviews were conducted in Swahili.

background information useful in preparing interviews, and can also yield insights that can be applied in formal analyses of these.

I conducted participant observation in multiple ways and in various settings. I moved to Mitini with the aim of becoming ‘immersed’ in village life, so that I could ‘hear, see and begin to experience reality [i.e. related to REDD+] as the participants do’ (Marshall and Rossmann, 1995: 79, see also Oliver de Sardan, 2015: 26). Residing in the community and following residents’ daily routine was crucial, as it enabled me to observe details of daily life and community members’ activities, thus providing insights to which I otherwise, by not living in the village, would not have had access. In the early days of my stay, I was accompanied by *Hamida*, a female neighbor, on daily walks around the *shehia* of Mitini. *Hamida* introduced me to other female members of the community. I observed their daily struggles to make ends meet, and was privy to their continual discussions of new strategies for earning extra income. By spending time with these women, I also acquired information about sensitive topics such as corruption and even embezzlement in dysfunctional development projects these women had known. Later I was able to observe that villagers sometimes did not voice their true views when such sensitive issues came up during discussions with - for instance - projects staff or donors.³⁸

Through women in Mitini, I met with, and spent time with men - their husbands, sons, brothers and fathers. In addition, the majority of the most active members of the local conservation committee were men. I met these men regularly at committee meetings. Some of them guided me through the various forested areas of Mitini. During six trips lasting from four to six hours, I got to know the forests and several of the men better. They told me about changes in vegetation, management and use over time; where they used to cultivate, or graze animals; and about historical changes in rules and restrictions. On our trips, we met local women and men with bundles of wood on their heads or at the back of their bikes. ‘Dried wood’, community members explained, ‘it is not allowed to collect it, but it is not fair to stop them’ (it was the responsibility of the committee to do so). Sometimes, we came across smaller patches of forest that had been completely cut down by people I was told were ‘young men with few alternatives, in need of money for sikukuu (the celebrations marking important Muslim holidays). These trips taught me

³⁸ I settled in Mitini in October 2011 - a few weeks before representatives from the HIMA project arrived to inform the community about the REDD+ project. The three days of negotiations regarding the Community Forest Management Agreement (COFMA) took place in January 2012.

the local history of the forest and about forest management, as well as the importance and moral inflections of flexible access to forest resources. In general, participating in men and women's daily activities gave me insight into the everyday life of residents of Mitini, as well as how forest use and management worked in practice. This perspective provided critical contextual information that helped me to use other qualitative methods more effectively.

During the fieldwork in Mitini, I observed a total of 15 meetings. Twelve of these were meetings of the local conservation committee, either regular committee meetings or meetings between them and the HIMA project, or representatives from the Forest Authorities who came to discuss the development of the Community Forest Management Agreement. The remaining three were open village meetings. In meetings, I kept quiet, only talking if approached directly. I met with participants before meetings to learn about their expectations, and afterwards, to hear their reactions to what had happened. I asked what results they expected from the meetings, and listened to their views about the development of a common strategy. As the Community Forest Management Agreement was developed with the Department of Forestry, I witnessed villagers' increasing frustration, as well as internal dissent within the committee and to some extent within the wider community.

I conducted participant observation at the REDD+ project and policy-making level, among HIMA staff and project partners in Zanzibar town. During meetings organized by the project, I observed different actors' participation, and spoke informally with them during breaks to get their views and thoughts about the issues under discussion. I also deliberately used these occasions to exchange phone numbers and to express my interest in talking more with them at a later stage. On some occasions, I went along when project staff visited *shehias* (other than Mitini) that were part of the project, listened in on conversations and observed the interactions between project staff and community representatives. In the car on our way to 'the field,' I heard project staff discuss their hopes for the visit. On the way back, I was present as they expressed their disappointment when things did not go as expected, or their contentment when a meeting had ended well. I also frequently visited - and sometimes worked from - the CARE office in Zanzibar Town. At the office, I listened in on informal conversations about new project developments, achievements and challenges; I acquired information about upcoming activities

and events; attended internal meetings; and on some occasions took part in social gatherings organized at the office.³⁹

Interviewing

Interviewing is considered an integral part of participant observation (Fontana and Frey, 2000). Throughout my fieldwork, I engaged in numerous spontaneous and informal interviews, exploring comments made during meetings or in discussions where several people had been present, and dwelling on issues of special interest. These interviews were particularly useful for checking the accuracy of observations made and seeking fuller background information on particular topics, such as specific (especially historical) events, incidents, actions (Weiss, 1994: 1). Informal interviews with the same individuals in different settings provided valuable insights into their experiences, ideas and reflections, as well as a deepening understanding of the reality in which they live (Kaarhus, 2017). Having been in contact and talked informally, with informants prior to interviewing them formally was useful in creating a meaningful and relevant research process (Kaarhus, 1999).

In the course of the fieldwork, I conducted formal, individual interviews with 77 informants.⁴⁰ The formal interviews differed from informal interviews, as appointments were made with informants prior to the meetings. During these interviews, I would take notes, and in some cases, I recorded the conversation.⁴¹ Recruitment of interviewees was made through purposeful selection (Maxwell, 2013: 97). This meant that informants were approached and invited for an interview because they were expected to provide particular insight into the case under investigation. This required former knowledge of informants. In town, all informants with whom I conducted formal interviews were, with very few exceptions, to some degree involved in the

³⁹ During the four months when the focus of the fieldwork was on Mitini, I sometimes attended project meetings in Zanzibar Town. Likewise, when I moved from Mitini in February 2012, shifting the focus of the fieldwork to REDD+ processes among HIMA staff and other actors involved in REDD+ in Zanzibar town, I continued visiting Mitini frequently - for just a few hours or for a couple of days. Sometimes visits corresponded with participation in meetings in the local conservation committee or HIMA project activities. These visits continued until I returned to Norway in the end May 2012. Later I conducted two other fieldwork stays. One from the beginning of December 2012 through January 2013, and another for three weeks in March-April 2013. I also kept in touch with key informants both in Mitini and in CARE by phone and during other visits to Zanzibar until the end of the HIMA project in December 2014, and the final submission of the thesis. I was also in Zanzibar during the months of April and May in 2014, and in August the same year. I also lived in Zanzibar 10 months from August 2015 through May 2016. Although I did not deliberately collect data during this period, I kept in touch with key informants both in Mitini and in CARE.

⁴⁰ In total, I conducted 101 formal, individual interviews. See appendix 1.

⁴¹ For more information on tape recording, see under data analysis.

REDD+ introduction process. Appointments were typically made with participants I met at seminars or other meetings organized by the HIMA project, and often because I wanted to further explore what they had said during the meetings. I also endeavored to interview some of the meeting participants who were markedly less active.

In Mitini, formal interviews were initially conducted with informants who were directly involved in the REDD+ project (i.e. the local *sheha* and members of the local conservation committee). Upon my arrival in Mitini, I had received a map of the *shehia*. Developed by the Department of Forestry, it indicated land use in different areas, as well as the borders of the nearby National Park and government forest plantation. The map was a useful visual reference for initiating conversations about the committees' role in enforcing existing rules and restrictions, as well as about forest use and management more generally. Later on in the fieldwork, I also interviewed local women and men who were not directly involved in the REDD+ project, whom I met through participation in everyday life in Mitini. I strove to ensure diversity among informants by approaching people of different backgrounds in terms of kin group (*ukoo*), gender, age and occupation. Through snowball selection (see e.g. Berg and Lune, 2012), I also interviewed local men employed as forest guards in the National Park, buyers of land in Mitini, migrant workers, former village leaders and others who had held central positions in land and forest management, and who thus could provide their perspectives on past and present forest management in the area. These interviews shed light on the level of knowledge and perspectives on the REDD+ process among those who were not directly involved in the project. They also contributed complementary information about historical changes in forest practices in the local community - including former COFMA processes.

Before each formal interview, I prepared a list of issues I wanted to explore. Although some questions were repetitive, standardized questions were considered inappropriate, since various informants would have different experiences and observations to share depending on their role, position, and relation to the topic in question. During the interviews, I remained flexible and open, so that either the informants or myself could diverge from the planned questions if need be. In that sense, both questions and responses were open-ended. Thus, interviews would often slide back and forth along the continuum from unstructured to semi-structured interview (see Descombe, 2007: 176). Interviews varied considerably in length. Some were short and lasted for

only about 30 minutes. Others lasted for more than two hours. On some occasions, when an informant demonstrated both comprehensive knowledge about specific aspects of the research, as well as willingness to talk with me, we agreed to meet again later to continue our discussions. Thus, some informants were interviewed several times, and some became key informants.

Group interviews

Towards the end of the main fieldwork, I also visited five other *shehias* that were part of the HIMA project. Here, I conducted group interviews with members of the local conservation committees.⁴² In all cases, I had met representatives of the conservation committee at HIMA activities prior to the group interviews. Among the *shehias* selected, two neighbored Mitini. Two other *shehias* were perceived by the HIMA project as ‘good’ and ‘bad’ performers respectively. The fifth *shehia* was selected because of the talkativity⁴³ - and welcoming attitude - of the local conservation committee representatives, evidenced when I had met them previously.

Data from group interviews with local conservation committees beyond Mitini provided useful comparisons to Mitini, and enabled me to assess the level of Mitini’s uniqueness. Group interviews may also have a synergistic effect (Brandth, 1996). As the researcher poses one question, the responses and interactions of one interviewee may stimulate the thoughts and ideas of another. According to Fontana and Frey (2000), group interviews may aid respondents in recalling specific events, and stimulate detailed descriptions. I experienced this effect when I returned for my second fieldwork period in December 2012 and decided to organise group interviews with elderly women and men in Mitini. During these interviews, the main topic of discussion was the historical changes in local use and management of forest resources. The interviews provided a more coherent narrative about the changes; they filled ‘gaps’ from previous interviews and both confirmed and further elaborated insights gained through other methods.

⁴² I also joined the HIMA project team on various visits to communities in relation to implementation of HIMA activities. In total, I attended meetings in 16 of the total of 46 participating *shehias* in the course of the fieldwork.

⁴³ According to Pelto and Pelto (1978), talkativity will naturally influence the choice of informants.

Review of documents and written sources

An immense amount of documentation about REDD+ is available. I collected documents through various channels. Political statements and policy documents issued by organizations promoting REDD+ globally were mainly found through online sources. In Zanzibar, CARE provided project documents, such as the project proposals, strategies, plans, budgets, and reports, as well as, ‘tools’ developed, studies, reviews and evaluations, including those conducted by Terra Global Capital. From the Department of Forestry, I retrieved forest-related legal documents and strategic plans as well as maps. From the Sustainable Management of Land and Environment (SMOLE) project, under the Zanzibar Ministry of Land, Housing, Water and Energy, I received land-related legal documents, as well as studies (related to land) conducted by the project. The REDD+ Secretariat in Tanzania, situated within the Institute of Resource Assessment at the University of Dar es Salaam, provided me with official REDD+ documents for Tanzania, such as various versions of the National REDD+ strategy; reports from REDD+ consultation processes at various levels, and studies commissioned by the Secretariat. I also conducted archival search at the Norwegian Embassy in Dar es Salaam and at the Zanzibar National Archives. Archival documents provided details into issues that could no longer be observed, such as the longer history of consecutive forest-related external interventions in and around Mitini, as well as correspondence between the HIMA project and the donor prior to project start-up.

The wide array of documents collected provided useful contextual information for the study of REDD+ in Zanzibar. The review of Zanzibar policies and legal documents, as well as REDD+ strategies and plans were particularly important in this regard. Before certain interviews, I reviewed documents that had been issued by the institution with which the informant worked. In several cases, I found that such an analysis helped me to devise questions of particular relevance to the specific informant (Kaarhus, 1999). Reviewing documents such as minutes from meetings, reports and assessments provided insight into the ‘presuppositions and meanings that constitute the cultural world’ of the institutions that had produced these sources (Peräkylä and Ruusuvuori, 2011: 670). It was also useful for ‘triangulation’ purposes (see for instance Bowen, 2009). By triangulating information collected through one method with another, I could corroborate findings, thus enhancing the trustworthiness of the data used in my analyses. Assessing official

reports in terms of who produced them, for what purpose and at what stage in the REDD+ introduction process, and comparing these with information gathered in more ‘back stage’ settings (Goffman, 1959), helped me to ascertain which issues were controversial, as well as how actual practice at times conflicted with stated plans and objectives (see also O’Learly, 2014).

3.5. Research ethics

Research ethics is an integral part of the research process. Thus, ethical considerations - and decisions - were central throughout the entire research process; from the selection of the research topic and research site, the applications for funding, while cultivating research relationships, during data collection, analysis and storage, as well as in the final dissemination of research findings (Maxwell, 2013; Akeroyd, 1984). Aiming to ‘develop ethical discretion and reflection, to clarify ethical dilemmas, and to promote good scientific practice’, the Norwegian National Committee for Research Ethics in Social Sciences and Humanities (NESH) has developed a set of ethical guidelines for social scientists (NESH, 2016). Key to research ethics is the recognition of informants’ rights. It is the responsibility of researchers to ensure the privacy, confidentiality and anonymity of participants, and that participation in the research is voluntary (ibid.).

This research project was subject to notification under the Norwegian Personal Data Act. The Norwegian Social Science Data Service (NSD), which serves as the ombudsman for social science research in Norway, is - on behalf of the Data Inspectorate - responsible for providing advice related to the ‘privacy’ of research subjects, and to issue licenses when needed. Prior to fieldwork, the NSD evaluated and approved the research protocol, the research topic and methodology, as well as procedures for treating sensitive information and personal data of informants, also ensuring free, prior and informed consent. In accordance with government regulations in Zanzibar, I applied for and obtained a research permit from the central government prior to commencing data collection. The permit was useful for introducing myself and the research project to local leaders (at the *shehia* and district level), as well as to relevant government institutions in Zanzibar Town. Permission to live in Mitini for a longer period was secured through application to the local *sheha* and the District Commissioner.

It is the researcher’s responsibility to anticipate ethical dilemmas that can arise as one deals with a vast variety of complex research relationships, and moreover, to find ways of resolving these

without damage to the research subjects (American Anthropological Association, 1971). Generalized - and often idealized - guidelines may, however, when implemented, pose new ethical challenges and dilemmas (ibid.). It is therefore important that various aspects of ethical standards and norms be considered in light of the specific scientific practices and disciplines of each researcher/research project. I elaborate on these in the following sections.

Informed consent

The obligation to obtain free, prior and informed consent is one of the standards regulating a researcher's relationship to informants. The Nuremberg Code of 1947, and later the Helsinki Declaration of 1964 on ethical principles for medical research involving human subjects, emphasized the right of individuals participating in research to provide consent and to refuse participation in research projects. The process of ensuring informed consent can be divided into three components: Communication of information; comprehension of information; and voluntary participation (American Anthropological Association, 2004). *Communication of information* is related to the provision of accurate information about the intent of the research, and how the information provided by participants will contribute to the research. Moreover, anticipated risks and benefits resulting from the research should be discussed with informants. *Comprehension of information* implies that it is the researcher's responsibility to ensure that information provided is fully understood by potential informants. The information provided must therefore be adapted to ensure comprehension within the particular cultural setting (Shrader-Frechette, 1994). Finally, *voluntary participation* stipulates that informed consent be obtained without any outside pressure.

The presentation of 'the self and the research project' is vital for how research relationships evolve (Ardener, 1984: 101). Arriving in Mitini, I introduced myself, providing as accurate information as possible about the purpose of the research project, including its limitations. I first had a meeting with the *sheha* and the managers of the local conservation committee. During my first week in Mitini, they organized a meeting with both the local conservation committee, as well as a 'community meeting' which, in principle, all residents of Mitini could attend. During these meetings I, the research project and its purposes were introduced to the wider community. I presented REDD+ as a new phenomenon, and said that I had come to Mitini to learn from its

residents about how they used and managed forest resources in the *shehia*, and moreover how they would experience the impending project. I further explained that during the fieldwork I would also engage with staff from the HIMA project in order to understand how they perceived the project. I emphasized that I had no mandate to change or to improve the REDD project, and that as a student, the research was first of all an academic exercise undertaken to fulfill the requirements of a PhD. I also said that it would take time before the ‘results’ (*matokeo*), i.e. my ‘report’ (*ripoti*), would be ready. Finally, I welcomed questions, to which I responded as honestly as I could.

Doing fieldwork in foreign cultures places particularly stringent demands on planning and implementation of a research project (NESH, 2016). Many guidelines present written consent as the ideal. For research projects conducted in societies where people are unaccustomed to dealing with written information, fulfilling this ideal might be problematic for a number of reasons. Asking for written consent may go against research ethics, both in terms of risking humiliating illiterate informants, as well as jeopardizing their feeling of security. Given these concerns, this research project followed Fluehr-Lobban (2003) who considers oral consent as an ethical alternative. The process of obtaining consent was combined with knowledge about and respect for local traditions, and acknowledgement of existing power holders who could potentially block others from participating. Possession of a formal research permit, careful cultivation of relations with local authorities and decision makers, combined with knowledge about the local community and the institutions participating in REDD+ gained through long-term presence in Zanzibar, prevented major problems in this regard - both in Mitini and among project staff and bureaucrats in Zanzibar town.

Since I, throughout the entire fieldwork, continued to meet new potential informants (in Zanzibar Town as well as in the villages), I developed a routine for explaining the nature of the research and seeking informed consent as soon as I realized that a new acquaintance could become an informant. Since I did not have to rely on an interpreter, I could control what was communicated, and moreover could correct eventual misunderstandings along the way. Since a good deal of data was obtained through participant observation, spontaneous conversations, and repeated interviews with key informants, the process of explaining the research project, assessing possible risks and benefits to informants, and obtaining free, prior and informed consent was an

interactive, continuous and incremental process (see also American Anthropological Association, 2004).

In formal interview settings, I began by repeating and/or elaborating the reasons I wanted to meet. I emphasized my duty as a researcher to ensure that no one could trace any information provided back to individual informants. I stressed that he or she was free to abstain from responding to any questions, at any stage in the process, without incurring sanction or being disadvantaged (Wood, 2006), and that not responding to questions was better than inventing answers. In encounters with key informants, discussions of the potential and actual consequences of being closely tied to me sometimes emerged. For instance, on one occasion, I was asked by a key informant to pretend that I did not know ‘something’, as the informant feared that the information could be traced back to them - with negative consequences. Informants also raised questions about my research, its objectives and my ambitions. I always endeavored to respond to these questions as accurately and honestly as possible. In consultation with key informants, I also decided to give the *shehia* where I undertook large parts of my fieldwork an invented name, rather than reveal its location.

Reciprocity and benefit sharing

Participant observation in a community entails spending time with women and men in their daily activities. While introducing myself and the research to the residents of Mitini, I emphasized that I would endeavor to not disturb their routines and that they should continue their activities as normal. I also made clear that I would not provide remuneration to informants. Long-term fieldworks often lead to long-term - sometimes life-long - moral obligations and practical responsibilities, towards both informants and the host community of ‘personal, professional and civic’ character (Akeroyd, 1984: 138). Particularly during the fieldwork in Mitini, I did - occasionally - struggle with ethical questions regarding what right I had as an outsider to intrude in informants’ lives, to observe them in sometimes ‘private’ situations, and to ask questions that could be quite personal, and sometimes very sensitive. Moreover, doing fieldwork in a community where most residents struggled economically, it was impossible to close my eyes to the - at times - urgent financial needs of ‘fellow villagers’.

As the fieldwork proceeded, I felt an increasing need to demonstrate my appreciation to informants for their time spent with me. In the much-quoted guide to ethnographic research edited by Roy Ellen, Ardener (1984: 109) writes that gift giving ‘as a means of creating and cementing relationships with informants, is only of benefit if it is done with discretion’ (Ardener, 1984: 109), and - I would add - when it is done in accordance with existing cultural practices. *Kuchangia* - to contribute (or help each other out) - is common among fellow Zanzibaris. I contributed for instance to the wedding of the son of one of my key informants, and to transport costs to Dar es Salaam when another key informant got seriously ill and urgently needed medical treatment. Exchange of small gifts is also an important element in social interaction among Zanzibaris. When returning from trips to Zanzibar Town, I sometimes brought small presents to informants. This could be dates for the Eid celebration, a bag of the preferred brand of rice or batteries for their torches. Moreover, when formal interviews were conducted in places where I could, for example, offer coffee or tea or biscuits, I did so.

Since the ‘gifts’ I had shared during the fieldwork had mostly benefitted a few key informants, after consulting with Zanzibari researcher friends, I chose to express my appreciation for the hospitality of Mitini residents by contributing to a community tuition fund earmarked for secondary school students. This donation was made at the end of the main fieldwork in order to minimize its potential influence on informants’ responses and behavior, and thus the quality of data (see Mikkelsen, 2007). The exchange of gifts was, however, reciprocal. Every time I left Zanzibar, sometimes even when I was only going to Zanzibar Town for a short while, villagers offered loads of fruits; oranges, pineapples and coconuts; homemade *visheti* (coconut donuts), fried fish and eggs, or whatever they had at hand.

Researchers’ positionality

A researcher’s epistemological stance and theoretical approaches shape relationships in the field (Moore and Sanders, 2005). According to social constructivist thinking, data produced through interaction with others will inevitably be based on researcher’s positionality, i.e. the researcher’s background - gender, age, nationality, experiences and preconceived ideas. The researcher’s positionality may affect what data is sought, found and presented. In ethnographic fieldwork, adopting a reflexive research approach (Maxwell, 2013: 90) - or other approaches that allow for

the possibility for intersubjectivity - has a validating effect on the data produced (Kaarhus, 2017; see also Geertz, 1973). Throughout the fieldwork, I therefore continuously reflected on how my background and experiences would affect my research relationships, shape the accessibility or inaccessibility of certain information, or otherwise influence the quality of data produced.

As a woman doing fieldwork in a sex-segregated society, where there are different spheres for women and men (Larsen, 2008), it was easier for me to interact socially - and informally - with women than with men. The topic under study, however, made it necessary to seek out both male and female informants. Cultural competence generated over time, including familiarity with the customary norms regarding expected female behaviour and dressing, for example, was useful in this regard. Although, I did find that I, as a foreigner, could in some ways adopt a 'genderless role' (Caplan, 1993: 170) that enabled the transgression of gender boundaries, and hence interaction with both women and men, contact with men was still relatively formal - principally in meetings, during planned trips in the forest, and in interviews (see also Dean, 2013: 105).

My status as a foreigner set me apart from my informants. Through years' of previous interaction with Zanzibaris, I had adopted ways of minimising my 'otherness'. Although I in most settings did not cover my hair, which most Zanzibari women do, I was always careful to dress in a culturally/religiously appropriate way, i.e. I wore long, local dresses, and often a *kanga* wrapped around my shoulders. Willingly engaging in local language practices - for example the competent use of Muslim greetings, as well as, when invited, participating in religious and cultural festivals and events was important. I also joined in the Muslim prayers, with which most meetings - both community and project-related - begin. Although I have made every effort to acquaint myself with local knowledge and cultural and social practice in Zanzibar, as well as with the economic, social and political struggles that define so many Zanzibari lives, I can never escape the fact that some important aspects of local lifeworlds remain inaccessible for me. I was a non-Muslim doing fieldwork in an almost 100% Muslim community, and, as an 'economically privileged' Norwegian, I had the option of leaving the islands any time I wanted.

My previous experience with CARE Norway was an important resource (Olivier de Sardan, 2015: 58). My familiarity with CARE's organizational culture, values and norms, as well as the constraints under which staff operate, helped me to grasp the 'logics' staff members deployed - that is, how they reacted and responded to various elements of the REDD+ policy framework

(see also *ibid*: 121). The fact that we had things in common, that I could relate to staff members' challenges, possibly contributed to generating trust and a willingness to speak openly, and granted me access to information that would have been less accessible to other researchers.

When a researcher intends to understand the perspectives of the people one is studying, she develops a certain level of empathy for - and a commitment to - the women and men she works with (Akeroyd, 1984: 138). In my study of the introduction of REDD+ in Zanzibar, I aimed to understand the points of view, interests and 'realities' of two at times competing groups of actors involved in REDD+. Although I felt empathy towards actors at both levels, my initial motivation was to understand local communities' concerns and the implications REDD+ for their lives, including their ability to secure their basic needs, today and in the future (see also Benjaminen and Svarstad, 2017: 21). I thus regard the study as situated primarily at the local, community level. During fieldwork, when representatives of both parties met - in meetings in Mitini or in Zanzibar Town, for instance - I communicated this positioning, and made sure to sit among representatives of the local community.

At one point during my research, I learned that, at a meeting with the Mitini conservation committee, a senior forest officer had accused Mitini residents of being under my 'Western' influence, and that it was due to my influence that Mitini had ended up as the only *shehia* signing a COFMA. Informants in Mitini did in fact sometimes ask me to provide advice or suggest ways of dealing with specific challenges. After attending a meeting of the 'village assembly' in Mitini, where elders had strongly recommended that the *shehia* conservation committee reject the current version of the COFMA proposal, I was approached by the different segments of the committee to discuss and exchange ideas about ways forward. Although I emphasized that my role was to study the introduction process of REDD+, and that I therefore should not influence it,⁴⁴ I felt so pressured to intervene I decided to leave Mitini for Zanzibar Town the next morning, so that villagers could respond to the situation without me being there.

Despite taking actions to minimize my influence on 'research subjects', what Maxwell (2013: 124) refers to as 'reactivity', such risks cannot be eliminated when data collection relies on

⁴⁴ I received such requests from both community members and staff in CARE and the department of Forestry. In all cases, I responded the same way.

personal interaction with informants (*ibid.*). It is possible that, simply by showing interest in REDD+ as a new phenomenon in Zanzibar, and in the COFMA process, and by posing (numerous) questions about it and about the history of forest management in general, I stimulated local discussions and reflection that reminded community members in Mitini of historical dispossessions and the broken promises of earlier interventions. I can only speculate how the COFMA process would have progressed in Mitini without my presence, and likewise, what would have happened in other *shehias* had I followed the COFMA processes there.

Influenced by an interpretive theoretical perspective (Geertz, 1973), I wanted most of all to remain open to different actors' perspectives (see also Rabinow et al, 2008: 80). My ambition has thus been to understand various actors on their own terms, including their subjective experiences and perceived realities. As such, the ethnographic approach taken is inspired by Olivier de Sardan's (2005:1) 'resolutely empirical' and 'non-normative' Anthropology of Development. For political ecologists, an interpretive perspective that focuses on exploring 'meanings' is often not enough. Political ecology may come with an emancipatory and liberating agenda (Peet and Watts, 1996), in which the researcher highlights existing inequalities and injustices and other undesirable consequences of dominant policies and discourses. Although this thesis prioritizes understanding Zanzibari actors from their own perspectives, it also wishes to expose the underlying - and sometimes problematic - assumptions inherent in global REDD+ discourses. The thesis thus also points to some of the potential negative implications of REDD+, and how mainstream REDD+ discourses are at odds with local norms, practices and 'realities'.

3.6. Analysis of data

In ethnographic studies, and qualitative studies more generally, the distinction between data collection, analysis and writing is somehow artificial (Fangen, 2010: 208). Rather than separate individual processes, these are interlinked and undertaken more or less simultaneously (see also Maxwell, 2013: 104). The interpretation and processing of ethnographic data commences during interviews and observation (Fangen, 2010: 208). Data analysis should then ideally continue immediately after the interviews are completed or observations made, until the very end of the research project - in this case until the finalization of this written thesis.

During my fieldwork, I tried to find time - ideally several times a day - to take detailed notes about what I had seen, experienced and heard. I also included descriptions of the settings and circumstances in which data was collected. In other words, I noted down information about not only what I came to know, but also about how I came to know it. The field diaries helped me to manage potentially subjective impressions/biases, and to produce 'thick descriptions' (Olivier de Sardan, 2015: 49). Later, they enabled me to consider how various research relationships shaped my analysis of the data, actively question my own interpretations, and examine how these arose (Berg and Lune, 2012: 205). I audio-recorded about 25% of the formal interviews I conducted, as well as many of the larger meetings at which I was present.⁴⁵ In a separate Excel file, I tagged each record (interview or meeting) with the names and background of informants, dates, locations, and key topics discussed.

The processing of data followed relatively unstandardized procedures (see for instance Fangen, 2010: 115). After the fieldwork, I read, and often reread, the transcripts and my field notes. Drawing on these, as well as my own memory, I noted down particularly relevant information in memos and highlighted specific statements and observations of particular relevance (Maxwell, 2013). When I found it useful, I clustered these according to topic. Through this process, 'tentative ideas about categories and relationships' started to emerge (ibid: 105). During the writing of the four papers that constitute this thesis, I have - with the help of the Excel sheets - repeatedly returned to the original sources (i.e. field diaries and transcriptions), sometimes seeking 'thicker' description, and at other times to better select specific quotes and to cross-check my interpretations.

The data analysis for this thesis further followed an inductive research logic, in which, from particularities discovered in the empirical data, I moved toward the generation of more general concepts and theories. In the course of the writing, I have compared, linked and contrasted my

⁴⁵ I recorded meetings and conversations only with the permission of informants and meeting participants. During meetings, I usually approached the chairperson to ask in plenary, on my behalf, for the permission to record. On some occasions, I myself asked for permission. I endeavored to be attentive to various individuals' reactions to the question. Although no one ever rejected the request, on a few occasions, I sensed hesitation and chose not to turn on the recorder. There were also a few occasions when I was asked to turn it off, for instance during the COFMA negotiation when the various representatives from Mitini on one hand and the Zanzibar forest authorities on the other decided to split up so that the villagers could 'deliberate in private'. In general, however, members of the committee wanted me to record the meetings, in this way 'witnessing' /documenting the process. Except for one interview in English that I transcribed myself, all tape-recorded material was transcribed by Zanzibaris, one already experienced transcriber and one whom I trained myself.

own interpretations of data from both the overall and embedded case with other studies in Zanzibar, REDD+ processes elsewhere, as well as with theoretical literature of a more general character. I have drawn on theoretical concepts used by scholars in political ecology and the anthropology of development insofar as these were useful to the analysis of empirically based findings. In line with Glaser's concept of 'theoretical sensitivity' (Maxwell, 1996), I have, however, throughout the study, engaged in critical reflection about the usefulness of such theories and concepts; carefully assessing how these capture the empirical setting under study; and moreover how they relate to concepts applied by informants.

Long-term iterative fieldwork that continuously moves back and forth between various research components implies an element of self-evolution (Olivier de Sardan, 2015: 49). Discussing specific findings and interpretations with various informants was useful for correcting potential misunderstandings, and adjusting interpretations. The latter was possible since I returned to Zanzibar several times during the writing period, and therefore had the opportunity to cross-check my data analysis with informants. Overall, the gathered data in its totality is much richer than what has been presented in the four papers that constitute this thesis. Writing an article-based thesis has implied strict word limits set by the peer-reviewed journals. It has also put restrictions on the topics that can be discussed in detail.

3.7. Questions of validity

An ethnography can both be conceived as a method and as the outcome of research. Through thick descriptions, the ethnographer seeks to demonstrate transparency about the process of knowledge production, and to convince the reader about the 'authenticity' of what is described, notwithstanding challenges related to potential bias (Olivier de Sardan, 2015: 58). Above, I have discussed issues that can be considered a threat to validity, e.g. researcher's positionality. Along with Maxwell (2013), I have argued that these are inevitable in ethnographic/qualitative research, and that the question should not be how one's positionality and the idiosyncrasies of research settings and projects can be eliminated, but how they can be understood, and used 'productively' (ibid: 125).

Several qualitative researchers have proposed alternatives to the concept of ‘validity’ (see e.g. Lincoln and Denzin, 1994; Guba and Lincoln and, 1998).⁴⁶ Suggestions include considering the credibility of the account instead of its internal validity, the transferability of the material presented instead of its external validity, the dependability of the interpretation instead of its reliability, and the study’s confirmability instead of its objectivity (see Fangen, 2010: 245-259). Maxwell (2013: 122) promotes a commonsense definition of validity as the ‘credibility of a description, conclusion, explanation, interpretation, or other sort of account’. Validity in qualitative research is thus not primarily linked to a notion of an ‘objective truth’ (ibid). Rather it is linked to the trustworthiness, authenticity and quality of the account presented (Lincoln and Guba, 1989; 1998) and to ‘epistemological validity’, that is, the assessment of the ways in which research has been undertaken, and data has been obtained and represented, in a way that fosters credibility (Fangen, 2010: 245). When it comes to ethnographic studies using interactive methods such as participant observation, Fangen (2010: 250) argues that it makes little sense to ask whether another researcher would have drawn the same conclusions. She recommends to rather focus on whether an independent observer would make conceptual observations that empirically or logically make those made in the first place invalid. By outlining in detail the approaches used and the considerations and decisions made in the course of the research process, I aim to offer methodological transparency, and this way subject my own research to external critical scrutiny.

⁴⁶ Already in the 1920s and 1930s, members of the Chicago school argued that qualitative methods should not be judged or assessed according to the same criteria as quantitative research (such as validity, reliability, objectivity) since it produces a completely different form for data/knowledge.

4. SUMMARY OF INDIVIDUAL PAPERS

4.1. Commodification of forest carbon: REDD+ and socially embedded forest practices in Zanzibar

In this article, we present an empirically based, critical investigation of the ways in which a Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+) project in Zanzibar established the systems required to produce a forest carbon commodity eligible for sale in the global carbon market. Based on long-term ethnographic fieldwork and in-depth knowledge about REDD+ processes in Zanzibar, we discuss how the commodification of forest carbon is at odds with local norms, practices and social relations at local level in Zanzibar, and show how commodification processes - in a context of highly volatile carbon markets - create new uncertainties and relations of dependence. We argue that, by converting the local forest into a source of one single commodity for sale ('forest carbon'), the project reduces the use value of the forest for local women and men, thus undermining the longer-term rationality inherent in local norms and socially embedded forest practices. We indicate that these also include norms that serve to protect forests. In the context of contemporary debates about the functioning of REDD+ and the commodification of forest carbon more in general, this article enhances current understandings of REDD+ practices and their impact at local level.

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4.2. The bricolage of REDD+ in Zanzibar: from global environmental policy framework to community forest management

The policy framework known as Reducing Emission from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+) attempts to create economic incentives for forest conservation and CO₂ emission reductions. This article explores what happens when REDD+, as a globally conceived environmental policy framework, is translated into practice in Zanzibar. Based on ethnographic fieldwork among actors involved in the policy translation process, the article investigates how these actors receive, interpret and give meaning to the introduction of REDD+. Using the concept of institutional bricolage, the article discusses the factors that provide legitimacy to

REDD+ at policy level in Zanzibar, and looks at why certain elements of the REDD+ policy framework are incorporated into practice while others are discarded. The article shows how actors make creative use of the available resources, within a spectrum that allows only for reinvention of established practices and acceptable ways of doing. The article concludes that although the process of carbon accounting represents a ‘technical necessity’ of the REDD+ policy framework, it lacks the legitimacy necessary to become durable. REDD+ in Zanzibar is thus at risk of becoming yet another example of a ‘conservation fad’ - an approach that initially elicits widely shared enthusiasm, but is later dubbed a failure and abandoned.

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4.3. Between resistance and consent: Project-village relationships when introducing REDD+ in Zanzibar

Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+) is an example of a globally important environmental intervention that is implemented throughout the global South. This article investigates rural villagers’ possibilities for influencing these interventions, and for negotiating access to forest resources at the local level. Based on data drawn from ethnographic fieldwork in Zanzibar, the article explores a process whereby representatives from one village in consultation with forest authorities negotiate a Community Forest Management Agreement that will be part of a future REDD+ scheme. The article reviews the multiple local responses to this pre-REDD+ process and discusses factors that influences these responses. Local claims about ‘lost land’ and ‘disappearing benefits’ are at the core of what villagers want to see redressed by the REDD+ project. But despite seemingly high local expectations at the project’s arrival, as well as the project’s self-presentation as participatory, villagers soon realize that their influence on the project is marginal. After attempting to voice their concerns through negotiation, villagers find that the project’s ahistorical and apolitical approach forces them into more resistance-like behavior - complicating the distinction between consent and non-consent to the project. Inspired by Foucault’s conception of power and the tensions between different knowledges, logics and practices at project vs. village level, the article seeks to further our theoretical reflections and

understanding of ‘project’-‘village’ dynamics in external environmental interventions with a global agenda, of which REDD+ is just one example.

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4.4. Access to land and forest resources in a REDD+ context in Zanzibar

Scholarly debates have over the past decades revealed a growing awareness about the limitations of development efforts that seek to formalise tenure rights. Despite these efforts’ often ‘pro-poor’ ambitions, scholars warn against elite capture - in which privileged groups take advantage of formal rights to land and natural resources at the expense of more marginal groups, thus cementing, rather than eliminating, existing inequalities and injustices in access to resources. It is further argued that, rather than being set by formal rules, access to resources is in practice determined by social relations and the abilities of individual and groups to invest in networks and alliances with those in control of the resource. Although elite capture of tenure rights has been well documented in scholarly literature about formalisation of tenure rights in an African context, it has received little attention in debates about initiatives that seek to formalize carbon rights, including the implementation of REDD+ projects. Drawing on Ribot and Peluso’s (2003) ‘theory of access’, this paper explores the rights-based and structural and relational mechanisms governing access, use, and management of land and forest resources in Zanzibar. Through an empirical account, the paper shows how a combination of such mechanisms shapes the ways local community members in rural Zanzibar are enabled to - and constrained from - benefitting from land and forest resources. I show how some groups of individuals - through investment in relationships with people of power - are able to benefit from land and forest resources, regardless of whether they have a legal right to do so, while others are not. With reference to the recent HIMA/REDD+ project in Zanzibar, the paper seeks to give further nuance to the debate about formalization of tenure rights, and carbon rights in particular, in REDD+ in an African context.

This paper is submitted here as a draft paper.

5. SYNTHESIS OF FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

This thesis discusses REDD+ as an example of an environmental policy framework conceived at international levels, and implemented at local levels in forest communities throughout the Global South. The thesis explores the encounter between the REDD+ global agenda of reducing forest-based CO₂ emissions, and thereby mitigating climate change, and the local realities and practices that the REDD+ policy framework aims to regulate, modify and change. The thesis combines an attention to the logics, goals, strategies and techniques of the REDD+ policy framework with an in-depth investigation of the historical and socio-political context where REDD+ is introduced - with its multiple rationalities and embedded practices. Along with Li (2007: 27), I argue that such an approach is well suited to understand how REDD+ is both 'constituted' and 'contested' by those responsible for its practical implementation. By conducting ethnographic fieldwork at multiple scales in Zanzibar, I have endeavored to grasp the realities and practices, as well as the responses and experiences, of actors involved in REDD+ at both local community and policy-making levels. An investigation of REDD+ at multiple scales and levels in Zanzibar also permitted following the HIMA project at different stages in the implementation process, that is, from before its initiation in 2010 until after its end in 2014.

The four individual papers that form part of this thesis provide insights into different elements and aspects of the REDD+ policy framework, and the different stages of the process of introducing REDD+ in Zanzibar. The papers demonstrate that the REDD+ policy framework is not introduced into a vacuum. When introduced to Zanzibar, REDD+ is conditioned and affected by historical and socio-political relations and experiences, local realities and embedded practices. These factors all have implications for the implementation of REDD+, and the level to which practical implementation is in line with the policy design and intentions. Several of the papers also highlight how the technicalities of carbon accounting become a constitutive element of the REDD+ project implementation in Zanzibar.

Paper one shows how the commodification of Zanzibar's forests, focusing on forests' role in carbon sequestration and storage, comes into conflict with local norms, in which flexible access to forest resources is critical to rural livelihoods. The paper argues that REDD+'s reductionist framing of the forest undermines local notions of the forest as insurance, and as a resource used primarily in emergencies and on special occasions when there is need for extra cash. Moreover,

the market logic inherent in REDD+, as well as a focus on values such as individualism and competition, marginalizes existing cultural norms and taboos that encourage long-term protection of forests, including norms that encourage local women and men in Zanzibar to use forest resources cautiously and primarily for subsistence. The paper also shows how strict enforcement of forest laws is considered unethical in the local communities, as it demonstrates rule enforcers' lack of understanding of, and empathy for, fellow villagers' precarious livelihoods. Members of local community conservation committees therefore feel a moral obligation *not* to sanction fellow villagers in need trespassing forest laws. People in influential positions, or those who have the ability to invest in social relations with such people, may also escape sanctions for rule violations. For them, their connections with the 'right' people may provide them with impunity. Key to paper one's argument is that the commodification processes risk ending up discouraging rather than encouraging local forest protection in Zanzibar.

Paper two furthers the discussion of the role of local social norms and established practices in the implementation of REDD+. Focusing on the introduction of REDD+ at policy-making levels, the paper shows how REDD+ provides some scope for social agency, thus enabling actors to creatively use REDD+ resources to advance their own agendas. This is, however, only possible to the extent that these do not conflict with the principles of carbon accounting. Instead, I argue that carbon accounting was considered a technical necessity and had a disciplining effect on the HIMA project. Despite project staff's reservations, carbon accounting could not be discarded from project activities. Bottled gas, however, which was initially proposed as a substitute for forest-based energy (and thus a means of reducing the pressure on local forest resources), had - as a fossil fuel - qualities that conflicted with the principles of the carbon accounting. Bottled gas could hence be rejected by the HIMA project. With HIMA not yet having generated any carbon revenues, carbon accounting may easily be abandoned. Without carbon revenues, the COFMAs lack the economic incentives supposedly needed to tackle the challenges associated with community forest management. Thus, REDD+ in Zanzibar is, as elsewhere, at risk of becoming a "conservation fad" (Lund et al, 2017; see also Redford et al, 2013; Fletcher et al, 2016) - achieving little new in terms of changing actual forest management and use in Zanzibar, and generating no more than business as usual scenarios.

Also at local levels - in the communities where REDD+ is introduced - local people's ability to influence the REDD+ agenda and implementation is marginal. In paper three, I discuss the process of negotiating a Community Forest Management Agreement (COFMA) in the local community of Mitini. I describe how community members of Mitini make various efforts to influence the HIMA project, and to challenge what they experience as asymmetric power relations between themselves and the project. HIMA was, however, incapable of dealing with the concerns raised by the local community. In line with Foucault's notion of productive power (Burchell et al, 1991), the paper shows how community members, when faced with domination, started engaging in resistance-like behavior towards the project. This opposition was, however, aborted once it began to have negative impacts on individual community members' privileges or their relationships with powerful people. In light of debates about REDD+ consultation processes, and the distinction between consent and non-consent to REDD+, paper three thus concludes that consent is a matter of degree. In Mitini, the COFMA negotiation process remained inconclusive throughout the project phase. HIMA project staff stopped coming to the community, and when the description of the HIMA carbon project was sent to a third party carbon validator in December 2014, Mitini was excluded from the list of communities that had been chosen as part of the project.

Paper four of this thesis further illustrates how women and men in rural Zanzibar are deeply implicated in various types of social relationships, and moreover, the importance of cultivating and maintaining such relationships as a means of securing local livelihoods in rural Zanzibar. Discussing the HIMA/REDD+ project as an example of an initiative that seeks to formalize rights to carbon, the paper demonstrates how access to land and forest resources in Zanzibar is highly determined by social relations and individuals and groups' abilities to invest in networks and alliances with those who control the resources. The paper argues that, despite claiming to ensure that the local population in rural Zanzibar benefits from future carbon sales, formalization processes risk causing elite capture, in which well-connected individuals, regardless of whether they have a legal right to a resource or not, are privileged over those in less connected positions.

Throughout the process of introducing REDD+ in Zanzibar, the HIMA project adopted a highly apolitical and ahistorical approach. Not taking into account the existing historical and sociopolitical contexts of local livelihood struggles, and the realities and practices embedded in

these, the HIMA project risks not only failing to achieve its expected goals of reduced forest loss and CO₂ emissions, it also risks consolidating existing structural inequalities, exacerbating conflicts, and, moreover, creating new ones. Further, since the validation of the HIMA Carbon Project is still pending, and thus - since HIMA has still not sold any carbon, the 45 local communities that have signed COFMAs risk finding themselves in the precarious situation of having signed away their rights to use forest resources while receiving little or no revenues or compensation in return. As such, REDD+ in Zanzibar has also created a situation of new uncertainties and new relations of dependence.

Although HIMA has not sold any carbon, it did prepare carbon for sale, thus completing the process of commodifying Zanzibari forest carbon. In the 45 local communities that signed COFMAs, carbon rights have been assigned, and systems for carbon accounting have been established and put to use. The ethnographic material presented here therefore provides new and empirically grounded insights into the broad variety of dilemmas project managers - as well as local communities - face when implementing PES-based REDD+ projects at local level. Moreover, since the socio-cultural context throughout Zanzibar is more or less the same, the ethnographic material collected in Mitini - although Mitini did not end up as part of the HIMA Carbon project - remains useful for discussing what happens when REDD+ and the PES-model meet the 'reality' of local communities - in communities beyond Mitini.

Since HIMA, like the majority of REDD+ pilot projects around the world, has not sold any carbon, the analysis of REDD+ presented in this thesis does not include an analysis of the extent to which carbon revenues function as incentives for forest conservation, reduced forest loss, and, ultimately, climate mitigation. Nor does the thesis include an analysis of how carbon revenues are distributed. As the focus at local level was on a community that ended up not signing a COFMA, this study is neither a study of the extent to which the communities that signed COFMAs have actually implemented these agreements and enforced new regulations. This I believe, might be an interesting topic for future research.

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PAPER I



Commodification of forest carbon: REDD+ and socially embedded forest practices in Zanzibar

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ABSTRACT

In this article, we present an empirically based and critical investigation of the ways in which a Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+) project in Zanzibar takes steps to establish the systems required to produce a forest carbon commodity eligible for sale in the global carbon market. Based on long-term ethnographic fieldwork and in-depth knowledge about REDD+ processes in Zanzibar, we discuss how the commodification of forest carbon is at odds with local norms, practices and social relations at local level in Zanzibar, and show how commodification processes – in a context of highly volatile carbon markets – creates new uncertainties and relations of dependence. We argue that, by converting the local forest into a source of one single commodity for sale ('forest carbon'), the project reduces the use value of the forest for local women and men, thus undermining the longer-term rationality inherent in local norms and socially embedded forest practices. We indicate that these also include norms that serve to protect forests. In the context of contemporary debates about the functioning of REDD+ and commodification of forest carbon more in general, this article contributes to enhance current understanding of REDD+ practices and impacts at local level.

1. Introduction

From its inception in 2007, the carbon scheme known as Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation – including forest conservation, sustainable management and the enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing countries (REDD+) – was designed to offer payments to countries and projects that could demonstrate progress in the reduction of forest-related CO₂ emissions (Angelsen, 2017). With funding expected to come primarily from carbon markets (Angelsen, 2017), the initial idea underlying REDD+ was that by attaching a market value to the ecosystem services provided through carbon sequestration and storage in the forest biomass, REDD+ projects would make it possible for developed countries to buy 'carbon credits' from developing countries (Leach and Scoones, 2015: 1). Internationally negotiated targets would in this way offer actors from developed countries the opportunity to pay for initiatives to reduce forest-related emissions, and hence 'offset' their own emission reductions.

Based on the Payment for Ecosystem Services (PES) model (Angelsen and McNeill, 2012), REDD+ generated enthusiasm among policy makers and practitioners worldwide, and further triggered the initiation of hundreds of REDD+ projects in and around forests across the Global South (Fletcher et al., 2016). After a decade of difficult

international climate negotiations, it has, however, become increasingly clear that the type of global carbon market that was originally envisioned has not materialized and is 'unlikely to emerge' (Angelsen et al., 2017: 718). Nevertheless, all around the world, local REDD+ projects have continued to make investments in capacity building and the establishment of systems required for carbon verification and validation, to ensure compliance with specific standards established for carbon sale.

Over the past decade, extensive research has been carried out to examine the effects of REDD+. Studies have shown how many REDD+ projects have encountered difficulties in translating REDD+ policy models into practice. It has proven difficult to document that actual reduction in forest loss has taken place (Angelsen et al., 2017), and – accordingly – that greenhouse gas emissions have been reduced. Empirical case studies have pointed to the ways in which REDD+ projects have caused uncompensated dispossessions and inflicted social costs on local communities (e.g. Nel and Hill, 2013; Nel, 2016; Svarstad and Benjaminsen, 2017; Scheba and Scheba, 2017), triggered various forms of contestations and resistance-like behavior (e.g. Beymer-Farris and Bassett, 2012; Cavanagh and Benjaminsen, 2015; Asiyani, 2016), and resulted in business-as-usual outcomes (Lund et al., 2017; Benjaminsen, 2017).

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Critical analysts have also discussed how market-based approaches that seek to commodify carbon may increase social conflicts, and moreover render everything but the carbon content of the forests worthless, thus obscuring other forest functions (e.g. Lohmann, 2009; Kosoy and Corbera, 2010; Bumpus, 2011; Stephan, 2012; Osborne, 2015). In *Conservation Biology*, Fletcher et al (2016: 674) furthermore argue that the difficulties associated with REDD+ implementation are 'symptomatic of inherent deficiencies in the REDD+ mechanism, itself symptomatic of contradictions in market-based conservation in general'. In a response to Fletcher et al. (2016), Angelsen et al (2017: 719) assert that it is misleading to blame the weaknesses of REDD+ on market-based approaches, claiming that only a 'tiny segment' of all REDD+ projects implemented worldwide are market-based, that is, designed in accordance with the principles of the PES-model. According to Angelsen et al. (2017), we have seen an 'aidification' of REDD+, where most projects implemented locally have adopted broadened objectives beyond those directly related to carbon sequestration and climate mitigation (see also Angelsen, 2017).

Based on an ethnographic case study of the introduction of a PES-based REDD+ project in Zanzibar, this article investigates how REDD+ implementation evolves in practice at local level. The article gives insight into a range of the dilemmas faced by local communities and project managers. Through an empirically grounded and critical account, the article contributes to broaden the empirical basis of contemporary debates on commodification of forest carbon as a key market-based approach to climate mitigation. We show how commodification of forest carbon can be at odds with – and potentially erode – socially embedded forest practices, including norms related to solidarity and reciprocity. These are norms that also serve to protect forests. We further show how the 'valuation' of forest carbon as a commodity meant for sale in a volatile carbon market involves both a quantitative verification, as well as a qualitative certification of a carbon – arguably – beneficial to women and the poor.

In the following sections, we begin by outlining key features of scholarly debates on Payment for Ecosystem Services (PES) and commodification of forest carbon. We briefly provide context to the REDD+ project implemented in Zanzibar, and elaborate on the ethnographic fieldwork on which the analysis in this article is based. We go on to demonstrate how the REDD+ project in Zanzibar was set up as a scheme, which – in line with PES principles – established the systems required to produce a forest carbon commodity eligible for sale. We proceed to discuss how local notions, practices and relationships at local level in Zanzibar – including socially embedded power structures – are incompatible with these commodification processes. In our concluding remarks, we highlight the ways in which processes of commodification of forest carbon may exacerbate tensions between local forest managers' short-term and long-term rationalities and livelihood goals, and ultimately risk aggravating local uncertainties and relations of dependence.

2. Payment for ecosystem services and the 'commodification' of forest carbon

The concept of ecosystem services, defined as 'benefits people obtain from ecosystems' (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005: vi), gained influence in global policy making through its conceptualization of tropical forests as rendering undervalued services that are fundamental for humans far beyond forest-dwelling communities in the Global South. Gaining prominence during the 1990s, the PES model was popularized with the launch of the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment in 2005 (Gómez-Baggethun et al, 2010), and promoted as an approach that could help reduce environmental degradation in developing countries.

Key actors in a PES scheme are conventionally cast as 'sellers' and 'buyers' of the ecosystem service. While critical political ecologists and geographers see PES as an example of the market-based approaches of

the 'neoliberal conservation' currently dominating global environmental policies (e.g. McAfee, 1999; Fletcher et al, 2016), economists such as Wunder (2013: 231) maintain that payments for ecosystems services are 'only in exceptional cases' made through competitive markets. At a global scale, governmentally financed PES schemes typically dominate (Wunder, 2013). While the PES-model is focused on 'achieving environmental outcomes', governmentally financed programs tend to 'politically drift into win-win spheres of multiple side objectives' (Wunder, 2013: 231). Due to political influences beyond the control of the model, these governmentally financed programs end up with broadened objectives, which also include poverty reduction or other developmental concerns. In *Conservation Biology*, Angelsen et al (2017) argue along similar lines on the adoption of multiple objectives in locally implemented REDD+ projects.

More generally, the term 'commodification' is used to refer to processes whereby domains previously governed by non-market values and norms are incorporated into markets (e.g. Gómez-Baggethun, 2015). Castree (2003) has identified five elements as key to the processes of commodification – privatization, alienation, individuation, abstraction, valuation and displacement. As to the commodification of carbon, Osborne (2015) holds that three of these elements stand out as relevant, that is individuation, privatization and valuation. *Individuation* refers to the construction of a bounded object (Castree, 2003); in the case of a PES-based REDD+ scheme, the carbon sequestration and storage service, which thus is isolated from other forest functions (Kosoy and Corbera, 2010). Through *privatization*, an individual or group is given 'exclusive rights' to the benefits provided by the service (Castree, 2003). Finally, *valuation* refers to the process of assigning a value to the carbon sequestration and storage services.

Scholarly debates on the social effects of 'commodification' can be traced back to Marx (1967 [1867]). Marx observed that market economies – with transferable private property rights – separate persons and objects creating new forms of alienation. Later, Marcel Mauss (1966 [1925]) contrasted market economies with gift economies where symbolic ties and reciprocal relationships accompany economic transactions, and in a certain sense make objects *inalienable*. Mauss further argued that these relationships – fostering mutual interdependence and feelings of solidarity in society – would erode and eventually disappear as a result of the processes of commodification. Building on Mauss, Polanyi (1958) used the notion of 'social embeddedness' to argue that the economy, and economic transactions, should not be perceived as separate and independent from the rest of the society. Economic transactions are rather integrated in and shaped by social relationships, cultural values and moral concerns linked to reciprocity and re-distributional obligations that may be based on kin, community or solidarity relationships within the larger society (see also Machado, 2011).

In a critical discussion of PES-based projects, Kosoy and Corbera (2010) furthermore draw on Marx's notion of 'commodity fetishism'. They argue that the commodification of ecosystem services blinds us to the complexity of the critical processes and social relationships underlying the process of producing ecosystem services. The commodification obscures both ecological complexities, ecosystems' non-economic values, as well as the power asymmetries underlying the trade of such services. Before we set out to employ the concepts briefly outlined above in an empirical analysis of the conversion of local forests into 'forest carbon' and how it affects social and power relationships in Zanzibar, we will present our Zanzibari case and the methods used to collect the empirical data.

3. Introducing the HIMA project in Zanzibar

The semi-autonomous polity of Zanzibar is part of the United Republic of Tanzania. The Zanzibari archipelago consists of two main islands, Unguja and Pemba, and some smaller islets. The contemporary landscape of Zanzibar is a mosaic of cultivated land (including small-scale agroforestry systems and larger – mainly governmentally

managed – plantations), natural forests, shrubs and grassland. A 2014 study estimated that the annual forest change rate in Zanzibar was -0.46% , with forest loss being caused by a combination of factors including urban expansion, tourism, immigration, and population growth, in addition to agricultural expansion and increasing demand for forest products (Kukkonen and Käyhkö, 2014; see also Benjaminsen, 2017). The forests still play an important role in the daily life of the local population. Eighty percent derive at least part of their livelihoods from forest-based activities (Department of Forestry and Non Renewable Natural Resources, 2012). Moreover, in rural areas, engaging in multiple uses of forest resources is a common strategy to minimize risks (Andersson and Ngazi, 1998; Fagerholm et al., 2012).

With funding from the Norwegian government, CARE International, in collaboration with the Zanzibari Department of Forestry,¹ was in the beginning of 2010 contracted to implement a REDD+ pilot project in Zanzibar. In April the same year, the project known as ‘Hifadhi ya Mitsitu ya Asili’² (HIMA) commenced its activities. HIMA’s aim was to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from deforestation and forest degradation, and generate carbon revenues that would incentivize participating local communities to manage forests sustainably (CARE, 2009). As a strategy to secure control over the potential carbon revenues produced in semi-autonomous Zanzibar, local actors involved in REDD+ decided to define HIMA as ‘a stand-alone project’ that would sell carbon credits to companies and individuals ‘interested in purchasing carbon credits directly from an individual project’ (Benjaminsen, 2017: 511). Using the Verified Carbon Standard as an accounting framework,³ HIMA aimed to produce Verified Carbon Units ready for sale in a voluntary carbon market.

Mitini was one of the communities invited to join the REDD+ scheme in Zanzibar.⁴ During fieldwork, women and men in Mitini often stated that their local forests to be in a fairly good state. But they also described a situation of lost access to land and local resource scarcity. While agricultural land had been in abundance in the past, women and men in Mitini claimed that access to farm land had declined over the past decades due to conservation and plantation projects, combined with a subtle ‘privatization’ process, where ‘powerful individuals’ had seized control over land through ambiguous land deals (Benjaminsen, 2014). In a situation where formerly community-managed land had become either governmentally or ‘privately’ controlled, several members of the conservation committee in Mitini, despite expressing a commitment to continuing to protect parts of the forests, emphasized the importance of having access to forest resources to cater for their daily needs also in the future.

Arriving in Mitini, the local importance of forest resources is readily apparent. Wooden poles and coral stones dug out of the surrounding forest soils make up the traditionally built houses. A variety of trees, producing fruits, spices and medicines provide shade to women weaving baskets and mats of *ukili* (narrow strips of dried palm fronds) and tending to pots of rice cooked on wood fires. Still, women and men from other parts of the archipelago come to visit sacred forest caves for spiritual and medical healing. Furthermore, agriculture is a basic livelihood activity. In fact, Mitini has historically been celebrated as one of Zanzibar’s breadbaskets, providing Unguja and the other islands with crops such as cowpeas, beans, potatoes and cassava, maize and sorghum, banana and spinach, as well as mango, breadfruit and citrus of various kinds. A combination of shifting cultivation and agroforestry (mainly fruit trees) has been the dominant agricultural practice. With

time, and increasing pressure on land, the farming of temporary crops without fallows has also become increasingly common. Thus, REDD+ aiming to change local forest use by offering carbon revenues as an economic incentive was through HIMA introduced into a local context where forests were already considered a scarce resource.

The study presented results from a long-term ethnographic research project investigating the process, actors and discourses involved in the introduction of REDD+ in Zanzibar. The first author followed the introduction of the HIMA project from its start until its completion in December 2014. Focused fieldwork in Zanzibar was conducted over a period of more than 12 months divided between four stays from April 2011 to April 2013. A variety of qualitative methods was applied to collect the empirical material on which the analysis of local practices and responses to REDD+ is based. During the fieldwork, the first author lived and interacted with villagers in Mitini before, during and after the introduction of the HIMA project. The researcher’s fluency in colloquial Swahili made direct data collection and participant observation possible. Data was collected through observation at about 45 project-related meetings – both at local-administrative *shelia* level and at the policy-making level in Zanzibar town; and through numerous informal and more than 100 formal interviews with informants before, between and after these meetings. An extensive review of science-based literature, political statements and policy documents issued by organizations promoting REDD+, combined with attendance at numerous meetings, seminars and conferences on REDD+ in Norway in the period 2010–2016, have provided a basis for understanding the overall ideas and models in REDD+ policies and discourses. In the following section, we draw on our empirically grounded material to show how HIMA took steps to establish the systems required to produce a forest carbon commodity eligible for sale in the global carbon market. In our analysis, we combine a critical discussion of the PES model with key elements of Castree’s (2003) discussion of commodification. We end the section with a discussion of HIMA’s marketing strategy and the ways in which the project adopted multiple objectives.

4. Commodification and marketing of forest carbon in Zanzibar

4.1. Drawing spatial boundaries to define ownership

In REDD+ promoting discourses we find that ‘clear and secure tenure rights’ to land and forests, as well as to carbon are referred to as ‘key elements for successful REDD+ strategies’ (Larson et al., 2012: 155). In line with central ideas in the highly influential Property Rights School in mainstream economics,⁵ the PES-model comes with the assumption that for something – including both goods or services – to become a commodity and thus be eligible for sale, the legal and material boundaries of the object need to be drawn (Kosoy and Corbera, 2010; see also Wunder, 2013). Drawing such boundaries constitutes the element of *commodification* referred to by Castree (2003) as ‘individuation’. For the HIMA project, this implied a need for spatially delimiting the areas that were to be included in the Zanzibari REDD+ scheme.

Throughout 2010–2011, the project invited a large number of local communities across Zanzibar to become part of the scheme. In each community, project staff facilitated discussions between the local *shelia* conservation committees⁶ – representing the local communities – and representatives from the Department of Forestry in Zanzibar. In order to develop the Community Forest Management Agreements (COFMAs),

¹ Its full name is Department of Forestry and Non-Renewable Natural Resources.

² In English: ‘conservation of traditional forests.’

³ The VCS program is, according to the program’s own website, ‘the world’s most widely used’ voluntary program for certification of greenhouse gas emission reduction. <http://www.v-c-s.org/who-we-are>. Last accessed October 16, 2017.

⁴ Mitini literary means ‘among the trees’ in Swahili. This article is an outcome of a PhD project addressing partly sensitive topics. In consultation with key informants, we have therefore decided to use an invented name for the village.

⁵ A key reference is Demsetz (1967). For critique of this school, see e.g. Lund (2001).

⁶ Prior to the COFMA negotiations, HIMA helped to organise elections of conservation committee in each *shelia* invited to joining the REDD+ scheme. *Shelia* is the lowest administrative unit in Zanzibar. The leader of the *shelia* is the *sheha*, an appointed representative of the central government at local level (Topan, 1998). The *sheha* then selects a *shelia* council. The *shelia* conservation committees is considered a sub-committee under the *shelia* council.

community borders were recorded, and areas for three different land use categories were allocated: (1) ‘utilization’ areas where user permits for e.g. fuelwood collection and shifting cultivation could be granted by the *shehia* conservation committees; (2) ‘alternative use’ areas for e.g. grazing, agriculture, and settlement; and (3) ‘conservation’. As part of this process, the *shehia* conservation committees and the forest authorities would in each community also agree on specific bylaws determining management and arrangements for use of each land-use category. These would include licenses required for use and fines to be charged, as well as rules concerning sanctions and penalties. The responsibility for rule enforcement, including the patrolling the forests, was then assigned to the *shehia* conservation committees. The COFMAs, which in principle would determine villagers’ access to and exclusion from forest resources for the next 30 years, would subsequently be approved by the Zanzibari Minister of Land, before the establishment of these agreements would finally be declared in a national gazette. At the end of the HIMA pilot project, the signed COFMAs would provide the basis for the Carbon Project that was submitted to the Verified Carbon Standard program for validation and verification.

In our view, a PES-based REDD+ scheme presumes a situation of relative forest-resource abundance, in which access to specific local resources can be replaced, or compensated for, by money. In a local context where the forest is rather a scarce resource and at the same time an integral part of daily subsistence and local livelihoods, we found that the PES-based process designed by HIMA to develop COFMAs with local communities encountered difficulties. This became particularly evident in Mitini, where local women and men already struggled to find areas to legally harvest wood for fuel and necessary building material, and experienced a scarcity of land for cultivating food; and where previous efforts had triggered resistance-like behavior and violation of rules as community members continued to use resources despite restrictions (Benjaminsen, 2014). With large parts of the local forest already under formal conservation, accepting additional restrictions on access and use of forest resources was not considered a feasible option by most women and men in Mitini.

During the early phase of the process to draft a COFMA, representatives of the local conservation committee demanded that, due to a lack of alternatives, subsistence activities were exempted from regulations. However, with information that the HIMA project would distribute ‘trial carbon funds’ to participating communities, diverging positions emerged within the *shehia* conservation committee (Benjaminsen, 2014). Still, the demand for unrestricted access to dry firewood (*kuni kavu*)⁷ remained a key element in the proposal presented by the conservation committee in Mitini to the Zanzibari Department of Forestry as a condition for signing an agreement with the forest authorities.⁸ The ways in which the HIMA project responded to this local proposal’s conditions will be revealed in our account of the further process below (see 4.3.).

4.2. Assigning carbon right holders

In addition to defined boundaries, the PES model requires that the goods and services provided (here, the carbon sequestration and storage) need ‘to be owned’ (Kosoy and Corbera, 2010, citing Vatn and Bromley, 1994; and Vatn, 2000; see also Wunder, 2013). In Zanzibar, all public land is ‘vested in, and at the disposition of the President, to be

⁷ In REDD+ literature this is normally referred to as dead wood, and includes ‘all non-living woody biomass except that which is contained in litter, either standing, lying on the ground or in the soil and including dead wood and roots’ (The REDD-desk, 2017a).

⁸ Other conditions included defining the governmental plantation that had been established within Mitini’s borders as a ‘utilization zone’ from which villagers of Mitini would have priority to harvest building materials and to cultivate between planting seasons. The conditions were part of a ‘proposal’ presented to the Department of Forestry. As discussed in Benjaminsen (2014), the proposal was controversial as some members of the conservation committee in Mitini felt that they should have put even stronger conditions.

held by him, for the use and common benefit, direct or indirect, of the people of Zanzibar’ (Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar, 1992: 3). With the signing of COFMAs, the rights and responsibilities for forest management and the benefits accrued from it were, however, formally devolved from the Zanzibari government (or the Department of Forestry as the ‘Forest administrator’) to the local communities (Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources, 2011: xi). The rights transferred to local communities here referred to potential incomes from sale of forest carbon. It also in principle implied a devolution of decision-making powers (see Manor, 1999: 6) over the forest carbon to the community level. This element of the *commodification* process is what Castree (2003) has termed ‘privatization’.

A review commissioned by HIMA concluded that carbon selling most likely would not become economically viable for individual communities due to limited carbon stocks and high transaction costs (CARE, 2011: 1). The HIMA project therefore decided to create a national (Zanzibar-level) institution that would act as a ‘carbon aggregator’ across all the participating communities.⁹ Different options for such an institution were outlined and debated by the various actors involved in the HIMA implementation. Representatives from the Department of Forestry questioned the capacity of the local communities, and made the case for a government-controlled aggregation entity. With support from CARE, community representatives argued strongly for an entity established and managed by them. In February 2012, a federation of *shehia* conservation committees participating in the HIMA project was launched and later registered as a new NGO under the name of ‘Jumiiya ya Uhifadhi Mimitu ya Jamii Zanzibar’ (JUMIJAZA).¹⁰ JUMIJAZA’s main tasks were to represent local communities in future sale of Zanzibari carbon on the global market (CARE, 2012: 16); implement the future Carbon Project; and manage the disbursement of carbon revenues to local communities (Royal Norwegian Embassy in Tanzania, 2015: 13). In theory, the creation of JUMIJAZA recognized local communities as custodians of forests, as well as of the carbon. However, the perceived need for clustering individual communities so they together could offer ‘larger volumes of carbon, verified through a single process’ (CARE, 2011: 1), would also reverse the power to make decisions related to carbon sale (see also Asiyambi, 2016). The unfolding of this ‘recentralization’ process is described in the following section.

4.3. Measuring, monitoring and reporting on ‘forest carbon’

In a PES-based REDD+ scheme, a basic requirement is that the carbon sequestration and storage service provided has to be measured, monitored and reported (Corbera, 2012: 613; see also Stephan, 2012). Among the many internationally recognized carbon accounting frameworks available, HIMA opted to adhere to the accounting framework known as the Verified Carbon Standard (VCS). The technical competence and procedural rigor needed to fulfill the conditions of the VCS framework require specialized expertise (Lohmann, 2009: 529). In Zanzibar, HIMA contracted the US-based consultancy firm, Terra Global Capital, to support the project in carbon accounting; more specifically in calculating changes in forest cover and carbon stocks, and furthermore translating these changes into measurable standard carbon units (Leach and Scoones, 2015: 5). The procedure implied ‘isolating carbon storage and sequestration functions from other services provided by the forests’ (Corbera, 2012: 613) and ‘prioritizing a single exchange value’ (Kosoy and Corbera, 2010: 1229) for Zanzibari forests, as an expression of their potential to reduce total emissions of carbon dioxide, and thus mitigate climate change. The carbon units – and the procedures followed to produce these – would in turn need to be verified and

⁹ A similar logic, i.e. the clustering of villages to enhance economic viability and attract carbon buyers, has been observed in the case of REDD+ in Nigeria (Asiyambi, 2016).

¹⁰ In English, the name is ‘Association of Community Forest Management in Zanzibar’.

validated by a third party, in order to make sure that ‘robust methods’ had been used to produce quality estimates for the carbon market (Estrada and Joseph, 2012: 248). This became a key element in the ‘valuation’ (Castree, 2003) of Zanzibari forest carbon as a commodity.

In Zanzibar, the initial intention was that Terra Global Capital would train Zanzibari partners in the VCS methodology (CARE, 2009). However, except for some data collection and recording, Terra Global Capital itself – finding that ‘the capacity in Zanzibar was too low to build on’ – ended up doing most of the tasks involved in accounting for carbon and in developing the documentation necessary for VCS compliance. Through a process conceived as a ‘technical necessity’ (Leach and Scoones, 2013: 957; Benjaminsen, 2017), the carbon accounting became a task too technically complicated for Zanzibari institutions to carry out themselves.

Vital functions of the process to commodify forest carbon in Zanzibar – including controlling the carbon sequestration and storage services – were in this way transferred from JUMIJAZA as a representative of the local communities, and handed over to the external actor Terra Global Capital in exchange for technical support. By signing the COFMAs, local communities were defined as custodians of forest resources, and thus also as owners of Zanzibari carbon through a ‘privatization’ and devolution process. Yet, as technical consultants to HIMA, Terra Global Capital ended up assuming the role as the carbon manager on local communities’ behalf. By insisting on highly technical and complex requirements for VCS compliance, and by assuming a role as the only capable carbon manager, Terra Global Capital would in essence remain in charge of the entire transaction process. In addition to managing the carbon development process, they would control the marketing of Zanzibari carbon, the evaluation of buyers, and the negotiation of the terms of sale. While carbon rights in principle were devolved to local communities, the focus on the technical requirements of carbon accounting (see also Ferguson, 1994; Li, 2007) – as a result of ‘the approach taken’ by involved actors (Lund et al, 2017: 132) or of the disciplining effects of ‘organized practices’ (Benjaminsen, 2017) – concealed the actual centralization of the control over carbon and its potential benefits (see also Ribot et al, 2010; PHELBS et al, 2010; Asiyambi, 2016).

In HIMA, we see that monitoring requirements led to project decisions that were basically in line with ‘fortress conservation’ (e.g. Brockington, 2002). In REDD+ schemes, dead wood is commonly categorized as one of five ‘carbon pools’ in forests.¹¹ Based on recommendations from Terra Global Capital, dead wood was included in the HIMA stock of carbon accounting (Terra Global Capital, 2011: 41). Although the VCS methodology does not exclude the possibility of permitting dead wood collection, Leach and Scoones (2013: 964) indicate that it is easier to implement what they refer to as ‘protection measures on a frontier boundary’. This argument was echoed during an interview with a Zanzibari forest officer, who explained: ‘Dead wood should be left to rot. If we allow people to harvest from protected areas, villagers may easily be tempted to take more than only dead wood. It becomes very hard to monitor’. As Leach and Scoones (2013; see also, 2015) have shown, in addition to technical requirements, social and political factors associated with carbon accounting contribute to pushing projects ‘in the direction of “fortress” forms of conservation’ (Leach and Scoones, 2013: 965), where ‘carbon and its on-going sequestration are to be protected in existing forms, with clear boundaries to exclude other activities’ (Leach and Scoones, 2015: 7). In a similar vein, and despite the condition concerning access to dead wood that had been presented by the villagers of Mitini during the COFMA drafting process, the HIMA project ended up promoting a strict regime that, with some minor exceptions prohibited all types of harvesting of

biomass from areas designated for REDD+ in Zanzibar.

This strict interpretation of REDD+ partly explains why the process of developing a COFMA in Mitini remained inconclusive throughout 2013–14. Benjaminsen (2014) describes the COFMA negotiation process in Mitini, and how local claims about former exclusion and dispossessions, including the fear of new ones, triggered considerable resistance – both overt and covert – towards increased regulation of forest use. Members of the local conservation committee received no concrete response, neither from the HIMA project nor from the forest authorities, on their proposal concerning access to dead wood. But when the HIMA pilot project came to a close in December 2014, they found that Mitini was not part of the Carbon Project submitted for VCS validation. The local needs reflected in the demands made by representatives of Mitini as conditions for signing a COFMA, turned out to be incompatible with the way the PES-model was used to make Zanzibari forest carbon ready for sale in a global market.

4.4. Marketing of Zanzibari carbon

In addition to the Verified Carbon Standard (VCS), the HIMA project endeavored to comply with the Climate, Community and Biodiversity (CCB) Standards – a set of carbon accounting standards seeking to improve well-being and reduce poverty while conserving biodiversity in the local communities where carbon forestry projects are implemented.¹² In this way, HIMA could certify Zanzibari carbon as ‘pro-poor and gender sensitive’. West (2012: 239) holds that certification represents ‘a way of getting a market share by means of story-telling that is meant to add value to the commodity’. Adding objectives or new ‘wins’ is considered a wide-spread marketing strategy in neoliberal conservation (Bumpus, 2011; Büscher, 2014). A senior member of the CARE team explained in a meeting with HIMA stakeholders in October 2011: ‘There is not enough REDD money available. Tanzania is only a small competitor compared to countries like Brazil and Indonesia. Our REDD therefore must be to the highest standards in order to compete with other countries for scarce REDD funding’. In a context where the *quality* of expected emission reductions was small, HIMA decided to market the *quality* of their carbon. The CCB certification was thus employed as an additional element in the ‘valuation’ of HIMA’s carbon. Marketing the quality of the carbon to potential buyers involved telling a story about a particular type of carbon, based on a carbon production that was supposed to guarantee no harm, ‘particularly in relation to women and poorer people’, and further ensure gender mainstreaming and equitable sharing of REDD+ revenues within participating communities (CARE, 2009: 8). In meetings, staff from CARE and Terra Global Capital argued that pro-poor and gender-sensitive carbon would correspond to ‘the high-quality REDD that the carbon buyers are looking for’. The idea was that this would place HIMA in a position to negotiate a good price for Zanzibari carbon in the voluntary market, which again could make up for the relatively limited quantity of carbon that could be produced through the measurement and verification processes based on the VCS methodology only. Thus, this additional element of ‘valuation’ was considered necessary.

We see that HIMA in their efforts to increase the value of the forest carbon commodity produced in Zanzibar targeted ‘buyers looking for development stories for public relations activities’ with ‘boutique carbon’, a phenomenon that has also been noted by Bumpus (2011: 623). There is, however, no evidence that the price of this commodity will increase with the ‘quality’ of the carbon sequestration and storage services. High-quality ‘boutique carbon’ from Zanzibar will not necessarily generate a higher price than ‘regular’ alternatives. Over recent years, the recruitment of new carbon buyers within the few existing

¹¹ A ‘carbon pool’ is a ‘system that has the capacity to store or release carbon’. According to the Marrakesh Accords the five main carbon pools in forests include above-ground biomass, below-ground biomass, dead wood, litter and soil organic matter’ (The REDD-desk, 2017b).

¹² The CCB standards were developed by a coalition of International NGOs, in which CARE is a member. Since November 2014, the CCB has been managed by the VCS (CCB Alliance, 2017).

voluntary markets has been low (Hamrick and Goldstein, 2016). Accordingly, carbon prices have ‘dropped precipitously’ compared to the early days of REDD+ (Leach and Scoones, 2015: 27). Moreover, like most other REDD+ projects, HIMA has so far not sold any carbon. With these circumstances in mind, we see that the whole process of commodification of forest carbon in Zanzibar rests on a highly fragile base.

The description of the HIMA Carbon Project was completed and submitted to a third party validator company in December 2014. More than three years later, the final validation and verification of the carbon project is still pending. According to Terra Global Capital, additional data – and thus, additional funding – is needed to fully complete the verification. There is at present no indication that such funding is forthcoming. Although Mitini ended up without a COFMA, 45 other local communities in Zanzibar have signed such an agreement, and are, through the delimitation of REDD+ areas, committed to *not* using forest resources within the ‘conservation’ areas for the next 30 years.¹³ HIMA and its partners find themselves in the situation of having produced a commodity whose exchange value is defined by a highly volatile market and a decreasing carbon price, and thus – in spite of efforts to brand a quality product – is critically uncertain. Where local communities already have renounced their rights to use the forest and its resources for other purposes, forest users living under precarious conditions may be willing to accept whatever price is offered to them. In fact, one may argue that, in a situation where commitments to abstaining from using forest resources have already been made, it would be unwise for them to turn down any offer to buy carbon. In agreement with the much-quoted thesis that the ‘poor sell cheap’ (Martínez-Alier, 2002), they may have few other options.

Given a low carbon price and few available carbon markets, the HIMA project opted for a marketing strategy directed at carbon buyers who are willing to pay more for a ‘quality carbon’ produced in ways that are advantageous for women and the poor. Angelsen et al (2017) relate the broadening of objectives in REDD+ primarily to a situation where the implementation of REDD+ moves away from PES and market principles. Our case shows, however, that rather than representing a distraction and diversion that dilutes and departs from the PES model, the adoption of multiple objectives are corollaries that implementers draw upon to attract buyers in a highly volatile carbon market; seeking to make PES-modelled REDD+ work on the ground. In the next section, we proceed to discuss how the processes to commodify forest carbon in Zanzibar are at odds with existing local norms, practices and relations – non-economic factors that historically, according to Gómez-Baggethun and Muradian (2015: 222), have acted as cultural barriers to commodification in ‘domains traditionally governed by non-market norms’.

5. Local realities at odds with the commodification of forest carbon

5.1. Local conceptions of forests as insurance

In Mitini, the forest and its resources are conceived as ‘a crucial resource reserve’ (Fagerholm et al, 2013: 673), but also considered an economic ‘buffer’ or insurance in the local community. Villagers place great value on the possibility to harvest from the forest in case of emergencies. As elsewhere in Zanzibar, smoke occasionally seeps out of a burning *tanu*, a framed pile of wood traditionally used to produce charcoal. Though charcoal is a traditional commodity made to create monetary income (Fagerholm et al, 2012: 426), charcoal making is not a major livelihood strategy. For most villagers, charcoal is made on special occasions, before weddings or religious holidays, when there is

¹³ We do however recognise that community members may choose to continue to use resources despite the restrictions outlined in the community forest management agreements (see also Benjaminsen, 2014).

an extra need for cash. Long-established norms and customs exist to safeguard the harvesting of forest resources necessary for renovation of village mosques, and – when needed – to repair homes of elderly people who otherwise have few means to secure the materials needed. The presence of, and access to, a healthy forest functions as a buffer against the many uncertainties inherent in local community members’ livelihoods. Villagers, alert to their own environment and needs, are well aware of this.

The function of forests as insurance, as well as the importance of flexible access to forest resources for livelihood security in Mitini in general conflict with the one-dimensional conception of value underlying the REDD+ commodification processes. The process of determining the economic values of goods or services that previously have not been constituted as objects of exchange is complex and will always imply challenges (Firth, 1967: 18, see also Bumpus, 2011). What is not defined within the narrow construction of forest value – the ‘verified’ and ‘certified’ carbon – is not considered a value in this equation. In the process of assigning a monetary value to carbon sequestration and storage, HIMA fails to recognize the multiple and largely non-market functions that the forest has for members of the local community (see also Stephan, 2012). The multiple-use value of the forest is reduced to a single exchange value, expressed through the price that may be obtained on a global carbon market. In relation to the local forest, this price only captures ‘a subset of the dimensions of its importance, worth and meaning to humans’ (Kosoy and Corbera, 2010: 1232). Following Polanyi (1958), grasping what an object is worth requires an analysis of its ‘social embeddedness’ – its place and function in the larger society (see also Graeber, 2001). In Zanzibar, this implies considering the inherent complexities of human-nature relationships, including the social function of flexible access to forest and forest resources, as well as the role of local norms of solidarity and redistribution in reducing local vulnerabilities. Through the commodification of forest carbon, non-economic factors embedded in long established social practices and cultural norms may be eroded (Mauss, 1966 [1922]) – or ‘disembedded’ (Polanyi, 1958) – from the webs of social bonds and relationships through which they historically have influenced local forest practices. Among these non-economic factors are those of solidarity and reciprocity.

In Mitini, we do however also see how the local conception of the forest as insurance represents an element of the local economy that potentially induces long-term motivation for forest protection within the community. Cultural norms and taboos motivate local women and men to use forest resources cautiously, and primarily for subsistence or as an insurance. If these are jeopardized as a result of the commodification process, REDD+ risks discouraging locally grounded and socially embedded conservation options, and will hence be unresponsive of the fulfillment of its own core objectives.

5.2. Local moralities and reciprocal relationships between forest users and guardians

‘We are all *ndugu*’ (sisters or brothers) is a common saying all over Zanzibar. Conflicts of any kind risk damaging the feeling of *udugu* (brother- and sisterhood). Strict enforcement of laws and regulations is in many circumstances conceived unethical and goes against the local conception of good manners, as it demonstrates lack of understanding with and empathy for fellow citizens’ precarious livelihoods. The perception of resource users and managers as rational economic agents always able and willing to maximize utility and pursuing own self-interest is however fundamental to the PES model (e.g. Karsenty and Ongolo, 2012). In the context of REDD+, the conventional understanding is that women and men in forest communities cut trees because it is the cheapest way to solve a practical problem – and the easiest way to sustain a living. The logic is that, through the provision of incentives in the form of promises of carbon payments, local forest users will discover the advantages of forest protection and

reforestation, and thus favor these activities over other land use practices.

Although villagers in Zanzibar thoroughly assess the pros and cons of different livelihood options, local attitudes towards conservation are not solely driven by what is economically rational. This means that villagers cannot be controlled and managed through financial incentives alone. Rather, following Polanyi (1958), we see women and men as locally situated socio-political actors, embedded in webs of meaning, practices and relationships that go far beyond the factors counted in the PES-model. This is demonstrated when *shehia* conservation committees are expected to patrol areas allocated for conservation and punish trespassers in accordance with the established bylaws. 'We cannot sanction our own people', committee members across the HIMA project area explain. When members of the conservation committee in Mitini come across a young village man cultivating in a protected area, instead of implementing the established bylaws and fining him, one of the committee member will rather talk to him like a father speaking to a son who has misbehaved. He expresses his understanding of the young man, that he has few other options to provide for his family, but also asks him to stop cultivating, and plant some trees instead. In this way, solidary *ndugu* relationships shape how fellow villagers relate to each other, and how they cooperate to sustain their lives in Zanzibar.

Governmental officers are also expected to act in ways that demonstrate their sympathy for, and affinity with, local women and men and the vulnerable conditions under which they live. During a discussion with elderly men in Mitini about the management of the neighboring National Park, one of the men gave an account of how two local girls had been brought to the police by National Park guards for collecting firewood within the Park: 'A government that arrests us for collecting two piles of firewood cannot be considered ours', he declared, and continued: 'People will despise such a government, and meet it with resistance'. Although one may assume that governmental officers would strive to sanction all rule violations in accordance with the law, *ndugu* relations, and the morality they involve, also apply to governmental officers in Zanzibar, and thus puts constraints on their performance. Around the same time that the two young girls were reported to the police, the Director of the National Park was replaced – arguably, because people in villages surrounding the Park had complained to influential allies within the government that the Director was too eager to enforce forest regulations.¹⁴ Solidary *ndugu* relationships extend beyond local communities, shaping local morality, REDD+ practices, and forest governance in Zanzibar in general. In the context of the HIMA project, the commodification of forest carbon – through the introduction of a market logic focused on individualism and competition into a society where such norms thus far have been constrained by both social and cultural factors – is at odds with the non-economic factors that motivate local women and men to protect forests. When market-based transactions are promoted, the reciprocal and redistributive potential of local *ndugu* relationships may be marginalized or lost. In this context, overlooking rule violations is not solely the result of insufficient enforcement. Rather, the practice attests to the importance of culturally weighted moral obligations and the relevance of pre-existing social relationships.

5.3. Asymmetric power relationships

While there is considerable local sympathy for the violation of forest regulations for subsistence purposes, villagers in Mitini disapprove of violations that entail any larger-scale commercial activities, especially if these activities involve using scarce resources for personal

¹⁴ Other ways in which communities do not just passively accept limitations on access and use of forest resources, instead applying various forms of covert resistance are discussed in another article (Benjaminsen, 2014).

enrichment. Still, large-scale violations may well remain unsanctioned. On several occasions, HIMA staff and partners talked about how the Department of Forestry had tried prosecuting in a case where locally produced charcoal was found to have been illegally transported by truck from one area of the island to another. The culprits were arrested, but released shortly after due to what was referred to as interference by *wakubwa* (i.e. 'big people'). The local term *wakubwa* is often – as in this case – used with reference to political leaders and urban elite. *Wakubwa* may however also include powerful individuals at local level, or any individual who is in a position to decide – or influence – who in the local community that will get to access and benefit from resources and not. In Mitini, individuals involved in large-scale charcoal making have, over time, invested in relationships with *wakubwa*, who in return may issue extraordinary cutting permits or who, as illustrated in the example above, may offer protection from sanctions and prosecution.

The support of the *wakubwa* may be political, in terms of casting votes and defending particular governmental policies. Or it may be economic, as in the case of one villager who collects seeds from the forest for the private nursery of an officer from the Department of Forestry. In return, the villager will be invited to meetings organized by the Department for which she would receive *per diems*. From the government's perspective, by giving favors and 'perks' to influential individuals at local level, governmental officers may convince villagers to implement projects – such as HIMA – that, in principle, may conflict with local needs and desires (see also Shinn, 2015: 9). For women and men in local communities, withdrawing support for a project or otherwise sanctioning *wakubwa* or the individuals protected by them may jeopardize their positions, ambitions and privileges (Benjaminsen, 2014). A key aspect of these socially embedded power structures is unequal power as expressed in asymmetric and potentially abusive relationships.

Members of the *shehia* conservation committees are as deeply ingrained in *ndugu* and *wakubwa* relationships as most other Zanzibaris. Failure to conform to local norms and practices may jeopardize their positions. While *ndugu* relations are horizontal, between what may or may not be individuals of similar standing, relationships with *wakubwa* are more vertical (see also Cameron, 2004). Both are reciprocal, but while *ndugu* relations are social and inflicted with moral obligations, *wakubwa* relationships are generally more exclusive and transactional – and often include the provision of access to specific privileges. As *wakubwa* have a central role in controlling who gets to access what resources in Zanzibar, women and men cultivate relationships with *wakubwa* as a means to secure their livelihoods and ensure assistance in times of need (see also Benjaminsen, 2014). Likewise, escaping sanctions from illegal utilization of natural resources is usually associated with careful nurturing of such relationships. However, as the *wakubwa* influence other villagers' access to forest resources, the lack of adherence to forest (by)-laws may also be a manifestation of existing patron-client relationships that result in certain individuals' impunity. The apolitical framing of REDD+ is unlikely to capably address *wakubwa*'s political privilege and their impunity when infringing on the rights of local forest users. Rather than safeguarding carbon benefits to 'the poor', REDD+ as implemented in the 45 *shehias* that have signed COFMAs in preparation for sale of carbon risks reinforcing existing power asymmetries inherent in these social and political relationships in Zanzibar society.

6. Concluding discussion

While the PES model itself appears convincing and simple, the implementation of a PES-based REDD+ project requires the establishment of a rigid accounting system that models and measures the complex ecosystem services of carbon sequestration and storage as these are narrowed down to a marketable commodity – the 'forest carbon'. In the HIMA project, this accounting process was deemed necessary within the given REDD+ framework, and is conceived as the only legitimate way

of making local ecosystems services eligible for sale. Although the project has aimed to ensure local forest communities' control of the right to carbon, the complex requirements associated with carbon accounting – in practice – put expert advisors in charge of the entire process of preparing Zanzibari carbon for sale.

The focus on complying with the technically demanding and complex requirements of carbon accounting both obscures and enables the recentralization of the power to make decisions related to carbon sale. Further, reproducing and exacerbating existing inequalities, and even generating new ones, such a focus also conceals the political economy of commodification in forest dependent communities. We see that despite its neutral technical appearance, REDD+ implementation unfolds as a highly political process. In Mitini, where most land available to villagers is already used for sustaining local livelihoods, HIMA failed to enter into real negotiations about local communities' demands. Instead, the commodification of forest carbon directed the project towards 'fortress conservation' practices, allowing limited alternatives for subsistence-based forest livelihoods. As is common in neoliberal conservation, HIMA chose through the CCB certification to adopt developmental objectives beyond those of carbon sequestration and climate mitigation with the purpose of making REDD+ work on the ground.

While the promises of carbon payments failed to convince women and men in the community of Mitini of the advantages of foregoing the forest's multiple use values in favor of a single exchange value, 45 other local communities across Zanzibar have through the signing of COFMAs committed themselves to abstain from using forest resources. Now these communities expect to receive carbon revenues. Given the highly volatile carbon market, there is no doubt a risk that they will find themselves in the precarious situation of having signed away their rights to forest resources, while receiving little or no revenues in return. For the local communities that have thus signed away their rights to the forest, the commodification of forest carbon has above all created new uncertainties and relations of dependence.

We have in this article argued that social and morally based norms are often more important than immediate economic utility in shaping human agency, and shown how an approach to forest access and use that is exclusively based on economic market rationality is at odds with social life and forest practices in Zanzibar. This approach ignores alternative logics of reciprocity or redistribution, and fails to take into account the internal conflicts that may emerge between local forest managers' short-term and long-term rationalities and goals. In Zanzibar, the HIMA project's attempt to change local people's forest use by introducing carbon revenues as an economic incentive took place in a context where villagers' considerations of longer-term livelihood security strategies deploy moral-political rationalities as well as economic ones. From the villagers' perspective, maximizing economic utility by responding to the economic incentives promised by the REDD+ scheme would – in fact – have been shortsighted. The established local practice of maintaining safety nets by nurturing relations of mutual support, both horizontal *ndugu* relationships and vertical relationships with powerful *wakubwa*, are key elements of their longer-term rationality. This social rationality, however, also entails the continued overlooking of conservation rule violations, especially when these involve fellow villagers in need. The commodification of forest carbon – resulting from the implementation of a PES-based REDD+ scheme – is thus not only at odds with forest protecting social rationalities. It also enters into conflict with the project's defined ambitions to reduce emissions.

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Further reading

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PAPER II



The bricolage of REDD+ in Zanzibar: from global environmental policy framework to community forest management

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The *bricolage* of REDD+ in Zanzibar: from global environmental policy framework to community forest management

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ABSTRACT

The policy framework known as Reducing Emission from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+) is based on the underlying idea of creating economic incentives for forest conservation and CO₂ emission reductions. This article explores what happens when REDD+, as a globally conceived environmental policy framework, is translated into practice in Zanzibar. Based on ethnographic fieldwork among actors involved in the policy translation process, the article investigates how these actors receive, interpret and give meaning to the introduction of REDD+. With the concept of institutional bricolage as an overarching perspective, the article engages in a discussion of what factors provide legitimacy to REDD+ at policy level in Zanzibar, and moreover, why certain elements of the REDD+ policy framework are incorporated into practice while others are discarded. The article demonstrates how actors make creative use of the resources available, but only within a spectrum that allows for reinvention of established practices and acceptable ways of doing. The article concludes that although the process of carbon accounting represents a 'technical necessity' of the REDD+ policy framework, it lack the legitimacy necessary to become durable. REDD+ in Zanzibar is thus at risk of becoming yet another example of a 'conservation fad' – an approach that initially invoked a widely shared enthusiasm, but later was dubbed a failure and abandoned.

ARTICLE HISTORY

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In April 2010, a new project called *Hifadhi ya Mimitu ya Asili*¹ (HIMA) started up in Zanzibar. The project aimed at reducing greenhouse gas emissions from deforestation and forest degradation, and to generate carbon income as an economic incentive to local communities in Zanzibar to manage forest sustainably.² Funded by the Government of Norway, HIMA was one of several projects initiated in Tanzania to pilot the Reduction of Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+)³ – a policy framework negotiated under the auspices of the United Nation's Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). UNFCCC promoted a process where developing countries would formulate strategies and develop institutions to enable forest-protecting communities to sell carbon

on the international carbon market, or alternatively receive compensation for their efforts to reduce deforestation and forest degradation.⁴ The process is known as the REDD+ readiness process. Key to this process is the establishment of systems for 'carbon accounting', that is, systems to monitor, measure, report and verify changes in forest cover and carbon stocks.⁵

In April 2008, the Norwegian government entered into an agreement with the Government of Tanzania to support a REDD+ readiness process in Tanzania.⁶ Thereafter, in March 2009, the Norwegian Embassy to Tanzania launched a call for proposals welcoming non-governmental organizations to submit proposals for REDD+ pilot projects. Out of 45 applications received by the embassy, nine REDD+ pilot projects were selected to test different elements of the REDD+ policy framework at different sites across the country. One of these projects, HIMA, was to be implemented by CARE International in Tanzania in collaboration with the Department of Forestry and Non-Renewable Natural Resources under the Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources in Zanzibar.⁷

When REDD+ was introduced internationally, it was celebrated as a novel and promising approach to create economic incentives for forest conservation and CO₂ emission reductions, and thus to mitigate climate change.⁸ The enthusiasm generated within conservation organizations; governments and research environments triggered an 'unprecedented commitment of political support and financial funds for the forest-development sector'.⁹ The pace of implementation of REDD+ has, however, been slow. The practical and methodological complexities of the REDD+ policy framework – in particular related to carbon accounting – has made it harder to implement than expected.¹⁰ These complexities have created doubt that REDD+ can reach the anticipated goal of forest protection and CO₂ emission reductions, and even more so, to positively impact the lives of women and men in the local communities where REDD+ is introduced.¹¹

Studies have also documented that the majority of REDD+ projects implemented have ended up not selling carbon at all.¹² The financial sustainability of REDD+ projects in the post-readiness phase is therefore questioned. Researchers have furthermore warned that REDD+ is becoming a 'conservation fad', that is, an approach that has invoked a widely shared enthusiasm, but rather quickly is 'dubbed a failure and abandoned'.¹³ Lund et al. contend that conservation fads are inherent in what they refer to as 'the logic of the development and environment industry', where the 'promise of change' is used to generate political and financial support.¹⁴ As conservation fads commonly incorporate central elements of existing approaches, they often end up producing business-as-usual scenarios.¹⁵

This article provides an empirically grounded account of what happened when REDD+, as a globally conceived and internationally negotiated environmental policy framework, was translated into practical implementation in Zanzibar. It explores how REDD+ proponents and bureaucrats in Zanzibar receive and experience the introduction of REDD+, and discusses how these actors interpret and give meaning to REDD+ and the various elements of the REDD+ policy framework. The article also considers the extent to which the actors involved are in a position to make adaptations and modifications to the REDD+ policy framework in accordance with the local context and needs. Finally, it discusses why certain aspects of the REDD+ policy framework were incorporated into practice, while others were rejected.

Data for this article was collected during 13 months of ethnographic fieldwork in Zanzibar.¹⁶ By combining various qualitative methods I studied HIMA at multiple levels. In addition to living with, observing and experiencing the introduction of the HIMA project in one local community, I conducted participant observation and took part in more than 40 meetings, workshops and seminars from community to policy-making levels in Zanzibar.¹⁷ I carried out numerous informal interviews with participants about their expectations prior to the meetings and their reactions afterwards. I conducted in total 106 formal, semi-structured interviews with informants at various levels (female and male villagers, project staff, bureaucrats, donors and politicians).¹⁸ Finally, I reviewed a large number of REDD+-related project and policy documents.

While the majority of the empirical studies conducted on REDD+ deal with REDD+ pilot projects. Fewer studies address REDD+ readiness processes at higher levels.¹⁹ Given that Zanzibar has a semi-autonomous governance system that is distinct from that of mainland Tanzania, its preparation for international trade of carbon required processes separate from those at the level of the Union government in Tanzania. It demanded the revision of Zanzibari policies in accordance with REDD+, and the establishment of systems, institutions and capacity that were specific for the implementation in Zanzibar. While I discuss HIMA as a REDD+ pilot project implemented at community level elsewhere,²⁰ this article investigates HIMA as a case of a REDD+ readiness process undertaken in the semi-autonomous state of Zanzibar.

Policy adaptation and translation

A sizable literature has emerged – in particular within anthropology – challenging mainstream conceptions of policy-making and implementation as a rational undertaking, where social and technical change is considered to be brought about by generalizable policy ideas and neutral scientific reasoning.²¹ Key to this body of work is that inconsistencies between policy and practices are conceived as natural and inevitable. When policies are translated into practice, they will always – to some degree – undergo processes of interpretation, modification and local-meaning making. In order to understand the complex influences of policies on established practices, and vice versa, how established practices actually influence processes of policy adaptation, there is need to examine actors' responses to, and creativeness in, policy translation processes.²² In the analysis of the adaption and translation of the REDD+ policy framework into practice in Zanzibar, I draw on Cleaver's concept of *institutional bricolage* as an overarching theoretical perspective.²³

The notion of *institutional bricolage* draws on anthropological critiques of mainstream development policy and practice. It refers to processes where 'people consciously and non-consciously draw on existing formulae (styles of thinking, models of cause and effect, social norms and sanctioned social roles and relationships) to patch and piece together institutions in response to changing situations'.²⁴ Change thus occurs, according to Cleaver, when actors invent, innovate and make pragmatic adaptations to new phenomena within the reality of their everyday practices and moral worldviews. In this article, the REDD+ policy framework is conceived as such a new phenomenon as it is introduced into the forest management policy context of Zanzibar.

The etymological foundation of ‘bricolage’ stems from the French concept ‘intellectual bricolage’ originally applied by the French structural anthropologist Levi-Strauss.²⁵ Intellectual bricolage denotes the process of using material leftovers from one project to creatively construct new artefacts. Levi-Strauss is thus describing a type of behaviour opposite to that of an engineer. While the engineer creates specialized tools for specialized purposes, the *bricoleur* is more of a handyman juggling multiple tasks – on one hand making the best out of whatever is at hand, but also someone who is limited by the resources available.

Cleaver uses institutional bricolage with reference to processes where actors ‘make creative and resourceful use of whatever materials are at hand, regardless of their original purpose’.²⁶ The inventiveness and reordering of the material at hand is however limited by the structure of society; by levels of technology and division of labour.²⁷ Promoting a ‘thicker model of agency’, Cleaver recognizes the complex and diverse influences that contribute to shaping human action.²⁸ Individuals – and institutions – are highly influenced by social concerns (such as the need to live in peace with others), as well as culturally and historically shaped ideas about the right way of doing things. Cleaver thus challenges the rational choice and one-dimensional notion of rationality, which she claims is inherent in mainstream institutionalism. Instead she reminds us about the existence of multiple rationalities, interests and agendas whereby social and moral factors may be as important for describing human behaviour as economic rationality. Central to institutional bricolage is thus the interplay between *agency* and *structure* in shaping behaviour and patterning policy outcomes.²⁹

Although Cleaver’s use of *institutional bricolage* has its basis in studies of local institutions for natural resource management, it is useful when exploring ‘changing situations’ also at higher levels. In this article, the changing situation is the introduction of REDD+ into policy-making levels in Zanzibar, that is, among the actors responsible for making decisions on the extent to which existing Zanzibari policies should be aligned with REDD+, what systems and institutions that should be established, and what capacity and competence to build as part of the REDD+ readiness process in Zanzibar. The concept of institutional bricolage is thus applied to explore the relationships between the global environmental policy framework that REDD+ represents and the Zanzibari agencies involved in translating REDD+ into practice. I consider how actors both consciously and non-consciously draw upon social norms and taken for granted ways of doing things in their responses to REDD+. I argue along with Cleaver that in order for policies to become durable, they have to be imbued by legitimacy. This article thus seeks to provide insights into what factors lend legitimacy to REDD+ at the policy-making level in Zanzibar. In the discussion, I also draw on theoretical contributions from other scholars where useful to clarify my arguments.

Situating Zanzibar within REDD+ in Tanzania

In Tanzania, a national REDD+ secretariat, established within the Institute of Resource Assessment at the University of Dar es Salaam, was in collaboration with a REDD+ task force responsible for facilitating the national readiness process, including the development of a national REDD+ strategy for Tanzania. Members of the task force primarily included technical staff from the Vice President’s Office of Tanzania and the Ministry of

Natural Resources and Tourism – the two agencies in Tanzania possessing political authority relevant to REDD+.³⁰ As Zanzibar is a semi-autonomous entity within the Union of Tanzania, the islands' government was invited to send one delegate to represent the islands in the task force.³¹ Zanzibar's membership was important to ensure that Zanzibari policies relevant to REDD+ were aligned with those decided upon as part of the REDD+ readiness process at Union-level.³²

The Tanzanian Union has been politically disputed more or less since it was established in April 1964 between the two recently independent and sovereign countries, Zanzibar and Tanganyika. Originally, a list of 11 political issues for collaboration was enshrined in the first constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania.³³ Since then several amendments have been made, and the list of political issues has grown to 22.³⁴ Many Zanzibaris are unhappy about what they perceive as an on-going, gradual deprivation of power from Zanzibar to the Union government. The fear of Zanzibar being 'swallowed' by the mainland that is becoming increasingly stronger and more dominant,³⁵ also manifested itself in relation to REDD+.

'Forest' is a non-union matter for which Zanzibar – constitutionally – has distinct legal authority from that of mainland Tanzania. The dominant view among REDD+ proponents in Tanzania was however that since REDD+ was an international mechanism under the United Nations, and signed up to by sovereign states (i.e. the United Republic of Tanzania), REDD+ was an issue to be managed by the Union government. This was disputed in Zanzibar. Representatives from the Zanzibari government argued that it was 'unconstitutional',³⁶ but 'not surprising'³⁷ – it was conceived as part of a centralizing tendency.

Managing REDD+ at Union-level meant developing a national strategy to align policies with REDD+; to determine the so-called drivers of deforestation, as well as to build competence on REDD+ requirements within the responsible institutions. More specifically, it implied development of a national forest inventory of forest resources, and establishment of a national forest reference emission level that could serve as a quantitative measure for Tanzania's future performance in changing forest cover and forest carbon stocks. Development of a national monitoring system was also required to control what in technical REDD+ parlance was referred to as *leakage*. Leakage occurs when a project introduced to reduce CO₂ emissions in one area is displaced and leads to increased emissions outside the defined project boundaries. Failing to account for and report on leakage may lead to overestimation of emission reductions,³⁸ which again may jeopardize 'carbon integrity', that is, the prospect of a project to qualify for sale of carbon.³⁹

In May 2009, the Government of Finland started funding the development of a national forest inventory in Tanzania. But when the report was completed two years later, it did not include data from Zanzibar. Representatives from the donor community in Dar es Salaam referred to this as an 'oversight' that had occurred 'because those who designed the program did not understand the context [... ..] that Zanzibar was something that should be explicitly mentioned'.⁴⁰ A separate inventory thus had to be undertaken in Zanzibar. The United Nations' REDD (UNREDD) programme to assist Tanzania to prepare and implement the national REDD+ strategy was also initiated without attention to the specific systems and practices of forest management in Zanzibar.⁴¹ With these 'oversights' questions about the legitimacy of Union and mainland institutions as representatives of Zanzibar on questions related to REDD+ intensified.

In March 2011, the US-based consultancy firm Terra Global Capital – contracted by HIMA to assist the project with carbon accounting and with the promotion of sale of Zanzibari carbon at the international carbon market – completed a feasibility study to determine the potential of HIMA to develop carbon credits, including generating income from them. The results, which were presented to project partners in Zanzibar in October 2011, varied from a conservative US\$3.2 million, to an optimistic US\$19.2 million over 30 years. As these estimations equalled an annual payment of between \$2 and \$10 per hectare, they did not represent very impressive figures compared to potential incomes from other land-use practices.⁴²

According to the national REDD+ strategy that was completed in March 2013, Tanzania aimed to establish a national REDD+ fund to attract incomes from both voluntary contributions and a future international compliance carbon market.⁴³ In Zanzibar, representatives from the forest authorities, CARE and Terra Global Capital had discussed the place of Zanzibar within the institutional set-up of REDD+ in Tanzania. Prior to the discussions, CARE in collaboration with Terra Global Capital had sketched out possible linkages. During the deliberations, the Zanzibari governmental representative deleted HIMA's institutional link to REDD+ at Union-level, quite literally with a stroke of a pen. With this move, HIMA was defined as a stand-alone project – a project that aimed to sell carbon credits to private companies, individuals or organizations interested in purchasing carbon credits directly from an individual project: actors would have control over the modest amounts of REDD+ revenues estimated from future sale of Zanzibari carbon. Within the prevailing political context, it was unthinkable for Zanzibari actors to give up (parts of) their autonomy over forest resource management to the Union government. Political concerns – such as Zanzibar's place within the Union – thus played a paramount role in shaping how REDD+ evolved in Zanzibar.

Forests, forest management and conceptions of deforestation in Zanzibar

Zanzibar consists of two main islands, Unguja and Pemba, and some smaller islets. The archipelago has a population of approximately 1.3 million.⁴⁴ The House of Representatives is the Zanzibar legislative and thus responsible for making the laws and regulations governing forest resources on the isles. The Department of Forestry serves as the 'forest administrator' and advises the Zanzibari government on all issues related to forest management – including policy formation, implementation and law enforcement. As a partner to CARE in the HIMA project, the Department of Forestry also had a key role in the REDD+ readiness process in Zanzibar.

With a long history of different interventions and land activities, the Zanzibari landscape today is a mixture of largely cultivated land, natural forests and scrub.⁴⁵ Before the nineteenth-century natural tropical forests and thickets covered most of Zanzibar.⁴⁶ Forests were communally managed in accordance with rules set by forest guardians, elders and their chief.⁴⁷ During the first half of the nineteenth century, around the same time the Sultan of Oman moved his seat to Zanzibar, clearing of forests intensified. First, for the establishment of clove plantations and later also as part of a campaign issued by the British colonial government to grow more food.⁴⁸ Governmentally regulated forest protection started in the 1940s with the issuing of a Wood Cutting Decree for mangrove forests. During subsequent years, this was extended to other types of forests. Since the

1940s, different governments have also established tree plantations in order to meet the increasing demand for building poles and fuelwood.⁴⁹ For the same reasons, villagers have been encouraged to establish their own woodlots. The first forest reserve decree was issued in 1950, and during the 15 consecutive years three forests reserves were gazetted.⁵⁰ After the Revolution in 1964, all land was nationalized. In 1965, the post-revolutionary government declared all mangroves forests reserves,⁵¹ and in the following years re-distributed (primarily cultivated) land confiscated during the revolution as so-called three acres plots.⁵²

During the 1980s, the government of Zanzibar started experimenting with Community Forest Management. In 1995, a new forest policy was formulated and followed in 1996 by a National Forest Conservation and Management Act. The Act provided the legal foundation for establishment of community forest management committees, and assigning these with user rights to community forests.⁵³ In the years after 1996, Community Forest Management Agreements were developed and signed between conservation committees at community level and the Director of the Department of Forestry. At HIMA's inception, 17 such agreements existed across the islands.

The forests in Zanzibar are part of the coastal forests of East Africa. Due to their relatively high diversity of endemic plants and animal species, they are listed among the world's 200 biodiversity hotspots.⁵⁴ While no official forest definition exists in Zanzibar, studies conducted over the years have applied different classifications for different land-use cover. As part of the REDD+ readiness process, a Woody Biomass Survey was conducted in Zanzibar in 2012/2013. The survey classified the land into the categories outlined in Table 1.

Although the forested areas of Zanzibar – in an international perspective – are relatively small, they play a considerable role in the daily lives of Zanzibari women and men. Eighty per cent of the population derives at least a part of their livelihoods from forests, and over 97% of all Zanzibari households use traditional biomass fuels (charcoal and firewood) as their main source of fuel for cooking.⁵⁵ Forests represent timber for building; fodder; medicinal plants and material for handicrafts. They provide fruit crops; beekeeping opportunities; income from tourism; water catchments; shelter for wildlife and estuaries for fish breeding.

Based on data from Unguja island, the annual forest change rate is estimated to be 0.46%.⁵⁶ Compared to national statistics and studies from other areas of Tanzania, the deforestation rate in Zanzibar is thus relatively low.⁵⁷ Zanzibar is however facing a situation of serious fuelwood deficiency.⁵⁸ According to estimations, over 50% of all wood

Table 1. Land cover/land use in Zanzibar.

Land cover/land use in Zanzibar	No. of hectare
Native forests (coral rag, high forests and bushland)	86,182
Mangroves	16,488
Tree plantations (incl. rubber)	3788
Agroforestry systems (cloves, coconuts and mixed trees/agricultural crops)	80,392
Agriculture (large scale, subsistence and paddy fields)	39,780
Mixed woody vegetation	7149
Other (including infrastructure, settlement, beaches and wetlands)	25,724
Total land in Zanzibar	259,503

Source: Adapted from Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar, "Zanzibar Woody Biomass Survey," 21.

products (including fuelwood) are imported from mainland Tanzania.⁵⁹ For many Zanzibaris, the import constitutes a reliable and relatively affordable source of energy. It also represents a release of some of the pressure on the islands' forest resources. According to the REDD+ policy framework, the import does however represent a source of 'leakage', as it displaces deforestation from Zanzibar to mainland Tanzania.

Knowledge about the main causes of deforestation is a precondition for succeeding to enhance forest cover and forest carbon stock. The identification of 'drivers' – or the main causes – of deforestation is therefore core to any REDD+ readiness process. Kukkonen and Käykhö describe how such drivers are unique in each area of Zanzibar.⁶⁰ Traditional land uses, such as shifting cultivation, have over time negatively affected forest quality and biomass in the so-called coral-rag areas.⁶¹ Around Zanzibar Town, where the population has quadrupled since the mid-1970s due to processes of urbanization and in-migration, in addition to natural population growth, agroforests and fruit tree plantations have been lost to city expansion.⁶² Along the coasts, forests are cleared as tourism resorts and settlement areas for employees are established.⁶³

The 'drivers of deforestation' were the subject for discussions on several occasions during the early phases of the HIMA project. Based on a combination of review of existing documentation and Participatory Rural Appraisals conducted in rural communities across the isles, HIMA project documents estimated that small-scale forest activities at local level constituted 97% of the total deforestation in Zanzibar.⁶⁴ The same documents estimated that potential drivers originating from outside local communities, such as construction of roads, settlement expansions and tourism accounted for 3%. Accordingly, HIMA documents identified unsustainable forest use at community level – and in particular wood fuel harvesting and shifting cultivation – as the main causes of deforestation in Zanzibar.

In interviews, some informants questioned why the negative effects of tourism on forests in Zanzibar were not addressed by the HIMA project. One forest officer offered an explanation: 'We might have thought it was a losing game.'⁶⁵ The service sector in Zanzibar, which primarily constitutes the tourism sector, accounts for about 50% of GDP.⁶⁶ The forestry sector, on the other hand, officially contributes about 1%.⁶⁷ For HIMA, imposing restrictions on villagers' forest practices was a much more feasible option than trying to impose restrictions on a wealth-generating and powerful tourism industry. Structural factors, such as the power relations between different economic sectors, contribute to shaping economic activities that can be incorporated into a project. More specifically, in Zanzibar the relatively insignificant contribution of the forestry sector to the formal economy determined what 'drivers of deforestation' the HIMA project incorporated into the regulating REDD+ scheme.

Community forest management: an available tool

With backing from the Forest Conservation and Management Act from 1996, Community Forest Management was included as a key component in the HIMA proposal. Community Forest Management was not new to either CARE or the Department of Forestry. Both institutions had played a central role in advocating this type of forest management in Zanzibar since the mid-1990s, and had thus extensive experience with supporting the establishment of local conservation committees and negotiating management agreements with local committees.

Although Community Forest Management had been practiced in Zanzibar for more than a decade its performance was inhibited by multiple challenges. In some communities where Community Forest Management had been introduced accounts of dysfunctional committees, elite capture of benefits and violations of rules were commonplace.⁶⁸ Studies have also documented the highly politicized character of these type of interventions.⁶⁹ The HIMA proposal also pointed at challenges. Firstly, the deforestation and forest degradation in community forests was reported to be on the increase despite the existence of Community Forest Management Agreements.⁷⁰ Secondly, the increasing deforestation was linked to the nonexistence of economic incentives to promote sustainable forest management over forest cutting and conversion of land to agriculture. Revenues from carbon sale were however initially presented as the incentive needed to tackle the challenges of existing community forest management regime.⁷¹ Finally, 'insecure' forest tenure was seen to inhibit good governance within the existing Community Forest Management areas.⁷²

'Securing carbon rights' was however a central part of the REDD+ readiness process in Zanzibar. For the carbon to be sold, it must be owned.⁷³ This also came up during an early stakeholder meeting within the HIMA project, where a senior forest officer – with reference to an earlier statement made by Terra Global Capital – stressed that 'only the group or individual who owns the carbon, can sell it'.⁷⁴ In the course of the HIMA project, 17 old and 28 new Community Forest Management Agreements between local communities and Zanzibari forest authorities were reviewed and developed. These agreements recognized that the right to use the land, and thus also the benefits from sale of carbon, lies with the local communities. After their completion, the Community Forest Management Agreements were sent to the Attorney General in Zanzibar for approval. Following this, they were signed by the Minister of Land before officially being gazetted. Within HIMA the gazetting, as well as the extension of the agreements from five to 30 years, was considered critical for the carbon – as well as the land – to be regarded as 'secure'.⁷⁵ Moreover, HIMA met the requirements for future carbon sale. From time to time, critical issues relating to the functionality of Community Forest Management were raised in meetings between HIMA and local communities. In coastal communities that were part of the project, there were stories of hotel owners that – with the blessing of district authorities – had cleared community forests for construction,⁷⁶ and that hotel staff collected firewood without permits.⁷⁷ Studies from mainland Tanzania have revealed similar cases where community forest management proved inappropriate to address causes of deforestation originating from outside local communities. Forest exploitation has prevailed, particularly because community forest management regimes lack the means to stop harmful practices by external actors.⁷⁸ Such incidents spurred discussions about HIMA's approaches in internal project meetings. When it became clear to project staff that REDD+ revenue to Zanzibar were likely to be modest, questions about the legitimacy of REDD+ as an appropriate means to solve the problems associated with Community Forest Management increased. The discussions did however always conclude with the need to focus on the plan, or more particularly, on what the project could achieve through Community Forest Management.

Central to processes of bricolage is the notion that the adaptation of new policies, and the different elements of these, is authoritatively linked to existing practices and acceptable ways of doing things.⁷⁹ HIMA is thus not alone in applying known and established strategies or tools. Neither is it alone on focusing on the problems that suit – or that can be

solved by – the policy tools available. In fact, in many instances of project management, the use of specific instruments become the policy objective in itself.⁸⁰ Kaarhus quotes Chatterjee who writes that ‘not only are instruments chosen according to goals that are desired, but goals themselves are very often fixed because certain instruments have to be used’.⁸¹ Hence, problems are defined by the availability of certain tools suitable to address a specific problem. In HIMA, the availability of Community Forest Management as a tool to control deforestation at community level in Zanzibar determined the process to identify the problems that needed to be addressed. As a result, unsustainable small-scale activities at community level was defined as the problem HIMA set out to solve, whereas larger scale ‘drivers’ at higher level remained unaddressed.

Making the best use of what is at hand: REDD+ as a source of funding

Poor funding of forest agencies and their operations has been identified as a major constraint to adequate policy implementation in Zanzibar.⁸² Allocations from the Zanzibari state budget to the Department of Forestry have for years only constituted small portions of what was proposed by the department. The execution of forest policies and plans in Zanzibar hence depends largely on external resources.⁸³

When Community Forest Management was introduced to Zanzibar in the 1980s–1990s, it emerged as a response to the international obligations of involving local communities in forest management and protection.⁸⁴ In addition to supplying the Department of Forestry with additional man-power (as tasks – in particular patrolling – were taken over by local communities), ‘community participation’ was seen as an effective strategy to protect forest resources in Zanzibar. Representatives of the Department of Forestry often argued that when local communities are involved in decision-making, forest protection is more likely to succeed.⁸⁵ Moreover, Community Forest Management represented an area international donors were keen to support. A governmental officer explained in an interview: ‘The government departments survive from one project to another. When the REDD project finishes there will be another.’⁸⁶ The HIMA budget covered the costs of four technical positions, two drivers, and 50% of a finance position within the Department of Forestry. In addition, a small percentage of the director’s salary and ‘benefits’ for the positions were covered. The budget also included costs for materials and equipment (a vehicle, motor cycles, laptops, etc.), as well as the competence building and training of Department of Forestry staff. In addition, the provision of funds for petrol and field officers’ per diems made it possible for the Department of Forestry to visit villages for consultations in relation to the development of the Community Forest Management Agreements.

The role of HIMA as a source of funding was also reflected in interviews with governmental employees. ‘We continue as usual. We have the same responsibilities as before, but the REDD project provides us with the resources and the infrastructure to undertake our tasks.’⁸⁷ In HIMA, the Department of Forestry, with the language of institutional bricolage, took on the role of a pragmatic bricoleur. The agency made creative use of what the project had to offer. The financial resources from HIMA were viewed as funds that could assist the under-funded agency to support their regular activities, and match existing plans – including the rolling out Community Forest Management across Zanzibar. Moreover, for forest officers with relatively modest salaries, per diems covered through the

project made it – in the words of one officer – ‘possible to send our kids to school’.⁸⁸ Hence, the HIMA project did not only contribute with much needed funding to the Department of Forestry. It also provided essential additional income to its employees.

Some officers within the Department of Forestry did however express reluctance towards certain elements of the HIMA project. The issue of land and land tenure has been a complex and highly conflictive issue in Zanzibar since before the revolution in 1964.⁸⁹ With reference to HIMA’s efforts to ‘secure land tenure’ through the gazetting of Community Forest Management Agreements, a representative of the forest authorities who was not himself directly involved in HIMA expressed in an interview: ‘Do they really think that they will secure land tenure in only four years? This is nonsense.’ He continued: ‘I have been thinking this from the start, but I left it since I did not want to cause any problems for the project’ (i.e. in accessing funds).⁹⁰ This statement was however only presented as a ‘backstage’ critique in an interview.⁹¹ In public, the same officer supported the project. Cleaver stresses that the requirement ‘to do the right thing is deeply embedded in moral ecological and solidarity models’.⁹² Instead of openly confronting the HIMA project, the forest officer underplays his criticism towards the project in solidarity with colleagues who benefitted from the project.

Green furthermore explains that although the receiving end might be reluctant to a new project and have the capacity to reject it, they rarely do because ‘too much is at stake in terms of the promised transfer of resources to jeopardize the process’.⁹³ In the case of REDD+ at Union-level in Tanzania, Koch similarly contends that governmental decision-makers adopted ‘a strategy of opportunistic adaptation’,⁹⁴ whereby they formally conformed to donors’ expectations to access funding. In situations where maintenance of relations are necessary to secure access to vital material assets, conflicts must be avoided.⁹⁵ The risk of harming useful relationships and thus losing vital institutional funding may explain why officers sceptical to elements of the REDD+ policy framework refrained from publicly raising critical questions that could harm the project. Lund et al. argue that REDD+ in Tanzania follows ‘the logic of the development and conservation industry’, where the testing of new policies (i.e. REDD+) represents a means for local actors to appropriate financial resources.⁹⁶ Also in the case of Zanzibar, the legitimacy of the REDD+ policy framework is linked to the extent to which it may contribute to sustaining the incomes of institutions and actors involved.

Understanding the rejection and incorporation of new policy

In order to address the existing fuelwood deficiency, the Department of Forestry had developed an ‘energy switch’ strategy to reduce the dependency on forest resources as sources of fuel for cooking.⁹⁷ The strategy included the promotion of bottled gas (i.e. Liquefied Petroleum Gas) in urban and semi-urban areas. In the HIMA proposal, the promotion of Liquefied Petroleum Gas formed part of the project’s measures to control leakage.⁹⁸ During the early stages of the project, HIMA staff initiated a publicity campaign to promote bottled gas, and started distributing free start-up equipment to households in semi-urban and urban areas across the Zanzibari archipelago. Access to an affordable alternative energy was expected to reduce the demand of fuelwood in Zanzibar town and other urban and semi-urban areas of Zanzibar. It could also potentially reduce the fuelwood deficiency and dependency on import of fuelwood from mainland Tanzania.

The promotion of bottled gas did however turn out to be problematic in practice. From project start-up, Terra Global Capital had been working with the project to assist HIMA – and Zanzibar – to comply with the so-called Verified Carbon Standards (VCS).⁹⁹ Terra Global Capital warned against implementing the gas component as part of the HIMA project and argued that as a non-renewable carbon-based fuel, the burning of gas would represent an additional source of CO₂ emissions.¹⁰⁰ Arguably, this would add costs and complications to the HIMA carbon accounting. They further argued that since the VCS methodology explicitly excluded carbon credits from substitutes of fossil fuels for biomass fuel, having the gas component as part of HIMA would jeopardize the project's carbon integrity, and as a result HIMA's chances of being validated under the VCS. As the Department of Forestry allegedly had the promotion of bottled gas as a prerequisite for supporting REDD+ in Zanzibar, HIMA partners decided to go for the most politically palatable solution: To do what they referred to as 'putting a fence around' the gas component. This meant that it would still be executed, but as a separate project outside of HIMA. In other words, it would not be included in the HIMA carbon accounting.

During the early stages of HIMA, CARE staff was optimistic about the potential revenues REDD+ would generate to local communities in Zanzibar. As one of the world's largest international humanitarian organizations, CARE was well acquainted with managing systems for monitoring, measuring and reporting on results. With external technical assistance from Terra Global Capital, learning to account for carbon and emission reductions appeared demanding but feasible. But in practice, like in other REDD+ projects,¹⁰¹ the process to comply with the VCS methodology and to ensure carbon integrity proved technically complicated and time consuming. As HIMA progressed, the usefulness of the carbon accounting was increasingly questioned in internal HIMA meetings. In an interview in March 2012, one of the officers involved in these activities stated:

We ['the international community'] have created a mechanism where most of the work is around the calculations that are necessary to give carbon-integrity. If we had invested the same amount of efforts into designing better ways of managing forests, we could have achieved the same end climate-wise, protected forest and reduced emissions. We would not measure them, and therefore we could not offset them. But if only the world really had the will to protect forests, we could have achieved the objectives of reduced deforestation - without the e-part - the emissions part. The offsetting is what drives the need to have strict reference levels, verifiable baseline data, all those things. You only need that very sophisticated MRV (i.e. the monitoring and accounting system used) if you need to measure the final product to a level of accuracy.¹⁰²

Despite the reservations expressed about the usefulness of carbon accounting and its significance to emission reductions and climate change, the possibility for rejecting it was never really up for discussion among members of the HIMA team. As demonstrated by the exclusion of bottled gas from the project, conforming to the logics of the carbon accounting remained acute for HIMA staff. They considered it a 'technical necessity'.¹⁰³ Without carbon accounting HIMA would not be a REDD+ project – only a regular Community Forest Management project. The carbon accounting thus represented a constituting element of the REDD+ policy framework and thus made HIMA into a REDD+ project. As a responsible project leader with a contractual obligation towards a donor, CARE felt obligated by the project activity plan. Within a strict carbon accounting and monitoring regime, they experienced that they had few other options than to continue with what

they often referred to as ‘ticking the activity-boxes’, that is, to carry out activities according to pre-set milestones. HIMA staff kept on collecting the data necessary for carbon verification and complying with the standards needed to ensure formal validation as a REDD +/carbon project. At the time HIMA was closing down in December 2014, the project received initial validation as a carbon project. More than two years later full validation is however still pending. Along with Community Forest Management, carbon accounting represented the key available tool to HIMA. Combined, the two tools controlled what the project could and could not become. With reference to Foucault’s notion of governmentality, Cleaver talks about ‘organised practices through which we are governed and through which consciously and unconsciously we govern ourselves’.¹⁰⁴ The ‘organized practices’ of carbon accounting seem to have had disciplining effects on HIMA project staff, and thus limited the scope they had to discard carbon accounting as an element of the REDD+ policy framework in Zanzibar. The significance of carbon accounting as an organized and disciplining practice needs to be recognized as important if we are to understand why carbon accounting is incorporated into REDD+ practice in Zanzibar despite the widespread reluctance it was subjected to among project staff. On the other hand, bottled gas as a potential substitute for forest-based energy had other qualities – as a fossil fuel – that conflicted with the principles of the carbon accounting. Bottled gas was hence rejected.

REDD+ as a fading ‘fad’

In line with the notion of institutional bricolage, the process to translate the REDD+ policy framework into practice in Zanzibar combined existing approaches with the adoption of new techniques. For HIMA, Community Forest Management represented an existing practice: a known and established tool with legal and institutional backing within the Zanzibari government. Representing a known practice and thus a preferable project strategy, Community Forest Management shaped the HIMA project and its focus on restricting smallholder – mostly subsistence-based – activities. On the other hand, the profitability of other land-use practices protected them from being incorporated into the regulating REDD+ scheme.

As pragmatic bricoleurs, HIMA partners interpreted the funding available through REDD+ as a means to revive and extend earlier efforts of rolling out Community Forest Management throughout Zanzibar. They did however experience that there were limits to the bricolage. Making creative use of what the project could offer was only possible as long as it did not conflict with the principles – and technical necessity – of carbon accounting. In fear that it would harm the project’s chances of qualifying for selling carbon, HIMA refrained from incorporating ‘energy switch’ activities proposed by the Zanzibari government, activities, which – despite their potential of reducing the pressure on forest-based resources – could not be accommodated for by the VCS methodology. Although project staff considered carbon accounting unhelpful for the project’s overall purpose, they were disciplined into continuing putting efforts into completing the complicated process to prepare for carbon validation.

While carbon accounting was incorporated into REDD+ practice in Zanzibar, its longer-term legitimacy beyond the readiness process may be questioned. More than two years after project finalization, HIMA has not generated any carbon revenues.

Without carbon revenues, carbon accounting may easily be abandoned. What is left of REDD+ in Zanzibar is then primarily Community Forest Management, which without carbon revenues will not be able to provide the economic incentives needed to tackle the challenges associated with this type of forest management. Thus, as elsewhere, REDD+ in Zanzibar is at risk of becoming an example of a ‘conservation fad’ – achieving little new in terms of changing actual forest management and use in Zanzibar, and generating little but business-as-usual scenarios.

Access to financial resources was undeniably important to ensure buy-in – and legitimacy – of REDD+ in Zanzibar. But in order to fully understand the incorporation and rejection of the various elements of the REDD+ policy framework in Zanzibar, we need to also recognize the disciplining effects of certain elements inherent in REDD+, as well as the fundamental role of known and established approaches in shaping practice. Acknowledging this is not only critical for the understanding of REDD+ and REDD+ readiness processes. It is also useful in the study of policy translation processes – and the relationship between policy and practice – within development and international environmental governance more in general.

Notes

1. Swahili for “Conservation of Traditional Forests”.
2. CARE, *Proposal for HIMA*, 5.
3. The original idea of mitigating climate change through the reduction of carbon emissions from deforestation in the tropics (RED) was proposed during the international climate change negotiations in Montreal in 2005. Later an extra ‘D’ was added to also include forest degradation. The ‘plus’ commonly implies the inclusion also of the enhancement of ‘forest carbon stocks... in developing countries’. Angelsen et al., *Analysing REDD+*, 381.
4. UNFCCC, “Decision 1,” para 70.
5. See, for instance, Leach and Scoones, *Carbon Conflicts in Africa*, 25–6.
6. The agreement totaled a potential amount of NOK 500 millions over the next five years. The total budget of the HIMA project was US\$ 5,539,175 over four years.
7. CARE International is an international humanitarian NGO with its secretariat in Geneva, Switzerland. The Department of Forestry and non-Renewable natural Resources is from now on referred to as the Department of Forestry.
8. Sills et al., *REDD+ on the Ground*, xx.
9. Lund et al., “REDD+ as a Conservation Fad,” 124.
10. See, for instance, Angelsen et al., *Analysing REDD+*.
11. McAfee, “Green Economy and REDD,” 244. See also Fletcher et al., “Questioning REDD+,” 673.
12. See, for instance, Sills et al., *REDD+ on the Ground*, 423.
13. Lund et al., “REDD+ as a Conservation Fad,” 125, see also Redford et al., “Fads, Funding, and Forgetting,” and Fletcher et al., “Questioning REDD+”.
14. Lund et al., “REDD+ as a Conservation Fad,” 125.
15. Redford et al., “Fads, Funding, and Forgetting,” 438.
16. The 13 months were divided between four stays from April 2011 to April 2013.
17. The meetings and seminars lasted from one to two hours to three days.
18. Eight of these were group interviews, the remaining included 76 individuals, which means that some were interviewed more than once.
19. See, for instance, Lund et al., “REDD+ as a Conservation Fad”.
20. See Benjaminsen, “Between Resistance and Consent,” 387–94 and Benjaminsen and Kaarhus, “Commodification of Forest Carbon,” 7–22.

21. See, for instance, Wedel et al., “Anthropology of Public Policy”; Shore et al., *Policy worlds*, see also Mosse, *Cultivating Development*; Mosse, “Anthropology of International Development”.
22. See, for instance, Mosse, *Cultivating Development*.
23. Cleaver, *Development Through Bricolage*, 33–50.
24. *Ibid.*, 45.
25. Levi-Strauss, *The Savage Mind*.
26. Cleaver, *Development Through Bricolage*, 33.
27. *Ibid.*, 34.
28. *Ibid.*, 15.
29. *Ibid.*, 13.
30. The former is a Union institution, while the latter only has jurisdiction on mainland Tanzania. Within these two institutions, the Division of Environment and the Forestry and Bee-keeping Division were assigned special roles. From 2012, the task force was expanded to include more sectors, as well as representatives from the civil society.
31. From 2012 he was joined by a second representative.
32. Interview with a representative of REDD+ at Union-level, 28 February 2012, Dar es Salaam.
33. Tronvoll, “Bridging Divided Identities,” 227.
34. The union matters mainly include matters relating to trade, immigration and security. See complete list in Tronvoll, “Bridging Divided Identities,” 228.
35. Myers and Muhajir, “Wiped from the Map,” 669.
36. Interview with senior governmental representative, 22 May 2012, Zanzibar Town.
37. Interview with senior governmental representative, 8 February 2012, Zanzibar Town.
38. Korhonen-Kurki et al., “Multiple Levels, Multiple Challenges,” 97.
39. The complexities involved in monitoring, measuring, reporting and verifying changes in carbon stocks (including leakage) is debated in the literature. See, for instance, Bäckstrand and Lövbrand, “Planting Trees to Mitigate,” 62–3; Zhang, “From Externality to Leakage,” 136–7.
40. Interview with UN representative, 28 February 2012, Dar es Salaam. Similar statements were made by other donor representatives.
41. Interview with a representative of UNREDD in Tanzania, 28 February 2012.
42. In comparison, one stack of firewood is sold for more than US\$0.5 and the price of a bag of charcoal is about US\$5.
43. United Republic of Tanzania, *National REDD+ Strategy*, xv.
44. United Republic of Tanzania, *Population Census*, iii.
45. Fagerholm, “Community Values and Benefits,” 34.
46. Chachage, “Environment, Aid and Politics,” 150.
47. The most famous was referred to as *Mwinyi Mkuu* (the Great Owner/Lord), who was the ruler of the indigenous Shirazi population of Unguja. See Middleton, “World of Swahili,” 42; Sheriff, “Slaves, Spice and Ivory,” 26; Sheriff and Ferguson, “Zanzibar under Colonial Rule,” 116–17.
48. Chachage, “Environment, Aid, Politics,” 150. The British declared Zanzibar a protectorate in 1890. British influence in Zanzibar was however paramount already in the 1870s. Sheriff and Ferguson, *Zanzibar under Colonial Rule*, 152–3.
49. Nahonyo et al., “Biodiversity Inventory Report,” 42–3.
50. Chachage, “Environment, Aid and Politics,” 150.
51. *Ibid.*, 150.
52. These re-allocations were, however, both highly ‘politicized’ and ‘uneven’, resulting in that a disproportionately large amount of land ended up in the hands of political elites of Post-Revolutionary Zanzibar. See for instance Myers, “Peri-Urban Land Reform,” 274–5.
53. Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar, “Forest Act No.10,” 182–7.
54. See, for instance, Burgess and Clarke, “Coastal Forests Eastern Africa,” 71–3.
55. Department of Forestry and Non Renewable Resources, “The Zanzibar Forest Policy,” 8.
56. For the period between 1996 and 2009, Kukkonen and Käykhö, “Analysis of Forest Changes,” 199. In comparison, HIMA sources operated throughout the course of the project with a

- deforestation rate of 1% per year. See for instance CARE, *HIMA Proposal*, 1; *VCS Project Database*, para 1.
57. Kukkonen and Käykhö, "Analysis of Forest Changes," 199.
 58. Owen, "Tackling the Energy Drivers," 12.
 59. Kukkonen and Käykhö, "Analysis of Forest Changes," 194.
 60. *Ibid.*, 193.
 61. The coral-rag areas are found in the Eastern part of the islands. The land is locally known as *maweni* or *uwanda*. *Maweni* literally means 'in the stones', and constitute rough bushes and soils with coral limestone, while *uwanda* are open areas of bush and grass, typically sued for animal grazing.
 62. Kukkonen and Käykhö, "Analysis of Forest Changes," 199.
 63. *Ibid.*, 199.
 64. Shifting cultivation contributed to 34%, fuelwood gathering 20%, wood gathering for charcoal production 17%, human caused fires 9%, timber (for local consumption) 10%, firewood for lime construction 4% and seaweed stick collection 3%, *HIMA Project Description*, 53.
 65. Interview with forest officer, 11 January 2012, Zanzibar Town.
 66. Department of Forest and Non Renewable Natural Resources, "The Zanzibar Forestry Policy," 7.
 67. However, if fuelwood and what is termed as 'indirect environmental benefits' (such as soil quality improvement, watershed protection, and biodiversity maintenance) are included, forestry has been estimated to account for over 10% of GDP. Department of Forest and Non Renewable Natural Resources, "The Zanzibar Forestry Policy," 7.
 68. See Benjaminsen, "Between Resistance and Consent," 386–7.
 69. See Myers, "Local Communities," 154–8; Saunders, *The Politics of People*, 59–62.
 70. CARE, *HIMA Proposal*, 2.
 71. *Ibid.*
 72. *Ibid.*, 7.
 73. Leach and Scoones, *Carbon Conflicts in Africa*, 32.
 74. Comment made by senior forest officer during a HIMA stakeholder meeting, 21 April 2011, Zanzibar Town.
 75. The argument that rights to resources are 'secure' when it is documented on paper has been heavily criticized in the literature. See for instance Peluso and Lund, "Frontiers of Land Control," 674.
 76. Comment made by a member of a *Shehia* Conservation Committee during a HIMA consultation meeting (REDD Forum) on 1 February 2012, Zanzibar Town.
 77. Comment made during a group interview with members of the Shehia Conservation Committee, which is part of the HIMA project, 4 April 2012, Coastal community, Unguja Island.
 78. Treue et al., "Does Participatory Forest Management," 35.
 79. Cleaver, *Development through Bricolage*, 147–50.
 80. Kaarhus, *Conceiving Environmental Problems*, 324–5. See also Ferguson, *The Anti-Politics-Machine*, 74–88; and Murray Li, *Will to Improve*, 7–10.
 81. Chatterjee, "Development Planning," 51–52 in Kaarhus, *Conceiving Environmental Problems*, 324.
 82. Department of Forestry and Non Renewable Natural Resources, *The Zanzibar Forestry Policy*, 11.
 83. Similar observations were made by Levine, "Staying Afloat," 570–1.
 84. Interview with forest officer, 10 April 2012, Zanzibar Town.
 85. This argument resonates with the Participation in Development literature, see for instance Chambers, *Whose Reality Counts*.
 86. Interview with forest officer, 10 February 2012, Zanzibar Town.
 87. Interview with forest officer, 14 March 2012, Zanzibar Town.
 88. Interview with forest officer, 13 March 2012, Zanzibar Town.

89. In addition, to the confiscation and redistribution of land, an estimated number of 10,000 (mainly individuals with 'Arabic' background) were killed. Thousands also had to flee the country.
90. Interview with forestry official, 11 January 2012, Zanzibar Town.
91. Goffman, *Presentation of Self*.
92. Cleaver, *Development Through Bricolage*, 73.
93. Green, "Globalizing Development in Tanzania," 128.
94. Koch, "Role of Aid Experts," 7
95. Cleaver, "Bricolage, Conflict and Cooperation," 33.
96. Lund et al., "REDD+ as Conservation Fad," 125.
97. Interview with senior forest officer, 11 April 2012, Zanzibar Town.
98. Other activities included supporting tree planting and use of fuel-efficient cook stoves in rural areas.
99. VCS is according to their own website 'the world's leading voluntary greenhouse gas program ... founded by a collection of business and environmental leaders who saw a need for greater quality assurance in voluntary carbon markets'. Verified Carbon Standard, "who we are" (<http://www.v-c-s.org/who-we-are>). Accessed April 21, 2015.
100. See for instance CARE, *Summary of Carbon Feasibility Study*, 3.
101. See for instance Leach and Scoones, *Carbon Conflicts in Africa*, 25–6.
102. Interview with HIMA staff, 21 February 2012, Zanzibar Town.
103. Leach and Scoones, *Carbon Forestry West Africa*, 957.
104. Cleaver, *Development through Bricolage*, 42.

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
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Between Resistance and Consent: Project-Village Relationships When Introducing REDD+ in Zanzibar

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Between Resistance and Consent: Project–Village Relationships When Introducing REDD+ in Zanzibar

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Reductions of Emission from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD) is one example of a globally important environmental intervention implemented throughout the global South. This article investigates the possibilities for rural villagers to influence these interventions, and thus negotiate access to forest resources at the local level. Based on data from ethnographic fieldwork in Zanzibar, the article explores a process where representatives from one village and forest authorities negotiate a Community Forest Management Agreement that will be part of a future REDD scheme in Zanzibar. The article reviews the multiple local responses to this pre-REDD process and discusses factors that contribute to shaping these responses. Local claims about ‘lost land’ and ‘disappearing benefits’ are at the core of what villagers want to see redressed by taking part in the REDD project. But despite the seemingly great local expectations towards the arrival of the project, as well as the project’s self-presentation as participatory, villagers soon realize that their influence on the project is marginal. After attempting to voice their concerns through negotiation, villagers experience that the ahistorical and apolitical approach of the project forces them into more resistance-like behaviour – complicating the distinction between consent and non-consent to the project. Inspired by Foucault’s conception of power and the tensions between different knowledge, logics and practices at project vs. village level, the article seeks to contribute to furthering our theoretical reflections and understanding of ‘project’–‘village’ dynamics in external environmental interventions with a global agenda, where REDD is just one example.

Keywords: project–village relationships; resistance; consent; REDD+; Zanzibar

Introduction

There is an emerging trend of globally important environmental interventions being implemented throughout the global South (Brockington et al., 2008; Hall et al., 2011; West, 2006). The introduction of initiatives framed as international efforts to protect the environment have revealed tensions between the knowledge and assumptions inherent in these interventions and those imbued in local practices and

rationalities. Post-structuralist scholars (e.g. Escobar, 1995; Ferguson, 1994; Scott, 1998) have highlighted how the dynamics and power of external interventions obscure historical and political dimensions of development. More recent scholarly contributions (e.g. Cleaver, 2012; Cooke and Kothari, 2001; Mosse, 2005) also add fuel to the debate about the extent to which rural villagers are in a position to influence external interventions, negotiate access to natural resources and even veto the arrival of such interventions.

During the negotiations of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in Montreal in 2005, the idea of using forest conservation as a tool for mitigating climate change, later known as REDD+,¹ was launched for the first time (Angelsen and McNeill, 2012). The initiative seeks to provide developing countries and local communities with an incentive to protect and regenerate forests through the financial value generated from carbon stored in the forests. A ‘triple-win’ guides the common understanding of REDD+. Firstly, climate change is addressed when forests sequester carbon and reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Secondly, forest biomass and biodiversity are protected and regenerated. Finally, the compensation provided is regarded as a tool for reducing poverty and facilitating development. Norway has emerged as the world’s largest REDD+ country investor, aiming to spend 3 billion NOK annually over a period of 5 years (MoE, 2010). The funding is channelled through various pathways, via multi- and bilateral channels and through civil society organizations.

In Tanzania, the Norwegian ‘International Forest and Climate Initiative’ aims to build institutional commitment for REDD+ at the national level and supports pilot projects to test the effectiveness of REDD+ measures at local levels. With support from the Norwegian Embassy to Tanzania, CARE International² entered in April 2010 into a collaboration with the Department of Forest and Non-Renewable Natural Resources³ in Zanzibar to implement a project called HIMA.⁴ A central element of the HIMA project is the creation of arenas for the management of community forests at the local level. Local conservation committees are (re)established with support from the project in each of the 29 *shehias*,⁵ which are part of the project (CARE, 2009). Moreover, the project ‘facilitates’ the development of a Community Forest

¹The ‘plus’ generally indicates that an initiative goes beyond reducing emissions from deforestation to also include the enhancement of ‘forest carbon stocks . . . in developing countries’ (Angelsen et al., 2012, p. 381). Although the two concepts are used interchangeably in Zanzibar, the HIMA project discussed in this article is referred to as a REDD+ project, as its overall goal is to ‘reduce greenhouse gas emissions from deforestation and degradation in Zanzibar, and generate carbon income which will provide direct and equitable incentives to communities to conserve forests sustainably’ (CARE, 2009, p. 5, emphasis added).

²CARE was selected as the project implementer by the Norwegian Embassy based on a ‘call for proposals’.

³Hereafter referred to as Department of Forestry.

⁴*Hifadhi ya Misitu ya Asili* – ‘conservation of traditional forests’.

⁵The shehia is the smallest administrative unit in Zanzibar.

Management Agreement (CoFMA) between the committee in each *shehia* and the central forest authorities in Zanzibar, as well as the subsequent zoning of land and drawing of borders to determine areas to be set aside for conservation, or restricted use, for the next 30 years. These agreements will then provide the basis for future REDD+ in Zanzibar.

The HIMA project represents one example of an externally conceived, yet locally implemented, intervention constructed as a key element to the solutions of a global environmental problem – climate change. Using the HIMA project as a case, this article explores the introduction of REDD+ in 1 of the 29 *shehias* that is part of the project in Zanzibar. The focus in this article is the on process whereby *shehia* representatives and forest authorities negotiate a CoFMA. With reference to the local histories of interventions in the area, the article provides an analysis of the multiple local responses to the project, as well as of the factors that contribute to shaping these responses. By exploring the different interpretations and responses to former and current interventions, the article seeks to demonstrate how consent and non-consent to the project are not clear-cut, but linked to wider aspects of governance in Zanzibar at large. Such insights are deemed useful for furthering our theoretical understanding of project–village dynamics of external environmental interventions with a global agenda – where REDD+ is just one example.

REDD+ and the study of resistance and consent

REDD+ has recently become a popular topic for research. In their book *Analyzing REDD+*, Angelsen et al. (2012) divide REDD+ research into 3 generations: The first generation deals with *designing* REDD+, drawing on experiences from past research on related topics. In this phase, studies warned against risks and recommended institutional set-ups (e.g. Phelps et al., 2010; Ribot and Larson, 2012; Vatn and Vedeld, 2013). In the second generation of studies, the focus shifted to the *implementation* of REDD+; policy formulations, decision-making processes and the challenges of actual REDD+ designs related to issues of land tenure, participation of various actors and benefit sharing (e.g. Awono et al., 2014; Krause et al., 2013). Finally, the third generation – to which there are still few contributions – focuses on *assessing the impacts* of REDD+: to what extent REDD+ reaches its goals and how REDD+ can be improved. The bulk of findings presented in Angelsen et al. (2012) deals with second-generation research. Tellingly, among these studies, only 1 discusses empirical findings on REDD+ from the perspectives of local villagers. Resosudarmo et al. (2012) present the results of a household survey across nine REDD+ projects in 4 countries. The survey investigates villagers' expectations towards the upcoming REDD+ project in the projects' early stages. Similar to what we will see in this article, villagers' initial hopes and worries relate to the potential future incomes from REDD+, as well as to the possible negative consequences it may have on their livelihoods.

REDD+ has also become a frequent topic within the literature that critically discusses payment for environmental services and the commodification of nature in general (e.g. Corbera, 2012; Peluso, 2012). Since REDD+ is a relatively new phenomenon, the main contribution from this body of research is a theoretical discussion of the *potential* implications of REDD+ at various levels. There are a few in-depth studies on how specific ongoing REDD+ initiatives are viewed and experienced by villagers at the local level (e.g. Beymer-Farris and Bassett, 2012; Milne and Adams, 2012; Yocum, 2013).⁶ Yet, I would argue that the level of understanding of what happens when REDD+ meets the realities on the ground is still weak. With an in-depth analysis of how local villagers meet and experience REDD+ processes, I intend to contribute to filling this gap.

A broad literature addresses the perils of interventions formulated earlier and the relationships between these interventions and the societies in which these are implemented. Several of the contributing scholars have been inspired by Foucault's conception of relational power. According to Foucault, power is an omnipresent, pervasive aspect of social life (Burchell et al., 1991), and can thus be found in a wide range of interventions applied by wide ranges of actors, and in the relationships between these interventions and their actors.

In the course of his career Foucault did, however, leave a room for power being productive, as well as repressive. When faced with domination, individuals may begin 'to formulate their needs and imperatives' (Burchell et al., 1991, p. 5). Although from a different theoretical perspective, McNeish (2002) comes near to this Foucauldian idea in his account of Bolivian peasants' responses to externally introduced local government reforms. McNeish (2002) argues that the imposed international development policies – perceived as a part of an expanding globalization – force peasants to 'think through' their situation and their place in the world. In the reflection process that follows, 'local notions of history, community and politics are recycled, reinvented and given new meanings' (McNeish, 2002, p. 262). Local responses to processes of globalization may thus represent productive responses to power – fostering creativity and processes where community members rediscover and rearticulate their desires and needs.

Scott (1985; 1990) has also written extensively about how villagers are not necessarily passive victims of various externally introduced interventions. Moreover, Kothari (2001, p. 151) stresses that it is possible for individuals or groups to 'choose to opt out of a participatory process completely', although such an act risks inducing social costs. If 'agency' is understood as 'the ability to choose level of enrolment in the project of others' (Cleaver, 2012, p. 119), the question of whether or not it is possible to say no to an external intervention thus becomes a question of the actual *scope for agency*.

⁶There are also some interesting contributions from NGOs; see, for instance, <http://forestpeoples.org/>.

Scholars have also warned against the paternalistic tendencies inherent in interventions claiming to be participatory (see, for instance, Cooke and Kothari, 2001), and how citizens are included in and dominated by the interventions through a process of mobilization from above (see also Agrawal, 2005). A key argument is that the rationality of the intervention and villagers' internalization of certain discourses inherent in the project guide their behaviour and act as a form of social control (Kothari, 2001). Mosse (2010) points to the importance of 'agenda setting power', and demonstrates how local knowledge and interests are defined as 'non-problems' and hence become sidelined by the interventions. Instead of allowing local knowledge and perceptions to meaningfully challenge and influence the intervention, local institutions such as the *shelia* conservation committees risk simply becoming mechanisms for confirming the externally constructed project, or as Spierenburg (2013, p. 121) formulated, an instrument for 'forced consent'.

Free Prior Informed Consent (FPIC) is a procedural concept supported by several international conventions. Although not explicitly mentioned as an obligation in the safeguards of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, obtaining FPIC is a common intension in many REDD+ projects (Howell, 2014; Jagger et al., 2012). In the case of the HIMA project, informed consent is defined as a requirement in the Climate, Community and Biodiversity (CCB) Standards for carbon certification (CCBA, 2013) to which the project has committed itself to. While the notion of consent may be insufficiently analysed and theorized in the literature on development and environmental interventions,⁷ Foucault's ideas about productive and repressive power; the creative forces of 'thinking-through'-processes (McNeish, 2002); as well as the more general literature on resistance and participation might be useful for furthering our understanding of the concepts of consent and non-consent to an intervention.

Abu-Lughod (1990) does, however, remind us that instead of using resistance as a sign of human freedom or as a proof of the ineffectiveness of the systems of power, we should use the studies of everyday resistance to teach us about the historically changing structures and relations of power. When investigating the potential consent and non-consent to an intervention, in this case the HIMA project, it is useful to explore power in both its productive and repressive forms. Such an approach may expand our conception of the range of strategies and structures of power and how people are entangled by them.

Fieldwork and data collection

The empirical data presented and discussed in this article are based on a total of 11 months of fieldwork divided between 2 stays in Zanzibar from September 2011 to January 2013. Data were collected using a combination of different qualitative

⁷For a general theoretical discussion of 'consent', see, for instance, Miller and Wertheimer (2010).

methods; observation at 15 meetings within the *shehia* conservation committee or between the committee and the HIMA project/forest authorities; numerous informal and unstructured interviews (Fontana and Frey, 2000) with various participants before and after these meetings; and observation of their anticipation before meetings, and reactions afterwards. Fluency in colloquial Swahili made this possible. Participant observation, observing what was being done, engaging with women and men in their daily activities and asking people questions and listening to them talking, was useful to see the HIMA project from the perspectives of villagers (Pader, 2006). It also provided a useful contextual basis for the more formal interviews conducted. As Zanzibar is a sex-segregated society where there are different spheres for women and men (Larsen, 2008), it was easier for me to partake in female than in male activities. The topic under study did however also require male informants. Contact with men had a more formal character. But as the fieldwork proceeded, I was able to spend some time in men's spheres. On a total of 6 occasions I joined smaller groups of village men on forest walks. During these trips, they showed me various forested areas and explained their current and past uses. Throughout the fieldwork, I also conducted more than 90 semi-structured interviews (Fontana and Frey, 2000) with informants of different backgrounds – gender, age, livelihood activity as well as their relationship to and familiarity with the project and the forest and forest management in general. About 25 per cent of the semi-structured interviews and discussions at meetings were recorded⁸ and later transcribed. The remaining data were recorded as field notes.

Although I also observed and participated in a number of events organized by the HIMA project in town and elsewhere in Zanzibar, this article focuses on the villagers in 1 *shehia* and their experiences, or rather my interpretation of their statements, perspectives and actions in relation to the arrival of the HIMA project. Ethnographic research of this kind is useful in illuminating differences in discourses, knowledge and practices at the project vs. village level (Escobar, 1997). The in-depth analysis of the processes from the villagers' point of view provides useful insights into critical aspects of the properties inherent in this and similar types of interventions.

Mitini⁹: village, forests and networks

With around 1300 inhabitants, Mitini is a small-medium-sized *shehia* in Zanzibari terms. Although a typical rural village, it is less than 2 hours' drive by local bus from Zanzibar town. Located in the inland region of the island of Unguja, Mitini has historically been an agriculturally rich area. Parts of the land are covered by high-standing natural forests. These areas are today within the borders of a National Park.

⁸After seeking permission from informants/meeting participants.

⁹Mitini literary means 'among the trees'. Due to the sensitivity of the topic discussed, I have decided to use an invented name for the village. For the same reason, the names given to informants in this article are not their real names.

As common in rural Zanzibar, livelihood strategies are highly diversified to minimize risks (Andersson and Ngazi, 1998). However, more than 90 per cent of the population practices cultivation of agricultural crops and livestock rearing (Fagerholm et al., 2012). Poultry rearing, hunting, and small-scale business and trade are also commonly practised. Moreover, a variety of forest products, such as firewood, building materials and medicinal plants, are harvested from forested areas for both subsistence and cash. Statistics indicate that throughout rural Zanzibar, over 90 per cent of the households use firewood for cooking (OCGS, 2010). Disaggregated data for Mitini are not available, but there is no reason to assume that the situation deviates significantly from the average. Interviews and observation in Mitini indicated that firewood (primarily dry wood) is collected on a daily basis, and primarily for household consumption. Charcoal making on the other hand is, despite some exceptions, more common on specific occasions when there is need for extra cash, for instance, before a wedding or religious holidays (*Eid*), or for example, for a 12-year-old boy who is saving for a bicycle to go to school (see also Fagerholm et al., 2012). Finally, some opportunities for formal jobs exist, such as guards in the National Park, labourers at the governmental plantation, watchmen, and school – and Islamic (*madarasa*) – teachers.¹⁰

When I first arrived in Mitini in September 2011, I was quickly made aware of the importance of the forest, and natural resources in general, to the villagers' life. Throughout the fieldwork, informants reminded me about the good condition of the forest: 'Just have a look at the forest and you will see we're not using it recklessly. It's there because we have taken care of it,' a man told me in November 2011. The few villagers who had heard about REDD+ jokingly talked about all the money they would get, and that REDD+ should be limited to their *shehia* only, since after all, they said, they had the largest forest of all in Zanzibar. But as the HIMA project proceeded, concerns about implications of the project's objectives increased. A male member of the *shehia* conservation committee told me in January 2012:

We want to continue protecting parts of the forest, but we also need to have something to use. We have only the forest; we have no sea; no rice fields; no tourism industry. We depend on our forest; for energy; for building and for food. We have no other alternatives.

Mitini, as all other *shehias* in Zanzibar, is headed by a *sheha*, an appointed central government employee (RGZ, 1998). The *sheha* is normally from the Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM) party.¹¹ In addition to the *shehia* council, nominated by the *sheha*, there are specific committees on different sectors – all reporting to the council. The *shehia* conservation committee is one of these. The current conservation committee was elected in

¹⁰The large majority (more than 95 per cent) of the population in *Mitini* are Muslims.

¹¹In July 2010 changes were made in the Zanzibari constitution, which secured power sharing between the two largest parties (CCM and CUF) in government formation. The power sharing at higher levels has not 'trickled down' to lower levels of decision making, however. In Mitini, CCM is still the party associated with the government.

July 2011 by village members, in an election facilitated by the HIMA project. In principle this means that a locally elected organ is reporting to a centrally appointed one. According to the governmental guidelines (MANR, 2011), committee members should be knowledgeable about the forest; honest and trusted by other villagers; represent different social groups (including women and members of poor households); come from different parts of the *shehia* and preferably be literate. Parallel to the *sheha* system, there is the *diwani*, who is elected at the ward level and a member of the district council. In addition, each constituency (*jimbo*) has its elected representatives in the House of Representatives (HoR) – the Zanzibari legislative.

Although not necessarily part of the formal governance system, villagers also frequently refer to the *wakubwa* ('big people', used with reference to 'those who have', including those who have access to decision-making power) as important power-holders. The *wakubwa* influence who gets and who does not. Their role in economic and political differentiation is further underlined by the local notion that one person's gain comes at the expense of others (Cameron, 2004, p. 112). Villagers may thus depend on urban elite for securing their livelihoods and well-being. Although the *wakubwa* control the networks and linkages between the village and beyond, relationships between them and the villagers are not only negative and abusive. With the right connections villagers may get assistance to find a job or support when problems occur. Sustaining relationships to *wakubwa* may provide villagers with access to resources they otherwise would not have had, and may act as a form of insurance in times of need.

A sense of dependence on the forests, and that it exists because villagers themselves have taken care of it, constitutes the central aspects of local experience-based knowledge and discourse in Mitini. Similarly, so does the existence of strong networks and relationships between people residing in Mitini and elsewhere in Zanzibar. But there is yet another critical factor that frames how villagers perceive themselves and their situation – the distinct local conception of lost land.

A history of dispossessions and local conceptions of 'lost land'

Historically, a combination of various processes of land use changes has contributed to the local conception of lost land and the decline in areas available for villagers' use in Mitini. The REDD+ project is the latest in a succession of external interventions introduced in and around Mitini over the past 100 years. To the North of the village, the forested areas in Mitini have been, and still are, parts of the largest natural forest found in Zanzibar (Burgess and Clarke, 2000). Before the beginning of the twentieth century, the forest was community managed and utilized according to customary laws, which were commonly decided upon by village chiefs of the surrounding communities (Pakenham, 1947; Shao, 1992). From around 1920, portions of the forest were sold to residents of Zanzibar Town, who later established a sawmill and introduced commercial logging. In 1948, the British colonial government bought the land

and started an afforestation programme that continued until the 1980s. Despite objections presented by the surrounding villages, the British gazetted a Forest Reserve in 1960. Then, after the Revolution in 1964, and the subsequent nationalization of all land in Zanzibar (RGZ, 1964),¹² the Forest Reserve was expanded first in 1965 and then again in 1982 (Finnie, 2003).

In 1984, a plantation of mainly acacia was established within the borders of the *shehia* of Mitini. The governmental plantation was part of the Zanzibar Forestry Development Project supported by the Finnish government (1980–1997). In a critical analysis of the Finnish aid in Zanzibar, Chachage (2000) argues that as the areas had previously been occupied by poor peasants, they ‘were being alienated by the project’ (Chachage, 2000, p. 181). People from the local communities protested and in September 1986, the plantation was set on fire (Chachage, 2000). In an interview with a group of elderly men in December 2012, the following story was presented:

One day a European lady arrived. She asked why we did not plant trees in there (i.e. the areas where the plantation is today). We cultivate food, we said. Oh, but this place is good for eucalyptus, she responded. Less than 3 days later we saw cars with acacia, eucalyptus etc. We were forced out of the area. Until today there are people who don’t have areas for cultivation. They are left to stagger (‘wanayumba tu’).

Although the plantation was established on former village commons, some villagers did take part in tree planting based on what I was told were promises of shares in future plantation revenues. Planting of the priority wood-producing species in the governmental plantation was also encouraged by distribution of citrus seedlings (for ‘private purposes’) to those villagers who participated in the planting (Chachage, 2000). When telling their story, villagers expressed disappointment that plantation wood to a large extent is – and has been – sold off in larger quanta to entrepreneurs from town and no revenue remains with, or entitlement to wood products is secured for, local residents.

After the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development of 1992, there was a global shift in focus from commercial wood production to conservation. This shift was also felt in Zanzibar where the political and economic liberalization process of the 1980s opened up for increased influence from multilateral and non-governmental agencies (Levine, 2007). A ‘conservation-orientation’ of the emerging tourism industry also contributed to this shift (Saunders, 2011). In interviews government officials also argued that the increased focus on conservation was as a result of the Tanzanian government’s commitments to international environmental conventions.

¹²Since the revolution, all land in Zanzibar is in principle the property of the state. The Forest Management and Conservation Act of 1996 provides, however, a legal scope for the Department of Forestry to enter into Community Forest Management Agreements (CoFMAs), which provides local communities with ‘a means to plan, manage and benefit from local forest resources’ (RGZ, 1996, p. 182). The Act also provides the *Shehia* Conservation Committee and the CoFMA.

As a first step, a ban imposed in 1992 stopped commercial logging, previously done by the government, and the removal of fallen trees (Nahonyo et al., 2002). Then, with funding from the Austrian Government, the Forest Reserve was upgraded to a Conservation Area in 1995. The Commission for Natural Resources¹³ and CARE International in Tanzania jointly implemented the project. In line with another global shift towards devolution of rights and responsibilities in forest management to local levels (e.g. Charnley and Poe, 2007), changes were made in the Zanzibar legislation in 1996. The new Forest Management and Conservation Act (RGZ, 1996) formally recognized villagers as managers of areas designated as ‘community forests’ (*misitu ya jamii*). In the Mitini area, the first generation of *shehia* conservation committees was established to manage the buffer zone around the Conservation Area (Finnie, 2003) – demarcated as community forest.

In 2004, the Conservation Area was officially converted into a National Park and expanded to also incorporate the community-managed buffer zone.¹⁴ While the Conservation Area arrangement guaranteed some village involvement in decision-making, as well as user rights in the buffer zones, the National Park did not. The establishment of the Park was perceived by many in Mitini as a violation of the earlier negotiated agreement. Villagers tried to ensure that some sections of the forested areas in Mitini were exempted from the Park. But instead, agricultural land was put under conservation without compensation to its former users (similar findings have been observed by Salum, 2009). As a result, several members of the conservation committee in Mitini withdrew. Those remaining formed the leadership of a second-generation conservation committee.

Since the initiation of the Conservation Area in 1995, CARE advocated for the establishment of a Community Development Fund based on revenues from tourism activities in the forest. In 2001 the government agreed to share parts (22.4 per cent¹⁵) of the revenues with the nine villages bordering the then Conservation Area. In Mitini, the leadership of the second conservation committee is, however, accused (by other villagers) of monopolizing both decision-making and the funds meant for local development purposes. ‘Wanakula wakubwa tu’ (the wakubwa are eating alone) was a common expression of what had happened, also indicating that villagers also can play the role as *wakubwa* – given that they have access to decision-making power and resources. Such stories about elite capture (Cooke and Kothari, 2001; Lund and Saito-Jensen, 2013), where certain individuals dominate committees and control revenues, are frequent and have become an issue full of controversies and

¹³More particularly the Sub-Commission for Forestry, which preceded first the Department of Commercial Crops, Fruits and Forestry (DFCCFF) and then later the Department of Forestry and Non-Renewable Natural Resources.

¹⁴The area under conservation increased from 2512 to 5000 ha, also including forests in neighbouring villages.

¹⁵Various sources give various percentages here, since it refers to the portion of the funds that remain with the Park after the central government has deducted their share.

diverging claims in Mitini. All the aforementioned have contributed to the existing perception among villagers that the governmental plantation and previous external conservation interventions have failed. Even more importantly, these interventions have contributed to increasingly constraining the area available for villagers' use.

Another contentious issue is the transfer of 'community land' into private hands. Although all land in Zanzibar officially is public, the Land Tenure Act of 1992 states that individuals and groups can achieve Right of Occupancy (RGZ, 1992). According to senior government officials, such 'occupancy', including rights to transfer user rights to others, may be achieved 5 years after planting of permanent crops. Similarly, land left unattended can be regarded as abandoned. What seems to have happened in Mitini is that through clearing and planting of new trees, community areas (*maeneo ya jamii*) have in the course of only a few years been converted into private land (*mashamba binafsi*). Sale of land is, however, often condemned by villages. But with support from the 'right' people (i.e. *wakubwa*), one is less likely to be subjected to open objections from fellow villagers. No villagers admitted to having sold land, but I was often told so by others – neighbours and dissatisfied family members. I also talked to buyers, who are normally wealthier people from town.

The establishment of the governmental plantation and conservation projects, and the conversion of land into private hands have contributed to the distinct local conception of 'lost community land'. In villagers' stories of what has happened, leaders are accused of not stopping the irregular sale of land, and instead of using the situation to position themselves, to build network and political support from the *wakubwa*. Claims about 'disappearing benefits' and 'elite capture', as well as the emerging realization that no land within the *shehia* border can be classified as 'community forest' and is thus not suitable for a CoFMA, were at the core of what the *shehia* conservation committee in Mitini wanted to see redressed by taking part in the REDD+ project.

Local responses to the HIMA project

We'll tell them everything. We'll tell them the truth. This is our chance to share our story with them. We'll not be afraid. They will have to listen and they will understand. Finally, we'll get a solution to our problems.

It was November 2011 and a group of women and men was seated in the shadow of a large mango tree. As members of the newly elected *shehia* conservation committee in Mitini, they were discussing the arrival of the HIMA project. A few days earlier the HIMA project team, consisting of representatives from CARE and the Department of Forestry, had passed by to inform that they would return one of the following weeks to discuss the development of a CoFMA. The HIMA team had requested a tour in the forested areas of the *shehia* and thereafter, in a 'participatory' manner, to develop the agreement with the committee. The exercise would take 3 days and the agreement signed would last for 30 years.

Attempting negotiation

In Mitini, committee members interpreted the invitation as a chance to redress existing problems by renegotiating access to and control over natural resources currently under the authority of the government (i.e. National Park and governmental plantation). They anticipated a negotiation process where the outcome was not yet set, and where their contributions as citizens would significantly affect decisions made. In January 2012, the HIMA project team returned to Mitini. They were taken for a forest walk. The committee members explained their situation. They talked about ‘the loss of the community forest’; their disappointment with ‘disappearing benefits’; ‘broken promises’ of earlier interventions and that local leaders have closed their eyes to all of the aforementioned.

Ostensibly surprised by the issues raised, the project team shook their heads and expressed their sympathy with the situation. But they reminded about the agenda, to revise and improve the existing CoFMA. They expected that through participating in the demarcation of areas for conservation, the *shehia* conservation committee would provide its consent to REDD+. The project team informed villagers that their claims to land within *shehia* borders were ‘outside the scope of the project’. Problems of disappearing benefits and elite capture were dismissed as ‘internal village issues’ and ‘beyond the mandate of the project’. At project inception, the conservation committee expected that the project’s participatory approach would provide an opportunity to share their concerns about ‘the lost land’ with government officers. But despite the project’s focus on local institutions and participation, the role of the *shehia* conservation committee and its members proved to be ambiguously constructed from project initiation. The ‘agenda setting power’ (Mosse, 2010) is with the HIMA project. Committee members trying to claim a negotiator role become unpredictable variables that the project is not prepared to handle. Their concerns become excluded from the project agenda. Hence, despite the HIMA project’s self-representation as participatory, the committee in Mitini seemed to have been invited into a process that in principle already had been planned and decided upon.

Attempting to ‘jump scale’

In Mitini, the differences in agenda and the inability of the project to address villagers’ real concerns triggered the conservation committee to change their strategy. They looked for other ways of influencing the project, and turned to the law and formal channels for influence. Already after one of the first meetings with the project, 2 members went to town to meet with a lawyer. The lawyer was a relative of someone in the village, but the outcome from the meeting was ‘scarce’. Igoe (2003, p. 879) recounts a case where pastoral groups try to reclaim traditional grazing land in Tanzania. Several judges refused to proceed with the case. One argued that it was ‘too politically difficult’. Similarly, in Zanzibar, I was told by various informants at higher levels that for a government official to try to ‘rectify the wrongs’ made in Mitini, s/he must be willing to put

her/his career on the line to do so. By addressing the case, one may trigger an argument that no one wants to be a part of. Instead the case is left to linger.

Holmes (2013) argues that communities around protected areas seldom succeed to 'jump scale' to influence higher levels for decision-making on policies relevant to them. Villagers in Mitini have, however, experienced that sometimes it is possible to jump scale: Moreover, before the national election in 2010 they managed with the support of their representative in the House of Representatives (HoR) to convince the Department of Forestry to 'release' some areas from the National Park for agricultural purposes. Alliances with people at higher levels might provide communities with crucial political support and help to frame their case in a politically legitimate way (Cavanagh and Benjaminsen, submitted). Informants at various levels in Zanzibar stressed that the release of agricultural land in Mitini would not have happened without the support of the HoR member. Neither would he support the case if he was not afraid to lose votes in the upcoming election. This again demonstrates the importance of networks and of maintaining relations with people with power, that is, in Zanzibar – the *wakubwa*.

In February 2012, when the process to develop a CoFMA in Mitini stagnated, the national elections were still three and a half years ahead. Villages concluded that contacting their representative in the HoR was not worth it. The *diwani* did, however, help to formulate letters with suggestions for land use, which were handed over to the Department of Forestry. To each letter, the HIMA team responded by proposing draft agreements. After the second draft was discussed, the conservation committee in Mitini asked for a meeting with the Director for Forestry. Although the Director of Forestry expressed understanding of their situation, the meeting led to little but a new training on 'conservation' for the committee. Thereafter, there was silence.

Using the 'weapons of the weak'

In his famous book, Scott writes that 'peasants' rarely have the resources to resist openly, and as we see in Mitini to influence policy decisions made at higher levels (Scott, 1985). As a consequence, various forms of covert strategies to resist may emerge. These strategies are undertaken to influence project progress and outcomes, and are often undertaken in parallel to more formal forms for resistance. Covert strategies may be subtle and disorganized (Holmes, 2007), but still have high symbolic value. In Mitini, there are people who repeatedly remove beacons marking the borders of the National Park. Fire is also a relatively frequent incident within the National Park. I never witnessed fires myself, but I was informed about incidents several times during my stay, both from villagers and staff of CARE and the Department of Forestry. Fire is common as a means of resistance within protected areas (Holmes, 2007). One reason is that it is usually hard to trace its origin. Fire may be natural and may come from lightning or from legal activities such as bee keeping or shifting cultivation. In this way fire may easily 'be disguised as a legal fire that got out of control' (Holmes, 2007, p. 195). A comment made by one informant during

an interview in January 2012 might explain some of the incidents of fire in Mitini: ‘If people don’t understand [i.e. the legitimacy of conservation rules/the National Park], it will have no force, and you will see fires every day.’

Villagers are also practising livelihood activities in some of the restricted areas. Firewood collection (especially dry wood), hunting, cattle grazing in the governmental plantation and some agricultural activities are still going on despite regulations. ‘When there is no other option, we have to do it illegally,’ a villager explained in an interview. The continuation of illegal activities may, however, be more than just lack of other options to secure one’s livelihoods. Such resistance may be accompanied by a discourse contesting the legitimacy of the rules (Haaland, 2008). Apart from communicating their story to the project team and beyond, villagers’ willingness and sometimes eagerness to talk and to share their version of the story with me (knowing that I would write about ‘their case’ later) may also be interpreted as an attempt at ‘covert resistance’ against the government.

Diverging positions in the local responses

When I returned to Mitini towards the end of 2012 – about a year after the first meeting – some members of the *shehia* conservation committee were concerned about the consequences of not coming to an agreement with the Department of Forestry. Without an agreement, the government could do whatever they want, since the land then legally would be government property. There were also rumours that the HIMA project was planning to distribute ‘trial carbon funds’,¹⁶ and that only *shehias* that had signed a CoFMA would receive such funds. This further enhanced the already emerging diverging positions within the conservation committee in Mitini. A fraction of the conservation committee decided to send a letter with suggestions for a new agreement to the Department of Forestry.

Ame is one of the letter-writers. He is member of several committees in the village. Although as concerned as other committee members about the ‘lost land’, he has since the start of the project argued for a non-confrontational line towards the government. The conflict made *Ame* uncomfortable. Several times when discussions in meetings with the project became confronting, he left in silence. As the process to develop the agreement proceeded and the conflict escalated, project representatives ended up contacting *Ame* instead of the leadership of the conservation committee when they needed to communicate something to the committee. ‘*Ame* is reasonable and cooperative,’ they explained to me. Other villagers accused *Ame* of being too concerned about securing his own position in ‘the party’. Having political ambitions within the CCM-party, *Ame* was afraid to be seen as uncooperative by potential government allies. Having relationships he needed to preserve made him more careful. Cooperation in the project was thus not

¹⁶CARE staff informed me that these funds were supposed to test the channels for distribution and benefit-sharing of future carbon revenues.

only about forest management per se, but it was also about forging and maintaining certain social and political relationships beyond the *shehia*, hence ensuring a certain positioning in ‘everyday life’.

Bahati is one of the most active female members of the conservation committee. Economically, she is in a tough situation. Before the arrival of the HIMA project she had little experience with ‘local governance activities’. The ‘gender focus’ of the project implied, however, a need for female candidates for the committee. *Bahati* was nominated by other villagers. ‘People like me, I know how to live with people, I am not causing any disputes,’ she explained. For the first time she experienced that a project brought some opportunities. She had the possibilities of getting per diems when attending meetings. Although not much, it was valuable money, as she had few alternatives to access cash. As a member of the conservation committee, she extended her network, knowledge and status in the village. These were privileges she risked losing if she continued to oppose the project. In her situation, lack of opportunities seemed natural and inevitable. Hence, for her the project was something positive, even though it might not bring the benefits she first anticipated. ‘It is better than nothing,’ she said. Together with *Ame*, *Bahati* was one of the initiators when the letter to the Department of Forestry was sent.

A few members of the conservation committee did, however, maintain that they would not sign any agreement without considerable changes in the current restrictions to use the forest. After the majority of the committee members had taken the step to send the letter to the Department of Forestry in January 2013,¹⁷ the more resistant committee members organized a village meeting. ‘We are selling our village for Tsh 5 million.’¹⁸ It is a trap,’ one of them told me after the meeting.

The continued resistance against signing an agreement did, however, have its price. *Khamis* is one of the most resistant individuals in Mitini. Previously, fellow committee members have referred to him as ‘knowledgeable about the forest’, ‘honest (when his criticism had been particularly harsh against the Department of Forestry)’ and ‘with high moral standards’. Later he ‘has not been to school’, ‘does not understand’ and ‘has become embittered after many years of disappointment’. Fewer committee members supported him at meetings.

The tone of the characterization of the more resistant committee members was even tougher among representatives of the forest authorities. ‘They are crooks just after own profit from forest destruction,’ one officer told me. I was informed that *Khamis* supports the political party – Civic Union Front (CUF), which has been the main opposition party since the reintroduction of the multiparty system in 1993.¹⁹ There were also

¹⁷Representatives from the Department of Forestry later told me that the letter never had reached the Director or other senior officials in the department.

¹⁸Equivalent to approximately USD 3000, which was the amount Mitini expected to receive from the REDD project as ‘trial carbon funds’.

¹⁹See footnote 8.

rumours that *Khamis* was affiliated with *Uamsho*, a group of Muslim *sheikhs* propagating full autonomy of Zanzibar within the Union of Tanzania.²⁰ *Khamis* dismissed the accusations as only attempts to discourage him. Others held that his resistance-behaviour was just ‘not the way we do it on Zanzibar’. For instance, a forest officer explained to me: ‘It is not normal that villagers oppose. They are supposed to respect governmental officials. In Mitini, it is like they are giving us an exam.’ *Khamis* ended up becoming increasingly isolated from the rest of the conservation committee. He was excluded from the flow of information about the project; he stopped showing up at committee meetings and finally aborted his overt attempts to oppose the project. But he maintained that he has good relationships with fellow villagers in other aspects of life; relationships which he intends to keep.

Analysing project–village relationships

The history of interventions in Mitini, and villagers’ experiences of how benefits are distributed, including the role of the *wakubwa*, provides the basis for how villagers regard their own options when responding to the HIMA project. With a marginal scope to influence the project agenda, villagers use various strategies to resist; not only in order to access restricted forest resources, but also to challenge what they experience as asymmetric power relations between themselves and the project. The fact that the project ignores, or is unable to address, the concerns raised by the villagers complicates the distinction between villagers’ consent vs. non-consent to the agreement that is being developed. In line with Abu-Lughod (1990), we see that responses to the HIMA project are framed by structural – both historical and political – inequalities.

Cleaver (2012) notes that both conflict avoidance and demands about the right ways of doing things are deeply embedded in our rationality and morality. In Zanzibar, concepts such as *kuvumulia* (to tolerate hardship) and *kustahamili* (to be patient) are considered cultural norms and ideals. It is perceived as a ‘character flaw’ not to be able to bring things up in privacy under 4 eyes, to reach a solution and thus prevent a confrontation. Such emic notions give virtue to the ability of living peacefully with others. With the value placed on concealment and the ability to conform in the Zanzibari society, as well as how the threat of *uchavi* (witchcraft) and *uganga* (sorcery) – if someone is provoked – may have disciplinary effects on the behaviour of women and men (Larsen, 2008, pp. 50–52), it is not hard to imagine why continued resistance is felt risky by many committee members in Mitini. For *Bahati*, dependence on the goodwill of others (i.e. *wakubwa*) for her livelihoods, and for *Ame*, the concerns related to maintaining relations with the right people for his future political career constitute important considerations. For them, continued opposition to the project thus seems irrational

²⁰The group has organized demonstrations and petitions against the union. They have achieved not only considerable support from many Zanzibaris, but also accusations of wanting to make Zanzibar into a Sharia state, and are thus described by some as ‘extremists’ and ‘troublemakers’.

(Cleaver, 2004). Cultural norms, existing forms of governance and overall political realities (including local–central relations and a historically stark party–political divide), in combination with individual interests, thus contribute to shaping responses. Together these insights represent knowledge and discourses influencing the positions of *Ame* and *Bahati*, which again make them adhere to the expectations of the project.

Foucault's notion of power provides an entry point into understanding how certain interventions produce subjects and citizens – not only by repression and control, but also by productive forms of power. For *Khamis*, the introduction of the HIMA project becomes a reminder of the failed history of earlier interventions, and hence triggers a 'thinking-through' process (McNeish, 2002) about injustices inherent in the broken promises, the exclusions and dispossessions that he claims to have been subjected to. Thus, for *Khamis* the opposition is not only about access to forest resources, but also a matter of justice, sovereignty and citizen–state relationships in general.

Cameron (2004) stresses the significance of party–state networks and patron–client relationships for rural livelihoods in Zanzibar. He claims that social categories such as class, gender, ethnic or racial division are secondary to the 'contradiction between state and society, as well as to that between the two main political parties nationally' (Cameron, 2004, p. 112). Resistance is often associated with oppositional identities (Hoffman, 1999). Therefore, for someone who already finds himself outside the networks of the political elite, it might be less risky for *Khamis* to oppose the project – in comparison to *Ame*. Although *Khamis* initially seems to be less concerned about 'the right way of doing things', the social risks involved in continued opposition eventually also constrain him. Yet, *Khamis* does seem to abort his resistance-behaviour only when these have negative implications for his relationship with fellow villagers.

What appears to be a final consent to the establishment of a CoFMA may indicate that external interventions, such as the HIMA project in Zanzibar, leave little room for social agency. Consensus is however a matter of degree. It may be forced, and it may be manufactured. Through hidden transcripts (Scott, 1990), an illusion of consent may be produced where subordinate groups create a space for resistance. In such situations, resistance is still present, but it is offstage and outside the vicinity of power-holders (Scott, 1990). Hence, even if an agreement is signed, there is no guarantee that the covert resistance will cease. With no viable alternatives available, villagers are likely to continue to claim land in the future, and with the right timing and support of *wakubwa*, they may end up succeeding – at least temporarily. Villagers might also continue using forest resources despite governmental restrictions.

The HIMA project in Zanzibar emphasizes the importance of 'the community'. The notion of 'communities' as 'homogenous and naturally recurring entities' (Milne and Adams, 2012, p. 144) has showed persistence in development planning in the global South (e.g. Blaikie, 2006; Charnley and Poe, 2007; Li, 2002). Yet, such a conceptualization of the local dynamics obscures the micro-politics at the local level, and moreover the distinction between 'villagers' and 'the project' as well as between 'locals'

and ‘outsiders’. In terms of REDD+, such a simplistic and idealized notion of ‘community’ comes with an assumption of ‘communities’ as uniform ‘rational’ economic decision-makers (Milne and Adams, 2012, p. 147), which as such can enter into legally binding contracts on sale of carbon and the future use of village land (Milne and Adams, 2012; Yocum, 2013). It may hence be pertinent to question whether it makes sense to expect a ‘community’ to provide consent or non-consent to an external intervention. Firstly, power inequalities between the ‘village’ and the ‘project’ provide obstacles to social agency and make it difficult for villagers to exercise an active citizen role. Secondly, since community borders ‘are not conterminous’ (Clever, 2012, p. 7), places need to be conceptualized as relational and ‘networked communities’ (Mohan and Stokke, 2007, p. 25) with high degrees of diversity and complex identities.

In this article I have demonstrated how local responses to interventions do not happen in a vacuum, but rather are conditioned and affected by structural and historical relations and experiences; former exclusions and dispossessions and the fear of new ones. I have presented an in-depth analysis of villagers’ responses, experiences and perceptions of the process to prepare the agreement that is meant to provide the future foundation for REDD+ in a village in Zanzibar. Villagers’ responses to the project varied over time, ranging from attempts at negotiation to various types of resistance, from collective action to more fractioned strategies. With its ahistorical and apolitical approach, the HIMA project risks consolidating existing alliances between local political elite and the central government, as well as the domination and control of certain groups in local decision-making. Without due consideration of the interconnections and power alliances between various actors within and beyond the local level, as to the historic and social processes producing and reproducing asymmetric power relations within project–village relationships, interventions seeking local consent may in fact end up being disempowering for villagers involved (Milne and Adams, 2012). I would, therefore, argue that the case discussed in this article has both theoretical *and* policy-related implications for how we should understand project–village relations, in particular how we handle taken-for-grantedness, rationalities and logics of external interventions with a global agenda.

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PAPER IV

Access to land and forest resources in a REDD+ context in Zanzibar

(Draft paper)

Grete Benjaminsen

Abstract

Scholarly debates have over the past decades revealed a growing awareness about the limitations of development efforts that seek to formalise tenure rights. Despite these efforts' often 'pro-poor' ambitions, scholars warn against elite capture - in which privileged groups take advantage of formal rights to land and natural resources at the expense of more marginal groups, thus cementing, rather than eliminating, existing inequalities and injustices in access to resources. It is further argued that, rather than being set by formal rules, in practice, access to resources is to a large extent determined by social relations and the abilities of individuals and groups to invest in networks and alliances with those in control of the resource. Although elite capture of tenure rights has been well documented in scholarly literature about formalisation of tenure rights in an African context, it has received little attention in debates about initiatives that seek to formalize carbon rights, including the implementation of REDD+ projects. Drawing on Ribot and Peluso's (2003) 'theory of access', this paper explores the rights-based and structural and relational mechanisms governing access, use, and management of land and forest resources in Zanzibar. Through an empirical account, the paper shows how a combination of such mechanisms shapes the ways local community members in rural Zanzibar are enabled to - and constrained from - benefitting from land and forest resources. I show how some groups of individuals - through investment in relationships with people of power - are able to benefit from land and forest resources, regardless of whether they have a legal right to do so, while others are not. With reference to the recent HIMA/REDD+ project in Zanzibar, the paper seeks to give further nuance to the debate about formalization of tenure rights, and carbon rights in particular, in REDD+ in an African context.

Introduction

Over the past ten years, the African continent has witnessed an influx of forest carbon projects seeking to reduce CO₂ emissions through the sequestration and storage of carbon in forest biomass (see e.g. Leach and Scoones, 2015). These projects - promoted under the climate mitigation mechanism known as Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+) - aim to provide governments and local communities with an economic incentive to protect and regenerate forests. These incentives will, however, only work as long as the legal and material boundaries defining the forests where carbon is sequestered and stored are clear (see e.g. Cotula and Mayers, 2009; Larson et al, 2013; Sunderlin et al, 2014). Moreover, the carbon must be 'owned' (see e.g. Kosoy and Corbera, 2010), i.e. carbon right holders must be assigned (see also Benjaminsen and Kaarhus, 2018). Without formal clarification and recognition, carbon

service providers will not be able to exclude others from using the resource, cannot be kept accountable for resource management, and thus cannot be paid (Wunder, 2013: 234; see also Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005). Similar assumptions underlie the broader neoliberal discourses that in recent decades have dominated debates on African land management (see e.g. Sjaastad and Cousins, 2008; Peluso and Lund, 2011). In these discourses, the formalization of clearly defined tenure rights is commonly portrayed as the precondition for efficient land markets, sustainable land management, and environmental justice, as well as for poverty reduction (see e.g. de Soto, 2000; Deininger, 2003).

Scholarly debates over the past 30 years have increasingly revealed a growing awareness of the limitations of tenure rights formalization efforts. Numerous scholars have pointed to the problematic aspects of such processes. Among these is the risk that formalized tenure may increase elite capture, and instigate processes whereby privileged groups take advantage of formal rights at the expense of more marginal groups (see e.g. Benjaminsen et al, 2004). It is argued that this, again, may cement - rather than eliminate - existing inequalities and injustices in access and benefits to resources (see also Sjaastad and Cousins, 2008). Furthermore, initiatives aiming to formalize tenure seem to build on an assumption of property rights as 'systems of rules that determine behavior' (ibid: 6). But, according to Sjaastad and Cousins (2008: 7, see also Falk Moore, 1975), formal rules should only be conceived of as 'an unreliable guide' to how a tenure system actually functions. In practice, access to relationships with people in power are often more important in determining the extent to which individuals' and groups' are able to benefit from a resource (Ribot and Peluso, 2003). Although this awareness is firmly established in scholarly literature (see also Berry, 1993; Peters, 2004; Peters, 2013), it is only to a limited degree reflected in scholarly debates about carbon rights and REDD+.¹ The challenges associated with securing and formalizing tenure rights in REDD+ project implementation has accordingly not been a major topic of discussion. With this paper, I seek to address some of these challenges.

The REDD+ project that was implemented in Zanzibar under the name of HIMA provides material for this discussion.² In the HIMA project proposal (CARE, 2009: 2), 'insecure forest

¹ Some exceptions exist, for example Corbera and Brown, 2010; Howson and Kindon, 2015; Chomba et al, 2016.

² The full project name in Swahili was *Hifadhi wa Misitu ya Asili* (conservation of traditional forests). The project was implemented by CARE Tanzania in partnership with the Department of Forestry on Zanzibar during the period from

land tenure' was explicitly identified as an obstacle to sustainable forest management in Zanzibar. Project proponents also argued for the formalization of rights to community forest areas as a means to ensure the rights of local communities to future carbon payments. Based on ethnographic fieldwork in one of the local communities that was invited to join the HIMA project, this paper explores the different mechanisms through which women and men in Zanzibar gain and maintain access to - and benefits from - land and forest resources. Drawing on Ribot and Peluso's (2003) 'theory of access', I address both the 'right-based' - and 'structural and relational mechanisms' that govern resource access, use and management in rural Zanzibar. Through an empirically grounded investigation of how these mechanisms shape the ways local community members are enabled to - and constrained from - benefitting from land and forest resources, the paper seeks to provide further nuances into the debate about formalization of tenure rights, and in particular carbon rights, in REDD+ in an African context.

In the following section, I begin by explaining the theoretical frameworks that have inspired the discussion of land and forest resource access in Zanzibar, including the discussion of different groups and individuals' ability to benefit from such access. After a brief outline of how the empirical material discussed was collected, I present the main features of the shifting and largely overlapping land tenure systems in Zanzibar: First, I discuss the customary systems and conventions, and thereafter introduce key post-colonial efforts to formalise tenure rights. I proceed by providing examples of how women and men in rural Zanzibar access land and forest resources, then conclude by discussing the implications this might have on HIMA's goal of ensuring that carbon benefits end up in the hands of women and men in local, rural communities across Zanzibar.

'Access' as an analytic focus when discussing land and forest resources

'Formalization of tenure' refers to processes through which specific natural resource regimes are recognized by the state (see e.g. Hirons et al, 2018). Arguments for formalization of land and natural resource tenure have commonly been associated with the so-called Property Rights School (see e.g. Bromley, 1989), in which the provision of title deeds as legal proof of property ownership is taken as an unchallenged implication (see also Sjaastad and Cousins, 2008). However, in their

influential contribution on the theory of access to natural resources, Ribot and Peluso (2003) warn against confusing 'property' with 'access'. While property refers to 'the rights to benefit from things' (ibid: 154), access is understood as 'the ability to derive benefits from things' (Ribot and Peluso, 2003: 153). The key distinction between rights and ability is that while rights present the prescriptive side, ability presents the descriptive (see also Ribot, 1998). The case presented in this paper provides insights into how and why some individuals and groups are able to benefit from land and forest resources regardless of 'whether or not they have rights to them' (Ribot and Peluso, 2003: 154, see also Ribot, 1998), while other individuals or groups do not. While the paper does not deal with the broader formalization debate as a whole, it uses 'access' to discuss 'securing tenure' in a REDD+ context in Zanzibar.

Ribot and Peluso (2003) further distinguish between *right-based mechanisms* and *structural and relational mechanisms* of access. Right-based mechanisms of access include *law-based* property rights attributed by formal law. Enforcement of a law-based claim implies the involvement of the state or government to enforce the claim (ibid: 162). It typically includes all land that is the property of the government, and property that has been gained through titles and deeds, permits and licenses. Right-based mechanisms of access may also be based on *customs* or *conventions*. For this type of access, social acceptance is key. In addition, we may find a range of extra-legal and often illegal mechanisms of access to land. Illegal mechanisms of access may imply 'the enjoyment of benefits from things in ways that are not socially sanctioned' either by the state or by the society (Ribot and Peluso, 2003: 164). These typically include various forms of corruption, as well as collusion with those controlling access through whom impunity may be gained.

Structural and relational mechanisms of access may work alongside - and may reinforce - right-based mechanisms (Ribot and Peluso, 2003: 160). In non-formalized settings, *social identity* or membership in a community or group is fundamental to being included or excluded from access to a resource (ibid: 170-171). *Labor relations* are also important. Access to resources may be gained by offering one's labor, or by engaging others to exploit the resource in exchange for payment or compensation (Ribot and Peluso, 2003: 167). Access to resources is also gained and maintained through *other types of social relations*, such as reciprocity, dependence and obligation (ibid: 172). In terms of the latter, Ribot and Peluso (2003) draw on Sara Berry (1993),

and her emphasis on the importance of investing in social relations as a means to gain access to different types of benefits. Studying African agrarian change, Berry contends that access to land is negotiable, negotiated, and subject to constant reinterpretation (Berry, 1993). More recent literature has, however, challenged Berry's notion of African land holdings and use as inherently flexible and negotiable. Peters (2004; 2013) points to the ways in which the pervasive pressure on land across the African continent has led to mounting competition and social divisions between - and within - various social groups. In this context, certain influential individuals and groups with access to resources and the right connections (to both national and international elites) have succeeded in their claims to land. Others - less privileged, and less connected, individuals - are, on the other hand, facing increased exclusion (Peters, 2013). With attention to the broader historical and political context of Zanzibar, this article examines the various mechanisms of access at play, and moreover who may lose and who may benefit from initiatives - such as the HIMA/REDD+ Project - that aim to 'limit or end negotiability and flexibility' (Peters, 2004: 270) through formal recognition of local communities as right holders of Zanzibari 'carbon'.

The ethnographic material on which this paper is based was collected over one year of fieldwork in Zanzibar.³ The fieldwork was conducted at two levels: At HIMA project level among project staff and policy-makers in Zanzibar Town, and in Mitini,⁴ one of the local communities that was invited to join the HIMA project. This paper focuses on ethnographic material collected in Mitini through a combination of various qualitative methods. I engaged in participant observation in daily life (see e.g. Pader, 2006; Olivier de Sardan, 2015) and conducted a large number of ethnographic interviews (see e.g. Kaarhus, 2017) with women and men in Mitini. Fluency in colloquial Swahili made spontaneous interaction possible. I also conducted formal, semi-structured interviews (see e.g. Descombe, 2007) with about 40 women and men of different backgrounds in Mitini, as well as group interviews (see e.g. Fontana and Frey, 2000) with elderly women and men. The focus of the group interviews was on recalling past events related to land and forest management. On six occasions, I joined small groups of local men on trips to the

³ Fieldwork was undertaken in the following periods: September 2011- May 2012; December 2012 – January 2013 and March –April 2013.

⁴ Since this paper is part of a PhD thesis, partly dealing with sensitive issues, I have after consulting with key informants decided to anonymize the local community studied. Thus, Mitini is not the community's real name. Neither are the names of individuals.

forests around Mitini. During these trips, I acquired knowledge about the areas within the *shehia*⁵ borders, and their vegetation, use and management. In my account, I also draw on in-depth knowledge about the Zanzibari society gained from about two decades of regular visits to Zanzibar - from 1997, when I conducted my first fieldwork, until today.

Customary and conventional practices for land management in Zanzibar

Zanzibar is commonly divided into two agro-ecological zones: the *plantation areas* to the West and centre of the two main islands, Unguja and Pemba, and the so-called *coral-rag areas* along the Eastern shores (e.g. McGeagh and Addis, 1934; Krain et al, 1993).⁶ The term *plantation area* can be traced back to the turn of the 17th century when the Sultan of Oman seized control of Zanzibar, and established it as a major regional trading centre based on a plantation economy (see Sheriff, 1987; Sheriff, 1991). A highly labour intensive plantation system came to dominate land use practices in Zanzibar (Mlahagwe and Temu, 1991). Labour was needed during picking seasons in the clove plantations, and the soil between the trees needed weeding. Before the abolition of slavery in 1897, slaves brought from mainland Africa were employed to work on the plantations. Plantation owners could however only afford slaves who were able to feed themselves (Sheriff, 1991: 118). The enslaved laborers were therefore given access to smaller plots in between the plantation trees to cultivate non-permanent food crops for their own consumption two days a week (Croucher, 2014). During the rest of the week, their labor was at the disposal of, and controlled by, the plantation owners. The abolition of slavery created a shortage of labour in the plantation sector. Plantation owners thus invited former slaves to remain on the plantation, granting them access to farmland for subsistence cultivation within the plantation areas (Shao, 1992: 8; Krain, 1998: 37). In return, former slaves kept the land free from regrowth, weeds and pests for the largely absentee landowners. They also represented easily available wage labour during picking seasons.

As plantations advanced in the Western parts of Unguja and Pemba islands, the ‘indigenous’ population⁷ was pushed off the land and eastwards into the coral rag areas (Sheriff, 1991; Shao,

⁵ *Shehia* is the smallest administrative unit in Zanzibar.

⁶ These two categories are however not to be considered absolute. There are patches of different soil types with different level of fertility and thus different types of vegetation and land use within both these two zones.

⁷ The ‘indigenous’ populations of Zanzibar ‘result from interrelations between a minority of traders of Arabian or Persian origin and a majority of African peasants, fisherfolk and traders’ (Myers, 2000:433). The British divided the

1992). *The coral rag* is characterised by rough bushes and soils with coral limestone. Here, the local population - the *wenyeji* - historically accessed land through clearing and planting of ground crops on 'unoccupied' areas. In combination with animal grazing - and along the coast, artisanal fishing - shifting cultivation has been the dominant subsistence-based livelihood activity. Some of the population living in the coral rag areas also travelled to the plantations to work during picking seasons as a means of supplementing their constrained livelihoods (Sheriff, 2001). Under the central government's labor policies, others were forced to do so (Sheriff, 1991: 120). This way, the *wenyeji* also became entangled in the complex social ties that emerged in the plantation area between those who controlled and exercised authority over land, and those who had to provide their labor to access it (see also Cooper, 1980).

Although access to land in Zanzibar was historically acquired through planting on cleared land, local councils of elders (known as *watu wanne*, 'four persons')⁸ played an important customary role in controlling access allocation. Based on ground-clearing and the planting of temporary crops, the councils would issue user-rights to local inhabitants (*wenyeji*). While the soil was considered communal, *wenyeji* who had planted trees could claim ownership to these (Shao, 1992). Individuals not originating from the local community (*wageni*, sing. *mgeni*) could also access communal land, but only through payment of user fees to the local council (ibid: 5; see also Sheriff, 1991). Traces of the differentiated conditions for land access inherent in the customary system, as well as the complex relations between those who controlled the land and those who worked it, can still be found in contemporary notions of land, identity and belonging in rural Zanzibar.

Agricultural land in Zanzibar has been, and still is, commonly referred to as *konde* or *shamba*. *Konde* constitutes a piece of communal land cultivated on a basis of individual user-rights (see also Middleton, 1961; Shao, 1992). Following a system of shifting cultivation, the vegetation of

population into three subgroups: The Pemba on Pemba island, the Tumbatu on Tumbatu island, situated between Unguja and Pemba, and the Hadimu in the Southern and Eastern parts of Unguja. Collectively, however, the 'indigenous' populations are commonly referred to as Swahili or Shirazi. Based on fieldwork among the Hadimu, Middleton (1992: 83) used the terms '*wananchi*' and '*wenyeji*', (literary meaning the 'owners of the land' and 'owners of the town', respectively) for 'locals', as opposed to '*wageni*' (literally meaning 'guests') for 'strangers' or 'tenants'.

⁸ The four members of the *watu wanne* council customarily represented principal kin groups (*ukoo*) in the local community (Middleton, 1961) - particularly in the coral rags areas of Unguja, which is where the HIMA project is implemented and thus where Mitini is situated.

bushes and thickets in a *konde* has customarily been cleared and burnt before seasonal ground crops were cultivated in ‘soil-pockets’ for a period of two to three years. Thereafter, the land was left fallow for 10 years or more, and returned to the community. As a communal piece of land, a *konde* could not be sold or inherited. The term *shamba* means a field or farm in Swahili.

Although a *shamba* may refer to different types of land holdings, it is in Zanzibar typically used with reference to agricultural plots or gardens with permanent (tree) crops often surrounding peoples’ houses (see also Krain et al, 1993: 12).⁹ In between the trees, various (temporary) field crops may be cultivated. As opposed to the *konde*, the *shambas* are family-managed. Members of the *ukoo*, that is, the members of a family related through common ancestors, have commonly acquired the land through inheritance. According to custom, family members made joint decisions about cultivation, harvesting, distribution of proceeds, as well as lending out - or increasingly also sale - of *shamba* land. Since *wenyeji* have exercised ‘full and inalienable rights (*haki*)’ to the *shamba* (Middleton, 1992: 83), the *shamba* has the potential to provide a security that the *konde* does not.

Land lending and land borrowing has a long tradition in Zanzibar (Middleton, 1961; Krain, 1998). Following a double cropping system similar to the prevalent system during the plantation era, a land borrower is commonly permitted to plant temporary crops underneath tree crops of a *shamba* and in exchange keeps the land free from weeds. Borrowers are typically people without or with little land, such as young men, widows or divorced women (Krain, 1998: 50). The customary practice of land borrowing is supported by Islamic hadith literature, which states that it is better to rent out land free of charge than to keep it unused (Jones, 1998: 26). The lending of land to others is thus locally conceived as an act imbued with morally (and religiously)-based norms of solidarity and redistribution.

Governmental efforts to formalize rights to land and forest resources in Zanzibar

Under British rule,¹⁰ all so-called ‘natural land’ in Zanzibar, predominately land in the coral rag areas, was treated as public, and was under the control of the colonial government (Jones, 1996: 19). Land holdings considered ‘British’, ‘Arab’ and ‘Indian’ were, however, treated as ‘private’

⁹ A similar term is *kiambo*. The meaning of the terms *kiambo* and *shamba* are overlapping. *Shamba* does however emphasize the productive side of the land, while *kiambo* commonly refers to the land as a homestead.

¹⁰ The Sultanate of Zanzibar existed as a British Protectorate from 1890-1963.

(ibid). The British colonial government introduced a system of indirect rule at local level, where representatives of the central administration were appointed from the local population in rural areas (Topan, 1998). The role of these representatives, locally known as *shehas*, was to exercise land control at local level. The centrally appointed *shehas* replaced the former *watu wanne*, and took over the role of managing the rental and lease of land, and collecting fees from not only *wageni*, but also the *wenyeji*, on behalf of the central government (Sheriff, 1991; Shao, 1992).

Shortly after Zanzibar gained independence from the British in 1963, the elected government, together with the Sultan and what was considered the ‘Arab’ land-owning class was overturned in a violent *coup* orchestrated by groups of men claiming ‘African’ origin (Glassman, 2011; see also Sheriff, 2001). Land reforms were at the heart of the new Revolutionary government’s agenda. Hence, they soon declared all land under full and complete governmental control (Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar, 1964). ‘Private’ land holdings were confiscated, and redistributed as three-acre plots to ‘peasants of African’ origin (Törhönen, 1998: 36). Those who benefited from the redistribution received a ‘certificate of title’ as a proof of land holdership (Jones, 1996: 23). However, since the Revolutionary government retained the ultimate ownership of the three-acre plots - by not allowing any transfer to a third party through inheritance or sale - the tenure security of these plots was ‘curtailed’ (see Lugoe, 2012: 22). An alternative, informal process whereby three acres plots were subdivided or sold was increasingly practiced (see Myers, 2008: 280). This way, much of the redistributed land ended up in the hands of people in government positions, as well as other individuals associated with the ruling government (ibid.). The inequalities and injustices related to land - that at least partly dominated the pre-revolutionary era - was not eliminated by the land redistribution process. Instead, new patterns of unequal access to land emerged - but with a new political elite as the privileged, land controlling group (see also Sheriff, 2001).

In the 1980s, Zanzibar - influenced by the broader neoliberal framework that dominated global development discourse - embarked upon a process of liberalization that included the introduction of new land laws. Supported by the government of Finland, the new land laws aimed at formalizing land tenure, and preventing the extra-legal land market that had appeared in the aftermath of the land redistribution process (Myers, 2008). While (re-)introducing private property to Zanzibar, the passing of various land laws did not entail the elimination of state

ownership. The Land Tenure Act of 1992 categorized all land as either ‘public’ land held by the government (or more specifically vested in the President), or as land under ‘right of occupancy’ held by a private person (more specifically a Zanzibari citizen or a Tanzanian citizen with residency in Zanzibar) (Jones, 1996: 27; see also Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar, 1992). The Act further stated that someone could become a ‘legal occupant’ (Jones, 1996: 27) of a piece of land by *application* to the government, asking to be granted a specific piece of land, or by claim of *adjudication*, based on either customary¹¹ or Islamic law. Through registration of the ‘rights of occupancies’, land holdership was recognized by law (ibid: 37), and the land could be transferred by inheritance, purchase or gift (Jones, 1996: 27). The formalization of land rights through registration was thought to provide individuals and groups with ‘secure’ land tenure (see e.g. National Forest Management Plan, 2008). In practice, however, the majority of those who have obtained rights of occupancies were powerful individuals, often with good connections to the ruling party, CCM (see Myers, 2008).

In addition to aiming to formalize individual rights to land, the introduction of community forest management in Zanzibar during the 1990s constitutes another effort to formalize tenure rights. In 1996, the government passed the Forest Management and Conservation Act. The Act provided the legal scope for delegating the right to manage and benefit from forest areas, from central forest authorities to local communities (Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar, 1996). Further, by developing and signing Community Forest Management Agreements (COFMAs) with the forest authorities, local community conservation committees would be formally recognized as custodians of areas delineated as local ‘community forests’ (*misitu ya jamii*). The COFMAs would then - according to the Act - provide local communities with ‘clear and secure rights to plan, manage and benefit from local forest resources’ (ibid: 182). Based on specific by-laws and resource use plans defined within the agreements, the committees could issue permits and licenses to forest users and charge fines to rule-violators. From the establishment of the first local conservation committee in the mid-1990s, until the start-up of the HIMA project in 2010, more than thirty local communities signed such agreements with the forest authorities of Zanzibar, and the responsibility to manage local ‘community forests’ was thus transferred to them. Mitini was one of these communities.

¹¹ A claim may, for example, be based on proof that one has used the land for twelve years or more. For this, one normally would need the signature of a local *sheha*.

Accessing land: Examples from Mitini

When an existing forest reserve close to Mitini was to be upgraded to a Conservation Area in the mid-1990s, the Zanzibar government invited Mitini and eight other neighboring villages to establish local conservation committees. The committees were then tasked with managing the ‘buffer zone’ around the Conservation Area designated as ‘community forests’ (see also Finnie, 2003), and with representing villagers in dealing with the government on all issues pertaining to forest management. When the Conservation Area was further upgraded to a National Park in 2004, large parts of Mitini’s buffer zone were incorporated into the Park, and the responsibilities for its management returned to the central forest authorities (see also Benjaminsen, 2014).

Wenyeji’s access to land

In Mitini, the establishment of the National Park in former communally managed areas seriously affected local access to forest resources and agricultural land; it generated a conception of resource scarcity and heightened fear of further loss of land (see also Benjaminsen, 2014). As Peters (2004; 2013) has observed elsewhere, the increased uncertainty and unpredictability intensified competition over resources in Mitini. Family members started to encourage each other to clear land and plant permanent crops in the few areas *not* incorporated into the National Park. But while planting and cultivation of permanent crops according to customs were restricted to *shamba* land, trees and other permanent crops were now introduced in areas formerly used for shifting cultivation. In the accounts of former conservation committee members, this shift in land use, together with the feeling that the local community’s land rights were being violated, and the government’s disregard for the local conservation committee, created internal conflicts and eventually led to the breakdown of the committee. The disappointment community members felt negatively affected their trust in central forest authorities.

Several people who had acquired land through clearing and planting ended up selling the plot later.¹² I was told about, one local man - *Simai* - who sold a piece of land because he was getting married, and needed cash to finish his house and to cover the *mahari* (dowry). Another man -

¹² During my time in *Mitini*, I frequently heard stories about people who had sold land - several only a few years after acquiring the land by clearing and planting of trees. The sellers did not tell me directly themselves that they had sold, but sometimes incomes from sales came up indirectly in conversations. I was also told about sales of land by - often-dissatisfied - relatives or neighbors, and I talked to buyers.

Mussa - sold land to invest in an emerging business opportunity. Both *Simai* and *Mussa* were members of influential local *ukoos* with homesteads in the immediate vicinity of the major agricultural land that had *not* been incorporated into the National Park. As such, the land they acquired was land their ancestors had used and managed for generations.

Selling land requires a document confirming the right to sell. The following process was explained to me: A person from Mitini who wants to sell a piece of land would first go to the *sheha* to get a document (*waraka*) confirming that s/he is the legitimate landholder. According to the Land Tenure Act of 1992, the next step would be to apply for a formal title deed, i.e. a 'right of occupancy', from the central government. Obtaining such a formal title deed is, however, considered out of reach for most residents of Mitini. As documented in other African contexts (see e.g. Benjaminsen and Lund, 2002), the bureaucratic process of obtaining a formal, legal title - or in Zanzibar, of being granted a 'right of occupancy', let alone having it registered - is considered both cumbersome and costly. Every step in the process implies the payment of a fee to a governmental officer - fees beyond what *Simai* and *Mussa* can afford.

Failing to acquire a formal title, potential sellers of land in Mitini opted to seek informal documentation of land holdership through the local *sheha*. After identifying a buyer, the *sheha* would also confirm the land transfer.¹³ In discussions between villagers of Mitini, the planting of temporary crops in communal areas, as well as the sale of land, was however often condemned. During my stay, the local conservation committee regularly discussed possible ways to prevent it from happening. They also recalled how attempts to solicit support from local leaders to stop or revert these processes had no effect, arguably, because the leaders were involved themselves. '*The wakubwa* (literally 'big people', indicating people of influence) *in Mitini are selling to wakubwa from town. They cooperate and divide the land between themselves. That's why it does not help to complain*'. In Mitini, having access to networks of people of influence is crucial both to avoid objections when communal land is acquired through clearing and planting, as well as to escape sanctions when the land is sold to outsiders. In the case of *Simai* and *Mussa*, I was told that their military background - and thus also close relationship to the ruling party - constituted,

¹³ Benjaminsen and Lund (2002: 6) have referred to similar processes as 'informal formalization'. The prevalence of such processes is also central to de Soto's (2000) argument.

in addition to customary 'rights' gained through membership in local *ukoos*, important sources of impunity.

Relationships with influential and powerful people are however not available to all (see also Peters, 2004). *Bi Tatu* is a divorced woman in her late 30s. She lives in Mitini with her old mother and four children, for whom she is the main provider. When her father passed away a couple of years ago, *Bi Tatu*, alongside her two sisters and one brother, inherited parts of his *shamba* with two large mango trees. Twice a year they produce loads of mango. Luckily, her eldest son - with the help of some friends - is old enough to do the picking, and, with the help of her brother, the mangos are sold at the market in Zanzibar Town. From the surplus, she normally buys a big sack of rice, cooking oil, flour and other essentials. Sometimes she also buys a few chickens to breed. The mango trees provide valuable money, but not enough to feed the entire family. For several years, *Bi Tatu* has borrowed land from *Simai*. Between the trees he planted, she has cultivated cassava, beans and different types of vegetables. But after *Simai* sold the land, this was no longer an option. Without the land, *Bi Tatu* is worried about the future. '*I think I will have to get married again*', she says. As an unmarried woman, *Bi Tatu* lacks access to both sufficient land and a sufficiently strong network to sustain a living for herself and her family. In need of social relationships with people of influence, she considers remarrying.

Wageni's access to land

While sellers of land in Mitini are local individuals in need of quick cash, buyers are usually better-off people from Zanzibar Town, such as politicians, high-level governmental officials and business men, and others with access to capital with which they can purchase access to land. *Ismail Tajiri* is a middle-aged business man from Zanzibar Town, and among those who have bought land in Mitini. On the land, he grows a variety of vegetables and fruits for the main market in town. Retaining his main residency - and his family - in Zanzibar Town, *Ismail Tajiri* has hired *Yunus* to attend to the land in his absence. *Yunus* is a man in his early 30s who originally comes from Mwanza region on mainland Tanzania. *Yunus* is thus a so-called '*mgeni*' (pl., *wageni*). *Yunus* arrived in Zanzibar and Mitini about two years ago, after having heard that it was possible to earn quick money in Zanzibar. *Yunus* explains that while Mitini has two growing seasons and possibilities for wage labor, his home village has only one, and few other

alternatives to sustain a living. Shortly after *Yunus*' arrival in Mitini, a friend of the local *sheha* introduced him to *Ismail Tajiri*. They agreed that *Yunus* would work on *Ismail Tajiri*'s land, and in return get his own piece to cultivate. '*It is a mutually benefitting relationship*', they say when I meet them both on the land.

Like *Yunus*, most of those who work on the land of others are *wageni*, i.e. immigrant workers from mainland Tanzania. As a historically rich agricultural area, Mitini with surroundings is popular among immigrants and has been so for decades (see also Middleton, 1992). According to the *sheha* who keeps a record of immigrant workers arriving in Mitini, there were - at the time of my stay - 86 adult *wageni* in Mitini (in a total population of approximately 1300). The *wageni* normally stay for one or two years before they return home. Some come several times. Both *Ismail Tajiri* and *Yunus*, however, need to invest in social relationships with the *wakubwa*. This includes the local *sheha*. Investment in such relations may in practice include paying the *mkubwa* (sing. *wakubwa*) a portion of the produce from the land. Both *Ismail Tajiri* and *Yunus* engage in an agricultural practice similar to the double-cropping system that dominated the plantation era. The *wageni* benefit from the land by offering their labor, while the landholders benefit through access to the labor *wageni* provide. In alliance with local people of influence, such as the *sheha* (and to some extent also *Simai* and *Mussa*), both *Ismail Tajiri* and *Yunus* not only get access to agricultural land: they also exclude locals (*wenyeji*) from land previously conceived as inalienable.

Investment in relationships with people of power may also entail offering them political support (Benjaminsen and Kaarhus, 2018). When the Tanzania Constitution Review Commission arrived in Mitini during the national consultation process in 2013, *Yunus* and some of his fellow *wageni* were observed sitting on the first row dressed in CCM merchandise.¹⁴ For *Yunus* - and other *wageni* who want to maintain access to land - not conforming to terms set by the *sheha* or other individuals close to him, may be risky. *Yunus* may risk being expelled from Mitini, and thus lose an important source of livelihood. The *shehas* plays the role of a 'gate-keeper' (Ribot and Peluso, 2003: 173) - controlling who gets to access and benefit from the land (here, either by selling it, renting it out or by offering their labor). Thus for *wakubwas* in the community, such as

¹⁴ In Zanzibar political discourse it is common to hear the political opposition arguing that immigrant workers are invited to the islands by the central government to vote for the ruling CCM party.

the *sheha*, people not originating from the community who come in search of access to land, may constitute a source of both potential economic and political support. For *wageni*, the *sheha* becomes a necessary partner in their pursuit of access to land.

A communal effort to reclaim land

For women and men in the local community, cultivating relationships with influential people is key. In Mitini, alliances with people at higher political levels proved particularly important when people attempted to reclaim land that had been ‘lost’ to the National Park (see also Benjaminsen, 2014). *Tahir* is a man in his 50s. As in the case of *Simai* and *Mussa*, *Tahir*’s *ukoo* goes back many generations in Mitini. As his homestead borders the National Park, *Tahir* claims to have - together with other members of his *ukoo* - lost significant agricultural land because of the establishment of the Park. *Tahir* was a member of the first conservation committee that was established in the mid-1990s. Since then, he has helped organize several local attempts to reclaim the land he believes was taken from him by illegitimate means. On one occasion, he and his fellow villagers did succeed in reclaiming some agricultural land.

One day, *Tahir* was listening to the radio he heard the President of Zanzibar introducing a campaign to increase food production and self-sufficiency across the islands. *Tahir* decided to call fellow villagers for a meeting. ‘*We have no-where to plant*’, he said, talking about the President’s agricultural campaign. ‘*But apparently one of us had a relative close to the President*’, he told me during one of our interviews. ‘*We decided to invite him to Mitini to discuss our case. He came, we talked and finally things started to happen*’. The case ended up at the table of Mitini’s representative in the House of Representatives - the Zanzibar legislative. According to *Tahir*, the representative forwarded the case to the relevant Ministry. The Department of Forestry was asked to identify land within the governmentally controlled areas of Mitini that was suitable for agriculture.¹⁵ ‘*In the following weeks we received many visitors. Officers from the Department of Forestry came to measure the land*’. A few weeks before the national election in 2010, a five years’ agreement was finalized, whereby three different areas totaling 142, 4 hectares of land were made available to community members for agriculture. When I arrived in Mitini about a year after the signing of the agricultural agreement, *Tahir*, alongside other community members, presented the release of land as a political transaction

¹⁵ That is, the National Park and a governmental tree plantation (primarily) established in the 1980s.

whereby the government had provided access to land in anticipation of securing votes for the incumbent government.

The agricultural agreement did, however, clearly state that Mitini villagers are not permitted to plant trees or any other permanent crop in the 'released' areas. Only temporary agriculture (*kilimo cha muda*) was permitted. Villagers reacted to the strict conditions with dismay: '*They think we don't understand. When allowing temporary agriculture only, they make us into slaves (watumwa)*', one man said to fellow villagers. In Mitini, identity and more specifically the belonging to the group of *wenyeji* (the group that is considered to origin from the community) has, according to customary practices, given privileges in terms of access to land. By belonging to a local *ukoo*, *wenyeji* have historically been able to access land - a *konde*, without cost, or a *shamba*, through inheritance. Being a *mwenyeji* (sing. *wenyeji*) has been key to establishing belonging and for having a legitimate claim to - and control over - community to land. *Wenyeji* experience being offered access to work land controlled by others, as in the case of the agricultural agreement - land controlled by the government - as a provocation. For them, having to work land controlled by others is associated with not belonging; with being landless, and ultimately - with reference to the patron-client relationships of the plantation era - with being a slave and 'unfree'. In Mitini, control of land, whether as an individual, a family, or - customarily - as a community, is associated with security and predictability. Not controlling land is associated with increased uncertainty and vulnerability. When control of access to land is imparted to the state, land users in Mitini become subjects, who must invest in relations with those who control the land in order to gain and maintain access to it.

Formalization of tenure rights through the REDD+/HIMA project

This paper describes a local context in which the HIMA staff aimed to implement a tenure-securing project as a prerequisite for engaging in a successful REDD+ readiness process. Through facilitating the development, and subsequent signing, of Community Forest Management Agreements (COFMAs) between local communities and the forest authorities in Zanzibar, HIMA staff expected to secure tenure within the areas designated as 'community forests'. Tenure security was considered a condition not only for sustainable management of these communal forest areas, it was also an integral part of HIMA's intention to ensure that

women and men in the local communities where the HIMA/REDD+ project was implemented would benefit from future carbon revenues.

In the course of the project, local conservation committees representing local communities negotiated COFMAs with the Department of Forestry. The negotiation process included agreeing upon the material boundaries of the areas to be set aside for carbon sequestration and storage (see also Benjaminsen and Kaarhus, 2018). By signing a COFMA, and publishing it in an official gazette, the government of Zanzibar formally recognized that the rights to the benefits from these areas, including future carbon revenues, lay with local conservation committees. As such, the COFMAs gained 'the force of a title deed' (Terra Global Capital, 2011: 17), which - according to HIMA staff - would protect areas under agreement from future sale or any other extra-legal use or transfer of land. This way, HIMA's effort to secure carbon rights was seen, as is common in other REDD+ contexts (see e.g. Larson et al, 2013), as a means of preventing land and 'carbon' grabbing - or in other words, local communities' loss of access and control over land and 'carbon' to outsiders.

However, as already well-established in scholarly literature (see e.g. Sjaastad and Cousins, 2008), this paper has shown that secured access to land and forest resources - also in Zanzibar - does not necessarily arise from having formal recognized rights to a resource and its benefits. In Zanzibar, land reforms have historically been associated with a considerable degree of elite capture whereby well-connected individuals have been privileged over those in less connected positions. This can be seen both in the (re-)distribution of three-acre plots in the aftermath of the 1964 Revolution, and in the allocation of 'right of occupancies' as part of the neoliberal land reforms of the 1990s.¹⁶ In the context of Mitini, where pressure on land has been on the increase, local individuals have - through investment in alliances with those who exercise control over land - succeeded in their claims to former communal land. On the other hand, less privileged individuals without sufficiently strong networks are experiencing increased exclusion from land and forest resources.

¹⁶ In Benjaminsen (2014), I also describe how local elites in Mitini in the past have been accused of monopolizing decision-making in the local conservation committee(s), as well as the distribution of benefits from the COFMAs. I was, however, told that the more recent local conservation committee (established as part of the HIMA project) had a broader distribution of membership than former conservation committees.

Myers (2008: 283) has argued that ‘pro-poor’ land reforms in Zanzibar are unlikely to succeed as long as the existing power relations that sustain inequality - with elite actors controlling access to and negotiation over land and resources - are not altered. Key to the discussion of this paper is to what extent REDD+ may constitute a tool in this direction. Although the HIMA project took steps to formalize local communities’ rights to carbon benefits, HIMA has not directly addressed the structural inequalities permeating the existing historical and political context in which it was implemented. This includes limited attention to the importance women and men in Zanzibar place on engaging in and cultivating social relationships as a strategy for not only accessing land and forest resources, but also as a means to sustain their lives in general (see also Wallevik, 2013; Benjaminsen and Kaarhus, 2018). Without due attention, the political and social structures that shape livelihood struggles at local level in Zanzibar are likely to trump HIMA’s intention to ensure formal recognition of local communities as carbon right holders. The limited benefits from land and forests resources in Zanzibar will thus continue to be subject to negotiation between diverse and unequally positioned groups of actors. Further, should REDD+ in Zanzibar produce carbon revenues, the potential of HIMA to actually ensure that carbon benefits end up in the hands of the ‘poor’, is, I argue, meagre. Instead, the formalization processes risk further exacerbating conflicts, and facilitating - rather than eliminating - extra-legal local dispossessions from former communally managed land.

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ANNEX 1: LIST OF INFORMANTS (FORMAL INTERVIEWS)					
	Sex	Approximate Age	Role/member of	Location/affiliation	Date of interview*
1	M	50	Conservation committee	Mitini	22.11.2011
2	M	45	Conservation committee	Mitini	22.11.2011
3	M	70	Zanzibar scholar	Zanzibar Town	01.12.2011
4	M	55	Sheha	Mitini	06.12.2011
5	F	35	Conservation committee	Mitini	06.12.2011
6	F	40	Officer	CARE Zanzibar	15.12.2011
7	M	45	Officer	CARE Zanzibar	15.12.2011
8	M	60	Senior officer	CARE Zanzibar	15.12.2011
9	F	40	Conservation committee	Mitini	03.01.2012
10	M	32	Migrant worker	Mitini	04.01.2012
11	M	40	Land owner	Mitini	04.01.2012
12	M	65	Elder	Mitini	05.01.2012
13	M	40	Villager	Mitini	05.01.2012
14	M	45	Conservation committee	Mitini	13.01.2012
15	F	42	Villager	Mitini	13.01.2012
16	M	40	Villager	Mitini	14.01.2012
17	M	60	Migrant worker	Mitini	14.01.2012
18	F	55	Migrant worker	Mitini	14.01.2012
19	M	70	Elder	Mitini	15.01.2012
20	M	60	Elder	Mitini	15.01.2012
21	M	50	Representative	REDD+ task force Tanzania	02.02.2012
22	M	55	Senior officer	Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resource	08.02.2012
23	F	40	Senior officer	Department of Forestry	10.02.2012
24	F	40	Consultant	Terra Global Capital	10.02.2012
25	F	35	Officer	Department of women and children development	14.02.2012
26	M	60	Officer	Department of Local governance	15.02.2012
27	M	50	Officer	Ministry of labour, economic empowerment and coops	16.02.2012

28	M	50	Senior officer	Department of Forestry	20.02.2012
29	M	50	Officer	Department of Environment	20.02.2012
30	M	50	Officer	Local NGO	22.02.2012
31	M	60	Former conservation committee	Mitini	22.02.2012
32	M	40	Officer	Local NGO	24.02.2012
33	F + M	50-40	Two officers	Norwegian Embassy to Tanzania	27.02.2012
34	M	50	Senior officer	CARE Tanzania	27.02.2012
35	M	45	Officer	UNREDD Tanzania	28.02.2012
36	M	60	Representative	REDD+ task force	28.02.2012
37	M	60	REDD+ scholar	Tanzania	02.03.2012
38	M	57	Officer	CARE Zanzibar	05.03.2012
39	M	37	Former conservation committee	Mitini	06.03.2012
40	M	28	Diwani	Mitini	06.03.2012
41	F	50	Officer	Department of Forestry	13.03.2012
42	F	50	Officer	Department of Forestry	14.03.2012
43	M	45	Senior officer	Department of Forestry	14.03.2012
44	M	25	General Secretary	JUMIJAZA	15.03.2012
45	M	35	Officer	Department of Forestry	15.03.2012
46	M	48	Buyer of land	Mitini	16.03.2012
47	M	60	Conservation committee	Mitini	16.03.2012
48	F	40	Conservation committee	Mitini	17.03.2012
49	H	35	Officer	Officer local NGO	22.03.2012
50	F	55	Chair person	JUMIJAZA	25.03.2012
51	M	50	Officer	Department of Forestry	26.03.2012
52	M	50	Officer	CARE	26.03.2012
53	M	70	Zanzibar scholar	Zanzibar Town	29.03.2012
54	M	50	Senior officer	Department of Forestry	05.04.2012
56	M	40	Senior officer	SMOLE	05.04.2012
57	F	33	Officer	SMOLE	06.04.2012
58	M +M	45+70	Two officer	Department of Land Administration	13.04.2012
59	M	50	Senior officer	CARE Tanzania	15.04.2012
60	M	45	Villager	Mitini	18.04.2012
61	M	40	Villager	Mitini	18.04.2012
62	M	50	Senior officer	Department of Forestry	20.04.2012
63	M	50	Member HoR	CCM	23.04.2012
64	F	70	Elder	Mitini	27.04.2012

65	M	75	Former sheha	Mitini	01.05.2012
66	M	50	Senior officer	Department of Environment	04.05.2012
67	M	55	Former conservation committee	Mitini	05.05.2012
68	M	50	Buyer of land	Mitini	05.05.2012
69	M	60	District Commissioner	District Commission	08.05.2012
70	M	40	Member HoR	CUF	09.05.2012
71	M	45	Senior officer	Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources	11.05.2012
72	F	50	Zanzibar scholar	Zanzibar Town	14.05.2012
73	M	40	Senior officer	Vice President's office - Environment	22.05.2012
74	M	55	Officer	CARE Zanzibar	23.05.2012
75	M	90	Elder	Mitini	16.12.2012
76	M	33	Conservation committee	Mitini	23.01.2013
77	M	26	Villager	Mitini	25.01.2013
	* Note that some informants were interviewed multiple times				

ANNEX 2: ERRATA

Sidenr	Avsnitt	Endret fra	Rettet til
ii	PART TWO, Paper 2	Journal of East African Studies	<i>Journal of East African Studies</i>
ii	3	Annex 1: List of informants	Annex 1: List of informants (formal interviews)
v	GLOSSARY - Jimbo	House of Representative	House of Representatives
v	GLOSSARY	Ngoma wa sheitani	Ngoma ya shetani
v	GLOSSARY	vicheti	visheti
vii	ACCRONYMS	DCCFF –	DCCFF -
vii	ACCRONYMS - FCPF	Worldbank	World Bank
vii	ACCRONYMS - REDD	Reduction of	Reducing
vii	ACCRONYMS – REDD+	Reduction of	Reducing
1	1	Reduction of	Reducing
4	3	communities in the Global South able to	communities in the Global South that are able to
4	4	to prepare Tanzania for the forest carbon trade	to prepare Tanzania for forest carbon trade
5	Footnote 9	“hima” also means “haste, urgency, focused forward energy’	‘hima’ also means ‘haste, urgency, focused forward energy’
6	2	In Paper 2 of the thesis I discuss	In Paper 2 of the thesis, I discuss
7	2	onerous technical requirements	onerous technical requirements
9	1	and the enthusiasm REDD+ it generated	and the enthusiasm REDD+ generated
11	1	and the processes of translation	and as processes of translation
12	4	‘agenda setting’ (Mosse, 2010), ‘everyday resistance’	‘agenda setting’ (Mosse, 2010) and ‘everyday resistance’
12	4	Homes, 2007	Holmes, 2007
13	2	the ‘right-based	the ‘right-based’
13	2	project seek to formalise	project seeks to formalise
13	2	and thus - arguably - in order to ensure	and thus - arguably - to ensure
16	2	the1830s	the 1830s
18	Footnote 20	Soon after	Soon after,
19	Footnote 21	–	-
24	2	tgaining	gaining

24	3	the the	the
24	Footnote 29	(National REDD strategy)	(United Republic of Tanzania, 2013)
25	1	In Paper 3 of this thesis	In Paper 3 of this thesis,
27	2	Ngoma wa sheitani	Ngoma ya shetani
33	2	'The Anti-Politics Machine '(1990).	'The Anti-Politics Machine ' (1990).
37	2	<i>case of the more than 500 REDD+ projects that have been implemented worldwide.</i>	case of the more than 500 REDD+ projects that have been implemented worldwide.
48	2	treating sensitive information and informants' personal data of informants,	treating sensitive information and personal data of informants,
50	2	the long term	long-term
52	2	The gift was made	The donation was made
52	2	<i>vicheti</i>	<i>visheti</i>
54	1	When a researcher means	When a researcher intends
54	3	a meeting of the Mitini conservation committee	a meeting with the Mitini conservation committee
55	2	I was wanted	I wanted
56	Footnote 45	meeting and conservations	meeting and conversations
56	Footnote 45	I usually approached to chairperson	I usually approached the chairperson
57	3	idiosyncracies	idiosyncrasies
58	1	'validity' ('validity' (
58	1	such as particular participant observation	such as participant observation
59	1	show how commodification processes - in a context of highly volatile carbon markets - creates	show how commodification processes - in a context of highly volatile carbon markets - create
60	2	Reductions of Emission	Reducing Emissions
61	2	<i>Forum for Development Studies (2014)</i>	<i>Forum for Development Studies (2014)</i>
63	1	well suited to understanding	well suited to understand
64	1	Key to paper two's argument	Key to paper one's argument
65	2	to a resources	to a resource
66	1	the HIMA Carbon	the HIMA Carbon Project
66	2	the social-cultural context	the socio-cultural context

Paper 4			
1	1	<i>the abilities of individual</i>	<i>the abilities of individuals</i>
1	2	CO ₂ emission	CO ₂ emissions
1	2	Reduction of	Reducing
6	1	about Zanzibari society	about the Zanzibari society
9	2	'peasants' of African' origin	'peasants of African origin'
9	2	three acre plot	three acre plots
9	2	were sold	was sold
10	2	the first local conservation	the first local conservation committee
11	2	As Peters also observed elsewhere (2004; 2013),	As Peters (2004; 2013) has observed elsewhere,
14	3	In Mitini, when	When
15	3	agricultural campaign 'But	agricultural campaign. 'But
15	3	at the table of the Mitini's	at the table of Mitini's
Annex 1			
Heading		ANNEX 1: LIST OF INFORMANTS	ANNEX 1: LIST OF INFORMANTS (FORMAL INTERVIEWS)
Sub-headings		Age	Approximate age
Sub-headings			Role/member of
Sub-headings			Location/affiliation
Sub-headings		Date of interviews	Date of interviews*
Informant no 6	Role	officer	Officer
Informant no 7	Role	officer	Officer
Informant no 8	Role	senior officer	Senior officer
Informant no 11	Sex		M
Informant no 38	Role	officer	Officer
Informant no 41	Role	officer	Officer
Informant no 45	Role	officer	Officer

Informant no 49	Role	officer	Officer
Informant no 50	Affiliation	JUMIJAZA	JUMIJAZA
Informant no 51	Role	officer	Officer
Informant no 57	Role	officer	Officer
*		some informant	some informants

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