Between visions and realities: Norway`s peace engagement in Colombia

Maria Skundberg Strøm
International Relations
Credit page

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Maria.stroem4@gmail.com

Noragric
Department of International Environment and Development Studies
The Faculty of Landscape and Society
P.O. Box 5003
N-1432 Ås
Norway
Tel.: +47 67 23 00 00
Internet: https://www.nmbu.no/fakultet/landsam/institutt/noragric
Declaration

I, Maria Skundberg Strøm, declare that this thesis is a result of my research investigations and findings. Sources of information other than my own have been acknowledged and a reference list has been appended. This work has not been previously submitted to any other university for award of any type of academic degree.

Signature………………………………..

Date……………………………………..
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Abstract

Norway has established a good reputation by taking responsibility for international peace and security and has been actively involved in several peace processes all over the world. With its peace engagement Norway has established its own section for peace and reconciliation and adapted a model for peace with certain characteristics unique for Norway. However, in the Norwegian official reports and evaluations of its peace engagement there is lacking a clear definition of the notion of peace and what is defined as success for Norway’s peace engagement. Further Norway have been modest on stating its motives for engaging so greatly in international peace and security. The aim of the thesis is to get a deeper understanding of Norwegian engagement for peace by looking at its engagement in the Colombian peace process.
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1.0 An Introduction

In 2016 we finally saw a peace agreement sign between the Colombian government and the guerrilla group, FARC-EP. After over 50 years of fighting for land, political rights and territory, the parties now had finally decided to sit down and talk. One of the actors that was assigned to make that happen was the “trusted facilitator”, Norway. By monitoring the peace process and negotiations together with the other guarantor, Cuba, Norway had done what others couldn’t – it got the parties to talk (Bastøe & Wilhelmsen, 2018). The Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize by the Norwegian Storting and our Prime Minster Erna Solberg stated two months after the agreement that Norway had contributed to peace in Colombia (Stockfleth, 2017). The audience was overwhelmed. But was it that easy? was peace established in Colombia? For the Colombians it was unfortunately not. The implementation of peace started at this point and Colombian had an unsure future ahead. Not long in the post-conflict period it was meet with stagnations in the peace process, new armed groups, treats and killings on social leaders and human rights activists, and no movement on the most important point of the agreement: distribution of land (Kroc, 2017; Kroc, 2018).

So, what created the false image of peace and the false image of success? Norway is an experienced actor in peace and security and has been engaged in several peace processes since the end of the Cold War. Is has got an increased interest in efforts for peace and has made peace and reconciliation a crucial part of its foreign policy. Norway has with this engagement established unique qualities in its peace engagement, that is can offer no matter conflict and context. However, the peace processes that Norway has engaged in has not seen the end of the goal: lasting and sustainable peace. When looked at the white papers of the Norwegian MFA the definition of success and what peace contain is missing from its framework. Further they lack a clear objective in why Norway engage so sufficient in conflict all over the world (Skånland, 2018; Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs , 2004). This I will now explore in my thesis by look at the practices in Colombia.

1.1 Objectives

This thesis seeks to examine Norway’s peace engagement through its role in the Colombian peace process. I will see how this peace accord can give some deeper understanding on
Norway’s visions and approach to peace and what drives Norway to engage in such comprehensive peace processes all over the world. I will look at Norway as a small state in International Relations and how Norway has developed its foreign policy based on its limitations in terms of size and population. To get closer to an answer in terms in Norway’s motives for its peace engagement I will look at theoretical assumptions connected to Norway, more specific the theory of «status-seeking».

In order to answer the research questions, I will look at Norway’s traditions of peace and its statements on its peace efforts as well as other opinions to Norway’s peace engagement. I will use the Colombian case as an empirical framework to see if it can tell something more about Norway’s visions and approach to peace and how this works in practice. Concerning the second question I will put the motives for the engagement in focus and look at small state foreign policy theory as “status seeking”.

The thesis will argue that Norway’s visions and approach to peace is lacking a clear framework and definitions which gives unrealistic expectation of Norway as a third party. It also argues that Norway’s visions and approach in theory and practice doesn’t collide because of the conditions and actors on the ground affecting Norway’s efforts. Finally, it will argue that there is evidence to that Norway’s engagement in Colombia are to some extend driven by status, but that these needs further exploration. Norway do also show commitment to peace by being a stable and trustworthy actor during the hole process.

This thesis seeks to answer the following questions:

**RQ1:** What does the peace process in Colombia tell us about Norway’s visions and approach for peace?

**RQ2:** Is Norway’s engagement in the Colombian peace process affected by a quest for status and recognition as a good power?
1.2 Outline
This thesis is organized into four chapter and three section. In chapter two and three I will address my theoretical framework and my choice of methods. I will argue around my choices and selection to this thesis before I turn to the three sections of the thesis. Section one gives you an introduction to Norway’s tradition and engagement for peace. Section three presents the empirical case of Colombia and section four opens up for analysis and a broader picture of the research questions by adding more sources of data as interviews, articles, research and media coverages. This section will further sum up the main findings of the thesis. In chapter four I will conclude the thesis and hopefully inspire to further research.
2.0 Theoretical framework

This chapter will address the theoretical framework of this thesis by giving an insight to the study and research on small states in International Relations and their foreign policy strategies. The aim of this chapter is to demonstrate the relevant IR literature to my research questions. I will first briefly go into the general view and notion of small states in the discipline of IR before I will investigate the theory of “status seeking” which is directly connected to my second research question.

2.1 Small states in IR

The early studies of small states in International Relations have been limited to their military and economic weakness compared to larger states. There has been a general lack of understanding and appreciation within the IR community as to the importance of the size of state with respect to domestic decision-making and foreign relations. The study and importance of small states have however increased the last decades and become an interesting field to explore. It has been noted that small states are finding its own ways to be influential and take part in international politics (Thorhallsson, 2018, p.28).

Small states have been historically have been seen to have little power and manoeuvre other than being pawns for great power, this has changed with the end of the bipolar world. While small states earlier have been defined by their population, territory, and military- and economic strength, more variables are added to define small states in the new world system. With a post-Cold War system that is peaceful, stable and internationalized, small states have found ways to compensate for their structural weaknesses and lack of influence (Thorhallsson, 2018). Studies of influential small states demonstrate that they develop issue-specific power to make up for what they lack in terms of structural power. Strategies of coalition-building and image-building has successfully been performed by small states and the autonomy of their diplomats can prove advantageous in negotiations and within institutional settings Steinsson & Thorhallsson, 2017, p.2). Small states also benefit from the perception of their image as neutral and peaceful. One form of promoting this image is through “soft power” which is the ability to get others to want what you want through appeal and attraction rather than coercion. This form is more suited for small states as they often lack the “hard power” means as military and economic strength. Soft power can provide both economic benefits and diplomatic clout and can be demonstrated be putting efforts to issues as the environment, human rights, women’s rights, conflict resolution, and humanitarian and
development issues (Steinsson & Thorhallsson, 2017, p. 12-13). In studies of small states there has also been a debate around whether small states seek practical, material benefits or ideational, status-oriented benefits. While there is no conclusion on this point there has developed theories and empirical examples on that small states, by offering unique qualities and take moral responsibility can be more visible in international politics and achieve recognition by greater powers (Steinsson & Thorhallsson, 2017). Two of these theories are called “shelter theory” and “status-seeking”, and for the relevance of Norway is will go deeper into the latter.

2.2 “Status-seeking” as small states foreign policy
Status in international politics is referred to as a state’s standing, or rank, in a status community. It is positional in the way that it gives meaning to actors in comparison with other relevant actors, it is perceptual because it is what people think of self and others, and it is social is the manner that beliefs in play are collective beliefs about a given actor’s standing in relations to others. Status seeking has further been reserved to thinking of great power strategies but has later been shown to be as important or even more, for small and medium states. Wohlforth, Carvalho, Leira & Neumann (2017) argues that small states suffer from state insecurity in a way that greater powers do not. With limited power and resources, small states may have status seeking as their only “game in town”. “Status” in its own terms implies the condition of filling a place in a social hierarchy, in a circle of recognition from all states in each given system. Identities emerge out of such processes; especially “state identities.” A state’s place in the hierarchy is also its place on the map of global politics. Status seeking is, therefore, a subcategory of state identity politics and is also coupled with the concept of recognition (Wohlforth et al., 2017, p.2-3). Recognition, they emphasize, must not be mixed with status. Recognition is here seen as an act or series of acts and are linked to agency. The concept of status however is not connected to agency but to structure and to “fill a place in a social hierarchy”. In other words, recognition is something you get after involved in status-seeking and status is here seen as a goal in itself (Carvalho & Neumann, 2015, p.7).

Status seeking by small and medium states does however differ from that of great powers. When it comes to small and medium states status seeking it is said that they make comparisons with others that are “similar but upward”, those that have similar characteristics but of higher status. For great powers this peer group is limited, but for the amount of smaller
states the setting of comparison is big and more complex. There are mainly two types of peer groups for small states, the functional peer group and the ideational. The functional groups are typically the neighboring states, those geographically close, while the ideational is the states that the state sees as an immediate competitor in terms of qualities or similarities. Further the social setting for small and middle states is different from that of greater powers. Without material power resources, smaller states see strategies as a being a good and moral actor as more feasible. The dominant tendency in International Relations is to use status motivations to explain socially suboptimal behavior. In seeking to identify the conditions under which status seeking leads to geopolitically competitive behavior, much of this literature is based upon “social identity theory” (SIT). There have been identified three strategies for improving a state`s status: mobility, competition and creativity. Mobility, referees to emulating the values and institutions of referent status superior. Such status mobility is typically rooted in emulation of acknowledged middle power practices, as for example taking on extended responsibilities or preserving international order. Competition, on the other hand, is seeking to match or surpass a higher referent state in the very dimensions of which its position is based. Competition take place along any number of categories relevant to the peer group. At last, creativity, is seeking to change socially approved status-conferring dimensions to those in which the state excels (Wohlforth et al., 2017, p. 4-7). Creativity in status seeking among small and middle power includes bring in some new dimension on which status can be measured, for example foreign aid or percentage of GDP. “Such creativity can lead to statements that what really matters in international politics is not might but right, and that certain small or middle powers are «moral» or «humanitarian» superpowers” (Wohlforth et al., 2017, p. 7).

2.3 Status via Moral authority
Status, argued by Wohlforth et al (2017) can depend on at least two variables, power in the traditional sense and moral authority. States may pose a moral in three different ways. First, they may take the cue from a tradition, which mean an abstract body of maxims. One example drawn here is European humanism as a moral tradition. Calling great powers out on their perceived hypocrisy in prioritizing power over morality is another. This strategy might give status-gains vis-à-vis a peer group, which is perceived to outweigh status loss with respect to great powers. Second, states may act morally by sustaining a social order. That means giving support to a given hegemonic order as something by maintaining and supporting the current system. And finally, they may also believe they act morally by sustaining the hegemony itself
Combining the different aspects of morality, it is hold that smaller powers that share the normative structure of leading powers in the international society, has an overall strategy of being perceived as a «good power». One way of achieving this is to seek status alongside or below states of great power. This is not by competing with the dominating power; it is by doing what the dominating power sees as good deeds (Wohlforth et al., 2017, p.9). Small states taking responsibility for international peace and security beyond what other states expect of them based on size and military resources is one way of gaining recognition as a good power. For this reason, small states competing for recognition as good power each try to use more on development and humanitarian aid than the other, and to promote their policies and concepts in multilateral settings. When small states try to promote themselves in a unique way, through a policy process, idea, concept or certain focus, Neumann and… argue that this is to seek the reward of higher status. “The aim is not to be a good power, but a better one” (Wohlforth et al., 2017, p.17).

Status as a good power can also give other benefits as access to great power arenas and good reputation. The recognition of the small state is often around the greatness of doing something good in spite of its size. One way of demonstrating great power hood and high international standing is to take moral responsibility for orderly maintenance of the international system through international peace and security. For this reason, Wohlforth et al (2017) argues that resourceful small and medium powers, like Western and prosperous states, use a lot of its resources on maintain order in the international system. It allows them to seek power in other means than military and economic strength and it gives them access to new arenas they would otherwise be excluded (Wohlforth et al., 2017, p.9-11).

The essence of being good in the way of engaging in systems maintenance, was well captured by former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan:

> It is easy for small nations to feel daunted by the global forces at work ... Large countries with enormous labour forces, abundant natural resources, arsenals of high-tech weaponry and fleets of expert technicians and negotiators may seem to have all the advantages. ... I would like to sound the strongest possible note to the contrary. My long experience at the United Nations has shown me that the small States of the
world ... are more than capable of holding their own. I would even go so far as to say that their contributions are the very glue of progressive international cooperation for the common good. (Wohlforth et al., 2017, p. 9).

To sum up; what is it to gain from such involvement for small and middle states? By seeking power by moral authority and acting as a good power small and middle size states can seek status alongside or just below great powers. It can achieve honor and prestige by doing something good in spite of its size and it can receive recognition by great powers which allow them to enter new arenas and take part in global politics. One way of doing this is to engage and take responsibility for international peace and security (Wohlforth et al., 2017).
3.0 Methodological choices and framework
In social research methods it is typically two approaches used: quantitative and qualitative research. While quantitative research is known for bringing more “hard data” through statistics and numbers, qualitative research is known for being more in-depth, based on contextual understanding and meanings. Since my research questions try to get a deeper understanding of Norway’s visions and approach to peace and further the motives for engaging in peace processes as Colombia, it will be more fruitful to use qualitative methods in my thesis (Bryman, 2016).

3.1 Sampling approach
When sampling the material for my research it was important to continuously remind myself of my research questions and why I have found these questions interesting to ask. Since my focus of study has been for one, Norway’s peace engagement seen through its vision, approach and motives, and second, its involvement specifically in the Colombian peace process, it was important for me to have a strategic sampling approach, more correctly a “generic purposive sampling”, that means that my sampling has not been randomly selected but based on my research questions (Bryman, 2016). The starting point on this thesis was my huge interest in the peace process in Colombia. After travelling to Colombia with the non-governmental organization “Latin-Amerikagruppene I Norge” (LAG), living with small-farmers on the countryside in Cauca, I got a deeper understanding of the conflicts many sides and the complexity of bringing upon peace in the country. With experiences, impressions and knowledge from the time in Colombia, I went home with an engagement of knowing more of the Colombian peace process as well as Norway’s role in it. In the search of knowing the status on the implementation and what Norway does at this stage, what strike me was that it is was so hard to find any good information from Norway’s side. I could find evaluations, documents and reports on Norway’s role in the negotiations but not any information on the implementation-period either no information on Norway’s work with the other guerilla-group, ELN. Further, because of my personal interest in the process, I was missing a clearer framework on how Norway work in peace process, what are their objectives, what is their approach, and what is defined as success. For that reason, I decided to look at practices in Colombia and compare them with Norway’s visions and approach demonstrated in their White papers. I wanted to see if the practices in Colombia could tell me anything more than the theory tells me, and if there is a correlation with the two. I terms of the missing “peace” in the peace processes Norway has engaged in and because of huge amount of time, resources
and capacity Norway uses on its peace and reconciliation work, I also wanted to get a deeper insight on the motives for engaging in such comprehensive peace processes. By looking into IR theory concerned foreign policy strategies of small states I found theories that argue that engaging in peace and security and acting as a good power can give status and recognition. For this reason, I have used “status-seeking through moral authority” as my main theory for this thesis.

3.2 Data Collection
For my research and design for data collection I have used documents, structural theories and semi-structural interviews. By using these methods, I have been able to collect data at different levels, some more official than others, some more personal than others, and some more valid and relevant than other. The main point is to use this different data to get a more representative overlook and to be able to do some categorizing or comparison of them (Bryman, 2016). I find documents useful because of its varicosity. Documents can be personal, official and written by different agencies as the state, the private sector and the mass media, which makes it possible for a broad analysis of the theme (Bryman 2016, ch. 23). To understand the Norwegian engagement for peace I have looked to official documents from the governments page but also public reports from research institutions in Norway and abroad. Together with this I have collected articles, public statements, interview and research on Norway’s visions, approach and motives for peace. In terms of analyzing Norway’s efforts in Colombia I have used NORAD’s evaluation as a base of study and empirical exploration before I have added more articles and research on Norway’s effort in the process. KROC institute’s reports on the implementation has also provided a structural and firm study, based on qualitative and quantitative methods, which has been useful to demonstrate the realities in the implementation-stage.

Interviews has also been an important source for my thesis. With interviews I have had the opportunity to selectively choose my interviewees and questions to collect the information needed for my research. At the same time, it has provided me with more personal aspects and possibly new views and information (Bryman, 2016, ch.20). For me to actually get some insight and information on the realities for Norway as a peace builder in Colombia, but also in general, this was crucial. I chose to do semi-structured interviews since this type of interview-structure allows you to move more freely between the questions as the conversation goes on and creates a good and unthreatening environment for the informants (Bryman, 2016).
Concerning my time and scope I was selective in my choices for informants. I contacted people from the MFA, ambassadors, researcher on Colombia peace process, on Norway’s peace engagement, as well as academics and journalists. Unfortunately, not all were able to put time aside, but I do believe I have got some good information that can inspire to further research.

3.3 Validity and reliability
In my research I have presented a variety of documents that gives a broad view on Norway’s peace and peacebuilding efforts. Further I have provided the researcher with more personal information concerning my research questions, in terms of semi-structural interviews. Either how, there are also more research that could be done, more interviews and documents to be included that could have given more strength to the thesis. Since the “status-seeking theory” is relatively new and that this quest of status is hard to grasp, more interviews would have been fruitful for my thesis. One important note on my data collection is that many well-established documents on Norway’s peace engagement are ordered or produced by the MFA or by institutions connected to the government. This affects the reliability or at least the objectivity of these papers which again can affect my overall thesis. The other important note is that qualitative data never can be hundred percent reliable. As qualitative data is based on words and personal experiences and not numbers and broad data, this data can only provide some insight and give better understanding of the features (Bryman, 2016).
SECTION ONE: “Norway as a “promoter for peace”

Norway has since the 1990s been active in peace and reconciliation processes. The country has made peace diplomacy an important part of their development model and foreign affairs and is recognized both domestically and internationally as a promoter for peace and solidarity. The engagement, also known as the “policy of involvement”, started after the Cold War when Norway engaged in many peace processes around the world and got known, by others, for its work in the Palestine- Israel conflict, called “the Oslo Accords.” Since then peacebuilding has been an important part of Norwegian foreign policy and in 2003 the government established a unit in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) dedicated to work with peace processes and conflict resolution, called “Section for Peace and Reconciliation”. Norway has by time established a rumor of having a unique way of promoting peace in different peace processes, so unique that it has been called the “Norwegian model for Peace” (Skånland, 2008).

1.1 Entering the peacebuilding field

Norway`s promotion for peace was not visualized before after 1993 and Norway`s role in the “Oslo-Accords”. Before 1993 peace was packed into the framework of “development aid” and “humanitarian assistance” and was not seen as a field alone. Stability and peace were constructed as preconditions for development, and it follows that Norway should contribute to deducting conflicts. After Norway took part in the Palestine-Israel conflict however, this changes rapidly. Norway`s success in this peace process created an optimism and a promotion of Norway as a leading country on peace engagement. Not only was this demonstrated in the media, but politicians in Norway also recognized it. The peace engagement was now referred to as “the policy of involvement” as was made essential in Norway`s foreign policy (Stokke, 2010).

In the governments White Papers before and after the “Oslo Accord” (as the engagement in the Middle East was known for) the notion of peace and Norway`s role is seen as increasingly importance. In the White Paper, “Peace, Conflict Resolution, and Democracy Promotion” published in 1995, it says that active participation in peace promotion is a major innovation in Norway`s international engagement, and that such efforts will be highly prioritized where Norway may make a difference. The report similarly highlights peace promotion as one of three main goals of Norwegian South policy and argues that Norway should be prepared to use more resources on peace and conflict resolution (Skånland, 2008). After the engagement
in the Middle East there was also developing a thinking of Norway with comparative advantages as a small state with no other interest than creating peace (Skånland, 2008, p. 48-49).

The Focus on promoting peace continued and only got stronger in the later publications by the government. Since 1995, peacebuilding and conflict prevention was an important part of the humanitarian approach and vice versa but is also developed as a field alone. In 2003 the MFA created the “section for peace and reconciliation” and not long after was there established a “strategic framework for peacebuilding” through the MFA. This was the first report to address how Norway “should” and “are” working for peace. In the report Norway addresses that the main goal for peacebuilding is to prevent armed conflict and building lasting and sustainable peace. To achieve this Norway points to preventing armed conflict from breaking out, facilitating and supporting peacemaking processes, and to help (re) build post-conflict societies (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004).

In the foreword of the document, the Minister of International Development, Hilde Frafjord Johnson, states that:

«Preventing conflict and making, keeping and building peace is a priority in Norwegian foreign policy. This also applies to development policy» (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004, p. 4).

Further the report emphasizes on the importance of understanding the underlying causes of conflicts and take steps to deal with them. It states that it requires trust between the parties, reconciliation among the people, enough security, a reasonable distribution of goods and burdens, and possibility for political participation. “Norway must promote national ownership and seek to ensure that the international community`s efforts to prevent conflict and build peace are comprehensive, coherent and well co-ordinated” (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004, p. 11). In terms of the strategic framework Norway also points to their commitment to the three mutually reinforcing dimensions of peacebuilding; security, political development and social and economic development, and further commit to support initiatives taken on these dimensions through the UN (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004).

Since this report was published in 2004, there has been no follow-up on the strategic framework on peacebuilding. Several reports, evaluations and “white papers” has however continued to demonstrate Norway`s engagement for peace and reconciliation. In 2015 there was published a report on “Peace, Security and Development”. The aim of this report was to
approach the challenges in the field of *peace, security and development* and demonstrate how these fields has positive effect on each other. The report is systemized into different important sub-categories to discuss what they indicate, how they should be tackled, the challenges to them and Norway’s overall contribution of the notion. Under ”*peacebuilding and peacekeeping*” it is addressed that it is in Norway’s interests to help maintain international peace and security in several manner. It points to the Norwegian Armed Forces as a vital resource for Norway on *peace and security* by contributing to UN peacekeeping operations, protecting authorities and civil population against armed groups, training armed forces in human rights, international humanitarian law, women’s rights and gender equality, and help monitoring implementation of peace agreements. Further it addresses the challenges of deep-rooted conflict based on control over valuable resources or illegal resources as drugs. Innovative solutions are suggested to this type of conflicts, that include better distribution of benefits as well as permanent control measures and considerable work on the part of the authorities over time;

"*In any case, the challenges posed by the underlying causes of the conflict will need to be addressed together with the parties to the conflict, on an ongoing basis*” (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2015, p. 12).

On the point on «*International conflict mitigation measures and mediation and reconciliation processes*» it is addressed that in many fragile states, the underlying conflict issues remain unresolved, and new issues may have arisen. It is addressed that in these cases, Norway and the international community’s dialogue with the parties should have a clear development focus, with emphasis on ensuring the safety of people and property. On this field Norway points to its extensive experience as a facilitator in peace processes, helping to stabilize and resolve a number of conflicts in developing countries. Norway also point again to its advantage as a small state without colonial past and with a good reputation as a nation of peace. On the other side it also acknowledges its earlier flaws by not knowing enough about the conditions in the countries it has been involved in. Therefore, the report points to greater effort to carry out more systematic context analyses and risk assessments in all its focus countries, especially on fragile states: «*In order for there to be a sustainable solution, proper follow-up work and the well-targeted use of long-term aid are also essential*» (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2015, p. 17).

An innovation in this report, separating it from earlier, is Norway’s focus on helping and
developing the UN mediation capacity by implementing its own *National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security*. This indicated that Norway gives priority to increasing the women’s participation and influence in peace and security processes (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2015, p. 19). It also addresses Norway’s continued commitment of fighting terrorism and Norway’s high priority to supporting the establishment of institutions that can offer stability in countries in transition from conflict to sustainable development (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2015).

The annual reports on Norway’s humanitarian policy also demonstrates a focus on humanitarian efforts, long-term development assistance and peacebuilding. The last report published in 2018 points to a more integrated approach of these three fields as was encouraged in the earlier reports. The report states that the concept of sustaining peace is guiding efforts in the UN. To build lasting peace and prevent new outbreaks of violence and humanitarian crises The UN system will have to work more effectively across institutional boundaries, have more inclusive processes and give more priority to peacebuilding measures. Concerning humanitarian efforts Norway puts its focus to reduce fragility and vulnerability by providing more sustainable solutions. This is further explained by helping people affected by conflict and crisis to meet their own needs by providing rehabilitation of institutions and services that can strengthen the individuals and local communities (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2018).

1.2 “The Norwegian Model for Peace”
During the increasing effort and recognition in the field of peacebuilding, but also the image of certain characteristics unique from others, there evolved a discourse on the Norwegian approach to peacebuilding. The discourse is known as the “Norwegian Model for Peace”. It is mainly known by four elements. *The first element* is what has been mentioned before, that Norway has a «small state advantage» in peace promotion. It addresses that Norway do not have a colonial past, no historical or vested interests, not affected by great power interests, and do not have muscle to pressure the parties to enter an agreement. These features are pointing to Norway’s impartiality and neutrality in peace processes. *The second element* is the close cooperation between Norwegian authorities, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and academic institutions, which strengthen the peace-engagement by drawing on NGOs’ and academic institutions` experience in the field - its flexibility, and contacts in the areas where the conflict is most present and challenging. *The third element* is that the Norwegian approach
is emphasizing and working on close contact with the parties and has confidence from the parties. Throughout the different peace efforts, it is highlighted that Norway has an ability of creating trust to the parties and between the parties by acting as a facilitator - passing on information, arranging meetings, and creating the environment for successful negotiation. This confidence to Norway as an actor is built through the Norwegian reputation as a facilitator, but also through the networks of the NGOs. The fourth element is that Norway has a long-term perspective on peacebuilding and is committed to provide aid and economic support for reconstruction, also after the peace-agreement, if necessary (Skånland, 2008, p. 87-89). The characteristics mentioned in the Norwegian Model for Peace is also presented on the governments’ webpage when presenting Norway’s peace engagement. It emphasizes its neutrality, long-term commitment, trust and willingness to talk to any part that wishes for a peaceful solution. The focus on bringing in more significant actors as women and victims is also addressed as well as Norway’s accept for failure. It states that Norway recognizes that no case is similar and that peace processes are complex (Norway’s approach to peace and reconciliation work, 2016).

To sum up we have seen that Norway has had a long tradition in engaging for peace and has been taking increasingly part in peace processes the last decades. Further we have seen that its peace efforts have become an important part of its foreign policy by developing a framework for its peacebuilding and creating an own section on peace and reconciliation (Skånland, 2018). In terms of their vision for peace and peacebuilding we have seen that Norway aims at creating lasting and sustainable peace by addressing roots causes of conflict and by supporting the UN in their initiatives for peace (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004) We have also seen that Norway has developed unique features of its peace engagement because of its advantages as a small state with no colonial past. It is addressed as a neutral and impartial actor which is flexible, trustworthy and willing to talks to all parties. Further it is an actor that commits long term, gives ownership to the parties and do not have any further interest than promoting peace (Skånland, 2018).
SECTION TWO: Empirical Exploration

To better understand Norway’s peace engagement in practise I now turn to my choice of empirical case: the Colombian peace process and Norway’s role in it. I will give a short introduction to the background of the conflict and the peace processes before I turn to the Havana accord and Norway’s role.

2.1 A long rooted conflict.
2016 was a historical year for Colombia. After over 50 years of civil war and many attempts of negotiating peace between the Colombian government, paramilitary groups and guerillas, a peace agreement between the FARC and the Colombian government was finally established, November 24th 2016 (Nylander, Sandberg, & Tvedt, 2018).

The Colombian conflict is rooted all back to the time of colonization with a divided country in terms of ethnical groups, different regions and political ideology. FARC-EP was a result of the political conflict between the two ruling parties, the Liberals and the Conservatives, which turned out to a massive violent confrontation in the 1950s, known as “La Violencia”, affecting not only the cities but also the more outskirt areas where more marginalized farmers lived. In reaction to this violent affection on rural properties and the high political concentration in the country, farmers took to arms to protect themselves and to force a regime change. Those farmers established “the revolutionary armed forces of Colombia” (FARC-EP), inspired by communist ideology (González, 2004).

Since then there has been an ongoing conflict between the guerilla and the government as well as paramilitary groups ordered from the big landowners. The paramilitary groups in Colombia has also been a big part of the conflict by operating as an armed group beside the official army, hired by the Colombian elite and drug Trafficant’s to “remove” guerillas and “radical views” on the left side. The civil war has mainly been over distribution of land and ownership to land, but it has also been on the reaction to the political polarization in the country and the political depression on any opposition. With an increase in production of illicit crops and drug cartels, this has also been a financial source to the war and created more violence (González, 2004). Since its beginning the civil war has caused over 200 000 people’s life’s, thousands of forced disappearances and kidnappings and almost 7 million displaced (Herbolzheimer, 2016, p.1).
2.2 The Colombian peace processes
There have been many attempts of establishing peaceful means since the conflict started. The first attempts were in early 1980s and involved a ceasefire between the two parties and an establishment of a left-wing party, known as “Union Patriotica” (UP). The negotiations included commitments from the FARC to condemn the practice of kidnapping and extortion, but also commitments from the government to modernize the political institutions and develop the rural areas in the country in terms of agrarian reform, better education, health and labor policy. But because of the lack of will to open for a broader political sphere from the military and economic elite, the negotiations were interrupted (Posso, 2004, p.46-48). A new agreement was established in 1986 to end the political isolation and moving forward, but the continuous confrontations between the FARC and the military did stop and the deal-breaker and the most tragic event was the killing of 3000 members of UP by paramilitary groups. The paramilitary groups were connected to what was known as the “United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia” (AUC), which was in collusion with state security forces to eliminate the political party (Herbolzheimer, 2016, p.1). This affected the dynamics in the conflict were the FARC got skeptical to a political solution to the conflict and changed the balance between the political and military wings of the organization. New attempts of negotiations were tried in 1991 and 1992, both inside and outside of the country, but without further success (Posso, 2004, p.47-48).

Rounds of negotiations were taken up again under Andrés Pastrana Arango (1998-2002) and the idea of a “New Colombia” through political, economic and social change arise with optimism both nationally and internationally (Posso, 2004, p. 49). The peace process was comprehensive and innovative and included presence of European and American government representatives as observers or facilitators, as well as representatives of the UN Secretary General and various UN agencies. The problem of this round of negotiations however was the little faith in creating a “New Colombia” without seeing a ceasefire and definite end to hostilities first. This skeptic wasn’t just from the large business groups and the traditional power holders, but also from the civilian populations that still experienced military actions and violence against them (Posso, 2004, p. 49). The tensions increased in the 2000s; the FARC increased in a steady phase and the paramilitary groups multiplied together with the greater involvement in drug and arms trafficking. With help from the US through “Plan Colombia”, security forces also increased in military strength and equipment. The international context of “War against Terror” as well as “the Drug War” made the situation
more intense and the peace process reached its lowest point of political backing (Posso, 2004, p. 49-50).

2.3 The Havana Accord
It was not before the presidency of Juan Manuel Santos (2010-2018) that the peace process succeeded. The parties regained contact in 2010 and started secret talks, first in Venezuela and Norway, then In Havana, Cuba. The peace negotiation with the president Santos involved many of the same points as the peace negotiation done under president Pastrana but had some fundamental changes. The framework on this peace talks was much narrower to begin with. Instead of addressing the economic, legislative, justice and security reforms, the negotiations started with the issue of rural development and guarantees of political participation and had a narrower goal; “putting an end to the conflict” (Herbolzheimer, 2016, p. 3).

The secret exploratory talks in Havana started in 2012. The Cuban government provided a good hospitality, support and security at all times. There were held ten negotiation rounds from February to August, each lasting between four and eight days. The agenda was signed on the 27th of August. It included six items - five on substantive matters, and one on implementation (Nylander, Sandberg, & Tvedt, 2018, p.2-3). The five items were: rural development, political participation, illicit crops, victims and conflict termination, and the last were concerning the implementation of them (Herbolzheimer, 2016, p. 2). After a lot of discussion, the negotiation agenda was also set, and the parties agreed that the overall aim of the peace talks was to end the armed conflict. This allowed the parties to focus on topics that were strictly necessary to end the conflict and what would be desirable elements for building peace later on. The framework tried to cover both the causes and effects of the conflict and separated the 5 items in these two categories. The agenda was set in chronological design, pushing back the most difficult themes at the end. There was a principle saying: "nothing is agreed until everything is agreed», meaning that the final peace agreement was a comprehensive package where every issue was intertwined (Nylander, Sandberg, & Tvedt, 2018, p. 3).

The agreement has been unique by adding focus points, working groups and commission on all points. Including women, victims and more actors directly involved at the negotiating table. The logistics around the peace talks were also comprehensive and though through with
many actors involved, both domestically and internationally. The formal talks took place in Havana, Cuba, and had a high-intensity work schedule where the meeting would last for sessions of 11 days, followed by short period of internal consultations and preparations for the next round of talks. By the beginning of the next round the parties would come with a joint statement on the development that had been done so far. When it came to the mandate and support each could appoint up to ten delegates (five that would be plenipotentiaries), assisted by a bigger team of around 20 people. The FARC was composed entirely by combatants and would rotate some of its commanders taking place, to make sure of a broad ownership and leadership commitment, and to provide feedback to FARC rank-and-file combatants about the development in Havana (Herbolzheimer, 2016, p. 2-3).

On the governmental side they were a careful selection to make sure of the commitment of two key stakeholders: the private and the security sectors. One retired general from the armed forces and one from the police, together with the one prominent business leader, the chief negotiator, Humberto de la Calle, and the peace commissioner, Sergio Jaramillo. The peace talks took place without a ceasefire; this was to state the strength and determination both to the FARC, the public opinion and the security sector (Herbolzheimer, 2016, p. 2-3).

The peace negotiations took time and effort both before and during the negotiations were the first three issues went relatively smoothly with the time of six months, whereas the two last issues concerning the victims and justice took more time. This was because of the considerable pressure from the public opinion in Colombia that impunity would be rejected for the crimes committed by both sides. These issues took 15 months to agree upon. After settling these contentious issues, the rest of the negotiations went on a “fast track” which meant working in parallel sub-commissions. The deadline of 23rd March 2016 was however not met. This was connected to the complexity around demobilization and weapon decommissioning, but also concerned the need to ensure the comprehensive implementation of a peace agreement (Herbolzheimer, 2016, p. 2-3).

2.4 Norway’s engagement in the Colombian peace process

Norway’s peace engagement in Colombia did first take place during the Pastrana negotiations (1998-2002) as a member of the Facilitating Commission and with Jan Egeland’s subsequent appointment as SRSG (Special Representative of the Secretary General). Egeland was the first to facilitate the visit of FARC commanders to Norway, in February 2000. Raul Reyes
and four other members of the FARC secretariat, as well as the organization’s highest decision-making organ, met with representatives of the Colombian Government in a location on the outskirts of Oslo to learn about the “Norwegian Model” (Fabra-Mata & Wilhelmsen, 2018, p.20). One of the advices from Egeland was to engage the military in the peace dialogue. This advice led to Norwegian support for the project “Skilling the Armed Actors for Peace in Colombia”, known as conversatorios (dialogues). The purpose for the project was to facilitate conversations between officers from the Colombian army and government officials, civil society actors and politicians representing the entire spectrum in preparation for potential peace processes. The conversatorios started in 2001 and continues today, with Norwegian government support. In 2005 Norway also contributed in the peace negotiations with the next biggest guerrilla-group, ELN. As a part of the «Group of Friends» (six member countries) Norway acted as a facilitator and supported civil society initiatives connected to exploratory peace talks. From the Norwegian Embassy in Bogotá, two Norwegian diplomats closely followed the talks between the ELN and the Colombian Government in those years. One of them was Norway’s Head of Mission in Bogota between 2006 and 2008, Dag Nylander, who later become Norwegian Special Envoy for the Peace Process between the Colombian Government and the FARC (Fabra-Mata & Wilhelmsen, 2018).

The talks that started in 2010 with the new president Juan Manuel Santos meant a more significant role for Norway as contributor to peace in the country. Norway together with Cuba was assigned as guarantors for the peace talks, all the way from the secret ones. Norway was chosen by several important reasons. One was their reputation as a «promoter for peace», with its foreign policy and earlier experience in peace processes. Another was Norway’s separation from the EU and US, and Norway’s willingness to support any party as long as they wanted to settle for peaceful means. Norway’s financial support was also crucial in giving technical support to the process, but a more significant factor was the trust Norway had in Colombia. Norway had already created contacts and good relationship in Colombia during the peace talks with the ELN. The guerilla-group stated through the secretariat: “we appreciated Norway’s willingness and experience. Some fellow comrades showed reluctance due to its NATO membership, but that was not an obstacle for us to give Norway the go-ahead” (Fabra-Mata & Wilhelmsen, 2018, p.25).

The Norwegian Embassy in Bogota kept picking up signals of a potential peace role for Norway. Norway was again invited to participate in another attempt at negotiating peace with
the FARC, this time through Dag Nylander. The success performance the Norwegian team’s had in the secret talks secured Norway’s role as a facilitator during the public negotiations. During the secret phase the negotiating parties decided that the guarantor countries had to be present at the meetings, listening to the discussions without intervening. By being present, the guarantors were expected to infuse solemnity and serenity into the direct negotiations. As important, they would gain a valuable insight to the discussions that could allow them to support the process and assist the parties to stay on track (Fabra-Mata & Wilhelmsen, 2018).

Norway and Cuba did not have a written mandate as guarantor countries. The Colombians were in the driving seat and had ownership of the negotiations. The guarantors, Norway and Cuba were to provide security to the negotiating parties both in legal, diplomatic, logistical, physical and even emotional domains. This meant a flexible role ranging from capacity-building, logistical support, trust-building, witnessing functions, and classic facilitation to more mediation-like initiatives - depending on the situation and according to the degree of tension and the pace of the negotiations (Fabra-Mata & Wilhelmsen, 2018, p.24-26).

The Colombian peace process also meant new approaches from Norway when it came to peacebuilding. Norway decided to have "focus areas” to help prioritize its work, achieve results and make its contribution more visible. The focus points was set between November 2012 and February 2013, and they were on women’s participation in the peace process and the inclusion of a gender perspective, demeaning, transitional justice, and children in armed conflict (Fabra-Mata & Wilhelmsen, 2018).

2.4.1 Women and Gender
The gender approach and focus on women`s participation got a lot of attention internationally and was an innovation in peace negotiations. Never before had gender gained such a prominent status in peace processes and in September 2014 it reached a milestone with the establishment of the Sub-commission on Gender. The Sub-commission was put through by many actors as Colombian women’s groups, the push from within the negotiations by women within the FARC and government delegations, and support from international actors including UN Women and guarantor countries (Fabra-Mata & Wilhelmsen, 2018).

The Norwegian engagement on “Women, Peace and Security” (WPS) started before the peace talks in Colombia, and the country was already one of five focus countries for Norway when
it came to promote initiatives to advance the WPS agenda. When the exploratory talks began, the Norwegian team encouraged the negotiating parties to include women in their delegations and to promote gender perspectives as an integral part of the peace process. The team further argued that the centrality of victims and women’s voice was crucial to ensure ownership of the peace process (Fabra-Mata & Wilhelmsen, 2018).

To achieve the desired goals around including women, the Norwegian team collaborated with UN Women and Colombian civil society actors. At the political level, UN Women and Norway devised strategic approaches to raise awareness of the importance of the WPS agenda. Information was shared between UN Women, Norway’s embassy in Bogotá and its Special Envoy for the Peace Process, as well as between the Norwegian team and the UN Women headquarters in New York. The stream of information was most intense in the first years of the public phase of the negotiations but existed throughout the process. The main focus was to address the voices of the Colombian women and bring concrete proposals beyond ensuring their participation (Fabra-Mata & Wilhelmsen, 2018, p.27-28).

The programmatic collaboration between the Norwegian team and UN Women was well demonstrated under the two National Summits of Women and Peace organized in Colombia in 2013 and 2016. Norway provided with funding and political support to UN Women for the summit in October 2013, where around 450 women from all over Colombia participated. Later, the UN Women presented these proposals to the negotiating teams in Havana, with Norwegian support. Not long after this summit did President Santos appoint two woman as plenipotentiary negotiators, and a female commander joined FARC’s negotiation team. Since 2009 UN Women in Colombia had been receiving Norwegian financial support for its country programme to strengthen women’s participation in peacebuilding. This funding has provided training sessions for newly appointed government women plenipotentiary negotiators; briefed the Oficina del Alto Comisionado para la Paz (Office of the High Commissioner for Peace, OACP), Organized regional workshops with women on “the end of the conflict”, assisted in facilitating the visit of women victims to the conflict to Havana, and arranged meetings between those women victims and women negotiators (Fabra-Mata & Wilhelmsen, 2018, p. 28).

The Sub-commission on Gender was an achievement in itself, leading to including a gender perspective in the peace negotiations and the final peace agreement. The goal of the Sub-commission on Gender was tasked to; “review with the support of national and international
experts, that the agreements reached, and eventual final agreement will have an appropriate gender approach”. Norway and Cuba have given technical support and provided gender experts to provide advices in the form of drafting notes on experiences from other peace processes, with suggestions on gender-sensitive text or supporting the reviews of the partial agreement. Important here were that the three gender experts worked under a set of ad hoc principles: technical advice was to be provided on demand by the negotiating parties. By funding of Norway, UN Women also invited three delegations of women’s groups and lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans and interest (LGBTI) representatives, that would participate in the peace negotiations during the autumn of 2014 and spring 2015. Experts of conflict-related sexual violence and gender equality were also invited to the negotiations and coordinated with the guarantor countries. Finally, on the negotiating parties’ request, the Norwegian and Cuban technical experts assisted sub-commission in identifying, and inviting female ex-combatants from other guerrilla groups, to share their experiences on demobilization and transition to civil life. This took place in May 2016 (Fabra-Mata & Wilhelmsen, 2018, p.30).

For Norway to follow up on women’s role they maintained good contacts and regular dialogue with various women’s organizations and networks. One strategic partner for Norway was the Norwegian civil society organization, The Forum for Women and Development (FOKUS). The FOKUS programme relating to UNSCR 1325 in Colombia (funded by 29 million Norwegian kroner (NOK) from 2010-2016) contributed to strengthening the women’s movement in peacebuilding. The work of FOKUS’s partner in Colombia, “Humanas”, together with other organizations, was significant in lobbing for the incorporation of conflict-related sexual violence and exempting amnesties for sexual perpetrators in the peace agreement (Fabra-Mata & Wilhelmsen, 2018, p.30).

Seen away for this positive inclusion of women and gender perspective, the «no» in the referendum showed that the gender language needed to be changed. The Norwegian team identified a lesson learned, that a too repetitive and imprecise from of language on gender may have contributed to fostering the fear of a «gender ideology» and eventually contributed to the people’s rejection of the peace accord. The renegotiated accord made some clarifying around the definitions and what it included. In the final accord there were eight thematic areas and all of them included rights of women but also of those people with diverse sexual orientations and identities. There have just been two other peace processes - in Northern Ireland and the Philippines - where there has been a positive reference to sexual orientation
2.4.2 Transitional Justice
Norway’s overall goal in the Colombian peace process was to assist the parties in achieving an accord that would combine peace and justice, in accordance with international law and Colombia’s legal obligations. To reach that goal it was important to increase awareness, especially towards the FARC, about the role of international law and the limits it puts on negotiation outcomes, but also to ensure the necessary balance in knowledge and capacity between the two negotiating parties (Fabra-Mata & Wilhelmsen, 2018, p.32).

There was a clear asymmetry in knowledge between the FARC and the Government when it came to Colombia’s legal framework, international legal norms connected to human rights violations, and serious crimes under international law. A focus for Norway was to support the FARC to gain access to expertise on transitional justice, by inviting experts to Havana and finance advisors to assist the FARC delegation on the issue. Norway’s first initiative was to bring two experts to Havana, Priscilla Hayner and Morten Bergsmo, to talk to the FARC about transitional justice and international criminal law. In 2012 these experts were some of the first outsiders to talk with the FARC delegation about human right and international criminal law (Fabra-Mata & Wilhelmsen, 2018, p.32).

Not long after was there arranged a seminar in New York on orders from Norway. Experts meet to explore challenges and map expertise on the topic, and this group of people was later known as the «New York Group». Norway most visible work on transitional justice was done in this expert group. It was first and foremost a Norwegian idea and supported financially and technically by Norway throughout its time. The group met 13 times in total, in New York, but also in Bogotá, Havana, Madrid and Panama. The group worked under secrecy and obligations of confidentiality and served as a platform for discussion around the issue, testing ideas and models in a confidential setting. The group had seven members included both Colombian and non-Colombian experts. They had all some kind of legal background, were knowable about the Colombian legal framework, international criminal law, and the working of the ICC. Some also were social scientists with international experience on non-judicial transitional justice mechanisms. From the Norwegian facilitation team did, Dag Nylander and Idun Tvedt, participate regularly, together with Martin Sørby from the Legal Affairs Department in the MFA (Fabra-Mata & Wilhelmsen, 2018, p.32).
The group’s deliberations were also useful to the Norwegian facilitation team. By being present and «passively active» actor during the discussions of the New York Group, Norway had a good overview of the debates around the theme and the different reactions to concrete ideas. Together with this, the Norwegian team could make sure that those ideas were aligned with international norm and principles.

For Norway, as a part of the Rome Statue of the ICC, it could never agree to participate in a peace process where amnesties for crimes against humanity and war crimes were accepted (Fabra-Mata & Wilhelmsen, 2018, p.33-34).

Even though it is hard to conclude on which affect The New York group had on the peace talks in Havana, it is certain that they played a crucial role in putting forward different proposals on the issue of transitional justice. The group has also been credited with contributing to a change in the FARC’s perception on the transitional justice framework, to point on what is realistic and what is acceptable in terms of international standards.

The group concluded in January 2016 to end their meeting as the FARC delegation and the Colombian Government had signed an accord on the issue of victims some month earlier (Fabra-Mata & Wilhelmsen, 2018).

In the process of inviting victims to meet with the peace negotiators, which was an innovative and unique step in peace processes, Norway and Cuba only decided to serve as an informal channel between the organizers of the visits and the negotiating parties. Furthermore, members of the Norwegian team accompanied these victims when they travelled to Havana, and facilitated encounters, which were experienced as positive.

One of the less positive aspects, on the other side, was the absence of a clear follow-up strategy to support those victims after their return to Colombia. There was here a lack of support and capacity within the Norwegian team. This did also account for the civil society organizations, except «The International Centre for Transitional Justice” (ICTJ). There was ongoing contact with the ICT office in Bogotá and its received funding form Norway every year from 2010-2016. In return the organization provided in-depth analysis, expert advice and briefings on topics of mutual interests as for example children’s. Overall, Norway, on this issue, was working on straitening the imbalance of knowledge between the two parties, by funding legal advisors to the FARC but also by establishing the New York Group to create ideas and proposals that would make the issue meet both Colombian and International legal standards issues (Fabra-Mata & Wilhelmsen, 2018, p.36).
2.4.3 Demining.
Colombia is one of the most landline-contaminated countries in the world. Between 1982 and 2012, as much as 10,189 people have been victims of land mines. The situation has affected the everyday life in the communities and restricted the people’s movement and activities. On this issue Norway brought in two main elements. One was the corporation with the Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) to establish a demeaning pilot project, the other was the collaboration with the US on a demeaning initiative in Colombia. The Norwegian team believed that showing initiatives on the ground, as the demeaning pilot project, was important for public trust and support for the Colombian peace process. The project was announced by the negotiating parties in March 2015 and created an opportunity to build confidence between the parties, and among Colombians in general during the peace talks. The demeaning took place between May 2015 and December 2016 in the villages of El Orejón (Antioquia) and Santa Helena (Meta state), and NPA was in charge of the process. Seen away from the lack of civilian international actors with documented technical expertise and experience in demining, the NPA was trusted as a Norwegian actor with links to the Norwegian government. The Norway team itself promoted NPA as a strong social actor and pointed to its experience working on indigenous rights, land distribution and marginalized groups in Colombia (Fabra-Mata & Wilhelmsen, 2018, p. 36-37).

In year 2013, the NPA started to explore opportunities to engage in demining in Colombia, and they meet with representatives from national authorities, the Campana Colombiana Contra Mines (Colombian Campaign Against Landmines, CCCM), the Programa Presidencial para la Acción Integral contra Minas Antipersonal (Presidential programme for Comprehensive Mine Action, PAICMA), and other relevant actors. The registration process started in mid-2014 and NPA was accredited as a demeaning operator for the project in early May 2015. The NPA travelled to Havana to work with the two parties. NPA had separate meetings with the FARC and the government, facilitated by Norway. Demining was a complex topic in the case of who it would benefit, in which areas, when it would take place and the potential risks in the field for all involved. After intense meetings a final proposal was established, with number of points relating to the roles and responsibilities (Fabra-Mata & Wilhelmsen, 2018).

The process involved a balancing act between actors and called for deep contextual
knowledge of the peace negotiation dynamics, but more broadly on Colombian conflict, history and society, and diplomatic sensitivity. Because of Norway’s understanding of this, they worked to inform the NPA on the political environment, the dynamics between the two parties and the complexity of the operational situation (Fabra-Mata & Wilhelmsen, 2018, p. 38).

The pilot project resulted in the clearance of 40,723 square meters of land. In total 66 land mines and one item of unexploded ordnance were found and destroyed. The pilot project set the foundations for later demeaning and disarmament work, in terms of model for corporation, but also for practical issues as the need to identify FARC members involved in the pilot to comply with life insurance legislation. It provided some valuable lessons for the wider peace process (Fabra-Mata & Wilhelmsen, 2018, p. 38-39).

The demeaning pilot project also had another important effect in the peace process; building trust. It allays some of the mutual fears between the military and the guerrilla force and it gave positive indications around the wider peace process for the Colombian public. It forced the parties to work together in practice, sharing a logo and uniform as well as their day-today work, living side by side. This project also opened up a venue for collaboration between Norway and the US. They announced a global anti-landmine initiative in Colombia, formally launched in Washington on the 4th of February 2016, with the aim of making the country mine-free by 2021. Norway gave 180 million NOK over three years to this initiative. To follow up, an expert meeting on demeaning was organized in Bogotá in May 2016, with representatives from more than twenty countries. Not long after was also the UN General Assembly in New York, where Norway and the US, as well as 19 other nations and the EU, pledged 105 million US dollars to support landline surveys and clearance, mine risk education and assistance for survivors of land mines incidents in Colombia (Fabra-Mata & Wilhelmsen, 2018, p. 39). According to informants from both parties in the peace talks, Norway had a key role in both the Colombian demining pilot project and the international anti-landmine initiative. Norway stimulated discussion around the issue and actively lobbied to get NPA on board in the project. The anti-landmine initiative with the US also signalized that Norway was in the peace process for the long haul, also into the post-conflict phase (Fabra-Mata & Wilhelmsen, 2018, p. 39-40).
2.4.4 Children in Armed Conflict
The last focus area for Norway was «children in armed conflict». The focus and work on this issue, on the other hand, was limited. As the peace process evolved the time and capacity for this issue faded. Internally, the Norwegian team seemed to lack a goal and a framework on how to work around it, and who was the driving force and focal point for this topic within the team. Unlike the other focus areas there was no natural contact point in the MFA to manage the issue and other issues were then more central in the first years of negotiations. Anyhow, there were some actions done. One was exploratory talks with UNICEF and contact with the SRSG (Special Representative of the Secretary General) for children in armed conflict, and facilitating contact between the SRSG and the two negotiating parties. By November 2013, Norway signed up for a framework arrangement with the ICTJ (The International Center for Transitional Justice), with the focus on children and transitional justice in Colombia. Unfortunately, the focus on children fell under Norway`s focus on transitional justice and the discussions on reintegration in the implementation period. in May 2016, the FARC and the Colombian government reached an agreement on terms for withdrawing children under 15 years from the FARC, and the final peace accord included provisions protecting children`s rights. There are no significant traces of direct Norwegian contributions to these developments (Fabra-Mata & Wilhelmsen, 2018, p. 39.40).

2.5 Post-Agreement Colombia
An important notion in the peace process was also to prepare for the implementation-period. It was recognized that this process wouldn’t be easy and that there needed to be a correct focus and framework around the post-agreement period. One actor that got responsibility to follow up was the KROC institute. The KROC institute is a university-based research center for International Peace Studies and after the signing of the peace agreement, the institute was given with the responsibility for technical verification and monitoring of the implementation through the «Peace Accords Matrix” (PAM) (Peace Accords Matrix Colombia, u.d.). The KROC institute has published two reports on the status of the implementation in Colombia.

The first rapport published one year after the agreement state that the pace of the implementation of the Accord in the first months of the process is equivalent to or faster than that of other comprehensive peace agreements. Significant progress has been made in several short-term achievements, which lay the necessary foundations for the subsequent development of medium and long-term implementation objectives (Kroc Institute, 2017, p. 5).
One of the positive progresses that has been identified is the lying down of arms and cessation of violence during the first months. The FARC has delivered their arms and started their reincorporation program under the tripartite verification mechanism in the demobilization zones. Another progress has been the establishment of the foundation for implementation which included active functioning of the implementation and verification mechanisms (Kroc Institute, 2017, p.5). The obstacles on the other hand has proven to be the security guarantees and priorities for regulatory, legislative and administrative implementation. The security guarantees mean advancing the security and protection measures for ex-combatants of the FARC, human rights defenders, and communities in the territories. Even though there are normative advancements and a security deployment planned in the Accord, they are not yet seen effective at the territorial level ((Kroc Institute, 2017, p. 6). The legislative, normative and administrative priorities are also lacking behind. These points are setting the legal foundation for political participation, the drug issue, the right of victims and rural development. The report emphasizes that without approval of these laws, the legal security of the implementation process is at risk as well as the sustainability of peace (Kroc Institute, 2017, p. 6).

When it comes to the medium-term advancements the first rapport shows that there is need for more progress concerning the political, social, and economic reincorporation of ex-combatants. A more comprehensive system must be put in place to address the different needs of the ex-combatants and those imposed by the context of the different territories where reincorporation occurs. The definition of the collective and rural programs would also need to be specified (Kroc Institute, 2017, p. 6-7).

For long-term achievement there had been little progress. The long-term achievements include the roots of the conflict: issue of land use, economic development, rural reform, and illicit crops. It is recognized as the most comprehensive changes that needs time and effort, but the KROC report states that some progress is needed to maintain the optimism and prevent further setbacks (Kroc Institute, 2017, p. 7-8).

*The second* report published 18-month after the agreement shows that the implementation continues to advance but also shows that the challenges addressed in report one is still maintaining. Based on their research they have found that approximately 21 % of the stipulations in the Colombian Final Accord have been fully implemented, 9 % have an intermediate implementation level, and 31 % have been minimally implemented. 39 % percent of the commitment, however, has not been initiated (Kroc Institute, 2018, p.11).
Despite the progress achieved, there has been slow phase in important points, and new problems has arisen that could offer further setbacks (Kroc Institute, 2018, p.6). There are some serious concerns for the success of the implementation and enduring peace. The first is regarding security and community protection. Since the peace agreement has been signed there has been a serious human rights situation. The post-conflict period has been affected by assassinations on social leader, human right defenders, ex-combatants of FARC-EP and their families. The number is now alarmingly high and calls for serious attention. Together with this has the demobilization of the FARC created a political vacuum where new armed actors are entering the stage, fighting for power and resources. The situation is these rural areas are unsure and there is need for concrete actions, better inter-agency coordination as well as continued financial commitments. Security forces also need to adopt strategies and methods of human security and community protection (Kroc Institute, 2018, p. 15).

Another area of concern is the long-term political, social, and economic reincorporation for ex-combatants. The former FARC-EP combatants are now going back to society and integrating into civilian life. This, however, has shown to be more challenging than imagined. Its yet not clear how they will gain access to the land and agricultural livelihoods, there is no robust long-term reincorporation strategy that integrates the visions and considers the special needs of ex-combatants, and there is a lack of viable options for effective civilian reincorporation which is a better alternative than returning to armed violence or illegal activities (Kroc Institute, 2018, p. 16).

The last concern are the missing legislative and regulatory measures essential to achieving some of the central promises of the accord, including political representation of historically marginalized areas, and the centrality of victims and Victims Law. There is need for a better progress in legislation and regulation related to strengthening the policy for democratic and participatory planning, guarantees and promotion of citizen participation, and guarantees for social protest and mobilization To conclude, this report demonstrate that it is a lot to be done to implement the peace accord, and it demands political will and great commitment from several actors, including the parties themselves (Kroc Institute, 2018, p. 16).
SECTION THREE: Analysis and Discussions

In the previous sections we have seen that Norway has made peace and reconciliation an essential part of its foreign policy and has participated greatly in several peace processes all over the world. We have seen that Norway reason to this contribution as a result of its advantages as a small state, by being impartial and neutral, without self-interests or affection by great power games (Skånland, 2018). Norway has created a comprehensive framework of peacebuilding aiming at tackling the underlying causes of conflict and creating lasting and sustainable peace (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004). By doing that Norway has adapted unique characteristics as being impartial, neutral, flexible and long-term committed to the process. In the NORAD evaluation we have also seen that the Norwegian Model has been transferred into practice by offering solid facilitation, capacity building, trust between parties and great efforts concerning women and gender, transitional justice, demining and children in armed conflict (Fabra-Mata & Wilhelmsen, 2018). However, in the KROC reports we do see that there are some serious challenges in the implementation of the accord that can affect the further success of establishing a peaceful Colombia (Kroc, 2018).

In this section I will further investigate Norway’s engagement in Colombia and see if this empirical case can tell us something about Norway’s visions and approach to peace in a greater sense, as well as their motives for participating in such complex peace process. I will do the discussion and analysis with my research questions sharp in mind and try to come with some analytical view and concluding remarks to them.

This section main aim is to bring us closer to answering the research questions of this thesis:

**RQ1:** What does the peace process in Colombia tell us about Norway’s visions and approach for peace?

**RQ2:** Is Norway’s engagement in the Colombian peace process affected by a quest for status and recognition as a good power?
3.1 Between visions and realities

Since Norway made peacebuilding as an important part of their foreign policy there has been many discussions about Norway’s role in peacebuilding, Norway’s approach to peace and its success in peace processes. While some has applauded Norway’s uniqueness and great effort in peace processes, others have criticized Norway for not having any aim or objectives for its peace efforts other that promoting itself as a “peace-nation”. Trond Ljødal, a former analyst for “The Organization of American States” (OAS) makes a strong reaction to that NORAD, which is an agency for Development Cooperation and directorate under the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, has evaluated Norway’s peace engagement in Colombia without actually addressing if the peace agreement was a success or not. Further he finds it interesting that the evaluation state that there is a broad consensus on that Norway has a special tradition on promoting peace, but it doesn’t say anything about its objectives for engagement. “Is the goal just to be a "peace-nation"?” He asks. For Ljødal anyhow, it seems like Norway has a goal - to promote itself as an important actor in international politics, especially in relations to the US. He concludes his article by saying:

“*It is something terrible wrong with the way Norway does its peace engagement, in countries far away, that we know little about. This politics needs a critical and firm evaluation and it should come from others than NORAD*” (Ljødal, 2018a, my translation).

In an interview with Dag Nagoda, who is the Norwegian Special Representative to the Colombian Peace Process and has followed the peace talks since 2012, I ask if Norway does operate with objectives and visions when working in Colombia. First, he states that rather than operating with “visions”, the approach is a more practical one. This does not mean that Norway does not have clear objectives for the engagement in Colombia, both long-term and short-term. The long-term objective is a to create a lasting and sustainable peace in Colombia, without relapse into conflict, and the short-term objectives are to strengthen the institutions in the agreement and avoid apostasy of ex-FARC combatants, he states (D. Nagoda, personal interview, April 4, 2019).

Kristian Stokke, a professor in sociology and human geography, do come with some observations of Norway’s peace engagement during the last decades in his article “Peace-
building as a Small State Foreign Policy: Norway’s Peace Engagement in a Changing international Context”. The first observation is that peace processes where Norway plays a prominent role tend to focus on achieving peace deals rather than comprehensive political reforms for substantive democracy. Even though Norway often commit to long-term efforts, the peace processes has typically been characterized by the wish to achieve quick results in form of ceasefires and peace agreements. Secondly, he states that the peace processes that are influenced by the Norwegian model for peace tend to be strongly internationalized, even though Norway claims to uphold the principle of local peace ownership (Stokke, 2012).

In media coverage’s on Norway’s peacebuilding the question of Norway’s success and its contribution to peace is often the big question. Bård Drange in an article published in 2018, ask this question himself. In the article he addresses that Norway has had engagement in several countries as Sri Lanka, Guatemala and the Middle East and point to that the peace engagement in Colombia has been the most successful because of its ability to create trust between the parties and by giving the parties ownership to the process. However, Drange points to that Norway cannot create peace alone and that it’s depended on the geopolitical context and great power interests. What is interesting in this article however is that when speaking of success in peacebuilding or why peace is difficult to establish, Drange refers to the time until a peace agreement is signed, and the armed conflict are over. The time of implementation and social transformation is however not addressed. Concerned Colombia’s relative success it is also just referred to the efforts in the peace talks, even though this article is published almost two years after the implementation started (Drange, 2018). This notion of that peace equals a ceasefire and a settlement, is further criticized by Jacob Becker Stockfleth, a journalist and activist in LAG. In a publication on the government’s website, Erna Solberg, the Prime Minster of Norway, states on a conference with one of the biggest business actors in Colombia, that Norway has contributed to establish peace in Colombia and that this opens for “green investments”. Stockfleth find this interesting to state just two months after the signing of the peace agreement and questions if this is Norway’s simplistic image of peace or if this is a way to promote and justify its own interest in Colombia by calling it a win-win situation (Stockfleth, 2017).

The evaluation from NORAD doesn’t demonstrate any direct effort from Norway in terms of addressing the “root causes of conflict” as Nagoda argues are its long-term goal. Rather it shows that Norway work with issues as transitional justice, women and gender, generating
peace talks and creating a room for the parties to agree, which better can be said to be the “symptoms of war”. Concerning this, I asked Nagoda why there hasn’t been a focus on the underlying causes of conflict which are addressed as crucial to reaching “lasting and sustainable peace” (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004). He tells me that Norway’s priorities to a large extent are the result of an adaption to the realities on the ground. “First of all, we do think that gender issues, transitional justice and child recruitment also are key issues in and by themselves. “While we also recognize the need to work more with the underlying and structural causes of the conflict, we have to deal with most pressing issues first”. At this moment, he tells me, the issues of safeguarding the integrated system for transitional justice and ensuring the reintegration of former FARC combatants are the most pressing priorities:

“Without Transitional Justice there will be no reconciliation after war, no functioning Truth Commission and no justice for victims. When it comes to the re-integration of FARC-EP, which are about 13 000 ex-combatants, - if they don’t know where they shall live and what their future holds, we might end up with a more alarming situation than before with many fractions or new guerrillas with different motives and lack of leadership to negotiate with” (D. Nagoda, personal interview, April 4, 2019).

Further he underlines the importance of maintaining a long-term perspective and to establish the institutional framework that is needs to address the «bigger themes». «The parties themselves have a 15 years perspective on the implementation of the agreement and it is only two and a half years since the agreement was signed» (D. Nagoda, personal interview, April 4, 2019).

Concerning the observation of Stokke, that although Norway often commit to long-term efforts, the peace processes has typically been characterized by the wish to achieve quick results in form of ceasefires and peace agreement, one can say that there is evidence on that the peace processes that Norway has engaged in has ended up in an agreements and ceasefire, but that these agreements has not seen any successfully transformation to sustainable peace (Drange, 2018). Seen in the case of Colombia however there is commitment on behalf of Norway to ensure a comprehensive effort also in the implementation. Nagoda tells me that Norway will commit to the work in Colombia as long as they are welcome by the parties and needed in the country. He does, on the other hand, recognize that the implementation phase in
many ways is much more complex than the negation phase, and that there are many tough challenges ahead which demand political will from many different political actors in the country if they are to be resolved (D. Nagoda, personal interview, April 4, 2019).

Kristian Berg Harpviken, a sociologist and researcher at PRIO, tells me that even though it’s an uncertainty on how greatly Norway focus on the implementation period, Norway has been one of the actors with greater patient and points to that Norway still are leading the support group for Palestine. In terms of addressing what approach Norway has to peace and the structural causes of conflict, Berg point to that its mainly two factors that affects how central the “root causes” is in each peace process. For one it is the parties’ attitude towards this question, which degree they want these underlying causes to be a part of the agenda and see possible solutions to them. The second factor is what kind of attitude the Norwegian team working on the concerning country has to these “root causes”. Berg further explains that factor one is most important, but that this offer challenges when Norway in a smaller and smaller degree leads on the process themselves and are affected by other actors (Berg, K, personal interview, May 9, 2019).

Gunnar M. Sørbø from the Chr. Michelsen Institute point to that Norway’s peace mediation has come under increasing challenges the last decades. For one he points to the broader power shift at the global level, with the emergent of developing powers that are more skeptic to Western ideas and models for conflict resolution. He also addresses it as challenging that the Trump Administration is not that preoccupied with issues like human rights, democracy and patient peace work, which could further weaken the bond between the US and Norway in peace processes. Second, he points to limitations to Norway’s “ownership” approach to peace efforts. This model can be problematic when a reform resistant state faces an intransigent rebel movement or there are key actors excluded from negotiations. The different domestic ideas of peace can make the mediation very difficult; he states. Third, he addresses that Norwegian mediation often has occurred in conflicts between a state and a non-state rebel group and has involved a twin approach by treating the two parties alike, an making a fair balance between the two parties. This however, he points to can create accusations of bias towards the non-state actor as in Sri Lanka were Norway was accused for being pro-Tiger and pro-Tamil (Sørbø, 2018).
With the new governmental shift in Colombia there has been some difficulties for Norway as a facilitator and guarantor for the peace process. As we have seen in media coverage’s the last months the new president, Iván Duque Márquez, from the conservative party Centro Democrático, has rejected six of the 159-point law that regulate the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP) court, which was established in the peace agreement. The JEP is a special tribunal, developed to judge those on both sides who have committed war crimes or crimes against humanity. In exchange for full confessions and reparations to victims, The JEP sentences war criminals to up to eight years of “restricted liberty”. This special tribunal was the measure that made the demobilization of the FARC real, and was seen as the backbone of the peace accord. Now that these laws are discussed and when Trump support Duque’s proposal, there is a fear of going to prison by former FARC-combatants, at worst get extradited to the US (WOLA, 2019).

In the Interview with Nagoda he also recognizes how damaging the political attacks against the JEP can be for the future of the peace agreement in Colombia. As we saw earlier, Nagoda pointed to how crucial the integrated system for transitional justice is for the further success of the peace accord. Nagoda also mentioned that there is a lack of political ownership to the agreement on behalf of the Duque-government, not just on this issue, but also in general. As he explains further: “there are many ways of preventing the success of a peace agreement. One is the rejection of laws that contributes to undermine the legitimacy of its key institutions. Another is to underfinance the implementation, which is a very effective way of undermining the agreement but hard to do anything about. Right now, for example, the very high number of Venezuelan migrants coming to Colombia is used to explain why the government cannot give priority to the implementation of the peace agreement.” (D. Nagoda, personal interview, April 4, 2019).

Nagoda also draws on one example that has been widely covered in the news, which is the issue of the substitution of illicit crops. The agreement established a program that offers support to poor farmers who sign up to remove their illicit crops voluntarily. As many as 140 000 families have signed up for the program, a clear sign that many poor farmers want to get out of the coca business if they are offered an alternative. With the change of government however, the funding for the program has been slashed. This does not only represent a breach of the peace agreement but also puts these farmers in a legal limbo: These 140 000 families have confessed that they are growing illicit crops and now fear that they will be subject to
prosecution from a government that is inclined to return to the old anti-drug policies based on enforced eradication and the use of herbicides. Nagoda do however say that this probably not will happen as long as the international society is watching, but it can still be very damaging to the credibility of the peace process (D. Nagoda, personal interview, April 4, 2019).

“The lack of ownership and political will in powerful sectors of society to follow up the peace accord makes the job very difficult for Norway as a guarantor country as well. Right now, we are using a lot of efforts just to avoid set-backs and explaining why the peace agreement should not be regarded as a threat but as an opportunity to deal with Colombia’s many challenges.”. Further Nagoda points to the importance that the agreement is understood to be a responsibility of the Colombian state, not the government. The agreement is a part of Colombia’s constitution and must be followed no matter who is in government (D. Nagoda, personal interview, April 4, 2019).

There have also been significant changes in the geopolitical context that has affected the peace process. When starting the talks with the FARC and the Colombian government, there was the Obama administration in the US, Santos in Colombia, and broad regional support from Brazil, Venezuela and Chile, all setting the conditions for success. Today however, there has been a political shift, Trump is now president for the United States, more right-wing governments have returned to power in the region, the situation in Venezuela is creating regional unrest and the conservatives are back in power in Colombia. As Nagoda underlines: this creates a more difficult environment for the implementation and is also a reason why there is no progress in the negotiations with the ELN, the other guerrilla group in Colombia (D. Nagoda, personal interview, April 4, 2019).

The affection of the geopolitical environment on Norway is also stated by Stokke. He addresses that Norway has been affected by the geopolitical context in terms of their peacebuilding approach during the last decades, and that seen away from their unique features it has been strongly institutionalized. He argues that Norway’s approach to peace reflects the international hegemony of liberal peace and especially the orthodox approach to peacebuilding: “Norway became an aid donor with a "peace nation” identity and close links to the US, to play a greater role in international politics.” At the same time, he states that Norway adapted a model for peace which revolves around facilitating dialogue, funding peacebuilding and coordinating networks of «like-minded» actors to promote negotiated
transitions to liberal peace. Further he argues that Norway has turned more to a realist approach the last years by recognizing and publicly stating that there also are self-interests in its peace engagement. He points to 2009 report to the parliament were the Minister of Foreign Affairs states that Norway’s real political interest has been extended due to globalization and that the Norwegian engagement politics are ethnically justified but in addition also in Norway’s interests (Stokke, 2012).

This is also visible in the white papers of Norway since the beginning of its peace engagement. Together with the “War on Terror”, Norway in 2006 published a report on “Foreign Policy Strategy for Combating International Terrorism”. In the foreword the Foreign Minister, Jonas Gahr Støre states:

“The purpose of this publication is to present the Norwegian Government’s counter-terrorism efforts, which are based on a strategic, Comprehensive and broad national approach, on international Cooperation with the United Nations in the lead, and on the fundamental Values that we wish to defend” (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2016, p. 4).

In terms of Colombia there has not been stated that Norway has arrived with a “liberal package” but we do see evidence that Norway are operating under a liberal framework and with liberal actors. There is a support for democratic transitions, human rights, transitional justice and human security. One of the focus points for Norway has been the issue of transitional justice and women, peace and security (WPS), both important features of the liberal peacebuilding and the UN framework (Fabra-Mata & Wilhelmsen, 2018).

When I asked Dag Nagoda how Norway’s approach in Colombia is affected by liberal policies, he stated that Norway does not operate in a vacuum and does not pretend to be a neutral actor. On the contrary, we are clear about our values, and our experience is that this is important to create trust with the parties, whether they share the same values or not. Further he says that there is no doubt that the US has an important role in many conflicts and at that a good relationship with the US makes Norway’s role easier and more efficient than it would have been with a more conflicting relationship. He also mentions that the Norwegian team work closely with Cuba, the EU, the UN and other international actors and that the approach can better be described as pragmatic and collaborative than affected by a certain kind of model (D. Nagoda, personal interview, April 4, 2019).
This Stokke also supports. He states that Norway has offered some unique characterizes in peacebuilding processes, that has showed a structural effect no matter the context. The basic building blocks of the approach is the invited facilitation of political negotiations rather than interventionist peacemaking, which involves the characteristics of the «Norwegian Model for Peace» as impartiality, flexible, instrumental and long-term use of humanitarian and development aid, but also humanitarian rehabilitation and development for peacebuilding through partnership between state authorities, NGOs and multilateral aid agencies. The Norwegian approach further gives ownership to the parties and gives them selves’ limited power to define the process or outcome of negotiations (Stokke, 2012).

Seen in the NORAD evaluation this features of the Norwegian model has been present in Colombia as well, where Norway has offered facilitation based on impartiality, but also by being flexible by giving support on logistics and resources and contributing with capacity-building between the parties, making sure of a balanced and good environment for peaceful solutions (Fabra-Mata & Wilhelmsen, 2018).

Anette Wilhelmsen and Per Øyvind Bastøe both working on NORAD’s evaluation department, support Norway’s unique approach in their article “Conditions for successful Norwegian peace-engagement”, and argue that if Norway should have a future as a “peace builder” it has to prioritize stronger where it shall contribute, concerning where it has good conditions of success. They further point to that a condition necessary for being a good facilitator is trust and points to Norway’s capacity of creating this trust by being a small team committing to be a part of all the negotiations, supporting all parties. Further they mention the importance of priorities - a good facilitator needs capacity in terms of time, competence and resources. Norway contributed here with different experts, organizations and civil society. It also contributed with logistics, and further support through the embassies in Colombia and Cuba (Bastøe & Wilhelmsen, 2018).

As a former volunteer to Colombia for the non-governmental organization “Latin-Amerikagruppene I Norge” (LAG) I experienced this engaging civil society on the countryside and was surprised to see how organized and political engaged the Colombian people are in the rural areas that are so distant from civilization. There is a huge environment of political mobilization, so big that it seen as a treat by the government. The supports for peace in Colombia are also strong in Norway were many NGOs are working with issues of justice, equality, human rights, human security etc. Many of the NGOs in Norway has further
contacts in the rural areas were the conflict have been most present and were more marginalized groups are living a more separate life from the cities. In an interview with Carolina Maira Johansen, from FOKUS, the non-governmental organization that took part in the peace process concerning the rights and empowerment of women, I asked her if there should be more “bottom-up” approaches to peace in Colombia and if she feel that the civil society is sufficient included in the peace process. She tells me that a lot of good effort comes from the civil society, both in Norway and in Colombia. For one she addressed the important role FOKUS and its partner-organizations in Colombia had on bringing in resolution 1325 and women’s important role in peace negotiations and implementation, but she also emphasize the important role civil society actors have for visualizing the realities in the rural territories and pressing for more structural changes that are important for a more just and peaceful Colombia. She does however say that civil society cannot do these transitions alone and are dependent on political will and engagement from more powerful actors. I, for that reason, asked her if the Norwegian NGOs working in Colombia was sufficient included in the Norwegian diplomacy’s decision-making and consultants rounds, and she answers that there is a good relationship between the NGOs in Norway and the MFA but also addresses that the civil society could have been used more. Concerning the future forward and efforts in the implementation Johansen states that we have to redefine the word “post-conflict” to “post-signing” – there is still great efforts that needs to be done for a just and peaceful Colombia (C.M.Johansen, personal interview, April 30, 2019).

Nagoda recognizes the importance of the civil society in the Colombian peace process. “Civil society organizations and activist play an important role in mobilizing people and calling the attention to what happens in the countryside. That’s why Norway has close relations with both Norwegian and Colombian NGOs, social movements, human rights organizations, and the many other organizations working on the implementation of the peace agreement. At the same time Nagoda says that Norway’s efforts are only a small contribution compared to the big needs in the country. “The human rights situations are precarious, and we cannot compensate for the increasing levels of threat and killings of social leaders and human rights defenders. This illustrates the limitation that we face as an international actor in Colombia, and we are continuously looking for better ways to work together with the civil society” (D. Nagoda, personal interview, April 4, 2019).

In the NORAD evaluation it was also stated that one of the lessons to be learned for Norway
in Colombia is to inform the civil society. The majority of “no” vote in the referendum for the peace agreement showed a rejection of the peace agreement that might have been because lack of communication with the Colombian population. Sufficient trust was not established between the two parties and the Colombian people, a trust that might have been present if there were greater effort to inform them during the process (Fabra-Mata & Wilhelmsen, 2018).

3.2 Taking responsibility for peace and security

With the difficult conditions, conflicting parties and interests; why do Norway engage in such peace process as Colombia? In the theoretical section on status seeking as small state foreign policy, we have seen that small states use strategies of “good power” to achieve status and be visible in the international community. One way of achieving status is through engaging in “peace and security”. Norway has engaged in peace and security since late eighteenth century and with its tradition as a peace nation and unique model for peace it has been said that Norway “punches above its weight” (Wohlfforth et al., 2017).

Several scholars and researchers in the field of IR have connected status-seeking theory to Norway’s “policy of involvement”. One of the most firm and well-established research has been performed by Carvalho, Neumann, Leira and William C. Wohlfforth. In their article “Moral authority and status in International Relations: Good states and the social dimension of status seeking”, they point to that Norway use both strategies of mobility, competition and creativity to obtain status, and that this quest for status has roots all the way back to its independence. Further they point to three circumstantial factors that has conditioned Norway’s longstanding “good power” strategy. The first is the national identity and domestic preferences were Norway used a strategy of creativity. By presenting the Norwegian people as naturally born peaceful this fit well into the international peace discourse emerging at the same time. It was stressed that being small gave some kind of status, a status of not being power seekers and thus being credible agents of change. Added to the status of smallness was status of pursuing peace. While wanting to stay out of great power politics, Norway also wanted to change the rules of the game. This would by one give honor, and the change in itself would give Norway a better position of the rank of states in the system. This was a strategy of creativity and the moral action was connected to abstract goodness (Wohlfforth et al., 2017, p.12).
The second circumstantial factor they address is the international setting. The Second World War and the ensuing Cold War brought new ways of attaining status for Norway. Norway alliances with great Western powers through military forces as NATO, participated actively in the League of Nations (1919-39), and provided troops for UN peacekeeping missions since the late 1940s. Being a «good power» was not only sought on an abstract scale, but also by maintaining the system with strategies of mobility and creativity. While these new ways of engaging for peace and security might have given status to Norway, this cannot be said to be the main motive in this area. This however, changes after the Cold War. Norway brand itself as a peace-nation once again, now in a more active way than before. The political leadership of the MFA realized that there was status to gain by being a good power. Wohlforth et al (2017), points to a statement from one MFA official: ‘There is no doubt that the Norwegian involvement in a series of peace processes is what to a large extent gives us access to the tops in the [US] State Department’. Further there was recognition that the status of good power opened new doors for Norway. Former foreign minister Jagland says to his head of station in 2001:

“While we show solidarity and a helping hand to fellow human beings in misery, we become a much more central actor in international politics than what our nature-given preconditions would have made us, something which makes us an experienced contributor and interesting conversation partner, and opens doors which otherwise would have been shut” (Wohlforth et al., 2017, p. 15).

The importance of the policy of involvement, Wohlforth et al (2017) argue was a key to open otherwise closed doors, especially the doors to Brussels and Washington. Norway saw return through its policy of involvement in international peace and security. The approach was a strategy of creativity by changing the scales but had elements of mobility in the way that the policies were not in direct opposition to US goals (Wohlforth et al., 2017, p. 15).

The last circumstantial factor they address is luck and resource endowments. One important element of luck concerned Norway status as a peace promoter is when Alfred Nobel in 1895 decided that a committee by the Norwegian Storting should award a yearly peace prize in his name. This brought both foreign recognition and a status marker of peace, internationally and not least within Norway. Further they point to Norway`s luck in the sense
that it is a wealthy country that has capacity of using its resources where it has interests. Norway is the third or fourth richest country in the world, bested only by tiny city-states. These conditions have made it possible for Norway «to punch above its weight» and take actions for peace. They point to Norway’s engagement in the UN as an example. Norway is a member of the Special Committee of Peacekeeping (C-34), were Norway seeks to be visible through championing causes that mirror its self-identification as a progressive and peaceful country. Here Norway demonstrates a strategy of competition in the sense that it seeks to invest more resources and efforts than other states in the same hierarchy. Norway gives a combination of small to large contributions to highly visible projects that fall outside of the UN framework. One example is the UN S/RES/1325 on women and peace. Norway is not only aiming at being a good power, but a better one (Wohlforth et al., 2017, p. 16-17).

Neumann (2011) further argues the importance for Norway to maintain the international system and that this also affects its foreign policy. He argues that small and rich countries like Norway will not have the same maneuver in a system that is more conflicting and less cooperative. In a system that is peaceful and institutionalize however, small and medium states have more influence and more room for participation. Therefore, they invest in maintaining the system, as Norway does in its peace and reconciliation efforts (Neumann, 2011). This is connected to Knut Vollebæk’s statement that Norway engage in peace negotiations because it wants a stable world, and the stable world requires engagement. He further states that if we don’t have a stable world, it will have economic consequences for all, and for our foreign policy in several ways. Erik Solheim supports this and add Norway’s history as a point of interest as well (Nordviste, E.M.M, 2012, p. 71-72).

In terms of Colombia it is also addressed that Norway`s diplomacy is depended on and have a duty to the international system. The substantial initiatives made by Norway in the peace process, as the focus areas, where performed through other international actors, especially the UN. A change in the system will not be of interest of Norway, it argues (Andersen & Carvalho, 2017).

Alan K. Henrikson also puts Norway in the limelight when talking about small states’ public diplomacy. He addresses that Norway aims at being useful and contribute to creative solutions where multilateral efforts have failed or have few results. One example he addresses concerning this is Norway’s public diplomacy through peace and reconciliation. A key to
Norway’s success in forming useful as well as durable relationships has been that it has something to offer and that is can offer it fast and quiet, also in financial and material form. He points the that Norway can identify with Gareth Evans notion of “niche diplomacy” in the manner that Norway has “concentrated resources in specific areas best able to generate returns worth having”. Norway through specializing in peace and reconciliation has become a visible and reliable partner in global politics. Norway’s main asset is not its “brand”, but its reputation. (Henrikson, 2005).

While others academic, Norwegian diplomats or researcher may not directly state that Norway is motivated by status there are many pointing to Norway’s quest for a good reputation and that its peace engagement has open many doors for Norway in terms of “having a seat at the table” (Nordviste, E.M.M, 2012). In the master thesis by Elsa Marie Mohr Nordviste (2012) it is stated that Norway has found its niche and uses this type of policies as a way of opening doors. Nordviste has interviewed several government officials, academics and researcher concerning the gains there are for getting involved in peace and security. The former Norwegian Prime Minster, Thorvald Stoltenberg said that: «when you are first recognized as a peace negotiator, it gives a network that is useful for Norway long after the conflict is over». The Ambassador Wegger Strømmen also support this by saying that any conversation with the Americans will have a large component of «door opening». Erik Solheim further point to that you cannot contribute with anything unless you have a good relationship with USA, India, Russia, China and the EU. He points to that peace negotiations may open some doors, but to do this kind of work you need certain connections (Nordviste, E.M.M, 2012, p.73). On the basis of reputation or self-gain there are mixed responses from the interviewees where some deny any selfish motives for engaging, where others point to that the motives are mixed. Thomas Hylland Eriksen however makes a clear statement that Norway gets involved in peace negotiations to get «fame», or a positive reputation in the sense of its interest of being known and admired by the outside world. He points to that this is not just Norway’s dream, but the dream of all small states in general. (Nordviste, E.M.M, 2012, p.69).

Trond Ljødal claims this to be right in Colombia as well. In an article in the Norwegian newspaper, Aftenposten, he argues that Norwegian diplomacy never has been about Colombia but about Norway’s position internationally. “You cannot call Norwegian efforts a success with the results you see today. Then it doesn’t matter if the intentions have been the best and
that the Norwegian negotiation-team never have been that good” (Ljødal, 2018b, own translation).

The KROC reports demonstrate that the results of the peace agreement haven’t been that optimistic. The one real success in the peace agreement has been the demobilization of former FARC-combatants and the “laying down of arms”. The other points of the agreement are meeting huge challenges and Colombia is also met with new obstacles in the post-conflict period (Kroc, 2018). When asking Nagoda about why they engage in such comprehensive peace processes as in Colombia, especially when the previous ones have failed, he tells me that there are several reasons for continuing working for peace. One simply must accept that creating peace if difficult and that you will have to fail many times before you succeed. Even though there is a risk of not ending with lasting and sustainable peace there can many benefits as part of the process: - You can get better humanitarian access, you can achieve bilateral or unilateral ceasefires and other efforts that limits the human suffering, at least for some time, and that can justify engaging the parties, even though it does not result in a final agreement. Another reason to keep engaging, he argues, is to build experience through the different processes and hopefully improve our approaches in the future it is important to learn from our successes as well as the failures. “In addition, one should not underestimate the political and diplomatic capital that lies in the knowledge Norway accumulates about the conflicts and actors where we are engaged”. Finally, he says it is also a moral commitment behind Norway’s engagement- if you have the resources, the competence and the ability - you should try to find peaceful solutions (D. Nagoda, Personal interview, April 4, 2019).

These thoughts reflect the government’s three key factors in peace and reconciliation efforts. For one they mention that peace talks are a learning process in which the participants are forced to consider political alternatives to continued violence. Even in the absence of a final solution, lives will be saved as long as the parties are sitting at the negotiation table. Negotiations can also reduce the risk of minor conflicts escalating. Second it points to that Norwegian policy should seek the right balance between breadth and focus. It is important not to spread efforts too thinly. At the same time, restricting efforts to a limited number of geographical areas and processes could lead to Norway losing its relevance, as it may not then have the flexibility and expertise needed to respond to a broad range of conflicts and to serious new conflicts as they arise. This is also a question of contributing to the international debate on the major conflicts of our time. Finally, it points to that peace and reconciliation
efforts require a long-term approach and entail risk. Deep commitment and a long-term engagement are essential if Norway is to exert a real influence and make a significant difference in peace processes. Further it states that peace and reconciliation efforts depend more than in any other foreign policy area – on personal relations and expertise, and on building networks over time. “Willingness to take risks is absolutely necessary for any actor that becomes engaged in conflict situations and peace processes between warring parties (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2008-2009).

3.3 What does the Colombian peace process tell us?

The Colombian peace process has offered a good analytical framework to discover some of the realities of on the ground when it comes to Norway’s vision of peace and peacebuilding. As we have seen in the discussion there are many ideas of Norway’s vision for peace and its efforts in practice. While some point to that it seems like Norway are taking quick solutions to get a peace agreement instead of focusing on comprehensive political reforms (Stokke, 2012), other point to that Norway is actually one of the actors that commit to the peace process in a long-term perspective and offer some unique qualities for building peace (Berg, 2019; Bastøe & Wilhelmsen, 2018).

In the case of Colombia, we have seen that there are great efforts and willingness from the Norwegian diplomacy. We have seen that the Norwegian team is committed to stay in Colombia in a 15-year perspective and that they are operating with both long-term and short-term goals in the process. Further we have seen even though Norway has an overall goal of establishing lasting and sustainable peace in Colombia, without fear of returning to war, there are some obstacles on the ground. For one there are pressing issues in the implementation that force Norway to address these and not the “root causes of conflict”. Norway are working on two of the concerning issues that we have seen in the Kroc reports, the reintegration of FARC and the issue of transitional justice, and the Norwegian team see these issues important to address to continue the work towards peaceful means (D. Nagoda, personal interview, April 4, 2019).

Second, we have seen that Norway is not operating for peace alone in Colombia and are affected by other actors both in terms of interests, political will and framework for
peacebuilding. We have seen that the geopolitical context has changed and are taken a more conservative turn in the region but also in the Colombian government. When Norway first engaged in the peace process there were good conditions for change with more left-wing governments in South America, a supportive US administration and a Colombian president that dared to break with old structures. Today, in the state of implementation, the conditions have changes and the peace process is facing more conservative powers, a Venezuelan crisis and a less supportive US-administration. Together with this the political will has seem to be more challenging with the new government in Colombia. As we have seen with president Duque and his more conservative government, there are many ways of interrupting the process and Norway are now using a lot of time and energy on preventing any setbacks and keeping the government committed (D. Nagoda, personal interview, April 4, 2019).

In terms of Norway’s framework and model for peace this section has shown us some different opinions but there has also been an agreement on some main features of the Norwegian engagement. We have seen that Norway, as mentioned earlier are working with several actors in peace processes, were many of them are under the liberal framework of UN. We have seen that Norway is committed to important features of this framework in terms of promoting liberal values as democracy, human rights, transitional justice and good governance. We have also seen that Norway, seen away from lack of success in implementation, has contributed to strengthening the women, peace and security agenda and transitional justice as important part of the UN framework, and that Norway has demonstrated a good example on successful demining projects for the future. Anyhow it would be wrong to categorize Norway is a certain “model”, even though it affected by the changing norms and framework for peacebuilding in the international community. The Colombian case has demonstrated that Norway offer a more practical and maybe pragmatic approach; one that comes with liberal values but at the same time offer some characteristics unique for Norway. The “Norwegian Model for Peace” has been identified by showing flexibility, commitment and close ties to many actors, also civil society. It has further showed strength in peace negotiations by making the parties meet, to trust each other and creating a balanced environment where the parties has ownership to the process (Fabra-Mata & Wilhelmsen, 2018).

The different views in media also demonstrate that there is a knowledge gap that needs to be filled. We have seen that the picture of what peace is affects the vision of whether it’s a
success or not and that it frames how one think in terms of peacebuilding. As we saw in the article of Drange, but also in the statement of Norway’s Prime Minster, Erna Solberg, there has developed an idea that peace is established when there is a settled peace agreement, even though this is not stated in Norway’s framework for peacebuilding and by Norwegian diplomats. In the white papers of the Norwegian government peace is referred to as state where there is no issue of distribution, human security and political participation. This we also have seen in terms of Norway’s vision for peace in Colombia. Both Dag Nagoda and Carolina From FOKUS point to that peace in Colombia calls for many changes, both socially, politically and economically, and Carolina point to that Colombia is not in a post-conflict period but a “post-signing” one. Nagoda further emphasize these changes will not be easy to see through and are a “generation-problem”, but the concludes by saying that Norway are willing "to stand in it” as long as they are needed and welcomed (D.Nagoda, personal interview, April 4, 2019).

3.4 A Quest for Status or a Quest for Peace?
In terms of Norway’s definition of success and objectives for engaging in peace processes this seems more a question of definitions and clearance about what Norway’s objectives are and when the overall goal is met. As we have seen through the white papers, through the official’s statements of government officials and by researcher concerned Norway’s objectives for engaging in peace and security, there are mixed thoughts about Norway’s motives. While the official white papers and Nagoda states that Norway engage because they can, because they will and because it comes positive outcomes out of engaging no matter result, Wohlforth et al (2017) point to that Norway’s peace engagement has been driven by status ever since its independence. They point to that because of its favorable conditions and its realization of that their peace engagement gave status and good reputation – status has developed as the main motivation for Norway’s peace engagement. While these arguments are valid in the sense that Norway’s peace engagement definitely has given Norway a good status and recognition as a "peace-nation” (Skånland, 2018) it would be wrong to state that this is the overall motivation for engaging in Colombia, but there are elements that support the theory.

First, it is the Norwegian model in itself. When studying the model both in theory and practice this model is clear in defining what Norway offers in peace process; impartiality, neutrality, flexibly, long-term commitment and local ownership - unique characters of the
Norwegian effort. But the model does not state anything about how to reach the goal: «peace» (Skånland, 2018). One can wonder if it is a strategy by presenting such a model and being inconsistent on what success implies. It can seem as the Norwegian model secure Norway from “loosing face” and a good status. By always presenting qualities they are good at and perform well in all peace process, Norway is recognized as a valid actor and unique facilitator in peace process - contributing to peace. Further by presenting Norway’s tradition for peace and Norway’s willingness to support all parties it seems as Norway do not have any interests and are not affected by great power politics. The model further gives away ownership to the parties which free themselves form critique and responsibility for the failure of the peace process. In a matter of fact, Norway, by its long-term commitment present itself as one of the ones standing in the long hall. Norway by this demonstrates that its committed, trustworthy and unique in peace process and Norway remains attractive in peace processes and maintains its reputation as a trusted facilitator.

One can also argue that Norway is trying to maintain its «niche» in peace and security, by engaging in such a comprehensive peace process as in Colombia, where there are interests from the US, the EU and the UN. By contributing in Colombia, especially with the status of a guarantor for the peace process, Norway demonstrates its strength and usefulness for greater powers. The elements that further can point to this is Norway’s innovation in its model by bringing in "focus areas". These focus areas, especially the one on bringing in more women at the negotiation table is also a theme in the UN framework that has been emphasized the last decade. By giving increased focus on points as this one, Norway takes responsibility for visible projects that fall outside of the UN framework and show that it has a “niche” in being a front runner on innovations in international peace and security. This correlates with what Wohlforth et al (2017) talks about when they say that Norway highlights its own brand of peacekeeping in parallel with UN involvements and that this is a result of Norway’s position and status. This can also further be connected to Henrikson (2005) in terms of that Norway puts its resources where it sees returns and that Norway’s main asset is not its brand but its reputation.

Another point of notice is that Norway in its white papers (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs , 2004) claims that peace is established by addressing root causes of conflict, but in reality rather addresses symptoms of the conflict which only has led to a peace accord so far (Fabra-Mata & Wilhelmsen, 2018).While this may be what Nagoda (2019) states, that this is
because there are other pressing issues that needs to be addressed first, it can also be too big of a risk in terms of failure and «loosing face» in the international community. Rather then, Norway safeguard itself by taking responsibility for highly visible project in the UN.

One last note that can point to that Norway`s engagement in Colombia was a source to increase and maintain its good status as a peace promotor, is that Norway decided to assign the Colombian president under the negotiations, Juan Manuel Santos, the Nobel Peace Prize (Porte, 2016). Being responsible for awarding the Nobel Peace Prize is as we have seen earlier, (Wohlforth et al., 2017) a fortunate condition for Norway`s status seeking. It gives Norway validity as an important actor for peace and it draws international attention to Norway and its peace efforts. The awarding of Santos concerned the Colombian peace process gave the Norwegian engagement in Colombia great publicity in a sense of being a crucial contributor to the Colombian peace. Colombia - which is on the other side of the world, well known for its guerilla-rebels and “coca-war” and for a never-ending struggle between the leftish movements and the elites (González, 2004) - had now reached peace with help from a small but great country, namely Norway. Both small and great powers were to recognize this and applaud it. “Norway punched above its weight”, again.

Anyhow, these points of notice are not hard enough evidence to claim that Norway engaged in Colombia in terms of status seeking. We have seen as mentioned above, that Norway are committed to work for peace and are doing solid work in supporting the parties in the process. Further we have seen that Nagoda (2019), as also stated in the official white papers, is willing to engage even though it is a risk of failure. Nagoda points to that Norway are willing to learn and draw experiences during the way. If it is the case, that the intentions are pure good and that Norway is thinking more in a sense of contributing to peace, support where it can, and where is offer good qualities, then there is necessary with more realistic definition on what Norway can do, what it can offer and where it has limits. As Bastøe & Wilhelmsen (2018) argue, “use their capacities right”.
4.0 Concluding remarks
In this thesis I have tried to get a deeper insight to Norway’s peace engagement by looking at Norway’s effort in the Colombian peace process. I have looked at Norway’s framework and vision for peace outlined in the official white papers and how these visions and approaches transforms into practice. Further I have tried to grasp why Norway engage so much time and effort in such comprehensive peace process, even when the risk of failure is high. What this thesis argue is that Norway’s visions and approach to peace are affected by the conditions on the ground. While Norway’s visions and approach is argued to be lasting and sustainable peace by addressing the root causes of conflict, the Colombia case shows us that this is more difficult in reality and that Norway are working more on the pressing issues of war as transitional justice, demining, women and gender and reintegration of FARC to the society. Further the Colombian case has demonstrated that it is not necessary the visions and approach that has changed, but that Norway are affected and limited by several conditions on the ground. The case of Colombia has shown us that creating sustainable and lasting peace isn’t an easy task. It demands political will, a good geopolitical context, great efforts of many important actors and a long-term commitment. For Norway as a small and committed country, this offered challenges in terms of changing their focus and efforts during the way. It has made the Norwegian team take decision on addressing other issues than the “roots of the conflict” and made Norway focus on keeping the dialog going between the two parties. Further we have seen that the Norwegian team recognizes that structural issues are comprehensive and demands greater effort, especially from the parties themselves. In that sense Norway has given full ownership to the parties of the conflict and believe that this is important for the further success of the peace agreement. This however has turned out to be one of the main obstacles in the implementation and has stalled the further process.

The Norwegian approach to peace and it’s the confusing notions of success also demonstrate that there is need for clearer definitions on what their objectives in peace processes are, how to reach them and what is a successful peace engagement. It points to that Norway needs to be more realistic in terms of their limits, possibilities and capacities in peace processes. There is a question of definition and filling the knowledge gap between theory and practice. For Norway this means being clearer about that peace do not equal a peace agreement, but also being clearer about their objectives by engaging in peace processes as well as their limits and their strengths on the ground. The lack of clarity creates false expectations of what Norway can do and what is seen as success for Norway. Either how, what is important is that the
Norwegian model for peace has the overall aim of reaching the goal it actually puts.

In terms of my second research question concerned the motives for engaging in the Colombian peace process the thesis shows that even though Norway do not claim there are interests in its peace engagement other than promoting peace, the Colombian case and the public statements by government officials demonstrates that Norway are occupied with its reputation and status, and recognize how this status as a small state taking responsibility for peace and security gives them higher international standing and access to new arenas. In terms of Wohlfforth et al (2017) statement that Norway seeks status through its peace engagement this is hard to define and needs more research. However, there are some elements in the Colombian case that support the theory. For one, bringing the Norwegian model that offer solid qualities in peace processes is a way of securing status and showing strength in facilitation. Another is to take upon focus areas that are of concern of the UN, and lastly, awarding president Santos the Nobel Peace Prize was a further boost to Norway’s uniqueness and status in the international community.

To sum up this case has demonstrated that Norway’s vision and approach to peace are lacking a connection between theory and practice and that Norway needs to clarify its peace engagement. It demonstrates that Norway has achieved a good status and reputation for its peace engagement, also In Colombia, and that it can outgrow its position in the hierarchy of stats by acting as a “good power”. In terms of motives for engaging in Colombia as well as other peace process, there many opinions and evidences to them all, but what is clear is that status as a “peace-nation” has given Norway many opportunities it might not have gotten otherwise.
5.0 References


file:///C:/Users/Bruger/Downloads/Herbolzheimer_NOREF_Innovations%20in%20the%20Colombian%20peace%20process_June2016_FINAL.pdf


https://kroc.nd.edu/assets/288008/180830_english_policy_report_2.pdf


6.0 Appendices

Appendix 1: Interview Dag Nagoda

1. First: can you tell me a little about yourself and how you got engaged in Colombia?
2. How did Norway first engage in the Colombian peace process? Was there any conflict around engaging in the process?
3. Were there some certain areas were Norway was more involved than others? Why?
4. Has Norway operated with a certain peacebuilding model in Colombia when it comes to its approach to peace?
5. Are Norway affected by the geopolitical context and other actors involved?
6. Norway has engaged in other peace processes earlier: would you say that there have been some lessons learned from these that has made this engagement different?
7. Norway has not seen to be directly involved in the issues concerning the “roots of conflict”, is there a reason why you are not working on these issues?
8. How about the pressing issues in the implementation: are you addressing some if these issues?
9. What is your role in the implementation now? What are you doing and which actors are still involved in this process?
10. Are the international society still active? An are there still financial funding of the process?
11. How about the ELN: what is Norway` s role in this process? And how is it affecting the implementation of the peace agreement?
   - What are the challenges concerning this process?
12. Have you taken some lessons from this peace process for later engagements?
13. With lack of success for lasting and sustainable peace in many of the peace process Norway has engaged in: why do you think Norway continues their engagement?
14. Do you have a vision for peace in Colombia? Objectives? A notion of success?
15. What is your personal view on peace and the right approach to reach this peace?

Appendix 2: Interview with Carolina M. Johansen

1. Can you briefly tell me a little about you work at FOKUS and about the organization?
2. How does FOKUS work in Colombia?
3. Why Colombia?
4. What was your role in the peace process? How did FOKUS participate?
5. What is your impression of Norway's general role in the peace process? What have they contributed to and what could have been better?
6. What approach has Norway had to establish to peace in the country? Have there been any objectives?
7. Has Norway included the civil society enough to reach the core of the conflict?
8. Has the civil society been heard during the process?
9. Do you feel that Norway has had a goal of solving the structural causes of the conflict?
10. How are FOKUS working on the issue of women in the implementation?
11. Do you have the impression that engagement in Colombia will continue until a more sustainable peace is established?
12. What is most important to address in terms of Colombia’s future? And what are the barriers?

Colombia forum:
1. When was “Colombia Forum” created and for what purpose?
2. What is the function of the Colombia forum? Do you feel it works?
3. How have the meetings with the MFA? Do you feel that there is a good and harmonized relationship with the MFA? Are your concerns being addressed?
4. How can this dialogue improve in the future?
Appendix 3: Interview-guide for researchers

1) How long has Norway been active in peace processes after an agreement is settled?
2) Has Norway had a significant role in the implementation-period?
3) Has Norway been addressing the points (the more underlying causes of the conflict) or more the “symptoms of conflict”?
4) Has Norway worked with any objectives in the different peace processes? And notion of overall goal?
5) Do you see Norway has a vision for peace?
6) Why is it less focus and efforts in the implementation when it comes to peacebuilding in general? Should this have been changed?
7) Do Norway operate with a certain peacebuilding model or do Norway have a more adaptive one?
8) Has Norway engaged with civil society in terms of peacebuilding?
9) What has been the motives for engaging in peace process?