Emotions and foreign policy: An Autoethnographic Study of Representational Techniques at Japanese War Museums

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Declaration

I, Vemund Sveen Finstad, declare that this thesis is a result of my research investigations and findings. Sources of information other than my own have been acknowledged and a reference list has been appended. This work has not been previously submitted to any other university for award of any type of academic degree.

Signature......................................

Date.............................................
Acknowledgements:

Throughout the process of researching and writing this thesis, spanning more than a year, I’ve been able to find an approach to International Relations which resonates with who I am and what I think is important. The emotions-approach in this thesis has filled a void I thought was missing from other theoretical approaches in IR; it highlighted the individual; the emotional and affective aspect of domestic and international politics and it spoke up against power. It allowed me to rediscover the malleability of social reality by breaking the chains of fear from trauma and venture anew into life filled with pride, optimism and vigour. Rather than being drawn into the metaphorical light onto which mainstream IR-theories shine, I chose my own path. By focusing on war museums, emotions and affect this thesis allowed me to work to understand the social mechanisms which redirects the power of emotions, highlighting some of the normative roots from which contemporary institutions and events rise. For that, this thesis represents a personal achievement.

I would like to thank my supervisors Kirsti Stuvøy and Katharina Glaab for challenging me and providing invaluable feedback throughout this process, as well as NMBU and the Fritt Ord Foundation for financial support in relations to my fieldwork in Japan.

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I dedicate this thesis to the memory of my father.

Vemund Sveen Finstad
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Abstract:

To this day, the alleged ‘history problem’; the perception from other countries, mainly Asian neighbours, that Japan has not come to terms with its aggressive and militarist past, continues to weigh on the Land of the Rising Sun and shape its room for manoeuvre in foreign policy.

Through an autoethnographic study of three Japanese war museums, this thesis argues for the importance of understanding the emotional roots of behaviour shaping both research in the field of International Relations, and developments in the international sphere.

This study provides readers with a view into a deeply personal journey to three war museums in Japan, where such sites come to be understood as highly political and arguably influential in shaping the normative space within which legitimate foreign policy can be enacted.

Through the emotional and affective sensibilities of the researcher, shaped by lived experience, this thesis presents an alternative to mainstream foreign policy analysis, as it highlights a bottom up approach exemplified by the analysis of Japan’s history problem.

The thesis argues theoretically for understanding the foundational role of emotions in policy formulation through its role in the social construction of rationality and legitimacy. It concludes that although there are political reasons internationally for why the history problem persists, the main cause of its continuous relevance is based on the maintenance of post-war emotions domestically in Japan.
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1. Introduction

In a public display of emotions, an alleged 120 000 protesters gathered in Tokyo on a rainy Sunday in August 2015. Near Japan’s parliament building, the Diet, they voiced their mistrust in the government of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and demonstrated their disapproval of Japan’s security policy shift (Takenaka, 2015). The protest, just one of many that weekend in Japan, was triggered by legislation which, in principle, allowed the Japanese military to be deployed overseas for the first time since the end of World War Two (Ibid.). This shift, which had been an aim for Japan’s main conservative leaders over the preceding decades (Tønnesson, 2017), signalled the end of Japan’s long-time status as a pacifist country. It included a reinterpretation of the ‘pacifist clause’, Article 9 in the constitution, imposed on Japan by the US after the second world war (AFP, 2015). It had also been preceded by a period of reinterpretation of the history of Japan’s highly controversial militarist period (Tønnesson, 2017), a time which many believe Japan has still not reconciled with. The memory of the last time Japan was a military power, subjugating much of East Asia under the weight of the long since vanquished empire, was again being called into the present. Why this history was recalled, is a good question.

Today, Japan is operating within a much-changed security policy environment. The distribution of power in East- and Southeast Asia is vastly different today, then at the time when Japan were able to conquer or annex much of the region. Firstly, the panoply of the United States covers much of the region, including Japan, something that makes it impossible for Japan to independently pursue foreign policy goals militarily, even if it wanted to. Secondly, if Japan was remilitarizing to do the bidding of the United States, acting as America’s ‘Britain in the East’ (Ikenberry, 2006), the powerful rise of China would act as a counterweight prohibiting significant shifts in distributions of power in favour of Japan. Even so, Japan’s foreign policy ambitions are being exacerbated by the alleged history problem. The history problem relates to the perception from other countries, mainly Asian neighbours, that Japan has not come to terms with its aggressive and militarist past (Dian, 2017, Tønnesson, 2017). This perceived lack of reconciliation is argued to severely amplify the importance of Japan’s international disputes, including territorial ones with other regional powers (Dian, 2017). It is also argued to have limited Japan’s possibilities for presenting itself
as a legitimate leading power in the East Asian regionalization process (Ikenberry, 2006, Dian, 2017).

It is within this social universe, where Japanese security policy is a source of active contestation, that this thesis operates. It is devoted to an investigation of what it is that makes the history problem still relevant today. The standard causes for the history problem are Japan’s alleged unwillingness to acknowledge responsibility for atrocities committed by Imperial forces in the 1930s and 1940s, as well as the impact of the Cold War, a period where authoritarian rule in Asian countries limited popular pressures and a lack of regional institutions arguably delayed the reconciliation process (Berger, 2010). However, this thesis primarily focuses on the domestic causes of the history problem conundrum. More precisely, it has identified what is believed to be a source inside of Japan that maintains the history problem; namely war museums. To provide war museums with explanatory power requires a move away from the standard causes explaining the history problem, to credit more ‘fuzzy’ variables. More precisely, the thesis suggests to both theoretically and empirically highlight the role of emotions and affect as entry points to understanding the psychological foundations of contemporary Japanese foreign- and security policy. War museums have been identified as sites through which an approach focusing on the link between emotions and foreign policy can be operationalized, and they are relevant to foreign policy because they are not, contrary to common perceptions, politically neutral. For example, Audrey Reeves’ (2018) study of London’s Imperial War Museum argues that the IWM shape public opinion about national identity and the moral dilemmas of past wars in ways which involves the engineering of both affect and emotion. Debbie Lisle (2006, p. 852) highlights the prevalence of simple and unchallenging narratives at war museums, replacing the emotional ambivalence of real war with a «… morally driven narrative that must be learned, understood and accepted by passive and dutiful visitors». War museums re-present war, and as Roland Bleiker (2001, p. 515) argues, representation is always an act of power, which is at its peak if able to disguise its subjective origins and values.

This thesis is therefore an interpretivist study that attempts to come close to how it feels to fear in Japan. For that purpose, fieldwork was conducted at three Japanese war museums in January 2019, including the Yūshūkan Museum in Tokyo and the Atomic Bomb Museums in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Using autoethnographic techniques, this fieldwork highlights subjective experiences of emotions. With this approach the thesis engages in discussions about how to research emotions and the standards of scientific research such an approach
requires. To explore Japan’s history problem the thesis draws on the affective turn in international relations, including reflections on memory, aesthetics, emotions and affect that has emerged in IR scholarship over the last two decades (Reeves, 2018, Hutchison, 2016, Langenbacher, 2010, Sylvester, 2009, Ross, 2006, Callahan, 2004, Edkins, 2003, Bleiker, 2001). This thesis aims to contribute to this field with an empirical analysis based on fieldwork into how emotions matter to Japan’s history problem and foreign policy. The thesis develops a framework for an autoethnographic fieldwork-based analysis and engages in discussions regarding the validity of approaching emotions as a scientific endeavour in this particular case, and in international relations more broadly.

1.1 Research question

As Article 9 in the Japanese constitution has been reinterpreted, it implicitly changes the role of Japan’s ‘self-defence’ forces. This thesis argues that Japan needs to confront affective and emotional dimensions domestically as a part of the policy shift. These developments require continuous work to legitimize a new collective understanding of the ambitions and necessities related to a rearmed Japan. This thesis argues that tackling the history problem requires changes domestically concerning the reproduction of memory at sites representing war history. Simultaneously, it requires working broad and long-term to expand the normative boundaries of positive affect in the general Japanese population. This issue is entangled with social and emotional dimensions that constitute trust and this thesis therefore addresses the reproduction of memory at sites representing war history in a comparative perspective across three war museums. It therefore asks: How do Japanese war museums reproduce memories of war and with what effects on the normative boundaries of foreign policy?

1.2 Structure of thesis

This thesis posits that emotions are a big part of what connects ordinary people to politics in representative democracies such as Japan. Following from this introduction, this thesis has four main parts and a conclusion. Chapter two introduces the affective turn in international relations and explain how the fieldwork on Japanese war museums is situated within this approach. The approach draws on post-positivist international relations perspectives to explore the relationship emotions shaped by experiences has with rationality and legitimacy, which in this thesis are argued to be socio-political constructs, also elaborated on in chapter two. Chapter three discusses methodology relevant for studying emotions in international relations before moving on to explaining the methods applied in this study. Chapter four
presents and discusses findings made at the three field sites through an autoethnographic perspective, before chapter five takes the initial analysis one step further. This chapter argues how the war museums operate according to an instrumentalist notion of history, and that they can be seen as a unity that contribute to a normative field enabling Japan to base its ontological security on a narrative of victimhood. From an epistemological point of view, this thesis argues throughout that research focusing on the aesthetic rather than mimetic qualities of sites can reveal what makes war museums efficient as sites shaping the normative space legitimate foreign policy can be enacted in. In addition, war museums are perceived as part of a field of actors with responsibility in signalling foreign policy intentions, expanding the realm foreign policy can be understood in from narrow state-centric conceptions.

2. Emotions, war museums and foreign policy

Right next to Hiroshima’s A-bomb Dome - the famous ruins of the pre-war industrial promotion hall - I come across a man dressed in a suit and tie. He is standing next to a monument and carries a shopping bag in his right hand, looking dejected, but still seemingly surveying the surroundings, as if waiting for someone. He pushes a button on the monument, and slowly walks away. A female voice starts speaking: In world war two, more than three million students over twelve years of age were mobilized for labour services throughout the country. As a result, more than 10.000 students were killed, including some 6000 killed by the atomic bomb. They gave up their youth and studies for the nation.

The tape-recording stops, and the man comes back. He pushes the button, the voice begins anew, and he walks away. The female voice starts speaking. When the voice stops, he repeats the process. Ten minutes pass, and he never lets the air go quiet. He doesn’t talk to anyone. Neither does he work there. He just pushes the button. Then he walks away.

At 8:15am, August 6, 1945, the first atomic bomb used against humankind exploded about 600 meters above Hiroshima. Almost the entire city centre was completely flattened. I was standing exactly at the spot where the bomb first hit, watching him, listening to her, and then a different man came up to me. «Where are you from», he asked slightly brazenly, measuring me up and down from behind thick, framed glasses. «Norway», I said calmly, «where are you from? ». I smiled. «Tokyo! », he answered quickly, before adding «Norway! », while pointing one finger upwards, «Ah... Northern Europe». I nodded, thinking he wished I was American.
I think the same forces that weighed on me while in Japan, were the ones that weighed on those men. That day, the Hiroshima-sky was blue, without a cloud in sight. We could have been anywhere, done anything. Yet here we all were, searching for a way to be heard, as if to warn about something we had seen down the road. After all, the experiences we’ve had in our past do something to us. A traumatic event shapes the choices we make in our present and the paths we take in our lives, by altering the space and ways in which we think and feel we are able to move. At least, that’s how I think, and it informs the entire approach of this thesis.

This chapter explains the connection between the seemingly individual realm of emotions and foreign policy. The first part of the chapter is concerned with explaining the emotions approach in this thesis, before arguing how emotions can be construed as part of the constructivist ontology while simultaneously departing from it on an epistemological level. The concept of trauma is central as the chapter moves on to explain how to ontologically operationalize war museums as the link connecting the seemingly individual phenomenon of emotions to foreign policy. Instead of focusing on material causes, this chapter builds a bottom-up theory for the purposes of this thesis that emphasizes a social ontology. In operationalizing war museums, the chapter argues how representations are crucial to the shaping political aims. Perceiving war museums through an emotions-lens, the thesis contends that such sites contribute towards not only the social construction of the nation state, but also acting as a determinant of political views on matters relating to state security through the engineering of emotion and affect.

If simply relying on the external senses for validating research, those traditionally related to mainstream international relations, the argument that war museums shape emotions and affect for political gains cannot be made. Thus, the chapter moves from war museums to argues that linking emotions, war museums and foreign policy require different epistemological orientations. Thus, the chapter draws attention to the subjective nature of social reality through a discussion on the concepts of legitimacy and rationality. The chapter then argues for an aesthetic mode of thinking which includes the sensory apparatus of the body in analysis, before introducing two analytical concepts, the poetics of space and emotional amplifiers. These concepts describe mechanisms which arguably influence the relationship between subject and object during interpretation of sites.
2.1 The emotions approach

The so-called affective turn has opened new avenues of legitimate enquiry in the field of IR, and research on emotions has taken on qualities which establishes it as somewhat of a mainstream approach (Clément & Sangar, 2018). Many IR-scholars have been drawn to the neurosciences to bolster their argument that emotions matter (Crawford, 2014, Mercer, 2014, Jeffery, 2014), with neuroscientific research having established feelings as «… just as cognitive as other percepts» (Damasio, 2006, p. 26-30), not separate from the reasoning process, but integral in assisting to it (Jeffery, 2014). The idea that reason and emotion existed in a dichotomous relationship has been the basis for positivist notions of objectivity and research ideals related to social science since the 18th century Enlightenment. This dichotomy is also prevalent in most theories of international politics (Jeffery, 2014), historically in the grip of positivism and behaviouralism (Hoggett & Thompson, 2012). However, findings in neuroscience not only validates emotions, they also suggest that brain structures affect social behaviour and social behaviour affect brain structure (Holmes, 2014). This relationship of co-constitutive learning between structure and agency within the brain, called neuroplasticity, highlights the connection between biological and social phenomena (Damasio, 2006), in a way which effectively enables change as the only constant and emotions as a crucial component in effectuating it. This ‘post-enlightenment’ argument implicitly grants legitimacy to theories arguing for conceptualizing ‘the now’ of any perceived social reality as a product of shared ideas (Wendt, 1999) which are subjectively meaningful (Bevir & Kedar, 2008) and shaped by historical and cultural forces (Reus-Smit, 2003). Simultaneously, it hints to the potential for transformation and emancipation inherent in self-reflexive processes that interrogate normative roots.

Emotions can thus not simply be dismissed as aberrations and deviations from a rationalistic norm (Ringmar, 2018). However, the everyday utility of emotions is arguably still poorly understood as they are frequently suppressed into action in accordance with what cultures have defined as the acceptable thresholds regarding its displays. Guiding individuals towards already established groups and interests working in conjunction with emotionally based principles, emotions are part of what shapes an outlook on politics. As such, emotions could be argued to form an important part of the link between norms and practice (See: Adler & Pouliot, 2014). According to Ross (2014) emotions are integral to the way people inhabit cultural and political communities. They are not ‘pre-discursive’ but fashioned by intersubjective frames which constitutes social reality (Butler, 2010). However, emotions
produce specific psychological processes and experiences (Kitayama, Karasawa & Mesquita, 2004). Thus, emotions are argued to go with identity (Fukuyama, 2018, Mercer, 2014). While emotions are certainly present at the individual level, thus relevant to the study of world leaders for instance (van Hoef, 2018), emotions are argued to also influence group dynamics (Delori, 2018, Mercer, 2014), shaping the motives and behaviours of states (Wolf, 2018, Heller, 2018, Hutchison, 2016), and even abstracted to the level of geopolitical influence (Moïsi, 2009). IR-scholars argue convincingly for incorporating research on emotions into considerations around norms and values (Ross, 2006, Hutchison, 2016, Koschut, 2017), but as of yet IR does not have a unified theory on emotions on which this thesis can lean on. Thus, this thesis takes as its starting point constructivism and argues for the presence of emotions in relations to normative boundaries, in this case boundaries which arguably apply to Japanese foreign policy. As argued by Ross (2006) it seems only a small step from the understanding of the importance of identity and norms to the idea that emotions matter as something which mediates the receptivity of individuals to such phenomena. Focusing on emotions entails following constructivism in conceptualizing social order as inherently dynamic and open-ended (Ashley, 1981). However, an emotions-framework has an implicit emancipatory potential in that it opens for the possibility of agents altering structures, given that there are suitable structural conditions for normative change. Acknowledging the fluid potential of social and political relations implies accepting (hopefully civilized) conflict as an ineradicable aspect of social reality.

A theory on emotions follows the bottom-up approach of constructivism which places individuals as its main units of analysis, seen within this camp as situated in a context of normative meaning which shapes who they are and the possibilities available to them (Fierke, 2016). Subjects are thus perceived as guided by what their identity is and the norms that apply to them, i.e. their behaviour is guided by a logic of appropriateness. Thus, what is considered rational becomes a function of what is legitimate (Fierke, 2016), conceptualizing the social world as relational. The result is a worldview which understands norms and rules as effective through the socializing of individuals and their subsequent desire to «do the right thing» (Risse, 2000, p. 4). Thus, through putting emphasis on the norms, rules and identity shaping and guiding the individuals that together make up society, constructivism provides a crucial first step in IR to argue the importance of emotions. Constructivists also highlighted the path-dependent character of international change by putting emphasis on «…how agents and structures are involved in a process of mutual creation and reproduction; how actors’
interaction is constrained and shaped by that structure; and how their very interaction serves to either reproduce or transform that structure». (Barnett, 2003, p. 101). By calling for greater ontological awareness of the relationship between agency and structure, constructivists highlighted how the actions of subjects both constitutes the social world and is being constituted by it. At the epistemological level they were arguing in favour of the multi-causal character of outcomes and the social world as an open system of equifinality (ibid). With such a tolerance for a multiplicity of outcomes and ways to get there, why isn’t emotions a key part of constructivist ontology?

Firstly, constructivism can be conceptualized as a structural theory as it highlights ideas, norms and values; ideational structures that are intersubjective and thus given a structural quality with the capacity constrain agents and action (Reus-Smit, 2003). Thus, while it opens for agency, it does not ascribe primacy to it over structure, and it does not explain how norms and rules are effective after they have been identified as influential mechanisms, beyond their structural properties. Secondly, constructivism attached itself to the positivist research agenda by assuming that cognition is «a property of intentional actors that generate motivational and behavioural dispositions» (Wendt, 1999, p. 224). This view has been criticized by Simon Koschut (2018, p. 321) who argues that «cognition that lack emotional input fails to produce a sense of obligation or loyalty necessary for collective identification». Koschut (2018) suggests, albeit on a purely theoretical level, that emotions form part of the sociocultural structure by which agents choose meaning frames and interpretations, which help align and sustain their cognitive perceptions and moral attitudes. Following the insights from neuroscience, it would be safe to follow Koschut in the assumption that emotions play a part in all interpretive processes. However, as Reus-Smit (2003, p. 132) notes; «historically and culturally contingent beliefs define how actors understand themselves, and who they think they are not only affects their interests but also the means they entertain to realise those interests». As such, emotions, which are widely perceived as elusive and unreliable, are yet to be accepted into the constructivist camp, despite the external validity granted by neuroscience.

However, seen from a constructivist point of view, bolstered by neuroscientific insights, emotions must be considered crucial for explaining behaviour. As Jackson (2005, p. xii) argue, «most human action is less a product of intellectual deliberation and conscious choice than a matter of continual, intuitive, and opportunistic changes of course – a ‘cybernetic’
switching between alternatives that promise satisfactory solutions to the ever-changing situation at hand». In these continuous, often subconscious, changes of social and political course that shape communities, emotions are at the core (Hutchison, 2016). Simultaneously, emotions are largely unseen or inaudible because they are hidden through institutionalization, «embodied in the cultures of occupations and corporations» (Hoggett & Thompson, 2012, p. 2). However, after a trauma does emotions often becomes something which take the foreground of conscious awareness. Human beings have an inherent need for understanding the meaning of things, especially after a trauma (Hutchison, 2016). It thus usually takes a catastrophic event, a trauma which rips apart and destroys the cohesion of time and identity (Edkins, 2006), to start a process of renegotiating the routines and beliefs of everyday life. In such situations, it becomes evident that emotions matter. Most states, which consists of groups of human beings, rise from a trauma, from real or imagined physical or psychological ruins, and «from the fragments of the ruins, the humiliation, we can reconstruct the lost totality, not just in poetry or visual culture, but in national salvation» (Callahan, 2004, p. 209). Indeed, the construction of national history is a central aspect to any effort at nation building (Berger, 2010), and by becoming socialized to national history, the narrative that defines what one is, nationality becomes a cultural artefact that command profound emotional legitimacy (Anderson, 1991). Legitimacy, the passive or active consent to a ruling body or set of policies (Hoskins & O’Loughlin, 2010), communicates shared emotional understandings that can weld together a community, at least temporarily. Thus, a state can be conceptualized as a *community of affect*, highlighting how emotions are crucial to shaping the political and social by proliferating collective forms of meaning and feeling after trauma (Hutchison, 2016).

A move to emotions from constructivism thus implies adopting a bottom-up approach as the main stream of political behaviour, highlighting agency, as all communities exist or are created as insulation against the heightened risk of trauma inherent in individuality. Constructivists are also concerned with the role of agency by focusing on the role of practices in the production and reproduction of social structures (Reus-Smit, 2003). Forms of community are themselves produced and reproduced through social practices (Edkins, 2003, p. 11), which carries with it «possibilities for transforming identities and renegotiating political affiliations» (Hutchison, 2016, p. 136). However, although constructivism includes a bottom-up approach to social order, it must be incomplete as it leaves out the importance of physiological and psychological systems for the human condition (Neumann, 2014). As Ross (2006, p. 198) points out; «constructivism contains as of yet no account of how norms,
identities and other intellectual phenomena are sustained by deeper ranges of human expression». Thus, in order to understand human action, this thesis considers the social, as constructivism does, but also the psychological (emotions) and the physiological (affect). Rather than simply focusing on cognitive systems, this thesis follows research that argues for how the body matters to IR, because mind and body are inextricably linked in relations to emotion and affect (source). What follows from taking emotions seriously is thus, contrary to constructivist epistemology, a post-positivist argument regarding the nature of social relations, including social science, which transcends the Cartesian mind/body dichotomy on which traditional IR-theories are built. This dichotomy, separating mind and body, rationality and emotion, does not hold if one accepts, as Neta Crawford (2014) has argued, that fear changes what people look for, what they see, and the way they think. Considering that democratic states for the most part have ended the practice of physically subjugating their own citizens, in the next section attention is drawn to how representations, such as war museums, are crucial to how modern states shape emotions and affect to serve political aims.

2.2 War museums as representations

War museums commonly position themselves as authorities as to how conflict is to be remembered. According to Christine Sylvester (2009) museums enjoy special privilege in that they retain the power to guide, and to reassure people that what they see has been judged to be of quality. As David Carr (2001, p. 30) argues, the museum is an «…entity that emanates dense waves of power, value and authority. It is endowed with power by its treasures and by its control of knowledge and information». This dominant position has led Lisle (2006) to argue that war museums can be seen «… as places where mass audiences are instructed about, and inculcated into, the principal values and norms of their communities». As Carr (2001) alludes to by referring to ‘treasures’, it is mainly the physical dimension of war museums which separates them from other sources of information representing war. This physical dimension is crucial in the creation of what Lisle (2006) calls the sublime; the emotional combination of terror and awe, which she argues is what visitors experience when confronting physical objects used in war and images of war. Representations of human suffering, such as war museums, memorials and memorialization practices, proliferate meaning after trauma. They are among the ways people confront the challenge of responding to trauma and the contending temporalities it invokes (Edkins, 2003, p. 57). Museums and memorials are well-known sites that re-present significant moments in a nation’s history and thus add to the
circulation and reproduction of ideas about national identity (Reeves, 2018). As Jenny Edkins (2003, p. 11) argue; how we remember a war «can be very much influenced by dominant views, that is, by the state». If citizens link their identity to the national history that is represented at a war museum, they can come to adopt what Hutchison (2016, p. 4) calls a shared emotional understanding of tragedy, that is circulated and reproduced at war museums. Although there are many diverse groups within a country, representations in museums and memorials structure, shape and alter modes of thinking and feeling through time (Wasinski, 2018) and are thus involved in «the engineering of both affect and emotion» (Reeves, 2018: 105). By professing the same message to all who visit war museums produce shared meanings which influence the social construction of legitimate security policy, in a process «whereby images and emotions become political» (Schlag, 2018, p. 216). This raises questions about what kinds of legitimacy war museums manufacture and maintain, based on institutional choices related to the promotion of some discourses over others and the representation of Self and Other. According to Sylvester (2009, p. 181) a discourse is an ensemble of knowledges that can become dominant in an area and shape subjectivities and behaviour without overt command or coercion. As argued by Ty Solomon (2014) it is through discursive representations that affect and emotions can function as the force of bonding that connects subjects to their identities. Designed and built after the actual event it represent has passed, war museums seek to produce memory. They are unable to represent its content in line with the often-chaotic events as they happened but can represent the history in a way which has the potential to transform memory. Thus, the aim is «… to produce in visitors a new and different set of memories as the basis for a collective identity» (Sherman, 1995: 53).

However, war museums are unique in the sense that they do not only provide linguistic representations of discourse. They commonly exhibit artefacts, such as bayonets and swords which have been used in combat, machine-guns and tanks that once were operative and served their purpose; the torn remains of a captain’s uniform or the actual letter sent by a deceased front-line private to his mother back home. Artefacts continue to attract the public and allows people to relate emotionally to events and processes of the past. The display of artefacts can be «seen as a way of bringing back the sanctity of the lives lost» (Edkins, 2003, p. 153), and museums can thus take on a ‘heightened’ role of importance akin to religious sites, becoming places of pilgrimage. As put forward by Benedict Anderson (1991) nationalism did not exactly replace religion, but it arose as religions declined and provides alternative responses to questions about human existence. This thesis posits that a critical approach towards sites
shaping fundamental beliefs is crucially important as it follows the sentiment made by Andrew Callahan (2004) that war museums are part of the field which informs the dynamic between nationalism and foreign policy. As war museums mediate the template between nationalism and foreign policy, they create national narratives with heightened importance because of their access to artefacts, which people refer to when making decisions related to the relationship between self and nation. Once intersubjectively shared templates of thought which remain unquestioned have been established, it implies that decisions can be made seemingly ‘instinctively’, or in affect. Affect is conceptualized as bodily forces augmenting or diminishing a body’s capacity to act (Clough, 2008), and it is argued to be crucial in decision-making. For example, Erik Ringmar (2018) argues that decisions are often not as rational as we would like to think, but rather a result of habits and instinctive reactions. He argues that when subjects analyse the world around them, they do so not from a position of being a tabula rasa but based on representations that are relevant to that situation. According to Ringmar (2018) it is in relations to this/these representation(s) that we react. Thus, when visiting war museums, the elements which constitutes a subject’s identity, a person’s lived experience, and which are relevant to juxtapose on a war museum, will contribute to shaping the outcome of the interaction between subject and object. This contrasts with traditional epistemological thought, which construes rationality in terms of a set of principles that reflect an objective reality (Mumby & Putnam, 1992). In short, it’s premised on a belief of rationality as something that is historically and culturally contingent. As Max Horkheimer (1972, p. 3) argued «perceived facts are co-determined by social-historical human conceptions (hence already implicitly rational!) before theoretical elaboration by the knowing subject».

Rationality is thus construed as a self-limiting form of ‘instrumental rationality’ (Neufeld, 1993). This means perceiving rationality not as a concept anchored in objective truth, but rationality as a social phenomenon, anchored in legitimacy. This ontology builds on the writings of Max Weber (1948), who argued that the state cannot be construed in simply materialist terms. As the statement goes a state’s successful functioning is based on claiming the monopoly of the legitimate (my highlighting) use of physical force within a given territory (Quoted in Reus-Smit, 2003), emphasising the fundamental importance of synchronization of the relationship of ideas between those who govern and the governed. As Reus-Smit (2003, p. 124) puts it, Weber’s stress on legitimacy is «… an invitation to explore the foundational role of ideas in undergirding the sovereign state», a world of ideas which, with regards to Japan’s security policy, war museums are argued to play an integral, socializing part. As combat objects become museum objects, the contexts they are made to act in changes the meanings
associated with them. Thus, war museums do not simply contain value-neutral, dry history lessons (Reeves, 2018). Rather, they are perceived as subjective representations, becoming political institutions as they have the capacity to decisively shape opinion based on lessons from past wars and conflict on a large scale (Lisle, 2006). War museums used to be the main sites where mass audiences could come to learn about past conflicts and the lessons associated with them. Today however, national narratives that war museums present are increasingly being challenged by alternative interpretations, made possible through technological innovations such as the internet and exchanges of peoples and ideas across borders, with one such example being this thesis. Thus, how we remember war is no longer determined by war museums alone, and the belief about meanings cannot be neatly delineated by national boundaries. This means that it is possible, to a perhaps greater extent than before, to stand ‘outside the self’ to interrogate the subjective role of national narratives presented at war museums, which means their political influence can be contested, challenged and even changed.

2.3 Aesthetics and war museums

This thesis takes a critical approach to the analysis of post-war narratives presented in war museums in Japan, but crucially, it does so through a method that highlights the subjectivity associated with aesthetic interpretation. War museums are argued in this thesis to disguise their role as political actors through the apparent showcasing of mimetic, i.e. objective, representations. By purportedly offering objective reconstructions of events, frequently in an authoritative manner, war museums hide their situated biases and position, which is not one of mimetic reconstruction of events, but one of aesthetic representations of events. To represent refers to the process of re-presenting an original object present at time/place X to another time/place Y. In this process of ‘copying’, some things are lost while others are gained (Hoskins & O’Loughlin, 2010). The crucial, poststructuralist point, is that artefacts are representations that do not have objective qualities in themselves but are continuously subject to interpretation (Campbell & Bleiker, 2013), i.e. they are given meaning by the subject interacting with them. Within this post-positivist reality, everything is perceived as a representation. Aesthetic insight does not advocate the existence of direct causal links between representations and political attitudes. The point is neither to be critical towards all representations. Rather, opening the field of IR up for aesthetic insight encourage critical analysis of social phenomena, allowing a re-discovery of the malleability of social life, to understand the aesthetic, not only the mimetic, qualities of representations. Such perceptions
open the space within which we think and feel we are able to move through challenging and overcoming fear as we step into the unknown, unmasking seemingly material objects as the social phenomena they are, in the realization that it is human beings who infuses objects with meaning. This makes it easier to reevaluate whether representations serve a purpose in the shaping of legitimacy and rational thought that addresses the needs of the present and future. It enables actors to take a more proactive role in encouraging more inclusive forms of life and policies. This thesis follows Max Horkheimers (1972, p. 9) argument that critical theory and critical practice such as this is desired for the purpose of producing «a conscious social subject» capable of challenging dominant discourses and practices. Crucially, challenging dominant discourses is important because it can inform solutions to problems. What is considered legitimate may not always be what is the most rational and challenging the status quo may be desirable as times and conditions change, as collective memory of the past, shaped by its past, can work to the detriment of the present. In the case of Japan this has become evident as the history problem persists as a basis upon which other states can react and draw negative attention to.

The change of perspective from mimetic reproductions to aesthetic representations thus opens for research on the relationship between war museums and emotions, as research on war museums seen through a positivist-lens can only say something about that social reality which is possible to validate by the senses. Collective remembrance is a key part of the building of any collective, and nation states are the social units exhibiting the most explicit forms of memorialization. However, the role and importance of such memorializing sites to culture and politics is often not appreciated, since their effects are not easily measurable using traditional positivist-inspired approaches to the study of international politics. Thus, in order to argue that war museums play a role in shaping a normative, emotional space in a world of ideas, it is necessary to be able to consciously experience this ‘emotional world’ and take it seriously, which leads one to adopt an aesthetic approach to social reality. Adopting an aesthetic approach implies acknowledging that there is always a difference between the represented, X, and its representation, Y (Bleiker, 2001). Although Y is about X, it’s not X. The difference may seem small, but it is vastly significant. It implies that representations such as war museums (Y), can alter the experience of war itself (X) in the process of moving it through time and space. Thus, unless you’ve been there (in the war) and experienced it for yourself, you’ll get the ‘war museum experience’ of war. This calls into question the relationship between emotions and power. «Facing us at all times, power eludes us», argues Christine
Sylvest (2009, p. 179). She draws an analogy between museums and the concept of collage, in that both to varying degrees mix things up and «launches objects out of assigned places and into spots we least expect them to be» (Sylvest, 2009, p. 21). In a collage however, it’s on the viewer, or interpreter, to make all the connections, theorize and reinterpret, but in a war museum, these choices are made for us. This altered experience of war is more than the sum of the material parts of X which can be externally validated. War museums frequently call the sensory attention of visitors to purportedly mimetic reconstructions of war, such as real-life artefacts, photographs and video-installations. By simultaneously not being open about their situatedness as institutions, offering aesthetic representations, war museums can disguise the subjective composition of exhibits. In this process, which furthers the politicizing of war and conflict, war museums are granted ‘special privilege’ (Sylvest, 2009) in the maintenance ideas, taking up an authoritative position on how to interpret the narratives of war that silences ambivalence (Lisle, 2006).

War museums are commonly interpreted based on the discourse they use, as written language has taken place as the principal medium through which representation and interpretation of security happen (Reeves, 2018). Language is central to this thesis too, as it follows the view put forward by Bruner (1991) that humans organize their experience and memory mainly in the form of narratives. However, war museums represent foundational narratives for the state and these narratives are thus, according to Lisle (2006), commonly structured in a way which does not offer possibilities for truly understanding the lessons of war. War museums do not offer precise renditions of past wars and conflicts through language that encompass the ambivalent nature of it. Instead, they frequently cloak realities in a language of victimisation, coupled with strategic forgetting and moral instruction, where «…difficult stories of trauma, violence and loss are neutralised and made amenable through comforting narratives of commemoration and education» (Lisle, 2006, p. 842-843). Reeves (2018, p. 105) has underscored that these narratives are made by and for cultural and economic elites, as she argues that they come together to «…build common narratives about the nation state’s engagement in past wars and its identity as a security actor within the broader world order». When war museums appear to convey value-neutral and unbiased information it must be asked if they simultaneously construct a narrative which benefits something and someone. Thus, the language at war museums tricks visitors. This reality is, however, frequently pushed to the background of intellectual awareness as we live in times shaped by scientific ideals juxtaposing absolute dichotomies such as truth/false, right/wrong, correct/incorrect, from their
natural science-origins onto the subjective human realm. Indeed, as Bruner (1991, p. 4) has argued, most of the knowledge about human knowledge-getting and reality-construction is drawn from studies of how people come to know the natural or physical world. At war museums widely differentiated and multifaceted issues are linguistically simplified, streamlined and shaped, often to fit into a ‘grand narrative’ spanning temporal and spatial divides and sometimes establishing connections of spurious validity.

It is through its narrative structure that war museums enable these ‘qualities’, and the narratives relate intimately to emotions in that something that was dangerous in the past is represented and brought into the present in a way that first creates feelings of fear and uncertainty. Subsequently, visitors are offered an escape from the potential anxiety-inducing situation of re-presented war through a saviour-narrative, often casting the state in the role of hero, that seeks to replace chaos with meaning, created through what Neta Crawford (2014) called a language of justifications, beliefs and reasons. War museums can be argued to shape experiences which become taken for granted as such sites appear to convey value-neutral and unbiased information while simultaneously representing a ‘dead’, unobtrusive object, not instinctively being perceived as an attempt at influencing thought. However, rather than allowing for individual interpretation and meaning making of the emotional unease associated with exposure to death, trauma, and violence, a narrative on how to make sense of the chaos of war is introduced. War museums represent carefully selected facts organized into a narrative that is intended to legitimize some options while ‘seamlessly and insidiously’ neglecting/condemning others (Reeves, 2018, p. 104) This form of communication is not value-neutral or power-neutral. Like all language, it is social and political, and like Jenny Edkins (2003) argues, relations of power are produced through and reflected in it. Thus, from this perspective war museums are highly political sites. They invite critical analysis on the basis that they are influential as they attempt to shape a uniform narrative which legitimizes certain political options. They are sites which people are usually exposed to at a very young age, commonly sites for class excursions and the like, thus providing foundational narratives at moments in human beings lives where they are not capable of critically assessing the information they are fed. Such narratives may be highly problematic if they’re legitimizing and reinforcing inequalities between social groups or promoting overtly ethnocentric attitudes which encourages or deepens animosity and antipathy between people of different nations, at least seen from the perspective of this thesis, which is shaped by a humanist and cosmopolitan ontology. Cognitive biases are useful, because they are normative ordering structures.
However, such ingrained, taken-for-granted beliefs can also limit the access to potentially better, more rational solutions to new challenges as they are also inflexible and likely to be a basis for negative emotions when challenged.

2.4 War museums and the body

As argued earlier in this chapter, the power of war museums cannot be appreciated without also incorporating into analysis the material artefacts which draw the eye and kindle the imagination in a way which changes their original function and meanings. Thus, for the purposes of this thesis, which is analysing the political function of museal content, beyond describing its material qualities, it is necessary to go beyond language, and thus beyond cognition, to incorporate the emotions, and thus the body. Museums and memorials are unique mediums in the sense that they allow visitors to physically move throughout the narrative. They arguably simultaneously retain their power to influence from the common misconception that movement is free; that use of the physical body around real objects of war or within areas of previous warfare does not matter or have consequences for the perceptions and interpretations made by visitors. By allowing for multiple visitors simultaneously, museums can also be argued to create a social field with its own code of conduct and behavioural expectations. This phenomenon can be tied up to the concept of governmentality, defined by Stuart Hall (1999, p. 14) as «how the state indirectly and at a distance induces and solicits appropriate attitudes and forms of conduct from its citizens». Tony Bennett (1995) has argued that the museum should be understood as an institution that was designed not only to ‘improve’ the populace, but to encourage citizens to regulate and police themselves (Quoted by Reus-Smit, 2003). Thus, from a social perspective, war museums can function to routinize some types of behaviour, creating practices, which is interconnected to forms of bodily and mental activities (Reckwitz, 2002a). War museums become like a training ground, not just for informing the mind, but for altering the movement of bodies in conjunction to security issues, disseminating subliminal, embodied ways of knowing. This thesis holds that the impact of war museums cannot be fully appreciated without also incorporating an awareness of the physical interplay war museums allow for in the analysis. This awareness needs to emphasize knowledge as a collective, as action, «working with a performative understanding of the world (Bueger & Gadinger, 2015, p. 449-450). Such an ontology even transcends cultural boundaries as it associates behaviour with deeper human faculties associated with emotions and affect, connecting with distant others through the commonality of vulnerable bodies (Butler, 2004). It means that war museums are constructed in a way which throughout the
narrative attempts to create a balance, where visitors are brought *physically close to war* through the display of carefully selected real-world items and harrowing accounts of brutality. Simultaneously, the emotions of uncertainty, fear and sorrow that may be generated by this physical proximity are not left to their own devices. War museums enable visitors to feel and imagine what it, whatever is on display, must have been like, but does not allow for the visitor him/herself to navigate their way out of those emotions. Rather, war museums commonly neutralise difficult stories of trauma, violence and loss and instead create «victorious accounts of war to evacuate, displace and silence ambivalence». (Lisle, 2006 p. 843). When approaching the study of war museums, it is thus important to keep in mind that they employ narrative techniques that trick visitors to adopt political perspectives. However, by adopting an aesthetic mode of appraisal which incorporates the body in analysis it may be possible to go beyond ontology, to connect to more fundamental faculties associated with affect and emotions. Thus, it may be possible to reach a different level of understanding and a more complete picture of the historically and culturally contingent practices that shape what is considered legitimate and rational in different societies.

This thesis aims to triangulate findings of normativity inherent in language with interpretations regarding normativity inherent also in material objects. Theory triangulation involves using several different perspectives in the analysis of the same set of data (Denzin, 2017). The reason for this is because although interpretive IR-analyses can be conducted according to just one source of theory, the saliency of the emotions-argument is thought to increase by making explicit several ways of conceptualizing the emotional and affective potential of such sites. These additional theoretical perspectives are highlighted by drawing attention to the materiality of war museums. As established, it is the physical aspect of such sites which principally set them apart from other representations of history and security. Thus, in addition to how the narrative is organized from a language-perspective within the museal space, the poetics of space (PoS), a concept developed by French phenomenologist Gaston Bachelard (1958), highlights issues related to architecture and design of public spaces. Rather than seeing the interpretation of narratives within war museums as something which happens in isolation from its surroundings, the concept of PoS adds to the phenomenology of the imagination, which is inherent in narrative analysis (source), the architectural space that is the museum. The argument for adding this is that an analytic focus on architecture and the meaning of spaces can reveal important “side-narratives”, negotiated through the affective sensibilities of the self. Architecture can add legitimacy to the main linguistic narratives,
conveyed through the written or visual representations of war inside the museums. The poetics of space can also refer to the material insides of war museums, as a process producing meaning through the internal ordering and conjugation of the separate but related components of an exhibition (Lidchi, 1997). This again refers to how museums «…employs certain representational strategies to claim authenticity and mimic reality» (Mason, 2011, p. 20), or strategies for promoting authority and status. Bachelard’s concept of PoS is intimately linked to the emotions through the notion of the reverie. Reverie is a state of creative daydream in which subject and object becomes intimately intertwined in such a way that «object is intimately bound up with the subject in the generation of meaning» (Picart, 1997, p. 60). War museums, as other types of museums, frequently inhabit lavish spaces which are pleasing from an aesthetic viewpoint, often particularly in terms of facades and surrounding public areas. The aesthetic element, which PoS highlights, induces feelings of well-being which could be argued to magnify the effect of representations, signalling as it does status, power and legitimacy. Aesthetic well-being promotes reverie-inducing situations, creating an emotional attachment between subject and object which arguably reduces capacity for critical analysis. (Similar to how churches, mosques etc. function) However, the PoS is simply a conceptual tool for highlighting material elements. The meanings that are inserted into the gap between visual objectification of presumably interconnected material elements and the concept of PoS is a subjective representation which may or may not resonate with the ideas of other social subjects about what matters in the process of interpretation. E.g. it is easy to imagine that for many Japanese, a ‘side-narrative’ consisting of architectural splendour for the purposes of achieving status, power and legitimacy, will not be as problematic, because it highlights narratives which are supposedly there for the protection of them. Thus, acknowledging the presence of emotions in cognitive appraisals of objects calls into question the possibility to even separate between subject and object. After all, the value-distinctions we give to objects are inextricably interlinked with our own lived experience, and does not represent an objective, pre-social conceptualization of the object of analysis. As Elizabeth Dauphinee (2010) has pointed out, the separation of subject and object rests not on truth, as objects cannot be independently verified. Rather, human conceptualizations of objects are intersubjectively shared representations, whose position of authority rests on their ability to generate trust towards a certain shared interpretation of them. If that trust is hurt, people will instinctively start to look elsewhere for something to hold on to.
This section provided justification for the next chapter delineating the methodology and methods applied in this thesis. Thus, the thesis now turns to explain why an autoethnographic method is required to study how war museums influence emotions and affect.

3. Methodological considerations on emotions-research

As argued in the introduction, several scholars point to how Japanese foreign policy is partly constituted by emotions (Tønnesson, 2017, Dian, 2018). This chapter is thus devoted to explaining the methodology and choice of method that has been used in this thesis to understand how war museums shape emotions on a collective level. This thesis uses autoethnography to study Japanese war museums. The approach was selected in order to facilitate a discussion on affect and emotions and their relationship with foreign policy and international relations. Thus, the first section of this chapter explains what autoethnography is, before initiating a methodological discussion by contrasting the approach with traditional ethnographic research. The chapter then moves on to discuss the ethical aspects related to studying emotions and affect in a foreign country using the autoethnographic method, before moving on to discuss the validity of this approach and the criteria for evaluating it. The chapter then explains the practical steps that were taken to collect data using the autoethnographic method, arguing that it by highlighting aesthetic insights produce its own sources and simultaneously enable arguments that cannot be made using other methods.

According to Clément & Sangar (2018) publications looking into what role affect and emotions play in decision-making and politics have been on constant rise in the past ten years. However, the ambition to research emotions using autoethnography clashes with the dominant modes of research and writing in IR, which still comes with the presumption that the writer must be absent from his or her own work for it to be considered legitimate (Doty, 2010). Thus, the second section of this chapter, which delineates the practical methods that were used during fieldwork on this thesis, also reflects the emotional need to legitimize the approach. The autoethnographic method was selected for the purpose of being able to access emotions and argue for the importance of foregrounding lived experience as something which influences any process of interpretation. In relations to the case in this thesis, such a move is also argued to be important from an ethical perspective, as ethnographic studies related to security policy in other countries risks misinterpretation if attributing findings to the sites rather than the researcher’s subjective interpretation of them.

3.1 An autoethnographic approach to war museums
Autoethnography is strand of anthropology that is based on intentional self-reflexivity, allowing researchers to insert their personal and subjective interpretation into the research process (Chang, 2008). According to Oded Löwenheim (2010, p. 1029) the value of an autoethnographic account lies mainly «in its ability to break through the text’s linguistic barrier and evoke an emotional and reflective response on the part of readers, to make them interested in the story and think about their own condition and position». As such, findings do not reflect a traditional authoritative account of what is, but rather represents a subjective ‘bottom-up’ form of research. Highlighted in this process is the very act of discovery, when the ontology of the researcher meets with the ontology which has shaped the museal exhibitions. It is a process where deliberations and discussions encourage learning of ‘the Other’ through self-reflexive analysis of ‘the Self’, where acknowledging the situatedness of subjects replace the passive submission to purportedly objective ‘facts’, and where subject and object are intimately connected. This ontology builds on Max Weber (1948), who stressed the importance of intersubjectively shared ideas, or legitimacy. The concept of legitimacy does not only serve as an invitation to explore the foundational role of ideas in undergirding the sovereign state (Reus-Smit, 2003). For such an ontology to be consistently applied, it is also an invitation to explore the foundational role of ideas undergirding the social scientist himself. Indeed, if politics is constituted by language, ideas and values, we cannot stand outside ourselves to make neutral judgements (Hill, 2016).

Autoethnography explicitly promotes the qualities related to subjectivity in interpretation as it stimulates introspection, creating a bridge for IR from the traditional realm of science as solely validated by the externally available senses into the sensorial and emotional. Here, individuals and groups are accepted as ontologically situated, meaning-making human beings, laden with sentiments and taste. The meaning of objects of research changes through time and space through diffusion of memory, and the process of research at all stages is one of interpretation which is influenced by the historical and cultural context of the researcher. Thus, this type of hermeneutic approach stresses the importance of understanding background conditions and cultures that constitute social reality and make actors and action meaningful (Lebow, 2008) while simultaneously calling for self-reflection, reflexivity in the research process (Reeves, 2018, Schwarz-Shea & Yanow, 2013, Chang, 2008). Focusing on the historical/cultural context implies that ontology takes the foreground (Jackson, 2008). The thesis takes a post-positivist approach to argue that the only thing we can know hope to know is found, as Jackson (2010) so eloquently puts it, by exploring the dynamic interplay between
observer and the observed, and the co-presence of culturally specific and existentially universal elements within the same behavioural field.

Thus, this section argues that understanding is better attained through being open about the subjective ontology of the researcher, highlighting assumptions, prejudices and emotional dispositions which are at play in the process of interpretation. Such a discussion on methodology is deemed to be relevant as it forms the foundation for taking seriously the approach of autoethnography. Thus, research becomes not about revealing the «truth» about the selected sites or culture, but to convincingly argue how and why the research undertaken is worthwhile and that it creates understanding that should be taken seriously. Autoethnography thus contrasts with traditional ethnography in that the latter advocates telling ‘realist tales’ (Van Maanen. 1988), or «apparently definitive, confident, and dispassionate third-person accounts of a culture and of the behaviour of members of that culture» (Bryman, 2016, p. 459). The ethnographic text «must provide an ‘authoritative’ account of the group or culture in question. In other words, the ethnographer must convince us that he or she has arrived at an account of social reality that has strong claims to truth» (ibid). Autoethnography uses the lived experience of the author as a methodological resource and subjective interpretations as primary data. This implies, as Chang (2008) points out, that the stories of autoethnographers needs to be reflected upon, analysed, and interpreted within their broader sociocultural context. As Horkheimer (1972, p. 3) argues, «… the world given to each individual is a social product, as is perception as well». That is not to say that this thesis argues for conceiving everything social as a construction – there are biological basics as well – only that evidence shows that cultural practices produce specific psychological processes and experiences (Kitayama, Karasawa & Mesquita, 2004) that is beyond the scope of this thesis to become assimilated into.

Autoethnographers also attempt to achieve cultural understanding through analysis and interpretation, and like ethnographers, autoethnographers follow an ethnographic research process by systematically collecting data, or field texts, analysing and interpreting them, and producing scholarly reports (Chang, 2008). Thus, while autoethnographic findings does not make any claims to objective truth, it is nevertheless argued here that it provides important insights, as it highlights subjective memory. According to Confino (1997, p. 1388) the term ‘memory’ can be useful in articulating the connections between the cultural, the social, and the political, between representation and social experience. However, single-site and single theory research findings may be more a reflection of the situation the researcher found
himselh in during data collection, and the conscious or non-conscious desires of representation that existed at that time, rather than an actual account of the socially constructed processes that belongs to the field under study. It is only when linked to historical questions and problems, via methods and theories, that memory can be illuminating (Ibid). Thus, the autoethnographic approach in this thesis relies heavily reflexivity to situate the researcher and allow critically assess the relationship between subject and object, and on theoretical deliberations on emotions and affect anchored in constructivism, as delineated in chapter two, in order to validate its scientific merit.

As established then, the relational character of autoethnography sharply diverges from the authoritative notions of social reality which traditional ethnography arguably should produce. Although postmodernism-inspired methods such as autoethnography have been criticized for an obsession with self-reflexivity (Salzman, 2002) autoethnography is not about focusing on the self alone and a priori not a personal investigation (Reeves, 2018). Rather, it is more usefully conceptualized as a «technique of social investigation conducted through the self» (Wakeman, 2014, p. 708) or as about searching for understanding of others (culture/society) through self (Chang, 2008). Thus, as Duckart (2005) argues, the self is a subject to look into and a lens to look through in order to gain an understanding of the societal culture (Quoted by Chang, 2008, p. 49). Autoethnography stresses how knowledge created is relational, produced in a relationship between the writer and the reader (Reeves, 2018), and between observer and the observed. This strand of IR research shares with IR scholarship in general the fact that its use is motivated by lifestyles, interests and backgrounds that hone different sensitivities (ibid). In this case its use is motivated by a ‘philosophical ontological wager’ of the self being inextricably linked to any analysis of the world (Neumann, 2010). As interpretive, subjective approaches such as this is dependent on perception, with perception being a relative concept with subjective experiences, or memory, as basis, the approach requires reflexivity, as it is a product of a certain culture and a certain power/knowledge-background (Löwenheim, 2010). Thus, the self is characterized through an introspective attitude which orients itself outwards by first filtering information through the self. Applying autoethnography onto questions of world politics allows this thesis to theorize upon an understanding of the importance of memory as a foundation upon which behaviour is filtered, as a ‘roadmap’, onto which new encounters are interpreted. As such, this approach is one way of many possible ways of seeing or feeling what’s relevant to the international. But it is not enough to pick a ‘vehicle of memory’, analyse its representation and draw conclusions about ‘memory’ or ‘collective
memory’, as memory does not offer any true explanatory power (Confino, 1997). Thus, this chapter highlights how autoethnography is a method of data collection which allows direct access to the analytical resource of individual emotions. It was selected as a method for this thesis in order to bring the researcher as close as possible to the environment being investigated, with the aim being, as in other qualitative approaches, to understand the world through ‘a different set of eyes’ (Bryman, 2016). Simultaneously, as autoethnographic data is based on subjective interpretations, it is crucial that the data is treated with critical, analytical and interpretive eyes and that arguments made are supported by other research (Chang, 2008).

3.2 The ethical way of knowing

Although foregrounding the ‘I’ backgrounds other perspectives (Neumann, 2010), the autoethnographic approach is useful for the purposes of this thesis as war museums are sites that are very much about the physical. Physical proximity coupled with (at least initial) psychological distance to the object of research allows for understanding emotions as an important factor in the process of understanding. Rather than the typical remote intellectualizing and subsequent emotional de-legitimization fostered by distance and disembodiment, the autoethnographic research process allows for presence and connectedness to the field of activity (Doty, 2010), which in this case opens for arguments encompassing emotions. According to Dauphinee (2010, p. 813), this approach allows «... the reader to see the intentions – and not just the theories and methodologies – of the researcher», opening researchers up to a deeper form of judgement which lies at the core of the ethics of autoethnography. What ethnographic researchers choose to emphasize while in the field is often a product of what strikes them as significant (Bryman, 2016), and autoethnography makes these processes explicit, highlighting everything emotions may lead to. This includes e.g. instances of withdrawal from the research process if overcome by strong, painful emotions, or the avoidance of situations which may evoke emotions, attempts at suppressing emotions or instances of pretending as if something never happened, because of shame. The aim is to jot down what happened and initially rationalize how and why during emotional moments, before later using it as a foundation for a more in-depth analysis of the relationship between the site and the ethnographer. Autoethnography foregrounds this subjective nature of data collection and interpretation by granting legitimacy to the inputs from the emotional part of the interplay between brain and body. It does not mean however overriding the rationalizing faculties when conducting analysis, but it does imply that focus is put on the researcher himself first, before this is interpreted into a wider context once it becomes
possible to treat the subject matter with some clarity and distance. From an ethical perspective such a process is arguably sensible as it allows researchers to deal with politically sensitive cases, such as the one in this thesis, while taking personal ownership of the research process and adding a perhaps unique perspective informing the field of available choices. Coming in from the outside to do research on a culture with a set of frames and an approach set in mind risks, in the words of Emmanuel Levinas, to interrupt the continuity of research subjects, «making them play roles in which they no longer recognize themselves» (Quoted in Dauphinee, 2010, p. 816). With the autoethnographic approach however, the thesis doesn’t risk «compromise the reputation, privacy, and trust of others» (Löwenheim, 2010, p. 1030). In any case, disclosure of private information about others, such as political stance, was not necessary for the argument and the purposes of this thesis.

From a research perspective there are interesting consequences from seeing things from an autoethnographic perspective. First, there are legitimate concerns regarding the role of emotions in social research. The traditional view on social science fieldwork holds that physical distance between the researcher’s body and the object of research favours an intellectual distance conducive to objectivity (Reeves, 2018). Although this study takes emotions seriously, it follows Jon Elster (2010), among others, who argue that emotions can have a direct influence on perceptions, leading to wishful thinking which contradicts most, if not all, available data. He further argues that this direct mechanism may be «especially dangerous» (my translation) if reinforced by an indirect mechanism which leads to the gathering of too little information when influenced by strong emotions (Elster, 2010, p. 273). As this thesis uses emotions both as a theoretical focus and as a methodological resource, confusions might occur over what role emotions have in the interpretations of findings. Taking emotions seriously means that they are part of an explicit focus on a self-reflexive process, and that they should be highlighted when present. This is motivated by the belief that through foregrounding subjective reactions and interpretations different discussions can take place, discussions that transcends conceptualizations related to traditional scientific epistemology, and opens for a more level playing-field between researcher and those who are done research on. Moments during fieldwork that are signified by greater emotional saliency are highlighted in the belief that they can provide useful insights regarding how, in this case, information at war museums is processed, thus pointing to how war museums function in relations to the average non-expert visitor, and how war museums thus influence politics.
3.3 The validity of autoethnographic research

The arguments presented so far in this chapter tie in with what Max Horkheimer (1972) argued was traditional scientific theory’s methodological separation between fact and value, according to him based on a (pre-)given, unexamined conception of social reality. This thesis shares the view that interpretivist social science, which seeks to grasp the subjective meaning of social action (Bryman, 2016), needs to be evaluated by a different set of standards than research of a positivist orientation. Causal relationships, a precursor for generalizability, requires some degree of measurement and quantification, which some scholars go as far as to rule out altogether in the case of researching emotions in IR. According to Bleiker and Hutchison (2008, p. 125) «… emotions cannot be quantified, nor can they easily be measured, even in qualitative terms». Thus, for assessing autoethnographic validity, Schwartz-Shea and Yanow (2013) have argued that positivist standards are inapplicable. In its place they suggest a different a set for interpretive research, highlighting the importance of trustworthiness, systematicity, reflexivity, transparency and positionality (Quoted by Aradau and Huysmans, 2019, p. 43). Although some might dismiss findings altogether based on its subjectivity position, findings made using autoethnography are, as argued by Neumann (2010, p. 1054) «neither more nor less scientific than what flows from other methodological choices», given that the research procedures that flows from it are explicit and in accordance with general research standards. Thus, the ‘scientificness’ of autoethnography should be judged by the degree of relevance it has and its ability to be explicit regarding what frames that are used from the researcher’s perspective. As ‘filters’ on interpretations the method presupposes lived experience and subsequent emotional reactions as influencing and shaping the research process. As autoethnography starts from the epistemological perspective that social research never achieves the ideal of objectivity or value-neutrality prescribed by positivist models (Reeves, 2018), by actively drawing attention to subjective experiences, biases and assumptions that are affecting the research process, and openly arguing their impact, researchers allow readers to critically assess research findings up against the background knowledge shaping choices in research.

As argued in chapter two, this thesis highlights the aesthetic qualities of war museums. The thesis is thus positioned within an interpretivist tradition where findings are impossible to validate externally as it does not keep subject and object strictly apart (Horkheimer, 1972). Research on the aesthetic qualities of representations is not possible to replicate. However, the interpretivist research agenda in IR allows for research aspiring to internal validity. While
validity refers to whether «you are observing, identifying, or ‘measuring’ what you say you are» (Mason, 1996, p. 24), internal validity refers to «whether there is a correspondence between researchers’ observations and the theoretical ideas they develop» (Bryman, 2016, p. 384). Autoethnography is well suited for research on war museums as it involves being able to talk about embodied ways of knowing, i.e. how interpretation can change through time and space from being stimulated by music, smells, tastes or colours, to mention some examples. The significance of such aesthetic insight is located precisely in the fact that it cannot be attained in any other way (Gadamer, 1960). According to Bleiker (2001, p. 520) it produces «an experience, sensuous at times, which cannot be apprehended or codified by non-aesthetic forms of knowledge». As such, aesthetic research may be likened more to art than science, in that art is in the space which we «cannot quite grasp, and cannot really see» (Sylvestre, 2009, p. 18). Although the social sciences have sharply demarcated themselves from art through its concepts and methods, Sylvestre (2009) argues that it is an integral part of IR, in that IR speaks of the art of politics, the art of diplomacy, the art of war and the art of peace, «which suggests that it is more than a decorative feature of the field» (Sylvestre, 2009, p. 18). As such, although autoethnographic research cannot provide authoritative research findings, it can arguably describe a process which has relevance to understanding war museums as spaces capable of influencing emotions relevant for policy.

3.4 Data collection: Producing sources for analysis

As individuals go through life, they learn to associate objects with emotions, and such embodied knowledge shaped by lived experience, often working in the background of conscious awareness, can resonate or elicit resistance when visitors are met with various parts of museal exhibits later in life. The aesthetic approach, highlighted through autoethnography, stresses «that our comprehension of facts cannot be separated from our relationship with them» (Bleiker, 2001, p. 522). In order to attain such aesthetic insight, this thesis has collected data using autoethnography, which enables researchers to use their own affective and emotional experiences as methodological devices (Reeves, 2018). It entails for the researcher to anchor his «consciousness into the research site as a material and sensorial environment, a basic mindfulness technique» (Reeves, 2018, p. 110). In this thesis, it also entails working introspectively to stay aware of the subjective processes of emotional resistance and resonance and attributing them to the correct source. Martha Nussbaum (2013, p. 11) argues that all the major emotions are ‘eudaimonistic’, meaning that they appraise the world from the individual’s own viewpoint. Thus, when using autoethnography as a method when analysing
sites such as war museums, there is a risk of misrepresenting subjective experiences and interpretations as being reflective of the research site and generalizing based on them.

Without a clear understanding of the eudemonistic nature of emotions their presence may be ascribed to some quality of the site, while this quality only worked as resonance – a trigger – to something already present in the researcher. This is what George Deveraux (1967, p. xvii) alluded to when he said «the subjectivity inherent in all observations (is) the royal road to an authentic, rather than fictitious objectivity … defined in terms of what is really possible, rather than in terms of what should be». Gaston Bachelard’s (1958) notion of *reverie*, points to the acknowledgment that how we feel in a situation, is how we learn in a situation. That the aesthetic element, which the poetics of space highlights, can induce feelings of well-being which could be argued to magnify the effect of representations, signalling as it does status, power and legitimacy. Allowing oneself to flow with aesthetics, imagination or reverie, creates an emotional attachment between subject and object which arguably reduces capacity for critical analysis. Thus, this thesis stresses the importance of working introspectively to continuously explore the self in relations to the other, so as not to misattribute responsibility onto the object of research for matters ‘the Self’ doesn’t like during interpretation. Also, during fieldwork, emphasis is put on affective behaviour, e.g. getting caught up in a certain part of the exhibition, getting bored by something, becoming agitated by something else, and then noting that down. It is a process of self-awareness and self-restraint which necessitates being knowledgeable about one’s own embodied ways of knowing and having the habit of introspective analysis. It is argued here that to interpret and analyse data collected through autoethnography benefits from a mental posture which anchors the cognitive and emotional processes to the moment, rather than some future or past. Then, it may become clearer where emotions are coming from, which helps in the sifting out of that which belongs to a different time and place but is activated by a ‘trigger’ at the research site. Thus, simplified and on the surface, the autoethnographic approach applied in this thesis was conducted as a systematic on-the-go documentation and interpretation practice of selected aspects at the research sites, done *through* the subjective, affective sensitivities of the researcher.

More precisely the research process was done as following: First, fieldwork at the sites was documented by taking written notes during and immediately after the visits. These notes usually contain first impression, keywords, emotions that came up when seeing something/reading about something. These fieldnotes were supplemented by audio voice logs recorded later, of thoughts, ideas and things that stuck as the minutes passed. These logs were
generally more analytical than the initial impressions, as they were recorded in areas where there was room to reflect out loud without disturbing others. In addition, photography played a role in the analysis and interpretation phase after fieldwork, as they kept fresh the initial impression made by parts of the exhibitions (where photography was allowed). Also, video recordings of exhibition rooms and moving installations were important to capture sound and ambience which is argued to be a key component of the exhibitions in relation to emotions, as it also helped to keep fresh memories from the field sites for analysis later on. Finally, official documentation, such as museum pamphlets, guide books and testimonials provided valuable input in the later stages of analysis. These sources were especially helpful with regards to remembering the practicalities of the museums; how many exhibition rooms there were, what the rooms contained and how they related to one another, but also for gaining a deeper understanding of the field under study. In the museums I focused on the connections between the exhibition rooms, as I entered the research with pre-conceived analytical categories such as the poetics of space and emotional amplifiers, which made me reflect on how the exhibition rooms were outfitted to serve a narrative purpose in relations to one another. This to me, was crucial to get a sense of the legitimacy that is arguably created by the war museums, and the overarching message that the thesis argues is being produced. Taken together, all these sources of data provided a strong basis for understanding and constructing the connection between emotions and legitimacy that could be argued to be constructed and maintained by narratives and representational techniques at the war museums themselves.

4. Case studies: An autoethnographic investigation of three Japanese war museums

In this chapter the autoethnographic study of the three war museums that were chosen as sites for the fieldwork, the Yūshūkan war museum in Tokyo and the Atomic Bomb Museums in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, is presented. The fieldwork was conducted in January 2019, with three days spent examining each site. The chapter begins by giving the sites a brief introduction while also explaining why exactly these sites were chosen and how they are perceived to be related to one another. As argued in chapter two, this thesis posits that war museums, nation and nationalism is interlinked in that such sites shape embodied affect and emotions, concepts which increasingly are being recognized as important in the reproduction of security imaginaries (Reeves, 2018, Ross, 2006). Crucially, the chapter highlights how from this thesis’ point of view representations of national history, such as war museums,
cannot be appreciated without considering the role of emotions and affects, and thus the body. As argued in chapter three, it is in the process of interpretation that the subjectivity of representations at war museums intersect with the lived experience of visitors. With contact begins a process of resonance and resistance to the narrative where existing emotional and affective dispositions in the visitor, shaped by adaptation to past representations, play a crucial role in the receptivity to the new information, influencing further action. The goal of the following empirical section is to make these internal negotiations between subject and objects explicit, to discuss the difference in representational practices at the sites and to interpret their consequences for the creation of boundaries of positive affect. This concept is presented as an outcome of the fieldwork for this thesis and is covered extensively in the chapter following this one.

The reason for selecting the Yūshūkan and the atomic bomb museums as sites was that they each represent the most destructive periods and events in the history of the nation of Japan, excluding natural disasters. As such they are assumed to provide crucial narratives upon which the understanding of Japan’s role in international relations is based. As stated in the introduction to this thesis, Japan’s history problem is still an issue influencing the relationship between Japan and its neighbouring countries. Based on the literature on affect and emotions in IR the thesis took these sites as maintaining central elements regarding the emotional and affective underpinnings of contemporary Japanese foreign relations practices. Rather than focusing on just one site, the thesis focuses on three in order to get a more complete picture of the normative space in which Japanese foreign relations can be enacted, and as the analysis of the sites will show, it became relevant to view the emotional and affective aspects of the three sites in relations to one another.

The first site that is explored in the next chapter using the autoethnographic approach is the Yūshūkan, a war museum located inside the religious Shinto complex of the Yasukuni Shrine. While Yasukuni is a temple-complex devoted to honouring 2,460,000 soldiers killed in war for Japan, the Yūshūkan is a «… museum of the articles and notes they left behind» (Yasushi, 2017, p. 3). Containing some 100,000 articles, including paintings, art works, armours, and weapons, the museum is a rich source of information regarding Japan’s past, but also embroiled in controversy related to its manner of historical representation. The museum has come under heavy criticism in the recent past for conducting historical revisionism and promoting militarism (Kuo, 2014, Fallows, 2014). The museum offers a narrative stretching through 19 exhibition rooms which paints Japanese war efforts in a favourably, and arguably
inaccurate light. The greater temple compound of Yasukuni, within which the Yūshūkan is located, has also taken on a political function as a place of education, memorialization and commemoration. Some 1068 of the war dead honoured at Yasukuni are convicted war criminals, with 14 of them ‘Class A’, including general and commander of the Kwantung Army in China and later Prime Minister of Imperial Japan, Hideki Tojo (Ryall, 2014). Visits to the shrine by recent Japanese Prime Ministers have caused outrage in neighbouring countries such as China and Korea (Takenaka, 2007), as any signs of political support to the allegedly ‘militarist shine’ of Yasukuni seems to gather criticism (Lies & Shin, 2018). Central to understanding this criticism is understanding Yasukuni, as it offers absolution after death of earthly deeds, kami, which elevates enshrined souls to deity status. Up until the end of World War Two Yasukuni played a pivotal role for civilian and military morale, and it was not uncommon for soldiers going on kamikaze-missions to say that they would meet again at Yasukuni in anticipating their deaths. Also, central to understanding the criticism directed at this site is understanding the adjoining Yūshūkan Museum, whose alleged attempts at whitewashing the history of Japan’s war crimes; crimes against humanity and crimes of aggression in the first half of the 20th century is a source of continuous tension. The practice of interrelating religion with politics and history is something which continues at Yasukuni and the Yūshūkan to this day. Its continuous presence in Japanese political life makes it relevant to study in order to argue its role as a resource in shaping the normative space for legitimate Japanese foreign policy.

The second and third sites that are explored in the following sections of this chapter are the Atomic Bomb Museums in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. These sites mainly represent the memorialization of the 6th and 9th of August 1945, and the aftermaths of these days. Large parts of both cities got annihilated by two American nuclear attacks, and it is estimated that about 140,000 people died in relation to the bomb in Hiroshima (The City of Hiroshima) while about 70,000 people are estimated to have died in Nagasaki (The City of Nagasaki). These sites are included because they are thought to represent events in Japanese history which heavily influence the continuous domestic support of a “pacifist clause” in the Japanese constitution. The initial ambition for studying these sites was to try to get close to an understanding of the emotional and affective impact these sites have on visitors through an autoethnographic study. In studying the atomic bomb museums and the Yūshūkan war museum this way, this thesis aims to argue for a research process which focuses on emotions as a way of mapping out the political space in which legitimate Japanese foreign policy can be
carried out. Because institutions have the power and reach to influence perceptions and thus legitimacy, they are argued here to have an effect on international relations because of the scale on which their influence works, and the constitutive effects they have on opinion as sites of authority. The reason for this assumption is the intersubjective nature of retentive memory (Dian, 2017). For memory to be politically influential it must be collectively shared by a sufficiently broad mass of individuals. Historically contingent intersubjectivity requires institutional support, for example through war museums.

Throughout this chapter a discussion leading up to the argument that war museums are influential as foreign policy signalling devices will be conducted. Emotions play a part in both the structuring of museums and the interpretation of them made by visitors. The research focus of the following chapter is how museums structure emotions, which is highlighted through an autoethnographic journey into not only the darkest moments of Japanese history, but also the darkest moments of this author. By doing so, it may be possible to relate to the emotions and traumatic moments that constituted both the outlook of the war museums, and the outlook of the author. Fieldwork carries with it the potential for many unforeseen issues. Choosing a personal approach to the study of the relationship between war and politics further expands the risk. Thus, before presenting the findings from the fieldwork, this chapter highlights the main challenges associated with it.

4.1 Challenges related to the fieldwork

As mentioned, the Yūshūkan museum has been mired in controversy for years, and as such there is a degree of tension surrounding the site which is reflected in their strict policies regarding interviews, taking photographs or in any shape or form recording or reporting from the site. This affected the fieldwork in that it limited the ability to record aspects of the exhibitions, as well as heightening subjective feelings of paranoia and suspicion when at the site. For a thesis devoted to self-reflexive studies of emotions, these extraneous factors posed a challenge which will be addressed later. Also, although there were coherent English presentations throughout all the museums, there were also many displays and particularly video installations that were solely in Japanese, clouding them from interpretation. A disclaimer that interpretations and analysis of the sites as based on the available English information is thus made. At the Atomic Bomb Museum in Hiroshima a significant challenge was that the museum was half-closed for renovations during the five days I spent in the city. Thus, my analysis from Hiroshima mainly focuses on reactions towards other parts of the
memorialization complex with which the museum is connected, although it also includes the part of the museum that was open.

On a more personal note my fieldwork became influenced throughout my time in Japan by the fact that I had difficulties recuperating my energy levels which dropped from being on such a tight schedule, working and travelling extensively in foreign surroundings. I struggled with a flu on and off for many days, which eventually knocked me out completely at the end of my time in Japan. This meant I had to spend four days alone in a hotel room in Nagoya just trying to get well enough before flying back to Norway, robbing me of what could have been valuable moments for analysis. In addition, self-doubt about whether I would be able to do what I had set out to do constantly crept on my mind. Slight paranoia about my stay and role in challenging established narratives in Japan contributed. (I.e. who do I think I am coming here thinking I am someone who have anything important to say about this massive subject).

The issues which this thesis deals with, such as the emotional effects of the atomic bombs, but also challenging national narrative regarding world war two, were at times quite hard to work with. As I was approaching the subjects autoethnographically the experiences sometimes became too close for comfort and at other times made me incredibly sad. Especially at those moments when my own personal history intersected with experiences told by atomic bomb survivors who had lost family and friends, I struggled to find motivation to keep going as I was constantly reminded of issues in my past, which when evoked temporarily overshadowed the effort it is to work on a master’s thesis. I had to keep reminding myself that having to negotiate all the difficult emotions that came up in me during fieldwork was the point of me being there and choosing the approach I had chosen. However, when I was there, alone, and found myself in the midst of it, I started regretting my decisions. I had the impulse of burying everything personal deep down, but simultaneously I have experienced the benefits of interrogating difficult emotions, getting to know them and thus no longer fearing them. So, I used such moments as inspiration, wrote them down and reflected upon them, and they ended up becoming a crucial part of the analysis of fieldwork. I also had the ambition to tell a story of how the professional can become personal, when dealing with issues of death and trauma, common features of IR. However, at times boundaries between the lifeworlds disconnected by space and time, self and other, became blurry and impacted the research process, as I allowed myself to be moved emotionally by the stories I experienced. Throughout the process of working with this thesis, but especially towards the end, I also struggled with how much I was comfortable sharing. Indeed, how does someone become a good reflexivist? Rest assured, I
have thought long and hard about sharing that which is present in the coming sections of this chapter. Finally, war museums cover issues which are complicated and vast by nature. E.g. many of the exhibition rooms at the Yūshūkan museum cover topics, a certain war or time period, that could easily be expanded on in a museum, or a study, of its own. As such, the analysis presented over the next sections presents snippets of everything that is available at the three sites. It presents an argument which is not an authoritative account of what these sites objectively represent, but a perspective which is argued to be important.

4.2 Field Site One: The Yūshūkan war museum

The Yūshūkan museum boasts an impressive collection of historically important Japanese artefacts and paintings in addition to massive volumes of text-based information and graphics depicting various important occurrences, and campaigns fought by the Japanese armed forces from the Meiji Restoration era to the end of World War 2 (ca. 1840 – 1945). As I roamed the halls of the museum for three days, on the 4th, 5th and 16th of January 2019, I took notes and analysed my thoughts and emotions upon which the following account is based. What was I doing there? I was challenging narratives and look for inconsistencies, touching upon nationalist ideas and poking my head into spaces, which frankly, were none of my business. People might get angry. And judging by my feelings of anxiousness and paranoia as I approached the huge Torii gate at the Yasukuni Jinja in Tokyo it seemed like it might happen. Maybe I was fighting myself, without consciously noticing. My confidence was at a low. As Elizabeth Dauphinee (2010, p. ??) asks; «what expert am I?» Like a frame, the Torii (gate) not only encapsulated my vision, but in a way also the senses. A Torii’s function at any Shinto shrine throughout Japan is to mark the entrance to a sacred space. I thought I didn’t care about sacredness, but I was wrong. It was submissive. I assumed it was a wish for that which lay inside to be allowed to exist in solemnity and peace. I was obviously not respecting that wish. A couple days before, on New Year’s Eve, I went to another shrine and I felt the connection. Most Japanese were on holiday and it was as if I joined some of them in the rituals of going to a shrine. The washing of the hands, the bow under the Torii, the clapping of hands two times when at the temples, and the removal of shoes when entering. The connection wasn’t spiritual, it was social. Insulated. Safe. I’d always scoffed at such practices. Now I was in a holy place doing research on a war museum, and I suddenly felt like I was about to offend someone, in one of the most controversial sites in all of Japan! What was I doing there, and why did they put a war museum inside a holy site? I’d always been afraid of
this mix, religion and politics, and they had even put shops which sold food and candy all along the entrance to make it seem benign.

As Oded Löwenheim (2010) pointed out writing autoethnography is to take up the risk of being personally liable for upsetting or challenging powerful people or institutions. At least it might feel that way, which may hamper the research and writing process. That started to dawn on me while in Japan, and I’d started to regret being so interested in figuring out the role of emotions in international relations, not to mention choosing Japan as a case. I found myself in the Yūshūkan, where the centrepiece of the entrance area, a type Zero fighter plane, had just drawn my attention. I immediately became aware of an anti-Japanese bias, at least in relations to warfare, as there was an initial sting in me as I saw the Zero. My only previous experience with the aircraft type had been through popular culture, as vessels of suicidal death from above, portraying the Japanese uniquely one-sided as evil and dangerous. Among these war-memorabilia, a normal cafeteria and a gift-shop reminded me that this was 2019, although a slight anxiousness crept at my consciousness. My large camera was hanging from my shoulder, but there were signs everywhere saying no photography, no recording of any kind of the exhibitions. I had a notebook though, which I would come to take fieldnotes in very secretively at different stages throughout the museum. I really did not want to be confronted and explain what I was doing. I was experiencing that mild paranoia, vulnerability and estrangement anthropologists describe as part of the liminal phase of fieldwork (Jackson, 2010). It was a phase in which I was trying to orientate myself, but also one in which I was acutely aware of how my emotions were shaping my interpretations. I couldn’t shake the feeling of being in enemy territory, while doing my best to blend in as a normal visitor. I was out to prove a point, that emotions and affect mattered, to a field of study which, apparently, didn’t care about such phenomena. Or so I thought. As I projected my own uncertainties onto IR, I went all the way to Japan to poke where I didn’t belong, to prove a point, to impress someone, and to live a little, for a master’s thesis. I must either have been very dumb, very brave or very desperate. Probably I was a bit of everything.

Having made my way through the first five exhibition rooms, I felt as if the museum had set the ground for what was to come. After focusing on the Japanese «samurai spirit», warrior mentality and early inner strife, it was as if the museum turned a chapter in the historical narrative. War museums are not value neutral, but this quickly became very apparent at the Yūshūkan.
The entire exhibition was ordered chronologically, but after the first five rooms this suddenly seemed to break as the exhibition turned self-referential with a room dedicated to the founding of the Yasukuni shrine. The shrine, at the time called the Tokyo Shokonsha, was established in 1869. The placement of this room after the one dealing with the many Satsuma rebellions of that time (e.g. Saga, 1874, Shinpūren, 1876, Akizuku, 1876, Hagi, 1876) seemed to indicate an intention of legitimizing Yasukuni as part of what signalled a unified Japan. What quickly followed was a room dedicated to the adoration of the Imperial family, a room in which a tight relationship between the Emperor, the Yasukuni Jinja, and the entire population of Japan was stressed. I suddenly realized I had started moving very ceremoniously as I entered the room, and I caught myself thinking that this exhibition increased the legitimacy of the Yūshūkan. Photographs of former emperors and princes in full uniform, adorned with medals covered the walls, and when I suddenly yawned over a stand showing the Imperial rescript on education of 1872 I immediately felt as if I was being disrespectful. The keywords I had jotted down in my notebook from the rooms up until this point were ‘troops’, ‘order’, ‘discipline’, ‘submission’, ‘respect’, ‘pride’, ‘nation’, and ‘skill’. It got me thinking, what is left out? Why aren’t there any alternative voices present? Judging by the exhibition up until this point, Japanese history seemed almost exclusively militarist, elitist and male. Where were the representations of the vast majority in Japan, the normal
people? Where were the women? Where was trade, commerce, business? Were they not too touched by war? As I made my way to the next exhibition rooms, I had a strange mix of emotions. Sympathy, yes, for their plight of the past, but with a bad taste. The Ōshūkan had begun building up a victim-narrative early, devoid of responsibility for own actions, where western aggression was claimed to be the cause of Japanese aggression. The early annexations of the Korean peninsula, Taiwan and parts of China were labelled «incidents» or given defensive justification. As Audrey Reeves’ (2018) study of the IWM in London showed, such representations are not unique to the Ōshūkan. Western states, too, promote the comfortable belief to the public that they solely wage ‘Just Wars’ (Reeves, 2018, p. 117). Thus, rather than sites reflecting objective knowledge, I understood that war museums should be seen as a part of the debate about a nation’s history.

The first day I spent at the Ōshūkan left me exhausted only halfway into the exhibition. Applying an autoethnographic method opens for the possibility of questioning representations (Dauphinee, 2010), and it is well suited for integrating work on emotions into IR. But it also demands presence and awareness, constantly working self-reflexively to ‘read’ and question the relationship between subject and object, changing situations and changing moods. I was initially struck by the lack of self-criticism about how Japanese foreign policy was conducted during this era. Outbreak of full-scale war in China was blamed on the Chinese, who opened fire on the Marco Polo bridge outside Beijing, not problematizing the least that the Japanese were there in the first place. There were no mentions of the atrocities committed during the wars at any time. Only a vague referral to something ominous at that point which the rest of the world knows as the Nanking massacre was made by stating the battles in China were ‘confused’, followed by a statement about how Japanese army leadership in China clearly gave orders about how Japanese soldiers were to behave with discipline. Thus, the exhibition gave the impression of ‘Just War’, a bloodless war, were the Japanese showed self-restraint, and simply acted defensively. I caught myself being honestly surprised by such a blatant unapologetic attitude, although it was somewhat expected. Focus was put on how China had to pay reparations for the war, although Japan was the invading force, suggesting that China were the ones in the wrong. A later placard informed the visitors how World War Two started, and it highlighted the harsh terms of the Versailles treaty, which could also be read as excusing Germany for its aggressive past. Thus, at certain points throughout the museum I became acutely aware of my own resistance to the narrative, and it cast a dark cloud over other parts of the exhibition. At some points it felt almost as if I was watching a crime
unfolding before my eyes as the museum arbitrarily or non-arbitrarily neglected key perspectives from the past or gave explanatory power to issues that would have been unheard of in a Western museum. There are numerous adjustments that could have been made which would have broadened the space of the «us» that have been affected by Japan’s history of warfare. However, the intensely ethno-centric mediating of history at the Yūshūkan had the effect of tiring me out. It felt as if I was experiencing cognitive dissonance. As I got to the part of the exhibition regarding World War Two, I couldn’t stand any more stories trying to shape the meaning of death and destruction, sick as I had become of the lies, the violence, the power games and the propaganda. In this sense, for me, the Yūshūkan offers a realistic rendition of what representing war is about; the creation of self-aggrandizing narratives characterized by the absence of objectivity and empathy for the «Other».

After the first day a key point for me, as I moved throughout the exhibition rooms anew, became to take responsibility for my own emotions, and not blame it on something I saw or read. As with any organization, the Yūshūkan is also shaped by political sensitivities and personal investments, which may make it difficult to open the museum up to critical investigation (Mason, 2011). My role there, as I saw it, was not to assign responsibility or point fingers. Rather, my aim was to register what happened to me, as my subjective ontology encountered the subjective representation of the war museum and use from that experience as I tried to understand how focusing on emotions could illuminate Japan’s history problem. A key aspect in that regard was taking seriously the call for reflexivity found in autoethnography, to forefront the relationship of the self with the world (Dauphinee, 2010), the relationship between subject and object. The following transcript from after the first visit to the museum illustrates how I «hook up to the world in order to do research» (Neumann, 2010, p. 1051), which is relevant to forefront in order to clarify the ontological perspective.

So, I’ve been at the Yūshūkan-museum (long pause). Was there for about two hours. It’s a very big museum, with a lot of information. It’s going all the way back to early nation building in Japan until after World War Two. It’s a museum which is almost exclusively focused on the military aspects of Japanese history. I’m left with the feeling that it represents Japan’s foreign policy in an extremely favourable light. I’m thinking it can be separated into three sections. The first one dealing with Japan’s own aggressive foreign policy. The second dealing with what Japan’s been (exposed to). And the third is about how Japan’s actions are being presented. When it comes to things like suicide missions and that kind of stuff, then they’re very open and honest. When dealing with the technical details, eh, the techniques that
were used. When it comes to their own politics, related to China in particular, then they’re very, eh, very, eh, apologetic towards themselves. They’re barely presenting the invasion of China as anything other than an occurrence, leaving out totally central aspects about the warfare (my voice lowered). All in all, there are a lot of things that are not mentioned. I got a feeling that one is here trying to present things in a very positive light. I became a little provoked by it. A little sick and tired by that they’re not willing to have a critical look at their own history. But I have to come back tomorrow. It was way too much for one day.

As this transcript makes evident, the collection of data was at this point in time signified by an interpretational process where I ‘allowed’ myself to reflect and analyse on my observations, rather than simply describe their material qualities. From the many recordings I made this was selected as it illustrates a pre-reflexive need to put what I had observed into a context that fit with my subjective ontology. There are other visitors to the Yūshūkan who agrees with my rendition of the exhibition. On the travel website Tripadvisor.com reviews of the museum are mixed. Excerpts from the five latest user opinions are; «Yushukan should only be visited by people who have already researched WW2» (sbfalby, 2018), «I’ve never felt as conflicted as I did after leaving this museum» (mme8771, 2018), «the museum adequately portrays the
Japanese vantage point» (Laur12345, 2018), «mostly presented from a far right imperialistic point of view» (ECWorld, 2017), «the museum is “pushing” Japan’s point of view on military history» (Simon P, 2017).

When on day two I got to the exhibitions regarding World War Two, I was beginning to feel sorry for the Japanese, based on the way history is narrated at the museum. The Yūshūkan served as an important reminder of the power of representations, and how the way history shapes impressions based on affective and emotional leanings in the present. Whether or not such representations have a causal influence on Japan’s history problem is not for this study to argue, but from an interpretational point of view it felt as if it could shape at least parts of the ground upon which contemporary Japanese foreign policy is enacted. As the discussion in chapter two of this thesis arguing for conceiving rationality as something that is historically and culturally contingent implies; through working on this thesis, and especially by contrasting the insights at the Yūshūkan to previous experiences in western war museums, the museum is perceived to have an important socializing function which legitimizes some political options. However, one site is not enough to convincingly argue on what grounds these processes occur. Thus, this chapter now turns to the next site that was visited.

4.3 Field Site Two: The Atomic Bomb Museum Hiroshima

Having departed Tokyo, I made my way south to Hiroshima, where I planned to stay for five days before heading to Nagasaki. Not long after arriving I found myself standing next to the monument that was devoted to students who had died in the atomic bombing of Hiroshima. I had begun writing myself into the story by imagining how I would have been dead in an instant had I been at this spot when the bomb fell. However, simultaneously as I was using my imagination this way, I was beginning to think that I had made a mistake from a research perspective, as I was so struck by the circumstances I found myself in that I was having difficulties thinking clearly. In the years after the bomb, which erased several entire neighbourhoods and left a scorched plain in its wake, the city of Hiroshima preserved the area, which is now the Peace Memorial Park, as the rest of the city was rebuilt and modernized around it. The only building left standing was the skeletal remains of what is now known as the «A-bomb dome», the old Hiroshima Prefectural Industrial Promotion Hall. The Peace Memorial Park is today a vast, scenic oasis in the middle of a vibrant, healthy city. However, like a cemetery, it did feel existential, like a reminder of the tenderness of life. And it sat there like a giant scar, as a hole in relations to the surrounding logic of structures.
consisting of tall buildings of glass, steel and concrete. In the hours I walked around in it, trying to immerse myself in the tragedy that was Hiroshima, it began to feel as if the shockwaves from 8:15am, august 6th 1945 still reverberated in the air, refusing anything or anyone to stand tall in this desert of the living.

The remembrance practices that are enacted after a catastrophe can have far reaching effects long after the event has passed. It is the trauma itself that is the initial impetus for memorialization, but as Emma Hutchison (2016, p. 63) points out traumatic events can be memorialized, and thus remembered, in ways that preserve and shape the sense of injury and loss, thereby potentially constituting communities around shared pain. The city of Hiroshima is today still devoted to keeping the memory of the bomb alive in a significant way, and the vast Peace Memorial Park is dotted with various installations made for remembrance practices. Although the main building of the Atomic Bomb Museum was closed for renovations during my time in the city, the newly renovated East Building allowed access to the public. As I went there for the first time, I was struck by how calm and dignified everything seemed. Large windows let in natural light and the scenes from the surrounding area, spacious and open, gave a glimpse of luscious trees and extravagant water features signalling a calmness and serenity sharply contrasting with my pre-conceived ideas about an atomic bomb museum. The area indeed looked more like the site of a presidential palace than anything remotely reminiscent of death and nuclear holocaust. As I entered the museum, I was met with an introductory exhibit showing images depicting the destruction of Hiroshima and an interactive installation showing the bomb being dropped and wiping out the part of the city. That was then followed by an exhibit dealing with the dangers of nuclear weapons, where the walls were painted black, and lighting was sparse, creating a gloomy atmosphere. At the end of a hall, where natural light came flowing in from wide windows I sat down with a group of random strangers in a room where testimonies from survivors were being played. We were gathered in a solemn state in front of a small television, that stood somewhat above us on a pedestal. It was a beautiful day outside. Slightly cold, but the sun was shining. I carefully looked around at those who had chosen to come inside to listen to stories from the aftermath of the atomic bomb. The strangers were all as in a trance, like children when watching cartoons. Completely fixed on the stories they sat, just sometimes slightly moving their bodies to shift position or cover their mouths with their hands, sighing deeply, breathing heavily. No-one talked, and I felt as if I was becoming a part of a social field, where the expectation was to hear these stories, but not to talk about them. It was as if we had to listen. I
wrote in my notebook; What do I, or we, take from here? Somehow, I didn’t see any reason for asking anyone else that. My palms were becoming sweaty, presumably as I reacted to the stories that were being told, and I was feeling increasingly weak, anxious even. Amputations, terrible burn injuries, open wounds from shrapnel, body parts torn to pieces. The overwhelming number of patients. The lack of medical equipment. These were stories of man-made hell, I thought, and they were being repeated over and over again. «Every August», one survivor said, «I re-live it». «The price of today’s peace was the agony of war». «I want young people to understand how precious peace is». What struck me was that when the survivors talked on tape about their experiences, they rarely seemed to exhibit any emotions. This, I felt, only added to the harrowing nature of the testimonies. I found them to be destabilizing, and I could feel myself being slowly consumed by fear. I started judging myself. Here they were, the victims on tape, having experienced it first-hand, and even then, managing to calmly describe what they had seen, while I was the one concerned with my emotions! I became terribly self-conscious, and I felt ashamed that I was getting such powerful emotional reactions from watching the testimonies. Together with images depicting injuries and facts regarding casualties the horrendous details provided a sharp contrast with the clean, white and open design of the museum itself. It felt like one of those places where being emotional would be frowned upon, as if the upscale design and the modern, open spaces were too civilized for such primitive displays of human frailty. I looked at other visitors in the museum, and I couldn’t tell how they felt either. However, I could see how they moved around. Those emotions, I thought, that make us move so quietly and calmly through the museum… Do they stay in us after we leave here? Do they stay in me? As I watched people moving around, I noticed how they simply whispered to each other, and one could hear breathing and footsteps as bodies slowly shuffled from right to left like crabs in front of the exhibits. An urge to connect to someone came over me, to talk about what I had experienced and what I felt, but I had no one I knew around. And as I was studying the others it was as if I made myself a target, as if I broke with a group, so I thought better keep low and not draw attention. And as I left the museum, alone, I randomly came upon a stone tablet placed inconspicuously behind a tree. It had a poem written on it which said;
The day after I couldn’t stand the thought of immersing myself in the atomic bomb-environment again. I found it sickening and repulsive. So, I went on a day long trip to Miyajima Island outside Hiroshima, where I was able to take in the views of the city from afar, nestled on the peak of a mountain with spectacular views of the bay. Throughout my entire time in Japan I was straddling that fine line between fieldwork and tourism described by other practitioners of autoethnography (Dauphinee, 2010, Doty, 2010). Not because I didn’t find the subject matter interesting, but because the impact of being so far away from the familiarity of routines, language and social interactions combined with the emotionally taxing nature of the subject under study meant I didn’t manage to. It wasn’t until the fourth day in Hiroshima that I thought something significant in relations to the work on this thesis happened. I had spent an entire day at the museum, mostly listening to witness testimonies, as I felt as if I’d lost the purpose of being in Hiroshima, being that the main part of the museum was closed. I also felt that I could never do justice to those who had lost their lives or who had lost someone they loved. This was not where I belonged, it was not my place to say anything about. Consequently, I had found it hard to work properly, as I struggled to concentrate and structure my thoughts. At the time I ascribed this difficulty to «a lot of feelings (that) have made my thinking difficult». However, I had forgot that rational thought and analysis was not
my goal of me being there – that came later; feeling was, only that I didn’t want to feel any more. It was too painful. As I had to process the emotions by myself, which took time, I could not stand outside myself to analyse what was going on. I had to wait to gain perspective. It began to dawn on me that this was untested ground. There were no plans or standard operating procedures on which I could fall back on. The road appeared before me as I walked it, as I depended only on myself for everything, and that road was about to take me places where I didn’t want to go.

Feeling tired, dejected and lonely I stopped by the stone tablet on my way back to the hotel where I lived. For some reason I didn’t care anymore about what I thought others may think. I needed to express how I really felt, and finally, as I sat down on a bench nearby, I let go. As I allowed myself to tap into the darkness I was carrying around inside me, I kept my feet on the ground, and I wrote this in my notebook;

Sadness came over me today. It would sound strange to say; I don’t know why. Suddenly I felt the human tragedy this event was. So much more than numbers, strategies, or casualties. But real people. People with a family, and friends. People who had hopes and dreams and who had worked to achieve something. And then, in an instant, everything was taken away. And for those who were left behind, so much was also taken away.

What initially drew me to the stone tablet was that I thought I saw emotions in the poem, something I didn’t think I’d seen as much in the witness testimonies. Testimonies were translated, but maybe I lacked some cultural or linguistic insight that would have enabled me to spot emotions in the survivors who spoke. However, I saw it there, in a poem in English. As I sat on the bench, tears welled up. I could see the trees and the grass that had grown on that land once barren and burnt, as I hid my face in my hands, as if not to be seen. And I sat like this for a while, then I got up and walked, and I walked all around the park, and later the city itself. I still tried to make sense of what I was feeling, so I wrote this in my notebook;

I can feel how tears are pressing, as I realize that the real sorrow, for me, is not to experience the death and destruction, but to experience the ones who are left behind … who are grieving. It is something I can relate to … It makes me think: To what extent to we take our past experiences into new situations? Why did the narrative of Hiroshima become so powerful to me just now? Do I want to be moved? Do I need to be moved? Why did it take so long? (Day 4 in Hiroshima). First, my experience in face of this horror was simply becoming tired. Ergo, “something” was pressing itself onto me, but it didn’t reach through.
What I needed was time. And as it passed, I enabled myself to see the one I was, from the vantage point of the one I’d become. Thinking back, months after the fieldwork, I think it’s fair to say that Hiroshima’s Peace Memorial Park and Atomic Bomb Museum directed itself towards an international audience. Although the evidence is somewhat anecdotal most of the visitors in the museum during the days I spent there were Caucasian, and in contrast to the Yūshūkan, all information was in English, and sometimes, as on the stone tablet, exclusively in English. Later on during my time in Japan I met a Japanese man; we came to talking and when I told him I’d been in Hiroshima to learn about the atom bomb, he just looked down and shook his head, saying he’d been there too once, three years prior. This man was in his seventies, and he told me it had been too painful to go before, so he had avoided it most of his life. Anecdotal, sure, but as he told me I understood very well where he was coming from. Back in Hiroshima, at one point nothing made sense to me, and I the only reason I wrote something was because I thought it might be useful for later, and it was an expression of a habit I have, which is trying to psychoanalyze myself. But at the height of destabilization, it was as if I’d lost myself and my purpose for being in Japan, and I was oscillating between sadness and anger, as a creeping realization had started to come upon me. That it was all about me. Me, me, narcissistic me! I had gone all the way to Japan to argue how emotions matter to IR, but simply ended up writing about me, because it was me all the time. I was projecting myself onto the world, and my own needs onto the field which I studied. I felt stupid and ashamed. But I continued trying to make sense of what I was experiencing. Afterwards I wrote:

I think it is about allowing emotions room, allowing its expression. To hold back is also natural, but is it good? No! I am holding back, but I’m also allowing myself to be moved.

Having dried my tears, I walked through the park and rang the bell of peace. The bell of peace is huge, and when you ring it, it sounds like Sunday morning church. This is what Hiroshima did to me, I thought, and later on, when the emotion had passed, I would judge myself, stating that I felt like a cliché, and how I felt weak. And later that night, as I was nearing the end of my five day stay in Hiroshima, I came back to the hotel after dinner, and I wrote this:

The arousal of sadness generated energy in me, energy that I could not get out simply from crying, because I lack the capacity or ability to cry properly to release that pent-up energy that comes from accessing the innermost capacities of my being! Thus, it turns into aggression, which can be projected either outwards or inwards. And I have no longer an interest in projecting it inwards, creating more bad emotions for myself and the way I feel, so
when a restaurant owner treats me poorly, by not even smiling and placing me like an orphan as far away from the other guests as possible, I’m going to get angry at him and his poor service skills, and the lousy, dry fish I paid 900 yen for and give him a passive aggressive, but high and mighty, high road fucking treatment like he’s never had before. You stuck up, probably racist, depressing piece of shit! It’s not my fault you decided on a restauranteur as a profession. Your wife probably hates you, you fucking moron. Fuck off.

I must admit, I was a little drunk when I wrote this, and I am ashamed to include it; I had finally found an outlet for my energy which I deemed socially acceptable, namely, to rant in a word-document alone in a hotel room after having been triggered by what I perceived was poor treatment at a restaurant. In truth, I was scared and filled with anxiety, as I looked through the window of my 24th floor suite and wondered what the fuck I was doing there. Later that night, having written my anger out, I drank some more sake, listened to music and cried alone in my hotel room, and I wrote;

I cried, because it reminded me of a time I will never have again, and moments that passed like sand in water. I cried for the moments that were and will never be again. For the people, myself and our fates.

And what I thought about was not the victims of Hiroshima, but how I missed my father, who died from cancer when I was seventeen years old, and whom I watched as he lay dead in a hospital bed all skinny and grey with hollowed cheekbones and the blood drained from his face. Him and all the other stuff I’d lost throughout my life, like other family members, friends and times when I was happy and my hair, however dumb that sounds, and lives that I once thought I might have and jobs that I didn’t get and lot of other fairly insignificant stuff compared to the memories that were all around me in the city. I allowed myself to wallow in all that bitterness and resentment, arrogance and self-deprecation that I had carried around with me deep down for years on end. Perhaps I cried more than anything about who I felt I’d become. Someone who closed the door to everyone around so he could sit and feel sorry for himself and be critical about how the world is and how politics is, and how unfair everything in the world is, just because I hadn’t found my place in it. Bitter, petty, self-absorbed.

Traumatized? I wondered if countries could become that way as well. Surely, the language of international relations, foreign policy or international diplomacy would never have described them as such. Its everyday practices have been put upon a pedestal, as if far away from the gritty realities of life, seemingly allowing entry for only those who act as if removed from it. Thus, for me, as I tried to fit in, I oscillated between wanting to take emotions seriously and
judging myself for doing so, paradoxically because I feel I should not, but I had always been rather hard on myself.

Photo: Cenotaph at Hiroshima’s Peace Memorial Park w/«A-bomb dome» in background. By: Vemund Sveen Finstad, January 2019

Japan’s history problem appears different from where it is analysed from, and this study can’t make any definitive claims to truth about where it originates from. Commentators have argued that the Japanese have a tendency towards depression, introspection, anxiety and self-absorption (Moïsi, 2009). For me though, the process described is an expression of what I consider a universal human need; to be allowed to care for oneself and feel sorry for oneself. Emotions are not irrational to those experiencing them, but rather an outcome of a clash between subjective interpretations of situational pressures, lived experience and capabilities. However, it is much easier for outsiders to dismiss them than trying to understand them. During my time in Hiroshima I got a strong sense of the city’s desire to promote the image of victimhood, not primarily to its own citizens, but to the world. The cosmopolitan feel of the exhibits of the Atomic Bomb Museum and the surrounding remembrance elements in the Peace Memorial Park do not close in on themselves but reaches outwards in a language that can be understood by most. My subjective affective and emotional sensibilities led me to this understanding as it resonated with those sites and those aspects of sites that were related to
my own subjective sense of victimhood. Perhaps someone else would have noticed something entirely different. However, what I experienced generated energy which ended up oscillating between anger and sadness, evoked by a trauma which I projected both inwards at myself and outwards at others, at least in my imagination, as I did not know what to feel, or if it was even okay to feel. But I wasn’t aware of all this then. I just remembered the stone tablet which resonated with me, with the words;

Give back my father, give back my mother
Give grandpa back, grandma back;
Give my sons and daughters back.
Give me back myself
Give back the human race.
As long as this life lasts, this life,
Give back peace
That will never end.

(Written and translated by Miyao Ohara)

Having analysed sites in Hiroshima devoted to memorialization and education related to the nuclear attack on the city through an autoethnographic emotions-approach, a pertinent question makes itself known; Does the unapologetic promotion of a victim-narrative on such a large scale have any consequences for Japan’s ability to face up to the issues shaping its history problem and thus its foreign policy? Memorialization sites in Hiroshima, as I experienced them, have the quality of being spaces which evoke powerful emotions of empathetic feeling towards the plight of the Japanese, not only those who were killed or injured by the atomic bomb, but also their relatives and towards Japan as a country. Because the sites are designed in such a way that visitors easily get a sense of the immensity of the tragedy, having preserved the A-dome and the vast area that is now the Peace Memorial Park, it becomes a place where one can grieve and where I experienced that I could get in touch with my own emotions of sorrow and feeling like a victim. As the approach showed, Hiroshima’s vast Peace Memorial Park can be read as a reflection of Japan’s post-war desire to be understood as a victim; however, victims rarely feel like they need to apologize. The Peace Memorial Park can also be read as a permanent reminder of who’s in charge, like a giant stamp saying U.S.A on the country of Japan. And in the face of overwhelming power, anyone can become passive, submissive and depressive, until something reboots their will to take responsibility anew. No matter what I learned or didn’t learn about Japan’s foreign policy
and its history problem, my time in Hiroshima was nevertheless a formative experience, and as I went on to Nagasaki, I thought I had started to get a sense of what it was like to be Japanese.

#### 4.4 Field Site Three: The Atomic Bomb Museum Nagasaki

Having arrived in Nagasaki I was surprised to find that the Atomic Bomb Museum was located mostly underground. The steep terrain in the area made it sensible to dig down, but also, I got the idea, it was a continuation of the way people protected themselves during the war, which was in makeshift air raid shelters dug into the hillside around where the museum now stood. Upon entry, I was surprised to find that the museum reflected a considerable Christian cultural heritage, as Nagasaki is the city where European immigration and trade to Japan in the 19th century took place. Unsurprisingly, this made the city feel more like home, and made available different templates of interpretation of the museum than e.g. the Shinto aspects of the Yūshūkan did, to which I remained illiterate. Thus, the emotional impact of the museum itself and the horror of an atomic attack became perceived as enhanced by reference to biblical allusions. One such example was the entranceway to the museum itself, which was built as a dome where visitors descended into the ground by ways of a circling passageway. This concrete structure let in natural light from the dome above as visitors metaphorically walked from the year 2000 downwards into ever greater darkness, ending in the year 1945 at the bottom, creating a sense of descending into hell. Whether or not this was the intention of the creators of the museums is unknown, but it is mentioned here as it points to how previous normative templates that visitors have been socialized into influence interpretation. For me, it provided a side-narrative enhancing emotions as the site’s poetics of space included a culturally Christian version of Nagasaki, which, I am ashamed to say, made a nuclear attack on the city seem even more outrageous.

During my first visit I found the museum a little claustrophobic, as I was walking into the unknown but simultaneously apprehensive about experiencing the same feelings of sadness and horror evoked at my museum visit in Hiroshima. As I descended into the depths depicting 1945, I learned that visitors were first introduced to Nagasaki before the bomb, the city where «Japanese students gathered to draw from the well of Western knowledge» (The City of Nagasaki, 2011). The strategic importance of the city for the imperial forces during world war two, which led to it becoming a target of the Americans, after the initial target was covered in clouds, was referred to simply as a «dark shadow» (Ibid). After this introduction the
exhibition rooms plunged visitors further into darkness by showing the direct aftermath of the atomic bomb. The rooms were dark and had an almost theatrical element of drama to them, seemingly customized to a Western audience as the destruction of the Urakami cathedral was highlighted, together with other minor real-life artefacts touched by the powers of the bomb and staged to gloomy sound effects and customized lighting. The remains of the church and other building-materials created an eerie proximity to not only the event itself, but also the fear associated with nuclear fallout. Visitors were simultaneously exposed to the most extreme depictions of human tragedy; the images of dead and severely burned women and children, as well as the immense destruction of the city. The museum showed an American leaflet, warning civilians to evacuate, but simultaneously stated that many residents testified that the leaflets were dropped after the atomic bombing.

Photo: Replica of the atomic bomb nicknamed «Fat Man», dropped on Nagasaki. By: Vermund Sveen Finstad, January 2019

As the museum was rather small, after the initial plunge into darkness, the rooms quickly became lighter and felt less intense. Simultaneously, visitors were provided with disturbing details regarding the aftereffects of the bomb, which is estimated to have taken the lives of 73,884 people in Nagasaki alone, and injured some 74,909. Artefacts such as melted coins and scorched stones, as well as images of the destruction of the city were testaments to the incredible force of the blast and the heat from it and the fires that raged in its wake. Context
and information regarding the human consequences of the blast, including radiation sickness-related issues was prioritized, as well as information about nuclear weapons in general. However, events leading up to the attack, specifically those of imperial Japan, were relegated to a minor role, mainly on two small screens which visitors had to engage with in length in order to access the content of. This revealed how priority was given to the suffering of civilians and the dangers nuclear weapons allegedly pose to the world at large, not a contextualization where the Japanese role leading up to the attacks became highlighted.

A rather unique feature about this museum compared to the other two museums was the active use of sounds and music continuously throughout the museum. At first the sounds were dark and dramatic, as it enhanced the emotions when coupled with images (moving and still) and artefacts (remains of buildings, clothes, various rubble, etc.). Afterwards the soundscape became lighter and as visitors were about to leave the music had turned light and cheerful. As I thought about what I had experienced I found it rather odd how I felt invigorated after my visits, and how the museum somehow motivated me to do something, rather than simply paralyze me with grief and fear. My own moods/emotions were congruent with the music. As I moved emotionally from horror and feelings of anxiety in the beginning to a more sentimental, sad and compassionate state, I afterwards got the urge to learn more, write more, to convey the horrors of the atomic bombs in my way, which I presumed was exactly what the museum was aiming for. As I exited the museum, I noticed that the pathway out of the museum was going straight upwards, in contrast to the circling downward entrance, as visitors were guided out to the tunes of joyful, inspiring music.

As I had become more desensitized to the horrors associated with the atomic bombings over time, I later spent most of the hours watching and listening to stories of the day the bomb fell and its aftermath from survivors on video-screens. I didn’t really know why I did it at the time, but the more I thought about it the more I felt that I wanted to understand more by seeking out real human beings, to attain even more proximity to the emotional understandings of such an event. Indeed, if I had interviewed someone for this thesis, would I have learned anything different? However, some of the depictions from survivors about the injuries to themselves and their family members were so horrible and heart-breaking that I started sweating at some points and could not sit still. I tried listening for as long as I could, but I had to quit after a while, take a break to collect myself, before I went back and watched some more. For some reason it felt uncomfortable being a Caucasian person watching stories from Japanese who had been affected by the bomb. But I kept coming back, and after I while I felt
as if I watched them through a new prism, one in which I could bear their pain without adopting it. As I went to the peace memorial hall, which is located right next to the museum, I was impressed with its clean design and sense of luxury, which was a stark contrast to the chaos and horror of the witness survival stories visitors can examine while there.

5. Concluding thoughts on the fieldwork

Together, the three war museums studied in this thesis, the Yūshūkan and the atomic bomb museums in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, became a unity to me that epitomized the suffering of the Japanese. According to the findings made in this thesis focusing on emotions and affect, these war museums all attempt to legitimize and maintain an image of Japan as a victim. The war museums are all closely affiliated with sites of memorialization, such as the Peace Memorial Park in Hiroshima, the Nagasaki Peace Park and Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo. Taken together they create a powerful, unified influence which arguably shape subsequent Japanese generations to the idea of victimhood as they all highlight the loss of Japanese lives. A major difference between the three sites is that the atomic bomb museums strongly advocate peace and the abolition of weapons of mass destruction, while the Yūshūkan is concerned with attempts at legitimizing Japanese Imperial aggression. The following section analyses in more detail how these processes arguably occur, while simultaneously highlighting the importance of challenging all these narratives as they together can be seen to contribute to the maintenance of a national culture fostering irreconcilability. The chapter starts by situating this claim within a historiographic tradition, arguing they are all shaped by instrumentalist notions of history. Subsequently, the chapter argues in three stages how emotions and affect link war museums to foreign policy - from the individual, to the group, to the nation – analysing fieldwork up against literature on primarily narratives, memory and memorialization.

5.1 Useful narratives

Practices related to commemoration of war, which include difficult stories of trauma, violence and loss (Lisle, 2006), are always going to be represented against the background of instability associated with states of action where competing preferences attempted to dominate one another with blunt force. Thus, posteriority is shaped by a history of violent means that closed the gap between lifeworlds, albeit temporarily, as war implies the loss of political control for at least one of the opposing parties. A win, if war can be said to have such a thing as winners, implies a solid foundation in the realm of the norms as evident in the old
trope of history as being written by the victors. Dominant discourses frequently emasculate the legitimacy of perceptions associated with the labels or identities of the competing side, which narrows the space for critical hindsight as sites commemorating war become directed forwards to the reconstruction of reality and more pressing, material needs. In this sense, war museums distinguish themselves from other types of modern museal representation, which assimilate and normalise widely varying interpretations based on norms of democracy, equal rights and multiculturalism (Lisle, 2006). War museums, however, continue to represent the foundational, one-sided meanings created from the vacuum of trauma long after the events have passed. As such they frequently do not welcome multiple points of view, but rather attempt to offer «comforting narratives of commemoration and education» (Lisle, p. 843). Such narratives can be considered as made amenable for a public shaped by war, characterized by desires to anchor meanings around a comfortable common structure. These narratives are designed to inform a great number of people (Schegloff, 1997), who vary in what knowledge they have available to interpret the narrative through, such as children and others with limited educational backgrounds. Thus, when analysed in posteriority, the narratives at the three war museums studied in this thesis appear as petrified time-capsules. They seem to be re-presenting the emotional needs and desires of a social space which seems long gone, where the immediate post-war desires of the nation trump more cosmopolitan versions of history. Commemoration practices centred around the post-war needs of the nation is nevertheless imposed on the present and transferred into a future. The way war is represented at war museums may also be read as reflecting a desire to simplify in order to offer some insight into complex issues without alienating everyone but the most dedicated. They may also be read as attempting to create a coherent storyline in a somewhat limited physical space that is the war museums. Goodwin (1981, 1986, quoted by Schegloff, 1997) also argues that who the intended recipients of the narratives are to one another, matters for how the design of stories become. This indicates how identity matters for interpretation and the importance of self-reflexive analysis, and how situating the researcher within a social and cultural context limits misunderstanding related to studies on politically sensitive topics.

Memorialization of war has arguably become a strategic issue, as international politics has been transformed from «conquer or be conquered» into «humiliate or be humiliated» (Callahan, 2004, p. 202). Simultaneously, museum curators work under constraints as their job depends on pleasing several competing stakeholders (Lisle, 2006). Conversely, the background from which this thesis approaches the issue related to Japan’s security policy is
not value-free nor politically neutral either, which is why this thesis stresses the subjectivity positionality. It is shaped by, amongst other things, western notions of museums as sites for enlightening the public and history as something to be learned, from as many angles as possible, in order to foster critical thought. This, however, is a privileged position to have. The agenda related to the displays at war museums in Japan may not share this conceptualization of history. War museums are commonly shaped by instrumentalist notions of history, which stresses the need for every state to achieve a usable past, a construction of memory facilitating «…the continuation of politics by other means» (Dian, 2017, p. 5). Dower (2012) argue that within this tradition, collective memory is as much about forgetting history as it is remembering it, as elites selectively suppress the memory of what is not instrumental to their political purposes or interests (Quoted in Dian, 2017). There is no universal collective memory, but as many memories as there are groups, as «every collective memory unfolds within a spatial framework» (Halbwachs, 1992, p. 6). In representing collective memory war museums represent a shared identity that unites a social group, e.g. a nation, whose members nonetheless have different interests and motivations (Confino, 1997). A past, according to instrumentalist notions, must steer emotions and motivate people to act; it must, according to Confino (1997, p. 1390) become a socio-cultural mode of action. Thus, history can seem to take the form of dry facts, but the dry facts are narrated in such a way that it creates memory that is emotionalized. This emotional element of war museums is however consistently eluding attention, as the strategic processes of selecting what is included and omitted, not only in terms of artefacts and memorabilia, but also in terms of describing facts about what happened, is forgotten. War museums thus seem to highlight elements which cement their authoritative position as sites which holds ‘the truth’ about the past. As the subjective origins of war museums are suppressed, memory can become politically influential if collectively shared by a sufficiently broad mass of individuals. War museums should thus be understood as representations of social capabilities that are created and maintained for the purpose of legitimizing certain political attitudes related to security. For example, political issues can become amplified by nationalistic rhetoric generated by issues arising from retentive memory (Dian, 2017, p. 2), which calls to attention the wider, social ground on which the agenda-setting competition is taking place and which war museums are an integral part of. Thus, this study of war museums has been concerned with mapping out the political space which limit or exacerbate the impact of individual characteristics on events (Hill, 2016). Using examples from the fieldwork, this chapter now moves on to discuss how Japan’s history problem can be argued to be maintained by commemoration practices, through
processes where emotions and affect play an integral part. It starts from the individual level, highlighting the benefits of the autoethnographic method, before arguing how these processes matter on broader levels of social aggregation.

5.2 The benefits of autoethnography

War museums are unique as representations of security in that they allow for the active inclusion of the body in the process of learning, which creates a different sense of proximity to the events depicted. As this autoethnographic study showed, I experienced first-hand how visits to a museum can become less about the intellectual and more about the physical and thus emotional. Visitors are no more proximate to the represented subject matter than they would be by reading a book, although the materiality of the site may create that illusion. But to move around in a closed physical space which combines visual and textual discourse with real-world artefacts kindle the imagination and produces effects which can only be verified through aesthetic insights. In addition, war museums greatly simplify events, presenting only snippets of storyline, and my experience is that when facts are missing, emotions fill the void. This points to how the museums cannot reflect the objective experience of the past but are rather part of a social field of institutions where cultural factors, such as values, ideas, social and religious norms fundamentally intervene in the interpretational process to shape what becomes perceived as history (Dian, 2017). History can become an instrumental practice even if it is not meant to be one, as the desires of factual representation is mixed with the desires of subjective memory, narrowing the field of view and taking away the possibility for visitors to achieve a platform sustaining a comparative ethos. What has been studied in this thesis is thus memory; history as it is felt by its victims, rather than ‘history’, per an initial naïve objectivist conception.

Through analysing the museums autoethnographically I was able to discover parts of myself in relations to the representational techniques that are employed at the war museums. Ian Buruma (1999) argues that memorialization has a universal appeal which transcends cultural and national boundaries. By invoking the memory of our ancestors, we are imagining that we honour them, while the reality is that we do it in order to draw attention to us, so others can acknowledge us and our suffering. My reflections from the fieldwork gave me an idea that this is a subconscious way of filling the emotional void that was left when the parent(s), or other loved ones, who seemed to have their entire existence directed at validating us, suddenly disappeared. By analysing the sites through myself I came to an understanding of how trauma generates an almost instinctive need to seek other paths of filling the emotional void,
times making us very single-tracked in our thinking, distracting our attention from the needs of others. My own story of losses and humiliations provided me with a different way of understanding Japan’s history problem. Not only did I recognize that trauma and emotions matter, but I also gained a deeper understanding of the difficulties related to changing established patterns of thought or institutions set in place to commemorate such experiences, such as war museums. As pointed out by Ian Buruma (1999, p. 6), by sharing the pain of others, we learn to understand their feelings, and get in touch with our own. As one witness of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima said in a recording: «you must have been here to understand». All three war museums communicate the rather unique perspective of the Japanese through a combination of factual and emotional representations. How I interpreted the museums was that they all tried to convey that an understanding of the Japanese experience is never simply cognitive, its emotional, and the emotional cannot be fully understood without a presence in the situation. Therefore, as this thesis have done, it calls for the need to always seek out the emotional presence to be able to understand. Although the understanding is not the same, the point is to have felt the fear, the anxiety, to be afraid for one’s life. Through such emotional experiences, visitors become as if connected on a fundamental level, on a level prior to the historically and culturally contingent ontology related to political issues. The self-reflexive reading of western conceptualizations of Japanese thought and policy initially present in me before fieldwork implies that Western scholars have difficulties acknowledging the importance of emotions, as I expected to find them in the Japanese, but not in myself. However, by sharing and making explicit subjective experiences of defeat or humiliation it became possible to relate on a level associated with deeper human faculties, while it will always risk eluding the attention of those not who do not take emotions seriously or have strategic interest not to. Although emotions are initially individual and subjective, they are also argued to have physiological, intersubjective and cultural components (Crawford, 2000, p. 125). Thus, what I discovered from studying the three war museums was not just parts of myself, but also a part of what shapes the normative ground on which generations of Norwegian men are encouraged to stand. To understand the Japanese, I have to cross-reference with the literature, as the fieldwork actually became about me, and it is to that this thesis now turns.

5.3 The effects on emotions at war museums

This thesis argues that the Yūshūkan and the atomic bomb museums have important elements in common. The sympathy that was evoked in me towards the plight of the Japanese at all
sites point to how the war museums provide the same normative foundations, but whether it reinforces Japan’s history problem and thus influences Japanese foreign policy is unclear from the fieldwork alone. While the Yūshūkan museum appears inward-looking, nationalistic and patriotic as it engages in a practice of historical revisionism, which may be interpreted as hostile, these impressions belong to mainly foreign observers. As mentioned in chapter two, cultural practices has the potential to produce specific psychological processes and experiences (Kitayama, Karasawa, Mesquita, 2004). For example, Japanese cultural practices tend to encourage harmonious social relationships, contrary to the individualism characterizing Western thought. Asian therapies tend to emphasise the effort towards changing the self in order to fit in with the existing order of things, rather than encouraging individuals to be assertive and self-expressive. (Ozawa-de Silva, 2002). Simultaneously, Japanese culture is classed as a high uncertainty avoidance culture (Hofstede, 2001), which means that situations that present uncertainty is more likely to cause a great deal of stress and anxiety. Such cultural practices arguably raise the bar for perceiving institutions such as the Yūshūkan the same way I did, even though the museum seems to omit all references to atrocities committed by Japanese forces in the 1930s and 40s. Nevertheless, the maintenance of such historical myopia can have the effect of stalling reconciliation processes after conflict, in that it continues to legitimize ethnocentric narratives potentially counteracting the pressure from other, more inclusive representations. When the way war museums represent history is a long way from how visitors understand history, like how the Yūshūkan omits mentioning atrocities committed in China and Korea from its narrative, their role may be perceived as hostile. Thus, politically the Yūshūkan is deeply problematic. As the war museum provoked me through its evident historical revisionism, it is likely to provoke others. However, by connecting to the deeper human faculties of emotions and affect I have come to see the Yūshūkan, and Yasukuni, as sites primarily aimed at providing comfort and consolation to those left behind after warfare. The institutional link the Yūshūkan has by being owned by the Yasukuni shrine, arguably shapes its representational processes, and thus the political interpretations of the war museum. From an emotional point of view, I do not see the Yūshūkan as a museum independent of the greater Yasukuni complex, but as a continuation of Yasukuni, where one can congregate in solemn remembrance of ancestors who have passed. That said, the social insulation that the Yūshūkan gets from being so intimately connected to the Yasukuni shrine, with its plea for ‘sacredness’, leaves much to be desired from an academic perspective. No matter the emotional attachments and underpinning, museums command positions of political authority regarding the interpretation of events.
As agenda setting sites they are deserving of critical enquiry as they have the capacity to not only maintain and influence, but to transfer normative, political biases. Thus, if unable to emotionally detach itself from the remembrance practices of Yasukuni, the Yūshūkan will continue to attract criticism.

While the Yūshūkan seems to rebuff all but the most ethnocentric Japanese perceptions of history, the atomic bomb museums seem to cater to a more cosmopolitan crowd. Not only are their exhibitions more widely available in English, but their subject matter is much easier to relate to. Not only do the effects of nuclear weapons represent a threat to survival regardless of identity or nationality, but the atomic bomb museums also openly acknowledged Japan’s responsibility for a state of war, albeit in a minor way compared to the main issues related to the effects of the nuclear attacks. However, as argued in this thesis, all three war museums have in common that they are promoting the plight of the Japanese people first and foremost. Thus, findings made at the three museums all point to how they are designed to evoke sympathy with the suffering of the Japanese, supporting the perception that Japan self-identifies as a victim after the terrible acts of war which ended with capitulation in 1945.

While the Yūshūkan feels more uncomfortable to a foreigner such as me, because of its revisionist historicist tendencies feeding potential revanchist attitudes related to Japan’s role within the wider region, the museum clearly advocates a narrative of victimhood in giving defensive justifications for past Japanese aggression. The atomic bomb museums are more understandably focused on highlighting the sufferings of the Japanese people, but do not contribute extensively to a spirit of self-examination regarding the role played by Imperial Japan in the conflicts preceding the nuclear attacks. The three museums studied all have in common that they operate in a grey-area where historiography appears as a subjective, socio-political construct, at least to an outsider like me. This is because their representational practices are all, albeit in different ways, infused with ways that encourage emotion and feeling. Examples of this are the way music and lighting are actively utilized to shape the museal experience, especially prevalent at Nagasaki’s Atomic Bomb Museum; how witness testimonies are widely applied; how personal artefacts, such as letters, poems, and torn remains of clothing or other wearables are used as representative of the events depicted, and how all the sites are tightly affiliated with nearby sites devoted to personal remembrance of lost relatives. All museums are political, some more so than others. While the atomic bomb museums face virtually no opposition in their struggle to encourage the abolition of nuclear weapons, the Yūshūkan is different in that it is enmeshed in a normative field which was
widely discredited by Japan’s loss in World War Two while simultaneously claiming a tight affiliation with the Japanese Emperor and the entire Japanese population.

The Yūshūkan and Nagasaki’s atomic bomb museum have in common a clear association with religious templates, Shinto and Christianity respectively, for enhancing their narratives. While Hiroshima’s atomic bomb museum utilizes a strategy which could be labelled as cosmopolitan self-preferentialism, in that their representations are shaped to allow visitors from especially the Western hemisphere to relate personally to the suffering of Japan’s citizens. At all three sites, the aesthetic elements of architecture, which are often taken for granted but which the poetics of space highlights, induces feelings of well-being which could be argued to magnify the effect of representations, signalling as it does status, power and legitimacy. Especially in Hiroshima, which have devoted considerable resources to the beautification of the former blast-site and the museal complexes themselves, aesthetic well-being promotes reverie-inducing situations. The way the site contrasts with the topic that is represented, and the state of horror visitors are shown it was once in, creates a powerful emotional attachment between subject and object which arguably reduces capacity for critical analysis. The poetics of space and emotional amplifiers arguably influences memory and opinions through the ‘softening’ of factual representations. This ‘softening’ encourages positive emotions towards some aspects of the discursive representation, which generates antipathy towards competing interpretations, which are not represented, or barely represented, at the sites. For example, in relations to the atomic bomb museums, it is difficult, if not impossible, to walk away from the sites with an image of nuclear weapons as anything but an abhorrence. As such, the emotional effects generated by representational practices are argued to create a normative ‘sphere of influence’ which shapes what is to be considered legitimate and rational thought, through the dissemination of emotionalized memory. It does not encourage e.g. a rational reflection on the utility of nuclear weapons as a deterrent to large-scale armed conflict between nations. Thus, it is to the political consequences of such practices this chapter now turns, as it discusses the insights gained from fieldwork in relations to Japan’s contemporary foreign- and security policy.

5.4 The political effects to the nation

Ayse Zarakol (2010, p. 4) has argued that Japan is on a status-conscious trajectory that can be traced back to a sense of ontological insecurity, which has made it difficult for Japan to admit to past crimes. Based on empirical studies, this thesis argues however that Japan are not ontologically insecure, as argued by Zarakol (2010), but basing ontological security on a
narrative of victimhood. The argument for this has been found by studying the representational practices at three war museums in Japan. Through the active preservation of ruins, both physical and mental through trauma, the sites testify to mainly foreign invasion, while only in passing referring to the domestic corruption during Japan’s militarist era, signifying a deep national humiliation at the hands of foreign powers. This is also consistent with even earlier representations that those based on world war two, in that the memory of the struggle against imperialism used to be a central feature of the national identities of virtually all modern Asian countries (Berger, 2010, p. 191). Zarakol (2010) argues that Japan has an «inability to apologize for past crimes» (Zarakol, 2010, p. 3) based on ontological insecurity that stems from the traumatic character of its incorporation into international society. However, if basing ontological security on a notion of victimhood, as argued in this thesis, Japan is by no means perceived as unable to apologize. Such a normative foundation rather implies that Japan would be more recepible to the practice of owning up to past crimes if they were themselves recognized as victims of past crimes by the powers who invoked the national humiliation. Such a move would signal a wish for Japan to be included into international society on an equal footing to the West.

Japan finds itself in the position of having to balance its war-memories between the suffering some of its citizens were exposed to with the atrocities some of its citizens committed (Langenbacher, 2010). As this study of three war Japanese war museums has shown, these historical and cultural institutions focus overwhelmingly on the suffering of its own civilians and soldiers. While the Yūshūkan provides no recollections of the atrocities committed by Japanese forces up until 1945 whatsoever, and seems to have worked actively to omit it from the historic narrative, the atomic bomb museums make only comparatively tiny contribution to balancing out the perception of Japan as sole sufferers of the pre-1945 era. It is by no means unusual that states focus on the plight of their own citizens regarding past wars and conflicts, and all nations sanitize their own history (Walt, 2019). The memorialization of innocent victims of wartime atrocities, such as that of the atomic bombs, is crucial for the sake of not repeating such crimes. However, after World War Two Japan, as well as Germany, found themselves in the situation of being subject to different standards of reconciliation than victorious countries, based on their loss of political control. Whereas Germany has been widely lauded for their efforts in reconciliating with historical enemies after World War Two and taking responsibility for past crimes and ideology, Japan still faces accusations concerning a lack of willingness to distance themselves from crimes committed
during that era and the thinking that led to it. From the 1990s onwards Japan have consistently been forced to deal with allegations from the war era, ranging from slave labour and forced prostitution in Korea (Park, 2019) to the Nanjing massacre and serious issues in Manchuria, now part of China, such as bacteriological warfare experiments conducted by Unit 731 and the brutal counterinsurgency campaign (Berger, 2010). Despite the common perception that Japan has not been able to reconcile with its past sufficiently, these allegations have been met with apologies from a succession of Japanese prime ministers as well as payments compensating forced laborers in Korea and Taiwan (Ibid). However, an upsurge in revisionist literature denying Japan had anything to apologize for, as well as numerous controversies regarding official state visits to the Yasukuni shrine, have reminded the world that Japan still have some ways to go for the history problem to become politically irrelevant.

As argued by Ian Buruma (1999, p. 3) it becomes questionable when a national community bases its communal identity almost entirely on the sentimental solidarity of remembered victimhood. For into such identities based on historical myopia, outsiders can easily project current or future intentions of historical revisionism, political hostility or even physical vendetta. It is natural and healthy to mourn, and collective memory and the communal discursive processes that constitute its construction are argued to be central to the healing of individual victims and their relations (Langenbacher, 2010, p. 16). However, if coupled with a lack of responsibility-taking, as in the case of Japan seen from the outside, the tolerance for such practices diminishes over time and they become seen as manipulative as political disagreements drag on. As the years pass, the devastating effect of nuclear weapons should never be forgotten, but the active promotion of victimhood by Japan becomes stale if not followed by active and concerted attempts at reconciliating and taking responsibility for past crimes. Towards this end, Japanese museums play an important role. Through the study of three war museums it seems to me that by foregrounding the ‘I’ Japanese post-war memorialization practices have encouraged a national culture which backgrounds the ‘you’.

By focusing overwhelmingly on the self rather than the other, despite the established historical consensus of Japan’s history of military aggression and wartime atrocities, while simultaneously being a great power due to its material capabilities, Japan is signalling a narrow-mindedness which is easy to interpret as threatening, feeding contemporary political disputes.

The contemporary political conundrum that formed the starting point for this thesis’ empirical focus was the recognition that Japan is undergoing a policy shift in its foreign policy.
Japanese remilitarisation efforts are evident through media reports, such as for example the report on government plans to buy 147 F-35 stealth fighter jets from the U.S and turning a helicopter carrier into a hangar ship (Pickrell, 2018). This is reported amid increased assertiveness from China and demonstrates Japan’s move away from a long-standing defence-oriented foreign policy. This, according to analysts (e.g. Tønnesson, 2017) is likely to cause major political friction with neighbours, especially China, whose own regional ambitions in some respects counter that of U.S ally Japan. It could also lead to increased militarization of conflicts regarding Japan’s unresolved territorial issues, with Russia over some of the Kuril Islands in the north and with North Korea, South Korea, China and Taiwan over the Takeshima/Dokdo and Senkaku/Diaoyu islets west/southwest of the Japanese mainland (Tønnesson, 2017). In a future where Japan remains a close ally of the United States, any remilitarization adding stick to Japanese foreign relations will likely be interpreted by particularly China, Russia and North Korea as a direct threat to their interests in the region.

Against this background, there is a need for Japan to legitimate its ongoing policy shift, smoothing their return to the status of being a ‘normal’ country with offensive military capabilities. Although Japanese state leaders have apologized several times for past crimes, post-war reconciliation between Japan and its Asian neighbours has been likened to «no process» (Moïsi, 2009, p. 50) compared to that between Germany and its European neighbours. Japan’s history problem persists and the absence of war between the states in East Asia is still reliant on military deterrence rather than trust or cooperation (Tønnesson, 2017, p. 147). According to Ian Buruma (1999, Quoted in Moïsi, 2009) the Japanese believe they’ve already paid a huge price for their wartime behaviour, which they consider a mistake but not necessarily a crime. This points to a lack of understanding which this thesis has traced back to representational practices at Japanese war museums, crucial sites for fostering a mood concurrent with a concerted effort towards national reconciliation. The German government built a Holocaust-museum in Berlin, complete with a library and document centre. Japan have this opportunity too, to signal their peaceful intentions and show how far they’ve come in the reconciliation process by institutionalizing the transgressions of imperial Japan. Such a move could be crucial, as Japan moves towards becoming a ‘normal’ country with the ambition to secure the legacy of ‘eternal peace’ enshrined in the monuments of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
6. Conclusion of thesis

This thesis has argued that emotions are socially constructed through language and practice that is historically, culturally and politically situated. Emotions are not simply individual, but inherently social, and manifest themselves on a group level through the dissemination of emotionalized retentive memory which become institutionalized in representations. The thesis has argued that representations, i.e. in this case war museums, disseminate memory and are thus relevant to study in IR as they have political consequences. Representations shaping memory are politically relevant because memory is the foundation for steering emotions and affect, and thus action, towards political aims. Thus, this thesis has argued that what is considered rational can be a function of what is considered legitimate, and it is partly out of the normativity of legitimacy that countries get their impetus for selecting some policy choices over others. Based on fieldwork done on three war museums it is argued in this thesis that Japan’s history problem is partly upheld by a communally shared ontology based on a notion of victimhood. Such normative processes are difficult to understand or rectify if analysis highlighting the deeper faculties of human behaviour, such as emotions and affect, are not considered. This thesis thus argued that collectively shared memories are crucially important for politics and order. That memory shapes emotions, that emotions thus deserve
serious scholarly attention and that war museums, through the dissemination of memory, are important sites in the creation of intersubjective norms, values and affective dispositions relevant to foreign policy. By arguing that war museums function as sites maintaining issues informing the social field in which the history problem persists, they are given increased agency. Thus, war museums are argued to be able to not only guide and shape the political discourse in Japan, national debates and international relations in a manner which utilizes and plays on emotions. War museums are also argued to matter to foreign policy because when regarded as central to the regulation of affective capacities domestically, they are also seen internationally as foreign policy signalling devices, transmitting notions of foreign policy ambitions, which may or may not seem peaceful.

Thus, war museums matter. They provide comforting narratives which create identification with a particular social group through positive emotions towards a particular social group. As representations, they shape collectively shared memories, which shape emotions and thus shared templates that are crucial in the formulation of legitimate policies. War museums are seen to influence emotions through aesthetic representations, not only visually represented, but also non-verbal, non-visual representations conceptualized as emotional amplifiers, like ambient sounds. As well, a meaning-making and legitimacy creating process at war museums is argued parallel to the main narrative by focus on an analytic concept labelled the poetics of space. Taken together, it forms an argument which allow bodily movement and the unique physical characteristics of war museums to come together in an arguably very effective (re)production of mental images of security, crucial for the creation of legitimacy and the re-enactment of certain power relations. Japanese war museums are no different in this sense than, say Western war museums, in that they highlight the plight of their own citizens. The war museums studied in this thesis allow visitors to connect with their own emotions, but not first without anchoring it to the plight of the Japanese. This can seem problematic for outside observers because Japan’s capitulation in the second world war created a legitimate space to demand they provide reconciliation for their actions. Simultaneously, it de-legitimized an approach where the needs of the Japanese come first. Japan, however, has been hesitant at accepting that outcome, and seem to struggle still with widening boundaries of positive affect to include the suffering of non-Japanese.

This thesis took as a starting point the self, making an ontological wager on the self being inextricably linked to any analysis of the other. Acknowledging the importance of emotions on an individual level is crucial, as it offers an alternative way out of situations that may seem
deadlocked; a way which does not lead out through the domination of others, but through the transformation of self. Through such a process, as the one described autoethnographically in this thesis, the subject situates itself anew within a collective while engaging in prosocial behaviour. Considering the need for Japan to legitimate its ongoing policy shift as it continues its path of becoming a ‘normal country’ with offensive military capabilities, such a path is theoretically possible to take for the state as well. In a world with nuclear weapons, it is perhaps the only rational choice there is if one wishes to not face the constant risk of humiliation.
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