“It’s Typically Norwegian to be Good”
- A Case Study on Norwegian Migration Policy concerning Ethiopia

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Declaration

I, Charlotte Thyra Lunde, declare that this thesis is a result of my research investigations and findings. Sources of information other than my own have been acknowledged and a reference list has been appended. This work has not been previously submitted to any other university for award of any type of academic degree.

Signature………………………………..

Date………………………………………..
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Abstract

The thesis aims to identify the particularities of Norwegian policy concerning migration from Ethiopia in an effort to assess how Norwegian identity is reflected in Norwegian migration policy. The findings are based on a case study on Norwegian migration policy in Ethiopia, which consists of interviews with informants who work with Norwegian policy on migration in the region. The thesis presents an image of Norwegian policy as centred around multilateral efforts, developed in the wake of the European migrant crisis. The paper seeks to demonstrate that Norwegian policy is an expression of the regime of goodness and Norway’s role as a country that works to do good.

Keywords: International Relations, Constructivist theory, Norway, Migration, The European Union, Multilateralism
List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

AU – African Union
EEA – European Economic Area
EU – European Union
EUTF – The European Union Emergency Trust Fund for Africa
Frontex – The European Border and Coast Guard Agency
IOM – International Organization for Migration
IMDI – The Directorate of Integration and Diversity
MFA – The Ministry of Foreign Affairs
NOK – Norwegian Kroners
NORAD – The Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation
NRC – Norwegian Refugee Council
OECD – Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
ODA – Official Development Assistance
OSCE – Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
POD – The Norwegian Police Directorate
PST – The Police Security Service
UN – The United Nations
UDI – Directorate of Immigration
UNE – The Immigration Appeals Board
UNHCR – United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNSC – The United Nations Security Council
WB – World Bank
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Introduction

“Helping people where they are” have become a political mantra over the past few years. The European migrant crisis has brought migration back on the Norwegian political agenda. However, a lot remains to be explored regarding how Norway works on issues concerning overseas migration to Norway. What characterizes Norwegian migration policy on this matter? And what can these policies teach us about Norwegian identity at large? This study will account for the particularities of Norwegian migration policies concerning migration from Africa in an effort to assess how Norwegian identity is reflected in Norwegian migration policy. A better understanding of this policy can potentially illuminate important aspects about a collective Norwegian identity which influences Norway’s migration policy with countries around the world.

The thesis relies on Ethiopia as a case study. Ethiopia is a particularly useful case study due to the country’s longstanding relationship with Norway and the important role it plays in the discussion concerning migration from Africa. The paper is split into six chapters. The first two chapters aim to situate the study within a conceptual framework and provide background information which facilitates an exploration of the relationship between policy and identity. The third chapter will give an overview of the data collection and analysis, while chapters 4 and 5 explore the findings of the study with a particular focus on international cooperation. The final chapter will offer a conclusion on the particularities of Norwegian migration policies and how they relate to Norwegian identity. Towards the end of the thesis, I also highlight a few suggestions for future research. The findings of the study will present an image of Norwegian policy on migration as centred around multilateral efforts, which were developed in the wake of the European migrant crisis. Ultimately, the paper aims to demonstrate that Norwegian policy is an expression of the regime of goodness and the belief that Norway offers an important addition to multilateral efforts.
1. Conceptual Framework

Before exploring how Norwegian migration policies relate to Norwegian identity, it is useful to review what has already been written about the topic. This chapter is split into two sections. The first section will explore literature on three topics that are central to understanding Norwegian policy. The second section will attempt to provide a conceptual framework, which can assist in the exploration of the relationship between migration policies and identity. In particular, the first section will review what scholars have written about migration policy, international cooperation, and Norwegian identity. A better understanding of what has already been written about these topics will help to situate the study within the scholarly debate and provide a basis for the analysis presented in chapter 5 and 6. The second part of the literature review will explore the constructivist tradition by focusing on what constructivist scholars have written about identity and interests. It will argue that constructivism is a useful perspective for the exploration of identity and highlight how the concept of role can assist in unpacking the relationship between identity and action.

A. Central Themes: Migration Policy, International Cooperation, and Norwegian Identity

Migration Policy
There are many competing definitions of migration policy. Czaika and De Haas offers two separate definitions in their work on migration, which does a good job of demonstrating how understandings of migration policy differ among and between different actors. According to the authors “International migration policies are rules (i.e., laws, regulations, and measures) that national states define and implement with the (often implicitly stated) objective of affecting the volume, origin, direction, and internal composition of immigration flows (Czaika & De Haas, 2013, p. 489). In addition to their rule focused definition, the authors also offer a description of migration policy as “developed in order to affect behaviour of a target population” (Czaika & De Haas, 2013, p. 489). This is a much wider definition which allows for an understanding of migration policy in a larger sense of the term. An expanded
understanding of migration policy is better suited to include some of the aspects that Taran argues that migration policy has to consider (Taran, 2001, p. 25). In his work on the human rights of migrants, Taran argues that migration policy has to account for a wide range of issues such as national labour market demand, unemployment, population density, border control, human rights policies and national security (Taran, 2001, p. 8). Taran goes on to argue that migration policies concerns most branches of government including the Ministry of Interior, foreign affairs, employment, health, education, housing, welfare and so on (Taran, 2001, p. 25).

Much of the literature on migration policy argues that not only do these policies concern a wide range of government actors, but that they also affect and are affected by other key non-state actors. Castles gives particular importance to the role of labour unions in developing migration policies in his work *Why Migration Policies Fail* (Castles, 2004, p. 214). According to Castles, unions are one of many interest groups involved in policy formation. National unions often struggle with the issue of migration because they want to oppose immigration in order to protect local workers, while at the same time represent the migrants who have been hired by local employers (Castles, 2004, p. 214). Ambrosini has also written about interest groups that play a role in migration policies. In particular, Ambrosini has addressed migrant intermediaries, which he defines as people or institutions who favour the entrance of immigrants (Ambrosini, 2017, p. 1816). This includes immigrants' entry into the labour market, accommodation, social needs, and other forms of possible regulation that can impact the life of immigrants (Ambrosini, 2017, p. 1816). According to Ambrosini, intermediaries can take a number of different actions including applying political pressure. Among other things, political pressure by migrant intermediaries has led to policy changes concerning amnesty and softer immigration restrictions. It is also said to have had a big impact on national debates concerning immigration (Ambrosini, 2017, p. 1817).

Due to its wide range of stakeholders, such as labour unions and other migration intermediaries, migration policy has become a competitive domain. As explained by Czaika & De Haas, "Migration policies are shaped in a political-economic context in which the attitudes and preferences of politicians and voters, interest groups such as employers and trade unions, and human rights organizations compete" (Czaika & De Haas, 2013, p. 504). Czaika & De Haas are not the only authors who have
highlighted the competitive aspect of migration policy. Ambrosini describes migration policies as a “dynamic battlefield” were a range of different actors compete for influence (Ambrosini, 2017, p. 1815). Politicians, human rights organizations, and labour unions have competing agendas and would often like to see wildly different policies concerning migration. Some politicians would for instance want to introduce more restrictive immigration policies in an attempt to appeal to a certain voter base, while human rights organizations would be more focused on insuring that a country is following international human rights standards and living up to its commitments. However, competing agendas is not only relevant with regards to different groups of stakeholders who strive to impact a particular policy. Sometimes, a single organization can experience internal competing interests. As demonstrated by Castles, labour unions can struggle to balance the relationship between the desire to represent more members and protect local jobs (Castles, 2004, p. 214). Similarly, parties in favour of restrictive immigration policies will have to consider the need for skilled workers while at the same time attempting to push an agenda which appeals to the party’s voter base.

Now that we have explored what migration policy is (a wide range of activities) and who participates in migration policy development (a large number of stakeholders), it could be worth quickly considering what scholars have said about migration policy success. Castles has written a lot about the results of Western migration policies and his book The age of Migration is regarded by many as the bible of migration (Castles, Miller, & Ammendola, 2005). Castles, and others such as Anderson (Andersson, 2016) are very sceptical of the effectiveness of European migration policy. Castles claims that the more states do manage migration, the less successful they seem to become (Castles, 2004, p. 205). European migration policies have been criticized both for their failure to address global inequality as well as for their short-term scope (Castles, 2004; Castles et al., 2005).

International Cooperation
International cooperation is becoming an increasingly important tool in the development of national migration policies. There is little written about why some states prefer to work multilaterally on migration, although many scholars have addressed the motivation for international cooperation more broadly. Exploring the
differences between a liberal and realist approach to international cooperation, could help illuminate some important aspects of international cooperation as it relates to migration policies.

A realist perspective would hold that international cooperation on migration issues is a temporary occurrence, which is likely to change as soon as it is becomes inconvenient for one of the more powerful states. As explained by Mearsheimer “alliances are only temporary marriages of convenience (Mearsheimer, 1994, p. 11). Or as Waltz put it “a dominant power acts internationally only when the spirit moves it” (Waltz, 2000, p. 29). A realist perspective holds that cooperation on migration issues is restricted by states’ concern for safety, which limits them from entering into permanent cooperation. “Cooperation among states has its limits, mainly because it is constrained by the dominating logic of security competition, which no amount of cooperation can eliminate (Mearsheimer, 1994, p. 9). This does not imply that international cooperation cannot take place, only that its duration is limited. As explained by Waltz “Worries about the future do not make cooperation and institution building among nations impossible; they do strongly condition their operation and limit their accomplishment” (Waltz, 2000, p. 41).

A liberal perspective has a very different outlook on the possibility of international cooperation and allows for longer-term cooperation between states on issues such as migration. Where realists focus on security interests, liberals account for several types of interests including cultural and economic ones. As summarized by Moravcsik, for liberals “state behaviour reflects varying patterns of state preferences” (Moravcsik, 1997, p. 520). A liberal approach identifies community as the most prominent feature of political order. These communities can be based on varying factors such as common interests or shared values. Liberals often view institutions as the major actor within the international order. Within the liberal tradition, institutions are thought to provide states with a number of factors which facilitates action. According to Keohane and Martin “Institutions can provide information, reduce transaction costs, make commitments more credible, establish focal points for coordination and in general facilitate the operation of reciprocity” (Keohane & Martin, 1995, p. 42).
Applied to the issue of international cooperation on migration issues, we see that realism and liberalism offers two very different outlooks on the longevity and continuation of multilateral efforts concerning migration. The realist perspective paints a picture of international migration management initiatives as temporary and fuelled by safety concerns. This approach would interpret the recent rise in European multilateral efforts concerning migration to be a direct result of the increased migration from Africa and the Middle East to Europe. European states became particularly interested in working together on migration issues post 2010, because they feared that migration posed a threat and assumed that international cooperation was the best way to secure the survival of their individual state. Now that migration numbers are decreasing (Euroactive, 2019), the perception of threat is diminishing and states are likely to discontinue their cooperative efforts on migration. Whereas a realist perspective would imply that the days of international cooperation on migration issues are coming to an end, a liberal approach holds that multilateral efforts on migration is likely to continue for the foreseeable future. According to the liberalist perspective, EU’s efforts on migration are not limited to safety concerns but also serve a cultural purpose through the manifestation of European values such as human rights. A common approach to migration is sustainable because it is rooted in a shared European community and manifested through stable institutions such as the European Union. When applying a liberalist perspective, we can conclude that recent multilateral efforts on migration are not a brief craze, but rather a phenomenon which is here to stay. Towards the end of this chapter, I will provide an introduction to a third theoretical perspective, constructivism. This section will review the basis for the approach and argue for its utility in the exploration of international cooperation on migration issues.

Norwegian Identity
The issue of Norwegian identity has been explored by several authors throughout the years. In general, scholars seem to agree on two concepts which are central to the Norwegian identity. The first is the idea that Norway is a country on “the outside”. Neumann has been active in developing the groundwork for an understanding of the Norwegian “outsideness”. Along with Olsen, Eriksen and Holst, Neumann is among the scholars who have written about this aspect of the Norwegian identity. In short,
one can say that the concept of Norwegian outsideness is centred around the Norwegian self-image as a country with privileged insight, which intervenes in state systems from an outside position (Eriksen & Neumann, 2011). According to this self-image, Norway does things differently and from an outside perspective. Norway’s decision not to join the EU and the development of Norway’s relationship to the EU after the European Economic Area (EEA) agreement is one of the most central themes in the discussion on Norwegian outsideness. Neumann has for instance written about the effect that the 1994 Norwegian Olympic Games had on the Norwegian vote during the EU referendum (Neumann, 1996), whereas Olsen has written about how Norway’s status as a non-member of the EU has impacted the country’s migration and asylum policy (Olsen, 2018). Neumann claims that scholars have under-reported on the ways in which the EEA agreement has affected Norwegian identity. According to Neumann and Eriksen, the underreporting could affect how we interpret policy decisions. As the authors explain, “Identity is also an integral part of policy. Therefore, the relationship between Norwegian national identity and Europe / EU is essential for understanding the policy in the area (Eriksen & Neumann, 2011, p. 415)”.

The second idea, which is said to be central to the Norwegian identity, is the that Norway is a country of goodness. As contextualized by Witoszek, “Norway is the only country which uses 1.06% of its GDP towards development aid to advance the cause of peace, human rights, and democracy. Indeed, it is one of the world’s most significant exporters of ‘goodness’ to all corners of the world” (Witoszek, 2011, p. 7). The fact that Norway is a perceived to be a country that does good is closely connected to the narrative which claims that Norway is a country of peace. The understanding that Norway is a peaceful country is said to date back to the 1890’s (Eriksen & Neumann, 2011, p. 432). This understanding, that Norway is more peaceful than other countries, helped to separate Norway from Sweden and is an idea which appears to have kept its relevance throughout the past 100 years. In the 1990’s Norway relationship to peace was explained and put in context through what would become known as the Norwegian model. The model, applied by the Norwegian government, was centred around Norway’s competitive advantages in the international sphere. The foundation for the model is the idea that Norway can benefit from working multilaterally and that Norway is playing an important role in
making the world a better place by doing so. Norway’s desire to work multilaterally has received a lot of attention in scholarly circles and is discussed both by authors like Lie (Lie, 2006) and Neumann and de Carvalho (de Carvalho & Neumann, 2015).

The Norwegian model is closely linked to another conceptual explanation of Norwegian policy often referred to as Godhetsregimet or the regime of goodness. The concept is based on the idea that Norwegians see themselves as part of a country that does good in the world, through actions such as peace work, development assistance, and multilateral efforts. Witoszek explains the idea of Norwegian goodness in the following way “Its wealth goes beyond the oil, gas and hydro-power that give it one of the highest GDPs in the world; it includes a rich tradition of peaceful, reform-oriented, development, emancipatory politics, a generous welfare system, and an identity based on partnership with nature” (Witoszek, 2011, p. 7). The concept of the regime of goodness was first developed by Norwegian historian and scholar Terje Tvedt who explored the role of universities, NGOs, and aid workers in Norwegian society. He critiqued the idea that official development assistance (ODA) and Norwegian development workers were naturally “doing good” and demanded a more sceptical exploration of the work that Norway was doing in connection to ODA, peace and democracy (Tvedt, 2006) The term regime of goodness is inspired by previous Prime Minister Brundtland’s statement that “it’s typically Norwegian to be good” (Tvedt, 1995). The term is described as ironic since “the concept of “regime” gives a technocratic, controlling tone to “goodness” – and this both constructs and deconstructs Norway’s achievements with a clever turn of the phrase” (Witoszek, 2011, p. 13).

Witoszek has added to Tvedt’s work on the regime of goodness by exploring the roots of the concept, in her book The Origins of the Regime of Goodness. In her work, Witoszek describes the regimes as a dominant system of values which has empowered social change in Norway over the past two hundred years. This system is said to adhere to a specific world view and an equivalent corresponding code of action (Witoszek, 2011, p. 54). Witoszek claims that two historical figures have been particularly important in transforming Norway into a country of goodness. The first is Norwegian poet turned social activist Bjørnstjerne Bjørnson. The other is Fridtjof Nansen, the Norwegian polar explorer who became the first High Commissioner on Refugees (Witoszek, 2011). Although their work drew on other aspects like the
values of the Christian enlightenment, the Norwegian obsession with being one with nature, and the traditional fairy-tale hero Askeladden who is always helping the needy, Witoszek concludes that Bjørnson and Nansen were the inventors of modern Norway as the regime of goodness (Witoszek, 2011, p. 192). The regime of goodness is said to be such an important part of Norwegian society that all leaders has had to address goodness in one way or another over the past two centuries. The regime has constituted a national ideal which has educated generations of Norwegians into what they are today (Witoszek, 2011, p. 211). The next section will rely on constructivism in an attempt to explore how this national ideal came to be.

Before exploring the constructivist approach to identity it’s worth highlighting some of the literature concerned with Norwegian identity politics. Eriksen has written a report about Norwegian social and policy reactions to increased immigration with a focus on anti-immigrant sentiments and nationalism (Eriksen, 2013). The report outlines a division between those who welcome immigration and those fear it. Eriksen also gives importance to the Norwegian backlash which followed the introduction of antidiscrimination policies in the early 2000’s (Eriksen, 2013). Other authors who have written about Norwegian identity politics include Gressgår, who has explored the topic through focusing on “political correctness” and freedom of speech (Gressgård, 2019). Grung and Leirvik have also approached the issue through their work on Norwegian identity politics and the Norwegian discourse on religion (Grung & Leirvik, 2012).

B. Constructivism: A useful Framework for Exploring Migration Policy

Constructivism 101
Unlike realism and liberalism, the constructivist approach is not concerned with interests. Instead constructivism focuses on how actors create knowledge and reality. The very foundation of constructivism is the understanding that ideas, knowledge, reality and identity are not set, but rather constructed through social processes. The way we think about the world helps to construct it and this continues through a synergic process. This is what Onuf refers to when he says that “Constructivism holds that people make society, and society makes people” (Onuf, 1998, p. 63). This understanding implies that individuals actively participate in
knowledge creation and negotiate things like reality and identity along with the society around them. As explained by the renowned constructivist scholar Adler, “constructivism is the view that the manner in which the material world shapes and is shaped by human action and interaction depends on dynamic normative and epistemic interpretations of the material world” (Adler, 1997, p. 322). The idea that reality is socially constructed stands in opposition to positivism, which is based on the idea that some knowledge comes from natural phenomena and that there is such a thing as human nature. However, it is worth noting that constructivism doesn’t imply a denial of an external reality, but rather an understanding that people appropriate meaning to the material world through social interaction. How people give meaning to the state is one of the main themes of Benedict Anderson’s book Imagined Communities. The book explores the issue of nationalism by illuminating how nations are socially constructed communities. Anderson explains how communities are imagined concepts, created by individuals who see themselves as part of a particular group (Anderson, 1991). The idea that individuals imagine themselves as being part of a particular community has been central to my approach to the study.

If we apply the constructivist approach to the case of multilateralism, we begin to see that organizations such as the EU and UN are not only platforms for international cooperation, but that these institutions functions as arenas for identity and knowledge creation. Adler argues that “Constructivism may hold the key for developing dynamic theories about the transformation of international actors, institutionalized patterns, new political identities and interests and systems of governance” (Adler, 1997, p. 323). A constructivist approach could potentially help make sense of the Norwegian identity (and how it relates to policy initiatives concerning migration from Ethiopia).

Identity and Policy
Constructivism has been applied to a number of issues within International Relations, including international organizations and power relations (Ahmed & Potter, 2006). Some authors have also used constructivism to explore government policies. (Aggestam, 2004, p. 5; Behravesh, 2011). The value of constructivism in the exploration of policy lies in constructivism’s ability to recognize and account for
identity, a concept which is said to be central to policy. According to Aggestam, “foreign policy is about national identity itself: about the core elements of sovereignty it seeks to defend, the values it stands for and seeks to promote abroad” (Aggestam, 1999, p. 83). Exploring the relationship between foreign policy and identity is said to be important due to the strong link between the two (Aggestam, 1999, p. 84). This does not mean that national interests are overlooked in the policy-making process (Behravesh, 2011, p. 6). Rather, identities are the basis of interests (Wendt, 1992). According to Behravesh, “it is the states’ constructed identities, shared understandings and socio-political situation in the broader international system which to a large extent determines their interests and the foreign policy practices to secure them” (Behravesh, 2011, p. 5). Egeland expands on the role of self-interests in his work on state’s human rights policies (Egeland, 1988). He has developed a model which displays how national norms and traditions work together with self-interest to impact policy. This model is useful in displaying how constructivism can account for national interests and offers a useful framework for exploring Norwegian migration policy.

Constructivist explorations of policy consist of many of the same concepts as other constructivist analyses. In particular, the idea of reimagining the past, constructing norms, and utilising discourse appears to be important components of a constructivist analysis of policy. Re-imagining the past can be thought of as the practice of constructing a history about the past and essence of a particular group or state. It is often described as a ‘continuing exercise in the fabrication of illusion and the elaboration of convenient fables about who “we” are’ (Ignatieff, 1998, p. 18). In her work on what she refers to as the remapping of the cultural history of Norway, Witoszek describes how the story of Norway is continuously recollected and re-invented (Witoszek, 2011). This process is facilitated by memes, which are pieces of collective memories. Witoszek explains that “a meme is a unit of social memory (stemming from the Latin mem/oria): an image, a social pattern or a story which is not copied but remembered and hence constantly re-invented in the process of recollection” (Witoszek, 2011, p. 17). According to constructivist theory, these memes or collective memories matter for policy because they help to inform the policy choices that policymakers view as possible. As explained by Aggestam, “These expressions of a collective national identity reveal how foreign policy-makers
view past history, the present and the future political choices they face” (Aggestam, 1999, p. 83). The collective memory creates a story about what a particular state is and what this particular state does. Policy is either considered appropriate or inappropriate based on the identity constructed based on the social memory. This is what Sjursen and Smith refer to when they say that “Policy would be legitimised through reference to what is considered appropriate given a particular group’s conception of itself and of what it represents” (Sjursen & Smith, 2004, p. 3). The understanding of what constitutes appropriate behaviour is often referred to as norms. Norms function to constitute, regulate, and enable actors (Björkdahl, 2013, p. 325). They indicate accepted behaviours for actors within a group that share their identity.

According to constructivism, norms are often communicated via discourse. Discourse appear to be particularly important in the case of policy because they signal what policy norms decision-makers are expected to follow. Torna and Christiansen explain policy action in the following manner, “Discourses make intelligible some ways of acting towards the world and exclude other possible modes of identity and action” (Tonra & Christiansen, 2004, p. 67). Behravesh expands on this by claiming that “Foreign policy practices of states are originally a product of discursive factors and socio-cultural constructions, in particular identities, “relatively stable, role-specific understandings and expectations about self” which they “acquire” through engagement with and participation in collective “meaning structures” (Behravesh, 2011, p. 3).

Before moving on to a more in-depth exploration of the causality between identity and policy, it is worth highlighting two aspects of the identity-policy relationship, which help to give a more complete understanding of the dynamic between the two. The first is the idea that not only does identity impact policy, but that policy also impacts identity. According to Wicaksana and Wahyu, “The historical, cultural, and political context plays significant roles in producing the state’s identity and national interest” (Wicaksana & Wahyu, 2009, p. 13). This idea adds to our understanding about the connection between identity and policy. We see that policy and identity work together in synergy, rather than through a one-way relationship. Such an understanding brings us back to Onuf’s description of constructivism which was introduced at the beginning of the chapter - “People make society, and society
makes people” (Onuf, 1998, p. 63). The second thing which it is important to keep in mind is the idea that both people and states have several identities, often in opposition to each other. There is no such a thing as one national identity, rather people constantly negotiate between a set of different identities that evolve and change as a result of different social processes.

Does Identity Cause Policy? - The Value of Reason and Roles
The last section has attempted to demonstrate how constructivists make sense of the relationship between identity and policy. We have seen that constructivist theory identifies a clear bond between how people comprehend their history and place in the world, and the policies that they interpret to be appropriate at any given time. However, an important question remains: does identity cause policy? Can a constructivist approach lend itself to the claim that different identities result in different policies? The final section of the literature review will highlight constructivist literature on interests and identity with a focus on reason and role conception. The assumption is that policy is a form of interest, and that constructivist literature can provide a framework which can be applied to the exploration of the relationship between Norwegian policy and identity in the future.

The Value of the Concept of Reason
As previously mentioned, constructivist theory holds that identity shapes interests. Wicaksana and Wahyu have written about national policy interests and explain that “The construction of identity substantially informs what's defined as the national interest. Dual process of articulation and interpellation is of central importance in understanding the construction of identity and the national interest in foreign policy” (Wicaksana & Wahyu, 2009, p. 14). However, due to the cyclical nature of the construction process of identity and interests it is impossible to separate the two. We simply cannot reduce our understanding to saying that one (identity) cause another (interests, or in our case policy). Rather than trying to explain the cause of interests, constructivists try to focus on “how possible” questions (Houghton, 2007). These questions are said to be an important addition to traditional analysis of foreign policy because they approach foreign policy orientations of states through notions of culture, role, and identity (Houghton, 2007, p. 25). Fierke is another constructivist
who is sceptical of exploring the cause of interests. Rather than discussing cause, Fierke refers to reason as a reference point for understanding policy. Fierke, warns of confusing reason with cause as it gives a different meaning. According to Fierke, “To refer to a reason as a cause is an interpretation; it takes the rule by which ‘giving a reason’ has meaning and gives it a different meaning” (Fierke, Dunne, Kurki, & Smith, 2013, p. 172). A reason for a particular interest is not be confused with cause, as it can be seen as a facilitating action. Unlike cause, reason helps to legitimate and persuade the need for a certain action. Fierke does a good job in explaining this in her contribution to the book International Relations Theories where she writes that “X may give a reason for action to Y. In doing so, X explains her actions. This may have some influence on Y, but, if so, it is less as a cause, in the sense that the impact of one stone on another may propel the latter in forward motion. Rather it is part of a conversation where X is trying to persuade Y, and thereby legitimate her own actions in terms that can be understood and accepted by others” (Fierke et al., 2013, p. 172). In other words, a reason for policy can have an influence on a particular policy choice but does not necessarily impact the policy in a way where it is to be consider the cause of that specific policy.

The Value of Role Theory
If the concept of reason can help us understand how policies are impacted by identity, the concept of role can help us understand the direction of certain policy choices. Role theory holds that a state’s foreign policy is influenced by its ‘national role conception’ (Hyde-Price, 2004). The theory was first applied to foreign policy analysis by Kalevi Holsti (Holsti, 1970) who used a sociological understanding to explain how policies are guided by understandings of ourselves. The theory is based on the idea that national identity impacts the policy that an actor pursues through things like history and norms. The construction of history is a particularly powerful driver for role conception because it facilitates action. Aggestam draws on Ross' works when she writes that “Ideas about who ‘we’ are tend to serve as a guide to political action and basic worldviews. Collective identities express a sense of belonging to membership of a distinct group. As such, they tend to provide a system of orientation for self-reference and action” (Aggestam, 2004, p. 82). Some of the strongest roles are included in a nation’s political culture. According to Aggestam,
“the more central a role conception becomes, the more likely it is to be surrounded by myths and institutions, thus becoming part of a nation’s political culture” (Aggestam, 2004, p. 91). In other words, the more history we construct and attach to a political culture, the stronger that political culture becomes. The constructed history, and the role conception it brings with it, helps to operationalize an image of the world which “triggers expectations, and influences the definition of the situation and the available options. It imposes obligations and affects the definition of risks” (Tonra & Christiansen, 2004, p. 110). In other words, roles make some policy options possible and other impossible. Role theory can help us develop a different understanding of how national interests and policies are defined; an understanding which focuses on roles and identities rather than values and security.

C. Summary of the Conceptual Framework
This chapter has shed light on previous literature concerning migration policy, international cooperation, and identity, in an attempt to cover the academic literature needed to thoroughly explore the question of how Norwegian policy on migration relates to Norwegian identity. We have seen that migration policy concerns not just decision-makers working on migration related issues, but a range of government actors along with a large number of non-state stakeholders. Despite the tension that arises as a result of competing domestic agendas on migration, the literature indicates that international cooperation on migration issues has become more common. The reason for this is contested and so is the longevity of current cooperation. What many scholars do agree on is the fact that Norway tends to favour international cooperation. Norway’s focus on multilateral cooperation is in line with the narrative of Norway as a peaceful country with an outside perspective that can benefit others. The second part of the chapter has been focused on constructivist literature and the value of a constructivist approach to identity. Constructivism offers an understanding of identity as constructed, an understanding which allows us to perceive of interests as flexible and multifaceted. The literature on role conception furthers the idea that identities are constructed and facilitates an understanding of how certain policy actions are accepted and others become unacceptable. The concept of roles will be discussed further in the analysis of the study.
2. Background

The following chapter will provide relevant background on migration and migration policy, which will help to further situate the study within historical and recent events. The chapter is split into three sections, which focus on the history and concept of migration, Norwegian migration policy, and the European migrant crisis. This part of the thesis will aim to draw attention to the context and environment that surrounds Norwegian policy by highlighting the controversy attached to migration and the European migrant crisis.

A. History of Migration

Migration is a concept as old as time. It is a central part of the human experience and a feature which has allowed societies to develop and adapt. Although migration has taken place throughout history, the practice appears to have intensified in modern time and become a predominant feature of the contemporary age (Taran, 2001, p. 9). People decide to migrate for a number of reasons, and it is difficult to pinpoint one particular motivation. Castles claims that the driving forces for international migration are extremely complex (Castles, 2004) and it seems reasonable to conclude that people decide to leave their community for a number of factors. Taran holds that migrants often chose to leave due to a combination of multifaceted political, social and environmental decisions. He has developed a list of seven factors which drive people to migrate, which offers a useful framework for exploring migration. According to Taran people migrate due to several reasons: 1. Increasing armed violence. 2. Ethnic and racial conflict. 3. Features of globalization. 4. Environmental degradation. 5. Development-induced displacement. 6. Denial of democracy. 7. Large-scale corruption (Taran, 2001, p. 13).

The question of how we refer to people who leave their homes to relocate somewhere else is a contested. The most common distinction can be found between the term migrant and refugee. A refugee is defined according to the 1951 UN convention which describes a refugee as “a person residing outside his or her country of nationality who is unable or unwilling to return because of a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion” (United Nations, 2019a). Whereas most
states accept and apply the UN definition of a refugee, there is no formal agreed upon definition of what constitutes a migrant. According to the UN, “most experts agree that an international migrant is someone who changes his or her country of usual residence, irrespective of the reason for migration or legal status” (United Nations, 2019b). Even in cases where this definition is accepted, there remains a great deal of confusion regarding how to refer to migrants. Scholars and policymakers have developed an extensive range of additional terms which are often attached to the concept of refugees. These include descriptions such as internal and international, temporary and permanent, voluntary and forced, regular and irregular as well as illegal and legal. All of these terms carry with them understandings of what it means to be a migrant and effects how policymakers and other approach the issue of migration. The question of how we refer to migrants is complex and worthy of its own in-depth exploration. In connection to the question of migration policy, it might be worth to highlight the concept of legal and illegal migration. This are terms which is central in many policy documents on migration and which can have an important impact on how a society relates to migrants and migration in general. The “illegalization” of migrants is said to be the “the most dramatic manifestation of the resurgence of tendencies to associate migrants and migration with crime and criminality, unemployment, disease, and other social ills” (Taran, 2001, p. 23). In addition to linking migrants to numerous negative impacts on society, the use of the term illegal migration is said to be problematic due to the vagueness of the term. According to Ambrosia, “a clear division between regular and irregular immigration is often blurred” (Ambrosini, 2017, p. 1821).

B. Norwegian Migration Policy
Most of Norwegian migration issues are handled by the Norwegian migration chain. The migration chain is described as “the process by which a person decides to apply for a residence permit or protection in Norway, via a decision in the immigration case for integration in the Norwegian society or for refusal and return to the home country or safe third country”. It includes a number of different actors including the Norwegian Directorate of Immigration (UDI), the Immigration Appeals Board (UNE), the Directorate of Integration and Diversity (IMDi), Skills Norway, the municipalities, the Norwegian Police Directorate (POD) with all its different sections, the Police
Security Service (PST) and Norwegian foreign service missions. Together, these agencies work to reduce asylum seekers without need for protection, ensure faster return and clarification of identity, and increase immigrants’ participation in work and social life. In other words, their work is centred around migrants and refugees who have already arrived in Norway. National refugee and migration policy is decided by Norwegian political authorities on the basis of national considerations and in accordance with international law. As an EEA member, Norway is bound to a number of EU agreements including the Schengen agreement of passport-free travel.

Whereas it is relatively easy to get an overview of the key stakeholders who work on domestic migration related questions, it is harder to obtain information about how Norway addresses migration issues outside of its borders. However, judging from a range of government documents it appears to be a multi-stakeholder approach which involves a range of different government actors. As concluded by the MFA commissioned report on Migration and Development, “there are several connections between, on the one hand, foreign and development policy and, on the other, migration, integration and inclusion policies” (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2006). As for Norway’s work on migration from Africa, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) developed a Platform for a Comprehensive Africa Policy in 2007, which remains the most complete reference on the topic (Norwegian Government, 2008). Here, the MFA makes clear that Norway wishes to work closely with Africa on several levels in order to better manage migration form the continent. The platform draws attention to the fact that Norway is affected by increasing labour migration from Africa, which has caused the number of illegal migrants from Africa to rise drastically over the last few years. One of the goals outlined in the platform is to “support measures that strengthen African countries’ opportunities to master the migration challenges and ensure national capacity, competence and manpower”. How Norway will do so is not specified, but the document concludes that Norway is seeking to go beyond development aid and cooperation. As concluded in the document, “We want a holistic policy towards Africa. A policy in which foreign, development, security, trade and business policies are seen in context, and seem mutually reinforcing, to safeguard both common interests and our own national interests (Norwegian Government, 2008).
The importance of working closely with other countries in order to ensure better migration management is repeated in several government sources. According to the white paper on Norwegian refugee and migration policy, migration challenges must be addressed through solutions based on cooperation and joint action. "If each individual country is to deal with these problems on its own, the solution will often consist of shoving responsibility onto neighbouring countries. A predictable, sustainable and robust refugee and migration policy requires cooperation, international solidarity, harmonisation of regulations and practices, and common solutions, not just in countries where immigrants settle, but also in transit countries and countries of origin" (Norwegian Ministry of Justice and the Police, 2009). The importance of include origin and transit countries in Norway's work on migration related questions has been repeated both by the present and former Minister of Foreign Affairs (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2017).

C. The European Migrant Crisis
The so-called European migrant crisis refers to the period from 2015-2017 when an increasing number of both migrants and refugees reached Europe, mostly via the Mediterranean Sea. The European migrant crisis happened as an increase in forcibly displaced people around the world reached its largest numbers since WWII in 2014 (International Organization for Migration, 2016). Approximately 1 million people crossed the Mediterranean in 2015 (UNHCR, 2016a). It is estimated that a staggering 3.771 people died while attempting to cross the Mediterranean that same year (UNHCR, 2016a). According to the UNHCR, 58% of the migrants who arrived in Europe by sea were males over 18 years, 17% were females over 18 years, and 25% were children under 18 years (UNHCR, 2016b). Most of the people who arrived were from the Middle East and Africa (UNHCR, 2016b). Germany was the European country who received the most refugees and migrants during the crisis. Germany operated with a more liberal border policy than other European states in this period and by the end of 2015 one million refugees were registered in the Germany refugee system (UNHCR, 2016b). It is widely claimed that Germany's open-arms policy triggered a domestic backlash (NPR, 2018) The crisis would also come to have a large impact on European cooperation on migration issues.
By 2016 the number of people crossing the Mediterranean to arrive in Europe had dropped to 350,000 (Reuters, 2018), which is approximately one third of the 2015 numbers. Four years later, in 2019, the European Commission cancelled the official crisis (Euroactive, 2019). Numerous human rights organizations have criticised European governments for their handling of the so-called migrant crisis. The extensive critique touches on a number of issues ranging from European states inability to save lives in the Mediterranean, to many government’s unwillingness to host arriving refugees, to the EU’s failure to insure a cohesive response to the crisis. Even the term “European Migrant Crisis” has been critiqued as many have pointed out that the migrant crisis was a global phenomenon with a range of dire consequences, most of which did not happen in Europe. In addition to the estimated 4,496 (International Organization for Migration, 2019b) people who died trying to cross the Mediterranean between 2015-2017, an estimated 400 000 - 1 million people were stopped from crossing the Mediterranean from Libya (Time, 2017). Most of these people are currently in overcrowded detention centres or living under inhuman conditions in Libya (Time, 2017). Of the 59.5 million forcibly displaced people in 2015, only 1 million made their way to Europe through the Mediterranean (UNHCR, 2016b). Although the unprecedented arrivals to Europe undoubtedly caused challenges for European authorities and put pressure on public services, the fact remains that most migrants and refugees were hosted by their neighbouring countries who unquestionably experienced an even larger migrant crisis during this period.

Although the European migrant crisis had less effect on Norway than it did on many other European countries, the period had a big impact on the Norwegian immigration and refugee services as well as on the public debate about immigration and refugees. The number of asylum applications increased drastically in this period. In 2015, 31 145 people applied for asylum in Norway, which was the largest number since the war in the Balkans (Statistics Norway, 2019). Most people either arrived through Svinesund via Sweden or through the Storskog border which Norway shares with Russia (Nettavisen, 2015). Many of the migrants were from Syria, Iraq, Iran and Ethiopia (NRK, 2015). As for migration statistics in this period, Ethiopians ranked 8th out of the nationalities arriving in Norway between 2013-2015 (Statistics Norway, 2019). As in many European countries, the migrant crisis resulted in a Norwegian
national debate regarding international commitments to assist migrants (and refugees), European burden sharing and the issue of sovereignty. In 2015, Norwegian authorities introduced internal Schengen border control at the Norwegian borders in an attempt to control entry into the country (NRK, 2016).

D. Summary of the Background
This chapter has explored the issue of migration by focusing on its origin, Norwegian policy, and the recent European migrant crisis. The first part of the chapter illuminated the history and concept of migration with a focus on the human tradition of migrating and the many contested terms used to describe migration. In the second part of the chapter, I explored Norwegian migration policy and demonstrated that Norwegian authorities have traditionally focused on refugees and integration related questions, rather than migration issues. The final part of the chapter reviewed the European migrant crisis by drawing attention to the number of people it has touched and a few of the consequences it has had. We have seen that although migration is an age-old tradition, immigration to Europe (including Norway) has increased drastically over the past few years. This is especially true for illegal immigration, which has reached unprecedented numbers. The background information on migration in general and the European migrant crisis in particular provides a useful context for exploring recent Norwegian policies concerning migration from Africa.

3. Methods

A. Research Objective and Research Questions
The objective of my research is to comprehend the particularities of Norwegian migration policies concerning migration from Africa in order to assess how Norwegian identity is reflected in Norwegian migration policy. Ethiopia has been chosen as a case study due to its role as a priority partner for Norwegian official development assistance, as well as for migration management efforts on the Horn of Africa. A better understanding of Norwegian policy concerning migration from Ethiopia can potentially illuminate aspects about a collective Norwegian identity and address how this identity relates to Norwegian migration policies for countries around
The research has been guided by two main research questions:

1. What are Norway’s main policies regarding migration from Ethiopia?
2. How is Norwegian identity reflected in these policies?

B. Research Design
The study relies on data collected through qualitative interviews. Choosing a qualitative approach allowed me to uncover policies that are not reflected in the literature. It also facilitated an exploration of identity issues as it not only identified newly developed policies, but also the significance that experts attached to these policies. A qualitative approach has allowed me to uncover themes and meanings that I would not have been able to identify through the use of another design method. As Berg and Lune explains, “insights obtained from qualitative research cannot only add texture to an analysis, but also demonstrate meanings and understanding about problems and phenomena that would otherwise be unidentified” (Berg & Lune, 2012, p. 6).

The research relied on purposive sampling which is a non-random form of sampling that allowed me to gather information strategically (Bryman, 2015, p. 416). According to Bryman “The goal of purposive sampling is to sample cases/participants in a strategic way, so that those sampled are relevant to the research questions that are posed (Bryman, 2015, p. 416). In addition to purposive sampling, I relied on snowball sampling which implied that I could add informants during the data collection phase. This is a process where “the researcher initially samples a small group relevant to the research questions, and these sampled participants propose other participants who have had experiences or characteristics relevant to the research” (Bryman, 2015, p. 416).

The units of analysis are people who have either developed, carried out or encountered Norwegian policy regarding Ethiopian migration in their work. These are referred to as informants throughout my research. The data consists of the answers that the informants have given during qualitative interviews. In total, I was able to
interview nine informants. Six of these work for Norwegian state agencies and encounter issues related to migration policy in some capacity of their work. The six Norwegian informants represent different agencies which interact with Norwegian policy on different levels and at different times in the migration chain. The three remaining people I interviewed have encountered Norway as an actor in their work and are employed for organizations that address migration. I wanted to interview both Norwegian state actors and actors who have encountered Norwegian policy from the outside in order to develop a more complete image of how Norwegian policies relate to the Norwegian self-image.

I contacted fifteen potential informants regarding participating in the study and would ideally have preferred to have a bigger sample. However, Bryman explains that the number of qualitative interviews depends on the scope of a study and that there is considerable variation among writers concerning the minimum requirements for an adequate sample (Bryman, 2015, p. 418). Due to the small sample size, I do not draw any general conclusions regarding Norwegian policies. This is a way of avoiding inappropriate generalizations (Bryman, 2015, p. 418).

C. Data Collection
Informants were initially approached either via email or in person. I had access to a few of my informants due to my professional connections at the time and contacted four of them face to face. I reached out to many other via email and got response from five additional informants. Prior to the interviews, I tested the interview guide on an acquaintance in order to discover any issues with sequencing, logic etc. I conducted semi-structure individual interviews, which allowed participants to speak freely about aspects that they themselves thought were important. Two separate interviews consisted of two informants at the same time. This was suggested by the informants themselves as they thought that it would make sense to include a colleague. In total I interviewed nine experts in the course of seven different interviews. Five of these interviews were conducted in Ethiopia and one was conducted in Norway. The final interview was conducted via Skype due to the fact that I was unable to travel back to Ethiopia and conduct the interview in person. Each interview lasted somewhere between 45-90 minutes. Two interviews were conducted in English, whereas the rest were conducted in Norwegian. All interviews took place in the informants' office or
work place meeting room. Due to the somewhat sensitive nature of the topic, I decided to take handwritten notes. I also insured all my informants that they would remain anonymous so that they could be comfortable to talk freely.

D. Data Analysis
Since I was unable to record the interviews, it was essential for me to review my notes directly after the meeting. Following my interviews, I would type up my notes on my computer, write out abbreviations, and add any additional remarks regarding body language or tone, which I though might be relevant for my analysis.

For my analysis, I relied on one of the most common approaches; a thematic approach. According to Bryman, this approach supplies a framework for the thematic analysis of qualitative data and provides a way of thinking about how to manage themes and data (Bryman, 2015, p. 585). I used Excel to organize my coding and structured according to the themes. A theme can be defined as “a category which is identified by the analyst through her data, that relates to her research focus, builds on codes identified in transcripts or field notes, and that provides the researcher with the basis for a theoretical understanding of her data that can make a theoretical contribution to the literature relating to the research focus” (Bryman, 2015, p. 584). I added themes as I discovered them and restructure several times. After I completed my coding, I did a triangulation where I compared my findings to statement and white papers, in order to see if my findings are in line with government documents.

E. Ethical Considerations
I assumed an overt role throughout the study and made sure to obtain informed consent from all of my informants. As explained by the Social Research Association “In voluntary inquiries, subjects should not be under the impression that they are required to participate. They should be aware of their entitlement to refuse at any stage for whatever reason and to withdraw data just supplied (SRA, 2013). The issue of voluntary participation was particularly important in my contact with the informants who didn’t work for Norwegian government agencies as I did not want them to feel obligated to participate because Norway is or could be a potential donor. I also made
clear to stress the fact that I was there as an independent researcher and that the study was in no way affiliated with the Norwegian government.

I have worked to protect the safety of my data throughout the study and I have done my best to ensure that my informants remain anonymous. Each participant was given a number which was referred to during the coding, as well as in the final report.

F. Potential Drawbacks
There are a few drawbacks to my research which should be addressed. In short, these drawbacks centre around the role of the informants, my role as a researcher, and the number of participants who participated in the interviews.

Norway’s official policy on migration from Africa is developed by the Norwegian government. Several of my informant are charged with carrying out this policy and were nervous about being quoted as having said something which could be interpreted as contradicting official Norwegian policy. On the basis of this, I decided not to record the interviews and treat my informants as anonymous sources in an effort to protect their identity. However, by not recording the interviews, I can have lost information that I was unable to capture in my notes. Similarly, the decision to keep informants’ actual job titles hidden prevents information about and comparison between the individual participants, which could have allowed for a more in-depth analysis.

I was conscious of the issue of reactivity throughout my study, but this is a complicate issue (Bryman, 2015, p. 494) which deserves exploration. Reactivity can be described as the way in which my presence affected the respondents. I think that it might have done so in two distinctly different ways. Firstly, there is a chance that the people I interviewed who worked for the Norwegian government might have been affected by the fact that they also had a working relationship with me. This could for instance have led them to appear overly positive towards Norwegian policies or be less likely to link Norwegian priorities to Norwegian identity. Secondly, it is possible that my presence affected the non-Norwegian informants who can have seen me as a potential future donor. In both cases, I tried to distance myself from the Norwegian state and make it clear that I was there as a researcher, rather than as a Norwegian or a professional acquaintance.
Finally, it’s worth noting that it is unfortunate that two of the interviews were conducted with several informants present. Although I was not left with the impression that they had a large impact on each other’s statements, it is possible that they might have become more “in tune” with each other than what would have been the case if I would have conducted the interviews separately.

4. Norwegian Policy: A New Multilateral Approach to Migration

This chapter will explore Norwegian policy concerning migration from Africa by focusing on policies centred around migration management in Ethiopia. The chapter is structured according to two of the themes that came out of the discussions with informants: the fact that most of the migration policies were developed after 2015 and the idea that these policies have been centred around common EU solutions. The third and final part of the chapter explores Norwegian support to migration management projects in Ethiopia with a focus on EUTF (The European Union Emergency Trust Fund for Africa). Towards the end of the chapter, I also review Norway’s recent return agreement with Ethiopian authorities, a case which appears to contradict the Norwegian pattern for multilateral solutions.

A. Organized according to Migration Stages

In general, informants referred to three main Norwegian policy efforts regarding Ethiopian migration to Norway. Broadly speaking, these can be identified as being multilateral policy efforts, national policy efforts, and bilateral policy efforts. Although all three policy levels intertwine and cross paths, the policies can be interpreted as addressing migrants and immigrants at different stages. Multilateral efforts appear to be particularly focused on the period before migrants leave their country of origin or a transit country. National efforts are fixated on the period which starts when an irregular migrant is present at the Norwegian border. Finally, bilateral efforts are centred around returning irregular migrants to their country of origin (or a third country) after they have been refused stay in Norway.

There are instances, where the trend of applying multilateral, national or bilateral efforts according to the stage of migration (before a migrant has left, when a
migrant is present at the border or after they have been expelled) does not apply. One example is national efforts to discourage migrants from leaving their country of origin, such as informational campaigns describing Norway as an unattractive destination. This was the case with the campaign *Irregular Migration: Truths and Misconceptions* which was targeted towards potential migrants in Somalia. The campaign was commissioned by the Ministry of Justice and developed by IOM in 2014 (Klassekampen, 2017). It relies on a number of channels and consisted of a documentary, radio programs, posters and 94-page cartoon, which paints Norway as a country with racism (Klassekampen, 2017). The cartoon was printed in 48,000 copies and the entire campaign had a price tag of NOK 4 million (Klassekampen, 2017). Similarly, there are cases of bilateral efforts at the border (working with Russia to control the shared border) or multilateral efforts to ensure return agreements (as discussed later in the study). However, in general the idea that Norwegian policy response to migration is organized according to the stages of migration (before, during or after) can provide a useful framework for separating and exploring the various policy aspects. Each of the three policy aspects are worthy of their own exploration and hold potential important insights regarding Norwegian migration policy. However, the main emphasis of this study will be Norwegian policy efforts concerning migration from Ethiopia focused on reaching potential immigrants before they leave. This is by far the least discussed type of policy and there is a need to uncover more about Norwegian efforts on this matter. An exploration of Norwegian efforts to manage migration before it reaches Norway can potentially inform larger studies on the topic and reveal important aspects about how Norway works to address trans-national issues.

B. Post-2015 Developments
The study draws attention to the fact that Norwegian policy regarding migration from Africa is relatively new. Much of the policy on this field is said to be developed during the fall of 2015, when politicians realized that previous policies were insufficient to manage migration from Africa. According to one of the informants who was active in developing Norwegian migration policy after 2015, the policy was a result of both European and Norwegian reactions to the migrant crisis. Policymakers and politicians felt like they had to do something. As explained by the informant, “We had
to design a new policy and stance that we had not previously had. We had to develop a Norwegian migration policy" (Interview 3, February 2019). Prior to the 2015 migrant crisis there was no overarching migration system, but rather a set of different bodies which had their own priorities. Before the migrant crisis, there was also less contact between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (UD), the Norwegian Directorate of Immigration (UDI) and the National Police Immigration Service (PU). The MFA did not work specifically on migration issues but did address different refugee related questions. For instance, the MFA focuses on refugee issues on both national, European and multilateral levels. Examples of this can for found in the work on national reception centres, cooperation through The European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex), and support to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). However, according to my informant “migration was an undermanaged issue” (Interview 3, February 2019). This is said to have shifted after the European migrant crisis, which helped to set migration issues on the Norwegian agenda.

The increasing importance attached to migration issues can be seen in the language change which appears to have taken place during the European migrant crisis. When the crisis started, authorities used a language which focused extensively on refugees, but this changed over the past few years. As explained by one of my informants:

“In 2015, we talked about refugees, now we are talking about migrants or both. This is an important distinction. At first, the entire discussion was centred around saving lives. Now, an understanding of a more complex image has emerged” (Interview 3, February 2019).

The fact that migration has become a more prominent issue for the Norwegian government is reflected in the number of times government has addressed migration in speeches or op-eds in recent years. In 2011, the word migration was included in 13 speeches or op-eds produced by government officials. This number quadrupled by 2016 when migration was mentioned in 61 government speeches or op-eds.
However, the increased focus on migration was not just reflected in rhetoric, but also lead to the establishment of new bodies and coordination efforts. In 2015, the MFA established the Section for Migration, charged with coordinating the MFA’s work on migration. The section also works across agencies and cooperates with the Ministry of Justice, the Norwegian Directorate of Immigration, the Police Immigration Unit and the Immigration Appeals Board. The body has a large portfolio and actively contributes to the negotiations on the UN Global Compact for Migration, follows multi- and bilateral processes related to migration (including EU, AU and bilateral return agreements) as well as migration-relevant work with a range of international organizations (such as UNHCR, IOM, OECD, World Bank, OSCE) (Norwegian Government, 2019).

C. Common Solutions
The revised Norwegian policy is said to be focused on three main aspects: return agreements, common solutions and burden sharing, and finally donating resources. According to one of my informants these policy negotiations take place on three different platforms: a Norwegian platform, an EU platform, and a platform between European and African countries (Interview 3, February 2019). Norwegian cooperation with the EU is an essential part of Norwegian policies following the European migrant crisis. As stated by one of my informants, “The Norwegian mantra is common European solutions” (Interview 6, February 2019). This is supported by European scholar Olsen, who argues that European cooperation has “clearly marked the Norwegian approach to the issue of migration” (Olsen, 2018, p. 3).

Supporting sending and transit countries for migrants is an essential part of Norway and EU’s policy. The Norwegian white paper Common Responsibility for Common Future from 2016, clearly states that “In addition to the major contributions Norway makes to humanitarian efforts to protect people who have fled their homes, we will also help to strengthen the capacity of host and transit countries to deal with mass migration. This is in line with SDG 10, which includes a target on facilitating orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration” (Norwegian Government, 2016). European efforts to cooperate with African origin and transit are mostly filtered through the European Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF). EUTF was established at the 2015 Valletta Summit on Migration, which was a meeting that
brought together leaders from European and African countries to address the root causes for irregular migration in Africa. The fund aims to “strengthen the capacity of African countries to deal with migration and focus on job creation, conflict prevention, stabilisation measures, reintegration of returned migrants, and humanitarian assistance for particularly vulnerable migrant groups (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2018b). One of the fund’s biggest projects is focused on so-called migration management which refers to “a planned approach to the development of policy, legislative and administrative responses to key migration issues” (International Organization for Migration, 2019a). As of September 2018, Norway had donated a total of NOK 140 million to EUTF. There are no agreements stipulating that Norway has to contribute to the fund and Norway’s support to EUTF is completely voluntary. According to the Minister of Foreign Affairs Sørreide, Norwegian support to the fund is important because “Poverty, unemployment and poor governance are the root causes of migration. European countries must work with countries of origin and transit to deal with migration and refugee crises” (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2018b). EUTF is split into three regions: Sahel and Lake Chad, North Africa, and the Horn of Africa. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) are key partners in all three zones, Horn of Africa.

D. The Case of Ethiopia
Ethiopia plays a particularly important role on the Horn of Africa. In addition to being an important power on the Horn, Ethiopia is also a major country of origin, transit and destination for people in the region (Danish Refugee Council, 2016). Ethiopia hosts a large mix of people, including refugees, regular and irregular migrants, as well as people who are being trafficked. Most people arrive from neighbouring countries such as South Sudan, Somalia, Eritrea, Sudan and Yemen (International Organization for Migration, 2018b). Migrants often continue on towards Saudi Arabia or South Africa. Many also move towards Libya in hopes of reaching Europe. According to IOM, the Horn of Africa was a major source of migrant arrivals in Europe in 2015 (Reliefweb, 2016). Eritreans, Somalis and Sudanese alone made up 56,000 arrivals to Italy in 2015 (Reliefweb, 2016).
Bilateral and Multilateral Support to Ethiopia

Ethiopia is an important partner for Norway, due to its significant role in the region. According to one of my sources, Norway is particularly supportive of Ethiopia’s open-door policy for refugees and migrants (Interview 7, March 2019). Norwegian policy towards Ethiopia predominantly consists of economic support filtered through a number of different international organizations. Ethiopia is one of the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation’s (Norad) partner countries for long-term development cooperation, which means that they receive a large percentage of Norwegian ODA. In 2018 Ethiopia received over NOK 520 million in bilateral ODA, making the country the eight largest recipients of Norwegian ODA. Over half of Norway’s ODA to Ethiopia was spent on initiatives connected to education and economic development (Norad, 2019).

In addition to bilateral support to Ethiopia, Norway is a major contributor to a number of international organizations that are present in Ethiopia including the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM). In November 2018, Norway donated an additional NOK 15 million to IOM, in addition to IOM’s yearly Norwegian support of NOK 125 million (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2018a). There are no numbers that indicate exactly how Norway’s support to IOM was spent. However, we know that over half of IOM’s 2018 budget for Ethiopia was spent on projects centred around greater economic and employment opportunities, and improved migration management (International Organization for Migration, 2018a). This includes supporting the Government on policy, legislation, administrative structures, operational systems and people necessary to effectively manage borders and facilitate beneficial human mobility (International Organization for Migration, 2018a). According to one of my informants, there is pressure from the Norwegian government to focus on IOM projects that discourage migration (Interview 7, March 2019).

As with other organizations, it is difficult to locate specific information about how Norway’s contribution to EUTF is distributed. However, the Horn of Africa appears to be a major priority for the EU. According to EUTF’s latest annual report, the Horn of Africa has received considerably more money than the other regions. In 2018, EUTF allocated NOK 4.3 billion to the Horn of Africa, compared to 2.4 billion to the North of Africa and 3.5 billion to Sahel & Lake Chad (European Commission, 2019a). Ethiopia
was the country in the region which received the largest allocations in 2018. In total Ethiopia received approximately NOK 943 million from EUTF in 2018 (European Commission, 2019a). EUTF invested this money in projects concerning greater economic and employment opportunities; strengthening resilience of communities; improving migration management; and improving governance and conflict prevention (European Commission, 2019a). The largest allocations were given to projects that focuses on migration. In total, EUTF has invested NOK 440 million in a Better Migration Management Project, aimed at improving migration management in the region, and addressing smuggling of migrants within and from the Horn of Africa (European Commission, 2019a). EUTF has also invested NOK 192 million in the project Stemming Irregular Migration in Northern and Central Ethiopia (European Commission, 2019b). The project is led by the German development agency and is aimed at addressing root causes of irregular migration (European Commission, 2019b).

Focus on Root Causes and Win-Win
Root causes are a red thread throughout Norwegian policy on migration from Ethiopia. Root causes have been interpreted as being a key aspect of resolving migration issues and the term is recurring in Norwegian governmental documents and speeches. In 2017, the Minister of Foreign Affairs Børge Brende stated that “We will intensify our efforts to address the root causes of today's migration challenges, such as poverty, unemployment and poor governance (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2017). Similarly, the aim of EUTF in Ethiopia is to create economic and employment opportunities, particularly for vulnerable people, through vocational training, access to micro-finance or by creating industrial parks (European Commission, 2018a). The concept of root causes was discussed by several informants during the interviews. According to one informant, focusing on root causes is just a way of insuring that people don’t migrate to Europe.

“EU priorities include supporting them in their place of origin. They are not trying to keep this a secret. They want to keep others out of their country. Keeping people where they are is a mantra for all European governments. EU is allocating funds to keep people here” (Interview 1, February 2019).
The same informant also questioned the effectiveness of policies that focus on root causes. For instance, one informant said that

“Addressing root causes” does not mean what they want it to mean. What kinds of jobs are you creating? EU is not hiding their goals, but they are not looking at the whole picture” (Interview 1, February 2019).

Another informant drew attention to the lack of evidence-based research on limiting migration through efforts focused on root causes.

“We talk a lot about migration-limiting measures in Norwegian aid. However, there is virtually no basis for saying that anything is a migration-limiting measure. There has been too little research on this” (Interview 7, March 2019).

One informant also questioned the cause and effect aspect of focusing on root causes.

“There is a lot of focus on root causes. Money is being spent and everyone is looking for fast results. It’s easier to start with vocational training and try to make people stay…. People ask themselves what this has to do with the goal”. (Interview 6, February 2019).

In addition to concept of root causes, the idea of win-win situations is central to a lot of European and Norwegian policy regarding migration from Africa. For instance, in 2016 the Vice-President of the European Commission Federica Mogherini explained that EU had launched a new approach to migration which was based on a win-win partnership (EU External Action, 2018). Following the Valetta Summit, the EU concluded that the EU-AU partnership was "an unprecedented mechanism for cooperation between our continents, a system where we identify our common interests, our common priorities and work together on concrete, practical,
sustainable win-win solutions” (European Commission, 2018b). As one of my informants concluded “the entire EU is talking about win-win” (Interview 1, February 2019). When asked, three of my informants responded that they saw regular migration as a potential form of win-win between Ethiopia and Norway. However, it is interesting to note that one of my informants were convinced that conversations about regular migration were mostly symbolic. According to my informant,

"The Valetta negotiations didn’t only focus on irregular, but also on regular immigration. But this is probably the aspect where we have done the least progress. The North Africa meeting mentioned exchange programmes along with more scholarships and student visas. It is symbolically important to facilitate more regulated migration, but this is not the focus (Interview 3, February 2019).

The Limits of Multilateralism
As explored above, Norwegian policy is rooted in the importance of common solutions. Before illuminating why Norway has chosen to focus on multilateral policies, it is worth exploring the Norwegian government’s recent efforts to insure a return agreement with Ethiopia. Although this agreement is focused on what happens to migrants after they arrive in Norway (rather than before potential migrants leave), it is worth reviewing the Ethiopian return agreement for several reasons. Not only does it hold information about Norway’s relationship with Ethiopian authorities on migration issues, but it reveals important aspects about the limitations of Norway’s multilateral approach in Ethiopia.

Norway originally entered into a return agreement with Ethiopia in 2012, which expired in 2017. The renegotiation of the new return agreement with Ethiopian authorities was challenging and required more work than Norwegian authorities had anticipated. Norway’s initial agreement with Ethiopian authorities was a so-called assisted return program, which gave voluntary returnees opportunities for work or studies upon their return to Ethiopia. The agreement did not cover so called forced return, which refers to people who are forcibly returned to their home country. Nevertheless, the program is described as successful. For instance, one of the
informants said that, “This program worked well for five years. It was a good deal for everyone. We could feel good because it had an impact”. The program expired in 2015 as Norwegian and Ethiopian authorities were unable to agree on the conditions for an extension before the contract expired. However, Norway was able to continue to carry out so called voluntary returns through IOM’s return program. Nevertheless, Norway decided to dedicate time and resources in negotiating a new return agreement. In January 2018, Justice Minister Sylvi Listhaug travelled to Ethiopia in an attempt to give more attention to the negotiations (NRK, 2018a). The agreement became an important priority for the Norwegian government’s Ethiopia policy. As explained by one of my informants “It’s hard to think about migration in Ethiopia, without thinking about return” (Interview 5, March 2019).

Norway initially tried to base the new return agreement on Norway’s affiliation with the EU. The idea was that since Norway contributes to EUTF, Norway should be included in Ethiopia’s return agreement with the EU. Norway was unable to convince Ethiopian authorities of the logic behind letting Norway be a part of EU’s deal on returns to Ethiopia. When referring to EU employee’s work on return in Ethiopia one of my informants expressed that “They don’t have to spend a lot of energy on return. We on the other hand, are on own in a lot of the time” (Interview 7, March 2019).

Four years after the initial agreement expired, Norway was able to establish a new bilateral return agreement with Ethiopia at the beginning of 2019. After years of negotiations, the countries agreed that Norway would have its separate agreement but would follow the same procedures as the EU (NRK, 2018b). This includes forced returns, which the initial agreement did not cover. Ethiopian authorities have previously been very sceptical of forced returns and the new agreement can be seen as a big win for Norway. As recent as in 2018, Ethiopian authorities expressed that they have – “no faith in receiving people who do not want to come to their homeland” and stressed that Ethiopia does not want to force any individuals to come back against their will (Bistandsaktuelt, 2019b). The official stance on forced return could be part of the reason why Ethiopian authorities did not want to make the content of the return agreement public (Bistandsaktuelt, 2019b).

The Norwegian return agreement with Ethiopia has received a lot of attention in Norwegian media. Politicians, scholars, and a range of different aid organizations have all commented on the fact that the agreement came only weeks after Norway
donated NOK 5 million to a new Ethiopian reintegration centre. The centre will be completed in 2020 and help provide support and advice to returnees on issues such as education and work. The money is channelled through IOM and an additional NOK 5 million will be awarded to the project in 2019. Norwegian authorities have made clear that the support to the centre does not include any conditionality concerning accepting returnees from Norway, but this has done little to stifle critics. Norwegian Church Aid called it “a clear example of how Norwegian self-interests have gained access to aid” (Bistandsaktuelt, 2019a). According to Lie this is an example of an indirect form of conditionality where donors can say they support national action, while local authorities do not have to admit that they are being subjected to external pressure (Bistandsaktuelt, 2019b).

E. Summary of Norwegian Policy
This chapter has explored the specificities of Norwegian policy on migration from Africa, by relying on the case study of Ethiopia. It has given importance to three particular aspects of Norwegian policy. Firstly, most of the policy on the matter is relatively new and was developed in the wake of the European migrant crisis. Furthermore, the Norwegian policy is rooted in the importance of common solutions, particularly EU led solutions. Finally, in the case of Ethiopia, we have seen that the policy is operationalized through support for EUTF and its focus on root causes. Towards the end of the chapter, I have demonstrated that Norway’s recent bilateral agreement with Ethiopia was a last resort following Ethiopia’s refusal to accept Norway as a part of the multilateral agreement with the EU. Now that we have explored Norwegian policy relating to migration from Ethiopia, it’s time to explore the issue of identity. The following chapter aims to uncover what this Norwegian policy reveals about Norwegian identity.

5. Norwegian Identity: Doing Good Through Migration Management Support
The last chapter illuminated the Norwegian government’s focus on common European solutions in its policy on migration management. As we have seen, Norway has been a strong supporter of EUTF, both rhetorically and financially. What
can we learn from Norwegian decisionmaker’s endorsement of so-called common solutions? What can Norway’s multilateral efforts reveille about the essence of the collective Norwegian identity at large? This chapter will attempt to highlight the issue of identity through the exploration of Norway’s support for EUTF. The chapter is divided into two main sections. The first is focused on how informants conceptualized Norwegian policy in a wider context. The second section aims to analyze informants' responses by exploring how the regime of goodness has provided certain role expectations. Towards the end of the chapter, I will also consider how self-interests affects policy action by relying on Egeland’s model for interest and motivation.

A. Themes in Norwegian Policy: Doing Good with a Little Bit of Self-Interest

I. Doing Good

The Norwegian government has repeatedly stressed the importance of Norway’s support to EU led efforts on migration management. Norwegian support to these initiatives was also a major theme in some of the interviews in the study. It is interesting to note that several informants thought that Norway has a responsibility to support common solutions. One informant for instance explained Norwegian support to Ethiopian immigration policy in the following way:

“We constantly say that we support Ethiopia’s open-door policy, which gives everyone a chance. But what we actually mean is that it’s the international community who has to take care of these migrants” (Interview 7, March 2019).

Another informant stressed that Norway’s contribution to EUTF is in line with Norway’s tendency to support common solutions.

“We contributed to EUTF because we should contribute to European solutions. The norm is that Norway does so where relevant” (Interview 3, February 2019).
According to the government, Norway has an extra responsibility in these efforts due to the country’s wealth. The *Norwegian Platform on Africa* clearly states that “As one of the richest countries in the world, Norway has a responsibility to follow through on financial commitments we have undertaken in international platforms for development (Statistics Norway, 2018). Previous studies have shown that Norwegians believe that Norway should continue to provide international ODA to countries in the global south. Similar studies also show that Norwegians not only think that Norway has a responsibility to help others, but also that Norway lives up to its responsibility by distributing resources to the rest of the world. In one study, 92% of respondents either fully or somewhat agreed that Norway was ‘A rich nation which shares its resources with others through humanitarian activity and peace work’ (Dagsavisen, 2016). Norwegian wealth was a theme in several of the interviews in the study. One informant for instance mentioned how Norwegian generosity towards Ethiopian returnees had been a point of frustration for EU officials. According to the informant:

“*Norway was criticized for being too generous with the previous return program. We gave perhaps NOK 75,000 per return. The EU believed that Norway had raised the price and that the Ethiopian authorities used an agreement with Norway as a means of pressure in negotiations with others*” (Interview 2, February 2019).

In addition to financial contributions, one informant highlighted Norway’s added value as a constructive participant in international coordinated efforts.

“*Valetta and EUTF were new processes. The EU was clear on the fact that they wanted Norway to join. We always give money. And we are a constructive participant who often donates personnel and resources.*” (Interview 3, February 2019).
According to the informant, Norway’s contribution to common solutions not only lies in the country’s financial support, but also in its quality as a partner. This understanding holds that Norway adds an important aspect to common solutions, something which perhaps no other country is able to provide. The following chapter will focus more on this by exploring the concept of *goodness* within Norwegian identity and policy. However, it is worth mentioning that the basis of this theory holds that doing good is an important aspect of the Norwegian collective identity. This implies that values such as equality and solidarity are important not only in Norwegian daily life, but also Norwegian policy. One example of this is the government white paper on Norway’s collaboration with Africa, which demonstrates how Norwegian values are conceptualized by Norwegian decision makers, even in matters pertaining to international collaboration. According to the government “Peace, development, human rights, democracy, and a just international world order are fundamental values in Norwegian foreign policy. This is the starting point for strengthening political cooperation with the African continent” (Norwegian Government, 2008).

II. Tension between Doing Good and Acting in Self-Interest

We have seen that the idea of doing good appears to be a central part of Norwegian policy. However, when discussing Norwegian policy on international migration, some informants also addressed the issue of Norwegian self-interest. The following section will explore the issue of self-interest as a motivation for support to international migration management support and how this effects the Norwegian identity.

Several of the informants were quite candid about what they interpreted to be the main goal of Norwegian policy, whether it be limiting migration, achieving a political agenda, or gaining more regional power. For instance, one informant said that the decision to develop a new policy was based on the desire to limit migration to Norway.
“It was an attempt to control the situation. The external border control fell in Greece and the Schengen area was opened up. Then came Hungary. It was a Norwegian desire to limit the number of people who came in” (Interview 3, February 2019).

Several informants also emphasized the fact that Norwegian policy was driven by a political agenda. In particular, one informant questioned the government’s motives for increasing ODA to education.

“Why do we think education support, which Norway is big at, was doubled during Solberg’s first term? To help them where they are. But this only makes people more eager. You give the community an opportunity to develop. This is incredibly political. We say “Oh, this isn’t politics, we are only providing schooling. But it is political” (Interview 7, March 2019).

Whereas some informants simply stated that Norway’s policy was political, others went further in outlining how and why policy is driven by a political agenda. One informant thought that European policy on migration management was a way of insuring domestic political support. According to the informant:

“You get votes out of this type of policy. It has become a political issue. Helping people where they are is a mantra for all European governments. EU is allocating funds to keep people here” (Interview 1, February 2019).

When discussing Norway’s return agreement with Ethiopia, another informant also drew a connection between policy and domestic votes. The informant specified that:

“The Norwegian government has been clear on their support for forced return. There has been a resurgence of this. There’s been a lot of hate crime and talk
of setting fire to reception centres. It’s a golden opportunity for the government to go public in the newspaper and say … that they’ve secured a return agreement” (Interview 2, February 2019).

Whereas some informants chose to give attention to the political nature of these policies, others highlighted how Norway’s multilateral support gives the country a more important role in the international community. One informant emphasised how Norwegian support has granted Norway a seat on the board of EUTF, which has given the country influence over migration management issues despite not being part of the EU. The informant explained that:

“Recently, for example, there was a meeting between the EU and the Arab League. Norway was not part of it. Norway has no major role in these issues at a political level. However, we do have an impact on the project level when we sit on the board of EUTF. We are in Schengen and can also discuss the ideas of the forums there” (Interview 6, February 2019).

Several informants seemed to be aware of the tension between the conceptualization of Norway as a generous country that does good and the idea of Norway as country that develops policy based on self-interest. One informant highlighted the dilemma concerning using Norwegian assistance to migration management projects on the Horn of Africa to benefit a Norwegian agenda. The informant explained that:

“There is a tension concerning the fact that this money would not go to traditional aid, but things like population registers and ID cards. This is a human right for citizens, but it’s also good for identifying people” (Interview 6, February 2019).
Later in the interview, the same informant went on to expand on the difficult relationship between cause and effect of Norwegian policy.

“You can ask some critical questions about cause and effect here. It is political action in Europe, but what effect does it have in Africa? For instance, Ethiopia has these industrial parks. It can take three generations for these projects to work. After all, it is the middle class that emigrates. There are some inherent dilemmas there” (Interview 6, February 2019).

Another informant explained that it was difficult to comprehend the importance that Norwegian authorities had placed on achieving a return agreement with Ethiopia considering the relatively small number of Ethiopians Norway is looking to return. The informant even went as far as saying that Norway’s efforts were embarrassing in face of the small number of cases concerned.

“Those two things don’t actually add up. I understand why Ethiopian authorities aren’t concerned with the 30 returnees from Norway. It’s embarrassing. Look at what this country has to deal with. We have four cases. They are like “eh, we got a couple of other things we are dealing with right now” (Interview 7, February 2019).

During one of the interviews another informant made an interesting observation about why Norway often uses words such as “humane” and “solidarity” to describe its policy. The informant explained that:

“We always talk about things such as the Nobel Peace Prize, human rights and social democracy. It looks bad to be racist, if you are pretending to care about the humanitarian situation” (Interview 5, February 2019).
B. Reflections on the Regime of Goodness and Self-Interest

This study has shown that Norway decided to prioritise multilateral policies on migration in the wake of the 2012-2015 migrant crisis. In the case of Ethiopia, these policies were expressed through Norwegian support to EUTF and its work on migration management on the Horn of Africa. When discussing Norwegian policies, informants gave importance to Norway assisting Ethiopia and being a good partner. What do these findings reveal about Norwegian identity and policy at large? This section will attempt to explain how Norwegian policy is a result of Norwegian role conception as a country of goodness. It will rely on Egeland's model of interests and motives in order to describe how Norwegian identity and self-interest work together to impact Norwegian policy on migration.

i. Migrant Management Policy as a Display of the Regime of Goodness

This section will focus on how Norwegian policy is an expression of the regime of goodness. However, before doing so it is important to stress that the policy is not only a reflection of the regime of goodness, but that it also reflects things such as international commitments and domestic politics. The particular value of exploring the regime of goodness through these policies lies in the concept's ability to reveal information about the identity behind Norwegian policies. By exploring some of the main factors behind Norwegian identity we can better understand the policy decisions that are made and develop a framework for assessing potential future policies as well.

During the interviews, informants expressed that Norway is a constructive and generous partner that recognizes its responsibility to do good (Interview 2, 3 and 7). The descriptions of Norway as a country that takes responsibility appears to be in line with the government’s priorities for Africa, which highlights justice as one of its main points. According to the government “Peace, development, human rights, democracy, and a just international world order are fundamental values in Norwegian foreign policy. This is the starting point for strengthening political cooperation with the African continent” (Norwegian Government, 2008). Tvedt’s concept of the regime of goodness (Tvedt, 1995), is a useful starting point for exploring these “fundamental Norwegian values” further. As discussed in the chapter regarding the conceptual framework, the regime of goodness is based on the idea that Norway has a rich
tradition for peace, reform, development and generosity. This tradition is not the result of an innate Norwegian goodness, rather a self-image which has been constructed through reimagining the Norwegian past with a focus on Norwegian participation in international peace processes and historical aspects which confirm the self-image. If we apply the concept of the regime of goodness to the case study of migration policy in Ethiopia, it appears as if Norwegian support to migration management serves as an expression of the regime of goodness. Support to EU led solutions and financial contributions to potential migrants on the Horn of Africa are voluntary contributions that Norway has decided to make, not because they are obliged to, but because its typically Norwegian to help others. This policy serves to confirm Norway’s role as a country that does good.

The restrictions concerning Norway’s role as a country of goodness are important to understanding Norwegian policy choices regarding migration. Role theory argues that states’ foreign policy is influenced by national role conceptions (Hyde-Price, 2004). Policy is “legitimised through reference to what is considered appropriate given a particular group’s conception of itself and of what it represents” (Sjursen & Smith, 2004, p. 2). In other words, role theory helps us draw a picture of identity as a practice which legitimises certain actions and delegitimizes others. Applied to the Norwegian case study, it becomes clear that belonging to a country of goodness encourages a specific type of policies. Not supporting the EU in their efforts to address migration to Europe would be a difficult policy choice for Norwegian decisionmakers because it stands in opposition to the Norwegian role as a country that does good. Leaving the EU to deal with migration issues on its own would undermine Norway’s role as a solidary partner who acts even when they’re not legally obligated to do so. Role theory helps us understand Norway’s multilateral support for migration management by displaying how the policy confirms the Norwegian role as an upholder of good. It also demonstrates how the EU and EUTF becomes platforms for acting out the actions that are expect of the Norwegian role.

ii. Making Sense of Self-Interest within the Regime of Goodness
The section above has demonstrated how Norway’s multilateral support for migration management projects on the Horn of Africa has helped to express Norway’s role as a county that takes international responsibility and donates generously to people
who are less fortunate. However, during the interviews informants also discussed Norwegian self-interest. For instance, informants talked about how Norwegian policy was connected to the desire for immigration control, domestic political votes, or more influence within the EU. The idea that Norway has a lot to gain from multilateral policies is nothing new and has been conceptualized through the so-called Norwegian model which holds that Norway has a competitive advantage within the international system. This is recognized by current Minister of Foreign Affairs Søreide who has said that “As a relatively small country with an open economy, Norway is dependent on multilateral cooperation in order to address the challenges it faces in a range of areas, including trade, climate, migration, and peace and reconciliation” (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2018c). Similarly, Former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jonas Gahr Støre stated that «Norway isn’t a small country in the UN. In the UN we have a lot more follow-through than our size would indicate. This gives commitments and opportunities» (Støre, 2006). So how can we make sense of self-interest within the Norwegian regime of goodness?

Alexander Wendt famously said that “actors do not have a “portfolio” of interests that they carry around independent of social context; instead they define their interests in the process of defining situations” (Wendt, 1992, p. 398). Despite its extensive focus on identities, constructivism does not argue that all interests are the result of identity. Behravesh explains constructivism’s dealing with identity in the following way, “This does not mean, at least for conventional constructivists, that the national interests and material objectives of state actors are totally overlooked in the interaction and policy-making process” (Behravesh, 2011, p. 6). If we apply the idea that both identity and self-interest have an impact on policy, we allow for the possibility that Norwegian policy is a result of Norway’s role as a country that does good, as well as of self-interests. Jan Egeland has expanded on the relationship between identity and self-interests in his work on how states relate to human rights (Egeland, 1988). His work offers an interesting starting point for understanding the relationship between identity and self-interests in policy development. According to Egeland, “The human rights profile of foreign policies is largely determined by the continuous tension which is perceived to exist between a nation’s egoistic self-interest and the altruistic moral interpretive represented by such norms and principles” (Egeland, 1988, p. 19). Egeland has developed a useful figure that
reflects how aspects like norms, tradition and self-interest work together to impact foreign policy action.

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<th>Interests and Motives Model</th>
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<td>(A) Self-interest</td>
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<td>(B) Norms and principles</td>
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<td>(C) Knowledge and tradition</td>
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| National Human Rights Policy | Foreign Policy Action |

Figure 1.

The model outlines how self-interest, norms and principles, and knowledge and tradition, separately feed into the creation of national policy. These three domains inform the priorities for domestic policy, which again influences state's foreign policy and policy action. Although, the model is concerned with human rights policy in particular, the basis lends itself well to the issue of migration policy due to its ability to account for both self-interests and other aspects such as norms. In the case of Norway's decision to support migration management projects through EUTF, the model's recognition of several policy motivations helps us understand that the policy decision was a result of both norms and principles, knowledge and tradition, and self-interest. As explored in the section above, Norwegian norms and tradition are significantly influenced by the regime of goodness, which has given Norway a specific role conception. Tradition for being generous and just, and a norm of supporting multilateral efforts has impacted Norwegian policy decisions. However, as demonstrated in the model on interests and motivations, self-interests also have an impact on policy. In the case of Norway's support to EUTF, possible self-interests for contributing include the belief that these policies actually diminish migration to Norway, lead to increased influence in the EU or increase Norway's international standing in line with the Norwegian model. The way in which Norwegian self-interest
and desire for multilateral cooperation affects policy on migration is an interesting issue which is worthy of its own thorough exploration. Fierke's work on the difference between reason and cause for policy (Fierke et al., 2013) can be particularly useful in an exploration of how and why a particular policy is developed. Suggestions for future research will be discussed further in the following chapter.

This chapter has demonstrated how Norway’s multilateral support for migration management reflects Norway’s role as a country that does good. Supporting EU efforts on migration is an expression of Norwegian goodness and a way of acting out the role expected from the kindest country on earth. The model for interests and motives demonstrate that policy action is likely motivated by a combination of norms and tradition (informed by identity) and self-interests.

6. Conclusions and Suggestions for Future Research

This study has been driven by two main goals. Firstly, the desire to understand the particularities of Norwegian migration policy focused on Africa, through the case study of Ethiopia. Secondly, the wish to explore how Norwegian identity is reflected in this policy. The thesis has concluded that Norwegian policy focused on migration from Ethiopia has been fixated on multilateral initiatives, which have served as an expression for Norway’s role as a just international actors motivated by the desire to do good in the world.

More specifically, the paper has offered a review of what scholars have written about migration policy and Norwegian identity through a constructivist framework and a particular focus on role conception. The background chapter explored Norwegian migration policy in a historical framework and aimed to provide context for the policy by accounting for the European migrant crisis. Chapter 4 presented the finding from the study, which showed that Norwegian policy on migration management was developed after 2015 and is mainly manifested via support for international initiatives. In the case of Ethiopia, we see that this policy consists of support to EUTF and its focus on root causes for migration. The study holds that Norway’s recent bilateral return agreement with Ethiopia is the exception to the rule of Norwegian multilateralism and the result of failed multilateral attempts
to ensure an agreement through the EU. The second half of the paper has been concerned with exploring what Norwegian multilateral migration policy reveals about Norwegian identity. Through the help of constructivism, we have seen that Norwegian policy is an expression of the regime of goodness and the belief that Norway offers a unique and particularly good addition to international questions such as migration. The perception of Norway as a country that does good, implies expectations of carrying out actions that are perceived as just and virtuous. These role conceptions have specific implications for policy action and encourage decisionmakers to prioritize large donations to multilateral initiatives.

The findings of the study highlight the continued relevance of the regime of goodness and its important impact on Norwegian identity and policy. Although constructed and open to change, it seems unlikely that the Norwegian collective identity as a country that does good will change anytime soon. Norway is currently campaigning for a temporary seat on the United Nations Security Council. An opportunity to directly influence UN Security Resolutions could grant Norway the chance to display its role as leader of the good on the big stage. This could potentially increase the relevance of the regime of goodness even further.

Suggestions for Future Research
This thesis has given a snapshot of how Norwegian support to multilateral migration management reflects current aspects of Norwegian identity. We have seen that the regime of goodness is an important concept for Norwegian identity and, as a result, Norwegian policy. The concept of the regime of goodness was developed 15 years ago and continues to provide a useful perspective for reviewing Norwegian policy. However, the regime of goodness has likely changed over the past decade and it would be interesting to review how a potential change in the conception of goodness has affected Norwegian policy and identity. Recent discussions regarding whether the government can require countries to sign return agreements with Norway in return for ODA clearly show that what it means to be a country that does good is being contested and renegotiated. It would be interesting to follow discourses, such as the one on requirements for ODA, through a historical lens of the regime of goodness in order to examine whether the regime has changed over time. This is a question which deserves further investigation in the future.
The issue of change is not just interesting with regards to the regime of goodness, but also Norwegian identity in general. Although constructed, identities tend to be resistant to change (Aggestam, 2004, p. 84). Wendt concludes that actors define their interests through the process of defining situations (Wendt, 1992, p. 398). Aggestam adds to this understanding by claiming that identity and foreign policy interests can be redefined as a consequence of issues internal as well as external to the state (Aggestam, 1999, p. 85). Will the European migrant crisis have any long-term effects on Norwegian identity? Will increasing support to EU solutions imply that Norwegians identify more closely with the EU? On the one hand, there is an increasing process of Europeanization among domestic actors and policies (Aggestam, 2004) which are likely to impact Norwegian identity in some respect. However, Norway is said to have “stubbornly held on to the idea of separateness from the community of European states” (Ingebritsen & Larson, 1997, p. 208). It is possible that increased policy cooperation with the EU will help to further separate the Norwegian identity, rather than bring it closer to the EU. These are interesting questions, which this study has been unable to examine, but that deserve further investigation. Other queries that the thesis has been unable to address is the issue of whether there is a causal relationship between identity and policy, as well as the relationship between bilateral and multilateral assistance. Can we claim that Norwegian identity cause policy? What is the relationship between bilateral and multilateral ODA? In what instances is one form of assistance preferred instead of the other? These are just some of the remaining questions which should be addressed in the future.

Exploring questions concerning aspects such as shifts within the regime of goodness, changes in the Norwegian understanding of what it means to be a country that does good, and the Norwegian identity’s relationship with the EU can potentially reveal important information about the future of Norwegian identity and policies. This understanding can be used to better comprehend and predict Norwegian foreign affairs priorities in general and migration policies in particular.
7. Appendix

Interview Guide

Interview Guide – Spring 2019

❖ Questions for all informants

1. What priorities shape Norwegian migration policies for Africa?
   A. Why has Norway chosen to focus on these particular priorities?

2. What conventions and agreements inform Norwegian migration policies?

3. How does Norwegian migration priorities differ from that of other countries?
   A. What is distinctly Norwegian about them?

4. How do you interpret the government’s focus on the following aspects in respects to migration from Africa?
   A. Humane policy
   B. Common solutions
   C. Win-win solutions

5. To what extent do you think Norwegian values are reflected in Norwegian migration policies?
   A. How so?

❖ Potential additional questions for informants with relevant area of expertise

Informant 1

1. Why is the Norwegian government prioritising a return agreement with Ethiopia?

2. What principles are guiding Norway’s return agreement negotiation with Ethiopia?

3. Can you talk a little bit about the concept of voluntary return?
   A. Why this is a priority for Norway?

4. The government refers to both irregular and illegal migration. How do you understand these concepts?
   A. What separates them?
   B. Why refer to both?
Informant 2

1. How does the government attempt to operationalize Norwegian migration priorities and objectives in Ethiopia?

2. What is the role of human rights in Norway’s migration related initiatives in Ethiopia?

3. Do you have an understanding of what the government is referring to when they say that they would prefer for the IOM to advice and not to be a normative organisation?

Informant 3

1. What were the Norwegian priorities during the negotiation for the Valetta Summit on Migration?

2. Why were these issues prioritized?

Informant 4

1. How does the government attempt to operationalize Norwegian migration priorities and objectives in Ethiopia?

2. The government refers to both irregular and illegal migration. How do you understand these concepts?
   
   A. What separates them?
   
   B. Why refer to both?

Informant 5

1. What priorities appear to be shaping EU policy with respect to migration from Africa?

2. How is EU attempting to operationalize these priorities and objectives in Ethiopia?

3. Have you noticed a difference between European states in regard to their bilateral migration policy efforts in Ethiopia?

4. What are your impressions of Norwegian migration policy?
   
   A. Have you noticed any particular themes in Norwegian policy?
8. References


Norwegian Ministry of Justice and the Police. (2009). *Norway’s refugee and migration policy in a European perspective*

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