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CONFLICT AND THE CRISES IN SOMALIA

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Declaration

I, Cabdi Hiis Udan, declare that this thesis is a result of my research investigations and findings. Sources of information other than my own have been acknowledged and a reference list has been appended. This work has not been previously submitted to any other university for award of any type of academic degree.

Signature……………………………….

Date…………………………………………

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Thesis Abstract

This thesis explores causes of the conflict in Somalia, a country that has experienced highly catastrophic conflict and continues to be in perpetual state of violent conflicts since 1991 its central state has collapsed. By combining certain conflict, theoretical frameworks the thesis seeks to understand the conflict in Somalia, its drivers, and role of the clan and its manipulation. The data in this thesis is collected through qualitative methods of interviews, participant observation, focus group and key informant interviews. The thesis finds that a number of causes and driver of the conflicts in Somalia as the colonial legacy, resources competitions, elites manipulation of clan and leadership and institutions failures.

While these factors fuel the conflict current theoretical conceptions, especially primordialist and instrumentalist fail to capture the conflict as they center on the nation of identity meanwhile the conflict in Somalia is a multifaceted one. Therefore, to better capture conflict in the country, an integrated and more domesticated theoretical conception that have the capacity to consider different elements in the conflict would be needed to advance our understanding of the country`s conflict.

1.0. Introduction

1.2. Statement of the problem

In early 1991, Somalia`s Mohamed Siyaad Bare's regime that ruled Somalia more than two decades was overthrown by rebel groups of Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM), United Somali Congress (USC), and Somali National Movement (SNM) (Menkhaus 2008). However, the rebel groups turned against each other, a full-scale civil war emerged, and the state collapsed. Since then the country has resisted initiatives to restore the collapsed central state and became fragmented into various autonomous political enclaves and local administration. While political entities of Somaliland and Puntland enjoy a relative peace (Menkhaus 2009). Despite the revival of a federal state in 2004 and the subsequent deployment of African Peacekeeping Missions (AMISOM), protracted violent conflict is rampant (Gaas, 2014) Especially, South Central Somalia continue in the circle of vicious and perpetually violent conflicts. The fact that the country faces not only one form of conflict but a series of separate but interwoven conflicts that feed one another leading to further polarization and hence continued instability of the country (Gaas, 2018). Recently because of the rise of Al-Shabaab Somalia has been subjected to increased international scrutiny in the form of "war against terrorism". From a theoretical perspective, Somalia's failure and subsequent difficulties of resolving its protracted conflict challenge theories in this regard ((Menkhaus 2003). Firstly, unlike many other African countries, Somalia has no religious, linguistic or ethnic divides that primordial theories suggest leading to violent conflict along these dividing lines and subsequently to a civil war. Secondly, even if the conflict can partially be explained by instrumentalist theoretical model centering on manipulation of elites yet such explanation is insufficient and fails to capture country`s conflicts that despite the more than 15 attempts to

rebuild the central Somali state continue to hinder current internationally recognized Somalia Federal Government (SFG) expand its control over the country. This thesis aims at understanding conflict in Somalia by disaggregating it to better understanding it and its drivers. In doing so, it distinguished different types of conflict in the country rather than following the more traditional approaches to viewing it as clan conflict (see Lewis, 1998). Therefore, this thesis aims contributing to new knowledge on the conflict in Somalia that is often misperceived and with that advances ways of better inform state building and peacebuilding efforts and policies towards the country by interested actors.

1.1. Research objectives and questions

The overall aim of this thesis is to contribute to our conception of violent conflict in Somalia by advancing our understanding of violent conflict and the role of the clan in Somalia. In order to so, it attempts to:

1. To understand the violent conflict in Somalia

       i.   What types of conflict exist in Somalia?

      ii.   What explains the persistence of the conflict in the country?

2. **To** understand the role of the clan and its manipulation in the conflict

       i.   What role does clan play in Somalia's conflict?

      ii.   When does clan become a major factor inducing conflict in Somalia?

1.2. Thesis Structure

The thesis is divided into seven chapters that introduce and state the study`s problem, provide background, methodological choice and theoretical framework to it and present its overall findings and conclusion. The first chapter introduces the thesis, states the problem, outlines research objectives and questions and outlines the thesis structure. The second provides

contextual background to the study. The third chapter provides study`s theoretical framework, while the fourth details study methodology, and methods and area of study. Chapter 6 is the findings and discussion of thesis while chapter 7 presents the conclusions and the recommendations of the study. References are listed in the end.

2.0.   Background

2.1.   Introduction

This chapter provides the necessary background to study. Its importance lies in the fact that it gives a context to the study by describing the country, its society, the conflict and the crises so that the eventual ensuing of the study on the conflict and its drivers in the post-state collapse era of the country is better framed in the chapters that follow it. This chapter outlines Somalia and its society, colonial legacy, the conflict, state collapse and civil war.

2. 2. Somali Society

Somalis are spread throughout the Horn of Africa, and especially they inhabit Northeastern regions of Kenya, the Ogaden region (Ethiopia`s region 5), Somalia, and in Djibouti (Lewis 2002). Somalis share a common ancestor, ethnicity, language, religion, and culture characteristics that make them a truly unique nation-state not found elsewhere in the African continent. Despite this, clan determines sociopolitical division and loyalties in the society (Lewis and Institute 1999, Ssereo 2003), 2013; Lewis 1961). However, while the most fundamental division of the society (Lewis 1961, 1957) is based on clan, and Islam and territory based identities and social organizations are present into the present day in the society and has historically played such role in the structure of the Somali society (Lulling 2006).

2.3.   Colonial partition of the Somali peninsula and its consequences

Somalia is a former colony state in the Horn of Africa that bordered the Indian Ocean to the East, the Gulf of Aden to North, Djibouti to Northwest, Ethiopia to West and Kenya to Southwest. Before colonies set foot on Somali soil, much of Somali society where nomads,

moving around freely without border segregation and chasing pastorals to find enough grazing for their livestock (Leeson , 2007). There was no central authority, but society had a clan-based structure to govern themselves and traditionally solve their dispute. People used to move freely within Somali territory (a greater Somalia) and sometimes beyond. However, the imperial adventures in the Somali territories in the Horn the fate of the current crises and misfortunes of Somalis in the horn was sealed (Hasci and Waldron, 1995). British, French and Italian colonies came to Somalia and divided among themselves Somali territories in the Horn of Africa. It was around 1880s when some European countries had begun the competition to colonize Africa, but their interest in Somalia started early in 1839. The British Empire which ruled Aden city in Southern Yemen had seen that the importance to have a base at the other side of the Gulf of Aden to protect the passage of the Red Sea Navy vessels going to India. Thus, British colony's move to Somalia had started 1875 when it captured the port of Berbera to govern the Gulf (Hamilton, 1967). The competition was joined by France, which had a conflict of interest with England, and controlled Djibouti. On the other hand, Italy which was controlling Libya joined the race over the Red Sea and took the port of Asab, Eritrea, then moved to Southern Somalia whose ports were vulnerable. To avoid dispute and conflict among Colonizers, they had held a conference in Berlin, Germany in 1884-1885 and had divided Somalia into five territories. Not only they had set boundaries between those five territories but gave names as well (Barnes , 2007). By the year of 1895, France was controlling Djibouti, Italy was controlling some of the central and southern regions, and England was ruling Northern regions. Sayyid Muhammed Abdille Hassan, a religious leader, has arrived Berbera, returning from Mecca (Kakwenzaire, 1985). Sayyid Muhammed had confronted British officers at Port of Berbera for paying tax and later became as the leader of an uprising organization against European colonialists. Sayyid Muhammed, also called Mad Mullah of Somaliland by British colony, had prepared up to 5000 Dervish soldiers. Afterward, he has declared a war against British colony's administration at

Berbera. British troops suffered severe casualties, destruction of properties and defeats from all the areas they met with Dervish. In 1900, England contracted with the king of Abyssinia Menelik for fighting along with British against Sayyid Muhammed and his paramilitaries (Hoehne 2010). Therefore, on March 24, 1900, Abyssinian troops led by a British officer went out Harar city and met with Dervish militants at Jigjiga town in Ogaden region, but after an intense fight, Dervish had defeated Abyssinian army (Kakwenzaire, 1985). After failing to uproot Sayyid Muhammed and his Dervish troops, England had tried to open a third front against Dervish and has agreed with Italy that was ruling Hobyo so they can attack from the South, but this plan was also ineffective to halt Dervish activities. When Dervish war cost so high to England and her all attempts to defeat Dervish ended up unsuccessful, finally, on October 1919, British Parliament had agreed to confront with the Dervish as a strong state and passed a bill to attack from the air, land, and sea. After that, January 21, 1920, the British air force has begun strikes, targeting Dervish bases, and has made sea and ground attacks consecutively (Killingray, 1984). Dervish became the first Liberation Front, which was attacked from the air, but dissolved a year later after their leader Sayid Mohamed has deceased in Imey, Ogaden region. Nearly the end of World War II, confrontations had occurred between British and Italian colonies over controlling Southern Somalia, so the region has shifted hands between them a couple of times. France did not go beyond Djibouti nor did it help England when it was struggling with severe battles against Dervish warriors. Furthermore, British colony had faced strong resistance from Jubbaland as well as Northern Frontier District (NFD) and had lost more pivotal officers than Dervish war and many soldiers (Turton, 1972). The resistance faced by British soldiers from the Southern regions in Somalia were not equal nor organized as that of Dervish in Northern regions, but led by clan leaders from the same tribe of Dervish leader Sayid Mohamed Abdulle Hasan. Those who led armed resistance against British in Southern Somalia were Ahmed Magan, the Sultan of Aji Sultanate and Haji Abdirahman

Mursal (Turton, 1972). These two leaders without cooperation had separately fought against British. British colony had used militias from Harti and Mareehan sub-clans of Darood and mercenaries from Uganda, South Africa, and India to defeat Ogaden warriors in Jubbaland and NFD regions (Moyse-Bartlett, 2012). Britain finally handed over Jubbaland to Italy in 1926, but continue to control NFD and had set up its biggest base in Wajir town. After enormous casualties caused by resistance rebellion (Ogaden Warriors), in 1926 British colony gave up Jubbaland and handed over to Italy (Lewis, 1963).   Colonial forces divided between divided Somali territories between them into Britain, Italy, and France into Italian Somaliland, British Somaliland, French Somaliland, the Ogaden, and Northern Frontier District (NFD)-   It is worth noting that a referendum from the people of NFD requested to join their Somali brothers, but England ignored it and the United Nations has abstained (Mahmoud, 2008).

2.4.Somali Youth League and the independence of Somali Republic

In the meantime, the first Somali political party formerly known as Somali Youth Club (SYC) was created in Mogadishu in 1943 however it changed later its name to Somali Youth League (SYL) which played a significant role in Somalia's process to independence during the 1950s and 1960s (Hassig and Latif 2007). 13 members established the party. 12 out of 13 founders were from the Italian Somaliland in the south of the country while only one member was the Isaaq-clan originating from British Somaliland. In later years, the members of the party increased, and the few educated Somalis and the police officers became members of the party like the rest of the population highly regarded their contributions. However, the early mentioned religious leader Sayid Mohamed Abdulle Hassan (The Mad Mullah) who fought against both the Italian and Britain colonial powers during the first two decades of 20 century influenced the most founding members of the party (Mukhtar 1989). Five years after its establishment, in 1948 SYC became fully functioning and structured political party and elected Abdillahi Isse as its

leader and the party was renamed Somali Youth League. Although there was a challenge to create only one party in this vast country, which was colonized by different and sometimes waring powers, SYL, succeeded to open local offices in all parts of the country except Djibouti which was colonized by France. It was not an easy task regarding politically and logistically to control such expanded region; however, the party overcame all such challenges, as all Somalis had during this time only two goals, which were Independency and Unity in all Somali territories and these were the sole objectives of SYL. Despite the fact that the region was colonized, different powers including Ethiopia with different agendas, however, all Somalis had the only goals mentioned above, very contrary to the current situation of the country were each small region within the country prefers its local authority than a powerful central government. Although SYL was very popular in British Somaliland in the Northern region, however some local parts were created in this part of the country such as Somali National League (SNL), which was supported by the dominant Isaaq clan, and United Somali Party (USP), which was associated with the all clans from the British Somaliland except the Isaaq clan. During the last two decades or so before the dependency of the country, there were historically significant events for the formation of the future Somali state in all the five Somali territories. In 1949, United Nations granted Italy trusteeship of Italian Somaliland. British Somaliland remained a protectorate of Britain until 26. June 1960 when the region became independent (Mukhtar 2003). In 1954 Ogaden, which was controlled by Britain, became part of Ethiopia without the consultation of the population and in later years, Northern Frontier District (NFD) became a part of Kenya. Britain controlled both territories and both were given to the neighbouring countries without the will of the inhabitants. Djibouti remained to be colonized by France until its independence in 1977 (Mukhtar 2003).

July 1st, 1960, Aden Abdullah Osman (Aden Adde) became the first president of the Republic of Somalia. The Somali government's main objective was to get back the missing Somali

regions to put back together what was known as 'Greater Somalia'. The ambition of newly elected Somali government and the will of its citizens drove the only four years old government to fight Ethiopia over Ogaden region in 1964 (Makinda, 1982). Ogaden contains the largest portion comparing the other missing Somali regions. The same year, Kenya, a one-year-old state, and Ethiopia had signed a joint military and security cooperation agreement. The conflict between Somalia and Ethiopia had calmed down in 1965, but forces for Somali freedom fighters have continued operating in all three missing Somali regions, Ogaden, NFD, and Djibouti. While during the Cold war Africa has fallen trap, leaders of Somalia were aligned to the United States and NATO and avoided to have a meaningful relationship with the Soviet Union thought they were getting some aid from Moscow. On Jun 10th, 1967, a free election was held in Somalia, and former prime minister Abdi Rashid Ali Sharmarke was elected as a president of Somalia and Mohamed Ibrahim Igal as a prime minister. Unfortunately, police officer assassinated Sharmarke on October 15th, 1969, in Las-Anod while he was paying a visit and accompanying relief supplies (Darwin, 2011). The motivation of the killer is still mysterious. Six days later October 21st, 1969, the military commander Gen. Mohamed Siad Barre came to power with a bloodless coup and had arrested the Prime Minister Egal and some of his cabinets. Barre has also dissolved the parliament (Darwin, 2011). Since Barre had worked with both Italian and British colonies and was well informed about Somalia's relationship with the United States, he had shifted right away to align with Moscow by the time he came to power (Payton, 1981). Somali Revolutionary and Socialist Party were announced in the country, and banners with pictures of Stalin and Mohamed Siad Barre were hanged on the streets. The first step that has been taken by the revolutionary government was to take over all foreign-owned industries followed by establishing a powerful military, improving education, as well as infrastructure and writing Somali Alphabets. In first January 1973, the military government announced that the country would use Somali writing while a foreign language was used in the country before this

time. That resulted In August 1974 an adoption of a rural campaign called 'Bar ama Baro', teach or learn which involved more than 20,000 teachers (Warsame, 2001). Within a year, the government has reduced by 85% of those who do not read or write. Then, the Revolution had turned to focus on the fight against poverty and to reduce or eliminate the country's dependence on foreign aids. Modern factories were established in the country by Barre's regime to process the natural resources that the country is rich in including agriculture, livestock, and fish. By 1980s, Somalia was exporting goods that worth millions of dollars and became one of the view Industrialized countries in Africa. On the other hand, the Socialist regime has built the most powerful military in the Horn of Africa within five years in power. While enjoying tremendous public support, the Barre's government imposed a new law called 'Family law', but Muslim scholars and Islamic clerics have opposed and condemned the new law, claiming that the law is conflicting with Islamic Sharia. The government responded by executing 10 of the most prominent clerics in Somalia at that time (Sage, 2001). The killing of those religious clerics has created waves of public anger and suspicions about the government's future steps, but no one was dared to express in public. On the other hand, the pursuit of getting back other missing Somali regions, the revolutionary government has tried to resolve diplomatically. Somalia tried to convince Ethiopia and Kenya that an African country couldn't colonize another African brother. When the military regime exhausted finding a diplomatic solution for the missing regions, they turned to use force. Afterward, units of Somali military forces have crossed into Ogaden region in late 1976, and in June 1977 waged full-scale war (Halliday, 1977). Siyad Barre also cut ties with Moscow and ousted all Soviet diplomats and military advisers in Somalia, and ordered them to leave the country within 24 hours (NYTimes, 1981). On the other hand, he renewed the interrupted diplomatic relationship with Washington DC. Somali National Army surprisingly had overrun the Ethiopian military within view months and got close to Addis Ababa, the Ethiopian capital after capturing the entire Ogaden region. Barre's behavior

angered Moscow and aligned with Ethiopia by giving full military and diplomatic support and has accused Barre as an aggressor. In late 1977, Russia, Cuba, North Korea, Libya and South Yemen had joined the fight along with Ethiopia (David, 1979). Israel has also aligned with Ethiopia by providing experts including pilots, cluster bomb and selling arms (Lefebvre, 1996). The anticipation of Somali leaders was to receive similar help from the United States and NATO but did not get enough support to match Warsaw Pact. Afterward, Siyad Barre was forced to withdraw his troops from Ogaden region, since SNA could not defend Ogaden region from one of the superpowers, Soviet Union, and its allies. Some of Somali military commanders and their forces, and WSLF militants refused to comply with Barre's order and insisted to fight, but later either convicted to death or sentenced life in prison for disdaining. When Somali Army pulled back from Ogaden, frustrated angered higher rank military officers had organized a coup to overthrow president Barre, most of them belonged to Majeerteen clan. Their plan was to conduct the coup on April 12th, 1978, but hasted on April 9th, fearing that someone might leak. The attempt has failed because, government was well informed and ready for them. Col. Abdullahi Yusuf, the mastermind of the failed coup was in Gedo region when the coup attempt was taking place, and escaped to Kenya after he found out the coup failure (Elmi & Barise, 2006). Among the coup planners were Gen. Mohamed Said Morgan (Siyad Barre' son-in-law) and Col. Mohamed Sheikh Osman, known as Cirro (Siyad Barre' nephew). Later after the coup attempt failed, Gen. Morgan was rewarded a higher position for leaking and Col. Cirro was one of 17 army officers and politicians that the regime has publicly executed for the attempt. After the coup attempt, the Revolutionary government has used excessive force to punish spoilers and their sympathizers (Elmi & Barise, 2006). Since then, Barre's regime has started losing public confidence day after day. During, September 1978, Col. Abdullahi Yusuf has announced first armed militia against Barre's regime and named Somali Salvation Front (SSF), and got hideout base in Ethiopia. Three years later, 1981, SSF had changed its name to Somali Salvation

Democratic Front (SSDF) (Cardoso, 2016). One year after the failed coup, parliamentary election has conducted by the military government, but all elected members were from ruling party, Somali Socialist and Revolutionary Party (SSRP). In February 1982, Barre has visited Washington to reduce international pressure and released from prison Mohamed Ibrahim Egal, former Prime Minister (upi, 1982). At the same time, he has arrested other politicians including his vice president, Ismael Ali Obokar, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Omar Arte Qalib, Major General Omar Hajji Masale and Dr. Mohamed Aden Sheikh. Thereafter, more oppositions had formed to overthrow Barre's regime. April 6th, 1981, a second Front, Somali National Movement (SNM) was founded in London, and the former prime minister of Somalia Ibrahim Haji Egal and other politicians from his tribe were the leading members of this Front. SNM also established base in Ethiopia that eagerly needed to undermine the ability of Somalia. In July 1982, SSDF militants supported by Ethiopian troops have captured Balanbale and Goldogob towns to cut off the flow of Northern to Southern Somalia (KismaayoNews, 2018). Meanwhile, Somalia government had responded aggressively and committed genocide against residents of Mudug region. Most of the government victims were SSDF sympathizers.

In 1986, East African countries formed a new intergovernmental organization, which deals with drought and development, especially trade between countries. Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGAD) was founded in Djibouti by Somalia, Djibouti, Kenya, Ethiopia, Uganda, and Sudan. To implement the foundations of IGAD, hostile countries like Somalia and Ethiopia must reconcile. Therefore, Somalia and Ethiopia have come to agree to stop violence, and move away their arms 10km from the Ogaden colonial border, and at the same time end supporting militias against each other. On May 23rd, 1986, Siad Barre has suffered a severe car accident and was taken to Saudi Arabia for treatment (Mkinda, 1991). When his health condition was improved, he returned to Mogadishu and immediately has held

an election in which he only competed himself. Since Barre was the only runner, voting cards were written 'Yes' or 'No'. After that, election committee has announced that Barre has received 99% of 'Yes' votes, while 1% has voted 'No'. This insincere clam was meant that Barre must stay in power, and the following day, he was inaugurated as president of Somalia for the upcoming seven years. Government's human rights abuse and violence against its civilians have dramatically increased. Then, Human Rights Watch has accused the Military government persecutions beyond humanity. Afterward, United States cut its support to Somalia (Lefebre, 1996). May 27th, 1988, SNM has encapsulated Burao city in Togder region and made a secret uprising in Hargeysa as well. Barre's regime ordered air raids upon Burao and parts of Hargeysa in which SNM fighters were operating, but Somali pilots rejected this. Lastly, Barre government hired South African mercenaries and did carry out air bombardment (Ahmed, 1999). Two more rebel groups, USC and SPM, were established by Hawiye and Absame respectively.

Even though Ethiopia and Somalia have agreed to stop supporting militias against one and other, yet Ethiopia has continued sheltering all Somali rebel groups. On the other hand, SSDF has discontinued a little while after Ethiopia arrested its leader Col. Abdullahi Yusuf. SPM, the wing led by Ahmed Omar Jes has started a guerrilla war against in Bay and Bakool regions, while the wing led by Bashir Bililiko made operations in Lower and Middle Juba. USC also opened frontline in Hiran, Galgadud and Mudug regions. Early 1989, guerilla wars that have different motives were taking place in many areas of the country, but had one common target, to overthrow Barre (Compagnon, 1990). On the other hand, Somalia used to support rebel groups against Ethiopia's Derg Regime, such as Ethiopian Peoples Liberation Front (EPLF), West Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) and Somali Abo Liberation Front (SALF). Those Ethiopian rebels that Somalia has Supported did not hinder the Derg Regime led by Mengistu Haile Mariam. While most of Somalia regions were in a flame, on July 14th, 1989, the

government has arrested Abdirashid Sheikh Ali Sufi, the son of a famous Sheikh in Somalia. The following day, hundreds of angered protesters filled up streets of part of Mogadishu. Then, the government used live bullets to protestors that caused the death of 9 civilians and dozens of others were injured. At the same time, countless persons were arrested (KismaayoNews, 2017). The following day, security forces have gathered from Mogadishu 47 people (most of them from northern Somalia), and then collectively executed at Al-Jazeera beach. The government has organized the regional football matches which have not been held for a couple of years, because of the ongoing violence around the country. Since Barre's regime was not controlling most of the country, they held a football match at Mogadishu Stadium and collected players from Mogadishu districts, pretending that they are from the 18 regions that Somalia consists of. The government aimed to send a message that says the capital is stable and deceive the eyes of the International community. At the opening ceremony, while president Barre was entering Stadium to participate watching, the crowds have booed to him, and his guards responded with firing their rifles. As a result, dozens of people had lost their lives, and many others were injured. As signaled by this incident in 1989, the regime become increasingly unpopular among Somalis, and the political, social and economic crises of the country gathered momentum-

2.5. The civil war

In August 1990, SNM, SPM and USC rebel groups met in Ethiopia and agreed on an operation plan to wage a final assault to oust the Barre's regime. By December, a social uprising erupted and the government resorted to bombardment, which caused the death and the injury of hundreds of civilians and destroyed lot of properties. By this time, the country political and economic downfall was visible. Meanwhile, a group of politicians self-styled as Manifesto attempted to save the country from chaos and not to fall apart, and civilians were expecting from them that at least they could maintain some political stability in the country(Adam 2008).

In early stages when conflict spread over Mogadishu, Manifesto had taken a mediating position. Therefore, they met with both Siyad Barre and some key rebel leaders to halt the battle, but it was believed that they were not honest about the process to be successful. One of the reason was that Manifesto did not want Siyad Barre to stay in power nor did they want one of the rebel leaders to replace him. The greed ambition of Manifesto has driven the country into a nightmare and later turned catastrophic (ibid).

As in early January 26th, 1991, Siyad Barre has fled from his palace in Mogadishu, from which he used to rule Somalia 21 years (Nytimes, 1991) to his hometown, Garbaharey. The national Somali National Army (SNA) disintegrated, and state collapsed. By January 27th, 1991, one day after when Siyad Barre fled from Mogadishu, the Manifesto group had met in Djibouti, and within two days appointed Ali Mahdi Mohamed as president of Somalia without informing or consulting rebel leaders. Furthermore, 29 January 1991, Manifesto hastily formed a government and appointed Ali Mahdi Mohamed as president, which has created new mistrust between all factions and drove the state into more profound turmoil. Thus, the level of frustration and distrust between political leaders, rebel groups, clan elders and even ordinary citizens went at the peak. All government institutional buildings throughout the country were looted, including, military warehouses and bases, water and power stations, schools and universities, museum and libraries, clinics and hospitals, factories and government offices including presidential palace and ministry building (Sahnoun, 1994). On the other hand, Ali Mahdi and his Manifesto government have announced that the Somali National Army must hand over their weapons to rebel militias. This order has caused to Somali National army to disintegrate and join their clan rebels to get protection from other tribal militias who might target them. Mogadishu inhabitants have started to flee and escape from a predicted civil war (Sahnoun, 1994). Soon Siyad Barre's topple, politicians and rebel leaders have competed to the

throne, and that put the country into a deeper mess. March 3rd, 1991, the face of Somali conflict has shifted to an absolute civil war. USC has surprisingly attacked their SPM counterpart base in Afgoye, and then later took over the rest of Lower Shabelle and Bay regions from SPM (Bakonyi, 2009). After that, the bloody civil war between Darood and Hawiye tribes has begun. Jun 1991, a peace conference facilitated by the International community was held in Djibouti for Somalia's warring factions, but couldn't reach a ceasefire agreement. July 1991, another round of peace conference attended by Manifesto group and other politicians from the toppled government was held in Djibouti, but again unwisely elected Ali Mahdi Mohamed as a two years interim president and Omar Arte Qalib as prime minister by undermining rebel leaders' capabilities (Adam, 1992). The most prominent leader in Mogadishu, USC rebel leader Gen. Mohamed Farah Aided has opposed Manifesto government and disclosed that he would not accept a president other than himself. At that time, Gen. Aided was controlling the presidential palace in Mogadishu, and that has forced Ali Mahdi to make his presidential base in North of Mogadishu, where his main Abgal clan's men, Hawiye sub-clan has dominated.

While political unrest and civil war spread out through Southern Somalia, on the North, SNM has organized the Northern tribal conference at Burao and formed Somaliland administration. May 18th, 1991, clan delegates have elected Mr. Abdirahman Tur as president of Somaliland and later claimed that they have seceded from the rest of Somalia. Somaliland's secession was caused by the distrust that SNM had Manifesto government (Samantar, 2009). On the other hand, Darood sub-clans were so divided and had different interest. But, Late March 1991, the situation forced them to come together to have a dialogue and resolve their unhealthy relationship. Finally, they have agreed to set aside their differences, and they had formed a Darood coalition to confront Hawiye. Early April 1991, Darood coalition militias have waged

war against Hawiye militias in Bay and Lower Shabelle regions, and within ten days have reached Mogadishu outskirt (Bakonyi, 2009). Then, the bell has rung in the ears of Hawiye political leaders and clan elders. Afterward, they set their differences aside and have organized Hawiye militias to defend Mogadishu. After few days of the intense fight, Hawiye militias overrun Darood militias and captured Kismaayo (Bakonyi, 2009). Kismaayo was hosting that time thousands of Darood refugees who have escaped early conflict in Mogadishu. Much of the people who have fled from Kismaayo have settled in refugee camps in Kenya. Late May 1991, Darood political leaders and clan elders had met in Dhobleey and agreed to operate with SPM umbrella. It is worth noting that SPM was belonged to Absame sub-clan of Darood, so the rest of Darood sub-clans have accepted to work under the umbrella of SPM (Lefebvre, 1992). In late June 1991, Darood militias led by Col. Jees and Gen. Morgan have recaptured Kismaayo from Hawiye militias led by Gen. Aided, and early July extended to Barawe (Lefebvre, 1992).

After Hawiye militias lost Barawe, Gen. Aided went back to Mogadishu to finish an unfinished task, and to put an end Ali Mahdi's claim for the presidency. November 19th, 1991, a war broke out between Hawiye sub-clans, Habargidir and Abgal led by Gen. Aided and Ali Mahdi respectively, and continued four consecutive months. Thus, Mogadishu was ruined by fighting militias and has separated by a 'green line' (Menkhaus, 2003). The segregation of the city has caused friends and relatives not to visit one and other if they live different side. On the other hand, the Darood in Kismaayo had soon developed a conflict of interest after knowing that Hawiye is at war with themselves. Afterward, war broke out between Absame militias and Majeerteen militias led by Col. Jees and Gen. Morgan respectively. After that, the second day of the conflict, rest of Darood militias have joined Majeerteen militias and defeated Absame militias (Menkhaus, 2003). The Absame militias led by Col. Jees had regrouped outside

Kismaayo and set bases. After many attempts to recapture Kismaayo, Darood militias led by Gen. Morgan had finally stormed Absame militias on February 22nd, 1992 (Lefebvre, 1992). Therefore, Col. Jees has escaped to Lower Shabelle to join Gen. Aided, who also was fighting with Mr. Ali Mahdi. On the other hand, close to 3000 soldiers who were loyal to Siyad Barre, but led by Gen. Mohamed Hashi Gani have attacked Aided militias from Gedo and took over Baidao and Balidoogle military airbase. Meantime, new alliances based on interest were formulated, and it seemed that faction leaders were shifting from tribal based coalitions to a clan-based alliance. February 27th, 1992, Gen. Aided (Habargidir), Col. Jees (Absame), Abdi Warsame Isaaq (Dir) and Shatigudud (Raxanweyn) had formed a new alliance, SNA (Clarke, 1992). They also carried out propaganda for their new coalition through Radio Mogadishu which was in the hand of Aided to scare their opponents. March 1992, SNA militias had forced Siyad Barre to cross Kenyan border after defeating his army in battle and chasing them till Bulohawo. At the same time, SNA militias have captured Kismaayo from Gen. Morgan and forced him as well to escape to Kenya (Menkhaus, 2003).

2.6. The UN intervention

After one year of chaos, millions of people suffered starvations. The news of the starvation reached out the world, and the United Nations saw the situation that it needed intervention. After the United Nations saw that the situation deteriorated day after day and the agonizing situation of the civilians, the Security Council imposed Somalia a general and complete embargo on arms deliveries through resolution 733 but the United Nations lacked to implement the arms embargo, and up to date the illegal arms pour into Somalia. The Security Council also asked the United Nations general-secretary late Boutros Boutros-Ghali to appoint a coordinator for humanitarian operations. Because of this, the secretary-general appointed Ambassador Hussein Sahnouni to be the United Nations coordinator for the relief efforts and sent him to

Mogadishu. After Sahnouni came to Mogadishu, he discussed the warlords Ali Mahdi and Aided fighting in Mogadishu to make cease-fire for the humanitarian efforts to reach the people in need. In 1992 after the most powerful warlords in Mogadishu Ali Mahdi and General Aidid agreed, the United Nations decided to send 500-armed UN securities personal to protect aid coming through the port of Mogadishu, but the United States rejected to pay the cost of the operation (Hagmann and Hoehne 2009). Then in April 1992 the Security Council decided the deployment of 50 unarmed military observers to watch the food shipments in Mogadishu. After this operation failed, due to the unwillingness and that the warlords did not respect the operation a new approach was vital. The fact that many Somalis died every day for famine, the secretary-general of the United Nations Boutros Boutros-Ghali informed the United Nations Security Council that the situations are beyond peacekeeping operation and the Security Council must decide to deal the problem with a more effective measure. In August 1992, the Security Council decided to send 500 Pakistani armed peacekeepers to Mogadishu with the mission to protect relief workers. This operation was called United Nations of Somalia (UNOSOM1) (DeRose 1996). The United Nations member states could not decide to intervene as the United Nations Charter not allowed that nations could decide the intervention of the problem without the mandate of the Security Council. On December 3, 1992, the Security Council decided under the resolution 794 that military and humanitarian intervention included 26000 of US troops to be sent to Somalia. This operation was called the United Task Force on Somalia (UNITAF), but in the US, this operation was known as Operation Restore Hope. The operation's main objective was to secure airports and ports and the protection of relief shipments. The operation was also responsible for assisting humanitarian relief efforts. The Secretary-general did not only want that the coalition force to work only on humanitarian work. He also wanted that the forces work ceasefire between the warlords and disarm the militias but both United States presidents Bill Clinton and George Bush did not want to enlarge the objectives of the mission, and they

just wanted that US forces only worked the humanitarian objective. Although the operation met huge challenges, however, the task was successful regarding declining the famine and succeeded that the aid to neediest people. The coalition forces did not only operate in Mogadishu, but they had forces almost every port of Southern Somalia. They also controlled some parts of Central Somalia. Even almost the areas they operated, they imposed some cease-fire. When the Security Council mandated the operation one of its major tasks was peacekeeping, but this operation was not fulfilled (DeRose 1996). In 1993 most of the United States forces were pulled out but 5000 troops of the US remained and became part of UNISOM2. After the UNITAF, where replaced by UNISOM2 it contained 20000 troops and 8000 logistical staff from thirty-three countries. Although the UNISOM2 continued the operation, the troops lacked the much of the advanced heavy equipment and the air power that the United States brought (DeRose 1996). After most troops of United States left the UNOSOM2 became weaker, and in June 1992, general Mohamed Farah Aided's militias killed twenty-three Pakistani soldiers. After the soldiers were killed, the United Nations issued another resolution, which allowed to hunt down those who killed the UN soldiers who were Aided's militias. After the UNOSOM2 decided to eliminate Aidid they completely left their previous task which was peacekeeping (Thakur 1994). Now the UNOSOM2 became one part of the conflict. When the UNOSOM2 soldiers attacked Aidid, they killed many of his supporters and some of his highest aides where captured including his financier Osman Atto. However, the operation was cancelled four months later when in October 1993 eighteen American soldiers were killed, and one of them was dragged in the streets of Mogadishu. On 16th November through Resolution 855, the Security Council cancelled UNOSOM2's mandate to arrest individuals who attack UN soldiers. During the UNOSOM2 were in Somalia, they were not only working for the humanitarian task, but they also supported many reconciliation conferences that the Somali leaders were discussing. One of these conferences took place in

Djibouti, and Ali Mahdi was elected again as the Interim President. After the 18 Americans were killed the American public became unsupportive for the operation and the US troops withdrawn from the country in March 1994 (Thakur 1994). After the United States withdrew from Somalia, the ability of UNOSOM2 became weaker, and the countries left on the ground were mostly from the developing countries which lack the similar power as the United States to deal with the situation. Although the operation in Somalia has succeeded the famine, however, it did not reach its primary task, which was peacekeeping operation. Without any control left on the ground the Somalia's operation ceased in March 1995 one year later after the US withdrawn. The UNOSOM2 operation became one of the failed peacekeeping operations that failed during post-cold-war. After the United Nations left Somalia, the country became totally anarchy. The number of Warlords became more and radical Islam groups emerged from many parts of the country. Even wars broke out the relatively peace areas like Somaliland and Puntland. Before current Puntland declared them as autonomous region there was fighting between religious groups and the rebel group SSDF who had the power in this region at that time. Somaliland there was also fighting between so-called the state army and many militias against them. The fighting in Somaliland continued until 1996. After 1996 the war in Somaliland stopped through negotiation between the fighting groups and efforts of local elders who solved the problems. In the north-eastern region, current Puntland the war against religious groups also stopped and Puntland declared as an autonomous region of Somalia. In the south and central Somalia, the situation became chaos. The warlords transformed the regions into small fiefdoms of clan-based kind of authority. General Aidid was killed in 1996 but his son an American citizen called Husein Aidid took the power of his father's militias. Clashes between rivalry warlords became every day events. Warlords blocked the ports and the airfields of the region. The few organizations who dedicate their lives to help the suffering people like MSF

and ISRC became a target. Many of staff of the organizations were killed and many of them were kidnapped. Ransom demand became also widespread (Ciisa-Salwe 1996).

The mission became bogged down confronted warlords, and American and western troops, as well as the UN, withdraw from the country in 1995. Since then warlords ran the country and clan militias Somaliland and Puntland were spared of this as Somaliland declared its succession from Somalia in 1991 and Puntland opted for a regional autonomy rather than outright independence in 1998 (Gaas 2009).   During these years, various efforts have been made to reconstruct Somalia, but none of them produced any positive results.

2.7.Peace conference, TNG, and the establishment of the TFG

After ten years of chaos in the southern and central Somalia, the United Nations decide to support some State building in the year 2000. A conference between the Somali groups where held in Djibouti. All the groups except Somaliland took part in the conference. After many months of stalemate and discussions, the groups agreed and elected Abdikadir salad Hassan as interim president, a former minister of interior of the military regime, who is from the south of Somalia and same tribe with Ali Mahdi and General Aidid. When the so-called parliamentary elected president came to Mogadishu, he could not do anything because the warlords in Mogadishu who participated the peace accord were against him and they did not want to cooperate with him. Just his clan militias kept him in life in a just few buildings in Mogadishu without the control of any what so ever. After another two years of chaos, the United Nations arranged in 2002 another conference in Eldoret in Kenya. The conference took place two years consecutive. The warlords became parliamentarian, and in 2004, the fixed parliament elected Abdullahi Yousuf who was the president of Puntland and former warlord as a president (Cornwell 2004). As the situation in Mogadishu was tough, the elected president could not

travel to Mogadishu and operate there. Nevertheless, a warlord who controlled a region in southern Somalia called Mohamed Habeb allowed that the president and his cabinet could move to his town. After the president started to operate there about a year with the help of economic support from the UN and the EU, the warlord who had the power of the area became challenging to deal with. He was like having the whole government as a hostage. Then the president and his followers decided to move to another town called Baidoa, which is 250km west of Mogadishu. When the government was stationed there, the situation in Mogadishu changed and allied different Islamic courts established so-called a religious group named Islamic Courts Union (ICU). The emergence and the fall of the ICU will be discussed in the next part of the Thesis as well as the Etihad group (Sage 2001).

2. 8. The rise of ICU and Al-Shabaab

Since the fall of the central government in 1991, different religious jihadists groups emerge from a different period in different regions of Somalia. During the early years of the civil war, the most powerful religious jihadist was the Etihad (Sage 2001). Although the group was established in, the early 1980s however as far as the military regime existed their activities were limited to preaching the people, sometimes preaching against the governance system of that time. However, as the country became transformed into anarchy and warlords fiefdoms, the Etihad group saw their opportunity for power and as mentioned earlier and in 1991, the group attacked the northeastern part of the country, currently Puntland (Sage 2001). Early mentioned SSDF founder, warlord and the Interim president of from 2004 until 2009 and the leader of that region at that time, fought back the attacking jihadists and defeated the group. After the group became defeated in the Northeastern region, they regrouped in Gedo region, south of the

country bordering Ethiopia, and the group ceased to be a waring religious group (Sage 2001). However, senior leaders of the Etihad were still in the country, and as the country faced another challenge, the warlords rejected that the interim government from the Eldoret-Kenya conference to enter the capital. The former members of Etihad and new members of Jihadists regrouped themselves and started to arm themselves once again (Sage 2001). As the ICU lost the war with Ethiopia due to lack of power and directly face to the Ethiopian firepower and given the fact that the leaders of ICU were inexperienced, they lost any kind of control among their members (Barnes and Hassan 2007). Although the interim government operated in Mogadishu with the help of Ethiopian troops, however, it was very week in terms of giving security and service and operated within few blocks of Mogadishu. At that point, newly emerged Al-Shabaab group turned to lead the fighting against both Ethiopia, the weak government troops as well as other armed militias. Al-Shabaab attacked their targets in any possible way including suicide bombers and targeting killings. As the fighting in Mogadishu deteriorated the civilian lives, and the reality that state building was very vital, the Security Council decided that under the mandate of the Security Council that African Union (AU) can send peacekeeping troops to Somalia (Hull, Svensson et al. 2008).

The AU mission, which is called the African Mission of Somalia (AMISOM), has not only peacekeeping as a task but they also have the mandate to fight against the terrorist group Al-Shabaab. Given the fact that there is no peace to keep in the country AMISOM is peace-enforcing mission rather than peacekeepers. When the AMISOM troops came to Somalia in 2007, the government was controlling just less that some kilometers in the capital (Hull, Svensson et al. 2008).

The troops from AMISOM, begun to fight against Al-Shabaab, right after they arrived the country, and in 2009 Al-Shabaab were thrown out from the capital. The number of the African troops were increased many times and currently more than 20000 troops from five different African countries including the neighbouring Ethiopia and Kenya who later became members of the AMISOM mission are fighting Al-Shabaab. The AMISOM troops liberated not only the capital but also many formerly Al-Shabaab infested big cities were liberated including the port cities of Kismayo, Brave, and Marka, where the terrorist group got their primary revenue through taxation and charcoal export. The AMISOM mission shown to be a success as the rebuilding of liberated areas is very massive. As the security returned in many parts of formerly Al-Shabaab based areas, the reconstruction is booming (Williams 2012). AMISOM and other actors including Turkey also train Somali forces however as corruption goes parallel with the history of Somalia, the Somali soldiers do not receive their salary properly, and they are not well armed. When it comes to the government, it cannot deliver any service to the population. In recent months, Al-Shabaab captured many areas in lower Shabelle region an agricultural region bordering with Mogadishu due to that the Somali soldiers pull out their camps in several cases. Al-Shabaab continues their suicide attacks of civilian areas including Hotels and many other different places. They also attack Somali and AMISOM camps, killing many soldiers and taking their weapons (Bruton 2014). The TFG paved the way for a more permeant and internationally recognized Somali Federal Government (SFG). The SFG supported by AMISOM remains weak, and continue to struggle to expand its control over the country, and has so far not brought peace and stability to the country.

2.9. Conclusion

The chapter has outlined various aspects of the Somalia society including the complexity of country history and its inheritance of colonialism as well as the element of the conflict. It has also shed light on the civil war and the consequent collapse of the Somali state as well as the various attempts of interventions and efforts to restore peace and reconstruct in Somalia. The conflict and the crises in Somalia is located in the geopolitical local of the Somali peninsula, colonial legacy, and the social structure that despite the homogeneity divides Somalis into clan families and clans that have been manipulated. In additions, because of the continued social and political crises, the country has faced the rise of groups, as ICU and Al-Shabaab become a reality that will continue to reflect the dissatisfaction of Somalis with the secular politics and the status quo.

Chapter three

3.0.   Introduction

 This chapter presents the approach and the methodology of the thesis. It describes data sources,

tools for the data collection, selection of interview as well as the choice of the study area, and

analyses. It also describes ethical issues and limitation of the study.

3.1. Approach

The research method that I used to conduct this study was a qualitative method, and the primary

tools that I have used for collecting data were interviews, which I carried out in various forms;

group discussions, and individual interviews, including interviewing key informants.

3.2. Justification of the method

The approach of a qualitative method emphasizes the epistemologically that the reality and the

truth we usually seek is socially constructed. That describes the meaning of its societal and

cultural context. Consequently, one can argue that without using the capacity of our common

understanding and intellect there is no truth or reality out there to find (Research Methods,

2003; Denzin and Lincoln, 2003, p. 13). For that reason, the subject of research which has been

conducted with the qualitative method is characterized by the proximity of the researcher. Also,

it focuses more on the experience of individuals and interactions while not losing the discursive

content of the conversation between interviewer and interviewee (Mason, 1996/1997, p.38).

The quantitative method is contrary to the qualitative approach so; it states that regardless

whether we aware it or not the reality and the truth do exist out there. The fact can be only

guessed since it is difficult or impossible to be fully comprehended (Research Methods, 2003;

Denzin and Lincoln, 2003). As Bryman (2015) depicted, there are some contrasts between

qualitative and quantitative research. The qualitative researchers use words and their approach to conduct research is invariably unstructured used by inductive strategies. They interact with participants so that they can genuinely understand the problem of the case study. The concepts and theoretical amplification come out of data collection, and "the perspective of those being studied-what they see as important and significant-provides the point of orientation." (Bryman, 2015: p.401). However, the quantitative research is the opposite of those above indications that defines qualitative research. When using a quantitative approach, a researcher is inadequately carrying out the studied subject while using a set of strict routines and prefixed measurements which is supposed to quantify an existing causal relationship between independent and dependent variables of research. Without considering the process of the whole study, the subject of the research is applied to some sets of measurements (Flic, 1998 in Denzin and Lincoln, 2003). However, "both seek to ensure that deliberate distortion does not occur" and "both argue the importance of transparency." (Bryman, 2015: p,402).

Understanding the violent conflict in Somalia and the role that the clannism and religion play is a complex field of study which needs to be enlightened. Many are confused about the cause of Somalia conflict for considering the homogeneity of Somali people who lack all the dividing lines that primordial theories suggest that they lead to violent conflicts. However, because of the recent rise of Islamists in Somalia, it has been subjected to an intensified International scrutiny in the form of "war on terror." From a theoretical perspective, the failure of Somalia and succeeding exertion of resolving its lengthy challenges theories in this regard. Therefore, since this study aims to investigate at understanding conflict in Somalia and its complexity, I realized that the qualitative research method as the most suitable approach. For the reason of more economical and flexible than quantitative research method. Further, it enables the researcher to disclose the anxiety, precedence, goals, needs and the desires of an interviewee. It does this through recording the voices of the interviewees and listening to their firsthand life

experiences which makes more accessible for the researcher to gain a rich perception of the subject study. On the other hand, unlike the quantitative research method, the qualitative approach is more flexible that allows for the researcher not to be caught strict procedures and predetermined tools (Valentine, 1997). The views and the understanding of informants about the problem of the subject study are precisely significant to be counted. Therefore, deploying a qualitative approach could be more meaningful for the investigation to be fulfilled. For that reason, a semi-structured qualitative method was essential to carry out this study.

Even though the popularity of qualitative research method is lately increasing the positivists and post-positivists yet criticize it that it is "unscientific, journalist, or soft science approach" (Flikc, 1998 in Denzin & Lincoln, 2003; Valentine, 1997). They argue that the result obtained through qualitative method has no theory or material that can be validated with and through their perception, they reasoned that the result could be influenced by the researcher's personal views (ibid). Qualitative researchers disregard these critics and argue that regardless of the approach and the tools that have been used for a study, no methodology can be without the influence of the researcher's personal biases (ibid). A good reason to disregard quantitative researchers claims that there can be biases in every stage of research from the very beginning to the very end output since the results will be interpreted by human mind which can be influenced by one's experience, expectations, views, and affiliations. Despite not being descriptive, the quantitative researchers miss a lot of valuable information that viably makes us further comprehend the problem.

As Flikc (1998) in (Denzin & Lincoln, 2003) presents, the aim of using quantitative approach has been the purpose of isolation or 'cause and effects' so that the logical relations can be

measured and operationalized. Hence, things are different today because the "rapid social change and resulting diversification of life worlds are increasingly confronting social researchers with new social contexts and perspectives…. traditional deductive methodologies…. are failing … thus research is increasingly forced to make use of inductive strategies instead of starting from theories and testing them…knowledge and practices are studied as local knowledge" (Flikc, 1998 in Denzin & Lincoln, 2003: p,15).

3.3. Study area

This study was conducted in various places including Oslo (Norway), Nairobi (Kenya), and Kismaayo and Mogadishu (Somalia). Besides, part of the study was done through phone calls, Facebook and WhatsApp voice and video calls. To get the full picture of the Somalia conflict, it was necessary to carry out broader research. Engaging with both diaspora and those who still live back home and bordering countries, especially Kenya, which hosts the most significant Somali refugees, was essential to obtain understandable rich data. Those I communicated through the advanced communication technology were Somalis who live UK, US, Canada, South Africa and UAE. But I was physically present at Oslo, Norway and went field work to Nairobi, Kenya, and Somalia.

3.4. Selection of respondents

To purposively select, the interviewees were not an easy task. The combination of time and efforts was not enough to gain access to crucial informants, but one of my advantages was being a member of Somali elites that made possible for me to get a more comprehensive network from different clan elders, elites, politicians, business people and regional and federal government members. For obtaining a representative sample that can reflect and delineate the

study population my selection of interviewees was not limited to a particular group. The people that I have conducted this study with were from different genders who have different social status in Somali society. Age, experience, education or being employed by either regional federal member states or the federal government was highly considerable. However, the informants have been selected with the respect of their awareness and knowledge about Somalia and its society, religion, culture, and conflict. After sorting out a long list of informants that my friends, relatives, and their networks presented to me, I selected 120 informants whom I considered were suitable for this study. In different times, places and situations, I briefly explained to the informants the purpose of the study and informed them that its participation is based on voluntary.

3.5. Research ethics

As part of research ethics (Bryman, 2015), each participant was given a consent about having the right to withdraw at any time from the interview or refuse to participate right at the begging. Besides, we agreed that voice recordings, notes and the names of interviewees would not be exposed to anyone other than the interviewer. All interviewees were asked ahead of time and given a chance to suggest how, when and where that they would like to be interviewed. So, the preference of each group or individual was considered. Open-ended questions were asked interviewees, and at the end, they have been given a chance to comment and make suggestions. Then, feedback about the information they provided to me was given to them so that they can get an opportunity to lay out what is needed to be added or changed. As Bryman (2015) stated "because of the frailties of human memory, ethnographers have to take notes based on their observations. These should be fairly detailed summaries of events and behavior and the researcher's initial reflections on them" (Bryman, 2015: p,440).

3.6. Data sources and data collection

The field work and the data collection process was conducted in between June 2017 to November 2017 in the above-given places. Moreover, a lot of literature about the conflict of Somalia and its history, culture and clan dynamics, and the rise of Islamism and terrorist elements were scanned and extensively reviewed. Numerous websites, reports, books and electronic articles were read as well. However, the primary data that was used to this study was collected as the form of interviews, participant observations, and discussions made by focus group, where the collected secondary data was received as the form of related literature.

3.6.1. Interviews

Conducting interviews are probably becoming more frequent to employ when carrying out a qualitative research method. Bryman (2015) argues that the reason is that the "ethnography usually involves a substantial amount of interviews, which undoubtedly contributes to the widespread use of the interview by qualitative researchers." (Bryman, 2015: p,466). Moreover, it seems that what is attracting interviewers is the flexibility of the interviews. The qualitative researchers and quantitative researcher tend to use a different method of interviews. Structured interviews are used for quantitative research method where the researcher determines at the very begging a set of fixed questions and asks in a close-ended way. The reason that the interview is structured in the quantitative study is "to maximize the reliability and validity of measurement of key concepts because the researcher has a specified set of research questions to be investigated." (Bryman, 2015: p,466). In contrary, qualitative researchers use a semi-structured interview where initial research ideas are more open-ended, and at the same time the viewpoints of interviewees are emphasized (Bryman, 2015).

Arguably, semi-structured interviews can be defined as being "a guided conversation in which only the topics are predetermined and new questions and insights arise as a result of the discussion and visualized analyses" (Pretty et al. 1995). For that reason, much of the essential data collection techniques that I used to this study was a semi-structured interview.

3.6.1.1. Individual interviews

Considering the perspective of Somalis that men are to be blamed the undertaking Somalia conflict, most of the interviewees were men while considerable females have participated. The face to face interviews lasted in between one hour to 2 hours whereas the communication through the technology (phone, Facebook, WhatsApp, and Fiber) lasted not more than 40 minutes. Through the interview process, I found out that Somali women are shyer than men and the men are more curious and inquisitorial.

3.6.1.2. Focus group interviews

Historically, the research studies that are related to business and commercial were used to conduct group interviews (focus groups) in the form of data collection. But now it is used in various social research that has different preliminary reasons and purposes. As it sounds, the technique of focus group is interviewing with more than one person. As Bryman (2015) presents, "the focus group contains elements of two methods: the group interview, in which several people discuss a number of topics; and what has been called a focused interview, in which interviewees are selected because they 'are known to have been involved in a particular situation' (Merton et al. 1956: 3) and are asked about that involvement." (Bryman, 2015: p,501). It was carried out 20 group interviews that consist of three to six interviewees for this study in case of triangulation. The target was to obtain as much information on each specific topic. For

that reason, most of the face to face interviews were conducted in a quiet and hospitable place that can make the interviewees relax and share their knowledge and experience about the topic. Three of the group interviews were conducted through teleconference. Like any other researcher, a prepared checklist to follow up the discussion process was in hand, and the participants were well aware of the discussed subject ahead of time.

3.6.1.3. Key informant interviews

Key informants including clan elders, politicians, elites, former warlords and federal and local government officers were purposively selected for the reason of their knowledge and experience about the study issues. One of my intentions about interviewing key informants was to obtain more in-depth information that may well clarify where the real problem of Somalia conflict lays and what kind of problem-resolution can be applied to.

3.7. Data analyses

Even though a clear-cut rule has not yet been developed for qualitative data analysis (Bryan, 2015) it is used to examine the data for this study by sorting out along with coding and the objective of the study was classified in accordance. A researcher must not be overwhelmed by the richness of the data that has been gathered. As Bryman (2015) states "it is crucial to guard against failing to carry out a true analysis. That means that you must protect yourself against the condition Lofland (1971: 18) once called 'analytic interruptus.'" (Bryman, 2015: p,570). However, the collected data that was obtained for this study was interpreted and examined within the cultural and social context.

3.8. Limitations of the study

Since much of the research was depended on interviewing people overseas, it was not an easy task to conduct it without painful memories. Even though Somalis are naturally adapted to talk about violent conflict freely, clan divisions, terrorism, and politics yet what most got into my nerve was the habit of not keeping promises. It was rarely happened to meet one of the interviewees on promised time. Another burden factor was a significant amount of data that was gathered in the form of a voice recorder. It was a painful experience to transcript the voice records, do color coding, sort out and finally do the analysis. Also, traveling to different cities in different counties or continents within a limited time was not advisable. But seeing and spending some time in the town I was born has given me the glimpse of hope which makes me forget the frustration and the anxiety that I have been through while conducting the research. Since my controlled study was not whatsoever related to the limitations that I have encountered the study results that I have presented is without personal bias. However, the expectations that the researcher and much of the interviewees had is that this study may produce a more in-depth understanding of the prolonged Somalia conflict and how to engage the future ones.

Chapter four

4.0. Theoretical framework and literature review

4.1. Introduction

This section situates the thesis into the broader concepts that have been advanced to explain conflicts in Africa. It will mainly review primordialist and instrumentalist theoretical models that have been used to understanding violent conflicts in the African continents. The reason is that these two theoretical models and not others are due to the broad application and dominance about analyzing the ethnic and tribal conflicts that tend to undermine state in Africa and at times lead to its collapse. However, the review that follows is highly fluctuating as some of the theories are discussed in detail while others are only passingly mentioned. First, ethnicity and ethnic conflicts are introduced and discussed before I turn to the primordialist and instrumentalist models in the following paragraphs-

4.2. Violent conflicts in sub-Saharan

Thought the question of violent conflicts in Africa is drawing academic attention and interests to the continent (Collier and Hoeffler 1998, Collier 2003) However, there contrasting perspectives on contemporary conflict in Africa (Geertz 1973, Asiwaju 1985). The first approach is the factionalist approach that focuses on leadership failure. In this respect it is viewed that leaders and elites in Africa instead of inspiring and bring stability and progress to have been preoccupied of clinching to power and staying reverent which also manifests in institutional setup and capacity or rather to put it precisely incapacity. Ideology is also other

element manifesting itself in struggle of class of haves and does not to explain the crises of state in Africa. This later perspective rests on ideology and institutions, which is advanced, by Marxist and neo Marxist scholars' further points the colonially inherited nature of state border that cut across single ethnic group and divide them into two or more countries. Further, it is also pointed out that leadership failure is created by the fact that African leads lack autonomy due imperial dominion of their decisions (Mamdani 1996). However, others elsewhere have pointed out the nature of states in African as part of reasons why violent conflict are so frequent in Africa. This argument is premised upon the failure of states to bring about development and instead focusing survival and which it also failed. However, African states capacity and power position coupled with identity and fragmentation is seen to reflect why so many conflicts that are violent is presented in Africa (Collier and Hoeffler 1998, Collier 2003). Thus, these theoretical perspectives on state violence advance explanation that focus on power, capacity, institutions, nature and the regime type. It has been pointed the problem to lie in the leaders political culture where state institutions are tool to enrich oneself and finally parallel power to state that through ethnic, tribal, and clan Networks undermine the power, legitimacy and role of state in public affairs (Doornbos 1990, Doornbos and Markakis 1994). Consequently, state in Africa remains largely peripherally and unable to penetrate society as these networks manipulation ethnic identity and class has also been suggested as a prime factor behind crises of state in Africa. However, respective literature especially tthough useful these approaches do not capture holistically the violence conflict in Africa (Schatzberg 2001). A major shortcoming in these approaches miss the informality of power in Africa, Indeed, the distinction between states, what is private, what is public and society in Africa is blurred. However, while these theoretical perspectives reflect sacred-ness of state as sole power" manipulator of means of violence (Hagmann, Bradbury et al. 2005) they deal with the hypothetical question of if state was strong how it ought controlled violence and therefore seek conformity rather than

divergences of state forms (Berger 2007). However, this line of theorisation produced a conception is perhaps why scholars as Alex de Waal (2009) suggest that instead one should look way African societies function and is structured by looking what is there. Asiwaju (1985) sees the problem to lie with the colonial inherited borders as an "artificial boundaries" and those arbitrary divide ethnic groups into two or more political borders. He suggests the set-up of these borders as being destructive and leading to, if not entirely responsible for, many of the costly violent conflicts in Sub-Sahara Africa. Moreover, in his article, "Africa and the New World Dis-Order: Rethinking Colonial Borders", Francis M. Deng (1993) shows **how and why** with the end of the Cold War conflicts to leading state collapse emerged as ethnic communities begun to assert their will and resist against the state. In that, conflicts along the ethnic lines widely accepted today as escalating (Crawford, 1998:8) and many countries in Africa have all witnessed or continue to suffer from ethnic conflicts. Collier and Hoeffler (1998), Collier (2003) suggest greed and grievances to explain crises of in Africa as greed and grievance fueling ethnic and class conflicts to occur. While both approaches have their own merits, they fall a short in explaining fully the intricate violent conflict in Africa. Maybe a more integrated model can reflect aspects of both and consider the context of conflict in Africa from different perspectives as could be promising. In the following section, we turn to these approaches, as the violent conflict is major factor assigning state in Africa its unique configuration, and fate.

4.3. The violent conflict, a question of identity?

Approaches that conceptualizes conflicts suggested that ethnicity, its manipulation, and class struggle as the basis of the conflict. Primodialist, and instrumentalist approaches advance converging explanation to conflict. The first perspective sees primordial ethnic as the basis for the conflict. The second emphasizes its manipulation rather than identity itself to be responsible for the violent conflicts in Africa. These approaches propose different antidotes that include

development focused policies, structural adjustment, good governance, and policies evolving on consolidation and social engineering. While these approaches provide a competing explanation, only primordialist and instrumentalist are viewed here.

Primordialism and instrumentalist approaches dominate studying nationalism, ethnicity, identity and group-based conflicts. As we will see in the following paragraphs both theoretical models fail to comprehend dynamics of conflicts, and their realities that involve weak and failing states. According to primordialism ethnicity is natural, resoluble, and thus static and is reinforced by unbroken attachment and exclusionary and strict boundaries of ethnicity of ethnic and race, language, religion, and even territory (Perez and Hirschman, 2009; Esteban et al., 2012; Geertz, 1973; Chandra, 2012: Isajiw, 1993; Poata-Smith, 2013). Therefore, ethnicity is an "absolute reality", extemporal, and static. Consequently, ethnic identity follows that same pattern as ethnicity where ethnic hatred, anxiety, and fear lead to incite, drive, and enforce commitment to conflict (Glazer, 1986:429). In that, primordilism sheds light on for instance the Rwanda, Bengalis Congo and Bosnia and Herzegovina conflicts (Turton, 1997; Connor 1994; Chandra, 2012). Elsewhere in Africa as in Somalia similar views to these above have been advanced by Hellander (1998) and Lewis (1998) that explained the perpetual violence in the country through primordial kinship loyalties provided by segmentary lineage. However, Samatar (2000) criticized that argument by showing the kinship cleavage in its traditional sense as cause violence is both futile and erroneous. Other factors as colonialization, social stratification, international relations and interventions have been suggesting to explain better the perpetual violence that culminated with the collapse of the Somali state (Besteman , 1998). However, Primordialist strength of explaining violent conflicts as stemming from genetically deposited group differences and hence assigning emotive conducts of irrationality to groups engaged in violence is the very weakness of the model. Primordialist overlooks historical

contexts of politics, resources, institutions, and structures within which such conflicts flare up in the first place. Another weakness of the model is that it assumes homogeneous societies to be less prone to a group based violent conflicts and vice versa for heterogeneous ones. However, many good examples are pointing to the contrary (McKay, 2011; Holm and Molutsi, 1992). Such examples include Botswana and Somalia. Somalia`s population homogeneity has instead of granting the country`s political stability become a liability to it. In contrast, Botswana, while its population is heterogeneous, it has so far enjoyed stability and has not experienced conflicts along ethnic lines as primordialism predicts. Further, primordialism that has been become widely discredited because of it fails explaining why ethnic conflicts erupt at a certain period and not another (Jackson, 2004; Holm and Molutsi, 1992). For example, why violent group conflicts have erupted in many African countries in the 1990s and onwards. Somalia in 1991, Rwanda in the 1990s and Darfur in Sudan in the 2003 and not anytime else than that point of time. But its difference, the model fails to answer why ethnic identities became as such point of contention and mobilization for conflicts at that these years instead of any other years? However, despite the primordialism`s notion of the biological rootedness of ethnicity`s inefficiency in addressing those above questions, yet the theory sheds light on certain dimensions of ethnic contestation. Such as what drives ethnic groups to commit into violence, and the premises upon which they are mobilized on. It explains further, the conduct of ethnic groups in the run-up to ethnic conflicts. Much so, primordialism captures factors that arouse ethnic mobilization and solidarity, which emphasizes the enduring power of ethnicity lies (Cornell and Hartman, 1998:151). Some example cases of ethnic violence as per primordialism explanation on the role of ancient hatred in conflicts between ethnic groups are easily identifiable (i.e., the case of Rwanda`s Tutsi/Hutu) yet roles played by such hatred is far from exclusive. Indeed, elite manipulation has been the very hallmark of the Hutu/Tutsi conflict leading to genocide in Rwanda in 1994 (Hintjens, 1999). Rwandan elites appealed to

manipulated ethnic differences of Hutu and Tutsi by stressing their respective ethnic differences and evoking fear and anxiety and hence legitimizing conduct of group violence and the grim fate of the target ethnic group. Through "othering" and politicizing ethnic identities, Rwanda`s political elites have played a centrifugal role in inciting ethnic genocide. Societies with ethnic cleavages suffer from the compartmentalization of economic and political organization along ethnic lines (Horowitz 2000). This reflects the ethnic division of ethnically diverse societies runs beyond social and deep into political and economic spheres.

The instrumentalist view of ethnic identity as "neither inherent in human nature nor intrinsically valuable" (Varshney, 2009:282). It sees ethnicity as a basic tool for achieving strategic goals by elites over power and resources that seek to control or get a share. Consequences, ethnicity is therefore, also instrument to confine resources and power into the hands of few (Collier, 2002:26-27). Instrumentalist model asserts organization along ethnic lines of groups depending on what benefits such groups perceive to gaining from that. They further assert that greed rather than grievance is more prominent as root for ethnic conflicts. They explain this that civil wars and ethnic conflicts often caused by greed over a perceived economic and political opportunities and sources that are scarce in their nature (ibid). Consequently, ethnic conflicts arise not from emotive behavior driven by irrationality but from rational actors making rational choice. Such rationality of actor's action for conflict is toward attaining power, resource, mitigating risks or even enhancing security and wellbeing of actors. Beyond rationality of actors and their manipulation of group identity in civil and ethnic wars that centers instrumentalist explanation of why ethnic conflicts erupt, the strength of the theory lies in its ability in explaining on why not all ethnic diverse societies face ethnic conflicts and civil wars and in some cases different ethnic groups decide to cooperate instead. Instrumentalist argues such decision of cooperation to depend of the perceived cost and benefits from waging war or opting for cooperation. In

addition, in the case that the first outweighs later ethnic wars are inescapable (Walter, 1997). Further, the model also sheds light on why members of an ethnic group participate in ethnic conflicts when they may not see a logical reason for doing so, and even so get involve in fighting along with the rest of their ethnic groups. The models explain this phenomenon not as irrationality but as a follow the flow without being persuaded to partake conflicts. Instrumentalist explains unconvinced individuals involve in the conflicts through rational game of cooperate as long as you perceive other group members cooperating (Hardin 1995). In relation to this, Collier and Hoeffler (1998) show the perceived benefits outweigh the cost of partaking in rebellion as possible direct advantages of getting share of blunders. Conflicts involving rebel groups as for instance that in Somalia and DRC to mention view is explained as a result of elite's manipulation of group identities for their own benefit (Menkhaus 2010). Consequently, instrumentalist propose for remedying conflicts has been termed as constricted on strategies evolving on state re-building rather advancing remedies aimed at resolving groups difference resulting from the ethnic identity that grants ethnic cleavages (Connor 1994). The instrumentalist explanation of why ethnic conflicts erupt suffers from its inability to explain group conflicts beyond micro levels: i.e. individual's greed for perceived potential of controlling power, resources or blunders for handful of elites as an explanation of conduct of group conflicts. Questions as how atrocities involved in such conflicts and abuses as rape contributes to the elite's material wellbeing as a motive to waging conflict. Despite that, instrumentalist bridge this question by suggesting that such atrocities and abuses are deployed as a strategic instrument to demoralize, defeat through intimidation and humiliation the perceived opposing group. They further assert that such instruments are a used to annihilate a group and win the allegiance of the other by elites (Verwimp, 2003:180; Weitsman, 2008). However, this raises a further question on instrumentalist explanation, which is why it is easy to leverage ethnicity as technology of power through proper manipulation along the lines of

ethnicity. Instrumentalist fail answering how elites realize that they are able to manipulate ethnic and tribal cleavages (Ruane and Todd, 2004). Despite this, such succinct role of elite does not provide adequate insights to ethnic conflicts that are a multifaceted reality in their nature. However, both approaches see violence as dominant factors instigating state failure and the nature of group's contestation over the state. However, instrumentalist see the problem at micro level of elite`s political culture. Here elites manipulate structures and group identities to enrich themselves and that is where the crises of state and governance in Africa lies in their view. Contrary to this primordialist sees ethnicity as independent where ancient ethnic hatred between different ethnic groups is unbridgeable and these conflict along the ethnic lines are inevitable (Perez and Hirschman, 2009).

4.4. Conclusion

The aforementioned theories of conflicts, they fail to shed light on certain significance causes of the conflict. Furthermore, this is the case also for primordialist and instrumentalist models dominating the studies of Somali conflict at the present. Scholars like I.M Lewis portrayed clan structure as a menace that stands in the way from uniting the society across clan lines to build state institutions and governance system for Somali people, which might not be the case (Lewis and Institute 1999). Therefore, to provide contextualized understanding, an integrated theoretical model is needed. Such model should take account of the shortcoming of the present models and conceptions on the Somali conflict that tends to shed lights aspects at best, however, yet fail in understanding conflict holistically. This includes the emergence of non- violent none state actors in Somalia. Respective theories attempting to explain focus causes and fail to emphasize on the process, primordialists as well as instrumentalist modes confuses the cause

into consequences. However, they all emphasis on different issues that are interlinked and at times play a role in the affairs violent conflicts as (e.g., ethnic conflict leading to ethnic mobilization and vice versa as well as the manipulation of ethnicity. Where in both cases the outcome is the overload of what intuition's, weakening of such intuitions and their collapse. Followed by the emergence of overgeneralized violence and civil wars. Therefore, theoretical models that can bring together diversified aspects pertaining to the cause of violent conflict is needed as current theoretical models in this regard albeit useful are insufficient in capturing the complexity of conflicts. Indeed, they tend to overlook external factors but also misconceive realities of the group in deities and their manipulation. Such integrated models should consider the relevant prevalent social, economic and political factors, as well as conditions that may explain conflict but also external influences and internal contradictions of the societies facing perils of violent conflict and crises. In doing so, they should be able to retrace current conflicts, back to their historical and societal sources and context. This thought it has to contend with the prominent intellectual traditions on conflicts that are either analyzed based on its colonial legacies or the internal discontent and peculiarities of politics and society might also be of help to any attempts geared towards finding a solution to the long-standing problem of Somali people.

Chapter five: Findings and discussion

5.0. Introduction

This chapter is the empirical product of thesis. It provides the findings of the thesis by identifying drivers of the conflict. It further discussed these findings. In the following section, first, the findings are presented which is following discussing these findings.

5.1. Findings

This study finds that the persist of the conflict cannot be explained by ethnicity as the clan is not equal to ethnicity-based differences. Unlike ethnicity and ethnic groups which entails the difference in characteristics of language, culture, religion or race, Somalis share all of that. Therefore, the clan is not equal to ethnicity and thus cannot be explained by ethnic-based conceptions of conflict as advanced by primordialist. While clan may be involved in conflict that is not dominant at all times. Multiple drivers of the conflict do exist beyond clan-based identity and its manipulation. While it may have played at one or the other stages of the violence, the conflict, and its actors has been mutating and continue to be so. Where in each state of the conflict, actors dissolve, and new ones emerge in their place. Therefore, the study finds that there is some overlapping strife that ranges from identity-based conflict, resource conflict, and ideological conflict. All of whom interact and are therefore interconnected conflicts where clanship is one of the flexible group identities manipulated and serviced by elites to their own interest of clinching to power, controlling resources and capturing the Somali state. However, the genesis of the crises and the conflict lies in the colonial legacy and failure of the new republic to reunite Somali territories in the Horn of Africa under one political map and a national state border. Despite this, recent phenomena of the rise of political Islam in the

country and ideology as one of the conflict drivers is explained by the utter failure of secular politics and elites of the country since Somalia`s independence in 1960.

5.2. Discussion

First, ethnic conflicts are often seen as being a variety of conflicts within state borders (see e.g., Braathen, Bøås and Sæther 2000; Brown, 1993:4). That implies that the conflict has to be between two or more groups that do not share the same ethnicity, which is an important condition that excludes conflicts such as those in Somalia and Cambodia from the category of ethnic conflicts. Groups in both of these countries share the same ethnicity but are fighting for political, ideological or clan-related reasons. Although ethnic conflicts are perceived as an "identity conflict", several issues make defining the ethnic conflicts problematic. First, since ethnicity is central to its definition, ethnicity itself is dynamic and imposed rather than being fixed and having a "'self –definition', that they share common traits and experiences, but it is often also a product of categorization of outsiders" (Stone and Dennis, 2003:58). It could be that this has compelled scholars such as Gilley to label ethnic conflicts concepts as contradictory and incomprehensive (2004:1155). Second, the fact that regional and international actors that do not necessarily share ethnicity with fighting ethnic groups can be drawn into the conflicts (see e.g. Carment, 1993) for political, security, economic, strategic, or even humanitarian reasons, makes the conflict not so ethnic, e.g. India enforcing the succession of Bangladesh and NATO ending the conflict in Bosnia (Heraclides, 1990). In the attempt to spell this out, Crament (1993:139) identifies some types of ethnic conflicts that all have an international involvement "self-appointed regional peacekeepers". Except for the decolonization struggles, the *bona fide* player of these types of ethnic conflicts is States, whether regional or international (ibid.). Third, the notion of ethnic conflict has different meanings from region to region or is even not used in describing such conflicts. Indeed, Tishkov observes "in Russia, the term 'ethnic conflict' came

into use late, because the word 'conflict' was usually replaced by the euphemism 'contradictions'". In fact, the Soviet Union was a place of relative ethnic peace despite the state's contradictory policy of repression and pandering towards non-Russian nationalities (1999: 574). Yamskov (1997:206) defines ethnic conflicts as a "dynamically changing sociopolitical situation caused by rejection of the existing status quo on a part of a significant number of people representing one or several local ethnic groups". This definition arguably captures two important points. First, it is broad in the sense that it encompasses both violent and non-violent ethnic conflicts, and second, it is a situation and conditions-oriented and flexible. Nonetheless, it excludes international actors and does not take into consideration the states that can be involved in ethnic conflicts beyond their borders. Realizing these loopholes in Yamskov's definition, Tishkov defined ethnic conflicts as "any form of civic clashes within or across state boundaries when at least one of the warring parties is mobilized and organized along ethnic lines or on behalf of a certain ethnic group" (Tishkov, 1999: 576). Violent ethnic conflicts, of which ethnic identity is an instrumental or direct tool for mobilization, or that are primordial, have resulted in any deaths or continue to claim lives in Burundi, Rwanda, Ethiopia, and Sudan, to mention a few. However, low-level ethnic conflicts include Kenya, Zimbabwe, and others elsewhere in Africa. Different scholars argue for different causes for ethnic conflicts, ranging from ethnic identity, territory, access, and competition for power and resources. Even so, it is difficult if not impossible to pinpoint a single common cause for all ethnic conflicts. Despite the ever-increasing number and complexity of theories about ethnic conflicts, and despite all of them also have some relevance and truth, they all fall short in providing universally plausible explanations as to the cause. It could be argued that the shortcoming of in this regard lie in several issues, with the amount of direct and indirect factors involved in such conflicts being one of these. Nevertheless, ethnic conflicts pose a challenge to states in terms of influencing how different scholars explain the causes of such conflicts. Hence, this the fact

that the conflict in Somalia has a clan- rather than ethnic element should be kept in mind. That would mean that instead of ethnic conflict, a clan conflict is more relevant to Somalia`s case as they are largely homogeneous. Thus, the conflict has been based on clan and sub-clan lines. In the Somali context, scholars have advanced a number of hypotheses on Somalia's predicament. Although none have been able to adequately explain why things in Somalia have gone the way of a loss of state, enduring violent conflicts, humanitarian disasters, all of which have thus far resisted "traditional remedies as provided by established theories' of state building and state recognition as well as governance".[1] The available literature on Somalia's advances a number of positions on the crises of the country that can be grouped into three categories: colonial legacy (including the fragmented nature of Somali-inhabited territories in the Horn of Africa, the political culture of leaders and the contradictory nature of the imposed state institutions on pastoral society), the end of the Cold War and the acceleration of globalization (Waldron and Hasci, 1995; Doornbos and Markakis) (Samatar 1992, Doornbos and Markakis 1994, Waldron and Hasci 1995, Menkhaus 2003, Kapteijns 2012). For others such as (Lewis 1998), Lewis (2002) nomadism and clannism are two aspects of Somali society contributed to the collapse of the state. He states that these two issues have resulted in a state of Hobbesian war of "me against my brother in Somali society". Lewis (1998) reasserts the nature of Somalis as an extremely idempotent has resulted in the demise of the state, thereby proposing that the crisis in Somalia be seen as continuity rather than a change. He further claims that clannism has caused the collapse of the state and the conflict in Somalia, although this has been criticized on epistemological and empirical grounds. According to Kapteijns (Kapteijns and Farah 2001, Kapteijns 2004, Kapteijns 2012, Reno and Kapteijns 2013, Menkhaus 2014, Roble 2014) Lewis has contributed to the clan discourse and its role in Somalis life's and the violence conflict in the country. Samatar (1992) proposes an alternative explanation where violence is the result of

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[1] External policy and military interventions to reconcile or defeat one or the other of conflicting actors, while restoring peace and the reconstruction of the collapsed state of the country.

a distorted elites political culture rather than of clanism itself. Others have pointed out the implications of Siyaad Bare's dictatorship and a failure of leadership on the state collapse, and by extension, the current status quo of the country (Waldron and Hasci, 1995; Doornbos and Markakis 1994; Samatar, 1992). Moreover, an incompatibility between the society and the form of the post-colonial Somalian state has also been shown that (Little 2003; Samatar 1994). Menkhaus (2007; 2010) explained how state rebuilding policies and interventions have created some unintended consequences, thus exasperating the violence.   Nonetheless, emphasizing clannism as an exclusive cause sole cause of conflict ignores well-documented external influences that have played a role in the collapse and governance crises that followed as formal institutions disappeared. The inherited colonial legacy has produced a twisted and corrupt political culture that undermines societal traditions has contributed to the clanship becoming a lethal identity to be manipulated but that is not directly responsible for the conflict and did not cause it from the first place. The inter-clan tension, which was initially implanted by the colonial masters as a divide and rule tactic, was later manipulated and deployed by the Bare regime as a way to stay in power, which in turn was used by warlords to maintain their narrow personal gains. Menkhaus, Sheikh et al. (2010) (2000) and Ismail (2010) attribute the collapse of the Somali state to the conditions triggered by Somalia's colonial legacy. They advance the hypothesis that the fragmented Somali territories have undermined the traditional institutions, hence sowing the seeds for state collapse. Ismail (2010) further states that the Somali state failed because it failed to deliver the tenets to which it was premised upon, namely the economic development and reunification of Somali-inhabited areas in the Horn of Africa. Consequently, Somalis rebelled against the regime and brought the state to collapse. Menkhaus (2003) suggests that in order to deal with the unfolding crisis in the country over the last 20 years, the crisis has to be disaggregated into the actual state collapse, the enduring warfare and violence and the prevailing anarchy. He further argues that internal factors alone can neither explain the

collapse nor the failure of rebuilding the central state in Somalia. Makinda (1992) and Waldron and Hasci (1995). This research is aware of the fact that the colonial inheritance of Somalia has had implications on the eventual collapse of the state by weakening it and undermining its traditional institutions, thereby sowing the seeds of the devastating Ogaden conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia in 1964 and 1977/1978. However, as previously stated, this proposed research assumes that the colonial legacy per se cannot be blamed for the immediate. Additionally, it would be erroneous not to look beyond these into other factors, including the roles of power, the state, violence and the various other aspects that include the inherited social and economic fragility. Furthermore, assuming that distant factors per se (colonialism and the colonial legacy, including borders) are responsible for the entire range of issues does not explain on the variations of strengths and fragility, and does not advance our understanding on the critical conflict-igniting issues involving the state collapse process that often happen abruptly.

5.3. Conclusion

The impact of colonial partition, weak institutions in post-independence, Ogaden war, social inequality and repressive policies, among others, are major causes of conflict in Somalia (Ukessays.com). Further, competition for resources is another. The manipulation group identity is the primary cause of the conflict; however, this does not mean that clan is the cause of conflict in Somalia. Rather is the way clanship has been manipulated to services their strategic aims. This social organization, be it religious or homogeneous grounds or other types of bond that connects them together might have a role in the conflicts, In Somalia, people are categorized through clan lines but not ethnicity (Demmers 2012).

Chapter six

6.0. Conclusion

This thesis attempted to understand conflict in Somalia, the driver of such conflict and paradox ties that involves. It aimed at shedding light on the contested role of the clan as group identity and its manipulation by elites in the protracted conflicts in Somalia that are most catastrophic conflict in the 21s century in many ways. That consequently challenges theories in this regard to explain the basis of the conflict comprehensively. Thought being endowed characterizes that that are seen as an antidote to the conflict and crises, and that would have advanced Somali nation-state to prosper and enjoy peace and progress, it remains perpetually violent. Further, the fact that state has collapsed and the country has to cope with its absence makes causes and drivers conflict more contested academically. However, the fact that Somalis as a society is spread throughout the Horn of Africa and thus is not contained in only nations state political border because of colonial inheritance sowed the seeds of the conflict. Despite the homogeneity of its society clan division manipulated by elites is partially to blame for the conflict rather than clan itself. Resources completion coupled with leadership failure at all levels has had the lead for conflict eruption from the first place, the collapse of the state and the civil society and that remains to underpin the current conflict in the country.

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