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Beyond post-accord reconstruction? A study on UN peacebuilding contributions in Colombia

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A study on UN peacebuilding contributions in Colombia

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Declaration I, Katherine Elisabeth Pedersen, declare that this thesis is a result of my research investigations and findings. Sources of information other than my own have been acknowledged and a reference list has been appended. This work has not been previously submitted to any other university for award of any type of academic degree.

Signature.....

Date.....

«Peace is not something you just sign, it is something you build»¹

¹ Statement from Carlos Castilla, one of the people working on the front line of the Colombian peace accord's implementation (The Guardian, 28.05.2018).

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Abstract

Intrastate conflicts pose a great threat to the international peace and security, and the UN is one of the organizations mandated to protect the international community. Thorough peacebuilding processes are important in order to move the conflict-ridden states from war to sustainable peace, and the purpose of this study is to examine to what extent the United Nations is equipped to support in peacebuilding processes of intrastate conflicts. Using the peacebuilding process in Colombia as a context, this study examines their efforts to support such a process.

The theoretical frameworks of post-liberal peace and Lederach's comprehensive peacebuilding framework could help examine to what extent the UN's capabilities currently have the necessary scope to effectively support peacebuilding in intrastate conflicts. Using these frameworks, it is deduced that it would be useful for the UN to move beyond the "traditional" understanding of peacebuilding as a post-accord activity, and to view peacebuilding as a wider process that contains all the necessary steps to move from conflict to a sustainable peaceful state. It was not necessarily found that the UN has made use of a wider understanding of peacebuilding, but it was found that they manage a range of other activities that can support peacebuilding and that their mandate does provide the opportunity to interfere if need be.

It was also found that both scholars and UN member states have pushed for change and argued for ways that the UN can improve, and that several reviews of the missions and the peacebuilding architecture has been conducted in the past decades. According to the findings in this study, the latest review in 2015 has not managed to put the UN peacebuilding on a desired level, but promising steps towards understanding peacebuilding as a larger process have been made. It is recognized that the UN has a challenging task trying to balance the respect for state sovereignty and the need to protect the security and human rights in the international society, and it will be interesting to follow the developments in the years to come.

List of abbreviations:

ELN - Ejército de Liberación Nacional (National Liberation Army)

FARC – Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia)

ICAN - International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons

IO – International organization

NGO – Non-governmental organization

R2P – Responsibility to protect

UDHR – Universal Declaration of Human Rights

UN – United Nations

UNDP - United Nations Development Programme

UNSC – United Nations Security Council

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1.0. Introduction

On April 10th 2018 we could read in our online newspapers about a heated debate in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) regarding the situation in Syria (NRK.no, 2018). The UNSC had gathered for an emergency meeting after alleged use of chemical weapons in Douma the previous Saturday. They are struggling to reach a joint decision as the conflict in Syria have several of the strong powers involved, and it seems very unlikely that Russia will allow sending any kind of message to Assad other than a verbal critique (ibid.) Once again, the United Nations Security Council is unable to act because they cannot reach an agreement. This is not an unusual situation. The veto power of the p-5 is frequently leaving the Security Council with their hands tied in serious situations, and the fact that the Security Council fails to act in serious situations is quite disturbing. Reform of the UNSC has been debated widely and concrete suggestions for change have been made, but none that all can agree on. Critics claim the balance of power in the UNSC no longer represent the balance of power in the international system, and that this leaves them unable to respond to the challenges faced in the international society today (Soderberg, 2015).

1.1. The United Nations in a changing world

Since the UN was established in 1945, the world and the threats the international society faces has been ever changing. The goal of the UN since the beginning has been to prevent another world war through the continuous protection of international peace and security. Making sure states don't wage wars on each other is only one of the issues that threaten the international peace and security, and the UN today must also pay attention to other threats including, but not limited to, climate change, social and economic development and nuclear weapons. The attention to these issues has taken form in The Paris Agreement on Climate Change¹, the Millennium Development Goals² and later the Sustainable development Goals³, and Nuclear Ban Treaty⁴. ICAN (International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons) was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2017 for *“for its work to draw attention to the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons and for its ground-breaking efforts to achieve a treaty-based prohibition of such weapons”* (Nobelprize.org, n.d.-b). Another

¹ https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/english_paris_agreement.pdf

² http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/sdgoverview/mdg_goals.html

³ <https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/21252030%20Agenda%20for%20Sustainable%20Development%20web.pdf>

⁴ <https://www.un.org/disarmament/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/tpnw-info-kit-v2.pdf>

Nobel Peace Prize winner is Juan Manuel Santos, the now former president of Colombia. He received the Nobel Peace prize in 2016 for his efforts to secure a peace deal between the Colombian Government and FARC, two parties who had been fighting each other since the 1960s (Nobelprize.org, n.d.-a). The conflict in Colombia is an example of another type of threat to the international peace and security; intrastate conflicts. Intrastate conflicts take place within the borders of a state between opposing groups where one is usually the state, and this type of conflicts have been more prevalent in the post-Cold War era (Lederach, 1997). Fukuyama goes as far as to suggest that “weak and failing states have arguably become the single most important problem for international order” (Fukuyama, 2004). Many of these conflicts are long-running and complicated and have already caused the populations to suffer from grave atrocities and hampered the social and economic development in the state. Common to all of these cases is that stopping the violence is not going to be enough, a massive effort needs to be put into making sure that the peace holds, and to rebuild societies and get development back on track. In other words, they need peacebuilding, and this study will seek to find out how the UN can contribute.

In this study two main ways to understand peacebuilding is outlined; peacebuilding as post-accord reconstruction of a state and peacebuilding as a larger process including all activities needed to move from conflict to a sustainable peace, including post-conflict reconstruction. It will be discussed how the United Nations has used the former, while the latter definition is commonly used by NGOs (Maiese, 2003). Professor John Paul Lederach (1997), who also has extensive experience from the field, uses the latter definition of peacebuilding in his book where he expands on the process of peacebuilding, and his work has been an important part of informing this study.

1.2. Research objectives in this study

The purpose of this study is to examine to what extent the United Nations is currently equipped to support in peacebuilding processes of intrastate conflicts through examining their efforts to support the ongoing peacebuilding process in Colombia.

The following research questions have guided this study:

- To what extent are the UN equipped to support peacebuilding efforts in intrastate conflicts?
- What are the limitations of the UN engagement in Colombia?

I seek to answer these questions through mapping the capabilities of the UN and evaluating these capabilities based on an understanding of the term peacebuilding as presented by Lederach. The Colombian peacebuilding process will serve as a context in which to evaluate these capabilities. I will argue that using a broader definition of peacebuilding as opposed to the limiting focus on post-accord reconstruction can help provide interesting insights as to what the UN capabilities in peacebuilding is, and what the limitations might be to the way the currently work with peacebuilding. UN peacebuilding architecture is largely based on the Liberal Peace framework (Cavalcante, 2014), and I will first look closer at what that entails, before I use Richmond's post-liberal peace theory and Lederach's peacebuilding framework to assist the analysis in order to better understand what limitations the UN peacebuilding might have.

In order to answer the research questions, data from the functions and politics of the United Nations will be gathered and analyzed. This data will be used to paint a picture of the UN's current capacities for support in a peacebuilding process. Further, I will collect data on the current intrastate peacebuilding process in Colombia in order to create a context for the use of UN peacebuilding capabilities, and to find out what they need from international actors such as the UN. Lastly, data on the UN engagement in Colombia will be used to examine how they work under the current architecture. I have chosen Colombia to provide a context because their peacebuilding process is *ongoing*, and this provides a unique opportunity to take part in a current discussion and learn how the current UN peacebuilding architecture is working.

This thesis is underpinned by the assumption that the international society is threatened by intrastate war and turmoil, and thus the international society has a role in the efforts of

peacebuilding of intrastate conflict. These assumptions will be discussed and explained in the following sections, but the goal is not to question the responsibility per se. Rather the goal is to examine how this responsibility is managed, what tasks this responsibility entails, and to what extent the United Nations are currently capable of responding to this form of threats that spring from situations taking place within a member state.

1.3. Outline of thesis

This thesis is divided into nine chapters, followed by a complete list of references. The first chapter is an introduction to the topic of this thesis and presents the research questions that have guided this study. Chapter 2 is a literature review that presents four academic discussions that informed this study and shaped the way this study was designed in order to fit into the debates. Chapter 3 outlines the two theoretical frameworks that guide the analysis and help make sense of the data that has been gathered, while chapter 4 outlines the methodological approach and account for limitations to this study. Chapters 5, 6 and 7 presents the data on UN capabilities, on the Colombian context and the UN involvement in Colombia respectively. Chapter 8 contains a discussion on the data with the support of the theoretical frameworks as well as the literature review, and chapter 9 is reserved for concluding remarks and some ideas to further research of the topic.

2.0. Peacebuilding and the United Nations

There has been an extensive amount of studies about peace and security, peacebuilding and the role and operations of the United Nations in this regard. Doing research for this study included going through large parts of this work, both to get valuable insights that could help frame this study, but also in order to find an angle that could perhaps contribute something new and relevant to the debate. There are four discussions or topics that have stood out as central to the formation of this study, and this section will be used to outline these discussions. In the end of the chapter the angle of this study is justified.

2.1. Intrastate conflicts as a threat to international peace and security

Through the materials reviewed it was found that the idea that intrastate conflicts are a threat to the peace and security of the international society is widespread (Lederach, 1997; Yilmaz, 2005). Francis Fukuyama even argues that “weak and failing states have arguably become the single most important problem for the international order” (2004). Intrastate conflicts or wars are understood as conflicts taking place within the borders of a state between several actors of whom one is typically the state. These conflicts generally have deep roots, and the animosities the conflicting groups carry towards each other have been carried on through generations (Lederach, 1997). The list of states that have experienced such conflicts is long, and include, but it not limited to, Rwanda, Kosovo, Liberia, Haiti and Sudan (Yilmaz, 2005), and currently states such as Yemen, Syria and Somalia. So why do these conflicts pose a threat to the international society if they take place within a state?

Even if the world is divided into different states, most states depend on each other for trade and other forms of cooperation, and when one state is unstable this will affect its partners. For example, a conflict can cause parts of the population to be displaced, either inside the state or across state borders. Europe experienced what turmoil this can lead to during the recent refugee crisis in 2015, where refugees crossed the Mediterranean Ocean from the Middle East and North-Africa to seek refuge and escape the horrible conditions in their home countries. This massive stream of refugees has had its financial costs to the European states, but more than that it has caused great instability politically both within and between the European states. Germany was near a governmental crisis because of disagreements on how to deal with the situation, while both Italy and Greece is far beyond their capacity to deal with the people who arrive as the EU states keep discussing how to handle the situation collectively (Aftenposten, 15.06.2018).

Another challenge with intrastate conflicts that affect the international community is the movement of weapons or other illegal substances. For example, Colombian drug cartels flood the market in the US with cocaine, and as this is a problem that the US wants to fix, they have put millions of dollars in US Aid into the battle against the drug cartels in Colombia (Welna & Gallón, 2007). Furthermore, the human rights and security are usually not well enough protected during this type of conflict. With a world that has become increasingly connected through the era of globalization, and it is easy for a Norwegian to sit at home and follow the developments in Colombia closely, even if the situation is unfolding on the other side of the world. This interconnectedness has given the “masses” grounds for putting pressure on their politicians and demanding that they act (Risse et al., 2013). As an example, there are several Oslo-based organizations engaged in the protection of human rights in Colombia, such as *Støttegruppe for fred i Colombia* (Support group for peace in Colombia) and *Latin-Amerikagruppene* (The Norwegian Solidarity Committee for Latin America)⁵. Both of these groups are active participants in the Norwegian public debate regarding the situation in Colombia, for example through writing debate articles criticizing the Norwegian level of support in the Colombian peace process (Latin-Amerikagruppene i Norge, 2017b).

In cases of intrastate conflict it becomes clear that “the identity of the people is not organically tied to citizenship of the state” (Lederach, 1997), as some groups might be fighting the state and the state might be struggling to fulfil their promise to protect their population. With the diplomacy known as quite state-centric and with a high regard for state sovereignty it puts the international actors in a difficult position (ibid.). The United Nations has been given a mandate to deal with such issues to an extent that is unlike any other international actor (Yilmaz, 2005). This is why the UN makes for a very interesting subject to study, but it remains to be seen if they can manage to balance these two, or if they too will face challenges with regards to sovereignty and human rights. The next section will start to take a closer look at the United Nations.

2.2. Post-Cold War changes in the UN

The UN is an organization of member states and they currently have 193 members. They have always had to consider all the different opinions and interests of their members, and as the

⁵ Visit their respective webpages for more information; <http://fredicolombia.org/> and <http://www.latin-amerikagruppene.no/>

political climate in the international society changes over time and with big events, the UN has had to prioritize different things over time. One specific event that widely referred to as a “game changer” in the literature is the end of the Cold War (Baehr & Gordenker, 2016; Lederach, 1997; Mayall, 1996). During the Cold War UN peacekeeping missions contained military personnel placed in the field as a buffer between the opposing parties in a conflict, for example along a border, in order to stop the violence, or oversee a ceasefire (Yilmaz, 2005). With the end of the Cold War the international community was filled with optimism that sparked discussions on how to develop the UN and their capabilities (Forsythe, 2012). An example of this is the launch of the term *peacebuilding* in 1992 when the UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali used the term in *An agenda for Peace* from 1992. This document outlined a proposed list of responsibilities and responses for the UN when dealing with contemporary conflicts, and in this document “peacebuilding” is suggested to mean “action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid relapse into conflict” (United Nations, 1992). At the same time, the mandates of peacekeeping missions started to expand, moving from classical peacekeeping missions limited to military personnel and becoming what is now referred to as *multidimensional peacekeeping*. Multidimensional peacekeeping describes missions that also include civilian personnel with the capacity to support in activities that goes beyond overseeing a ceasefire, including electoral support, rebuilding, and economic and social development in order to start building a more sustainable peaceful society (Yilmaz, 2005).

There is also another term that was introduced in the 90s that is said to have impacted the way that the UN has developed since, namely the term *human security*. This term appeared officially for the first time in the Human Development Report in 1994, and in this document it “*equates security with people rather than territories, with development rather than arms*” (UNDP, 1994). This term challenged the state-centric thinking of international security studies by widening the understanding of security and taking into account the people within the states that the international society so deeply respects the sovereignty of (Newman, 2010). Human security requires a commitment to human rights and the protection of the individuals rather than that of states, which in turn will improve welfare and foster development (Newman, 2010). While the idea of human rights as a universal right was not new, the Universal Declaration on Human Rights was approved in the UN in 1948, but now the idea was that the international community could and should help the states secure the rights of their people if need be. But with the high regard for state sovereignty the UN lacked ways to

legitimize humanitarian interventions, and it was necessary to establish a shared understanding of when such interventions were an option. After several gross incidents in the 1990s, such as the genocide in Rwanda, the international community came to an agreement to commit to the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) in 2005 (Forsythe, 2012). This agreement has strengthened the human rights, because it provides legitimacy to ignore state sovereignty in certain cases where the humanitarian needs are dire, and to prevent acts of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing (Risse et al., 2013). With this agreement, the states are made accountable for the protection of their people, and sovereignty will not necessarily be respected if they cannot fulfil this task (Risse et al., 2013). However, in the years following the commitment to the R2P, it became clear that the principles were easier to agree to on paper than to execute in complex situations (Forsythe, 2012).

2.3. Peacebuilding as more than post-accord reconstruction of a state

Peacebuilding is a term first used by Johan Galtung in the 1970s but it was not until twenty years later the term became significant to the UN. In *An agenda for Peace* from 1992 “peacebuilding” is suggested to mean “action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid relapse into conflict” (United Nations, 1992). Reviewing *An Agenda for Peace*, it is found that peacebuilding here is referred to as post-conflict peacebuilding, and put as an action following the other activities preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping (ibid.).

The use of the term peacebuilding does vary in the literature, and also in how actor pursue it in practice (Barnett et al., 2007). The way the different agencies use of the concept is largely shaped by their mandate and practices, as for example the UN interpretation of peacebuilding is shaped by the use in *An Agenda for Peace* (Barnett et al., 2007). It was found that in many cases peacebuilding is used either as a vague concept without setting any concrete ending or start or as a concept referring to a post-accord reconstruction in the same way that the term seems to be understood by the UN. But there are also examples of studies where peacebuilding is used as a wider concept, arguing that peacebuilding should be understood as a process that spans across a longer period of time, and includes other phases than that of post-accord rebuilding (Doyle & Sambanis, 2000; Lederach, 1997). Lederach is one of the voices arguing for a broader understanding of peacebuilding, and in his comprehensive framework for peacebuilding he outlines a range of processes, actors and approaches. While he agrees that the post-accord period with a focus on rebuilding a society is a crucial one that

deserves much attention, he argues that peacebuilding refers to a much wider process, including all the necessary steps to move from conflict to sustainable peace (Lederach, 1997). This would include what the UN referred to as preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping, and Lederach's framework will be further discussed in chapter 3.2. In addition, Sawatsky argues that the historical perspective must not be forgotten when dealing with peacebuilding in intrastate conflicts (Sawatsky, 2005). He argues that peacebuilding must not be a short-term solution, and that only a proper knowledge of the history and the root causes of the conflict will help sort out the conflict and this knowledge is essential to building a peaceful future that can be sustained in the given environment (Sawatsky, 2005). A wider definition of peacebuilding is already commonly used in the NGO sector (Maiese, 2003), and it can be argued that other international actors would be better served adopting this wider understanding as well.

In both the narrow and the wide understanding of peacebuilding, it is seen as a process that works towards peace beyond an absence of violence. It also considers levels of structural violence, cooperation, creating functional institutions, protection of human rights and so on in order to create a sustainable peace, making it an approach based on an understanding of "positive peace" (Jeong, 2002). Barnett and his co-authors speak of three dimensions of post-conflict peacebuilding; first, stabilizing the conflict zone by removing weapons from the combatants, and reintegrating them into society. Second, restoring state institutions is to deal with restoring the state activities and build the capacity to secure the needs and rights of the population of the state. And third, taking care of social and economic issues, and planning for development in this area in the peaceful future (Barnett et al., 2007). Different actors have different approaches to peacebuilding, for example by focusing on a specific stage of the process such as demobilization or development (Barnett et al., 2007).

When talking about different stages of a peacebuilding process in this study, it is referred to the process of ending the violence, negotiating a peace, implementing this peace and sustaining it over time. This is why when looking at the capabilities of the UN this study must include a wider scope of activities than that of post-accord reconstruction, because post-accord reconstruction in its own does not here constitute peacebuilding. In studies examining peacebuilding it is found a variety of activities and processes in focus for the different studies. Some focus on reconciliation (Rettberg & Ugarriza, 2016; Skaar et al., 2005), reparations

(Firchow, 2017), truth commissions, amnesties and trials (Loyle & Appel, 2017), the importance of reaching a comprehensive peace agreement (Joshi & Quinn, 2017) and others. Mechanical factors, such as the demobilization and elections, are but one of the necessary factors that must receive attention in a peacebuilding process. Emotional factors must also be prioritized, as these are extremely important in order to reach a peaceful state that can be sustained over time (Lederach, 1997). Reconciliation is such a factor, and this is a term that returns as a central one across much of the literature on peacebuilding. Still the term is often used quite diffusely; and sometimes as a process and others as an end goal after a peacebuilding process (Rettberg & Ugarriza, 2016). It has also been found that where measures of reconciliation are taken seriously, there is a lower risk of relapsing into conflict (Loyle & Appel, 2017). Lederach sees reconciliation as “providing a focus and a locus appropriate to every stage of peacebuilding and instrumental in reframing the conflict and the energies driving the conflict” (Lederach, 1997). His approach will be further discussed in chapter 3.2 and is central to the analysis. It is important to design every peacebuilding process to the situation at hand, taking the context into consideration, but most of them have a lot of the same activities (Doyle & Sambanis, 2000). Any given peacebuilding process should contain both the mechanical and the more emotional processes and seek solutions to both. Throw in local ownership to the process, and proper support from the international community, and all in all the peacebuilding should be a success.

There is typically a range of both internal and external actors involved in a peacebuilding process. While local ownership to peacebuilding processes is seen as important to secure the sustainability of the peace, it can be difficult to secure this in practice. This is exemplified by De Coning (2013) in his study on the process in Somalia. International actors have been known to undermine the local ownership of peace processes, and the following two arguments are widely used; 1) the state is so weak after the conflict that it is impossible to find the capacity to coordinate the peacebuilding process, and 2) There is not necessarily a legitimate leader of the state in the beginning of a peacebuilding process, thus it is wise for external actors to take a more leading role until a legitimate leader can be elected through fair and free elections (De Coning, 2013). Further, the various international actors that get involved in peacebuilding activities in a state can have self-serving motives guiding their investments. For a government that is in charge of their own peacebuilding process, it can be challenging to guide the peace process as they see best for their state, while at the same time pleasing the

international donors (De Coning, 2013). He also points out that while all parties in the conflict and international community share the goal of sustainable peace, the strategies on how to get there, or what “there” is, are not necessarily the same. The most important actors to have on board are the locals who will have to sustain the peace that is built (De Coning, 2013).

2.4. Can the UN contribute to successful peacebuilding in intrastate conflicts?

While there is a range of international actors that can contribute to a peacebuilding process in a state, this study is focused on examining one in particular, the UN. This section will look closer at what the existing literature on UN peacebuilding tells us about their capabilities. There have been a lot of studies examining how the UN manages their mandate to protect international peace and security. Of those studies, many have examined their peacekeeping missions (Howard, 2015; Yilmaz, 2005), the way the security council makes decisions (Aurobinda Mahapatra, 2016; Soderberg, 2015), the R2P (Risse et al., 2013), and their peacebuilding efforts (Cavalcante, 2014). Many of these studies points to flaws in the UN mechanisms and criticize the way they operate, causing this study to question to what extent the UN can contribute to successful peacebuilding in intrastate conflicts at all. As established in the previous section, peacebuilding can be seen as a process that goes beyond post-accord reconstruction of a state, thus when looking at the UN capabilities this study will include more than what they refer to as peacebuilding. It is argued here that peacekeeping, peacemaking, development and the protection of human rights can be placed into the equation in addition to traditional peacebuilding.

The largest task of the UN has become peacekeeping, and these missions are authorized under chapter VI or VII, but they were never explicitly mentioned in the UN charter (Howard, 2015). Impartiality, consent and the limited use of force are core principles in UN missions, and although the interpretation has changed some over time, the validity of these principles still stand (De Coning et al., 2017). With a change in contexts where UN peacekeeping missions are deployed, the tasks for the missions have grown. UN Peacekeeping now refers to the range of activities and processes that the UN is engaged in as “multidimensional peacekeeping” (United Nations Peacekeeping, n.d.-a). The UN peacebuilding or peacekeeping practices have received extensive critique, some because of specific events or lack thereof, and some of the critique is more generally fixed at the way these missions are poorly organized and unable to adapt to local contexts. It is also found that the contributions that of some of the larger states is dependent on their own foreign policy goal is, for example

the United States want a priority of missions that combat the “war on terrorism” (Yilmaz, 2005).

The Security Council has also received extensive critique for the way they make decisions, or sometimes for their failure to agree when a situation requires their attention. Remembering the discussion on Douma from the introduction, it is not always easy for the members of the Security Council to agree on what actions to take in a given situation, and often their hands are tied because one of the members of the SC uses their veto-power to block resolutions (Soderberg, 2015). One study found that the decisions of the Security Council in the cases of Syria and Mali were largely influenced by the geopolitical interests of the members with a veto-power (Aurobinda Mahapatra, 2016). Arriving at unanimous decisions in situations where an invitation has not yet been extended from the state is the most difficult, but these might also be some of the more critical cases, for example in cases where the use of the R2P could be considered.

As briefly mentioned in a previous section, the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) in one way the UN can legitimize interventions, but the use of the agreement in practice has been widely debated and critiqued (Forsythe, 2012). This agreement provides legitimacy to ignore state sovereignty in certain cases where the humanitarian needs are dire, and to prevent acts of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing. The R2P is made up of three pillars. The first pillar emphasized that it is primarily the responsibility of the state to protect their population from the atrocities of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing. The second pillar speaks to the responsibility of the international community in supporting the state in the protection of the population through peaceful means such as humanitarian aid and diplomatic action. The third pillar legitimizes the collective use of force from the UN should the two first pillars prove insufficient in protecting the population from these gross human rights violations (Risse et al., 2013). In the initial discussion leading up to the agreement, some states warned that it should not become a tool to legitimize foreign interventions that sought to fulfil self-serving foreign policy, and the smaller states in particular feared that this would be yet another way for the great powers to impose their beliefs on the weaker states (Risse et al., 2013). The R2P was used to legitimize a military intervention for the first time in 2011 in Libya, but after this experience states have been reluctant to invoke it. For now, the R2P still remains one of the tools that the UN can use

(Risse et al., 2013), but there are ongoing discussions to change it (United Nations, 02.07.2018).

Since the introduction of the term peacebuilding in 1992, there have been several evaluations of the UN peacebuilding efforts. Secretary General Kofi Annan's recommendation for a reform in "In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all" (United Nations Secretary-General, 2005), led to the establishment of the UN peacebuilding architecture that exist today in 2005 and 2006. Three organizations were founded to coordinate the UN efforts in peacebuilding; the UN Peacebuilding Commission, the UN Peacebuilding Fund and the UN Peacebuilding Support Office. Chapter 5 will further review this current UN Peacebuilding architecture.

2.5. Where this study fits into the debate

Due to the constant development of the UNs relationship to peacebuilding since the term came to use, and a peacebuilding architecture that was established in 2005 and has been reviewed and amended since then, it was found that there is a need for a study on how the current peacebuilding architecture manages peacebuilding. Many of the cases that have been studied so far have not been done under the current mechanisms, thus using this study to look closer at a current peacebuilding process provides a chance to contribute something new. Thus, choosing to do a case study on the UN in Colombian peacebuilding that is currently taking place, provides us an opportunity to evaluate what capacities they have and how they are used according to the current setup.

When the term peacebuilding is used here, it refers to the umbrella-term that include all the different phases of conflict, negotiating peace, implementing the peace accord, and sustaining the peace, and where peacekeeping, peacemaking, and post-conflict rebuilding are different processes that typically take place within a peacebuilding process. This means that in the context of the Colombian peace process there is about 50 years to examine in the past, four years of negotiations, almost two years of a post-accord phase, and a future that has not yet been written. As it is argued that the UN approach to peacebuilding is built on the idea of liberal peace yet has received extensive critique for its lack of success, it is suggested to use theories that propose post-liberal peace view on peacebuilding as well as the wider understanding of peacebuilding to underpin our study on the UN peacebuilding efforts. With this it is hoped to uncover ways in which the peacebuilding practices can improve.

3.0. Theoretical frameworks

The theoretical underpinnings of any study are important to explain and discuss, in order to create transparency on what leads to the different interpretations and the conclusions drawn. Theory can be tested or generated during a study, but theoretical frameworks also help find the interesting concepts to use when analyzing our data (Tjora, 2009). In this study two theoretical frameworks relevant to the research are presented. The goal of the study is to see if the UN are capable to respond to the threat of intrastate conflict in the current international sphere, thus the chosen theoretical frameworks provide ideas on how it should ideally work, and we can use these to evaluate whether the UN is up to date or still have room for improvement. Where the post-liberal peace framework largely speaks to the UN or the international society's approach to peacebuilding, Lederach's approach tries to widen the understanding of peacebuilding processes as a whole.

3.1. Post-liberal peace framework

The Liberal peace framework has had great influence on the way that the UN conducts its peacebuilding efforts, but as was discussed in the previous section, the various functions of the UN has received extensive critique. Richmond (2012) has criticized the liberal peace theory and has devised a framework that he refers to as *post-liberal peace framework*.

First, the *liberal peace framework* is focused on the promotion of democracy, economic reforms that are market-based, and other institutions that creates peace in a state (Newman et al., 2009). The approach is also rights based, meaning that the legitimacy of the operations lean on the goal of securing the human rights of the population. The logic behind liberal peacebuilding is the threat to the international order that internal conflicts pose, and the idea that democratic states that depend on each other for trade do not go to war. They found that great amounts of effort and capacities have been put into peacebuilding for reasons of both security and humanitarian concerns, but also that that the focus and funding for peacebuilding activities increased after the 9/11 terror attack, which they suggest can be seen as "a strategic imperative for international action" by powerful developed states (Newman et al., 2009).

UNs approach to peacebuilding is based in liberal peace theory and has naturally resulted in their peacebuilding practices to focus on spreading certain norms and practices. In Cavalcante's study on UN peacebuilding practices in Guinea-Bissau he found that this liberal

approach limited their contributions to the peacebuilding (Cavalcante, 2014). The top-down approach failed to include the needs and opinions of the population, and it failed to consider the everyday contexts of the local community they operated in. This method risks the consent of the people in which they are trying to help altogether, and consent and cooperation is crucial to achieve the goals of the peacebuilding process (Richmond, 2012). It has been claimed that there is no real alternative to the liberal peace approach, and thus it remains the best alternative despite its alleged flaws (Richmond, 2012).

This identified limitation, an probably also the claim that there is no alternative, is largely what has led to Richmond's attempt to devise such an alternative in what he calls the post-liberal peace (Richmond, 2012). He suggests the term *post-liberal peace* to describe what he calls a *local-liberal hybrid* form of peace (Richmond, 2012). Where the top-down form of peacebuilding by international actors outlined above faces the local forces of peacebuilding and create a hybrid of the liberal peace that is adapted to fit the context. In this way it is an easier adjustment for the states going through a peacebuilding process, while the qualities of the liberal peace are still maintained.

When it comes to the way the international society approaches the peacebuilding process, they either sideline or completely ignore the grassroots organizations that are ready to contribute to peacebuilding. Richmond registers a complete lack of focus on the care for the local and everyday peace, as the recipients are defined as states rather than communities or people. The concern seems reserved for what a peacebuilding process will do to the state as a part of the international order (Richmond, 2012). In this sense, liberal peacebuilding is merely what the donors want it to be, and the people of the state in the peacebuilding process are reduced to subjects of in the powerful donors' quest to fulfil their ideologies. The implications that follow this strategy are severe for the local agents of the peacebuilding process, and can jeopardize the sustainability of the peace (Richmond, 2012). He argues that in order to make lasting changes, the international community must act as the advocates of these grassroots organizations, supporting them in their discussions and activities that contribute to the peacebuilding process, because they are the ones who can contribute the insights into what the communities need and the international donors must adapt to (Richmond, 2012).

Richmond (2012) further argues that as the liberal approach does not necessarily lead to proper results when it comes to important goals of a peacebuilding process, such as the

development, social justice and overall improvement of the everyday lives of the people living within the war torn countries, perhaps new agencies should be established. He suggests establishing a form of institution that will deal with needs and the welfare of the people, as well as their rights. According to Richmond this will result in a lack of radicalization and lower the risk of returning to conflict, as the experience of being alienated or misrepresented is likely to lead to certain groups to go to extreme measures in order to be heard (Richmond, 2012).

While it might seem now that the liberal peace project is merely a selfish act by the international society in order to secure themselves, this need not be the case. Solidarity with the suffering population need not be the motive behind the actions for the contributions to matter to the recipients, however, something must be done, as the current method seems yet not to manage to create sustainable peaceful societies.

In the post-liberal peace theory, it is found that the importance of consent is underlined. As previously discussed, the UN missions require consent, but from the state (De Coning et al., 2017). This theory asks the international community to look further than to the state, and gain the consent from the people, as the local grassroots are central to a successful peacebuilding process.

3.2. Lederach's Framework for Peacebuilding

The second framework used in this study is the Peacebuilding framework presented by Lederach (1997). It has already been discussed that there are many ways that peacebuilding can be defined, and that this study understands peacebuilding as Lederach presents it, that peacebuilding refers to a much wider process, including all the necessary steps to move from conflict to sustainable peace (Lederach, 1997). He does agree that the post-accord period with a focus reconstruction of society is a crucial one that deserves much attention, but he argues that this is not enough. With the framework for peacebuilding he provides a detailed set of perspectives and activities that together form his suggested approach. The five components in his framework are *structure*, *process*, *reconciliation*, *resources* and *coordination*, and these will all be accounted for in this chapter.

3.2.1. Structure

When talking about structure he discusses different levels of leadership and approaches to the dealing with conflict. Figure 1 shows us how he has put these approaches into a system.




Figure 1. Actors and approaches to peacebuilding. (Lederach, 1997).

Top-level leadership consist of high profile leaders from the military, political organizations and religious groups. They have perceived power in the sense that people listen when they speak, and the media typically provides them with a lot of space to get their messages across. This helps them have influence on the framing of the issues of the process. A challenge for these leaders can be that in several conflicted settings, there might be a lot of animosities towards them among the people, as these may be the very leaders that have failed to provide them with security. The approaches associated with this level are what he calls *top-down approaches* to peacebuilding. The primary goal here is typically to negotiate peace agreements and ceasefires between the high-level leaders in the conflict, before moving on to discussing issues of reconciliation and reconstruction. These processes are likely to receive international support, either from international organizations such as the UN or by other

states. For example, Norway functioned as a neutral facilitator of the Oslo agreement between Israel and PLO in the 1990s. It is also believed that the results that are achieved at the top-level can have a trickle-down effect, meaning that when the leaders of the different parties to the conflict make decision, the results will resonate with the rest of the population. This approach assumes that the primary focus of the peacebuilding is the negotiation of a ceasefire, before the process continues and starts including the whole population and the various programs for building peace. This can result in the rest of the population feeling left out, as they must wait to be included until the implementation process begins, and it can be wise to facilitate the inclusion of lower level input earlier in the process (Lederach, 1997).

Middle-range leadership are other actors that carry a lot of respect for their high positions in fields such as education and business, or important people in networks representing specific groups, and who is not directly connected to or controlled by the government. This group is defined by their networks that extend both upwards and downwards, presenting them with a unique opportunity to influence at all levels. These leaders are also not motivated or led by the quest for political or military power, and their positions outside the limelight provides them a flexibility that the top-level does not enjoy. The approach associated with this level is built on this position in between and is referred to as the “middle-out” approach. The middle-range leaders use their position to influence and engage in processes both at the top and in the grassroots, and activities carried out can be problem-solving workshops, conflict resolution training and peace commissions (Lederach, 1997).

The grassroots leadership represent the largest part of the society, and the leaders here are those that directly interact with the masses – local community leaders, heads of refugee camps, local health officials and so on. The life on this level is in many situations shaped by a survival mentality as the need to secure water, food and shelter may be the most important part of their everyday struggles (Lederach, 1997). The leaders on this level see the conflict lines and the suffering it brings to the population first hand and can contribute valuable knowledge of what is needed in a peacebuilding process. In this level we find the *bottom-up approach*, where the local desire for change, and also the exhaustion from living under poor conditions, drives the peace process forward (Lederach, 1997).

For international actors it can be difficult to navigate the task of supporting peacebuilding in complex emergencies such as intrastate wars. Many of the ongoing conflicts have deep roots,

and the animosities the conflicting groups carry towards each other have been carried on through generations (Lederach, 1997). Lederach's argument that intrastate conflicts show that not all people identify with the state they inhabit, is particularly challenging to deal with when the current organization of diplomacy is state-centric and have high regard for state sovereignty (ibid.). Thus, he proposes that a "middle-out" approach led by middle range leaders is the most useful because their position between the other levels provides them a unique opportunity to involve both the grassroots and the high-level officials in one unified process.

Further, structure is also concerned with the way that the dynamics of the system is connected with the different sources of conflict. It is not enough, he says, to sign international policy agreements in order to fix the systemic issues such as demobilization and the rebuilding of civil society. One must also create concrete plans and initiatives to deal with these at a systemic level and work over time to make real change (Lederach, 1997).

3.2.2. Process

Peacebuilding processes are difficult to put into very clear-cut timeframes, as the needs in every context will vary. But it is possible to say something about the different steps or phases that each process goes through and that is what Lederach conceptualizes in the Nested Paradigm model presented on the next page. As we can see from the model, the objectives linked to the desired future must be embedded in the actions carried out in all the steps beforehand. He underlines the importance of keeping the long-term perspective in focus throughout the process, but also to remember to take knowledge of the development of conflict into account when planning for peace. And to realize what the desired future is, it is necessary to carry out a thorough reconciliation process.

He also suggests that peace should be seen not as a specific time and place, but rather as a "dynamic social construct" that not only needs to be built on a solid foundation but requires maintenance and care over time to be sustained (Lederach, 1997). The same can be said about the peacebuilding process. There are no hard lines that mark the start and the end of a peacebuilding process, and likewise for all the smaller processes that take place during peacebuilding. Rather, it must be seen as a dynamic process that has space to include a variety of actors and approaches to peacebuilding.




Figure 2. Nested Paradigm (Lederach, 1997)

3.2.3. Reconciliation

Lederach (1997) stresses that the rehabilitation of the relationships, or reconciliation, is crucial to successfully transform the society from one of conflict to one of peace. He sees reconciliation as “providing a focus and a locus appropriate to every stage of peacebuilding”, as it is an activity that should be sustained over time and is not limited to post-accord settlements (Lederach, 1997). Reconciliation is facilitated through bringing people on different sides of the conflict together and giving the safe space to discuss their past grievances as well as their hopes for the future, providing a chance to heal. Figure 3 outlines all the various aspects that together lead to reconciliation, such as establishing a shared history and acknowledging the mistakes made, justice for the victims, and forgiveness to the perpetrators. This will not be achieved through the signing of a peace agreement alone but must be at the center of every step of the peacebuilding process. He claims that reconciliation has previously been seen as a peripheral or irrelevant activity in traditional approaches, and he changing this focus will provide sustainable results (Lederach, 1997).




Figure 3. Reconciliation (Lederach, 1997)

3.2.4. Resources

The component of resources is almost a given but mentioned anyways. Financial contributions are necessary in order to fund the range of activities in a peacebuilding process. But there are a range of other resources that are also important. Resources that can contribute to the process by offering materials or new ways of thinking in order to develop the process and the society (Lederach, 1997).

3.2.5. Coordination

The component of coordination contains ways so organize the interaction of the past four components. He warns that the coordination should not function as managing agency but rather as the center of communications between all the different actors contributing to the peacebuilding process. After the peacebuilding process has been completed, and the country is in a state of positive peace, the goal is to sustain the peace that has been achieved. Third-party actors withdraw from the situation, and the state should be able to sustain itself (Lederach, 1997). However, NGOs and IOs can help by monitoring the situation, and offer help if necessary to avoid relapse into conflict.

The different processes that peacebuilding encompasses cannot be set into fixed timeframes and might last longer than one of the phases or take place several times. For example, peacekeeping efforts could occur both during a temporary cease-fire while negotiating a peace

deal and while implementing a peace accord. It is also impossible to know how long the peacebuilding will last as all the contexts are different. It is essential to design every peacebuilding process specifically to fit the context, and the needs will vary depending on the conflict and its parties (Lederach, 1997)

3.3. The role of the theoretical frameworks in this study

We can find several similarities between the two frameworks. They both agree that the practices of the UN that they have observed are not ideal, and they both underline the importance of including the grassroots in the peacebuilding process in order to succeed. Lederach speaks of a middle-range leadership approach as these leaders have a unique opportunity to impact both the level above and under them, potentially uniting all levels. This reasoning fits well with the post-liberal peace approach, as Richmond also considers a local-liberal hybrid to be beneficial. They both agree that the practices of the UN that they have observed are not ideal, and they both underline the importance of including the grassroots in the peacebuilding process in order to succeed, which the “middle-out” approach does. This knowledge that these two frameworks give us will help us understand the data that has been collected on the functions on the UN and help us make sense of how they have contributed to the peacebuilding process in Colombia.

4.0. Methodology

This section will account for the choices made regarding the methods used in this study and explain how the research was conducted. First, I will account for the design of the study and the selection of Colombia as a case. Then I will take the reader through the data selection and analysis, before discussing any limitations to the study.

4.1. Case study

For this study I have chosen a case study design, which entails that the research is focused around a specific case that is analyzed in depth (Bryman, 2012). A “case” used in a case study is typically a specific place or a specific community, such as a neighborhood, a university, a family or organization (Bryman, 2012). Some researchers choose to do a comparative case study using two or more cases in order to compare the findings and analyze the topic of research, and this provides the opportunity to understand how it works in different contexts (Bryman, 2012). While designing this study, it was considered whether it would benefit more from a single- or multiple-case study. A comparative case study would have provided the opportunity to compare the UN contributions in the different contexts but choosing a single case study provides the opportunity to go more in depth in our analysis, and we found the latter to be more intriguing.

The chosen research strategy is qualitative, and typical distinctions to this strategy is that the study is more focused with words rather than numbers and in Bryman’s words “embodies a view of social reality as a constantly shifting emergent property of individual’s creation” (Bryman, 2012). This strategy puts an emphasis on interpretivism over positivism, and in many cases, but not all, the goal is to generate theory rather than testing it (Bryman, 2012).

The Colombian peacebuilding process has been chosen as the context in this study for two main reasons. First, because the process is so new that it provides the opportunity to examine the current UN peacebuilding architecture that was revised as recently as 2016. If another context dated earlier had been chosen instead, it would not have been possible to say something about the current functions, but it would have been a study on historic events. Second, this process was chosen because Colombia is a relatively democratic state with an economy that is in many ways prosperous. This is not always the case for states that need the support of the UN, and it provides some interesting dynamics that will be examined in the following chapters.

4.2. Data collection and analysis

In this research the sources of data are text-based and both primary and secondary. It is an asset to a study to collect different kinds of data, for example using data from written sources and interviews, and this way securing triangulation of the data. Triangulating the data helps improve the validity of the study by cross checking information with different sources or different methods (Bryman, 2012) . While this study is based on written sources only, a range of different sources has been used in order to see the subject from different perspectives.

The primary sources here are the official documents gathered directly from the United Nations, as well as the Colombian peace accord. A strength in using official documents such as these are that one can find correct records of events and the documents do not change over time but are stable sources, something that is a risk with interviews (Bryman, 2012). Of course, we must consider that there is always a chance that the UN reports are biased when it comes to reporting on their own work, but it is still considered an important source of data that must not be excluded. The official documents from the United Nations is used to establish their capacities as well as involvement in the peacebuilding process in Colombia, and the peace accord is used to establish what the main issues of the peacebuilding process is and how they plan to solve them. In addition, a variety of sources from the media as well as NGO reports are used in order to confirm, reject or offer additional perspectives to the UN involvement, or perhaps the lack thereof.

The secondary sources used in this study are studies already conducted by other researchers in the field, and these are presented as the literature review in chapter 2. The benefits of using secondary sources is that it saves a lot of time and it holds high quality that benefits the analysis of the data in this study (Bryman, 2012). Some disadvantages to this type of sources is that it can be complex and difficult to apply when not deeply familiar with it thus risking misinterpretation of the data. And also, although one can expect some quality, it is difficult to actually test it (Bryman, 2012). The use of secondary sources leans heavily on other researchers' previous interpretations of data, and it is crucial to be aware that the data used here has already been interpreted before. All in all, these sources provide other insights to the capacities of the UN and to peacebuilding and is useful for the triangulation.

I have used an iterative approach to the data collection and analysis, meaning that I have shifted between looking at theory and data several times (Bryman, 2012). This is done

because as the reflection around the theory evolves, it can be necessary to take another look at the data, and vice versa, and it has been useful to let the reflections of each of these parts of the study develop each other. In order to gather the relevant data for this project, a variety of databases has been used to run searches for relevant literature. Further, references made in the literature that was found was followed. The UN database was also an important place to search for relevant data on their peacebuilding architecture and of the mission in Colombia. Their web pages also functioned as a tool to get an overview of what their capabilities are, and to provide relevant information.

There are extensive amounts of data that available on both the UN in general, the Colombian peace process, and the UN mission to Colombia, but it is impossible to account for all the details in a small study such as this one, thus it was necessary to make some decisions regarding what data to pursue, and what to leave out. I have opted to use sources from news media and NGOs that I believe to have reputations of being trust-worthy, such as BCC News and Human Rights.

Even after some sources of data were left out, it is still necessary to summarize the relevant information, and this was especially evident during the writing of the chapter 6 that presents the Colombian context. The conflict in Colombia has lasted for over 50 years before the peace accord was negotiated, and it was neither possible nor necessary to cover this whole period in detail. The information seen as relevant to this study provides an overview of the parties, the conditions the population was living under, and what the roots of the conflict are in order to understand what Colombia needs in terms of peacebuilding. For the section where the data on the UN peacebuilding architecture is described it was important to find information about what the UN can contribute. And for the section on the two UN missions in Colombia it was important to find information about what the UN did contribute to the peacebuilding process in Colombia, and together with the knowledge about their overall capabilities we can also deduce what they did not contribute and use this in our discussion following the data sections.

4.3. Limitations

One major limitation to a case study is that it lacks reliability due to the difficulty of generalizing the findings into other contexts. A case study can still provide valuable insights, but it must not be taken for granted that the findings in this study will be the same if applied to a different UN peacebuilding situation.

This study is based on written sources, both primary and secondary, and the overwhelming number of available sources out there makes it possible that something could have been missed during the collection of data. I do believe that I have gathered a saturation point when collecting the data, but there is always a chance that there are other sources out there that would have helped improve this study.

Concerning the analysis of data, and especially data from secondary sources, there is always a risk of misinterpretation or potentially also mispresenting of the work of others. This study leans heavily on the work of others, and I have made references throughout the thesis to accredit these sources, and hope that I do not bring shame to their work through the interpretations in this work.

Lastly, I would like to point out the challenge of choosing the Colombian peacebuilding process as a context in this study. This process is still ongoing, and some events have been unfolding at the same time as this study has been conducted. This results in the possibility that some very recent events have been left out unintentionally, and it means that we cannot yet conclude if the process as a whole has been a successful one or not. Further research is required at a later time in order to evaluate the entire process, it is still believed that this study can contribute some interesting insights.

5.0. United Nations capacities for peacebuilding

As the scope of this study goes beyond studying the post-accord reconstruction phase of a peacebuilding process, this section will also need to expand from looking at only the official UN peacebuilding architecture. The chapter has been divided into three sections where the first section will present the mandate of the UN and some of the latest reviews done on the field of peacebuilding. Section 2 presents the findings on the three agencies that form the UN peacebuilding architecture, and section 3 presents a range of other tools or agencies that can fall within the term peacebuilding as used in our study.

5.1. Mandate

The United Nations was established after the end of the Second World War in order to prevent future wars, and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) was especially tasked with the protection of peace and security and upholding a stable world (Gordenker, 2017). The Security Council is central to international use of force and sanctions, through conflict resolution and the authorization of peace operations (Soderberg, 2015).

The United Nations is not a world government, but an organization where the 193 member states have several forums to address their issues, and together use the mechanisms of the UN to solve these issues (United Nations, n.d.-a). Because of the organizations broad membership base, they must accommodate the range of languages, cultures, religions and ideologies that the members have, as well as work with the fact that the members have various capabilities when it comes to everything from military capabilities and financial capacity (Jackson & Sørensen, 2013). The members are sovereign, and this sovereignty is highly respected. In the UN the member states have formed a set of common norms and rules that each state is responsible for following through in their respective countries, but the interdependence that comes with increasingly global challenges creates a foundation for an international organization, such as the UN, that can help solve problems that the states are facing (Baehr & Gordenker, 2016).

While the member states are sovereign, the UN still hold some power to intervene, especially when it comes to issues of security. This power is managed by the UN Security Council that is tasked with exercising “special responsibilities for maintaining peace” (Baehr & Gordenker, 2016), and upon establishment of the UN, five states were rewarded permanent seats and veto-power in the Security Council because of their power at the time and this

reflected the current balance of power. While it has been questioned whether this arrangement still represent the balance of power in the international society, it still stands for now (United Nations, 2016d).

5.2. The UN Peacebuilding Architecture

As already discussed in the literature review in chapter 2, peacebuilding became a hot topic in the 1990s after the Agenda for Peace, and the way the UN works with peacebuilding has been under constant development. Despite a lot of good work has been carried out by the UN in a long list of missions since the launch of the concept, as much as half of the contexts where the UN was involved in the transition from war to peace relapsed into conflict within five years, according to the now former Secretary General Kofi Annan (United Nations, 2005b). These relapsed conflicts continue to disrupt the international order, and the UN must continue to support the peacebuilding efforts. This is part of the motivation behind Secretary General Kofi Annan's recommendation for a reform in "In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all" in 2005 (United Nations Secretary-General, 2005).

2005 was also the year that the Brahimi report, or formally known as the "*Comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects*", was launched (United Nations, 2005a). This review was initiated because of revelations that UN personnel had committed sexual exploitations while on a UN mission in Congo in 2004 and sought to thoroughly review the scope of these transgressions and find the weaknesses in the UN systems that could allow this to happen in the first place. The findings of this report further support Annan's push for reform in the UN in general, and when it comes to UN missions in particular.

The peacebuilding architecture that the UN has today is built on Annan's recommendations as well as the Brahimi report, and started to take form at the 2005 World summit. Three organizations were founded to coordinate the UN efforts in peacebuilding; the UN Peacebuilding Commission, the UN Peacebuilding Fund and the UN Peacebuilding Support Office.

The UN Peacebuilding Commission was established by the Security Council and the General Assembly in December 2005 (United Nations, 2005c; United Nations, 2005d). The Commission is mandated to coordinate the various efforts from the UN and other actors to

assist peacebuilding processes. In the mandate it is underlined that they should focus on the reconstruction and building institutions that help secure human rights and development. Thus, peacebuilding is here referred to as a post-conflict action to help recovery from conflict. We cannot say that they had moved beyond thinking of peacebuilding as a post-conflict reconstructive activity and to a more holistic approach. But it is also stressed that they should work towards prolonging the work in the post-conflict zones in order to create a more sustainable peace. After the review of the peacebuilding architecture in 2015, it was stressed that the UN Peacebuilding commission must “promote an integrated, strategic and coherent approach to peacebuilding, noting that security, development and human rights are closely interlinked and mutually re-enforcing” (United Nations Peacebuilding, n.d.-b). Here we can start seeing that the UN might be moving beyond peacebuilding as merely post-accord reconstruction.

The way that Annan suggests the Peacebuilding Commission to function as a place of coordination, we see that it fits straight into the coordination role that the peacebuilding framework requires. As Lederach (1997) says, an office of coordination should only be a place to exchange information, and to keep an overview of the process and the range of activities hereunder.

The role of the UN Peacebuilding fund is to provide financial resources to projects that seek to sustain the peace in post-conflict contexts, and make sure that they do not relapse into conflict (United Nations Peacebuilding Fund, n.d.). In this sense, they are an important part of making sure that the peacebuilding efforts do not end after the initial implementation phase. They have provided \$623 million to such projects run by governments, other national or local institutions and other relevant actors in peacebuilding processes across 33 states (ibid.). This is both a post- and a pre-conflict measure, which indicates that they understand peacebuilding as a larger process, although we also here find a large focus on the post-accord phase. But, it is important to note that just because they see post-conflict matters as the most pressing, it does not mean that they think this is all peacebuilding consists of. Even Lederach agrees that the post-conflict phase is one that deserves a lot of attention. The good news here is that they contribute to locals, and we see that they are also led by the principles of liberal peace in the way they allocate funds.

The function of the UN Peacebuilding Support Office is to assist the Secretary General in the practical tasks of planning for peacebuilding, as well as support the Peacebuilding Commission with guidance on strategies and policy on the field. It is also the Peacebuilding Support Office that is in charge of administering the Peacebuilding Fund (United Nations Peacebuilding, n.d.-a)

As discussed in an earlier chapter, traditional peacekeeping missions was the norm for UN missions up until the post-cold war changes in the international society, and the tasks for the missions changed into what is referred to as “multidimensional peacekeeping” (United Nations Peacekeeping, n.d.-a). Today the UN have two types of peace operations, namely peacekeeping missions and Political missions and good offices engagements (United Nations, 2018b), and they are both mandated by the Security Council.

Peacekeeping missions are led by the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping operations, and these missions contribute troops to conflicted areas that focus on protecting the civilian population, preventing further conflict and strengthen the security in conflict areas (United Nations Peacekeeping, n.d.-b). UN peacekeepers help provide the space for political discussions to take place, and they also seek to have root caused to the conflicts addressed (ibid.).

Political missions and good offices engagements are led by the United Nations Department of Political Affairs, and these are missions that typically support mediation between parties, hold elections after peace agreements and otherwise support the implementation of peace. These missions consist of diplomatic envoys that help support the implementation of peace agreements in the field (United Nations, n.d.-b).

We see that these agencies answer to the Secretary General and the Security Council and are only in charge of carrying out the mandate provided them from case to case, and to advise on best practices of peacebuilding. Their task of coordination and funding are especially interesting to highlight here. According to Lederach both of these functions can be quite important parts of a peacebuilding process, and two tasks that the states may not be able to carry out themselves (Lederach, 1997). Also, when it comes to the decisions in a peacebuilding process, they do not aim to decide on how the processes are designed, but they offer support, and try to establish best practices. It seems as they are open to what Richmond

calls a local-liberal hybrid (Richmond, 2012). While they do put a lot of emphasis on the post-accord phase, it is still evident that they are starting to move towards a more holistic approach with an understanding of peacebuilding as something more than just post-accord reconstruction. This could do wonders for their overall capacities, because they will better understand what their part in the process can be.

5.3. Other UN contributions to peacebuilding

As this study seeks to understand what UN peacebuilding activities are available beyond what we have chosen to call post-accord reconstruction, this section will be used to outline some of the other agencies, tools and mechanisms that we consider fitting to peacebuilding as a wider process. It is important to point out that this may not be a complete list of contributions, but it is merely a selection that was found to be very relevant to this research.

Development and securing human rights and a proper livelihood for people is good investment into security. When people are leading good lives, it is less likely to end in conflict. We find this way of thinking in the (post-)liberal peace (Richmond, 2012). When it is argued that states that are democratic do not go to war with each other, a large part of what is meant by “democratic” is that human rights are secured, the population can take part in fair and free elections and society is overall well-functioning for all. Establishing basic human rights and a proper livelihood for the people should not be only a part of the post-accord phase where it is implemented, but it must be something that is sustained over time. In addition, it should be something that the international community works with continuously all the time, all over the world, in order to secure that no new conflicts erupt. There have been several important steps towards this in the past few years. Already in our introduction we mentioned international deals that have been made in the UN in order to secure development and security. The attention to these issues has taken form in The Paris Agreement on Climate Change, the Millennium Development Goals and later the Sustainable development Goals, and Nuclear Ban Treaty. It is argued here that all of these deals contribute to peacebuilding, and the way that the UN can be used as a forum to push these agendas is quite unique.

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) is an agency that work with sustainable development, democratic governance and peacebuilding, and climate and disaster resilience across 170 states and territories (UNDP, 2018). Their programs provide support to the local communities through supplying funds, volunteers, advice and technical support on the ground

(ibid.) Their priority at the time is the Sustainable Development Goals, and they always include a focus on the protection of human rights in their work (ibid).

It is also appropriate to include the Responsibility to protect (R2P) in this section. As outlined in a previous chapter, the R2P provides the legitimacy for intervention during a conflict where the government of a member state is not able to fulfill their responsibility to protect its citizens (Risse et al., 2013). In accordance with the peacebuilding framework of Lederach (1997), attempts to stop a conflict are also a part of peacebuilding, making the R2P a valuable tool. Now, unfortunately many are reluctant to use the R2P, especially after the experience from Libya, but it is important to underline that military intervention is not the only part of the R2P, it is clearly stated that diplomatic means should be tried first (Forsythe, 2012; Risse et al., 2013).

6.0. Colombia – the context

In this study Colombia and their peacebuilding process provides a context where the capacities of the UN can be examined. This chapter will provide some background information about Colombia, the conflict and the attempts to end the violence. Further, information about the negotiations that led to the peace agreement between the Colombian government and FARC will be presented along with the goals of the peace agreement. The last section will share some information about how the process of implementing the peace agreement is going.

6.1. The Conflict

Colombia is a country located in South America, bordering Venezuela, Ecuador, Brazil, Peru and Panama as well as both the Caribbean Ocean and the Pacific Ocean. 48,6 million people live in Colombia, and Catholicism is the most prevalent religion in the country (FN-Sambandet, 2017). Colombia is a republic state, and as of the 7th of August 2018, Iván Duque is the President. The financial situation in Colombia is relatively good despite the long running conflict, and it has especially been noted that liberalization of the market in the 90s led to economic growth, alongside a focus on security in the cities that has helped drawn foreign investors to the country. The sinking amount of violence has also helped the economic situation (ibid.). Oil is the most important legal export in Colombia, but if we include illegal substances, cocaine ranks as the number one export. The cocaine business has been lucrative for the drug cartels and the farmers who grow the coca plant, but the violence connected to this business has created great problems for Colombia and for the countries who's markets flood with Colombian cocaine. One of these is the United States. USAID has contributed millions of dollars to Colombia to “strengthen its capacity to address development challenges” (USAID, 2017), and part of the motivation for USAID is to put an end to the drugs (Welna & Gallón, 2007).

But the cocaine and the cartels that run it is not the only root to the problems in Colombia. The past 50-60 years in Colombia have been filled with violent conflict resulting in over 600,000 deaths, many gross human rights violations, and as many as 5 million people displaced (McNeish, 2015). The start of the conflict is marked by the period referred to as *La Violencia* (The Violence), which was a decade of war between the liberal and the conservative elites who fought for the power in the state. In 1958, after more than 300,000

lives had already been lost, the two parties settled the dispute with a power sharing agreement, dividing the all the positions in government between them, but also excluding any other political parties (Welna & Gallón, 2007). The farmers and other people in the countryside had been deeply affected by *La Violencia*, and during the conflict they formed their own military forces in order to protect themselves. These groups were supported by the communist party who gained a lot of support in the countryside, and after they were excluded from the government positions, a conflict between the government military forces and the guerilla groups started in 1964 (Welna & Gallón, 2007).

There are many different parties in this conflict; guerrilla groups, paramilitaries and the government forces, as well the large number of civilians that have been affected by the violence. Drug cartels fuel the conflict, there are problems connected to corruption, and democracy and human rights are under great pressure because of the conflict (Welna & Gallón, 2007). Attempts at viable solutions for power sharing have been attempted several times after *La Violencia*, but no viable results have come from this, leaving the many issues unsolved in Colombia (Welna & Gallón, 2007). The peace agreement from 2016 only tackles the relationship between the Government and FARC, but the hopes are that ELN will also enter into a peace agreement with the state shortly (United Nations, 2018a).

Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, FARC) is a left-wing guerrilla group that was established in 1964 by a man known as Manuel Marulanda Vélez or Tirofijo and was made up of rural bands that had already existed since the 1940s (Welna & Gallón, 2007). Over time FARC grew to consist of more than sixty different rural cells and is the largest guerilla group with about 18,000 fighters at the most (Welna & Gallón, 2007). Their main mission was to fight for their land rights, and further they support the redistribution of wealth in the country and they are against foreign interests meddling in the Colombian politics and business (Encyclopaedia Britannica, n.d.). The groups have used a range of armed attacks in their rebellion, such as bombings and assassinations, and they have funded their operations through connections to the drug cartels and with support from “sympathetic governments, such as the Cuban government of Fidel Castro” (ibid.). Through the years there have been a few attempts at settling the dispute peacefully. Most notably is the cease-fire agreement in 1985 that established the political party the Patriotic Union (UP), that consisted of members from both FARC and other left-wing groups (ibid.). The UP did well in the following election, but their political participation

was halted over the next few years due to a range of assassinations of their political leaders by paramilitary groups belonging on the right side of the political scale (ibid.). New attempts to reach a peaceful solution with FARC was instigated in 1998 by President Pastrana, but FARC withdrew from the negotiations shortly after (Encyclopaedia Britannica, n.d.). Following this attempt at negotiations, the newly elected president Uribe started an intensive fight against FARC in 2002, using policing and various military operations towards the group which severely reduced the number of attacks perpetrated by FARC and their presence in the urban areas of Colombia were severely minimized (ibid.). But their operations continued, and they were responsible for a range of deathly attacks up until they announced that their days of kidnapping and extortions was over and entered the peace negotiations with the Colombian government in 2012 that led to the signing of a peace agreement in 2016.

Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN) is the second largest guerilla group claiming about 5,000 fighters and was also established in the 1960s (Welna & Gallón, 2007). They were heavily influenced by communist thought from the Cuban Revolution, and this group has been more explicitly led by their ideologies than FARC while still sharing the rural roots (Welna & Gallón, 2007). There have been several attempts to reach a peace agreement between the Colombian government and ELN as well, and it is believed that it is necessary to get ELN on board with the peacebuilding process in order to succeed. Peace talks were announced during the presidential election in 2014, and the official talks started in Ecuador in February 2017. These negotiations have met a lot of challenges along the way and have yet to conclude in any official peace agreement (Latin-Amerikagruppene i Norge, 2017a).

Paramilitary groups have already been mentioned as right-wing perpetrators that basically forced the UP out of the political scene through assassinations in the 1980s. These forces are armed groups that in various capacities collaborate with the military in the battle against the guerilla groups. It is not known what the full extent of violence they have caused, but in 2011 there were 173 183 documented murders by the paramilitaries over the past 20 years, and it is believed that large parts of the massacres in Colombia since the 1980s have been conducted by the paramilitary groups (Latin-Amerikagruppene i Norge, 2017a).

Drug cartels in Colombia have been a problem both in their own, but also due to their links to the various guerilla and paramilitary groups (Welna & Gallón, 2007). Thus, the “war on drugs” fueled by the US goes hand in hand with the Colombian governments fight against the

various groups and create an extremely complex conflict. The millions of dollars that the US has contributed in aid over the past decades have come with certain guidelines that will serve the interest of the US. This is an example of how peacebuilding activities in a state can be disrupted by donors making claims to how the aid is spent as exemplified by De Coning (2013) in his study from Somalia.

The Colombian government has their share of the responsibility for the violence as well. For example, it is claimed that the government under President Uribe in the beginning of the 2000s took part in arming paramilitary groups (The Guardian, 08.09.2011). Furthermore, Human Rights Watch claim that the Colombian Government does not sufficiently prioritize to investigate the gross human rights violations that have been committed by the various groups and has failed to provide security for the population (Latin-Amerikagruppene i Norge, 2017a).

6.2. The Peace Accord

With the election of president Juan Manuel Santos in 2010 came new hopes for a peaceful solution to all the violence in Colombia, because he was determined to finally put an end to the violent conflict (McNeish, 2015). Already in 2010, pre-negotiations with FARC started, and official talks began in February 2012 in Havana, Cuba. These peace talks were led by president Santos of the Colombian government, and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), and supported by Cuba and Norway (McNeish, 2015). After four years and many rounds of negotiations, a peace accord was signed august 24th 2016, but the “Final Agreement for Ending the Conflict and Building a Stable Peace” was signed November 24th 2016 after some small amendments (United Nations, 2017b).

When entering into the peace talks, there were five topics that needed to be discussed and solved between the parties. These topics were rural reform, illicit drugs, political participation, ceasefire and the permanent laying down of arms, and the victims to the conflict. The peace agreement consists of six parts that each outline one of these issues and the planned action to solve it in the next phase of the peacebuilding. The sixth part establishes a mechanism for implementation and verifications of the Final Agreement, and the international community is invited to take part in the process as neutral observers and support the implementation.

The comprehensive rural reform that is outlined in part 1 seeks to include the rural areas and the population inhabiting these areas in the Colombian society. This group has not been able to enjoy the same rights as the urban population, as there have been issues with land rights, lack of security in the areas, and the governmental institutions have not been equally functioning across the state. The parties agree to structural changes through reform that will secure the equal rights of the entire population (United Nations, 2017b).

Part 2 bears the title “Political participation: a democratic opportunity for peacebuilding”. The root of the problem in Colombia has largely been a disagreement concerning political rights, ever since the power sharing agreement in 1958, where all other parties than the liberals and the conservatives were excluded from the government (Welna & Gallón, 2007). It is important for FARC to gain these rights, as that is what they have been fighting for. But the provision is not only to open up for FARC but to lay the groundwork for other parties to take part in the discussion too, creating an open and inclusive political arena so that the people can take part in the discussions concerning them and their country and what kind of peaceful society they will have in the future. The negotiation process was also open to input from others, as it was important to get a range of views in order to center the deal in the population (United Nations, 2017b).

Part 3 is concerned with the ceasefire and the permanent laying down of arms, as well as the reintegration of FARC into the Colombian society as civilians enjoying the same rights as the rest of the population. These two topics are interlinked because successful reintegration will be the safest way to avoid a relapse into violent conflict, and also because a promise of reintegration is non-negotiable for FARC combatants if they are to leave their violent habits behind (United Nations, 2017b). When we get to the UN missions in Colombia we will find that this point receives a lot of attention during the first two years of the implementation of the peace agreement.

The problem with the illicit drugs in Colombia is addressed in part 4. They target the land used for growing the crops as well as the trafficking of drugs and other illegal activities that is connected with this activity. Part of the plan is to transition the farmers who grow these illegal crops today, into growing legal crops in the future.

Part 5 addresses the plan for reparations for the victims of the conflict. Lederach argues that reconciliation should be central to any peacebuilding process, and this point in final

agreement between the Colombian government and FARC speaks to their understanding of this importance. A system is established based on both judicial and extrajudicial mechanisms that together provide means to investigate to get to the truth, sanction perpetrators, and pay reparations for the victims of the crimes that have been committed. Individuals, groups and communities are all classified as victims. Commission for truth is established and will contribute to the reconciliation of the Colombian people (United Nations, 2017b).

The deal underlines the need to not only put down arms, but to fundamentally change some important part of the Colombian society in order to solve the issues that have led to the conflict in the first place. The political sphere must become truly open, issues of land ownership must be dealt with, and the operations of the state institutions must become functional also in the countryside of Colombia (United Nations, 2017b). Further, it is underlined that a rights-based approach is the foundation for the entire agreement, that the fundamental rights that are not explicitly mentioned in the final agreement will also continue to be a goal to fulfil in accordance with international law (United Nations, 2017b).

While the peace negotiations have been led by the leaders from the government and FARC, it is found that a range of organizations and groups have contributed their statements to the peace negotiations in hopes of being heard, including but not limited to the Afro-Colombian Social Movement, women's groups and indigenous groups (WOLA, 2014). The results of this input can be found in several sections of the final agreement that discusses people's individual rights, as well as the rights of specific groups – women, indigenous peoples, LGBTI and others (United Nations, 2017b). Referring back to Lederach's framework for peacebuilding, it can be suggested that the leaders in the negotiation process are what he calls high-level leaders. These two carried a lot of power trusted in them by their group, and they received support from the international community in their negotiations. But middle-range contributions to the negotiations are evident in the statements provided by the various social groups as well. Furthermore, the participation of citizens that is outlined in the final agreement will help endorse the agreement and provide ownership to the peacebuilding process (United Nations, 2017b)

6.3. Post-accord implementations – 2016-2018

The specific details of the UN mission will be presented in the next section, but the last part of this chapter will start to discuss some of the implications the peace agreement has had for the Colombian people in the period since signing in 2016 until now.

Unfortunately, not everyone in Colombia supported *this* peace agreement. After the deal was signed, the adoption of it was put to a vote in a national referendum November 2nd 2016, and with a low voter turnout and small margins, the “No” side won the vote (BBC News, 03.10.2016). The reasons uttered for this is, amongst other things, that many feels that justice for the victims of the conflict and thus also the punishment for perpetrators is not good enough, and both the former president Uribe and the Catholic church were against the agreement (Latin-Amerikagruppene i Norge, 2017a). By Lederachs view, it can seem as though the element of reconciliation was not weighted heavily enough compared to that of demobilization and reintegration of FARC combatants in the peace agreement. But then only days after, Juan Manuel Santos was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts to land a peace accord with FARC. The peace accord was slightly amended and passed through congress in December 2016.

After the majority of voters rejected the peace agreement, it was passed quickly through the congress. Possibly this could be a result of the fact that after Santos received the Noble Peace Prize, all the eyes of the international community were on Santos and Colombia, leaving him no choice but to expedite the adoption of the deal. It is also possible that rushing the deal through the congress at this time could have contributed to making the wedge between the ones who supported the deal and those who didn't even deeper, as their concerns were not heard (Lederach, 1997).

The reason that a majority of the Colombians who voted “no” in the referendum is not that they are against peace, from all the sources we have seen, there is no disagreement about the goal being peace, but rather how to get there. Although the number of murders has decreased since the peace deal between the Colombian government and FARC was struck in 2016, the violence has not stopped completely yet. Previous FARC fighter, Ruben Cano, expresses that “We have always wanted a peaceful solution to the armed conflict. The way to end war has never been more violence” (my translation) (NRK.no, 16.06.2018). He and some of his companions that previously fought for FARC lost their patience while waiting for the government to fulfil their promises given in the peace accord and have taken matters of making a life for themselves into their own hands by buying land and building homes. He expresses his concern that the election of the new president might threaten the fragile peace (NRK.no, 16.06.2018). Furthermore, Human Rights Watch report in 2014 reveals that both

the guerrillas and the paramilitaries were still responsible for many human rights violations and serious crimes such as murders, abductions and child recruitment (Human Rights Watch, 2014), showing how the violence does not automatically stop just because discussions of peace have commenced, as they did in 2012. In addition to the issues connected to the peace agreement with FARC, there are other problems facing the country. There is still no peace agreement with ELN but talks started back up again in Havana in May 2018 (WOLA, 2018). It is crucial for the peace process to get this group on board as well. Furthermore, the turmoil in their neighboring country, Venezuela, have caused as many as one million people to cross the border in order to search for work after the economic collapse in their home country (The Guardian, 09.05.2018).

When the 2018 election campaigns started, it seems only natural that the peace process was an important topic among the candidates and the voters too. Iván Duque was elected president, and he was very clear during the election campaign that he was negative towards the peace agreement with FARC as is, and that his goal was to change it if he was elected president (The Guardian, 28.05.2018). President Duque took office in Colombia on August 7th, only days before the publication of this study. In his inaugural address he vowed to continue to improve the financial situation in the country, as well as confirming that he still plans to change the peace agreement with FARC (BBC News, 08.08.2018). It will be for another study to examine how the change in presidency will affect the peacebuilding process in Colombia, but it is interesting for us to note that this can have implications to the implementation and thus also implications to what Colombia might need in terms of support from the UN.

We do not yet know what the future in Colombia will look like, but we can assume that president Duque will initiate a process to make amendments to the current peace deal. In turn, this could result in insecurities that lead to instability, but it can also lead to a more unified people who feel heard in the peace process. The support for Duque in the elections can suggest that there is a lot of healing left to do before the Colombian people can embrace the peace. These democratic processes are an important part of any given peacebuilding process, and this is underlined across the data and theory that has been reviewed for this study. One can only hope that the actions of the new president will only strengthen the peace process, and not disrupt it to the level of causing a relapse into conflict.

7.0. Peacebuilding in Colombia and the role of the UN

As Lederach outlines in his framework, peacebuilding begins long before a peace accord is signed. As it is important for us to examine the range of possible contributions by the UN, this chapter must start by looking at the actions they took during the conflict and the peace negotiations. Next, it will present some data from the two UN missions in Colombia.

7.1. Conflict intervention

There had been several attempts at a peace deal with FARC through the years, most notably in 1985 and 1998 as described in section 6.2., but both of these ceasefires did not last long before the violence started back up. During these decades of war, the human rights violations that was recorded can be suggested to have been so severe that invoking the R2P could have been justified. However, the R2P was not established before 2005, and while this was a critical time in Colombia, it seems likely that the Conflict in Colombia was not the main priority of the UN at that time.

But there are other ways to contribute during conflict than to stage a military intervention, humanitarian aid and other support in the peacebuilding process was also much needed. UNDP is the part of the UN machinery that is responsible for overseeing the UN efforts in development, and they have had a presence in Colombia working on democratization and poverty reduction to help the Colombian people (UNDP, n.d.). In addition, other actors in the international community that supported Colombia in the years before the peace accord. The US contributed millions of dollars in aid, specifically to end the drug cartels (USAID, 2017). And a range of NGOs have been present in Colombia to help mitigate the humanitarian needs. One of them is the Norwegian People's Aid who has been present in Colombia since 2004 working to support democratization and to secure the rights of indigenous peoples (Norsk Folkehjelp, n.d.). You also find support through documentation of violations by organizations such as Human Rights Watch who annually post reports on their findings in Colombia (Human Rights Watch, n.d.)

When FARC decided to come to the negotiating table with the Colombian government, international actors stepped in to support the negotiation process. Cuba and Norway played a supporting role as facilitators for the talks, acting both as hosts, observers and negotiators. The UN was informed of the near end of negotiations already in January 2016. They were invited by President Santos to start preparations for a mission to Colombia to support the

implementation of the peace agreement and started planning for the first UN mission to Colombia shortly after (United Nations, 2016a). As a part of the process of planning for the mission in Colombia, a UN representative liaised with the negotiating parties, and contributed advice based on their best practices with monitoring and verification to help the negotiating parties make feasible plans. The UN Security Council approved the planned mission in Colombia resolution 2261 and requested to be kept informed on the preparations and recommended size and scope of the mission, as well as a report on the progress every 90 days.

7.2. The UN mission to Colombia

When the peace deal between the Colombian government and FARC had been signed in 2016, president Santos sent the UN Secretary General a letter informing him of the achievement and inviting the UN mission to enter into effect (United Nations, 2017b). By this time, the mission had been carefully planned, and by August of 2016, 180 observers from a range of member states had already arrived in Colombia and were ready to start contributing to the process.

The UN mission to Colombia is one of the political missions and good offices engagements run by the Department of Political Affairs (Department of Political Affairs, 2018a). The mandate of the mission was to take part in a “tripartite mechanism to monitor and verify the definitive bilateral ceasefire and cessation of hostilities, and the laying down of arms” (United Nations, 2016c). It was made clear that the territorial integrity of Colombia was to be respected, and that the UN only participated as a neutral observer as the parties to the conflict were to hold on to the ownership of the process. During the planning phase the UN continuously coordinated with the other two parties in the tripartite team, and through the data from the UN mission we can see that this coordinator-role is one that they kept throughout the process.

Eight regional headquarters were established and functioned as bases for the personnel that was deployed for the mission. These headquarters oversaw the process in 23 transitory local zones in Colombia and coordinated the monitoring of the laying down of arms (United Nations, 2016b). The mission consisted of about 450 observers spread out in both national, regional and local level, with Jean Arnault as the Special Representative for Colombia as well as the Head of the UN mission to Colombia. He and his team were based in an office in

Bogotá, and they oversaw the progress and reported back to the UN Security Council and the Secretary-General.

From the reports sent to the Security Council it is found that the tasks of the Mission was to coordinate the monitoring and verification and to observe that the two parties to the conflict respected the agreement of a permanent ceasefire (United Nations, 2017c). They were also tasked to log the weapons that were turned in during the laying down of arms and secure the destruction of these arms. Certificates were handed out to those from FARC who did hand in their arms, providing them evidence that they are ready for reintegration. They report that the situation is still unstable, and that much more work is needed to get to a peaceful state.

Attacks on human rights defenders have continued after the signed peace agreement was in place. A number of FARC members and their families have been killed, likely by dissidents who do not support the peace accord (United Nations, 2017a). These actions challenge the peace, as the population could start to lose faith in the process. A range of legislation agreed upon in the peace agreement has been fast-tracked through the system, including law of political integration of FARC and the establishment of a Comprehensive System of Truth, Justice, Reparations and non-repetition (United Nations, 2017c). Yet, it is reported that the situation is still unstable, and that much more work is needed to get to a peaceful state.

The UN Mission contributed both logistical and administrative support in the field, while also functioning as a mediator in disputes between the parties. The Mission also liaised with the range of Colombian actors contributing to the peacebuilding process, for example the Colombian police force was in charge with providing the security around the different zones (United Nations, 2017d). They also contribute information on activities besides the laying down of arms. For example, they reported that the National Reintegration Council, consisting of two representatives from both the Colombian government and from FARC, had met more than 30 times already, and their goal in this period was mainly to focus on the reintegration of children connected to FARC, to the release of FARC combatants, and to start planning for the reintegration of FARC (UN Mission in Colombia, 2017).

They experienced great success in reaching the goal of laying down arms before the end of this mission (UN Mission in Colombia, 2017), and it was completed as scheduled on September 26th 2017. The Security Council congratulated the parties for their “remarkable achievements” during the first year of implementation of the peace accord (United Nations

Peacekeeping, 30.11.2017). However, even if the results of the first year were remarkable, a lot of work still remained in Colombia, and the UN continued their presence in Colombia with a second mission, the UN Verification Mission to Colombia.

7.3. The UN verification mission to Colombia

The UN Verification Mission in Colombia was established by the UN Security Council Resolution 2366 and is also a political mission (Department of Political Affairs, 2018b). This second mission was needed in order to support the reintegration of FARC combatants into society, after the first mission had successfully overseen the laying down of arms. In the final peace agreement, these two processes were outlined as two that depended on each other (United Nations, 2017b). Thus, to secure that the laying down of arms is final and there is no relapse into conflict, it is crucial to secure a successful reintegration process as well.

Specifically, the mandate of this second mission is to verify the implementation of the provisions in the peace agreement that deals with the reintegration of FARC in the political, economic and social life. The mission was set to last for an initial period of 12 months, starting on the 26th of September 2017 as the first mission concluded its mandate (United Nations, 2017e). In the mandate for this mission it is also underlined that the territorial integrity of Colombia is to be respected, and that the UN missions is present to provide support to their peacebuilding process (ibid.). While praising the efforts made in the first UN mission to Colombia, the Security Council asked the parties to accelerate the implementation going forward, to ensure the continued support for the peacebuilding process, and to utilize the support of the range of institutions and groups ready to contribute (United Nations Peacekeeping, 30.11.2017).

From the reports sent to the Security Council it is found that the tasks of the mission were in large parts to fill the same role of a coordinator and neutral observer as in the first UN mission to Colombia (United Nations, 2018a). Only this time, they monitored the next step of the implementation, overseeing the reintegration of FARC and supporting the work of developing legal guarantees (ibid.). They kept a close eye on the security situation in the different areas and liaised with the Colombians in charge with providing secure zones. It was also found that the UN Mission was flexible and adapted as the situation developed. They reported moving funds around when needed, and also moving the personnel and their offices around to account for the movement of former FARC combatants in order to provide them support (ibid.). The

mission also paid special attention to cross-cutting issues, such as gender mainstreaming, ethnic perspectives and child protection (United Nations, 2018a).

Further the reports speak of the developments in the context. Elections were hosted in Colombia during the presence of the Verification Mission, and it was reported that these were the most peaceful elections to take place in Colombia for years (United Nations, 2018a). It is further stated in the report that it has been observed real changes in Colombian politics since the peace agreement was signed, including the political party FARC being represented in Congress (ibid.). However, killings of social leaders increased after the election, making it necessary to take steps towards improving the security for civil society (United Nations, 2018a).

The head of the UN Verification mission, Arnault, reports that the UN has cooperated well with Santos and his government, and that they are ready to continue the cooperation with president Duque. The leadership shown in this process by both Santos and the leadership of FARC receive praise, both from the UN Mission, and from each other (United Nations, 2018a). It can be found uncertainty in any peacebuilding process, and this is also true in the Colombian process. Furthermore, it is pointed out that while great achievements have been made during the past two years, the agreement between these two parties is only one part of the conflict in Colombia, and further steps are required to consolidate the peace (United Nations, 2018a)

The UN verification mission to Colombia is set to complete its mandate in September 2018 after a 12-month period of involvement. Thus, the final report for the mission is not yet available. So, what happens next? It is clear from the data discussed in chapter 6 that the Colombian peacebuilding process will not be concluded in September, but it is possible that the internal peacebuilders can handle the process on their own moving forward. Lederach (1997) argues that the peacebuilding process should be carried out by a middle-out approach, and this could support the idea of leaving the local leaders in charge now that the most crucial phase of the implementation is over. Also considering the post-liberal framework (Richmond, 2012), a legitimate leader has been elected, and provisions for building strong institutions have been made. Thus, the UN is no longer needed to the same extent as they were two years ago.

8.0. Discussion

The past three chapters have presented data on the UN peacebuilding architecture, on the Colombian context and on the UN involvement in the Colombian peacebuilding process. This section will further discuss the findings using the theoretical frameworks from chapter 3 with the support of the literature review in chapter 2.

Throughout this entire thesis it has been pointed out that there are different interpretations of the term peacebuilding. Here it is taken to mean the wider process including all the necessary steps to move from conflict to peace, also including the activities that take place before there is a signed peace accord and the process of implementation starts. When the UN first took the term peacebuilding into use, they used it as a term to describe the post-accord reconstruction of a state (United Nations, 1992), and I was curious to see if the use of the term had changed through reviews and as a response to critique and also the changing world that the UN operates in.

The reason that this definition is used is the idea that if peacebuilding is seen as a complex process, then the efforts that go into the process will be better coordinated and consider the history, the reconciliation and the local context. And this would arguably be better than using a tunnel vision when conducting a standard post-accord reconstruction. Thus, in order for the UN to effectively contribute to peacebuilding, they must see peacebuilding as more than post-accord reconstruction of a state. Because this study relies on this interpretation of peacebuilding, the rest of the discussion will be organized in three important steps, conflict and negotiations, implementation of the peace agreement and sustaining the peace in the future. The different sections will discuss the ways that the UN was found to have the means to contribute throughout the process, whether they define the actions taken as peacebuilding or not. While using this organization of the discussion, keep in mind that activities might stretch past these specific phases (Lederach, 1997). Lastly, this chapter will summarize the successes and limitations to the UN involvement in the Colombian peace process.

8.1. Conflict and negotiating peace

The conflict in Colombia is, like most intrastate conflicts, complicated and long lasting with deep animosities between the different groups at war. It was found that the international community did attempt to help in different ways during this time, for example by providing aid, supporting development projects and acting as guarantors in the negotiation of the peace

agreement. One of the actors that was present during this time was the UNDP supporting development in the country (UNDP, n.d.).

It has also been pointed out that the UN has an option to use a military intervention to end the violence in situations where the state is unable to protect its population from gross human rights violations by invoking the third pillar of the R2P (Forsythe, 2012). Data claiming that the Colombian government did not manage their task of protecting their people well enough was found in NGO reports, and in the final peace agreement this was also admitted by the parties (United Nations, 2017b). This information leads to believe that intervention in Colombia could have been justified with the R2P, but this was not an option that the UN utilized. There can be many reasons that the R2P was not invoked, among them is the possibility that the conflict in Colombia was not seen as severe enough to be a priority for the international community, or perhaps that the conflict did not disrupt the international order to an extent that demanded their attention. Colombia is one of the most democratic states in the region, has relatively well-functioning institutions in the urban areas, and an economy that has been growing since the market was liberalized in the 90s (FN-Sambandet, 2017). Considering the liberal underpinnings of the UN, could have been seen as a quite functioning country, and not one that needed to be rescued from themselves. Furthermore, it must be recalled that the R2P was established in 2005, meaning that for most of the time of the long-running conflict invoking the R2P was not yet an option. And even after its adoption, the R2P has been a contested agreement, and many states are reluctant to use it at all (United Nations, 02.07.2018).

To intervene in the matters of a state can only be done when the risks to human security is too high. And as the respect for state sovereignty is important in the UN, it was found that the Security Council has difficulties sanctioning missions without an invitation as consent is one of the core principles of UN missions (De Coning et al., 2017). This can severely limit the UN engagement in this phase, as not all parties in a conflict will always welcome the intervention of the international community. Now, in the case of Colombia, the parties have welcomed the UN support in form of political missions after the signing of the peace accord, but the data found during this study does not speak to how the parties in Colombia would have reacted to any UN military involvement during this phase.

During the process of negotiating a peace agreement between the Colombian government and FARC, the parties received support from actors in the international society, but it was not the UN that acted as the facilitators and guarantors for the process. Looking at the final peace agreement between the parties, it is found that it resonates well with the liberal peace framework that the UN is also shaped by. The peace agreement is rights-based, and the plans for the future commits all parties to the protection of the rights of both individuals and groups and the establishment or strengthening of institutions across Colombia (United Nations, 2017b). Furthermore, it is found that the peace agreement is also quite in line with the recommendations of the framework for peacebuilding (Lederach, 1997). Lederach (1997) is especially adamant that measures of reconciliation should be a central part of any peace process in order to secure its success, and the peace agreement between the parties puts a lot of emphasis on this as well. The peace agreement has a clear, long-time perspective, and the roots of the conflict are well addressed in the peace agreement (United Nations, 2017b).

Based on the data it can be suggested that different approaches have been used to solve the conflict in Colombia. As the peace negotiations have been led by the president of the Colombian government, and the leadership of FARC, it is what Lederach (1997) refers to as a top-down approach. He characterizes the top-level leadership as exactly this – the well-known leaders in focus that can lead the way because their people have trust in them and they have a lot of influence. Lederach (1997) further argues that as the top-level leaders do not always know what the masses in the grassroots actually care about in their day to day life, the top-level approach to peacebuilding is not necessarily the best solution throughout the process. It was found that the lower levels of Lederach pyramid (Figure 1, page 18) have been given the opportunity to provide input into the peace negotiations, and the UN mission reports suggest that they have been involved in the implementation as well. However, it must be concluded that this study does not provide enough insights into the topic of involvement of mid-level and grassroots leaders to make conclusions regarding their involvement.

8.2. Implementation of the peace accord

When the peace accord was signed, the UN established the first UN Mission to Colombia. They received word from Colombian president Santos already in January in 2016, forecasting a deal to soon be finished, and providing the UN the chance to start preparations for a mission to start as soon as the deal was signed.

As pointed out in both the frameworks by Lederach (1997) and Richmond (2012), the use of a top-down approach to peacebuilding might not be the best approach. The inclusion of the local leaders is crucial to the success of the peacebuilding process, and it was evident from the UN mission reports that a wide range of Colombian actors were included in the process. However, the polarization in the population concerning the peace agreement could suggest that measures of reconciliation are not yet sufficient, and it is crucial that the entire population is brought “on board” as soon as possible. This should be advice that the UN contributes to the parties. The previous insurgents must be properly reintegrated into society so that they will not return to violence, and there must be appropriate forms of justice so that the population that was affected by the violence can accept this reintegration. And the entire population must heal and learn to live next to each other. Even when the institutions are in place, this can take time (Lederach, 1997).

In the mandate of the UN Peacebuilding Commission it is stressed that they should focus on the reconstruction and building institutions that help secure human rights and development (United Nations Peacebuilding, n.d.-b). Thus, peacebuilding is here referred to as a post-conflict action to help recovery from conflict. That means that we cannot say that they had moved beyond thinking of peacebuilding as a post-conflict reconstructive activity and to a more holistic approach. On the other hand, it is also stressed that the Commission should work towards prolonging the work in the post-conflict zones in order to create a more sustainable peace, and this can suggest that they are moving in this direction.

8.3. Sustaining the peace

The challenge with choosing to evaluate the UN capabilities in an ongoing peacebuilding process is clearly that it is difficult to evaluate its entirety when large parts are still in the future. The current UN mission to Colombia will last until the end of September 2018, and at the same time it is also clear from the data that the peacebuilding process in Colombia will not be finished by then. The process of implementing the peace accord has been critiqued for being too slow. While the permanent ceasefire and the laying down of arms was found successful, there are still ways to go in dealing with the rest of the issues addressed in the peace agreement. Reparations and other steps in the reconciliation process has just begun, the reintegration of FARC into society has started but still has ways to go and illicit drugs remains a problem in Colombia.

With the President Duque taking office in Colombia on August 7th, no one knows what the future in Colombia will look like. He vowed to continue to improve the financial situation in the country, as well as confirming that he still plans to change the peace agreement with FARC (BBC News, 08.08.2018), and it can be assumed that president Duque will initiate a process to make amendments to the current peace deal. In turn, this could result in insecurities that lead to instability, but it can also lead to a more unified people who feel heard in the peace process. The support for Duque in the elections can suggest that there is a lot of healing left to do before the Colombian people can embrace the peace. These democratic processes are an important part of any given peacebuilding process, and this is underlined across the data and theory that has been reviewed for this study. One can only hope that the actions of the new president will only strengthen the peace process, and not disrupt it to the level of causing a relapse into conflict. Yet, a peacebuilding process consist of many different processes that are all important to the success and to a sustainable, peaceful future, and it is not unusual that the process must be re-evaluated, and plans change along the way.

It is imperative that Colombia, as every other state affected by intrastate conflict, manages to sustain the peace on their own. As the most critical phase of the implementation is over, it is fitting with the peacebuilding framework that the different internal peacebuilders are left in charge of the process. It is also important to point out that even if the UN missions to Colombia comes to an end, there is still a UN presence in Colombia through UN agencies such as UNDP that has continuously worked to promote development in the country (UNDP, n.d.). In addition, the functions of the peacebuilding architecture aim at supporting peacebuilding processes with funds and other means of support even after the initial phase of implementation of a peace accord (United Nations Peacebuilding Fund, n.d.) No one knows exactly how the situation will develop in Colombia, and in a way that is always the case in a peacebuilding process. Also, it will take decades to determine if the process was a success, because in order to do so, the peace must be sustained for a long time without relapse into conflict.

8.4. UN strengths and limitations in peacebuilding

This examination of the UN capabilities has found that UN is especially good when they can step into the role as a coordinator of various efforts. They can provide a neutral third-party during negotiations and implementation, and in doing so they have the rest of the international community in their back. The three agencies they have established as their peacebuilding

architecture can probably still develop their methods and improve how they work with coordination, but it was clear from the data that they have an attitude towards learning and best practices that tell us that they are committed to further developing their methods. In the peacebuilding framework used here, the role of coordinating the peacebuilding efforts is an important one, and it is best served by someone that can remain impartial, and who does not make all the decisions in the process (Lederach, 1997). This suits the UN well, as they are not supposed to function as a world government who overruns the member states, which is why the sovereignty is so highly respected. With the role of coordinating, it must also be easier to respect the sovereignty of the states they operate in.

Further, with the UN only functioning as a coordinator and advisor for the process, this leaves the local population in charge of the decisions. It was argued by both Lederach (1997) and Richmond (2012) that the local context was extremely important to consider when planning, and that those who know this context best is of course the people who have lived it. Yet, this does not mean only the top-level leaders, but it includes leaders on the mid-level and grassroots-level who have a better understanding of the day to day experiences of the population.

It was also found that there are some limitations to the UN engagement in Colombia. Knowing their interpretation of peacebuilding as a post-accord process, it was possible to guess that it would be the activities during this phase they would be best at delivering. As outlined above, while still having some possible points of improvement, the post-accord coordination is a role the UN fits well. But the data showed us that the phase before a peace accord is much more challenging for the UN to navigate. They have mechanisms that allows them to intervene in a conflict on a humanitarian basis, but their willingness to act without an invitation is small. Further, they have mechanisms that both seek to hinder relapse into conflict but also try to hinder conflicts breaking out in the first place. They have worked to promote and preserve human rights almost since the very beginning of their existence, and they have a monitoring mechanism that helps the member states evaluate and work to improve the way they protect the rights of their population. Also, the UN has proven to be a forum where the states can make significant agreements on development and climate change, and thus inspire all states to take part in a common effort to mitigate the negative effects that a changing climate or disproportionate development can have on communities over the world.

It is unclear in our data if the UN sees these efforts as parts of peacebuilding, but here it is argued that it is.

The UN is not supposed to be a “world government” and treading the line of respecting sovereignty and protecting human security and is not an easy task. Ideally the UN would have more options to support states in conflict, or to intervene when necessary, so that conflicts can end sooner. Further, a heightened focus on reconciliation in peacebuilding is necessary and is believed to help secure a higher rate of sustainable peaceful societies after conflicts. There are still ways to go for the UN to be properly adjusted to support intrastate conflicts, but there are many ongoing discussions that provides hope for the future.

9.0. Concluding remarks

The purpose of this study was to examine to what extent the United Nations is equipped to support in peacebuilding processes of intrastate conflicts through examining their efforts to support the current peacebuilding process in Colombia. The following research questions have guided the study:

- To what extent are the UN equipped to support peacebuilding efforts in intrastate conflicts?
- What are the limitations of the UN engagement in Colombia?

First, the literature review outlined four academic discussions that informed this study and shaped the way this study was designed in order to fit into the debates. A case study was conducted with the UN peacebuilding in Colombia as a case, and it was argued that the theoretical frameworks of post-liberal peace and Lederach's comprehensive peacebuilding framework could help examine to what extent the UN's capabilities currently have the necessary scope to effectively support peacebuilding in intrastate conflicts.

Using these frameworks, it is deduced that it would be useful for the UN to move beyond the "traditional" understanding of peacebuilding as a post-accord activity, and to view peacebuilding as a wider process that contains all the necessary steps to move from conflict to a sustainable peaceful state. It was not necessarily found that the UN has made use of a wider understanding of peacebuilding, but it was found that they manage a range of other activities that can support peacebuilding and that their mandate does provide the opportunity to interfere if need be.

It was found that both scholars and UN member states have pushed for change and argued for ways that the UN can improve, and that several reviews of the missions and the peacebuilding architecture has been conducted in the past decades. According to our findings, the latest review in 2015 has not managed to put the UN peacebuilding on a desired level, but promising steps towards understanding peacebuilding as a larger process have been made. It is recognized that the UN has a challenging task trying to balance the respect for state sovereignty and the need to protect the security and human rights in the international society, and it will be interesting to follow the developments in the years to come.

Further research on this topic could include several different contexts in which to examine the UN capabilities. With several contexts in the study, it would be possible to see if the UN has a specific pattern that they always follow, or if they manage to tailor their response to the local contexts. Another interesting approach to the topic could be to study the larger picture of peacebuilding, including a wider scope of actors to see how they fill different roles and work together to achieve a successful peacebuilding process. Lastly, another study on the Colombian peacebuilding process should be executed after the ongoing peacebuilding process is completed. That would make it possible to evaluate the entire process, including what steps was taken to sustain the peace once established.

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