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The Role of Human Intelligence (HUMINT) in Counter-Terrorism: A Case of Boko Haram

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Declaration

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Declaration

I, Emmanuel Kwabla Kpeglah, declare that this thesis is a result of my research investigations and findings. Sources of information other than my own have been acknowledged and a reference list has been appended. This work has not been previously submitted to any other university for award of any type of academic degree.

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Abstract

The role of human intelligence (HUMINT) in fighting terrorism with specific focus on Boko Haram war with the Federal Nigeria is the core of this thesis. It delves into how HUMINT was deployed in the fight, the strengths and deficits of these strategies and lessons that emerge in their use. Boko Haram, the terrorist organisation that registered its lethality on the global scene of terrorist organisations attracted a good measure of scholarly attention. Much is done on their mode of attacks, their growth, their religious and social significance, what they stand for, what they could do and the tactical strategies the security adopts to contain, deter and defeat them. There is yet to be a keen attention on the use of human intelligence in fighting the war.

The study discovered the use of local assets or spies in the dearth of trained intelligence officers knowing how long it takes to train an efficient intelligence asset. In-depth interviews with past and present intelligence officers and the engagement of experts in security from academia brought a new dimension of locating local assets at the estimated setting of terrorist targets to access asymmetric information for policy could be a new way human intelligence could add on to existing strategies. This is because intelligence assets are mostly constrained by language and in the case of Boko Haram Kanore, culture, geography in very localised conditions. Situations of this nature could reduce an asset to a strategic liability, vulnerable to capture by the enemy and its concomitant compromise of tactical operations.

Key words

Terrorism, intelligence, human intelligence, asymmetric information

List of abbreviations

C-JTF   Civilian Joint Task Force

HUMINT   Human Intelligence

M-JTF   Military Joint Task Force

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Chapter one

1.0 Introduction

Reports indicate Boko Haram - Nigeria's second civil war (Cook, 2014, p 3) is militarily and technically defeated (bbc.com, December 24, 2015, bbc.com, November 24, 2016). Nevertheless, they announce their essence through sporadic suicide attacks (news.un.org, January 11, 2015). Indeed, the jihadists firepower that seemed to overrun the federal army some time ago weakened and their Belgium-sized-20,000-square-mile-caliphate crumbled in March 2015 by the regional coalition forces of Nigeria, Cameroun, Chad and Niger (bbc.com, November 24, 2016). The Nigerian army raided and drove them from their last camp in the north-eastern Sambisa forest (euronews.com, December 24, 2016) and the black Salafist flags no more fly on most of the towns captured including strategic Gwoza, the caliphate capital, tactically protected by volcanic peaks of the Mandara mountains (Blair, 2015, Bryman, 2012).

Ethnicity and religious extremism are identified as triggers in most armed confrontations in Nigeria (Walker, 2012, p 2). There are vast documented militant religiosity dating back to Sheik Uthman dan Fodio (1754 -1817) who led a jihad against corrupt and apostate Hausa ruling class to establish the Sokoto caliphate (Agbiboa, 2013). The ideology, the cognitive map and the actions of Boko Haram is not distant from Sheik Uthman. This is because, Boko Haram believes that northern politics was seized by a crop of corrupt Muslims and waged a war against the Federal Republic to establish a pure Islamic state rule by sharia law (Walker, 2012, p 2). Boko Haram officially calls itself "Jama' atul Alhul Sunnah Lidda 'wati wal Jihad" which translates as "people committed to the propagation of the Prophet's teaching and jihad" (Forest, 2012, p 1). Viewing terrorism as an effective channel of carving their sharia-governed sovereign entity, Boko Haram began its confrontation in 2009 after the central government of Nigeria launched a counter attack that killed 800 people, mostly the sect members (Mantzikos, 2013, p 10).

In what most analysts observed to have toughened Boko Haram and self-possessed for revenge was the killing of Mohammad Yusuf, the leader of the cult. Series of mayhem on mostly softer targets were unleashed against Nigerians including neighbouring Chad and Cameroun. Among the various attacks, which targeted churches and other perceived enemies of Islam including Moslems were the bombing of the Nigerian Police Headquarters, June 16, 2011 in Abuja, the August 26, 2011 suicide bombing of the United Nations buildings and the abduction of Chibok schoolgirls April 14, 2014 (Tukur, 2017). These atrocious gains shot Boko Haram to international notoriety. Current statistics revealed that Boko Haram killed 100,000 people and displaced an estimated 2,114,000 people, producing 52,311 orphans and 54,911 widows (Tukur, 2017).

If the international coalition, together with the Nigerian army reduced the tactical expansions and strategic effectiveness of the terrorist group. How was it done? What was the role of intelligence in containing the threats? Sect members of Boko Haram in July 2009 after the showdown between the

Nigerian security forces fled to neighbouring countries to regroup, recruit, retrain and resurface with renewed pre-emptive experience and stepped up attacks (Maiangwa et al., 2012, p 47). How was human intelligence fashioned to neutralise such schemes to defeat the miscreants decisively?

To answer these questions, the research examines the role of human in intelligence (HUMINT) in the counter-terrorism efforts that perhaps enfeebled the front of the Boko Haram's military operations and how human intelligence could help wither the front of the terrorists?

1.1 Problem statement

This research digs how security apparatus engaged intelligence in the Boko Haram struggle. Michael Howard (2002 p 10) observed that a struggle against terrorism is primarily a battle for hearts and minds and that without hearts and minds, one cannot obtain intelligence and without intelligence terrorists cannot be overpowered (Howard, 2002, p 10). In essence, intelligence is the handmaiden of a warrior (Keegan, 2010, p 5) as military strength depends on regular flow of intelligence (Austin and Rankov, 2002, p 1). This explains the important part intelligence assumes in fighting any battle.

My personal motivation for this study leans on my understanding that a vibrant intelligence community has the key to overcoming deadly terrorists' attacks. As Treverton and Angell (2008) and Berkowitz (2002 p 190-192) have indicated terrorists are human beings not states, they shield themselves by mixing their activities into normal social life and are ready to risk their lives for whatever belief they have. They exploit the weaknesses in social and bureaucratic set ups and with the internet that makes avalanche of information available to them to attack innocent civil society (Berkowitz, 2002, p 190-192, Treverton and Agrell, 2009).

On the battle grounds with the jihadists, the Nigerian army experience many strategic and tactical losses. Were these losses intelligence failures?

Using constructivism, rational choice concepts and Betts (1978) concepts of intelligence failure as framework (Betts, 1978), the study will explore themes in intelligence with specific focus on HUMINT. The research will examine the strengths, weaknesses, dilemmas, risk factors, epistemological assumptions as well as best approaches of HUMINT as applied in fighting the Boko Haram terrorists.

1.2 The significance and scope of the study

It is a practical view that intelligence study as a sub-field is a missing dimension of international affairs but gathered momentum some two decades past (Scott and Jackson, 2004, p 140). The study will contribute to this hidden discipline taking the centre stage in world security debate.

The scope of the study will be limited to the events connected to human intelligence gathering, collation, analysis and interpretation and dissemination in the war and how effective or weak they were.

1.3 Objectives of the study

The objectives of the study are:

1. Identify how human intelligence (HUMINT) schemes were applied in fighting Boko Haram.
2. Examine the success or failures of the human intelligence (HUMINT) strategies engaged.
3. Suggest some solutions to intelligence lapses if any.

1.4 Research question(s)

How were human intelligence techniques applied in fighting Boko Haram terrorists and how

efficient or less efficient were these strategies?

1.5 The structure of the thesis

Chapter two reviewed related literatures and created the gaps the study essayed to fill. Chapter three discussed the method and methodological strategies through which data was derived. Whilst chapter four analysed the data, given details of HUMINT strategies deployed in fighting Boko Haram, chapter five, which closed curtains on the study gave summary and recommended some solutions to lapses.

Chapter two

2.0 Literature review, theories and concepts

Nations across the world today battle tiny but daring groups of terrorists, whose threats are firmly embedded in their plans. Their miniature but destructive instruments are tough to spot in the bustling human routines. Satellites are unable or limited raking through the caves, deep forests and vast deserts where terrorists hide from the eyes of the security apparatus. For these

reasons Betts (2009) is convinced that though harder it was to understand and predict the intentions of the Soviet threats in the cold war days, the ideology, purposes and behaviour of radical Islamists terrorists are hardest to divine and hardest to diagnosed (Betts, 2009, Seale, 1999). Take for example the dreadful day - September 11, 2001- 9 /11. The dexterity in planning and the accuracy of its execution, the death count and all had shaken everyone including the intelligence community across the world. One of the chief lessons learnt was the changed nature of the enemies the capacity to uncover their secrets altered radically.

Treverton (2009) identified four changes – terrorists act slowly, attack carefully, discontinue targets and attack modes and unpredictably emerge with new groups, skills and innovations. Secondly, the swings in their targets deprive the intelligence community and policy of sharing stories that could enable analysis and communication and therefore policy actions. Thirdly, terrorists engage in asymmetry warfare, shape capabilities against human vulnerability and weak defence. For example, fuel-filled jets and weak passenger clearance procedures at airports or truck filled with explosives driven through buildings could be vulnerable assets to their cause. Terrorists according to Treverton, engage in intense tactical investigations through huge quantity of information available to them. Finally, since the business of intelligence is a realist enterprise, the statist approach to intelligence gave prominence to secrets - information that intelligence "owned." However, terrorists are hardly open (Treverton, 2009, p 2-4).

These changes and indications give a clear boundary between the cold war period and today in which in the former, intelligence targets were easy to find but hard to kill (Soviet military forces) but in the post-cold war, they are easy to kill but hard to find (terrorists) (Betts, 2009, p 8). It was an era described "the golden age of intelligence" when technical collections provided high confidence compare to espionage – human intelligence or HUMINT which was not successful as spymasters have hoped (Betts, 2009, p 8).

There are no doubts admitting technology encouragingly impacted the gains of intelligence collection especially the deployment of unmanned aerial vehicles which provided quicker and efficient conflict coverage. Yet human intelligence is required to cope with the most crucial aspect of the war on terror more than it was necessary to implement strategies against Moscow's lethality (Betts, 2009, p 8).

2.1 What is intelligence?

Intelligence is as elusive as a fictional character (Gill and Phythian, 2006, p 1), it's a "dark world of secrecy and deception useful for nefarious acts…,"(Turner, 2005, p 2), ambiguous as the term "news" but every journalist noses newsy news when it breaks and take note (Gill et al., 2008, p 4) so is "the keen intellect and iron-willed" spy knows when he or she chances upon it. Like

many disciplines, intelligence is a victim of definition predicament. Gill and Phythian observe that no definition for intelligence works (Gill and Phythian, 2006, p 1). Warner also ask "without a clear idea of what intelligence is, how can we develop a theory to explain how it works questions (Warner, 2002, p 15)? He suggested a definition of intelligence as a "secret state activity to understand and influence foreign entities," (Warner, 2002, p 21). This conception also falls on same dialectical deficiency as foreign entities could be related to other states which could not explain non-state actors who are threats to national security.   However, in this labyrinth, I choose the course of Gill and Phythian (2006) who suggest the start-point of defining intelligence is the recognition that it is a means to an end and that end is state security. Of course, there are a range of sub-state actors, commercial, non-commercial, criminals and terrorist organisations who also perceive the need to collect and analyse intelligence to guard against thievery of the secrets. It for this reason and for the purpose this research that I adopt Turners (2005) conception of intelligence as a working definition. He defined intelligence as a policy relevant information, collected though open and clandestine means and subjected to analysis for the purpose of education, enlightening or helping policy makers in formulating and implementing national security and foreign policy (Turner, 2005, p 4). There are three elements of specificity in the definition. It projects the mission of intelligence – gathering information based on the requirements political elites identified. The definition specifies the objectives of intelligence – intelligence cycles – identifying needs, collecting information based on those needs, analysing the information, producing finished intelligence based on those analysis and disseminating the analysis to political leaders who may then identify additional needs that may start the cycle all over. The third leg of the definition serves as an asset to political leaders to implement foreign and national security policy (Turner, 2005, p 4-5).

This could be a better conceptualisation of intelligence that involves a sovereign state with non-state actor Boko Haram in an asymmetrical warfare.

2.2 Problems of human intelligence

"Knowledge of the spirit–world is to be obtained by divination; information in the natural science may be sought by inductive reasoning; the laws of the universe can be verified by mathematical calculation: but the dispositions of the enemy are ascertainable through spies and spies alone" (Tzu, 2005, p 123). The totality of the quote, especially the last segment reveals unescapable essence of human intelligence.

However, Sun Tzu's trust in intelligence seem to have swung when he warned – "just water which carries a boat from bank to bank may also be the means of sinking it, so reliance on spies, whilst production of great results is often time the cause of utter disaster." This is not to cast as fickle the role of intelligence in war-craft but to sound a note that intelligence gatherers out comes are not determined in mathematical precisions. What enables a good general to conquer and achieve feats beyond the reach of ordinary men is foreknowledge about the enemy's intentions, disposition and what he means to do which are not deductible from historiography nor reasons from analogue cases.

Carl Von Clausewitz, the Prussian war theorist may adopt "accept and reject" tactics on these claims. His definition of intelligence as "every sort of information about the enemy and his country – the basis in short of our own plans and operations" gave him up for acceptance but refuted his tolerance for intelligence by branding it as "unreliable and transient." He argued that wars based on intelligence had weak structures that can easily collapse into ruins.

Quality control is a trying task in intelligence and much trickier for human intelligence. For varied intentions, some sources creatively embellish obtainable public information, spice them up with well-turned intelligence jargons to resemble data from highly placed insider sources to hoodwink and outwit intelligence officers – "paper mill" (Shulsky and Schmitt, 2002, p 16) Then when a source is "doubled" by providing fictitious pieces of information to a target especially in a case of a captured source who feigns loyalty to avoid punishment, intelligence quality becomes mistier. Sun Tzu (2001 p125) refer to them as "doomed spies"

Intelligence officers must be cautious of walk-ins,' potential suspects, who could be "double agents"- spying for an actor they pretend to be spying on.

Important it is to consider Av Sun Tza (Tzu, 2005, p 123) idea of recruiting "worthy men who have been degraded from office, criminals who have undergone punishment, favourite concubines greedy for gold, men who are aggrieved for being in subordinate positions or passed over in distribution of posts …or fickle turncoats who always want to have a foot in each boat." Such people he noted be secretly approached by means of rich presents to win their hearts and minds.

He identified five classes of spies- the local spies, inward spies, converted spies, doomed and surviving spies. In the heart of the enemy country, the intelligence community must win people over through kinder treatment to fill the local spy demand. The favourites for inward spies are the worthy men and women deposed and degraded from office not losing sight of criminals who have undergone punishment and are ready to spit vengeance on the system that wrongly or rightly pursued them.

Though this could be a riskier business, Tzu was optimistic on the view that converted spies – getting hold of the enemy's spy and altering them for one's own purpose is one of the best ways to grab the secrets of the enemy. Then in name of state survival, spies are set on death mission

by giving purposefully deceptive information to the enemy which when discovered the enemy would have no option than put to death the dishonest spy.

Finally, the surviving spy is most promising as he or she relays credible information from the enemy. They are not only part of the regular army but are the heartbeat of victory, progress and state survival in the anarchic state structure (Tzu, 2005).

A spy of surviving category "must be a man of keen intellect, though in outward appearance a fool; a shabby exterior, but with a will of iron. He must be active robust, endowed with physical strength and courage; thoroughly accustomed to all sorts of dirty work, able to endure hunger and cold and put up with shame and ignominy," (Tzu, 2005, p 126).

Tzu further indicated that a surviving spy must be an honest character full of intuitive perception and practical intelligence or wisdom. However, in a situation that spy secrets are leaked the spy must be put to death and stop the mouth that divulge the secret with death reward (Tzu, 2005, p 127).

As stated earlier, though earlier despites its weakness, human intelligence in the fight against terrorism must take a frontal stage with supports from electronic collections and open sources system.

2.3 What is terrorism and who is a terrorist?

Terrorism is a "cliché in search of a meaning" (Kennedy, 1999, p 4) and who a terrorist is reeking ambiguity. No definition has been universally accepted and the unknowable "who is a terrorist and what definition better applies" still remains. Depending where one stands, a terrorist or a terror organisation could be gloried as "freedom fighters." Some are even martyred as their images find space on walls of those who put belief in their ideologies (Kennedy, 1999, p 2).

Boko Haram, an Islamic sect around which discussions are centred is an example of numerous of such groups searching better definition. Is it a local or international terror group? Is it a political organisation? A regime changer? The sect rose from the embers of ruining economic and political performance sparking anger and vengeance directed at the Federal Nigeria through series of lethal attacks on the military, police, schools, political figures and other infrastructures (Blanquart, 2012, p 30). The evolutionary process of the sect, first as a charity organisation having an Islamic school and a mosque that attracted pupils from many homes including neighbouring countries, used the mosque for recruitment for its grand aim and when Ustaz Mohammed Yusuf was captured and killed (Chothia, 2012, Blanquart, 2012, Adesoji, 2010), a war theatre emerged in which the Salafist fundamentalists, Boko Haram stooped to unleash its ideology on a constitution-governed secular Nigeria (Adesoji, 2010, p 96). Since the Boko

Haram violence was not the only attempts towards the imposition of Islam, analyst observe that the novelty of Boko Haram was identified in the heroism in its soldiers, "the spread and swiftness of its military organisation and the belief in its leadership and perhaps its membership that it could engage a modern state in a military duel all show an extraordinary commitment to their cause" (Adesoji, 2010, p 96).

Caught in this definition quagmires, Blanquart settled on the Australian Counterterrorism white paper (2010) model of meaning that defined terrorism as an enduring threat from international terrorism in the form of violent jihadist movements to Australia comprising predominantly of groups associated with al-Qaeda (Blanquart, 2012, p 32). The crux of his definition was anchored on Boko Haram's relationship with other international terrorist organisations and specifically mentioned intelligence reports that specially from the Algeria and the US that highly linked Boko Haram with Somalia al-Shabaab and al-Qaeda Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). Blanquart further predicted that Boko Haram could be an incubator of international terrorism, expand and join the global jihadist movements specifically Al-Qaeda. He indicated that defining Boko Haram using the Australian model Nigeria could reap Australia's efforts in containing Boko Haram insurgency and further argued Australia had a robust bilateral relation with Nigeria and had given aids to the Nigerian government for developmental purposes.

Two truths confirmed Blanquart's data. Boko Haram was locally focused on regime change and ideology shift from secular to Sharia as the ultimate law for Nigeria. However, when the bombs of Boko Haram thundered through the United Nation's building in the capital Abuja in ….it was a unspoken confirmation that Boko Haram had assumed international "mission" as terror-inducer movement (Connell, 2012, p 87).

Secondly, credible reports indicated Boko Haram's affiliation and collaboration with AQIM with the later supplying arms for the former to "defend Muslims in Nigeria and stop the advance minority of crusaders" indicating further that al-Qaeda had much interest in the sub-Saharan Africa. Again, Boko Haram confirmed sending its members for training with AQIM and al-Shabaab whilst they also share ideas in constructing improvised explosive devices, recruitment of suicide bombers, the efficient use of the internet in spreading messages for recruitment to their fold and intelligence sharing (Connell, 2012, p 89).

How sustainable is a definition fixed on affiliation, bilateral relations and aid? What happens when affiliation changes? Arguing in constructivists terms, I could confidently say affiliations, bilateral relations and aid could collapse the very day actors "deconstruct," or "reconstruct" their relationship and cease to mutually hold each other as friends or allies based on their application of rational choices and appropriateness logic. This is because, states in their relation with others change norms which in effect change their interests and practices towards each other (Checkel, 1998, p 330). Friends could be enemies (deconstruct) just as enemies could be friends (reconstruct).

In 2004, the United Nations Security Council in its efforts to settle the definition dilemmas only identified some acts common with terrorists as criminal:

"Criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury or taking of hostages, *with the purpose to provoke a state of terror* in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, *intimidate a population or compel a government or an international organisation* to do or abstain from doing any act, *which constitute offence within the scope of and as defined in the international conventions and protocols* relating to terrorism"(Saul, 2005).

This conception of definition for terrorism is lifeless at birth. The notion of law according to H.L.A. Hart is an amalgamation of primary (prescriptive) and secondary (institutional empowering) rules. However, in international society there are no universally agreed upon rules of recognition, rule of change and rule of adjudication (Wilson, 2009, p 4). Given the anarchic international scene as realists perceive it, the international system lacks an overriding authority for rule enforcement even if there are some internationally agreed laws shifting the issue to self-help domains. Laws in modern states are backed by authority of government including its power to use or threaten force. Unfortunately, the international laws are without such prop (Wilson, 2009, p 4). Again, the asymmetry nature of terrorists, their facelessness, their fleeting appearance and their multifaceted mode of attacks make any effort to define terrorism tougher in such term by criminalizing their activity is a good step but have limited success. They are not states to be coerced, deterred or defeated charged and sanctioned. In all these uncertainties, a better approach of defining terrorists and their acts is to identify terrorism using its features as indicated in the US 22 Code Annual Country report on terrorism:

The term *international terrorism* means terrorism involving citizens or territory of more than 1 country.

The term *terrorism* means premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatants targets by subnational or clandestine agents.

The term *terrorist group* means any group practicing or which has significant subgroups which practice international terrorism.

The term *territory and territory of a country* mean the land waters and airspace of a country

The term *terrorist sanctuary and sanctuary* mean an area in the territory of the country that is used by a terrorist organisation to carry out terrorist activities including training, fund raising, financing, recruitment or as transit point.

Boko Haram satisfies all these features – they started their operation in the north-eastern city of Maiduguri, the capital of Borno State (Eme et al., 2012,p 82) and moved to a village called Kanama, Yobo state near the border with Niger, setting a separatist community that ran on hard-line Islamic principles (Walker, 2012, p 3).

The terrorist's attacks are varied targeting soft spots - government installations, churches and mosques(Blanchard, 2014, p 4) with

Boko Haram involved members who come from Chad and Niger (Eme, 2012, p 17) and situated as their base and sanctuary in Sambisa forest (Waddington, 2015).

Though this approach could be a better conceptualisation of Boko Haram, lacks the ability to define terrorists who are described as "lone wolf terrorists." Even though some of these lone wolves are linked to terrorist organisations, there are those who act alone considering the case of the Oklahoma city bomber in 1985 who acted without affiliation to any known terrorist group (Phillips, 2011a).

2.4 Theoretical bond – constructivism

Through intersubjective interactions and influences such as norms, identity and ideas, the world is socially constructed. Identity engenders order and predictability, "telling you and others who you are," "who others are" and a particular set of interests regarding choices of consequent actions in a particular domain (Hopf, 1998, p 174-175). Identity and interests evolve through social practices. Every sovereign state has varied interests. As these interests are sieved, some are legitimised whilst others are cast or omitted because there is no reason for them or its promised gains may be too meagre. However, choices are constrained by webs of understanding of the practices, identities and interests of other actors that prevail in a particular historical context (Hopf, 1998, p 177).

Power to the constructivists has a metaphysical and material conception. Unlike neo-realists and liberalists who engage military and economic power or both as the single most important power, constructivists believe in both – material (economic and military) and discursive power. They put faith in the power of knowledge, language ideas and culture arguing that ideas as forms of power is more than brute force (Hopf, 1998, p 177). The power of social practice lies in the capacity to produce intersubjective meaning that constitute social structures and their actors. Social practices in effect produce predictability and order, certainty and therefore strengthen confidence about actions of an actor producing reactions from the other actor. Essential to constructivists is having the economic and military means to employ discursive power (Hopf, 1998, p 179-180).

At the heart of discursive power is issues relating to security. To give meaningful approach to security, constructivists advance the concept of securitization or de-securitization – a discursive construction of threat or removal of the issue from the security agenda (Williams, 2012, p 69, McDonald, 2008). This involve varied issues such as terrorism, environmental changes could lead to security problem diseases such HIV/AIDS.

Securitization is the act of positioning through speech acts (usually by a political leader) of a particular issue as an existential threat to survival which in turn with the consent of relevant citizenry enables emergency measures and the suspension of normal politics in dealing with the it (McDonald, 2008, p 567). At this point of securitization, negotiation is key focussing on the historical resonance of the threat which when successful, the threat is well articulated and defined and the facilitating conditions specified.

The actors under this discussion are the Federal Republic of Nigeria and Boko Haram. Understanding the identity of the two actors sets the limit for legitimacy and feasible political action as it gives a fuller definition of "who we are and other/s from whom we need protection" (Williams, 2012, p 62). The federal republic of Nigeria is a secular nation with liberal norms and ruled by a federal constitution. What threatens this ideology is the Salafist jihadist organization – Boko Haram battling Nigeria in an asymmetry warfare

2.5 Nigerian security structure and how intelligence is positioned

When the Nigerian security service was established in 1976 as the Nigerian Security Organisation (NSO) the vision was the police together with the various security branches of the armed forces were capable of maintaining political stability and public security. However, the February 13, 1976 tragedy in which General Murtula Mohammed was killed in a coup d'état to take over the reins of government. changed the scope to a secret service organisation. Though the coup was stopped General Olusengun Obasanjo who succeeded Murtula Mohammed constituted an intelligence organisation independent of those involved in the intelligence information gathering. It was realised that the existing Special Branch of the Police was what was reformed into the NSO (Ugochukwu, 1996, p 72).

According to the law that established it the NSO was to prevent and detect crime against the security of Nigeria, protect and preserve all classified matter concerning or relating to the security of Nigeria and such other purpose as the head of federal military government may assign it. Contrary to legal requirement, the degrees of NSO was not published in the gazette especially facts relating to basic structure and standing orders and therefore remained secret.

The NSO according to Ugochukwu (1996) was later given additional mandates such as:

Obtain information by secret sources or other means accurate intelligence regarding persons or organisations that engage in acts of espionage, subversion or sabotage against Nigeria or engage in acts that may threaten the security of Nigeria (ibid).

Identity and where necessary arrest or assist in the arrest of persons believed to have committed crime against the security of Nigeria.

The operational orders also laid down the following assignment: collect collate, assess and disseminate intelligence information affecting Nigeria's state security and maintenance of public order. They are mandated to investigate all acts of subversion, espionage and sabotage against the country. They are also to keep records of individuals and organisations engaging in subversive activities and investigate the reliability of person who may have access to classified information against the country including keeping records of individuals and organisations engaging in subversive acts.

After ten years in operation, Ugochukwu wrote the NSO struggled under the glitches of sudden establishment. It lacked needed materials for its intelligence work which hindered its efficiency. The circumstances surrounding its establishment as a reaction to an assassination of a president predisposed its personnel seeing themselves as regime protectors. Its police heritage fuelled complacency in training for its staff. As a result, it relied mainly on the Nigerian Army Intelligence Corps Training School which is structured for basic intelligence not sophisticated training in intelligence (Ugochukwu, 1996).

Nevertheless, the NSO has extended operational area covering the range of both the CIA and the FBI in the United States of America. Under civilian rule between 1979 and 1983 for example the cruelty but could not predict and stop the December 31, 1983 coup d'état. Under Buhari who took office as the civilian regime the NSO took a more notorious image of vendetta exploiting the provisions of the preventive detention decrees promulgated by the regime. At this point the NSO was an observed view that the NSO turned the law unto itself as former politicians became victims of harassment, intimidation and long-term detentions without trial. It was reported that journalists, social commentators were silenced and the whole atmosphere in Nigeria was reminiscence of the classical image of the "Big Brother Watching You" (Ibid, p 75). Basil Ugochukwu reported that when Buhari and Idiagbon were overthrown by General Ibrahim Babangida in August 1985, things had deteriorated forcing to accept responsibility and

promised his government would respect the right of the citizenry but warned his government would not allow human right propaganda to degenerate into subversion (Ugochukwu, 1996, p 76).

2.6 The Nigeria intelligence service reorganised

One year after his presidency, president Babangida reorganised the intelligence service when he signed the National Security Agencies Decree Number 19 of June 5 1986 into law. The law split the NSO into three agencies with distinct mandates. It established the following agencies.

2.7 Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA)

This agency is charged with the responsibility of detecting and preventing crime of a military nature against the security of Nigeria and to protect and preserve all military classified matters concerning the security of Nigeria within and outside the country.

2.8 The National Intelligence Agency (NIA)

This branch of the intelligence agency is responsible for the general maintenance of security in Nigeria and outside the country in matters of related to military issues particularly pertaining to intelligence outside Nigeria.

2.9 The State Security Service (SSS)

This branch of the security agency is charged with the task of detecting and preventing within Nigeria any crime against the internal security of Nigeria and the protection and preservation of all non-military classified matters concerning the internal security of Nigeria. The activities of these agencies come under a coordinator who is appointed under the decree and whose function is to advise the Head of State on matter of concerning intelligence activities of all the agencies. He or she is expected to recommend to the head of state matters in relations to the activities of the agencies as circumstances demand. The coordinator also evaluates intelligence reports on national security and provide appropriate dissemination of such intelligence within the government using existing facilities(Ugochukwu, 1996, p 72-77).

2.10 The growth and religious significance of Boko Haram - an intelligence perspective

The memoirs of Boko Haram as they trickled to light disclosed concentrated narratives, a piece of which could be that names were like bowls carrying destinies to their intended ends and aspirations to their peaks. Debatable it is that if names could be viewed as such perhaps, they run risks of moral subtlety and mists of nuances. Until such nuances are expelled, such disputes take unending lengths.

When Boko Haram created a "live- off-the-land" life style, named a camp "Afghanistan" in the remote northeast Nigeria and called themselves the "Nigerian Talibans." It seemed well-connected to their official name – "Jama' atul Alhul Sunnah Lidda' wati wal Jihad" which translated as "people committed to the propagation of the prophet's teaching and jihad" (Meehan et al 2011). This is symbolic of Mecca-Medina pilgrimage as embarked by prophet Mohammed.

The sects most popular name "Boko Haram" was perhaps a criticism and a disguised refutation and mockery of the Yusuf's philosophies by neighbours who rejected joining the sect as it referred to those in the northern part of the country as *"yan boko."* This is translated as child of the book, people whose heads have been turned away from the teachings of Allah by the corrupting western values (Walker, 2012, p 3). To be labelled as such is to be deemed spiritually alienated, morally corrupt in holiness and guilt-ridden in criminality of the self-aggrandisement rather than dedicating oneself to the *umma* (community) (Walker, 2012, p 3).

To cure and clean the irredeemably dirtied city was to go on *hijra* (Walker, 2012), an Arabic term which literally means "to abandon," "break ties with someone" or "migrate." The movement signified Prophet Mohammed's obligatory movement from Mecca to Medina in AD 622 and that of the migration of a group of Muslims on a voluntary *hijra* from Mecca to Abyssinia in AD 615-27. The Mecca migration was validated by a treaty called "the pact of war" *(bay 'at al-harb/hijra)* with an oath to protect Muslims and wage *jihad* against enemies (Masud, 1990, p 30-31). Masued (1990) further informed "it was an obligatory physical movement towards self-identity in a nascent Muslim society." *Hijra* was closely connected to *jihad* and way of establishing a bond of relationship among Muslims. *Hijra* is again linked to the five pillars of Islam such as attention (*sam'*), obedience (*ta'a*), migration (*hijra*), struggle (*jihad*) and organisation (*jama'a*) (Masud, 1990, p 32-33).

It was on these Islamic doctrines; Boko Haram firmed its ideologies notably to creating an attention to the moral errors the Nigerian society slipped into making it less favourable to the strict application of Sharia law and the propagation of Islam. The live-off- the- land approach was the first purifying approach with jihadist intent. Yet many literatures, concluded rather debatably - "the group was not founded as a violent insurgency bent on overthrowing the Nigerian government" (Meehan et al 2011).

Boko Haram, satisfied all indicators of a hatching Islamism, beginning with missions that incubated into activism and finally to violent jihadism. As missionaries, they adopted al'da'wa (preaching sermons) placing emphasis on community outreach and on the blind side of the federal government sowing seeds of Salafism. It was well packaged in philanthropic duties such as free health services, aids and Islamism-based education among poor and economically deprived society. The final aim of this tactics is Islamization to gain local support for a grand agenda (Glay and Adeanku 2015 p 187).

Boko Haram was not the first jihadist movement in Nigeria. As indicated in the introduction, Usman dan Fodio started jihadist movements in northern Nigeria in the early nineteenth century when he toppled the Habe ruler in Hausa-land and established the rule of religious scholars ('*ulama'*). This religious purging had legitimised a theological criterion as a precondition for political participation that demanded a sound education in Islamic law and theology. What endangered this rooted norm was the introduction of Western education as symbolised by books (Hausa: boko) by British colonial authorities. This was understood by the Muslim north as a warning of a rising impact of an unknown colonial,

Christian, materialistic and immoral Westernisation process (Loimeier, 2012, p 130-139). Loimeier furthered that the accepted western education, the English law and the colonial economic and post-colonial economic streams secularised the Nigerian society leading to a deep crisis among the northern Nigerian Muslim society which he described as "modernisation shock." The first attempt to confront the shock and Islamise modernity was the introduction of the "Yan Izala" (Hausa: "Songs of Izala") but was found to be too mild and less radical to contain the threat and therefore un-Islamic. A better replacement perhaps was found in a Cameroonian led Maitatsine movement between 1980 and 1987. Mohammed Marwa who settled in Kano in 1960s according Loimeier's report unhurriedly nurtured a group of migrant followers in Ayagi in Kano called "the walled city of Kano" to register his radical rejection of non-Qur'anic innovations such as watches, western dresses bicycles and even ritual prayers. Like Boko Haram the sect and its leader was nick-named the master of rejection. Maitatsine registered its presence in violent actions and a crackdown on it by the Nigerian security forces December 19, 1980 when Mohammed Marwa attempted storming a central mosque in Kano triggered an armed response from the Nigerian army and after several days of fighting about 6000 people were reported killed including the sect leader Mohammed Marwa (Loimeier, 2012, p 140-141). It is instructive to note that many analytical explanations assigned the emergence of Maitatsine in the 1980s established a strong link between the two sects - from Maitatsine to Boko Haram, with same philosophy, same objectives, same organisational planning and armed resistance. The socioeconomic factors that synergise the two sects and sparked their armed confrontation were also not disjointed – economic dislocation, deprivation, income inequalities in addition to poverty aided by local catastrophes in the form of famine and rinderpest (cattle plague) epidemic with their close association to Islam (Adesoji, 2010, p 97-98).

The two groups with their adherence to the Wahhabi understanding of the *"tawhid"* (the oneness of God) were bent on creating God's kingdom on earth with rigidly reigning Islamic laws, destroying whatever stood the way to this objective as they perceive violence not sinful to Islam but a means to a pure end (Campbell, 2014). There are many questions perhaps than answers that could satisfy analytical doubts taking into account Lowenthal's views on current and long-term intelligence and considering the merging historical backgrounds of the two sects. What role did intelligence play in the fight against the Maitatsine militants? What lessons were learnt and what were the intelligence forecast after these crises?

2.11 Infiltrating terrorist organisations and networks using asymmetric information

For every terrorist attack, there is mostly dialogue or conversation between core and peripheral contributors. They interact to arrange resources, personnel and other logistics. This interaction could include members of the terrorist group, affiliate, associates and even with citizenry. There are several points government agents may inject into the network of interaction that characterises a planned attack. With asymmetric information terrorists cannot be sure of the quality of their affiliates, the injection of

government agents into the network or terrorist interaction introduces or increases the quality of uncertainty that confronts the terrorists and can have far reaching implication (Phillips, 2011b, p 349). The question then is what is asymmetry information? According to Peter J. Phillips (2011), a piece of asymmetric information is established when agents on one side of a transaction, or more generally an economic interaction, know something that agents on the other side do not know. Using a business situation in engaging this discussion, one could realise that a market of second-hand mowers, individuals showing purchase interests are only aware of the average quality of the used mowers. However, only the owners of the mowers know whether the machines they are offering for sale is of high quality or low quality. This is what Peter J. Phillips called quality uncertainty. The procurers of the mowers face an asymmetric information problem and they must make decisions on the basis of their perception of the average quality of used mowers on the market. In a situation of this nature, sellers of high quality used mowers cannot obtain high prices for their high-quality machines. A withdrawal from the market based on sound economic logic becomes a preferred option in order to retain ownership of their high-quality machine than accepting a giveaway price. The logic of conclusion of this behaviour is that lower quality mowers control the market and drive out high quality mowers until the market is characterised by traders of very low-quality mowers. Then the market could probably collapse.

How is this relevant to government agents penetrating terrorists camps? Philips (2011) gave a three economic actor scenario – terrorists, terrorist affiliates or associates and government agents. The intention of the government agents is to impersonate the affiliates in order to infiltrate the network of terrorist interaction. There are many routes and infiltration paths that could be imagined with this ordinary economic framework and the government agents impersonating terrorist's affiliates inject quality uncertainty into the network. The injection of agents who are very low-quality affiliate into the network of terrorist interaction. This reduces the average quality of the affiliate and there is no way for the terrorists to distinguish between higher quality affiliate and government agents. This can obtain positive results in particular instances however, it would be understandable but incorrect to conclude that the injection of government agents into terrorist networks causes terrorists to curtail their behaviours. Instances of this nature is that it is the terrorist's higher quality affiliates that withdraw from the network of interaction. If they find it necessary to curtail their acts, it is because they cannot find a higher, reliable affiliates with which to interact in order to put up building blocks for terrorists operations (Phillips, 2011b, p 352).

There are three reasons for which asymmetric information and quality uncertainty could be explored in the fight against terrorism. They are (a) sponsorship and financing of terrorist organisations, (b) explaining the phenomenon of terrorist franchising and (c) terrorist involvement in high success probability vis – a -vis low success probability terrorist attacks. The first which is sponsorship of terrorism is a prime importance and has received considerable attention. It is critical because the collapse

of sponsorship for terrorists through the use of asymmetric information by government agents could be one of the viable means of deterring terrorism.

Terrorism franchising is an entry for Global Terrorism Database that contains entries for terrorist organisation. Some of these no longer exist however there are many active terrorist organisations in existence example of which is Boko Haram. However, successful terrorist organisation may be those that are particularly skilful at signalling their quality to the grassroot supporters and sponsors. In view of this, successful terrorist groups are those that have overcome some of the asymmetric information problems that permeate the market for terrorism and political influence. The last implication shows the risk reward ration that characterised network of terrorist interaction may be imparted by quality uncertainty and asymmetric information (Phillips, 2011b, p 352-354).

Chapter three

3.0 Methodology

This chapter discussed methods and methodologies of the study stating their justification, problems, associated with each and how they were overcome. It also discussed the primary and secondary sources used stating how data was accessed and used. The chapter also explored data collection tools, reliability, validity, ethical issues and limitations of the study.

3.1 Research design

The research is a case study. It is mostly preferred strategy when "how" or "why" questions are posed especially when the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within real-life context (Yin, 2017, p 1). Yin identified three conditions that called for case study and the first satisfied this research. "The type of research question posed" (Yin, 2017, p 4). As indicated above, case study addresses the "how" question and my research question "How were human intelligence techniques applied in fighting Boko Haram terrorists and how" satisfied this condition.

Case study also focuses on comprehending the dynamics within a single setting or could involve multiple cases and numerous levels of analysis. Case studies typically combine data collection methods such as archives, interviews, questionnaires and observation (Eisenhardt, 1989, p 535). It is this reason I chose in-depth interview to gather data on the topic.

3.2 Method and methodology

The study adopted qualitative method and applied qualitative methodologies. Qualitative investigations are based on description, understanding and classification of human experiences which involve a series of full and deeper reflections and description of relevant experience (Polkinghorne, 2005, p 139). Methodology is a concept of gaining knowledge and the activity of considering and reflecting on to justify methods. It describes and analyses methods and techniques, determining its appropriateness, throwing lights on their limitations and resource in its attempts to answer a research question (Clough and Nutbrown, 2012, p 36). These authors also suggested the need for a better understanding on how research questions are articulated with questions asked on the field. For a study to be persuasive, there should be a demonstrably clear, logical and reflexive relationship between the research question and field questions and in the process provide careful consideration of ethical questions (Clough and Nutbrown, 2012, p 39). A contrary method to qualitative investigation is quantitative method. Quantitative method makes claims about a population on the basis of the study of a sample of that

population with random or representative data selection sources from population (Polkinghorne, 2005, p 139).

3.3 Primary data source

Considering the above as a guide, I selected a methodology conducive to my study which was semi-structured or in-depth interview. The choice of this strategy was based on my understanding of intelligence as a sensitive state craft used in protecting the territorial space of states against internal and external aggression. In-depth interviews involve conducting intensive individual interviews with a small number of respondents to exploring their perspectives on a particular idea, program or a situation. For the purpose of example, questions in in-depth interviews could demand from participants their thoughts, experiences, expectations and any change they perceive in themselves as a result of their involvement in the programme (Boyce and Neale, 2006, p 3). These writers also noted that in-depth interviews are useful when the researcher wants detailed information about the respondent's thoughts and behaviour in details offering a complete picture of a phenomenon and why it happened. Field interview is a speech event closer to friendly dialogue but having an explicit purpose of leaning learning? about the informant and his setting (Neuman, 2014, 372) and delves deep into social and personal matters (DiCicco-Bloom and Crabtree, 2006, p 315).

3.4 Secondary data source

The study consulted literatures, books, journals, newspaper publications, academic articles on the topic. The literatures focused on terrorism and intelligence more specifically on Nigeria, the West African sub-region, Africa and beyond. Again, the literatures also discussed issues relating to the intelligence community across the world especially the United States of America, the Nigerian Intelligence Community and Africa in general. The use of the secondary data was important because depending solely on primary data might not be sufficient for the study especially applying certain methodological rules like triangulation, validity and reliability. In effect, the secondary data augmented the use of the primary data for a better understanding of the topic. The literatures gave better background information to the topic. For example, data from books, online articles and many other scholarly genres enabled me access to necessary information about the sect Boko Haram. They assisted the research in two three ways. In the first place, they gave a broad idea about the topic during preliminary investigations about the topic and secondly, they augmented analysis to cross check facts. They also assisted in the literature review part of the study where extensive review of literature informed the early stage of the research by delineating areas of interest and relevance that should be covered by the review (Louise Barriball and While, 1994, p 333). Articles from the media such as Nigerian newspapers, online portals, such as

bbc.com, aljazeera.com, the CNN and other news outlets were consulted and their contribution toward the study was immense.

3.5 Choosing study setting

Qualitative researchers have one important object of interest. It is the effort to investigate lived experience of real people in real settings. They spend time querying how individuals make sense in their everyday lives, exploring their behaviour within the context of their natural occurrence (Hatch, 2002, p 21) until they gain some or full understanding. This informed the choice of Abuja and Lagos, the new and old capital of Nigeria respectively. Being a Ghanaian schooling in Norway, the choice of Nigeria was a difficult one. However, touched deeply by the assaults visited on the innocent population by the Boko Haram militants and knowing well how terrorism know no territorial boundary, I was burdened to investigate using qualitative means how human intelligence played a role in the fight.

On 26th July when Boko Haram riot broke and lasted till 30th July 2009, it spread across four states – Bauchi, Kano, Yobe and Borno. It was most extensive in Borno perhaps it was the homeland of the leader of the movement (Adesoji, 2010, p 6) and since then Maduguri, the capital of Borno state and its surrounding towns and villages had been the battle grounds of the Boko Haram militants and the government forces. Going to Maduguri to have a first-hand observation and to seek the views from at least a member of the Civilian Joint Task Force (C-JTF) could have been a good plan. However, the battle field was deemed be unsafe, hence I limited my search effort to Lagos and Abuja.

The map Federal Republic of Nigeria showing Boko Haram Territories (currently lost territories)

Source: The Telegraph

3.6 Sampling

The application of human intelligence techniques, the efficiencies or deficiencies of these procedures in fighting Boko Haram was the controlling question of this research and therefore informed the sampling procedure adopted. Bryman (2012) emphasized this view that sampling should be conducted with reference to the research question so that units of analysis are selected based on the standards that would allow the research question to be answered (Bryman, 2012, p 410). The study settled on purposive sampling for this reason. The selection was done with the caution that selecting the ways of obtaining data and from whom the data could be required must be done with a sound judgement. Tongco (2007) wrote this as critical because no amount of analysis can make up for improper data collected. Purposive sampling which is also called judgement sampling is an intentional choice of informants due to the qualities the informants possess (Tongco, 2007, p 147). This is non probability sampling that captures a good deal of varieties in the units such that sampled members differ from each other according to key characteristics relevant to the research question (Bryman, 2012, p 483). Through this criterion, three sets

of intelligence experts were demarcated – practicing intelligence officers, retired intelligence officers and security experts in academia.

Since intelligence officials are hard to locate because of the nature of their work, when I sampled out the first informant, he also proposed another expert in the field. This snowballed until I had the seven informants. This strategy which is called snowball sampling according to (Bryman, 2012). In this sampling strategy, the researcher usually samples out a small group of people relevant to the research question and these sampled participants proposed other participants who have had the experience and the characteristics relevant to the research (Bryman, 2012, p 415). In the view of Neuman it is a method of sampling informants in a network. The method is based on the analogy of snowball which begins small but becomes larger as it rolled on wet snow and picks up additional snow (Neuman, 2014, p 207). The nature of the topic makes this approach appropriate. Terrorism and intelligence are secretive ventures which makes it difficult getting the right people to take part in the study hence the need to depend on one informant or a small group of informants and subsequently get the others on the basis of the link to the initial informant (Neuman, 2014, p 207). I had my first informant through a friend. My first informant also proposed next one until I gained access to all my seven informants.

3.7 Pre-data gathering activities

Having settled on in-depth or semi- structured interview as my key strategy of digging data, questions were developed to scrutinise informants views, experience and knowledge on human intelligence strategies and how they were deployed in the fight against Boko Haram militants. What guided this strategy was the main research question How were human intelligence techniques applied in fighting Boko Haram terrorists and how efficient or less efficient these strategies. All the field questions were designed in the best way possible to answer it Some of the questions covered by the interview guide include: Why is the use of human intelligence considered a significant approach in the fight against Boko Haram? What are some of the unique shortcomings in the use of human intelligence fighting against Boko Haram insurgency? Why do you choose human intelligence against all other collection methods?

Notwithstanding these questions, issues that cropped up in the course of the interview that were relevant and needed further clarification were pursued with follow up questions. For example, what does emotional intelligence means?

According to Bryman (2012, p 472), interviewing is a demanding exercise and therefore it is worth conducting some pilot interviews not just to test how well the interview flows but to gain experience in managing the main interview effectively. The pilot interview helped to reflect and pay attention to where it was needed.

All the interviews were conducted at convenient locations of the informants based on their choice. Whilst some were conducted in the offices of informant's others were done in homes of the respondents.

3.8 Data collection method - in-depth /semi-structured interviews

Data collection is a key segment of a research project. This is because a collected data has the purpose of providing evidence for the experience the researcher attempts investigating. In view of this I chose face to face or in-depth interviews. This choice was based on the complex nature of the topic – the role of human intelligence in the fight against Boko Haram. The topic bordered on national security of the Federal Nigeria and therefore very sensitive. Interviewing is a technique of gathering data from human sources by asking them questions and getting them to react verbally. The purpose is to gain detailed accounts from the informant of his or her experience under study (Polkinghorne, 2005, p 142). To achieve this purpose the field questions were designed with close attention to the research question and the research objectives. For example, one of the key objectives of the research was to Identify how human intelligence (HUMINT) schemes were applied in fighting Boko Haram including its successes and failures.

In-depth interviews are usable when a researcher seeks detailed information about a person's thoughts and behaviours or want to explore issues in depth. In-depth dialogue is also a good tool in providing context to other data, offering a more complete picture especially answering what happened and why it happened in a given phenomenon. In-depth interaction provides very detailed data than those obtainable through other data extraction channels such as surveys. Since setting for such conversations is a preferred choice of the interviewee, it presents a restful atmosphere comfortable enough for a healthy dialogue that generated very valuable and usable data.

It is well suited to the exploration of attitudes, values, beliefs and motives. Through this method I was able to evaluate the validity of the respondent's answers by observing non-verbal indicators which is very useful particularly when holding discussion on sensitive issues. This is what Ekman and Friesen called leakage or deceptive clues which they explained as some actions ordinarily associated with certain states of the mind may partially supressed through the will and in such cases the muscle which are least under the separate control of the will most liable still to act causing movement which could be recognise as expressive (Ekman and Friesen, 1969, p 83). Such cues only called for further probe through follow-ups questions with intuitive

attentiveness. Since I used the same interview guide in conducting the interview, it facilitated comparability of submissions (Louise Barriball and While, 1994, p 329) and cure false claims. In-depth interview is not without pitfalls as responses could be biased or interviewer having un-reviewed mind-set (Boyce 2006, p 3). Whilst some problems could be anticipated in advance and addressed before the main data collection commences, such as potential interviewer biases, unexpected circumstances may arise if data collection occurred over time and at multiple locations (Louise Barriball and While, 1994, p 334). These problems were dealt with through making myself part of the object I interview by being very objective.

3.9 Field data taking

Apart from one informant, all others agreed to be recorded after I informed them and explained the purpose for recording and its use. The use of tape recorder in interview is very important because whilst enhancing smooth flow of the interview sessions, it also preserves, protect and safeguard the information. In quoting informants, it makes it accurate and apt. Again, in face-to-face interviews, the interviewer does many things simultaneously – listening quick-wittedly, examining body language, picturing facial look of the respondents all at the same time and tracking unclear matters with follow-ups question. Recording the interview allows the researcher maintains full concentration. Taking detailed note whilst conducting interview may not allow the researcher to give enough attention to necessary details. Further, recording allows natural flow of the interview as the informant mostly loses knowledge of the presence of the recorder and speaks naturally. Beside the recordings, occasional note taking took place to serve as a backup to avoid running into difficulties if the recorded dialogue is corrupted or something untoward happened that raided the recorded product of the interview.

3.10 Data transcription

After each interview session, I transcribed data as soon as possible. This was because each interview generates large data (Kvale and Brinkmann, 2014, p 206) and it is better to start early. Transcribing interviews from an oral to a written form is in itself an initial analytic process (Kvale and Brinkmann, 2014, p 206). For the purpose of cleaning the data, I edited out repetitions and other interruptions. For example, during of my interview sessions, there were quite a number of interruptions because my informants needed to attend to some assignments at the same time talking to me. By editing out these extraneous pieces, the data became legible

for analysis. Where renditions were too long, I summarised very long the speeches of respondents, however ensuring that their original presentation was not lost. The transcribed data together with field notes were used for analysis. They all contributed to the analysis of the acquired data.

3.11 Data presentation

The expected outcome of a qualitative investigation is a descriptive information organised in a way that best fits the data (Sandelowski, 2000, p 338-339). This is done to support a telling analysis of the obtained data though pattern identification and themes. Qualitative data is an "attractive nuisance" because of its riches but to find the right analytic path through the cumbersome data base becomes the knot researchers must untie to achieve results (Bryman, 2012, p 570). To Neumann (2014), it begins with the research question and the objectives of the study. It then moves to the frame work of assumptions and concepts, asking questions linking concepts to the evidence and reveales features of the data. Additional evidences are then sourced to address unsolved issues that emerges, if any. The method which he calls successive approximation continues until the evidence and theory shape each other (Neuman, 2014, p 427) into a meaningful content. Using this method as a guide, the transcribed data was ordered, summarised and categorised into themes. The data was clearly written and indicated with inverted comas showing the exact words of respondents. Efforts have been made to refine the presented data with thorough reading, looking out for inconsistencies, oversights or errors.

3.12 Analysing data

Data analysis discusses findings in a way that answers the research question or otherwise. To do this, the coded data was given a deductive approach. This approach involves using a structure or predetermined framework or theory to analyse data or interview transcripts (Burnard et al., 2008, p 429). To handle this effectively, the data was coded. Coding in this sense is an analytical categorisation of data in order to impose order on data and breaking it down into manageable piles (Neuman, 2014, p 422). Having scanned through the transcribed data, I flagged core opinions, noting them as themes across the entire data (transcribed interviews). Using the research question as a guide, I coded for example "how human intelligence featured in the war," "the use of military force." Out of these coded items, I obtained themes such as

"the essence of human intelligence in counterterrorism," "military approach to counterterrorism."

3.13 Reliability of the study

Reliability tests whether same results could be achieved each time the same object is measured using the same methods and methodologies. In otherwise, an indicator has high reliability if it yields the same result for a construct when applied to a different subpopulation (Neuman, 2014, p 139). Reliability is more concerned about consistency of results especially if the result of a study can be reproduced under similar methodology and same result is attained in a different a setting (Golafshani, 2003, p 598). Quality judgement in qualitative research is a topic of varied interpretations (Ali and Yusof, 2011, p 26). Reliability was improved by stating clearly the data collection process and analysis and the problems genuinely encountered. Further, the views as espoused by respondents have been presented as much as possible without twisting or distorting anything during the interviews and analysis.

3.14 The validity of the study

Validity is another contested term which according to Neuman (2014, p 141) is even more difficult to achieve than reliability. Neuman noted a valid indicator for a particular purpose could be invalid in some other situations. The term refers to how well the conceptual and operational definition bonds with each other (Neuman, 2014, p 141). In other words, validity refers to whether a method investigated what it purported to scrutinise (Kvale and Brinkmann, 2014, p 282). The study adopted in-depth semi-structured interview to gather data. The process underwent constant reviews for quality checks by dropping some questions that could not produce desired results during pilot. There were questions that were asked to throw light on unclear matters in the course of the dialogue. Interviews were conducted among active and retired intelligence community some drawn from military and police and security experts in academia who shared their opinions on the topic. All the interviews were tape-recorded except one. This enhanced accurate records of the actual words of the respondents. After each interview, I summarised my understanding of the views expressed by respondents to ensure harmony in the views they expressed and the way I understood them. I also triangulated the submission of respondents by searching for convergence among multiple different sources to form themes or categories in the study (Creswell and Miller, 2000, p 126). The different sources in this case was those from the intelligence community both active and retired and security experts from academia. Triangulation is military term. It describes the navigation at sea where a sailor triangulated among different distant points to determine their ship bearing. Denzin (1978) identified four types of triangulation across data namely: sources (i.e. participants), theories, methods (i.e. interviews, observations, documents) and among different

investigators as in (Creswell and Miller, 2000, p 126). All efforts have been made to satisfactorily ensure these four criteria stated above were met and as a result enhanced the validity of the study.

Finally, validity was ensured through the use of the same questions and same words in each question in the interviews. Responses from the informants conveyed equivalent meanings and this according to Denzin 1989 was what helped to standardise the semi-structured interview to facilitate comparability (Louise Barriball and While, 1994, p 330).

3.15 Ethical duties

Almost all studies with human participants involve some degree of risks. Marczyk et al noted that these risks may range from minor discomfort or embarrassment caused by somewhat intrusive or provocative questions to a much more severe effects on participants physical or emotional wellbeing. As these risks present researchers with ethical dilemma regarding the degree to which participants should be placed at risk in the name of scientific progress (Marczyk et al., 2017, p 233). It is for this reason that all researchers have ethical duties and responsibilities toward the object or persons of their investigations as it requires balancing the value of advancing knowledge against the value of non-interference in the lives of others (Neuman, 2014, p 445). Under this obligation and based on my methodology, all the interviews that I conducted were arranged with each of the participants. I did not give them informants consent form but depended on their prior agreement to take part in the research or agreed to grant me the interview which established their "implied consent." Bryman was explicit observing that enquiries involving human subjects should be base as far as practicable on freely given informed consent of the subject. They should be aware of their entitlement to refuse at any stage of for whatever reason and to withdraw data if supplied (Bryman, 2012, p 129).

Ethicists and scientists believe that research participants must not only be voluntary but be based on adequate knowledge of and understanding of the nature, duration, purpose and methods and potential hazards of the study. Murphy and Dingwall who stated this further admonished that informed consent is relational and sequential process rather than a contractual agreement based on trust between the researcher and the researched and it's a matter over which the research host exercises on-going judgement (Murphy and Dingwall, 2007, p 9-10). This gives the researched the liberty to withdraw if he or she chooses. All these safeguard measures were adopted and followed with clarity in a way that all participants consented and were free from coercion or pressure. They understood the risks and benefits involved (Marczyk et al., 2017, p 235) in participating in the study. I took care to protect the privacy and the identity of informants by avoiding the use of their names but identified them by number, for example, informant 1, informant 2 up to the seventh respondents. This aspect was very important to the topic under investigation because of its connection to state security and secrets. Above all, I showed maximum respect to my respondents by respecting their autonomy free choices and the decision to do

what they will (Marczyk et al., 2017, p 240). This made me let go those who disallowed my request for interview.

3.16 Limitations and problems

Matters of state security are difficult handling because of the secrecies covering them. So, the covert nature of human intelligence deployment in the fight against Boko Haram restricted a lot of information hence its non-availability for public access. This had placed a number of limitation to the study. Some of these problems were foreseen. For example, a pre-fieldwork meeting with my supervisor revealed that some of the issues might border on national security and officials might not be in a position to give information on them. However, we agreed I focus on general themes or issues pertaining human intelligence deployment in fight. As predicted my first question "what approaches are unique to Nigeria in deploying human intelligence in the fight against Boko Haram?" was rejected because my informant declined an answer because it was a state secret as the war was not over.

Terrorism like many other terms in the social sciences has many definitions. Since there is no one accepted definition to the term, interpretation becomes a difficult task for different actors and stake holders. Again, since the topic dealt with human intelligence which is a secretive state craft, obtaining highly classified data from the security agencies was a hard task. Most security and intelligence agencies were unwilling to release information under the pretext of safeguarding state secrecy. For the purpose of fairness to the convention of non-disclosures of classified state information I accepted it all.

Further, there were some interviews that could not take place because of disappointments on the part of participants though they initially agreed to take part in the research. One of such case was an arranged telephone conversation with the informant with an agreed time. On several occasions when I called, he failed picking the call and I realised his decline in the action.

Funding was a problem to the study. As a self-finance student, there were problems with funding research costs. My budget for travelling from Norway to Nigeria required quite a huge financial demand beyond what was offered by my university. This had forced me falling on further finance from my own resources. However, I can say with confidence, the research was successful.

As I anticipated, there were difficulties getting intelligence officers both active or retired to speak to the issues. This was remedied by adding security experts in academia. This did not only help in cross-checking facts but brought different perspectives on the topic. Since the earlier stated problem could result in dearth of adequate primary data, secondary data sources augmented the deficit.

Chapter four

4.0 Data Analysis

Drawing a metaphorical sketch of the "muggle - magic" divide, Nexon and Newman portrayed Harry Porter's world noting that the muggle earth is a mirror-image of the magical realm whose creatures self-organise into conflict - oriented groups and fight each other daily. In the Westphalia system, states and its "wizardry creatures" shape conflict conducts. Exception to this notion is terrorism which could involve transnational identities and may operate against the nation-state. Nexon and Newman argued that even in such cases of extraordinariness, a nation - state must exist within which terrorists find space to operate because every inch of the liveable globe belongs to some nation-state (Nexon and Neumann, 2006, p 110). Truly, these observations hold for the feuding Nigeria and the terror group Boko Haram as they engage each other in asymmetry encounters with wit and all–war techniques including intelligence and counter-intelligence. This chapter gives reports and analysis on how HUMNIT as a war tool or pre-tactical effort was deployed in the fight against Boko Haram insurgents.

4.1 Fighting Boko Haram – how important was human intelligence

Informant 4 recounted an African proverb that says; before the witty qualer bird (Akparo) puts itself to flight, it uses its wings and eyes as sentinels and resources for protection against its adversaries. This he explained corresponds to instinctual, natural, human and animal intelligence. He made these claims to drive the idea that the survival of any nation depends on intelligence and that the use of human intelligence to tap natural intelligence is important. Barry Yeoman (2013), described birds for example as "winged sentinels" that possess skills giving indisputable foreknowledge historically useful to the military. During World War 1, pheasants detected oncoming hostile aircrafts at long distances and gave alarm by insistent cries, canaries sensed poison gas, gulls followed submarines in search of garbage and indicated that birds are not just useful but are bona fide heroes (Yeoman, 2013).

According to the CIA avenues through which HUMINT is collected include: secret acquisition of photograph, documents and other materials, overt collection by people overseas, debriefing of foreign nationals and official contact with foreign governments. Specifically, the use of human, a spy, to gather intelligence is associated with HUMINT (Grey, 2015, p 2). In spy-craft, betrayals are virtues. Spies betray their fatherlands or at least the confidence put in them by those who granted them access to the secrets (Grey, 2015, p 2) and as one actor invests in hiding these truths, the other engages counter-methods to steal them, the circle continues in the name of state survival, a realists mantra. The question then is, "it the wittiest and or the dirtiest that succeeds?"

My first informant (1) was emphatic that the Nigerian security depends largely on HUMINT but declined to disclose the methods or approaches specific to Nigeria in HUMINT gathering. This he said

could breach security confidentiality and compromise current operations as the war was not over and explained further that Boko Haram was only degraded; most of the towns and villages they controlled fell from their hands, yet the battle was still ongoing.

However, HUMINT he noted was about seventy percent of the intelligence deployment because it is cost effective compared to other forms of intelligence collections. "All the other forms of intelligence have limitations because they are not able to read and interpret the human mind, so human intelligence is considered significant because it is able to infiltrate beyond the limits that the other sources of intelligence cannot"

To informant 2, all aspects of intelligence needed human intelligence support. He noted that: "Even the American when they were to get the most wanted terrorist Osaman bn Laden, it was the combination of human and technical intelligence. First when they knew where he was human intelligence identified him physically. He therefore concluded that "You can have all the forms of technical intelligence apparatus but still need human intelligence because it is more traditional and that where we (Nigeria) have our strength for now."

4.2 Problems of human intelligence – doubles and access limitation

On December 31, 2009 when a Jordanian medical doctor, Humam al-Balawi, from the tribal hinterland of Pakistan agreed greeting American intelligence officers at post in Khost – Afghanistan, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the White House were high in hope that he could lead them on to Osama bin Laden, the al-Qaeda leader. Eight officers honoured the meeting with a birthday cake prepared to celebrate al-Balawi. Lost toil! He lowered his hands into his side pocket as the meeting progressed, pulled his detonator string blowing himself up. Seven officers were killed including the base chief, Jessica Matthews, one of the finest world experts on al-Qaeda. Her death was equated to "sinking an aircraft career in a naval war." Al- Balawi was a double agent, perhaps, a triple one and all the labours of planting a spy next to bin Laden blown. It was the first time the officers met him. However, if only they had checked! Jessica didn't want to offend him but accorded him some "reverence" after many years of vain opportunities to gain access to bin Laden. In the clouds of this desperation, she misjudged the signs and the result was American's historic adversary since Soviet Russia (Grey, 2015, p 1-2).

The anecdote above explained in many ways the situation the Nigerian intelligence community faced dealing with Boko Haram. "If you pick an agent you don't know certainly if that agent is truly your own or he or she is working for the next person against you," says informant one (1). There are other difficult conditions that predate the dual problem of assets in accessing the "domain of target" to be able to effectively mine important details from the inner cells of Boko Haram. They are ethnicity, language, religion and tribe. Boko Haram's ethnic composition is primarily Kanuri speakers and Kanurized groups

comprising 8 percent of Nigeria's Muslim population (Michael, 2015). Baka Michael reported that Boko Haram's epic centre Maiduguri, north-eastern Nigeria's Borno state continue to be largely inaccessible making it tough for researchers and perhaps intelligence agents to gather detail data. How many fighters has Boko Haram? What degree of autonomy Boko Haram commanders enjoy? What is their command structure? What is their main source of arm supply? Are the materials use for improvised explosive devices local or foreign?

To be able to answer these questions, access is a key factor and as informant one (1) mentioned their sources were limited to access. The question of accessibility is two-fold. Geographical accessibility and "domain of target" accessibility. Gaining geographical accessibility does not guarantee domain accessibility. In the heat of conflict, when Maiduguri was under siege, the militants controlled major towns along four of the fives roads that connected the Maduguri to the rest of Nigeria. They are Monguno to the north, Dikwa to the east, Bama to the south – east and Damboa to the south – west. What remained in government hands was the western approach from Yobe State capital of Damaturu (Allison, 2015).

The core criteria to domain gain if geographical opening is established is having assets whose intelligibility in the Kanuri language (Manga Kanuri or Yerwa/Beri Beri Kanuri) is very high with an additional fluency in Hausa and a demonstrable level of Sunni Islamic appeal. This is because, since eleventh century, the Kanuri populace accepted the Sunni version of Islamic religion and had kept it till today (Oreva, 2017).

Can one train assets to gain these qualities within a short time? Informant 1 noted that it could take a lot of years. A better choice could be the use of Bono natives who are Kanuri speakers. "The reason the battle was so sophisticated was, most of the people leading the insurgency are Kanuris and to have your human intelligence effective, you are by necessity have to recruit Kanuris," noted informant 1. This reinforces the notion that human intelligence is a specialised skill that takes years to grow an appropriate degree of competence (Lowenthal, 2016, p 147) and in the estimation of 9/11 Report, it could take five to seven years of training, language study and experience to bring a recruit up to a full and perhaps peak performance (Oreva, 2017, p 90).

Informant 1 was of the views that even trained spies "unlike machines are not certain." if you recruit a source and train him how sure are you that when he goes on to the field he knows what information is useful to the Nigerian army, so that when he goes to Boko Haram he will be able to get that. This explains how complex human intelligence can be and that good training is required but unlike machines good professional training is still not enough to build total loyalty among agents and especially for "insurgency you don't just ask anybody to become your source."

4.3 Limitation to access

Informant one (1) strongly hold the view that how close a source is to the "target domain" is crucial. "Among various persons close to Boko Haram Leader Shekau, there is a limitation to access for a cook, there is limitation to access to the cleaner and his driver also has some level of limitation to access. However, the personal assistance to Shekau may have access to critical information than all others that work around the target. This is not to say all the other sources apart from the personal assistance could not provide information. However, the personal assistance is highly likely to provide relevant details that could lead to credible intelligence about what Shekau is thinking and his lines of actions including his tactical operations."

How could this be possible as the Nigerian army was overwhelmed and pressured by sequence of bombings, abductions, attacks on churches, military installations and even Muslims by the jihadists?

A therapy to these problems according to informant 2 rested first in welfare. He stated: "You have to ensure the welfare of agents is well taken care of so that he or she doesn't turn a double." He also mentioned that there should be a structure of reward and punishment for dishonest agents. To informant 2, it is a disgrace to be disloyal and according to Tzu (2005) a compromised is a doomed agent that must be put to death (Tzu, 2005, p 127). For this reason, informant 2 said: "from the scratch it is important to build agents to be loyalty to a cause." He also proposed agent monitoring through what he called "vetting after care," which he described as "a constant vetting exercise for the agents to see if the person is still loyal to the cause." The rationale for this was that a source can be loyal today but could change tomorrow.

4.4 The approach of the Nigerian security to the insurgency

According to informant 2, the Nigerian police and the military have intelligence units and the principles used in training security intelligence officers was not different from what was used for civilian counterparts. "In the police we have what is called the crime intelligence division. Peculiar to the army, we have the Air Force intelligence who are more involved in imagery. We also have the naval maritime intelligence that covers the maritime industry. Then we have the infantry intelligence that focus on the land and use more human intelligence collections due to their interaction with the people."

This means the Nigerian intelligence community has a well-grounded structure that covered most significant areas of intelligence needs and that the infantry in this war has a direct responsibility but not without the support from the Air Force and the Navy in their intelligence led operations against the Boko Haram militants. In the views of Handel (2013), operational intelligence is essentially processed,

purified and up-to-date information about the enemy. For intelligence to be more useful in support of military operations, experts must be kept well informed of all the latest developments concerning their own forces' operation plans. The availability of intelligence under such condition permits the achievement of better results on the battle field at a lower cost, thus intelligence act as a force multiplier (Handel, 2013, p 2-3).

How effective was this rule applied in the fight against the militants? This is a very difficult question to answer. However, when asked whether there was an alternative to the deployment of intelligence as a forerunner to tactical operations, informant 4 (categorized under security experts) has this to say: "The only alternative to intelligence is the brazen use of military force. If you want facts and you don't get them, you use military tough force." It was a response that necessitated many questions and deep reflections. Has Nigerian security been able to gather intelligence as a pre-tactical strategy or has chosen excessive force in fighting Boko Haram? Von Clausewitz argued that most intelligence is false and any war built on intelligence is an effort foundering on straw and for these reasons Clausewitz endorsed self-reliance as the best defence (George and Kline, 2006, p 3). Was the Clausewitz strategy of intelligence apathy the choice of the Nigerian army and for which purpose?

Is the accusation of abrasive force a fair assessment of the Nigerian security? Could it be that they are stiffly trained to conventional warfare without room to "bend" a little to new wars? Informant 3 described their tactic as the "the sledge hammer approach" and further claimed "the security did not understand the nature of the war they were fighting." Dictionary.com explains sledgehammer as crude or ruthlessly forceful, lacking all dexterity or grace. This gave the indication that the federal security apparatus either lacked the skills to engage the terrorists or have the skills but failed to apply them or chose a short cut to solving the problem. Informant 3 three believed "they only resorted to sheer use of force thinking probably the sledgehammer approach will quell the terrorists."   It is important admitting Clausewitz was writing about an era different from what currently pertains.

However, many literatures affirmed the federal security lacked intelligence led operations. One of them was Agbiboa who described their method as the "stick" approach which he indicated had been the favoured option by the security forces with the use of aggression on Boko Haram members and innocent civilians. He noted that the Operation Restore Order in which 8000 officers and men were deployed to Borno region resulted in extra-legal killing, pursuit of the innocence and intimidation of the Borno citizens. Far from conducting intelligence-driven operations, the JTS just halted access to areas, carried out house to house searches and shooting young men in their homes at times (Agbiboa, 2014, p 60-61). In the view of Abubakar, Borno citizens were threatened on two fronts, the menacing fangs of Boko Haram insurgents and the hard-hearted guns of JTS soldiers. "The soldiers brought in to enforce state of emergency declared as much more war against the people than against the Boko Haram insurgents" (Abubakar, 2014). Whilst the military denied such reports, Agbiboa insisted the legacy of the Nigerian

armed forces has been arbitrariness, ruthlessness, brutality, vandalism inactivity, low accountability to public and corruption. Nigeria he further noted presented itself as an apparatus of violence and relied on coercion for compliance rather than winning hearts and minds.

In identifying the problems facing the Nigerian military and its intelligence arm, informant 1 named adaptation as one of its Achilles Heels. The federal army was trained to face aggressions from rival states, a realist war notion. "The Nigerian military is trained to face external aggressors from external territories," he stated. This means they lacked the capacity of asymmetric warfare and according to informant 5, the Nigerian army lacked understanding of the war they face. However, could the Nigerian army be blamed for lack of understanding this type of war? Even the united states according to Barno 2006 is fumbling. "Our enemies today clearly understand the value of asymmetrical approaches when dealing with the overwhelming conventional combat power of the United States military. Unfortunately, our unmatched conventional capability has slowed the US response to the changing, asymmetrical nature of modern war. We as a military are at risk of failing to understand the nature of the war we are fighting—a war which has been characterized as "a war of intelligence and a war of perceptions." We must confront this dilemma and take our thinking to a new strategic level in this era to understand the tools and strategic approaches required to create victory in this very different 21st- century environment (Barno, 2006, p 15).

4.5 The civilian joint task force (C-JTF) – an improvised intelligence unit?

The Daily Trust, one of the Nigerian newspaper on its Monday 29 January 2018 issue wrote that the Nigerian intelligence architecture is dysfunctional. It said the principal pillars which supported it seemed to operate in parallel lines and without the synergy or guidance to be normally provided by the Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA). The consequence the paper stated was an inter-agency rivalry playing out in public.

The publication sparked many questions. Had this affected intelligence collection in the fight against Boko Haram? If yes how did it affect it and if no how efficient was intelligence support to tactical operations? In the wake of the insurgency, President Good-luck Jonathan declared a state of emergency in three states Borno, Yobe and Adamawa but failed to achieve desired purpose as evidenced in increased attacks by the militants. The upsurge in assaults of Boko Haram was intelligence failures by the Military Joint Task Joint (Bamidele, 2016) as operations were far from intelligence driven. According to Agbiboa (2015) C-JTF became the eyes and the ears of the security forces and they were often the first to respond to trouble… and provided the military with intelligence and manpower (Agbiboa, 2015). For this reason, many argued that it was the C-JTF that filled the intelligence vacuum in the security apparatus in fighting Boko Haram.

To informant 5, the decimation of Boko Haram was greatly the effort of Civilian Joint Task Force (C-JTF), who he noted provided credible HUMINT that led to the decimation of the sect. "They helped secure many villages, it was to their credit that the sect was decimated by working side by side the military Joint Task Force (M-JTF)." He indicated that the M-JTF were not from the area and therefore lacked knowledge about the geography of the war zone and unable to speak the local language, Kanuri and therefore could not identify Boko Haram infiltrators whom he noted tiptoed into towns anytime they planned an attack and retreated after the operation.

This raises the question whether intelligence is still a secret business? It is a question engaging hurting debates on intelligence, which was historically a secret cult. Democratic societies cannot constantly withstand the pressures for accountability and control of their secret services. This according to them is especially true when intelligence efforts are directed against a country's own citizen not at foreign armies as in the case of Boko Haram. Even Israel is not immune from the trend of exposures as mistakes have become public knowledge than successes (Black and Morris, 1991, p xii). It on this bases that Nigerian public are ardent followers of events including intelligence deployments in the three states where the crisis was rife and hold their own views on the performance of the security.

4.6 The history of civilian joint task force (C-JTF) - a replica of local intelligence detachment

It came unplanned. It was a reaction by distressed locals, stuck between two brutal opponents-Boko Haram militants and the security forces both of which were accused of war crime by human right observers and the media (Comolli, 2015, p 3).

Abba Mos Villa, a lone confronter of the militants in the community was C-JFT maiden member. He chased Boko Haram members with his car when they surfaced to carry out murders or to explode an explosive. He was killed by the militants before the advent of the C-JTF but was generally credited as the inspirer of the group. At a wedding ceremony in Hausari, a town located south of Maiduguri, an attendee was suspected to be hiding an AK47 gun in his *kaftan*. He was said to have been assigned by the Boko Haram to assassinate a guest at the wedding. Baba Lawan, a young kola-nut seller mustered bravery, confronted him resulting in a clash. Other guests joined in the struggle and when a search was conducted after he was outdone, a machine gun was found hidden in his kaftan. He was handed over to the M-JTF. From that time Baa Lawan rallied the youth in Hausari where they began pursuing suspected Boko Haram members. The arrested snowballed as interrogation of the detained led to further arrests. Other towns and villages joined the chorus as the movement spread to all neighbourhoods across Maiduguri giving birth to what is now called the C-JTF. At that time, it was unsafe to be a young man in Maiduguri. Two threats thrived to their harm – on one side, they were targets for the militants because they were accused of betraying them, on the other, the military considered them probable Boko Haram members and consequently targeted them for their erratic killings (Abubakar, 2014).

The use of this C-JTF as the HUMINT wing was not without problems. A report compiled by the Amnesty International stated that C-JTF sometimes false information emanated from the C-JTF that resulted in killing innocent civilians. It is in this vein we could agree with Byrne (2017) who argued that the definitional boundaries between rebellion and terrorism and state repression are unclear. Militant actions directed against soldiers can be recorded as terrorism, while lethal police actions or government-initiated attacks on civilians are regarded as acts of war, or collateral damage, and so ignored (Byrne, 2017).

According to informant 1, the Nigerian Federal army was structured and trained to fight conventional wars - facing aggressors from external territories. Importantly, the intelligence assets were also devised for external security deployments. The major problem facing the Nigeria army was adaptation. He noted "If Nigeria and Cameroun are going to war, there are so many channels human agents can be deployed, because there is a line of people you can choose from the army but here you are in a war against Boko Haram, you are limited to three options. Either you recruit Boko Haram members, or you deploy military personnel, which in most cases too expensive, or people of Kanuri extraction.

From this account one could see the gaps, the breaches and the bridge and make sense of their methodology in fighting this war. The gap between the enemy and the tactical operations of the federal army was intelligence, as a result there were many reports of failed operations where Boko Haram militants overran the federal army known to be the biggest in the west African sub-region (Comolli, 2015). Even within the narrow counter-terrorism lens, Abuja's approach to Boko Haram was problematic. It is indeed hard to fight an organisation whose operations organisational structures you don't know according to my fifth informant. This pointed to the deficit of human intelligence assets the Nigerian army has on the sect and that for Boko Haram having the ability to engage in multiple and coordinated bombings in different cities, one could perhaps see them as a "decentralised cult" with different cells carrying their own destructive project against innocent Nigerians (Solomon, 2012, p 8) however, against a powerful army.

However, what created a timely bridge that led to decimation of the Boko Haram according all my informant except informant 1 was the C-JTF that did not only fill out the intelligence gap but provided other tactical assistance to the military in the war. According to Amnesty International, the military relied heavily on the C-JTF for its operations in the north-east. The military indicated in its August 2013 report that the army's Joint Investigation Team (JIT) mentioned the contribution of the Civilian-JTF to the success of military operations. "The involvement of these Youth Volunteers crowned the operations with success not envisaged in the past (Amnesty.org, 2015).

Many watchers had observed that most of Nigerian's counter-terrorism efforts were reactive military force without joining effort with civilian-JTF model in the aspect of intelligence gathering which many argued had contributed to the escalation of Boko Haram terrorism (Bamidele, 2016, p 131).

4.7 Gender inspired abduction and intelligence failures

Among the major attacks wreaked on Nigerians by the Boko Haram guerrillas, one was bizarre – the Chibok abduction. It attracted global anger and raised many questions especially how alive the Nigerian security system and its responsibility to protect citizens? Informant 6 was of the view that the security does not act quicker enough to information especially knowing well they are at war with a ruthless Boko Haram. "Good pieces of intelligence information in some cases emanated from communities under attack but were not acted upon." He noted that four hours before the abduction, the community got wind of the attack and passed on the information to the army, but nobody came until the girls were carted away. This was the position Amnesty International also held but was denied by the Nigerian government (Gaffey, 2017). Chibok, a Christian dominated community in the Borno State was deemed safe until midnight of April 14, 2014 when a successful attack by Boko Haram militias had 276 girls kidnapped. Girls from surrounding villages came to Chibok, a government boarding secondary for their final examination. Some schools in the region were closed down as they became targets to the Boko Haram guerrillas who hated western education for their belief that it is corrupting Islamic values. They arrived in an intensity of bombardment at midnight, raided the dormitories and loaded 276 girls onto trucks. It was the first attack on Chibok (Bbc.com, May 8, 2017) which according to Amnesty International lasted until dawn. Informant 6 held the view that the attack could have been avoided.

4.8 Analysis of Chibok and Dapchi adductions

Let's assume Nigerian Federal intelligence community was unaware of the warning. Could this a better plea be? According to the CIA major intelligence failures are usually blameable on analysis deficit, not collection flops because such pieces of information could be discounted, misinterpreted, ignored, rejected or overlooked as the "signals" are "lost" in the "noise" (Heuer, 1999, p 74). In the circles of intelligence, there is always a tension between new experiences and alteration of conventional wisdom in the face of a changing world and security situations. The question then is, what were the signals and the noise and how were they mingled and drowned? The noise could be the peaceful history of Chibok, a long held view that Boko Haram had attacked villages further north and east but Chibok had been spared these pains (Hegarty, 2016). It accounted for the long-held view, the dots Nigerian intelligence community constantly connected to arrive at a "natural path," that led to a mind-set and a "mental rut." This seemed to have clogged the search for worst options. A strategic assumption for the Nigerian intelligence community was to think Chibok could not be attacked based on its peaceful history in the turbulent Maiduguri enclave. However, there were many tactical indicators that made the attack imminent. The name Boko Haram (Hausa: Western education is forbidden) (Loimeier, 2012), could be a distant tactical sign but relevant to start with. Attacks mostly targeted police officers, Christians and perceived liberal Muslims (Agbiboa, 2013). The third could be that the community is Christian

dominated. A forth tactical signal was some schools in the Maiduguri were closed down because of the war except Chibok. Time strategic signal, which was the fifth and converged with the tactical indicators was the on-going examinations in which girls from various schools congregated to take exams. This had increased the total population of the school and knowing well how terrorists have high appetite for crowds for their attacks the intelligence had no option than to securitize Chibok. According to Abraham Ben-Zvi whenever strategic assumptions and tactical indicators of impending attack converged, an immediate threat must be perceived and appropriate precautionary measures taken. He argued that when discrepancies existed between tactical indicators and strategic assumptions, strategic assumptions prevailed always giving way to a hiatus in the light of the contradictory information. These are the example of the "signals" that were "lost" in the "noise" of misinterpretation or rejection.

However, Ben-Zvi concluded that tactical indicators must trigger higher level of intelligence alert because of the indication that a bigger surprise is on the way (Heuer, 1999) . This was the attention the information about attack must receive even in midst of "data glut" flying from difficult- to-verify open sources. In the view of Bett, the most frequently noted sources of breakdowns in intelligence lie in the process of gathering timely data, sharing it with decision makers and impressing on them the weight and relevance of the information. Then a timely prediction of the enemy's intentions and selling that prediction to responsible authorities. In what Bett called, operational evaluation, he argued that once hostilities are on underway, informed decision making involves appraisal of tactical efficiency in order to adapt strategy and choices. The Nigerian intelligence community may be pardoned for "data glut" as a result of incalculable mass of it coming from the open sources with difficult verifiability avenues as the war progressed. However, Amnesty International stated that the warnings were received from multiple civilians and local officials who had seen or learned about the militant advancing on Chibok (Mathis-Lilley, 2014). Writing on the topic Anatomy of terror: What makes normal people become extremists? Byrne (2017) observed that classified data is no more comprehensive as about 80 percent of top-secret intelligence is drawn from open sources, including media reports (Byrne, 2017). For this reason, one could see the lamentation of the first informant about the adaptability question from conventional war tactic to asymmetry warfare. Does the Nigerian army really understand the war they are fighting asked fifth informant rhetorically? But he quickly answered, "No."

Another important task of defence planning is having the duty of using intelligence to develop doctrines and forces for deterrence and defense. Defense planning estimates the enemy in terms of capabilities and intentions within a period of several years with intelligence inclining towards "worst case" analysis in planning and "best case" analysis in operational evaluation. Had the Nigerian army adhered to these principles, 17 army officers and some local police persons would not have been left at Chibok at a time the school was serving as an examination centre for various other school pupils. These few army men must be commended to have attempted repelling the attack though were quickly overpowered and retreated with one soldier getting killed (Mathis-Lilley, 2014).   Has the Nigerian army reflected on its

tactical efficacy? If this was well-done, they would have had their intelligence tilted to "worst case" analysis which could attract a battalion of 300-800 "best case" (officers) under the command of perhaps a lieutenant colonel until the exam was over. Unfortunately, it was the opposite that happened. The world did not exhaust mourning the disappearance of the Chibok girls then three years now, history of another intelligence failure repeated itself as parents of 110 young girls from Government Girls Science and Technical College in Dapchi, Bulabulin Yunusari Local government area in Yobo state were again snatched by the Boko Haram militants (Akinwotufeb, 2018). Could it be that lessons have not been learnt for which this affliction had befallen Nigeria a second time? Why was it that soon after the soldiers had been removed from the checkpoint, the attack took place? Why did the governor of the Yobe State Ibrahim Gaidam not aware that the soldiers had been withdrawn? The army who first denied reports from the governor now admitted they redeployed the soldiers away from Dapchi because they felt Dapchi was relatively secured (Bbc.com, 26 February 2018), a strategic flaw parallel to the Chibok debacle. And the wailing of distraught parents continues.

Terrorists don't just choose targets unless for strategic reasons. Among the reasons given in choosing the embassy in Kenya in 1998 bombing, the king-reason was because the ambassador was a woman and that the attack could result in a huge publicity if she had been killed (Warning, 2013, p 91). The militants still apply same strategies. Comparing the global reaction to the abduction of the Chibok girls, one could agree that Boko Haram adopted this strategy to announce their presence in the world jihadist map. In addition, the abduction could earn them huge sums of dollars in ransom.

4.9 Overcoming terrorism through intelligence

How do we train intelligence officers to be able to neutralise the lethality of the Boko Haram should be our preoccupation informant 4 noted was his ultimate concern? In the view of informant 7, the Nigerian intelligence community had not been able to design a training model that could counter the ideological messages Boko Haram peddled around. They claim they are at war with the west because they perceive the west to be the cause of their problems. So, they hate America, Jews and Europe. Unfortunately, "we have not been able to convince our people and the sect followers effectively that what they claim is not true. So, they still have the capacity to recruit base on that propaganda." He then suggested that the Nigerian intelligence community should train intelligence assets on language use, with close attention to diction of Boko Haram through what he called forensic analysis of their language content – forensic linguistics. Forensic linguistic is applied in mostly legal discourse and criminal trials. However, an aspect of it could be important to identifying terrorists in their budding state before they hatch into radicalism. Since ideological transmission is pushed by language, according to informant four, it is important to examine the manner in which people interact among themselves, why they are interacting in that way and what is being accomplished through such an interaction (Coulthard and Johnson, 2010,

p 1)? Forensic linguistics is the application of science to the analysis of language samples in an enquiry (Olsson and Luchjenbroers, 2013, p 2). My fourth respondent noted that intelligence officers must be interested in how terrorists choose their words? What are their arguments? Informant four continued that if intelligence officers could apply forensic linguistics, they could have gained some fore-knowledge on the intentions of the Boko Haram before they could grow into the monster that it is today. Boko Haram began as a charity organization, by its next stage, it was characterized by verbal assault on secular society - democracy and so prepared the stage and launched its grand mission. Then when its leader was killed that event became a prompt to pelt Nigeria with unimaginable violence (Mohammed, 2014, p 10).

Another important training model that informant 3 suggested is the use of emotional intelligence. This could ameliorate the adaptability lack among the military that could sharpen the tactical front of the army accused of the use of abrasive force. Emotional intelligence is the ability to monitor one's own and others emotions to discriminate each of them and to use the information to guide one's thinking and actions (Mayer and Salovey, 1993, p 433). This corroborates the tenet that emotionally intelligent individual develops 'meta mood' which empowers them to pull back and recognize the need to take it easy and be less 'mad' from the ongoing. This is because emotionally intelligent persons have higher problem-solving abilities that would manage security provoking anger that could pose security challenge. (Torubeli and Ambakederemo, p 118). According to Susan Peaceful (2012), all conflicts have emotional and cultural perspectives as salient drivers. This makes it necessary for policy makers and intelligence agencies to deeply understand human nature and utilize intelligence to guide strategies to help resolve and de-escalate conflict.

As informant 3 noted, the military must not just shoot because terrorists are killing but they must exercise restrain as terrorists mostly use human shields as a tactic to avoid killing innocent populace. How to build relationships with local communities and with other nations, understanding not only individuals but cultures, learning against manipulating but lasting common grounds. Emotional intelligence builds tolerance trust, respect, good will and understanding between communities and countries, avoid sending spies but analysts that seek first to understand then to be understood (wpas.worldpeacefull.com, November 10, 2012).

Through the prism of emotional intelligence positive solutions are developed rather than running on fear of seeing terrorist in the face of any person with beard. Military strategies in his view create greater insecurity because of its core concept of using fear to control in order to change behaviour. Intelligence officials must hypothetically frame negative questions and be guided by peace desires, question the realities rather than being caught up in group and delusional thinking and ignorance that comes from unquestioned mantras. This was exhibited by the United States military power that could not defeat the Taliban in Afghanistan because of lack of asking the right questions as they were caught up in the fog

of war (wpas.worldpeacefull.com, November 10, 2012). To win this war is to win hearts and minds not when the last militant falls.

The initial approach to the fight by the federal army in the eye of the informants was the use of offensive force which recorded many intelligence failures with a major one discussed in the analysis. However, there emerge the C-JTF which served as the intelligence branch of the army. They furnished the army with valuable asymmetric information that debase Boko Haram. Hence CJTF become the human intelligence scheme applied in fighting Boko Haram which established my major objective that sought to identify the human intelligence schemes applied in the fight, their successes and failures and the lessons learnt.

Chapter five

5.0 Summary, conclusion and recommendations

The lethality of attacks against innocent Nigerian citizenry by the Boko Haram sect and how human intelligence played a role in decimating the sect was the purpose of this thesis. The nature of new wars has brought battle fields too close to ordinary life and its asymmetric nature makes predictability hard if not impossible. These occurrences coupled with democratic norms are bringing to light the roles of intelligence in fighting terrorists. This is an indication of an emerging norm where the "secret shells" of intelligence is getting broken making citizens a bit conscious of the activities of once clandestine intelligence agencies.

What this achieved was ordinary citizens are able to determine if the security operations against the insurgents was intelligence-led or not. In the case of fighting Boko Haram, the realization of intelligence deficit in the counter-terrorism efforts of the Nigerian army emerged a model of intelligence support for the Nigerian army called Civilian Joint Military Task Force. Despite some criticisms against their deployment because of reported cases of abuse on their part, Amnesty International confirmed their contributions to the successes of the military was notable. As members of same villages with the Boko Haram fighters they were able to give credible intelligence by identifying them, giving information about impending attacks and sometimes arresting them. Some of them who are hunters and knew the geography of the Sambisa forest, the hide outs of Boko Haram led the army to their secret camps leading to the gains of the army in the fight. This emphasized the strength of Peter Philip's discussion on introducing quality uncertainty into the transactions and interactions of terrorists network that potentially destroy their network (Phillips, 2011b, p 2). What actually explains the low power of Boko Haram is the fact that terrorist networks in touch with their grassroot supports survive and those that lost support through quality uncertainty dies down. Through the support of the military by ordinary "local intelligence assets" the fire power of Boko Haram dwindled.

This is bringing intelligence from its high levels of governmental circles to the locals as states across the world lost their Weberian right as sole users of force. What this means is that states must extend their intelligence lens to the "top" and to the "bottom," giving it policy attention if early warnings of terrorist attacks could be identified and prevented. The intelligence lens at the "top" would have to focus on other states, determine threats and the stop, whilst at the same time keeping firm intelligence efforts among the local communities. Mohammed Yusuf, the sect leader when he started identifying a vulnerable spot of the society (poverty) pretended attempt to solve a problem and launched his terrorist mission that led to the death of millions. Whilst this forcefully highlighted the importance of human intelligence in fighting terrorists, it also serves as a call for reflection as to why terrorists behave the way they do. Reflecting on such themes could lead to the discovery that we wouldn't be able to explain terrorism until one can completely empathize the pain and the frustration that cause it (Stern, 2003, p

xvi). "To empathize is to understand and to share the feeling of another without necessarily having the feelings of pity or sorrow for their misfortunes agreeing with their sentiment or opinions or having a favourable attitude toward them - the feelings that define sympathy. It's a kind of vicarious introspection, (ibid p xvii)." Stern believed this craft could be learned to understand and share feelings that give rise to terrorism but still maintain that terrorists' actions are immoral or even evil. Such understanding could lead governments to that alienated society could be a threat to society as it could lead to terrorist acts. Religiously alienated people Stein wrote would want to hasten the return of the Messiah by carrying out God's judgement against unrepented sinners. Terrorists harness uncontrollable outrage as their rallying point to murder or recruit to new sect members as it was in the case of Palestinian who felt humiliated by Israeli policies and called for attack on them creating vicious cycle of atrocities both sides. The benefits of terrorists are partly spiritual, partly emotional and partly material and as they are caught collective-action problems as only those who contributed incurred the cost of their actions but the broader collective share the benefits (Stern, 2003).

Gaining a better understanding of these facts could lead to appropriate actions towards fighting terrorism. By this even in the face of cruelties, such as beheading victims, abduction, bombings and killings, Byrne (2017) advised political leaders to be measured in their speech against jihadists. When politicians demonise terror groups as evil, hormones flood the brain with danger signals. Then politicians forget how to think scientifically. "We need to get inside the heads of terrorists and look at ourselves as they look at us," he stated. Terrorists incidents in the Syria and Iraq according to him showed jihadists as David's and conventional armies as lumbering Goliaths (Byrne, 2017). Boko Haram played the David character in many ways by their daring resilience and like a tiny "ant" entered the "tusks" of a huge elephant - the Nigerian federal army and they had gone gaga.

The terrorist groups could piece and merge with relative ease, they are anti-fragile, strengthening under attack. They are not wedded to a charismatic leader but are self-organising network that can operate independently of a single knob of control and have ready source of new personnel. For example, the US strategy of increasing troop number in Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan would not protect against jihadists. Such moves rather increase terrorism because they are flexible, re-spun spider webs (Byrne, 2017). They are alienated victims of beliefs, fogged by mystic revelations of quicker return of the Messiah by killing unrepentant sinners. Endemic despair filled their hearts, uncontrollable desperation transformed even mothers to become donors of their sons for suicide-murders with the engraved idea that martyrdom operations are worthy of both earthly and heavenly rewards (Stern, 2003, p 10, 32-33).

It is for this reason drone strikes aim at decapitating terrorist cells are likely to fail as studies by Jennifer Varriale Carson at the University of Central Missouri concluded that killing a high-profile jihadist is counter-productive if its intension is to decrease terrorism. This is because killing a charismatic leader may inspire a potent posthumous charismatic appeal or cause a splintering that results in extreme

factions rising in prominence (Byrne, 2017). A good example was the killing of Mohammed Yusuf, Boko Haram leader who was believed to have been killed in prison custody by the Nigerian Police. They hibernated for some months after the killing of its leader and came back stronger, more violent and more heroic. Terrorist groups are seldom defeated by military force, they either achieve political solution or they wither away because the grievances are solved or dissipate, or they alienate their supporters through excess brutality. This is the reason bare military force options as chosen by the Nigerian federal army could hardly work – win hearts and minds of the aggrieved. "Our counter terrorism strategy, which is no strategy will destroy our democratic values," (Byrne, 2017). The Nigerian Terrorism (Prevention) Act (2013) tells it all. Under the Terrorism Act as amended in (2013), the military was given wide powers to arrest and detain people. Section 27 for example allows the arrest and detention of a person found in any premises or places or in any conveyance by relevant law enforcement officers of any agency until the completion of a search or investigation under the provisions of this act. According to Amnesty International, this provision was very broad and even violated Nigeria's constitution and international human right obligations. Under the amended act, anyone who attempts or threatens any act of terrorism, or omits to do anything that is reasonably necessary to prevent an act of terrorism or assist or facilitates an act of terrorism is guilty of an offence. People convicted of such an offence could face death penalty, which is the ultimate denial of human rights and a cruel inhuman and degrading punishment. All these happened at a time a state of emergency had been declared which gave the detentions legal justifications (Amnesty.org, 2015, p 33) and perhaps making the killings legal.

According to Byrne (2013) terrorist groups are like H_2O. It can be in several states as ice, water or vapour. In Mardugri in 2010 for example, "it was ice." The military melted it when a joint security team raided Boko Haram hideout in Dautsen, Tanshi at Bauchi state. They melted it when Yusuf Mohammed was killed July 31, 2009 in police custody. But it liquefied, turned into water as a trophy from Shekau to Yusuf and flowing into the countryside, seizing towns and villages. Then it vapourised again when as the Federal Army chased them out and claimed to have defeated them technically. They will live to fight them again (Byrne, 2017, p 33).

In all these analysis and suggestions as indicated by Byrne (2017) fighting terrorism is one of the most difficult warfare as every option to counter terrorism is burdened with problems. So, what are the clear ways to win the terror war?

5.1 Recommendations

An African proverb stated that as hunters shoot without missing their mark, birds fly without perching. Intelligence should play "the bird that flies without perching-" it must take the lead on how to have access to finances conduits for terrorists, making material for improvised explosives very hard to find. For example, informant three was of the view that government must have proper records on artisans that

work in quarries, the chemicals they import, the quantities they use daily, weekly, monthly, quarterly and annually. He also noted that government must keep critical watch on retired army and police officers, especially their engagements after retirement. The fertilizer use by farmers must also be monitored closely as they could be used to produce explosives.

In the case of Nigeria, C-JTF has produced good food for thought in repositioning state intelligence agenda. It is for this reason the study suggests that each town and village must have intelligence unit to be coordinated by state government. This if well-arranged and coordinated could supply credible intelligence and early warnings to thwart terrorist attacks. Since terrorist have respect no territorial boundary, the sub-regional divisions have intelligence systems with efficient sharing mechanism to deal with all terrorist activities. Education using the media – social and traditional media is key.

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