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Drones, Targeted Killings and the Rhetoric of a Killable Enemy

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DRONES, TARGETED KILLINGS AND THE RHETORIC OF A KILLABLE ENEMY

A Reaper MQ-9 Remotely Piloted Air System (RPAS) taxis along the runway at Kandahar Air field, Afghanistan.

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Declaration

I, Erskine Yengoude Apiiyah, declare that this thesis is a result of my research investigations and findings. Sources of information other than my own have been acknowledged and a reference list has been appended. This work has not been previously submitted to any other university for award of any type of academic degree.

Signature......................................

Date...............................................
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Abstract
In the context of the international fight against terrorism, nations continue to target and kill people suspected of being terrorists or associated with terrorist networks. This war on terror has largely been driven by remotely piloted drones which is now a weapon of choice for western democracies. Although the legitimacy of targeted killing missions continues to be debated, these nations continue to make public justifications for eliminating suspected terrorists. The aim of this thesis was therefore to understand how western democracies framed their adversaries as targetable and killable as part of the global war on terror. Using the enemy image theory and US, Israel and UK as case studies, I explored the political discourse of these countries to understand how their political actors have justified suspected terrorists as killable targets. At the end of the study, my findings revealed that politicians use discursive devices that identify and polarize individuals and groups. The means of polarization involved the use of words that create a general divide between the self and the ‘Other’. Words that were degrading were peculiar to the ‘enemy’ whiles the complimentary imagery addressed the self or the state. Secondly, the political actors advanced the rhetoric to the projection of a threat that is existential and imminent in nature. The threat was framed in extra-ordinary terms out of normal politics such that, the threat situation required exceptional measures that included the killing of suspected terrorists. Finally, political actors emphasized the need and justifiable grounds for which the ‘enemy’ must be targeted and killed. This justification to kill the enemy was found to be normalized through the construction of the enemy in the political discourse.

Keywords: Drones, Targeted Killing, Enemy and Western Democracies.
Contents

Declaration.................................................................................................................................................. ii
Acknowledgements....................................................................................................................................... iii
Abstract ...................................................................................................................................................... iv
1.0 Chapter One: Introduction.................................................................................................................. 1
  1.1 Problem Statement .............................................................................................................................. 2
  1.2 Research Aim and Research Question ............................................................................................... 4
    1.3.1 Drone ........................................................................................................................................ 4
    1.3.2 Targeted Killing ........................................................................................................................... 5
    1.3.3 Western Democracies .................................................................................................................. 5
    1.3.4 The ‘Enemy’ .............................................................................................................................. 6
  1.4 Delimitations ........................................................................................................................................ 6
  1.5 Outline of Study ..................................................................................................................................... 6
2.0 Chapter: Two Literature Review ......................................................................................................... 7
  2.1 The legal Debate .................................................................................................................................. 7
  2.2 The Proliferation of Drone Technology ............................................................................................... 9
  2.3 The Effectiveness of TKs .................................................................................................................... 10
  2.4 The Moral Debate ............................................................................................................................. 11
  2.5 The Debate on the Impact and Accountability of Targeted Killing ................................................. 12
  2.6 The Constructivist Argument ........................................................................................................... 13
3.0 Chapter Three: Methodology and Research Design ............................................................................ 15
  3.1 Critical Discourse Analysis ................................................................................................................ 15
    3.1.1 Qualitative Research .................................................................................................................. 15
    3.1.2 Critical Discourse Analysis as a Method .................................................................................... 16
  3.2 Research Design .................................................................................................................................. 17
  3.3 Data Collection and Method ............................................................................................................. 18
  3.4 Sampling and Sample size ................................................................................................................. 20
  3.5 Reliability and Validity ....................................................................................................................... 20
  3.6 Ethical Considerations ........................................................................................................................ 21
  3.7 Limitations ......................................................................................................................................... 21
4.0 Chapter Four: Theoretical Framework and Concepts ........................................................................ 23
  4.1 ‘Enemy’ Image ................................................................................................................................... 23
    4.1.1 Concepts of Enemy Image ......................................................................................................... 24
References ........................................................................................................................................... 67

Appendix One: Interview Guide ........................................................................................................ 78

Appendix Two: Speeches by Politicians .............................................................................................. 78
1.0 Chapter One: Introduction

In the records of human history, individuals and certain groups in political societies have once eliminated their leaders whom they deemed as oppressors and dictators to restore equity in governance while others have also killed leaders of their adversaries to change the outcomes of war. Even though the practice of targeted killings (TKs) have existed early in history, its prevalence has varied in time as well as its political, legal and moral analysis. For instance, in the history of ancient Greece, citizens were honoured for the successful elimination of tyrants for the maintenance of democracy in the city-state (Teegarden, 2014). Early in the 15th Century, even though acts of killing or assassinating state leaders were deemed legitimate in Europe (Senn & Jodok, 2017), changing rules de-legitimized this practice pushing state actors who engaged in them to do so in secret (Alston, 2011).

Despite the long practice of TKs, eliminating another person in another country was challenging because it required the deployment of personnel physically on the ground in challenging terrains, the use of proxies in the foreign country or the use of long-range missiles to attack. In modern times, the difficulty in practicing TK is no more with the advent of drones making the practice easier and cheaper culminating in an exponential increase in the number of TK operations (Horowitz & Fuhrmann, 2015). In practical terms, drones and targeted killings are two separate phenomena. As indicated earlier, TKs have existed early in history whiles drones are a recent development. The reason why the two are studied together is because drones have resulted in the killing of more people.

Also, while states were previously operating under cover in their TK missions, current trends now show how states engage in open justification of the method and usually cite it as part of national security strategy (McDonald, 2016). Indeed, the technological advancement in the use of drones represents a technological revolution for TKs. Due to the ability of the drone, they have become a weapon of choice especially for western democracies because these nations now want to go to war with less risk to personnel and equipment (Senn & Troy, 2017).

Among western democracies, the US is the leading country in the use of military drones for TKs (Cole, 2018; Walker, 2017). Meanwhile, airstrikes by US drones have continued in Syria and Iraq as part of the fight against ISIS and Al-Qaeda (Cole, 2018). Secondly, Israel has been adjudged as the pacesetters in the use of armed drones (Byman, 2011) and the only nation that has recorded
the highest number of assassination operations among western nations since World War 2 (Bergman, 2018). In Europe, UK is the only country that has deployed armed drones as part of its operation against ISIS in Iraq and Syria. That notwithstanding, the UK government have still indicated continued strikes in Syria and Iraq until ISIS is completely defeated (Cole, 2018).

There are different kinds of weapons possessed by states all over the world for lethal attacks. This can range from rifles to tanks, inter-continental ballistic missiles (IBMs), submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), attack helicopters such as the AH-64 Apache helicopter among others. However, armed drones have not only emerged as a weapon of choice for those who possess the technology, but also have a growing capacity to be deployed in unlimited contexts. Modern armies are consistently deploying armed drones in the context of conventional warfare and outside the battlefield (Fisk & Ramos, 2016). Armed drones account for over 95 percent of TKs outside the battlefield (Himes, 2015).

As much as this phenomenon undergoes transformation, debates about the issue in academia have varied in its ethical, legal and political dimensions. Central to the debate in academia is the justification for TKs. Arguments in literature about the justifications for TKs generally take a legal, ethical and philosophical perspective. Scholars who argue along these three themes can further be categorized under three axes: research that disputes TK as a method of counter-terrorism, those that accept it and finally academics who think that existing legal conventions and statutes need to be updated to reflect contemporary threats to the security of nations (Finkelstein, Ohlin, & Altman, 2012). There are two other branches of the debate on the subject area which also focuses broadly on the use of drones as a preferred method in TKs and finally, the impact of TKs.

To contribute to this academic debate, this thesis looks at the issue from another perspective by seeking to understand how political actors frame their adversaries as killable targets or as in the words of Gregory, “their lives losable” (Gregory, 2017, p. 212). To achieve this, I focus on the international counter-terrorism rhetoric of the US, Israel and the UK.

1.1 Problem Statement
Armed Drones are a subject of debate across the globe as nations continue to acquire drones of different kinds and for varying purposes. Key among the widespread use and development of the technology is that a significant number of countries who “possess drones are well-established democracies such as US, Israel, France and the UK” (Senn & Troy, 2017; Martins, 2015). The
US and Israel are the largest manufacturers of armed drones in the world. In this category, the US is the leading country in the use of military drones for TKs whiles Israel is judged as the world’s largest drone exporter (Cole, 2018; Walker , 2017; Davis, et al., 2014). Within this framework, the US has continued to engage in drones strikes in Syria and Iraq as part of the fight against ISIS and Al-Qaeda (Cole, 2018). In drone warfare, Israel has been adjudged as the leading nation in the use of armed drones (Byman , 2011) and the first nation to acknowledge the elimination of a suspected terrorist in November 2000 (Senn & Troy, 2017). Israel has also recorded the highest number of assassination operations among western nations since World War 2 (Bergman , 2018).

The MQ-9 Reaper drone produced by General Atomics is America’s major combat drone. The closest competitor to the MQ-9 Reaper is Israel’s IAI Heron drone. Recently, Chinese-made armed drones have made it to the drone market with supply to countries in the middle east, Africa and countries in Asia. Pakistan, Nigeria and Iraq used the Chinese CH-3 and CH-4 drones in 2015 whiles the CH-5 became China’s newest version in 2016 (Goh & Doyle, 2018). In Europe, though some countries are yet to acquire the technology and others still debating the acquisition of it, countries involved in the drone technology are UK, Germany, France and Italy (Di Salvo, 2017; Dworkin, 2015). Currently, UK is the only country that has deployed armed drones as part of its operation against ISIS in Iraq and Syria. It is estimated that about 58 airstrikes have been conducted by British drones in Syria in 2018. And like the US, the UK government have indicated continued strikes in Syria and Iraq until ISIS is completely defeated (Cole , 2018).

In the past, secrecy characterized TK operations but lately, nations now engage in open justification of this method of counter-terrorism. The practice has become common-place such that the US president for instance may decide which ‘enemies’ of the state may die based on a “kill list” (Friedman, 2012). Former director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) once referred to drones as “the only game in town” (Singer P. W., 2009, p. 33). Evidently, drones now form part of regular counter-terrorism measures of western democracies, which indeed is to eliminate, rather than capture, suspected terrorists.

Much as drones have changed contemporary methods of fighting, debates on the subject have traversed along two approaches. First, research has focused on the justification of the method as a counter-terrorism tactic from the legal and ethical perspective. Research along these approaches can be categorized into research that disputes TK as a method of counter-terrorism, those that
accept it and finally academics who think that existing legal conventions and statutes need to be updated to reflect contemporary threats to the security of nations (Finkelstein et al, 2012)

Critical in the debate of TKs is the identification of targets for a “kill list”. Drones permit their operators to identify specific targets to be able to direct “warheads on foreheads” (Gregory, 2017, p. 213). Selecting targets for elimination is usually preceded by long periods of surveillance including the trailing of several people through their social networks. These individuals being followed are sometimes not people already known, but the criterion is to identify behaviour patterns that are suspicious and indeed generic in nature (Chamayou, 2015). The pattern of life identified are usually linked to that of terrorists which may not have been confirmed by intelligence (Wilcox, 2017). This method of identifying a killable target in principle is primarily based on a pre-determined profile awaiting an appropriate match.

The convergence in the arguments of Gregory, Chamayou and Wilcox unveils the research gap that is addressed by this thesis. This study takes the argument further by looking into how targets are framed by the political actors for the acceptable logic of eliminating the ‘enemy’. While previous studies provided limited knowledge into how targets are framed by politicians to make their adversaries targetable and killable, this thesis will present an advanced scholarly argument for the understanding of this subject as well to activate a sustained academic debate on the topic.

1.2 Research Aim and Research Question
In the context of the international fight against terrorism, the US, Israel and UK continue to target and kill people suspected of being terrorists or associated with terrorist networks. This war on terror has largely been driven by using remotely piloted drones. Although the legitimacy of TK missions continues to be debated, these nations continue to make public justifications for eliminating suspected terrorists. The aim of this thesis is therefore to understand how the political actors of US, Israel and UK frame the ‘enemy’ in order to make him targetable and killable. For achieving the aim of this study, the central research question is: In the context of the International fight against terrorism, how do western democracies frame the enemy as targetable and killable?

1.3 Definition of Key Terms

1.3.1 Drone
In the Military dictionary of the United States (US) Army, “a drone is a land, sea or air vehicle that is remotely or automatically controlled”. (Joint Publication 1-02, p. 171). By this definition, a drone is not necessarily an aerial object. Examples of a drone can include submarine drones,
marine drones, and terrestrial drones provided there is no human being controlling the machine. Drones can be remotely piloted by humans or controlled independently by artificial intelligence (robots). However, existing technology for the military do not include autonomous lethal robots, though technology is advancing towards that domain for the future (Chamayou, 2015). In modern warfare, drones are commonly referred to as Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) or in other domains Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAVs). The appropriate term depends on whether the drone is mounted with weapon or not. Against this backdrop, this thesis focuses on TKs executed by armed aerial vehicles (also known as hunter-killer drones).

1.3.2 Targeted Killing
The Academic discourse on target killings has generated several terminologies such as “summary execution, extra judicial killing, named killing, targeted elimination, targeted killing, or state sponsored killing” for this subject (Senn & Troy, 2017, p. 185). The discourse has been closely related to assassination and has therefore caused the use of TK and assassination interchangeably by many scholars. That notwithstanding, this study does not attempt to submit arguments to distinguish between the meanings associated with the various labels associated with TK. On this basis, I follow the definition of TK as suggested by Melzer in his book “TK and International Law”. He defines TK as “the use of lethal force attributable to a subject of international law with the intent, premeditation and deliberation to kill individually selected persons who are not in the physical custody of those targeting them” (Melzer, 2008, p. 5).

1.3.3 Western Democracies
Democracy is a concept with several possible meanings depending on what one emphasizes to define it. The commonly accepted definition of democracy pays attention to the institutions of democratic governance as well as its procedures. In the words of Robert Dahl, democracy is associated with the “institutions and processes of representative governance” (Dahl cited in Dalton , Shin, & Jou, 2007, p. 143). In other words, if governments are formed through free and fair elections, then democracy is said to prevail. In other contexts, democracy is defined in terms of outcomes such as freedom and liberty. These outcomes are achievable through the functioning of democratic institutions (ibid). Accordingly, western countries that exhibit these tenets of democratic governance are deemed as western democracies.
1.3.4 The ‘Enemy’
The Latin word *inimicus*, literally meaning *not-friend* is the root word of the word *enemy*. The Cambridge online dictionary defines *enemy* as “a person who hates or opposes another person and tries to harm them or stop them from doing something”. In the US, the Federal Law defines enemy as “the government of any nation with which the US is at War” (Holt, 1989). In the field of Political-Psychology, it is argued that the idea of opposing force, with its accompanying damaging effects are sometimes nuanced and found to be associated with the relationships that persons have with others in a conflict. It acknowledges the role of perception and therefore suggests that “enemy is a person or group of persons perceived to represent a threat to or to be hostile towards the perceiver” (Silverstein & Flamenbaum, 1989, p. 53).

The word enemy has distinctly registered varying meanings across fields. During the era of the cold war, it was observed that the Soviet Union was deemed as the enemy of the US and its allies (Leffler, 1994) not only because they posed as a physical threat to the US per se but also because they represented a different ideology which put them in a comparative position as a superpower. However, in contemporary times, enemy has been understood in more abstract terms by many people since they have not experienced war of any kind (Holt, 1989). Based on the current widened definition of the term, enemy may include persons or groups with opposing ideologies, religion or values that puts them in a competitive position for global influence (Zur, 1991).

1.4 Delimitations
Though a lot of studies in this area have generally focused on the political, moral, legal and general impact of targeted killings using drones, this study adopts a different focus by looking into how western democracies have framed their adversaries as targetable and killable. To achieve this and using three countries as case studies, I focus on the political rhetoric of US, Israel and UK in the context of the international fight against terrorism.

1.5 Outline of Study
Following this introduction, Chapter two (2) is next which will deal with the Literature Review. Chapter three (3) focuses on the research methodology and research design. Chapter four (4) will highlight on the theoretical framework of this study. Chapter five (5) discusses Western democracies and TKs. In Chapter (6), I conduct an analysis of my data and follow up with a discussion. Finally, I conclude in chapter seven (7).
2.0 Chapter: Two Literature Review
In the past decade and a half, the international fight against terrorism has gone through some transformation due to the increasing deployment of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and especially for their deployment in TK missions. The current revolution of TKs using drones has sparked enormous research among academics resulting in an extensive literature on the subject. Central to the debate in academia is the justification for TKs. Arguments in literature about the justifications for TKs generally take a legal, ethical and philosophical perspective. Scholars who argue along these three themes can further be categorized under three axes: research that disputes TK as a method of counter-terrorism, those that accept it and finally academics who think that existing legal conventions and statutes need to be updated to reflect contemporary threats to the security of nations (Finkelstein, Ohlin, & Altman, 2012). There are two other branches of the debate on the subject area which also focuses broadly on the use of drones as a preferred method in TKs and finally, the impact of TKs.

2.1 The legal Debate
The first branch which is the largest in the research area deliberates on the legitimacy of TKs by measuring the strategy of TK against legal and moral principles to find out whether there is the need for an overhaul in strategy and law to meet the changing faces of armed conflict. The key question which drives this branch of research is whether International Humanitarian Law (IHL), which opposes the regime of preventive force (lethal) targeted against individuals or the more liberal and allowing nature of armed conflict is also the regulator of state-sponsored TK (Blum & Heymann, 2010; Falk, 2014; Otto, 2012).

Scholars in the area of these two paradigms have come to agree that research on TKs finds itself in an awkward position between these two paradigms by recommending the consolidation of their elements (Farer & Bernard, 2016), the enhancement of their distinctiveness (Finkelstein, Ohlin, & Altman, 2012) or the discontinuity of the paradigms with the aim of exploring other possible frameworks for the adjudication of whether TK is legally permissible (Hakimi, 2012).

Reflecting on the limits of international law and based on the premise of Whitley Kaufman, who argues that it is permissible in the history of the just war tradition to employ the so called preventive force (2005), Michael Doyle (2008) points out the circumstances under which preventive force will be legitimate under the United Nations Charter. Brunstetter and Braun (2011) however suggest the need for a hybrid framework that operates between the just war tradition and law enforcement
since fighting terrorists cannot be adequately regulated by the current legal paradigm or the war convention.

Similarly, some academics have also argued on whether the principle of self defense is an acceptable grounds for targeting and killing people (Corn, 2012; Finkelstein, Ohlin, & Altman, 2012). They have therefore researched into the legal admissibility of using lethal force against nations who do not have the capacity or willingness to disallow non-state actors to establish a firm base on their soil for the launching of lethal attacks on other nations (Dawood, 2013; Deeks, 2013).

Arkin (2009) and Bradley Strawser (2010) take a different position arguing that the key issue is not about the use of drones per se, but the control and management of drones within the principles of the laws of war, namely the principle of distinction and proportionality, just cause and distinguishing between combatants and non-combatants. Ohlin et al. (2012) are however of the view that the principle of distinction as framed in international law offers terrorists an advantage. Due to the weakness in the term, terrorists deliberately do not identify themselves as combatants to be protected in the same manner that civilians will be treated.

A step further in this area is where scholars take the argument to the analysis of the legal stance as well as the terminology that states and non-state actors use in legitimizing TKs. Gregory for instance critically analyzes the terms combatants and non-combatants in international law and shows us how international law (the law supposed to regulate armed conflict and prevent violence against vulnerable groups) has been used to justify the elimination of people and making civilians more vulnerable (Gregory, 2017; Gregory, 2015).

The principle of jus in bello on the other hand discusses the question of unfairness and symmetry in operations related to TKs. On the question of unfairness, research has debated on the means to distinguish between combatants and non-combatants and have made immense contributions in this regard. These recommendations include finding a legitimate target using individual behaviour (Guiora, 2012), organizational connection, (Gross, 2010) or a fusion of both (Finkelstein, Ohlin, & Altman, 2012)

In the context of armed conflict where the US, Israel and UK have cited the threat of terrorism as the basis for killing suspected terrorists, there has also been a growing debate on the relevance of the underlying principles of Just War theory (jus ad bellum and just in bello) in assymetrical conflicts involving states and terrorist groups, or whether these principles can be supported by a
jus ad vim (Walzer, 2011). The principle of jus ad vim applies to the context of using force that is short of war such as TK (Frowe, 2016). Further and with a focus on jus ad bellum, some academics have argued that since it has become morally permissible for states to apply military force on a large scale, the same principles should be applicable to TK missions (Statman , 2012).

This takes the debate to the doctrine of proportionality in the use of force. Here, scholars in this debate have either supported (Lewis , 2013) or contested (Megan & Brunstetter, 2013) the claim that using drones in TK missions reduce civilian casualties. Whereas some are of the view that the use of drones to kill is a more “humane” approach to killing, others also argue on the moral implications that is inherent in the method. Lewis is one of the scholars who thinks that drones are more humane in TKs (2013).

2.2 The Proliferation of Drone Technology

Regarding research on the use of drones as a preferred tool in TK, the literature includes studies using statistical data to document the state of prevalence of the phenomenon (Eisner, 2011; Mcgovern, 2010). Studies in this area have also covered the history of TKs as a strategy and enquired into why states prefer to use this type of violence (Teegarden, 2014; Gazi & Brym, 2011).

Within this sphere, research has delved into the patterns and motivations for the spread and use of drone technology as a tool in modern warfare (Gilli & Gilli, 2016). At the same time, some scholars are of the view that drones lower the cost of war which has made war so probable (Tucker, 2014) which has consequences for the international system (Boyle , 2015). Gilli & Gilli, disagree with this position contending that producing advance weapon systems require heavy infrastructure and expertise that cannot be easily acquired from other fields (2016). By citing countries like the US, France and UK, they maintain that these countries have found it challenging adopting and adapting the drone technology. Therefore, there seems to be an overly exaggerated idea about the spread of drone technology.

In a comparable context Michael Fuhrmann and Matthew Horowitz (2015) focus on the stimulating factors behind the adoption and spread of drone technology. They establish the fact that countries that are experiencing threats to their national security are more likely to acquire drones. Though this may not be the only defining criteria or reason to acquire drones, the type of political system (democracies or autocracies) was found to be an underlying factor in pre-disposing a country to acquire the technology. Finally, to predict accurately whether a country was likely to
acquire drones, these drivers largely rested on the country’s general advancement in technology (ibid).

In a fourth-coming article by Martins and Küsters, the authors have also highlighted on the expansion of drone research and development in Europe which has attracted huge funding from the EU. Their research indicates that there are over 200 projects aimed at drone research and development in Europe. Out of this number, more than 50% of the project is towards dual purpose drones (military and civilian) whiles the fraction for military research and development is constituted by 80 projects (2018). This trend indicates that the drone business is no more the preserve of countries like the US but now a technology with global demand and use.

2.3 The Effectiveness of TKs
Academics generally disagree on the effectiveness of TK as a method of counter-terrorism. In ‘The trouble with Targeted Killing’, scholars like Carvin seek to answer the question of whether TK is an effective counter-terrorism measure. The author argues that even though current research provides a good platform for studying TKs, the findings are not enough grounds to conclusively judge that TK is or is not an effective counter-terrorism tactic (2016). In another context of a similar study, academics have claimed that the elimination of suspected terrorist targets is an effective strategy because it diminishes the enemy’s overall cohesion and fighting capabilities (Johnston, 2012).

Also, Wilner in his studies found that eliminating key members of terrorist groups constrain the operational capabilities of militant groups thereby limiting them from carrying out coordinated attacks effectively as a group (2010). Even though Knopf (2012) agree with Wilner on the effectiveness of TK on the basis that it makes it inherently dangerous for terrorist to carry out attacks, this argument has been rejected by some academics who think that the elimination of state actors and non-state actors (Piazza & Horgan, 2016) has no negative consequences or implications for the enemy’s morale or willingness to fight (Abrahams & Mierau, 2015; Sarbahi & Johnston, 2016).

Tominaga studied the effects of decapitation operations beyond targeted groups. He also concluded that eliminating militant leaders did not generally reduce attacks from militant groups. However, operations of other non-targeted groups also decreased over the period which is an indirect effect of the targeted operations (2018). Cronin on the other hand thinks that results to indicate whether
TK is an effective method may be mixed. However, in judging the effectiveness of the method in the Israeli case, she agrees that targeted strikes may have prevented attacks against Israel thereby saving a lot of civilian lives domestically (2009). In a similar research, Mannes contends that though it may be difficult to make a strong case for the effectiveness of decapitation strikes, reference can be made to the general drop in the frequency of violence as an indication of a successful strategy (2008). Aside studies on the effectiveness of TKs, other research also focused on the circumstances that explain why some governments eliminate leaders of social movements (Bob & Nepstad, 2007)

Between 1945 to 2004, Jordan studied 298 leadership decapitation strikes in different parts of the globe. His findings were that targeting and killing leaders of terrorist groups can be effective in some contexts but can also produce undesired results in other contexts (Jordan, 2009). Jordan argues that factors including the size, age and type of the terrorist group are critical in judging whether killing of their leaders will be bring the activities of the group to a halt or not. He concludes that decapitation as a strategy in counter-terrorism is counter-productive when it is used against large, and deep-rooted religious terrorist groups.

In opposition to the study conducted by Jordan, Price argues that eliminating the leaders of terrorist groups is critical to the sustainability of the group (2012). He compared the mortality of decapitated terrorist groups with non-decapitated terrorist groups and concluded that the former had a higher mortality rate than the latter. He further maintained that not only was any form of leadership crises critical to a terrorist group’s survival but also eliminating leaders in the early life of the group was more effective.

2.4 The Moral Debate
Chamayou highlighted on the moral complexities of TK underscoring the fact that drones have been given the same right to kill as soldiers or combatants on a battlefield (2015), which others believe is a high level of risk vesting drones with so much lethal power (Sharkey, 2010). In a situation where drones cannot be classified as morally responsible for their actions, and even if such classification was possible, it would be an exercise futility to hold a machine accountable. Alternatively, it will also be unfair to hold the drone programmer accountable since there is no direct moral obligation for the functioning or malfunctioning of the drone (Chamayou, 2015).
These arguments put forward show how scholars are concerned not only about the way the technology is being deployed currently, but also the context of their use since these machines are being given some degree of autonomy: “the capability of a machine (usually a robot) for an unsupervised operation, hence the smaller the need for human supervision and intervention, the greater the autonomy” (Allinson, 2015, p. 3)

Furthermore, in answering the question of whether killing by remote control is wrong in itself or whether the method presents complex moral issues, Bradley Strawser (2013), Ronal Arkin (2009) and Armin Krishnan (2009) have argued in defense of drones with justifications for the method of killing using the just war theory, realism and pacifism. Kaag and Kreps however disagree with these justifications stressing that though the assumption is that less casualties will be incurred by employing drones, this should not necessarily mean that we should deploy them (2014).

2.5 The Debate on the Impact and Accountability of Targeted Killing

A continuous debate on the legitimacy of TKs is the debate on the accountability of the state on its TK missions. This domain has received enormous critique (Alston, 2011; Singer, 2012) from academics. In comparison, some academics have countered the critiques suggesting that the US for instance has a rigorous system in place that ensures the domestic accountability of the U.S targeted-killing missions (McNeal, 2014). Further, other studies have also made recommendations in relation to how the levels of accountability can be improved at the international and domestic levels (Guiora, 2013; Murphy & Radson, 2009).

Another area of focus is into the effects of TKs on contemporary societies. One group of academics focused on the broader impact of killing state leaders and how this exercise affects domestic politics (Jones & Olken, 2009; Iqbal & Zorn, 2008). In other arguments, the subject is analyzed from the perspective of modern conflicts and discusses the regional and local effects of TK (Boyle, 2013; Fair, Kaltenthaler, & Miller, 2016).

Some literature have criticized the US and Israel for conducting secret missions (Bergman, 2018; Jaffer, 2016) whereas others have also focused on the impact of the revolution of TK on the global international order and therefore recommend some changes to the global international order (Senn & Troy, 2017). Unlike the US that has a clear TK programme, some scholars maintain that the UK is still debating the use of unmanned systems for TK missions even though the country has drone deployments in Syria in the fight against Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) (Turns, 2017). This indeed is agreed by scholars as a contradictory position. However, the UK argues that its
mission are strictly guided by its policy to defend their nation and its citizens against national security threats (HC 747/HL 49, 2016).

2.6 The Constructivist Argument
Few scholars like Wilcox highlight how algorithms are used to determine characteristics associated with terrorist that makes them targetable. He thinks that algorithms are language interpreted based on social norms (2017). Allinson conducts similar studies in his work “Drone and Necro-Politics”. His arguments point to how drone operators operate within a pre-determined mental machinery which shapes the target into a killable object when in contact (2015). This pre-defined scope segregates places and groups of people into who matters, and who does not, who is disposable and who is not (Mbembe, 2003).

In her book titled “Legitimate Targets? Social Construction, International Law and US Bombing” Dill (2014) shares similar thoughts with Grayson with a thought-provoking account of whether International law (IL) is capable of regulating state behaviour in the absence of a central authority. Using an innovative method, she explores the constructivist theory associated with IL to unravel why states create IL and abide by it. Her major argument questions the term legitimate target and analyzes how IL defines it. IL considers legitimate targets as military objectives and calls for the application of the principles of distinction and proportionality as conditions for legitimacy.

Dill suggests that IL describes the conditions required for a target to be deemed as legitimate for engagement. However, the law fails to disallow or prevent the individual from making subjective judgements about what a legitimate target is. It also does not address the consequences of an attack since the individual is only required to observe a certain criterion and a state of mind or intent which indeed is not verifiable (ibid). Basically, the analysis has sought to establish that arriving at what is deemed as a legitimate target according to IL hinges strongly on the perception of the attacker. The construction of the target for destruction as Dill has addressed is what forms the crux of this study.

Still focusing on the issue of legitimate targets and in this context how the enemy is framed, Pope (2015) presents a scholarly insight into the discourse on high-value targets in the UK. The theme of high-value target was identified to precede arguments in favour of the surgical precision of drone strikes in UK discourse. Analyzing the killing of Anwar Al-Awlaki in Yemen on 30 September 2011, Pope indicates that the event received wide publications across media outlets.
Notable among all the articles was the emphasis on the threat that Anwar Al-Awlaki posed to the UK and the fact that the legal implications of the UK Killing its own citizen was relegated to the background. Anwar Al-Awlaki was described as an ideologue who had radicalizing potentials (ibid). This suggested that eliminating Anwar Al-Awlaki was a means to prevent future radicalization of others. Other news headlines read “Evil Unplugged” and “Fanatic Killed”. Baitallah Mehsud, one of the suspected Taliban leaders was also described as a “border-warrior with a brutal career who had become a high priest of suicide bombers” (p. 147). Additionally, in ‘A Critical Evaluation of Drone Strikes in Pakistan’, Aslam also conducted studies into how debates regarding casualties were politically acceptable to frame threats and securitize the actions of states (Aslam, 2011).

With reference to securitization, a study conducted by Romaniuk using the Copenhagen School’s theory of securitization focused on US targeted killings using armed drones. According to the interpretation of the Copenhagen School, the global war on terrorism is a means of securitizing terrorism such that a situation is classified as threatening enough to require the application of exceptional force. The securitization process consequently validates targeted killing by means of armed drones as a counterterrorism measure for the US global war on terror (2015). Undeniably, except for the work done by these scholars, debates on drones and TKs featuring constructivist thinking are generally not common (Pope , 2015).

Disputably, even though all these scholarly works have been conducted in this domain, there is little information about how the ‘enemy’ is constructed in practical terms. Especially, the political constructions that make the ‘enemy’ a killable object or “their lives losable” (Gregory , 2017, p. 212). Using the US, Israel and UK as the focus of this research, this study takes the debate further by finding out how the ‘enemy’ is framed by western democracies for the acceptable logic of killing the ‘enemy’. While previous studies provided limited knowledge into how targets are framed by states to justify their elimination, this thesis will present an advanced scholarly argument for the conceptualization of this subject as well to activate a sustained academic debate on the topic.
3.0 Chapter Three: Methodology and Research Design
This chapter highlights the different approaches that were employed to undertake this study to answer the research question. The research question to be answered in this study is: *In the context of the International fight against terrorism, how do western democracies frame the enemy as targetable and killable?* The following themes are addressed in the chapter: I start by explaining the approaches used in the study. Next, I concentrate on the research design which is a case study. Thirdly, I illuminate on the criteria used in selecting the respondents for the research. I again highlight on the data collection methods applied to the study and finally I explore the limitations of the study.

3.1 Critical Discourse Analysis
3.1.1 Qualitative Research
The aim of this thesis as indicated earlier is to find out how western democracies (US, Israel and UK) frame the ‘enemy’ as targetable and killable in the context of the international fight against terrorism. While looking for an appropriate approach to carry out this study, the Critical Discourse Analysis (henceforth called CDA) method of qualitative research approach was found to be well-suited to achieve the aim of this study.

According to Bryman (2012) the strength of qualitative research design lies in its stress on the use of words rather than numbers in the collection and analyzing of data. Its distinct principles and approach has earned it a reputation of being a reliable method in social research. First, concepts and theory of qualitative research are driven by the synergy or communication between individuals and not phenomena. Secondly, knowledge built from this approach is based on the interpretivist paradigm in which analyzing and interpreting the social world using its participants becomes a tool to make meaning to understand the social world. More importantly is the ability to generate theory out of research due to the link between the two (Bryman, 2012).

Further justifications for opting for this method of study is the inherent ability to triangulate and explore. In the words of Bryman, triangulation enables the researcher to confer results of a study with other existing research. This system of cross-checking results is meant to validate the findings of a study in a context where the research has made use of different sources in a single study (2016).
3.1.2 Critical Discourse Analysis as a Method
CDA is a form of qualitative Discourse Analysis. It is a research method that provokes scholars to advance from viewing language as metaphysical to understanding them as having meaning that are relative to a particular social, political and historical context (McGregor, 2010). This suggests that the method investigates real cases of social interaction by taking a linguistic format (Blommaert & Bulcaen, 2000).

The beliefs, ideas and positions of people can be illustrated using language by speech or texts which if analyzed communicate a certain meaning within the context. This type of analysis facilitates the explanation of events, conditions and issues (Mogashoa, 2014). Mogashoa further emphasize that “given the power of the written and spoken word, critical discourse analysis is necessary for describing, interpreting, analyzing and critiquing social life reflected in text” (p. 104).

This suggests that how we perceive the world and our idea of reality is communicated through language which in the end produces a kind of discourse (Van Dijk, 2005). The key element in discourse is that it denies ‘objective truth’ since reality is constructed and appreciated through categorization. Our understanding of the world does not mirror what exist but rather an outcome of our means of categorizing the world and evaluating several events in different ways. Therefore, different realities exist subjectively and by re-communicating them we create different discourses and contrasting ways of viewing the world (ibid). This constructivist ontology of understanding the social world connects with my research question which consequently creates a good foundation for it to be answered adequately.

Since reality is constructed through discourse, it also possesses an inherent power to determine which norms and values are acceptable and normal. Thus, there is competition between the different perspectives and discourses about reality regarding the most influential paradigm over people’s thoughts. These competing paradigms contribute to the formation and replication of uneven power relations between ideas and perceptions of reality (Van Dijk, 2005). In trying to be the dominant discourse that an audience may accept, the paradigm which eventually becomes dominant can determine the knowledge and perception that an audience should have (Diamond & Cobb, 1999)

According to Fairclough’s, speakers and their audience arrive at an understanding through varying means which includes persuasion (2001). Diamond and Cobb consider persuasion as a means of
convincing other people to alter their views on a subject (1999). In that vein, they will disregard presently held beliefs in favor of the new ideas or believes the persuader presents (Diamond & Cobb, 1999). Finally, Batstone maintains that critical discourse analysts set out to unravel how the construction of texts conceal certain perspectives in a subtle manner (1995). In this context, the researcher will analyze how the political elite have constructed the image of their adversary in a manner that the intended audience are able to accept the logic of TK.

A significant point to establish is the reason for opting for this method of study. This is largely because of its affiliation to language and also as summarized by Wodak and Meyer (2014):

“In contrast to other approaches to text and discourse analysis (for example, content analysis, grounded theory, conversation analysis; see Titscher et al., 2000) CDA strongly relies on linguistic categories. This does not mean that topics and contents play no role at all, but that the core operationalization depends on linguistic concepts such as actors, mode, time, tense, argumentation, and so on.” (p. 28)

3.2 Research Design
This study adopted the Case study research design. This approach allows the researcher to interrogate a contemporary phenomenon especially within the context of the case. George and Bennett (2005) cited in Levy (2008) define a case as “an instance of a class of events”, and a case study as “the detailed examination of an aspect of a historical episode to develop or test historical explanations that may be generalizable to other events” (p. 2). Based on this definition, scholars using the case study approach are entreated to embrace the approach of a historian, but should change the descriptive propositions of specific results into analytical expositions based on variables (George 1979, cited in Levy, 2008).

The typology of case study design applied to this research is the ‘Illustrative Case study’ approach. This type of case study is usually concise and does not extensively explain a case or test a standpoint of a theory absolutely. On the other hand, the approach aims to offer the reader an impression or sense of a theoretical debate by making available an empirical representation of its application, or to exhibit the empirical significance of a theoretical standpoint by finding at least a single case that is of relevance (Eckstein, 1975 cited in Levy, 2008).

A major reason for adopting a case study approach is to be able to understand a real-world situation whereby the ability of the researcher to make sense of cases will involve varying contexts in
relation to the specific case (Yin, 2013). Another significant advantage I realized from using this design was the ability to use different sources for the study in order to triangulate (Bryman, 2012). For this reason, this study chose western democratic states represented by US, Israel and UK.

For clarity, I want to emphasize that the US, Israel and UK are not the only western democratic states, and neither are they the only western democratic states who are in possession of the drone technology. France has been in possession of Harfang drones since 2008 and acquired Reaper drones in 2013 in which two of them were subsequently deployed in the Sahel in 2014. Similarly, Italy and Germany also are in possession of the Predator drone and the Israeli-made Heron I drones respectively (Cole, 2016). These three countries (US, Israel and UK) were therefore chosen as case studies for illustrative purposes in the quest to understand how state actors frame their adversaries as killable targets in the context of the global war on terrorism.

The criterion of case selection was principally based on the multiple case study approach. This approach involves the selection of two or more cases for a single study. It is scientifically appropriate especially when the chosen cases are not absolute representations of the larger population (Harrison & Calan, 2013). While a generalization is not the aim of my work, the use of multiple cases enhances the validity of the research findings (Yin, 2013). The three cases were also chosen with the issue of context in mind as applicable to case study design. Moreover, since purposive sampling is the driving sampling method in the conduct of a case study, this informed the criteria for selecting the cases—the underlying features of the cases and their uniqueness (Harrison & Calan, 2013). On this basis, I argue that my selection of the three countries was also largely purposive.

### 3.3 Data Collection and Method

The study made use of multiple data sources featuring primary and secondary data. I chose multiple sources of data for the study to ensure triangulation and to build converging lines of enquiry in this study (Bryman, 2016). In the words of Yin, researching for consistency of data across multiple sources of enquiry is like verification (2013). The primary data sources included speeches by politicians and interviews. Selected speeches were available in both video and text formats online. Speech transcripts were compared with video versions for accuracy. Online sources included Dronewars UK, University of California Santa Barbara’s American Presidency Project and the website of the International Institute of Counter-terrorism in Israel. Other sources were the
European Forum on Armed Drones (EFAD), the New American Foundation, Long War journal and the Bureau of Investigative Journalism.

The speeches cannot be considered as true or false in the real sense per se. The issue of whether they are justified or not was also not of interest to me since that is another master thesis. These speeches were chosen because they address my research question adequately in terms of context. I also considered other secondary sources of data such as scholarly articles, books, newspapers, government websites, government documents, legal documents, documentaries and court rulings that touch on the area of research.

Semi-structured interviews were used in the conduct of this study. Semi-structured interviews include questions that deal with a certain range of issues or topics and may not strictly follow a laid down sequence (Bryman, 2012). Semi-structured interviews can be likened to a conversation (Burgess, 1984) where questions are more flexible and open ended to allow interviewees to speak freely to give their own account of an issue. The researcher is therefore able to probe further on important points raised by the interviewees (Berg & Lune, 2012).

The interviews were conducted on skype call with analysts for an expert view on the subject. The views of the experts were essential in providing a broader understanding of the context that the discourse of the area of study transpires. Understanding issues in appropriate context is important in the conduct of CDA (Yin, 2013). According to Byman, telephone interviews can be used in qualitative research when respondents are scattered and cannot be easily reached (Bryman, 2016). In total, I conducted two (2) Skype-call interviews and one (1) face-to-face interview. Each lasted approximately twenty (20) minutes. Through the assistance of my supervisor, respondents were contacted via email at least one week before the time for the interview. At the end of every interview, the researcher asked further questions for clarification on some of the issues. The interviews were recorded with the consent of the interviewees and guided by an interview guide. However, respondents had the opportunity to speak freely on the issues. Recorded interviews were later transcribed and analyzed based on the research questions under separate headings (Bryman, 2012).

Interviews on telephone or the web have been judged as effective in terms of cost and are largely used in qualitative studies (ibid). Yet, there are downsides to the use of telephone interview. The researcher is unable to observe non-verbal cues and other body language which are important to
the research. That notwithstanding, telephone interviews are known to be more appropriate if respondents cannot be reached easily or are located over vast distances. On the other hand, the face-face interview with my third respondent facilitated the observation of non-verbal cues which are important for the conduct of interviews (ibid).

3.4 Sampling and Sample size

Against this background, the study adopted the purposive sampling design since it is relevant to the qualitative data requirements that characterizes the social sciences (Berg & Lune, 2012). This approach is most beneficial to research that has limited resources and therefore requires the selection of cases that are rich in information for the effective utilization of resources. It is also inexpensive, offers easy access to respondents and fast to apply in qualitative research (ibid). It was also the most applicable to the research because I was looking out for data that addressed this study in the context of armed drones and targeted killings.

A sample size of twenty-one (21) political speeches were used in the conduct of this study. For qualitative research Charmaz (2006) suggests that a sample of twenty-five (25) is sufficient for small research projects. This is further reiterated by Richie, Jane & Lewis (2003) who maintained that qualitative samples are usually less than fifty (50). Finally, Green & Thorogood (2009) also indicate that for most qualitative research, researchers derive little new information after having explored a sample size of twenty (20). This therefore justifies choice of sample for a qualitative study of this nature.

3.5 Reliability and Validity

Reliability and Validity are concepts in research methodology that seek to evaluate the quality of a study in line with the principles of scientific research. In the words of Kerlinger, reliability can be likened to words like accuracy, predictability, consistency and stability (Kerlinger, 1973).

Even though the findings of CDA are produced from a reflexive and contextualized approach, this does not exclude the study from evaluation. And despite the diverse perspectives of how to measure the validity of qualitative research, the common rules for assessing the validity of qualitative research are context, coherence, rigour, relevance and usefulness (Yadley, 2011). In terms of context, I situate my research in the appropriate context by connecting the study to relevant scholarly literature on drones and targeted killings. Coherence relates to the effective use
of language to advance a scholarly thought rather than resorting to personal feelings whiles rigour concerns the provision of a detailed account of the subject under study (Taylor, 2001). Based on my approach to this study, I am of the view that I meet the criteria of coherence and rigour since my analysis was conducted through a well-defined scientific methodology to arrive at logical conclusions. In the matter of relevance, my study is related to an empirical issue of targeted killings in the context of international counter-terrorism. Finally, ‘usefulness’ according to Taylor can be judged from its contribution the body of academic enquiry or application outside scholarship (2001). I am certain that my research meets this criterion since the study presents an advanced scholarly argument for the understanding of this topic as well activates a sustained academic debate on the topic. Although I have been conscious of the criteria outlined during the conduct of this study, the extent to which I was successful in the application of these scientific principles will be judged by the reader of the research.

3.6 Ethical Considerations
Ethical considerations can be deemed as one of the salient aspects of qualitative research. Ethical principles in social research involves certain key elements grouped into four main areas by Diener and Crandall (1978): the potential of research to harm participants; whether informed consent is lacking; whether privacy of participants is invaded; and whether there is an element of deception. Issues bothering on the above specifically were strictly adhered to during the study. To ensure informed consent, the researcher sought the explicit consent of respondents via email before the commencement of the interviews. Informed consent allow respondents to be fully aware of the nature of the study and the implications of their involvement from the beginning (Bryman, 2016).

3.7 Limitations
The role of the researcher is significant in every research design. In fact, when using qualitative methods, it is a likelihood that the researcher’s background, identity and bias will impact the findings or how the results will be interpreted. It is therefore important that such biases or preconceptions are eliminated to preserve the study’s integrity (Bryman, 2012). However, Bryman is emphatic that it is practically not feasible to curtail entirely the biases of the researcher. Against this background, researchers are advised to caution readers about their assumptions (ibid). Indeed, the materials used for the analysis of this study were subject to the researcher’s bias- a phenomenon identified in literature as a weakness in qualitative research design. This weakness therefore made
it impossible to generalize results to the larger population (Bryman, Social Research Methods, 2016).

Furthermore, another limitation of this study had to do with the challenge with the extent to which the study could go in interpreting the text being analyzed to bring out a contextualized interpretation. That notwithstanding, discourse analysis research method allows the analyst to introduce and impose meanings on texts being analyzed (Wodak & Meyer, 2001). Parker and Burman (2004) have summarized the argument stressing that “analysts are not only readers but also producers of discourse” (p. 150).

Thirdly, the principal tool of data collection, analysis and interpretation in a qualitative study is the researcher (Parker & Burman, 1993). Therefore, although I acknowledge that language is a social construct, it is also imperative to recognize that I was not insulated from the process and products of these social constructions. Therefore, the findings, conclusions and interpretations of this study will be restricted to that of the researcher. However, the advantages and benefits of critical discourse analysis depends on the aptitude of the researcher to produce explanations and interpretations from a rigorous and reflexive methods of inquiry (ibid). These have effectively been applied in this study.

Also, CDA research has been criticized as being biased socially and politically. On the contrary, Wodak and Meyer (2001) maintain that “critical discourse analysis research combines what perhaps somewhat pompously used to be called ‘solidarity with the oppressed’ with an attitude of opposition and dissent against those who abuse text and talk to establish, confirm or legitimize their abuse of power. Unlike much other scholarship, CDA does not deny but explicitly defines and defends its own socio-political position, that is CDA is biased – and proud of it.” (p. 96).

Moreover, there was a challenge with fixing the time for the skype interview for my first respondent. The time-zone difference was miscalculated initially since the respondent was in another country. This compelled me to start my first interview an hour earlier than we agreed. Also, network problems within the jurisdiction of my respondent dropped the skype call twice. But nevertheless, these challenges did not affect the findings of this study.
4.0 Chapter Four: Theoretical Framework and Concepts

4.1 ‘Enemy’ Image

Theoretically, this thesis is based on the scholarly conception of Image which rests upon the premise that an object can be meaningless to us except our perception of that object (Larson, 1985). The theory of image is a type of constructivist ontology that emphasizes the importance of ideational factors and argues that image reconstructs reality since we cannot conceptualize an idea or object which have no symbolic representation in our minds (Praetorius, 2012).

In the field of International Relations, the “enemy” as a concept is not new. Many scholars have analyzed and explained this concept to pinpoint its role in the building of states and the formation of identities. Goldman (2011) and Arendt (1793) have explored extensively the function of the “enemy” image in totalitarian states. That notwithstanding, this cannot be limited to only totalitarian regimes, but also can be extended to modern democracies.

In the words of Kenneth Boulding, the notion of subjective knowledge which can be found to exist together with the empirical world, is able to provide us with a firm basis to understand the events of politics. He thinks that individuals in general and political leaders of states behave in terms that demonstrate how they perceive the world and not necessarily how the world actually is (1956).

In the context of armed conflicts, scholars have argued about the role that the image of the ‘enemy’ plays in armed conflicts. They have stressed that “enemy” image is a source of motivation for people to discriminate against others and engage in violent behaviour against others (Atran, 2010). Governments also subscribe to this image to garner support from members of their societies to oppose the ‘enemy’. The desire for this support has been judged to be an impetus for the spread of messages that indicate an impending threat to the survival of the state thereby calling for absolute loyalty to the course of government to alleviate the perceived danger (Peek, 2004).

The image of the enemy is also described as the characterization, description or depiction of the enemy. This characterization can either be derived from the actions of the enemy or from the subjective interpretations of the perceiver. What this means is that the image of the enemy can be correct or prejudiced, fictitious or real. However, in most cases it is both (Zur, 1991). The commonly held beliefs, stereotypes and dehumanizing of the ‘other’ (ibid) also represent the image of the enemy. This process of dehumanization in the end seeks to legitimize the aggression meted out to the enemy.
Whiles I undertake this study using the “enemy image” theory, I will emphasize that the aim of this research was not to establish for a fact that “evil” or “enemies” do or do not exist in the real-world situation. Against this background, my aim is to present a scholarly argument using the US, UK and Israel as case studies, the results of which will form the basis for future academic debate and enquiry. The foundations of the ‘Enemy Image’ theory will therefore form the lenses through which I will conduct this study.

4.1.1 Concepts of Enemy Image

4.1.2 Enemy Propaganda
In the context of enmity, propaganda refers to the means through which enmity is disseminated. Laswell defines it as the articulation of views or actions by individuals or groups intentionally with the aim of having an impact on the views and actions of other individuals or groups (1960). In his study of contemporary social systems, Ellul introduced the term propaganda of integration. He thinks that modern propaganda integration is possible using modern communication technology to create a certain level of agreement within society that is important for the preservation of the social order and for public support (1965). Some of the modern technological tools are the press, movies and audiovisuals, radio and spoken words.

4.1.3 The Double Standard in Attention and Evaluation
Scholars consider the double standard dynamic as one of the most influential elements in altering enemy image. It refers to the instances where a different standard of measure is used to evaluate the actions and drive of the enemy as opposed to a different set of standards for own self (Zur, 1991). This situation of bias is essentially linked to the popular saying that “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter”. Some scholars have asserted that political leaders usually fail to accept that terrorists also possess some level of rationality in their thinking about their actions which makes them capable of recognizing social, political and religious unfairness towards them (Blum W., 2003). This perceived injustice is possible grounds for them to retaliate with the slightest opportunity. The effect of the double standard is holding on to inaccurate ideas about the ‘enemy’ which can lead to a disproportionate estimation of danger.

4.1.4 Hostile Predictions and Self-Fulfilling Prophecies
According to Zur, the probability to form negative opinions about the behaviour of the enemy, and the tendency to recollect mainly negative facts and relate non-violent behaviour to situational factors are usually accompanied by offensive predictions about the future actions of the enemy which outpaces what can be verified physically on ground. He argues that since it is highly
probable for most people to judge the enemy as threatening than they may be, there is also the high tendency to expect the ‘enemy’ to act more dangerously and violent in the future than can be verified from available facts (Zur, 1991).

He again looks at the self-fulfilling prophecies as an element of hostile prediction. Zur thinks that judging the enemy as possessing an aggressive intent result in a deterrent or defensive action. The dangerous estimation breeds more suspicion leading to threats and counter-threats which subsequently produces hostile or defensive actions. Indeed, pre-emptive strikes by states are done for defensive purposes. Similarly, the response of the ‘enemy’ will be considered as unprovoked aggression if the enemy’s intentions has been misinterpreted. Self-fulfilling prophecies and predictions of danger have a direct impact on military decisions of any state.

4.1.5 The Kinetic Nature of Enmity
An individual or group could be an enemy today but can also become a friend in the foreseeable future. Opinions and judgements about the enemy usually focus on historical variations between “us” and the ‘enemy’. Since the focus has always been on the hostile behaviour of the ‘enemy’, current emphasis will still be directed towards ‘evils’ that have occurred in history. Historical Facts may be distorted to create enmity between contemporary enemies (Zur, 1991).

4.2 Constructing the Enemy
To examine how ‘enemies’ are socially constructed, Simone De Beauvoir uses the concept of the ‘One’ and the ‘Other’ to illustrate how social constructions of the ‘enemy’ become profound during periods of conflict and national crises. According to de Beauvoir, several groups within society exist in the category of the “Other” who are designated by their inferior status whiles the ‘enemy’ is the one whose destruction is gratifying. She maintains that the idea of the ‘Other’ largely depends on how the ‘One’ decides to perceive itself. If the ‘One’ defines itself as good, then the ‘Other’ will be ‘bad’ or ‘evil’. If the ‘One’ is tranquil, the ‘Other’ will be hostile. (De Beauvoir 1952, cited in Peek 2004).

De Beavoir continues in the same line of thought pointing out that the major means by which the ‘Other’ is constructed is through visual delineation (eye) and narratives (voice). The ‘voice’ and the ‘eye’ of the ‘One’ therefore becomes the tools for socially constructing the enemy. In contemporary times, the visuals and the voices are represented by the social and political leaders, and the media (ibid). These characterizations are what shapes our perspectives about others.
This dualism explained by de Beavoir is reiterated by Zur as he analyses the construction of realities. He also thinks that in the constructing of reality, there is the representation of the *we-they* duality which allows actors to perceive the world in terms of *sacred-evil*. The side that represents the “other” (*they*) then becomes the “evil (enemy) who threatens the security of the “we”. Clearly, for “*us*” to feel safe, then the need to destroy the *evil* becomes apparent (Zur, 1991). Indeed, a central theme recognized by Steiner (2015) is that the existence of *fear* and *stress* (because of perceived threat) is a good platform for the ‘enemy’ to be constructed. The analysis and thoughts expressed by these scholars so far then seek to suggest that the existence of modern conflicts or wars (and in this context counter-terrorism) are apparently battles of resistance or fortification against an ‘enemy’.

According to Knightly (1975) and Keen (1991) cited in Steuter & Wills (2009), early studies of how the ‘enemy’ is constructed investigate the consistency in the use of animal images and disease metaphors to bolster the wider political discourse of a compelling hostile distinction. More greatly, substantially laying the foundations for the language of obliteration and destruction which is the reasonable deduction to the metaphors of the ‘enemy’ as a ‘disease’. These dehumanizing metaphors are so definite and consistent such that they possess the ability to form a distinct symbolic language in the context of the global war on terror whereby going after the ‘enemy’ is linguistically coined as a ‘hunt’ for a ‘prey’ (ibid). These animal and disease metaphors are now common place in both domestic and international discourse in the international fight against terrorism.

A principal point identified by scholars in the process of constructing the enemy is the introduction of a ‘legitimate action’ that is supposed to neutralize the defined threat from the constructed ‘enemy’. The logic in this context is that obliterating the ‘enemy’ that has been constructed as ‘bad’ or ‘dangerous’ becomes an acceptable antidote (Buzan, Wæver, & de Wilde, 1998). Legitimate action can be located within the decision-making process of political leaders. Wodak believes that this legitimate political action is influenced by the perception about the threat (2015).

The mention of legitimate action draws into the analysis of legitimate targets (enemy) since the action is directed towards the perceived threat (enemy). In her book titled ‘Legitimate Targets? Social Construction, International Law and US Bombing’ Dill explores the constructivist theory in the context of International Law to establish how the law constructs the ‘enemy’ for it to pass as a legitimate object for targeting. Indeed, IL has prescribed certain conditions (distinction and
proportionality) which if upheld ‘transforms’ the ‘enemy’ into a legitimate target (Dill, 2014). However, since the law does not show us how to arrive at these preset conditions, constructing a legitimate target (enemy) depends meaningfully on the subjective views of the perceiver.

The analysis so far indicates the role of perception in decision-making and for that matter political decisions. Clearly, images create a dualism of ‘we’ and ‘they’ which in the end creates the ‘Other’ as the hostile element that calls for a legitimate action targeted at the ‘enemy’. The enemy is also represented as a disease to be cured or an animal to be captured or killed. These images have the inherent ability to drive the language and action of destroying the ‘enemy’. As determined by me, these image theories and concepts can adequately answer the research question of this thesis. With the application of these theories and concepts, I seek to answer how political actors frame their adversaries as targetable and killable.

4.2.1 Operationalizing the Theoretical Framework
For answering my research question, the concepts and theories of ‘enemy’ image introduced in my earlier discussion will basically form the tools for analyzing the data gathered. More importantly, constructing the image of the ‘enemy’ has been found to follow a three-staged process. This process identified aligns with my study since it successfully leads me to what elements to look for in the data.

First, the distinction between ‘We’ and ‘Them’, ‘Us’ and ‘They’ sets the stage for constructing the enemy. This stage is what I call the ‘Otherism’ stage. In creating the ‘other’, the ‘enemy’ will be described in various forms that include dehumanizing the ‘enemy’ with animal and disease metaphors for the acceptable logic of eliminating the ‘animal’ or curing the ‘disease’. There is the creation of a duality which is embedded with a set of values that separate the ‘Us’ from ‘Them’ (Peek, 2004). These values are those that allow the distinction between ‘good’ and ‘evil’, ‘sacred’ and ‘profane’, civilians and combatants, among others.

The second stage is what I term the stage of ‘Existentialism’. Here, the political actor depicts the ‘enemy’ as an existential threat to the people. The ‘existential threat is not only applicable to the present but also the future as indicated in the concept of hostile and self-fulfilling prophecies (Zur, 1991). Time becomes a pressing factor in dealing with this threat. Exposing the vulnerability of the state to the people can elicit fear that in the long run will call for immediate and necessary action.
The third stage which is final stage is what I call the stage of *Necessity*. This stage constitutes the required legitimate action which becomes *necessary* and *urgent*. The urgency and justification will be derived from the earlier two stages of constructing the enemy. At this stage, the ‘enemy’ would have been transformed into an object that can be destroyed (Allinson, 2015) since the justification of the action would have been established from the ‘enemy’ construction in the first two stages.

This framework will adequately furnish me with the tools that I can use to derive the construction of the ‘enemy’ as depicted by the US, Israel and UK in the context of their international counter-terrorism strategies. By adopting this framework, I will look out for texts, quotations and remarks by political actors that characterize the construction of the ‘enemy’ image. I will then conduct a critical discourse analysis (CDA) of the data to bring out the contextualized meaning for answering my research question. In doing this, I will delimit my focus to only the data that addresses the themes relevant for answering the research question. Whiles the stages in the framework will constitute the primary basis for analyzing data, other concepts from the theoretical discussion will also be used occasionally to explain the data in relation to context.
5.0 Chapter Five: Western Democracies and Targeted Killings: The Case of the US, Israel and UK

This rapid development in the drone technology have been judged to be more appealing to western democratic states since the people of these nations demand that their states go to war at a lower cost (Senn & Troy, 2017; Martins, 2014). Granting the technological revolution, the millennium has witnessed a profound increase in TK missions with the US emerging as the leading nation in this counter-terrorism strategy, followed by Israel and the UK who also engage in TK missions (Dworkin, 2015; Sharkey, 2011). This chapter elaborates on the targeted killing strategies of the US, Israel and the UK by tracing their histories to shed some light on how they have sought to justify their TK strategies.

5.1 The US Experience

5.1.1 Background of US Drones and TKs

The American involvement in assassination dates back into the 1950s and 1960s of the cold war era. American assassination attempts within this period once triggered a special investigation by the Church Committee into the operations of the CIA abroad for alleged conspiracy to eliminate foreign leaders. Following the recommendations by the Church Committee, President Ronald Reagan passed the Executive order 12333 prohibiting persons working on behalf of the US to participate or plot to engage in assassination (Poznansky, 2017). Even though the ban was clear in basic terms, the term “assassination" remained highly contested across time.

Later in 1998, the US embassy bombing in Nairobi and Tanzania presented a challenge to the earlier Executive order by Reagan. President Clinton in response to this attack ordered the firing of missiles into Afghanistan where it was suspected that Osama Bin Laden was operating a terrorist training camp. The order also included secret operations to capture Osama Bin Laden alive if circumstances permitted or killed if it is imperative. Clarifying this operation against Reagan’s order, the government stated that the ban on assassination was not applicable to a military objective like Bin Laden who orchestrated the attacks (Friedman, 2012). In fact, the justification suggested that the US was taking a pre-emptive measure of self-defense by going for a kill.

On 12th October 2000, a few months before the 9/11 terror attack, the US naval vessel Cole whiles deployed on the Port of Aden was attacked by suicide bombers killing 17 crew members of the vessel and injuring thirty-nine 39 others. This 'suicide mission' was later found to be orchestrated by Osama Bin Laden and his Al-Qaeda terrorist network. When the CIA and Pentagon were later
asked to submit their own remedy to the attack, “the assassination of one of those allegedly involved in the Cole bombing, along with six other suspects” was suggested (Woods, 2015). Whereas the US government considered the possibility of embarking on a TK mission, the US secretary of state at the time, Colin Powell expressed concerns about the legal admissibility of the intended approach and how the operation might be carried out (ibid).

Later in September 2001, the Al-Qaeda terrorist group orchestrated another attack on the US hitting the World Trade Centre and Pentagon. George Walker Bush, then President of the US authorized the use of armed drones to eliminate members of the Al-Qaeda terrorist group. This was in accordance with Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) passed in Congress (Sterio, 2012). Clearly, the approach of President Bush rested on the Clinton’s earlier strategy of targeting Bin Laden for a kill or capture.

Although the US had pronounced Afghanistan as a war zone, US armed drones have been used in other areas of the world including Yemen, Libya and Syria. Remarkably, the fundamental doctrine of the US war on terror was that, the battlefield will pursue any individual or group listed as enemies due to their association with Al-Qaeda forces anywhere in the world (Sterio, 2012). The Bush administration received wide criticism about the chosen approach to counter-terrorism. However, his leadership insisted that the programme conformed with International Law.

The CIA deployed its first armed drone, the Predator in October 2001 in Afghanistan which fired and missed its target who were members of the Taliban (Sifton, 2012). Later in November of the same year, CIA fired at a group of Al-Qaeda leaders killing their third in command, Muhammed Atef. During this period, key members of the Taliban crossed into Pakistan and were granted a haven. Between 2002 and 2004, the predator drone conducted surveillance operations in Pakistan but subsequently struck in May and December 2005 killing high ranking members of the Al-Qaeda. However, Pakistani Authorities denied that any such attacks happened (Williams, 2010). The drone programme of the US during this period was gaining momentum and becoming a preferred method in its counter-terrorism strategy.

For clarification, there are two separate drone campaigns run by the US government. One of them is run by the US army in the war zones of Afghanistan and Iraq with the aim of targeting and killing US enemies who fight against troops deployed in that zone. Some scholars have described this programme as an expansion of conventional warfare. The other programme is run by the US
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The CIAs programme is targeted at terrorists around the globe including locations that do not have US soldiers deployed (Sterio, 2012).

By 2008, drone strikes in Pakistan had increased. This was largely because the Bush administration had decided to strike without any collaboration with Pakistani security apparatus who were suspected of tipping off the Taliban and AL-Qaeda operatives. The drone campaign however entered another phase in 2009 when Obama was elected into office and later with the election of Donald Trump in 2017. The Obama and Trump period will be discussed in detail in the next section.

5.1.2 The US TK Programme Extended
President Obama continued with the counter-terrorism strategy handed over to him by his predecessor. On January 23, 2009, Obama ordered his first drone strike in Pakistan which killed one militant and ten civilians. The Obama administration expanded the CIAs drone programme making it the core of his administrations counter-terrorism tactics as drone strikes continued in Yemen and Pakistan (Sterio, 2012).

A significant event during the Obama era was the killing of Osama Bin Laden in Pakistan by the US Special Naval Warfare Development, also known as the SEAL Team Six (Friedman, 2012). In September of the same year, a drone operated by the CIA targeted and killed US-born Militant cleric Anwar Al-Awlaki and his 16-year old son Abdulrahman (CNN, 2011). This operation was described in many circles as a rare move against an American Citizen and a landmark event in American history and Law (Mazetti, Savage, & Shane, 2013).

Prior to 2012, the Obama administration had been criticized of using the CIA to conduct secret TK missions. However, in January 2012 the expectations were high after President Obama publicly acknowledged US targeted strikes in Pakistan for the first time. He also assured the American people of a more transparent US drone policy and to strengthen it to avoid civilian deaths (Zenko, 2017). In May 2013, at an address at the National Defense University, Obama officially made public the new Presidential Policy Guidelines (PPG) for US TKs outside conventional battlefield. Despite these, drone strikes continued. Within that period, the US had been involved in TK for more than a decade and armed drones had played a major role in this strategy over the period.

President Donald Trump was elected into office in 2016. His regime has witnessed a step-up of offensive and secret operations by the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) supported by a
reignited CIA beyond the borders of America’s pronounced battlefields. According to Micah Zenko, the Trump administration recorded 75 drone strikes in his first 74 days in office. Generally, this represents an average of one strike a day. Yemen and Somalia remain at the core of Trump’s targeted zones including the Afghan-Pakistani border where strikes have increased after the launch of Trump’s Afghanistan strategy (Niva, 2017). According to Luce and Naylor (2018), even though Trump still aims at fighting in Afghanistan, strikes in Yemen have doubled up to 100 in 2017 as compared to 44 strikes in the previous year.

Donald Trump’s strategy differs significantly from that of his predecessors, President Obama and President Bush. Whereas the focus of Obama and Bush were on Al-Qaeda, Trump seems to wage war against Afghan Militants who are rebelling against the current regime in Kabul or Taliban fighters of Pakistani origin who are fighting the government of Islamabad (Luce & Naylor, 2018).

The Trump administration has also expanded the authority of the CIA and Pentagon to conduct drone strikes whiles relaxing the rules regulating TKs in Somalia and Yemen. Critical among the change in rules is the targeting of foot-soldiers of suspected high-value terrorists who have no leadership roles or special skills. TK missions in Pakistan and Yemen will also not undergo strict vetting in the manner that it was done in the Obama era. (Cohn, 2017). Evidently, America’s TK programme continues unabated under the current regime. Therefore, Trump’s strategy can largely be argued as an embrace of President Obama’s expansion of TK.

5.1.3 The US Justification for TKs
Legal advisor to the US State Department, Harold Koh, has argued that domestic law gives power to the executive through the Authorization for the appropriate and necessary Use of Military Force (AUMF) force against enemy combatants as determined by the president. Other US state depart legal advisors have also asserted that the constitution of the US empowers the president to protect US citizens against imminent attacks.

The US also seeks to justify its TKs and use of force against terrorist groups by invoking the principle of self-defense in International Law (IL) and International Humanitarian Law (IHL) (Duffy, 2015). The US also argues that the law on international human rights is not applicable to the use of force against terrorist groups like Al-Qaeda and partly because of the armed conflict it is engaged in with Al-Qaeda and its associated forces (Odle, 2013).
Following the September 2001 terrorist attack, President Bush declared that America’s war on terror took effect with Al-Qaeda. In this vain the US was going to adopt all defensive measures against terrorism. Within this scope, the US deployed military forces in Afghanistan and Iraq as an indication of its ‘Global War on Terror’ (Odle, 2013). These operations launched by the US had a single aim-to kill or capture suspected terrorists, with the latter reason most likely in most cases.

During President Obama’s administration, government officials declared that the main targets of Obama’s counter-terrorism strategy was groups that constituted the most dangerous threat (Al-Qaeda) to the US. A former director of the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), John Brennan reasoned that there was no code in IL that disallowed the US from employing the use of lethal force against its enemies outside the terrains of the battlefield especially when the country in context gives its consent and lacks the capacity to take the necessary action against the impending threat (Odle, 2013). This assertion suggested that the US was not restrained to conduct strikes for instance in Somalia and Yemen in the manner that it has been done in the past.

Given that President Trump is judged to have intensified and expanded Obama’s counter-terrorism approach especially with the launch of Trump’s new Afghan strategy (Cohn, 2017), it is warranted then, at least for illustrative purposes to argue that the current Trump administration still justifies the pursuit of its enemies on the principles of self-defense. The Trump administration therefore will continue to consider Al-Qaeda and its associated members as threats to its national security. The US TK missions will therefore continue to be justified by the Trump administration on this basis.

5.2 The Case of Israel
5.2.1 Israel’s Use of Drones and TKs
The development and use of drones is well paced in the history of Israel. In the early 1970s, Israel procured its first surveillance drone (the Fire Bee) from the US and formed its first drone squadron in Tel Aviv. It is on record that during the build up to the Yom Kippur War of 1973, the Israeli Airforce deployed the US manufactured Chukar drones over Egypt for surveillance and deception purposes (Dobbing & Cole, 2014).

In 1981, a drone was deployed over Lebanon to take photographs in real time of anti-aircraft systems of Syria during the Israel-Lebanon crises. The earliest record of the IDF use of drones for the engagement of a target was in the Lebanon war in 1982 where drones were used to find military
objectives for other manned aircrafts to engage (ibid). In drone warfare, Israel has been adjudged as the pacesetters in the use of armed drones for TK missions. While evidence to this assertion is not clear, Israel has also not publicly acknowledged the claim being adduced (ibid).

In pursuing its enemies, the Israelis adopted TK as a strategy. Prior to the second Arab-Israeli war, also known as the Tripartite Aggression in 1956, Israel fired some members of the Palestinian Fedayeen group killing them in Gaza and Jordan. Methods used in TK by Israel have varied. Missiles like the hellfire missile have in certain circumstances been deployed on helicopters and fired into the bases of suspected terrorists. The use of bombs, booby traps, and assassins (though not publicly acknowledged) have also been part of their tactics (Byman , 2011).

The initial profound experience of terror activities happened in the 1970s including the famous massacre of Israeli athletes in the 1972 Munich Olympics which brought to birth the famous Operation Wrath of God of 1972; a covert operation where Israel sought to assassinate persons involved in the massacre (Reeve, 2006). In 1973, commandos from the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) eliminated members of the Fatah movement including Yusuf Najjar who was then the deputy of Yasir Arafat. About a decade later, the head of Palestinian Liberation Organization, Khalil Al-Wazir was also killed by the IDF in a move to cripple the leadership of the PLO and to stifle the development of the second intifada (Shmulovich, 2012).

In 1993, the signing of the Oslo Peace Accords transformed the relationship between Israel and the PLO from adversaries to partners in a peace process. This led to the cessation of offensive action against PLO members leading to the granting of amnesty to suspected terrorist who were arrested before the peace process commenced (Byman , 2011). However, Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) were consistently pursued since they were seen to be thwarting the peace process. This offensive action led to the elimination of Fathi Shiqqaqi, the leader of the PIJ, by the Mossad and Yahya Ayyash, a member of the Hamas (ibid).

Aside from targeting Palestinian terrorist, Israel also targeted one of the covert guerilla groups in the south of Lebanon; Hezbollah and Amal. In one of their most successful missions in 1992, IDF forces used a scout drone to eliminate the leader of Hizballa, Abbas Musawi. The drone was used to find the target and the missile was fired from a helicopter (Haberman, 1992). Also, during Operation Accountability of 1993, Israeli forces conducted air strikes against militant groups in Lebanon with a concurrent flight of drones over their airspace. Similarly, Husam Al-Amin, the
man who was in charge Amal operations was also killed in 1998 (Plaw, 2008). The year 2000 onwards then set the pace for another wave of Israeli targeted mission activities. It also marked the beginning of the second intifada.

5.2.2 Israel’s TK Policy

In some contexts, Israel’s TK policy has been designated as an “assassination policy”. This phrase has generally been rejected by Israel and would rather want to refer to their counter-terrorism doctrine as an “extrajudicial punishment, selective targeting or a long range hot pursuit” (Luft, 2003, p. 3). However, interchanging these terminologies does not change the essence of the policy nor does it change the history of verifiable assassinations conducted by Israeli security forces.

The dependence of Israel on targeted killing as a preferred military tactic emanates from the radical Zionist movement of the 19th century, the agony that characterized the Holocaust and a conviction among the leadership of the Israeli state as well as its people that the nation and its people are in a never-ending danger of destruction as it pertained during the Holocaust. In such a circumstance, Israel anticipates that it will not receive assistance from any country (Bergman, 2018). Israel’s policy on TK was officially announced on 9 November 2000 even though the strategy existed more than two decades before the official announcement. Following Israel’s public declaration of its TK policy, this was not welcomed by the US at the outset. But following the September 2001 attack on the World Trade Centre and Pentagon by Al-Qaeda, the US became silent on the issue afterwards (Byman, 2011).

Going on the offensive and sustaining it during the second intifada was based on the premise that there no longer existed a single line of contact with terrorism. Dozens of sustained operations were carried out both in the air and on the ground daily to achieve a multifaceted impact (Fishman, 2005). Byman argues that TKs was a preferred method since it was acceptable domestically to achieve the needs of the state which included an offensive response to Palestinian terrorism (2006).

Israel possessed a far developed assassination programme than the US by the beginning of the second Intifada in 2000. According to the Israeli human rights wing B’Tselem, the Israeli IDF engaged in 270 TK operations between 2000 and 2014 within the territories of Palestine which resulted in 455 casualties. The legality of the assassination programme then became questionable to the IDF commanders only after the killing of Dr. Thabet Ahmad in 2001 who was suspected of
operating terrorist networks in Palestine. Legal experts of the IDF who were later consulted on the issue confirmed that the acts were legal, however covertly (Byman, 2011).

Some scholars also viewed the TK policy as a typical exhibition of *post-heroic policy* since the IDF had been engaged in this method of counter-terrorism in Lebanon and surrounding areas far back in the 1970s. Post-heroic policy—a concept coined by Edward Luttwak has two main rules. First, the concept focuses on preventing casualties on own forces and secondly, the killing of civilians of the enemy is to be avoided (1994). The underlying rules of the post-heroic concept were deemed as a classical feature of western democracies who were engaged in non-existent battles in which their willingness to surrender was relatively low. Whiles Israel’s post-heroic strategy served as a link between morality and operational effectiveness, the Palestinian side was interested in heroic warfare which would have resulted in casualties on both sides (Kober, 2007).

TK policy in Israel had domestic legal backing. In 2002, the conditions under which TK could be executed were outlined by the judge advocate general of the IDF. Prior to the execution of terrorists, the Palestinian authority must first disregard calls for their arrest, the Israelis must confirm that they are unable to effect arrest and the killing must be done with the intention of preventing future terrorist activities and not for revenge. Petitions in 2002 calling for the quashing of Israel’s TK policy was rejected by an Israeli high court on the basis that once the outlined conditions were followed, TK was well aligned with Israeli law (David, 2003).

Aside the legal backing of the Policy, final word was vested in the Israeli General Security Service (GSS) regarding targets that were to be executed whiles approval of the recommended targets came from the military and political authorities. Though enthusiasts who were known to actively engage in terror were immediate targets, the new clause in November 2006 was that the targeting of influential and senior terror propagators was to be brought before the attorney general for a hearing before execution in absentia (ibid).

5.2.3 The Israeli Justification for Targeted Strikes

After admitting that it had a TK policy, Israel had to earnestly justify to audiences both at home and abroad about its method of fighting terrorism. Though highly challenged, a theme that forms part of its justification is self-defense and necessity. The government also thinks that their strategy should be judged in the context of the *near-war* it is fighting with terrorist groups. In 2001, the IDF argued in defense of their actions legally, and in the words of General Finkelstein, they had the right to combat *hostile elements* when the aim is to save lives (Byman, 2011).
Following the killing of Hamas spiritual leader Sheikh Ahmed Yassin in March 2004 by an Israeli Hellfire missile in Gaza city, Israeli Prime Minister Aerial Sharon sought to justify the assassination mission describing Sheikh Yassin as a “mastermind of Palestinian terror” and a ‘mass murderer’ who formed part of the greatest enemies of Israel (Gazit & Brym, 2011). Though the attack was condemned widely by the international community, Israel insisted that it reserved the right to self-defense. In fact, leaders of the Israeli political landscape regard Palestinian political leaders as terrorist who by this definition makes them legitimate targets for elimination (ibid).

Also, prior to the death of Palestinian leader Yassir Arafat, Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon had once declared Arafat as a legitimate target (Hunter, 2010). This assertion of targeting Arafat is confirmed by Israeli investigative journalist, Ronen Bergman (Bergman, 2018 cited in Teinbuch, 2018). Sharon sought to justify this stance arguing that the Palestinian leader supported Palestinian terrorism. Though the IDF never carried out this operation, the stance on eliminating state leaders as a method to fight terrorist groups was clearly communicated by the leadership of the Israeli state (ibid).

On 13th December 2006, the Israeli supreme court finally passed a landmark judgment on a petition presented to it by two human rights groups, the Public Committee against Torture in Israel and the Palestinian Society for the Protection of Human Rights and the Environment. The petition challenged the legality of Israel’s TK policy claiming that it violated the IHL, Israeli domestic law and the fundamental rules of human morality (Bodansky & Ben-Naftali, 2007). The supreme court argued among other things that Israel was engaged in an armed conflict with the terrorist groups in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza strip. However, since those involved in the hostilities did not conform to the statutes of International law, they are categorized as civilians who by the interpretation of the Geneva Convention’s Article 51(3) of 1997 cannot be protected by international law unless they stopped their active involvement in the violence (Schondorf, 2007).

The court further imposed restrictions on the Israeli government indicating that the government in executing its TK policy

“must (a) satisfy itself that there are no other means available that would be less harmful to the targeted civilians (b) conduct an independent, thorough, post factum review of the identity of the person attacked and the circumstances of the attack
and (c) consider compensating, in appropriate cases, innocent civilians that were harmed” (p. 308).

This ruling obviously had implications for the future of Israeli TK programme but also was a clear indication of the consolidation and expansion of the Israeli TK policy.

5.3 The Case of UK
5.3.1 Background and UK Drone Operations
The development of unmanned systems in the UK dates to the 1930s and 1940s when the UK manufactured unmanned radio-controlled De Havilland Tiger Moths for use by the Royal Navy in the practice of targeting (Cole, 2012). While the US and Israel had pioneered the use of drones in the 1960s and 1970s, the UK began spending on the technology in the 1980s when it requested reconnaissance drones (the Phoenix) for the British Army. The Phoenix drone was supposed to remain in active service from 1999 to 2013 but was phased out in 2006 due to high attrition rate (ibid).

Early in 2005, plans were advanced to develop the Watchkeeper drone for Artillery Regiment of the British Army. The Watchkeeper possessed similar features as the Israeli Hermes 450 and was designed for reconnaissance, target acquisition and surveillance for the regiment (Cole, 2012). The Artillery regiment successfully conducted its first flight-test of the drone in October 2008 at West Wales (Thales, 2010). Prior to the development and testing of the Watchkeeper, the UK had contracted the procurement of the Reaper drone from General Atomics in 2006. This was done in combination with the renting of the Hermes 450 drone from Israel for the conduct of operations in Afghanistan in 2008. The first British Reaper drone recorded its first strike in Afghanistan in 2008 and the last time the UK Reaper engaged in air strikes in Afghanistan was 15 November 2014 (Dronewars UK, 2018).

Between October 2014 to December 2017, the UK continued air strikes in Iraq and Syria totaling 338 and 60 respectively. Statistics of significant casualties, according to Dronewars UK, were reported in 2010 and 2011. In January 2010 and March 2011, the Reaper fired the Hellfire missile into insurgent activity killing 12 and 6 insurgents respectively. A statement later released by the Ministry of Defense indicated that casualties recorded in March 2011 included four Afghan civilians (ibid).
Another event in the history of UK drone operations is the killing of Reyaad Khan on 21st August 2015 in Syria along with another person Junaid Hussain. These two people were killed by a hellfire missile that was fired from an RAF drone (BBC News, 2015). Like the US case of killing Anwar Al Awlaki, Khan, who was also a British national. Evidently, this was also the first time that a British military asset was used to attack and kill in a country that the UK was not engaged in a battle. In an address in the House of Commons in September 2015, British Prime Minister David Cameron christened the attack as a “new departure” in the government’s use of lethal force outside of armed conflict (HC 747/HL 49, 2016).

UK armed drones continue to be deployed in Iraq and Syria in a joint operation with the US codenamed Operation Shader- a form of assistance to the Iraqi government. However, the declaration by the Iraqi and Syrian government about their victory over ISIS and the Jihadist respectively in 2017 signaled the closure of Operation. Contrary to this, indications from the British military higher command indicates that there are intentions for the British Reapers to continue flying indefinitely in Iraq and Syria (Cole, 2018).

5.3.2 UK Justification for Targeted Killing
Whiles Ministers of the British Parliament continue to argue that ISIS still pose as a threat to the UK, British foreign secretary, Boris Johnson consolidates the position in a written statement to the ministers arguing that:

“Daesh is failing but not yet unbeaten. It continues to pose a threat to Iraq from across the Syrian border and as an insurgent presence. It is also a global terrorist network. Daesh has the ability to plan and inspire terrorist attacks at home and abroad. Therefore, we will act to protect the UK and our allies, as long as necessary” (Cole, 2018, p. 2)

Generally, there have been calls for the elimination of British citizens involved in ISIS. In October 2017, the British International Development Secretary, Rory Stewart supported this stance when he recommended the killing of British-ISIS members as the only way to deal with the situation since their existence was a threat to the UK (Cole, 2018). This standpoint was later reiterated by Gavin Williamson, British Defense Secretary and also supported by Sir Mark Sedwell (ibid).
Also, in an interview with a retired British Royal Airforce officer about the killing of Cardiff-born Reyaad Khan in Syria, Airmarshal Bagwell argued that he did not disagree with designating Reyaad Khan as an ‘enemy’ combatant since he engaged in Jihadist activities. His engagement with the Jihadist to him made him killable. He further stressed that once TK of ‘enemy’ combatants like Reyaad discouraged more Brits from joining ISIS, then he was fully in support of the method (Cole, 2018).

In justifying the killing of Khan by UK prime minister, David Cameron argued that Khan was engaged in ‘barbaric’ activities in the UK and was planning attacks against British nationals on home soil and elsewhere in the world (BBC News, 2015). He further maintained that Khan and Hussain were jointly enlisting sympathizers for ISIL to coordinate attacks against the west and British nationals (HC 747/HL 49, 2016). Against this backdrop, Cameron defended the UK government’s action on the basis that there was no other better alternative to protect the British citizenry especially when there was no functioning government in Syria at the time to coordinate with the government of Britain. The absence of British Military forces on ground was also cited as an alibi for direct military action to stop Khan and his counterpart to orchestrate the planned attacks (ibid).

In 2011, British Attorney General Jeremy Wright also defended the UK strategy while speaking at the International Institute for Strategic Studies on 11 January, 2017. He argued that it was inappropriate for a state to be denied its right of protecting its people whiles an identified target and time of attack has not been dealt with in the first place (Sullivan, 2011). In meaningful terms, the UK government does not recognize the need to confirm a tangible target, place, direction and time of threat before taking preemptive measures such as launching drone strikes against the identified threat (ibid).

Though the inconsistencies in the UK TK policy is still debated in the context of International Law, European Law and UK domestic law, armed drones are still being deployed in the international fight against terrorism. The legal inconsistencies have been relegated to background with the justification of protecting the citizens of UK in the face of imminent threats.
6.0 Chapter Six: Data Analysis and Discussion

Main Research Question: In the context of the International fight against terrorism, how do western democracies frame the enemy as targetable and killable?

In this chapter, I present my data and conduct an analysis of the data using CDA. The data consists of the extracts of speeches from selected politicians of the US, Israel and UK. I adopted this interpretivist approach to bring out the meaning of these statements in relation to the context in which they were delivered. Additionally, I present the views I received from the experts during my interviews. Responses of the interviewees were used to support the analysis in this section. The results of the CDA is analyzed further in the discussion section where I interpret the results of the CDA from the lenses of my theoretical framework.

6.1 Analytical Approach

The general findings of this research are based on twenty-one (21) speeches by politicians across the three countries used as case studies. The analysis is also supported by the interviews with the experts. The three documentaries and interviews enabled me to situate my analysis in the appropriate context relevant for CDA. The selected speeches occurred between the years 2009 to 2017. Speakers of the selected speeches are former US President Barack Obama, President Donald Trump, former US General Counsel of the Department of Defense Jeh Charles Johnson, former director of the CIA and counter-terrorism advisor John Brennan, former British Prime Minister David Cameron, British Prime Minister Theresa May, former British foreign secretary Philip Hammond, British secretary of state for foreign and commonwealth affairs Boris Johnson, Israeli President Reuven Rivlin, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Israeli Defense Minister Moesh Yaalon. The speeches of the selected politicians were chosen for this study because they address my research question adequately in terms of context. By focusing on these speeches, I avoid the general discourse on counter-terrorism which may not be relevant to the study. The documentaries used in this study are ‘Gate Keeper’- a film that narrates the story of the Israeli internal security service (Shin’Bet) produced in 2016 by Droh Moreh, ‘Drone’ produced in 2014 by Tonje Schei and ‘Remote’-a documentary on drones and humans produced in 2017 by Ian Shaw. The selected documentaries are available on YouTube. The documentaries also feature some of the quotations made by the politicians which are in focus.

The selected speeches highlight on the themes ‘Otherism’, Existentialism, and Necessity. ‘Otherism’ is the stage where a divide is created and embedded with a set of values that separate
the ‘Us’ from ‘Them’. Political actors use negative descriptors at this stage to paint a unique category for the ‘enemy’. The stage of Existentialism is the stage where the political actors depict an existential threat to their society and people. The stage of Necessity constitutes the justifiable action that is required to eliminate the threat. The stage of Necessity is drawn from the first two stages. The table below outlines the details of speeches selected.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>No.</th>
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<th>Speech and or Date Delivered</th>
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<td>1</td>
<td>US1</td>
<td>Donald Trump</td>
<td>Strategy in Afghanistan and South Asia 21.08.2017</td>
<td>Fort Meyer, Arlington Virginia</td>
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<td>US3</td>
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<td>US4</td>
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<td>US7</td>
<td>Jeh Charles Johnson</td>
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<td>US9</td>
<td>Jeh Charles Johnson</td>
<td>National security law, lawyers and lawyering in the Obama Administration 22.02.2012</td>
<td>Yale Law School</td>
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<td>US10</td>
<td>John Brennan</td>
<td>The President’s Counter-terrorism Strategy 30.04.2012</td>
<td>Woodrow Wilson Centre</td>
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<td>John Brennan</td>
<td>09.08.2012 Yemen and Drones</td>
<td>Council on Foreign Relations</td>
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<td>Eric Holder</td>
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<td>Northwestern School of Law</td>
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<td>UK1</td>
<td>Philip Hammond</td>
<td>Challenges of Extremism 31.10.2015</td>
<td>IIS Manama Dialogue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>UK2</td>
<td>Boris Johnson</td>
<td>How Global Britain is Helping to Win The Struggle Against Terror 07.12.2017</td>
<td>Foreign and Commonwealth Office</td>
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<td>15</td>
<td>UK3</td>
<td>Theresa May</td>
<td>20.09.2017</td>
<td>UN General Assembly, NY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>UK4</td>
<td>Theresa May</td>
<td>London Bridge Attack 04.06.2017</td>
<td>Downing Street, London</td>
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<td>17</td>
<td>UK5</td>
<td>David Cameron</td>
<td>Air Strikes in Syria 02.12.2015</td>
<td>House of Commons</td>
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I assembled the transcripts of these speeches from various online sources. The transcripts for all the selected speeches were accessible online and in video formats, texts or both. Other transcripts were also unedited speeches of the speakers. To ensure accuracy, videos and documentaries of the quotations were compared with the texts or transcripts. Transcripts were gathered from the websites of Dronewars UK, University of California Santa Barbara’s American Presidency Project, US Lawfare Institute, the website of the international counter-terrorism organization in Israel and New times Israel.

For my analysis, each transcript was read thoroughly to identify the themes indicated above and the discursive devices. These identified themes became central to my coding process since they featured prominently in the general justification for targeting the ‘enemy’. Having coded successfully, I went further to analyze these speeches using CDA approach to bring out the contextualized meaning of the statements. The meanings derived from the analysis were assigned to their relevant themes to aid a further interpretation of the results from the analysis.

Next, the results of the analysis are interpreted through the lenses of my three-staged (Otherism, Existentialism, Necessity) operational framework derived from the enemy image theory supported by other concepts of the theory. The last section of this analysis entails the discussion of the results from my CDA. The discussion reveals how my research question is answered through my analysis and finally I conclude the study.

6.2 The US Discourse
6.2.1 ‘Otherism’

“...We cannot and should not expect Al-Qaeda and its associated forces to all surrender, all lay down their weapons in an open field, or to sign a peace treaty with us. They are terrorist organizations ... I am aware of studies that suggest that many ‘terrorist’ organizations eventually denounce terrorism and violence, and
seek to address their grievances through some form of reconciliation or participation in a political process. Al Qaeda is not in that category ... There is no compromise or political bargain that can be struck with those who pursue such aims.” (Jeh Johnson, 2012) US7

In this statement, Jeh Johnson places Al-Qaeda in a very unique category of their own. The ‘enemy’ is judged to be immune to peaceful approaches. Without any evidence, he rejects the possibility of the ‘enemy’ to surrender even though some other evidence is suggesting so. The ‘enemy’ is described as only comparable to violence and therefore denied the opportunity to change the way he or she is perceived by surrendering. Creating a ‘dark’ image of the ‘enemy’ is a form of ‘othering’. The self or the state creates these categorizations according to the subjective concerns of the state. The ‘enemy’ is subsequently evaluated and treated based on the subjective categorizations.

“...So damaged is Al-Qaeda’s image that bin Laden even considered changing its name. Al-Qaeda is the antithesis of the peace, tolerance, and humanity that is the hallmark of Islam”. (Brennan, 2012) US10

Al-Qaeda is again represented here as the epitome of the opposite of acceptable values in Islam which are peace, tolerance and humanity. This translates as hostility, hate and inhuman traits. It seeks to suggest that Al-Qaeda belongs to some ‘Other’ type of religion that operates on these negative tags. This is a typical approach to constructing the image of the ‘other’ who the ‘Us’ thinks are different. These descriptions are inherently subjective because it de-rationalizes and de-legitimizes the activities of Al-Qaeda.

Brennan continues “...Targeted strikes conform to the principles of distinction, the idea that only military objectives may be intentionally targeted and that civilians are protected from being intentionally targeted. ... With the unprecedented ability of remotely piloted aircraft to precisely target a military objective while minimizing collateral damage, one could argue that never before has there been a weapon that allows us to distinguish more effectively between an Al-Qaeda terrorist and innocent civilians”. (Brennan, 2012) US10
Brennan continues to use discriminatory constructions to categorize people into ‘killable people’ and ‘non-killable people’. The words ‘distinction’ and ‘precision’ are used to communicate that only ‘terrorists’ are being killed. It separates ‘We’ from ‘them’ in order to find space to make the ‘Other’ dispensable. Even though he appeals to the principles of international law as the basis for such ‘discrimination’ in order to justify himself, the result is that he only uses IL to support the subjective categorization to make way for the application of an action which will be deemed as justified under this circumstance. The justification for the required action is reflected in his recommendation of using drones as the appropriate instrument to target the people he has ‘transformed’ into killable objects using his framing.

Obama Continues “…Neither I, nor any President, can promise the total defeat of terror. We will never erase the evil that lies in the hearts of some human beings, nor stamp out every danger to our open society….Nevertheless, this ideology persists, and in an age when ideas and images can travel the globe in an instant, our response to terrorism can't depend on military or law enforcement alone”.

Obama (2013) US4

Obama continues to paint an enduring nature of terrorism which pre-supposes the requirement of an equally matching enduring action to deal with terror. Obama refers to the ‘enemy-’ as evil and claims that this evil ideology is a characteristic of some ‘Other’ type of human beings. During my interview with the analyst on this, she opined that “the idea has always been that they are targeting some dangerous ‘brown men’ or someone else in the world”. This is precisely a rhetoric of crafting danger in someone who is different from ‘Us’. It also strengthens the idea of terrorism because of the way they have constructed who the enemy is. Obama’s further assertion that this evil ideology can spread across the globe gives credence to the use of military force to stop the threat from spreading to other domains. The use of force is supposed to be the means to incapacitate the ‘evil hearts’ of the ‘enemy’ from planning and executing evil attacks against the United States.

Later Trump (2017) also stresses that “…America and our partners are committed to stripping terrorists of their territory, cutting off their funding, and exposing the false allure of their evil ideology”. (Trump, 2017) US1

To Trump there was the need to make public an ideology of the ‘enemy’ which to him was attractive, however false. This an expression of ‘Otherism’ where two camps of truth and falsehood
are pitched against each other. The ‘enemy’ is confined to the camp of falsehood which automatically places the state in the camp of truth. What is problematic here in the statement of Trump is that even if for a hypothetical statement we say, ‘that the ‘enemy’ possessed an ideology’, the question that is left unanswered is ‘who determined what was false or true about the ‘enemy’ ideology and how’? Clearly, subjective judgement plays an influential role in arriving at what the ideology of the ‘enemy’ is. Evil ideology also connotes cruelty, destructiveness and beastly motivations of the ‘enemy’ Therefore an ideology that is ‘evil’ can drive the ‘enemy’ to engage in ‘evil’ acts. By painting such a picture of the ‘enemy’ he can create the urgency to act in order to protect: an action that will obliterate the ‘enemy’ to avert the consequences of ‘enemy’ action.

Further, the politicians adopt the use of dehumanizing terms to describe the ‘other’. Below are statements to confirm the dehumanization of the ‘enemy’.

“...we have seen lone individuals, including American citizens, often inspired by Al-Qaeda’s murderous ideology, kill innocent Americans and seek to do us harm”.
(Brennan, 2012) US11

“...Terrorists who slaughter innocent people will find no glory in this life or the next. They are nothing but thugs, and criminals, and predators, and -- that's right – losers”. (Trump, 2017) US2

“...This is a battle between barbaric criminals who seek to obliterate human life, and decent people of all religions who seek to protect it”. (Trump, 2017) US3

Both Trump and Brennan employ the use of discriminatory descriptors to deprive the ‘Other’ of a human face to make the ‘Other’ humanity’s foe. The negative descriptors such as “murderous ideology, thugs and criminals” are used to connote the personality of terrorists which assigns them characteristics that conjures an atrocious and abominable image that is intended to draw some emotional response from the audience. This emotional response will be characterized by anger and revenge for this abominable ‘enemy’. And once the state actor is successful in creating a less human image of the ‘enemy’, it consequently becomes psychologically acceptable to use violence or aggression against the ‘enemy’ (Steuter & Wills, 2009). The ‘enemy’ as a predator is also a metaphor that describes the ‘enemy’ as an alien animal with the lethal capacity to feed on humans. The word predator generally has a ‘hunting’ undertone which establishes a relationship between the ‘hunter’ and the ‘hunted’. While this relationship puts the human ‘Other’ in a ‘hunted’
position, it conjures the urgency to ensure the safety of the human ‘Other’ by putting in measures to reverse the situation that will result in hunting for the ‘predator’. The inception of this hunting machinery in pursuit of the ‘enemy’ replaces unbiased words such as ‘searching’ or ‘locating’ the ‘enemy’. States base on this hunting machinery and images to hunt for terrorists using ‘hunter-killer drones’.

It’s this surgical precision, the ability, with laser-like focus, to eliminate the cancerous tumor called an Al-Qaeda terrorist while limiting damage to the tissue around it, that makes this counterterrorism tool so essential. (Brennan, 2012)

Brennan likens the ‘enemy’ to a disease that requires surgical tools for the expunging of the disease. Medically, cancerous tumor is known to have the ability to spread to other important organs of the body to cause harm or death. It is in the same light that Brennan places the ‘enemy’. Therefore, representing the ‘enemy’ as cancerous indicates the ability of the threat to form anywhere which requires the need for urgent ‘military treatment’ to stop the ‘disease’ from spreading to other important geographical areas. In this case, the ‘enemy’ has the capacity to move beyond geographical borders to cause harm. Surgical tools in this context refers to weaponized drones which are judged to have the ability to engage in precision strikes without harming civilians. ‘Limiting damage to the tissue around it’ relates to avoiding the death of civilians in targeted strikes. Indeed, de-humanizing the ‘enemy’ using disease metaphors makes it easier and acceptable to eliminate the ‘Other’.

During my interview, the respondent had this to say about the dehumanization of the enemy: “…they paint them as non-human almost. At the military level we have heard stories that they are calling targets or people whom they have killed as ‘bugsplat’”. Literally, these terminologies take away humanity from people. ‘Bugsplat’ is an animal metaphor that dehumanizes the ‘enemy’ as deadly and hostile. Operators of drones usually refer to their kills as ‘bugsplats’ because observing images of bodies through video visuals in the air looks like ‘insects’ that are being smashed.

6.2.2 Existentialism

“...Al-Qaeda leaders continue to struggle to communicate with subordinates and affiliates. Under intense pressure in the tribal regions of Pakistan, they have fewer places to train and groom the next generation of operatives. They’re struggling to attract new recruits. Morale is low, with intelligence indicating that some members are giving up and returning home, no doubt that this is a fight they will never
In short, Al-Qaeda is losing badly...For all these reasons, it is harder than ever for Al-Qaeda core in Pakistan to plan and execute large-scale, potentially catastrophic attacks against our homeland” (Brennan, 2012) US11

A year later, Obama states again that “Today, Osama bin Laden is dead, and so are most of his top lieutenants. There have been no large-scale attacks on the US, and our homeland is more secure” Obama (2013). US4

Brennan and Obama in different contexts assured the American people of their safety due to the casualty suffered by the top hierarchy of the ‘enemy’ (Al Qaeda). America was deemed safer because the ‘enemy’ was disorganized at the strategic level, weak and unable attack over a long period due to the high attrition rate suffered in the ‘enemy’ camp. In the next few lines of the same statements, the weakened and disorganized ‘enemy’ regained his strength, becomes organized and can pose as a threat to their homeland. This can be seen from the 2012 speech by Brennan where he again maintains that “…Nevertheless, the dangerous threat from Al-Qaeda has not disappeared. As the Al-Qaeda core falters, it continues to look to affiliates and adherents to carry on its murderous cause”. Later in 2013, Obama also conveys the same message of the enemy’s existence and ability to throw a lethal punch saying: “...Now make no mistake, our nation is still threatened by terrorists”. In my interview with the analyst, she also added that “they paint people, non-state actor groups like Al-Qaeda or ISIS or whoever the next spinoff will be as dangerous and the most threatening group facing the United States”. These groups are indeed represented as inherent threats to the American way of life.

Obama continued “We are at war with an organization that right now would kill as many Americans as they could if we did not stop them first. So this is a just war — a war waged proportionally, in last resort, and in self-defense”. (Obama, 2013) US4

Obama’s words construct an environment of permissiveness, inevitability, and expediency for appropriate military force to stop the impending attack on the US. He looks for a justification for applying military force in the context of the ethics of war, IHRL and IHL by referring to the principle of proportionality in the application of military force. Obama equally invokes the right to self-defense which is permissible under Article 51 of the UN Charter if there are reasonable grounds to justify that an existential threat meets the criteria of being immediate and imminent,
just as Obama tried to portray. The threat that is said to be willing to kill millions of Americans puts the audience in distress.

I now shift my focus to Donald Trump’s remarks in 2017. In the words Trump:

“From now victory will have a clear definition: attacking our enemies, obliterating ISIS, crushing al Qaeda, preventing the Taliban from taking over Afghanistan, and stopping mass terror attacks against America before they emerge”. (Trump, 2017) US1

These words from Trump suggested that America was going take pre-emptive measures against the existential threat posed by the ‘enemy’. Justifiably, the idea of taking pre-emptive actions or engaging in preventive war against your adversary points in a direction which signifies that the ‘enemy’ is not only perceived as having the ability to inflict some sort of great damage, but also has been judged to possess the will to do so urgently.

“But we’ve pummeled the heart of al Qaeda in the Fatah, but the appendages of it, you know, are — still exist and continue to grow” (Brennan, 2012) US10

“…what we’ve seen is the emergence of various al Qaeda affiliates. From Yemen to Iraq, from Somalia to North Africa, the threat today is more diffused” (Obama, 2013) US4

In the above statements, the threat is projected as boundless and therefore not limited by geography. It also introduces an idea of several pockets of ‘enemies’ scattered over a wide geographical area which are essentially lumped up as a single unit with a singular motivation. This goes to justify the strategy of America to take the battlefield to any suspected terrorist anywhere in the world.

6.2.3 Necessity

“…Targeted strikes conform to the principle of necessity, the requirement that the target have definite military value. In this armed conflict, individuals who are part of Al-Qaeda or its associated forces are legitimate military targets. We have the authority to target them with lethal force just as we target enemy leaders in past
conflicts, such as Germans and Japanese commanders during World War II”.
(Brennan, 2012) US4

Brennan made explicit reference to international law to define a legitimate military target. While IL only gives a criterion for arriving at what a legitimate target is, the process of judging and arriving at a legitimate target falls within the subjective evaluation of the attacker or the state. Just like earlier categorizations, it is the speakers who have defined who and how the ‘enemy’ is, and based on that assessment, IL has been cited to rationalize the subjective portrayal of the ‘enemy’. Brennan makes a submission that paints a picture of an ‘objective military target’ in order to claim the legitimacy to kill. He likens the targeting of suspected terrorists to targeting in World War II to justify the killing of the ‘enemy’ even though the two contexts are not the same.

“...We are at war against a terrorist organization called Al-Qaeda... And the president has a Constitutional and solemn obligation to do everything in his power to protect the safety and security of the American people”. (Brennan, 2012) US10

Brennan further connects the pursuit of the ‘enemy’ to his constitutional mandate to protect the American people. The responsibility to protect has become necessary an urgent here since the ‘enemy’ has already been constructed. The analyst was also of the view that the war on terror narrative has been crafted such that it has become so deep-seated in the psyche of the public. Evidently, there will be no sort of widespread resistance to military action which ultimately forms the basis of legitimacy.

In another context Obama stresses that “...Al Qaeda and its affiliates try to gain foothold in some of the most distant and unforgiving places on Earth. They take refuge in remote tribal regions. They hide in caves and walled compounds. They train in empty deserts and rugged mountains”. (Obama, 2013) US4

Obama shapes the thoughts of the people to accept the justification for the deployment of armed drones as the most appropriate method to fight the ‘terrorists’ who have been constructed as inhabiting areas that are not within human reach. This an argument in favour of the operational efficiency of drones which lies not only in its ability to be deployed in very challenging terrains over long periods, but also its ability to locate and target the ‘enemy’ over a wide geographical spectrum which significantly takes away the risk that deploying soldiers physically on ground will
pose. It would therefore be reasonable to accept that drones were the solution to lower the cost of war.

Further, Obama argues again “… it's also not possible for America to simply deploy a team of Special Forces to capture every terrorist. Even when such an approach may be possible, there are places where it would pose profound risks to our troops and local civilians. But what we can do — what we must do”. (Obama, 2013) US4

Even though, it has been difficult to verify how many authorized and successful capture operations the Obama administration conducted during his regime, the general rhetoric here is that it preferred to capture than kill terrorists if the opportunity presented itself. Verifying from his statement above, Obama concedes that it was not possible to capture every terrorist. Certainly, if a capture was not possible then a kill was inevitable and justified. The fate of the ‘enemy’ consequently depended on a discretionary tactic which has hardly resulted in the capturing of the ‘enemy’, judging from the history of military operations.

We need all elements of national power to win a battle of wills, a battle of ideas. So what I want to discuss here today is the components of such a comprehensive counterterrorism strategy”. (Obama, 2013) US4

After successfully constructing the threat that the country faced, emphasizing on the vulnerability of the American people and creating the space for state action, Obama could submit his strategy that was to deal with the impending threat. My interviewee had this to say about the awareness that was created about their vulnerability through the construction of the threat: “…the government exposed the vulnerability that Americans did not know they had after the 9/11 attack. They emphasized the need for protection of the American people”. Certainly, the government’s ability to paint the extent of vulnerability to its people creates a panic situation which calls for immediate action. This obviously sways the public into accepting that they are vulnerable so they needed someone to protect them which was the duty of the state. Then, the public response is to go along with it.

Trump continues “…we will also expand authority for American armed forces to target the terrorist and criminal networks that sow violence and chaos throughout
Trump gives a clear indication here that he was going to continue the legacy of his predecessors by fighting the war on terrorism with the same tools and strategy of the previous administrations. He also derives some authority and support from his audience and domestic law to target terrorists by labeling them as criminals who disturb the peace of Afghanistan. The criminal labelling is supposed to activate a pursuit of them and to create a firm basis for the justification of such a pursuit to restore the social order which they have described as being threatened by these criminals.

6.3 The Israeli Discourse

6.3.1 ‘Otherism’

“...That’s the moral divide. We mourn; they celebrate the death of thousands of innocents... That’s the moral divide. We celebrate; they mourn the death of an arch-terrorist”. Netanyahu (2014) IS1

‘Otherism’ is demonstrated in the expression “the moral divide”. It is an exposition which is aimed at drawing the borders between the inner-group and the outer-group, between those who are part of the inner-group and those who are outside of the group. In other words, not only is the ‘enemy’ precluded and invalidated from belonging to the inner-group, but also does not qualify to be part of the moral society and humanity. The terrorist in Netanyahu’s view is morally bankrupt. Once the ‘enemy’ is cut off from the circles of morality, then actions that are taken against the ‘enemy’ cannot be evaluated on moral grounds. This comes as a relief for government who is fighting the unseen ‘enemy’ because decisions for fighting their adversary can be applied without fear.

“...but above all it requires, I believe, clarity and courage – clarity to understand they’re wrong, we’re right; they’re evil, we’re good... Evil has to be resisted. Netanyahu (2014) IS1

Introducing the frames of good and evil technically excludes the Israeli government from an objective scrutiny of it its own actions in the context of fighting terrorism. Having successfully introduced two camps of ‘good and evil people’, Netanyahu subjectively keeps Israel in the category of ‘good’ and the ‘enemy’ branded as the ‘bad guy’. For this reason, there is a very high likelihood that each group’s actions will be evaluated based on good and bad, a situation where the Israeli government’s aggression against the ‘enemy’ will be deemed as good and appropriate.
The actions of suspected terrorists are absolutely tied to their perceived nature (evil). This is a very influential discourse and a form ‘damaging’ where acts of the terrorist are examined and judged out of context or devoid of any credit to history. It rips the ‘terrorists’ actions of any political, social and economic motivations and rather discredits the ‘enemy’ on many grounds. While there are no empirical justifications or rationality found in the acts of the ‘enemy’, the plausible response to this evil is ‘cleansing’ and ‘purging’ the society of such evil. Evil must be resisted, as echoed by Netanyahu.

“...Hamas, like al-Qaeda and its affiliates... all are branches of the same poisonous tree. All present a clear and present danger to the peace and security of the world and to our common civilization”. Netanyahu (2014) IS1

Netanyahu also adopts a dehumanizing metaphor “branches of the same poisonous tree’ to communicate two ideas: first is to demonstrate the dangerous nature of the ‘Other’ and the second is address the objectives of the ‘enemy’. Though acts of terror have earlier on been regarded as having a global scope and perpetrated sometimes by different groups, the prime minister sought to overlook the possible different motivations of Hamas and ISIS. Reasonably, giving credit to the motivations of an adversary may have consequences on Israel’s actions against these groups. Disregarding ‘enemy’ motivations makes it easier for the state discriminate. Also, categorizing the different groups as branches of one ‘poisonous tree’ justifiably calls for a singular method of ‘cutting down’ (thus eliminating) ‘the ‘poisonous tree’ for the safety of his people.

“...If they gain ground, if they were to succeed, they would return humanity to a primitive early medievalism. I say early medievalism because my father, my late father was a great historian of the Middle Ages and I’d be giving them too much compliment – early medievalism, primitive early medievalism”. Netanyahu (2014) IS1

The prime minister goes on to degrade and dehumanize the ‘Other’ by making claims to their adversary’s ability to reverse modern civilization: a very disturbing picture of a primitive ‘Other’. The middle ages refer to the period in history where the life of man was said to be unsafe and fraught with frequent wars. It has been termed in other circles as the ‘dark ages’ dating several thousand years before our common era (Blumberg, 2016). Such a gloomy category for the ‘enemy’ is basically a biased description of the ‘other’ to satisfy personal motivations.
“...These groups have absolutely no moral or other impediment to their mad desires. Once they have massive power, they will unleash all their violence, all their ideological zeal, all their hatred, with weapons of mass death”. Netanyahu (2014) IS1

Referencing the desires of the ‘enemy’ as ‘mad’ is an attempt to discount that the ‘enemy’ is logical or reasonable and may have or continue to have justification for engaging in what they have been judged to be doing. Painting the ‘enemy’ as illogical puts the ‘self’ or the state in the reasonable or logical category. The ‘enemy’ is further denied any opportunity for negotiation (if possible) with the state. The words here are also manipulative to the extent that, the ‘enemy’ is projected as a very distinct entity different from ‘Us’: an opportunistic ‘enemy’ who will take advantage of the absence of military action to grow stronger or more powerful than the state militarily.

“...any connections [these groups] have with Jewish ethics or values does not exist.” (Moshe Ya'alon, 2014) IS4

The Defense Minister in this address was referring to ‘domestic terrorism’. His remarks distances Jewish identity and values from the identity of individuals and groups who are suspected of being terrorists. Even though the suspects in this context may be Jews in practical terms, the defense minister categorizes ‘them’ to belong to an alien value system that is not characteristic of Jewish tradition. He therefore succeeds in creating the ‘Other’ using these discursive devices.

6.3.2 Existentialism

“...So we have no shortage of threats and they have come about as a result of the collapse of the old order... this new type of war actually is more difficult than dealing with the old type of war. But that’s the war that we’re facing. That’s the terror war that we now face”. Netanyahu (2014) IS1

The collapse of the old order is a phrasing that is related with the period of the Cold War. The existential threat being predicted is compared to the threat of the cold war era: a phrase here that exaggerates the threat and a conscious attempt to distinguish it largely from what existed during the period of the Cold War. What is interesting here is that, this new threat is said to be more powerful than the Soviet Union which was once estimated to possess a stockpile of missiles that threatened the west. The ‘enemy’ is nowhere viewed as a small group of disgruntled young men and women with meagre resources that do not even match the resources of a province in a country.
Ascribing to the ‘enemy’ that powerful status commensurate to a modern army determines and justifies a corresponding response to this threat that is existent out there.

“...But these people... are basically forcing you to fight a new war and that new war requires two things. It requires the ability to have precision-guided munitions to be able to target the terrorists who are targeting you from inside civilians' areas, but to try to limit the damage – what is called collateral damage or the incidental civilians casualties that accompany any war. Here they’re placed right in there, deliberately, by the terrorists. So you need precision weapons”. Netanyahu (2014) IS1

Another aspect of the threat that the people should worry about was the proximity of the ‘enemy’. The ‘enemy’ was not restrained operationally to the external borders of our homeland, but also now lived with us within our community. Fighting the ‘enemy’ within our homeland required new methods which Netanyahu subsequently pinpoints to the use of ‘precision weapons’, that is armed drones. Whiles conceding that these weapons have the tendency to cause casualties no matter their ability to eliminate their targets with precision, civilian casualty is treated as an inevitable outcome of the war against the new ‘enemy’. Responsibility for the collateral damage is subtly shifted to the ‘enemy’ who is accused of living within the people. This goes to justify both the targeting and elimination of the ‘enemy’ including any excesses that come as result of the application of the military force.

“...But we are living in a reality where the plague of murderous Jihadi fundamentalism, religious fanaticism and incitement – embodied in the Islamic State and Hezbollah – are at our very borders and have not missed out Gaza and the West Bank either; we live in a reality of a chaos-stricken Middle East in which uncertainty is the only certainty”. (Reuven Rivlin, 2016) IS3

President Rivlin uses very strong language full of emotions to create a picture of the ‘enemy’ which takes the issue out of normal everyday politics. He adopts the use of dehumanizing language that seeks to project the nature of the existential threat. The enemy is described as an embodiment of criminality, brutality, extremism and of negative influence. This is by all standards an extra-ordinary ‘enemy’ that the state of Israel must deal with. Whiles the sensationalism works to his advantage, the need for extra-ordinary measures to deal with this existential threat is established.
6.3.3 Necessity
Having succeeded to establish the existence of the threat and how it looked like, Netanyahu calls for global action to deal with the ‘enemy’.

“...I believe that the battle against these groups is indivisible and it’s important not to let any of these groups succeed anywhere because if they gain ground somewhere, they gain ground everywhere”. Netanyahu (2014) IS1

“...And these groups must be fought, they must be rolled back and they must ultimately be defeated. That's why Israel fully supports President Obama's call for united actions against ISIS. All civilized countries should stand together in the fight against radical terrorism that sweeps across the Middle East, sweeps across the world...We have always viewed it as our common battle for our common future”. Netanyahu (2014) IS1

Netanyahu paints a global threat and emphasizes the urgency required to obliterate the ‘enemy’. Irrespective of the different experiences of the other western nations being referred to, the speaker constructs a common ‘enemy’ for all of them. The necessity of the common action is linked to the well-being of the nations for the future. The ability to create an existential threat situation validates the military action that is deemed appropriate for the situation. At this stage, the ‘enemy’ has been constructed adequately to exist in order to warrant a pursuit.

Finally, Israeli Defense Minister emphasize that “...Israel will not tolerate such criminal activity, which is terrorism in every respect...We invest, and will continue to invest, the best resources at our disposal to fight an all-out war on this phenomenon and treat extremist and violent groups harshly” (Moshe Ya’alon, 2014) IS4

This is a claim for justifiable action against the ‘enemy’. By criminalizing the activities of their adversary, pursuing the ‘enemy’ does not only receive the validation of domestic law, but also becomes a necessary action which allows the employment of state resources for this course of action. A state of intolerance for the activities of an adversary means that nothing will stop the
state from taking measures that will thwart the success of their adversary. The credence given to the course of action will receive the support of the public following the framing of the ‘enemy’.

During my interview with the analyst, he was of the view that “the kind of projection made about the enemy is one that threatens the survival of Israel. There is this state of alarm in the air which makes imprisonment, kidnaping or detaining of suspected terrorists seemingly less effective to deal with the situation”. Clearly, the politicians seek to create an exceptional situation that require exceptional measures. Exceptional measures that are justifiable through the threat construction. Killing the suspected terrorists is normalized since it becomes acceptable and necessary to meet the safety needs of the people.

6.4 The UK Discourse
6.4.1 ‘Otherism’
“...they have a significant propaganda reach right across the world”
(May, 2017) UK4

The above quote from the British Prime Minister portrays their adversary as a misleading entity that is capable of spreading falsehood. There is the use of a modality of truth to create a divide between ‘truth’ and ‘lies’. The speaker does not consider his own statements as a form of propaganda against the ‘enemy’. This creates the impression that, what the prime minister projected about the ‘enemy’ were the facts or the truth. The statement also portrays the ‘enemy’ as an illegitimate entity.

Later in 2015, British foreign secretary Philip Hammond also maintained that
“...the ideology that underpins the threat we face today... is rooted in a corrupt interpretation of one of the world’s great religions; because of that, it has deeper roots and wider reach. (Hammond, 2015) UK1

The ‘enemy’s’ ideology is described as a dishonest and a manipulated representation of ‘Other’ religions. She subjectively disrepute the ideology of the ‘enemy’ and again indicates the ability of such ‘falsehood’ to spread globally. The message is also scheming in the sense that it creates a wide gap between the ‘Us’ and ‘Them’ so that an ‘entity that is different from ‘Us’ is created. The spreading ability of the ‘enemy’s’ ‘falsehood’ also implied the urgency to stop the spread of such ‘falsehood’.
The speaker continues “…Its fundamental tenets, besides violence and intimidation are discrimination, subjugation and sectarianism”. (Hammond, 2015) UK1

The quotation is filled with emotional and biased descriptors of the ‘enemy’. The words in this statement are different forms of ‘othering’ that define the ‘enemy’ in terms that are chaotic in nature. It also suggests that the ‘enemy’ is a group that threatens the well-being of the self. Sectarianism in this context means that the ‘enemy’ belongs strongly to another group that is different from ‘Us’.

“They are bound together by the single evil ideology of Islamist extremism that preaches hatred, sows division and promotes sectarianism. “…It is an ideology that is a perversion of Islam and a perversion of the truth”. (May, 2017) UK4

Prime Minister Theresa May also echoes the same ideas represented by Philip Hammond in the previous section. She again uses the truth modality to describe the ‘enemy’s ideology as a wayward form of Islam. In constructing the ‘Other’ as evil against the contrasting image of good, she draws a distinction between an inner (good) and an outer (evil) community, where the outer community is characterized with lies and brainwashing (otherwise referred to as sectarianism)

To the analyst, earlier UK political discourse about security used to feature words like ‘insurgents’ and ‘enemy fighter’. However, such terminology has been replaced lately by the word ‘terrorist’ which he thinks is a ‘loaded term’. Indeed, adopting the use of the word ‘terrorist’ is a form of ‘othering’ to signify a clear distinction between ‘Us’ and ‘Them’. It is used subjectively to describe the ‘other’ in stronger terms that creates an atrocious ‘enemy’. Describing a group as ‘terrorists’ cannot be objective. As the widely known cliché agrees, ‘one ‘man’s terrorist could be another man’s freedom fighter’.

To Cameron “…there was nothing to suggest that Reyaad Khan would ever leave Syria or desist from his desire to murder us at home, so we had no way of preventing his planned attacks on our country without taking direct action”. (Cameron, 2014) UK5

The ‘enemy’ is described as possessing an unquenchable desire to kill British citizens. There is no opportunity for the ‘enemy’ to change his mind or turn around even if that was possible. Once the
‘enemy’ was an ‘automated killing machine’ targeting the British, killing him first was not only logical but also necessary and urgent.

According to British Prime Minister Theresa May, “they have shown their brutality, by murdering, raping and torturing men, women and children in the territories they hold, and by murdering western hostages - including British citizens - in the most savage way imaginable. (May, 2014) UK3

The prime minister uses de-humanizing words to construct the ‘enemy’ as primitive who demonstrates wicked instincts by engaging in inhuman and brutish actions against women and children. The ‘enemy’ is demonized in a manner that will as far possible create an unpleasant ‘Other’ who will not be acceptable in the society on any grounds. Foreign secretary Philip Hammond uses similar descriptors in a different context saying: “Da’esh’s extreme doctrine is subversive as well as barbaric: it pursues its objective through a reign of terror and violence, murderous towards anyone”. (Hammond, 2015) UK1

To Boris Johnson “...Perhaps we should think of a fight not against a military opponent but against a disease or psychosis – even though that metaphor is itself imperfect. The notion of a disease or contagion fails to do justice to the moral agency of the terrorists. “...It is a scourge, a disease, a malaise; but we can get on top of it, because for all its allegedly instant addictive power”. (Johnson, 2017) UK2

Boris Johnson adopts the use of a disease metaphors that portray the ‘enemy’ as having a mental disorder that makes him incapable of acting based on what is right or wrong. This mental disorder is also described as infectious. So, like the other politicians, this discursive practice of using disease metaphors call for a ‘cure’ in the form of a military action. Johnson ends with this: “...anyone who actually went to Raqqa discovered that it was a hopeless and unsanitary dystopia (2017). Raqqa is a city in Syria where ISIL is believed to exist. The environment of the ‘enemy’ is described as foul and deprived.

According to the analyst, the politicians have mostly framed terrorists in inhuman terms to the people. The public has little detail about who these suspected terrorists are and why they do what
they do. This to a large extent means that ideas about who the ‘enemy’ is and what the ‘enemy’ can do have largely been formed based on the framing of the ‘enemy’.

6.4.2 Existentialism

“...ISIL and its western fighters now represent one of the most serious terrorist threats we face.... (May, 2014) UK3

A threat of an imminent nature is revealed to the people. The expression ‘one of the most serious threats’ singles out a particular ‘enemy’ among a generally perceived number of existing threats. It also seeks to lay emphasis on the nature of the threat. The ‘enemy’ being referred to in this statement is judged subjectively as the most dangerous to the livelihoods of the British people. This construction therefore exposes a vulnerability which was otherwise unknown.

“...ISIL have made no secret of their desire to bring death and destruction to the United Kingdom, the United States and to other western countries’” (May, 2014) UK3

The Prime Minister again constructs an ‘enemy’ that she thinks is common to its allies and other western interest. The statement makes claim to a singular motivation of the ‘enemy’ to launch lethal attacks on the UK and other western countries. The creation of a common threat invariably calls for a common action to defeat a common ‘enemy’. If a common ‘enemy’ has been created then “we must adopt a common response to this common threat if, together, we are to confront them, and defeat them”. (Hammond, 2015) UK1

The imminence of this threat is later re-iterated by the Chancellor of the Exchequer Philip Hammond in 2015 when he stressed that:

“…Da’esh, and the extremist Islamist ideology it espouses, represents a fundamental threat to all of our security”. UK1

The danger the ‘enemy’ poses is once more amplified and the ‘enemy’ is portrayed as lethal and sophisticated by British foreign secretary Boris Johnson in 2017 when he laid emphasis on the activities of the ‘enemy’ in order to attack Britain. He stressed this saying:

“they are working on new bombs of all kinds, and new ways of eluding detection. They are enlisting everyday objects as terrorist weapons”. (Johnson, 2017) UK2
Prior to the above statements, British Prime Minister David Cameron had suggested that:

“...With the rise of ISIL, we know terrorist threats to our country are growing.
...The threat picture facing Britain in terms of Islamist extremist violence is more acute today than ever before”. (Cameron, 2014) UK5

The UK Prime Minister used the past and the present circumstances to establish the existence of danger for which reason they should be afraid. The argument to justify the magnitude of the threat today is meant to justify the necessity to apply not only force, but military force at an incremental level equivalent to the levels of the threat that is deemed to be growing. The exaggerated threat is also able to free Cameron from the institutional and legal constraints that were supposed to limit the application of military force especially in that context when the drone strike was against a target who was a British national.

In the analysts’ view, even though the public does not know who these people are, what he can be sure that they know through the framing is that ‘these people pose as an imminent threat’ to us. This means that the political discourse about the ‘enemy’ creates an acceptable level of existent danger in the minds of the people which calls for the need to put in measures to contain it.

6.4.3 Necessity

“...My first duty as Prime Minister is to keep the British people safe. That is what I will always do. There was a terrorist directing murder on our streets and no other means to stop him. The Government do not for one minute take these decisions lightly, but I am not prepared to stand here in the aftermath of a terrorist attack on our streets and have to explain to the House why I did not take the chance to prevent it when I could have done. That is why I believe our approach is right”. (Cameron, 2014) UK5

The speaker makes an evaluation of the action taken against the ‘enemy’ in relation to the activities of their adversary. He invokes the moral and legal permissiveness inherent in his constitutional duty to protect the people which therefore becomes the basis for judging his approach as right. If he was right to kill the ‘enemy’, then it is correct to say that the ‘enemy’ is judged to be wrong and unjustified. Killing the ‘enemy’ in this context was therefore constitutionally necessary.
Further, Cameron reiterates that “…We took this action because there was no alternative. In this area, there is no Government we can work with; we have no military on the ground to detain those preparing plots. ...the airstrike was the only feasible means of effectively disrupting the attacks that had been planned and directed. It was therefore necessary and proportionate for the individual self-defense of the United Kingdom”.
(Cameron, 2014) UK5

While the capture or arrest of suspected terrorists is an operational method acceptable in modern counter-terrorism tactics, Prime Minister Cameron’s assessment precluded the option of capture during the operation that resulted in the Killing of Reyaad Khan. The speaker paints a helpless situation for themselves. The applicability of targeting the ‘enemy’ was therefore necessary because of the ‘nature’ of the threat and the prevailing circumstances. Second, he appeals to a nation’s right to self-defense as captured under International law which makes the ‘enemy’s life losable in this context.

Cameron continues emphasizing that “…if there is a direct threat to the British people and we are able to stop it by taking immediate action, then, as Prime Minister, I will always be prepared to take that action. That is the case whether the threat is emanating from Libya, from Syria or from anywhere else”. (Cameron, 2014) UK5

The speaker gives further justification to the drone strike against Khan and his counterpart. After establishing in his earlier submission of an existing threat, he makes an emphatic claim that the drone strike eliminated the impending threat. Impliedly, this method (in this context of targeted killing using drones) of dealing with a national threat became a method of choice for similar future threats if the state could sufficiently establish a direction that the threat was believed to be coming from.

“…At the same time we in the UK, Global Britain, are helping to reverse the spread of the disease overseas, and in its most hideous and dangerous manifestations that will mean surgery. It will sometimes mean military action of the kind we have taken in the skies above Raqqa and Mosul, where the UK has been among the biggest
While the speaker still makes use of dehumanizing forms framing, air strikes are likened to ‘surgical’ tools meant to provide a cure for the ‘lethal disease’. To the analyst, these framings about the ‘unknown’ who is deadly creates the impression that there is no other alternative to the action being taken and the people being killed are always people who threaten the survival of state. There is a lot of effort in terms of rhetoric regarding ‘precision strikes’ in Johnson’s statement. Arguably, targeting in this context is justified on the basis that innocent people are not being killed. Therefore, eliminating such people is only necessary and legitimate.

6.4.4 Discussion of Findings

In this study I have sought to investigate how western democracies frame the ‘enemy’ as targetable and killable in the context of the global war on terror. The findings in this study reveals a clear pattern of ‘enemy’ imaging that is relevant to the understanding of TK. This section of the study will therefore entail the interpretation of the results from my analysis of the data gathered.

As revealed in the sequence of the results of this research, the image of the ‘enemy’ is critical to the field of counter-terrorism because such discourse will usually precede the action of any state in fighting terrorism. As Larson will rightly put it, an object can be meaningless to us except our perception of it (1985). This means that perception is influential in determining the behaviour of states. Across the three countries used as case study, the image of the ‘enemy’ manifested itself in a process that finally leads to the targeting and elimination of the ‘enemy’. I identified and classified the process into three stages namely Otherism, Existentialism and Necessity.

In the first stage which is Otherism, the findings revealed that political actors engaged in identification and polarization. The means of polarization involved the use of words like criminal, murderer, hostile, immoral, brutal, and evil in contrast to words like good, humane, moral, peaceful and compassionate. Corroborating the thoughts of Peek (2004), the negative descriptions were peculiar to the ‘enemy’ whiles the complimentary words addressed the self or the state. The ‘Otherism’ stage puts the ‘enemy’ into a unique category which is characterized by a different standard of measure and evaluation for any activities of the ‘enemy’. This is evidenced in the findings where politicians judge the actions and motivations of the ‘enemy’ as wrong, immoral, bad or evil whiles judging their own actions as right, moral and justified.
Another common theme that was also prominent in this stage from the findings was the dehumanization of the ‘enemy’ using animal and disease metaphors. Dehumanizing metaphors such as predator, cancerous tumor, plague, barbarian and bugsplat have been definite and consistent in the narrative. Such consistency in the discourse has immensely formed a unique symbolic language in the context of the international fight against terrorism (Steuter & Wills, 2009). As revealed in the language of fighting suspected terrorists, the pursuit of the ‘enemy’ for instance has been linguistically coined as a ‘hunt’ for a ‘prey, the surgical removal of a disease or the crushing of insects.

Politically, this framing of the identity of the ‘self’ and the identity of the ‘Other’ provides a framework for justifying state behaviour and policy, and in supplying the logic and standards for achieving state goals (Bittner 1963 cited in Bellot, 2017). In other words, the metaphors and language used to designate the ‘Other’ built the foundations for framing the acceptable logic to target or pursue people who are suspected as being terrorists.

The construction of the ‘Other’ led the process to the stage of Existentialism. In this stage, the results indicated how the politicians depicted a threat of existential and imminent nature. Across the three cases, the politicians made references to the capabilities of the ‘enemy’, organization, intent and possible location. Obama and Trump for instance declared war against an ‘enemy’ who was of a boundless nature and threatening to kill Americans if pre-emptive measures were not taken. Benjamin Netanyahu also likened the threat to that of an organized army whiles Theresa May spoke about an ‘enemy’ who was threatening the interest of the West. An important aspect about the location of the ‘enemy’ is where politicians practically say the ‘enemy’ also lived with them. Indeed, the exaggeration of the threat practically characterizes this stage. This is what Zur (1991) has referred to as hostile predictions and self-fulfilling prophecies. The language about the ‘enemy’ is a classical representation of an extra-ordinary ‘enemy’. It is also a form of propaganda against their adversary as rightly indicated by Laswell (1965). Enemy propaganda can impact on views about the ‘enemy’.

Legally, this way of framing the existence of imminent danger connects with International Law which practically allows states to take pre-emptive actions to avert an imminent danger (Dill, 2014). One could argue that the threat situation is different according to context, and political actors could be referring to different levels of threat existence at varying moments. However, what is striking and basic among the different framing and contexts is the perceived existence of a threat
out there irrespective of how different it may be looked at. The magnification of an international threat is also able to draw the emotional response politicians may require to justify their future political decisions. This emotional response is usually fear and distress which consequently influences the urgent need for more protection for the people.

Having defined the threat in clear terms in the first and second stage, the ‘enemy’ discourse moves to the stage of *Necessity*. This stage features a justification for the use of exceptional action against the extra-ordinary ‘enemy’ which includes killing the ‘enemy’. At this stage, the ‘enemy’ is sufficiently constructed to court support from the people including domestic and international law. As rightly put by Fairclough, speakers and their audience can arrive at an understanding through varying means which includes persuasion (2001). It is revealing from the results that John Brennan for instance described suspected terrorists as ‘legitimate military targets’. Obama on the other hand made claims to the risk involved in fighting those ‘legitimate targets’-an argument that was in favour of using drones to eliminate the targets. David Cameron also referred to his constitutional responsibility to protect British citizens whiles Netanyahu and Moshe Ya’alon indicated their intolerance for the threat which is the reason why state resources will be invested into the fight against suspected terrorists. It is therefore telling here that the central components of the submissions made by the politicians are *legitimacy* and *necessity* of exceptional action-an action that should be adequate to eliminate the existential and imminent threat. The necessity and legitimacy rationally was derived through the construction of the ‘enemy’ who was not only described as an illegal, irrational and inhuman ‘other’, but also an entity that is extremely dangerous to the people.

Undeniably, the image of the ‘enemy’ is the driving force in the construction of an adversary who must be killed. The image indeed drives the language and action for destroying the ‘enemy’. It is demonstrative from the general rhetoric that once the ‘enemy’ has been constructed in the terms indicated from the discourse, politicians may not necessarily have to say explicitly that the ‘enemy’ must be killed. The ‘enemy’ naturally becomes a killable object. Deductively, the adversary who can and must be killed in this context was a product of the political discourse.
Chapter Seven: Conclusion and Future Research

My thesis investigates armed drones and targeted killings with a focus on how western democracies frame the ‘enemy’ as targetable and killable in the context of the international fight against terrorism. Using the US, Israel and UK as illustrative case studies, I analyzed the political discourse of these nations and how the rhetoric of a killable enemy is produced by the state actors. I found out that constructing the ‘enemy’ into a killable object involved a three-staged process namely Otherism, Existentialism and Necessity.

First, the politicians used discursive devices that identified and polarized individuals and groups. The means of polarization involved the use of words that created a general divide between ‘good’ and ‘evil. The negative descriptors were peculiar to the ‘enemy’ whiles the complimentary words addressed the self or the state.

Secondly, the political actors advanced the rhetoric to the projection of a threat that was existential and imminent in nature. Political actors in framing the threat used language that magnified the threat in terms of the enemy’s capabilities, organization, intent and activities. With such vulnerabilities exposed to the people which otherwise was unknown before this discourse, politicians create an acceptable logic for the pursuit of the ‘enemy’.

Finally, the discourse moves to the stage of necessity. In this stage I found out that political actors emphasize the need and justifiable grounds for which the ‘enemy’ must be targeted and killed. This stage derives legitimacy from the first two stages of this process through the construction of the ‘enemy’.

The findings of this research reveal the influence of the ‘enemy’ image in the context of the international fight against terrorism. It provides a framework for the understanding of this topic as well as activates a continuous debate for future scholarly work.

As this thesis concludes, I close by indicating some areas for future research. First, future research should consider how arguments or justifications for TKs have changed over time among states. This should be studied from the period prior to the advent of armed drones and the period after drones and how these changes (if any) have spread among state actors. Secondly, since technology is evolving at a speed faster than changes to international law in regulating modern warfare, scholars should study whether international law will be able to regulate the use of autonomous weapon systems (killer robots) which is the future of armed drone technology. Lastly, considering
the proliferation of armed drones to other parts of the world including Asia, Africa and the Middle East, new research questions will arise because of the deployment weaponized drones in different contexts and by different actors aside the major players like the US, UK and Israel. Future research should therefore focus on the impact that the deployment of armed drones will have on these nations as they begin to use the technology.

References


Appendix One: Interview Guide

1. What kind of image does the political actors project about suspected terrorists or the ‘enemy’?

2. What kind of response or reaction does the ‘enemy’ image put out there draw from the public?

3. How does the reaction from the public influence political action against the ‘enemy’?

4. How does the acceptability of the image constructed about terrorists or the ‘enemy’ justify the action (targeted strikes) directed against the ‘enemy’?

5. How does the image constructed about the enemy influence the use of armed drones to eliminate suspected terrorists?

6. How different or similar are the framings of the enemy by the politicians?

Appendix Two: Speeches by Politicians

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