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Norway's search for status through the deployment of police officers to international operations

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Declaration

I, Alf Halvar Næsje, declare that this thesis is a result of my research investigations and findings. Sources of information other than my own have been acknowledged and a reference list has been appended. This work has not been previously submitted to any other university for award of any type of academic degree.

Signature.....

Date.....

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Abstract

This thesis studies Norway's contributions of police officers to South Sudan as part of the United Nations Mission In South Sudan (UNMISS), and to Afghanistan as part of the Norwegian Police Support to Afghan Authorities Project (NORAF), and what the rationale for Norway is for participating in international operations with police officers. My problem statement is **to what degree can Norway's participation with police officers in international operations be explained as an action to seek status**. This is studied through evaluating Norway's actions as an attempt to be perceived as either a moral authority or a reliable partner by looking at Norway's goals and commitments, Norway's contribution to UNMISS and NORAF, and exploring what Norway has gained through these contributions. Studying this problem statement has been approached through a qualitative approach using 12 qualitative interviews, participation observations and document analysis. My findings show that status seeking is an important part of Norway's participation with police officers in international operations. When comparing NORAF and UNMISS, the goal to maintain Norway's status concerning its bilateral and multilateral relations has been reached, while Norway has been less successful with reaching its goals concerned with development assistance. In addition, Norway has prioritized to be perceived as a reliable partner rather than, and often at the expense of, being perceived as a moral authority. This means that Norway's contribution of police officers to international operations – originally meant as a tool of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs for development assistance – is also used for seeking international status.

List of Acronyms

ABP – Afghan Border Police

ANP – Afghan National Police

ANSF – Afghan National Security Force

AU – African Union

CNPA – Counter Narcotics Police Afghanistan

CPA – Comprehensive Peace Agreement

CSTC-A – Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan

DAC – Development Assistance Committee

DPA – United Nations Department of Political Affairs

DPKO – Department of Peacekeeping Operations

EASFSEC – Eastern Africa Standby Force

EEAS – European External Action Service

EU – European Union

EUPOL-A – European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan

FDD – Focused District Development

FPU – Formed Police Unit

GDP – Gross Domestic Product

IDP – Internally Displaced People

IGAD – Intergovernmental Authority on Development

IPCB – International Police Coordination Board

IPO – Individual Police Officer

ISAF – International Security Assistance Force

JUNO – Norwegian bilateral police project in Serbia

MFA – Ministry of Foreign Affairs

MINUSTAH – United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti

MST – Mission Specific Training

NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NGO – Non-Governmental Organization

NODEFIC – Norwegian Defence International Centre

NOK – Norwegian kroner (currency)

NORAF – Norwegian Police Support to the Afghan Authorities

NTM-A – NATO Training Mission Afghanistan

ODA – Official Development Assistance

OPCW – Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

PHS – Norwegian Police University College

POC – Protection of Civilians

POD – Norwegian Police Directorate

SG – United Nations Secretary General

SPLA – Sudan People’s Liberation Army

SPLM – Sudan People’s Liberation Movement

SRSG – Special Representative of the Secretary General

SSR – Security Sector Reform

TIPH – Temporary International Presence in Hebron

UK – United Kingdoms

UN – United Nations

UNAMA – United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan

UNMIK – United Nations Mission in Kosovo

UNMIL – United Nations Mission in Liberia

UNMIS – United Nations Mission in Sudan

UNMISS – United Nations Mission in South-Sudan

UNMVM – United Nations Monitoring and Verification Mechanism in Columbia

UNPOC – United Nations Police Officer Course

UNSMA – United Nations Special Mission in Afghanistan

US – United States

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Chapter 1 - Introduction

The concept of *status* within International Relations has often been believed to only be of relevance towards the great states and states striving to gain great power status, and that these states strive more for status than smaller states (Wohlforth 2015). But in 2015, Benjamin de Carvalho and Iver B. Neumann edited and published the book: *Small state status seeking – Norway's quest for international standing*, where they, with the help of several other authors focusing on different relevant topics, showed that the concept of status is also relevant to smaller states (de Carvalho & Neumann 2015). This is summed up well in the conclusion written by Wohlforth (2015, p. 154): “For years, scholarship in this area has assumed, implicitly or explicitly, that great powers value status more than small ones [...] Taken as a whole, this book challenges each of those assumptions.”

When it comes to power status, small states are unable to compete against the great and striving states. Because the old way of gaining great power status, (through increasing a country's geographical size), no longer is a valid option, smaller states have to compete against each other to gain status as a *good power* (Neumann & de Carvalho 2015). In their book, they describe two ways of gaining good power status, namely: “... small states will play on their moral authority” and “... they seek to be perceived as good, reliable partners in a hegemonic arrangement or within a multilateral set-up.” (Neumann & de Carvalho 2015, p. 10-11). Through Norway's economic strength, the country has pursued an international political agenda to strengthen Norway's status. An example of the areas where status can be sought, is the participation and involvement in international operations. Norway strives to be perceived as a moral authority as well as a reliable partner, and has a long history of contributions, both economical and with personnel, to international operations. One of the most recognized ways to promote a country's status internationally is through the United Nations (UN), but status can also be sought through bilateral engagements.

Norway has a strong and persistent history in the UN, and was among the countries that established the UN. The Norwegian Trygve Lie was the first Secretary General (SG) (FN-Sambandet 2017b). Norway's continuous and strong support of the UN can be seen through Norway's economical contributions to the organization. In the time period of 2002-2004,

Norway was the 7th largest contributor, totally, of assessed and voluntary financial contributions to the UN (Global Policy Forum). In 2016 Norway was the largest contributor of official development assistance (ODA), measured compared to gross national income (1.11%), and is together with only five out of 28 Development Assistance Committee (DAC) countries, above the UNs ODA target of 0.7% (OECD 2016). Hence, Norway is a major economical contributor to UN operations.

However, the UN is also strongly dependent on member countries' support via human capacity and experts, in addition to economic support. In that respect, Norway has contributed with personnel to UN operations since 1949 when five military personnel were deployed to the UN operation in Kashmir, and since then, more than 60 000 Norwegians have participated in UN operations (FN-Sambandet 2017b). Norway's first contribution of police officers to international operations was in Namibia in 1989, where they monitored the peace process and the election process (Politiet 2017). Since then, Norwegian police officers have been present in many international operations. In 2017 the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) will be using more than 71.000.000 NOK on training, support and deployment of about 35 Norwegian police officers to international operations (Det Kongelige Utenriksdepartement 2017). In the white paper delivered from the MFA regarding the future of Norwegian foreign and security policy, the government pledges continue to participate in building the justice and security sector in host countries through UN operations (Utenriksdepartementet 2017). Therefore, Norway's participation with police officers in international operation is based on more than 25 years of experience and a pledge to keep providing police officers to international operations. However, this begs the question: what does Norway gain by participating in international operations with police officers?

Kleiven (2012) argued that Norwegian police officers that have been deployed to international operations feel neglected, unprepared and ignored and that the whole system is based on a foreign policy focusing on promoting Norway's international relations, and not the reality on the ground. Osland (2017a) recommends the creation of a knowledge management mechanism that will secure and redistribute knowledge created in the field. The need of such a management mechanism supports Kleiven (2012) statement regarding a lack of communication to police officers in international operations. What might be a missing support of the police officers sent to international operations could indicate that their participation was not mainly based on police arguments. Instead, their deployment might be driven more by Norway's foreign policy agenda, prioritizing participation in international operations to show

that Norway does not only provide economical support to UN, but also shares the common risk by supplying human capital. This notion is supported by Høgseth (2008, p. 59 [My translation]) that stated that: “Norwegian police contributions in Afghanistan should undergo a thorough evaluation in relation to work tasks, what strategy and which co-operation partners are chosen for the future. If this is not done, the whole project is, in my opinion, a form of symbol politics by Norway, and is only to a small degree part of the democracy building effort in Afghanistan”. I will therefore in my thesis explore whether the concept of status can help explain Norway’s large economical and personnel contributions to international operations by looking at Norway’s participation in the UN operation in South Sudan, UNMISS, and the Norwegian bilateral police operation in Afghanistan, NORAF.

Research regarding Norwegian police in international operations has mostly been focused on the police officers and their experience when participating in international operations (Høgseth 2008; Kleiven 2012; Osland 2017b). In my thesis I will discuss how it is possible to explain Norway’s participation with police officers in international operations by applying the concept of small states as status seekers presented by de Carvalho and Neumann (2015). My problem statement is: **to what degree can Norway’s participation with police officers in international operations be explained as an action to seek status.**

To answer my problem statement, I have the following three objectives with adhering research questions:

1) To describe Norway’s commitments and goals when contributing police officers to international operations.

Research questions:

- I. What are Norway’s commitments and goals in relation to UNMISS and how do these relate to determining police deployment?
- II. What were the commitments and goals in relation to NORAF? How do they compare with UNMISS?

- 2) To describe Norway's contribution to South Sudan with the Norwegian police component to UNMISS and to Afghanistan, through the Norwegian police project NORAF.**

Research questions:

- I. How has the Norwegian police contribution to UNMISS developed since the operation started?
- II. How was NORAF established and how did it develop through the project period?
- III. Comparing the framework surrounding police contribution to UNMISS and NORAF, what are the advantages and disadvantages?

- 3) To explore what Norway has gained by contributing with police officers to South Sudan and Afghanistan.**

Research questions:

- I. Which commitments and goals have been fulfilled through participation in UNMISS and NORAF?
- II. What role does police professional experience and advice play regarding Norwegian international operations?

Chapter 2 - Theoretical framework

Bures (2007) claims that there are no international relations theories that cover the concept of international peacekeeping operations. However, in my thesis I wish to study if the concept of status (de Carvalho & Neumann 2015) can be used to explain why small states choose to participate with police officers in international operations, when there are no apparent economic, political or police professional arguments for doing so.

In the next section I would like to discuss some of the key traditional international relations theoretical concepts and give an explanation as to why they cannot be used to fully explain Norway's contribution with police officers to international operations. In the second section I will give an introduction to the concept of status and why I believe that it can be used to explain Norway's participation in international operations with police officers.

2.1 Key International Relations Theories

Realism has two core values that create the basis for realist thought and foreign policy: national security and state survival (Jackson & Sørensen 2013). This mentality, however, generally fails to explain Norwegian participation in international operations with police officers. First, I would like to point out some economic arguments that question the realist mind set. In 2016, Norway had a defence budget of 49.1 billion NOK in 2016 (Statsbudsjettet 2016 2016b). The Norwegian armed forces are the key facilitators for the survival of the Norwegian state and should therefore be one of the main financial focuses of the Norwegian government. Therefore, it is questionable why Norway only provides a 1.55% of the national GDP to defence expenditures, well below the 2% guidelines agreed upon by NATO (NATO 2017a). In contrast, Norway spent 33.6 billion NOK on their foreign aid budget in 2016 (Statsbudsjettet 2016 2016a). The fact that Norway spends a relative small amount on the army, state security, while at the same time spends so much on foreign aid, that minimally to

do with securing the Norwegian state, makes it hard to explain Norway's foreign policy based on realists concepts.

One of the basic realist ideas presented by Jackson and Sørensen (2013, p. 66) is "... a conviction that international relations are necessarily conflictual and that international conflicts are ultimately resolved by war". This is in direct conflict with Norway's engagement in multilateral organizations, like the UN, where Norway has been participating since the start of the League of Nations more than 100 years ago. The three pillars of the UN; human rights, peace and security, and development, encourage cooperation, not war, and are in strong contrast with the realist idea about international relations (UN.org 2015). Subsequently, realism fails to explain why Norway participates with police officers in international operations; especially those that are organized through the UN, which make out the majority of operations that Norway are currently engaged in. In addition, realists focus their attention on the great powers in world politics (Jackson & Sørensen 2013). Norway is considered a small state, not a great power, therefore realism does not provide a suitable framework to explain why Norway contributes with police officers to international operations.

Neorealism differs from realism in its focus of analysis: where realism looks at actors (state leaders) and their decisions and actions, neorealism looks at the system that is external to the decision makers (Jackson & Sørensen 2013). Realism believes that a state's leaders will act upon, out of free will, a need to provide national security and state survival, while neorealism believes that there is a system around national leadership that forces them to prioritize national security and state survival. Neorealism focuses on the bipolar great power structure during the Cold War period, and believes that this was a period of international peace and stability (Jackson & Sørensen 2013). This focus on a world system with two dominating great powers, makes it hard for neorealism to adapt to the post-Cold War period (Kleiven 2012). With currently only one great power and multiple lesser actors, and the fact that more and more conflicts are intra-state conflicts, often driven by ethnicity and religion, and not inter-state conflicts, does not go well with neorealism ideology. In addition, neorealism's focus on the former great power Soviet Union and the current great power of the US, makes the theoretical framework less relevant in analysing the political actions of a small states like Norway and why they would participate with police officers in international operations.

Liberalism differs from realism in its understanding of the responsibility of the state. Where realists see the state as an instrument of power, liberalists see the responsibility of the state as

upholding the rule of law and securing its citizens liberties and property (Jackson & Sørensen 2013). Put differently, realists prioritize the states security, while liberalists hold the individual citizens security above that of the state. This mentality is in contrast to modern day conflicts in the same way that neorealist are, because modern day conflicts are more and more intra-state conflicts, not inter-state conflicts. If a state's primary focus is the security of its citizens and not the state, why are the majority of today's conflicts based on the state against one or several groups among its citizens? In addition, contrary to realists, liberalists believe that through reasoning states can find common ground for cooperation internationally, instead of conflict and war being the only possible outcome of inter-state interactions (Jackson & Sørensen 2013). Neorealist criticise this liberalist notion because many conflicts still occur, instead of being solved through reason (Jackson & Sørensen 2013).

Liberalists believe that through an interest of progress, states are no longer the key actors but instead point to international organizations and terrorist groups which, among others, have a leading role in world politics (Kleiven 2012). When it comes to international operations Bures (2007) states that liberalism explains state participation in UN operations to secure international peace and uphold norms and values. Neack (1995), however, in his analysis of state participation in international operations concludes that states participate in international operations to serve their own interests. Neack (1995) conclusion shows that Norway's participation in international operations with police officers can't be explained through a liberalist's theoretical framework. This is, however, interestingly close to the concept of status, the fact that states participate with police officers in international operations to serve their own interests, where one of these interests would be for a state to promote itself as a good power.

Social constructivism, often just referred to as constructivism, differ from the theories presented above in one key aspect in particular. Constructivists believe that ideas and beliefs shepherd decision making actors, and moves away from the concept that these decisions are guided by materialistic factors, like economic and military, that has dominated other theories (Jackson & Sørensen 2013). An example, presented by Hopf (1998), is to imagine a burning theatre with one door and ask oneself who will exit first, the strongest, the disabled, women, children or will it be at random? To ascertain the result of the situation, it is not enough to know the distribution of materialistic factors among the evacuating theatre goers. One also must understand the "... culture, norms, institutions, procedures, rules, and social practices that constitute the actors and the structure alike" (Hopf 1998, p. 173). In other words, there

are more than materialistic factors that help determine how a state behaves. It is social constructivism's focus on norms, ideas and identity, instead of relative power, that has opened up the relevance of small states and their foreign policy (Neumann & de Carvalho 2015). It is within the social constructivism's framework that we find the basis for understanding small states status seeking.

2.2 Status

Status is a concept that falls within the theory of constructivism because it is based on the concept that states base their actions on other states subjective perception of the state's position in a hierarchic system. Status is based on the principle that actions are made on subjective thoughts and opinions, not material values. Therefore, status is principally different from the other theoretical concepts, as explained with constructivism.

Earlier work on status has primarily focused on middle and rising powers as the BRICs countries, Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (Paul et al. 2014). The lack of focus on small states search for status is clear in the literature. I was unable to find any other work than the book *Small states and status seeking: Norway's quest for international standing* by de Carvalho and Neumann (2015) and the article *Developing status as a small state: Estonia's foreign aid strategy* by Crandall and Varov (2016). Carvalho and Neumann confirmed that the reason they wrote the book was the lack of work done on small states' search for status. This was also confirmed by another scholar, Paul D. Beaumont, at the Department for International Environment and Development Studies (Noragric) at the Norwegian University of Life Sciences (NMBU) who is also working on the concept of status. He referred me to an article by Crandall and Varov (2016) that was based on the book by de Carvalho and Neumann (2015). The limited scholarship on status and small states has thus limited the amount of sources used in this chapter.

In this sub-chapter I shall give an introduction to the concept of status, show through examples that Norway seeks status, and discuss the relevance of status seeking explaining Norway's participation in international operations with police officers. To finish off, I shall

discuss what my thesis offers to the development of the field of status as a concept, through expanding the knowledge on small states status seeking.

What is status?

In their book, *Status and World Order*, Larson et al. (2014, p. 7) defines status as "...collective beliefs about a given state's ranking on valued attributes (wealth, coercive capabilities, culture, demographic position, socio-political organization, and diplomatic clout." Neumann and de Carvalho (2015, p. 4) simplifies this definition by defining status to "... the condition of filling a place in a social hierarchy." Both books underline that a state's status is not a domestic concept, but an international concept. Status is a subjective concept and is given to a state by other states, based on how they see that state's position relative to other states (Larson et al. 2014). Neumann and de Carvalho (2015) specify that the only way a state can confirm its status within a hierarchy is by interacting with other states. Therefore, because status is subjective, if a state wishes to change its status, the state needs to change other state's perception of its status (Larson et al. 2014).

It is also relevant to mention that the quantity of status a state can give to another state is related to the quantity of status the "giving" state possesses. As Græger (2015) points out; it is better for Norway's status when Norway receive homage from the US president than a Nordic ministerial colleague. However, this means that smaller states have less influence on their own and other states status. When small states are unable to influence others status, they are subjected to larger countries that can influence status (Crandall & Varov 2016). This has changed with the increased importance of multilateral organizations like the UN. Multilateral organizations reduce the ultimate value of economic and military powers, as a result, small states, unable to compete economically or military, are better positioned to seek status through multilateral organizations (Schia & Sending 2015). Schia and Sending (2015) also points to small state's ability in multilateral organizations, to increase its status through being perceived as a 'go-to-state' in assisting in particular process, and presents Norway's peace and reconciliation portfolio as an example of this.

Small states may compete against each other to be recognized as a good power, through striving to be perceived as a moral authority and as a reliable partner (Neumann & de

Carvalho 2015). One way small states compete to be recognized as a good power, is by seeking specific hierarchic systems where they can do well. Due to the limited resources of small states, they need to focus their resources on some of these hierarchic systems if they wish to successfully compete for the acceptance as a good power. One way small states can do this is by presenting "...its status as something (peace nation, best ally, 'good' state, etc.)..." (p.148), by focusing on hierarchic systems they are already established in, they increasing their hierarchic status through doing well in that field (Wohlforth 2015, p. 148). One example is Norway's presentation of itself as a peace nation and Norway's focus on peacekeeping operations. Norway has made itself relevant in international operations through small and highly visible contributions that has made "... it possible for Norwegian diplomats within the C-34 [Special Committee on Peacekeeping] to 'punch above their weight' and – if nothing else- be recognized as having sufficiently high status to punch in that weight class: *a good power*" (de Carvalho & Lie 2015, p. 67). However, it is important to note that when small states choose which hierarchy to focus their resources, that other states recognize that hierarchic system (Clunan 2014). If other states do not recognize a certain hierarchic system, doing well within that hierarchic system and becoming a good state, will not increase that state's overall status.

When a small state is competing for the status of good power within a hierarchy it is important to stress that the state is competing against equal, small states. For Norway's, these states are what have been named the "...usual suspects': fairly small, fairly wealthy, democratic, and all eager to spread their moral capital" (Neumann & de Carvalho 2015, p. 13). When looking at Norway as a peace state, Norway might feel its position as a good power is threatened by increased spending by the larger states Canada or the Netherlands. However, a larger threat to Norway's status is from the neighboring Nordic states and linked to how much they spend on peacekeeping operations (Neumann & de Carvalho 2015). An important point that Wohlforth (2015, p. 148) presents is that "If all small states punch above their weight, none does. And if many punch above their weight, the fact that Norway does as well brings little status." In other words, it is important for Norway, in this example, to not just do better than the comparable Nordic states, but much better, to ensure its position in the hierarchic system of peacekeeping.

To sum up, status is a given states position in a hierarchic system that can be changed based on other state's perception of that state, in relation to similar and comparable states in the same hierarchical system.

Does Norway seek status?

Historically, Norway's search for status can be tracked back to the 1800s when Norway gained its own constitution and moved closer to dissolution from Sweden. Due to limited resources, Norway's search for status was primarily based on using moral authority towards being recognized as an independent state, while Denmark and Sweden was focused on improving their status among other states (Leira 2015). This was a historic period where Sweden and Denmark were not considered peers to Norway, and were instead higher up in hierarchy system than Norway. Norway was in a loose union with Sweden, and had yet to become the resourcefully strong state we know today. However, already during this period of time, Norway was focusing towards a promoting itself as a peace nation and maintaining its neutrality. During this period of history, Europe was governed by aristocracy and wars amongst states were common, and Norway was subjected under the Swedish king and nobility. Therefore, when the Norwegian parliament was developing a foreign policy, they based it on the common discourse trend in Europe; that nobility and kings, together with emperors, were war-prone, while the people were peaceful (Leira 2015). Norway, who saw itself as the people and Sweden as the king and nobility, therefore chose to follow the path as a peace nation when attempting to establish an international identity. To establish oneself as a peace nation internationally become an important part of creating a national identity, and also helped differentiate Norway from Sweden, helping Norway on the way to independence from Sweden (Leira 2015). Norway also presented itself as peace nation early into the multilateral arena, particularly during the 1920s when the League of Nations, the forerunner of the UN, "...became a forum for Norwegian peace-aspirations and status-seeking" (Leira 2015, p. 36).

International operations have always been an arena to promote peace nations' ambitions. Contributing with troops to international operations differs from economic contribution and strong policy work, because it shows that the state is willing to take part in the burden-sharing by risking the lives of their own. de Carvalho and Lie (2015) state that many critics wrongly claim that Norway's contributions to international operations are insignificant in size. This is because Norway cannot compete against the larger countries troop contribution like Kenya and China. Instead Norway is competing for the title as the largest contributor amongst the small states (de Carvalho & Lie 2015). This has put Norway in a position where our limited human resources for contributing to international operations, has forced Norway to focus on quality over quantity. This focus for Norway seems to work out well for it's status within

international peacekeeping operations: “Neither troop and police contributions nor financial contributions make Norway stand out in terms of peacekeeping. And yet, the country is viewed as one of the strongest proponents of new policies for peacekeeping (de Carvalho & Lie 2015, p. 67).

Norway has also specialized in being a ‘team-player’, a state that other states can rely upon to accept tasks, even though Norway doesn’t have any direct interest or relation to a conflict (Schia & Sending 2015). One example of this is Norway’s work with over several decades and facilitation, together with Cuba, of the peace agreement between FARC and the Colombian government (Regjeringen.no 2016a). This has given Norway a good status in the region. Good-status Norway has followed up with providing three female police officers to the UN operation in Colombia following the peace agreement (Hermann 2016). Another example of Norway taking responsibilities in a country that is outside what might be considered a natural area is Haiti, where since 2010 Norway has provided 800 million NOK and UN troops (Norad 2015). Norway has also made Haiti one of its focus countries for development cooperation (Regjeringen.no 2016b). In addition, Norway, together with Denmark, took responsibility for the joint UN-OPCW (Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons) operation in 2013-2014, where Syrian chemical weapons were transported out of Syria and destroyed (Regjeringen.no 2013a). This is resource-demanding work for small nations, but it is not without rewards: “A small state will see its status rewards exponentially multiplied if it can succeed in fostering international peace and security – that is, in taking on a responsibility that initially rests not upon its shoulders, but on those of the great powers” (Neumann & de Carvalho 2015, p. 11).

Arguably, the most famous contribution Norway has had to international peace work is the ‘Oslo Agreement’. Through this agreement, Norway’s position as a good power within international peace work was secured, and in terms of status, it was a major Norwegian success (de Carvalho & Lie 2015). For Norway, working with peace had provided status-benefits cheaply; some expenses were given through Norway’s participation in UN peacekeeping operation and other peace work, but the overall cost had been small compared to the status gained (Leira 2015). An example is that Norway has only delegated 436 million NOK to peace, reconciliation and democracy measures in the proposed budget for 2018 (Regjeringen.no 2017b), a relative modest sum of the total national budget for 2018 of 1.325 billion NOK (Lorch-Falch 2017). The Nobel Peace Prize is another cost efficient institution

securing Norway's position, and history, as a peace nation, and in that way stating Norway's moral authority (Johnsen 2015).

As Leira (2015) points out, Norway's status seeking process through its work with world peace, and being a peace nation, must be considered a spectacular success. This is supported by Matlary (2002) that claim that in the US they often mention the fact that Norway has taken on international responsibilities far above the borders expected by Norway based on the size of the state's population. When an important world power like the US, both publicly and directly, acknowledges Norway's international work, it is a strong boost to Norway's status. It is also a verification that the Norwegian parliament in the 19th-century made the right choice when deciding that Norway should profile itself internationally as a peace nation. By acting like a great power through taking responsibilities in the field of peace and stability, exceeding what can be expected by a small state, Norway is maintaining its status as a good power (de Carvalho & Lie 2015).

Why use the status concept in this thesis?

Proclaiming Norway as a peace nation has been accepted well by the citizens, so well in fact that one can argue that Norway as a peace nation has been more important for the Norwegian self-confidence than Norway's international status (Leira 2015). For a government to promote a stable foreign policy, it needs the population's support to ensure re-election. To be seen as a reliable partner, and thus a good power, continuous support for the states foreign policy is important. Therefore, to have an international profile is important to justify spending money outside the national borders. This policy is evidenced in Norway's self-image as a peace nation, but is also seen in the US self-image as the number one democratic state, charged with spreading democracy to the whole world. US role as the *de facto* democratic state might be dwindling, but it proves the point that as long as US could argue that their actions were a byproduct of providing democracy, their actions were easier to accept, both nationally and internationally. Now, in 2017, it has a new president that is withdrawing from international agreements, for example the Paris climate agreement (Shear 2017), unshamefully, proclaiming that it will put US first (BBC 2017), and is demanding more from its allies and initially did not give its allies in NATO a formal commitment that the US would uphold its alliance commitments (Rucker et al. 2017). However, all this will not have a large impact on

the US overall status, because it is, currently, the only great power in the world since the downfall of the Soviet Union.

For small states, the situation is substantially different. Because there are many more small states than there are great powers, a small state needs to continuously work to maintain its position or do even better than the other small states to improve its position. To do that, a small state needs to stay true to its international image, and focus on the areas that it does well. For Norway, that means to maintain its position as a peace nation and engage in peace related work. Contributing with Norwegian police officers in international operations is such peace related work. The UN, with its number one purpose of "...maintaining international peace and security..." (United Nations 1945, p. 3), is the main arena for Norway to promote itself as a peace nation. I will in chapter 4.1 and 4.2 show how the UN is the basis for both UNMISS and NORAF, and how by participating with police officers, Norway has used the UN as an arena to promote itself as a peace nation and engaged in peace related work.

Norway also works through other sectors, like international climate politic, to increase its status (Lahn & Rowe 2014). However, Norway, is both internationally and nationally, known as The Peace Nation. It is through this image I believe it may be easiest to show that Norway, as a small state, does seek status. And by showing that Norway does seek status through its image as a peace nation, I will present examples from Norway's participation with police officers in UNMISS and NORAF that show that Norway has pursued status under the perception as a peace nation at work. de Carvalho and Lie (2015, p. 69) emphasizes the importance of Norway's peace work for Norway's status: "Being a state with a reputation of being able to act in order to solve difficult conflicts, and also having a reputation of consistent involvement in peacekeeping operations, has helped to put Norway in a club reserved for those with higher status". Græger (2015) established that the use of military forces in humanitarian interventions is a tool within the foreign-policy. I will in my thesis show that the police also is such a tool, albeit a more peaceful tool in the toolkit of the Norwegian MFA.

If status as a conceptual framework is to be established within international relations, the concept needs to cover the whole aspect of states: small, medium and great; until then literature on status and status seeking will be incomplete (Neumann & de Carvalho 2015). This statement is supported by Crandall and Varov (2016, p. 412) that state that "The current international relations literature on status is only touching the surface on the utility of status in understanding state behavior". One of the reasons status as a concept is under theorized, may

be because it is hard to research, especially qualitatively. This is highlighted by de Carvalho and Lie (2015) in interviews with diplomats where it became clear that to confirm that they search for improved status, the diplomats had to admit that the drivers behind their policy differed from those officially proclaimed. On a general note, Norwegian foreign policy has been under theorized, and because it has been primarily done by historians, and through a broad realist perspective (Neumann & de Carvalho 2015).

Wohlforth (2015) states that the primary assumption within the status framework has been that small states do not value status as much as great powers, and that this notion has now been challenged by de Carvalho and Neumann (2015). Crandall and Varov (2016) support the statement by Wohlforth (2015), and take it further by stating that small states potentially seek status more than rising powers and that this will have to be explored further. Clunan (2014) calls for more research on the ability of states to manipulate their status through foreign policy. Crandall and Varov (2016, p. 421) sums it up by stating that “Status as a concept shows promise in contributing to the understanding of size as well as understanding small state behaviour”. In my thesis I shall show that Norway is manipulating its status through the use of police officers in international operations as a foreign policy tool, and through that also seeks status.

Chapter 3 - Methodology

This chapter contains an introduction to the theoretical framework used for the data generation and data analysis used in this thesis. The chapter will give an introduction to qualitative research as a methodological concept and ethical considerations made when conducting interviews, observations and document analysis. As a side note, all use of quotes from interviews, police reports and personal communications have been translated by me, from Norwegian to English. The translation is, to the best of my ability, a direct translation of their statements without changing the true meaning.

3.1 Advantages and disadvantages of qualitative research

When conducting qualitative research, it is important to be aware of the main advantages and disadvantages with the methodology, and I shall here give an introduction to the methods used.

On a general basis, qualitative research provides insight compared to quantitative research that provides overview (Tjora 2017). In other words, qualitative research gives a deeper understanding through the use of a flexible framework that can simplify a complex issue (Rahman 2016). An example of the flexible framework is that one can ask unplanned follow up questions when conducting semi-formal interviews based on the answers provided by the interviewee.

Through the flexible framework of qualitative research, it is possible to combine different types of data gathering methods when collecting data, like in depth interviews, observations and document analysis. Through the use of discourse analysis it is possible to look at other communications than speech to uncover a purpose behind something that is said or presented (Bryman 2012). Griffin (2004) was referring to Burman & Parker (1993) when stating that it has been demonstrated that qualitative methods, when using multiple data generating tools,

can discover inconsistencies and variations, and this is one of the advantages of discourse analysis. In other words, qualitative research can discover hidden and informal mechanisms that otherwise might have stayed hidden when conducting quantitative research.

There is however some disadvantages to qualitative research. First of all, it is not possible to replicate qualitative research because it is not possible for the researcher to replicate the original factors and control all variables (Strauss & Corbin 1998). This is because the researcher is the main tool for data generation, therefore the researchers preference of information will influence what data is collected (Bryman 2012). Also, the context of the interviews may be different and not possible to recreate. This is made even harder when the researcher uses anonymises interviewees to protect the sources. Since it is not possible to replicate qualitative research, validity of the research is ensured through other methods. For example, the researcher can provide thick description and reach data saturation during the data generation process. If a researcher attempts to replicate the original research by achieving an equal data saturation, the secondary research should achieve similar results as the original research (Morse et al. 2002).

Another way to improve validity in qualitative research is through the technique of triangulation. Triangulation is a validation process that use multiple sources of information instead of a single source (Creswell & Miller 2000). Denzin (1989) presents four types of triangulation: data triangulation, investigator triangulation, theory triangulation and methodological triangulation. In my thesis I have used two out of these four types of triangulation; data triangulation and methodological triangulation. Methodological analysis is divided between within-method triangulation and, the more satisfactory version, between-method triangulation (Denzin 1989). Between-method triangulation uses several different data generating methods to improve the datasets validity. An example is what I have done when gathering data through the methods of interviews, participation observations and document analysis. Data triangulation is divided into three subtypes: time, space and person (Denzin 1989). Persons are in turn divided into three levels: aggregate, interactive and collectivity. The aim of data triangulation is to gather as many different sources as possible that cover the field of study (Denzin 1989). In my study I have done this through interviewing three different interview groups, with different relations to the field of study.

Another disadvantage when comparing qualitative and quantitative research is the ability to generalize the findings. The qualitative method is time consuming opposed to quantitative

methods, making it harder to create the same sample size as for the quantitative method (Bryman 2012). Due to the limited number of interviewees in qualitative research as opposed to quantitative research, it is hard to generalize the findings to common statements for a larger group (Rahman 2016). However, Guba and Lincoln (1994) argue that generalization has only a statistical value, but it has no value when it comes to studies of individual cases. In that sense, the inability of generalizing qualitative findings is irrelevant, because it is not within the purpose of qualitative research to produce statistically generalizable data. Instead qualitative data contribute to theory generation through exploratory research. Qualitative research does so by providing insight to human behaviour where quantitative research excludes meaning and purpose (Guba & Lincoln 1994).

3.2 Challenges and dilemmas

In the beginning, access to information was the largest challenge I was faced with when collecting data. This was primary due to two reasons. First, the lack of previous studies with the same focus made it challenging to get an overview over the research area. The second reason was, to get access to relevant data and interviewees. However, throughout my study the process of getting access to relevant documents and personnel improved to a satisfactory level, and I got a surplus of data.

Another challenge I was faced with was to restrict and focus the goals of my thesis due to the lack of previous studies of Norwegian police officers in international operations. In the process, I realized that “less was more” and took the opportunity to help contribute to a field that is not that well studied. It is important to note that the initial large amount of data collected was rewarding, even though some of it has not been directly relevant for my thesis, it has given me a better background and understanding of the research area.

There has also been some uncertainty towards the use of status as a theoretical concept. The way it is now implemented in this thesis is the same way that it was presented through the book “*Small states and status seeking: Norway's quest for international standing*” (de Carvalho & Neumann 2015), that has been the primary basis for the theoretical framework. Status as a theoretical concept, especially focused against small states, is a relative new

concept within International Relations Theory. However, the advantage, as with the lack of previous studies on the Norwegian police officers in international operations, is that my thesis may bring new and relevant information for this important study area.

A possible challenge that Tjora (2017) suggests is that the researcher may feel an obligation to interviewees because they have taken time to answer the questions. This is also to some extent true for my interview situations. Through my interviews and research I located several areas within Norway's international police work that I felt could be improved. This left me with a feeling of owing the interviewees, and other individuals I had interacted with during my data collection, to address these issues. However, it fell outside my thesis to address all these issues and present potential solutions to them.

3.3 Comparative research

In my study I took a comparative research approach to answer the research questions. Bryman (2012, p. 72) defines the comparative research method as “... *studying two contrasting cases using more or less identical methods.*” With regard to my two studied cases, there were many similarities, but also differences between them. I have chosen these two operations because they differ in their fundamental framework. Namely that one operation, NORAF, is a bilateral operation, while UNMISS is a multilateral operation.

Further, Bryman (2012) explains that it is easier to understand a phenomena when you compare cases. My two cases are also of interest because they both are strongly politically founded in Norway's foreign policy interests. The conflict in Afghanistan was the first time Article 5 in NATO was activated (Regjeringen.no 2012). A strong presence from Norway was important to show NATO, and the US, that Norway are a strong, reliable and relevant allied. South Sudan on the other hand, has been an important part of Norwegian foreign politics and Norwegian NGOs have been present in Sudan since the 1970s (Regjeringen.no 2013b). The importance of Norway's involvement in South Sudan is evident by the Norwegian inclusion in the 'Troika'. The Troika co-operation was created in 2009 and is a closed group containing Norway, the UK and the US, and is among the important actors in the country together with the UN, AU (African Union) and IGAD (Intergovernmental Authority on Development).

Normally the UK and the US would be considered on a different hierarchic level than Norway when it comes to development aid. But in South Sudan, they are equal partners in their own group, the Troika. This is a testament to Norway's work in South Sudan.

The two cases selected for analysis in my thesis, are two countries that have had a relatively large presence of Norwegian police officers, and have been important countries in Norway's foreign policy. At its most, it Norway had 24 police officers in Afghanistan and 18 police officers in UNMISS, and the operations lasted for nine years in Afghanistan on six years and still ongoing in UNMISS. Another reason for the use of comparative research is the ability to uncover similarities and variances, and through that expose features of a case that otherwise would have been more difficult to reveal (Mills et al. 2006).

When studying more than one case, I will better be able to answer my problem statement: **to what degree can Norway's participation with police officers in international operations be explained as an action to seek status**. This is supported by Bryman (2012) who claims that an increasing amount of researchers have called for more use of multiple cases when conducting case studies.

Selected international operations for the study

The use of cases in qualitative studies is a common way to open up for the use of "...qualitative and quantitative data generation, interviews, observations, surveys, registering data studies, document studies and so on, and happily (most preferably!) a combination of these" (Tjora 2017, p. 41 [My translation]). Norway has in recent years been engaged in several international operations with police officers for example MINUSTAH (Haiti), UNMIL (Liberia), UNMISS, (South Sudan), UNMIS (Sudan), UNMVM (Columbia), TIPH (Hebron), EASFSEC (Nairobi), NORAF (Afghanistan), UNMIK (Kosovo) and JUNO (Serbia). In my thesis I will focus on Norway's police contribution to the multilateral UNs operation to South Sudan, UNMISS, and Norway's bilateral project in Afghanistan, Norwegian Police Support to the Afghan Authorities, NORAF. This thesis is based on different sources of information to establish the empiric data pool: qualitative interview's, personal observations from pre-deployment training, document analysis of written monthly and quarterly police reports from NORAF and UNMISS, official white papers, and scientific articles.

When selecting cases-studies, Tjora (2017) claims that it is common to pick cases based on their availability and the researcher's knowledge to the case. This is only partly true for my selection of NORAF and UNMISS, as both cases are relevant for answering the problem statement. These two international operations were also chosen for methodological reasons because they are among the largest international operations Norwegian police have participated in during the last years.

UNMISS is one of several ongoing international operations where Norwegian police participate, other operations are MINUSTA, UNMIL, UNMVM and TIPH (Det Kongelige Utenriksdepartement 2017). UNMISS is the operation with the currently largest presence of Norwegian police officers, while South Sudan, like Afghanistan, is among the twelve focus countries for Norwegian foreign aid (Regjeringen.no 2014), meaning that Norway has a strong political interest in the country.

Another important argument for the chosen cases is that NORAF was primarily a bilateral operation, while UNMISS is a multilateral operation. This makes it possible to study if Norway only seeks status through international organisations, or if Norway also seek status through their international bilateral work. Based on this, the two selected cases, NORAF and UNMISS, are well suited for answering my research statement.

3.4 Qualitative Interviews

Several interviewees that had worked with Norway's police contribution to Afghanistan mentioned that it had been some time since they had worked with NORAF, and therefore they were concerned that their memory might pose data validity issues. The data gathered from an interview will never be better than the interviewee's memory. It was therefore important to validate their interview statements with other interviews, reports or other sources when possible. They were commenting on experiences that created the basis for the reports. and the actions were in the context of the time they were in Afghanistan. Today we may have a different opinion of what works and what does not work in Afghanistan, and the overall situation both in Afghanistan and internationally has changed to varying degrees. It is therefore important to see the statements given today, not in today's context, but in the

context of the time the interviewees worked with NORAF, to give a more correct understanding of the data.

It is not unusual that the recruitment of informants is challenging, and that the researcher is left with the feeling of being unable to get sufficient information on all aspects of the research (Tjora 2017). Also, when one approaches a delicate theme, one should expect that it is hard to get participants to take part in interviews and one needs to approach the topics in a delicate way to be successful (Tjora 2017). In this sense, my engagement as a research assistance at the Norwegian Police University College (PHS) during my thesis has been valuable. The access to an official PHS e-mail, being referred to interviewees through key individuals working with police officers in international operations, and being invited to participate in meetings and observe courses, have helped to create my own network. My engagement at PHS has significantly improved the gathering of information, and I am sure that I would not have been able to gain the same access to information without this affiliation. The engagement at PHS has made it possible to make a more thorough research in my thesis because it has provided me with a legitimacy that has opened doors that otherwise would have been closed.

The interview groups

When selecting whom to recruit for interviews, the main rule is that the individual should be able to provide reflected answers on the relevant topics (Tjora 2017). In my study it was important to get a broad group of individuals that have experience or have knowledge of Norway's contribution of police officers to international operations. This is because the primary aim of the qualitative interviews was to give a broad perspective to the topic and compare different views. Hence, my interviewees were in three groups: police officer (PO), police expert (PE) and senior official (SMO).

The interviews are one of the methods used for my method triangulation to improve the validity of my study. Interviews, as opposed to documents, can at times provide less censored information. This is especially true when the interviewees are anonymized. In that way the potential consequences of the statements made are reduced compared to written documents with the author named. However, these statements could for the same reasons be false

because the interviewee do not have to stay accountable for the statements. This emphasizes the importance of triangulation of the validity of the data. Therefore, by conducting interviews on different levels of the hierarchy (Norway's participation in peacekeeping operations) I got different personal depictions of the same situation. This way I had improved data validity through data triangulation based on interviewing person representing different groups partaking in Norway's deployment to international operations. I experienced that the anonymized interviews gave me access to additional information and personal views and opinions on situations, that otherwise were left out in the formal documents. Hence, by looking at a situation from different perspectives, it was possible to reveal hidden or informal mechanisms that were harder to decipher, or not even covered, through formal documents.

Police Officer

The police officers selected for interviews were chosen based on their deployment to NORAF or UNMISS. The interviewees might have had one or more deployments to one or more operations. They all had a key position within NORAF or UNMISS, either as a contingent leader or an equally central position. This interview group represented the experiences from working in the field. The interplay between the Norwegian Ministry of foreign affairs and the Norwegian police directorate down to the police officers in the field, and how these police officers in the field experience this interplay, was the primary interest of these interviews. Therefore, it was important that the police officers worked in a position that gave them insight into the communication between Norway and the police contingency in Afghanistan or South Sudan. That would primarily mean the contingent leaders that was the communication link between Oslo and the deployed contingency.

Police Experts

The police expert group was the most diverse of the three interview groups. However, they all had in common that they were police officers with extensive insight and knowledge of the work of Norwegian police officers in international operations. Some of the interviewees were involved in deploying and administrating police officers to international operations, while other held key positions in other parts of the police, but had extensive experience of the work in international operations. This group represents the intermediate level in the hierarchy, the

interlink between the police officers in the field and the policy makers in the Norwegian MFA. Their experience and position make them “experts” within the police, when it comes to Norwegian police officers in international operations. However, it is important to note that even though this group is named police experts, like the other two groups, provide their personal perspectives. One can argue that their personal perspectives is an “experts-opinion”, but I have chosen to treat every person interviewed equally when evaluating their statements, as opposed to gathering expert statements from each interview group. This is also true for the “police officer” and “senior ministry official” interview group.

Senior Ministry Officials

This interview group was the most consistent of the three groups. All the interviewees were representatives of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and had worked directly or indirectly with police and international operations. Some of the interviewees had a more country specific experience and had worked with the international operations more indirectly. While other interviewees had worked primarily with international and multilateral peacekeeping operations, but not specifically to the case countries. This group represented the top of the hierarchy, they were tasked with engaging POD and the department of justice based on what the Norwegian government and the Norwegian Foreign Ministry had decided to be the Norwegian foreign policy agenda.

These three groups represented the three steps on the hierarchy that was the Norwegian participation with police officers in international operations. How they experienced this interplay from different angles was important when studying varying aspects of Norway’s participation in international peacekeeping operations with police officers.

[Interview process](#)

Each group interviewed consisted of four individuals, making a total of 12 interviews. The length of the interviews varied between 45 min. and 2 hrs. 15 min., and totalled approximately 15 hrs. 45 min. The length of the interviews varied based on subject’s response to the questions. When looking at the length of the interviews, it might be possible to see a correlation between the individual’s openness in their response and the length of the

interview. It is also important to note that because the interviews were semi-formal, the length of the interviews were also influenced by the interviewee's personality and "talkativeness", and the interviewers ability to present questions in a way that entices the interviewee to explore and discuss the topic further.

The limited previous work done on Norwegian police officers in international peacekeeping operations made it harder to get a grasp on the topic: However, to map and give background information I conduct informal interviews with the authors of (Høgseth 2008; Kleiven 2012; Osland 2017a) . These informal interviews helped me improve my understanding on the topic and find potential interviewees. Together with the suggestions received from PHS and information gained through the preliminary research, these informal interviews created the basis for the interview group.

The further selection of potential candidates was done through the *snowball sampling* approach (Bryman 2012). This approach is done by starting with a small group of relevant interviewees, who propose other potential interviewees with relevant experience and knowledge, whom in turn will propose new potential interviewees. This approach was successful in my study, because in the last three interviews, with two police experts and one official expert, I started to observe a repetition of answers from previous interviews. In the question of how many interviewees is sufficient when conducting qualitative work, Tjora (2017) is referring to Holter (1997) when claiming that as a main rule one should aim to reach information saturation. In other words, when the interviews no longer provide new information on the questions I asked. I therefore stopped at 12 interviews as I had reached a satisfactory level of information saturation on most of the questions asked. This matches well with Tjora (2017) proposal of between 10 and 15 qualitative interviews for an empirical based master thesis that builds on interviews. As a note, I would like to add that the number of individuals contacted with a request for an interview was larger than the number of interviewees conducted for my thesis. Some of the potential interviewees declined the request for an interview, while others failed to respond to my request.

I decided on a semi-structured approach for my interviews. In semi-structured interviews the researcher have some predefined questions, but they are phrased to give the interviewee freedom on how they wish to answer and the researcher the freedom to ask follow up questions based on the interviewees answers (Bryman 2012). To encourage the interviewees to speak as much as possible about their personal views and experiences, it is important not to

limit the topics too much, as one might miss out on relevant and interesting information that has not been previously identified. This was important in my study, as my primary intention with the interviews was exploratory research to gather as much information on the topic as possible, not to create two comparative datasets for my two studied cases, due to limited previous research done on the field. However, it is important to keep in mind that with semi-structured interviews it is only possible to explore relations connected to the interviewees subjectivity or the interview as a subject (Tjora 2017).

I built my interviews around eight primary topics. The phrasing of the questions related to these topics varied based on the interviewees background and knowledge that was established in the start and throughout the interview, and how they answered previous questions. When the interviewee said something of particular interesting or quickly mentioned a topic I wanted to explore further, I wrote it down in my notebook to later bring up the topic without interrupting the interviewees “train of thought”. When I wrote down follow up questions while the subject was talking, I applied a technique proposed by Tjora (2017) to encourage the interviewee to divulge more information. This technique is based on holding back follow up questions to create a, borderline, awkward silence that the interviewee might automatically break by providing additional information. I found this technique to be highly effective at times, while less effective other times. For it to be an effective, and not destructive tool, it is important to not overuse the technique during an interview and to a certain degree be able to read the personality of interviewed subject.

The interviews were conducted in the geographic area surrounding Oslo. This was primarily for logistic reasons, but also because most of the relevant people work, or live, in the geographic area surrounding Oslo. The alternative would have been to conduct interviews over skype or telephone. But as a rule, one should avoid telephone similar interviews as you will lose an important aspect of face to face interviews through reduced possibility of properly using and observing body language (Tjora 2017). In addition, it is important to create trust between the interviewee and the interviewer to ensure that the interviewee will speak freely and not withhold information. Also, it is easier to establish trust face to face, than through skype or the telephone. The interviews were conducted with the promise of full anonymity to the interviewees to avoid personal censorship. The interviewees were informed that they have the option to at any time refrain from answering any questions and ending the interview. No one chose to refrain from answering any of my questions or topics, but I did experience that

some of the interviewees performed self-censorship, both openly and without mentioning it, while others told me that they did not give me permission to quote them on certain statements.

I also informed them that the recordings from the interviews would only be used to transcribe the interviews into a written format, and then the recordings would be deleted once I was done. I also gave them an introduction of myself and the project. This introduction was both meant as a formality, but was also intended to make the interviewee more relaxed and less sceptical to me as an interviewer. Tjora (2017) also emphasized the importance of creating a safe environment for the interviewees and advices to leave it to the interviewees to pick a location. When the interviewees in my study choose the location, one wanted to meet me at the Norwegian Police University College (PHS), while the rest chose their own place of work.

To ensure the anonymity of the interviewees, each interviewee was given a classification and a random number. This will be used to refer to interviewees in the study, and at the same time secure their anonymity. The classification and references of interviewees in the text were divided into the three groups, *police officers*, *police experts* and *senior ministry officials* as described earlier in chapter 3.4. Police officers will be given the classification *PO*, police experts will be given the classification *PE* and official ministry officials will be given the classification *SMO*. I will also give each classification a number between 1-4, to differentiate the interviewees within in each group. Therefore, when quoting from an interview, it will be presented this way: “Interviewee PE-2 claims that...”. By separating the groups, it was possible to identify group specific opinions and compare them, and see if the different groups had dividing opinions internally or externally.

I did not give gender balance an explicit focus in my thesis. I believed it was more important to interview people in key position and with key knowledge than to uphold a gender balance. However, I had a representation of five women and seven men among the interviewees for my thesis. The PO group consisted of one woman and three men, the PE group one woman and three men, while the SMO group consisted of three women and one man.

Transcribing the interviews

While the interviews were an ongoing process through the summer and autumn months of 2017, I chose to wait with the transcription of the interviews. There are three reasons for this,

firstly, during the interview period I was also conducting my document analysis of the reports. I did not wish to conduct two data analysis at the same time. Secondly, I wanted to fully take advantage of the information potential of the interviews. By postponing the transcribing, I would be revisiting the interviewees after I had finished the police reports, which I present later in my methodology, and gained a better understanding of the topics. This way I would have gained a better understanding of the information provided in the interviews improving my data analysis. Thirdly, by transcribing the interviews over a short period made it easier to compare the information given and potentially discover hidden and informal mechanisms between the different levels in the hierarchy. This in turn would help focus the further analysis of the topic. The transcribed interviews consisted of 261 pages, which are the basis of the data pool for my study.

3.5 Participant observations

Denzin (1989, p. 156) define participant observations as “A commitment to adopt the perspective of those studied by sharing in their day-to-day experiences”, while Kawulich (2005) states that “Participant observation involves the researcher’s involvement in a variety of activities over an extended period of time that enable him/her to observe the cultural members in their daily lives and to participate in their activities to facilitate a better understanding of those behaviors and activities”. This describes well the part of my study where I participated in different pre-deployment training courses provided to Norwegian police officers. By participating in these courses I got good perspectives and knowledge of the police officers experiences and how training is focused during the pre-deployment training. When collecting first hand data, participant observation provides the researcher with a deeper and broader understanding of the setting that otherwise might have stayed hidden if data had been gathered through other methods. According to (Bernard 2017, p. 355) participant observation gives an intuitive understanding of what has happened. However, for practical and logistical reasons it was not possible to share the experiences of the police officers in their daily work when deployed to South Sudan and Afghanistan. Therefore, participation observation was limited to gather data from the Norwegian police officers pre-deployment

training. While I have used interviews and document analysis to gather information in regards to the police officers experiences made during deployments in South Sudan and Afghanistan.

In participant observation, the most important and hardest part is to gain access to relevant arenas to gather information (Bryman 2012). This was not so for my study. Through my position at PHS I was invited to participate in four pre-deployment courses; two Mission Specific Training courses (MST), United Nations Police officers course (UNPOC), and a supplementary course. I participated as an observer on these courses. Tjora (2017) claimed that making observations a part of your empirical data generation is often chosen based on availability and not necessary out of necessity. To start with, I did not plan to use observations in my thesis, but rather focus on interviews and document analysis for data generation. However, in many cases even a limited amount of observations might provide useful additional data (Tjora 2017). Therefore, when given the option to participate, I chose to participate based on two arguments, to use it as an introduction to the topic of Norwegian police officers in international operations and to increase my empirical data pool and knowledge.

Bernard (2017) describes participant observation as involving deception and impression to get close to people and make them comfortable with your presence. When doing so, it provides you with the possibility of collecting the data you want and provides experience based knowledge. To reach these goals, it is therefore important to gain acceptance of your presence from the group you are trying to partake in. My general experiences were that I was meet some skepticism among the other course participants based on me being an outsider approaching their turf, police work. This may be because I was neither a military nor police officer; I was “just” a civilian, as opposed to the course participants and lecturer. This is supported by Kawulich (2005) who refers to Schensul, Schensul and LeCompte (1999) that state that in the beginning researchers should expect to feel excluded. My expectation to be treated as an outsider was to a certain degree confirmed during the UNPOC course. During this course I got accepted more quickly as a member of the group by the international participants than the Norwegians. Perhaps because the international participants to a certain degree also were outsiders, as opposed to the primary group of Norwegian police officers. However, I was not excluded in talks among the participants outside the classroom. This was especially noticeable during the UNPOC course, due to its length and that we all had accommodations at the training center. As a sign of my increasing acceptance among the course participants of the UNPOC course, I was given access to discussions about the course

framework and course themes among the course participants. This way I was privileged to information which the course lecturers did not have to the same degree, as they primarily only had access to the formal feedback in the end of the course. Through discussions with the course participants I also got access to a private and more uncensored version of their thoughts, than what was provided to the course lecturers. In other words, I was granted a certain level of acceptance as an outsider, while it was obvious for both sides that I was not one of the group.

Participating in these courses provided valuable knowledge around Norwegian police officers in peacekeeping operations that eased working with my studies and made the work much more enjoyable. Not only did I get a strong introduction to the conflict in South Sudan and UN peacekeeping operations, I also got to experience the pre-deployment training Norwegian police officers get prior to deployment. In addition, I gained contacts that I later used to assist me in my thesis. One example on what I gained through my course participating was that I changed my opinion of the pre-deployment training after I had participated. I experienced a much better training program than what has been described in much of the literature I had read. This can be explained with the police increasing their pre-deployment training programs over the last years. As was also evident for the supplement course described later in this chapter, which was arranged for the first time in 2017.

Mission specific Training, 08.11.2016-09.11.2016 and 07.03.2017-08.11.2017

The first course I participated in was the Missions Specific Training (MST) course for police and military personnel deploying to UNMISS in South Sudan. The MST course was a collaboration between PHS and Norwegian Defence International Centre (NODEFIC) and lasts two days. The aims of this course, with the individual self-study, presented in the course plan (Learning goals MST UNMISS, 2016) were as follow [My translation]:

- To be aware of relevant information and the region East-Africa and South Sudan.
- To be aware of underlying reasons for the conflict in South-Sudan and the region, in addition to the dynamics in the conflict.
- To be aware of key documents and relevant information about UNMISS. Including the role of the police and the military.
- To be aware of living and housing conditions for personnel in UNMISS.

- To be aware of Norwegian interests and ongoing engagements in the region and South-Sudan.

The course had lecturers from the Norwegian MFA, PHS, NODEFIC, currently deployed police officers on leave, Norwegian military intelligence, Save the Children Norway and journalists. In other words, it was an intense and broad course giving the participants relevant country information to prepare them for deployment. What differentiated these two MST courses from the other two courses I participated in, was that the participants were from both the police and military. Both the military and police had different and separate training programs prior to the MST course. There are two reasons for this, the first reason was because the course was equally relevant for both parties deploying to UNMISS, and the second was to get acquainted and create contacts across disciplines. The latter has potentially saved Norwegian lives in South Sudan during the worst unrests in the country, which will be discussed later in the thesis.

My experiences from the two courses are different, even though they were almost identical academically. The courses were held at PHS at Majorstua, Oslo, in November 2016, and at NODEFIC at Akershus Fortrest, Oslo, in March 2017. The main difference was how I experienced my participation in the courses and what I was focused on. When I participated in the first MST course in 2016, I was fairly new to the field of police officers in international operations and South Sudan as a case country. Therefore, I very much enjoyed the learning output. The second time, I was more knowledgeable about the presented topics, as I have had more time to work with the topics and already had participated in the course once. Because I participated in the course twice, with improved knowledge, the notes taken from the second course were more detailed and informative, and presented topics in a broader context.

During the classes I chose to sit in the back and only take notes, and not interact with the rest of the participants. However, I engaged with both the lecturers and class participants in the coffee and lunch breaks. I was therefore much more than just an observer as stated by Bryman (2012).

The two MST courses helped to get an understanding of the conflict that is ongoing in South Sudan. In addition, by participating in this course, I was introduced to some of the thoughts the police and MFA had about the conflict, as both groups were lecturers during the courses. But most importantly, I was able to learn about the pre-mission training the Norwegian police officers obtain prior to deployment to South Sudan.

UNPOC 14.08.2017-25.08.2017

The UNPOC course were held at the Justice Sectors Course and Training facilities in Stavern, Norway. UNPOC is the Norwegian police officers first formal training for the participation in international operations. Troop contributing countries to UN operations are mandated to provide adequate training to police and military officers prior to deployment to ensure that they are ready to perform their assign duties upon arrival (Course information UNPOC 2017). In addition to the Norwegian police officers, there were also police officers from Finland, Colombia, Ukraine, Uganda and Kenya participating. The use of a multinational classroom helped prepare police officers to the reality in the UN operations where you have to cooperate with many different police contributing countries and police cultures. The course was fully financed by the Norwegian Police Directorate (POD).

Compared to the specialisation focus of the MST courses, the UNPOC course was designed to give the course participants a more general introduction to peacekeeping operations. Where the MST provided hands on knowledge about the operation the participants were deployed to, the UNPOC gave a general introduction to provide knowledge that was relevant to all peacekeeping operations. The UNPOC instructors and invited guest lecturers also represented a broad set of presenters. There were both national and international instructors, police officers, military officers and civilian researchers. In addition, the UNPOC lecturers presented classic classroom lecturers, and participated in group work and exercises, and trained the police officers in collaborating across nationalities.

In the classroom setting, I was sitting at the back off the classroom together with the other lecturers and took notes from the presentations, avoiding asking or answering questions as in the MST course. During the MST course I slept private and travelled back and forth to the course. This was not an option for the UNPOC course. I therefore lived and interacted with the course participators and instructors during breaks and spare time. In one case I also helped out in one of the course exercises due to illness amongst the instructors. In this case I assisted in carrying out a course exercises, together with another instructor, in the use of “language assistance”, the use of an interpreter during deployment. In other words, in accordance with Bryman (2012) concept of ethnography.

Because of the length of the course, two weeks, it was some spare time, and interaction with the other participants. Fangen (2015) states that, during long lasting field work, the researcher can create bonds of friendship with the participants, making it harder and possibly ethical questionable to use them as research objectives. This might also be relevant for my study, and I still have contact with some of the participants and lecturer. However, I concluded that this would not be of an issue for my study, as I was not there to study the course participants or lecturer, but rather the course itself. I did not perform any interviews of the participants, only informal conversations, and none of what was said during our conversations was used directly into my thesis.

Supplementary Course 28.08.2017-31.08.2017

The last course I participated in is the supplementary course to the UNPOC course. This was the first time the course was held, and was meant as a supplementary course to the Norwegian Police officers after the UNPOC course, and prior to their respective MST courses. The course was a combination of practical and theoretical parts. A part of the course was used to the fitting of equipment, medical tests and additional first aid training. The police officers were also lectured in why Norway participate with police officers in international peacekeeping operations. The course lasted four days and was held at PHS in Oslo, while the day with first aid lecturers was held at Sessvollmoen Army Camp.

Similar to the MST courses, I sat in the back of the classroom and did not interact with the other participants or lecturer during the class. Outside the classroom I interacted with the class participants and lecturers during breaks and meals, but I did not partake with any of the participants on our free time like during the UNPOC. However, as stated by Bryman (2012), this was not only observation, but also other types of interactions with the participants.

3.6 Document analysis

For my document analysis I looked at two different sources, the reports written by police offices in their deployment to NORAF and UNMISS, and other relevant formal document as for example white papers. Hence, the document sources were concerned with the same topics, but from different perspectives; from those that performed a mandate, and those that gave the mandate.

The primary advantage of using document analysis to generate empiric data is that it is a non-intrusive method. In studies of political processes such analysis is often relevant (Tjora 2017). Compared to qualitative interviews and ethnography, you do not interact with your research subjects to create information when doing a document analysis, but instead work with already created information. The documents used in document analysis are documents that were not originally created with a research purpose (Tjora 2017). Documents that has been created for research purposes are academic papers and does not fall under the data generating purpose of document analysis. Scott (1990) divides the documents for document analysis into two sub-groups, personal and official, where a personal document is those that is not classified as an official document. The use of document analysis is a common way to generate data when doing research, but the documents provides information created at a specific time and place, and are often created with specific readers in mind (Tjora 2017). This is why it is important to gather information from several sources to give a broader view of a topic by approaching it in different ways. An example is the use of quality interviews to gain a personal and maybe a more uncensored point of view of a situation. An example is, after I had interviewed a contingent leader I read reports the interviewee had produced. The information obtained was not conflicting, but during the interview I got more information and learned about some of the situations described in the reports from a different and more detailed point of view. It is therefore important to be critical when analysing documents, and consider when, where, to whom and for what purpose they were created, and in this way improve the quality of the analysis (Tjora 2017). Bryman (2012) agrees and claims that it is an issue with documents credibility and the writers bias, and that it is therefore important to approach documents with caution and treat them as the authors depiction of reality. Bryman (2012, p. 544) therefore proposes to use Scott (1990) four criteria for assessing a documents quality:

1. *Authenticity. Is the evidence genuine and of unquestionable origin?*

2. *Credibility. Is the evidence free from error and distortion?*
3. *Representativeness. Is the evidence typical of its kind, and, if not, is the extent of its untypicality known?*
4. *Meaning. Is the evidence clear and comprehensible?*

To strengthen the quality of the research, it is important to be critical of the sources. Through the use of Scott (1990) four criteria, and the consideration of the questions asked by Tjora (2017), documents used for the researchers document analysis has been given a thorough evaluation and analysis to ensure quality in the research.

However, document analysis is a strong tool together with other data generating methods, especially when working with official documents. Official documents will represent the official intention of an action, while interviews will represent the interviewee's memories, experiences and reflections of the same action (Tjora 2017). The combination of these two will give a broader data pool which in turn will turn into a more nuanced case analysis (Tjora 2017).

Police reports

It is important to separate reports written by contingency leaders in the field and official governmental white paper, because they are written by different institutions for different purposes, and should therefore be regarded differently. White papers, are official documents representing the governments point of view on a particular case, whereas the police reports are unofficial documents representing a contingency leaders point of view or understanding of a situation. It is therefore particularly important to adhere to the precautions presented by Tjora (2017) and Bryman (2012) presented in the introduction to this subchapter, to ensure the quality of the document analysis. However, by being aware of the purpose of the document and who the author is, and to who the document is written, it might be possible to reveal additional and unformal mechanisms during the analysis.

To start with, it seemed difficult to gain access to police reports. It was difficult to know whom to contact to get granted access to the documents. Luckily, I got in contact with a police officer at my second MST course that was able to assist in getting permission from the right people. I was allowed to sit at the Norwegian Police Directorate (POD) and work with

the reports there. The reports were not classified, but on a general basis unavailable to the public, and therefore have some security measures attached to their use, to avoid further distribution. The limited access to the reports not being able to make copies or bring them out of POD, meant that I had to take comprehensive notes to ensure that I got all information needed. However, these reports were not classified, therefore, using them as sources for my thesis does not pose an issue in regards to making the thesis public after its acceptance.

For the UNMISS/UNMIS reports I started with the monthly reports from UNMIS June 2010 to get some of the background information for UNMISS, and to gain information of the situation also prior to the establishment of the South Sudan state. Until January 2014 I looked at every second report. This was done because the reports varied little from report to report in this period and to save time. In October 2014, the reports were changed from a monthly structure to a quarterly structure, meaning four reports each year instead of twelve. This change was presumably done because the reports at times were repetitive and because more urgent actions were communicated through other channels. All together I was left with 50 pages of notes from the UNMISS/UNMIS reports.

The NORAF reports were handled different than the UNMISS/UNMIS reports, both out of necessity and because the situation in Afghanistan was more unstable than in South Sudan. The reports I have analysed starts from January 2006 and written monthly until the end of operation in June 2012. Norway has had a police presence in Afghanistan since 2003, however, the reports prior to January 2006 has not been included in the new digital archive at POD, and would therefore have demanded a lot of extra work to gain access to, which were not possible for my thesis. Compared to the reports from UNMISS, I chose to read every report from NORAF and not just every second report. This was because the situation in NORAF was much more unstable, and because it was a bilateral, not a multilateral project, it was more a subject to Norwegian national policies and political wishes than UNMISS. Small and large changes would happen over a shorter period of time, and there were a closer dialog between the Norwegian contingent responsible for the reports and the Norwegian policy makers. Because the political actions of the Norwegian government are of importance to my thesis, it was therefore natural to analyse the NORAF reports with extra scrutiny. In addition, the situation was the same as for the UNMISS reports, that I had to take extra thorough notes to avoid having to return back to POD for extra analysis. I therefore ended up with 107 pages with notes from the NORAF reports. Totalling 157 pages of notes from both the UNMISS and NORAF reports.

Official white papers

The white papers studied, can be divided into three different levels or types. The first type of documents is the documents created by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) for either external or internal use. Examples of this is the MFA's framework and guidelines for SSR efforts adopted 2014/2015 or the MFA's framework for Norwegian efforts in vulnerable states and regions. The second type of documents are official documents presented by the Norwegian Government. Examples of this is the Soria Moria agreements created by the Stoltenberg first and second government that were a cooperation between the Labour party (AP), Centre Party (SP) and the Socialist Left Party (SV). The third kind of documents are official documents by the UN, examples of this is the Security Resolution 1325 – Landmark resolution on Women, Peace and Security (OSAGI 2000) or the Department of Peacekeeping operations guidelines on Police Capacity-Building and Development (United Nations Police 2015).

3.7 Qualitative analysis

The aim of using a qualitative analysis approach is to try to establish underlying themes in the materials being analysed (Bryman 2012). These underlying themes I wish to establish will be used as arguments for answering my research questions. When working with these themes, it is important to be well organized to avoid personal bias by the researcher. The most common method for that is the technique called coding. The goals with coding are three-fold:

“... (1) to extract the essence in the empirical material, (2) to reduce materials volume, and last, but not least (3) to facilitate for idea generation on the basis of details in the empirical data. By rendering an inductive empirical coding it is possible to reduce the influence of different expectations and theories that every researcher more or less explicitly will bring with him into the analysis (also known as “gut feeling”)” (Tjora 2017, p. 196 [My translation]).

The data analysis in this thesis was conducted into two separate processes, the concept of coding to is explained below. The first part will focus on analysing documents, while the second part will focus on analysing interviews. This separation was done to *triangulate* findings and not mix primary and secondary data.

Document analysis

To analyse the official documents to establish the Norwegian foreign policy, both public documents and documents with restricted public access, I adopted the technique created by Barry A. Turner and presented in Bryman (2012). This technique is a form of Qualitative Content Analysis where the aim is to select and collect different themes of relevance from a text (Bryman 2012). Turner labelled cards with different themes he found interesting, with a reference to the source, while analysing official documents, and then added references to other paragraphs and texts that mentioned the same theme (Bryman 2012). In my study I did the same, except I did not use cards, but rather a dedicated document. This document contained the information collected from all the official documents that were analysed, and was divided into topic chapters and sub-chapters. These chapters represent general groupings of themes and the sub-chapters represent themes correlate to Turners labels of his cards. This document looked similar to my advanced study outline to make it easier to sort my findings into a context relevant for my study goals.

It is important to keep in mind when analysing documents, especially the field reports, that they might be biased based on the writers own point of view or perception of the reality. In addition, reports might be glamourized (Osland 2017a) or changed, so it does not backfire on the author (Kleiven 2012). Bryman (2012) supports this by referencing Atkinson and Coffey (2011) who underlines the importance of acknowledging the context a document has been written and for whom, and that documents are created to deliver an impression favourable to the authors and those they represent. In addition, to reduce author bias it is important to use several sources and look to the original source when possible. This is to avoid an author's intentional or unintentional agenda, and focus and point of view in their personal interpretation.

When analysing the data created by my document analysis, the following checklist presented by Bryman (2012, p. 561-562) was considered to enhance the interpretation and acknowledge potential bias by the document author(s):

- *Who produced the document?*
- *Why was the document produced?*
- *Was the person or group that produced the document in a position to write authoritatively about the subject or issue?*
- *Is the material genuine?*
- *Did the person or group have an axe to grind and if so can you identify a particular slant?*
- *Is the document typical of its kind and if not is it possible to establish how untypical it is and in what ways?*
- *Is the meaning of the document clear?*
- *Can you corroborate the events or accounts presented in the document?*
- *Are there different interpretations of the document from the one you offer and if so what are they and why have you discounted them?*

Interview analysis

The interview analysis was based on the same concept as the document analysis, namely the collection of information under relevant themes for answering the research questions. The reason why I did not use the more traditional coding analysis technique was primarily based on two arguments connected to the interview framework. First, because the interviews had an exploratory nature the interviews were predominantly semi-formal, borderline to informal, to allow the interviewee to elaborate around the topics. This was due to the nature of the topic and the necessity to shed some light on little discussed topics, and that the interviews were not primarily conducted to compare interviewee answers with each other. It is also important to keep in mind that in qualitative research the question of whether or not a case is representative for a group or situation is not relevant, because this is not possible to test in a statistical sense (Bryman 2012). The second reason was to simplify the process of comparing the document analysis with the interview analysis. By having the same structure, with chapter and sub-

chapters, in the documents analysis and interview analysis, it was easier to find matching or mismatching information that could be explored further.

The inability of qualitative research to be conclusive for a group as a whole, will not be a problem for my ability to fulfil my problem statement and research objectives. The reason for this is that I am conducting an exploratory research that attempt to introduce new information to a field that is new and previously minimally explored in a small-state context, as Norway is.

As with the document analysis, it is also important to ask questions to strengthen the interview analysis. Some questions I have actively used through the analytic process to be aware of bias in the statements of the interviewees. These are: Does the interviewee have something to gain by answering in that way? What position did the person have during the period of time we are discussing in the interview? What position is the person currently holding, and how might that affect the interview? Does the interviewee carry certain resentment towards individuals or people, or from the period in question?

There will not be a specific analysis of the ethnography, as this primarily function as an additional source of information to my basic knowledge to the topics, and did not provide directly relevant information to help me answer my research statement and objectives.

3.8 Ethical considerations

When comparing qualitative and quantitative work, it might be a large difference when it comes to ethical issues. Because of the framework surrounding qualitative research methods, the researcher often gets much closer to the research subjects through interviews and observations (Tjora 2017). Bryman (2012) referred to Diener and Crandall (1978) when highlighting four reoccurring issues when it comes to ethical considerations in social sciences: *harm to participants, lack of informed consent, invasion of privacy and deception of the participants*. While, Tjora (2017) presents trust, confidentiality, respect and reciprocity as important aspects to the communication between the researcher and research subjects and contacts. They both highlight one key element that has been important in my study; that the

most important thing when generating empirical data is not gather data but to preserve the wellbeing of my research subjects. Below I will present how I approached this concept when gathering data.

Interviews

When conducting my interviews it was important to ensure informed consent from my interviewees. Tjora (2017) emphasizes the importance of gaining an informed consent prior to starting an interview and recording it, underlying this is also to provide information to the interviewee as to how the recordings will be handled. Berg (1998, p. 47) defines informed consent as “...the knowing consent of individuals to participate as an exercise of their choice, free from any element of fraud, deceit, duress, or similar unfair inducement or manipulation”. To ensure that you have the informed consent of the interviewees is a key tool to ensure a high ethical standard to your research.

To ensure that I had an informed consent from my interviewees I both got a written and oral consent. When planning and setting up interviews with my research subjects, this was done through the use of emails, I also asked for their permission to record the interviews. This was in turn repeated when I met the interviewees; and got the confirmation that they were comfortable with the recording of the interview. Through this process I got both a written and oral confirmation of the interviewee’s consent. In addition, the interviewees were informed that the recordings would be destroyed after I had transcribed the interviews into a written format.

As explained earlier in the qualitative interview sub-chapter, each of my interviewees was anonymised by changing their names with a classification. For my own use, I have a handwritten document with the interviewees classification. However, I am the only one with access to this document, which has been kept separate from the transcribed and previously recorded interviews. To add an additional level of security to my interviewee’s anonymity, I operated with different classifications during the period I was gathering information and transcribed interviews compared to what is used in this thesis. The original classification used during the collection of information phase of my thesis was destroyed after I had created the new classification list used in the thesis.

I have kept notes from interviews to a minimum to avoid the possibility of recognition of my interviewees. In addition, upon the request of the interviewees, or if I believe there is a chance that they can be recognized when referring to an interview, they will be contacted by email to be given the option to deny the use of particular quotes or parts. In other words, controlling their informed consent. This is of great importance for me as a researcher, because some interviewees touched upon sensitive information when answering my question, while other emphasised the importance of not being quoted on some of their answers.

Because of a slightly different focus of my master thesis than what I started off with, I contacted some of the interviewees that I had interviewed early in the process to get their additional consent to use their interview. This was done because their original consent could have been interpreted as given under false conditions. Everyone gave their consent for me to still use their interview.

Participant observation

During my observations of the different training courses the course responsible person introduced me as a master student collecting information for the thesis, and that I was there to participate with the rest of the participants to study the course. Tjora (2017) is referring to NESH (1999) when proposing that as a main rule a research activity should not start prior to the participant's informed consent. But as Bryman (2012, p. 154) states: "The boundaries between ethical and unethical practices are not clear cut." In my data collection this might be the question, given that the course participants did not have the option not partake in my observations, because the courses were mandatory on their part. However, after a personal evaluation I concluded that I did not breach my ethical obligations as a researcher. The main argument for this was that I were not there to observe the individual students or lecturers, but rather to evaluate the courses as a training concept and to gather knowledge on pre-deployment training through participating in them myself rather than through secondary-sources. The second argument was that all the courses were placed under the "Chatham House Rule". Chatham House Rule means that "... participants are free to use the information they receive, but neither the identity or affiliation to the speakers, and other participants, can be disclosed" (NORAD 2011 [My translation]). I do not refer to any particular individuals, students or lecturers, when using the data collected through the observations from the courses.

Document analysis

As stated earlier, document analysis is a “non-intrusive” way of generating data. Therefore, it was not an ethical concern with gaining informed consent. However, I have chosen to avoid repeating the names of the participants of the Norwegian contingency and the report writers, contingency leaders, and other personal data. This decision was because these names were provided under the presumption that the documents would be only used as an information channel from the field back to POD, the Norwegian MFA, the Justice department and other relevant actors. In other words it was meant, to be inaccessible to the general public and not a key source of information for a master thesis.

There is also a question of intentional or unintentional bias by the author of documents. These are important to acknowledge when working with the documents. However, I have already presented this topic in the sub-chapter about document analysis.

Chapter 4 - Norway's commitments and goals when contributing police officers to international operations.

In order to understand Norway's commitments in UNMISS and NORAF it is important to look at Norway's international commitments and goals that have created the basis for the framework for Norway's police contribution to these operations. Major organizations as UN and NATO are based on different systems, and Norway's commitments are based on international treaties, laws and agreements. These international commitments have been important for Norway's participation in the multilateral operations in South Sudan, UNMISS, and the bilateral police project in Afghanistan, NORAF. In my study, I have focused on international treaties as the basis for understanding Norway's commitments, while Norway's foreign policy interests shaped Norway's goals, when participating in international operations.

4.1 Norway's commitments to UN

The UN and Norway have a strong associated history since the UN was established in 1945, which is evidenced by the Norwegian Trygve Lie being elected as the first secretary general of UN (FN-Sambandet 2017b). Since then, the UN has been a fundamental cornerstone in Norway's foreign policy, and Norway is a loyal supporter of the organization (Interviewee SMO-2), since Norway's first participation in an UN operation in 1949 (FN-Sambandet 2017b). Not only do Norway have a long history in the UN, but Norway also have a genuine strong national feeling of commitment and believe in UN as the most important worldwide multilateral organization that can help to solve international problems through the organizations three pillars (Interviewee PE-4). These three pillars that UN is built on; human rights, peace and security, and development (UN.org 2015), are fields that match well with Norwegian values of equality and human rights, and what Norway has focused on in their foreign policy (Interviewee PO-1).

Like the other member states of the UN, Norway's commitments to the UN are based on voluntary signed treaties and conventions (Interviewee PE-2). However, there is one commitment that is obligatory for members to sign, namely the UN charter that states in article 4, 1: "Membership in the United Nations is open to all other peace-loving states which accepts the obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the judgment of the Organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations" (United Nations 1945, p. 4). Norway as one of the founding nations signed the Charter 26. June, 1945 and implemented the Charter into the Norwegian legislation 27. November, 1945 (Lovdata 2017a). Based on the outputs from the search engine at Lovdata (2017b), the UN Charter is the only treaty between Norway and the UN that is relevant for my thesis because it regulates international peace and participation in international operations.

The UN Charter currently consists of 111 articles. Six of these are particularly relevant for my study; article 25, article 39, article 41, article 42, article 48,1, and article 51. Article 39 states that "The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security" (United Nations 1945, p. 9). Article 39 is the basis for why Norway, and other member states, participates in international peacekeeping operations, both with police, military and civilian staff, and resources.

If the Security Council has decided that there is a threat to international peace they have two primary tools based on article 41 and 42. Article 41 calls upon the use of *soft powers* through non-military powers to enforce article 39. However, if the UN Security Council decides that the use of soft power is not enough to enforce their resolutions of security international peace, they can use article 42. Article 42, as opposed to article 41, calls on "... action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security" (United Nations 1945, p. 9). These are the articles that create the basis for the Security Council to take actions when there is a threat to international peace.

But why should the UN member states do as the Security Council decides? We can find the answer for this in article 25 and 48.1. Article 25 states that "The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter" (United Nations 1945, p. 7). It is this article that enforces the Security Council's decisions upon the UN members and forces the UN's members to follow the rulings of the Security Council. However, it is article 48,1 that commonly is used as a basis for

Norway, and other members, participation in peacekeeping operations, which states: “The action required to carry out the decisions of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security shall be taken by all the Members of the United Nations or by some of them, as the Security Council may determine (United Nations 1945, p. 10).”

Even though the UN is the agreed upon responsible actor for maintaining international peace by most nations, individual states has the right to defend themselves until the UN has taken actions as to re-establish international peace and security. Article 51 states that: “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security” (United Nations 1945, p. 10-11). In other words, the UN Charter acknowledges every state’s right to self-defence, but it emphasises that the responsibility for maintaining international peace and security lies with the UN Security Council, and nothing shall interfere with this work.

4.2 Norway’s commitments to NATO

As for the UN, Norway was one of the founding nations of NATO which was established by 12 nations, and Norway has been an active contributor to the organization since the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty on 4. April 1949 (Norway.no 2017). The North Atlantic Treaty was implemented into the Norwegian legislation through a royal resolution 12. May 1949 (Lovdata 2017c), making its 14 articles legally binding commitments.

Among the 14 articles in the North Atlantic Treaty, article 5 and 7 are of particular relevance for my study objectives. Article 5 is the basis for NATO as a defence alliance and states: “The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area” (NATO 2016). An interesting part, but not so often

spoken of, is that Article 5 also state that: “Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security” (NATO 2016). What this means is that even though NATO is a regional defence alliance with 29 members (NATO 2017c), it will fall back on the authority of the UN Security Council, and respects the UN as the key global multilateral organization to ensure global peace and security.

This is underlined in the North Atlantic Treaty Article 7 that states: “This Treaty does not affect, and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations under the Charter of the Parties which are members of the United Nations, or the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security” (NATO 2016). Through Article 7 NATO’s position internationally is strengthened and easier to understand. NATO is a supplementary organization to UN for the NATO members to further ensure their own security. The basis for the North Atlantic Treaty is the UN Charter, as underlined in the introduction to the North Atlantic Treaty that states: “The parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations ...” (NATO 2016). In addition, Article 7 underlines that the Security Council is the de facto global organ for peace and security. This way, NATO is an organisation that works as a supplement to the UN, for selected members, and not a competing organization. It is worth noting that three out of the five permanent members of the Security Council (the US, the UK and France) (United Nations Security Council 2017a), were also among the 12 founding states of NATO (NATO 2017b). This may explain the strong bonds between NATO and the UN.

4.3 Norway’s commitments and goals when participating with police officers in UNMISS

UN article 41 present the none violent steps for the UN to attempt to re-establish international peace and security. An example of the use of article 41 was the UNs sanctions against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan in the early months of 2001 (United Nations 2001). These sanctions were used to enforce Security Council resolution 1267 calling on Afghanistan to stop harboring and training terrorist organizations and to hand over Usama bin Laden after the

bombings of the United States embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania (Security Council 1999). Another example of the use of article 41 was the continuation of the UN Department of Political Affairs (DPA), Special Mission in Afghanistan (UNSMIA), until it was replaced by the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) in 2002 (Security Council 2002).

However, when the Security Council decides that article 41 is not enough to re-establish international peace and security, the Security Council can decide on an article 42 operations instead. Whereas article 41 operations often are led by the UN department of Political Affairs (DPA), article 42 is led by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). An example of the DKPO operation is UNMISS, in South Sudan (UNMISS 2017d). UNMISS was established 9. July 2011 as a response to the establishment of the Republic of South Sudan as an independent state from Sudan, and was tasked with consolidating peace and security, and assisting with development. UNMISS originally consisted of 7,000 military and 900 civilian police personnel (Security Council 2011).

The article 48,1 in the UNs Charter (United Nations 1945) and Security Resolution 1996 (Security Council 2011) are the basis for the Norwegian commitments made to the UN, that shapes the basis for why the Norwegian MFA has decided to keep supporting UNMISS with 18 police officers in 2017 (Det Kongelige Utenriksdepartement 2017). However, UN peacekeeping operations are based on voluntary contributions from its member states (FN-Sambandet 2017b). Because the UN cannot force a country to participate in a peacekeeping operation, member states can choose which operation they will participate in. For Norway, it is seen as almost a duty to support the UN (Interviewee SMO-3), and Norway is committed in all three of the UN pillars. But because Norway is a small state, it has limited possibilities of participation and therefore prioritize where to commit its resources. These decisions of participation are not primarily made on binding commitments made to the UN, but rather what is within Norway's foreign and security political interests (Interviewee SMO-3). Even though Norway might be among the most conscientious members of the UN (Interviewee PE-2), participation in peacekeeping operations is voluntary. This means that Norway also can pursue foreign policy goals in relations to status, while sustaining the commitments made to the UN.

Not only can Norway pursue foreign policy goals related to status, but Norway can also seek economic goals. An example of this is the arguments for why Norway officially got engaged in the Sudan/South Sudan civil war: "Sudan contributed in the 1990's to destabilize the

region, something that also threatened Norwegian policy and economic interests” (Regjeringen.no 2013b [My translation]). It might be a goal in itself to participate in UNMISS and show solidarity to a country in need and the UN as an organization. But the official goals show that Norway also has additional goals to participate in UNMISS, rather than just fulfilling its responsibilities as a member of the UN. One of my interviewees sums it up: “But at the same time it is not only, to put it bluntly, to be nice, but because we have an interest in the region connected to the resources that lies there” (Interviewee PE-2). This is an example that Norway can maintain its status by projecting itself as a peace nation and upholding its commitments to the UN, while also pursuing alternative goals. In other words, Norway might have at least three goals for participating in South Sudan; to uphold its status as a peace nation by contributing to UN led peacekeeping operations, economical goals and to maintain its unique status within South Sudan (see chapter 5.1).

4.4 Norway’s commitments and goals with NORAF

The goals and commitments for the Norwegian bilateral police contribution to Afghanistan, NORAF, are established in the document: “Agreement between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Norway and the Interior Ministry of the Transitional Government of Afghanistan regarding the Norwegian contribution to the rebuilding of the Afghanistan police force as Part of the Stability Pact for Afghanistan” signed 09. March 2003 (Den Kongelige Norske Ambassade Kabul 2003). The document secures the immunity of Norwegian police officers to Afghan law and defines the activities of Norwegian personnel as: “1. Advising the Afghan authorities on the establishment of an Afghan police force which is bound by rule-of-law principles and respect for human rights, and on combating drug cultivation, drug processing and drug trafficking” and “2. Assisting the training of Afghan police recruits, other police personnel, and personnel of other Afghan Law enforcement institutions, in light of the principles set out in point 1” (Den Kongelige Norske Ambassade Kabul 2003, p. 3). This document establishes the formal commitments Norway made bilaterally with the Afghan government with regard to the NORAF project. However, Norway’s bilateral police contribution to Afghanistan was not an independent occurring operation. It must be seen together with the overall military and civilian Norwegian presence

in Afghanistan. This point of view was emphasized by a senior official at the Norwegian MFA: “In my point of view, the police efforts in Afghanistan must first and foremost be seen in the light of the fact that there was gradually a need for wide-ranging involvement in many sectors – in addition to the military efforts in Afghanistan” (Personal email received 02.10.2017 [My translation]). By seeing the contribution made through NORAF to Afghanistan as a part of the overall Norwegian military and civilian presence in Afghanistan, Norway’s commitments to the UN and NATO, through the UN Charter and the North Atlantic Treaty, must be acknowledge.

As with the UN, NATO is a fundamental cornerstone in Norway’s foreign policy (Interviewee SMO-2). To maintain Norway’s good relations to the US and ensuring NATO’s relevance have been a central part of the Norwegian security policy goals since the establishment of NATO (NOU 2016: 8 2016). NATO’s importance to the Norwegian foreign policy is summed up by Anne Helene Rui (Norwegian Labour Party) in a debate in the Norwegian parliament in 2000 when they discussed reforming the Norwegian Army towards participation in international operations. She argued that: “As a NATO-alliance country it is important that we in Norway continue the engagement we have, and have had in many years, in international operations. If we expect help if we should need it, we have to show continuous solidarity ability to help others when they need it” (Stortinget 2000 [My translation]). Norway’s chance to show solidarity to the NATO-alliance came already the year after Rui’s statement in the Norwegian parliament.

Twelfth of September 2001, NATO agreed that the terror attacks against the US the day before, 11. September 2001, had activated Article 5 in the North Atlantic Treaty and all members of NATO were obligated to assist US (Regjeringen.no 2012), to “...restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area” (NATO 2016). The validity of invading Afghanistan in an attempt to restore international security in the North Atlantic area was funded by the Security Council already in 1998 and 1999. This was done through two Resolutions that established that the Taliban was assisting international terror which in turn caused a threat to the international peace and security. This is evident in Security Council resolution 1214 which states: “Demands also that the Taliban stop providing sanctuary and training for international terrorists and their organizations, and that all Afghan factions cooperate with efforts to bring indicted terrorists to justice” (Security Council 1998).

And security Council resolution 1267 which states:

“Strongly condemning the continuing use of Afghan territory, especially areas controlled by the Taliban, for the sheltering and training of terrorists and planning of terrorist acts, and reaffirming its conviction that the suppression of international terrorism is essential for the maintenance of international peace and security,

Deploring the fact that the Taliban continues to provide safe haven to Usama bin Laden and to allow him and others associated with him to operate a network of terrorist training camps from Taliban-controlled territory and to use Afghanistan as a base from which to sponsor international terrorists operations” (Security Council 1999).

The Security Council resolution 1267 demanded that Taliban handed over Usama bin Laden. This means that already years prior to the attacks on 11. September, the Security Council had agreed that terrorism, and especially Usama bin Laden, was a threat towards international peace and security and established that Taliban was supporting and provided assistance to a terrorist organization.

As with NATO, The Security Council also convened on the 12. September 2001. Here the Security Council agreed to Resolution 1368 that reaffirms that terrorism is a threat to international peace and security and the right of individual or collective self-defence. An especially interesting part of resolution 1368 is paragraph 5 that state that the Security Council: “Expresses its readiness to take all necessary steps to respond to the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, and to combat all forms of terrorism, in accordance with its responsibilities under the Charter of the United Nations” (Security Council 2001a). Based on these Security Resolutions, US with its NATO partners actions were backed up by Security Council resolutions and were within their right, based on international understandings, to invade the Taliban controlled state of Afghanistan as a response to the terrorists acts by Usama bin Laden that activated of Article 5 after the 11. September 2001 attacks.

The operation was named “Operation Enduring Freedom”, and Norway initially supported the operation with special operations soldiers, transport planes, F16 fighter jets and mine clearing teams (Regjeringen.no 2012). Through this contribution, Norway upheld its commitments to the US through the implementation of North Atlantic Treaty, Article 5, without being in conflict with any of the articles in the UN Charter. Norway’s contribution to Operation Enduring Freedom lasted until January 2006 (NOU 2016: 8 2016). However, Norway maintained its presence in Afghanistan, and is still today (2017) present through their contribution to the NATO led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).

Fifth of December 2001, the “Agreement on provisional arrangements in Afghanistan pending the re-establishment of permanent government institutions”, more commonly known as the Bonn agreement, was signed (Security Council 2001b). The Bonn agreement “... request the United Nations Security Council to consider authorizing the early deployment to Afghanistan of a United Nations mandated Force” (UN.org 2001). Through Security Council resolution 1386, the request made by the Bonn agreement was fulfilled, and ISAF was established, and per request, the UK was put in command (Security Council 2001b). However, NATO took over control over ISAF in august 2003 after a request from the Secretary General of the UN (Regjeringen.no 2012).

In addition to fulfilling the commitments made bilaterally to the Afghan Government, the UN and NATO, Norway’s participation in Afghanistan was structured around three goals: “To show solidarity and offer support to the US, and contribute to secure NATO’s relevance. The second goal was to contribute to avoiding that Afghanistan became a breeding ground for international terror. The third goal was to contribute to building a stable and democratic Afghan state through long-term aid and support to a peaceful solution to the conflict” (NOU 2016: 8 2016, p. 17 [My translation]). The first goal can be understood as a direct search for status through bilaterally supporting US wishes and multilaterally through securing NATO’s power and Norway’s relevance within the organization. NORAF’s training of the Afghan National Police (ANP) can be argued as a step towards the fight to avoid international terror based in Afghanistan. But NORAF’s training of ANP can be understood as a direct consequence of the third goal, because it is important to have a functioning justice sector to ensure a long-lasting democracy within a state. NORAF as a part of the overall Norwegian effort in Afghanistan, we can see the overall Norwegian goals in Afghanistan as also being the goals of NORAF and to a certain degree, NORAF have worked towards reaching all these three goals, in varying degree of success.

4.5 Commitments to UNMISS vs NORAF

When we compare the commitments and goals of the police contribution to UNMISS and NORAF, it is easier to get an overview of the commitments relevant to Norway’s participation to UNMISS, than the commitments relevant to NORAF. In UNMISS the

Norwegian police officers dispatched to the UN and is placed under UN command and control. In other words, the commitments for UNMISS is to primary take part in the operation, not what actually happened on the ground in South Sudan. This differs from Norway's police presence in Afghanistan, because the police are not dispatched to a multilateral organization, but a Norwegian bilateral project. In other words, the commitments in Afghanistan are not limited to just sending Norwegian police officers to participate in a multilateral organization, because NORAF was a bilateral engagement between Norway and Afghanistan. In addition, understanding the commitments surrounding the Norwegian police contribution to Afghanistan becomes furthered complicated by the fact that NORAF cannot be understood as only a bilateral commitment between Norway and Afghanistan. Instead Norway's police contribution to Afghanistan must to be seen as a part of the total Norwegian presence in Afghanistan. Therefore, to understand the commitments in relation to the Norwegian police contribution to Afghanistan, one also needs to acknowledge the multilateral agreements and commitments between Norway and the UN, and Norway and NATO.

UNMISS is based on an article 42 mandate by the UN Security Council and is led by the UN DPKO. ISAF is also based on an article 42 mandate by the UN Security Council, but it has one fundamental difference, it is not led by the DPKO, instead the Security Council gave the responsibility first to the UK and later NATO. As opposed to the DPKO led operation in South Sudan, UNMISS, the Security Council just mandated the establishment of a force to provide it juridical backing and international legitimacy. ISAF's legitimacy, through being based on a UN mandate, is shown by the contributing countries. Even though ISAF is a NATO led operation, 50 countries contributed to the ISAF even though NATO only have 29 members, which means that more than a fourth of the UN members were contributing to the operation, underlining the operations legitimacy (Regjeringen.no 2012).

In South Sudan, Norway only participate in one multilateral operation in the country to uphold its international commitments, UNMISS. But in Afghanistan there were different multilateral operations to participate in to uphold its commitments to the UN Charter and the North Atlantic Treat. In addition to participating in ISAF, and that way uphold Norway's commitments to the UN and NATO, Norway also participated in UNAMA and Operation Enduring Freedom. By participating in UNAMA, Norway upheld its commitments to the UN, but when Norway contributed to Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, Norway also upheld its commitments to Article 5 in the North Atlantic Treaty, Article 51 in the UN

Charter, and showed support to the US. In other words, Afghanistan had and still has many different organizations and actors operating in the country. This makes mapping out and understanding Norway's commitments when participating with police officers in Afghanistan a more complicated process than understanding the commitments when participating with police officers in UNMISS.

It is also important to note that Norway's police contribution to both these international operations is a civilian contribution, as opposed to the military presence Norway has in both South Sudan and Afghanistan. Norwegian participation in international operations is financed through what is called: Security Sector Reform and Peace operations (Interviewee SMO-3), found under chapter 164. Peace, Reconciliation and Democracy in the Norwegian MFA budget (Statsbudsjettet.no 2017). The important thing is that chapter 164 in the budget for the Norwegian MFA falls under program area 03 international aid (Statsbudsjettet.no 2017). In other words, Norwegian police participation in international operations is by definition a form of Norwegian development assistance, founded by the Norwegian MFA. In other words, contributing with Norwegian police officers to these two operations must be understood as civilian development assistance to uphold the international commitments Norway has made through international agreed upon treaties.

Chapter 5 - Norway's police contribution to South Sudan, UNMISS, and Afghanistan, NORAF.

To evaluate Norway's participating in South Sudan and Afghanistan, it is important to have a good understand of how these operations were established, how they developed and how they were terminated. This will be covered in chapter 5.1 and chapter 5.2. In addition, it is important to understand the framework that shape the international operations that Norwegian police is participating in. I will therefore, in chapter 5.3, present and discuss selected factors that influence the framework to the Norwegian police officers that has participated in UNMISS and NORAF.

5.1 The development of UNMISS and the Norwegian police contribution

Norway's and South Sudan's common history

Norway has a long history of civilian aid and contribution to South Sudan and Sudan. The Norwegian NGO, Norwegian Church Aid, has been present in South Sudan and Sudan since 1973, and has created a strong inter-church network between the countries (Hernæs 2016). Another important Norwegian NGO in Sudan/South Sudan is the Norwegian People's Aid, that has been present in the region since 1986, and is among the largest aid organizations in the country (Norsk Folkehjelp 2017). Norwegian People's aid became known as the SPLA/Ms (Sudan People's Liberation Army/Movement) most loyal partner in the period prior to South Sudan's independence, and the work they did, together with other NGO's, under extreme conditions during the war is why Norway has a good reputation in South Sudan (Regjeringen.no 2013c). The good standing for Norway and Norwegians created by these NGOs in South Sudan, and their networks, have given Norway a status in the country far above what Norway's population size should indicates. Even though the Norwegian aid has become relatively smaller over the last years due to an increased USAID presence in the

country, Norwegian People's Aid was the largest non-governmental employer in the country prior to the civil war outbreak in 2013, making a Norwegian flag on people's cloths or their cars a positive signature anywhere in South Sudan (Interviewee SMO-4).

Thanks to the long and hard work done by Norwegian NGO's, Norway is now to be considered among the top three most influential countries in South Sudan, and we are a part of the Troika group (Interviewee SMO-1). The Troika group came together to organize a donor conference in Oslo in 2005 (Regjeringen.no 2013b) and consists of the US, the UK and Norway, and is among the most influential organizations in South Sudan. This is evidenced by the Troika's joint statement with the EU (U.S. Department of State 2017), that the parties currently in conflict in South Sudan calls on the assistance of the Troika to help them to meet and discuss the ongoing situation (UNMISS Fourth Quarter 2016). Further, the Secretary General of the UN's praised the Troikas work with the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) (UN.org 2005). One of my interviewees explains how Norway is able to stay relevant in the Troika, together with the presumably more relevant states, the UK and the US: "The reason for why we are a relevant partner is because we have information they do not have, even with their large administration. This is because we have a different network then they have. They have a formal network and a large intelligence network, while we have our informal contacts, through inter alia, humanitarian organization, aid organizations and because of our long presence in the country compared to the others" (Interviewee SMO-4). Norway's relevance is confirmed by the Norwegian government that has stated that: "Norway has trust and access to central groups both in the North and the South. This makes us seem as a relevant dialog partner" (Regjeringen.no 2013b).

Norwegian authorities have played an important part in the Troika, the African Union (AU) and the UN, through many years and have played a key role in development, humanitarian and peace assistance through making South Sudan a priority state for assistance through both economically and competence (Hernæs 2016). Norway played a key part through the peace process and signed the peace agreement as a witness, and was responsible for arranging the donor conference for South Sudan in 2005, confirming Norway's key position (Regjeringen.no 2013b). To further underline Norway's position in South Sudan, the first SRSG (Special Representative of the Secretary General) of UNMISS, Hilde Frafjord Johnsen, was a Norwegian politician that had been heavily engaged in the peace process in 2005 (Øyvind Grosvold & Berit Rekaa 2011). An expert in Norway-UN relations confirmed to me

that the appointment of Johnsen as the first leader of UNMISS was directly linked to Norway's efforts in South Sudan (Personal email received 06.11.2017).

Establishment of UNMISS and South Sudan

Since South Sudan/Sudan gained its independence in 1956 from Egypt and the UK, 41 out of 57 years has been filled by civil war (NORAD 2017b). It has been estimated that about 2,000,000 people died and 4,000,000 became Internally Displaced People (IDP's) during the civil war (Regjeringen.no 2013b). The peace process started 9. January 2005 with the signing of the CPA between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) (UNMISS 2017a). The CPA scheduled a referendum for January 2011, where 98.83% of the participants voted for the independence for South Sudan (UNMISS 2017a). The demand for 60% participation in the election was reached with a strong margin (UNMIS January 2011). On the 8. July 2011, the Security Council passed Resolution 1996 (2011) that welcomed the establishment of the Republic of South Sudan on the 9 July 2011 as an independent state, and established the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (Security Council 2011).

The Security Council decided that UNMISS would consist of up to 7,000 military personnel and 900 civilian personnel, and decided that the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) should start its orderly liquidation and transfer its staff and resources to the newly established UNMISS (Security Council 2011). Norway already had police officers working in UNMIS, in other words, Norway has had a police presence in UNMISS since it was established in 2011. The original mandate of UNMISS "...was to support the Government in peace consolidation and thereby fostering longer-term state building and economic development; assist the Government in exercising its responsibilities for conflict prevention, mitigation, and resolution and protect civilians; and help the authorities in developing capacity to provide security, establishing the rule of law, and strengthening the security and justice sectors in the country" (UNMISS 2017c). This meant that the Norwegian police officers together with the colleges from other countries would be tasked with training the SSPS (South Sudan Police Services) as a part of strengthening security services in South Sudan (UNMISS 2011). Some of the development and training projects the Norwegian police officers partook in towards the SSPS was community base policing strategy development (UNMIS January 2011), certifying

drivers to reduce accidents and crime (UNMIS April 2011), training 800 SSPS recruits in human rights, use of force, investigation and community policing (UNMIS April 2011), teaching Child Act and Restorative Justice (UNMIS June 2011), and training the Diplomatic Protection Unit (UNMISS April 2013).

A review of the UNPOL made by UN headquarters in 2013 made the following statement: “In line with the mandate mission concept and realities on the ground in South Sudan, the development of the South Sudan National Police Service (SSNPS) must remain a primary objective of the mission in its support to extension of state authority. Supporting the transformation of the SSNPS from a militarized, inchoate police service which can ensure internal security throughout South Sudan, including protection of civilians and human rights, remain critical. The Police Component’s focus on the mandated tasks of training, mentoring and advising remain valid.” (UNMISS July 2013). This meant that the UN Police, which Norwegian police officers was a part of, were doing a good job in a difficult situation. It was growing instability in the country with increasing issues of cattle theft that in one case forced approximately 100,000 people to flee their villages and 80,000 cattle was stolen (UNMISS December 2011). In addition there were clashes between government soldiers and rebel soldiers during an attempt at peace negotiation that resulted in soldiers burning down houses and civilians fleeing for shelter in the regional UN camp (UNMISS January 2013). The SSPS were also struggling with the fact that the leaders within the organization had been recruited based on their merits during the civil war. Hence, they often had a military mindset and culture which made it hard to implement and develop community based policing within the SSPS (UNMIS June 2011).

Civil War December 2013

In the beginning of UNMISS, the UN mandate, the Norwegian police officers were primarily engaged in leadership training and more basic police abilities. However, this changed abruptly in December 2013, when the security situation in the country worsened and the focus changed to Protection of Civilians (POC) (Regjeringen.no 2017a).

Fifteenth December 2013 fighting broke out in Juba between government soldiers and President Salva Kiir announced that the former vice-president had attempted a coup (Kulish

2014). The conflict ended up with both parties turning to ethnical specific attacks on civilians, and hostile public statements were made by South Sudanese officials claiming that the UNMISS was aiding the rebel fraction (UNMISS 2017a). Days followed with violence, and the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay announced that they had found at least four mass graves, and that both the Dinka and Nuer part of the population was risking to get killed based on their ethnicity (UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 2013). To deal with the deteriorating security situation within the country, that had only gained its independence two years earlier, the Security Council increased the troops numbers to 12,500 and the police included Formed Police Units (FPU) to 1,323. Due to the urgency they also opened up for the transfer of personnel from other operations to reach the new cap (Security Council 2013).

FPU's differ from the more traditional Police Officers (IPO). IPO's are the kind of police contribution Norway deploys to South Sudan. FPU's came as a unit of up to 140 individuals and were tasked with public order management, protection of UN personnel and facilities and respond to threats other than military (United Nations Police 2017a). While IPO's, like the name suggests, are independent units and perform many different tasks, for example day-to-day police work, and development, mentoring and training of local police and specialized investigations (United Nations Police 2017b). The original UNMISS mandate had not asked for FPU's, therefore the need for FPU's now showed that there were a worse security situation in the country than in 2011. After the Security Council passed resolution 2132, two Bangladeshi FPU's were moved from the UN operation in Congo and one Nepali FPU was redirected from the UN operation in Liberia, together they totaled 423 police officers (UNMISS December 2013).

By the end of February 2014, an estimated total of 900,000 South Sudanese had been displaced, 167,000 had crossed the border to one of the neighboring countries, while the remaining had become IDP's. In addition, food security situation had greatly worsened questioning the survival of up to 3.7 million South Sudanese (UNMISS 2017a). For security concerns the UNMISS leadership had now decided that refugees seeking shelter should be allowed access into the UN (UNMISS December 2013). During the fighting, South Sudanese had arrived at the UN camps in Juba, Bor, Akobo, Bentiu, Malakal and Melut to seek refuge ending up with counting more than 85,000 civilians living inside UN camps (UNMISS 2017a). This created a particular serious situation in the IDP camp in Yei, because there were no military presence in the camp. Therefore unarmed IPO personnel that was originally there

to train the local police were now responsible for securing the camps together with SSPS, wild life officers and prison officers, making a particularly insecure situation for the refugees (UNMISS January 2014). In addition, the SSPS was accused of having contributed to the violence and participated in the breaches of human rights and no longer had the necessary trust in the public (UNMISS January 2014). The accusations were so strong that many people at the UN headquarters advised to end the capacity building of SSPS (UNMISS February 2014).

In the start, the Norwegian police contingency reported home that it was still to a certain degree possible to perform capacity building in six states, while that in the remaining four all such activities were set on hold. The SRSG had told them to focus on, but not limited to, POC and reporting on human rights violation (UNMISS December 2013). With the deteriorating situation, the Norwegian police was set to primary work with POC and started to question the use of highly educated and qualified police officers for that kind of work (UNMISS January 2014).

UNMISS had been relatively unharmed since the uprising, but 17 April the UNMISS compound in Bor was attacked, which killed 47 IDPs and wounded two UN peacekeepers (United Nations 2015), creating an outrage within the Security Council (UN.org 2014a). Only a few days before, 14-16 April, mass violence had occurred in Bentiu with reports of more than 200 dead men, women and children as a result of systematic targeting and execution of civilians based on their ethnicity (UN.org 2014b). Until now, the work focus of POC were only given as an operational guideline from SRSG, but on the 27. May 2014 the Security Council adopted resolution 2155. Resolution 2155 changed the overall mandate of UNMISS from focusing on development to authorizing the use of *any* means necessary for the protection of civilians (Security Council 2014). In only a few years, the tasks for the unarmed Norwegian police officers and IPO's had changed drastically from training and developing the SSPS, to focusing more or less exclusively on POC against two armed factions.

According to the UNMISS Fourth Quarter report (2014) the following was the situation for Norwegian police officers in 2014: "Even if there are touches of capacity building in a few states, the contingencies mission as of today is primary to work with Protection of Civilians. This is in practice only done inside the POC-camps fences, where the SSNPS [SSPS] are not permitted. UNPOL does not act on cases happening outside these areas. UNPOL-officers are unarmed, but are supported by armed Formed Police UNITS (FPU)-units and military units

whom either perform “Joint Patrols” or can be requested if they are needed. The mission of UNPOL is to patrol on foot or in vehicles around and inside the IDP-camps and observe/report.”

[A new attempt at peace](#)

As a part of the peace accords in 2015 it was decided that a new police force should be established, tasked with demilitarizing the Capital of Juba, and the police force should contain troops from both warring factions (Interviewee SMO-4). The Security Council in resolution 2252 (2015) underscored the importance JIP (Joint Integrated Police) would play and included in the UNMISS mandate a tasking of UNMISS personnel to assist in the training, support and advisory of the JIP (Security Council 2015). It was from the Norwegian side great interest in trying to get three newly arrived contingent members into this project and in that way better utilize their police resources, but their contribution was not accepted (UNMISS First Quarter 2016). Norway was so interested in the possibility of helping with training instead of just POC that three Norwegian police officers with police training competence were recruited specifically for the task (Interviewee SMO-4). However, later the Norwegian contingency leader was tasked with the leading of the whole JIP project (Interviewee SMO-4), and in that way Norway partially got their way.

The thought that the Norwegian police and the IPO’s could return to their original mandate of training and capacity building was abruptly ended 8. July 2016, the day before the 5-year anniversary of the South Sudanese state. During talks between President Kiir and the former vice president Machar, heavy fighting broke out close to where these talks were being held (Dumo & Biryabarema 2016). Fighting also started outside the UN House in Juba where two Norwegian officers had to put on their protection gear and search for shelter until they were picked up by the Norwegian Army and their armed vehicles (UNMISS Second Quarter 2016). There had been tension in the area prior to the peace talks, and several indications of the region being hit by riots and instability (UNMISS Second Quarter 2016). Some of this instability was because Machar had arrived to Juba for the peace talks with a protection force of 1,300 individuals (BBC.com 2016). The tension in the area was evidenced a few days prior to the peace talks, when a disagreement between soldiers from the two factions at a checkpoint left five soldiers dead (Burke 2016). The same day armed cars from the US

embassy had been shoot at by SPLA (Sudan People's Liberation Army) forces (UNMISS Second Quarter 2016). During the conflict soldiers looted properties and killed individuals apparently derived by ethnic grievances (CIVIC 2016). And soldiers gang raped and beat foreign humanitarian workers (Kindersley & Rolandsen 2016).

The conflicted ended with a ceasefire after four days of fighting, that had resulted in the death of more than 270 people (BBC.com 2016). The conflicted had also resulted in Machar leaving Juba and demanding that a third party took responsibility for the security in Juba before he returned to the peace talks. SPLA responded that they would consider a regional protection force in Juba an invasion, and they would order the SPLA to treat these forces as hostile (UNMISS Second Quarter 2016). Following up an UN resolution authorized the deployment of a Regional Protection Force (Security Council 2016a). However, due to article 2,1 in the UN Charter that states: "The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members" (United Nations 1945), the situation needs to be dire before the UN decides against the will of the state they operate in. It is important to keep in mind that UNMISS is operating in South Sudan per an agreement with the South Sudanese government specified in the SOFA (2011) signed upon the establishment of UNMISS in 2011. The UN can therefore not force a Regional Protection Force upon the SPLA to further the peace process between the two primary warring factions. Instead, the SPLA delayed the deployment of a Regional Protection Force, which has yet to be accepted in the first half of 2017, while there is a demanding security situation in the country with an increasing number of warring factions. In Resolution 2327 the Security council raised the troop ceiling to its current numbers of 17,000 troops and 2,101 police officers, as a responds to the worsening security situation in the country (Security Council 2016b). As a testament to the increased instabilities in South Sudan, the original mandate in 2011 of 7,000 military and 900 civilian personnel has increased with 10,000 military and 1,201 police officers (UNMISS 2017b).

For the Norwegian MFA the importance of the Norwegian police presence in South Sudan was evident during the conflict period in 2016. Even though both the UK and German police contribution were evacuated, and later the Norwegian Embassy, it was desirable that the Norwegian police contribution was able to hold its ground when the going got tough (Interviewee PO-1). Luckily, the Norwegian contingency only counted three people at the time, because of the implementation of personnel leave in the period.

There might be two main reasons for the importance for the Norwegian contingency not to evacuate. First, if Norway evacuated as the other nations, it would have created serious consequences both to UNMISS and to Norway. Key western nations as the UK and Germany, had evacuated their personnel (UNMISS Second Quarter 2016), if a country with Norway's status also regarded the situation to be too dangerous for its UN personnel, it could have caused a chain reaction among the remaining contributing countries (Interviewee PE-4). For the sake of Norway's position in UNMISS, maintaining the position seemed to be the right choice, because the UK and German contribution that was evacuated were not let back in to the mission by the UN (UNMISS Second Quarter 2016, Interviewee PE-4). This was due to their lack of "solidarity" to the mission in a time of need (Interviewee PE-4). The second reason for the Norwegian MFA to hold its stand in the country both during the 2013 and 2016 conflicts, were to show Norway dedication and solidarity to South Sudan. South Sudan has been, and continues to be, an important foreign policy "project" for Norway, and an important way to show Norway's dedication for peace and an important promotional arena for Norway's status as a Peace Nation.

The current security situation in South Sudan, and the resulting focus on POC, have made several of my interviewees question the validity of sending highly qualified Norwegian police officers to the country, instead of using them in Norway or other international operations where they can be put to better use (e.g Interviewee PE-3, PO-3). This is an example of how Norwegian foreign policy interest play an important factor in deciding whether Norway should contribute police officers. Compared to the civil war for independence from Sudan, and the civil war that broke out in 2013, the current civil war is so fractional and with relative weak leaders, that there are no easy way to get representative parties to the negotiation table (Kindersley & Rolandsen 2016). The country is in more or less full civil war, therefore performing capacity building and other peacekeeping tasks are out of the question. Currently there is no peace to keep, and unarmed police components are inferior to armed military components in a peace-building operation, which is the situation in South Sudan. In addition, there is a serious ethical consideration connected with participating in a UN operation in a country with a government that uses famine as a weapon against its own population (Bolle 2017).

One of my interviewees sums it up: "I believe that it stands to reason that we are obviously doing this for foreign policy reasons, than what the Norwegian police have left for their service there, compared to other places" (Interviewee PE-4). In other words, police

professional concerns and the police's potential gains are not the driving factors as to why Norway is still standing in South Sudan, if you compare it to Norwegian foreign policy interests. Not only is South Sudan an important part of the Norwegian foreign policy. Norway's work in South Sudan has also given Norway an exclusive seat at the table together with its two closest allies, the US and the UK, through the Troika cooperation.

5.2 The establishment and development of NORAF

The background and establishment of NORAF

As with South Sudan, Norway has a strong civilian history in Afghanistan. The Norwegian NGO, Norwegian Church Aid (Kirkens Nødhjelp), has been present in Afghanistan since 1979 and also gave support to Afghanistan in 1971-72 (Kirkens Nødhjelp 2017). Therefore, a Norwegian civilian contribution in addition to the military presence in Afghanistan was natural. After the Bonn agreement on 5. December 2001, it was decided to divide the responsibilities for a Security Sector Reform (SSR) into five different groups, each with a responsible state: the US got the Afghan national Army, the UK got the Counter Narcotics Police (CNPA), Italy got the Rule of Law program, Japan got Disarming, mobilizing and reintegration of ex-militia and Germany got the Afghan National Police (ANP) (Nyborg & Ganapathy 2012, p. 9). It was through this division of responsibilities of SSR responsibilities NORAF was established and placed under the lead of the German Police Project.

Originally, Norway was asked by the US to take responsibility for the training of the Afghan Border Police (ABP), however, a Norwegian fact finding team decided that it was not doable for Norway to train the ABP (Nyborg & Ganapathy 2012). In my interviews, both interviewee PE-1 and interviewee PE-2 found it strange that Norway chose to send a fact-finding team to established whether or not it was possible, because Norway does not have a boarder police or specific experience from such activities. As interviewee PE-1 stated: "I believe that you have to look for a long time to find an analysis that show the background for why those choices was made [...] I believe that what happened was that you have people in prominent positions

that don't know what they are talking about. And they come up with convenient ideas that are poorly evaluated.”

So why did Norway decide to investigate the possibilities for a civilian police contribution taking charge for the ABP, even though Norway had no preconditions for succeeding in such work? Interviewee PE-2 states that the US originally was planning to take charge for the ABP, but the organisation was moved from the Afghan Defence Ministry to the Ministry of Interior (MOI). Hence, the US defence department could no longer finance a civilian border police placed in the MOI, and the US started to put pressure on the Norwegian MFA to assist. This is partially supported by Høgseth (2008) that confirms that it was the US that asked Norway to take charge of the training of the ABP, and as a result: “...it was decided to send a “fact finding team” from the Police Directorate to Afghanistan to evaluate what the Norwegian police could contribute to the German police project, German Police Project Office (GPPO) towards the Afghan authorities [...] based on a police professional evaluation by the team, the advice was that Norway did not have capacity to take charge for the build-up of the ABP” (2008, p. 4 [My translation]). Norway did however have the capacity to assist the GPPO and their work with the APN. Therefore, based on the evaluation and advices made by a Norwegian police officer employed in the UN at the time, it was decided to create a pilot project to see if Norway would be able to participate in the German led training of the ANP.

The pilot project was established in 2003 and lasted for three months, where five Norwegian police officer's taught human rights to Afghan police officers whom were employed as instructors at the police academy in Kabul (Interviewee PO-3). All the Norwegian police officers had completed an instructor course at PHS in human rights and management, and all the course information was translated to Dari prior to deployment (Høgseth 2009). As Høgseth (2008, p. 33 [My translation]) states: “... no Norwegian police officer has ever received better preparation for an international mission, than these five did.”

The pilot project appeared promising and after conversations with the Germans in charge of the police project, it was decided to continue training ANP at the police academy in Kabul (Interviewee PO-3). In Mai 2004, Norwegian police officers were back in Kabul, and NORAF was officially established with an increased contingent of eight police officers, responsible for training 600 ANP leaders in preliminary introduction in human rights, management and operational procedure (Høgseth 2008). The focus on training ANP at the police academy was gradually “rubbed out” (Interviewee PO-3), and already through the summer of 2004 NORAF

had also been involved in the UK led police reform work with the Afghan Counter Narcotics Police (CNPA) (Høgseth 2008).

It may be relevant to take a closer look at why the US was so insistent on Norway taking responsibility for the ABP, and why Norway was willing to try comply, even though there were no arguments supporting that they would be capable to handle such a task. Kleiven (2012, p. 131) is referring to a private communication with a Norwegian MFA official that stated that: “The backdrop for deploying Norwegian police officers to Afghanistan was Norway’s hesitance to participate in the Iraq conflict, leading the U.S to urge the Norwegian Foreign Ministry (MFA) to contribute police personnel to Afghanistan.” This is particularly interesting because a MFA official told me that: “Personally, I don’t believe that the Norwegian police effort in Afghanistan has any coherence with Norway not participating in the invasion of Iraq. To claim that there exists a connection would be very speculative, and I don’t believe that you will find any factual basis supporting such speculations (Personal email received 02.10.2017). Hence, the de Carvalho and Lie (2015, p. 70) statement “...that status was a difficult topic to discuss, as it would have entailed admissions that the drivers behind policies were different from those officially proclaimed”, appears to be valid.

As opposed to the invasion in Afghanistan, the invasion in Iraq did not have the support of a Security Council Resolution, as both France and Russia were against an attack on Iraq (FN-Sambandet 2017a), and Norway was at the time one of the non-permanent members of the Security Council (United Nations Security Council 2017b). In other words, the armed engagement in Iraq was not based on Article 5 in the North Atlantic Treaty, nor the UN Charter article 42 or 51, thus it did not have the same international legal basis as the Afghanistan operation. Because of this lack of legality, Norway chose not to participate in the US led invasion of Iraq together with the UK, Australia and Polish forces (FN-Sambandet 2017a). This decision strained the Norway-US relation, and was hurtful for Norway’s overall status and bilateral status to the US.

The Iraq invasion started 23. March 2003 (FN-Sambandet 2017a). During the same period Norway deployed a new contingency to the US led Operation Enduring Freedom in march 2003, a Norwegian surgical team and the Telemark Task Force I+II (army squadrons), which significantly increased Norway’s presence in ISAF and in Afghanistan (NOU 2016: 8 2016). Norway deployed a total of 402 personnel to the stabilization phase in Iraq, from June 2003 to 2005 (I tjeneste for Norge 2017b), in addition to the NORAF pilot which was deployed in

2003. It may be hard to conclude on whether or not these actions were driven by an attempt to re-establish the Norway-US relations after Norway decided not to participate in the invasion of Iraq. However, Norway's primary, and only reached goal in Afghanistan was to offer support to the US and secure the relevance of NATO (NOU 2016: 8 2016). Therefore, it can be argued that Norway was in need of improving Norway-US relations, and this influenced the Norwegian foreign policy. This could also explain why the US was pushing so hard for Norway to take responsibility for the ABP, and why Norway so eagerly complied by sending a "fact-finding-team" to evaluate the possibilities for Norway taking such responsibilities. Afghanistan was at the time among the most expanding area of the Norwegian foreign policy and establishment of NORAF needs to be seen in connection with the overall Norwegian contribution to Afghanistan (see chapter 4.1). One may therefore assume that, at least to a certain degree, the evaluation of involvement in the training the ABP and the following establishment of NORAF must be seen in connection to Norway's lack of participation in the US led invasion of Iraq.

The Interim period

NORAF expanded their current projects with the CNPA together with the UK and the Police academy with and in January NORAF held the first training course in Faryab, a 5-day course in management and human rights for 40 high ranking police officers (NORAF January 2006). In September the same year, a meeting was held between NORAF and the Norwegian PRT in Maymanah to formalize the stationing of two police officers in the PRT together with the Norwegian army. Later in 2010 the Faryab region became the main area of focus for NORAF (NOU 2016: 8 2016), as opposed to the original cooperation with Germany in Kabul. One of the reasons for moving the police project out of Kabul was the security factor. At times, NORAF was unable to go to work up to 8-9 times a months due to "lock-downs" in responds to Taliban attacks or threats (Interviewee PO-2). Therefore, the police was positive to reduce their presence in Kabul to enable them to do their job.

Prior to moving NORAF's focus from Kabul to Faryab, there were two relevant events. The first is the increase of the NORAF contingent to 18 police officers in 2007, and the second is Norway joining EUPOL-A. In 2005 the Soria Moria declaration was signed and formed the basis for the new Norwegian government consisting of the Labour Party, the Centre Party and

the Socialist Left Party. There are two statements made in this declaration that is of particular interest. The first one states: “Norway shall be a pronounced peace nation. The government will strengthen Norway’s efforts to prevent, mitigate and resolve conflicts” (Soria Moria 2005, p. 5 [My translation]) and the second one states that: “... to strengthen Norway’s participation in ISAF in Afghanistan. On this basis, we will not renew Norwegian participation in Operation Enduring Freedom when the mandate for these troops has expired” (2005, p. 12 [My translation]). The second statement must be seen as a direct follow up to the first. Norway needed to re-establish its reputation as a peace nation. Operation Enduring Freedom was originally an offensive operation, while ISAF was an UN mandated force responsible for re-establishing peace and stability. In other words, by prioritizing ISAF over Operation Enduring Freedom, Norway could maintain its obligations to the US and NATO, while also pursuing its status as a peace nation.

In 2006, ISAF activities expanded to the southern and eastern Afghanistan. This put the Socialist Left Party support for participation in ISAF under political pressure because it made ISAF a part of the ongoing war in Afghanistan (NOU 2016: 8 2016). NATO called on Norway to help in The South with special forces, but Norway decided not to comply to the request made by NATO. This was seen as a major victory for the Social Left Party within the Norwegian government (Vinding et al. 2006). In 2007, Norway was again requested to participate with special forces in South Afghanistan. And again the request was declined, and this in turn sparked criticism from the Norwegian opposition that claimed that the decisions would harm Norway’s bilateral relationship with the US and the UK (NOU 2016: 8 2016). Norway was now under pressure to reestablish its status as a reliable partner, and as a compromise within the government, it was decided to send Norwegian special forces to Kabul, thus avoiding the most violent areas in southern Afghanistan, making the decision acceptable for the Socialist Left Party (Bakkeli et al. 2007). Norway’s military participation in Afghanistan was a strongly contested topic within the government, as the Labour Party wanted to maintain foreign relations with the US and other important NATO allies, while also acknowledging the Social Left Party concerns to ensure the survival of the government. This is supported in a classified document sent from the US Embassy in Oslo to different key US actors like the CIA and the Secretary of State, made available on Wikileaks.org, it stated that: “...we believe that MOD statements are part of a Labor Party effort to co-opt existing NATO plans and priorities regarding Afghanistan in order to present the Socialist Left Party (SV)

with the image of a victory while maintaining current Norwegian commitments to ISAF” (Embassy Oslo 2008).

The issue of maintaining the Norway-US relations, while at the same time pursuing Norway’s status as a peace nation has been an issue throughout Norway’s participation in Afghanistan. This was explained by Græger (2015, p. 102) who stated that: “Closer ties with the USA have probably enhanced Norway’s status in NATO. Through its military investments, contributions and defense cooperation, Norway is out there, playing with ‘the big guys’ – but at what cost? Conflicts between status gained from close military cooperation with allies on the one hand, and Norwegian foreign policy traditions on the other, where status is gained through ideational factors such as moral authority and where criticism of US foreign policy has often been voiced, will make trade-offs likely”. It is within this mentality it can be explained why Norway increased its NORAF contingency to 18 police officers in 2007. Increasing the police contribution showed the US and NATO, that Norway was willing to send more troops to Afghanistan and take its share of the burden, while also in its own interest pursued its status as a peace nation. This is supported by Høgseth (2008) that is quoting an anonymous source saying: “The decision to double the Norwegian police contribution had a direct correlation with the Soria Moria-declaration from the Stoltenberg Government on Norwegian soldiers in Afghanistan” (Høgseth 2008, p. 39 [My translation]). In other words, the statements in the Soria Moria (2005, p. 5) stating that Norway wanted to “...strengthen Norway’s efforts to prevent, mitigate and resolve conflicts” is directly supporting an increased NORAF contingency. However, the increased ISAF participation needs also to be understood as having influenced the increase in police officers in NORAF from 9 to 18. This statement was made prior to the ISAF expanding into the southern parts of Afghanistan. After the expanse it was harder for the Socialist Left Party to endorse Norway’s ISAF participation because they now saw it as an aggressive force, the same way as they saw Operation Enduring Freedom. While still enabling Norway to strengthen its participation in Afghanistan, an increase in the number of police officers was a much less controversial decision than increasing the military troops.

Apart from the increase in NORAF’s police officers from 9 to 18, there was a second even I would like to discuss. The second event is the choice to partly participate in European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL-A). This choice changing NORAF’s status from a bilateral engagement, to a mixture of bilateral and multilateral engagement. EUPOL-A was a civil European External Action Service (EEAS) operation, under the EU’s Common Security

and Defence Policy (CSDP), and was established in 2007 (EEAS 2016). One of the interviewees (Interviewee PO-4) explain the establishment of EUPOL-A as a result of Germany realizing that they were unable to handle the responsibility of training the ANP, while at the same time taking over the presidency in the EU, from 01. January 2007. This notion is partially supported by Høgseth (2008) who states that during the spring of 2007 EU decided to take over the responsibility of training the ANP from Germany. The Norwegian police's professional advice, given in an independent report commissioned by POD concluded that: "Norway should participate in the ESDP operation, but based on police professional reasons, should reduce the participation to a minimum" (Hartz et al. 2007, p. 2 [My translation]). This was supported by one of the interviewees (Interviewee PO-3) who stated that Norway should have had one or two representatives in both EUPOL-A and UNAMA, but only for coordination reasons, and instead Norway should attempted to stay focused on one task to maximize the potential success of NORAF.

One of the MFA officials interviewed (Interviewee SMO-2) stated that Norway had two reasons for joining EUPOL-A: The first reason was based on the fact that the strongest criticism against the police contribution in Afghanistan was that it was too un-coordinated, therefore one was hoping that EUPOL-A would function as a coordinated organisation for the different police projects in Afghanistan. The second argument for joining EUPOL-A was that it was within Norway's foreign interests to maintain good relations to EU. Therefore, the Norwegian MFA pursued the EUPOL-A option, and convinced the Norwegian Department of Justice and POD.

However, based on the advice made in the independent evaluation by Hartz et al. (2007) regarding joining EUPOL-A. Joining EUPOL-A was not primary based on the police professional advice made in that evaluation. It is therefore plausible to see that Norway-EU relations were prioritized over the police professional advice. The argued that several of the EU countries were only partially going to join EUPOL-A (Hartz et al. 2007). This means that the EU countries did not fully invest in the EUPOL-A project, and questioning why a non-EU member like Norway should want to do what the EU members did not. The second and more important argument against joining EUPOL-A for coordination reasons, was that EUPOL-A only did coordinate an estimate of 160 police officers while the International Police Coordination Board (IPCB) would coordinate more than 960. This because the US, holding the majority of the police officers in Afghanistan, could only be represented in IPCB (Hartz et al. 2007). As a consequence, Hartz disproved the coordination argument made by the

Norwegian MFA, for joining EUPOL-A. Indicating that joining EUPOL-A was based on Norway-EU relations. As the report stated: “As much as possible of the Norwegian contribution should be given bilaterally and coordinated through IPCB...” (Hartz et al. 2007, p. 33 [My translation]).

One year after the establishment of EUPOL-A, the operation counted 156 participants from 21 countries where Norway (two participants) and Canada (two participants) were the only third party countries participating (NORAF July 2008). It was decided in May 2008 to increase the size of EUPOL-A to 400 participants, which was received with mixed feelings in the EUPOL-A headquarters, because EUPOL-A had so far only been able to reach about 68% of the current target number of 234 participants (NORAF July 2008). In February 2010, EUPOL-A was still far from the goal of 400 participants, as they only counted 286 (NORAF February 2010). The Norwegian MFA had decided that the newly increased NORAF contingency of 18 police officers should be put at EUPOL-A’s disposal, but after a year only two officers had been accepted into EUPOL-A (Høgseth 2008).

Because EUPOL-A was struggling to fill up its mandate with police officers from EU countries, it is reasonable to assume that they would accept all the additional help it could get. However, this was not the case. As Høgseth (2008, p. 32 [My translation]) explains: “If EU accepted the 18 Norwegian, about 40 Canadian and some Australian police advisers in their operation [...] the power balance internally in EUPOL-A had been unacceptable for both the EU and these three countries”. There were also issues connected to the operational capabilities of EUPOL-A as an interviewee (Interviewee PO-2) presented: “I feel that the EU in many ways was badly prepared to operate such large operations [...] I absolutely mean that we [Norway] was excessively friendly and loyal towards the EU”. It can therefore be why Norway was so adamantly decided on NORAF being implemented in EUPOL-A, even when EUPOL-A did not want the Norwegian contribution Høgseth (2008, p. 57). However, this can be understood based on the Norwegian MFA’s original argument for joining EUPOL, which was among others to maintain good relations to EU. This is pointed out by one interviewee (Interviewee PO-2) stating that Norway had a good standing in EUPOL because Norway, as opposed to the EU countries that only seemed to complain, came to the operation and was offering services. This in turn was supported by the Norwegian delegation to EU that was commended on the work done in Afghanistan when they were participating in meetings in Brussel.

There were a third additional option for joining EUPOL-A, or maintaining a pure bilateral arrangement only coordinated by the IPCB. Namely the US led Focused District Development (FDD) program where many other countries had deployed their police officers (Kleiven 2012). Because this was a US led operation, it would seem to be the obvious choice compared to EUPOL-A, however there were seemingly problems with the FDD project. The US wanted to build ANP as a type of security force, and had less focus on developing a democratic police based on local ownership (Høgseth 2008), and the FDD primarily used US military personnel to train ANP (Kleiven 2012), which meant that the Norwegian police would be set under military command.

Because the FDD was focusing on building a security force rather than a democratic police, this was in conflict with the third Norwegian goal for being in Afghanistan, namely to build a democratic Afghanistan. Therefore, a continuous bilateral commitment or a commitment to EUPOL-A that used civilian police officers to train ANP in democratic policing (Kleiven 2012) was more favorable. Norway based their Afghanistan participation on what was called the 'Norwegian Model', namely to emphasize a distinct divide between the Norwegian military and civilian contribution to Afghanistan (NOU 2016: 8 2016). One of the interviewees (Interviewee SMO-2) explained that there were an additional economical factor to not choosing the FDD project, namely that by training security forces, that would be perceived as a paramilitary force and not a civilian police, the Norwegian police contribution no longer were a civilian contribution to Afghanistan, and it could no longer be financed from the Norwegian development aid budget.

Norway did, however, to a certain degree end up participating in the FDD project. In September 2008, there were five police officers in the Norwegian PRT that were waiting to be accepted to the EUPOL-A project (Høgseth 2008). In November the same year, five Norwegian police officers were added to the FDD project, where four of them were placed in CSTC-A (Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan) (NORAF November 2008). In that way, Norwegian police officers could join a project they wanted to participate in, instead of waiting for EUPOL that was still struggling with the establishment phase (Gjerstad 2009). This made NORAF's contribution to FDD and EUPOL-A equal in numbers. Meaning that NORAF had equal investments in two different multinational projects, while also running its own bilateral projects. This is interesting because at a time the cooperation between EUPOL-A and FDD was close to nonexistent and EU seemed to failed to even acknowledge the existence of the FDD project (Høgseth 2008). Halvor Hartz, a previous

contingency leader and a fellow at NUPI (Norwegian Institute of International Affairs) at the time, state in an interview with the Norwegian newspaper Dagbladet, that:” The government has listened to the police professional advice. And EUPOL has become more pragmatically and realize that they are a supplement to the US FDD-process, the only security reform of any size in Afghanistan” (Gjerstad 2009). On the 10. September 2009, the US CSTC-A (Combined Security Transition Command-A) was merged with NTM-A (NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan) and was rebranded to CSTC-A/NTM-A. Together they started to focus on a “train the trainer” principle through training, advising and mentoring ANPs own training organization inside the Afghan Ministry of Interior Affairs (NORAF August 2009). This made working in the CSTC-A/NTM-A less controversial than earlier, because the focus gained a more civilian focus and character. In addition, to confirming that Norway was participating in a police project that was fundamentally based on principles against the “Norwegian Model” of separating civilian and military forces, the Norwegian State Secretary Raymond Johansen (Labor party) confirmed that the Norwegian contribution to Afghanistan would increase from 18 to 23 police officers within 2009 (Gjerstad 2009).

The termination of NORAF

NORAF was now participating in different tasks bilaterally, through EUPOL-A or the CSTC-A/NTM-A, and in January 2010, NORAF consisted of 23 police officers (NORAF January 2010). This meant that the project had increased considerably from the five man pilot mission in 2003 that assisted the German police project at the Police Academy in Kabul, and evaluated the possibility for a continued Norwegian Police contribution to Afghanistan. However, the Norwegian bilateral police adventure got an abrupt ending. In December 2011, the contingent leader was informed by the Norwegian POD that the project was to be terminated by the end of the next year, 2012 (NORAF December 2011). By the end of July 2012 NORAF was terminated. Afghan employees at the CNPA, voiced their gratitude for the help, but they also voiced their concerns for the future of Afghanistan and CJTF (NORAF July 2012). An interviewee (Interviewee PO-3) said that they never were told why the project was terminated and that they hardly had time to finish up their ongoing projects.

The abrupt termination of NORAF was explained to me by an MFA official: “Due to safety concerns it was not considered possible to continue the Norwegian Police effort in Faryab

after the Norwegian military presence was terminated. There were different views on whether or not the police presence in Kabul should be continued. In the fall 2011 it was decided that the police effort in Kabul should be terminated already from the summer 2012. In addition, it was decided to gradually reduce the police efforts in Faryab [...] POD therefore advised that the whole Norwegian police contribution should be terminated the summer 2012 (Personal email received 02.10.2017). This is supported by the NOU 2016: 8 (2016) that also states that the security situation, independently from the termination of the military contribution, was so bad that it only permitted limited activity from the police program.

One of the interviewees (Interviewee PO-2) told me that this was because Norway was asked by the US to withdraw their troops in Faryab. Because the US contingency was partially reliant on the Norwegian military contingency at the PRT. If Norway withdrew their military, the US also had to withdraw a sizeable US presence in Afghanistan and Obama could say in his election campaign “I pulled troops out of Afghanistan”. This was the reason the operation ended much quicker than planned. Hence, it may be argued that the police contribution ended as a direct consequence of the termination of the military operation. As my interviewee (Interviewee PO-2) stated: “I am absolutely sure that the police contribution was fully reliant on the security provided by the military contribution. We could not be there without them.”

Interviewee PO-2 agreed that the Norwegian police still had something to contribute in Afghanistan after the withdrawal, especially at the Staff College or EUPOL-A that were not terminated until 31. December 2016. However, due to the poor security situation in Kabul and the strict EUPOL-A security regime, Interviewee PO-2 believed that most of the time would have been spent on lock-down (not allowed to leave the base), and the overall contribution would have been unjustified based on a cost benefit point of view. Therefore, it was better to withdraw the whole NORAF contribution, and instead focus the resources on operations outside of Afghanistan that would have been a better use of Norwegian economic and police resources.

5.3 Comparing the framework of UNMISS and NORAF

In both South Sudan and Afghanistan, prior to the establishment of both UNMISS and NORAF, Norway has had a civilian presence since the 1970s through Norwegian founded and funded NGO's. Norway has also used its status as a peace nation to help facilitate peace talks between the different warring factions. In South Sudan, Norway participated in the peace process that ended in South Sudan's independence through the strong position as a Troika member. While in Afghanistan, Norway was among the original states that together with Hamid Karzai acknowledged that a political solution was needed to end the war with Taliban (NOU 2016: 8 2016). In addition, for both the South Sudanese and Afghan peace processes there have been facilitated dialogs and meetings, both by and in Norway. However, it is safe to say that the peace process between Sudan and South Sudan has been more successful than the peace process between the Afghan government and Taliban. The current conflict in South Sudan is not between Sudan and South Sudan, but rather between internal factions and is therefore a new conflict than the one that Norway helped to facilitate peace talks for.

Norway's engagement in the two peace processes has influenced in different degrees the overall framework surrounding these two international operations. In South Sudan, Norway's part in the peace process made it among the three key states with regards to South Sudan, due to Norway's membership in the Troika. While in Afghanistan it helped to promote Norway as a peace nation and an relevant contributor. This was done through using Norway's networks to facilitating talks and meetings on high levels with the Taliban (NOU 2016: 8 2016). In addition, Norway facilitated to peace talks between the Taliban and the Afghan government in Norway (NTB 2015; Sandberg 2013).

Two other important factors that are important to acknowledge when looking at the overall framework surrounding UNMISS and NORAF, are the mandate for the operation, and the operations focus on military vs. police.

Mandates

When comparing the framework surrounding UNMISS and NORAF the mandates for the Norwegian presence and how it has changed during the Norwegian presence are important.

The mandates differ from Norway's commitments presented in chapter 4 of this thesis. The commitments are signed agreements that create the background and basis for initiating an operation and creating a mandate, while the mandates itself establishes the operational framework during the operation.

UNMISS's original mandate was "... to consolidate peace and security, and to help establish the conditions for development in the Republic of South Sudan..." (Security Council 2011, p. 3). This mandate was to be reached through assisting with an effective and democratic government and through establishing good relations with South Sudan's its neighbours. The main concern during the establishment of UNMISS appears to be assisting with building a South Sudanese state and ensure that the conflict leading to South Sudan independence from Sudan would not be reignited. This is in contrast to today's situation where the conflict is not between South Sudan and Sudan, but rather among different factions inside South Sudan. This is reflected in the current mandate that has established that UNMISS is authorized to use any means necessary to ensure the: "Protection of civilians", "Monitoring, and investigating human rights", and "Creating the conditions conducive to the delivery of humanitarian assistance" (Security Council 2016b, p. 6-7). This means that the responsibilities of the Norwegian police officers changed from being focused towards training and capacity building, in a country rebuilding itself from war. To an operation where the responsibilities of the Norwegian police officers was to assist with securing the security for the civilian population in a country in civil war. In other words, the mandate for the Norwegian police officers in South Sudan changed with the situation in the country.

The establishment of the NORAFs mandate must be approach differently to fully understand the situation for NORAF. The primary mandate for NORAF was the agreement signed between the Norwegian MFA and the Afghan Interior ministry, which established that NORAF was tasked with assisting the establishment and training of the ANP. This agreement were not revised or changed during the lifetime of NORAF. However, NORAF did not operate individually, it also partook in other projects and operations. NORAF was originally establish to support the GPPO, therefore, the mandate for the GPPO also were to a degree relevant for NORAF. And later NORAF also contributed with police officers to the UK lead training of the CNPA. NORAF also delegated police officers to UNAMA, EUPOL-A and CSTC-A/NTM-A. In other words, NORAF did not only have its own mandate guiding the work of the Norwegian police officers, it also had the bilateral mandates for Germany, the UK and the US, in addition to the multilateral mandates of the UN, EEAS and NATO. In addition,

because NORAF must be seen as a part of the overall Norwegian contribution to Afghanistan, the mandates for Operation Enduring Freedom and ISAF are also relevant to a certain degree.

When we compare the mandates creating the framework for the two cases there are two main differences. First, the mandates adaptability of the situation in the country it operates. The UNMISS mandate changed in concurrence with the situation on the ground, while the bilateral agreement establishing the primary mandate for NORAF stayed the same during the whole operational period. The second difference was that the Norwegian police contingency to South Sudan only have one mandate at any time to adhere to, while NORAF had a multitude of mandates to take into consideration in addition to the primary mandate established through the bilateral agreement.

Military vs. police focus

The primary focus in the two international operations might be understood based on the number of military and police personnel deployed. A large military to police ratio can be understood as the police being given a minor priority to the more superior military, while a small ratio will indicate that the military and police focus is more equal. Understanding how the military and police are prioritized compared to each other helps to understand the focus of an international operation.

UNMISS was originally mandated with 7,000 military and 900 civilian police personnel (Security Council 2011), being a little less than a 8:1 military to civilian police ratio. This has changed with the worsening security situation in the country and is now mandated with 17,000 military and 2,101 police personnel including FPU's (Security Council 2016b), being a slightly more than 8:1 ratio. This means that the civilian police are still a significant part of the overall UNMISS presence in South Sudan. This is reflected in the Norwegian participation where Norway is providing 17 military officers (I tjeneste for Norge 2017c) and has budgeted for 18 police officers (Det Kongelige Utenriksdepartement 2017), almost a 1:1 ration in the Norwegian contribution.

At its largest, ISAF counted 130,000 military personnel (I tjeneste for Norge 2017a) while Hartz et al. (2007) established that IPCB coordinated 960 police advisers. These numbers are not from the same period of time due to lacking more relevant numbers, but it is used to prove

the point. This gives us an above 135:1 ratio of military to police ratio of the international presence in Afghanistan. This is also visible in the Norwegian delegation that had 600 military troops at its most (I tjeneste for Norge 2017a), while NORAF peaked with 24 police officers (NORAF November 2009). This give us a 25:1 military to civilian police ration in the Norwegian contribution to Afghanistan. Therefore, Afghanistan had a much higher international, and Norwegian, military to police ratio than South Sudan.

When comparing the Norwegian contribution to UNMISS with NORAF, we can see that in South Sudan the international police contribution have a greater relative relevance compared to what the international police contribution had in Afghanistan. This is reflected in the Norwegian policy, because in South Sudan the military is seen as equally important to the police, while in Afghanistan the military were given a much higher priory than the police.

[Advantages and disadvantages of UNMISS compared to NORAF](#)

What are the advantages and disadvantages of participating in UNMISS compared to NORAF? In my study the overall reoccurring themes are national control, coordination and security. UNMISS is a large multilateral organization, able to provide a strong framework, while NORAF as a relative small bilateral project, compared to UNMISS, is able to provide strong national control over the decision-making process.

When Norwegian police officers are sent to UNMISS, Norway is no longer in full control over what they do in the field, as they are allocated to the UN and are thus answering to the UN leadership. When the police officers answer to the UN, they might be commanded to do tasks that go against the wishes of their home country. One example of this is the prison containers issue in the UNMISS camps. On the 6. July 2015 the contingent leader got the following message from the Norwegian Ministry of Justice: “Norwegian police advisers in UNMISS shall not participate in the implementation of the current practice of detentions for IDP’s before further clarification has been provided. All police advisers in the operations must be informed (UNMISS Third Quarter 2015).” The issue was that criminal elements amongst the IDP’s within the UN camps were kept in containers due to lack of other prison structures, as these camps were not originally build as refugee camps, and because there was no functioning justice system. This became a human rights issue for the Norwegian MFA due

to the state of these facilities. Consequently, the Norwegian contingency was ordered not to participate in the ongoing practice. There are three issues in regard to this: First, the Norwegian police were following commands coming from the UN command, which is what they are supposed to follow, not orders from their own state. Secondly, when these prisoners were transferred to the SSPS they were shortly set free and three out of four returned to the IDP camp, where one was rearrested (UNMISS Fourth Quarter 2015). This opens up for concerns regarding the human rights for those IDP's suffering from these criminal elements inside the IDP camps, if perpetrators are not removed from the victims (Interviewee PE-3). Lastly, every police officer was indirectly a part of this practice, because this was currently the best solution due to lack of a better alternative. Not only was it a problem that Norway was attempting to micro-managing their UN allocated police officers, in doing so, Norway also asked the police officers to disregard current practises and orders. The only option would have been to repatriate the Norwegian contingency, which actually the Netherlands were forced to do after ordering their police officers not to participate in the practice (Interviewee PE-3). The orders were placed on hold after the contingency reported back to POD about the potential consequences, who relayed the information to the Norwegian MFA and Ministry of Justice (UNMISS Third Quarter 2015). This exemplifies one of the negative sides of participating in UNMISS, the police officers are no longer under national control, and the only option is to repatriate them, if they disagree with what they are tasked to do in the operation. "If you want to be a part of a UN operation, you have to adapt to the UN operation, right? It will not get better than how it is set up. So, you need to be willing to go into an established system and make the best out of the situation" (Interviewee PE-1). Sometimes the orders given in a UN operation conflict with both the individual police officers and the troop contributing state's ethical and moral standards. The UN is a large organization with many different cultures and backgrounds working together. It is therefore important to acknowledge that the UN cannot make everyone equally satisfied at all times. It is therefore important to accept this premise and work with it, not against it, in an attempt to make the organization better.

However, when you are part of a large project like UNMISS, it is possible to partake in more complicated and coordinated operations across departments and disciplines. For example it does not help only to develop the police, but you also need to assist in developing the whole legal chain. It matters little if the national police force is fully functional, if the prison service and court system are not. In an attempt to help rebuild the whole justice system in

Afghanistan, NORAF was collaborating with the Norwegian “Styrkebrønnen”, an organization placed under the Norwegian Ministry of Justice consisting of prosecutors, judges, defence lawyers and representatives from the correctional services (Regjeringen.no 2017a). However, the size of the Norwegian contribution was so small that it did not achieve much. The hope of reforming the justice system in South Sudan is currently bleak due to the security situation. But when security has returned to a certain degree where the main focus of the operations is POC, a large organization like UNMISS might have the capacity to achieve some results in engaging the whole justice system.

The main issue for Norway when partaking in bilateral operations, is the fact that Norway is relative small compared to many other police contributing countries (Interviewee PO-1). At its largest, NORAF counted 24 police officers, which makes it understandable that a bilateral operation by Norway alone, would not have a significant impact on Afghanistan’s justice sector, or ‘just’ the ANP with a targeted strength of 134,000 by October 2011 (NATO 2010). Another issue with being so small is the security concern. NORAF was fully dependent on the Norwegian Army to provide security for the parts of NORAF operating in Faryab, as was evident by the termination of NORAF when the military presence ended in Faryab in 2012. This is different from UNMISS, where both military and FPU are tasked with providing security to the remaining staff. Due to the large financial costs to provide enough security it would be unrealistic for Norway to participate with bilateral projects like NORAF without guaranteed security from the allied states and other organizations (Interviewee PE-3). As a general note, NORAF would have been unable to make long lasting changes to the ANP by itself. However, NORAF was only one of many bilateral and multilateral operations at work, towards the Afghan police reform. Cooperating both with the German Police project, the UK narcotics project, the CSTC-A/NTM-A and EUPOL-A. In that sense one could consider NORAF a bilateral operation within a large and uncoordinated multilateral operation.

The primary critique against the police contribution to Afghanistan as a whole, was that it was too fragmented, which also was among the greatest weaknesses of NORAF, while it also lacked a superior plan or strategy (Interviewee SMO-2). As opposed to UNMISS, NORAF primarily only answered back to Norway, and therefore had potentially good control over projects and resources. However, as the project lacked an overall plan or strategy, much was left to the police officers in the field. One interviewee told me that the interviewee never met anyone that had heard of any plan for NORAF, which ended up with people doing tasks they found interesting, rather than continued on ongoing tasks (Interviewee PO-3). Another

interviewee told me that “we ended up doing everything equally bad” (Interviewee PO-2). One of the reasons that NORAF lacked an overall plan was because Norway was not experienced in these types of international operations, as they had primarily contributed to UN operations that already had a set framework and a thorough coordination mechanism (Interviewee SMO-2). This is supported by the NOU 2016: 8 (2016, p. 95) that states: “Given that both the international and Norwegian police and justice efforts were fragmented, the possibilities for achieving good results were limited.” An example of fragmented international coordination was when two French representatives held a two week course in basic human rights in the Afghan Ministry of Interior Affairs, albeit most of the participants already had received this course from the Norwegian contingency earlier (NORAF May and June 2007). An example of lack of coordination and planning within NORAF, was the planned Norwegian training center in Meymaneh for the ANP (NORAF May 2010). There was no proper analysis committed and the ANP had not been consulted, which is supported by the fact that suddenly one day, an Afghan training center appeared made by the ANP themselves (Interviewee PO-2).

Another challenge when working in UN operations is that you are unable to control who or what your police officers will be working with when they arrive in the country. When deployed to a operation, many police officers from developing countries earn relatively large sums of money compared to what they earn at home. An IPO earn between 120\$-200\$ per day paid from the UN (Be a peacekeeper 2015), which is more than a police officer from Rwanda earn in a month (RWFacts 2017). Which means that they may try not to be sent home and lose this ‘golden ticket’, often resulting in leaders avoiding to take decisions because they are more focused on not doing something wrong than to pursue the operations mandates (Interviewee PO-1). Another issue regarding the quality of work in UN operations, is based on the UN providing economical reimbursements to countries for their police and troop contribution to UN operations, starting from \$1,028 per person per month (General Assembly 2012). As FPU’s contains approximately 140 officers, a country will earn approximately \$1.730.000 each year for each FPU, especially making it lucrative for poor countries to provide FPU’s for UN operations. The lucrativeness of providing FPU’s has made some countries speculate in FPU’s that are badly or unqualified (Interviewee PE-3), or abuse national systems where non-police personnel with uniform and ranks are deployed, providing the operation with unqualified personnel for the task (Interviewee PE-2).

Another issue with relinquishing control over what the police contribution is used for is that they may get tasks that is over or under their capabilities. An issue with the current security situation in UNMISS is that highly trained and qualified Norwegian police officers are tasked with regular guard duty. But there is a general problem when participating in UN operations that Norwegian police officers are not always used expediently based on their capacities (Møller 2017). Not only does this make international service unsatisfying for the affected police officers, but it also opens up for an ethical dilemma regarding the fact that there are definitely better ways to put this resource to use, both nationally and internationally (Interviewee PO-1). In addition, it makes recruitment harder for POD not knowing what kind of police officers is needed for what position in the operation, as the police officers tasks are not made known until the new contingent members arrive in South Sudan (Interviewee PO-3). This is in contrast to NORAF where Norway owned and controlled the whole operation enabling them to recruit specific police officers for specific tasks (Interviewee PO-3).

Generally speaking, there is a difference in the organization of UNMISS and NORAF. UNMISS provided an established operational framework, but Norway lost the control over their police officers. NORAF on the other hand provided the option of full control over the Norwegian police officers, from recruitment until they returned to Norway post-mission, and Norway had to establish and maintain their own operational framework. The general criticism against UNMISS is based around the lack of control over what and who the Norwegian police officers has been working with. While the main critics of NORAF is connected to the overall coordination and strategy. Both of these critics may cause a reduction in the quality of the operational output.

When it comes to the Norwegian status concerns as a peace nation, on a general basis it is much easier to promote oneself through a bilateral engagement like NORAF than a multilateral engagement as UNMISS. As a small state, like Norway, one run the risk of being “lost in the crowd” among all the other contributing countries in UNMISS. In addition, you run the risk of being perceived as something you are not, due to the actions of other parties in UNMISS, thus hurting Norway’s status as a peace nation. But on a general basis, it is not controversial to provide civilian police to an UN peacekeeping operation. This makes UNMISS the least risky choice of the two with regard to status and the status effect may be questioned.

NORAF on the other hand was a project that Norway had full control over and could handpick the contingency and the tasks they would do (Interviewee PO-3). Therefore, NORAF was the ideal chance to show Norwegian police competence and promote Norway as a peace nation, without disappearing in a larger organization. However, in that sense, NORAF may have failed compared to the potential it had. It does not help much to have full control over the operational framework, if it is not followed up with adequate resources and commitment from the Norwegian MFA. This issue is, however, not only limited to NORAF, but the overall Norwegian contribution to Afghanistan, as stated in NOU 2016: 8 (2016, p. 200 [My translation]): “The overall approach represents an idea that the Norwegian government has failed to convert into practice in Afghanistan”. Therefore, NORAF represented the ‘high risk, high reward’ alternative when comparing NORAF and UNMISS.

Both these operations were successful in maintaining Norwegian commitments to their representative organizations and allies. However, due to the lack of overall coordination and planning, NORAF failed to capitalize on the opportunities provided by being a bilateral operation compared to participation in a multilateral operation. Under such circumstances it would have made more sense to participate in multilateral operations with a set framework, if Norway fail to achieve satisfactory results bilaterally.

A third option that is less relevant to the research question covered, but worth to mention, is the concept of UN specialized police teams. Specialized police teams consists of individual experts picked for a specific tasks within a UN operation (United Nations Police 2017c). Norway currently has a team working with Sexual Gender Based Violence (SGBV) in Haiti, counting six police officers (Det Kongelige Utenriksdepartement 2017). Based on currently established experiences, they appear to increase the potential of putting a Norwegian mark on operations instead of drowning inside a multilateral operation, and be able to maintain Norwegian ideas and interests (Interviewee PO-1). The quality of the training and development of the local police have evidently also increased through specialized police teams, as stated by Møller (2017) quoting a Haitian National Police instructor saying: “Finally MINUSTAH [the UN operation in Haiti] are doing something that really matters for us.”

As with UNMISS, the specialized police team in Haiti is a part of the UN framework. As with NORAF, it is possible to recruit individuals with specific abilities for the operation, because you know what they specifically are going to work with. That way you can recruit specialists for the operation, instead of more generalists that are needed for other operations when you

don't know what the police officers will be tasked with. With the use of specialists, the police officers will be more satisfied with their deployment, while there is a larger chance of successfully reaching the goals set for the operation. In other words, specialized teams is a mix of the advantages of both UNMISS and NORAF. This makes specialized police team the potentially the best option of the three, for future Norwegian participation international operations.

In summary, the advantages with UNMISS are a strong operational framework and coordination across different fields, while the disadvantage is that individual police contributing states lose control over their contributed police officers. In that sense, NORAF is the opposite of UNMISS. NORAF provided the option of full control over the police officers and the police were tasked per the discretion of the Norwegian state. However, NORAF lacked a strong framework and coordination both inside and outside the project. It is, however, important to point out that a lack of coordination between projects were a general issue among many bilateral and multilateral projects in Afghanistan (NOU 2016: 8 2016).

Chapter 6 - Norway's gain by contributing with police officers to South Sudan and Afghanistan

To understand why Norway contribute with police officers to international operations it is a central question what they may gain by doing so and, hence, what have Norway gained by participating with police officers in UNMISS and NORAF. Here I will first approach these questions by discussing how Norway have fulfilled their commitments and goals set for the two operations, and thereafter, what the Norwegian police have gained through participating in international operations.

6.1 Commitments and goals

Commitments

Norway has upheld its commitments to the UN Charter and the North Atlantic Treaty by participating in NORAF, and its commitments to the UN Charter by participating in UNMISS (conf. chapter 4.1 and 4.2). But a relevant question is did it uphold its commitments to the Afghan authorities made by the signing of the bilateral agreement?

The bilateral agreement stated that NORAF should “Assist in the training of Afghan police recruits, other police personnel, and personnel of other Afghan Law enforcement institutions” (Den Kongelige Norske Ambassade Kabul 2003, p. 3), and the training should be based on the principles of rule-of-law and human rights, and include training in combating drug cultivation, processing and trafficking. Based on the NORAF reports, the training benefactors have been primarily ANP, ABP and law enforcement personnel within the Afghan Ministry of Interior Affairs. The topic of human rights was among the main courses taught from the pilot project (Høgseth 2009). Norway joined the UK project in training the CNPA already in 2004

and have therefore also conducted training in combating drug cultivation, processing and trafficking.

The UN Secretary General defines rule-of-law as “a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, public and private, including the state itself are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human rights norms and standards” (Secretary General 2004, p. 4). Afghanistan still had not implemented a national plan against torture (Human Rights Watch 2016) and Afghanistan is ranked 169/176 most corrupt states in the Corruption Perceptions Index (Transparency International 2016). It can therefore be argued that such a country is not based on rule-of-law. However, as NORAF was pursuing the development of a democratic state, one can assume that the training provided by NORAF was based on rule-of-law.

The NOU 2016: 8 (2016, p. 136 [My translation]) summary of the NORAF contribution in Faryab was: “In sum, the Norwegian police efforts appears first of all as a contribution based on symbol politics from Norway to strengthen the civilian efforts in the province, without a sufficient analysis of achievable goals and how to reach them. It is possible to demonstrate good performance in individual projects, but there did not exist and overall plan and priorities shifted”. This statement also works to sum up the overall NORAF contribution, not only the work done in Faryab. One of my interviewees (Interviewee PO-4) stated that his was the least meaning full international operation the interviewee had participated in, and the only legit reason for being there was due to Norway’s NATO membership.

One of the few successful long-lasting projects by the Norwegian army is the training of the Afghan anti-terror unit CRU 222 (Crisis response unit) (NOU 2016: 8 2016). It is worth to note that NORAF assisted in this training of CRU 222 (NORAF November 2008), even when New Zealand was responsible for the Unit (NORAF October 2009). This is one of the few Norwegian success stories from Afghanistan, which also can be regarded as a success story for the NORAF project, and not only for the Norwegian army.

To establish what NORAF’s actual commitments were in addition to its bilateral commitment to the Afghan Government, was not an easy task, as they were not clearly defined. In addition to the commitments for NORAF as a part of the general Norwegian contribution to Afghanistan, NORAF also had interests elsewhere by participating in and cooperating with other operations and nations; for example, the German police project, the UK police project,

the US FFD, and CSTC-A, EUPOL-A, UNAMA and NTM-A. Compared to UNMISS, the situation for NORAF has reflected the overall uncoordinated and confusing situation in Afghanistan. However to sum up, although difficult to be precise, NORAF seemed to fulfill its commitments made to Afghanistan through the bilateral agreement.

Goals

NORAF should not be seen as an individual project, but rather a part of the overall Norwegian contribution to Afghanistan (conf. chapter 4.2). Thus, the overall goals for Norway can also be seen as the goals for NORAF. The three Norwegian goals for Afghanistan that was given in the NOU 2016: 8 (2016) were: (1) to support the US and NATO, (2) stop international terror based out of Afghanistan and (3) build a stable and democratic Afghanistan. The NOU 2016: 8 (2016, p. 193) concludes the following with regard to obtaining the three goals:

- The first goal can be seen as a success, Norway was able to maintain its good relations with the US and securing the continuous relevance of NATO.
- The second goal can be seen as partially met, as there have not been any new international terror attacks based out of Afghanistan.
- The third goal has not been met, Afghanistan has become fully reliant on foreign aid, and conflict and corruption has been steadily increasing.

But are this also the conclusion for how NORAF reached these three goals? NORAF, by being a part of the Norwegian efforts helped maintain relations with the US, and NATO and UN. But NORAF also helped improve relations with the EU through the participation in EUPOL-A. As an interviewee states: “It was important to be a part of the EU mission as a country in Europe. I believe we contributed a lot of good into that mission” (Interviewee PO-2). Being a part of EUPOL-A as a non-EU country also gave an additional international recognition to Norway and the police project. For example, in international fora when the development of the ANP was discussed, the list of contributing nations was often referred to as USA, Canada, EU and Norway (Interviewee PO-4). Giving the impression that Norway was a sizeable contributor. Other small states that it is naturally to compare Norway with, for example Sweden, did not get the same level of recognition for their work because they are a part of the EU. The goal of maintaining international relations, but bilaterally and

multilaterally, can therefore be seen as met, and to a larger degree than compared to the overall Norwegian contribution.

Overall it has been argued that Norway has helped to reduce international terror based out of Afghanistan (NOU 2016: 8 (2016)). NORAF train the ANP that was part of ANSF that fights the different insurgency and terror groups in Afghanistan, so it can be argued that NORAF has partially helped to reach this goal. However, as argued in NOU 2016: 8 (2016), Daesh (more commonly known as IS/ISIL/ISIS) is present with a faction in Afghanistan. Daesh has claimed responsibility for many of the recent international terror acts. It is, however, hard to prove if the Daesh in Afghanistan had anything to do with these incidents. In addition, Felbab-Brown (2017) concludes that this faction of Daesh is primarily consisting of Taliban defectors that has pledged allegiance to Daesh, and is consequently not a part of Daesh. This faction has been able to conduct two major terror attacks in Kabul so far in 2017, against a military hospital in Kabul on the 8. march (Popalzai & Ellis 2017) and against the Iraqi Embassy in Kabul on the 31 July (Osborne 2017). However, national targets seems to be the primary concern of the group and US estimates that most of this faction of Daesh's leadership has been killed and up to 75% of the terror groups fighters has been eliminated (Osman 2017). It is therefore questionable whether or not this group has had any influence on changing whether or not the conclusion made in the NOU 2016: 8 (2016) still is valid. It can therefore be concluded that NORAF has helped to stop international terror based out of Afghanistan through their training of ANP.

It can also be concluded that the goal of establishing a stable and democratic Afghan state, the development assistance oriented goal, has not been met. Afghanistan has become a more democratic state after the removal of Taliban, but it is still a country ravaged by conflicts between different factions and experiences numerous terror attacks. The former UN SRSG to UNAMA, Kai Eide, explained that the security situation has become much worse, and the US has started to use helicopters for transport inside Kabul in fear of attacks when using the roads (Skjetne 2017). Even though the security situation in the country is getting worse, this is in spite that the ANP has received training. However, the overall training has been too uncoordinated and unable to keep up with the growing instability in the country. NORAF has been successful in providing training to the ANP as per the commitments made bilaterally, but there are many other factors in play. Hence, the training of the ANP has not been adequate in establishing a stable and democratic state, therefore, the third goal has not been completed. As the NOU 2016: 8 (2016, p. 197 [My translation]) sums up: "The international and Norwegian

efforts within state building and development show results on some areas by the end of 2014 [...] Given the ambitious of a peaceful and democratic development as it were on its highest, the results still were disappointing, especially in light of the significant resources that has been use on the project”.

For Norway it has been a goal in itself to participate in South Sudan, and in that way maintain its status in South Sudan. Norway’s status in South Sudan is much stronger than the position Norway had in Afghanistan, because the Troika puts Norway among the top three most important states operating in South Sudan (Interviewee SMO-1). This is an important and unique position for a small state like Norway in an international setting. Therefore, it has been important for Norway to maintain its relations to South Sudan, the UN and the Troika to maintain relevance in South Sudan. This has been done through economical contributions (560.9 million NOK in 2016 in direct bilateral assistance (NORAD 2017b), in addition to what is provided through the UN and the participation with personnel, both military and police, to UNMISS. Because Norway has been able to stay relevant in South Sudan, and participated in South Sudan with police officers since the birth of the state. The goal of maintaining Norway’s status as a peace nation internationally and its overall status in South Sudan has been met.

Norway’s large oil reserves makes it possible to assume that the economic and political interests mentioned by Regjeringen.no (2013b) is likely tied to South Sudan’s large oil fields. In the fiscal years of 2017/2018 South Sudan plans to double its oil production to 290,000 barrels per day (Hourelid 2017). With prices for one barrel of crude oil being \$57.74 (Macrotrends 2017), the South Sudanese oil fields represents a major economic interest in the region. As a contrast, Norway produces daily 1,901,000 barrels of oil in November 2017 (Norwegian Petroleum Directorate 2017). Because South Sudan is one of the largest oil producers in Africa (Global Witness 2017), it is a general fear that the conflict can influence the world markets (BBC.com 2014). The Norwegian oil sector provided the Norwegian government with 169 billion NOK in 2015 (Haugan 2017), making it understandable that Norway is interested in maintaining a stable oil marked. If South Sudan produces more oil, there price of oil will probably go down. But it is more favorable to have a stable oil price to better estimate a yearly income. In addition, a stable South Sudan, speaking with one voice, will be easier to make trade agreements with, compared to a South Sudan in civil war with different factions selling oil both on the white and black marked.

Norway implemented through NORAD the Oil for Development (OfD) program to South Sudan, to assist in the oil production, but after the conflicts in 2013, no OfD personnel has been in South Sudan, and in 2016 the project was postponed indefinitely (NORAD 2017a). In this sense, Norway's contribution to South Sudan has failed to provide enough security to stabilize the South Sudanese oil production, which in turn will help stabilize the world market. By assuming that the economic and political interests mentioned by Regjeringen.no (2013b) is connected to the South Sudanese oil production, Norway's engagement in UNMISS and South Sudan has failed to reach this goal.

When comparing NORAF and UNMISS, the goals to maintain Norway's status concerned with its bilateral and multilateral relations has been reached, while Norway has been less successful with reaching the remaining goals. In other words, the goals concerned with status has been reached, while the goals concerned with development assistance was not reached. This may be because the goals related to Norway's status have been the primary goals, and thus been the ones getting most of the attention. As one of my interviewees states in regard to NORAF: "We were there exclusively to be able to say that we were there" (Interviewee PO-4). This is partially supported by the NOU 2016: 8 (2016) that concluded that the police project in Faryab primarily were symbol politics. Hence, it can be argued that Norway's presence in NORAF and UNMISS is based on maintaining international relations and pursuing Norway's status. If correct, it is understandably why only this goal has been reached, and not the more secondary goal of development assistance.

6.2 The police professional framework

In the report regarding Norwegian police in international operations since the first operation in 1989 until 2016, the first recommendation was to establish a "knowledge management mechanism" and a "mechanism that enables the transfer of experience" (Osland 2017a, p. 11). The lack of prioritized learning from the field personnel's experience is not only a problem within the police in international operations. While the Norwegian army has a system for knowledge transfer, the Norwegian MFA does not have an adequate system for this (NOU 2016: 8 2016). Such a system would enable the knowledge and experience made during an

international operation to be saved and generate in a knowledge pool. This knowledge pool would help improving preparations for upcoming contingencies, help to improve the quality of the work done in the field, thus increasing the chance of successfully reaching pre-set goals, and such a system will help understand what individual police officers learn in the field. According to the UN, knowledge management is a key element to improving the organizations output (Caparini & Osland 2017). By systemizing and understanding the acquired knowledge, it would be possible to find ways to implement the knowledge into police officers work at home. That way the Norwegian state would gain a better national police force as a bi product of participating in international operations.

Today's reality is unfortunately different. There is no knowledge mechanism and the experience made in the field is generally not put to good use by the relevant authorities in Norway. Many of my interviewees points to the fact that police officers gain a better understanding of different cultures, and is something they bring back in their daily job, and also might be useful in later tasks. But one interviewee (Interviewee PE-2) stated that the experiences made in the field is lost when police officers return, because their Police Chiefs does not have any personal experience from international operations, and therefore don't understand the competence the returning police officers brings back from deployment. In Osland (2017a, p. 57 [My translation]) report, one of the police officers responds sums this up: "None of my direct superiors or any at the police district leadership has ever shown any interests for what experiences I have gained during my deployment". On the question of whether or not their acquired competence is seen as relevant by their employers upon their return from deployment, 85.9% responded negatively (Osland 2017a).

The NOU 2016: 8 (2016) recommended that the government should consider career planning for military and civilian employees, this is currently far from what seems to be the general practice within the police. Several police officers had experienced that their employer found deployment to international operations to be unfavorable and an ego trip (Osland 2017a). This lack of follow up from their Norwegian employers greatly disappointed many police officers (Kleiven 2012). This shows a negative culture within the Norwegian police that fails to find any value with deploying police officers to international operations. An example of the consequences of the ignorance of international operations is when a highly sought police officer withdrew his application for deployment after being contacted by his police chief that stated very clearly that it would be bad for his career promotions to drive a lorry around in South Sudan for a year (Interviewee PE-4).

Hence, there is a need for a mechanism that is able to highlight what police officers gain through deployment to international operations, and what kind of improved resources the Norwegian police as an organization receives through the returning police officers. This mechanism will also help improve pre-deployment training through direct evaluation of the various topics relevance. In addition, it will better prepared police officers for their work when supported by a knowledgeable POD and MFA that take into use previous experiences. Until then, it is primarily the individual returning police officers that is able to reap the benefits of the acquired knowledge from his or her deployment. While the police service and MFA earn relatively little from the knowledge and experience made in the field.

In Norway, the police are suffering under the military as the “smallest sibling” when it comes to participation in international operations. Norwegian police in international operations will always be inferior in number of people compared to the military. In contrast to the police, the military is a participating part when the Norwegian MFA is considering participation international operations, while the police are contacted after a decision has been made (Interviewee PE-2). Under the current system, the police are unable to provide a police professional advice as to what and where capabilities can be provided, and what police related goals are feasible to achieve. The MFA is responsible to show results when spending large sums on police deployments (Interviewee PE-4). But it is hard to hold POD responsible for lacking results based on a decision process they were unable to part take in and provide police professional advice. It is therefore in the interests of all parties to include POD in the planning process.

The objectives of the decisions made by the politicians was questioned. On a political level it was more important that Norway had police officers in Afghanistan, than what Norway achieved by having police officers in Afghanistan, and as a lack of interest on a strategical level there were never made any guidelines (Interviewee PO-3). Another interviewee disagrees that it was more important to be in Afghanistan, than what was achieved, but states that it was a mistake to not have clear guidelines from the start of the operation (Interviewee SMO-2). One of the police experts puts the responsibility of lack of strategic thinking on POD, and feels that POD currently has a potential for improvements when it comes to strategic thinking (Interviewee PE-1). What is clear from this is that there is an opinion among interviewees that there is room for improvement in the strategic thinking when it comes to international operations.

POD is the governmental organ with the most overall police professional knowledge and where the deployed police officers are managed. It is therefore a natural place to expect strategic planning when it comes to international operations. With regard to police in international operations it is important to understand the interplay between the MFA and different other actors. When the MFA has decided that they want to deploy police officers to a region/operation, they contact POD to see if they have the capacity to respond to their request (Høgseth 2008). If POD is capable of providing police officers, the Norwegian MFA “buys out” the police officers from their current workplace from the Norwegian Ministry of Justice for the period they are deployed. In other words, POD represents the police professional knowledge, and the MFA is the economical responsible, while the Ministry of Justice have to temporarily replace the police officers. It is might therefore be natural to place the strategic responsibilities with POD.

However, there is a major issue related to available resources. First, the delegation of funds from the MFA to POD which decides where Norway is going to deploy forces can be seen as the operational mandate, and is provided on a yearly basis (Interviewee PE-3). This makes it hard to conduct any kind of strategic planning because the operational mandate could change drastically from one year to another. In 2017, the MFA is spending 71,725,000 NOK on police officers in international operations (Det Kongelige Utenriksdepartement 2017), however, none of the MFA’s spending’s appears to be used on any long term strategic or co-ordination work. Today there is 2,5 annual assignments at POD that works specifically with international operations (Personal email received 01.12.2017). These 2,5 persons at POD is responsible for recruiting and supporting police officers deployed to 7 different international operations. It is therefore understandable that POD at its current capacity, is unable to also partake in long term strategic work.

There are several other people working with international questions in relation to the Norwegian police. But there is only the 2,5 persons and one person at the MFA, totaling on 3,5, who works dedicatedly for Norwegian police in international operations. In other words, the framework surrounding Norwegian police in international operations is not a particularly highly prioritized area.

One of the interviewees argued that because the MFA has as a goal to help improve peace and security in the world, and they use the Norwegian police to help to reach that goal, they should be both interested and responsible for financing the strategic work regarding police participation in international operations (Interviewee PE-4). It should be within the MFA’s

interest to send out the best possible representatives for Norway doing the best possible job. And when they are spending as more than 71 million NOK they should be in their interest to spend a bit more to ensure the quality of the output of the projects. It should fall within the responsibility of long time planning and coordination to create and maintain a knowledge gathering and distribution mechanism. Such a mechanism would be essential to enable the best possible completion of the task. As a bonus, this mechanism would also benefit the Norwegian police as a whole. In other words, improved strategic work would benefit both the individual deployed police officers, the goal reaching success rate during the deployment, and the whole police force upon the police officers return. Therefore, result in a generally improved Norwegian police force. It should therefore be in the interests of both the MFA and Ministry of Justice to invest economically into long term strategic and coordination work in regards to international operations.

It only takes relatively minor economic investments to deal with the main critics against Norwegian police officers in international operations, namely lack of overall strategic planning and coordinating. If the government does not wish to fix highlighted problems, it is hard to see that police professional advice plays a role in regards to police officers in international operations, compared to foreign interests of the MFA. If so, it is foreign policy concerns that controls police participation in international operations, not police professional advice.

It is also a commonly occurring concern that Norwegian national foreign policies are prioritized over police professional advice regarding local factors. Brogden (2005, p. 89) believes that police training projects repeatedly fails to take into account the local context. In other words, it is a common issue that the actual local needs are overlooked and when conducting international operations. Brogden (2005) is referring to Wood's (2000) example of a case where local realities were not highlighted during the decision process, namely when the U.K. high commissioner donate bicycles and 300 whistles to a community police forum to help them combat gun trafficking and violence. This raises the question again of whether or not it was most important to show that you were contributing rather than what effect your contribution had.

This seems also to be reflected for parts of the Norwegian contributions to international operations. "It was never a question about how it could help the receiving country better [...] It was always how it appeared, and how to satisfy UN's demands and later NATO's demands" (Interviewee PO-4). Another interviewee had the following to say when comparing

Norway to one of the countries it is often compared Norway to, Sweden: “When they start to do something, they have a more overall mindset with regard to what they wish to gain in return. While Norway, I find to be fragmented at times, we move a little back and forth. And then we check off that we have participated, without taking time to discuss how to best contribute and what are the actual facts in the other end” (Interviewee PE-2).

One example of this was the discussion in regard to whether or not NORAF should join EUPOL-A. The police professional advice from the NORAF in Afghanistan was to avoid joining because it would most likely mean an inapplicable security regime that would result in large amount of “lock downs” (Interviewee PO-4). While the MFA wanted to join EUPOL-A based on maintaining good relations to the EU and hoped for better co-ordination amongst the contributing countries to the training for ANP (Interviewee SMO-2). Norway ended up with partially joining EUPOL-A, and that way maintained good relations to EU, but also chose to ignore the police professional advice, which ended up being right with regards to the security regime (Interviewee PO-4). However, it does not matter if there is a slightly better coordination between European actors in Afghanistan, if they have to stay on “lock down” most of the time and is therefore unable to fulfil their tasks.

Another example of foreign policy factors being prioritized over police professional factors, is aspects of NORAF’s women’s project in Afghanistan. The women’s project was a designated part of the NORAF contingency that was working specifically towards female police officers. In 2009, the women project in NORAF was requested by the Afghan MOI to provide a security course for female officers (NORAF January 2009). This security course gained a lot of attention, both in Norway and internationally. For example, the Norwegian defence minister Anne-Grete Strøm-Erichsen came and visited the Afghan course participants (NORAF March 2009). While the German police project participated as observers on a course to learn from the security course (NORAF November 2009). The EUPOL Training Center Development wanted to cooperate with the security course to hold the course other places in Afghanistan (NORAF August 2011), and later NTM-A formalised a cooperation agreement with the security project (NORAF November 2011). This security project helped to highlight NORAF amongst many different police projects in Afghanistan, and this course was intended to work according to a train-the-trainer principle. The first course was held to educate 16 trainers (NORAF January 2009). Later out in the project, the police professional advice was to distance NORAF from this project and let the trained Afghans take charge while they were monitored by Norwegian instructors. That way NORAF could delegate their resources over to

less functioning projects. This advice was not well received as the security course had become the crown jewel in NORAF's portfolio (Interviewee PO-2). Instead NORAF kept working with their trained instructors until NORAF left Afghanistan (NORAF June 2012). When the police professional advice is to cancel a project, but they are kept running for another year, it is larger political perspective rather than police professional advice that counts (Interviewee PE-3).

In summary, Norway is currently lacking a mechanism to take advantage of the knowledge acquired during deployment to international operations. The lack of such a mechanism leads to poor feedback to the Norwegian police force, and they get little back from deploying police officers to international operations. It also shows a lack of interest in wanting to make use of the overall positive development assistance output the deployed police officers represent. If the MFA does not wish to improve the development assistance tool that the Norwegian police contribution to international operations is, it begs the question why deploy police officers to international operations. If you compare countries that participate in UN operations, you will find countries which are much more professional than Norway (Interviewee PE-1). An example is Finland who has one of the best knowledge gathering mechanisms in Europe for police officers in international operations (Caparini & Osland 2017). The overall strategic framework surrounding Norwegian police in international operations is lacking, and needs to be improved so that the Norwegian police, and Norway, gain from deploying specialists as police officers in international operations. Until then, participation with police officers in international operations only represents a value to the Norwegian MFA, while it represents little police professional value. As shown with examples from the field, police professional advice that potentially could improve the development assistance given, were often a second priority compared to the wishes of the Norwegian MFA.

Chapter 7. Conclusion - Status seeking as an explanation for Norway's participation with police officers in South Sudan and Afghanistan.

According to Neumann and de Carvalho (2015), small states do not compete against great powers for status, instead they are competing against each other to be recognized as a good power through playing on their moral authority and to be perceived as a reliable partner. The previous chapters have presented Norway's participation in UNMISS and NORAF. I shall here summarize the main results and show that when Norway pursues its desire to be perceived as a reliable partner, it is often damaging to its perception as a moral authority. Thereafter, discuss why, when pursuing status, Norway's focus is on being perceived as a reliable partner over a moral authority.

UNMISS and NORAF both have in common that they are based on a UN mandate. By allocating economic and personnel resources to a UN mandated operation, Norway is presenting itself as a reliable partner for the UN. Because small states, like Norway, are better positioned to seek status through multilateral organizations (Schia & Sending 2015). Therefore, multilateral operations mandated by UN is an important platform for small states status seeking. However, it is common within the UN that small states contribute to international operations. As Wohlforth (2015, p. 148) stated: "If all small states punch above their weight, none does. And if many punch above their weight, the fact that Norway does as well brings little status". Hence, to seek status it is not enough to just participate; a small state needs to present and highlight its contribution so it is regarded above the rest of the other smaller states.

In South Sudan, Norway has pursued the position as a reliable partner to maintain the position as the de facto good state amongst the small states. Norway has had an advantage through its long history in the country and membership in the Troika, but this position needed to be maintained to uphold Norway's status. There are three points with regard to Norway's participation in South Sudan that can be observed to show that Norway pursues the perception as a reliable partner to maintain its position as the good power:

- I. Norway has had a police contribution in UNMISS since its establishment in 2011. Norway has maintained its presence in South Sudan through two rounds of civil

unrest, where it once got so bad that both the German and the UK contributions were withdrawn, in addition to the Norwegian embassy staff.

- II. Despite a drastic change in UNMISS's original mandate focusing on capacity building and training to POC, Norway has maintained its police contribution to UNMISS.
- III. Norway maintained the police contribution to UNMISS, even though the operation started a practice that went against the Norwegian view of human rights.

The first point, that Norway has maintained its presence in spite of local unrest, does not cause a conflict between pursuing status as a moral authority and being a reliable partner, but the second and third points do. On the second point, due to the change in the UNMISS mandate, Norwegian police resources were not used to their full capacity. Highly trained Norwegian personnel were at times set on guard duty at the gates of IDP camps, instead of being deployed to other international operations where it could have been possible to achieve more meaningful results. If Norway wanted to pursue a status as a moral authority, Norway should have redistributed the Norwegian police officers to other UN operations where they would have been able to give development assistance through training and other capacity building activities. The use of *unarmed* Norwegian police officers to guard IDP against heavily armed perpetrators was not a good use of the resources the Norwegian police represent. However, by maintaining the Norwegian presence in UNMISS, despite the change in mandate and the local situation, Norway is maintaining its position as a reliable partner.

The third example is based on the use of container prisons in the UNMISS IDP camps. Norway sought to present itself as a moral authority by deciding that the practice conflicted with Norway's views on human rights, and ordered their police officers to avoid partaking in such practices. However, when confronted with the fact that Norway would have to withdraw their police contribution to UNMISS if they chose to comply with the orders, Norway chose to put the order to rest. In other words, Norway decided that it was more important to maintain its contribution to UNMISS and be a reliable partner, than withdraw its contribution and pursue its position as a moral authority.

In the same situation, the Netherlands, with a generally lower status in South Sudan than Norway because they are not a member of the troika, chose to withdraw their contribution to UNMISS. As opposed to Norway, the Netherlands pursued status by presenting itself as a moral authority above a reliable partner.

Regarding NORAF in Afghanistan, the bilateral relationship between Norway and the US needs specific attention. As the primary goals for the Norwegian presence in Afghanistan were to show “...solidarity and offer support to the US, and contributing to securing NATO’s relevance” (NOU 2016: 8 2016). When analyzing NORAF contribution and commitments it cannot only be analyzed as an independent bilateral engagement between Norway and Afghanistan, but rather as a part of the overall Norwegian contribution to Afghanistan.

There are four points that can be highlighted to show that NORAF was a Norwegian tool to primarily improve its position as a reliable partner, and secondarily as a moral authority:

- The establishment of NORAF can be seen as being a part of the process of improving Norway-US relations after Norway chose not to participate in US operations in Iraq.
- The doubling of the NORAF contribution from 9 to 18 police officers can be understood as bettering Norway-US and Norway-NATO relations after Norway chose not to partake in the NATO operations in the southern parts of Afghanistan.
- The termination of NORAF as a result of the termination of the Norwegian military contribution of the PRT in Faryab, per request of the US government.
- The Norwegian MFA went against the independent police professional advice (Hartz et al. 2007), and joined EUPOL-A

The three first of these points are all based on Norway’s primary goal in Afghanistan, to support the US, thus pursuing status through being a reliable partner. The two first goals can also be understood as an attempt to reach the third of Norway’s goals in Afghanistan, building a stable and democratic Afghan state, thus also pursuing status as a moral authority. However, the termination of NORAF came at the expense of the pursuit of moral authority. The same did joining EUPOL-A that had a security regime that hindered effective training and capacity building within the ANP.

Therefore, the participation of Norwegian police officers in UNMISS and the establishment and implementation of NORAF can be seen as Norwegian status seeking through being a reliable partner, above moral authority. As Græger (2015) pointed out, it is better for Norway’s status when Norway receives homage from the US president than a Nordic ministerial colleague, and Norway’s close ties with the US have probably improved Norway’s status in NATO. This also explains why Norway has pursued status through being a reliable partner, above being a moral authority. Pursuing oneself as a reliable partner is a more focused approach towards status seeking than pursuing status as a moral authority. When

pursuing status as a reliable partner, it is directed towards those specific states and organizations where the state wishes to be perceived as a reliable partner. While it is harder to claim moral authority through actions in the same way as being perceived as a reliable partner, because it is harder to control which state will perceive the actions taken as the morally right one. And, hence, in that way improve a state's status as a moral authority based on their actions.

The Norwegian MFA, responsible for the Norwegian civilian contributions to international operations, does not have an institutionalized mechanism to take advantage of the knowledge police officers get in international operations (NOU 2016: 8 2016; Osland 2017a). This can be interpreted as the Norwegian MFA prioritizing contributing with police officers rather than improving the assistance that they contribute. Police contributions to international operations are financed through the Norwegian MFA's development funds, and are in that sense a development assistance tool. Today, the only time the knowledge made during Police deployments are used, is when previously deployed police officers are invited as lecturers to the pre-deployment training, organized by PHS and POD, that police officers receive prior to deployment. However, if the MFA do not improve this particular development assistance tool when given the opportunity, it opens up the question of whether or not development aid is the main purpose of the participation with Norwegian police officers.

Currently, there seem to be no improvement of the overall framework surrounding Norway's participation with police officers to international operations. Until a better framework is established, Norway's participation with police officers in international operations only represents a value to the Norwegian MFA, while it represents little police professional value. In that sense, Norwegian participating with police officers to UNMISS and NORAF can be understood through the concept of status seeking. This notion is strengthened through the examples from international operations, where police professional advice has become secondary compared to the MFA's foreign policy wishes.

When comparing UNMISS and NORAF, there are several advantages and disadvantages to both forms of international operations. However, regarding general conclusions related to multilateral and bilateral operations and Norway seeking status, it should not be done based on only two operations, UNMISS and NORAF. This is because much of the factors that have influenced UNMISS and NORAF have been external factors that have been outside the operational control. In addition, NORAF cannot be seen as a simple bilateral operation, but

rather as an element in the overall international contribution to Afghanistan. They both have in common that only the commitments and goals concerned with maintaining and improving Norway's international bilateral and multilateral relations and to be perceived as a reliable partner has been reached. However, reaching the remaining goals that emphasize moral authority and development assistance has been less successful. It is important to underline that these goals concerned with moral authority have been harder to reach than being a reliable partner. But the goals related to moral authority have arguably also been treated secondary. If they had been equally valued the goals in relation to moral authority would have been prioritized to reach success.

If Norway's intention when contributing with police officers to international operations is to seek status, it means that it is not primarily intended as development assistance. Norway's continued contribution to UNMISS, NORAF joining EUPOL-A and the termination of NORAF are all examples that could have had a different outcome if the intention of participating with police officers was primarily to provide development assistance. In this sense, the goals of providing development assistance can be understood as being undermined through Norway's search for status. This understanding is furthered by the Norwegian MFA's lack of interest in improving Norway's police contribution to international operations as a development assistance tool.

To conclude, Norway's participation with police officers multilaterally to South Sudan and bilaterally to Afghanistan have helped Norway to maintain, and improve, its international status through its desire to be perceived as a good state among the small states. The present thesis has not covered all the factors connected to Norway's presence in South Sudan and Afghanistan. However, based on the results discussed from Norway's participation in UNMISS and NORAF, one can conclude that status seeking has been an important factor when Norway has participated in international operations with police officers. In addition, the two cases discussed in this thesis show that Norway has prioritized status through being perceived as a reliable partner, rather than as a moral authority. And though it has done so successfully, it has potentially come at the cost of the quality of the development assistance that Norwegian police could have contributed to such international operations.

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