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The Australian identity, national security and the United States alliance: examining Australia's idiosyncratic foreign policy

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Declaration

I, Aaron James Willey, declare that this thesis is a result of my research investigations and findings. Sources of information other than my own have been acknowledged and a reference list has been appended. This work has not been previously submitted to any other university for award of any type of academic degree.

Signature.....

Date.....

Dedication

This thesis is primarily dedicated to the memory of my nans: Hilary Dowe and Marjorie Willey. Additionally, my pop: Harry Willey. My mum and dad: Helen Willey and Keith Willey. My brothers: Joel Willey and Daniel Willey. Jesus. And lastly, my inimitable mate Nathan Bennett.

Veritas vos liberabit

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Abstract

This thesis aims to discover how and why Australia has institutionalised an intimate alliance with the United States. This alliance is understood by Australians as a mechanism to consolidate national security. Throughout Australian history national security has dictated its strategic direction and has been the predominant goal of successive governments. However, national security policies are constructed upon multiple conceptualisations because Australians perceive the world in numerous intertwined ways. The concept of national security has been instilled with various meanings when articulated by different Australian governments. Nonmaterial factors, such as social and cultural norms and values, have moulded Australian interests. This demonstrates the interplay between identity within Australia and foreign policy. Indeed, Australia's US alliance behaviour is founded upon contradictory worldviews and is nuanced. This is because Australian national security policy is framed by different conceptualisations and is socially constructed. This thesis contends that Australia has subsequently cultivated an idiosyncratic foreign policy.

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Introduction

The United States (US) occupies a seminal place within Australian foreign policy. This has manifested in Australia solidifying an alliance with the US. The relationship has become highly institutionalised within both Australian government and society (Bisley, 2013, p. 410). This prompts the question: why has Australia desired an intimate alliance with the United States? Developing an understanding of Australia's alliance motives helps to explain its policy objectives. This assists in discerning Australia's historic and current foreign policy trends and for predicting the long-term future of its national security strategies.

In exploration of this idea, Stewart Firth contends that different theoretical assumptions have governed Australia's foreign relations. Firth believes that the Realist concept of state power is central to national security. However, he also affirms that norms associated with international law and cooperation have mollified Australia's global behaviour. Firth concludes that Australian foreign policy is determined by multiple influences (Firth, 2011, p. xiv).

However, in understanding how and why Australia has pursued the intimate US alliance, minimal discussion has categorised the key motivations that have holistically driven Australian foreign policy towards the United States. By contributing to the literature published regarding the Australia-US alliance this thesis identifies important factors that have compelled Australian behaviour. This deconstructs central narratives surrounding Australia's foreign policy and provides insights into its underlying conceptualisations.

Australian foreign policy is dominated by the concept of national security (David Horner as cited in Mediansky, 1997, p. 73). From the viewpoint of David Horner, this medium has guided the strategic direction of Australia throughout its history (as cited in Mediansky, 1997, p. 73). To consolidate its national security objectives Australia has institutionalised an intimate relationship with the United States (Henry S. Albinski as cited in Mediansky, 1997, p. 185). This is Australia's key alliance and has been pursued for several reasons (McLennan, 1997, p. 65). National security policy is constructed upon numerous discourses because Australians conceptualise the world in various intertwined ways (David Horner as cited in Mediansky, 1997, p. 73). All these concepts are somewhat related to the United States (Henry S. Albinski as cited in Mediansky, 1997, pp. 189-190). According to Carl Ungerer, Australian national security concerns are filtered through the prism of the US military relationship (Ungerer, 2014).

To elucidate Australian desirability for the US alliance, the first segment will introduce this thesis' conceptual framework. I will present Kenneth Waltz's International Relations theory of Realism and argue his model describes aspects of Australia's US alliance behaviour. However, I also assert that Waltzian Realism proposes a simplistically cynical view of international relations and this disguises multiple factors that determine Australia's reasoning for an alliance with the United States.

The conceptual framework's second section will introduce Constructivism, an International Relations theory developed to counterpoint Realism. I will examine the phenomena presented within this thesis through Constructivist theory. However, Constructivism is multifaceted and possesses numerous streams. I will posit that collectively these streams provide insight into the various ways Australian national security has been defined. Holistically, a Constructivist analysis helps to understand Australia's desirability for an intimate US relationship.

The first chapter will argue Australia has pursued the US alliance based upon a rational cost-benefit analysis. The Australian government has coveted an intimate alliance with the United States to secure its economic prosperity and balance against perceived threats. However, I also contend that the alliance is predicated on a normative component. Both Australian government and society have affirmed that common values and norms underpin the intimate relationship. These two conceptualisations have driven Australia's national security strategies towards the US.

The second chapter will attest that consecutive Australian governments have been influenced by the 'Middle Power' concept. National policymakers have manufactured and positively imbued this international relations approach within Australia's political discourse. Through their behaviour, successive Australian governments have constructed and reproduced the 'Middle Power' reputation globally. In constructing this external identity, Australian statesmen have also associated this international role with the US. This has denoted domestically that the US alliance is important to national security and legitimised the US' functionary role within foreign policy to the public.

The third chapter will posit that Australian statecraft towards Asia has primarily been formulated through the prism of fear. An entrenched fear of Asia has remained an underlying feature of both Australian society and government. This trend is predicated upon civilisational discourse because Australians predominantly imagine Asian peoples as intrinsically dissimilar and dangerous. This xenophobia has determined Australian national security policies and is exemplified by the examples of Indonesia and China.

The fourth chapter will contend that the 1983-1996 Bob Hawke-Paul Keating government constructed a new national myth. This represented social engineering through elite intervention. Through this project the Labor government aimed to undermine the dominant Anglo-Celtic national identity and ideationally reposition Australia further into Asia. The achievement of this objective was portrayed as a national security concern to the populace. However, the regionalist myth advanced by the Australian government was both paradoxical and ambiguous in its portrayals of Asia. This project was further undermined by the government's hostile defence posture towards Asia and maintenance of the intimate US alliance to preserve territorial national security. These actions subsequently reinforced Australia's ideological alienation from Asia.

The fifth chapter will argue that the John Howard 1996-2007 government repurposed the prevalent ANZAC (Australian and New Zealand Army Corps) myth in Australian society and culture. Howard's rhetoric depicted the preservation of Australian values as a national security concern. By using shared normative understandings implicit within the militaristic Anzac tradition, Howard tailored a specific national security discourse. The discourse's deployment systematically silenced major dissent and mobilised the public to support Australian intervention in the US' War on Terror.

The sixth chapter will affirm that Australian national security has been governed by a dominant strategic culture. Australia's strategic culture prioritises bilateral alliances with a 'great and powerful friend'. First the United Kingdom (UK), and now the United States. Australia's strategic culture reflects its geostrategic impediments because successive governments have leveraged these relationships to secure territorial national security. This dependence though has encouraged Australia to demonstrate unwavering loyalty to its 'great and powerful friend'. However, from an Australian perspective, these alliances are multifaceted. Social and cultural norms have also created Australia's national security interests because Australia perceives an alignment of values with Western countries. This characteristic has instituted a social contract between society and government regarding Australia's acceptable alliance mechanism to protect national security.

The seventh chapter will assert that the Australia-US alliance has become somewhat problematised. This stems primarily from Australian uneasiness regarding China within global politics. Both society and government have articulated concerns that Australian national security is partially undermined by the intimate US alliance. Australia has subsequently attempted to balance both bilateral relationships and remain noncommittal in certain areas. However, these relationships are interdependent and cannot be

compartmentalised. This has created flashpoints of tension within the Australia-US relationship and demonstrates that the alliance is nuanced.

The eighth chapter will argue that particular phenomena presented within this thesis are also explained by Wayne McLean's Realism. McLean's Realism is anchored in revisionist Realist authors and challenges Constructivist interpretations of international relations (McLean, 2016). He argues the Australian government has demonised asylum seekers to redirect and partition domestic xenophobia from issues concerning China. Through these actions the government has safeguarded its Chinese security and economic relationship. McLean also seeks to undermine the view that the Australia-US alliance is underpinned by ideational factors. McLean's analysis provides insights into Australian behaviour. However, I will contend that Constructivism affords greater understandings into Australia's national security machinations and the resultant US alliance pursuit.

In responding to challenges within international affairs Australia has aimed to consolidate its national security interests. On a macro-level national security has been the Australian government's primary objective and has directed foreign policy (David Horner as cited in Mediansky, 1997, p. 73). This has become manifest in Australia institutionalising an intimate alliance with the United States. The factors which have compelled Australian alliance behaviour are heterogeneous (Henry S. Albinski as cited in Mediansky, 1997, pp. 185-188). The term national security has been imbued with various meanings when defined by different Australian governments (Ungerer, 2010). Nonmaterial factors, such as social and cultural norms and values, have moulded Australian behaviour (Gyngell & Wesley, 2007). This demonstrates the interplay between identity within Australia and foreign policy and exhibits the efficacy of Constructivism in explaining prevalent Australian favourability towards the United States (Devetak & True, 2006, p. 241). Indeed, Australia's US alliance behaviour is founded upon contradictory worldviews and is nuanced. This is because Australian national security policy is framed by different conceptualisations and is socially constructed. This thesis contends that this has resulted in Australia developing an idiosyncratic foreign policy.

Conceptual framework

The importance of organisational devices

Discerning the social reality requires a framework for analysis. These frameworks are based on theories and function as organising devices to classify social phenomena and establish the criteria of relevance of the analysed subject. This designates key explanatory variables that provide insights into a nation's foreign policy rationale (Holsti, 1992, p. 5). The following section will detail Waltzian Realism and Constructivism. Comprehending these theories helps to explain facets of Australian behaviour towards the US.

Kenneth Waltz's Realism

Realism is the dominant theoretical perspective within International Relations scholarship (Rosenau, 2000). An important strand of this theoretical approach is Neorealism. This Realist tradition was first introduced by Kenneth Waltz in his 1979 book "Theory of International Politics" republished in 2010 (Kenneth N. Waltz, 2010). Waltz seeks to explain how states behave in the world and postulates that the international political system is defined by the inexistence of a central authority and is inherently anarchical. This condition is understood as a static characteristic of global politics (Kenneth N. Waltz, 2010, p. 114).

The primary referent object within the international system is a state. These units are regarded as both sovereign and functionally uniform (Kenneth N. Waltz, 2010, p. 96). Consequently, states possess similar institutional features and are socialised into the multistate system through a combination of competition and imitation. Additionally, Waltzian Realism contends that states have similar needs however, retain different capabilities. States possess more capability and power than others and this cultivates fear and insecurity because states are unable to discern other states' precise intentions. Consequently, this leads to a Security Dilemma (Kenneth N. Waltz, 2010, p. 187).

According to this theoretical framework states are rational and egoistic. States are concerned primarily with safeguarding their safety and survival. To attain this objective national governments will consolidate and retain power to maximise their security vis-à-vis competing nations, a pursuit predicated upon the state's perception of mutually exclusive

agendas (Kenneth N Waltz, 1988, p. 70). The nature of the competition is viewed in zero-sum terms, which denotes that one state's gain is equal to another's loss within the international system (Li, Xie, Meng, & Xu, 2011).

In essence, this intrinsic anarchy necessitates that nations ratify foreign policies aimed at preserving and enhancing their strategic objectives (Jepson, 2012). This is the primary motivation guiding the formation of foreign policy. This results in governments using a cost-benefit analysis to evaluate the desirability of a specific policy. Accordingly, this helps the state predict whether an action's benefits outweigh its incurred costs (Cellini & Kee, 2010, p. 496).

These national security concerns similarly determine a state's rationale for pursuing alliances. From the viewpoint of Stephen M. Walt, alliances are predominantly formulated in response to threats (Walt, 1985, pp. 8-9). Based on Waltzian Realism, a key component of alliance theory is balancing which involves allying in opposition to the principal source of danger. According to this rubric, states increase their security because aggressors confront combined opposition (Walt, 1985, p. 3). States will conform to this pattern, irrespective of their partisan attachments and domestic political machinations. Waltz's theory proposes that domestic politics negligibly influences both states' foreign policies and outcomes within worldwide politics (Hobden & Hobson, 2002, p. 68).

Waltz's approach explains aspects of international relations through underscoring the importance of national security to alliance calculations. His framework is important because Australian statesmen have been influenced by this brand of Realism. For example, in discussions with the US regarding China, former Prime Minister Kevin Rudd self-identified as a Realist (as cited in Flitton, 2010). Leslie H. Gelb, the emeritus president of the Council on Foreign Relations, categorised Waltz as a watershed academic who altered the study of International Relations (as cited in Martin, 2013). However, Waltz's analysis unduly emphasises struggle within worldwide politics and advances a superfluously pessimistic view of global relationships. Michael P. Sullivan similarly observes that within International Relations scholarship Waltzian Realism has been derided as both oversimplified and wholly incorrect (Sullivan, 2005, p. 333). This leads the Waltzian paradigm to inadequately define the concept of national security and conceal important factors that govern alliance behaviour. Using this theoretical model to holistically explain Australian foreign policy towards the US is fallacious. This contrasts with the Constructivist approach to International Relations.

Constructivism

Constructivist theory was developed to counteract Realism. Alexander Wendt has argued that Constructivism provides insights into why and how strategic actors have enabled structural change within world politics (Wendt, 1992). This theoretical framework provides a more comprehensive understanding of national security by rejecting universal definitions. Through emphasising its innate particularities Constructivists focus on how specific security perspectives and practices emerge. National security is variously defined and is socially constructed (Matt McDonald as cited in Williams, 2013, p. 65). In this analysis who and what constitutes a group; its core values; perceived origination of threats to those values; and how value preservation or advancement are achieved are paramount considerations (Matt McDonald as cited in Williams, 2013, p. 65). For Constructivists, security is context specific and is defined by the actors' social interaction and is articulated and negotiated in a precise social and historical context. Constructivists evaluate how security is ascribed meaning and analyse its implications for political practice within a particular setting (Matt McDonald as cited in Williams, 2013, p. 65). What constitutes security is determined by identity within a group.

Identity is a term which denotes perceptions of self both individually and collectively. Nonmaterial factors are central to worldwide security practices. The key ideational dimension of world politics addressed by Constructivists is the role of norms. Norms are defined as shared expectations about appropriate or legitimate behaviour by actors within an ideational grouping (Matt McDonald as cited in Williams, 2013, p. 65). Actors acquire identities, which are defined as relatively stable, role-specific understandings and expectations about self, by participating in normative collective meanings (Anthony Giddens as cited in Wendt, 1992, p. 397). This definitional process of identity is formulated through interactor negotiation and contestation.

The negotiation and contestation of national security occurs within a state's social setting. This begins with actors verbally claiming to represent a group (Matt McDonald as cited in Williams, 2013, p. 68). In exploring how security is ascribed meaning, Constructivists firstly emphasise that national security is negotiated between political leaders and domestic audiences. Secondly, these concepts are contested between actors articulating alternate visions of values and their method of achievement (Matt McDonald as cited in Williams, 2013, p. 67). This signifies the mutual constitution between agents and structures.

The intersubjective interaction of agents and structures defines a state's national security interests. National security is conceived through interstate relations. Constructivism disputes that state interests are determined by the anarchical nature of the international system. This view is captured in Wendt's 1992 article "Anarchy Is What States Make of it" (Wendt, 1992). In his publication Wendt challenges the view that global anarchy inevitably conditions state interests and action. Using the sociologist Anthony Giddens' concept of structuration, Wendt suggests that through their behaviour state agents are capable of influencing both the content and effects of the global anarchical structure. The meaning states ascribe to anarchy is undetermined by a higher authority's nonexistence. Wendt concedes that anarchy encourages self-help, an overwhelming concern with survival and viewing conflict as an inevitable feature of world politics. However, he asserts this represents a mutable culture of anarchy and through their practices states choose to either maintain or disrupt this culture (Wendt, 1992, p. 395). This leads Constructivists to conclude that possibilities of change exist because states' actions either validate or question the international system's normative basis (Matt McDonald as cited in Williams, 2013, p. 69). Normative behaviour stems from prevalent discourses within national societies. This is because discourse governs both predominant beliefs and interests in states (Walt, 1998, pp. 40-41). These desires are formulated through the intersubjective interaction; the mutual constitution of agents and structures; and the central role of ideational factors, such as norms and identities, in the dynamics of both national and world politics (Matt McDonald as cited in Williams, 2013, p. 64). Accordingly, national security is socially constructed. Constructivism eschews describing reality given its presupposed fluidity and produces theory that elucidates specific cases (Jackson, 2010, p. 203).

Constructivism is important in explaining Australia's desirability for an alliance with the United States. Gaining an understanding of Australia's US alliance behaviour identifies the influence of ideational factors within its national security strategies. Their formulation has resulted from the interplay between agency, identity and normative values within Australian politics. However, multiple Constructivist theories explain Australia's rationale for an intimate US relationship. This is because its alliance behaviour is predicated upon contradictory worldviews and is nuanced. Australian foreign policy is subsequently framed by different conceptualisations and is socially constructed. Each section will describe Constructivist approaches specifically related to the behaviours exhibited by Australia towards the US. The exception is Elizabeth Kier's normative partisan framework which is used in three chapters: Australia's US alliance rationale (chapter 1), Fear and the Australian

political discourse (chapter 3) and The Hawke-Keating government's Asia-Pacific myth (chapter 4). Cumulatively, these themes illustrate the idiosyncratic characteristics of Australia's foreign policies.

Elizabeth Kier's normative partisan framework

Elizabeth Keir, in her article "Culture and military doctrine: France between the wars", evaluates how a state's national security doctrine is determined. In Keir's theoretical model military doctrines within a state are produced partly by its domestic political machinations (Kier, 1995, p. 67). Within particular countries Keir argues this represents a consensual partisan framework because all important political actors similarly view the military's role (Kier, 1995, p. 69). This convergence stems from the alike social values and ideas that determine these individuals' mindsets within their respective societies. Keir's Constructivist model elucidates how state military doctrines are formed through non-systematic normative determinants (Kardaş, 2006, p. 92). This addresses how a civilian policymaker's perspective and agency helps formulate the national armed forces' role within a state (Kier, 1995, p. 67). This represents an important mechanism that governs a state's national security strategy.

The limitations of research within International Relations

Historically, the concept of objective analysis within International Relations has been a paramount consideration. For example, Émile Durkheim contended that incorporating the personal values of a study's practitioners was unscientific. This is because eradicating preconceptions is essential to preserving the study's integrity (as cited in Bryman, 2012, p. 39). However, Alan Bryman posits that this theoretical position has reversed nowadays. Within social science scholarship, such as International Relations, he accepts the infeasibility in curtailing the researcher's biases (Bryman, 2012, p. 39). For instance, the researcher may develop a sympathy which was absent at the outset. Alternatively, an individual's social and cultural conditioning could pollute the interpretation of data and its conclusions. Researchers are advised to caution readers about their assumptions (Colin Turnbull as cited in Bryman, 2012, pp. 39-40). Accordingly, I have been influenced by the International Relations theory of Constructivism and I am liable to interpret information and data through this prism. Using this organisational device might impair my investigation by disguising significant facets of

the analysed subject (Holsti, 1992, p. 5). I subsequently acknowledge this shortcoming. However, an academic enquiry should expose its value-laden premises to both investigation and criticism. This has been an agenda within this thesis.

In summary, this thesis has eschewed providing prescriptive solutions for global politics. In his seminal work “The Anarchical Society: A Study of World Order”, Hedley Bull likewise contended that assessments which presented “practical advice” are a corrosive element (Bull, 2012, p. 308). Throughout this examination my conscious purpose has been to provide an intellectual description of historical Australian behaviour towards the United States within international affairs.

Chapter 1: Australia's US alliance rationale

The ANZUS alliance is Australia's key military relationship with the United States. ANZUS, a collective security agreement between Australia, New Zealand and the United States, was formalised in 1951. ANZUS was created in the post-World War II era and stemmed from apprehensions within the Australian and New Zealand governments concerning future Japanese remilitarisation and the rise of communism within their immediate East Asian neighbourhood (W. Tow & Albinski, 2002, p. 153). The Treaty constituted an American security guarantee to both Australia and New Zealand against these threats. However, New Zealand was suspended from ANZUS in 1986 after initiating a nuclear-free zone in its territorial waters and disallowing the entry of nuclearised American vessels (W. Tow & Albinski, 2002, p. 153). The term ANZUS currently denotes the Australia-US bilateral relationship.

This relationship, in reference to the British-American 'special relationship', was labelled the "new special relationship" by former Australian Prime Minister Julia Gillard in 2011 (as cited in Platell, 2011). However, as Amanda Platell notes, the relationship is long-established and increasingly close (Platell, 2011). Nick Bisley further asserts that the alliance possesses heightened institutional and cultural depth within Australia (Bisley, 2013). Both society and government have desired Australia to maintain military linkages with the US. From an Australian perspective, this alliance is multidimensional. The relationship is based upon a rational cost-benefit analysis which provides quantitative military and economic advantages. According to Desmond Ball, these benefits are the strategic essence of the alliance and guarantee Australia's defence and economic prosperity (Ball, 2001b, p. 235). However, the alliance is also based upon the existence of shared norms, values and fraternity. Paul Dibb likewise asserts that the common democratic values of Australia and the United States has contributed to the alliance's entrenched resilience (Dibb, 2005, p. 1). The interaction of these elements has produced the current policy setting (Bisley, 2013).

The Australian public views America favourably. Despite widespread criticism of certain features of the United States' global role, public polling highlights the consistent majority support Australians exhibit for the American alliance (Bisley, 2013, p. 411). This is evinced by a 2015 Lowy Institute poll. In this poll 77% of Australians agreed that: "Australians and Americans share many common values and ideals. A strong alliance is the natural extension of this" (*THE US ALLIANCE*, 2015). Moreover, this theme is similarly

demonstrated by the National Opinion Survey: Australian Attitudes Towards the US conducted in late 2007 by Professor Murray Goot for the United States Studies Centre at the University of Sydney. This study reveals that 79% of Australians believed the American alliance was either “very important” or “fairly important” (as cited in Goot, 2007, p. 19). Evidently, Australians have expressed solidarity with the US and this has manifested into a dominant social and cultural perception that the bilateral relationship is highly important to Australia (Bisley, 2013). Accordingly, the alliance has become a resolute feature of the domestic polity.

The Australia-United States alliance is highly valued within Australia. According to Doctor Kerry Raymond Bolton, Australians perceive the US as both benevolent and overwhelmingly powerful. In their language describing the United States, Bolton maintains that Australians have endowed the US with sibling nation-state status (Bolton, 2012, p. 3). According to Dennis Phillips, this has resulted in the alliance possessing unrivalled bipartisan support within Australian politics (Phillips, 2008a). Alan Renouf, former Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs, has noted that the intimate relationship with the US has entrenched itself as the Bible in Australia’s foreign relations (as cited in Phillips, 2008a). Historian Peter Edwards likewise contends that the alliance has become an Australian political institution (as cited in Phillips, 2008a). Indeed, another support mechanism for the alliance is elite attitudes. These attitudes have resulted in the alliance gaining a robust foundation within the Australian polity. The bipartisan US approach to international relations within the Australian government has been named ‘the Canberra consensus’ by Nick Bisley (Bisley, 2013, p. 410).

Australia’s bipartisan approach to the Australia-US relationship is comprised of two underlying conceptualisations. These dual desires for an intimate relationship with the United States are: a Realist cost-benefit assessment and shared normative values. Consecutive Australian governments have adopted a relatively uniform approach to the American alliance (Bisley, 2013). D. McDougall likewise contends that the US relationship is defined by emphasis rather than divergence by the Labor and Coalition governments (McDougall, 2009, p. 68). This has resulted in Australian strategic thinking being dominated by both Realist rational concerns and normative views. This is firstly illustrated by Australia’s Realist US alliance objectives.

Australia's Realist US alliance objectives

The US alliance is the centrepiece of Australia's national security strategy. The security agreement delivers multiple benefits and has helped Australia achieve its security goals and protect its vital interests. From the perspective of the Australian government, its intimate alliance with the United States provides Australia with privileged access to: US military hardware and training, intelligence, American policy-elites and nuclear deterrence capabilities (Bisley, 2013).

The alliance provides Australia with privileged access to the US military. The relationship allows the Australian Defence Force (ADF) to capitalise the United States' military hardware and training (Bisley, 2013). The US possesses the world's most technologically sophisticated and proficient military and strictly regulates defence trade by hierarchising allies' access to technology. For instance, in 2007 Australia was awarded the highest access level to US technology (as cited in Bisley, 2013, p. 406). With the US maintaining its technological hardware pre-eminence this imbues the ADF with a distinct material advantage (Bisley, 2013, p. 406). This is illustrated by the 2000 Australian Defence White Paper. The Paper asserts that Australia has strived to ascertain:

better access to US military technology, including in highly critical and sensitive areas that could give us a vital edge in combat. The kind of ADF that we need is not achievable without the technology and access provided by the US alliance (as cited in Government, 2000, p. 35).

Moreover, without this arrangement the cost of acquiring advanced technologies would be prohibitively high (Bisley, 2013, p. 406). This access is paramount to both achieving and maintaining the primacy of Australia's defence capabilities relative to its perceived enemies. The Australian government subsequently believes the US alliance helps Australia achieve its rational national security goals.

The alliance similarly affords Australia access to US intelligence networks and technology. Australia receives much intelligence from the United Kingdom-United States of America Agreement (Bisley, 2013, p. 406). Canberra policymakers regard the intelligence relationship as Australia's greatest strategic asset and is critical to national security (Ball, 2001a). For example, the 2000 White Paper contends that "[i]ntelligence cooperation and

sharing [with the United States] play a central role in enhancing our understanding of the world around us” (as cited in Government, 2000, p. 35). According to a 2006 House of Representatives Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade Inquiry, “[t]his feature of the alliance is the least stated but possibly one of the most significant aspects of Australia’s defence relations with the US” (as cited in *Australia’s Defence Relations with the United States Inquiry Report*, 2006, p. 35). This view is mirrored by Peter Jennings in an Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) report. In the inquiry Jennings stated that Australian intelligence gathering and assessment would be hampered without the alliance. Furthermore, akin to the acquisition of military hardware, Jennings asserts that Australia cannot monetarily afford to duplicate America's intelligence gathering capability (submission 11 to the Inquiry as cited in *Australia’s Defence Relations with the United States Inquiry Report*, 2006, p. 35). Evidently, the Australian government believes the intimate US rapport helps Australia achieve its rational national security objectives.

The Australia-US alliance provides Canberra political access to Washington. Privileged access to US policymakers has remained a key purpose of ANZUS for Australia (Bisley, 2013). Australian elites have historically believed this link helps strengthen national security. This view is highlighted by Percy Spender who was an Australian architect of the ANZUS agreement. The Treaty was designed by Australia to intersect with Washington’s informational network. For instance, Spender wrote to Australian Prime Minister Robert Menzies that ANZUS “was to be a toe hold into the councils in USA [sic] which affect the world and its destiny” (as cited in Bisley, 2013, p. 406). Likewise, former Prime Minister Paul Keating contended that “ANZUS’s main and critical benefit may simply be this: it provides standing for us to have our voice heard in Washington, especially about developments in this part of the world” (as cited in Bisley, 2013, p. 406). Nick Bisley, in his article “‘An ally for all the years to come’: why Australia is not a conflicted US ally”, has likewise argued that political access helps Australia procure its interests (Bisley, 2013, p. 406). Indeed, from the perspective of consecutive Australian governments, the alliance has consolidated Australia’s rational national security objectives.

The US nuclear stockpile occupies a seminal place within Australian foreign policy. Australia uses the coverage of the United States’ nuclear weapons to allay national security concerns. This is because the United States is the world’s leading nuclear power and consecutive administrations, to protect US worldwide hegemony and security, have threatened to deploy the nation’s comprehensive arsenal to deter threatening state actors. This strategy of deterrence has been named the Calculated Ambiguity Doctrine (CAD) (Sagan,

1996). The CAD-strategy is highlighted by the 1996 rhetoric of the American Secretary of Defense William Perry, conjecturing the extent of a US retaliation:

For obvious reasons, we choose not to specify in detail what responses we would make to a chemical attack. However, as we stated during the Gulf War, if any country were foolish enough to use chemical weapons against the United States, the response will be ‘absolutely overwhelming’ and ‘devastating’ (as cited in Sagan, 1996, p. 85)

Through this deterrence strategy, the United States intends to contain aggression within the international political system. Furthermore, the ANZUS agreement affords Australia protection underneath the United States’ nuclear ‘umbrella’ (Clarke, Frühling, & O’Neil, 2015). Adversaries are deterred from attacking Australia because the United States and its allies are perceived alike. Indeed, Australia officially subscribes to the Cold War doctrine of extended deterrence (Firth, 2013). This policy represents an integral element in Australian national security strategies. For instance, according to the Australian government in 2009, extended nuclear deterrence “provides a stable and reliable sense of assurance and has over the years removed the need for Australia to consider more significant and expensive defence options” (as cited in Government, 2009, p. 50). These views are mirrored in an Australian Department of Defence document published in 2006 which states:

Australia does rely on the extended deterrence provided by US nuclear forces to deter the remote possibility of any missile born nuclear attack on Australia... our policy recognises that it is only the extended umbrella of US nuclear forces that can provide us with a comprehensive deterrent protection against anything more substantial in terms of nuclear missile strike (as cited in Government, 2006, pp. 6-7).

Evidently, US nuclear policy has informed Australia’s national security doctrine. By using the intimate connection with the United States, Australia has neutered perceived threats without expending capital to independently develop the technology. This has reduced budgetary pressure and, from the perspective of consecutive governments, helped strengthen Australia’s rational national security interests. Australia subsequently desires to advance the United States’ position within the world.

Australian foreign policy has aimed to promote American primacy (H. White, 2011). Canberra believes that US military pre-eminence within the Asia-Pacific region underpins

Australia national security. This is because America has largely stifled interstate friction with its armed movable assets (Fullilove, 2015a). The forward presence of the United States military in Asia has supported regional stability and helped Washington create an advantageous economic order based upon economic liberalism. This has provided successive countries, such as Australia, with high economic growth (Fullilove, 2015a). According to John Ikenberry, US power has become a central component of the contemporary international order (as cited in Beeson, 2003, p. 398). The United States' institutionalisation of the current liberal rules-based-order has afforded tangible benefits to its participants. Ikenberry further asserts that its creation of influential intergovernmental institutions, such as the World Bank and the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs, has advanced an international economy that has bonded nations through commerce. US benevolence is illustrated by its self-restraint to eschew favouring American interests through domination (John Ikenberry as cited in Beeson, 2003, p. 398). This development has substantially benefited the Australian economy. The United States regional order protects both the stability and prosperity of Australian interests abroad. Indeed, Kevin Rudd asserted the status quo regional architecture is highly preferred (as cited in Flitton, 2010). This is likewise reflected by Australia's Centre of Strategic & International Studies which contends United States supremacy is favoured by Australia (M. J. Green, Dean, Taylor, & Cooper, 2015). As historian John Lewis Gaddis has observed, the US established its worldwide hegemony by consent (as cited in Fullilove, 2015a). The Australian government is primarily concerned about regional instability arising from competition between the major powers. This destabilisation, rather than threatening Australia's territorial integrity, would problematise the international environment (Bisley, 2013). Consequently, this would constrain Australia's ability to pursue its economic objectives within the Asia-Pacific region. Successive governments have subsequently committed Australia to the alliance and the US' broader regional vision (Bisley, 2013, p. 404). These policies have mostly centred on China.

Harry J. Kazianis argues China's rise is generating regional instability. He asserts that Beijing is aggressively aiming to slowly weaken the political and military status quo to consolidate its disparate interests (Kazianis, 2016). The view is reflected by Australian commentator Doctor Michael Fullilove who contends that China aspires to be the pre-eminent power in Asia and displace the US (Fullilove, 2015a). From the viewpoint of Kazianis, an intense security competition is developing between China and America and its regional allies which includes Australia (Kazianis, 2016). Indeed, Australia has expressed

concerns regarding Chinese behaviour. This has resulted in consecutive governments assuming only US involvement can neuter Chinese aggression (Park, 2011).

The Australia-US alliance system within the Asia-Pacific has adapted to protect against Chinese aggression. Australia hopes to counteract an undesirable Chinese multilateral order emerging (Park, 2011). From the perspective of the Australian government, this would undermine Australian interests (Park, 2011). Accordingly, Australia desires to safeguard the United States' benign hegemony. This trend is highlighted by the rhetoric of former Prime Minister Paul Keating.

For instance, in 1993 the Clinton administration shifted the United States' posture on multilateralism. President Clinton advanced the formation of a "new Pacific community" (Park, 2011, p. 144). This revised American approach resulted in the creation of Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). Australian efforts to facilitate this multilateral community were primarily related to preserving the US regional security commitment. Maintaining the United States' regional engagement was the overriding aspiration of the Australian government (Park, 2011, p. 145). For example, in a 1996 speech addressed to Singapore's Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Paul Keating emphasised that "[o]ne of the main reasons behind Australia's support for APEC has been our conviction that closer America economic engagement in Asia and the Pacific will reinforce the essential political underpinnings of its security relationships" (as cited in Park, 2011, p. 145). Evidently, Australia positively views the US underpinned regional order. From an Australian perspective, the intimate alliance has strengthened its rational national security interests. This has resulted in Australia seeking to sustain US engagement in the Asia-Pacific.

Protecting US primacy remains a major feature of Australia's security policies (Park, 2011). Australia contributed to the achievement of this objective by gaining inclusion into the East Asia Summit (EAS). For instance, China was initially enthusiastic prior to the summit and hoped to manipulate the meeting to assert its regional influence (Park, 2011, p. 150). This provoked concern that China desired to bifurcate the involved countries into US and China blocs (Park, 2011, p. 150). This was based upon zero-sum calculations because China's actions were designed to reduce the United States' influence and preside over an 'East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere' (Park, 2011, p. 150). To circumscribe this development the US compelled its regional allies to include Australia. By including Australia this maintained indirect US influence on the summit and counteracted Chinese ambitions (Park, 2011, pp. 150-151). The addition of Australia into the EAS helped undermine the development of a hostile indigenous grouping in the Asia-Pacific and curtailed East Asian exclusivism (Park,

2011, pp. 149-151). Jae Jeok Park contends that this obstructed Chinese efforts to refashion the Asia-Pacific order and helped ensure US pre-eminence (Park, 2011, p. 152). Evidently, Australia has contributed to the United States' agenda. From an Australian perspective, America's regional presence strengthens Australia's ability to pursue its economic goals (Dewar, 2011).

The Australian government has developed an intimate rapport with the United States to secure its strategic interests. This has been predicated on a rational cost-benefit analysis. The benefits Australia receives are understood to negate perceived threats and maintain economic prosperity. Indeed, the US alliance has strengthened Australia's rational national security aims. This demonstrates the Realist worldview of Australia and these optics have determined aspects of foreign policy. However, from an Australian viewpoint, the Australia-United States alliance is similarly based upon a normative component.

The importance of norms within the Australia-US alliance

Australian policymakers cherish the shared norms between Australia and the United States ("Australia Matters for America/America Matters for Australia," 2015). Language which invokes fraternity between both countries is frequently employed in Australian discourses. This captures an integral aspect of the security relationship with the US. The rhetoric of former Australian Prime Minister Julia Gillard illustrates this trend. Gillard, in her speech to the United States Congress in 2011, contended:

Speaking for all the Australian people...to all the people of the United States... [the Australian government offers] a simple message. A message which has been true in war and peace, in hardship and prosperity, in the Cold War and in the new world. A message I repeat today... You have a true friend down under.... [American soldiers] risk[ed] everything to help free the world... I see the same brave and free people today... You have an ally in Australia. An ally for war and peace. An ally for hardship and prosperity. An ally for the sixty years past and Australia is an ally for all the years to come... [o]ur values are shared and our people are friends. This is the heart of our alliance. This is why in our darkest days we have been glad to see each other's face and hear each other's voice... Australia will stand firm with our ally the

United States. Our friends understand this. Our enemies understand this too... As a friend we share your grief. As an ally we share your resolve... [Australia shares the United States' belief] [t]o foster human rights and religious freedom [abroad]... In both our countries, true friends stick together. Our nations do this, and our people do this as well (as cited in Gillard, 2011).

Moreover, Gillard personalised these values by recounting an anecdote of Australian sacrifice alongside the Americans. In her narrative she described that “one group of Australians spent two months in New York training and working, including a long time with New York’s Fire Department Rescue 1. They worked hard together and became more than colleagues - they became mates”. One Australian, Kevin Dowdell, “was one of the hundreds of New York firefighters killed when the [twin] towers came down [in 2001]”. Gillard concludes by asserting that this story “says it all about the friendship between Australia and the United States” (as cited in Gillard, 2011).

Evidently, Gillard’s speech praised the United States. In her language she emphasised the positivity of the United States’ values which are similarly possessed by Australia. Through establishing a shared history of like-mindedness and cooperation Gillard fostered imagery of fraternity between both countries. This demonstrated that the alliance is based upon friendship and is portrayed as an immutable characteristic. Through its repetition this characteristic is fixed to notions associated with the Australia-US relationship. Timothy Mitchell asserts this is because the opening visual imagery of a text establishes the holistic relationship between the analysis and its object. The frequent repetition of the convention naturalises the characterisation and diminishes the awareness that the worldview has been constructed (as cited in Philpott, 2001, p. 382).

The intimate comradery of Australia and the United States is a common theme verbalised by Australian statesmen. This closeness is likewise highlighted by the speeches of two previous Australian Foreign Affairs Ministers: Alexander Downer in 2005 and Gareth Evans in 1989. For instance, Downer contended that “[t]he strength of the Australia-US alliance is built on shared democratic values... It draws on a history of common sacrifice and effort to support and enhance those values and perspectives over generations” (as cited in The Honourable Alexander Downer, 2005). Moreover, this theme is demonstrated by Evans. In his lecture Evans posits that “like all of us, the United States is irresistibly drawn towards the promise of the decline of confrontation in superpower relations, because it offers a more

peaceful and a more prosperous world” (as cited in Senator the Honourable Gareth Evans MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 1989, p. 5). Both these address are targeted domestically and emphasise the positive virtues of the United States. The values and ideas which underline the Australia-US alliance are depicted as historically based. This language implies that both states possess static commonalities and harmonisation of views. Furthermore, Evans’ assertion of the normative desire for peace is portrayed as objectively preferential. Through the US’ pursuit of this goal a timeless and adaptable friendship has developed between nations. These depictions both legitimise and naturalise Australia’s intimate US alliance within the mindset of the Australian public.

The views articulated by the aforementioned Australian statesmen are replicated in a collaborative American and Australian scholarly publication entitled “Australia Matters for America/America Matters for Australia” (“Australia Matters for America/America Matters for Australia,” 2015). The publication attests that both countries share key values and these include strong democratic institutions, the rule of law, adherence to international norms, and openness to immigration (“Australia Matters for America/America Matters for Australia,” 2015, p. 2). From the perspective of James Bennett, the ideational closeness between both states has resulted in a shared identity emerging. Bennet contends that a ‘network commonwealth’ of English-speaking nations defines international politics. Australia and the United States, as integral components of this Anglophile community, are bound by the shared values of Anglo-American cultural and political traditions (as cited in W. T. Tow & Acharya, 2007, pp. 10-11). This development has cemented the durability of the Australia-US alliance.

A Constructivist explanation of Australia’s US alliance rationale

Indeed, Australia’s US alliance behaviour is explained by core Constructivist theory and Kier’s conceptual framework. Firstly, Australia has been compelled by international anarchy to secure its economic prosperity and balance against perceived threats (Bisley, 2013). To counteract these concerns Australia has fostered an intimate relationship with the United States. This demonstrates the rational cost-benefit component of the alliance and typifies Waltzian Realism. However, these policies have been constituted through the social negotiation of national security within Australia. Australians, both at the elite and populace level, have internalised this culture of anarchy and represent socially constructed Realist

optics through which Australians perceive the world. Moreover, this has been replicated outwardly by Australia in the international system and has determined its behaviour towards the US. Furthermore, the Australia-US alliance is predicated upon ideational factors. Both the Australian government and society have affirmed that shared values and norms also underlie the intimate alliance. This demonstrates the importance of identity within Australia's US alliance calculations. The relationship's ideational features have been negotiated between elites and the public within the Australian social setting. Indeed, policymakers have verbally claimed to represent the Australian public. Targeting their declaratory statements predominantly at the populace, national statesmen have manufactured normative objectives within the national security discourse. This has established collective understandings of appropriate Australian behaviour to secure national security objectives. Agency and normative morality are paramount to Australia constructing its foreign policies towards the US. Secondly, this trend conforms to Keir's theoretical model (Kier, 1995). The 'Canberra Consensus' represents a consensual partisan framework that has dominated Australian strategic military planning. Australian politicians have demonstrated an aspiration to link Australia to the United States militarily. This convergence has formed from the similar social values and ideas that have determined the mindsets of all important domestic political actors. This exhibits how civilian policymakers' normative perspectives and agency determine the role of a state's national armed forces. Indeed, Australia's US alliance behaviour is founded upon contradictory worldviews. This is because Australian national security policy is framed by different conceptualisations and is socially constructed. This thesis posits that Australia has subsequently developed an idiosyncratic foreign policy.

Chapter 2: The ‘Middle Power’ concept in Australia

A Constructivist explanation of the ‘Middle Power’ approach

According to Constructivists, ‘Middle Power’ status is a constructed political category by policymakers (Hynek, 2004, p. 37). This construct is defined by the notion of reputation. Constructivists believe that middling countries endeavour to preserve their reputation as legitimate members of the international community (Hynek, 2004). To achieve this objective, a state’s policy-elites imbue the ‘Middle Power’ category with positive connotations (Rutherford, K., S. Brem, and R. A. Matthew as cited in Carr, 2014, p. 76). This approach accepts the veracity of the ‘Middle Power’ assertions by nations (Mark Beeson as cited in Carr, 2014, p. 76). For instance, Nikola Hynek, in his exploration of the ‘Middle Power’ concept in Canada, posits that Canada has manufactured its international position by reconstructing and reproducing its external identity. This identity is both maintained and cultivated through symbolic interactions associated with the ‘Middle Power’ meaning (Hynek, 2004, p. 40). This is represented within the Australian context.

Australian political discourse and the ‘Middle Power’ concept

Australian foreign policy, since the Second World War ended, has been dominated by the ‘Middle Power’ concept (Ungerer, 2007, p. 539). This conceptual framework has provided a foundation for the government’s macro-level national security strategies. Moreover, within the Australian political system, the concept has largely been pursued bipartisanly (Ungerer, 2007, p. 540). This discourse has determined how Australia perceives its role within the world (Ungerer, 2007). Accordingly, policymakers have used this prism to rationalise policy (Ungerer, 2007).

However, within international relations scholarship, the ‘Middle Power’ concept is indistinct (Ungerer, 2007, p. 539). The behaviours that constitute a ‘Middle Power’ are varied. According to Carl Ungerer in his article “The ‘Middle Power’ concept in Australian Foreign Policy”, this term describes states with different geographic, material or normative attributes (Ungerer, 2007, p. 539). These definitional differences are problematic because this

has led to confusion surrounding the term. However, a state possessing middle-ranking economic, military and diplomatic capabilities and actively pursuing a 'Middle Power' approach offers insights into its international status (Ungerer, 2007, p. 539). Indeed, 'Middle Power' diplomacy resonates with politicians and policy-elites throughout the world. This is because this classification captures the foreign policy activities of various countries. The 'Middle Power' characterisation uses socially predefined foreign policy behaviours within a state (Ungerer, 2007, p. 539). In the view of Carl Ungerer, these behaviours include a preference for working through multilateral institutions and processes, a commitment to promoting international legal norms and a proactive use of diplomatic, military and economic measures to achieve political outcomes (Ungerer, 2007, p. 539). This view is mirrored by the Canadian scholar Dennis Stairs who, in his article entitled "Of Medium Powers and Middling Roles", argues that countries of secondary rank with similar capabilities, minds and approaches exist. He asserts that this impression transcends the chaos of global politics (as cited in Ungerer, 2007, p. 540). Stairs' observation is important because the 'Middle Power' idea is based upon a Realist interpretation of International Relations (Ungerer, 2007, p. 540). Australia's pursuit of its self-serving objectives are subsequently filtered through its perceived limitations.

Consecutive Australian governments have used specific opportunities within international relations to exercise their power and influence (Ungerer, 2007, p. 540). This has manifested in Australia adopting a 'Middle Power' outlook and indicates predominantly both a regional diplomatic and force projection approach to achieve national interests. This contrasts with 'great powers' which are defined by their global interests and reach (Ungerer, 2007, p. 540). Australia's self-identification as a 'Middle Power' has strongly influenced the form of its diplomatic practices (Ungerer, 2007, p. 540). This viewed is mirrored by David Martin Jones and Andrea Benvenuti in their article "Tradition, myth and the dilemma of Australian foreign policy". Jones and Benvenuti contend that since Australian Federation in 1901 foreign policy has been defined by a common assumption (Jones & Benvenuti, 2006, p. 103). This assumption insists that Australia requires a strategic personality that is both externally orientated and extroverted. These behaviours have eventuated in Australia framing a more self-determined foreign policy and adopting a 'Middle Power' approach (Jones & Benvenuti, 2006, pp. 103-104). This process has been elite driven.

Australian statesmen have crafted the 'Middle Power' narrative within Australian politics (Beeson & Higgott, 2014). These policy-elites have imbued this narrative with meaning (Ungerer, 2007). This has resulted in the concept becoming an important feature of

the Australian identity. The 'Middle Power' narrative has been used as a rhetorical device within Australian foreign announcements. Policymakers, in their declaratory statements, have emotively appealed to Australia's cultural, social and ideational norms. This type of language has resonated domestically and has established acceptable foreign policy behaviours within the Australian populace (Ungerer, 2007). These themes are illustrated by two instances within Australian history: the 1949-1972 Liberal-Country Party government of Robert Menzies and his successors and John Howard's 1996-2007 government respectively. The 'Middle Power' theme underwrote much of Australia's post-World War II foreign policy orientation. This view is highlighted by Garfield Barwick's statement to the Australian Parliament as Minister for External Affairs in 1964. In his speech Barwick declares:

Australia is a middle power in more senses than one. It is clearly one in the general sense in which the expression is used. But also it has common interests with both the advanced and the underdeveloped countries; it stands in point of realised wealth between the haves and the have-nots. It has a European background and is set in intimate geographical propinquity to Asia [...] This ambivalence brings some strength and offers promise of a future of which Australia can be confident, a future of increasing influence. As well, it emphasises the need to seek and to accept collective security, with all the compromises which such a course so often entails (as cited in Ungerer, 2007, p. 543).

This excerpt highlights the importance of the 'Middle Power' concept in Australian diplomatic practice. Throughout the speech, Barwick identifies Australia's limitations. These restrictions, including both geography and wealth, have placed Australia precariously within the world. According to this view, Australia tenuously straddles the centre of the international political spectrum. However, using niche opportunities to exercise power and influence provides the prospect of an improved future. This view is also mirrored in the Howard government despite the Coalition explicitly rejecting the 'Middle Power' concept. The government claimed that 'Middle Power' diplomacy and its emphasis on multilateral methods was a self-imposed limitation on Australia in international affairs (Ungerer, 2007, p. 548). This trend is highlighted by Alexander Downer, Shadow Foreign Affairs Minister prior to his ascension to the portfolio, at a Young Liberals Convention in February 1996:

To say Australia is a middle power implies we are merely similar to a multitude of other countries, a mediocre power defined only by the size of our population. Worse, it suggests we are helplessly wedged between big and small powers with very little role to play. This sells us short and overlooks the rich potential that Australia has to play a vital role in the world [...] I do not accept Australia as merely a middle power. Rather, I believe Australia is a ‘pivotal’ power (Alexander Downer as cited in Ungerer, 2007, p. 549).

The sentiment, notwithstanding Downer’s limited explanation of the ‘pivotal’ power thesis, faintly mirrored the ‘Middle Power’ label previously used. For instance, in another speech in 2006, Downer asserted that Australia’s:

global agenda in no way undermines our role in the region. Australia is an especially significant regional power in our neighbourhood. We don't claim this title as a right, nor did we ever seek it. But the facts on the ground are indisputable. By regional power I don't mean that we dominate others in our region. We don't aspire to hegemony. That's not our style. We work cooperatively, within international norms and towards the common good (The Honourable Alexander Downer, 2006).

This text illustrates Australia’s underlying commitment to the ‘Middle Power’ concept. In the excerpt Downer identifies Australia’s preference to work regionally and promote international legal norms to achieve political outcomes.¹ From the viewpoint of Carl Ungerer,

¹ Australia’s predisposition towards multilateralism within its foreign policy is nuanced. During the Howard prime ministership the Liberal Party embodied, from the viewpoint of Graeme Dobell, a United Nations (UN) phobia (Dobell, 2010). This theme is displayed by Howard’s discussion in his autobiography “Lazarus Rising” of two main foreign policy issues of his leadership: Iraq and East Timor. For instance, regarding the 1999 East Timor intervention, Howard eschewed crediting the legal and moral authority of the UN in its intermediation. Similarly, concerning the Iraq War, Howard was scathing of the UN’s failings. This is illustrated by Howard’s meeting with Hans Blix, the individual who led the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission and inspected Iraq’s possession of nuclear weapons (Dobell, 2010). For example, Howard exasperated that Blix admitted Iraq would have remained uncompliant without the pressure applied by the US military. For Howard this exhibited the UN’s double standards and impotence, contending “[a] resolution of the Security Council carried no weight at all” (as cited in Dobell, 2010). However, within the autobiography Howard does praise individuals within the UN commenting that in his dealings with Secretary General, Kofi Annan, over East Timor: “[h]e was professional, candid and fully understood my own domestic political realities.” (as cited in Dobell, 2010). Indeed, from Howard’s perspective, individuals deliver, nations act, and the UN obstructs. This leads Dobell to conclude the Howard government was characterised by selective UN rejectionism. For more information read Graeme Dobell’s “Howard’s selective rejectionism” (Dobell, 2010).

the similarity of the two concepts demonstrates that, irrespective of political stewardship, Australian foreign policy is consistently styled (Ungerer, 2007, p. 549). Consecutive governments have constructed foreign policy through the prism of Australia's perceived limitations. Australia has used specific opportunities to exercise its power within the international relations system. This has manifested in Australia maintaining an intimate relationship with the United States.

The Australian government has publically repeatedly emphasised the United States' importance to Australia. These declaratory statements have predominantly been targeted at the domestic audience. For example Robert Menzies, after his re-election in the 28 April 1951 federal election, and prior to the formal signing on the ANZUS Treaty, contended that "[w]e have improved enormously the relations between Australia and the United States of America, whose generous approach to the world's problems means so much to all of us" (Menzies, 1951). The glorification of the US in public discourses is likewise illustrated by the Howard government. Howard argued that the alliance helped Australia achieve its goals. For instance, his government's first White Paper on Foreign and Trade policy in August 1997, entitled "In the National Interest", declared:

a central feature of the Government's approach to foreign and trade policy is the importance it places on bilateral relationships as a means of advancing Australia's interests (as cited in Government, 1997, p. iii). There is no strategic relationship closer than that which Australia shares with the United States (as cited in Government, 1997, p. 35).

The 'Middle Power' concept occupies a seminal place within Australian diplomatic practice. Indeed, despite leadership changes, the post-World War II conduct of Australian diplomacy has been recurrently constant. The connotations associated with this idea have resulted in Australia desiring a stronger relationship with the US. From the perspective of the Australian government, the intimate United States alliance possesses significant utility. Fullilove attests the alliance is a force multiplier and allows Australia to enhance its influence over international events. By allying with the US Australia contributes to both global and national security and furthers its interests (Fullilove, 2015b). Mark Beeson concurs asserting that the intimate relationship helps the Australian government to utilise the United States' hegemonic position within global security (Beeson, 2002, p. 236). The alliance represents a key foundation for Australia's role in international affairs.

These examples illustrate the utility of both core Constructivist tenets and the Constructivist 'Middle Power' theory in explaining Australian behaviour towards the US. Australia's pursuit of its self-serving objectives have been filtered through its perceived limitations. This demonstrates the Realist optics that have dominated how successive Australian governments have understood the world. These governments have constructed and internalised a culture of anarchy that advances that 'Middle Power' states should use specific opportunities within international relations to secure their interests and have replicated this idea outwardly through their behaviour. This perspective is socially constructed because Australian policymakers have manufactured the 'Middle Power' concept within the national political discourse. Akin to the Constructivist 'Middle Power' theory, these statesmen have instilled this idea with positive connotations. Through their language consecutive Australian governments have designed a specific reputation within the international community. The reproduction of this external identity has been both maintained and cultivated through symbolic interactions associated with the 'Middle Power' meaning. Moreover, these actions have legitimised to the domestic audience Australia's relationship with the US. By framing national security concerns through the 'Middle Power' concept, Australian statesmen have implied their acquisition necessitates a functionary role by the United States. Through associating the US with Australia's 'Middle Power' role Australian policymakers have depicted the intimate alliance as an integral component in its foreign policy pursuits. This helps to explain favourable Australian foreign policy towards the United States. Indeed, Australia's US alliance behaviour is founded upon multiple worldviews. This is because Australian national security policies are framed by various conceptualisations and are socially constructed. This thesis subsequently posits this represents the emergence of an idiosyncratic Australian foreign policy.

Chapter 3: Fear and the Australian political discourse

Australia's international outlook has been partially determined by fear (Philpott, 2001). The concept of fear is explored by Barry Buzan in his book "People, States, and Fear". Buzan contests the Realist view of national security and highlights its limitations in explaining fear which defies rational and empirical explanations (Buzan, 2008, p. 26). This leads Buzan to conclude that within international relations scholarship security is an underdeveloped concept (Buzan, 2008, p. 26). This concept is further explored by Linda Green who argues that fear is an elusive idea. This is because fear is highly personal and imperceptible to others. However, Green posits that fear is an overwhelming experience and that its pervasiveness fundamentally determines social and cultural perspectives (L. Green, 1994, p. 230). The idiosyncratic nature of this experience, in conjunction with its powerfulness, manifests into multiple political possibilities (Philpott, 2001, p. 373). This is illustrated by the Australian context.

Fear based perspectives are predicated upon a widespread anxiety within the Australian imagination. This anxiety encompasses multiple interlinked outcomes which are perceived to damage Australian politics. Throughout Australian history both the government and society have feared that Australia is susceptible to military invasion from an Asian power.² This eventuality would extinguish the Australian existence and eradicate the national social and cultural identity. These concerns have provided a prism through which Australia understands its international position. Fear has become an inescapable component of Australian views toward Asia and has formulated foreign policy (Philpott, 2001, p. 371). Moreover, these constructions have cohered the Australian identity and helped consolidate Australia into a single political community (Philpott, 2001, p. 374). Fear has substantially governed Australian political discourse.

² High rates of immigration primarily from non-Western countries has also catalysed concerns within Australia that its social and cultural identity is being undermined. This is evidenced by Pauline Hansen's One Nation Australian political party in the late 1990s and her portrayal of Asian immigration threatening Australian values (Leach, Stokes, & Ward, 2000, p. 225). This illustrates that these ideational concerns are incompletely related to military invasion. However, throughout Australian history invasion by a hostile Asian power has been the predominant concern within the collective Australian consciousness. This theme is highlighted by the historicity of immigration to Australia. For example, Immigration Minister in the Labor Chifley government Arthur Calwell commented in 1947 that "we have twenty-five years at the most to populate this country before the yellow races are down on us". During this period "yellow" was a pejorative term used to denote individuals of ethnic Asian heritage (as cited in Faye, 1998, p. 348). Furthermore, this is similarly demonstrated by the White Australia Policy, officially known as the restrictive immigration policy under the Commonwealth Immigration Restriction Act of 1901. This policy favoured and induced migration from the British Isles to Australia. Indeed, large-scale immigration from non-European migrants principally occurred when the Act was abolished in 1966 (Jupp, 1995, p. 207).

Anxieties represent an enduring feature of Australia-Asia relations. These anxieties have become enshrined within the practice of Australian statecraft. According to Simon Philpott, these policies have been constructed by ideational domestic factors. The ways fear has been domesticated provides insights into Australian foreign policy (Philpott, 2001, p. 374).

The influence of fear within Australia stems from the dominance of phobic narratives. These types of narratives have been used in the national media to frame both economic and political concerns regarding Australia's future (Philpott, 2001, p. 377). According to Meagan Morris, phobic narratives occupy a place where polarising perspectives fluctuate. These divergent views are agoraphobia, the fear of exposing the state to an immensely powerful 'other', and claustrophobia, the fear of being separated from a wider dynamic world (as cited in Philpott, 2001, p. 377). Indeed, both engagement and disengagement with Asia are portrayed as threatening. This has helped solidify fear and anxiety as constant features of the Australian identity (Philpott, 2001, p. 377).

National identity and interest are intrinsically related within Australia's phobic narratives. Within these narratives, threats to the national wellbeing have been located exogenously (McAllister & Ravenhill, 1998). In this dominant discourse Asia has been framed as an extraterritorial danger and has become alienated within Australia's collective imagination (FitzGerald, 1997). Through emphasising seemingly immutable differences the Asian region has been objectified to constitute an 'other' (Philpott, 2001, p. 375). Contrasts against this construction have stabilised and anchored the Australian national identity (Burke, 2010). Historically, this national identity has been predicated upon a white civilisational and ethnic Australianness (Philpott, 2001, p. 372). This alienation project portrays Australia as a moral arbitrator and defender of international justice while, contrastingly, Asians are depicted as morally and civilisationally inferior.

In discussions relating to Australia-Asia relations civilisational discourse has crafted its evolution. The 'clash of civilisations' thesis was first articulated in 1996 by Samuel Huntington. According to this influential thesis, the world is comprised of different civilisation groups that subscribe to distinct cultural and religious practices. The hypothesis stipulates that these practices have inspired the evolution of incompatible identities which will become the primary source of conflict in the post-Cold War world (Huntington, 1997). Huntington observed these examples partly based upon phenomena from ancient history. He cites the entrenched fault line between Western Christendom and Islamic civilisations as leading to ongoing conflict into contemporary times. The cause of this conflictual pattern

stems from the two irreconcilable religions - Christianity and Islam - that founded these civilisations (Huntington, 1997, p. 210). Civilisational conflict is subsequently a longstanding theme throughout human history. From the viewpoint of Mark Beeson, this idea has been popularised within national discourses and has increased the likelihood of civilisational discourse becoming self-fulfilling (Beeson, 2002, p. 232). Indeed, Ruby Hamad asserts that Australians are largely disdainful of non-Western countries (Hamad, 2016). Despite predating Huntington's thesis, civilisational discourse has imbued Asia with ageless dangerousness within the Australian mindset. The construction of imagined enemies within Australian political discourse represents this trend (Bisley, 2013, p. 404). These imagined enemies represent the latent civilisational anxieties within both Australian society and government and have constructed foreign policy. This xenophobia is illustrated by two countries in Asia: Indonesia and China.

Australia's enduring fear of Indonesia

Australian attitudes towards Indonesia and partly formulated upon an entrenched fear (Philpott, 2001, p. 371). This discourse is predicated upon a prevailing view within government that Indonesia remains a significant challenge within Australian statecraft (H. White, 2013). Indeed, since gaining independence from The Netherlands in 1945, Indonesia has remained a conceivable threat in Australian defence planning. The Australian government has consistently viewed Indonesia worryingly and these anxieties have governed the bilateral relationship. This is illustrated by the predominant 'arc of instability' discourse within Australian strategic thinking (Ayson, 2007, p. 215). From the viewpoint of Graeme Dobell, this term was conceived within government to politely articulate concerns about Indonesia (Dobell, 2003, p. 6). This perspective stemmed largely from Australia's 1999 mission to East Timor. During this period Australia commanded a United Nations peacekeeping mission to the Indonesian province of East Timor which was asserting independence. Australia's intervention troubled diplomacy and ruptured relations with Indonesia (Blaxland, 2015). The deterioration of the relationship is evidenced by Indonesian President Megawati Soekarnoputri ignoring Prime Minister Howard's attempted telephone conversation in 2001 to discuss the people smuggling issue. This issue was important and impacted both countries because asylum seekers seeking refuge in Australia transited from Indonesia by boat (C. A.

Snyder, 2006, p. 334). Thus, Soekarnoputri's action was a deliberate rebuff of Australian foreign policy. However, since these difficulties bilateral relations have improved. For example, the Australian government currently notes that:

Australia and Indonesia also work closely on a range of common strategic interests in regional and global fora. We are the only two members from the Southeast Asian region in the G20 and cooperate in the East Asia Summit, ASEAN Regional Forum, IORA and MIKTA (an innovative grouping comprising Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea, Turkey and Australia)...Cooperation between Australia and Indonesia on security matters is underpinned by the Lombok Treaty (2006), with a Defence Cooperation Arrangement signed in September 2012. Both countries reaffirmed their commitment to strengthening bilateral relations in August 2014 by signing a Joint Understanding on the implementation of the Lombok Treaty, which provides an agreed approach to enhancing intelligence cooperation (as cited in Government, 2016c).

Evidently, Canberra and Jakarta have endeavoured to normalise bilateral relations and institutionalise a somewhat constructive relationship. However, despite relations improving, Australian strategic concerns remain. This theme has been articulated in various iterations in the rhetoric of Australian statesmen and official policy. For instance, according to seminal Australian academic Hugh White, the government's 2013 Defence White Paper demonstrates that defence against Indonesia remains an ADF priority. Indeed, this is expressed in diplomatically evasive language wherein the government has depicted Indonesia as an opaque danger (H. White, 2013). Indonesia is "introducing advanced platforms" and its "[r]egional military modernisation... raises the levels of capability required by the ADF to maintain the edge that has historically underpinned the defence of our continent with a comparatively small population" (as cited in Government, 2013, p. 14). The military missions of the ADF have been designed to repel small-scale incursions by the Indonesian military (H. White, 2013). Hence, concerns regarding Indonesia have determined Australian strategic thinking. This text highlights Australia's strategic and material limitations. Furthermore, the language conjures an overwhelming sense of isolation within the Australian psyche. By linking Indonesia to Australian territorial vulnerability this connotes Indonesia with both hostility and malevolence and suggests that Australia's advanced military hardware preserves national security.

This threat is predominantly understood in cultural terms. The metaphors and images used to describe Indonesia have historically been negative by government officials. However, this negativity is framed inexplicitly. Indeed, the routine and benign descriptions of Indonesia have stimulated ingrained white Australian anxieties (Philpott, 2001, pp. 371-372). The agenda of this is twofold: by conceptualising Indonesia as both backward and inherently different this implies Australian values and attitudes are superior. This trend is illustrated by the former Australian diplomat and academic Bruce Grant. For instance, in 1964 he wrote:

Australia and Indonesia are as diverse a pair of neighbours as it is possible to find. One is a large, flat continent, thinly populated with Caucasians professing Christianity and capitalism, essentially materialist, rational and scientific in outlook, instinctively part of the western world. The other is an archipelago of mountainous islands, populated with Asians professing Islam and socialism, essentially mystic and irrational, instinctively opposed to Western values (as cited in Philpott, 2001, p. 381)

This excerpt exemplifies Australia's narrow views of Indonesia. In this narrative both countries are defined by contrasting civilisational discourses. Grant's assertion of Australian scientific authority and reference to Indonesian irrationality depicts Indonesia as inherently inferior. Similarly, this view is demonstrated by the former Australian Foreign Affairs Minister Gareth Evans in 1995 who contended:

Australia, a vast continent, is largely arid and sparsely populated by seventeen and a half million people: Indonesia, a lush archipelago of 17,000 islands stretching from Sabang Merauke, is very densely populated by 190 million people. Australia, is predominantly Caucasian, and following Judaeo-Christian traditions, although now with over one million of its population of Asian origin and a significant Muslim minority. Indonesia – a deeply religious society – is predominantly Muslim, but with significant Christian, Buddhist, Hindu and other minorities (as cited in Philpott, 2001, p. 381)

In their rhetoric the authors emphasise the differences between Australia and Indonesia. By referring to alternate national characters, religious affiliations and the significant population disparities this entrenches the palpable dissimilarities between both countries. This polarises both worldviews and reinforces an immutable conflictive civilisational discourse.

Furthermore, this heightens the perception that Australia is encroached by states with potentially malevolent intentions. This arouses the latent fears and anxieties of Australians towards Indonesia and conjures xenophobic feelings. Both government statesmen, by designating events and actors as foreign to the domestic audience, reinforce these fear based discourses and increase their normativity within society. This is additionally highlighted by the perception of Indonesia within Australia's population.

Indonesia has historically occupied an untoward position within the Australian imagination (Philpott, 2001). A prevailing theme of mistrust has characterised Australia's social and cultural perceptions of Indonesian motives. According to Richard Chauvel, this has resulted because both countries inhabit different strategic spheres (Chauvel, 2006, p. 143). This idea is illustrated by a poll published in 2004 by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI). This survey confirmed that many Australians regard Indonesia as the country's greatest security threat. The report quoted a 2001 survey that showed 31% of respondents believed Indonesia likely posed a threat to Australia's security. This figure heavily outweighed other countries: China 9%, Malaysia 6% and Japan 5% (as cited in *Attitude Matters: Public opinion in Australia towards defence and security*, 2004, p. 18). According to ASPI, public concerns about Indonesia have increased since the poll's inception in the 1960s. However, this coexists with a contradictory trend because fewer Australian believe a credible external security will materialise (*Attitude Matters: Public opinion in Australia towards defence and security*, 2004, pp. 18-20). Evidently, this illustrates a paranoid feature within the Australian polity regarding Indonesia. Australians believe that both countries possess diametrically opposed agendas and are mistrustful of Indonesian intentions within international politics.

This is also illustrated by a cartoon published in *The Australian* newspaper in 2002 by Peter Nicholson (as cited in Chauvel, 2006, p. 146). This picture was printed after Indonesian President Megawati and Australian Prime Minister John Howard signed the Memorandum of Understanding on Combating Terrorism. In this cartoon the two leaders are depicted as expressing that "we are of one mind about the war on terror" whilst shaking hands. However, the 'thought bubbles' of Howard and Megawati present this as untrue. In Australia's 'War on Terror' Howard personally accosts and intimidates Osama Bin Laden with a rifle while American President George W. Bush applauds in the background. Contrastingly, Megawati's 'thought bubble' portrayed Indonesian Special Forces rampaging through the dissent Indonesian areas of Aceh and Papua to suppress separatists (as cited in Chauvel, 2006, p. 146). Both countries are depicted as inhabiting different strategic spheres and possessing divergent

worldviews. Nicholson illustrates the perceived difference of agendas between Australia and Indonesia. This indicates that cooperation between the two states is riddled by mutual suspicion and imbues Indonesians with unfamiliarity. These portrayals evoke imagery of Indonesian deceitfulness and makes Indonesians, within the Australian consciousness, untrustworthy figures.

This theme is also highlighted by Australian comments in response to the Australia-Indonesia spying controversy in 2013. In this controversy the Australian intelligence community was discovered monitoring the telephone of Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY). In response, Indonesian protestors across the country burnt the Australian flag, demanded Prime Minister Tony Abbott apologise and appealed to the President to dissolve diplomatic ties with Canberra (Karlis Salna, 2013). The reaction of many Australians is captured by the individual named “middlewingist” who contributed in the comments section of The Guardian news article which reported this event. In their rhetoric the palpable culpability of Indonesians within the Australian mindset is emphasised. In the section the individual commented:

I am not surprised at [sic] the Australian government used it's [sic] US provided abilities to spy on the Indonesians. (I assume its [sic] been going on since not long after 9/11, the date which the US began its perpetual whimpering, pants-urinating fear and paranoia) After all, the Indonesians wouldn't know about democracy, human rights [sic] and respect for neighbours if it hit them in the goolies [sic] with a wet shark fin.

They have consistently shown that they will take whatever they think they can get away with. From conquest of the lands of different ethnic groups, illegal fishing, corruption through all levels of government, and a fairly recent dictatorship, to not having a visa system like the rest of the world where people who have no valid reason to be in the country can not [sic] even get on a plane to go there.

They use this lack of control over who enters their country as a way to extract more and more "aid" for their officials and cronies to pocket from Australia. Any fool can see that their friendship towards us has been just as shallow and self interested [sic] as our own. They are customers, not friends, they cannot be trusted to do the right thing,

and they only respect force. Friendship as Australians would think of the term, is seen as weakness in their culture (as cited in Laughland, 2013)

This excerpt illustrates the overriding negative perceptions that dominate Australian discourses towards Indonesia. The language used emphasises the inherent differences between Australia and Indonesia. ‘Middlewingist’ admonishes Indonesian norms and behaviour as morally culpable and portrays Indonesians as selfish and devious. This argument is expressed in cultural terms and both elevates and praises Australian values. This moral bifurcation illustrates the heightened sense of mistrust many Australians possess towards Indonesia. Australian and Indonesian strategic imperatives are portrayed as mutually exclusive. This has eventuated because both peoples understand the world differently and the bilateral relationship is defined by static obstacles. Indeed, Australians are xenophobic towards Indonesia.

This overriding perspective within Australian society is addressed by SBY in a sombre speech to the Australian Federal Parliament in March 2010. He candidly remarked that the Australia-Indonesia relationship is challenged and stems from each peoples’ mutual misperceptions. He contended that “[t]here are Australians who still see Indonesia as an authoritarian country, as a military dictatorship, as a hotbed of Islamic extremism or even as an expansionist power” (as cited in H. White, 2013). These alarmist sentiments are echoed by Richard Tanter who argues the two societies continually misrecognise each other through unacknowledged racial stereotypes. He posits that Australians possess a persistent misunderstanding of Islam that originates from unexamined ancient European ideas and concludes that an Australian-Indonesian war is inevitable (as cited in Philpott, 2001, p. 379). Likewise, seminal Australian academic Hugh White suggests that both countries possess dissimilar worldviews. White asserts that in most dimensions of national life; geography, history, economics, religion, language and culture, Australia and Indonesia are polarised (H. White, 2013). Consequently, the mutual rivalry and suspicion between both countries will continue unchanged (H. White, 2013).

Evidently, fear has characterised Australian views of Indonesia. This has become a dominant perception within both Australian government and society and its prescience has determined national security strategies. Australia has subsequently formulated foreign policy through the prism of xenophobia. This trend is similarly illustrated by China.

Australia's enduring fear of China

Long-term anxieties have historically governed Australian strategic thinking towards China. From an Australian viewpoint, China represents strategic and cultural opposition to Western governance and interests (Harris, 1995). This has remained an underlying conceptualisation within both the Australian public and government and has manifested into entrenched fears.

Fears of being overwhelmed by China have remained prescient within the Australian imagination. For instance, a poll conducted in 1996 asked the Australian population: "In your opinion, are any of the following countries likely to pose a threat to Australia's security?". China, after Indonesia, was deemed as either "very likely" or "fairly likely" to threaten national security ("Perceptions of security threats to Australia" as cited in McAllister & Ravenhill, 1998, p. 124). This is additionally illustrated by 2015 polling from the Lowy Institute. In these surveys 61% of Australians believed that "China's aim is to dominate Asia". Furthermore, 66% contended that "Australia should do more to resist China's military aggression in our region, even if this affects our economic relationship". This wariness is further evidenced by the majority of Australians (56%) disagreeing that "having China as an important global power makes the world more stable" (as cited in Institute, 2015, p. 9). Evidently, Australians are overwhelmingly mistrustful of Chinese behaviour and have consistently identified China as a national security threat.

From the advent of Australia intense fears of Chinese domination have existed within the government. This is illustrated by the rhetoric of Australia's first Prime Minister Edmund Barton. In a speech to the Australian Parliament in 1901, Barton posited:

The fear of Chinese immigration which the Australian democracy cherishes... is, in fact, the instinct of self-preservation, quickened by experience. We know that coloured and white labour cannot exist side by side... We are guarding the last part of the world in which the higher races can live and increase freely for the higher civilisation (as cited in Johnson, Ahluwalia, & McCarthy, 2010, p. 59).

Evidently, Barton's overtly racist language is predicated upon civilisational discourse. He clearly demarcates between Australians, which constitute the superior race of humanity, and the Chinese which are by implication inferior. This inferiority, though verbalised in relation to immigration, is portrayed as an immutable obstacle to Australian-Chinese relations.

Consequently, Australians are cautioned of the inherent antithesis between Chinese and Australian peoples. China is constructed as both distrustful and dangerous to the Australian existence. These depictions elicit overwhelming feelings of xenophobia.

Australia's engagement with China subsequently remains a sensitive issue within the national psyche. These concerns stems partly from perceived Chinese aggression within Asia. From the perspective of the Australian government, this is because Chinese actions in the South China Sea will potentially jeopardise its strategic national security (Thayer, 2010). This is illustrated by the strategic significance of new Chinese naval facilities. The Chinese military has both repurposed and constructed islands. This is firstly demonstrated by Yulin Naval Base.

Yulin Naval Base represents an important component of Chinese military strategy. The base, near Sayna on Hainan Island, provides China with the ability to extend its military influence into both the Pacific Ocean and South China Sea (Thayer, 2010, p. 73). The base accommodates nuclear submarines capable of launching intercontinental ballistic missiles and allows China to strategically position its nuclear deterrent force. This is demonstrated by the presence of a Chinese Type-094 Jin-class submarine. The Type-094 is a second-generation nuclear vessel and is China's deadliest naval strike weapon (as cited in Thayer, 2010, p. 74). The efficacy of this development is captured by Admiral Willard of the US Navy who contended that "[o]f particular concern is that elements of China's military modernisation appear designed to challenge our freedom of action in the region" (as cited in Thayer, 2010, p. 74). Furthermore, portions of the base were built underground and are unmonitored by foreign satellites (Thayer, 2010, p. 74). This obscurity of intentions has elicited concern within Australia. For example the 2016 Defence White Paper, under the tutelage of the current Liberal government, noted that:

The 2016 Defence White Paper represents the Government's firm commitment to the Australian people that we will keep our nation safe and protect our way of life for future generations. This is a fundamental responsibility of the Australian Government; the safety and security of the Australian people and the defence of our territory and interests is our first and abiding priority (as cited in Government, 2016a, p. 9). As China grows, it will continue to seek greater influence within the region. As a major power, it will be important for regional stability that China provides reassurance to its neighbours by being more transparent about its defence policies (as cited in Government, 2016a, p. 42) The growth in the capability of China's military forces is

the most significant example of regional military modernisation (as cited in Government, 2016a, p. 16). Territorial disputes between claimants in the East China and South China Seas have created uncertainty and tension in our region (as cited in Government, 2016a, p. 30)

Evidently, within the government's psyche an entrenched, publically unarticulated fear of Chinese foreign policy exists. These anxieties are based on a Realist Security Dilemma. This is demonstrated by the rhetoric of Kevin Rudd. According to a WikiLeaks cable, Rudd privately warned US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to prepare to use force against China "if everything goes wrong". In an extensive conversation Mr Rudd described himself as "a brutal realist on China" and confirmed the planned improvement of Australia's navy was "a response to China's growing ability to project force" (as cited in Flitton, 2010). This is because Australia was unable to discern China's precise intentions and was pessimistic about the potential outcomes its behaviour could catalyse within the international system. This overwhelmingly Realist view of International Relations within the Australian government is likewise illustrated by former Defence Department official Mr Jennings. According to Jennings, Australia's primary 21st Century security challenge is Asia's dramatic rise in power epitomised by China. Australians need to "update our thinking" on what he labels China's "might makes right approach". Jennings posited that "[w]hen we started work on this white paper two years ago there was no island constructions [by China]. There were no missile deployments or air craft [sic] deployments" (as cited in Wroe, 2016a). Mr Jennings is a self-identifying 'hawk' a term which denotes desirability for aggressive foreign policies predicated on strong military power. Accordingly, he strongly favours "freedom of navigation" operations close to China's military islands and attests a powerful Australian military will deter Chinese aggression (as cited in Wroe, 2016a).

Carlyle A. Thayer similarly asserts that China is acting aggressively to secure its interests. China is developing enhanced capabilities to both exercise its sovereignty claims over the South China Sea and to protect its vital Sea Lines of Communication through the Malacca and Singapore Straits (Thayer, 2010, p. 73). These actions, through both refashioning and constructing islands into military installations, has allowed China to more acutely project power. Thus, China intends to enhance its offensive military capabilities. According to Rudd, the Australian government is devoted to advancing Australia's military capabilities to thwart China's ambitions (as cited in Flitton, 2010).

In summary, both Australian government and society have expressed anxieties regarding Chinese military behaviour. Australians remain concerned about the strategic implications of China's rise and the resultant regional balance-of-power change. This is despite the 2016 White Paper conceding another state attacking Australian territory is improbable (as cited in West, 2016). Evidently, Australians are convinced the nation resides within a hostile geopolitical environment (McAllister & Ravenhill, 1998, p. 126). This demonstrates the Realist optics which have dominated the Australian mindset. The Australian government is highly pessimistic of Chinese foreign policy. According to Gregory Clark, this underlying assumption has dominated Australian strategic thinking and indicates an entrenched fear of China (as cited in Harris, 1995, p. 237). Likewise, Alan Renouf has described Australia as the frightened country (as cited in Harris, 1995, p. 237).

A Constructivist explanation of fear within Australian political discourse

Indeed, Australian favourability towards the US is explained by Constructivism. Australian strategic thinking towards Asia has been determined by an ingrained xenophobia. These conceptualisations are illustrative of latent anxieties many Australians possess regarding the Asian region. The reproduction of fear within Australian statecraft has remained commonplace and constitutes a defining feature of Australia's social imagination. Firstly, this is predicated on ideational factors. The majority of Australians identify themselves as inherently different from Asian peoples and this is partly constructed upon civilisational discourse. In conceiving the nation's position within the world, Australian fears have manifested into a culture of anarchy which perceives Asia threateningly. Consequently, Australia has become overwhelmingly concerned with survival and has viewed conflict as an inevitable feature of world politics. Australia has replicated this perspective outwardly through its behaviour within the international system. Secondly, this demonstrates the emergence of a consensual partisan framework that has dominated Australian military planning. This convergence has developed from the similar social values and ideas that have determined the mindsets of all important domestic political actors. Civilian policymakers' normative perceptions and agency have structured the Australian Defence Force to defend against an Asian opponent. These developments have become dominant features of Australian politics. Indeed, Constructivism helps to explain Australian behaviour and

illustrates its US alliance rationale is predicated upon contradictory understandings of global politics. This has resulted because Australian national security policy is framed by different outlooks and is socially constructed. Australia has subsequently developed an idiosyncratic foreign policy.

Myths in Australia's political discourse and Constructivism

Emanuel Adler, in his article entitled “Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics”, posits that myths define national security discourses (Adler, 1997). Myths are related to political selection. Political selection is explored by Mark Besley who analyses how key personalities have gained power within the US and the UK. In his argument, political selection refers to the underlying institutional structures that influence which individuals gain ascendancy within a national consciousness (Besley, 2005, p. 44). An individual’s prominence is determined by the social popularity of their ideas because this establishes policy credibility and consolidates political legitimacy (Besley, 2005, p. 45). According to Adler, political selection is elite driven and results from the political leaders’ intersubjective expectations of progress. This process involves using publically understood ideas and institutions to propose solutions to critical political problems. Political selection subsequently functions to delineate collective perceptions of ‘better’ or ‘worse’ and depends on prior social agreements about ‘good’ and ‘bad’. The solutions leaders advance are contingent upon shared normative understandings about how needs should be ascertained (Adler, 1997, p. 341).

Myths have crafted Australia’s foreign policy traditions (Jones & Benvenuti, 2006). These traditions have determined Australian behaviour within the world and have evolved due to the relationship between national identity and the structures of Australia’s collective memory (Kammen, 1991). Myths mould a country’s strategic personality (Ziemke, 2000). In the view of Alastair Iain Johnston, strategic personality is informed by stories. In these stories truths are exaggerated to create an appealing narrative that helps cohere people into possessing a common, self-reproducing group identity (as cited in Jones & Benvenuti, 2006, p. 105). According to Walter Russell Mead, national myths are a democratic necessity that condense historical traditions and ideas into shorthand. Deploying a shorthand allows policymakers to improve communication of ideas to the non-specialist public and improves their comprehension of policy (Mead, 2013, p. 61). This aids statesmen to structure domestic foreign policy debates and control the country’s narrative. This trend is illustrated by the 1983-1996 Hawke-Keating Labor government and the 1996-2007 Howard Liberal government.

Chapter 4: The Hawke-Keating government's Asia-Pacific myth

The Australian government during the Hawke-Keating period constructed a new national myth (Jones & Benvenuti, 2006). Through this project Labor hoped to transcend the dominant Anglo-centric regional identity which dominated Australian political discourse. The policymakers believed this was Australia's destiny (Jones & Benvenuti, 2006). Labor cultivated a distinctive regional and multilateral emphasis. To cement this myth into foreign policy, the government further enmeshed Australia into the Asia-Pacific through trade. This embrace of Asia was premised on substantial East Asian economic growth (Jones & Benvenuti, 2006). For instance, Australian exports to its Association of Southeast Nations (ASEAN) neighbours increased by 24% between 1977 and 1988 (as cited in Jones & Benvenuti, 2006, p. 107). Contrastingly, and prior to the UK entering the European Economic Community and severing its preferential trade agreement with Australia, exports to the United Kingdom and continental Europe had heavily declined. Moreover, Australia's meagre growth, coupled with recession in the early 1990s, contrasted with the 6 to 8% per annum Gross Domestic Produce growth of various ASEAN and North East Asian economies (as cited in Jones & Benvenuti, 2006, p. 107). These global and regional trends, in the view of K.S. Nathan, necessitated a compelling reassessment of Australia's political, cultural, economic and strategic approach to Southeast Asia (Nathan, 1991, p. 336). This provided a catalyst for the Hawke-Keating government to ideationally reposition Australia. Indeed, this change was linked to ideas associated with national security.

Government policy during this period constituted social and cultural change through intelligentsia intervention. Elites manufactured and implemented Australia's ideational relocation (McAllister & Ravenhill, 1998). This is illustrated by Gareth Evans the Minister for Foreign Affairs during the Hawke-Keating era. For example, Evans proclaimed that Australia was unconstrained by "the reality of its own geography" and was neither an Anglo-American outpost nor a transplanted European nation in Asia. In contrast, Australia was a constituent of Asia and "[t]he old perceptions... based on "Asian" and "European identities"" were antiquated (as cited in Adler & Barnett, 1998, p. 272). Accordingly, Evans promoted the idea domestically:

Our future lies, inevitably, in the Asia Pacific region. This is where we must live, must survive strategically and economically, and find a place and a role if we are to develop our full potential as a nation (as cited in G. Smith & Lowe, 2005, p. 462).

The reimagining project of the Australian identity by Labor is explained by the concept of liminality (Higgott & Nossal, 1997). This idea helps to analyse the ideational shift in Australia's international location. Originally employed by anthropologists, this term describes the threshold experienced by people undergoing rites of passage. An individual subsequently experiences two existences simultaneously (Higgott & Nossal, 1997, p. 170). This transitional phase, between the positions assigned by law, custom, convention and ceremony, confuses the individual (Turner, 1969, p. 95). This confusion stems from the contradictory identity adjustment process because a person occupies a position with both incongruous outlooks.

Liminality literature highlights the ambiguities the Labor reimagining project catalysed within Australia. During this period Australians largely identified with the Anglo-American world (Higgott & Nossal, 1997, p. 171). This was because most Australians had familial roots in the British Isles. Furthermore, the cultural referents and institutions of the community - political, economic, social, educational, religious, cultural, sporting - despite evolving local characteristics, traced their origins to the imperial centres of either Britain or the United States (Higgott & Nossal, 1997, p. 171). This subsequently conflicted with the new Asian identity the government had manufactured.

The main proponents of Australia's ideational redefinition were institutional and elite driven. This movement was advanced primarily by the government (Higgott & Nossal, 1997, p. 175). Australian policymakers during the Hawke-Keating era crafted this myth within Australia's foreign policy discourse. This reflects an attempt to engineer a new national identity by renegotiating Australia's ideational place (Jones & Benvenuti, 2006). The government ideationally repositioned Australia by reconceptualising Asia within the national imagination. The agenda of this action was twofold: undermine the dominant Anglo-centric discourse and emphasise Asia's importance to Australia (Higgott & Nossal, 1997, p. 174). By refashioning Australia ideologically, the government hoped to assert a stronger nationalist sentiment domestically. Through strengthening society's national partisanship, this would help manoeuvre Australia into a more ideationally distinct place within foreign affairs (Jones & Benvenuti, 2006, pp. 106-107). Through this Labor portrayed its actions as necessary for the country's development. Adopting this mindset, as depicted to the public, contributed towards national security because Australian prosperity required engaging differently with world.

However, this new regionalist myth was paradoxical. This narrative was riddled with ambiguities because Asia was depicted monolithically (Jones & Benvenuti, 2006, p. 108). In its language the government unrecognised the nuances of Asia and eschewed pursuing bilateral relations of varying intensity (Jones & Benvenuti, 2006, p. 108). This homogenous regionalism reinforced the dominant perceptions that Asians were inherently different from Australians. Indeed, these portrayals undermined the reimagining project envisioned by Hawke and Keating.

The government's alternate foreign policy direction was additionally weakened by its internal contradictions (Higgott & Nossal, 1997). These ideational constructions coexisted with a highly antagonistic defence posture towards Asia. For example, the government spent approximately \$10 billion annually against security threats that could singly originate from regional neighbours (as cited in Higgott & Nossal, 1997, p. 176). Thus, defence policies were designed to protect Australia from threats emanating from Asia. This is illustrated by the 1994 Defence White Paper:

our region is one of great dynamism, strategically as well as economically. The next fifteen years will see great change in our strategic environment. With the end of the Cold War, important new uncertainties have emerged about the future strategic situation in Asia. Economic growth will increase the power of nations in our region, and political change may make their policies less predictable. Because of these uncertainties, we acknowledge the possibility that our security environment could deteriorate, perhaps quite seriously in the future. We recognise that at some time in the future armed force could be used against us and that we need to be prepared to meet it (as cited in Government, 1994, p. 4)

Furthermore, during the Hawke-Keating period Australia was committed to maintaining an intimate alliance with the US. The American connection for Australia remained prescient to protect territorial national security. The Australia-US alliance continued to be perceived as integral to safeguarding Australia's security. Thus, Hawke eagerly supported the United States and was determined to keep the Americans enthused towards Australia (Firth, 2011, p. 37). Hawke proclaimed that both countries would be "together forever" and confirmed this commitment by telling US President Ronald Regan that Australia was the US' most reliant ally (as cited in Firth, 2011, p. 37). According to Hawke in his 1983 election victory speech, Australia's "alliance relationship with the United States... [was] close and constructive [in]

nature” and with Labor’s ascension to power had “been reaffirmed”. The United States “has given us a position of influence from which to work positively for peace” (Hawke, 1987).

Evidently, this illustrates the Constructivist myth and normative partisan framework theories. The Labor government constructed a new national myth to reshape the Australian identity. This development was elite driven and stemmed from Labor’s intersubjective expectation of progress. Labor policymakers attempted to reshape and cohere the Australian public and portrayed these measures as helping Australia to overcome its ideational confusion. The government grounded its rhetoric in shared normative understandings within Australian society and projected the idea its actions were both necessary and positive. Adopting this mindset was depicted as benefiting national security because Australia needed to newly engage with the world to prosper. However, given the inherent ambiguities and contradictions within its arguments, this project within Australian society reinforced its holistic cultural and social alienation from Asia. Indeed, this coexisted with maintaining an antagonistic defence posture towards Asia and ultimately aligned with the United States. This illustrates the normative partisan framework because all important political actors similarly understood the Australian military’s role. These examples identify the role Australian policymakers’ views and agency regarding normative concerns have had in structuring the ADF to protect Australia from an unidentified Asian threat. The Constructivist theoretical framework subsequently provides insights into Australian behaviour. Hence, Australia’s alliance behaviour towards the United States is founded upon contradictory viewpoints. This has resulted because Australian national security policy is framed by dissimilar conceptualisations and is socially constructed. This thesis affirms that Australia has cultivated an idiosyncratic foreign policy.

Chapter 5: The Howard government and the Anzac myth

The concept of securitisation within Constructivism

The Copenhagen Peace and Research Institute in Denmark developed the concept of securitisation. The key proponents of this idea were Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver. According to their research, a securitising action denotes the discursive construction of threat. This involves an actor declaring a specific issue, dynamic or actor to be an extensional threat to a particular referent object (Buzan, Wæver, & De Wilde, 1998, p. 25). The articulations of threat are designated as speech acts. A speech act is a linguistic representation that constitutes a version of reality which is depicted objectively to its targeted audience. Indeed, these acts possess a performative role (Matt McDonald as cited in Williams, 2013, pp. 72-73). Through using the language of security and threat a state representative moves a development into a depoliticised area (Matt McDonald as cited in Williams, 2013, p. 72). In this area objects are removed from domestic political discussion and help the representative claim authority to use whatever means necessitate blocking the threat. These actions, if accepted by the relevant audience, securitise the issue and enable a suspension of normal politics. This allows the representative to implement emergency measures to overcome the perceived crisis (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 26). Security is subsequently understood as a negotiated product between speakers and audiences. Albeit, conditioned significantly by the position of authority a speaker possesses within a particular group (Matt McDonald as cited in Williams, 2013, p. 72). Ole Wæver suggests that successful securitisation generally involves the articulation of threat from a specific place, in an institutional voice and by elites (as cited in Aradau, 2004, p. 8). These themes are illustrated by the Howard government's manipulation of Anzac language.

Howard's repurposing and securitisation of the Anzac Myth

Policymakers legitimise foreign policy to the domestic populace by controlling language (Holland, 2010). Language manufactures both meaning and identity (Holland, 2010). This is achieved by conceptualising a 'geographical imagination'. According to Gregory Toal, a 'geographical imagination' is a simultaneous processes of linking and differentiation which

demarcates the 'same' from the 'other'. This bifurcates events and characterises phenomena as 'ours' and 'theirs'. In this process partitions are constructed which designates familiar and unfamiliar spaces (as cited in Holland, 2010, pp. 645-646). 'Geographical imaginations' are a medium through which normative knowledge is created and represent a knowledge-social power nexus. These concepts are fluid and are adapted by policy-elites to define acceptable and unacceptable social perspectives (Holland, 2010, p. 644). Articulated through these prisms policy-elites produce social capital. According to Lene Hansen, elites use social capital to manufacture the domestic's understanding of the state's position in the international system (Hansen, 2013, pp. 6-7). This naturalises particular foreign policy practices and imbues them inevitability within the national consciousness (Holland, 2010).

Language makes policy communicable to the domestic population. Policymakers interlace their rhetoric with the nation's cultural terrain when constructing foreign policy (Barnett, 1999, p. 15). This is achieved by using domestic symbols, metaphors and cognitive cues and functions to frame arguments. Framing organises experiences and fixes meaning to events (Barnett, 1999, pp. 8-9). These policymaker narratives are targeted domestically to improve understanding of the articulated concepts (Barnett, 1999, p. 15).

National narratives are bolstered by the use of emotive language (McDonald, 2010). Many narratives are founded upon 'memory politics'. This type of politics uses society's collective memory to advance both nationalistic practices of commemoration and narrow interpretations of identity. These actions produce conditions for particular security policies and practices to be enacted (McDonald, 2010, p. 287). A key theme of 'memory politics' is the notion of trauma (Brassett, 2010). James Brassett defines trauma as an event where notions of security are fundamentally questioned. These experiences are perceived as unspeakable and are characterised by an overwhelming sense of betrayal (Brassett, 2010, p. 16). Consequently, this exposes fundamental vulnerabilities and irrevocably alters those affected. While experienced individually, large-scale dramatic events link individuals within a community and define the collective identity (Brassett, 2010, p. 22). This is because traumatic events are difficult to understand through existing frameworks and new forms of governance are created to manufacture meaning (Karen Fierke as cited in McDonald, 2010, p. 289). This is illustrated by the experience of war because a nation's participation is ascribed meaning and its narrative is formulated by elite strategic intervention (McDonald, 2010). To remember the created meaning, the war-dead are memorialised. These practices are saturated with politicised narratives concerning the nature of their sacrifice (McDonald, 2010, p. 290). The principles the soldiers embodied are mythologised and celebrated by national

governments to mobilise the home-front to support specific foreign policies (McDonald, 2010, p. 290). This is illustrated by the Anzac myth within Australia.

The Anzac myth occupies a seminal place within Australian culture. According to this myth, the Australian nation was founded upon the Australians' experience at Gallipoli, contemporary Turkey during the First World War. In this campaign the ANZAC soldiers confronted insurmountable challenges and suffered immense casualties. At Gallipoli, Australia was exposed to the destructiveness of war and forfeited its innocence (McDonald, 2010, p. 291). However, rather than remembering Gallipoli predominantly as a tragic and unnecessary site of violence, the experience's official and collective memory is of immense bravery and selflessness (McDonald, 2010, p. 290). The experience of war beget the latent comradeship within the individual Australian soldier. From the viewpoint of Kenneth S. Inglis, this perspective gained ascendancy within the Australian imagination because the Anzac legend was co-extensive with an older nationalist tradition (as cited in Encel, 1967, p. 4). In the myth these figures depict the ideal Australian. According to Australia's official World War I historian C.E.W Bean, the "diggers" demonstrated "reckless valour in a good cause... enterprise, resourcefulness, fidelity, comradeship, and endurance that will never own defeat" (as cited in McDonald, 2010, p. 291). Moreover, the 'digger' was characterised as frank, classless, and resilient to discipline. These qualities were increasingly fixed to the positive virtues of larrikinism, pragmatism and an unshakeable commitment to egalitarianism within Australian society (McDonald, 2010, p. 291). This portrayal vividly employed themes from Australia's history, lucidly referencing the British convicts who settled the Australian continent (McDonald, 2010, p. 291). These Australian virtues are noteworthy within the Gallipoli narrative.

However, this event possesses dual representations within the Australian mindset (McDonald, 2010, p. 292). In the narrative of Gallipoli Australian heroism coexists with acts of British betrayal. The Anzac myth portrays Australians as being unnecessarily sacrificed by the ineptitude and unconcern of British military planners (McDonald, 2010, p. 292). This demarcates Britain from Australia and institutes a theme of Australianness. Indeed, Gallipoli allowed the emergence and assertion of a stronger Australian identity through twin narratives of heroism and betrayal. These views resulted from Bean's historical construction because, according to the overarching narrative of Gallipoli, Australia proved both its worth and role within the world (McDonald, 2010, p. 290). Through the trauma of Gallipoli Australia ascertained nationhood and developed a nascent understanding of independence (McDonald,

2010, p. 292). The Anzac myth has subsequently become a central component of the Australian identity.

The ANZACs have been mythologised within Australian society and culture. This mythology is revered by the Australian public. For instance, the 2003 Australian Survey of Social Attitudes notes that the ANZACs were identified as the nation's paragon figures. This is because approximately 90% of Australians view the ANZACs as having "a lot" or "a little" influence in Australian history (as cited in Tranter & Donoghue, 2007, p. 172). Furthermore, their importance to the national imagination is illustrated by their characterisation. The sacredness associated with Anzac acts and symbols of commemoration pervade Australian society and culture (McDonald, 2010, p. 294). According to Richard White, Anzac Day possesses semi-religious rituals (R. White, 1981, p. 136). Graham Seal likewise contends that travel to Anzac sites are habitually described as pilgrimages (Seal, 2007, p. 137). The myth subsequently controls powerful representational force within Australia.

Australian society also possesses a militaristic component. This is heavily linked to the Anzac myth. These two interrelated themes are explored by S. Encel in his publication "The Study of Militarism in Australia" (Encel, 1967). In the article Encel posits that Australian society has historically been dominated by the idea of the citizen soldier. The citizen soldier occupies an important role in Australia's prestige hierarchy (Encel, 1967, p. 2). The strength of the citizen soldier tradition is demonstrated by reverence of the Anzac legend and is grounded partly in accepted myths about the qualities of the Australian soldier. This concept is centred on notions regarding the national character transferred to a warlike setting (Encel, 1967, p. 4). The writings of Australian military commander of the First World War Sir John Monash exemplifies this theme. For instance, writing in the "Australian Victories in France" published in 1923, he gratifies that within the Australian army:

There was no officer caste, no social distinction in the whole force. In not a few instances, men of humble origin and belonging to the artisan class rose, during the war, from privates to the command of battalions... the whole Australian army became automatically graded into leaders and followers according to the individual merits of every man, and there grew a wonderful understanding between them (as cited in Encel, 1967, p. 6).

The honourability of the Australian citizen soldier is also typified in a recurrent myth about the Australian army. John Laffin, Australian military historian and World War II veteran,

asserts that within the army an “unwritten creed among officers... that they would never ask a man to do anything they themselves could not or would not do” exists (as cited in Encel, 1967, p. 6). Evidently, both these texts revere the Australian soldier.

Through emphasising positive virtues the Australians are depicted as both loyal and patriotic. These combatants reflect Australia’s innate virtues. This is because these men are citizen soldiers sourced from Australian society. The Australian existence is portrayed as utopic and worthy of protection from external threats. The soldier embodies Australians both collectively and individually. These themes are celebrated annually in Australia on Anzac Day when all Australian servicemen are honoured. For example, the Australian War Memorial in Canberra, funded by the national government, stipulates that on Anzac Day:

Australians recognise 25 April as a day of national remembrance, which takes two forms. Commemorative services are held across the nation at dawn – the time of the original landing, while later in the day, former servicemen and servicewomen meet to take part in marches through the country’s major cities and in many smaller centres. Commemorative ceremonies are more formal, and are held at war memorials around the country. In these ways, Anzac Day is a time at which Australians reflect on the many different meanings of war (as cited on the webpage of the Australian War Memorial).

The glorification of the Anzac concept epitomises the development of an Australian militaristic tradition. This tradition represents a significant social force within Australia. The pervasiveness of this force is highlighted by Carolyn Holbrook an Anzac Day historian. She notes that Australia is currently devoting \$500 million on commemorating the five year centenary. This amount exceeds the combined spending total of the UK, France, Canada, New Zealand and Germany (as cited in Irving, 2016). Nick Irving asserts that this exemplifies that Anzac Day has eclipsed Australia Day as the genuine national holiday. He concludes that Australians are urged by all sectors of society to recognise the overriding importance of the Anzac legend (Irving, 2016). Mark McKenna likewise contends that Australians are primarily encouraged to view their identity and values through that nation’s military endeavours. This is both through the memory of the ANZACs and the actions of Australian soldiers abroad (McKenna, 2007). This demonstrates the intertwinement of militarism and the Anzac myth within Australian society.

Anzac mythology was privileged within the Howard 1996-2007 government (McDonald, 2010). Howard manipulated this discourse to reshape the national consciousness and was its key architect. The efficacy of this construction was that, from the viewpoint of White, the Gallipoli campaign provided a prefabricated myth of Australianness (R. White, 1981, p. 128). Likewise Carol Johnson, in her article entitled “John Howard’s ‘Values’ and Australian Identity”, contends that Howard portrayed his national identity project as emerging organically from Australian history (Johnson, 2007, p. 196). Accordingly, this enhanced his argument’s legitimacy. Under his tutelage the Australian government repurposed the Anzac myth. By manipulating this myth Howard manufactured consent from the public and, through mobilisation of this social capital, the government garnered support for specific foreign and security policies. This identity project justified Australian intervention within both Afghanistan and Iraq in the War on Terror (McDonald, 2010). By manipulating Anzac mythology Howard’s invoked ‘memory politics’ related to historical Australian sacrifice in war. Domestically, this implied that the Australian existence and its fundamental liberties and values were threatened (Holland, 2010). Defending these ideals necessitated the government responding militaristically. The importance of ideational factors in Howard’s foreign policy is highlighted by the government’s moralising agenda. For instance, on 12 September 2001 after the terrorist attacks against the United States Howard argued:

This is an occasion where everybody’s got to stand up and be counted and everybody who cares about the sort of life we like to take for granted and perhaps never should in our own country (as cited in McDonald, 2010, p. 296).

He tied these values to Australian military intervention by justifying that the “foreign policy of Australia should always reflect the values of Australia” (as cited in McDonald, 2010, p. 294). The importance of Australian values is also illuminated by Howard’s responses to the 2002 Bali bombings. In these “indiscriminate, brutal and despicable” bombings 88/200 people killed were “innocent” Australians and represented the largest nationality. Howard, tacitly identified Australians as the primary targets through noting that “the exact extent of Australian casualties” remained unknown. Asserting that “[w]e must therefore prepare ourselves as a nation for the possibility of a significant number of Australians [sic] deaths amongst the fatalities” (as cited in "Prime Minister Howard's Speech On Bali Bombing,"

2002). To further signify Australians were primarily targeted he highlighted Bali's immensely close geographical and relational proximity to Australia conveying:

by the generations of so many Australians who have come here... we thank you from the bottom of our hearts for the love and support you have extended to our fellow countrymen and women over these past days (as cited in "John Howard's Bali memorial speech," 2002).

Additionally, this contextualisation invoked themes of Australian friendliness, generosity and gratitude which represented the archetypal Australian character within the national imagination. In his rhetoric Howard portrayed these normative values as objective standards. He later posited:

Particularly at this time of national challenge for Australia and for the values we hold dear in common with other nations of the world, it is a time to particularly honour and give thanks to our great national institutions... formed to give expression to the determination of this nation to defend, where necessary, what it believes in and what it stands for and what it values most (as cited in McDonald, 2010, p. 297).

Indeed, the Prime Minister employed emotive language. This rhetoric was highly coercive and exclusionary, equating the protection of Australia's unique values with a militarist foreign policy. This sentiment was further advanced by the deployment of Anzac mythology. The myth enabled military action by channelling the nation's anger (McDonald, 2010, p. 298). For example, in a 2002 speech at the state funeral of the last Australian Gallipoli veteran, Howard framed participation in the War on Terror as "fighting now for the same values the ANZACs fought for in 1915: courage, valour, mateship, decency [and] a willingness as a nation to do the right thing, whatever the cost" (as cited in McDonald, 2010, p. 297). This appeal to essential Australian values is likewise demonstrated by Howard's Anzac Day speech in 2004. Addressing Australian troops stationed in Bagdad the Prime Minister contended:

you are seeking to bring to the people of Iraq who have suffered so much for so long, the hope of liberty and the hope of freedom, and your example, your behaviour, your

values, belong to that great and long tradition that was forged on the beaches of Gallipoli in 1915 (as cited in McDonald, 2010, p. 297).

Evidently, Howard repurposed Australia's social understanding of the Gallipoli campaign. In his rhetoric he equated its values as the moral equivalent of those embodied by Australian participation in the War on Terror. Through using 'memory politics' and Australian militarism, Howard justified Australian foreign policy domestically (Holland, 2010). The language used linked military intervention to a narrative of Australian identity that resonated with large segments of the population (Holland, 2010, p. 654). This subsequently marginalised alternative narratives (McKenna, 2007). Through defining the debate he rendered contestation difficult and negatively positioned challengers (Holland, 2010). This represents a securitisation of foreign policy. By describing opponents to the war-effort as "un-Australian" Howard evoked the authority of the 'authentic' Australian and delegitimised dissent by representing contrary views as unpatriotic (as cited in Holland, 2010, p. 643). By using this 'speech act' Howard portrayed dissenters' behaviour as the antithesis of the Anzac soldier. This coerced key political opponents into embracing Howard's foreign and security policies. The representational force of the Gallipoli narrative disallowed strategic political actors to craft a socially sustainable rebuttal (Holland, 2010). For example, during the first two years of the War on Terror Labor and groups voicing alternatives were circumscribed. This is illustrated by former Labor Opposition leader Kim Beazley's response on 14 October 2001 to the Afghanistan War:

September the 11th has changed the way we nations now think about security and what we have to do to defend ourselves. We have to stand shoulder to shoulder with George Bush and Tony Blair to root out and destroy international terrorism (as cited in Holland, 2010, p. 656).

In summary, the Howard government crafted an incontestable view of Australia and its relationship with the world. Howard repurposed a militaristic narrative imbedded within the Australian cultural terrain to manufacture a distinct foreign policy discourse. He employed a fearful mentality which located both difference and danger beyond Australia's borders. This is how Australians were encouraged to understand the 11 September attacks and the resultant military participation in the War on Terror (Holland, 2010, p. 643). Furthermore, to achieve this objective Howard securitised Australia's military participation. His language was

inherently coercive which systematically silenced dissent and was achieved by using Anzac mythology. Indeed, though Labor would condemn Australia's participation in the 2003 Iraq War, the pre-eminence of the Anzac myth helped, in the view of Matt McDonald and Matt Merefield, the Howard government to legitimise Australian involvement without losing significant political capital (McDonald & Merefield, 2010, p. 186). This viewpoint is mirrored by Daniel Nourry who posits that the representational power of the Anzac tradition compelled Australia onto the battlefield in Iraq (Nourry, 2005). This account of the Anzac discursive power indicates the importance of identity narratives within the construction of Australian security practices towards the United States (McDonald, 2010, p. 293).

The Howard government exploited the Anzac legend to advance domestic support favouring the Australia-US alliance. This helped the government present greater affiliation with the United States as both sensible and morally justifiable (T. Smith, 2006). Howard's representations framed intervention in the United States' War on Terror as consistent with core national values. The alliance and support for US foreign policy was a manifestation of the shared values embodied by both countries (Holland, 2010). Howard linked the Anzac values to the United States by asserting in 2003:

If we left this contest only to [sic] United States, we would be leaving it to them to defend our rights and those of all the other people of the world who have a commitment to freedom and liberty (as cited in McDonald, 2010, p. 296).

The sacrifice of the ANZACs was further linked to supporting US policy by the 2002 contestation:

For non-belligerent, peace-loving people we have over the years made a very big sacrifice of lives and blood in the defence of values that are important to us and important to the other nations of the world... it's important for the preservation of the kind of nation that we have been, we are, and we hope always to remain, that occasionally we have to take action in concert with our allies (as cited in Holland, 2010, p. 655).

Indeed, the Howard government selectively advanced components of the Anzac myth (T. Smith, 2006). In his characterisation of the Australia-US alliance the Prime Minister omitted references to the myth's betrayal. The act possessed twofold importance: the positive

qualities of the United States were emphasised while connotations of neglect and uncaringness were disassociated. This denoted to the Australian public the righteousness of the United States' agenda in the War on Terror and legitimised a more militaristic Australian foreign policy. Furthermore, these assertions civilisationally demarcated the world upon binary calculations.³ Howard's rhetoric constructed the West, primarily consisting of Australia and the United States, as both civilised and righteous. Contrastingly, this depicted all other non-Western nations as morally culpable. Participating within the US led interventions was framed as defending the essential values which stemmed from the ANZACs. Jack Holland similarly argues that, through invocation of this tradition, Howard portrayed his militarist foreign policy as the latest incarnation of Australian sacrifice in war. The ANZACs' selfless comradeship linked intervention to resonant national values and naturalised Australia's military association with the United States (Holland, 2010, p. 646).

Evidently, Constructivism helps to explain Australian foreign policy. The Howard government repurposed the militaristic Anzac myth in Australian society and culture. This goal was achieved through using shared normative understandings about 'good' and 'bad' associated with the Australian identity. The preservation of Australia's core values were depicted as a national security concern. Furthermore, this represented a securitisation of Australian participation in the War on Terror by elites. Howard claimed authority to use whatever means necessitated halting threats to national security. These 'speech acts' coerced political opponents and mobilised the domestic population to favour Howard's agenda. This was linked to Howard's foreign policy goal of supporting the US' interventionist wars. Indeed, Australia's favourable US alliance behaviour is based on numerous and contradictory worldviews. This is because Australia's national security strategy is framed by multiple conceptualisations and is socially constructed. This thesis argues that these developments have resulted in Australia developing an idiosyncratic foreign policy.

³ Refer to Samuel Huntington's 'clash of civilisations' thesis in Chapter 3

Chapter 6: Australia's foreign policy strategic culture

The Constructivist approach to strategic culture

William Cannon, in his article entitled “How will Australia’s Strategic Culture Inform Its Engagement In the Indo-Pacific Region?”, asserts that a country’s strategic culture is unique (Cannon, 2014, p. 10). The idea of strategic culture was conceived by Jack Snyder in his 1977 analysis of the Soviet Union’s nuclear policy “The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations”. This culture is defined as the ideas, conditioned emotional responses, and patterns of behaviour that a national security community have acquired through instruction or imitation (J. L. Snyder, 1977, p. 8). This concept is somewhat linked to Hedley Bull’s Society of States thesis. According to this framework, state behaviour within international relations is partly due to habit or inertia (Bull, 2012, p. 60). Foreign policy is constructed in response to features which include: history, geography, international and military relationships, the political system, culture and the political boundaries previously established (Cannon, 2014, p. 10). From the viewpoint of David Kilcullen, these ideas indicate the broad direction of strategic cultural thinking (Kilcullen, 2007, p. 47). In a strategic culture predominant ideas determine norms and, according to Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, create the state’s interests (as cited in LauTerbach, 2011, p. 63). Specifically, security interests are defined by actors who respond to cultural factors (Peter J. Katzenstein as cited in LauTerbach, 2011, p. 63). This is because interest formation stems from a ‘logic of appropriateness’ (LauTerbach, 2011, p. 63). Norms dictate social structures which determine the proper means for pursuing interests and defining objectives. Consequently, independent variables associated with interests, such as the Realist conceptualisation of anarchy, are understood as dependent variables that are created, modified, and replaced by variables representing the rise of new strategic cultural norms (Ronald L. Jepperson, Peter J. Katzenstein and Alexander Wendt as cited in LauTerbach, 2011, p. 64). This is represented in the Australian context.

An Australian strategic culture

Australians desire Western pre-eminence (Fullilove, 2015b). This is partly because the West has traditionally preserved the international status quo. Fullilove argues that counteracting revisionist powers is highly advantageous to Australian interests (Fullilove, 2015b). This stems from Australia's territorial indefensibility. Australia is the 6th largest country and, including its external territories, covers almost 20% of the globe (as cited in Kilcullen, 2007, pp. 49-50). According to 2016 statistics, Australia has also approximately 24 million people (*Population clock*, 2016). Over 40 countries in the world have greater populations. Moreover, 85% of Australia's population and 90% of its key infrastructure are located within 50 kilometres of its maritime borders making Australia vulnerable to seaborne attacks (as cited in Cannon, 2014, p. 12). From the viewpoint of David Reynolds, given the space and people imbalance, successive governments have recognised that Australia is incapable of halting a hostile great power assault (Reynolds, 2005, p. 352).

This theme is exemplified by Geoffrey Blainey in his publication entitled "The Tyranny of Distance" (as cited in Whitten, 2013, p. 7). Blainey establishes distance as the ideational feature that has defined Australia's developmental psychology. In his research he cites the large distances between its major cities, the interior, and between the colonisers and their European homelands. Furthermore, Australia within its immediate geographical region is largely surrounded by cultural and socially dissimilar states. Blainey claims these geographies have established an attitude towards the territory that is both defensive and reactionary (as cited in Whitten, 2013, p. 7). Australia possesses an underlying distress of geographic isolation and encroachment. According to Mark Beeson, this realisation has induced feelings of insecurity (Beeson, 2001, p. 45). This has governed Australian strategic culture and has become manifest in an approach towards international relations called Traditionalism.

Traditionalism prioritises security relationships with 'great and powerful friends' (Wesley & Warren, 2000, p. 9). Traditionalists understand the world as inherently anarchic and dangerous. A Security Dilemma resulting from uncertainty about other states' intentions means the state's foremost priorities are to strengthen national security and maximise power (Wesley & Warren, 2000, p. 10). To achieve these goals an alliance is desired by the state. However, Traditionalist alliances are also predicated on innate shared interests and objectives. Traditionalism believes cultural affinity, similarities and closeness of

political structures and ideology forges securer relationships and breeds trust (Wesley & Warren, 2000, p. 13). Indeed, in selecting a ‘great and powerful friend’, Traditionalists prefer alike countries. The Traditionalist worldview is subsequently also normative and is comprised of two contradictory attitudes to international relations. The Traditionalist foreign policy approach stems from the interaction between domestic forces within Australia (Wesley & Warren, 2000, p. 23).

Australian society is complex. The populace is directly affected by international forces and social attitudes regarding Australia and its position in the world have become increasingly clustered (Wesley & Warren, 2000, p. 12). This process has resulted in the development of politicised social cleavages which, through emphasising different international desires, has created expanding foreign policy constituencies (Wesley & Warren, 2000, p. 12). These constituencies are cultivated from the interplay between nationalism, identity, tradition, ethnic or racial animosities or sympathies; and economic position with Australian society and have determined how Australians self-identify (Wesley & Warren, 2000, p. 12). Australians understand themselves primarily as a Western country. This is demonstrated by the annual ‘feelings thermometer’ by the Lowy Institute which measures Australians’ feelings towards other countries on a scale of 0° (coldest feelings) to 100° (warmest feelings) in temperature (Institute, 2015, pp. 15-16). For instance, a 2014 poll asked Australians to choose “Australia’s best friend” from a list of six countries in the world, the United States ranked highest with New Zealand scoring 35% and 32% respectively. Moreover, this was followed by the United Kingdom with 17%. Australians’ warmth towards the United States, New Zealand and the United Kingdom have been consistent features of Lowy Institute polling (Institute, 2015, pp. 15-16). Contrastingly, feelings towards Australia’s social and cultural disparate neighbours were negative. China and Japan/Indonesia were chosen by 9% and 1% respectively (Institute, 2015, pp. 15-16). Michael Wesley and Tony Warren, in their article entitled “Wild Colonial Ploys? Currents of Thought in Australian Foreign Policy” have contended that Australia, both at a governmental and social level, has avoided seeking a powerful Asian ally. This perspective has evolved because of the combined cultural difference and historic weakness of the region’s countries (Wesley & Warren, 2000, p. 14). Indeed, the two most powerful countries in the world since Australian Federation have mirrored Australia in language, culture and political and judicial traditions (Wesley & Warren, 2000, p. 14). This has culminated in Australia desiring intimate security relationships with initially Britain and currently the US. The Traditionalist mindset has subsequently governed Australia’s alliance pursuits.

The origins of Traditionalism are situated in Australia's beginnings as a British colony. The predominantly British colonisation of Australia occurred when Great Britain was the world's dominant state. Accordingly, most Australians identified strongly with British society (Meaney, 2001, p. 82). Throughout the period of large-scale British migration, Britain was comprised of 4 countries; England, Wales, Scotland and Ireland, with diverse cultural and social practices. In Australia these transplanted migrants blended and homogenised the British traditions (Meaney, 2001, p. 82). Neville Meaney contends that the idea of Britishness was pervasive within both the collective and individual mindset of Australians (Meaney, 2001, p. 79). This view is illustrated by a Sydney Morning Herald publication and Australia's National Anthem "Advance Australia Fair" respectively.

For instance, Australia was first visited by a reigning British monarch Queen Elizabeth II in 1954. According to Neville Meaney this possessed unparalleled quasi-religious significance for Australians (Meaney, 2001, p. 80). The Sydney Morning Herald declared that Elizabeth epitomised "the supreme achievement of the British race" (as cited in Meaney, 2001, p. 80). This theme of reverence towards Britain is also demonstrated by "Advance Australia fair". Peter McCormick's song was written in 1879 to honour the widespread pre-Federation Australian colonialists as British. This was implemented as Australia's national anthem in 1977. One verse published circa the First World War, despite being removed from the current version at its adoption as the national anthem, proclaimed that:

Britannia then shall surely know
Beyond wide oceans' roll
Her son's in fair Australia's land
Still keep the British soul (as cited in Meaney, 2001, p. 80).

The permanence of Britishness in Australia has defined the national identity. Australia had two overlapping albeit distinct views of Britain. As British peoples Australians understood themselves as partisans of the Empire. However, this coexisted alongside Australians also viewing themselves as peripherally adjunct and subordinate colonials (Meaney, 2001, p. 83). Despite their incongruity, these ideas underlie the importance of the British concept within the Australian imagination. The theme's power was overriding for Australians, believing both in British unity and desiring to further the Empire's dominance (Meaney, 2001, p. 89). As a British community abroad, an ascendant and militarily powerful Empire would defend

Australia's territorial national security from hostile threats (Meaney, 2001, p. 85). To maintain this protection Australians were encouraged to exhibit loyalty to Britain (Meaney, 2001, p. 79). However, Britishness in Australia slowly eroded post-World War II.

The change of Australian social attitudes resulted from exogenous forces within worldwide politics. This trend was catalysed by Australia's growing strategic dependence on the US military during World War II. Australian Prime Minister John Curtin's New Year message on 27 December 1941 in the Melbourne Herald illustrates this theme. Responding to the Australian warships HMS Prince of Wales and HMS Repulse's destruction by Japanese forces, Curtin controversially stated to the Australian people: "[w]ithout any inhibitions of any kind, I made it quite clear that Australia looks to America, free of any pangs as to our traditional links or kinship with the United Kingdom" (as cited in Gyngell, 2005, p. 100). This historic speech marked a watershed moment in the bilateral Australia-United Kingdom relationship. Britain lacked the requisite military strength to protect Australia from Japanese invasion and neutering the threat necessitated embracing the United States. This movement towards the US was further compelled by other impetuses outside Australia's control. Namely, the post-World War II disintegration of the British Commonwealth and Britain's decision to economically disengage with Australia and embrace Europe. This compelled Australia to see its Britishness as illusory and reluctantly acknowledge Britain as a foreign nation (Meaney, 2001, p. 89). From Meaney's viewpoint, the history of nationalism in Australia is indicative of thwarted Britishness (Meaney, 2001, p. 89). These developments occurred within the Cold War environment which was characterised by geopolitical bipolarity.

The Cold War further reoriented Australian foreign policy towards the US. This war was headed by two nations: the United States, which represented the West, and the Soviet Union which was identified as the East. Australia reacted by cultivating a holistically intimate relationship with the United States. This is because the US was both Western and a superpower. David Reynolds suggests the Cold War impelled Australia from Britain's geopolitical orbit into encircling another Western hegemon (Reynolds, 2005, p. 350). This behaviour has resulted in the cementation in Australia's strategic culture as the junior partner of a similar global power (Wesley & Warren, 2000, p. 15). Michael Wesley and Tony Warren have subsequently posited that Australia behaves primarily as a great power 'doctrine taker' rather than a 'doctrine maker'. Australia uses the doctrine's terms and objectives to manipulate 'great and powerful friend' allies in pursuit of its territorial national security

interests (Wesley & Warren, 2000, p. 14). This is demonstrated by the Robert Menzies government.

Robert Menzies was an enthusiast of Australia possessing a ‘great and powerful friend’. For instance, in April 1965 the Menzies government committed an Australian battalion to the US led Vietnam War. This was designed to strengthen the Australia-US alliance as Menzies told Parliament: “[i]t is a continuing interest to this country to be regarded and to remain as a valued ally” of the United States (as cited in Reynolds, 2005, p. 350). Viewed through the prism of the Cold War conflict Garfield Barwick, Minister for External affairs in 1964, argued that protecting Australia’s “European background” and guarding against its “intimate geographical propinquity to Asia” were paramount objectives (as cited in Ungerer, 2007, p. 543). To achieve this goal Australia relied upon its “great and powerful friends” (Menzies as cited in Ungerer, 2007, p. 543). By proactively aligning its diplomatic, military and economic measures with the West, headed by the United States, would Australia achieve its political and national security outcomes. However, this ‘great and powerful friend’ dependence has led Australia to become increasingly insecure about its inability to discern the United States’ agenda (O’Neil, 2013, p. 102). According to Andrew O’Neil, Australia has historically doubted the US’ willingness to protect Australian national security. This has resulted in consecutive Australian governments participating in US led conflicts to engender bilateral reliance (O’Neil, 2013, p. 102). This is intended to foster loyalty from the United States. This loyalty, in the view of Michael Wesley and Tony Warren, is designed to manufacture goodwill from the US and allows Australia to redeem the ‘great and powerful friends’ comradery when its territorial national security is threatened (Wesley & Warren, 2000, p. 15). Greg Pemberton has contended that Australia warred in Vietnam because of its dependence on the United States. He asserts that was necessary to stimulate a larger US commitment to Southeast Asia (as cited in Reynolds, 2005, p. 350). As aforementioned in Chapter 3, Asia is a region Australia has historically feared.⁴

This trend is also demonstrated by the US military and intelligence presence in Australia. The presence refers to ‘joint facilities’ or bases and typify the inherent asymmetrical cooperation between the United States and Australia (Tanter, 2013). These bases occupy three forms: Firstly, ADF bases to which US military forces have access. Secondly, Australian and American co-located facilities. Thirdly, US bases which provide Australia with limited access. Writing in The Australian newspaper, J. Short argues that the

⁴ Chapter 3: Fear and the Australian political discourse

bases make Australia the 'southern anchor' of the US alliance system. This allows Australia to contribute to the United States' permanent Asia-Pacific presence and, from the government's viewpoint, is fundamental to Australian national security (as cited in Wesley & Warren, 2000, p. 10). According to Richard Tanter, Australia has intensified US military involvement domestically because policymakers believe Australia's utility to the United States is enhanced (Tanter, 2013). This is similarly demonstrated by the history and pattern of Australia's military deployments abroad. Fullilove notes that only Australia has participated in all the United States' major conflicts of both 20th and 21st centuries. He asserts that Australia is likely the US' most reliable ally (Fullilove, 2015b). Indeed, aligning with likeminded countries and using their strategic position represents an integral dimension of Australian strategic culture.

Australia's strategic culture has subsequently instituted a social contract between society and government regarding its acceptable alliance mechanism to protect national security. This theme is exemplified by Paul Kelly in "The End of Certainty: The Story of the 1980s". According to Kelly, Australia was partly founded on the two interrelated ideas of faith in government authority and great power dependence (as cited in Evans, 2005, p. 22). Michael Evans similarly argues that interstate cultural linkages allowed the Australian political system to seek military security with a designated 'great and powerful friend' (Evans, 2005, p. 22). This represents a foundational ideology that enhances security by joining an impenetrable, global spanning empire (Paul Kelly as cited in Evans, 2005, p. 22).

Evidently, the Constructivist view of strategic culture elucidates Australian behaviour. To counteract perceived threats Australia has maintained and fostered intimate military relationships with a 'great and powerful friend'. First, the United Kingdom and currently the United States. This reliance reflects Australia's geostrategic impediments. Australia has leveraged the benefits and opportunities from these relationships to further its territorial national security objective. This is because Australia's Traditionalist strategic culture perceives international relations as both chaotic and dangerous and is underpinned by the Realist conceptualisation of anarchy. However, Australia's 'great and powerful friend' reliance is multidimensional. This Realist perception has been modified to incorporate new strategic cultural norms. Norms, determined by cultural factors, have also defined Australia's national security interests. This has governed the acceptable means through which the Australian government is socially contracted to the public to pursue national interests and acquire objectives. Fullilove contends that Australia perceives an alignment of values with Western countries (Fullilove, 2015b). These values preclude the 'great and powerful friend'

from attacking and subduing Australia. This has resulted in Australia willing to work with alike countries which occupy the apex of global politics (Fullilove, 2015b). However, this 'great and powerful friend' dependence has caused Australia to demonstrate unfailing loyalty to both its historical great protectors. This is a key philosophy that underpins Australian behaviour and represents an integral component of its strategic culture. These examples explain why Australia desires an intimate security relationship with the United States. Australia's Traditionalist strategic culture, according to the Minister for Foreign Affairs Julie Bishop, ensures that the US alliance remains "a cornerstone of its strategic policy" (as cited in Cannon, 2014, p. 14). Indeed, Australia's alliance behaviour towards the US is founded upon contradictory worldviews. This is because Australian national security is framed by different conceptualisations and is socially constructed. This thesis asserts that this indicates Australia has developed an idiosyncratic foreign policy.

Chapter 7: Australia's US alliance concerns

The Australia-US alliance is characterised by flashpoints of tension. These concerns primarily involve China and are demonstrated by two issues. Firstly, since World War II Australian defence relations have been based on the ANZUS alliance (Beeson, 2003). However, this has coincided with the Australian economy becoming increasingly reliant on Chinese trade and investment (Scutt, 2015). Canberra desires that both the US alliance and enhanced economic cooperation with Beijing remain mutually compatible. Former Prime Minister Howard asserted in 2013 that “[o]ne of the things that Australia must do is avoid those people who say we have to make choices” (as cited in Mathieson, 2013). However, in prioritising economic development, Australia has become increasingly concerned about maintaining positive relations with China. This has elicited distress in Washington. Furthermore, this theme is similarly illustrated by the issue of entrapment within Australian foreign policy discourses. Australia has articulated concerns its ANZUS obligations will induce the ADF into war against China (M. J. Green et al., 2015, p. 7). The intimate alliance with the United States is perceived to undermine aspects of national security. Evidently, the Australian government has aimed to craft a workable trilateral relationship with both China and the United States. This has resulted in successive governments striving to balance both relationships. However, these dealings are interdependent and cannot be compartmentalised. This has problematised Australia's relationship with the United States and demonstrates that the Australia-US alliance is nuanced.

Australia's paramount economic relationship with China

China has catalysed Australian development and is immensely important to Australia economically. This is because China is both Australia's largest trading partner and export market. For instance, in 2001 China accepted less than 6% of Australia's exports while contrastingly, now receives over 23%. Moreover, during 2000-2001 China supplied over 8% of Australia's imports however, in the 2009-2010 period China supplied nearly 18% (as cited in Dewar, 2011, p. 5). Figures from Australia's Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) exhibit that overall bilateral trade in 2013 was worth around \$151 billion. This was over double Australia's dealings with its second largest trading partner Japan (as cited in Woodington, 2015). China's importance to Australian economic progression is also reflected

by perceptions within both the Australian population and government. For example, a 2008 poll by the Lowy Institute notes that 62% of Australians agreed that Chinese growth benefited Australia (as cited in Zhu, 2013, p. 149). The Australian government likewise concurs. DFAT asserted:

The Government is pursuing a number of initiatives to strengthen and diversify this relationship. Economic diplomacy is at the core of the Government's international engagement. This is why we [Australia and China] are bringing together activities in trade, growth, investment and business... [illustrated by] The China-Australia Free Trade Agreement (ChAFTA) [that] entered into force on 20 December 2015. The Agreement will enhance the growing trade and investment relationship between our highly complementary economies (as cited in Government, 2016b).

Furthermore, this intimacy of the Australian-Chinese economic link is illustrated by the Australian Minister for Investment and Trade Andrew Robb. Sydney Morning Herald columnist Peter Hartcher stated that Robb believes the greatest time-period for Australian firms to pursue business opportunities in China is now (as cited in Hartcher, 2016a).

Evidently, China is paramount to the Australian economy. However, this trend has created difficulties in Australia's relations with the US. Shannon Tiezzi, from *The Diplomat*, posits that Canberra is balancing both its Washington security alliance and its Beijing economic relationship. She highlights how the Australian government is aiming to provide the United States greater military access to Australia without prompting Chinese indignation (Tiezzi, 2014). According to the authors of "The ANZUS Alliance in an Ascending Asia", Australian behaviour has elicited concerns within the US government. This is because Asia's economic importance to Australia has worried Washington that Canberra is inclined to abandon the alliance (M. J. Green et al., 2015, p. 8). Australia faces important strategic choices and managing its American and Chinese relationships will define its position in the current Asia-Pacific Century (Garrett, 2010). Indeed, Australia has aspired to balance both its US and Chinese agendas however, these relationships are interdependent and cannot be compartmentalised. This has subsequently problematised Australia's alliance with the United States and exemplifies that the Australia-US relationship is characterised by flashpoints of tension and is nuanced.

Australia's US alliance entrapment

The Australia-US alliance is complicated by the problem of entrapment (M. J. Green et al., 2015, p. 8). Australia is concerned its intimate US relationship will lead Australia unnecessarily into conflict with China. This challenge has arisen from China's expanding military capabilities and self-declared defence posture (M. J. Green et al., 2015, p. 7). This has been designated as a key issue by both the Australian public and government.

From an Australian perspective, Australia and the United States are somewhat strategically diverged by the East China Sea issue (Phillips, 2008b). For instance, in a January 2015 poll 71% of Australians contended the ADF should avoid military involvement alongside the US in an East China Sea conflict with China (as cited in M. J. Green et al., 2015, p. 7). This is predominantly related to Taiwan. For example, in August 2004 former Foreign Minister Alexander Downer controversially stated that Australia's ANZUS obligations unextended to the Taiwan Strait:

Well, the ANZUS Treaty is a treaty which of course is symbolic of the Australian alliance relationship with United States, but the ANZUS Treaty is invoked in the event of one of our two countries, Australia or the United States, being attacked. So some other military activity elsewhere in the world, be it in Iraq or anywhere else for that matter does not automatically invoke the ANZUS Treaty. It is important to remember that we only invoked the ANZUS Treaty once, that is after the events of 9/11, because there was an attack on the territory of the United States. It is very important to remember that in the context of your question (as cited in Gupta, 2008, p. 151).

Downer's interpretation of the Treaty incensed the United States (Malik, 2005, p. 6). In response, Washington issued a public rebuke and a US State Department spokesperson countered that:

Articles IV and V of the treaty specifically say that an armed attack on either of the treaty partners in the Pacific would see them act to meet the common danger. Critically, an attack in the Pacific is defined as including any attack on armed forces, public vessels or aircraft (as cited in Malik, 2005, p. 6).

Moreover, two days later US ambassador to Australia Tom Schieffer likewise explicitly stated that “[w]e are to come to the aid of each other...if either of our interests are attacked in the Pacific” (as cited in Malik, 2005, p. 6). After US officials reiterated Australia’s ANZUS obligations the Australian government altered its opinion publically. Howard corrected his Foreign Minister and Downer quickly backtracked by stressing that Australia would always remain silent regarding its Taiwan position (Malik, 2005, p. 6). Evidently, Australia was concerned about harming its intimate relationship with the United States. This concept is further illustrated by the 2000 Defence White Paper. This Paper, predating Downer’s interpretation, articulated the government’s apprehension about aligning with the US against China over Taiwan. In structuring the ADF, the text contended that the Australian government balanced “the demands of operations on Australian territory and the demands of deployments offshore” (as cited in Government, 2000, p. 79). According to William Tow, the government was anxious its support for the United States in a war against China would unnecessarily threaten national security. This is because Australia would invoke China’s wrath despite providing the Americans with meagre assistance due to its limited projection capabilities (W. Tow, 2004, p. 282). Indeed, stemming from its US alliance obligations, Australia has demonstrated a longstanding trepidation about becoming coerced into war against China.

This theme has determined current Australian foreign policy. Australia is presently being pressured by the US to challenge Chinese assertiveness. A senior US navy commander recently urged Australia to conduct naval patrols circa the territory claimed by Beijing in the South China Sea. Vice Admiral Joseph Aucoin, Commander of the Japan-based 7th Fleet, specifically asserted that “[y]es” the United States desired Australia to confront China alongside the American military (as cited in Wroe, 2016b). Aucoin’s comments represent the most forthright public statement directed towards Australia by a US official concerning this issue. This is contentious because 12 nautical miles represents the distance sovereignty extends from land into the sea and constitutes a territorial claim challenge (Wroe, 2016b). Evidently, these actions would anger China and the Australian government hopes to avoid this eventuality (Wroe, 2016b). Indeed, Australian Defence Minister Marise Payne replied to Aucoin’s comments that Australia would continue exercising freedom of navigation and flight. However, this referred to military movements that respected the 12 nautical mile instruction (Wroe, 2016b). She invoked the themes of Australian independence and sovereignty asserting that “freedom of navigation exercises are a matter for each individual country”. In securing its national interest Australia would remain increasingly opaque: “[t]he

Government will not comment publicly on the specific details of future [Australian Defence Force] activities [within the 12 mile limit]" (as cited in Wroe, 2016b). These examples highlight the divergence between Australian and US policy objectives. This stems from concerns that Australian national security is threatened by aspects of the intimate US alliance. The issue of entrapment has subsequently determined Australia's foreign policy direction and illuminates that the Australia-US relationship is somewhat problematised.

A Constructivist explanation of Australia's US alliance concerns

Constructivism subsequently helps to explain Australian behaviour towards the US. Both society and government have desired Australia to pursue the rational national interest. These interests have been defined as economic development and the avoidance of war respectively. However, these policies have been constituted through the social negotiation of national security within Australia. Australians, both within government and society, have internalised a culture of anarchy which views self-help and conflict within international relations as unavoidable. This signifies socially constructed Realist optics through which Australians perceive the world. Moreover, this has been replicated outwardly by Australia within the global system and has determined its behaviour towards the US. This has resulted in the Australia-US relationship becoming somewhat characterised by both disagreement and unease. Indeed, Australians fear the intimate US alliance will catalyse Australia into war with China. This anxiety has dominated Australian foreign policy discourses. Hence, as highlighted previously in *Australia's enduring fear of China* section, Australia desires US primacy within the East Asian region to contain Chinese assertiveness.⁵ However, Australia is undesirous of becoming personally militarily involved and has attempted to balance both bilateral relationships and remain noncommittal in specific areas. These relationships though are interdependent and cannot be compartmentalised. This has problematised Australia's relationship with the United States and exemplifies that the Australia-US alliance is characterised by flashpoints of tension and is nuanced. Indeed, Australia's US alliance behaviour is founded upon contradictory worldviews and desires. This has resulted because Australian national security is framed by dissimilar conceptualisations and is socially

⁵ *Australia's enduring fear of China* section in Chapter 3

constructed. This thesis attests that Australia has subsequently cultivated an idiosyncratic foreign policy.

Chapter 8: Wayne McLean's Realist explanation of Australian behaviour

Constructivism's explanatory power of Australian foreign policy is challenged by Wayne McLean. In his article entitled "Neoclassical Realism and Australian Foreign Policy: Understanding how security elites frame domestic discourses", McLean examines the evolution of Australian national security using Realism (McLean, 2016). He seeks to explain phenomena that contradicts Waltzian Realism by challenging his atomistic portrayal of the state. McLean asserts that the home-front impacts the creation of foreign policy. His analysis subsequently incorporates domestic level variables. This view is predicated upon the contention that international material pressures drive state behaviour and guide longer term outcomes at the systematic level. However, domestic political forces constrain elites from responding to external pressures and confronting global structural challenges (McLean, 2016, p. 1). Consequently, elites attempt to mould these discourses to allow appropriate changes within the national security posture (Schweller, 2006, pp. 16-17). Indeed, McLean argues that the disconnect between popular sentiment and foreign policy is explained by the refinement of the Realist model (McLean, 2016, p. 1).

McLean contends that his theoretical framework explains the interplay between the home-front and the government in the creation of foreign policy. According to this rubric, elites act to minimise domestic influence on international decision-making. These actions stem from concerns that poorly executed rhetoric damages the national interest (McLean, 2016, p. 1). Elites redirect public attention to protect higher-order security issues from becoming the focus of domestic political debates. This objective is achieved by concentrating on peripheral issues to the national interest (McLean, 2016, p. 2). This compartmentalises the home-front from the creation of foreign policy.

The difference between public discourses and security agendas is illustrated by the idea of inflation. Inflation constitutes a process where the government redirects the public's ideas. According to James Headley and Jo-Ansie van Wyk, this rerouting creates a mode of participation that satisfies the populace's morality without harming immediate security interests (Headley & van Wyk, 2012, p. 13). McLean suggests this is highlighted by the Australian context. For instance, Australia's history of xenophobia has been manipulated to strengthen the state against threats. This negative language has historically been related to anxieties concerning East Asians (McLean, 2016, p. 12). In the context of China's rise, this rhetoric has become increasingly problematic for the Australian government. This is because domestic anti-Chinese sentiments, if permitted to influence foreign policy, would

problematise Australia's territorial and economic national security goals with China (McLean, 2016, p. 12). McLean suggests that the Australian government has deliberately shifted these xenophobic forces to concepts surrounding asylum seekers. This is because asylum seekers are weak, possess negligible political power and an unconsolidated sovereign identity. Accordingly, transferring negativity to this grouping poses minimal security implications to the Australian state (McLean, 2016, p. 12). This trend is evidenced by public opinion. For example, since the late 1990s Australians have increasingly viewed asylum seekers as a national security threat. Indeed, precluding the 2001 federal election, media attention on the related issues of terrorism and asylum seekers were the majority election topics (McLean, 2016, p. 12). A 2013 Lowy Institute Poll noted that 51% of people were "very concerned" while an additional 23% were "somewhat concerned" about "unauthorised asylum-seekers coming to Australia by boat". In contrast, threat perceptions regarding China have softened since 1996. Hence, in 1996 19% of Australians polled view China as a "very likely" security threat compared to 40% that responded "not very likely". By 2007, Australians who viewed China as a "very likely" threat had declined to 10% while 54% replied "not very likely" (as cited in McLean, 2016, p. 12).

McLean posits that these examples demonstrate the superficiality of security concerns regarding asylum seekers within national discourses. This is further evidenced by China being the principal source of people seeking asylum in Australia (McLean, 2016, p. 12). However, this statistic has remained largely unknown because of their arrival solely by plane. Afghani and Iraqi refugees have dominated the national groups featured in media coverage (McLean, 2016, p. 13). This perception has resulted from a combination of media and elite messages. For example, 29% of the media's 'authoritative' viewpoints were from politicians while only 12% were sourced from professional refugee workers (as cited in McLean, 2016, p. 13). McLean's analysis demonstrates the compartmentalisation of the domestic from the government. Through minimising the influence of the home-front's views on its foreign policy creation the government has protected its bilateral relationship with China. This has safeguarded Australian national security by reducing the likelihood of war between the two countries and maintained the valuable economic dimension.

Lastly, McLean posits that his Neoclassical Realism holistically explains Australia's intimate relationship with the United States. In the context of the Australia-US alliance, this view is illustrated by the compartmentalisation of Australian society's moral norms from higher-order security policies (McLean, 2016, p. 5). McLean undermines the perception that the Menzies government's Anglophile identity determined Australian foreign policy. He

suggests that the government's foreign actions were grounded in Realist philosophies and that Menzies desired to advance the national interest. He cites that, contrary to the populist Anglophile view, Foreign Minister Percy Spender engaged extensively with Asian countries. This was through multiple institutions such as; the newly formed United Nations, the Colombo Plan, and the South East Asia Treaty Organisation and initiated a strategic trading relationship with Australia's World War II enemy Japan (McLean, 2016, p. 5). McLean asserts that the Anglophile and xenophobic narratives used in domestic discourses during this period allowed the Liberals to reorient security policy from the UK to the US with minimal domestic resistance (McLean, 2016, p. 5). McLean's account counterpoints Constructivist theory. His analysis indicates that the Australian government has been motivated by Realist considerations within its foreign policy construction. These insights provide value into how and why Australia formulates its national security policies towards the US. However, these phenomena are similarly explained by the Constructivist model. The utility of Constructivism in explaining Australian behaviour is demonstrated by both Merom's Constructivism and general Constructivist tenets.

Gil Merom's Constructivism: an alternative to Realism

Gil Merom, in his book titled "How Democracies lose Small Wars", examines how the home-front shapes a Western state's foreign policy (Merom, 2003a, 2003b). The home-fronts' significance is demonstrated by the Western state's participation in insurgency wars. Insurgency wars, or 'small wars', are geographically isolated conflicts centred abroad from the Western state. Merom asserts the conduct of insurgency wars has become increasingly irreconcilable with the political and cultural features of Western societies. He argues there presently exists a normative difference concerning issues of violence between Western countries and their populaces. Within the book Merom discusses the mechanisms Western governments deploy to minimise the normative gap and curb its consequences. This is achieved by both advancing information aimed at delegitimising an insurgency and monopolising the supply of information to their publics. These actions help the Western government to control the 'small war' conflict narrative and compartmentalise its contentious aspects from their respective societies. Indeed, Western states manipulate the politically relevant forces within society to achieve policy goals (Merom, 2003b, pp. 78-80). For the

purposes of this examination this thesis will reference the role of norms in the creation of foreign policy and the Australian government's conflict narrative management and compartmentalisation efforts towards the public.

A Constructivist explanation of Wayne McLean's Neoclassical Realism

Merom's Constructivist theory elucidates Australian behaviour. Firstly, the Australian government has advanced information aimed at delegitimising asylum seekers and, through manipulating the media, monopolised the supply of information domestically. Through redirecting the public's view this has enhanced the Australian government's control of its national security narrative and compartmentalised its contentious aspects from society. Accordingly, this has protected Australia's higher-order security interests with China. Secondly, McLean's analysis undermines aspects of his main thesis. Within the article McLean limitedly extrapolates upon why Australia has militarily gravitated towards the US. For instance, he contends that maintaining strong Western alliances favours Australian security and Australia is undesirous of an Asian security guarantor because the region provides "no natural allies" (McLean, 2016, p. 12). The use of the term natural connotes a normative component. This is important because Merom contends a Western society's moral norms moulds its national security approach. These examples suggest that, beyond material capabilities, Australian behaviour is compelled by other motivations. An ideational component is also integral to how and why Australian foreign policy is formulated towards the United States. Thus, Australia's US alliance behaviour is predicated upon inconsistent worldviews and is nuanced. This has resulted because Australia's national security policies are framed by numerous conceptualisations and are socially constructed. This thesis maintains that Australia subsequently possesses an idiosyncratic foreign policy.

Conclusion

Australia has structured its national defence around the concept of a reliable US alliance (Hartcher, 2016b). The Australian government asserts that “[a]n enduring alliance with the United States (US) remains Australia’s most important defence relationship” (as cited in Church, 2016). These sympathetic views are likewise reflected in Australian society. This thesis has questioned how and why Australia has desired an intimate alliance with the United States. The foremost answer to this question is national security. Indeed, throughout Australian history this prism has directed strategic thinking. However, Australians conceive national security in multiple ways. National security policies are subsequently predicated upon various intertwined conceptualisations. For Australians, the US alliance is understood to secure national security interests. Gaining an understanding into how and why Australia has pursued an intimate alliance with the United States identifies the main motivations that have universally driven Australian foreign policy.

To explain Australia’s pursuit of the intimate US alliance, the first segment introduced this thesis’ conceptual framework. I firstly presented Waltzian Realism and argued his theory describes characteristics of Australian behaviour. However, I also contended that Waltz’s theory advances a simplistic description of global politics and camouflages numerous factors that govern Australia’s US alliance rationale.

The second theoretical section introduced Constructivism and examined the phenomena presented within this thesis through Constructivist theories. Collectively, these strands improve understandings of how and why Australian national security has been defined. An analysis based upon Constructivism holistically provides greater insights into Australia’s behaviour towards the US.

I firstly argued Australia has predicated its US alliance pursuit on a rational cost-benefit analysis. The government has desired an intimate alliance to secure its economic prosperity and balance against perceived threats. However, I also posited that the alliance is based on a normative component because Australian government and society have both affirmed that commonalties underlie the relationship. These two conceptualisations have driven Australia’s national security strategies towards the US.

I secondly attested that successive Australian governments have been guided by the ‘Middle Power’ concept. National policymakers have both created and positively imbued this global approach within Australian political discourse. Through their actions, consecutive governments have constructed and reproduced the ‘Middle Power’ reputation internationally.

In manufacturing this external identity, Australian statesmen have also linked this international role to the US. This has signified domestically that the United States alliance is paramount to national security and legitimised the US' functionary role within foreign policy.

I thirdly posited that Australian statecraft concerning Asia has predominantly been constructed through the prism of fear. An entrenched fear of Asia has dominated both Australian society and governmental perceptions. This trend is based upon civilisational discourse because Australians primarily perceive Asians as inherently different and threatening. This xenophobia has governed Australia's national security strategies and was represented by the examples of Indonesia and China.

I fourthly contended that the Hawke-Keating government manufactured a new national myth. Through this project Labor desired to challenge the dominant Anglo-Celtic national identity and ideationally relocate Australia further into Asia. This was portrayed as instrumental to national security and represented social engineering through elite intervention. However, the government's proposed regionalist myth was both paradoxical and ambiguous in its depictions of Asia. This project was further weakened by Hawke-Keating's antagonistic defence posture towards Asia and the preservation of the intimate US alliance to conserve territorial national security. These policies subsequently reinforced Australia's ideological estrangement from Asia.

I fifthly argued that the Howard government repurposed the dominant Anzac myth within Australian society and culture. Through his language he portrayed the protection of Australian values as a national security concern. By using common normative understandings imbedded in the militaristic Anzac legend, Howard tailored a specific national security discourse. The discourse systematically suppressed major dissent domestically and organised Australians to support the US' interventionist wars.

I sixthly affirmed that Australia's national security has been governed by a dominant strategic culture. This strategic culture prioritises intimate alliances with a 'great and powerful friend'. First the UK and presently the US. Australia's strategic culture exposes its geostrategic impediments because consecutive governments have leveraged these relationships to safeguard territorial national security. This dependence has resulted in Australia displaying staunch loyalty to its alliance partner. However, from an Australian viewpoint, these relationships are multidimensional. Social and cultural norms have also produced Australia's national security interests. Australia identifies an alignment of values with Western states and this feature has established a social contract between society and

government concerning Australia's acceptable alliance mechanism to protect national security.

I seventhly asserted that the Australia-US alliance has become somewhat problematised. This has stemmed predominantly from Australian uneasiness concerning China within international relations. Australian society and government have both voiced apprehension that national security is partly destabilised by the intimate US alliance. Australia has subsequently aimed to balance both bilateral relationships and remain noncommittal in several areas. However, these relationships are interdependent and cannot be compartmentalised. This has produced flashpoints of tension within the Australia-US relationship and demonstrates that the alliance is nuanced.

I eighthly argued that selected phenomena exhibited within this thesis are also explained by Wayne McLean's Neoclassical Realism. McLean challenges Constructivist interpretations of international relations by citing the Australian government's demonisation of asylum seekers domestically. He argues this project is designed to redirect and partition societal xenophobia from issues regarding China and has shielded Australia's Chinese security and economic relationship. McLean also seeks to undermine the view that the Australia-US alliance is underpinned by ideational factors. I affirmed that McLean's examination provides understandings into Australian behaviour. However, I also contended that holistically Constructivism improves comprehension into the machinations of Australian national security and its US orientation.

However, international relations is mutable and adaptive to new developments. This prompts the question: what circumstances would compel Australia to wholly abandon the intimate US alliance? The current rise of US Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump provides insights into this idea because he challenges the Australia-US alliance status quo (Hartcher, 2016b). For example Mike Green, a Republican Party foreign policy adviser, conceded that Trump could vandalise the network of post-World War II US alliances:

You can picture a scenario where Trump goes to Australia and says: 'Australia is just free riding on us and just sending small numbers [of forces] compared to ours. I love Australia, it's a huge country, I love Fosters, but I'm pulling out of the Darwin deal for rotating deployments of US Marines and I want to renegotiate the ANZUS treaty...That's a scenario I could easily imagine (as cited in Hartcher, 2016b).

This theme is likewise illustrated by conservative US Republican commentator and adviser Ying Ma. Ma commented, after being questioned whether US defence allies should assume existing commitments would remain intact under a Trump Administration, that “I guess they should hedge a little bit... I don't think a shake up [sic] of our alliances would be that bad" (as cited in Hartcher, 2016b). These attestations have generated concern within the Australian political establishment.

This has eventuated in the Labor Party recently criticising Trump's foreign policy. For instance, Opposition Leader Bill Shorten warned a Trump Presidency would be "very difficult" for Australia and suggested that “if I was in America I would be voting for Hillary Clinton" in the upcoming 2016 US presidential election. However, these assertions were qualified that Labor would “stick to the American alliance full stop” (as cited in McIlroy, 2016). Shorten maintained that a Labor government, irrespective of which American political party gained power, would collaborate intimately with the US both politically and militarily (McIlroy, 2016). This illustrates that the US alliance is entrenched within Australian politics. Accordingly, the intimate relationship is predisposed to continue determining Australia's national security policies.

To overcome challenges within international relations the Australian government has strived to strengthen national security. This has been Australia's paramount goal and has governed its foreign policy pursuits. Maintaining an intimate US alliance is perceived as helping Australia to achieve its national security interests. However, the term national security is fluid and denotes various meanings. Australia's social and cultural norms have regulated its foreign policy determinations. This demonstrates the interaction between identity within Australia and foreign policy and highlights the usefulness of Constructivism in explaining predominant Australian affection towards the United States. Indeed, Australia's US alliance behaviour is founded upon contradictory worldviews and is nuanced. This is because national security policy is framed by different conceptualisations and is socially constructed. This thesis has posited that Australian foreign policy is subsequently characterised by its idiosyncrasies.

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