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STUDENT'S DECLARATION

I, Abdi Ibrahim Magan, declare that this thesis is a result of my research investigations and findings. Sources of information other than my own have been acknowledged and a reference list has been appended. This work has not been previously submitted to any other university for award of any type of academic degree.

Signed: _____

Abdi Ibrahim Magan

Date: _____

ABSTRACT

This study examines genesis of the Somali's instability and causes of the protracted conflicts in the country. It also explores the compatibility of clan and state in Somalia. In the proposed federalism state of the country is analyzed as to whether it can advance peace in Somali. Qualitative interviews were conducted for answering these questions. The study argues that genesis of continued instability in Somalia to lie in the colonial legacies in the country, Ogaden war debacle, cold war politics, and proxy wars perpetuated by external actors. Meanwhile, clan and clannism contestation over power and resources and poverty and illiteracy as well as ideology (Al-Shabaab) combined have contributed the sustainability of conflicts in Somalia.

DEDICATION

I dedicate thesis to parents and spouse and children and the Somali people at large

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Above all, thanks to almighty Allah for enabling me to achieve my thesis. Without guidance, support, clear and timely feedback from my supervisor Mohamed Husein Gaas, this research paper would not have been successfully accomplished. Whenever I felt overburdened or exhausted with the research work he was there to fill me up with hope and energy. I wish to thank him for his tireless assistance.

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LSIT OF ABBREVIATIONS

SNM- Somali National Movement
SSDF- Somali Salvation Democratic Front
USC- United Somali Congress
SNF--Somali National Front
USP- United Somali Party
SSNM- Southern Somali National Movement
NMBU- Norwegian University of Life Sciences
WSLF- Western Somali Liberation Front
ONLF- Ogaden National Liberation Front
OLF- Oromo Liberation Front
SNA- Somali National Army
NFD- Northern Frontier Districts
FGS- Federal Government of Somalia
SYC- Somali Youth Club
SYL- Somali Youth League
TPLF- Tigray Peoples Liberation Front
ELF- Eritrean Liberation Front
OAU- Organization of African Unity
SPM- Somali Patriotic Movement
SDM- Somali Democratic Movement
TFG- Transitional Federal Government
AU- African Union
ICU- Islamic Courts Union
TNG- Transitional National Government
IGAD- Intergovernmental Authority on Development
UNSOM- United Nations for Somalia
ICC- International Criminal Court
UNSC- United Nations Security Council
AMISOM- African Mission for Somalia

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CHAPTER ONE

1.0. INTRODUCTION

1.1. PROBLEM STATEMENT AND BACKGROUND

Since its last governments have collapsed in 1991, Somalia remains lacking a viable and functional government for over twenty years. The civil war, collapse of its central state, and now as armed rival factions continue to haunt the country (Ciment, 2015b). While the genesis of the conflict lies with colonial legacy of Somalia's inheritance of divided Somali territories in the horn, the collapse of the state and the civil war became the outcome as the country had fallen to their prey. United Somali Congress (USC), Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM), and Somali National Movement that were all clan based rebel groups succeeded in ousting the regime of General Mohamed Siad Barre in January 1991 (Shillington, 2012). Following this the state collapsed, rebel's groups ousted the regime, turn the fight on themselves, and full-scale civil war emerged. As a result of power- hungry warlords and politicians, the nation's people were divided along clan-segments and it has been all most impossible to reestablish functioning viable central state (Holihan, 2007). State governance, the entire public services delivering system had seized to operate. The endless fighting forced the people to flee from their homes either to live as internally displaced persons (IDP's) in their own country or to seek refuge in other countries. Life was not easy for those who remained in the land, as they were made to pay forced pay forced revenues and be exposed to the danger of repetitive fighting, to say (Holihan, 2007). The lawlessness situation that had prevailed in Somalia gave an access to international terrorists, criminal groups and piracy, among others. Some of the warmongers got an agreement with some foreign firms to allow Somali coasts to be used as a dumping spot for radioactive and toxic nuclear wastes. War profiteers imported shipments of expired medicine and foods with no one to control them. Not only above-mentioned groups have benefitted from this condition of turmoil and instability. Various reconciliation and peace building efforts have largely failed to end the conflict for the last 25 years. However, under international pressure in 2004 warring factions agreed on transitional federal charter and transitional federal government (TFG) was established. In the place of the TFG,a permanent Somalia federal government (SFG) emerged in 2012.

However, despite this positive progress towards political stability, the country remains ridden by conflicts and lacking effective state governance. Therefore, it is important to understand both the genesis of and the causes of the conflict of which this thesis aims to examine by deductively studying conflicts, its underlying causes and contributors.

1.2. OBJECTIVES

This research endeavors to understand the root and the causes of the conflict in Somalia. In that it aims to:

1. Examine the genesis of Somalia's instability
2. Explore causes of conflict in Somalia
3. Evaluate whether federalism can advance peace in Somalia

1.3. RESEARCH QUESTIONS

1. What is the genesis of instability in Somalia?
2. What are the causes of conflicts in Somalia?
3. Can Federalism advance Peace in Somalia?

1.4. DEFINITION OF KEY CONCEPTS

- **Instability:** means a condition where recurrence of conflicts and wars are experienced.
- **Underlying Causes:** The fundamental causes or factors that trigger violence.
- **Federalism:** Constitutional system of governance in which power is divided between national and state governments.

1.5. Thesis Outline

This thesis is made up of seven chapters. Chapter one outlines the introduction and background of the research with Problem statement, Research Questions and Objectives; Whereas Chapter two provides an account on the methodologies and strategies applied during research studies. Chapter three is the literature review. Relevant available studies, books, articles and documents on the genesis and causes of violent conflict in Somalia reviewed. Chapter four discusses colonial powers partition of the Somalis territories in the horn of Africa as the source of instability of Somalia. Indeed, the colonial legacy inherited by Somalia has become a source of the unending conflict in Somalia. Here of key legacy contributing to this is highlighted. Chapter five addresses the clan, role of clan elders; and federalism. Chapter six discusses the research finding. Finally, chapter concludes the thesis and is where concluding remarks are provided. References are listed at the very end of the thesis.

CHAPTER TWO

2.0. METHODOLOGY

2.1. INTRODUCTION

This chapter outlines methodology of the study, qualitative Approach, Selection of Study population, Study Area, Research Ethics, Data Source of Collection, Data Analysis and Study Limitation.

2.2. JUSTIFICATION OF THE METHOD

Qualitative approach emphasizes epistemologically, that there is nothing external to the human perception, understanding and judgment. Reality is an outcome of the constant social interaction and can only be constructed, explained and assigned to its meaning by the social world through an examination and study (Bryman, 2012a, p. 380). The focus on understanding the social reality between individuals and groups in an interpretive manner rather than the natural world around them is what makes qualitative distinctive (Norman Denzin, p. 8). Whereas, in quantitative social reality is regarded as an objective one out there with or without our knowledge, qualitative allows the people under study to participate and give an account of their own social life and cultural experiences and the relationship between them and others in a natural way (Berg, 2001). In quantitative, prefixed questionnaires are used with numbered variables to deductively determine the relationship between theory and research without taking note into how individuals or groups interpret or perceive their own social life ("Introduction to Quantitative Research,"). However, critics fault qualitative research of being unspecific and inconsistent for its application to various research methods and strategies. For example, ethnography differs with qualitative interview so is the focus group (Brayman, 2012, pp. 381-383). Somali's situation of statelessness, clan based civil wars, protracted conflict and successive failure of peace efforts has been the motivation of this research. From the fact that there are multiple factors associated with the conflict in Somalia, this research is dedicated to study on the people's perspective towards the underlying causes of conflict in their country. Having seen the need to interact with Somali people and allow them to

air their views and perception, qualitative was seen as an applicable, and much appropriate than its counterpart i.e. quantitative.

Following reasons were used to justify the use of the qualitative in this research: First, dissimilar to the natural world, in social world, meaning is given to the events and environments and this entails the researcher's presence in person before the subject or the people under study to read from their minds. Secondly, the intent to deliver contextual description and detailed account of the researched society, groups or individuals makes qualitative approach unique. Thirdly, qualitative research in social world is disposed as a series of events and actions hence these transformative changes and dynamics over time, needs to be disclosed with sequential flow, therefore qualitative is an ideal approach to do that. Fourthly, unlike the quantitative research where hypothesis and pre-determined process of data collection is dealt with, qualitative research prefers to understand, detect and observe the true nature of the social subject under study (Bryman, 2012c, pp. 401-404).


Not only quantitative research was criticized for deficiency and shortfalls but the qualitative has also been under spotlight of critiques from quantitative researchers. For example; qualitative approach is faulted for being too much reliant on the subject of study, likewise the tendency of employing a variety of methods and strategies molded this approach as unspecific and inconsistent with which a target population cannot be generalized. Another failure or imperfection of qualitative approach was said to be inaccuracy of the quality of the research outcome to be replicated as there is no solid formula or processes to follow other than researcher's reliance on selection respondents and data collection. The effectiveness and representativeness of the qualitative approach was also questioned owing to the limited size of the population sample compared to the general population of a particular place or area. As far as qualitative research is concerned, M. Williams (2000) indicated that moderation of generalization is possible where by a comparable groups are compared with each other to figure out the differences. Qualitative research faces another criticism from falling short in transparency. For example, doubt are cast on how participants and interviewees were chosen in a qualitative

research or the applicability of the sample units to the general population (Bryman, 2012c, pp. 405-406).

2.3 QUALITATIVE METHODS

Qualitative is characterized by adopting interviews as the research method. Owing to the fact that there is no such a firm structure or organization to follow, there is always room for an adjustment with more emphasis on the respondent's opinion. As interview progresses, space is always provided for the interviewer to notably deviate from the course of action and come up with new ideas and questions. Unlike the structured interview, there are possibilities to conduct interview with an individual or subject all over again (Bryman, 2012d, pp. 469-470).

Two types of interviews are generally employed by the qualitative research; unstructured and semi-structured. The unstructured interview tends to allow interviewee to respond to the research question with almost no interruption whereas the semi-structured method, questions on a list are to be addressed with the discretion of the interviewees in shaping the responses, however new questions might arise during the interview. In this method, the same question/s should apply at each interviewee. There is a possibility of having new ideas or suggestion cropping up during the interview (Bryman, 2012d, p. 471). As the causes of conflict in Somalia is the focus of the study, in order to be specific, semi-structured was adopted as an appropriate method in this qualitative research (Bryman, 2012d, p. 472). Spiraling was seen as an appropriate procedure in this research, as there is always room for change and inclusion (Bryman, 2012d, p. 25).



2.4 SELECTION OF STUDY TOPIC AND AREA

15 years after the collapse of central government of my country in 1991, with almost no functioning and viable state yet exists in Somalia. The present federal government of Somalia though internationally recognized remains however functionally incapable and weak. And thus conflict despite the 22000 strong African peacekeeping troops remains at large. Then the researcher started to ask himself several questions like why Somali conflicts yet remain after 25 years unresolved? What happened in Somali that sowed the unending hostility and mistrust between conflicting actors including clans? These meant to me that there has to be something in the genesis or the causes of the conflicts in Somalia that can explain all of this. Because of this, i selected in doing my thesis research on exploring the genesis of instability and conflicts in Somalia. To see the people's perspective on the conflict, participants from the 18 regions of Somalia were targeted with interviews. Due to security situation in Somalia that do not permit active fieldwork in the country, most of the interviewed were conducted in Nairobi and Oslo that both has large Somali diasporas. Respondent regions were from all these regions reflected in the map bellow.



Map reflecting respondents regions in Somalia. Source of the map: (Manuszak, 1994).

2.5 SELECTION OF RESPONDENTS

Research interviewees were purposively selected to be of Somali national, middle-age group in-between 45 to 65 and must have lived in Somalia to witness events unfolding in the country from state of order and governance to the state of anarchy and civil war. Participants of different background, education, gender and social status were chosen on purpose to ensure representativeness of the sample to reflect the population under study (Bryman, 2012d, p. 418). Key respondents were also preferred for they have obtained a wide scope of knowledge and experience of the Somali society historically, culturally and traditionally. Therefore, to address the causes of conflict in Somalia, the researcher saw having two study sites/ areas as better strategy to follow than having only one in order to ensure for more inclusivity, effectiveness and representation of the targeted population than having only one. Being Somali national himself, affected by the violence and incessant clan wars in Somalia, committed him to play an active role as a researcher on this study. It was impossible to balance interviewees based on gender and regional belonging proportionally, below table shows, among others, name of region and number of interviewees and the male female ratio. All in all 64 respondents from the 18 Somali regions were interviewed.

2.6 RESEARCH ETHICS

Having informed about aims and purposes, interviewees had assured their participation in this research with no condition at all. The owners of the interview settings were equally informed about the interviews. The researcher being Somali saved him a lot of complication and misunderstanding and made the things easier. Some interviewees were curious in knowing more information about the research where others have required their names to either, be anonymous or left unrecorded but none of them requested informed consent in written form (Bruce Lawrence Berg, 2012, pp. 90-94). Interviewees were assured of high degree of confidentiality and anonymity of anything discussed or spoken during the interview. It was noticed that some participants were more attentive than others on keeping what was conversed secret. And in that respect, the researcher, knowing the security implication, guaranteed them full protection of their views and privacy, however, quite few of them requested to be notified with the outcome of the research. Most of the settings in which interviews were conducted were public places so our interviewees or respondents would not be identifiable through their physical address (Ibid).

2.7 DATA SOURCES AND COLLECTION

Extensive search on the existing literatures and documents in relation to the conflict in Somalia was conducted before, during and after the fieldwork. The University's online library for relevant studies and researches so far made on the topic in question was accessed. Sources of invaluable help in NMBU included Bibsys Ask and Oria (Bruce Lawrence Berg, 2012, pp. 113). Websites, books, articles, reports and videos were accessed and read continuously. Two types of data were used in this study; primary and secondary. Primary data was mainly the interviews and field notes obtained during the study whereas existing literatures, studies, articles, online and printed documents represented the secondary data. It took to collect the data for five months starting from 16/05 to 15/10 2015. Data collection in Nairobi was started 16/5 and finished on 26/07, where Oslo's took place from 28/07 to 15/10 the year 2015. The interviewees were from

all the 18 regions of Somalia. Each region was assigned with three respondents or interviewees. The 54 participants were equally divided between Oslo and Nairobi with allocation of 27 interviewees to each site. In identifying suitable participants or respondents to the research, support and facilitation was lent by some friends and acquaintances both in Oslo and Nairobi. After the identification of interviewees, a contact was established for a meeting at which the purpose of the research was briefly explained. Having them agreed to the proposal, a venue for the interview was organized followed by the interviews. Despite the arrangements, some interviews did not go through on schedule while some others took place unexpectedly with no prior notification. Those skipped off or abstained to take the interviews were replaced with others who were willing to do so. Nonetheless, any participant or respondent considered as a potential target for interview was included as long as he or she was of valuable to the research in question.

Five different locations were designated for the interviews to take off. Area in Easlegh Nairobi: Albushra Hotel, Nomad Palace Hotel, Easleigh Mall. Down Town: Grand Regency Hotel and Spring Valley. Total of 27 participants were interviewed. Interview venues in Oslo were, among others, Taran Coffee center at Grønland, Torshov, Oslo City, and Central Train Station and, Storø Center etc. 27 respondents took the interviews. The researcher was able to locate 10 more participants. Nairobi and Oslo each were getting 5 interviewees. Among them were politicians, former civil servants, staff of international NGO's and businessmen. Though not included in the initial plan, the researcher saw them as influential personalities of great contribution to the research. The views of the above-mentioned group, served as a checklist to verify on the information provided during the interviews for validity and reliability purposes or could be a complementary to missing pieces. Number of interviewees varied from venue to the other with more or less two interviews at a time. Estimated time for each interview was ratio of 60 minutes within which all the questions were answered.

2.8 DATA ANALYSIS

Data analysis was conducted according to research objectives and questions- the data was coded and sorted out along the criteria of relevance and representation. Then this were

further sorted out and thematic analysis was applied to structure and organize data into classes. The emerging themes were classified and grouped into various categories after which they were sorted out and coded in reference to the research questions and steered by the reviewed literatures during the studies (Bryman, 2012b, p. 13).

2.9 STUDY LIMITATION

Security counted as the biggest obstacle without which many regions and towns would have been visited. Time and financial constraints played role in hindering to this study. The size of the sample was not in proportion to the population it represents to generalize thus opening the doors for further studies to back the current one. The research fell short of its target in reference to male-female ratios i.e. numbers of actual women interviewed were notably below than that indicated in the original plan. This was probably attributed due to the fact that Somali community of being highly patriarchal. Some of the interviews or respondents were found eager to know student's own clan, which could compromise the credibility of the study. Ever-increasing traffic jam of Nairobi had resulted cancellation of planed meetings to take place for various times after which all the groups were finally met. Moreover, power failure or electricity blackout in Nairobi had been the cause of postponement in interviews for several times.

CHAPTER THREE

3.0 LITERATURE REVIEW

3.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter deals with literature(s) accounts that have already been established on the topic. It will also enable readers to view the research in question from different perspectives to give them of a wide scope of understanding the matter.

3.2 LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FOUNDATION

According to Karl Marx in his theory of conflict, coercion and power play key role in imposing order in a society. Furthermore society is portrayed as having segmented into sectors that contest for recourses and opportunities. Social groups do sustain order in a society through power and dominance by the ruling class and not through shared agreement among social groups in question. From the conflict point of view, inequality is necessary to be perpetuated for those who are top on the social ladder to continue their utmost gain in economy at the expenses of the ruled class in the society (Andersen & Taylor, 2007). Siad Barre's policy of social discrimination i.e. ally with certain clans and keep others at bay created a commotion of upheaval and agitation, there by forcing those that were left in the cold to take arms to bring change to the country through violent means (Lefebvre, 1991).

Scholars in political science see grievance as the cause of armed insurgent groups where economists view greed as the igniter of rebellions. Normally, two types of civil wars are experienced: one that is initiated by a motive and another, which is born out in search of opportunity goals. War in grievance, some groups in a particular state feel denied of their rights as a citizens so they see violence the only means to get equality. Meanwhile motive driven wars, some groups opt rebellion as better way to get wealth for themselves (Collier, 2005).

As per Hobbes, conflict is explained as a consequence of competition between political rivalries with varying views urged by group pledge. For Schmitt, conflict is defined as an

antagonism that finds its root from groups whose views are inconsistent against each other. Conflict in Somalia is ascribed to have arisen from sharp political cleavage between clans on how the government manages state affairs especially allocation of senior posts, wealth, resources etc. (Gutale, 2008).

From the structuralism point of view, conflicts observed in Africa were due to the fact that colonial states' demolish of the old traditional ways in which Africans had to administer for themselves and not establishing legal institutions that replace the old ones. From the Somalia context, the judiciary system that the colonial powers had instituted were too weak to carry out services as they suffered from severe shortage of both qualified staff to do the work and the financial means required to implement the judicial assignments in the country. Somali's independence in 1960s comes at the wake of fierce contest between political parties in order to win the top seat of the state with no effective platform of institutions to handle the situation. This is also believed to have contributed to the conflicts in Somalia (Gutale, 2008, pp. 16-17). The clan lenience had won over that of the state thus making statehood very difficult to be realized. Individuals feel responsibility to their respective clan that is bound by blood kinship which gives them their unique sub-identity under the common one shared by all clans and/ or groups in the state (Mahmood, 2011a).

In primordial society, there is a tendency that a dominant group to coalesce itself with minority groups to form a coalition government. In such situation, the minority group might feel short changed or denied of their portion in the distribution of wealth, employment opportunities or the likes. This type of discomfort by such groups can result a conflict within the ruling elites. In Somalia, The military ruler placed his trust in clans at the expenses of other clans which eventually led to violent conflicts in the country (Eller, 1999). In Rahim (2015) conflicts is explained an outcome of incompatibility between two major partners in a group or entity as is quoted in “ an interactive state in which that behaviors of goals of some other actors are, to some degree, incompatible with the behavior or goals of some other actor or actors” (Rahim, 2015, p. 15).

Conflict was defined in a different ways: Conflict had been explained as a contest for social position within a certain society; in addition to that, conflict was labeled it as any key social adjustment or change over a period of time within a given society or a struggle for meager resources between social groups. On the other hand, conflict is interpreted in a condition where “ actors use conflict behavior against each other to attain incompatible goals and/ or to express their hostility (Bartos & Wehr, 2002:12-13).

As compared to the case in Somalia, conflict is defined as a one that takes place between groups within a state that is not necessarily homogeneous in nature. Despite the fact that, there is only one ethnic society in Somalia, the conflict in this state is at times termed as an ethnic-based one. It is within this ethnic-society that groups find themselves opposed against each other. Anthony Smith described ethnic-society to be a community bound together by ancestral lineage, territory, and traditional practices that give them unique identity from the other ethnic communities. Ethnic conflict is here by defined “a dispute about important political, economic, social, cultural or territorial issues between two or more ethnic communities” (Brown, 1993, pp. 4-5)

The combination of two major factors is believed to have bred the civil war in Somalia: basic factor and contributive. The basic factor started with the formation of the new Somali state within the western-led global system of free market and economy and the failure committed by Somali leaders after the independence. The contributive factor arises from how the state was run by the military regime under the leadership of General Mohamed Siad Barre (1969-1991), which created ruling elites of some clans with the oppression and alienation of some other clans thus leading a wide division among the Somali people. At the arrival of the colonial powers, a new style of social life was introduced in contrary to how the Somali people had lived and ruled themselves over centuries. This is believed to have caused the new state to face tremendous challenges (Kieh & Mukenge, 2002).

Somalia, a small state with fewer resources had been switching sides between United States of America (USA) and United Soviet Socialism Republic (USSR) for aid and

military support in the cold war era. The successor governments that come to power, after the independence did not take into consideration of the people's traditional way of power distribution and social affairs and instead ruled this country through highly centralized system with all the powers in the capital city of the state and had very little to offer to the peripheral locations. Any peace effort aimed to bring peace Somalia, should take note of establishing system of state in which power is decentralized with people's tradition and cultural values as fundamental basis (Grant & Kirton, 2007). Climate change as a cause of successive and prolonged droughts is evidently believed to have given stimulus to conflicts in Somalia. Society's resilience to avoid conflict occurrence has been hampered by, due to the harsh weather and the decrease in livestock prices and the reduction of income in livestock market overseas (Jean-Francois Maystadt, 2013).

Having to be mono-ethnic community, yet Somali people are challenged by frequent conflicts and clan fighting among various groups within this society. Some say that the instability that marred this state finds its roots into the way clans are structured whereby retaliation between the offender-clan and the victim-clan could spark more violence. Others attribute conflicts as one instigated by some politicians who use clan adherence as a ladder to gain power and influence. Meanwhile others ascribe it as an outcome of colonial manipulation with denial of traditional autonomy structured by rules and cultural values of the clan (Anthony Appiah, 2010).

Others view the way the political crises in Somalia had been interpreted and defined in a different light. They argue that this whole idea as a shallow and misleading judgment constructed and framed by foreign elites. People like Mukhtar strongly believe that Somali society are formed by two main groups; pastoralists who are predominantly found in the north and farmers who are mainly found between the two rivers, Juba and Shabelle. Having, each group of its own language, culture, traditional values and mode of production, among others, that features them distinctively from the other, viewing them as one ethnic-society was as tantamount to causing conflicts among people in the state. (Ismail Ahmed, 1999).

With Eclectic theory, conflict in Africa is ascribed as the result of, or combination of various aspects. Naturally, some people or countries happen to be wealthier or richer than that of their neighbors. So, there is this tendency that the less fortunate might, out of envy, be tempted into a crime. Here the extreme poverty and idleness plays the role of motivation to conflict. On the other hand, the repressiveness of the regimes, confining power in the center at the expenses of periphery, denying people of their rights, abuse of power, etc. works as an incentive for the people to opt in violence. Conflict might be perpetuated in the situation where an X state grants access or provides military base to a rebel group to launch an attack on Y state, (Kieh George Klay 2002).

The competition for conquest between Christians and Muslims in the horn of Africa is believed to have born the early conflicts in the horn of Africa. The Ifat Sultanate under the leadership of Walashma Dynasty was in constant war with the Ethiopian Solomonic Kingdom of Aksum. The objective of each kingdom was to conquer more lands in order to increase resource, influence and last but not least to get their religion spread and accepted. The Ethiopian army's victory over the Walshma Dynasty, an Ethnic Somali paved the way the rise of Islamic Sultanate of Adal with the leadership of Imam Ahmad Ibrahim Al-Ghazi known as Guray by the Somalis and Garang by Ethiopians. This charismatic Somali leader with army mainly drawn from ethnic Somali had invaded and conquered the land of Abyssinia in its almost entirety. Ethiopian Emperor's army with the back of Portuguese army fought back and defeated the Imam's army and finally, captured Adal Sultanate (Mekonnen, 2013). The strong competition between these hostile kingdoms; Abyssinia and Somali-predominated Sultanate in which each side was striving so hard to advance and win more territory from the other was as well attributed to have partially laid the foundation of the conflict in the horn of Africa (Mukhtar, 2003a).

In mid 19th century Britain had handed over to Abyssinian Empire the Ogaden region populated by ethnic Somali in the east of Ethiopia. The people of this region had been opposed to Ethiopian rule and for that reason had taken arms to resist them to regain back freedom and self-determination. The postcolonial Somali states saw morally right to support and stand by their brethren in this region. Somalia offered this resistant group

with bases and everything within its power to help free Ogaden. In 1971 Soviet Union moved to Somalia and made its naval base in Berbera, a seaport town in the north and in exchange, Somalia would receive military support and equipment with personal training and modernization of its armed forces. Somalia took no chance to provide military assistance to the Ogaden guerilla movement known as Western Somalia Liberation Front (WSLF). Due to lack of experience in the international arena, Somali would not limit itself to that but had to send its regular troops inside Ogaden region in 1977. Somalia was seen as too ambitious to take Ogaden without proper diplomatic channel and this had resulted Soviet Union to switch side and provide Ethiopia even far more military aid and personnel until Somali troops were forced out of Ogaden in 1978. This is believed to have paved the way of more violence to take place in the horn of Africa (Ambrosio, 2001).

The proxy war that was fought in Somalia between groups supported by Ethiopia and Eritria after the war between these two states in 1998-2000 is undoubtedly viewed as having increased the intensity of the violence in the region in particular Somalia. Eritria supported rebel groups such as Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), United Islamic Courts in Somalia (UIC) and Afar movements in Ethiopia (ARDUF) while Ethiopia, on its side supported Transitional Federal Government of Somalia as a counter action to Eritria's move to arm rebels to fight Ethiopia (Bernard Enjolras, 2010). American suspension of aid funds to Somalia in 1980th and its influence on major donor states and multipartite organizations to follow the same suit and the United nations and other states and none-state actors' lack of strategy towards Somalia, before and after the regime collapse in 1991, has been acknowledged as a golden chance that had been missed, in which Somalia's situation could have been positively attended. The failure of intervention by United Nations and United States after the regime fall had exacerbated the situation and emboldened ruthless warlords and clan militias (Jentleson & Conflict, 2000).

In the absence of state governance in Somalia, the Islamic militant groups' attempts to install an Islamic state with financial support and training from mainly Gulf States in

Arabian Peninsula and their invitation to foreign Jihadists had been a big contribution to deepen conflicts in Somalia and the horn states in general (Hansen, 2013).

In another account, the cause of Somali conflicts is believed to have arisen for the fact that the country has a little resource and economy to share plus the desire by each of the two super powers (USA and USSR) to have Somalia on its side as they see it as a strategic place during cold war era, resulting Somali state to change sides between the two major powers. On the other side, those who come to power after the independence lacked the know-how and the expertise needed to build a modern state but rather wanted to rule the country collectively without considering of the people's cultural and traditional values that was based on clan confederacy (Grant & Kirton, 2007).

While many Somali diaspora keep supporting their fellow relatives back home either by sending money or engaging in participating community projects such as education, health, water etc. There are others who feel unhappy about how things are going in their country of origin or might be opposed to some senior politicians in the government whose clan members have allegedly been behind the killing, maiming or displacing people from their family members or clan at large in the civil war. These dissident diaspora with easy access of Internet facilities at their host-countries mostly in the west can play an active role to politically fight government in position or advance their will with less effort. Such attempts might weaken the reconciliatory effort and can hinder the trying initiative at home in order to create conducive environment and trust after many years of anarchy and civil strife (Cousins, 2014).

Structure and resource curse are perceived as having great effect on the continuity of violence in Somalia. Having the social contract breached by the ousted regime under the leadership of Major General Mohamed Siad Bare, the state had collapsed and the seed of hatred and deep mistrust among clans sown. On the other hand the rival groups fought in gaining an access to economic sources as the country has very little resources of its own. How the conflicts are identified and constituted by the society is an aspect of significance in structuration. The World Bank report describes the clan inconsistency of lacking any

definite structure or pattern to follow, network and interaction between various clans and the social interchange of purchase and sale of commodities and goods in situations of no state as factors prolonging the conflict in Somalia (Team, 2005).

Somali conflict is the product of numerous causes and factors but the one that counts the most prominent is the contest among rival groups over political leadership and control of resources. Somali clans are used to fight over water and Pasture or raid of camel, well before nation was granted the freedom by colonial states. Gaining the independence had led large number of pastoralist to move to the towns in search of employment and better life. This transition demanded a change of living style from pastoralism to urban live. So the higher one was in a senior political position in the state government, the better for him or her to access wealth and respect thus making the competition among clan members a fierce one (Baris, 2006).

Kriesberg (2005) states that there are five elements that shape conflicts that prolong in duration or are intractable: they are lengthy in time, damaging in character, profitable to the warring parties, conflict is profitable, have no maturity or determination and there is no resolve to come to terms to end it. These characteristics are subject to change gradually as conflict develops. In any attempts to find solution for this type of intractable conflicts are necessary to meet the above-mentioned constituents. The stages that these protracted conflicts develop into are categorized into six: an outburst of the conflict, intensification with damage of lives and property, any undertaking aimed at resolving its to bear no fruit, the conflict will form itself in an organized way, the conflict to increase its magnitude and change in shape, and finally, the conflict to yield to the efforts and come to an end. Agents that are perceived to cause the Somali conflicts are internal and external acts: the environment, from which the parties in a conflict operate i.e. ability to keep fighting, resource, quality of management and the organization. External engagement can, as well, have dire consequences on the intractable conflict. The effect of world power/s might have a strong impact on the direction the conflict is taking. These external factors include peacekeeping missions, aid assistance, intervention of hostilities, etc. (Pettersson, 2011).

Conflicts and wars in Africa are mainly regarded as having initiated due to the following agents: during colonization in the continent, the colonial powers had put to an end the traditional local systems through which Africans used to solve conflicts at hand without delivering effective mechanism to replace them. Moreover African leaders did not have the knowledge and expertise required to run the newly established state. Liability of African states to fail constituted as the major cause of conflicts in Africa. Following Berlin Conference in 1884, Europeans created new boundaries in Africa. Consequently, these new demarcation lines had set a part same ethnic groups while at the same time pulling together people of the multi-ethnic origins into a new states. This forced organization had led confusion, identity crises, and loss of local ways to resolve conflicts in Africa, leading conflicts among nation states in Africa. Somalia's divide in five regions i.e. British Somaliland, Italian Somaliland, French Somaliland; Ogaden region of Ethiopia and Kenya's Northern Frontier's Districts (NFD) sets a good example of the dilemma (Zezeza, 2008).

Conflicts experienced in Africa are different in nature. Arab Africa suffered largely from religious-based conflicts whereas Black Africa undergo one resulted by ethnicity. War between Algerian Islamist and the secularist government backed by the military and the Hutu-Tutsi war in Rwanda can be case in point. The violent conflict that took place between whites and black Africans rose mainly from resource control meanwhile the ones between Africans themselves are more due to identity-based. This tendency of Africans valuing their ancestral root and cultural construction above all, is one that cannot be isolated from factors to cause conflict in the continent. The acquisition of advanced weapon with unprofessional armies at hand, had led many African states to fail. It's in the record that armies turned on mutinied against own government ousting head of states. Such unpredictable military and the successive coups in Africa pose themselves as conspicuous cause of unrest and conflicts in the continent. Countries of two-ethnic groups in Africa are more prone to conflicts to those of multi-ethnic groups (Ibid).

However, the fundamental causes of conflicts in Somalia are categorized in to two aspects: basic causes and intensifiers. Basic cause: the legacy left behind by the colonial

states especially creation of new boundaries into which nations of same ethnic societies was separated, as is the case of Somalia. The new emerging states took over on this danger as they were no in a position to remedy the situation. Before too long, the time bomb planted by the colonizers started to blow up prompting many states to fall apart with succession of wars and protracted conflicts all around Africa including Somalia (Mbuguwa, 2013, pp. 1-38)

At the onset of cold war, Somalia had switched sides between the two-superpower states in a bid to access a hand to sustain and to build military might that will shun away any potential threat to the dictatorial rule. With free supply of weapon, ammunition and financial aid, Siad Barre sustained his iron grip administration for over twenty years only to drive a wedge between the Somali clans and create current prevailing situation of mistrust and deep animosity. The attack carried out by Al-Qaida on American soil in September 11, 2001 made Somalia appear on the news headlines worldwide with members of Al-Qaida suspected of hiding in Somalia. The so-called war on terror led by United States of America had played an inflammatory role to conflicts in Somalia at local level. Inability of successive governments in post state collapse since 1991 to enforce the law and provide security for its citizens, inadequacy of resources and wealth, absence of service delivery and manage clan identity among others, form the basis of conflicts in Somalia. This quote is an indicative of how Somali public views the current Somali Federal Government (SFG) (Ibid).

“The government authorities incited clanism as the conflict in Jubaland and lower Shabelle regions in June 2013 indicated. Pro government militias, which were mainly from the clan of the President, were involved in the conflict” (Ibid).

CHAPTER FOUR

4.0 COLONIAL PARTITIONS AND ITS IMPACT ON THE SOMALI PEOPLE

4.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter discusses the divide of the Somali territories by European colonial powers and its repercussion on the Somali people. Factors regarded the most contributive to the conflicts in Somalia such as Ogaden war, war on Somaliland and civil war after the regime fall in 1991, be highlighted.

4.2 PARTITION OF SOMALI TERRITORIES IN THE HORN AFRICA

The partition of Somali people and land is believed to be the source of endless wars and conflicts in the Horn of Africa. As a part of Scramble for Africa, following Berlin Conference in 1884, Somali people was divided between various colonial powers. Northern Somalia known as Somaliland and Northern Frontier Districts (NFD) predominated by Somalis went to British, French declared Northwest coast current day Djibouti as its colony, Ethiopian Empire captured Ogaden meanwhile Italy took South Somalia as its share (Gaas, 2007) The implication of this was that among others mobility of pastoralists with their livestock back and forth across a vast area inhabited by Somali people in search of water had come under strict conditions given the new boundaries(Asiwaju, 1985). Somali people were not left with any choice other than to apply different jurisdictions and policies passed by colonial masters (Asiwaju, 1985). A renowned Somali poet was quoted as saying:

“The British, the Ethiopians, and the Italians are squabbling,
The country is snatched and divided by whosoever is stronger,
The Country is sold piece by piece without our knowledge,
And for me this is the Teeth of the Last day!”.¹

¹ Faarah Nuur quoted in David D. Laitin(1977). Politics, Language, and Thought: The Somali Experience,

No longer would Somalis enjoy the free access they used to have for centuries as moving from one occupied territory to another, now involves paying heavy taxation or even risk of denial to entry. Each colonizer was driven by its own interest to protect for example British wanted to use Somaliland as a source of meat for their troops in Aden, Yemen, France made the Somali coast a coaling station and a base that connects to their colonies in Africa and Indo-China, meanwhile Ethiopia's interest was to expand and gain land and resources. British authority used NFD as a buffer zone against the migration of Somalis and Oromo from south and north. Ethiopian's case was somehow different from the other European partners. Ethiopian soldiers were carrying out constant raid and harassment on the Somali pastoralist community in Ogaden (Asiwaju 1985). As the imperial forces embark on mission, people were robbed of all they had including food stock, livestock, and land and above all, were taken as slave, as the imperial forces embark on mission. The suffering of Somali People in light of the partition, a Somali Prime Minister in 1965 in his famous speech was quoted as say:

“Our misfortune don't stem from unproductiveness of the soil, nor from a lack of mineral wealth. These limitations from well-being were accepted and compensated for, by our forefathers from whom we inherited, among other things, a spiritual and cultural prosperity of inestimable value: the teaching of Islam on the one hand and lyric poetry on the other ... No! is that our neighboring countries, with whom, like the rest of Africa, we seek to promote constructive and harmonious relations, are not our neighbors. Our neighbors are our Somali kinsmen whose citizenship has been falsified by indiscriminate boundary arrangements. They have to move from artificial frontiers to their pasturelands. They occupy the same terrain and peruse the same pastoral economy as ourselves. We speak the same language. We share the same creed, the same culture and the same traditions. How can we regard our brothers as foreigners?”.²

Ogaden resistance to the British rule in Jubaland earlier 19th century had received a formidable attention. Aulihan sub clan under the leadership of Abdurrahman Mursal Omar took a surprise offensive on Sarinle post along side Juba river on 16th of February

² http://beeshadireed.blogspot.se/2012_04_09_archive.html

1916 in which nearly hundred of soldiers were killed including the District Commissioner of Sarinley District, lieutenant Elliot Francis. Somali rebels were able to take away with so much weapons and ammunition that would sustain them on course for the next two years to come. Punitive expedition was finally dispatched to deal with the uprising and to regain control of territories held by militants. The expedition had finally defeated the rebels and tracked their leader down to the Ethiopian border. Consequently, Aulihans had to pay high price of their actions. British conscripted hundreds of Marehans to participate in retribution of Aulihan nomads. Marehan, an archrival clan, took advantage of the situation and made away with large stock of herds belonged to the former as this has led to heighten the hostility between the two clans (Simpson, 1999).

In Ogaden region, following the defeat of Italian forces at Adwa, Ethiopia in 1896 signified Ethiopia's position in military terms hence sending a message to the other invading powers not to consider it as a target for invasion thus strengthening their expansion into the lowland in the south. Owing to the outbreak of epizootic epidemic in 1890s that had claimed much of highlanders' livestock, Emperor Menelik II had to find a food source for his people, most importantly, the soldiers. So to save highlanders of famine and starvation, Ogaden Somalis had been subjected to all forms of brutality. The imperial soldiers killed locals at will, raped women, stripped of their herds as well as food stocks, and had many of them taken as slaves. The disparity between the two sides, in terms of culture, religion and language had a detrimental effect on the situation. Apart from providing food for advancing troops, Ogaden region had become appropriate ground to settle poverty-stricken youth from Abyssinia in the north that would be armed and to reinforce the imperial forces. According to Wylde (1902:70-71), Forces will be dispatched in to the region first to set a base, followed by a mixture of tax collection on one side, and raids to take possession of livestock on the other. The loss of livestock and other properties was reported to have been direct consequence of starvation of Somali people in Ogaden in 1892 (Oba, 2013).

Brussels Act of 1890s allowed Ethiopian Empire to associate with the other European colonial powers as an equal ally. Under this agreement, Abyssinians were enabled to

receive firearms and ammunitions, a privilege that other Africans were denied to. The unrestricted access of the European arms industry gave the Ethiopians the courage to conquer and subjugate the Somali region of Ogaden and Oromo (Ghalib, 2014).

Ogaden people had, at different stages, changed hands from one colonial state to the other. For Example, at first, Abyssinian Empire claimed Ogaden as one of their territory late 1890, and then become part of the east African colony under Italy in 1936. Following British victory over Italy, Ogaden for the third time become British colony in 1941. In 1948 Britain handed over the region back to Ethiopia (Bereketeab, 2014).

Italy was able to bring Somali people in the horn under the then dissolved East African Empire known as *Africa Orientale Italiana* which comprised Ethiopia, Eretria, Ogaden, British Somaliland and Italian South Somaliland. Somali region of Jubaland that British had ceded to Italy in 1925 was made part of this large territory. Owing to the milder characteristics of the Italian Authority in comparison with the other colonizers, the sense of feeling unity and nationhood among Somalis were believed to have thrived much under the Italian rule (Mahmood, 2011b).

Having agricultural production, in particular banana and cotton, improved largely in areas between Shabeele and Juba Rivers in south Somalia providing labor opportunity for locals whereas middle class group among Somalis had emerged both from south and north regions in Somalia. Despite the class-based legacy of Italians which would signify whites as a superior race, Somalis were allowed to serve for the state under different capacities, a chance rarely experienced by Somali people under the other colonial administrations in the horn of Africa (International Business Publications, 2012).

During world II, Ogaden was reclaimed by British and combined with Somaliland with the ambition to re- unite the entire Somali people under their rule. British suddenly changed their old approach of no engagement with new political strategy in a bid to win the heart of the people thus paving the way for high level of nationalism and the dream to have Somali inhabited regions solidly united under one national flag (Kefale, 2013).

The United States of America, France and Russia saw British proposal in 1946, to create Greater Somalia that would bring all Somali territories under their rule, a kind of military tactic in which British Empire was to be further expanded. The motive behind British insistence on this matter was never to help the Somali nation out of their agony as they claimed, but rather the prospect of exploring petroleum and natural gas in the Italian Somaliland. Yielding to the international pressure at final, British returned Ogaden to Ethiopia in 1948. The Haud also known as Reserve Area that lies between Somaliland and Ogaden that British had retained to provide grazing for pastoralists in Somaliland was as well handed over to Ethiopia in 1954 (Vestal, 2011).

After their loss to British, Italian still wanted its former colony to be brought under their rule. Oppositely, British promoted the foundation of Somali Youth Club (SYC) in 1943 in Mogadishu that was renamed Somali National League in 1947. Somali youth were inspired and backed by British authority to join ranks with SYL in order to achieve two major goals: re-unify Somali people and territories and to reach them development and better economy. Despite their strong resistance to Italian rule, SYL had to be patient with them at least for 10 years of trusteeship under the sponsorship of the United Nations (UN) from 1949 to 1960 (Rothermund, 2006).

The British cause of having greater Somalia of 1946 spearheaded by Ernest Bevin, then secretary of foreign affairs, in which all the territories inhabited by Somalis were to be united under their rule had also stimulated the predominantly ethnic Somalis of Northern Frontier Districts (NFD) in Kenya. Encouraged by the independence of Somali state in 1960 formed by British Somaliland in the north and Italian Somaliland in the south and the denial of choice to integrate with Somalia after referendum in 1962 in which over 80 percent voted yes, inhabitants of this region rallied behind their own political party to demand their right for independence and to self determination to unite with the Republic of Somalia (Whittaker, 2008).

Northern Frontier District Army (NFDA), the armed wing of The Northern Province Progressive Peoples Party (NPPP) was treated as an outlaw group with no objective who wanted nothing but to steal livestock. Surprisingly, NFDA challenged Kenyans by putting up a fierce resistance against Kenyan forces. The militants divided themselves in small units, which enabled them to wage war on multiple fronts. These rebels were allegedly receiving training, supply of arms and ammunition from Somalia. Kenyans had also difficulty in controlling traffic on the long and porous border with Somalia that would give the insurgents an easy pass through. Kenyans to view pastoral community aliens with no manners or collectively consider them, as bandits are believed to have attracted many young men to join the rebellion and to prolong the war period with increased casualties (Ibid).

Kenyan security forces claim that inhabitants in NFD are so much alike in appearance that they find problem in distinguishing who is friendly to the government from who is not. Using this pretext, they established villages in 1966 in which people were to be collected and forced to live in a designated areas. To shed more light on the prejudice towards NFD residents especially Somalis, then Kenyan assistant minister for Lands and Resettlement in 1965 was quoted as saying before the legislative house:

“We do not want to be told that there are loyal Somalis, let loyal Somalis should come out and show us their loyalty. Let them be put in a camp where we can scrutinize them and know who amongst them are good”(Whittaker, 2014, pp. 109-129).

In the event of an incident or an attack on police or military posts by rebel suspects, nearest village would be spotted with investigation. In such operations all hell would break it's loose. Soldiers were ordered to shoot anyone in the vicinity at their discretion. In order to justify government policy to screen the people in NFD, in which the forced camping by the government, in 1967, Robert Matano, assistant cabinet secretary at president's office was also, quoted as saying

“The government is here to look after the interest of loyal people of this country...the government has a duty to find the people who have done wrong” (Ibid).

The policy devised the government to contain insurgents would indiscriminately punish the people. The perception was that Somalis look after their herds at day and to become a bandit at night. This gives security forces the confidence to go any length in repressing Somalis. On livelihood, pastoralists rely on their herds for various uses including milk, meat, bartering or selling them to buy other commodities they are in need. But camping the people and their herds into an enclosure prevents the livestock movements from one place to another in search of better grazing areas. People found roaming outside the designated villages might, consequently be shot for rebel or sympathizer. This restriction had severely diminished population both on people and their livestock. Clans regarded hostile to the government would be hugely fined or their herds appropriated. No one was safe from brutalizing soldiers including women, children and elderly (Markakis, 2011).

There are two major factors believed to have inspired people living in northern Kenya: one was the denial of outcome from a referendum conducted by a British inquiry commission in 1962 of which residents voted yes to re-unite with Somalia and the state of Somalia formed by the merger of British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland in 1960 whose vision was to realize the dream of Greater Somalia that brings all the territories under one state (Tube, 2014).

In revenge action for killing of some civil servants by suspected bandits near the border with Somali, Kenyan army were massively deployed into Garissa. Somalis were rounded up and brought into a section of the town under guard for several days with no water and food. Thousands reported to have been beaten, women raped, and all sort of criminality and inhumanity were not to mention. Those who lost their loved ones were left traumatized forever. With all these things happening, no one was held accountable. The same government that had sent them to carry the mission was shielding perpetrators. A senior ranking official was quoted as saying “ The only good Somalis is the dead one” (Nichols, 2015)

On February 1984 in a Wajeer District, one of the most painful incidents had unfolded. Thousands of men from Dagodia, sub clan of ethnic Somalia were rounded, blindfolded and loaded on to military trucks. Offloaded at the Wagalla Airstrip in an unbearable degree of temperature, hand tightened and stripped naked. They were beaten to death and those tried to escape were shot dead on the spot. Another section of security forces executed an attack on women, children and elderly at home. Words are not enough to explain what had happened that day and it is still fresh in the minds of those survived from the attack and the community as a whole. On an account of suspect, victims were asked to provide firearms or suffer the consequences, that was it (somalimidnimoty, 2012). This heartbreaking and heinous crime was prevalent in this region and is believed to have born much of the hate and discontent towards security forces (Smith, 2008).

4.3 OGADEN WAR

Not long before independence, Somalia experienced a period of conflicts and turbulences both national and regional levels. This marked the genesis instability its attributes, among other things include the legacy of the colonial powers partition of Somali inhabited territories in the horn of Africa. Borders were created to set by ink and paper politics that put apart people of one ethnicity. With no time to waste, the new government in 1960 under the leadership of the first president of Republic of Somalia had made its intention in re-unifying of all Somali territories. This mean a warning shot to Ethiopia and Kenya over the Ogaden and NFD regions that the British had handed over to them. This eventually resulted Somalia and Kenya getting at the brink of war following the predominantly Somali insurgent who fought Kenya in-between 1963-1967 for the secession of NFD. However, Ogaden seemed to be much weightier and with more significance for the Somali state in comparison to that of NFD (Weisburd, 1997).

The Somali government had openly stated that Ogaden should either unified with Somali republic or be entitled to self-determination`, a claim that Ethiopia was adamantly opposed to. Inspired of the moral and material support provided by the new Somali state,

some Ogaden men took arms and revolted against Ethiopian army in 1961 and had engaged in a hit and run style of war until 1963 after which a war between neighboring states had to ensue. The war ended earlier 1964 following an arbitration of Sudanese mediators (Karl R. DeRouen, 2008).

Despite the fact that the hostility was halted through mediation effort, the thorn in the flesh that tends to trigger the war was never addressed without which another flare-up of clashes could be expected at any time. Another round of war between the two armies took place in 1972 set off by the same Ogadeni militants after the resumption of armed conflicts. The war finally had to stop even though Somali army was reported to have made some progress in the fighting over the Ethiopian army (Karl R. DeRouen, 2008. pp. 695).

Following Soviet expulsion from Egypt in 1972 for not supplying military equipment it required to re-engage war with Israeli, Moscow considered Somalia as the next strategic spot to offer the base it badly needed in order to keep the American-led Alliance under check in this region. Somalia and Soviet had signed an agreement that would give Moscow the right to use Berbera as naval base where by the latter would provide the former with, among other things, shipment of military aid and personnel training. In an effort to win more Soviet support and stature and to enhance relationship with east-Alliance, “a Scientific Socialism” was introduced in Somalia. Somalia was lucky to have been supplied with sophisticated weaponry and the expertise and know-how that were necessary and prerequisite to demand the return of the occupied Ogaden. First through peaceful settlement and if fails then military means as the last resort to ensure freedom for that region (Mukhtar, 2003a, pp. 241-242).

After the assassination of Emperor Haile Selassie in 1974, Ethiopia embarked on political instability resulting from, on one hand, various rebel insurgents fighting either for self-determination or more regional autonomy, among them, Tigray Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF), Western Somalia Liberation Fronts (WSLF) and Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF), and, on the other hand, the inability of the new military commanders to keep together this nation of highly diversified ethnic-societies. American reduction of aid

funds to Ethiopia due to perpetual human rights violation in there had further weakened government position to deal with the crises. On the other hand Somalia saw this as an opportune time that presented itself to reclaim Ogaden back to their hands (Nkaisserry, 1997) .

Out of desperation, Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam, the new Ethiopian leader, with immediate effect, severed diplomatic relationship with America and replaced them with Soviets. On the other hand, new recruits were under going military training in Somalia to expedite an offensive on the Ethiopian disheartened army. At first, WSLF engaged guerilla war and was able to liberate large swathes of Ogaden in 1976 and followed by the invasion of Somali regular Army to take over almost the entire of the region in question. Given the nature of contract signed with Ethiopia, and the prize it offers, Soviets betrayed Somalia for its neighbor. Ethiopia received latest military equipment with ground troops from Cuba, Yemen and Libya in their thousands with the back of Soviet technical advisors. Somali army lost the battle to Ethiopian army and was forced out of Ogaden earlier 1978 (Ciment, 2015a).

Given the degree of risk to unreservedly rely on Soviet military and economic support and its inexperience to evaluate and understand constant shift of alliance and friendship between west and east, Somali government proved to be amateur in international political arena. The military regime in Mogadishu fell short the awareness of the fact that neither Moscow nor Washington wanted Ethiopia to lose Ogaden (Nkaisserry, 1997, pp. 12-15). An initiative taken by the Organization of African Union (OAU) to mediate peace settlement between Somalia and Ethiopia did not bear any fruit. However Somalia lost to win the blessing of this organization as they had persistently sided with Ethiopia (Huth, 2009).

Somalia was left no option but to approach support from America and some friendly Arab countries in Middle East. Washington admittedly sent Somalia some military supplies for defense means but short of launching an offensive. Advocacy of democracy, good governance and free economy had to replace with Angel-Lenin style of Scientific

Socialism as a precursor to win American aid and support. Somalia was no match to militarily re-engage with Ethiopia. The heavy expenses in the war with Ethiopia and the subsequent consolidation of defense afterward cost the young Somali nation economically. As a reciprocal tactics, Ethiopia armed Somali dissidents to conduct guerilla war in Somalia (Mubarak, 1996, pp. 38-41).

After a failed coup attempted by some senior officers in the military, Siad Barre saw to rely on certain clans as the only way forward to maintain his rule, a move that had rendered state institutions futile, ushering period of instability and deep mistrust among various groups in the country. With the establishment of the first clan-backed armed insurgent in 1978, Somalia set its feet of the road to chaos and disintegration. Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) of Majeerteen sub-clan set a precedent for other dissatisfied clans to form their armed militia (Elizabeth M. Cousens, 2001).

Any clan regarded hostile to the government was subjected to collective punishment including killing, rape arbitrary arrest, appropriation of stock and property, not least to demolish shelters and homes. Residents living in Mudug region were first to suffer such kinds of raids carried out by the so-called by “red Barret” special unit in the military (McKenna, 2011). Despite the fact that clan and its use was prohibited, contradictorily, the president allegedly becomes heavily inclined on three clans: Marehan, Ogaden and Dhulbahante. His own, that of his mother and the clan of his in-law and the head of intelligence. Considering how speedy things had turned up, Ogaden war was a bad omen to predict more turmoil to occur in Somalia. The foiled attempt to overthrow the head of state did not all help the situation to return business as usual. Using Ethiopian as a safe haven to organize and plan attacks on Somalia, SSDF become more emboldened to recruit more members to join their movements. In an attempt to force rebels to lay arms and refrain from hostility, the security forces, in a single swoop, butchered thousands of unarmed civilians from Majeerteen in 1979 only to have shared the same clan lineage with the insurgent group. Any time an offensive has been launched by SSDF, the response was obvious; retaliation of severe reprisal massacre on the innocent civilians. Adding salt to the injury, an extra mile was gone to penalize these residents by, among

other things, closing all public services like schools, dispensaries etc., cutting traffic in and out of the area, destruction of water sources such as water reservoirs, boreholes and catchments, impounding herds and valuables. Government's action appeased no one but rather compelled many ordinary citizens to join ranks to their fellow gunmen out in the bush thus making the humanitarian situation more deteriorated (Baumann, p. 15).

CHAPTER FIVE

5.0. CLAN, STATE AND FEDERALISM

5.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter addresses clanism, role of clan leaders both pre- and postcolonial era, , reconciliation and peace making and federalism in the making, as a new system of governance in Somalia.

5.2 TRADITIONAL WAY OF PROBLEM SOLVING

Prior to the arrival of colonial powers, shortage of water and pasture, among other things, made groups and clans clash in the past and Somalis developed clan imbedded mechanism to address conflicts in Somalia. As the need forced to come up with some common approach to deal and resolve conflicts over grazing and water wells. Poetry was used as tool to make peace where, at the same times, it could be used as a weapon to break relations and disunite the society. Marriage could also play a bridging role between adversaries. Before we elaborate on how Somaliland had made to meet the ends of clan and state building, there are four basic items that are worthy of notice that can help us understand more clearly about the Somali way of finding solutions to the conflicts: maintaining the performance of blood compensation for the victim, Elders 'ability and specialty in resolving conflicts, an endorsed agreement that binds clans or sub clans for execution and implementation of agreements, and forum for consultation and discussion (Zartman, 2000, pp. 184-186).

At the onset of anarchy following the 1991 state collapse and civil war, clan leaders took no chance in playing their role as mediators and peace enforcers but not all the regions were so lucky. For example, in the south of the country elders' effort engage in peace settlements had been greatly undermined by the marauding militia who pay respect to no one. However, clan elders were eventually able to regain their influence at later stage when the intensity of the war had subsided. In some areas, local customary law was complemented and strengthened by implementation of Sharia law as was the case of the

Islamic Courts in Mogadishu but this was not throughout the country. Traditional system of rule was widely applied in resolving disputes at large (Ibid).

According (Lewis 2014), however there are three pillars that are necessary to sustain Somalis traditional way of governing the society: the *Xeer*(customary law), clans themselves and the clan elders. *Xeer* varies from clan to clan however in general terms it is practiced Somalia, more so in Somaliland and Puntland where the colonial engagements were less severe in eroding the traditional institutions including *xeer* than that of the south central regions of Somalia. In practice *xeer* has three aspects (Lewis, 2014). Negotiation where parties will talk to each other and work out finding an amicable solution to their differences, mediation where a third party would facilitate conflicting parties to come to terms with each other and arbitration in to which parties at loggerheads will appoint a neutral person or a group whom they confide in to pass a judgment over their case (Ibid).

The emergence of both Puntland and Somaliland has demonstrated that the traditional settlement of conflict in Somalia has succeeded in place where modern political mediations and conflict resolution has failed miserably. This has further set the stage for the present federalization paradigm of Somalia. In the following paragraphs we explore these issues.

5.3 SOMALILAND

Somaliland comes forth at the demise of the military government headed by General Mohamed Siad Barre in 1991, which succumbed to an insistent fighting waged by clan-backed insurgents. Observing independence on 26th of June 1960 from the British, Somaliland merged with Italian Somaliland a week after to form Republic of Somalia, a union largely believed by northerners to have shown nothing for the people in this region. Out of violence and un-proportionate use of force unleashed on Isaaq clan by the government forces in the 1980s, prompted the establishment of SNM by the clan members in the diaspora(Renders, 201). Engulfed by communal war and clan reprisals with the rest of the country in the south, Somaliland enjoyed certain degree of security

and stability. Interim Administration of Somaliland was set up with the help of clan elders including non-Isaaq clans, regardless of their staunch support to the fallen regime (ibid).

In Somaliland, clan and state building were made combatable with each other through institutionalizing the former into the system of state government. It was the clan leaders, whose tireless efforts and initiatives had made it possible the building of a relatively modern state that reflects on its communal needs without being dictated by any external partners as what should be done, thus earning them the title “backbone of state”. In Somaliland, before becoming a member of council of elders, a candidate must have won the vetting and the approval of the clan he or she would represent. The role of this body is, among other things, to bridge parties in conflict, for instance, the government and its people; negotiate for peace settlements within the government officials and within the state-clans themselves. The practical application of clan traditional ways and mechanism helped the clan-appointed leaders to peacefully overcome into any dispute to arise and reward them a great respect among the society as a whole (Guevara, 2012).

5.4 PUNTLAND STATE

Aware of the intensifying insecurity and the looming danger of attacks of militia with no national government to control, the people in northeastern region had made an effort to remobilize former SSDF forces. SSDF was the first armed group to oppose the military regime after the Ethio-Somalia war in 1977-78. This group becomes dysfunctional as a result of internal conflicts between its top officials. The notion of having them, as former veterans, had been so popular in light of the unprovoked raid on Galkacyo by USC militia led by General Mohamed Farah Aideed in February 1991. The attack in which approximately thousand civilians were butchered had created a sense of vigilance and fear of further similar incidents to take place. Meanwhile re-organization of SSDF was undergoing, clan elders or “*isimo*” were relied on for upholding peace and security in the region (Johnson, 2008, pp. 1-94).

The failure of Soderre/ Ethiopia in 1997 follow peace conference in Boosaaso, has re-energizing peoples in Puntland's desire to start building state of their own which, according to them, will set a basis for a would-be federal state of Somalia. Following this SSDF top council had appointed a technical committee to prepare a draft of a constitution to be reviewed and approved by delegates from all the regions: Bari, Nugaal, North of Mudug, Sool and Sanaag (Ibid).

The constitution was adopted with Puntland as the new name of the state. Initially three regions namely Bari, Nugal and North. Mudug were planed to form for the envisaged state but Sool and Sanaag regions were included afterwards when their delegates attending the conference requested to do so. Puntland state was now made of exclusively Daarood clan family i.e. Harti, Leylkase and Awrtable. Marehan, sub-clan of Daarood in Galgaduud region turned down the offer to join the process of state building. Delegates had voted Boosaaso as the capital city. The process in which Puntland was built is much the same as that of Somaliland with the exception of few things: Unlike Somaliland, Puntland will remain part of Somalia; there is only one chamber of parliament, Puntland is made of one clan family rather than incorporating different clan families (Ibid).

Though council of elders in puntland state or "*isimo*", play a major role in appointing the members of the parliament, among other things; they don't function themselves as legislators like their counterparts in Somaliland. Puntland State was, in advance, structured to lay a foundation for future federalism in Somalia as system of centralism was now out of question. Three years of transition was approved and Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed elected as interim president for Puntland State of Somalia. The importance of having an inclusive system of governance from the grass root level was reflected in the under-mentioned Somali proverb:

Haani salka ayay ka unkantaa

"A milk container is built form the bottom up"

5.5 JUBALAND STATE FORMATION

Considering threats posed by terrorist groups both in Somalia and Kenya, the former defense minister of Transitional Federal Government of Somalia (TFG), Mohamed Abdi Mohamed known as Ghandi had proposed to the Kenyan government the need to train Somali youth from Jubaland in Kenya, especially Dadaab refugee camps whom would eventually be re-integrated into the Somali National Army (SNA) to fight Alshabaab in Jubaland; regions of Lower Juba, Middle, and Gedo. These three regions, sharing a long and porous border with Kenya, were believed to have hosted large number of the hostile militants to use the densely forest found in this area, as springboard, to launch an offensive on targets in Kenya. Kenya had positively responded to the appeal by allowing some 3000 youths to be trained and armed in Kenya (Warah, 2014).

An allied forced of Kenya Defense Force and (KDF), Raskamboni Brigade and the Somali National Army (SNA) had finally engaged in a war with Alshabaab in Jubaland in 2011. It took the combined forces for one year to reach and capture Kismayo, the major seaport of Jubaland. Ahmad Mohamed Islam, known as Madobe, was chosen the chairman of interim administration in Kismayo. A process of reconciliation and peace making, in which all clans had participated, was undertaken. Despite of encountering conflicts, the local administration was successful in bringing the opposition groups into the consultative forum aimed to discuss the way forward. A technical committee representing clans and political groups prepared a draft constitution to be endorsed by the delegates with the official name of the state, flag and the capital city, among other things, followed by the election of Ahmad Madobe the president of Jubaland, a move believed to have triggered a clash between Jubaland forces and militia loyal to Colonel Barre Adan Shire, known as Barre Hiiraale. Ethiopia intervened the situation hence calling a meeting in Addis-Ababa, for mediation. As per the agreement, Ahmad and his administration was given a mandate of two years in order to give more time for further reconciliation, inclusivity and participation of all stakeholders (Hesse, 2013).

Jubba Interim Administration took no chance in negotiating for peace and unity with all the concerned parties, clans and groups on one hand; meanwhile the people of Jubaland

largely approved a final draft of the constitution. The structure of the government, parliament and the judiciary was voted with Parliamentary seats allocated among clans. With almost all the federal constitutional requirements fulfilled, Ahmad Mohamed Islaan was once again elected the president of Jubaland State of Somalia in August 2015 for four years (News, 2015).

5.6 TOP TO BOTTOM UP APPROACH

It has been evident that the country could no longer stay in this situation any longer. The type of state government to be formed is a matter of great concern for the Somalis. With one section of the people advocating a decentralized system from the grass root level while another section is for powerful centralized government that holds the pieces of the country together. This comes after both Somaliland and Puntland had been able to build a state from the basis. People in the south, not borrowing a copy from the achievements scored by these two states, had tried their luck for top-down approach. Not all the clans have liked this way but some powerful clans had forced their will through. Ismail Omar Gelle, president of Djibouti, called a peace conference for the Somalia civil society in Arta, Djibouti in 2000. This time, political factions and warlords were denied a participatory access, for, having failed to bring any solution in the previous meetings (Mohamoud, 2006).

Around 2000 delegates representing clans gathered to engage in a consultative discussion to create a framework that would facilitate roadmap upon which state government will be instituted for Somalia. Finally, transitional charter was voted and allocation of parliamentary seats through unprecedented clan formula called 4.5. This formula represents four major clans and the half denoting an aggregate of small clans. Major clan would receive an equal number of seats in the parliament whereas the minority clans or “Others” as was coned, would get half of the seats entitled to a bigger clan. Centralized state government with a president and appointed prime minister was also part of the charter. This government had very little to achieve, as warlords, opposition groups and unfriendly clans stood in its way, rendering it ineffective. The resignation of the TNG

president, Abdiqaasim Salaad Hassan, set the ground for another conference to be convened in Kenya 2002-2004 (Susan Allen Nan, 2011).

The methodology used in this new conference was much the same as that in Arta, Djibouti with exception of accommodation of warlords and to allow more groups to participate, not in the least of federalism to be enshrined in the provisional constitution of Somalia for the first time in history. Unlike

his predecessor, the new president appealed for peacekeeping forces to help his government take over the country. Sharif Sheikh succeeded Mr.Ahmad in 2009 with the doubled parliamentary seats to include members from his former Islamic Courts Union (ICU). Another president was sworn in office in 2012 with the same framework but this time the government had received an international recognition to enhance its relations with the international community and to access more aid funds, among others. This government under the leadership of Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, seems to have lacked the capacity and the will to take the country to the next level of one man one vote as the constitution mandates them to do so. With no hope of change, people in the regions started to emulate Somaliland and Puntland to build locally owned states that are built from the bottom and not from the top. Jubaland states of Somalia can be a good example of this (Bryden, 2013b).

5.7 SOUTHWEST STATE OF SOMALIA

Digil and Mirifle predominated regions of Bay, Bakool, and Lower Shabeele, federalism had long been campaigned as the best option viable for the Somali people through which power could be shared among various clans in the country. To promote the interest of their clan, Hizbia Digil and Mirifle party (HDM) proposed to Italian Trusteeship Office in Mogadishu in 1947, however, Somali Youth league (SYL) with the vision of uniting Somalia, had prevailed over and won most of the seats in the parliament (United Nation, 2013).

In 1995, Rahanwen Resistance Army (RRA), an armed wing of the above-mentioned clan

Had made another failed attempt to institute a federal state, this time, for a broader southwest with the inclusion of three more regions i.e. Gedo, Middle jubba and Lower Jubba, Unfortunately, violent conflict within the group and the take over of Bakool and Bay regions by USC forces loyal to General Aideed made the plan impotent. Kismayo-held conference, in which Jubaland was formed as a new federal state, comprising Gedo, Middle and Lower in 2103, had infuriated traditional elders of Digil and Mirifle meeting in Baidoa, prompting similar conference to be convened for six regions, overlapping with Jubaland on its three regions (Mukhtar, 2003b).

Federal government of Somalia, IGAD an Untied Nations for Somalia (UNSOM) had engaged a dialogue in which the southwest elders and politicians were finally convinced to consider for three region-states rather that six. The similar procedure employed by predecessor federal member states such as puntland and Jubaland was replicated, as of now, delegates from Bay, Bakool and Shabeelada Hoose are yet to agree on the distribution of parliamentary seats among clans (Current, 2014).

5.8 FEDERALISM IN SOMALIA

The oppressive rule of the Siad Barre in 1969-1991 and the subsequent civil war had the effect of many Somalis seeing federalism as the solution today. However, federalism continue to be most debated issues by the Somali people at the present, with one section of community to support the idea, where another section is apposed to it. The argument for pro federalism evolves around that federalism would emancipate the country from tyranny and excessive use of power by the center. Whereby, the anti-federal camp would see it as a foreign-driven agenda aimed to weaken the unity and the national integrity of Somalia. Moreover, Federalism, according to them, is meant for multi-ethnic and heterogeneous societies but not for Somalis who share language, culture, religion, feature etc. (somalianews.com, 2015).

As centralized unitary system of rule was now a bad option to consider, given the reputation earned by the former government, Federalism was finally enshrined in the provisional charter in 2004. Federal-pessimistic group was finally convinced to the fact

that this was only a charter and not constitution and if it should be one, public referendum was required, in addition, the type of federalism also entails further consultation and discussion, and therefore they let it pass out for this time. Federalism existed in Somalia in theory but not in practice, except Puntland state, which set precedent for would-be federal member states in Somalia. A head of the national conference scheduled in Mogadishu in August 2012 to form a new Federal Government of Somalia to take over from the then incumbent Transitional Federal Government of Somalia (TFG) whose tenure in Office had expired, Two prerequisite conferences took place in Puntland, one in Garowe and another in Gaalkacyo in the same year. In both meetings, Federalism was, among others, reaffirmed as the only way through which the bits and pieces of this nation could be brought and held together. As Somalia seems to have set its foot on a new system, there is a need to explore federalism, its types, which one is most fitting Somalia and why it is so (Studies, 2015).

Inferences that can be drawn from the last 2 decades and half is that federalism as a formal binding agreement separating power of the national state and the local state is a solution. In fact, in this system states should give up some powers to the national and/or regional one while each one has to retain some power for itself. Federalism is, therefore, a way of sharing power between the two layers of governments. The two levels of states should basically agree on amendment in the constitution, as one level is not constitutionally empowered to so. However, as there are various forms of federalism Somalia would need to sort out the form that best fits her. According to Preston King, there are three ways in which federalism is categorized i.e. coming together, holding together and putting together. Coming together: states independent of each other will join forces and agree on establishing a common state shared by all without losing identity and territorial integrity, while everything is mutually shared among partner states. United States of America and Australia are good example of it. Holding together: is a situation in which a state divides power between central government and regional government. In this way, regions will be, democratically consulted on the degree of self-rule they will have. However the central government is more powerful than the peripheral one and the amount of power relegated could vary from region to another, Belgium is another

example. Putting together federalism form, is form where centralized government might use force to institutes a state, some of these states might have been free before they were coerced to be part of the new one. USSR have done this (Adimassu, 2015).

As was reflected in previously, Somalia fell into anarchy in January 1991, after the removal of the military regime by clan-backed armed factions. No one group had emerged dominant or prevailed over to assume state leadership; neither there was a consensus between them in order to save the country from lawlessness. Except Somaliland and puntland, the rest of the nations had borne the brunt of bloody civil war that had reached it climax in 1992. Suspension of relief activities by humanitarian agencies left civilians helpless. The subsequent humanitarian intervention of UN and USA is believed, for lacking proper strategy to deal with the crises on hand, to have achieved nothing but to make scavenging warlords more emboldened to add more fuel on the fire thus widening the divide and mistrust among clans in Somalia (Møller, 2009)

Federal Government of Somali (FGS) being so weak allegedly bias and entangled into clan politics, absolutely with no powers to execute its mandated services, in conjunction with the establishment of strong federal member state such as Puntland, Jubaland, Southwest and Galmudug, the prospect of centralized unitary system of governance seems out of question. Besides, Somaliland is a necessary evil whose disenfranchisement needs to be dealt with care and compromise; another case in point that would give a boost to the adoption of federalism in Somalia. A federation of power in which states have to negotiate and agree on common government that looks after their shared national interest such defense, monetary, external and internal affairs, etc. The talk of national government with more powers might be something that is not for time being realistic but that could be best negotiated for when people had regained their lost confidence (Bryden, 2013a)

CHAPTER SIX

6.0 FINDING AND DISCUSSION

6.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter discusses the research findings and discussions and the scholarly established literature of the research with the reflection of participants' diversified responses to the research questions.

6.2 FACTORS THAT CAUSE CONFLICTS

There are two major factors that count as genesis of instability in Somalia and as causes of the present conflict that started with collapse of the Somali state in early 1991. These can also be seen as Internal and External or distant and immediate factors in the conflict. Clanism, weak governments, competition meager resource, illiteracy, radical Islamism, among others counts as key internal causes of conflict. Meanwhile factors such as Colonial legacy Cold War, Ogaden War, Regional and International Intervention and Proxy war are the genesis of instability in Somalia. The researcher had interviewed total of 64 interviewees of which 10 of them were key respondents while 50 interviewees that were initially planned.

PART A: INTERNAL

6.3 EFFECTS OF ILLITERACY

The collapse of educational sector had extremely increased the level or growth of illiteracy in Somalia. Children were prevented opportunities of going to school by the insecurity and the intermittent civil war in the country. Having no basic knowledge to save them risking their lives, lots of youth joined rank of clan forces, viewing it as a way to survive from unfolding situation. Recruiting of School-age children into an armed militia or criminal gangs made attempts to bring parties around negotiating table futile. It also hinders any community developmental projects to take place (Luke, 2015).

Owing to illiteracy, youth in Somalia were not opportune in taking part of any significant meetings in both reconciliation and developments going on in their country. Study shows,

70 % of this youth in question are mainly those born after 1991, whose age are below 30 years. There is also indication in the same studies that, in some regions in Somalia, the more the households are poor, the more their children are liable to participate in violence and criminality should there be unrest and chaos (Mbugua, 2103).

“Illiteracy and unemployment had pushed us to fight each other. Look wealthy countries like Saudi Arabia and UAE and Kuwait, government attends to economic needs, and you don’t see much people running after politics. Hunger and lack of education is what drives the civilians to look for trouble. If your family is provided all that they required, you might not care about who is in the top office and who is not. No need of exceeding one’s limit” (Interview with Faduma, Oslo 2015).

Similarly another interviewee viewed cause of conflict in Somalia as follows:

“I think my people have two dangerous factors that could be attributed to anything that is happening in their beloved land. That is Illiteracy and poverty. Literacy rate is very low as most people lacked an opportunity to educate their children. Poverty is also another undeniable factor that contributed lots of the instability in the country” (Interview with Amir, Oslo 2015).

6.4 POWER AND RESOURCES

In Somalia, there are two types of resources that cause conflict among society; rural and urban. The former people tend to compete over source of water, land for pasture and livestock possession, etc. While the latter, they contest over leadership and domination, accumulation of arms, accessing senior jobs and the likes. In both cases, clan network was to be depended as a means to reach the intended goal. To overthrow the military regime in Somalia, hostile clans mobilized militia of their own to fight the state forces and when that was achieved clans turned their guns on each other for political dominance and resource control (Network, 2011)

For the fact that the country had ushered in a period of statelessness from earlier 1991, clan reliance has reached its toll. Scarcity of resources had also escalated the situation and made sections or sub-clans among each major clan to fight one another (Poverties, 2013). The protracted infighting between rival groups has hindered farmers to grow their farms on season as usual, prompting extreme hunger and starvation in which thousands had lost their lives meanwhile huge number of people were forced to either seek refuge from the neighboring states or become and IDP's within their out home country. Cutting trees for charcoal or other means nearly stripped the land of its forests paving the way for widespread desertification compounded by population growth of unprecedented level (David, 1996).

“After Siad Barre, there started a power struggle and resource competition throughout Somalia. Clans were fighting over dominance and in control of major towns. Clan's identity replaced state institutions and become a source of security and protection. The more your clan was stronger the better for you to access resources (Interview with Adar, Nairobi 2015)”.

Meanwhile another respondent put it this way:

Resources are little to meet the social needs and as English proverb says, “a hungry man is an angry man; many might see committing crime as a way to sustain their life.” (Interview with Amina, Oslo 2015).

Unemployment become source of insecurity and instability in Somalia says another interviewee:

“I think most of the conflicts in Somalia lies with unemployment. Young men without job will stop at nothing to look for one. Many of them will might be employed by warlords to fight for them; many will turn into piracy where others will end up to join groups like Alshabaab. Some youth put barriers on the high ways to extort money from

the passengers. Had there been an opportunity for employment, insecurity incidents would have decreased” (Interview with Jama, Oslo 2015)”.

Control of key towns and facilities such as seaports and airports for means of commercial and revenue collection had caused more conflicts between various clan militia and warlords:

“In my opinion, Somalis conflicts find its way into inadequate wealth and resources. Control of Kismayo seaport is a good example. How many times had this town to be fought over by rival clan militia? What makes it conflict-prone was the fact that it is an economic hub. The international airport and seaport will provide big revenue to whoever was in control. This has resulted the formation of alliances and groups” (Interview with Warsame, Oslo 2015).

6.5 REGIME FAILURES AND INCOMPETENCE

Many accuse the military regime that come to power on a bloodless coup d'état in October 1969 after the death of Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke, the democratically elected president of the state, much of what is happening in Somalia. Firstly, the national constitution was immediately replaced with Scientific Socialism; a move that was politically meant to shift the country to Soviet-led bloc at that time. This was followed by nationalization program in which the government took over control of country's economic sources, land management and distribution, etc. Inconsistently, the government's allocations of the nationalized assets to the president's close family members and his political adherents made the people so infuriated. High level of social inequality, nepotism, clan favoritism and poorly designed economic policies had all contributed to deprive people of their basic rights as a citizen of the nation. People's mistrust of their own government had reached to unprecedented level to the extent of some desperate clans taking arms and fight it to its collapse in January 1991(Jamal).

In light of the above mentioned one of the respondents lamented this way:

“When the civilian government was in rule, Somali people had no that much problem and everything seemed to have been going well, except that the government’s officials with association with allegedly engagement of nepotism and corruption. The real problem had started with the military government. These guys knew nothing about governance. They really abused the power and plunged the country into the current situation. So everything that went wrong the military government of 1969-1991 had to be blamed for”. (Interview with Anwar, Oslo2015).

The adoption of Scientific Socialism by the Siad Barre’s regime in violation of Islamic teaching was, according to one respondent, the major cause that ignited violence in Somalia.

“Mohamed Siad Barre had replaced our religion with Scientific Socialism just to show his friendly commitment to the USSR. The prominent Sheiks or religious clerics who come out to oppose him, were all shot dead to set precedent for any one, who might follow their foot steps. In 1975, the revolutionary government did an immoral action and I think that was the cause of the evil misfortune that had befallen on us. Nothing is worst on earth than forcing the people to appease Soviet Socialism above their religion. The president had wrongfully involved himself in a big mistake. He was so obsessed of the new ideology of Karl Marx and Angeles and was so determined to establish it, in abrogation of parts of the holy Quran. In his bid to enforce his campaign the president ordered the execution of resistant religious clerks” (Interview with Khalif, Nairobi 2015).

One interviewee was quoted as saying Government’s reliance of incompetent and unqualified personnel prompted its failure:

“The coup d’état led by General Mohamed Siya Barre had changed the situation to the worst. The dictator, while avoiding the intellectuals and technocrats become dependent on ignorant soldiers and laymen. Military Generals and colonels were appointed as ministers in the key ministerial posts that needed a highly educated and professionals.

Tens of thousands of youth were trained as a new military recruits. The government had spent most of the budget on military equipment and weapons. So I think the government's incompetency and short of the required personnel to run the jobs had eventually crippled the country's economy and gave way to civil war and unending conflicts amongst us" (Interview with Adani, Nairobi 2015).

Similarly, social discrimination and state inefficiency played prominent role in the people's uprising according to Aisha Mohamed:

"Somali post-colonial governments were not competent enough to lead us in the right direction. They really failed us. For instance, the government that took power in 1960 was known the corrupt government. There has been high level of financial misappropriation and nepotism. For example I was a minister or an officer somewhere in the state offices, I would give an employment opportunity to my closed clansmen rather than giving the people of equal treatment. Those who qualify the vacant post might be denied and perhaps given to unskilled one simply because of their clan" (Interview with Aisha, Nairobi 2015).

On the other hand, the international community was blamed for being half heartedly and uncommitted to finding solution to Somali problem;

"Violent conflicts happen everywhere in the world but there are other countries that instantly come for the aid of others in a state of war and conflict. Unfortunately, we don't have that kind of friendly states to make sacrifice in helping us find amicable solution to our differences in order to rebuild our failed state all over again. An example, Kenya had experienced an outbreak of ethnic violence in 2007 election in which over thousand people were killed in an ethnic clash but this was put to halt. Leaders among them Kofi Anan former head of UN, Tanzanian Presidents among others with the full back of International community and the UN Security Council, had tirelessly worked and mediated between the government and the opposition. Another step was to set up an International Criminal Court (ICC) for perpetrators of the violence, which had sent a warning signal to any one who would want to be involved in

a similar act. Somalia has been in a turmoil for almost a quarter of a century now, why would not the international community commit itself to stop the violence for all this whiles that means they are heedless about us” (Interview with Habarwaa, Nairobi 2015).

6.6 CLAN FACTOR

The role of clan elders as an interface to make peace between clans in times of conflicts through traditional laws or “Xeers” had been greatly undermined or rather rendered ineffective by judiciary system of pre-colonial states and when the state collapsed, clan elders found so difficulty in overcoming the situation at hand (Ethnopolitics, 2003). Somali society, being an aggregate clan-families, each clan has its own chiefs or heads to follow for leadership and guidance. In most cases, such leaders fell short of their responsibility by not mobilizing members to implant loyalty in the clan. Therefore the unity within the clan is always at stake. The structure of the clan itself is so intertwined that there is a room of disunity among clan members. Uneducated members of the clan are easy target to carry guns and obey leaders’ order. Studies showed that one-ethnic societies like, as is the case of Somalia are likely to experience conflicts and wars than that of multi-ethnic one. Some intelligent clan warlords have achieved their goal of war to another clan by justifying its cause as right thing to do in principle whereas the religious ones had to validate it as a holy war. The clan members under constant manipulation of their leaders had always opened doors for more fighting among Somalis (Eloy E. Cuevas, 2010).

Politicians and clan leaders started to use the clan as a tool with which to bargain for more power and influence fuelling more violence in Somalia. This has ushered a shift of relationship between different clans i.e. some clans might establish a coalition of their own not necessarily because of kinship but of political or economical interest. The ambition of clans with strong militia to take the control of resourceful territories in the expenses of the smaller ones prolonged the conflict (Raymond).

What made the Somali conflict unique and distinctive was the fact that no clan or group had been able to assume statehood or rather asserts dominance over others to avoid outbreak of total anarchy and lawlessness in the country. This situation of clan warfare demanded the need to establish own militia in order to ensure security of that particular group. This new phenomenon of self-reliance and intractable wars had opened doors to other foreign states or stakeholders to intervene, making things even more entangled. The country broke into smaller batches and enclaves run by an independent armed militia under a warlord. In this situation, there emerged freelancing gunmen whose aim was to loot and rob of people's properties with no exception including their own kinsmen. Certain warlords started of hiring such unbinding guys or "*Mooryaans*" in Somali terms to out-power rival clans and/ or to gain control of more territory. The fact that those newly recruits hailed from other clans in a distant area, facilitated the commitment of more atrocities as traditional rules and customs don't apply to them given the clan they belong to. Lewis (1994) described the situation in Somalia as in:

"In 1991, reactively influenced by example of SSDF, the SNM, USC and SPM, the general tendency was for every Somali major clan to form its own militia movement. Thus clans were becoming effectively self-governing entities through out spheres of influence in a process, which, with the abundance of modern weapons, frequently entailed savage battles with the high toll of civilian casualties. The political geography of Somali hinterland in 1992, consequently, closely resembled that reported by European explorers in 19th century. Spears replaced by Kalashnikovs and bazookas. These clan area could only be entered or traversed by outsiders (people of other clans, foreigners) with the consents of the locals, and usually the payment of appropriate fees or protection" (Vinci, 2008).

A warlord might some times organize his own militia or influence shift of militia's clan loyalty to that of his. Some businessmen had also started to establish a militia of their own that had been possibly picked from section or whole of their clan-family to guard their facilities. This militia was more accountable and obedient to them than that of collectively owned by the clan or commanded by a war leader. Having the Somali

community fractured thus far, it has become extremely tough to find a consensus solution and to look for common national political cause for the entire nation (Ibid).

Clanism, above all, was viewed to be the major causing factor of conflict and instability in Somalia says the following interviewees:

“Clan in Somalia is the biggest problem that has no remedy at all. The love and respect for our clan transcends the love and respects we have for our state. We need to pray for our people to be united again as a state. May our Allah provide us with peace and stability? Diseases without medical attention, problem without solution, hunger without food to eat. That is what clanism in Somalia is all about” (Interview with Hilowle, Nairobi 2015)”.

“Clan is not the problem in itself. It is there to know our ancestral roots; but because of some politicians or businessmen using it as an instrument to reach their goals that is when clan becomes problem. The recognition of the cause of the problem was an important part of its solution. Somali people should grow from the danger of spoilers and get to know what is good for their nation” (interview with Adan, Oslo 2015).

“Clan was responsible for everything that is happening to us. Why I should say so, even the Somali diaspora has not been able to transcend over clan matter. Each community was attached to certain clan. There was no one single diaspora association that brings all Somali sections together. Somaliland Community, Puntland, Jubaland, Southwest, Galmudung, they all stand, not the entire nation but respective clans. You see how clan was dangerous” (Interview with Abyan, Oslo 2015).

6.7 RELIGIOUS

Apart from the fact that Somali people are Muslim of Mainly Sufi order, the position of the Islamic religion to become part of social and national identities was rather

strengthened by the use of the religion by anti-colonial movements as a way to reach their targets. Historically, during the long running war between British and Somali Dervishes from approximately 1898 up to 1920, religion became a tool to mobilize clan fighters to confront the foreign invasion. Likewise, the SYL from 1943 up to the 1956 closely cooperated with religious leaders for preaching the people to get popular support for their cause. Various religious groups emerged in Somalia at various stages but all with one objective, to use the religion as an instrument enabling them to ascend the throne. They only differed in methodologies and networks. Divergent religious ideologies led some parties, such as Al-Itahad Al-Islami and Al-shabaab to invite foreign Jihadists to fight alongside them. This has paved a way for International terrorists and criminals to take advantage to find their way into Somalia as a safe haven from prosecution. An outbreak of war started to take place between radical militant of Al.shabaab and Ehlu Sunna in an armed conflict in 2008. Ehlu Sunna was cleared mostly from the south of the country and was confined to towns in central regions. However, they proved to be a formidable force, whose resistance kept Alshabaab at bay. The contest between religious groups with opposite views made the country a conflict-prone and further deepened the divide among people (Hansen, 2014).

“After the fall of military government, in Somalia, there emerged religious groups that oppose each other: reformist and traditionalist. The former enjoyed financial support from Arab states whereas the latter received support from within the local community. Reformist group took no time in arming militants to fight for control of power and economy. In their bid to install Islamic state had put them at loggerheads with the coalition of moderate groups later renamed Ehlu Sunna Wal Jama. This has finally pushed an armed confrontation between Al-shabaab and Ehlu Sunna, Each group wanting to overpower and finish the other as they feel it as a stumbling block to reaching their Agenda” (Interview with Hussein Amina, Nairobi 2015).

“Religious groups with huge funds from Arabian countries, in particular, Gulf States taking advantage of the anarchic situation, recruited and armed militants with the intention to install an Islamic State in Somalia. Those groups, especially Al-Itahad Al-

Islami (AIAI) took their operations across the border into Ethiopia. Ethiopian forces crossed into Somalia to destroy the group after they have defeated them in Ogaden. Al-Shabaab as an offshoot group of ICU has emerged in 2008 and become an Al-Qaida affiliate. These groups had either been directly or indirectly responsible a bulk of conflicts in Somalia. This is a project funded and supported by foreign state in the name of Islam. For example Saudi Arabia, the biggest sponsor of Somali Islamist groups, they don't exercise the Sharia in their country and yet they support client groups in other countries. I believe, foreign countries in particular Arabs had played major role in conflicts in Somalia and they still want it perpetuated" (Interview with Saylici, Nairobi 2015).

"We become a hot spot for terrorists. Having no functioning state for long period of time, made our country to become sanctuary for criminals from all over the world. The so-called Jihadist immigrants are estimated to number thousands. The order to carry out any bloody mission in a target has to be issued not Alshabaab Somalis but Alshabaab foreigners. So long groups such as Al-Shabaab, Al-Qaida and others of the same attitude operate in Somalia, no peace for our nation and they are the ones that are setting us against each other to make our land their hideout from prosecution for the atrocities they committed in their countries" (Interview with Ruqia, Nairobi 2015).

PART B: EXTERNAL

6.8 COLONIAL IMPACT

Somali conflict finds its root from divisive legacy of the colonial states. The nation was divided into five sections of which each one was allocated to a different state. For instance British declared Somaliland and NFD as their protectorate, Ethiopia for Ogaden, Italy took control of south Somaliland meanwhile France got Somali coast now renamed Djibouti as its share of the booty. This partition is strongly believed to have laid the foundation of deep mistrust and animosity among clans. And to make matters worse they supported some of the clans at the expenses of others. Postcolonial states in Somalia replicated the oppressive culture of the colonizers. In the undertaking, colonial states preferred some clan-families over the others not because of quality material but being obedient and submissive in the sense they perfectly adapt and comply with the colonial requirement and mission (Kioimbugua, 2013).

Colonial powers manipulated and restructured clan-characteristics and started to use it as an instrument to divide and rule the Somali people, as was the case in many countries in Africa. Clan-groups were tacitly created in each colony and the clans were made to hate and mistrust each other. Some of the clans were considered friendly while others were viewed as hostile. The ally clan was fully mobilized and furnished with everything it needs including weapons to punish and bring the foe clan to its knees. To put anti-colonial insurgents to an end, almost the same formula was employed in Somalia. This tactical performance played out by the colonial powers saved the colonizers a united Somali front challenging them as a common enemy in their land and left them bogged down in an internal violent conflict among themselves. And the similar legacy was passed down to the post-independent states in Somalia. The ruling elite promoted clanism and used it as a tool to either ascend to the throne or to maintain power (Ismail, 2010).

As a result of inadequate water and pasture for pastoral community, conflicts had become unavoidable. Ogaden and Isaaq clans were good example of this. The need of water and better grazing land, the Isaaq in the people Somaliland had no choice but to move with their livestock into the Ogaden side of the Haud (a land between British Protectorate of

Somaliland and the Ogaden region on the east of Ethiopia). Consequently, Ogaden saw the endless mobility of Isaaq pastoralist as a threat to their very existence and had started resisting the traffic of the latter. The partition of Somali nation by the colonial states had served the advantage of Isaaq clan at the expense of Ogadens. Following, the declaration of Somaliland as a protectorate under British rule in 1897, The Isaaq pastoralist were given a free access to Haud with no restriction at all, a move to marginalize Ogaden pastoralist in eastern Ethiopia. In addition, the aftermath of the long raging war against the Dervishes, a Somali resistant group led by Sayid Mohamed Abdille Hassan, known as Mad mullah, in Somaliland, the British armed Isaaq clan to the teeth, to carry out more raid on the Ogadens thus deepening the enmity and mistrust between the two clans (Zewde, 2008).

To deliver their mission, colonial powers, in violation of Somali social way of constant mobility in search of water and better grazing areas with no limitation, had designated each clan to a certain district (s) or areas to live, whose access was restricted to the other clan-families in the country. This has caused violent conflict and unrest among clans and finally led to an armed struggle with the colonizers. This was a clear indication to believe that the protracted conflict in Somalia finds its way back to colonial masters who interfered with the people's way of co-existing each other by creating new boundaries to make their life miserable (Farah, 2011).

“Somali people are brothers and sisters, from time immemorial they lived side by side in their land. In the event of violent conflict or misunderstanding, traditional elders used to judge between them through “*Xeers*” or binding agreement. European colonial states had started to divide Somali nation through clan lines. The divide policy had set clans or sub clans against each other for power and supremacy. Hostilities and antagonism prevented them to unite their effort to fight their common enemy i.e. colonizers. Conflict among our people is something that had been planted by Europeans in their scramble for Africa” (Interview with Ibtisam, Nairobi 2015).

Somali people's livelihood has been mostly dependent on their livestock herds. For instance when overgrazing took place in an area, then it would become necessary for the nomads to travel many miles, with their herds, in search of pasture and water. This was a reality of life as livestock has been all they had as a mode of production to survive. Without consulting them or considering their way of life, colonial authorities put territorial demarcation to divide this nation. The Somali partial independence from British and Italy in 1960 comes in the wake of Somali nationalism at its climax. As most of African countries observed their independence in the 1960th, Somali people wanted to have their independent nation united under one state government including NFD, Djibouti and Ogaden; a dream that has not come true. As a measure of level of sentiments by the people, the then Somali presidents who come to power in 1967 Mr. Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke was quoted as saying in his book:

“Our misfortune is that our neighboring countries (...) are not our neighbors. Our neighbors are our Somali kinsmen whose citizenship had been falsified by indiscriminate boundary arrangements`. They have to move across the borders to their pastureland. They occupy the same terrain and pursue the same pastoral economy ourselves. We speak the same language. We share the same creed, the same culture and the same traditions. How can we regard our brothers as foreigners”? (Zoppi).

Similar statement was issued by one of the research subjects that was interviewed in Nairobi May 2015, by viewing conflict in Somalia as one sourcing from the division of the nation between colonial states in pursue of their colonial agenda:

“It is not a freedom or a full freedom. Our people did not get what they deserved to. How can you be an independent while your kinsmen are not? What kind of independence was that? The postcolonial state of Somalia has ever been restless in their bid to regain the occupied territories back, in particular Ogaden and NFD. That was the source of conflict in my homeland” (Interview with Nirig, Nairobi 2015).

“The type of type of colonialism that our people had experienced is really not normal. First of all, multi-colonial states made the situation more painful. This is Ethiopia taking Ogaden region as booty; Italy allocated itself with South Somaliland, France settled in Djibouti, meanwhile British got Somaliland as its protectorate. The fact that, each state employing a different policy and culture had deepened the division among our people” (Interview with Nuriye, Nairobi 2015).

“Ethiopians had lacked the military power as well as financial to take over Ogaden region. European states, for religious ground, had empowered them to do so. And when Somali Heroes rose up and faced Abyssinians in a armed conflict, British and Italians coalesced with Ethiopia and made the Dervish forces under the leadership of Mohamed Abdulle Hassan, to eventually lose the war” (Interview with Abdirahman. Nairobi 2015).

“The fighting that broke out between colonial states, at different stage, in a bid to gain control of more territories, cost Somali people numerous lives and properties as well as displacement. The fighting between Dervishes and British forces are believed to have cost lives of one third of the population in Somaliland. This war was proof for the Somali people of being both resilient and committed to defend their motherland” (Interview with Sheikh Abdi, Nairobi 2015).

“Who was the worst colonizer amongst Italy, British, French, Ethiopia and Kenya? As far as I am concerned Ethiopia was the one. Ethiopian Empire had ever willed to annex Somalia. It was not a secret any more. Ethiopians ever claimed our land as theirs by saying: Somalia is a part of Habasha or land of Abyssinia. Kenya is a minor colonizer compared to former” (Interview with Abbey, Nairobi 2015).

“Somalis in Ogaden were very unlucky to have Ethiopia in their territories. They were too weak to sustain their soldiers. For them, people’s livestock were their source of food. Each family or clan or sub-clan had been levied to pay a kind of forced taxation

or (Gibir) without which, they would receive a severe punishment” (Interview with Borle, Nairobi 2015).

“Following, the independence of Djibouti in 1977 left the hope of Greater Somalia dead. Kenya and Ethiopia might not grant Ogaden and NFD of freedom due to the precedent set by Djibouti as an independent state with no will to reunite with Somalia. Without the manipulation of France, Djiboutian would have voted to reintegrate with their Somali brethren and not to seek for own independence under the French manipulation. Colonialism had shown its face in a different color” (Interview with Saytun Nairobi).

“I consider Ethiopia and Kenya the worst colonizers on earth. Europeans forced them on us; we did not choose them, did we? Afterwards, Somalis could get rid of them by fighting them and we had the will and power to remove them. But those who installed them on us still provide all they need to hold on to us. Many are opposing their rule while many of us are convinced to live with them” (Interview with Ruqia, Oslo 2015).

“In Kenya, apart from torture and massacre executed by Kenyan security forces, people have an internal self-rule known as county government. In this autonomous administration, Somalis have the right to rule by themselves just like any other county or region in Kenya. Within this new system in the state, ethnic Somalis could still fight for more autonomy than breaking away” (Interview with Abdifatah, Oslo 2015).

“I think the damage that the colonial states had caused to us is immeasurable and irreparable. Had they not come to Africa, Somali people would have lived their lives freely and without control, could have established a state of their own, enjoy and eat the fruits of freedom and self-determination. We are victim for those who crossed oceans in order to be a forceful master over an equal human being” (Interview with Hodan, Oslo 2015).

“The agenda and goal of European adventurers were almost the same but their application was rather differed. History was reflected Italians as best for Somali nation. People were given chance to work for pay. Roads were constructed, mosques were built, Somalis were allowed to do middle and lower class jobs such teachers, clerks, and police forces, etc.” (Interview with Hiis, Oslo 2015).

“So long, our people and territories are under occupation, the people of the neighboring states will know no peace and the business will not be as usual. Even If the republic of Somalia let go Ogaden and NFD regions, those states will always be restless and vigilant and will be skeptical Somalia of having a strong and capable government that might threaten them or rather demand the return of the occupied territories. I think that was why any effort to bring back normalcy was failing in Somalia” (Interview with Mursal, Oslo 2015).

“ONLF should lay arms; it is not possible to defeat Ethiopia. Nation of 90-million backed by Israel and states in the west, was too big for us to pull down, we are not matching them. The Somali regional state provides us with a lot of opportunities. Lets educate our children, build and develop our state and advocate for freedom when opportunity presents itself but not now” (Interview with Egal, Nairobi 2015).

“It is not advisable to give up with nothing to gain. Whether you surrender or not, the treatment was the same shit. Fighting for your integrity and self-determination is best path to follow. Every one was born free, so fight and return your freedom. Your enemy is just like you and not god-sent angels. Lets die in honor than take disgrace” (Interview with Hibaq, Nairobi 2015).

“Somalia has ever been in state of war. You cannot enjoy a freedom while your own brother was being colonized. So long our territories are still under occupiers, the conflicts in the horn of Africa will persist. You see those living in Ogaden and NFD are Somali by nationality. They were denied of freedom and their identity would remain

the same as ever. Nobody can change that fact” (Interview with Ex pharmacist, Hussein, Oslo 2015).

6.9 COLD WAR

Despite the colonial partition, in which Somali nation was balkanized between different colonial powers as was discussed in chapter 4, the instability of Somalia greatly lies with cold war contest between east and west blocs. Somali’s strategic location in the horn of Africa, its close proximity to the Arabian Peninsula and the route that connects Europe and America to Asia and Far East made each of the two superpowers; USSR and USA to induce Somali government to its side. Initially, Moscow won Mogadishu’s friendship as a counter policy of America’s support to Ethiopia. Russia’s switch to Addis Ababa following new military regimes that come to power had made Washington necessary to establish ties with Somalia. At the end of the cold war America had suspended all the aid funds to Somalia so was its western allies and the multilateral organizations to follow the same suit. Clan-based factions with bases in Ethiopia fought the state forces exhausting government’s effort to deliver on military and social and services of the nation. The Autocratic regime had finally collapsed in January 1991 and only to be succeed by civil war and famine across the country (Healy, 2010) .

“Somalia has become battleground for the big powers. Both West and east wanted Somalia for its strategic location. So the competition between the superpowers i.e. USA and USSR made our country to suffer. Initially, Moscow won a friendship with our government. That friendship comes to an end when Russia turned its back to us in preference of Ethiopia as a new ally. Somalia was left with no option but to seek a friendship with America. USA did not help us the way soviet did to Ethiopia. Moreover America’s suspension of aid funds to our government was fatal to our economy. The government was not able to pay its own staff. The government’s ability to maintain its authority throughout the country was becoming weaker and weaker by the day. Opposition forces were in collaboration to hasten the downfall of the weakling government. Later 1990, government forces started to cede grounds to the advancing rebels until they were forced to break up” (Interview with Sahra, Oslo 2015).

7.0 OGADEN WAR

Going to war with Ethiopia in defiance of warnings from the then OAU and the Soviet Union put Somalia on the wrong side of the situation. Out of sympathy, SNA started a war whose consequences were not carefully calculated, in support of WSLF. The initial victory of the war turned out a disastrous one. With the help of Moscow, Somali forces were forced out of Ogaden with reportedly high casualties. As the consequence of the war loss, internal conflict started to emerge with failed coup attempt by section of military officers. Ever since, the country was sliding into a quagmire of violence and instability (Bank, 2005).

Siad Barre's insistence to remain on the throne after a lost war with Ethiopia on Ogaden region in 1977-78 was viewed as an instigative effect of the violent conflict in Somalia says Borle;

“After the defeat of Somali government in Ogaden war, the president should have resigned and hand over the rule to transitional non-military government, such move would have prevented the country from falling into chaos. The situation really demanded a change of leadership at that time but soldiers did not mind about the importance of that. The insistence of the military junta in the top office led the country into more bloodshed and cost irreparable damage of lives and properties” (Interview with Borle, Nairobi 2015).

Somalia's invasion of Ogaden was helpless to the situation at hand as strongly believed by Sahal;

“The worst plan that military government had ever to take was war on Ogaden region under Ethiopia. As superintendent soldier, I should put the blame squarely on Siad Barre's shoulders. Why would he order the war while WSLF had already scored victory on most fronts with Ethiopian forces? It was also noted that Soviets would not have intervened into the situation without Somali engagement. The source of all conflicts in

my country, I believe the president and his assistants were to be held responsible and no one else” (Interview with Sahal, Nairobi 2015).

Similarly, another interviewee framed the situation as if Siad Barre wanted to take back Ogaden from Ethiopia to rule himself and not to free them at all:

“People should ask themselves as to why Somalia invaded Ogaden? Was it because they wanted to free Ogaden from Ethiopian occupation? Or was it that Somalia was expansionist state who wanted to annex another territory to rule? I think the latter is almost near to the truth. Somalia wanted to take the region and rule regardless of WSLF’s wish for freedom and self-determination. For Example, Somali’s flag was ordered to be hoisted in all the places that had fallen and that indicates itself the plan of the government, moreover, those nominated to be in charge were mostly officials from Somalia and not from the people in the region” (Interview with Ambia, Oslo 2015).

Two other respondents shared the same view;

“Many people believe the war Somalia waged with Ethiopia in Ogaden was suicidal. Moscow would not have likely supported Ethiopia the way it did, had Somali army not invaded Ogaden. This was an indication that the military government knew nothing about how to play international games. Consequently the entire state of Somalia was lost because of the political mistakes committed by Barre’s government” (Interview with Abdi Sheikh, Oslo 2015).

“Despite the fact that Organization of African Union (OAU) had warned our president for not to go to war, he made the decision by himself. Ogaden war was a big disaster for our people. We played a wrong card by sending our regular army into Ethiopia. The government spent huge budget on the war and we become bankrupt that is why we have this problem for to day” (Interview with Guhad, Oslo 2015).

7.1 ROLE OF REGIONAL STATES

7.2 KENYA

Kenya exploited the anarchy of Somalia into its own benefit of becoming a commercial center for Somalia business community and entrepreneurs. This also gave Kenya the leverage to become a key political and economic state in the region. Kenya's attitude towards Somalia has recently changed from low profile style to active political participation. Kenya's support to the formation of Jubaland and its subsequent military intervention has been allegedly prompted by Al-shabaab threats to its national security. Kenya's military incursion with no prior approval from FGS was seen by many as a breach to territorial integrity of Somalia and sabotage to government's effort to bring peace and stability to the country as a whole. Kenya was, later on, approved by United Nations Security Council to be member of troop contributing countries to Somalia to fight Alshabaab and to help FGS install law and order in Somalia. However, the contingent of Kenya stationed in Jubaland was reported to have not been taking orders directly from AMISOM central command in Mogadishu. Furthermore, Kenya has sent its navy into Somali's coast, at the pretext of fighting piracy.(Eriksson, 2013).

7.3 ETHIOPIA

The hostility between Somalia and Ethiopia dates back to 19th century following the conquest of Ogaden region by Ethiopian imperial forces under the rule of Menelik II mid 1890s. Ethiopia's plan of expansion was supported by other colonial powers as part of scramble for Africa. The British again handed over the Somali pastoralist in this region to Ethiopia after their victory over Italy in the entire east African region in 1948. The two neighboring states went to war twice over this region in 1964 and 1977. It is strongly believed that Ethiopia has contributed a lot to the Somali conflict through arms supply and ammunition to friendly groups in Somali. For fear of renewed conflict in the future with its neighbor, Ethiopia has ever been opposed to any effort towards establishing a strong centralized government in Somalia. It rather supports regional states with more power. Some states in Somalia have been closely attached to Ethiopia than the FGS (Ibid).

7.4 UGANDA

Uganda's mission in Somali is not the type of Kenya and Ethiopia. One way of it was to fight Al-Shabaab in Somalia before spilling over to their country. Another was to win political influence to become a strategic actor in the region. The third and most observable one has been its dedication to help a strong and centralized government of Somalia to be created and this is where its path diverges with that of the Ethiopian and Kenya. Many people see Ugandan involvement to support and advance the interest of some groups and not the entire population of Somalia. Government in Mogadishu has been accused of making an excuse to show federalism as not viable solution to Somali problem. Kampala's determination comes at a time when federalism had already been adopted as the system of government. The seemingly, protection and preservation of one side's plan portrays Uganda as biased and was tantamount to betraying the other's (Ibid).

Any effort aimed to bring peace and stability to Somalia by the Somali people has been suffering from constant undermining by regional states. Each state has its own strategic interest to follow. For example Kenya, Ethiopia, Uganda and Burundi have peacekeepers in Somalia. In their mission, its obvious that there is no coordination between them, that means each state is pulling the robe in a different direction thus making matters further complicated.” (Interview with Yasmin, Nairobi 2015).

There is no just and neutral international community and if there were one Somalia would have been rescued from the current situation. The national forces are not empowered to fight Alshabaab and instead the UN is supporting forces from African countries. The so-called peace keeping forces are not keeping any peace at all” (Interview with Jama, Oslo 2015).

“Egypt has ever been involved in the horn of African politics. It has ever been supporting Somalia warlords and now regional states with arms and military equipment and provides support to ONLF and other rebel groups fighting for freedom. (Interview with Shabel, Oslo 2015).

7.5 PROXY WARS

The border dispute between Ethiopia and Eritrea has intensified into Somalia through proxy war. Ethiopia supported the internationally backed TFG in Baidoa while Eritrea took sides with the ICU in Mogadishu to depose the former. Both governments sent arms shipments and military equipment to its client groups to minimize the danger posed by its enemy's influence inside Somalia. This your enemy's enemy is your friend's character was believed to have undetermined attempts being made to bring Somalia back to its feet after long period of violent conflict and clan warfare and allowed terrorist groups to easily find their way into Somalia (Terrence, 2007).

On the Other side, Ethiopia's push for federal government made up of decentralized states in Somalia and Arab states' back for centralized one have made Somalia another battleground for the two sides. Each one wants to show whose dominance reflected in the ongoing Somali political transition. Ethiopia views a strong unitary state assisted by Arab states especially Egypt a threat to its national security, as had been the case in 1964 and 1977. Arab states see installation of powerful state in Somalia as the only means to keep Ethiopia under checks. Both groups have been sending military and financial support to their ally in Somalia to execute the intended goals (Menkhaus, 2013).

The proxy wars on behalf of others were not limited to the above-mentioned. USA sponsored Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Burundi and Somali itself in the war against Al-Qaida affiliated group of Al-shabaab inside Somalia. These countries were provided with military equipment, personnel training, and financial and logistical assistance, among others. This kind of wars was said to have been less costly as compared to Iraq and Afghanistan wars. However, having no control over what is happening on the ground by the proxy forces smears this mission with risky and much uncertainty. For example, Ethiopia's troop invasion to Somalia in 2006 to fight ICU in Mogadishu has made Al-shabaab to emerge out of this group. Attacks by American unmanned drones in targets inside Somalia might as well carry with civilian unknown casualties and property damage ("U.S. intensifies its proxy fight against al-Shabab in Somalia," 2011)

“Libya used to provide weapons and ammunitions to Somali insurgents. SSDF commanders were first to be supplied with, followed by SNM and USC. Muámmar Al-qadafi the former president of Libya by sending arms shipment into Somalia had been at certain stage, part of the conflicts in Somalia (Interview with Rage Nairobi).

“It is not Ethiopia or other African state, be it near or far. Somali people are proud and not submissive to anyone. African fellow states are used against us. It is a fact that everybody knows. We are not kids and we know where something has gone wrong. I don’t blame our African fellows but rather blame Al shabaab, Alqaeda and states like America, British, France, and Italy etc. Time has come for our people to realize the need to get rid of alshabaab, reconcile ourselves, with our neighbors and the international community at large” (Interview with Geedi Oslo 2015).

7.6 CAN CLAN AND STATE IMPLEMENT EACH OTHER?

Since the clan issue become a very important factor in Somalia without which peace settlement and state rebuilding might find difficulty to succeed, then, it has to be put it into a context in any attempt geared to find lasting solution for the Somali problem after getting bogged down in a long conflict since the overthrow of Siad Barre in January 1991. Time has come for the people in south-central Somalia to borrow a leaf from the precedent set by Somaliland and puntland. Both Somaliland and Puntland, clan Elders took the lead in state building from bottom up approach through Somali traditional law “*Xeers*” with less outside intervention compared to south. The only difference was that Elders in Somaliland were to deal with various clans whose political views were far apart especially in particular Daaroods and Isaaqs where there was mainly one clan-family in Puntland. How ever both regions were successful in making peace among the people and form a functioning state for them. The so-called 4.5 formula practiced in the south representing four major clans and the coalition of smaller clans is an outdated way and was totally not applicable to the situation at hand (Management, 2013)

Jubaland State consisting of Lower Juba, middle Juba and Gedo region was born out with Ahmad Mahamed Islam known as Ahmad Madobe following of a long process dating

back to 2009. The interim of Juba later renamed Jubaland State of Somalia took no time in arranging consultative meeting among various clans in the region to agree on forming long envisaged federal member state in accordance with national federal constitution. Despite attempts by former warlords, some politicians and the FGS itself to derail the process, the resilience of people of Jubaland and their strong leaders have finally paid off with the re-election of Ahmad Madobe on 12th of August 2015 in Kismaayo, the temporary head quarters of the state. Jubaland now reaped the fruits of inclusive and bottom up approach of state building at the footsteps of their predecessor's i.e. Somaliland and puntland. Similar process of state building was replicated in Southwest of Somalia. The goodness of federal system is that it is a grass root system where clans will be given the chance to negotiate and accommodated each other to agree on power sharing of their own rather than grappling with an appointed administration forcefully imposed on them by the national government as has been the case in Somali since the independence (Ido, 2014).

“If we really want peace and to live together, everything can be done. You see there is a fear; this fear is with certain specific groups among clans in Somalia. These clans are very skeptical about bringing law and order to the country simply because they might be brought to book after settlement. So they have to use their influence to maintain the status qua. With this group, quite many of them have allegedly robbed properties of clans whom they have chased away; they still have houses, farms and so on that they fear of losing them to the real owners if Somali people was to live in peace Otherwise while we consider clan as a central and indispensable part of any reconciliation and state building, we can make our nation back to normalcy and nothing can stop us coming together if we prove our commitment beyond doubt and in action. States were now built right before our eyes; Somaliland, Puntland and Jubaland were a good example of the rest of Somali. Why cannot we copy from them?” (Interview with Deeqa, Oslo 2015).

“Clan and state can never compliment each other. They are two different things that cannot go together. Clan business should not be associated with state formation in

Somalia. It is disastrous; clanism has been the sickness of our nation how could the same destroyer be a remedy to the same destruction it caused to us. We must put our thoughts beyond clan. With clan, we will become so weak that we cannot defend our beloved country from any one” (Interview with Nur Bolle, Nairobi 2015).

In a state building, clan can be used in a way that is helpful and constructive but not a way to destroy the nation and to take what belongs to others. There has to be an open and transparent system of governance. People should know each other through clan lineage but should be allowed politicizing and making a clan association to instabilize the nation. Lets build a strong inclusive national government that keeps us together than having a system that turns ourselves into enemies” (Interview with Garane, Nairobi 2015).

“If clan was not made incorporated into the national constitution, then somewhere some clan is going to use it against the state and possibly get it destroyed. Therefore the clan and state should be made accepting each other to avoid disintegration of a system in the future. May be over a time, the use of clannish style might come to an end” (Interview with Maryan, Oslo 2015).

7.7 CAN FEDERALISM ADVANCE PEACE AND STABILITY?

The use of clan by the colonial powers to divide and rule the Somali people and the highly centralized government that came to power after the independence are believed to have driven a wedge among Somali clans to mistrust each other forcing the country to plunge into civil war in 1991. It has, finally become necessary for Somali people to embrace federalism as the only way to decentralize power to bring governance closer to the people. Despite skepticism of some clans against federalism, federalism was adopted as the system of governance in an IGAD sponsored peace conference in Nairobi in 2004. Areas that are yet to be agreed upon include how the country's resources are shared, the federal parliament was yet to vet for several key commissions such as boundary, power and resource distribution etc. Puntland state set a good precedence to the new member

states in the country. Jubaland emerged followed by Southwest state and then come Galmudug lastly with Hiran and Middle Shabeel to join soon (Analysis, 2014).

Accept the self-proclaimed state of Somaliland in the northwest; the rest of the country federation process has been going on. Apart from this actual reality throughout the south of the country, there seems to be reservation with some clans on the practicality of federalism within a homogeneous society that has nothing to differ within itself. They view it as not genuine federalism but clan-imbued whose agenda was to break up the country into clan ruled enclaves only to further the hope of bringing Somali back on track through real reconciliation and power sharing (Ulusio, 2014).

“People who oppose Somalia to adopt federal system are probably those who want the country to continue in its present condition. It means, they have enough money, which they have benefited from the anarchic situation the country had fallen. Clan is a fact, a fact that is unavoidable so we don’t have to be in denial of reality of our people. In Somalia what ever you have to do clan, one way of it or another, clan has a role to play. What should be done is that we have to accept it and incorporate our state systems other it will be disastrous” (Interview with Asmo, Nairobi 2015).

“Gone are days when people would say federalism is not our type. Don’t you see that Somalia is a federal state? Member states were either formed such as Puntland and Jubaland or are under process of formation. Any system that was imposed on the people will probably collapse. Federalism and clan will accommodate each other. Having from different clan families does not mean that clans cannot agree on power sharing. The bigger clans and smaller ones can coexist in federalism. Moreover rights of minorities will be protected, it is not that I am the big clan and should get what I want” (Interview with Geddi, Oslo 2015).

CHAPTER SEVEN

7.9 CONCLUSION

The aim of the study was to understand the genesis of Somalia's instability and the causes of its protracted conflicts and examine whether clan based federalism can advance political stability and peace in Somalia. Data was qualitatively collected through qualitative interviews and key informant interviews. It was found that Somalia is associated with two major factors causing instability and conflict: external and internal. External factors include the legacy of the colony, Ogaden war, proxy wars, and neighboring states hostile foreign policy towards Somalia as well as the al-Qaida linked alshabaab in the country. These being the genesis of instability other factors have directly contributed to the conflict worsening of the situation in the country such as a failed foreign intervention, harsh climate, short rains and successive draught and famine in the country etc. Internally, clanism, illiteracy, and poverty, collapse of institutions, competition over resource and power and dictatorship and warlords remain to be the leading factor creating conflicts in Somalia. These factors combined had further weakened position of clan elders to address the hostilities among clans, undermining the traditional way of resolving social problems. However, given the complexity of the challenges facing state building resulting from these factors federalism seem promising solutions that can bring stability and reconstruct state in Somalia. Despite this, major challenges lies in implementing it and much of the Somalia's fate will depending on how it is implemented and whether Alshabaab is defeated in the foreseeable future. However, further research is recommended here to be conducted, especially research focusing on best approaches that Somalia given the sharp contrast of its population over the issue of federalism, federalism could be implement without risking balkanization of the Somalia.

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