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The EU Foreign Policy Architecture after the Lisbon Treaty: The Role of the EEAS in Empowering the EU as an International Actor

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Master of Science in International Relations

Credits

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Declaration

I, Nuno Marques, declare that this thesis is a result of my research investigations and findings. Sources of information other than my own have been acknowledged and a reference list has been appended. This work has not been previously submitted to any other university for award of any type of academic degree.

Signature

Date

Dedication

*This Thesis is Dedicated to My Parents, My Wife
and My Two Children*

**For Their Love, Support, Encouragement, Strength, and Inspiration, as I pursue My
Life`s work**

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Before I express my gratitude to the people who have directly contributed to the work described in this thesis, it is important to acknowledge the importance of higher education free for tuition fee in Norway. In addition to the fact that Norway has become my family`s home, it has given me the opportunity to conclude my Post-Graduation at NMBU.

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Finally, a few words to myself: I DID IT!

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Table 1. Central Administration of the EEAS in 2010

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List of Abbreviations

BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
DEVCO	Directorate-General for Development and Cooperation
DG ECHO	DG Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection
DG RELEX	Directorate General for External Relations
DG	Directorates General
EC	European Community
ECD	European Commission Delegations
EEAS	European External Action Service
EP	European Parliament
ESS	European Security Strategy
EU	European Union
EUSR	EU Special Representative
FAC	Foreign Affairs Council
FPA	Foreign Policy Analysis
GSC	General Secretariat of the Council
HR	High Representative for the CFSP
HR/VP	High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy / Vice-President of the Commission
IGC	Intergovernmental Conference
MEPP	Middle East Peace-Process
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
PSC	Political and Security Committee
TEFU	Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
TEU	Treaty on European Union
ToA	Treaty of Amsterdam
ToL	Treaty of Lisbon

ToM	Treaty of Maastricht
ToN	Treaty of Nice
UN	United Nations
US	United States

ABSTRACT

The Treaty of Lisbon (ToL) sought to meet the new global challenges by providing the European Union (EU) with the necessary institutional and political tools to strengthen its role in international relations. The European External Action Service (EEAS) has emerged as a potential driving force for the EU foreign policy. With its unique position within the EU institutional framework and comprising an amalgamation of three groups of officials, its mandate is to provide a more coherent and effective foreign policy. The *suis generis* Service is at the centre of the coordination role that runs along two dimensions: vertically, between the Service and the 28 Member States; and horizontally, between the Service and the EU institutions involved in the foreign policy-making of the EU (the Commission, the European Council, and the Council of the EU). This thesis is a qualitative research, approaching the analysis of the EEAS in applying the three following approaches: Europeanization (uploading, downloading, and socialization), capabilities-expectations gap, and the EU's actorness. These three approaches have contributed to the examination of the EU's capabilities in international relations. Supported by the "triple-hatted" High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy / Vice-President of the European Commission (HR/VP) and the EU Delegations, the EEAS has been given the tools to bring together the actors that constitute EU's foreign policy, and to strengthen the EU's visibility and influence in the world. Special attention has also been giving to the building of a new *esprit de corps* as a key element in the construction of a coherent and effective European diplomatic service. Elements such as leadership, communication, trust, public image, training and career prospects have the potential to promote *esprit de corps*, thus turning the EEAS into a more effective organization. The empirical analysis shows that the institutional and political innovations brought by the ToL was intended to establish a coherent EU foreign policy but this remains a work in progress. However, these innovations have given the EU the opportunity to enhance its presence and influence in the world of politics.

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1. INTRODUCTION

In this chapter I will provide a general introduction of the thesis, followed by the presentation of the research questions, which will work as guidelines throughout the thesis. It also presents the organization of the thesis.

1.1. Introduction

The European Union (EU) has developed increasingly as an actor in international relations, particularly since the European process of European integration after World War II. Since then continuous efforts have been made to enhance both the coherence and the effectiveness of the EU's foreign policy. The entry into force of the Treaty of Maastricht (ToM) in 1993, with the subsequent establishment of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), constituted arguably the major milestone for the EU to become a stronger and a more coherent foreign policy actor.

However, the introduction and the nature of the CFSP framework has somehow contributed to inconsistent policy initiatives from the EU. The ongoing tensions between intergovernmentalism and supranationalism not only dominate the EU foreign policy literature but also represent an important impediment in EU's quest to become a global power as the EU seeks actorness beyond Europe.

The nature of the world is constantly changing and in the last three decades, the parameters of the EU's external policies have also changed. On the one hand, the EU's strategic environment in which the EU operates has experienced important transformations. With the weakening of the Westphalia sovereignty, ongoing financial crisis, emerging powers, such as the BRICS, and non-state, transnational actors *inter alia* international, regional organizations and non-governmental organisation, multinational companies and terrorist organizations are playing a greater role in the international system. Hence, they challenge both the role of traditionally foreign policy actors such as nation-states, and also the EU's role to tackle the challenges and to play a more influential role globally. On the other hand, the EU has been expanding its foreign policy portfolio, which comprises various strategies *inter alia* the European Security Strategy (ESS), DG Trade, DG Development and Cooperation, DG Enlargement.

The EU is a unique entity and polity, often mentioned as *suis generis*. It comprises 28 Member States with a population of more than half a billion, and is the world's biggest trader and aid

donor. The EU is certainly a significant international actor in a more connected, contested and complex world. However, and taking into consideration the challenges and opportunities in the international landscape, the main question that this thesis seeks to discuss is whether the EU will become a global power in the near future. The role of the EU is indeed being challenged politically and economically.

To tackle as well as approach, the opportunities that arise from these changes, the Treaty of Lisbon (ToL) – which came into force in December 2009 – set out to overcome the challenges mentioned above, but also with the aim to bring more coherence and effectiveness – internally and externally – into the EU, enhancing its influence and legitimacy in the international arena.

With the entering into force of the ToL, the external relations system of the EU has entered a new era. The ToL introduced a new set of institutional and political structures, strengthening the capacity of the EU in the international realm by equipping the EU with new tools. One of the most important innovations in this regard is the establishment of the European External Action Service (EEAS) to improve effectiveness of EU's foreign policy, thus turning the EU into a more vertical and horizontal coherent actor.

This thesis seeks to analyze the primary task of this *suis generis* diplomatic service, which is to coordinate – vertically and horizontally – the structure and the making of EU's foreign policy. Since the EEAS comprises an amalgamation of three groups of officials, the thesis will also examine the expectations created by the existence and development of a common working culture, also known as *esprit de corps*. More specifically, this thesis asks whether it will play an important role in enhancing both the effectiveness of the Service and the policy coherence and coordination within the EEAS, and between the EEAS and the other key EU foreign policy actors.

Furthermore, this thesis will also provide an analysis of two other “actors” that play an important role in supporting a more coherent and effective EU foreign policy: first, the “upgraded” role of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR), which is also the Vice-President of the European Commission (VP), becoming the new High Representative and Vice-President (HR/VP). The ToL sought to give considerable responsibility to one individual to support the EEAS and to bring together the actors that constitute the EU's foreign policy. Second, the role and work of the EU Delegations to strengthen the EU's visibility in the world and bring added value to the EU Member States and their diplomatic services.

In sum, the objective of this thesis is to analyze whether the EU is actually able to represent a common foreign policy and, more importantly, whether the EU is able to pursue its strategies and priorities by using the new tools of the ToL. This is particularly eligible at a time when conflicts, security tensions, climate change, and financial crisis create expectations that the EU will take on greater responsibilities, not only in EU`s own neighbourhood but also globally.

1.2. Research Questions

The overall aim of this thesis is to analyze the EU foreign policy architecture after the ToL by presenting the new key institutional and political structures, and how they seek to improve the effectiveness and coherence of the EU`s foreign policy. Along with the creation of the EEAS, upgrading of the HR/VP role, and the introduction of the President of the European Council, the management of the EU foreign policy is entrusted to three other institutional actors that already exist: The Commission, The European Council, and the Council of the EU.

Also, it seeks to examine how these new structures have been applied in practice and how they interact with each other. Against this background, the two following research questions will guide this analysis:

- 1. To what degree has the Treaty of Lisbon (ToL), through the creation of the EEAS in particular, equipped the EU with the necessary tools for becoming a powerful international actor?*
- 2. To what extent has the EEAS enabled the EU to pursue a more coherent and effective common foreign policy?*

For the sake of this thesis, and since the nature of the EU foreign policy is multifaceted (Keukeleire & Delreux 2014: 11), the terms CFSP/CSDP, external action, external dimension of internal policies, and EU foreign policy need some clarification because a sharp delineation is not always possible and may lead the reader to some misunderstanding.

The ToL distinguishes the CFSP/CSDP, the EU`s external action, external dimension of internal policies, and EU foreign policy. As for the CFSP, it “provides the main platform for developing and implementing the political and diplomatic dimension of EU foreign policy”

(Ibid: 12), while the CSDP comprises civilian and military crisis management instruments to “underpin and implement the EU’s foreign policy and to reinforce the potential and credibility of the CFSP” (Ibid). Regarding the EU’s external action – under the competency of the European Commission and its commissioners and Directorates General (DGs) –, it comprises the following policies: trade, development cooperation, economic and financial cooperation with third countries, humanitarian aid, sanctions and international agreements (Ibid). As with regards to the external dimension of internal policies, it comprises internal policies of the EU *inter alia* energy, environmental, and migration, asylum policy, which are also relevant in the EU foreign policy (Ibid). Hence, EU foreign policy includes CFSP/CSDP, the various dimensions of the EU’s external action and external dimensions of internal policies. It can also include foreign policies of Member States as long as they are developed through interaction with the EU (Ibid: 13).

The research questions will be answered through the use of three different theoretical approaches or concepts: Europeanization, the capability-expectations gap, and EU’s actorness.

The Europeanization concept refers to the complex and interrelated interplay between the national foreign policies of the Member States and EU foreign policies. It comprises three dimensions – uploading, downloading, and socialization –, which empirically is difficult to draw distinctions between them (Balfour, Carta & Raika 2015: 6). The capability-expectations gap is closely related to the contribution from Hill (1993) when he analyzed the international role of the EC (former name of the EU) and identified a gap between what it had been planning to do and what the EC was able to deliver. EU’s actorness contributes to understanding the EU’s ambitions to play a greater role in the international arena. Within this concept, scholars such as, Jørgensen (2013), Jørgensen, Oberthür, and Shahin (2013), and Bretherton and Vogler (2006) have enriched the debate regarding the actorness and influence of the EU in international affairs.

Combining these three approaches or concepts will provide me with useful tools that I will apply throughout this thesis. Additionally, empirical evidence, literature, and one interview will also provide me with a better understanding and knowledge of the perspectives, decisions and relationships of the key actors involved in EU foreign policy.

One of the main criticisms before the entering into force of the ToL was the EU’s lack of coherence in its foreign policy. The ToL has introduced a range of new actors within the foreign policy of the EU, especially the EEAS and the HR/VP. Hence, the first research question aims

to analyze whether the establishment of these two actors – as well as the role played by the EU Delegations – may contribute with the necessary tools that may help the EU achieve its aims and ambitions.

The second research question explores on whether the EEAS` unique position within the institutional framework of the EU has enhanced coordination within the EU, thus improving the EU`s foreign policy. Here, the relationship between the EEAS and the other EU`s foreign policy key actors – the Commission, European Council, The Council of the EU – and the Member States will also be examined. Also, it examines whether the building of *esprit de corps* can play a crucial role in enhancing the coherence and effectiveness of the EEAS – and more broadly the EU.

1.3. Organization of the Thesis

The rest of the thesis is structured as follows:

Chapter 2 outlines the methodological aspects of data collection and the more general research design. I outline the challenges that I have encountered while writing the thesis, as well as the limitations of the thesis itself. Also, I address the ethical considerations when working with a thesis. The chapter also presents the three different approaches that have been applied in the thesis.

Chapter 3 presents a historical view of the development of an EU foreign policy since the “Annus Mirabilis” (1989) and up until the entering into force of the ToL. This chapter shows how the roots of today`s discussions regarding EU`s foreign policy can be found in the recent debates and policy choices.

Chapter 4 is divided into four sub-chapters. Sub-chapter 4.1. describes the *suis generis* nature of the EEAS, 4.2. deals with the “Coherence Mandate”. Sub-chapter 4.2.1. analyzes the vertical coherence (between the EEAS and the Member States), and 4.2.2. analyzes the horizontal coherence (between the EEAS and the EU`s foreign policy key actors). Chapter 4.3 provides an overview of the structure and organization of the EEAS, and 4.4. examines the staff of the EEAS and the development of a new *esprit de corps* resulting from an amalgamation of several identities.

Chapter 5 is divided into three sub-chapters. Sub-chapter 5.1. describes the roles, powers, and responsibilities that were entrusted to the HR/VP. Subsequently, being “triple-hatted”, 5.2. deals with the need for deputisation of the HR/VP. Sub-chapter 5.3. discusses the role of the EU Delegations and the added value seen from a Member State perspective. It also focuses on the expanded role of Heads of EU Delegation.

Chapter 6 summarizes the main findings and the conclusions of this thesis.

2. METHODS AND THEORY

The purpose of this chapter is to present the research design of this thesis and to explain why a case study – the European External Action Service (EEAS) - is the best way to better comprehend the distinctive character and structure of the EU foreign policy institutional set-up as adopted by the post-Lisbon Treaty. It also presents how data is collected and the sources used in this thesis. The sources are aimed at providing me with a better understanding and knowledge of the perspectives, perceptions and relationships relevant to the EEAS, but also the other key actors involved in the making and implementation of the foreign policy of the EU.

I will also address the limitations and challenges that I have met while writing the thesis in addition to the ethical considerations during the writing process.

Furthermore, I will present the theory framework that will be applied in the analysis. Here I ground my theoretical framework with the following approaches or concepts: Europeanization, the capability-expectations gap, and EU actorness. These three ways of thinking about EU foreign policy, external relations and the EEAS in particular provide me, I argue, with a number of useful insights that I will draw upon throughout this thesis.

2.1. Research design

According to Yin (2014: 26), “the research design is the logical consequence that connects the empirical data to a study’s initial research question, and ultimately to its conclusions”. The method applied in this thesis is qualitative, which is suitable for investigating particular features and characteristics of a phenomenon. Johannesen et al. (2010: 32) argue, that it is particularly valuable when researching something that we already know. According to Berg and Lune (2012: 1), qualitative research uses methods that ask questions such as what, how, where, and when describing situations, topics, narratives, definitions, and perceptions. Hence, these methods were perceived as the most suitable for the purpose of this thesis.

This thesis analyses whether the post-Lisbon structure, having the new diplomatic Service – the EEAS - as a case, have strengthened the role of the EU in the international realm. In order to answer the Research Questions (see Chapter 1), three different approaches were applied (see

2.5.), to analyze the complex EU foreign policy structure, the interaction between the EEAS and the Member States and the other EU external relations key actors, the emergence of an *esprit de corps*, as well as the role of the HR/VP and of the EU Delegations.

According to Berg and Lune (2012):

a case study is an approach capable of examining simple or complex phenomenon, with units of analysis varying from single individuals to large corporations and businesses to world-changing events; it entails using a variety of lines of actions in its data gathering segments and can meaningfully make use of and contribute to the application of theory (Berg & Lune 2012: 325).

Also, case studies can provide a deeper understanding of a phenomenon, events, people, or organizations (Ibid: 328).

Consequently, a case study seemed, to be the most appropriate method to analyze the growing capacity of the EU after the Lisbon Treaty to conduct external diplomatic relations with the establishment of the EEAS. It analyzes the gradual institutional and structural developments in the external competences of the EU as well as its ability and capacity to conduct a more consistent and coherent foreign policy through the EEAS framework.

2.2. Data Collection

Case studies require multiple methods and/or sources of data through, which it creates a full and deep examinations of the specific case. What is more, which methods are used and how to combine them depends on the case (Berg & Lune 2012: 326). The underlying primary sources for my research have been the relevant European treaties, particularly the Treaty of Lisbon (ToL 2012). This thesis also includes official reports, research projects, and declarations from central European decision-makers and actors. With regards to secondary sources, this thesis predominantly uses academic contributions such as books and scholarly articles, policy papers, newspaper articles and relevant websites dealing directly with the EEAS and with the more general issue of the foreign policy of the EU.

As the author`s understanding of the topic improved and as further data was being collected, new questions, challenges, and concepts arose leading to a further development of the understanding of the data presented. Moreover, due to a large amount of available printed

sources, online documents, and news articles that have provided relevant acceptable and reliable information represent the majority of material in this thesis.

The interview that the author conducted was used both to acquire background understanding and knowledge, and to complement the data collected. The original plan was to conduct interviews with Ambassadors from the Member States located in Norway and perhaps also EU officials. However, this showed to be practically impossible, and therefore only one interview was conducted with an EU diplomat posted in a third country.

The interview was audio recorded, but my interviewee did not agree that the name or other identifying information could be mentioned in this thesis. Hence, neither reference to the interviewee name nor the interviewee real position within the EU will be presented in this thesis.

Due to the fact that the set of questions were sent in advance by e-mail, it might lack the sense of “spontaneity of probing and chasing down interesting topics that inadvertently” could have arisen in the course of the interview (Berg & Lune 2012: 134). Nevertheless, I felt that this was the most efficient thing to do, and besides, I wanted to avoid asking sensible questions.

Even though the set of questions were sent in advance, the interview followed a semi-structured format (Berg & Lune 2012: 112-114). The formality of the interview was adjusted due to the relationship that was developed with the informant, and questions were indeed rephrased at will. Also, the flexibility of this type of interview has allowed other areas to be discussed in addition to the relevant topic.

Overall, the objective with this interview was not only to gather specific and additional data, but rather to provide a better understanding and knowledge of the perspectives, perceptions, and relationships of the actors examined in this case study. Nevertheless, it was useful to have an inside view of an EU diplomat who has relevant knowledge and understanding concerning the EEAS.

2.3. Limitations and challenges

The first question that arose was which theoretical approach or approaches should be chosen for this thesis, and whether it was appropriate or not for this case study. With regards to European studies, studies on the EU, and studies on the foreign policy of the EU, according to

Adler-Nissen (2015: 6-7), there is a rich and massive list of theories *inter alia* neorealism, classical realism, classical liberalism, constructivism, intergovernmentalism, foreign policy analysis, rational choice institutionalism, federalism. As a result, my choice was rather than simple. Some theories are more applied than other, depending on whether they *inter alia* pretend to analyze the significance of institutions in international politics and the impact of domestic politics upon governmental preferences (intergovernmentalism) or the relations between actors and institutions in contractual terms (rational choice institutionalism) (Ibid: 10-11).

As it will be further examined in 2.5, I have opted for approaches or concepts rather than theories. As Keukeleire and Delreux (2014: 321) argue, the theoretical frameworks are considered “as lenses through which EU foreign policy and the political dynamics that drive it can be better understood and explained”. What is more, and according to them, none of these lenses provide right or wrong answers, but “they do offer useful analytical insights that allow for making sense of what we empirically observe” (Ibid).

Against this background, I felt that the approaches or concepts used in this thesis - Europeanization, the capability-expectations gap, and EU’s actorness – have allowed me to better understand and analyze the empirical observations, thus, answering the Research Questions.

Validity and reliability are methodical challenges in a research. While validity addresses to what extent the data answers to the research question, reliability deals with the quality of the data applied in the thesis. Also, reliability is important because it can either strengthen or weaken the validity of the study. In this thesis, and to improve the validity and reliability, the internet plays an important role in collecting information and data. It functions as a great advantage for today’s social scientists. The internet constitutes a rich source of useful documents, thus, apart from the official documents, I had to be very critical when using and referring to documents and websites that I found on the internet.

While access to primary data beyond official websites has been limited (e.g. interviews with EU diplomats, EU officials) secondary sources are ample and a number of books, articles, and studies from a variety of experts and academics have been used in the thesis. There are three studies that I would like to mention and that have provided more quality to the analysis in this thesis: “Manufacturing esprit de corps: The case of the European External Action Service” (Juncos & Pomorska 2014); ‘The Organisation and Functioning of the European External

Action Service: Achievements, Challenges and Opportunities’ (Wouters et al. (2013); and “Equipping the European Union for the 21st century: National diplomacies, the European External Action Service and the making of EU foreign policy” (Balfour & Raik (2013a) I believe that these types of secondary sources can be considered a good supplement to support my analysis throughout this thesis because they will help me in trying to answer my research questions:

- 1) *To what degree has the Treaty of Lisbon, through the creation of the EEAS in particular, equipped the EU with the necessary tools for becoming a powerful international actor?*
- 2) *To what extent has the EEAS enabled the EU to pursue a more coherent and effective common foreign policy?*

2.4. Ethical considerations

Addressing the ethical obligations involved, the most significant ethical principle during the writing process was not to plagiarize or claim credit for the result of others, in other words, to avoid plagiarism and scientific misconduct. Plagiarism is the most common form of scientific misconduct and defined as the appropriation of another person's ideas, processes, results or words without giving appropriate credit. Plagiarism is often intentional much due to confusion regarding the definition of plagiarism and how to avoid it. Regarding this subject, and being an unexperienced researcher, it is my responsibility to be very careful during the writing of this thesis.

In order to avoid plagiarism and improve the quality of my research work, it has been extremely important that I allot enough time for writing; read all the references carefully; decide about appropriateness in making references; and write down all my work in my own words/language.

2.5. Approaching the research questions

This thesis was designed to contribute to a better understanding of the distinctive character of the EU foreign policy structure after the entering into force of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009. My research interest has therefore been predominantly of empirical nature and not of theoretical natural, even though, and according to Saurugger (2013: 5), theories can be important as they provide an understanding of how a specific question might influence the response to a given research question, thus, adding order and meaning to a phenomena observed.

A number of academic debates regarding the building of a common EU foreign policy can be found within the broader discussion about the nature of the EU as an international actor. Here, the EU's ability to assert itself as a recognized global power has been widely criticized by many scholars, politicians and by the public in general.

One of the many debates arise from the debate regarding the very existence of a common European foreign policy. Hence the concept of Europeanization is an analytical framework, which in the context of this thesis is understood as three interrelated processes: the bottom-up process (uploading), top-down process (downloading), and the search for an identity or common diplomatic culture at the European level (socialization) (Balfour, Carta & Raik 2015: 6).

The concept of Europeanization goes back to the wider debate between two prominent European integration theories, intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism. Regarding the former, it refers to the role of national governments in defining their interest in intergovernmental relations. It explains why states, as rational actors pursuing their own interests and objectives can accept the idea of shared sovereignty, given the fact that sovereignty is the basis for statehood per se and for explaining the relationships between states (Saurugger 2013: 75-76). Regarding why states accept the idea to create and join supranational organizations, Saurugger (2013:36) claims that it is "the rational action of a political and administrative elite seeking to defend its own interests". One of the core assumptions of neofunctionalist theory is a transfer of loyalty, which means that the transfer of such loyalties is necessary for the creation of a new political community (Ibid: 42)

Hence, the concept of Europeanization attempts to go beyond these two integration theories to the analysis of the interplay between the Member States foreign policies and the EU foreign policy.

The innovations of the Treaty of Lisbon were meant not only to strengthen the EU as an international actor but also to improve the preconditions for a higher degree of coherence (vertical and horizontal) of the EU's foreign policy. According to Keukeleire and Delreux (2014: 129), "the relationship and interacting processes of foreign policy on the national level and foreign policy at the EU level are often labeled as Europeanization". This approach seeks to analyze how the national foreign policies are being "Europeanized" into more coordinated and convergent policies, while at the same time analyse how these same national foreign policies influence and affect the common EU positions in international affairs. Also, it seeks to analyze whether the building of a common working culture – *esprit de corps* – has improved the coherence and effectiveness of the EEAS itself.

In the beginning of the 1990s, Hill (1993) developed the concept that became broadly used as the capability-expectations gap. This second approach provides a framework for a better understanding the European foreign policy behavior. According to Hill (1993) the EC (European Community at that time) would face high expectations on the global stage since the end of the Cold War, hence, these internal and external expectations would "pose a serious challenge to the actual capabilities of the EC, in terms of its ability to agree, its resources, and the instruments at its disposal" (Ibid: 315).

EU's actorness is the third concept which contributes to understanding the EU's ambitions to play a greater role in the international realm. Scholars such as Jørgensen (2013), Jørgensen, Oberthür, and Shahin (2013), and Bretherton and Vogler (2006) have contributed to the examination of the EU's capabilities in relation to its international actorness. Bretherton and Vogler (2006) are focused on the concept of coherence, which is much concerned with the relationship between the EU's actorness and effectiveness, where their inter-related concepts of opportunity, presence and capability, contribute to the idea that the EU continues to be a key international actor while its impact (and effectiveness) in global affairs is declining.

These three approaches will not be used in an oppositional matter, but rather as supplement to the research questions. I believe that confining myself to just one theory would hinder and restrict the understanding of the case and processes that I seek to analyze. This thesis works

under the assumption that, depending on the situation and factors, all these approaches provide me with a number of useful insights I will draw upon throughout this thesis.

2.6. Europeanization

The concept of Europeanization has become a significant theme in the field of EU. However, this concept has been conceptualized in various ways and applied differently in various studies. Some scholars refer to Europeanization as a phenomenon distinct from the EU while others see it as a particular EU- related phenomenon. Given that “Europe” is not synonymous with the EU, probably the correct term to use here would be “EU-ization” (Keukeleire & Delreux 2014: 129).

Nevertheless, with regards to the EU foreign policy, probably the most far-reaching definition of Europeanization comes from Radaelli:

Processes of (a) construction (b) diffusion and (c) institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, “ways of doing things” and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the making of EU’s public policy and politics, and then incorporated in the logic of domestic discourses, identities, political structures and public policies (Radaelli 2002).

In this thesis, the phenomenon Europeanization refers to the complex and interrelated interplay between the national foreign policies of the EU member states and the EU foreign policies. According to Balfour, Carta and Raik (2015: 6-8), this interplay can be understood as having three dimensions: firstly, uploading (national projection) of domestic foreign policy objectives and preferences onto the EU level; secondly, downloading (national adaptation) to the EU level, which implies changes in national foreign policies triggered by participation over time in EU foreign policymaking; thirdly, socialization, that is, changes of ideas, preferences and even identity between the national and the supranational levels as a consequence of participation in the structures of the EU decision-making. The socialization process is closely linked to whether the EEAS officials might develop an *esprit de corps* and what elements have the potential to promote it, and how it can be achieved. *Esprit de corps* is understood as the emergence of shared ideas, beliefs and values among the EEAS staff and their ambition to achieve a common objective.

2.6.1. Uploading

Within this framework, the context of the EU foreign policy strengthens the foreign policies of the member states, allowing them to upload or project their preferences, objectives, and priorities to the EU level, and shaping EU policy. Europeanization at this level allows them, making an instrumental use of the EU, to promote and even increase their national interests.

In line with the neo-liberal intergovernmental approach, and according to Moravcsik (1998: 1-6), European integration is the result of a strategic calculation by member governments to promote their economic interests, and it occurred for economic reasons such as an economic boom and new markets with huge expansion possibilities. In foreign policy language, it means that the member states transferred their preferences and objectives to the EU level in order to increase national influence in the world. Keukeleire and Delreux (2014: 132) argue that in making institutional use of the EU, it also allows member states to upload their national priorities (in certain regions or regarding specific themes) in a way that they would not be able to act alone. Through this bottom-up process, whereby national governments promote their interests through the EU framework, the member states continue defending their foreign policy independence, and thus increasing the EU's importance in the international real (Balfour, Carta & Raik 2015: 7)

Although several non-state actors inhabit the international system, foreign policy is still conceived as *domaine réservé* of sovereign governments. Within this context, it is unsurprising that with the creation of the EEAS, Member States might perceive this Service as a competitor to national foreign ministries, and thus resisting to transfer further power to the EU. This can lead to a tension between member states that wish to drive uploading on the one hand, and the following strengthening of EU foreign policy on the other hand. A crucial question here is whether member states see this bottom-up process as a positive contribution to strengthening the role of the EU in international relations. As Keukeleire and Delreux (2014: 132) put it, the member states are not always successful in uploading their preferences to the EU level, and this might explain why some member states pursue other fora or networks in order to expand their foreign policy objectives.

2.6.2. Downloading

Already back in the 1990s, Ladrech (1994) contributed to the study of Europeanization as he observed the effects of this in France. He argues that domestic politics were being changed because of the EU membership. However, he pointed out that the Europeanization effects would have different consequences across all member states. According to him, domestic factors would play an important role when adapting to the EU effects, and therefore “fears of harmonization or homogenization were unfounded” (Bache et al. 2015: 46).

Even though the Europeanization phenomenon implies changes in the member state`s world view, values, norms and even identity, one must keep in mind that these “immaterial dimensions are deeply rooted in a member state`s domestic context” (Keukeleire & Delreux 2014: 131). From this perspective, the downloading concept suggests that the EU changes and shapes the national policy-making structures, practices, and processes and that these gradual changes occur at a different pace according to the EU member states domestic realities. As Risse et al. (2001: 1-2) argue, the extent to which adaptational pressure leads to domestic change depends on five intervening factors: multiple veto points in the domestic structure; facilitating institutions; domestic organizational and policy-making cultures; the differential empowerment of domestic actors; and learning.

It is incontestable that to a greater or lesser extent, EU member states` domestic policies change as a result of EU membership. According to Keukeleire and Delreux (2014: 130-131), this top-down process has led to four outcomes: firstly, member states have developed foreign policies on issues and regions on which they hitherto had no policy or interest at all; secondly, it has allowed member states to transport complex issues from the domestic arena to the EU arena; thirdly, it has forced member states to update or even modernize their traditional national foreign policies; and fourthly, it has led to transfer both formal and informal power to the EU through the EEAS, by giving it an even central role in foreign policy agenda setting.

2.6.3. Socialization

The notion of socialization adds a horizontal dimension to the Europeanization phenomenon. This concept refers to “a process through which national officials attached EU institutions in Brussels or that are closely involved in EU policy-making increasingly thin in European rather

than (solely) in national terms” (Keukeleire & Delreux 2014: 133). In other words, close socialization between ministers, diplomats and civil servants through common institutions generates changes in the practices, views, values, interests and identity of policy-makers, making it to a greater extent challenging to separate what is national and what is European.

Keukeleire and Delreux (2014: 133-134) stressed that socialization has had less impact in larger countries like France, the UK, and Germany because of their larger administrations and active role in bilateral relations. Besides, this socialization has affected differently, on the one hand, policy-makers that work closely to EU policy-making, and, on the other hand, those with little or no involvement at all in the EU network.

What is more, socialization is closely related to the emergence of an *esprit de corps* among the EEAS officials. As it will be mentioned in Chapter 4, the EEAS is comprised of a diverse group with different backgrounds with different views, positions and ambitions. With the contribution of Juncos and Pomorska (2013, 2014) framework, it will allow me to examine whether this amalgamation of groups of officials helps to improve the internal coherence of the EEAS, thus increasing the effectiveness of the EEAS and supporting the idea of a stronger European voice in the world.

2.7. The Capability-Expectations Gap

In his seminal article titled: “The Capability-Expectations Gap, or Conceptualizing Europe’s International Role”, Hill (1993) analyzed the international role of the European Community (EC) and identified a gap between plans and intentions on the one hand, and what the EC was actually able to deliver, on the other. According to Hill, the EC has been performing four functions since the beginning of the European project until the 1990s: first, as a key stabilizer of Western Europe; second, as an influential actor in the world trade; third, being present and having an active voice in the developed world; and fourth, being an alternative voice in international diplomacy in a multipolar world (Ibid: 310-311).

In an age of globalization, states remain central actors in international affairs, but they are increasingly challenged by non-state actors, such as the EU, who now plays a major role in international politics. While foreign policy analysis (FPA) has sought to analyze the external affairs of states in international affairs, thus omitting the non-state actors, global governance -

an analytical concept that studies how global problems should be handled - includes non-state actors. In so doing, the literature takes into account how non-state actors contribute to either “the political regulation of social affairs or to provide common good” (Risse 2013: 181). In the context of this thesis, the non-state actor studied is an international organisation, the EU.

Following the end of the Cold War, in 1993 Hill (1993: 312-315) argued that the EC now had an opportunity to extend its global activity. He listed six functions in which the EC might perform in the future, hence strengthening its international role: first, the EC as a real candidate to become number two in the global balance of power, after the USSR’s decline; second, a regional pacifier; third, a global intervener; fourth, a mediator of conflicts; fifth, a bridge between rich and poor; and sixth, joint supervisor of the world economy.

The EC’s problems when trying to make these functions to actually work, was what Hill qualified to as a gap between the expectations (both internally and externally) placed on the EC and the EC’s genuine capability to encounter these expectations. Hill (1993: 315) stresses the capability-expectations gap as having three main elements, such as the ability to agree, resources, and the instruments at the EC’s disposal. Moreover, the creation of the Single Market and the hopes for a unified Europe, gave increased expectations and demands. Also, Hill argues that already at that time, when the Member States had just accepted the Maastricht Treaty (ToM) and the EC was heading towards a great development:

(...) the Community does not have the resources or the political structure to be able to respond to the demands which the Commission and certain Member States have virtually invited through their bullishness over the pace of internal change. The consequential gap which has opened up between capabilities and expectations is dangerous (Hill 1993: 315).

Hill (1993) provides ways in which this gap can be closed over time. One possible way was to establish “[...] a single, effective foreign policy [...]” (Ibid: 315) but this would require major changes within the EC, particularly in taking decision with regards to high politics, thus imposing the necessary resources and instruments to support those decisions (Ibid: 316). Another possible way is for the EC either to increase its capabilities or to decrease its expectations. Regarding the former, this depends on political and constitutional changes, hence these changes would have to ensure cohesiveness, resources, and operational capability. However, regarding the latter, this would lead to lower ambitions for the EC, thus limiting the EU’s actorness in the international realm (Ibid: 321).

Hill (1993: 236) concludes that the EC's role needs to have a more realistic perception of what the EC is capable of performing and delivering. It does not mean that the EC needs to lower its expectations, but rather to make expectations that are adequate in terms of available capabilities. If the EC continues to "talk up" its capabilities, the outcome is what Hill (1993) has conceptualized as the capability-expectations gap.

Hill's analysis was based on two key concepts: actorness and presence. In his perspective, actorness enabled the scholars "to chart the EC's changing role in the world without becoming distracted by the "is it or isn't it a superpower" (Hill 1993: 309). The EC was already a key international player, and according to Sjöstedt (as cited in Hill 1993: 309), an international actor could be an entity if it would be autonomous and possessed certain structural prerequisites in order to act at the international level. Regarding the concept of presence, Hill (1993: 309) emphasizes how the world perceives the EC and "the significant effects it has on both the psychological and the operational environments of third parties".

Carta (2009) concluded that the EU is now "described as an important player thanks to its internal diversity, which leads to a multifaceted capacity to dialogue with different counterparts and a natural propensity to adopt multilateral initiatives" (Ibid: 215).

In this thesis, Hill's (1993) theory will be relevant to determine whether the establishment of the EEAS as one of the major innovations of the Lisbon Treaty, has provided the EU with stronger institutional capacity and policy instruments, thus strengthening the EU's actorness and presence in the international system.

2.8. EU's actorness

Actorness in international politics is interpreted in different ways. The numerous debates about the EU's actorness acknowledge the importance of the EU in marking its place in international relations. I have focused on those contributions that I find most relevant for the present thesis.

A conceptualization of actorness that has enriched the EU's actorness debate comes from Jørgensen (2013), Jørgensen, Oberthür, and Shahin (2013), and Bretherton and Vogler (2006). What is more, it enriches this thesis because the EU has been criticized for its lack of legal personality and institutional fragmentation (Saurugger 2013: 217). However, with the entering

into force of the ToL and the creation of the EEAS, it confirmed the EU's ambitions in strengthening its position and influence in the world of politics.

Jørgensen (2013: 109) observes that debates on the emergence of a common European foreign policy have become a hot issue in international relations during the past two decades. In order to measure the performance of the EU's in international institutions, which is an important aspect of EU actorness, Jørgensen, Oberthür, and Shahin (2013: 4-8) adopt and build on organizational theory. They identify four core elements of organizational performance: effectiveness; relevance; efficiency; and financial viability. These core elements will be/ or are relevant when analyzing the performance of the EU in world politics in general, and of the EEAS in particular.

Regarding effectiveness – goal achievement - Jørgensen, Oberthür, and Shahin (2013: 5-6) observe the existence of various standards when measuring the EU's effectiveness in international affairs, but the objective here is to acknowledge that when assessing EU's goal achievement can itself be challenging. For example, the objectives can be very broad, thus appearing meaningless for an assessment, like the European Security Strategy (ESS) of 2003 (Ibid: 6). Also, the objectives of the EU are neither clear nor explicit. As Jørgensen, Oberthür, and Shahin (2013: 6) argue, it is important to take into account the level of difficulty in achieving the goals that have been purposed. Whether the EU succeeds in achieving its goals, it depends on the level of ambition, the features of the challenges and the preferences of other actors.

With regards to relevance – unity, representation and delegation, coordination -, it is critical to determine who “the EU and its stakeholders are” (Jørgensen, Oberthür, & Shahin (2013: 6). Within the context of the current thesis, important stakeholders are the HR/VP, the EU Delegations, the European Commission, the European Council, the Council of the EU, and the EU Member States. If these stakeholders see no relevance, then it cannot be possible to refer to EU performance, thus relevance and performance are linked.

What is more, representation usually implies some mechanism for the coordination of the EU's foreign policy (Jørgensen, Oberthür, & Shahin 2013: 7). This is the rationale behind the establishment of the EEAS and the “upgrading” of the role of the HR/VP – further examined in Chapter 4 and 5- which was to enhance coherence and coordination of the EU's foreign policy.

With regards to the efficiency and financial/resource viability Jørgensen, Oberthür, and Shahin (2013: 7) argue that these two elements are related, thus discussed jointly. They refer to the ability of the EU to “raise the resource required for high performance in the negotiation [...]” (Ibid). Efficiency relates to the relationship between the costs incurred and the effectiveness, that is, the objectives achieved.

Bretherton and Vogler (2006) also address the relationship between the EU’s actorness and effectiveness, where their inter-related concepts of opportunity, presence, and capability, contribute to the idea that the EU continues to be a key international actor, but its impact (and effectiveness) in global affairs is declining. Here, the concept of opportunity refers not only to the external environment of the EU, which is built upon both by ideational and material features limiting or allowing actorness, but also to the expectations and perceptions of EU’s partners. Regarding the interplay between discourse and material possibility within the enlargement policy towards Central and Eastern Europe, this led to raised expectations that the EU had enough resources to allow new members (Ibid: 27). However, in the middle of an ongoing financial crisis, does the EU have the capacity to continue with this enlargement policy? As Bretherton and Vogler (2006: 27) put it, these situations can provide “opportunities for the EU to adopt new roles and responsibilities”.

The concept of presence is twofold: first, it is based on the character and the identity of the EU; second, the external consequences of the EU’s internal policies. The exercising of influence is therefore of considerable importance to the EU’s actorness, thus, it enables one to evaluate the EEAS – and the EU more broadly – its influence through its external activities (Saurugger 2013: 218-219).

Concerning the last concept, capability, it describes the actorness of the EU in international affairs. This concept is very important when analyzing both Chapter 4 and 5 because “it is based on structural and material elements (the legal or financial ability to act) and the political willingness of European actors to engage in activity” (Saurugger 2013: 219). In other words, the EU must identify its priorities (consistency) and formulate and implement policies (coherence).

2.9. Summary

This Chapter has presented the research design of this thesis, which is of a qualitative nature and has explained why a case study was chosen to better understand the distinctive character of the EU foreign policy structure with the entering force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, particularly with the creation of the EEAS.

It has also presented how data was collected and which sources are predominant in this thesis. I have also described in details the interview process with the EEAS official and that the purpose of this interview was to provide a better understanding and knowledge of the perspectives, perceptions and relationships, not only of the EEAS but as well all the other key actors involved in the foreign policy of the EU.

I have addressed the limitations and challenges that I have met while writing this thesis. I have also addressed some concerns and awareness regarding the ethics of research and writing.

Finally, I have presented the approaches that I will apply in the following chapter. The first one relates to the concept of Europeanization which included three sub-categories: uploading, downloading and socialization; the second is the capability-expectations gap (Hill 1993); and the third is EU's actorness, where scholars such as Jørgensen (2013), Jørgensen, Oberthür, and Shahin (2013), and Bretherton and Vogler (2006) have highly contributed to the examination of the EU's capabilities in international relations. These three approaches add a complementary function in approaching the Research Questions.

3. EVOLUTION OF A COMMON EU EXTERNAL ACTION AND FOREIGN POLICY

The purpose of this Chapter is to present the progress that has happened in developing a common EU foreign policy since the “Annus Mirabilis” (1989), followed by Treaty of Maastricht (1993), creation of the illusive CFSP, Treaty of Amsterdam (1999) and the appearance of Mr. CFSP - Javier Solana -, the Convention on the Future of Europe in 2003, until the entering into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009.

This thesis will seek to present that after long and hard negotiations, the EEAS aims to strengthen the coherence and effectiveness of the EU`s foreign policy.

3.1. From 1989 “Annus Mirabilis” to The Treaty on European Union

The year 1989 is known as “Annus Mirabilis”. This was the year that changed the political landscape in Europe, particularly with the collapse of communism in the Soviet Union, the revolutions that swept the Central and Eastern Europe and the fall of the Berlin Wall, which led to the reunification of Germany.

Jacques Delors, former President of the European Commission (1985-1995), called these events as “acceleration of history”. Additionally, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the following military conflict in the Gulf along with the crisis in Yugoslavia led to the proposal – by Britain, France and Germany – of creating the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).

The establishment of the CFSP was one of the substantial developments of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) in 1993, also known as the Treaty of Maastricht (ToM). According to Keukeleire and Delreux (2014: 46-47), four main reasons were behind the creation of the CFSP: first, CFSP concerned strengthening of European integration; second, it was about the relations between the member states and the European Commission, and for the major states, the creation of the CFSP was necessary in order to develop the EU as a foreign policy actor by ensuring member states` full control; third, the CFSP was perceived as a tool to reinforce European identity; finally, the CFSP was also perceived as a tool to allow the EU to become a stronger and more coherent foreign policy actor.

3.1.1. The Pillarization and the illusive CFSP

The TEU marked an important step towards European integration by bringing important implications for both internal and external activities. As Bache et al. (2015: 151) claim, the EU became then a mix between intergovernmentalism and supranationality. While the first pillar remained an area of pooled sovereignty in which the EC was a supranational one, the second and third pillar became areas of intergovernmental agreement and cooperation, which means that decision-making remained in the member governments. In terms of CFSP, the TEU brought new features, new instruments, and a new decision-making structure.

In the Article J. 1 (1) of the ToM (1992), it is emphasized that the EU and its Member States shall “define and implement a common foreign and security policy, governed by the provisions of this Title and covering all areas of foreign and security policy”.

The 1989 events led Europe not only to affirm its intention to maximize its own security and defense capabilities, but also to strengthen its position as a military actor. Howorth (2014: 5) argues that the foreign and security policy remained, nevertheless, under control of the member states. The 1991 Gulf War revealed that the EU member states were divided whether to join the US-led coalition or not to take part. Nine EU member states – Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the UK – joined the American coalition. The EU’s objective to become an international security actor was proving to be daunting.

According to the Article J. 1 (2) of the ToM, the objectives of the CFSP are a framework of common values and a policy program to bind all the external activities, which comprised *inter alia* the following elements: to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests and independence of the Union; to strengthen the security of the Union and its Member States in all ways; to preserve peace and strengthen international security; and to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.

The violent conflicts in former Yugoslavia constituted the first security challenge facing the infant CFSP and the EU in the post-Cold War. Also here, as it happened during the Gulf War, the EU proved once again to be incapable of a common action mainly because the Member States differed so profoundly on the use of military force. It was the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) that took action and began the air campaign against Serbia, both in 1995 (Bosnia and Herzegovina) and in 1999 (Kosovo) (Keukeleire & Delreux 2014: 47). Indeed, the

cooperation within the NATO framework is regulated in the Article J. 4 (5) of the ToM where it is clear that any EU policy on security matters should be compatible within NATO framework.

Keukeleire and Delreux (2014: 157) note that both the Gulf War and the Balkan crisis proved that the EU was not able to pursue a common foreign and security policy. Also, the Member States were not interested in developing the CFSP and did not provide it with the necessary instruments and institutional framework (Ibid: 49). In addition, Article J. 4 (1) states that “The common foreign and security policy shall include all questions related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence” (ToM (1992)). This statement allows for different interpretations from the Member States whereas accommodating both optimistic and skeptical views about the development of the CFSP in achieving a probable “common defence” (Keukeleire & Delreux 2014: 49).

From 1994, the EU and its Member States started to focus on establishing partnerships with countries outside of Europe. As Keukeleire and Delreux (2014: 50) observe, special attention was given to the Mediterranean countries and to support structural reforms in other regions. With these globalized partnerships, especially with its structural foreign policy towards neighbouring countries, it could be affirmed that in the second half of the 90s the EU did have a foreign policy. Structural foreign policy means a long term policy with the goal of shaping *inter alia* political, legal, economic structures in third countries. However, “this was neither the foreign policy conceived by the Treaty of Maastricht through the CFSP, nor a foreign policy as might be conventionally understood” (Ibid).

3.2. Giving a “face” to EU foreign policy: The Solana period

The Treaty of Amsterdam (ToA) came into force on 1st May 1999 after the ratification process (Council of the EU 1997). In the field of external relations, the Treaty introduced the following important modifications in order to promote a common will and common instruments that would strengthen the CFSP:

- The creation of the function of Secretary General/High Representative (HR) for the CFSP;
- The creation of a new common strategies instrument, joint actions;
- The incorporation of the so-called “Petersberg Tasks” into the EU.

The central innovation of the institutional framework of the CFSP was the creation of an HR:

The Secretary-General of the Council, High Representative for the common foreign and security policy, shall assist the Council in matters coming within the scope of the common foreign and security policy, in particular through contributing to the formulation, preparation and implementation of policy decisions, and, when appropriate and acting on behalf of the Council at the request of the Presidency, through conducting political dialogue with third parties (Article J.16 of the ToA 1999).

The establishment of this function gave finally a “face” to EU foreign policy (Keukeleire & Delreux 2014: 51):

The Cologne European Council in 3 - 4 June 1999 designated Mr. Javier Solana Madariaga to the new post of Secretary-General of the Council and High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, a post he held for ten years (1999-2009). The designation of this high-profile political figure strengthened the EU foreign policy implementation and a new era was born: The Solana period (Council of the EU 1999).

Former Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs and Secretary general of NATO, Solana became Secretary-General of the Council of the EU and its first High Representative for CFSP in 1999. His duties were to present ideas and analyze policy options to help EU leaders agree on a common foreign and security policy, thus giving the Union more political clout in international affairs. As Keukeleire and Delreux (2014: 51) note, the appointment of Solana gave the CFSP a new impulse for its development, thus indicating the EU and its Member States indicated that they meant serious regarding strengthening the EU`s foreign policy.

Javier Solana rapidly took the CFSP to a higher level on the international stage, and soon became known as ‘Mr. CFSP’. Especially five achievements can be highlighted. First, he played an important role in the Middle East Peace-Process (MEPP). With regards to the resolution of the MEPP, the House of Lords issued a report stating that “the pro-active role of Dr. Solana has gone a long way towards improving the situation” (House of Lords 2007).

Second, he played an active part in the resolution on the conflict in former Yugoslavia (Operation Concordia) in 2003. This operation became the first ever military operation of the EU. In the words of Solana:

(...) for the EU, this day is a sign that a lot has been achieved over a short period of time. We began to build a Common European Foreign and Security Policy in 1992. Few then believed that only a decade later we would send out men in arms under the EU's flag (Solana 2003).

Third, he played an important and driving role for a free and fair re-run of elections in Ukraine in 2004. This was an important step for the relations EU-Ukraine, and as Solana (2005) stated on 11th January 2005: “Ukraine is a key partner for the European Union. I very much look forward to working closely with you to deepen and intensify our relations”.

Fourth, Solana was the primary architect of the “Road Map for Peace” (2003)- produced by the Quartet of the EU, US, UN and the Russian Federation - which set out actions needed toward a resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Within the effective multilateralism framework, an article in Politico (2003) argues that this was probably the major triumph for EU foreign policy under Solana`s period.

Finally, he played a major role in the formulation of the European Security Strategy (ESS) in 2003, which was to become an essential steering document for the EU in the years to come. This strategy emphasized the need for a multilateral and global approach to security in Europe and throughout the world. Whereas the Bush administration focused on a pre-emptive strike security doctrine, the ESS focused on effective multilateralism Council of the EU 2003).

To sum up, it can be affirmed that Javier Solana increased the visibility and effectiveness of the CFSP, as showed above, but Solana`s diplomatic skills were not sufficient to overcome all hurdles facing EU foreign policy, thus “never succeeded in becoming a genuine motor” of the CFSP/CSDP (Howorth 2014: 40)

3.2.1. The Convention on the Future of Europe

An extensive restructuring of the EU institutions was somehow foreseen under the discussions of the Constitutional Treaty which began with the “Future of Europe” debate, thus set in motion by the European Council in 2000 and fostered by the meeting in Laeken (Laeken Declaration) intended to establish a “Convention on the Future of Europe” (European Council 2001). The working group was represented by representatives of national governments, members of national parliaments, the European Parliament, the Commission, thirteen candidate countries and observers from other institutions. This working group recognized that together the EU member states could achieve much more on the international realm than alone (Bache et al. 2015: 172-173).

Balfour (2015: 33) observes that the main disagreement lied on whether the HR for CFSP should become part of the Commission, or whether it should be associated to the member states through the Council. However, the Treaty set principles and objectives of EU external action, the competences and legal responsibilities of the EU in external representation, and the decision mechanisms of the European Council. What is more, these negotiations led to the creation of both “Union Minister for Foreign Affairs” – whose name did not survive – and the European External Action Service (EEAS). Javier Solana, together with Chris Patten – European Commissioner for External Relations at the time – worked on a report which outlined some of the characteristics of the Service: its *suis generis* nature not as an institution, its role to assist the Minister, the effort to avoid duplication with the services of the Commission and the Council’s Secretariat, the potential resource represented in the EU Delegations (Ibid: 34).

The Convention produced a single text of a Treaty on the European Constitution and presented its draft to the Thessaloniki European Council in June 2003. Negotiation of the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) opened in September 2003 where some of the proposals were amended, but the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe was signed by the heads of government and the EU Foreign Ministers in October 2004 in Rome. The Treaty establishing a Constitution of Europe was rejected by the French and Dutch referendum. Hence, the ratification of this Treaty failed and the European Council of June 2005 called for a period of reflection (Balfour 2015: 33). As Balfour (2015: 34) observes, after this reflection period, the EU started new negotiations that led to a new Treaty, the Treaty of Lisbon (ToL 2012). In theory, the EEAS existed, but due to the French and Dutch rejections by referendum of the Constitutional Treaty in 2005, the discussion on the practicalities of establishing the Service started only when the ToL was finally approved and entered into force in 2009.

3.3. A stronger EU foreign policy capacity: The Lisbon Treaty

The role of the European Union as a global actor in the international system has always been a central part of the European integration process and continuous efforts have been made to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of the EU’s foreign policy. As Keukeleire and Delreux (2014: 56-57) note, the September 11 terrorist attacks and the Iraq and Afghanistan wars provided additional motivations to strengthen the EU’s foreign policy ambitions and capacities as well as the European integration project.

The Treaty of Lisbon was signed by the EU member states on 13 December 2007 and entered into force on 1 December 2009. For the sake of this thesis, it is worth mentioning that the Treaty of Lisbon (ToL 2012) comprises both the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TEFU). Even though these two treaties are separated from a legal perspective, together they are called as the Treaty of Lisbon (Keukeleire & Delreux 2014: 14). While the TEU includes the main provisions for the CFSP and CSDP, the TEFU includes the main provision on the UE's external action and the external dimensions of internal policies (Ibid: 15). Also, the ToL has been revised in several occasions since entering into force in 2009, hence when referring to the Treaty of Lisbon in this thesis, I refer to the 26 October 2012 Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Function of the European Union (ToL 2012).

The ToL introduced three major institutional innovations: The President of the European Council; the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and vice President of the Commission (HR/VP); and the European External Action Service (EEAS).

The Article 15 (6) of the ToL (2012) introduces the position of President of the European Council – also further examined in Chapter 4 - becoming the first major innovation in this Treaty. The six-monthly rotating presidency of the EU had been perceived as somehow counterproductive, especially in the area of foreign and security policy. The intention with the rotating presidency was to give all the EU Member States experience in leading the EU project, but this intention resulted in internal incoherence, confusion, erratic policy shifts and external lack of understanding (Howorth 2013: 14). According to the ToL, the European Council elects its President by a qualified majority for a term of two and a half years, renewable once, and the President's main functions are to “facilitate cohesion and consensus” within the Council, and to “ensure the external representation of the Union on issues concerning its common foreign and security policy” (Council of the EU 2009).

The second major innovation in the Post-Lisbon architecture was the creation of the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and vice President of the Commission (HR/VP). This topic will be further deepened on Chapter 5, therefore, the purpose here is to provide a general introduction. This new “triple-hatted” figure entails actually three distinct responsibilities. First, the HR is responsible for CFSP and CSDP. Secondly, the HR is also Vice President of the Commission, which means that it coordinates the other Commissioners

in charge of external relations. Thirdly, the HR/VP chairs the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC), replacing the rotating Presidency of the EU (Balfour 2015: 35).

Howorth (2014: 55-62) addresses three main reasons that explain the introduction or upgrading of this key institutional position in the EU's foreign and security policy. The first was the need for better coordination and integration of the foreign and security policies of the EU's Member States. The second reason was the need for synergies between the main drives of CFSP/CSDP: trade, development aid, humanitarian assistance and crisis management. The final reason was the growing recognition by the EU Member States the need for a centralized decision-shaping agencies. This is also in line with one of the core elements – relevance – of Jørgensen, Oberthür, and Shahin (2013: 6) when measuring EU's performance in international affairs. The upgrading of this key actor allowed the EU to determine who represents and coordinates the foreign policy of the EU.

The Lisbon Treaty sought to introduce coherence in EU foreign policy by entrusting one individual with responsibilities at the top level across the board of much of the EU's external action. The HR/VP's first major priority was the establishing of the European External Action Service (EEAS), something that Catherine Ashton succeeded relatively well (Howorth 2014: 55-62).

3.3.1. The EEAS: An European diplomatic corps in the making

The third, and probably the most innovative reform in the Lisbon Treaty is the establishment, to the benefit of the HR/VP, of the EEAS. This section will address the negotiations on the establishment of this Service and the key actors that were involved in this process. With regards to the EEAS' internal organization, functions, staff, and structure, they will be further deepened and examined under Chapter 4.

Regarding the creation of this new body, the ToL stipulates the following:

In fulfilling his mandate, the High Representative shall be assisted by a European External Action Service. This service shall work in cooperation with the diplomatic services of the Member States and shall comprise officials from relevant departments of the General Secretariat of the Council and of the Commission as well as staff seconded from national diplomatic services of the Member States (Article 27 (3) of the ToL 2012)

The negotiations on the establishment of the EEAS were the outcome of an inter-institutional bargaining struggle between the following actors: the then 27 member states, the Council

Secretariat, the European Commission (EC), and the European Parliament (EP). In order to solve the “old” controversy between supranationalism and intergovernmentalism, the Swedish Presidency issued a report approved by the European Council that the EEAS would be a service of *suis generis* nature, in other words, separated from the Commission and the Council Secretariat (Duke 2008: 6).

The member states – particularly the big ones – have sought to counter the attempts from the Commission to take control of the EEAS. The member states initial positions were distrustful of this new body. While the smaller member states and the new member states claimed for a fair representation of all nationalities, at all levels, in order to avoid that the EEAS could be converted into a “directoire” of the big powers, the big member states – The United Kingdom, France, and Germany – have attempted to grab key positions within the future service (Balfour 2015: 41). Indeed, and in line with Balfour (2015: 41) observations, the national positions have delimited the perimeter action for the EEAS, where the main work focus of this Service in the first months was to ensure a good level of cooperation between Brussels and the European capitals.

The Council of the EU, through its permanent General Secretariat of the Council (GSC), is one of the main decision-making bodies of the EU (see Chapter 4). Before 2009, the role of the President was performed by the Head of State or government of the member state currently holding the Presidency of the Council of the European Union (rotating presidency) (Keukeleire & Delreux 2014: 66). When the Lisbon Treaty entered into force in 2009, the Spanish Presidency of the EU had aspiration to “upload” its ambitions and strategies towards Latin America and Mediterranean countries, but it had to adapt to the new constitutional framework and let Mr. Van Rompuy preside over the European Council, thus tone down its ambitions. Pending the establishment of the Service, the Spanish officials still managed to chair several preparatory bodies in the Council, in the Political and Security committee (Lefebvre & Hillion 2010: 3-4). Moreover, when setting up the EEAS proposal, Spain was represented in the team of diplomats and senior Commission and Council officials (Ibid: 4). The EEAS proposal, also known as the Ashton Proposal (Ibid: 5), outlined *inter alia* the *suis generis* placement of the EEAS, its role, staff, structure, and recruitment (further examined in Chapter 4).

As for the Commission, it sought to ensure a strong influence of the Commission over this new Service. According to Dialer (2014: 50-52) two elements confirm this argument. Firstly, former HR/VP Catherine Ashton (2009-2014) came from the Commission, where she worked as Trade

Commissioner. Secondly, Barroso's former Head of Cabinet, João Vale D` Almeida was appointed as Director General of DG Relex. In line with what Keukeleire and Delreux (2014: 73-74) argue, the Commission was – and still is – eager to control important aspects of EU external relation, mainly with respect for enlargement and neighbourhood policy, development policy, as well as humanitarian aid and trade. This might reveal that the Commission wants to keep control over crucial aspects of the EU external relations, in particular where the EU exercises its strongest influence (EU's actorness).

As to the European Parliament (EP), the draft decision on the setting up of the EEAS was found not acceptable by the EP's rapporteurs, Elmar Brok, Guy Verhofstadt, Hannes Swoboda, and Rebecca Harms and Daniel Cohn-Bendit (Elmar Brok 2010). According to its rapporteurs, the proposal needed several changes so that the EP could be able to carry forward the required modifications of the Staff and Financial Regulation. Regarding funding and budget issues, the EP had a firm position because it supported the incorporation of the EEAS into the Commission's structure mainly for budgetary reasons. The rapporteurs decided to deliver an alternative proposal where they described the purpose, the architecture, the staff and the new organizational structure of the EEAS (European Parliament 2010a). Even though the EP did not succeed in imposing all its views and demands, some concessions were given and a compromise was reached. Some of the most key concessions earned were the budgetary control over the EEAS, the right to be informed on CFSP/CSDP developments, and to be consulted on the launching of new CSDP missions (Council of the EU 2010).

The main questions arise: will the creation of the EEAS lead to a more coherent and effective EU foreign policy? Will it manage to be the coordinator role of the EU foreign policy in cooperation with both the key EU institutions and the Member States? Without pretending to give an answer to these questions, and after so many modifications in the EU treaties, the ToL, and particularly the establishment of the EEAS, has created high expectations to provide the EU with the institutional capacities to address the shortcomings as key actor in the international arena. Nevertheless, these innovations mentioned above are intended to support the EU to strengthen its global actorness, but whether it has strengthened the coherence and effectiveness of EU foreign policy, the following two chapters will attempt to provide an answer.

3.4. Summary

This chapter has presented the significant progress that has happened in developing EU foreign policy. Moreover, it shows how the roots of today's discussions regarding EU foreign policy, along with its basic features, can be found in the recent debates and policy choices. From a pre-Lisbon European foreign policy, it can be said that the EU had neither adequate instruments, political ambitions nor sufficient resources to strengthen EU's position on the international scene. Essentially, EU foreign policy has always been a contested matter, reflecting the *suis generis* nature of the EU as a key international actor.

The Lisbon Treaty has created a hybrid model of foreign policy, but does not modify the fact that major EU foreign policy decisions are negotiated intergovernmentally and the EU has – and will continue to do so – managed to overcome challenges of policy coherence and institutional complexity. The Lisbon Treaty aimed exactly to strengthen the coherence and efficiency of the EU's foreign policy, and it was the result of long and hard negotiations. The establishment (upgrading) of the position of the HR/VP, the President of the European Council and the creation of the EEAS are all innovations which support the EU on its way to global actorness.

The Lisbon Treaty created high expectations for a more coherent and efficient foreign policy, particularly with the institutional innovations mentioned above. Moreover, while improving the EU's external efficiency and international representation (see Chapter 5), the innovations also created more confusion regarding the relationship and division of labour between the various key actors involved in the EU's foreign policy (see Chapter 4).

4. A NEW STAGE FOR EU FOREIGN POLICY: INTRODUCING THE EEAS

The purpose of this Chapter is to present the unique position of the EEAS within the EU institutional framework. By comprising personnel with three different backgrounds, the EEAS is often defined as a *suis generis* and *interstitial organization*.

This chapter also addresses the primary task of the Service: to coordinate – vertically and horizontally – the EU's foreign policy. Concerning vertical coordination, the EEAS can be perceived as an opportunity and solution from an efficiency perspective for the Member States. With regards to horizontal coordination, it will examine the relationship between the EEAS and the Commission, the European Council, and the Council of the EU.

I will also address the existence and development of an *esprit de corps* as a crucial element to enhance the effectiveness of the EEAS, thus improving the coherence of the whole EU foreign policy-making structure.

Furthermore, factors such as leadership, communication, trust, public image, training, and career prospects will be examined because they all have the potential to foster and promote an organizational *esprit de corps*.

4.1. The *suis generis* nature of the EEAS

As mentioned in the previous chapter, the creation of the EEAS was a product of a tough bargaining between the Member States, the Council Secretariat, the Commission, and the Parliament. The outcome was a *suis generis* service or body. The political and economic context in which the EEAS started to operate was not easy. Also, the Arab Spring in 2011, the economic crisis, and tensions within the euro zone contributed to a difficult start.

The EEAS could be conceptualized as an *interstitial organization*:

(...) an organization that emerges in interstices between various organizational fields and recombining physical, informational, financial, legal and legitimacy resources stemming from organization belonging to these different organizational fields (Bátora 2013: 599).

He argues that this status leads, firstly to conflicting organizational principles and practices within the organization of the Service, secondly, conflicting sets of expectations in relation to the EEAS internally and externally.

The EEAS has a unique position within the EU institutional framework consisting of the Commission, the Parliament, and the Member States, and that this special nature of the Service can be used “to promote the strategic direction of the EU’s external action” (EEAS 2013: 7). The EEAS Review (EEAS 2013) was prepared by both the HR/VP and the EEAS. It makes a total of 26 short-term and nine medium-term recommendations in order to “be a catalyst to bring together the foreign policies of Member States and strengthen the position of the EU in the world” (Ibid: 2).

This specific nature of the Service “increased compartmentalization and policy segmentation, and created a complex and highly formalized division of competence between the Commission and the EEAS” (Carta & Duke 2015: 57). What is more, a study that analyzed the organization and function of the EEAS (Wouters et al. 2013: 20) comprising interviews with employees coming from the EEAS, Union Delegations, the Council, EC and Member States, argues that the *suis generis* placement of the EEAS between the Commission and the Council was a mistake. It was considered a mistake because it gave the perception that the Commission had lost its powers while the EU Member States felt that this new Service would compete with their national diplomacies.

Furthermore, the Service lacks a final word over most of the EU’s external relations tools, mainly because the Commission is at the heart of the EU’s external action and involved in all stages of policy-making, with the exception of CFSP/CSDP (Keukeleire & Delreux 2014: 73-75).

Hence, the result was a *suis generis* body with inherent ambiguities and complexities. What is more, this complexity led “to an environment of mistrust and skepticism” (Ramopoulos & Odermatt 2013: 32). Also, in addition to improving coordination and coherence, one of the major challenges of the EEAS will be to “ensure that the rest of the world pays attention” (Howorth 2014: 67). This is in line with what Balfour and Raik (2013a: 61) argue, that the EEAS needs to become the EU’s internal motor and worldwide interface to address the current Europe’s global decline. In order to do so, the EEAS shall ensure the coherence and better coordination of the EU’s foreign policy. From Hill’s (1993) perspective, the creation of the EEAS is one of the suggested solutions to close the gap: establishing a single, effective foreign

policy. According to Hill (1993: 315), this would require major changes within the EC (now EU), particularly in taking decisions regarding to high politics, thus imposing the necessary resources and instruments to support those decisions.

4.2. The EEAS “Coherence Mandate”

Since the early days of the European integration, the need for more policy coherence has been a hot topic. Regarding foreign policy, it has considerably developed since the European Political Cooperation (1973), over the Maastricht (1993), Amsterdam (1999), Nice (2003) and Lisbon (2009) Treaties. This is an area where the EU may find it more challenging to become an important player, opposed to areas *inter alia* trade, finance, development, energy (Smith 2013: 114-115).

Policy coherence has for many years been prominent in the literature of the EU foreign policy, emphasizing the need for coordination and consistency (Lequesne 2015b: 358). Also (Koehler 2010: 58) stresses that coherence “is a necessary precondition for the efficacy of foreign policy not only of the EU but of all international actors”.

Keukeleire and Delreux (2014) argue that:

lack of consistency in EU external policies is detrimental to the EU’s capacity to present a coherent message in international politics and undermines its credibility as an international actor as well as its ability to achieve specific foreign policy goals (Keukeleire & Delreux 2014: 113).

This “claim” for coherence or consistency in the EU external policies assumed significant relevance in the post–Cold War international realm. Within this context, Duke (1999: 2) observed the following: firstly, the emergence of the three pillar structure in 1993; secondly, the development of the Union calls for the development of institutional mechanisms to ensure consistency at both European and national levels; thirdly, the end of the Cold War; fourthly, the increased overlapping between the EU’s pillars; fifthly, the encouragement from the USA for the EU to develop the ESDI, leading the EU Member States to act more consistently within the UN and NATO frameworks; and finally, the increasing development of strategies and partnerships in other regions of the world.

As Thomas (2012) notes:

Coherence may be necessary for the EU to exert its influence abroad, but it clearly is not sufficient in a multi-centric world order where many others do not share the EU's collective policy preferences and are ready to deploy vast resources in pursuit of their goals (Thomas 2012: 457).

This demand for coherence is stated in Article 21 (3) under the General provisions on the Union's external action and specific provisions on the common foreign and security policy:

The Union shall ensure consistency between the different areas of its external action and between these and its other policies. The Council and the Commission, assisted by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, shall ensure that consistency and shall cooperate to that effect (ToL 2012).

Furthermore, this complex system of political and bureaucratic actors with distinctive competences and resources is well defined in Article 27 (3):

In fulfilling his mandate, the High Representative shall be assisted by a European External Action Service. This service shall work in cooperation with the diplomatic services of the Member States and shall comprise officials from relevant departments of the General Secretariat of the Council and of the Commission as well as staff seconded from national diplomatic services of the Member States (ToL 2012).

Hence, the EEAS is the Service linking the Member States, the Commission, the European Council, and the Council, and the centre of coordination among them. As Furness (2010: 19) puts it: "policy coherence relies heavily on coordination among actors". Coordination is not possible without a clear understanding of the objectives of each actor. Within EU foreign policy, these two processes are known as vertical and horizontal coherence (Lequesne 2015a: 46).

4.2.1. Vertical coherence: The EEAS and Member States

Vertical coherence addresses the overall consensus between policies agreed at the EU level and the policies pursued by the Member States. This determines whether the EU is able to "speak with one voice", which means influence and recognition in international relations. The EEAS is often perceived as the 29th foreign service that brings added value to European diplomacy (Balfour & Raik 2013a: 33).

The EEAS can bring added value to the Member States at two different levels: first, at a political level. The EEAS and also the EU provide added value “through empowerment and multiplying effect gained by member states through acting together and speaking with one voice”. Second, the EEAS` potential in carrying out some tasks that either can complement or replace the work of the Member States (Balfour & Raik 2013a: 34).

Regarding the political level, the relationship between the EEAS – and the EU more broadly – varies from the concepts “uploading”, “downloading”, “offloading,” and “cherry picking” (Ibid). While the two first concepts were introduced in Chapter 2, the “offloading” and “cherry picking” provided the author a new perspective on the relationship between the national and European foreign policies. “Offloading” means that Member States are unable or unwilling to cover all areas of international relations, while “cherry picking” signifies that some Member States use the EU to achieve the best possible gains.

For small and medium-sized Member States, the uploading concept is seen as a considerable multiplying potential. For a small country like Slovenia comprising only 37 embassies (see Table 2. in Chapter 5), the EEAS may be able to advance its own strategic foreign policy objectives (Gropas, Lange, & Tzogopoulos 2015: 173). On the other hand, countries such as Poland and Sweden as successful countries in uploading national objectives into European objectives, referring to their initiative in establishing the European Institute of Peace (2014) (Balfour & Raik 2013a: 34).

Big Member States such as France perceive the EEAS as a Power Multiplier. It emphasizes that the objective with the establishment of the EEAS was to bring coherence to the EU`s foreign policy and to make Europe more visible in the international realm (Terpan 2015: 96-97). As Terpan (2015: 106) puts it: Paris`s support of the EEAS results from the balance between costs (in terms of losses in national sovereignty) and benefits (financial, or in terms of influence and prestige).

Regarding the downloading process, Balfour and Raik (2013a: 35) refer to Germany as “the most adaptive among the big member states and ready to accept further limitations to national sovereignty”. Even though Germany has objective beyond European borders, it has always been a strong supporter of European foreign policy, where its positions on foreign policy issues usually reflect the middle ground among the EU Member States (Adebahr 2015: 108). Also, countries that were granted EU membership in 2004 have moved from not having a foreign

policy at all, to having a foreign policy that amplifies certain national foreign policy goals through the EEAS framework (Balfour & Raik 2013a: 35).

When it comes to the “cherry-picking” concept, the UK is often linked to this concept. As Fiott (2015: 77) puts it: “the UK’s foreign policy must be understood within the prism of the country’s global and European roles”. The combination of its EU membership, its permanent seat on the UN Security Council, its nuclear and military powers, its global diplomatic reach, and its financial power as a centre of global financial transactions makes it a European power. Balfour and Raik (2013a: 36) argue that the UK is unsure whether the EEAS has the capabilities to either promote the British interests or to increase the EU’s influence internationally. Nevertheless, the UK sees the EU-Iran negotiations, the EU’s sanctions against Syria and the EU’s role in the Horn of Africa as beneficial to its national positions (Ibid).

The “offloading” concept relates to issues that are formally high on the agenda of both the EU and its Member States, but where the latter simply moves the burden to the EU level. In democracy and human rights issues, the Member States tend to use the EU as a protective shield in cases where other parties do not appreciate the EU promoting and addressing values, and principles such as democracy, the rule of law and human rights (Balfour & Raik 2013a: 37-38). But also within these issues, Keukeleire and Delreux (2014: 143) note that, both the EU and its Member States have been losing their legitimacy in expressing such values and principles due their “double standards” or inconsistent applications of human rights and democracy standards.

Regarding the second level - developing structures of practical burden-sharing and materializing the potential of the Service - Balfour and Raik (2013a: 37) note that there is much to be done. Only Germany and Poland have not suffered cuts in their diplomacy budgets, but all the other Member States have restructured, rationalized and downsized their Ministries of Foreign Affairs. According to (Balfour & Raik 2013b: 6), none of these changes were a consequence of the EEAS, even though taking into account the potentials benefits of joint action that the EEAS could provide.

Similar to the potentials that the EU Delegations have in providing added value to the Member States – see Chapter 5 – so can the EEAS provide added value to the Member States and their Ministries of Foreign Affairs, particularly at times of austerity and where there is a need for efficiency.

Regarding efficiency, there are reasons for transferring some functions of national diplomacies to the EEAS, for instance, having just one large EU Delegation representing the EU as a whole, as well as centralizing some consular services in the EU in order to cover the labour costs of consular services. Even though some Member States value reporting from the EEAS, they still not consider the idea that the EEAS could replace the work of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs (Balfour & Raik 2013a: 37-38). Unsurprisingly, Gropas, Lange, and Tzogopoulos (2015: 180) note that Greece has turned to the EEAS to complement its diplomatic services when they were severely affected by the economic and financial crisis. What is more, if this trend of downsizing continues, it is expected that other Member States such as Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Latvia, and Portugal will start to look at the EEAS with other eyes.

Since many of the Member States are still getting used to the existence of the EEAS and its potential, the main argument of the Member States to still resist the transfer of functions from the national to the European level is that the EEAS “is too weak and too new as an institution to be able to take over any tasks from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs” (Balfour & Raik 2013a: 38). Moreover, when addressing the budget and personnel of the EEAS compared to other Member States, the EEAS resources are still limited, thus Member States are yet reluctant in transferring some of their resources to the European level (Ibid).

This is much in line with one of the core elements of organizational performance provided by Jørgensen, Oberthür, and Shahin (2013): financial/resource viability. Within this context, the EEAS will need to increase its resources in order to add more value to the Member States, thus increasing its efficiency.

The EEAS can actually be perceived as an opportunity and solution from an efficiency perspective for the Member States to “do more with less”, but as long as the Member States retain their national sovereignty, and are “against” transferring of such resources, the capabilities of the EEAS remain limited.

This limitation is more visible within international organizations. One relevant example is the role and presence of the EU at the UN system (Lequesne 2015a: 52). According to Duke (2012):

the question of the Union’s cohesion in the UN Security Council is largely subject to the extent to which the two permanent EU members, France, and the United Kingdom, represent national positions or common positions of the Union where they have been defined (Duke 2012: 17).

In the past, there were two possible ways for the EU to “speak” at the UN Security Council: first, by the country holding the rotating presidency; second, the HR could address the UN Security Council after the agreement of all members of the UN Security Council (Blavoukos & Bourantonis 2013: 135). Even though the EU has no representation at the UN Security Council, the Article 34 of the ToL allows the HR/VP to present the EU’s position whenever there is a subject on the United Nations Security Council agenda.

The EU acquired observer status at the UN General Assembly (1974) (Assembly, U. G 2011). Empirical evidence shows that there is a higher degree of coherence agreement of the EU Member States positions at the UN General Assembly than at the UN Security Council. A relevant example is during the crisis in Libya, where in June 2011, both France and the United Kingdom voted for creating a “no fly zone” and calling for an immediate ceasefire in Libya, while Germany, who has the status of a non-permanent member at the UN Security Council, had abstained on Resolution 1973 (The United Nations 2011). As Lequesne (2013: 83) noted “the national rationale has prevailed”, in this case, where the coordination role of the HR/VP and EEAS failed to reach an agreement between the different positions of the larger EU Member States. Also, Jørgensen, Oberthür, and Shahin (2013) stressed the connection between relevance and performance. Within the UN Security Council, it can be argued that the EU’s stakeholders – France and the UK - see no relevance in speaking at “one voice” together with the EU, thus EU’s performance at the UN Security Council is low.

This view is also in line with what Smith (2013: 122) observed, that “when EU member states do agree on a common position, the EU can face considerable opposition – and even hostility”, hence undermining the coherence of the EU.

But there have also been stories of success regarding grand bargains of the EEAS. Perhaps the most successful story *per* today is the agreement on the Iran nuclear issue. According to Posch (2013: 187), “the EU has been the driving force” behind the Iran deal, ensuring its place as a primary actor on the international scene (Ibid).

My interviewee (Interview 2016) observed that Federica Mogherini (HR/VP), together with the United Kingdom, France, Germany, China, Russia, USA, and Iran have reached a historical agreement. In my interviewee words:

the EU was asked to take on the facilitating role here, and I think we have delivered...and I think it has also shown that in certain places the EU has a specific distinctive role to play (Interview 2016).

This is in line with what Hill (1993 p. 312-15) suggested: in order to strengthen its role in the international scene, the EU shall be a regional pacifier and a global intervener. Moreover, for the gap to be closed over time, Hill (1993) mentioned *inter alia* that the EU would have to establish a single, effective policy, thus imposing the necessary resources and instruments to support those decisions. This is exactly what the EU did with the creation of the EEAS. Also, the EU has also increased its capabilities in creating a new foreign policy structure, thus creating greater expectations to ensure better vertical and horizontal coherence.

4.2.2. Horizontal coherence: The EEAS and the EU's foreign policy key actors

Horizontal coherence refers to the coherence and division of labor between the policies formulated across the EU's policy-making structure. The horizontal coherence or coordination between the EEAS and the Commission is the one that comprises the most bureaucratic transactions (Lequesne 2013: 81). What is more, a crucial aspect of coordination between these policies takes place within the EEAS (Balfour & Raik 2013a: 18).

As mentioned above, the number of the Commission's competences has been continuously growing and currently the Commission regulates a wide range of policy areas. Lequesne (2013: 81) points out that the aid programs are managed by the Directorate-General for Development and Cooperation (DEVCO) as well as other Directorate Generals (DGs). Each of these has staff in the EU Delegations. Cooperation and humanitarian aid policies are very often coordinated with CFSP, which is under the authority of the EEAS. Both the EEAS and the Commission through DEVCO, want to keep their formal competences in order to preserve their interests and on account of their interests. This lack of a clear separation of competencies between Cooperation and humanitarian aid policies and CFSP can lead to interinstitutional tensions. As Carta (2013: 93) acknowledges: "The necessity to guarantee a viable coordination of all EU services dealing with external relations is not new for the EU". For example, DG Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (DG ECHO) has offices all over the world that work independently of the EEAS and thus sees itself as the responsible actor for coordinating the humanitarian aid (Lequesne 2015b: 359).

In the aftermath of the earthquake in Haiti in 2010, the EU was criticized for revealing a lack of coordination and visibility. In response to this criticism, the HR/VP created the post of

Managing Director for Crisis Response and Operational Coordination (Ashton 2013). Unsurprisingly, DG ECHO saw the creation of this post as “encroaching on its own area of competence” (Helwig et al. 2013: 41). Even though DG ECHO sees itself as the legitimate actor in coordinating the EU humanitarian instruments, the role of the HR/VP is to “ensure overall political coordination of the Union’s external action”. Hence, internal tensions can rise when competences overlap between the Commission and the EEAS (Ibid).

Despite interinstitutional tension, Helwig et al. (2013: 41-42) observe that it now seems to exist a better horizontal coordination. In cases of humanitarian crises, for example, natural disasters, DG ECHO takes the lead, while in cases that imply stronger political and security measures, coordination role is conducted by the HR/VP.

The relationship between the EEAS and the Commission is complex (Wouters et al. 2013: 56). To enhance the coordination between these two actors in European foreign policy, Wouters et al. (2013: 57) provided some recommendations, *inter alia* the greater use of the Vice-President (VP) function of the HR/VP. As further discussed in Chapter 5, the VP function remains very limited, not only because of a busy schedule, thus the need for deputisation, but because “most of the Commissioners are not naturally inclined to accept the HR/VP’s coordination” (Ibid: 53).

My second research question refers to what extent has the EEAS enabled the EU to pursue a more coherent and effective common foreign policy. Thus, when looking back at the establishment and further organization of the EEAS, one could not expect fully implemented good relations and cooperation between the EEAS and the Commission. However, since the EEAS comprises officials with background from the Commission, it can be expected that cooperation will improve over time. What is more, if the EEAS were transferred some policy areas which are still under the Commission, then the EU could increase its potential in the coherence of the external relations.

Within the European foreign policy-cycle, two other EU actors intervene in the foreign policy-structure of the EU: The European Council and the Council of the European Union. These are two distinctive actors within the EU, as well as in their relationship with the EEAS

With regards to the European Council, it is important to note that it cannot be considered as an executive actor because it can neither negotiate nor adopt laws. Nevertheless, it is included here because of the important functions it executes concerning political lead and external representation (Keukeleire & Delreux 2014: 63). It brings together the heads of state and

government of the 28 Member States, the President of the European Commission, and the European Council President. Whenever foreign and security policy issues are discussed, the HR/VP takes part in European Council meetings.

In the post-Lisbon period, and according to article 15 of the ToL (2012), the European Council and its President have the job to ensure the external representation of the EU on issues related to CFSP matters. The role of the President of the European Council (two-and-a-half-year term renewable only once) is to represent the EU internationally at the level of Heads of State and Government. At the ministerial level, it is the HR/VP that represents the EU (Keukeleire & Delreux 2014: 65).

Even though this division of labour, in theory, is more visible, Keukeleire and Delreux (2014: 65) observe that the introduction of this actor in the post-Lisbon period neither did bring additional competences nor powers. Moreover, and since it concentrates the highest Member States authorities, the Member States will continue to defend their national interests. Given the external visibility of the European Council meetings as they confer both legitimacy and visibility to the EU, even when Member States have different meanings on an issue, the “European” approach prevails (Ibid: 65-66).

Regarding the cooperation between the HR/VP and the European Council, the level of cooperation is positive (Wouters et al. 2013: 35). It was concluded that there is a satisfactory level of cooperation between the EEAS and the European Council. A good example was the role of information provider by the European Council to the Heads of Delegation (Ibid: 36).

The other relevant actor in shaping the EU foreign policy is The Council of the European Union, also known as The Council. It is the main decision-making body in EU foreign policy, both politically and legally, particularly regarding the CFSP/CSDP framework. In practice and to further complicate the horizontal coordination, the rotating Presidency – in every six months - represents the EU externally when external dimensions of internal policies are discussed. It also chairs all other Council configurations with the exception of the newly established Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) – chaired by the HR/VP (see Chapter 5).

Nevertheless, the primary Council configuration for the policy-making of the EU foreign policy is the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC). The FAC is chaired by the HR/VP, except when trade issues are discussed and comprises both the Member States` foreign ministers (Keukeleire & Delreux 2014: 66). The FAC is at the heart of the policy-making of the EU foreign policy, where most of the decisions are taken at a lower level in the Council, thus, the EU “is struggling

to live up to the expectations” (Ibid: 68). This does not come as a shock, as the agenda often includes a huge number of issues to be discussed, but also a great number of participants (the HR/VP, ministers, senior diplomats and advisers from the Member States, EEAS officials, and many others) attend these meetings. As a result, there is limited time for everyone to express their views and positions, and for all the issues to be discussed. Hence, informal meetings have gained importance to discuss views and positions for all the parties involved (Ibid).

If this post-Lisbon structure dealing with the foreign policy was already complicated, the General Secretariat of the Council (GSC) also has a key role in the relationship between the EEAS and The Council. The GSC assists both the European Council and the Council of the EU (The Council). The role of the GSC is to “organize and ensure the coherence of the Council’s work” (Ibid).

With regards to the relationship between the EEAS and the GSC, it was observed as “not very cooperative” (Wouters et al. 2013: 44). Wouters et al. (2013: 44) argue in their study that this relationship can be challenging due to the obligations of the EEAS to support the HR/VP in her role as President of the FAC “without prejudice to the normal tasks of the GSC” and that both the HR and the EEAS are to be assisted “where necessary by the GSC”. These two formulations do not add clarity to the relationship between these two actors. Feedback from the EEAS notes that the EEAS does not receive any assistance for the Council Legal Service. It is also noted that there is no communication between the GSC and the Delegations, which from an EEAS perspective can be regarded as a problem. My interviewee (Interview 2016) explained that even though there is no direct communication between the EEAS and the Council because “of the way the Institution works”, cooperation is argued to be “fine”. Nevertheless, regarding the cooperation between the EEAS and the Council, it was concluded that cooperation is positive (Wouters et al. 2013: 44).

With regards to horizontal coordination, although the cooperation between the EEAS and the Commission has potential to improve, the relationship is still complex because many of the competences overlap in terms of overall EU foreign policy. Regarding the relationship between the EEAS and the European Council, and The Council, it can be argued to be more positive when compared to the EEAS – Commission relationship. With the entering into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the division of labour between the EU’s foreign policy actors had become complicated, particularly with the introduction of “a complicated structure of EU presidencies”, thus increasing the complexity of foreign policy coordination (Carta 2013: 91-94).

When issues become relevant and need to be addressed, some major questions pop up: How should the EU be represented in multilateral institutions? How should national policies be coordinated? Which methods of delegation should be employed? Regardless of who represents the EU, representation involves delegation to allow the EU to speak with one voice, and providing the EU with more autonomy and recognition (Jørgensen, Oberthür, & Shahin (2013: 7). It is not possible for all these actors to represent the EU on equal footing (Ibid).


Overall, it is clear that the EEAS – and the EU more broadly – are aware of the needs of a joined-up approach to increase the EU’s relevance in the world and to face the increasingly interdependent, complex and globalized challenges.

4.3. Structure and organization

The EEAS has its Headquarters in Brussels. Outside the Headquarters, it comprises 139 EU Delegations (further analyzed in Chapter 5) in non-member countries and in international organizations. While much happens in Brussels, the “EU Delegations are potentially a huge strategic asset for the European Union and the achievement of a more coherent, visible and effective external action” (Helly et al. 2014).

The Council Decision of 26 July 2010 establishing the organization and functioning of the EEAS (Council of the EU 2010) outlined the manner in which the central administration of the Service would be organized (see Table 1. below).

Table 1. Central Administration of the EEAS in 2010



Source: Author’s own.

Since the establishment of the EEAS in 2010, the organization of the EEAS have been subjected to various revisions (see Annex 1.). On 28 July 2015, the HR/VP announced a new organizational structure of the EEAS (EEAS 2015b). In the words of Mogherini, these organizational changes allow the EEAS to:

become a more effective organization, apt to deal with the many challenges that we are confronted with. I hope that with these structural improvements, the performance of the service as a whole will be enhanced. I do realise very well that the success of the EEAS depends on our ability to work together efficiently and rapidly, with a true sense of teamwork and with clear structures and reporting lines (EEAS 2015b).

These challenges were related mainly to top-down administrative models and the apparent lack of communication from the same direction (Carta & Duke 2015: 59). As Schmidt (2015) points out “communication is a key element of diplomatic activity” and that “the EU needs effective communication at all levels for the implementation of a meaningful diplomacy”.

Just six years after the establishment of the EEAS, Mogherini introduced a new organization of the EEAS to improve the service`s organization and functioning, but at the time of writing, there is not enough empirical evidence to make an evaluation whether these modifications have turned the Service into a more effective organization.

4.4. Staffing the EEAS: Building a new *esprit de corps*?

The EEAS personnel are an amalgamation of three groups of officials (Lequesne 2015a: 46):

- 1) Commission civil servants coming from the former Directorate General for External Relations (DG RELEX), the former Commission delegations and a few from the Directorate General for Development and Cooperation (DG DEVCO);
- 2) Civil servants from the General Secretariat of the Council;
- 3) Diplomats from the national ministries of foreign affairs.

Although article 27 of the ToL (2012) was not very informative concerning the composition of the EEAS staff, both the Council Decision of 26 July 2010 (Council of the EU 2010) and the Staff Regulations adopted on 26 November 2010 (European Parliament 2010b) established precise guidelines. In line with the Article 7 of the Council Decision (Council of the EU 2010),

it was outlined that until 20 June 2013, the staff of the EEAS would be an amalgamation of the three groups of officials.

Hence, it can be argued that “one of the challenges to the creation of a common culture is the different backgrounds of the EEAS” (Wouters et al. 2013: 24). In this context, common culture relates to whether the establishment of the EEAS has changed the practices, views, values, interests and identity of EU officials.

The study conducted by Juncos and Pomorska (2013: 1344-1345) concluded that the officials working for the EEAS have indeed a higher degree of identification with the EU than to their home countries. Also, the EEAS officials interviewed in that study “showed a strong support for the norms that underpin the EEAS and saw the EEAS as a good thing for EU foreign policy”. My interviewee (Interview 2016) observed that having a myriad of nationalities, administrative and working cultures is “actually a great strength” and that mix of cultures strengthens the organization.

Much of the literature regarding the EEAS raises the question of a new *esprit de corps* resulting from an amalgamation of several identities. In this context, Juncos and Pomorska (2014) provide an interesting analysis whether the development of an *esprit de corps* has either improved or undermined the coherence and effectiveness of the EEAS. In organizational studies, this concept is often associated with key variables such as organizational commitment, propensity to leave, cross-functional co-operation, and productivity. The two latter are closely linked with internal coherence and effectiveness (Ibid: 303). As a result, *esprit de corps* is essential for the EEAS to contribute for a more coherent and effective foreign policy. To better conceptualize *esprit de corps* in this thesis, the organizational studies literature provides a better understanding of the importance of *esprit de corps*.

Boyt et al. (2005: 689) define *esprit de corps* as “an individual level phenomenon resulting from one’s interaction in a group of other individuals (...) that consists of feelings and beliefs the individual holds about the group”. From the EEAS perspective, it is defined “as the emergence of shared beliefs and values among individuals within a group and a desire among those individuals to achieve a goal” (Juncos & Pomorska 2014: 305).

Following Boyt et al. (2005) framework, there are three distinctive categories of *esprit de corps*: organizational; professional; and workgroup. For the sake of this thesis, and to examine the factors that can contribute to the building of a new *esprit de corps*”, the most relevant category is the organizational category. Regarding this category, Boyt et al. (2005: 690) define

it as “the extent to which an individual enthusiastically shares the values and goals of an organization”. There are six elements that contribute to the development of *esprit de corps*: leadership; communication; trust; public image; and training (Ibid: 690-693). I add one more factor: career prospects. Regarding the latter, Juncos and Pomorska (2013) provide a remarkable contribution to understanding the EEAS officials attitudes towards the EEAS and whether it influenced their career prospects.

With regards to leadership, good leaders play an important role in developing *esprit de corps* among their staff and that a main component of effective leadership is “giving the organization goals and norms guiding their work” (Juncos & Pomorska 2014: 308). What is more, Boyt et al. (2005: 690) point out that “the more positive the employee perceptions about the performance of the organizational leader, the higher will be their organizational *esprit de corps*”. Regarding the development of *esprit de corps*, what matters here are the perceptions of the HR/VP’s performance.

During the Ashton period (2009-2014), it was observed *inter alia* that the Service had too many leaders, lack of strategic vision and sense of direction, and needed a politically strong figure at the top of the EEAS (Juncos & Pomorska 2014: 307-308). Also, Ashton played the role of an administrator and coordinator and not of a strategic thinker (Nünlist & Bieri 2015: 2). This is in line with the empirical evidence from Ashton’s first year as the new HR/VP as it was marked by tough negotiations to create and develop the EEAS. Hence, criticism over her lack of leadership does not come as a surprise.

The appointment of Federica Mogherini as the new HR/VP in 2014 was very controversial, both in the media and in literature. For example, an article in Politico (2014) mentioned *inter alia* the fact that she is a woman, her views on Ukraine (too pro-Russian), her thin CV (eight months as Foreign Minister in Italy). Critics wanted a new “Solana”, but instead it was an Italian politician with lack of experience who got the HR/VP job (Nünlist & Bieri (2015: 3). However, there are some positive observations regarding her role as the “EU’s foreign policy chief”: first, the gaps between the Service and the Commission and the Council, here understood as communication and coordination, have been narrowed (see Chapter 5); second, her key role in the Iran deal, although the Iran agreement was already in an advanced stage when she started the job (Politico 2015). When compared to Ashton’s period, Mogherini has been able to focus not only on the internal coordination but also on external representations of

the EU. As (Nünlist & Bieri 2015: 4) observed: “She has exhibited convincing self-assurance as well as factual expertise and solid preparation”.

As the time of writing, there is not much empirical evidence with regards to this aspect in Mogherini`s period. It remains, therefore, to be seen how the current officials at the EEAS evaluate the Service`s Head chief. Still, my interviewee (Interview 2016) when evaluating Mogherini`s first one and half year as HR/VP, stated *inter alia* that she has made a positive start, formed very strong relationships with the Foreign Ministries, outside and inside the EU, and that she has made a very positive start with the Commission and the Parliament. To quote my interviewee: “We are proud to have her”. Nünlist and Bieri (2015: 4) have also acknowledged that with the improved coordination with the Commission, it will allow her to improve EU`s coherence.

Communication is defined as the ability of an organization to “communicate goals, ideas, and achievements” (Boyt et al. 2005: 690). Regarding communication within the EEAS, Juncos and Pomorska (2014: 309) note that there was not much discussion among the staff concerning the nature of the new Service until 2009 because it was “elite-driven and highly politicized”. According to their empirical findings, “a large majority of interviewees emphasized that information was scarce, unclear and the implication for their careers were uncertain at the best of times”. Two years after the establishment of the EEAS, the empirical evidence provided by (Juncos & Pomorska 2014: 310) reveals that the situation was still very chaotic and the internal communication system still needed to improve. What is more, internal communication is vital to information sharing not only between the European institutions but also between the EEAS and the 28 Member States.

When compared to her predecessor, Mogherini seems to be a more open public communicator, and that,

she seems to understand that better cooperation within the institutions and with the member states necessitates *inter alia* improved communication and more presence and visibility (Schmidt 2015).

Schmidt (2015) notes further that Mogherini with the support of the EEAS should share information openly not only internally but also externally in order to achieve a comprehensive approach to EU foreign policy. This improved communication with all key actors of EU foreign policy improves not only the “European socialization” of all actors but it also strengthens trust between all these actors.

Trust facilitates information sharing, co-operation, and risk-taking within an organization (Boyt et al. 2005: 691). In the case of the EEAS, the lack of mutual trust among the EEAS personnel stemmed from the fact that the Service has brought together an amalgamation from three different institutions.

The EEAS staff “have a high degree of identification with the EU and are more attached to the EU than to their foreign countries” where the EEAS officials show greater support to the Service and its role in shaping the EU foreign policy (Juncos & Pomorska 2013: 1345).

As Juncos and Pomorska (2013) observed:

The start-up of the EEAS had a negative impact on the *esprit de corps* and that the morale at the time of the interviews was pretty low, particularly among the former Commission officials because for them the Commission had developed a strong *esprit de corps* (Juncos & Pomorska 2013: 1345).

Lequesne (2015a: 47) analysis of the conflict of bureaucratic origin among the staff is in line with the findings of Juncos and Pomorska (2013). He notes that former Commission officials felt that the presence of national diplomats in the EEAS was a way to “renationalize” EU foreign policy and those national diplomats were unable to “express the Community interest”. Regarding national diplomats, Lequesne (2015a: 47) observes that even though national diplomats are much more prepared to carry out political reports, they are not so familiar with the demanding financial procedures of the EU institutions. These tensions of working and thinking conflicts are not confined to the Headquarters. Comparable conflicts can also be found in both in the EU Delegations and on EU Member States embassies in third countries, where the perception of difference exists in these two groups of staff, leading to somehow a lack of trust towards the other group (Ibid: 48).

For instance, my interview did not confirm many of the concerns mentioned in the literature:

(...) the thing that really surprises me here is now quickly the Member States have accepted that we take the role of the Presidency locally...I was really surprised by that. I thought that it would take a lot longer to establish credibility. Maybe one of the reasons why it works is because the Service is made up of people coming from Member State diplomatic services as well as from the European institutions (Interview 2016).

Moreover, my interviewee stated that this is a “work in progress” and *esprit de corps* “takes time to develop”.

Regarding perceived public image (internal and external), the more positive the image is the higher *esprit de corps* and the faster it will develop among its personnel (Boyt et al. 2005: 691). The start of the Service was a backdrop for the creation of a strong *esprit de corps*. Perhaps the major criticism was that it raised a lot of expectations about the Service to improve the coherence and effectiveness of the EU's foreign policy. My interviewee stated that "it is incredibly easy to criticize if you have not been a part of it". Moreover, the tough negotiations on the creation of the EEAS have also damaged its external image (see Chapter 3).

All this is acknowledged in the EEAS Review whereas stated that it was a "tough" start, expectations were high and that the "economic backdrop made investment in the service more difficult" (EEAS 2013). Despite this, the Review noted, "that Europe has a special role to play in today's world". Moreover, it recognized that the EEAS can *inter alia* "strengthen the position of the EU in the world". My interviewee also confirmed many of these statements, by arguing that "if you compare the EU to a single Member State, we are never going to live up to expectations" (Interview 2016), but when compared to any other international organization, then the EU does really well. When mentioning the role of the EEAS in the Iran deal, my interviewee commented that "the EU was asked to take on the facilitating role here, and I think we have delivered". According to my interviewee, the challenge now is "to live up to its expectations". However, the negative public image of the Service at the end of 2012 was not that relevant to develop an *esprit de corps*. The main problem was the lack of public interest in the Service (Juncos & Pomorska 2014: 311).

With regards to the training element, the EEAS HR report (EEAS 2015a: 17), states that coherent training of EEAS staff is a "key instrument" to *inter alia* "constantly develop diplomatic, management and leadership skills, update their general and specific knowledge, acquire new IT and language skills". Furthermore, one of the main aims of the EEAS Learning and Development initiatives is to contribute to building a common EEAS organizational culture and *esprit de corps*. It states further that,

target training for different groups of staff plays an essential role in ensuring an efficient and high performance that lives up to the needs of today's working environment in the external action service (EEAS 2015a: 17).

In addition, to contributing to building a common EEAS organizational culture and *esprit de corps*, the training initiatives aim *inter alia* to improve the performance and efficiency of the EEAS in the fulfilment of its mandate; increase individual performance and motivation of

EEAS staff; facilitate the building of networks and platforms of exchange within the EEAS and with other EU Institutions, the Member States, International Organisations (Ibid). It can be argued that these initiatives have the potential to pass on vital knowledge and skills required to the staff to work effectively, thus building a common diplomatic culture.

Finally, career prospects have been analyzed by (Juncos & Pomorska 2013). It was observed that the large majority of officials claimed that the establishment of the EEAS would have a negative impact on their career. Also, officials coming from the Commission felt that staff coming from Member States “were benefiting from lobbying on their behalf by their capitals” (Ibid: 1340). On the other hand, Member States diplomats argued that joining the EEAS would have a negative impact on their diplomatic career when returning “home”. Still, and despite the negative impact of the EEAS on their careers, it was noted that the majority of the interviewees, if given a choice, would again join the Service. Nevertheless, the EEAS has become one of the most competitive institutions in terms of jobs applications (Ibid: 1341).

Juncos and Pomorska (2013) explored also the reasons why these officials decided to join the EEAS. It was observed that looking for a new challenge, prestige and reputation were frequently mentioned. Some stated that they were looking for a new challenge rather than career prospects. Unsurprisingly, small Member States diplomats recognized that the EEAS would give them a “more exciting professional opportunity”. Regarding prestige, a better *curriculum*, and given the potential role of the EEAS in the world of politics, many perceived the EEAS as the place to do “diplomacy”. For some, job satisfaction prevailed over career promotion and reputation, as it was “more important than salary and status” and “in terms of progression and promotion was not as relevant as job satisfaction”. However, some negative aspects can be linked to job satisfaction when joining the Service, such as lack of payment for overtime, lack of nice working environment in the Service, bad management, and disorganization (Ibid: 1341-1344).

These findings illustrate that the majority of the interviewees working at the EEAS felt that joining the EEAS had a negative impact on their careers. However, if given a new chance, and notwithstanding some adverse working conditions, they would still join the EEAS because of new challenges and prestige that this Service would offer them.

4.5. Summary

The EEAS` unique position within the EU institutional framework and comprising personnel from the Commission, the Council and the Member States make it a *suis generis* service in the EU`s foreign policy-making structure. This new diplomatic service created a complex and formalized division of competence between the EU foreign policy actors dealing with external representation. Hence, one of the major goals of the EEAS it to ensure a better coordination and coherence of the EU`s foreign policy.

Even though the demand for coherence within the EU foreign policy has existed since the days of the European Political Cooperation, the Lisbon Treaty sought to increase the EU`s profile and credibility as a key player in the international realm, and to strengthening the coherence of the EU`s foreign policy.

The primary task of the EEAS, with the support of the HR/VP is to coordinate – vertically and horizontally – the EU`s foreign policy. When taking into consideration the classic separation between bureaucracy and politics, the reality is that the EEAS is only able to influence the first but not the second, particularly when dealing with highly controversial issues between the EU Member States (Lequesne 2013: 81). Also, the EEAS is still a young service, and therefore, premature judgments would not be appropriate. Nevertheless, it can be concluded that the prospects for reaching a coherent and consistent EU foreign policy remain slim. On the grounds that the economic crisis in the Eurozone has overshadowed the attempts in improving cohesion in EU foreign policy, “the gaps between “rhetoric and action” and “expectations and capacity” in EU foreign policy are by no means closing” (Mayer 2013: 114). Hence, the pursuit for more coherence and consistency are currently of a secondary order. Moreover, the creation of this Service had two main objectives: firstly, to connect foreign policies related competences; secondly, maintaining the divisions of competences unchanged (Carta 2013: 96). The result is that the EEAS with the support of the HR/VP is the link between all the actors involved in the EU`s foreign policy-making, but the current structure has introduced further complexity to the foreign policy of the EU.

The EEAS is an amalgamation of three groups of officials and has been going through modifications in its organization to turn the Service into a more effective organization. As Juncos and Pomorska (2013: 1344) observed in their study “identification with the EEAS and the EU more generally can be seen as a key element in the construction of an effective European diplomatic service”. Having this in mind, it is expected that the existence and development of

esprit de corps in the EEAS will be a critical factor to enhance the effectiveness of the EEAS, and the policy coherence and coordination between the EEAS and the key actors in the foreign policy-making of the EU. As a result, there are six factors that have the potential for the emergence and further promotion of organizational *esprit de corps*: leadership, communication, trust, public image, training, and career prospects.

It has been argued that “the variety of experiences and perspectives of its staff is an asset of the EEAS” (Balfour & Raik 2013a: 56). Hence, to use the potential of the personnel from different backgrounds and maintain the attractiveness of the EEAS, these six factors mentioned above have to be prioritized to build a strong shared working culture.

5. THE EEAS: FROM BRUSSELS TO THE WORLD

The world is constantly changing, challenges come and opportunities occur, enabling actors to compete for visibility to conquer presence. Still, this is closely linked to the actor`s capabilities. Against this background, the purpose of this Chapter is to present the other major innovation introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon (ToL 2012), namely the “triple-hatted” HR/VP. It also seeks to analyze whether the powers and responsibilities, which she has been entrusted by the ToL have been enough to bring together all the actors involved in the making of the EU`s foreign policy.

It will also analyze the question of deputisation of the HR/VP, that is, because of her busy schedule, it has been recognized the need to substitute her in many of her duties and responsibilities.

Sub-chapter 5.3. will analyze the work and role of the EU Delegations in strengthening the visibility of the EU. Also, it examines whether the EU Delegations can provide added value seen from a Member States perspective. Within the EU Delegations context, I will also address the key role of the Head of Delegations in the functioning and performance of the Delegations.

In sum, this Chapter - as well as Chapter 4 - will be fundamental in providing answers to my two research questions: firstly, to what degree has the Treaty of Lisbon, through the creation of the EEAS in particular, equipped the EU with the necessary tools for becoming a powerful international actor? Secondly, to what extent has the EEAS enabled the EU to pursue a more coherent and effective common foreign policy?

5.1. The HR/VP: Mission impossible?

I am looking forward to working closely with colleagues in the Council, the Commission and the Member States to strengthen Europe`s foreign policy. We will do this with determination and with full respect for the values that the European Union stands for, above all peace and prosperity, freedom and democracy, the rule of law and the universality and indivisibility of human rights (Ashton 2009).

The establishment of the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the Commission (HR/VP) was undoubtedly one of the most discussed innovations of the ToL. In the following, I will outline the new responsibilities and functions of the HR/VP.

Previous to the post-Lisbon structure, the position brought together the previous HR for CFSP and the Commissioner for External Relations. Now, this position comprises three distinct functions, often considered as “triple-hatted” (Balfour 2015: 35):

- 1) The High Representative shall conduct the Union's common foreign and security policy. He shall contribute by his proposals to the development of that policy, which he shall carry out as mandated by the Council. The same shall apply to the common security and defence policy;
- 2) The High Representative shall preside over the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC);
- 3) The High Representative shall be one of the Vice-Presidents of the Commission. He shall ensure the consistency of the Union's external action. He shall be responsible within the Commission for responsibilities incumbent on it in external relations and for coordinating other aspects of the Union's external action.

Concerning the first function, the HR/VP submits proposals to the Council (Articles 18 (2) and 27 (1) ToL 2012) and, in cooperation with the Member States (Article 26 (3) ToL 2012), ensures the implementations of the decisions adopted both by the Council and the European Council as stated in the Article 27 (1) of the ToL. What is more, the ToL in its Article 27 (2) states that the “The High Representative shall represent the Union for matters relating to the common foreign and security policy”.

In addition, the HR/VP “shall conduct political dialogue with third parties on the Union's behalf and shall express the Union's position in international organizations and at international conferences” (Article 27 (2) ToL 2012). Here, and referring to the one of the core elements addressed by Jørgensen, Oberthür, and Shahin (2013), the EU has determined who represents the EU in international organisations and at international conferences, thus increasing the EU's relevance.

With regards to CFSP matters and accountability to the European Parliament, the ToL states the following:

The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy shall regularly consult the European Parliament on the main aspects and the basic choices of the common foreign and security policy and the common security and defence policy and inform it of how those policies evolve. He shall ensure that the views of the European Parliament are duly taken into consideration (Article 36 part 1 of the ToL 2012).

The HR/VP's second function is to chair the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC). However, the rotating Presidency still chairs the FCA meetings when Trade issues are discussed (Keukeleire & Delreux 2014: 77). One of the consequences is the downgrading of the role of the National Foreign Ministers, even though the foreign Ministers of the Member States elaborate the external action of the EU - analyzed in the previous chapter – as further stated in the article 16 (6).

Concerning the role as Vice-President of the Commission, the ToL states:

shall ensure the consistency of the Union's external action. He shall be responsible within the Commission for responsibilities incumbent on it in external relations and for coordinating other aspects of the Union's external action (Article 18 (4) of the ToL 2012).

The nature of the EU foreign policy can be considered as multifaceted (Keukeleire & Delreux 2014: 11). The EU treaties differentiate the CFSP/CSDP on the one hand, and the EU's external action and external dimension of internal policies on the other hand. As for the CFSP, it “provides the main platform for developing and implementing the political and diplomatic dimension of EU foreign policy”, while the CSDP “includes various civilian and military crisis management instruments” (Ibid: 12). Regarding the EU's external action – under the competency of the European Commission and its commissioners and Directorates General (DGs) –, it comprises the following policies: trade, development cooperation, economic and financial cooperation with third countries, humanitarian aid, sanctions and international agreements (Ibid). Concerning the external dimension of internal policies, such as energy, environmental, and migration and asylum policy, which are also relevant in the EU foreign policy, the relationship between “external action” and “external dimension of internal policies” “is not always clear-cut, as interests and activities stemming from the various policy fields can also compete with each other” (Ibid: 13). Predictably, the 2009-14 Commission through its Commissioners “retained” the portfolios with external competences, ensuring that these portfolios remained in the “hands” of the European Commission. In theory, it would mean that the Vice-President hat of the HR/VP would allow her, first, to “connect the toolbox of policies such as trade, aid, as well as the external dimension of energy, climate change, with the politics of diplomacy”, and second the “right of initiative in matters of Commission competence as well as in CFSP” (Balfour 2015: 35).

The result is that the HR/VP not only bridges two different EU institutions (the Commission and the Council), but also two different types of interests (the “European” and the national ones). Also, it bridges two centres of gravity of EU foreign policy, namely the CFSP/CSDP and the external action/external dimension of internal policies (Keukeleire & Delreux 2014: 78).

5.1.1. HR/VP’s tasks: Decision-making, implementation, external representation, and consistency

Altogether, the principal tasks of the HR/VP can be broken down into four interrelated elements: decision-making; implementation; external representation; and consistency (Keukeleire & Delreux 2014: 78). These four elements are much in line with what Jørgensen, Oberthür, and Shahin (2013) identified as the core elements – effectiveness, relevance, efficiency, and financial viability - for the EU to perform in the international system.

Concerning decision-making, the ToL provides the HR/VP with extensive opportunities *inter alia* the initiative in EU foreign policy and shape the EU’s agenda in the international realm. By presiding the FAC, and in CFSP matters, she is responsible for taking initiative and making proposals with the EU Member States, and in some cases with the support of the Commission (Articles 18 (2), 27 (1) and (3), 30 (1), 42 (4) ToL 2012). For non-CFSP matters, the Commission still remains the exclusive right of initiative (Article 17 (2)).

Regarding implementation, according to the articles 26 (3) and 27 (1), the HR/VP is responsible for implementing the CFSP decisions adopted by the Council. When the Council or the European Council has defined a common approach, the HR/VP in coordination with the Ministers for Foreign Affairs “shall coordinate their activities within the Council” (Article 32). With respect to CSDP matters, the HR plays a coordinator role together with the Political and Security Committee (PSC), which exercises political control and strategic direction of the missions “under the responsibility of the Council and of the High Representative” (Article 38).

Concerning external representation:

The High Representative shall represent the Union for matters relating to the common foreign and security policy. He shall conduct political dialogue with third parties on the Union's behalf and shall express the Union's position in international organisations and at international conferences (Article 27 (2) ToL 2012).

The HR plays also a coordinator role when the EU Member States are active in international organizations and conferences (Article 34 (1)). For example, if the EU has a subject to be discussed on the UN Security Council, the EU permanent members on the Security Council “shall request that the High Representative be invited to present the Union’s position” (Article 32 (2)).

Finally, consistency - perhaps the most vital function of the HR/VP’s role – is well described in the Article 21 (3). Together with the Council and the Commission, the HR ensures consistency between the different areas of the EU’s external action. The articles 18 (4), 21 (3), 24 (3) and 26 (2) highlight also the importance of the HR, together with the Council, in ensuring unity, consistency, and effectiveness within the foreign policy framework of the EU.

The combination of all these elements - decision-making, implementation, external representation, and consistency – have not only strengthening the potential of the HR/VP’s function, but has also increased the structural shortcomings of this function.

Hence, the Lisbon Treaty has sought to pursue more effectiveness, relevance and efficiency (Jørgensen, Oberthür, & Shahin 2013) in EU foreign policy by entrusting one person - added by the EEAS - with new responsibilities, competencies and powers. The accumulation of all these positions generates real potential to strengthen the EU’s foreign policy and EU’s position in the world. Nevertheless, the combination of the “three hats” has become an obstacle for success due to the complex institutional setup, but also to “lack” of political will and structural flaws.

5.1.2. “Lack” of political will and structural flaws

Concerning political will or the “lack” of political will of the EU Member States is widely discussed in the literature as being the most common explanation for the lack of success of the EU foreign policy. Moreover, political will has been prescribed as the cure to all the EU’s foreign policy failures and mistakes (Keukeleire & Delreux 2014: 128). Following Keukeleire and Delreux (2014: 128-129) framework, the Member States “lack” of political will can actually include five different dimensions:

1. The refusal of the EU Member States in allowing the EU to play a more active role on a particular issue;
2. The lack of ambition from the Member States in taking the lead in international affairs;

3. The reluctance from the Member States to accept the political, moral, budgetary and other costs related to the strengthen EU`s actorness;
4. The existence of too many different political wills;
5. The amount of political will is reflected in the Member States` public attitudes and support.

One example of the “lack” of political will is the management of the crisis in Libya in early 2011. In the early days of the crisis, Member States such as Italia, Greece and Malta refused to apply sanctions against Libya. According to Howorth (2014: 137), this was predictable, particularly, when their historic and influential trading partner Muammar Gaddafi sat upon billions of their investments, but as also assisted to suppress the migrant flow from the North Africa. Despite initial internal divisions, Member States condemned not only the use of force, as well as to call for reforms in Libya. The HR/VP on the behalf of the EU agreed to call for “an immediate end to the use of force and for steps to address the legitimate demands of the population, including through national dialogue” (Council of the EU 2011).

Although the Lisbon Treaty provided the HR/VP to play a key role in crisis management, the possibility of a military intervention further politicized the issue, as well as exposed the different positions of the EU Member States (Helwig et al. 2013: 426). What is more, the centre of decisions shifted to the heads of state. On 10 March, British Prime-Minister, David Cameron, and the French president, Nicolas Sarkozy wrote a letter to Herman Van Rompuy (President of the European Council 2009-2014) in which they *inter alia* mentioned the inclusion of no-fly zone (The Guardian 2011a).

In a declaration one day later, the European Council stated *inter alia* that they condemn the “violent repression the Libyan regime applies against its citizens and the gross and systematic violation of human rights”, “the use of force, especially with military means, against civilians is unacceptable and must stop immediately” and the Member States “will examine all necessary options, provided that there is a demonstrable need, a clear legal basis, and support from the region” (European Council 2011). Furthermore, they acknowledged the importance of their cooperation and the “contentment” from the UN Security Council, the Arab League, and the African Union.

Neither the EU nor the HR/VP was able to take a clear position, and with the increasing number of civilian casualties, the UN Security Council adopted on 17 March 2011 Resolution 1973 (The United Nations 2011). The UK, France, the USA and other countries launched a military

operation, which later became a NATO mission. In the words of Howorth (2014: 138), the “fact that the Libyan operation became a NATO mission is worth pondering”. For the first, the USA was initially opposed to intervening in Libya because the Obama administration considered another intervention in a Muslim country as a bad idea. Thus, it would have to be conducted by Europeans. Second, countries such as Germany, Poland, France and Turkey were not interested that it would become a NATO operation. When France realized that this would not become an EU operation, the French President tried to persuade the UK’s Prime-Minister to run it bilaterally. They were not successful, not only because the USA decided to intervene in Libya through the NATO framework, but mainly due to the fact that NATO had the operational facilities to succeed (Ibid: 138-139).

Altogether, while the Libyan intervention became a relatively military success, the reaction of the EU and its Member States raised much criticism regarding its abilities, willingness and capabilities to act as a crisis management actor in its neighbourhood. As US Defense Secretary, Robert Gates declared on 10 June 2011 in the light of the operation in Libya:

Many of those allies sitting on the sidelines do so not because they do not want to participate, but simply because they can't. The military capabilities simply aren't there (The Guardian 2011b).

What is more, the decisions around the Libya crisis have also shown the limited role of the HR/VP in such crisis, much because “the scope of action is determined by the nature, timing and silence of the crisis and defined by the Member States” (Helwig 2013: 248). This can also be perceived as an expression of the limits of the EU as a foreign policy actor. As soon as the debate starts to involve military intervention, the EU becomes side lined by the Member States because the EEEAS – and more broadly the EU – “has no possibility to change the divergences which result from policy and historical positions” (Lequesne 2015a: 52)

Concerning the structural flaws, Keukeleire and Delreux (2014: 79-81) provide interesting observations. First, the HR/VP can be considered as “the Servant of two Masters”. On the one hand, when the HR/VP carries out CFSP/CSDP activities as mandated by the Council – and by the Member States more broadly - she is accountable and loyal to the Council and to the Member States. On the other hand, as Vice-President of the Commission, the HR/VP defends the interests of the EU. Furthermore, the HV/VP’s Council hat is more employed than her Vice-President hat. When exercising the role as Vice-President, she is actually bound by the Commission procedures as long as they consistent with both her role in chairing the FAC and

carrying out the CFSP activities. Also, in making use of her role as one of the Vice-Presidents of the Commission, she has much less freedom of *manoeuvre* than the other Vice-Presidents with external relations. Second, her Council hat is very limited as her capacity to act:

(...) hinges on the go-head he or she receives from the Council, on the ability of the Council to adopt decisions, and the availability of instruments to shore up diplomatic activities (Keukeleire & Delreux 2014: 79).

To summarize, the HR/VP can neither take decisions nor negotiate with another actor unless there is a common position from the Member States at the Council. Still, in cases where the HR/VP has the support from the Member States, success is dependent on whether diplomatic services possess the necessary instruments. The HR/VP is not the only actor within the EU to conduct the EU foreign policy. She “shares” this role with many other relevant actors with their own priorities, strategies, desire for power and political visibility. This complexity can complicate the coordinator role of the HR/VP, as well as limiting her efforts in the making of a strong EU foreign policy.

5.2. Deputising for the HR/VP

What emerges from the analysis above is that the many *hats* of the HR/VP have led to conflicting priorities that are impossible for only one person to harmonize. As Howorth (2014) notes:

To be expected to attend meetings of the European council, to chair the FAC, to attend meetings of the College of Commissioners as well as special Commission meetings in the areas of Enlargement, Neighbourhood, Development and Humanitarian Assistance, to chair the European Defence Agency, plus ad hoc meetings of the EU defence ministers, as well as to run the EEAS and to represent the EU at summit meetings and other events around the world – all of this is wildly unrealistic (Howorth 2014: 61)

The EEAS Review acknowledged that combing these *hats* has forced the HR/VP to miss *inter alia* regular institutional meetings of the Council, the Commission, the European Council, and the European Parliament. The result is that the current arrangement of both internal and external representation remains very fragmented and it undermines the quest for coherence. Once again, Jørgensen, Oberthür, and Shahin (2013) have to be mentioned. They argued that representation

is one of the core elements to increase the EU's performance. Still, and since it is physically impossible for the HR/VP to attend to all these schedules, there has been recognized the need to substitute her in some of these schedules. Furthermore, the creation of this "triple-hatted" has also created too high and unrealistic expectations to one single individual, thus the HR/VP has been incapable to encounter these expectations (see Hill 1993).

In the study performed by the Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union, the question regarding deputising the HR/VP was acknowledged by the interviewees (Wouters et al. 2013: 32-33). It was recognized the necessity of deputising for the HR/VP, but the interviewees showed different meanings on how this deputising should be implemented. Some have suggested that the RELEX Commissioners could take on this role while another suggestion was for the Member States to give up the principle of equality of Commissioners. It was also suggested that Member State foreign ministers could take on this role. Upgrading the managing directors was also suggested.

The current arrangements are ad-hoc and involve the Minister of the rotating Presidency, Members of the Commission with geographical responsibilities, senior EEAS officials and EU Special Representatives (EUSRs) (EEAS 2013: 13). Recognizing the need to be deputized, Ashton proposed two solutions: first, by involving Member State's foreign ministers in a more direct coordinating responsibility; second, by creating a new formal deputy HR/VP position(s). Regarding the latter, the feasibility of this suggestion is well questioned and more complex "because of the absence of a clear legal basis in the Treaty". The former, and although feasible since it would be in line with the existing Treaty and legislative framework, it would require the approval of the Commission President (Ibid: 13).

With the entering into force of the ToL, it was expected that the upgrading of the role of the HR would give better access to the extensive foreign policy instruments of the Commission. Furthermore, it was also expected that the ToL provided the HR/VP with the opportunity to combine a Commission initiative in external relations with CFSP arrangements. Also, the Treaty of Lisbon implemented a joint leadership with other policy areas with an external dimension, for instance, trade, development, migration as well as asylum policy. But, these areas are managed by their respective Commissioners, with their own ambitions and plans (Berger & Ondarza 2013).

On 1st November 2014, The President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker sent a mission letter to Federica Mogherini. In this mission letter (Juncker 2014), and concerning

the deputisation necessity, Juncker entrusted the Commissioner for European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations and other Commissioners (this letter did not specify whom it concerned in particular) with the tasks of deputising Federica Mogherini in areas related to Commission competence. Thus, the questions regarding her deputisation have been *solved* through the new Commission`s arrangements.

In sum, this sub-chapter presented the Commission`s established *modus operandi*, and seeking greater control over foreign policy is clearly visible in this Mission letter. The ToL provided the HR/VP with a traditional instrument of a foreign minister, the EEAS. But the current system undermines the HR/VP`s ability to use the Commissions extensive external resources as an instrument in her coordinator role of the EU`s foreign policy. Also, it projected to improve the coherence of the EU foreign policy by triple hatting this post, as well as trying to strengthen the visibility of the EU in the world with the upgrading of the EU`s diplomatic system, the EU Delegations. Against this background, the following sections will examine the work of the EU Delegations and to what extent the coordination “abroad” developed a certain sense of either rivalry or partnership seen from the Member States` perspective.

5.3. The EU Delegations: Giving the EU “One Voice” abroad?

In a hearing at the European Parliament, Federica Mogherini recognised the important role played by the EU Delegations in giving the EU one voice and managing its policies abroad (European Parliament 2014). As Dialer and Austermann (2014: 100). put it: “ Today, the Delegations are supposed to be the eyes, ears and mouthpiece of the EU and its member states towards the authorities and the population in their host countries”.

Per today it consists of 139 Delegations around the world, and most delegations are responsible for one single country while others oversee relations with a group of countries or a region. Additionally, there are Delegations dedicated to maintaining relations with international and multilateral organisations, such as the African Union or the UN (see Annex 2.). When comparing to the number of embassies of the 28 Member States` foreign services, the EU with its Delegations ranks after France, Germany and the UK (Austermann 2015: 52) As the table (Table 2.) below suggests, it is worth noting that the geographical representation of the EU is even more important given the fact that the Delegations are only represented outside the EU, while the Member States` embassies also cover representations within the EU.

Table 2. EU Delegations and Member States` embassies in the world

EU Delegations	139
Austria	85
Belgium	82
Bulgaria	76
Croatia	55
Cyprus	43
Czech Republic	91
Denmark	72
Estonia	37
Finland	71
France	166
Germany	155
Greece	83
Hungary	80
Ireland	61
Italy	123
Latvia	38
Lithuania	40
Luxembourg	30
Malta	23
The Netherlands	108
Poland	88
Portugal	73
Romania	93
Slovakia	62
Slovenia	37
Spain	121
Sweden	90
United Kingdom	152

Source: Counted by the author based on EU Delegations websites, and website www.embassypages.com. For the sake of comparison, only fully-fledged embassies and EU Delegations were counted.

It is important to stress that the EU Delegations are far from being an invention in the Lisbon Treaty. The first delegations opened in the 1950s and they were called “European Commission Delegations” (ECDs), representing the European Commission and not the EU as a whole. Representing the EU as a whole was a responsibility by the embassy of the EU Member State holding the rotating Council Presidency. During the 1960s and 1970s, the role of the Delegations was to inform key allies about the European integration project, but mainly to implement development aid. Despite the increasing number of the Delegations in developing countries – mainly Africa – as well as in Latin America and in Mediterranean countries (after the accession of Portugal and Spain), it was only in 1987, with the Single European Act, that

they were for the first time included in the Treaty framework as coordinators between the Member State embassies and the Delegations (Dialer & Austermann 2014: 101).

During the 1980s, the Delegations were a powerful foreign policy tool for the EU within the Enlargement framework. To a large degree, the Delegations represented a “development ministry”, a “trade ministry” and an “enlargement ministry” (Austermann 2015: 52). Unsurprisingly, Dialer and Austermann (2014: 102-103) observed that the Delegations took over traditional tasks of diplomatic representation, and by the early 1970s the Heads of Delegation received the Ambassador title and thus diplomatic immunities according to the 1961 Vienna Convention of on diplomatic Relations.

The title of Ambassador given to the Head of Delegation confirmed the EU’s unique *suis generis* status in international law. First, states are the only actors in international law able to recognize other States, and although the Member States have transferred powers to the EU, the EU is still not considered a State. Second, this raised the question how the EU was able to acquire a diplomatic status for its diplomatic agents (Wouters & Duquet 2011: 4). The solution was the Chapter VI and VII of Protocol No. 7 in the ToL, and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (Council of the EU 2015), which states *inter alia*:

the Member State in whose territory the Union has its seat shall accord the customary diplomatic immunities and privileges to missions of third countries accredited to the Union (ToL 2012).

Finally, the transfer of powers by the Member States to the EU has caused internal and external effects. Internally, the Commission, the Parliament and Court of Justice were all entrusted with executive, legislative and judicial powers respectively. Externally, the Article 47 of the ToL granted the EU legal personality, enhancing the EU’s capacity in the world of international affairs, thus emphasizing its unique position in international law (Wouters & Duquet 2011: 4-6).

Notwithstanding the outlined incremental *diplomatization* of the EU with the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty, the Delegations have received a genuine political update. For instance, the representative of the EU in third country capitals and international organisations does not change every six months. Hence, increased visibility has strengthened the presence of the EU in the world (Austermann 2015: 53). As mentioned by Hill (1993) and Bretherton and Vogler

(2006), presence is one of the core elements for the EU to exert influence “on both the psychological and the operational environments of third parties” (Hill 1993: 309).

The Delegations play an important coordinator role within the EU foreign policy framework in third countries. Previously (pre-Lisbon), convening and chairing thematic meetings were a privilege of the embassy that represented the rotating presidency. Despite the early days of the Service, my interviewee was surprised over how quickly the Member States have accepted the role that the EU Delegation takes locally. My interviewee thought that it “would take a lot longer to establish credibility” (Interview 2016). According to my interviewee, probably one of the reasons for the relative success of this EU Delegation is “because the Service is made up of people from Member State diplomatic services as well as from the European institutions” (Ibid). Still, the EU is not present in every part of the world. In a number of countries, this coordination role is still assumed by the Member State that holds the rotating Presidency or by other states which are present on the ground (Council of the EU 2012).

In line with Austermann (2015: 54), the Delegations are well resourced in developing countries. After all, this is where it all started. What is more, as a result of the cuts in national budgets (EEAS 2013: 11), there has been a decreasing of the EU Member State embassies in these countries, leading to a united European diplomatic representation (Austermann 2015: 54). Austermann (2015: 54) argues that one should remember that the lack of interest of national embassies in developing countries might be linked to their low strategic and economic importance.

Next, one could expect that the EU Delegations would have a difficult time to pull the Member States together in a third country that is key to traditionally high politics matters and of high economic interest, such as in the ten strategic partners, namely Brazil, Canada, China, India, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Mexico, Russia, South Africa, and the United States. The function of these strategic partnerships is “namely the self-assertion of the EU as a partner, an actor or a pole in a challenging international system” (Grevi 2013: 163). As Balfour and Raik (2013a: 46) observed, it is here where the EEAS faces the big challenges in adding value. In other words, it would be in these locations that the EEAS` coordinating role could become more vital. As they put it: “Member states hold different views on the desirability of policy initiative and judgment originating from EU delegations” (Ibid).

For small Member States, such as Estonia, with limited diplomatic representation due to historical and economic reasons, the extensive geographical coverage of the Delegations

network provides added value. Representations abroad remain as key tools of Estonia, but it is underlined the importance of strong institutions such as the EU and shared norms as they provide an “umbrella” and voice opportunities to small states (Beneš & Raik (2015: 188-191).

For middle sized States such as Spain, that have international ambitions but lack financial and staff resources, the EU Delegations are seen “as a promising novelty for Europe’s international influence, and, it has favoured cooperation between EU and Spanish missions in third countries” (Frontini et al. 2015: 129). Moreover, Spain defends the coordinating role of the EU Heads of Delegations and advocates the need for more shared reporting between the Service and the Member States. This is much in line with what Helwig et al. (2013: 65) underlined in their study, that “a shared and comprehensive pool of information is seen as the ideal basis on which a one-voice European foreign policy can be developed”. This information exchange has to be reciprocal in order to allow for a coordinated and vertical coherent EU foreign policy (Ibid: 67).

For those Member States that have an extensive diplomatic network, the added value of the Delegations is quite different. Taking France as an example, Terpan (2015: 97) observed that to bring coherence to the foreign policy of the EU and make the EU more visible in the international arena, the EEAS must bring added value to national diplomacies and not replace them. Regarding the leading role played by the Delegations, they should function as a complementary role for national ambassadors (Ibid: 98). But also here, France has a different view: first, that the big Member States should still be involved as they can provide added value; and second, that the EU Delegations can take a leading role in sensitive cases, such as investigating into human rights claims, “because they can have side effects and jeopardize economic (or other) interests” (Ibid).

The EU Delegations operate also on a daily basis with the Commission services. This horizontal cooperation is due not only because the management of the EU operational funds is executed by the Commission, but mainly because most EU Delegations comprise staff officials coming from the Commission (Helwig et al. 2013: 67). DG Development and Cooperation (DEVCO) has been the largest contributor of personnel to the EU Delegations, although the DG Enlargement personnel have been involved in the monitoring of pre-accession preparations and implementation of the candidate countries and potential ones.

In unstable countries, DEVCO plays a strategic role in steering the EU Delegations while in countries where the EU crisis management is deployed, there is a joint cooperation between

the Delegations, the CSDP, and the Member States. The growing presence of the EU in Africa comprises nearly all the instruments within the EU foreign policy tools, covering all the major policy areas (Helly et al. 2014: 7-8). In other words, and according to Ponjaert (2013: 153), Africa emerges “as one of the key litmus tests for the expected benefits in terms of increased horizontal foreign policy coherence”. Thus, the EU is well equipped to deal with peace-building and crisis management situations: The EU’s comprehensive approach. This doctrine (adapted from NATO) is also a “prerequisite to strengthen the effectiveness of the EU as an international security provider” (Pirozzi 2013: 17). Throughout this comprehensive approach, the EU is able to tackle problems in regions where the presence of NATO is neither welcome nor appropriate (Keukeleire & Delreux 2014: 147). As the Delegations are at the forefront of the presence of the EU in these unstable regions, a better cooperation between the EEAS, through the CFSP/CSDP framework, and the relevant Commission services, particularly DEVCO, is required.

Wouters et al. (2013: 68) observed in their study that the overall cooperation between the Delegations and the Commission is improving. Even though there are several factors that play a main role in the quality of this cooperation, it was observed that the cooperation “is said to work better when the Head of Delegation or a staff member previously worked in the Commission” (Ibid: 69).

5.3.1. The expanded role of Heads of Delegation

With the entering into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the role of Heads of Delegation has expanded. They now *inter alia* chair the Head of Missions meeting; lead on EU political dialogue processes; hold the overall responsibility in communicating the role of Delegations; and policies and positions of the EU (Helly et al. 2014: 5). Interestingly, my interviewee has also stressed that the Delegations have a credibility and legitimacy function not only towards the host countries, but also internally such as “reminding Commission colleagues that we exist” (Interview 2016).

Likewise, the HR/VP, the Heads of Delegation are also “triple-hatted”, that is, they are “servants” of the Commission, the Council and the Member States. The Delegations bring a greater sense of unity and a clear chain of command than at the EU Headquarters because they are responsible for security and defence issues, and for the internal polices with external

dimensions (Wouters et al. 2013: 63). This can prevent or even mitigate potential conflicts between the EEAS and the Commission (Ibid).

What is more, both (Wouters et al. 2013: 63) and Helly et al. (2014: 5) stressed that personality and background are not only a key determinant on how the Delegations work, but also a key to the effectiveness of the Union's foreign policy abroad. Helly et al. (2014 p. 5) observed that a Head of Delegation coming from the Commission appears to be more familiar with the EU programme management procedures than national seconded diplomats. Whether Heads of Delegations coming from the EU Member States are more skilful diplomats than the ones coming from the Commission can be arguable. Nevertheless, it is important to keep in mind that diplomats coming from the Commission were not trained as diplomats. For example, a study conducted by Adler-Nissen (2014) examined *inter alia* the differences between a *genuine diplomat* – coming from the Member states – and a *symbolic diplomat* – coming from the Commission. Regarding these differences, she concluded that on the one hand, diplomats coming from the Member States are trained to be strategic, to share knowledge and to follow a political line, while on the other hand, officials with background from the Commission “have different dispositions, loyalties, and experiences” (Ibid: 671-672).

Expectedly, Wouters et al. (2013: 64) observed in their study that Heads of Delegation coming from the Member States have “little or no experience of working for and with Union Institutions”. In order to enhance the expertise within the Delegation and to create a common culture (see *esprit de corps* in chapter 4) among the Delegations staff, further training on existing practices and structures at the Union level were suggested by the interviews in the study (Ibid).

Nevertheless, the literature regarding the role of the Heads of Delegation has underlined that the key to strengthening the role of the EEAS, hence of the EU on the ground lies not only in the ability of the Head of Delegation to exert leadership, but also in gaining the trust and respect of Member States ambassadors. To quote my interviewee: “(...) in the end, it is down to credibility” (Interview 2016).

Parallel to gaining the trust of the Member States, the EEAS Review (EEAS 2013: 12) acknowledged that the Delegations are gradually building their role and perhaps in a near future acquiring new capabilities, such as for example, consular protection and the further development of the network security experts. The following section will examine the opportunities and challenges that lie ahead in releasing the Delegations' potential.

5.3.2. Cooperation and burden-sharing

Cooperation and burden-sharing have been a very much discussed topic regarding EU diplomacy. When combining the number of the EU Delegations and the Member States own diplomatic services (see Table. 2), the EU has the largest diplomatic service in the world. The following questions were addressed by Jørgensen, Oberthür, and Shahin (2013: 7): Does this diplomatic monster help to achieve the EU's objectives efficiently? What about the costs of running both the EU Delegations and the Member States diplomatic services in common places? These questions will be addressed below.

In the EEAS Review, when addressing the cooperation with the Member States in Delegations, the former HR/VP Catherine Ashton recognized the importance of increasing the sharing of information, both classified and sensitive, between the Delegations and the Member States. What is more, and given the current budgetary constraints, she proposed “a shared interest in further developing local co-operation in both policy and practical areas” (EEAS 2013: 12).

In practice, this means that if due to change of priorities or budget cuts, a Member State diplomatic service is forced to close a location where an EU Delegation already exists, then the EU Delegation can add value to this specific Member State. This added value can be provided in terms *inter alia* of access to information, contacts and access to local actors. But, for example, if a specific Member State wants to strengthen its contacts and influence in a location where it does not have a diplomatic representation, then an EU Delegation can actually be a facilitator for the Member State,

Balfour and Raik (2013a: 47) pointed out the awareness coming from the EEAS as well as from the Member States in co-location arrangements. This practice is a good example where the Member States recognise the added value from the EEAS and Delegations (Ibid). Balfour and Raik (2013a: 47) gave the example of the UK ambassador to Morocco, who is also the non-resident Ambassador to Mauritania, and who uses the EU Delegation in Mauritania when he travels there. This mechanism of co-location framework occurs generally in bilateral diplomatic posts where the Member States usually do not have strategic interests (Dermendzhiev 2014: 17). Moreover, and according to my interviewee, “it depends on the size of the Member State” (Interview 2016).

For example, a small state like Portugal considers the arrangements provided by the Delegations for official visits of national diplomats as an asset and “recognizes the benefits that spring from the “economies of scale” generated by the EEAS” (Pereira, Vieira & Schaik 2015: 146).

Nevertheless, such arrangements have the potential of fostering not only closer ties between the Member States and the EU Diplomats, but especially the trust that Member States have in the potential of the EU Delegations. Regardless of the intentions of the Member States with such arrangements, the fact is that the EU Delegations enjoy a level of both credibility and trust among the Member States. For the EU, these arrangements can increase both the visibility and credibility of the EU as an international actor in third countries. In other words, it increases the EU’s actorness (Bretherton & Vogler 2006) in the international realm. What is more, and according to my first research question (To what degree has the Treaty of Lisbon, through the creation of the EEAS in particular, equipped the EU with the necessary tools for becoming a powerful international actor?), it can be argued that the EU Delegations have become a key tool for the EU to become a “powerful” international actor.

Another form of cooperation is joint embassy premises. For example, the EU, the UK, Germany and the Netherlands share a building in Tanzania. Luxembourg has established its embassy on the premises of the EU Delegation to Ethiopia, while Spain and the EEAS share under the premises of the EU Delegation in Yemen (Balfour & Raik 2013a: 47). Hence, looking at these examples, these arrangements are presented in small less strategic African countries. As Dermendzhiev (2014: 19) puts it “ the motivations are most probably a combination of weaker strategic interests and cost-efficient solutions to share the security bill in unstable countries”.

On the other hand, and according to (Austermann 2012: 6), 27 Member States maintained large embassies in key locations such as Washington, Beijing, and Moscow, while 26 Member States are present in Cairo and Tel Aviv. Unsurprisingly, the level of cooperation in these locations are complex, not only because of the strategic interest of the Member States but also because they prefer to deal with the host state bilaterally, without involving the EU (Ibid: 7).

Another area where there is a vast potential for burden-sharing and which has brought much contest and controversy is the extent to which the EEAS, through the Delegations framework, should serve the EU citizens in developing consular services. Article 5 (9) of the EEAS Decision (Council of the EU (2010) pointed to a future role for EU Delegations to provide

consular protection. With regard to this area, the HR/VP in the EEAS Review (EEAS 2013: 12) acknowledged the lack of resources and expertise in both the Headquarters and in Delegations respectively.

This is actually an “old” discussed topic among the EU Member States. Indeed, article 8 of the Maastricht Treaty (ToM 1992) refers to this possibility of the EU to develop consular services. With the entering into force of the Lisbon Treaty, article 3 (5) has further strengthened this potential to contribute to the protection of its citizens.

Obviously, this issue has raised considerable skepticism among the EU Member States on whether they will further empower the EEAS by handing over consular affairs to the EEAS` overseas delegations.

In the study performed by Raik (2013: 2), she stressed positive experiences of coordination in crisis situations where the Delegations assisted *inter alia* with transportation, communication, providing emergency. As a matter of example, during the civil war in Libya in 2012 when most EU Member States closed down their embassies, the EU Delegation in Damascus played a crucial local presence by staying open and also hosting national diplomats.

However, and since it deals with sensitive issues that still lie at the heart of nation-state sovereignty, there can be found different positions and motivations among the EU Member States.

Expectedly or not, France, with its largest diplomatic network among the EU Member States, strongly supports the EEAS role in crisis coordination, where “all member states would benefit from burden-sharing and coordination” (Terpan 2015: 98). Expectedly because France`s top priorities are grandeur and influence, and not expectedly because the EU has become an important framework for the foreign policy of France (Ibid: 103). This support can expectedly be found in several smaller and middle-sized EU Member States, but mainly because of other reasons such as economic reasons and to ease the burden of national diplomatic services.

Slovenia, who has one of the smallest diplomatic networks of the EU Member States (see Table 2.), sees very positively the co-location and pooling of the EEAS and national services, and although they recognized the added value that the EEAS through the Delegations framework, the support in consular matters would be limited to crises situations (Gropas, Lange, & Tzogopoulos 2015: 173-174). As a matter of example, the Netherlands has been positive to the

eventual transfer of diplomatic tasks to the EEAS, although this will take time given the opposition of the big EU Member States (Pereira, Vieira & Schaik 2015: 147).

As Raik (2013: 2) noted in her study, “the UK has been the principal opponent of any transfer of competences to the EEAS, be it consular or other matters”. However, and as she continued, the UK suggested the Delegations may develop some consular functions in accordance with the needs of the EU Member States, referring to the smaller ones.

A key question here is also to what extent consular protection and responsibility of diplomatic tasks is a priority for the EEAS. For example, Raik (2013: 2) argues that the EEAS should be rather engaged *inter alia* in political reporting and representation, vertical and horizontal coordination. Moreover, the EEAS neither has resources nor the expertise (Ibid). Also, Wouters et al. (2013) observed that an interviewee from the Commission noted that consular services should be handled jointly in order to establish a central consular office, issuing EU visas (Ibid: 74). Expectedly, feedback from the EU Member States is divided, as it was argued that the EEAS should stay away from consular affairs because of the lack of resources and expertise of the EEAS (Ibid). Other Member States stressed that diplomatic tasks should stay within the Member States competencies because of cultural, and especially linguistic reasons.

The added value of the EU Delegations has been acknowledged by all the parties involved, particularly by the EU Member States. Many EU Member States have been forced to reduce their diplomatic representations abroad due to budgetary constraints, taking an interest in cooperation and burden-sharing with the EU Delegations. Furthermore, diplomatic representation still touches Member States sovereignty sensitivities, thus, the EEAS, along with the EU Delegations, should continue to play a coordinator role, providing both information and expertise, as well as offering diplomatic services whenever necessary.

5.4. Summary

This Chapter, as well as Chapter 4, has addressed the research questions which I proposed to answer throughout this thesis:

- 1) *To what degree has the Treaty of Lisbon, through the creation of the EEAS in particular, equipped the EU with the necessary tools for becoming a powerful international actor?*

2) *To what extent has the EEAS enabled the EU to pursue a more coherent and effective common foreign policy?*

This chapter analysed how the Lisbon Treaty gave the HR/VP considerable responsibility to ensure both consistency and coherence of EU external relations. The powers with which the position has been endowed by the Lisbon Treaty have not been enough to bring together the actors that make up the foreign policy of the EU, mainly the Member States and the European Commission.

The Libya crisis provided an example of the HR/VP's limited role in crisis situations, much due to the Member State's different positions. What is more, the combination of three "hats" has prevented the proper function of the position, hence limiting her efforts in the making of a strong EU foreign policy.

With regard to coordination with the Commission, and although the Lisbon Treaty provided the HR/VP with the traditional instrument of a foreign minister, the Commission's strong established *modus operandi* and search for control over foreign policy is clearly documented here. This new foreign policy system has undermined the HR/VP's ability to fulfill her role as the EU Foreign Minister *vis-à-vis* the Commission's extensive external resources as well as a clear need for deputisation.

The question of deputisation has somehow been solved by the Commission President Juncker, who entrusted the Commissioner for European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations and other Commissioners with the tasks for substituting Federica Mogherini in areas related to Commission competence.

Perhaps one of the most important contributions from the EEAS to strengthen the visibility of the EU in the world and to bring added value, seen from a Member States perspective, has been the work and role of the EU Delegations. Within the Delegations, the Head of Delegation plays a key role in the functioning and performance of an EU Delegation. What is more, through the Delegations framework, the EEAS has the potential to take over some of the core functions of traditional diplomacy in coordination with the Member States; thus, increasing the potential in providing the EU with a stronger voice and presence in the world of affairs.

6. CONCLUDING REMARKS

It is acknowledged that the EU's distinctive toolbox, size, economy and peace, democracy and development promoter make it qualified to deal with the current global challenges. In order to make use of these resources, it is important that the EU is also equipped with the necessary and functioning foreign policy tools. It has been argued that the Treaty of Lisbon (ToL), and consequently the establishment of the EEAS, equipped the EU with the necessary tools to strengthen its role as an international actor. What is more, the ToL aimed at strengthening the coherence and efficiency of the EU foreign policy. Hence, the purpose of this thesis has been to provide answers to the two following research questions:

- 1) *To what degree has the Treaty of Lisbon, through the creation of the EEAS in particular, equipped the EU with the necessary tools for becoming a powerful international actor?*
- 2) *To what extent has the EEAS enabled the EU to pursue a more coherent and effective common foreign policy?*

It is concluded the ToL has indeed developed institutional and political efforts to both enhance the coherence and effectiveness of the EU foreign policy and strengthen the EU's actorness in international relations. The establishment of the EEAS emerged as the potential driving force in the foreign policy-making structure of the EU.

The EEAS unique position within the EU institutional framework, as well as comprising personnel from the Commission, the Council, and the Member States make it a *suis generis* service or body. Its primary task is to coordinate vertically and horizontally the EU foreign policy.

Regarding the vertical coordination, it can be concluded from the Member States perspective, that the EEAS has the potential to provide added value, especially in times of austerity. Nevertheless, many Member States are still getting used to the existence of this new diplomatic Service, thus still resisting in transferring some of their resources to the European level. What is more, the relationship between the EEAS varies from the concepts such as uploading,

downloading, offloading, and cherry picking. This means that Member States perceive the role of the EEAS differently.

With regards to horizontal coordination, and taking into consideration that the Commission still holds most of the EU's external relations tools – with the exception of the CFSP – the EEAS lacks a final word in the policy-making of the EU's foreign policy. Hence, the relationship between the EEAS and the Commission is still complex. However, empirical evidence suggests that cooperation between these two key actors has the potential to improve. Regarding the relationship between the EEAS and the European Council, and The Council, it can be argued to be more positive when compared to the EEAS – Commission relationship.

Special attention was given to the building of a new *esprit de corps*. Literature argued that “identification with the EEAS and the EU more generally can be seen as a key element in the construction of an effective European diplomatic service” (Juncos & Pomorska 2013: 1344). Also, the variety of experience and perspectives of the EEAS staff is considered an asset, and in order to use the potential of the staff and maintain the attractiveness of the EEAS factors such as leadership, communication, trust, public image, training, and career prospects have to be prioritized to build a strong shared working culture. This could enhance the policy coherence and coordination of the EEAS towards all the actors dealing with the EU foreign policy.

The coherence mandate of the EEAS is supported by the new position of the HR/VP and the work and the role of the EU Delegations.

Concerning the new position of the HR/VP, in practical terms, this position comprises three distinct functions, thus considered as “triple-hatted”. Even though this role could indicate a more coherent foreign policy of the EU, its position conflicting duties towards the different institutions creates challenges with regards to decision-making. Also, the combination of three *hats* has prevented the HR/VP the proper function of her position. Subsequently, there has been a general need for political deputisation of the HR/VP. Apparently, this need for deputisation has been solved by the President of the Commission, Juncker, by entrusting Commissioners with the tasks for substituting the HR/VP in areas related to Commission competences.

The work and role of the EU Delegations has arguably been not only the most important contribution in strengthening the EU's visibility in the world but also in bringing added value, as seen from a Member States perspective. Evidence has shown that the EU Delegations have the potential to play a central role in managing relations with government and non-governmental actors on a much broader range of issues than any EU Member State's diplomatic

service. What is more, due to budgetary constraints, EU Delegations could take over some functions which are currently managed by the Member States. The main challenge is that some of these functions still touch sovereignty sensitivities, thus, Delegations will continue to play a coordinator role, and provide information and expertise. Within the Delegations, the Head of Delegation plays a key role in the functioning and performance of an EU Delegation. Also, through the Delegations framework, the EEAS has actually the potential to take over some of the core functions of traditional diplomacy in coordination with the Member States, in addition to the potential in providing the EU with a stronger voice and presence in the world of affairs.

Even though the ToL provided the EU with institutional and political structures to strengthening the coherence of the EU, it can be argued that the ToL did not solve the problems of coherence and unity. By multiplying the number of EU actors dealing with foreign policy – EEAS, HR/VP, and President of the European Council – the ToL have increased the need for more complex negotiations between the EU and Member States, and among the EU institutions themselves. This complex EU foreign policy system born out of the ToL has indeed weakened the coherence of the EU foreign policy. What is more, in order to improve the coherence of EU foreign policy it is necessary not only to improve the institutional cooperation within the EU, mainly the relationship between the EEAS and the Commission, but also to include the Member States as they still remain the most important actors in making foreign policy, particularly the traditional stronger ones- the UK, Germany, and France. Managing the diversity of the EU Member States' interests, and the coordination of the EU's internal positions is the primary challenge that the EEAS – and the EU more broadly – needs to overcome.

However, the EEAS, as well as the EU Delegations can actually be perceived as an opportunity from an efficiency perspective for the Member States to “do more with less”, but as long as they retain their national sovereignty, and are not willing to transfer further resources to the EU level, the capabilities of the EEAS remains limited. Also, these shortcomings, with the added factor of the ongoing financial crisis, contribute to keeping the question open of whether the EU can become a global power in a near future.

To sum up, one can say that establishing a coherent EU foreign policy has probably been the most challenge feature of European integration hitherto. The institutional and political innovations brought by the ToL intended to overcome this challenge but the empirical material has so far shown that EU foreign policy remains a work in progress. Strengthening the role and policy action of the EEAS and the HR/VP as well as adjusting the current organisation structure

of the EU foreign policy structure can actually contribute to improving the coherence and effectiveness of the EU's foreign policy. Nevertheless, these institutional and political innovations have given the EU the opportunity to enhance its international presence and influence.

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
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
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ANNEXES

Annex 1. EEAS HQ Organisation chart as of 16 March 2016



Annex 2. EU Delegations and Offices around the World (infographic)



103 BILATERAL DELEGATIONS (responsible for EU relations with a single country)

1. AFGHANISTAN	A	36. GEORGIA	G	71. PAKISTAN	P
2. ALBANIA	A	37. GHANA	G	72. PANDA NEW GUINEA	P
3. ALGERIA	A	38. GUATEMALA	G	73. PARAGUAY	P
4. ANGOLA	A	39. GUINEA	G	74. PERU	P
5. ARGENTINA	A	40. GUINEA-BISSAU	G	75. PHILIPPINES	P
6. ARMENIA	A	41. HAITI	H	76. RUSSIA	R
7. AZERBAIJAN	A	42. HONDURAS	H	77. SINGAPORE	S
8. BANGLADESH	B	43. HUNGARY	H	78. SLOVIA	S
9. BELARUS	B	44. IFAO	I	79. SLOVAKIA	S
10. BENIN	B	45. ISRAEL	I	80. SOUTH AFRICA	S
11. BOLIVIA	B	46. IVORY COAST	I	81. SOUTH SUDAN	S
12. BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA	B	47. JAPAN	J	82. SOMALIA (BASED IN KENYA)	S
13. BULGARIA	B	48. JORDAN	J	83. SOUTH AFRICA	S
14. BURUNDI	B	49. KENYA	K	84. SUDAN	S
15. BURKINA FASO	B	50. KOREA	K	85. SWAZILAND	S
16. BURUNDI	B	51. KYRGYZSTAN	K	86. THAILAND	T
17. CAMBODIA	C	52. LAOS	L	87. TANZANIA	T
18. CAMBODIA	C	53. LESOTHO	L	88. THAILAND	T
19. CAMBODIA	C	54. LIBERIA	L	89. THAILAND	T
20. CANADA	C	55. LIBYA	L	90. TIMOR-LESTE	T
21. CANE VERDE	C	56. MADAGASCAR	M	91. TOGO	T
22. CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC	C	57. MALAYSIA	M	92. TUNISIA	T
23. CHAD	C	58. MALAYSIA	M	93. TURKEY	T
24. CHILE	C	59. MALI	M	94. UGANDA	U
25. CONGO REP.	C	60. MALDIVAS	M	95. UNITED ARAB EMIRATES	U
26. CONGO DEM. REP.	C	61. MALI	M	96. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA	U
27. COLOMBIA	C	62. MALI	M	97. UZBEKISTAN	U
28. CUBA	C	63. MONTENEGRO	M	98. UZBEKISTAN	U
29. CYPRUS	C	64. MOROCCO	M	99. VENEZUELA	V
30. CZECH REPUBLIC	C	65. MOZAMBIQUE	M	100. VIETNAM	V
31. DENMARK	D	66. NETHERLANDS	N	101. YEMEN	Y
32. EL SALVADOR	D	67. NEPAL	N	102. ZAMBIA	Z
33. ETHIOPIA	E	68. NEPAL	N	103. ZIMBABWE	Z
34. ETHIOPIA	E	69. NIGERIA	N		
35. FINLAND	F	70. NORWAY	N		

12 BILATERAL DELEGATIONS (responsible for groups of countries of a region)

1. CARIBBEAN	ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA, DOMINICA, GUYANA, JAMAICA, PARAGUAY, TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO, VENEZUELA
2. CHINA	HONG KONG
3. CIS	ARMENIA, AZERBAIJAN, GEORGIA, MOLDOVA, OSSETIA-ALANIA, RUSSIA, UKRAINE
4. GABON	EQUATORIAL GUINEA, GAMBIA, GUINEA-BISSAU, SIERRA LEONE
5. INDIA	INDIA
6. INDONESIA	INDONESIA
7. JAPAN	JAPAN
8. KAZAKHSTAN	KAZAKHSTAN
9. MALDIVAS	INDIA, MALDIVAS
10. MALDIVAS	INDIA, MALDIVAS
11. MALDIVAS	INDIA, MALDIVAS
12. MALDIVAS	INDIA, MALDIVAS

7 REGIONAL DELEGATIONS (responsible for another Delegation)

1. AUSTRALIA	NEW ZEALAND
2. COLOMBIA	CHINA, HONG KONG AND TAIWAN
3. GAMBIA	CHINA, HONG KONG AND TAIWAN
4. GUINEA	OFFICE PANAMA
5. GUINEA-BISSAU	SIERRA LEONE
6. SIERRA LEONE	GAMBIA
7. THAILAND	LAOS

5 REGIONAL DELEGATIONS (dependant from another Delegation)

1. EQUADOR	COLOMBIA
2. GAMBIA	SIERRA LEONE
3. LAOS	THAILAND
4. NEW ZEALAND	AUSTRALIA
5. TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO	GUINEA

4 REPRESENTATION OFFICES

1. CHINA (HONG KONG)	OFFICE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
2. WEST BANK AND GAZA STRIP	OFFICE OF THE EU REPRESENTATIVE
3. KOSOVO	EUROPEAN UNION OFFICE IN KOSOVO
4. TAIWAN	EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND TRADE OFFICE

8 MULTILATERAL DELEGATIONS TO INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS

1. AFRICAN UNION	ADDIS ABABA
2. UN	GENEVA
3. WFP	GENEVA
4. UN	NEW YORK
5. OECD / UNESCO	PARIS
6. FAO - HOLY SEE - ORDER OF MALTA	ROME
7. COE	STRASBOURG
8. UN FEARL / OSCE	VIENNA
9. ASEAN	JAKARTA



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