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Who should be the main actor in governing REDD+ projects on the ground?

A comparative study of the relationship between NGOs and the local government in the implementation of three REDD+ pilot projects in Tanzania

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Abstract

This thesis is grounded in the discussion on how REDD+ should be governed on the ground in Tanzania. There are two governance structures that have been the focus of the debate. First, it is a national approach where state authorities at national, regional and district level would be key actors. Second, it is a nested approach where NGOs would most likely be key actors at local level. Part of the process of preparing Tanzania for REDD+, has been to implement pilot projects. In this thesis, the focus has been on the implications for the local government due to NGOs being responsible for the implementation of these projects.

A qualitative research approach has been used in order to study the implementation process of three pilot projects in Tanzania. The analysis is mainly based on primary data collected by semi-structured interviews, however, secondary data such as research articles, reports and government documents have been used in addition.

The main findings suggest that the local government acted as 'service providers' to the NGOs in the implementation process. Although the implications for the local government have been positive, it has not been to a large degree. From a theoretical perspective, there are some key issues in relation to the legitimacy of the process due to how NGOs were able to dominate in relation to decision-making and how there was a detachment of democratic accountability.

This thesis argues that the the local government should be key actors in governing REDD+ on the ground rather than NGOs. It is a contribution to research that focuses on the role of the local government in Tanzania regarding implementation of projects funded by the North. In addition, it can contribute specifically to the debate in Tanzania concerning the governance of REDD+.

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Abbreviations

AWF African Wildlife Foundation

CBFiM Community Based Fire Management

CBFM Community Based Forest Management

CCE Community Carbon Enterprise

COP Conference of the Parties

CSO Civil Society Organizations

DFO District Forest Officer

DFM District Forest Manager

FAO Food and Agricultural Organization

FBD Forest and Beekeeping Division

FCPF World Bank's Forest Carbon Partnership Facility

FIP Forest Investment Program

FPIC Free Prior and Informed Consent

FSC Forest Stewardship Certification

GCF Green Climate Fund

JUHIBECO Inter Village Council

LUP Land Use Planning

MCDI Mpingo Conservation and Development Initiative

MJUMITA Tanzania Community Forest Conservation Network

MRV Monitoring, Reporting and Verification

NGO Non-Governmental Organization

NCMC National Carbon Monitoring Centre

NCCSC National Climate Change Steering Committee

NCCTC National Climate Change Technical Committee

NLUPC National Land Use Planning Commission

NRTF National REDD+ Task Force

PFM Participatory Forest Management

PFRA Participatory Forest Resource Assessment

PPP Public Private Partnership

RED Reduced Emissions from Deforestation

REDD Reduced Emissions from Forest Degradation and Deforestation

REDD+ Reduced Emissions from Forest Degradation and Deforestation, Conserving and Enhancing Forest Carbon Stocks and Sustainable Managing Forests

TFS Tanzania Forest Service

TFCG Tanzania Forest Conservation Group

UNDP United Nations Development Program

UNEP United Nations Environment Program

UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

URT United Republic of Tanzania

VEO Village Executive Officer

VLFMP Village Land Forest Management Plan

VLFR Village Land Forest Reserve

VLUC Village Land Use Commission

VLUP Village Land Use Plan

VNRC Village Natural Resource Committee

VPO Vice President's Office

1. Introduction

At COP21[1] in Paris, an ambitious goal of limiting global temperature increase to 1.5 degrees above pre-industrial levels was made. In order to meet this goal, there is clearly a need for new and innovative solutions. The importance of the forest in mitigating climate change is explicitly recognized in the Paris Agreement due to the high emissions deriving from the forest sector. Approximately 25% of all global emissions is from the land sector, and within this, about half of the emissions derive from deforestation and forest degradation (IPCC 2014). UNFCCC has introduced REDD+ in order to provide a financial incentive for developing countries to reduce greenhouse gas emission from deforestation and forest degradation, and conserve and enhance forest carbon stocks by improved forest management. Although more than 50 developing countries have made progress in the design of their REDD+ strategies and action plans (WWF 2015), there still does not exist an agreement that will ensure long-term financial support from donor countries. Yet, as the statement by the UN Executive Secretary of UNFCCC, Christiana Figueres, demonstrates, there is still hope that REDD+ can contribute to meaningful emission reductions:

> *Global deforestation alone accounts for more than 20 per cent of the world's CO2 emissions. Therefore, global action on forests is crucial to meet the challenge climate change presents, and **REDD+** is key to unlocking forest mitigation potential in many developing countries (Figueres 2015).*

1.1 REDD+ readiness in Tanzania

Tanzania is one of the countries that started preparing its REDD+ strategy under the UN-REDD program after COP13 in Bali in 2007. In April in 2008, the government of Tanzania and the government of Norway signed a Letter of Intent on a Climate Change partnership where Norway would provide USD 90 million for various REDD+ activities in Tanzania (Peskett and Brockhaus 2009). Since the establishment of the partnership, nine REDD+ pilot projects have started its implementation, methodologies for carbon accounting has been developed and promotion for research and capacity building programs related to climate change has been initiated (URT 2013b). In addition, Norway has provided assistance in order to promote Public

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[1] COP21 is short for the 21st Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).

Private Partnerships for increased investments in sustainable management of forest, and supported Tanzania in preparation for a future REDD+ funding mechanism (URT 2013b).

Two distinct REDD+ readiness processes have emerged simultaneously in Tanzania. First, there is the the national process of establishing strategies and an action plan for implementing REDD+ on the ground. Second, there is the process of implementing pilot projects where NGOs have been contracted directly by the Norwegian Embassy in Tanzania. Initially, the idea was that the pilot projects were to align with the national standards of REDD+, however, the absence of an intermediator between national government and the pilots, resulted in the work of the pilot projects being developed mostly independently (Norwegian Embassy 2013).

There has been a debate concerning the way that REDD+ should be operated within Tanzania in the future. Rantala and Di Gregorio (2014) describe the options as followed: 1) a national approach, which would entail that the central government would have full control over accounting and distribution of payments; 2) subnational approach where accounting and payments would go directly from international sources to individual projects; or 3) a nested approach that combines the two above. The debate has mainly been in relation to a national approach where a national REDD+ trust fund would be established and a nested approach where communities would directly access international funding[2] (Rantala and Di Gregorio 2014). The National Strategy on REDD+ has proposed a national approach, which would surely give the local government responsibilities concerning the governance of REDD+ on the ground. However, numerous of Civil Society Organization (CSOs), especially, are strong advocates for a nested approach.

1.2 Problem statement

Previous research suggests that the local government in Tanzania have been sidelined in the implementation of REDD+ pilot projects. Because the implementation of REDD+ projects involves implementing government policies that are ordinarily under the jurisdiction of local authorities, it becomes a question of legitimacy. In addition, it can be problematic for the sustainability of the REDD+ projects if the local government do not have the capacity to uphold the governance of the projects in the future. Since there is not a lot of existing research that focuses on the implications for the local government due to NGOs being in charge, this thesis

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[2] More details concerning this debate will be discussed in section 5.5.

will be a contribution as it will go more in debt into the process, studying the relationship between the local government and NGOs.

1.3 Research questions

As mentioned, an interesting aspect of how the REDD+ pilot projects have been implemented in Tanzania, is that Norway has contracted NGOs directly instead of giving money through the Tanzanian government[3]. In relation to the REDD+ pilot projects in Tanzania, it is unclear to what extent the local government[4] has been involved in the implementation process. Hence, the first research question in this thesis will be:

> 1) What role did the district government play in the implementation process of the REDD+ pilots?

The type of activities that will be studied in relation to the role of local government are foremost: a) the role of the district government in informing communities about REDD+; b) the role of the district government in land use planning such as defining boundaries and mapping; and c) the role of the district government in making decisions related to payment level and distribution.

Previous research has suggested that NGOs have been the leading actors while the local government have acted as service providers to the NGOs (NIRAS 2015c). There are several concerns with regard to the implications derived from the lack of participation from the local government in the implementation phase. One concern is that it may result in the administration not being able to develop the competence and expertise required to uphold the sustainability of the REDD+ projects in the future. Similarly, lack of involvement by the local government in such projects, might result in the state remaining weak in terms of governance. Even though giving funding to NGOs might be a better alternative than paying the state directly in the short-term, it could be problematic since NGOs tend to come and go. Acknowledging the seriousness of the concerns described above, the second research question will make an attempt to

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[3] It should not be inferred that the reason for contracting NGOs to implement pilot projects rather than going through the state was because Norway supported such a model. However, the reason for doing so was heavily influenced by recent issues concerning misuse of funds within the Tanzanian forest sector during the years leading up to the REDD+ partnership between Norway and Tanzania.
[4] The local government refers to the District Council and Administration.

determine how the local government has been affected by NGOs being responsible for implementing the pilots. Thus, the next question has been formulated as followed:

2) Is the local government benefiting or losing out in terms of resources such as money and competence?

Another issue concerns the legitimacy of the implementation process. The way that the pilot projects have been implemented is crucial as it has to do with how the communities perceive the projects and how they accept the authority of NGOs. Without meaningful involvement by the local government in the implementation of REDD+ pilot projects, it brings into question how legitimate the implementation process has been. This is especially due to the fact that the implementation of REDD+ pilot projects involve implementing government policies, which are ordinarily under the jurisdiction of district authorities. The legitimacy of the process is also important because it will influence the outcome of the projects and its effectiveness. The third research question will therefore be:

3) How legitimate was the process?

As mentioned previously, there is a debate going on in Tanzania regarding which governance model of REDD+ should be selected in the future. The model proposed in the national strategy would give government authorities at national, regional and local level key responsibilities in the governance of REDD+, however, concerning the nested approach, it is questionable what role the local government would play. Rantala & Di Gregorio (2014) have presented the two options as an interesting dilemma:

Should REDD+, as a potential new source of funding, be used to strengthen weak state governance or channeled directly to local communities as compensation for the opportunity costs of forest conservation, which they may not have been able to access previously? (section: "discussion").

The first option from the question above would be an implication due to the governance structure presented in the National REDD+ Strategy as it would surely strengthen the state since they would be key actors regarding governance. The second option would be the implication of the 'nested approach' where communities could access the carbon market directly rather then

it being channeled through the central government. It has been questionable what the role of the local government would be in the 'nested approach', so the last research question will therefore be:

4) What would be the role of the local government in the governance of REDD+ if a 'nested approach' is chosen?

Hence, the overall objective of this master thesis will attempt to explain the implications for the local government as a result of NGOs being responsible for the implementation of REDD+ pilots in Tanzania. In addition, it will be to evaluate two governance models of REDD+ in Tanzania in order to determine what would be the 'better' option. The ambition of this thesis is to broaden the understanding of how the local government and NGOs interact on the ground in Tanzania, and to provide insight into the implications for the local government if either of two models become selected.

1.4 Structure of the thesis

This thesis is structured into 7 chapters. Following, there will be given background information which will provide context to the research questions. Next, there will be a presentation of the conceptual framework which is based on institutional theory. Thereafter, there will be an overview of the methodology before moving on to the analysis, discussion and finally the conclusion.

2. Background

This section is divided into four main parts. First, I will provide information on the background of REDD+ and explain the concept. Second, I will introduce the governance options for REDD+ on a global level. Third, I will present some of the key policies and laws in Tanzania that are significant in relation to REDD+; namely the decentralization process, land tenure and forest governance. Last, I will give some information concerning the state of the forest in Tanzania, which will include drivers of deforestation.

2.1 The evolution of REDD+

At COP11 in Montreal in 2005, Papa New Guinea and Costa Rica with the support by eight other nations, presented a new agenda item called *RED*, or more precise "Reducing emissions from deforestation in developing countries and approaches to stimulate action" (UNFCCC 2016). Since deforestation was perceived as a major issue in relation to global climate change, the item was well received by the UNFCCC members (Pistorius 2012). At this stage, RED was perceived as a cost-effective mitigation scheme where developing nations could contribute to climate change mitigation without impairing their development (Pistorius 2012). The debate continued, and at the COP13 in Bali, the item had progressed from RED to *Reducing Emissions from Forest Degradation and Deforestation* (REDD), as it was realized that forest degradation was an even bigger issue than deforestation in some countries (Wertz-Kanounnikoff and Angelsen 2009).

Initially, the emphasis was merely on reducing and preventing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation. However, in order to avoid creating a mechanism that would reward historically high emitters, activities such as conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest stocks were included, as it would allow communities with low deforestation rates to participate by keeping their forests intact (REDD desk 2016). Thus, additional items were included so that REDD was transformed into *Reducing Emissions from Forest Degradation and Deforestation, Conserving and Enhancing Forest Carbon Stocks, and Sustainable Managing Forests* (REDD+) at the COP14 in Poznán in 2008[5] (Wertz-Kanounnikoff and Angelsen 2009).

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[5] The *plus* was not officially included in project texts until 2009 at the COP15 (Pistorius 2012).

Figure 1 Phases of the debate and milestones for the design and implementation of REDD+

Source: (Pistorius 2012)

Since the idea of REDD+ was launched, there has been great effort at the international level in order to put it into practice (Angelsen and McNeill 2012). Numerous of international programs have been developed in order to start the implementation. The UN-REDD Program for instance, was created in 2008, and is governed by other implementing agencies under the United Nations such as the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP). The UN-REDD Program gives support to national governments in partner countries located in Africa Asia-Pacific and Latin America with REDD+ readiness efforts (UN-REDD Program 2015). Other programs that were established at the COP13 in Bali, is the World Bank's Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) and the Forest Investment Program (FIP) for the purpose of assisting in preparing for REDD+ on the ground in the selected REDD readiness countries (Angelsen and McNeill 2012). These programs provide essential funding for preparing developing countries with tropical or subtropical forests for REDD+. In addition, there are a few bilateral partnerships that have been established between developed (donors) and developing (recipient) countries. Among the REDD+ donor countries, Norway is the most prominent, and has established bilateral agreements with Brazil, Guyana, Indonesia, Mexico and Tanzania (Streck and Parker 2012).

As an idea, REDD+ has been very successful (Angelsen and McNeill 2012). This is evident in the amount of REDD+ readiness activity that has been put into force, millions of USD that have

been donated and the number of pilot projects that has been implemented. Although, REDD+ initially was presented as a "quick, cheap and easy" solution to climate change mitigation at the global arena, it has become clear that there are major governance challenges involved in operationalizing the scheme on the ground (Angelsen and McNeill 2012). Seeing that international negotiations on REDD+ have been slow and the ambiguity of the concept, there has been huge variation regarding implementation of REDD+ in different countries. This is among others, a result of the variety of opinions on how REDD+ should be governed and the variation in local conditions – both natural and institutional (source?).

2.2 Different models of REDD+

Despite there being consensus on the fact that REDD+ has great potential in being a cost-effective solution to mitigating climate change, there exist vast disagreement on the governance structure of REDD+. Certain issues have shown to be particularly contentious, such as the type of governance model. Globally, there are two governance models that have been discussed. This is either a national approach or a subnational approach. The national approach involves that the governance of REDD+ would be controlled by the central government in recipient countries, and could either be financed through a market or a fund. In contrast, the subnational approach, entails that mainly non-governmental actors, such as NGOs, would be responsible for the governance of REDD+ on the ground. The subnational approach would most likely entail that a market would finance REDD+, but it could also be through an international REDD+ fund[6] (Skutsch and McCall 2010).

The main argument for a subnational approach surrounds the technical and political weakness within developing countries at national level, whereas the argument for a national approach is based on the wish to avoid internal leakage and "cherry picking" of projects (Skutsch 2010). A national approach was preferred in global discussions under UNFCCC when REDD+ was first introduced as it would give more sovereignty to states and it would make REDD+ different

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[6]There are several varieties of how REDD+ could potentially be governed nationally, which include more options than the choice between a market or fund. Vatn and Vedeld (2012) have suggested four possible governance outcomes: 1) a market/project based architecture similar to CDM, 2) a system with national REDD+ funds independent of national administrations, 3) a national REDD+ fund organized under national administration, 4) conditional budget support where an international fund will support developing states in realizing REDD+ activities. All of these possibilities come with strengths and weaknesses, and a thorough evaluation of each is needed in order to find the best possible solution.

from earlier forest conservation initiatives, which were mainly project-based (Angelsen & McNeill 2012). However, up to now, a national approach has not been what has happened within most REDD+ readiness countries. There are numerous of reasons for this development. One reason is that there was great pressure arising from donor pledges to quickly start implementation of REDD+ on the ground that resulted in money being given to NGOs who were ready to start implementation of pilot projects. In addition, donors were more favorable of funding individual projects where they had more control over the use of money and output of the projects (Angelsen and McNeill 2012). Although, we see that a subnational approach has been favored up to now, it is likely that national governments in recipient countries might become the leading actors in the future. This is because national policies and institutions within REDD+ readiness countries must be in line with the global design in order for it to be effective (Angelsen and McNeill 2012).

In relation to the discussion on the subnational or national approach, there is a question on how REDD+ should be financed. The two options are either through a compliance market or through an international fund. According to Guizol and Atmadja (as cited in Angelsen and McNeill 2012), during the UNFFCC meetings in 2007-2008, a dual funding approach was preferred by most countries where the idea was that public sources would in the short-term provide funding for capacity building, while the market would provide for result-based payments in the long-term. Because of the many practical issues of creating an international market for REDD+, an overall agreement has still not been decided upon. As such, REDD+ is not included in any compliance carbon market up to this date[7].

Those who are proponents of a market, argue that it will among other, be the most cost-effective option, that it is the only option for attracting enough resources to REDD+, and that it will avoid the issue of corruption and long bureaucratic procedures experienced in many developing nations (see Vatn and Vedeld 2012). There exist many concerns about choosing a market approach, however. Some global concerns are that a market might exaggerate the issue of leakage within countries, and that it might result in the more powerful nations and actors attracting more REDD+ projects which will work against REDD+ being a pro-poor conservation scheme (Skutsch and McCall 2010, Angelsen and McNeill 2012). A global

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[7] Instead, some pilot projects have successfully been linked to the voluntary market.

REDD+ fund has therefore been introduced, such as the Green Climate Fund (GCF) that was established at COP17[8].

As mentioned previously, the direction of REDD+ is yet to be decided, leaving leeway for individual nations and projects on how they would like to carry out REDD+ in the present. There are plenty of issues that needs to be addressed internally in tropical forest nations before an agreement may be reached globally. National debates concern many of the same issues as the global debates, however, they tend to emphasize more on *how* and by *whom* REDD+ is implemented in addition to being more concerned with benefit sharing (Peskett & Brockhaus 2009). As emphasized by Peskett & Brockhaus (2009), in certain situations there has been tension between the state and the private sector[9] within tropical forest nations. For instance, in certain cases, states are resisting to acknowledge subnational approaches that are being developed simultaneously with national strategies of REDD+, and are delaying the development of regulations that would support the subnational approaches. Furthermore, there tends to be a lack of coordination between the state and private sector, which is prohibiting an effective development of REDD+ within REDD+ readiness countries (Peskett and Brockhaus 2009).

Moving away from the global situation of REDD+, I will turn to a thorough presentation of the situation of REDD+ in Tanzania. Next, the relevant policies and regulations within Tanzania will be presented as they are significant for the success of a potential large-scale REDD+ scheme in the country. As such, there is a need to go a bit back in time so that the situation today can be understood on a deeper level.

2.3 Relevant policies and laws in Tanzania

In the following sections, I will provide an overview of land tenure, forest governance and decentralization of government as they are important for how REDD+ is implemented within the Tanzanian context.

2.3.1 Decentralization of Governance in Tanzania

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[8] The GCF is accountable to the United Nations and investments originate from both private and public sectors, which can further be channeled to projects or programs at international, national or subnational level (GCF 2016).
[9] NGOs are the main private actors.

In Tanzania, the decentralization process, or devolution of power to be more precise, started in 1982 with the Local Government Act (URT 1982). The decentralization of government was influenced by international debates in relation to forest governance, which transitioned from 'command and control' to more participatory forms (Blomley and Iddi 2009, Rantala and Di Gregorio 2014).

The governance structure of villages in Tanzania has its origin from 1975 during the villagization program[10]. Subsequently, Village Assemblies were created, which consisted of all persons over age 18 in a village, and Village Councils, which were 15-25 elected individuals headed by a Village Chairman (FBD 2009). Village Councils were able to formulate their own legally binding bylaws, which needed to be approved by the District Council. The two key political actors at the village level is the Village Chairman who has been elected into power by villagers, and the Village Executive Officer who is an employee of the District Council and in contrast to the Village Chairman, this person has no voting rights (Kajembe, Silayo et al. 2015).

Table 1 Local government structure and functions

Administrative/ Political Level	Function	Number on mainland Tanzania
Village Government	Overseeing development activities at the local level, ensuring local law and order, enforcement of local bylaws co-ordination of local planning, overseeing land use planning and allocation	10,571 (registered)
Ward	Co-ordinates and supports village planning, supervises service delivery and ensures integration of priorities into district plans and budgets	1,756
District Council	Maintenance of law and order, and good governance, ensuring equitable and effective delivery of services to people in their areas, raising, receiving and disbursing funds in line with local development priorities	97
Regional Administrative Secretariat	Linking local governments to central ministries, advising local governments on planning, financial management and service delivery, monitoring and reporting local government activities to central government	21

Source: Blomley and Iddi 2009

The table above shows the different levels of local government, and their respective functions. As the table illustrates, there is a level of government between village and district level. A Ward usually consists of minimum 5 villages and consists of 25 members which include an elected

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[10] During the years 1967-1973, the government had implemented a villagization program that relocated 80% of the rural population to 5,528 villages. The exact number is questionable as different sources have reported on different numbers. According to a USAID report, 75% of the rural population was reallocated (USAID 2011).

chairman, other elected members and the Village Executive Officer who is the secretary to the council (Baker, Wallevik et al. 2002).

At the district level, the government is constructed similar to the village government. The representative of the central government at the district level is the District Commissioner who is appointed by the President to assist the regional commissioner to fulfill his/her duties (Baker, Wallevik et al. 2002). There are also District Councils who are elected by the local population, which is headed by a District Council Chairman elected by the Council. The Chairman has significant influence on the decision-making process and the direction of policy. In addition to the Chairman, there is a District Executive Director who does not have voting rights but is in charge of the operational procedures of the local government, head of all staff, responsibility for revenue collection among other important matters at district level. Within the local government system there are also departments who are headed by professionals who give advice to the sub-committees of the District Council. Staff within the departments are in charge of implementing the decisions that are decided by the District Council (Baker, Wallevik et al. 2002). In relation to the implementation of REDD+, it is the staff within the departments of natural resources such as forestry and land planning who have been actively involved.

The systems created following the Local Government Authority Act, did not meet the expectations of the people and was criticized for being a top-down system where the local governments were constrained by a central government bureaucracy (Baker, Wallevik et al. 2002). Accordingly, the Local Government Reform Programme has been implemented in Tanzania since year 2000 for the purpose of further decentralizing authority from the central government to lower levels of government. Kessy and McCourt (2010) argue that there are two significant constraints that remain in relation to decentralization of government in Tanzania. The first constraint is the continued influence from the central government and regional government in human resource management. The second constraint is the district council's increased dependency on the central government in terms of revenue. Although, the article of Kessy and McCourt only involved two districts, other sources (see Baker, Wallevik et al. 2002), point to similar findings.

2.3.2 Land tenure and property rights

In Tanzania, land is a very important resource and land tenure regimes have a big influence on how forests are managed. This section, will provide an overview over land tenure before looking at how the forest is governed.

When Tanzania got its independence from British colonial rule in 1961, the new President of Tanzania, Julius Nyerere, introduced "African socialism" where ethnic groups were granted customary property rights. Collective cultivation of land was encouraged during this time in the newly established villages (USAID 2011). The new government continued to use many of the same land concepts that had been developed during the colonial period, which as a result, did not lead to major changes in relation to tenure and land rights (Veit 2010).

During the rule of the first President, there was limited economic growth and land tenure was very insecure. As such, the second President, Ali Hassan Mwinyi, introduced individual property rights and promoted private investments in land in order to promote economic growth (USAID 2011). Numerous of new policies and laws were established correspondingly, which liberalized the economy and made Tanzania more attractive to foreign investors. Since Tanzania got its independence, there was no comprehensive land policy that governed land tenure, land use management and administration, until the *National Land Policy* was introduced in 1997 (URT 1997).

Although a land policy was much needed, disappointedly, it did not result in major changes (Sundet 2004). The policy failed to address the most central issue related to tenure, namely that of decentralizing land administration. Recommendations for decentralization had strongly been emphasized in studies on the policy by both civil society and by the Land Commission, however, they were ignored by the government (USAID 2011; Sundet 2005). As a result, a further centralization of administration in regards to land matters was implemented. In addition, the policy was criticized for supporting foreign and commercial investors looking to acquire land in the country. The policy did aim for allowing villages to govern their own land, however, since they were constrained by rigorous administrative and bureaucratic procedures, in practice, this was not so (Veit 2010).

The purpose of the policy was mainly to address the numerous of land issues that had been arising as a result of a steady population increase, a higher demand on land, urbanization,

investors wanting to acquire land, and land conflicts as a result of insecure land rights (URT 1997). Further, the policy set the base for the new land legislations; the *Land Act of 1999* and the *Village Land Act of 1999*. According to the land acts, all land in Tanzania is vested in the President in trust for present and future generations, and administered by the Commissioner of Lands under the Ministry of Lands and Human Settlement Development on behalf of the President (URT 1999a). The Land Act and the Village Land Act were established in order to provide the legal framework for the three categories of land that exist in Tanzania: 1) reserved land; 2) general land; and 3) village land.

The Village Land Act provides the framework for land that is allocated to villages under long-term management agreements, while the Land Act provides the framework for reserved land and general land (URT 1999a, URT 1999b). Reserved land is land that is set aside for special purposes such as forest reserves, game parks, land reserved for public utilities and highways etc. (Sundet 2005). General land is defined differently in legal texts, making it very confusing and easy to take advantage of. For instance, the Land Act defines general land as "all public land which is not reserved or village land and includes unoccupied or unused village land", while the Village Land Act defines general land as "all public land which is not reserved land or village land". As such, it is not clear who has jurisdiction over land on unoccupied village land. Because all general land is under the jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Lands, while village land is under the local government, such inconsistency in the definitions has resulted in conflict in numerous of cases (Veit 2010).

There are two main types of tenure that are recognized under the Village Land Act and Land Act of 1999: 1) *customary right of occupancy;* and 2) *granted right of occupancy*. Granted right of occupancy applies to general and reserved land, and can be obtained up to 99 years. Such regulations are similar to those that existed during the colonial period showing limited tenure reform since Tanzania's independence (USAID 2011, Veit 2010). Customary right of occupancy is described as village land that villagers hold under customary law or have been allocated from the village council (URT 1999a, USAID 2011). Villages have rights to land held collectively under customary law, and they can demarcate their land, register these collective rights, and obtain a certificate as proof (USAID 2011). 753 villages had obtained its certificate up to 2009 (USAID 2011), which is a small number considering there are 11,000 villages in Tanzania all together. The procedures of land administration at village level is complex. According to the Village Land Regulations passed in 2001, there are 50 forms in total that can

be used by villagers to administer their land (Sundet 2005). In order for the villages to take advantage of the new regulations passed by the Village Land Act, it is essential that they are properly trained to understand the system. Otherwise, more powerful actors an easily manipulate the system to their advantage (Sundet 2005).

2.3.3 Forest governance and PFM

The legal framework for forest management and administration in Tanzania is the Forest Act of 2002, designed following the National Forestry Policy in 1998. According to the act, there are national forests reserves, local authority forest reserves, village forests and private forests (URT 2002). Participatory forest management (PFM) is a central component within forest policy in Tanzania and has been implemented across the country since the 1990s (URT 2012). The legal framework for PFM is based in the Forest Act (2002). The Forest Act advocates for PFM in two ways, e.g. one objective is "to delegate responsibility for management of forest resources to the lowest level of local management consistent with the furtherance of national policies" (section 3d, URT 2002).

Further, the act supports PFM in two ways (pp. 7 Blomley and Iddi 2009):

1) "Enabling local communities to declare – and ultimately gazette – Village, Group or Private Forest Reserves" - referred to as Community Based Forest Management (CBFM)

2) "Allowing communities to enter into agreements with government and other forest owners for joint management agreements" - referred to as Joint Forest Management (JFM)

Although, the two types of PFM are similar in that they allow communities to manage forests, they differ in fundamental ways. CBFM takes place on village or private land, and the forest is owned and managed by either a village council through a village natural resource committee (VNRC), a registered group, or an individual (URT 2012). Costs and benefits of CBFM will mostly go to the owners and the central government has limited influence. JFM on the other hand, takes place on either central or local forest reserves, and management responsibilities are shared between communities surrounding the forests and the owner through an agreement. The Forest Act (2002) does not state how benefits arising from forest under JFM shall be shared, which has resulted in a longer process and negotiation period for establishing JFM agreements. In 2013, however, the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism published guidelines for

sharing of benefits. According to the guidelines, the communities would get <49% of the profit from protective or productive forests under JFM (URT 2013a)[11].

Data from 2012 show that 23.3% of forests in Tanzania are under PFM arrangements, which covers 2285 villages and 77 districts (URT 2012). Studies on PFM in Tanzania have suggested that forests under JFM or CBFM arrangements have improved forest conditions compared with forests managed by government alone, or under open access regimes (Blomley and Iddi 2009). However, there has been some evidence of leakage where the establishment of PFM have resulted in less disturbance of forest in one area but increased activity in another forest area. It should be noted, that the evidence for leakage is stronger concerning JFM than CBFM (Blomley and Iddi 2009).

In order to establish PFM, the process of Land Use Planning (LUP) must be accomplished. The National Land Use Planning Commission (NLUPC) published guidelines for village land use planning in 1993, however, few villages have had the resources and competence to take on the rigorous task. The importance of carrying out LUP has been emphasized in the Land Act, and a detailed framework for carrying out the process is found in the Land Use Planning Act (URT 2007). LUP is essential for effectively managing valuable natural resources in villages. Especially since most villagers depend on agriculture, forestry and beekeeping for their livelihoods, LUP is important to ensure its sustainability. It has been registered by the NLUC that around 1,000-1,200 villages have successfully developed LUPs. The exact number is uncertain due to the fact that there are various actors conducting LUPs, such as NGOs and district government officials in addition to the NLUPC (Makwarimba and Ngowi 2012).

Guidelines for PFM have been published by the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism and have been grouped into six main steps (URT 2013; Vatn et al 2013):
1. Getting started:
    a. District level: select villages for PFM, brief district staff, create a district PFM facilitation team
    b. Village level: the district facilitation team meet with the village council and village assembly and create a village natural resource committee (VNRC)
2. Assessment and management planning:

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[11] In relation to REDD+, JFM arrangements could become a potential issue since communities are not owners of the forests. Tanzania's National REDD+ Strategy (2013) does not state details concerning carbon rights. Thus, it is questionable how potential future carbon revenues will be shared between local communities and national or local government.

a. identify and agree on the village and village forest reserve boundaries, conduct a participatory forest resource assessment (PFRA) with the VNRC

b. measure and assess the forest and consult stakeholders and natural resource users

c. develop a management plan and village bylaws

3. Formalizing and legalizing:

a. the VNRC presents the draft to the village council and assembly who has to approve

b. the draft is sent to the ward development committee who informs neighboring villages in the ward about the location and rules

c. the draft is brought to the district council for final approval

4. Implementing:

a. Awareness-raising among village members concerning the management plan and bylaws

b. Strengthen the VNRC and its ability to hold meetings, undertake patrols, perform record-keeping and monitor the forest

c. District monitoring and supervision, and conflict resolution if necessary

5. Revising and gazettement

a. After three years the forest management plan can be reviewed and revised is necessary

b. Request that the FBD officially gazette the VLFR

6. Expansion to new areas

a. PFM can be expanded or include more villages

b. Neighboring villages can request their own CBFM or be included into the JFM agreement

c. If so, a plan and new budget needs to be made

A major challenge concerning the establishment of PFM, is that responsibility lies with the District Councils and staff who are heavily constrained by human and operational resources to effectively implement the policies that are under the Forest Act 2002 (Blomley and Iddi 2009). As such, most of the funding for PFM has been via donors through either NGOs, area based projects, or funds channeled through the Prime Minister's Office to regional or local governments[12].

As mentioned previously, forests on village land is under the management of villages under supervision by the District government. Forest on general land, however, which is mainly Central Government Forest Reserves, is managed by the Executive Agency, Tanzania Forest Service (TFS)[13]. As it is a newly established agency, its role within the forest sector is still in

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[12] The fact that the government advocates for the establishment of PFM, but does not set aside substantial funding, should be highlighted. It means the state is dependent on donors. In the light of this, REDD+ has been positively received as it presents a great opportunity for providing funding for the expansion of PFM across the country.

[13] The government transferred responsibility for the management of Central Government Forest Reserves from the Forestry and Beekeeping Division (FBD) to TFS in 2010 (TFCG; TFS). According to TFS's webpage, the reason for the transfer was in order to improve forest protection and management (TFS 2016).

the process of being formed. Since its establishment, TFS have had a big success in revenue collection. While the BDS collected TZS 10.9 billion in 2005/2006, TFS collected TZS 75 billion in 2014/2015 (TFCG 2015). The majority of the revenue collected is from the sale of trees for timber and for charcoal (TFCG 2015).

The legal harvest, transport, sale and export of forest products, is by the issuance of licenses and permits. The issuance of licenses and permits from local authority forest reserves or village land, is the responsibility of the Forest Officer within the District. While in regards to the forest on general land or the central government forest reserves, it is TFS who are in charge. There are also checkpoints stationed at administrative boundaries for monitoring timber trade and collecting revenue (Kajembe, Silayo et al. 2015). In many cases there are District Forest Officers (DFO) and District Forest Managers (DFM) working alongside each other in the same area. While the DFO is under the jurisdiction of the local government, the DFM is directly reporting to the central government. In some districts there have been reported conflict between the DFO and DFM, particularly in relation to revenue collection as the guidelines for issuing permits and harvesting licenses are not clear (TFCG 2015).

A major concern with how TFS operate, is that they often issue harvesting permits without considering the source of the forest produce (TFCG 2015). As a result, a significant proportion of the revenue that they collect from natural forest produce, originates from village land. This means that TFS is overstepping its mandate as they are only supposed to be managing central government forest reserves and forest on general land. Furthermore, this is problematic because while villages are struggling to invest money in the management of their forests, TFS are profiting as they do not invest anything back into the village forests, which in the end results in village forests being unsustainably managed (TFCG 2015).

2.4 State of the forest

Approximately 55% of land in Tanzania is classified as forests and woodland, adding up to 1.6 million hectares (FAO 2015). 37% of forest area is government forest reserves. The amount of forest that exist on general or village land is not clear as different sources use different definitions of general land, and thus, contradicting numbers are found in literature. If the definition from the Land Act is used, then it can be said that 54% of forest is on general land,

while 9% is on private or village land (USAID 2011). Whereas if we use the definition from the Village Land Act, the amount of forest on general land is significantly reduced as most of the forest is within village boundaries. Correspondingly, the Ministry of Lands and Human Settlement Development have reported that 70% of land in Tanzania is on village land, 28% on reserved land and only 2% is general land (Government of Tanzania 2011 cited in Veit et al 2012).

Because most forest on village land is likely to be on land for communal use or on land set aside for future use (Veit, Vhugen et al. 2012), it can be problematic if the definition of village land from the Land Act is used rather than the definition found in the Village Land Act as it would classify most of the forests in villages as general land. In this way, villages are in the position to lose parts of their land to the central government or private investors. In regards to REDD+, such uncertainty in tenure could result in villagers losing out on carbon benefits.

2.4.1 Motivation for REDD+

Deforestation is a serious issue in Tanzania, and according to a report by FAO (2015), approximately 370,000 hectares of forest is lost per year. A significant amount of carbon is stored in the forest, which makes Tanzania an attractive place for the west to implement carbon offset projects. Likewise, REDD+ could presents a great opportunity for Tanzania as well, as it may allow for the maintenance and recovery of forest while at the same time it may reduce poverty in local communities. However, this is not a simple task as Tanzania has up to now experienced one of the largest global annual net losses of forest cover between 1990-2010 (FAO 2015). Unless serious efforts to protect the forest are implemented, the forest could be gone within 50-80 years if the loss of forest continues at the present rate Kweka, Carmenta et al. (2015). Hence, REDD+ in Tanzania could contribute to meaningful efforts in order to reverse the trend of forest loss in the country.

2.4.2 Drivers of deforestation

The causes of deforestation and forest degradation are many, and include both direct causes such as conversion of forest land to agriculture and indirect causes such as poverty and population growth[14]. Targeting the issue from various angles is vital in order to construct and

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[14] Different regions differ in the most prominent drivers in addition to differences between urban and rural areas, however, in this section the drivers will be discussed in general of all of Tanzania.

implement successful policies and programs for forest conservation. As such, an overview of the most prominent direct causes will be given below[15].

2.4.2.1 Agriculture

Approximately 75% of the population in Tanzania depend on agriculture for their survival (Kweka, Carmenta et al. 2015), and in a country where the annual population growth rate persists around 3% (The World Bank 2016), the number of people who depend on agriculture is likely to grow. The practice of shifting cultivation is an issue since the dominant trend is a rotation cycle of three years which does not leave enough time for the land to regenerate and makes the practice unsustainable (Kweka, Carmenta et al. 2015). Small-scale farmers are the driving force behind the conversion of land as they commonly suffer from a lack of alternatives (Kweka, Carmenta et al. 2015). There exists a national policy, *Kilimo kwanza,* that is a national effort to modernize agriculture practices. REDD+ could possibly support the policy intervention by targeting sustainable agriculture, which might relieve pressure on forest land.

2.4.2.2 Logging

Logging is a major driving force of deforestation and forest degradation. Unsustainable practices and the persistent issue of illegal logging are major threats to the forest. Logging activities in Tanzania have actually increased since the early 2000s as a result of a sustained global demand, improved accessibility to forest areas and more decentralization of forest management and logging activities (Milledge, Gelvas et al. 2007). The large amount of illegal activity in relation to timber harvest and trade makes it particularly challenging for REDD+. Although the revenue collected from timber has increased, reinvestment in the forest remains an issue (Kweka, Carmenta et al. 2015). Despite the growth in revenue, it is estimated that at least USD 58 million are lost each year due to illegal activity (Kweka, Carmenta et al. 2015).

2.4.2.3 Firewood and charcoal

Firewood and charcoal is also a major issue. Data from NAFORMA[16] (2015), demonstrate that approximately 80% of households use firewood and charcoal for cooking. Although, other energy sources such as gas, kerosene and electricity are mostly used for lighting for instance, over 90% of the energy supply in Tanzania derives from the forest (Milledge, Gelvas et al.

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[15] Indirect causes that are mentioned in the National Strategy for REDD+ (2013), are policy failures, rapid population growth and urbanization.
[16] NAFORMA is short for the "National Forest Resources Monitoring and Assessment of Tanzania Mainland".

2007). It is estimated that 70% of the deforestation in Tanzania is related to the production of firewood (Makundi 2001 cited in (Kweka, Carmenta et al. 2015). Although alternative energy sources have been introduced in the past, charcoal production remains a pressing issue in the country, and could be detrimental for the success of a potential large-scale REDD+ scheme.

2.4.2.4 Forest fires

According to Rucker and Tiemann cited in Kweka, Carmenta et al. (2015), an average of 11 million hectares burn annually in miombo woodland (75%), forest plantations (20%) and montane forests (5%). The most common source behind the fires is fire escape from agriculture plot preparations, hunting activities and charcoal production. Fires in forests usually happen because it is affordable and the only way for many to clear land for agriculture. The number of wildfires could significantly be reduced by introducing better practices for clearing of land, charcoal production and hunting. However, up to this date, there is no national fire management policy in Tanzania (FFP 2013). As such, lack of fire management could be a threat to REDD+.

3. Conceptual framework

Environmental issues can be framed in different ways, resulting in multiple interpretations of the phenomenon (Evans 2012). In doing so, there are certain aspects of an issue that will be highlighted while others ignored. As such, it is important to be clear in which way an issue is portrayed so that the problem is not misunderstood or biased in a certain direction. This thesis, will make an attempt at answering the research questions by using institutional theory. Governance structures that include actors and institutions will be of main concern. 'Good governance' will be portrayed as key to making REDD+ a success, and in light of this, legitimacy is used as a criterion for evaluating the governance structure of REDD+. Following, there will be an introduction to the theoretical framework of institutionalism that the analysis will be based on.

3.1 Governance

The shift in focus from government to governance happened simultaneously with the emerging globalization of the economy (Evans 2012). The term 'government' refers to the "formal and institutional processes which operate at the level of the nation state to maintain public order and facilitate collective action" (Stoker 2002, pp. 17). During the years following up to the new millennia, the state was no longer the only responsible actor for governing. Instead, other actors such as the public, NGOs and businesses became part of the governing process. Not necessarily meaning that the state became less powerful[17], but since the state no longer had the human and financial resources to fulfill all the necessary duties, other actors have been becoming more involved in governing public and private goods.

Governance has been defined in multiple ways in literature. For the purpose of this thesis, definitions within the discipline of institutionalism have been considered. Evans (2012, pp. 45) defines governance as the "role of institutions in grouping different actors together, and rules in steering their activities". Similarly, Vatn and Vedeld (2012, pp. 423) have described governance as "the structures and processes that shape social priorities, how conflicts are acknowledged and possible resolved, and how human coordination is facilitated". From the former definition, we can conclude that governance includes two main components; processes and structures. Further, Vatn (2015) refers to the process as encompassing how social priorities

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[17] See Raustiala (1997) for arguments in favor of NGO inclusion in governance.

are shaped, how conflicts are dealt with and the way that human coordination is facilitated. Vatn (2015) refers to the structure component as the way that the processes are organized and 'administered'.

3.1.2 Environmental governance

Following, the focus will be narrowed down to that of environmental governance. Environmental governance, as defined by Vatn (2015, pp. 134), "refers to use, management and protection of environmental resources and processes". In other words, environmental governance is the way that humans control and regulate their natural environment and interactions with each other. The governance of environmental resources can be a conflictual issue because it entails giving rights to some while excluding others (Vatn 2015). In order to better understand the complexity surrounding the governance of the environment, it is helpful to use frameworks to order information.

As mentioned previously, governance includes both processes and structures. This thesis will mainly be concerned with the process that results in a new resource regime. Since the governance structure is key in order to understand the process, it will be explained in more detail below.

3.2 Environmental governance structures

REDD+ can be explained as a new governance structure where new institutions are formed and new actors are introduced. Vatn (2015) has developed a framework for studying governance structures, which includes two parts; the type of actors involved and the institutional structures that facilitate the interaction between actors. I consider the framework a good tool to use because it illustrates how the actors and institutions are connected and how they influence each other, however, because it does not adequately illustrate the influence of civil society, I have developed the framework further where civil society has become more central.

Figure 2. The Governance Structure

Based on Vatn (2015)

3.2.1 Institutions

There is no single definition of what an institution is, and even scholars within the same academic field of research describe it differently. North (1989) describes institutions as "rules, enforcement characteristics of rules, and norms of behavior that structure repeated human interaction" (pp. 1321). Closely related, but more detailed, there is Vatn's (2015, pp. 78) definition of institutions: "Institutions are the conventions, norms and formally sanctioned rules of a society. They provide expectations, stability and meaning essential to human existence and coordination. Institutions support certain values, and produce and protect specific interests." In short, this thesis will refer to institutions as rules, norms and conventions that structure human interaction.

As the table above illustrates, there are three types of institutions involved in the governance structure. These are the institutions governing the policy process, institutions that form the resource regime, and institutions that facilitate deliberation. This thesis will focus on the process that that results in the creation of a new resource regime.

Vatn (2015) describes the rules that govern the policy process as constitutional rules and collective-choice rules. Constitutional rules are those that representatives in power must follow, which relate to the positions that they hold, and rules in regards to the relationship between the representatives and the citizens that they represent. Collective-choice rules are those that influence policy making, management and policy decisions at local, national and international

level (Ostrom 1992). In relation to REDD+, the constitutional and collective-choice rules are significant as they influence the way that REDD+ is integrated into the existing laws and policies.

According to Vatn (2005), a resource regime consists of two main elements. The first element is the rules that govern the use and transfers of the right to a resource. The second element is the rules that govern the transactions between the actors that use the resource. Implementing REDD+ on a local level, involves adopting a new set of rules in regards to the rights to the forest and how the forest should be managed. Ostrom (1992) refers to these rules as 'operational rules' that directly affect the day-to-day decisions made by users of the resource. In the case of REDD+, the users would be those involved in the management of the REDD+ forests. Hence, identifying tenure rights to the forest is essential in regards to REDD+, especially because payment for reduced carbon emission will be given to the right-holder of the forest. In addition, rules concerning forest management are crucial. Likewise, the implementation of REDD+ has resulted in new actors becoming involved in the governance of the forest, which means that new relationships are being formed, which further entails that new institutions are created that facilitate the interaction between the actors.

The institutions of civil society are also influential. Although they are more prominent in the form of norms, organized entities of civil society such as NGOs follow their own set of formal rules. NGOs operate at local, national and international level, and while some influence policy processes at one level, others are operating at all levels (Vatn 2015). Commonly, NGOs have rules that they need to follow that are written in the law within the country that they operate. In Tanzania for instance, there is a Non-Governmental Organizations Act (2002) that includes values and norms that NGOs should follow. According to the NGO Code of Conduct, there is a NGO Council that has responsibility to facilitate and self-regulate NGOs in Tanzania (NGOs 2008). Because civil society must follow the laws and regulations within the country that they are established, their actions are somewhat constrained by state regulation.

3.2.2 Actors

Governance includes a variety of actors, and can be divided into three main groups; economic actors, political actors and civil society actors (Vatn 2015) where political and civil society actors will be emphasized.

In this thesis I will mainly be studying the role of the state, namely the district governments and to some extent village governments, in addition to civil society actors, namely NGOs who have been responsible for implementing the REDD+ pilot projects. My focus is not on economic actors, although the actors mentioned could be perceived as economic actors in some sense. To distinguish between political and civil society actors properly is important, as it is because of their different characteristics, that makes for such an interesting situation to discuss. Though, doing this in a comprehensive way is too ambitious for this thesis, I will instead provide some basic information of the characteristics of each.

Political actors would be actors who have a say in the establishment of rules for how governance processes shall play out in practice, and often will act as a third party in regards to conflict. Vatn (2015) has divided political actors into two 'types'; public authorities and international organizations. Public authorities, will be the focus here and will be discussed in relation to the state, or what Vatn (2015, pp. 147) refers to as "the most developed public authority".

Civil society actors play a normative role in governance and can both be organized in the form of NGOs and researchers, or unorganized in the form of individuals, families or other groups of people. Although, there is no general agreement on how NGOs can be defined, Cherrett, O'Keefe et al. (1995) found that NGOs can be divided into two broad categories: 1) grassroots who are usually community-based and focus on the process that facilitates reaching their goal, and 2) professional organizations that are composed by intellectuals or professionals constructed to do a particular job. While grassroots usually are membership organizations that are responding to local interests, professional organizations are usually funded by private donations and/or public support and are usually project-focused. Out of the two typologies above, I would classify the three NGOs of concern in this thesis as professional organizations. As described in more detail in section 5.1, the NGOs consist of professionals who are specialized in dealing with forest conservation related projects.

Domestically, the state is more or less universal by promoting the common interest of society, establishing and enforcing rules, and guaranteeing the autonomy of civil society (Eriksen and Sending 2013). In contrast to the state, private actors are particularistic where they are not responsible for the whole society. While the state is accountable to the society which it represents, private actors are only accountable to a particular set of actors (Eriksen and Sending 2013). The major difference between the state and NGOs from the description above, is that

while the state is responsible for the whole society, NGOs are only representing a particular type of actors. As a result, NGOs can specialize in particular fields such as health or the environment in a particular geographically area, which make them able to effectively implement individual projects. The state with its universal responsibility, on the other hand, can implement large-scale programs that can crosscut multiple fields, which enables multiple of issues to be targeted simultaneously at a large scale. Accordingly, both NGOs and the state is important for development in different ways. In relation to states that have budgetary constraints, NGOs are especially important as they can step in when the state is not able to provide services for the public. As such, NGOs can act as an auxiliary role to the state.

3.3 Modes of Governance

A governance structure can be set up in a wide variety of ways. Evans (2012) for instance describes a governance structures as 'modes of governance' meaning a set of rules that guide interaction based on principles of how actors are best motivated. Further, Evans goes on to recognize three modes of governance that are commonly referred to: a) a hierarchy which is a "clear pyramid of control through which decisions taken at the top are subsequently passed down to those below"; b) a network which is where "autonomous stakeholders work together to achieve common goals"; and c) a market that binds "stakeholders together as suppliers and consumers of particular resources or products" (pp. 35-36).

Network governance is probably the most similar to how REDD+ is governed and will thus be described in more detail. Networks are formed based on the shared belief that "no single actor, public or private, has all knowledge and information required to solve complex dynamic and diversified problems" (Kooiman 1993 cited in Boedeltje and Cornips 2004). As such, when multiple stakeholders work together who have different capabilities, complex issues can be addressed more effectively. Another strength of network governance, is that it can combine "local practice and global rules in a flexible and decentralized manner" (Bäckstrand 2006, pp. 293).

The governance structure of REDD+ is complex, especially because it needs to ensure that there is a link between global demands, national and subnational structures, and at the same time answer to the needs of local people (Korhonen-Kurkin, Brockhaus et al. 2012). Certain technical and practical issues for instance needs to be synchronized at all levels in order for it to be effective. In relation to Monitoring, Reporting and Verification (MRV) of carbon emission

reductions for instance, it is encouraged that there shall be national MRV systems, however, this has been problematic in several REDD+ readiness countries (Korhonen-Kurkin, Brockhaus et al. 2012). Leakage is also a component of REDD+ that needs to be synchronized at multiple levels of governance. As leakage can both occur locally, nationally and internationally, and come from multiple sectors, it is essential that there is an inclusive monitoring system so that leakage can be avoided. Accordingly, there is a need for the involvement of both public and private actors in the governance of REDD+ at multiple levels.

3.4 Evaluating governance structures

3.4.1 "Good Governance"

When evaluating a governance structure, the concept of 'good governance' is often being referred to (Evans 2012). In order to determine if a governance structure is, in fact, 'good', there needs to be certain criteria that are used to evaluate the governance process or structure. Legitimacy has often been used as a criterion (Vatn 2015), and as stated previously, will be used in this thesis in order to evaluate the implementation phase of REDD+ pilots. As such, legitimacy will be conceptualized below.

3.4.2 Legitimacy

Legitimacy is a necessary component of governance in democracies. There does not exist a definition of legitimacy that is universally accepted (Bernstein 2011), however, in literature, there are some criteria for legitimacy that has commonly been referred to; accountability, transparency, access to participation, deliberation and fairness (Bernstein 2004). Bernstein's definition of political legitimacy, is that of "acceptance and justification of shared rule by a community" (pp. 20). This definition implies that the reason why people believe that they should accept a decision by an authoritative rule is also why the decision is accepted, and vice versa (Bernstein 2011). Similarly, Vatn (2015) describes legitimacy as "justified authority" and further distinguishes the definition into three sub-categories; decisions that follow the law, decisions that are accepted by those it concerns, and that the decisions follow a normative standard. Accordingly, this thesis will refer to legitimacy in the light of legal issues, normative standards, and how decisions are accepted by those it concerns.

It is important to acknowledge, however, that in global environmental governance, a decision may be legitimate in the eyes of some, but illegitimate in the opinion of others. Bernstein argues

(2011) that "legitimacy requirements vary across forms of governance and issue areas owing to the interplay of governance institutions with international social structure, on the one hand, and the community of actors affected and/or regulated by the institutions on the other" (pp. 24-25). In the light of this, the global, national and local community might not always coincide in what they consider to be legitimate. For instance, civil societies commonly put emphasis on accountability, participation, transparency and equity, while business actors value efficiency and the rule of law (Bernstein 2011).

3.4.3 Input (and output) legitimacy

Scharpf (1997) has labeled legitimacy in either input or output legitimacy. Further, this has inspired the work of several other researchers, e.g. Bäckstrand (2006) and Vatn (2015). In short, input legitimacy is the process of decision-making, and links the decisions being made with the preferences by those being ruled. Output legitimacy is the result, or the outcome, of a governance processes. Vatn (2015) has developed a conceptual framework for studying legitimacy, which will be used in the analysis of this thesis. Both input and output legitimacy present valuable tools that can be used to evaluate the legitimization of REDD+ pilot projects. Since this thesis is concerned with the process of implementing the REDD+ pilots, it will be focusing on only input legitimacy.

According to Vatn (2015), input legitimacy involves "what conditions are set for decision-making, how power to decide is delegated, the form and conditions for participation, how transparent the processes are and finally how the power to decide can be called back – i.e., accountability" (pp. 164). The process of decision-making is core, where key terms within this are; participation, transparency, power to decide, and accountability. In addition, Vatn emphasizes the importance of procedural justice, or equal opportunity. This involves an equal right to participate. Participation can happen in various forms, and there is no agreement on what is determined to be fair participation. Pretty (1995) have presented a typology of participation: 1) manipulative participation, 2) passive participation, 3) participation by consultation, 4) participation for material incentives, 5) functional participation, 6) interactive participation, and 7) self-mobilization. The typology demonstrates some of the many variations of the form of participation that can take place, and ranges from people being manipulated into participating to the people being the ones initiating the decision-making process.

Closely related to participation, is that of decision-making power. Before going into this, the

concept of power should be defined. Following the work of Robert Dahl (1957, pp 202-203), power can be understood as a relation between people, or "A has power over B to the extent that A can get B to do something B would not otherwise do"[18]. However, this definition assumes that power is exercised against someone's will. Foucault (1984), introduces a distinction between power and domination where three types of power relations are recognized; strategic games, government, and domination. I have found that power as strategic games and domination to be of interest, and will explain them in more detail below.

Lemke (2002, pp. 6) describes Foucault's idea of power as strategic games as a way of "structuring the possible field of action of others". Defining it as *strategic games* is because "every field has its own logic, rules and regularities which are not explicit and which make it resemble the playing of games" (Nuijten 2005 pp. 3). Key to this, is that it does not necessarily mean that power is exercised against someone's will, nor that determining the field of action is 'bad' (Lemke 2002). However, whoever determines the field of action has a lot of power because they are in the advantage of being able to make it function in their advantage (Nuijten 2005 pp. 3).

Foucault's definition of domination is more similar to that which has been defined by Dahl, where A has the power to make B do something that B would not otherwise do. In relation to the implementation of REDD+ pilots, it is not so that the villages or the district has agreed to do anything that they do not wish to be a part of. Accordingly, the definition of Dahl is not very relevant. Instead, Foucault's description of power as strategic games, is more or less sound in this context. In terms of decision-making, it is clear that not all actors have equal amount of influence and that those with the most power will be more in control over the decision-making process.

Transparency is also a term that has been referred to in numerous of ways in literature. The term is about "the degree of openness in conveying information" (Ball 2009, pp. 297). In regards to governance, it concerns to what extent information related to the decision-making process is visible to the public (Vatn 2015; Ball 2009). Gupta (2008) have operationalized transparency as 'information disclosure', which has among others been key for NGOs in order to increase accountability of their work (Gupta 2008).

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[18] It should be noted that Dahl has later been criticized for not including conflicts that are not visible (Vatn 2015).

Gupta (2008) argues that there are two core assumptions that link governance-by-disclosure initiatives: 1) the procedural nature, and 2) that information matters and thus can empower. The procedural nature could for instance be Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC), which is a procedure that ensures protection of the rights of indigenous or other forest-dependent communities when approached by stakeholders who are interested in their land or resources (UN-REDD 2013). The second assumption that Gupta discusses is how the information given can empower, or change the power relationship between actors. As argued by scholars, information is "neither value-neutral nor universally valid" (Gupta 2008, pp. 5), and thus the scope and content of information given, is critical in many situations.

An essential part of input legitimacy is in regards to the way that those who have the authority to make decisions, are in power. In democracies for instance, political decisions are made by parliaments, governments and other public bodies who have authority because they have been voted to power by the citizens that they represent. Accountability is key in the light of this. Grant and Keohane (2005) define accountability where it "implies that some actors have the right to hold other actors to a set of standards, to judge whether they have fulfilled their responsibilities in light of these standards, and to impose sanctions if they determine that these responsibilities have not been met" (pp. 29). While democratic governments are accountable to the people in the way that they are dependent on their votes to remain in power, in network governance structures, the authority to decide has been delegated by other means (Bäckstrand 2006). Hence, accountability is not ensured in the same way as traditional hierarchy modes of governance where the state is the main governing body.

In network modes of governance, power has been delegated to various actors making it challenging to ensure accountability (Bäckstrand 2006). Keohane (2002) have named three justified types of accountability that are commonly referred to: 1) Authorization, 2) Support, 3) Impact. Here it becomes helpful to distinguish between what Keohane (2002) calls internal accountability and external accountability. Internal accountability would be in regards to authorization, meaning an actor who gives authorization to another to act, and support, meaning actors who give financial or political support to another. External accountability is "accountability to people outside the acting entity, whose lives are affected by it" (Keohane 2002, pp. 14-15). While internal accountability more often is attainable because providing funding and support is a way of influencing the accountable actor, those who are affected by

the decisions and who do not have financial or political influence, are less likely to succeed in holding the actor accountable (Keohane 2002).

4. Methodology

4.1 Research strategy

In order to understand the process of implementing the selected REDD+ pilots, a qualitative research approach has been used[19]. On the surface, this is evident as the collection and analysis of data mostly consist of words, and because the emphasis is on processes, which is mostly associated with qualitative research (Bryman 2012). An inductive approach to the relationship between theory and research has been applied, meaning data about the topic has been gathered before going forwards with developing theories that could explain patterns found from analysing the data (Bryman 2012).

In regards to ontology, this thesis will perceive the findings as social constructions rather than objective realities. As described by Alan Bryman (2012, pp. 33), "it implies that social phenomena and categories are not only produced through social interaction but that they are in constant state of revision". REDD+ as a new governance structure, is still in the process of being constructed. The concept of REDD+ is being interpreted in multiple ways and certainly influenced by various actors interested in revising the concept into serving their best interests. Seeing that the focus of this thesis is to analyze the process of implementing three REDD+ pilot projects, which actors have the most influence on decision-making, will likely influence the outcome of the policy process.

In terms of epistemology, or what should be considered as acceptable knowledge in a discipline (Bryman 2012), this thesis will subsume to the interpretivist view of applying knowledge. In studying the process of implementing REDD+ pilots, the perceptions and experiences of the selected informants have been key sources of data collection. In addition, their interpretations and experiences of the process have further been analyzed and placed into what Bryman (2012) refer to as a 'social scientific frame'. As such, a double interpretation will be applied. This thesis will use conceptual frameworks from literature in order to organize the information gathered and to understand the findings in the light of existing literature.

4.2 Research design

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[19] This is not to say that there is a clear distinction between the two types of research strategies (Bryman 2012). Although, a qualitative approach has been used, it does not mean that the thesis does not include characteristics that belong to quantitative research.

A research design is the structure, which guides the selection of a research method and the analysis of the data collected (Bryman 2012). Since the aim of this thesis is to compare the processes of implementing three different REDD+ pilots, the research design can be classified as a comparative multi-case study. Bryman (2012) states that the main advantage of using a multi-case design is that it improves theory building. As such, by comparing the processes of three REDD+ pilots, the findings will be better able to test, revise, or even suggest new concepts to theory. The multi-case design has by some writers been criticized for being too focused on comparing the cases to each other, rather than paying attention to the context of each case (Bryman 2012). Thus, when analyzing the data, I have tried my best to have an open mind so that the contexts of each case are acknowledged.

4.2.1 Selection of pilots and subjects

The selection of pilot projects was not coincidental or random. Both my supervisor, Arild Vatn, and co-supervisor, Desmond McNeill, had contacts in Tanzania. Vatn was part of an ongoing research project that included the REDD+ pilots in Kilosa and Kondoa, while McNeill had established contacts in Kilwa. By selecting these pilot projects, I was able to use existing data from Kondoa and Kilosa for my analysis, and it made my time in the field more feasible as I could be assisted by established contacts. In addition to practical reasons, these three pilots were from different regions in Tanzania, had been more or less implemented during the same timeframe, and had undergone several of the same processes. Accordingly, the pilots represented three comparable cases.

In regards to the selection of subjects, it was essential that similar subjects from each pilot were selected so that a comparison could be done. Since it was important that the subjects interviewed had been involved in the implementation of the REDD+ pilots, purposive sampling was used. The plan was to interview the Executive Director in each NGO, officers at the district level who were involved in the implementation of REDD+, and the Village Chairman and/or Village Chief in one REDD+ village in each district. Because I was not able to plan the interviews before arriving at each district, I could not know for sure if the subjects that I would like to interview were available during my stay in the area. As a result, the subjects interviewed varied a bit in terms of positions. It should be mentioned that some of the subjects were interviewed more than once as I realized later on that there was additional information that I needed for the

analysis. It should also be noted that after the interview at the Kondoa District Office, we[20] decided to conduct an interview at the TFS Office as we found it relevant in relation to some of the issues that were discussed at the District Office. Although, I did not interview TFS in Kilosa or Kilwa and it can as such not be comparable, the information did explain some issues in regards to the general relationship between the District Forest Officers and TFS Officers[21].

4.2.2 Data collection

The method used for collecting data was semi-structured interviews. I had prepared interview guides beforehand, and it was set up in a way that the interviewees had some leeway in how they wanted to reply. In addition, follow up questions were asked, especially whenever unexpected information was given. Interview guides helped ensure that key issues were discussed, however, each interview varied a bit according to the experiences of the informants. It should also be mentioned that the interview guides evolved during my time in the field as new information came to my attention. In order to ensure that what was being said was properly recorded, I used a tape recorder during all interviews. This was very helpful as I could be more alert during the interviews and was able to go through the interviews more thorough than if I had just taken notes.

Concerning the interviews conducted at village level, I had to have a translator as the informants did not speak English. Additionally, I was among others accompanied by Professor George Kajembe during the interviews at district level in Kondoa, which allowed for certain issues to be discussed in Swahili. This was very helpful as it limited the space for miscommunication. It would have been useful to have a translator with me during certain other interviews as well, however, this was not possible due to resource constraints.

In addition to the primary data that I have personally collected, I have used existing reports, journal articles and official publications for answering the research questions. This has both been helpful in triangulating the findings as well as being an addition to the primary data. In order to fully understand the degree of involvement of the local government, I have also included an excerpt of the financial reports from TFCG and MCDI that show the amount of the REDD+ funding that was allocated to district staff during the implementation of the pilots. I made several attempts in getting the same data from AWF, but did not succeed. Nevertheless,

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[20] In Kondoa, I was accompanied by Arild Vatn and George Kajembe during all interviews.
[21] A list of all persons interviewed is found in the Appendix.

I would expect the numbers to be somewhat similar to that of the other two pilots. Thus, I have found that having the data from Kilwa and Kilosa is sufficient for the analysis of research question 2 of this thesis.

4.2.3 Coding and analysis

Transcription of interviews occurred continuously during the collection of data. This ensured that I was more prepared for the following interviews and was able to get more meaningful information than if I had not started processing the information collected until the end.

Although data was reviewed continuously throughout the data collection period which resulted in a revised interview guide and more knowledge on the subject, I did not start coding until after most of the data was collected. Two interviews were conducted later after having left the field, as I found that there was some information that was still missing, but otherwise coding happened after data collection. It should be noted that I could have conducted more interviews after data collection, however, because of the time constraint and the practical issues arising from scheduling interviews from Norway it was not feasible.

Thematic analysis was the method used for the analysis of the data. According to Victoria Clarke and Virginia Braun (2014, pp. 1947) thematic analysis can be described as "a method for identifying and analyzing patterns of meaning (themes) in qualitative data". Further, Clarke and Braun (2014) describe the process as involving generating codes and then identifying themes from the data. The codes that I generated, captured interesting features of the data, which I believed to be of potential relevance to the research questions. After having identified the themes, I started comparing the data from the three pilot projects by looking for similarities and differences. The theory section and analysis was written simultaneously as new concepts and themes were found and I was searching for ways to explain the discovered patterns.

4.3 Challenges and limitations

The main challenges that I experienced during data collection was language barriers, scheduling interviews and time constraints. In terms of language, this was challenging because some of the informants had trouble comprehending the questions asked, and as such, did not respond to what I was trying to communicate. I only experienced this in a few of the interviews and only in regards to a few questions, so it did not significantly alter the data collection in a negative way. However, it did make it more challenging as I had to work harder to reformulate the

questions so that they could more easily understand, and in a few cases I was not able to get all the information I was hoping for. In the field, I had some difficulties trying to schedule interviews as I was only in each district for a certain amount of days and was not able to plan the interviews ahead. This is closely related to the issue of time constraint because if I would have had more time in the field, I might have been able to conduct more interviews, or speak to the same people a second time, which would have increased the credibility of the findings.

With regards to the limitations of the thesis, I would like to make a note that the findings are not meant to be generalized to a population such as in quantitative research. The informants interviewed were selected based on their availability and their involvement in regards to the implementation of the REDD+ pilot projects. It could be that the findings would have been different if I had interviewed someone else. Likewise, the findings do not represent the processes of the six other REDD+ pilot projects implemented in Tanzania. Nonetheless, without making any generalizations, the findings do highlight some general issues in Tanzania in relation to the the local government.

4.4 Ethical considerations

Ethical considerations were taken seriously throughout the research process. Before starting the fieldwork, I made sure that I was familiar with the the ethical principles in social research. Accordingly, I did my best to ensure that the research did not result in 1) harm to participants; 2) lack of informed consent; 3) invasion of privacy; and 4) deception (Bryman 2012, pp. 135).

I did not want the informants to feel coerced into participating in the interviews. As such, I made sure that I had their informed oral consent before moving forward with the interviews. All interviews started by a presentation of myself and an explanation of my research which included what the information gathered would be used for. Next, I kindly asked for their permission to use a tape recorder explaining the purpose and that I would be the only one having access to the recordings. In the end of the interviews, I would allow the informants to make any additional comments or ask me questions if they had any additional concerns or curiosities.

5. Analysis

This section is divided into five main parts. First, there will be a presentation of the three pilot projects and the area that they are based. Following, the rest will be based on the four research questions.

5.1 Presentation of the pilots

All of the three pilot projects have been funded by the Norwegian Government and started its implementation in 2009. Thereafter I will respond to each of the four research questions, separately.

Figure 3. Map of Regional Boundaries in Tanzania showing location of pilot projects
Based on Tripp (1999)

5.1.1 REDD+ pilot project in Kilosa

The REDD+ project in Kilosa District is located in the Morogoro Region and was implemented by Tanzanian Forest Conservation Group (TFCG). It is part of a partnership project called "Making REDD Work for Communities and Forest Conservation in Tanzania" between TFCG and Tanzanian Community Forest Conservation Network (MJUMITA). TFCG was established in 1985, and is the largest Tanzanian NGO focusing on forest conservation (TFCG 2016).

TFCG consists of professional foresters, biologists and communicators with the mission of improving forest management and supporting livelihood activities for communities living in the forests (TFCG 2016). MJUMITA is a network organization that is present in 12 regions, 23 districts and 450 villages in Tanzania (MJUMITA 2016). The main role of MJUMITA is to promote network and cooperation processes so that the members will increase their capacity to manage and conserve the forests, in addition to give its support in relation to ownership and improved livelihood conditions by better utilization of land (MJUMITA 2016).

The vegetation in Kilosa consists of mainly dry woodland, sub-montane, and grassland. There are ten Forest Reserves within the District, which are all managed by TFS (Kajembe, Silayo et al. 2015), however, none of these areas are included in REDD+. The majority of households that were part of the REDD+ project in Kilosa were subsistence farmers. As such, approximately 80% got their main income from crop farming and 60% from livestock keeping (NIRAS 2015a). In addition, numerous of households were involved in small businesses (40%) such as small shops, tea rooms, brewing local beer and selling crops (NIRAS 2015a). Some conflict as a result of farmers and herders living together in the same area are common, which has been exacerbated by poor land use plans. Numerous of drivers of deforestation are identified in the area, e.g. shifting cultivation, large-scale agriculture development, agro-pastoralism, charcoal production, timber harvesting and poor land use plans (NIRAS 2015a).

TFCG and MJUMITA signed a contract with the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on August 9th, 2009. USD 5,914,353 was allocated the project that lasted from September 2009 to December 2014. TFCG/MJUMITA implemented REDD+ in six villages in Kilosa District[22]. A "pro-poor" approach to implementing CBFM combined with REDD+ was used. In addition, TFCG were strong advocates for a nested approach to REDD+ in Tanzania where villages can directly access the carbon market whereas the central government deals with monitoring. TFCG have put great effort into influencing policy at national level (NIRAS 2015a) where they have advocated for the Community Carbon Enterprise (CCE), which they have developed together with MJUMITA (TFCG 2016)[23].

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[22] TFCG implemented REDD+ in Lindi District located in Lindi region in addition to the project in Kilosa District.
[23] More information on the CCE model in section 5.5.

5.1.2 REDD+ pilot project in Kondoa

The REDD+ pilot project in Kondoa District, which is located in the Dodoma Region, has been implemented by the African Wildlife Foundation (AWF) in the Kolo Hills Forest. AWF was established in 1961 and works with wildlife conservation, land & habitat protection, community empowerment and economic development (AWF 2016).

The REDD+ project was entitled "Advancing REDD in the Kondoa Irangi Hills Forest". The REDD+ sites within the Kolo Hills were the Salanka, Isabe and Kome Forest Reserves. The goal of the project was to combine poverty alleviation with climate mitigation by building capacity for rural communities to benefit from REDD by improved forest management and conservation. The total budget amount from 2010 to the end of 2014 was USD 2,516,182 (NIRAS 2015b).

The Kolo Hills is a semid-arid zone covered with mainly miombo woodland. The forest is especially important as it holds the headwaters of the Tarangire river, which nourishes the wildlife population in the Tarangire National Park (Kajembe, Silayo et al. 2015). There has been significant decline in forest area due to livestock grazing, agriculture and harvesting of wood for energy. Thus, AWF had been working in the area since 1995 as the Kolo Hills have important ecosystem value for both biodiversity and communities in the area. AWF have been introducing PFM to villages in Kolo Hills since 2007 (Vatn 2016).

In regards to REDD+, AWF's initial plan was to include 15 villages surrounding the Salange and Isabe Forest Reserves, which was managed by TFS and Kondoa District Council. Later, six more villages were included in the project as they were also using the Kolo Hills Forests (NIRAS 2015b). AWF's main focus was on improving land use management and introducing alternative livelihood activities such as better agricultural practices in order to reduce forest degradation. In contrast to the REDD+ pilot in Kilosa that only focused on establishing CBFM arrangements, the plan in Kondoa was foremost to establish JFM agreements with communities and the owners of the forest reserves. Some of the villages that participated in REDD+ in Kondoa also had CBFM, however, the establishment of JFM was the main priority of AWF (Kajembe, Silayo et al. 2015).

5.1.3 REDD+ pilot project in Kilwa

The REDD+ pilot in Kilwa, located in Lindi Region, was implemented by Mpingo Conservation and Development Initiative (MDCI)[24]. MCDI was founded in 1995 starting as a series of student expeditions from Cambridge University where they did research on the ecology and conservation status of Mpingo (MCDI 2016). Since then, it has transformed into a NGO where the permanent field base was set up in Kilwa in 2004 (MCDI 2016). A partnership with the Forestry Office in the District has been established and they have been active with community-based conservation activities (MCDI 2016).

The vegetation in Kilwa District is mostly miombo woodland, but also includes some East African coastal forest. Kilwa District is one of the most forested districts in Tanzania where forests and woodlands cover approximately 70% of the land (MCDI 2015). 85% of the population live in rural areas where fishing and subsistence agriculture are the main sources of income encompassing more than 80% of the labor force (Kweka 2016). Logging and grazing in the area have increased in recent years due to an improved road connecting Kilwa with Dar es Salaam and relocation of livestock keepers to Kilwa in 2006 (Kweka 2016).

The title of the REDD+ project was "Combining REDD, PFM and FSC Certification in South-Eastern Tanzania" and lasted from 2009 to the end of 2014. The total budget for the project was USD 1,948,123. Five villages in Kilwa District were involved in MCDI's REDD+ project (MCDI 2015). In contrast to AWF and TFCG that proposed that the REDD+ money would go directly to communities, MCDI suggested that they would instead use all payments from REDD+ to cover the cost of expansion of CBFM to more villages in the district, while the revenues generated from the villages participation in the Forest Stewardship Certification (FSC) would cover the costs of continued forest management in addition to other benefits for the communities (MCP 2009).

The results from a formal analysis done by MCDI during the first REDD+ project year, concluded that the most significant driver of deforestation in remote areas in Kilwa was fire (NIRAS 2015c). Accordingly, MCDI decided to include fire management in their plan, and became the first REDD+ project to focus on fire management in dryland forests globally (MCDI 2016). MCDI developed a community based fire management program (CBFiM) for Village

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[24] Initially, MCDI held the name Cambridge Mpingo Project, then Mpingo Conservation Project, before finally in 2010, it became Mpingo Conservation & Development Initiative (MCDI 2016).

Land Forest Reserves (VLFR) that focused on early burning in order to reduce the risk of out of control fire (MCDI 2016).

5.2 Role of actors in the implementation process

Before going into the specifics of how the process played out in practice, it should be mentioned that the process is required to include three main components. First of all, the NGOs were obligated to propose the project to the districts and villages allowing them to freely accept or reject the project. Second of all, the idea of the pilot projects was that they should combine the concept of REDD+ with PFM. The process of PFM, which is described in more detail in section 2.3.3, already has a set of guidelines which should be followed. In other words, the pilot projects needed to both abide to the requirements of REDD+ but at the same time follow the existing laws and regulations in relation to PFM. Third of all, REDD+ entails that communities who reduce emission from deforestation and degradation will receive benefits. Although there are clear guidelines for the establishment of PFM, NGOs have some leeway in how they decide to approach their projects such as what activities they decide to implement, and in what way they involve other stakeholders.

This section will present the findings in regards to the first research questions: In what way has the local government been involved in the implementation process? The results that are presented below, include both primary data that I collected by semi-structured interviews in addition to secondary data such as reports and research articles.

5.2.1 Implementation process in Kilosa

The whole process of REDD+ in Tanzania started in 2008 by an informal conversation between Charles Meshack, the Executive Director of TFCG, and the current Councilor from the Norwegian Embassy, Ivar Jørgensen, where they discussed Tanzania's natural resource management in general and the opportunity of involving Tanzania in REDD (Meshack, pers. comm.). Succeeding the meeting, Meshack developed three concept notes of ideas on how REDD could be handled in Tanzania, and the Norwegian Embassy were interested in one of the three. The idea was that they could build on PFM. The ambassador was quite interested and before the proposal got approved, it had to be opened up to all NGOs in Tanzania (Meshack, pers. comm.).

According to Meshack, after having gotten the agreement with the Norwegian Embassy, the next step for TFCG, was to try to understand the idea of REDD and which sites they should focus on. In the concept notes, Meshack had mentioned both JFM and CBFM, but because CBFM had a clear process, TFCG ended up focusing merely on CBFM. Next, TFCG had a workshop in Dar es Salaam where they selected four districts before they made some criteria and ended up with two sites, one of them being Kilosa District in Morogoro Region. The criteria that they were looking at was additionality, deforestation rate and leakage (Meshack pers. comm.).

The Principal Forest Officer in Kilosa, Othmar Haule, confirms this, and highlighted that it was not that TFCG asked Kilosa to participate, but it was through the competition that Kilosa District had won. After the nominations, the representatives from the district had to brief the District Council about REDD+. The District Council agreed to the project after having asked a lot of questions of what would be the benefits etc. (Haule, pers. comm.).

Immediately after the nominations, TFCG arranged intensive REDD and PFM training in Lindi. From Kilosa, Haule together with the District Forest Officer, were invited to attend the 3 week-training organized by TFCG with the support from Regional Forest Authorities, Rico FTC in Thailand and from the Olmotonyi Forest Institute (Haule, pers. comm.). The number of participants were between 13-15 and consisted of different stakeholders such as from other NGOs, investors, staff from the Ministry of Natural Resources and District staff. This group was referred to as the 'advisory committee'. The training consisted mainly of how to integrate REDD+ in PFM. According to Haule, the advisory committee prepared training manuals during this time, which they had to follow when implementing the activities in the villages. Because TFCG already had developed a proposal, the other stakeholders were only able to influence the project to a certain degree (Haule, pers. comm.).

After the training, the next step, according to Haule, was creating awareness to the other district authorities about the concept of REDD+. In addition, they had to create awareness in the villages. According to a TFCG technical report (Kibuga, Nguya et al. 2011), the project team for the Kilosa REDD+ project had made a plan for incorporating the concept of FPIC[25] into the

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[25] FPIC, is a term that is usually used in relation to informing communities about REDD+ projects. It is not explicitly integrated in the 2010 UNFCC Cancun Agreements, but it is highly encouraged to follow the guidelines (UN-REDD Program 2013).

project design. As such, the project was first introduced to all Village Executive Officers and Village Councils where they came to an agreement on when to introduce the project at sub-village level, which would result in more representative attendance than if it were to be at village level. Project staff and district staff divided themselves into two groups in order to speed up the FPIC process. In each group there was one staff from TFCG, one from MJUMITA, one district staff (District Forest Officer or REDD contact person), and one village leader (Chairman or Village Executive Officer) (Kibuga, Nguya et al. 2011).

During the initial meeting with the communities, the DFO/District REDD Contact Person started by introducing the project and explaining how REDD+ is linked to forest conservation and how it would benefit the communities. In addition, the villagers were told that the project had already been launched at district level because of the benefits that they believed it would bring villagers. It was made clear that it was up to the village to accept or reject the project. Project staff from TFCG or MJUMITA continued by explaining more details about the project. Then the staff from the district explained the policies and legal framework around PFM. After this, community members could ask questions before a vote was carried out. If they decided to accept, the staff from the district explained the concept of having a VNRC and its responsibilities where they also elected members for the committee (Kibuga, Nguya et al. 2011).

After the villages had agreed to participate, the next step was to create new organizations such as the VNRC and Village Land Use Commission (VLUC). The representatives within these organizations were trained by staff from TFCG/MJUMITA on issues such as land use management (Madafu pers. comm.). Since none of the villages in Kilosa had land certificates, this process was first initiated (Vatn 2016)[26]. Then the committee allocated the land in the village for different activities. Later, experts from the DLUM team[27] came to approve the proposal and help with mapping[28]. The draft of bylaws was made by the VNRC who were assisted by district staff before being sent to the Village Assembly for approval[29]. Further, the

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[26] The process of getting the land certificates approved was time-consuming, and TFCG/MJUMITA continued the implementation process without waiting for the final approval from national authorities (Vatn 2016).

[27] The DLUM consist of staff from various disciplines within the district such as from the Natural Resource Office, Land Department, Agriculture, Livestock, Community Development, Planning, Water and sometimes staff from the Legislators Office who are experts in dealing with bylaws and laws.

[28] According to Meshack (pers. comm.), there was no need to hire staff from central government because the guidelines were already there. TFCG had to find a way to tie PFM to REDD.

[29] The bylaws include rules on "utilization that do not demand prior permission; utilization demanding permit but no payment; utilization demanding permit with payment; and finally activities not allowed" (Vatn 2016).

draft of bylaws was sent to the District Council who would after approval send the VLUP to the Land Use Commissioner in Dar for final approval (Haule pers. comm.). TFCG were only present during this process to oversee how the district officials worked with the villagers (Madafu, pers. comm.).

TFCG/MJUMITA included trial-payments in their project where they tried to mimic a performance based system by calculating the CO_2 emission reduction and divided payments based on the market price for carbon (Vatn 2016). According to Meshack (pers. comm.), TFCG/MJUMITA made guidelines for villages on how to reach a decision which included three options that the villages were free to choose from. The options were 'individual dividends', payments for community projects, and payment to the VNRC for continued protection of the forests. Some community members chose higher individual payments rather than saving money for community development projects, while others preferred to leave TFCG in charge of the money, suggesting a lack of trust in the leadership in the villages (Dyngeland, Vedeld et al. 2014). In regards to the payment left for community projects, TFCG/MJUMITA guided the village government on making its proposal so that it was recorded how much would be spent on what activity. This way, it would be possible to monitor how the payments were spent and the village government could be held accountable (Meshack pers. comm.). To the best of my knowledge, the district did not play a major role in this process, however, I cannot confirm this.

5.2.2 Implementation process in Kondoa

While TFCG selected their districts based on certain criteria through a competition, AWF already had a special interest in the area where they for instance started implementing PFM in several villages in Kolo Hills since 2007. In addition, according to a Project Idea Note published by AWF (2014), Kondoa District requested assistance with reducing deforestation and degradation trends in the area after a report was published by the Tarangire Manyara Ecosystem Working Group. It was only after this that AWF got involved where they sent a proposal for implementing a REDD+ pilot in Kondoa District (Loubser, Knowles et al. 2014). Part of AWF's process of developing a proposal, involved partnering with key personnel from the District such as the DFO and the District Land & Natural Resource Officer. Together they visited potential villages and discussed with the village governments about the benefits of being involved in REDD+ (Loubser, Knowles et al. 2014).

The decision to endorse REDD+ was done by both the District Council and District Administration (Mvungi, pers. comm.). According to Mvungi, the Kondoa Land & Natural Resource Officer, there were no arguments against endorsing REDD+. This was largely due to the district government's lack of ability to monitor the conservation of forest since the early 1990s (Mvungi pers. comm.). According to Mvungi (pers. comm.), the district was able to give their inputs on the proposal, especially as AWF needed their help in gathering information.

AWF requested one officer from the district government for capacity building. The reason behind this, according to Salehe (pers. comm.), was because the district would in this way build capacity to run the project in the future. The district agreed, and accordingly, Wasiwasi Baharia became a member of the AWF team. By hiring a member of the district government to be part of the AWF team, AWF could more effectively collaborate with the local government by having Baharia as a 'middle-man' between AWF and the district.

The first step within the district was to raise awareness and to build capacity of councilors, ward executive officers and forestry officers. In regards to the introduction of REDD+ in the villages, district staff played a major role (Salehe, Mvungi, VEO, pers. comm.). The district and AWF went together to introduce REDD+ in the villages, however, staff from the district were the main speakers during the first meetings, and they introduced AWF as their partners (Mvungi pers. comm.). In order to ensure greater inclusion of village members, the introductory meetings were held in Kiswahilli, and consent was made through democratic vote during Village Assembly meetings. Out of the 21 villages consulted, 18 villages agreed to participate. The three remaining villages were consulted with further (Loubser, Knowles et al. 2014).

Once the selected villages had agreed to participate in REDD+, the process of LUP started. This process happened similar to the process in Kilosa where the VLUM together with the DLUM[30] were key actors. In Kondoa, there was also one representative from the National Land Use Commission (NLUC) from Tabora who assisted in the process[31].

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[30] The team from the district consisted of staff from the land and natural resources, agriculture, surveyors, foresters and wildlife officers.
[31] The reason for involving a representative from the NLUC was because the District had too little technical competence (Vatn 2016).

In addition, the 13 villages bordering the forest reserves created an association in 2012, called JUHIBECO, or as they are also referred to as, the Inter Village Council. JUHIBECO consists of three representatives from each participating village who are selected based on popular vote in the Village Assembly in each village (Loubser, Knowles et al. 2014). The responsibilities of JUHIBECO is to manage the forest on behalf of the participating villages and carry out activities such as forest patrol (Mvungi pers. comm.).

In regards to the establishment of JFM, the first step was to raise awareness in villages that the forest belonged to the government (Mvungi pers. comm.). At the time, the guidelines concerning benefit-sharing for JFM in Tanzania had not been clarified, which resulted in a longer process in regards to reaching an agreement. Plan Vivo, which was the company that AWF hired to do verification of the forest, demanded that the communities get a higher amount of the benefits than the owners, so AWF had to negotiate with the central and district government on this issue. According to Salehe (pers. comm.), both parties agreed on giving the communities 80% of the benefits without hesitation. However, other sources reveal that AWF's proposal had been contested by TFS in particular, who wanted to get 40% of the benefits rather than 20% (Vatn 2016). Two agreements were made in the end. One between the villages and TFS, which was in regards to the forest that belonged to the central government (Salanga Forest Reserve). The other was between villages and the District, which was in regards to the forest reserve that belonged to the local government (Isabe Forest Reserve).

Similar to TFCG, AWF also did a trial payment, although it was not in the original plan. Payments were made to village councils through JUHIBECO who kept 15% (Vatn 2016). These payments were based on opportunity costs, or to be more precise, the size of the REDD+ forest and compliance to the established rules (Kasisi pers. comm.). Staff from the district were involved in coming up with the criteria for payment within villages, and they also assisted in observing the forest land that was involved per village in order to determine how much money each village should get (Kasisi pers. comm.). The village councils spent the money on community projects, which were decided by the general assembly in each village (Vatn 2016).

5.2.3. Implementation process in Kilwa

In Kilwa, the process of implementing REDD+ was an extension of the conservation and community development work that MCDI had already been doing for years. As such, REDD+ was a way to get funding to expand PFM to more villages.

MCDI's REDD+ proposal was approved by district authorities before being approved by the Norwegian Embassy (Ndumbalo pers. comm.). According to Ndumbalo (pers. comm.), MCDI's contractor requested that the District Council had to approve the budget before they would process the proposal. Thus, the District Council were able to evaluate the budget and made some suggestions before it was finally approved.

After the approval, according to the Director of Field Operations of MCDI, Jonas Timothy, was selection of villages (Timothy pers. comm.). The selection was done based on which villages had forest in the area (Mustafa pers. comm.). Next, MCDI facilitated awareness raising both within the district and the government of the selected villages. In relation to introducing REDD+ to the villages, both staff from the district and MCDI participated (Ndumbaro pers. comm.). The Village Chairman of Ngae Village informed me that MCDI was the one to propose the idea of REDD+ in the village, while the district got more involved later in the implementation phase, so it would seem like MCDI was the key actor in the introductory meetings[32]. After the village governments had been informed about REDD+, the village leaders went to the Village Assembly to make awareness to the rest of the population (Ngae Village Chairman pers. comm.)[33].

Next, VNRCs were created in the villages who were further trained by MCDI on how to demarcate the village forest, make an inventory of the different species in the forest, patrolling and punishments which would be written as bylaws (Kirunda pers. comm.). According to Mustafa (pers. comm.), staff from the district e.g. forester officer and community officer were involved in the training. The Village Council and Village Assembly were also trained on issues concerning forest conservation and the benefits, the governance roles of different members in the village and revenue sharing (Ngae Village Chairman pers. comm.).

According to a report by MCDI (2015), MCDI initially planned to skip the LUP step as it would drive up the costs of establishing CBFM[34]. However, since REDD pilots had a high profile

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[33] All of the six villages that were approached by MCDI agreed to participate in REDD+, however, Nambondo village had to be abandoned later due to serious boundary conflict with a neighboring village (MCDI 2016).
[34] In the project report written by MCDI they justify this by stating that LUP is not a legal prerequisite for PFM, but only encouraged (MCDI 2016).

nationally, this fact became known, which put pressure on MCDI to conform to the national strategy for effective land-management. Kilwa District Council asked MCDI to begin the PFM process with LUP. As a result, MCDI worked together with the district council to design a solution for LUP (MCDI 2015)[35]. The LUP process happened similar to the other two pilots, which included demarcation and mapping of the village forests and developing bylaws. The PFM team[36] were actively involved in the LUP process. A PFRA, facilitated by MCDI with assistance by the PFM team, was also conducted in order to identify the existing plants and biodiversity in the area (Timothy pers. comm.).

MCDI was the main actor in assisting the communities with benefit-sharing (MCDI 2015). Improving village governance was a main component within this. Training was given to the VNRC and the Village Council on the importance of accountability. In addition, governance in the villages was improved by the attendance of either MCDI or the District Council. MCDI decreased the amount of assistance provided each year so that the villages would eventually be able to run the General Assembly meetings themselves. MCDI had a clear idea about how the villages should best spend the profits from the VLFR, and helped the VNRC and Village Council to understand that the money would need to both support the continued management of the VLFR as well as be used for community development projects (MCDI 2015). MCDI's key role in relation to benefit-sharing was confirmed by the Village Chairman and Village Executive Officer in Ngea Village (pers. comm.). To the best of my knowledge, the district was not actively involved in this step, but their presence was likely.

5.2.4 Similarities and differences in the processes

I have found four main areas of concern with regards to the process. The first issue concerns how REDD+ was introduced to the district and the influence that the district had on the proposal. The second issue involves the way that REDD+ was introduced to the villages and specifically who was the main actor during the first meetings. The third issue concerns the role of NGOs and the local government in the process of LUP. Finally, the fourth issue concerns the role of NGOs and the local government in deciding payments. I have created a table in order to illustrate the findings so that a comparison can more easily be made.

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[35] It should be noted that during an interview with Timothy (pers. comm.), the original plan of omitting LUP was not mentioned and instead he stressed the importance of including LUP in the implementation process of the pilots.
[36] The PFM team consists of forest officers, agriculture officers, land use officers and community development officers from the district. The PFM team would be synonymous with the DLUM in the Kilosa and Kondoa project.

The three pilots differ in the way that REDD+ was introduced to the districts. TFCG had a thorough selection process where a few selected districts were invited to compete in order to participate in REDD+. In this case, the districts were actively pursuing the opportunity in being involved in REDD+. Although, TFCG already had a tentative proposal prepared before the REDD+ and PFM training, the participants were able to give their input to some degree.

AWF on the other hand had already chosen Kondoa as a district they wished to implement REDD+. This is largely due to the fact that AWF had started introducing PFM in Kondoa district since 2007. There did not seem to be any doubt in whether they should accept the REDD+ project as they were desperate in terms of funding for protecting the forest. The findings suggest that the district were able to give some input to AWF's proposal, but this was mostly information that AWF needed from the district.

Table 2. Role of district government in the implementation process

	Introduction of REDD+		LUP process	Payments
	District level	**Village level**		
Kilosa	District staff actively participated by being invited by TFCG to compete. TFCG/MJUMITA already had a proposal made. 'Advisory Committee' could comment and come with suggestions.	District staff were key during the initial meetings. TFCG/MJUMITA were also involved but only after having been properly introduced by the district.	DLUM team actively involved especially in regards to mapping and assisting the VNRC in making bylaws.	TFCG/MJUMITA were the main actors concerning the trial-payments.
Kondoa	AWF involved the district during the proposal stage by gathering information and consulting with district before sending the application to get the project approved.	Both AWF and district staff were involved during the first meetings with the villages. District were important in order to establish trust.	Process similar to Kilosa. DLUM team actively involved, but were also assisted by the NLUC.	AWF main actor concerning trial-payments, but findings show some involvement by the district.
Kilwa	MCDI involved the district during the proposal stage. REDD+ became an extension to the MCDI's PFM work already in progress. Proposal and budget was approved by the district before signing the contract with Norway.	Staff from both the district and MCDI were involved during the first meetings. Nevertheless, findings suggest that MCDI were the key actors.	The PFM team from the district were actively involved and the process was similar to the other two pilots.	MCDI was the main actor concerning benefit-sharing.

In the same way that AWF had previous experience with PFM in Kondoa, MCDI had already established itself as an NGO working with PFM, conservation and development in Kilwa. Thus, REDD+ was only an extension of the PFM work that MCDI had already started, and the district

easily agreed as it would involve that PFM would be extended to more villages. In this way, REDD+ became part of an existing agreement between MCDI and the district.

In terms of how REDD+ was introduced to the villages, there were also some differences between the pilots. In all cases, both the districts and NGOs were involved, however, they differed somewhat in regards to who was the key actor. In regards to the pilot in Kilosa, the findings suggest that the district were there to introduce TFCG in order to establish trust, however, TFCG were the ones who eventually took over to give detailed information of the concept of REDD+ and the pilot project. In Kondoa, the findings show that the process was similar to Kilosa where staff from the district introduced AWF as their partners. In Kilwa, the findings suggest that the district were involved, however, it would seem like MCDI was the key actor.

The findings suggest that the districts played a somewhat similar role in terms of the LUP process. Because of their technical expertise, and the clear PFM guidelines, this process was relatively straight-forward because the NGOs were obligated to follow the legal PFM guidelines. Staff from the districts were actively involved in for instance mapping the villages and forest areas. In all cases, the NGOs were coordinators and present during the whole process. In Kondoa, AWF also hired a professional from the Commissioner of Lands, which suggest that the district did not have the necessary competence to take on this process on their own. In the all three of the pilots, the district gave their assistance when their technical expertise was needed.

In regards to payment, the NGOs were key actors. In Kilosa, TFCG/MJUMITA developed guidelines for villages where the villages could decide how payments would be distributed themselves. In Kondoa, the district government assisted AWF in coming up with criteria for how benefits should be shared between villages, so it is clear that the district was involved to some degree. AWF was the key actor in facilitating the JFM agreements and ensuring that the village would get 80% of the benefits. In Kilwa, MCDI was the main actor where they committed a substantial amount of time on training the VNRC and Village Council on benefit-sharing.

5.3 Implications for the district government

Moving on to the second research question: is the local government benefiting or losing out in terms of resources such as money and competence? This question can be interpreted in two ways. First, it can be interpreted as the implications for the local government given that NGOs were in charge. Second, it can be interpreted as the implications for the local government if they were to have received the funding directly from the Norwegian Embassy. The second scenario would be hypothetical, and will be discussed accordingly.

In order to answer the research question, I have first of all, discussed with the interviewees in order to get their point of view. In terms of competence, it is rather challenging to determine without having done 'before and after' testing of the competencies of staff within the district. However, I have found it possible to get a general idea on the issue by evaluating in what way district staff have been involved in the implementation of different REDD+ activities. In regards to money, it would have been possible to measure by reviewing the financial documents of the district before REDD+ and after the implementation of REDD+ pilots. This has not been feasible, and instead, I have discussed with the interviewees, in addition to reviewing the amount of money that has been transferred to the district from the NGOs during the implementation of REDD+[37].

In order to answer the research question in the hypothetical way, it will only be inferred to how I would interpret the likely scenario if the funding would have gone through the state instead of given directly to the NGOs. Following, I will discuss the findings in relation to both interpretations of the question for each pilot before making a comparison in the end.

5.3.1 Kilosa District
5.3.1.1 The implication as they played out in practice

In relation to competence, it seemed like the district in Kilosa increased their competence during the implementation of REDD+. According to Meshack (pers. comm.), the district is now better off:

> *I can remember when we started REDD, when we had meetings, there were very few people that could talk or discuss, but this project built capacity of different stakeholders including the district and the way we introduced the concept was linking it to climate change in the broad concept because climate change*

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[37] As mentioned in the methods section, I only have financial data from Kilosa and Kilwa.

is caused by deforestation as one of the causes, so it was linking the climate change impact and what we could do to reduce that kind of impact. So the VLUP was one of the interventions that could be done to improve village tenure and at the same time CBFM. It was the link between climate change and how you could use the interventions to reduce deforestation as a link to climate change. So now they are better off. Now they understand. Because in most of the activities they were our partners in implementing.

Meshack's evaluation is supported by that of the Kilosa Principal Forest Officer, Othmar Haule (pers. comm.), who informed me that at the time of the introduction of REDD, there was little capacity about REDD and how it operates within the district. In his view, by working with TFCG which included the intensive REDD training, has contributed to capacity building within the district. He believes that they are now able to carry out the activities on their own, if they had the funding to do so.

A concern had been whether the local governments are against PFM because they lose income. However, in terms of money, it would seem like the REDD+ project has positively impacted the district government in Kilosa. Mr. Haule's reflection on this was as followed:

> *With the financial intentions to this REDD project, this did not affect anything to the district council because bylaws that are made by the villages does not overshadow the district or central government bylaws. The bylaws are always supposed to support the management activities in local areas. Anything that is done at community level does not affect the district level financially. The law says that if a village declares forest land to be a village land forest reserve then all the revenues that will come from that village forest reserve, will remain at village level, 100%. But the district can impose what we call produce cess, this is a small amount of money that does not go over 5%. If a village for example produces charcoal, say 90 kg per bag, the district council can charge an additional to the buyer, 5% more. So the district will get 5% from the business man because he is asked to pay an additional 5% to the council. So all the rest will remain at the village level…. Yes. So actually, the REDD program did not affect anything in terms of financial revenue to the district council. I can say that in fact, the first trial payment received by the villages has actually relieved the district from pressure to send money to these communities for building community development projects. The villages were supposed to get support from central government but now they are able to support their own projects from revenue from their forests. It is a relief to the government (pers. comm.).*

Because the district collects 5% of the revenue from VLFR, their income from forests continues even though the tenure regime has transformed from being forest on village land which is unused or "open access" (according to the Village Land Act), to VLFR with a management plan. Because of Haule's positive feedback on the impact of REDD+ in terms of money, it can

be inferred that the income from the forest on village land before it became a VLFR was less than what it is now.

Similarly, Meshack did not believe that the district government lost in terms of income:

> *I don't think they lose or lost revenue but I think that the law is very clear, if you put forest under CBFM, 100% of the revenue goes to the community. So for them they would lose revenue because they can no longer issue licenses to the general land and the forest that is not protected. In terms of the incentives, the communities would receive funding directly and they would benefit from the forest themselves and they are thinking in the long-term you could reduce the allocation of the district because the district's responsibility is to support these villages, to be an extension to these villages, so if the village has enough resources then the district can allocate their resources to another village. I don't think it is a lose or win, but it is more complimenting towards the district's revenue in general. In terms of allocation of revenue in general. I think it is more supporting the district to have good incentives to live by. I don't see it as losing because the villages are in the district (pers. comm.).*

In this sense, it would seem like the district benefited from the REDD+ project because it relieved the district from delegating resources to these communities as they are now able to finance their own community projects and to manage their forests without extensive assistance from the district.

5.3.1.2 The implications given the district were in charge

Moving on to the hypothetical question. What would have been the implications for the local government if the funding for the pilot projects would have been given directly to the state? First of all, it should be noted that there would have been a risk by doing this. Money might have been lost due to long bureaucratic procedures or misuse of money. In addition, the implementation process might have taken significant more time because of bureaucracy. Despite of the risks, this could have been an opportunity to empower the forest sector within the local government where they could finally have the resources to do their job. In addition, the local government would have most likely increased their competence significantly in regards to REDD+ since they would have been in charge.

In order to understand this scenario better, I have included a table of the set up costs of the pilot in Kilosa, published in the master thesis of Deus Ngabo (2013).

Table 3. Costs by categories and actors (USD)

Categories	TFCG Head office	TFCG Local office	MJUMITA Head office	MJUMITA Local office	Consultancy	District	Village	Villagers	Sum
Personnel costs	232283	113348	161517	186540	190004	79219	98553	5447	1063868
Office costs incl. consumables	35753	60182	23508	37666	0	0	0	0	157109
Travel costs	59005	0	3663	0	0	0	0	0	62668
Capital assets	27663	0	16930	0	0	0	0	0	44593
TOTAL	354704	173530	205618	224206	190004	79219	98553	5447	1331281

Source: Ngabo (2013)

The table shows that the total costs used on district staff during the set-up of the pilot was USD 79 219, which is only 5.95% of the total set-up costs of USD 1 331 281. In comparison, the total costs spent on TFCG and MJUMITA was USD 958 058, which is 71,97% of the total set up costs. It can only be imagined what the implications would have been if the district would have received this amount, especially when taking into consideration that the forest sector within the districts do not get funding from the central government. Thus, the implementation of the REDD+ pilots could have been a way to significantly empower the local authorities where they could have been able to do their job while at the same time build competence that is required for running REDD+ projects in the future.

In the opinion of the DFO in Kilosa (Haule pers. comm.), it was a good idea to let NGOs implement the REDD+ pilots, stating that at the time, the district did not have capacity because of lack of knowledge in regards to REDD+, however, he believed that the district would now be able to carry out the REDD+ activities as their capacity has increased.

5.3.2 Kondoa District

5.3.2.1 The implication as they played out in practice

In Kondoa, AWF hired one person from the district who was trained on REDD+. He is now running a project by the EU in the area, which strongly suggest that his competence has increased as a result of REDD+. However, the findings show that the picture is not the same in regards to the rest of the staff within the district.

During the interview with the district in Kondoa, there was a discussion on whether the district had given their assistance to AWF during the implementation of REDD+ or if there had been

capacity building. The response from the interviewees varied. The Land and Natural Resource Officer, Mvungi, argued that there had been capacity building because of their involvement in the LUP process. In his opinion, the representative from the NLUC had given training to district staff during the process. However, in the view of the Forest Officer, Kasisi, the district was only giving their assistance. The other forest officers agreed, and informed us that AWF picked staff from the district according to their needs, and paid them individual salaries for their services. In this way, the district acted more as service providers to AWF rather than partners.

When asked if the district would be capable to do LUP now if they had got the money, they admitted that they would not because most of their staff who had the required competence had been transferred. The Town Planning Officer now has its headquarter in Dar es Salaam, the Surveyor has transferred to another district, the Cartographer and GPS Specialist have also transferred[38]. This implies that even if there was some capacity building within the district, it has only been in regards to specific staff because as key specialists have disappeared so has the competence. It could be asked whether the staff would have remained in Kondoa if the district had more resources. There is no need for competent staff if they do not have resources to do their job.

Without having gotten a concrete answer, it would seem like the district is neither better or worse off in terms of money. Although, the district does not have the resources to keep their competent staff, this is not due to the REDD+ pilot. It can be said, that the REDD+ pilot has not significantly contributed to competence building or an increase in money to the district. However, the situation could have been significantly different if the district would have received the funding directly rather than it going through the NGOs.

5.3.2.2 The implications given the district were in charge
As mentioned previously, I was not able to collect data concerning the transfer of money from AWF to the district in Kondoa. However, I do know that allowances were paid to district staff for the work that they did in relation to REDD+ similar to what was done in Kilosa and Kilwa. Correspondingly, as the findings from the first research question show, the involvement of staff from the district in Kondoa was not significantly more than that of Kilosa. Thus, it is likely that

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[38] They have been transferred by command from the Prime Minister's Office (Mvungi pers. comm.)

the percentage given to the district was similar to the other two pilots. Concerning the hypothetical scenario, it would likely be equivalent to what I described in relation to Kilosa.

5.3.3 Kilwa District
5.3.3.1 The implication as they played out in practice
The findings from the pilot project in Kilwa are somewhat contradicting. As mentioned, MCDI and the district have been working closely together for 10 years. Ordinarily they have meetings once a week where MCDI explain opportunities and problems to the district and then they solve them together. According to the Beekeeping Officer, MCDI and the district often borrow staff from each other. For instance, if MCDI are doing LUP but do not have a Land Planning Officer, they will borrow staff from the district. Sometimes the District Council specifies an activity, and then they will borrow staff from MCDI. In this sense, it would seem like MCDI and the district work as a team.

Similarly, it would seem like the district is continuously involved in all activities that MCDI initiate in the district. In regards to sustainability of MCDI's projects, the Beekeeping Officer stated that:

> *We don't expect the NGO to go away very soon, but all the things that they are doing, because they are all documented there will be sustainability and follow ups if they are not around. But we don't expect them to go in the time being. We are aware, because everything that they are doing we are close to them so we know, we can take over. If there is some time that they are not around, we can mobilize instead of abandoning those activities that are already done. The sustainability should be there. (pers. comm.)*

In addition, it would seem like MCDI is, in fact, building competence within the district. The Beekeeping Officer explained to me that MCDI for instance conduct seminars from different disciplines within the district such as with the council management team and councilors. However, it would seem like MCDI's main focus is competence building at village level rather than building competence within the district. In a sense, it appears like MCDI is doing the district's job where training is not taking place, rather MCDI is using the district as service providers when they need the technical expertise of the district such as with LUP, or if there are legal issues that need to be solves such as boundary conflicts between villages. In regards to REDD+, the Beekeeping Officer was very clear that MCDI was the main actor, and that the district only gave assistance if there were any issues.

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An interesting fact is that when there are serious cases going on within the village forest, the villagers contact MCDI first because they are aware of the lack of resources within the district (Timothy pers. comm.). Ordinarily, the district is supposed to be informed, so this demonstrates how MCDI are in a way taking on the responsibilities of the district[39].

In terms of income, it is challenging to determine whether the REDD+ pilot has increased or decreased income to the district. When asked, neither the Beekeeping Officer or the Natural Resource Officer believed that the district was losing out in terms of income. Instead, they informed about the 5% produce cess that the district collects from the VLFR[40] (pers. comm.).

5.3.3.2 The implications given the district were in charge

Data from MCDI (2016) show the difference regarding payments to MCDI staff and district staff respectively during the implementation process (year 2010-2014):

- MCDI Staff Salaries: USD 347,892
- MCDI Vehicle Mileage (fuel and maintenance): USD 225,064
- Other Admin Costs: USD 157,656
- Allowance to District Council Officers: USD 14,026

The data show that the resources spent on MCDI staff, vehicles and other administrative activities was significantly higher than that of district staff (USD 730,612 compared to USD 14,026). It should be noted that the total budget for MCDI was USD 1,948,123, so the majority of the resources were spent on other activities, as only 37.5% of the resources went to MCDI and 0,72% was allowances to the district. Similar to Kilosa, the percentage of the total amount given to the district is very small suggesting limited involvement by the district in the implementation process. Again, I would like to mention that if the local government would have been the key actors, the implications would have been significantly different. If the district in Kilwa would have spent USD 730,612 internally, it could have greatly increased the competence and could have empowered the district forest department profoundly.

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[39] The fact that the district is not able to do their job, is largely due to lack of resources and manpower.
[40] MCDI also gets 5% produce cess from the VLFR. An agreement has been made with the villages who MCDI have worked with where they give 5% of the income from the forest to MCDI, which will support other villages in Kilwa to establish VLUP.

During my interviews with district staff, we discussed what they believed the outcome would have been if they had been delegated funding directly. According to Mustafa (DFO in Kilwa), the best solution was to give funding through MCDI to implement the REDD+ pilot rather than giving it to the district. Mustafa supported this by referring to the long bureaucratic procedures that the district had to adhere to, which would have resulted in a longer implementation period than what the NGOs were able to accomplish. Unlike the NGOs where they can make plans and act accordingly, it is not uncommon for the district to postpone plans. The Kilwa Beekeeping Officer's (Mbwana) view, was similar to that of Mustafa. He also stated that NGOs can do everything in a shorter time compared to the district because they can go forward with implementing activities shortly after being planned. Mbwana also mentioned funding and staff being an issue, and he believed that MCDI was needed because the district is not capable of doing all activities at the same time because the area that they are authorized to govern is too big considering their limited resources and staff. On the other hand, Mustafa (pers. comm.) stated that if the local government were not suffering from bureaucracy constraints, they would not be in need of NGOs to implement projects such as REDD+. In his opinion, the district did not lack competence, but the issue was the long processes and funding.

5.3.4 Comparison

5.3.4.1 Implications in practice

In Kilosa, the findings suggest that there was some competence building within the district. This would refer to the 3-week training that TFCG facilitated where two staff from the district participated. In Kondoa, AWF trained one person from the district who became the middle-man between AWF and the district during the implementation of REDD+. Other than this, the findings cannot confirm that there was any other competence building of the remaining staff within the district in Kondoa. The district is actually worse off now than before the implementation of REDD+, however, this is due to the transfer of competent staff rather than an impact of REDD+. In Kilwa, the findings are a bit contradicting. However, there is no strong evidence that show that there has been competence building within the district. Instead, the focus of MCDI has been to build competence at village level.

In regards to money, it would seem like neither Kilosa, Kondoa or Kilwa District have negatively been affected. However, they vary a bit in terms of the benefits. The findings from Kilosa suggest that the district is relieved from distributing resources to the villages that are now under REDD+. In addition, Kilosa district get 5% of the revenue from the VLFR. In

Kondoa, the findings do not show any sign of the district benefiting but neither that they are losing out. However, it would be likely that the district is benefiting in terms of relieving some resources since villages have an additional income source. In Kilwa, the findings suggest that the district are benefiting both in terms of how the villages are able to fund the management of the VLFR and community development projects themselves, and the 5% produce cess that is going directly to the district.

5.3.4.2 Implications given the district were in charge

It should be noted that the implications for the district government if they had been given the responsibility of implementing the pilots would have likely been significantly different. The resources spent on the district during the implementation process were very low compared to what was spent on the NGOs. In Kilosa, the district received approximately 6% of resources spent on the setting up the project, while in Kilwa the district received less than 1% of the total amount. Considering, the forest sector within the district government have very low budgets, the REDD+ funding could have been of great significance empowering the district staff as they could finally do their job, and there could have been a great increase in capacity. It is interesting, though, that the informants from the district who were interviewed believed that it was the best solution to let NGOs be in charge of the implementation process.

5.4 Legitimacy and role of the district government

In the theory section, key terms within input legitimacy have been defined as participation, transparency, power to decide, and accountability. In order to answer the third research question, I will use the terms above to analyze the legitimacy of the implementation process of the pilot projects. Key aspects within this will be the role of the district in addition to the way that the pilots have been legitimized down to the villagers and up to the central government and donor.

5.4.1 Participation

In terms of participation, I will describe the type of participation that occurred during the implementation process. Pretty's (1995) typology of participation will be used in order to classify the type of participation of villages and the local government. I will discuss participation in relation to all three pilots simultaneously because I have found that they were similar to a large degree.

All three of the NGOs were clear on the fact that the villages should be consulted by building awareness on REDD+ and PFM, and then were free to decide for themselves if they wanted to be a part of REDD+ or not. In addition, the NGOs were obligated to get permission from the district governments where they wanted to implement as they are the legal custodians of villages within the districts. However, other than getting permission to implement the projects, the NGOs were not obligated to include the villages and district government in decision-making. Nevertheless, it would likely have resulted in a more challenging implementation process if the villages and district governments did not at least feel like they to some degree had an impact on the outcome.

By studying the implementation process, I will argue that the involvement of the district government and villages can be classified as what Pretty referred to as 'functional participation':

> *Participation seen by external agencies as a means to achieve project goals, especially reduced costs. People may participate by forming groups to meet predetermined objectives related to the project. Such involvement may be interactive and involve shared decision making, but tends to arise only after major decisions have already been made by external agents. At worst, local people may still only be coopted to serve external goals (pp. 1252, 1995).*

First of all, it is likely that the NGOs used participatory processes in order to increase the effectiveness of their projects. For instance, according to Salehe (pers. comm.), AWF made sure that the project activities were backed up by being included in the district development plan, so that whatever AWF had planned would not be challenged by district authorities. Having the support by the district was essential as it also meant that it would be more likely that villages would accept the project. In regards to the introduction of the pilot projects in both Kilosa and Kondoa, it would seem like the district was very important in order to establish trust with the villages. As stated by Salehe, involving the district was very important "…so the villagers know that their leadership has accepted you" (pers. comm.). By having the leadership come speak of the project and introduce the project in such a way that the villagers perceive the NGOs as assisting the district in implementing activities that are in their own interest, strongly encourages the villagers to accept. In addition, having the support of the district increased effectiveness of the project by ensuring cooperation of villagers as they would perceive the projects as legitimate and the NGOs as having legitimate authority to implement.

In Kilwa, both staff from the district and MCDI introduced REDD+ to the villages, but I do not know if the district were needed in the same way as in Kondoa and Kilosa since MCDI was already a recognized NGO working on PFM in the district. However, as Timothy emphasized (pers. comm.), having a good relationship to both the district and the villages is crucial in order to implement effectively.

Second of all, the findings suggest that although the district governments did have some influence on decision-making, major decisions had already been made by the NGOs. For instance, in the case of TFCG/MJUMITA, they already had a proposal made before involving Kilosa District. Although, TFCG/MJUMITA included two district personnel in the 'advisory committee', they could only make recommendations to the existing proposal. Another inference to NGOs having full control over major decisions of the process, is their control of the budgets. The NGOs could have for instance given the district governments a budget and let them be in charge of the LUP process in the villages, however instead, the NGOs remained in control by acting as managers and coordinators on all areas even in relation to the LUP process which is ordinarily facilitated by the district government.

At village level, the villagers participated by being actively involved in the LUP process by developing bylaws and deciding on the utilization of land in their village. Although, guided by both district staff and the NGOs, the villagers did have influence on the making of management plans concerning the land within the villages in addition to benefit-sharing.

It could be asked whether the district government would have facilitated a more participatory implementation process than the NGOs if they had been in charge. It goes without saying that the district government in this case would have been fully involved and would have full control over major decisions. However, if the district government would have included the villages in a more participatory way, is questionable. It could be that the NGOs have been more focused on creating a space where villagers can voice their opinion. While NGOs are more dependent on having participatory processes in order to be perceived as legitimate, the state is not dependent in the same way as they can enforce their power by command and control.

5.4.2 Transparency

In regards to transparency, it will be looked at how transparent the process was. Were the NGOs transparent in terms of project documents, budgets etc.? What was the scope and content of

information given to the district and villages who had to accept the projects? It will also be looked at how transparent the NGOs were compared to how the state likely would have acted. I will base the analysis of transparency on the two core assumptions suggested by Gupta (2008) which were: 1) the procedural nature of information disclosure, and 2) that information matters and thus can empower.

In relation to the procedural nature of information disclosure, FPIC is often referred to in regards to projects initiated by NGOs or other non-state stakeholders. All three of the NGOs analyzed in this thesis put emphasis on incorporating the principles of FPIC in their projects were awareness raising was a first step both in relation to the district governments and with villages.

The information given prior to the villages' opportunity to reject or accept the project was on the concept of climate change and REDD+, how the project would benefit the districts/villages and what activities would be implemented. With regards to FPIC at village level, it can be said that the NGOs together with district staff spent considerable time on the first meetings in order to ensure that the villagers understood the concept of REDD+, the benefits and the necessary procedure for implementing PFM, before they were asked to give a vote on whether to accept or reject the project. According to a TFCG technical report (2011), TFCG/MJUMITA used multiple ways of communication such as drama, printed materials written in Swahili, formal meetings and more informal discussions. During the introductory meetings in all three pilot projects, the information was given in the local language in order to ensure full comprehension of what was discussed. In a report by MCDI (2015), it is acknowledged that there are challenges in incorporating the principles of FPIC in villages since the education level is generally low. As such, the information given on REDD+ was simplified, which means it is likely that key information was left out.

I do not have sufficient data on the extent of information given to the district government, however, it is reason to believe that they were more informed about the risks and challenges involved than what was shared with the villages. In addition, as their education level was higher, they were probably better able to get a more comprehensive understanding of what REDD+ would entail for the district.

As mentioned previously, TFCG openly discussed the proposal with the 'advisory committee' where the members in the committee were able to give their recommendations. The Principal Forest Officer in Kilosa informed me that TFCG presented the budget of the project, so the district were in this way able to get some insight into how the funding for the project would be spent. It would seem it was a fairly open process where the district was somewhat included in the planning of the project.

The findings from the pilot in Kondoa, also suggest that the district had insight into the budget and were involved early on in the process. According to Salehe, AWF showed the district the whole budget and how much would be spent on which activity so that the district could see the amount that would be spread over 4-5 years. In Kilwa, the findings are similar. According to the district staff interviewed, the district council were able to review the whole budget of MCDI before getting the project approved by the Norwegian Embassy, and the district were even able to make some adjustments.

Moving on to Gupta's (2008) second assumption that information matters and thus can empower, the question regards the content of information given and how it has been framed. Since an issue can be framed in a particular way in the aim of serving a particular purpose, the content of information given can be crucial. Previously, I have written about how the benefits of the project were provided. However, I have not found any evidence that suggest that the risks or downside of accepting the project were discussed during the initial meeting with the villages. This implies that the information given was biased in the sense that the villagers were not able to make a fully informed decision when giving their consent.

During my interview with the village government in Ngae Village (pers. comm.), the Village Chairman expressed some complaints in relation to FPIC. He seemed to be unhappy with the fact that they were not informed about the complications in relation to the carbon market, and that they have not received the benefits that they were expecting. This suggests that although a process of awareness raising occurred and NGOs gave the villages the freedom to accept or reject the project, the information that was given could perhaps have been more neutral in the sense that both the benefits and the risks were discussed.

Without sufficient information, villagers are not able to make informed decisions, and are not able to negotiate with the NGOs by setting their own conditions. For instance, how can the

villagers hold the NGOs accountable if they do not have the necessary information to do so? If the villagers had been able to completely comprehend what the project would entail, it could have empowered them so that they could demand that what was promised, was also delivered.

Up to now, the discussion has been on how transparent the process was towards the district and villages, however, another aspect is how transparent the process was towards the contractor, which in this case was the Norwegian Embassy. The NGOs had a strong audit where they continuously had to report back to the Norwegian Embassy in Tanzania.

In addition, NGOs have to reveal information of their activities to the central government in Tanzania. According to Meshack, there is a strong audit being reported to the government:

> *... in terms of as an organization and as a project it was audited, we are audited in whether the funding is being managed in terms of the agreement and also according to the organization institution, but also that we meet the statistical contribution as part of the government policy, reporting the annual reports to the government and also the organization audit to be submitted to the government. (pers. comm.)*

5.4.3 Power to decide

In relation to power in decision-making, I will look at to what extent the district and villages were able to exercise power in decision-making.

In a general sense, the scenario in the case of implementing REDD+ pilot projects in Tanzania can be explained as follows. NGOs have been hired by the Norwegian Embassy in Tanzania to implement pilot projects. Because the idea has been that REDD+ can be implemented by combining it with PFM, which entails giving villages the right to manage forests and thus receive benefits, it is in this sense in the interest of villagers to accept. Ordinarily, it is the district government who has the responsibility to implement PFM in villages, however, because the district is so constrained by lack of resources and manpower, they are not capable to do their job. In addition, the central government in Tanzania is not setting aside money for LUP, because it is an expensive process and the forest is not a priority. The District Principal Forest Officer in Kilosa explained to me that:

> *the commissioner of lands, when we met him in Morogoro with different stakeholders, he said that the only way for these villagers to carry out LUP is by getting support by other stakeholders. For instance, if someone wanted to do mining in a village, they would have to do LUP first, if someone wanted to do*

forest management, he had to do LUP first. So through the support by different NGOs or stakeholders in a village, that is how they are able to carry out LUP. So like in Kilosa, we had support from WWF who supported about 7 villages in the southern part of Kilosa, and we have been having support from Oxfam, and TFCG. So various NGOs and institutions when they implement activities in the villages, they support the LUP (Haule pers. comm.).

As such, it is clear that the district governments are dependent on NGOs or other stakeholder in order to implement LUP in villages. Thus, when any NGO come to the district to propose a project, they easily agree. Because of this, it is very likely that anything that the NGOs propose will be welcomed as long as it is according to the law, which gives the NGOs a lot of power to implement in their own way and by their own agenda.

This way it is easy for donors (or the international community) to decide which and how conservation projects shall be implemented. In this sense, it is not as Dahl says that A (the NGO) has power over B (the district/villages) in such a way that the NGO will make the district/villages do something they they would otherwise not agree to. Nonetheless because it is in the district's and villages' interest, the process is not about the NGO having power over the district/villages in the sense that they are doing something that they do not want to, but in terms of how and what is done, the NGO does have a lot of power. As such, Foucault's definition of power as strategic games can be applied. Foucault explained this type of power as "structuring the possible field of action of others". In this scenario, the NGOs who have been hired by the Norwegian Embassy are able to determine the field of action, and thus, the district/villages have a limited amount of space to choose their actions.

On the other hand, the district government do have power in the sense that the NGOs are dependent on their approval of the projects. In addition, the district government have the power to influence how the villages perceive the NGOs. However, because the district government are so desperate for funding, the likelihood that they will not support the NGOs is very unlikely.

5.4.4 Accountability
As described in the theory section, it is challenging to ensure accountability in network modes of governance as power has been delegated to various actors. In addition, this presents a special case where NGOs have responsibility of implementing activities (PFM), that are ordinarily under the jurisdiction of state authorities. In terms of accountability this results in a paradox where the NGOs are accountable to their contractors, whereas the government is accountable

to the people but lack authority of the work done by NGOs. I was able to discuss accountability with Meshack and Timothy, and will share their take on the issue. This will also be analyzed in relation to what Keohane (2002) has called internal accountability and external accountability. In addition, democratic accountability will be discussed, which would have been particularly relevant if funding was channeled through the central government.

Meshack's (pers. comm.) take on accountability was that he perceived TFCG more as change-agents rather than being accountable to any particular actor. Since they were implementing existing policies that had already been agreed to such as VLUP, in his view, they were merely speeding up the process, and providing input on how to improve the policies. Meshack described their work as helping the government, because otherwise nobody would do it. However, in terms of funding, he did agree that TFCG were accountable to their contractor. In addition, Meshack mentioned that TFCG were also accountable to the central government because they have to submit annual audit reports (pes. comm.).

In the view of Timothy (pers. comm.), accountability was not an issue because the donors who give MCDI funding come to monitor the project. They evaluate what they are doing in their office and go to the villages to speak to the villagers. In this way, how MCDI spend their money is closely monitored, and written in reports. Timothy explained that donors will stop funding them if they do not spend the money properly.

Both Meshack and Timothy were clear on the fact that they were accountable to their contractors. Meshack added that NGOs were also accountable to the central government. Applying Koehane's (2002) theory on internal and external accountability, it can be said that the NGOs are accountable to their contractors because they influence them in terms of financial support. They are also internally accountable to the central government in Tanzania because the central government gives NGOs authority to exist and act within the Tanzanian boundaries. However, in terms of being accountable to those that their projects impact, which would be external accountability, it becomes more challenging as they neither have political nor financial influence on NGOs. As mentioned by Timothy, when donors come to monitor MCDI's projects, they go speak to villagers who are directly affected, and in this way villagers do have an opportunity to give feedback and voice their complaints if they have any. In this way, accountability could be ensured by establishing a relationship between the contractor and those that are affected.

By shortcutting the government when contracting NGOs to implement the REDD+ pilot projects, there is a detachment of accountability from village level up to the central government. In democracies, citizens can hold the rulers accountable if they do not live up to their expectations by voting them out of office in the next election (Bäckstrand 2006). However, this link is cut out with regards to the scenario discussed in this thesis. Since the district government is not the key actor, villagers cannot hold them accountable if there are certain issues that they are unhappy with. If funding had been channeled through the central government down to the district level instead, then there would have been a stronger link from village level up to the central government, which would provide democratic accountability.

5.5. Implications for the district government if the nested approach becomes reality

In this section I will first provide an overview of the characteristics of each model and the expected role of the district in each. I will use secondary sources such as governmental documents, reports from TFCG/MJUMITA and research articles. In addition, information from an interview with Meshack will be given in order to evaluate the possible role that the district would play if a nested approach is chosen rather than the model proposed in the national REDD+ strategy.

5.5.1 National REDD+ Strategy

Preparing Tanzania for REDD+ was part of developing a national strategy. This process started in 2008 when the bilateral partnership on climate change with Norway was established (Rantala and Di Gregorio 2014). The overseeing body of technical and operational issues in relation to REDD readiness is the National REDD+ Task Force (NRTF) (URT 2013). The NRTF, consists of senior officials from relevant government ministries and from Civil Society Organizations (CSO) (URT 2013). The NRTF had the responsibility of constructing the strategy (CDNK 2011), and the process included stakeholders' consultation and awareness raising on various REDD+ issues (URT 2013).

According to the Environmental Management Act (2004), the Division of Environment in the Vice President's Office (VPO) is mandated to coordinate all climate change issues (URT 2013). Within the Division of Environment, there is a National Climate Change Steering Committee (NCCSC) who has responsibility of guiding and overseeing all climate change related activities in Tanzania and National Climate Change Technical Committee (NCCTC) (URT 2013). In

relation to REDD+, the government has proposed to establish a national REDD+ Fund and a National Carbon Monitoring Centre (NCMC). The fund will distribute payments at a national level, and the NCMC will provide technical services on measuring, reporting and verification of REDD+ activities across the country (URT 2013). The idea is that payments from either an international fund or market will be made straight to the Fund managed by the central government who will further distribute payments to the communities involved in REDD+.


Figure 4. Institutional Structure for REDD+ Implementation and Reporting.

Source: URT (2013b)

The REDD+ governance structure proposed in the National REDD+ Strategy is illustrated in the figure above. The national strategy proposes to implement REDD+ through the existing regional and district local government institutions. The Regional Administrative Secretariat will be the link between the national REDD+ authorities and the local government. Within the district, the Environmental Management Committees will act as the REDD+ coordinators (URT 2013). At the district level, the forest reserves, village forests, private forests etc. will each account for their carbon levels which will in turn account for carbon benefits, and then from

the district it will be scaled up to national accounting system. The NCMC will be responsible for verifying carbon data.

Objective 1 of the national strategy, is "A participatory forest management regime is employed to ensure engagement of the local communities in implementation of REDD+ schemes" (URT 2013, pp. 42). This will involve capacity building of local communities, local government authorities and TFS. The strategy also envisages to engage CSOs in implementation activities, especially as they have acquired essential knowledge from implementing pilot projects. This model implies that local government authorities will play a central role in the governance of REDD+ at local level. CSOs will also be engaged to some degree[41].

5.5.2 Community Carbon Enterprise Model

As an alternative to the fund model where the central government would be in control, TFCG together with MJUMITA have designed a model that they call the Community Carbon Enterprise (CCE). The main motivation for developing and promoting such a model, is the worry that the National Fund would prevent benefits from reaching the most vulnerable who bear the highest costs of REDD+, namely the communities (Rantala and Di Gregorio 2014). Benefit-sharing from national to local level has been problematic historically in Tanzania, where the benefits have not reached local communities who have been the ones directly affected (TFWG 2010). The CCE model would give communities direct access to markets where they could potentially sell carbon without going through the national government. In order to reduce transaction costs, the idea is that each participating village will be assisted with monitoring, reporting and verification of emission reductions, and then the compile of carbon credits from the villages would be sold as one at the market (Mustalahti and Rakotonarivo 2014).

Several CSOs with TFCG in the forefront[42], have been advocating for a nested approach where the national system exists, but also allows for villages to access markets or funds and receive payments directly. The CCE model proposes that there shall be a national accounting system for emission reductions in order to avoid 'double accounting' (TFWG 2010). As such, the model proposes direct payments to communities within a national accounting framework (TCS 2016).

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[41] The strategy does not propose to what degree CSOs will be involved.
[42] MCDI also support a nested approach to REDD+ in Tanzania (MCDI 2015)

The CCE model was tested in the two pilot projects that TFCG and MJUMITA implemented in Kilosa and Lindi. 10 villages in Lindi and 12 villages in Kilosa has tested and approved the model (MJUMITA 2016)[43]. MJUMITA has up to now played the role as service-provider where they are responsible for remote sensing, contracting third party verification, marketing and payment facilitation. According to the plan, the reports developed by MJUMITA will be presented to the village leaders, representatives from the District Authorities, National level institutions and NGOs responsible for REDD+ implementation (MJUMITA 2016). The revenues from the sale of emission will be distributed back to the villages according to the amount of emission reduction achieved. At village level there will be bylaws that further determines how benefits will be distributed within the village. This will be possible by each village member above the age of 18, will subscribe to the village project register, and then their performance will be monitored and recorded in the register. The VNRC will then report the register according to their VLUM and VLFMP (Kimbowa, Mwayafu et al. 2011).

Figure 5. Source: http://www.mjumita.org/what-we-do/projects/redd/index.htm

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[43] It should be noted that the CCE model has not been able to enter the international carbon market for Kilosa as a result of issues with getting clear images for calculating the historical emission reduction (Meshack pers. comm. 2016).

The hypothetical question that I have been wanting to answer is: what role would the local government play in the governance of REDD+ if an alternative model is chosen? According to Meshack (pers. comm.), the model is set up in a way where any stakeholder can potentially be the service-provider, which now is MJUMITA. Thus, if District Authorities were properly capacity-built on remote sensing, marketing and payment facilitation, they could potentially take on the job of MJUMITA in the future. However, the likelihood of this happening is low due to their limited capacity, and the effectiveness of the work done by MJUMITA.

If the nested approach was chosen above the National Fund and MJUMITA keeps its job as a service-provider, or another NGO takes its place, what would be the role of district government? According to Meshack (pers. comm.), the district would play a major role developing the VLUP and would have to approve the VLFR. In addition, the district would likely be involved in developing activities that would reduce emission at village level. However, in terms of the trading component, the district would not be involved as it can function on its own (Meshack pers. comm.). As such, it would seem like the district would be involved in the same way that they have been during the pilot implementation process, however, they would be sidelined in the CCE model after all the necessary institutions are in place.

6. Discussion

RQ 1 of this thesis has been to evaluate the role of the district government compared to the NGOs during the implementation of REDD+ pilot projects in Tanzania. In this section I will discuss this further. Thereafter, I will discuss and compare the two models proposed for REDD+ in Tanzania including what I consider to be the risks and benefits of each.

6.1 Role of the district government and the NGOs

The findings show that in general, the district government were involved during most stages of the implementation phase. However, to what degree they have been involved has been the crucial question. Kajembe, Silayo et al. (2015) argue that the district governments were "on lookers" during the implementation phase rather than being actively involved. They have concluded this based on findings from the Kilosa and Kondoa pilots. Although, I would not have chosen those exact words, I would partly agree with the statement.

As I argued in section 5.4.3 concerning Foucault's theory on power as strategic games, the NGOs are able to determine the field of action, and thus I argue that the district/villages have a limited amount of space to choose their actions. As a result, in the decision-making arena I would agree that the district governments are "on lookers". The NGOs have consulted the district by getting their approval for implementing the activities. However, they have not allowed the district government to actively participate in major decisions. I would argue that the NGOs were clearly in need of having the district on their side in order to effectively complete their projects and thus included the district in a way where they were fully aware about what the NGOs planned on doing, but were not actively involved in the decision-making process that formed the projects.

Rather than describing the district government as "on lookers" I would describe them as service-providers since they were actively involved in certain activities such as LUP although they acted as "on lookers" in terms of decision-making.

Although, the district participated in several project activities, the NGOs did not let the district be in charge of any of the activities, even with regards to the process of LUP. Although some of the district staff interviewed described the NGOs as their "partners", it did not seem like a partnership. Instead, I would argue that the district government acted as service-providers to the NGOs where they assisted in the activities that where either assigned to the district

government by law, or for the purpose of increasing the effectiveness of the projects. For instance, concerning introducing REDD+ to the villages district staff were present in order to establish trust of the NGOs, and concerning LUP were the district had both the technical competence needed in addition to the formal responsibility to facilitate. In return for their services, the district staff would get allowances from the NGOs.

I would like to add that the role of the district government in this scenario, contradicts existing theory. Vatn (2015) has written that civil society actors usually offer legitimacy to political actors. However, the scenario described in this thesis is the opposite, where the state has offered legitimacy to NGOs. Earlier, I have explained this as the district establishing trust between villages and the NGOs by introducing the NGOs to the villages during the introduction of REDD+. In theory, there is an ideal that civil society puts pressure on the state to facilitate legitimate processes. In this scenario, NGOs have been delegated responsibility for implementing projects that include activities that are usually done by district authorities. As such, the villages might have been reluctant to participate if an outsider came without having being openly accepted by the district authorities. In this way, the NGOs needed the district in order to be perceived as a legitimate authority.

6.2 Understanding the implications by comparison of the two models
In this thesis, I have presented two governance models of REDD+. The first model is the nested approach, which would look similar to how the pilot projects have been set up. They are all project-based, while they in the future would also entail national accounting systems. The other model is what has been proposed in the National REDD+ Strategy where funding would be channeled through the central government and REDD+ would be governed through the state authorities at national, regional and local level. Out of the two models proposed, which would be the best solution?

6.2.1 National REDD+ Strategy
A key question is: will the local government be able to take on such a large role with regards to REDD+ projects, if the national REDD+ strategy, as it is constructed now, is fully endorsed? The issues that were mentioned by the informants during the interviews might become an obstacle to the national REDD+ strategy. For instance, is it possible that the REDD+ Strategy can be effective considering the bureaucratic constraints that the local government face which result in long and tedious processes? Will it result in institutional transformation of

administrative procedures, or would it end up being a project that produces weak results at the same time as being very time consuming and costly?

One of the most unexpected elements that came up during the interviews, was how positive the district staff were about the NGOs being responsible of implementing the REDD+ projects. I would have thought that district staff would have expressed some resentment or that they would have liked to be more in charge. Instead, they seemed to talk about the NGOs as the solution, stepping in when the district government are not able to do their job. It was surprising to see how low their confidence was in their ability to implement the REDD+ projects. Although I would have thought that the district would be more open to being in charge of a project that would empower them to implement PFM in villages, perhaps they were just being realistic.

Based on the information I got from the interviews, I will argue that the district governments in Tanzania, or at least the three that I have interviewed, are deeply constrained in numerous of ways. The key issues that came up were unreliable funding, insufficient funding and long bureaucratic procedures. These findings are also in line with previous research on the problems concerning the decentralization of government in Tanzania (see Kessy and McCourt 2010).

Unreliable funding from the central government is problematic for several reasons. Above all, it makes it almost impossible for the district to make long-term plans as they do not know what their budget will be more than a year ahead of time. This constrains development for instance, because development projects might be initiated but then derailed after a year if funding is not sufficient to sustain the work. Another consequence of unreliable funding is that money set aside for a particular purpose could be 'borrowed' to fund other purposes perceived as more important. At the Kilwa District Office (pers. comm.), I was informed that this was not unusual.

Similarly, the district government is clearly constrained by insufficient funding. As it was mentioned in several of the interviews, the forest sector is not a priority, and as a result they have very few resources. This makes it particularly challenging for the district forest officers to do their job. A consequence of this, is that TFS are in some occasions taking over. An example is Kondoa District where TFS have intervened in the management of the forests even though they are within village boundaries. In the interview with TFS in Kondoa District, the rationale behind TFS' interference was that TFS have responsibility for all forest in Tanzania, and if the

district officers are not capable to manage the forest, then they perceive it as their obligation to intervene.

In addition to the problems with funding, operational constraints make the whole governance process incredibly time-consuming. Long procedures due to bureaucracy was mentioned as a major constraint several times during the interviews. A consequence is that plans take a long time to put into action. An example is the extensive process concerning LUP where the plans have to be approved by the Commissioner of Lands. According to the Principal Forest Officer in Kilosa (Haule pers. comm.), some of the LUP have not yet received approval since 2010. Further, he said that the district has suggested that this process should be limited to the district or regional level rather than having to go through the central government. Clearly, there is a need for improvement in the governance system that can make such processes more effective.

The forest sector is unlikely to be prioritized in the near future since poverty continues to be a pressing issue in the country. REDD+ could in this way be a great opportunity for Tanzania where the forest sector could receive funding to implement the national PFM policies, while at the same time tie it to the carbon market. Unlike the issues due to funding, bureaucracy is probably more challenging to change as it entails transformation of the whole governance system in Tanzania. A possibility could be that by a potential large-scale REDD+ scheme where the model proposed by the National REDD+ Strategy is put into force could put political pressure on the central government to make institutional changes concerning the governance system.

6.2.2 Nested Approach
The nested approach advocated strongly by TFCG backed up by other NGOs such as MCDI, are particularly worried that a national benefit-sharing system could result in failure where communities do not receive payments. The nested approach proposed as an alternative, is believed to avoid such risks as communities can directly access carbon markets. Although, this is a very important issue, I will argue that such a model may not be the best solution in the long-run.

If a nested approach is what in the end is chosen, it could imply that NGOs will continue to be leading actors in the implementation and management of the projects at local level. The local government will likely continue to be shortcut, making NGOs stronger actors compared to the

local government with regards to land and forest management in the districts where REDD+ is implemented.

I found that the partnership between MCDI and the district in Kilwa rather interesting. The fact that MCDI has become such a permanent actor in terms of governance within the district might in some sense suggest that they are becoming an extension of the Kilwa District Government where they are assisting the district in doing their job, and receiving an equal amount of revenue from the villages where they have implemented PFM. If a nested approach becomes the selected model in the future, then more partnerships such as what is experienced in Kilwa between the district government and NGOs might be established. This raises the question of whether the district government will become less significant in the future if NGOs are able to establish themselves as legitimate institutions.

The likelihood of NGOs becoming too powerful contra the state is unlikely. The state has many mechanisms that enables it to enforce its power over NGOs, so if the central government perceive NGOs as a threat they could enforce rules which would hinder this from happening. If this happens, though, then the local government will have to take over. However, if they have been passive actors the whole time than their ability to do so is most likely low, which would mean that the progress that has been made in forest management by NGOs could be quickly lost.

7. Conclusion

This thesis has among others studied the relationship between the local government and NGOs in the implementation of REDD+ pilots. Above all, my analysis has focused on what happened in practice. However, I have also tried to evaluate what the implications would have been if the district government had been in charge rather than the NGOs. By doing this, my goal has been to provide insight into two different governance structures of REDD+ on the ground in Tanzania, and particularly the implications for the district government. Below, I will give a brief overview of the main findings from the thesis before evaluating the prospects for the future.

7.1 Main findings

Regarding RQ 1, I have argued that the district government were 'on lookers' in relation to decision-making, but acted as service providers to the NGOs in other areas such as introducing REDD+ to the villages and regarding the LUP process. Despite the differences between the pilot projects, the district governments were similar in their active role in the LUP process and their importance during the introductory meetings with villages. The staff interviewed at the district office in Kilwa and Kilosa were very clear on the fact that the NGOs had been the main actor, while the staff interviewed in Kondoa disagreed partly on this, however, the findings strongly suggest that AWF was the key actor as well.

In regards to what the implications have been for the district in terms of competence and resources (RQ 2), the findings suggest that although the district government have not been negatively affected, the positive effects have been modest. Although, there has been some competence building, it has only been with regards to a few people, which have not resulted in any significant improvements. In terms of resources, the REDD+ projects have relieved the districts from distributing resources to the REDD+ villages, and Kilosa and Kilwa district are also collecting a 5% produce cess from the VLFR. It is questionable if the income that the district collected before REDD+ was higher, but in Kilosa and Kilwa, the district seemed very positive so I would infer that they are collecting more money now than before. In Kondoa, representatives of the district forest sector did not express being either positively nor negatively affected by REDD+.

Regarding the legitimacy of the process (RQ 3), the focus has been on input legitimacy in terms of participation, transparency, power to decide and accountability. In terms of participation, I

have argued that there was 'functional participation', meaning that the participation by villages and the district government was a way to reach the project goals most effectively. Although, there was shared decision-making to some degree, this was only after key decisions had been made by the NGOs. Transparency was analyzed in relation to FPIC and the power of information. The principles of FPIC were used such as awareness raising and allowing the districts and villages to have the freedom to accept or reject the projects. However, the information given at village level seemed to be biased meaning that there was a clear emphasis on the benefits while the risks were left out. In regards to power to decide, I have argued that the NGOs have been able to determine the field of action, and thus, the district government and villages have a limited amount of space to choose their actions. Accountability in the implementation of the pilots has previously been described as a paradox where NGOs are accountable to their contractors, whereas the government is accountable to the people but lack authority regarding the work done by NGOs. The findings infer that there is a lack of downwards accountability from the NGOs to the villages while at the same time a detachment of accountability from village level up to the central government.

Whether the district government would have facilitated a more legitimate implementation process is questionable. In terms of transparency and participation, it could be that the NGOs did a better job than what the district would have done. However, in terms of accountability and power to make decisions, it could be that it would have been a better option to have the district government in charge.

In conclusion, it would seem like the district government acted as 'service providers' to the NGOs. Although, the implications for the district in terms of money and competence have been positive, it has not been to a large degree. In terms of input legitimacy, it would seem like the informants from the district perceived the process as legitimate, however, there might be some disagreements on village level as they were not informed about the risks before accepting the projects. From a theoretical perspective, on the other hand, there are some key issues in relation to the legitimacy of the process. This is foremost due to how NGOs were able to dominate in relation to decision-making and how there was a detachment of democratic accountability.

What would have been the implications for the local government if the funding for the pilot projects would have been given directly to the state? As mentioned, there would be a risk by doing this as money might have been misused or lost due to long bureaucratic procedures. It

would also be a question regarding the capacity of the district. Despite of the risks, I argue that this could have been an opportunity to empower the forest sector within the local government where they could finally have the resources to do their job. In addition, the local government would have most likely increased their capacity significantly in regards to REDD+ as they would be actively involved, rather than assisting the NGOs in specific activities.

7.3 Prospects for the future

Out of the two governance structures described in this thesis, which would be the best solution for REDD+ at a local level in Tanzania? Although the nested approach could efficiently implement and improve forest governance at village level, it does not imply that there will be improved governance at district level. As such, it could be asked what will happen if REDD+ is abandoned after a certain amount of years and the district government are left to take over the governance once again? Will they be able to if they have been passive actors in the REDD+ governance?

I would argue that the best solution would be to go with the governance structure proposed in the National REDD+ Strategy, although, it would be essential to ensure that benefits reach forest communities. A large-scale REDD+ scheme with the district government in charge at the local level, could possibly result in empowerment of the forest sector within the district. This is not to say that NGOs are not needed. The competence of NGOs is of great value and I believe that a partnership between the district government and NGOs would be a good solution.

I propose, however, that the NGOs and the district government swap roles. Rather than the NGOs being responsible for the projects, I think it would be better if the the district government were in charge while the NGOs served the role as service providers to the district. This way, the NGOs could contribute their expertise where the district government needed assistance. In addition, the NGOs could also put pressure on the district government to facilitate transparent and participatory processes. Further, this would entail that the democratic link between villages, the district and the central government would be present.

From what I have learned, there is a great need for institutional reform of the governance system in Tanzania where more autonomy and resources are allocated to the local government so that they are able to more effectively do their job. Although decentralization of government has occurred, it has not been done adequately. Since the local government remains weak in terms

of resources and manpower, and have to adhere to the central government and await their permission to do simple procedures, there are big delays in the implementation of programs and projects. Despite these obstacles, if given a chance, REDD+ could perhaps present an opportunity to empower the local government.

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9. Appendix

Name	Position	Date	Other interviewers participating or present	Setting
Charles Meshack	TFCG Executive Director	07.11.15 19.11.15 11.03.16	07.11.15 – Kajembe 11.03.16 - Vatn	Mount Meru Hotel, Arusha/ TFCG Office/ Phone
Othmar Haule	Principal Forest Officer (Kilosa)	26.11.15		Kilosa District Office
William Sulupsi Madafu	Member of Mjumita from Nyali Village, Kilosa	25.11.15	Maria Gorrett Nantongo and a translator (research assistant from Tanzania)	Nyali Village
John Salehe	AWF Country Director	07.11.15	George Kajembe present	Mount Meru Hotel, Arusha
Emmanuel Mvungi	District Land & Natural Resource Officer	10.11.15	Arild Vatn and George Kajembe	District Forest Office, Kondoa
Emmanuel Kasisi	District Forest Officer	10.11.15	Arild Vatn and George Kajembe	District Forest Office, Kondoa
Agnes Duhilo	Assistant Forest Officer	10.11.15	Arild Vatn and George Kajembe	District Forest Office, Kondoa
Deogratius Michael Joseph	Assistant Beekeeping Officer	10.11.15	Arild Vatn and George Kajembe	District Forest Office, Kondoa
Clement Kabeni	Assistant Forest Officer	10.11.15	Arild Vatn and George Kajembe	District Forest Office, Kondoa
	Tanzania Forest Service Officer (Kondoa)	12.11.15	Arild Vatn and George Kajembe	TFS Office, Kondoa
	Village Chairman and Village Executive Officer (Mnenia Village Kondoa)	09.11.15	Arild Vatn and George Kajembe	Mnenia Village

Jonas Timothy	MCDI Director of Field Operations	30.11.15		MCDI Office, Kilwa
Abushiri Mbwana	Kilwa Beekeeping Officer/Liaison to Mpingo	02.12.15		Kilwa District Office
Raymond Ndumbalo	Kilwa District Natural Resource Officer	02.12.15		Kilwa District Office
Abrahmani Kirunda	Ngae Village Chairman	01.12.15		Ngae Village
Nurdin A Mahikiveo	Ngae Village Executive Officer	01.12.15		Ngae Village
Rehenna Khalidi	Ngae Village Agricultural Officer	01.12.15		Ngae Village
Mfangavo Mustafa	Kilwa District Forest Officer	25.04.16		Phone