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Organized Opposition to the Oil Industry in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria

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Declaration

I, Ingrid Zeiner Oppegaard, declare that this thesis is a result of my research investigations and findings. Sources of information other than my own have been acknowledged and a reference list has been appended. This work has not been previously submitted to any other university for award of any type of academic degree.

Signature……..
Date……

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Oslo, May 2015

Abstract

Nigeria's oil industry, which is concentrated in the onshore and offshore areas of the Niger Delta region, has been characterized by agitation and protest over the uneven distribution of the oil wealth, and the pollution and environmental degradation associated with the industry, from the independence of Nigeria from British colonial rule.

Nigeria, despite being Africa's largest economy, faces many developmental challenges, in terms of poverty, corruption, political instability and fragmentation, and militarization. The importance of petroleum resources for both the global and Nigeria's economy contributes to a dynamic where any threat to continuity of the oil-industry has been conceived as threat to the global economy and survival of the Nigerian state.

This thesis argues that structures of decentralized despotism created by the indirect rule of the British colonial powers have been accompanied by post-independence neopatrimonial rule, and strengthened private authority multinational corporations, shapes and constrains the possibility for organized protest groups to promote their grievances in the Niger delta.

It explores the space for organized opposition in the Niger Delta, and the strategies employed by protest groups to promote grievances related to the oil industry. Through analyzing four sub-cases, it argues that the political, economic and social structures created by decentralized despotism and neopatrimonial rule, influences both the space for – and nature of – organized protest in the Niger Delta.

Acronyms and Abbreviations

CSR	Corporate Social Responsibility
EEZ Decree	Exclusive Economic Zone Decree of 1978
GmoU	Global Memorandum of Understanding
LUA	The Land Use Act of 1978
MEND	Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta
MNOCs	Multinational Oil Corporations
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
MOSP	Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People
NNPC	Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation
SPDC	Shell Petroleum Development Company

Map 1: Nigeria



Source: UN (2014).

Map 2: the Niger Delta



Source: Ite et al. (2013).

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1.0 Introduction

1.1 Context

Nigeria is Africa's largest economy, most populous country, and is the world's seventh largest oil exporter. The oil-industry in Nigeria took off in the 1970's, and currently oil accounts for about 75 per cent of official revenues and 95 percent of export earnings (International Monetary Fund, 2014). However, the enormous wealth that oil in Nigeria has generated has not led to higher living standards for the average Nigerian, in fact, living standards for many has deteriorated alongside of the growth of the petroleum industry. Between 1970 and 2000 the number of people living on less than one dollar a day grew from 36% to 68%, and gaps in income distribution grew; 85% of oil revenues accrued to 1% of the population[1] (Watts, 2008, UNDP, 2015). Thus, the Nigerian oil industry has "simultaneously enriched international oil companies and their partners – national and local elites –and contributed to the disempowerment and impoverishment of local peoples, through direct dispossession, repression and the pollution of the air, lands and waters of the region" (Obi and Rustad, 2010: 3). The vast oil resources in Nigeria are mostly concentrated in the onshore and offshore areas of the Niger Delta region, where local people have organized protests against the Nigerian state and multinational oil companies for decades.

In the relations between the state and opposition the Nigerian state has tended to respond to crisis through the employment of 'hard' rather than 'soft' power (Ukeje, 2010). The importance of petroleum resources for both the global and Nigeria's economy contributes to a dynamic where any threat to continuity of the oil-industry is conceived as threat to the survival of the Nigerian state.

The political, economic and social structures that compromise the Nigerian state are influenced by the country's history of colonization. Mamdani (1996), argues that structures of "decentralized despotism" were institutionalized during the British colonization of Nigeria divided the populations in two categories of citizens, ruled directly by the colonial power; and subjects, ruled indirectly by 'traditional' laws through inserted chiefs. These structures were created to secure and advance the narrow interests of the colonial power, and the Nigerian

[1] This development was not exclusive to Nigeria; several most African countries experienced severe economic stagnation and profound dept during the same period, associated with structural adjustment.

elite after independence. This legacy has shaped the fragmented characteristics of Nigerian politics, and been accompanied by neo-liberal decentralization (Zalik, 2004).

After Nigeria gained independence from colonial rule, the state has been described as neopatrimonial, in that the bureaucratic structures and laws of any modern state are in place, but the separation between the public and the private spheres are blurred and organized in a patron-client structure, where personal connection become imperative for an individual's success in politics, employment opportunities and social benefits (van de Walle, 2012). The neopatrimonial structures have left many of the communities of the Niger Delta feeling marginalized from partaking in state decision-making, and receiving benefits from the enormous wealth that the oil industry is extracting from their lands.

In a country that is characterized by a strong state with neopatrimonial tendencies and home to a massive oil industry which has great importance to the global economy and energy supply; what possibility is left for the organizing opposition in the Niger Delta? This thesis will explore the space in which the opposing communities in the Niger Delta form their protests in the context of an oil-based economy and what has been described as a neopatrimonial state.

1.2 Research Question

What is the available space for organized opposition in the Niger Delta context, and what strategies do different types of organized opposition groups apply to promote their grievances?

Sub Questions

1. How does the context in the Niger Delta influence the way in which the protests are organized?
2. What are the goals and strategies of organized opposition groups in the Niger Delta?

To answer the research question, the context in which opposition takes place in the Niger Delta will be discussed, and four sub case-studies of opposition will be analyzed: 1) opposition/ negotiation through organized through 'traditional' structures; 2) The Movement

for the Survival of the Ogoni Peopele (MOSOP); 3) Women's protest in the Niger Delta; and 4) opposition by military means: Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND). The four cases have been chosen in order to give the widest possible overall picture of organized opposition groups in the Niger Delta, given the time and resources for this master thesis. The cases represent the different forms that organized opposition groups take in the region, and will be analyzed through the theoretical framework of private authority of multinational corporations, decentralized despotism and neopatrimonial rule, which will be presented in chapter two, and the Nigerian and Niger Delta context that will be presented in chapter three.

1.3 Assumptions and Limitations

1.3.1 The underdevelopment of the Niger Delta

Much of the literature on the Niger Delta and the oil industry highlights the marginalization and underdevelopment of the region. In this regard it is important to note that while the Niger Delta communities suffers from underdevelopment, poverty, environmental degradation and marginalization, these grievances are not exclusive to this region in Nigeria.

Figure 1: Index of State GDP per Capita:



* The color-codes are ordered in categories of ascending GDP Index from light brown: 0.058- 0.201, to dark brown: 0.630-0.772.

Source: UNDP (2009), Human Development Report Nigeria 2008-2009, Achieving growth with equity

This map displays the distribution of GDP per state in Nigeria, and all though it does not show income inequalities internally in the respective states, it does show how poverty is not exclusive to the Niger Delta region, and in fact some of the Niger Delta states are in the category of highest GDP index. However, as will be discussed in the subsequent chapters, the perception of injustice is especially strong in the Niger Delta, because so little of the vast resources that are extracted from this region accrue to the development of the region, and as the communities in the Niger Delta perceive themselves to be the rightful owners of resources found on their lands.

1.3.2 The Greed/Grievance Question

When researching and analyzing the Niger Delta conflict it is at times challenging to separate between some actor's grievances; and other actor's 'greed' or opportunism in their efforts to

protest the state and oil companies, especially when the violence is the method of protest. According to Ikelegbe (2006), it is not easy to draw the line between activist and militants, because their roles can sometimes be overlapping, and because the "two groups constantly interact in somewhat symbiotic relationships" (Ako, 2010: 46). Furthermore, different actors and authors will have different views on defining protesters motivation as being inspired by grievances or greed, in relation to their own position to the matter. For instance Human Rights Watch, with its organizational aim of uncovering human rights breaches will view the matter differently than the Nigerian state or oil companies, which is primarily concerned with protecting the vested interest of the state, or company, respectively. Bøås and Dunn (2007) argues that just because armed insurgencies act within their local, social, economic and historical context it does not mean that their trajectories are entirely unique. Their motives and strategies reflect the context in which they operate, and collective experiences of corruption, abuse of power and position, and poverty. This means that separating between militant protest groups' greed and grievances is difficult, because even when the motivation of a militant protest group is to promote grievances, they are not necessarily able to separate themselves from their context, which may encompass structures influenced by elements of greed. The notion of 'path dependence' to political, economic and social structures influencing the space for – and form of – organized opposition in the Niger Delta, will be discussed more closely in the theoretical approaches in chapter two, and the analysis in chapter four.

1.3.3 Theoretical Approaches

Any complex area of research will have multifold theoretical approaches applied in previous research by numerous scholars. To represent and discuss all available theoretical consideration in dept and in a meaningful way in any study would prove difficult, and near impossible in this thesis, given time and resource constraints. It was therefore important to prioritize in accordance to relevance to the research question, and represent the theoretical framework that seemed most equipped to strengthen the analysis and help answer the research question. Theories on "Resource Curse" for instance, have often been used to explain the underdevelopment of countries that are endowed with an abundance of natural resources – especially oil and natural gas – due to the tendency of the oil sector to employ relatively few, highly educated and well paid people, and uneven investments; where big cities and the formal sector is prioritized over rural areas and the informal sectors (UNDP, 2006). However,

this theory is controversial as the uneven distribution of oil-resources is not caused by the oil itself, but is related to state structures.

This thesis will argue that the space for organized opposition in the Niger Delta is determined by its context; the political, economic and social structure that makes up the Nigerian state, and the possibility to promote grievances for organized opposition groups. This thesis will argue that structures of decentralized despotism that were implemented by the British colonial rule have had influence on the current Nigeria, and that Nigeria is characterized by neopatrimonial rule as a result of its history. According to Karl (1997: 45), state capacity should be understood as "the sum total of a state's material ability to control, extract, and allocate resources as well as its symbolic or political ability to create, implement, and enforce collective decisions. She argues that state capacity thus is "a measure of the potential to raise revenues, provide services, exercise coercion, create consensus, and select and refine policies" (Karl, 1997: 45). Nigeria has been highlighted as the very example of neopatrimonialism, and this has clear implications for the context in which organized opposition groups can promote their grievances in the Niger Delta.

1.3.4 Facts and numbers

When describing the context for organized opposition in the Niger Delta, recent and accurate information is crucial to provide relevant data for the analysis. Concerning factual numbers on e.g. population and economic growth in the Niger Delta, it proved difficult at times to find recent and reliable data, as many of the more recent articles also referred to older articles and books. Emphasizing accuracy over novelty, a few factual data presented in this thesis are from 2008 and 2010. The data will still represent the current context, even though certain numbers are not updated, as the situation described in reliable sources in 2008 and 2010 is still very much the same.

1.4 Research Method and Design

Some texts on social research advocate a linear research design with progression from idea, to theory, to design, to data collection, to analysis, and finally to findings (Berg and Lune, 2014). However, a more dynamic model encompassing both "theory-before-research" and "research-before-theory" through a spiraling model, where each segment of the research is revisited throughout, leaves the researcher more adaptable to new information and ideas as the research unfolds (ibid: 25-26). Through this approach, the researcher "begins with an idea, gathers

theoretical information, reconsiders and refines the idea, begins to examine possible designs, reexamines theoretical assumptions, and refines these theoretical assumptions and perhaps even the original or refined idea" (ibid: 25). During the research for this thesis this dynamic approach has been implemented, as doing research and reading have continuously provided me with new information and approaches, which I have wanted to take into account.

1.4.1 Research Design: Case Study

Yin (2003) argues that "the case study is the method of choice when the phenomenon under study is not readily distinguishable from its context". The context in which opposition is organized in the Niger Delta is key for understanding this phenomenon, and that is why the research method chosen for this thesis is case studies. The cases have been chosen to explore the space for opposition in the Niger Delta, and the complexity of strategies and means of organized opposition in the context of the Nigerian state and a multinational oil industry. Bryman (2012) argues that the research design of a multiple case study "entails studying contrasting cases using more or less identical methods. It embodies the logic of comparison, in that it implies that we can understand social phenomena better when they are compared in relation to two or more meaningfully contrasting cases or situations".

There are some challenges associated with the case study as a research method. According to Yin (2003) these are mostly prejudices, but still worth mentioning. The main challenge with using the case study as a research method is the lack of rigor to this method. Adherents of quantitative research methods criticize the case-study approach of not being systematic enough in terms of representation of information, thus creating biased or random results. Yin counters this notion arguing that every researcher employing the case study must strive to report all evidence fairly, which applies to all research methods, though it can be especially challenging when using case studies. A second major challenge concerns the lack of possibilities for scientific generalization beyond the specific case. Arguably the case study can be analytically or theoretically representative, but not statistically representative. This means that the case study is not applicable for enumerating frequencies, but can be applicable to expand and generalize theories. Therefore the viability of employing the case study as a research method is reliant on the aim of the research. As the aim of this thesis is to explore the space for organized opposition in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria specifically, and the context in which opposition takes place; the case study approach is a helpful tool for expanding on existing theories on the Nigerian state, and to explore different approaches to

both the context; and the rationales, outcomes and space for organized oppositions in this context.

1.4.2 Validity and Reliability

Validity relates to how well the data represents the concept which is being studied, while reliability refers to trustworthiness of the collected data. The criteria for ensuring validity are divided in *internal* and *external* factors; referring to the causal relationship of variables; and the generalization of experiences from one situation to another, respectively (Berg and Lune, 2014). According to Yin (2003: 36) internal validity has been given the "greatest attention in experimental and quasi-experimental research" because it strives to explore whether on variable can be causally explained by another. In this research it is assumed that the political, economic and social structures that compromise the Niger Delta society influence the possibilities for civil society to organize protest towards the state and the oil industry. In terms of the external validity of this thesis, it might be endangered by the research method of case studies. The purpose of this research has been to create and in-depth analysis of the available space for organized opposition in the Niger-Delta context specifically, which means the analysis cannot be easily transferred to a different context. However, the decentralized despotism that was enforced during the colonization of Nigeria is relevant for all the previously colonized sub-Saharan Africa, and the subsequent neopatrimonial tendencies that arguable characterize the Nigerian state, are not exclusive to the Nigerian context. Thus elements of this analysis may be transferred to similar contexts of organized opposition, in sub-Saharan Africa especially.

The validity of a research is also dependent on the level of reliability; the trustworthiness of the collected the data. Triangulation of different sources is thus key, in order to ensure the reliability of the data. Triangulation can also be ensured through the implementation of different methods, such as observation or interviews. Due to lack of time and resources field work in Nigeria, was not a viable option for this research. The sources for this study has thus been journal articles and academic books by renowned authors, reports from nongovernmental research institutes such as the Human Rights Watch and newspaper articles, attempting to review all available data on the Niger Delta context, to the extent that this is ever possible, to increase the reliability level. I have strived to include sources from both

Nigeria and outside, both peer reviewed and not, to increase the breadth and reliability of the information.

1.5 Structure of the Thesis

Chapter two of this thesis will discuss the theoretical approaches for the subsequent analysis. The chapter on the theoretical framework will first present the ways in which the private authority of multinational companies are seen to have gained increased importance in global governance, and in some countries to some extent replaced the role of the state's domestic governance. Second, the impact of colonial legacy through policies of decentralized despotism on the current political structure in Nigeria will discussed, to highlight the context both in which the oil industry is operating, and to which protest is organized. Finally chapter two will present the theory of neopatrimonialism as an understanding of the political, economic and social structures in Nigeria.

In chapter three of this thesis the context for protests in the Niger Delta will be discussed. The first section of this chapter will provide an overview of: 1) the Nigerian state, 2) political transitions after independence, 3) corruption, and 4) the oil industry. The second section will provide an overview of: 1) the Niger Delta region of Nigeria, 2) protest and opposition in the Niger Delta, and 3) the militarization of protest and the state's response to protest.

In chapter four, the analysis of the available space for organized opposition in the Niger-Delta context, and the strategies that are used to induce change by the opposing communities, will be organized through sub-case studies of four different organized protest groups in the area; 1) opposition and negotiation organized through 'traditional' community structures, 2) the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP), 3) Women's protest in the Niger Delta, and 4) opposition by military means: MEND. The cases have been chosen to give the best possible overview of different organized opposition groups, and the strategies they apply to promote their grievances. The cases will be analyzed through the applied theoretical approaches presented in chapter two, and the Niger Delta context discussed in chapter three. Each case will be organized through an introduction, assessments of the organized opposition group's objectives, means/strategies and organizational structure, an exploration of the outcomes of the protest, and a conclusion.

Finally, chapter five will summarize and conclude the findings of this thesis, and discuss the findings' implication for future research and political solutions to the Niger Delta conflict.

2.0 Theoretical Framework

2.1 Private Authority in International Relations

A state-centric perspective of international relations downplays the role of corporate actors in shaping global political economy. Cutler (2003), argues that the emergence of private regimes and the concept of private authority are central to capturing the impact of emerging global norms of corporate conduct. According to Tsogas (2009) "the global economy diminishes the regulatory capacity of the nation-state and transnational forms of labor regulation are created to fill this vacuum". Private authority refers to private sector companies that are beginning to replace governments in governing some areas of international relations. The development of private authority is explained by governments' reluctance to intervene in the global economy and international organizations inability to govern effectively (Cutler et al., 1999). "In an era when the authority of the state appears to be challenged in so many ways, the existence of alternative sources of authority takes on great significance, especially when that authority is wielded internationally by profit-seeking entities" (ibid: 4). With an international economy scarcely regulated by states, companies cooperate internationally to establish rules and standards of behavior, thus governing specific issue areas. Cutler et al. (1999) , argue that "states voluntarily abandon some of the functions that are traditionally associated with public authority due to the forces of liberal ideology, globalization or the lack of state capacity to manage current issues". The extent of international cooperation among companies, the number of multinational corporations, and the total global production, have increased in both scope and intensity. The norms companies establish through international cooperation have influence on the rest of the international society.Cutler et al. (1999), argue that "cooperation among private sector actors can become authoritative or government-like, even in the international sphere, thus challenging our notions of the character of political authority itself".

The multinational oil companies operating in the region have contributed to the increasing militarization of conflicts in the Niger Delta. Ukeje (2010: 94) argues that "multinational and local oil companies and the Nigerian state are locked in a complex, opaque and very often incestuous relationship in which each party looks to the other to sustain and advance mutual interests". While oil companies have become a governance-like actor that communities relate to, the oil companies rely on the state for support and protection when dealing with the demands of the communities (ibid).

Omeje (2006) describes three major consequences that the security strategies of oil companies have on the militarization and insecurity in the Niger Delta: 1) Security communitization; which describes "the contractual engagement of members and youth groups of the local communities to provide security for oil installations and operations within their localities"; 2) security privatization, which refers to a "surge of specialized security companies/organizations and private military corporations" and 3) the corporatization of security, which describes the situation where the oil companies are allowed to operate their own security outfits or to considerably run (…) a detachment of the state's defence forces assigned to protect the corporation's personnel and property" (Omeje, 2006: 486-488). The way the security strategies of the oil companies fuel the militarization and insecurity in the Niger Delta highlights the standards and practices of multinational companies when operating in a developing country where the central state fails to constrain the economic self-interest of economic actors (ibid). The security strategies of the oil companies thus have consequences for organized protest groups in terms of 1) contributing to the militarization of organized protest in the Niger Delta, as private actors have gained the means to engage in violent protest; 2) in terms of the general insecurity in the Niger Delta, and specifically the insecurity of those who organize protest – even through non-violent means; and 3) in terms of how private profit-seeking actors have adopted powers that are usually associated with the sovereign state – namely being the providers of security, and deployment of violent means.

2.2 Colonial Legacy

> To stretch reality, but without stepping outside the bounds of the real, the Africa of free peasants is trapped in a nonracial version of apartheid, with a dividing line between subjects and citizens, regulated by customs on the one side and modern law on the order, a form of 'institutional segregation (Mamdani, 1996).

In his much cited book, Mamdani (1996) created the framework of "decentralized despotism; an understanding of how policies implemented by the colonial rule in Africa has put its mark on contemporary African states. Decentralized despotism refers to the division between

"citizens" and "subjects" in a way that resembles South African apartheid, between urbanism and tribalism (Mamdani, 1996). He argues that even though colonial rule abolished slavery; "colonialism crystallized, formalized, and built on the range of unfreedoms unleashed in nineteenth-century conquest states". From African tradition, "colonial powers salvaged a widespread and time-honored practice, one of decentralized exercise of power, but freed that power of restraint, of peers and people"(Mamdani, 1996: 48). This practice laid the basis for decentralized despotism.

As slavery was abolished in the Western Hemisphere, the "practical need organizing a new regime of compulsions" emerged, this time "within newly acquired African possessions (Mamdani, 1996: 38). Abolishing slave-trade had been the result of a humanitarian campaign, but raised practical issues on how to sustain production and export of cotton and textiles, with the solution being found in the colonization of Africa. Thus, "the Africans who yesterday were transported to the New World could now stay at home – in both instances to produce cotton for the 'Satanic mills'" (ibid). The structure of power designed during the colonization of Africa was thus based on the motivation of extracting resources and employment with minimal investment in the colonies[2].

The dubious credit of being the architect of the British indirect rule during the British colonization of Nigeria and Kenya has been credited Lord Lugard; the High Commissioner of the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria from 1899 to 1906. He has been seen as the creator of the colonial system in which external, military and tax control was operated by the British, while almost every other aspect of political life was left to be governed by 'traditional' leaders and chiefs. The system of indirect rule was a strategy created to facilitate British power and control over a large subject population and land areas, with very few British representatives present to manage the domination (Mamdani, 1996).

One of the central points of Mamdani's book, "Citizen and Subject, Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism", is his criticism of assumptions about pre-colonial African history, especially in terms of tribalism. He argues that "Britain, more than any other power, keenly glimpsed authoritarian possibilities in culture". Britain simultaneously salvaged and

[2] There were substantial differences between the French and British strategies of colonization in Africa. The French strategy, at least theoretically, was intended to eventually incorporate the African subject population as citizens of France, whilst this was never intended by the British for their African colonies (Mamdani, 1996).

sculpted tradition, even where there were not much authoritarian tendencies to detect in the diverse and heterogeneous traditional societies that compromised pre-colonial Africa, to create a structure in their African colonies that could be managed with just British representatives. “By this dual process, part salvaging customs and tradition, and part sculpting, they crystallized a range of usually district-level Native Authorities, each armed with the whip and protected by the halo of custom” (Mamdani, 1996: 45).

Continuing, the author argues that the policies of decentralized rule were first implemented by the British and were deliberately different from the strategies implemented during the colonial rule in India. The previous strategy in India had been to “rejuvenate” the Indian society, whereas in Africa the new strategy became to utilize and conserve local customs; from emphasizing progress to emphasizing power. The “containerization of subject people” was organized as tribes and enforced by real or appointed chiefs, as a way to maintain the social equilibrium (Mamdani, 1996: 51).

In his studies of indirect rule in Nigeria, Padmore (1936) observed that “so long as the chiefs collect the amount of taxes assigned to them and supply labor when ordered to do so, the European officials seldom interfere” (cited in Mamdani, 1996: 52). The chiefs obtained powers and roles that had not been seen in pre-colony times; they were granted legislative, executive, judicial and administrative powers; as long as they fulfilled of the demands of the colonial state advisors they ruled freely over their subjects. This type of rule often led to extreme abuse of power in terms of over taxation and forced labor (ibid).

Mamdani’s argument that the decentralized despotism that was implemented during the colonial rule has implications for governance structures we see in contemporary Africa, also Nigeria, is supported by a number of scholars. Watts argues that the colonial rule left much of the Niger Delta marginalized and isolated, with “complex complicities between chiefs, local youth groups, political parties, the state political classes, and the companies” after independence from colonial rule. (Watts, 2005: 121). Zalik (2004): 403) argues that “the colonial legacy contributes to shaping Nigeria’s political fragmentation deepened through the creation of new states and local government areas that has accompanied neo-liberal decentralization”. According to her, “the present conjuncture of partnership development” make “relationships to authorities more 'localized' through participatory strategy involving oil industry agents and contracted development NGOs, the subject relationships of patron-client

that Mamdani associates with tribalism are in fact entrenched (ibid)". Zalik thus argues that "decentralization and privatization continue to promote paternalism, albeit in a localized form, through devolution of authority to traditional governance structures" (ibid).

Ukeje (2010) argues that the security structures imposed under colonial rule remained intact after independence of Nigeria. "Indeed, out of the myriad institutional relics adopted wholesale by the successor post-colonial state, the most notorious were the police and army" (Ukeje, 2010: 87). According to him these structures were "instruments of state coercion, subjugation and exploitation, sustained by some of the most obnoxious arbitrary colonial ordinances retaining intact - programmed to secure and advance the narrow interest of the ruling elite, and by extension those of the colonial state against colonial subjects, including women" (ibid). During the colonial British rule policing was enforced from actors living outside the communities in which they operated, and this is still the case today. Soldiers and anti-riot police of other ethnic origins than those living in the Niger Delta, "who are unlikely to identify with and be sympathetic to the cause of restive oil communities, are deployed" (Ukeje, 2010: 90).

2.3 Neopatrimonialism

This paper has argued that the policies of decentralized despotism that were implemented during the colonial period in Nigeria, has continued influence on Nigerian political, economic and social structures today. As colonialism ended in Sub-Saharan Africa, the rulers of the newly independent states faced the dual challenge of building their economic growth on limited domestic industries, and building state legitimacy (Sindzingre, 2012). "The existing private sector consisted mostly of foreign firms", and the rulers of these states "relied on foreign investors, built their economies through state intervention, public ownership and exploitation of resources, and fostered private entrepreneurs who were chosen among their political allies and whose wealth did not represent a threat" (ibid: 93). The fragility of the new political structures often led the rulers to discourage any domestic activity outside of their control. Thus, "the 'public' and the 'private' spheres where built both on overlap and mistrust, which has been compounded by bureaucracies that also functioned along the extractive and rentier model", described as neopatrimonialism (ibid)

Neopatrimonialism is a framework based on Weber's types of legitimate rule for understanding the dynamics of states that have a 'modern' state structure while at the same time having patrimonial tendencies. The concept of neopatrimonial rule was first applied to the African context by Jean-Francois Médard (Bach, 2012). According to van de Walle, neopatrimonial rule is characterized by three indicators; 1) presidentialism: meaning both formal and informal rule that "place one man above – usually the president – largely above the law and not subject to the checks and balances that democratic executives face in mature democracies", 2) Systematic clientelism: "by the president and his immediate followers to maintain status quo and ensure political stability, and 3) reliance on "the fiscal resources of a modern state to provide the resources that are distributed following a clientistic logic" (van de Walle, 2012: 112).

Neopatrimonialism has been described as a mixture of two of Weber's three types of legitimate rule; patrimonialism and legal-rational bureaucracy, in that the bureaucratic structures and laws are in place, but the separation between the public and the private spheres are blurred and organized in a patron-client structure. In a neopatrimonial structure "relationships of loyalty and dependency pervade a formal political and administrative system, and leaders occupy bureaucratic offices less to perform public service than to acquire personal wealth and status" (Bratton and van de Walle, 1994: 458). Neopatrimonialism thus explains "the disconnection from specific forms of political regimes of this specific political economy mechanism and treatment of the public-private divide, as it underscores mechanisms of overlapping (public-private, political-economic) and personal power that may fill different forms and formal institutions" (Sindzingre, 2012: 95). According to Médard (1991); "the neo-patrimonial conception of power is situated in the historic continuity of the traditional patrimonial conception, however it must not be confused with it, to the extent that is not rooted in any traditional legitimacy". Sindzingre (2012) argues that neopatrimonialism is a concept that should be understood as a "political device inducing specific behavior and modes of exercising power" which outcomes – not its induction – may be "predatory" or "developmental". In other words; neopatrimonial rule may create predatory or developmental outcomes through political, economic and social structures, whilst the cause and induction of neopatrimonial rule should not be assumed to be predatory, nor developmental.

Nigeria is organized as a multi-party democracy, but at the same time decisions and resources are privatized, and personal links to power becomes essential. As the concept of neopatrimonialism was established, is was generally argued that neopatrimonial rule was inherently undemocratic and an obstacle to the achievement of capitalist accumulation (van de Walle, 2012). It is important to note that political clientelism exists in all modern states, though to different degrees. Van de Walle argues that the degree of democratization determines the degree and type of clientelist behavior; "the more clientelist practices will benefit mass publics; and the more they will be limited to legal and codified behaviors" (van de Walle, 2012: 116). The less democratic the system is, on the other hand, the more is the clientelist practices and benefits excluded to the political elites (ibid). Sindzingre (2012: 95) however, argues that "neopatrimonialism does not appear to be linked to a particular type of political regime, e.g. democracy or authoritarianism". Nor, she argues, is it "linked to particular types of public policies, e.g. less 'accountable', or 'transparent' policies, as neopatrimonialism refers to sets of individual preference, social mechanisms and functions, which may be conveyed by a great variety of 'forms', by many types of formal policies and institutions" (Sindzingre, 2012: 95).

A general consequence of neopatrimonial rule according to Bøås (2010), is a division in the population in the lines of regional and ethnic affiliation, driven by the mechanisms of patrimonial distribution of resources. To partake in Nigerian politics is difficult without access substantial resources, that are necessary to "compete in the country's violent and corrupt political system", especially without enjoying the control public resources to begin with (Human Rights Watch, 2007). "As a result, in many parts of Nigeria, successful candidates are often those who are 'sponsored' by wealthy and powerful individuals known in Nigerian parlance as political godfathers. (…) In return, they demand a substantial degree of control over the governments they help bring into being—not in order to shape government policy, but to exact direct financial "returns" in the form of government resources stolen by their protégés or lucrative government contracts awarded to them as further opportunities for graft" (ibid).

2.4 Decentralized Despotism, Neopatrimonialism and Path Dependence

The concept of path dependence "originated as an idea that a small initial advantage or a few minor random shocks along the way could alter the course of history" (Page, 2006: 87). In common interpretations, path dependence means that "current and future states, actions, or decisions depend on the path of previous states, actions or decisions", more loosely meaning that the history matters when analyzing the present (ibid: 88). The notion of path dependence needs to be handled carefully, as a deterministic interpretation of the current as a direct linear consequence of the history, is problematic to say the least. However, the political, economic and social structures implemented through colonial rule in Nigeria, and the Niger Delta, has had clear implications for the current political, economic and social environment, and the space in which organized opposition takes place in the Niger Delta. Bøås and Jennings (2012) suggest focusing on the embeddedness of neopatrimonialism in the informal social structures and practices, to determine the conditions for resistance against and within this structure. In this regard they have identified two aspects of the Niger Delta society of particular concern: 1) the obvious connection between militant groups and members of the local political elites, and 2) the way in which the motivation of actions of militant groups tend to fluctuate between 'greed' and 'grievances' (ibid). According to Bøås (2010) neopatrimonial rule is re-created in armed insurgencies in the Niger Delta, because broad-reaching resistance seems only possible through participation in the intertwined structure of crime and politics. This results in insurgencies taking part in criminal activity while at the same time praying on the very population of which they come from, and are protesting on behalf of (ibid). Bach (2012) argues that "given that the origins of many armed groups in the Niger Delta are linked to the efforts of local politicians to sponsor violence in support of their own political ambitions, the frequently violent and cynical conduct of groups is not surprising. To a large extent, the Delta's armed groups mirror the conduct of the government officials who helped create and often continue to sponsor them".

2.5 Conclusion

The theoretical framework for this thesis begun with an outline on theories on private authority of multinational corporations, and how these can, in environments of little formal

regulatory institutions end up replacing some areas of government in the communities in which they operate. Theories on the private authority of private profit-seeking actors, help explain the strong position the multinational corporations has gained in the Niger Delta, and also, the expectations that host communities have towards these companies, and the perceived responsibility the companies have towards the host communities.

Path dependence is a concept that focuses on how historic events shape current political, economic and social structures. Although one should be careful to interpret current events as directly and deterministically decedents from historic contexts, it is evident that the current political, economic and social structures of Nigeria is marked by institutions and structures implemented under colonial rule, and in order to understand the current Nigeria, one has to take into account the country's colonial heritage. In order to answer the first part of the research question, of what the available space for organized opposition is in the Niger Delta is; Nigeria's colonial history and the subsequent institutionalized structures that still influence the current Nigeria, was examined through the framework of Mamdani's decentralized despotism. It was argued that the British colonial rule deliberately divided the populations in two categories; of citizens, ruled directly by the colonial power; and subjects, ruled indirectly by 'traditional' laws through inserted chiefs, as a strategy designed to ensure British domination over large populations and land areas, with just a few British representatives present to manage the colonial rule (Adunbi, 2011, Mamdani, 1996). These structures of decentralized despotism have been sustained, to a large degree throughout the post-colonial Nigeria, and according to Zalik (2004) been accompanied by 'neo-liberal decentralization' that has transferred state authority to 'traditional' and private governance structures.

This thesis has also argued that the structures of decentralized despotism have contributed to the current neopatrimonial characteristics that compromise the Nigerian state. As argued by Bratton and van de Walle (1994: 458), neopatrimonialism results in a system in which "relationships of loyalty and dependency pervade a formal political and administrative system, and leaders occupy bureaucratic offices less to perform public services than to acquire personal wealth and status". These characteristics thus influence both the basis of protest, as the Niger Delta communities have become marginalized in terms of distribution of political power and the wealth that accrues from the massive oil industry on their lands; and the space in which organized protest groups can promote their grievances. In the analysis in chapter four the implications these characteristics have on different types of organized protest groups

in terms their space for, and objectives, strategies, organizational structure and outcomes of promoting their grievances will be analyzed in four different cases from the Niger Delta.

3.0 The Niger Delta History and Current Context

3.1 The Nigerian state

Nigeria is Africa's with its estimated population of 173 million people, is Africa's most populous country and largest economy (Obi and Rustad, 2010, UNDP, 2015). Despite evolving into a massive economy, the country still face major challenges in terms of developmental issues such as poverty, environmental degradation, and unemployment; and structural issues such as distribution of wealth, corruption, violence and being an unconsolidated democracy, still establishing democratic civil rule (International Monetary Fund, 2014, UNDP, 2015). This chapter will provide a brief overview of some of the challenges the Nigerian state is facing in terms of political stability, corruption and in relation to the oil industry. To capture the whole picture of such a complex, heterogeneous and sometimes paradoxical country in a brief description would be virtually impossible; rather, this chapter aims to provide the essential Nigerian context to the oil-related conflict in the Niger Delta. Subsequently this chapter will provide an overview of the Niger Delta, and discuss the background to conflictual relationship between the Niger Delta communities and the oil-state partnership.

3.1.2 Political Transitions

Nigeria gained independence from British colonial rule in 1960. According to Human Rights Watch report (2007: 11) "Nigeria's post-independence history has been overshadowed by the depredations of a series of corrupt, abusive, and unaccountable governments". In the period between 1960 and 1999, Nigeria only "had two elected governments and both were overthrown in military coups before completing a second term in office", meaning that during the first 40 years of independence, 30 years were governed by military rule (ibid).

The first general and regional elections were arranged in 1964 and 1965, but were largely discredited on account of "fraud, violence and intimidation" (ibid). In 1966 a partially failed coup d'état resulted in the transition towards military rule, with the Igbo leader General Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi as head of state. However, he was assassinated after less than seven months in office, an "his death was followed by ethnic rioting across Nigeria that helped precipitate Nigeria's horrific Biafran civil war" (Human Rights Watch, 2007:12).

The civil war ended in 1970, and Nigeria's military rule continued with intense power struggles until 1979, when the country again returned to civilian rule under President Shehu Shagari. "Shagari's administration, which initially had the blessing of Nigeria's military establishment, was blamed for widespread corruption at both the federal and state levels, deepening levels of poverty and internecine political warfare that led ultimately to the electoral debacle of 1983 (Human Rights Watch, 2007). Due to extreme rigging of the election the same year, with hired thugs to intimidate opposition by all parties, civilian rule was once more overthrown, and Nigeria returned to military dictatorship under Generals Ibrahim Babangida and Sani Abacha respectively, until 1998 (ibid).

Upon the death of Abacha, who was still in office at the time, with the "military's claim to power thoroughly discredited", and "popular and international pressure for a return to civilian rule" General Olusegun Obansanjo was elected the "first president of Nigeria's Fourth Republic in May, 1999" (Human Rights Watch, 2007: 14)

Since then, Nigeria has remained under civilian rule, though not without facing challenges and problems. "Nigeria's civilian government has failed to realize hopes that an end to military rule would lead to democratic governance, progress in combating poverty and corruption and respect for human rights on the part of those in power" (Human Rights Watch, 2007). The elections of 1999, 2003, and the 2007 when Umaru Yar'Adua was elected, were all severely criticized for major rigging and violence. In the 2011 election, with the main candidates being Muhammadu Buhari and Goodluck Jonathan, the rigging was less obvious than during previous elections. However, "when Jonathan's victory was announced, there was rioting in the north, accompanied by the greatest bloodshed since the civil war" (Campbell, 2015).

This year's election (2015) however, was recognized for being less violent than the previous, and for displaying positive democratic development (Kramviken, 2015). Goodluck Jonathan's acceptance of Muhammadu Buhari's win of the election, despite being encouraged to protest was a positive sign of democratic statesmanship (ibid).

3.1.3 Expansion and Fragmentation of States in Nigeria

Since independence the number of states in Nigeria had expanded from 3 to 18. Zalik (2004: 404) argues that "the new state administrations serve as conduits for channeling resources directly to regional and ethnic power holders". Until the 1990's, when Cross River, Akwa Ibom, Edo and Delta states were created and Rivers state was split into two, creating the new Bayelsa state; the Niger Delta was continuously excluded from these federal arrangements, according to her. However, she argues that "new territorial boundaries merely re-inscribe ethnic divisions by replicating minority politics at the state level" (ibid). Thus, she opines, even though minorities have advocated the creation of new states as a strategy to transmit resources towards them; "the resulting struggles for power within the new administrations only exacerbated communal tensions through an additional level of minority-majority relations", within the patron-client structures of neopatrimonial rule (ibid: 405).

3.1.4 Corruption

At the core of conflict between the Nigerian state, the MNOC's, and the communities in the Niger Delta, is the perceived unjust distribution of the wealth accrued from the oil industry. The uneven distribution is deteriorated by the widespread state corruption through all levels of Nigerian governance structures. The origins of Nigerian corruption can be traced to the era of colonialism and the implementation of indirect rule, when "warrant Chiefs where appointed" by the British rulers (independently of previous status) and "empowered to try cases and control forced labor, such that they became very powerful, corrupt and unpopular" (Cyril and Ezeogidi, 2013). During the decolonization period of the 1950's, Britain strived to conserve the economic structures in Nigeria, to ensure its position as "senior partner" in their economical enterprises, while "their Nigerian counterparts were no more than a junior or subordinate partner in this power-sharing arrangement" (Osoba, 1996: 373). According to Osoba, "the departing British colonialists succeeded in securing their acquiescence in retaining, even consolidating and enhancing of the existing structures of accumulation under which foreign monopoly capital dominated all key sectors of the economy – export-import trade, extractive and manufacturing industries, banking, insurance, shipping etc" (ibid). In return, Nigerian elites where given access to leading, lucrative positions in these foreign companies, and thus opportunities of private accumulation. Osoba (1996: 374) argues that the structures implemented between the British and the Nigerian elite "profoundly affected the

elite's attitude to the use of state power and the state treasury when they acceded to supreme political power after independence".

In 2014, Nigeria was ranked 136 out of 175 on Transparency International's corruption scale, meaning that Nigeria's problems of corruption have not been mended, since the end of the colonial period (Transparency International, 2015).

3.1.5 The Oil Industry

The vast oil resources in Nigeria are mostly concentrated in the onshore and offshore areas of the volatile Niger Delta (Omeje, 2007). The oil production in the Niger Delta is dominated by multinational oil companies (MNOC's), such as Royal Dutch Shell, ExxonMobil, ChevronTexaco, Agip, and Total (ibid). Though extraction of crude oil was initiated in 1950, the dramatic rise of Nigeria as a strategic player in the world of oil geopolitics occurred largely in the wake of the civil war that ended in 1970 (Watts, 2008). The output of crude oil production reached its peak of 2.44 million barrels a day in 2005, then declined significantly due to violence and disruptions. After 2009, the production started to recover, but has however not recovered to the level it was at in 2005, because of ongoing supply disruptions (US Energy Information Administration (EIA), 2015).

Eberlein (2006: 580) argues that during the time of petro-military alliance, from 1970 to 1998, "the hegemony of the rent based oligarchy was perpetuated through heavy repression of public discontent, the cooptation of local gerontocratic (elders) rulers, and the top-down allocation of finance". During this period, according to him, "sovereignty was shared between the military central state, its branches in the state governments and the MNOC's. Further, he argues, "the significance of oil production for the elites, commercial importers of consumer products, international construction companies and the global oil market, *de facto* equipped MNOC's with the capacity to declare a state of emergency" (ibid). This meant that any obstruction – or even threat of obstruction – to the continued oil exports led to an immediate military response; "suspending all human, civil and legal rights". This tendency served as a "vivid illustration of the fact that, generally, the ultimate expression of sovereignty resides, to

a large degree, in the power and the capacity to dictate who may live and who must die" (Eberlein, 2006: 580, Mbeme, 2003: 11).

From the 1990's the cooperation between the Nigerian state and the MNOC's has been structured through production sharing contracts; "allowing the MNOC's to bear the all operating costs and share the output with the government" (Ukiwo, 2008: 78). The Nigerian governments' share in oil revenue is among the highest in the world; where 5 per cent of the profit goes to a company, 77.5 per cent goes to the Nigerian government. This is because the production costs in Nigeria are among the lowest in the world, due to "the lax regulatory environment" (ibid).

The country's oil and natural gas industry accounts for approximately 75% of government revenue and 95% of total export revenue, thus the Nigerian economy is vulnerable to a drop in crude oil prices as it is very dependent on oil revenues (International Monetary Fund, 2014).The five decades of oil extraction in Nigeria, has yielded both the state and multinational oil companies (MNOC's) with substantial accumulation. Although the state has assumed ownership over the oil industry, it has engaged in institutionalized partnership, agreements and production contracts with MNOC's. Thus, while "government controls access, and gets a larger share of oil profits, MNOC's control production and have considerable leverage over costs, of which government has little or no capacity to monitor or regulate, and has to bear the larger burden" (Obi, 2010: 5).

According to Obi (2010: 6) the role of the Nigerian state in the oil industry is embedded in the history of the Nigerian state", as the oil industry "took the form of colonial and post-colonial laws that vested the ownership of oil in the state". In relation to this, three state legislations are of significant importance; the Petroleum Act of 1969, Exclusive Economic Zone Decree of 1978 (EEZ Decree), and the Land Use Act of 1978 (LUA) (ibid).

The Petroleum Act states that "the entire ownership and control of all petroleum in, under or upon any lands to which this section shall be vested in the state" (Obi, 2010: 6). It also endows the Oil Minister the exclusive right "to grant oil mining leases to oil companies, meaning that oil producing communities have no legal ownership over the oil that are extracted from their lands (ibid).

The EEZ Decree further institutionalized the removal of ownership for oil producing communities by ensuring that "the entire property in and control of all minerals, mineral oils and natural gas in, under or upon any land in Nigeria or in, under or upon the territorial waters and Exclusive Economic Zone of Nigeria shall vest in the government of the federation and shall be managed in such a manner as may be prescribed by the National Assembly" (Obi, 2010: 6).

The LUA unifies "the various land tenure systems in Nigeria, and place all land in the federation in the trust of the state governments" (Obi, 2010: 6), thus empowering the state to "legally acquire land with or without paying compensation to its indigenous owners, the people are alienated from the land, and with it their livelihoods" (Oluwaniyi, 2010: 160). This law is, again, especially harsh on the Niger Delta communities, due to the region's strategic importance in the global oil-industry, meaning that many of these communities have lost the legal ownership on the land on which their livelihood is dependent upon. "What they can lay claim to are just surface rights, but the granting of these is completely subject to the whims of officials in the oil companies and the Nigerian state" (ibid).

The public defiance of the military-corporate rule and the institutionalization of state ownership over oil resources in the Niger Delta, led to the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People from the end of the 1980's, which will be discussed in section 4.3, constituted the beginning of a change in the relations between MNOC's local communities in the Niger Delta, and the central government (Eberlein, 2006).

3.2 The Niger Delta

The Niger Delta region is situated in the South-East of Nigeria, and covers an area of 75 000 square kilometers. The region compromises Africa's largest wetland, and is home to a wide range of biodiversity (Obi and Rustad, 2010: 3-4). The Niger Delta is made up of 9 states; Abia, Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo, Imo, Ondo and Rivers, with an estimated total population of 31 million people[3], across 3000 communities, comprising over 40 different ethnic groups speaking about 250 different dialects and languages (Idemudia, 2014, Nweke, 2012, Obi and Rustad, 2010).

[3] The population estimate in the Niger Delta is from 2010, as no recent reliable estimate was found.

At the heart of the Niger Delta conflict "is the strong feeling among the ethnic/oil minorities that the non-oil-producing ethnic majority groups that dominate the federal government also control the oil wealth, while they who produce the oil suffer (unjustly) from neglect, exploitation and pollution" (Obi and Rustad, 2010: 7)

The Niger Delta region and its position as a marginalized area in Nigeria date back to the colonial period. In 1958, the Willink's Commission of Inquiry by the British colonial administration in 1958, that examined the fears of the minority groups over perceived marginalization and domination by the major ethnic groups in order to provide possible solutions (Nweke, 2012). "The Commission's Report revealed that the fears of marginalization and domination expressed by the Niger Delta people were real, noting that the region was poor, backward and neglected", and stated that the Niger Delta should be recognized a 'Special Area' (ibid: 203).

Immediately after independence, in 1962, the Niger Delta Development Board (NDDB) was established based on the findings of the Commission, "with the aim of addressing the pervasive geographical, environmental and developmental challenges prevalent in the region" (ibid). This was the beginning of the post-independence developments that "brought the issues bordering on the Niger Delta region to the front burner of national and international discourse" (ibid).

3.2.1 Protest and Opposition in the Niger Delta

The Niger Delta has a long history of struggles for self-determination from the arrival of the British traders, through the colonial period, and after Nigeria's independence in the 1960's. "The notion of 'resource control' is grounded in the historical struggles of the people of the Niger Delta for self-determination and local autonomy, particularly in reversing decades of perceived federal marginalization in the distribution of power, and from the benefits accruing from the exploitation of the natural resources in the region" (Ako, 2010: 42).

Watts (2005: 106) argues that "modern petro-capitalism operates through a particular 'oil complex' (an institutional configuration of firms, state apparatuses, and oil communities) that constitutes a radical- and multifaceted- challenge to customary forms of community authority, systems of ethnic identity, and the functioning of local state institutions".

Central to the oil complex is: "1. a statutory monopoly over mineral exploitation, 2. a nationalized oil company (NNPC) has majority holding in its production arrangements with foreign companies, 3. the security apparatus of the state along with private security forces of companies, 4. the oil producing communities themselves, and 5., the political mechanism by which federal oil revenues are distributed to government and the state" (Watts, 2005: 112).

Watts refers to the oil complex as a double movement; "a contradictory unity of capitalism and modernity: 1. Oil has been a *centralizing force* that has rendered the (oil) state more visible and globalized, underwriting a process of state building and national community imagining. 2. Oil-led development, driven by an unremitting political logic of ethnic claims-making and staggering corruption by the political classes, has become a force of *fragmentation* and *illegitimacy*, radically discrediting the state and its forms of governance" (Watts, 2005: 115)

The territorial rootedness of the oil industry means that the Niger Delta oil needs to be extracted in the same geographical/social setting as it has been discovered as it is not economically viable to invest in the infrastructure needed for movement (Zalik, 2004). This in turns means that the oil industry is working in close relations to Niger Deltan communities. Even though the law asserts that the land on which oil is extracted belongs to the state, many of the communities where the MNC's communal landholding persists, which leads to a situation where the MNC's often negotiate with both the state and the communities in which they operate (Adunbi, 2011). In this scenario, Adunbi (2011: 103) argues that "oil corporations, nongovernmental organizations, and cooperating communities are crafting new sites that are creating and redefining governance structures".

Frustration over the lack of results from non-violent protests has led to violence and militarization; attacks on oil installations and kidnapping expatriate oil workers, has been one strategy for drawing attention to the cause (Obi and Rustad, 2010: 3).

However, Ikelegbe (2001) argues that the grievances, demands and anger in the region have also given rise to the flourishing of civil society. "While in the 1970's and 1980's, the communities disparately and un-coordinately articulated grievances to the MNOC's and blocked access routes to oil installations as protests, civil society emerged in the 1990's as a

mobilization platform of popular struggle against the state and MNOCs. The entrance of civil society has created a communal, ethnic and regional formation of resistance with considerable coordination, and has raised the quality, intensity, and extent of articulation, aggregation and expression of demands to that of regional struggle of equity and justice" (Ikelegbe, 2001: 438).

3.2.2 Militarization

Ibeanu (SOURCE) created the framework "contradiction of security", which refers to the different perceptions of security of local communities, and that of state officials, in relation to the oil-industry. For the communities, security revolves around acknowledging the "mindless exploitation of crude oil and the resultant ecological damage threaten resource flows and livelihoods". For the state officials security is perceived in terms of the "unencumbered production of crude oil at competitive costs". Ukiwo supports this notion, arguing that "it is evident that central to understanding the current insurgency in the Niger Delta, are the competing constructions of oil as a national and local community resource. The dominant discourse of oil as a national resource to be harnessed to build a virile nation has been associated with the pauperization and disempowerment of oil producing communities" (Ukiwo, 2010: 22) This contradiction of security means the state is unable to separate itself and mediate conflicts, and thus becomes a " major actor in, or 'fueller' of, violent conflicts and insecurity in the region" (Ukeje, 2010: 93) .

In the relations between the state and opposition the Nigerian state tends to attempt to solve crisis through 'hard' rather than 'soft' power (Ukeje, 2010). The importance of petroleum resources for both the global and the Nigerian economy contributes to a dynamic where any threat to continuity of the oil-industry is conceived as threat to the global economy and survival of the Nigerian state. Obi argues that "the globalization of the Niger Delta's oil has gone side by with its 'securitization', in which global hegemonic forces see oil as a vital "globally-needed" resource, whose continued "uninterrupted" flow along with the safety of (transnational) oil investments and oil workers must be protected at all costs, including military means" (Obi, 2008.428). The oil industry is also considered a national security concern (Ukiwo, 2010).

Ukiwo (2010: 19) argues that the focus on greed as the primary or motivation, or as an extra incentive for perpetuating conflict, of Niger Delta militants "leads to the adoption of a

securitized solution and neglect of the imperatives of redressing more fundamental issues of injustice and horizontal inequalities". The focus on security derives from the assumption that those who engage in violent conflict are motivated by greed and personal interests, which entails a "law-and-order approach" to resolving these conflicts. According to Ukeje (2010: 89) this approach "continues to raise the threat level attached to even the slightest disagreement across the Delta Region". He argues that "the Nigerian state is increasingly and readily disposed to the most unusual securitization of virtually every aspect of society and politics in the oil region" (ibid). At the same time it seems obvious that the state deliberately obscures the distinction between criminal activities and genuine community protests.

Ukiwo highlights factors at the regional, national and international level that explains the process of militarization of protests in the Niger Delta. At the regional level "the rapprochement between elite and non-elite groups, the popularization of the resource control agenda and the proliferation of youth organizations were crucial" (Ukiwo, 2010: 24). At the national level "the continued dependence of the Nigerian state on oil and the determination of dominant social forces to control wealth by all means" were essential (ibid). At the international level the crucial factor was the "increasing reliance of the global oil markets on the Nigerian oil amid deteriorating security conditions is the Middle East, developments in information technology and communications, and proliferation of small arms and light weapons (ibid).

This chapter has discussed the context of Nigeria and the Niger Delta to – in addition to the theoretical framework of private authority of multinational companies, decentralized despotism and neopatrimonial rule – provide a framework of the available space for organized opposition groups to promote their grievances in the Niger Delta. Political instability and fragmentation, militarization, corruption and perceptions of unjust distribution of wealth accruing from the oil industry are issues that influence the space for organized opposition in the region. The subsequent analysis will explore the strategies different types of organized opposition groups apply to promote their grievances.

4.0 Analysis: Case studies

4.1 The Cases

The previous chapters have given an overview of how the context in Nigeria and the Niger Delta, shapes the available space for organized opposition. The four sub-cases for this analysis have been chosen to give the widest possible overall picture of organized opposition in the Niger Delta, given the time and resources available for this research; in order to analyze the strategies of different types of organized opposition groups in the Niger Delta; in order to answer the main research question: What is the available space for organized opposition in the Niger-Delta context, and what strategies do different types of organized opposition groups apply to promote their grievances?

The four sub cases represent the different forms organized opposition can take in the Niger Delta, and are: 1) protest and negotiation organized through 'traditional' community-structures; 2) organized civic protest, turned violent, through the case of Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni people; 3) Women's protest in the Niger Delta, through the case of the Gbaramatu women's war; and 4) Protest through military means, through the case of Movement of the Emancipation of Niger Delta.

The cases will be analyzed through the applied theoretical approaches presented in chapter two, and the Niger Delta context discussed in chapter three. The analysis will discuss the objectives, organizational structure, means and strategies, and outcomes of the different organized opposition groups, and discuss whether these groups have been able to promote their grievances.

4.2 Protest and Negotiation Organized Through 'Traditional' Community-Structures

Nweke (2012: 206) states that traditional institutions refer to "the indigenous political arrangements whereby leaders with proven track records are appointed and installed in line with the provisions of their native laws and customs." He argues that "traditional institutions are symbols of indigenous peoples' rights, privileges, laws, customs and traditions" and include "the chiefs-in-council, elders-in-council, title holders who may be appointed based on their contributions to the growth and development of their communities with executive,

legislative or judicial powers" (ibid). In this instance it is important to remain critical of the 'traditional' as something directly descending from pre-colonial Nigeria, and remember how 'traditional' institutions were creatively sculpted during British colonization, to fit the power structure of the colonial rule. As discussed in chapter two "the underlying logic of indirect rule system was that the colonial government directly interfered with native authority affairs and invariably the authorities of the rulers were undermined as they lost their previous autonomy and sovereign powers; being largely restricted to the dictates of regulatory roles on behalf of the colonial state" (Nweke, 2012: 210).

Thus, new fields of power were institutionalized through the colonial policies of decentralized despotism, which divided the populations in two categories of citizens; ruled directly by the colonial power; and subjects, ruled indirectly by 'traditional' laws through inserted chiefs (Adunbi, 2011, Mamdani, 1996). Adunbi (2011: 103) argues that "collective actions and practices symbolically and materially connect the present with the past, thereby establishing historical continuities for the subject population, even when the state introduces new juridical entities that transfer the claims of the subject population to the state".

Umejesi (2015) highlights the difference of the conception of public ownership between the pre-colonial Nigerian communities, and the British colonial power. In pre-colonial Nigeria, "ownership and management of natural resources remained under the control and ownership of small independent communities which exercised their exclusionist rights against their equally small neighboring communities," meaning that "the sense of statehood revolved around these atomistic communities, not necessarily around the ethnic-whole" (ibid: 43). Colonization and the subsequent introduction of modern statehood thus broadened the "definition of resource ownership the definition of resource ownership by transferring communal resources from the ownership and control of the 'primordial public' (the community) to the state (the national public) without negotiation between the owning community and the state" (ibid). On the contrary to European regions in different countries that over the centuries have related to each and established communalities, the "shared historical memories" among communities and ethnic groups were very limited prior to the colonization (Lugard: 1972, in Umejesi: 2015).

Thus, when the British colonial rule acquired land for 'public purpose' the indigenous communities had a different understanding on the definition of the 'public purpose', than the

colonial state. Umejesi (2015: 43) provides an example of a community with one hundred people on which's land was acquired for coal exploitation, that this community would understand "public purpose on the basis that 'public' implied them – the one hundred people – as the owning public". He argues further that while the Nigerian state has since its creation in the early twentieth century become the sovereign owner of all natural resources in Nigeria, the extent to which ordinary citizens identify with the state is questionable (ibid: 45).

According to Adunbi (2011), "many Niger Delta communities view oil as a resource that was divinely ordained from their ancestors". The Ugbos and Ijawas for example connect "their history of migration" with claims on oil wealth. Although Nigerian laws such as the Petroleum Act, Exclusive Economic Zone Decree, and the Land Use Act asserts that the state and local government own the land on which oil is extracted, communal landholding still persists in many parts of Nigeria. "This leads to a situation in which multinational corporations, in many cases, negotiate both with the state *and* with communities – and even family members – in areas where they explore for oil" (ibid). Thus, he argues, "oil companies, NGO's, and cooperating communities are crafting new sites that are crafting and redefining governance structures".

The ways in which the MNOC's interact with a community depend on way the community is related to the oil industry. There are three types of host communities: 1) producing communities or those in which onshore oil exploration takes place; 2) terminal communities of the locations of territory port or terminal facilities; and 3) transit communities or settlements where territory transit pipelines pass through (Idemudia, 2014: 155).

Based on information gained from personal interviews with community members in the Niger Delta, Adunbi states that "when international corporations identify a community or family as a host, they are obliged to enter into a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the community or family specifying what benefits should accrue to them (Adunbi, 2011: 105). The families whose inherited land hosts e.g. flow stations and platforms, are thus given opportunities to obtain benefits through for example contracts for serving as security guards on the land. These benefits can in turn become basis for conflict on three levels: 1) "Within host families over control of inherited land"; 2) "conflict within communities over access to benefits from multinational corporations"; and 3) "intercommunal conflict regarding which communities qualify to be called "oil-producing"(ibid). The patron-client relationship

between members of communities and representatives for MNOC's thus lays the basis for deciding who gets access to benefits, and who gets excluded, and who gets a seat at the table when negotiating MoU benefits for the whole community (ibid).

4.2.1 Objectives

The objectives of opposition and negotiation with MNOC's, organized through 'traditional' community structures, as discussed above, is to gain greater political influence on decision-making in the Niger Delta, and to obtain a bigger share in the resources that are extracted from the Niger Delta, and some communities perceive to belong to them by ancestral heritage. These objectives can also, contribute to conflict between and within communities, as both communities and individuals seek to obtain resources and benefits from the oil companies.

4.2.2 Means/Strategies

Ukiwo (2008) highlights five strategies employed by communities towards the MNOC's. First, he argues:

> Oil-producing communities have approached the MNOC's for the provision of social amenities and economic empowerment projects. These include construction of jetties, classrooms, health centers, and roads; and provision of electricity. These demands became necessary because the state had abdicated its responsibility of providing public goods and services. The Nigerian state had transmogrified into and absentee landlord that siphoned royalties and rents without ploughing back resources for the development of the oil-producing communities. Unable to access the state in a context of a shrinking democratic space, community members began to confront the MNOC's to solve their problems (Ukiwo, 2008: 82).

The second strategy, according to him is related to the companies' CSR strategies failure to change the negative perception of the oil industry by the communities:

> Thus, when dialogue failed to attract these amenities, community activists have attempted to stop oil production by occupying flow stations and blocking roads to oil facilities. This second strategy has often resulted in violence because the

> Nigerian state, anxious to protect its interests, has often deployed security forces to quell community agitations (ibid).

Third, is the strategy employed by the elites of oil producing communities, namely demanding appointments for positions in Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC); the state oil corporation through which the federal government of Nigeria regulates and participate in the county's petroleum industry. The rationale behind this strategy was to ensure the implementation of policies favorable to oil the oil-producing communities, and trickle-down effects through office-holders commitment towards their "primordial and clannish interests (ibid).

The fourth strategy by oil-producing communities is "the long-standing agitation for increment of the percentage of revenue allocated on the basis of derivation" (ibid). To a great extent this agitation resulted in the decision that "the revenue allocated to derivation should be no less than 13 percent", signed in the Constitution of 1999. However, oil producing communities have continued to demand further increment, has the current percentage is "much lower than the 50 per cent that obtained in the pre-civil war period" (ibid).

Finally, Ukiwo argues, oil-producing communities have deployed strategies aiming to exclude non-indigenes from the space, through "indigeneity discource" (ibid).

> They have asked for quotas in contracts and employment in the MNOC's. Oil company jobs have become more attractive because of the enhanced wages in the sector, and declining employment opportunities in both the public and private sectors. The peoples of the oil-producing communities are aggrieved that most of the jobs in the industry have gone to non-indigenes (ibid: 160-161).

4.2.3 Outcomes

MNOC's have implemented a series of CSR initiatives "to not only bridge the legitimacy gap between communities and MNOCs, but also help them secure their social license to operate" (Idemudia, 2014). However, despite these different initiatives and approaches, the perception

of the oil industry remains negative, "and incidences of corporate-community conflicts continue to escalate and the kidnapping of oil workers is now common" (ibid).

Idemudia (2014) opines that this continued negative perception is caused partly because of the companies' inability to fulfill their promises to the communities and the continued oil spills undermining local livelihoods; and partly because of internal fragmentation within communities, competing for benefits from the industry. According to her "the rentier context in the Niger Delta has undermined traditional authority as well as promoted opportunism and competition to acquire oil wealth" (ibid: 160). She argues that the rentier approach makes the MNOC's reactive to stakeholders' demands rather than being proactive to the wants and needs of the community. Additionally, she argues "the use of the level of community violence as an indicator of the state of corporate-community relations is a poor measure of social license to operate as it conflates available evidence about support with 'actual' levels of support" (ibid).

Theories on private authority, and on how private companies in environments of little state regulations and interventions, can evolve into governance like actors, were discussed in chapter two. However, even if the MNOC's were be held completely accountable for pollution and responsible for cleaning up oil spillages, and possible be required to invest more in the communities they operate, e.g. in terms of offering employment opportunities to local people; a company whose essential purpose is profit-making, cannot replace the state and state structures in governing and providing its citizens with security and essential services such as health, education and a fair share in government revenues in the Niger Delta, or elsewhere. Thus, the viability of corporate solutions to solve community agitation alone is not probable.

4.2.4 Conclusion

The state centralization of 'public' resources has been in conflict with pre-colonial notions of 'communal' resources, and the Niger Delta communities' view that the resources extracted from their lands belong to them, through virtue of their geographical setting, and by ancestral heritage. The objectives for protesting and negotiating with MNOC's, is to achieve greater influence and share in the resources that are extracted from the Niger Delta communities. This

can also be a source of conflict between and within communities, as they compete to achieve benefits from the MNOCs. Ukiwo (2008) outlined five strategies applied to promote community grievances, namely: 1) negotiations to receive amenities such as health centers, roads and access to electricity; 2) obstruction of oil production; 3) elites' negotiations to receive appointments for positions in key decision-making institutions; 4) negotiations to increase the percentage of revenue allocated on the basis of derivation; and 5) demanding for exclusion of non-indigenes from the oil industry in the Niger Delta, and greater employment opportunities for local people in the area, in the oil industry.

As a response to the expressed agitation by communities in the Niger Delta, the MNOCs have implemented a number of corporate social responsibility approaches, to mend the legitimacy gap between the communities and the companies, and to secure the MNOC's 'social license to operate' (Idemudia, 2014). However, the negative image that the MNOCs have in the Niger Delta communities has not reversed, and the probability of corporate strategies solving the agitation and perception of unjust treatment by the communities in the Niger Delta is low.

4.3 The Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People

4.3.1 The Movements Protest of the Shell-State Partnership

A defining moment in the transformation of resistance to the oil industry in the Niger Delta, was the peaceful community-based protest led by the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) (Idemudia, 2010). The execution of writer and human rights activist Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight other activists in November 1995 raised a storm of protest and outrage across the world. Their deaths highlighted the suffering of the ethnic minority, the Ogoni people, in the Niger Delta. The Nigerian government was widely denounced, and the oil company Shell condemned for its ambiguous and belated interventions (Amnesty International, 2005: 636). Ken Saro-Wiwa, and the other MOSOP activists, fought to put an end to the environmental damage, caused by oil spills, and pollution that exhausted the nature and endangered people's health and livelihood.

The Ogoni struggle against Shell dates back to 1958 and the company's interaction with the Ogoni environment is at the root of the conflict. As the oil production evolved in the Ogoni territory it "spawned relations of production which alienated the landowners and producers from the products of their land, while degrading the environment and destroying the basis of

livelihood in the agro-based peasant economy" (Obi, 2005: 322). The struggle intensified in 1991, when MOSOP was formed as a more radical Ogoni grouping; demanding "social justice for minorities, equity in power sharing in Nigeria, compensation for environmental devastation and the restoration of the environment, payment of economic rents to oil-producing areas, human dignity and self-actualization" (Saro-Wiwa, in Obi, 2005: 324). Ogoni traditional elites and MOSOP ended up becoming rivals in the conflict, because the these elites feared that the uncompromising stance and methods of MOSOP would endanger their personal relationships with the Nigerian state and oil companies, remove them from their rentier positions, and endanger the possibility to solve the conflict peacefully.

Under the leadership of Saro-Wiwa, MOSOP effectively blocked access to oil wells for Shell workers from 1993, "costing the Shell-state partnership an estimated loss of N9.9 million an day (approximately 580 000 dollars) (ibid). However, neither the state nor Shell yielded to the demands of MOSOP. Shell answered to the accusations by denying their responsibility in the matter, and arguing that the accusations were exaggerated. The Nigerian state "viewed MOSOP activities as subversion and economic sabotage", and met MOSOP resistance with military means, terrorizing villages and communities suspected of sympathizing with the cause (Obi, 2005: 325). In November 1995, Saro-Wiwa and eight other leaders were convicted and hanged on counts of inciting a mob to murder four conservative Ogoni Chiefs (ibid). The execution of the 'Ogoni Nine', and imprisonment of other MOSOP activists, silenced the organization in Nigeria, but members of the organization in exile continued their efforts from abroad. Shell's involvement in the conflict was condemned internationally, which subsequently pressured the company to engage in Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) initiatives as a method of managing peaceful corporate-community relations in the Niger Delta (Idemudia, 2010: 169).

4.3.2 Objectives

The objectives of MOSOP were formulated through the Ogoni bill of rights as follows: "political autonomy to participate in the affairs of the Republic as a distinct and separate unit," including "the right to the control and use of a fair proportion of Ogoni economic resources for Ogoni development" (Human Rights Watch, 1999).

4.3.3 Means/Strategies

One of MOSOP's strategies was to internationalize their cause, and bring attention to the struggle of the Ogoni people outside of Nigeria, through involving NGOs such as Amnesty International, Greenpeace, and Unrepresented Nations and peoples Organization (UNPO); and campaigning through newspaper articles and documentary films (Obi, 2005). By gaining international attention, MOSOP wanted to put pressure on the Nigerian government and the MNOC's operating in the Niger Delta. MOSOP also employed strategies of sabotage, by blocking the access of Shell oil wells, in order to damage the profits of the Shell-state partnership (ibid).

4.3.4 Organizational Structure

The MOSOP was formed as a more radical organized protest from the existing community structures, but their efforts did not translate to equal commitment from all Ogoni communities and leaders. As such, there was conflict between MOSOP and the conservative Ogoni community leaders. MOSOP's uncompromising stance towards the oil industry and the state, made some Ogoni leaders wary that the opportunity to solve the conflict peacefully would disappear (Agbonifo, 2011). The military violence employed by the state also deterred unified commitment to the movement. A side from this, some members of the local elite also had lucrative clientistic links to both the state and Shell, meaning they also had incentive to hinder the MOSOP cause. Regardless of the different reasons – neopatrimonial structures included – the disunity of the Ogoni people might have hindered the success of the movement (ibid).

4.3.5 Outcomes

Almost 20 years after the execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa, the multinational oil companies' CSR initiatives and voluntary codes of conduct have failed to reduce the negative impacts of their operations in the Niger Delta. The biggest impact of the MOSOP conflict with the state-Shell partnership is perhaps the contribution to the increasing degree to which Shell and other multinational corporations are perceived as having responsibility beyond compliance to government protections and regulations, since these are limited. As the private authority of MNOC's is strong in relation to and partnership with the Nigerian state - which is not perceived as sufficiently catering to the rights and needs of oil minorities- the expectations towards the MNOC's practices are raised, although not necessarily met.

4.3.6 Conclusion

What started out as peaceful community protests from 1958 to promote the Ogoni people's grievances caused by oil companies' presence and pollution on Ogoni land in the Niger Delta, escalated from the late 1980's into the formation of MOSOP in 1991. Under their new leader, Ken Saro-Wiwa, MOSOP demanded social justice for minorities, higher influence on decision-making in Nigeria, compensation for the devastation on the environment, payments for rents to oil-producing communities, and human dignity and self-actualization (Saro-Wiwa in Obi, 2005). The formation of MEND caused fragmentation in the Ogoni leadership, as the organization's uncompromising stance and methods against the MNOC's caused the traditional Ogoni elites' to be fearful of jeopardizing their personal relationships with the state-oil partnership, of the possibility of being removed from their rentier-positions, and of the disappearing possibility of solving the conflict peacefully. This brings about the question of whether the Ogoni-fragmentation was influenced by path dependence of neopatrimonial structures, inhabiting the Ogoni people as a collective separate to separate themselves from their context when organizing to promote their grievances. MOSOP engaged NGOs and international media to bring attention to the sufferings of the Ogoni people, as well as blocking access for Shell to their oil wells to obstruct production. In 1995, the 'Ogoni nine' were pinned, condemned and hanged on allegations of inciting a mob to murder four conservative Ogoni Chiefs. The importance of petroleum resources for both the global and Nigeria's economy contributes to a dynamic where any threat to continuity of the oil-industry is conceived as threat to the global economy and survival of the Nigerian state, which has caused the securitization of all oil-related issues and conflicts in the Niger Delta. The hanging of Saro-Wiwa and the eight other activists simultaneously silenced the Ogoni protest locally, and brought massive media attention and condemning of both the Nigerian state and Shells involvement in the conflict internationally. The biggest impact of the MOSOP conflict with the state-Shell partnership is perhaps the contribution to the increasing degree to which Shell and other multinational corporations are perceived, also internationally as having responsibility beyond compliance to government protections and regulations, since these are limited.

4.4 Women's Protests: The Gbaramatu Women's "War"

4.4.1 Women's Participation in Civil Society in the Niger Delta

Community women in the Niger Delta are generally very organized and take part in civil society at different levels. First, in "local groups of traditional organizations" involving "socio-economic, thrift, welfare and support groups"; second, in the "community, clan and ethnic associations"; and third, in pan-ethnic and regional associations" (Ikelegbe, 2005: 251). Even though community women in the Niger Delta do not organize primarily for the purpose of protest, community women's organization serves as prime platforms from which women can mobilize for protest on issues that are perceived to affect whole communities (Oluwaniyi, 2010).

Oluwaniyi (2010: 150) argues that the context for women's protest in the Niger Delta are characterized by two important factors: first "the exclusion of women from the benefits of the oil economy, state repression of their protests, and the ways in which oil production threatens the environmental basis for their subsistence: land and water"; and second "the ways in which dominant patriarchal relations marginalize and subordinate women to men, and how this is expressed in women's protests and politics". Women in the Niger Delta are thus not just constrained and marginalized by the state system and oil economy, but also by oppressive gender relations (Ikelegbe, 2005, Oluwaniyi, 2010). These gender relations are especially uneven when it comes to land ownership; even though women in the Niger Delta often serve as the breadwinners of their families, they are not allowed to own the land on which they farm, and they tend to be excluded from " authority over household matters" (Oluwaniyi, 2010: 159). Women are also excluded from compensation for loss of land, which usually is paid to men, while the women who are depending on the land for their livelihood are left out of negotiations with the oil companies, and suffer impoverishment (ibid).

4.4.2 Gbaramatu Women's "War"

The Gbaramatu Kingdom includes the Okerenkoko, Kokodiagbene, and Kenyagbene communities in the Niger Delta. In 2002 Gbaramatu Women organized protests against SPDC and Chevron in Okerenkoko and Kenyagbene respectively, on account of 30 years of "oil spills, gas flares and unfair treatment" resulting from the companies oil exploration and production in these areas (Oluwaniyi, 2010: 155). For example, owing to Chevron-Texaco's activities in the community, "farms were being damaged, and rivers were covered with oil,

therefore suffocating aquatic animals to death. Moreover, there was no potable water in the host communities in Gbaramatu and people relied on the polluted streams and rivers for domestic use, exposing themselves to debilitating health infections and hazards" (ibid). What initially triggered the protest was Chevron's decision to withdraw one of it boats, which used to transport Kenyagbene women to Warri town on market days, meaning the women would have to first get to Escravos to get transport to Warri town. Frustration over the company's decision led to the mobilization of six hundred women, blocking the river passage from Abiteye flow station to Escravos for Chevron-Texaco workers, to show their dismay (ibid). Chevron reacted to the protest by calling on the State Naval Patrol team, which attacked the unarmed women from gunboats and capsized the women's boats, leading to the drowning of one woman, and the sinking of five boats (ibid). Due to the prolonged frustration with the presence and procedures of Chevron in the area, the protest escalated with support of other Gbaramatu women's leaders, mobilizing protest and occupation of five flow stations in the Niger Delta in July 2002. After ten days of protest with 11 000 oil barrels a day shut in, and huge losses of income for Chevron and the Nigerian state, Chevron-Texaco were forced to negotiate with the Gbaramatu women, which led to a signed agreement between the parties of a memorandum of understanding (MoU) (ibid). Later, in 2005, the MoU was replaced by the Global Memorandum of Understanding (GMoU). The GMoU model was a shift away from oil companies negotiating with communities, to negotiating with "a group of communities in a cluster", which enabled the companies to deal with different communities within the same ethnic group in one cluster. (Idemudia, 2014: 159) The GMoU initiatives have however not successfully reversed the negative perception of the oil-industry, because it has failed to keep all developmental promises that have been made, oil spills and gas flares still occur, and the general perception that "oil companies' CSR initiatives are not borne out of genuine community concerns but out of the need to buy peace remain rampant" (ibid). Idemudia (2014: 160) argues that one of the major reasons why the GMoU has not been successful in changing the negative perceptions of the oil companies, is that environmental pollution caused by the companies are not properly addressed, because they tend to focus on "affirmative duties (i.e., social investments)", rather than "negative injunction duties (e.g., questions of oil pollution incidence and compensation payments)." Secondly, he argues, these strategies tend to "exacerbate trust deficit issues as opposed to ameliorate them", (…) because the companies tend to "keep power over decision-making within the corporation for flexibility and control as well as emphasizing engagement with local elites over open community engagement" (ibid).

4.4.3 Objectives

The objectives of women's protests in the Niger Delta are brought on by mismanagement of oil companies in terms of oil spillage, land degradation, gas flaring and water pollution, as well as issues related to "land ownership; household relations; socio-economic survival; and patriarchal relations between the state/ oil industry and women" (Olankunle, 2010, Oluwaniyi, 2010). The objectives of organized protest for women thus range from countering issue specific matters, to the general oppressive structures of the state, oil-industry and gender relations.

4.4.4 Means/Strategies

Olankunle (2010) argues that women in the Niger Delta generally protest peacefully through community sensitization, press war, civil disobedience, and lobbying to press home their demands. Ikelegbe (2005: 260) describes the usual procedures of community women's protests in the area as following: The protests are initiated from the residence or the village square, with a "procession through the community to alert community members and groupings", which can go on for several days. Second, the "object of grievance" is directly engaged, "such as oil company facilities, communal governance structures, local elites or groupings such as youths". With issues involving elites and groupings within the society; the protesters "may peacefully visit the houses, and meeting places of communal leaderships", where the women can "engage with the objects of agitation directly" (ibid). When the object of agitation is an oil company, the protest "may involve occupations and disruptions". The most extreme form of procession and protest is "the deployment of partial or total nudity", which believed to be a curse (Ikelegbe, 2005, Oluwaniyi, 2010).

4.4.5 Organizational Structure

As mentioned, women in the Niger Delta do not usually organize themselves for the purpose of protesting, but the women's organizations serves as platforms from which they can organize protests. Also, according to Oluwaniyi (2010: 154) "women leaders are highly respected and they can mobilize women within their community irrespectively of the individual group they belong to". Thus the organizational structures of community organizations for women in the Niger Delta are already in place, and the protests build on

these structures when they arise. Generally, the women keep men out of the organizations and protests, to avoid that the men can subvert the goals of the organizations and seek "influence or determine who shares in whatever benefits may accrue from the protests" (ibid).

4.4.6 The Impact of Women's Protest

The results of women's protests in the Niger Delta have achieved varying degrees of success. In the case of the Gbaramatu protest that led to the signing of a MoU and later the GMoU, the actual benefits only started to trickle down to the inhabitants of the area several years later. Chevron committed themselves to" participatory partnership, transparency and accountability", and investing in "building community capacity for sustainable development and conflict resolution in the area" (Oluwaniyi, 2010). However, Oluwaniyi (2010: 162) argues that "in spite of some positive recorded outcomes, women in the oil-rich Niger Delta region are still marginalized and suffer brutalization in the course of the just struggles for gender rights in the context of the overall struggle for resource control and self-determination in the region".

4.4.7 Conclusion

Women's protest in the Niger Delta is characterized both by the way in which dominant patriarchal relations marginalize and subordinate women to men; and by the exclusion of women from the oil economy, sate repression of their protests, and the ways in which oil production threatens women's livelihood by polluting the environment (Oluwaniyi, 2010). Community women in the Niger Delta are generally very organized and take part in civil society at different levels, which means that the different women community organizations can serve as platforms from which women in the Niger Delta can organize protests. With 30 years of Gbaramatu women's agitation on account of oil spills, gas flares and unfair treatment by MNOC's operating in the area, the final straw that led the Gbaramatu women to organize protest was the Chevron's withdrawal of a boat used by women in the area to travel to the markets in Warri. The subsequent blockage by six hundred women of access to a flow station was met by an attack on the unarmed women by the navy, which led more women to mobilize and successfully block access to five flow stations for ten days; forcing Chevron to negotiate.

A MoU, and later GMoU was signed by Chevron, committing the company to participatory partnership, transparency and accountability, and to invest in building 'community capacity'

for sustainable development and conflict resolution. Although the Gbaramatu women were able to force Chevron to negotiate with them, women still suffer from marginalization and brutalization, and the GMoU has not successfully reversed the negative perception of the oil industry. The failure of the GMoU to improve the negative perception on MNOC's is based on the failure to keep promises made, and the general perception that company initiatives towards the communities are not born out of genuine concern for the communities, but rather a way of buying peace and social license to operate in the Niger Delta. Arguably, this case displays how the space for organized opposition in the Niger Delta is shaped and constrained by the counter-strategies of the MNOCs. Through the companies' strategies of resolving conflict through 'buying peace' rather than responding to the root causes of grievances promoted by protest groups; they shape both the space for- and outcome of- organized opposition in the Niger Delta.

4.5 Opposition by Military Means: MEND

The Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) is an umbrella organization for a number of subgroupings that seeks to protests the distribution of wealth generated by oil extraction in the Niger Delta (Hansen, 2008). Following attacks by unknown actors on oil installation in the Niger Delta in 2005, MEND first gained notice when it facilitated an attack on Shell Petroleum Company's (SPD) offshore oil field and abducted four expatriates, on January 11, 2006 (Courson, 2009). On January 15, MEND orchestrated another attack on an SPDS flow station, seriously obstructing the Nigerian and international oil industry. According to a MEND spokesperson, Jomo Gbomo, the objective of the organization is to "totally destroy the capacity of the Nigerian government to export oil", due to the perceived injustices of continued poverty, marginalization and unemployment in the Niger Delta, in spite of tremendous oil wealth in the area (in Courson, 2009: 18).

Courson (2009) argues that the emergence of MEND altered "the socio-economic space and political ecology of the Niger Delta and Nigeria as a whole". Through using military means the organization brought global attention to the local context and thus "tappet into the local-global dimension of the quest for resource control in the Niger Delta" (Courson, 2009: 24). The organization has also sought to resolve the conflict outside the realm of the Nigerian state, by consistently utilizing international media, because the state is perceived to be incapable of distancing itself from its own vested interests in oil, and close cooperation with multinational oil companies (ibid).

4.5.1 Objectives

In an interview with ABC News in 2007, the spokesperson for MEND, Jomo Gbomo stated that:

> The Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) is an amalgam of all arm bearing groups in the Niger Delta fighting for the control of oil revenue by indigenes of the Niger Delta who have had relatively no benefits from the exploitation of our mineral resources by the Nigerian government and oil companies over the last fifty years (Brian, 2008).

Despite the organization's objective to injure the oil economy in order to gain attention to the injustice of the wealth distribution in the Niger Delta, and bring about a change to this situation, "this goal is also mixed with immediate financial aims, and some of its suborganizations are showing signs of greater inclination toward financial rather than politically motivated activity" (Hansen, 2008) (PAGE). However, the organization is still defined as an insurgency group, because its publicly stated objective is political (ibid). Obi (2010: 17) argues that "MEND reflects a mix of several tendencies—ranging from radical resistance, to ambivalence towards the Niger Delta elite, and some opportunism. It goes back to the earlier point that resistance politics in the Niger Delta operate in rather ambiguous ways, in which former allies part ways, enemies become collaborators, and the quest for resources to wage the struggles sometimes blurs the line between waging a struggle for a just course and engaging in criminal acts for self-aggrandizement". The MEND rebellion could thus be understood through the context of a neopatrimonial oil economy, as being overshadowed by the path dependency of indirect rule.

4.5.2 Strategy/Means:

The strategy of MEND has been protest through armed insurgency: According to Courson (2009: 19) the use of violence locally to affect the oil trade globally has had two significant effects; "on the one hand, it has led to more global attention being focused on the situation in the oil producing communities in the region, particularly the plight and demands of the people, while on the other it has raised the energy security stakes of the world's established and emerging powers in the region". By taking Western expatriates hostage and sabotaging

oil facilities – leading to increased price on crude oil internationally – MEND has brought global attention to the local situation, actively engaging international media (ibid).

4.5.3 Organizational Structure

MEND is an umbrella organization, and does not have a clear leadership structure, but is rather a "loose coalition of shadowy groups (cells) and a variety of leaders scattered across the states of the Niger Delta, who sometimes are unaware of events undertaken by other cells until such events are publicized" (Courson, 2009:19). This guerilla-type strategy means there is no easy way for the state police or military to target the leadership of the organization in order to eliminate it. However, it also makes it difficult for MEND to act as a unified civic movement with clear objectives and strategies, and controlling the actions of other participant of the movement. Bøås (2010) on the other hand, argues that discursively MEND was consistently coherent. However the tendency of MEND members to switch between the roles – of political insurgents and other roles, such as hired political thugs for the very political elite that they were protesting, and sometimes even deploying as "the armed wing in support of the grievances of local communities", taking hostages for local communities to highlight their grievances – was what discredited their political agenda (ibid: 122).

4.5.4 From Violence to Amnesty Program

In tan ABC News interview Jomo Gbomo warned about MEND's objective to escalate its efforts and use of violence in 2007:

> Our aim on inception was to attract international attention to the plight of the people of the delta and the injustice the world has been turning a blind eye to. That obviously had no effect on the Nigerian government and oil companies so we have progressed to the next stage of our campaign which is limited attacks on oil installations and administrative facilities. This also appears to be doing little good and we are now considering the next phase which will be a more ruthless approach to our objective (Brian, 2008).

Obi (2010: 17) argues that the securitized and militarized response of the state and oil-alliances of the state was influenced by the propensity of the Nigerian state to dismiss MEND as criminals; the post 9/11 war on terror discourse "provided the context for 'labeling' MEND

as a terrorist organization with possible links to other transnational terrorist organizations targeting Western oil interests"; and the "increased strategic profile of West Africa in global energy calculations".

The increasing urgency of the conflict called for immediate attention, so the government under President Umaru Musa Yar'Adua initiated the Niger Delta Amnesty Program, as an attempt to improve the security situation in the area. (Okurebia and Daniel, 2013). Thus, "amnesty and unconditional pardon to all persons who have directly or indirectly participated in the commission of offences associated with militant activities in the Niger Delta" (Ujah et al., 2009). The Amnesty Program promised each ex-militant a payment of N65 000 monthly, and payment of rent and vocational training, in exchange for disarmament (Oluwaniyi, 2011). MEND was first skeptical of the program, as they publicly stated:

> We call on political thugs, armed robbers, kidnappers, pirates etc, from other states in Nigeria to take advantage of the government's offer by travelling to one of the centers in the Niger Delta and trade their weapons for amnesty. Come with the whole gang and get rehabilitated with gains of free education, money to start legitimate business etc. This is a unique opportunity in a country where so many graduates cannot find jobs and girls no longer marry for love (in Bøås, 2010: 123).

They did, however, eventually agree to engage in peace negotiations, and on November 14, 2009, late President Yar'Adua held the first meeting with the negotiation team appointed by MEND (Okurebia and Daniel, 2013: 39). Although the first meeting was not successful, 15 000 militia men turned up to the second, which was "the remarkable, particularly, as the number included virtually all the known militia groups under MEND across the Niger Delta States" (ibid). Before the period for applying for Amnesty had ended in October 2009, 26 358 persons had surrendered their weapons and joined the program (Oluwaniyi, 2011). This number is extremely high, in relation to previous numbers of recorded militants, which displays how the program was conceived as a very lucrative business, providing militia-leaders with incentives to recruit as many militants as possible to receive more 'compensation' when surrendering. The participants in the program were moved to camps for rehabilitation in six Niger Delta states. "Full rehabilitation of ex-militants began in June 2010 at the Obubra camp in Cross River State, and involved training ex-militants on non-violence

and career classification with their meals, accommodation and clothing needs taken care of, within the N1.273 billion budget for the program" (Oluwaniyi, 2011: 51-54). When the rehabilitation was completed, the participants were to be reintegrated into their respective communities through skill training or formal education, lasting from six months to five years (ibid).

The immediate outcome of the Amnesty Program was that violence, number of kidnappings and sabotage was significantly reduced, but not eradicated, while oil production increased from 700 000 to 2.4 million barrels a day. However there were several major issues with the Program, which posed challenges to the continuance of peaceful development in the Niger Delta. According to Oluwaniyi (2011: 51) "the tenets of the technical committee were not adhered to by the federal government for a bottom-up approach to the program. Rather, the government collaborated with ex-militants' commanders, who were only interested in their personal aggrandizement and did not consult with the militants on the ground". Second, the payout approach undermined the quality of the program as many of the participants were in it for the money, rather than for the rehabilitation and training (Oluwaniyi, 2011: 52). Third, according to Oluwaniyi, a large part of budget went to the "ex-militants' commanders, managers of the program, and the surging number of consultants and contractors – to the extent that the program itself was perceived as being a very lucrative business, rather than a transformational strategy" (ibid). Also, many people in the Niger Delta that were affected negatively by the oil industry, feeling marginalized, but lacking the resources to protest through violent means, were totally excluded by the Amnesty Program. Finally, Oluwaniyi argues that the root causes of the conflict; "alienation, marginalization, exploitation, corruption, unemployment, poverty, youth and women's issues", were not adequately addressed by the Program, which endangered the future stability and peace in the area (ibid). Agbiboa (2013) supports this notion, arguing that despite the decrease in violence after 2009, the amnesty program will only be a temporary solution. He argues that "cash payouts to armed militants and proposals to give oil-bearing communities a 10% stake in state oil revenues fail to seriously address the underlying issues of 'government corruption, political sponsorship of violence and environmental degradation' that continues to fuel resistance in the Niger Delta"(Agbiboa, 2013: 460).

Human Rights Watch too conclude that after spending approximately 400 million US Dollars a year since 2009, on providing economic incentives to insurgencies in the Niger Delta

through the Amnesty Program, the Nigerian government has failed to address the region's underlying causes of violence and discontent; "such as poverty, public sector corruption, environmental degradation from oil spills, and impunity for politically sponsored violence" (Human Rights Watch, 2014). The Nigerian government, upon announcing that the Program will be terminated in 2015, has acknowledged that its inability to secure jobs for the trained ex-militants or implement an orderly exit strategy may portend more danger for the region (ibid).

The future stability post-Amnesty Program is uncertain also with the new elected government of March 2015, with Muhammadu Buhari as president. The former insurgency leader – now private paramilitary actor – Ekpemupolo, was part of the Amnesty agrrement with the former president Godluck Jonathan; and has threatened with full out war, were the former president not to win the election. The future stability of the Amnesty is thus reliant on the new government's negotiation with the former military insurgencies (Grønskar, 2015).

4.5.5 Path Dependence

As discussed in chapter two, the embeddedness of neopatrimonialism in the Nigerian informal social structures and practices, determine the conditions for resistance against and within this structure. Bach (2012) argues that "the kind of decentralized violence and impunity that MEND represents is not a force in opposition to Nigeria's dysfunctional brand of politics but rather an integral part of it". Bøås (2010: 117) argues that agents for resistance turn into agents of the status quo because "the pervasive and increasingly dysfunctional neopatrimonial systems have created a machine-like character of African politics". This tendency is especially strong in long-lasting conflicts, where extraction of resources is possible, and the chance for any 'real victory' or change seems less and less possible (ibid). According to Bøås, there is little doubt that militia groups and political elites have connections in the Niger Delta. Neopatrimonial rule is thus re-created in armed insurgencies in the Niger Delta, because broad-reaching resistance seems only possible through participation in the intertwined structure of crime and politics. This results in insurgencies taking part in criminal activity while at the same time praying on the very population of which they come from, and are protesting on behalf of (ibid). MEND has consistently rejected terrorist or criminal labels on the organization, insisting that "its struggle is for survival, equity, dignity and justice for the people of the Niger Delta" (Courson, 2009: 24). However, evidence show that the same actors who participated in kidnappings and sabotage for political protest, in many cases also took

hostages purely for ransom and work as "hired thugs for local strongmen and politicians, especially during election campaigns" (Bøås, 2010: 122-123) . Thus, actors under MEND are "conducting an armed political insurgency, but also operating as bandits, and on the role are actively co-opted by the very elite they are rebelling against" (ibid). According to Bøås, the way to make sense of the MEND rebellion is to view it as a combination of 'tactical' and 'strategic' agency; "insurgency is thus an attempt to address social injustice (a strategy) as well as a mode of production and a way to make a living" (ibid). In other words, one has to encompass the various agendas that actors under the MEND-banner engage in to understand the rebellion. The combination of tactical and strategic agencies discredits the real political agenda of MEND, as the organization is perceived to be motivated by greed more than grievances, although this is not necessarily true.

4.5.6 Conclusion

MEND first gained notice after orchestrating an attack on SPD's off shore field in 2006, and the organization was later responsible for a number violent of attacks on oil installations and hostage-takings in the period between 2006 and 2009, when the Amnesty Program was initiated. The objective of MEND was to fight for control of oil revenues by indigenes if the Niger Delta, and fight against the indigenes marginalization from the oil wealth that were extracted from the area. MEND's strategy was armed insurgency; the use of violence locally to affect the oil trade globally, which both brought international attention to the grievances of Niger Delta communities, and raised the energy security stakes for the powers operating in the region. Courson (2009) argued that MEND's loose, guerilla-like structure made it difficult for to act as a unified organization, and at the same time difficult for state authorities to fight them. Bøås (2010) on the other hand, argued that the organization did act relatively unified, through discursively coherent objectives, but that the organization's political agenda was rather discredited because of the members' tendency to switch roles – from protesting under the banner of MEND, to engaging in criminal activities, and even to support local communities with volatile means outside of the MEND structure.

Bøås (2010) argues that the embedness of neopatrimonial structures in Nigeria, had effects on MEND's protests as well; turning the members of the organizations from agents of change, into agents of status quo. He argues that there is little doubt that militia groups and political elites have connections in the Niger Delta, and that neopatrimonial rule is thus re-created in armed insurgencies in the Niger Delta, because broad-reaching resistance seems only possible

through participation in the intertwined structure of crime and politics. This results in insurgencies taking part in criminal activity while at the same time praying on the very population of which they come from, and are protesting on behalf of.

The organization was first met with military response from the Nigerian government, who labled member of MEND as criminals. But the escalation of the conflict, and the urgency to solve it, eventually led to the initiation of the Amnesty Program by the president at the time, Yar'Adua. The objective of the program was to rehabilitate insurgency groups, and to provide economic incentives to surrender. Even though the immediate effect of the program was a sharp decrease in number of violent attacks and hostage-takings, the program had several structural problems, especially in that many of the participants were more interested in the immediate economic gains than to really be rehabilitated. Also, many of the people in the Niger Delta who were affected negatively by the oil industry, but had not engaged in violent protest, did not receive any benefits. Most importantly, the program did not address the roots of the conflict and agitation, but rather the effects of it. The Nigerian government has admitted its inability to secure jobs for ex-militants or implement an orderly exit strategy when the program will be determined this year, and that this may portend more violence in the future.

5.0 Conclusion

This thesis has argued that the colonial legacy and structures of decentralized despotism has laid the basis for neopatrimonial rule in Nigeria. The indirect British colonial rule was designed to divide the populations into two categories; citizens, ruled directly by the colonial power; and subjects, ruled indirectly by 'traditional' laws through inserted chiefs, to ensure British domination over large populations and land areas, with just a few British representatives present to manage the colonial domination. The structures of decentralized despotism were sustained and accompanied by neo-liberal decentralization after independence, with the strengthened private authority of MNOC's, shaping political, economic and social structures in Nigeria today – and the environment in which protest is organized and responded to in the Niger Delta (Zalik, 2004). Also, colonial characteristics of the police and army, which served as instruments of securing and advancing the narrow interest of the ruling elite, have to a large degree maintained to this day (Ukeje, 2010). Neopatrimonialism represents a system in which relationships of loyalty and dependency pervade the political and administrative system, and the motivation for taking public bureaucratic positions is more about acquiring personal wealth and status, than performing public service (Bach, 2012). These characteristics influence both the basis of protest, as the Niger Delta communities have become marginalized in terms of distribution of political power and the wealth that accrues from the massive oil industry on their lands – and the space in which protest groups organize and promote their grievances. Thus the embeddedness of neopatrimonialism in the informal social structures and practices, determines the conditions for resistance against and within this structure (Bøås and Jennings, 2012). In this regard it is apparent that some of the organized opposition groups in the Niger Delta, through their close and ambiguous relationship and periodical cooperation with political elites, sometimes end up turning from agents of change, into agents of status quo, cooperating with the elites of whom they are protesting, and praying on the vary population of which they are protesting on behalf of. Their real and justifiable political agenda becomes discredited by the fact that some of the protesters also engage in other (sometimes criminal) agendas – as a result of being part of the context in which they are organizing protest – which obscures their political aim through arising questions of whether they are motivated by greed or grievances.

The post-colonial Nigeria has been characterized by militarization and unstable political structures, but returned to, and has remained under civilian rule since 1999. The perception of unjust distribution of the wealth accruing from the oil industry is strengthened by the

widespread corruption in Nigeria. The oil industry was organized through a petro-military alliance from 1970 to 1998, strengthening the power and positions of both the Nigerian elites and the private authority of MNOC's, and embodying heavy repression of public discontent (Eberlein, 2006). The importance of Nigerian oil, both for the state and the global energy market, led any obstruction to the continued extraction and production of oil to be seen as a security threat (and was responded to accordingly) to the Nigerian state and the stability of the international oil market. The three state legislations – the Petroleum Act, the EEZ Decree and the LUA – further centralized the oil resources to the state, and marginalized communities in the Niger Delta from political influence and economic gains from the resources that were extracted from this region. At the heart of the Niger Delta conflict is the strong feeling among the ethnic/oil minorities that the non-oil-producing ethnic majority groups that dominate the federal government also control the oil wealth, while those who produce the oil suffer unjustly from neglect, exploitation and pollution (Obi and Rustad, 2010). Communities in the Niger Delta has had a long history of organizing protests and promoting their grievances since independence, which to a large degree has resulted in militarization, due to the strategic importance of oil, domestically and globally. The theoretical framework of private authority, decentralized despotism and neopatrimonialism; and the context of the state-oil partnership, corruption and militarization in Nigeria, explain the context and available space in which organized protest groups promote their grievances in the Niger Delta.

The aim of this thesis was to address the research question: What is the available space for organized opposition in the Niger-Delta context, and what strategies do different types of organized opposition groups apply to promote their grievances? Four sub-cases were studied for the analysis. The cases: 1) protest and negotiation organized through 'traditional' community-structures; 2) organized civic protest, turned violent, through the case of Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni people; 3) Women's protest in the Niger Delta, through the case of the Gbaramatu women's war; and 4) Protest through military means, through the case of Movement of the Emancipation of Niger Delta; were elected to provide a broad picture of organized opposition in the Niger Delta. The cases were organized according to the organized protests' objectives, means/strategies, organizational structures and outcomes.

Each of the organized protest groups in the cases presented were able to induce change in terms of initiatives from the MNOCs through CCR strategies and the GmoU; and the state

through the Amnesty Program. The available space for opposition were constrained in different degrees in terms of the military response from the state, the competition in and between communities to achieve benefits from the oil industry, and the embeddedness of neopatrimonialism; affecting especially MEND's ability to distance its protest and promotion of grievances, and the very system of which they were protesting against; and the responses of the Nigerian state and the MNOCs. The strategies employed by the different organized protest groups varied from peaceful negotiations with the state-oil partnership, obstruction and blockage of oil installations, involving international media to bring attention to the local situation and insurgency. The different conflict-solving solutions employed by the MNOC's have not been able to reverse the negative image these companies have locally, and they cannot hope to replace the government in providing necessary services and security to the citizens of the Niger Delta. The state led initiative of the Amnesty Program, did to a large degree decrease the violence and number of attacks and hostage-takings, but did not solve the roots of the conflict, meaning that the future stability in the Niger Delta region is uncertain.

The implications of the path dependence of decentralized despotism and neopatrimonial structures constraining both: the space for – and form of – organized opposition groups' promotion of their grievances; and the forms, strategies and success of the Nigerian state's and MNOC's response to these promoted grievances; is that future research and policy-making on the area needs to take into consideration the involved actors' grievances, as well as the greed caused by political, economic and social structures in the Niger Delta. If the conflict between the communities in the Niger Delta and the petro-state relationship is to be resolved both the greed and grievance aspect of the conflict needs to be taken into account and be resolved.

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

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