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Declaration

I, Mikael Bergius, declare that this thesis is a result of my research investigations and findings. Sources of information other than my own have been acknowledged and a reference list has been appended. This work has not been previously submitted to any other university for award of any type of academic degree.

Signature.....

Date.....12.08.2014.....

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Expanding the Corporate Food Regime – The Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania

-Current and Potential Implications for Rural Households



Jatropha plantation in Kisarawe District

by Mikael Bergius

Abstract

It is widely agreed that agriculture will remain a key foundation in efforts to reduce poverty, achieve food security and improve the environment worldwide. However, what type of agricultural development that is best suited to achieve these multiple aims is debated. Some argue for an expanded role of multinational agribusiness corporations in partnerships with governments, while others call for a radical transformation of the agri-food chain by re-embedding control over agriculture in small-scale farms and communities. A range of coordinated initiatives currently underway involving agribusiness corporations, governments and development institutions indicates that the former approach is emphasized. I claim that this approach represents an expansion of a specific structure of production, distribution, and consumption within the agroecosystem known as the corporate food regime.

My overall objective in this thesis has been to critically engage with this approach to agricultural development. Based on qualitative research undertaken in Tanzania during the fall of 2013 I have applied the concept of the corporate food regime to the analysis of the Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania (SAGCOT). I argue that SAGCOT represents an expansion of the corporate food regime in the country. Two broad conclusions can be drawn from the analysis: *Firstly*, while small-scale farmers are presented as the main beneficiaries of SAGCOT, their participation in setting up the initiative have been negligible. Instead SAGCOT is formed through the vision of corporations and reflects their aspirations to enhance their control over African agriculture. *Secondly*, SAGCOT risk facilitating a subsumption of Tanzanian agriculture to global capital and may thus signify a “control grab” whereby small-scale farming households risks surrendering their autonomy and rights to land and other vital resources. Current land acquisition processes in which the Tanzanian government seeks to acquire land for SAGCOT investments are found to be fraught with violations of the rights of small-scale farmers and pastoralists.

Against this background, I present an alternative path which recognizes small-scale farmers, and the knowledge they possess, as the driving force of agricultural development. This alternative is expressed by the interlinked language of agro-ecology and food sovereignty and entails an agricultural sector connected to local natural resources and knowledge, whereby farm management and control over essential farm inputs are embedded with farmers themselves instead of with global capital.

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List of Acronyms

ACT	Agricultural Council of Tanzania
AGRA	Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa
AGRF	African Green Revolution Forum
ANSAF	Agricultural Non-State Actors Forum
AoA	Agreement on Agriculture
ASDP	Agricultural Sector Development Program
ASDS	Agricultural Sector Development Strategy
CAADP	Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Program
CCRO	Customary Certificate Right of Occupancy
CSO	Civil Society Organization
CVL	Certificate of Village Land
ERP	Economic Recovery Program
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
Haki Ardhi	Land Rights Resources and Research Institute
IMF	International Monetary Fund
LHRC	Legal and Human Rights Center
MKUKUTA	National Strategy for Economic Growth and Reduction of Poverty
MNC	Multinational Corporation
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
MVIWATA	National Network of Farmers Groups in Tanzania
NAFSN	New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
PPP	Public-Private Partnerships
RPF	Resettlement Policy Framework
RUBADA	Rufiji Basin Development Authority
SAGCOT	Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania
SAP`s	Structural Adjustment Programs
SAT	Sustainable Agriculture Tanzania
SBT	Sugar Board of Tanzania
SIDA	Swedish International Development Agency

SRESA	Strategic Regional Environmental and Social Assessment
TAHA	Tanzania Horticulture Association
TAFSIP	Tanzania Agricultural and Food Security Investment Plan
TARIPA	Tanzania Rice Partnership
TIC	Tanzania Investment Center
TRIPS	Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
URT	United Republic of Tanzania
UPOV	International Union for the protection of New Varieties of Plants
VLUP	Village Land Use Plan
WEF	World Economic Forum
WTO	World Trade Organization

PART ONE: INTRODUCTION

1.0 Introduction

We are faced with a challenging trilemma. Despite economic growth, billions are still poor, despite producing more than enough food, hundreds of millions still go to bed at night on empty stomachs, and despite continuously declaring visions about the need to care for the environment, the natural resource base on which we exist continues to be undermined. How, then, should we face up to this trilemma in ways that are not only socially just, but also in ways that manages to maintain a fruitful dialogue with nature?

Agriculture provides a part solution to this question. Despite increasing rates of urbanization, the majority of the world's poor still resides in rural corners around the globe. These rural corners are considered to be the location of nearly seventy percent of the total population in the Global South (World Bank, 2014). For these people, small-scale and family driven agriculture continues to be the primary means of generating livelihoods. It provides not only an essential source for food and incomes, but is also an important carrier of history and diverse knowledge cultures inherent in rural communities. Indeed, these family driven farms produce the majority of the world's food (UNEP, 2011), and are hence vital locations in which the aforementioned trilemma can be addressed (Altieri, 2008).

However, while it is widely agreed that agricultural development is key to reduce poverty, achieve food security, and improve the environment, what type of agricultural development to achieve this is debated. On the one hand, some argue that it is best, and most efficiently, addressed by expanding the role of multinational corporations (MNC's) in agricultural development and to integrate small-scale farmers in international value-chains (NAFSN, 2012; WEF, n.d.). On the other hand, others argue for a thorough transformation of the entire agri-food chain where power of production, and the means of production, are (re)rooted in the family farms and communities where the majority of production takes place (McMichael, 2011; Via Campesina, 2011; Wittman, Desmarais, & Wiebe, 2010a). A range of coordinated initiatives currently underway involving large corporations, governments and development institutions indicates that the former approach is emphasized in a conjuncture defined by their self-acclaimed concern for the triple problem of poverty, food, and environment.

I argue that this approach represents an expansion of a specific structure of production, distribution, and consumption within the overall agroecosystem known as the corporate food

regime (McMichael, 2005). This expansion is characterized by the proliferation of technology intensive farming practices (including patented seeds, chemicals and equipment) underpinned by the teachings of neoclassical economics and free trade. The New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition (NAFSN) of the G8 and the New Vision for Agriculture of the World Economic Forum (WEF) are two of the most recent global initiatives through which the corporate driven agricultural model is exported to countries of the Global South. An expansion of the corporate food regime also entails expropriation of rural land areas for large-scale farms which in some cases are termed in less politically sensitive language as nucleus farms (SAGCOT, 2011). As such farms are established surrounding communities are expected to provide labor for example through on-farm employment or through out-grower schemes. This makes up the core content of what constitutes “value-chain integration”.

In the context of Tanzania the corporate expansion materialize through its Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania (SAGCOT) initiative. SAGCOT is a Public-Private Partnership (PPP) initiative between the Tanzanian government, agri-corporations, development partners, nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) and local organizations which proclaimed goal is to lift small-scale farmers out of poverty, enhance food security and promote economic development while preserving the environment (SAGCOT, 2011). The initiative is organized along the structures of the corporate food regime and highlights small-scale farmers as the main beneficiaries. Project documents claims that by linking small-scale farmers to value-chains both at the output and input side of production, predominantly through out-grower arrangements, they will get access to modern technologies that in turn will increase their productivity and incomes (SAGCOT, 2011).

Indeed, Tanzania is still an agrarian country with agriculture (value added) contributing to about thirty percent of the total Gross Domestic Product (GDP). It is considered that nearly three quarters of the population derives their livelihoods from the agricultural sector while it is close to hundred percent in the rural areas. These farmers – almost exclusively operating small-scale farms - have the main responsibility in terms of bringing food from the field to the plate in Tanzania. It is considered that about ninety percent of the food that is produced and consumed in the country stems from small-scale agricultural production (Makoye, 2014). Agriculture is therefore considered to be a key sector of focus if Tanzania is to reach its stated development goals (URT, n.d). This emphasis on agriculture for development is illustrated by Tanzania's current efforts geared towards putting agriculture at the forefront of

its development agenda through the Kilimo Kwanza (agriculture first) strategy. The stated aim of Kilimo Kwanza is to commercialize and modernize the agricultural sector by creating incentives for investments from the private sector (Tanzania National Business Council, 2009). The SAGCOT initiative is the first major program set to put Kilimo Kwanza in motion.

Proponents of a corporate expansion in the agricultural sector in Tanzania (and elsewhere) argue that it will bring much needed investments to agriculture and modernize what is considered to be an inferior and backward looking peasantry. By linking these farmers to international value-chains may not only the above trilemma be addressed, but it can be addressed in ways which also accommodates the interests of what are profit seeking corporations. Hence, the trilemma is turned into a win-win opportunity as small-scale farmers, and the resources they possess, becomes integrated into corporate strategies of capital accumulation.

My overall objective through this thesis is to critically question the assumption that the currently emphasized strategy of a corporate expansion in agriculture is suited to address the challenging trilemma set out above. This will be done through an investigation of how benefits and costs related to the SAGCOT initiative are distributed among the involved stakeholders, with a particular emphasis on small-scale farmers as these are portrayed as the major beneficiaries of the initiative. Indeed, the SAGCOT initiative is highlighted as a model for African agricultural development (NAFSN, 2012; USAID, 2013). NAFSN (2012) writes that ‘Tanzania is a showcase for public-private partnership in agricultural growth, exemplified by the development of its Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor’ (p. 1). In this context, understanding the current and potential effects of SAGCOT is significant given the likelihood of similar initiatives being implemented elsewhere.

The corporate expansion in Tanzanian agriculture involves a whole range of different and complex issues which cannot be addressed in its full in this thesis. It is thus of particular importance to set out some boundaries within which to structure the analysis. In so doing, the thesis will be organized around three broadly defined research questions:

Firstly, what characterized the planning process leading to the SAGCOT initiative and how is the initiative set up?

- Which actors led the planning process?
- Where there any meaningful representation of small-scale farmers?
- Which key assumption underpins the SAGCOT initiative?
- What are the likely implications for small-scale farmers in terms of their autonomy and power of production and resources?

Secondly, since a major component accompanying the corporate expansion is access to vast areas of suitable land for commercial agriculture, a significant portion of this thesis look into the issue of land. More precisely, I ask what is characterizing the land identification and acquisition process for SAGCOT investments.

- Who are the main actors involved in identifying land?
- In which areas is land currently identified?
- Under what circumstances are rural communities included/excluded in this process?

Thirdly, against the background of the two former questions, I ask whether there are viable alternatives to the currently corporately dominated trajectory of agricultural development envisioned in Tanzania.

- What alternatives exists which can bring developmental benefits while retaining control over agricultural production in the hands of Tanzania's small-scale farmers?

To answer these questions the thesis will proceed in two main parts. Part one consists of some introductory reading providing background knowledge to the analysis. Following this introduction, chapter two in part one will outline the theoretical context which informs the SAGCOT initiative. This chapter will introduce the concept of food regimes as a governing structure within the global agroecosystem and in particular describe and discuss the corporate food regime. Chapter three briefly outlines the main features in Tanzanian agriculture and development since independence to provide an understanding of the particular context through which the SAGCOT initiative emerges. The final chapter of part one will present the overarching research framework underpinning this thesis, describe the study area of attention as well as discussing the specific methods that have been adopted as a means of generating

data. Moving on to part two, this will be organized around three chapters whereby each chapter addresses each of the three research questions, respectively. In chapter five I will discuss the processes leading to the SAGCOT initiative and examine how the initiative is set up. Through empirical investigation carried out in villages surrounding two proposed SAGCOT investment areas chapter six will critically discuss the issue of land for SAGCOT. Chapter seven is informed by the two preceding chapters in part two, and proposes an alternative register for agricultural development in Tanzania expressed by the interlinked language of agroecology and food sovereignty. Finally, a concluding chapter summarizes and reflects on some of the key aspects derived from this thesis in context with the wider debates on agricultural development.

2.0 Through the Frame of the Corporate Food Regime

As outlined in the introduction, the SAGCOT initiative represents an international expansion of a corporate food regime. This regime – essentially governing relations of agricultural production - is embedded within broader socio-ecological systems conceptualized as agroecosystems. Agroecosystems are integrated socio-ecological systems that possess complex relations and interdependencies - both between humans as social relations, and between humans and the environment as socio-ecological relations (Vatn, 2005). In this thesis I will primarily concentrate on the social relations inherent in agroecosystems, although some attention will also be given to the ecological half of the system. Before turning our attention to the concept of food regimes, it is necessary to briefly expand on the conception of agroecosystems.

At its most basic, an agroecosystem can be conceptualized as a system which through some degree of human intervention into nature is managed to produce food and other raw materials for human consumption (Apeldoorn, Kok, Sonneveld, & Veldkamp, 2011; Tomich et al., 2011). Additionally, the agroecosystem also provides more intangible products, and produce public goods such as ecosystem services, cultural landscapes and climate change mitigation (carbon sinks) (Darnhofer, Bellon, Dedieu, & Milestad, 2010).

An agroecosystem consists of many and diverse components and agents interacting simultaneously. These interactions occur within, and between, social, ecological and economic domains at multiple scales from the small-scale farmer at the local level, to the MNC's and multilateral institutions operating at the global level. These cross-scale relations mean that events or changes in one part of the system may affect, in non-linear ways, other parts of the system. As such, decisions made by agents within the agroecosystem, be it a small-scale farmer, a government institution, a multilateral organization, or a MNC, are influenced by these reciprocal relationships. Against this background, I see the definition by Cabell & Oelofse (2012) as sufficient to encompass many of these inter-linkages which are relevant to this thesis. They define an agroecosystem as a system which is

...managed with the intention of producing, distributing, and consuming food, fuel, and fiber. Its boundaries encompass the physical space dedicated to production, as well as the resources, infrastructure, markets, institutions, and people that are dedicated to bringing food to the plate, fiber to the factory, and fuel to the hearth. The agroecosystem operates simultaneously at multiple nested scales

and hierarchies, from the field to the globe (Cabell & Oelofse, 2012, pp. The Agroecosystem and Resilience, para. 1)

This definition acknowledges that the functioning of the agroecosystem is shaped by its inherent political-economic environment. Thus, changes that occurs to the agroecosystem are often socially constructed, and could therefore, as argued by Davoudi (2012), often be otherwise.¹ As the agroecosystem goes through various forms of change the social relations inherent in this system suggests that while some people gain, others lose (Vatn, 2005) - or put differently, abundance for some might be scarcity for others (Scoones, Smalley, Hall, & Tsikata, 2014). Who wins and who loses depends on whose interests and whose rights to essential resources are promoted and/or protected. Indeed, this reflects the inherent power asymmetries in society (Smith, 1984; Vatn, 2005). Such struggles over power are key, not only to determine the outcome for various groups and individuals, and whether these outcomes are just and fair, but also in terms of how a particular issue is framed and approached (i.e. hunger, poverty or climate change). These questions are at the core in the analysis of SAGCOT in this thesis. In the next section I will develop an understanding of the political-economic forces governing the agroecosystem.

2.1 Relations of Production in the Agroecosystem: Food Regimes

As I have shown above, the relations of production within the agroecosystem are governed by political economic conditions. It is therefore important to understand some of the dynamics and dominating governing forces in this system to identify winners and losers as the relations of production change. In this thesis such changes are exemplified by the expansion of the corporate food regime in Tanzania through the SAGCOT initiative. In this section I will first set out to examine the concept of food regimes and how such regimes have evolved through time. I then go on to describe the dominating food regime in the contemporary context in terms of how it is structured, the main actors, and the type of agricultural production it promotes.

First it is necessary to define the concept of regimes. Regimes are institutional structures which regulates society through a variety of means – both in formal and informal ways (Vatn, 2005). In its broadest sense, regimes can be defined as the ‘principles, norms, rules, and

decision making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue-area' (Krasner, 1982, p. 185). Vatn's (2005) conception of regimes is made up of two main components. Firstly, they consist of the rules and norms which concerns the ownership and access to a resource, and secondly, inherent in regimes are the rules and norms which governs how the resource, and the products obtained from this resource, can be transacted between different actors.

Indeed, regimes are fundamental in shaping the complex web of social and socio-ecological relations in the agroecosystem. The governing forces that shape this complex web have been termed food regimes (Friedman & McMichael, 1989). The concept of food regimes has been most prominently developed through the work of McMichael and Friedman (Friedman & McMichael, 1989; Friedmann, 2005; McMichael, 2000, 2005, 2009) and is defined by Friedman (1993) as a 'rule-governed structure of production and consumption of food on a world scale' (pp. 30-31). The concept of food regimes, in other words, comprises the whole agricultural- and food value chain, from field to plate, and are thus in consonance with the definition of the agroecosystem as 'managed with the intention of producing, distributing, and consuming food, fuel, and fiber' (Cabell & Oelofse, 2012, pp. The Agroecosystem and Resilience, para. 1). Through history, three different food regimes have been identified with each representing time specific political and economic structures (Friedman & McMichael, 1989; McMichael, 2009). The rise and decline of these regimes reflect wider alternating periods of liberal and organized capitalism within world capitalist development. To illustrate these dynamics I will briefly turn towards Polanyi's (1957) "double movement" thesis.

In his seminal work, "The Great Transformation", Polanyi (1957) argue that for the modern capitalist economy to function it needs to organize its three essential elements – labor, land, and money – for sale on the market as fictitious commodities. Fictitious commodities are objects represented as commodities, but which are not produced for sale. This fiction, if left to unregulated markets, Polanyi argues, would lead to a socio-ecological destruction. To alleviate such destructive forces and to ensure the continued existence of the liberal state and capitalist production, Polanyi argues that capitalism contains cyclical phases of unregulated (liberal capitalism) and regulated (organized capitalism) markets. This is what he refers to as the "double movement":

It can be personified as the action of two organizing principles in society, each of them setting itself specific institutional aims, having the support of definite social forces and using its own distinctive methods. The one was the principle of economic liberalism, aiming at the establishment of a self-regulating market, relying on the support of the trading classes, and using largely *laissez-faire* and free trade as its methods; the other was the principle of social protection aiming at the conservation of man and nature as well as productive organization, relying on the varying support of those most immediately affected by the deleterious action of the market—primarily, but not exclusively, the working and the landed classes—and using protective legislation, restrictive associations and other instruments of intervention as its methods (p. 132).

The history of food regimes mirrors these two organizing principles in the capitalist society. The first food regime, which encompassed the period between the 1870s and the 1930s, was embedded in a phase of liberal capitalist development. The expansion of this regime, also coined the colonial-diasporic food regime (Friedmann, 2005), was intrinsically linked with the emerging European industrial sector. The regime was characterized by two sets of food flows, from the colonial territories in the Global South and from the settler states (i.e. US, Canada, Australia), respectively (McMichael, 2009). Under the auspices of British hegemony food flows from the colonial territories were associated with ‘the violent incorporation of colonial lands and peoples into an expanding world capitalist economy’ based on free trade (Fairbairn, 2010; McMichael & Raynolds, 1994, pp. 317-318). This incorporation entailed a widespread re-organization of economic resources structured to fuel industrialization processes in Europe. It relied on first ‘slave-labour-based and later indentured-labour-based plantation systems’ and included the supply of cheap tropical agricultural products such as raw materials (i.e. cotton, timber, rubber) for the industry and commodities for direct consumption (i.e. coffee, tea, cocoa) by the emerging working class (Friedman & McMichael, 1989; Patnaik, 2011, p. 15). The flow of agricultural products from the colonial territories marked an emerging pattern of ‘world-economic specialization’ whereby agricultural production and exports became the defining feature of the Global South (McMichael & Raynolds, 1994, p. 318). Indeed, this marked the historical root of the global division of labor within world capitalism between the peripheral Global South (agriculture and raw materials) and the industrial core of Europe (Friedman & McMichael, 1989; Nilsen, 2013)

The second type of food flows in the first food regime was typified by temperate foods (meat and grains) produced by migrant populations (diaspora) in the settler colonies. Export

production from these areas eventually competed with European agricultural production and became staple provision for the European proletariat (Friedmann, 1993; McMichael & Raynolds, 1994). In fact, settler state farming emerged as the agricultural core within the world economy. It fuelled industrialization processes both in Europe as well as within the settler states. This strategically important provisioning role of the settler colonies incentivized the development of capitalist agriculture based on capital and energy intensive production – a mode of production which would become a mainstream model for agricultural development. Moreover, as this model required the continuous provision of externally sourced agricultural inputs it facilitated a greater integration of capitalism and agriculture and led to the emergence of an agro-industrial complex designed to service farming across the world (McMichael & Raynolds, 1994).

The second food regime, also termed the mercantile-industrial food regime, emerged in the postwar years between the 1950s and 1970s. Whereas the first food regime was based on free trade (between Europe and the colonies) embedded in a liberal phase of capitalist development, the second regime emerged within the context of a government-organized capitalism (Friedman & McMichael, 1989). This organized form of capitalism was characterized by the combination of Keynesian economic policies and the Fordist form of mass production/mass consumption. Whereas the former sought to manage the economy via public investments and national regulation of capital, the latter subsidized mass consumption by the working classes by raising industrial wages (McMichael & Raynolds, 1994). Indeed, the Fordist mode of production and consumption further augmented the global division of labour as increasing demands of processed and luxury goods in the industrial core intensified demand for tropical foods and raw materials from the periphery (McMichael & Raynolds, 1994). The government-organized capitalism materialized in the agricultural sector, first in the US and then in Europe, through market protection and government farm subsidies (including export subsidies) which combined with high-input technology based in the oil economy incentivized production of agricultural surpluses which were dumped on the world market (Fairbairn, 2010; McMichael & Raynolds, 1994).

The subsidized agricultural overproduction in the US and Europe intermeshed with decolonization processes and cold war geopolitical challenges. Firstly, the new generation of independent states in the Global South needed access to cheap food so as to concentrate scarce financial resources for economic modernization and development. Secondly, the US

was desperate to maintain its hegemonic position by containing the global spread of communism (Friedman & McMichael, 1989; McMichael & Raynolds, 1994). Indeed, it was believed that keeping populations of the Global South “well fed” was requisite to this strategy. Combined, this laid the foundation for the “reversal” of ‘world agricultural trade flows by...shipping surplus commodities’ to the Global South via the mechanism of food aid (McMichael & Raynolds, 1994, p. 332). The rationales underpinning this mechanism were on the one hand to secure ‘loyalty against communism’, and on the other to establish new markets in the Global South (McMichael, 2009, p. 141). The ultimate effect of these reversed trade flows was food import dependency in many countries (Friedman & McMichael, 1989). This has undermined food production across most of the Global South as it has been cheaper to import subsidized food from the US and Europe and divert financial resources to industrial projects instead of domestic agriculture. Consequently, many small-scale food producers in the Global South have been outcompeted from agriculture, thus compromising national food self-sufficiency and fostering urbanization (Araghi, 1995; Davis, 2006; McMichael & Raynolds, 1994).

The deployment of agricultural surpluses in the Global South formed the centerpiece of a post-colonial “development project”. According to McMichael (1996 in McMichael, 2009) this project had as its ultimate aim to expand capitalist markets (to contain communism) as the ‘vehicle of ‘national’ economic growth and modernity’ (p. 141). In addition to food aid, which prompted national divestment from agriculture in the Global South, a somewhat contradictory component of the “development project” was agricultural modernization through state intervention (i.e. subsidies, protectionism). This entailed land reforms and the selective global spread of the agro-industrial complex via the Green Revolution, ‘which injected high-yielding varieties of a few cereals (wheat, maize, rice) coupled with the heavy use of subsidized fertilizers, pesticides, irrigation and machinery into the agricultural economies of the Global South’ (Holt Giménez & Shattuck, 2011, p. 110). This “revolution” produced uneven results both between and within countries and have been associated with increased rural class differentiation and land concentration (Holt Giménez & Shattuck, 2011). While rhetorically promoting the idea of national development, McMichael (2009) states that the overall reality of the “development project” was an international expansion of agribusiness value chains of ‘inputs, technologies and foodstuffs, eroding the coherence of national farm sectors’ (p. 146). The food aid complex, in particular, undermined national strategies for agricultural modernization. In the 1980s the international expansion of

agribusinesses gained momentum as the post-war government-organized form of capitalism “removed its gloves” - marked by the removal of the gold standard in the 1970s and lifting restrictions on capital - and reversed to a (neo)liberal phase. This phase saw the emergence of a new rule-governed structure of production and consumption of agricultural- and food products formed through the vision of corporations. It is this corporate food regime which frames the analysis in this thesis.

2.2 Removing the Gloves: The Corporate Food Regime

Carrying legacies of the previous regimes, the corporate food regime came to the fore in the context of the global turn towards neoliberal politics in the 1980s (McMichael, 2005). The emergence of the corporate food regime cannot be understood outside the context of this turn and capitalisms “disembedding” from Keynesian regulations imposed in the post-war period.

The period of organized capitalism in the 1950s and 1960s had provided macroeconomic stability coupled with high economic growth and improved living standards. However, by the late 1960s and early 1970s the period of continuous growth was followed by stagnation eventually throwing the Global North into an economic crisis. In a bid to counter high inflation rates and to revive the US economy the Nixon administration eventually left the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates (the gold standard) in 1973 allowing the dollar to freely fluctuate against other currencies. Meanwhile, this process of unchaining capital coincided with the stockpiling of surplus capital in Northern banks fueled by a combination of Eurodollars stemming from the Marshall Plan and Petrodollars accumulated by the OPEC countries as a result of high oil prices (Hanlon, 2009). The demise of the Bretton Wood system facilitated instabilities in world financial markets and brought further disorder to an economy already in crisis (McMichael & Raynolds, 1994).

In a context of economic crisis and low circulation of capital in the Global North, capital was “pushed” on Global South governments via extremely low interest rates (Hanlon, 2009). This solved two problems; Northern banks secured continued capital circulation while countries in the Global South got access to cheap capital to finance development efforts. By the late 1970s, private loans to Global South governments increased by nearly 50 percent as compared to the early 1970s. However, when the US in 1979 raised interest rates to dramatic levels (“The Volcker Shock”) in a bid to quell inflation and attract capital many countries in

the Global South struggled to fulfill their debt obligations (Harvey, 2006). This eventually culminated into the international debt crisis whereby Global South debt in 1986 amounted to about one trillion US dollars (Nilsen, 2013).

It was in the context of the economic downturn during the 1970s that calls to dismantle government-organized capitalism moved center stage (Harvey, 2006). In this context, neoliberalism emerged as a prescription seeking to reduce government interference in the economy to revive profitability (Hanlon, 2009; Harvey, 2006). It is important to note that while it is often claimed that neoliberal policies entails a reduction, or removal, of the government in economic planning, the more correct interpretation is that neoliberalism fosters a restructuring of the role of governments towards facilitating “good business climates”. This includes

the privatization of assets as a means to open up fresh fields for capital accumulation. Sectors formerly run or regulated by the state (transportation, telecommunications, oil and other natural resources, utilities, social housing, education) are turned over to the private sphere or deregulated. The free mobility of capital between sectors and regions is regarded as crucial to reviving profit rates and all barriers to that free movement (such as planning controls) have to be removed except in those areas crucial to “the national interest” (however that may be conveniently defined). The watchword of the neo-liberal state is, therefore, “flexibility” (in labor markets and in the deployment of investment capital) (Harvey, 2006, p. 35).

The neoliberal predilections formed the centerpiece of policy responses to the international debt crisis. Via debt-conditional Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) neoliberal policies were, in many cases forcefully, exported to the Global South (Harvey, 2006; Patnaik, 2011). The SAPs primarily had two aims. Firstly, they were designed to facilitate a restructuring and repayment of debts that had accumulated across the Global South during the 1970s and 1980s (Hanlon, 2009). Secondly, through the liberalization of trade and privatization of industries and social services, the SAPs sought to establish a less restrictive flow of capital and goods in order to decrease government expenditures and facilitate private investments in important areas of development (Hanlon, 2009). Ultimately, the SAPs were ‘packaged and sold as the new development agenda’ (D. Moyo, 2011, p. 20). However, what they achieved in practice was a stagnation, or even decline, in per capita GDP, setbacks in health and literacy, reduced food security, increased inequality and even a further accumulation of debts owed to foreign creditors (Hanlon, 2009; Harvey, 2006; IMF, 2003; Patnaik, 2011).

The turn to neoliberal politics and economic liberalization opened up new spaces to corporate control in a bid to keep capital accumulation on track in a context of economic crisis (Harvey, 2003, 2006). It has facilitated a restructuring of the food regime in which the consequence has been increased control by corporate elites over land and resources at the expense of small-scale farmers (McMichael, 2005; S. Moyo, 2011; Moyo, 2013). Holt-Giménez & Shattuck (2011) view this corporate dominated food regime to consist of two closely related and simultaneously existing trends – the neoliberal- and the reformist trend. These trends are key foundations of the theoretical context in which SAGCOT emerge. On the one hand they express the regime’s resilience, while on the other hand they reflect a societal Polanyian “double movement” (Holt Giménez & Shattuck, 2011) . By taking this stance, it also follows that the possibility for food regime change depends on the relative power of the societal counter forces that seeks to protection from social, cultural, and ecological abuse. Let me first consider the neoliberal trend of the regime.

2.2.1 The Neoliberal Trend of the Corporate Food Regime

The neoliberal trend of the regime rests firmly on free trade rhetoric. This can be epitomized by the former philanthropist and chairman of the agribusiness giant Cargill, Whitney MacMillan, who suggests that there ‘is a mistaken belief that the greatest agricultural need in the developing world is to develop the capacity to grow food for local consumption. This is misguided. Countries should produce what they produce best – and trade’ (Lynas, 2001 in McMichael, 2005, p. 290). This type of free trade rhetoric inherent in the corporate food regime is anchored in what Harvey (2006) refers to as the neoliberal state. Here the main priority is to cater for corporate interests and facilitate good business climates (see above) to attract investments and stimulate economic growth. This is perceived as ‘the only way to eradicate poverty and to deliver, in the long run, higher living standards to the mass of the population’ (Harvey, 2006, p. 25). The neoliberal state strives to form close alliances with corporate powers to pursue shared goals, often outside of democratic control, through institutional arrangements such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and the World Trade Organization (WTO) (Harvey, 2006; McMichael, 2000, 2005).

The neoliberal trend of the food regime represents a powerful consolidation of actors from governments, industries, philanthropic organizations and global institutions (Campbell, 2009; McMichael, 2000, 2009; Patel, 2012). Their shared interests are institutionalized through the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) and The Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) of the World Trade Organization (WTO). While the AoA placed restrictions on sovereign states to regulate their agricultural sector (especially through agricultural liberalization in the Global South) and maintained Northern agricultural subsidies, the TRIPS sanctions corporations to patent genetic resources which might potentially jeopardize farmers rights to plant crops that have been developed through centuries of experimentation (Holt Giménez & Shattuck, 2011; McMichael, 2000). Together, these institutional arrangements constitute an unprecedented market force with which the prominent actors of the regime capitalize.

The tight links between these actors materialize through a wide range of partnerships and organizations. One such link is PPPs in which risk-sharing arrangements are thought to provide necessary funding to finance agricultural investments. improve coordination, and reduce transaction costs for example related to land acquisition and transport (Borras Jr & Franco, 2010b; McMichael, 2012b). Critics argue that PPPs are favoured by the corporate sector primarily for two reasons: Firstly, they offer corporations an opening to directly determine policies that they can benefit from. Secondly, they enable corporations to direct a substantial part of the risks involved to the public sector, while potential profits are privatized (Harvey, 2006). The regime is held in place and promoted through aligned initiatives by philanthropic organizations (i.e. The Gates Foundation, The Rockefeller Foundation), MNC's (i.e. Monsanto, Yara, Cargill, Unilever, Syngenta, DuPont), International Finance Institutions and donor governments. Some of the latest initiatives stemming from the neoliberal trend include, among others, the New Vision for Agriculture of the WEF and the New Alliance on Food Security and Nutrition of the G8 (NAFSN), both formed in a bid to further entrench the role of MNC's in global food and energy production (Holt Giménez & Shattuck, 2011; McKeon, 2014; Patel, 2012; Perfecto, Vandermeer, & Wright, 2009). These initiatives have direct relevance to SAGCOT in Tanzania. Their shared message is that people's food security is best met through a revival of the Green Revolution and by exposing food distribution to the "touch of the invisible hand" in markets whereby food security is first and foremost determined by purchasing power. Green revolution type technological fixes primarily focussed towards quantities (increasing yields) – often associated with widespread negative

environmental and social consequences - are considered as inevitable if we are to respond to the dual challenges of global food security and ecological security (Holt-Gimenez, Altieri, & Rosset, 2006; Holt Giménez & Shattuck, 2011; McMichael, 2012).

Agricultural modernization, mechanization, and technological advancements are thus key foundations of the regime (Scrinis, 2007). As Holt-Giménez and Shattuck (2011) argue, the neoliberal trend ‘has an unshakable faith in the power of technology’ (p. 116) to meet global food needs now, and in the future. From this perspective, all issues regarding food security are solvable by engineering ourselves around productivity constraints via technological fixes (Darnhofer et al., 2010). In other words, in this technocratic universe nature can always be managed and clear causes and effects can be identified in order to “design” an optimal agroecosystem able to “feed the world”. The “designing“ of these optimal farming systems include the importation and use of external technologies such as seed varieties that promises high yields (i.e. GMOs and hybrid seeds), pesticides and herbicides to control pest outbreaks and nutrient competition, and synthetic fertilizers to enhance soil fertility (Darnhofer et al., 2010; Perfecto et al., 2009). Indeed, these technologies are what only a few well-financed corporations can afford to devise and supply. Moreover, since small-scale traditional farming systems are considered un-progressive within this trend, an expansion of the corporate food regime is associated with the establishment of large-scale mechanized monocultures (Kremen, Iles, & Bacon, 2012). These technological and spatial fixes focussed merely on increasing food quantities are, from the perspective of the neoliberal trend, considered inevitable if we are to respond to the dual challenges of global food- and ecological security.

However, the neoliberal trend of the corporate food regime is widely criticized for its negative social and environmental effects. Holt-Gimenez, Altieri & Rosset (2006) argue that since the neoliberal turn the

forced privatization of food crop marketing boards – which, though flawed, once guaranteed African farmers minimum prices and held food reserves for emergencies – and rural development banks—which gave farmers credit to produce food—have left farmers without financing to grow food or buyers for their produce. Free trade agreements have made it easier for private traders—the only buyers and sellers of food who are left—to import subsidized food from the U.S. and the E.U. than to negotiate with thousands of local farmers. This amounts to “dumping,” which drives local farm prices below the costs of production and drives local farmers out of business (p. 4).

Furthermore, promotion and increased use of fossil fuel dependent chemicals in agriculture has led to an encroachment on nature which is at odds with ecological processes. Such encroachment can be exemplified by the “pesticide treadmill” – the evolution of resistance among pests necessitates continually larger amounts of pesticide - or synthetic fertilizers interference with natural cycling processes (S. R. Gliessman, 2007). These technologies, often associated with green revolution techniques, is ultimately disconnecting agricultural production from local natural capital and undermines the natural resource base on which not only the agroecosystem depends, but even the overall earth system (Perfecto et al., 2009). Moreover, the adoption of advanced technologies and the deployment of mechanized large-scale farms are increasingly moving control of global food, fibre and fuel production from those working the lands, towards MNCs. In this context we must consider Harvey’s concept of accumulation by dispossession (Harvey, 2003).

Accumulation by dispossession is derived from Marx’s concept of primitive accumulation. Primitive accumulation was adopted by Marx to help explain how capitalist production came into being. Harvey (2003) summarizes Marx’s conception of primitive accumulation as an original form of appropriation which sought to privatize the means of production, such as land, to create a class of surplus landless proletariats `and then releasing the land into the privatized mainstream of capital accumulation` (p. 149). As Marx argued, the ‘expropriation of the agricultural producer, of the peasant, from the soil’ was the basis of the whole process (Marx 1867 in Akram-Lodhi, 2007, p. 1443). Harvey (2003) elaborates on Marx’s conception and argues that rather than primitive accumulation being just an initial stage it is a continuous process and a key survival mechanism for capitalism to secure further growth (Akram-Lodhi, 2007). Accumulation by dispossession, then, refers to the acquisition of land and expulsion of indigenous populations in the name of efficiency (i.e. large-scale farms); the conversion of various forms of property rights; suppression of alternative forms of production; and to colonial, neo-colonial, and imperial processes of appropriation of natural resources (Harvey, 2003).

Since the global turn towards neoliberalism land appropriations in the Global South has gained momentum on a scale not experienced since the colonial heydays. Whereas the colonial-diasporic food regime violently appropriated colonial lands to produce tropical food exports for Europe, accumulation by dispossession in the corporate food regime occurs via the financial power held by corporations in concert with corporate-friendly governments and

donor institutions. The sustained reassertion of land dispossession during neoliberal globalization has made Araghi (2000) call it “the great global enclosure of our time”. As Araghi (2000) argue:

‘Institutionalizing agro-exporting regimes, deregulating land markets, and drastically cutting farm subsidies and price supports are measures that have forced millions of subsistence-level rural petty producers to compete with (heavily subsidized) transnational food corporations and highly capitalized producers in the industrial world. That is, labor intensive local agriculture are pitted against globally organized agro-industrial corporations’

Hence, as world market forces have increasingly penetrated rural areas, millions of small-scale farmers across the Global South have been rendered landless. It has given rise to a de-peasantization process fuelling migration of “surplus populations” to less fertile lands or to urban slums (Araghi, 1995, 2000; Davis, 2006; Li, 2010; McMichael, 2012a). Here it is important to point out, as White, Borras Jr, Hall, Scoones & Wolford (2012) do, that “surplus populations” do not invoke Malthusian theories of overpopulation relative to nature’s capacity to provide, but rather there is a “constructed surplus” relative to capitals’ requirements for labour. The emptying of rural land is illustrated by the demographic milestone of 2007 when the majority of the world’s population became urban. Calculations show that as much as two-thirds of urban population growth between 1975 and 2000 is attributable to rural dispossession (Araghi, 2009). Currently, a convergence of dynamics around food, energy, climate change and finance has contributed to a further upsurge in accumulation by dispossession popularized by the term “land grabbing” (Mousseau & Mittal, 2011; Patnaik, 2011; White et al., 2012). Several scholars, researchers and organization have in recent years uncovered a wide range of land deals whereby local populations are forced to relinquish their land rights to open corporate investment space (Cotula, Vermeulen, Leonard, & Keeley, 2009; GRAIN, 2008; Mousseau & Mittal, 2011). While the extent of these deals is significant, it is as of yet no reliable data on how much land that has actually been acquired.

Nonetheless, via processes of accumulation by dispossession farmers’ autonomy from global market forces are reduced as land, seeds (i.e. patented germplasm), cultures of production, and, in the longer term, local knowledge systems are released into the privatized mainstream of capital accumulation (McMichael, 2009, 2012b; Patel, 2012). As Li (2010) points out, it is the places and resources, and not the people, that are valued in these processes as rural areas are seen to contain resources of untapped potential (World Bank, 2007). This is among the reasons why thousands of Indian farmers have taken to commit suicide (Mohanty, 2005;

Shiva, Jafri, Emani, & Pande, 2000). In the state of Andra Pradesh, suicides among farmers increased from 233 in 1998 to 2600 in 2002, whereas in Maharashtra suicide rates tripled between 1995 and 2005 from 1083 to 3926 (Patnaik, 2004 in Bello & Baviera, 2010). In response to the negative social and environmental externalities set out above the corporate food regime institutes mild reforms to make the regime less harmful.

2.2.2 The Reformist Trend of the Corporate Food Regime

During the second half of the 1990s global neoliberal politics underwent a restructuring process towards what has been termed “inclusive” neoliberalism (D. Porter & Craig, 2004). This restructuring came against the backdrop of the failures of the neoliberal project (i.e. the SAPs) and the widespread opposition towards it. In short the “inclusive” neoliberalism seeks to incorporate the poor in the global economy and institute protective social reforms for the poorest and most marginalized in the process (D. Porter & Craig, 2004). In so doing, neoliberalism is given a “human face” by responding to social demands for reforms while the underlying neoliberal order is held intact. The emergence of a reformist trend in the corporate food regime reflects this turn moving towards a more regulated neoliberal order in global capitalism.

Hence, the reformist trend emerge in the context of a Polanyian “double movement” inherent in society (Polanyi, 1957). By this I do not mean that the reformist trend represents a “double movement” process of re-embedding the market in society. Rather it appears as a mild response to societal forces demanding changes in the structure of production and consumption of food on a world scale. Such forces originate in transnational social movements (i.e. agrarian based farmers’ movements) and prompt the corporate food regime to restructure its components and institute some of their demands to make it less harmful (Holt Giménez & Shattuck, 2011). Indeed, this dynamic contributes to pre-empt some of the critique directed towards the corporate food regime and is also an expression of its flexibility. As Harvey (2006) writes, when capitalism encounter constraints in society or nature, ‘the elastic powers of capital’ modifies to secure continued accumulation (p. 81). The adaptive capacity of the corporate food regime allows it to adjust without undergoing structural transformation. Thus, the mission of the reformist trend is essentially no different from that of

the neoliberal trend; ‘the reproduction of the corporate food regime’ (Holt Giménez & Shattuck, 2011, p. 115).

There is a dynamic relationship between the neoliberal and the reformist trend. This means that specific initiatives of the regime may contain both trends at the same time. The institutions driving forward the reformist trend and the technologies they promote is essentially the same as in the neoliberal trend, albeit reformed so as to internalize some of the negative externalities produced by the regime into existing market structures (Holt Giménez & Shattuck, 2011). From this perspective the negative externalities associated with the regime is parsed into components which can be addressed via technocratic measures.

Friedman (2005) offers a strong critique of this de-politicized approach. She views the mild reforms adopted by the corporate food regime as a type of “green capitalism” where ‘a new round of accumulation appears to be emerging in the agrofood sector, based on selective appropriation of demands by environmental movements, and including issues pressed by fair trade, consumer health, and animal welfare activists’ (p. 229). Through these selective appropriations the corporate food regime is able to legitimize its continued expansion. Examples includes regulatory and certification systems such as the principles on Responsible Agricultural Investments, the Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests, roundtables for sustainable production of palm oil, soy, and biofuels and various fair-trade and organic food certification schemes (Borras Jr & Franco, 2010b; Friedmann, 2005; Holt Giménez & Shattuck, 2011).

Moreover, in a bid to offset accumulation by dispossession the reformist trend advocates a value-chain approach to agricultural development in which small-scale farmers becomes integrated in global value-chains for example through various forms of contract farming. McMichael (2013) writes the value-chain project in the contemporary context is a ‘corporate vision recycled by development institutions eager to recover and reproduce their legitimacy in overseeing world food security’ (p. 672). He continues by stating that the value-chain concept ‘proclaims a practical solution to food ‘deficits’ via an implicit normative reference to ‘valuing’ producers hitherto marginal to world markets’ (p. 672). The value-chain approach in other words promises increased productivity and rising incomes for small-scale farmers. However, an inherent part of it is the “chain” component through which asymmetric power relationships mediated by debt develops between small-scale farmers and corporations

potentially stifling decision making and eroding the autonomy of the former. Such relationships are established via corporations provision of farming inputs including seeds, chemicals and credit (McMichael, 2013).

The continued reproduction of the corporate food regime relies on the simultaneous existence of neoliberal and reformist trends. As pressure mounts to adopt less socially and environmentally harmful production and trade alternatives, the regime has the capacity to re-organize by undertaking minor adjustments and institute measures such as those mentioned above. More than being a “new round of accumulation”, the “green capitalism” Friedman (2005) describes is rather a natural development of capitalism and an expression of its flexibility (Harvey, 2006; Polanyi, 1957). By promoting notions of win-wins, where both investors and local farmers (and the environment) benefit through new contracting arrangements, an expansion of the corporate food regime is by some interpreted as an opportunity rather than a threat (Deininger, 2011; Von Braun & Meinzen-Dick, 2009). Subject to mild regulations, the reformist trend gives the corporate food regime a green disguise pre-empting structural change. Having discussed the theoretical context through which the SAGCOT initiative emerges, the next chapter will present a brief overview of agricultural development in Tanzania since the 1960s until the formation of SAGCOT.

3.0 Background: Agriculture in Tanzania – From Independence to SAGCOT

Since achieving its independence in 1961 agricultural development policies in Tanzania have developed from a state centred approach to one which has been increasingly geared towards liberalized markets. In this chapter I will first briefly outline the main features characterizing agricultural development in Tanzania between 1961 and until the mid 1980s. This will be followed by a description of key aspects of the contemporary policy context and drivers underpinning the current SAGCOT initiative.

3.1 Agriculture and Development from 1961 until 1990s

In 1962, the president of a newly independent Tanzania, Mwalimu (teacher) Julius Kambarage Nyerere, in his inaugural speech outlined his first steps towards building a socialist society:

‘All of us have agreed that we must establish a true socialist society [...] Two important instruments we shall use for this purpose are the Government itself and the Co-operative Movement. I would like to see every single one of us a teacher and an instrument of Ujamaa’ (Nyerere, 1966, p. 185).

What Nyerere envisioned in his speech that day has very much shaped the agricultural policy context in post-colonial Tanzania through the overall message of Ujamaa (African socialism). This section will start off with a description of the early years of independence characterized by what Ponte (2002) refers to as a combination of “transformation” and “improvement” to agricultural development and modernization. Next, I will turn my attention towards the Arusha declaration of 1967 which recognized Ujamaa as national development policy dominated by heavy government intervention in agriculture and the well known villagization programme. Lastly, I will look into the early “crisis years” of the 1980s eventually leading to the (neo)liberalization of Tanzanian agriculture, which continues into the contemporary context in which SAGCOT appears.

The period leading up to the Arusha declaration aimed towards agricultural modernization at the rural community level – where more than 95 percent of the population resided - by a strengthening of extension services and cooperatives. The “transformation” and “improvement” approaches that Ponte (2002) refers to was actually based on advice given to

Tanzania by the World Bank in 1961. The “transformation” approach entailed the establishment of new rural settlements in what was considered as land abundant areas. A pilot settlement scheme in the Songea District in South-Western Tanzania were designed to accommodate about 250 households to primarily produce export crops based on intensive farming practices under the direction of government officials (Mapolu, 1990; Ponte, 2002). Alongside this “transformation” approach, the “improvement” approach aspired modernization and to raise agricultural output using existing social structures. The primary means to achieve these improvements were the expansion of extension services, as well as increasing the role of co-operatives in terms of credit and input supply. In addition, and perhaps more importantly, by replacing to role of Asian Merchants in marketing (Mapolu, 1990; Ponte, 2002).

By 1966 it had become clear that neither the “transformation” approach, nor the “improvement” approach had produced any substantial results. The “transformation” approach was associated with enormous costs as compared to the financial return granted by gains in agricultural output. Moreover, Mapolu (1990) reports that under this scheme resettled farmers experienced reduced autonomy through which the farmers ‘tended to see themselves as government employees rather than independent farmers receiving government technical assistance’. Under this scheme the government controlled both the means of production as well as outputs, while the farmer’s role was reduced solely to supply labour. It was thus difficult to ensure buy in at the local level, lack of which eventually prompted many farmers to withdraw from the settlement schemes (Mapolu, 1990; Ponte, 2002) . As to the “improvement” approach it facilitated some expansion of areas put under production and subsequently increased outputs. However, this increase was primarily due to climatic conditions and prices, rather than extension services which formed the centrepiece of the approach. It is also stated that gains which were ascribed to the approach, were captured by already well-off plantation owners and commercial farmers (Coulson, 1982; Ponte, 2002). The increased role of co-operatives envisioned under the “improvement” approach sought to replace the dominating role in marketing held by Asian merchants (Havnevik, 1993). However, while Asian dominance might have been undermined, marketing procedures of agricultural products for various reasons deteriorated under this scheme (Ponte, 2002)

The agricultural development context in Tanzania during the 1960s was characterized by the gradual increase of government control of agencies, cooperatives and trading institutions. These moves eventually became enshrined in the Arusha declaration of 1967 which outlined

the main principles that were to guide the socialist development in Tanzania. Sundet (2006) argues that this declaration is probably the most influential policy statement in the history of Tanzania. While Nyerere's ideas of ujamaa were theorized and published in 1962, the Arusha declaration made ujamaa a formally recognized national policy. It sought to bring about development through self-reliance by utilizing, and nationalizing, the rich diversity of assets and resources found within the Tanzanian borders (Nyerere, 1979; Ponte, 2002). The idea found in the previous "transformation" approach of moving people into villages remained an integral component of ujamaa.

Through "Ujamaa vijijini" (literally translated to socialist villages) the government sought to reorganize the relatively scattered rural settlement pattern to one organized around the "socialist village" (Maghimbi, Lokina, & Senga, 2011). The aim of the approach was to develop and modernize rural areas by combining the old and traditional with new and modern technology and knowledge. The government envisioned that by relocating and concentrating rural populations in villages under the centralized provision of social services human and economic development would thrive (Maghimbi et al., 2011; Ponte, 2002). The new villages were conceived of as agricultural producers' cooperative institutions in which collective farming operations were encouraged so as to achieve economies of scale to adopt modern farming techniques (Mapolu, 1990; Sundet, 2006). Whereas the new villages were conceived of as independent farming institutions, agricultural activities were to a considerable degree centrally planned and executed by the government (Mapolu, 1990).

In the early stages "Ujamaa vijijini" was a voluntary scheme. Bernstein (1981) reports that between 1967 and 1973 the total population living in new villages increased from half a million to two million, or 15 percent of the rural population. Impatient with the slow progress, Nyerere and the ruling party Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) in 1973 made villagization compulsory (Shivji, 1998) as epitomized Nyerere's famous edict: 'to live in villages is an order' (Sundet, 2006). This order facilitated military style operations eventually leading to the resettlement of millions of small-scale farmers and pastoralists into the new villages (Maghimbi et al., 2011; Sundet, 2006). It is reported that between 1973 and 1976 five million, or fifty percent of the rural population, had been relocated to new villages (Ponte, 2002), which meant that the whole rural population of 13 million in 1976 were residing in 8320 villages Maghimbi et al., (2011).

The forced villagization campaign is generally thought to have had negative effects on agriculture in the short term (Maghimbi et al., 2011). There are too multiple reasons for this which cannot be provided ample space here. I will therefore confine myself to briefly mention three factors that have been pointed out in the literature. Firstly, forced relocation into new villages had disruptive effects on the lives of farmers. Moving, rebuilding and resettling households demanded a considerable amount of time and effort. Moreover, people were often settled on land of poorer quality than before, while concentrated settlements in village centres increased walking distances to farming fields and to areas for the collection of firewood and water (Ponte, 2002; Sundet, 2006). In addition, the promised provision of social services also failed to materialize due to financial constraints. Secondly, the strong emphasis on collective farming in the villages is said to have been lacking appropriate incentives for individual farmers (Ponte, 2002). Maghimbi et al., (2011) links this with what they writes is the ‘typical socialist problem of how to measure the individual’s productivity and creativity’ (p. 34). Instead of making farmers work harder, the collective farming approach, Maghimbi et al., (2011) argue, made farmers put less effort into the project which in turn negatively affected output.² The third negative factor that is widely pointed out is that resettlement of people were done without paying attention to already existing customary land tenure systems in the newly established villages. This resulted in great confusion about land rights and undermined customary land holders (Maghimbi et al., 2011; Sundet, 2006). Some have stated that “ujamaa vijijini” actually resulted in dispossession of customary land on a scale greater than during colonial times (Maghimbi et al., 2011; Shivji, 1998). Nevertheless, on the positive side, the villagization campaign provided Tanzania with a localized administrative and political structure with an elected Village Council and a Village Assembly made up of all adult members living in the village. The roles of these institutional arrangements were set out in the Village Act of 1975 and provide the overall framework for the administrative unit of villages in the contemporary context (Sundet, 2006).

The failure of villagization, coupled with a wide range of other both external and internal factors contributed to a deep economic crisis in Tanzania during the late 1970s and early 1980s. In spite of the crisis – and amidst growing international pressure for liberal economic reforms – the government did not make any far reaching adjustments to its economic policies. Nyerere argued that the conditions set out by the World Bank and the IMF for future financial support undermined Tanzania’s sovereignty and did not address the real causes behind the crisis (Ponte, 2002). However, eventually the crisis reached a point where the country had no

choice but to give in for the pressure from the international finance institutions. Just after president Nyerere's resignation Tanzania went into negotiations with the IMF about economic reforms. This eventually culminated in the 1986 agreement after which the first three year Economic Recovery Program (ERP) was launched (Hyden & Karlstrom, 1993; Ponte, 2002). The structural adjustments set out in the ERP marked the start of the liberalization era in Tanzania.

In the following years Tanzania undertook a wide range of policy changes in the agricultural sector in line with the structural adjustments recommended by the IMF and the World Bank. Substituting the previous policies based on the vision of ujamaa the new paradigm was dictated by the teachings of liberalization and privatization where the role of the government in agriculture, and in the economy in general, was to be reduced (Maghimbi et al., 2011; Skarstein, 2010). Instead it was considered necessary to increase the working space for the private sector and ensure that resources were optimally allocated to the most efficient and profitable producers so as to achieve development and increased well-being for the population. However, providing a detailed analysis of the effects of liberalization in the agricultural sector, Skarstein (2010) concludes that structural adjustments did not improve the situation for Tanzania's small-scale farmers or for the agricultural sector in general. Furthermore, Ponte (2002) and Skarstein (2010) show how the production of food crops actually stagnated or declined after liberalization as compared to pre-liberalization years of 1979-1984.

Nevertheless, government withdrawal from the economy and further liberalization continued to be the main mantra in this post-ujamaa environment. As Sundet (2006) writes, during the early 1990s 'ujamaa was out and investment promotion the new buzz word' (p. 8). This vision was manifested through the Tanzania Investment Act No.26 of 1997 which established the Tanzania Investment Center (TIC) whose purpose is to be a one-stop centre for investors and to co-ordinate, encourage, promote and facilitate investments in Tanzania. It was generally believed that agricultural transformation and poverty reduction could be achieved by opening up for investments and give more room for private agribusinesses - a belief that grew stronger entering towards the new millennia.

3.2 From Vision 2025 to SAGCOT

The turn during the mid-1980s towards development strategies that were in consonance with a market led economy were in Tanzanian policy circles seen to create a need for a more long term vision for development. This need were to a large degree prompted by the three year structural reform strategies, or SAPs, which were considered as too short sighted lacking a vision around which the country could unite. The former MP, Nassoro Malocho stated that `the whole philosophy of working for the country's development and that of its people [during SAP`s] started losing direction and as a result the country lost its vision which had originally been based on long-term development objectives (URT, n.d, p. xi). To fill this empty space the Tanzanian government during the mid-1990s started the development of what was to become known as Vision 2025.

The Vision 2025 was intended to complement and underpin the SAP`s and to form a long term philosophy that would build national unity and cohesion. It is centered around the following main features:

A Tanzanian who is born today will be fully grown up, will have joined the working population and will probably be a young parent by the year 2025. Similarly, a Tanzanian who has just joined the labour force will be preparing to retire by the year 2025. What kind of society will have been created by such Tanzanians in the year 2025? What is envisioned is that the society these Tanzanians will be living in by then will be a substantially developed one with a high quality livelihood. Abject poverty will be a thing of the past. In other words, it is envisioned that Tanzanians will have graduated from a least developed country to a middle income country by the year 2025 with a high level of human development. The economy will have been transformed from a low productivity agricultural economy to a semi-industrialized one led by modernized and highly productive agricultural activities which are effectively integrated and buttressed by supportive industrial and service activities in the rural and urban areas. A solid foundation for a competitive and dynamic economy with high productivity will have been laid. Consistent with this vision, Tanzania of 2025 should be a nation imbued with five main attributes; High quality livelihood; Peace, stability and unity; Good governance; a well educated and learning society; and a competitive economy capable of producing sustainable growth and shared benefits (URT, n.d, p. 2).

It is also worth mentioning how Vision 2025 defined the state of the agricultural sector. In addition to low and erratic productivity, the sector is described as “largely untransformed” and dependent on ”backward technology”. Many of the same type of arguments fuel contemporary rationales for SAGCOT implementation within the overall context of the corporate food regime. Indeed, characterizations of traditional African agricultural practices as “backward” and “underproductive” are the rule for those advocating a green revolution in Tanzania and beyond (Scoones et al., 2014; Sulle & Nelson, 2009)

In a quest to concretize and operationalize the philosophy of Vision 2025 the Tanzanian government in 2005 released a national strategy called *Mkakati Wa Kukuza Uchumi Na Kupunguza Umaskini Tanzania (MKUKUTA)*.³ The MKUKUTA aims to accelerate economic growth and reduce poverty. It centers around five year development plans which were considered to be better equipped than the previous three year plans to mobilize and implement resources as well as monitoring their poverty reduction impact. The MKUKUTA is organized around three clusters: (1) Growth and reduction of income poverty; (2) Improved quality of life and social well-being; and (3) Governance and accountability (URT, 2005, 2010b).

The three clusters sets out a whole range of different sub-goals, strategies and intervention packages to achieve the overarching aims of economic growth and poverty reduction. Among others, the clusters were specifically aimed towards increasing agricultural growth rates from five percent in 2002 to ten percent in 2010 by increasing areas under irrigation, increase agricultural production by investing in more productive technological packages in agriculture and improve access to support services (URT, 2005, 2010b). Moreover, and interestingly, they also mention to increase awareness on the use of eco-agricultural techniques and traditional knowledge – a type of rhetoric much less communicated in later SAGCOT documents. Elsewhere, commercialized agricultural sector and pursuit of policies that attracts agricultural investments, including public-private partnerships and the establishment of development corridors, are underscored interventions (URT, 2005, 2010b).

While the MKUKUTA did not focus exclusively on agriculture, it was nonetheless (at least in rhetoric's) seen as the most important area for intervention. Thus, the following year (in 2006), as the current President, Jakaya Kikwete, entered into office, the Agricultural Sector Development Strategy (ASDS), and subsequently, the Agricultural Sector Development Program (ASDP) was finalized. While the former was the policy, the latter stakes out its 'action plan for a green revolution in Tanzania' according to the President himself (SAGCOT, 2011, p. 4). To achieve this, the ASDP has two formal objectives: (1) enable farmers to have better access to and use of agricultural knowledge, technologies, marketing systems and infrastructure, and (2) increase private sector investment in agriculture based on an improved regulatory and policy environment (Cooksey, 2012). Through these objectives the program aims to increase farmers' incomes, improve food security and sustain agricultural growth rates of at least 5% (Haug & Hella, 2013). Of the total budget of US\$

1,780 million over 8 years the market and private sector accounts for only two percent which indicates that the second objective of the program is weakly emphasized (Cooksey, 2012). Indeed, the weak private sector involvement made donor agencies and others to perceive ASDP as too state centered dubbing it a `traditional government centered, productivity-enhancing program with the private sector playing the role of contractor` (Cooksey, 2012, p. 9; 2013; SAGCOT, 2011). Thus, rather than focusing on markets and value chains ASDP primarily emphasize state support for inputs (Cooksey, 2012). This observation led Haug and Hella (2013) to label ASDP as a “fertilizer subsidy program”. However, as external interest in African agriculture started to mount towards the second half of the 00s, partly as a result of what has become known as the triple F-crisis, Tanzanian agricultural policy have increasingly turned towards the private sector.

The interconnected triple crisis of food, fuel and finance of 2008 made the world increasingly aware of the vulnerabilities, and failures, of the prevailing capitalist system. Firstly, the food price spikes in 2007/2008 plunged millions of people into hunger, and subsequently catalyzed food riots in numerous countries worldwide (Berazneva & Lee, 2013; Bush, 2010). Secondly, rising and increasingly volatile oil prices, coupled with evidence of global peak oil have created new incentives for non oil-producing countries to invest in the production of agro-fuels (Skarstein, 2011; IEA, 2011). Further compounding this was EU’s policy aiming at a mandatory 10 percent proportion of fuels used in transport to come from renewables by 2020 (European Commission, 2006, p. 10), a move which led to a guaranteed market for agro-fuels in Europe. Thirdly, the global financial crisis has led to a “rediscovery” of agriculture within international investment circles. Farmland investments are increasingly viewed upon as more secure in the long term, especially in the context of rising demands, and subsequently prices, for soft commodities (Cotula et al., 2009). The common feature of these interconnected crises is that they are perceived to constitute a window of opportunity. As one of the key Tanzanian stakeholders of the SAGCOT initiative stated in an interview:

(...) out of the crisis in 2008 the world started thinking about alternative ways to produce food. When you know that 60% of all arable land in the world is in Africa, the food crisis was also an opportunity to the continent and to us in Tanzania.⁴

The triple F-crisis has contributed in putting agriculture at the forefront of the international development and investment agenda (Hall, 2011; McMichael, 2011). The WEF illustrates this new opportunity amidst crises in its New Vision for Agriculture by stating that a projected

global population of nine billion people in 2050 requires leaders of business, government, civil society, farmers organizations, development partners and other groups to work together to deliver food security, environmental sustainability and economic opportunity through agriculture (WEF, n.d). Moreover, the philanthropic power house of Bill and Melinda Gates (the Gates Foundation) states 'that investments in agriculture are the best weapons against hunger and poverty...' (Gates Foundation, 2011), while famous American author and investor, Jim Rogers, on his hand, puts it more bluntly; 'If you want to get rich, you should be investing in farmland' (Miller, 2012).

Amidst a growing investor interest in farmland in the wake of the triple F-crisis the G8 in 2009 launched the L'Aquila Food Security Initiative. The initiative highlights the importance of increased food production, improved access to food and empowerment of small-scale farmers to gain access to enhanced inputs, technologies, credits and markets. As part of the initiative the G8 countries pledged to mobilize US\$20 billion in public financing for food security (Official statement, 2009). The United Nations Special Rapporteur on Food, Olivier De Schutter, states that while the L'Aquila statement articulated an important shift in the understanding of hunger at the level of rhetoric, what has happened on the ground is showing 'more land concentration [in fewer hands], more private investment in large-scale agriculture, more expensive technologies emerging which only better-off farmers will be able to afford in the long term' (Chandler, 2012)

Meanwhile, these external developments occurred alongside adjustments to internal agricultural policy in Tanzania. While the ASDP was criticized for putting the private sector in the background, the Kilimo Kwanza (agriculture first) initiative puts the private sector at the fore. The initiative, which was launched by the president in August 2009, is organized around ten pillars through which the aim is to commercialize and modernize the agricultural sector through PPPs. It specifically aims to mobilize the private sector by creating incentives for investments and also seek to increase the amount of land available for large-scale commercial agriculture - most of which is bound to come from village land areas given that about 70 percent of all land in Tanzania is Village Land (Boudreaux, 2012; German, Schoneveld, & Mwangi, 2011; Tanzania National Business Council, 2009). According to Cooksey (2013), Kilimo Kwanza represents a clear break from the state-centered and small-farmer focused ASDP. Despite President Kikwete's repeated assurances that Kilimo Kwanza is putting small-scale farmers in the frontline, Cooksey (2013) argues that the initiative

promotes the interests of large-scale farmers. Indeed, there is apprehension that this will eventually undermine the role of small-scale farmers and pastoralists and their importance as food producers (Bergius, 2012). Furthermore, the simultaneous existence of two apparently competing agricultural policies (ASDP and Kilimo Kwanza) has created a challenging and confusing situation as to what type of policy is actually preferred.




Figure 3-1: SAGCOT Policy Contexts and Drivers

The year following the launch of Kilimo Kwanza Tanzania became a signatory of the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme compact (CAADP). CAADP is the agricultural program of the New Partnership for Africa's Development, which in turn is a program of the African Union (AU). CAADP was endorsed at the AU assembly in Maputo in 2003 and is said to be an Africa-led initiative which aims to rationalize and revitalize African agriculture for economic growth, poverty reduction and food security. More specifically it aims to increase agricultural productivity with at least six percent per year and increase public investment in agriculture with ten percent of national budgets.⁵ However, as Cooksey (2013) notes, the CAADP process remained stalled until September 2008 when external donors, led

by USAID, pledged financial support to the program. From that time on, the G8 countries, and especially the US, increased its influence within the CAADP. Cooksey (2013) writes that

...this proved to be the point at which the American camel stuck its head into the African (Union's) tent. From 2008 to date, CAADP's 'African-owned' policy narrative has been steadily sidelined by the US-led G8 mobilisation of (support for) global agribusiness, with assistance from aid agencies and philanthropies (p. 28).

Some few months before signing the CAADP compact in September 2010, president Kikwete launched the SAGCOT initiative (May, 2010) at the World Economic Forum Africa summit in Dar Es Salaam. At the summit he boldly described the initiative as the largest agricultural undertaking in the history of Tanzania (The Guardian, 2011). Passing through some of the most fertile lands in the country, SAGCOT is said to be offering great development potential by linking small-scale farmers with global agribusinesses through 'hub and outgrower' arrangements in which smallholders more easily can access inputs, value-adding facilities and markets (SAGCOT, 2011). The initiative is put forward as a way of implementing Kilimo Kwanza, and is said to be about setting 'Kilimo Kwanza in motion'.⁶

With SAGCOT now being brought to the forefront of the country's agricultural development strategy, it appears as if Kilimo Kwanza, with its strong focus on the private sector and agribusinesses, is given priority, leaving the ASDP more in the background. Given the increased influence of the US and the G8 in CAADP since 2008 (through the mobilization of global agribusinesses) it would thus seem natural to align CAADP in Tanzania with Kilimo Kwanza and SAGCOT. However, this was not the case. Instead CAADP was integrated into the ASDP through Tanzania Agriculture and Food Security Investment Plan (TAFSIP) in 2011 (Cooksey, 2013). According to Cooksey (2013), the 'CAADP/TAFSIP challenges the "private-sector" emphasis of KK [Kilimo Kwanza] and virtually returns agricultural policy-making to the state-centred, small-holder oriented format of the ASDP' (p 17). When the NAFSN initiative of the G8 in 2012 pledged with financial support to agricultural development within the SAGCOT area they committed to align their investments with CAADP/TAFSIP, despite the latter's turn away from Kilimo Kwanza. Cooksey (2013) notes that it is not clear in what ways the CAADP/TAFSIP will accommodate the new involvement of the US and the G8 in their bid to expand the corporate food regime in Tanzania. Instead, NAFSNs endorsement of the CAADP/TAFSIP at the expense of Kilimo Kwanza can be explained by political considerations. As Cooksey (2013) argues, because the NAFSN

initiative covers the whole of Africa it is politically more legitimate and palatable to support the official CAADP framework. Despite this, it remains clear that the activities proposed by the NAFSN is more in line with Kilimo Kwanza, with the development of SAGCOT being singled out as a priority area for ‘high-impact investments’ to reduce poverty and address what it states are ‘the underlying causes of food insecurity’ (Cooksey, 2013, NAFSN, p 2). Before moving on to part two, the final chapter in this part will set out to discuss the research framework and methods underpinning this thesis as well as describing the study area.

4.0 Research Framework, Study Area and Methods

In its broadest sense, the practice of undertaking research refers to the processes involved in gathering data, information and facts for the advancement of knowledge. In the social sciences such processes may take a variety of forms. Hence, as a starting point it is important to acknowledge a central distinction inherent in social science research. That is the distinction between the concepts of methodology and methods. Whereas methodology refers to the general process of undertaking research and how we can generate knowledge, research methods refers to the specific body of techniques that are adopted in a research project to collect data (Howell, 2013; Sartori, 1970). Deriving from this, this chapter will proceed in three parts. First, I will briefly discuss the overarching research framework that underpins this thesis. Secondly, I will present the study area under focus of attention. And thirdly, a considerable share of this chapter will be devoted to describe and discuss the specific methods that were adopted to generate and analyse data

4.1 Overarching Research Framework

This thesis draws primarily on research carried out in Tanzania from August to December 2013. It is based on a qualitative research methodology and its associated methods. This approach has been chosen in order to understand a specific phenomenon and its effects in a specific context. That is, the expansion of the corporate food regime via the SAGCOT initiative in Tanzania. While a quantitative approach could provide interesting additional insights to certain aspects of this expansion, being a solitary researcher with a limited amount of time has made such techniques difficult to adopt for this project. Moreover, with the SAGCOT initiative still in a very early stage, it is difficult to generate quantifiable data at this point. By adopting a qualitative research methodology I strive towards 'understanding parts of the world more or less as they are experienced and understood in the everyday lives of people who "live them out"' (Crang & Cook, 2007, p. 1). In other words, I seek answers to questions such as "how", "what" and "for whom" in the context of the expansion of the corporate food regime in Tanzania.

This thesis builds upon the notion that knowledge, or facts, cannot stand on their own independent of individuals. Rather they are invariably linked to the subjective understanding of the world people derive via social interaction (Howell, 2013). This notion is anchored in

the social constructivist ontological and interpretivist epistemological basis which often underpins qualitative research strategies. Social constructivist ontology denies that social entities can exist externally to individuals. Instead, they are constantly created and perceived via individuals own contextual interpretation. This ontology invariably affects *how* we can know things about reality. Thus, interpretivist epistemology in qualitative research maintains that knowledge emerge via a deep understanding of social reality and the context in which it is embedded. Applied to this thesis, it is thus likely to be more than only one “factual social reality” regarding the expansion of the corporate food regime via SAGCOT depending on the social context (i.e. environmental activists, the poor farmer, a government leader, or company executive). Before discussing how these ontological and epistemological assumptions have influenced this research project and its trustworthiness, the next sub-chapter will present the study area where fieldwork has been carried out.

4.2 Study Area

The southern corridor in Tanzania where the SAGCOT initiative is implemented makes up about one-third of the total mainland area (figure 4-1). The total SAGCOT area comprises about 37 million hectares of land, whereby 7.5 million hectares is considered to be arable (SAGCOT, 2011). The designated SAGCOT area is home to a diverse collection of ethnic groups and has a total population of approximately 11 million people – comprising 25% of the total mainland population. By 2025 it is predicted that this population will increase to about 16 million. While real population density within the corridor is relatively low, large areas remain uninhabited due to a demanding topography and protected areas (URT, 2013b). Agriculture is the leading economic activity within the corridor with rice, maize, cassava and pulses being the principal crops for small-scale farmers. In addition, pastoralism is also widespread within the SAGCOT area. Livestock farming includes 2.5 million cattle, 0.8 million goats, and 3.4 million poultry (SAGCOT, 2011).

Tanzania’s location just south of the equator determines the complex and variable climatic conditions in the corridor. Whereas the coastal areas are characterized by their warm and humid tropical climate, areas further inland are more temperate with temperatures ranging from 20 to 23 degrees year round (URT, 2013b). For the purpose of this thesis I conducted fieldwork in south-central Tanzania, within what has been termed the Kilombero cluster.




Figure 4-1: Map of SAGCOT area (URT, 2013b)

The Kilombero cluster is located within the Kilombero sub-basin. It has a highly variable climate between the lowland areas and the highland, and is hot and humid in the valley. The total surface of the Kilombero cluster makes up about 1.1 million hectares and has a total population of nearly 300 000 people. Several investment projects involving different crops have been outlined and planned for the Kilombero cluster (URT, 2013b). During fieldwork I conducted interviews in two of these planned areas known as the Kisaki site and the Ruipa site, located in the Morogoro district and the Kilombero district, respectively. Both sites are planned for the production of sugar-cane.

The choice of these sites was based on information I received from a central governmental stakeholder during the early stages of fieldwork in Tanzania. In both areas the government is currently approaching and negotiating with village communities about acquiring land for investment purposes offering me the opportunity to look into this process while it was ongoing. Whereas the Ruipa site at this point has reached a relatively advanced stage in terms of locating the land and negotiations with villagers, the Kisaki site was at the time of fieldwork still at a very premature stage. As of December 2013 no concrete decision had been

made in terms of the exact location or the total size of the site. Nevertheless, choosing two sites in different stages of their implementation has offered the opportunity to make comparisons.

The Kisaki site is located in the Morogoro district in close proximity to the Tazara railway system (figure 4-2). While the exact location for this site has not yet been decided, the government has been approaching a number of villages for the purpose of acquiring land for the SAGCOT initiative. Out of these I did the majority of interviews in Nyarutanga village where both village authorities and household representatives were interviewed. I stayed in this area approximately three weeks. Additionally, I also conducted interviews of village authorities in the neighboring villages of Milengwelengwe, Vigolegole and Gomero.

As for the Ruipa site, this is located in the Kilombero district about 400 km from Dar es Salaam (figure 4-2). In contrast to the Kisaki site, the exact location and size of this site has already been specified. Four villages surround the projected area. These are, Namwawala, Kisege, Mofu and Mbingu. Because Namwawala is the village that is targeted to give away the vast majority of the land needed for SAGCOT, I conducted household level interviews in this village. – in addition to interviews with the village authorities. I also conducted an interview with village authorities in the neighboring village of Mofu. Lastly, I also spent a considerable amount of time in Morogoro and Dar es Salaam to organize village visits and to conduct interviews of various government agencies, private organizations and CSO’s.




Figure 4-2: Geographical location of Ruipa and Kisaki ⁷

4.3 Research Methods

In this section I will outline and discuss the specific methods that have been adopted during empirical fieldwork for this thesis. I will also discuss some of the challenges related to these methods, note some key ethical safeguards and briefly consider the thesis' trustworthiness. I will first proceed with a discussion of the sampling approach.

4.3.1 Sampling Approach

The qualitative approach to research is often characterized by its intensive character. As opposed to quantitative research projects that often works with large representative samples, qualitative researchers works with fewer units, and instead explores many variables in the quest to gain in-depth understanding “from within”. Thus, as part of designing this research project I have strived towards preparing a theoretically justified sample of actors which has been considered as valuable contributors to increase the understanding of SAGCOT. By theoretically justified samples I do not mean the representativeness of the people approached, but rather a sampling approach which acknowledges that information is distributed differently and unevenly among actors across society (Crang & Cook, 2007; Grimen, 2010). Indeed, this is linked to the epistemological underpinnings referred to above which see information, or knowledge, that actors possess as inherently subjective and a reflection of the social context that different actors are a part of. For example, regarding an expansion of corporate agriculture in Tanzania, a business leader, a farmer, or a food sovereignty activist may have different perspectives on the issue, and may also hold different interests that they are eager to protect and promote.

Against this background, it has been an aim to ensure a sample which cuts across a wide spectrum of actors which may contribute in uncovering these various perspectives and interests. With these considerations in mind, I adopted a purposive sampling strategy so as to ensure the participation of some key actors and to capture key dynamics inherent in the SAGCOT initiative (Berg & Lune, 2012). Accordingly, the sample includes respondents representing various offices within the Tanzanian government, private companies and organizations, NGO's and rural household representatives. Sampling for household level interviews was done with the assistance of village governments and local “helpers”. My initial plan was to divide village households into strata according to income levels to facilitate for comparisons between high, medium and low income households. However, I experienced at an early stage that a more appropriate approach in order to fulfil the objectives of the study

was to ensure that I had respondents situated in different geographical locations of the villages as perspectives would potentially vary according to location. For example, the views of household representatives that is likely to be dispossessed of their land to make room for investors would possibly be different from the views of those which are still in a position to keep their land. I also requested assistance to identify female respondents in the villages given the central role played by women as natural resource users in Tanzania. Additionally, a snowball sampling approach was adopted in cases where it was required in order to gain deeper knowledge about certain aspects or when opportunities arose from the purposive sample to “snowball” additional respondents. Indeed, this proved to be beneficial in the quest to get in touch with “difficult-to-reach populations” such as some government employees and others (Berg & Lune, 2012).

The aim when sampling for this project has in other words been to ensure a sample which reflects various perspectives towards SAGCOT. Since rural farming households are expected to carry a substantial share of the expected impacts of a corporate expansion in Tanzanian agriculture a vast majority share of respondents come from these households. In total, 67 interviews were conducted of a sample size of 116 different respondents. Some of these interviews (of village governments) took the form as group interviews while respondents considered as key informants were interviewed on multiple occasions. Out of the 116 respondents, 53 respondents are from rural households, 41 respondents are representatives of government authorities at the village level, while the remaining 22 were respondents from CSOs, private companies and organizations and government institutions. Moreover, out of the 53 household level respondents, nine of these were females.

4.3.2 Data Collection and Analysis

As already indicated, interviews has been the main technique adopted to generate data for this thesis. At its most basic, an interview can be defined as an ‘conversation with a purpose’ (Berg & Lune, 2012, p. 105). The purpose of the conversation is for an interviewer and a respondent to generate data which can be used for analysis in research projects. Goffman (1959 in Berg & Lune, 2012) argue that the interview situation takes the form of a dramaturgical stage act in which the respondent is the lead actor while the interviewer takes on the role as audience. In this dramaturgy the lead actor, that is the informant, transmit coded words and deeds, whereas the audience, that is the interviewer, understands these by

decoding them and putting them into a system. This purposeful dialogue between the informant and the interviewer can take different forms, ranging from the open and unstructured conversation in which there is no real predetermined plan for what direction the conversation should take, to the fully structured, and less flexible, interview where the interviewer has a set list of questions (Berg & Lune, 2012).

For the purpose of this research I have chosen the middle ground, that of semi-structured interviews. The reasons for this are primarily two-fold. Firstly, although I have some previous research experience from Tanzania (Bergius, 2012a) I consider myself as new in the field of research interviews. Conducting semi-structured interviews thus made me feel more at ease with the interview situation and it provided some security not only for me, but also for the respondents, as I had a predetermined plan for the interview which helped to secure a continuous flow in the conversation. Secondly, the semi-structured interview allowed for flexibility during interviews to elaborate or put less weight on certain issues while at the same time allowing me as a researcher to steer or guide the interview in a certain direction based on some predetermined questions or broad parameters for discussion (Berg & Lune, 2012; Crang & Cook, 2007).

I outlined the predetermined questions, or parameters, for the interviews in interview guides. Developing interview guides was helpful as it required preparatory background reading on the topic which facilitated knowledge for potential follow up questions. Demonstrating knowledge and being well prepared was especially helpful when interviewing what can be considered as “high ranked” respondents, such as some of the government officials and company executives, because it contributed to building down some of the “social walls” that might have existed between me as a student, and these respondents. It gave me a sense of respect. Moreover, as outlined above, developing an interview guide served as a checklist for me during interviews which helped to make sure I covered all the topics necessary in order to meet the objectives of the interview, and the broader objectives of the research itself (Crang & Cook, 2007).

In order to let both myself, and the respondents, to get acquainted with the interview situation and to establish rapport I organized the interviews with the aim of letting them develop in a progressive manner. This means that the interview guide contained an introduction, a main part, and a conclusion. In the introductory part I covered the more “easy topics” referred to by

Berg & Lune (2012) as “throwaway questions” letting the respondents introduce themselves, before we moved onto more sensitive issues in the main part. At the village level interviews such sensitive issues included among other things questions surrounding land and access to land which is a hot issue in Tanzania. In the concluding part of the interviews I normally let the stage open to allow the respondents to elaborate on issues they felt I did not cover thoroughly enough or to ask me any questions that they might have had for me. Organizing interviews this way facilitated a smoother flow of sensitive issues into the conversation as it proceeded. While I used more or less the same interview guide during all interviews conducted at the village level (see appendix 1), the interview guide for the remaining interviews was custom made according to the position of the respondent

Interviews with respondents from village households were conducted at the residencies of the respondents themselves. Indeed, the actual location of the interviews is significant and may influence the direction that the interview takes. As Crang & Cook (2007, p. 63) argue, the ‘various facets of peoples identities are very much immersed in/between the different spaces and places of their lives`. Thus, while the outcome of interviews in this research project has depended as much on those researched as it has depended on me; it has also depended on the context in which the interview takes place. The decision to conduct household level interviews at the residencies of the respondents was made with reason. I considered respondents to speak more freely and feel more at ease discussing issues that might be sensitive to them in a safe environment. Furthermore, I also felt that conducting interviews at the place where the respondents lived at a time suitable to them was the right thing to do as it meant they would spend less time of their day to meet me. This was also one of the reasons why I decided not to pay any sitting allowance for those participating in interviews, nor was it expected.⁸

The vast majority of the remaining interviews took place in the offices of representatives of the organizations that I considered to possess important information for this study.⁹ Conducting “office interviews” was a rather unintentional choice based primarily on what was suitable for the respondents. While doing these interviews at the workplace of the respondents may have provided a safe setting, it may simultaneously have influenced the information that was shared during the interviews. As Crang & Cook (2007) argue, respondents may foreground the organization they work for and downplay other issues the researcher might be interested in. Indeed, during some of the “office interviews” it appeared

as if this might have been the case as some respondents, when discussing more sensitive issues, made sure to make their own organization “look good”.

Given that this research project has relied heavily on interviews for data collection it has been highly dependent on the openness of people to share their histories and concerns. Thus, in line with what Crang & Cook (2007) points out, this research has depended as much on the cooperativeness of the people and communities that has been researched as it has depended on me as a researcher. While the interview guides to some degree allowed me to control the interviews, it was the respondents who held the “steering wheel” by emphasizing what was important to discuss under each topic and how to “correctly” define reality. My role as a researcher can only be to interpret the accumulated information from the interviews, information which in fact has already been interpreted by the respondents themselves. Indeed, this point back to the epistemological and ontological underpinnings of this thesis and of qualitative research methodology in general. The generated information has been constructed through the interaction between me and respondents during the actual interviews and during my own interpretation and analysis of the accumulated data material. From this it follows that this thesis ultimately reflects both my own and the respondents’ subjective worldviews – it is not neutral or value free.

Lastly, secondary literature has also provided significant data to complement interviews and has been gathered throughout the whole research period. Because the implementation of SAGCOT has yet to reach an advanced stage for the evaluation of implications for rural farming households, the thesis, and especially chapter five, has been reliant on secondary literature in order to assess potential future implications. In other words, by combining official documents which describes the SAGCOT initiative with authoritative academic literature that address many of the issues associated with the expansion of the corporate food regime in general it has been possible to generate a large amount of material for the analysis.

Organizing and analyzing the material that were accumulated during the interviews has been a significant task. With more than 60 interviews, all lasting for approximately one hour, a considerable amount of time has been spent to transcribe the recorded material and getting a firm overview. While quantitative research projects often have clear directions of how to analyse data, there is no step-by-step recipe for analysis in qualitative research (Berg & Lune, 2012). Instead, analysis has taken place from the onset of the research. Through a continuous

interplay between me, as a researcher, and the accumulated data, both from interviews and secondary sources, analysis has permeated the whole project period (Ryen, 2002; Strauss & Corbin, 1998). Indeed, through the semi-structured interviews the information that is shared by respondents has been constantly interpreted and analyzed both to ask potential follow up questions, and to revise the interview guide as respondents sometimes brought up issues that I was not aware of before entering the field (Grimen, 2010).

As a first step in managing the vast amounts of transcribed data material I aimed to explore some of the overarching patterns and identify vital connections between the various interviews, and between the interviews and the research questions that guided the investigation (Crang & Cook, 2007). After acquiring this initial overview I went on to develop a scheme based on the interview guide which sets out some broad categories/topics and subsequently deconstructed the interviews to fit according to these categories/topics. This was helpful in terms of getting a systematic overview and to further identify key patterns. After systematically categorizing the material I developed additional sub-categories according to which the material was colour coded. Appendix number 2 shows an example of this analytical method. It should be pointed out that this analytical technique was applied to the household level interviews only. Moreover, the interviews at the household level covered a wide array of topics whereby all might not be directly relevant to the thesis. However, covering many topics was still considered as relevant for my own understanding of the rural context, and the challenges that small-scale farmers face, and thus also for the analytical process. As for the remaining interviews, these were, as put out above, custom made according to the respondents. In analysing these I therefore aimed to identify key words and meanings to explore linkages between these and the household level interviews as well as the secondary sources. Eventually, after proceeding with the analysis and writing the data material has been further subdivided to fit according to the headings that this thesis is divided into.

At this point, it is important to point out that while this presentation of methods might give the impression that the research has followed a predetermined linear plan of ‘reading, doing, and writing’ (Crang & Cook, 2007, p. 2), this is not a true reflection of the process. Instead, the whole process has been characterized by going back and forth between the various stages of the research process, doing revisions and changes continuously. Indeed, this one of the key strengths of doing qualitative research – it allows for flexibility. For example, at a very early

stage my plan was to investigate on the ground impacts of SAGCOT investments. However, as I became aware that little had materialized in terms of concrete on the ground investments, I had to slightly change my approach. Thus, I decided to identify areas where the Tanzanian government is trying to acquire land for the purpose of SAGCOT investments (Kisaki-Gomero and Ruipa Valley) and look into these processes to get an understanding of both current and potential future implications of the initiative. In the next section I will outline some of the main challenges I have encountered during the course of this research.

4.3.3 Challenges and limitations

All research at some point experience challenges along the way. While some of these might be of the expected type, others might come as a surprise. Being able to deal with these challenges, and to be open and reflect about them is important and increases the validity of the research (Crang & Cook, 2007). In the next few paragraphs I will outline some of the main challenges I have encountered during fieldwork and the research process in general, including experiences related to planning fieldwork, what I as a researcher can contribute to those taking part in the study, issues surrounding the sensitivity of agricultural investments, and lastly some few words on the use of an interpreter.

Firstly, I want to highlight some of the issues surrounding the planning of fieldwork for this project. As outlined above, I had to slightly change my approach to the fieldwork as SAGCOT had not yet materialized much in terms of on the ground investments. It was thus difficult prior to my arrival in Tanzania to get an idea of what was actually happening within the corridor. When arriving in Tanzania I learned, after talking to some of my pre-established contacts from previous fieldwork, that I should try and change the approach and look into the processes concerned with identifying land areas for investments under the SAGCOT initiative. Indeed, this period of not knowing exactly how to approach the issues I wanted to look into created some initial uneasiness. This was further intensified by the fact that I initially struggled to get in touch with the right people who could provide information about which areas that are planned as investment locations. However, after several rounds of interviews in Dar es Salaam with different stakeholders, I was eventually introduced to the General Director of the Rufiji Basin Development Authority (RUBADA) whose organization I then found out was mandated to identify land for investments under SAGCOT. Some few weeks during the initial parts of the fieldwork were in other words spent in Dar es Salaam

trying to plan the fieldwork and which cases to look into. When I finally was able to meet the RUBADA General Director I was able to generate a list of potential cases. Out of these the two cases of Kisaki-Gomero and Ruipa Valley were chosen in consultation with one of my key contacts at the Land Rights Research and Resources Institute (HakiArdhi).

Another challenge that appeared continuously during the fieldwork period was questions about what I, as a researcher, can contribute in return to those taking part in the study. This occurred frequently, especially during interviews in the rural setting. As stated above, sitting allowance for taking part in interviews was not expected. However, several villagers expressed concerns about what they will get out of participating in the research. As one respondent directly stated to me: ‘I am giving you all this information about my life and my problems, but what will I get out of it, what can you offer in return, will you help us?’¹⁰ Another respondent asked in similar words: ‘We would like to know what will happen after you finish your work here? How will you help us?’¹¹ These questions took me by surprise and are very important to reflect upon. Indeed, these villagers expressed a concern that I was just “another one of those” who asks some questions, put the information in the suitcase and return back to my home country without giving anything back to those who actually have the most important stake in my findings. This question is highly relevant, because the research I have conducted to write this thesis is, in the end, meant to be for the villagers in Tanzania. One way to partly address this issue, which I also intend to do, is to translate the thesis into Kiswahili and return it to those communities and people that have given of their time to help me fulfil my research objectives. However, as Berg & Lune (2012) points out, this is not ideal as the information, for various reasons, may still be inaccessible to some participants. A better solution would be to organize meetings or workshops with the participants in which we could discuss the findings of the research. Nevertheless, reporting back to the people who participated in the study helps to ‘fulfil the ethical mandate...to respect the support given to [my] work by the [respondents]’ (Berg & Lune, 2012, p. 270).

I also encountered some challenges with regards to the sensitivity surrounding the issue of agricultural investments. Indeed, this has been a heated issue in Tanzania during recent years as large-scale investment in land and agriculture have often been associated with negative impacts on local populations (Bergius, 2012a; Chachage, 2010; Havnevik & Haaland, 2011; Mousseau & Mittal, 2011). Due to this I faced some challenges when trying to get access to conduct interviews in one of the villages where there was a significant conflict over land.

Some sections of the village authorities did not trust me when I explained to them my intentions, where I came from and showed them my research permit and student ID card. Some believed, including some villagers, that I was either an agent of the government coming there to spy on them, while others thought I was there as an investor aiming to take the land away from local villagers. As one villager stated:

You said to us you are coming here for the purpose of learning. But for me, I think your approach is unconvincing because I feel you are trying to persuade us to accept this investment in our village. If you want to get information from me about this investment you better change your approach because there are many as you coming here, saying they are students or researchers as you are, but all of them deceived us in the end. They were liars.¹²

Due to this suspicion, I was forced to acquire additional documentation from the district authorities in order to confirm my identity and my intentions of coming to the village. Interestingly, when I finally gained their trust and was granted access to the village I was welcomed with open hands and given valuable support in order to conduct interviews. Furthermore, the fact that there was so much tension in the village about this served as a highly interesting observation.

Lastly, there are also significant challenges surrounding the use of interpreters. While the “office interviews” were all conducted in English, the interviews at the village level were conducted in Kiswahili. Due to my low proficiency in Kiswahili I got interpreting assistance from two students at the Sokoine University of Agriculture – one for each case study. This was of course indispensable and their help in overcoming the language barrier has been highly appreciated. The intention of including the issue of interpreters as a challenge is thus not directed to these persons, but rather to point at some general challenges. One challenge is related to the fact that using interpreters provides a filter through which the information needs to pass through. Ryen (2005) argue that as much as two-thirds of the information may disappear when “filtered” through an interpreter. Moreover, because the interpreter’s subjective world views are brought into the interview situation this may influence the way the information is translated and may also influence how it is interpreted by the researcher. These challenges are, however, difficult to avoid if you are not fluent in the local language, but still important to reflect upon. Moreover, as I have done during previous fieldwork (Bergius, 2012a), to partly stave off for this challenge I aimed to utilize the interpreter as an informant

rather than as a neutral transmitter of messages` through informal discussions about the interviews and how they could be interpreted (Edwards 1998 in Temple & Young, 2004, p. 170). Moreover, both interpreters have been helpful in terms of organizing administrative issues during visits in the village and to provide some assistance in transcribing key interviews.

4.3.4 Ethical Considerations

At its most basic, research ethics within the social sciences refer to the notion of “do no harm”. This means that the research must avoid providing any physical or psychological harm to those who have contributed in making the study possible (Berg & Lune, 2012). This research has from the onset strived towards keeping this key ethical consideration as a steering principle. This has been considered particularly important in the context of this study, given the tension surrounding agricultural investments in Tanzania as argued above. The next couple of paragraphs will discuss two central ethical considerations this study has adopted in order to avoid harming participants.

One such consideration is the issue of informed consent. About informed consent, Bryman (2008) argue ‘that prospective research participants should be given as much information as might be needed to make an informed decision about whether or not they wish to participate in a study’ (p. 121). Thus, before any interview, respondents were informed about me and my background and the content and aims of the study and why I wanted to speak to them about issues concerning their livelihoods. I spent a considerable amount of time to explain and make sure respondents understood that I was an independent researcher without connections to the government and any private company to avoid any misunderstandings. Indeed, with the tension surrounding agricultural investments in Tanzania, this was particularly important. Moreover, respondents were not at any stage during interviews pressured to answer any question they felt uncomfortable with. In most interviews I also used a recorder to tape the interviews. Before using this, respondents were always informed about its purpose and given the chance to decide whether or not to use it. Indeed, using recorders may constrain the natural flow of the conversation and make respondents feel more uncomfortable (Crang & Cook, 2007). However, after explaining respondents about its purpose, and ensuring them that it will be for personal use only, most respondents had no objections to using it. This leads us to another crucial ethical consideration, that of confidentiality.

Given the tension surrounding agricultural investments protecting respondents' identity has been considered as vital. As this thesis will show, it has been reported examples of violence and arrests directed towards people who have been speaking to media about their concerns about land issues. Against this background, names of villagers have been left out altogether. I have also considered anonymizing names of villages that I have visited, but eventually decided to keep these names open. In most cases I consider it unproblematic to reveal which villages that have taken part in the study. Moreover, especially with regards to one village, it would be very difficult to describe and discuss the issues without revealing the name of the village. Indeed, for this village, it has figured prominently in Tanzanian media and in some NGO reports due to extensive land conflicts. However, I take due care aligning the thesis with the overarching ethical principle set out above, and continuously weigh what I write up against this. For the information provided by the remaining respondents, that of government officials and representatives of CSOs and private companies, I have decided not to anonymize most parts of this. Still, if there are meanings or statements which I find may cause harm in any way, these will be anonymized – in other words, if in doubt, I have adopted a precautionary approach.

4.3.5 Some Brief Reflections on Trustworthiness

First of all, the main purpose of this research has been to study the effects of a given phenomenon in a given context. It is thus not an aim to achieve generalizable results, but rather to describe the effects of an expansion of the corporate food regime in Tanzania in ways which are recognizable to others (Grimen, 2010). Moreover, as already pointed out, it is important to be transparent to the fact that this thesis is the result of my own, and the respondents, partial and situated subjectivity. In line with the ontological and epistemological underpinnings guiding the research what is presented in this thesis is the result of the intersubjective truths produced in the research encounters. As such, information and stories presented in this thesis that has been told during interviews 'are not simply to be regarded as means of mirroring the world, but as the means *through which it is constructed*, understood, and acted out'(Crang & Cook, 2007, p. 14 original emphasis).

Indeed, one of the most common critiques directed towards qualitative research is its lack of objectivity inhibiting rigorous, valid and generalizable conclusions (Bryman, 2008; Crang &

Cook, 2007). Instead of providing detached accounts of society, qualitative research aims to provide views from within trying to explain, or describe, specific social contexts. While qualitative research in most cases does not allow generalize findings it does not mean that it is not trustworthy. Grimen (2010) argue that qualitative research may be evaluated against what he term sociological representativeness. This means that the conclusions of research should reflect society in ways which are recognizable to other people within the population that have been sampled (and who has not contributed directly to the study), and to other academics within the field. Against this background, the rigorous sampling strategy adopted for this research and the weighing of findings up against descriptions of other similar contexts is seen to enhance the trustworthiness of this thesis. However, as outlined above, it would be further enhanced if core findings could be presented and discussed with those who have contributed to the study. Lastly, I have through the whole process kept complete records of the information that I have collected.

PART TWO: SAGCOT - Transforming Agriculture – Transforming lives?

5.0 Expanding the Corporate Food Regime in Tanzania: SAGCOT – A Corridor for who?

If we want to transform the lives of people in Africa, we need to focus our efforts on raising agricultural productivity, creating markets and making agriculture a business not a development activity – Akin Adesina, Nigerian Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development (Gates Foundation, 2011).

5.1 Introduction

The concept of corridors as spaces of intense economic activity is nothing new. Through history, markets and trade for all types of products has normally been seen to take place along established transportation corridors. Cutting across more than 6000km, the ancient Silk Route is one of the most extensive, and famous, examples connecting eastern and western Asia, with the Middle East and Europe (Kuhlmann, Sechler, & Guinan, 2011). In the contemporary context, economic corridors, or development corridors as they are also coined, is fast gaining credit as an effective means of reaching economic and social development objectives. By connecting ‘economic agents along a defined geography’, the stated aim of development corridors is to facilitate functional inter-linkages between the supply and demand side in markets, and to overcome coordination challenges which may limit investments, productivity and trade (Brunner, 2013, p. 1; Byers & Rampa, 2013). Agricultural growth corridors are constructed along the same rationales, albeit with a particular focus on agricultural value chains.

The agricultural growth corridor concept lies at the heart of the expansion of the corporate food regime in Tanzania. The concept was first presented by the Norwegian fertilizer giant Yara International at the United Nations Private Sector Forum in New York in 2008 which was joined by representatives of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the International Finance Corporation of the World Bank, Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA)¹³ and others (Jenkins, 2012). Yara describes the concept as ‘an innovative way to finance regional development and lift people out of poverty’ by developing what is considered as underutilized land areas to enhance food production and economic growth (Yara, n.d.). The concept was subsequently expanded and concretized at World Economic Forums in Switzerland and Tanzania and has been widely embraced by corporations

representing the whole value chain involved in growing, producing and bringing food, fuel and fibre from fields to consumers. The concept is also widely supported by governments, donors and international institutions such as the World Bank and the FAO and fits well with donors' increased orientation towards replacing aid with trade (SAGCOT, 2011; WEF, n.d).

In October 2009, a meeting which included Yara, the Tanzanian prime minister's office, the TIC, the African Development Bank, the World Bank, the Norwegian Embassy and Norfund, was convened to discuss ways to implement the agricultural growth corridor concept in the context of Tanzania. With high-level support from President Kikwete steps were taken to develop a concept note for the official launch of SAGCOT at the World Economic Forum on Africa in Dar es Salaam in 2010 (Jenkins, 2012). The concept note was well received among the participants. Subsequently, a SAGCOT Executive Committee, made up of the Tanzanian Government, Tanzanian based interest groups of industry and agriculture, MNCs and donors, was established in order to further mobilize interest around the strategy and to engage stakeholders at national and international levels. In the quest to mobilize interest around the concept the initial focus of the committee was to design a detailed action plan, which came to be known as the SAGCOT investment blueprint. The investment blueprint was completed in time for President Kikwete to present at the annual World Economic Forum in Davos in 2011 (Jenkins, 2012).

The investment blueprint was developed under joint leadership by UK based agricultural development companies Prorustica and AgDevCo. Whereas Prorustica is an international consultancy boasting public-private partnerships as the silver bullet to agricultural development in Africa (Prorustica, n.d), AgDevCo describes itself as a not-for-profit agricultural investor committed towards identifying, developing and arranging early-stage financing for sustainable agricultural and agri-processing business opportunities in Africa (AgDevCo, n.d). Among others, AgDevCo is funded by the Rockefeller Foundation, USAID, AGRA and UK's Department for International Development – all prominent actors involved in promoting a technology intensive green revolution across Africa. Interestingly, AgDevCo counts the Norwegian company Green Resources among its partners of sustainable agricultural development in Tanzania, a company which activities has been widely criticized partly due to allegations of unfair land and resource dispossession of local communities (AgDevCo, n.d; Benjaminsen, Bryceson, Maganga, & Refseth, 2011; Larsen, 2012). The

funding for developing the investment blueprint came from a wide array of sources including several MNC's, the Tanzanian government, international donors and AGRA (Jenkins, 2012).

The investment blueprint outlines the agricultural growth corridor concept in Tanzania in more depth. It sketches out opportunities and strategies over the coming 20-year period to make SAGCOT a reality and lift more than two million people out of poverty. With a reference to other countries where 'commercial agriculture has been successful' (SAGCOT, 2011, p. 17) the blueprint states that the success of SAGCOT ultimately depends on four critical features: It needs (1) access to ample land and water, and to be organized through the development of (2) agricultural clusters with (3) adequate access to infrastructure. Moreover, it requires a (4) symbiotic relationship between the private sector, which plays a leading role, and the public sector which commits in terms of providing agriculture supporting infrastructure and a business friendly environment (SAGCOT, 2011).

It is believed that aligning the agricultural growth corridor around these features will coordinate and improve linkages between farmers (small, medium, large), agribusinesses and other institutions involved in agricultural development to create win-win outcomes that ensures poverty reduction, food security and corporate profits (SAGCOT, 2011). However, the construction of agricultural growth corridors is to a considerable degree defined and driven from the top, offering dismal opportunities for small-scale farmers to influence the agenda. It is therefore a concern that small-scale farmers will be unable to participate in SAGCOT in ways that they can benefit.

In this chapter I aim to demonstrate how SAGCOT represents an expansion of the corporate food regime. Through this, I argue that the development of SAGCOT in Tanzania jeopardizes small-scale farmers' autonomy and control over their main livelihood generating activity: agriculture. This argument will in the following be justified through a critical discussion based on the four features mentioned above as vital for the success of SAGCOT. In turn I will address the underlying assumptions of the SAGCOT initiative focusing on the concept of scarcity, before I turn my attention to the process of planning and implementing SAGCOT. I will then discuss the concept of clusters and the complementary role played by the public sector in opening up spaces for commercial actors.

5.2 Underlying Assumptions: Production Scarcities and Land Abundance

If at the moment, a farmer in Africa produces for two people, the food feeds two people, when the farmer in Europe produces to feed 130 people, just imagine if you can also augment that capacity in Africa, also to be able to feed 130 people, this world will have no problem with hunger and malnutrition – President Kikwete of Tanzania (Kikwete, 2010).

These words came from President Kikwete during his participation at a roundtable discussion at the WEF in 2010. They illustrate very well contemporary discourses surrounding food security. Hunger and malnutrition is predominantly associated with production scarcities and a lack of appropriate technologies. The rational approach to the problem is therefore to increase production mainly through technocratic solutions. Yet, on a global scale, the world today produces more than enough food for everyone. According to FAO statistics the total food supply per capita comes to more than 2800 calories per day (FAOstat, 2014). Even for Tanzania, where more than thirty percent of the population is considered undernourished, the calorie supply per capita comes to about 2150 calories per day (FAOstat, 2014) which suggests that food shortage is not primarily due to low productivity, but rather due to access and weak distribution networks (Sulle & Hall, 2014).

Nevertheless, the development of the agricultural growth corridor in Tanzania emerge on the back of mainstream discourses of scarcity (Scoones et al., 2014). These discourses are shaped by a combination of Malthusian and Ricardian notions of absolute and relative scarcity, respectively. While the Malthusian notion of absolute scarcity sees scarcity to emerge as a result of the inevitable contradiction between growing populations and the (in)ability of ‘earth to produce subsistence for man’ (Malthus, 1998 [1798], p. 4), relative notions of scarcity emphasize that scarcity is not absolute, but can be overcome through technological innovation and more efficient allocation of resources (Scoones et al., 2014). In the context of agriculture the problem is thus perceived to be an issue of production levels relative to population growth.

These perspectives materialize in policies and initiatives aimed towards the challenges of solving the ongoing global food crisis and how to feed 9 billion people in 2050. Through a Malthusian/Ricardian frame of scarcity these challenges are interpreted by many as an issue

of population and productivity imbalances where more efficient use of scarce resources is imperative (Scoones et al., 2014). The operation of this “scarcity mind”, as Lappé (2012) calls it, provokes a quantity oriented focus in which too low quantities of food relative to the world’s population can be addressed through technological means. Thus, instead of interpreting scarcity as a socially constructed political configuration characterized by scarcity for some and abundance for others (Scoones et al., 2014), mainstream scarcity discourses reflects humans needs to simplify complex realities and identify clear cause and effect relationships (Kremen et al., 2012; Vatn, 2005). From this it follows that resource scarcities (i.e. land and water) that prevents increased food production can be rationally offset by the application of technological innovations such as high yielding seeds (GMOs, hybrid seeds), chemical fertilizers, and pesticides for the continued provisioning of food, fuel and fiber to a growing world population.

Simultaneously, within the mainstream frame of scarcity certain areas of the world are seen to hold a comparative advantage relative to global scarcities. This goes especially for the African continent which is depicted to possess vast areas of land with untapped potential for agricultural development (World Bank, 2007). In partnership with the major players of the corporate food regime, African countries are with the assumed existence of such areas, commonly referred to as “unused” or “underutilized”, envisioned playing an important role if we are to avoid a Malthusian catastrophe (Scoones et al., 2014).¹⁴ Interestingly, in this context the potential for a future catastrophe is turned into an opportunity of win-win where corporate profits, global food security *and* African development can be combined (EU, 2012).

However, while Africa is perceived to contain the natural resources needed, it is not seen to possess the preferred knowledge and technology as hinted above by President Kikwete. As Scoones et al., (2014) notes, ‘African agriculture is often depicted as stagnant, underproductive, and a cause of land degradation, in need of revival through integration with large-scale, commercial operations’ (Scoones et al., 2014, p. 14). Hence, the means required to breathe life into Africa’s untapped agricultural potential, and to put its “unused” or “underutilized” land areas under more efficient use, needs to be brought to Africa from the outside. Not surprisingly then, since these technologies are what only well funded corporations are able to disburse, the mainstream scarcity discourse is held firmly in place by

those with an interest in advocating a corporate food regime expansion (Holt Giménez & Shattuck, 2011; Scoones et al., 2014).

Moving to Tanzania, the above becomes visible as the corporate food regime seeks to expand through the implementation of SAGCOT. Since the success of SAGCOT depends on ample access to land for commercial agriculture, it readily assumes that such land is available. With an assumed abundance of lands of underutilized agricultural potential, Tanzania is seen to have the capacity to become a major food-exporting country in a world where scarcity is imminent – provided the right investments and technologies are mobilized from the outside (Grow Africa, 2013). In a meeting on Kilimo Kwanza, one of Tanzania’s agricultural policies of which SAGCOT is a core project, President Kikwete has been quoted as saying that with ‘one million acres under [...] large-scale farms, we could do wonders’ (Ambali, 2009 in Cooksey, 2013, p. 23). This implies that the future of agriculture in Tanzania is associated with large-scale mechanized farms, while the role of Tanzania’s many small-scale farmers remains unclear (Cooksey, 2013). President Kikwete further substantiates this in the foreword to the investment blueprint where he states that

Tanzania has immense opportunities for agricultural development. There are 44 million hectares of arable land, only 24 percent of which is being utilized...Tanzania’s agriculture is predominantly small holder, characterized with very low productivity due to very limited use of modern technology and techniques of production. As a result, therefore, the country’s huge agricultural potential remains unutilized (SAGCOT, 2011, p. 4).

Agricultural investor interest in Tanzania is based on the premises set out by Kikwete in the investment blueprint (Havnevik & Haaland, 2011). Lack of technology and abundance of land is the key message. The perceived millions of hectares of “unused” or “underutilized” fertile land across Tanzania and Africa is, in the context of increasing soft commodity and land prices, increasingly viewed upon as a potentially profitable investment (Cotula, 2012; White & Dasgupta, 2010). However, Haugen (2010) shows that such perceptions may be problematic as he reveals discrepancies in estimates of land availability in Tanzania amounting to as much as 50 million hectares. Similarly, Tenga and Kironde (2012) argue that numbers regarding land availability for investments in Tanzania are misleading and lead to false expectations among investors. Kaarhus (2011) discuss similar problematic in Tanzania’s neighboring country Mozambique as its government also strives to attract investors. This means that perceptions regarding land abundance for investments require critical

assessments, as ‘even where land is currently underused and seems abundant, it is still likely to be claimed by somebody’ (Cotula et al., 2009, p. 62; Paul & Steinbrecher, 2013). Moreover, in the context of initiatives such as SAGCOT there are also considerable political and economic interests involved in labeling land as ”unused” or ”underutilized”. Such categorizations contributes to justify large-scale land acquisitions in the name of efficient resource allocation to meet rising global demands in a perceived context of scarcity (Patel, 2012; Scoones et al., 2014). Understandably, agricultural investors are seeking the fertile higher-value land areas for productivity and profits reasons. Those areas are, however, rarely unoccupied (Cooksey, 2013). Chapter six will provide deeper insights into the problematic of land for SAGCOT.

Despite these obscurities concerning land availability, the mainstream scarcity informed discourse remains consistent as SAGCOT is promoted. Echoing President Kikwete, the chairman of the Agricultural Council of Tanzania (ACT) is also quoted in the investment blueprint as saying that ‘The agricultural potential of the southern corridor is enormous, but remains largely dormant or highly underexploited[...]It is time for the Agricultural Sleeping Giant [Tanzania] to awake’ (SAGCOT, 2011, p. 12). This awakening process is associated with putting the perceived dormant land areas under more efficient use by commercially, often large-scale, oriented producers. In this strive towards assumed efficiency small-scale farmers may lose out, or be outright excluded (Bergius, 2012; Sulle, 2009). Indeed, Mr. Kirenga, the Chief Executive Officer of the SAGCOT Center (see below about the SAGCOT center), has remarked that large-scale agriculture and use of advanced technological machines is inevitable for the agricultural sector to reach its full potential in Tanzania (The Guardian, 2014a, 2014b). This poses questions as to what role is to be played by Tanzania’s small-scale farmers as the country embarks towards a corporate expansion within its agricultural sector. These Malthusian/Ricardian assumptions on land and productivity are what pave the way for SAGCOT.¹⁵

5.3 Coming from the Top – and Kept There

Despite the strong focus towards commercial large-scale agriculture SAGCOT documents and advocates adopts a smallholder oriented rhetoric promising major benefits to small-scale farmers and their communities (i.e. Grow Africa, 2013; SAGCOT, 2011; URT, 2013b; Wa

Simbeye, 2014a). As one interviewee stated, ‘the most important aim of this initiative is to be inclusive and to liberate the smallholder farmer ...in fact, the smallholders are the most important partners we have – without them SAGCOT would not exist.’¹⁶ In line with this, an integral component of SAGCOT is to incentivize linkages between agribusinesses and small-scale farmers through so called hub and out-grower schemes. In these schemes the aim is to integrate small-scale farmers in global agricultural value chains by facilitating access to inputs, extension services, value adding facilities and markets (SAGCOT, 2011; URT, 2013b). To invest under the SAGCOT initiative investors need to demonstrate a will to include ‘emergent and small-scale farmers and their interests into their operations’ (SAGCOT, n.d.-c, p. 7). However, what the interests of small-scale farmers actually are, or if their interests are in consonance with the interests of those implementing SAGCOT, is not provided nor readily sought after. Let me explain.

Despite the smallholder oriented rhetoric and proclamations stating that SAGCOT has been a ‘coalition of the willing’ (Ramberg, 2013, p. 44) allowing ‘anyone who had the time, interest, and capability to contribute (Jenkins, 2012, p. 17), the initiative has from the very beginning been top-down driven.¹⁷ Since the presentation of the corridor concept itself by Yara at the UN in 2008 and at subsequent meetings, the concept has been discussed and developed within the confines of corporations with top level support from governments, donors and others (Jenkins, 2012). While the SAGCOT executive committee included some Tanzanian associations, the early phases of SAGCOT have been more or less void of influence from civil society and small-holder farmers’ representation (Byers & Rampa, 2013; Jenkins, 2012; UNDP, 2013). It has been suggested that the Tanzanian organizations that were selected as partners, such as those in the executive committee, were selected ‘because they were seen as legitimate by the government’ (Ramberg, 2013, p. 44).

Indeed, it has evolved during interviews that local participation in SAGCOT seems to be based on selective consultations. One stakeholder suggested during an interview that while SAGCOT seeks to include civil society they only want to include those considered as “constructive” and “pragmatic”, and not “activist”, civil society organizations (CSOs).¹⁸ This indicates that whether or not CSOs participate in deliberations concerning SAGCOT hinges on whether or not they align with the agricultural commercialization project SAGCOT envisions. A representative of the largest network of small-scale farmers in Tanzania, Mtandao wa Vikundi vya Wakulima Tanzania (MVIWATA), stated in an interview:

When SAGCOT was developed we were not involved at any point, and we are the biggest network of small-farmers in the country. To be honest, no one here [at MVIWATA] know what SAGCOT is about, because we have not been included in the process of formulating the initiative. Maybe that is also the purpose, to leave us out of it. The process of establishing SAGCOT has not at any point been involving small-farmers, and that is strange, when they say that small-farmers are the target of the whole initiative. That makes you believe that maybe the small-farmers not really are the main target for SAGCOT, [instead] it is meant for some elites and some big companies. This whole thing is planned at the higher level, and then it is brought down to the people.¹⁹

MVIWATA is a member of La Via Campesina, a global peasant movement that strongly oppose the expansion of the corporate food regime and its associated green revolution technologies. Instead La Via Campesina is advocating food sovereignty and agro-ecological models of production which according to their website ensures that the rights to use and manage lands, territories, water, seeds, livestock and biodiversity are in the hands of those who produce food and not of the corporate sector (Via Campesina, 2011). In other words, La Via Campesina is championing a trajectory of agricultural development which is not aligned with that of SAGCOT. Thus, MVIWATA's membership in La Via Campesina might be what puts them in the category of "activist" organizations which excludes them, and its more than 100 000 small-scale farming members, from participating in the development of SAGCOT. Excluding so called "activist" organizations is not a feature limited to the SAGCOT initiative only. Patel (2012) and McMichael (2013) notes that it is rather a general feature characterizing current corporate food regime initiatives that advocates a second Green Revolution (of which SAGCOT would be a concrete example). Commenting on La Via Campesina, Patel (2012) writes that the

...kinds of policy that La Via Campesina advocates are not consonant with those of a second Green Revolution. So, while smallholder farmers are asked to guide the second Green Revolution, it seems as if they are asked to do so in ways that conform to an agenda that has already been written. Their voices matter, but only when they say what they ought (p. 39).

It is perhaps not so strange then, given the top-down approach, that there is very limited awareness about SAGCOT in Tanzania (Byers & Rampa, 2013). Except from some central stakeholders with close relations to the political leadership, coming out to the districts and villages in the rural areas very few know about the initiative and what it aims to achieve (as

of December 2013). When asked about SAGCOT and the broader vision of Kilimo Kwanza, a farmer in the Kilombero district replied:

...when you mention Kilimo Kwanza, it is just an empty word for me. I just hear it all the time, but I don't experience anything like Kilimo Kwanza, and it does not have any impact on us small-farmers. I don't know if this thing called Kilimo Kwanza really exists, but if it does, it certainly do not exist in our village'.²⁰

Nevertheless, as SAGCOT has proceeded and moved towards implementation it seems that there has been a slight change of strategies by opening up for some involvement of “constructive” and “pragmatic” CSO's. In various consultation rounds CSO's and other organizations have been provided the opportunity to give feedback to environmental and social assessments of the initiative, such as the Strategic Regional Environmental and Social Assessment (SRESA) and the development of a SAGCOT “Greenprint” (Milder, Buck, Hart, Scherr, & Shames, 2013; UNDP, 2013; URT, 2013b).²¹ While these consultations have brought several important issues to the table, they do not challenge the underlying assumptions and ideologies of SAGCOT in any significant ways. Their feedback, characterized by relatively moderate language, is therefore unproblematic for SAGCOT to integrate in its implementation. For example, rather than to question the actual implementation of large-scale mono-crops enterprises, the CSO's simply recommends that environmental impacts assessments of such enterprises ‘should also take account of the possible long term impacts, on soil quality, water resources, and plant and animal species’ (TNRF, 2012, p. 9).

Moreover, responding to calls for a more structured engagement in SAGCOT by non-state actors, the SAGCOT Centre,²² the ACT, the Tanzania Horticulture Association (TAHA) and The Agricultural Non-State Actors Forum (ANSAF) in early 2014 signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) to ‘strengthen farmer's participation’ in the implementation of SAGCOT (SAGCOT, 2014). Indeed, this move is in line with how one report states that moving ‘...into implementation [of SAGCOT], more and more decisions will happen further and further down the organization chart’ (Jenkins, 2012, p. 10). However, here it is worth mentioning that of the Tanzanian organizations that were seen as legitimate to take part in the SAGCOT executive committee, one of them was the ACT - an agricultural private sector apex organization in Tanzania. Furthermore, the TAHA is also a private sector apex

organization with a strong business oriented focus and whose partners include among others The Gates Foundation and AGRA (TAHA, n.d.). ANSAF, on the other hand, is more small-holder farmer oriented (Cooksey, 2012). It is an umbrella of international and local civil society organisations – of which MVIWATA is listed as one of the members - which on its website claims to be committed towards finding solutions in agricultural systems ‘that works for the poor’ (ANSAF, 2013). Nonetheless, commenting on the MoU, MVIWATA representatives interprets the agreement as “bogus” and furthermore states that

... ‘Although MVIWATA is a member of ANSAF, our fellow members have decided to “leave” us since they know our position on the matter. We have therefore decided to start the process of withdrawing from that forum in order to maintain our position and philosophy’.²³

This indicates that the MoU, as well as the opening for CSO feedback to the SRESA and the “Greenprint”, is more reminiscent of a reformist strategy inherent in the corporate food regime (Holt Giménez & Shattuck, 2011). As a compromise moderate, or “constructive”, CSOs are taken onboard in a bid to make the SAGCOT initiative appear politically more palatable, without necessarily challenging the neoliberal currents underpinning the initiative in general. It allows little space for more radical organizations, such as MVIWATA, to influence in any significant way. It substantiates what was argued above that to ‘strengthen farmers’ participation’ in SAGCOT essentially means to strengthen participation that conforms to strategies that has already been decided at higher levels and then “brought down”.²⁴ The CSOs are therefore seen, at most, to play a complementary role for example by assisting investors in organizing efficient out-grower arrangements with small-scale farmers (Jenkins, 2012). Indeed, the involvement of CSOs thus seems to be envisioned as a mechanism of reducing transaction costs for investors by transferring these to civil society. For MVIWATA, these strategies are at odds with their philosophies regarding agricultural development, thus prompting them to eventually withdraw from ANSAF to maintain integrity.

Rather than being a project of, and for, small-scale farmers in Tanzania the top-down character of SAGCOT suggests that the initiative is for corporations’ first, and small-scale farmers second. Indeed, Yara’s country manager in Tanzania stated that he doubts whether SAGCOT will be able to create any significant positive change for small-scale farmers in the

long term.²⁵ This will become clearer as we move on to discuss the concept of agricultural clusters in SAGCOT.

5.4 Clusters of Profitable Agribusiness

Against the background of mainstream scarcity discourses SAGCOT is implemented as part of Tanzania's quest to fast track a green revolution by putting its "underutilized" land areas under commercial production. As briefly outlined above, to achieve this aspired commercialization SAGCOT will be developed along a set of priority areas termed clusters (SAGCOT, 2011). These clusters have been identified to contain significant untapped potential for commercial agricultural development and are thought to be geographically well placed to achieve the stated long term mission of the SAGCOT initiative: lift more than 2 million people out of poverty (SAGCOT, 2011).

But first of all, what is meant by an agricultural cluster?

Agricultural clusters are in general terms defined as geographic concentrations of interconnected agricultural industries (farming, processing and service firms), public institutions (research centres, universities, extension services) and other organizations that 'gain advantages through co-location' (Bosworth & Broun in Gálvez-Nogales, 2010, p. 3; M. Porter, 1998; SAGCOT, 2011). These advantages are said to include better coordination of investment activities, reduced transaction costs and the creation of economies of scale decreasing production and marketing costs (M. Porter, 1998; Reardon & Barrett, 2000). The clusters are normally concentrated along adequate logistics infrastructure, such as roads, railways, and ports, which facilitates links to markets and incentivizes investments in commercial agriculture (SAGCOT, 2011).

So far six clusters have been identified within the southern corridor in Tanzania. These are all concentrated in relative vicinity of shared backbone infrastructure, such as the Tanzania-Zambia Railway Authority (TAZARA) system and the Port of Dar es Salaam facilitating linkages to international markets for agricultural outputs, as well as inputs. As one interviewee said: 'just imagine, for example, flowers, tomatoes, vegetables, they can transport it from Mbeya to Dar es Salaam, and the next day it is already in Europe.'²⁶ Indeed, the

identification of clusters is based primarily on their potential for viable commercial agriculture. An appendix to the investment blueprint states that

SAGCOT will develop...by proposing a set of investment areas - the clusters - which are based primarily on commercial growth criteria. This does not mean that other interests such as rural poverty reduction and food security are excluded, but the primary objective of the choices will be commercial (SAGCOT, n.d.-b, p. 3)

Thus, the development of the clusters will be driven by the private sector based on the commercial opportunities that exists in each area with the aim of attracting investments that creates synergies across all components of the agricultural value chain (SAGCOT, 2011). The six clusters which have been identified are in different stages of their development and include Sumbawanga, Mbarali, Kilombero, Ilhemi, Ludewa, and Rufiji.




Figure 5-1 The clusters

The activities that takes place within the clusters seeks to cover all components of the agricultural value chain in order to allow each player to benefit as if it had greater scale. The development of clusters is thus seen as essential to compete in the world market and is moreover thought to be beneficial as a strategy to attract additional investors once development is underway (SAGCOT, 2011). As one stakeholder remarked, ‘investors won’t be interested in going where there aren’t anyone from before’.²⁷

5.4.1 Vertically Integrated Clusters of Power

Farming is a business. We should not romanticize it as anything else - Kavita Prakash- Mani, Head of Food Security at Syngenta (Syngenta, 2012)

The value chain approach within the SAGCOT clusters enables a further vertical integration of prominent actors within the corporate food regime into Tanzanian agriculture. In general terms, vertical integration refers to the increased control, or ownership, of the value chain of an agricultural product – including the process of developing genes, seeds, and chemical inputs, to primary processing, distribution, manufacturing and retailing (Kilmer, 1986; Scrinis, 2007). While vertical integration most often occurs through mergers between corporations operating at different sectors of the value chain, Scrinis (2007) points out that it may also occur in the form of a clustering approach, whereby corporations operating in different sectors form strategic “co-operative alliances”.

Indeed, SAGCOT emerges as a top-down driven project in which corporations, with the backing of big philanthropy and governments, seek to increase its control over Tanzanian agriculture through “co-operative alliances” (Scrinis, 2007). Encapsulated by a string of other initiatives aiming to open up African agriculture for businesses, such as the New Alliance of the G8 and the New Vision on Agriculture of the WEF, the range of corporations involved to transform agriculture to deliver, in the words of WEF, ‘food security, environmental sustainability and economic opportunity’ are substantial (WEF, n.d). Among the prominent backers of SAGCOT specifically includes corporate heavyweights such as Monsanto, Syngenta, Bayer Crops Science, Dupont and the aforementioned Yara (SAGCOT, 2011). Within a region where markets for their products are still relatively underdeveloped, cooperative projects such as SAGCOT offers great opportunities.²⁸ Certainly, these corporations are not involved in SAGCOT as a way of “developing” Tanzania, but rather, to use the words of Yara’s Managing Director in Tanzania, they are ‘extremely business focussed’²⁹, thus aiming to strategically position themselves to take advantage of new market opportunities to bring profits back to their shareholders.

These corporations have a significant interest in increasing their presence in Africa. They are all global market leaders in the increasingly consolidated seed and pesticides industry (Howard, 2009). Together, Monsanto, Syngenta and Dupont control more than 50 percent of the market shares globally for seeds and pesticides respectively (Howard, 2009). Furthermore, some of the largest processing and trade corporations such as Unilever, General Mills and Bunge are also among the partners said to be interested in developing SAGCOT (SAGCOT, 2011). Of these, Unilever has already made considerable investments in the tea production in the corridor (SAGCOT, 2013).³⁰ By coming together in joint ventures, alliances, and in projects such as SAGCOT these corporations are able to draw on each other's strengths while simultaneously increasing their combined control over production and distribution of agricultural products (Hendrickson & Heffernan, 2002; Scrinis, 2007).³¹ Yara's strategy manager, Oystein Botillen, admitted in an interview that the SAGCOT model is indeed linked to MNC's wish to ensure control throughout their value chain (Ramberg, 2013). It follows from this that while MNC's wish to ensure or increase their control over Tanzanian agriculture, someone else necessarily would need to relinquish theirs. In a political economic context where agricultural policy is disproportionately geared towards an expansion of corporate driven agriculture, those someone else are likely to be Tanzanian small-scale farmers and pastoralists.

There has been little to show for in terms of concrete investments of the various corporations in SAGCOT thus far. Nevertheless, as the project is still in an early phase this is expected to change when reaching more advanced stages as several corporations and smaller agribusinesses have signed letters of intent to establish projects in the corridor.³² Thus, against the backdrop of the corporations involved in SAGCOT so far, and building on Hendrickson & Heffernan (2002), figure three illustrates a simplified and hypothetical example of how the SAGCOT clusters might appear when reaching more advanced stages.

As the agricultural product moves through the various stages of the value chain (see figure 5-2) the product, starting with the intellectual property right acquired by the biotechnology corporation, remains under control by a collection of agribusinesses concentrated within the cluster (Hendrickson & Heffernan, 2002). From a collection of genetic resources biotechnology corporations are able to develop seeds which possess certain qualities, such as high productivity and tolerance to diseases or drought, which via various distribution channels will be made available to farmers' and to plantations and out-growers connected to

these. While these seed varieties, called hybrid seeds, do not technically prevent farmers from saving seeds and re-use them the next season, subsequent generations of hybrid seeds lose their advantageous traits and are thus practically not much worth saving for the next sowing season. Therefore, farmers who are attracted to adopt hybrid seeds must purchase new seeds each year from seed producers (S. R. Gliessman, 2007). To encourage expanded investments in the production, trade, and use of such seeds, Tanzania has recently harmonized its seed legislation to align it with the International Union for the protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV) (Grow Africa, 2013).³³ This allows for the protection of intellectual property rights of commercial seed breeders whose seeds are treated as special commodities and not as public goods. There is in other words an imminent risk that this may marginalize local seed varieties and restrict, or even criminalize, customary forms of seed-saving and distribution (Borowiak, 2004) – traditional practices which are widespread in Tanzania and in Africa in general. In addition, there are also calls from researchers and politicians in Tanzania advocating a relaxation of the country's bio-safety regulations so as to facilitate for the introduction of genetically modified crops (All Africa, 2014; Wa Simbeye, 2014b).

With regards to the seed sector, Syngenta has been the most active in SAGCOT this far. Syngenta currently works with other companies to develop distribution networks for their inputs and wants to 'contribute to delivering cluster initiatives aimed at developing large farms and surrounding smallholders' (Grow Africa, 2013, p. 109). It is working closely with the Agrica/KPL rice plantation, one of the first large-scale investments in the corridor, introducing new rice seed varieties as well as various crop protection solutions including pesticides and herbicides. Additionally, Monsanto intends to introduce 3-5 new drought tolerant and insect resistant maize hybrid seed varieties that initially will be available royalty free to seed companies. Its plans for Tanzania includes developing partnerships with various organizations, such as the Agricultural Market Development Trust (AGMARK)³⁴ and Farm-Input Promotions Africa,³⁵ in order to strengthen agro-dealer networks to better facilitate the distribution of its seeds to farmers (Grow Africa, 2013).




Figure 5-2: A hypothetical illustration of a SAGCOT cluster based on Hendrickson & Heffernan (2002). The illustration is indicative and developed to give readers a sense of how the value chains may look like as SAGCOT is implemented.

For fertilizers Yara³⁶ is the dominant firm in Tanzania. According to previous Executive Vice President of Yara, Arne Cartridge, now the director of the Grow Africa platform, one of the main bottlenecks for the growth of the fertilizer industry is the weak purchasing power of the poor as compared to large commercial farmers (Cartridge, 2007). Entering into partnerships in projects such as SAGCOT thus offers great potential for continued growth and dominance of Yara in Tanzania. The Norwegian giant, whose 36 percent of the shares are controlled by the Norwegian government, is now considered to supply around 40 percent of the fertilizer in Tanzania and could soon assert a monopoly position (Benson, Kirama, & Selejio, 2012). Other actors within the fertilizer industry in Tanzania complains that Yara receives “special” treatment by the Tanzanian government, referring specifically to the assistance in obtaining a long-term land lease for the construction of a fertilizer terminal outside the port of Dar es Salaam (Benson et al., 2012)³⁷ – one of the first major investments under the SAGCOT initiative. Yara is together with Syngenta part of the Tanzania Rice Partnership (TARIPA) which seeks to develop the rural input supply network through training of small-scale farmers, village based advisers and agro dealers in their technologies. Yara is also working closely with Agrica/KPL to enhance its rice yields (Grow Africa, 2013), as well as to improve productivity at Unilever’s tea plantation.³⁸

The next stage of the SAGCOT clusters is that of the agribusiness producers. While most progress in terms of investment intents so far has been on the inputs supply side, it is expected that more investors will enter on the production side as well as land suitable for investments is currently identified throughout the corridor (see chapter six).³⁹ Some of the investments that have been announced were already underway before SAGCOT was initiated and includes the aforementioned rice project of Agrica/KPL, and AgroEco Energy’s sugar plantation in Bagamoyo. Both projects have been touted as “SAGCOT flagships” showing the way for responsible agricultural investments.⁴⁰ However, despite being put forward as examples to follow, both projects, and especially that of AgroEco Energy, have been associated with displacement of rural populations (Herzler, 2014). Moreover, AgroEco Energy has a murky history due to its link with a similar sugar project in the Rufiji district where the company interfered in the environmental and social impact assessment in its quest to make project plans appear more positive than they were (Havnevik & Haaland, 2011).

The development of clusters of profitable agribusinesses as envisioned under SAGCOT pose a significant risk on small-scale farmers. Through the establishment of nucleus farms and

various forms of integration in international value-chains they risk surrendering their control over production via land dispossession (see chapter six) and increased reliance on external and volatile input markets. In essence, the idea of clusters of agribusinesses in SAGCOT is ultimately a power relationship whereby asymmetric relations between corporations and small-scale farmers are likely to facilitate “control grabs” to the benefit of the former (White et al., 2012). Consider for example the case of hybrid seeds which are envisioned to play an important role in SAGCOT and elsewhere in Africa. As I wrote above these seeds are undesirable to replant thus forcing users to buy new seeds every planting season. In addition, such seeds often come with “packages” of inputs (i.e. fertilizers and pest controls) and practices that go along with it. This increases the costs of farming, it fuels dependency on inputs provided by centralized markets, and may prompt farmers to engage in more intensified and specialized production at the cost of crop diversity (S. R. Gliessman, 2007).

As stated in the previous sub-chapter, SAGCOT has from the onset been controlled within the confines of corporate alliances (including governments, donors and some CSOs). This is also likely to be reflected in the development of the SAGCOT clusters in which a small number of firms via debt relations (i.e. through out-grower schemes) control what is produced, who produce, how it is produced, product quality, purchase the produce and supply the agricultural inputs. In her study of existing out-grower schemes in Tanzania, Kamuzora (2011) finds that farmers face great uncertainties by joining out-grower-schemes which, from the outside, may seem lucrative. In her case studies she finds that: payments for out-grower produce are sometimes too low as compared to the considerable investments (debt financed) farmers make to take part in the scheme; out-growers (sugar) suffer from random attribution of the cane they deliver to the nucleus farm facilitating chance-based payment and opening up for manipulation; and harvest quotas leave out a substantial amount of out-growers who are then not able to sell their produce, leading to extensive losses for the out-grower. Barret et al., (2012) reports of similar issues in their cross-country study of contract farming for international value chains. The risks inherent in these schemes are in other words disproportionately carried by the out-growers and in particular the small sized out-grower farmers (McMichael, 2013). Moreover, it incentivizes more specialized production whereby out-growers re-prioritize their labour from producing food crops to produce cash crops for distant markets via the nucleus farm, thus potentially reducing food security as households becomes dependent on buying food (Smalley, 2014). As one sceptical small-scale farmer in a proposed sugar cane production area in Kilombero put it:

‘We can’t feed our children with sugar. Ok, we might get some more money if we start producing sugar instead of food, but at the same time we would also spend more money on food. If sugar was doing so well, why do [out-growers from Kilombero] come here to grow food?’⁴¹

Indeed, farmer’s risks surrendering their autonomy not only through the monopolistic relation with the nucleus farm, but also through their increased reliance on markets to sustain their food needs. This vulnerability intensifies when out-growers are not able to sell their crops or get low prices as mentioned above. Since larger out-grower farmers are more likely to have the capacity to absorb these risks, the potential benefits of the nucleus/out-grower model in SAGCOT are likely to be captured by limited amount of individuals while rural inequality may intensify (McMichael, 2013; URT, 2013b). Through the analytical lens of the corporate food regime, however, this might not be a problem as it may facilitate the movement of land towards larger and “more efficient” producers (Oya, 2012). Due to the significant risks involved many out-growers in the Kilombero District have reverted to producing food crops to sustain their livelihoods (Kamuzora, 2011; Smalley, 2014).

SAGCOT’s strong emphasis on promoting the nucleus/out-grower model may contribute to a ‘shift away from local farmer-centred agricultural practices to ones that are mediated heavily by corporate (often foreign) interests’ (Borowiak, 2004, p. 527). When seeds and other inputs becomes externalized and decoupled from local farming systems to instead be supplied by MNCs, this shift might not only undermine the autonomy of small-scale farmer’s from exogenous control (Cabell & Oelofse, 2012), but also in the longer term undermine traditional knowledge and cultures attached to local ecological processes and the rural way of life (McMichael, 2005; Yapa, 1993). The knowledge in this “modern” transformation is instead sourced from outside the farm and the role of the farmer is that of technology application (S. R. Gliessman, 2007). In this shift towards corporate controlled farming, in the words of van der Ploeg (in McMichael, 2013, p. 674), capital ‘imposes its own order’ on small-scale farmers by transforming their role from that of being a farmer to being a labourer. The subjugated small-scale farmer potentially ‘becomes a grower, providing the labour and often some of the capital, but never owning the product as it moves through the food system and never making the major management decisions’ (Hendrickson & Heffernan, 2002, p. 350). Analytically, SAGCOT may represent an exercise in accumulation by dispossession essentially producing “surplus populations” whose role is to produce for international rather

than local markets. This dispossession process includes not only land, but also seeds, knowledge and culture, in the name of modernity and development. Indeed, this is completely in line with MNCs wish to increase their value chain control in Tanzania as stated by Yara's strategy manager (Ramberg, 2013).

To facilitate for the expanded control of agribusiness it is, as highlighted in the SAGCOT investment blueprint, vital to have a supportive public sector which provides an enabling environment for agribusinesses to thrive (SAGCOT, 2011). Since economic liberalization during the 1980s Tanzania has taken several steps to facilitate for this. This can be illustrated by the increase in Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) as percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in Tanzania from 7 percent in 1990 to almost 40 percent in 2012. In 2013 Tanzania was the top FDI destination in Eastern Africa (UNCTADSTAT, 2014). The adoption of Kilimo Kwanza in 2009 and subsequently SAGCOT further underscore Tanzania's intention to open up space for agribusinesses. The agribusiness indicators of the World Bank indicates that Tanzania is perceived by agribusinesses as a favourable place to invest their capital (World Bank, 2012).

Despite a wide array of liberalization measures during the last decades the investment blueprint states that ensuring SAGCOT's success depends on further liberalization in key areas (SAGCOT, 2011). Tanzania's framework agreement with NAFSN, whose proposed activities are aligned with SAGCOT (Cooksey, 2013), is aimed towards this and addresses several perceived bottlenecks preventing further agricultural investments. As part of the framework Tanzania commits to undertake a range of policy changes including reducing tariffs and taxes, liberalize production and trade for agricultural inputs and identify, and facilitate access to, land for large-scale agricultural investors. Concrete interventions so far include a 2012 finance bill which waived VAT on irrigation equipment, tractors, and farm implements, the removal of an export ban on food commodities, and the aforementioned alignment of its seed legislation to UPOV (Grow Africa, 2013). Moreover, steps have been taken to demarcate land for investments with plans currently in place to have 15 sites available for large-scale agriculture for rice and sugar within the next few years predominantly in the Kilombero and Rufiji clusters (see chapter six for details on land issues).⁴²

In addition to business enabling policies, two other institutional arrangements are described in the investment blueprint as key to support the growth of agribusinesses in the SAGCOT clusters: Innovative Financing Mechanisms and The SAGCOT centre. The investment blueprint outlines three types of innovative financing to incentivize agribusinesses to establish themselves in the clusters. Firstly, a Catalytic Fund has been established to finance start up costs for agricultural businesses. Businesses can access this fund, provided they demonstrate that their project takes small-scale farmers interests into account, to finance among other things the process of acquiring necessary land rights and negotiating agreements with local communities, to conduct social and environmental surveys or to organize out-grower schemes (SAGCOT, 2011).

Secondly, so called patient capital will be used to provide long term investments in agriculture supporting infrastructure such as irrigation systems, feeder roads and storage facilities that do not provide immediate returns. Thus, such investments will typically be done by the government and donors. It is expected that patient capital and investments in agriculture supporting infrastructure will have a knock on effect and catalyze further privately sourced investments into the clusters of the corridor (SAGCOT, 2011, n.d.-a).

Thirdly, to leverage capital from the domestic banking sector into agriculture increased availability of loan guarantees is argued to be important (SAGCOT, 2011). Such guarantees are normally provided by the public sector as a way of reducing risks associated with commercial bank lending to agricultural investments (SAGCOT, n.d.-a). For example, in March 2014, the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) announced that it will provide US\$ 18.7 million in loan guarantees in support of Eco Energy's sugar project in Bagamoyo (SIDA, 2014). While these three types of "innovative financing" are not intended to directly finance large MNCs as those described above, they do indeed subsidize their expansion in Tanzania in indirect ways by incentivizing establishment of medium and large-scale commercial agricultural enterprises such as the likes of KPL/Agrica and AgroEco Energy. Certainly, these mechanisms contributes in addressing what Cartridge (2007) perceived as one of the main bottlenecks for growing the fertilizer industry in Africa – the low purchasing power of the poor as compared to large commercial farmers. Moreover, they may also indirectly finance land dispossession of small-scale farmers for larger actors.

Alongside these mechanisms the SAGCOT centre was established as a private sector led partnership organization whose aim is to unlock commercial progress within the clusters (Jenkins, 2012). To unlock progress the centre seeks to provide information about investments opportunities, coordinate and connect investments and other activities, and monitor the progress. Moreover, it also seeks to identify constraints in the policy environment that prevents the growth of commercial activities in the corridor (Jenkins, 2012; SAGCOT, 2011). Essentially, the centre is providing a link between business and the government through which dialogue is facilitated and where business can make a unified pressure towards the government to change policies that is at odds with their own interests. The aforementioned removal of an export ban is the result of such pressure.⁴³ Indeed, since economical power translates into political power (Hendrickson & Heffernan, 2002), the corporations involved in SAGCOT holds considerable weight in influencing policies in ways that favour them. This opportunity to influence policies through the SAGCOT centre seems to be more or less reserved for these businesses and a selective part of civil society which provides a ‘legitimizing front’ (Hendrickson & Heffernan, 2002, p. 358; SAGCOT, 2014). As seen from the discussion above, small-scale farmers neither have, nor are they given, similar opportunities. In this context, MVIWATA questions

[...]why is there so much focus on creating a conducive environment for business interests instead of trying to create conducive environments for small-scale farmers in which they have sovereign control over their resources and are able to participate in fair markets while growing the food they want how they want? ⁴⁴

5.5 Concluding Comments

In this chapter my intention has been to illustrate how the SAGCOT initiative represents an expansion of the corporate food regime. Informed by underlying discourses of scarcity, the SAGCOT initiative is formed through the vision of agribusiness corporations which through a value-chain approach seeks to enhance their control over Tanzanian agriculture and capitalize on what is perceived to be lands and resources of untapped potential. As part of this approach Tanzanian small-scale farmers are assumed to benefit widely via their inclusion in international value-chains, for example through SAGCOT’s out-grower model. In fact, small-scale farmers are held forward as the most important partners in SAGCOT ultimately determining the success of the initiative.

However, I have shown that small-scale farmers and their organizations to a significant degree have been excluded from SAGCOT planning processes. Instead of being a coalition of the willing allowing anyone with an interest to contribute (Jenkins, 2012), the initiative has from the onset been led and held within the confines of corporations in close relationship with governments and various donor organizations. While SAGCOT publicly welcomes small-scale farmers groups and other organizations to participate and leave feedback, they are asked to do so in ways which conforms to the underlying ideologies of the corporate food regime. Hence, as a reformist compromise, organizations conceived of as “pragmatic” or “constructive” are given a greater space to participate, whereas organizations perceived of as “activists” are compromised or outright excluded. The latter is illustrated by the lack of involvement by MVIWATA - the largest organization for small-scale farmers in Tanzania - whose agricultural development philosophy is not aligned with that of SAGCOT.

Via the development of clusters of inter-connected agricultural businesses SAGCOT facilitates a vertical integration of an alliance of multinational agribusiness corporations. Considering the immense economical and political power shared among these corporations, backed by national and international government institutions and donors, there is a potential for SAGCOT becoming a corridor of power in which benefit streams are monopolized upwards in the value-chain (Byers & Rampa, 2013). SAGCOT exemplifies an expansion of the corporate food regime whereby Tanzanian agriculture risks subsumption to global capital, that is, an agro-industrial sector disconnected from local natural resources, being dependent on importing inputs, technology and knowledge. As an inherent part of this expansion, small-scale farmers are envisioned incorporated in international value-chains, albeit as subordinated units of production, through for example out-grower schemes mediated by a debt relation. Hence, SAGCOT may potentially represent a process of “accumulation by dispossession” (Harvey, 2006) displacing local forms of production, eroding traditional knowledge, and ultimately undermining the autonomy of small-scale farmers.

The challenge for Tanzania lays in developing alternatives to agricultural development which distanciates farmers from the corporate controlled input and output markets. Such alternatives exist and needs to recognize both demands for healthy and nutritious food and promote relations of production and distribution which encourage a dynamic rural economy and secure small-scale farmers’ autonomy.

6.0 Taking SAGCOT to the Field: The Issue of Land

6.1 Introduction

Land is the most fundamental asset within the agroecosystem. It is an asset which cannot be consumed, but which access to, and maintenance of, is directly generating food and livelihoods for billions of people worldwide. This livelihood generating source will always remain a fixed asset, meaning that the absolute supply of land can neither be increased nor reduced. Yet, people might still experience land scarcity as a result of environmental change reducing land quality or via inequitable distribution emanating from political and economic prioritizations and associated power struggles. In this latter context, land scarcity manifests itself through the politically oriented notion of scarcity for some, and abundance for others (Scoones et al., 2014). This is a core issue as the corporate food regime seeks to expand in Tanzania through the SAGCOT initiative.

At the backdrop of a triple crisis of food, fuel and finance, governments, development institutions and MNCs are seeking to find ways to transform land use and agricultural practices – especially across the African continent (NAFSN, 2012; WEF, n.d). This transformation entails a shift from what is often considered inefficient and stagnant peasant agriculture, towards a modern, industrial and capital intensive agricultural sector. As an inherent part of this process the concept of “land mobility” is often deployed (Patel, 2012). It refers not to the movement of land per se, but essentially to the movement of people working the land. That is, access to and control of land change from those considered to be inefficient land users (i.e. peasant farmers) towards those that are assumed to be more efficient producers and able to achieve economies of scale (Patel, 2012). “land mobility”, in other words, lies at the heart of a corporate food regime expansion, and appear as a depoliticized substitute to related concepts such as accumulation by dispossession (Harvey, 2006) and de-peasantization (Araghi, 1995). It is a process through which land scarcity as defined above may materialize as small-scale farmers and pastoralists are dispossessed of their land in the name of efficiency and productivity.

“Mobilizing” land is a key to facilitate the expansion of the corporate food regime in Tanzania. Access to ample suitable land for commercial agriculture is listed as one of the

principal requirements to implement the SAGCOT initiative (SAGCOT, 2011). Accordingly, Tanzania currently endeavor to create an enabling environment to incentivize investments and facilitate access for investors to fertile land considered “unused” or “underutilized” (SAGCOT, 2011). The implementation of the SAGCOT initiative indicates that the Tanzanian government, together with other SAGCOT partners, readily assumes that such land is available. ‘There will be no problems with land’ was a common phrase unequivocally stated by various government officials during interviews undertaken as part of the fieldwork for this thesis. Other reports also highlight this perception and further quotes high level SAGCOT officials as saying that there are ‘hundreds of thousands of “unused and unoccupied” hectares of land’ within the designated SAGCOT areas (Boudreaux, 2012, p. 2). However, as I have argued in the previous chapter, these assumptions about land availability for commercial large-scale agriculture are highly problematic.

While the SAGCOT area may contain vast amounts of land suitable for agricultural investments, the crucial questions is, from whom, and under what circumstances, will these hundreds of thousands of hectares come (Boudreaux, 2012; Tenga & Kironde, 2012)? There are concerns that SAGCOT with its strong emphasis on agricultural commercialization will sideline Tanzania’s small-scale farmers by dispossessing them of their land and reducing their role in agricultural production to one in which they are turned ‘into mere labourers’ on large plantations (FIAN, 2014; Provost & Kabendera, 2014; Sulle & Hall, 2014). In similar words, Boudreaux (2012) argue that SAGCOT may result in a situation where the role of small-scale farmers is undermined in an attempt to create space for large-scale commercial producers. Moreover, the Strategic Regional Environmental and Social Assessment (SRESA) for SAGCOT also highlights the potential for conflicts over land (URT, 2013b). While these concerns are relatively widespread, there is currently little information as to what is actually happening on the ground in terms of identifying and acquiring land for investments under SAGCOT. This chapter is an attempt to fill this gap.

The chapter is structured as follows. Firstly, I will present a brief background on the issue of land and its legislation in Tanzania. This is necessary so as to understand the overall legal framework guiding land and land acquisition for SAGCOT investment projects. Secondly, I will provide a brief general discussion on the land issue for SAGCOT and present an overview of existing plans and status. Lastly, a significant portion of this chapter will be devoted to a presentation and discussion of two planned investment sites – Kisaki-Gomero

and Ruipa - within the proposed SAGCOT area with an emphasis on the processes of identifying and acquiring land that is to be offered to investors. Against the background of investigation carried out in villages surrounding these two planned investment sites, I argue that an expansion of the corporate food regime in Tanzania through SAGCOT may represent a widespread exercise in land dispossession of small-scale farmers and pastoralists. As such, the SAGCOT initiative may further a situation characterized by land scarcity for some (small-scale farmers and pastoralists), and abundance for others (commercial large-scale farmers/companies). First, let me start with a brief background to land administration in Tanzania.

6.2 A Brief Background to Land Administration in Tanzania

The contemporary environment for land administration is informed by Tanzania's experience of colonial rule. Before turning our attention to the contemporary context, it is important to briefly consider some of the history relating to land administration in Tanzania.

The first European colonizers of mainland Tanzania, the Imperial German Government, in 1895 enacted the Imperial Decree which declared all land, occupied or not, as crown land vested in the German empire. When Great Britain acquired control of the colony in the wake of the First World War the crown ownership of land remained intact (Maghimbi et al., 2011; Nzioki, 2006). In 1923 the British introduced the Land Ordinance system (Maghimbi et al., 2011). Under this system land rights were under the control of the Governor to be held, used, or disposed of, as deemed or granted rights of occupancy for periods up to 99 years (Maghimbi et al., 2011; Nzioki, 2006). Maghimbi et al., (2011) argue that the Land Ordinance of 1923, which declared all lands as public land, facilitated land dispossession of rural communities legitimized through ambiguous wording by stating that land shall be held under the British Crown for the direct, or indirect, benefit 'of the natives of the Territory' (p. 26). This centralized system functionally subordinated customary rights to land to those rights deemed or granted by the colonial state for the "benefit" of the natives (Shivji, 1998).

When Tanzania gained independence in 1961 substantial parts of the legislation on land from the colonial period remained intact. It retained the notion that all land in the country should be held publically with the President as the ultimate title holder as a trustee for all natives of

the country (Sulle & Nelson, 2009). During this period, the socialist development trajectory, and then subsequently the neoliberal turn in the 1980s, led to land and agricultural policies which were somewhat contradictory. Amidst pressures to liberalize the Tanzanian economy the land administration remained centralized (Sulle & Nelson, 2009). These contradictions sparked land conflicts, widespread confusion and rural discontent with the land policy and eventually led to the appointment of a Presidential Commission of Enquiry into Land Matters in 1991 (Ikdhahl, Hellum, Kaarhus, Benjaminsen, & Kameri-Mbote, 2005). The commission published its findings in 1994 and was followed by the current land policy in 1997. Subsequently the contemporary land acts of 1999 were issued and came into force in 2001, and has been amended several times since then (Nzioki, 2006; Sundet, 2005).

The principal legislation governing tenure and access to land which came into force in 2001 are the Land Act and the Village Land Act of 1999. These acts regulate three main categories of land: Village Land, General Land and reserve land. Village Land is land found within the demarcated or agreed boundaries of Tanzania's 12000 villages. Of the total land area in the country this category makes up approximately 70 percent and is administered by the village councils through the authority of the village assembly, and on behalf of the President. Twenty eight percent of the land area is Reserved land and is set aside for sectoral legislation. It includes national parks, game reserves and forest reserves. Lastly, General Land includes predominantly urban areas and government controlled estates. This latter category makes up about 2 percent of the land area and is covered by the Land Act (Sundet, 2005; Tenga & Kironde, 2012). The current legislation retain the radical title in the hands of the president as a trustee for and on behalf of all the citizens of Tanzania and is thus still informed by the colonial Land Ordinance of 1923 (Ikdhahl et al., 2005; Shivji, 1998). An important change in the new legislation is that customary land rights are made legally equivalent to granted rights of occupancy - a reason why many consider the Tanzanian legislation as one of the most progressive and well formulated in Africa.

It is the Village Land Act which provides the overall framework for Village Land and the legal recognition of customary rights to land. Through this act villages and villagers can formalize claims on land by applying for Certificates of Village Land (CVL) and Customary Rights of Occupancy (CCRO) respectively. The process of securing these rights start with the demarcation of village boundaries and the preparation of Village Land Use Plans (VLUP). The VLUP is supposed to be prepared by the village with support from district and

sometimes central government authorities. For various reasons, primarily due to financial constraints, the VLUP process have been slow and so far it is considered that only between 700 and 800 villages in the country have land use plans (Tenga & Kironde, 2012).

Through the VLUP process three different categories of land should be allocated within the demarcated village borders. Firstly, communal Village Land which includes lands for school buildings, pastures, or forest areas. Secondly, individual and family land which includes settlements and land for agricultural activities. And thirdly, reserved land which includes land used for individual or communal purposes or which is saved for future generations. The village category of reserved land must therefore not be confused with the national Reserved Land category (Boudreaux, 2012; Tenga & Kironde, 2012). The village councils can, through the authority of the village assembly, to a certain extent, allocate the third category of Village Land to Tanzanian citizens from both within and outside of the village. At this point those who have been allocated land from village authorities may begin the lengthy and costly process of applying for a CCRO from the Ministry of Lands (Tenga & Kironde, 2012).

While widely considered as one of the most progressive legislations on land in Africa, the two acts are often not implemented as envisaged. This may in some instances compromise village authorities vis-a-vis investors or higher authorities during land use planning processes (Tenga & Kironde, 2012). In this context, it is important to mention some apparent pitfalls of the legislation which jeopardizes tenure security for villagers. One major issue surrounds the third category of Village Land as defined above and the inconsistent definitions of General Land in the Land Act and the Village Land Act. Whereas the Village Land Act defines General Land as `all public land which is not reserved land or Village Land` (URT, 1999b, p. 14), the Land Act defines General Land as `all public land which is not reserved land or Village Land and *includes un-occupied or unused Village Land*` (my emphasis) (URT, 1999a, p. 24). These ambiguities make it possible to locate General Land anywhere as long as that land is not used or occupied. This opens up for arbitrary interpretations of what is considered as “excess” or “unused” land. As Sundet (2005) notes, this “excess” or “unused” land, which may be used for various economic activities or saved for future generations, are thus no longer under the jurisdiction of the village council, but instead the central government (Sundet, 2005). This is significant in the context of SAGCOT because it is predominantly General Land that will be accessible for investors. Thus, as Tenga & Kironde (2012) comments:

Because it is the national government that determines the allocation of General Land and that directly benefits from leasing General Lands, adopting this broad definition of General Land places villages at risk of loss of land, use rights, and potential revenue or other benefits; it also creates opportunities for corruption (p. 97).

Furthermore, the vested trusteeship power over land empowers the president to transfer any area of Village Land or reserved land to General Land for public interest. Such public interest includes investments of national interests (URT, 1999b). While it is not clear what such national interests include, it opens up for neoliberal interpretations within the corporate food regime. As Shivji aptly sums up, under ‘neoliberalism the private investor – a former Zimbabwean settler, a Boer farmer from South Africa or a US seed company experimenting on GMO – can dispossess a customary owner, *through* the state, because the state says it is in “public interest”’ (Shivji, 2006).⁴⁵ Given the strong support of the government, and the president specifically, the SAGCOT initiative clearly falls within the definition of investments of national interests (Boudreaux, 2012). Furthermore, while the Village Land Act authorizes village assemblies to approve or refuse transfers of Village Land less than 250 hectares, transfers that exceeds this size are subject to approval by the Minister of Lands after *considering* any recommendations made by the village assembly (Tenga & Kironde, 2012). In other words, Village Land transfers that are likely to have a greater impact are ultimately moved beyond the control of those utilizing those lands. Indeed, as already mentioned, these pitfalls inherent in the legislation provide openings for elites and authorities higher up to compromise village decision making power. Taking into account the ‘long-established narrative in Tanzanian development policy that smallholder pastoralists and farmers are inefficient, do not contribute sufficiently to the development of the nation, and are in need of “transformation”’ (Sulle & Nelson, 2009, p. 36), villagers land rights are in jeopardy. The final decision of Village Land transfers hence lies with the government, which then goes on to determine what compensation should be paid. It is stipulated in the legislation that no Village Land can be transferred until the type, amount, method and timing of the payment of compensation has been agreed upon (URT, 1999b).

Lastly, under the current legislation, foreign investors cannot lease Village Land directly. This land must first change legal status to General Land after which process the investor contracts directly with the government. It is the Tanzania Investment Center (TIC) which normally holds the Granted Right of Occupancy. TIC then provides Derivative Rights to the

land for the investor (Sulle & Nelson, 2009). An illustrative example of this process can be seen below.




Figure 1-1: Example of a land acquisition process for foreign investors in Tanzania adopted from Bergius (2012a). See also Mousseau & Mittal (2011), Sulle & Nelson (2009) and URT (2010a). The Land Act states that non-citizens are not allowed to own land in Tanzania, but may obtain user rights to land for investment purposes through a derivative title issued by the TIC, which is based on a leasehold system for up to 99 years (URT, 1999a). Land can also be acquired through conveyance where the title is transferred to another company or individual.

6.3 Overview of Land in SAGCOT

It is generally held that Tanzania has about 94.5 million hectares of land. As put out above approximately 70 percent, or 66 million hectares, of this is administered by the village councils through the authority of the village assembly and is thus categorized as Village Land. The total area which according to the SAGCOT investment blueprint is considered to be suitable for agriculture within the SAGCOT area, which cuts across from Sumbawanga in the West all the way to the Indian Ocean in the East, amounts to 7.5 million hectares. Except from some urban areas and old government estates, the vast majority of this land is Village Land (URT, 2013b). The investment blueprint envisions that if 300 000 hectares of this land are put under commercial agricultural production massive gains in terms of reduced poverty and food insecurity will be achieved (SAGCOT, 2011). However, as I have posed earlier, from whom and how this land will be made available remains a mute question.

The likely answer is from the villages within the corridor. There is simply not enough General Land in the rural areas to facilitate for this commercialization alone.⁴⁶ Indeed, the General Director of the National Commission for Land Use Planning has stated that in order to open up investment space for commercial development in SAGCOT the government seeks to transfer about 18 percent of Village Land to General Land to increase the overall percentage of General Land to about 20 percent (Boudreaux, 2012).⁴⁷ This indicates a strong belief on behalf of the Tanzanian government that SAGCOT represents investment opportunities that are considered to be of “national interests” and that any opposition to such land transfers should not come in the way of the overall interests of the nation, and potential investors. Furthermore, it points towards a perception amongst government officials that the SAGCOT area consists of substantial amounts of “unused” land that can easily be converted to General Land and leased out to what is often, but not exclusively, foreign investors.

Despite widespread perceptions that there are vast amounts of land available for investments within the SAGCOT area, there are no reliable sources of information confirming how much and what type of land is available. One presentation given by the Minister for Lands, Housing & Human Settlements to an agribusiness investment event in 2012 boasts of more than 900 000 hectares of land having been identified for potential investments within the SAGCOT area (SAGCOT, 2012b). However, as Boudreaux (2012) points out and what has also appeared during interviews for this thesis, it is very likely that the “on-the-ground reality” is that there is little land that is currently legally available for the government to lease out to investors. Indeed, this points back to why the government is eager to increase the amount of General Land within the corridor. As for the SAGCOT areas specifically, it is the Rufiji Basin Development Authority (RUBADA) which has been mandated to facilitate Village Land use planning processes (UNDP, 2013).

RUBADA is established by an Act of Parliament of 1975 entitled the Rufiji Basin Development Authority Act. RUBADA’s functions according to the act includes; promotion of investments and facilitation of development activities within an ‘Area of Land through or along which the Rufiji River flows’ (Tenga & Kironde, 2012, p. 69). This includes the majority of the SAGCOT area, and plans are underway to amend the RUBADA act to expand its geographical authority to cover the whole SAGCOT project area.⁴⁸ RUBADA is mandated to undertake VLUP’s across the SAGCOT region and as part of that process identify land for investments. When the land use plans are completed and approved by village assemblies

RUBADA will notify the TIC about the amount of land that is available for investments which then goes on to promote it to investors.⁴⁹ Often, however, investors come directly to RUBADA leading to claims that the authority will effectively ‘become the land bank for the corridor’ (Tenga & Kironde, 2012, p. 70; UNDP, 2013). According to RUBADA’s General Director RUBADA differs from other government institutions that undertake land use plans as one of its principal aims is to identify suitable land for agricultural investments.⁵⁰ This explicitly indicates that as RUBADA undertakes VLUP’s within the SAGCOT area its first priority is to identify investment land, while land tenure security for villagers becomes a subordinated prioritization.⁵¹ It is stated to be a substantial political pressure from above to identify suitable investment areas.⁵² Through interviews it has evolved that the only thing missing to get SAGCOT to a “take off” stage is to identify and acquire land that can be offered to investors. As will be shown below, this top-down pressure may force small-scale farmers and pastoralists at the village level to surrender rights to land to open up space for agricultural investors in the name of “national interests”.

According to the investment blueprint the SAGCOT initiative will in the early stage prioritize areas where rapid development and immediate gains can be achieved. Out of the six areas, termed clusters, that are identified in the investment blueprint, the Kilombero and Rufiji clusters are believed to contain significant potential to achieve “early wins” (SAGCOT, 2011). In line with this, RUBADA’s General Director reported that the authority is currently prioritizing land use planning work around 14-16 potential investment sites for SAGCOT.⁵³ These sites are summarized in the table below.

Table 6-1: Overview of sites currently prioritized for SAGCOT investments. This overview is based on information provided by the General Director of RUBADA.⁵⁴ The overview may not show a total and accurate picture of planned activities within SAGCOT. It should also be mentioned that it does not include investment projects that are already underway.

Site	Location	Size (ha)	Crop	Description
Mkongongo	Rufiji cluster	20 000	sugar	This site was prepared for the Korean Rural Community Cooperation (KRC) some years back for rice production. The company planned to invest more than US\$50 million; 5 000ha was planned to be utilised as a demonstration of irrigation rice farm jointly owned by KRC and RUBADA. Another 5 000ha was set aside for smallholders and 5 000ha for small industries. However, KRC is now said to have pulled out of the project for unknown reasons. Instead, the site is now earmarked for sugar investors where 20 000ha are planned for the nucleus farm, and

				5000ha for outgrower schemes. However, it is reported to be some controversies in the area with regards to land. That may also be a reason why the KRC eventually pulled out? The surrounding area is to be the destination for a planned agricultural youth camp aiming to educate new generations of outgrowers. According to RUBADA, this camp will be an “outgrower generating engine”.
Muhoro	Rufiji cluster	20 000	sugar	The total area of the Muhoro site is according to RUBADA 36 000 ha. 20 000ha is planned for the nucleus farm while the remaining will be for outgrowers. An investor is said to be preparing the area, but the current status is unknown.
Tawi/Utunge	Rufiji cluster	20 000	sugar	The Swedish company SEKAB tried to acquire this site some few years back but withdrew, allegedly due to funding problems. The current status of the area is also unknown, but it is among the earmarked sites for SAGCOT. In relation to SEKAB’s previous plans an Environmental and Social Impact Assessment was prepared by the Swedish consultant company Orgut. It demonstrated the major negative social and environmental consequences of the project if it were to be established.
Lukulilo	Rufiji cluster	8 000	rice	The Lukulilo site has already been finalized and the investor is expected to start production sometime this year. The firm is said to be owned by James Maynard from the UK and is called Lukulilo Farms Ltd. The 8000ha which is planned for the project is surrounded by 4 villages: Ndundunyikanza, Nyaminywili, Kipugira and Kipo.
Mvuha and Kisaki	Kilombero cluster	20 000 x 2	sugar	The Mvuha and Kisaki sites are located close to each other in close proximity to the Tazara railway. A preliminary survey has been done, but the exact location and size of the sites has not yet been decided. In addition to the sugar projects planned for the area, an investor is also interested in establishing smaller farms for the purpose of agrotourism. The Kisaki site is located very close to both the Selous Game Reserve and the Mikumi National Park.
Kiberege	Kilombero cluster	20 000	sugar	In Kiberege sugar cane cultivation is already underway by the Kiberege Prison. The plan is to expand the current area with another 20 000ha (through a partnership between Kiberege/RUBADA) and to attract private investors to establish a processing factory. The Illovo/Kilombero Sugar Company plantation is located only 60km away from Kiberege.
Mkulazi	Kilombero cluster	60 000	sugar (25 000ha x 2) Rice (5 000 ha x 2)	An invitation was sent out in March last year to investors to express interest for acquiring and developing the Mkulazi farm site for sugar or rice crops. Several investors are said to have expressed their interest for the site, but little has happened so

				far. Apparently, the site is reported to have too low water capacity to supply the planned projects. Additionally, the river which passes through the site is the same river which will provide water for another large-scale sugar project in Bagamoyo on the Tanzanian East coast. The land title for this area is with the TIC.
Ruipa	Kilombero cluster	10 000	sugar	The Ruipa site is located some few km from Ifakara town, the district capital of Kilombero. There have been some conflicts surrounding earlier projects in this area. Despite these conflicts, the site is still planned to be promoted to investors.
Kihansi	Kilombero cluster	5 000	rice	Unknown status
Ngalimila	Kilombero cluster	5 000	rice	Unknown status
Ulanga	Kilombero cluster	not known	rice	Unknown status
Manda	Ludewa cluster	20 000	sugar	This area has only been roughly identified and land use plans have not yet been undertaken.

Two of these sites – Kisasi-Gomero and Ruipa - will in the next section be subject to a closer analysis. I will particularly focus on the Ruipa site because this site has a longer history and has reached a more advanced stage of establishment. The two proposed investment sites are both located within the Kilombero cluster along the southern corridor. While the Ruipa site is found in the Kilombero district the Kisasi site is located in the district of Morogoro. Both sites are thought to offer considerable potential for commercial sugar cane production through establishments of large plantations with out-growers connected to these. Lastly, as for the Ruipa site, it should be mentioned that the plans to develop a sugar industry was in place before the initiation of the SAGCOT initiative. Nevertheless, the experiences from Ruipa both before, and after, the launch of SAGCOT provides valuable insights to the process of identifying and acquiring land for SAGCOT investments in general.

6.4 The "Race" for Land in SAGCOT

In a context of rising interest in farmland, Tanzania has agreed to adopt and implement regulations to guide land use planning and land acquisition processes. Some of these reformist measures includes the Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security (CFS guidelines) and the G8 Land Transparency Partnership which, as its name implies, is first and foremost focussed towards enhancing *transparency* of large-scale land deals (Herzler, 2014). For SAGCOT specifically, a Resettlement Policy Framework (RPF) has been proposed to

establish guidelines on how to ensure “best practice” when SAGCOT investments require resettlement and compensation.

Although some of these regulations, especially the CFS guidelines, are progressive in terms of enhancing land rights of small-scale farmers and pastoralists, they occur in a reformist context of the corporate food regime in which the aim is to find ways to acquire land for large-scale agricultural investments “responsibly” and “transparently”. Whereas the CFS guidelines as its first point emphasize that land governance should be tilted towards improving tenure security for vulnerable and marginalized people to ensure the realization of the right to adequate food, poverty reduction and sustainable livelihoods, the G8 Land Transparency Partnership, on the contrary, lists improving ‘transparency and benefits of large-scale land deals’ as a primary objective. It should be noted, as Herzler (2014) observes, that the NAFSN framework agreement with Tanzania somewhat ambiguously confirms merely ‘to take account’ of the CFS guidelines instead of it forming the centrepiece of the agreement. As do the G8 Land Transparency partnership, the SAGCOT RPF (URT, 2013a) puts emphasis on how large-scale investments, compensation and resettlements can be organized in ways that reduce harm and increase benefits for people affected by investments. Among its ten guiding principles it states that involuntary resettlement and land acquisition will be avoided where feasible, or minimized, where it cannot be eliminated. Furthermore, where involuntary resettlement and land acquisition are considered *unavoidable*, resettlement and compensation activities will be conceived and executed as sustainable development programs. Additionally, “Project Affected People” will be meaningfully consulted and will participate in planning and implementing the resettlement activities’ (URT, 2013a). These guidelines, and in particular the two latter, assumes that large-scale land acquisition for agribusinesses is, if not the only, a primary vehicle to achieve agricultural development. In the course to achieve this, evicting small-scale family farmers may be an “unavoidable” but “necessary” cost. Such evictions are made politically palatable by framing them as “sustainable development program”. Despite being rhetorically framed as an initiative putting small-scale farmers at the front, SAGCOT is instead a project tilted towards placing fertile farmland in the hands of agribusinesses, rather than small-scale farmers. As Haki Ardhi (Tomitho & Myer, 2012) observe, current Village Land use planning in the Morogoro region seem to concentrate along low lying areas amenable to large-scale mechanized farming.

A presentation given by one of the first investors under the SAGCOT initiative, Agrica/KPL, states that evictions and resettlement of people will 'be an issue for any new farm in East Africa' (Agrica/KPL, n.d.). Indeed, this acknowledges the fact that land is not available to the extent often proposed within corporate and government circles in Tanzania. Nevertheless, in a quest to accommodate the "interests of the nation" the areas which is currently identified for investments under SAGCOT includes some of the most fertile lands in the country. 'The proposed SAGCOT area is in fact the food basket area which is feeding the entire nation', the head of a Morogoro based organization stated in an interview.⁵⁵ It is these fertile lands that corporations want to access to maximize production and profits, and it is also these areas Tanzanian small-scale farmers and pastoralists want access to for food cultivation and grazing. Together this creates a great demand for land within the corridor (Herzler, 2014).

In the villages surrounding the two proposed investment sites of Kisasi-Gomero and Ruipa, the demand for land is characterized by the rapidly increasing population. This increase can be partly attributed to the high amount of in-migrants searching for more fertile lands. One in-migrant to Nyarutanga village (Kisasi-Gomero) explained:

The main reason I came here was that there was a shortage of good land in my previous location. For four successive years I cultivated without getting anything. I wanted to improve the health status of me and my family, so I decided to look for a new area that could suit our needs. So I decided to talk with my husband and we decided to leave Shinyanga to go to Dodoma to my sister's son. Then we asked him, 'is it possible for us to stay here in this area?' And he said, 'no, this area is not good for you, but I will go somewhere to find a good and fertile place for you.' Then he went here to Nyarutanga and surveyed the area and found that this is a good place to stay. Then I reported to the village authorities which allowed me to settle here. This land is so good for us.⁵⁶

Another in-migrant living in Namwawala village (Ruipa) expressed similarly:

The main reason I decided to come here was that the area had good and fertile land for cultivation to suit my needs. In this area I am able to get sufficient food for my family. I will feel so bad and remain crying if I lose this place. This area is so fertile and good for us and I want to stay here as long as possible.⁵⁷

In recognizing the high demand for land government representatives in Tanzania have stated that the government 'needs to move fast' in order to acquire land for the proposed investment projects to avoid problems of having 'too many' people moving to and residing within

investment sites. Such “problems” has materialized throughout Tanzania with the high demand for land prompting small-scale farmers and pastoralists to settle within abandoned state ranches. In Bagamoyo, a sugar investment project was implemented at a former state ranch. The Razaba ranch, as it was called, was acquired by the state

‘in 1976 and abandoned in 1993. In the decades since Razaba was abandoned by the state, people from several villages including pastoralists, farmers, and charcoal-makers established their livelihoods on the former ranch. One village has built houses on it and laid claim to the land using customary forms of organization. However, the state continues in the process of transferring the land to an investor [Agro Eco Energy] for a large-scale sugar project (Herzler, 2014, p. 9).’

Ultimately the high demand for land manifests itself through a “race” for the most productive land areas between the Tanzanian government and those seeking high returns on their investments, and small-scale farmers and pastoralists seeking to secure and improve their livelihood security. This “race” leads to a competition over fertile land, and have in some cases developed in to violent conflicts. In 2012-2013 several people were injured and/or killed by the police in conjunction with a forceful eviction exercise of pastoralists and agro-pastoralists taking place in Kilombero and Ulanga districts (IWGIA, 2013). In November 2013 a confrontation between farmers and pastoralists in Mvomero district ended in a tragedy and left one dead and 39 injured (Shariff & Mtanda, 2013). Forced evictions of pastoralists and agro-pastoralists also took place in Morogoro district in October 2013 after mounting conflicts with farmers in the area. All these locations are within the proposed SAGCOT area. The conflicts have been linked with the SAGCOT initiative (IWGIA, 2013), as well as with other large-scale agricultural projects and conservation initiatives taking place in the country contributing to higher demands for land and “squeezing” farmers and pastoralists together on increasingly smaller areas.⁵⁸ Some small-scale farmers in Kilombero district went as far as terming themselves “investment refugees”. One of these explained:

Previously I was living in Mbeya [South-Western Tanzania]. When I lived there I was forced to move because they took a large part of my land for investment in rice production. After being forced of my land in Mbeya I went to Msolwa [Kilombero District] to start a new life there. But when the sugar factory needed more land in Msolwa the same thing happened to me one more time. So I moved here. And what now, I might lose my land once again, where can I go? You know, the investors took the land of many people in Msolwa, and many of these moved here [to Namwawala] to continue farming. If they take our land again, where can we go?⁵⁹

This “squeezing” trend and increased competition for land is likely to exacerbate under the current agricultural policies focussed towards large-scale commercial agriculture. In contrast to the frequently stated perception that land is widely available for large-scale agricultural investments, the high demand for land and the associated conflicts is one indication showing that such perceptions are likely to be based on false assumptions (see chapter 5). In this context it is a worrying sign that government institutions, such as RUBADA, are seeing it necessary to ‘move fast’ in order to open up space for the expansion of the corporate food regime. When the RUBADA, together with district authorities in Morogoro, in 2012 approached a number of villages surrounding the proposed SAGCOT sugar investment site Kisasi-Gomero this “fast-tracking approach” was evident.

The purpose of these visits was to sensitize village authorities and villagers about the benefits that accrue from agricultural investment projects in an attempt to persuade villagers to free up parts of the land under their administration for SAGCOT (Tomitho & Myer, 2012).⁶⁰ As they approached the villages the RUBADA and the district authorities requested land amounting to between 3000 to 5000 hectares located nearby the river which flows through the villages (Tomitho & Myer, 2012).⁶¹ A RUBADA representative stated that before embarking on village visits they normally prepare in such a way that they are able to ‘do as many villages as possible in one day’.⁶² Haki Ardhi (Tomitho & Myer, 2012) reports that Village Assembly meetings in some of the villages surrounding the Kisasi-Gomero site were conducted just a few hours after RUBADA’s initial meetings with the Village Councils. This means that too little time was allocated both to evaluate and discuss the issue and for the village authorities to organize a village assembly with a meaningful attendance rate (Tomitho & Myer, 2012). This is another indication that Village Land use planning within the SAGCOT area is first and foremost geared towards securing enough land for the implementation of SAGCOT offering little space for an informed participation of villagers to influence the process. Rather, the exercise has been fraught with violations of the rights of farmers and pastoralists.

6.4.1 Arbitrary Exercise of Power and Arrests of Opposing Villagers

It is of concern that the SAGCOT initiative and its focus on large-scale commercial agriculture will jeopardize land rights of small-scale farmers and pastoralists and further intensify land conflicts (Boudreaux, 2012; Herzler, 2014). In the Ruipa area, and to some

extent also Kisasi-Gomero, tensions are building as a result of the attempts to allocate Village Land to large-scale commercial agriculture. In Ruipa, this tension is amplified by the expansion of the nearby Udzungwa national park and the Ramsar wetland protection area leaving farmers and pastoralists with less land from which to make a living and with modest potential for expansion of their activities.⁶³ A representative of the district authorities in Kilombero, where the Ruipa site is located, acknowledged that the villagers faced an increasingly complicated situation and that the “squeeze” of farmers and pastoralists were further compounded by the current plans to establish a sugar cane plantation under SAGCOT.⁶⁴ This has set the parameters for the intense conflict currently evolving in Ruipa.

First it is necessary to briefly consider the historical background of the Ruipa site. The area has a history of conflict and was actually identified and demarcated a long time before SAGCOT was initiated. In 1976, a land parcel was identified in the Ruipa area by RUBADA and later surveyed by the Sugar Development Corporation (SUDECO), a Tanzanian parastatal, for the purpose of establishing a sugar cane plantation. Being located right in the heart of the Kilombero Valley and in close proximity to one of the country’s largest rivers, the Kilombero River, the site was thought to offer ideal conditions for sugar cane cultivation. However, the site was prepared in a context of economic crisis and at a stage when several Tanzanian parastatals went bankrupt (Chachage, 2010). Hence, while the site was successfully surveyed, little development materialized on the ground. Then, almost thirty years later, the Sugar Board of Tanzania (SBT) in 2005 revived the plans of developing a sugar industry in the area. The SBT, which is the successor of SUDECO and is under the Ministry of Agriculture, is mandated to promote and develop the sugar industry in the country.

With the revival of the plans in 2005 the central government ordered district authorities in Kilombero District to provide the land to Illovo Sugar Company. Subsequently, through a letter headlined “Titling of land for Illovo Sugar Company in Areas Within Ruipa Valley” Kilombero District authorities communicated these directives to village leaders in four villages: Mbingu, Mofu, Kisegese and Namwawala (Chachage, 2010). In the letter the village authorities were ordered to prepare an emergency village assembly for the purpose of approving the sugar project and for giving land to Illovo. It is clear that this offered little space for village authorities to engage villagers and to have an informed process as to *if* the village assembly should approve the project or not (Haki Ardhi & LHRC, 2009).⁶⁵ The

planned project area initially covered a greater area and more villages than the four mentioned above. Over the long time span between the identification of the site and the revival of the project in 2005 population growth in neighboring villages had been significant. According to local CSO's, Haki Ardhi and the Legal and Human Rights Center (LHRC), the project area that was surveyed in 1976 consisted of 6 blocks; A, B, C, D, E, F. Due to the lack of development on the site blocks D, E, F was later occupied by people and registered as villages (Haki Ardhi & LHRC, 2009). These three blocks were subsequently left out of the project plans by the SBT. The remaining blocks (A, B, C) make up a total land area of approximately 9,300ha and cuts across the four villages mentioned above, with a significant amount of land (6300 hectares) coming from Namwawala village. These areas were decided to be kept for the project despite cutting across Village Land utilized by small-scale farmers and pastoralists.

Despite being a planned plantation site since the 1970s, the directives from the government in 2005 was the first time villagers in Ruipa became aware of the plans for a sugar plantation. Being ordered to simply approve a project of which they had limited information about, and which would entail evictions of thousands of people, did not fall well among villagers. Facing a loss of nearly forty percent of their land the resistance was particularly strong in Namwawala village. Most of the land in this village is located in the populous sub-village of Idandu. As long term residents of the targeted area, villagers, through the village assemblies, rejected to comply with the directives from the district and central government. The villagers

...asserted that according to the Village Land Act Number 5 they have authority over the Village Land and the central government is not supposed to direct them to accept an investor [...]. The central government, on the other hand, is of the view that the area is under its authority as it was valued by SUDECO and it has a title for it (Mgumia & Mvula, 2007 in Chachage, 2010, p. 19).

Another move by the government in 2008 further intensified the situation in the villages, especially in Namwawala. In December that year district land officers called a meeting with villagers in Namwawala to inform them once again that a portion of their Village Land had been ordered to be set aside for a sugar cane plantation. Villagers were informed that this order came from the president and that the acquisition of their land was to the benefit of the nation (Chachage, 2010).⁶⁶ In the same meeting the district land officers also presented a map to the villagers showing the demarcations for the proposed plantation.⁶⁷ However, once again villagers remained sceptical. As one farmer in Namwawala stated:

After the land officers and the village leaders informed us that the president wants to take the land, we asked them, 'if the president wants the land, where is the evidence?' We were then told that to accept or not to accept this investment was none of our business: 'the president wants the land so you have to move out whether you like it or not'.⁶⁸

The top-down and forceful approach fuelled resistance among Namwawala villagers. This resistance was further amplified by the local radio announcement from district authorities in January 2009 ordering villagers living or farming within the project area to prepare and comply with an upcoming valuation of their farms to avoid loss when determining the compensation amount. Facing the prospect of losing large parts of some of their most fertile land villagers gathered to seek clarifications on what had been presented to them as a presidential order. Since no evidence of such order had been presented to the villagers in Namwawala they organized a group ("Namwawala villagers committee") tasked with the responsibility to represent project affected villagers in making an enquiry to the central government. In February 2009 a letter from this group was submitted to the President's Office asking the government to clarify whether or not the president had made an order to acquire the Village Land in line with the provisions set out in the Village Land act. The group also went to the President's Office in Dar es Salaam to follow up on the issue. However, the issue remained unsolved. Commenting on this issue and the process involving presidential acquisition of Village Land, two Tanzanian organizations, Haki Ardhi and LHRC (2009), writes the following in their report:

There are three stages in the process. The first stage is *Preliminary investigation* of suitable land for the intended purpose. Under this stage the responsible organ, among others conducts a survey together with clearing and setting out boundaries of the proposed land. This is what SUDECO did in 1976. The second stage is *giving notice of intention to take the land* after the President is satisfied with it. This notice should be within 6 weeks. This is given by the minister on his behalf. And lastly, *taking possession of the land*. This is done after the compensation is completed [...] The findings have shown that Stage 2 and 3 above were not fulfilled, there is no proof of Presidential acquisition of the land as it is alleged by district officials. Rather, the only evidence available is the survey conducted by SUDECO in 1976 and the Maps showing the planned project (preliminary investigation) (p. 6).

Against this background the LHRC, in their annual Tanzania Human Rights Report, argue that through an arbitrary exercise of power the government was 'forcing the villagers of Namwawala to move out of their lands to pave way for sugar plantation investment' (LHRC, 2010, p. 127). At this point the escalating conflict also reached media headlines. Chachage (2010) refers to a local newspaper headline, 'Namwawala village explodes', accompanied by a subtitle 'that the police have gone on rampage beating people' (p. 19). In a similar tone, a

media article from April 2009 quotes a public servant employed in the district authorities as saying that ‘those who lied to the president should be arrested’ (Venance, 2009). Here, the civil servant refers to the group of villagers from Namwawala who made enquiries to the President’s Office seeking clarifications regarding the presidential acquisition of their Village Land.

It did not take long for these threats to become reality. As the conflict continuously intensified several villagers faced various forms of violation by the government and police forces (Chachage, 2010; Haki Ardhi & LHRC, 2009).⁶⁹ The group of villagers from Namwawala who made enquiries to the President’s Office were arrested and officially charged for an offence of giving false information to a public servant (Haki Ardhi & LHRC, 2009).⁷⁰ Others were arrested reportedly for divulging critical information about the government’s approach to journalists (Chachage, 2010), obstructing the police in exercising its duty (Haki Ardhi & LHRC, 2009), destroying public property, and for forgery of documents.⁷¹ An advocate representative from the LHRC who has been aiding villagers in these cases explains that the arrests and charges filed against them were unjustified.⁷² He further stated that arrest orders in some of these cases were given directly by the leadership within the district authorities, and that the authorities were also involved in fabricating evidence against some villagers – seemingly because they were uncomfortable with having their authority challenged by people they viewed upon as “troublemakers”.⁷³ Nevertheless, due to the lack of authoritative evidence some charges were eventually withdrawn while others were struck out in court (Chachage, 2010).⁷⁴

6.4.2 Uninformed and Coercive Consultation

Amidst the growing conflict in Namwawala the valuation of crops and properties started just weeks after it was announced through the local radio in 2009. The valuation, which was finalized in late 2013, has according to villagers been a catalytic element in the conflict. As previously mentioned, one of the central tenets of the various reformist initiatives that guides land acquisition in Tanzania and for the SAGCOT project specifically is that people who are affected by such acquisitions should be meaningfully consulted and able to participate to secure a transparent valuation and compensation process. However, Haki Ardhi and LHRC (2009) characterize the early stages of this process in Namwawala as disputable and for

failing to comply with necessary legal procedures. Similarly, the advocate from LHRC who aided the villagers in the various court cases stated:

‘The valuation should be participatory and involve the people. In Namwawala they have not done it in the right way. People were just told to sign their name on a piece of paper without actually knowing what they put their signatures on. These valuations that have been done, to me, it is as if they do not exist. It feels as if this valuation process is only political and done just to show that they are doing the “right thing”’⁷⁵

Indeed, doing the “right thing” makes the process of large land acquisitions politically more palatable to external observers. The various reformist measures, such as the CFS guidelines, the G8 Land Transparency Partnership, and the RPF, becomes instruments adopted at the policy level, but which fails to offer any real security for small-scale farmers. In the end, the question is not whether or not large land transfers are the right thing to do, but rather how best to justify them. While adopted at the policy level as external legitimizing strategies, the government bodies mandated to undertake land use planning, identification of investment land and valuation exercises within the SAGCOT area appear to apply these measures in confined ways. Notions of “participation” and “consultation” are restricted to simply informing, and in some cases coercing, villagers into consenting investment projects which are not necessarily in their own interest. Indeed, when some of these government entities were asked during interviews if they adhered to any concrete guidelines during their work “on the ground” there was no mentioning of any specific guidelines, nor did it seem to be any operationalized understanding of what “participatory”, “local consultative” or “transparent” processes would actually entail.

At the village level, in Nyarutanga (Kisaki-Gomero site), villagers explain that they, during meeting(s) with RUBADA, were simply informed about decisions that had already been made on their behalf. Respondents in Nyarutanga reported that the village council had already agreed with RUBADA that a portion of their Village Land would be set aside for investors *before* the issue was taken to the village assembly. They further stated that they in practice had no power to actually influence the decision.⁷⁶ Moreover, the minutes from the village assembly, which are signed by those present at the meeting, is often used to demonstrate that villagers have been consulted and agreed to allocate land for investments.⁷⁷ However, it is important to note that villagers often provide their signatures before the

assembly take place to document their presence, and not necessarily their consent to what was discussed at the meeting.⁷⁸ Even further compromising villager's decision making space was RUBADA's approach which seemed geared towards "selling a business idea" rather than providing a context for meaningful participation. In selling this idea RUBADA, on behalf of a potential future investor, informed villagers about the major benefits that would accrue from an investment in their land, including employment opportunities, infrastructure development and new market opportunities.⁷⁹ At no point were villagers, or village authorities, informed about potential disadvantages linked to the allocation of land for investments. According to village authorities in Vigolegole village (Kisaki-Gomero), RUBADA simply had simply explained: 'one of the disadvantages is that if you disagree to give us land you lose all the potential advantages'.⁸⁰ Similarly, in Milengwelengwe village (Kisaki-Gomero), village authorities asserted that RUBADA adopted a "divide and rule" strategy promising greater benefits to those villagers which agreed to allocate more of their land: 'They [RUBADA] said that if we decide to give a greater area than the other villages then we will get more benefits as compared to those villages who just give a little land'. Indeed, similar incidences concerning large-scale land acquisition has been reported elsewhere in Tanzania (Theting & Brekke, 2010)

Returning to Namwawala, villagers describe the land acquisition process, and particularly the valuation exercise, as coercive and uninformed. One villager said:

'These people came with the assistance of some of the village leaders. They threatened the villagers and said that if they do not participate in the valuation exercise then your land will still be taken and you will be left with no compensation at all'

Another villager who was caught by surprise when government valuers came to do the valuation of his property sought clarifications from them as to the purpose of their visit. According to him the valuers replied: 'every person with land must give it to the government. It is a government issue and we were just sent here to do a job'.⁸¹ Some villagers also explained that government valuers were accompanied by armed police as they were undertaking valuation of crops and properties.⁸² This created fear and anger among many villagers. As one villager described:

You know, this government is hand in hand with business people rather than supporting its own citizens. The people who came here to take pictures and value our farms even brought with them police with firearms. There have been a lot of conflicts in this district so when some of the people saw the firearms they were scared and agreed to have their farms valued. They did not explain to us anything except that they want to bring an investor to the area to produce sugar cane. I denied them to value my farm. I was afraid that if I let them do it they would use it as a proof that I agreed to give my farm away. They can give me millions, and I will still lose in the end.⁸³

The additional fear and anger prompted by the valuation exercise in Namwawala may not come as a surprise given the high degree of resistance towards the sugar plantation by the residents.

The efforts of the government to suppress local resistance towards the sugar plantation are worrying in a context of a corporate expansion in Tanzanian agriculture through SAGCOT. Considering that this expansion is perceived by the Tanzanian government and other SAGCOT partners as critical for the country's development, local opposition to such land transfers may easily be interpreted as an opposition to the wider "interests of the nation". Hence, villagers in Namwawala are considered as "troublemakers" standing in the way of Tanzania's development that needs to be silenced. As the LHRC advocate stated:

...this effort by the government occurs because they believe that if they lock up some of these most vocal opponents the land conflict would be easier to handle. Because, when people hear about situations like that occurring, they get scared and abstain from voicing their opposition'⁸⁴

Several villagers stated in interviews that they feared what might happen to them if they try to voice their resistance. One of them said: 'the government is not trustworthy to us...we don't know who to trust anymore. We don't dare to say anything because if you raise your voice, you don't know what can happen'.⁸⁵ Some villagers have even been hiding away in the local forests fearing night arrests (Haki Ardhi & LHRC, 2009). The approach by the government institutions in the villages surrounding the Kisaki-Gomero and Ruipa sites appears to be rooted in a trend characterized by a compromised space for small-scale farmers and pastoralists to meaningfully influence agricultural development policies within the corporate food regime (see chapter five). These farmers and pastoralists are likely to carry a substantial part of the costs related to large-scale investments in agriculture as they face the threat of expulsion from their land (Bergius, 2012b; Matondi, Havnevik, & Beyene, 2011; Mousseau & Mittal, 2011; Sulle & Nelson, 2009). As one villager stated furiously:

Only the government and the investor will benefit from this, not the people. The people will be removed out of the area, lose their homes and their farms. We don't want these plantations to be established because the whole land will be taken for business, and the peasant will have no land for small-scale farming. We cultivate food, and they cultivate for business. This investment will not benefit us at all.⁸⁶

6.4.3 'They wanted to bribe us, but we will not give our land'

In 2012 the conflict in Namwawala took a new turn. According to media reports the Illovo Sugar Company, which since 2005 intended to expand their operations in Tanzania through the sugar plantation in the Ruipa area, decided to withdraw its interest. It is not clear why Illovo decided to pull out, but according to an article in a Tanzanian newspaper, company representatives cite the 'endless land conflicts' in the area as a major decisive factor prompting the withdrawal (Rugonzibwa, 2012). The perception of "endless land conflicts" illustrates a considerable degree of obstacles standing in the way for the effective implantation of SAGCOT. It illustrates that land is not as easily available as often claimed while it would be politically very unpalatable to forcefully remove large numbers of people to make way for large-scale investments. Despite this, when Illovo pulled out of the project the government remained adamant to find new investors to the site in Ruipa. Amidst the ongoing conflicts in the area, the government started to actively promote the Ruipa site to investors under the SAGCOT initiative (SAGCOT, 2012a).

The Ruipa site was among the areas that were promoted to investors during an Agribusiness Investment Forum held in Dar es Salaam in November, 2012. At this forum, prospective investors were informed that the government was in the final stages of 'site preparation in order to promote and lease it to qualified investors' (SAGCOT, 2012a, p. 30). Investors were also presented with a map showing how parcels for a 9.300ha farm had been demarcated indicating that the area was more or less waiting for an investor to operate the land (figure 7). At no stage in the presentation was there any mentioning of the thousands of people currently living on and/or farming within the prescribed area,⁸⁷ nor was there any mentioning of the major conflict which has evolved in the area since 2005. One small-scale farmer in Namwawala stated angrily:

Although the government promotes this area to investors the situation here is not the way they promote it to be. Sometimes they take pictures and make maps and put them on the internet. They try to make it

look like it is an open area without people living there, while the situation here is opposite. Also, the government is not interested in informing villagers about the importance of land and about their rights. They know very well that if villagers are educated it will be more difficult to get the land they want.⁸⁸

Another small-scale farmer in Namwawala echoed his fellow villager:

There is no such thing called investment for sugar in this village. This whole investment issue is propaganda from the government. When they promote this investment they are saying that no people are living in that area, and that the area is open, which is not true. There is no land available here to establish a plantation and we don't want anything like that. If they come here there will be no land left for us, the area is not big enough. If this is established in the village it will ruin the lives of the people here and for the future generations. We will have nowhere to go, no place to cultivate for food and incomes, and no place for our children to cultivate in the future. So if they establish this investment, where will we go?⁸⁹




Figure 6-2: Map of the Ruipa site as presented at the Agribusiness Investment Forum in 2012 (SAGCOT, 2012a)

Alongside attempts by the government to promote the Ruipa site to investors under the SAGCOT initiative and amidst claims that the government was in the final stages of site preparation, the extent of the conflict in Namwawala was, and still is, significant. In fact, in

addition to the earlier mentioned arrests and criminal charges, the villagers in Namwawala, with the legal aid of LHRC, established a case in the land division of the high court in 2010 (case number 07/2010).⁹⁰ In this case, one of the members of the previously mentioned committee was elected to represent the villagers in a suit against the district authorities and the SBT to prevent the sugar project and for the attempts by the two bodies to remove people without adhering to the legal procedures pertaining to acquisition of Village Land.⁹¹ Recall the legal analysis of Haki Ardhi and LHRC from above that the government had not followed all necessary steps in claiming the land in the Ruipa area.

However, case number 07/2010 was suddenly dropped. An excerpt from a letter sent in June 2013 from Namwawala village to the SBT, and with copies sent to the district authorities, reads as follows:

...Let it be understood that during the initial stages of the project a conflict occurred between the villagers and the government. Through the village assembly dated 31.01.2009...we villagers decided to form a committee to resolve the conflict. In that meeting, [name removed] of the villagers committee was elected to manage the conflict until we eventually decided to drop the case.⁹²

The letter is purportedly sent on behalf of ‘Farmers and Land Owners in the Sugarcane Project Area in Namwawala Village’, but lack information about who authored the letter on their behalf. The advocate from the LHRC who managed the case explains that while the case was proceeding some of the villagers that were involved, including the elected member of the villagers committee, suddenly changed their minds.⁹³ While originally opposing the project, these people made a u-turn and now welcomed the establishment of a sugar plantation in Namwawala. The LHRC advocate stated:

The person they elected to represent the villagers in opposing the project was compromised, so he no longer felt an interest in going forward with the case. Instead he suddenly wanted the plantation to be established.⁹⁴

When the other members of the villagers committee learned that the case had been dropped and that some villagers had changed their view towards the investment plans, they decided to come together to prepare a new lawsuit. Again with the legal assistance of LHRC, case number 40/2012 was established in the land division of the high court.⁹⁵ This time, three

persons from the villagers committee were elected to manage the case together with the LHRC advocate.⁹⁶

Regarding this new case the June 2013 letter to the SBT from Namwawala village reads:

We, five [hundred and] forty nine (549) farmers, who are among those who live in the sugarcane project area and construction site for Ruipa sugar factory request that the project is not compromised by anyone, for personal and political gains, who is not part of that area, and which may lead to an unnecessary conflict. [Name removed] uses case number 40/2012 for political gains without involving the target group. We append a list of our signed names. The information that we, farmers and residents of the project area, have elected [name removed] to manage the dispute and open a case to go against the project is not true...Therefore we do not want to debate. We request that the case [40/2012] is dropped immediately for our benefit and of the nation in general.⁹⁷

It is not clear why some villagers appeared to have changed their minds about the sugar project. However, a new letter from August 2013 refers to the June 2013 letter and sheds some light on the issue. The letter, which is sent from the Village Chairperson of Namwawala village to the SBT and with a copy sent to the District Commissioner of Kilombero, reads:

Through the Namwawala village General Assembly convened on 06.08.2013, when the land disputes committee was reporting on the progress of case number 40/2012, we were informed that some villagers had sent a letter to the Sugar Board claiming that they do not recognize case number 40/2012, which is under [name removed] and others, and welcomes the sugarcane project to the village. After receiving this information villagers were shocked to learn that the letters also included their names. The villagers explained that they did not participate in preparing any letters and not even in writing their names. The villagers requested me, the Namwawala Village Chairperson, to refute the information brought to you in this letter regarding Namwawala village. Also bear in mind that the letter which was sent does not identify the name of the writer or the sender.

- a) The letters have not been read to the villagers and some the names which were appended do not belong to villagers or owners of plots in Namwawala village.
- b) It was revealed that some of the names on the list belonged to villagers who died a number of years ago.
- c) Some of the names on the list also belong to kids, some of whom are primary school children.⁹⁸

Indeed, during fieldwork in Namwawala village I met with both parents of the children mentioned in the letter and relatives of the deceased family members whose names had been included on the list. These confirmed that the names had been put on the list without their

consent. According to one of the key respondents in the village the vast majority of the 549 names and signatures were invalid and/or fake.⁹⁹

Furthermore, several villagers in Namwawala explained that the SBT and district authorities after realizing that their previous approach had stirred significant unrest made attempts to change their approach in order to create consent in the village. One of the key strategies they reportedly adopted was an attempt to change the perceptions of the villagers towards the project by establishing close connections with certain influential members of the village. As one respondent stated:

...the district authorities and the SBT came here and asked for land, but we denied cooperating with them. Now they [the district authorities and SBT] have their own people inside here in the village who goes around trying to convince villagers that this investment projected is needed here.¹⁰⁰

This was categorically denied by the SBT. One of the SBT managers stated:

This project in Ruipa is first and foremost to the benefit of the people there, and the nation. So we went there and met with the village governments to negotiate with them, and they accepted it all. Then we had the village meetings with the villagers. During these meetings we found that many villagers, you can call them troublemakers, were not willing to comply with us even though we had reached agreements with village governments in that area. So when the villagers see some of the village people guide people from the SBT, district authorities, or valuers, around in the village rumours are saying that these people are working for the SBT and things like that. But that is not the case. Those who want to comply with us, very nice, and those who do not want to comply, it does not mean much, because at the end of the day, the government will have that land area for sugar, no question about it. They have the final decision.¹⁰¹

Nevertheless, several villagers presented accounts of how the SBT and the district authorities had people on the “inside” working actively to persuade villagers to comply with the project. Some even reported that as part of the strategy of creating alliances with influential villagers the SBT offered them a sum of money to convince their fellow villagers and possibly to drop the court case. One of the respondents explains:

Some were told that if you convince the people of the village to provide the land for investment, then you will get money. Even I was offered this money. The SBT was the ones who came here to ask for help from some villagers and told them that they will provide money if they make villagers accept the investment. When they came here they first offered 50 000tsh. Then, if we were able to create consent

among the villagers to get the plantation established we would get an extra 5 million. But I refused to take part in this. They wanted to bribe us, but we will not give our land, so I told them to go back where they came from. It is not possible to bribe us, it won't work, the land is what we need, not the money.

While it would be speculative to claim that it was the bribe from the SBT which prompted some villagers to change their views towards the sugar project and to formulate a letter with signatures which are seemingly forged, it does appear as an attractive incentive. Regardless of this, it does tell of an alarming misconduct in a context where land is to be acquired on a significant scale as the corporate food regime expands in Tanzania. Indeed, in this context the tenure security of small-scale farmers are even further jeopardized when government institutions enter into alliances - mediated by bribes - with village elites in a quest to persuade people to consent land acquisitions. One small-scale farmer in Namwawala questioned the approach by the government:

Instead of the government supporting us, we need to look after our rights and fight for ourselves against our government so that we can keep the land we depend on. If we do not want this investment in our area, then why is the government trying to force something upon us that we do not want?¹⁰²

Moreover, the approach adopted by the government, together with the SBT, in Namwawala is hardly in consonance with the reformist jargon of “participation”, “local consultation”, and “transparency” adopted at the policy level. As the LHRC advocate stresses, these types of approaches to land acquisitions are not untypical in Tanzania:

I know the trend and I have seen how the government and others operate. They choose some influential people to make sure that they will get the land that they want. Of course, this is hard to verify at times, but it happens, many many times. It is not surprising that this is going on there [in Namwawala] now, because the dispute is getting very intense. People have been living in that area for more than 30 years, and the sort of procedures that the government is following to remove those people with force is something that we are trying to protect the people from.¹⁰³

Indeed, as the LHRC advocate hints, this approach is not confined to government institutions. Van Eeden (2014) reveals examples of bribes and broader instances of corruption related to the large-scale sugar project of Swedish firm Agro EcoEnergy in Bagamoyo. Here it should be mentioned that the Agro EcoEnergy venture has been held forward as a flagship project for the SAGCOT initiative and as a prime example of responsible investments in agriculture.¹⁰⁴ In February 2014 the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency

(SIDA) announced its decision to provide close to US\$ 18 million to guarantee the debt obligation of a commercial loan acquired by the Swedish firm. Elsewhere, British firm Sun Biofuels deliberately exploited the vast financial and informational power asymmetries in their relationship with villagers in Kisarawe District in order to create consent towards its large-scale land investment (Bergius, 2012a). Against this background, there is thus a grave concern that SAGCOT may potentially represent a major threat to the land rights of small-scale farmers and pastoralists.

As of June 2014 villagers had yet to be informed as to how, if, or where they will be relocated as a consequence of the proposed Ruipa sugar plantation. Despite having adopted a framework to guide resettlement for the SAGCOT initiative, it is very uncertain to what extent these guidelines will be applied in practice. At the moment there is no specific resettlement legislation in Tanzania (URT, 2013a). Indeed, this investigation illustrates a serious inadequacy in that regard. It indicates that the resettlement guidelines (the RPF), together with the other reformist initiatives seeking to make large land transfers “responsible”, may potentially become mechanisms through which large-scale land acquisitions are externally legitimized while having negligible meaning to those forced off their land. One of the most respected legal experts on Tanzanian land legislation, Dr. Ringo Tenga, argue that due to the lack of appropriate institutional infrastructure Tanzania is yet to be adequately prepared for initiatives such as SAGCOT. He further states that in a context where the implementation of SAGCOT is likely to necessitate resettlement on a significant scale, even if a functioning institutional infrastructure were in place, the question would be: Where can people be relocated to?¹⁰⁵ The chief government valuator reflects on the same issue:

In cases where investments include the relocation of people, there is no policy or organized way to do this that exists today. There is no department within the government which is responsible for doing this. And that is a burning issue actually – because it is very difficult for a villager to find a new place which suits his or hers needs. But sometimes, if the government has plots somewhere, which they might see as good sites to relocate people, they might assist in this, but as of today, this is not a requirement, and it is not a legal requirement, so in most cases it is up to the people themselves to find a new place.¹⁰⁶

Government valuers that were involved in the valuation exercise in Namwawala village also stated that in most cases displaced villagers are just given money and then it is up to the evictees to locate a new place. One of them stated:

In the case of this area [Namwawala], now when the valuation has been done... people will get this money and it will be enough to buy an alternative land somewhere. When they get the money they can buy new land and then build a new house. The resettlement is normally the responsibility of those who have been paid compensation, it is not with the government, and it is not as if we transport them to a new village. They just get their money and go to a new place and settle there. Maybe they go to town and open a shop and settle down there. Most of the farmers would prefer to buy land in close vicinity of the same village. For now we do not have anything like an action plan for resettlement. It is not how it works, at least according to my knowledge.¹⁰⁷

In other words, those evicted from their lands is likely to carry a significant weight on their shoulders in order to make way for Tanzania's agricultural transformation. Respondents in Namwawala express that not knowing what the future will bring takes a significant toll on many villagers. Many have reduced investments in their own farms fearing that they may be without a farm for the subsequent year. Namwawala villagers also explain that their biggest worry is not to lose land per se, but to lose exactly *this* land due to its fertility:

There is no land which is as good and fertile as this. Probably that is also why the government want to take this land away from us. Even if people are compensated and relocated to a new place, they are still likely to lose as it will not be possible to find an area as good as this.¹⁰⁸

Indeed, as already pointed out, the areas identified as potential investment sites under SAGCOT contains some of the most fertile lands in the country. Having access to these lands is considered a vital lifeline for both current and future generations. Small-scale farmers in Namwawala complain that they might be forced to cultivate under more adverse conditions if the sugar industry is implemented in the area – fearing a return to colonial conditions: ‘The government is taking the country back to the colonial period as they try to force people of the most fertile land and relocate them to infertile areas’.¹⁰⁹ In similar words, another said: ‘This just like during colonialism. Removing people to less fertile areas, and then tell them to go work at some plantation. It is like bringing the country back to colonial rule’.¹¹⁰

6.5 Concluding comments

A prerequisite for implementing the SAGCOT initiative is access to ample land suitable for commercial agriculture. The Tanzanian government, together with other partners involved in SAGCOT, readily assumes that such land is widely available. This is epitomized by the repeated claim by various government officials that for SAGCOT ‘there will be no problems with land’. However, while the designated SAGCOT area may contain vast amounts of land suitable for commercial agriculture it is questionable to what extent this land is available to investors. The vast majority of land is already under use for various purposes by small-scale farmers and pastoralists, is legally categorized as Village Land in the Tanzanian land legislation, and is administered by the village council through the authority of the village assembly (URT, 2013b). Accordingly, the government has stated its intentions to acquire land from villages for promotion to investors under the SAGCOT initiative.

In this chapter I demonstrate how the SAGCOT initiative facilitates, and advances, competition for land in rural Tanzania. Investigation carried out in villages surrounding two planned investment sites indicates that villagers are pressured, or forced, to relinquish rights to land in order to create space for investors that will “bring” modern development to Tanzania in the form of capital intensive, large-scale agriculture. This pressure originates in the concerted efforts by investors, donors, and the Tanzanian government to expand the corporate food regime in Tanzania. It materializes at the village level via arbitrary, uninformed, and coercive land acquisition processes in which the Tanzanian government seeks to prepare the ground for investors under the SAGCOT initiative. In this quest for “modernity” small-scale farmers and their practices seem to be thought of as a thing of the past not suitable to a growth oriented economy. Their control over land, and hence their autonomy as farmers, are put at risk.

In conclusion, I argue that the SAGCOT initiative risks contributing to land concentration in the hands of agribusinesses and national elites. De-politicized by an underlying logic of ““land mobility””, this land concentration represents a process of accumulation by dispossession and an emptying of rural space to cater for a corporate expansion. As a result, the SAGCOT initiative may amplify what are already widespread conflicts over land in Tanzania.

7.0 An Alternative Way: Agroecology and Food Sovereignty

We start from a full acceptance of our African-ness and a belief that in our own past there is very much which is useful for our future - Julius K. Nyerere "The Purpose is Man" (Tsuruta, 2006, p. 103)

7.1 Introduction

The ways in which we currently organize the global agroecosystem is not sustainable. The production methods and institutions involved in bringing food to the plate, fiber to the factory, and fuel to the hearth are neither socially just, nor able to maintain a continuous dialogue with nature. The continuing expansion of the corporate food regime is associated with the overuse and degradation of soil, water, and genetic diversity ultimately altering the complex ecological processes underpinning the agroecosystem. This occurs within a short sighted vision where future productivity and integrity of the agroecosystem is relegated in favor of high productivity in the present (S. R. Gliessman, 2007). Moreover, the corporate expansion within the agroecosystem has been a primary force transferring control of agricultural production (and consumption) away from rural communities' eventually de-linking agriculture from local natural capital while simultaneously rendering hundreds of millions of small-scale farmers worldwide with no land from which to generate vital livelihoods (Araghi, 2000; S. R. Gliessman, 2007). An indicative of the failures of the corporate food regime and its free trade rhetoric in satisfying societal needs is that in a world of plentiful food, approximately one billion people still suffers from chronic undernourishment while another two billions are defined as food insecure (Holt-Giménez, Shattuck, Altieri, Herren, & Gliessman, 2012; UNIC, 2008).

Nevertheless, in spite of this corporate expansion, small-scale farmers continue to be the main feeders in the world. A recent report from Genetic Resources Action International (GRAIN) estimates that small-scale farmers feed the world on a continuously shrinking share of the world's farmland. According to GRAIN's calculations, 90 percent of all farms worldwide are small-scale, but they only control about 25 percent of the world's farmland (GRAIN, 2014).¹¹¹ In non-industrialized countries small-scale farmers are considered to account for about 80 percent of the total food production (Hazell, 2011). In this light, it is peculiar that most governments, donors, and international development institutions continues

to promote the industrial, capital intensive, and often large-scale mode of agricultural production underpinned by their aspirations to “feed the world”. In a context where those feeding the world are actually small-scale farmers, many of which are using traditional, diversified, ecological, and locally adapted farming methods (Altieri, 2008), it becomes clear that rural development and food policies should be concentrated towards these in ways which enhance their control over agricultural production. This entails investing in and strengthening rural communities through increased autonomy, local institutions and secure land rights and entitlements (Havnevik, 2011).

Small-scale farmers are in fact the largest investors in small-scale farming. They invest a considerable amount of time, labor and resources into their practices every day (HLPE, 2013). Further supporting and strengthening autonomous small-scale farming systems are key both from a social and environmental perspective. In addition to feeding the world, small-scale farms are more productive and resource conserving than large-scale farms, they utilize local resources and conserve agrobiodiversity, they reduce global warming due to low uses of fossil fuel in production, and they can, if supported, contribute significantly to rural employment and ensure broad based and inclusive economic development (Altieri, 2010). In contrast to the teachings of the corporate food regime, small-scale agriculture has the potential to address the challenging trilemma of poverty, food insecurity, and environmental degradation. Last, but not least, supporting small-scale farming systems contributes in preserving rural life and the immense culture heritage and knowledge inherent in them - essential properties of a productive and adaptable farming system (HLPE, 2013).

Tanzania reflects the global trends in agriculture outlined above. About three quarters of its total population is considered to derive their livelihoods from predominantly small-scale agriculture (World Bank Data, 2014). Despite this, the country’s current agricultural policy is heavily tilted towards stimulating agribusiness investments and large-scale agriculture as illustrated by the SAGCOT initiative. Indeed, this indicates that as the country seeks to reach its development goals the knowledge and practices inherent in small-scale farming communities are thought to be inferior and backward representing a time of the past (Sulle & Nelson, 2009). These practices of the past, however, dominate within the proposed SAGCOT areas where about 95 percent of the land currently under production is farmed by small-scale farmers (SAGCOT, 2011). With a government eager to rapidly commercialize and modernize the agricultural sector it is questionable to what degree these farmers fit into the

government's vision of "modernity". Whereas some farmers might be integrated in vertical value chains, potentially rendering them as mere applicants of externally sourced technology and without the sovereignty to make major farm management decisions (see chapter five), others are facing the threat of land dispossession or relocation to areas of poorer quality (see chapter six). This is not sustainable.

In this chapter I aim to challenge the corporate expansion envisioned under the SAGCOT initiative. I do this by suggesting an alternative path to agricultural development which instead of subjugating small-scale farmers and their practices as a thing of the past utilizes their knowledge as a driving force. In promoting this alternative vision I introduce the closely related concepts of agroecology and food sovereignty, both of which have gained much attention during the last two decades (Altieri, 2010). In short, these concepts promotes a type of agricultural development which builds on traditional knowledge, is coupled with local natural capital, is globally autonomous and locally interdependent (Altieri, 2010; S. R. Gliessman, 2007). Ultimately, agroecology and food sovereignty seeks to reshape power relations within the agroecosystem in ways that empowers small-scale farmers. Whereas this chapter is directed towards Tanzania specifically, it should be read as a response and critique towards the overall teachings of the corporate food regime. I argue that to achieve broad based and inclusive development Tanzania should reorient its policies towards small-scale farmers in ways which make use of the knowledge they possess, secures their autonomy, and enhances their control over vital resources such as land. Hence, instead of implementing an agricultural growth corridor, I introduce an "agro-ecological corridor of food sovereignty".

In my approach, I will organize the chapter in the following way. I will first provide a frame for the alternative vision in which agroecology and food sovereignty will be conceptualized. Next, I will provide a brief critique of SAGCOT's current reformist efforts to green itself. Third, I sketch out the key components I consider necessary to guide an agroecological transition towards the achievement of food sovereignty in Tanzania. In the last section I will sum up the key messages that can be drawn from the chapter.

7.2 Framing the Alternative: Agroecology and Food Sovereignty

While the practice of agroecology dates back to agriculture's origins, the contemporary understanding of the term started to develop during the 1970s. It emerged at the backdrop of a "rediscovery" within agricultural science that there was a lot that could be learned from the practices that farmers already deployed in their fields (Hecht, 1987). In its simplest form, agroecology has been defined as the 'application of ecological concepts and principles to the design and management of sustainable food systems' (S. R. Gliessman, 2007). It refers to the holistic study of agriculture including interrelationships between mineral cycles, energy flows, biological processes and socio-economic factors (Altieri, 1987b). By the early 1980s, agroecology had developed into a methodology and conceptual framework for the study of agroecosystems. During this period there was a growing recognition of the potential of traditional farming systems in the Global South as these were thought to possess important knowledge of ecologically based farm management (S. R. Gliessman, 2007). As Altieri (1987b) writes in his seminal book on agroecology, traditional farming systems are complex systems 'well adapted to the local conditions, which have allowed peasants to meet their subsistence needs for centuries' (p. xiv). Entering into the 1990s and present times, agroecology has matured into a well known concept which promotes a more environmentally and socially sensitive approach to the management of agriculture and food systems (Hecht, 1987). Thus, as Gliessman (2007) argue, in the contemporary context agroecology has become a change agent within agriculture and food politics. I will return to this issue shortly.

By building on traditional practices the agroecological approach seeks to increase productivity and economic viability of farming while ensuring long term social and environmental sustainability (S. R. Gliessman, 2007). A central feature characterizing agroecology is that of integrated production systems. These contrasts to the conventional farming practices advocated by the corporate food regime where agricultural production is based on imported inputs, technology and knowledge. From the perspective of agroecology, integrated production entails a system which strives to illuminate natural ecosystems to promote beneficial interaction and synergies between the biological components of the system. By understanding these complex processes and relations it is possible to enhance productivity and facilitate for the system's own generation of fertilizer and crop protection, thus, reducing the need for costly external inputs (Altieri, 1987a; S. R. Gliessman, 2007). Moreover, research has shown that agroecological and diversified farms are more resilient to

extreme weather events than monocultural farms (Holt-Giménez, 2002). Some of the most common techniques and principles inherent in agroecological farming systems includes on farm nutrient and energy recycling; reliance on local crop varieties; integrated crop and livestock production; diversified crop, field and landscape patterns of species, genetic resources, and practices over time and space; farmers autonomy from external economic forces; a focus towards improving overall productivity of the system instead of focusing on specific crops; and confidence in local knowledge and culture (Cabell & Oelofse, 2012; De Schutter, 2013; S. R. Gliessman, 2007). In agroecology the aim is in other words to work *with* nature so that the “inputs” are the natural processes themselves, thus striving towards closed loop farming systems. At the farm these principles may materialize through a wide variety of techniques which are summed up in the table below.

Table 7-1: Examples of agroecological techniques (Altieri, 1987a, 2010; S. R. Gliessman, 2007)

	Characteristics	Benefits	Socio-economic potential
Polyculture	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Crops are planted within certain spatial proximity to achieve biological complementarities that enhance nutrient use efficiency, pest, weed and disease regulation, and crop yields. • They may involve mixtures of annual crops, annuals with perennials, or mixtures of perennials. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The major rationale for polycultures is that frequently more yield (20-60%) can be obtained from a given area as opposed to an equivalent area of monoculture. • Increased diversity reduces the risk of total crop failure. • More efficient use of light, water and nutrient resources. • Polycultures makes possible various kinds of beneficial population dynamics among herbivores and their predators thus reducing the need for chemicals. • Polycultures are also likely to be less prone to weeds (due to crop density) and diseases. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Decrease costs of farming. • Increases incomes and distribute income through time as harvests can be collected at different times. • Enhance food and nutritional diversity.
Cover cropping and mulching	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cover cropping refers to the practice of growing non-crop species in a field to cover the soil for part or all of the year. Cover crops may be retained for one or several seasons, or they may be incorporated into the soil as green manure. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Improves soil structure and water penetration due to increased soil aeration. • Prevents or reduce soil erosion by spreading and slowing the movement of surface water. • Enhance fertility by adding organic matter and traps nutrients in the soil left over from previous crops. • Provides alternate hosts for beneficial enemies of crops 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reduce need for external inputs (fertilizer and crop protection), thus lowering production costs.

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> pests. Minimize competition between the main crops and noxious weeds. 	
Crop rotation and minimum tillage	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Crop rotation is a system which grows different crops in recurrent succession and definite sequence on the same land. Minimum tillage seeks to reduce soil loss and conserve soil moisture. Plant residues are left on the soil and the surface is left as rough as possible. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Crop rotation systems recycle nitrogen and organic matter and reduce the need for imported energy. Crop rotation can suppress insects, weeds and diseases by effectively breaking the life cycles of pests. Minimum tillage enhance soil fertility, conserves moisture, reduce soil compaction and increase the potential for multiple cropping on the same land. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Enhance food and nutritional diversity. Reduce the need for external fertilizer thus lowering costs of production. Economic diversification and security by spreading risks and spread labor demands more evenly.
Agroforestry systems	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Agroforestry is the practice of including trees spatially and/or temporally in crop- or animal production to obtain more diversity of products and reduce the need for external inputs. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Agroforestry systems aim to optimize beneficial interactions between trees and crops- or animals. Well managed agroforestry systems allow more efficient capture of solar energy, enhance nutrient uptake, retention and cycling. They make possible a more stable population of both pests and their predators. Enhanced complementarity may result in higher productivity. Agroforestry systems are beneficial in areas of marginal land quality and are well adapted to small-scale farmers due to its low cost. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Reduce need for external inputs (fertilizer and crop protection), thus lowering production costs. Enhance food and nutritional diversity.
Integrating crops and livestock	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Integrated crop and livestock systems are farms which seeks to take advantage of the ecological complementarity of livestock animals and crop and forage plants. Plants feeds animals, and animal excrement provides plant nutrients. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Can be operated profitably on small-scale farms. Livestock obtain nutrition from plants inedible for humans and convert the energy to various forms of biomass that humans can eat. Livestock transforms energy and matter contained in plant biomass: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Animal biomass has value as food, fiber, fertilizer, and raw material. Livestock can do work and provide a range of valuable services such as weed management and pest control. Animal manure provides soil microorganisms with energy. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Reduce need for external inputs (fertilizer and crop protection), thus lowering production costs. Enhance food and nutritional diversity. Provides an important source of protein. Economic diversification and security by spreading risks.

Agroecology is normally critiqued on three areas: Its confidence in traditional farming techniques, productivity and for failing to scale up. Firstly, Altieri (2010) argue that it is a common perception that traditional farming methods, relying on hand tools and draft animals, put a ceiling on productivity. However, rather than being a technological constraint, the cause for not producing more appears to be social. Altieri (2010) writes:

When the farmer succeeds in providing enough food for subsistence, there is no pressure to innovate or to enhance yields. However, research shows that traditional crop and animal combinations can often be adapted to increase productivity when the agroecological structuring of the farm via crop combinations and/or animal integration is improved and when the use of labor and local resources is efficient (p. 126).

Secondly, and related to the former, it is often claimed that small-scale traditional farming is backward and unproductive, and in need of new modern technology to thrive. However, if considering total output rather than yields from a single crop research have shown that small farms are more productive (Rosset, Patel, & Courville, 2006). While a large farm may produce more per hectare of a single crop, a small farm practicing polyculture can generate more food per unit area while also enhancing nutritional diversity. For example, in Mexico a one hectare polyculture of maize, squash and beans produced as much food as a 1.73 hectare monoculture of maize (Altieri, 2010). In addition, the increased productivity of small-scale diverse farming systems comes with less negative impact on the environment through more efficient use of natural resources and biodiversity conservation (S. R. Gliessman, 2007; Rosset et al., 2006). One should also add that an agroecological approach does not reject all modern technology. Indeed, if applied in the right way, and by adapting technology to farmers rather than the opposite, modern technology can provide useful tools also in an agroecological approach to agriculture (Pretty, 1995). Thirdly, critics of agroecology assert its lacking ability to scale up. Holt-Gimenez & Altieri (2012) points out that this critique ignores the fact that agroecology ‘remains marginal to official agricultural development plans’ and is undermined by the vast financial resources committed towards expanding the corporate food regime (Altieri, 2002; p. 93). In other words, the forces holding agroecology back lies not in agroecology per se, but in the lack of resources committed towards it and in the structural power of the corporate food regime.

As an approach to agriculture which adheres to low, or no, uses of external inputs and thus promoting circular production systems, agroecology is knowledge intensive rather than capital intensive (Altieri, 2002). It builds on ecological knowledge which ‘has survived the test of time’ through the ‘pressures of droughts, downpours, blights and pest invasions’ (Norgaard, 1987, p. 25). Agroecology capitalizes on the evolutionary practices of traditional farming systems to enhance the science of ecology and sustainability in modern agriculture. It uses the rationale and knowledge of farmers as the starting point from where modifications and adaptations to agricultural practices can be developed through participatory methods and shared via farmer-to-farmer networks (Altieri, 2002; Holt-Giménez, 2006). Hence, agroecology contrasts from the “monologue” approach of the corporate food regime which strives to “bring development” to “underdeveloped” areas of the Global South in the form of new technologies (seeds, machinery, chemicals). Indeed, this points us to the political dimensions inherent in agroecology.

Agroecological practices directly challenge the approach to agricultural development associated with the expansion of the corporate food regime. The agricultural model within this regime has made farmers increasingly dependent on technology and knowledge external to the farm itself, ultimately eroding their decision-making capacity about what to grow, how to grow it, and what to do with the final product (de Molina, 2012; S. R. Gliessman, 2007; Kremen et al., 2012). This disintegration of knowledge and autonomy from the farm is what agroecology seeks to re-embed in ways which empowers farmers to regain (or keep) control and be experts of production (Altieri, 2002). In so doing, agroecology does not exist in a political vacuum. It is not merely confined to the ecological management of agricultural systems to restore sustainability. Instead, it is a concept that holds political agency by posing a real challenge to the deeply entrenched structural power exercised by the actors of the corporate food regime. Citing Gliessman (2011), de Molina (2012) writes that agroecology is ‘a powerful tool to achieve change in the food system, in other words, a massive redesign of the economic structures that govern our food systems’ (p. 46). Just as agroecology employs the concept of autonomy as an attribute of sustainable ecosystems, the politics inherent in agroecology also calls for the autonomy of those undertaking farming activities (de Molina, 2012). Hence, in this context we must consider the closely related concept of food sovereignty.

The food sovereignty concept was originally coined by the La Via Campesina peasant movement at its Second International Conference held in 1996. It was introduced to challenge the asymmetric political and economical power relations inherent in the corporate food regime (McMichael, 2010; Wittman, Desmarais, & Wiebe, 2010b). It proposes a radical alternative to the current corporately dominated agriculture and food sector and is broadly defined 'as the rights of nations and peoples to control their own food systems, including their own markets, production modes, food cultures and environments' (Wittman et al., 2010b, p. 2). Through the concept of food sovereignty La Via Campesina advocates for a democratic restructuring of food- and agricultural systems which puts the control of land, water, seeds and natural resources in the hands of those producing food, and not in the hands of corporate alliances (Via Campesina, 1996).

A little more than a decade on from the La Via Campesina conference, the 2007 Nyeleni International Forum on Food Sovereignty, of which La Via Campesina was a member of the steering committee, was a key event in terms of securing broad based participation around the further development of the term. The forum, which gathered five hundred representatives of organizations of peasants/family farmers, artisanal fisher folk, indigenous peoples, landless peoples, rural workers, migrants, pastoralists, forest communities, women, youth, consumers and environmental and urban movements from eighty countries in both the North and the Global South, reached consensus on a shared vision of food sovereignty:

Food sovereignty is the right of peoples to healthy and culturally appropriate food produced through ecologically sound and sustainable methods, and their right to define their own food and agriculture systems. It puts the aspirations and needs of those who produce, distribute and consume food at the heart of food systems and policies rather than the demands of markets and corporations. It defends the interests and inclusion of the next generation. It offers a strategy to resist and dismantle the current corporate trade and food regime, and directions for food, farming, pastoral and fisheries systems determined by local producers and users. Food sovereignty prioritises local and national economies and markets and empowers peasant and family farmer-driven agriculture, artisanal - fishing, pastoralist-led grazing, and food production, distribution and consumption based on environmental, social and economic sustainability. Food sovereignty promotes transparent trade that guarantees just incomes to all peoples as well as the rights of consumers to control their food and nutrition. It ensures that the rights to use and manage lands, territories, waters, seeds, livestock and biodiversity are in the hands of those of us who produce food. Food sovereignty implies new social relations free of oppression and inequality between men and women, peoples, racial groups, social and economic classes and generations (Nyéléni, 2007).

By adopting a rights-based language the definition of food sovereignty points out that designing and controlling the food- and agricultural system is not ‘the privilege of the few but the right of all’ (Patel, 2009, p. 667). From the perspective of small-scale farmers this fosters a need for policies which secures their right and control over key productive resources and access to fair markets for their produce. The concept has been embraced by a wide range of local, national, and international social movements and NGOs in their efforts to achieve radical change in agricultural policies (Wittman et al., 2010b).

The two concepts of agroecology and food sovereignty coincide on most levels. Both are a product of the corporate food regime insofar that both concepts emerge as a reaction and alternative to the multiple environmental and social flaws associated with the industrial agricultural model (Holt Giménez & Shattuck, 2011). They share a common value which see humans and nature as living in dynamic relationships of mutual dependency, and that these symbiotic relationships, and the knowledge contained in them, must be constantly nurtured with respect to sustaining ecosystems and livelihoods of current and future generations. Both advocates a dismantling of the structural power of the corporate food regime by localizing production, knowledge, technology and markets and trough this enhance the autonomy of small-scale farmers as well as ecosystems (Altieri, 2010; Fairbairn, 2010; Holt Giménez & Shattuck, 2011). At the same time, policies which reduce such autonomy, such as the privatization of seeds or the promotion of agro-chemical packages, are explicitly rejected. Both concepts envisions small-scale sustainable farming systems as best suited to ensure equitable progress in terms of raising rural incomes and enhancing food security, as well as halting rural-urban migration and preserve the environment (Altieri, 2010; Masioli & Nicholson, 2010). Lastly, it is important to point out that while advocating localization and autonomy, neither concept invokes the neoliberal notion of “no government”. Rather, they stress the importance of governments to reprioritize resources from creating enabling environments for agribusinesses (i.e. the state has been “captured” by capital (Holt Giménez & Shattuck, 2011), to enact policies which facilitate sustainable small-scale agriculture to thrive in accordance with the principles of agroecology and food sovereignty. Before I go on to sketch out how this alternative vision might play out in Tanzania, I will first briefly discuss the shortcomings inherent in SAGCOT’s reformist attempts to “green” itself.

7.3 A SAGCOT Greenwash

Tanzania's agricultural policies have a pervasive bias towards facilitating a "green revolution" based on capital intensive agriculture. This bias materializes, among others, through initiatives such as SAGCOT and fertilizer subsidy program which incentivize input-intensive and industrialized farming practices. These initiatives systematically undermine the opportunities for a thriving agroecological transition.

Partly as an acknowledgement of the unsustainability associated with industrial farming practices the SAGCOT initiative is taking steps to "green" itself through a green growth program. In collaboration with SAGCOT stakeholders, an US-based consultant (EcoAgriculture Partners) has been working to advance green growth as part of the SAGCOT planning and investment framework. This work has materialized in a SAGCOT "Greenprint" which is meant to complement the SAGCOT Blueprint 'by creating a roadmap to meet the goals of the Blueprint while generating environmental and social benefits' (Milder et al., 2013, p. 4). Through this "greening" attempt SAGCOT assumes that its corporate, capital intensive and large-scale agricultural model can coexist with more sustainable approaches seeking to deploy "climate-smart" seed technologies and increase the efficiency of inputs (Milder et al., 2013).

Indeed, the attempts to "green" the SAGCOT initiative reflects a broader trend within the corporate food regime of co-opting bits and pieces of the demands put forward by agroecology and food sovereignty advocates. The SAGCOT "Greenprint" reflects a reformist argumentation which asserts that to achieve food security and development while preserving the environment 'we need all solutions' (Holt-Giménez & Altieri, 2012; Holt Giménez & Shattuck, 2011, p. 133). That is, corporate industrial agriculture complemented by agroecological approaches, thus avoiding calls for a radical shift in agricultural development that puts farmers themselves in the driving seat. Hence, some of the proposed approaches in the "Greenprint" include, among others, conservation agriculture, precision agriculture, sustainable rice intensification and (certified) organic agriculture (Milder et al., 2013). It is important to note that while some of these might be part of an arsenal of agroecological techniques and approaches, it does not necessarily mean that they are aligned with the key agroecological principles centred around autonomy set out above (Kremen et al., 2012; Magdoff, Foster, & Buttel, 2000). The way SAGCOT attempts to "green" itself reflects this

unalignment. The current experience of certified organic agriculture in Tanzania makes a telling case.

A 2008 estimate counted approximately 23 certified organic projects in Tanzania covering an estimated land area of between 37 000 to 64 000 hectares. These projects are primarily run by foreign owned export oriented industries focussing on commodity crops such as coffee, tea, cocoa, cashew nuts and cotton as well as sesame, herbs and spices (Bakewell-Stone, Lieblein, & Francis, 2008). Most of these projects follow the out-grower model whereby the exporting companies generally pay for certification. There are especially four issues which have been identified with these models in Tanzania which require attention. Firstly, stringent certification standards and quality controls may foster authoritarian company-farmer relationships significantly eroding the autonomy of the latter (Thiers (2005) in Bakewell-Stone et al., 2008). Secondly, and related to the former point, farmers involved in these schemes have described the farmer as ‘the hoe of organic farming’ complaining that ‘farmers are used like implements to assist companies; they are not listened to or cared for, and thrown aside when the work is done’ (Bakewell-Stone et al., 2008, p. 28). Thirdly, dependency on one buyer for market access increases vulnerability of farmers in case of market collapse. And fourthly, when organic farming schemes have been introduced from external agents it often fails to align with rural identities, beliefs and value systems (Bakewell-Stone et al., 2008). Indeed, these issues would also apply to non-organic out-grower models as discussed in chapter six. In addition, as Altieri (2010) points out, “greening” approaches via organic farming within the overall framework of the corporate food regime that ‘do not challenge the monocultural nature of plantations and that rely on external inputs and expensive foreign certification seals and fair-trade systems destined only for agro-export offer very little to peasants and small farmers’ (p. 131).

The “greening” of SAGCOT is on the one hand a tactical retreat on behalf of agribusinesses offering them a greater degree of external legitimacy, while on the other hand it implies that a fine tuning of the practices of the corporate food regime will secure both social and environmental benefits (Holt Giménez & Shattuck, 2011). Through this it pre-empts the less radical critique and distrust towards the SAGCOT initiative. However, as Altieri (2010) argue, a fine tuning of the corporate food regime will do little to redesign agroecosystems in ways which restores farmers autonomy. Together with other measures directed towards “responsible” land acquisitions (see chapter six), the SAGCOT Greenprint is another example

of what Friedman (2005) termed “green capitalism” within the reformist framework of the corporate food regime. The perspectives of agroecology and food sovereignty go beyond the mere “green capitalism” and corporate codes of conduct advocated within the reformist framework. As Fairbairn (2010) states, food sovereignty advocates ‘target political bodies, not corporations’ (p. 30). In the next section I attempt to roughly sketch out how this alternative vision could materialize in the Tanzanian context.

7.4 The Southern Agroecological Corridor of Food Sovereignty

A Tanzanian transition towards an agricultural development path based on the concepts of agroecology and food sovereignty requires wide ranging cultural, economical and political changes that reaches beyond community and national levels. This transition in Tanzania can thus not be fully realized in isolation from the rest of the world. However, it is beyond the scope of this chapter to critically consider the wide array of transformative changes necessary at the international level to radically alter the governing structures of the agroecosystem. In this section I will confine myself to present a rough overview of some of the key components I consider necessary to guide an agroecological transition towards the achievement of food sovereignty in the context of Tanzania. I will do this by building on the SAGCOT idea of clusters – albeit clusters of agroecology and food sovereignty rather than clusters of powerful agribusiness alliances (illustrated in figure 7-1). In sequence, I will focus on the following components: Knowledge creation and the “peasant pedagogy”, land policies, seeds, markets and overall government policies.

Knowledge creation and the “peasant pedagogy”

As explained above agroecological farming techniques is knowledge intensive rather than capital intensive. They support the development of smallholder agriculture and promotes local self reliance by valuing local context specific knowledge and utilizing local resources (Altieri, 2002). In Tanzania most farmers already deploy agroecological techniques through their traditional farming practices, including cover cropping and mulching, agroforestry and polycultures. This entails that an agroecological transition can build on these practices and might involve only minor modifications to practices farmers are already familiar with (Bakewell-Stone et al., 2008). By further developing these practices, which have sustained farmers through time, one also builds upon key values and cultural beliefs inherent in rural




Figure 7-1: A schematic presentation of an alternative vision for agricultural development in Tanzania build around the interlinked concepts of agroecology and food sovereignty. The arrows illustrate a circular system which nurtures local natural resources and knowledge. See text for further details.

communities. Indeed, while conducting interviews for this thesis, a key value I encountered among farmers was their desire to conserve and nurture the land on which they depend. Bakewell-Stone et al., (2008) explains how traditional knowledge helps to biologically control pests within the SAGCOT area and thus reduces the need for externally sourced chemicals:

Organic mango production in Morogoro makes use of a local practice of planting *Euphorbia* spp. around the base of the trees in order to limit damage by termites, and also the African marigold (*Tagetes erecta*) for its pest repellent properties. In the coastal region it has become local knowledge that transferring red weaver ants to cashew trees biologically controls the *Helpelitus* beetle (p. 27).

Complementing and modifying traditional knowledge with modern agroecological science – with its whole-systems approach - through participatory research projects is essential. This entails a complete turn away from the top-down nature of SAGCOT. It must involve farmers from the onset in formulating research agendas and goals adapted to local realities, and facilitate their active participation throughout, including knowledge dissemination (i.e. through participatory seed breeding) (Altieri, 2010). A key challenge is to scale up and share this synthesized knowledge to further increase agroecological literacy among small-scale farmers. A proven and effective way to reach broad sectors of the rural population is through “campesino a campesino” networks (farmer-to farmer networks) (Holt-Giménez, 2006). The Cuban experience provides valuable ideas for this.

Cuba has taken major steps in transitioning from a form of high-input, export oriented industrial agriculture towards agroecological farming. This transition has been boosted by the Cuban government’s food sovereignty policy since the end of the Sovjet trade bloc and has contributed to the highest food production score in Latin-America between 1996 and 2005. A key ingredient in this success has been the horizontal dissemination of agroecological knowledge whereby successful agroecological farmers were linked up with other farmers to demonstrate their practices, while the role of local organizations was to facilitate and organize for these meetings to occur. These farmer-to-farmer learning networks eventually developed into an agroecological movement with a membership base counting more than a third of the total peasant sector in Cuba. Instead of the demobilizing effects of top-down knowledge and technology sharing, these bottom-up ways of organizing and disseminating knowledge are more flexible, fosters self reliance and are rooted in local realities, needs and

cultures (Cabell & Oelofse, 2012; Rosset, Machín Sosa, Roque Jaime, & Ávila Lozano, 2011). Moreover, the outreach of farmer-to-farmer networks are more extensive as compared to conventional extension services which is limited to the number of farmers that can be reached by a single technician and is often constrained by lack of finances (Rosset et al., 2011). Indeed, in a North-Western Tanzanian region there is only one government extensionist for every 500-600 farmers (Bakewell-Stone et al., 2008). Rosset et al., (2011) compiles a list of five principles – the “peasant pedagogy” - which guides the farmer-to-farmer knowledge sharing methodology:

- (1) *Begin slowly and on a small scale.* Farmers try out new methods on a small part of their land, without rushing.
- (2) *Limit the introduction of new methods.* People get overwhelmed when they try many new practices at the same time.
- (3) *Achieve rapid and recognizable successes.* The process works best when farmer promoters first teach things that they are sure will have a rapid positive impact, because people are motivated to continue participating.
- (4) *Carry out small-scale experiments.* Everyone is encouraged to experiment on small areas of their own land, without risking their entire harvests. The more farmers who become active experimenters, the faster the overall transition advances.
- (5) *Develop a multiplier effect.* As more peasants become promoters and experimenters, the process begins to demonstrate a self-catalyzing momentum (p. 170)

Indeed, farmers innovating, experimenting and sharing knowledge goes far back in time in Tanzania, and is widespread within village communities (Mchomvu, Tungaraza, & Maghimbi, 2002b). As one small-scale farmer in rural Morogoro stated:

‘In this village we [farmers] rely on each other to share new knowledge. For example, if someone gets a good harvest, I look at his field and go to ask him how he managed to get such a good harvest. Perhaps we have used different seeds. In that case we exchange seeds and collaborate in order to get the best output for both of us. From my fellow villagers I have also learned how to select seeds from my own harvest. One time, I met with someone in the community who took me to a house where some elders were staying. When I came there the elders showed me how to pick the good seed from the bad seed. I frequently utilize the elder’s knowledge’¹¹²

By establishing farmer-to-farmer networks the aim is to formalize and scale up this mechanism of knowledge sharing. This would not exclude the role of the traditional extension service, but rather redefine it whereby its main role would be to facilitate and

support the development of farmer-to-farmer learning (Rosset et al., 2011). Local NGO's and farmers organizations, such as MVIWATA (see chapter five), could also play an instrumental role in facilitating such networks and link these with regional and international peasant movements such as the Alliance for Food Sovereignty in Africa and the La Via Campesina (MVIWATA is a member of the latter).

Moreover, local grass root organizations, such as the Morogoro based Sustainable Agriculture Tanzania (SAT) are already working together with small-scale farmers in the area to further develop their agroecological literacy through participatory research and courses as well as setting up farmer-to-farmer networks.¹¹³ A central tenet guiding their work is that knowledge and progress evolves through horizontal interaction. The vast experience and knowledge of small-scale farmers is in other words a central stimulus in their approach. This, and other similar initiatives (i.e agroecological farmer field schools), should be supported and scaled up in accordance with the "peasant pedagogy". Lastly, as part of an agroecological knowledge generating strategy, the planned agricultural youth camps within the SAGCOT clusters (see table 6-1 in chapter 6) is an idea which can be further developed. However, rather than these being 'outgrower generating engines'¹¹⁴ educating young prospective farmers in industrial farming techniques, they should seek to educate young experts of agroecology.

Land politics

Land is perhaps the most fundamental component in claims for food sovereignty. Having effective control over this ultimate livelihood generating resource is the starting point from where food sovereignty eventually can be achieved. Tanzania is perceived to have one of the most progressive legal frameworks for land in Africa in which rural populations, via the village assembly, are in relative control over their Village Land through the regulations set out in the Village Land act (see chapter six). However, in the contemporary context where the Tanzanian government, in alliance with donors and several MNCs, are promoting land policies which are at odds with food sovereignty, it is difficult to imagine how agricultural development based on agroecology and food sovereignty can thrive. As illustrated in chapter seven of this thesis, despite a progressive land legislation villager's land rights, and ultimately their food sovereignty, are in jeopardy when the government is determined to transfer land to investors for the development of large-scale farming ventures. The government's hostility to food sovereignty is for example reflected by its plans to transfer

land from the Village Land category (administered by the village council through the village assembly) to General Land (administered by the central government) and increase the share of the latter from 2 percent to 20 percent to facilitate for land based investments under SAGCOT (see chapter six). These types of policies facilitate a re-concentration of land in the hands of national and global elites and are in fundamental conflict with the principle of food sovereignty (Borras Jr & Franco, 2010a).

As an ultimate starting point, the government needs to recognize that small-scale farmers are the most important investors in agricultural land. Thus, instead of policies facilitating re-concentration of land, food sovereignty requires re-distributive land policies directed towards people with little or no land (Borras Jr & Franco, 2010a). In Tanzania this would for example entail the transfer of land which has been left idle by investors back to village communities (Abdallah, Engström, Havnevik, & Salomonsson, 2014; Bergius, 2012b; MVIWATA, 2014). It would also entail a change to the current approach to Village Land use planning. With an aim of increasing the amount of General Land to 20 percent, the Village Land use planning in SAGCOT areas is starting from the premise of identifying land which is suitable for investors¹¹⁵. Instead, Village Land use planning should start from the premise of sufficiently identifying the various claims that are made on land within villages. Furthermore, it should investigate through what means villagers themselves can invest in their own land to achieve food sovereignty. This would mean that land use planning processes should be village and farmer led and be aligned with key agroecological principles with the goal of establishing a vibrant, diverse and sustainable food producing hub. An important challenge in these processes is to balance the interests and needs of farmers and pastoralists to avoid conflicts.

Moreover, land areas which are categorized as General Land but which is de-facto tended and used by small-scale farming communities should be transferred to the Village Land category. This refers especially to forest land which is often perceived as “unused” but which access to is often significant for rural livelihoods. One villager in Kisarawe District, where a biofuel company acquired such “unused” land, reported that 70 percent of his household’s income relied on the utilization of such land for hunting, collecting wild foods, fodder and other environmental goods (Bergius, 2012a). One concrete issue related to this is the inconsequent definition of General Land in the land legislation which places “unused” Village Land in the General Land category (see chapter six). From a food sovereignty perspective this ambiguity

must be addressed by incorporating such land as part of the Village Land in order to make claims to such land more formal and secure (Borras Jr & Franco, 2010a).

Land redistribution was a requisite underpinning the agroecological revolution in Cuba. The government transferred about 80 percent of formerly state-owned farmland to cooperative and individual farmers. Moreover, although the process has been widely critiqued, and rightly so, Zimbabwe's fast track land reform transformed its agrarian structure. It changed from one where more than a half of the agricultural land was controlled by large-scale producers to one where small-scale, mixed farming is predominating ultimately improving the lives of many land poor Zimbabweans (Cliffe, Alexander, Cousins, & Gaidzanwa, 2011; Scoones et al., 2011).

Seed sovereignty

As with land, seed is another ultimate prerequisite for agricultural production. It is the very starting point of a complex web of human and biological interactions which eventually culminates into food for human consumption. Seeds also play a critical role in sustaining cultural knowledge and in conserving agro-biodiversity (Kerr, 2010). These multiple purposes that seeds play makes seed sovereignty a key component in claims for the broader food sovereignty. During the last two decades the Tanzanian seed sector, as with the agricultural sector in general, has been liberalized allowing increased private sector participation in seed breeding and distribution. Despite liberalization about 90 percent of Tanzanian farmers rely on the informal seed sector for their access to seeds (usually traditional varieties) which is based on on-farm seed saving, exchanges and gifts among farmers (Kessy, 2006). Some of the main reasons for the low uptake of improved seed varieties are the financial inaccessibility and the unpredictable supply (Mbunda, 2013). Farmers also steer clear of improved seed varieties to avoid external dependency and because traditional varieties are easier to market and performs better under rough conditions (Mbunda, 2013). As one small-scale farmers in Kilombero told me:

'The local maize seed is normally very reliable, and is especially resistant during periods of little rain. When this seed is planted here, it will develop differently from other areas in the country. So there are local variations of the same seed which are adjusted to the local soil and the local climate. This is very important'.¹¹⁶

There is a risk with the further expansion of the corporate food regime in Tanzania and the increased role envisioned by corporations in breeding and distribution of seeds that seed sovereignty may slowly erode.

A first step to avoid this is to reverse policies and legislations which are currently underway which increases the power of multinational seed corporations over the Tanzanian seed system (see chapter five). Moreover, agricultural research should put more emphasis on the informal seed sector and traditional seed varieties which have evolved through time via farmer's selections, is rich in agrobiodiversity and adapted to local contexts. Conserving and developing traditional seed varieties, and the biocultural heritage contained in them, is a key component of agroecology and food sovereignty (Altieri, 2010; Holt-Giménez & Altieri, 2012). By tapping into to this bio-cultural heritage and incorporate it in modern knowledge through participatory seed breeding programs it is possible develop seed varieties which are appropriate to local needs, preserve agro-biodiversity and enhance yields in a climate change context (Altieri, 1987a; Kerr, 2010). Thus, in line with agroecological and food sovereignty principles farmers themselves – and especially elders – must play a key role in seed development for seed sovereignty.

There is generally limited recognition of the traditional seed system and the importance of local knowledge in seed management in Tanzania (Kessy, 2006). In addition to honouring traditional knowledge through research resources should be committed towards agrobiodiversity conservation and restoration programs through a combination of ex situ and in situ seed conservation. Ex situ conservation could come in the form of village or district seed banks where local seed varieties are stored and mechanisms put in place for the effective exchange of seeds between farmers and the seed bank. In situ conservation entails conservation through use. It allows seed varieties to adapt continuously and requires farms and farmers to be the repositories of genetic information and bio-cultural knowledge (S. R. Gliessman, 2007). In situ conservation would be ensured simply through the continued use of a wide variety of local seeds by farmers, but could also be ensured by specific initiatives directed towards district or village levels. Indeed, as part of village or district land use planning specific sites could be set aside as “biological and cultural heritage sites”. Lastly, quality seeds (both new and traditional varieties) must be made accessible at affordable costs to farmers via the cooperative movement, village outlets and farmer-to farmer-networks.

Markets access

Agricultural development based on agroecological- and food sovereignty principles seeks to stimulate development of strong, fair and dynamic local markets (Wittman et al., 2010b). Instead of linking farmers to global markets through value-chain integration, via risky contract relations (as proposed in SAGCOT), a food sovereignty based market development seeks to strengthen local, national and regional linkages between producers and consumers in ways which keep the generated wealth within communities (van der Ploeg, 2009 in Altieri et al., 2012). Strengthening local markets would improve farmers control over their businesses and enhance their bargaining power while also reducing the social, environmental and economic risks associated with global market dynamics (Bakewell-Stone et al., 2008; McMichael, 2010). Moreover, it is also impediment that farmers receive fair prices for their produce which reflects the costs of production. In Tanzania farmers are often forced to sell their products at artificially low prices to crop merchants, especially if there has been a good harvest and the supply is high (Mbunda, 2013). If farmers receive fair prices for their products it would incentivize production and agroecological innovation (Rosset, 2000). One strategy to facilitate for the strengthening of local markets in Tanzania may be to rebuild the cooperative movement.

During the 1950s and 1960s Tanzania is said to have had the third largest cooperative movement in the world and it played a crucial role in the rural economy by buying crops (even in times of bad world market prices), providing education and trusteeship for small-scale farmers getting credit. However, with time the cooperative movement became gradually weakened, a process which gathered pace following Tanzania's adoption of structural reform programs during the late 1980s after which the remaining cooperatives became more elitist while poor farmers became marginalized (Mchomvu, Tungaraza, & Maghimbi, 2002a). The modern cooperative movement in Tanzania is considered to be relatively weak. However, there are signs of a renewed recognition of the potential of cooperatives in generating social and economical benefits to Tanzanian smallholders as illustrated by the Cooperative Reform and Modernization Program initiated by the government (Bibby, 2006).

A strengthened cooperative movement would be instrumental in the process of creating strong, vibrant, local markets in Tanzania. These should be structured in such a way that they manage to crowd in poorer segments of the farming communities. Mchomvu et al., (2002a) suggest that one strategy to secure an inclusive cooperative movement would be to provide

financial support for poor farmers to buy shares in a cooperative or to start their own. An expanded role of cooperatives would provide small-scale farmers a reliable purchaser of their products while offering fair prices. They would be involved in facilitating producer-consumer and rural-urban linkages for agricultural products and achieve economies of scale in transport. This would have to be complemented by significant public investments in improving infrastructure such as road and rail networks. Cooperatives could also be involved in developing small-scale member owned processing factories which would add value to their member's agricultural produce and create additional synergy effects throughout the economy. In addition they may enhance member's access to credit (Mchomvu et al., 2002a).

Lastly, it is interesting to note from anecdotal evidence which suggests that many Tanzanians have a preference for locally produced organic foods due to health reasons and taste (Bakewell-Stone et al., 2008). Traditional maize (Bakewell-Stone et al., 2008) and rice¹¹⁷ varieties, for example, is supposedly tastier than other high yielding varieties making buyers willing to pay more. As one Kilombero farmer stated:

‘We keep our own, local rice seed varieties because they give a product that the customers want. The improved rice seeds do not have the right quality and is red in colour. People don't want that quality; it doesn't taste as good as the local rice’.¹¹⁸

This indicates the potential in developing local markets for local products produced via agroecological methods.

Government policies

It is difficult for this alternative vision of agricultural development to thrive without the right policy environment. Although agroecology and food sovereignty is advocating a bottom-up approach this must be accompanied by a government which appreciates the potential of these alternatives in delivering on key issues such as food security, poverty, environment and climate change. This includes policies on key food sovereignty components such as fair markets, seeds and land as argued above. However, as Borras Jr & Franco (2010a) notes regarding the latter, ‘while land re-distribution is the “heart” of agrarian reform, post-land (re)distribution support service packages and favourable rural development policies are the “soul” (p. 114). It is impossible for agroecology and food sovereignty to scale up in a context where the Tanzanian government's priority is to enable an expansion of the corporate food

regime. As argued above, this priority should turn towards creating an enabling environment for small-scale farmers, industries and cooperatives to prosper and invest in and strengthen rural communities and their institutions in ways which enhance their autonomy.

The government should play a key role in improving infrastructure such as roads and railway networks. This is impediment so as to enhance access to markets. There are for example already plans underway to upgrade the Tazara railway system which links rural areas with urban markets in Morogoro and Dar es Salaam as well linking producers with Zambian markets. Moreover, the government could, in collaboration with donors and cooperatives, also invest in storage and handling facilities which reduce post harvest losses. The government should also enact agricultural policies which protects national production and avoid cheap imports which repress prices on locally produced food (Haug & Hella, 2013). Moreover, financial resources should be re-prioritized towards support programmes for agroecological agriculture.

It is expected that Tanzania spends close to US\$ 52 million subsidizing agrochemicals and fertilizers (URT, n.d.). However, studies have shown that despite such subsidies only 11 percent of households use chemical fertilizers as they are unaffordable to most small-scale farming households (Mbunda, 2013). Many farmers are also of the impression that chemical fertilizers are of no use to them because they farm on very fertile lands¹¹⁹ or they find their self-produced organic fertilizer a better option (Mbunda, 2013). Moreover, Mbunda (2013) notes some farmers are sceptical to apply chemical fertilizers because ‘they believe that if their land gets used to chemical fertilizers, outputs will be gravely affected the moment the chemical fertilizers become unaffordable or inaccessible’ (p. 8). Instead of spending money on expensive fertilizer imports and subsidies - which do not reach the majority of farmers anyway – the government should consider to reprioritize financial resources towards agroecological research and support programs which are adapted to local contexts, and to scale up agroecological education (such as the aforementioned field schools/youth camps) and farmer-to-farmer networks. It is shown that such networks have a great potential in reaching large segments of the rural population (Rosset et al., 2011).

Lastly, the government may also have an instrumental role in creating new and stable markets for small-scale farmers produce. In Brazil the “Programa de Aquisição de Alimentos”, created in 2003, has improved the livelihoods of many small-scale farmers by creating a

demand for their products, such as school and hospital meal programmes. This programme has allowed small-scale farmers to circumvent among other things volume requirements which would arise when selling to a trader (Altieri et al., 2012). Indeed, similar projects could be implemented in the Tanzanian context.

7.5 Concluding Comments

In this chapter I make the claim that there are realistic alternatives to the currently emphasized industrial and capital intensive approach to agricultural development in Tanzania. These alternatives are found in the linked concepts of agroecology and food sovereignty which are rooted in a Polanyian “double-movement” inherent in society. As such, they emerge as a reaction to the negative social and environmental externalities associated with the expansion of the corporate food regime (Holt Giménez & Shattuck, 2011). They advocate a re-embedding of farm management with farmers themselves instead of with global capital and recognize small-scale farmers, and their vast knowledge, as a driving force towards achieving food security, alleviate poverty, and reduce global warming.

Tanzania contains all conditions necessary to pursue this alternative path of agricultural development. It is enriched with vast natural resources and fertile land, and still has a majority of its population engaged in small-scale agriculture. While I do not claim to hold any panacea to the diverse challenges faced by small-scale farmers in rural Tanzania, I sketch out some ideas which I deem necessary to guide a turn towards an agricultural development path based on agroecology and food sovereignty. This includes: generation of agroecological knowledge which integrates modern science with traditional practices and dissemination of this via farmer-to-farmer networks; alignment of Village Land use planning with agroecological- and food sovereignty principles by enacting re-distributive, rather than re-concentrative, land policies; securing farmer’s control over seeds and the conditions under which they are conserved, developed, stored or distributed; develop strong and fair markets and enhance local-national-regional market linkages by reviving an inclusive cooperative movement; and re-prioritize government financial resources towards agroecological research, education and support.

Instead of subordinating small-scale farmers as receivers of externally orchestrated development plans and technologies, these alternatives respects, builds upon, and capitalizes

on the knowledge, practices and expertise that are already found among rural communities. They have the potential to increase rural incomes through enhanced productivity and a reduction of farming costs by reducing, or eliminating, commercial inputs and keep the generated wealth within communities. Along with increased productivity and incomes agriculture could again become an attractive option for the younger generation and contribute to halt rural-urban migration streams. Concluding, agroecology and food sovereignty provides a framework for agricultural development which is well equipped to strengthen rural communities through increased autonomy, local institutions and secure land rights and entitlements (Havnevik, 2011).

8.0 Concluding Remarks

Agriculture will remain a key foundation in efforts to reduce poverty, achieve food security and improve the environment worldwide. It provides essential incomes and a direct source of food for the majority population across the Global South, and can under the right conditions conserve and/or rebuild the natural resource base on which human societies ultimately depends (Perfecto et al., 2009). To fulfil this great potential agriculture must be vitalized via policies that place people and nature at the centre of agricultural development. In many countries of the Global South this is at present not the case. Throughout this thesis my overall objective has been to critically engage with the approach to agricultural development currently prioritized by governments, donors, development institutions, MNCs and others. I argue that this approach represents an expansion of a specific governing structure within the overall agroecosystem known as the corporate food regime.

Food regimes have historically coincided with wider alternating periods of liberal (colonial-diasporic food regime) and organized (mercantile-industrial food regime) forms of capitalism. The corporate food regime came to the fore in the context of the global (neo)liberal turn in the 1980s with the demise of the Bretton Woods system and a restructuring of the pivotal role of governments in economic development towards providing “good business climates“. This opened up new spaces to corporate control and has lowered entry barriers for global agribusinesses into the agricultural economies of the Global South. The corporate food regime, in other words, rests on a symbiotic relationship between governments and corporations in which the latter holds considerable political power, together with various development institutions and NGO’s.

The corporate food regime is associated with the proliferation of green revolution technological packages and deployment of large-scale mechanized farms. The expansion of the regime has contributed to shift control of global food, fibre and fuel production from small-scale farmers towards an increasingly consolidated alliance of agricultural MNC’s. The development of an agricultural value chain has disconnected agricultural production from local natural capital as essential farm inputs are sourced from outside the farm, thus ultimately undermining the environment and reducing small-scale farmers’ autonomy from global market forces. Analytically, these characteristics represents an overall process of accumulation by dispossession as land, seeds, cultures of production and ecological

knowledge are incorporated into the privatized domain of capital accumulation. As a result, millions of small-scale farmers across the Global South have directly and indirectly been forced to migrate to less fertile lands or to urban slums as “surplus populations” relative to capitals requirements for labour (Araghi, 2000).

The social and environmental concerns associated with the rise of the corporate food regime have brought calls for reform and radical transformation of the regime. These calls originate in transnational social/environmental movements that in a Polanyian fashion seek to re-embed the market in a system of regulations. It has prodded the corporate food regime to move towards a reformist trend which seeks to institute mild reforms by parsing the negative externalities associated with the regime into components which can be addressed by technocratic measures. This includes measured steps to incorporate small-scale farmers in international value-chains as well as the selective appropriation of demands put forward by social/environmental movements. However, as Holt Giménez and Shattuck (2011) argue,

‘these developments seem trivial when compared to the binge of unregulated speculation on the world’s food commodities, the explosion of land grabs, the steady spread of GMO’s and agrofuels, and the growing monopoly control over all aspects of the food system’ (p. 135).

Hence, I argue that the emergence of a reformist trend serves only to give the corporate food regime a legitimating green disguise which pre-empts structural changes to the governing forces of the agroecosystem. Indeed, the reformist trend is a prerequisite for the continued reproduction of the corporate food regime making it politically more palatable.

In this thesis I have applied the concept of the corporate food regime to Tanzania. I make the case that the current approach to agricultural development and modernization via the SAGCOT initiative represents an expansion of the corporate food regime in Tanzania. This expansion is facilitated by the steps taken by Tanzania since the late 1980s towards establishing “good business climates” as exemplified by the Tanzania Investment Act No.26 of 1997 and the establishment of the investment promotion agency TIC. Incentivizing private, and often foreign, investments has been thought of as key to raise capital for development activities and to deliver higher living standards to the Tanzanian population. Thus, there has been a steep increase in FDI in Tanzania since 1990, whereas investments in agriculture specifically have witnessed a clear upward trend (Mousseau & Mittal, 2011; UNCTADSTAT,

2014). The combination of “good business climates” and a range of additional external factors have made Tanzania an attractive and favourable location for agribusinesses to invest their capital (World Bank, 2012). It is in this context the SAGCOT initiative has emerged.

SAGCOT builds upon the notion that agricultural transformation and poverty reduction can be achieved by opening up for investments and give more room for private agribusinesses. From this perspective efforts are focussed towards making agriculture a business rather than development activity. In chapter five I have shown how the SAGCOT initiative represents an expansion of the corporate food regime. Three broad conclusions can be drawn from this discussion:

Firstly, the SAGCOT initiative has from the early stages been controlled within the confines of a coalition of global agribusiness corporations, the Tanzanian government, donors and development institutions. Setting up the initiative within these confines has allowed SAGCOT to be structured along the interests of agribusinesses who wish to get a firm foothold in African agriculture. Participation from small-scale farmers and their organizations are encouraged only if they conform to the underlying neoliberal ideology SAGCOT advances. Rather than pertaining to SAGCOT alone, this is a feature characterising initiatives of the corporate food regime in general (McMichael, 2013; Patel, 2012). Those who challenge the legitimacy of the regime are excluded, while more moderate voices from civil society are included as a compromise offering the corporate expansion a legitimating front. Via the latter, the reformist trend of the regime is exemplified in SAGCOT.

Secondly, I have argued that the SAGCOT initiative rests on underlying Malthusian/Ricardian discourses of scarcity. These discourses portray African agriculture as unproductive, stagnant, a cause of environmental degradation and as a thing of the past in desperate need of revival. They are firmly held in place and promoted by agribusinesses, in concert with governments and donors, as part of a broader strategy to justify the proliferation of green revolution technologies and the establishment of large-scale farms. From this perspective, an expansion of the corporate food regime is depicted and legitimized as a “solution” to food insecurity, poverty and environmental degradation.

Thirdly, SAGCOT risk facilitating a subsumption of Tanzanian agriculture to global capital whereby the agricultural sector becomes decoupled from local natural resources and

ecological knowledge. Small-scale farmers, envisioned to be incorporated in international value-chains via uncertain out-grower schemes governed by debt relations, risk their autonomy as local agricultural practices are replaced by technologies and practices mediated by corporate interests. Consequently, I claim that the SAGCOT initiative, from planning to implementation, may signify a “control grab” of Tanzanian agriculture, which is embedded in wider capitalist processes of accumulation by dispossession.

A key notion in this regard is the issue of land. A principal requirement for implementing SAGCOT is access to ample land suitable for commercial agriculture. While little land has so far been put under production by agribusinesses, the government currently attempt to create an enabling environment to incentivize investments and facilitate access to land which is assumed “unused” or “underutilized”. This involves the identification of land areas suitable for the establishment of large nucleus farms. In chapter six I have examined the issue of land for SAGCOT and investigated the process of identifying and acquiring land for SAGCOT investments.

In spite of repeated claims from Tanzanian government circles that there are vast amounts of land available for large-scale agriculture, and that there will be “no problems of land” for SAGCOT, it is important to emphasize that little land is currently legally available for the government to lease out to investors. In fact, most land is located within demarcated village boundaries and is administered by the village councils via the village assemblies. To make it legally accessible for investors it must be acquired by the central government and change status from Village Land to General Land. However, the proposed SAGCOT areas contain some of the most fertile lands found in Tanzania. These lands are what both small-scale farmers and investors seeks to access to. Consequently, the SAGCOT initiative risks furthering competition for land within a geographical area which is already entrenched in land conflicts. Small-scale farmers hold the weakest hand in this competition as there is a strong government bias towards securing access to land for investors rather than small-scale farmers. As I have shown in chapter six, this competition for land materializes “on the ground” through land acquisitions processes fraught with violations of the rights of small-scale farmers and pastoralists. I have found that these are under immense pressure to surrender rights to land to open up fertile space for the expansion of the corporate food regime through SAGCOT.

This top-down pressure on small-scale farmers to relinquish rights to land originates in the sustained reassertion of land dispossession during neoliberal globalization (Araghi, 2000). It occurs through the combined financial and political power held by agribusiness corporations in close ties with business friendly governments. The land dispossession which may be an outcome of the SAGCOT initiative risks facilitating a re-concentration of land in Tanzania in the hands of national and global corporate elites. This dispossession feeds into broader processes of de-peasantization in which the suppression of peasant agriculture by global capital creates “surplus nature” which is released into the privatized mainstream of capital accumulation (Araghi, 2009; Harvey, 2006). As a consequence, small-scale farmers may be forced to migrate to lands of lower quality or to urban areas to search for alternative livelihoods, while others may enter into cheap labour relations on plantations.¹²⁰ Reformist measures designed to make land acquisitions more “transparent”, “participatory” and “responsible” do not change the fact that small-scale farmers are dispossessed of their control over land. The emphasis is first and foremost put on creating a “good business climate” for agribusinesses to thrive. The whole process is underpinned by calls for “land mobility” which ultimately de-politicises land dispossession in the name of efficiency, productivity, modernity and development. However, from the perspective of many small-scale farmers the SAGCOT initiative may put them in adverse conditions.

This leaves us with the question: What alternatives exist to the corporate expansion in Tanzanian agriculture envisioned under SAGCOT which can be both socially and environmentally just? In chapter eight I have suggested an alternative path for agricultural development in Tanzania expressed by the interlinked language of agroecology and food sovereignty. This alternative path is directly informed by the critique I have posed towards the corporate food regime and its expansion in Tanzania in this thesis. I have made the claim that building and transforming agricultural development in Tanzania around the concepts of agroecology and food sovereignty is a viable strategy to move towards food security and reduce poverty while maintaining a continuous dialogue with nature. This would entail an agricultural sector connected to local natural resources and knowledge, whereby farm management and control over essential farm inputs are embedded with farmers themselves instead of with global capital. I am not romanticising the harsh realities faced by many small-scale farmers in rural Tanzania, rather I propose an alternative path that acknowledges small-scale farmers as a principal driving force for agricultural development.

Internationally, there is a growing peasant mobilisation around this alternative vision for agriculture in the food sovereignty movement (i.e. La Via Campesina). The immediate context prompting the expansion of this movement is the continuous subjugation of peasant agriculture worldwide by the corporate food regime. Hence, it is a product of the regime and represents a Polanyian “double movement” advocating a dismantling of the corporate food regime and a re-embedding of the economy in society to the benefit of people, societies, and the environment. Whether the movement succeed in its demands for food regime change ultimately depends on its ability to advance clear political proposals and its concerted power relative to the corporate food regime (Holt Giménez & Shattuck, 2011). Chapter eight has been my first-stage attempt to enter the food sovereignty discourse and engage in the work towards achieving a socially and environmentally just food- and agricultural system.

We are now well aware of viable alternatives to the corporate food regime and they are yielding encouraging results (Altieri, 2010; IIASTD, 2009; Wittman et al., 2010b). The question is whether we turn this knowledge into wisdom by acting on it. The challenge is on politicians, farmers, and all other segments of society to demonstrate their wisdom to build a sustainable future able to meet the fundamental needs of people while reproducing ecology.

9.0 References

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Appendices

Appendix 1 – Interview Guide

Interview guide for village visits

Introduction:

- Name, age, household size, income sources, land size (proof?),

Land

- Individual land
- Community land
- Activities:
 - Agriculture
 - Subsistence
 - Income
 - market
 - Forest
 - Subsistence
 - Income
 - market
 - Other

Agriculture

- Land use
- Crops and Harvesting
- Inputs? (fertilizer, pesticides, seeds)
- Markets and Sales
- Learning, Knowledge sharing and Development
- Water and Irrigation

SAGCOT SCENARIO

- Have you been informed about SAGCOT? Or the plans for your village?
- How did RUBADA approach?
- What did they say?
- How did you make the decision to grant land to RUBADA?
- How long time did they spend here and how long time did the entire VLUP take?
- Did you participate in a Village Assembly with RUBADA?
- What do you think would change here if an investor came and lets say you produce sugarcane and sell to them?

Appendix 2- Analytical Guide

INTERVIEW ANALYSIS

Ruipa hh1R															
	Socially self-organized	Ecologically self-regulated	Appropriately connected	Efficiently managed	Environmentally sensitive	Exposed to disturbances	Compatible with local natural assets	Reflective and shared learning	Globally autonomous and locally interdependent	Honors legacy	Builds human capital	Reasonably Profitable	Optimally Redundant		
GENERAL HOUSEHOLD hh1R	LAND USE hh1R	CROPS/HARVEST hh1R	INPUTS hh1R	MARKETING hh1R	KNOWLEDGE hh1R	SAGCOT, LAND, RUBADA, SBT hh1R	SAGCOT, LAND, RUBADA, SBT hh1R								
Remarks hh1R:															

Appendix 3 – List of SAGCOT Partners

Private Sector Companies

- Africa Potato Initiative
- AGCO
- Agro EcoEnergy
- Bayer CropScience AG / Bytrade
- CRDB Bank
- Diageo / East African Breweries Ltd
- Jain Irrigation Systems Ltd
- Kijani Agro
- Kilombero Plantation Ltd (KPL)
- Kilombero Valley Teak Company Ltd (KVTC)
- Kuwaiti Danish Dairy Company
- McLaughlin Gormley King Company (MGK)
- MIC Tanzania (TIGO)
- Minjingu Mines and Fertilizer Ltd
- Monsanto
- Mtanga Foods Ltd
- National Microfinance Bank (NMB)
- Nestlé
- Olam
- Opportunity International
- Pyrethrum Company of Tanzania
- SABMiller / Tanzania Breweries Ltd
- Seed Co Tanzania Ltd
- Shambani Graduates Enterprises Ltd
- Silver Street Capital
- Syngenta International AG
- TANSEED International Ltd
- Unilever
- United Phosphorus Ltd / Advanta

- Yara International

Apex and Farmer Organizations

- Agricultural Council of Tanzania (ACT)
- Confederation of Tanzania Industries (CTI)
- Tanzania Horticultural Association (TAHA)
- Tanzania Sugarcane Growers Association (TASGA)

Development Partners, Foundations, Research Organizations and CSOs

- Africa Wildlife Foundation
- Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA)
- Department for International Development (DFID)
- Global Alliance for Improved Nutrition (GAIN)
- Heifer International
- International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN)
- Kilimo Trust
- Royal Norwegian Embassy
- Tanzania Agricultural Partnership (TAP)
- The Nature Conservancy (TNC)
- United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
- United States Agency for International Development (USAID)
- World Bank

Government of Tanzania

- The Government of the United Republic of Tanzania
1. President's Office
 2. Prime Minister's Office
 3. Vice President's Office
 4. Ministry of Agriculture, Food Security and Cooperatives
- Agricultural Seed Agency (ASA)
 - Financial Sector Deepening Trust (FSDT)
 - Tanzania Investment Bank (TIB)
 - Tanzania Investment Centre (TIC)
 - The Rufiji Basin Development Authority (RUBADA)

Endnotes

- 1 Davoudi (2012) applies his argument to socio-ecological systems in general.
- 2 This argument is a classical example of the “tragedy of the commons” (Hardin, 1968)
- 3 MKUKUTA is an acronym for Mkakati Wa Kukuza Uchumi Na Kupunguza Umaskini Tanzania. Translated to English it means The National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty.
- 4 Interview 28.08.13 with Tulalumba Mlogo, Executive Assistant at the SAGCOT Centre Ltd.
- 5 See the CAADP website at <http://www.nepad-caadp.net/>
- 6 Email correspondence with Petter Hveem, Norwegian Embassy
- 7 Map downloaded from “mapsof.net”: <http://mapsof.net/map/tanzania-detailed-map>
- 8 Paying sitting allowance may also be problematic for other reasons. Firstly, the respondents may participate in interviews based on how much they are getting paid, which may influence what type of information they share. Secondly, it may make the field difficult for other researchers entering the same area if respondents are already used to get paid a certain amount to participate in research projects.
- 9 Except from one short interview which took place at a restaurant in Dar es Salaam.
- 10 Interview 13.11.13 with household representative in Namwawala.
- 11 Interview 23.11.13 with villager in Namwawala village.
- 12 Interview 23.11.13 with villager in Namwawala village.
- 13 AGRA was founded in 2006 through a partnership between the Rockefeller Foundation and the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation. According to its website AGRA advocates for policies that support its work across all key aspects of the African agricultural “value chain”- from seeds, soil health, and water to markets and agricultural education. Critics argue that the ‘shadow of Monsanto, DuPont, Syngenta and other seed and agrichemical multinationals, and equity funds lie just behind the scenes of AGRA’s show. Building new markets and market infrastructure for commercial seed in Africa opens the door for future occupation by multinationals... AGRA and other capitalist interests have identified a profitable (‘bankable’) investment opportunity in smallholder agriculture in Africa, linked to Green Revolution technologies. They are now acting on that’ (African Center for Biosafety in McKeon, 2014).
- 14 A Malthusian catastrophe refers to a situation where population growth outpaces agricultural production.
- 15 This is not to imply that productivity in Tanzanian agriculture cannot, and should not, be improved. But rather, the basic assumptions characterized by scarcity makes room for approaches to agricultural development which focuses mainly on increasing technology and less on political scarcities. See Scoones et al., (2014) for an interesting discussion on this.
- 16 Interview 28.08.13 with Tulalumba Mlogo, Executive Assistant at the SAGCOT Centre Ltd.
- 17 Interview 12.12.13 with Norwegian stakeholder representative.
- 18 Interview 12.12.13 with Norwegian stakeholder representative.
- 19 Interview 06.12.13 with Laurent Kaburire, Head of Programmes at MVIWATA.
- 20 Interview 23.11.13 with household member in Namwawala village, Kilombero District.
- 21 MVIWATA did not take part in these consultation rounds. For details on the recommendations of those 19 CSO’s who took part, see “Feedback and Recommendations from Civil Society Organizations for the “Greenprint” Strategy of the Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania Initiative”. Available at the Tanzania Natural Resource Forum (TNRF, 2012): <http://www.tnrf.org/Greenprint.pdf>
- 22 The content and role of the SAGCOT centre will be explained further down.
- 23 E-mail correspondence 18.03.14 with Thomas Laiser of MVIWATA.
- 24 Interview 06.12.13 with Laurent Kaburire, Head of Programmes at MVIWATA.
- 25 Interview 09.12.13 with Pal Oystein Stormarken, Managing Director of Yara Tanzania Ltd.
- 26 Interview 28.08.13 with Tulalumba Mlogo, Executive Assistant at the SAGCOT Centre Ltd.

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- 27 Interview 28.08.13 with Tulalumba Mlogo, Executive Assistant at the SAGCOT Centre Ltd.
- 28 Interview 09.12.13 with Pal Oystein Stormarken, Managing Director of Yara Tanzania Ltd.
- 29 Interview 09.12.13 with Pal Oystein Stormarken, Managing Director of Yara Tanzania Ltd.
- 30 To my knowledge, Bunge and General Mills have not yet come up with any concrete investment plans in Tanzania.
- 31 See for example joint ventures such as Bunge with Dupont (Dupont, 2003) and Monsanto with Syngenta (Hendrickson & Heffernan, 2002).
- 32 Interview 28.08.13 with Tulalumba Mlogo, Executive Assistant at the SAGCOT Centre Ltd.
- 33 In March 2013, a group of Tanzanian CSO's wrote a statement expressing their concern with UPOV. Their statement can be found at ip-watch: <http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/UPOV-Tanzania-CSO-Statement-1.pdf>
- 34 According to its website, AGMARK is a regional non-profit development organization with headquarters in Nairobi. AGMARK has specialized in programs that facilitate smallholder farmers and pastoralists to access inputs and technologies for increased production and output markets for surplus production (AGMARK, 2014).
- 35 FIPS describes itself as a "not-for-profit" company committed to improving the crop productivity of small-scale farmers in sub-Saharan Africa. It does this through the dissemination of the appropriate farm inputs, and information on their most effective utilisation (FIPS, 2014).
- 36 Between 2004 and 2009 Yara has been involved in three different corruption cases. In Libya and India Yara bribed high standing public officials during negotiations to establish joint ventures for fertilizer production in each country, while in Russia the company bribed one of their suppliers via a Swiss bank account. Together all three cases amount to a total of US\$ 12 million. A press release from the Norwegian National Authority for Investigation and Prosecution of Economic and Environmental Crime (Økokrim) released in January 2014 reveals that a fine of 295 million NOK (approximately US\$ 50 million) has been issued to Yara for the offences – an amount that hardly will be noticed for the company which in 2012 had a turnover of about US\$ 14 billion.
- 37 According to Benson et al., (2012), Yara's competitors said the government would never have assisted them to obtain if they had proposed similar plans.
- 38 Interview 09.12.13 with Pal Oystein Stormarken, Managing Director of Yara Tanzania Ltd.
- 39 Interview 12.12.13 with Petter Hveem, Norwegian Embassy. Interview 28.08.13 with Tulalumba Mlogo, Executive Assistant at the SAGCOT Centre Ltd, Interview 10.09.13 with Aloyce Masanja, General Director of RUBADA.
- 40 Interview 10.09.13 with Aloyce Masanja, General Director of RUBADA, Interview 28.08.13 with Tulalumba Mlogo, Executive Assistant at the SAGCOT Centre Ltd.
- 41 Interview 18.11.13 with villager in Namwawala village.
- 42 Interview 10.09.13 with Aloyce Masanja, General Director of RUBADA.
- 43 Interview 28.08.13 with Tulalumba Mlogo, Executive Assistant at the SAGCOT Centre Ltd.
- 44 Interview 06.12.13 with Laurent Kaburire, Head of Programmes at MVIWATA.
- 45 Thos contrasts to land acquisition during the socialist era where the 'state could dispossess a customary owner because land was "*mali ya umma*", public property (Shivji, 2006).
- 46 According to one presentation the amount of Village Land within the SAGCOT area is 60 percent, while General Land amounts to 2 percent. The rest is considered to be untouchable Reserved Land. See presentation by Minister for Lands, Housing and Human Settlements (SAGCOT, 2012b)
- 47 See also German, Schoneveld, & Mwangi (2011).
- 48 Interview 10.09.13 with Aloyce Masanja, General Director of RUBADA.
- 49 Interview 10.12.13 with Aloyce Masanja, General Director of RUBADA.
- 50 Interview 10.09.13 and 10.12.13 with Aloyce Masanja, General Director of RUBADA.
- 51 This concern was also highlighted during an interview with a representative of Tanzanian CSO Haki Ardhi who said that the RUBADA during land use planning insists that there must be land set aside for investment – interview 29.08.13 with Cathbert Tomitho, Program Officer, Haki Ardhi.
- 52 According to an Interview 12.12.13 with Petter Hveem, Norwegian Embassy.
- 53 Interview 10.09.13 with Aloyce Masanja, General Director of RUBADA.
- 54 Interview 10.09.13 with Aloyce Masanja, General Director of RUBADA.
- 55 Interview 05.12.14 with Janet Maro, Head of Sustainable Agriculture Tanzania (SAT)

56 Interview 20.09.13 with villager in Nyarutanga village.

57 Interview 19.11.13 with villager in Namwawala village.

58 Interview 06.12.13 with Laurent Kaburire, Head of Programmes at MVIWATA.

59 Interview 22.11.13 with villager in Namwawala village.

60 Interview 10.09.13 with Aloyce Masanja, General Director of RUBADA.

61 Interviews with village authorities in Nyarutanga, Vigolegole, Gomero and Milengwelengwe 19.09-30.09.

62 Interview with representative of RUBADA.

63 Interview 06.12.13 with Laurent Kaburire, Head of Programmes at MVIWATA. Interview 11.12.13 with Reginald Martins, Advocate at LHRC.

64 Interview 29.11.13 with representative of Kilombero District Council

65 Recall that the legislation stipulates that it is the central government which has the final say in such matters when the land in question exceeds 250 hectares.

66 Interviews with villagers in Namwawala village 19.11-20.11

67 Interviews with villagers in Namwawala village 19.11-20.11

68 Interview 23.11.13 with villager in Namwawala village. Similar accounts of the said meeting were presented by several respondents in the village.

69 Interview 11.12.13 with Reginald Martins, Advocate at LHRC.

70 Interview 22.11.13 with villager in Namwawala village.

71 Interview 11.12.13 with Reginald Martins, Advocate at LHRC.

72 Interview 11.12.13 with Reginald Martins, Advocate at LHRC.

73 Interview 11.12.13 with Reginald Martins, Advocate at LHRC. Interview 11.12.13 with representative of the SBT. Interview 11.12.13 with representative of Kilombero District Authorities.

74 Interview 11.12.13 with Reginald Martins, Advocate at LHRC.

75 Interview 11.12.13 with Reginald Martins, Advocate at LHRC.

76 Interviews 19.09-26.09.2013 with villagers in Nyarutanga village

77 During interviews with the RUBADA I was frequently given this information as evidence that the process was participatory.

78 Interviews 19.09-26.09.2013 with villagers in Nyarutanga village and 29.08.13 with Cathbert Tomitho, Program Officer, Haki Ardhi.

79 Interviews with village authorities in Nyarutanga, Vigolegole, Gomero and Milengwelengwe 19.09-30.09.

80 Interview 30.09.13 with village authorities in Vigolegole village.

81 Interview 19.11.13 with villager in Namwawala village.

82 This was also confirmed by the valuers themselves.

83 Interview 22.11.13 with villager in Namwawala village.

84 Interview 11.12.13 with Reginald Martins, Advocate at LHRC.

85 Interview 17.11.13 with villager in Namwawala village.

86 Interview 18.11.13 with villager in Namwawala village.

87 During interviews with the village government, LHRC, government valuers the amount of people asserted to live and/or within the designated investment area have differed from 1500 to 3000. By the time of fieldwork the valuation report was just to be finalized (December 2013). I have been unsuccessful in getting access to this report.

88 Interview 17.11.13 with villager in Namwawala village.

89 Interview 22.11.13 with villager in Namwawala village.

90 Interview 11.12.13 with Reginald Martins, Advocate at LHRC.

91 Interview 11.12.13 with Reginald Martins, Advocate at LHRC.

92 Excerpt from letter (27.06.13) with the headline: 'Acceptance of Sugarcane Project and Ruipa Sugar Factory, and Refuting Case No. 40/2012 under [name removed] which opposes the Sugarcane Production Project'. The letter has been translated from Kiswahili to English.

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- 93 Interview 11.12.13 with Reginald Martins, Advocate at LHRC.
- 94 Interview 11.12.13 with Reginald Martins, Advocate at LHRC.
- 95 Interviews with villagers in Namwawala village 17.11-24.11.13
- 96 Interview 11.12.13 with Reginald Martins, Advocate at LHRC.
- 97 Excerpt from letter (27.06.13) with the headline: 'Acceptance of Sugarcane Project and Ruipa Sugar Factory, and Refuting Case No. 40/2012 under [name removed] which opposes the Sugarcane Production Project'. The letter has been translated from Kiswahili to English.
- 98 Excerpt from letter (22.08.13) with the headline: 'Refutation of all letters dated 27.06 .2013 and 06.07.2012.' The letter has been translated from Kiswahili to English.
- 99 Interview 22.11.13 with villager in Namwawala village.
- 100 Interview 23.11.13 with villager in Namwawala village.
- 101 Interview 11.12.13 with representative of the SBT.
- 102 Interview 23.11.13 with villager in Namwawala village.
- 103 Interview 11.12.13 with Reginald Martins, Advocate at LHRC.
- 104 Interview 28.08.13 with Tulalumba Mlogo, Executive Assistant at the SAGCOT Centre Ltd. Interview 10.09.13 with Aloyce Masanja, General Director of RUBADA.
- 105 Interview 12.12.13 with Ringo Tenga, Law Associates Advocates.
- 106 Interview 13.12.13 with Joseph T. Klerruu, Chief Government Valuer in the Ministry of Lands, Housing and Human Settlements Development.
- 107 Interview 02.12.13 with Government valuer in Morogoro region.
- 108 Interview 20.11.13 with villager in Namwawala village.
- 109 Interview 23.11.13 with villager in Namwawala village
- 110 Interview 23.11.13 with villager in Namwawala village
- 111 These small-scale farms holds on average 2.2 hectares of land (GRAIN, 2014).
- 112 Interview 20.09.13 with villager in Nyarutanga village
- 113 Interview 05.12.14 with Janet Maro, Head of Sustainable Agriculture Tanzania (SAT)
- 114 Interview 10.09.13 with Aloyce Masanja, General Director of RUBADA.
- 115 Interview 10.09.13 with Aloyce Masanja, General Director of RUBADA.
- 116 Interview 17.11.13 with villager in Namwawala village
- 117 Through several interviews in Kilombero villagers reported that they prefer to produce local rice because it is tastier and easier to sell.
- 118 Interview 19.11.13 with villager in Namwawala village
- 119 This was the view of most farmers I met in Namwawala village.
- 120 Indeed, a recurrent attitude among government officials I interviewed in Tanzania was that small-scale farmers can, and should, make way for large-scale agriculture by moving to nearby towns and find alternative livelihoods.