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[mirshahi.maral@gmail.com](mailto:mirshahi.maral@gmail.com)

Noragric  
Department of International Environment and Development Studies  
P.O. Box 5003  
N-1432 Ås  
Norway  
Tel.: +47 64 96 52 00  
Fax: +47 64 96 52 01  
Internet: <http://www.nmbu.no/noragric>

## Declaration

I, Maral Mirshahi, declare that this thesis is a result of my research investigations and findings. Sources of information other than my own have been acknowledged and a reference list has been appended. This work has not been previously submitted to any other university for award of any type of academic degree.

Signature.....*Maral Mirshahi*

Date.....*11 August 2014*.....

# Dedication

To the most beautiful flower in the world – Golandam.

To the amazing man with a greater plan (and good genes) – Behzad.

To my greatest pride and joy – Milad.

And, to my dearest Bartholomew – I couldn't have done this without you.



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Maral Mirshahi



# Abstract

In this analysis, I ask the question: *How has the Supreme Leader of Iran justified the nuclear program domestically between 2003 and 2013?* Puzzled by how the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, has maintained support for a nuclear program that is very costly for the Iranian society – both in the political, economic and social sense – I explore his nuclear rhetoric addressing domestic audiences.

Ayatollah Khamenei's rhetoric is central for understanding Iranian nuclear politics. His authority to determine nuclear policies depends on internal legitimacy. His nuclear decision must be justified within the Iranian society, because audience costs matter – also within the Iranian theocracy. Through the systematic analysis of primary sources in Farsi and English, this analysis aims to fill a knowledge-gap, by providing new empirical insights into the domestic politics of the Iranian nuclear program.

By applying quantitative and qualitative methods, I investigate the manifest and latent content of the Supreme Leader's nuclear rhetoric to domestic audiences. The content analysis shows that the Ayatollah justifies nuclear progress primarily on the basis of nationalism, ideology, religion and self-esteem. Contrary to what many scholars propose, the findings show that limited attention is given to nuclear denial and external security. The Supreme Leader's legitimacy mainly relies on political actors and the general public in Iran. Khamenei justifies nuclear progress as a way of engaging in economic and scientific jihad<sup>1</sup>; as a means to fighting external threats and increase national and international power; and as serving the religious and ideological ends of resistance, independence and justice. By pursuing nuclear progress, the ideology on which the Islamic Republic is based upon will be enforced and secured. By maintaining a rhetoric that focuses on the revolutionary ideology and Islam, the Supreme Leader upholds the domestic consensus on the nuclear question.

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<sup>1</sup> Jihad is an Islamic concept, which means *struggle/resistance*. Jihad refers to Muslim's inner spiritual struggle (a Muslims duty to fulfill religious duties), and the outer, physical struggle (the resistance against infidels and enemies of Islam).



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# **Chapter 1**

## **Introduction**

# 1. Introduction

In the study of Iran's nuclear program, scholars predominantly focus on Iran's diplomatic efforts and technical capabilities. Limited attention has been given to investigating the Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei, and his role in the Iranian nuclear program. Although the Supreme Leader has the overarching authority to determine nuclear policies, his viewpoints on the nuclear issue are seldom analyzed. Scholars who do incorporate the Supreme Leader's statements into their analyses usually do so unsystematically, and predominantly look at the speeches addressed to foreign audiences. Ayatollah Khamenei's rhetoric to domestic audiences is central to politics, because it serves as a means to justifying and legitimizing certain national policies and dismissing other political trajectories (Krebs & Jackson 2007: 36-38) Audience costs do matter – also within the Iranian theocracy (Weeks 2008), because the authority of the Supreme Leader relies on internal legitimacy, and nuclear decisions must be justified to domestic audiences. How, then, does the leading authority of the Islamic Republic of Iran justify the Iranian nuclear program to domestic audiences?

Among Iranian clerics, political factions, interest groups and the general public, there are various standpoints on the Iranian nuclear issue. While some hardliners and conservative politicians and clerics promote nuclear weapons latency, pragmatist and reformists want to limit Iran's nuclear program to civilian purposes only. These different viewpoints are to some extent visible in Iran's diplomatic approach – for example by comparing the nuclear negotiations under the pragmatist president Khatami and the (lack of) diplomacy under the hardliner president, Ahmadinejad.<sup>1</sup> Nevertheless, despite the varying standpoints within Iran and the various diplomatic approaches that have been taken in the past decade, the Islamic Republic appears to hold broad support for the nuclear program.

By studying the rhetoric of the highest authority in the Islamic Republic, an important part of the Iranian narrative may be uncovered. This exploratory analysis sheds new light on the domestic politics of the Iranian nuclear program. Keeping in mind that this exploratory analysis will not

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<sup>1</sup> See Mousavian (2012), Rouhani (2011)

ascertain the true nuclear intentions of the Supreme Leader<sup>2</sup>, it aims to provide insight into arguments that have appeased different religious and political factions within the Iranian government, as well as nuclear interest groups and the general public. This analysis also aims to illuminate why nuclear behavior, which is considered as confusing and threatening by the international community, is justified and legitimized as rational within Iran.

## 1.1 Problem statement

It is puzzling that the supreme leader has maintained support for a nuclear program that is very costly for the Iranian society – both in the political, economic and social sense. Since the uncovering of the undeclared nuclear sites at Natanz and Arak in 2002, Iran has been under great political pressure (Chubin 2006:33). Iran’s nuclear persistence and disregard to international concerns has also led to bilateral sanctions against Iran, and six UN Security Council Resolutions – four of which have included the imposition of economic sanctions against Iran.<sup>3</sup> The continued political pressure and economic sanctions against Iran shows that the international community is still concerned about the Iranian nuclear program (Chubin 2013:9). It also indicates that under the negotiation surface, a consistent nuclear strategy is being upheld. In light of the overarching authority the supreme leader has over Iran’s nuclear policies, I will investigate how he has rationalized and justified the strategy of persistent nuclear pursuit to national audiences.

The supreme leader’s rhetoric is an entry point for understanding how the Iranian government legitimizes its nuclear behavior. Political rhetoric plays a big role in shaping national policies. Moreover, such rhetoric does not exist in a void. As pointed out by Weeks (2008), governments – including those of the non-democratic type – rely on domestic accountability and legitimacy. The political rhetoric of the supreme leader shapes the Iranian narrative, and serves as a basis for consensus about Iran’s nuclear policy among various actors in Iran. Ayatollah Khamenei has a constitutional obligation to fulfill his duties as religious leader of the Islamic Republic. However,

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<sup>2</sup> From here on out I use the terms “the supreme leader”, “the Ayatollah”, “Ayatollah Khamenei” and “Khamenei” interchangeably when referring to the Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei. In the following sections, I have chosen not to capitalize the term “supreme leader”, in order to make the text more reader-friendly.

<sup>3</sup> See UNSCR 1696 (2006), UNSCR 1737 (2006), UNSCR 1747 (2007), UNSCR 1803 (2008), UNSCR 1835 (2008) UNSCR 1929 (2010). UNSCR 1696 and 1835 do not entail sanctions.

the supreme leader faces domestic audience costs if promoting a nuclear trajectory which is not deemed as legitimate.

## 1.2 Research question

Against the backdrop of the problem statement, this thesis seeks to explore the political rhetoric of the most prominent decision maker in Iran, supreme leader Ayatollah Khamenei. As outlined in the Iranian constitution, the supreme leader is the religious guardian of the Islamic government. More specifically, he has the authority to delineate national policies, including nuclear policies, in order to ensure the uninterrupted process of the revolution of Islam. In light of his authority, the statements of the supreme leader may demonstrate the grounds on which Iranian nuclear policies have been justified.

According to the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the supreme leader is a religious leader – a *faqih*.<sup>4</sup> The only authority that is ranked above the supreme leader is Allah, as the constitution is built upon Islam – making the Islamic Republic what is referred to as a *theocracy*. The supreme leader is regarded as a pillar of the state, and serves as a *mediator* between different institutions and the political factions constituting the political community. The Iranian theocracy relies on the domestic political structures, institutions and practices within the Iranian society which decide who retains the political power in the Iranian community. In order to retain his political power, the supreme leader must justify his decisions to domestic audiences. If not, the supreme leader faces domestic audience costs. This motivates the following research question:

*How has the Supreme Leader of Iran justified the nuclear program domestically between 2003 and 2013?*

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<sup>4</sup> *Faqih* means an ‘expert in Islamic jurisprudence’ in Farsi.

By exploring the speeches given to domestic audiences in a systematic and comprehensive manner, the aim of this thesis is to explore how the supreme leader has justified Iran's nuclear program. More specifically, I will answer the following sub-questions:

- i) *How is the nuclear program justified by the Supreme Leader to the Iranian society?*
- ii) *What is the claimed purpose of the nuclear program?*
- iii) *Who are the audiences of Supreme Leader's statements?*

The answer to these questions can provide insight into the significance attached to nuclear technology and advancement, and show whether patterns in terms of theme, timing and audience are apparent in the supreme leader's nuclear rhetoric. Moreover, it may shed light on the types of arguments that have so far appeased domestic audiences, and led to political consensus on the nuclear issue. Acknowledging that the political rhetoric of the supreme leader not necessarily reflects *true intentions*, this analysis provides the basis on which the highest leading authority of Iran has legitimized his nuclear choices in the past decade.

### **1.3 Thesis outline**

This study consists of six sections: Introduction (chapter one), Theory (Chapter two), Research design (Chapter three), Analysis (Chapter four), Conclusion (Chapter five), Implications (Chapter six), References (Chapter seven) and Appendices (Chapter eight).

This chapter (chapter one) outlines the introduction, problem statement, research question and background of the study. In chapter two, I provide a literature review of theories of nuclear proliferation. Here, I discuss the theories of nuclear proliferation, as well as the strengths and weaknesses of quantitative and qualitative methods associated with these theories. Finally, I outline the theoretical framework of the thesis.

In chapter three, I outline the research design of the thesis. First, I discuss the unit of analysis, namely the Supreme Leader's speeches. Second, I discuss the research methods I have used, which is both a qualitative and quantitative approach to content and discourse analysis. Third, I discuss how the data has been operationalized. Finally, I discuss the validity and reliability of my methods.

Chapter four is the main section of the thesis, including the content and discourse analysis. The findings presented in this section are based on the quantitative and qualitative analysis of the supreme leader's speeches to domestic audiences in the period 2003-2013. In chapter five, I conclude my research findings. In chapter six, I discuss the implications my findings have on theory. In chapter seven, I have cited the references that I have used in this thesis. In this section I have also presented the list of the speeches that were used in the analysis. Finally, in chapter eight, the dataset, on which the quantitative analysis is based, is added.

## 1.4 Background

### 1.4.1 The genesis of the Iranian nuclear program

Iran's nuclear program dates back to the 1950s, when it was initiated as part of the American *Atoms for Peace* program and the Baghdad Pact. Iran, led by Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, entered an agreement on civil nuclear cooperation with the United States in 1957. Following this development, the *Tehran Nuclear Research Center* (TNRC) was established and the first Iranian nuclear reactor was built with American assistance. In 1968 Iran signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), agreeing to abstain from nuclear weapons in return for access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, including an energy program (NPT 1968). In 1974, Iran agreed to the basic safeguards obligations set out in the Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/214). The same year the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) was established.

Three years later, the Shah was overthrown by the Islamic Revolution. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who became the leader of opposition against the Shah, assumed power. In April 1979 Iran was declared an Islamic Republic (Geldenhuys 2004:114). The first supreme leader, Ayatollah Khomeini, was initially uninterested in the nuclear program. However, during the Iran-Iraq war, Iran's changed its stance. After being subjected to chemical warfare by Iraqi forces, and with Saddam Hussein pursuing a nuclear weapons program in Iraq, Ayatollah Khomeini secretly decided to resume the Iranian nuclear program (Albright & Stricker 2010).<sup>5</sup> After the death of Khomeini in 1989, Iran's nominal president for eight years, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, became supreme leader. During the 1990s Iran continued its nuclear pursuit, but was not in the limelight for suspicious nuclear behavior.

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<sup>5</sup> More specifically, Ayatollah Khomeini decided to pursue nuclear fuel cycle technology.

### 1.4.2 Suspicious nuclear sites and Iran's cooperative approach

This changed on 14 August 2002, when the Iranian opposition group National Council of Resistance (NRC) shared documents revealing two clandestine nuclear facilities outside the cities Natanz and Arak. The claim was that the facility near Natanz was a uranium fuel fabrication plant, and that the facility near Arak was a heavy water reactor. In December 2002, the American think-tank *Institute for Science and International Security* (ISIS), reported that Natanz was a nuclear enrichment facility (thus, not a fuel fabrication plant), and that Arak was a heavy water production plant under construction (Albright & Hinderstein 2002).<sup>6</sup>

In the case of Natanz, international suspicion had been raised due to the fact that gas centrifuges technology used in the uranium enrichment facility was obtained illegally through the A.Q. Khan Network (Albright & Stricker 2010). In the case of Arak, foreign powers were concerned that this capability could potentially be used for the production of plutonium for nuclear weapons. The facilities in Natanz and Arak are of dual use nature, meaning that they may either serve peaceful purposes or be tapped for the production of weapons-useable nuclear materials. Thus, their existence did not constitute a formal breach of article II of the NPT on the production of nuclear weapons (Kippe 2008). Nevertheless, the secrecy of the facilities raised concern among world powers. International pressure on Iran therefore increased, in order to coerce the Islamic Republic to roll back, or at least contain, its nuclear developments.

Meanwhile in the region, the U.S. invasion of Iraq was taking place, and Saddam Hussein was also accused of having a secret nuclear weapons program. At this point, Iran did not fully grasp the seriousness of the voiced concerns (Mousavian 2012). When comprehending the potential consequences of this development, the moderate pragmatist president Mohammad Khatami<sup>7</sup> made concessions to the demands of the IAEA and attempted to negotiate with world powers. Pragmatist politicians maintained that Iran had three options to choose from with regard to diplomatic interactions: direct talks with the United States; bargaining with the EU; or relying on an alternative bloc, comprising Non Aligned Movement states<sup>8</sup>, China and Russia. At the time,

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<sup>6</sup> Site preparation for the construction of an adjacent heavy water research reactor were also uncovered by ISIS.

<sup>7</sup> 2001-2005

<sup>8</sup> The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) is a group of states which are not formally aligned with or against any major power-bloc. The main principles of these states are mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty; mutual non-aggression, mutual non-interference in domestic affairs, equality and mutual benefit; and

Iran's supreme leader rejected any calls for direct negotiations with the US. Iran therefore chose to resolve outstanding disputes and eliminate technical and legal ambiguities through engagement with the EU as the main negotiating party. It also continued talks with the NAM and East Asian powers, and opted for full cooperation with IAEA (Mousavian 2012:84-86).

In the wake of the Natanz and Arak discovery, Iran agreed to the modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements of its safeguards agreement with the IAEA in February 2003, as a measure of assurance. This code required Iran to report on a new facility as soon as the decision to construct it was taken. Before the modification, "Code 3.1" required states to report on new facilities "normally no later than 180 days before the facility is scheduled to receive nuclear material for the first time." Iran also agreed to inspections of Natanz and Arak by the IAEA. During these inspections, the IAEA found traces of highly enriched uranium at the Natanz plant. This development concerned a number of states in the international community. As international pressure mounted, Iran conceded to international demands after talks with Britain, France and Germany (EU3) (Kippe 2008).

On 18 December 2003, Iran signed the NPT Additional Protocol (AP), allowing more intrusive IAEA inspections. Iran also agreed to suspend all uranium enrichment-related activities (IAEA 2014).<sup>9</sup> In 2004, Iran and the EU-3 signed the Paris Agreement, which extended the temporary suspension of Iran's nuclear activities. Succeeding President Khatami in August 2005, the conservative hardliner Mahmood Ahmadinejad<sup>10</sup> became president. Ahmadinejad assumed a somewhat aggressive and non-cooperative approach compared to Khatami.

### **1.4.3 Iranian non-compliance results in sanctions**

In September 2005, despite the signing of the AP and the Paris Agreement, the IAEA reported that Iran had resumed uranium enrichment-related activities, and that a number of issues of

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peaceful co-existence. As of 2012, NAM had 120 member states, and 20 observer countries. The U.S, UK, France, and Russia are not member states. China has observer status in NAM.

<sup>9</sup> Nuclear enrichment-related activities, such as development of centrifuges and the production of uranium hexafluoride were suspended.

<sup>10</sup> 2006-2013

concerns related to the nuclear program remained unresolved.<sup>11</sup> From the Islamic Republic's point of view, diplomatic engagement through the Paris Agreement seemed futile: Iran was getting all "sticks" and no "carrots" despite its cooperative strategy. Iran therefore shifted its approach, and declared that it would stop the voluntarily implementation of the AP in 2006. Iran also refused to respond satisfactorily to the IAEA's questions concerning past and ongoing experimentation on nuclear weaponization (Mousavian 2012).

Although the Additional Protocol was not binding by international law, it constituted a political obligation for Iran to show that it did was not carrying out suspicious nuclear activity. The suspension of the AP in 2006 therefore raised greater concern for the IAEA and world powers. This led the IAEA Board of Governors to refer Iran's nuclear file to the UN Security Council in February 2006, resulting in the first UN Security Council Resolution against Iran.<sup>12</sup> This resolution did not constitute sanctions, but was to warn Iran of sanctions if it did not suspend its nuclear enrichment-related activities. Iran did not give in to this warning. As a result, the UNSC adopted Resolution 1737 which outlined the first round of sanctions against Iran.<sup>13</sup>

In March 2007, Iran announced to the IAEA that it was suspending the implementation of the modified Code 3.1 and reverting back to the original version of the code. Furthermore, unresolved issues of concern highlighted by the IAEA remained unaddressed (Joyner 2010). The IAEA, however, iterated that the reversal of Code 3.1 could not be carried out unilaterally by Iran, and proposed that this could only be done on the basis of consensus between the IAEA and Iran. In light of these development international concerns heightened. In the following years the UNSC passed four more resolutions demanding the suspension of enrichment-related activities cooperation with the IAEA.<sup>14</sup> The UNSC resolutions<sup>15</sup> in 2007 and 2008 banned the supply of nuclear-related materials and technology to Iran; froze the assets of key individuals and companies with ties to the nuclear program; and imposed monitoring of Iranian banks, ships and aircrafts as well as individuals involved with the nuclear program. In the final UNSC resolution<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>11</sup> Iran had restarted its gas centrifuge program and the manufacturing of centrifuges. It also resumed operations at the Isfahan uranium conversion facility – a facility which made uranium hexafluoride.

<sup>12</sup> See UNSCR 1696 (2006)

<sup>13</sup> See UNSCR 1737 (2006)

<sup>14</sup> Enrichment-related activities included heavy water and reprocessing activities, in both the heavy water facility in Isfahan and in Arak.

<sup>15</sup> See UNSCR 1747 (March 2007), UNSCR 1803 (March 2008), UNSCR 1835 (2008)

<sup>16</sup> See UNSCR 1929 in June 2010

against Iran, the arms embargo was tightened by the UNSC; funds and assets of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) were frozen, and travel bans were imposed on individuals linked to the nuclear program and Iran's ballistic missile program.

#### **1.4.4 Resuming diplomacy and cooperation**

Replacing Ahmadinejad, the moderate pragmatist Hassan Rouhani was elected as Iran's president in 2013. Similar to Khatami, President Rouhani – who was a former nuclear negotiator – urged a cooperative approach vis-à-vis the international community and the IAEA. Iran's willingness to negotiate had substantially increased, and under the Rouhani-government, Iran even engaged diplomatically with the United States – something it had not done in over 30 years. However, it was clearly expressed by Ayatollah Khamenei that only the diplomatic approach to tackle the nuclear issue had changed – not the politics or demands of the nation. Following a series of talks, on 24 November 2013, Iran and the P5+1 countries<sup>17</sup> signed the Geneva Interim Agreement<sup>18</sup>. This agreement entailed decreased economic sanctions against Iran in exchange for a short-term containment of certain nuclear activities. As of August 2014, Iran and P5+1 are working toward a Comprehensive Agreement on the Iranian nuclear program, with an extended deadline set to 24 November 2014. Hence, the nuclear future of Iran is still being negotiated by P5+1 and Iran – under the supervision of the supreme leader.

This background suggests that Iran has maintained its will to pursue the advancement of nuclear technology. Although Iran during Khatami and Rouhani has opted for a conciliatory diplomatic approach, these approaches have been under the authority of the supreme leader. This assumption is confirmed by past nuclear negotiators.<sup>19</sup> Also, the technical advancements Iran has made the past decade suggest that Iran – regardless of the diplomatic approach it has taken – has pursued the development of nuclear technology. This further encourages the exploration of the supreme leader's statements to domestic audiences, because the respective Presidents of Iran, as well as nuclear negotiators – regardless of their standpoint on the nuclear issue – have followed the supreme leader's instructions during negotiations.

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<sup>17</sup> P5+1 is a term for the permanent five members of the United Nations Security Council, namely United States, Russia, China, Britain, France, plus Germany.

<sup>18</sup> This agreement is officially titled the Joint Plan of Action (JPA). See European Union External Action (2013)

<sup>19</sup> See Rouhani (2011) and Mousavian (2012)



# **Chapter 2**

## **Theory**

## 2. Theory

### 2.1 Literature review: theories of nuclear proliferation

In the literature of nuclear proliferation, the technical capability to develop nuclear weapons is called the “supply-side” aspect of proliferation, while a government’s motivation to develop nuclear weapons is called the “demand side” aspect of proliferation (Sagan 2011:226). Given the topic and research question of this thesis, the literature review will focus on scholarship looking at the “demand side” of nuclear proliferation.

When studying nuclear proliferation, scholars predominantly look at external and internal determinants. Scholars point out incentives and constraints imposed by the following factors: external security (Mearsheimer 1990; Frankel 1993; Paul 2000), domestic politics and economic interests (Lavoy 1993; Solingen 1994), as well as norms and identities of individuals, groups within society and nations (Hymans 2006b; Moshirzadeh 2007). The methodological approaches to studying these determinants vary. While some scholars rely on deductive logic, others use an inductive approach. The former may be associated with theory-driven research and the latter with empirically-driven research.

Theory-driven researchers use deductive reasoning in order to make inferences about factors that lead to nuclear proliferation. While some opt for quantitative research methods accounting for a range of factors which may provide findings that are generalizable and probabilistic, others choose qualitative methods, such as case studies, to accept or reject hypotheses. In short, studies that are theory-driven seek to test a particular theory and a number of assumptions formulated as hypotheses. In contrast, empirically-driven studies of nuclear proliferation use inductive research tools in order to expand the understanding of why states proliferate. Such scholarship mainly takes a qualitative approach, whereby one or several cases are observed intensively, and where the research findings may broaden the understanding of a specific phenomenon or case. Empirically-driven research may illuminate new factors and mechanisms which can be useful for theory development.

In the following section, I discuss how external and internal determinants may explain a state nuclear behavior and highlight the advantages and disadvantages of inductive and deductive

logics. As shown in the discussion, while the traditional approach has been to look at security motivation for answers, scholars have acknowledged that domestic politics and norms play a significant role in understanding the demand side of nuclear proliferation. My assessment is that when studying rhetoric on nuclear issues, both external and internal drivers should be included.

Following this discussion, I briefly discuss the benefits and trade-offs of using quantitative and qualitative methods. While quantitative research can provide probabilistic and generalizable answers, qualitative research provides deep insight into causal mechanisms. I argue that pragmatism is important when choosing research methods. By using both quantitative and qualitative research methods, the unit of analysis can be approached from multiple angles. In turn, this may lead to more comprehensive and robust conclusions, with higher validity and reliability. Thus, for a holistic understanding, the respective theories and methods approaches should be regarded as complementary, rather than competing.

### **2.1.1 External determinants: security and power**

The study of nuclear proliferation has been dominated by variants of realism<sup>20</sup> (Hymans 2006a:456). From a “hard realist” point of view, the international system is an anarchy in which states rely on self-help in order to ensure state survival (Waltz 1979; Waltz 1981), and nuclear weapons are the “absolute weapon” to achieve this goal. Realists posit that states – as rational actors, and given the anarchic structure of the international system – will proliferate if they have the means to do so. Nuclear proliferation is understood as “a response to external security threats, which are thought to be endemic to the international system due to the pervasive logic of the security dilemma” (Singh & Way 2004: 863). Assuming this logic, states may exercise their nuclear option in order to deter threatening states or to preserve or increase their relative power in the international system (Potter 1982).

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<sup>20</sup> It should be acknowledged that the terms “realism” and “realist” encompass a variety of viewpoints, and many may disagree with the way these terms are used in this analysis. However, in order to simplify the debate, I use the term “realism” and “realists” in the same vein as used by Hymans (2006a). Here, these terms refer to those who assume the world to be an international anarchy, in which states opt for nuclear weapons in order to secure their survival and to obtain regional or international balance of power.

In addition to the arguments rooted in the classical realist notion of hard power, scholars focusing on soft power means highlight nuclear development as a means to economic security and power (Barzegar 2012: 231). However, the proposition that advanced nuclear technology serves as a means for soft-power is often intertwined with the assumption that states are opting for nuclear latency.

Looking at the Iranian nuclear case through the “realist” lens, Iran’s behavior can be interpreted as an effort to obtain a means for deterrence against enemies and threats, such as the United States and Israel (Chubin 2013: 18; Sagan & Waltz 1995: 45), and/or to achieve balance of power in the turbulent Middle Eastern region (Mearsheimer 1990; Paul 2000; Chubin 2008; Ashraf 1993: 160-163; Fitzpatrick 2008: 49). The long-term enmity with Israel and the military presence and political influence of Western powers in the region make motives of external security and deterrence of threat appear to be likely. The fact that Iran is the only Shia-Persian state in a Sunni-Arab region is claimed to cause regional insecurity. In this context, Iran is assumed to struggle for increased regional power and hegemony.

Although outlining a number of factors that seem reasonable for explaining nuclear proliferation motives, the theory falls short when empirical evidence is taken into account. Empirical studies show that even though most states have faced some sort of security threat, a large number of countries have not opted for nuclear weapons (Ogilvie-White 1996). The security argument cannot explain the gap between states that are assumed to have nuclear weapons ambitions and actual nuclear weapon states (Hymans 2006a: 456). On a macro level, realism seems to suffer the problem of consistently over-predicting overall proliferation (Hymans 2006a: 458).

From a methodological point of view, Sagan (1996/97: 26) points out that empirical research supporting the realist argument suffers from potential selection bias. By observing a proliferation episode that fits the “security-mold”, researchers then work backward to identify security threats that can be taken to rationalize state’s decisions to proliferate (Singh & Way 2004: 863). Furthermore, the disregard for factors beyond those imposed by the international structure, limits the scope of this approach. Realists come up short in explaining cases where the balance of power and security threats have not led to nuclear proliferation (Sagan 1996/97; Paul 2000).

Indeed, when studying the case of Iran, security factors may be relevant and important in order to understand why Iran could be motivated to proliferate. However, assuming security to be the only explanatory factor is dissatisfying.

### **2.1.1.1 Technological determinism**

Within what is described by realists as an anarchic international system, scholars view nuclear proliferation as an inevitable extension of conventional military force – so-called ‘technological determinism’ within the military sector (Singh & Way 2004: 862). This viewpoint is connected to the deductive inference posited by realists that states – as rational actors, and given the anarchic structure of the international system – will proliferate if they have the means to do so. In the international competition for power and security, states that have the sufficient economic and technological capacity may therefore opt for nuclear weapons as a result of a “nuclear domino effect”.

However, this argument also suffers from lack of empirical support. As Singh & Way (2004:962) point out, numerous states, such as Italy, Belgium, Japan, Canada and Germany, have abstained from developing nuclear weapons despite having the technical capacity to do so. While acknowledging that technological and economic capacity is a minimum requirement if a state wants to proliferate, the empirical findings show that technology in itself does not determine proliferation. Moreover, the scholarship focusing on technological imperatives steers the focus toward the “supply side” of the proliferation equation, and systematically disregards the “demand side” of proliferation (Hymans 2006a:458).

## **2.1.2 Internal determinants: politics, norms and values**

Due to the shortcomings of theories that limit their focus to external drivers, the theoretical debate has been supplemented with more in-depth, contextualizing approaches. In order to nuance the understanding of why states proliferate, scholars have looked at internal determinants proposing that insight into the political system, internal power structures and national characteristics may shed light on nuclear motives.

Emphasizing domestic power structures and political economy, Solingen (1994: 136) proposes that “ruling coalitions pursuing economic liberalization are more likely to embrace regional nuclear regimes than their inward-looking, nationalist, and radical-confessional counter-parts”. This approach looks at internal power dynamics and the effects particular regime types and economic structures may have on proliferation patterns. This theory is built on the assumption that nuclear decision-makers’ conceptions of interest is affected by the kinds of ties they have to economic and international processes (Solingen 1994: 139). According to Solingen (1994: 139) “liberalizing coalitions do not merely trade away the right to have "the bomb" for the right to make money; they perceive little inherent benefit in a policy of nuclear ambiguity for both domestic and international reasons.”

Similarly, Sagan (1996/97: 63) argues that national actors may steer towards or away from nuclear proliferation, depending on whether it serves their parochial bureaucratic or political interests. Sagan highlights that national actors are not passive recipients of top-down political decision-making. Rather, political actors and interests groups influence nuclear politics and developments through their political power and control of information so that it serves their own interests (Sagan 1996/97: 64).

Studying the case of Iran, scholars have explored the dynamics and processes within the decision-making elites in Iran such as the supreme leader, the president and nuclear advisors, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), The Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), the Atom Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), the clerical establishment, the foreign ministry and the military (Bar, Machtiger & Bachar 2008; Chubin 2013; Ziemke, Brumberg, Samii, Hashim & Eisenstadt 2005; Entessar 2009; Saghafi & Ehsani 2004). However, as pointed out by Solingen (2007), a methods constraint for such studies is the difficulty in accessing data on

dynamics, processes and interests within governments that are “closed and inward-looking”, such as the Iranian theocracy.

An alternative approach is the intensive historical and societal study of nations pegged as potential nuclear proliferators. Scholars propose that factors such as nationalism (Shahibzadeh & Selvik 2007) identity conceptions (Hymans 2006b; Hymans 2012; Moshirzadeh, 2007), pride and prestige (Barzegar 2012; Lodgaard 2007: 100) within a nation may breed policies of nuclear advancements or proliferation. In the case of Iran, Hymans (2012) claims that Iran’s historical legacy and ideological culture enables the inclination towards nuclear latency. Barzegar (2012) claims that due to the national identity and the Islamic ideology, advanced nuclear capabilities is regarded as a symbol of pride and prestige in Iran. These viewpoints assume that Iran will seek to advance its nuclear program and seek nuclear weapons latency, in order to win symbolic power and status – both regionally and internationally.

As plausible as these propositions may be, such approaches are often criticized for their methodology and reasoning, because intangible factors such as pride and prestige are difficult to conceptualize, operationalize or measure. Furthermore, it is difficult to prove the underlying psychology behind potential nuclear ambitions and uncovering so-called “intrinsic motivation” (Hymans 2012: 25), because “motives are the most illusive of psychological data” (Morgenthau 1978: 5).

In sum, the various theories of proliferation have both strengths and shortcomings. It is reasonable to assume that states *may* resort to development of weapons of mass destruction in order to deter their enemies. However, this does not mean that states *must* go down the nuclear path to resolve security issues. Furthermore, the power dynamics and level of economic interdependence may motivate or discourage nuclear proliferation. However, due to the opaque nature of second-generation proliferators, it is difficult to gather data on such processes and be certain that the cause of proliferation is not hidden in other confounding factors (Cohen & Frankel 1991: 14-15). Also, intentions are not necessarily fixed, and may therefore change. Finally, factors such as national identity conception and norms within a society may illuminate

curious nuclear behavior. However, it may be difficult to conceptualize, identify, measure and make sense of this type of intangible factors.

As seen in the previous sections, strengths and shortcomings of theory and methodology are closely interrelated with research methods. In the following section, I will briefly discuss some strengths and weaknesses of the quantitative and qualitative approach to analyzing nuclear ambitions and intentions. Discussing the strengths and weaknesses of theory and methods is valuable in order to produce knowledge that is cumulative (Hellevik 2002). The scrutiny of the quantitative and qualitative research methods will shed light on particular benefits and trade-offs. It may therefore serve as a valuable entry point to shaping a research design which is suitable for answering the research question of this thesis.

### **2.1.3 Quantitative and qualitative methods: strengths and weaknesses**

In addition to the theoretical discussion, it is valuable to debate the fruitfulness and limitations of quantitative and qualitative research methods. The praise and criticism of methods is central, because it determines the validity and reliability of the knowledge that is produced.

A common research challenge is the operationalization and coding of determinant factors. Nuclear opacity and the ambiguity around nuclear hedging strategies impose a particular challenge for researchers in the data collection process (Levite 2002). Furthermore, scholars disagree on how one should conceptualize, operationalize and code data once it is obtained. Fuhrmann, Kroenig & Sechser (2014: 44) argue that “whereas quantitative models demand clear coding decisions”, qualitative research design are “more forgiving of ambiguous classification.” These scholars suggest that the quantitative approach enables easier oversight of the operationalization, interpretation and conclusions drawn from data, which in turn allows for a more transparent oversight of the research, and allows replication and control for those who disagree with the choices within the research study. Quantitative methods is therefore claimed to provide a higher degree of external reliability than qualitative methods.

Sagan (2014), however, argues that the operationalization of particular variables may prove difficult for quantitative researchers as well. For example, how can one determine the divide between nuclear exploration and nuclear pursuit, if the coding difference is an extra warhead or an extra dollar in the nation's GDP? As Sagan (2011: 227) states "significant uncertainty exists about whether and when to code particular states as exploring or pursuing the bomb". Ambiguous classification is therefore not only a challenge to qualitative researchers. If data is inaccurately coded, quantitative research may be prone to systematic bias, because the data that is produced entails a pattern or errors, which in turn decreases the robustness of the research findings (Sagan 2014).

The comparison of the quantitative studies presented by Singh & Way (2004) and Jo & Gartzke (2007) illustrates that when data is coded and operationalized differently, quantitative researchers also reach different conclusion. As Sagan (2010: 233) points out, the scholars' choice of variables, data sets, coding rules and statistical model impacts the research findings. For example, while Singh & Way (2004) find strong support for both enduring rivalries and militarized disputes as causes of proliferation, Jo & Gartzke (2007) find strong support for status-driven motives. This example shows that research – quantitative or not – is inherently value-laden, and the researcher's standpoint and choices shapes the research findings.

Another constraint related to data collection is the observations and coding of certain concepts, such as pride, prestige and norms. For quantitative researchers such concepts are particularly difficult to quantify. Fuhrmann, Kroenig & Sechser (2014: 49) acknowledge the difficulty in assigning a numerical value to, for example, prestige. Although quantitative researchers may be able to devise variables to proxy the concepts, they cannot be measured directly. Then, due to the obscurity or intricacy of some of these concepts, it may be risky to use "proxy variables that are easily available, rather than collecting the data that reflect the substantive variables of real interest" (Sagan 2011: 230).

An advantage of statistical models is said to be that they assign equal weight to each case. This features takes away the opportunity for researchers to cherry-pick cases that are suited to illustrate their point, thus removing selection bias. Furthermore, statistical models provide ways to identify and exclude cases that deviate from the dominant trends. Statistical analysis may

therefore be a useful precursor to identifying cases which require in-depth study (Fuhrmann, Kroenig & Sechser 2014: 43). However, in order to assign equal weight to each case, one needs comparable observations of each case. In the analysis of nuclear proliferation in general, and opaque proliferation in particular, access to data is limited and varying. Due to evidence-related constraints, it may be difficult to reach meaningful insights from statistical findings (Gavin 2014: 24).

Perhaps the main feature of quantitative methods as such is the ability to producing generalizable results. Statistical analysis allows for an accurate probabilistic calculation. In turn, scholars such as Fuhrmann, Kroenig & Sechser (2014: 45) propose that this advantage enhances the foundation for drawing sound conclusions, because it is based on probability and steers away from deterministic claims. Qualitative research is thus criticized for making few, if any generalizable inferences. Having a confined scope of analysis consisting of a single or a few cases, the conclusions drawn are also limited because they do not illuminate broader trends (Fuhrmann, Kroenig & Sechser 2014: 41).

However, in light of the limited number of potential proliferators in the world, one could argue that for research aimed to understand current cases of concern, a generalization is not needed. While statistical analyses intend to identify average effects, rather than to explain outliers (Fuhrmann & Kroenig 2014: 44), qualitative methods enable the exploration of outliers through intensive in-depth analyses. However, since qualitative research is not probabilistic, one cannot assign a level of certainty to the causal mechanisms and relationships that are detected (Sagan 2014). Spurious relationships are difficult to detect in qualitative analyses, because qualitative research methods have no way of accurately controlling for intervening or extraneous variables.

## 2.2 Theoretical framework: strategic culture and political rhetoric

Based on the theoretical discussion, various approaches – despite outlining plausible drivers for nuclear proliferation – face the challenge of approaching what seem to be unanswerable questions about actors’ motives. As Cohen & Frankel (1991: 14) point out, the nuclear behavior of second generation proliferators, as opposed to first generation proliferators<sup>21</sup>, is characterized by opacity. This implies that states with nuclear ambitions will keep technological and military developments secret, and not advertise their intentions in the political realm. Studying opacity poses an epistemic challenge, because having a clear grasp of a phenomenon whose very nature is opaque seems paradoxical (Cohen & Frankel 1991: 15). Even if Iran has a ‘nuclear hedging strategy’<sup>22</sup>, it will be difficult - if not impossible - to uncover its intentions due to opacity (Levite 2002).

A second challenge of studying state’s nuclear ambitions is, as pointed out by Scott Sagan (2011: 233-234), that “nuclear intentions may be ambivalent and can push in both civilian and military directions.” State governments are not unitary actors facing the binary choice “proliferate” versus “not proliferate”. Nuclear weapons acquisition depends on complex political and technical processes, and decision makers on different levels may have different intentions and influential powers on the path toward nuclear proliferation. Thus, refining the intentions of Iran to a single set of explanatory factors is too simplistic, and attributing importance to one decision-making unit over another is difficult.

The starting point of this theoretical framework is that due to nuclear opacity one can analyze proliferation intentions with few certainties (Bowen & Moran 2014: 3). The next best option can be to explore the claimed intentions of states, presented in their political rhetoric. In light of methodological limitations, I concur with Krebs & Jackson’s (2007: 36) in that mainstream

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<sup>21</sup> The term ‘first generation proliferators’ refers to the five declared nuclear powers, namely the United States, Great Britain, France, Russia and China. The nuclear proliferation of these states is characterized by complete visibility. In the Cold War context, first generation proliferators advertised, rather than kept secret, their nuclear weapons advancements.

<sup>22</sup> As defined by Ariel Levite (2002) nuclear hedging is a strategy of “maintaining or appearing to maintain a viable option for the acquisition of nuclear weapons”.

scholarship should avoid centering causal accounts on unanswerable questions about actors' true motives and focus instead on what governments are saying. It is valuable to look at political rhetoric because decision makers are to some extent bound by their public statements. I also support Weeks (2008: 36) proposition, that one should not underestimate the vulnerability of leaders in nondemocratic states to audience costs. Nondemocratic leaders require the support of domestic elites (Bueno de Mesquita et. al. 2003). It is therefore important to explore rhetoric, because it is central to politics. As Krebs & Jackson (2007: 36-38) highlight "[rhetoric has] real causal impact on political outcomes", and legitimacy established through rhetoric is important for maintaining policies.

In order to investigate the political rhetoric of Iran, I use Kartchner's (2009) theoretical framework on strategic culture. This framework serves as a suitable point of departure for exploring what the supreme leader claims are the means and ends of its nuclear pursuit, as well as highlighting what he constitutes as allowable or optimal behavior with regards to its nuclear program. Kartchner's (2009: 57-58) definition of *strategic culture* consists of three aspects: "a shared system of meaning", "a collection of value preferences" and "a template for human action". Kartchner's outlines the three aspects as the following:

1. *Strategic culture can be considered a "shared system of meaning," with language and terms that are understood and agreed within a given culture, and identifying and defining what is considered rational within a society. It is a way of interpreting the world, a way of relating to the community, its members, and the relationship of the community to other communities. It is based on "evolving meanings conditioned by historical precedent and contemporary experience." In this sense, strategic culture helps define the "means" of a group or a nation's national security policy.*
2. *Strategic culture may be seen as a "collection of value preferences", specifying what a group's, state's, or society's appropriate security objectives and desires are. That is, strategic culture contributes to defining the "ends" of a groups or nation's national security policy.*
3. *Strategic culture is a source of determining what constitutes allowable or optimal behavior, or a "template for human action," relating ends and means in an appropriate, and culturally sanctioned manner. Cultural influences can be considered a template for human strategy" and those strategies can in turn be reflected in behavior. In other words, this aspect of culture relates the meaning of the first aspect of culture (a system of shared meaning), with the objectives representing the collective value preferences, and helps determine appropriate means for achieving those ends. (Kartchner 2009: 57-58)*

This definition of strategic culture provides a valuable framework for systematic analysis of the data at hand. However, contrary to Kartchner (2009), I do not suggest that this framework provides insight into motivations and intentions. Rather, I propose that the theoretical framework allows the exploration of how the supreme leader justifies the nuclear program. More specifically, how the supreme leader uses historical precedent and contemporary experience to explain why nuclear development is rational within a society; why nuclear advancement is deemed as an allowable and optimal way of enforcing national culture and value preferences; and why advanced nuclear technology is an appropriate means to reach nation's security policy ends.

As pointed out by Kartchner (2009: 55), strategic culture for issues related to weapons of mass destruction will primarily be emphasized on the national level. Although the focus of this thesis is not to uncover nuclear weapons ambitions, I agree with Kartchner that analysis of the national level is fruitful. The analysis therefore focuses on political rhetoric addressing domestic audiences.

The analysis of the supreme leader's speeches, within this theoretical framework, may add value to research and policy making in two particular ways. First, because it outlines what the supreme leader posits as rational behavior. According to Hudson (1997: 8) "Differences in moral reasoning, based on culture, may skew traditional assumptions of rational-choice theory." When exploring political rhetoric, rather than intentions, it is therefore interesting to see what Iran's supreme leader is claiming as rational for Iran. Such justifications – whether it reflects the true intentions of Iran or not – has impact on the Iranian society and may provoke international repercussions. Understanding Iran's key decision maker's way of reasoning may inform on how to tackle the Iranian nuclear case.

Second, insight into Iran nuclear justifications may be valuable for assessing the political leeway of Iranian nuclear negotiators. For some, the systematic and in-depth understanding of the supreme leader's nuclear rhetoric can serve as an entry point for "knowing one's enemy" and enable better threat assessment and development of defensive and offensive policies. For others, this understanding can add to the foundation for "knowing one's friend", by providing new entry points for developing innovative diplomatic solutions aimed at building confidence between Iran and the international community, so that the nuclear issue may be resolved.

Kartchner (2009: 57-58) proposes that “states at present most interested in acquiring, proliferating, or using WMD often justify their policies and actions in cultural terms. Rather than dismissing such language as mere propaganda, strategic cultural perspectives underscore the importance of such language for understanding motivations and intentions of these actors.” I argue, that even if “language is mere propaganda”, it has serious national and international implications, because governments, regardless of regime type, depend on legitimacy to stay in power. Also, the audience costs may be detrimental to the leader, because backing down from his standpoint may signal incompetence and decrease his power and authority (Weeks 2008: 42).

“Mere propaganda” can indeed provoke international response if the political rhetoric is perceived as threatening. However, if the rhetoric proposes nuclear weapons as illegitimate on the basis of national culture and religion, reversal of such rhetoric (and thus reversal of policies) may severely damage the legitimacy of the leader among domestic audiences.

As discussed in the literature review, the various theoretical approaches have some shortcomings in explaining nuclear proliferation ambitions. Yet, they encompass factors that can be understood as important. The insight one can draw from the literature review is that, external security, domestic politics and economic interests, norms and identity perceptions do matter. However, one should bear in mind two particular caveats. First, there is the difficulty of determining the correlation of factors that lead to proliferation. Second, the challenge of explaining what makes a state go from having no proliferation intentions, to having the intention to explore, to pursue and to acquire nuclear weapons. This thesis may contribute to illuminating the first caveat. Due to the research focus, however, the second caveat will not be addressed.

In light of the advantages and trade-offs of quantitative and qualitative research methods, I will approach the research question using a mixed methods approach. Given the topic of the thesis, qualitative research method is deemed as the most suitable approach for the in-depth and intensive exploration of the data at hand. However, the qualitative approach shall be supplemented by simple quantitative methods. The univariate analysis of the manifest content of the speeches serves as a tool in picking up on main themes and topic of the supreme leader’s nuclear rhetoric. Using this approach also enables a transparent and replicable coding process, on which the qualitative in-depth analysis is based. By using simple quantitative methods as an entry point, so-called “classification ambiguity” can be mitigated.

# **Chapter 3**

## **Research Design**

# 3. Research Design

## 3.1 Unit of analysis

Having political rhetoric as the point of departure, it is necessary to assess *whose* rhetoric is important. Given the assumption that political rhetoric has impact on political outcomes, it is reasonable to assume that decision makers with power, regardless of regime type, wish to stay in power. This assumption is rather uncontroversial in international relations theory (Krasner 1978). Although the means by which state leaders ensure political power vary greatly, legitimacy is to some extent important for all state leaders. While leaders in liberal democracies may wish to legitimize their actions in order to winning re-election, other regime types may wish to legitimize their actions in order to gain the support of political elites (Weeks 2008), or to pursue strategic interests and consolidate power (Kinne 2005: 116-118).

As Kinne (2005) highlights, the regime type and constitutional framework of a state may influence the means to which state leaders ensure political power. In the case of Iran, the political system is built upon the Islamic constitution that was established after the revolution in 1979. Shahibzadeh & Selvik 2007: 9) propose that the Islamic constitution and the institutional setup of the Iranian political system was a compromise between a concept of “leadership-educator of a revolutionary state and the conception of liberal democracy based on a political contract regulating the relationship between the ruler and the ruled”. The core elements of the constitution consist of the principle of democracy through parliamentary elections, under the authority of the supreme leader.

As outlined in the constitution, the role and authority of the supreme leader’s is based on the concept of ‘*velayat*<sup>23</sup> *faqiye*’, stipulating that the Islamic government is founded on a basis of ‘religious guardianship’.<sup>24</sup> Article 5 of the constitution establishes the position of the supreme leader as one who provides “continuous leadership and perpetual guidance” and has a

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<sup>23</sup> *Velayat* means ‘government’ in Farsi.

<sup>24</sup> This point is outlined in the Preamble of Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran. See Iran Chamber Society (2014)

“fundamental role in ensuring the uninterrupted process of the revolution of Islam”.<sup>25</sup> Two key features of the duties and powers of the supreme leader are his authority to delineate general policies and his responsibility to supervise that general policies are properly executed.<sup>26</sup>

However, the religious supreme leader – the *faqih*<sup>27</sup> – is regarded as a pillar of the state, and serves as a *mediator* between different institutions and the political factions constituting the political community (Shahibzadeh & Selvik 2007: 12). An example that illustrates the supreme leader’s role as mediator is in the Ayatollah’s Friday Prayer Address (2012), where he discusses the issue of parliamentary elections and the vetting of political candidates:

*I would like to say a few things about the issue of vetting [of political candidates]. The Guardian Council approves certain individuals and disqualifies certain others. There are four points that I would like to mention in this regard. The first point is that according to the law, the Guardian Council is responsible for the process of vetting. It should make sure candidates have the necessary qualifications. Of course, I have always advised them that they should not raise their standards so much that only a few people are approved as qualified. They should be lenient about the standards. The second point is that some people are opposed to this supervision by the Guardian Council. Their objections might be legitimate and valid, but we should pay attention to the fact that when a trustworthy governmental organization makes a decision, we should accept it. All of us should abide by the decision. For example, imagine that the Majlis<sup>28</sup> passes a law. I might have problems with the law. I might say it is flawed. But it is a law and I must observe it. When a trustworthy governmental organization – such as the Guardian Council – makes a decision, we must accept the decision and abide by it. (Supreme Leader’s Friday Prayer Address – 03/02/2012)*

This example illustrates the overarching authority the supreme leader has over the democratic processes in Iran, because the Guardian Council is selected by the supreme leader, which in turn is responsible for vetting political candidates. It also shows how the supreme leader legitimizes the execution of power, over which he has responsibility to supervise and delineate.

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<sup>25</sup> See Iran Chamber Society (2014)

<sup>26</sup> This point is outlined in Article 10 of Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran. See Iran Chamber Society (2014)

<sup>27</sup> *Faqih* means an ‘expert in Islamic jurisprudence’ in Farsi.

<sup>28</sup> *Majlis* means ‘parliament’ in Farsi.

In simple terms, this means that the democratic elements set forth in the constitution are ultimately under the authority of the supreme leader. The constitutional assignment of the *faqih* gives internal legitimacy to the supreme leader. The only authority that is ranked above the supreme leader is Allah, as the constitution is built upon Islam – making the Islamic Republic what is referred to as a *theocracy*. However, as Shahibzadeh & Selvik (2007:19) point out: “theocracy is a fiction since there are real people, real political structures, real institutions, real practices which decide who retains the political power in a community.” This viewpoint strengthens the relevance of legitimacy, because it highlights the various domestic audiences that must be appeased in order to retain political power. An important way to achieving legitimacy is by carrying out the duties one is assigned. However, this aspect may in turn be used to justify and legitimize political decisions.

One example of using duty as a justification for political decision, particularly related to the nuclear issue, can be found in the following speech made by the Ayatollah Khamenei:

*Regarding the nuclear issue, during the time when there were certain turbulences, certain measures were adopted which might not have been favorable. At that time, I said in a public address that if certain things were not done, I would have to step in. And this was what happened. This is the meaning of leadership and it is based on Islam. This is a positive point in the Islamic Republic.(...) Different organizations - including the judiciary, the executive branch and the legislative branch - are doing their legal responsibilities with full authority within the framework of the Constitution, as is the case with the rest of the world. But the Islamic Republic must not deviate from the path towards those ideals, otherwise the leadership will be held responsible. The Leader is the one who must answer for such deviations. The Leader has a duty to prevent such deviations. (Supreme Leader’s Speech to Students of Kermanshah Province - 16/10/2011)*

This example illustrates the superior authority of the supreme leader, and how his decision-making veto is justified on the basis of his constitutional duties. Specific to nuclear politics, the key role and ultimate power of the supreme leader is also verified by key nuclear negotiator, Seyyed Hossein Mousavian, as well as former nuclear negotiator and current President, Hassan

Rouhani. In their respective memoirs, they both confirm that all final decisions on the nuclear issue have to be approved by the supreme leader (Mousavian 2012; Rouhani 2011).

Assuming that political leaders wish to stay in power and rely on domestic legitimacy in order to do so, political rhetoric is therefore deemed as an important mean to obtaining legitimacy. As the brief peek into the constitution shows, the supreme leader is granted the status of “religious guardian” of the nation, making him the key decision maker in Iran. More specifically, his powers and duties entitle him to supervise and delineate general policies of the state. Based on this simplified background, one can understand why the statements of the supreme leader are a relevant and pivotal source of gaining insight into how the Iranian nuclear program is justified.

On the official website<sup>29</sup> of the supreme leader, public speeches to the domestic and international audiences are available. This source is considered to be both reliable and valid for the exploration of the supreme leader’s political rhetoric. The speeches are mainly available in Farsi, however many speeches are also available in English. For the analysis, speeches in Farsi and English are included. As highlighted in the introduction and background chapter, international concerns related to the Iranian nuclear program started in 2002. While 2002 is the natural starting point for exploring the nuclear rhetoric of the supreme leader, I will focus on the period 2003 to 2013, due to limited data availability. The year 2014 is excluded from the analysis, because the study commenced in 2013.

### **3.2 Research methods: content and discourse analysis**

The idiographic objective of this thesis, as reflected in the research topic and question, calls for an intensive, qualitative research design through which detailed and in-depth knowledge about the unit of analysis is obtained. In addition, simple quantitative methods are included in order to give an overview of patterns of rhetoric topics as well as target audiences. By combining qualitative and quantitative methods, the topic at hand may be examined from different angles and provide a more complete and trustworthy analysis of the data. By using simple quantitative method, namely through a univariate content analysis, I measure the frequencies of the manifest

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<sup>29</sup> [www.khamenei.ir](http://www.khamenei.ir)

content of the speeches and the distribution of speeches across audiences and time. This approach provides insight into how much and how often certain words and themes have been mentioned over time and across different audiences. By using qualitative methods, namely discourse analysis, I explore the complexities and context in which the speeches are given. This ‘triangulation’ of methods and analysis further enhances the reliability of the research findings.

The quantitative approach to text analysis is referred to as “content analysis” and the qualitative approach to text is referred to as “discourse analysis”. However, one should keep in mind that these analytical approaches are often associated with a particular epistemology, ontology, axiology and methods. In order to clarify my approach, I use the following criteria for my analysis – inspired by the taxonomy presented by Hardy, Harley & Phillips (2004: 21)<sup>30</sup>:

**Table 1: Content and discourse analysis matrix**

<i>Content analysis and discourse analysis combined</i>	
Dealing with meaning	Meanings are constructed in a particular context, but the words one uses counts. Quantitative methods provide an overview of the frequencies and distributions of the manifest content, while qualitative methods provide in-depth insight into understanding the meaning behind the words.
Dealing with categories	Categories emerge from the data. However, empirical research and theoretical work provides ideas for what to look for and the research question provides an initial simple frame.
Dealing with technique	The categories that emerge from the data allow for coding schemes involving counting occurrences of meanings in the text. Analysis is an interactive process of working back and forth between the texts and the categories.
Dealing with context	The analysis must locate the meaning of the text in relation to a social, political and religious context.
Dealing with reliability	The results are reliable to the degree that they are understandable and plausible to others.
Dealing with validity	The results are valid to the degree that they show how patterns in the meaning of texts are constitutive of reality.

<sup>30</sup> This taxonomy is a modified version of that presented by Hardy, Harley & Phillips (2004).

### 3.3 Operationalization of categories

In order to structure the rhetoric of the supreme leader, I have constructed categories which reflect the various themes that have been emphasized. In the initial phase, the categories were shaped on the basis of the assumptions outlined in theories of nuclear proliferation and specific to the case of Iran. Using the concepts of external and internal determinants as a starting point was valuable, because it enabled compartmentalization of the data at hand. In the initial stage, I categorized the words into two categories: external security and threats, national identity and norms. However, using an inductive approach, the categories were modified for each round of analysis. The final categories, which reflect the various aspects of the supreme leader's rhetoric, are: *Threats*, *Denial*, *Identity and Self-actualization*. Each category consists of two or more subcategories, for further conceptual clarity and refinement. The words within each subcategory are indicators for the respective category. It should be noted that in the content analysis I have included variations<sup>31</sup> of the words within each subcategory. The dataset of the univariate analysis is presented in Appendix A.

The first category, *Threats*, is inspired by theories emphasizing the 'security argument'. In the operationalization of this category, I have developed two subcategories which I think reflect the core premise of the security argument in the Iranian context. The subcategories are labeled as *Enemies* and *Security threats*. I have operationalized the subcategory *Enemies*, by including the words: America, Israel, Zionist, Iraq, enemy, enmity, West, westoxication, Europe, England, English, foreigners, colonial, imperialist, bully and ignorant. In the operationalization of the subcategory *Security threats*, I have included the words: security, insecurity, survival, threat, impose, war, warmongering, opposed, hostile.

The second category, *Denial*, is an extension of both the security arguments and the national identity arguments, proposing that denial of nuclear technology has been a grievance to Iran. I understand denial to be a result of domination and discrimination. A manifestation of so-called

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<sup>31</sup> For example, when searching for the word "nation" (which belongs to the subcategory *Nationalism* in the category *Identity*), I searched for several variations of the word, such as: nation, national, nationalism, nationalistic, nationalize, nationalization. After several rounds of data collection based on this technique, I merged the variations into one category. In this thesis I will only refer to these so-called "core words" used in the final data-collection worksheet.

denial is through sanctions. Therefore, I have included three subcategories within this category and labeled them as: *Domination*, *Discrimination* and *Sanctions*. In the subcategory *Domination* I have included the words: dominate, humiliate and arrogance. In the subcategory *Discrimination* I have included the words: discriminate, hypocrite, injustice. The final subcategory, *Sanctions* is rather self-explanatory, so further operationalization of this word has not been required.<sup>32</sup>

The third category, *Identity*, is inspired by the arguments of scholars looking at internal determinants. *Identity* is divided into four subcategories, labeled as: *Nationalism*, *Self-esteem*, *Ideology* and *Religion*. These subcategories reflect the nationalistic aspect, the ideological aspect and the Islamic aspect of identity, and include other factors which reflect the Iranian self-esteem.

The subcategory *Nationalism* consists of the words: nation, Iran, country and identity. The subcategory *Self-esteem* consists of the words: dignity, honor, pride, grandeur, greatness, great, confidence, courage, prestige, symbol and integrity. The subcategory *Ideology* consists of the words: revolution, Khomeini, Aban, Dey, freedom, power, powerful, strength, resistance, endurance, fight, vigilance, determination, defend, defense, justice and independence.<sup>33</sup> The subcategory *Religion* consists of the words: Islam, religious, faith, Quran, God, Allah, jihad, spiritual, holy, divine, moral, immoral, ethics and values.

The fourth category, *Self-actualization*, is an extension of the category *Identity*, because it looks at how national identity and so-called intangible values are manifested. Thus, for operationalizing this category I have outlined three subcategories, labeled as: *Knowledge*, *Progress* and *Scientific development*. The subcategory *Knowledge* consists of the words: knowledge, knowledgeable, wise, wisdom, smart, intelligent, intelligence and intellectuals. The subcategory *Progress* consists of the words: progress, effort, achievement, innovation, innovate, innovative and economic. The subcategory *Scientific development* consists of the words: science,

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<sup>32</sup> In this category, the word embargo was included. However, this only appeared once in the nuclear speeches throughout the period 2006-2013.

<sup>33</sup> The 19 Aban is a date from the Persian calendar, translating to November 4. This refers to the day which the Iranian Hostage Crisis in 1979 began. The 13 Dey is a date from the Persian Calendar, translating to January 3. This refers to the dawn of the revolution in 1979. These dates are emphasized in the speeches of the Supreme Leader as important. The former is deemed important, because it symbolizes a day of resistance against the USA, branded “an arrogant world power”, the latter is deemed important because it signals the breakthrough of the ideology of the Islamic Republic.


scientific, scientists, development, technology, technological, advancement, advance, develop, energy, oil, gas, nuclear, fuel, uranium, enrichment.

Using a quantitative univariate analysis, I look at the distribution of speeches across time and audiences, and explore the manifest content of the speeches by analyzing the frequency of words. This allows assertion of particular patterns and variations of the content, and provides valuable findings of the content's surface structure (Berg & Lune 2012: 355, 364). I acknowledge that these categories constitute artificial distinctions, and some may disagree with the operationalization of the categories and subcategories. However, by using a quantitative coding scheme, the content analysis provides oversight of the operationalization, interpretation and conclusions drawn from the data. In turn, this allows for replication and control for those who disagree with the presented findings, and thus enhances the external reliability of the study.

In addition to enabling a systematized and transparent coding approach to the manifest content of the speeches, the quantitative approach is also valuable to decrease bias related to own value-loaded conceptions. Thus, by including simple features from quantitative methods, I could see whether the themes and topics that were included in the qualitative analysis actually matched the quantitative findings. This process allowed for a more rigorous in-depth discourse analysis, because the interpretations of themes and topics were based both on the manifest and latent content of the speeches. Following the content analysis, the discourse analysis was included in order to explore the latent content and the deep structural meanings of the speeches. The combination of methods has allowed for insight into the rhetoric of the supreme leader, the context in which the speeches occur (Berg & Lune 2012: 364), and taking into account the time of and the audiences to whom the speeches are conveyed (Paltridge 2006; Wodak & Krzyzanowski 2008).

### 3.3.1 Content analysis

Based on the operationalization outlined in the section above, I conducted a content analysis of the word frequencies and distributions of speeches across time and audiences. In simple terms, this means that I counted the number of times particular words have been said, and analyzed the patterns of such frequencies. The word frequency count is based on 87 speeches translated to English in the period 2006 to 2013.<sup>34</sup> The distribution of the speeches is presented in figure 1.



**Figure 1: Speech distribution: number of speeches given per year (2006-2013)**


<sup>34</sup> These translations are made by those administrating the official website of the supreme leader, and are therefore official translations.

Due to the variation in speech distribution, the results of the word frequency counts – absolute word frequency number – have been divided by the number of speeches in each respective year to produce a relative number. This procedure is illustrated in table 2.

**Table 2: Speech and word frequency overview (2006-2013)**

Year	Speeches	Word frequency	Word frequency mean
2006	6	8497	1416,167
2007	7	17191	2455,857
2008	19	38187	2009,842
2009	10	30860	3086
2010	14	24483	1748,786
2011	11	27794	2526,727
2012	11	46221	4201,909
2013	9	41350	4594,444

Furthermore, as the number of words per speech varied, I have taken into account the total amount of words in a given year and the average amount of words per speech (Figure 2). The results for the total amount of words for each year show a variation for each respective year. However, when dividing by the number of speeches and looking at the average word amount, the results for each year appeared predominantly similar.



**Figure 2: Total and average number of words per speech (2006-2013)**

As illustrated in figure 2, due to the similar averages across time, the data for each year is regarded as comparable. This further strengthens the argument to use the relative word frequency numbers. Based on these findings, the analysis will include figures showing relative frequencies, rather than absolute numbers of words. It is worth noting that the absolute numbers of the word frequency count were fairly similar to the relative numbers. This further strengthens the argument to use relative numbers, as no great variations are left out of the discussion by excluding the absolute numbers from the analysis.

As the frequency-count tool used for this method only supported the Latin alphabet, the speeches included for the univariate analysis are Khamenei’s speeches in English, which are official

translations provided on the website of the supreme leader. However, for mapping the audiences of the speeches, I have included speeches in Farsi and English translations.

Based on the univariate analysis, I have outlined the patterns and variations for the respective categories over time. By aggregating the word frequency of subcategories within each category, I first look at the main trends and variations between *Threats*, *Denial*, *Identity* and *Self-Actualization*. I show the extent to which Ayatollah Khamenei has used rhetoric on the bases of security, denial, identity and self-actualization. These findings shed light on the domestic justification of the nuclear program in a broad sense, but do not take into account the interplay within the respective categories. In order to further break down the categories and explore the various aspects of threats, denial, identity and self-actualization, I look at the patterns between subcategories within each category over time. By looking at the aggregated word frequency within each subcategory, we can see which aspects within each category are prominent, as well as patterns and variation between subcategories. Finally, I look at patterns across subcategories of different categories, in order to highlight patterns that may have been missed across categories.

By undertaking an inter- and intra-category analysis using word frequency count, the first section paints a descriptive picture of the supreme leader's rhetoric. This picture provides an overview of the key themes of the speeches, and provides indicators of interesting aspects to look closer at in the discourse analysis. Finally, I have included an overview of the target audiences. First, I illustrate the audiences of the speeches on which the univariate analysis is based upon.<sup>35</sup> Following, I show the audiences of speeches in Farsi<sup>36</sup> for the period 2003-2013. The audience distributions provide an overview which further elaborates the content analysis findings, as well as providing contextualization for understanding the discourse analysis.

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<sup>35</sup> This implies the speeches translated to English from the period 2006-2013.

<sup>36</sup> Excluding the duplicates, meaning the speeches translated to English.

### 3.3.2 Discourse analysis

Following the content analysis, an in-depth discourse analysis of the supreme leader's rhetoric is conducted. This analysis enables the exploration of the latent content and deep structural meanings of the rhetoric of Ayatollah Khamenei. The discourse analysis also enables the contextualization of the descriptive findings by showing how the four categories are interwoven.

The discourse analysis is based on the 87 speeches translated to English, as well as 80 speeches in Farsi. The English speeches have been selected as most relevant among 315 speeches regarding the nuclear issue, and the Farsi speeches have been selected as most relevant among ca. 450 speeches regarding the nuclear issue.<sup>37</sup> Using the categories as a starting point, the content of the 167 speeches is systematically categorized. The speeches were labeled under different categories, in order to systematize the topics that were reflected. By applying this approach, I have extracted the main discursive themes in the supreme leader's speeches. On the basis of this extraction, I discuss the key rhetoric that is conveyed and exemplify the core messages of Khamenei with quotes and contextualization. By doing so, I aim to give a "thick description" of the supreme leader's rhetoric on the nuclear issue.

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<sup>37</sup> In the initial phase of choosing speeches relevant to the research topic, I included all speeches including the words *nuclear, atomic, uranium*. Following, I took out speeches that were irrelevant to the topic, or which only had one or a few sentences about the nuclear issue.

### 3.4 Validity and Reliability

The use of existing data from a primary source which is publicly available allows for replication and control, and enhances the external reliability of the findings. Furthermore, as the data at hand is from an official source containing public speeches of Ayatollah Khamenei, the data is considered to be relevant for the research purpose. The systematic analysis of data provided by this source may bring forth new data for future research. Furthermore, it is useful because it is openly available online and free – features that reduce the time, money and access constraints researchers might face in the data collection phase.

As stated in the previous section, the content analysis is based on 87 speeches in the time period 2006 to 2013. All of these speeches are official translations to English provided on <http://english.khamenei.ir/>. On this website, there were no speeches from the period 2003 and 2004, and only one speech related to the nuclear issue from 2005 in English. The software used for the content analysis did not support Farsi because of encoding issues.<sup>38</sup> Thus, speeches in Farsi were not included in the content analysis. I chose not to translate the speeches in Farsi to English. The main reason for this is that my language skills in Farsi are not on the level of a professional translator. An attempt of translating the Farsi speeches could thus result in erroneous translation and include a preconceived conceptual bias. Furthermore, including unofficial translations and comparing them to the official translations could reduce the reliability of the research findings. In particular, the comparability of terms/concepts from different sources of translation could put the internal reliability at risk.

However, I have included the speeches in Farsi in the mapping of audiences. Also, the speeches in Farsi are included in the discourse analysis. As the discourse analysis explores the context and themes within the political rhetoric, the analysis of speeches in both languages allowed for checking the intertextual coherence. This implied that for speeches available in both English and Farsi, I could analyze the speeches individually and check whether the interpretation of the texts matched. In sum, the source of information that is used is considered to be both relevant and reliable. By using different methods, I have sought to strengthen the internal validity of the

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<sup>38</sup> The software I used is available at: [http://www.writewords.org.uk/word\\_count.asp](http://www.writewords.org.uk/word_count.asp)

study. By giving a detailed account for my methods, I have sought to strengthen the internal reliability of the study.

Fuhrmann, Kroenig & Sechser (2014: 46) highlight that a focus on primary documents may entail several problems. Records may be incomplete, “but the absence of evidence is not evidence of absence”. Thus, one might conclude incorrectly, because a crucial piece of information may be missing. Indeed, a particular challenge is that the speeches of Khamenei may be modified or removed from the official website. In order to mitigate this challenge, I have printed out the sources I have used. Furthermore, as these statements are public, I have also been able to retrace a number of speeches on other websites which provide the transcripts. Furthermore, as I am looking at the rhetoric, rather than the intentions, of Ayatollah Khamenei, the focus of the study is on what has been explicitly expressed, rather than secretive intentions. Thus, the main methodological challenge associated with studies of nuclear proliferation is removed. Another particular challenge that could threaten the internal reliability is the operationalization of the categories that I have used in the content analysis. As highlighted in the theory chapter, the operationalization, coding and interpretation of data is greatly debated among scholars who study nuclear proliferation. I have sought to reduce this challenge is by providing a thorough account for the operationalization of categories and coding of data in the content analysis, so that the study may be replicated by those who disagree with my operationalization, coding and interpretations.

# **Chapter 4**

## **Analysis**

## 4. Analysis


### 4.1 Content analysis

The content analysis is based on 87 speeches from the period 2006 to 2013, showing word frequencies and distribution over time. In the first section, I discuss the rhetoric of the supreme leader in the period 2006 to 2013. I refer to these findings, presented in figure 3, as *Domestic justifications*. Then, I discuss rhetorical rationale based on *Threats*, *Denial*, *Identity* and *Self-actualization* separately, by exploring the subcategories within each category. Figure 4 shows the results of the category *Threats*; figure 5 shows the results of the category *Denial*; figure 6 shows the results of the category *Identity*, and figure 7 shows the results of the category *Self-actualization*. The dataset on which the content analysis is based on is presented in appendix A.

#### 4.1.1 Domestic justifications

Khamenei's domestic justifications are predominantly based on nationalism and national self-esteem, ideology and Islam. Following, the Ayatollah uses rhetoric focusing on knowledge, progress, scientific development as well as enemies and security threats. Finally, and to a very limited extent, Khamenei refers to aspects of denial, focusing on domination, discrimination and sanctions. These general findings are illustrated in figure 3. When looking at the main findings, one may keep in mind that the highest number of speeches occur in 2008 and 2010 (cf. figure 1), while the highest total word frequency occur in 2008, 2012 and 2013 (cf. table 2).

### Domestic Justifications



**Figure 3: Supreme leader’s speeches (2006-2013): Domestic Justification**

As shown in figure 3, all categories share the same trend with a minor exception for *Self-actualization* – which has a slight decrease between 2012 and 2013. This means that the proportion between the rhetoric categories have been somewhat stable, implying that when justification on the basis of one category has gone up or down, the same development has occurred for all outstanding categories as well.<sup>39</sup> This finding suggests that the Khamenei has consistently concentrated his rhetoric firstly on *Identity*, secondly on *Self-actualization*, thirdly on *Threats* and finally, on *Denial*.

The trend for the categories *Threats*, *Denial* and *Self-actualization* is moderate in a positive direction. Due to greater variance between the minimum and maximum value, *Identity* has a

<sup>39</sup> As mentioned, this is the case for all categories and all years, with the exception for the category *Self-actualization* in the year 2012 to 2013. In this period, references to all other categories increases, while reference to *self-actualization* decreases.

moderate to high, positive development trend. This finding suggests that references to identity-related words have been more volatile over the years than for the remaining categories. One interpretation may be that justifications on the basis of external threats are constant albeit low, while rhetoric on national identity is generally high and particularly amplified when deemed necessary.

Rhetoric on the basis of *Denial* and *Self-actualization* increases slightly from 2006 to 2007. While references to words such as *domination*, *arrogance* and *sanction* are mentioned circa 3 times per speech in 2006, this average increases to circa 8 times in 2007. On average, words such as *achievement* and *progress* are mentioned circa 30 times per speech in 2006, while references spike in 2007 to circa 49 times per speech.<sup>40</sup> References to *Threats* increase from 16 in 2006 to almost 52 times in 2007. Within this category, there is a particular spike in usage of the words *America*, *enemies* and *war*.

Similarly, justifications on the basis of *Identity* increase in 2007 compared to 2006. On average, references to the word *nation* are six-fold, and references to the word *Iran* are made 4.5 times more frequent in 2007 compared to 2006. Furthermore, references to the words *Islam* and *God/Allah* are nearly doubled in 2007, in comparison to the previous year. However, although references to words in the category *Identity* increase from 2006 to 2007, there is a slight decrease in the occurrence of the words *independence*, *faith* and *religion*.

In 2008, there is a small decrease in all *Domestic justification* categories. Compared to the previous year, this is particularly apparent for the category *Threats*. Words such as *America*, *Iraq* and *threat*, which reflect *Threats*, are less used. As implied, while the overall mentioning of words within the category *Identity* decreases in 2008, it is interesting that the words *courage*, *confidence*, *revolution* and *power*, indicators of *Identity*, actually increase compared to 2007. In 2009, references to all categories increase, and the rise pattern is particularly similar between *Identity* and *Threats*. Within the category of *Threats*, there is an increased occurrence of the words *America*, *enemy* and *hostility*. Also, words referring to national identity, such as *dignity* and *honor* are used more compared to the previous year.

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
<sup>40</sup> These average numbers include all words within the respective categories. This implies that the average per speech includes all words within the category. The exact word frequencies (stated in relative numbers) are available in appendix A.

All categories are less referred to in 2010 than in 2009. However, there is a particular drop in references to *Identity*. References to the words such as *nation* and *Iran* decrease nearly three-fold in 2010, compared to 2009. Also, while mentioning the identity-related words *powerful* 12 times, *justice* 21 times and *dignity* 26 times on average in 2009, these references diminish to respectively 1, 1 and 6 times on average in 2010. In 2011, justifications on the basis of all categories increase. This trend continues in 2012, with a particular spike in the *Identity* category. There is a clear increase in usage of the words *great country* and *honor* in 2012. Finally, in 2013, references to *Threats*, *Denial* and *Identity* increase, while rhetoric of *Self-actualization* drops slightly.

Based on the findings across all four categories, the following tentative conclusions are suggested. Firstly, rhetoric related to national identity with particular emphasis on the nation's greatness, honor and dignity is prevalent. Secondly, the greatest threat that is emphasized is American domination, hostility and arrogance. Thirdly, references are made to words such as confidence and courage, which are said to reflect the revolutionary ideology, and the people are urged to pursue achievement and progress, despite the imposition of sanctions. Against the backdrop of the literature review, these preliminary findings may suggest that theories focusing on nationalism (Shahibzadeh & Selvik 2007), identity conceptions and intrinsic motives (Hymans 2012; Barzegar 2012) are relevant. Theories on technological determinism and external security may also be deemed as relevant, because of the focus on self-actualization and security. However, external factors are less focused on compared to internal factors.

## 4.1.2 Threats

In this section I break down the category *Threats*, analyze the frequency similarities and variations between the subcategories *Enemies* and *Security threats*, and look at the development of these patterns over time.



**Figure 4: Supreme leader's speeches (2006-2013): Threats**


When looking at the frequency increase for both subcategories from 2006 to 2007, it is apparent that *Enemies* are referred to four-times more than *Security threats*. Words of particular emphasis within this subcategory are *enemies*, *America* as well as *Iraq*. In 2008, this number drops to half of that from 2007, but picks up again in 2009, albeit not to the level it was in 2007. It is worth noting that the number of speeches and total number of words increase in 2008 (cf. figure 1 and 2). In 2010, references to *Enemies* drop to a level that is lower than in 2006. In 2010, there is a particular decline in references to the words *enemies* and *America*. However, in 2011, there is an

increase in references to words related to enmity, a trend that continues in 2012 and 2013. In 2013 enmity rhetoric peaks, and the number of references to this subcategory is six times greater than in 2010, where it was referred to the least.

The pattern for the subcategory *Security threats* is somewhat constant, without substantial frequency variations. Furthermore, the occurrence of security threat-related words is rather low. Whilst there is a slight increase from 2006 to 2007, the numbers decrease in 2008. In 2009, the number increase again, but drops in 2010 and 2011. In 2012-3 there is a slight increase. During these two years, the words that are mostly used within this subcategory are *threats*, *opposition* and *imposing*. Thus, as seen in figure 4, there is a similar development pattern between the subcategories *Enemies* and *Security threats*. When looking at the rise and decline pattern of both subcategories, there is an apparent correlation. However, the degree to which they grow and drop varies, making the relationship weak. The chart also shows that rhetoric concerning *Enemies* is substantially higher than that of *Security threats*.

### 4.1.3 Denial

Breaking down the category *Denial*, in this section I analyze the frequency similarities and variations between the subcategories *Domination*, *Discrimination* and *Sanctions* and look at the development of these patterns over time.



**Figure 5: Supreme leader’s speeches (2006-2013): Denial**

The frequencies for the subcategory *Discrimination* show marginal rhetoric of so-called ‘double standards’. On average, discrimination-related words have been used less than once per speech for all year except 2012 – in which it has been used only once on average. It is worth noting that words such as deny, denial, double-standards have not been mentioned at all. These findings are particularly interesting, because a number of scholars claim that a great grievance for Iran has

been discrimination by the IAEA and the world powers in obtaining nuclear technology. It is therefore curious to why this is not reflected to a greater extent in the Khamenei's speeches.

When looking at the frequencies of the subcategory *Domination*, there is no clear trend between the years 2006-2010. The frequency increases fivefold from 2006 to 2007, decreases in 2008, increases slightly in 2009, and drops again in 2010. To a great extent, this pattern resembles that of the subcategory *Sanctions*. This implies that in the period 2006 to 2010, the rhetoric of sanctions and domination has developed similarly. In 2011, there was a slight decrease in references to domination, bringing the domination-related rhetoric closer to the average frequency of sanctions-related rhetoric. However, this trend reverses considerably in 2012 and peaks in 2013. Rhetoric of *Domination* is at the highest in 2013, and at the lowest in 2011. On average, the Ayatollah said the words dominate, humiliate and arrogance 13 times per speech in 2013 – 11 times more than in 2011.

As shown in figure 5, references to sanctions double from 2006 to 2007. A reasonable interpretation is that sanctions-related rhetoric spikes due to the UN sanctions imposed in 2006, and in March 2007.<sup>41</sup> However, the reference to sanctions drops again in 2008, and stays at a low level until and including the year 2010. This is somewhat curious in light of further sanctions imposed in 2008<sup>42</sup>. The trend reverses in 2011, and there is an increase in reference to sanctions. The increasing reference trend continues in 2012, and remains relatively high, although slightly diminishing, in 2013. One interpretation of the increased rhetoric on sanctions after 2010 is that the UNSC resolution adopted in 2010<sup>43</sup> – which encompass broader and harsher restrictions than previous sanctions – imposed further grievances for the Islamic Republic.

Overall, sanctions are mostly referred to in 2011, 2012 and 2013. These findings may suggest that rhetoric on sanctions were high in 2007 as a result of the first exposure to sanctions imposed in 2006. Furthermore, that sanctions-related rhetoric may have spiked in the last year as a result of cumulative pressure from extensive and comprehensive sanctions over time

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<sup>41</sup> See UNSCR 1696, UNSCR 1737 and UNSCR 1747


<sup>42</sup> See UNSCR 1803 and UNSCR 1835

<sup>43</sup> See UNSCR 1929

When comparing the subcategories, it is apparent that references to *discrimination*, *hypocrisy* and *injustice*, are limited and rather constant. In contrast, the subcategories *Domination* and *Sanctions* share the same pattern for the entire period, except for 2011. In the period 2006 to 2010, whenever Khamenei mentioned *sanctions*, he mentioned *domination*, *humiliation*, *arrogance* 2-3 times more. In 2011 this pattern changed. The references to both subcategories increased in the following years, compared to the 2006 to 2011. In sum, while the reference to *discrimination* is rather limited and constant, there development pattern for *domination* and *sanctions* is somewhat more fluctuating. Noteworthy periods, in which the reference to these two subcategories peaks, are 2007, 2012 and 2013.

### 4.1.4 Identity

Looking at the subcategories for the category *Identity* (figure 6), the immediate impression is that there is correlation between three of the four subcategories, namely *Ideology* and *Religion* and *Self-esteem*.



**Figure 6: Supreme leader's speeches (2006-2013): Identity**

The subcategory *Nationalism* is the only subcategory that has a particularly different development pattern than the outstanding subcategories. The overall frequency sums for the time-period 2006 to 2013 show that the ranking of subcategories in the order of highest to lowest frequency is: *Nationalism*, *Religion*, *Ideology* and finally *Self-esteem*. The most frequent words that were referred to by Khamenei in his speeches on the nuclear issue were *nation*<sup>44</sup>, *identity*, *Iran* and *country*. After rhetoric on nationalism, the most frequently used words were religion-

<sup>44</sup> And other varieties of the word nation, such as nationalism, nationalist, nationalization, nationalistic etc.

related words, in particular *Islam* and *Allah*<sup>45</sup>. A cursory interpretation of these findings is that when speaking of the nation and the national identity, the supreme leader highlights that it is an Islamic nation relying on Allah.

The subcategories *Ideology* and *Self-esteem* share a somewhat identical development pattern. The only difference between these subcategories is the marginal decline of self-esteem related words in 2007, while ideology-related words increase slightly in 2007. However, references to both subcategories increase somewhat in 2008 and 2009. In 2009, the most prominent words within the subcategory *Self-esteem* were *great*, *dignity* and *honor*. In 2012 and 2013, the same words were prominent, and there was a greater reference to the word *pride*. The most frequent combinations of word belonging to the subcategories *Nationalism* and *Self-esteem* are terms such as “honorable nation”, “great nation”, “nation with dignity” and “national confidence”. Based on these findings, one may conclude that in addition to being an Islamic nation, Khamenei highlights that it is a great and honorable nation with dignity and confidence.

For the subcategory *Ideology*, the most prominent words are *revolution*<sup>46</sup> and *power*. As illustrated in figure 6, the distribution patterns for the subcategories *Ideology* and *Self-esteem* shows that ideology and self-esteem related rhetoric has been more stable than that of *Religion* and *Nationalism*. References to nationalism-related words have been particularly volatile throughout the period 2006-2013.

In sum, when comparing the subcategories within the category *Identity*, the most prominent feature is that all subcategories, except for *Nationalism*, follow a nearly identical pattern. The period where identity-based rhetoric was used the most was in 2009, 2012 and 2013 (cf. figure 3). Words reflecting the nation itself were referred to the most, while words reflecting the national self-esteem were referred to the least. While references to words reflecting the Islamic religion shared similar development pattern as words reflecting ideology and self-esteem, the subcategory *Religion* was closer to the subcategory *Nationalism* in terms of word-frequency.


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<sup>45</sup> Including the word *God*; these words were merged into one category.

<sup>46</sup> Including other variations such as *revolution*'s, *revolutionize*, *revolutionary*.

### 4.1.5 Self-actualization

Breaking down the category *Self-actualization*, in this section I analyze the frequency similarities and variations between the subcategories *Knowledge*, *Progress* and *Scientific development*, and look at the development of these patterns over time.



**Figure 7: Supreme leader’s speeches (2006-2013): Self-actualization**

The distribution pattern for the subcategory *Knowledge* shows that the use of knowledge-related words has been rather constant and low compared to the other subcategories. In contrast, as illustrated in figure 7, the patterns of the subcategories *Progress* and *Scientific development* fluctuating, as the frequencies rise and fall in the period 2006 to 2013. Arranging the subcategories by highest to lowest frequency, the Ayatollah referred mostly to scientific development, then to progress, and finally – and to a limited extent – to knowledge in the period 2006-2013.

Throughout the entire period, Khamenei used words related to scientific development circa 21 times on average per speech. Within the subcategory *Scientific development*, references to words such as *science*, *nuclear* and *energy* double from 2006 to 2007, but dropped in 2008, 2009 and 2010. Rhetoric related to scientific development increases again in 2011 and 2012, and references to words such as *scientific*, *advance*, *nuclear*, *oil* and *gas* were most frequent during these years. This finding suggests that the rhetoric on scientific development has occurred in the context of energy resources.

The supreme leader mentioned words in the subcategory *Progress* circa 18 times on average per speech in the entire period. The frequency distribution for the subcategory *Progress* shows that progress-related rhetoric increases from 2006 to 2008, with a doubled frequency of reference to the words *achievement*, *progress* and *efforts*. However, this trend reversed in 2009, and dropped to the lowest point in 2010 – in which references to progress were only 9 times on average per speech. Similar to the development pattern of the subcategory *Scientific development*, the progress-related rhetoric rose again in 2011 and peaked in 2012. In 2013, references to both scientific development and progress dropped. Despite this decrease in frequency, the references to both progress and scientific development related words are the second highest in 2013 when looking at the overall distribution.

In sum, while rhetoric on knowledge has been limited but stable, rhetoric on scientific development and progress has been irregular but substantially higher than *Knowledge* on average. References to scientific development were at the highest in 2007, 2012 and 2013. Similarly, references to progress were at the highest in 2007, 2009, 2012 and 2013. One interpretation of the spike in references to scientific development in 2007 could be that nuclear advancement was urged because Iran had stopped the implementation of the NPT Additional Protocol and resumed nuclear enrichment in 2006.

### 4.1.6 Subcategory comparison


The distribution patterns, similarities and variations discussed in the previous sections inspire the further exploration of some subcategories, because particular similarities are apparent across categories. These comparisons may shed light on relationships that may have been overlooked. In the following section I present three figures in which subcategories across categories are analyzed. I discuss the distribution patterns and frequencies of the following subcategories:

**Table 3: Subcategory comparison - Linkages**

Category	Subcategory	Linkages
Threats and Denial	Enemies and Domination	Rhetoric on the threat subjects, namely enemies, may be accompanied by descriptive words, such as domination-related words.
Denial and Self-Actualization	Discrimination and Knowledge	Rhetoric on the denial aspect <i>discrimination</i> may be mentioned in connection with the knowledge aspect of national self-actualization.
Threats and Denial	Security Threats and Sanctions	Rhetoric on security threats may have a relationship with sanctions, because sanctions could also reflect an aspect of threats to national security.


These comparisons may enhance the understanding of how the manifest content of Ayatollah Khamenei’s speeches is connected. This could be of particular value for the discourse analysis, because it may show the necessity of recalibration of the current categories, and provided more accurate indicators for further exploration.

In the operationalization of the subcategories *Enemies* and *Domination*, it is apparent that words in these subcategories have a connection to each other. Both subcategories represent a factor of grievance in the Iranian context. While the words in the subcategory *Enemies* predominantly are subjects, e.g. *America*, *Israel*, *West*, the words in the subcategory *Domination* are verbs and adjectives. This is one way of understanding how these two subcategories may be linked; while *enemies* describes the ‘who’ of grievances, *domination* may describe the ‘how’ of the grievances. For example, although the words arrogance/arrogant, humiliate/humiliation/humiliating and dominating/domination may describe why and how Iran is denied nuclear progress, these words may also be a description of Iran’s enemies as such.



**Figure 8: Supreme leader’s speeches (2006-2013): Subcategory comparison – enemies and domination**


In the comparison of the subcategories *Enemies* and *Domination*, presented in figure 8, it is clear that with the exception of 2013 the patterns of these subcategories are identical. However, there is a substantial difference in the frequencies of each subcategory. One way of interpreting the difference in frequency is that the emphasis on the ‘who’ is more important than the attributes of the subject. For example it is reasonable to assume that if it has been emphasized a few times that America is dominating and arrogant, the repetition of adjectives and verbs becomes obsolete, because the description of the subject is already established. Another cross-category comparison can be made for the subcategories *Knowledge* and *Discrimination*. The initial motivation to compare these subcategories is that the patterns for both are rather constant and have a low frequency. Furthermore, as highlighted in table 3, one may hypothesize that the denial-related word *discrimination* could refer to the denial of knowledge.



**Figure 9: Supreme leader’s speeches (2006-2013): Subcategory comparison –discrimination and knowledge**

When comparing the development patterns for *knowledge* and *discrimination* (figure 9), it is apparent that the trends are somewhat similar, but not identical. Although references to the words knowledge, intelligence and intellectuals occur almost 3 times more on average than the words discriminating, hypocrisy and injustice, a correlation between these patterns is apparent.

Finally, assuming that rhetoric on security threats may be related to sanctions – because sanctions also reflect an aspect of threats to national security – it is interesting to compare the subcategories *Security threats* and *Sanctions*. This comparison enables the exploration of the frequencies of sanctions in connection to security threats, which is valuable since sanctions was operationalized as an indicator for denial, rather than threat.




**Figure 10: Supreme leader’s speeches (2006-2013): Subcategory comparison – security threats and sanctions**

The comparison of the subcategories *Security threats* and *Sanctions* shows that the Ayatollah's references to security-threat related words have been more volatile than references to sanctions. As illustrated in figure 10, the subcategories seem to share a similar development pattern with the exception of 2013. Although the frequencies of *Security threats* are higher than that of *Sanctions*, this difference is not particularly great. These findings may suggest that that sanctions may be referred to in the security threat context.

### 4.1.7 Target audiences

Following the preliminary findings based on the content analysis, it is fruitful to discuss the target audiences of the Ayatollah Khamenei’s rhetoric. The findings presented in figure 11 show the audiences of the speeches that have been analyzed in the content analysis, namely speeches translated to English from the period 2006-2013.<sup>47</sup> By exploring the target audiences for each given year in the period 2006-2013, this section illuminates the audiences of Khamenei’s speeches. This may provide a better foundation for contextualization of the Ayatollah’s domestic justifications, by informing the reader on the recipients of the nuclear rhetoric. The audiences have been clustered into four groups, namely *Political*, *Military*, *Academics and scientists* and *General public*.



**Figure 11: Supreme Leader’s speeches (2006-2013): Audiences of speeches translated to English**

<sup>47</sup> This analysis is based on 87 speeches translated to English.

The audiences that have been addressed the most in the period 2006 to 2013 were the group *Political* and *General public*. When looking at the entire period, both groups received an equal amount of speeches, namely 28. The audience group *Political* represents political actors in a broad sense. The group includes the Iranian parliament, government officials, foreign ministry ambassadors and representatives, the Assembly of Experts, the Judiciary and judiciary officials, the economic sector, the Supreme Council of Cultural Revolution, clergy and seminaries, and persons attending religious memorials and the Islamic Unity Conference.<sup>48</sup>

The audience group *General public* includes people of a certain geographical area or of a particular ethnicity, youth, women, nurses, laborers and labor groups, farmers, media, as well as speeches given at sporting events, and revolution/war related events and memorials such as speeches to families of martyrs and veterans, ‘13<sup>th</sup> of Aban’<sup>49</sup> memorials, ‘19<sup>th</sup> Dey’<sup>50</sup> memorials, Khomeini memorials and Friday prayer addresses<sup>51</sup>.

The audience group that came in second place, in terms of being addressed throughout the period 2006 to 2013 was *Academics and scientists*. This group includes university professors, students, elites and outstanding personalities<sup>52</sup>, nuclear scientists and engineers. This audience group was addressed 19 times throughout the entire period. Finally, the audience who has been addressed the least was those included in the group *Military*. This category includes the Basij<sup>53</sup>, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps<sup>54</sup>, armed forces and cadets, military officials, police officials and air force personnel. The *Military* audience was addressed 12 times throughout the entire period.

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<sup>48</sup> As highlighted, the categories are labeled in a broad sense. The choice to include economic sector in this category was that the economic sector may be understood to have particular influence in politics. The religious-related audiences are also included in this category, as religion is a fundamental part of the Iranian political system, and religious actors are prominent in Iranian politics.

<sup>49</sup> Iranian hostage crisis memorial

<sup>50</sup> Revolution memorial

<sup>51</sup> Friday prayer addresses can also be coded under the category “Political” as they serve as a political guideline for clergymen whom base their speeches on that of the Supreme Leader. However, as these speeches are televised and thus available to the general public, I have included it in the category “General Public”.

<sup>52</sup> This audience reflects persons who have demonstrated particular academic or technical excellence.

<sup>53</sup> A voluntary Islamic paramilitary militia, subordinate to and receiving orders from the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC).

<sup>54</sup> The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is Iran’s most powerful security and military organization, responsible for the protection and survival of the regime.

As seen in figure 3, domestic justifications on the basis of all categories are at the highest in 2012 and 2013. Comparing these findings with the audience overview presented in figure 11, it is apparent that in 2013 all audiences were targeted almost equally. For the remaining years, Khamenei’s target audience has varied. In the following section I will briefly discuss the domestic justifications for each audience group, focusing on the years they were mainly targeted.

#### 4.1.7.1 Political audiences

The political audience was addressed the least in 2006 and 2009. For the remaining period, this group has been addressed three or more times each year. In 2007, the political audience is targeted 3 times more than the military, general public, academics and scientists. Moreover, this audience group was particularly targeted in 2008 and 2012 – six and five times, respectively. The political audiences of Khamenei’s speeches in 2007 were government officials, clergy and seminaries, as well as persons attending religious memorials. The words that were primarily emphasized by the supreme leader in 2007 were:

**Table 4: Words with highest frequencies in 2007**

<b>Threats</b>	America, Enemy, Iraq, Israel, War, Security, Insecurity
<b>Denial</b>	Arrogant, Domination, Sanction
<b>Identity</b>	Islam, Nation, Country, Revolution, Greatness, Power, Confidence
<b>Self-actualization</b>	Nuclear, Progress, Effort, Achievements, Knowledge, Economical, Scientific, Oil, Technology, Energy

It is worth noting that with the exception of 2012 and 2013, domestic justifications on the basis of *Threats* were at the highest in 2007. Similar to that of 2012, in 2007 threat-related words were used 51-52 times on average per speech. In 2008, the *Political* audiences of the Ayatollah’s speeches were persons attending religious memorials and prayer meetings, as well as government officials of the executive branch. During this year, the main emphasis of Khamenei was on the following words within each category:

**Table 5: Words with highest frequencies in 2008**

<b>Threats</b>	America, Enemies, West, Colonialism, Threatening, Zionism, Bullies, Iraq, Opposed
<b>Denial</b>	Arrogant, Domination, Hypocrisy, Sanctions
<b>Identity</b>	Islam, Nation, Country, Revolution, Power, Strong, Resistance, Vigilance, Independence, Values, Honor, Confidence, Courage
<b>Self-actualization</b>	Nuclear, Progress, Effort, Achievements, Knowledge, Economical, Scientific, Oil, Development, Technology, Advance, Energy, Uranium, Enrichment

In 2012, the audiences within this group were members of the Iranian parliament, judiciary officials, government officials as well as persons attending religious memorials. The main emphasis of the supreme leader to this audience group was on the following words within each category:

**Table 6: Highest word frequencies in 2012**

<b>Threats</b>	America, Enemies, West, Zionism, Iraq, War, Hostility
<b>Denial</b>	Arrogant, Humiliation, Sanction
<b>Identity</b>	Nation, Country, Islam, Revolution, Greatness, Power, Strength, Resistance, Vigilance, Determination, Justice, Independence, Values, Jihad, Dignity, Honor
<b>Self-actualization</b>	Nuclear, Progress, Effort, Achievements, Knowledge, Economical, Scientific, Oil, Technology, Advance, Energy, Gas, Uranium, Enrichment

#### 4.1.7.2 Military audiences

Audiences clustered in the group *Military* have been addressed throughout the entire period, except for the year 2011. However, this audience group has been addressed to a limited extent for the entire period, with the exception of 2010. This finding is interesting, because this is the year in which domestic justification was at the lowest.

In 2010, the emphasized words within the *Threats* category were *America, enemies* and *hostility*. Within the category *Denial*, the Ayatollah emphasized *sanctions*. Within the category *Identity* the words *Islam, nation, country, revolution, greatness, power* and *honor* were highlighted. Finally, within the category *Self-actualization*, the words *nuclear, progress, effort, achievements, knowledge, scientific, technology, advance* and *fuel* were particularly used. The audiences in 2010 were high-ranking military and police officials, air force personnel, Basiji professors and members of Construction Basij<sup>55</sup>.

#### 4.1.7.3 Academics and scientists

Academics and scientists are an audience group which has been targeted to a rather even extent through the entire period except for 2007. This audience group was addressed at the most in 2008, 2009, 2011 and 2012. In 2008, the audiences consisted of elites, teachers and university students. In 2009, audiences included elites, students and academics. In 2011, audiences included university professors, outstanding personalities and students. In 2012, audiences consisted of nuclear scientists, outstanding personalities and students.

Words with highest frequencies in 2008 are presented in table 5, and words with highest frequencies in 2012 are presented in table 6. In 2009, the words that were mostly used by Ayatollah Khamenei were the following:

**Table 7: Highest word frequencies in 2009**

<b>Threats</b>	America, Enemies, West, Zionism, Security, Opposed
<b>Denial</b>	Arrogant
<b>Identity</b>	Islam, Nation, Country, Revolution, Greatness, Power, Strong, Justice, Dignity, Honor, Courage
<b>Self-actualization</b>	Nuclear, Progress, Effort, Achievements, Knowledge, Economical, Scientific, Oil, Advance, Energy

<sup>55</sup> In 2008, the Iranian Parliament passed a law to the effect that government construction and economic projects could be contracted to the Basij (Aryan 2008).

As outlined in figure 3, domestic justifications on the basis of threats and identity increased in 2009 compared to the previous year. In 2011, the words that were mostly used in the domestic justifications of the supreme leader were:

**Table 8: Highest word frequencies in 2011**

<b>Threats</b>	America, Enemies, West
<b>Denial</b>	Arrogant, Hypocrisy, Sanctions
<b>Identity</b>	Islam, Nation, Country, Revolution, Greatness, Power, Strength, Vigilance, Jihad, Honor
<b>Self-actualization</b>	Nuclear, Progress, Effort, Achievements, Knowledge, Scientific, Oil, Development, Technology, Advance, Energy, Gas

In 2011, domestic justifications on the basis of all categories, namely *Identity*, *Self-actualization*, *Threats* and *Denial* increased compared to the previous year. When reviewing all speeches given to audiences in the category *Academics and scientists*, it is apparent that only one speech was given to nuclear scientists. The remaining speeches were given to people within academia and so-called elites and outstanding personalities.


#### **4.1.7.4 General public**

The general public has been addressed consistently throughout the entire period. While being least addressed in 2007, the general public was addressed the most in 2008. The audiences in 2008 consisted of people with various ethnic backgrounds; from the geographical areas Abarkooh, East Azerbaijan, Shiraz and Yazd; families of martyrs; people attending the memorial of Imam Khomeini; and audiences of the Friday prayer address. The words that were mostly used by Khamenei in 2008 are presented in table 5.

In 2011 the audiences of the supreme leader's speeches were people from the geographical areas Qom, Mashhad and Kermanshah, audiences of the Friday prayer address and prominent Iranian women. It may be worth mentioning that the cities Qom and Mashhad are considered to be holy by Shia-Muslims. The words with highest frequency in 2011 are outlined in table 8.

### 4.1.8 Audiences of speeches in Farsi

The audience group analysis in the previous section was based on the English translations of the supreme leader’s speeches. This analysis reflects the audiences of the domestic justifications of Khamenei. However, as the discourse analysis is also based on speeches in Farsi, it may be interesting to look at the target groups of these speeches as well. Bearing in mind that word frequencies are not available for the speeches in Farsi, this overview may still be valuable in order to contextualize the discourse analysis.



**Figure 12: Supreme Leader’s speeches (2003-2013): Audiences of speeches given in Farsi**

The frequencies presented in figure 12 reflect 80 speeches in Farsi, which is used in the following chapter. The speeches that have been analyzed here do not include the translations in English. These findings are supplementary to the audience group findings outlined in the previous sections.

The audiences that have been addressed the most in the period 2003-2013, are the groups *Political* and *General public*. Sharing the first place, these groups have both been addressed 28 times throughout the entire period. Interestingly, Khamenei's emphasis on these groups is also reflected when looking at the Farsi speeches, and the number of speeches given to these audience groups is exactly the same as the findings based on the speeches translated to English. Similar to the previous analysis, the audience group that was addressed after *Political* and *General public* audiences was *Academics and scientists*. This audience group was addressed 19 times. Finally, the *Military* audiences were addressed 12 times throughout the period 2003-2013. These findings increase the robustness of the findings presented in the previous section, because the same categories are emphasized to the same extent in speeches available in the original language. As mentioned earlier, duplicate speeches have been taken out of the analysis based on the speeches available in Farsi. This means, that the results presented here do not include speeches that the previous findings are based on.

When looking at audience distribution, it is apparent that the political audiences were addressed most in 2003 and 2006. The *military* audiences were addressed most in 2007 and 2010 – the latter also reflected in the audience distribution of speeches translated to English. The audience group *Academics and scientists* were addressed the most in 2006 and 2012. It is worth noting that this audience group was not addressed at all in 2004, 2005 and 2010.<sup>56</sup> Finally, the general public was addressed mostly in 2005 and 2006. However, as seen in figure 12, this audience group has been addressed regularly throughout the entire period – a finding that is also reflected in the audience overview for speeches translated to English.

Based on these findings, the following tentative conclusions may be suggested. Firstly, that Ayatollah Khamenei has directed his public speeches primarily toward political audiences and the general public. Secondly, it seems as though these two groups have been regular target audiences throughout the entire period. Thirdly, it appears as though public speeches to the

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<sup>56</sup> Since the speeches translated to English are not included in the analysis based on the Farsi speeches, the previous findings are not included in this section. As shown in the findings from the previous section, academics and scientists were addressed in 2010. The findings presented here reflect only audience frequencies for speeches available in Farsi, with English translation duplicates removed from the analysis.

military are limited, compared to other audience groups. Fourthly, academics and scientists have also been addressed somewhat frequently throughout the entire period – with the exception of 2004 and 2005<sup>57</sup>.

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<sup>57</sup> As highlighted in the previous footnote, the audience frequencies based on speeches translated to English show that academics and scientist were addressed in 2010.

## **4.2 Discourse analysis**

In order to explore how the nuclear program has been rationalized within the society, I first look at rhetoric on the historical precedent and contemporary experiences which contextualizes the nuclear rationale. In light of this context, I discuss how the nuclear program is justified as both a means and an end to obtain national objectives.

### **4.2.1 Historical precedent**

In the following section I look at the supreme leader's rhetoric focusing on the historical precedent. I discuss the past experiences which have been emphasized by the Ayatollah, and show how these experiences shape the rhetoric describing the value preferences of the Islamic Republic of Iran. More specifically, this section illuminates how the supreme leader justifies the government of the Islamic Republic, and the policies it carries out – including nuclear policies.

#### **4.2.1.1 The pre-revolutionary Iran: national humiliation and inferiority**

Elaborating on the Islamic revolution, Khamenei describes it as a movement that freed the nation of humiliation, inferiority, backwardness, dependence and oppression, and restored national dignity, honor, power, grandeur, self-confidence and self-respect. He claims that the goal of the revolutionaries was to gain freedom and independence from foreign domination and exploitation through an Islamic revolution – a goal that was reached in 1979.<sup>58</sup>

During the Islamic revolution a popular slogan of the revolutionaries was “Neither West, Nor East – Islamic Republic”.<sup>59</sup> The essence of this slogan was that the Islamic Republic would be a government free of foreign domination and independent of the ideologies of foreign powers. As stated by the Ayatollah, the Islamic Republic is “an alternative path in the face of dictatorship and arrogant regimes<sup>60</sup> on the one side, and democracies<sup>61</sup> devoid of spirituality and religion on

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<sup>58</sup> Supreme Leader's Speech on His Arrival in Shiraz - 30/04/2008

<sup>59</sup> See Khomeini (1980)

<sup>60</sup> Referring to autocratic governments built upon the principles of Marxism, namely the USSR

the other”.<sup>62</sup> The revolution in Iran is described by Khamenei as something different than revolutions in many other countries, because internal uprising was accomplished without foreign support. It is highlighted that the Islamic Revolution was an uprising precisely *against* foreign interference and control. The Islamic revolution and the establishment of the Islamic Republic are thus explained as “a middle ground between westoxication and backwardness”.<sup>63</sup>

The supreme leader claims that prior to the revolution, the Iranian people believed that the nation had two choices: staying “backward” or becoming westernized.<sup>64</sup> It is further stated that the people of the Iran, at that time, believed that the nation was inferior, regressive and dependent. Consequently, this perception is claimed to have enforced humiliation and loss of national self-esteem. Describing the pre-revolution time, Khamenei states that the Iranian people were constantly told that they did not have indigenous competence to do anything themselves. Ascertaining that the Pahlavi regime fed the nation with rhetoric of inferiority, Khamenei claims that the nation’s talented and innovative people were repressed. This is said to be the greatest treachery of the Shah’s regime.<sup>65</sup>

#### **4.2.1.2 The Islamic revolution: reclaiming dignity and self-confidence**

As a reaction to these grievances, the supreme leader claims that the revolutionary movement liberated Iran from domination and influence on the basis of Islam. As stated by Khamenei, the revolution brought the Iranian nation and people out of “the depths of humiliation and insignificance to the heights of dignity”.<sup>66</sup> It is highlighted that national progress and development after the revolution was a struggle, because Iran did not have access to material resources, money or weapons. Furthermore, the Islamic Republic was inexperienced in terms of

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<sup>61</sup> Referring to democratic governments built upon the principles of liberalism and capitalism, namely the United States

<sup>62</sup> Supreme Leader’s Friday Prayer Address – 29/07/2009.

<sup>63</sup> Supreme Leader's Speech on the Occasion of the 19th Demise Anniversary of Imam Khomeini - 03/06/2008

<sup>64</sup> Ibid

<sup>65</sup> Supreme Leader's Speech to Laborers - 26/04/2006

<sup>66</sup> Supreme Leader's Speech to Basijis – 26/03/2006

organization and military training. However, despite poverty and lack of experience, the Ayatollah commends the revolutionary ideology for having kept the nation out of harm's way.<sup>67</sup>

As claimed by Khamenei, the revolution opened a path to superiority, by promoting national self-confidence and the slogan "you can". Inspired by an ideology promoting independence and self-reliance, it is said that the nation discovered its indigenous capabilities – including within the field of modern technology. As seen in the supreme leader's statements, modern technology is regarded as a manifestation of the nation's ideology. More specifically, advanced nuclear technology is considered to be a concrete way of serving national interests, because it enable the production of nuclear energy for the domestic market.<sup>68</sup>

The Ayatollah claims that a key feature which was re-established through the Islamic was "the spirit of national honor".<sup>69</sup> National honor is defined by Khamenei as "social and individual strength of character which gives individuals and societies the power and strength to clear obstacles and confront challenges."<sup>70</sup> This power and strength is described as a means to protect and resist foreign enemies. Furthermore, Khamenei claims that by strengthening this ideological feature, the nation becomes more resistant to both tangible threats such as political and economic warfare, and intangible threats such as immorality and evil.<sup>71</sup>

In Khamenei's statements, national honor and dignity are often used interchangeably, implying the same ideological characteristic. These concepts are often mentioned in the context of past domination, and contrast inferiority and humiliation. Referring to two centuries of oppression preceding the Islamic Revolution, Iran is said to have gone through a "difficult, dark and humiliating era." Urging the Iranian people to remember the historical grievances of the nation, this era is described as a time when Iran had a limited role in regional and global developments.<sup>72</sup> The Ayatollah claims that colonial governments of different parts of the world occupied the

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<sup>67</sup> Supreme Leader Meets with Students on "National Day of Fighting Against Global Arrogance" - 03/11/2013

<sup>68</sup> Supreme Leader's Speech to Laborers - 26/04/2006

<sup>69</sup> Supreme Leader's Speech at Imam Khomeini's (r.a.) Shrine – 03/06/2012

<sup>70</sup> Supreme Leader's Speech at Imam Khomeini's (r.a.) Shrine – 03/06/2012

<sup>71</sup> Supreme Leader's Address to Young Elites – 03/09/2007; Supreme Leader's Speech to University Professors – 25/08/2011; Supreme Leader's Speech at Imam Ridha's (a.s.) Shrine – 20/03/2012

<sup>72</sup> Supreme Leader's Address to Young Elites- 03/09/2007

nation and robbed nations of resources and wealth.<sup>73</sup> Not only did Iran suffer politically and economically, colonization also led to backwardness in science and technology.

Expressed regretfully, Khamenei states that instead of being independent and sovereign, the nation was under the influence of foreign policies and served as a puppet state for dominating powers.<sup>74</sup> In this period, the Ayatollah also describes Iran as being excluded from global competition in science and politics. This is implied to be a particular grievance, because global competition and industrialization characterized this era. Expressing disappointment of the pre-revolutionary backwardness and inferiority, Khamenei underlines that rapid development and scientific advancement, including in the area of nuclear technology, is vital for national progress.<sup>75</sup>

As described by the Ayatollah, the Islamic Revolution put an end to this era of humiliation, by overthrowing the so-called treacherous, evil anti-Islamic regime of the Shah.<sup>76</sup> It is further highlighted that with the installment of the Islamic Republic, true democracy was established in Iran. The Islamic revolution is described as putting an end to the historic degradation, oppression and dependence, and serving as the turning point which brought independence to the nation.<sup>77</sup> Furthermore, the Islamic Revolution is claimed to have revived the national self-confidence, by replacing national humiliation and inferiority with determination and faith. The late Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khomeini, the Islamic revolution and the “sacred defense era”<sup>78</sup> are claimed to have contributed significantly to increasing the level of national self-confidence.<sup>79</sup> The revolution is also said to have brought dignity to the nation and the people.<sup>80</sup> Praising Khomeini and the revolution, it is stated that the cultural norm of “we can” was re-instilled into the hearts and minds of the Iranian people.<sup>81</sup>

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<sup>73</sup> Speech to elites - 26/08/2008

<sup>74</sup> Supreme Leader’s Speech at Imam Khomeini’s (r.a.) Shrine – 03/06/2012

<sup>75</sup> Supreme Leader’s Speech at Imam Reza’s (a.s.) Shrine – 21/03/2007

<sup>76</sup> Supreme Leader’s Speech to Exemplary Nurses - 21/04/2010, Supreme Leader’s Friday Prayer Address – 03/02/2012

<sup>77</sup> Supreme Leader’s Friday Prayer Address – 03/02/2012

<sup>78</sup> The “sacred defense era” is a term used to describe the Iran-Iraq war.

<sup>79</sup> Leader’s Speech to a Group of University Students from Yazd Province – 03/01/2008

<sup>80</sup> Supreme Leader’s Speech to Nuclear Scientists – 22/02/2012

<sup>81</sup> Supreme Leader’s Speech at Imam Khomeini’s (r.a.) Shrine – 03/06/2012

Due to the dominating and oppressive characteristics of the enemies, Khamenei underlines that the revolutionaries faced immense opposition and hostility. Referring to Iran's nuclear program, Khamenei highlights that Western powers were part of the nuclear related technology of the country during the time of oppression. The Ayatollah states that, in this period, indigenous capabilities were undermined and foreign expertise was prioritized. This feature is claimed to have broken down the national self-confidence. However, the Ayatollah points out that after the revolution these ties were severed, and many of the projects that were previously in cooperation with western powers were cancelled.<sup>82</sup>

Khamenei points out that after the revolution, the enemies expected the Islamic Republic to fail due to lack of experience and resources. The Ayatollah also stresses that the enemies have since 1979 undertaken demoralizing strategies. Ridiculing the enemies, Khamenei proposes that foreign powers may have thought: "Yes, you carried out a revolution, but you cannot run the country by yourselves. You cannot make progress. You cannot keep up with the world". However, as described by the Ayatollah, the Islamic Republic and the revolutionaries proved the enemies wrong resisting foreign pressure. As claimed by Khamenei, the Iranian people were encouraged by the revolutionaries not to lose their dignity or forget their value. They were also urged to remain resistant to the foreign influence and threats.<sup>83</sup>

## **4.2.2 Contemporary experience**

In light of the rhetoric on historical precedent, mainly focused on the revolutionary Islamic ideology and its features, this section looks closer at the supreme leader's take on the contemporary experiences of the Islamic Republic. In this section I discuss how Ayatollah Khamenei describes the present domestic and external affairs of Iran, and how the nuclear policies of Iran are justified within this context.

### **4.2.2.1 Arrogant, bullying powers**

Connecting references of the past with the contemporary experience, the rhetoric on foreign powers concentrates mainly on those considered to be threats to the Islamic Republic. The main

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<sup>82</sup> Supreme Leader's Speech in Meeting with Participants of 7th Elite Youth Conference - 09/10/2013

<sup>83</sup> Supreme Leader's Speech to Nuclear Scientists – 22/02/2012

enemy that is referred to in Khamenei's speeches is 'America', meaning the United States. Other enemies that are referred to are 'Israel' and 'Western powers', as well as others allied with the United States. It is highlighted that the enemies of Iran consist of a few arrogant governments, and that the camp opposing Iran is not the global community as such. However, these few governments are said to have immense power over media. Using this power, the enemies are accused of producing propaganda against Iran and its nuclear ambitions – making the concerns regarding Iran's nuclear program seem greater than they are.<sup>84</sup>

The supreme leader describes these enemies as arrogant, bullying, bloodthirsty and ruthless, devoid of spirituality and religion.<sup>85</sup> He proposes that they are driven by passion and greed, making them corrupt and two-faced.<sup>86</sup> These characteristics are regarded as spiritual weaknesses, because it leads the global bullying powers to involve in crimes, violations and oppression.<sup>87</sup> Due to their passion-driven and immoral ideology, the enemies are claimed to seek monopoly over resources and power. In order to achieve these goals, the enemies are said to use methods of domination and oppression.<sup>88</sup> Warning the domestic audiences, Khamenei states that: "You should not think that conspiracy against this country is just a delusion. No, that is a fact. Plots are being hatched all around us".<sup>89</sup>

In light of these characteristics, the Ayatollah states that the enemies' main goal in Iran is to dominate the country. He proposes that the primary reason for wanting to dominate Iran is its oil and gas resources and its strategic geopolitical position. Emphasizing that the enemies are driven by national security concerns, Khamenei proposes that:

*The arrogant powers know that their survival depends on oil and gas. The day they fail to acquire oil at a cheap price, the day they are forced to make concessions and stop bullying for*

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<sup>84</sup> Supreme Leader's Speech to Government Officials – 24/07/2012

<sup>85</sup> Supreme Leader's Speech to Exemplary Nurses - 21/04/2010; Supreme Leader's Speech to Participants of the 17th National Prayer Meeting - 19/11/2008; Friday prayer address – 29/07/2009; Public Address on the Occasion of Imam Ali's (a.s.) Birth Anniversary – 17/07/2008. The words 'arrogant' and 'bullying' occur in numerous speeches, as accounted for in the descriptive analysis.

<sup>86</sup> Supreme Leader's Speech to Participants of the 17th National Prayer Meeting – 19/11/2008; Supreme Leader's Speech to Exemplary Nurses - 21/04/2010

<sup>87</sup> Supreme Leader's Speech to Officials of the Executive Branch – 23/08/2008

<sup>88</sup> Supreme Leader's Speech to Air Force Personnel - 07/02/2009

<sup>89</sup> Supreme Leader's Speech to Elites – 28/10/2009

*the sake of oil and gas - that day will be a tragic day for them. (Supreme Leader's speech at Imam Ridha's (a.s.) Shrine – 20/03/2012).*

In light of these interests, the Ayatollah proposes that the primary goal of the enemies is regime change in Iran. Moreover, he claims that the enemies seek to overthrow the Islamic Republic and replace it with a puppet state which will allow access to national resources.<sup>90</sup> Exemplifying this point in a number of speeches, the supreme leader states that:

*They are still dreaming about re-establishing the domination they had achieved over our country due to the treachery of the evil Pahlavi regime, the domination that lasted for many years. They are dreaming about going back to those days. The Iranian nation will not allow such things. (Supreme Leader's Speech to Exemplary Nurses – 21/04/2010)*

*What do the arrogant powers want? They want our country to be ruled by a government whom they can easily control, just like certain countries in the region which have a lot of oil, yet they are like putty in the hands of the Americans. (Supreme Leader's speech at Imam Ridha's (a.s.) Shrine – 20/03/2012)*

*The goal is to threaten. The goal is to pressure. The goal is to make us tired. They themselves announced that their goal was to change the political system and the political mechanisms. (Supreme Leader's Speech to Judiciary Officials - 26/06/2013)*

Ayatollah Khamenei highlights that the enemies are known for spreading fear and threats, and for toppling governments that are not allied with them or reliant on them.<sup>91</sup> Describing Iran as a nation independent of foreign powers, Khamenei proposes that ever since the revolution the so-called enemies have imposed many threats or punitive measures of political, security, military and economic nature, aiming to hurt the nation. However, he emphasizes in a rather offensive manner that, Iran –through its revolutionary ideology – has been able to resist the enemies and

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<sup>90</sup> Supreme Leader's Speech to Exemplary Nurses – 21/04/2010; Supreme Leader's speech at Imam Ridha's (a.s.) Shrine – 20/03/2012

<sup>91</sup> Public Address on the Occasion of Imam Ali's (a.s.) Birth Anniversary - 17/07/2008

stand up against bullying powers.<sup>92</sup> This is a recurring theme, highlighted in the following excerpts:

*[T]he Islamic Republic has faced opposition for thirty years. This opposition is not something new. (...) Whenever they felt they could play a role, they tried to deal us a blow. The Revolution has resisted these blows during the past thirty years. It has not been weakened by these blows. (Supreme Leader's Speech to Members of the Assembly of Experts – 24/09/2009)*

*Of course they wanted to overthrow the Islamic Republic, which proved to be impossible for them, so they tried to at least keep the Islamic Republic and Iran backward. The Islamic Republic has overcome these threats. (Supreme Leader's Speech to Government Officials – 07/08/2011)*

*Even the day when [the enemies] had intentions of overthrowing the Islamic Republic and [the enemies] announced this openly, [the enemies] could not do anything, and [the enemies] will not be able to do anything in the future either. (Supreme Leader's Speech at Imam Ridha's (a.s.) Shrine – 21/03/2013)*

It is repeatedly stated by the supreme leader that the enemies' so-called concern about the nuclear issue is a rhetorical cloak for achieving their goal of domination.<sup>93</sup> The Ayatollah highlights that the true motive behind waving Iran's nuclear issue as a threat to international security is to oppose the Islamic and revolutionary ideology, because this prevents the enemies from pursuing so-called 'illegitimate interests' in Iran.<sup>94</sup> He also points out that the nuclear issue seems special and significant, because of the great public attention it has gotten due to the propaganda of western powers.<sup>95</sup>

The enemies are said to use the nuclear issue as an excuse to achieve their ulterior motives, because nuclear development and progress is a clear manifestation of the Islamic Republic's ideology of resistance and independence. One example that is given by Khamenei is that the

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<sup>92</sup> Supreme Leader's Speech to People of Kermanshah – 12/10/2011

<sup>93</sup> Supreme Leader's Speech at Imam Khomeini's (r.a.) Shrine – 03/06/2012; Supreme Leader's Speech to Government Officials – 24/07/2012; Supreme Leader's Speech on the Occasion of the 19th Demise Anniversary of Imam Khomeini - 03/06/2008; Supreme Leader's Address to People Active in Economic Sector - 18/08/2011; Supreme Leader's Address on the Occasion of Imam Khomeini's Demise Anniversary - 04/06/2009; Supreme Leader's Friday Prayer Address - 14/09/2007

Supreme Leader's Speech to Basijis – 26/03/2006

<sup>95</sup> Supreme Leader's Address to Young Elites- 03/09/2007

enemies' have been willing to sign nuclear contracts with nation's that are far behind Iran in terms of scientific knowledge and industrial means. According to the Ayatollah, such deals are a way of dominating over weaker nations, by reeling them into dependency. The enemies are claimed to be opposed to Iranian innovation and advancement based on indigenous capabilities.<sup>96</sup> The Ayatollah claims that when arrogant world powers are confronted by nations that do not want to be dependent of them, they assume a position of double-standards. Describing the Islamic Republic as this type of nation, the enemies are thus said to make any excuse to diminish the legitimacy and authority of Iran. As described in greater detail in statements from 2011 and 2013:

*All the propaganda by the Americans and Zionists about human rights, the nuclear issue and the imaginary atomic bomb is broadcast with the purpose of presenting a distorted image of the Iranian nation to the countries of this region. But they have been unsuccessful. (Speech to people of Qom – 09/01/2011)*

*Neither democracy, nor human rights, nor the nuclear issue are important to them. The issue is that the Islamic Republic is standing on its own feet, is relying on its own power, is standing firm by relying on Allah the Exalted and is making progress in different areas. They do not like this, and so be it. (Supreme Leader's Speech to Judiciary Officials - 26/06/2013)*

*Claiming that the enemies are grieved by Iran's progress and success, hostile foreign powers are accused of linking the nuclear progress to controversial issues in order to stifle Iranian progress.<sup>97</sup> The supreme leader emphasizes numerous times that the nuclear issue is blown out of proportion, and made into something it is not, namely a suspected nuclear weapons program. The nuclear issue has been described as a pretext by the enemies to raise international opposition and create domestic instability.<sup>98</sup> As stated in 2008: "They allocate millions of dollars and spend enormous sums of money in order to pit the people against the Islamic Republic. (...) They come up with new pretexts. Sometimes they pick on the nuclear issue, and sometimes they find faults with other things."<sup>99</sup> According to Khamenei, such tactics are futile, due to the ideology and religion of the Islamic Republic. The Ayatollah claims that foreign governments know that Iran is not after nuclear weapons, and that the nuclear issue is*

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<sup>96</sup> Supreme Leader's Speech on the Occasion of the 19th Demise Anniversary of Imam Khomeini - 03/06/2008; Supreme Leader's Speech on the Occasion of Mab'ath - 30/07/2008

<sup>97</sup> Bayanat dar didare kargozarane nezam 06/08/2003

<sup>98</sup> Supreme Leader's Speech to Government Officials – 30/10/2005; Supreme Leader's Speech at Imam Ridha's (a.s.) Shrine – 20/03/2012; Supreme Leader's Speech to Air Force Personnel - 07/02/2009

<sup>99</sup> Public Address on the Occasion of Imam Ali's (a.s.) Birth Anniversary - 17/07/2008

used as an excuse to pressure Iran.<sup>100</sup> The supreme leader foresees that allegations against Iran will not be revoked, because the so-called enemies do not want the nuclear issue to be resolved.<sup>101</sup> The Ayatollah proposes that the enemies will use all possible means to cause uproar around the nuclear issue.<sup>102</sup> As exemplified in a speech from 2009, Khamenei states:

*[A]s you can see, in the propaganda broadcast during the past few years by our opponents and the western media, they say that Iran is after a nuclear bomb instead of saying Iran is after peaceful nuclear energy. And they have been saying these things in order to justify their false claims. Is that not injustice? (Supreme Leader's Address on the Occasion of Imam Khomeini's Demise Anniversary - 04/06/2009)*

#### **4.2.2.2 Domination through soft-war**

Describing the enemies as “hegemons” and “superpowers” of the world, Khamenei highlights the ways they have created obstacles and problems in the past.<sup>103</sup> The grievances that are mostly mentioned are political and economic domination, colonization and warfare. For example, the Iran-Iraq war and U.S. support to Saddam Hussein is cited as a particular grievance, and is often used as an example showing the moral corruption of enemy states.<sup>104</sup> In addition to speaking about past grievances and giving examples of the enemies’ lust for power and domination, Khamenei also discusses potential future threats. Elaborating on the future plans of the enemies, the Ayatollah lists a number of strategies which the enemies are thought to use against Iran in order to achieve their goals. In a speech from 2007, these strategies are mapped out as the following:

*I would like to divide into three categories the plans that the arrogant powers of the world have prepared against the Iranian nation: psychological warfare, economic warfare and efforts to confront the progress and scientific power of Iran. (Supreme Leader's Speech at Imam Ridha's (a.s.) Shrine - 21/03/2007)*

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<sup>100</sup> Supreme Leader's Speech to Nuclear Scientists - 22/02/2012

<sup>101</sup> Supreme Leader's Speech to People of East Azerbaijan - 22/02/2013

<sup>102</sup> Supreme Leader's Speech to Judiciary Officials - 26/06/2013

<sup>103</sup> Supreme Leader's Friday Prayer Address – 03/02/2012

<sup>104</sup> Ibid.

Khamenei refers to these types of strategies as “soft war” strategies.<sup>105</sup> He claims that, as opposed to military confrontations, where the enemy opts to destroy strategic territories and disable the military, so-called soft-wars have the aim to destroy the nation’s spiritual stronghold, faith and determinations.<sup>106</sup> Soft-wars create confusion in the political atmosphere of Iran, predominantly through the use of propaganda.<sup>107</sup> By promoting false ideas, the enemies seek to influence Iran’s domestic sphere. By creating national turmoil, they seek to interfere with and transform the internal affairs of Iran.<sup>108</sup>

Addressing economic warfare, Ayatollah Khamenei states that the imposition of bilateral and multilateral sanctions is the enemies’ means to cripple Iran.<sup>109</sup> The domestic audiences are urged to see the reality that sanctions are a manifestation of the enemies’ double-standards and quest for domination.<sup>110</sup> Characterizing the enemies’ imposition of sanctions as malicious and spiteful, the supreme leader claims that wise and just people and states will consider such sanctions as both savage and irrational.<sup>111</sup> Sanctions as a means for economic warfare, is said to not affect Iran. However, Khamenei does imply in his speeches that the sanctions may have a psychological effect on the nation. The supreme leader clearly implies that economic and psychological warfare are intertwined. For example, sanctions are described as a means to create a cleavage between the Iranian public and the government. As stated in 2012:

*The agents of the US government are making efforts throughout the world to implement the sanctions, hoping that they will harm the Iranian nation and create a rift between the Iranian people and the Islamic Republic. (Supreme Leader’s Speech at Imam Ridha’s (a.s.) Shrine – 20/03/2012)*

Furthermore, sanctions are explained as a means to discourage the Iranian nation of pursuing its path and create uncertainty around the nation’s ideology and policies. The Ayatollah states that sanctions serve as a tool to interfere with the domestic affairs of Iran, by making the people of

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<sup>105</sup> Supreme Leader’s Speech to Elites – 28/10/2009

<sup>106</sup> Supreme Leader’s Speech to Members of the Assembly of Experts – 24/09/2009

<sup>107</sup> Supreme Leader’s Speech on the Occasion of the 19th Demise Anniversary of Imam Khomeini - 03/06/2008

<sup>108</sup> Speech to Students and Youth of Qom – 26/10/2010

<sup>109</sup> Supreme Leader’s Speech to Government Officials – 07/08/2011; Supreme Leader’s Address to People Active in Economic Sector - 18/08/2011

<sup>110</sup> Supreme Leader’s Speech to Students and Academics of Kurdistan – 17/05/2009

<sup>111</sup> People of Bojnourd – 10/10/2012

Iran disappointed and discontent with the Islamic Republic.<sup>112</sup> The Ayatollah states that by pressuring Iran on the nuclear issue through soft-power means, the enemies seek to create a distance between the people and the government. As highlighted in 2012:

*They are doing everything in their power to confront the Islamic Republic and their goal is to deprive the holy Islamic Republic of the great popular support that it enjoys. This is the main purpose of the sanctions that have been imposed on us. Of course, they falsely claim that the people are not the target of their sanctions: "We want to avoid harming the people." And this is a lie and a trick, just like the rest of their claims. Contrary to what they say, their main target is the people. The purpose of the pressures is to frustrate the people and cause problems for them so that they break their bond with the Islamic Republic, so that they sever their heartfelt connection with the Islamic Republic. (Supreme Leader's Speech to Judiciary Officials – 27/06/2012)*

As shown in the quotes above, sanctions are seen as a means to create a cleavage between the people and the Islamic Republic. Warning the domestic audiences, the Ayatollah says that the enemies seek to blame the sanctions on the Iranian government and its alleged misbehavior. This is explained as a tactic to encourage the people of Iran to think that their economical grievances are the fault of the Islamic Republic. Indeed, the enemies are claimed to wage psychological warfare through propaganda and rhetoric in order to undermine the people's trust in government officials.<sup>113</sup> It is expressed that such tactics are not exclusively linked to the nuclear issue. Rather, the enemies are claimed to apply psychological warfare through different channels, in order to decrease the legitimacy of the Islamic Republic. For example, as highlighted in the July 2009 Friday Prayer Address, by undermining the election's in Iran:

*They want to cast doubt on the election and weaken the confidence of the people in the results. They want to undermine this trust. The enemies of the Iranian nation know that without trust there would have been a low turnout. A low turnout would have questioned the legitimacy of the establishment. That is what they are after. (Friday prayer address – 29/07/2009)*

As insinuated by Khamenei, by promoting distrust among the Iranian people and aiming to destroy the Islamic faith on which the republic is built upon, the enemies seek to overthrow, or at

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<sup>112</sup> Supreme Leader's Speech at Imam Ridha's (a.s.) Shrine – 21/03/2013

<sup>113</sup> Supreme Leader's Address on the Occasion of Imam Khomeini's Demise Anniversary - 04/06/2009

least destabilize, the government. He emphasizes that the enemies seek to punish the government and the people of Iran for being committed to Islam.<sup>114</sup>

#### 4.2.2.3 Military confrontation and nuclear weapons

As illustrated in the previous section, the rhetoric concerning enemies and threats emphasizes to a great extent so-called soft-war strategies. On the contrary, rhetoric expressing concerns of military confrontation is rather meager. As seen in a number of statements, the supreme leader does not express a fear of military attacks. As stated in 2009: “A military attack against us is unlikely. I am not saying that there is no possibility of a military threat - this threat is just unlikely.”<sup>115</sup> Furthermore, enemy statements that have been understood as implicit military threats are somewhat disregarded. For example as a retort to U.S. president Obama’s “all options are on the table” response to Iran’s nuclear persistence in 2010, Khamenei stated:

*Now there are some dim-witted people who are threatening the Iranian nation! The US President implicitly threatened us with a nuclear attack last week. Such threats will not affect the Iranian nation. But the threat will be a source of disgrace in the political history of America. It will be a black spot on the American government's record. The threat revealed what was going on behind their pretended love for peace and humanity and their commitment to nuclear treaties. It revealed what lies behind the hand of friendship extended towards the Iranian nation. Their fox-like rhetoric became wolfish. Until now they were saying that they were willing to extend a hand of friendship. It became clear what was behind their claims. It revealed the intentions of their bloodthirsty and domineering nature. (Supreme Leader's Speech to Exemplary Nurses – 21/04/2010)*

Describing nuclear threats as “disgraceful” and as an act that will leave a “black spot” on a government’s history, Ayatollah Khamenei may be implying that the unlikelihood of nuclear attack is due to the international norm against the use of nuclear weapons. Beyond the statements that highlight the unlikelihood of a nuclear attack, the remaining rhetoric on armed attacks is rather limited in Khamenei’s speeches. Although warning the domestic audience of the threat of

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<sup>114</sup> Supreme Leader’s Friday Prayer Address – 03/02/2012

<sup>115</sup> Supreme Leader's Speech to Members of the Assembly of Experts – 24/09/2009

economic and psychological warfare, there is limited focus on conventional warfare against Iran.<sup>116</sup>

However, the Ayatollah does address the military capabilities of the enemies, highlighting their unscrupulous ways to dominate other states. As seen in the previous example, Khamenei particularly emphasizes the enemies' nuclear weapon capabilities and how such weapons are used as a means to dominate other nations. Expanding on this point in a speech from 2007, the supreme leader highlights that the immorality of enemies has led them to build nuclear bombs:

*A government like the US that has not heard of morality, spirituality, and international rights considers itself entitled to such international bullying simply because it has access to knowledge and has managed to turn this knowledge into useful [nuclear weapons] technologies. (Supreme Leader's Address to Young Elites- 03/09/2007)*

Khamenei claims that immorality and passion-driven ambitions has driven the United States to acquire nuclear weapons, and that the characteristics of this enemy also makes it capable of using such weapons. The US commitment to the non-proliferation is explained by the supreme leader as a hoax, and he claimed that the support to Israel, who has developed nuclear weapons and threatened to use such weapons against Iran, proves this point.<sup>117</sup> Khamenei's emphasis on the power-lust and double-standards of the enemies is apparent in a speech from 2010:

*They want to use their nuclear power as a means to dominate the world. This is true of all nuclear powers. They all want to use their nuclear power as a means to dominate other nations and the entire world. None of them have signed the IAEA's nuclear treaties. They have not accepted to conform to them, neither will they ever do so. They are blatant liars. But then they start finding fault with other nations and complain that they have failed to conform to a particular part of the treaties. The nuclear powers do not believe in these treaties. They only want to prevent other countries from becoming their nuclear rivals. That is the problem. (...) We have transparent nuclear policies. We have repeatedly said before that we are not the kind of people to use destructive nuclear weapons. (Supreme Leader's Speech to Exemplary Nurses – 21/04/2010)*

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<sup>116</sup> Supreme Leader's Speech to Government Officials – 18/08/2010

<sup>117</sup> Supreme Leader's Speech to People of East Azerbaijan - 22/02/2013

A feature throughout Khamenei's speeches, and as seen in the previous example, is that when talking about double-standards, the focus is not on denial of nuclear technology. The focus is rather on the hypocrisy of nuclear weapons states. The phrasing of statements about 'hypocrisy' is aggressive. Rather than using victimizing words such as 'denial', the Ayatollah emphasizes on how foreign threats and hypocrisy must be dealt with. Khamenei claims that the enemies' allegations and threats against Iran do not affect the nation, and he takes a clear stance against the enemies.<sup>118</sup>

Referring to the 2010 NPT review conference, Khamenei explains to the domestic audiences that, all nations of the world – except the “arrogant American government and other bullying powers” – encouraged the recognition of the right to peaceful nuclear technology. In this context, he emphasizes that enemy powers have indeed lost their influence in the world, and that they are “no longer in a position to significantly affect international policies.” Referring to the Islamic ideology, the Ayatollah ascertains that “through its thirty-year resistance the Islamic Republic has managed to influence global public opinion in a way that not only people but governments – that is 189 governments – stood up against America and (...) America's will.” This, Khamenei argues, is a divine sign for the great Iranian nation.<sup>119</sup>

As I will show in the following section, the supreme leader highlights that Iran will not allow interference with its nuclear policies. Indeed, giving in to the demands of the dominating powers is seen as synonymous to giving them permission to re-establish hegemony over Iran.

### **4.2.3 The nuclear rhetoric of the supreme leader**

As discussed earlier, the statements of the supreme leader show that national interests are shaped on the basis of Islam, the revolutionary ideology and, to some extent, the historical Iranian legacy. The former two facets are recognized by the supreme leader as intertwined, because the revolutionary logic is based on Islam.<sup>120</sup> When exploring the latent meaning of Khamenei's

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<sup>118</sup> Supreme Leader's Speech to Exemplary Nurses – 21/04/2010

<sup>119</sup> Friday prayer address 04/06/2010

<sup>120</sup> Supreme Leader's Speech in Meeting with Commanders of Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps - 17/09/2013

statements, Islam appears to be the primary foundation of national identity, while the revolutionary ideology and the Iranian legacy seem to elaborate on how Iran interprets and puts Islam into political practice. While the different facets of identity can be examined separately, as done in the content analysis, the following sections show how these aspects are connected in the supreme leader's statements.

As stated by the Ayatollah, the Islamic Republic and the Iranian nation face a continued struggle against external threats. In order to enjoy freedom, independence and grandeur, Iran must remain resistant and self-sufficient.<sup>121</sup> Indeed, the historical past and the contemporary precedent may contextualize the shared system of meaning within the Iranian society. More specifically, this contextualization can show the rationale on which the supreme leader's justifications are built upon. In the following section I discuss how the nuclear advancements are linked to the national identity – the basis on which the national strategy is justified.

#### **4.2.3.1 Justifying nuclear energy, condemning nuclear weapons**

In a statement made in 2003, Ayatollah Khamenei underlines the nation's right to produce nuclear energy, but warns against dependence on other nations in nuclear fuel production. Highlighting the broken promises of the past and stating that nuclear trade always entails unfair conditions, the nation is urged to be self-reliant by only using indigenous capabilities to produce nuclear fuel.<sup>122</sup> Ayatollah Khamenei claims:

*We have mastered the nuclear fuel cycle despite the efforts of our ill-wishing enemies. We have signed the NPT, and we were supposed to receive assistance [in nuclear development]. However, the Zionists [Israel] and America have announced to the World that they should not help Iran. Without any assistance we have slowly managed to develop our nuclear fuel cycle. This nuclear development is something different than making an atomic bomb. Nuclear development is about scientific progress. Those who are interested in nuclear weapons can pursue a nuclear weapons track and achieve this goal. We are not interested in following the*

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<sup>121</sup> Supreme Leader's Speech on His Arrival in Shiraz 2008/04/30 -

<sup>122</sup> Bayanat dar didare za'erin va mojaverine haram mottahare razavi - 21/03/2003

*nuclear weapons track, and we are even opposed to having chemical weapons. (Bayanat dar didare za'erin va mojaverine harame mottahare razavi: 21/03/2003)*

By comparing Iran to the enemies' position on nuclear weapons, the supreme leader underlines that Iran does not have nuclear weapons ambitions. As claimed in a statement from 2012: “[T]hey know and they acknowledge that Iran is not after nuclear weapons, which is true. We have our own reasons not to go after nuclear weapons. We have not manufactured any nuclear weapons and we never will.”<sup>123</sup> Khamenei underlines that Iran opposes nuclear weapons on the basis of the Islamic faith, because the development and use of nuclear weapons is considered unlawful and sinful. The Ayatollah also highlights that such weapons are futile and dangerous.<sup>124</sup> In a speech from 2009 the supreme leader uses the word *haraam*<sup>125</sup>, constituting the statement as a fatwa<sup>126</sup> against nuclear weapons:

*On numerous occasions, the Iranian people and government officials have announced that they do not seek to develop nuclear weapons and that nuclear weapons have no place in the needs of the nation and the military system of the country. We announced that it is haraam and prohibited to use nuclear weapons from an Islamic point of view and that having such weapons causes a great danger and needless trouble. We are not after nuclear weapons, and neither do we wish to have them. Even if they paid money and told us to develop a nuclear weapon, our nation and officials would not do so. (Supreme Leader's Address on the Occasion of Imam Khomeini's Demise Anniversary - 04/06/2009)*

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<sup>123</sup> Supreme Leader's Speech at Imam Ridha's (a.s.) Shrine - 20/03/2012

<sup>124</sup> Supreme Leader's Speech to Nuclear Scientists - 22.02.2012; Supreme Leader's Address to the People of East Azerbaijan - 09/03/2008

<sup>125</sup> Haraam means 'forbidden' or 'illegal' in Arabic.

<sup>126</sup> A fatwa is a formal legal opinion on issues pertaining Islamic Law. When a statement addressing a particular issue of societal concern is accompanied by one of the five expressions of Ahkan (Islamic commandments), it is considered to be a fatwa. A fatwa may be written or oral. The five degrees of Islamic Ahkan consist of the words *Wajib* (Obligatory), *Mustahab* (Recommended), *Mubah* (Indifferent), *Makruh* (Inappropriate/not recommended) and *Haraam* (Forbidden/illegal). Thus, a statement made by the Supreme Leader explicitly saying that nuclear weapons are forbidden, is understood as legally binding. It is worth noting however that fatwas, like laws and directives, are subject to alteration and reversal.

Claiming that the enemies' statements about Iran are based on lies, Khamenei expresses sternly that no government is entitled to deny Iran the right of nuclear development.<sup>127</sup> As exemplified in a speech from 2007:

*In their comments and political commentary, they say western governments are opposed to Iran's achieving nuclear energy. Nobody cares whether they agree to it or not. Has the Islamic Republic asked permission for achieving nuclear energy? The Iranian nation has not entered this arena with the permission of others, so it cannot be denied permission. All that matters is that the Iranian people want and have agreed to have this energy. (Supreme Leader's Speech at Imam Reza's (a.s.) Shrine – 21/03/2007)*

In addition to what comes across as a fierce refusal of interference with the nuclear policies of the nation<sup>128</sup>, Khamenei maintains that all nuclear activities in Iran are peaceful and constitute the nation's indisputable and inalienable right.<sup>129</sup> Referring to those "standing in the way" of Iran's progress by "creating obstacles" for nuclear advancements, Khamenei points out that nuclear discrimination is apparent in the international community.<sup>130</sup> Opposing such discrimination, he underlines that "one is not to act selectively" and "accept and legally acknowledge nuclear progress and development of certain countries and not others". Such double-standards are said to be unacceptable for Iran.<sup>131</sup> Contrasting Iran with the foreign powers, the Ayatollah states that the moral values of the Islamic Republic do not permit nuclear weapons.<sup>132</sup> Elaborating on this issue, Khamenei stresses that:

*It is wrong for [Iran] to use its knowledge to build such weapons as nuclear bombs, which do not discriminate between those who are innocent and those who are not and between those who are armed and those who are not. A nuclear bomb does not discriminate between infants and others. It kills everybody indiscriminately. (...) We do not approve of such change. (Supreme Leader's Speech to Academics of Semnan - 09/11/2006)*

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<sup>127</sup> Supreme Leader's Speech at Imam Reza's (a.s.) Shrine – 21/03/2007

<sup>128</sup> Supreme Leader's Speech to University Professors – 25/08/2011

<sup>129</sup> Supreme Leader's Address on the Occasion of Imam Khomeini's Demise Anniversary - 04/06/2009; Supreme Leader's Address to Teachers in Shiraz - 01/05/2008; Supreme Leader's Speech to Government Officials – 18/08/2010; Supreme Leader's Speech to People of East Azerbaijan - 22/02/2013; Supreme Leader's Speech to Thousands of People from East Azerbaijan - 17/02/2008; Supreme Leader's Public Address on Eid al-Ghadir – 06/12/2009

<sup>130</sup> Supreme Leader's Speech at Imam Ridha's (a.s.) Shrine – 21/03/2013

<sup>131</sup> Bayanat dar khotbehaye namaze jom'e – 21/10/2005

<sup>132</sup> Supreme Leader's Speech in Meeting with Commanders of Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps - 17/09/2013

Quoting the Quran and discussing the difference between good and evil, the supreme leader highlights that Islam has always promoted the virtue of justice. Linking the contemporary world with evil, the Ayatollah claims that it is characterized by oppression and injustice. In this context, the domestic audiences are reminded that Islamic virtues and the revolutionary ideology must not be forgotten.<sup>133</sup> Emphasizing this point, he underlines that:

The fact that oppression is bad and national independence and national dignity are great virtues, has not changed. (...) The fact that the world has changed cannot give us an excuse to change our behavior, our ideals and our goals. (...) Global arrogance is a system which divides the world into the oppressed and the oppressor. The logic of the Revolution, which is based on the logic of Islam, is "Deal not unjustly, nor shall you be dealt with unjustly. (Supreme Leader's Speech in Meeting with Commanders of Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps - 17/09/2013)

While opposing change that is motivated by external forces, Khamenei encourages change and progress that is inspired by the main pillars of the revolutionary ideology and the Islamic religion.<sup>134</sup>

Describing the world as a place filled with oppression, transgression and injustice, the supreme leader claims that nuclear weapons are the tools of arrogant powers in order to dominate and control other nations and countries.<sup>135</sup> Through global arrogance, these powers are said to have established a system that divides the world into two camps: the dominators and the dominated. The dominators are always assumed to break down the resistance of those who try to fight for their rights and seek independence.<sup>136</sup> The revolutionary ideology is described as opposing such dominations, and Khamenei firmly criticizes any means of domination, including nuclear weapons. Underlining that no wise nation or government would seek to develop nuclear weapons, the supreme leader distances the Islamic Republic from such ambitions. Rather, he suggests that science and technology should be accompanied with spirituality, religious faith and

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<sup>133</sup> Ibid.

<sup>134</sup> Supreme Leader's Speech to Academics of Semnan - 09/11/2006

<sup>135</sup> Supreme Leader's Speech to Cadets - 15/04/2009

<sup>136</sup> Supreme Leader's Speech at Imam Reza's (a.s.) Shrine – 21/03/2007

ethics. These aspects are, as claimed by the supreme leader, what is missing in the contemporary world.<sup>137</sup> As stated in 2006:

*Combining science with religion means that religious faith is used to determine the orientation of science. Science is like a weapon that can be used against the best or the worst people: it depends on the hands that this weapon falls into. This weapon is science, and religious faith determines its orientation. (...) If religious faith had control over Western knowledge, it would not have developed into atomic bombs and they would not have faced the dilemma of how to deal with these bombs. (Supreme Leader's Speech to Academics and Students of Imam Sadiq (a.s.) University – 19/01/2006)*

Pointing out that scientific progress with disregard to religious orientation is dangerous, the Ayatollah highlights that nuclear weapons are destructive and burdening. Khamenei claims that science that is not accompanied by religious faith leads to domination and oppression in the forms of occupation, violence and exploitation. Immoral scientific development, and nuclear weapons acquisition, is thus claimed to be attribution of colonial and neo-colonial powers.<sup>138</sup>

Another key problem in what is described as the “modern” and “materialistic world” is that knowledge is used to enforce corruption, transgression, extremism and destroying human values.<sup>139</sup> Assigning such features to the colonial powers of the past, Khamenei underlines that Western countries have the same colonial ambitions today. The Ayatollah claims that Western powers use their knowledge to develop (nuclear) weapons, through which they can dominate and oppress.<sup>140</sup> Assuming a clear position against such features, Khamenei expresses that the revolutionary ideology of Iran is based on justice and human dignity, and thus against nuclear weapons.<sup>141</sup> Claiming that dominant powers want all nations to surrender to an unfair global system, the Islamic Republic is said to fight global arrogance and promote the independence of nations, on the basis of the Islamic revolutionary ideology.<sup>142</sup>

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<sup>137</sup> Supreme Leader's Speech to Academics and Students of Imam Sadiq (a.s.) University – 19/01/2006

<sup>138</sup> Supreme Leader's Speech to Academics and Students of Imam Sadiq (a.s.) University – 19/01/2006

<sup>139</sup> Supreme Leader's Speech to MPs of 9th Majlis – 13/06/2012; Supreme Leader's Speech to Cadets - 15/04/2009; Supreme Leader's Address to Clergy in Qom – 21/10/2010

<sup>140</sup> Supreme Leader's Speech to Cadets - 15/04/2009

<sup>141</sup> Supreme Leader's Speech in Meeting with Commanders of Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps – 17/09/2013

<sup>142</sup> Supreme Leader's Speech to Cadets - 15/04/2009

Referring to international law and all nuclear related activities, the Ayatollah claims that Iran has never broken the law and has always been under close scrutiny of the IAEA. Claiming that the nation has accepted the close monitoring of nuclear activities, Ayatollah Khamenei says that provoking controversy and using the United Nations Security Council for their own ends will be detrimental for global powers. Khamenei warns that if global powers approach the Islamic Republic with hostility and double-standards, Iran will break international law, in the same vein that global powers break international law by denying Iran its basic rights.<sup>143</sup>

*They should know that if they continue to threaten us and turn to violence and oppression against us, the Iranian nation and their officials will definitely use all their potential to harm those enemies who try to attack them. (Supreme Leader's Speech at Imam Reza's (a.s.) Shrine – 21/03/2007)*

Stressing that enemies pose a hostile threat to the existence of the Iranian nation, Khamenei urges an “appropriate, logical and determined battle” against enemies. Outlining the necessary requirements for fighting the enemies, he proposes three main points. Firstly, the Ayatollah highlights that the struggle and fight has to be motivated by religious faith. Secondly, he proposes that the nation should have insight into what arrogance is and how it is exercised. The nation is encouraged to remember its own religious and revolutionary identity, and act upon this identity. Thirdly, the nation is urged to have knowledge about the characteristics and possible strategies of its enemies.<sup>144</sup> Reviewing the statements on the “national requirements for fighting the enemies”, one interpretation may be that the supreme leader’s rhetoric depends greatly on the enmity image in order to justify the national rationale. It seems like the characteristics of the enemies define what Iran is *not*, and that the national identity conception relies on the existence of foreign threats.

Describing arrogance – a trait often used to characterize the enemies – Khamenei states that “arrogance refers to a global power or a group of global powers. When these powers look at themselves, they see that they have financial, propaganda, and military facilities. Therefore, they think they are entitled to interfere in the affairs of other countries as if they owned them”.<sup>145</sup>

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<sup>143</sup> Supreme Leader’s Speech at Imam Reza’s (a.s.) Shrine – 21/03/2007

<sup>144</sup> Supreme Leader’s Address to Students on the Occasion of 13th of Aban - the national day of fighting global governance - 03/11/2009

<sup>145</sup> Ibid.

Ayatollah Khamenei states that arrogance is what makes global powers deny other nations of nurturing their abilities and seeking progress. Seeking to be peerless, the arrogant global powers oppose the advancements and growth of other nations, because progression will increase nation's powers and make them potential rivals.<sup>146</sup>

Khamenei also proposes that the enemies of Iran fear Iranian success and development in the nuclear field, because this can inspire other Islamic nations to building nuclear facilities as well. The Ayatollah implies that a potential regional spill-over of peaceful nuclear development is positive. On the basis of Islamic jihad, the supreme leader encourages nuclear development; not only for Iran, but also for other Islamic nations, because progress is the path towards independence of foreign powers, and the road of resistance to foreign threats.<sup>147</sup>

In addition to the Islamic ideology, the pursuit of a peaceful nuclear program is also justified on the basis of rational calculation. Pointing out that nuclear weapons are extremely costly and of no actual use, they are understood as weapons that do not bring about power. Furthermore, the acquisition of nuclear weapons is said to burden nuclear weapon states, because the slightest mistake or accident would lead to serious consequences for the state. Highlighting the overall risk nuclear weapons pose to global security, Khamenei warns against both nuclear accidents and in the event that nuclear weapons fall into the hands of terrorists. In addition to the religious argument, logical considerations are claimed to speak *against* nuclear weapons, but *for* civil nuclear energy.<sup>148</sup>

Discussing the pursuit of nuclear energy, Khamenei expresses clearly that containment and rollback is out of the question. Highlighting that the United States has firmly insisted on Iranian nuclear rollback, Khamenei states that, as opposed to the Libyan case, Iran will not offer its nuclear program "on a silver platter".<sup>149</sup> He highlights that despite the insisting demands of Western powers in past negotiations, Iran has progressed in its nuclear advancements. Khamenei underlines that the most important merit for achieving such advancements is national self-confidence. The Ayatollah encourages the nation's elites to practice national self-confidence and

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<sup>146</sup> Supreme Leader's Speech to Thousands of People from East Azerbaijan - 17/02/2008

<sup>147</sup> Supreme Leader's Address to the People of East Azerbaijan – 09/03/2008

<sup>148</sup> Supreme Leader's Speech on the Occasion of the 19th Demise Anniversary of Imam Khomeini - 03/06/2008

<sup>149</sup> Leader's Speech to a Group of University Students from Yazd Province – 03/01/2008

remove the need for assistance from others. As implied by Khamenei, the lack of national self-confidence to pursue indigenous nuclear capabilities amplifies dependence. In turn, dependence of foreign countries will keep the Islamic Republic “backward”.<sup>150</sup> As stated in 2008:

*When you are waiting to be served a dish that has already been prepared, you will not attempt to prepare it yourself, nor will you learn to cook. This is one of the main dangers and a very obvious one at that. It is not a philosophically complex issue. But we sometimes tend to ignore this obvious point and this simple mechanism that contributes to the country's staying backward. (Leader's Speech to a Group of University Students from Yazd Province – 03/01/2008)*

Nuclear progress is seen as a means to resist enemy threats. As a response to the enemies' strategies of domination, Khamenei proposes various ways to which Iran can defend itself. Highlighting the complexity and importance of this issue, he states that there is a suitable strategy for each and every types of warfare imposed on Iran. As mentioned in previous sections, the enemies are claimed to impose economic and psychological warfare against Iran. As a response to such threats, the Ayatollah encourages resistance through *scientific* and *economic jihad*. In the same vein that economic and psychological warfare are intertwined, economic and scientific jihad are also closely linked.

#### **4.2.3.2 Economic and scientific jihad**

As discussed in the previous section, the Islamic identity is closely linked to the revolutionary ideology, because it outlines the importance of national independence and resistance of foreign domination. Islamic identity seems to justify scientific progress, because such progress is a means to *jihad*.<sup>151</sup> More specifically, as claimed by Khamenei, manifestation of knowledge

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<sup>150</sup> Ibid.

<sup>151</sup> *Jihad* means struggle, and refers to the resistance and fight all Muslims must exercise against the enemies of Islam. Jihad does not refer to violent action (in particular). Rather it is often used to describe a struggle and a fight against political, economic or normative imposition.

through technological advancement is a way of standing up to the enemies of Islam.<sup>152</sup> The Ayatollah underlines that Jihad leads to success. In order to engage in Jihad, national unity and solidarity must be preserved. Through national unity, foreign plots to stir up discord within the country under pretexts such as ethnicity, religion, politics, can be avoided.<sup>153</sup> As stated by the supreme leader:

*It is necessary to preserve unity. Fortunately our nation is vigilant. All those who care about the country and religious democracy - which is a source of pride for the Iranian nation - should cooperate in a harmonious manner. Government officials should do the same. If they have issues with one another, they should try to avoid making these issues public because this would be detrimental to our national unity. Everybody should pay attention to this point. I seriously warn our government officials about this issue. (Supreme Leader's Public Address in Mashhad - 21/03/2011)*

Calling for scientific jihad, Khamenei urges the scientific networks to be unified. Scientific jihad implies that the nation pursues scientific advancements and progress in a tireless and relentless manner, is claimed to be of utter importance. He also encourages interconnectedness across all scientific sectors.<sup>154</sup> The Ayatollah claims that scientific jihad is something more than having “plain rhetorical” appeal. Rather, he says that it is rooted in a deep and sophisticated consideration based on Islamic identity. Nuclear scientists are praised, and referred to as “outstanding personalities” conducting research and work which is highly significant for achieving national goals. The nuclear sector, as well as other sectors of science and technology, is encouraged to continue their efforts. Academics and scientists are also motivated to pursue scientific and technological development orientated in knowledge that is based on ethics, faith and spirituality.<sup>155</sup>

Scientific jihad is seen as a way to spread Islamic values, through the promotion of justice and morality and through knowledge-sharing with other nation's that seek to be independent of oppression and domination. Khamenei claims that the labor that is devoted to scientific jihad is

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<sup>152</sup> Supreme Leader's Public Address in Mashhad - 21/03/2011; Speech to exemplary laborers - 28/04/2010; Supreme Leader's Public Address on Eid al-Ghadir – 06/12/2009; Supreme Leader's Speech at Imam Ridha's (a.s.) Shrine – 20/03/2012; Supreme Leader's Address to People Active in Economic Sector - 18/08/2011

<sup>153</sup> Supreme Leader's Public Address in Mashhad - 21/03/2011

<sup>154</sup> Supreme Leader's Speech to Nuclear Scientists – 22/02/2012

<sup>155</sup> Ibid.

recognized as a kind of jihad. Based on the Islamic ideology, laborers are urged to have compassion, cooperation and common goals as a starting point for their efforts. The material progress of the country is said to be based on two factors. The first factor is knowledge, and production is the second factor. Laborers are urged to be united and “work in conjunction” in order to achieve the same goal. The Ayatollah points to the religious motivation of labor in the Islamic ideology. This is explained as different from labor in capitalistic and socialist societies, where laborers are regarded as “nuts and bolts” serving a materialistic end.<sup>156</sup>

Khamenei highlights that contrary to the enemies whom seek to obtain power through immoral and oppressive means, Iran will increase its power by relying on Islam and morality.<sup>157</sup> In a speech delivered to nuclear scientists, Khamenei highlights the importance of knowledge:

*Their power, wealth and facilities are the result of their knowledge. It is not possible to confront them without knowledge. "Knowledge is authoritative power." (...) Knowledge is a source of power. Anybody who enjoys this source of power can move forward. Anybody, any nation or any society that does not have it will be forced to give in to the power of others. Therefore, this emphasis on science is based on an accurate calculation. (Supreme Leader's Speech to Nuclear Scientists: 22/02/2012)*

Scientific development in light of religion and ethics is assumed to lead to great progression. Such progression is understood as the power of being independent, resilient and resistant toward immoral enemies and unjust threats. Highlighting scientific progress as a mean to preserve and actualize national identity, Khamenei stresses that “genuine national power depends on knowledge”. Explaining what holy and pure knowledge is, the supreme leader highlights that:

*Knowledge is a means. It is a tool. If this tool falls into the hands of a spiteful and evil murderer, it will create nothing but tragedies. But the same tool can be used by a righteous person as a means to safeguard families and the rights of human beings. This knowledge should be utilized only when it is accompanied by purification. (Supreme Leader's Speech to Young Elites – 06/10/2011)*

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<sup>156</sup> Speech to exemplary laborers - 28/04/2010

<sup>157</sup> Supreme Leader's Speech to Nuclear Scientists – 22/02/2012

The nuclear program is not only claimed by Khamenei to be a way of manifesting knowledge for its inherent value; it is also regarded as an instrument to acquire power. Indeed, the Islamic identity is the basis on which Iran will defend its rights and stop the transgression of enemies. The resistance against the domination is rooted in religion, and Khamenei states that if the nation does not defend itself “God will question us”.<sup>158</sup> In sum, the Islamic identity is used as a foundation to justify the nuclear program on moral grounds, and to affirm that nuclear progress is encouraged in light of religious values. Assuring domestic audiences that divine assistance will accompany them in reaching the “lofty ideals” of Islam, the supreme leader ensures the people that “the final victory” will be theirs. Claiming to have Allah on the nation’s side, the Ayatollah proposes that “the arrogant centers of power have no choice but to retreat when they are faced with a strong and faithful nation”.<sup>159</sup> This rhetoric is particularly addressed to the Iranian parliament. Khamenei underlines that the parliament is an essential pillar for promoting spirituality and criticizing the materialistic world. The parliament is urged to promote reliance in God, rather than material sources of power – such as nuclear weapons.<sup>160</sup>

Referring to the nuclear decision making processes of the country, the supreme leader highlights that internal decision making as well as the international negotiations are based on domestic dialogue and consensus. The Ayatollah underlines that it is important for the nation to know that “the [Iranian] decision makers are likeminded and the verdict on the nuclear issue is unanimous” and that “the nuclear progress - from the beginning and also for the last couple of years – has been based on such collective efforts of thought and action among Iranian decision-makers”. He emphasizes that the decisions related to the nuclear program are made on the basis of comprehensive and holistic considerations – not in hast, and not on the basis of divided opinions. This unanimity among decision makers is said to be due to the Iranian nation’s right to pursue nuclear capabilities.<sup>161</sup>

Khamenei highlights that countries leading in terms of economy, science, military and security power are jointly opposing the Iranian nation. These countries are claimed to use their various

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<sup>158</sup> Supreme Leader’s Speech to Thousands of People from East Azerbaijan - 17/02/2008

<sup>159</sup> Supreme Leader’s Address to Students on the Occasion of 13th of Aban - “the national day of fighting global governance” - 03/11/2009

<sup>160</sup> Supreme Leader’s Speech to MPs of 9th Majlis -13/06/2012

<sup>161</sup> Bayanat dar khotbehaye namaze jom’e – 21/10/2005

means of power against Iran, in order to dominate the nation and make it “bow to the global hegemony”.<sup>162</sup> However, as stated by the Ayatollah:

*[T]he Iranian nation and the Islamic Republic are standing firm against all these things with all their power. They want to force us to say "yes", but the Iranian nation and the Islamic Republic have refused to do so. That "yes" means bowing to the global hegemony - the order of domination. But the Iranian nation and the Islamic Republic refuse to do so. We stand up and say "no" to the order of domination, but this "no" is not a "no" to science. It is not a "no" to civilization. It is not a "no" to progress. It is not a "no" to the collective experiences of humanity. It is a "no" to domination and greed. It is a "no" to the efforts to enslave and subdue nations of the world. We said "no" and we stuck to it. (Supreme Leader's Speech to University Professors – 25/08/2011)*

Khamenei warns the people that, in the soft war context, national self-confidence may be “dented, undermined, shaken” or “not boosted to the extent that the nation requires”.<sup>163</sup> Referring to the nuclear cooperation and voluntary suspension of nuclear activities under the presidency of Khatami, the supreme leader highlights that cooperation with western powers was useless, and Iranian cooperation ultimately signaled Iranian retreat. The European and western powers are criticized for making unreasonable demands and pressuring Iran to giving up its nuclear program.<sup>164</sup>

*They told us to suspend our nuclear activities voluntarily. We suspended our activities thinking that it was voluntary and temporary. Later on whenever we tried to appeal against this suspension, they shamelessly set off a worldwide uproar against us in the press, the media and political assemblies claiming that Iran wanted to break the suspension agreement. Suspension turned into a sacred cow which Iran had no right to approach. We went through this experience. It is no longer a new experience. They finally told us that this temporary suspension was not enough and that we had to forget about nuclear activities altogether. At that time, in a televised meeting with the officials, I declared that if they kept up the process of their continual requests, I would personally intervene, which I finally did. (Leader's Speech to a Group of University Students from Yazd Province - 03.01.2008)*

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<sup>162</sup> Supreme Leader's Speech to University Professors – 25/08/2011

<sup>163</sup> Leader's Speech to a Group of University Students from Yazd Province – 03/01/2008

<sup>164</sup> Leader's Speech to a Group of University Students from Yazd Province – 03/01/2008

The foreign opposition against Iran's nuclear advancement is described as a tool to undermine the national self-confidence. Referring to the pre-revolution era of humiliation and inferiority, Khamenei reminds the nation of Iranian dependence on foreigners in all production and machinery related matters. As stated in 2010: "We had to borrow everything from foreigners. We had to beg them. We had to give them our oil. We had to give up our dignity and political power. We had to tolerate their hegemony in order to get what we wanted." In contrast to this past, the Ayatollah highlights that Iran has made a lot of progress after becoming an Islamic Republic. Boasting about the nuclear progress Iran has made, Khamenei states that:

*A nation that was helped by no one, a nation that was refused industrial products and technological advances managed to manufacture the second, third, and fourth generation centrifuges. All the countries that enjoy nuclear power and technology were left astonished. They were asking themselves, "Who did they learn these things from? (Speech to exemplary laborers - 28/04/2010)*

However, Khamenei points out that Iran has still not fulfilled its full potential. As claimed by the Ayatollah, Iran is far from having what the "Iranian nation and its historical legacy deserve[s]", and currently lacks "the position [it] deserves among the countries of the world." In light of the rhetoric of inferiority, the supreme leader urges the nation to becoming superior through development and progress.<sup>165</sup> The supreme reminds the domestic audiences that scientific advancement and knowledge constitute the main pillars of the Iranian national resistance against dominating global hegemonies. Scientific progress is claimed to lead to both practical and executive advances. Nuclear development is explained as a means to secure the national ideology as well as increasing national power.<sup>166</sup>

Furthermore, nuclear achievements is said to be a concrete way of increasing the nation's dignity. Highlighting that nuclear progress is of material importance, Khamenei underlines that it is not the materialistic calculation or the monetary value of the nuclear program that is the most important. The nuclear program is first and foremost a manifestation of national knowledge, superiority and determination.<sup>167</sup> Knowledge is said to give the nation self-confidence, and resistance is described as "a glorious event in the world". The Ayatollah further claims that the

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<sup>165</sup> Speech to exemplary laborers - 28/04/2010

<sup>166</sup> Supreme Leader Meets with Students on "National Day of Fighting Against Global Arrogance" – 03/11/2013

<sup>167</sup> Supreme Leader's Speech to Nuclear Scientists – 22/02/2012

glory of resistance is particularly acknowledged by other states.<sup>168</sup> One may interpret that Iran is seeking international recognition for its efforts to resist foreign powers, in addition to fulfilling its national duties as an Islamic Republic. This point is also highlighted in a statement made in 2008:

*They would have said "it is impossible", "is it really possible to do such a thing?", "what a naïve idea!" The Iranian nation proved that it can do it. It is the same in all other fields, but nuclear energy has appeared as a manifestation. It has attracted global admiration. This nation has the talent and enthusiasm to do the same thing in all other fields. Our nation also has the courage to step in and do the same thing in other fields. That is something obvious, a self-evident reality. You have many other undeniable rights as well. (Supreme Leader's Address to Teachers in Shiraz - 01/05/2008)*

Discussing nuclear cooperation, Khamenei points out that, if Iran had been dependent on states such as France or Germany to run its nuclear industry, it would not have been self-confident in its scientific progress. The Ayatollah states that national self-confidence has led to scientific progress, which in turn has given Iran the power to put up resistance against foreign domination. Furthermore, the nation's indigenous technical capabilities are said to bring about both dignity and honor. As exemplified in statements from 2011 and 2008:

*If we had to beg eastern and western industrialists and scientists to build a dam, a power plant, a highway, a tunnel and a wheat silo for us, our nation would not have this sense of dignity and our government officials would not have the necessary honor to stand up against global arrogance. There would neither be such self-confidence nor such determination and willpower. Who developed stem cells and nuclear energy for us? It was our universities that helped our nation to preserve its dignity and honor. (Supreme Leader's Speech to University Professors – 25/08/2011)*

When underlining the nation's right to produce nuclear energy, Khamenei warns against dependence upon other nations for nuclear fuel production. Highlighting the broken promises of the past and that nuclear trade will always entail unfair conditions, the Ayatollah urges the nation

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<sup>168</sup> Supreme Leader's Speech to University Professors – 25/08/2011

to be self-reliant by only using indigenous capabilities to produce nuclear fuel.<sup>169</sup> As seen in a statement from 2008, Khamenei proposes that cooperation as such is only pursued if it serves national interests:

*One of our fundamental policies is to break off relations with the US, but we have never said that these relations will remain so for ever. There is no reason to permanently break off our relations with America or any other government. The problem is that the conditions of this government are such that it is harmful for us to establish relations with it. Any relations with any country are formed on the basis of a calculation that predicts a benefit. When there is no benefit for us, we do not try to establish relations. But if there are any losses, we will certainly not pursue the establishment of relations. (Leader's Speech to a Group of University Students from Yazd Province – 03/01/2008)*

Elaborating on the nation's strategy of scientific progress, Khamenei highlights that rapid acceleration in all areas of science and technology is important. As part of this strategy, nuclear advancements are described as a prerequisite for overcoming national difficulties. He states that scientific progress is a fundamental policy, because development within the field of science leads to "real national progress".<sup>170</sup> Linking progress to economy, the Ayatollah argues that many countries may offer their natural resources such as oil and gas for export, but that they are dependent on importing other products in return. He states that in such countries, the progress is only superficial and not real. Real progress is defined as indigenous capabilities, where the nation can depend on its own domestic capabilities.<sup>171</sup>

By introducing *jihadi* policies into the economic strategy, Khamenei claims that arrogant powers and their mission to defeat the Iranian nation can be resisted. Explaining economic resistance as a means to ensure national security, the supreme leader defines *economic jihad* as the following:

*[E]conomic jihad means the Iranian nation's persistent, comprehensive and purposeful movement with the intention of rendering the aggressive and spiteful efforts of the enemy ineffective. Becoming the top country in the region is not just a whim. No, we want to become the top country because the destiny of our nation depends on it. If a country fails to fulfill its needs and make progress in the area of economy, knowledge and infrastructure that are*

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<sup>169</sup> Supreme Leader's Speech to Government Officials – 18/08/2010

<sup>170</sup> Supreme Leader's Speech in Meeting with Participants of 7th Elite Youth Conference - 09/10/2013

<sup>171</sup> Supreme Leader's Speech in Meeting with Participants of 7th Elite Youth Conference - 09/10/2013

*necessary for progress, it will be oppressed in a merciless way. We do not want to be oppressed. Our country has been subjected to oppression and transgression for two hundred years. This oppression was the result of the weakness of incompetent, corrupt and materialistic monarchies and the dynamism that their enemies enjoyed. (Supreme Leader's Address to People Active in Economic Sector - 18/08/2011)*

Economic policies on the basis of religion and ideology are described as enhancing national focus on independence and self-reliance. This strategy is claimed to be a good and subtle technique to circumvent the economic warfare imposed by the enemies.<sup>172</sup> By implementing policies on the basis of economic jihad the nation is said to “gradually develop a kind of immunity to sanctions”.<sup>173</sup> Khamenei proposes that the sanctions against Iran are regarded as a “blessing in disguise”, because they enforce national capabilities.<sup>174</sup> Indeed, the sanctions against Iran are said to be an advantage, because they spur the people of the nation into action. In turn, the ideological aims of progression and resilience can be achieved through indigenous scientific growth.<sup>175</sup> As described by the Ayatollah:

*They want to pressure the Iranian nation in economic issues. (...) They threaten us with sanctions. Sanctions cannot harm us. Have we not been under sanctions so far? We achieved nuclear energy while we were under sanctions. We achieved scientific advances while we were under sanctions. These widespread measures for constructing the country were adopted while we were under sanctions. Sanctions might even benefit us under certain circumstances because they might make us more determined to make efforts. (Supreme Leader's Speech at Imam Ridha's (a.s.) Shrine - 21/03/2007)*

Describing economic warfare more concretely, the enemies are said to undermine employment opportunities, disrupt national welfare, work against national growth and isolate the Iranian people from the Islamic republic. In this context, the Iranian people are urged to have national self-confidence, because self-confidence is a necessity for engaging in economic and scientific

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<sup>172</sup> Supreme Leader's Address to People Active in Economic Sector - 18/08/2011

<sup>173</sup> Ibid.

<sup>174</sup> Supreme Leader's Speech to Government Officials – 07/08/2011; Supreme Leader's Speech on His Arrival in Shiraz – 30/04/2008

<sup>175</sup> Supreme Leader's Speech in Mashhad – 21/03/2009; Supreme Leader's Friday Prayer Address - 14/09/2007

jihad.<sup>176</sup> The resistance against sanctions is highlighted as beneficial for Iran. By not succumbing to the pressure imposed by the enemies, Khamenei proposes that the threats of the dominating powers are undermined within their own country and in the international context. Resistance is thus understood as a way of increasing Iranian dignity and power in the region. Ayatollah Khamenei therefore proposes that if Iran stands up against the threats of dominating powers, these threats cause more harm to the enemies than to Iran.<sup>177</sup>

Khamenei stresses the importance of “economy of resistance” – a concept used synonymously with economic jihad – and highlights that the nation must minimize its dependence on oil. Resource dependence is associated with the “evil legacy from a hundred years ago”. By proposing that knowledge-based industries can fill the dependency-gap, the supreme leader points out that oil dependence can be minimized by focusing national efforts on indigenous and self-sustained development.<sup>178</sup>

The nuclear issue is explained as a means to making scientific progress with consideration to economic cost effectiveness. The Ayatollah underlines that the nuclear program provides the nation with a source for renewable energy. By pointing out that fossil fuel resources such as oil and gas are non-renewable, Khamenei warns the domestic audiences against foreign powers who want Iran to use these valuable and finite resources. In an analogy, he warns about those who urge Iran to sell its precious, historic jewels in order to buy fruit. Khamenei questions why Iran should do so, when the nation has the capability of planting, growing and harvesting fruit on its own.<sup>179</sup> National independence and indigenous capabilities are thus encouraged, both in order to achieve scientific and economic progress. Furthermore, the youth of the nation are particularly encouraged to pursue the path of progress and indigenous capabilities.

Discussing indigenous capabilities, Khamenei claims that:

*The value of countries, governments and nations depends on this inborn power. If a country makes a leap on its own and if it achieves growth from the inside, this will make this country*

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<sup>176</sup> Supreme Leader’s Speech at Imam Ridha’s (a.s.) Shrine – 20/03/2012

<sup>177</sup> Supreme Leader’s Friday Prayer Address – 03/02/2012

<sup>178</sup> Supreme Leader’s Speech to Government Officials – 24/07/2012

<sup>179</sup> Bayanat dar khotbehaye namaze jom’e – 19/08/2005

*and this nation valuable, important and respected. But if such growth is not achieved from the inside and if it is achieved with the help of others, then this country will not earn respect. (Supreme Leader's Speech in Meeting with Participants of 7th Elite Youth Conference - 09/10/2013)*

As exemplified in this quote, it is apparent that the external perception of national progress is of importance. Indeed, nuclear advancement is understood as a means to making Iran seem “valuable and important” internationally, and lead to international respect. Another example can be seen in a statement from 2008:

*In spite of the fact that propagandists and politicians are shouting insults at us, I can assure you that nations admire you. Even those politicians admire Iran deep in their hearts. Whenever I see the course of negotiations - whether in IAEA or other political gatherings - I can see that they are astonished at and praise the Iranian nation for its perseverance, enthusiasm for knowledge, and insistence on preserving this scientific and national honor. (Supreme Leader's Address to Teachers in Shiraz - 01/05/2008)*

These statements suggest that foreign admiration and praise is considered to be important. In light of the historical context, one may interpret that international acknowledgement is important to Iran, in order to show that the Islamic Republic – contrasting the regime of Pahlavi – is independent and resistant against foreign domination. Khamenei states that through nuclear development the country has fulfilled a historical mission. As highlighted in a speech from 2013:

*Today, after the passage of more than three decades, the nightmare which they have been suffering from is gradually coming true. That is to say, a great national and regional power has emerged which has not been defeated by different economic, security, political and psychological pressures. On the contrary, this power has managed to influence regional nations, to establish and promote communal Islamic culture and to help regional nations have a sense of identity. (Supreme Leader's Speech in Meeting with Participants of 7th Elite Youth Conference - 09/10/2013)*

Khamenei further emphasizes that the achievements of the nation must be “shouldered with great responsibility”, and that the nation must not stop progressing. The supreme leader highlights that the nuclear development of Iran must continue without any interruptions or pauses. The same is

said to be true in other areas of society as well, including social, political and military movements.<sup>180</sup> As expressed by Khamenei in 2009: “I feel assured that this society and government will undoubtedly achieve its goals through this tangible material, spiritual, scientific, and ethical progress.”<sup>181</sup>

Instead of following the westernized path of development, the nation is urged to pave its own way by following the ideals of Islam, and by pursuing the notions of the revolution. Acknowledging the flaws of the past, the Ayatollah highlights that knowledge is the key to national progress. In turn, progress is the means to achieve greater power. As further highlighted:

*I have for years emphasized the issue of knowledge, research, progress, innovation, and pushing back the boundaries of knowledge. It is not possible for the country to become powerful in the absence of knowledge. Knowledge brings about power. (Supreme Leader’s Speech to Elites – 28/10/2009)*

By standing up against the enemies’ demands and pursuing scientific progress, Khamenei proposes that the nation will project power. He states: “Even if they bomb Natanz and Isfahan’s Uranium Conversion Facility, how do they want to bomb our knowledge? As you see, knowledge brings about immunity and power.”<sup>182</sup> Knowledge, through its inherent value, is claimed by Khamenei to bring about power. In this context, the Ayatollah stresses that nuclear knowledge and advancements is a national requirement. However, he does emphasize that nuclear progress is only an example of Iranian aspirations, and one of the national strategies for achieving “the position it deserves in international relations, in terms of moral and spiritual values”.<sup>183</sup>

Finally, with regard to scientific jihad, Khamenei emphasizes the importance of self-confidence among the Iranian people. He claims that national self-confidence, including the nuclear sphere, reveals the “innate talents” of the people. He also iterates that the enemies have forgotten that

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<sup>180</sup> Supreme Leader’s Speech in Meeting with Participants of 7th Elite Youth Conference - 09/10/2013

<sup>181</sup> Supreme Leader’s Speech to Elites – 28/10/2009

<sup>182</sup> Supreme Leader’s Speech to Elites – 28/10/2009

<sup>183</sup> Supreme Leader’s Speech in Abarkooh - 05/01/2008

Iran's history is full of scientific achievements. Referring to Iran's historical legacy, the supreme leader states that:

*Our country was the pioneer among Islamic countries at a time when nothing was going on in the western world, at a time when westerners used to burn alive those who made a scientific discovery thinking that they were performing black magic, at a time when absolute scientific darkness had dominated Europe - and there are many things to say in this regard. These advances belong to the world of Islam, but Iran was at the forefront of Islamic countries in different scientific advances, in philosophy, in rational sciences, in religious studies, in Islamic jurisprudence and in hadith. Also, Iranians wrote books about natural sciences, medicine, pharmacy, engineering, astronomy and other sciences. This is our history, which is indicative of the existence of exceptional talent in this part of the world. (Supreme Leader's Speech to Outstanding Personalities of Kermanshah – 18/10/2012)*

Khamenei urges the nation to preserve its self-confidence, and a means for doing so is through high-level scientific breakthroughs, including the nuclear sector. In particular, the youth are encouraged to show self-confidence, and use their knowledge and talent in the pursuit of progression.<sup>184</sup> As stated in 2008:

*What we desperately need is national self-confidence of the youth, especially the learned and scientifically active youth who are the prospective managers of the scientific, political or scientific and executive future of this country. This segment of society must pay careful attention to the advice concerning national self-confidence. (Leader's Speech to a Group of University Students from Yazd Province – 03/01/2008)*

Pointing out that Iran has been lagging behind the world with regard to scientific progress in the past decades, the people are urged to continue their progress and catch up with the world. The Ayatollah refers to Iran as the Islamic nation which, throughout history and among Islamic nations, has been the most advanced in terms of science, development, technology, philosophy and language. In light of its historical legacy, Khamenei states that Iran “will not wait, and has not waited” to continue this path of knowledge and progress. Nuclear technology is thus explained as an indicator of the national legacy, characterized by a high level of knowledge and advancement.<sup>185</sup>

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<sup>184</sup> Leader's Speech to a Group of University Students from Yazd Province – 03/01/2008

<sup>185</sup> Bayanat dar khotbehaye namaze jom'e – 21/10/2005

Khamenei emphasizes that the nation's goals are not confined to scientific progress. Rather, he urges the people to pay special attention to spirituality, morality and self-education.<sup>186</sup> On the basis of religion, ideology and national legacy, the domestic audiences are urged to carry out scientific and economic jihad. The statements on nuclear progress seem to contain rhetoric emphasizing both inherent and utilitarian values. The supreme leader's speeches suggest that the nuclear program serves as a valuable means to achieving national interest, and an end on its own.

Indeed, the supreme leader highlights that a progressing nuclear program enables the achievement of the revolutionary goals of independence and resistance. In turn, such resistance is claimed to enhance the national ability to fight against soft wars imposed by the enemies. Through economic and scientific jihad, the nation is encouraged to pursue nuclear progress with determination and relentlessness. By doing so, the nation may pursue the "lofty goals of Islam" on which the revolutionary ideology is based upon.<sup>187</sup> Reminding the nation of its historical legacy, Khamenei encourages the people to be confident in their abilities. Furthermore, in light of the Islamic values on which the jihadi struggle is based, the supreme leader promises that the nation "will undoubtedly receive divine assistance" in its battle against the enemies.<sup>188</sup>

However, the nation is warned that it must take the necessary measures to receive divine assistance. Khamenei states that the nation must stand united despite internal differences and fighting vigilantly.<sup>189</sup> More specifically, this means that politicians must not be fooled by the enemies' false promises of equality through cooperation and negotiation.<sup>190</sup> Furthermore, the general public is urged to resist materialism and westoxication, and encouraged to see through the enemies' goals to separate the people from the government. Finally, the Ayatollah encourages the academic and nuclear sector to pursue progress in all fields, including the nuclear field. This development, however, must only be on the basis of Islamic values and the revolutionary goals.

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<sup>186</sup> Leader's Speech to a Large Gathering of the People of Yazd - 02/01/2008

<sup>187</sup> Supreme Leader's Speech at Imam Ridha's (a.s.) Shrine – 20/03/2012

<sup>188</sup> Supreme Leader's Speech to Members of the Assembly of Experts 24/09/2009

<sup>189</sup> Ibid

<sup>190</sup> Supreme Leader's Speech to Government Officials – 18/08/2010

In sum, the statements of the supreme leader suggest that the nuclear program serves as both a mean and an end to achieving national security and increasing national power. Based on the discussions above, the nuclear program seems to be described as something tangible and noticeable – a concrete way of manifesting religious and ideological values. Based on the statements of the Ayatollah Khamenei, the nuclear program actualizes three facets of national interest. It actualizes intangible concepts of value, such as respect and honor; it manifests inherent value, by using knowledge to spreading Islamic values; and it serves as a means to ensure the security and prosperity of the nation in the future.



# **Chapter 5**

## **Conclusion**

## 5. Conclusion

In this thesis, I have investigated the research question: *How has the supreme leader of Iran justified the nuclear program domestically between 2003 and 2013?* Using a modified version of Kartchner's (2009) theoretical framework of *strategic culture*, I conducted a content and discourse analysis of Iran's supreme leader's rhetoric communicated to domestic audiences in the period 2003-2013. This investigation has led me to draw the following conclusions.

### *How is the nuclear program justified by the Supreme Leader to the Iranian society?*

The quantitative findings based on the manifest content of the supreme leader's speeches suggest that words related to national identity are the most prominent in his nuclear rhetoric, compared to words related to national self-actualization, security threats and denial of nuclear technology and nuclear rights. References to national ideology, religion and self-esteem are first and foremost emphasized by the supreme leader. Words focusing on national self-actualization and external threats are used to a lesser extent. Although nuclear progress and foreign enemies are referred to, they are not as frequently emphasized as national ideology and religion are. Finally, there seems to be limited use of denial-related words. Khamenei's rhetoric is not particularly focused on the denial of nuclear technology, international discrimination on nuclear development, or the inhibiting effect of sanctions. Rather, the main emphasis of his nuclear rhetoric rests upon the argument that Islam, the revolutionary ideology and the Iranian legacy are the reasons Iran should pursue nuclear progress.

The discourse analysis contextualizes these findings by showing that the supreme leader mainly justifies the nuclear program to the Iranian society by referring to Iran's past and contemporary experiences, characterized by foreign domination and threats to the Islamic revolutionary ideology of Iran. The pre-revolutionary Iran is described by Khamenei as a time of suffering under the domination of foreign powers, which consequently led to national humiliation and inferiority. The Islamic revolution is presented by Khamenei as the source of revival of national dignity and self-confidence in national capabilities. Domestic audiences are warned by the supreme leader that the Islamic Republic is still threatened by foreign enemies – namely the United States and the West – whom seek to dominate Iran. The Ayatollah claims that foreign

enemies wage economic and psychological warfare against the Islamic Republic in order to undermine the Islamic government, and in order to exploit Iran's oil and geopolitical position.

### ***What is the claimed purpose of the nuclear program?***

Against the historical and contemporary backdrop, the Ayatollah rationalizes nuclear progress as a way of resisting foreign threats by engaging in economic and scientific jihad<sup>191</sup>. Khamenei claims that nuclear progress based on indigenous resources and capabilities is a means to fighting external domination, because it signals national independence and self-sufficiency. According to the supreme leader, nuclear advancement is deemed as a permissible means to increase national and international power, because it leads to economic and ideological independence. The supreme leader legitimizes nuclear progress as a desirable means to fulfilling Islamic duties. He argues that expanding knowledge and achieving scientific progress within the framework of Islam is virtuous, because it leads to the protection of Islamic values.

Khamenei further claims that nuclear development for peaceful purposes serves the religious and ideological ends of resistance, independence and justice – values all faithful Muslims should strive towards. Ayatollah Khamenei points out that the Islamic Republic – due to the nation's Islamic value preferences – is opposed nuclear weapons, because such weapons are indiscriminate and evil, and thus an illegitimate source of power. The supreme leader does, however, iterate that the Iran's nuclear policies should be shaped entirely on the basis of the values of the Islamic Republic. Khamenei stresses that Iranian nuclear decision-making should not be affected by foreign influence or coercion, and nuclear capabilities should not in Iran should not depend on foreign assistance.

### ***Who are the audiences of Supreme Leader's statements?***

The quantitative findings show that the domestic justifications of Ayatollah Khamenei are first and foremost directed toward the Iranian parliament, politicians, government officials and the

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<sup>191</sup> Jihad is an Islamic concept, which means *struggle/resistance*. Jihad refers to Muslim's inner spiritual struggle (a Muslims duty to fulfill religious duties), and the outer, physical struggle (the resistance against the enemies of Islam).

general public. To these audiences, Khamenei stresses that nuclear progress is first and foremost about the internal and external struggle of Islam – namely Jihad. He therefore urges the political audiences and the general public to pursue nuclear development, and disregard foreign interference on the nuclear issue. The Ayatollah’s reasoning rests on the argument that Iran should focus on national objectives motivated by the revolutionary ideology and religion, rather than the appeasement of foreign powers.

The supreme leader’s rhetoric addressing the political audiences consists of numerous warning against deviation from the national ideology and religion. Political actors, such as the parliament, the nuclear negotiators, and other government officials are warned against the propaganda of Western foreign powers. Khamenei stresses the duties and obligations politicians and government officials have to the Islamic Republic, and to the Iranian people. Khamenei stresses that deviations from a progressing nuclear policy will be costly for future generations of Iran, and that nuclear containment will decrease the security and power of Iran. Khamenei’s statements to the general public are mostly expressed in an encouraging and motivating way. The people of Iran are urged by the supreme leader to support the nuclear program, because it represents the ideological values of resistance, independence and self-confidence. The general public are urged by the Ayatollah to be vigilant against foreign manipulation, and encouraged to contribute to the progress of country, including nuclear progress.

In the justifications to the academics and scientists, the supreme leader stresses the importance of knowledge, scientific progress and development in all aspects of society, including the nuclear sector. This audience group is encouraged to support the Iranian nuclear program on the basis of the historical legacy of the country. Khamenei claims that Iran, historically, Iran has been a front-runner in the region and internationally, in terms of philosophy, literature and science. In light of this legacy, the supreme leader urges the general public, academics and scientists to continue their path toward progress. Rhetoric addressing the military sector has been limited, and has consisted of a combination of the arguments outlined in the sections above. One particular argument that stands out is the ideological references that are made to this audience group. The military audiences are encouraged to continue on the path of the revolutionary ideology, and not be intimidated by foreign threats.

# **Chapter 6**

## **Implications**

## 6. Implications

As discussed in the theory chapter, the scholarship which investigates the Iranian nuclear program predominantly focuses on the question of nuclear weapons ambitions and intent. Based on the discussion in the literature review, I conclude that from a theoretical and methodological point of view, intentions are difficult – if not impossible – to study. Rather, I propose that the rhetoric of potential-proliferators could be explored. My argument is that, rhetoric matters because all governments, including non-democratic ones, face audience costs if their statements, and thus policies, are not recognized as legitimate among domestic audiences. The findings of this case study illuminate aspects of the Iranian nuclear program that have not been sufficiently highlighted in past scholarship. In the following section I will outline the main implications this study has for theory, analysis and policy.

### 6.1 Security and soft-power

If one places the research findings in the theoretical framework of realist, with the core argument that ‘states seek survival in the international anarchy through self-help’, the following implications can be suggested. The supreme leader’s emphasis on independence, self-sufficiency and resistance against foreign security threats does echo the “realist” mind-set to some extent. However, Ayatollah Khamenei does not justify the development or use of nuclear weapons as the solution to external security threats. Khamenei’s rhetoric rather depicts a contemporary context in which soft-power means such as economic and agenda-setting power seem to be the cure for fighting foreign domination. The domestic justifications of the Ayatollah suggest that nuclear progress is a means to economic power because it reduces dependence on foreign energy resources, alleviates national energy consumption and increases the value of national non-renewable resources such as oil and gas. According to Khamenei, the Iranian resistance against nuclear containment and rollback signals power and independence in the region and internationally. One interpretation of the Ayatollah’s justifications may be that, the continued resistance of foreign demands and the persistent pursuit of nuclear progress is a signal that Iran is setting the agenda, not only for itself, but also as an example for other states. These findings

suggest that the neo-realist approach to soft-power should be further incorporated in the study of nuclear proliferation. This may also suggest that concepts traditionally associated with the liberal institutionalism, namely economic and agenda-setting power should not be overlooked when analyzing non-democratic states. One possible way of developing such theories could be to explore the meaning of soft-power in non-democratic states.

## **6.2 The importance of domestic politics**

The investigation of the domestic justification of Ayatollah Khamenei show that national identity, including ideology, religion and historical legacy are the factors that are predominantly focused on. This may suggest that, for Iran, external determinants are not the main driver behind the rationalization of the Iranian nuclear program. For theory development, this finding implies that internal determinants, such as domestic politics, norms and values, are important in order to understand the greater picture of states' nuclear rationale. These kinds of analyses should, however, be accompanied by rigorous and systematic content analysis of key decision makers' statements on the state's nuclear issue. Scholars should provide a detailed operationalization of the variables they study, outline their concepts thoroughly, and be careful about the conclusions they draw.

## **6.3 Clarifying the symbolism-argument**

The investigation of the relationship between the revolutionary ideology and Islam and the Iranian nuclear program, which has been undertaken in this thesis, may contribute to the understanding of how so-called 'intrinsic' and 'intangible' factors motivate nuclear pursuit. Scholars usually use these terms to describe concepts such as pride and prestige, and how such factors may inspire nations to seek nuclear weapons. The research findings of this study suggest that concepts such as pride, honor and dignity are not at all related to the acquisition of nuclear weapons, in the rhetoric of the supreme leader. Rather, so-called intangible factors are explicitly outlined as ideological and religious values in the Iranian society. Khamenei explicitly states that nuclear advancements are a manifestation of ideological values, because nuclear capabilities, 1)

enable independence from foreign powers, 2) project national resistance against foreign domination, 3) project national power through indigenous nuclear accomplishments. These findings suggest that state leader's do not necessarily see nuclear symbolism or pride associated with nuclear technology as an intrinsic end. Rather, as exemplified by Khamenei justifications, the manifestation of values within society is important, because of its utilitarian function to increase security and power. The findings also suggest that scholars should put more effort into the conceptualization and definition of terms. For example, concepts such as *nuclear symbolism*, *pride* and *prestige* should be rethought or removed from the academic debate, if such concepts do not reflect the empirical findings or if they do not add any substantial meaning to understanding nuclear cases.

## **6.4 Debunking the denial-argument?**

The systematic analysis of the supreme leader's speeches suggest that nuclear denial is emphasized to a limited extent – as opposed to what is typically presented by those studying domestic drivers for nuclear pursuit. This case study shows that Ayatollah Khamenei frames the concept of denial in a way that is different by the typical academic proposition of 'denial of technology' and 'denial of rights'. From Khamenei's perspective, foreign powers are not in a position to deny Iran of nuclear technology. Although this type of rhetoric does not necessarily match reality, it should be taken into account for better understanding curious cases such as Iran.

This finding suggests that conclusions about domestic drivers should not be drawn, without a rigorous investigation of primary sources, because this may lead to erroneous findings. For example, scholars such as Solingen and Hymans have contributed immensely to the theoretical and empirical understanding of Iran's nuclear program. However, as their case studies do not include the systematic exploration of primary sources, their conclusions draw on the conventional interpretation of the Iranian nuclear program rather than adding nuance to the debate.

## 6.5 Iranian nuclear hedging?

Finally, for those concerned with Iran's nuclear program as a case of nuclear hedging, the findings of this thesis may suggest the following. First, if proliferation *intent* requires an explicit acknowledgment that nuclear weapons are allowed and permissible, the thesis findings show that that is not the case when investigating the Iranian supreme leader's rhetoric. However, due to what is described by Cohen and Frankel as the nature of second-generation proliferators, I would not think that many scholars expect an explicit acknowledgement of proliferation intent among state leaders. However, if proliferation *intent* only requires that a state leader announces the interest in dual-use technology, then the findings of this thesis may imply that this might be the case for Iran. For scholars seeking to investigate states' nuclear hedging strategies, perhaps it is wise to clarify and elaborate the concept of nuclear hedging. Researchers may for example discuss and outline the difference between peaceful and non-peaceful dual-use nuclear technology.

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The statements of Ayatollah Khamenei suggest that mixed signals are being sent from the Iranian supreme leader. On one hand, Khamenei claims that Iran will not pursue nuclear weapons on the grounds of religion. On the other hand, the supreme leader claims that Iran will deviate from international agreements if such agreements are discriminatory and based on double standards. One way of interpreting this finding is that while Khamenei is signaling that Iran has no proliferation intentions, it is not seeking foreign approval or acknowledgment of this intention. By maintaining such rhetoric, the absence of proliferation intent is expressed – but as a matter of national discretion.

For scholars seeking to investigate states' nuclear hedging strategies, perhaps it is wise to clarify and elaborate the concept of nuclear hedging. Researchers may for example discuss and outline the difference between peaceful and non-peaceful dual-use nuclear technology.

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## **7.1. List of speeches: Official English translations**

Khamenei, Ali (2013) Supreme Leader meets with students on “National day of fighting against global arrogance”. (03/11/2013)

Khamenei, Ali (2013) Supreme Leader's Speech in Meeting with Basij Commanders (20/11/2013)

Khamenei, Ali (2013) Supreme Leader's Speech in Meeting with Members of Supreme Council of Cultural Revolution (15/12/2013)

Khamenei, Ali (2013) Supreme Leader’s Speech in Meeting with Participants of 7th Elite Youth Conference (09/10/2013)

Khamenei, Ali (2013) Supreme Leader’s Speech in Meeting with Commanders of Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (17/09/2013)

Khamenei, Ali (2013) Supreme Leader’s Speech to Judiciary Officials (26/06/2013)

Khamenei, Ali (2013) Supreme Leader’s Speech at Imam Ridha’s (a.s.) Shrine (21/03/2013)

Khamenei, Ali (2013) Supreme Leader's Speech to Olympic and Paralympic Medalists (11/03/2013)

Khamenei, Ali (2013) Supreme Leader's Speech to People of East Azerbaijan (22/02/2013)

Khamenei, Ali (2012) Supreme Leader’s Speech to Students (31/10/2012)

Khamenei, Ali (2012) Speech to outstanding personalities in the region of north Khorasan (16/10/2012)

Khamenei, Ali (2012) People of bojnourd (10/10/2012)

Khamenei, Ali (2012) Supreme leader’s Speech to Members of Armed Forces and Their Families in Noshahr (18/09/2012)

Khamenei, Ali (2012) Supreme Leader’s Speech to Government Officials (24/07/2012)

Khamenei, Ali (2012) Supreme Leader’s Speech to Judiciary Officials (27/06/2012)

Khamenei, Ali (2012) Supreme Leader's Speech to MPs of 9th Majlis (13/06/2012)

Khamenei, Ali (2012) Supreme Leader's Speech at Imam Khomeini's (r.a.) Shrine (03/06/2012)

Khamenei, Ali (2012) Supreme Leader's Speech at Imam Ridha's (a.s.) Shrine (20/03/2012)

Khamenei, Ali (2012) Supreme Leader's Speech to Nuclear Scientists (22/02/2012)

Khamenei, Ali (2012) Supreme Leader's Friday Prayer Address (03/02/2012)

Khamenei, Ali (2011) Supreme Leader's Speech to Outstanding Personalities of Kermanshah (18/10/2011)

Khamenei, Ali (2011) Supreme Leader's Speech to Students of Kermanshah Province (16/10/2011)

Khamenei, Ali (2011) Supreme Leader's Speech to People of Kermanshah (12/10/2011)

Khamenei, Ali (2011) Supreme Leader's Speech to University Professors (25/08/2011)

Khamenei, Ali (2011) Supreme Leader's Address to People Active in Economic Sector (18/08/2011)

Khamenei, Ali (2011) Supreme Leader's Speech to Government Officials (07/08/2011)

Khamenei, Ali (2011) Supreme Leader's Speech to Prominent Iranian Women (22/05/2011)

Khamenei, Ali (2011) Supreme Leader's Public Address in Mashhad (21/03/2011)

Khamenei, Ali (2011) Supreme Leader's Address to Participants of International Islamic Unity Conference (20/02/2011)

Khamenei, Ali (2011) Friday prayer address (05/02/2011)

Khamenei, Ali (2011) Speech to people of Qom (09/01/2011)

Khamenei, Ali (2010) Speech to Students and Youth of Qom (26/10/2010)

Khamenei, Ali (2010) Supreme Leader's Address to Clergy in Qom (21/10/2010)

Khamenei, Ali (2010) Supreme Leader's Speech to Families of Martyrs and War Veterans from Qom (20/10/2010)

Khamenei, Ali (2010) Supreme Leader's Speech to Young Elites (06/10/2010)

Khamenei, Ali (2010) Supreme Leader's Speech to Members of Construction Basij (22/09/2010)

Khamenei, Ali (2010) Supreme Leader's Speech to Cabinet Members (30/08/2010)

Khamenei, Ali (2010) Supreme Leader's Speech to Government Officials (18/08/2010)

Khamenei, Ali (2010) Speech to Basiji professors (23/06/2010)

Khamenei, Ali (2010) Supreme Leader's Address to MPs (08/06/2010)

Khamenei, Ali (2010) Friday prayer address (04/06/2010)

Khamenei, Ali (2010) Speech to exemplary laborers (28/04/2010)

Khamenei, Ali (2010) Supreme Leader's Speech to Exemplary Nurses (21/04/2010)

Khamenei, Ali (2010) Supreme Leader's Address to High-Ranking Military and Police Officials (11/04/2010)

Khamenei, Ali (2010) Address to air force personnel (08/02/2010)

Khamenei, Ali (2009) Supreme Leader's Public Address on Eid al-Ghadir (06/12/2009)

Khamenei, Ali (2009) Supreme Leader's Address to Students on the Occasion of 13th of Aban (03/11/2009)

Khamenei, Ali (2009) Supreme Leader's Speech to Elites (28/10/2009)

Khamenei, Ali (2009) Supreme Leader's Speech to Members of the Assembly of Experts (24/09/2009)

Khamenei, Ali (2009) Friday prayer address (29/07/2009)

Khamenei, Ali (2009) Supreme Leader's Address on the Occasion of Imam Khomeini's Demise Anniversary (04/06/2009)

Khamenei, Ali (2009) Supreme Leader's Speech to Students and Academics of Kurdistan (17/05/2009)

Khamenei, Ali (2009) Speech to cadets (15/04/2009)

Khamenei, Ali (2009) Supreme Leader's Speech in Mashhad (21/03/2009)

Khamenei, Ali (2009) Supreme Leader's Speech to Air Force Personnel (07/02/2009)

Khamenei, Ali (2009) Supreme Leader's Speech on Eid ul-Ghadir (17/12/2008)

Khamenei, Ali (2008) Supreme Leader's Speech to Participants of the 17th National Prayer Meeting (19/11/2008)

Khamenei, Ali (2008) Friday prayer address (19/09/2008)

Khamenei, Ali (2008) Supreme Leader's Speech to Government Officials (09/09/2008)

Khamenei, Ali (2008) Speech to elites (26/08/2008)

Khamenei, Ali (2008) Supreme Leader's Speech to Officials of the Executive Branch (23/08/2008)

Khamenei, Ali (2008) Supreme Leader's Speech on the Occasion of Mab'ath (30/07/2008)

Khamenei, Ali (2008) Public Address on the Occasion of Imam Ali's (a.s.) Birth Anniversary (17/07/2008)

Khamenei, Ali (2008) Supreme Leader's Address to Families of Martyrs in Shiraz (04/06/2008)

Khamenei, Ali (2008) Supreme Leader's Speech on the Occasion of the 19th Demise Anniversary of Imam Khomeini (03/06/2008)

Khamenei, Ali (2008) Supreme Leader's Speech to Basij Members (03/05/2008)

Khamenei, Ali (2008) Supreme Leader's Address to Teachers in Shiraz (01/05/2008)

Khamenei, Ali (2008) Supreme Leader's Speech on His Arrival in Shiraz ) 30/04/2008)

Khamenei, Ali (2008) Supreme Leader's Address to the People of East Azerbaijan (09/03/2008)

Khamenei, Ali (2008) Leader meets people from various ethnic backgrounds (12/03/2008)

Khamenei, Ali (2008) Supreme Leader's Speech to Thousands of People from East Azerbaijan (17/02/2008)

Khamenei, Ali (2008) Supreme Leader's Speech in Abarkooh (05/01/2008)

Khamenei, Ali (2008) Leader's Speech to a Group of University Students from Yazd Province (03/01/2008)

Khamenei, Ali (2008) Leader's Speech to a Large Gathering of the People of Yazd (02/01/2008)

Khamenei, Ali (2007) Supreme Leader's Speech to Seminarians (29/11/2007)

Khamenei, Ali (2007) Supreme Leader's Speech to Ashura and az-Zahra Brigades of Basij Forces (26/11/2007)

Khamenei, Ali (2007) Supreme Leader's Speech to Government Officials (22/09/2007)

Khamenei, Ali (2007) Supreme Leader's Friday Prayer Address (14/09/2007)

Khamenei, Ali (2007) Supreme Leader's Address to Young Elites (03/09/2007)

Khamenei, Ali (2007) Supreme Leader's Speech to Panegyrists on Fatima Zahra's (s.a.) Birthday (05/07/2007)

Khamenei, Ali (2007) Supreme Leader's Speech at Imam Reza's (a.s.) Shrine (21/03/2007)

Khamenei, Ali (2006) Supreme Leader's Speech to People of Garmsar (12/11/2006)

Khamenei, Ali (2006) Supreme Leader's Speech to Academics of Semnan (09/11/2006)

Khamenei, Ali (2006) Supreme Leader's Speech to Government Officials (19/06/2006)

Khamenei, Ali (2006) Supreme Leader's Speech to Laborers (26/04/2006)

Khamenei, Ali (2006) Supreme Leader's Speech to Basijis (26/03/2006)

Khamenei, Ali (2006) Supreme Leader's Speech to Academics and Students of Imam Sadiq (a.s.) University (19/01/2006)

## **7.2 List of speeches: Original language (Farsi)**

Khamenei, Ali (2013) Bayanat dar didare daneshamoozan o daneshjooyan [Supreme Leader's Speech to Students] (03/11/2013)

Khamenei, Ali (2013) Bayanat dar didare masoolan va karkonane ghoveye ghazaa-eeyeh [Supreme Leader's Remarks to the Officials and Employees of the Judiciary] (26/06/2013)

Khamenei, Ali (2013) Didare a'zaaye majlis khobregan ba rahbare enghelab [Supreme Leader's Meeting with Members of the Assembly of Experts] (07/03/2013)

Khamenei, Ali (2013) Bayanat dar didare mardome Azarbaijan [Supreme Leader's Address to the People of Azerbaijan] (16/02/2013)

Khamenei, Ali (2012) Bayanat dar didare daneshamoozan va daneshjooyan [Speech to Students] (30/11/2012)

Khamenei, Ali (2012) Bayanat dar didare kargozarane nezam [Supreme Leader's Speech to Government Officials] (20/08/2012)

Khamenei, Ali (2012) Bayanat dar didare ra'is va masoolane ghazaa-eeyeh [Supreme Leader's Speech to the Head and Officials of the Judiciary] (29/06/2012)

Khamenei, Ali (2012) Bayanat dar didare daneshmandane haste'ii [Supreme Leader's Meeting with Nuclear Scientists] (19/03/2012)

Khamenei, Ali (2012) Didare a'zaaye ettehadiye anjomane eslami daneshjooyan Oroopa ba rahbare enghelab [Supreme Leader's Address to the Members of the Union of Islamic Students Association in Europe] (01/01/2012)

Khamenei, Ali (2011) Bayanat dar didare sofar'ha va roas'hayeh namayandegihaye siasie iran dar kharej az keshvar [Supreme Leader's Meeting with Ambassadors and High Representatives of Foreign Affairs] (28/12/2011)

Khamenei, Ali (2011) Bayanat dar didare ja'm-i az asaatide daneshgah-ha [Supreme Leader's Speech to a Group of University Professors] (12/10/2011)

Khamenei, Ali (2011) Bayanat dar didare fa'aalane bakhshhaye eghtesade keshvar [Supreme Leader's Address to People Active in Economic Sector] (17/08/2011)

Khamenei, Ali (2011) Bayanat dar didare masoolane nezame jomhooriye eslamiye Iran [Supreme Leader's Speech to Government Officials] (07/08/2011)

Khamenei, Ali (2011) Bayanat dar didare farmandehane arshed nezami jomhooriye eslamiye Iran ba farmande kol ghova [Supreme Leader's Meeting with High-ranking Military and Army Commanders] (03/04/2011)

Khamenei, Ali (2011) Bayanat dar haram mottahare razavi dar aghaze sale 1390 [Supreme Leader's Speech at Imam Reza's (a.s.) Shrine on the Commencement of the Year 1390] (21/03/2011)

Khamenei, Ali (2010) Payame vali-amr mosalmin be hojjaaj beit-ol-lahel haraam [Supreme Leader's Speech to Mekka Pilgrims] (15/11/2010)

Khamenei, Ali (2010) Bayanat dar didare jami'i az karafarinan sarasare keshvar [Supreme Leader's Meeting with a Group of Entrepreneurs from across the Country] (07/09/2010)

Khamenei, Ali (2010) Bayanat dar didare azaye basiji heyate elmi daneshgahha [Supreme Leader's Speech to Basij Members of the University Faculty] (11/07/2010)

Khamenei, Ali (2010) Didare vazir va masoolane vezarate khareji va sofara o roas-aye namayandegihaye Iran dar kharej az kleshvar [Supreme Leader's Meeting with the Foreign Minister, Foreign Ministry Officials, Ambassadors, High Representatives of Foreign Affairs] (28/02/2010)

Khamenei, Ali (2010) Bayanat dar didare dast-andarkarane sakhte navshekane jamaaran [Supreme Leader's Meeting with People Involved in Work on the Jamaran-Destroyer Naval Fleet] (19/02/2010)

Khamenei, Ali (2010) Bayanat dar didare jam'i az mardome azarbaijan [Supreme Leader's Address to people of Azerbaijan] (17/02/2010)

Khamenei, Ali (2009) Bayanat dar didare mardom be monasebate eid-e Ghadir [Supreme Leader's Meeting with People in the Occasion of Eid-e-Ghadir] (06/12/2009)

Khamenei, Ali (2009) Payam be kongereye azime hajj' [Supreme Leader's Speech to the Hajj Congress] (26/11/2009)

Khamenei, Ali (2009) Khotbehaye namaze jom'eye Tehran [Supreme Leader's Friday Prayer Address] (19/06/2009)

Khamenei, Ali (2009) Bayanat dar didare ostadan va daneshjooyane kordestan [Supreme Leader's Speech to University Professors and Students in Kurdistan] (17/06/2009)

Khamenei, Ali (2009) Payame nowroozi-e rahbare enghelab be monasebate aghaze sale 1388 [Supreme Leader's Norwooz Speech on the Commencement of the year 1388] (21/03/2009)

Khamenei, Ali (2008) Didare asaatid va daneshjooyan dar daneshgahe elm o san'at [Supreme Leader's Meeting with University Professors and Students of the University of Science and Industry] (14/12/2008)

Khamenei, Ali (2008) Bayanat dar didare ra'ise jomhooriye va a'zaaye heyyat'e dowlat [Supreme Leader's Speech to Government Officials] (10/09/2008)

Khamenei, Ali (2008) Bayanat dar didare basijiane ostane fars [Supreme Leader's Speech to Basiji Members in the Fars Province] (03/05/2008)

Khamenei, Ali (2008) Bayanat dar didare janbazan va isargaran va khanevadehaye shahidaye ostane fars [Supreme Leader's Speech to Families of Martyrs and War Veterans from the Fars Province] (02/05/2008)

Khamenei, Ali (2008) Bayanat dar didare moalleman ostane fars [Supreme Leader's Meeting with Teachers from the Fars Province] (01/05/2008)

Khamenei, Ali (2008) Didare azaye majlese khobregan ba rahbare enghelab [Supreme Leader's Meeting with Members of the Assembly of Experts] (26/02/2008)

Khamenei, Ali (2008) Bayanat dar didare mardome Tabriz [Supreme Leader's speech to the People of Tabriz] (17/02/2008)

Khamenei, Ali (2008) Bayanat dar didare mardome yazd [Supreme Leader's Speech to the people of Yazd] (02/01/2008)

Khamenei, Ali (2007) Bayanat dar didare gordanhaye nemoone Ashura va al-Zahray-ie basij [Supreme Leader's Speech to the Basiji Al-Zahra Battalions (women) and Ashura Battalions (male)] (26/11/2007)

Khamenei, Ali (2007) Bayanat dar didare daneshamoozan va daneshjooyane basiji [Supreme Leader's Meeting with Basiji Students] (31/10/2007)

Khamenei, Ali (2007) Bayanat dar didare kargozarane nezam dar rooze eide saeede fetr [Supreme Leader's Speech to Government Officials on the Occasion of Eid-al-Fitr] (13/10/2007)

Khamenei, Ali (2007) Bayanat dar didare a'zaaye yehhate dowlat va modirane ejrayie keshvar [Supreme Leader's Meeting with Government Officials and the Executive branch] (30/06/2007)

Khamenei, Ali (2007) Bayanat dar maraseme hijdahomin salgarde ertehal hazrat emam Khomeini [Supreme Leader's Address on the Occasion of the 18<sup>th</sup> Anniversary of Imam Khomeini's Demise] (04/06/2007)

Khamenei, Ali (2007) Bayanat dar didare namayandegane haftomin dowre majlise shoraye eslami [Supreme Leader's Meeting with the Representatives of the 7<sup>th</sup> Parliament] (29/05/2007)

Khamenei, Ali (2007) Bayanat dar didare daneshjooyane daneshgah ferdowsiye Mashhad [Supreme Leader's Speech to Students at Mashhad Ferdowsi University] (15/05/2007)

Khamenei, Ali (2007) Bayanat dar didare asaatide daneshgahhaye ostante Khorasan dar daneshgahe ferdowsi [Supreme Leader's Speech to University Professors at Ferdowsi University in the Province of Khorasan] (15/05/2007)

Khamenei, Ali (2007) Bayanat dar didare masoolane eghtesadi va dastandarkaran ejraye asl 44 ghaanoon assassin [Supreme Leader's Speech to Economic Officials and Executives of the Constitution's article 44 on Economic Privatization] (19/02/2007)

Khamenei, Ali (2007) Bayanat dar didare mardome ghom dar salrooze eid'e saeede ghadir khumm [Supreme Leader's Speech to the People of Qom on the Anniversary of Eid-e-Ghadir] (17/02/2007)

Khamenei, Ali (2006) Payam'e rahbare moazzame enghelab eslami be monasebate kongereye azime hajj [Supreme Leader's Speech to the Hajj Congress] (29/12/2006)

Khamenei, Ali (2006) Bayanat dar didare aghshare mokhtalef mardom dar ostane entekhabat majlese khobregan [Supreme Leader's Speech to Various Groups of People in the Province of the Assembly of Experts Election] (13/12/2006)

Khamenei, Ali (2006) Bayanat dar didare mardome ostane semnan [Supreme Leader's Speech to People in the Province of Semnan] (08/11/2006)

Khamenei, Ali (2006) Bayanat dar khotbehaye namaz jom'eye Tehran [Supreme Leader's Friday Prayer Address] (13/10/2006)

Khamenei, Ali (2006) Bayanat dar didare kargozarane ne zam [Supreme Leader's Speech to Government Officials] (10/10/2006)

Khamenei, Ali (2006) Bayanat dar didare asaatiid va azaye hayyat elmiye daneshgahha [Supreme Leader's Speech to Professors and Members of the University Faculty] (05/10/2006)

Khamenei, Ali (2006) Bayanat dar didare sherkatkonandegan dar hamayeshe konferanse vahdat eslami [Supreme Leader's Meeting with Participants of the Islamic Unity Conference] (21/08/2006)

Khamenei, Ali (2006) Bayanat dar didare nokhbegane javan [Speech to Young Elites] (16/08/2006)

Khamenei, Ali (2006) Bayanat dar didare roas'aye daneshgaha va moassessat amoozeshe 'aali [Supreme Leader's Meeting with University Deans and Higher Education Institutions] (14/08/2006)

Khamenei, Ali (2006) Bayanat dar didare masoolane sazmane enerjiye atomi va karshenasan haste'ii [Speech to the Heads of the Nuclear Energy Agency and Nuclear Experts] (15/06/2006)

Khamenei, Ali (2006) Bayanat dar didare jam'I az kargardane sinama va telvezion [Speech to a Group of Cinema and Television Directors] (13/06/2006)

Khamenei, Ali (2006) Bayanat dar maraaseme hivdahomin salgarde ertehale hazrate imam Khomeini [Supreme Leader's Address on the Occasion of 17<sup>th</sup> Anniversary of Imam Khomeini's Demise] (04/06/2006)

Khamenei, Ali (2006) Didare namayandegane majles ba rahbare enghelab [Supreme Leader's meeting with parliamentary representatives] (28/05/2006)

Khamenei, Ali (2006) Bayanat dar didare zae'rin va mojaverine haram mottahare razavi [Supreme Leader's Speech to Pilgrims and Local Audiences at Imam Reza's (a.s.) Shrine] (21/03/2006)

Khamenei, Ali (2006) Didare vazire omore khareje va roas-haye namayandegihaye Iran ba rahbare enghelab [Supreme Leader's Meeting with the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Head Representatives of Iran] (14/03/2006)

Khamenei, Ali (2006) Didare azaye majles khobregan ba rahbare enghelab [Supreme Leader's Meeting with Members of the Assembly of Experts] (09/03/2006)

Khamenei, Ali (2005) Bayanat dar khotbehaye namaze jom'e Tehran [Supreme Leader's Friday Prayer Address] (21/10/2005)

Khamenei, Ali (2005) Bayanat dar khotbehaye namaze jom'e [Supreme Leader's Friday Prayer Address] (19/08/2005)

Khamenei, Ali (2005) Bayanat dar didare mardome kerman [Supreme Leader's Speech to People of Kerman] (01/05/2005)

Khamenei, Ali (2005) Bayanat dar didare za'erin va mojaverine haram mottahare razavi [Supreme Leader's Speech to Pilgrims and Local Audiences at Imam Reza's (a.s.) Shrine] (21/03/2005)

Khamenei, Ali (2005) Bayanat dar didare mardome Pakdasht [Supreme Leader's Speech to People of Pakdasht] (29/01/2005)

Khamenei, Ali (2004) Bayanat da khotbehaye namaze jom'e [Supreme Leader's Friday Prayer Address] (05/11/2004)

Khamenei, Ali (2004) Bayanat dar didare kargozarane ne zam [Supreme Leader's Speech to Government Officials] (27/10/2004)

Khamenei, Ali (2004) Bayanat dar didare jam'i az masoolane vezarate omore khareje [Supreme Leader Speech to members of the Foreign Ministry] (15/08/2004)

Khamenei, Ali (2004) Bayanat dar didare jam'i az javanan ostane Hamedan [Supreme Leader's Speech to Youth in the Province of Hamedan] (07/07/2004)

Khamenei, Ali (2004) Bayanat dar didare jam'i az masoolane jihade daneshgahi [Supreme Leader's Speech to the Academic Center for Education] (21/06/2004)

Khamenei, Ali (2003) Bayanat dar didare kargozarane ne zam [Supreme Leader's Speech to Government Officials] (02/11/2003)

Khamenei, Ali (2003) Didare nokhbegane javan ba rahbare enghelab [Supreme Leader's Meeting with Young Elites] (22/10/2003)

Khamenei, Ali (2003) Bayanat dar didare jam'i az daneshamoozan [Supreme Leader's Speech to Students] (17/09/2003)

Khamenei, Ali (2003) Bayanat dar didare jam'i az daneshamoozan Zanjaan [Supreme Leader's Speech to a Group of Student in Zanjaan] (13/09/2003)

Khamenei, Ali (2003) Didare azaye moassese' Rooyan ba rahbare enghelab [Supreme Leader's Meeting with the Rooyan Institute] (02/09/2003)

Khamenei, Ali (2003) Bayanat dar didare ra'is jomhor va azaye hayate dowlat [Supreme Leader's Meeting with the President and Government Officials] (27/08/2003)

Khamenei, Ali (2003) Didare masoolane vezarate omoore khareje ba rahbare enghelab [Supreme Leader's Meeting with Foreign Ministry Officials] (18/08/2003)

Khamenei, Ali (2003) Didar sofara va roas-haye namayandegihaye Iran dar kharej az keshvar ba rahbare enghelab [Supreme Leader's Meeting with Ambassadors, and Head Representatives of Foreign Affairs] (18/08/2003)

Khamenei, Ali (2003) Bayanat dar didare kargozarane nezam [Supreme Leader's Speech to Government Officials] (06/08/2003)

Khamenei, Ali (2003) Bayanat dar didare zaa'erin va mojaaverine haram mottahare razavi [Supreme Leader's Speech to Pilgrims and Audiences at Imam Reza's (a.s.) Shrine] (21/03/2003)

## 8. Appendix: Dataset (relative numbers)

### Subcategory: Enemies

	AM1	AM2	AM3	IS1	IS2	ZI1	ZI2	ENM	ENM2	ENM3	W1	W2	WESTOX	EU1	EU2	ENG3	ENG4	FOR	COL	IMP	B	IG	IR
2006	11	3	3	1	0	2	0	7	7	0	3	4	0	3	0	2	2	3	4	0	0	1	1
2007	38	21	34	13	0	2	1	17	34	7	4	14	0	8	4	5	4	3	3	0	11	3	49
2008	10	25	2	1	1	8	9	47	69	10	20	23	4	9	8	3	3	3	10	0	27	4	15
2009	36	21	20	2	0	18	7	71	32	18	5	30	1	4	0	1	3	5	1	0	6	2	7
2010	14	9	0	0	0	2	0	18	29	4	4	12	0	2	2	1	3	4	1	0	12	4	4
2011	35	6	11	6	1	5	3	44	16	2	9	36	0	16	0	0	3	5	0	1	2	0	5
2012	84	38	0	5	0	37	10	50	46	12	25	36	2	12	9	9	11	6	6	1	13	1	19
2013	110	103	1	3	0	23	8	47	66	11	9	19	0	10	5	5	14	2	4	2	12	0	9

### Subcategory: Security threats

	SEC	INSEC	SURV	IMP1	IMP2	THR1	THR2	THR3	WAR	WAR2	WAR3	OPP	HOST
2006	3	1	0	7	0	1	6	4	6	1	1	7	2
2007	13	6	1	6	0	8	2	3	27	4	11	4	4
2008	6	1	0	13	1	1	16	15	16	0	6	26	7
2009	13	0	0	12	1	8	8	11	0	0	1	18	8
2010	6	0	0	7	2	8	7	8	0	1	0	12	19
2011	10	0	0	15	3	3	3	18	7	0	1	5	0
2012	11	0	7	28	2	7	4	34	20	0	1	13	15
2013	24	0	2	14	5	8	0	11	0	2	0	37	29

**Subcategory: Domination**

	ARR	DOM	HUM
2006	4	5	1
2007	21	12	8
2008	37	13	2
2009	28	5	4
2010	7	8	8
2011	11	6	0
2012	20	5	15
2013	91	13	11

**Subcategory: Discrimination**

	DISC	HYPO	INJUST
2006	4	0	0
2007	0	0	0
2008	2	7	0
2009	4	0	1
2010	0	3	0
2011	1	7	0
2012	5	5	2
2013	2	6	0

**Subcategory: Sanctions**

	SANC	EMB
2006	7	0
2007	20	0
2008	15	0
2009	9	0
2010	10	0
2011	40	0
2012	61	1
2013	49	0

**Subcategory: Nationalism**

	NAT1	NAT2	IRN	COUN	IDENT
2006	22	18	31	70	6
2007	133	25	142	100	4
2008	293	53	209	166	2
2009	177	42	119	183	5
2010	66	11	40	81	1
2011	69	11	85	170	0
2012	154	64	181	205	8
2013	174	31	277	190	10

**Subcategory: Ideology**

	REV	KHOM	AB/DEY	FREE	POW1	POW2	STR1	STR2	RES1	RES2	RES3	END	FIG1	FIG2	VIG1	VIG2	DET1	DET2
<b>2006</b>	13	1	0	10	4	0	10	8	0	1	0	0	6	8	1	2	4	1
<b>2007</b>	20	0	0	2	20	5	11	10	1	7	1	0	3	2	5	7	2	2
<b>2008</b>	127	6	0	9	72	3	20	10	6	12	2	1	11	10	2	14	9	8
<b>2009</b>	60	13	2	7	39	12	21	6	5	7	3	0	9	7	5	7	9	8
<b>2010</b>	65	3	1	1	35	1	7	6	2	4	0	0	2	4	3	12	5	8
<b>2011</b>	30	0	2	1	24	7	10	21	2	9	0	0	1	2	2	14	3	6
<b>2012</b>	117	17	0	10	55	24	5	44	4	21	1	0	8	4	4	14	16	3
<b>2013</b>	102	1	2	0	53	13	14	23	2	19	1	3	4	11	3	5	14	16

	DEF1	DEF2	DEF3	JUS	IND1	IND2	IND3
<b>2006</b>	0	0	0	12	8	0	0
<b>2007</b>	4	3	2	9	3	1	0
<b>2008</b>	8	4	9	8	12	0	2
<b>2009</b>	2	0	1	21	5	5	1
<b>2010</b>	3	1	3	1	6	5	0
<b>2011</b>	3	1	2	7	1	3	0
<b>2012</b>	6	5	2	18	13	3	1
<b>2013</b>	2	1	6	4	6	8	0

**Subcategory: Religion**

	ISL	REL	FAI	QUR	GOD/ALL	SPIR	HOL	DIV	MOR	IMMOR	ETH	VAL	JIH1	JIH2
<b>2006</b>	43	28	31	6	12	7	5	5	4	0	4	3	2	0
<b>2007</b>	75	11	11	3	30	8	3	3	4	1	0	6	0	0
<b>2008</b>	198	29	28	13	112	11	15	8	6	2	1	31	4	0
<b>2009</b>	208	37	20	19	86	15	15	12	7	0	3	5	2	0
<b>2010</b>	225	62	24	15	74	22	26	19	5	2	7	10	9	0
<b>2011</b>	131	35	17	11	82	15	21	12	4	0	7	1	26	0
<b>2012</b>	229	28	11	39	149	32	53	35	3	0	6	18	18	0
<b>2013</b>	246	22	22	22	97	17	46	9	11	3	0	5	5	1

**Subcategory: Self-esteem**

	DIG	HON	PRID	GRAN	GRE1	GRE2	CONF	COUR	PRES	SYMB	INTEG
<b>2006</b>	6	2	4	0	0	20	9	2	1	0	0
<b>2007</b>	2	5	1	2	0	19	15	2	0	2	0
<b>2008</b>	8	19	7	15	3	84	64	12	0	1	2
<b>2009</b>	26	18	4	4	4	66	8	10	0	0	0
<b>2010</b>	6	17	7	0	8	55	4	5	1	0	0
<b>2011</b>	7	17	6	2	1	34	8	1	5	2	0
<b>2012</b>	20	76	17	0	0	74	9	8	4	2	1
<b>2013</b>	25	14	9	2	6	87	5	8	0	0	1

**Subcategory: Knowledge**

	KNOW1	KNOW2	WIS1	WIS2	SMA1	INT1	INT2	INT3
2006	17	2	0	4	0	0	0	3
2007	18	0	2	0	0	0	2	2
2008	67	2	11	4	1	2	1	7
2009	47	0	2	0	0	3	3	5
2010	61	0	6	5	0	0	0	7
2011	39	2	0	1	0	1	0	12
2012	21	2	3	3	0	1	0	9
2013	12	4	8	9	0	3	7	10

**Subcategory: Progress**

	PROG1	PROG2	EFF1	EFF2	ACH1	ACH2	INN1	INN2	INN3	INN4	ECON1
2006	14	0	0	18	11	5	3	0	4	2	17
2007	35	0	3	17	10	24	6	0	2	0	20
2008	61	0	5	51	36	33	12	0	6	0	21
2009	71	0	1	35	13	29	1	0	0	1	16
2010	42	0	4	40	10	23	2	1	0	0	8
2011	52	0	18	34	15	21	4	0	0	2	2
2012	119	9	8	56	35	40	5	0	0	2	82
2013	47	1	4	36	43	61	9	0	1	0	38

**Subcategory: Scientific development**

	SCI1	SCI2	SCI3	SCI4	DEV	TECH1	TECH2	TECH3	ADV1	ADV2	DEV1	DE2	ENRG	OIL	GAS	NUC	FUEL	URAN	ENRCH
<b>2006</b>	15	8	0	0	3	6	2	0	5	0	2	2	7	19	0	10	1	0	0
<b>2007</b>	34	42	2	3	1	12	2	5	9	0	0	6	33	19	1	36	1	0	0
<b>2008</b>	12	65	0	7	14	23	12	2	15	0	1	7	46	10	0	90	1	9	5
<b>2009</b>	5	27	0	4	0	5	3	0	11	0	1	6	17	17	3	30	0	2	1
<b>2010</b>	15	54	0	0	6	14	8	4	17	0	0	4	7	3	1	37	14	7	4
<b>2011</b>	31	51	0	13	11	27	5	3	32	0	5	4	15	22	10	32	2	0	0
<b>2012</b>	17	59	1	14	6	23	6	3	48	0	12	5	13	51	29	74	4	14	8
<b>2013</b>	17	71	0	5	5	8	14	0	9	1	1	4	8	14	2	71	14	8	18

**Category and subcategory sums:**

	ENM	SEC.TH	THREAT	DOM	DISCR	SANC	DENIAL	NAT	IDEO	REL	SELF.EST	IDENTITY	PROG	KNOW	SCI.DEV	SELF-ACTUALIZATION
<b>2006</b>	9,5	6,5	16	1,6	0,6	1,1	3,3	24,5	14,8	25	7,3	71,6	12,3	4,3	13,3	29,9
<b>2007</b>	39,2	12,7	51,9	5,8	0	2,8	8,6	57,7	17,1	22,1	6,8	103,7	16,7	3,4	29,4	49,5
<b>2008</b>	16,3	5,6	21,9	2,7	0,4	0,7	3,8	38	19,2	24,1	11,3	92,6	11,8	5	16,7	33,5
<b>2009</b>	29	8	37	3,7	0,5	0,9	5,1	52,6	25,5	42,9	14	135	16,7	6	13,2	35,9
<b>2010</b>	8,9	5	13,9	1,6	0,2	0,7	2,5	14,2	12,7	35,7	7,3	69,9	9,2	5,6	13,9	28,7
<b>2011</b>	18,7	5,9	24,6	1,5	0,7	3,6	5,8	30,4	13,7	32,9	7,5	84,5	13,4	5	23,9	42,3
<b>2012</b>	39,2	12,9	52,1	3,6	1	5,6	10,2	55,6	35,9	56,4	19,1	167	32,3	3,5	35,1	70,9
<b>2013</b>	51,4	14,6	66	12,7	0,8	5,4	18,9	75,7	34,7	56,2	17,4	184	26,6	5,8	30	62,4



Norwegian University  
of Life Sciences

Postboks 5003  
NO-1432 Ås, Norway  
+47 67 23 00 00  
[www.nmbu.no](http://www.nmbu.no)