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Declaration

I, Ulaş Korhan, declare that this thesis is a result of my research investigations and findings. Sources of information other than my own have been acknowledged and a reference list has been appended. This work has not been previously submitted to any other university for award of any type of academic degree.

Signature.....

Date.....

ABSTRACT

This qualitative study suggests that the Turkish people established their diasporic group soon after their first arrival to Norway. In the beginning, there was a small number of Turks in Norway, so they could come together under one agenda and act in unison. However, following the increase in their population, their character became as heterogeneous as the population in Turkey. In other words, there became a rich diversity among the members. Despite the heterogeneity in the Turkish community in Norway they have been able to come together during certain circumstances. Therefore, from a constructivist point of view, they have influenced the Norwegian politics through identity making with the help of organizations, creating awareness through demonstrations and exerted influence via the usage the media.

*To my family,
Fazilet, Zeki and Ezgi*

*And to my wife
Johanna*

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List of Abbreviations

| | |
|--------|---|
| FAF | Fremmedarbideren Forening – The Foreign Worker |
| IR | International Relations |
| METU | Middle East Technical University |
| NRK | Norsk rikskringkasting AS - Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation |
| NTGD | Norveç Türk Gençlik Derneđi – Norwegian Turkish Youth Association |
| NORTİB | Norveç Türk İslam Birliđi – Norwegian Turkish Islamic Union |
| SAS | Scandinavian Airlines (System) |
| SFCA | State Film Censorship Authority |
| SSB | Statistisk sentralbyrå – Statistics Norway |
| SV | Sosialistisk Venstreparti - Socialist Left Party |
| TES | Turkish Employment Service |
| TWA | Turkish Worker Association |

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Introduction

November 2nd 1978, Karl Johans gate, the main street in Oslo. At 13:00, Turkish workers started to come together in the east side of the street. The group grew in number with the participation of other migrant groups and Norwegians. They came together to protest against a movie named "The Midnight Express". According to Turks, the movie was highly offensive and it was portraying Turks as brutal, savage barbarians¹. They walked along the Karl Johans Street with banners in their hands.

When the group reached Stortinget, the Norwegian Parliament, they started to shout anti-racist slogans and demanded the Norwegian authorities to ban the movie. They also handed out announcements in three different languages (Norwegian, Turkish and English) to raise the awareness of the society. The protesters drew attention to that Norwegians did not know much about Turks yet, and that the Midnight Express could misinform them. Moreover, they claimed that the Turkish children and the other migrant kids might be exposed to abasement in their friend environment after the movie had been released.

The protests made the State Film Censorship Authority (SFCA) re-examine the movie. After the reconsideration, they decided to cut some parts of the Midnight Express and set the age limit to 18. In an interview published in Aftenposten, Else Germeten – from the SFCA – said that, "It is not very often that we both cut some parts and set the age limit to 18, but it has

¹ St. Petersburg Independent Newspaper. December 21, 1978. William Mullen. 'Midnight express'

been done in this case because it is a very extreme movie that the SFCA have agreed upon that with full attendance.”

- Aftenposten, 3 November 1978

“Fremmedarbeidere i protest-tog mot film”

Foreign Workers in protest against movie

(see Appendix – 5 News about Midnight Express Protest)

“Where are you from?”

This question is familiar and repeatedly posed to most of us in the cosmopolite environment of Europe today. It is somehow an indicator of how extensive the process of globalization has been, in making the world increasingly connected. The outcomes of globalization, such as the transnational exchange of commodities, economy and information almost ignore the traditional borders of the nation-state. New technologies and communications systems such as the Internet has decreased the distances and turned the world into a 'global village' (McLuhan, 1996). Through international organizations, corporations and civil society, even those who do not share same interests come close to each other.

The global exchange has not been limited only to goods and products, but it has also included people. Traveling around the world has become easier and the numbers of travelers worldwide have increased by leaps and bounds.

However, the exchange of people has been quite different than the exchange of goods, because people do not only carry their body and their work force with them. They, additionally, bring their identities, experiences, cultures, habits and needs. So, the classical idea of nation-states and the challenge between countries have thus become more complicated. In fact, uprooting and resettling large numbers of people outside of their homeland do not cut the tie between people and their former countries. Conversely, migrant people have continued to live their culture, they have protected their identities and have had connection with their families and friends in their homelands. This situation created a favorable environment for diaspora establishment.

Actually, neither the migration nor the diaspora establishment are new concepts. The Jewish diaspora, the migrant communities of Greeks and Armenians have also been mentioned with these terms for a long time. Yet, Cohen (1996) underlined the increasing frequency of the 'diaspora' term in the academics. He argued that the term 'diaspora' has not only being applied to Jews, Greeks, Armenians and Africans; it has been being deemed by at least thirty ethnic groups today (*ibid.*).

According to the United Nations 'International Migration Report' (2013: 1), the population of international migrants was numbered 232 million by 2013. This number forms the 3,3

percent of the whole world population. So, although some academics argue that it is not possible to esteem every community outside of their homelands as ‘diaspora’, the growth in the number of migrant groups and diaspora communities is significant.

Herein, the relationship between two things, the globalization as a powerful phenomenon, and diasporas as a products of globalization come into account. Michel Foucault (1991) taught us that power may be productive, but it does not mean that it is in control of everything that it produces. Similarly, the creation of the transnational sphere and diasporas are not completely under the control of states and administrations. They do not stay tranquil outside of their homelands. On the contrary, they are prone to show reactions to relevant developments in their homelands or hostlands and make themselves be heard by the hostland society via migrant communities, associations and politicians. In this purpose, diasporas make use of lobbying activities, mobilized actions such as demonstrations, and any kind of media tools to increase the awareness in the society and to make an influence on political decisions.

Despite its small population of 5 million, Norway is a very cosmopolite country where migrants constitute the 12% percent of the whole country population (Statistics Norway, 2014). Many migrant groups, like Pakistanis, Somalis, Polish, Palestinians, the ones from African countries and so on have their diasporic communities in the country and the Turkish community is one of them.

Among Turkish people, a shared identity and language have emerged spanning state borders. People from all around Turkey have been united under the social construct of Turkishness (or even more inclusively: being from Turkey). Social networks and shared ideas are used first in the establishment of the diaspora and second in the contribution to the development of the Turkish people in Norway and in the Turkey-related issues in the Norwegian society.

This thesis aims at examining how the Turkish people have been organizing their diaspora group in Norway since the early 1960s and what the character of their diaspora is. It also addresses how Turks have made use of their community and what kind of impacts they have made on the Norwegian society and on the administrative authorities since their first arrival.

Objectives, Research Questions and Hypothesis

Objectives

The first objective of this study is to present historical background of the Turkish migration to Norway. The reason of starting with presenting the background is that the conventional view about the establishment of new diasporas has a long academic tradition. This tradition argues that the reasons of migration and the migrants' backgrounds play a significant role in determining their decisions about what kind of diasporic entities they will form (Marienstras 1989; Esman 1994; Tololyan 1996; Cohen 1997; Van Hear 1998). Therefore, I will first explain the story of the Turks' migration to Norway. In this part, I will give references to the early comers' experiences before and after their arrival to Norway.

The second objective of the thesis is to understand the characteristics of the Turkish diaspora. Although many diaspora groups look like a homogenous society from outside, they are actually divided into many different fractions. Turkish diaspora in Norway is one of those heterogeneous societies. Therefore, the second objective of the thesis is to identify some of the different groups and their agenda.

The third and the final objective of this study is to explore the sphere between the Turkish migrants and the Norwegian society. In this part, I will examine how Turks organize their diaspora and what tools they use to express themselves in the political sphere.

Research questions

In accordance with these objectives, this research aims at answering the following research questions to guide through the data collection:

- What is the background of the Turkish diaspora in Norway?
- What is the character of the Turkish diaspora in Norway?

And finally,

- Does the Turkish diaspora have any influence on Norwegian Politics? If yes, how? If no, why not?

Regarding to the last research question, in order to avoid any kind of bias in the findings I chose to ask ‘how’ or ‘why not’ questions as well. In this way, I believe that the research can go deeper and make a consideration regardless of the outcomes.

Of course these main research questions bring along some other minor questions. With this purpose, the research will address the following questions as well:

- If any, who and what organizations stand out in the establishment and management of the Turkish diaspora in Norway?
- Are politics in home and hostlands determinant factors for the diasporas political activities?
- What tools have the Turkish diaspora used for diaspora establishment?
- If the Turkish diaspora has had any influence on Norwegian politics, what tools have they made use of?

Hypothesis

As mentioned above, diasporas are influential actors in the politics. This refers to both traditional diasporas and recent diasporas, for example the Tamil, the Palestinian and the Kurdish diasporas. However, I believe that the strength of a diasporic groups and their influence on politics depend on many factors such as culture, tragic background, population, and common motives.

Turkish people have a long history of migration, yet the Turkish diaspora setting is relatively new. Although Turks are one of the earliest migrant groups to arrive in Norway, their population is not as high as Polish, Somalians, Pakistanis and many other migrant groups living in Norway.

Therefore, my hypothesis is that the Turkish diaspora in Norway perhaps does not make a big impact in the Norwegian politics, however it can be partially influential in some cases.

Conceptual Framework and Definitions

When reading an academic work about a specific topic, it is important to clarify the definitions of concepts that can be interpreted in many ways. In this part three of the major concepts of this will be defined and explained in order to provide the reader a background to understand their meanings.

Turk / Turkish

The first challenging terms that needs to be clarified in this study is “Turk” and “Turkish”, because these words are being used differently in various contexts in different parts of the world by different groups of people. An associate professor in Sydney University, Christine Inglis (*et al.* 2009), puts this confusion as:

“while in English- speaking countries such as Australia and the United States, the term “Turks” is still used (...) as an ethnic group of people, in European studies of migration it is increasingly common to replace this term by periphrasis to designate the groups originating from Turkey.”

This is because the word “Turk” has four different meanings depending on the circumstances. Firstly, according to the article 66 in the Turkish Constitution, a Turk is a citizen of Turkey. In other words, anyone who has a Turkish passport is a Turk. Secondly, “Turk” characterizes an ethnic signification. For instance, particularly Kurds from Turkey, despite their Turkish citizenship, often emphasize their “Kurdicity” and refuse to be identified as Turks. Thirdly, especially in Europe, the word “Turk” has a religious connotation that refers to people belong to Sunni Islam or Alawism - *Alevilik* (Inglis *et al.*, 2009). And finally, according to many Turkish people, the term “Turk” is correlated with the Turkic people that are a collection of ethnic groups numbering over 150 million, living in northern, eastern, central and western Asia, northwest China and parts of Eastern Europe (Moser and Weithmann, 2008: 173). According to them, the Turkic people speak the same kinds of languages, share cultural

values and habits and furthermore, they have a common ancient historical background, which constitutes the term of “Turks”.

This study does not make any ethnical judgment while deciding who is the member of the Turkish diaspora. For instance, during the research, one of the interviewees was a Turkish-Jew who was a regular participant in the Turkish meetings and he was one of the long-lasting members of the group. Moreover, I also observed Kurdish people who took role in the Turkish diasporic activities. Therefore, the concept of “Turk” and “Turkish” in this study should be understood as a person who is (or was) a citizen of Turkey, and does not distinguish themselves from the Turkish community.

Thus, the study does not include everyone who have/had Turkish citizenship, and it does not comprise the so-called Turkic people who used to live in the Turkic lands before they migrated to Norway. The purpose of doing that is to eliminate some other strong diaspora groups originated from Turkey, specifically Kurds and Turkish Armenians. It also excludes the other Turkic groups such as Uighurs of Xinjiang in Norway.

Diaspora

Another challenging term in this study is “diaspora” because there is no consensus among academics on a single definition that explains it the best. Many scholars consider the diaspora term as debatable and there have been several discussions on the meaning of the word “diaspora” (Safran 1991, Cohen 1997, Schulz & Hammer, 2003). Therefore, it is important to clarify different types of diaspora definitions and then explain what “diaspora” means in this study.

Until recently, some dictionary definitions of diaspora did not simply explain the term, but instead illustrated it with reference to the Jewish diaspora experience. (Sheffer, 2003: 9). Robin Cohen, one of the prominent experts on diasporas, also argues that the Jewish experience is at the heart of any definition of the diaspora concept (Cohen, 1997: 21). However, the common features of the modern diaspora understanding went beyond the classical Jewish model (Vertovec, 1997: 3).

According to Safran, the concept of diaspora is applied to expatriate minority communities whose members share several of the following characteristics:

- 1) “they, or their ancestors, have been dispersed from a specific original "center" to two or more "peripheral," or foreign, regions;
- 2) they retain a collective memory, vision, or myth about their original homeland, its physical location, history, and achievements;
- 3) they believe that they are not and perhaps cannot be fully accepted by their host society and therefore feel partly alienated and insulated from it;
- 4) they regard their ancestral homeland as their true, ideal home and as the place to which they or their descendants would (or should) eventually return when conditions are appropriate
- 5) they believe that they should, collectively, be committed to the maintenance or restoration of their original homeland and to its safety and prosperity; and
- 6) they continue to relate, personally or vicariously, to that homeland in one way or another, and their ethno-communal consciousness and solidarity are importantly defined by the existence of such relationship.” (Safran, 1991: 83-84)

“In terms of this definition” Safran continues that “we may legitimately speak of the of the Armenian, Maghrebi, Turkish, Palestinian, Cuban, Greek, and perhaps Chinese diasporas at present and of the Polish diaspora of the past, although none of them fully conforms to the "ideal type" of the Jewish Diaspora.” (Safran, 1991: 84). However, Cohen criticizes this measurement system. He first raises a question about the Kurds since these criteria may be too narrow to fit even seemingly established diasporas such as the Kurdish diaspora. Then he examines the Turkish diaspora by stating that, “The Turks are now more widely dispersed in Europe than just in Germany, although we may need longer to establish whether they will become a diaspora.” (Cohen, 1997:22). In the conclusion of his book, Cohen attempts to explain different diasporic groups with similes of gardening terms, where he places Turkish migrants in the third group as *transplanting community*. In Figure 1, he explains the reason: “there is a high possibility of failure depending on the original condition, the journey, and the new site.” (Cohen 1997: 178).

| Gardening term | Type of diaspora | Examples in this book |
|-----------------------|---------------------------------|--|
| Weeding (1) | Victim/refugee | Jews, Africans, Armenians Others: Irish, Palestinians |
| Sowing (2) | Imperial/colonial | Ancient Greek, British, Russian Others: Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch |
| Transplanting (3) | Labour/service | Indentured Indians, Chinese and Japanese, Sikhs, Turks, Italians |
| Layering (4) | Trade/business/ professional | Venetians, Lebanese, Chinese Others: Today's Indians, Japanese |
| Cross-pollinating (5) | Cultural/hybrid/ postmodern | Caribbean peoples Others: Today's Chinese, Indians |

Notes to the guide: (1) A “weed” is a subjective concept. It is thought either that there are too many of them, or that they are too prominent. They need, some gardeners think, to be uprooted, cast out, destroyed, if possible, by weed killers. The equivalent for diasporas are the practices of expulsion, deportation, genocide and “ethnic cleansing”. (2) Increasing plants in a seminal way, from seed. The seed is sown by scattering – the exact original Greek meaning of the word diaspora. (3) Digging up and replanting. This has a high rate of failure, depending on the original condition, the journey and the new site. (On the ships taking “coolies” to the Caribbean 18 per cent died. Another 25 per cent returned to India at the end of their indenture.) (4) Strictly, “layering” is but one method of propagating vegetatively (rather than seminally, as in (2) above). Other possibilities are “dividing”, “taking cuttings” and “grafting”, all of which have their equivalent sub-categories in the trade/business/professional diasporas. “Layering” is the most common case and comprises taking cuttings without separating them from the parent plant until they are rooted. Establishing trading outposts or branch plants is common among merchants and entrepreneurs. (5) Fruits cannot develop from flowers without adequate pollination. Better crops arise from additional pollinator varieties. Pollen is borne by water and wind. In the case of cultural diasporas it is borne by waves (physical migration) and airwaves (for example, the migration of ideas or music). *Acknowledgement:* My gardening guide was Joy Larkcom et al. (1984).

Table 1: Explanation of different types of diasporic groups with gardening terms. Retrieved from Cohen, Robin, 1997, *Global Diasporas: An Introduction*, 178

Yossi Shain and Aharon Barth, two academics specializing on International Relations (IR) and diaspora politics, define diaspora in a way that includes also stateless diasporas, such as the Kurdish and Tamil diaspora. They say that, “We define diaspora as a people with a common origin who reside, more or less on a permanent basis, outside the borders of their ethnic or religious homeland – whether their homeland is real or symbolic, independent or under foreign control. Diaspora members identify themselves, or are identified by others – inside or outside their homeland – as part of the homeland’s national community, and as such are often called upon to participate, or are entangled, in homeland-related affairs (Neumann, 2011: 570; also see Shain & Barth 2003: 452; Varadarajan 2010; King 1998).

Rogers Brubaker, professor of sociology at University of California, makes an analytical comment to Safran’s list mentioned above. He argues that there is an unnecessary repetition in Safran’s diaspora criteria; “Four out of six criteria specified by Safran (1991), concern the orientation to a homeland”:

- 1) “they retain a collective memory, vision, or myth about their original **homeland** its physical location, history, and achievements;
- 2) they regard their ancestral **homeland** as their true, ideal home and as the place to which they or their descendants would (or should) eventually return when conditions are appropriate
- 3) they believe that they should, collectively, be committed to the maintenance or restoration of their original **homeland** and to its safety and prosperity; and
- 4) they continue to relate, personally or vicariously, to that **homeland** in one way or another, and their ethno-communal consciousness and solidarity are importantly defined by the existence of such relationship.” (Brubaker, 2005 and Safran, 1991: 83-84)

Accordingly, Brubaker (2005: 5) makes a brief of Safran’s list and comes up with three core elements that remain widely understood to be constitutive of diaspora:

- 1) dispersion,
- 2) homeland orientation
- 3) boundary-maintenance

In this study, the “diaspora” should be understood as the definition that Safran has suggested. However, to avoid the repetition in his definition, I will also employ the Brubaker’s category system as well.

So I define diaspora as, ”people with a common origin who reside outside of their homeland - which can be real or symbolic - but still want to practice their cultural habits and are afraid to be assimilated. Diaspora members feel like a part of a distinctive national community, which is visible in the hostland’s society and therefore have the possibility to influence the hostland society and politics, and homeland-related affairs.”

The reason behind this definition is that it captures all the main points that the diaspora scholars explain; people residing outside of their country, their homeland oriented behavior and their distinctive structure in the society. Moreover, this definition points out the diasporic groups’ possible influences in the society and politics. With exercising ‘influence’ I do not mean a group of migrants that all the time try to affect the society and politics with active means. Rather, their mere existence can be enough to fulfill the definition of influence.

Political influence

The third main concept of this thesis is “political influence”. Since the political influence can be defined as a very general concept I prefer to clarify it within the contextual framework of diaspora. To have a better clue about political influence one should review the meaning of the term ‘politics’. The political scientist Harold Lasswell defines politics as the decision about "who gets what, when, and how" (Schmidt *et al.* 2011: 5). Adrian Leftwich (2009), a prominent academic in political science, makes a more detailed explanation of it: “all the process of conflict, cooperation and negotiation in taking decisions about how resources are to be owned, used, produced and distributed.” He also underlines the essential role of ideologies and interests (Leftwich, 2009: 13).

It is generally accepted that diasporas, given their enhanced status in a globalized world seek to translate their position into political power and influence (Gottschlich, 2006: 13). Moreover, the definition of politics offered above explains that politics depend on cooperation

and negotiation and is thus open to influence from outside. So, what does political influence mean? Can it be described as an influence in any of the processes that was explained above? This would again be a too general definition, and too vague to explain the political influence that a diaspora can exert on many different levels.

Because the character of a diaspora is transnational, it means that the diasporic group has ties to more than one country and can assert influence on both the homeland and the hostland politics. In the case of this thesis, first, there is national level that refers to the Norwegian politics where the diaspora can make use of political tools such as demonstrations to raise awareness for the issues relevant to the Turkish diaspora and their homeland. There is also the international level, such as issues regarding the influence of the Turkish diaspora where Norway and Turkey have to cooperate. The definition of political influence thus has to take the transnational, multi-level character of the diaspora into consideration.

When I am talking about the political influence of the Turkish diaspora I want to focus on ‘how’ and ‘what is the conclusion’, which means ‘how does the Turkish diaspora attempt to influence the Norwegian politics?’ and ‘what is the possible result of it?’

In this work, ‘political influence’ can thus be defined as a change in state regulations, partly or completely, carried out intentionally or unintentionally by a diasporic group. In other words, if a person or a group manages to influence any kind of regulations that were determined by the decision-makers in the state, this can be considered as an influence in the politics. Moreover, in my definition of the political influence, I have also included the attempts by a diasporic group to change a rule or practice which create awareness in the society and can later bring about political outcomes as a political influence.

Research Strategies

*... Many arrows, loosed several ways,
Fly to one mark ...*

William Shakespeare, Henry V

Deductive and Inductive Approaches

In the social research it is useful to consider the relationship between theory and research in terms of deductive and inductive strategies. Alan Bryman (2008, 9), writer of the well-known book “Social Research Methods” and Professor of Organizational and Social Research in the School of Management at the University of Leicester, advocates that the deductive approach is the most common view in the social research. Accordingly, the deductive approach is carried out in this way: “Theory and hypothesis deduced from it [social research] come first and drive the process of gathering data.” (*ibid.*9). Hence, the research will be performed out of a hypothesis. This step gives the researcher an idea about what kind of research methods were used in the previous studies and what strategies the researcher can follow for the information gathering. The last step of the deductive approach “involves a movement that is in the opposite direction from deduction – it involves induction, as the researcher infers the implications of his or her findings for the theory that prompted the whole exercise.” (*ibid.*9). In the last step the researcher confirms or rejects the current hypothesis and goes to revision of theory.

The inductive approach is carried out in the opposite direction of the deductive research. Bryman (*ibid.*: 11) says that, “With an inductive stance, theory is the outcome of research.” Consequently, the researcher draws generalizable inferences out of observations. Since the inductive theory is not based on any hypothesis, it gives a bigger opportunity of observation.

However, the inductive approach might also end up with generating enormous amount of data and make the revision of a theory very difficult especially for an unskilled researcher.

Starting this research, I first read many books and articles about diaspora studies, which supplied a base for how to approach my object of study. Yet, the theories I captured from these resources were not my only basis, instead I gave a special importance to my interviews and observations as they helped me to draw my own framework. So, this study is an outcome of both deductive and inductive approaches, as they are inherently interrelated.

Research Design

Qualitative Research Method

This thesis will employ qualitative methods as the main research strategy. There are three main reasons of choosing the qualitative method, which deals with understanding the words and making sense out of them instead of the quantitative one, which deals with measuring with the help of numbers and statistical values. Firstly, reaching the large number of the ‘right’ people who belong to one small group, in this case the Turkish diaspora members in Norway, doing surveys with them and to analyzing the surveys could be very time-consuming. Secondly, since this study enquires ‘how’ or ‘why not’ questions, it would have been very difficult to quantify the variables. Thirdly, interviewing people, explaining the misunderstood questions, analyzing their body language and finally grabbing information out of this combination were offered as a strategy within the qualitative method, while the quantitative method offered other strategies that I did not find as helpful to research this topic.

In the following sections, I will illustrate how I used the qualitative research method in practice.

Criteria in Social Research Design

A research needs to fulfill certain criteria in order to be trustworthy. According to Bryman (2003: 31) there are three prominent criteria for the evaluation of social research: *reliability*, *replication* and *validity* (internal and external). Reliability concerns whether the results of a

study are repeatable under the same conditions. For instance, asking the same question to the same interviewee more than once and getting different answers would show an inconsistency in this kind of measurement, and thus the study could not be considered reliable (*ibid.*). Replicability is an attempt by the researcher to make his or her own research possible for other researchers to replicate. In this criterion, it is very obvious that, if a researcher does not supply the exact procedure under which the study was made, replication for the following research might not be possible (*ibid.*: 32 and 55). Validity is the last criterion, which is concerned with the integrity of the conclusion, and whether it can be applied in a wider context (*ibid.*: 32). There are two different types of validity: internal and external. In internal validity the researcher tries to be sure that x causes y and it is not something else but x that causes y. Certainty in this matter shows the quality of *internal validity* of research. In external validity, it is important to make sure that the results of a study can be generalizable outside of its context (*ibid.*). For example, the results of a research that collected information from 25 people should eventually be applicable on more than 25 people.

Case Study Design

Considering the main theme of the thesis, the research questions and the target group, this thesis follows a case study design. John Gerring starts his book named ‘Case Study Research’ with a suitable metaphor that defines case study design very well. He writes,

“There are two ways of learning how to build a house; to study the construction of many houses – perhaps hundreds of thousands of houses, or to study the construction of a particular house (...) the second one is called ‘case study.’” (2007: 1).

Under the light of this description, there are several reasons of conducting case study in this research. First of all, although ‘diaspora studies’ is not a new field, the Turkish diaspora in Norway was never been examined as it is aimed to be done here. Therefore, it is possible to come across with new variables. The writers of a book about case studies named “Case Studies and Theory Development in The Social Sciences”, Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett (2005: 20) states that, “Case studies have powerful advantages in the heuristic identification of new variables and hypotheses through the study of deviant or outlier cases and in the course of field work—such as archival research and interviews with participants,

area experts, and historians. When a case study researcher asks a participant “were you thinking X when you did Y,” and gets the answer, “No, I was thinking Z,” then if the researcher had not thought of Z as a causally relevant variable, she may have a new variable demanding to be heard.” (Denzin and Lincoln, 2011:310)

Secondly, the planned methods and strategies in this thesis are often suggested within the case study design. In a case study, the researcher examines history, archival documents, interview transcripts, and other sources to find a causal process (George and Bennett, 2005). According to Yin (1994:80), the sources of evidence in a case study are: documents, archival records, interviews, direct observations, participant observations and physical artifacts. This research has employed all of these sources. Moreover, the Turkish radio was listened frequently for more than a year. The usage of these sources will further be explained in Research Methods section.

Thirdly, a case study does not have to rely on only one incident and it actually gives a wider range than many other research methods. In fact, it can include several incidents that could replicate themselves. Each case may provide a single observation or multiple (within-case) observations (Tellis, 1997). Hence, different incidents can reinforce each other and make a consistent storyline for one single case. In this thesis one single case, the Turkish diaspora in Norway is aimed to be explained through the experiences of different individuals. In this way, all the interviewees were asked to tell the story of the Turkish diaspora and its current activities. They all mentioned about it from their individual perspectives and from their different kinds of involvement in the diaspora. However, these different angles ultimately reinforced the one single case, which is the Turkish diaspora’s influence in the Norwegian politics.

Although, some claim that the case study design is prone to versions of ‘selection bias’, George and Bennett (2005: 23) say that, “...selection on the dependent variable should not be rejected out of hand. Selection of cases on the basis of the value of their dependent variables is appropriate for some purposes...” In this thesis, the interviewees were selected on the basis of their influential and initiative-taking roles in the diaspora, a strategy conducted in order to gather information from significant actors.

Research Methods

Information gathering

This thesis collected data through archival research, informal and formal interviewing techniques, and participant and non-participant observations in Oslo – Norway. For more than two years I have been observing Turkish diasporic social and political events in Oslo. During the course of this time, I have had many conversations with diaspora members, who were involved in the diaspora establishment process, participated in political actions or took social and political roles relating to the diaspora. I have continuously read the diaspora media, both written and Internet based, that comments on diasporic social and political engagements. I also frequently listened to the Turkish radio for over a year. Since there is no Turkish TV channel broadcasting in Norway, the TV media was not included in any part of this work.

Theories and data for diasporas were garnered through the books and articles of diaspora scholars as well as being derived from the findings. In the process of checking the literature, I preferred to give priority to Turkish diaspora works and other diaspora researches in Scandinavian countries because it could have been easier to find parallel cases. Among them, Sarah Anderson's (2011) work on Tamil Diaspora in Norway named "From Oslo With Love: Remittances, Resistance and Staying Tamil in Oslo and Batticaloa" gave me a good insight of transnationalism and I used it as an inspirational model for this thesis.

Simultaneously, a Turkish newspaper named *Milliyet's* and the Norwegian newspaper *Aftenposten's* archive provided information about the early Turkish migrants in Norway. The newspaper *Milliyet* was chosen particularly because it is one of the newspapers in Turkey that has the biggest international network. *Aftenposten* is also the largest newspaper in Norway. Fortunately, both of the newspapers, which could supply the most information, provide their archives on Internet, so I could gather a lot of information about the Turkish diaspora in Norway including the names of prominent members in the diaspora. Thanks to transparency policy in Norway and the unknown telephone number service, I met with the first members of the Turkish diaspora and I garnered background data of the Turkish migrants through informal conversations and interviews with community leaders, politicians and activists in Oslo.

Archival Research

Archival research is the process of finding, evaluating, interpreting and analyzing the resources found in archives (Corti, 2004). This research started with the collection of data from the archives of a Turkish newspaper called *Milliyet*. Archival research in the *Milliyet* newspaper showed that the first news about the Turks in Norway was published in 17 April 1970 by Lütfü Güven. In other words, the archival research in *Milliyet* did not only provide information about the situation of Turks in Norway, it also supplied me with the name of a key respondent, whom I met later and did my first interview with.

The other archival resource for this thesis was the biggest newspaper in Norway, *Aftenposten*. Although I had difficulties with evaluating the news in *Aftenposten* because of my relatively weak Norwegian, I took pictures of almost everything that I thought which could be related to with the topic of this research. After that I asked help from a translator for the interpretation of the news. Eventually, *Aftenposten* supplied me some useful stories that is related with the situation of Turks in Norway, difficulties they experienced and also their political engagements in Norway. For instance, the story of the protest about the Midnight Express, which was presented at the beginning of the introduction section, was found in *Aftenposten* archive that dates 3 November 1978. (See Appendices number 5: News about Midnight Express protest)

Thirdly, a big part of the archival research was conducted in the *Landsorganisasjonen i Norge* – The Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions (LO) archive rooms. The reason of preferring the LO archives was that almost all of the Turkish people who migrated to Norway were unskilled workers, so I thought that the Turkish migrants must have some connection with the Norwegian workers' union. For instance, the LO could have a role in making the Turkish migrants being aware of the workers rights and responsibilities in Norway. In fact, these kinds of brochures and booklets were the first resources I came across in the LO archive. Beside of that, I found newspapers from the beginning of 1980s, that were published by the Turkish migrants in Norway: *Demokrat* and *Fremmedarbeideren*. These newspapers gave me a better understanding of the problems of the Turkish people in Norway and roots of the diversity within the Turkish diaspora. In the LO archive, I also came across with numbers of Turkish and Kurdish political refugee application cases.

Lastly, I came across with a journal from the *Norveç Türk İslam Birliđi* – Norwegian Turkish Islamic Union (NORTİB) archives, which started to be published by the *Norveç Türk Dernekleri Federasyonu* – Norwegian Turkish Associations Federation (NTDF) in 1994, *Türkün Sesi* (The voice of Turk). While the secular and socialist themes stood out in the journals that I found in the LO archive, nationalist and conservative statements drew attention in *Türkün Sesi*, a subject I will further explain in chapter 5, in the findings about ‘the usage of media and preservation of the national identity’. (See page 110 and 111).

Sampling

Random sampling is the most common sampling way in many life sciences. However, it can be very problematic in small-n studies (King, Koehane and Verba, 1994), where small-n refers to a small number of cases, such as case studies. To gather information from the right people and then to know where to continue gathering information is crucial for research. The present research employed three non-probability sampling strategies. It first study first tried to determine who are knowledgeable and who can be the key respondents in the Turkish diaspora in Norway (i.e., key informant sampling). After that, the research process continued with the people who can be relevant to the research topic and referenced by the initial sample interviewees (i.e., snowball sampling). Lastly, I chose some participants based on their relative ease of access (i.e., convenience sampling).

Non-probability Sampling Method

A good way to define something is to demonstrate what it is not. Hence I prefer to define the non-probability sampling by describing the opposite of it. Bryman defines the probability sampling as a technique that can calculate the probability of getting a specific sample (Bryman, 2008: 179). Non-probability sample does not meet this criterion and it covers all the rest of sampling models (*ibid.* 183). This thesis used three types of non-probability sampling models: *key informant sampling*, *snowball sampling* and *convenience sampling*.

Key informant sampling

As it was outlined above, it can be problematic to seek information randomly in the case study design. Therefore, the researcher must carefully look upon how to obtain knowledge and information. Tongco (2007) suggests that the key informant sampling is the most effective technique when it comes to studying certain cultural domains. Accordingly, key informant sampling can be defined as a technique where the researcher gathers information from the reflective members of a community who are knowledgeable about the topic of research and able and willing to share their knowledge (*ibid.*). There is more than one key informant who supplied crucial information for this study. Yet, Lütü Güven is the precursor of the key informants, because he was the first informant I reached and he was willing to share his experiences starting from 1959. In fact, none of the other informants in this research had longer experience of the Turkish diaspora in Norway.

Snowball sampling

Snowball sampling represents the technique where the researcher first makes contact with a relevant group of people, and then expands the research group with other relevant people by using the initially established contacts (Bryman, 2008: 185). By this way the researcher easily finds other knowledgeable informants that are possibly familiar with the theme. The new informants supply new data so that the researcher can examine and elaborate the previous theories that are generated by previous findings. In the course of using the snowball sampling, the researcher must be careful that the gathered informants are not extreme cases, but generalizable people or even representatives in the group (Schutt, 2008). Surely, this can only be possible with knowing the characteristics of the research group (Biernacki and Waldorf, 1981: 160).

In this study, Mr. Güven guided me to start the snowball sampling. The majority of them reached were early migrants like himself. Besides, he told me to meet a person who is significant person representing the young generation: a female Norwegian politician with a Turkish origin (33) who preferred to stay anonymous. Later she recommended me to interview with one of the founders of the Turkish Radio in Norway: Tahsin Candaş. Mr. Candaş told me to meet another knowledgeable person Naci Akkök, who is an academician

and a politician (Mr. Naci was a candidate representative from Venstre Partiet in the Parliamentary elections in Norway in 2013). And so the snowball sampling continued in this way in this study.

Convenience Sampling

In some cases the researcher choose samples through existing contacts, friends, colleagues, etc. because they are available by virtue to the researcher and they are easy to reach. This way of sampling is called *convenience sampling* (Bryman, 2008: 183). Although the convenience sampling is an easygoing process and it supplies a high rate of response, it can be problematic since the findings cannot be generalizable (*ibid.*).

Acknowledging that, I used this sampling model for two interviews and one observation group to check the balance with the responses that I got by using other sampling models. I met and interviewed Salman Türken, an academic in the Psychology department at the University of Oslo, who migrated to Norway in the summer of 1999 through marriage. Ferruh Özalp is another friend I interviewed, an academic in the Pedagogy Department at the Oslo College who arrived to Norway in April 1980.

Interviews

Interview is perhaps the most attractive way of information gathering because of its flexibility. This part will explain the employed interview methods in this study.

Qualitative Interview

This thesis is a qualitative research, thus it employs the qualitative interview method. The qualitative interview and quantitative interview are very different from each other in a number of ways. In qualitative interviewing method, the researcher has space for new questions and the questions can be asked in many different ways. The point in the qualitative interview is to get rich and detailed answers that give an essence about the research topic (Bryman, 2008:

437.). Moreover, in qualitative interview method the same interviewee can be interviewed more than one time in different occasion (*ibid.*)

Because of those flexible features the qualitative interview method was the most suitable option for information gathering for this thesis.

Semi-structured and non-structured Interviews

Interviews with participants were conducted in two different ways, *semi-structured* and *non-structured interviews*. In a semi-structured interview, "The researcher has a list of questions or fairly specific topics to be covered (interview guide), but the interviewee has a great deal of leeway in how to reply." (Bryman, 2008: 438). In an unstructured interview, the researcher deals with certain range of topics but s/he does not follow an interview guide (*ibid.*) In fact, the unstructured interview can be very similar in character to a conversation (Burgess, 1984).

During the research I systematically interviewed 12 people in total. While seven of the interviews were done in the semi-structured way, five of them were performed in a conversational or non-structural method. I also performed the non-structured interview method with four of the interviewees that I had had semi-structured interviews with before, in order to capture the variety of aspects.

I interviewed with some of the respondents for more than one time and in different occasions. This was particularly useful, because I started to get the interviewees' trust in the second and third meetings, so it created an invariably more relaxed atmosphere comparing with the first meetings. Also, the main contents of the further meetings consisted of rather deeper comments, discussions and free questions about the diaspora's past and current situation. The non-structured interview method in the further meetings, in some cases, continued like *muhabbet*, which is quite different to the western conversation model. I can define *muhabbet* as friendly conversation with openness and trust that aims to find solutions to one's questions

and problems with pinpointing comments and advices. This kind of conversation mostly continues in a serious mood with occasional jokes.²

Throughout the whole process of the research, using the semi-structured and non-structured methods allowed me to learn a lot about the interests of the respondents that I would not learn by using other methods. Moreover, some respondents presented their experiences in such a good way that they covered almost all questions in a chronological order, so interfering the talk with questions was not always necessary. All in all, using the semi-structured and non-structured methods provided me a wide range of information, including those that were not meant to ask to interviewees. Therefore, they were very useful in this research.

Life history interviews

Life history interview is a type of unstructured interview technique. Accordingly, the researcher selects an interviewee on the basis of this person's possible important role in the group and asks him or her about their lives (Bryman, 2008: 52, 695). In this method, the story is usually enriched with diaries, photographs and letters (*ibid*: 440). The aim of the life story interview method is to grasp the key turning points of the interviewees' lives and to get a better understanding of the interviewee's role within the researched group.

In this research, I conducted the life history interview in order to get a deeper understanding about the establishment of the Turkish diaspora and its early period starting from 1959. Correspondingly, prominent early migrants were asked to tell about their life stories. The stories that revealed information about their migration, what they first thought about the situation in Norway, their opinions on Norwegian society, their first settlement, Turkish network, the establishment of the Turkish diaspora and the following process were the most related stories with the theme of this research.

Observation

² An academic work on *muhabbet* is currently being conducted by Nicklas Poulsen, who is planning to release his work by the end of 2014.

Although the interviewees are expected to give the essence about what they are being asked, there can be reasons of thinking that the reports are not entirely accurate (Bryman, 2008: 254). Therefore, the researcher must also seek for consistency between the stories and the real life events and try to fulfill the story. An obvious way to do that is to observe people's behavior directly (*ibid.* 256). Observation methods provide a wide perspective about the participants' lives and they supply social, cultural, political and economic contexts. The researcher can use observation methods to gain more explanatory data about the relationship between people, norms, ideas and events. In other words, it allows the researcher to find out how frequently and under what conditions the respondents come together, do what and with whom.

In this research I conducted observation several times in different groups and in different contexts (protests in the street, meeting places and on social media groups). But I particularly observed three main groups that I thought would be the most useful for the research: 1) the early Turkish migrants 2) the Turkish group that became more active in the post-Gezi Park protests period and 3) Turkish associations that efficiently use the social media, particularly Facebook groups.

I conducted my observation in two different ways: participant observation and non-participant observation.

Participant Observation

Participant observation is a setting where “the researcher immerses him- or herself in a social setting for an extended period of time, observing behavior, listening to what is said in conversation both between others and the fieldworker and asking questions.” (Bryman, 2008: 697). Participant observation had one big advantage, which is that it brings the researcher and participants closer to each other and it generates trustfulness and openness (*ibid.*). In fact, participant observation was the best way to gain trust during this research and it established a convenient atmosphere for further observations and interviews as well.

I conducted the participant observation with the early-migrant Turks. Before the Gezi-Park protests³ started, the Turkish diaspora was stationary, so it was not possible to observe the diaspora in action. Therefore, I interested in observing the early members of the diaspora. In order to do that, I joined the early migrants' regular meetings in a café/restaurant. It was fortunate that the early migrants came together in this particular place many times a week. Moreover, after I performed the fourth non-structured interview they said that I am always welcome to join them. So I could conduct my observation in this group easily.

Non-participant Observations

In non-participant observation, the researcher observes but does not take on an active role in what is going on in the social setting (Bryman, 2008: 257). In other words, the observer is socially distant from the subject and not in a position to influence in any part of the process. In the research process, I conducted this kind of observation in three different settings: meetings, protests and social media groups. In meetings and protests, there were always some other new participants in the group; therefore I do not think that my participation was more noticeable than anyone else's. My only interaction in these events was to meet with the members of the diaspora. I did not mention about my observing role in these meetings. So I believe that my participation did not make any difference in people's behavior.

In that part of the research, I observed the relationship between people, how they know each other, what the features of the group are, what kind of mediators do they use to represent their ideas in Norway and what kinds of plans they come up with to be more influential in the Norwegian society.

In the social media part, I observed the shared posts in the mentioned Facebook groups for over a year, since September 2012 until the end of 2013. Most of the posts in these platforms consisted of news about news in Turkey and Turkey-related issues, oncoming seminars in Norway, outcomes of the seminars and posts of religious themes. Non-participant observation on the social media platform has been a successful process, because as long as you are member of a group on Facebook you can see all the posts that are posted by the admin and

³ For more information about Gezi Park protests, check pages 97 – 98.

members. Moreover, Facebook has a facility that allows the members of the groups to comment under posts. Those comments supplied a rich amount of data about the members' opinions about the projects, their problems and demands and how they dealt with their problems in the Norwegian society.

Other issues in information gathering

The interviews lasted between 50 minutes to 4 hours. My Turkish skill helped me a lot during observations and interviews, and I guess I could catch the body language and small nuances. The respondents sometimes changed the topic of the discussion in the interviews, but I managed to put the interviews into track. Most of the interviews were conducted in the restaurants at the center of Oslo. When any meeting was decided to be held in a restaurant I tried to be careful not to take those meetings in rush hours. Some of the other meetings were conducted in interviewees' offices or homes.

While I preferred to take notes and seldom used recording in non-structured interviews and observation, the semi-structured interviews were all tape-recorded with the permission of respondents for further analyses.

Limitations and Challenges

There have been several limitations and challenges in this thesis. I had eight challenges during the research of the thesis where one of them occurred during the writing process.

First of all, in the beginning of the thesis I planned to conduct my research not only in Oslo but also in Drammen, Stavanger and Trondheim, the other major cities in Norway where the Turkish people are populated as well. Yet, due to time and financial limitations I conducted the research only in Oslo⁴. Nevertheless, some of the interviewees and the people that I observed were residing outside of Oslo. During the research I found chance to interview and

⁴ By 2010, almost 6000 Turkish people were residing in Oslo and its was followed by Drammen with 2169 (SSB, 2010).

observe people who reside in Bærum, Lillestrøm, Drammen and Fredrikstad as well. Moreover, most of the diasporic political attractions, especially demonstrations, have taken place in Oslo, so I do not think that limiting the research to Oslo reduced the quality of the findings about political influence. Therefore, I mention the Turkish diaspora that I observed as ‘The Turkish diaspora in Norway’ throughout the thesis.

Secondly, since I was new in Norway while doing the interviews, I did not know much about the Norwegian culture or Norwegian institutions. That situation was rarely an obstacle, because in some cases the interviewee wanted to give examples about a Norwegian institution or some cultural knowledge that I was not aware of, and when I experienced this obstacle I asked the interviewee to write it down, so I could search it after the interviews.

There has not been any case where the interviewee did not want to answer a question. But in some cases the interviewee did not want to reveal so much information because they thought it could be sensitive information. When I felt the interviewee did not want to uncover a story, I reminded the interviewee that the information could be anonymous if they wanted to, which I believe made them feel more relaxed during the interview process. In this thesis, I tried to be attentive not to reveal any sensitive issues and information.

Another challenge was about the bad connotation of some main terms in this thesis, such as “diaspora” and “lobbying”. The word “diaspora” was sometimes correlated with “working against Turkish state”. For example one of the respondents in the participant observation claimed that there is no such thing like the Turkish diaspora, he claimed Armenians have a diaspora and they use it to push French government to accept the genocide. “Lobbying” was correlated in a similar way: influencing the decision-making through unlawful means. In order to prevent such associations, I defined the meanings of these terms to the respondents when I felt they were understood wrong. Perhaps these explanations enlightened them about the meaning of diaspora and lobbying but their approach to the topics did not change immediately. Therefore, doing the second and third observations and interviews were very useful. Eventually, I could not explore much about lobbying, but I collected a lot of information about the diaspora.

Another challenge was that, some respondents could not think of any influence of the Turkish diaspora in the Norwegian politics and they asked me if I had already found anything about it so far. Although I tried to avoid such questions and gave them more time to think about an answer, when I told them the example of the Midnight Express movie protests, the interviewees started to find similar experiences to that. I think the reason of this situation is that, many Turks are not aware of their influence even though they themselves organize meetings, seminars and protests.

After the snowball sampling I noticed that the key actors in the diaspora limited me to the secular, liberal and leftist side of the Turkish diaspora in Norway. Yet I had limited time to research every group. Therefore, I used “convenience sampling model”, and also followed media and social media shares of the other groups, specifically, Norwegian Turkish Islamic Union – NORTİB, Norwegian Turkish Youth Association NTGD and Norwegian Turkish Associations Federation – NTDF. I believe that the media and social media shares on the official webpages and Facebook groups supplied a lot of information about these groups’ disposition and their activities in Norway. Consequently, I gave a place to these groups in the thesis as well.

Also it was not possible to reach some of the key players within the Turkish diaspora in Norway. For instance, I could not get any interview appointment from any official in the Turkish Embassy in Oslo. Nevertheless, I received an e-mail from the embassy with some general information about the Turkish people’s situation in Norway.

Lastly, throughout the research process almost all research methods were conducted in Turkish. That allowed me to save a lot of time during the information gathering. Moreover, conducting the research in my own mother language allowed me to catch small nuances as well. However, it posed some minor problems in the translation and analysis part. I did all the translation myself and honestly it was not always possible to reflect all details in the translated text. Analyzing some text in which these nuances could not be reflected was problematic. It either cost me to analyze weakly or to explain the analysis not as well as it could have been done in the original language. For instance, in the example of early migrants, Lütfü Güven mentioned that the early Turks in Norway could not find any Turkish cheese and olives in the old days. This translation unfortunately does not explain as much as it means in Turkish, in which it symbolizes poor conditions, lack of basics and longing for home.

Theorizing Diaspora and its Political Influence

Research Theory

Throughout the research I noticed that the diaspora studies does not offer a regular system, as it seems at the first glance. Therefore, I unintentionally shuttled between gathering data and analyzing it until I eventually came up with a theory out of this interaction. However, a new data sometimes broke down the theory that I came up with in the beginning. Therefore, the inductive research process did not continue as a straight, smooth process, but instead it involved moving back and forth between the data, analyses and the theory to see how they fit together. This strategy is actually explaining the main idea in the grounded theory. Therefore I chose to apply the grounded theory as a research method in this study.

Grounded Theory

The grounded theory was firstly mentioned by Glaser and Strauss in their book named *The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies for Qualitative Research* in 1967. This research theory sees the qualitative research as being essentially about lived experiences, behavior, organizational functioning, social movements, cultural phenomena and interaction between nations (Strauss and Corbin, 1998: 11). Grounded theory has contributed to the social sciences in many ways, and in this study three of the points that they mentioned provided a big benefit. First, grounded theory “proclaims that persons are actors and they take an active role in responding problematic situations (*ibid.*: 9).” Second, the grounded theory suggests that, "the meaning is defined and redefined through interaction.” (*ibid.*: 9) In other words, the meaning of concepts and the perception of actions are outcomes of the interaction between the

researcher and his or hers study objects. Lastly, grounded theory supplies “awareness of the interrelationship among conditions (structure), action (process) and consequences” (*ibid.*: 9).

In this study, data collection, analyses and theory were gathered as recommended in grounded theory. Grounded theory suggests that one should conduct the research starting with the data collection, and then derive the theory out of the analysis of the data collection. This is how this research was conducted, and I found it useful in studying the particular field of diaspora. Because grounded theory allows the data collection to be made before the theorizing and analysis, it suited the way my research was conducted. Moreover, this study saw the close connection between data collection, analyses and theory, something that is accurately reflected in the grounded theory (Glaser and Strauss, 1967).

However, it is possible to criticize some of the points in grounded theory. For instance, the point about ‘defining the meanings out of interaction between the researcher and actions’ can sometimes give very subjective results and it can affect the credibility of the thesis. To overcome this problem in this study, through Glaser and Strauss’ recommendation (1967, 228), I presented the data as evidence for the findings and tried to make how I obtained these outcomes from the data as clear as possible for the reader. I presented illustrations, graphs and tables, and occasionally quoted directly from interviews to illuminate the findings (*ibid.* 229).

The theoretical framework

In the beginning of this study I thought that studying diasporic groups might require a framework that contains liberalist and realist elements. That was because I saw the diasporic groups as non-state actors and I thought they would consistently promote liberal values, such as human rights and democracy, and also create an interaction between states, although this interaction does not always need to be positive. Moreover, these were the factors where I thought the realist approach could come into consideration: First, through their loyalties to their homeland, the diaspora members could be considered as soft power instruments for states and they could also be seen as financial resources through remittances. And second, I was looking for concrete results, for example a change in the Norwegian law or regulation in favor of the diaspora or the diasporic group’s homeland. However, throughout the study I noticed that the diaspora and the influence of the diasporic groups in a society can be much

more complex than I assumed at the first place. Identity preservation and maintenance, different groups within the diaspora, these distinctive groups' attempts to increase awareness in the homeland society from different perspectives, the usage of media, common goals with other interest groups made me realize that aims, politics, the understanding of influence and so on can change and they are constructed. All these aspects are reminiscent of the building stones of constructivist theory. Therefore, I thought constructivism would be the most suitable theory to employ in my research on the Turkish diaspora in Norway.

| Table 2. | Three conceptions of the international system | | |
|-------------------------|---|---|---------------------|
| | Realism | Liberalism | Constructivism |
| Main instruments policy | Military and economic power | Institutions, liberal values, networks of interdependence | Ideas and discourse |

(Source: Jackson and Sørensen Introduction to International Relations – Theories & Approaches. Page 232)

Constructivist Theory

Kant stated that the knowledge always is subjective, since it is filtered through human consciousness (Jackson and Sørensen, 2010: 162). This precondition is also true for constructivism, and Jackson and Sørensen defines the essence as of constructivism as: "(...) the social world is not a given: it is not something ‘out there’ that exists independent of the thoughts and ideas of the people involved in it.” (*ibid.*) Thus, the social sciences cannot be studied the same way as the natural sciences, and it cannot be objective through their positivist sense of understanding (*ibid.*).

Some of the main focuses of constructivism are ideas and beliefs, identity formation, the relationship between structures and actors and the underlying historical and cultural background (*ibid.*:167). Studying people who migrated to another country, who try to maintain the homeland identity in their new setting and adapt to the new conditions culturally and politically, requires understanding of the main focuses of constructivism. Also, when it comes to explaining the social relationships and influencing in the politics, the constructivist

perception of power is useful to apply on the study of diasporas (*ibid.*: 166) Thus, the study of diasporas and constructivism have many common denominators, and therefore I found it the most suitable theory to apply on my research.

According to constructivism, identities are not fixed, but rather created in the interaction of actors (Jackson and Sørensen, 2010: 167). This can be applied on the case of the Turkish diaspora in Norway as well, where the identity of the diaspora was not fixed since the beginning, but rather changed by the interaction and social relationships between the people in the diaspora. In this interaction, different ideologies and migrants with different characters had an important role in shaping the identity of the “Norwegian-Turkish”. For instance, while the Turkish migrants used to be united under a worker organization in the 70’s and 80’s, now the majority of them are united under an organization where the traditional Turkish values have the main focus. The construction of the identity is altered with the changing of the needs and priorities in what it means to be Turkish.

Another example from the Turkish diaspora in Norway connected to the constructivist theory is the perception of the scarfed women. Accordingly, in Turkey, the headscarf is not only a religious attribute, but also it is seen as a political symbol, a promotion of the conservative ideology. Because of the headscarf’s political connotations some Turkish people are skeptical towards the use of it in certain places such as state institutes, justice courts, etc. However, in Norway, the headscarf is more of a symbol of identity. Because it does not carry the same political connotations as in Turkey, the headscarf means something different in Norway, something that shows the loyalty to the nationality and religion. So, while some Turkish people are skeptical towards the use of headscarf in Turkey, they support it in the context of Norwegian social life. Because as Seagrave stated: “identity does not always determine interests ... sometimes identity is the interest.” (Seagrave, 1995: 455). In other words, the protection of identity can be the most important factor, which overshadows the domestic political aspects. This shows how people’s perception of the same issue can change from place to place, or from one context to another.

Another aspect that constructivist theory captures in this study is about the definition of power. In constructivist theory, power and ideas are very closely connected. Barnett and Duvall suggest: “Power is the production, in and through social relations, of effects that shape the capacities of actors to determine their own circumstances and fate. But power does not

have a single expression or form. It has several.” (Barnett and Duvall, 2005: 3). Just like Tannenwald (2005: 15) suggests, I think that this idea of power boils down to that ‘ideas must be widely shared to matter’.

During the research process, this kind of power presented itself with the Gezi Park protests in Oslo. The members of the Turkish diaspora who protested against the Turkish government’s action during the Gezi Park protests became more visible although the majority of the Turkish diaspora did not join or were even against it. Thus, to create awareness and influence the politics, the diasporas do not mainly rely on the realist-oriented factors of military or financial power to influence the politics. Instead, in the case of diasporas, widely shared ideas can be a great instrument to influence the politics.

Nevertheless, Ogden (2008, 5) claims that the constructivist theory cannot explain all aspects of diaspora in an adequate way. Consequently, he claims that constructivism has too rigid categories of identities and do not allow the multiple identities and loyalties that occurs within the diaspora. However, I think if there is a theory in IR that allows multiple identities and loyalties it is constructivism. This is because in constructivist theory the identities are not fixed, oppositely they are constructed through the interaction of actors. For example, Turkish and Armenians might be rivals when they are in their homelands, however, for example in Norway they can unite under the identity of migrant and hence support each other.

To conclude, the constructivist theory with its ability to explain to enlightening the concepts of identity, ideas and power is very helpful to understand and rationalize the study of diaspora. Therefore, this study chose to see the Turkish diaspora in Norway through the perspective of this IR theory.

Theorizing the migration, transnationalism and diaspora politics

This study focuses on three of the most central components in the diaspora: migration, transnationalism and diaspora politics. These three components deserve their own theoretical explanations, in order to fully understand how they operate individually and collectively within the diaspora.

Turkish migration to Norway and the theory about chain migration

In many cases of the members of the Turkish diaspora in Norway, we see a pattern of chain migration, which is defined as “sets of interpersonal ties that connect migrants, former migrants, and non-migrants in origin and destination areas through ties of kinship, friendship, and shared community origin.” (Massey *et al*, 1993: 448). Based on the notion of the chain migration, I found an interesting pattern within the Turkish diaspora’s migration to Norway.




Figure 1. A model that shows the differences between individual and economic migration patterns within the chain migration.

Figure 3. shows a model of two different kinds of chain migration. Accordingly, Ö stands for *öncül*, which is Turkish for precursor, and in the context of migration it refers the pioneer migrant who brings at least one more migrant with him/her or after him/her. The main characteristics of the individual migrants are that they are skilled or semi-skilled, they know a foreign language and they usually have high education. Individual chain migrants usually tend to invite their friends and colleagues from their homeland by informing them about job

opportunities, and in many cases offering temporary accommodation help. The individual migrants do not need to migrate to a particular country; instead the pull factors in this country make them settle there. According to the Turkish case in Norway, many individual migrants bring other individual migrants.

Economic migrants on the other hand, are mostly unskilled and do not know a foreign language (before they arrive). Economic migrants tend to invite family members and relatives, who they also share an income with in the beginning of the migration process, either through remittances or simply by living together. Since they usually do not know a foreign language, and financially rely on the family members, they do not have as many optional countries as individual migrants have to migrate to, but instead tends to migrate to the country where their family or relatives already reside.

Another finding about the economic chain migrants is that because of their family bonds and lack of language skill, they tie to each other and preserve their traditional values in a stronger way. This contrasts to the individual chain migrants, who usually have no family members in the hostland, have an educational background and also skilled, and are thus prone to socialize outside of their homeland ties.

In the model, the individual chain migrants have more *Ö – öncül*, although they are a smaller amount of migrants. There are more economic chain migrants, but they have fewer *öncül*. This shows two things: first, that the individual migrants are more initiative taking, and second, that they have a more independent character. Their character is reflected in the interaction within the diaspora and the hostland society. Consequently, individual migrants tend to be more influential both within the diaspora and in the hostland politics.

However, this does not mean that the economic chain migrants are inactive in the diaspora. *Öncüls* in economic migrants do not correlate with the migration to Norway with only financial comfort, but also with other kinds of facilities, such as already existing Turkish network. Also, even though they usually arrive to the hostland as unskilled and without a language skill, they learn new skills in Norway through *Høgskolen i Oslo* – Oslo University College or *Universitetet i Oslo* - University of Oslo, and other educational institutions as well as through being an apprentice for future employment. These practices improve their language skill as well. Moreover, economic migrants do not always make other economic

migrants come to Norway. For instance if their children went to, or continued their education in Norwegian schools, they should perhaps be considered as educational migrants. Eventually, by this way, there have been very active members among the Turkish economic migrants in the diaspora and in the Norwegian society as well.

Theorizing Transnationalism

Transnationalism is one of the central elements when it comes to migration and diaspora studies. This is likely because transnationalism refers to a linkage between two countries, and creates a social space in between the national boundaries. Varadarajan (2010) calls this space “domestic abroad”. Anderson and Lee (2005) provide a clear definition of transnationalism:

“The concept of transnationalism describes the practice among immigrants of establishing and maintaining kinship, economic, cultural, and political networks across national boundaries, and the creation of multiple sites of ‘home’.” (Anderson and Lee, 2005: 9).

Even though transnationalism is an old phenomenon, the globalization process that began in the late twentieth century increased the presence of the phenomenon (*ibid.*). The migrant communities all around the world, China Town and Little Italy in New York, the Turkish neighborhoods in Berlin, the Pakistani neighborhoods in Birmingham – all of these are examples of how transnationalism is present around the world. The visibility of the Turkish migrants in Norway is visible in for example the neighborhood of Grønland in Oslo and many neighborhoods in Drammen in Norway.

Anderson explains Carling’s notion of the ‘transnational social field’, where the practices of both migrants and non-migrants constitute the transnational social field. In other words, not all migrants are active participants of transnationalism, and additionally, we cannot exclude non-migrants from the transnational social field (Anderson, 2011: 43 and Carling, 2007: 31-33). According to Faist (1999), the transnational social field consists of relationships of a social, symbolic and material nature. In my opinion, this can be even more clear with the expansion of migrant groups and with the establishment of social networks, cultural activities

and the usage of economic and political means whether they are achieved from the homeland or the hostland.

There are various examples where social, symbolic and material relationships are creating links between the Turkish diaspora and Turkey. The usage of media usually comprises the connection between the homeland and the diaspora, in providing a space of information, knowledge exchange and a chance of scrutinizing the politics of both the homeland and the hostland. Accordingly, the existence of the many Turkish-Norwegian journals is a good example of transnationalism in action, as the members of the diaspora cooperate with likeminded groups in Turkey. Another media-related example is the use of Norwegian media to highlight events in Turkey when the Turkish media is inadequate to supply information. The most concrete example of this was when VG-TV broadcasted the events from Taksim Square during the Gezi Park protests, when the Turkish media was not showing it. This even made the transnational social field become even more visible, as people in Turkey were participating in the transnational practices by watching the Norwegian channel.

Since the establishment of the first Turkish organization, the cultural social sphere has been supplied by these organizations. The cultural sphere in the Turkish diaspora is very much dependent on transnational practices, in that it is providing a context for identity formation and political engagement. Especially the opposition ideologies in Turkey have had the chance of expressing themselves and developing their own transnational space. As it is seen in the example of the Tamil and Kurdish cases, such oppositional groups can use the arena of free speech offered in the hostland in order to promote boycotting home state governments and create a consciousness against human rights violations and injustices which are often difficult to speak up against in the homeland (Anderson, 2011: 47). Similar to this example, different ideologies, particularly opposition groups in the Turkish diaspora, practice the transnational sphere through the social network that locates in both home and hostlands by using different media tools such as radio, newspaper and Internet. Among these media tools, especially the Internet supplies a great space for freedom of expression (not only freedom of speech), because it involves so much data that cannot always be disciplined by the state officials. And when one party tries to control these platforms, it just triggers the usage of transnational social field to a greater extent, because the oppositional diasporic groups try to protest the limiting implementations of the homeland state and to create a consciousness towards the undemocratic applications that takes place there. For instance, the ban of YouTube and

Twitter and detentions of people who criticize the state through such platforms in Turkey activated the transnational network to oppose the Turkish government (Harding and Letsch, 2013).

The transnational community within the Turkish diaspora in Norway does not only operate through the opposition. It also regularly works to improve the network and the relationship between the diaspora and the Turkish state. Accordingly, the diaspora members have connections with their fellow countrymen, state officials and institutions and also, regardless to their ideology, with the other diaspora members who participate in transnational practices. The usage of the homeland's media can also be used to inform the non-migrants who are considering migrating to Norway about the situation of Turks in Norway and to explain the economic, educational and social opportunities in this country, and this creates this type of transnational space. The articles about the Turkish people in Norway in the Turkish newspaper *Milliyet* in the 1970s are good examples of the creation of transnational space in the media level.

In addition the media, the diaspora members organize national and religious activities and establish their own venues, such as cafeterias, mosques etc. In these types of events, the state officials and diaspora members work hand in hand or under the supervision of the state officials. This becomes more visible when the theme of the event is to teach the national values to new generations in order to maintain the identity. Organizing activities in the national days, such as making regular visits with children to the Turkish Embassy in every 23rd April – known as *National Sovereignty and Children's day* in Turkey, can be given as an example to the usage of transnational social field. From the constructivist perspective, this creation of identity maintenance also generates the awareness of having a certain honorable character and feeling of belonging, in this case being Turkish. The continuous practices of keeping the idea of belonging to the homeland alive increase the chance of the usage of this idea as a political instrument in the future.

Both opposing and supporting the homeland state create a transnational arena. Yet different ways of involvements in this space cause bipolarization and isolation within the diaspora group, which disrupt the unity and decrease the chance of diasporas' influence in the homeland politics.

Theorizing the diaspora politics

Among some diasporic groups traditional values such as family and religion play important roles in the daily lives of the diaspora members. Therefore, their formal organizations often meet with these demands, which make these organizations take part at a local level, such as celebrating religious festivals. Yet it still does not mean that the members are not concerned about politics. Turkish diaspora members in Norway are also concerned with political developments, yet their political participation and influence in the Norwegian politics fluctuates in different spheres.

Most certainly, labor immigration from Turkey to Europe has dominated the history of migration in the last several decades. However, entrepreneurs, intellectuals and professionals played a significant role in the activation of the diaspora. Sheffer, an Israeli political scientist, suggests that:

“(…) influential people communicate their opinions through a diaspora’s traditional media outlets as well as the new media, and they can gain considerable influence over its cultural, social, and political development in its host countries and in the homeland. They also can be quite useful in fostering close contacts between diasporans and their homeland and in helping diaspora communities adjust to host countries.” (Sheffer, 2003: 167)

He adds that this is true for many diasporic groups in many different countries such as the Cubans and Armenians in the United States, Jews and Palestinians in the West and Turkish intellectuals in Germany (*ibid.*). The influential people have played important roles in the establishment and politicization of the Turkish diaspora in Norway as well.

Laguerre, professor in social anthropology at the university of California, proposes:

“The aim of diasporic politics is to influence both homeland and hostland policies or political practices on behalf of the homeland and the residential diasporic community.” (Laguerre, 2006:14).

I think Laguerre's statement could be more complete if we consider the diaspora's unique opportunity to influence two countries through their political actions. Therefore, especially regarding the Turkish-Norwegian case, I would add to Laguerre's statement that diasporic politics sometimes aim to use the homeland to influence the hostland politics, and vice versa.

Diaspora politics involve an extensive use of organizational tools such as associations and demonstrations, media tools such as radio, journal and social media. These tools provide a diasporic space where the members can mobilize for action (*ibid.*: 166). The forms of action can work in different ways and on different levels. Increasing awareness in the hostland society, molding public opinion and lobbying are all different instruments to influence the politics.

These usages of homeland or hostland politics to improve the conditions for the diaspora may increase during particular events in one of the countries, such as electoral campaigns and political tumult (coup d'états, mass protests etc.) (*ibid*, 2006: 163). During these kinds of political events, diaspora members often tend to show political reactions, as they would do if they were still residing in their homeland. Laguerre puts it as:

“(…) when they participate in hostland politics, they do so by using the homeland political frame of reference.” (*ibid*, 164)

In this context, demonstration is not only a way of protest, but also a way of creating closeness to the atmosphere that would occur if they had been present in the homeland events.

Several observations and interviews demonstrated that sometimes opportunity and loophole situations in the hostland can form a base of enrolment into the implementation of regulations. Individual or collective actions by the members of the diaspora can bring about unintentional influence in the politics. If the diasporic groups take advantage of these opportunity situations, their actions are usually met with more restrictive politics by the hostland state.

Diaspora politics can also make use of lobbying to reach the decision-making processes in the hostland. Lobbying as a diasporic instrument to influence politics often requires key members' willingness to engage in the politics in the hostland as well as close collaboration with the diaspora members and the homeland (*ibid*: 73). Yet, one cannot say that the

structural limitation within the homeland politics can restrict the diasporic influence in the hostland politics. Thus, the political structures in the hostland and its flexibility (or inflexibility) to external influence also play a critical role in the efficiency of this influence.

A story of Turkish diaspora in Norway

Migration of Turks

“Some of you went eastward,
some went westwards...”

- Orkhon inscriptions -

Turkish history is a history of migration. The first Turkic written sources, the Orkhon Inscriptions (Ross and Thomsen, 1930) refer to movements of Turks towards east and west. These nomadic actions formed the first migration patterns of Turks. That pattern changed with the Seljuk Turks’ conquest of Anatolia, which was followed with permanent Turkic settlement there and the establishment of the nation of Turkey. Meanwhile, the other Turkic tribes either formed their independent nations such as Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan or formed enclaves within other nations such as Chuvash Republic in Russia and Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region of Uyghur people in China.

The modern Turkish migration started in the late 19th century and in the early 20th century. During this migration period the United States was the most preferred country of destination for the Turkish emigrants (Karpas, 2002 cited in Sirkeci 2005). The instability in the European and Ottoman lands at the end of 19th and the beginning of 20th centuries was the main reason of the America directed emigration of Turks. According to Turkish historian and

former professor at the University of Wisconsin, Kemal Karpat (*ibid.*), approximately 1 million Ottoman citizens migrated to North and South America between 1890 and 1914, and a minimum of 150 thousand of those were Turkish.

In Europe, the Turkish population was on decline in the same period. Despite the fact that Cyprus annexed with the British Empire in 1914 and many Cypriots started to migrate to Britain in 1920s, only a few of them were Turkish Cypriots (Oakley, 1979: 13). Furthermore, in 1923, immediately after the Republic of Turkey was founded, the migration was used as a way of nation building (Hecker, 2006). During the nation-building process, there were many waves of forced migration as well as population exchanges between Balkans and Turkey. For example, following the Norwegian diplomat Fridtjof Nansen's ideas, there were official exchanges of population between Turkey and Greece in accordance with the Treaty of Lausanne where approximately a half million of Turks living in Greece and Greek Islands were resettled to Turkey (Hecker 2006). Consequently, the Turkish population in Europe was minimized during that period and the migration from Turkey to Europe continued at the individual level until the second half of 20th century.

Mass Migration to Europe

The year 1961 was a milestone in the Turkish international migration history, because it marked a beginning of a mass labor migration from Turkey to Europe and Australia. Following the Second World War, developing economies in Europe were in need of workforce and European migration policies were based on this demand for labor from neighboring countries. Turkey on the contrary, was fighting with high unemployment rates. In order to balance these dynamics, a bilateral labor recruitment agreement was signed between Turkey and the Federal Germany in September 30, 1961. This pact aimed to provide Germany with temporary unskilled labor, *Gastarbeiter* - Guest Workers, while thinning the ranks of Turkey's unemployed (Kirisci, 2003). The workers were expected to return to Turkey with new capabilities and with the help of these skills develop the Turkish economy from rural agriculture to industry (*ibid.*). This agreement was followed by bilateral agreements with Austria, the Netherlands and Belgium in 1964, France in 1965, Sweden and Australia in 1967. Less extensive agreements were made with the United Kingdom in 1961, Switzerland in

1971, Denmark in 1973, and Norway in 1981 (Korfali *et al.* 2010: 23). Thereby, while Europe supplied labor power for their booming economies, Turkey diminished the unemployment rates and gained benefit from the in-flow remittances to home.

The agreements led to an immediate increase in the Turkish population in Europe. Despite the fact that the intake of regular migrant workers by Western European governments almost totally ceased in 1975 because of the oil-crises, and the Turkish immigration route turned to oil countries in the Middle East (mainly Saudi Arabia, Libya and Kuwait) (Gitmez, 1979), the number of Turkish citizens residing in Europe continued to increase (Bilgili and Siegel, 2010). Immigrants admitted on guest-workers schemes settled permanently in these countries by acquiring permanent resident or citizenship status in their host countries. Throughout the period the migration to Europe also continued with asylum seeking, family reunification and illegal labor migration (Korfali *et al.* 2010: 24). As a result, the population of Turks in Europe rapidly increased starting with these kinds of migration.

Migration to Norway

Contrary to the general belief of Turks starting to arrive to Norway in 1970s, Turks actually started to migrate to Norway in the end of 1950s. The first Turkish community in Norway consisted of individual migrants who were motivated by personal reasons and those who came through friend invitation or ship work. Therefore, first Turkish migrants settled either in the coastline cities or populated towns in Norway. Early Turkish immigrants say that the first Turk arrived to Oslo via a ship work and he decided to settle in Norway short after his arrival in 1958 (interview with Lütfü Güven, 05.11.2012). The first migrants' experiences were starkly different from the migrants in later periods. They experienced friendly reception and free movement around Europe. Equal rights with Norwegians and high wages were other two major motivations for the Turkish immigrants to settle in Norway.

In that period, middle aged, mostly semi-skilled, single males consisted the Turkish community in Norway. Short after the settlement, Turks started to learn about the life in Norway and they enjoyed the higher standards. However, because of the small size of the community they started to grow secluded feelings and they started to long for the homeland

although they did not really want to return there. Therefore, the early immigrants promoted Norway among their friends. High wages, high living standards and the open-minded society were common topics when trying to persuade friends of moving to Norway. Moreover, some of the Turkish migrants sent train or ship tickets to their best friend to show the wealth and hospitality. Those who came following their friends later invited their own best friends and relatives. This chain-migration was common among many early migrants in Norway (Anderson, 2011: 55). Another way to come to Norway was through private worker agencies, however these companies were shut down later on the accounts of deception⁵. After the labor recruitment agreement was signed between Turkey and the Federal Germany in 1961, Germany became the most preferable destination for the Turkish immigrants. During this period Federal Germany and other agreement countries in Europe received 96 percent of all Turkish migrants and, so the population of Turks in other countries increased in short numbers during the mass migration period (Korfali *et al.* 2010: 23).

However, mass migration to Germany (and other agreement countries) made an influence on secondary destinations as well. During the oil crises, stricter regulations and less demand for unskilled workers caused many emigrants to experience failure in their attempts to succeed in their new countries. After the oil crises in 1975, the economic pressure that Western European governments went through ended the regular flow of migrant workers (Korfali, 2010). In the meantime, Turkish migrants who could not “make it” in their first country wanted to try it one more time in other countries instead of going back to Turkey and be labeled as a “loser” (Gitmez, 1979.; interview with Lütfü Güven, 05.11.2012). Under these conditions, Norway was one of the preferred secondary destinations because of its open society, low unemployment and high wealth.

Interviews with the members of the Turkish diaspora

The following interviews aim at presenting an insight about the early Turkish migration to Norway, their first networks, first establishments and engagements with politics in Norway. It is not possible to give all the logs from each of the interviews that I conducted throughout the

⁵ An example of this is shown in Dagbladet, 19.08.1970. Betaler 4000 kr. for Jobb i Norge – They pay 4000 kr. for work in Norway

research, but this section will present the important parts of the five selected interviews that were chosen due to their well-informing contents. By doing that I aim to do two things: First, to give an overall picture about how I conducted the interviews. Second, to show the interviewees' responses to the questions related to the background, character and influence of the Turkish diaspora in Norway. During the talks, interviewees often gave a generous amount of data about the prominent Turkish associations in Norway, the tools that the diaspora has been using, and social and political details. In the course of interviews, sometimes the interviewees had difficulty with remembering the exact dates, names and the places. In these cases, I later checked and fixed the interview log with the exact and full information. The other interviews that could not be presented here will be used and referred to in the findings in chapter 5 to support the findings of the thesis.

I think it is important to present the raw material like this, because this study is the first of its kind when it comes to investigating the Turkish diaspora in Norway.

Interview 1 – Lütfü Güven

I first saw Mr. Güven's name in the newspaper Milliyet's archives. The headline of his short description was named "50 out of 150 Turks in Norway work in ships" and it was dated the 17th of April 1970. The second article written by him, which dates 23 September 1970 was titled "35 Turkish people from Bingöl started to work in Norway". And later, I saw another article written by him from 8 April 1974, which was titled as "Turkish people in Oslo established an association". All these articles that I found in the archives aroused my curiosity of Mr. Güven, and I checked his name on Internet at www.1881.no which is a website that allows its users to find the people's phone numbers.

Fortunately, I found his number, called and asked him for an interview. He accepted my request so we arranged our first meeting in a restaurant, which locates in the center of Oslo, in 05.11.2012. The first interview lasted for 75 minutes.

Mr. Güven migrated to Norway through a ship work in 10th August 1959. He explains there was no visa issue between Turkey and Norway in that period so he did not need any document to travel here. He just needed a stamp in the passport to be able to work.

“Immediately after I got off the ferry, I went to a police officer in the dockyard (...) and asked him how I can get a work permission. The police liked me. We soon got along together. He first helped me to get work permission - it was a very simple thing in these years; just a stamp - after that, he helped me to find a job in the Turkish Embassy.”

So he started to work in the Turkish embassy. He said, when he first arrived to Norway, they were only 6 Turkish immigrants in total. He added that, “Five of them have died, it is only me who is left.” That was a very convincing start in term of researching the background of the Turkish diaspora, because he was the most knowledgeable person about the background of the Turkish diaspora.

Then he continued and told about the social atmosphere in Norway when he first arrived, “The Norwegian society used to be very open; we did not have migrant status like today. Oppositely, people were thinking that we were exotic, so in many cases we were having advantages in the society.” Apart from the social atmosphere in Norway, Güven told the story of how his friends migrated to Norway one by one.

“Since I liked the environment in Norway, I recommended my friend Nurettin Kakiş, whom I met in Denmark, to migrate here. He came here shortly after me. Kakiş invited his friend Altan Gülpınar. Gülpınar invited his another friend and this chain went on like that.”

about a their first social engagements and solidarity within Turkish groups, he stated that:

“We were having regular meetings. We were sitting in a café like here [showing the restaurant that we are sitting in] to drink tea or coffee. But these meetings were not serious. (...) There were not many Turkish things around, no TV, no radio, no Turkish cheese or olives and no newspaper for us. We were a very small amount of people. The point in those meetings was to speak Turkish and if one of us brought something from Turkey then we could offer each other and share. (...). More Turkish migrants started to arrive in the following period; slow by slow.”

In 1974, when there was 700 Turkish people in Norway, and according to Lütfü around 500 of them were living in and around Oslo, he took the initiative to establish the first Turkish association in Norway, *Turkish Workers Association*. He explained the establishment of the association, disappointment with later organizations and failure in maintaining the environment that he created with nostalgia:

“There are many different Turkish associations. I wrote them down... 13 of them. Their names exist on paper, but they do not do anything (silence). Turkish Workers Association was the first one (...) I established it in the 24th February 1974. But it also stopped its work. They first unified with the Turkish Islamic Union in Norway (NORTIB) [10 years ago] and then, they completely disappeared, so they don't exist anymore.”

He continues:

“I tried to establish another organization to maintain the environment in the Turkish Workers Association. I bought another place from the community in Grønland (a neighborhood in Oslo). I built a cafeteria inside the building, I put a table tennis board to the living room, and I brought 370 books from the Turkish Education Ministry. The books were about many things, from children books to history books. I built a praying place for religious people inside of the house. I told them to come and pray here if they wanted to. And then, I said “good bye” to the members. What did people do? They withdrew from each other in a very short time and the association was dissolved.”

Accordingly, Güven states the aims of the Turkish Workers Association as follows:

“In these years, when Turkish people started to come here, in 1970, 71,72,73,75 whatever, people had issues with healthcare, with the working place; they had disagreements with the employers, the bank, they needed a translator etc. The association was taking care of these kinds of problems. If we could not take care of it we were directing them to the right people, so they could fix their problems. (...) Besides, we used to organize some activities to bring people together and to create a

good network within Turks in Oslo. Then this organization turned into Islamic Union.”

Güven argues that such an association is not needed anymore because: “It is the second/third generation here. These families’ children learnt Norwegian and they know how to deal with these kinds of problems on their own. Now their children do what the association was doing before.”

I wanted to investigate more about the background of Turkish people’s migration to Norway and told Güven that there was a labor agreement between Turkey and Germany in 1961, but there was no such an agreement with Norway. So, why did the Turkish people choose to migrate to Norway?

“When I arrived it was more like a coincidence or you loved someone in Norway and decided to live with this girl friend or wife (he specially said ‘girl friend or wife’ to indicate that the early Turkish migrants were mostly young and male). Later, people who wanted to go to other European countries but could not go because of visa requirement started to migrate here (Norway). Besides, those who could not find enough opportunity – or simply could not make it – in the continent countries (like Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands) wanted to migrate to another place to try their last chance. Norway was one of them.

“All Turkish migrants in Norway were naturally workers. They were generally nice people but some of them were also shy and unsocial.”

When I asked Lütfü Güven about the political involvement of the Turkish people and their relationship with the Norwegian authorities, he had a difficulty in apprehending the question and asked me how do I mean. I think that was not a statement of not understanding the question, but the essence of it. I briefly explained it as participating in the decision making process with different means, perhaps having contacts in the administrative organs for lobbying or somehow representing themselves in the Norwegian politics. Then Güven mentioned about the narrow-minded social life among the majority of Turks in in 1970s, but he also underlined a common problem they faced in those years:

“No, no, there was no relation with the administration. When they came here, they first found a job, let’s say a factory work; they were going from factory to home; from home to factory. Besides, sometimes they were meeting in a café around here (in the city center) and they were meeting, let’s say people from Uşak or Konya, 10 people was meeting in a café, they bought 3 tea or coffee, 7 of them don’t buy anything, they sit for free. Some of them were kicked out from the café and they were coming to me to complain about it. (...) They were saying “we have nowhere to go. (...)

In fact, “to have nowhere to go” was a big obstacle in the integration process. In short time the migrated Turks got stuck in the circle of routine and according to Lütfü Güven even though their life situation changed the majority of them continued this routine.

“... that was the situation then, people go from home to work, from work to home. There was no mosque either. They built a mosque later. (...) Some of the Turkish people got illnesses in Norway, because of the climate I guess, and they retired from their work early. And then what happened? They started to go between mosque and home, mosque and home.”

To get a more fulfilling answer about political influence of Turks in Norway I mentioned that I heard about the Midnight Express protest in 1978. He said he remembered this protest very well, but he was not sure if the protest really made any influence in the decision making process. Güven mentioned about different motives of this protest:

“We were afraid that the movie would affect us badly here and many other migrants were also afraid. Because it is like a domino effect, if society starts to hate one group of immigrants they will hate all the others one by one. Families with children were scared if their kids could be treated badly among their friends at school or wherever. That was how we interpreted the situation. Many people supported these protests, even Norwegians. (...) The Fremmedarbeideren (Foreign Workers Association) group was also with us. But of course Turks were forming the majority of the group. (...)

At this point he remembered more events from 80s, and he mentioned about the Democratic Progressivist Association (Demokratik İlericiler Derneği), which was established by Turkish student in Norway. He says that:

“It was in the 1980s. They (the student migrants) were very dynamic and clever girls and boys. I think, if some Turkish association had any influence in the Norwegian social and political life, it might be them.”

He also talked about the separation between the Turkish and Kurdish groups in Norway. Nevertheless, he does not disclaim the influence of the Kurdish diaspora and its influence on Turkish migrants.

“... four or five years ago (I found the exact date in Aftenposten, 03.11.2007) Turks protested against the PKK. (...) some PKK sympathizers attacked the protestors and they injured three to five young guys. (...) Kurdish people try to be more influential in Norwegian politics, because they want to be heard all around Europe. And of course it affects Turks in many different ways (but he did not mention about those “different ways”).”

Mr. Güven also mentioned about the Turkish Radio in NRK and he said even though it was once a week and only 45 minutes, it was popular among Turks and Turks regularly listened this program. According to him, people were proud to be able to listen to a program in the Turkish language on a Norwegian radio. Besides, it was a necessity because people were wondering about news in Turkey.

Before we ended our interview, Mr. Güven talked about Muslim graveyards, which makes people to travel to Norway and see the heritage of their relatives. He gave an anecdote about that the Turkish people are good in business, they open cafes and shops all around Norway, but they do not have a vision. They expect the state to understand them when they have a common problem.

Interview 2 – Anonymous (Female, 33)

Via Lütfü Güven’s advice I arranged an interview with another knowledgeable person who was born in Norway but has a fluent Turkish with almost no accent. She is 33 years old, and

preferred to stay anonymous. I will mention her name as K in this log. I met K in another restaurant in the city center in 21.01.2013.

I started my interview with a question about the character of the Turkish diaspora. K explained that the Turkish people are mostly known with their affirmative character and they are actually not that visible in the society comparing with other populous minorities:

“The Turkish people are hard-working people. In my environment Norwegians usually like Turks, so they are positive. However, if we check the situation in Drammen it is a different image. For example, 50 percent of the Turkish women does not work there which is not positive. In the past Turks were fighting in the streets all the time. It creates a very negative image of Turks in Norway.”

K told that, almost all of the Turkish people in Norway are laborers and they are earnest people, but the majority of them do not give enough interest to education. K thinks that the education level among Turks in Norway is very low. She mentioned about an association called NTGD (Norwegian Turkish Youth Association), which promotes Turkish youngsters to go to university and have higher education but she said that the progress in this matter is quite slow. I wanted to learn more about NTGD and asked her about the association’s background. K told that most of the Turkish families did not want to send their children to NTGD because it was not conservative:

“There were three Turkish girls who wanted to establish an NGO for the Turkish youth in Norway. Just like many other NGOs it was based on three main values: non-profit, non-political and non-religious, which means you do not support any particular political party or religion over others in the association. But Turkish people did not get this philosophy. ”What does it mean non-religious? Are you against religion? Are you against Islam?” they asked.”

According to K Turkish people in Norway are not well-organized, except when it comes to religion, which is the first and foremost thing that brings them together. K says:

“All Turks can come together if a famous imam comes from Turkey. None of them would care if an academic visits Norway for the purpose of an educative seminar. (...) The most active Turkish association is the religious one.”

K thinks that the Turkish people have no influence in the Norwegian politics and they are inadequate to change the relationship between Turkey and Norway in a positive direction. I asked K if Turks come together under political purposes.

“They do not do it professionally. Turkish associations are not strongly organized. Although they come together, they shout in the streets. They cannot do any lobby. (...) They do not have useful networks; they do not know any people in the administrations. To be honest, I did not see that Turkish people came together and did some useful political action together. (...) Maybe some Turks try to do something useful for the political issues between Turkey and Norway; nonetheless they are not professional lobbyists.”

Before we ended the interview with K, she recommended me to interview one of the earlier Turkish immigrants, who work in the Norwegian media, so I could learn more about any possible political influence. Through her guidance I met with the third interviewee.

Interview 3 – Tahsin Candaş

Tahsin Candaş is the third person that I conducted the semi-structured interview with. I met Tahsin Candaş in his working place at NRK (Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation) in 11.02.2013. I knew that he used to work in the Turkish radio in NRK and he was an active person within the Turkish diaspora in the years that he arrived.

Candaş arrived to Norway first in 1971 as METU (Middle East Technical University), where he was studying sociology, was closed after the “coup by memorandum” in Turkey and it was not sure when it would be open again. In this year he traveled around Europe, worked in different countries like Germany and Denmark, and finally arrived to Norway. His first opinion about Norway was very positive:

“In Norway, the state and social system was developed, people were honest and modest. Moreover they could speak English. So I liked Norway.”

Later he returned back to Turkey for two times, first for continuing his education and second for the obligatory military service. He permanently migrated to Norway in 1978. One year after his immigration, he started to study MA Sociology in the University of Oslo, where he also enrolled to the student union. And events began to develop at that point:

“We were around 15 foreign students. (...) We firstly had a student club in 1977-78, then we heard about the Turkish Workers Association and we wanted to be active in this association. It did not take long for us to be active in the association because we were used to be in such an environment from the university. (...) We wanted to be effective in the Norwegian politics so we started to join local meetings of the political parties. (...) Later we took the initiative to establish the *Fremmearbeideren Foreningen* (The Foreign Worker’s Union), where I took responsibility of the culture department.”

During these years the association became very active and Turkish people found a chance to express themselves in the public media through the Turkish Radio in NRK. The Turkish radio was established in 1979 and it continued to broadcast for 16 years until 1995. The Turkish Radio consisted of 3 major parts: 1) children/youth 2) news and 3) magazine, and each of the parts lasted for approximately 15 minutes. First, in the children/youth part, the radio aimed to inform Turkish kids and the young generation about Norwegian culture and Norwegian society:

"The main intention of this part in the radio was the integration. A lot of families who arrived to Norway from Turkey did not know anything about the Norwegian children culture. We wanted to do something about it. For example, when a Turkish child comes to Norway he or she does not have any clue about the Norwegian children classics (fairytales, stories etc.) that are widely known among children in here. Therefore, we thought it would be a good idea to translate some of the Norwegian children classics into Turkish, and make radio theaters out of them. In this way, Turkish children could integrate into the Norwegian society easier by getting access of this common knowledge that every Norwegian child knows..."

Second, in the news part, the radio aimed to update the audience about the happenings in Turkey and in Norway. The news such as changes in working regulations in Norway, political issues in the two countries, elections, official visits and their possible effects on migrant Turks living in Norway, changes in the retirement regulations that might affect the old people were subjects in that part of the program. In other words, the changes that would have influence on the lives of migrants were the main topic in the news part.

Third, the magazine part of the radio aimed to take people's attention by using the paparazzi culture of Turkey and it tried to ensure the continuity of the audiences via gossips and rumors. According to Candaş, the magazine part of the Turkish radio was taking the fewest efforts and it was just for entertainment.

However, according to Candaş, the following process in the organizations and in the radio was not as good as in the beginning due to skepticism from both Turkish and Norwegian authorities. "Because," says Candaş:

"...we were dynamic and we started to be visible in the society. Besides, we were in Norway, a free country, and we did not hesitate to criticize the implementations in Turkey during and after the coup d'état in the radio. So the Turkish Embassy was always checking our radio program. (...) Starting with the 1980 coup d'état, almost every criticism towards Turkey was considered as communist propaganda. So they labeled us as communists. (...) NRK also got suspicious and pushed us to translate everything that we say in the program. We translated everything for years. They saw nothing wrong in the texts, just critique of happenings in Turkey."

"At the same time" Candaş says,

"After the coup d'état in Turkey, the Turkish state sent three imams to Norway. They had support from the Embassy as well. Because they were religious characters and had support from the state, many Turkish people followed them. They told everyone that they would establish a new association and build a mosque. Instead, they turned the association into a mosque and a coffee house."

I asked about the political influence of Turks in Norway. According to Candaş, Turkish migrants express themselves in two main ways:

“[First], via Turkish government. For example, the Ecevit government⁶ signed an agreement with Norway in 1977. Many Turks did not feel it in their daily lives but these social agreements put Turkish people in a better condition than other migrant groups in Norway. For instance, one of them is about retirement. Turkish people can transfer their labor working days to Turkey. So as long as you have a residence permit in both countries, you can transfer your working days between countries. This rule is still valid. (...) A Pakistani cannot do it. (...)

[The second] way is protesting in the streets. But even in such a civil expression, the support from the government is important. Sometimes, Turkish people have different types of concerns and they want to share it with the Norwegian authorities but they do not mobilize when they do not find the support of the Turkish government. For instance, people came together to protest against the Midnight Express, but that protest was also supported by the Embassy, which made more people join. (...) People who did not have a clue about Midnight Express joined the protest because some Turkish officials told them to.”

According to Candaş, there are some cases where Turkish people unintentionally influence the Norwegian politics and the relationship between Turkey and Norway. He explains it with one example.

“A Turkish man marries a Norwegian woman and they have a daughter. When the daughter becomes a teenager he takes her to Turkey because of her so called “honor”. And the father wants to stay in Turkey with their daughter, because he wants their daughter to grow up like Turkish girls. But according to Norwegian law this is nothing else than kidnapping, because he takes the daughter against his wife’s will. The kid is a Norwegian citizen. So it is nothing else than kidnapping. (...) I do not know if there is a special agreement about this situation, but now Turkish authorities finds the girl and send her back to Norway.”

⁶ Ecevit was five times Prime Minister of Turkey.

Although I could not find any judiciary rule about this kind of incident in the rest of the research one other observant also mentioned about a similar situation. Before we ended our interview, Candaş mentioned that the Turkish migrants in Norway tried to establish new associations in 90s but none of them were sustainable.

Interview 4 – Naci Akkök

I conducted my fourth semi-structured interview with Naci Akkök at his place in 25.02.2013. Before I met him, I knew that Akkök was one of the Turkish students who arrived in Norway in the second half of the 1970s and that he has had an active social and political life since his arrival. In the interview he said that he migrated to Norway in 1976 to continue his education. But later he decided to stay in Norway because of better educational conditions, a more liberal life style, and simply because he was offered a job in a status project that would look good on his CV. Akkök mentioned about other Turkish students who came to study in Norway in this period:

“The second half of the 70s was a period when numerous of Turkish students came to Norway. I came here at the same period with many other Turkish students. Almost all of them were from METU (Middle East Technical University).”

That Akkök said “students from METU” was particularly noteworthy. Because this statement means mainly two things: First, METU was giving the best education in the greater part of departments in Turkey. Second, the students in METU have usually been known with their political engagements and involvement in socio-political organizations. Therefore, what Akkök tried to say with “students from METU” is that, they were clever, educated and politically active people.

I asked about the social situation in Norway when he arrived and their acceptance by the Norwegian society. He explained that with a theory of his own.

“When we came to Norway, the society was very inclusive. It closed up afterwards. (...) but we did not have any problem with our inclusion. (...) I have a theory about it. Accordingly, the distance between educated people, no matter where they are from, is

shorter than the distance between the educated and the uneducated people even if they are from the same country. While educated and uneducated people have very different life philosophies and they have difficulties to understand each other, these obstacles diminish when two educated people from different nations start to communicate. (...) Since the education level in Norway has always been high and we were also university students, we did not have any difficulty in the Norwegian society. Although we did not lose any contact with Turkey, we integrated into the society in a very short time.”

After that Akkök continued to tell about how Turkish students became active within the Turkish diaspora in Norway:

“(...) shortly after their arrival, the Turkish students established a student organization in the University of Oslo. Then, we became aware of the Turkish Worker Association (TWA). The worker’s association already had some members but it was not very active; just like the current Turkish associations. (...) We, as students, did not have many problems except occasional financial problems. Additionally, most of the Turkish migrants in Norway were workers; so we thought that showing solidarity with the workers was the most important thing. (...) Then a group of leading students in the student organization became members of the Turkish Worker Association. Soon afterwards, this group ran candidacy in the association and they won the election. Hence, the Turkish students took over the Turkish Workers Association by 1978.”

According to Akkök, with the inclusion of educated people and the workers’ support, the worker association became critical in the daily lives of the Turkish migrants (and in the lives of many other migrant worker groups, especially the Pakistani workers) in Norway. Furthermore, the association was used as an educational social center in the following 3-4 years, until 1982. Akkök listed the important outcomes of the organization during this period:

“First, in order to cope with workers’ problems, we tenured workers consultancy from the Norwegian Ministry of Social Affairs. Although we opened this consultancy within the body of TWA, this consultancy was for anyone’s use, not only for the use of Turkish workers. (...) Second, we published the Worker’s Handbook to inform the new workers about their rights and responsibilities in Norway. (...) Third, more than 30 percent of the Turkish people (especially the women) did not know how to read

and write in Turkish and the majority of them were illiterate in Norwegian. Therefore, we started two sets of courses: Literacy courses in their mother tongue (separate for women, with women teachers, because of the demand from the men), and Norwegian courses with two teachers, one Turkish and one Norwegian. (...) Fourth, we established a youth culture house. This house had 2 main aims: a) to pull the younger generation from a potentially criminal environment and b) to prevent their possible break off from their mother tongue and culture. (...) Fifth, we enriched the environment of the worker's association and the youth culture house with music, dance, drawing courses, and of course reading. My friend Satılmış Yayla and I played different kinds of instruments like saz, clarinet, drum etc. and another friend, Doğan Gürsel, taught Turkish traditional dances. We brought Turkish books. Süreyya Aydın, a cartoonist, taught how to draw to kids and youth.”

However, Akkök underlines that the environment under the TWA could not be sustained for long-term. Different ideologies within the diaspora became more visible because of the steady increase in conservatism among Turkish migrants in Norway and other dynamics like the military coup in Turkey. That situation later caused a fragmentation and separation of the groups. Akkök says:

”90 percent of the active people broke their relationship with the association after the conservative migrants became dominant. (...) The existence of the association continued, but the number of activities drastically declined, until it was in the level of current associations.”

Akkök mentioned that the influence of the Turkish students in Norway was not limited only with the Turks. They also influenced other migrants in Norway via a) other associations, b) media and c) a unique finding, a loophole in the regulations of the Student State Education Loan Fund, *Lånekassen*.

“First, we also helped to Fremmedarbeider Foreningen (FAF) to get stronger and to maintain its work until it was closed down in 1987. In this organization the leader was from Sierra Leone and the secretary was from the US, but the majority of the active members were Turkish and Pakistani. (...) Second, FAF was crucial for the migrants because it used to have a radio program. Perhaps the hardest thing for foreign workers

is to be heard in media. FAF used to be one of the most listened radio programs among foreigners until 1987. When FAF was closed the radio program was also automatically shut down. A member of the Turkish diaspora, Doğan Gürsel, later applied for and kept the FAF radio's concession. This radio program still continues under the name "Radio Inter FM 107.7 MHz". Gürsel still leads this radio program as the general manager & chief editor, and I am the deputy manager & editor of it. Currently the radio broadcasts in 8 different languages: Arabic, Urdu, Somalian, Persian, Afghan, Albanian, Azeri and Turkish. (...) Third, we could not benefit from the Lånekassen since we were foreigners. One day when we were talking about that situation we came up with the concept of "De facto Educational Refugee". De Facto Education Refugee was referring to a loophole that we found in the State Education Loan Fund (Lånekassen). This loophole later helped us and other 3rd world students to claim a right to get loan and scholarship from Lånekassen. That was perhaps one of the most important things we did. After that, many more students came to Norway from third world countries, naturally. (...) This continued until the Norwegian state changed the regulation."

According to Akkök, the activity level of the Turkish diaspora was very high starting from the first half of the 70s until 83. But in the later period people established many different associations and none of them was successful enough to unite the Turkish migrants under one organization. Then, he mentioned about a Turkish ambassador who came up with an idea.

"In the beginning of 1990s, Ömür Orhun (Turkish Embassy in Oslo between 06.12.1990-21.04.1995) was designated as the Turkish Ambassador to Norway. Before that, the Embassy was approaching to Turkish migrants with the mentality of an intelligence service. Mr. Orhun finally closed the long lasting gap between the Turkish migrants in Norway and the embassy. (...) In this period there were many small-scale Turkish associations in and around Oslo. Mr. Orhun came up with an idea of uniting the active associations under one federation, so the Federation of Turkish-Norwegian Associations was established."

Before we ended our interview, Mr. Akkök concluded that individuals could be very influential within the Turkish diaspora but the Turkish diaspora in Norway has generally been quite passive.

Interview 5 – Ferruh Özalp

I met Ferruh Özalp through a friend in 2011 and after getting to know her more, I realized that she has a lot of knowledge about the Turkish diaspora in Norway. I conducted a semi-structured interview with Özalp at her place in 28 October 2013. In addition to that she was a knowledgeable person, there were four main reasons that led me to conduct an interview with her. First of all, Özalp was easy to reach since she is my friend. Second, I thought it was useful to make an interview with someone who is outside of the snowball sampling, so I could check the consistency in the stories that I got through the previous interviews. Third, I wanted to interview someone after the Gezi Park protests (started in 27 May 2013) that somewhat changed the environment in the Turkish diaspora. Fourth, I found it important to acknowledge another female's perspective in the Turkish diaspora as well.

I started my interview with Özalp by asking about her migration background. She said:

“First my uncle moved to Norway in 1969, then my mother moved in 1971 and my father followed her in 1974. They were working in Drammen (a city 45 minutes outside of Oslo). In the meantime, I was in Turkey studying at the Teacher's Training School and working in a labor union. Turkey was chaotic in these years, especially between the coup by memorandum in March 1971 and before the coup d'état in September 1980. So, my family was always calling me to come Norway, because they were worrying about the atmosphere in Turkey. In this period, many of my friends in Turkey were looking for job and study opportunities in other countries. People were fleeing from Turkey. Finally, I also decided to come to Norway and migrated here in April 1980. I was one of the student migrants who arrived in this period.”

Özalp said that, her first engagement with the “people from Turkey”⁷ was through her family but because of cultural differences within the Turkish society, she later changed this

⁷ During the interview Özalp often stressed on saying “people from Turkey”, instead of saying “Turkish people” or “Turks”. Because, according to her, Turkey is a country where

environment and preferred to be with other students like her. She explains that situation and its reasons:

“My first engagements with the people from Turkey were through my family and relatives. But I was not happy with that environment. I experienced conservatism for the first time in Norway. One day when my father’s friend came home, I reached forth to say hi to him, but he did not shake my hand because I was a woman. I had never experienced such a thing in Turkey before. (...) When the conservative Turks see a Turkish girl sitting in cafes or restaurants they were gossiping about her and saying in a jokey way, “she is no longer Turkish, she became Norwegian now”. (...) My parents were economic migrants but it does not mean that I must be an economical migrant. I was a student migrant. Therefore, I was hanging around with my brother’s friends who graduated from METU and studied in Norway just like me. They became my friends in a very short time.”

According to Özalp, such divisions in the Turkish society were having an important place in the background of the Turkish diaspora in Norway. The first half of the 1980s was the period that the Turkish diaspora was active; hence Özalp could easily engage with the other Turkish students who were working in the youth culture house where she also took responsibilities. However, she noticed the cultural differences within the Turkish diaspora members there as well:

“In the beginning of 1980s, when we were teaching Anatolian folk dance in the youth house, some parents did not allow their small daughters to hold boys’ hands.”

Özalp says that the division between the educated and the non-educated Turkish migrants in Norway was deep. While educated people were graduated from the best universities in Turkey and they were politically active, uneducated people were the ones who directly came from small traditionalist villages in Turkey, even before experiencing a city-life. However, the only detachment reason within the Turkish diaspora was not the education level differences.

there are lots of different ethnicities, so saying ”people from Turkey” is more inclusive concept.

According to Özalp, the ideologies were often crashing. She tells about her experiences right after she started to work as a teacher:

“For some, our liberal values, our educated background and political knowledge were disturbing. According to them there were two types of people from Turkey: Muslims and communists. Since we were students and teachers, according to them, we could be considered as communists. (...)”

Özalp claimed that the Jewish Community’s example inspired the Norwegian integration policies. However, the Turkish example was including so many fractions within the group, therefore it did not fit in a same way as the Jewish community did.

“I think, Leo Eitinger (a Norwegian Jewish humanist psychiatry professor who lived between 12 December 1912 - 15 October 1996) is an influential person in the integration policies of Norway. According to his opinion, immigrant groups in Norway could have their own small organizations. And in these organizations, they could help each other and make the integration process much easier. Perhaps that worked for Jewish people, because Jewish people stick together, they help each other in financial issues and they find work for each other if it is necessary. But it was not same for the people coming from Turkey. There were many fractions, even fractions of fractions. Exclusion within the Turkish community in Norway has been more dominant than inclusion.”

When I asked Özalp about the political influences of the Turkish diaspora in Norway, she first mentioned about the Turkish Muslim community. According to her, even though the Muslim community in Norway has different fractions within the community, religion brings them together and therefore they can be well organized. A well-organized group has higher capability to have an influence in the society and politics.

Özalp gave details about the usage of media in the Turkish diaspora. She said that the contact people in the media sector could be crucial at the time of big events, because either the diaspora members wanted to show their perspective to Norwegian society and the contact people could ease the way to reach the media sphere, such as TV and newspapers; or these

key people could ask and learn different issues from their close friends who were coming from the country where the big events took place. She provided an example about it:

“For example, during the Gezi Park protests, one of my friends working in the media contacted me about the situation. And I explained my own perspective, which was later reflected in the media. (...)”

She said that the Turkish diaspora members during the Gezi Park protests has used the media in a productive way so it got attention from and increased awareness in the Norwegian society against police violence and political events in Turkey. According to her, this situation even made some Norwegians to bring up the topic to put a pressure on important characters in Norway. She said:

“For instance, the Norwegian King and the Queen will go to Turkey soon [the Norwegian Royal Family visited Turkey in 5-6 November 2013]. Norwegians ask them to meet with protesters as well. (...) We can say that the Turkish diaspora’s usage of media and Gezi Park-related demonstrations in Oslo increased awareness in the society and this could be one of the reasons of this pressure.”

Özalp later explained that the visit of influential Turkish people could actually be a useful tool for the Turkish diaspora in Norway. According to her, these people can sometimes be key actors in reflecting the Turkish diaspora’s opinion in Norway. She said:

“For instance Zülfü Livaneli (a Turkish artist, intellectual and Goodwill Ambassador for UNESCO) met with William Nygaard (chairman of the Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation). Yasar Kemal (a Turkish writer with Kurdish origin) also met with important people in Norway. Talking to these people about our problems and ideas can sometimes make a change, because they can inform the lobbyists, politicians and media about these things.”

In the following part of the interview Özalp acknowledged the importance of personal initiatives in the Turkish diaspora. According to her, the personal relationships and problems dominate the Turkish network and that often creates conflicts within the group. Before we

finished our interview, she pessimistically added a speech from Cengiz Aytmatov (a Soviet and Kyrgyz author) “Turkish people are like pig bristles; two of them do not come together.”

Findings

Background and the character of the Turkish Diaspora in Norway

1. Different Types of Turkish migrants in Norway

We should first remember that, Turkish migrants are one of the earliest migrant groups in Norway and they started to migrate to Norway at the end of 1950s. Considering this, the Turkish migrants in Norway have longer than 55 years of history by 2014. During this period Turkish people came to Norway with different types of migration. According to the findings of this research, the majority of the Turkish migrants in Norway migrated to this country as mainly individual migrants, worker migrants, student migrants, political asylum migrants, and for family reunion. While some of them came to Norway in their own ways, many of the Turks followed the pattern of chain migration.

1.1 Individual migrants

Individual migration can be referred as migration that is motivated by personal reasons (Sirkeci, 2005). Many people living in rural areas in Turkey considered the individual migrants as adventurers people (observation, 15 February 2013). The Turkish people who migrated to Norway at the end of 1950s and at the beginning of 1960s consisted of individual migrants. The Turkish individual migration to Norway lasted for almost a decade but still the number of individual migrants has been small. In this period, there were some Turkish people who worked in the ships and traveled the coastline countries around the world and Europe.

Accordingly, the arrival of some of those ships to Norway has started a settlement story for the early Turkish migrant group.

The typical characteristics of this group were that they were semi-skilled, young male workers, who could speak at least a foreign language, mostly English, in an intermediate level or better. According to early migrants stories, the first 35-40 Turkish migrants in Norway came through ship works. The main reasons they decided to stay in Norway were a) they had travelled for a long time in the sea and wanted to find a work on land, b) they already had some capital, which made them feel comfortable with taking initiative in another country c) family reunion, d) no visa issue with Norway and e) financial reasons, which simply meant that they could make more money in Norway than in Turkey or in many other European countries. Majority of this group of people actually did not plan to stay in Norway permanently, they actually intended to go back to Turkey or continue travelling after they saved enough money. However, they later got used to the life style in Norway and decided to settle there. (Unstructured group interview: 1 February, 2013).

Lütfü Güven was one of the individual Turkish migrants who arrived in Norway in 1959. He could speak English and he worked in a ship that weighed anchor in Istanbul, travelled Asian, African and European countries and finally ended up in Scandinavia. He reported:

“I first came to Denmark – Copenhagen with a ship work, but I did not like it there and I wanted to give it a try in Norway. (...) Norwegian people were very nice and helpful. The second day of my arrival to Oslo, I found a work in the Turkish Embassy with the help of a Norwegian police officer.”

Another interviewee (A, Male-76: Interview date 14 Januray 2013) told a story about his job position in the ship and how he decided to stay in Norway:

“I was an electrician in Turkey and I started to work in a ship as a technician. (...) When the ship arrived to Norway I met someone who needed an electrician for the planes in SAS - Scandinavian Airlines System. I told my boss that I wanted to work in this job. My boss first tried to persist me to continue working in the ship, but after he understood that I really want to go and try some another job, so he wrote me a very good reference. I applied the job in SAS with this reference and I got it.”

In a newspaper clipping dated 17 April 1970, Güven said that, “50 out of 150 Turkish people in Norway work in ships (...) [and] 20 of these people are married to Norwegian women.”

In this piece, as he later stated, Güven clearly encouraged future individual migration from Turkey to Norway. He promoted Norway with the help of financial opportunities as people could earn double of they earn in Turkey, and also they could have equal rights with the Norwegians. He wrote that:

“Norwegian labor market needs skilled workers, sailors and captains (...) Although it is not easy to save money in Norway because of taxes, a Turkish cook in a restaurant can earn 1600-1800 Norwegian Kroner which is around 2600-3000 Turkish Liras.” (According to the Republic of Turkey Ministry of Labor and Social Security statistics, the minimum worker wages in Turkey by 1974 was 1200 Turkish Liras).⁸ “Norway is a socialist country. All foreign workers in Norway have equal rights and they earn as much as Norwegians.” Güven ends his piece by mentioning about educational opportunities in Norway, which leads better jobs and better wages: “There are 5 Turkish captains in Norway who were graduated from the ship captain school and became the ‘4th captain’ after 10 months of education.”

The interviews and the newspaper clipping provided an overall picture of the first Turkish immigrants in Norway. The individual Turkish migrants did not have a specific plan to migrate to Norway but when they arrived there they liked the living conditions, or they married to a Norwegian. These kinds of reasons made them settle in Norway. Another common characteristic of the individual migrants was that, they were not moved to Norway through a company or agency, they came there themselves and were unaware of each other.

⁸ Daily and monthly minimum wages according to years, (available in Turkish) http://www.csgeb.gov.tr/csgebPortal/ShowProperty/WLP%20Repository/csgeb/dosyalar/istatistikler/gunluk_aylik_asgari_uc

1.2 Economic / Worker migrants

The most common feature of Turks in Norway is characteristic as a worker. Although most of the interviews in this research were conducted with, teachers, politicians, professionals and employers, the observations part provided such a knowledge that most of the Turkish migrants that have arrived throughout the years have been unskilled worker migrants.

Turkey did not sign any labor agreement with Norway as she did with Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, and France etc. Hence, there has not been any mass worker migration from Turkey to Norway. According to Statistics Norway, in 1970, the number of Turkish migrants in Norway was only 236 (Østby, 2013).⁹ Philip Martin (1991), an international migration scholar and the chair of the UC Comparative Immigration and Integration Program, states that the number of Turkish worker migrants in Germany, was 66000 in 1964 and it swelled to 130000 in 1970. Accordingly, between 1961-1975, about 805000 Turkish people was sent to work outside of Turkey by the Turkish Employment Service (TES) and other 120000-150000 migrated by illegal ways (*ibid.*). So comparing with these numbers, the population of Turkish people in Norway was quite small.

One of the main findings of this thesis was that the mass migration to main labor receiving countries can make some indirect influences on the secondary destinations of migrants as well. In accordance with that following the recession in 1972 due to the oil crisis, Germany and other European countries that had labor agreement with Turkey started to apply new restrictions on the entry of worker migrants (Sirkeci, 2005: 609). Moreover, these restrictions affected the current Turkish migrants in those countries as well. Hence many Turks could not renew their working permit before they could save enough capital. So many Turkish migrants

⁹ This number was given as '150' in the Güven's description in the newspaper Milliyet which dates 17 April 1970. As Güven stated later, the difference between this numbers would be because he was more aware of people living in Oslo and around Oslo like Drammen, and the people who visit the Turkish Embassy. He later stated that the other 86 people were probably living in the other harbor cities like Kristiansand, Stavanger, Bergen, and Trondheim etc. Considering the number differences and the places they would be living in, the number of individual Turkish migrants would be higher than it was predicted in the previous section.

who could not “make it” in their first destination wanted to migrate to other countries to try it one more time instead of going back to Turkey with failure stories and be labeled as a “loser”.

Güven in his article dated 17 April 1970 in Milliyet, mentioned that many Turkish workers in Norway were those who could not manage to get a working permission in other European countries. In our interview he repeated this statement and he said, “Pakistanis came from England and many Turks came from agreement countries.” He added, “The Pakistanis had an advantage because they knew English.” With the new migrants from Turkey and the agreement countries, the number of Turkish worker migrants started to increase in great numbers at the beginning of 1970s and the population of the Turks in Norway grew more than 10 times between 1970 and 1980 and almost three times between 1980 and 1990.

Table 3. Statistics regarding the increase of the Turkish population in Norway

Table 2.1. Immigrants and descendants, by country background. Absolute figures. 1970-2011

| | 1970 | 1980 | 1991 | 2001 | 2006 | 2011 |
|-------------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| Sweden | 11 198 | 11 018 | 12 465 | 23 010 | 23 489 | 34 108 |
| Poland | 1 198 | 1 672 | 4 873 | 6 432 | 11 864 | 60 610 |
| Turkey | 236 | 2 384 | 6 706 | 10 990 | 14 084 | 16 430 |
| Kosovo | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 13 303 |
| Morocco | 401 | 1 286 | 3 312 | 5 719 | 7 031 | 8 305 |
| Somalia | 3 | 31 | 1 747 | 10 107 | 18 015 | 27 523 |
| Philippines | 70 | 789 | 3 731 | 5 885 | 8 561 | 14 797 |
| Iraq | 20 | 38 | 932 | 12 357 | 20 076 | 27 827 |
| Iran | 43 | 135 | 6 066 | 11 016 | 14 362 | 16 957 |
| Pakistan | 163 | 6 828 | 16 341 | 23 581 | 27 675 | 31 884 |
| Vietnam | 20 | 2 072 | 9 964 | 15 880 | 18 333 | 20 452 |
| Chile | 85 | 947 | 6 028 | 6 491 | 7 084 | 7 708 |

Source: Population statistics, Statistics Norway

Source: Lars Østby, 2013 - *Norway's population groups of developing countries' origin - Change and integration*

This research also found out that before 1970 there were very little worker migration from Turkey to Norway compare to the other European countries and the following decades. This might be mainly due to two reasons: the academic research part demonstrated that an institution in Turkey named Turkish Employment Service (TES), which made sure that the

country of destination supplied the minimum standards for Turkish migrant workers, were only operating in the agreement countries¹⁰.

The second reason was connected to the first reason, because of the valuable help that could be offered by TES in the agreement countries, they were not likely to move to a country where TES was not operating.

An interviewee, H (Male, 72 - 08.04.2013) said many of the Turkish worker migrants who migrated to Germany were not aware of or did not dare to try out other working opportunities in Europe. According to him

“The workers who migrated to Germany were unskilled, they did not have any expertise, and they could not speak any foreign language. Thus, many of them did not dare to look for other options in Europe. (...)”

Güven also underlined two things about the Turkish workers who migrated to Germany between 1961 and 1970. First of all, they were *Gastarbeiter* – guest workers who would eventually return to Turkey. Second, they were making a lot of money comparing with what they would earn in Turkey. Therefore, he says:

“(...) they were trying to have enough savings and go back to Turkey. (...) In Germany, the work was ready. Good or bad, some place to live was given by the factories. There was no reason for them to consider migrating to another country. It would have been another undertaking for them.” (Interview, Lütfü Güven: 08.04.2013)

Most of the Turkish worker migrants, or in other words, economic migrants, were those who came from the other European countries or from the rural areas in Turkey. Another feature

¹⁰ For example, certifying the health and skills, the issuance of identity cards, transport agreements, and how to handle breaches and cancellations of contracts (Martin, 1991) and often establishment of assistance organizations to help migrants to deal with various problems, such as housing (Abadan-Unat, 1976). Therefore, migrating to the agreement countries was the safest option for the unskilled workers.

that they usually had in common were that they were unskilled. The worker migration from Turkey to Norway has not ended, and it still continues today. The restrictions in Norway though slow down the migration flow in the last years. Many worker migrants also came to Norway via invitations from friends and relatives, a phenomenon that is called chain migration. This kind of migration will be further explained.

1.3 Educational Migrants – Turkish students in 70s and 80s

Even though the Turkish educational migrants in Norway have not been populous, this thesis found out that the Turkish student migrants have been very influential within the diaspora. Moreover, many of them migrated to Norway in the same period as the other types of migrant groups. Therefore, I thought it should be useful to give a special focus to this group.

Starting from the 1960s, many engineers and doctors left Turkey to work in the West, mainly in Europe (Güngör and Tansel, 2007). In Norway, this phenomenon started to be recognized with the arrival of numerous of students around the middle of 1970s. The stay of these students led to the emigration of professionals in many different fields and it became a part of an issue that was later recognized as ‘Brain Gain’ (West, 2010). Unlike the labor migrants, the students’ focus in Norway was not only about financial matters, but also about world-class education, and new job opportunities that existed within their professions.

The beginning of 1970s was the period when the ‘push’ and ‘pull factors’ were simultaneously valid. ‘Push factors’ refer to the conditions that drive people to leave their country. These conditions can be economical and political instabilities such as unemployment, political threats and constraints that affect daily life. ‘Pull factors’ on the other hand refer to the conditions that attract people to migrate to a new place. For example, better life standards, attractive working environment, better income, ease to find job, respect to individual freedoms and human rights are common pull factors in the case of Turks’ migration to Norway.

Candaş, who migrated to Norway as an educational migrant, referred to the push factors in Turkey at the beginning of 1970s. Accordingly, he said:

“During 1971 coup in Turkey, METU was closed due to political activities of its students, and we did not know when it would be opened again. (...) In these years, we METU students started to look for education and job opportunities in Europe and the USA” (Interview with Tahsin Candaş, 11.02.2013)

In a similar way, Akkök, who was another student migrant, mentioned about the pull factors in Norway, such as “better educational conditions, a more liberal life style” and a job that he easily found. (Interview with Naci Akkök, 25.02.2013)

Therefore, while Norway had ‘pull factors’ such as free and high standard education, low unemployment rates and better life standards, Turkey was experiencing political instability, high inflation and lack of good job opportunities, which were push factors for especially the educated people. These conditions caused educated people to leave their homeland and look for other possibilities outside of Turkey.

Between the years of 1971 and 1980, hence many Turkish students migrated to Norway. Most of them graduated or did a part of their university education in one of the top rank universities in Turkey, METU (Middle East Technical University). Beside of its educational success, METU has also been known with its political and organizational activities such as protests and active student clubs. Accordingly, the students who graduated from this university were also socially and politically active people. In addition to that, they could speak at least one foreign language.

This study could not find the exact number of Turkish students who arrived to Norway within that period and it is unknown how many of them who graduated from universities in Turkey, particularly METU. However, all the interviewees pointed out that, especially between 1974-1985, the university students were very influential actors within the Turkish diaspora.

Correspondingly, in the period mentioned above, the Turkish students in Norway established a student club in the University of Oslo; they took important roles in the established worker organizations like TWA and FAF and activated these organizations. The Turkish students took initiatives in opening courses, doing social activities to create solidarity within Turks and other foreigner groups. By using media tools they aimed to make foreigners, and especially

Turks', voice to be heard in Norway. So, comparing with the labor migrants the students had much more active roles within the diaspora and in the Norwegian society.

Some of these activities still continue today. For instance, the Radio Inter FM 107.7 broadcasts in 8 different languages in Oslo and a Turkish program airs every Sunday between 20:00- 24:00. The current Turkish Norwegian Youth Association (NTGD) has similar aims and uses the same paths as the Turkish students' youth organization had in 1980s. Regarding to that, Akkök said, "(...) NTGD is more or less a successor of the Turkish Youth Organization that we established in 1980s."

However, the dynamic atmosphere of 70s and 80s movement was eventually ended because the social character of the Turkish diaspora was changed with the inclusion of new economical migrants. The diaspora after this period dominantly took the form of a more conservative one. Besides, the Turkish students migrants of 80s movement simply grew up and they left the student environment for adult life. Since, the other new Turkish students did not have the same characteristics and motivations and they did not picked up where the pioneers had left. (Interview with Ferruh Özalp, 28.10.2013 and Interview with Tahsin Candaş, 11.02.2013).

1.4 Political migrants

As a consequence of the 1980s military coup d'état, politically motivated migration increased and a lot of Turkish and Kurdish people, especially Kurds, made up the majority of the political migration from Turkey to Norway. While doing archival research in the LO archives, I came across with over 100 files regarding to the cases of Turkish political asylum seekers. Many of those cases were from the beginning of 1974 until 1990, and thus connected to the political instability in Turkey and the 1980 coup d'état in Turkey.

The files revealed a detailed a description of the incidents of humanitarian issues, such as severe experiences in the prisons in Turkey. As all of the political asylum seekers that I checked were named 'Turkish', it was not easy to find out whether they were about Turkish or Kurdish asylum seekers. However, the files that I found were mostly in Norwegian, French and English been stamped by LO, Amnesty International and other Norwegian authorities,

and they were approved for migration to Norway as political asylums. Therefore, we can conclude that many political migrants from Turkey arrived to Norway during and after the period of political instability and the coup d'état.

One who checks the archives of the Norwegian newspapers *Aftenposten*, *Dagbladet* and *Arbeiderbladet* can easily recognize that there are a lot of news about political developments in Turkey, Turkish migrants, Kurdish people in Turkey, humanitarian issues and political migrants from Turkey. Some writers of the related articles were with Turkish and Kurdish origins although they preferred to stay anonymous.

A piece in *Arbeiderbladet* newspaper dated 3.3.1975 and titled “*Kurdisk språk og kultur blir undertrykt i Tyrkia* – Kurdish language and culture is being suppressed in Turkey”, revealed that, there have been more and more Kurdish people had been migrating to Norway via political asylum. Another piece in *Dagbladet* dated 13.5.1976 and titled “*Norsk klage over tortur i Tyrkia* – Norwegians complain about torture in Turkey”, explained Norwegian department of Amnesty International followed the torture cases in Turkey and they sent a complain letter to Süleyman Demirel, the prime minister of Turkey at that time. Relating with the coup d'état in Turkey, one day after the coup took place in 13.9.1980, Hansen in *Aftenposten* stated that the Turkish people in Norway listened the Turkish radio and kept calm. However, they did not know much about what was going on in Turkey and they were worrying the most. (Lone Hansen, “*Verst ikke å vite noe* – Not to know anything is the worst”, 13.9.1980 – *Aftenposten*)

According to the interviews and observations, this research found out that the Kurdish political asylums, who arrived to Norway between 1974-1990 had a major role in the establishment of the Kurdish diaspora in Norway. However, the research did not find any evidence about the Turkish political asylum seekers enrolled in any political engagements in Turkey. This can be because people would not like to speak about their severe experiences rashly.

All in all, the Turkish political migrants, even though they did not do anything specific, their mere migration and existence in Norway would be influential in the Norwegian society in a certain degree.

2. Different Types of Turkish migration to Norway

2.1 Family migration

A great number of Turkish migrants have right of permanent residency in Norway through a family reunion. Throughout the years, the Turkish family migrants did not have any specific agenda and a deliberate influence within the Turkish diaspora. However, the family migration continues to challenge the borders of the countries. This research had two findings about the family migration type.

First, the majority of the Turkish people who had a residence permit in Norway through the family migration are males. And the number of Turkish males in Norway who migrated through marriage has reached to high numbers. Regarding to that, one of the interviewees F, 80 said that:

“Of course not every Turkish man has married to a Norwegian, but I think every Turkish living in Norway has at least one friend who is married to a Norwegian women.” (Interview conducted in 20.05.2013)

In the line with this finding, there is a statistical research carried out by SSB about family migration, with the titled: “Koner fra Thailand, ektemenn fra Tyrkia” (Wives from Thailand, husbands from Turkey) in which, the family reunion definition includes not only the Norwegian citizens, but also other nationalities that can provide for a living in Norway (Daugstad, 2008). According to the SSB’s statistics, Daugstad (*ibid.*) concludes, “Although Family establishment is not what affects the migration as a whole to the greatest extend, this is far heading the main reason for immigration for some immigrant groups. This applies in particular to those from Thailand, Morocco, Turkey and Pakistan where between 63-52 percent of those who immigrated in the period 1990-2006, received a residence on the basis of a family establishment.”¹¹

¹¹ <http://www.ssb.no/befolkning/artikler-og-publikasjoner/koner-fraa-thailand-og-ektemenn-fraa-tyrkia>

Second finding demonstrated that family reunion migration has not always been unproblematic. In a few cases the cultural differences between Turkish and Norwegian couples caused child abduction. In the interview with Candaş, he explained that there were a few cases where Turkish men had sent their daughters to Turkey without asking for the Norwegian mother's approval. He said that:

“(...) When the daughter becomes a teenager he takes her to Turkey because of her so called “honor”. And the father wants to stay in Turkey with his daughter, because he wants the daughter to grow up like a Turkish girl. But according to Norwegian law this is nothing else than kidnapping, because he takes the daughter against the mother's will. (...)“

Candaş' example shows that family reunion migration could sometimes unintentionally influence the relationship between Turkey and Norway, and it brought the Turkish and Norwegian authorities together to work on a solution through the Hague Convention in International Child Abduction ("The Hague Convention") which supplies expeditious methods for the return of an internationally abducted child by a parent from one member country to another (Anton 1981, Bruch 1994, Silberman 2000). Both Turkey and Norway are members of the Hague Convention since 1955 (Norway is member since 15.07.1955 and Turkey is member since 26.08.1955), therefore it is expected that the child abduction problems between the two countries have been solved through the Hague Convention regulations.

This study could not reach any dataset about the number of such cases between Turkey and Norway throughout the history, however according to the Justice Ministry of Turkish Republic a total of 736 files regarding to the international parental child abduction were processed between 2000 and 2011 in Turkey.¹² And there has been one case between Turkey and Norway in 2012.¹³

¹² The original file is available in the Justice Ministry of Turkey official website in Turkish: http://www.uhdigm.adalet.gov.tr/duyuru/Faaliyet_Raporu_2011.pdf

¹³ Zaman, *Türkiye'nin başı 'çocuk kaçırma'larla dertte (Turkey has trouble with child abduction)* 11 October 2013

2.2 Chain Migration

As it was mentioned in the theoretical part, the chain migration is a type of immigration that makes people migrate by following a pioneer who is a family member, relative or friend. It is typical in the chain migration that once the initial migrant settles down in the ideal country of destination, the relevant information about the better conditions in the destination spreads and it triggers the chain migration with the migrant's social capital. In the chain migration, an *öncül* – pioneer often provides travel expenses and supply accommodation to later ones. Since the chain migration process is expanding, the initial migrant - the *öncül*, disappears or becomes no longer be visible in time.

This research found that the chain migration has been one of the most common migration styles among Turks in Norway. The majority of the interviewees, 8 of 12, mentioned that they migrated to Norway through a friend or a family member. Moreover, many of them later encouraged some other Turks to migrate to Norway as well. Correspondingly, in the archival research, the Turkish journals published in Norway did not only mention about the individual migrants, but they often addressed to Turkish families and family members, which helps us to conclude that inviting the family members from Turkey and bringing the kids in the later periods has been a common migration style among Turks.

An interesting outcome of the thesis about the chain migration was that while individual and educational Turkish migrants tended to contact with their friends to lead chain migration, the economical migrants tended to contact with the family members and relatives. For instance, an early individual migrant N (Güven's friend) tells the story of how he migrated here through one of his friends. N says:

“The reason why I am here is sitting beside of you (showing Lütfü). We met in Denmark and had a very nice friendship. And then, he said:

- ‘I am going to Norway, come with me.’

I said to him:

- ‘Not now, maybe sometime in the future.’

Honestly where I was in Denmark was not a charming place then and I did not have good friends there so it was boring. Anyway, I came to Norway three days after Lütfü

to give it a try as well. When I came to Oslo, I directly went to Turkish Embassy to get in contact with other Turks. There, Lütfü opened the door. I was shocked.”

After N arrived to Norway, he invited his friend Altan Gülpınar who stated that:

“N is the reason why I am in Norway today. [...] In 1960, during the military coup in Turkey, I was in the army. When I finished the military service, I went back to Izmir, to my family and to my work. However, my working position was given to another person who was a relative of the boss. That situation made me very angry. For a while, I was unemployed, but then I started to work in a bank. In the meantime, N. was always inviting me to Norway and mentioning about good environment and life standard there. He was also complaining about that he had only one good friend in Oslo. I told him that it would be a nice to come and visit. Shortly after I received a letter from N and a one-way train ticket to Oslo. (...) When I came to Oslo, I started to work with N. but later I found a job in SAS. (...) Things went pretty fine for me in Norway and I decided to stay here.”

In a parallel way, Tahsin Candaş while explaining the Turkish educational migrants in Norway also mentioned that the students who liked the environment in Norway encouraged their friends to come to Norway and they promoted the migration to this country through mentioning the new job opportunities, free and quality education etc. (Tahsin Candaş interview 11.02.2013) Therefore, beside of the push factors in Turkey and the pull factors of Norway specifically in this period, there was also a network within educational migrants. So by using this network the Turkish students in Norway encouraged other students to come to Norway. However, this attempt eventually was not very prosperous and did not cause any student migration wave to Norway from Turkey.

The chain migration among the Turkish economic migrants in Norway, on the other hand, tended to include the family members and relatives. Özalp said:

“First my uncle moved to Norway as an economic migrant in 1969, then he invited my mother who moved in 1971 and later my father followed her in 1974.” (Interview with Ferruh Özalp – 28.10.2013)

Another person during the observation part of this research also mentioned that he came to Norway through his older brother. He reported:

“My brother was in Norway, he was working and sending money to us in Turkey. Later I decided to join him in Norway so we could earn more money together. (...) Therefore I came to Norway through him.” (Observation – 05.06.2013)

Like the above examples have showed, chain migration had an important role in Turkish peoples' migration to Norway. Interestingly, while most of the individual migrants invited individual migrants, economic migrants tend to invite family members and relatives.

The influence of the Turkish diaspora in Norway

First of all, this thesis found out that the Turkish diaspora members did not think that they have had a specific influence in the Norwegian politics at a first glance. Later, when they started to talk about their experiences and involvements, the respondents realized that the Turkish diaspora could actually have had an affect in the politics. Some respondents stated that the Turkish diaspora tried to create a social awareness in Norway. Accordingly, they tried to make Norwegians and politicians perceive the events from a Turkish point of view.

The following section will present some of the areas where the Turkish diaspora has been, or has tried to be influential.

1. The Turkish organizations

1.1 The first Turkish organization in Norway – The Turkish Worker Association (TWA)

The first Turkish diasporic group did not come together around a political agenda. Rather, they came together to solve their practical problems and to establish a social network and solidarity.

Turkish migrants started to arrive to Norway in the end of 1950s and therefore, they have one of the longest histories in Norway as migration group. However, their diasporic group was not established until the 1970s. SSB's statistical dataset report named "Norway's population groups of developing countries' origin - Change and integration" by Lars Østby (2013) highlights that one of the most significant years for the Turkish population in Norway was 1970s. He says, "During the seventies, immigration from Pakistan and Turkey continued in higher numbers than from the other countries (...)" (*ibid*, 22).

The increase in the Turkish population in Norway brought new problems for the Turkish migrants, and these problems needed to be handled. Even though there were institutions in Norway that were for helping migrants, they could not supply the Turkish migrants with what they needed, or how to resolve their problems due to frequent communication difficulties. Moreover, the information was not sufficient to make the Turkish migrants aware of them, and also the language posed a drawback.

These problems created a necessity for an association that could organize the Turkish network, inform its members, educate them and help them with administrative issues. Thereby, in 24th February 1974, with the initiative of Lütfü Güven, a leading character of the community, the first Turkish organization in Norway called "Turkish Worker Association" was established. Accordingly, the main aims of the association were to inform its members about their rights and responsibilities in Norway, to inform of standard wages and warn them for labor exploitation. The overarching goal was simply to bring Turkish people together.

It was a common sense that the migrants in Norway experienced (or could experience) similar problems, so the solutions would be best provided by a social network. Therefore, bringing people together and to launching an interaction among them was crucial. The Turkish Workers Association was very useful to meet that demand and it was productive in bringing practical solutions for common problems.

The diasporic public sphere is where the members of diaspora express their political views, discuss their projects for the homeland and the diaspora, and interact with hostland and homeland government officials and politicians, and reflects on its contribution to society (Laguerre, 2006: 114).

1.2 Turkish students and De Facto Educational Refugee

The Turkish students have been active in the Turkish diaspora, especially between 1974-1985. Although the number of the students was small comparing with the population workers, they became prominent within the diaspora. The best example of their influence in the Norwegian politics was the loophole found in the regulations of Student State Education Loan Fund, *Lånekassen*.

The educational migrants started to arrive in 1974, and most of them came from the top universities of Turkey. Moreover, they were politically active and had experience in organizing clubs and associations. Both Akkök and Candaş stated that... Therefore they took on a dynamic role within the Turkish diaspora, and by doing this they activated the Turkish people in Norway. They first started a student club, but then chose to focus on TWA instead, partly because it was already an established association, and partly out of solidarity for the workers. However, in the middle of the 1980's the ideological, political and religious differences in the group became more visible, and this led to the annexation of TWA by rather conservative Turks and got a new name Norwegian-Turkish Islamic Union (NORTİB), an association that will be explained further.

According to Akkök, the most important influence of the Turkish students was to find a loophole in the regulations of *Lånekassen*. According to that, students who complete their education in public college, folkehøyskole, which ordinarily lasts for one year, could be admitted to normal schools by providing that they had good grades and enough fund to be able to live in Norway, which would secure the student visa. These funds could easily be borrowed from friends and contacts and immediately be returned back when the application was accepted and the visa was granted. Once the visa was granted, the loans were available for international students through the Norwegian student loan office.

The information about the loophole was spread by word of mouth among the migrants. Many young and educated people migrated to Norway by using the loophole in the following years. During this period, comparatively educated young people's arrival from all around the world supplied a brain gain to Norway in a certain extent. This happened because, even though it

was a Turkish student who found the loophole, it was not only Turkish people who used it. On the contrary, the students who came to Norway through the gap were mostly from third world countries. That situation was problematic, because once a third world country citizen entered Norway, Norwegian authorities did not tend to send him or her back to their country because of humanitarian considerations. For instance, at the beginning of 1980s, a number of Tamil students used the loophole and were guaranteed the study permit. However, following the events in Sri Lanka in 1983, the Norwegian government was not in a position to send the Tamil students home to Sri Lanka, even if they did not fulfill the requirements to renew a study permit (Anderson, 2011: 55).

Why could not more Turkish students migrate to Norway during that period by using the loophole? There were mainly two reasons. First, the political environment in 70s was of such a character that one should not leave the country during such pressing and turbulent circumstances. Second, after the coup in 1980s, it simply became more difficult to leave Turkey. Punishments such as imprisonment and passport banning made it even impossible for many.¹⁴

¹⁴ In the 1977 elections none of the parties could get enough majority to form a government and in the following three years the prime minister changed for three times. The political instability brought about economic and social problems. Unprecedented political violence had erupted in Turkey in the late 1970s, and the overall death toll of the 1970s was estimated at 5,000, with nearly ten assassinations per day. Following that, in 12 September 1980, the Turkish army seized the control and it governed the country for the next three years. Throughout the coup, many educational institutions and other public bodies were suspended, 650.000 people were arrested, 517 persons were sentenced to death and 388.000 people were not given passport. Although there is no accurate number that indicates how many of these people were students, considering the active role of the young people in the events, it would not be wrong to say that quite many of them were students. (Source: The Grand National Assembly of Turkey, Parliamentary Investigation Commission for the Coups and the Memorandums – November 2012. See references: ‘The Grand National Assembly of Turkey’)

1.3 Norway Turkish Islamic Union – NORTİB

1.3.1 Homeland politics can influence in the diaspora

Change in homeland politics can alter the political atmosphere in the diasporic groups as well. Throughout the years the Turkish diaspora in Norway has supported this argument by following the homeland state's direction and directives, which has affected the great majority of the diaspora. The establishment of NORTİB in Norway is a very good example of this argument. In NORTİB's case, this has meant that the political activities have been passivized, partly as a reaction to the 1980 coup d'état, and partly because of the encompassing trend of a new focus on religion and Turkish identity.

As I mentioned above, NORTİB was the organization growing out of TWA in the end of the 1980's. As the political climate in Turkey had undergone a profound change due to the coup d'état in 1980, this also affected the atmosphere in the Turkish diaspora in Norway. Until 1988¹⁵, Turkish people were gathered under a single roof, the roof of Turkish Worker Association. However, in time the political ideological and communal differences surfaced among the members, and eventually this led to segregation and division in the community and a "painful" separation period followed the events (NORTİB, 2014).

The secular tendencies that have been dominant in Turkish politics for many years gave way for more conservative and nationalist values, boosting the importance of religion in the society. NORTİB followed these trends, as this association focused on the more religious, conservative and nationalist values that a majority in the Turkish population both in Turkey and in Norway could relate to. NORTİB developed into an organization that handled the issues that most of the Turkish people in Norway would care about, such as religion, promoting the Turkish culture in Norway and also to maintain a Turkishness that is more related to the conservative values. Nevertheless, even though the association underwent a change in its major motifs and orientation, it preserved some of the functions of TWA, such

¹⁵ According to interviewees, 1988 is an official date. The actual date is 1985 because the last three years between, 1985-1988, was a very passive period for the association. (Interviews with Akkök, Güven, Özalp)

as helping the Turkish people to integrate into Norwegian society and helping them out with work-related issues.

1.3.2 Using the homeland government as a mediator

In some cases, the Turkish diaspora in Norway perceived the homeland authorities as more efficient in solving their problems in their new homeland than the Norwegian authorities. This is because of several reasons, which will be explained more in detail.

The current Turkish government – AKP, intends to change the constitution, which dates from 1982 and is thus a result of the coup d'état in 1980, which makes it outdated. Therefore, AKP opened an announcement for the Turkish NGO's around the world and asked for their opinions and contributions to the new constitution. NORTIB acknowledged this in a structured way, by providing a list of demands for what they would wish to be in the new constitution. This ambitious list includes practical demands, such as making it easier to use a Turkish driver's license in Norway, which is currently not possible. There were also demands of a social character, for example the wish for a Turkish school for the children of Turkish people in Norway. This school would bring the Turkish children together, and teach them about Turkish culture, literature and religion. There were economic demands on the list as well, concerning both work-related and simply a cheaper travel opportunity for Turkish citizens when they are going to their homeland.

What is most interesting about this list of demands is the way it intends to make use of the Turkish state as a mediator, in order for these demands to be picked up by the Norwegian authorities. In this way, it shows that sometimes the diaspora groups see it as more efficient to use their homeland government to push through social, economic and political demands instead of turning directly to the hostland authorities. There can be many reasons for this, but the major ones that I found in this research are: a more similar ideology with the homeland government than with the hostland government, a feeling that they would be more powerfully represented by the homeland state officials and lastly, the prospect of a future expatriation might lead the diaspora members to create strong ties to the homeland authorities rather than the hostland authorities. In fact, a statistical study on the ties to the homeland among Norwegian migrants show that Turks has strong ties with their homeland via real estate and

landed estate ownership. Accordingly, one in three Turks own a second home in their homeland and 14 per cent of them still own land in Turkey. (Blom & Henriksen, 2009: 35).

The list in itself did not have any direct influence on the Norwegian politics. However, it is a forceful stance and a political attempt to fulfill the goals of the diasporic group. Considering the definition of political influence in this thesis, the list that NORTİB has prepared cannot be recognized as political influence. Nevertheless, if something on the list would happen to be accepted by the Norwegian authorities, it could be counted as political influence in the Norwegian and Turkish politics.

1.4 Norwegian Turkish Associations Federation - NTDF

The Turkish officials can also make a big impact on the Turkish diaspora in Norway. That support from the Turkish officials can increase the social, cultural and religious activities within the diaspora. However, it does not necessarily mean that the Turkish diaspora is getting more influential in the Norwegian social and political life.

In 1990, Ömür Orhun became the Turkish ambassador of Norway. Orhun brought with him to Norway an ambition to reach his fellow countrymen by changing the image of the embassy. Before Orhun's arrival, the Embassy was approaching the Turkish migrants with suspicion and had not really gained a trust among the active Turkish migrants. During his term of office, Orhun came up with the idea to make the Turkish associations more effective by uniting them under a federation – the Federation of Turkish-Norwegian Associations (NTDF).

In my thesis there have been several findings that point out to that fact that the Turkish state does influence the Turkish diaspora in Norway, most clearly demonstrated via the Embassy. One might say that NTDF is a bigger version of NORTİB, occupied with the issues close to home for the Turkish migrants, such as religion, preserving Turkish culture and identity and social activities. This is more visible when you read NTDF's rules and regulations, where you can see the similarities with the program of NORTİB. NTDF also tries to be the face of Turkish migrants in Norway, but it does not have a deliberate agenda to increase the political activities of its members. Yet, they established the biggest network among the Turkish migrants in Norway. That could help them to mobilize if a political event in line with the

Turkish state's policies would take place. An example of it was seen far before of the establishment of NTDF in the Midnight Express Protest, a political stance that was supported by the Turkish Embassy as well. Because protesting against a movie that damages the image of the Turkish people and Turkey was in parallel with the Turkey's state's will.

2. Demonstrations

In this research, demonstrations refer to political protest, a term that can be defined by taking the attention of the authorities for an issue that the group involved in the protest perceives as wrong and unjust. Demonstrator groups are often driven by dissatisfaction with a current topic, and wish to change the situation. It further suggests that the protesting group cannot solve the issue by themselves, instead they pledge to the authorities to solve this injustice or wrongdoing for them (Opp, 2009: 34).

Demonstration is one of the political tools that the Turkish diaspora has used to voice their opinions about issues concerning their situation. In this section, I will describe some of the major demonstrations that the Turkish diaspora has been involved in, and that was repeatedly mentioned by the respondents in both interviews and observations.

2.1 Midnight Express

There are two main findings with regard to the Turkish migrants' protest against the 'Midnight Express' movie. First of all, it shows that demonstrations can partly or completely accomplish their goals. In the case of the Midnight Express, the goal was partly accomplished, because it ended up with a limited display of the movie. Nevertheless, the demonstrations can produce concrete results, such as the forceful reactions in the society that are taken into consideration by the authorities. Second, it shows that an issue that concerns other diasporic and non-diasporic groups can make the groups come together for a common cause, in this case Pakistanis, Moroccans and Norwegians and other worker groups (for instance LO-supporters) came together to support Turkish migrants in the protest (Interview with Lütfü Güven, 05.11.2012). Beside of the diasporic and non-diasporic groups, the Turkish officials, including the Turkish Embassy, gave their full support (Interview with Tahsin

Candaş, 11.02.2013). The reason for the Embassy's full support might have been that the image of Turkey and Turkish people was threatened by this movie, and this was something that also concerned them.

The protest against the movie "Midnight Express" was the first major protest where the Turkish people in Norway came together as a unity. The goal of the protest was to make the State Film Censorship Authority (SFCA) ban the movie. Through a silent march followed by the shouting of slogans in front of the Norwegian parliament, they partly accomplished their goal. Instead of a complete ban, SFCA cut some parts of the movie and set the age limit to 18. Besides, NRK removed it from their TV-program schedule in the following years (Aftenposten, "Det nytter å reagere mot NRK" 03.02.1987).

The second finding was that, the enrolment of other diasporic groups and non-diasporic groups to another diaspora's cause can increase the capability of the protests and make them more meaningful. This is because it can give more legitimacy to the cause and thus increase the chances of making it succeed. In the case of the 'Midnight Express' movie protest, the cause was owned by the many social groups in Norway from the very beginning, both because of the provocative elements, but also because of the unfair image of Turks in the movie (Aftenposten, *Det nytter å reagere mot NRK* - It is possible to react to NRK 03.02.1987). So therefore we can conclude that if the cause that the Turkish diaspora also concerns other diasporic and non-diasporic groups in the Norwegian society, and moreover gets backup from the Turkish authorities, the chance of success gets higher.

Homeland governments, in this sense, are influential in redesigning the hierarchy of importance of different diasporic groups in different locations, seen as political constituencies. Some diasporic groups form the core of projected overseas constituencies because they consist of government loyalists, while other diasporans sometimes stand at a lower echelon or on the periphery because they need to be neutralized as a result of their critical stance vis-à-vis the homeland government. (Laguerre, 2006)

2.2 Anti-PKK demonstrations (Anti-terror demonstrations)

The clash between Turkish and Kurdish sides in Turkey has always been an issue between Turkish and Kurdish diasporas as well. After the Turkish military forces' operation towards the PKK that caused deaths, the Kurdish people abroad, specifically PKK sympathizers, filled the squares and protested against the Turkish state's actions. Similar to that, when PKK caused deaths in the Turkish Military Forces, the Turkish people abroad, especially nationalists, protested against the PKK.

These kinds of protests have taken place in Norway as well. In 3 November 2007, such a protest took place in Youngstorget, one of the central squares of Oslo. "The background of the demonstration was about PKK's terror attacks towards Turkey from the North-Iraq and its terrorist organizational activities in Norway". (VG News by Amdal Harald, Inga Semmingsen, Camilla Ryste and Lars Kristian Tranøy (03.11.2007) *Opptøyer under Oslo-demonstrasjon* – Riots in Oslo demonstration). In the demonstration, around 450 Turks gathered to protest against the recent terrorist actions of the PKK. During the protest, 20-30 Kurdish PKK-sympathizers showed up and the protest became turbulent, as the aggression between the groups escalated (*ibid* and Interview with H. (Male, 70s. 22.03.2013)).

This event generated two findings. The first finding is that, diasporas do not always cooperate, they are sometimes opposed to each other. For example, in the protest against the *Midnight Express* movie, several migrant communities and diasporas showed how different diasporic groups could come together under a common cause, and pursue solidarity and cooperation. In the case of the anti-PKK demonstrations however, another form of interaction between diasporas is revealed; how they can clash. During the protest, the leader of the Turkey Committee¹⁶ and the initiate taker of the demonstration Sefa Martin Yürükel said that. "PKK is a terror organization and it also wants to create conflict in Norway." In accordance with that, what the demonstrators wanted from Norway was to recognize the PKK as a terror organization, which would not be favorable for the PKK sympathizer members of the Kurdish diaspora. Therefore, we can conclude that, the homeland-related political events of the

¹⁶ I heard about the Turkish Committee for only a few times during the interviews, but I did not find any information about it in the media except this particular event.

Turkish diaspora in Norway can also put it in a situation where it is actually against another diasporic group.

The second finding is that, the diasporic groups can ask to the hostland state to support their homeland state for a specific reason. During the anti-PKK demonstration, one of the signs was saying: “*Norge, Støtt Tyrkias kamp mot PKK-Terror* – Norway, support Turkey’s struggle against the PKK-Terrorism”. This can be shown as one of the most clear and concrete examples of the Turkish diaspora trying to influence Norwegian politics – as they want Norway to support Turkey in their struggle against the PKK.

The outcome of the anti-terror demonstrations is unclear, but there are two versions of how it turned out. On the one side, I have the interviewees’ version of what happened which point to a change in attitude towards Turks in the Norwegian society. According to them, the demonstrations made the Norwegian society to see the Turkish-Kurdish issue in a new light, with more nuances than before, to the benefit of the Turkish people in Norway (Interview with Lütfü Güven and Naci Akkök).

On the other hand, there are two features in *Aftenposten* and *Dagbladet* that describe the events with a pro-Kurdish stance, without much nuance of the Turkish-Kurdish situation.¹⁷

2.3 Gezi Park protests

Laguette (2006: 60) says that, “When the opposition is unable to operate at home because of repression, the diaspora may constitute the main opposition and undermine the activities of the homeland government through public demonstrations and its lobbying of Congress.” This quote explains the following section about the Gezi Park protest in Turkey, how it was

¹⁷ Klungtveit, Harald S. & Bjørn K. Bore (03.11.2007) *Slagsmål mellom kurdere og tyrkere i Oslo* - Fight between Kurds and Turks in Oslo. *Dagbladet*. Available: <http://www.dagbladet.no/nyheter/2007/11/03/517109.html> [accessed: 13.05.2014]

Josefin Engström (03.11.2007) *Voldelig demonstrasjon* – Violent demonstration. *Aftenposten*. Available: <http://www.osloby.no/nyheter/Voldelig-demonstrasjon-6492843.html> [accessed: 13.05.2014]

mirrored by the Turkish diaspora in Norway and how it changed the political atmosphere in the diaspora.

The research part of this thesis was conducted in a fortunate time, because with the Gezi Park protests, the Turkish diaspora became activated after many years of tranquility. The Gezi Park protests motivated the politically active part of the Turkish diaspora, and it was remarkable because there had been almost three decades since such a big event had taken place. It is even mentioned in a news article in *Aftenposten* named *Minner om 70-tallet* – Reminding of the 70's¹⁸, which suggests that it has been a very long time since the members of the Turkish diaspora came together for a political cause.

The Gezi Park protests started on the 28th of May 2013. The protests took place with a passive resistance by environmentalists regarding the building of a shopping mall in one of the few green areas in the center of Istanbul. Because of the police forces' violent treatment of this protest, a mass protest started. Soon after, the protest in Istanbul expanded around Turkey, and around the world. The environmental protest had grown into a mass movement that was objecting the policies of AKP and Prime Minister Erdogan. These policies included alcohol restrictions, lack of a free media climate, and the general Islamic profile of AKP. Moreover, it also turned into a general protest against police violence. An example of this is that protests of a similar character broke out in Brazil where the methods of passive resistance were inspired by the protests in Turkey. The Gezi Park protests had a broad repercussion all around the world including Norway.

In Norway, around 70 people came together in Halvdan Svartes Gate, outside of the Turkish Embassy, to make a statement that they were also against the policies of the Turkish government and the police violence in Turkey. This group of people came together through the use of social media, more explicitly a Facebook group, to communicate and to plan the protest. Accordingly, one of the young members of the diaspora took the initiative to open an arrangement on Facebook and invited the people he thought would be interested. The people who wanted to join also shared the event, and so it spread. What was interesting about this is

¹⁸ Aftenposten. (01.06.2013). *Minner om 70-tallet*. Available: <http://www.aftenposten.no/nyheter/uriks/--Minner-om-70-tallet-7218096.html> [accessed: 09.05.2014]

that, it confirms the network ties in the Turkish diaspora, and how these can be used to gather the diaspora members to try to make a political impact.

Cengiz Çandar (2013), who is a Turkish journalist, wrote an article about the Gezi Park protests where he sees the protests as a historical milestone in the democratization of Turkey. In this piece he defined the Gezi Park protesters as "urban and well-educated young people" who participated in a political protest for the first time. This is also reflected among the people who came together for the Gezi Park protest in Oslo, where there were also many young and educated Turks who participated in such a diasporic event for the first time (Observation, 1 June 2013). Moreover, the people who came together were mostly Turkish and quite a lot of them were new in Norway (*ibid.*). The protest also brought some of the old members of the diaspora, who had been active in the 70's and 80's. Apart from the Turkish people, family members, boyfriends and girlfriends of different nationalities also joined the protest.

The first and the foremost aim of this group was to show their solidarity with the Gezi Park protesters. Another aim was to show to the Turkish Embassy and the Norwegian society that they were not satisfied with the current political and social conditions in Turkey. Actually, the people in the protest had many different goals in the demonstration. The heterogeneity of the group was shown by the different signs and banners, for example *Polis terörüne son* - Stop the police violence, *Doğaya Saygı* - Respect the nature. But their common denominator was that they were all against the policies of the current Prime Minister of the time – Tayyip Erdogan.

2.3.1 Segmented groups in the diaspora can come together in big events

The Gezi Park protesters in Turkey came together around very different motives and with different aims. Moreover, they consisted of a multitude of ideologies and ethnicities. According to the KONDA Research and Consultancy Service survey (2013) in which the respondents can choose more than one option, 58 percent of the protestors were there because the rights of freedom were being violated. 37 percent of them were protesting to oppose AKP and its policies. 30 percent wanted to show a reaction against Erdogan's statements and attitude and 20 percent joined the protests because the government tried to remove trees in

Gezi Park. According to the same research, 44 percent of the protestors had not attended any demonstration before. Lastly, high education level among the protestors in the Gezi Park draws attention. Accordingly, 56 percent of the protestors are having at least undergraduate education (According to Konda statistics, this value is 12 percent in Turkey).

It was not possible to make any survey, but according to my observations, the people joining the Gezi Park protest in Oslo were having the same kind of characteristics. While quite a few of them were students, the others were also educated people. The group also included politicians and cultural workers. In some way, the group was mirroring the Gezi Park protestors in Turkey. The difference was that while the young people were taking a more active role in following the protests in Turkey, in Norway, some of the experienced members of the diaspora who were active in the 70's and 80's took on the leadership role. It seems like the older members had for a long time been segmented within the diaspora, but the Gezi Park protests gave them a chance to come together around a common collective goal once again. But however, the whole Turkish diaspora did not come together under the goals of the Gezi Park protests.

2.3.2 Temporary unification and bipolarization in the diaspora

The Gezi Park protests could be seen as a potential overbridging of the ideological gaps in the Turkish diaspora in Norway, a chance to come together around this issue and protest against the politics in the homeland. But instead of creating unity, the Gezi Park protests highlighted the already existing differences within the diaspora, and created a bipolarization with the conservatives on the one side, and the Gezi Park protest-supporters on the other. This bipolarization pinpointed the political aims for both of these two groups in the diaspora, and made the diaspora have a more political character.

Nevertheless, this bipolarization was only temporary. During the Gezi Park protest, Kemalists, socialists, nationalists, ethnic minorities etc. could come together under a common cause: that the politics in Turkey are not going in the right direction. But soon again, as the situation in Turkey changed into a more passive character, the same happened in Norway. Because of personal and ideological challenges within the group, this brought a new fragmentation within the Turkish diaspora.

According to my observations, we can come up with two major findings. First, the members of the Turkish diaspora members in Norway could come together due to important causes, like the big event that the Gezi Park was, regardless of their ideology and personal relations. During process of the Gezi Park protests in Norway, people with different ideological backgrounds, as it was stated above, Kemalists, socialists, nationalists and so on could create a dynamic group with a political motive. In this particular case, that created a bipolarization in the diaspora. Yet, it showed that Turkish people in Norway can put their ideological and personal differences aside and came together under one common cause.

The second finding is that, when the intensity of the big event (like the Gezi Park protests) faded, the temporary unity that it created disappeared, though not completely. In the Gezi Park case, the diaspora did not entirely go back to its previous form. A new political consciousness had been brought up, for example shown in the newly instated Turkish communities called *Geziniyoruz Oslo* –”We are wandering about - Oslo”¹⁹ and *Norveç Dayanışması* – Solidarity in Norway. These are communities occupied with political issues, using the social media to maintain the network that was created during the Gezi Park protests. Still, the unity that was present during the Gezi Park protests is not there anymore. People were again divided into groups, and the concrete and unusual unity produced by the Gezi Park protests disappeared and for the majority of the members in the diaspora, and it went back to its previous fragmented state.

2.3.3. The political influence of the Gezi Park protests

A quote coming from one of the activists in the aftermath of the Gezi Park protests in Oslo summed up the question of what the protests aimed to achieve and how it could be done:

“What do we want to do here, why are we coming together? It is because we want to create awareness in the Norwegian society, and to make the Norwegian authorities to see the situation from our perspective. We also want to make them

¹⁹ Directly translated as ”We are wandering about - Oslo” and could be said to be a wordplay related to the Gezi Park protests.

put an international pressure on the Turkish government, as Turkey is a democratic country and just because they have gotten many votes, they cannot behave however they want.”

It is true that the state authorities and the Embassy are important factors that can activate the Turkish diaspora. In the Turkish diaspora in Norway, this has been seen in the cases of the organization NTFD and the Midnight Express protests. Nevertheless, the authorities are not the only activating factors; the mass protests in the homeland can also create a reaction abroad. Moreover, the mass movements can also politicize diasporic groups.

In the Turkish diaspora in Norway, the Gezi Park protests made the diaspora to reassert its political consciousness. Just like mentioned in the quote above, how could this newfound political consciousness be used to influence the Norwegian politics?

There have been several attempts by the Turkish diaspora in Norway to create awareness and to make Norway to put a pressure on Turkey in this issue. One of them was inspired from a protest in the Italian parliament in which a group of female deputies wore red to support the famous woman in red from the Istanbul Gezi Park protests.²⁰ Members of the Turkish diaspora demanded Norwegian parliamentarians to do a similar protest, as a symbolical gesture of solidarity with the Gezi Park protestors. However, this attempt did not succeed. Another attempt was also made to make the decision-makers of Norway to act in support of the Gezi Park protestors. It consisted of trying to make any Norwegian deputy stand up for the rights of the Gezi Park protestors, like in the example that took place in the Québec parliament in Canada by the deputy Jamie Nicholls in 4th June 2013.²¹ Besides, the planned royal visit by the Norwegian king to Turkey right after the Gezi Park protests had taken place was another chance of an influence for the Turkish diaspora. Some members of the Turkish

²⁰ Hürriyet Daily News (12.06.2013) *Italian deputies wear red to support Gezi Park protestors* <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/italian-deputies-wear-red-to-support-gezi-park-protesters.aspx?pageID=449&nID=48685&NewsCatID=351>

²¹ Gazette. (05.06.2013). *NDP's Nicholls calls on Turks to exercise restraint.* <http://www.gazettevaudreuilssoulanges.com/2013/06/05/ndps-nicholls-calls-on-turks-to-exercise-restraint/>

diaspora wanted the King to pay attention to what was going on in Turkey at the time and in this way exerting influence on the Turkish government.

None of these attempts of political influence succeeded. However, starting with the 70 people demonstrating outside of the Embassy, the Gezi Park protests received a lot of attention in the media, which probably would not be possible without the diasporic events, such as the demonstration.

The failures in these attempts bring about a question: Without the support of the Turkish authorities, can the Turkish diaspora succeed in its attempts to influence Norwegian politics? Of course, the support of officials is always an advantage to make a political influence. Yet it does not mean that the diaspora's action without state support is ineffective.

3. The role of media in the Turkish diaspora in Norway

The Turkish diaspora in Norway have throughout the years used many different media tools as platforms for discussion about both the homeland and the hostland issues. In addition, with the help of the media tools the Turkish diaspora has done everything from gossip to promoting its interests. Laguerre (2006: 114) underlines that; the diasporic public sphere is an important platform for various activities related to the diaspora, such as expressing political views, discussing the projects for the homeland, the hostland and the diaspora. The Turkish diaspora in Norway have used the media platforms mainly to: exchange information, for identity-protection and for maintaining the already established network. Beside of that, the importance of integration into the Norwegian society has been stressed in one of the diaspora journals and the Turkish radio.

In the Turkish case in Norway, the diasporic public sphere was supplied with radio and journals almost simultaneously in the end of 1970's and in 1980's. Later, newspapers and Internet platforms became a part of the Turkish media in Norway as well. This section will present the different media channels in a combined manner.

3.1 The Turkish media as a tools of migration to Norway

In 1970's, Lütfü Güven started to write in the newspaper Milliyet as a reporter for Norway. In his newspaper articles, while he was giving information about the Turkish people's situation in Norway he also promoted Norway as a migration destination. Because during these days, there was a high level of unemployment in Turkey, and many headed for Germany and other agreement countries. Güven tried to show Norway as a good destination for Turkish worker migrants by highlighting the financial opportunities and the equal rights with Norwegian workers. For example, a short news notice called "35 Turkish people from Bingöl started to work in Norway"²² was a simple way of showing Turkish people that Norway existed as an alternative for migration. Advertising Turkish people's successful projects in Norway, such as establishing worker unions and cultural associations encouraging the Islamic culture, were other ways of inspiring Turks to come to Norway. If they did come to Norway, they would know that they would not be on their own, as there was an already established Turkish community there.

What is interesting here is that the initiative of one individual can create a big influence in the history and the character of a diaspora. Somehow, this is very visible in the Turkish diaspora in Norway. In many cases in the history of the Turkish diaspora in Norway, certain individuals have come to the front with their initiatives, and have made an impact in the diaspora. In this case, Güven's usage of media has been influential to supply a platform for the exchange of information, which in turn has created networks that can be perceived as a basis for certain migration flows. When it comes to the Turkish migrations in Norway, these networks might have triggered individual, economic and chain migration. Alonso and Oiarzabal make a similar statement, and emphasizes the network building provided by media tools (also including modern media tools like Internet): "These networks lead to chain migration, which, in turn, helps to perpetuate migration flows between specific sending and receiving areas and among consecutive generations of immigrants." (Alonso and Oiarzabal, 2010, 6). Of course to implementing a measurement of the importance of media in these different types of migration is hard. None of the interviewees mentioned about the media as an important reason for their migration, however I believe that visibility in the media and

²² Milliyet (23.09.1970). *Bingöllü 35 Türk Norveçte İşe Başladı* - 35 Turkish people from Bingöl started to work in Norway

such encouragement that Güven did had a role in changing the character and the history of the diaspora.

3.2 Media as a tool to inform the new migrants

During my archival research, I found a small booklet in the archives of LO, which was named: *Aramıza Hoşgeldin – Welcome aboard*.²³ This booklet was published in collaboration with LO, and was giving information about rules, regulations and instructions (such as how to have tax card etc.) in Norway for the newly arrived Turkish workers. In addition to that, *Aramıza Hoşgeldin* was strongly promoting each and every Turk to be a member of LO, and more generally informing about how Turkey and Norway differed when it came to workers' rights. This booklet was prepared in 1978 by the Turkish students who had just started to be active in TWA, and this handbook was one of their first contributions.

The political influence of this case was that the *Aramıza Hoşgeldin* booklet was published in collaboration with LO, and this implies that the Turkish diaspora had a connection and relationship with one of the strongest political organs in Norway. This shows that the interests of the Turkish diaspora were visible in the Norwegian society and thereby recognized. The *Aramıza Hoşgeldin* case did not appear as a politically influential media tool, yet it proves that the political organs in Norway acknowledged the Turkish diaspora as an important group whose needs were taken into consideration.

3.3 Turkish media tools in Norway used as an instrument for political critique

Following the *Aramıza Hoşgeldin*, several Turkish left-wing migrants came together under the leadership of İsmail Büyükakan and started to publish a journal named *Demokrat – Democrat* in 1980. In the same period, another journal named *Fremmedarbeideren – The Foreign Worker (FAF)* was also being published in every third month. This journal was a media branch of an association with the same name. The main ideology of *Fremmedarbeideren* was very similar to *Demokrat* and it also aimed to bring migrants together under the umbrella

²³ *Aramıza Hoşgeldin* can also be translated as welcome to our community. The point of the name was to greet those who just joined to the worker Turkish migrant groups in Norway.

of worker identity²⁴. Apart from the written media, in 1979 NRK started broadcasting Turkish radio programs for 45 minutes every week. These radio programs were also sometimes filled with political content.

Some of the notable examples of critiques in these media platforms were towards the political situation in Turkey and the 1980 coup d'état, oncoming visa restrictions towards Turkish citizens, discrimination incidents in Norway and internal critique within the Turkish diaspora.

Accordingly, an article in *Demokrat* issued in July-August 1981 informed its readers about an anti-“junta” demonstration that took place in Oslo. The article explained that different Turkish and Kurdish left-wing diasporic organizations also supported the demonstration and the protestors handed out Norwegian pronouncements about the bad implications of the “junta government”. Similar articles against the coup d'état in Turkey also took place in the *FAF* journal.

In another issue of the *Demokrat* dated May 1981, the writers criticize the Turkish diaspora members and the associations because they did not react against Norway’s visa restriction to the Turkish citizens: "The Turkish Workers Association (TWA) did not do anything against the new visa regulation. It cannot go on like this. We should react all together now, or it will be too late." In this piece it is clearly seen that the media was used as an attempt to increase the Turkish diaspora members’ awareness towards Norway’s implementations and to activate them against the undesirable regulations.

In the same issue, *Demokrat* shared a story of a Turkish woman who was exposed to discrimination in Norway. In the article the story of the woman was explained in detail and it ended with encouraging people to react against racism and discrimination towards immigrants in Norway.

²⁴ *Fremmedarbeideren* had many similarities with *Demokrat*, it was relatively more inclusive and allowing other ideas as well. Probably it was because of the wide range of writers and readers from different diasporic and ideological groups in 8 different languages (Arabic, English, Indian, Kurdish, Norwegian, Spanish, Turkish and Urdu).

When we think about the radio we should first remember that the importance of radio in 1970s and 80s were at least as important as today's mobile phones and similar social media tools. Even today, some of the early migrants listen to the Turkish radio, which broadcasts every Sunday. The Turkish radio was also used as an important critique tool in where the implementations of both the homeland and the hostland were criticized. The 1980 coup d'état is again the most prominent example. Candaş said that:

“We were in Norway, a free country, and we did not hesitate to criticize the implementations in Turkey during and after the coup d'état in the radio. So the Turkish Embassy was always checking our radio program. (...) Starting with the 1980 coup d'état, almost every criticism towards Turkey was considered as communist propaganda. So they labeled us as communists. (...)”

Here we see that the radio program also had political content and through the diaspora members' interests and life perspectives, it was used to as a platform of sharing ideas that opposed the situation in the homeland and to inform the other members through their point of view.

A finding about the usage of media in the Turkish diaspora in Norway is that, it did not only serve the transnationalism through the using of the mother language but it also clearly served political purposes. And together with the other political actions the usage of media succeeded to influence some of the Norwegian political institutions. For instance, LO published a notice:

“There has been a coup d'état in Europe in Turkey. LO vigorously condemns the terror and imprisonments of trade unionists and our other comrades. For the reconstitution of democracy and attainment of syndicate rights in Turkey, we agree to the European Workers Movement request on suspension of Turkey's membership to European Council.” (Demokrat, issue number 1: May 1981)

Another interesting outcome of the usage of media as a critique tool is that, usually the diaspora members have a lack of critique within their group, for the purpose of preserving the unity and the image of the diaspora and the homeland. However in the case of the Turkish diaspora in Norway, there were a lot of samples that showed that a lot of internal critique took place, where the members of the diaspora did not hesitate to criticize each other and even

themselves but maybe these actions were done at the expense of unity, as the Turkish diaspora have continuously been fragmented.

3.4 The usage of media to support the homeland state

As it was stated above, some journals that the Turkish diaspora members used were more open-minded and allowed a wider range of ideologies to be presented. The FAF journal is a good example of it. While the majority of the mass media, different NGOs (mostly Kurdish migrant associations) and Norwegian civil society organizations such as LO were criticizing the happenings in Turkey, some of the Turkish people supported the coup d'état and they explained that the reason was because of the disorder in Turkey before the coup. In the case of the coup d'état their argument was that “now at least, there is an order.”

In this way they claimed that the coup d'état did not need to be bad although it was not democratic. The visibility of such news conducted in that point of view in a popular migrant newspaper was remarkable because the coup d'état situation was a noteworthy case.

Beside of this noteworthy case, the Turkish diaspora members have used the media for creating a strong political image of Turkey and by this they aimed to increase the power of their homeland in international negotiations, or more specifically, bilateral agreements between Norway and Turkey. The role that the diaspora played in this was that the NORTİB association issued a list of demands that they sent to the Turkish authorities. This list is available in NORTİB's website, and this list could be an example that the Turkish diaspora can use media tools to further the image of Turkey in a positive way, and for Turkey and the Turkish diaspora to be shown as influential and political.

Other ways of promoting the image of the homeland and for identity building in the Turkish diaspora was to announce arrangements via media. One interesting example was a history seminar arranged by NTDF, which was about the Ottoman Empire and its treatment of minorities. The seminar was advertised for in both Turkish and Norwegian, and could be seen as an attempt to present the positive parts of the Turkish history. This argument is also supported when looking at the themes of other activities arranged by NTDF. Accordingly,

Ottoman history, religious leaders and modern Turkish history including Atatürk were the recurring themes in the arrangements promoted by NTDF and NORTİB.

In conclusion, the Turkish diaspora in Norway used journals and Internet platforms for the creation of a better image of the homeland, and to strengthen their state as a party in international negotiations.

3.5 Usage of the media and preservation of the national identity

As it was suggested in the previous section, the homeland orientation in the diasporic media sphere was not the only indicator of identity preservation. Regardless of their ideological backgrounds, most of the Turkish diasporic media organs in Norway were conducted in Turkish and this was in itself a statement for the protection and maintaining of the Turkish identity.

Moreover, some Turkish journals prominently aim to protect conservative and nationalist values. I found a very good example of this in the Turkish Islamic Union archives, a journal that was published by the NTDF with the name of *Türkün Sesi* – The voice of Turk. In this matter, an issue of *Türkün Sesi* dates October-November 1997 mentions about lack of reading habit among the Turkish people and through the first order of Qur'an, which is "read", it suggests every Turkish people to have present of a catechism, Qur'an and Turkish history books in their home and improve their reading skills through these and other literature, poetry and novel books. Therefore, one of the ways to preserve the identity in the *Türkün Sesi* was that the Turkish individuals should take responsibility to learn more about national and Islamic values and maintain these values through knowledge sharing with the oncoming generations.

Beside of its leftist tendency, *Demokrat* was also a good example for increasing the awareness of identity and preserving it. According to *Demokrat*, the Norwegian state should have given support to the migrant groups for maintaining their mother language and their culture. In the issue dated May 1981, *Demokrat* suggests:

“A comprehensive mother language courses should be obligatory in the Norwegian education system.”

and

“Migrants should be given opportunity to perform their cultural and religious requirements freely.

In addition to the Turkish journals in Norway from 80s and 90s, the Turkish diaspora has made use of the current Norwegian and the Turkish mass media tools to inform the readers about new organizations, activities and opportunities that the Norwegian state supplies. The elective Turkish course in the Norwegian schools in Oslo is a very good example of it. Accordingly, these courses' existence was dependent on a sufficiently large demand, but the problem was that people did not have enough information about it. Therefore the social media tools and the radio could be used to spread this important information to the Turkish diaspora. The way this message was carried out in these platforms, was also a bit of a warning to the diaspora members that unless they did not pay attention to this, the Turkish elective courses would be removed from the education plan. As it is clearly seen in this case, encouraging the second and third generations of Turkish migrants to learn one of their mother languages via media tools, was a way of making sure the preservation of the Turkish identity in Norway.

To sum up, the Turkish journals in Norway, such as *Türkün Sesi* and *Demokrat*, the Turkish radio program and the current media tools including Internet are productively used to preserve the Turkishness in the Turkish diaspora in Norway.

3.6 The usage of media and political influence

The usage of media in the diasporic groups is so essential that it answers many questions about the political orientations of diasporas, their grand strategies and specific tactics that the leading members employ in dealing with their host countries, homelands and other actors (Sheffer, 2003: 23). One of the important findings of this thesis is that, in political matters, media can be used as a tool that encourages the diaspora members to integrate into the hostland society, get a higher education and represent the homeland in the influential


economic and social positions. Furthermore, it can also be used to promote political engagement of the diaspora members, and in the times of important political events it can operate as a reflector of the diasporas' perspectives.

3.6.1 Media as a tool of promoting political participation

The usage of Turkish radio in Norway is one of the most fitting examples connected to the political influence of the Turkish diaspora in Norway. Consequently, during the election campaigns in the Norwegian parliamentary elections 2013, the Turkish radio strongly encouraged the Turkish people in Norway to vote. In 1st September 2013, the Turkish radio host Doğan Gürsel in conversation with Gülay Kutal, representative for the Norwegian political party *Sosialistisk Venstreparti* - Socialist Left Party (SV), stated that:

”Turkish people have to use their rights to vote. Not to vote means nothing else but ‘I don’t know anything’. The voting rates among the immigrants in Norway is 52 percent. The voting rate of Turkish people is even lower than that, behind of Somalians, Indians and Sinhalese. During their campaigns, politicians make visits to immigrant communities. They make visits to Turkish communities as well, yet, since the voting rate among Turkish migrants is very low, the Norwegian politicians do not give enough importance to the needs of the Turkish people in Norway. For instance, issues such as double citizenship, minimum income for families, more freedom to scarfed women and the encouragement of learning the mother language are not being sufficiently taken into consideration by the politicians. Therefore, if Turkish people want to be taken seriously in the Norwegian politics they should vote. No matter what party they support – they should vote.”

Starting Election 2013. Electoral turnout in per cent among the sample of Immigrants and Norwegian- born to immigrants with Norwegian citizenship, by country background and sex



Graph 1. The voting participation of Turks in the Norwegian Parliamentary election in 2013

Retrieved from: <http://www.ssb.no/en/valg/statistikker/vundinnv>

The program continued with more encouragement of the listeners to vote – and especially for the political parties that could supply benefits for migrants. Similar discussions continued in the Turkish radio program until the Election Day. This discussion in the Turkish radio was a clear example of using media as a linkage between the Turks in Norway and the Norwegian political arena. The discussion can also be seen as an encouragement for the Turkish people to improve their image when it comes to political participation.

However, the promotion of voting in the radio channel was not reflected in the voting statistics that was published by SSB after the elections. Despite a small increase, from 42 to 48 percent (SSB, 2014), the increase was not significant enough to indicate that the

encouragement of the political discussions in the radio program could have facilitated this. One of the reasons of this might be that the other media tools were not used as efficient as the radio. Notwithstanding the usual apolitical character of the diaspora, the inefficient use of the other media tools can be a reason for why the political participation of Turks did not increase in a significant way.

3.6.2 Media as a tool of promoting integration

The second dramatic example about the usage of the diasporic media in Norway concerns issues of integration. At this point, we should acknowledge the difference between integration and assimilation. While assimilation refers to the pushing aside of the homeland identity, integration is more of a fusion of the homeland and hostland identities. This fusion allows for being a spokesman for both homeland and hostland, which is why integration is so essential for immigrant groups that wishes to gain political influence in both their homeland and hostland societies. While it is possible to talk about a distinctive identity in integration, this distinctive identity disappears when it comes to assimilation. Therefore, if a group of Turkish migrants assimilate into the Norwegian society, even though they influence in the politics, this could not be counted as the Turkish diaspora's influence in the politics, because the boundaries are blurred.

In 20th October 2013, the Turkish radio program hosted Dilek Ayhan, one of the prominent Turkish-Norwegian women who had just become the state secretary in the new Norwegian government's Ministry of trade, industry and fisheries. During the program, she was asked to give advice to the young Turkish generation in Norway. Ayhan said:

"Although the Turkish people are not introverted as individuals, the Turkish community in Norway is introverted. The Turks must have a better vision in the Norwegian society to get a foothold. To do that, first and foremost, they must learn Norwegian. They should make a habit of going to the library as often as possible. They should make friends with Norwegians and university students. (...) And the Turkish families should never discourage their kids from their future plans."

So, what the radio program did was to host a person from the Turkish diaspora who had just reached a successful position and then ask: “how did you do that?”. Ayhan’s answer suggested that integration is one of the most crucial factors in becoming successful and to gain an influential position in the society.

This event in the radio program was one of the good examples that showed how the media highlighted the importance of integration in order to become more influential in the hostland. During my listening to the Turkish radio program for over a year, I listened to other similar discussions that promoted integration. As a result, one of the findings of this thesis is that, through promoting integration, the Turkish diasporic media, specifically the radio, gives strategies and specific tactics to the members of the Turkish diaspora about how to be more influential in the Norwegian politics.

3.6.3 The usage of non-diasporic media in the big political events

The non-diasporic media is another important platform where the diaspora members can reflect their opinions and foster their interests. First of all, on an individual level, members of the diaspora can attain job positions in the media organs. Through these job positions they can sometimes be very influential and provide a space for the groups in the diaspora that they are in favor of. Especially during the big political events, the importance of their role increases.

During the information-gathering part of this research, the Gezi Park protests started, and the usage of non-diasporic media, i.e. the Norwegian media, became a tool for the Turkish diaspora to show the events from their point of view. How could they show the events from their point of view to the hostland society? The Turkish diaspora made use of the key persons who were working in the Norwegian media or who had a network within the Norwegian media. This goes for different groups within the diaspora, in other words, during the Gezi Park protests, both the Gezi Park protest-supporters and the AKP-supporters reflected their opinions in the Norwegian media through their contact people. Throughout the event some of the people had interviews in the journals, and others wrote columns and articles to explain the situation from their own perspective.

The key persons did not only operate in the media network, but also in other related forums and NGO's. The Turkish diasporic media in Norway made use of social media to a great extent to plan meetings, to prepare demonstrations, sharing knowledge, updating each other, and expressing their own opinions about political matters. But the problem was that because these posts was in Turkish, it could not reach the Norwegian society, Therefore, the usage of Norwegian media had a crucial role in spreading different points of views in the Turkish diaspora to the hostland society.

An example of this is that during the Gezi Park protests, the people who were against the implementations of the Turkish government and the police violence could express their opinions and share information efficiently via Norwegian media. That led to more Norwegians' participation in the demonstrations, and it even led to Norwegians taking their own initiatives to show solidarity with the Gezi Park protesters.

In conclusion, the Turkish diaspora in Norway used the media for political purposes. It was first of all used as an attempt to increase the Turkish people's participation in the politics, secondly gave them tactics and developed strategies on how to be more influential in the Norwegian politics and was finally used to increase awareness of the Turkish political issues in the Norwegian society and to influence the politics through this awareness. The attempts to influence the Norwegian politics via media can be seen as another brick in the wall, where wall is used as a metaphor for the addition of all the elements that influences the Norwegian politics.

4. Lobbying

Lobbying can be considered as the most well known diasporic act of gaining political influence. The American Jewish population has efficiently used the lobbying to influence in the US foreign policy towards the Israel region (Dekker, 2010: 3). Such a big outcome in the American Jews' case, and other similar cases makes lobbying to take attention from many other diasporic groups, because it simply increases the possibility and the level of success. According to Laguerre (2006: 73), lobbying requires the process of willingness to engage in the hostland politics, interaction with the hostland political actors and institutions as well as interaction with the homeland actors.

While talking about lobbying activities in the Turkish diaspora in Norway, one should not forget the general character of the Turkish diaspora. The majority of the Turkish migrants in Norway have been economic migrants; their priority has not been to influence politics with the means of lobbying. Moreover, as I observed the members of the Turkish diaspora believes that The Norwegian system is not open for lobbying activities. Ronald Rogowski (1987: 209) confirms this opinion as he states: “Pressure groups are restrained where campaign resources or the legal control of nominations are centralized in the hands of party leaders. Of course, such control is achieved quite effectively by rigid list-system PR [proportional representation].”

According to the interviews and observations in this research, the Turkish diaspora in Norway has not had many opportunities to use lobbying as a political tool. K, who herself is an influential person in the Norwegian politics, argued that the Turkish diaspora does not have any professional lobbyists to influence in the Norwegian politics or to improve the relationship between Turkey and Norway (Interview with K, 21.02.2013). In parallel with that, Gülay Kutal (unstructured interview, 01.05.2014) stated that the Turkish people do not lobby in Norway, yet she also added, three of the 59 representatives in the Oslo City Council are from Turkey.²⁵ Despite these Turkish representatives, as the low voting scores from the last Norwegian parliamentary elections indicates that the political participation of the Turks in Norway is not high.

Although K and Kutal argued that there is not any particular Turkish lobbying in the Norwegian decision-making, this study has found three outstanding examples of lobbying-like activities where the members of the Turkish diaspora has had an important role or taken the initiative. The first example is about a rule named *24-års reglen* – 24-year rule. The 24-year rule is a rule in the Danish immigration law that is a restriction to prevent family reunification immigration and forced marriage. It is called the 24-year rule because both of the spouses have to be 24 years old before they can use the family reunification for getting a

²⁵ By May 2014 the names of the Norwegian representatives coming from Turkey in the Oslo City Council are: Gülay Kutal, Mertefe Bartinliglu and Gülsüm Koc.

residence permit in Denmark.²⁶ According to one of the interviewees in this research, although the Norwegian parliamentarians also mentioned about having a similar rule in Norway,²⁷ this suggestion was stopped with the help of different diasporic groups. K said that,

"24-year rule was also about to be installed in Norway, but with the support of different diasporic groups, we tried to stop this rule through lobbying. We told the parliamentarians that this law is against the human rights and the values of Norway. Moreover, Norway does not have a big problem with these kind migrant issues; oppositely migrants help this country to develop. Thanks to our lobbying, they did not install such a rule." (Interview with K in 21.02.2013)

The second example is about a common difficulty that the Norwegian politicians with an immigrant background often experiences. This difficulty is about the language problem, and how the immigrant politicians, comparing with the Norwegians, have difficulties with expressing themselves in their speech. Kutal says that:

"I do not have any problem to express myself in Norwegian, but it is a reality that comparing with the Norwegians, it takes slightly longer time to find the right words and therefore, I sometimes need more time in my speeches in the council and in the party. Many of my colleagues with an immigrant background express similar concerns. Therefore, I suggested to the Norwegian legislatures to add 1 optional minutes to the politicians with an immigrant background." (Unstructured interview with Gülay Kutal, 01.05.2014)

So far, Kutal's suggestion has not been accepted by the Oslo city council or the Norwegian parliament, yet the political party that she is member of, SV, started to give an optional minute to the politicians with an immigrant background.

²⁶ For more information check Danish Immigration Law, Chapter 1 Paragraph 9: <https://www.retsinformation.dk/Forms/R0710.aspx?id=29079#K1> [available in Danish, accessed in 08.05.2014]

²⁷ Dagbladet. (09.10.2006). *Danske innvandringsregler skremmer norske politikere – Danish migration rules scare Norwegian politicians.* <http://www.dagbladet.no/magasinet/2006/10/05/478845.html> [accessed: 09.05.2014]

These two examples show that the lobbying of the Turkish diaspora members did not only aim to benefit their own diaspora, but also the other migrants in Norway. Both of these examples of lobbying have completely or partly achieved their goals.

The third example of lobbying in the Turkish diaspora is about identity preservation. According to a news article in *Zaman Iskandinaviya* written by Engin Tenekeci, dated 21.02.2013, some of the Turkish families issued complaints that their children had difficulties to learn Norwegian since they did not have a sufficient knowledge of their mother language. These complaints made the Turkish representatives, Kutal and Bartınlıođlu, to lobby in the Oslo city council to add Turkish elective courses to the education plan (starting from the 5th class). According to Kutal and Bartınlıođlu, to learn the mother language is a natural right of every single person. Therefore they meant that Norway should not ignore the importance of giving Turkish courses for the Turkish migrants' children.²⁸ In another newspaper article Bartınlıođlu says that:

“We expect that it will not be only the Turkish people's children who want to learn Turkish, we expect and children's of the Norwegians, Pakistanis and the people with the Middle Eastern background to take Turkish as second foreign language as well.”
(Turkish newspaper *Akşam*, 21.11.2013).²⁹

To conclude, these examples provide three findings. The first finding is that there is not much active lobbying in the Turkish diaspora, because of the character of the diaspora. The second finding is that, in the few example of Turkish lobbying in Norway the Turkish lobbyists work in cooperation with other migrant diasporas and either aim to prevent undesired regulations or to improve the conditions for all migrant groups. Thus, the lobbying is often made in the

²⁸ *Zaman Iskandinavya*. (21.02.2013). *Her çocuk, anadilini öğrenme hakkına sahiptir – Every kid has right to learn their mother language*. Available at: http://iskandinavya.zaman.com.tr/iskandinavya/newsDetail_getNewsById.action?newsId=9351 [accessed: 11.05.2014]

²⁹ *Akşam* (21.10.2013). *Oslo'da Türkçe seçmeli dil – Turkish became elective course in Oslo*. Available at: <http://www.aksam.com.tr/dunya/osloda-turkce-secmeli-dil/haber-262951> [accessed: 11.05.2014]

interest of both Turks and other migrant groups. The third finding is that, the members of the Turkish diaspora who are working in the decision-making level feel loyalty to their homeland and sometimes act in favor of the political decisions that will benefit the Turkish diaspora.

Last but not least, this study has found three examples of lobbying and three of them have partly or completely accomplished their goals. The reason of this might be that the lobbyists have already acquired positions in the decision-making level and thus have the knowledge about how the Norwegian politics functions. Therefore, they might have more realistic aims and effective strategies to be able to succeed in their lobbying. Although we cannot witness a lot of example of lobbying in the Turkish diaspora in Norway case, the mentioned cases show, lobbying in diasporic groups has an essential role in attaining their political interests.

Conclusion

This study has been the first research about the Turkish diaspora in Norway and its influence in the Norwegian politics. The main aim of the research has been to find answers to three main research questions:

1. What is the background of the Turkish diaspora in Norway?
2. What is the character of the Turkish diaspora in Norway?
3. Does the Turkish diaspora have any influence on Norwegian Politics? If yes, how? If no, why not?

In order to gather information and answer these questions, this study emphasized on archival research, interviewing and observation as a strategy of getting hold of the story behind the Turkish diaspora, as well as its background, character and possible political influence in the Norwegian politics.

1. The background of the Turkish diaspora

The earliest Turkish migration to Norway started in 1958, yet the population of Turks in Norway increased significantly after the beginning of 1970s. Most of the Turks in Norway had migrated to Norway because of individual, economic, educational and political reasons. Educational migrants arrival to Norway in 70s and 80s led to small amount of ‘brain gain’ in this period.

Turks migration to Norway has occurred in different ways, yet family reunion and chain migration have been the most common types of migration. In the chain migration, individual and economic migrants show differences. Accordingly, while economic chain migrants

tended to bring their family members, individual chain migrants tended to bring their friends. This situation and other historical factors, such as restrictions to *Gastarbeiters* in Germany later caused more economic and less individual Turkish migrants to arrive to Norway. Furthermore, while there has been less *öncül* - pioneers in the economic migrants side, individual migrants have had more *öncül* people. This background had an important role in the character of the diaspora.

2. The character of the Turkish diaspora

First of all, this study gave a special focus on the political influence of the Turkish diaspora in Norway. This led me to emphasize the characteristics of the diaspora from a perspective that highlighted their engagements in political events. Therefore, throughout this research, the ideological differences within the diaspora have stood out. Under this light, the simple answer to the question about the character of the Turkish diaspora in Norway is: the Turkish diaspora in Norway is heterogeneous.

Different types of migration had an important role in shaping the character of the Turkish diaspora in Norway. Chain migration and family migration had the biggest impact in this matter. This research found a pattern among the Turks who migrated to Norway via chain migration. Accordingly, the characteristics of the individual and the economic chain migrants differ. On the one hand, the individual chain migrants are generally semi-skilled or skilled, mostly educated, know at least one other language than Turkish and they are mostly liberal or occasionally left oriented. Economic chain migrants on the other hand are usually unskilled, do not know a foreign language (before their arrival) and have rather traditionalist or conservative views. They are thus political in different ways, the first group more often oppositional, and the second group more often focused on identity politics.

3. Does the Turkish diaspora have any influence on Norwegian Politics? If yes, how? If no, why not?

My definition of political influence in this thesis was defined as:

“The achievement of changing state regulations, partly or completely, carried out intentionally or unintentionally by a diasporic group. Moreover, in my definition of the political influence, I have also included the attempts by a diasporic group to change a rule or practice which create awareness in the society and can later bring about political outcomes as a political influence.”

Considering my definition, the Turkish diaspora have an influence in the Norwegian politics. This leads us to the question “how?”

The findings of this thesis points to four political tools that the Turkish diaspora in Norway have made use of in order to influence the Norwegian politics: organizations, demonstrations, media and less comprehensively lobbying.

Since the 1970s the Turkish non-governmental organizations in Norway have taken important roles in the establishment of the diaspora, creation of the network and politicization of the Turks in Norway. In 1970s and 80s Turks, the Turks in Norway were gathered under one organization, where the Turkish student migrants had a special role in these organizational activities. The student migrants activated the association through identity making, molding public opinion, and opposing the homeland and hostland state’s implementations. In the end of the 1980’s, the ideological differences within the Turkish diaspora became more visible and the diversities shaped the future political organizations within the Turkish diaspora.

Demonstrations have taken an important role in the politicization of the Turkish diaspora. Important political events that concerned the Turkish diaspora in Norway often created an aspiration within the diaspora to show their political stance via demonstrations. This study found three demonstrations where the Turkish people tried to influence Norwegian politics. In the Midnight Express movie protests, the Turkish diaspora aimed to prevent a possible damage to their identity. This protests led Norwegian authorities to change regulations concerning this matter. In the anti-terror protests, the Turkish diaspora members tried to influence the hostland state to support their homeland state and take an action against another diasporic group in the hostland. In the Gezi Park protests, diaspora members came together to mold public opinion towards an issue in Turkey and to gain support from the Norwegian politicians for their cause.

The media took another important role in the Turkish diaspora. The Turkish diaspora's usage of media platforms to influence the Norwegian politics was mainly used in order to promote political participation, to promote integration in the Norwegian society and to use non-diasporic media in the big political events.

Lobbying has not been the most common instrument to use among Turks in Norway, as it usually demands political capital and contacts within the decision-making level in order to be effective. However, there are three outstanding examples of when lobbying has been used to further the political interests of the Turkish diaspora: 24-year rule, the optional extra 1 minute to politicians with migrant background and the promoting of adding Turkish as a elective course in primary school.

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Appendices

1. First news in a Turkish newspaper about the Turkish migrants in Norway



“...Norway becomes a new market for Turkish workers. The current number of the Turkish people in Norway is 150. While 20 of them have been living in Norway for a long time and they are married to Norwegians, the rest of the Turks come from the other European countries because they somehow could not get residence permit from the other countries and they want to try their last chance in Norway...”

“... Norway is a socialist country, there is no unemployment, Norwegians do not discriminate foreigners and people have high standards although they cannot save a lot of money. Turks in Norway just live the moment with enjoy...”


Lütfü Güven (17.04.1970, Milliyet Newspaper)

3. The First Turkish Association in Norway



Milliyet, dated 8 April 1974, announced to the readers in Turkey that, “In order to provide social and cultural solidarity – Turks in Oslo established an Association”. The article continues with giving the aims of the Turkish Worker Association and the situation of Turks in Norway.

4. Turkish Written Media



A selection of the written media that the Turkish diaspora members in Norway produced during the 70s, 80s and 90s.

5. News about Midnight Express protest

Fremmedarbeidere i protest-tog mot film

Fremmedarbeiderforeningen protesterer på det sterkeste mot at norske myndigheter tillater at filmen «Midnight Express» vises i Norge. Det er tatt juridiske skritt for å få stanset filmen som foreningen mener er rase-diskriminerende og dermed rammes av loven. Filmen, som skild-

rer hvordan en amerikansk narkotikasmugler opplever brutaliteten i tyrkisk fengsel, vil føre til alvorlig forverring av det gode forhold mellom fremmedarbeiderne og deres norske verter, mener foreningen som appellerer til alle rettenkene nordmenn og fremmedarbeiderne å

slutte opp om demonstrasjonen på Karl Johan Lørdag kl. 13, som de tyrkiske arbeideres forening har tatt initiativet til.

— Det er ikke så ofte vi både klipper en film og setter aldersgrensen til 18 år. Men det er gjort i dette tilfelle fordi det er en veldig sterk film som Statens Filmkontroll har behandlet i fullt kollegium. Dog har vi ikke noen hjemmel i kinoloven til å forby en film på de premissene, uttaler Else Germeten i Statens Filmkontroll til Aftenposten.

Jeg kan godt forstå fremmedarbeidernes syn og at de synes det er leit med denne filmen som de frykter skal bli en belastning på forholdet mellom tyrkiske fremmedarbeidere og vertslandet. Men i et demokrati som vårt kan vi ikke bruke sensur for å stoppe en biografisk film som er en meningsytring fra en mann som har opplevd en begrenset sektor av Tyrkia, sier Germeten. — Kan film rammes av loven om rasediskriminering?

— Den kan vel det hvis det oppføres til straffbare handlinger. Dog tror jeg ikke den kan rammes selv om et annet land fremstilles ufordelaktig. Det har vært gjort i film til alle tider, såvel som man skildrer mord, voldtekt og andre straffbare handlinger. Jeg vet ikke riktig hva konsekvensene skulle bli hvis vi skulle forby kritiske ytringer om sitt eget eller andre samfunn eller grupper. Jeg sa til fremmedarbeiderforeningen at vi ikke kan stoppe filmen, men oppfordret dem isteden til å gå til motaksjon gjennom informasjon. Det står enhver friatt til å demonstrere og skrive i avisene hvis de mener filmen gir et fortegnert og ensidig bilde av forholdene i Tyrkia, sier Else Germeten.

Ny direktør ved Meteorologiske

Rådgiver, dr. philos. Kaare Langlo ble i statsråd idag utnevnt til direktør ved Meteorologisk institutt i Oslo.

Langlo er født i Bergen i 1913. Han tok matematisk-naturvitenskapelig embedseksamen ved Universitetet i Oslo i 1941 og den filosofiske doktorgrad ved samme universitet i 1953.

Fra 1952 til 1976 var Langlo ansatt i Den meteorologiske verdensorganisasjon, WMO. Han var vise-generalsekretær i organisasjonen fra 1971 til 1976 da han ble rådgiver ved Meteorologisk institutt.

Dr. jur. Mads Andenæs professor i Bergen

Amanuensis dr. juris Mads Henry Andenæs ble i statsråd idag utnevnt til professor



Professor i psykiatri

Overlege dr. med. Arne Sund ble i statsråd idag beskikket til professor II i medisin (katarstrofepsykiatri) ved Universitetet i Oslo.

Sund er 53 år gammel og tok sin medisinske embedseksamen ved Universitetet i Oslo i 1950 og den medisinske doktorgrad samme sted i 1968.

I 1965 ble han konstituert som sjefpsykiater i Forsvarets sanitet med fast ansettelse fra 1967.



Ny byfoged i Oslo utnevnt i statsråd

Byråsjef Per Iver Hauge ble i statsråd idag utnevnt til byfogd ved Oslo byfogdembedes 2. avdeling. Hauge er 53 år gammel og tok juridisk embedseksamen i 1952.

Efter en tid ved Oslo politikammer var Hauge i 1955—57 dommerfullmektig ved Nord-Hedmark sorenskriverembede. Siden den tid har han vært ansatt i Justisdepartementet, de siste 10 år som byråsjef.



The introduction of the thesis started with this example of diasporic activity. In 3 November 1978, Aftenposten announced “Foreign workers protests against a movie”

6. Identity maintenance



Nasrullah Kakis har samlet gamle minner fra 1960-tallet. Her står han mellom Rådhuset og Vestbanen.

FOTO: NINA

Feiret 50 år i Norge

Trodde du at de første arbeidsinnvandrene fra Tyrkia kom på 1970-tallet, så tar du feil. Et fåtall har bodd i Norge siden 1958. I går feiret de seg selv.

NRIN I, HAZ

– Jeg ble kjent med en norsk familie da jeg deltok i EM i seiling i 1969. Da jeg kom til Norge, flyttet jeg til dem på Majorstuen. Siden har jeg bodd i Oslo, forteller Nasrullah Kakis (72).

– Jeg kom til Norge for å besøke Nasrullah i 1961 og ble her. Jeg var elektriker, og har jobbet som flytekniker i SAS i nesten alle år, forteller Altan Gulpinar (70).

– Jeg fikk jobb som sjåfør ved den tyrkiske ambassaden i Oslo, og valgte å bosette meg her da jeg giftet meg, forteller Lütfü Güven (78).

Kakis, Güven og Gulpinar er alle gift med norske kvinner. De har barn og barnebarn i Norge.

Over 100 norsk-tyrkere var i går samlet i Papa Sigolo Restaurant i Oslo sentrum for å feire 50 år i Norge. Noen av de første kom til Norge som gjemmen i 1958. Flere er gått bort.

– Jeg tror jeg er den eneste her som har bodd i Norge siden 1958. Jeg kom hit som student, forteller Aydin Ener (80). De tidlige snakker om gamle dager, og husker fremdeles Os-



Her er (f.v.) Nasrullah Kakis, Altan Gulpinar og Lütfü Güven i den tyrkiske ambassaden i Oslo for å feire den tyrkiske nasjonaldagen i 1961.

FOTO: NINA

lo som en liten by uten særlig trafikk og støy.

Fredelig og fattig

– Nordmenn vi traff var veldig hyggelige og tolerante. Det fantes ikke noen diskriminering. Det var først på 1970-tallet at Oslo begynte sin utvikling mot en storby med mye trafikk og støy, minnes Ener.

Kakis husker Norge som et fredelig og fattig land, og trives godt i grønne omgivelser. – Folk måtte jobbe hardt på den tiden. Jeg var glassmester, og husker at mange hadde flere jobber for å klare seg. Den gangen fantes ikke sosialen, forteller Kakis.

Savner dere ikke Tyrkia?

– Jeg har et sommerhus der, og er der av og til, svarer Gulpinar.

– Jeg har slekt i Tyrkia, og vurderer nå å flytte tilbake for



Aydin Ener var en av de aller første med tyrkisk bakgrunn i Norge. Han kom hit som student ved Universitetet i Oslo

å tilbringe mine siste år der, supplerer Ener.

Selv om de første tyrkerne bosatte seg i Oslo på 1950-tallet, kom de fleste på 70-tallet. I dag bor det over 2300 personer med tyrkiske røtter i hovedstaden.

www.aftenposten.no



Med sang til levende musikk feiret (f.v.) Altan Gulpinar, Nasrullah Kakis og Lütfü Güven tyrkernes 50 år i Norge i går.



Wesche og Nasrullah Kakis klarte ikke å holde seg, og tok seg en dans til tyrkiske rytmer på Papa Sigolo.

«Nordmenn vi traff var veldig hyggelige og tolerante. Det fantes ikke noen diskriminering.»

Aydin Ener

In this Aftenposten article from 10 November 2008, we can read about the earliest members of the Turkish diaspora and over 100 Norwegian Turks (some of them are my interviewees) celebrating the 50th year of the Turkish migration to Norway.

7. Creating awareness in the Norwegian society



A Norwegian woman standing in Karl Johans gate, the main street of Oslo is holding a sign saying: “I am standing here for the four persons who lost their lives in Gezi Park in Turkey. To memorize the four, come and stand with me. #standingman on Twitter.” in which “standingman” refers to one of the symbolic actions during the Gezi Park protests.



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