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Declaration

I, Selina Köhr, declare that this thesis is a result of my research investigations and findings. Sources of information other than my own have been acknowledged and a reference list has been appended. This work has not been previously submitted to any other university for award of any type of academic degree.

Signature.....

Date.....

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ABSTRACT

The primary objective of this work is to improve the understanding of the Azad Kashmiri perspective on their situation and the Kashmir conflict in general. To achieve this, qualitative interviews in Pakistan and Azad Kashmir were conducted and analysed with the help of the humiliation theory. The secondary objective was to challenge the theory on its applicability on multi-party conflicts: what can the humiliation theory learn from the case?

The present research suggested that humiliations from the Pakistani side strengthened the Azad Kashmiri nationalism and the stance for a re-united, independent Kashmir. The past and the expected continuation of present humiliations from the Indian side create an atmosphere in Azad Kashmir that supports, or at least, tolerates a militant freedom struggle. Furthermore, the neglect of Azad Kashmir's right to self-determination and the enforced division of Kashmir were perceived to be humiliating. This last set of humiliations causes Azad Kashmiris to either demand a plebiscite as suggested by the UN or an inclusion of Kashmiri representatives in the reconciliation process between India and Pakistan. The aim of the latter group is to find a mutually acceptable solution of the Kashmir issue for all three parties: India, Pakistan and Kashmir.

Regarding the second objective, the present thesis found that most types as well as features and dynamics of humiliation are at work in Azad Kashmir. The case suggests two additional types or, at least, subgroups of humiliation: The loss of identity as well as being neglected or ignored can be seen as humiliating. Moreover, two additional mechanisms can be identified from the case: First that the destroyed hope for dignity can increase feelings of humiliation and mobilise people, and second that interpersonal contact between humiliators and humiliatees can reduce feelings of humiliation. Furthermore, the case suggests an enhancement of the humiliation model for conflicts with three parties. The thesis suggests that further research on India and Pakistan can help increase the awareness about reciprocal humiliations and find the point of equal dignity that symbolises a mutually acceptable solution.

List of Abbreviations

AJK	Azad Jammu and Kashmir (also called Azad Kashmir or Pakistan administered Kashmir)
FG	Focus Group
G-B	Gilgit-Baltistan
IR	International Relations
J&K	Jammu and Kashmir (also called Indian administered Kashmir)
JKLF	Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front
NDU	National Defence University (Islamabad, Pakistan)
OI	Open Interview
RQ	Research Question
SSI	Semi-Structured Interview
UN	United Nations
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
US	United States
UK	United Kingdom

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction

The Kashmir issue is one of the longest running and most intractable contemporary conflicts (Bose 2003; Sehgal 2011; Wolpert 2010). Though the literature about the Kashmir issue and its potential solutions is vast and diverse, there are only a few studies on the perspective of Azad Kashmir¹ and current social and political developments in that region (Snedden 2012). The present thesis will add to the knowledge about this neglected region. It will help improve the understanding of the Azad Kashmiri mind-set in the light of a psychological perspective: What is the role of humiliations in forming opinions and justifying actions in Azad Kashmir?

The study of humiliations has gained importance in the field of International Relations (IR) to explain conflicts (often cited works include, for example, Fattah & Fierke 2009; Lindner 2006; Lowenheim & Heimann 2008; Saurette 2006). Humiliation causes and sustains conflicts by distancing the involved parties: the group of humiliators establishes itself above the level of equal dignity by putting the group of humiliatees down. This arrogation helps justify counter-humiliations and violence by the humiliatees, which in turn triggers similar responses in the humiliators. This cycle of humiliations keeps conflicts at the intractable level – reconciliations are difficult because humiliations keep the parties apart.

The Kashmir conflict is labelled intractable: since the separation of British India into India and Pakistan in 1947, the two new countries have been claiming control over Kashmir. The first Indo-Pakistan war was fought over Kashmir, soon after the partition, in 1948. The UN

¹ Azad Kashmir or AJK is one part of Pakistan's administered Kashmir; the other part is Gilgit Baltistan (formerly known as Northern Areas).

brought about a ceasefire and demanded to let Kashmiris decide the fate of their state democratically with the help of a plebiscite (United Nations Security Council 1948). Such a democratic decision never took place; instead, Kashmir was divided in an Indian administered and a Pakistan administered part. Since two Indo-Pakistan wars followed in 1965 and 1971, the focus of the international community shifted from the will of Kashmiris to inter-state relations between India and Pakistan. Moreover, in 1998 both states demonstrated nuclear power. The Kargil War² in the following year had the potential to escalate in the world's first nuclear war and ended by Pakistan's withdrawal (Wolpert 2010). Any future inter-state crisis meant a global threat, which was kept at bay by keeping a silence on the Kashmir issue. Today we read in the news mostly about Pakistan's internal problems with terrorism and corruption and India is known as the world's largest democracy and a rising economic power. Kashmir seldom hits the headlines, although it is still an unresolved issue.

Besides the inter-state conflict "about Kashmir" there is an intra-state level, a conflict "in Kashmir" (Khan 2009, p. 65): Demonstrations and insurgencies within Jammu and Kashmir (J&K)³ against the Indian occupation have been taking place. In the name of the Kashmiri cause, terror attacks in J&K and allegedly on Indian soil have been conducted (BBC ; Rai & Sengupta 2006; The Guardian 2005; The Guardian 2006). But also in Azad Kashmir the calls of people for a united, independent Kashmir grow louder. Moreover, until the early 21st century, militant groups had training camps in Azad Kashmir, which may be a sign that the non-resolution of the conflict has been a fertile ground for militant insurgencies in this region.

Rapprochements between India and Pakistan and their attempt to solve the dispute have been interrupted either by Kashmiris themselves or by the groups that claim to act in the name of the Kashmiri cause either for independence or for joining Pakistan: the Mumbai attacks in 2008, for example, terminated the peace talks between India and Pakistan for nearly three years (Denyer & Brulliard 2011). The attacks were thought to be planned and executed by members of Lashkar-e-Taiba – a "Kashmiri militant group" (Wilkinson 2008) with aims to

² Kargil is a region in Kashmir nearby the Line of Control (the border that divides Kashmir).

³ Jammu and Kashmir is the name of the Indian administered part of Kashmir.

liberate Kashmir from the Indian occupation (Cronin 2004). This example shows that individual opinions or actions matter and can change the atmosphere from good will back to animosity.

To improve the understanding of the Azad Kashmiri perspective and to identify present chances and challenges in the region, the primary data was acquired during a fieldtrip to Pakistan and Azad Kashmir. Qualitative interviews and focus groups were conducted in December 2012 and January 2013. The goal of this qualitative research was to investigate how the non-resolution and the dispute as such are perceived by Azad Kashmiris today: Have humiliations affected their opinion forming and actions? The aim was to cover diverse views and the major political stances and *not* to find out what the entire population or a majority thereof thinks. Therefore, the participant sample was purposive and, thus, non-probabilistic. The next section will present the research objectives and questions in more detail. The final section of the introduction will present the outline of the thesis.

1.2 Objectives and Research Questions

The primary objective is to improve the understanding of the Azad Kashmiri perspective on their situation and the Kashmir conflict in general. To achieve this, we conducted qualitative interviews and analysed the data with the help of the humiliation theory. The research questions (RQ) for the primary objective are the following:

RQ 1.1 Which past events or collective memories of humiliation are still seen and felt as humiliating today and keep influencing attitudes and behaviour of Azad Kashmiris?

RQ 1.2 Do Azad Kashmiris fear future humiliations and does this fear influence present decisions?

RQ 1.3 Which features of humiliation can be identified in relation to the Kashmir-conflict in AJK?

RQ 1.4 Are the interviewed individuals and groups aware of how humiliations influence their attitude and behaviour? Are they aware that their own actions could have the potential to humiliate others?

This analysis will also help achieve the secondary objective, i.e., to improve the understanding of the role of humiliations in an intractable three-party-conflict. The research question here is:

RQ 2.1 How does the Kashmir conflict from the Azad Kashmiri perspective illuminate the humiliation theory?

1.3 Outline of the Thesis

The next chapter provides a detailed account of the historical and geopolitical background of the Kashmir conflict. Processes during the partition of the Indian subcontinent, its aftermath and major political developments in region until today will be presented. In the same chapter, the theoretical background will be explained in more detail: What is the humiliation theory, how has it been used and what are the drawbacks and benefits of applying the theory on the Kashmir issue? The chapter will be concluded with the theoretical framework created out of the reviewed literature.

The third chapter gives a detailed overview over the research approach of the thesis: reasons for methodological choices are explained followed by a detailed description of the data collection process and information about the data analysis. The chapter also reflects upon measures to ensure trustworthiness as well as ethical problems.

The fourth chapter combines the presentation and analysis of interview data to answer the research questions. The first section demonstrates which past events are still influencing opinions and actions in Azad Kashmir and qualify as humiliations according to the theory. The second section deals with future perceptions of interviewees and how this influences their present attitude. An analysis of features and dynamics of humiliations in the present case follows in the third section. The fourth section debates whether participants showed

awareness of the influence of humiliations and of the effect of their own behaviour on others. The final section suggests an enhancement of the theory according to the case-specific findings. The thesis concludes with a presentation of the main findings.

CHAPTER 2

HISTORICAL AND THEORETICAL CONTEXT

2.1 Geopolitical and Historical Background

The following sections summarise the historical development of the Kashmir dispute and the current geopolitical status of the region.

2.1.1 Partition of British India and Kashmir

Since 1940, the Muslim population of British India demanded their own state, separate and independent from the majorly Hindu population of the Indian subcontinent. When the British colonial power planned to withdraw its troops in 1947, Muslims succeeded in their wish for “their own government rather than remaining subordinate to India’s Hindu majority.” (Wolpert 2010, p. 7) The subcontinent was divided into two countries: those states with a majorly Muslim population were supposed to become Pakistan and the regions with a majorly Hindu population were united into India. Princely states were an exemption as their rulers were given the special right to decide which country they wanted to join. However, “the British encouraged each princely ruler to consider geographical factors and the will of his subjects in deciding his accession.” (Snedden 2012, p. 7)

This put the Kashmiri ruler of the time, Hari Singh, in a dilemma. He himself and Kashmir’s elite were Hindus, but the majority of the population was Muslim. Had Kashmir not been a princely state, it should have become part of Pakistan because of the population’s religious affinity and, secondly, because Kashmir had geographically been straightforwardly connected

to areas that were supposed to become Pakistan. For these reasons, Kashmiris had also established matrimonial ties with the people living in the regions that were about to become Pakistan. The railway to Sialkot and the road connections to other cities in Punjab were important trade routes. On the other hand, there was no route to the areas that were going to merge with India.

Kashmiris were never asked about their opinion even though Singh was advised by Mahatma Gandhi and Lord Mountbatten⁴ to consult his people and make a decision according to the majority's will. We can only speculate how Kashmiris perceived their own situation and which option the majority might have favoured. In the end, it was Singh who was authorised to decide but he neither wanted to join India nor Pakistan. An independent Kashmir though was not acceptable for India and Pakistan in the long term. Both nations saw J&K as a part of their new identity. Kashmir was seen as a prestigious object and it was also important in regard to its water resources.

On the 17th August 1947, the official border between India and Pakistan (excluding Kashmir) was made public. It was also announced that Punjab – a Muslim majority state – was to be divided between India and Pakistan instead of merging completely into Pakistan. As soon as the news came out, a mass migration started and violence broke out. Furthermore, the chosen course of the boarder that separates Punjab resulted in a road-connection between Kashmir and the Indian part of Punjab, offering a new geographical and economic link to India. Still, Singh was not willing to join India and this irresolution resulted in Kashmir being independent for some months after the partition of the subcontinent.

While the migration and killings outside of Kashmir continued, the situation within Kashmir became increasingly tense. Some people fled to Pakistan, others to India. Muslims in the western parts of Kashmir who held strong ties with the Pakistani part of Punjab feared that the new link between Kashmir and the Indian part of Punjab could convince Singh to accede to India (Snedden 2012). They began to rise against their Hindu landlords and protested against the Maharajah (Snedden 2012; Wolpert 2010). The aim was to liberate Kashmir from the Hindu rule and integrate it into Pakistan. This Azadi ('freedom') movement resulted in

⁴ The last Viceroy and first Governor-General of India, who was in charge of Britain's withdrawal from India.

the foundation of a provisional ‘Azadi government’ that ruled over the liberated or ‘freed’ areas (Snedden 2012). It is sometimes claimed that Pashtoon tribesmen from the North West Frontier in Pakistan started the uprising in Kashmir against the Hindu rule. However, Snedden (2012) has elucidated how the revolt was actually triggered by Azad Kashmiris themselves and that Pashtoons and other Pakistanis supported their struggle later on.

At the time of the revolt, Maharajah Singh called India for help to stop the uprising. India in turn demanded Singh to integrate Kashmir into India and he agreed. The Muslim population of Kashmir and many Pakistanis were outraged (Wolpert 2010). The situation soon escalated and resulted in the first Indo-Pakistan war: Pakistan Army and many Pakistani combatants fought on the side of Azad Kashmiri Muslims against the Hindu authorities and other pro-Indian groups in Kashmir, who in turn were supported by the Indian Army.

India called on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and protested that Pakistan’s actions were unlawful because Kashmir as a whole was officially turned over to India by its ruler. But the resolution 47 of the UNSC demanded a plebiscite as well as the withdrawal of both Indian and Pakistani troops. No such actions were taken and the UN called for ceasefire in 1949. Since then the ceasefire-line has been functioning as a division of Kashmir.

The Indian part of Kashmir is referred to as “Jammu and Kashmir” (See Map 1 on the next page) and Pakistanis would often call it “Indian-occupied Kashmir”. The Pakistani part of Kashmir today consists of two provinces: “Azad Kashmir” (“free Kashmir”) and “Northern Areas” (See Map 1 on the next page; this area was renamed as “Gilgit Baltistan”). Indians often call both provinces together “Pakistan-occupied Kashmir” due to Pakistan’s political and administrative influence in the regions. Officially though, these areas are not part of Pakistan.

As you can see in the map on the next page, China plays a side-role in the conflict, too. In 1963 Pakistan gave a part of its controlled territory in Kashmir to China. The reasons were diverse, but most importantly Pakistan wanted to win China as an ally. The Sino-Pakistan agreement contains an article stating that if the Kashmir dispute is resolved, China will re-open negotiations with the concerned government. India was outraged about the deal because it is claiming control over the original Kashmir territory (marked with the fat grey line in the

map below). Furthermore India had some border disputes, or rather war with China also concerning the Aksai Chin territory.



Map 1 Kashmir. [taken from Wolpert (2010, p. 28)]

2.1.2 Aftermath of the Partitions and Present Status

Since the partition of Kashmir in the first Indo-Pakistan war , the second (1965) and third (1971) Indo-Pakistan wars as along with the Kargil war were probably the most devastating and internationally most noticed events in relation to Kashmir. The second Indo-Pakistan war was fought for Kashmir and is sometimes referred to as the second Kashmir war. Besides the destructions and casualties, it did not result in any change of the status or borders of Kashmir. The third Indo-Pakistan war in 1971 resulted in the secession of Bangladesh (East Pakistan) and the above mentioned ceasefire-line within Kashmir was renamed into “Line of Control”. This line turned into an actual state-border between India and Pakistan, but the agreement could not suppress claims of India and Pakistan over the whole of Kashmir (J&K). The Kargil war between India and Pakistan in 1999 gained international attention especially because both states had acquired nuclear weapons in the preceding year.

Besides the wars, several crises between India and Pakistan about cross-border violations and access to water keep both states on bad terms with each other. Though wars and crises keep the conflict intractable, we can also notice progress in Indo-Pakistan relations. Confidence building measures in the early 2000s included a bus-service between Muzaffarabad (in AJK) and Srinagar (J&K). Though the terror attacks in Mumbai in 2008 stopped the confidence building measures, India and Pakistan have taken up talks again.

Interestingly, the global attention still lies on the inter-state relations albeit an intra-state insurgency against the Indian occupation of Kashmir taking place since the late 1980s. This freedom struggle was triggered by rigged elections in the Indian part of Kashmir (Snedden 2012) and is still going on (Bose 2011). Freedom fighters call for an end of India’s occupation and human rights violations. Furthermore, they demand a plebiscite to decide Kashmir’s future and are supported by like-minded people in Azad Kashmir (Snedden 2012). Militant groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba infiltrated the movement and operated training camps near Muzaffarabad in Azad Kashmir (Cronin 2004; Lakshmi 2008). The Mumbai attacks in 2008 showed that it does not take another war to disturb the inter-state peace-process; rather, eight trained militants are enough (Lakshmi 2008).

2.2 Humiliation Theory as a Tool to Explain Intractable Conflicts

This section introduces what the humiliation theory stands for and how it has been used as a tool to explain conflicts and disputes on national and international levels. Finally, it discusses the pros and cons of applying the humiliation theory on the present case.

2.2.1 The Humiliation Theory in Theory

The Humiliation Theory has gained acceptance as an interdisciplinary approach to violent conflict. It draws upon Psychology and can be applied on different levels of conflict (Lindner 2006): inter-personal, inter-group and international. The present study will focus on the inter-group and international level and therefore discuss only the corresponding literature.

According to Lindner (2009), humiliation is not only an emotion: We need to differentiate between humiliation as 1.) an act (word or deed), 2.) a feeling and 3.) a process. 1.) A humiliator carries out the act of humiliation (consciously or not), 2.) the humiliatee feels the emotion of humiliation and 3.) act and emotion together form the process of humiliation (Lindner 2009). If the act of humiliation is planned as such, it is called a conscious or intended humiliation. This stands in contrast to an unconscious or unintended humiliation, when the action was not planned to be humiliating, but nevertheless made the humiliatee feel humiliated. Whether an action is perceived to be humiliating depends on the historical context and cultural background; “different cultures, different groups within a culture, and different individuals within a group often disagree as to whether or not an experience rises to the level of a humiliation.” (Lindner 2006, XIV).

But what exactly is humiliation? According to Klein (1991) being put down, excluded or made less are typical humiliating events. Furthermore, he names the loss of face and the violation of personal boundaries. Besides those humiliating experiences, the fear of being humiliated can trigger the same emotional and behavioural responses (Klein 1991).

Lindner (2003) defines humiliation as a kind of suppression, an “enforced lowering of a person or group, (...), that damages or strips away their pride, honour or dignity”.

To be humiliated is to be placed, against your will (...) and often in a deeply hurtful way, in a situation that is greatly inferior to what you feel you should expect. Humiliation entails demeaning treatment that transgresses established expectations. It may involve acts of force, including violent force. At its heart is the idea of pinning down, putting down or holding to the ground. Indeed, one of the defining characteristics of humiliation as a process is that the victim is forced into passivity, acted upon, made helpless.” (Lindner 2003).

Linder visualises the “hierarchy of human worthiness” or “vertical scale of human worthiness” (Lindner 2006, p. 6) in form of a diagram, depicted in Fig. 1. The diagram illustrates how ranked honour or the process of humiliation separates humankind: Drifting away from a level of humility or equal dignity, some people rise to the top of the scale, while the others are put down to the bottom of the scale.




Figure 1 “The vertical scale of human worthiness” [based on Lindner (2006, p. 6)]

Counter-humiliations can function as a way to lift the former humiliatee’s status by lowering the status of the former humiliator. Thus, through becoming himself a humiliator, a former humiliatee can reach the top of the scale and put his perpetrator even more below the bottom of the scale (Lindner 2006). Fig. 2 shows this process using the example of genocidal “cleansing” as a counter-humiliation.




Figure 2 “Genocidal Cleansing” [taken from Lindner (2006, p. 136)]

Goldman and Coleman (2005) seem to depart from Lindner’s framework as they see humiliation and other emotions as the fuel that makes conflicts intractable. They designed an integrated definition that entails the essence of various other definitions of humiliation:

“We define humiliation as an emotion, triggered by public events, which evokes a sense of inferiority resulting from the realization that one is being, or has been, treated in a way that departs from the normal expectations for fair and equal human treatment. The experience of humiliation has the potential to serve as a formative, guiding force in a person’s life, such that depending on the context in which it occurred, it can significantly impact one’s individual and/or collective or group identity. Finally, humiliation is a moral emotion. As such, the experience of humiliation motivates behavioral responses that may serve to extend or re-define previously existing moral boundaries, thus in some cases leading individuals to perceive otherwise socially impermissible behavior to be permissible.” (Goldman & Coleman 2005, p. 11)

Based on the above definition, humiliation has four preconditions: (1) an individual or group who is inferior or made to feel inferior and a counterpart who is superior or feeling superior, (2) Expectations about what is fair or appropriate; I would like to mention here that

(perceived) injustice is probably the most unfair and unequal treatment, (3) individual and/or group identities, and (4) moral values/boundaries.

Expectations about what is appropriate and moral depend on cultural and historical contexts. In addition to the above definition Goldman and Coleman (2005, p. 5) point out that "...the experience of humiliation on a collective level can lead individuals to feel justified in expressing rage and seeking violent revenge for the humiliation cast upon their group", but "However, under other circumstances, individuals may feel humiliated but do not seek violent revenge or retribution". They suggest that society has an influence in triggering the cycle of humiliation and violence: if a person feels humiliated and the society he lives in gives him to understand that a violent reaction is understandable or even acceptable, he will react aggressively. In addition, he will memorise the humiliation combined with his anger intensely. Through this intensification it is likely that he will keep acting hostile and more aggressive towards the humiliator and even expand the negative emotions and aggression on the humiliator's group without experiencing any further humiliating event. This "provokes further acts of retribution from the other side, perpetuating the cycle of violence and humiliation." (ibid., p. 25). Furthermore, taking revenge for being humiliated can appear time-displaced: "social information processing theory suggests that even if individuals' immediate emotional reactions to a humiliating situation are moderate, if they perceive the social context to privilege aggression and they do in fact intend to aggress, their emotions may become more extreme over time." (ibid., p. 24)

Lindner identifies two different ways of reacting on humiliation: "Hitler-like" and "Mandela-like" behaviour (Lindner 2006). The Hitler-like reaction triggers the cycle of humiliation as described above. A Mandela-like action breaks the cycle of humiliation, e.g., by not taking revenge and in the best case forgiving the perpetrator. Supplementary to these two potential reactions, humiliatees can develop cultural differences to separate themselves from their humiliators (ibid.).

In addition to the above definitions I would like to introduce Saurette's (2006) framework that helps to identify when humiliation is likely to have occurred and to have influenced ensuing incidents. It consists of seven points that define key-characteristics, pre-requisites, and possible reactions towards humiliation:

First, he sees a connection between “ideas about, and perceptions of, ‘honour’ and ‘respect’” (ibid., p. 506) and humiliation. Feeling humiliated includes a feeling of being disrespected (ibid., p. 507). Second, a prerequisite for humiliation is a “certain self-perception as the basis for self-respect” of the humiliated party that can be denied or ripped away by the humiliator. Third, the humiliation becomes reinforced if it publicised, e.g., showing pictures or videos of humiliating acts through mass media can intensify the feeling of humiliation. Therefore (this is the fourth feature) it needs a “recognised, common sense standard of judgment, that is shared by the humiliatee and a broader audience”. Fifth, Saurette argues that “the elements that trigger humiliation depend heavily on a specific cultural sensitivity”. With the sixth feature of humiliation, Saurette devotes himself to the variety of reactions towards humiliation. Those five reactions are: Firstly, you obey the humiliator. Secondly, you react against the humiliator; this could include violence. Thirdly, you take other “negative and unpredictable” actions, for example to disempower the humiliator. A fourth possible reaction is that you start to question or rebel against the social standards that would label the act against yourself as humiliating. Or fifthly, you take no visible action at all, but develop a strong aversion within yourself against the humiliator. This feeling could explode and trigger any of the four other mentioned reactions later on. Back to the seven features of humiliation: With the final characteristic, Saurette looks into the dynamic and tactic humiliation. The dynamic form of humiliation is an unconscious reaction while the tactic is intentionally used to influence behaviour of the humiliatee(s). A conflict could for example start with a dynamic or unconscious humiliation which triggers acts of tactic humiliation to take vengeance. Saurette concludes that “humiliation is a key emotion and a set of specific dynamics and tactics that are distinct from feelings of fear and interest.”

2.2.2 The Humiliation Theory in Practice

The humiliation theory and the role of emotions on an international scale become more and more recognised and open new ways of thinking about conflict. Lindner was among the first to study humiliation on the international level and to create a theory of humiliation and dignity. She calls humiliation “the nuclear bomb of the emotions that instigates extremism and hampers moderate reactions and solutions”. (Goldman & Coleman 2005; Lindner 2006).

In her works she has applied the humiliation theory on diverse topics including WWII, the Rwandan genocide, terrorism and economy. Furthermore she continues to develop the theory and to broaden its horizon.

Saurette (2006) was one of the first who brought humiliation to the discipline of International Relations. He applied this framework on US foreign politics after 9/11 and concludes that the senior decision makers', the strategic community's as well as the popular domestic community's self-understanding of a strong elite USA was shaken by the attacks; all three subgroups of American society felt humiliated and reacted with counter-humiliation against the humiliating party and its alleged supporters.

Fattah and Fierke (2009) see humiliation in a wider framework "within a cluster of emotions, including betrayal, dignity and compassion" (ibid., p. 69). The focus of their article is the role of humiliation and betrayal in the politics in the Middle East. They argue that the current rise of Islamic extremism in the Middle East is based on the "inability of secularism to address the widespread experience of suffering in the region" (ibid., p. 81); Islam offers a rich and great past and hope for a future in dignity. They point out that emotions depend on the respective cultural background and give a certain meaning to historical events. As a result, the narratives of those events and the emotions linked to them function as a justification for future actions. In other words, Islamists use the narrative of humiliation by the West against Islam for violent counter-humiliations. Thus, the article can be seen as a mirror-study to Saurette's analysis of post 9/11 US foreign politics.

Lowenheim and Heimann (2008) study the process of revenge as a response to humiliation in international politics which is congruent with the above described counter-humiliations. They identify three variables that make a state likely to take revenge: "(1) the degree to which a state experiences a harm against it as morally outrageous, (2) the intensity of humiliation that the harmed state feels following the injury, and (3) the extent to which negative reciprocity is institutionalised in international politics." (ibid., p. 687). The conclusion explains Israel's proneness to revenge through its location within a hostile environment that challenges its existential right and Israel's resulting militaristic culture.

Mahapatra and Shekhawat are researching the internal conflict of Jammu and Kashmir and the situation of the population in that region. They have highlighted that both Pakistan and India use repressive tactics and take control over the parts of Kashmir they administer (Mahapatra & Shekhawat 2008a). Currently they are working on a paper called “Viewing Kashmir Conflict through the Prism of Dignity and Humiliation” (Mahapatra & Shekhawat 2008b).

2.2.3 Drawbacks and Benefits

A pitfall of using humiliation theories as a theoretical framework could be the development of a humiliation addiction of the researcher: everything might seem to be a humiliation. Therefore, it is important to define in the theoretical framework of the present thesis what exactly is regarded as humiliation.

Another drawback could be that this study has the potential to make India, Pakistan and other involved parties appear as perpetrators and the root of all evil. But the intention is not to accuse or put the blame on someone – the aim is to give voice to the perspective of Azad Kashmiris and to understand their thinking and behavior better. Even if these thoughts and actions might not all be justified in the eyes of others, they do exist and influence the Kashmir issue.

A common critique of studying emotions in IR is researchers’ focus on one single, negative emotion and their negative outcome (Sasley 2011). Sasley (2011) argues that other emotions might influence the decision making processes, too, and that feelings as triggers or causes of certain behaviour cannot be singled out. By applying the humiliation theory, the present thesis may seem to be blind in regard to other negative and/or positive emotions and developments. However, the focus will not only lie on humiliation as an *emotion*, but as an *act* and a *process*, too (Lindner 2009). By defining these acts and processes we can ascertain when humiliation is the key emotion that informs behaviours. Furthermore this study includes positive reactions towards humiliating incidents that Lindner would refer to “Mandela-like” behavior. To distract interviewees from solely negative thinking I included a control question about positive developments and effects of the Kashmir issue in the interviews.

The potential benefit from applying the humiliation perspective is to increase awareness and understanding for the Kashmiri point of view. The theory will help discover the underlying reasons for people's actions and present attitudes towards their perpetrators as well as towards potential solutions to the conflict. From the Azad Kashmiri perspective, which actions keep the humiliators on top of the scale and the humiliatees at the bottom? And what should be done to reach a level of equal dignity and thereby leaving the conflict behind?

In the best case the present study could also increase Kashmiris' awareness for their own behavior and their perceived perpetrators stances; by asking participants about what influences their own opinion, about the intentions behind their perpetrator's actions and if Kashmir's actions could have humiliated others, I also aim at provoking critical thinking about their own role in the issue.

The humiliation theory itself could benefit from the present case. The theory has mostly been used in typical dual conflicts, i.e., issues between two parties. Kashmir is a multi-party conflict, i.e., an issue between three or if we include the international community, even four parties. The analysis will show whether the theoretical framework proves equal for this complexity.

2.3 Theoretical Framework

As the literature discussion has shown, the humiliation theories focus on dual relationships, i.e. disputes or conflicts between two parties. This thesis explores a triangular conflict between India, Pakistan and Kashmir as parties. I focus on the perspective of Azad Kashmir about humiliating events and dynamics during the on-going dispute is to improve the understanding of the conflict itself and to challenge the theory regarding its ability to account for dynamics in a multi-party conflict. Therefore I create a framework based on the above mentioned studies and apply it on the case.

In order to study the role of humiliation in the Kashmir conflict on the intergroup and international level, we need to determine who is humiliated or who feels in a certain way.

In this thesis I assume that a state is a group of people that can be humiliated. But I will not adopt Wendt's (2006) suggestion that "collectives do have a kind of consciousness", which is difficult to research, rather I follow Tuomela's (2007) argument: Individuals have an "I-mode" and a "we-mode". The I-mode includes personal goals and interests while the we-mode refers to acting and thinking as a group-member. If this collective we-mode is humiliated, the individual can feel and act as if he himself was humiliated – depending on how intense he identifies himself with the we-mode. The we-mode that the present study focusses on is the feeling of belonging to Kashmir and/or Pakistan. Religion, i.e., Islam, as a we-mode might play a role too and will be kept in mind.

In order to think and act as a group-member we create an image of this group. This image of one's own group carries a history that can be called collective memory and influences its group members' thinking, acting and even feeling. For example, Germany was responsible for the Holocaust and even today Germans feel obliged to remember, excuse and show regret, although they had nothing to do with it in person. That shows that the group ("Germany") while being part of its group members' identity, is also independent from its members individual personality.

The group dynamics can influence an individual's behavior and even overrun personal values and interests of the I-mode (cf. Cottam 2004, chapter 4). Thus, people when acting in the we-mode can behave, think and feel different from their I-mode because they adopt their group's perspective.

Based on this discussion and keeping in mind that the group is part of one's own identity, I argue that humiliating a state, a nation or a religious group has an effect on its citizens' and decision makers' attitude, emotions, and behavior although they were not personally humiliated.

The literature review on humiliation showed the diverse concepts and emphases of different studies. The following theoretical framework of the present thesis combines the main ideas of those studies and consists of two sets of criteria. Both sets will be applied on the case to determine which types and dynamics of humiliation are at work in present day AJK.

The first set helps determine the type of humiliation, i.e., what triggers or causes feelings of humiliation, and consists of seven criteria:

- 1) Being put down or made to feel less (Klein 1991), e.g. through dehumanisation (Lindner 2009), can humiliate
- 2) Discrimination and/or disrespect can humiliate (Saurette 2006)
- 3) The loss of power, helplessness or forced passivity can humiliate (Lindner 2003)
- 4) Loss of face and hurt honour can humiliate (Klein 1991; Lindner 2009; Saurette 2006)
- 5) Injustice can humiliate (Goldman & Coleman 2005; Lindner 2006)
- 6) Exclusion can humiliate (Klein 1991)
- 7) The “out-group” violating the personal boundaries (Klein 1991) and disrespecting the self-perception (Saurette 2006) of the “in-group” can humiliate.

The second set helps identify features and dynamics of humiliation and consists of seven criteria.

- 1) Past humiliating events are perpetually memorised in an exaggerated way. Through this, the feeling of humiliation stays active and growing without any further event ((Goldman & Coleman 2005), (Margalit 2002)). The way history is taught in training facilities (schools, universities etc.) or narrated to the future generations by elders, scholars and public figures can play an important role.
- 2) The fear of being humiliated again triggers the same responses as an actual humiliation (Klein 1991).
- 3) Perceived past humiliations or expected future humiliations can justify extraordinary measures that would not be regarded as permissible under normal circumstances, for example counter-humiliations in form of discriminations, violence and even genocidal cleansing. (Goldman & Coleman 2005). The current social atmosphere can hinder or support an individual’s wish for revenge and thus influence his or her decision to take action (ibid.).
- 4) Humiliation can lead the humiliatee to create new cultural differences and divisions (Lindner 2000); a new “we-mode” comes into being that separates itself from the humiliator who becomes an “out-group”.

- 5) Humiliation can turn into an addiction and can be instrumentalised: when humiliation is imagined, provoked or misused for gaining a profit, for being pitied or acknowledged (Lindner 2006, p.127). If someone is addicted to humiliation it also means that he sees the self or we-mode as a victim and the other or out-group as the perpetrator. The addicted victim is unable to see own misdeeds or how his own behavior could humiliate the other. Furthermore he expects an intended humiliation behind any action of the other, even if it seems to have a positive intention at first sight.
- 6) The power of the humiliating event is increased by making the humiliation public (Saurette 2006)
- 7) Human rights reduce the probability of humiliations and thus have “the potential to minimise conflict” (Lindner 2009, xxii)

CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGY

This chapter is divided into six sections. First, alternative research strategies are discussed, followed by a reasoning for a qualitative approach. The second section presents the chosen methodology and data collection process. The third section introduces the participants and describes the atmosphere during the interviews. In the fourth part, the data analysis is described. In the next step strategies to ensure the approach's trustworthiness are discussed, followed by ethical considerations.

3.1 Discussing Alternative Research Approaches

For identifying specific features and dynamics of humiliation, a quantitative approach might seem reasonable for two reasons. First, quantitative methods like surveys or structured interviews result in structured data that makes it easy to identify the previously defined patterns of humiliation. And secondly, with the help of statistical data, general conclusions for the entire population could be drawn.

However, in this specific case, several arguments speak against a quantitative approach: First, the sampling of participants would have to be probabilistic. Due to the limited resources (including time and community access) for the fieldwork, it was not possible to acquire such a sample. Furthermore, travel in Azad Kashmir was difficult because of the weather situation and conditions of roads. That is why the places visited were convenient and non-probabilistic. A second argument against quantitative methods is the role of the researcher in a study: quantitative studies focus on the researcher's view and assume that her theory is an ultimate truth that is to be tested – surveys or structured interviews for example do not offer enough possibilities to give voice to the participants' views, how their situation actually looks like

and what really is important for them (Bryman 2008). Thus, a quantitative approach might have humiliating effects on the participants because it places the researcher's view above the participants' views. Furthermore "humiliation" is difficult to measure because it is an individual and personal experience. And finally, a questionnaire or structured interview with direct questions about humiliation might itself be humiliating: people do not like to admit that they feel put down or humiliated.

In this thesis I will use a qualitative research design. A qualitative approach in this case is the more dignifying option as compared to a quantitative study because it gives importance to the participants' thoughts and experiences. Additionally, in qualitative interviews patterns of humiliation can be identified without directly mentioning the word "humiliation" too often. That is because the participants are aware of the research's focus on humiliation and they can describe features of humiliation without calling a spade a spade. Another argument for a qualitative approach is the thesis' focus on a specific context. The thesis is not supposed to become a basis for generalization, but rather, to gain more insight in a specific problem. I do not aim at concluding how the entire population in AJK or a majority thereof thinks or feels. Rather, I would like to find out firstly, which features and dynamics of humiliation are at work (if at all) and secondly, if the case suggests additional features or dynamics that add to the theory. This aim has consequences for the research design: the thesis uses a deductive approach to test if the chosen framework is applicable to the case and enlightens the case from this specific point of view. Additionally, the thesis has an inductive element because conclusions drawn from the case have consequences for the theory, too.

3.2 Methodology and Data Collection Process

The qualitative data-collection took place with the help of semi-structured interviews, focus groups and open interviews during a fieldtrip to Pakistan and Azad Kashmir. The fieldtrip between the 27th December 2012 and 10th January 2013 resulted in an up-to-date insight into the current situation of the conflict: interviewees reported about events and issues that keep influencing their lives and opinions but are not covered in the established literature.

It should be noted here that the semi-structured interviews, open interviews and focus groups were dialogues or conversations rather than sequences of prepared questions followed by the participants' answers. Interview questions were prepared before the fieldtrip (see interview-guide in the appendix) but were integrated in the conversation in such a way that it would not disturb the oral fluency of the dialogue partners. This approach helps to dignify the participants and their experiences and to avoid that the research itself would become humiliating (Lindner 2001). Furthermore it allowed participants to touch upon issues and topics that were not covered by my prepared questions. My rather passive mode as a listener had a positive side effect: I had more time to pay attention to the body language of the interviewee and to make notes. The conversations were audio-recorded, except when the setting was unsuitable (e.g., when the conversation took place outside) or the participant felt uncomfortable about being recorded. In every case I was able to take detailed notes.

Most interviews were conducted in English, however, for some participants it was easier to communicate in Urdu. In these cases my husband translated my questions as well as the following answers into Urdu. My husband had been listening to several interviews that I conducted in English before, knew the questions and the purpose of the study.

3.3 Selection of Participants and Conversation Dynamics

The present thesis is not supposed to mirror the view of the entire population in AJK. Rather, its aim is to identify features and dynamics of humiliation that are at work in AJK and have the ability to influence people's opinions and actions. Similar to DePaulo's (2000) remarks about qualitative marketing research, I aim to "discover" reasons for perceptions and actions. Therefore, a non-probability, purposive sample is convenient. "The key point is this: Our qualitative sample must be big enough to assure that we are likely to hear most or all of the perceptions that might be important." (DePaulo 2000). This means that the selected interviewees should belong to diverse parts of society with conflicting views.

To ensure that the most important perceptions are covered, the sampling strategy was revised after semi-structured and open interviews with academics at the National Defence University (NDU) in Islamabad. These participants shared their knowledge about the social and political

structure as well as the different views in Azad Kashmir. A “gatekeeper” from the NDU provided me with several contacts and organised interviews with representatives of the different political stances and ideologies in Islamabad, Muzaffarabad as well as in Mirpur. Another gatekeeper from Lahore helped me to find appropriate local communities and individuals in Mirpur who would like to take part in this research. Most participants were contacted and chosen by the gatekeepers or by their local contacts. During my stay in AJK I found several participants through a befriended family and when I visited a marketplace in Muzaffarabad.

An overview over the different interviews and focus groups is given in the following table (See also the “List of Interviews” in the end of this thesis). It should be noted here that academics, politicians and bureaucrats did not only share their professional and official point of views but also their personal experiences and opinions. Generally, the line between the different spheres of society is very thin in AJK: the elite has similar experiences and opinions as the common population. What divides them are their means to influence the situation in Kashmir.

Place	Target-group	Method ⁵	Sample features and role in the research
Islamabad (Pakistan)	Academics and students at the NDU	4 SSIs	Urban elite, balanced in gender and age.
		2 OIs	
		1 FG	Helped to get an idea about Azad Kashmiri society and the role that humiliations could have played there.
	Head of an NGO	1 SSI	
Researcher from a local Think Tank	1 SSI	Triangulation.	
Muzaffarabad (Azad Kashmir)	Politician and bureaucrats	5 SSIs	Rather urban, strong “refugee-influence”, little diaspora-influence, balanced in gender and age.
	Academics and students at the AJK University	1 FG	
	Academic and schoolbook author	1 SSI	Accounts of temporary witnesses are the essential empirical data of this thesis.
	Civil society leader (NGO)	1 SSI	
	Local population (doctors, shopkeepers, journalists)	3 FGs	
1 SSIs			
Mirpur (Azad Kashmir)	Politician	1 SSI	Rather rural, little “refugee-influence”, strong diaspora-influence, balanced in age and gender.
	Local population (engineer, workers, farmers, housewives, teacher)	3 FGs	
		1 SSI	Accounts of temporary witnesses are the essential empirical data of this thesis.
Lahore (Pakistan)	Retired Army Colonel	1 SSI	These interviews gave an idea how the issue is perceived outside of Azad Kashmir.
	Politician	1 SSI	
	Beauty parlour employees	2 FGs	Triangulation.
	Person from Gilgit	1 SSI on the phone	

Table 1 List of Interviews and Focus Groups

⁵ SSI = Semi-Structured Interview, OI = Open Interview, FG = Focus Group

It may seem that I focussed on the elite's view, but that is not quite the case: I ensured to cover all layers of society that might be influenced by or spread humiliations, i.e., decision makers (politicians and bureaucrats), academia, NGOs and the local population (including journalists, teachers and students).

In Islamabad I first talked to academics from the NDU to get an idea about the society and current state and developments in Azad Kashmir. I was able to conduct 4 structured and 2 open interviews to cross-check if my research questions would miss out any important issue. The academics partially had a Kashmiri background so their personal ideas as Kashmiris also fed into the research. Furthermore I conducted one structured interview with a researcher from a local Think Tank, one structured interview with the head of an NGO who is also a politician in AJK, as well as a focus group with 8 students (2 from Pakistan and 6 from different parts of AJK). During this focus group 4-5 students were dominating in the conversation which I partially let happen due to the lack of time and because they seemed to represent essential point of views. The other participants either showed agreement or disagreement with body language or interjections. I tried to include the rather passive students with direct questions.

The first interviews and the focus group with students revealed potential rifts in Kashmiri society that enabled me to specify the "sample" for future interviews: I needed a sample balanced in age and origin (people who had always been living in Azad Kashmir and those who migrated from the Indian part of Kashmir). Gender, class, diaspora-influence and characteristics of the place (rural/urban) seemed to influence opinions or emotions rather less. However, I decided to talk to men and women separately whenever possible, simply because men would tend to dominate a conversation taking place in a group.

The interviews in Muzaffarabad covered the opinions of decision makers in AJK and of the urban society. One semi-structured interview with a politician and four semi-structured interviews with bureaucrats revealed the different political stances in AJK. At the University of AJK in Muzaffarabad a focus group with 4 academics and 10 students from diverse parts of AJK and the Indian part of Kashmir was conducted. It was chaired and partially translated by Dr. Faiz-ur-Rehman, Director Institute of Kashmir Studies. The session lasted more than 2 hours and all interviewees participated equally: One question was asked at a time and

answered by everyone individually. The opinions and arguments were diverse and everyone seemed to respect and be interested in each other's point of view. Furthermore, I conducted an open interview with an academic and schoolbook author and a semi-structured interview with the head of an NGO in Muzaffarabad. The latter also knows the bureaucracy well and can be seen as a go-between between the government and the local population in Muzaffarabad which was very helpful for triangulation purposes. At the community level one structured interview with a retired journalist as well as three focus groups (one with two shopkeepers, one with two doctors and one with 4 journalists) were conducted. I met some of these participants through a befriended family and others by chance at a market in the city centre. Since the participants of the first two focus groups were relatives or close friends, their experiences and opinions were quite similar. They complemented each other and when they disagreed at a point they explained and/or defended their personal stance. My stay in Muzaffarabad ended with a focus group with four journalists (two from the Indian part of Kashmir and two local Azad Kashmiris) at the Central Press Club. Though the conversation was respectful and productive in the beginning, it almost escalated in an argument about Kashmir's future. At this point the group interview was interrupted and eventually aborted because a press conference began.

In Mirpur I interviewed one more politician and former Chief of Justice. The rest of the time I spent in the town centre and two villages to interview the local population. One semi-structured interview was conducted in Mirpur with an engineer. Three focus groups took place in two villages in the outskirts of Mirpur. During a focus group with two workers one of them became very emotional when talking about his experiences during the freedom struggle – the other participant then took over the conversation until his friend had settled again. The second focus group with a farmer and his retired brother resembled a normal semi-structured interview with each of them as they did not engage in a discussion and agreed on most points. However, when one of them finished talking, the other would usually add some more information which both of them agreed on again. The third focus group took place with three women of three different generations: grandmother (a retired housewife), mother (a housewife) and granddaughter (a teacher). The conversation was lively as the women seemed very interested, answered all my questions very detailed and commented on each other's personal views on historical and present events as well as future expectations.

In Lahore I was able to talk to a Pakistani politician from a district nearby the boarder to Jammu and Kashmir. My father in-law, a retired Colonel, was stationed at the Line of Control in the 1980s and was able to enlighten some issues mentioned by participants from the army's perspective. I also interviewed several (Pakistani) women at a beauty parlor, some of them didn't know anything about the Kashmir issue (they admitted that they do not watch the news nor had heart about it from friends etc.), others knew quite much about the conflict from TV (news and bollywood movies). These interviews and focus groups in Lahore gave an idea how the issue is perceived outside of Azad Kashmir and were mainly be used to cross check claims of the local population in Azad Kashmir concerning the Pakistani stance.

The fieldwork covered the major views and perceptions of Azad Kashmiris. The only limitation was that I was advised not to conduct interviews at a refugee camp: Officials there are not very happy about visiting journalists or researchers because refugees are usually very emotional there. The situation could turn into turmoil when, e.g., people would start crying or complaining loudly about their situation etc. But I was able to interview several people who originally come from the Indian part of Kashmir and have been living in refugee camps before. Actually, it was difficult to find someone living in Azad Kashmir without any relation to the Indian part of Kashmir – either they themselves or their families originated from J&K or they knew people who have family there.

3.4 Thematic Data Analysis

The data was analysed in a thematic way, similar to the process described by Bryman (2008, p. 554 ff.): I transcribed the interviews and read through them several times. The essential parts of the text were then copied in an Excel sheet where each interview occupied several rows with direct quotes in one column. In a next column the quotes were then categorised into three major themes, i.e., past events, future expectations and awareness. These themes are based on the research questions 1.1, 1.2 and 1.4. In the third column the themes were further divided into subthemes, i.e., past events were specified (e.g., division of the sub-continent, insurgency, Mumbai attacks etc.), future expectations were categorised into three main stances (i.e., hopeful, pessimistic and expecting the status quo to continue) and the theme “awareness” contained the two subthemes awareness of own actions and awareness of

others' situation. It was then possible to sort and filter the direct quotes from the interviews according to these themes and subthemes. Moreover, the past events were partially grouped together in a fourth column when they indicated a thematic connection, e.g., oppressions before and during 1947 and oppressions in today's Indian part of Kashmir in recent years.

This approach enabled me to gain a better overview over all interviews at the same time. Additional information like the participants' age, gender, origin etc. helped to identify whether a certain stance is typical for a certain group of people. The results will be presented in chapter 4 based on this Excel matrix.

3.5 Strategy to Ensure Trustworthiness

To ensure the trustworthiness of a qualitative research Bryman (2008, p. 376 ff) presents four criteria based on Lincoln and Guba (1985) and Guba and Lincoln (1994). I tried to satisfy these criteria as far as possible. They are called credibility, transferability, dependability and confirmability and will be discussed in the following paragraphs.

To achieve a high level of *credibility* or *internal validity*, I used triangulation, i.e., I cross-checked the findings from interviews and focus groups with each other throughout the research process. If interviewees would, for example refer to disadvantages resulting from their political views, I would ask for concrete examples and would discuss this perception (anonymised) in the following interviews. Furthermore, open interviews helped to verify if my approach would miss out on any important aspect and if my theoretical assumptions were too researcher-focussed or too little participant-focussed. With the help of these diverse methods and multiple sources of data I was able to stay critical towards the participants' statements but also towards my own perceptions.

In addition, discussions with researchers and students of the NDU helped to develop a *credible* sampling-strategy that would ensure the inclusion of the major ideologies and opinions about the conflict present in Azad Kashmir.

The second criterion for trustworthiness in qualitative research is called *transferability* or *external validity*. This criterion is concerned with to what extent the research findings can be generalised and applied on other contexts. Qualitative studies are usually context-sensitive and researchers may not be able to judge by themselves if and how their findings apply to other settings. Therefore it is important to give detailed information about the context of the study, e.g., historical, societal and geographical issues, the research process, methods of data collection and analysis so that other academics can judge if the findings are transferable to settings related to their speciality. The present thesis provides the reader with such detailed information about Azad Kashmir's historical and geopolitical background as well as the settings of the interviews and focus groups.

The *dependability*-criterion, sometimes referred to as *reliability*, demands that the research and its results should be repeatable. That means another researcher, given the same context and access to the same participants, should be able to replicate the findings. Since social settings constantly change, it is impossible to repeat the study with the very same findings, even if I personally was to repeat the research myself. As Marshall and Rossman (2011, p. 253) note, "...the social world is always being constructed and the concept of replication is itself problematic". However, to enable the readers to judge for themselves whether the research was conducted in an appropriate manner and if the drawn conclusions are justifiable, I provided them with a detailed account about methodological issues. It was not possible to make the fieldwork notes and interview transcripts available in this thesis because I wanted to guarantee the promised anonymity of the participants.

Finally, the detailed account of methodological choices and profound argumentations also help to increase the *confirmability* or *objectivity* of the study. However, since personal experiences and dispositions of researchers feed into their works, full objectivity is neither achievable nor desirable.

3.6 Ethical Considerations

All participants were informed about the purpose and theoretical setting of the study and their role in it. They agreed to take part on the understanding that everything they say will be treated confidentially. In most cases the consent agreement was provided verbally. To focus group participants and interviewees of the local population a participant information sheet and a form for the consent agreement was handed out (please see the appendix).

Some participants were not concerned about their anonymity, others explicitly asked for it. Therefore I decided to not mention names of participants. Other personal information like gender, age, origin or profession will only be stated if the identity of the participants cannot be inferred from it. Although I do not think that the participants would face any disadvantages or even harm because of talking to me or being mentioned in this thesis, I am aware that the professional reputation especially of students and bureaucrats could be affected. This was another reason to ensure anonymity.

CHAPTER 4

THE ROLE OF HUMILIATIONS IN AZAD KASHMIR

This chapter is structured in accordance with the research questions. It will present the results from the interview-data gathered during the fieldwork in Pakistan and Azad Kashmir and analyse them with the help of the theoretical framework. Supporting secondary literature will be referred to where applicable. The first section of the chapter deals with the historical events that keep influencing the mindset of people in Azad Kashmir. It also discusses what kinds of humiliation have taken place according to the theory. The second section shows what people expect from the future and how these expectations shape their current thought and actions. The third section analyses which features and dynamics are at work in Azad Kashmir. The fourth section discusses whether participants are aware that humiliation-dynamics may influence their thinking and behaviour and that these in turn may humiliate others. The final section suggests enhancements to the theory based on the case and a re-modelling of the theory for three-dimensional conflicts like that in Kashmir.

4.1 Historical Grievances that Keep Influencing the Present Mindset

The first set of interview questions aimed at finding out which past events keep influencing the present mindset in Azad Kashmir. As expected, participants would *not* usually go through the chronology of the conflict. Rather, most interviewees naturally combined the events and processes in a set of memories concerning a specific topic or theme. The six major themes are 1) injustices and oppressions during Hindu rule, 2) division of and disconnection within Kashmir, 3) worldwide disregard and neglect of the UN-resolution and the Kashmiri point of view, 4) uncertainty and paternalism in accordance with the AJK interim constitution, 5) carnage and misuse of emotions during insurgencies, and 6) exploitation by Pakistan using the example of the 2005 earthquake. The themes are not ranked in importance but follow

roughly the chronology of the major events discussed. Each of the following sections will first present the results of the interviews and then examine what kind of humiliation they correspond to according to the theoretical background.

4.1.1 Hindu Rulership – Remembering Injustices and Oppression

According to several interviewees, Hindus had oppressed Muslims for centuries⁶. That is why Muslims demanded their own state – Pakistan – when the British left the subcontinent in the 1940s (see also, for example, Snedden 2012 and Wolpert 2010). Kashmir, too, was ruled by an autocratic Hindu, Hari Singh. He and his predecessors had shown privilege towards fellow Hindus and deprived the rest of the majority-Muslim population of influence and power (Snedden 2012). The lack of opportunities and rights for Muslims during Kashmir's Hindu rule was one central memory of oppression mentioned in interviews.

Another central memory in this context is Singh's behaviour just before the division of the Indian subcontinent. Singh had to decide whether he wanted Kashmir to become part of India or Pakistan. All interviewees accounted that it was clear that Kashmir should have become a part of Pakistan for two reasons. Firstly, because the population was majority Muslim; and secondly, because of the geographical and economic links with regions that were supposed to become Pakistan. Singh however, was hesitant to make a decision.

Additionally, Indian Prime Minister Nehru as well as Mahatma Gandhi and Viceroy Mountbatten paid Singh a visit. Two interviewees highlighted this fact and reported that the population opposed this interference of high ranked pro-Indian VIPs⁷. The population was afraid that these influential people would convince or even pressure Singh to accede to India. When Singh then still did not show any signs for an accession to Pakistan, an uprising against him and the Hindu landlords started in Poonch (Snedden 2012). Interviewees reported that Singh and the Hindu elite conducted massacres as a response to the uprising: Indian soldiers

⁶ Interviews 11, 14, 22, 24, 25;

⁷ Interviews 20 and 24;

and the Hindu elite of Kashmir killed Muslims. Many Muslims fled to Pakistan or were internally displaced.⁸

Nevertheless, the fight against Hindu landlords continued and was later on supported by Pathans from Pakistan and resulted in the creation of the Azad Kashmiri government on 24th October 1947. The “Azadi”, “free”, government was and still is seen as the legal successor of Singh’s autocratic rule by Azad Kashmiris⁹. Singh, afraid of being overthrown by the on-going revolution, asked India for help to defeat the Azadi movement. India demanded from Singh in return to hand Kashmir over to India – he agreed. However, as highlighted by several interviewees, the new Azadi government was then already in charge and thus Singh had no authority to make such a decision¹⁰. India nevertheless accepted his decision and invaded Kashmir on 27th October 1947. This “Black Day” is mourned each year by Kashmiris and on both sides of the LoC demonstrations and rallies take place (AFP 2013; *Kashmiris on both sides of LoC observe Oct 27 as Black Day* 2012).

Other injustices and oppressions remembered in the context of Hindu rule are the continuing human rights violations in today’s Indian part of Kashmir. Refugees that fled from the Indian part to the Pakistani part of Kashmir are very active in reporting their witnessed cruelty and social injustices in J&K¹¹. They account how Indian troops abduct, torture, kill and rape Muslims – men, women and children. These stories reach the population in Azad Kashmir through various channels, either through personal contact with refugees, through media, politics or NGO reports¹². Every participant I talked to – independent of direct contact to refugees – knew about the bad conditions in J&K for Muslims¹³. Some interviewees are convinced that India is conducting a genocide since 1947 to reduce the number of Muslims – by turning the Muslim majority into a minority, integrating Kashmir into India would be justifiable¹⁴.

⁸ Interviews 4, 12-14, 19, 20, 24-27; see also Snedden (2012)

⁹ Interviews 5, 11, 12, 23;

¹⁰ Interviews 5, 11, 12, 23;

¹¹ Interviews 4, 5, 12, 16, 17, 19-21, 25;

¹² Interviews 4, 9, 12, 13, 23, 27;

¹³ Interviews 1-31;

¹⁴ Interviews 24-26;

Azad Kashmiris seem to be very well informed about historical events and the Hindu rulers of the past. Though most interviewees assured that they do not wish for revenge and do not hate Indians, the anti-Indian stance is dominant. They also explained that their antipathy and distrust towards India are not based on one or two specific events but, rather, have grown over the years because of the uncountable number of injustices and humiliations conducted by India¹⁵. Massacres during the partition in 1947 and during anti-Indian protests as well as continuing killings conducted by Indian Special Forces in J&K are burned into Azad Kashmiris' minds¹⁶. Still, participants say, this legacy continues as India oppresses pro-Pakistan and pro-independence movements and does not respect Kashmiris' right to self-determination¹⁷.

The above descriptions in relation to Hindu rule resemble three kinds of humiliations as defined in the theoretical framework. Firstly, the mentioned massacres and attempted genocide qualify as humiliation through dehumanisation, i.e., being put down or made to feel less. Secondly, during the interviews several discriminating occasions were mentioned, e.g., the Hindu domination over and oppression of Muslims in Kashmir but also in the rest of the Indian subcontinent before 1947. In Kashmir, a Hindu elite ruled over the majorly Muslim population. This discrimination is still remembered and some interviewees are convinced that this discrimination still takes place in today's Indian part of Kashmir. Finally, two injustices can be identified: 1) the visits of pro-Indian VIPs before Singh's decision to join India are seen to be an unfair interference and 2) Singh's pursuant decision to accede to India is seen to be unjust because the new Azadi government was already in charge. India accepted Singh's decision and invaded Kashmir unlawfully.

¹⁵ Interviews 1-3, 5, 7, 12, 14, 15, 19-22, 24-27;

¹⁶ Interviews 1-3, 5, 7, 12, 14, 15, 19-22, 24-27;

¹⁷ Interviews 5, 12, 14, 19, 20,

4.1.2 Division of the Motherland(s) – Remembering Loss and Disconnection

All Azad Kashmiri participants mentioned the division of the Indian subcontinent and the following division of Kashmir to be core issues that still affect them today¹⁸. The division of the subcontinent into the two new states, India and Pakistan, was expected to dignify Muslims. Muslims hoped for a better future in their own state, for more rights and opportunities and the end of oppression (see, for example, Bose 2003; Snedden 2012). Kashmiri Muslims were deprived of that hope because their state did not accede to Pakistan.

The lost hope fuelled the Azad Kashmiri movement in 1947 to free Kashmir from Hindu rule and accede to Pakistan¹⁹. This revolution triggered the first Indo-Pakistan war which in turn resulted in the creation of a ceasefire-line that until today divides Kashmir (Snedden 2012). All Azad Kashmiri participants agreed that the division of Kashmir was wrong and that the route of the ceasefire-line divides their people artificially²⁰. Important developments that are seen to have manifested the division are the re-naming of the ceasefire-line as the Line of Control (LOC) as well as the continuing failure of India and Pakistan to find a solution²¹.

Furthermore, Azad Kashmiris are frustrated about the ups and downs of dialogues between India and Pakistan about Kashmir. In 2005 a bus service between Muzaffarabad (AJK) and Srinagar (J&K) was implemented. This milestone was very positive for the communities and created a new hope that people to people contact will increase. However, it is still a very limited form of contact and the visa procedures are complicated and time-consuming²².

The division continues to affect social, cultural, economic and political relations between the two parts of Kashmir. Azad Kashmiris as individuals as well as a nation suffer from the disconnection to the Indian part of Kashmir. The personal trauma of divided families that cannot visit each other has become a metaphor for the trauma of the Kashmiri nation and a divided identity. The gradual loss of Kashmiri culture and identity was mentioned by several

¹⁸ Interviews 1, 5-21 and 23-27;

¹⁹ Interviews 14, 15, 26, 27;

²⁰ Interviews 1, 5-21 and 23-27;

²¹ Interviews 5, 9, 12, 19, 22, 27;

²² Interviews 9, 10, 11, 12, 18, 19, 23, 24, 26, 27;

interviewees – the division as well as Pakistan’s attempt to assimilate Azad Kashmir and India’s attempt to diminish the Muslim part of Kashmiri culture with force affect their identity²³. Both approaches continue to fail because Kashmiris have not come to terms with the division. Although the division has led to different socio-economic developments in the Pakistani and the Indian part of Kashmir, people still wait and wish for a re-union and their right to decide what will happen with a re-united Kashmir. Most interviewees agree that whether this re-united homeland should join Pakistan or opt for independence is a secondary question.

Another problem arising from the disconnection is the closure of natural routes across the LOC which hinders the trade and thereby harming small-scale businesses and the economy as a whole²⁴. One traditional trade route, for example, runs from Srinagar (J&K) via Muzaffarabad (AJK) to Rawalpindi (Pakistan). But because of the LOC this connection is cut off.

The relations between politicians in AJK and J&K are limited, too, because both Pakistan and India prohibit people to people contact²⁵. Several interviewees are convinced that both states are scared that Kashmiris would meet, debate and find a solution for their state that is not in the interest of Pakistan and India²⁶. In fact, all Azad Kashmiris I talked to are convinced that it is only because of the selfish interests of Pakistan and India that no solution has been found. They assured me that Kashmiris, if finally given the right to self-determination, would very easily make a decision²⁷. They furthermore agreed and emphasised that any solution of the Kashmir issue has to entail a re-union of Kashmir, or, at least, allow travel and trade within Kashmir without any hindrance.

According to locals, the LOC is also known as “bloodline” because many Kashmiri freedom fighters have sacrificed their lives to end the occupation and division of their homeland²⁸.

²³ Interviews 5, 10, 12, 16, 20, 21, 25;

²⁴ Interviews 7, 14, 23, 27

²⁵ Interviews 11, 23;

²⁶ Interviews 9, 11, 12, 16, 23, 27;

²⁷ Interviews 1, 5-21 and 23-27;

²⁸ Interviews 12, 13, 24, 26;

After more than 60 years of division Azad Kashmiris support this struggle for freedom mentally, but focus on working for a political solution²⁹. Although they complain about economic shortcomings in AJK they highlight that people in the Indian part of Kashmir suffer much more because of human right violations. And since Azad Kashmiris do not accept the LOC as a border, they think and feel as if these human rights violations happened in their own country³⁰. In both parts of Kashmir, so the interviewees agree, the people are frustrated about the on-going division. In the Indian part of Kashmir, this frustration turns into aggression from time to time; protests and insurgencies have taken place throughout the years³¹.

The accounts of participants regarding the division of Kashmir showed three different kinds of humiliation related to the theory. First, Participants did not talk about a loss of power as defined in the theory, but of never having been in power. Kashmiris have never been asked or enabled to decide the fate of their own state: it was Singh, the autocratic Hindu ruler, who in the end decided that Kashmir should become part of India. This decision triggered the first Indo-Pakistan war over Kashmir and the former princely state has been divided between the two countries ever since – this division was forced upon Kashmir and most people I talked to oppose this disconnection.

The second kind of humiliation in relation to the division is the injustice that Kashmir should have – but did not – become part of Pakistan. The unbiased criteria for the accession (the majority of the population was Muslim and Kashmir is geographically more linked to Pakistan than to India) were ignored. No matter if interviewees had a pro-independence or pro-Pakistan stance, all agreed that Kashmir' division and non-integration into Pakistan were unjust, not in the name of the Kashmiri people and allegedly against international law.

Thirdly, the disconnection and lack of contact between the two parts of Kashmir can be interpreted as an exclusion of Kashmiris from having a united Kashmiri identity, culture, economy and political system. Kashmiris are divided in their opinions as to who is responsible for the on-going division of their homeland. Some blame India and Pakistan for

²⁹ Interviews 1, 5-21 and 23-27;

³⁰ Interviews 5, 11-21 and 23-27;

³¹ Interviews 3-5, 7, 8, 10, 12-14, 19-23, 25-27; Snedden 2012;

not honestly working towards a solution, others blame the UN or the West in general for keeping the conflict running for its own political aims³²

Besides the three familiar types of humiliation, the present case suggests a new kind or new subgroup of humiliation. The loss of identity, e.g., through a forceful division or assimilation can humiliate. This type of humiliation can be seen in relation to the loss of face or hurt honour, as it concerns the humiliatees' personality or reputation. However, it could qualify as an own type of humiliation in this case because some Azad Kashmiris feel as if they do not even have a face that they could lose³³.

4.1.3 The UN Non-Resolution – Remembering Disregard and Neglect

During the first Indo-Pakistan war in 1947, India called on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to act as an arbitrator. India complained that Pakistan had supported the Azadi rebellion and took control over parts of Kashmir unlawfully. As a result the United Nations (UN) negotiated a ceasefire between India and Pakistan in 1948 and helped to end the first Indo-Pakistan war. The UN furthermore highlighted Kashmiris' right for self-determination: a plebiscite in Kashmir should decide whether the former princely state should accede to India or Pakistan (United Nations Security Council 1948). However, a plebiscite never took place. The situation escalated again: two Indo-Pakistani wars followed in 1965 and 1972. The 1999 war about the Kargil-district in Kashmir particularly caught international attention because India and Pakistan had acquired nuclear weapons in 1998³⁴.

This repeated escalation of the Kashmir conflict and the continuing non-resolution in general are frustrating the local population³⁵. The UN-resolution was, and still is, very important for Azad Kashmiris because it promises a right of self-determination for the Kashmiri people after decades of autocratic rule³⁶. Furthermore it promised a solution for the entire former

³² for details see the following section 4.1.3

³³ Interviews 1, 5, 6, 10, 12, 14, 16, 21, 25;

³⁴ See, for example, Cheema (2013);

³⁵ Interviews 5, 11-21 and 23-27;

³⁶ Interviews 1-28, 30, 31;

princely state and thus would support a re-union and holistic solution for Kashmir. The non-implementation of the UN-resolution is seen as a blatant injustice and several participants are disappointed about the international community's ignorance and failure to act. Every year on 5th January, demonstrations and rallies take place in the whole of AJK to commemorate the resolution and call for its implementation³⁷. The interviewees explain that they do not wish for revenge or redress but only want their human right of a democratic decision of their homeland's fate.

Independent from participants' background, Azad Kashmiris agree and are convinced that the UN should step in, mediate and finally push the plebiscite through³⁸. However, they also emphasise that the Kashmiri perspective is neglected in the UN-resolution of 1949 because it only talks about two possible options for Kashmir: an accession to Pakistan or India. But some Kashmiris are thinking about independence as a third option that should be included in a possible plebiscite³⁹.

Participants generally complain about the media's and the international community's focus on state actors and national interests of India and Pakistan⁴⁰. The Kashmiri perspective is neglected. Some academics, students and bureaucrats argue that even most books and academic articles written about the topic do not take the Kashmiri perspective into account⁴¹. These works, so they say, either analyse the inter-state conflict between India and Pakistan, focus on China's or the United States' interest and influence in the region or address the insurgencies in J&K as an internal problem of India. None of these perspectives represent the everyday grievances of Kashmiri people. Azad Kashmiris emphasise that Kashmir has never been a conflict or a dispute between two states, but has been an issue for Kashmiris to decide the future of their state⁴².

³⁷ Interviews 5, 11-21 and 23-27;

³⁸ Interviews 2, 3, 5, 6, 10, 12, 15, 16, 20, 21, 23-27;

³⁹ Interviews 5, 10, 12, 21, 23, 25, 27;

⁴⁰ Interviews 3-7, 9-17, 20, 23-25, 27;

⁴¹ Interviews 3, 5, 12, 16, 18;

⁴² Interviews 5, 11-21 and 23-27;

Azad Kashmiris believe that the UN and the international community would have already intervened if they genuinely wanted to resolve the issue⁴³. Participants see four reasons for this passivity: Firstly, the animosity between India and Pakistan has boosted the arms trade for decades. Secondly, a resolution could stabilise the region and create two other Asian superpowers in addition to China – a potential threat for the West. Thirdly, nobody wants to start an argument between two quarrelling nuclear powers. An escalation could lead to the first nuclear war ever. And finally, India is a rising economy and an important market that nobody wants to put off. These reasons are perceived to be hypocritical, unfair and to the detriment of Kashmiris who still have to live in a disputed area.⁴⁴

In addition, the terror attacks of 9/11 had counter-productive effects on promoting the Kashmiri perspective⁴⁵. The freedom fight is now labelled “terrorism” – a defamation of the Azadi movement. Azad Kashmiris are proud of this movement that freed ‘their’ part of Kashmir from Hindu rule in 1947 and continues today in parts of J&K⁴⁶. Today, most Azad Kashmiris prefer to articulate for their right to self-determination in peaceful ways: local NGOs inform the local population as well as the international community about the Kashmiri point of view on the matter⁴⁷, politicians and academics discuss possible solutions of the issue at international conferences⁴⁸. In articles, journalists spread information about the UN-resolution and the on-going Azadi struggle in newspapers⁴⁹, on TV and in the radio and every Azad Kashmiri child has seen or heard about the rallies on 5th of January to commemorate the UN-resolution⁵⁰. It is humiliating for the local population that nobody seems to listen to these outcries⁵¹.

⁴³ Interviews 1, 5, 6, 10, 12-14, 20, 21, 23, 25, 27;

⁴⁴ Interviews 1, 5, 6, 10, 12-14, 20, 21, 23, 25, 27;

⁴⁵ Interviews 3, 5, 7, 25, 27;

⁴⁶ Interviews 5, 12, 13, 18, 19, 20, 21, 23-27;

⁴⁷ Interviews 5, 9, 12;

⁴⁸ Interviews 4, 7, 10, 11, 12, 22, 23;

⁴⁹ Interviews 4, 5, 12, 20, 21, 26;

⁵⁰ Interviews 12, 13, 15, 27;

⁵¹ Interviews 4, 5, 7, 10-13, 15, 20-23, 26, 27;

The non-resolution is humiliating in two ways. Firstly, it is seen as an injustice that the UN-resolution has not been observed and that Kashmiris' right to self-determination is not acknowledged. Kashmiris are frustrated and disappointed about the UN, but also about India and Pakistan who do not seem to want a solution. Furthermore, the case suggests an additional type of humiliation: being neglected or ignored. Interviewees describe that their perspective and grievances in relation to the Kashmir issue have been out of the focus: US, UN and other western actors as well as academia and the international media focus on India and Pakistan. Being ignored, intentionally or unintentionally, was described by several participants as unfair, frustrating and humiliating⁵². This type of humiliation is different from being helpless, discriminated or treated unjustly because the latter ones imply and require attention from the humiliator.

4.1.4 The Interim Constitution Act - Remembering Uncertainty and Paternalism

AJK has adopted the Interim Constitution Act in 1974. The purpose of this interim constitution is to govern and administrate the liberated Azad Jammu and Kashmir until the former princely state's fate will be decided by a plebiscite (Azad Govt. Of The State of Jammu & Kashmir 1974) . The act provides AJK with semi-autonomy; *semi* because of two reasons. Firstly the act allows Azad Kashmiris to vote their own Prime Minister and President but neither is accepted internationally due to Kashmir's disputed status. And secondly, the act assigns functions to the Federal Government in Pakistan. Islamabad arranges matters like defence and security, foreign affairs and currency through the Ministry for Kashmiri Affairs⁵³. Azad Kashmiris pay with Pakistani rupees and hold a Pakistani passport. The strong link with Pakistan finds its expression in the loyalty clause of the Interim Constitution Act: President, Prime Minister as well as Members of Parliament need to declare that they "will remain loyal to the country and the cause of accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to Pakistan" (Azad Govt. Of The State of Jammu & Kashmir 1974)

⁵² Interviews 5, 12, 17, 19, 24-27;

⁵³ Interview 1, 2, 5, 11, 12, 16, 18, 23;

The Pakistani constitution does not list AJK (nor any other part of Kashmir) as a province and thereby confirms AJK's semi-autonomy. According to article 370 of the Indian constitution, the current territory of J&K (without AJK and Gilgit-Baltistan) has special, autonomous status within India. Nevertheless, India holds that the territory of the former princely state belongs to India (BBC ; Nayar 2013; The Guardian 2010).

The three stances as well as AJK's Interim Constitution Act itself are seen as the manifestation of Kashmir's unclear status and have influenced Kashmiris' identity and mindset, politics and economy as the following paragraphs will show.

Since 1974 AJK has an interim or temporary mindset. The present situation is often described as "uncertain" or "unclear" because people have been living a life on hold and for more than 40 years⁵⁴. They wait for a final solution decided by a plebiscite that will re-unite Kashmir and clarify its status. Most participants would describe their situation as an identity-crisis because Azad Kashmiris are not Pakistanis although they have a Pakistani passport; they are not Kashmiri because Kashmir is still incomplete, i.e., divided, and internationally not recognised as a state; they are not Indian either although India claims the entire territory belongs to India; "So what are we?" asked one interviewee and others expressed their frustration about this uncertainty and many years of unfulfilled hopes⁵⁵. They are deprived of their right to self-determination and of their nationality in a region where, as they say, nationalism is very important⁵⁶. Furthermore, especially the younger generation explained that they fear losing their Kashmiri culture and becoming more and more Pakistani⁵⁷.

Interviewees also complain about and criticise the Pakistani paternalism and influence in AJK. According to Kashmiri students in Islamabad as well as Muzaffarabad and the local population in Mirpur, the Ministry for Kashmiri Affairs influences the AJK bureaucracy and the government's decision making⁵⁸. Academics as well as Kashmiri politicians and

⁵⁴ Interviews 1, 7, 8, 10, 12, 14, 16, 20, 21, 23-25, 27;

⁵⁵ Interviews 1, 5, 6, 10, 12, 14, 16, 21, 25;

⁵⁶ Interviews 4, 5, 7, 10, 12, 15, 19, 20, 22, 24, 26, 28, 30;

⁵⁷ Interviews 5 and 12;

⁵⁸ Interview 5, 12, 18, 21, 23-26;

bureaucrats confirmed Islamabad's influence and explained that this originated from the constitutional act⁵⁹.

Another perceived political humiliation is the loyalty clause in the Interim Constitution Act: members of the AJK Assembly, including the President and Prime Minister, have to declare that they support an integration of Kashmir into Pakistan. If they stated that they preferred an independent Kashmir they would not be allowed to assume their office. That means that the pro-independence mindset has no political representation in the Assembly of Azad Kashmir. The younger generation blames that on Pakistan; they think that Pakistan controls politicians in AJK through the Ministry and by only accepting pro-Pakistani politicians in the AJK Assembly⁶⁰. Furthermore the local population seems to have lost their trust in local politicians. Kashmiris both in Muzaffarabad and nearby Mirpur believe that politicians, because of being loyal to Pakistan, do not act in the population's interest but in Pakistan's interest⁶¹. The current government in AJK is often referred to as Pakistan's "puppet government"⁶². Especially in Mirpur people believe that the AJK government is neither interested in nor working towards a resolution of Kashmir's status because then they would lose power and influence. As a consequence these people have stopped voting and declared that if the political efforts to resolve the Kashmir issue continue to fail, they would support the militant freedom-fight.⁶³

Academics and politicians on the other hand have a more differentiated view on the matter. They know that the blamed loyalty clause is part of the AJK constitution and not an invention of Pakistan. The aim of the clause was to unite Kashmiris, prevent a further fragmentation within Kashmir and assure that politicians work towards the same goal. A removal of the clause before the next general elections is still under debate⁶⁴. Politicians also explained that their ability to work towards a plebiscite or influence a resolution for the Kashmir issue is limited for two reasons. Firstly, AJK's international representative is Pakistan; the AJK Prime

⁵⁹ Interviews 1, 2, 7, 11, 12, 15, 18, 23;

⁶⁰ Interviews 5, 12, 27;

⁶¹ Interviews 17, 19, 24-27

⁶² Interviews 5, 12, 18;

⁶³ Interviews 24-27

⁶⁴ Interviews 9, 11, 23;

Minister and President are internationally not accepted as representatives of the region. And Secondly, the contact between AJK and the Indian part of Kashmir is restricted. Especially for politicians it is difficult to meet and discuss strategies or approaches with their colleagues from the other side. Another issue pointed out by politicians and bureaucrats are the empty seats in the AJK Assembly that are reserved for representatives from the Indian part of Kashmir⁶⁵. These empty seats are a constant reminder that Kashmir is incomplete and were established in the Interim Constitution Act.

Besides the mentioned grievances related to identity and politics, the third major set of problems arising from Azad Kashmir's disputed status are economic drawbacks. Due to this unclarity and the unpredictable future developments, nobody invests in the region⁶⁶. Jobs and career opportunities are scarce, leading to a brain drain as educated Azad Kashmiris find work in Pakistan or abroad. Kashmiri students in Islamabad and Muzaffarabad reported about their limited study opportunities and the lack of infra-structure in Azad Kashmir: "there are only two universities in AJK and not a single airport"⁶⁷. Local Kashmiris in Mirpur complain that Pakistan is not investing in the region because AJK is not a Pakistani province⁶⁸. But on the other side this does not stop Pakistan from using AJK's natural resources. A more detailed discussion about the exploitation of resources will follow in 4.1.6. The older generations see the situation slightly more positively. They appreciate Pakistan's quota scheme for Azad Kashmiri students in Pakistan and overall feel treated like Pakistanis by the government in Islamabad, e.g., they are proud of their Pakistani passport⁶⁹. However, some of them are increasingly dissatisfied that Pakistan does not treat AJK like a province in regard to investments in education or infra-structure⁷⁰.

Living in a disputed territory with an interim mindset is humiliating in five ways. Firstly, the loyalty clause of AJK's Interim Constitution Act is discriminating people with a pro-independence mindset because they are not able to hold office or become a member of

⁶⁵ Interviews 1, 7, 11, 15, 23;

⁶⁶ Interviews 5, 8, 10, 12, 17, 21, 26;

⁶⁷ Interview 5;

⁶⁸ Interviews 24-27;

⁶⁹ Interviews 12, 13, 20, 26, 27;

⁷⁰ Interviews 13, 20, 26;

parliament when openly declaring their opinion. Interestingly, participants who feel humiliated by this loyalty clause think it was established by Pakistan and thus see Pakistan as the humiliator. However, the clause is part of the AJK constitution and was implemented by Azad Kashmiris themselves. Politicians and bureaucrats explained that the clause is currently under debate. Furthermore its aim was not, as perceived by some, to discriminate against anyone, but to unite Kashmiri politicians to work towards the same goal, i.e., the integration of Kashmir into Pakistan.

Secondly, even today Azad Kashmiris are not in full control of their state. That their own government, that is supposed to represent the Azad Kashmiri people, is not fully in charge was directly referred to as “humiliating” by several interviewees.. Interviewees complained about Pakistan’s paternalism and interference in politics and administration. The democratically elected Azad Kashmiri government depends on Pakistan as participants claimed, and is not representing Azad Kashmir’s interest in international institutions ambitiously enough. This can be seen as a humiliation due to the loss of power or, actually, not being in power.

Another humiliating aspect that is related to Kashmir’s disputed status is the loss of identity or loss of pride. Due to Kashmir’s unclear status, Azad Kashmiris feel deprived of their right to have a nationality. Participants explained that nationality in Asia is a very important part of one’s identity and without nationalism, i.e., pride in one’s own origin, one is not a complete person⁷¹.

Fourthly, humiliation as exclusion plays a role: Interviewees with a pro-Pakistan stance feel excluded from being part of Pakistan. Another issue that can be interpreted as exclusion is that Kashmiris do not have their own international representation – J&K depends on India and AJK depends on Pakistan for being represented at international level.

And fifthly, both Pakistan and India violate Azad Kashmir’s personal boundaries. Pakistan continues to intrude Azad Kashmir’s political space. India has not taken physical nor political control over Azad Kashmir, but violates Azad Kashmir’s self-perception: India claims that

⁷¹ Interviews 5, 12, 15, 19, 20, 22, 24, 26, 28, 30;

Kashmir belongs to India (BBC) – Azad Kashmiris emphasised throughout the interviews that the whole state of Jammu and Kashmir is a disputed territory and belongs neither to Pakistan nor India (see also Snedden (2012) and (Central Intelligence Agency 2013)).

4.1.5 The Insurgency since 1989 – Remembering Carnage and Misuse

In 1987 elections in J&K were rigged – the population and the parties who lost the election were outraged and began to demonstrate (Snedden 2012; BBC). During the following two years the demonstrations rose in scale and triggered an outcry against the Indian occupation of J&K⁷². Protesters were split in their demand: some wanted independent Kashmir, others an accession to Pakistan. This freedom movement turned into a freedom fight in 1989. The militant insurgency was supported by Pakistan with weapons and military training camps in AJK⁷³. Pakistani president Musharraf ended this support in 2004⁷⁴. The insurgency nevertheless continues and India keeps trying to defeat it by force⁷⁵. Indian Special Forces conduct extrajudicial killings in J&K and threaten the entire Muslim population – not only the insurgents⁷⁶. The insurgency was hijacked by religious extremist groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba and the Pakistani Taliban⁷⁷. They fight against the Indian occupation of Kashmir and want to found an Islamic state. Lashkar-e-Taiba is responsible for the terror attacks in Mumbai 2008 that damaged the slowly improving relationship between India and Pakistan (Wilkinson 2008). Most recent large scale protests against the Indian occupation took place in 2010; protestors demanded a reduction of Indian troops in J&K and independence for Kashmir⁷⁸.

⁷² Interviews 5, 11, 12, 20, 21, 25;

⁷³ Interviews 19, 21, 24, 25;

⁷⁴ Interviews 2, 7, 19, 21, 24, 25;

⁷⁵ Interviews 19, 21, 24, 25;

⁷⁶ Interviews 5, 12, 19, 21, 24, 25, 26, 27; Human Rights Watch (2006) reports about human rights violations conducted by both Indian forces and militants in J&K.

⁷⁷ Interviews 14, 24, 25, 27;

⁷⁸ Interviews 5, 12, 19, 21, 24; see also, for example Mushtaq (2010)

Azad Kashmiris identify themselves with the freedom fight of their “brothers and sisters” on the other side. The Indian occupation and oppression is unacceptable for them and many interviewees shared their personal traumas – either from their very own experience or from horrifying stories they heard about the conditions in J&K⁷⁹. These stories reach them through refugees who fled from J&K, through reports in the media, publications by NGOs or through political rallies in AJK. All participants mentioned the human rights violations against the entire Muslim population in J&K and/or the carnage conducted by Indian forces during the insurgency.

Most Azad Kashmiris I talked to now prefer a political solution because the armed struggle did not achieve anything. In contrast, in response to the insurgency, Indian Special Forces keep threatening the population in J&K and many people were killed. Militant groups are still present in AJK, for example the JKLF, but they do not have many active supporters and not much influence in the region.

Azad Kashmiris are aware that religious extremists like the Pakistani Taliban and Lashkar-e-Taiba have hijacked the freedom fight. The actual goal of these groups is *not* to fight for the right of self-determination, but to implement the Shar’ia and to found an Islamic state (Cronin 2004). They profit from the on-going conflict in Kashmir because it is a way to get funding and to recruit members. Thus, they do not work towards a solution for Kashmir but want to keep the conflict running. To support this argument, several interviewees referred to the Mumbai attacks of 2008: these attacks conducted by members of Lashkar-e-Taiba stopped the confidence building measures between India and Pakistan and ended any hope of an immediate reconciliation⁸⁰. Most interviewees believe that the religious extremists have harmed the Kashmiri freedom struggle, because now the freedom fighters are labelled terrorists⁸¹. And nobody in the international community would support a terrorist movement⁸².

⁷⁹ Interviews 10, 13, 17 - 19, 21, 22, 24-27;

⁸⁰ Interviews 4, 9 – 11, 14, 19, 21, 23, 24-27;

⁸¹ Interviews 1, 5, 7, 9 – 11, 12, 14, 19, 21, 23, 24-27;

⁸² Interviews 4, 23, 24-27;

Militants have profited from the insurgency and so did Pakistan. Although some participants fully appreciate Pakistan's support for the insurgency, others are critical: they think that Pakistan misused the movement for its own political goals⁸³. After three wars, Pakistan was not able to face India in a direct battle a fourth time. Supporting the insurgency was a chance to weaken India without starting an inter-state war. However, interviewees emphasise that it was indigenous Kashmiris who triggered the freedom fight and not Pakistan, as some international media claim.⁸⁴

Another actor that profits from the conflict is the media. TV channels and newspapers mislead the population and report about "horror-stories" in J&K – this fuels the animosity against India in Azad Kashmir's and Pakistan's population. From the people I talked to, only the elite have mentioned this influence.⁸⁵

In relation to the insurgency, four types of humiliation can be identified. After the killings during 1947, India's suppression of the Kashmiri insurgency in the late 1980s is the second mentioned occasion of dehumanization. Some interviewees were fighting in this struggle for freedom, some others fled from the violence to AJK or Pakistan. They report about their traumatic experiences during this intra-state war that is moderated but still going on⁸⁶. Until today people flee from the Indian part of Kashmir to find refuge in Azad Kashmir or Pakistan. They report human rights violations like killings, torture and abductions in J&K conducted by Indian Special Forces in recent years.

Secondly, Azad Kashmiris mentioned two dishonouring aspects. Religious extremist groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba and the Pakistani Taliban have hijacked the freedom movement in Kashmir and subvert it for their own goals. Some interviewees argue that because of the involvement of such groups, the Azadi movement lost its face – instead of fighting against oppression and for human rights, the goal of jihadists now is to take revenge, terrorise the Indian population and fight for an Islamic state. The second dishonouring aspect in this regard is that outsiders have started to label the freedom fighters as "terrorists". They do not

⁸³ Interviews 1, 2, 4, 25-27,

⁸⁴ Interviews 2, 4, 5, 12, 14, 19, 24, 25, 27;

⁸⁵ Interviews 4, 7, 10, 11;

⁸⁶ Interviews 19 and 25;

differentiate between the indigenous movement or freedom fight and the external, religiously motivated jihad. This is seen as a defamation and as an *attempt* by the US and India to dishonour and humiliate the movement. However, the local population still supports the struggle for self-determination, at least mentally. That means that they identify with the goals of the freedom fighters though they do not necessarily endorse violent actions. Some still find it honourable to risk their lives for the freedom fight despite the involvement of extremists and stigmatisation as terrorists.

Thirdly, the violent suppression of the demonstrations in the late 1980s and the human rights violations such as abductions, rapes and killings qualify for humiliations in form of injustices.

4.1.6 The 2005 Earthquake – Remembering Support and Exploitation

The 2005 earthquake resulted in an immense destruction and loss of life in AJK and the surrounding countries. The LOC was opened at several places to allow international emergency relief to cross⁸⁷. The international support had positive long term effects, e.g., Saudi Arabia built a hospital in Muzaffarabad and Japan built new bridges. However, many roads in AJK and especially in Muzaffarabad remain destroyed or in bad condition.⁸⁸

The earthquake was exclusively mentioned by interviewees from Muzaffarabad. They remember it as a traumatic experience but nevertheless associate it with the international solidarity and relief actions, too. The aid coming in from far-away western countries like the US, UK, Belgium and Austria have influenced people's opinion positively about these countries: before the earthquake, people were generally critical or even hostile towards West. Opinions about Pakistan changed, too.⁸⁹ Pakistanis were the first to arrive to help after the earthquake. This solidarity of the Pakistani population weakened the pro-independence mindset in AJK and especially in Muzaffarabad.⁹⁰

⁸⁷ Interview 12, 18, 19;

⁸⁸ Interview 11, 12, 17 - 19;

⁸⁹ Interview 11, 12, 17 - 19;

⁹⁰ Interviews 18, 21;

The opinion about the Pakistani government however has not changed drastically. That is because the Federal Government took control over aid funds and did not spend all of it in Kashmir's interest. Large sums are "lost" and roads in AJK are still destroyed. Every year the very same destroyed roads are used as an argument to get donations. NGOs and donor countries are aware of this problem and reduced the amount of direct financial aid; rather, they go to affected areas and build roads and bridges by themselves. As a consequence, so interviewees assured, Pakistan's government prevents NGOs from coming to AJK. Islamabad wants these NGOs to pour aid into Pakistan's territory, in areas that were affected by the 2010 flood.⁹¹

Participants from Mirpur have not mentioned the earthquake as an influential event; however, they mentioned corruption and funds that do not reach Kashmir as well as the exploitation of resources by the Pakistani government⁹². Academics, bureaucrats and politicians confirmed that according to the Indus Water Treaty, India and Pakistan are allowed to use the water in Kashmir⁹³; interviewees in Mirpur account that Kashmiris themselves were not even allowed to take part in the treaty negotiations and are not allowed to make use of their own natural resources⁹⁴.

Pakistan is profiting from the hydro-power projects in AJK and builds dams on Kashmiri's property with very little compensation⁹⁵. Interviewees believe that Pakistan is only trying to milk the "Kashmiri cash-cow", is interested in the land and the water but does not care about the Kashmiri people. Some interviewees furthermore report that bureaucrats and politicians in AJK who represent Azad Kashmiris interest are removed from office or are forced to step down⁹⁶. As an example they name Farooq Haider, former PM of AJK. He accounts that his relationship with Islamabad during his term of office was troublesome. He demanded constitutional reforms thereupon the resources in AJK would belong to Kashmiris and not to Pakistan.

⁹¹ Interview 11, 12, 17 - 19;

⁹² Interviews 23-27;

⁹³ Interviews 1, 2, 4, 11, 16, 22;

⁹⁴ Interviews 23, 27;

⁹⁵ Interviews 23, 26, 27;

⁹⁶ Interviews 12, 19, 26, 27;

The exploitation of resources and funds meant for Azad Kashmir humiliate in 3 ways. Firstly, Azad Kashmiris have lost power or, actually, have never had sovereignty over local resources like water. Pakistan as well as India are taking control over and exploit Kashmiri rivers for generating hydro-power. In inter-state agreements like the Indus-Water-treaty the use of water is regulated without even consulting Kashmiris.

Secondly, Pakistan continues to violate Azad Kashmir's personal boundaries by misusing financial means, preventing NGOs from working in Kashmir and taking control over local resources such as water.

Thirdly, the case suggests an additional kind of humiliation as described in 4.1.3: Being ignored can humiliate. India and Pakistan overlook Kashmiris when they negotiate water treaties or confidence building measures.

4.2 Ideas about the Future and Their Effect on the Present

Kashmiris are split in their opinion about the future. Based on the conducted interviews, three major mindsets can be identified. Participants with the first mindset fear an escalation either in form of war or another insurgency. The second group is hopeful that the situation will improve further and that a peaceful solution will be found. The third mindset fears and is convinced that the status quo including the present grievances will prevail. Interestingly, neither age nor gender nor professional background seems to be an influential factor for these stances. Even similar personal experiences like expulsion or participation in the defeated freedom fight lead to different mindsets. The following paragraphs will discuss each mindset and its influence on present decision-making in detail.

Participants with the first mindset fear that the current peaceful situation can escalate any time in a nuclear war between India and Pakistan or another large scale insurgency. Interviewees mentioned regular cross-border violations from both Indians and Pakistanis as potential war-triggers. Another trigger could be a terror attack planned and conducted by radicalised freedom fighters in mainland India (like the attacks in Mumbai 2008). That is

because India claims that Pakistan is supporting these terrorists and thus the relationship between the two states is tense. The other form of escalation mentioned is an insurgency. Some participants fear that the freedom fight could rekindle, escalate in a civil war and risk lives and property of Kashmiris in both the Indian and Pakistani parts.

Participants who are afraid of an escalation in one way or the other show two main reactions. Firstly, especially the local Azad Kashmiris have arranged themselves with the status-quo and decided to stay passive. They believe they cannot do anything to stop India and Pakistan or the freedom fighters from fighting. This stands in contrast to the second form of reaction. Parts of the academic, political and administrative elite actively support a peaceful solution like their colleagues with a hopeful mindset that will be discussed later.

People with the second, hopeful mindset explain that the Kashmir dispute shows a positive tendency: the conflict cooled down from a war-period to a period of inter-state crises and intra-state insurgencies. The current peace process between India and Pakistan gives hope for further improvement of the inter-state relations and a peaceful solution. Interviewees are also hopeful that the Kashmiri voice will be heard and a mutually acceptable solution will be found.

Interviewees with this hopeful mindset either show present passivity or actively work towards a political solution. Participants with a passive reaction argue that the status quo is a healthy balance and that the positive political relationship between India and Pakistan will continue without any further Kashmiri interference. Others want to actively support this development and influence the decision making process. Academics and politicians who are hopeful, but also their more pessimistic colleagues who fear an escalation, work towards a peaceful solution. They propose and discuss solutions, spread information and influence decision-makers both locally and globally. They believe that only with the help of Kashmiris a mutually acceptable solution can be found. A variety of creative solutions has been suggested, e.g., Kashmir could become a shared economic zone between India and Pakistan. Especially academics and politicians demand an open debate without any previously defined goals or preferred solutions.

The third major mindset believes or fears that the present status quo will prevail. Some participants have arranged themselves with it; they are either satisfied with the present situation or know that they cannot change it. Some stated that they could even imagine and accept that the status quo becomes a permanent solution, i.e., the LOC would be turned into a state border between India and Pakistan. However, they do not take any actions nor work towards such a solution. Other interviewees are afraid that the present grievances will continue; they are not able or do not want to arrange themselves with the status quo. Their biggest fear is that the division of Kashmir, the non-resolution and interim-mindset will continue. They are frustrated about the past as well as the present situation and want to free Kashmir from future grievances. Therefore they either tolerate aggression or show combat readiness if political attempts to solve the issue continue to fail.

Participants from all three mindsets wish for a mediation of the international community to prevent an escalation, to support the peace-process and to end the status quo. Although they prefer to achieve a solution peacefully, most participants are hesitant to oppose the freedom fighters or militant groups publicly. Participants with a hopeful mindset are afraid of being labelled as “unbelievers”, thus losing their personal status in society as well as damaging the status of the supporters of a peaceful solution. Most pessimistic or uncertain participants additionally understand the wish for action of their fellow sufferers or even support the reasons behind the armed struggle: political options have failed before and are not a promising alternative, at least not a drastically better than a militant insurgency.

4.3 Features and Dynamics at work in Azad Kashmir

Now that we know that some types of humiliation play a role in AJK we will analyse which features and dynamics of humiliation are at work. The purpose is to understand the formation of opinions in AJK and how humiliations trigger or justify actions. In our theoretical framework we presented seven features and dynamics of humiliation in accordance with present literature – the following paragraphs will apply them on the case and discuss them in detail.

4.3.1 Memorizing Past Humiliations

The first symptom of humiliation that we will analyse is the exaggerated memory of past events. A group that is constantly reminded or unable to forget past humiliating experiences passes the feeling of humiliation on to future generations. Thus, this feeling stays present even though the act of the humiliation has ended and took place several years, decades or even centuries ago.

As we have seen in section 4.1 of the present thesis, several past events are memorised in Azad Kashmir and keep influencing present attitudes. However, labelling all these memories “exaggerated” seems to be an exaggeration in itself. Nevertheless we can say that history is remembered extensively in all layers of society and that people generally are well informed about the past; especially about oppressions, killings, injustices and exploitations. Interestingly every participant mentioned the UN resolution of 1949 that promised a right to self-determination but was never implemented⁹⁷.

These collective memories of humiliation are mostly transferred to future generations with the help of three channels, as interviewees explain: family members and fellow citizens talk about their experiences, oppressions, persecutions and lives as refugees. Refugee camps are not far from the town-centers. The direct contact to refugees spreads a negative picture about India. The second channel is the media that reports about present grievances in J&K as well as AJK and would usually combine the news with comparisons to past events. Interviewees confirmed that the literacy rate in AJK is with 65% relatively high (Azad Govt. Of The State of Jammu & Kashmir 2012) and that newspapers and TV channels are available even in remote areas. The third channel that reports about past humiliations are politics and NGOs. In public speeches of politicians or pamphlets of NGOs people hear and learn about the past. Furthermore, every year on 5th January the UN-resolution is commemorated and protests for self-determination take place. Such events keep the collective memory of the unfulfilled hope for a dignifying solution and the feeling of humiliation alive.

⁹⁷ Interviews 1-28, 30, 31;

4.3.2 Expecting Future Humiliations

Being afraid of future humiliations informs present decisions and opinions and can trigger the same responses as an actual humiliation. Interviewees do not seem to fear future humiliations; rather, they showed three different expectations. The first group of participants believes that the present stagnation will continue. They are either acting passively to not disturb the peaceful status quo, or they support the freedom struggle, either politically or militantly. It is not a fear of an additional future humiliation that influences their opinion, but rather, their fear that present humiliations will continue. The second mindset evident from the interviews is afraid of an escalation in form of another Indo-Pakistan war or a large scale insurgency. This fear of an outbreak of violence results in two different reactions. Firstly, participants stay passive as this standstill has led to a peaceful status quo or secondly, they support the political process of finding a solution. The third mindset hopes and thinks that the Kashmir issue will be solved peacefully and work towards a peaceful solution like the interviewees with a pessimistic mindset. Both, fear of violence and hope for a peaceful future, triggered Mandela-like behavior, i.e., attempts to leave the past behind and resolve the issue in peaceful ways. The fear of stagnation on the other hand triggers support for or toleration of violence. However, all three mindsets would prefer a peaceful solution.

Another interesting dynamic in this regard is the stance of militant groups in society. Participants who oppose violence stated that they would not publicly criticise militants or freedom fighters because they fear losing their own or their group's stance in society. This fear of being personally humiliated by being degraded in society weakens Mandela-like mindsets: interviewees would rather stay passive than actively supporting or hindering non-violent actions.

4.3.3 Past and Future Justifying Counter-Humiliations

The third feature of humiliation is that remembered past humiliations or expected future humiliations can create a wish for retaliation. It depends on the current sentiment in society whether actual counter-humiliations are regarded as permissible or not. Therefore, taking

revenge for humiliations can occur time displaced, i.e., when the larger society would support or at least tolerate such extraordinary measures.

The memory of past humiliations combined with continuing present grievances and little hope for betterment have created such a tolerating atmosphere in Azad Kashmir. Most Azad-Kashmiri interviewees state that they do not oppose and generally support the idea behind a militant freedom struggle (for details see 4.1.5). Some participants declared that if political negotiations continue to fail, they will take up arms to fight for their rights. However, all participants would prefer a peaceful, dignifying solution, acceptable for Kashmiris, Pakistanis as well as Indians – they do not wish to take revenge or to humiliate anyone. Therefore, it seems to be unlikely that a large-scale insurgency like the one in the late 1980s will reoccur in the near future without any additional humiliating event. The actual danger of an escalation emanates from small extremist groups that do not have much influence in Azad Kashmir today, but are admittedly tolerated. These groups feed on the collective narrative of past humiliations, present perpetrations and the future uncertainty. Such narratives help them to get funding, recruit members and to justify their terror. Furthermore the majority of interviewees tolerate militant groups either because of sympathy or because of fearing for their reputation. This tolerance for extremisms is dangerous: the Mumbai attacks of 2008 showed that extremist groups, no matter how small they may be, can influence the course of the Kashmir issue.

4.3.4 Creating a New We-Mode

The fourth dynamic says that humiliations can divide a people. If one part of a group humiliates another part, these humiliatees may form a separate, independent identity. They hope that this new “we-mode” will dignify them and create enough distance to the humiliator to stop the humiliations.

In the present case, the original goal of the Azadi movement was to free Kashmir from Hindu rulership and integrate Kashmir into Pakistan. The whole idea behind Kashmir joining Pakistan was to create an Islamic state where Muslims can live in dignity. Today, this sentiment is still present but for some interviewees, joining present day’s Pakistan is not a

dignifying option anymore: they complain about Pakistan's paternalism, i.e., influence in local politics and exploitation of resources, as well as about Pakistan's internal problems like corruption, poverty and insecurity (for details see 4.1.4 and 4.1.6). These developments, i.e. the humiliating relationship between Pakistan and Kashmir as well as the humiliating reputation of Pakistan lead to the growth of Kashmiri nationalism. Some interviewees prefer Kashmir to become an independent state, free from Pakistan's and India's influence. The emergence of this new we-mode became evident during the interviews when participants clearly differentiate between Kashmiris and Pakistanis. Their dominant we-mode is not "Muslim from the Indian sub-continent" anymore, but "Muslim-Kashmiri". Though they share religious and cultural ties with Pakistan, their nationality starts to separate.

4.3.5 Instrumentalising and Imagining Humiliations

Fifthly, the feeling of humiliation can be addictive and lead to self-pity as well as paranoia: humiliatees want their constant suffering to be recognised and acknowledged. Additionally, they may oversee their own misdeeds and assume any decision or action of others is intended to humiliate them further. This addiction to humiliation or self-victimisation can be instrumentalised for gaining a profit.

During the interviews participants complained that their perspective and grievances are ignored. They strive or at least wish for attention from international institutions, academia and the public. However, they did not seem to want acknowledgement for their suffering, rather, they wanted support to get their human right of self-determination. As they want to and work towards ending their humiliation, we cannot talk about an addiction to humiliation.

Religious extremists have hijacked and instrumentalised the movement to reach out to a bigger crowd, gain influence, recruits and funding. They use humiliating narratives of the past and warn of future humiliations to justify their violence and terror against India – with success. Although these militants are seen to be blinded by their emotions, most participants can understand that people cannot bear any more sufferings and join the militia. Most interviewees tolerate these groups and their goals even if they disagree with the means to achieve these goals. Another actor that keeps the feeling of humiliation alive and growing is

the local media. Journalists see it as their duty to report about India's wrongdoings and the grievances of Kashmiris in J&K (for details see 4.1.5).

4.3.6 The Role of the Public

The sixth dynamic argues that an act of humiliation is more powerful, i.e., increases the feeling of humiliation, if it reaches a wider public. Interestingly, in the present case participants complained about their humiliation not being noticed by a wider public. Several interviewees actively work for bringing humiliations like resource grabbing and human rights violations to light⁹⁸. This contrast between the theory and the case can be explained by the different expected reaction of the public. The theory assumes that the public would support the humiliator, thus increasing the number of humiliators and with them the feeling of humiliation. In the present case it is expected that the public supports justice and thus the stance of the humiliatee. Kashmiris hope that this support will pressure the humiliators to stop the injustices.

4.3.7 The Role of Human Rights

The seventh dynamic argues that human rights can hinder humiliations and consequential conflicts. As the interviews showed, the lack of rights, e.g., the right to self-determination or control over own resources, can humiliate and has the potential to trigger conflicts. Granting Kashmiris these rights can dignify them and will fulfil the goals of the freedom fight that will then lose justification. Similarly, militant groups and terrorism will lose ground. However, these are theoretical assumptions and whether the humiliated population will actually act according to the theory still remains to be seen. It is noticeable though that Kashmiris in AJK acknowledge that their situation is better than that of Kashmiris in J&K. They argue that while Pakistan grants rights to Azad Kashmiris, India is responsible for human rights violations in J&K. India's oppressive behaviour is seen to fuel demonstrations and

⁹⁸ Interviews 11, 12 (I12P1-2), 18, 23;

insurgencies. Based on this viewpoint we could argue that if human rights are not violated, a peaceful co-existence is more likely.

4.4 Awareness

So far we found out that humiliations have taken place and informed opinions as well as actions of decision makers and the local population. But are participants aware of this influence of humiliations? And are they aware that their humiliators might feel humiliated themselves by Kashmiris' counter-actions?

Participants are aware of the role of being subdued and subduing others. It is mainly the first type of humiliation through attempted genocide and the ongoing suppression in J&K that backs up the anti-India stance in AJK today. These dehumanisations and discriminations justify terror attacks on Indian soil. Most participants are aware that the animosity is mutual: they do know and admit that right before and during the first Indo-Pakistan war not only Hindus killed Muslims, but Muslims persecuted Hindus as well. Thus, Indian Hindus have developed an anti-Muslim stance just like Muslim Kashmiris have developed a stance against Indian Hindus⁹⁹. The major difference, as interviewees explain, is that Muslims stopped persecuting and killing Hindus after partition, while the Indian Special Forces still violate the human rights of Muslim Kashmiris in J&K¹⁰⁰. However, it should be mentioned here that since 1947 there are no Hindu communities left in the areas where I conducted interviews.

Regarding the second type of humiliation, participants did not report about AJK discriminating or disrespecting anyone. Also not mentioned as a potential humiliation is the loss of power of Hindu ruler Singh caused by the foundation of the Azadi government – Singh's decision to accede to India might have been a reaction to prevent this humiliation. Participants did not admit that Azad Kashmir behaves unjustly or excludes anyone.

⁹⁹ Interviews 2, 4, 5, 12, 19, 21, 24-28, 30;

¹⁰⁰ Interviews 3, 5, 9, 10, 12, 13, 19, 21, 24-28, 30, 31;

However, being aware that the loss of identity or violation of personal boundaries can humiliate, participants know that the proposed solutions to the Kashmir dispute will humiliate either Pakistan (incl. pro-Pakistan Kashmiris), pro-independence Kashmiris or India: All three parties see the territory of the former princely state of Jammu and Kashmir as an essential part of their own, independent identity. None of the three parties can accept the others' claim over this territory as this would violate their self-perception. Thus, the three parties humiliate one another simply by claiming that Kashmir belongs to only their own mode. Most participants are aware of this dynamic and the importance of nationalism; however, they argue that perceived humiliations or incomplete identities do not justify taking control over a territory. Therefore, it should be decided by the inhabitants of the disputed territory who should get the property right over Kashmir or, at least, the inhabitants should take part in negotiations for finding a solution.

4.5 Consequences for the Theory and Transferability to Other Contexts

4.5.1 Not Applicable and Additional Types and Mechanisms of Humiliation

The above analysis showed that there is one type of humiliation that was identified in the theoretical framework, that is not fully applicable on the case. Participants are divided in their opinion about being forced into passivity or being helpless. Some Azad Kashmiris today do not see any way of influencing the future of their state. They stopped voting and showed apathy about current political decisions in the region because they think it won't make a difference anyway – they feel helpless. However, especially the younger Kashmiris I talked to do not accept this helplessness: they actively complain about the politicians' passivity and argue that Kashmiris have to play a bigger role in negotiations between India and Pakistan. Some politicians and academics try to be heard in international forums suggest solutions to the Kashmir issue in a dignifying way for all three parties – India, Pakistan and Kashmir. Thus, we cannot really talk about a forced passivity, but rather a resignation and a feeling of helplessness in the population due to more than 60 years of non-resolution.

Besides the seven familiar types of humiliation discussed in the literature, the present case suggests two new kinds or new subgroups of humiliation. Firstly, the loss of identity can humiliate (as described in 4.1.2 and 4.1.4) and secondly, being neglected or ignored can humiliate (as described in 4.1.3).

Regarding the features and dynamics of humiliation, the present case showed that one mechanism did not apply to the case: the theory claims that the feeling of humiliation increases when the humiliation is made public. In Azad Kashmir however, interviewees complained that their humiliation is unperceived outside of Kashmir – they felt humiliated by this indifference.

Furthermore two additional mechanisms of humiliation can be identified in the case of Kashmir. Firstly, being already in the position of a humiliatee, the destroyed hope for dignity humiliates even further but can also mobilise victims. The non-implementation of the UN-resolution that promised and gave hope for the right to self-determination is seen as a humiliation. Every year the UN-resolution is remembered during demonstrations and speeches on 5th of January. All spheres of Azad Kashmiri society showed commitment to strive for a plebiscite as described in 4.1.3.

A second new dynamic is that people to people contact changes opinions and can relativise the relationship between humiliator and humiliatee. Perpetrators may realise that the humiliatees are humans, too, and the victims may realise that the perpetrator might not want to humiliate them intentionally. The 2005 earthquake in Kashmir is a good example where interviewees reported that extremists on both sides lost ground.

4.5.2 A Model for Triangular Conflicts

The present case showed that the theoretical framework based on humiliations between two parties also applies to multi-party conflicts. The vertical scale of human worthiness (see 2.2.1) however, is not an accurate depiction of the present case's dynamics because there are humiliating relationships between more than one humiliator and more than one humiliatee. Therefore this thesis suggests extending this model to a triangle with India, Pakistan and

Kashmir as exemplary actors. Additionally, the International Community and the different stances within Kashmir can be included as case-specific influences as the model on the following page shows.

The model describes the humiliating relationships between Pakistan, India and Azad Kashmir in a triangle: each side of the triangle depicts a humiliating relationship between two actors. Compared with the vertical scale of human worthiness, there is not a *line* of equal dignity but rather a *point* of equal dignity in the middle of the triangle. The triangle-model helps to describe conflicts with three parties.

In the present case, interviewees perceive Pakistan, due to its internal problems like corruption and terrorism, to be on a lower level than India that is a rising superpower. The relationship between the two countries is the focus of the international community, like the UN, the media and academia. This focus humiliates Azad Kashmir. Furthermore, Azad Kashmir feels humiliated by Pakistan as well as India. Azad Kashmiris with a pro-independence mindset are furthermore discriminated by the political dominance of the pro-Pakistan mindset.

This model is based solely on the perception of Azad Kashmir. Pakistan as well as India and the international actors might disagree. Thus, the triangle might turn upside down if the issue is observed from a different point of view. However, all points of view will agree that a point of equal dignity needs to be found to find a mutually acceptable solution. Only when this point is achieved counter-humiliations lose justification. A study of the perspectives of Pakistan and India with the same theoretical framework could help to compare and contrast the views of all the three involved parties and to find ways to reach a point of equal dignity. For Azad Kashmiris, this point would be reached when their right to self-determination is granted (and accepted) and contact between the two parts of Kashmir is possible.




Figure 3 Model of Humiliating Relationships as perceived by Azad Kashmir¹⁰¹

¹⁰¹ The idea of a triangle and the point of equal dignity was inspired by interviews with several Kashmiri academics and politicians.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

The primary aim of this research was to enlighten the Kashmir issue from a psychological perspective: how do humiliations influence the society in Azad Kashmir? It also aimed at enlightening the humiliation theory regarding multi-party-conflicts: what can the humiliation theory learn from the case?

Regarding the first question, the present research suggested that Pakistan's influence in Azad Kashmir's politics and exploitation of resources was perceived to be humiliating and has strengthened the stance for a re-united, independent Kashmir. On the other hand, past and present humiliations and the fear of future humiliations by India have created an atmosphere in Azad Kashmir that supports or, at least, tolerates a militant freedom struggle. Interviewees felt humiliated by the unjust, on-going occupation of J&K and human rights violations in that region since the partition of the subcontinent. Furthermore, the neglect of Azad Kashmir's right to self-determination and the negative effects of the enforced division of Kashmir on cultural, economic and personal ties between the two parts of Kashmir were perceived to be humiliating. This last set of humiliations causes Azad Kashmiris to either demand a plebiscite as suggested by the UN or an inclusion of Kashmiri representatives in the reconciliation process between India and Pakistan. The aim of the latter group is to find a mutually acceptable solution of the Kashmir issue for all three parties: India, Pakistan and Kashmir.

Regarding the second question, the present thesis found that most types as well as features and dynamics of humiliation are at work in Azad Kashmir. The case suggests two additional types or, at least, subgroups of humiliation: The loss of identity as well as being neglected or ignored can be seen as humiliating. Moreover, two additional mechanisms can be identified from the case. First that the destroyed hope for dignity can increase feelings of humiliation

and mobilise people, and second that interpersonal contact between humiliators and humiliatees can reduce feelings of humiliation. Furthermore, the case suggests an enhancement of the humiliation model for conflicts with three parties.

The thesis suggests that further research on India and Pakistan can help increase the awareness about reciprocal humiliations and find the point of equal dignity in the middle of triangle that symbolises a mutually acceptable solution.

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List of Interviews

Interview 1, Bureaucrat, Semi-Structured, Conducted in Lahore but Participant is from Muzaffarabad, December 2012

Interview 2, Academic, Semi-Structured, Islamabad, December 2012

Interview 3, Academic, Semi-Structured, Islamabad, December 2012

Interview 4, Academic, Semi-Structured, Islamabad, December 2012

Interview 5, Students, Focus Group with 8 Participants, Islamabad, December 2012

Interview 6, Academic, Open Interview, Islamabad, December 2012

Interview 7, Academic, Semi-Structured, Islamabad, January 2013

Interview 8, Academic, Open Interview, Islamabad, January 2013

Interview 9, Head of NGO / Politician in AJK, Semi-Structured, Islamabad, January 2013

Interview 10, Academic, Semi-Structured, Islamabad, January 2013

Interview 11, Politician, Semi-Structured, Muzaffarabad, January 2013

Interview 12, Academics and Students, Focus Group with 14 Participants, Muzaffarabad, January 2013

Interview 13, Academic and Schoolbook Author, Semi-Structured, Muzaffarabad, January 2013

Interview 14, Bureaucrat, Semi-Structured, Muzaffarabad, January 2013

Interview 15, Bureaucrat, Semi-Structured, Muzaffarabad, January 2013

Interview 16, Bureaucrat, Semi-Structured, Muzaffarabad, January 2013

Interview 17, Local Population, Focus Group with 2 Participants, Muzaffarabad, January 2013

Interview 18, Head of NGO / Local Population, Semi-Structured, Muzaffarabad, January 2013

Interview 19, Local Population, Focus Group with 2 Participants, Muzaffarabad, January 2013

Interview 20, Journalist / Local Population, Semi-Structured, Muzaffarabad, January 2013

Interview 21, Journalists / Local Population, Focus Group with 4 Participants, Muzaffarabad, January 2013

Interview 22, Politician, Semi-Structured, Lahore, January 2013

Interview 23, Politician, Semi-Structured, Mirpur, January 2013

Interview 24, Local Population, Semi-Structured, Mirpur, January 2013

Interview 25, Local Population, Focus Group with 2 Participants, Mirpur, January 2013

Interview 26, Local Population, Focus Group with 2 Participants, Mirpur, January 2013

Interview 27, Local Population, Focus Group with 3 Participants, Mirpur, January 2013

Interview 28, Pakistan Army, Semi-Structured, Lahore, January 2013

Interview 29, Local Population, Focus Group with 4 Participants, Lahore, January 2013

Interview 30, Local Population, Focus Group with 2 Participants, Lahore, January 2013

Interview 31, Local Population, Semi-Structured, on Phone, January 2013

Appendix I: Interview Guide

(Reminder: Inform the participants about the content and aim of the research. Ask for informed consent.)

I. Questions about personal background and linkages with Kashmir

Mutual introduction, general questions about family, origin, profession etc.

II. Questions about the past

I'm interested in how past events shape your opinion and feelings about the conflict.

- How did you experience or learn about the conflict's past? What are your sources? (Parents, school, news, own research,...)
- I would like you to think about the most important events that come into your mind. Can you tell me which past events still influence you today? What has really had an effect on your identity or your nation (Pakistan and/or Azad Kashmir) today?
- How does this past influence you in your behaviour or thinking today? (How does it influence decision makers?)
- Who else was affected by these events (and in what way)? Is there a wish for revenge?
- Can you think of any positive effects the conflict had on you or anyone else?

III. Questions about the present situation

- How would you describe the present atmosphere in Azad Kashmir? (If you look at the present conflict about Kashmir, how do you feel about it? Do you feel directly affected?)
- From where do you get information about the conflict these days, what's going on? How reliable do you feel those sources are?
- Do you think anyone is profiting from (or even instrumentalizing) the conflict? Do you think anyone is actively preventing a solution? (Why?)
- Have you heard about secessionist movements, for example the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front? What do you think about them?

IV. Questions about the future

- What is your personal outlook on the situation in Azad Kashmir: what are your expectations? And wishes? What are your thoughts on future challenges in AJK? How do these thoughts about the future influence your present behaviour/thinking/decision making? (Short term and long-term planning)
- Are you worried that the conflict could escalate in future?
- Are you afraid that Pakistan /Azad Kashmir could be discriminated in future?

V. Awareness (about ‘the self’ and ‘the other’)

We have talked about your present situation, what has happened in this conflict and how it could develop in future;

- Do you think those actions/deeds were intended to put you down?
- Is there any action that was executed by Pakistan or Azad Kashmir that could have caused India to feel put down? Did that cause a response by India?

VI. Ending

- Is there anything you would like to add? Is there anything we have not talked about that is important for you in this conflict?
- Do you have any questions?

Appendix II: Participant Form and Consent Agreement

Name:

Age:

Place of residence:

Birthplace:

Workplace and responsibilities:

Consent Agreement

I was informed about the purpose of the study and my role in it. I agree to participate in the interview (focus group discussion) voluntarily, provided that my personal information will be treated confidentially and anonymously. I am aware that I can withdraw any time without giving a reason.

Signature

To be filled in by the interviewer

Place:

Date:

Focus group no.:

Appendix III: Information Sheet

About the research “The Role of Humiliations in the Kashmir Conflict”

This research is conducted for a Master’s thesis in International Relations. The thesis will look at the Kashmir conflict from a psychological perspective. It aims to find out if and how past humiliations (“tazleel”) keep influencing the conflict today and maybe create fears of future humiliations. Since the field of study is International Relations, the role of humiliation on the national (Pakistan) or regional (AJK) level will be emphasised. Therefore interviews and focus group discussions will be conducted. The focus will lie on the personal perceptions and experiences of the participants. Communities in AJK, NGOs, journalists, politicians, bureaucrats, military officials and academics are the target groups.

Your participation:

Your participation is voluntary. If you would like to take part in this study, I will need some personal information (name, workplace and responsibilities) along with a consent agreement from you. We will then proceed with the interview that would last for about 1 hour. It would be very helpful for me if you allowed me to voice-record our conversation, but of course you are free to refuse that without giving any reason!

Whatever you say will be treated confidentially – no matter if it was recorded or not.

You can withdraw from the study at any time, before, during or after the interview.

Unfortunately I cannot offer you any compensation.

Contact:

If you have any questions, wish to get or give further information or would like to withdraw the information you provided from the research, please feel free to contact:



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