

Should Norway Intervene? a discourse analytical approach to Norway's "policy" on military interventions 1999-2011

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Declaration

I, Nora Knoph Berg-Eriksen, declare that this thesis is a result of my research investigations and findings. Sources of information other than my own have been acknowledged and a reference list has been appended. This work has not been previously submitted to any other university for award of any type of academic degree.

Signature.....

Date.....

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However, all mistakes and inconsistencies are solely my own.

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Abstract

Since 1999 Norway has participated in three military interventions and refused to participate in a fourth. This thesis explores how Norway's participation in military intervention has been made possible and whether there is a Norwegian policy on military interventions. It adopts a discourse analytical approach as a theoretical basis and as a method. By examining a broad range of texts on the debates on Norway's participation in interventions it seeks to identify a dominant representation of the circumstances under which Norway will participate. Contrary to what one might expect this thesis finds that it is not possible to identify one coherent discourse on military intervention in Norway or a dominant representation of circumstances under which Norway will participate. Therefore it is not possible to identify a Norwegian policy on military intervention, which makes it difficult to predict Norway's position in future questions of participation in military interventions. However, the intervention discourse does not appear "out of the blue" whenever a new intervention is debated. Throughout the various interventions we find three main recurrent elements: NATO membership, promotion of the UN and promotion of universal human rights. Through the use of a layered framework these can be understood as fairly permanent construction of principles on which Norwegian foreign policy is based (the strategic level) that are more deeply rooted in constructions on national security and Norwegian self-images (idea level). Although we cannot predict future decisions based on the analysis of the intervention discourse, the layered framework indicates that some representations are more fundamental than others. Thus, actors will have to argue within the frames set on levels one and two: they must provide proper constructions of NATO, the UN and humanitarianism. Consequently Norwegian participation in any future intervention will have to provide proper representations of promotion of international law and the UN, Norway's obligations to NATO and the allies and offer a proper representation of humanitarian concerns. Otherwise, we can expect a shift in the discourse with, changes in the more fundamental construction of Norwegian foreign policy and/or serious political consequences for any actor that seeks to promote a policy which cannot be argued within the frames of continuity.

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1 Introduction

Since the strategy of neutrality failed to keep Norway out of World War II, NATO membership became the main strategy of Norwegian security. In the post-WWII era, the chief objective of Norwegian security and defense policy was to prevent an attack on Norwegian territory. Since joining NATO as a founding member, Norway has participated in three military interventions. However, the circumstances were quite different from what had been imagined back in 1949. In 1999 Norway participated in NATO's first intervention, in Yugoslavia, where civil war had broken out on the issue independence for Kosovo. Next, Norway participated in the intervention in Afghanistan in 2001 and then in Libya in 2011, but the request for a Norwegian contribution to the intervention in Iraq in 2003 was declined. During the Cold War a Norwegian policy on war could be imagined. The main concern was protection against an invasion of Norwegian territory. Only if another NATO country were attacked by a state, activating the collective defense, could it be imagined that Norway would participate in war outside its own territory. Since the Cold War Norway has participated in three military interventions outside of Norway, but in none of the cases were the situation as the one described above. This leads to the question of whether Norway's participation in military interventions should be seen as a part of a new policy on military interventions, or is the participation rather coincidental.

The four military interventions on which Norway has had to take a stance has been quite different and we find no clear common denominator for Norwegian participation, or non-participation. The Kosovo intervention was a NATO operation that was not mandated by the UN where the main argument for intervening was humanitarian. The intervention in Afghanistan came as a response to terror attacks on the USA. The UN had given the country the right to defend itself, but there was no explicit mandate allowing the intervention in Afghanistan. This operation was not a NATO operation but Norway supported the Alliance through a coalition of the willing and the reason for intervening was given as mainly self-defense. Humanitarian reasons were mentioned only later and mainly as regards the Norwegian contribution to ISAF. The 2003 intervention in Iraq was not based on an explicit UN mandate. It was conducted by a coalition of the willing, and the reason given for intervening was that Iraq failed to comply with sanctions imposed in relation to their holding and production of Weapons of Mass Destruction. Also in this instance humanitarian reasons

were mentioned only after some time. Norway did not participate in this intervention, mainly because there was no mandate from the UN. In the intervention in Libya Norway announced its participation before there had even been time for any debate. The main reason for the intervention was humanitarian and there was a mandate from the UN allowing member states to invoke all necessary means to enforce a no-fly zone. The operation was led by NATO. As this brief summary shows the interventions were quite different. It is not obvious under what conditions Norway will, or will not, participate.

Therefore, this thesis seeks to explore if there is a Norwegian policy on military interventions. With four interventions where Norway has had to take a stand, there should be enough material to see whether there is a pattern that can be understood as a Norwegian policy on participation in military interventions. Some previous studies have applied discourse analysis to military interventions in order to understand how the intervention could be made possible through discourse (Bruun-Lie 2004; Hatling 2010). However, these have focused on single interventions and the policies adopted in the specific case, without looking at the Norwegian intervention discourse as a whole. There are also some studies of other areas of foreign policy that touch on the intervention discourse, like studies of the defense discourse (Græger 2005, 2007, 2009) and the peace discourse (Leira 2005; Skånland 2008, 2009, 2010), but these do not study the intervention discourse as such, and do not explicitly say anything about Norwegian policy on military interventions. This thesis seeks to fill this gap in the academic literature.

1.1 Research question

Conducting a military intervention is one of the most dramatic actions a state can undertake as it maintains the use of force and breaching a state's sovereignty in order to achieve political goals. There can be many reasons for resorting to this mean of action. Explanations can be based on a construction of self-defense, humanitarian concerns or other political objectives. Norway's participation in military interventions has also been given a number of reasons. By exploring the arguments for participating in previous interventions we can see if there is a pattern for when and why Norway intervenes and whether this pattern makes up a policy on interventions.

When studying policy, and especially foreign policy, there are usually some challenges concerning access to information. Decisions of Norwegian foreign policy, especially those involving considerations of security and defense, are usually made by the government. The Parliament (Stortinget) is the informed and consensus is secured through the *Enlarged Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defense*. These meetings are closed and the minutes of the meetings are kept secret. Therefore studying the reasons for Norwegian participation in military intervention can be challenging. However, through applying discourse analysis one can turn this challenge into an advantage as the approach searches for “structure and meaning exactly at the level where meaning is generated: in the discursive universe” (Wæver 2002: 30). The frames within which one may argue about foreign policy, which limit and make possible statements and actions are, discursively produced. Therefore one does not try to find the “real” intentions of the decision makers; one studies discourse for its own sake, and not as indicator of something else. As we are looking for the frames within which one has to argue about policy we can work with public open sources.

By establishing the discursive frames of the intervention discourse and the dominant representations one can identify the frames within which one has to argue about military interventions. The frames limit possible policy options as there are some utterances that cannot be made. The options for action are limited by what is seen as logical and correct. Therefore studying discourse can provide insights into what policy options are available and what one can expect to be limiting these. Based on these considerations a research question can be formulated:

How has Norway’s participation in military interventions been made discursively possible?

In order to answer the research question I will examine the debates on Norwegian participation in the interventions in Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya through parliamentary debates, newspaper articles and government documents. Consequently the timeframe of this thesis will be the years from 1998 to 2011. As it is impossible, within the frame of this thesis, to undertake a detailed analysis of a full thirteen years of material, the data material is limited to the decision period where the main debate on participating in an intervention took place.

Through the analysis it becomes apparent that there is not one coherent discourse on military interventions in Norway. Further there is no dominant representation of under what circumstances Norway will participate in an intervention. Therefore it is not possible to identify a Norwegian “policy” on military intervention. However, the intervention discourse does not appear out of nowhere every time there is a debate about a new intervention. There are some recurring elements and the debates about the interventions are usually concerning the same issues. Specifically I identify three elements that all the debates, to a greater or lesser extent, are concerned with and relate to: *NATO membership*, *promotion of the UN* and *promotion of universal human rights*. Through the use of a layered framework the elements found in chapter two can be understood as rather permanent construction of principles on which Norwegian foreign policy are based. These are located on the strategic level and more deeply rooted in constructions on the idea level. Although the lack of a coherent intervention discourse and dominant representation makes it difficult to identify a pattern of Norwegian participation in military interventions, the layered framework provides us with the insight that some of the representations are more fundamental than others. Therefore actors will have to argue within the frames set on idea level and the strategic level, meaning that they have to provide proper constructions of NATO, the UN and humanitarianism. Consequently Norwegian participation in any future intervention will have to provide proper representations of promotion of international law and the UN, Norway’s relation to its allies and offer a proper representation of humanitarian concerns. If this is not the case we can expect a shift in the discourse with change in the more fundamental construction of Norwegian foreign policy and/or serious political consequences for the actor promoting a policy that cannot be argued within the frames of continuity.

1.2 Outline of the thesis

The thesis is outlined in the following manner. In chapter two the theoretical basis and method applied in the thesis will be laid out. In the first section discourse analysis will be explained as a theoretical framework. The second section of this chapter will explain the methodological advantages of discourse analysis before laying out the analytical framework of the thesis. The third chapter reviews some of the existing literature on Norwegian foreign policy, and especially works applying discourse analysis. The objective of this chapter is to serve as a backdrop in order to position this thesis and it will also inform some of the discussion in chapter four and five. The analysis will be presented in chapter four and five. The main objective of chapter four is to map out the intervention discourse. This will be done

according to Neumann's (2001) framework where the two first steps of a discourse analysis is to delimit the discourse and identifying the representations. In chapter five the third step, the layering of the discourse is analyzed. This is done inspired by Wæver's (2002) layered framework which is laid out in chapter two. It begins with the deep idea level moving to the strategic and finally the policy level. In this last section the focus will be on how opponents can contest each other in the discourse. Chapter six will give a short summary of the main findings of the thesis and provide some concluding remarks.

2 Discourse analysis as theory and method

The thesis is informed by a discourse analytical approach founded in poststructuralist theory of International Relations. It has a strong emphasis on language and how the inherent structures of language frames the room of possible utterances and action. When studying policy in general, and particularly foreign policy where much is hidden, employing discourse analysis can be an advantage as one stays at the level of discourse. This is where the frames within which one has to argue about foreign policy, which limit and makes possible both statements and actions, are produced. Therefore one can study discourse through open and public sources for its own sake, and not as an indicator of something else (Wæver 2002). In discourse analysis theory and method is closely connected therefore the theory section and the method section are somewhat intertwined.

This chapter will be divided in two where the objective of the first section will be to explain how discourse analysis can be used as a theoretical framework while the second section will be concerned with how discourse analysis can be used as a methodological tool. First, discourse analysis will be placed within the poststructuralist tradition of International Relations theory and the ontological and epistemological foundation of the theory and method will be addressed briefly. Secondly, the poststructuralist view of language, in contrast to the structuralist one will be laid out as a way of seeing discourse analysis as theory. Here the importance of language in discourse analysis will be laid out before discourse and representations are defined as terms. Then the concept of discursive production will be explained before elaborating on how a layered framework can be valuable when explaining discursive change. The second section will begin with explaining the methodological advantages of discourse analysis and some of the challenges before laying out the analytical framework of this thesis.

2.1 Discourse analysis as a theoretical framework

Poststructuralist discourse analysis theory is interpretivist and informed by an ontological position of constructionism. This entails that social phenomenon and their meanings are

continuously being constructed (Bryman 2008: 19). Not only are they socially produced, but they are also in flux. It is in opposition to a positivist understanding of social science, refusing the claim that social scientists should aspire to the methods of natural science. Rather, the social scientist needs to grasp the subjective meaning of social action (Bryman 2008: 16). Further, the structure and agents are seen as mutually constitutive.

2.1.1 The importance of language

At the theoretical core of all discourse analysis we find an emphasis of the importance of language and discourse on the social construction of the world. Discourse analysis is about studying meaning, and it studies meaning where meaning occurs, that is in language (Neumann 2001). It builds on some basic insights from linguistics. Ferdinand de Saussure, who is considered the founder of modern linguistics, introduced the idea of language as a system of relations (Neumann 2001: 18). He argued that the relation between language and reality was arbitrary; there was no natural link between language and the “real world” (Jørgensen and Phillips 1999: 18-19). Inspired by de Saussure’s linguistic, structuralism emerged. It was rejecting the referential view of language which assumed that language was something that directly and objectively referred to a material object or phenomenon. On the contrary they claimed that the world does not itself decide how it should be interpreted (Milliken 1999: 229; Wæver 2002: 28). Structuralists saw language as a relational system where words were defined in opposition and relation to other words. Further, they claimed that language was embedded with a latent relational system that decided what the manifest social patterns of interaction would look like (Neumann 2001: 19). Following de Saussure, structuralists viewed the use of language to be too arbitrary to say anything about the structure. This has been one of the main points of poststructuralist criticism of structuralism as the framework could not explain change in the structure as language was viewed as something independent of social context.

Contrary to the structuralist differentiation of the social and language, the poststructuralist argument is that it is through language that the structures are created, reproduced and changed (Jørgensen and Phillips 1999: 20-21). Therefore it became an objective of poststructuralist discourse analysis to study language for its own sake, and not motivated by an objective of unraveling hidden structures (Neumann 2001). On the contrary, the poststructuralists claimed that the structures lay bare in the language. The structures are rules that bound the discourses by deciding what statements give meaning, what is seen as logical, natural, and what is not

accepted to say. In this way language restrain how we think and act (Bergström and Boréus 2005: 306). Consequently, building on Foucault, discourse can be understood as “a system for the formation of statements” (Bartelson 1995: 70).

2.1.2 Defining discourse and representations

Although Bartelson offers a short definition of discourse, there is need for a more extensive definition that captures more of the basic insight of post-structuralist discourse analysis. Neumann (2001: 18) gives the following definition of discourse:

A discourse is a system for the production of a set of statements and practices which, by inscribing in institutions appear as more or less normal, constitutes reality for its carriers and have a certain degree of regularity in a set of social relations.¹

This definition captures the insight that discourse is more than just language. Discourse not only plays out in text, and through language, but also on other arenas. One such arena can be that of art. Pieces of art are not made in a vacuum. Rather, they relate to other pieces and “speak” to each other and they are usually understood in the context of other art. In this sense “everything can be studied *as text*” (Neumann 2001: 23). Further, the definition includes the idea that production of statements and practices constitutes a reality for its carriers. As language is found between people and the world, “there is nothing outside of discourse” (Campbell 1998 [1992]: 4). Still this does not mean that everything is text or that everything is discourse. Discourse analysts does not deny that there is a material world and do not claim that everything is text, but rather that we can study anything *as text* (Neumann 2001: 23).

Another important poststructuralist insight is that there is not merely *one* discourse, but several, where the same expressions can have different meanings from one discourse to another. Any particular discourse is made up by a number of representations. Representations are models or structures through which we interpret the world. In order to create meaning out of what one is sensing models are used to filter the information. By applying already existing models these are re-presented. Neumann (2001: 33) defines representations as “things and phenomenon in the different guises they appear to us, that is not the things themselves, but the things filtered through what comes between us and the world: language, categories etc.”. Further he establishes that representations, more specifically denotes “the most important packages of reality demands that a discourse consists of” (Neumann 2001: 177-178). When

¹ All Norwegian quotes have been translated to English

the carriers of the same representation are institutionalized or appear as one clear group, they make up a position in the discourse. Both representations and positions can be either dominant or marginalized (Neumann 2001: 178). A dominant representation can constitute a state of hegemony and the representation will remain unchallenged to the degree that it seems natural (Neumann 2001: 178). However, this does not mean that the discourse is not political as there will be discursive effort put into maintaining the situation of hegemony where the dominant representation is not openly disputed (Neumann 2001: 60).

In order to understand how the structures occur and how they develop and change one has to understand how discourses are produced. As established above, a basic insight of discourse analysis is that language is embedded with meaning, and that the structures or models in the language constrain what utterances that are possible to make. But discourse analysis should not only look at how the actors are constrained, they should also look at how the structures or models as preconditions for statements are produced. According to Milliken (1999: 236) this happens in several ways, including through establishing “common sense” and through the production of policy practice. Representations are either confirmed by being re-presented in a similar matter, or they can be given new meaning by being re-presented with minor variations. Further change can occur through discursive struggles where the dominant position of one representation is challenged by an alternative representation gaining ground. Within discourse analysis one can also explain how the signifying system works to structure and limit the options the policy makers find reasonable (Milliken 1999: 240). In this way discourse not only constrains what statements can be made about a certain issue, but also limits the room for action. Consequently, an understanding of discourse as productive can be helpful for explaining discursive change.

2.1.3 Discursive change: a layered framework

Where poststructuralist traditionally have drawn on Foucault and his refusal of the existence of a structure claiming that “[n]othing is fundamental” (Neumann 2001: 36) Ole Wæver’s layered framework returns to the structuralist idea claiming that some things are more fundamental than others. When studying the intervention discourse, where the specific debates are situationally contingent applying a layered framework can be helpful in order to understand how some representations are more permanent and deeply rooted than others. Wæver’s framework not only studies the superficial level, but also looks for deeper and more fundamental and permanent structures through the use of a layered framework. Here the

structuralists insight that some things are more fundamental is combined with the study of the superficial level. Wæver argues that discourse “forms a system which is made up of a layered constellation of key concepts” (Wæver 2002: 29). Within a given representation not all characteristics are equally resistant and there might be some elements that unite, while others differentiate (Neumann 2001: 62). The deeper structures, the ones that unite, are more consistent and therefore more resistant to change and harder to politicize (Wæver 2002). Still, change is not impossible as the structures are socially constructed. The layered framework also allows us to study how the different levels interact and in this way it can be helpful when explaining change within continuity. There is a larger probability of change within continuity on the more superficial level than when there is change on the deeper levels.

The adaptation of a layered framework does not imply that different discourses play out at the different levels. Rather, the intervention discourse (in this case) includes and articulates itself around all three layers simultaneously (Wæver 2002). The first layer is the deep level. Even though we might find different representations of issues on the third level we can expect that they still share some of the essential codes at the deeper level. Based on this assumption one can expect that the deeper the level the disagreement is found on, the more marginalized the alternative representation will be. If there is change on level three this is either variations of the basic premises and one is still within the frames set on level one and two, or there is so much pressure that there is change in the basic premises set on levels one and/or two (Wæver 2002: 33).

The second level takes the basic constellations found at level one and adds specifications and variations as every new layer adds to the deeper one (Wæver 2002). Wæver (2002) explains how the second level involves a particular articulation of the constellations at level one. The way in which the constellation at level one is articulated at level two is not given. Rather, there is often flexibility and ambiguity to the way in which the constellation has been merged (Wæver 2002). Change on level two is less likely to happen than on level three and such change would be difficult to explain within the frames of continuity and it would probably have large consequences for the carriers of the dominant representation. Still, change on level two would be less disruptive than change on level one.

Finally, the third level is where the articulations and formations of specific policies are found thereby including the more general level of abstraction into the specific situation. The third

level is also relevant for integrating more dynamic elements into the structural model. Wæver (2002) indicates three main ways in which opponents can contest each other on level 3. First they can contest other actors by arguing that they fail to give an accurate construction of the elements found on level one. Secondly actors can argue that what their opponent construct on level two is threatening to the principles on level one. Third, they claim that their opponent's constructions of the policies are not in touch with reality. Here the opponent's view of both level 1 and 2 might be corresponding, but with different perceptions of the realities of the situation.

2.2 Employing discourse analysis as method

Discourse analysis is not only a theoretical framework, but can also be used as an analytical framework. Although there is a considerable literature on the theoretical foundation of discourse analysis, the literature exploring discourse analysis from a methodological point of view is more limited and there are few "recipes" for conducting discourse analysis. The lack of a literature on the issue might be because many poststructuralists traditionally have viewed methodology as a feature of positivist approaches to science (Hansen 2006: 1). Still, there has been some contributions focusing on how discourse analysis can be used as a method of analysis within the field of International Relations in recent years (See for instance Hansen 2006; Milliken 1999; Neumann 2001).

2.2.1 Method applied

When studying politics, and especially foreign, security and defense policy there is always a challenge related to the fact that the access to information is limited, as this kind of information is deemed sensitive. In Norway, foreign policy issues that are important and that have a certain sense of emergency are dealt with by the government who informs the Parliament through the *Enlarged Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defense* (EPCFAD). The minutes of the EPCFAD is usually kept secret for 30 years. Therefore one cannot achieve insight into the discussions and "real" reasons behind the decisions made on foreign affairs, security and defense. Although this is a challenge when studying foreign policy, one can make this challenge and advantage through the use of discourse analysis.

Remaining at the level of discourse, discourse analysis turns this challenge into an advantage. In the words of Ole Wæver (2002: 26) one "does not try to get to the thoughts or motives of the actor, their hidden intentions or secret plans". Rather, the approach searches for "structure

and meaning exactly at the level where meaning is generated: in the discursive universe. In a specific political culture there are certain basic concepts, figures, narratives and codes, and only on the basis of these codes are interests constructed and transformed into policies” (Wæver 2002: 30). The logic of the argument remains much clearer if one sticks strictly to the level of discourse “– one works on public, open sources and use them for what they are, not as indicators of something else” (Wæver 2002: 26).

The analysis adopts an *intertextual* reading of the material (Hansen 2006). This focuses on how texts relate to other texts by simultaneously constructing legitimacy for its own reading and re-presenting the old one. In the intervention discourse the memories of previous interventions are a part of new representations and the interventions can be said to ‘speak to each other’. The meanings of representations of Norwegian participation in previous interventions are presented and re-presented. As this thesis searches for patterns among the different interventions across time the intertextual reading can be helpful in identifying the representations and how they relate to each other. Further the thesis adopts an analysis of *policy practice* (Milliken 1999). It is concerned with explaining how discursively produced representations enables policy practice by claiming that the signifying system is structuring and limiting the policy options found reasonable. However, even though the thesis aims at explaining policy practice through discourse analysis, it does not imply that there is a casual link between the two (Hansen 2006). Rather, it explains how the possible policy options are discursively constructed and limited.

2.2.2 The nature of the study: how is data collected and analyzed

As mentioned in the introduction, this study aims at analyzing the debates concerning the three military interventions that Norway has participated in, and one that Norway did not take part in, namely the interventions in Kosovo, Afghanistan, Libya and Iraq. The reason for analyzing the discourse on all four interventions is the objective of studying the intervention discourse as a whole. This might be seen as a rather ambitious project, but as there are only four interventions that have been debated it should not be an impossible project, not even within the frames of a master thesis. Ideally the discourse delimits itself as this is a question of what meaning they are given by its carriers (Neumann 2001). Therefore the delimitation of the discourse cannot be an analytical move as how the carriers of the discourse delimits the discourse, what they define as a part of the discourse and what they define as exterior to it is an important part of the analysis. However, in order to be able to analyze the

discourse on all four interventions some limitations on the type of material and the timeframe have been made.

First, the empirical material used as the basis for the analysis is primarily politicians in official positions, but also others who contribute to the formation of the discourse. The choice of looking primarily at texts by politicians is made because we are not trying to find out what ordinary people “really” think about military interventions, but rather we are looking for the structures within which one has to argue about Norwegian participation in military intervention (Wæver 2002). Those who define these structures are to a large extent leading political actors. As foreign policy is the prerogative of the Monarch, and consequently the government’s responsibility in Norway, how government officials, and especially the Prime Minister, Foreign Minister and Minister of Defense construct the arguments for Norwegian participation is of crucial interest. Still, these are not the only actors forming the discourse. Therefor the statements of other politicians are also relevant, and especially those who are in opposition. Further, the analysis includes representations found in the wider media articulated by journalists, researchers, military staff, government officials, and others.

Secondly, the timeframe of the material studied is rather strict. When conducting the news searches the timeframe has been set to mainly the decision and discussion period, excluding much of the debate after the intervention is initiated. Especially in the case of the intervention in Afghanistan, where Norway has been involved for 12 years, the material analyzed has had to be limited. Therefore it is restricted to the period from the terror attacks hit on September 11th 2001 to the first Norwegian troops were deployed in January 2002². As the Norwegian involvement in the interventions in Kosovo and Libya were rather limited in time the empirical material analyzed is collected from the discussions begin to the Norwegian contribution is ended. When it comes to Iraq, both the period during the decision making, and from it is clear that Norway will not participate and sometime out in the operation is included.

Even though the analysis attempts to cover a broad range of texts, it is not possible to do an exhaustive analysis of the intervention discourse. This is both due to the limits set by the frames of this thesis, but also because it is close to impossible to access and locate all relevant

² It would be interesting to follow the changing argumentation and discourse of the Norwegian contribution to Operation Enduring Freedom and ISAF, but this is not possible within the frames of this thesis. For an analysis of the changing discourse on the Norwegian contribution after the new coalition government in 2005 see Hatling (2010)

texts. While some are rather easily accessible, such as government papers and parliamentary debates, news articles are an example of material that can be more difficult to obtain. Further, the discourse might play out in unexpected arenas and be difficult to identify as a part of the intervention discourse. Therefore there might be texts that do not fit in to the findings and that articulate representations that are not identified in this thesis. In that case there is need for more extensive research on the issue.

The analysis includes texts from parliamentary debates, press releases, addresses to parliament and the prime ministers New Year address (when these have been given within the timeframe laid out above). Further, I have conducted an extensive search in news media using Norway's largest database of news articles Atekst (also known as Retriever). Here I have limited the time frame as previously explained and used key words to limit the search. The key words used have been the name of the countries that have been the subject of the intervention namely Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya coupled with words such as NATO, Norway or Norwegian.³ Although the key words gave a rather wide search with a large number of hits, there might be some sources that were not captured by these key words. Still it was necessary to couple the country's name with words such as Norway or Norwegian in order to limit the number of hits which otherwise would have been overwhelming. Consequently the critical issue is not to limit the search too much or too little. Not all the articles generated from the searches were read. I skimmed through the titles, selecting those that appeared relevant. In the next step only the ones found relevant for the analysis were read more thoroughly and only a small part of these were actually referred to in the text. The main idea is that the texts referred are representative of patterns found through analyzing the material.

The nature of discourse analysis is subjective and based on interpretations. The researcher chooses what is referred and interprets the material into representations and discourses. This has consequences for questions of validity and reliability. Therefore it is important that all quotes are well referenced so verifying them is possible. It should be noted that a vast majority of the data I have collected is in Norwegian and there might be some challenges related to this. I have tried to translate the quotes as directly as possible, at the same time it is

³ The exact key words used were 'Kosovo, NATO, Norway' 01.09.1998-01.10.1999, 'Afghanistan + Norwegian' 11.09.2001-01.02.2002, 'Iraq, Norway/Norwegian' 01.11.2002-01.03.2003 and 'Libya, Norway/Norwegian' 19.02.2011-01.08.2011. All these search words are translated from Norwegian.

not possible to translate all words and sentences directly from Norwegian to English with them still making sense. Consequently, the English of some of the quotes might seem a bit odd.

2.2.4 Analytical framework

Based on an initial read-through of the material three recurring subjects or elements that were present in the debates about Norwegian participation in the different interventions were identified and used for the further analysis. These are:

- *Considerations for the alliance.* How is Norway fulfilling the obligation it has through NATO and solidarity with the allies?
- *Considerations for the UN and international law.* Are the interventions mandated or allowed by the UN and/or are they in accordance with international law?
- *Humanitarian considerations.* How is the humanitarian situation in the subject country now? Will it be made better or worse by the military intervention?

After identifying these elements the material was analyzed with reference to these. Main objectives were to look for how the elements were treated and how the arguments related to them. Further, where elements were in conflict with each other questions of what considerations were dominant and which were overrun by other concerns were of importance. This part of the analysis is written out in Chapter four which maps out the discourse and the representations.

In chapter 5 the analysis of the intervention discourse and the findings made here will be further analyzed through the use of a layered framework. This builds on the framework of Wæver (2002) who operates with three discursive layers. Wæver's (2002) layers are not directly transferrable to the intervention discourse I develop a separate set of layers based on the intervention discourse. Here the main objective is to make out construction of the different levels in the representations, looking for articulations that unite, and those that separate representations. As the intervention discourse draws in representations from other discourses on Norwegian foreign policy and I do not have the possibility of conducting a separate analysis of these discourses due to restraints on time and space I will draw on already existing literature. The main and relevant findings in the existing literature will be laid out in the next chapter and applied to the analyses in chapters four and five.

3 Existing literature on Norwegian foreign policy discourse

This chapter reviews existing literature on Norwegian foreign policy discourse. There is not an overwhelming amount of work done on this issue, but in recent years a literature has been emerging. On Norwegian foreign policy in general the literature is more extensive. Even though these contributions do not adopt a discourse analytical approach they can still inform the main priorities and issues of Norwegian foreign policy. The work that has been done from a discourse analytical stance is mainly on more limited areas within Norwegian foreign policy. Nina Græger (2005, 2007, 2009) analyzes the Norwegian defence discourse and the internationalization of the defence. While Skånland (2008, 2009, 2010) and Leira (2005) has analyzed the Norwegian peace discourse. Further there has been some work, in the form of master theses on the discourse on Norwegian participation in military interventions (Bruun-Lie 2004; Hatling 2010). These have been concerned with single interventions and not the discourse as a whole. The objective of this chapter is first and foremost to provide brief background information on Norwegian foreign policy, and a review of previous research to map out the field and place this thesis within it. Secondly, the objective is to inform the further analysis both in chapter four to compare the results of the analysis with the results of previous work and to inform chapter five where a layered understanding of the discourse will be adopted.

The first part of this chapter provides a short recap of Norwegian foreign policy practice. Here we will see how consensus is constructed as an important trait of Norwegian foreign policy. The second section explores previous literature on Norwegian self-images where the construction of the Norwegian regime of goodness and Norway as a humanitarian great power holds a strong position. Here the construction of Norway as a peace nation will be assigned some room as there is a more extensive literature on this issue than on some of the others. The literature on the self-images of Norwegian foreign policy is important for this thesis as it will inform the ideas on which the intervention discourse builds on. Further, as will be indicated in the analysis, the intervention discourse and peace discourse are closely. Then, the Norwegian promotion of a world order led by the rule of law will be explored explaining how Norway is

promoting multilateralism and universal human rights. This is also relevant as a part of the Norwegian self-images and is an important part of Norwegian foreign policy. Constructions of the UN and human rights are often found as parts of representations on Norwegian participation in military interventions. The third section will be concerned with Norwegian security and defense examining the main representation of Norwegian security and defense and how this has developed especially since the end of the Cold War. Constructions of security and defense are an important part of the interventions discourse and the two are affecting each other.

3.1 Norwegian foreign policy practice

The practice of Norwegian foreign policy constitutes the preconditions for the interventions discourse. Therefore the literature review will start by addressing this issue. Norwegian foreign policy does not have a long history as it is only in 1905 that Norway got its own and independent foreign policy. At this point Norway was lacking both a practice for forming and for processing foreign policy issues (Sjaastad 2006: 20). Until World War II the main idea was that agreement on foreign policy issues would work as a strategy for survival in the international anarchy regulated only by the power balance of the great powers (Sjaastad 2006). Foreign policy is formally the king's prerogative and thereby the government's responsibility. When there are Parliamentary debates about foreign policy these are either initiated by the government or by members of the Parliament. Debates initiated by the government are usually based on written presentation such as the foreign budget, government white papers or propositions or they can be based on an oral presentation by the Foreign Minister (Sjaastad 2006: 23). When a debate is initiated by the Parliament this is usually on the basis of a proposition from the Committee on Foreign Affairs concerning a proposal from one or more of the members of Parliament. These are also known as document 8 proposals (Sjaastad 2006: 23).

Regularly the Foreign Minister holds his address on foreign policy two times a year, but sometimes addresses are held based on current situations where Norwegian forces are contributing abroad. In addition the Parliament has the regular and the spontaneous question session and the interpellation institute. According to Sjaastad (2006) the Parliamentary debates on foreign policy are characterized by few participants who are usually prominent members of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defense. Both media and members of Parliament claim that there is too little debate on foreign policy issues in Parliament and in the

Norwegian public in general (Sjaastad 2006). This account must be seen in relation with the focus on consensus on issues of foreign policy as an important trait of Norwegian foreign policy.

3.1.1 Consensus on Norwegian foreign policy

When describing the Norwegian political system in general consensus is frequently voiced as a characteristic trait, and even more so when it comes to foreign policy. Then Foreign Minister Jonas Gahr Støre wrote that “[c]onsensus has traditionally had primacy to debate, when the questions have been considered important” (Støre 2010: 11). According to Græger (2007: 65) consensus became a part of the “doxa of Norwegian defense policy”. During the Cold War the strategic situation “contributed to consensus becoming a goal and a measure at the same time. In order to resist potential pressure from the outside, consensus about security policy was presented as important”. It was presented as crucial that Norway appeared united to the outside world. The importance of this is also stressed today. Sjaastad (2006: 19-20) explains how

[o]pen disagreement is seen not only as a strategic problem, but as a threat to Norway’s role in the world. This is not only the case during a state of war, such as we have been witnessed to in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq, but also during more normal political conditions. Instead of politicizing – through control and critical questions – the Storting contributes to depoliticize.

The representation of consensus as an important part of Norwegian foreign policy can be seen as a discursive construction (Bruun-Lie 2004). By viewing consensus as a dominant representation one can gain insight into how the construction of consensus also helps maintain consensus, both through discursive reproduction and through the materiality of the discourse and institutionalization. In this way the construction of consensus can be seen as a loop where the consensus feeds into the materiality and institutionalization which further enforces the consensus. The Enlarged Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defense (EPCFAD) is often noted as an arena where consensus is secured as it contributes to issues having a broad anchoring (Græger 2007: 65). When challenged on their foreign policy politicians and others can point to the important tradition of consensus in Norwegian foreign policy as a means of depolarizing the issue. In this way EPCFAD can be understood as an institutionalization of consensus in practice.

The tradition for consensus has also played out through the continuation of similar policies regardless of the “color” or the government. In the words of Jan Egeland “the broad agreement of what we shall promote [...] has been the family silver that shifting Norwegian Foreign Ministers have managed” (Jan Egeland cited in Dobinson and Dale 2000: 49). It has been highlighted as an issue of importance that Norwegian foreign policy should be recognizable regardless of government, meaning that there should be a continuation of the “long lines” and main objectives (Leira et al. 2007). The next two sections give brief recap of what these lines and objectives are.

3.2 Norwegian self-images: Norway is a humanitarian great power

The literature on the self-images of Norwegian foreign policy is important for this thesis as it informs the ideas on which the intervention discourse builds on. The self-image that Norway is a humanitarian great power contains several characteristics of Norwegian foreign policy. One that has been given increasing attention in later years is the self-image of Norway as a peace nation. The strong position this construction holds in Norwegian foreign policy makes it relevant for a study of Norwegian participation on military interventions and through the analysis of the next chapters it will be made apparent that the intervention discourse and peace discourse are closely connected and draw on each other. Secondly Norway as a promoter of a world order based on rule of law is based both on arguments of this being in Norwegian interest as a small power and ideal reasons. This includes promotion of multilateralism through especially the UN and international law, and the promotion of universal human rights.

3.2.1 Norway is a peace nation

Leira et al. (2007) finds that there is a Norwegian peace tradition that goes back to the late 19th century. The Norwegian peace effort was a part of a larger European peace movement which emerged during the 19th century, but it did not manifest itself in the Norwegian discourse before the 1890s, because there was not really any discourse on foreign policy to speak of in Norway until then (Leira 2005). Leira argues that at the beginning of the 20th century there was a consensus, close to a doxa (cf. Bourdieu 2005 [1977]), that Norway should be leading a peace policy as peace was the main objective of Norwegian foreign policy.

When exploring the reasons for the Norwegian peace engagement Leira (2005) finds a discursive connection between the people and peace. It is the people who are inherently peaceful. Various explanations are given regarding the peaceful nature of the Norwegian people. Leira locates both material and biological reasons. The material reasons are amongst others that Norway is a small country at the outskirts of Europe and that Norway does not have a history of policies of expansion or as a colonial power. Biological reasoning claimed that the Norwegian people were born peaceful. Leira also finds an idea of a Norwegian exceptionalism claiming that Norway had a mission or a calling to work for a more peaceful world. These arguments are found not only at the beginning of the 20th century, but also a century later uttered by previous Foreign Minister Jonas Gahr Støre who in 2006 stated that “with our point of departure we have nothing less than an obvious responsibility to be a nation for peace” (cited in Leira et al. 2007: 13).

During the Cold War the idea of Norway as a peace nation was played down as Norway wanted to keep a low profile, but as the Cold War ended the peace policy again emerged during the 1990s (Leira et al. 2007: 12). Now the peace policy was expanded to involve more areas so that much of the policy Norway led towards “the third world” could be seen as a part of the peace policy. The reasons cited were the same as in the late 19th century and early 20th century: Norway held an extraordinary position that enabled it to serve as a peace nation, peace negotiator and humanitarian great power. In 1993 the Oslo Accord really sparked off the idea of a Norwegian peace-involvement policy (Skånland 2008, 2009, 2010).

Skånland (2008, 2009, 2010) analyzes the Norwegian peace discourse, and finds a dominant position emerging from 1993 to 2003. The Oslo Accord of 1993 is identified as the triggering cause of a distinct peace policy and the idea of Norway as a peace nation emerging. The discourse draws on ideal and traditional arguments for legitimizing the peace policy, but it also inherits an emphasis on an instrumentalist self-interests. The peace policy has the potential for giving Norway a good reputation as well as gaining access to important arenas for exercising influence. The continuation of the peace policy after the change in government from a labor government to a conservative coalition government in 1997 showed that the peace involvement was no longer dependent on certain actors or parties (Skånland 2009: 326). In 2000 a central discursive construction was introduced. In his annual New-Years Address Prime Minister Kjell Magne Bondevik stated that “Norway is a peace nation”.

After 2003 Skånland (2008) finds that the dominant position is challenged and that there is a discursive struggle. He identifies two alternative representations. According to the first representation challenging the dominant one, Norway's peace involvement is conducted at the expense of other more important foreign policy considerations and that Norwegian foreign policy should be concentrated on other areas. The second alternative representation addresses the peace involvement in positive terms, but it is criticized for a lack of idealism. Further, the close relationship to the USA and Norwegian participation in international operations led by the USA are articulated to be weakening the peace policy. Still, the dominant representation prevails and its position in the discourse remains strong.

3.2.2 *Aid*

Another important self-image found by Leira et al. (2007) is that Norway is a giant within development aid. They argue that there has been a development in the aid discourse. First the motivation for giving aid was explained to be altruistic and based on moral. It was a part of a "regime of goodness" (Leira et al. 2007: 16). In this way Norwegian aid can be written into the peace discourse and to the self-image of Norway as good and exceptional. This has the consequence that the aid practice cannot be criticized, as the peace involvement is above criticism because criticizing practice is equal to critique of the self-image. As the intention behind aid is good and based on the premise that aid is ethically praiseworthy criticism of practice is subordinate and criticism of aid in general is morally condemned. The goodness motivating aid was important as there should not be any self-interest behind it. By doing this, aid could help give Norway credibility internationally. This is also why it has become more important in recent years to make Norwegian aid more visible. Throughout the 1980s the Norwegian discourse on aid became more driven by self-interest, and the Norwegian aid came with strings attached, as opposed to earlier development aid. The self-image as a nation that gives aid to others and shares its goods still holds a firm place. The critic that is raised on Norwegian aid is usually on practice, that Norway is not living up to its obligations as an aid-nation or that the aid given is undermining Norway as an aid-nation, not on the self-image of Norway as a state that shares its resources with others and works for a better world.

3.2.3 *Norway is for a world order based on the rule of law*

The principle that Norway is for a world order led by the UN is an important part of Norwegian foreign policy which is repeatedly constructed as parts of the representations found in the intervention discourse. Norway is a great supporter of the UN in many ways.

Politically Norway is promoting a world order led by the UN. Further, Norway has contributed militarily in a number of peace operations on behalf of the UN. But perhaps most important is the economic contribution Norway gives to the UN. According to Leira et al. (2007) Norway is the 7th largest economical contributor to the UN. Norway's commitment to the UN is based on the self-image as an altruist, a peace nation and a multilateralist. Still the legitimization of Norwegian promotion of the UN also has a self-interest dimension. As a small state Norway needs the organization as a world order where international law, and not the survival of the fittest rules serves its interests best. Norway is presented as "the UN's best friend" and the UN is seen as a collective effort for peace, security and development (Leira et al. 2007: 21). This can be seen as a small state strategy (Neumann 2011). Leira et al. (2007: 12) argues that the "promotion of the UN and the eager for humanitarian aid can be seen as a part of the peace tradition, as projects for a better and more organized world and for global redistribution of resources". Kjetil Visnes (2000: 222) has argued that "[t]he UN is no longer a corner stone in Norwegian foreign policy, it is a 'monument'". Thus, Norwegian UN policy is not only a means to achieve a goal, it has a value in its own right. Promotion of the UN has become a part of the "Norwegian cultural heritage", and has achieved status as "listed" (Visnes 2000: 222).

Another core area of Norwegian foreign policy is the promotion of universal social and political human rights (Støre 2010: 18). The Norwegian definition of human rights is rather broad as it contains social, economic, political, cultural and civil rights (Visnes 2000: 100). In the Norwegian discourse, the UN and the UN charter of human rights are constructed as important entities in the promotion of universal human rights. Visnes (2000: 101) argues that the Norwegian interpretation of human rights expansion and universality makes natural the argument that "[o]ne has the right to, within the principle of sovereignty, intervene against breaches of human rights". He continues: "[t]he Norwegian discourse has thus established a connection between the citizens' rights and what legitimacy the international community gives the state apparatus as a representative of the sovereign" (Visnes 2000: 101). Bruun-Lie (2004) finds a similar approach to human right in the discussion of the intervention in Kosovo. Some of the carriers of the dominant representation promote an understanding of sovereignty as sovereignty of the people, meaning that the principle of sovereignty only apply to states who rule in accordance to the will of the people. Consequently "Yugoslavia could not be treated as a state in line with other countries because it did not live up to the demand of sovereignty of the people as it was a dictatorship" (Bruun-Lie 2004: 84). In this way universal

human rights are prioritized before state sovereignty, at least where the demand for popular sovereignty cannot be said to be present. This understanding of sovereignty is particularly important for construction of representations in situations where a humanitarian intervention is in question.

3.3 Norwegian security and defense

Constructions of security and defense are an important part of the interventions discourse. The two can be seen as mutually constitutive as on the one hand, the experience from the interventions have influenced the development of the defense and on the other hand, constructions of Norwegian defense and security and the capacity of the defense are influencing the interventions. As previously mentioned the main objective of Norwegian foreign policy and defense prior to and during World War II and during the Cold War was peace in and for Norway. Before World War II the Norwegian strategy was to be free from alliances in peace in order to claim neutrality in war. When Nazi Germany invaded Norway on April 9, 1940, it became apparent that the strategy had failed to keep Norway outside World War II. In 1949 Norway was one of the founding members of NATO. During the Cold War the Soviet threat from the east made Norway keep a low profile with a close relationship to the USA.

3.3.1. Representations of Norwegian security and defense

In this period security was understood in a national context. Græger & Leira (2005) argue that there has been a substantial change in the Norwegian defense, both considering perceptions and the use of it since the Cold War ended. They claim that traditionally “the dominant representation has seen Norwegian participation in international operations as a supplementary task. Accordingly, the “real” task of the military is to defend Norwegian territory – land and people” (Græger and Leira 2005: 48).

During the 1990s there was an “internationalization of the security policy” as Norwegian security policy shifted from seeing security in a national context to seeing security in an international context (Neumann and Ulriksen 1997: 103). The new understanding of Norwegian security policy is captured in the phrase “[t]he international community is Norway’s first line of defense” (Ulriksen 2007). Meaning that as a small state it is in Norway’s interest that the international community prevails as rule of law is preferred to rule

of force. Therefore strengthening and maintaining a highly institutionalized international community is of importance to Norwegian security. Leira & Græger (2005) claim that the Norwegian defense discourse was not tied to the international dimension, rather it was treated as a national and domestic issue. When the defense got a number of new international tasks after the Cold War ended such as participation in peace operations and military interventions, this could not be tied to the defense discourse as this did not have an international dimension. Rather, the new international role of the defense was inscribed in the peace discourse (Græger and Leira 2005). Therefore the peace discourse has been deciding for what Norway can and cannot do, meaning what policies can be employed, as they have to be explained within the frames of Norway being a peace nation (Leira et al. 2007: 15). The self-image is set, but the practices that can be employed on its basis are still in flux.

Another means of securing Norway that has traditionally and still holds a strong place is through NATO and the USA. During the Cold War, Norway's unique position as the only NATO country that shared a border with the Soviet Union ensured interest on the part of its allies', the USA in particular. Even though the end of the Cold War reduced Norway's need for US protection, it had little impact on the main representation of the USA in Norwegian defense discourse (Græger 2007: 62). Græger finds a new dominant representation in the defense discourse emerging in the early years of the new millennium. This contains an argument that restructuring the defense from a national to an international defense combined with increased Norwegian participation in international operations would strengthen the territorial defense of Norway (Græger 2007: 76). NATO is continuously presented as the cornerstone of Norwegian security and the USA as Norway's most important ally. Therefore maintaining NATO's relevance and credibility, especially in relation to article 5 of the Atlantic Treaty "which is a mainstay in the territorial defense of Norway also after year 2000" is presented as of great importance to Norwegian security (Græger 2007: 84). Further, maintaining the US interest in the organization and in Europe is presented as crucial for ensuring NATO's relevance and credibility (Græger 2007). This argument is cited in support of Norwegian participation in operations led by the USA such as in Afghanistan, and for why NATO should succumb to the USA's global ambitions (Græger 2007: 84).

Græger (2007) finds that there was an adjustment in Norwegian policy towards the USA after the change in government in 2005, but that the main lines in the policy remained the same:

By connecting the Norwegian political and potentially military support to the USA directly to the “solidarity obligation” and Article 5, the Minister of Defense also created a connection to the territorial defense of Norway. The will to contribute to “Operation Enduring Freedom” can be interpreted both as returning the favor of the US will to contribute to the defense of Norway during the Cold War, and as an investment in Norway’s future security. (Græger 2007: 93)

Such representations probably contributed to other alternative representation such as not supporting the USA military operations in Afghanistan “would have been dismissed as non-solidarian and irresponsible and attempted to be marginalized” (Græger 2007: 93). Through the analysis of the debate on Norway’s contribution to the interventions in Afghanistan in chapter four it will be made clear that this description fits well with the representations found in the debate. After the events of September 11, there was little room for political reflections about Norway’s relationship to the USA (Leira et al. 2007: 33).

Although marginalized, Græger (2005) still finds that there was an alternative representation of the Norwegian debate about NATO and Norwegian participation in OEF. This representation was found in the Socialist Left Party (SV), the Center Party (SP) and some parts of the Norwegian Labor Party (AP). It was America-skeptical and held that Norway should be careful about becoming too closely connected to the USA as it might make Norway a target for terror actions (Græger 2005: 234). According to Græger (2005) the position is rooted in NATO skepticism from the 1970s and 1980s. SV was founded on foreign policy issues and the question of Norwegian NATO membership in particular. Today they are the only party that is against Norwegian NATO membership all together as their program of principles states that SV is against Norwegian membership in NATO (SV 2011). SP does not share this position of being against NATO all together. Rather, they are skeptical towards the new policy and course that NATO has taken with the out-of-area operations. They argue that NATO should remain a defense organization and focus their activities on the NATO-area (Græger 2007: 114).

The dominant representation described the Norwegian participation in the Operation Enduring Freedom as a possibility to give something back to the USA for guaranteeing Norwegian security for so many years. In addition participation had the potential for creating goodwill among the allies and increasing the chance of being heard (Leira et al. 2007: 34). It is often stated, when Norway is to participate in a military interventions, that the Norwegian contribution is manly symbolic; it is not substantial in the sense that the Norwegian

contribution is not crucial for the result. It is the “profit in relation to security policy that is of importance” (Sverre Disen cited in Henriksen 2013: 29). Henriksen (2013) points out that in the operation in Libya Norway’s contribution was not only symbolic, but that Norway gave a substantial contribution for the first time. During the mission in Libya the Norwegian fighters dropped 600 bombs and initially they flew between 15 and 20% of the missions. Further, the Norwegian fighters took on missions and targets that the other countries would not.

3.3.2 Discourse on military interventions

In contrast to the situation during the Cold War, the argumentation and legitimation of Norwegian participation in international operations were to a larger extent founded in the broader and more general discourse on foreign policy throughout the 1990s and 2000s. In this period the defense was to a larger extent used as a tool of foreign policy. The argument that Norwegian participation in international operations was complementing Norway’s role as an international actor gained ground (Græger 2007). Græger (Græger 2007: 89) explains how these type of arguments were found concerning Norwegian participation in Afghanistan:

[t]he Norwegian contribution to ISAF has been justified in considerations for loyalty with the alliance and the need to maintain NATO’s relevance, but also for solidarity with the population of Afghanistan. When the acts of war and the lack of a comprehensive strategy made the ISAF-operation more subject to criticism, solidarity became a more prominent argument in the international discourse.

By playing on Norway’s sense of solidarity, not only with the USA, but also with the people of Afghanistan, participation in international operations was tied to Norwegian engagement for peace and humanitarian efforts. This was particularly true when operations were drawing out in time or meeting difficulties (Græger 2007). When the Stoltenberg II government took office in 2005 they withdrew the Norwegian contribution to OEF in Afghanistan and the Norwegian forces in Iraq in order to focus the Norwegian contribution on ISAF. ISAF was based on a UN mandate and led by NATO in contrast to OEF which was a coalition of the willing led by the USA (Hatling 2010: 35, 39-40). Hatling (2010) analyzes the change in policy with the new Stoltenberg II government in 2005 arguing that the debate is “framed by discourses about international law, rebuilding of the Afghan community and solidarity with the alliance” (Hatling 2010: 81-82). Participation is legitimized based on arguments of international law which make Norwegian participation more comfortable domestically. The consequence is that humanitarian interventions to a larger extent are legitimated with a basis in the ideal objectives of Norwegian foreign policy (Hatling 2010: 40-41). According to

Græger (2007: 89) the Norwegian contribution to Operation Free Iraq was also legitimated within the larger discourse on Norwegian foreign policy focusing on humanitarian needs and solidarity as it was presented as “an expression of international solidarity with the population of Iraq”.

Bruun-Lie (2004) finds similar arguments concerning the intervention in Kosovo. She claims that the dominant representation attempts to define the intervention in Kosovo within the frames of international law, as a way of legitimizing Norwegian participation. This representation argued that the fact that the Security Council had stated that the situation in Yugoslavia was a threat to international peace and security made possible an intervention within the frames of international law. Further she finds that it was important to main carriers of the representation, mainly the government and prominent politicians on foreign policy, to present the intervention as anything but a war. Especially the Prime Minister Kjell Magne Bondevik refused to define the intervention as war. Rather, labels such as limited military operations were used. This was important in order to explain the intervention within the frames of a continuation of NATO policy – even though this was the first time NATO went to war – and within the frames of continuity of Norwegian foreign policy (Bruun-Lie 2004). Further, there are some representations that attempt to redefine the referent objects of security and sovereignty from the state to the people (Bruun-Lie 2004). The security of the individual needed to be secured regardless of nationality. This can be seen as a part of a representation constructing and understanding of sovereignty as sovereignty of the people, meaning that the principle of sovereignty only apply to states who rule in accordance with the will of the people.

Bruun-Lie (2004) also finds the tradition for, and construction of consensus to be an important part of the dominant position. The government and various members of Parliament frequently refer to the consensus on the Kosovo issue as something positive and important. Alternative representations were marginalized and defined as outside the discourse by claiming that they were breaching the consensus on the issue as they were seen as attempts to politicize a depoliticized issue. Bruun-Lie (2004) designates the Enlarged Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence as an arena where consensus is achieved and presented (by the carriers of the dominant representation) as the reason why there is no need to discuss these issues further.

3.4 Conclusion

Through this chapter we have seen that Norwegian foreign policy practice is characterized by consensus. Not only is there a large degree of consensus on foreign policy issues among the parties in Parliament, but representations of consensus as important and as something to strive for is used as a means of maintaining consensus and depoliticizing issues. Further we saw how the Norwegian peace tradition emerged and has become increasingly prominent since 1993. Together with a promotion of a world order based on the rule of law including promotion of multilateralism, and especially the UN, aid and universal human rights the peace involvement policy can be seen as a part of a self-image of Norway as a humanitarian great power. Through the third section we saw how Norwegian security and defense has gone from being legitimized within a national discourse to a more international discourse. It has also been important to be able to connect the self-image of Norway as a peace nation and Norway as a good ally.

Recent years have seen the emergence of a literature on Norwegian foreign policy discourse, especially on the Norwegian peace discourse and on the defense discourse, but also on Norway's participation in military interventions. The most important contributions have been laid out in this chapter with a special focus on the contributions that are relevant for this thesis. However, there has not been, to my knowledge, any work on the intervention discourse as a whole or the development in this. As the Norwegian history of participating in military interventions is rather brief, such an analysis should not be an overwhelming task. Conducting a military intervention is the most dramatic means of action a state can take and the closest we come to traditional warfare. From being a country that attempted to keep a low profile internationally Norwegian foreign policy has taken a dramatic turn with participation in three interventions in the last 14 years. Further, there is a striking difference between the Norwegian contribution in Kosovo in 1999 and that in Libya in 2011. Thus, the object of this thesis is to examine if there is a new Norwegian policy on military interventions through analyzing how participation in military interventions has been made discursively possible. The two following chapters will analyze the debate on Norwegian participation in the interventions in Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya. Both chapters, but especially chapter five will build on the existing literature outlined in this chapter.

4 Mapping out the intervention discourse

In this chapter I present and discuss what I view as the intervention discourse in Norway. Building on the framework drawn by Neumann (2001) this chapter starts with the first two steps of a discourse analysis; delimiting the discourse and identifying the representations in the discourse. The next chapter will be concerned with the third level, the layering of the discourse. Neumann (2001) also suggests a fourth step which is to analyze the materiality of the discourse. However, as one of the findings of this thesis is that there is no coherent intervention discourse and consequently no dominant representation that runs through the discourse it is difficult to imagine how the intervention discourse would materialize and consequently this fourth step will be left out.

How a discourse is delimited in relation to other discourses is a question of what kind of meaning they are given by its carriers. The analysis concerns the various interventions where Norway has participated, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Libya, as well as Iraq where Norway did not participate.⁴ By looking at the debates about Norwegian participation in military intervention played out in the parliament and in the newspapers I map out what I view as the intervention discourse. After exploring such texts, a problem is encountered; there does not seem to be one coherent Norwegian intervention discourse. Military interventions are not discussed in general or principal; rather they are discussed in relation to specific situation where Norway has to decide whether or not to intervene. However, the debate on Norwegian participation in military interventions does not appear “out of the blue”; they relate to previous debates and “speak” to each other. There is a level of consistency regarding what issues are addressed, and not all aspects of Norwegian foreign policy are deemed relevant. Therefore it makes sense to use discourse analysis as a tool for studying the Norwegian policy on interventions, even though we do not find one coherent discourse. In chapter two discourse was defined as a “system for the production of a set of statements and practices which, by inscribing in institutions appears as more or less normal, constitutes reality for its carriers and have a certain degree of regularity in a set of social relations” (Neumann 2001: 18). As there

⁴ There is some disagreement about whether or not Norway actually participated in the intervention in Iraq, but the dominant discursive construction on this point is that Norway did not participate and therefore this is how we relate to it.

is some sense of regularity in the debates about military interventions they can be seen as a “system for the production of a set of statements and practices”. Further they have a “certain degree of regularity in a set of social relations”. Therefore it makes sense to refer to an intervention discourse although this does not appear as one coherent discourse.

When analyzing discourse one usually tries to identify different representations that either hold a position as dominant or marginalized. As established in chapter two, representations are the most important bundles of reality demands that a discourse consists of (Neumann 2001). As the intervention discourse does not appear as one coherent discourse we do not find one representation that runs through all the debates. Rather the representations are based on the different situations and differ from intervention to intervention. Still, there are some elements that are included in all the representations. These elements concern Norway’s obligations to its NATO allies, compliance with international law and the UN and humanitarian concerns. First, the NATO-alliance is important in the Norwegian discourse. The alliance is often referred to as the core of Norwegian security policy and Norwegian obligations to its allies and how to relate to these are often found as part of the main representations in the discourse. Secondly, concerns for international law and the UN are an important part of the Norwegian discourse on interventions. In Norway claims of supporting a world order lead by the UN are frequently voiced. All the participants take international law and the UN into account, even though they disagree on how Norway should relate to this. The third representation is relating to humanitarian concern. In the Norwegian debate humanitarian concerns are often voiced when considering participating in an intervention. I examine at how these components are dealt with in the debates about Norwegian participation in the different interventions (in a chronological order), analyzing how they relate to each other and whether there are representations of some elements that are more dominant than others.

4.1 Kosovo

The run up to the intervention in Kosovo was quite long starting in the second half of 1998, while the actual intervention started in the end of March 1999. NATO began discussing a possible intervention in Kosovo before the summer of 1998 and on September 23rd the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1199 expressing a “deep concern” for the “rapid deterioration in the humanitarian situation throughout Kosovo” demanding all parties to cease hostilities and commit to a ceasefire (S/RES/1199 1998). The next day NATO authorized an

activation warning formally advising the possible execution of a NATO attack. On October 13th NATO invoked an activation order threatening to bomb Serbian targets if Milosevic did not succumb to the demands of the Security Council resolution within the next 36 hours. The same day Norwegian fighters were sent to the NATO base in Italy ready to participate in a potential operation. An agreement was reached before the deadline accepting an observation force from OSCE, *Kosovo Verification Mission* to Kosovo and the establishment of a flight surveillance operation, *Operation Eagle Eye* that would make sure that Milosevic's troops withdrew from Kosovo. Further, NATO got the task of planning a withdraw force, *Joint Guarantor* to guarantee the security of the OSCE observers. Even though Yugoslavia approved the agreement, the NATO activation order remained. On February 6, 1999, the Rambouillet talks began, with NATO Secretary General Javier Solana leading the negotiations. On March 18, the Albanian, British and US delegations signed the Rambouillet Accord, while the Yugoslav and Russian delegations refused.

The failure of the peace talks was declared on March 23, and on the same day NATO announced it would initiate an air operation. Norway participated in *Operation Allied Protector* (OAP) with of six F-16 fighters with personnel of approximately 180 people. Norway also contributed with personnel to the NATO forces in Macedonia who were supporting the humanitarian assistance with amongst others one cargo aircraft. The Norwegian fighters were serving support functions and did not themselves conduct any bombings. OAP lasted for 10 weeks until June 10, when Milosevic and NATO agreed on an international peace plan and the UN-mandated⁵ *Peacekeeping Kosovo Force* (KFOR) started entering Kosovo led by NATO. Norway participated in both the initial OAP and in KFOR. The Norwegian contribution to KFOR consisted of one infantry division and personnel to KFOR's headquarters, the multinational brigade headquarters, the multinational military police company and the multinational transport company. The Norwegian contribution to KFOR was not in place in Kosovo before September and Norway was criticized for using a long time to get the contribution to KFOR ready as it took six months from the first request came to the first contingency was in place. The focus of the analysis will be on Norwegian participation in OAP as this was the intervening force.

⁵ KFOR was based on a mandate established in S/RES/1244 of June 10th 1999

The Norwegian government was supportive of NATO's action throughout, and participated in the operation when this started. Although there was a long debate about Norwegian participation in an intervention in Kosovo there was a dominant position of support to Norwegian participation in the intervention.

4.1.1 Humanitarian considerations

The most common discursive construction was that the humanitarian situation in Kosovo demanded action, and that Norway should take part in such actions. This articulation is found in a vast majority of the analyzed material. VG for example stated that “[h]eavily armed Serbian military forces has been conducting a more overt “ethnic cleansing” than in Bosnia. After the Kosovar guerilla was fought down this summer the Serbs have systematically been bombing and burning villages. The purpose might be to destroy the livelihood for the Kosovo Albanians that make up over 90% of the population” (VG 1998a). The humanitarian situation in Kosovo was presented and re-presented as disastrous. The newspapers reported that in addition to Kosovars being killed by Serbian military forces, the refugee situation would lead to a humanitarian crisis. Kosovars were driven from their homes and many were living in refugee camps. During the fall of 1998, the forthcoming winter was presented as a serious challenge to all the refugees who did not dare return home. *Aftenposten* (1998a) reported:

It will be a race against time. The last couple of days the wind has blown cold in Pristina, the temperature drops down to a few degrees at night. Fall is over us, and winter is just around the corner. Reports of the first deaths amongst the refugees have already come, a newborn child succumbed to the cold, a pregnant woman died right before giving birth and an old man could take no more.

A picture of a population in desperate need and a tyrannous Serbian government was drawn. Accounts of the approaching winter created a sense of urgency. The conclusion was that *something* needed to be done. Foreign Minister Knut Vollebæk articulated it this way: “we are facing a humanitarian catastrophe and we cannot accept this, we have to do something about it. And we have to show that we are serious” (NTBtekst 1998b). An editorial in *VG* stated that “it is overdue that the NATO countries should do something efficient to stop the Serbian rampage in Kosovo” (VG 1998b). NATO could not allow this to happen.

The representation of the humanitarian situation in Kosovo was connected to narratives of previous situations where the world community had not intervened and “allowed” humanitarian catastrophes and genocides to happen. These narratives often refer to the

massacre in Srebrenica where between 6000 and 8000 people are estimated to have been killed. Erik Solheim stated that “[w]ith genocides such as the ones we have witnessed in Rwanda and Srebrenica in Bosnia the international society both has the right and the duty to intervene” (NTBtekst 1999). The representations of the genocides in Rwanda and Srebrenica were as reminders of what the consequences might be if the world community failed to “do something” about the situation in Kosovo. The representations were also related to a sense of embarrassment as NATO had not managed to keep the genocide in Srebrenica, which was declared a UN safe zone, from taking place. In an op-ed *VG* stated that “the Serbs arrogant indifference toward the reactions of the world community are embarrassing to the UN and especially to the western great powers, who have more than enough means to avert a new genocide on Balkan” (VG 1998a). The discursive construction of a potential humanitarian catastrophe in Kosovo was accepted by most. As the need to stop Milosevic was established and accepted a new debate of how emerges.

4.1.2 The alliance

A second discursive construction concerned the alliance and Norway’s relation to it. There are three main findings amongst the representations of NATO. First, NATO had to act on behalf of the interventional community, as the UN was prevented, mainly by the veto powers, from doing so. This position was legitimated by articulating a link between the international society and NATO. The UN was kept from adopting a resolution mandating an operation in Kosovo by Russia and China’s veto in the Security Council. Therefore someone else had to take action on behalf of the international society. *Aftenposten* reported that Norway was willing to participate with fighters in order to force through a solution in Kosovo. Foreign Minister Knut Vollebæk explained: “[i]ts important that Milosevic understands that the international society is serious and stops the assaults on civilians and sit down at the negotiation table” (Aftenposten 1998b). He later articulated this more explicitly: “NATO is acting on behalf of the international society” (NTBtekst 1999). The position is re-presented by several actors. The leader of the Norwegian Helsinki Committee has expressed a similar understanding: “it is imperative that the international society through NATO this time does not allow the government in Beograd to ridicule the Security Council resolution” (Borchgrevink 1998). According to Minister of Defense Dag Jostein Fjærvoll, NATO did not want the task of acting on behalf of the international community, but they simply had to as they were the only ones capable: “it is not NATO that has asked for the task of acting on behalf of the world community. I simply don’t see anyone else who has the capacity to take on the task”

(Aftenposten 1998c). The question of whether NATO is actually executing the will of the international community, is not addressed, but taken for granted.

Secondly, there are some, but not a large amount of representations of why Norway should participate in the NATO-mission. The lack of representations of why Norway should participate might be due to a depoliticization of the issue where Norwegian participation in NATO operations is seen as natural. However, even representations that are depoliticized need to be maintained through re-presentations (Neumann 2001: 60). At one point Prime Minister Kjell Magne Bondevik (1999a) gives a reminder of why Norway should support NATO:

[f]or Norway it is deciding for our own security and possibility for taking responsibility that NATO remains a central tool for peace and stability in our part of the world. Norwegian contribution of resources and personnel to NATO's efforts for peace is therefore basically an investment in our own defense.

He reaffirms the importance of Norwegian contributions to NATO by representing Norwegian participation as an investment in national security. This representation of NATO is quite well established in the Norwegian discourse and a similar representation is also found by Græger (2007) in her study of the defense discourse: the restructuring of the defense towards increased participation in international operations is represented as a means to strengthen the territorial defense of Norway. According to Græger (2007) this representation grew forth in the early 2000s. Consequently this might be one of the early articulation of such an understanding.

Third, NATO is presented not only as an alliance for collective defense, but also as an organization for peace and democracy. Thorbjørn Jagland presents NATO as “a defense organization for democracy and human rights” (Stortinget 1999), while Prime Minister Kjell Magne Bondevik represents NATO's relevance in this way:

we therefore have a moral and political responsibility to maintain a solid preparedness against assaults and humanitarian crisis – both nationally, regionally and globally. Freedom and peace as a permanent condition can unfortunately never be taken for granted. Therefore we have to continue our peace work on a broad front. NATO has to remain a central tool in this work. (Bondevik 1999b)

These articulations represent NATO as an organization working for broader aims than only defense and security. Græger and Leira (2005) argues that the new and international

understanding of the defense and security in Norway had to be explained within the frames of the peace discourse as this held an international dimension, while the defense discourse on the other hand was national. Consequently these formulations can be seen as an attempt to unite the Norwegian efforts for peace with the involvement in NATO. The representations also entail an understanding of enlarged security where international peace and stability is seen as important for Norwegian territorial security.

4.1.3 *International law*

There was no decision in the UN Security Council mandating the intervention in Kosovo. Yet, this was not represented as an obstacle to a NATO intervention or Norwegian participation. The main representation entailed an account of international law that did not interpret an intervention without a UN mandate as a breach with international law. The government argued that although they would have preferred an explicit mandate from the UN Security Council, this was not an absolute necessary. Humanitarian concerns and solidarity with the alliance were prioritized before international law and the UN. Foreign minister Knut Vollebæk articulated the government's position:

We could of course wish that there was a decision in the UN that explicitly authorized the use of force. The Security Council has none the less established that the situation in Kosovo constitutes a threat to the peace and security of the region. The decision is made in accordance with Article VII of the UN-Charter, which involves a clear warning that force can be applied. With the critical humanitarian situation in Kosovo in addition, we therefore mean that the necessary foundation for the use of force as a last resort exists. (NTBtekst 1998a)

Thorbjørn Jagland re-presents the dominant position in more general terms arguing that the opportunity to intervene without a UN mandate had to be maintained for emergency situations like the one in Kosovo:

The rule should still be that the Security Council should authorize operations outside the borders of the alliance. The door should still be kept ajar for exceptions if this is necessary to prevent crude breaches of international law. It is not simple as this can turn out to be a slide. On the other hand NATO should not in principle disclaim the right to intervene against i.e. genocide if a veto power opposes it. This will create a powerlessness and cynicism that will become intolerable in the long run. (Stortinget 1999)

There are a few carriers of alternative representations on this issue. Initially SV foreign policy spokesperson Erik Solheim was articulating the need for a UN-mandate in order for Norway to support an intervention: "we cannot sit idly by and watch three to four hundred thousand

refugees sit in the winter cold, waiting in the middle of the heart of Europe. [...] if an action is to be started Norway has to secure a mandate from the UN in order for the world community to be behind it” (Aftenposten 1998b). This is the articulation is a part of an alternative representation demanding a UN mandate as the basis for an intervention and Norwegian participation in it. As the situation progressed and the prospects of getting a UN mandate became poor, the ones holding this alternative position were even more marginalized as former carriers of the position such and Erik Solheim who was also representing the official position of SV adapted to the dominant representation. In an opinion piece by Erik Solheim in January 1999, this explicit demand for a UN mandate was not present. Rather he addressed the subject more vaguely stating that “there has to be worked for a UN-mandate for a possible military intervention. If the international community does not succeed with a powerful performance in the near future, the result is given. There will be full war. NATO will be forced to bomb Serbia” (Solheim 1999).

There are also other articulations of an alternative representation. In an opinion, piece Carsten Rønnefeldt and researcher Espen Barth Eide articulate an alternative representation in opposition to the dominant position which they label “the doctrine of humanitarian intervention”. They argue that: “[b]ecause the doctrine of humanitarian intervention sets aside the basic principle in international law, it also threatens the actual foundation of the international judicial order by weakening the norms’ general meaning in practical international politics” (Rønnefeldt and Eide 1999). Rønnefeldt and Eide argue that the government is shaping a new policy of humanitarian interventions, and that this will be at the expense of the UN. Hallgeir H. Langeland of SV articulates another version of an alternative representation:

The NATO bombing has started. Norway is at war. The UN and international law has yet again been put out of order. In front stands the country who does not pay their bill to the UN, and who wants to rule the world on their terms, the country who has declared plans of turning NATO into a world police and in this way contribute to destroying the system of international law we have in the world today. The NATO-country Norway follows obediently, contributing its own military forces. (Stortinget 1999)

Langeland combines the concern for international law and the UN with an American skepticism questioning the motives of the USA for intervening in Kosovo. SV is formally against Norwegian NATO membership and this issue was the basis SV was founded on. However, SV was divided on the issue of Norwegian participation to the intervention in

Kosovo. Officially SV was supportive of the operation and thereby contributing to a complete consensus amongst the parties in the parliament on the issue, but as seen there was some oppositional voices in parliament. There was a large flank of the party that were not supportive of the intervention who were carriers of this alternative representation.

4.1.4 Summary

In the debate on Kosovo we find two strong discursive representations. The first one is articulating the prospects of a humanitarian catastrophe in Kosovo and that the world community cannot simply watch this happen. *Someone needs to do something*. The second discursive construction is that NATO has to act on behalf of the world community when the UN is paralyzed from taking action. Together these discursive constructions came to dominate the discourse and make up the dominant position. Humanitarian concerns and concerns for the alliance were given priority over the concerns for international law and the UN. Compliance with the UN and international law are a part of the debate, but the position that the lack of a UN mandate should not be a reason for NATO to restrain from taking action in Kosovo.

4.2 Afghanistan

In Afghanistan the situation was quite different from that of Kosovo. The situation with Afghanistan came as a reaction to the terror attacks on the USA September 11, 2001. The next day the UN Security Council adopted a resolution condemning the terror attacks stating that the USA had the right to individually or collectively defend itself (S/RES/1368 2001). Following the UN resolution NATO activated article five, the core of the Atlantic charter, which states that an attack on one of the member countries is to be regarded as an attack on all the member countries. On September 20, President George W. Bush launched the *War on Terror*. Washington held that it could prove that the attacks had been committed by the terror organization al Qaida and planned by Osama bin Laden, amongst others. Washington argued that there was reason to believe that Osama bin Laden and al Qaida had been allowed to train and plan the attacks in Afghanistan. The Afghan Taliban regime was faced with the ultimatum of handing over bin Laden and other terrorist leaders or facing the consequences. As the Taliban refused to succumb to the demands the USA and Great Britain launched an attack on Afghanistan on October 7th. *Operation Enduring Freedom*⁶ (OEF) was not a NATO operation

⁶ *Operation Enduring Freedom* commonly refers to the operation in Afghanistan, but it also played out in the Philippines, the Horn of Africa and a few other places as an extension of the War on Terror. However, when mentioning *Operation Enduring Freedom* in this thesis I will be referring to the operation in Afghanistan.

but conducted by a *coalition of the willing*. On November 30th the Norwegian government made public an offer of Norwegian military contribution to OEF. This consisted of six F-16 fighters, four Bell helicopters, one electronic fighter, a small amount of staff officers, a limited amount of specialists within winter operations, a small number of mine clearance personnel and a transport control unit. After the initial air campaign the UN established the *International Security Assistance Force* (ISAF) which from 2003 was led by NATO. Norway deployed their first forces, consisting of a transport control unit of 10 people and an explosive clearance team of approximately 15 people to support this mission in January 2002. Norway withdrew from OEF in 2006 concentrating their contribution on ISAF. Norway still remains a part of ISAF today, but ISAF are planning to withdraw from Afghanistan in 2014. The focus here will be on Norwegian participation in OEF and not ISAF as OEF was the intervening operation.

As for the Norwegian debate on participation in Afghanistan it is important to be aware that there was a shift in government in October 2001 from a Labor party government (AP) to a center-right coalition government consisting of the Conservatives (Høyre), the Christian Democrats (KrF) and the Liberals (Venstre). Therefore throughout the debate the same actors speak from different positions. Concerning the debate about the intervention in Afghanistan there were two elements that were dominating the others. The representation of the need to be solidarity with the alliance was the element that was most emphasized and compliance with international law and the UN came secondly. The dominant representation was that Norway should participate in the intervention. There was a rather large majority holding this position. Humanitarian arguments also emerged after some time, and were used more frequently in the Norwegian discourse as the situation progressed to legitimate continued Norwegian participation. However they were not represented as a main reason for Norwegian participation. At least not initially.

4.2.1 The alliance

The dominant position in the debate concerning the intervention in Afghanistan maintained that Norway should be solidary in two ways. First, Norway should be solidary with the American people. As a response to the American attacks on Afghanistan then Prime Minister candidate Kjell Magne Bondevik (who later became Prime Minister) articulated it this way “Norway has to show solidarity with the USA after the gruesome terror attacks on the country September 11” (NTBtekst 2001a). Such articulations of Norwegian solidary contained

statements of sympathy and compassion with the American people after the terror attacks. These articulations were also used to marginalize the argument of those carrying an alternative representation on the issue by accusing them of not being solidary and showing a lack of sympathy. This was also expressed less directly by reminders of the loss the USA had suffered. According to State secretary for the AP government Espen Barth Eide: “[i]t is important to remember that it is the USA that has been attacked” (NTBtekst 2001c). The position was continued by the new government. Now Prime Minister Kjell Magne Bondevik stated that: “[w]e must not forget September 11th, and we must not forget that what the terrorists did was to deliberately kill thousands of innocent people” (Aftenposten 2001b). Minister of Defense Kristin Krohn Devold uses stronger images in her statements “we thought that the images of people jumping from the 100th floor in order to die as painless a death as possible would stick longer. Unfortunately there are many who are already forgetting this tragedy” (Aftenposten 2001a).

Secondly, Norway should show solidarity with the USA as a NATO-allied. This articulation was often presented simultaneously with the one above. Then state secretary for the AP-government Espen Barth Eide articulates the position:

[i]t is only fair that Norway stands with the USA through thick and thin. The country has an obvious right to defend itself. For 52 years we have based the defence of Norway on the USA and our other allies coming to our rescue if we were to be attacked. Now the USA is attacked and it is only fair that we are ready to be there for them. (NTBtekst 2001c).

In this articulation solidarity is not only related to sympathy and compassion, but also to Norway’s obligations to the alliance. A similar articulation is made by Foreign Minister Jan Petersen: “we provide this contribution as a part of a collision pursuant to international conventions. NATO’s article 5 is triggered here and all NATO countries are obligated to help another NATO country that has been attacked” (NTBtekst 2001b). The leader of the standing committee on defence, Hans J Røsjorde combines the representations of solidarity based on compassion and solidarity based on obligations: “what means something now is giving solidarity to the USA. As an ally we are obligated to support the USA in their fight against terrorism. It is a democracy that has been attacked. Actually, it is the democracy itself that is attacked” (Klassekampen 2001b). The need for a collective response to the terror attacks was supported by representations of the attacks not only being on the USA but the West in general. These types of discursive representation were a prominent part of the War on Terror where terror was constructed as a threat to all western societies. Bondevik shares the position

that the attack was not only on the USA: “[t]he terror attacks on the USA September 11 was a declaration of war. It was a declaration of war against the international legal order, against international interaction, against free and open societies, against tolerance, against actual human dignity” (Bondevik 2001).

In the debate we also find an alternative and USA-skeptical representation. This position challenges the dominant representation of support of the USA by arguing that Norway is not leading an independent foreign policy, but simply following whatever Washington says and does. Especially SV has been eager to promote a Norwegian foreign policy independent of the USA. In a parliamentary debate about Norwegian participation in OEF SV’s Heikki Holmås (Stortinget 2001) articulated the representation:

[i]t has been discouraging in this debate that Høyre’s and the other parties’ way of discussing foreign policy has been to wag their tail after the USA has spoken [...]. It had been a lot better for Norway if we could have an independent foreign policy where one could see the long lines, and where one could make our share of decisions and take a position, without first listening to what comes ticking in from Washington.

In the same debate Audun Lysbakken, also from SV, questions Washington’s motives: “[t]he USA has conducted more military interventions the last century than the very expansive Roman Empire did through several centuries. The victims of the US policy have been many. We know that the USA has been willing to support dictators and perpetrators if they have only been willing to stand on the side of the USA [...]” (Stortinget 2001). Further SV submits a proposal to the parliament that Norway should not offer forces to OEF. In addition to these representations of the USA there are several US skeptical representations in the debate taking place in the public media. One of these is articulated by head of Harstad RV: “the US goals are defined from oil and military strategy. The US has never cared about human rights in a country. [...] the USA is an imperialist power seeking world domination” (Pedersen 2001). There are several such articulations in the debate, but they are not carried by “authorities” in the discourse. Even though the statements of SV’s members of Parliament present a similar representation, they are not quite as sharp as those of Pedersen. Still, both positions are marginalized as something that is not a part of the discourse as these utterances are defined as beyond what is accepted within the discourse.

4.2.2 *International law*

Shortly after the terror attacks the UN declared that the USA had the right to defend itself. This statement received broad support in the Norwegian debate and the right of the USA to defend itself was presented and re-presented as obvious. Beyond these initial representations of the USA right to self-defense, we do not find many statements about the intervention being in compliance with international law. This can be due to an acceptance of the initial presentations and re-presentations making further representations on the issue unnecessary. The initial representations stated that Norway was supportive of USA's right to defend itself and involved assumptions that the USA would act in compliance with international law. According to NTB, Foreign Minister Thorbjørn Jagland of the AP government "strongly stressed the fact that the USA according to international law and the UN charter has an individual right to counterattack, but adds that possible retaliation must be within international law" (NTBtekst 2001d). The leader of the standing committee on Foreign Affairs Einar Steensnæs also confirms the right of the USA to defend itself, making clear that it was based on the same assumption: "a broad and united Parliament stands behind the USA. But we do assume that the US reaction will be in compliance with international law" (NTBtekst 2001d). Despite the initial assumptions that any US actions would be in compliance with international law, there was not much further representations of international law.

In addition to the alternative representations of how Norway should relate to the alliance there were a few alternative constructions challenging the dominant position on the issue of international law. Not everyone was convinced that the actions taken by the USA was in compliance with international law. The director at the institute of human rights, Nils A. Butenschøn articulates an alternative position "[i]t is very problematic in relation to international law to bomb a country based on a suspicion that they are harboring terrorists. But then again the USA has not made a habit of following international law" (Klassekampen 2001a). In contrast to the position described above Butenschøn assumes that Washington will not follow international law. Still this alternative position is marginalized, and not met with any debate by the holders of the dominant position. As the alternative representations of Norway's obligations to NATO in this particular situation this representations also entails an American skepticism distrusting the intentions of the USA

4.2.3 Humanitarian concerns

Humanitarian concerns were not presented as one of the initial reasons for intervening in Afghanistan, but as the situation progressed concerns for the population in Afghanistan were presented and re-presented. As a response to a growing demand in the Norwegian debate for the bomb campaign to stop the Minister of Defense Kristin Krohn Devold stated “[t]he Taliban regime is to a large extent, independent of the current campaign, responsible for the devastating suffering the Afghan people are subject to [...]. The bombing cannot stop now: those who think that would be right, also seen in relation to the population in Afghanistan are wrong” (Aftenposten 2001a). In the Prime Ministers annual New Year address Bondevik represents the humanitarian situation in Afghanistan in this way: “the population of Afghanistan has suffered under war, poor governance and natural disaster. When the actions of war are finished a new chapter for the restoring of Afghanistan will be opened” (Bondevik 2002). The representations of the humanitarian situation in Afghanistan were used to legitimize the military operation by claiming that the population would be better off without the Taliban regime and as a way of legitimizing the civilian suffering caused by the OEF’s bomb-campaign. The leader of the standing committee on defence Thorbjørn Jagland articulated such a representation: “[n]o one likes bombs and actions of war, but the alternative is that the humanitarian catastrophe we have seen in Afghanistan is allowed to continue” (Stortinget 2001).

4.2.4 Summary

In the debate about Norwegian participation in the intervention in Afghanistan there is a dominant representation of support to the intervention. Claim of the need to support the USA, both morally through being solidary and showing compassion, and due to the obligations through NATO were dominating the debate. Concerns for international law were not central in the discussion, as these were assumed to be covered, and there was a UN mandate stating the right of the USA to defend itself. As the situation progressed humanitarian concerns became a larger part of the debate, but this was not present as one of the initial representations of why Norway should participate in Afghanistan. This can be seen as an effort to tie participation in interventions to the Norwegian engagement for peace and humanitarian efforts which is particularly true in the Norwegian discourse when operation are drawing out in time or meeting difficulties (Græger 2007).

The debate about Norwegian participation in the intervention of Afghanistan stands out from the other debates in some ways. This is especially true concerning two issues. First, in contrast to the other intervention the intervention in Afghanistan was presented as an action of self-defense. It did not share the idealistic and humanitarian reasons for intervening as found in the debates on Kosovo and Libya. Consequently the debate draws more on the representations founded in the discourse on security and defense, and less on the peace and humanitarian discourse compared to the other debates. Secondly, the Norwegian discourse must be seen in relation to the international (and mainly the US) discourse on the War on Terror. This might also explain why a large proportion of the alternative representations are America-skeptic. These appear throughout the debate, but are especially more prominent in the debate on Norwegian participation in the intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq.

4.3 Iraq

According to Thune et al. (2003: 93) “‘the second Gulf War’, the one usually referred to simply as ‘the Gulf War’, never really ended”. Since the fighting stopped in February 1991 a massive set of economic sanctions was invoked on Iraq and there has been a continuous no-fly zone over parts of Iraq with a series of short air-attacks. This was part of a policy for regime change in Iraq led by the USA. This was formalized in 1998 by *The Iraq Liberation Act*. This authorizes the president to support the Iraqi opposition in order to remove the regime of Saddam Hussein. In 1998 the UN withdrew its weapons inspectors in a protest against the lack of cooperation from Iraq, and in December 1999 *United Nations Monitoring Verification and Inspection Mission* (UNMOVIC) was established. UNMOVIC was supposed to control Iraq’s stock and use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). However, the Iraqi regime refused to accept the inspections. President George W. Bush and his administration represented a more aggressive attitude towards Iraq, and after 9/11 the situation in Iraq was linked to the War on Terror. On November 9th 2002 the UN accepted resolution 1441 giving Iraq “a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations” by providing a declaration of its program to develop WMD and giving the weapon inspectors from UNMOVIC and the *International Atomic Energy Agency* (IAEA) access to the areas they wish to inspect (S/RES/1441 2002). Iraq provided the UN Security Council with a 12,000-page report⁷ and allowed access for the weapon inspectors. On November 19, the Norwegian

⁷ The original report was only made available to the permanent members of the Security Council as the USA withdrew the report from the remaining members, there amongst Norway, who were given an edition edited by the USA

government received a request from the USA to consider the possibility of a contribution to a possible military operation in Iraq. The Norwegian government decided to await the treatment of Iraq's compliance in the UN Security Council before responding to the American request. Another request from the USA came in January 2003, but the Norwegian response remained the same (NTB 31.01.03).

In the debate about Norwegian participation in a possible war in Iraq, the public became quite polarized and the normal consensus in questions of foreign policy was not as dominant as usual. The government was awaiting the decisions from the Security Council and the USA before it took a stance. When it became clear that the USA, Great Britain and a number of other countries would intervene in Iraq without basis in a new UN resolution the Norwegian government decided that they would not participate in the intervention. On March 20th *Operation Iraqi Freedom* (OIF) was initiated launching an attack on Iraq by a *coalition of the willing* led by the USA. Norway did not participate in the initial attacks, but Norwegian troops were sent to Iraq during the summer 2003. The Norwegian contribution consisted of an engineer company of approximately 150 people in the British area of responsibility and a small number of staff officers in the Polish division. According to the Foreign Minister Jan Petersen, the Norwegian military contribution in Iraq has “always been in accordance with the Security Council resolution 1483 of May 22nd of this year” and consequently the Norwegian contribution did not hold status as a part of the occupation force (Petersen 2003).

When comparing with the other interventions, the dominant representation was much weaker. There were several contesting representations also within the government as their official position was unclear.

4.3.1 *International law*

In the debate about the Iraq war one of the most prominent questions and considerations was that of international law and the UN. Initially the government's position was that a UN mandate would be preferred, but that it was not a condition for Norwegian support. The position is articulated in NTB: “[t]he government has a strong wish that Iraq will succumb without use of military force. [...] The Foreign Minister means that isolated it is not necessary with another resolution, but still supports this work hoping that Iraq this time will understand the seriousness of the situation” (NTBtekst 2002c). Jan Petersen confirms the position in an answer to a question from Kristin Halvorsen during Question Hour in the Parliamentary:

[...] there is no doubt that Iraq is still subject to the ceasefire conditions of SR 687 from 1991. This resolution also refers to former resolutions, including SR 678 from 1990, which authorizes the use of force for restoring peace and security in the area. [...] If the Security Council states that Iraq substantially breaches these conditions for ceasefire, there is, in isolation, no demand for another resolution. But I still mean that this is clearly desirable. (Stortinget 2002).

Initially Prime Minister Kjell Magne Bondevik articulates a similar position. NTB reports in an article titled “Bondevik opens for Iraq war without a UN mandate”:

Norway can support a war on Iraq without a separate decision from the UN Security Council giving a clear signal to use military power. [...] -It is a precondition for Norwegian support to a military action against Iraq that it has a clear basis in international law. This is deciding, and it would from the Norwegian point of view be preferable if there was a new UN resolution. (NTBtekst 2002b)

After Christmas 2002 the position held by Prime Minister Bondevik is changed. NTB reports: “in a press conference he [Kjell Magne Bondevik] made it clear that a possible military action on Iraq demands a decision from a new treatment in the UN Security Council. [...] – Also if the UN opens for a military operation, Norway has to take an independent stance. We will not necessarily infer unconditionally to such a decision” (NTBtekst 2003a). Now there is a discursive struggle taking place both in the general debate and in the government, as Foreign Minister Jan Petersen does not follow Bondevik’s new position. Outside the government there are different articulations of how Norway should relate to the UN and to the USA. In an editorial in *VG* the need for a mandate from the Security Council is taken for granted: “[...] Norway can become a participant in a possible US-led war on Saddam, assuming that the war is approved by the Security Council” (VG 2002).

An alternative discursive constructions concerned with how Norway should relate to a potential UN resolution supporting military operations in Iraq is that Norway should not participate regardless of what decision the UN makes. An early articulation of this position is made by the leader of the Labor Party’s youth group, Gry Larsen. NTB reports: “Norway has been acting cowardly in the Iraq question. The Labor Party (AP) should give a clear statement that it is out of the question for us to participate in a war on Iraq, regardless of whether there is a UN-mandate or not” (NTBtekst 2002a). According to *Klassekampen* there is a broad range of carriers of this position: “people against war from several camps have united behind a petition that goes against an escalation of the use of force against Iraq, regardless of whether

there is a UN-mandate or not” (Klassekampen 2002a). Center Party leader, Åslaug Haga, elaborates on the position:

The Prime Minister has been very sparse giving evaluations attached to a potential war in Iraq. He has mainly kept to procedure, and we still hear the mantra: the UN track. The problem with the UN-track is that the USA has taken the UN hostage. President Bush states that if you do not do as the USA wants, we will go to war on Iraq alone. President Bush is saying that if the Security Council does not do as the USA wants, then the UN is making itself irrelevant. This is a form of blackmail. And the USA is actually breaching the basic principles of multilateralism, as some of us are concerned with. We can risk that the USA threatens their way to a decision in the Security Council without it representing the collective wisdom of the council. (Stortinget 2003a).

The many protest against intervening regardless of the terms gives rise to the question of what the Norwegian position will be if the UN does accept a new resolution. VG reports: “[t]he government has urged critics and oppositional to restrain themselves in the debate, by referring to Norway giving an ‘independent evaluation’ of a new decision in the UN. But now Bondevik tells us that this ‘independent evaluation’ will have an outcome that is close to predetermined: Norway supports all resolutions and decisions in the UN Security Council – simply because it is Norwegian foreign policy” (VG 2003b). According to VG the Prime Minister is presenting support of the UN as a tradition in Norwegian foreign policy. The position is re-presented by Secretary of the Nobel Peace Prize Committee, Geir Lundestad: “Norway’s policy has always been to support the UN – and to encourage others to do the same. Then we also have to do it when the UN makes uncomfortable decisions” (Dagsavisen 2003). A similar position is articulated by VG: “[i]t would be a dramatic breach with our foreign policy tradition if the government did not support a war in Iraq that was legally rooted in the UN” (VG 2003a). Jan Petersen elaborates on the position explaining that Norwegian support for the UN’s decisions does not automatically mean that Norway has to participate in a war in Iraq. NTB (2003b) reports “Foreign Minister Jan Petersen ensures that it is up to the government to decide whether or not Norway will contribute militarily to a possible war on Iraq, even if the Security Council gives a green light for an attack”.

When the intervention on Iraq started Norway did not participate in it. In his address to the parliament about the Iraq question Prime Minister Kjell Magne Bondevik articulate the Norwegian position: “Norway’s position is clear. We cannot support this war. Norway has consequently maintained that military actions must have a clear foundation in international

law through a new decision from the Security Council. Such a decision is not made” (Bondevik 2003). The lack of a UN mandate is presented as the main reason why Norway cannot participate in a war on Iraq. In light of the description of the discursive struggle concerning the Norwegian position above it is worth noting that the Prime Minister presents the Norwegian position as consequently having demanded a new UN mandate. This is represented by several of the participants in the debate. Jens Stoltenberg of AP stated that “all along we have agreed that the use of military force against Iraq could only happen after a new and clear decision in the UN Security Council” (Bondevik 2001) and Oddvard Nilsen (Høyre) confirmed that “[t]he government has [...] consistently follow[ed] the UN-track and stress[ed] that a potential military action has to be anchored in international law by a new decision in the UN Security Council” (Stortinget 2003b).

4.3.2 *The alliance*

As most of the debate about Norwegian contributions to an intervention in Iraq is concerned with international law and the UN, concerns for the alliance are not voiced that frequently. Still, there are some carriers of an alternative position, mainly politicians from the populist Progress Party (FrP), who argue that Norway should prioritize the alliance before international law. FrP leader Carl I. Hagen voices a concern for the future of the alliance once the decision that Norway will not support the intervention is made: “I’m worried about the future. Our security has depended on the USA, Great Britain and the other NATO countries. [...] This is a miserable choice the government and the majority of the parliament has made when it comes to our own future security” (Stortinget 2003b). In his address the parliament Prime Ministers Kjell Magne Bondevik reassures Hagen, and others that the Norwegian position has not jeopardized the relationship between the countries:

[t]he USA respects our position and stresses the importance of continuing the long-lasting and excellent relationship that Norway and the USA have had. In the conversation the President himself emphasized that discussions and difference in opinion is normal between friends and allies. We agreed that the close and good relationship between our two countries will continue. (Bondevik 2003)

There is also another alternative representation of Norway’s considerations for the alliance present in the discourse. These articulations present the government, and Prime Minister Bondevik and Foreign Minister Petersen in particular, as simply tagging along after the USA, rather than making any independent decisions. The leader of the Center Party Åslaug Haga articulated this representation when commenting on Norway’s period as a member of the

Security Council: “[i]t is sad that Norway in the most important issues has tagged along after the USA” (Klassekampen 2002b). This type of criticism is found in most of the debates about the different interventions without them being taken seriously, but in this instance Bondevik responds explicitly to the accusations: “[w]e will nevertheless take our own stance. If anyone believes that we are tagging along after the USA no matter what they do, then they are shamefully wrong” (Aftenposten 2003). He makes a similar statement in the parliament: “[i]t is also completely misleading and in my view crude propaganda to say that we necessarily obedient will follow the USA. We have had an independent line” (Stortinget 2003a).

4.3.3 Humanitarian concerns

Humanitarian reasons are not adduced in the Norwegian debate as a main reason to intervene in Iraq. Still there are some who brings this forth in arguments for why Saddam Hussein should be removed from his position. Morten Høglund of FrP articulated such a position: “behind every evaluation concerning Iraq’s future, considerations for the civilian population should prevail. The Iraqis deserve better. They deserve the chance to experience freedom, democracy and the absence of abuse and repression” (Stortinget 2003b). Humanitarian reasons and concerns for the population are also cited as a reason why one should not intervene militarily in Iraq. Jon Lilletun of KrF states that: “[t]he population in Iraq is already vulnerable after years of sanctions and repression. KrF is worried about the humanitarian consequences a war will cause for the civilians. War will kill and injure innocents, people will be forced to flee [...]” (Stortinget 2003b). This is a good example of how humanitarian reasons are often brought for as both reasons to intervene and as reasons not to intervene. On the one hand, the humanitarian situation of the population might be made better by a regime change. But on the other hand, the population will suffer under a war. Despite carriers of the positions that Høglund and Lilletun are presenting, humanitarian concerns did not hold a prominent place in the discourse.

4.3.4 Summary

In the debate about the Iraq war there was a large degree of polarization where over 100.000 people protested against Norwegian involvement in an intervention in Iraq. As it became clear that the intervening countries would act without basis in a new UN mandate the representation that Norway would not participate in the intervention prevailed as the dominating one. Representations of international law and the need for any military action to be mandated by the UN dominated the debate. Still, concerns for the alliance were voiced by some, as were

humanitarian concerns. The fact that relations to the allies were not underscored to a greater extent played up might indicate that this was not considered acceptable in the discourse.

4.4 Libya

The operation in Libya came as a response to a wave of protest to the regimes in the Middle East beginning in 2010 which by some was called *the Arab spring*. After protests in Tunisia and Egypt led to an overthrow of the government in the respective countries the first reports of protests in Libya came on February 17, 2011. On February 26, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1970 condemning the regimes use of force against civilians and invoking restrictions on the Libyan regime in form of an arms embargo, travel ban and asset freeze of key members of the Libyan regime (S/RES/1970 2011). Gadafi did not comply with the demands of the UN and the sanctions did not stop the continuation of violence against civilians. On March 12, a decision from the Council of the League of Arab States called for the imposition of a no-fly zone on Libyan aviation. A second resolution 1973 was adopted by the UN Security Council on March 17, demanding a ceasefire. The resolution invoked a no-fly zone in Libya to help protect civilians allowing member states to take “all necessary measures to enforce compliance with the ban on flights” (S/RES/1973 2011). Further, the resolution authorized member states to “take all necessary measures [...] to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya including Benghazi, while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory” (S/RES/1973 2011). On this point the resolution was historic in that it was the first resolution adopted by the UN Security Council based on the principle of *Responsibility to Protect* (R2P)⁸.

The morning after resolution 1973 was adopted Minister of Defense Grethe Faremo stated that Norway would participate in the military operation (NTBtekst 2011c). *Operation Unified Protector* (OUP) started March 19th initially led by the US, but later taken over by NATO. Norway contributed with six F-16 fighters and one cargo aircraft. They flew their first missions March 24th. The Norwegian contribution was given praise for their quality and for taking on a disproportionately large amount of missions. The Libyan regime was successfully overthrown in August 2011.

⁸ The principle of R2P was established in the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document. The Un Security Council formalized the support for R2P in resolution 1674 in April 2006.

4.4.1 Humanitarian concerns

In the buildup to the intervention there was a lot of focus in Norwegian media on the humanitarian situation in Libya. Reports of protesters being violently struck down by the government were frequent. Aftenposten represents the situation in the following way in an report from Tripoli: “thousands of machete armed regime supporters dressed in green flocked to the center of the capital after Gadafis speech Tuesday. According to one witness it looked as if they were to go from house to house hunting for opposition. - It looks like they have the green light to kill, he says” (Aftenposten 2011a). Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg articulated a similar representation of the situation in Libya: “[Gadafi] is responsible for leading a war against his own people. He has said that he won’t show any mercy for his opponents, and he has promised to revenge the attacks. This means that if [he] is allowed to continue, we have not seen the worst of him yet” (Dagbladet 2011). Foreign Minister Jonas Gahr Støre condemned the situation:

I condemn the use of violence against peaceful protesters in Libya, Bahrain and Yemen. [...] The protests in Libya, Bahrain and Yemen are an expression of the populations wish for more democracy and participation. The governments must respect basic human rights, like political, economic and social rights. It is now essential that all forces contribute to a peaceful dialog about reforms. (NTBtekst 2011d)

Based on these type of testimonials a sense of urgency was constructed. The Foreign Minister later on followed up the previous statement: “[i]t is urgent that something is done with the situation in Libya because there is a civil war-like situation in the country” (NTBtekst 2011a). The senses of urgency was also articulated by others. In an article titled “Time is running out in Libya” Dagsavisen reports: “Muammar Gaddafi’s troops can within short time reach the rebel capital Benghazi. [...] Gaddafi’s troops are now only 240 kilometers from Libya’s second largest city [...]” (Dagsavisen 2011).

Also after the operation was initiated articulations about the humanitarian situation in Libya were made. NTB reported that

Western flight attacks have struck government forces outside the city, but not the tanks that have invaded the city. Now there are also snipers placed on the rooftops. Both the city’s hospital and residents have supposedly been hit. – Many corpses have been lying in the streets for days now. We can’t reach them because of the snipers, says the spokesperson, who states that two people were killed in the city Thursday, while seven lost their lives the day before. (NTBtekst 2011e)

Even though the discursive construction of a humanitarian crisis in Libya was dominating there were some alternative representations of the situation. Klassekampen was questioning the validity of the reports from Libya: “[n]either the UN Security Council or others have documented that Gaddafi’s troops are slaughtering civilians even though UN resolution 1973 is entirely based on the claim” (Klassekampen 2011a). However the representations questioning the validity of the report did not gain much attention.

The debate on Libya, as the other debates, contains memories and lessons learned from the previous interventions. As in Kosovo the memory of Rwanda and Srebrenica were strong narratives. Norway’s ambassador to the UN, Morten Wetland, articulates the representation “[t]here is a broad consensus that situations like the one in former Yugoslavia or Rwanda never should happen again” (Aftenposten 2011c). Lessons from the other previous interventions, especially those in Iraq and Afghanistan are often used as arguments for what to do in Libya. As a response to accusations of not supporting the rebellion in Libya Foreign Minister Jonas Gahr Støre answers that western countries should not think they can dictate the form the democracy should take in these countries: “here we have little to go on. The Iraq war is in many peoples memory” (NTBtekst 2011g). Lieutenant Colonel Geir Ødegaard at the Norwegian Defence University College elaborates on the position: “what Western countries fear the most is being involved in the conflict in a manner that makes them responsible for cleaning up the mess afterwards. [...] Therefore it is out of the question to go in with ground forces like it was done in Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003” (VårtLand 2011). While the initial idea was that one could intervene and enforce a regime change in Afghanistan and Iraq and then leave again the operations are often represented as having developed into quagmires in the Norwegian discourse. Consequently the question of this being a potential development in new interventions is important.

4.4.2 *International law*

In the debate about the situation in Libya the room for action is limited by a discursive construction of it being impossible for Norway to participate in an operation without a UN mandate. This position is articulated early in the debate. NTB reports “[s]tate secretary Espen Barth Eide says that it is out of the question for Norway to support a flyzone without permission from the UN” (NTBtekst 2011b). The representation is broadly accepted in the discourse. Aftenposten reports that “[t]here is broad political opposition in Norway to NATO

adapting a military operation without support in the UN” (Aftenposten 2011b). Even the people pushing for an intervention, like the Director at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs Jan Egeland, re-presents the position: “in 2011 our leaders are not allowed to be spectators to civilians being slaughtered on its feet. [...] The Security Council has to authorize enforcement of a flight prohibition and a marine blockade” (Egeland 2011). Even though he is promoting a military operations it is the UN Security Council who has to make the decision. Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg articulates the representation explicitly: “[i]t would have been a breach of Norwegian foreign policy if we had advocated the use of military force without a basis in international law and the UN” (NTBtekst 2011f). In the parliament he elaborates on the position: “[o]ur engagement builds up under a long line in Norwegian foreign policy, namely the support for a world order led by the UN where the use of force is regulated by the UN charter and decisions in the UN Security Council, [...] Norway should be recognizable when the UN takes on demanding tasks, we participate and take our share of the responsibility” (Stoltenberg 2011). Here promotion of the UN and taking its share of the responsibility for executing the will of the UN is constructed as a part of Norwegian foreign policy.

Even though there is a large degree of consensus on this issue. There are a few articulations of an alternative representation. When Aftenposten reported on a broad opposition to military action without basis in the UN they further reported that FrP was not completely opposed to the idea, as party leader Siv Jensen stated that: “[...] it would in my opinion be terrible if we also when it concerns the Libyan population, remained sitting still because one was more concerned with finding semantic formulations than taking action, and ended up in a situation where the population was literally slaughtered down due to a lack of will of taking action” (Stortinget 2011). Even though Siv Jensen does not explicitly propose military action without a UN mandate, there is an emphasis on the alliance and the humanitarian situation in Libya that promotes “taking action” as opposed to “sitting still”. A more explicit articulation of the position that the need for action should not be overshadowed by the wish for a UN mandate was made in an editorial by VG: “[t]he government should support the introduction of a military no-fly zone over Libya, even if the UN Security Council is paralyzed from taking action due to Russian and Chinese resilience” (VG 2011a). Later VG re-presented the position in another editorial: “[...] Støre and his colleges should not use international law and the UN card as an apology for not taking action”(VG 2011b). Even though we find some carriers of an alternative representation, the position from the Kosovo debate that

humanitarian interventions without basis in a UN resolution must sometimes be acceptable is to a large extent marginalized and does not really challenge the dominant representation.

However Professor in political science from the University of Oslo, Janne Haaland Matlary (who was advisor to the Foreign Minister during the Kosovo intervention) argues that the refusal of Norwegian participation without a UN-mandate in Libya does not have to have implications for future debates about Norwegian participation in military interventions. She states that: “[...] it was right and wise to wait for a mandate this time. In Kosovo there was a European problem that we had more closeness to and responsibility for. As is well known NATO attacked without a mandate, and a mandate cannot be an absolute demand, for there will be new situations like Kosovo, where real policy gives a veto in the Security Council” (Matlary 2011). Matlary claims that even though the government shut the door for Norwegian participation without a mandate in this instance, this does not have to be the case in future situations.

4.4.3 The alliance

There is not that many articulations about why Norway should and will participate in the operation focusing on the alliance. This might be because the position is so embedded that it is no longer necessary to address the issue. Siv Jensen confirmed this by stating that: “[i]t is completely natural that we cooperate with our allies through NATO and don’t exclude military attacks to stop the serious breaches of human rights in Libya” (Aftenposten 2011b). However this representation is not typical of the dominant representation as it emphasizes the obligations to NATO rather than to the UN. Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg articulates the dominant representation: “when the UN resolution was clear, we had no other choice than to see it through with Norwegian forces. In order for the UN project to have any credibility in the future, we have to show that we are willing to follow up on the Security Council’s decisions” (Klassekampen 2011b). The Prime Minister mentions, not country’s obligations to the alliance, but its obligations to the UN, as the main reason for Norwegian participation.

4.4.5 Summary

The dominant position on the intervention in Libya contained elements from all the discursive constructions. First there was a humanitarian crisis and an understanding that something had to be done. Secondly the intervention was based on a UN resolution. Third Norway participated in the operation with its allies through NATO. Still, concerns for the alliance

were not present as one of the main reasons to participate. Rather the focus was on the obligations to the UN. Despite this, the intervention in Libya can in some ways be seen as the “perfect” intervention: all the representations are present and they do not clash with each other.

4.5 Summary

The objective of this chapter was to carry out the two first steps of a discourse analysis: delimiting the discourse and identifying the representations. Through the analysis it was made clear that the intervention discourse does not emerge as one coherent and comprehensive discourse. Rather, it is activated by the prospect of new interventions where Norway has to take a stance whether or not to participate. Further, one dominant representation of when and why Norway should participate in a military intervention running through the discourses is not found. In the debate about the intervention in Kosovo representations of the humanitarian situation was dominating the debate but Norway’s participation was made possible by an initiative in NATO. The representations of NATO indicate that obligations to the alliance were presented as deciding factors for Norwegian participation. There was not a UN mandate, but the Norwegian debate was still played out within the boundaries of international law and there was a representation that Norway’s actions were still in compliance with international law, even though there was no Security Council mandate. In the debate about Afghanistan the need to show solidarity with the USA and obligations to NATO were as dominant representations of reasons for participating in the intervention. There was a UN mandate stating the right to self-defense, and therefore there was not much discussion on international law, even though the actual operation was not UN mandated. As the operation progressed humanitarian arguments became more prominent. Still, the concerns for the allies were dominating the debate. Norway did not participate in the intervention in Iraq, but there was a larger polarization in the debate than in the debates concerning the other interventions. The fact that the operation was not in compliance with international law thumped allied request for support. Further humanitarian concerns were not represented as a reason to intervene in Iraq. In the debate about Libya the humanitarian concern was dominant, but a UN mandate was presented as a precondition for Norwegian participation. In the debate there was a discursive limitation of the room for action by statements that Norway would not participate without a UN mandate. The alliance played a part, but articulations of the alliance were not prominent in the debate.

In the discourse on Libya the room for action was discursively limited though a demand for a UN mandate in order for Norway to participate. Further, strong, although not necessarily many, representations of all the elements were present. In the debate on the intervention in Libya the elements were not in conflict with each other and there were therefore not many representations challenging the dominant one. In this way the intervention in Libya can be seen as the “perfect” intervention. The fact that the intervention in Libya was successful in including all the elements and there was a clear precondition of a UN mandate for Norwegian participation that can be said to have been limiting the room for action leads to the question of whether this should be seen as the emergence of a Norwegian policy on military intervention. Although new debates on Norwegian participation in military interventions draw on the experiences and relate to previous debates it is unlikely that this should be interpreted as the emergence of a policy on military interventions in general. As in the previous situations the intervention in Libya is situationally contingent. The discursive construction that it was impossible for Norway to participate in military action in Libya without a UN mandate limited the room for action in this particular situation, but this does not mean that this will be the case in future situations.

Through this short summary we see that the debates emphasize different elements as the main reasons for Norwegian participation. Although there is not one dominant representation, there are still elements that are reoccurring. These are picked from the general debate on Norwegian foreign policy. Not all elements are picked, and there is a sense of regularity to what issues the intervention discourse activates. For instance, as discussed in chapter two, aid and peace involvement are also important parts of Norwegian foreign policy, but these are not subjects that are as persistent through the debates like the three discussed in this chapters. However, even though the elements activated are the same, the meaning put into the elements have changed. The intervention in Libya for instance, must be seen in relation to the UN adapting the concept of *responsibility to protect* (R2P) which has enforced the position of humanitarian interventions. The mandate from the UN Security Council on the situation in Libya was the first that was based on this concept. With this in mind one might question why the intervention in Kosovo was so easily accepted in the Norwegian debate as this was a humanitarian intervention taking place years before the concept of R2P was adopted. However, the intervention in Kosovo has to be seen in relation with the fresh memories of the genocides in Rwanda and Srebrenica which constituted strong narratives in the debates.

There has also been a change in the representations of NATO where the objectives of the organization and Norway's membership have been inscribed with new meaning. NATO has gone from being a strict defense organization where the collective defense was the most important feature to adapting an expanded concept of security opening for operations *out of area*. Further, this has, together with Norwegian participation in military interventions, influenced the Norwegian defense. When comparing the Norwegian contribution to the military intervention in Kosovo with the one in Libya this becomes apparent. During the intervention in Kosovo the Norwegian fighters had restrictions on their contribution as they for instance could not fly during night. These restrictions were not only politically imposed, but also a capacity issue of the Norwegian defense and the air crafts themselves. The challenges met during the Norwegian contribution to the operation in Kosovo were brought forth as one of the reasons for a major restructuring of the defense. In Libya the results of the restructuring process became apparent as Norway was one of the largest contributors to the operations in relation to population size. Consequently, previous participation in military interventions has influenced Norway's possibilities for participation in future interventions. The need to restructure the defense from an invasion defense to one that was adapted to participate in international operations was explained both within the frames of the security and defense discourse and the peace discourse. Norway had to participate in international operations through the alliance in order to keep it relevant. Further it was important to maintain the interest of the US in the alliance and in Europe (Græger 2007).

Another aspect of the difference between the Norwegian contribution to the intervention in Kosovo and Libyan is the way the Norwegian contributions were represented. During the operation in Kosovo it was emphasized that Norway did not actually drop any bombs. The chief of the Norwegian soldiers colonel Hannestad stated that the Norwegian participation in the intervention in Kosovo was "something completely new, we took part in a war-like situation" (Aftenposten 1999). the main task of the Norwegian contribution to the NATO-operation was "to fly close together with air crafts that [...] drop[ped] bombs over targets in Serbia and the province of Kosovo" (Aftenposten 1999). The contrast to the descriptions of the Norwegian contributions to Libya is striking. According to Aftenposten Foreign Minister Jonas Gahr Støre stated that: "the Norwegian and Danish air crafts are enhanced has the best in class" as Norwegian fighters never before had bombed "as much, as many and as fast" (Aftenposten 2011d). While the Norwegian participation in Kosovo (and OEF in Afghanistan)

was represented as mainly symbolic, the Norwegian contribution to the operation in Libya was substantial. This was in part because the Norwegian defense in 2011, in contrast to 1999, had the possibility of providing a substantial contribution, but it also has to be seen in relation to the legitimation of these contributions. The representations of Norwegian contribution in Libya was more idealistic and there was a lack of representations of the alliance. While the symbolic contributions were legitimized as investments in Norwegian national security, the substantial contribution was given idealistic reasons of promotion of the UN and protection of human rights. This fits well with the findings of Græger and Leira (2005) who claim that the internationalization of the defense was difficult to explain with a basis in the defense discourse as this was mainly national. Therefore it was inscribed into the more idealistic and international peace discourse.

5 Conceptualizing the intervention discourse: adopting a layered framework

Through this chapter the framework of a layered discourse will be adopted to make sense of the findings of the previous chapter. This is the third level of Neumann's (2001) framework, but builds mainly on the work of Wæver (2002). The layered framework can be helpful in this instance where we do not find one coherent discourse or a dominant representation throughout the discourse. Further, it might be helpful when explaining the elements we find that are addressed in all the debates.

This chapter will start with a short recap of the layered framework then the framework will be used to analyze the findings in the previous chapter where the discourse was delimited and the representations were identified. The analyzed material can be argued to be mainly played out at the policy level. I will begin by examining the deepest level of the intervention discourse looking for constructions that all the representation have in common on a more fundamental level. Secondly the strategic level⁹ will be analyzed arguing that the elements that the discourse was constructed around, namely international law, the alliance and humanitarian concerns, found in the previous chapter are drawn into the intervention discourse from the wider discourse on foreign policy, and also some more specialized discourses like the defense discourse and the peace discourse. The reason why these elements are continuously addressed is because they are seen as basic principles or strategies of Norwegian foreign policy. Third the policy level will be analyzed focusing on how the opponents contest each other in the discourse.

The layered framework

Ole Wæver's framework of a layered discourse laid out in chapter 2 might helpful when explaining the Norwegian discourse on interventions and the struggles found within the intervention discourse. The adaptation of a layered framework does not imply that different discourses play out at the different levels. Rather the specific discourse includes and

⁹ This label is borrowed from Leira (2012)

articulates itself around all three layers simultaneously (Wæver 2002). In other words, we can expect that a representation of Norwegian participation in a specific military intervention (policy level) will involve a construction of some basic principles of Norwegian foreign policy present in the intervention discourse namely NATO membership, promotion of the UN and international law and promotion of universal human rights (the strategic level) building on a deeper foundation of the principals of Norwegian foreign policy (the idea level). However, it is important to take note that layered framework is adopted as an analytical tool. It is not something that can be observed or that the actors in the intervention discourse are conscious about or relate to.

At the policy level we find the situationally contingent discussions about Norwegian participation in military interventions, drawing on the deeper levels. The elements found that are frequently referred to in the intervention discourse are representations from the strategic level of the principles of Norwegian foreign policy: that Norway is a NATO allied, that Norway is promoting a world order led by the UN and that Norway is promoting universal human rights. These elements have become almost depoliticized and naturalized in the Norwegian discourse. The fact that they are discursively constructed as principles rather than policies is a clear example of depoliticization. According to Wæver's framework we can expect that there might be some alternative representations on this level, but that these are marginalized. This assumption fits well as we have seen through the previous chapter that there are some alternative representations of these issues in the Norwegian discourse on interventions and in chapter three we also saw that there are some alternative representations in the discourse on foreign policy in general. Even though these positions are not often challenged and the alternative representations are marginalized it is not unimaginable that Norway's position on these issues, sometime in the future could be different. Therefore these principles are founded in even deeper ideas of Norwegian foreign policy, and we therefore have to move to the idea level to find what these principles are founded on. Even though the intervention discourse mainly plays out at the policy level this chapter will begin by looking at what all the representations have in common by analyzing the idea level.

5.1 The idea level

The intervention discourse plays out mainly at the policy level, but it draws in, represents and confirms constructions on the strategic and idea level. While the constructions on the idea

level are continuously represented in the debates representations of constructions at the idea level are rarely explicitly articulated. Therefore this first section will explore whether there is actually a deeper level present in the intervention discourse.

The elements placed at the strategic level are drawn in from the wider discourse on Norwegian foreign policy and from more specialized discourses within the same field such as the peace discourse and the defense discourse. Through the literature review in chapter three we saw that especially Græger and Leira argued that some of these principles were founded in a deeper level of Norwegian foreign policy. Norway's peace involvement policy, the promotion of the UN and the humanitarian engagement can be seen as a part of a self-image of Norway as do-gooder and as a humanitarian great power (Leira 2005). This self-image is more deeply rooted in the idea that Norway has a mission or a calling to work for peace. The peace policy and the idea of a connection between the people and peace cited to legitimize of much of Norwegian foreign policy. Norway held an *extraordinary position* that enabled taking on a role as a peace nation and humanitarian great power. These representations of Norwegian foreign policy have sometimes conflicted with the representations of Norwegian security and defense. However, the dominant representations in the different debates about Norwegian participation in military interventions manage to combine these concern, by constructing an idea that policies promoting the Norwegian self-interest, in this instance national security, are also what is best for the world, namely peace (Leira 2012: 386). This representation holds a belief in progress and that a prosperous development for the world is possible and a belief that Norway can contribute to this development. Further the idea maintains that following Norwegian self-interests is not in conflict with working for development in the world. In a sense what is in Norway's self-interest is also what is best for the world.

Prime Minister Kjell Magne Bondevik's explanation of Norwegian participation in the intervention in Kosovo is a good example of how the kind of construction described above: “[f]or Norway it is deciding for our own security and possibility for taking responsibility that NATO remains a central tool for peace and stability in our part of the world. Norwegian contribution of resources and personnel to NATO's efforts for peace is therefore basically an investment in our own defense” (Bondevik 1999a). He elaborate on the position in an address to Parliament: “we therefore have a moral and political responsibility to maintain a solid preparedness against assaults and humanitarian crisis – both nationally, regionally and

globally. Freedom and peace as a permanent condition can unfortunately never be taken for granted. Therefore we have to continue our peace work on a broad front. NATO has to remain a central tool in this work” (Bondevik 1999b). By representing NATO’s relevance as important both for Norwegian security and for the organization to maintain the ability of carrying out its work for peace. Bondevik’s articulation involves the construction at the idea level of Norway as a do-gooder. These statements involve several of the representations discussed above. First, Bondevik claims that “we” have a responsibility to work to avoid assaults and humanitarian crisis that is both morally and politically founded. This representation fits well with the basis Leira finds for the self-image of Norway as a humanitarian great power that Norway holds and extraordinary position enabling and making Norway morally responsible to work for a better world. However it also entails a representation where Norwegian NATO membership is inscribed into the peace discourse as NATO is represented as a central tool for Norwegian peace work.

Further, the support of the UN is constructed as a tradition in Norwegian foreign policy. We find explicit articulations of this during the debate about Norwegian contribution the intervention in Iraq. VG: “Bondevik tells us that [...] Norway supports all resolutions and decisions in the UN Security Council – simply because it is Norwegian foreign policy” (VG 2003b). Secretary of the Nobel Peace prize committee Geir Lundestad follows: “Norway’s policy has always been to support the UN – and to encourage others to do the same. Then we also have to do it when the UN makes uncomfortable decisions” (Dagsavisen 2003). A similar position is articulated by VG: “[i]t would be a dramatic breach with our foreign policy tradition if the government didn’t support a war in Iraq that had a legal basis from the UN” (VG 2003a). Such of representations of the UN and Norway’s relationship to the UN are also found in the debate about Norwegian participation in the intervention in Libya. Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg stated that: “[i]t would have been a breach of Norwegian foreign policy if we had advocated the use of military force without a basis in international law and the UN” (NTBtekst 2011f). In Parliament he elaborated on this position: “[o]ur engagement follows a long line in Norwegian foreign policy, namely, support for a world order led by the UN where the use of force is regulated by the UN charter and the decisions of the UN Security Council, [...] Norway should be recognizable when the UN takes on demanding tasks, we participate and take our share of the responsibility” (Stoltenberg 2011). These representations do not explicitly invoke constructions on the level of ideas, but it builds on an underlying idea that multilateralism, especially through the UN is good for Norway and for

the world. By seeing the international community as Norway's first line of defense promotion of the UN can be understood as a small state strategy (Neumann 2011; Ulriksen 2007). Consequently idea maintains that promotion of the UN is in Norway's self-interest, as a world order based on the rule of law secures Norwegian sovereignty and interests. Further, the UN is constructed as a project for better and more organized world where the democracy, human rights and redistribution of resources are the main goals (Leira et al. 2007). The lack explicit articulations of these representations in the intervention discourse might be explained by Visnes' (2000: 222) claim that "[t]he UN is no longer a corner stone in Norwegian foreign policy, it is a 'monument'". In other words, the UN policy is so naturalized in the Norwegian discourse that it has gained a value in its own right and has become a part of the "Norwegian cultural heritage" and achieved status as "listed" (Visnes 2000: 222).

Even though there are not that many explicit articulations of the basic ideas of Norwegian foreign policy in the intervention discourse we still see that the representations build on more deeply founded ideas of Norwegian foreign policy and contain elements of such representations. Formulations of the reasons for Norwegian participation in military interventions contain constructions of Norwegian security and international security going hand in hand. Norway should support NATO and its allies not only because this will strengthen Norwegian security through the security guarantee of NATO but also because NATO is working for peace and stability in the world. Norwegian support of the UN is also presented as being in the self-interest of Norway and as being part of efforts for a better and more organized world, which is in the interest of the world in general.

5.2 The strategic level

The elements found in the intervention discourse that are used throughout chapter four, namely constructions of the allies, constructions of the UN and humanitarian concerns can be understood as constructions on the strategic level. These elements are frequently found in representations on the policy level of the intervention discourse, but as they are present in the debates on all the interventions they should be seen as more permanent constructions. Further there is a larger degree of consensus on the issues at the strategic level than on the policy level. However, the elements at the strategic level are inscribed with different meaning and interpreted differently from situation to situation at the policy level. The elements placed at the strategic level of the intervention discourse are not an exhaustive presentation of the

strategies of Norwegian foreign policy in general. Rather, they are representations of strategies of Norwegian foreign policy that are repeatedly activated in the intervention discourse.

First, the representation of Norway as a promoter of a world order led by the UN is the most important representation of multilateralism in the Norwegian discourse on foreign policy. The construction of the UN might even be less challenged than Norwegian NATO membership. There is a large consensus that the UN is something good for Norway and for the world in general. The only party which sometimes challenges the representation of the UN is FrP, but they are not explicitly against the UN. Rather, they are against to giving priority to support of UN decisions on the expense of other considerations. Norway is a large contributor to the UN both politically and economically and Norway is often presented as “the UN’s best friend”. The Norwegian construction of the UN is given both idealist and self-interest reasons. On the one hand, multilateralism and especially the UN is presented as good for the world as it promotes the rule of law, rather than the rule of force. At the same time it is presented as in Norway’s interests as a small state because small states do not have the force to assert themselves when rule of force prevails, but rule of law secures the rights and security of the small state. Politically, Norway tries to support the UN in several ways. One of these is to act within the frames of international law and to recognize the UN Security Council as the authority that decides what is in relation to international law. Another way is through supporting the decisions made by the UN Security Council often by taking a share of the responsibility of implementing them.

Secondly, this is also to some extent the case when it comes to the promotion of universal human rights, which is also a specification of the representation of Norway as a humanitarian great power. Viewing human rights as a universal good is in many senses idealistic, but it is also sometimes represented as in Norwegian interest. With an understanding of an enlarged concept of security, instability in parts of the world far from Norway can pose security threats to Norway and the lack of basic human rights can be the root of such instability as this is presented as the basis for democracy and development that are both considered stabilizing traits. Humanitarian considerations are also founded within the peace discourse. In the intervention discourse we most clearly find constructions of Norway as a supporter of the UN and as concerned for and a promoter of human rights. Still, we also find other constructions of Norwegian self-images that are present in the discourse. This is especially true for

representations of Norway as a peace nation, but also representations of development aid. These features mainly in alternative representations holding that the Norwegian involvement in interventions threatens the country's peace involvement suggesting that Norway should withdraw from participation in military operations led by the USA and refine the peace involvement policy. Skånland (2009) finds a similar constructions as a part of an alternative representation of the peace discourse. However, the carriers of the dominant representations also make attempts of inscribing the Norwegian participations in interventions into the image of Norway as peace nation and giant within development aid.

Third, NATO is presented and represented as a cornerstone of Norwegian security. According to Græger (2007) the reduced importance of NATO, and especially American protection of Norwegian territory after the Cold War ended had little impact on representations of the USA in Norwegian security and defense policy. Still there is a change in the dominant representation of Norwegian NATO-membership during the early 2000s as constructions of NATO are changed from being explained in a national context to being explained in an international context (Græger 2007). Consequently, Norway should no longer focus solely on defense of its own territory in form of an invasion defense and "holding time" until NATO arrives. Norway must participate internationally in NATO operations as an investment in Norwegian territorial security, to make sure the allies will come to Norway's rescue, and as an extended concept of security understanding international security as important to maintain Norwegian security. Although there is a considerable consensus on Norwegian NATO membership, and alternative representations on the issue often are marginalized, the NATO issue is where we find most alternative representations throughout the intervention discourse. Therefore this will be accorded some space here.

Although support of NATO is one of the issues on which we most frequently find alternative representations, there is only one political party in Parliament that is formally against Norwegian NATO membership: that is SV. Throughout the debate we find SV representatives promoting alternative representation of Norwegian support to NATO, but also some representatives from SP and AP are skeptical to the role NATO is taking on. The alternative representations of NATO mentioned here in order to underscore the complexity of this representation and because it is a clear example of a representation that affects several layers simultaneously.

Although SV is formally against NATO membership the position is not frequently explicitly voiced, especially not during the period that SV has been in government. Still, as seen in the previous chapter the NATO-skepticism in SV is especially visible in the representations of some of the party's representatives in parliament. The articulation of SV being against Norwegian NATO membership all together is an alternative representation on the strategic level. It does not propose an alternative construction of the idea level of Norwegian foreign policy. The carriers of the alternative representation do not indicate that there should not be a defense of Norway, or that Norway should not work for a better world. Rather they argue that these concerns are difficult to combine through Norwegian NATO-membership. As the NATO question is depoliticized any attempts by SV to politicize the issue are marginalized. Therefore we most often find alternative representations of policy options that do not explicitly articulate representations on the strategic level. On the policy level we find representations that global security should be secured through the international community through the UN, and not limited regional organizations. Consequently the representations are not opposed to multilateralism, but the multilateralism has to be international, not regional.

Alternative representations on the policy level take many shapes. First, there is a construction that is skeptical of the direction NATO has taken and their new *out of area* policy which argues that NATO should remain a strict defense organization and should not get involved outside its area. Further, we here also find an outlet for the America skeptic positions often doubting or questioning the intentions and motives of the USA and the way the country has conducted foreign policy in the past. This position also leads to constructions of alternative representations of policy arguing that Norway should not participate in the specific interventions, based on all, or some of the previously mentioned reasons. Carriers of alternative representation on level three are also found among SP and some parts of AP. The fact that SV is the only parliamentary party that is against Norwegian NATO membership all together supports that assumption that alternative representations at the deeper levels of a discourse are more marginalized than the alternative representations on the level of policy. This might also be the reason why this position is not voiced that often by SV. They have been promoting Norwegian exit from NATO for a long time without winning ground, and when they entered into a coalition government the promotion of an alternative representation of the strategic level became more difficult.

5.3 The policy level

As mentioned the intervention discourse plays out mainly at the policy level. It is given this name as this is the level the policies in relation to different situations are constructed. Here we find the discussions about Norwegian participation in the different interventions. While the idea level and the strategic level contain rather persistent constructions the policy level is situationally contingent and therefore more fluid. Therefore rather different policies can be constructed on the basis of the same ideas and strategies or in other words within the frames set on the deeper layers (Wæver 2002). Therefore there is room for change on the policy level while the more permanent levels remain the same as there is room for different representations of policies based on the same principles and ideas and there can be change within continuity. The same cannot be said for the level of strategies and ideas. Change here is only expected to occur if there is a large amount of pressure on the representations and one can expect that the costs for the actors carrying the representations will be too large for the continuity to be maintained. Consequently there will be a shift in the system.

Through the analysis conducted in chapter four it became apparent that there was not a lot of discursive struggle in the debates about the interventions. We did not find one dominant representation in the Norwegian intervention discourse stating on when and on what basis Norway will participate or refuse to participate in an intervention. Rather we found that this varied from situation to situation. Still the element confronted remained more or less undisputed. Rather, the discussions concerned how these elements were supported best, especially when considerations for different elements were conflicting each other. Therefore we seek to explain how Norway can have made such different decisions within continuity. An important observation in this regard is that the decisions made are always represented as a continuation of Norwegian foreign policy. Wæver (2002) proposes three main ways in which the opponents can contest each other on the policy level. The ways offered by Wæver cannot directly be transferred to the intervention discourse, but inspired by Wæver three main groups of ways in which the opponents can contest each other is developed based on the findings in the previous chapter. First, carriers of an alternative representation can argue that the opponent's constructions of policies in the debate about Norwegian participation in military interventions are threatening the constructions found on the strategy level and/or the level of ideas. This can either be due to a representation of policy that is harmful to the constructions of strategies or ideas, or the proposed policy can be prioritizing one of the elements on

strategy level at the expense of one of the other elements. Secondly, the one suggesting an alternative representation can argue that the opponent's construction of the situation in question is not in touch with reality. A third way of contesting opponents is by arguing that the proposed policies are made on the basis of other considerations than the representations of strategy and ideas.

An example of the first way of contesting each other can be found in the discourse on the Norwegian participation in the intervention in Kosovo. Here, the main discursive struggle was concerning the issue of international law. Carriers of an alternative representation were accusing the government of taking on a policy towards the UN that was not supporting the principal found on the strategic level that Norwegian policy should be supportive of the UN and that the UN Security Council should be the ones passing judgment according to international law. This kind of representation is articulated by Rønnefeldt and Eide (1999) who claim that an intervention without a mandate from the UN Security Council “threatens the actual foundation of the international judicial order by weakening the norms’ general meaning in practical international politics”. By conducting an intervention without a mandate from the UN Security Council the rule of law and the UN is weakened. Consequently the policy is not supporting the constructions on the strategic level as the Norwegian policy is contributing to a weakening of international law rather than strengthening it. However, the carriers of the dominant representation did not dismiss the construction of the UN on the strategic level as they still had to argue within the frames set on the deeper levels. The representation therefore maintained that it was not that the UN decided not to adopt a resolution, but rather that they were kept from adopting it. Hence the UN could not make the decisions because the Security Council did not reflect the will of the council, or give the correct interpretation of international law as it was being blocked by the vetoes of some of the permanent members of the Security Council. Not intervening in Kosovo would weaken international law and the UN, rather than strengthen it. In this way the position is reproduced and the understanding is accepted as in accordance with the principle on level two.

During the debate about the intervention in Afghanistan a critique of the way international law was interpreted was presented by the director at the institute of human rights, Nils A. Butenschøn: “[i]t is very problematic in relation to international law to bomb a country based on a suspicion that they are harboring terrorists” (Klassekampen 2001a). Also here the argument is that the way in which international law is interpreted will actually harm the rule

of law in international relations, rather than support it. A third version of this way of contesting representations occurred during the debate on the intervention in Iraq when an alternative representation indicated that Norway should not support an intervention in Iraq, regardless of what the UN decided. This representation was deviating from the idea that the best way for Norway to promote the UN was through supporting the implementation of the UN's decisions. The leader of the Center Party Åslaug Haga articulates this alternative representation:

The Prime Minister has been very sparse giving evaluations attached to a potential war in Iraq. He has mainly kept to procedure, and we still hear the mantra: the UN-track. The problem with the UN track is that the USA has taken the UN hostage. President Bush states that if you do not do as the USA wants, we will go to war on Iraq alone. President Bush is saying that if the Security Council does not do as the USA wants, then the UN is making itself irrelevant. This is a form of blackmail. And the USA is actually breaching the basic principles of multilateralism, as some of us are concerned with. We can risk that the USA threatens their way to a decision in the Security Council without it representing the collective wisdom of the council. (Stortinget 2003a).

Haga's argues that even if Norway supports the UN by choosing "the UN track" it will in fact be weakening the UN and thereby not supporting the construction of the UN on level two, as this is not the "real" will of the UN. This representation shares the understanding of the UN system as less than perfect found in the debate about the Kosovo intervention. Although they are promoting a different policy the basic understanding is the same; the decisions made by the UN Security Council does not always reflect the will of the council or the "right" interpretation of international law. The logic of the representation entails a paradox: in some situations *not* following the UN might be the best policy to promote the UN.

Another alternative representation found in the debate on the intervention in Iraq articulates a concern that the policy of non-contribution promoted by the dominant representation will have negative effects on the future of the alliance. FrP leader Carl I. Hagen explains: "I'm worried about the future. Our security has depended on the USA, Great Britain and the other NATO countries. [...] This is a miserable choice the government and the majority of the parliament has made when it comes to our own future security" (Stortinget 2003b). Not only does Hagen argue that the decision threatens the future of the alliance, but he also connects this to Norwegian security. In the same debate there are also some representations contesting the dominant one on the issue of humanitarian concerns. Morten Høglund of FrP articulates that "behind every evaluation concerning Iraq's future, considerations or the civilian

population should be prevailing. The Iraqis deserve better. They deserve the chance to experience freedom, democracy and the absence of abuse and repression” (Stortinget 2003b). Here the dominant position is challenged on the issue that it does not support the construction of Norway promoting universal human rights on level two. However we find a similar argument indicating the opposite policy. Jon Lilletun of KrF states that “[t]he population in Iraq is already vulnerable after years of sanctions and repression. KrF is worried for the humanitarian consequences a war will cause for the civilians. War will kill and injure innocents, people will be forced to flee [...]” (Stortinget 2003b). While Høglund argues that not supporting the intervention in Iraq is not in line with the construction of universal human rights on level two, Lilletun argues that not supporting the intervention is the best way to secure the construction of human rights on level two. These quotes show how different policies still can share some constructions on the strategic and idea level even though they disagree on how these are best promoted to through formulations of policies on Norwegian participation in interventions.

We also find representation that claim that the dominant representation is prioritizing some of the elements on the strategic level over the others. In the debate about the military intervention in Libya FrP leader Siv Jensen stated, “[...] it would in my opinion be terrible if we also when it concerns the Libyan population, remained sitting still because one was more concerned with finding semantic formulations than taking action, and ended up in a situation where the population was literally slaughtered down due to a lack of will of taking action” (Stortinget 2011). Here she argues that the concerns for promotion of the UN and international law were prioritized at the expense of the construction of humanitarian concerns and universal human rights at the strategic level.

An example of the second way of contesting opponent’s representations is often found in alternative representations that are more skeptical to the USA and NATO. In the discussion about the intervention in Kosovo SV’s Langeland articulated an alternative representation of the USA and NATO:

[t]he UN and international law has yet again been put out of order. In front stands the country who does not pay their bill to the UN, and who wants to rule the world on their terms, the country who has declared plans of turning NATO into a world policy and in this way contribute to destroying the system of international law we have in the world today. The NATO-country Norway follows obediently, with contributions of its own military forces. (Stortinget 1999).

Langeland here claims that the dominant representation of the situation is not in touch with reality. In contrast to the dominant representation he articulates an alternative reason for the intervention in Kosovo and for the Norwegian involvement claiming that it is not humanitarian reasons that are ‘forcing’ NATO to take action, rather the USA does not care about the UN and are acting on basis on their own interest and some hidden motive. It is mainly the US intentions that are the source of criticism. A similar representation, also skeptical to the US motives, is found in the debate about Afghanistan where Audun Lysbakken (likewise SV), states: “[t]he USA has conducted more military interventions the last century than the very expansive Roman Empire did through several centuries. The victims of US policy have been many. We know that the USA has been willing to support dictators and perpetrators if they have only been willing to stand on the side of the USA [...]” (Stortinget 2001). Here Lysbakken offers an alternative representation of the USA to the dominant representation of the USA as a victim. In the debate about the intervention in Libya *Klassekampen* questioned the validity of the reports from Libya: “[n]either the UN Security Council or others have documented that Gaddafi’s troops are slaughtering civilians even though UN resolution 1973 is entirely based on the claim” (Klassekampen 2011a). Here they are questioning the credibility of the realities of the situation which the dominant representation is based on. Still, the carriers of these alternative representations are not successful in their attempt to challenge the dominant representations as the alternative representations are mainly marginalized.

The third set of alternative representations is arguing that the proposed policies are made on the basis of other considerations than the constructions found at the strategic and idea level. These representations are questioning the government’s ability to make their own decisions on military interventions claiming that Norway is simply wagging their tail after the USA. In a parliamentary debate concerning Norwegian participation in OEF in Afghanistan SV’s Heikki Holmås stated: “[i]t has been discouraging in this debate that Høyre and the other parties’ way of discussing foreign policy has been to wag their tail after the USA has spoken [...]. It would be a lot better for Norway if we could have an independent foreign policy where one could see the long lines, and where one could make a share of decisions and make up a position, without first listening to what comes ticking in from Washington” (Stortinget 2001). A similar articulation is found during the debate on the intervention in Iraq by the leader of the Center Party Åslaug Haga who is commenting on Norway’s period as a member of the Security Council: “[i]t is sad that Norway on the most important issues has tagged

along after the USA” (Klassekampen 2002b). This type of criticism is found in most of the debates about the different interventions without them being taken seriously, but in this instance Prime Minister Bondevik responds explicitly to the accusations: “[w]e will nevertheless take our own stance. If anyone believes that we are tagging along after the USA no matter what they do, then they are shamefully wrong” (Aftenposten 2003). Bondevik’s explicit reply to the alternative representation might be a sign that the dominant representation is being challenged. Normally an alternative representation like this one would simply be ignored and marginalized, but that fact that it is responded can be a sign of politization of an issue.

5.5 Conclusion

Through this chapter we have seen how a layered framework can provide deeper insights into the intervention discourse. We began by looking at what the representations had in common. The question was posed of whether the intervention discourse contains constructions of a deep level. This question was addressed by looking for permanent and more fundamental constructions of the representations in the intervention discourse. There are not a lot of explicit representations of constructions at the idea level in the intervention discourse. However the representations of policies and strategies build on more deeply founded ideas of Norwegian foreign policy and contains elements of such representations. There is a basic notion of Norway as good that most of the representations rely on and there are close to no representations of arguments based on pure self-interest. Further, the representations are based on an idea that what is good for Norway and what is good for the world goes hand in hand. For instance, articulations of the reasons for Norwegian participation in military interventions contain constructions that promotion of Norwegian security is also promoting international security. Further, NATO is not only represented as an organization that promotes Norwegian security, it also promotes international security by working for peace and stability in the world. The same type of representations are found in construction of the UN. Support of the UN is in the self-interest of Norway, but it is also a part of efforts for a better and more organized world, which is in the interest of the world in general. Further it was established that the elements found through the analysis of chapter four can be understood as constructions at the strategic level of the discourse. These representations are more permanent than the situationally contingent policies as they are repeatedly activated in the intervention discourse. The policy level is where the intervention discourse plays out and debates

concerning what policies Norway should make in the different situations take place. Consequently this is also where we found most of the discursive struggle. Three main ways in which opponents could contest each other was established. These are that representations on the third level are threatening the constructions on level two and/or one, that the opponent's construction of the situation in question are not in touch with reality or that the representations on level three are not made on the basis on the basis of the constructions on levels one and two, but rather for other reasons.

Although the previous chapter concluded that there is no coherent discourse on military intervention in Norway and that there is no dominant representations on the issue there are some patterns that are reoccurring in the debates on Norwegian participation in specific military interventions. Through the adaptation of a layered framework the elements found throughout the intervention discourse are understood as constructions of strategies of Norwegian foreign policy. They are three among a number of strategies of Norwegian foreign policy that are repeatedly activated in discussions of military interventions. There is also a larger degree of consensus on these issues that there is on the representations found on the policy level. Even though the strategies are a part of the intervention discourse how they are represented and what meaning is inscribed into them varies from situation to situation. Consequently the frames set on the deeper levels still leave room for maneuver on the policy level. By representing policies as in accordance with the constructions on the strategic and idea level rather different, but not all policies can be presented within the frames of continuity.

6 Conclusion

In the introduction we asked *how Norwegian participations in military interventions had been made discursively possible* in order to find if there exists a Norwegian “policy” on participation in military interventions. The analysis has shown that the answer to this remains inconclusive. Applying discourse analysis, we found that the intervention discourse did not appear as one coherent discourse, nor did we find one dominant representation.

Chapter two explained how the thesis is informed by a discourse analytical approach founded in poststructuralist theory of International Relations. In studying policy in general, and particularly foreign policy where much is hidden, employing discourse analysis can be an advantage as the analysis stays at the level of discourse. Here the frames are produced within which one may argue about foreign policy, which both constrain and makes possible statements as well as actions. An important part of discourse analysis involves looking for representations, finding which ones are dominant and which ones are marginalized. As representations and discourse are socially produced, they are also in flux, but not all elements of the representations are equally changeable. Wæver’s concept of a layered framework offers the insight that some things are more fundamental than others. Discourses can be understood as a layered constellation of key concepts, where some elements differentiate while others unite (Wæver 2002). In this way the adaptation of a layered framework can be helpful for explaining change within the frames of continuity.

The third chapter of this thesis represented a brief review of the literature on Norwegian foreign policy discourse. We saw how consensus on foreign policy has been constructed as an important characteristic of Norwegian foreign policy, and how this can be understood in discursive terms as a dominant representation. Constructions of the tradition of consensus and the importance of this are used by actors as a way of achieving and maintaining consensus and depoliticizing issues. As to the literature on the discourse on Norwegian foreign policy, the amount of work done on the subject is not overwhelming. The work that has been done from a discourse analytical stance has focused on more limited areas within Norwegian foreign policy. Nina Græger (2005, 2007, 2009) explains how Norwegian security and defense has gone from being legitimized from a national discourse to a more international

discourse. It has also been important to be able to connect the self-image of Norway as a peace nation and Norway as a good ally. Skånland (2008, 2009, 2010) and Leira (2005) have analyzed the Norwegian peace discourse which together with the promotion of a world order based on the rule of law (including the promotion of multilateralism, and especially the UN, aid and universal human rights), can be seen as a part of a self-image of the country as a humanitarian great power (Leira et al. 2007). Further, there have been some master theses on the discourse on Norwegian participation in military interventions (Bruun-Lie 2004; Hatling 2010). However these have been concentrated on single interventions and not the discourse as a whole.

In chapter four I presented and discussed what I view as the intervention discourse in Norway. The analysis here was based on the two first steps of the framework presented by Neumann (2001), delimiting the discourse and identifying the representations in the discourse. The four debates on Norwegian participation in the interventions in Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya were analyzed by examining how the debates unfolded in the Parliament and in the major newspapers. We found some recurring elements in all the discourses: representations of Norway's obligations to NATO, Norway's promotion of the UN and its promotion of humanitarian concerns. The intervention discourse does not appear as a single, coherent discourse, nor do we find one dominant representation of the circumstances under which Norway might agree to participate in a military intervention. The representations are situationally contingent, but they all relate to the above-mentioned three elements.

In the debate about Kosovo representations of the humanitarian situation was dominant, but Norway's participation was made possible by an initiative taken in NATO. Representations of NATO indicate that perceived obligations to the alliance were among the deciding factors for Norwegian participation. There was no UN mandate, but the Norwegian debate still unfolded within the boundaries of international law, and there was a representation that Norway's actions were still in compliance with international law, despite the absence of a Security Council mandate. In the debate about the intervention in Kosovo, humanitarian concern and obligations to the alliance dominated. In the debate about Afghanistan, the need to show solidarity with the USA and obligations to NATO were dominant reasons for participating in the intervention. There was a UN mandate stating the right to self-defence, and therefore there was not much discussion about international law, even though the actual operation was not UN mandated. As the operation progressed humanitarian arguments became more prominent. Still, concerns for Norway's NATO allies were dominant. Next, although Norway did not

participate in Iraq, in that debate there was a greater polarization than in the debates on the other interventions. The fact that the operation was not in compliance with international law trumped allied requests for support. Further humanitarian arguments were not prominent. In the debate about Libya, humanitarian concerns were dominant, but a UN mandate was a precondition for participation. In the debate there came a discursive limitation of the room for action by statements that Norway would not participate without a UN mandate. The alliance played a part, but such articulations were not prominent in the debate.

In chapter four we examined whether there was a dominant representation, or whether one or some of the specific three elements had to be present in order for Norway to agree to participate in an intervention. We saw that representations of concerns for the alliance were the only element present in all three interventions. This might indicate that representations of the NATO alliance and Norway's allies are the most important in determining Norwegian participation in an intervention. However, this aspect was not clearly formulated in the debate about participation in the intervention in Libya: humanitarian concerns and concerns for the UN featured as the most important reasons for Norway. And, as noted Norway declined the request from the USA to participate in the intervention in Iraq.

In the debate about the intervention in Libya, some of the actors made attempts to limit the room of action by stating that Norwegian participation was simply out of the question as long as there was no UN mandate. That had not been stated so explicitly before. Might this be understood as a dominant representation emerging? In the debate about Norwegian participation in Libya all three elements were successfully represented: there was an explicit UN mandate to enforce a no-fly zone and protect civilians with all necessary means, the operation was led by NATO, and the main reason for intervening was concerns for the civilian population. In many ways the intervention in Libya can be seen as the "perfect intervention" providing successful representations of all three elements, without their clashing with each other. However, the fact that the intervention discourse is situationally contingent makes it difficult to say whether this can be transferred to other interventions. Further, we cannot determine whether this is a policy on Norwegian participation in interventions that is now emerging, or whether the representations here are valid only in this specific situation.

Therefore, the fifth chapter analyzes the intervention discourse through the use of a layered framework. Wæver (2002) argues that a discourse consists of several layers where a specific

discourse includes and articulates itself around all levels simultaneously. Consequently we can expect that a representation of Norwegian participation in a specific military intervention (policy level) will involve a construction of some basic “principles” of Norwegian foreign policy that are present in the intervention discourse (strategic level), building on a deeper foundation of the principles of Norwegian foreign policy (idea level). At the policy level we find situationally contingent discussions about Norwegian participation in military interventions, drawing on the deeper levels. Elements frequently referred to in the intervention discourse are representations from the strategic level about the principles of Norwegian foreign policy: namely that Norway is a NATO ally, that Norway promotes a world order led by the UN, and that Norway promotes universal human rights. These elements have become almost depoliticized and naturalized in the Norwegian discourse. The fact that they are discursively constructed as principles rather than policies is a clear example of depoliticization.

First, the question of whether there is a deep level of the intervention discourse was discussed looking for constructions that were common for all the representations. Although the constructions on the idea level are rarely explicitly articulated in the intervention discourse, the representations build on some of the same ideas founded in a deeper level of Norwegian foreign policy. Some of the existing literature explains different constructions of Norwegian foreign policy in relations to a deeper level. For instance, Norway’s peace involvement policy and the promotion of universal human rights build on a self-image of Norway as a do-gooder and humanitarian great power (Leira et al. 2007), while Norwegian NATO membership is both inscribed into the peace discourse and related to Norwegian security and consequently self-interest. This combination is an important part of the construction on the deeper level of Norwegian foreign policy where there is an understanding of Norway as a do-gooder working for a better world goes hand in hand with Norwegian self-interest as there is no conflict between the two (Leira 2012). Further, the elements found through the analysis of chapter four were located at the strategic level as they are more permanent than the representations at the policy level (they are present in all the debates), but as they draw on some deeper constructions of Norwegian foreign policy, they do not belong on the idea level. The policy level is where the intervention discourse plays out and debates take place concerning what policies Norway should adopt in the various situations. This is also where we found most of the discursive struggle. Three main ways in which opponents could contest each other was established. These are that representations on the policy level threaten the constructions on

strategic and/or idea level, that the opponent's construction of the situation in question are not in touch with reality or that the representations on the policy level are not made on the basis of the constructions on the strategic and/or ideas levels, but rather for other reasons.

Although we did not find one coherent discourse or any dominant representation in the previous chapter, application of a layered framework showed that some parts of the representations found on the intervention discourse (policy level) are more fundamental than others. The elements found in chapter four that all the discourses relate to are identified as constructions of principles of Norwegian foreign policy on the strategic level. They are placed on this level as they are more permanent than the representations on the policy level, simultaneously they are more deeply founded in constructions on the level of ideas, even though explicit articulation on the idea level are rarely found in the intervention discourse. Therefore actors have to relate to this in order to argue and act within continuity. Still, there is room for maneuver and interpretations of the strategic and idea levels which lead to different policies being adapted on the basis of the same principles. However we saw that not all policies could be adapted as requests for a Norwegian contribution to the intervention in Iraq was dismissed.

Can we, then, say that there exists a Norwegian "policy" on military interventions? Through the use of discourse analysis one can find patterns and models within which the actors have to argue. These set the frame for what utterances can be made, but also for the policies that can be adopted. Therefore the study of the intervention discourse should be able to shed light on possible frames for action and what is possible within the frames of the discourse. This thesis has shown, that contrary to what one might expect, it is *not* possible to identify a Norwegian "policy" on military intervention. We do not find one coherent discourse on military intervention in Norway, nor a dominant representation of the circumstances under which Norway will participate in an intervention. This makes it difficult to predict Norway's stance in future questions of participation on military interventions. However, we must bear in mind that the intervention discourse does not appear "out of thin air" whenever a new intervention is debated. Throughout the different interventions, three main elements reoccur in the Norwegian debate: NATO membership, promotion of the UN and promotion of universal human rights. Although we cannot predict future decisions based on the analysis of the intervention discourse, the layered framework shows that some representations are more fundamental than others. Therefore actors will have to argue within the frames set on the idea

level and the strategic level: they have to provide proper constructions of NATO, the UN and humanitarianism. Consequently Norwegian participation in any future intervention will have to provide proper representations of promotion of international law and/or the UN, Norway's obligations to NATO and the allies and offer a proper representation of humanitarian concerns. Otherwise, we can expect a shift in the discourse, with changes in the more fundamental construction of Norwegian foreign policy and/or serious political consequences for any actor that seeks to promote a policy which cannot be argued within the frames of continuity.

As mentioned, existing research on Norwegian foreign policy discourse enhance the construction of Norway as a peace nation as a dominant representation in the Norwegian peace discourse. As opposed to the previous policy of "keeping a low profile" internationally in order to avoid getting involved in conflicts there has been a dramatic change in Norwegian foreign policy as Norway has participated in three military intervention in the last 14 years. Further, the Norwegian participation in interventions has undergone a striking development when comparing the participation in the intervention in Kosovo and that in Libya. However, we find little change in the Norwegian debate on participations in military intervention. Although we cannot locate a dominant representation in the discourse as such, there is a sense of regularity in the part of Norwegian foreign policy that is activated in the debates. While the interventions have been quite different, where two have been humanitarian (one based on a UN mandate, and one without) and one was argued form self-defense, the main constructions in the representations were the same. However the meaning inscribed into the elements have not necessarily been the same. This is made clear in discussions of international law in relations to the UN Security Council. While the UN Security Council was constructed as not necessarily representing international law in the debate on Kosovo and Iraq, during the debate on Libya it was held forth that Norway would not participate without a UN mandate. Also concerning construction of NATO has the meaning inscribe into the position. From being a purely defense organization NATO has changed into becoming a global organization. This has implications for the Norwegian intervention discourse as what support of the allies and of NATO entails. Therefore there is a great room for maneuver in the intervention discourse. Although the actors at the policy level has to provide proper constructions of the idea level and the strategic level, the thesis has shown that there is a considerable room for maneuver when formulating policy as the intervention discourse is situationally contingent. Further, the meaning inscribed into the elements at the strategic level is not set. Consequently there is

room for taking on a number of policies on Norwegian interventions, even though actors have to relate to the constructions on the strategic level and idea level. Therefore we cannot claim that there is a Norwegian policy on interventional interventions.

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