

NORWEGIAN UNIVERSITY OF LIFE SCIENCES



THE MEDIA AND FOREIGN POLICY:

**A STUDY OF THE MEDIA'S ROLE IN THE INTERVENTION
IN LIBYA (2011)**

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Declaration

I, Siri Sveinsdotter Baastø, declare that this thesis is a result of my research investigations and findings. Sources of information other than my own have been acknowledged and a reference list has been appended. This work has not been previously submitted to any other university for award of any type of academic degree.

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Any errors or omissions in this paper are solely my responsibility.

Oslo
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ABSTRACT

The academic goal of this thesis is twofold: Firstly, to look at the case of the intervention in Libya and better understand the role of the media in this specific international intervention. Secondly, the aim is to provide more knowledge of the role of the media in international interventions, and thus hopefully be able to strengthen the theoretical linkage between media/foreign policy. In order to do so, four countries involved in the intervention in Libya, namely Britain, the United States, Norway and Denmark, are studied through Piers Robinson's 'policy-media interaction model' (2002). This model analyzes both the media coverage of the situation in Libya in leading national newspapers in these countries, as well as the domestic political climate in the four countries during the period of policy debate leading up to the policy decision to intervene. The empirical findings from this thesis indicates that the media did have an influence on the policy decision to intervene in particularly the United States, but also to a certain extent in Denmark, Britain and Norway. This influence of the media laid primarily in the media's ability to open up for non-official sources in the coverage of the situation in Libya. By doing so, the media enabled non-official frames to become the dominant ones in the coverage, something that made the Libyan authorities lose legitimacy and increased the legitimacy of the Libyan opposition. By contrasting the findings from Libya with Syria, a case of non-intervention, this thesis also argues that the media can be a decisive factor in understanding why the international community chooses to intervene in some humanitarian crisis, while not in others. The empirical findings point to the importance of assessing to what extent non-official sources manage to affect and lead the coverage on a foreign policy issue, and thus affect the way that issue comes to be understood. The more independent the media are in portraying a crisis, and the less dependent the media are on official sources, the more likely it is that the media may influence the way a crisis is approached, and thus the political reaction to the crisis. The empirical findings of this thesis also points to three aspects that, integrated within the 'policy-media interaction model', may provide a more comprehensive understanding of the possible influence the media may have on a foreign policy decision.

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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

What role do the news media play in humanitarian interventions? Can the media be a defining force in affecting Western leaders to intervene in violent and complex conflicts in other countries, or do they simply follow the cues of the powerful international leaders, essentially rendering the media with little to no influence in these situations? These are questions that have puzzled scholars since the end of the Cold War, and yet there are still no clear answers to the somewhat elusive relationship between media and international interventions. However, major political events over the last few years have again highlighted the importance of understanding the role of the media in international politics, and the media's possible influence on foreign policy decisions.

The international humanitarian intervention in Libya in 2011 raises the question of the news media's role in decisions of humanitarian interventions. In March 2011, after only a month of intensive fightings in Libya between Gaddafi's army and the opposition in the country, the UN Security council passed resolution 1973, which opened up for a no-fly zone in Libya and authorized the use of "all necessary measures...to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, including Benghazi"(UN Security Council, Bellamy and Williams 2011:844).¹ An international intervention, led by a NATO-coalition, became a reality. In Syria, a much worse humanitarian situation has taken place, erupting about a month after the first protests broke out in Libya on February 17, 2011. There have been numerous reports of brutal executions of civilians, as well as the Syrian regime using cluster bombs aimed at civilians in populated areas (Human Right Watch, Syrian Observatory For Human Rights).^{2 3} As many as 70 000 Syrians may have been killed so far in the violent fightings (UN News Centre), but despite these numbers and the attempt of

¹ Press statement from UN website: <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2011/sc10200.doc.htm> (accessed 15.03.2013)

² Human Rights Watch Website: <http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/01/16/gruesome-toll-deadly-cluster-bombs-syria> (accessed 15.03.2013)

³ Syrian Observatory For Human Rights Website: http://syriahr.com/en/index.php?option=com_news&nid=683&Itemid=2&task=displaynews#.UW0X9q4xVuE (accessed 15.032013)

countries such as France to raise the issue, an international intervention still seems far-fetched.⁴ Why did the West intervene in Libya, but not in Syria? Can the media have played a part in the policy decision to intervene in Libya, thus influencing the way states act?

1.1 Why study the news media's role in the intervention in Libya?

As the Cold War came to an end in the beginning of the 1990's, the world saw the demise of the bipolar order that had prevailed for decades, and with it the disintegration of what many believed to be a strong anti-communist consensus dominating in the West, particularly prevalent within the United States (Robinson 2002). With a new world order, the 1990's also saw the emergence of a new type of international involvement in foreign countries, namely coercive humanitarian interventions. In the wake of the interventions in northern Iraq in 1991 and Somalia in 1992, many argued that the media, with the advances in communication technology and the demise of the anti-communist consensus, had become so powerful that they had actually pressured the United States to intervene in these crises (Livingston 1997, Robinson 2002). A conventional understanding of a more influential and powerful media began to develop among both scholars and policy makers. Some worried that the media, through extensive and graphic coverage of human suffering in far-away conflicts, could even force politicians into making policy decisions that was not in the national interest of their country (Gilboa 2005, Livingston 1997). This understanding is, however, contradicted by W. Lance Bennett (1990) and his seminal 'indexing theory', which assumes the media to have little to no influence on foreign policy decisions as the media index news according to official sources. Still today, the question of media influence on foreign policy decisions remain contested, and we have little exact knowledge of the role of the media in international relations, and their possible influence with regards to policy decision such as humanitarian interventions.

However, with the military intervention in Libya, the role of the news media in international interventions has again become of interest. As the way we come to see the world, and thus our understanding of international politics, to a large extent is based on the coverage and impressions we receive from mass media (Lippman 1922, Bennett 1994, Luhmann 2000), it seems crucial to better understand the media/foreign policy relation, and the influence the

⁴ UN website: <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=43866#.UW0Vxq4xVuE> (accessed 15.03.2013)

media may have on states' foreign policy actions. The media is far-reaching in our society, and some go as far as to say that all our knowledge about the society in which we live in is brought to us by the mass media (Luhmann 2000). The media becomes in many ways the “the lens through which men see; the medium by which they interpret and report what they see” (Mills 1963:406). Therefore, the way we come to understand humanitarian crises, and the political reactions to them, may to a large extent be shaped by the media's coverage of these crises (Shaw 1996). If this is the case, the importance in understanding the media's role in humanitarian interventions is pivotal, as it may provide crucial insight into why states act the way they do in the international realm. Thus, it is interesting to study the news media's role in the policy decision to intervene in Libya, as it may expand our knowledge of the media/foreign policy relation, as well as to broaden our understanding of the factors that influence why states chose to intervene in some conflicts, but stay out of others.

1.2 Objectives and research questions

The specific objective of this master thesis is to better understand the role of the media related to the international intervention in Libya in 2011. What part did the media play when it came to the political decision to impose a no-fly zone and protect civilians with all necessary measures? Did the media have a pivotal role in affecting the international decision to intervene in yet another Arab country, without any clear indications of how long or costly the war might be? By answering these questions, the hope is to obtain a better understanding of the role of the media when covering humanitarian and political crises, such as the one in Libya, and the possible influence and power the media may have on foreign policy decisions to intervene. The academic goal of this thesis is twofold: Firstly, to look at the case of the intervention in Libya, and better understand the role of the media in this specific humanitarian intervention. Secondly, the aim is to provide more knowledge of the role of the media in international humanitarian interventions, and thus hopefully be able to strengthen the theoretical linkage between media/foreign policy.

My general research questions are as follows:

- To what extent is news media coverage a decisive factor in understanding why the international community chooses to intervene in some humanitarian crises, while not intervening in other?

- What influence did the media have on the political decision to intervene in Libya from March 2011?

In order to answer these questions, the coverage of Libya will be studied through Piers Robinson's 'policy-media interaction model' (2002). This model is to a large extent based on Bennett's 'indexing theory', a theory that seeks to find a direct and causal relationship between media and foreign policy (Bennett 1990). In short, Robinson assumes that the media is rendered non-influential in policy decision when there is elite consensus on a specific issue. In accordance with the indexing theory, the media will in these cases remain uncritical of official policy and marginalize any critical voices outside of the political elite, as they will follow the cues of the politicians (Bennett 1990, Robinson 2002). However, differing from the 'indexing theory', Robinson opens up for the possibility of media influence when there is elite dissensus and policy uncertainty on a political issue. Combined with a critical and empathy-framed media coverage, "the conditions exist under which the CNN effect might occur" (Robinson 2002:31). In other words, the media may influence a policy decision to intervene under these conditions. Robinson's 'policy-media interaction model' is useful to apply, as it not only measures the frequency of coverage of a political issue in order to find a possible causal link, but also looks at the way a crisis is framed within the media, as well as the level of policy certainty among the decision makers. Hence, it provides an extensive and thorough analysis, focusing on several aspects of both the media coverage as well as the political climate in which a policy decision was taken. As an additional analysis, I will also look at the media coverage in Syria, applying the same method as I used to analyze the case of Libya. The study of Syria is implemented into this thesis in order to compare the coverage of these two countries. The hope is that I, by doing so, might detect differences in the coverage of these two crises that can help explain why the international community chose to intervene in Libya, but not in Syria, and ultimately enable me to provide an in-depth answer to the general research questions of this thesis.

It is important to note that this thesis will study the influence of the news media by looking at the media coverage within newspapers. Newspapers only constitute a small part of the news media a whole, by which I mean professional news organizations whose primary goal is to publish news information (Fevik 2011). This selection excludes television, radio, as well as web pages and social media. However, the choice of newspapers, and not news programs in television channels or news coverage on web pages, primarily has to do with the simplicity of gathering and comparing data from different newspapers. Due to the limited scope of this thesis, it is most convenient to use newspapers, as they are easily available and also because the coverage in the newspapers selected from the different countries is easily comparable as they are all leading national newspapers with rather similar political leanings.

While Robinson only tests his model by applying case studies to the United States, this thesis will expand the analysis to include four countries, namely the United States, Britain, Denmark and Norway. Thus, this thesis will look at the role and influence of the news media in these four respective countries regarding the same political decision, which was to intervene in Libya. In doing so, the reach of Robinson's model will be broadened, as it includes more countries, testing if this model is applicable for other countries besides the United States. In addition to this, it provides an opportunity to apply the model to different political systems, namely the two-party system in Britain and the United States, and the multi-party system in Norway and Denmark. According to Gabriel A. Almond's (1956) classical work on comparative political systems, a two-party system is characterized by a "homogeneous, secular political culture" (p 398). Because of the existence of only two political parties, members of the parties find it necessary to adopt moderate positions, thus enabling stability and efficiency. However, with more political parties represented, the political system creates a more heterogeneous and fragmented political culture (Lijphart 1969). It will be fruitful to see if Robinson's model, applied solely to the United States with its two-party system, will be applicable also for countries with differing political systems, and possibly a broader and more fragmented opposition.

The four operational research questions of this thesis are as follows:

1. *What were the central characteristics of the media coverage of the situation in Libya within the main national newspapers in Britain, Norway, the United States and Denmark?*

2. What characterized the domestic political climate in these four countries during the period of policy debate leading up to the intervention?

3. What were the main differences and similarities in the media coverage and political climate in these four different countries?

4. To what extent did the media coverage influence the countries' decision to intervene in Libya, and how can the case of Libya help us to answer the general research questions of this thesis?

In order to answer these questions, the thesis consists of a quantitative content analysis of news articles from four similar mainstream newspapers from the four countries, specifically Aftenposten (Norway), Berlingske (Denmark), The Telegraph (Britain) and The Washington Post (the United States). It also consists of an analysis of press statements and secondary sources in order to assess the level of policy certainty within the four countries, and in this way get an understanding of the elements that characterized the domestic political climate in these countries during the period of policy debate leading up to the intervention. The thesis also consists of a thorough framing analysis, in which the media's framing of Libya will be analyzed. In addition to these three analyses, there will be an analysis of the frequency and range of sources used in the articles on Libya, which can give an indication of whether or not the articles about Libya have been indexed according to the political elite, or if social voices have been able to affect the coverage.

1.3 Why use Libya as a case study?

The choice to use the intervention in Libya as a case study is based on several factors. First of all, the UN resolution to intervene in Libya was passed just a month after the first protests began in Libya, in a rather uncertain political climate with powerful countries in the UN Security Council being skeptical towards such an intervention. While countries such as Britain early on in the process wanted to work towards the implementation of a no-fly zone and international intervention, the US administration and Pentagon were hesitant of this for quite a long time. France was also supporting a no-fly zone, while Germany throughout the

process took a firm stand against an international intervention. Thus, there was a situation taking place on the international political scene, in which both elite dissensus and policy uncertainty seem to be important aspects. Second of all, there was from the very beginning intense international media coverage of the situation in Libya, and the United Nations (UN) very early framed the situation as a problem of humanitarian protection. Colonel Gaddafi provided evidence for this in his speech on March 16, in which he threatened to kill all rebels in the country (Kinsman 2011).

Thus, the international decision to intervene took place rather quickly, among uncertain and divided UN member countries at the same time as there was intense international coverage of the crisis. These factors makes for an interesting case study of possible media effects studied through Robinson's 'policy-media interaction model', as the apparent policy uncertainty, the short timeframe in which the decision was reached, the intense international media coverage and the international division among powerful states may have opened up for greater media influence, creating a pressure towards central international politicians to act quickly.

1.4 Thesis Outline

This thesis begins with a literature review of seminal work related to the topic of media and foreign policy, before outlining the theoretical framework of the thesis, where Robinson's model will be explained and assessed carefully (Chapter 2). The next chapter (Chapter 3) outlines the methodological framework of the thesis, assessing and explaining the conceptualizations, limitations and choices made within the analyses. Here, the four analyses used in the thesis will be explained, and the choices made with regards to the methodological framework will be assessed. Chapter 4 begins by providing a brief background of the Libyan conflict, in order to place the conflict in Libya and the intervention within historical context. The rest of the chapter consists of the empirical findings from the four analyses conducted. The presentation of the empirical findings is divided into four parts, in which the findings from each country are presented separately. At the end of this chapter, there will be a summary where the differences and similarities both in media coverage and the political climate amongst the countries will be presented. In Chapter 5, the empirical findings will be discussed and analyzed with the aim of answering the four operational research questions of

this paper. Finally, in the conclusive chapter of this thesis (Chapter 6), there will be an analysis of the case of non-intervention in Syria. While this additional analysis of Syria does expand the regular structure of a concluding chapter as it introduces new empirical material, I believe this addition can make the concluding part of the thesis more profound and meticulous. By comparing Syria to Libya, the hope is that this can provide a more in-depth answer to the general research questions of this thesis. Are there any significant differences in the media coverage between Syria and Libya that may help to explain why Norway, the United States, Britain and Denmark chose to intervene in one country, but not the other? More importantly, can the media coverage have played a determining role in these policy choices? These questions will be explored in this final chapter, which will end with a conclusion in which the general research questions of this thesis will be answered.

CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This chapter consists of a literature review, where the seminal work done within the field of media/foreign policy relations is presented, as well as the theoretical framework on which this thesis is built. The literature review introduces four distinctly different theories of media power that, without being able to capture all scholarly contribution within this field (Thune, 2009), do provide a useful departure for better understanding “the central theoretical positions that are currently informing the knowledge about the role played by the news media in international politics”(Thune 2009:37). This literature review provides an opportunity to assess the academic research already done within the field of media/foreign policy research. By doing so, the aim is to build on the current knowledge of the media/foreign policy relation, as well as to assess the limitations within these theoretical positions. Hopefully, this can enable me to provide a better basis for which to understand the media’ s role in humanitarian interventions. Ultimately, the hope is that this endeavor will enable me to expand our knowledge of the media/foreign policy relations, and contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of the possible influence the media may assert in relations to how state act. In the second part of this chapter, the theoretical framework of this thesis will be presented. This framework is, as mentioned in the outset of this paper, based on Robinson’s ‘policy-media interaction model’.

2.1 The Confusing Concept of the CNN-effect

The subject of media power and the possible effects that media may have on foreign policy have been debated and written about for decades, without there ever emerging a clear consensus in the field. In the early years, the studies of media and foreign policy focused primarily on the effects media had on public opinion (Bennett, 1994). Already back in 1922, Walter Lippmann studied the media and its effect on public opinion. In the book ”Public Opinion” (1922), Lippmann points out that, as we human beings are never fully able to grasp and understand our environment, we depend on the mass media to provide us with knowledge of the world in which we live. Thus, the media provide us with what we take to be the truth.

In his book, Lippmann explains the importance of the media in shaping our perceptions, writing: “[l]ooking back we can see how indirectly we know the environment in which nevertheless we live. We can see the news of it comes to us now fast, now slowly; but that whatever we believe to be a true picture, we treat as if it were the environment itself” (1922:4).

With the growing importance of television news in the beginning of the 1960’s, there was an increased focus on how the international flow of information could affect foreign policymaking (Nacos et al. 2000). In the 1980’s, with birth of the phenomena of global, real-time news, this became even more prevalent, as the technological revolution within television was assumed to change the role of media (Gilboa 2005). The focus on the media’s possible influence grew particularly strong after the Gulf War in 1991. With the live coverage of this war, CNN would emerge as a powerful broadcasting organization, and this coverage marked a turning point in the history of communication (Gilboa 2005). It laid the foundations for the birth of the myth of the so-called ‘CNN-effect’, which is the belief that global, real-time media have expanded their power and ability to affect foreign policy (Livingston 1997). The media was believed to have a strong impact on policy decisions, particularly when it came to the many humanitarian interventions during the 1990’s (Gilbao 2002, 2005). Statements made by senior officials such as Madeleine Albright gave the impression that the media did indeed have a strong effect on foreign policy (Gilboa 2002). However, the concept of the CNN-effect has been criticized for being both imprecise and confusing (Thune 2009, Gilboa 2005). Many studies of the so-called CNN-effect have been undertaken, but as Gilbao has pointed out, these studies “present mixed, contradictory, and confusing results”(2005:34). According to Steven Livingston (1997), attempts at clarifying the concept have not succeeded and as Etyan Gilboa (2005) and Henrik Thune (2009) point out, there is a clear need for a new research agenda, leaving the CNN-concept behind and developing new ones in order to better understand the relationship between media and foreign policy.

2.2 Indexing theory: The leading research program

The indexing theory has become the dominant school of thought within the scholarly research on the role of news media in international politics and has, according to Thune (2009:61)

developed into the leading research program on this field. Bernard Cohen's seminal book "The Press and Foreign Policy" (1963) was the first of a now long line of articles and books to look at the relationship between the press and foreign policy by studying the behavior and norms of the American foreign affairs reporters. In his book, Cohen studies the tight connection between the executive branch and the foreign affairs journalists. He argues that the press, particularly when aspiring to be "neutral", easily become an instrument to public officials, who represent their primary sources (1963:28).

Extending this argument further, Hallin (1986) studied the role of the media in the Vietnam War. It was believed, especially among conservatives, that the media in this particular case was responsible for undermining the governmental authority; the prevailing thought was that "the media contradicted the more positive view of the war officials sought to project" (1986:3). In Daniel C. Hallin's book "The 'Uncensored' War: The Media and Vietnam", he investigates these claims. Hallin found that, contrary to popular belief, the media did not go against the official view of the war. In fact, the press relied primarily on government officials and American soldiers as sources. As long as there was elite consensus regarding the war, the media would generally project a positive view of the war. Critical coverage did not appear before critical voices within government and administration emerged. Thus, the critical coverage of the Vietnam War was not driven by the media, but by elite dissensus. As Hallin writes, "the administration's problem with the 'fourth branch of government'⁵ resulted in large part from political divisions at home, including within the administration itself" (Hallin 1986:213).

Inspired by the work of Hallin, W. Lance Bennett introduced the indexing theory in 1990 in his article "Toward a Theory of Press-State Relations in the United States"(1990). This hypothesis reflect the central empirical findings of Hallin, namely that the media cover the government voices, and that any critical coverage on a topic will first appear when there is political disagreement on an issue. Bennett started out with the preliminary hypothesis that "mass-media news professionals tend to "index" the range of voices and viewpoints in both news and editorials according to the range of views expressed in the mainstream government debate about foreign affairs topics" (Bennett 1990:106). Bennett looked at the media's coverage of U.S. policy making in Nicaragua in the middle of the 1980's. By conducting a

⁵ The fourth branch of government refers to the media

content analysis of New York Times from this period, measuring the frequency, direction and source of all opinions voiced in this newspaper, Bennett concluded that the opinions voiced in news stories came overwhelmingly from government officials. Public opinions and popular concerns were neglected, although there did emerge public opposition to White House policy (Bennett 1990). As he writes, “the evidence suggests that Times coverage of Nicaragua was cued by Congress, not by the paper’s own political agenda or by a sense of “adversarial journalism” (Bennett 1990:121).

Bennett’s conclusions imply that the coverage of foreign affairs in the media will reflect the opinions and views of the foreign policy elite. Whenever there is elite dissensus on a topic, this will be reflected in the press as critical coverage. However, when there is elite consensus on a topic, critical voices will normally be marginalized. This hypothesis contradicts the popular image of the media as a “watchdog”, constantly challenging and looking over the shoulders of the ones in power. As Bennett’s study illustrates well, the literature within the indexing-theory have cast doubt on the media’s power and ability to affect a foreign policy decisions directly. The conclusion Bennett drew from this is that the media coverage tend to conform to the interests of political elites, therefore rendering it unlikely that the media have the power to set an agenda or influence a political decision, thus contesting the popular beliefs of the CNN-theory.

Several scholars have found empirical evidence in support of the indexing hypothesis, among others Jonathan Mermin (1997), Steven Livingston and Todd Eachus (1996) and Robinson (2002). In the book “Debating War and Peace: Media Coverage of US intervention in the Post-Vietnam Era” (1999), Mermin also finds that critical perspectives on government policy that have not been expressed inside the government are usually ignored or marginalized. The case studies of the interventions in Grenada and Panama show evidence of especially powerful indexing effect, and Mermin concludes that: ”the evidence in support of the indexing hypothesis is impressive” (1999:100). John Zaller and Dennis Chiu (2000) looked at 35 foreign policy crises, and their findings also suggest that the press is following the lead of government officials, and in particular members of Congress and the President. However, the cases they looked at after the end of the Cold War showed only slight support for the indexing hypothesis, and not the strong empirical findings in favor of the indexing hypothesis that Mermin found. Zaller and Chiu’s (2000) findings suggest that the media coverage is more

balanced and less prone to indexing when communism is not involved in the conflicts, as is the case after the Cold War.

In the book “The CNN Effect: The myth of news, foreign policy and intervention” (2002), Piers Robinson developed the ‘policy-media interaction model’. In this model, Robinson applies the indexing theory, while at the same time opening up for instances where the media may in fact have had an effect on foreign policy decisions. In agreement with the indexing theorists, Robinson assumes that journalists follow rather than cause elite dissensus among politicians. Thus, when there is elite consensus on a political issue the media will operate within the “sphere of consensus”, with the result being that the media remain uncritical of the official policy (2002:31). However, Robinson is critical of how the indexing theory, on the basis of this assumption dismisses any independent media influence, thus ignoring the possibility that journalist may play an independent role in those cases where there is elite dissensus regarding a political policy combined with policy uncertainty within the government (Robinson 2001, 2002). In his book, Robinson develops his theory of media influence, the ‘policy-media interaction model’, by attempting to implement the possible news media effects on policy into the indexing theory. He does this by introducing two other concepts to the theory: level of policy certainty and media framing. Robinson’s argument is as follows; under conditions of elite dissensus, policy uncertainty among decision makers and critical and empathy-framed media coverage, the media can influence policymakers to intervene for the sake of humanitarian objectives (2002:128). By applying this model to different humanitarian interventions that took place in the 1990’s, he finds evidence supporting his ‘policy-media interaction model’, but only in cases involving the less risky option of the use of air force. Robinson thus concludes that policy certainty and political leadership can control the news media agenda to a rather extensive degree, which indicates that the media influence over politicians is small. However, in certain cases the media can affect policy decisions to intervene with less risky military options. As Robinson notes, “the findings offer support to the claim of a more powerful media and, at the same time, caution against the over-estimation of media power” (2002:128).

2.3 Other seminal findings within the field

Although the indexing theory has become the dominant school of thought within this field of study, there are several other important scholarly contributions that have examined the role of the news media in international politics outside of this dominant theory. Due to the scope of this thesis, a complete overview of all these contributions is not possible. Instead, the focus here will be on three different theoretical approaches outside of the dominant ‘indexing theory’. These approaches are represented by Robert M. Entman (2000, 2004) and his ‘frame-contestation model’, Gadi Wolfsfeld and his ‘political contest model’, Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky’s (1988, new edition 2002) ‘propaganda-model’, and lastly Martin Shaw (1996) and his focus on the media’s growing importance in a globalized world. These scholarly works are selected as they represent the most important contributions to what Thune (2009) categorizes as different theoretical approaches that, together with the indexing theory, represent four distinctly different theories of media power (2009:43). These four theoretical approaches are journalistic theories, systemic theories, socioeconomic theories and globalization theories. Indexing theory falls in under the category of journalistic theories, while Entman and Wolfsfeld are part of the systemic theories. Herman and Chomsky’s propaganda model is part of what can be termed socioeconomic theories, while Shaw represents the globalization theories. Although these categories do not capture all contributions to the scholarly debate of the media’s role in international politics, it does, as Thune argues, “indicate a useful point of departure for a typology of current knowledge about media/state relations in international politics”(2009:43).

2.3.1 Entman’s ‘frame-contestation model’ and Wolfsfeld’s ‘political contest model’: Contesting the indexing theory

Robert M. Entman and his ‘frame-contestation model’ can be seen as part of the systemic theories of the media in international relations. Systemic theories look at the political role of news media when it comes to foreign policy decision-making, similar to the indexing theorists. It differs, however, in that the systemic theories have a much broader focus on the role of the media. “Here, the impact and the influence of the media on the conduct of foreign policies depend on paradigmatic formations of the international and domestic strategic and ideological climate in which the news media are embedded”, as Thune explains it (2009:48).

Entman contests the view of the indexing theorists, arguing that the media may have an actual impact and influence. According to Entman (2000, 2004), the media's possibility to influence lies in their ability to frame the news in ways that favor one elite's view over another. He argues that the loss of the Cold War paradigm in the 1990's has increased the media's influence, as the demise of the strict Cold War consensus led to elite dissensus, which now has become the rule, rather than the exception. This also means that the White House has lost some of its power to control the framing and definition of issues, since there no longer exists a clearly defined evil regime that poses a direct threat to the United States (2000, 2004). Moving away from a clearly defined enemy within the Cold War paradigm, "this loosening of thought patterns once tightly constrained enhanced the potential power of media as against the White House and made journalists more independent of the elites outside the administration too"(2004:152). Entman argues that one can find evidence of this in cases such as Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo, where the White House according to him had a difficult time controlling the framing of the situation (2004).

In his book "Media and political conflict" (1997), Gadi Wolfsfeld also focuses on the importance of frames and the influence the media can assert when choosing what frames to emphasize. He focuses on the role of the media in unequal political conflicts, meaning conflicts between a government and at least one antagonist that is significantly less powerful than the government, such as a rebel group, a weaker country or a terrorist group. The choice to focus on unequal conflicts is based on the argument that these are the types of conflict where the media have the opportunity to assert most influence over the political process (1997:2). Wolfsfeld argues that the best way to understand the role of the news media in politics "is to view the competition over the news media as part of a larger and more significant contest among political antagonists for political control" (1997:3). This is a competition both over access to news media, and over what types of media frames are conveyed through the media. The competition over media frames means the struggle over meaning, which is an integral part of a conflict, as success when it comes to conveying a particular frame of a conflict to the public can lead to a higher level of support. If what Wolfsfeld calls the challengers, the least powerful antagonists in a conflict, manage to frame themselves as innocent victims, with the authorities as the brutal oppressor, this can have an immense effect, as this frame is an "extremely powerful conveyor belt for bringing their messages to the public"(1997:38).

Thus, Wolfsfeld goes further than Entman in contesting the view of the indexing theorists by arguing that other groups in fact can and do compete with elite sources in the news media (1997:5). According to Wolfsfeld, the media do open up for other groups to affect the framing of a conflict, not just the political elite. While the political elite, have some clear advantages in terms of access to the news media, this does not mean that challengers cannot compete with authorities. As Wolfsfeld argues, “many challengers can overcome these obstacles and use the news media as a tool for political influence” (1997:5). The media’s influence lie here; in their ability to raise the political standing of the challenger in a conflict, which again can lead to the challengers obtaining a rise in political status. Perhaps the most important benefit of increased political standing is the increased likelihood of third-party intervention. According to Wolfsfeld, the media, particularly in recent years, play a critical role in this process; they can shed light on the weaker side of a conflict, bringing their story into the spotlight (1997:67). Wolfsfeld argues that the news media are at their most independent when they advocate the case of the challengers, thus giving more room for the challengers’ frame and less room for the official frame. This involves a focus on the injustice and victims frame of the challengers, which implicitly give the message that “something must be done”. Such a framing puts pressure on political actors to react, to mediate, or to come to the aid of the victims, thus, enabling a possible third-party intervention (1997:68-70). Thus, “[t]he greater and more sympathetic the coverage of challengers and their cause, the more central and independent the role of the news media in altering the balance of power” (1997:72).

2.3.2 The Propaganda Model: Media as an ideological tool

Socio-economic theories of the media within international relations do not focus on the effect of the behavior of the individual journalist, but instead on the media as a social institution. Thus, what one looks at are the structures within the media, and how economic, social and ideological factors may shape and affect the news production (Thune 2009:52). Perhaps the most famous theory of media influence within this group of theories is Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky’s ‘propaganda-model’ from their book ”Manufacturing Consent” (1988, new edition 2002). They argue that the media have no influence or power over decision makers, as the media in fact function as a tool to mobilize support for the state and powerful private interests. Their function is to “serve, and propagandize on behalf of, the powerful societal

interests that control and finance them” (2002: xi). These societal interests have the power to constrain and shape the media, and thus get their agendas and interests through to the public. According to Herman and Chomsky, this propaganda function is not the only function of the media, but it is a very important one. The established power, the government or powerful private interests, have the capabilities of framing news in ways that benefit them, marginalizing dissent and getting their message across to the public (2002:2).

This propaganda model is enabled by structural factors, shaping the way news is being produced. Herman and Chomsky (2002) point to three decisive structural factors, or news “filters”, that shape the way the news is being produced in favor of the powerful and wealthy. First of all, media firms are rather large businesses, controlled by wealthy people whose main goal is to make a profit. Thus, the interests of the owners are often closely connected to other corporations, limiting what the media covers with regards to these corporations. Secondly, the media depend on advertising, and have to an increasing degree taken this into account when they aim to maximize audience. This development “will gradually increase advertising time and marginalize or eliminate altogether programming that has significant public-affairs content”(2002:17). Thirdly, the media depend on powerful official sources, such as government officials or business corporations. These sources are credible, thus making them reliable sources, but they are also easy and cheap for the media, as they usually go to great lengths to provide journalists with information. According to Herman and Chomsky (2002), all of these filters enable the powerful and the wealthy to gain control of the media, rendering the media powerless and without influence towards the established power. Thus, within this understanding of the media, the media is said to have no influence over political decision, but is instead a tool used to frame news in ways that benefit the ones in power, favoring the political agendas of the wealthy and powerful.

2.3.3 Media's role in a global society

In contrast to both the indexing theorists and Herman and Chomsky's propaganda model, Martin Shaw (1996, 2000) argues that the media does in fact have rather extensive power when it comes to influencing politicians and their policy decisions. In fact, the media's role has been expanded throughout these decades, a development that is caused by great changes in world politics (2000). Shaw bases his arguments on the assumption that we now live a

world of cultural and economic globalization, in which a global society has emerged. The world has become more integrated, with the result being the development of a global civil society and the emergence of global crises. The reason for this development is the reduction of distance between the West and the non-Western countries. Here, media come to play an important role in more than one sense. First of all, the global flow of news in our world both undermines distance, but can also be part of creating it. The media is involved with the representation of people in global crises, showing their situation, and are in this way part of shaping the political reactions towards these crises, by either bringing the crisis close to us or distancing us from it (1996:12). In addition to this, governments know that the way they respond to such global crises can affect their standing in domestic politics. Thus, people's reaction to the media's representation of crises, even when not uttered vocally, is of significance (1996:10). As Shaw writes, "[i]n the era of expanded global communications and serial global crises, media and societal responses are part of world politics at every stage"(1996:7).

Shaw (1996) studies the international responses to the Kurdish crisis in 1991, and argues that the media in this particular case had a major effect on the policy decision by Western powers to intervene (1996:156). Of pivotal importance here was the media coverage, in which graphic and strong portrayals of the Kurdish people's suffering made a strong case for intervention. As Shaw notes, "[t]he graphic portrayal of human tragedy and the victims' belief in Western leaders was skillfully juxtaposed with the responsibility and the diplomatic evasions of those same leaders to create a political challenge which it became impossible for them to ignore"(1996:88). Thus, the media coverage here became pivotal when it came to the international intervention.

2.4 Theoretical framework

After having presented the seminal findings within the area of study which constitute the media/foreign policy relations, it is time to move on to explain the theoretical framework on which this thesis is built. As mentioned in the outset of the paper, I have chosen to apply Robinson's 'policy-media interaction model' as the theoretical framework of the thesis.

The model is chosen because it provides a comprehensive analysis of the media/foreign policy relation, by advancing beyond the effect/non-effect dichotomy that has been prevailing in this area of study (Robinson, 2002:37). Robinson's model aims to offer a two-way understanding of media-state relations, as it uses the 'indexing theory' as a foundation for the model, while still opening up for instances when the media may assert influence on a policy decision (Robinson, 2002).

As already mentioned in section 2.2, Robinson's 'policy-media interaction model' is to a large extent based on Bennett's 'indexing hypothesis'. However, unlike Bennett (1990), Robinson opens up for the possibility of the media having an influence on policy processes, even though the news might be indexed according to governmental debate, and therefore are mainly following the cues of politicians. This possibility of influence appears when there is elite dissensus on a political issue, combined with policy uncertainty within the government. Elite dissensus enables critical coverage that can influence uncertain policy makers, and in this sense, according to Robinson, journalists have the opportunity to, intentionally or unintentionally, become important participants in the political debate when they choose which version of the debate to support, and thus also how to frame an issue (2002:15). As Robinson argues:

"This assumption means that elite manufacturing consent theory⁶ tends to ignore the possibility that journalist might actually take sides (either consciously or unintentionally) during elite debates over policy, or even take the side of non elites (Wolfsfeld 1997), and in doing so become active and powerful participants in political debate" (2002:15).

According to Robinson, the indexing theory "black boxes" the possible media effects that a given coverage may have on a policy decision by not exploring this possibility at all (Robinson 2001, 2002). Much of the research done on the CNN-effect focuses on policy certainty as a key factor in determining any possible media influence on a policy decision. Robinson notes that: "it appears that, as policy certainty decreases, news media influence increases and that, as policy becomes more certain, the influence of news media coverage is

⁶ Robinson have chosen to rename Bennett's 'indexing theory' to 'elite manufacturing consent theory', as he argues that this label incorporates the essence of these types of elite models of media-state relations, namely that news media are influenced by government policy, and rarely the other way around (2002). I have chosen to use the label 'indexing theory' in this paper, as I believe the label 'elite manufacturing consent theory' to be too close to Herman and Chomsky's 'manufacturing consent theory'(1988).

reduced” (2002:25). Media framing is the other important part of Robinson’s policy-media interaction model. Here, the focus is on how news media coverage frames a humanitarian crisis. News media do not “objectively” portray humanitarian crises. Instead, coverage of one crisis can be very emotive and graphic, sympathizing with the victims, while coverage of another crises may be more distant and less emotive (Robinson 2002). Thus, the framing gives an indication of what type of pressure news media might have been asserting (2002:27). A strong focus on the victims of a conflict, e.g. starving refugees or suffering women, identifies them as victims in need of help, which can have an influence on a policy-decision “to do something”. Equally, a critical framing of a government’s inaction can have an influence on policy makers, as it creates a political imperative on policy makers to act. Robinson calls this empathy and critical-framing of a conflict (Robinson 2002:29).

Table 2.1 The policy–media interaction model and theories of media–state relations (Robinson 2001, 2002)

Level of elite consensus	Media- state relationship	Role of the media
Elite consensus	The media operate within “sphere of consensus” and coverage reflects elite consensus on policy	Executive manufacturing consent: the media remain uncritical and help build support for official policy
Elite dissensus	The media operate within “sphere of legitimate controversy” (Hallin 1986) but coverage, overall does not favor any side of the elite debate	The media reflect elite dissensus as predicted by Hallin (1986) and Bennett (1990) but remain non-influential
Elite dissensus but policy certainty within executive	The media operate within “sphere of legitimate controversy”(Hallin 1986) but coverage, overall, becomes critical of government policy	Although coverage pressures government to change policy, policy certainty within executive means that media influence is resisted
Elite dissensus plus policy uncertainty within government	The media take sides in political debate and coverage becomes critical of government. The media are now active participants influencing elite debate	“ The CNN effect”: in conditions of policy uncertainty, critical media coverage provides bargaining power for those seeking a change in policy or makes policymakers feel pressured to respond with a policy or else face a public relations disaster. Here the media can influence policy outcomes

By implementing the level of policy certainty and framing of coverage, Robinson illustrates what type of effect the media may have on policy decisions in different situations. In the table above, Robinson describes his ‘policy-media interaction model’. As one can see, there are four possible media effects. When there is elite consensus on a topic, the media will act in

accordance with the manufacturing consent theory, or the indexing theory, thus making it unlikely that the media will produce coverage that challenge the consensus. However, when there is elite dissensus on a topic, the media will reflect this debate, covering both sides of the issue. Here, one can see the beginning of what may be a more influential media, but as long as they are not favoring any sides, the media will remain non-influential. The possible influence towards a policy decision begins if the journalists start to promote one side of the debate over the other, framing the news so that it reflect this particular side of the debate. When there is policy certainty within the executive, this critical coverage will be resisted by the government, which means that policy-makers are unlikely to be influenced by the media (Robinson 2002). If however, “policy uncertainty in government combines with elite dissensus and critical and empathy-framed media coverage the conditions exist under which the CNN effect might occur” (2002:31). Thus, in these instances the media may have an influence on a foreign policy decision.

2.4.1 Expanding the theoretical framework: Implementing an analysis of news sources

While the theoretical framework of this thesis is based on Robinson’s ‘policy-media interaction model’, I have also chosen to expand this model by implementing an additional analysis to the theoretical framework, namely an analysis of news sources that measures the frequency and range of sources that appeared in the coverage of the situation in Libya. This choice is based on what I perceive to be lacking in Robinson’s model; the fact that he does not study the type of sources that are present in the news coverage on foreign policy issues, particularly within the coverage prior to when a policy decision is taken. Robinson takes it as a starting point in his analysis that the media index their news according to official sources. Thus, his basis of analysis is the assumption that the ability of the media to influence a policy decision is dependent on particularly elite dissensus and lies mostly in the media’s ability to favor one side of the political debate and therefore become critical of the government. This can again pressure politicians into acting or change a policy. However, in my opinion, it is an important addition of the model to study the sources present in the coverage, as this can give indications of the voices that managed to gain access to the coverage, and subsequently may affect they way the conflict is framed. By doing so, one can get a more complete picture of the voices that shape the narrative and framing of the conflict, and thus in many ways shaped

the understanding of that particular conflict. In addition to this, it enables to see whether or not an indexing of news according to official sources actually took place in the coverage of a conflict.

The analysis of the frequency and range of news sources consists of a quantitative analysis, in which all the sources that are present in the articles on the conflict in Libya are counted and organized in groups of ‘civilians’, ‘experts’, ‘officials’ and ‘Libyan officials’ (the method is detailed in more depth below in chapter 3.4). There are two reasons why this addition is of importance. Firstly, in his article explaining the indexing theory, Bennett (1990) writes that

“ when official opinion is in disarray for any of a variety of reasons, the journalistic process may be relatively more chaotic. With this chaos may come a decline in the familiar “official” narrative structure, opening the way for anomalous news narratives told through disparate social voices” (1990:107).

Thus, when dealing with a conflict or a situation that suddenly and surprisingly emerges on the global political arena, such as the Arab Spring in general and the conflict in Libya in particular, the politicians may be left uncertain and confused as to how to react and how to approach the situation politically. In situations like these, the indexing theory and its presumption that the media do not have the power to directly affect a foreign policy decision because they simply follow the cues and opinions of the politicians, may be incorrect as it does in fact open up for other voices to be heard besides the political elite, filling the vacuum of the political disarray and absence of political debate. As Bennett (1990:107) himself writes, it may become impossible for journalists in these situation to apply the indexing norm, which can leave the possibility open for other voices to be heard. This is an interesting point to make, because it means that there may occur situations also in foreign policy that open up for an “anomalous news narrative”, meaning news narratives that are shaped by other sources than the political elite. This may also open up for some kind of media influence, as the politicians then react to the media coverage instead of being the ones who initiate the coverage.

Secondly, if social voices are dominating the news coverage of a foreign policy issue, it is also of great interest to study what type of sources are dominating the news coverage. If sources that support the Gaddafi regime in this case are dominating the coverage, it is logical

to assume that they can affect the framing of the news coverage, and in this way also the way the conflict is understood. In the same way, the framing will probably be affected if non-governmental organizations involved with human right issues are dominating the news narrative, and likewise if the Libyans opposing the Gaddafi regime have been dominating the news coverage. Thus, this analysis can give an indication both as to whether or not the media may have had an influence on politicians to act, and also provide a better understanding of the voices that have been able to influence the framing of the conflict, and subsequently how the conflict is understood.

CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK

As seen in the previous chapters, the aim of this thesis is to study the possible influence of the media in the intervention in Libya by applying Robinson's 'policy-media interaction model'. In this chapter, I will explain and assess the methodological framework of the thesis, meaning the method applied to gather and analyze the data used to study the media coverage of the conflict in Libya and the level of policy certainty in the four countries during the period of policy debate leading up to the intervention. As Ole R. Holsti (1969) writes, a good research design is one that clearly states the objective of the study, and ensures that theory, data gathering, analysis and the interpretation of data are integrated (1969:27). Thus, the aim of this chapter is to construct a research design that is comprehensive, thorough and reflects the objective of this thesis: to study the possible influence of the media on the decision to intervene in Libya.

The methodological framework of this thesis relies on a combination of both qualitative and quantitative analyses. Some of the analyses conducted are solely quantitative, such as the quantitative content analysis and the news source analysis measuring the frequency and range of sources. The framing analysis, on the other hand, implements both a quantitative and qualitative approach in order to enhance the reliability and validity of the findings. Such a use of multiple methods is called triangulation, and is applied within social sciences as a method to cross validate data, based on the idea that multiple viewpoints can give a greater accuracy. This may also provide a more holistic view of the units that are analyzed (Jick 1979, Bryman 2008). I will begin this chapter by explaining the research design as a whole, before I move on to explain more in more depth the different type of analyses used in the thesis, as well as the choices made regarding selections of analysis material and timeframe. Lastly, I will explain and assess the limitations and challenges related to the method chosen for this thesis.

3.1 Research Design

The research design of this thesis is fourfold. Firstly, I will conduct a quantitative content analysis, in which I study the coverage of Libya both prior to the decision to intervene and after the decision was taken. All news articles regarding Libya will be counted, together with the coverage of Libya within the commentary section, consisting of commentaries, opinion editorials and editorials. This will give an indication of how extensive the coverage of Libya has been within the timeframe of the analysis, as well as at what time the coverage was most extensive and when it was least extensive. This is important, as marginal coverage prior to a policy decision gives an indication of little possible media influence, while a massive coverage of a crisis prior to a policy decision may on the other hand give an indication of more possible media influence, as the politicians may have been pressured into responding to this coverage. This can also indicate whether or not an indexing has taken place within the coverage, as one can see if the coverage initiated or followed elite debate.

Secondly, I will analyze the framing of the conflict. Was there a dominant framing of the conflict, and could this framing have played a part in the policy decision to intervene? In order to detect the framing of the conflict in Libya, I will read all the articles regarding Libya in order to identify their subject matter and develop a sense of the overall tone of the articles (Robinson 2002:137). Also, in accordance with Robinson's model (Robinson 2002:138), I will apply a more systematic approach by conducting a quantitative keyword test, in which I test if the inferences made in the interpretive analysis can be confirmed by the keyword test.

Thirdly, I will analyze the level of policy certainty prior to when the decision to intervene was taken. If this policy certainty was high, with little or no elite dissensus, there is a strong probability that the politicians had already made up their minds, leaving little room for media coverage to influence the policy decision. However, as policy certainty decreases, the influence of news media increases (Robinson 2002). Hence, detecting the level of policy certainty is pivotal for understanding what influence the media coverage may have had on the decision to intervene. This analysis consists of press statements and press briefings from the different countries, as well as an analysis of secondary sources such as news reports.

Finally, I will analyze the frequency and range of sources that are present in the coverage. This is an important addition to the other analyses, as it gives a better indication of what type

of sources may have been able to shape the media framing of the conflict, and what type of sources were dominating the coverage prior to the policy decision was taken.

3.1 Quantitative content analysis of newspapers

In order to get a an overview and asses the extent of the news coverage on the situation in Libya, both prior to and after the policy decision to intervene was taken, I have conducted a quantitative content analysis of the four newspaper included in this thesis, namely The Washington Post, Berlingske, The Telegraph and Aftenposten. As Ole R. Holsti writes (1969:2), content analysis is a research method that is specifically developed for investigating the content of communication, in this case the communication within newspapers regarding the specific issue of Libya. All news articles about Libya in these respective newspapers were counted, as well as all editorials, opinion editorials, news analyses and commentaries. In order to obtain a complete overview regarding the coverage of the situation in Libya in these four newspapers during the timeframe of the analysis, I have looked through three of the papers, Berlingske, Aftenposten and The Washington Post, on microfilms provided by the National Library of Norway and the Library of Congress in Washington, DC. As it proved difficult to obtain microfilms of the coverage in The Telegraph, I contacted this paper directly and was sent the articles on Libya within the timeframe of analysis. In order to obtain a stronger reliability, and prevent any articles from being overlooked, I also examined The Telegraph's coverage within the newspaper collection at The British Library in London.

Two of the newspapers in this analysis, The Telegraph and The Washington Post, are broadsheet newspapers, while Aftenposten and Berlingske are in tabloid format. The tabloid format is half the size of the conventional broadsheet newspapers, thus differing both in the size and layout from the broadsheet newspapers (Örnebring and Jönsson 2004). Because of these differences, it became difficult to adopt one singular method of counting the extent of coverage. While an article in Aftenposten and Berlingske usually covers between half a page and up to two pages, a page in The Washington Post and The Telegraph usually consists of several more articles. Applying the same method of counting would thus give an inaccurate impression of the extent of coverage in the four newspapers, as the layout and the size of the papers differs quite a lot. Therefore, I found it most appropriate to count the coverage of

Aftenposten and Berlingske in number of pages, while the coverage of The Washington Post and The Telegraph in number of articles. This provides a more accurate picture of the extent of coverage within these newspapers.

3.1.1 Sampling of newspapers

This thesis bases its analysis of the media's possible influence in the intervention in Libya on the media coverage in four different newspapers from four countries. These newspapers are: The Washington Post (the United States), The Telegraph (Britain), Berlingske (Denmark) and Aftenposten (Norway). The newspapers are chosen because they have several important similarities, which is of great importance in order to compare the coverage between the different countries. The newspapers are all among the leading newspapers in their respective countries, based in the capital, and with a rather conservative political stance. While The Washington Post and The Telegraph are both broadsheet newspapers, Aftenposten and Berlingske are published in tabloid format, albeit with a coverage that is more similar to what one sees as typical for the broadsheet newspapers; a rather sober tone in the articles and in-depth coverage on a variety of issues. Therefore, although they are printed in the tabloid format, they do not incorporate the traits that have been said to be specific of the tabloid newspaper, such as simplification of complex issues, emotionalism and sensationalism (Örnebring and Jönsson 2004:287). As these newspapers are all prestigious national newspapers, they fall into the group of what Bennett calls "leading press organizations"(1990:106), and it is plausible to assume that they are part of setting the professional standard and influencing the daily news agenda in their respective countries. In this sense, the foreign policy coverage here may influence the coverage in other newspapers, as other newspaper may look to these leading newspapers for what constitutes news (Mermin 1999:13) It is also plausible to expect that they, in their role as leading press organization and large prestigious newspapers, will be read by the elite readership, which the political elite is part of.

3.1.2 Choice of time period for analysis

The analysis of the coverage of the situation in Libya stretches from February 18 to March 31, 2011, 41 days all together. This particular timeframe is chosen because the first protests in Libya started on February 17, 2011. The conflict in Libya first appeared as a story in the newspapers on February 18, and by starting the analysis on this day, one can get a more complete overview and understanding of the media coverage of this issue. This timeframe follows the conflict all the way through the end of March. The decision to intervene was taken on March 17, when the UN Security Council passed resolution 1973. By extending the analysis throughout March, it is possible to obtain a thorough impression of how the coverage was characterized also after this decision to intervene had been taken.

The analysis is divided into four different periods; February 18 to 26, February 27 to March 12, March 13 to 17, and March 18 to 31. These four periods represent important political decisions taken in the conflict in Libya, culminating in the final decision to intervene. The first period, February 18 to 26, cover the period from when the first protests and killings started in Libya until the UN Security Council passed resolution 1970, condemning the violations of human rights and the killing of civilians, as well as imposing economic sanctions against the Gaddafi regime. This was a rather strong international reaction, coming just nine days after the violence had begun. The next period, February 27 to March 12, represents the period from when the first UN resolution was passed until the Arab League called for the UN Security Council to impose a no-fly zone over Libya. This was a surprising call to make from the regional organization who had previously been skeptical towards interventions, and it was by far the most important reason why the UN Security council five days later was able to pass resolution 1973, approving military attacks against Gaddafi's military forces (Bellamy and Williams 2011). With the approval of Arab states, it became easier for countries such as the US to agree on a military intervention, as well as making it difficult for China and Russia to veto it. Thus, in many ways, this time period was the most decisive.

The third period, March 13 to 17, represent the time period from when the Arab League called on the UN Security Council to impose a no-fly zone until the UN Security Council passed the resolution. The last period, March 18 to 31, represents the time period from when the resolution was passed and the international military intervention began. This period is included to compare the coverage before and after the decision was made.

3.2 Framing of news

Framing is one of three elements in Robinson's 'policy-media interaction model', and is an important tool used in order to understand what kind of pressure the news media may have been exerting on politicians and public opinion (Robinson 2002:279). Robinson bases his ideas on Entman's (1991,1993) work on media framing, in which Entman sees framing as a way "to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation" (1993:52). Hence, by selecting a certain focus in a news story, e.g. the humanitarian crises in a conflict situation, the media may influence the way people come to understand that specific situation. This implies that in those cases where a single frame dominates the coverage and narrative of an issue, a majority of people will come to a common understanding of that event (Entman, 1991). News frames are made up of keywords, metaphors, concepts, symbols and images that are emphasized in a news narrative, and the way to detect a specific framing is by searching for concepts, images and words that are repeated throughout the narrative, and thus make up the media frame (Entman 1991:7).

Robinson separates between what he labels distance framing/empathy-framing, and between support framing/critical-framing (2002:28). With distance-framing, the coverage of an event is framed so that it creates an emotional distance between the audience and the people suffering in a conflict. Here, the use of key words such as 'soldiers', 'men' or 'Muslims' create a barrier between the audience and the people described. Empathy-framing, on the other hand, puts an emphasis on the suffering of the people, identifying them as victims. Here, the coverage will bring the conflict closer to the audience, often using keywords such as 'mother', 'children' and 'people', which the audience can more easily relate to emotionally. A support frame is a frame that creates support for a policy decision taken, for example a humanitarian intervention. Robinson employs a combination of approaches in order to identify the empathy/distance framing and the support/critical framing in news coverage. First, he goes through the media reports to detect the overall tone and emphasis of the report and to identify the subject matter. This is a in a unsystematic and interpretive approach, but Robinson argues that it does possess a high degree of validity, since it requires the researcher to thoroughly read the reports and assess the overall tone of the reports is (2002:137). The second approach Robinson uses is more systematical and reliable, and consists of quantifying

the keywords used in reports. First, one has to predict a set of key words that are expected to be associated with each frame. Thus, when choosing keywords associated with a critical-frame or a support-frame, one has to look for words that are either critical of a policy line or supportive of it. Secondly, one has to count the key words in a report as they are used in relation to the subject of enquiry (2002:139).

In the framing analysis of the media coverage of the situation in Libya, the conceptualization of the support frame and the critical frame differs slightly from how Robinson conceptualizes it. Robinson conceptualizes a critical-framing as one that is critical of a government's policy, and a support-framing as one that is in support of a government's policy line. Thus, when the media coverage has a critical-framing, this can create pressure towards a government to respond by changing its policy (2002:31). However, as Robinson writes, it is necessary in each case to establish precisely what aspects of a policy may have been open to criticism, as well as the actual policy debate that occurred in order to choose the keywords connected to each frame (2002:138). In my opinion, the most important aspect of the Libyan case was not the question of whether the media coverage was critical of a government's position or not, but whether or not the media created a framing that explicitly or implicitly built support for the opposition's cause, thus enabling the intervention from the international society. Hence, I conceptualize the support frame as one that builds support for the Libyan opposition movement. Such a frame is one in which the Libyan opposition is framed as a group fighting for basic human rights such as freedom and democracy, while framing the Gaddafi regime as a brutal oppressor. As Wolfsfeld argues, such a framing has a powerful effect, as it delegitimizes the authority, while at the same time legitimizes the claims of the challengers, raising their political power (1997).

Thus, a support frame in the coverage of the situation in Libya would be one that magnifies the position of the Libyan opposition (Entman 2004), emphasizing their goal as legitimate while focusing on values that are seen as "good" in the eyes of Western leaders, such as freedom and democracy. Although not explicitly supporting an intervention, such a framing may have an influence in affecting politicians to intervene for at least two reasons. Firstly, a discourse of freedom, democracy and liberation from a brutal dictator appeals to Western leaders as these are seen as Western values pivotal for development and peace. That would make it harder for the leaders to justify not supporting the opposition by intervening. Secondly, a framing that focuses on major human rights violations and the attacks on civilians

may pressure the politicians into feeling that something should be done in order to avoid another genocide, like the ones in Rwanda in 1994 and Srebrenica in 1995.

A critical-framing, on the other hand, is one that frames the Libyan opposition as an Islamist group, connected to terrorist organizations such as Al-Qaeda or in other ways incorporate an anti-Western attitude. Such a framing would effectively delegitimize the opposition’s claims, and make it easier for the Gaddafi regime to justify strong actions taken against the group. This will to a higher degree promote the authorities’ ‘law and order’-frame, justifying their actions as a method to uphold stability and peace (Wolfsfeld 1997).

Therefore, the keywords selected to measure a possible support frame are words and rhetorical options that help construct a framing of the opposition in Libya as democratic activists and regime opponents, with words such as ‘freedom/freed and ‘democracy’. The support frame also involves words that frame both Gaddafi, as well as his actions towards the Libyan people, in very negatively loaded ways, such as ‘tyrant’ and ‘brutal’. This helps to build support for the opposition’s cause, while also helping to justify a humanitarian intervention and delegitimizing the Gaddafi regime. Words such as ‘bloodbath’ and ‘genocide’ are particularly potent in underlining the atrocities committed against the people in Libya, whilst also emphasizing the seriousness of the actions committed by the Gaddafi regime. Keywords connected to a critical-frame are words that are critical towards the opposition, referring to them as ‘Islamists/Islamist’ or connected to terrorism. Also, an emphasis on the violence or killings they commit, or describing them as dangerous, would make it more difficult for the opposition forces to receive international support. The support-frame keywords and the critical-frame keywords are as follows:

Table 3.1: Support keywords	Table 3.2: Critical keywords
1. Regime opponents	1. Islamists/Islamist
2. Democracy	2. Terrorists/Terrorist connection
3. Democratic movement/democratic activists	3. Dangerous
4. Freedom/Freed	4. Violent/Ruthless
<i>Regarding Gaddafi and his regime:</i>	5. Criminals/Bandits
5. Tyrant/brutal	6. Occupants/occupy

6. Bloodbath/bloody/massacre	7. Kill/killed (committed by the opponent groups)
7. Genocide/mass killings	

When it comes to measuring an empathy-frame and a distance/neutral-frame, the keywords are as follows:

Table 3.3: Empathy keywords	Table 3.4: Distance/neutral keywords
1. People/civilans	1. Soldier/fighter
2. Protesters/demonstrators	2. Muslim
3. Kill/killed (committed by Gaddafi)	3. Uncertain/uncertainty
4. Violence/violent (committed by Gaddafi)	4. Poorly managed/led
5. Refugees	5. Men
	6. Libyans
	1. Soldier/fighter

The empathy frame keywords are chosen because they help create a framing of the conflict as one in which protesters and innocent civilians are being killed by the Gaddafi regime. Within Western culture, the words ‘demonstrator’ and ‘protester’ carry connotations of civilians, usually unarmed, while protesting is seen as one of the most vital rights in a civil society. When protesters are being shot at or attacked by the authorities, this helps promote a framing of the protesters as victims and the authorities as brutal oppressors. These descriptions give the reader a more empathic impression than words such as ‘fighter’, ‘men’ or ‘soldier’, and most strongly in this setting, ‘Islamist’ or ‘terrorist’. ‘Fighter’, ‘men’ or ‘soldier’, as Robinson argues, carry connotations of power and responsibility, thus minimizing the sympathy and distancing the readers from those described, while also creating an impression that the opposition is on more equal terms with the Gaddafi forces than civilians and demonstrators are (Robinson 2002: 138). Using the words ‘civilians’ and ‘people’ when describing suffering people create a nearness towards those described, reminding the reader of their similarity with them, while also illustrating the imbalance in power between the civilians and the Gaddafi regime (Robinson 2002).

3.3 Measuring policy uncertainty

Robinson builds on the work of, among other, Hilsman (1987) and George (1989) in order to define policy uncertainty, and thus enable the measurement of the level of policy uncertainty within a government. In short, through the work of George (1980) and Hilsman (1987), Robinson understands policy-making as the outcome of a complex bargaining process between a set of subsystems in government. The most important subsystem within the United States consists of the President and his closest policy advisers, while the Pentagon, State Department, National Security Council, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the CIA are other subsystems that can exert power when a policy decision is being made (Robinson 2001, 2002). Within this conception, policy certainty can be defined as a function of the degree of consensus and coordination of these subsystems when making a foreign policy decision. Robinson applies George's (1989:114) typology of faulty policy that may emerge from intra-governmental politics when he defines policy uncertainty. According to this definition, a policy might be "unstable" when different sub-systems disagree with each other, which again will lead to an inconsistent or undecided policy. Not forming a policy is another form of uncertain policy, often occurring when a crisis unexpectedly occurs, with no policy being in place. Lastly, wavering policy is a form of uncertain policy reflected when there is little commitment within the sub-systems to a particular policy, resulting in the policy changing frequently (Robinson 2002:27, 134). As Robinson notes, "(t)aken together these three types of policy, if observed either within a policy sub-system or between sub-systems, can be taken to be indicative of policy uncertainty within the executive" (2002:27).

Robinson's method to measure the policy uncertainty is primarily to analyze officially released documents, such as press briefings and press statements issued by the White House, the Pentagon and the State Department. There are limitations to this, as press statements and briefings can be used to misinform political opponents or to disguise the real policy intentions, something Robinson also takes into account. However, as the executive branch is dependent on maintaining public support especially in crisis situations, it is safe to assume that the press briefings will try to avoid any indications of a policy uncertainty. Thus, when one can find evidence of wavering policy, no policy or inconsistent/undecided policy in these situations, one can assume that this is a rather strong indication of uncertainty within the executive (Robinson 2002:136). On the other hand, when the executive have already decided on an intervention, the press briefings will most likely be used to justify and promote this

policy, which can be observed as a high level of certainty. In addition to this method, Robinson goes through several secondary sources and primary interviewing in order to strengthen the inferences made by the analyses of press briefings and statements (Robinson 2002:136).

While Robinson only applies his model to the United States, and thus only measures the level of policy certainty within this country, I am applying the model to four countries. Hence, I will measure the level of policy certainty within the executive in Denmark, Norway, the United States and Britain. Except for this difference, I will apply the same method as Robinson when measuring the level of policy certainty, namely by studying press briefings and press statements from the respective countries, as well as examining secondary sources such as news report in which politicians speak out on the issue of Libya. The important point of the analysis is to detect the level of policy certainty, as well as to find the point when the policy decision to intervene was taken. If the policy decision to intervene in Libya was taken early in the process, this leaves little room for a possible influence by the media. However, if a government decided late in the process and there was a generally high level of uncertainty within the government, this opens up for a much higher possibility of media influence.

3.4 Measuring frequency and range of sources

In order to measure the frequency and range of sources that are present in the coverage of the Libyan conflict, I have adopted the method Jonathan Mermin (1999) applies in his book “Debating War and Peace: Media Coverage of US Intervention in the Post-Vietnam Era”. Mermin applies this analysis in order to investigate the indexing theorists’ claim that journalists rely extensively on official sources, thus marginalizing critical perspectives on government policy that do not come from inside the government itself (1999:19). In order to assess whether or not such an indexing takes place in the media coverage of foreign policy issues in the United States, Mermin measures the frequency of sources consulted on a variety of US foreign policy decisions. His analysis consists of dividing the sources into groups of ‘players’, ‘experts’ and ‘the public’ (1999:28), detecting frequency of each group. This can give an indication of what types of voices are consulted on a foreign policy decision, and also the extent to which official sources come to dominate the coverage.

Politicians and government officials fall into the group called ‘players’, while the ‘experts’ represent former politicians and government officials, researchers connected to Washington think tanks, as well as university academics. Academics are viewed as having a more independent voice than former government officials and people connected to Washington think tanks, as the latter groups can have a political agenda and thus “incentives and inclinations to express views consistent with those being expressed inside the government”(1999:29). University academics, on the other hand, usually stand free to address issues and alternative policy approaches that the former group of experts may not be able to talk about (ibid). Adopting Mermin’s method, the analysis of sources in this paper is divided into:

Table 3.5: Overview of the different groups of sources

Official sources		Experts		Non-Official Sources	Official Libyan sources
National official sources	International official sources	Former government officials, and people connected to government think tanks	University Academics (also include academics and researchers connected to research institutes)	Civilians (includes ordinary people, interest groups, NGO’s, other media, people connected to the Libyan opposition)	Politicians connected to the Gaddafi regime, Libyan media

Due to the scope of this paper, the groups of sources differ somewhat from the ones Mermin (1999) applies in his analysis. While Mermin did not include foreign sources, as he argues that these do not have much credibility to an American audience, foreign sources are included in this analysis. These sources are included because the intervention in Libya was an international decision that took place on a global political stage. Thus, foreign official sources are relevant in this analysis, as they could have an influence also on the national debate discussing a possible intervention. Within this analysis, the sources who are not official or experts are placed in the group ‘civilians’. This group consists of the social voices, namely ordinary people, interest groups such as Human Right Watch, as well as Libyan civilians and those connected to the opposition forces. These sources are independent of the official sources

and may contribute to a different framing of the conflict than official sources. Other media are also part of this group. Often, newspapers will refer to other news sources, such as Reuters, BBC and CNN, in their articles, and these sources also represent civilian sources, independent of political ties. Lastly, a group is added which consists of the official Libyan sources and Libyan media quoted in the coverage. These are not placed in the group of foreign officials or civilians, as it is safe to assume that this group has a clear political agenda aimed at delegitimizing the Libyan opposition and argue against an intervention. Therefore, it is interesting to see how much they make up of the total amount of sources in the coverage of the Libyan conflict, and to what extent they may have affected the framing of the conflict.

3.6 Scope of the thesis and methodological limitations

This thesis bases its discussion and analysis on the findings from four countries, namely Britain, the United States, Norway and Denmark. In order to study the media coverage of the situation in Libya in these four countries, I have conducted analyses of one newspaper from each country: The Telegraph, The Washington Post, Aftenposten and Berlingske, within a timeframe of 41 days. There are some limitations related to this selection that needs to be assessed.

One limitation of this thesis is the low number of newspapers, as I only used one newspaper from each country. Whilst this is in accordance with Robinson's model, which is the methodological framework of the thesis, it does represent an analytical limitation, because it makes it more probable that the selection may not be representative of how the media coverage of Libya in fact was in these countries. When you have a wider selection of articles and newspapers, it is easier draw generalizations from your selection to the media (Østbye, Helland et al 2007). However, as this thesis does not aim at providing an exact media analysis of how the news coverage of the situation in Libya was characterized in the respective countries, but instead is focused on how the media coverage may have influenced the state to act, it still represents a good selection. As mentioned above in section 3.1.1, these newspapers represent "leading news organizations" (Bennett 1990:106), and as leading elite newspapers it is plausible that they are read by the political elite, and also that they are part of setting the news agenda among other newspapers in their countries (Entman 1999). In this sense, the coverage from these newspapers represents a useful point of departure for analyzing the

media coverage on Libya and the influence it may have had on the political decision to intervene.

Secondly, the selection of countries for this analysis must be addressed. The four countries in this thesis are chosen as they represent countries that were all involved in the intervention in Libya. Preferably, I should have looked at *all* the countries involved in this intervention, as it would have given me a better understanding of whether or not there were aspects of the media coverage in all these countries that could give indications of a possible media influence. Unfortunately, due to the limited scope of this thesis, I had to make a selection. The choice of using these four countries as case studies is based on the fact that there are some interesting differences between these countries that can provide more insight into Robinson's model, as well as give more insight into the role of the media in foreign policy decisions. Norway and Denmark are relatively small countries with a multi-party system, while the United States and Britain are larger, more powerful countries with a two-party system. While Britain began to argue in favor of a no-fly zone rather early in the policy process, and Denmark supported such actions, the United States and Norway seemed much more hesitant of a military intervention throughout the policy process. These differences can provide a more comprehensive understanding of the media's role in this policy decision, because it provides data from countries with different political systems, which made their decision to intervene under different circumstances and under different political climate.

A last limitation within this thesis is that there are three days lacking from the data material of the British media coverage on Libya, and five days lacking from the data material of the British media coverage on Syria. This missing data material is due to the difficulty of gaining access to archives containing old editions of *The Telegraph*. I was luckily sent most of the articles needed in the analyses of the media coverage of Libya and Syria from *The Telegraph*'s own library section. However, as this represented a very extensive task for the library due to the large timeframe of analysis in both Syria and Libya, it was impossible to get a hold of the all articles from *The Telegraph* in time. I therefore went to the British Library in London, where they have old editions of *The Telegraph* in their original forms. However, the British Library does not hold Sunday editions, and for this reason the dates February 27 and March 27 is missing from the Libya material. In addition, March 26 was also missing from their collection. In the Syria material, March 26, March 27, April 3, April 10 and April 17 are missing. Although this is unfortunate, as the analysis material from Britain is incomplete, I

believe the data material from the British coverage to be large enough to still provide insight into the media coverage of Syria and Libya in The Telegraph.

CHAPTER FOUR: EMPIRICAL FINDINGS

As stated in the introduction of this paper, the aim of the thesis is to study the role of the media in the decision to intervene in Libya by looking at four different countries; Britain, the United States, Denmark and Norway. In this chapter, I will present the empirical findings from the analyses conducted of these four countries, which will create the background for further discussion in Chapter 5. The findings from each country will first be presented separately, before I in the last part of this chapter move on to compare and highlight the major empirical findings amongst these four countries, first in relation to the coverage in the different countries, and lastly in relation to the domestic political climate that prevailed in these countries. The chapter will, however, begin with a brief background of the conflict and intervention in Libya, in order to provide some contextual and historical background to the analyses

4.1 Background of conflict and intervention in Libya

What seemed to begin as non-violent protests in Libya on February 17, 2011, would soon develop into a protracted and violent civil war (Anderson 2011). Inspired by the uprising in Tunisia and Egypt, the rebellion in Libya was a reaction to the mismanagement of the country, caused by the rule of Colonel Gaddafi (Brahimi 2011). After decades living under the brutal regime of Colonel Gaddafi, Libya had become a country divided by kin and clan. There was lack of any form of public sector, and corruption and scarcity of basically everything had made people lose faith in the government, seeking instead protection among family and clan (Anderson 2011).

While protests in Tunisia and Egypt had caused the leaders to capitulate rather quickly, this was not the case in Libya. Instead, Gaddafi launched a bloody crackdown against the protesters, who established their own opposition forces to try to remove Gaddafi (Daalder and Stavridis 2012, Payandeh 2012). According to international media coverage, protesters were met with tanks and warplanes, and there were multiple media accounts of executions of unarmed civilians. Senior officials in the UN quickly framed the situation in Libya a problem of human protection, and on February 22, Navi Pillay, the UN's High Commissioner for

Human Rights, urged the authorities to stop the use of violence against civilians (Bellamy and Williams 2011). The same day, the League of Arab States (LAS) suspended Libya's participation in the organization until the violence would cease, and condemned what was happening in the country. This was the first sign of the important role that this regional organization would play in the crisis (Dunne and Gifkins 2011). Within this context, the UN Security Council discussed the crisis and unanimously passed resolution 1970 on February 26. This resolution condemned the violence in Libya, emphasized the country's responsibility to protect its people, and implemented an arms embargo against Libya. The resolution was fairly uncontroversial, but Russia stated that they would not go further in their measures to stop Gaddafi's regime (Bellamy and Williams 2011).

However, as Gaddafi refused to comply with the demands of resolution 1970 and the violent fighting continued, the international pressure for implementing stronger measures against Gaddafi grew. France and Britain made calls for a tougher international response, writing up a draft resolution for a no-fly zone over Libya. On March 16, Gaddafi held a speech to the nation in which he promised to show no mercy to the rebels, and to "cleanse Libya, inch by inch, house by house, alley by alley, person by person, until the country is cleansed of dirt and scum" (Kinsman 2011:84). This speech was a worrisome reminder for many of the Rwandan genocide in 1994, and it increased the international pressure for tougher action against the regime. The probably most decisive factor for the Security Council to pass resolution 1973 was LAS decision on March 12 to call on the Security Council to impose a no-fly zone over Libya and establish safe areas to protect civilians (Bellamy and Williams 2011). This was rather surprising, seeing as LAS has been a firm opponent against humanitarian interventions. As Bellamy and Williams (2011) argue, their decision was decisive for the Security Council to pass resolution 1973, first and foremost by changing the United States' policy, who had been cautious of an intervention up to that point (2011:843). However, this appears to have been decisive also when it came to preventing China and Russia from blocking the resolution (Welsh 2011, Dunne and Gifkin 2011).

On March 17, 2011, the Security Council passed resolution 1973. Emphasizing that crimes against humanity may have been committed, and stating that the situation in Libya was a threat to security and peace, the Council authorized the use of "all necessary measures...to

protect civilians” (UN Security Council⁷, Bellamy and Williams 2011:844). However, this was not without controversy. A third of the Council’s members, namely China, Brazil, Russia, Germany and India, abstained from voting, which illustrated a strong statement of dissent. The reason for the countries abstaining was the belief that the mission had a low chance of success. However, the contention did not cause any vetoes against the resolution, and the historic resolution was passed. This is the first time the Security Council has authorized a no-fly zone with the explicit goal of protecting civilians (Dunne and Gifkin 2011). On March 19, 2011, a coalition force of Western states led by the United States launched air and missile strikes against the Libyan forces (Daalder and Stavridis, 2012). While neither China nor Russia had blocked the resolution, both countries were critical of a military intervention (Payandeh 2012). France and Britain were very vocal in their support, whilst other countries such as Poland, Turkey and Estonia were skeptical. Germany, who had chosen to abstain from voting, also refused to participate in a NATO-led intervention, leading to a rather divided Europe. In the end, the coalition participating in the intervention in Libya consisted of France, Britain, the United States, the Netherlands, Canada, Italy, Norway and Denmark (Kinsman 2011).

4.2 Empirical findings from Norway

In this section, the empirical findings from the Norwegian case will be presented. I will begin by presenting the results from the quantitative content analysis, and then move on to present the findings from the framing analysis. Thirdly, the empirical findings from the analysis measuring the frequency and range of sources will be presented, and lastly, the findings from the analysis of policy certainty.

⁷ UN website: <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2011/sc10200.doc.htm> (accessed 28.03.2013)

4.2.1 Results of quantitative content analysis

Table 4.1: The extent of the news coverage throughout this period, in average each day:

18. -26th of February 3 pages in average	27th of February – 12th of March 2.75 pages in average	13. - 17th of March 1 page in average	18. – 31st of March 3.71 pages in average
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Table 4.2: How many times is Libya mentioned on the front page during this period? :

18. – 26th of February 5 small front page notices, 2 large front page notices	27th of February – 12th of March 7 small front page notices, 1 large front page notice	13. – 17th of March 1 small front page notice	18. – 31st of March 7 small front page notices, 1 medium front page notice, and 4 large front page notices
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As seen in table 4.1, the coverage of Libya in *Aftenposten* was rather extensive for the first nine days, with an average of 3 pages covering the situation in Libya each day, and as table 4.2 illustrates, the situation in Libya was mentioned on the front page of *Aftenposten* seven out of the nine days. Two of these notices were large, covering most of the front page (see appendix for more). Thus, in the case of Libya, prior to any policy decisions, there was a massive focus on the Libyan situation in *Aftenposten* within the news section in the paper, something that was also reflected in the commentary section. Throughout this time period, the situation in Libya was the focus of five editorials, and one opinion editorial (see appendix for more).

Throughout the second time period, from February 27 to March 12, *Aftenposten* had on average 2.75 pages of coverage a day on the situation in Libya. Although representing a decline of 0.25 pages from the first period, it is still a rather extensive coverage over such a long period of time. In this time period, Libya was mentioned on the front page eight of the fourteen days. Within the commentary section during this period, there were three editorials, six opinion editorials and two commentaries. Hence, the focus on the situation in Libya within the commentary section was, as in the news section, extensive.

The third period, which is the shortest of the periods with only five days, is also a somewhat special one as it was to a large extent dominated by a major earthquake that hit Japan on March 11, with a subsequently tsunami wave that devastated the country. This may be the reason why the coverage of the situation in Libya dropped rather significantly during this period, from 2.75 pages a day on average in the second period, to only one page on average a day during this period. There was only one small front page notice within this period, and the situation was given minimal attention in the commentary section, with only one opinion editorial.

Turning to the fourth period, from March 18 to March 31, the coverage increased dramatically, to an average of 3.75 pages a day. There were also several front page notices during this period, reflecting the massive news coverage. All together, there were seven small front page notices, one medium sized front page notice and four large front page notices, meaning that Libya was mentioned on the front page twelve out of the fourteen days of coverage.

4.2.2 Framing

The conflict in Libya was covered extensively in *Aftenposten* from the first day the violence erupted in the country, and the coverage from particularly the first period falls into a rather simple narrative of “the good vs. evil” conflict, with the civilians and protesters going against a ruthless and evil dictator in fight for freedom and democracy. Articles with headlines such as “Breaking the barrier of fear” (February 18), “Libyan fighter jets shooting at civilians” (February 22), “Fleeing in panic” (February 24) and “Tobruk demonstrating for freedom” (February 26) underlines the frame that was established from the first day of coverage, namely one in which the protesters are innocent victims, while the Gaddafi regime is a brutal oppressor. Both the support-frame and the empathy-frame are dominating the coverage, with a particularly strong focus on the cruelty committed by the Gaddafi regime and the suffering of the Libyan opposition (see appendix 1 for more). Words that negatively describe the Gaddafi regime during this period are frequently used, among other ‘brutal’ and ‘tyrannical’, and the situation is framed early as one in which there was a severe threat against civilians, with the use of strong words such as ‘massacre’, ‘mass killings’ and ‘genocide’. In one article from February 21, the word ‘massacre’ is used four times, and the article describes how

“Gaddafi’s people shot at a funeral procession”. This sentence carries strong meaning beyond the mere factual, as it portrays a regime that not only shoots at its own people, but also at unarmed civilians mourning the loss of their loved ones. The many editorials commenting on Libya in this period also give an indication of how important this issue was perceived within the newspaper. The overall tone of the five editorials is one of great concern for the civilian population in Libya, as well as a strong condemnation against Gaddafi’s action and support for the Libyan opposition.

In the second period, the support-frame becomes even more dominant, with a great emphasis on freedom and democracy. However, it is important to take note of the rather high frequency of the words ‘Islamists/Islamist’ from within the critical-frame, being mentioned fifteen times. This could represent a counterframe, with a focus on the possible threat of Islamist regimes and growth of conservative Islam within Libya. However, when studying the articles closely, ‘Islamists/Islamist’ are mentioned nine of the fifteen times in the same article from March 5, with the headline “The US sees Islamist regimes emerging”. While mentioning ‘Islamists/Islamist’ nine times in just four short paragraphs, it does provide a rather nuanced focus on elements of Islamism, with a US government source being quoted saying: “We shouldn’t fear Islam in politics. It is the conduct of the political parties that we should be judging, not their relationship to Islam”. Libyans that are quoted in Aftenposten also nuance the focus on religion, as they several times emphasized the importance of establishing a secular and democratic state in Libya.

While the support-frame is more dominant in this period, the empathy-frame is not as strong here as in the previous period. The Libyan population is to a lesser extent described as ‘demonstrators/protesters’ as the conflict develops more towards a civil war, with the opposition having created their own armies, fighting back against the Gaddafi regime. There is an increase in the use of keywords such as ‘soldier/warrior’, ‘Libyans’ and ‘men’. However, the Libyans are still mostly described as ‘civilians/people/humans’, as well as ‘refugees’, and while there is still a great focus on the violence and killings from the Gaddafi side, there is no mention of the opposition committing murders or being involved in violence against the population. As with the keywords ‘Islamists/Islamist’, ‘Muslim’ is a keyword that is used much more frequently in this period than the first. The high frequency of this word could create a distance from the readers, as it may remind the readers of the differences between themselves and the Libyans, thus making it harder to sympathize with those

described. However, as with ‘Islamists/Islamist’, the use of ‘Muslim’ is never used to describe the Libyan population, but used in articles describing the more general situation in the Arab countries. Also, the word is almost exclusively used in a positive context. In many ways, the dominant frame that emerges through the coverage of Libya, also in articles emphasizing religion, is one which establishes hope that the Arab revolts may represent a defining moment in history, and that the Arab world may become democratic and free from autocratic rulers.

When it comes to the last period before the intervention started, March 13 to March 17, there is not sufficient coverage for any particular framing to emerge. However, these articles covering the situation in Libya all focus on how the opposition forces are losing ground to Gaddafi’s forces, with headlines such as: “The opposition forces are forced to flee, oil town has fallen” (March 14) and “Here they are waiting on the attacks from Gaddafi” (March 16). Thus, the emphasis is on how the opposition forces are struggling to fight of Gaddafi’s forces, and the people interviewed emphasize the gravity of the situation they are in, warning that Gaddafi’s forces could crush them at any time.

The coverage of the conflict in Libya after the decision to intervene had been taken continues with a support-frame, in which the focus on the opposition’s fight for freedom and democracy still prevails, while Gaddafi’s cruelty towards civilians is emphasized. Keywords connected to an empathy-frame are particularly dominant, with ‘civilians’ being a word used extensively (see appendix 1). There are some articles with a critical focus on the war that Norway is now going to be a part of, such as an article with the headline “Fears prolonged war” from March 19. However, there is generally minimal critical coverage and few articles questioning the goals of the military intervention. The civilians who are interviewed in Libya are also generally very positive to the intervention, and a number of articles focus on the gratitude they feel towards the West, who has, in their own words, “finally come to the Libyans rescue”.

4.2.3 Frequency of sources

An interesting finding related to the coverage of the situation in Libya in *Aftenposten* during the periods prior to the policy decision to intervene, is the range and frequency of sources. In

the first period, there were a total of 90 different sources quoted in the articles related to Libya. Of these, 61 were civilian sources, consisting of 67.78 percent of the total sources being used. Of the civilian sources, 52.46 percent were Libyans. There were no official Norwegian sources quoted in this period, and only 14 foreign official sources, making up 15.55 percent of the total amount of sources (see appendix 1).

The high percentage of civilians and Libyans amongst the sources was also present in the second and third period. During the second period, 62.5 percent of the total sources were civilians. Here, the Libyans represent a 69.4 percent of these civilians. Thus, as in the first period, civilians in general, such as Human Right Organizations and other media, and Libyans in particular make up a big proportion of the sources. Another important remark is the fact that Libyan officials and Libyan media supporting Gaddafi were marginalized to a rather large extent. Only 11.11 percent of the sources were connected to the Gaddafi regime in the first period, while this decreased to just 3.67 percent in the second period. Official sources increased in this period to 25 percent. 19.85 percent are foreign official sources, while 5.15 percent were Norwegian official sources.

This use of sources is also reflected in the third period (see appendix for more), although the analysis material here is much smaller than in the two previous periods. Here, 75 percent of all the sources were civilians, while 25 percent were foreign officials. Of the civilians, 77.78 percent were Libyans. During the fourth period, after the decision to intervene in Libya had been taken, the frequency of sources changes. While civilians had been the dominant sources in the news coverage in the three prior periods, the Norwegian and foreign official sources have now become the largest group of sources (see appendix 1). Libyan official sources, however, remained marginalized, making up 6.6 percent of the total sources in this last period.

4.2.4 Level of policy certainty

The first political reaction from the government in Norway regarding the situation in Libya came when the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Norway (MFA) issued a press statement on February 19, stating that they were “condemning the violence against peaceful protesters in Libya, Bahrain and Jemen”, arguing among other that the protests were “an expression of the

people's wish for greater democratic participation".⁸ On February 22, the MFA in Norway issued another press statement, this time specifically regarding the situation in Libya, stating: "We strongly condemn the ruthless use of violence by the Libyan authorities against their own civilians".⁹ On February 28, the MFA released a press statement in which then Foreign Minister Jonas Gahr Støre said: "A collapse in Libya will create a dangerous power vacuum in North-Africa. It is a challenge that the international community has to face".¹⁰ While these press statements do indicate that the Norwegian government took the situation in Libya seriously, and that it was placed on the political agenda in Norway, the MFA does not propose a military intervention or a no-fly zone, and did not seem to have decided on any policy with regards to Libya at this point.

The first political statement regarding the possibility for imposing a no-fly zone came on March 9, when then state secretary of MFA, Espen Barth Eide, was interviewed in *Aftenposten*. Here, he concluded that Norway would not support a no-fly zone over Libya without the support of the UN. He was generally skeptical towards a no-fly zone, saying: "One has to consider what one can achieve with such a no-fly zone".¹¹ This position seemed to be dominant in the Norwegian parliament as well, with a broad political agreement against a military intervention in Libya without a backing from the UN.¹² Whether or not Norway would support a military intervention in the case of a UN mandate was, on the other hand, not clear. Thus, at this point of time, there did seem to be unclear policy-line within the government, as well as the Norwegian parliament, as to whether or not Norway would support a military intervention that had the support within the UN, something that is reflected in the interview with Barth Eide, who took a reluctant and hesitant stand, providing no clear answers. This points to a prevailing policy uncertainty within the Norwegian executive.

⁸ Norwegian government website:

<http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/ud/presesenter/pressemeldinger/2011/norge-fordommer-voldsbruken-i-libya-bahr.html?id=633937> (accessed 07.03.2013)

⁹ Norwegian government website:

http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/ud/presesenter/pressemeldinger/2011/vold_egne.html?id=634501 (accessed 07.03.2013)

¹⁰ Norwegian government website:

http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/ud/presesenter/pressemeldinger/2011/mr_hovedsesjon.html?id=634845 (accessed 09.03.2013)

¹¹ *Aftenposten*, 09.03.2011. "Utelukker Norge i NATO-angrep". Accessed from Retriever, 27.01.2013

¹² *Aftenposten*, 09.03.2011. "Utelukker Norge i NATO-angrep". Accessed from Retriever, 27.01.2013

However, in a parliamentary hearing on March 16, the Norwegian opposition parties raised criticism against the way the government had been reacting to the situation in Libya.¹³ Erna Solberg, the leader of the Conservative Party, asked Gahr Støre to explain Norway's position regarding the issue of a no-fly zone, in which he responded: "Norway does not rule out the support for a no-fly zone". Solberg referred to what was happening in Libya as "a massacre that, in the opinion of many, meets the criteria of the "responsibility to protect" within international law", and that the way Gaddafi is acting could "put an end to the resurgence of democracies in North-Africa". Thus, at this point, there had developed elite dissensus within the Norwegian parliament on the issue of Libya, and the opposition was calling for a political response from the Norwegian government to what was taking place in Libya. The government was, however, still hesitant and undecided on this issue, as Gahr Støre's response indicates.

All this suggests that there did not really seem to have been a policy in place in Norway regarding the issue of Libya. Although the foreign minister did make statements regarding the situation in Libya, these statements were loose and unspecific, and they never gave any answer to whether Norway would participate in an intervention or not. When the issue of a no-fly zone was brought up, both the foreign minister and the state secretary of MFA were vague and reluctant to give a clear answer regarding the Norwegian political stand. It is interesting to note that there was no political debate at all on this issue before the parliamentary hearing on March 16, when the opposition suddenly urged the foreign minister "to do something". This is also illustrated in the very low frequency of official Norwegian sources in *Aftenposten*, as mentioned in 4.1.3. The highest percentage of Norwegian sources in the periods prior to March 18 was 5.15, measured between February 27 and March 12. In the two other periods, there were no Norwegian politicians who commented on this issue at all. This does indicate that there did not seem to be a policy in place within the Norwegian government, and it also indicates that the government may have been uncertain and reluctant with regards to how to politically approach the issue. Thus, in the case of Norway, there did appear to have been a high level of policy uncertainty within the government, as well as an elite dissensus among the opposition parties, at least expressed in the late part of the process. The policy decision in Norway was not taken before the actual UN resolution had been

¹³Norwegian government website:
http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/ud/aktuelt/svar_stortinget/sporretime/2011/svar_flyforbud.html?id=636083
(accessed 07.03.2013)

passed. On March 18, the MFA issued a statement in support of the resolution, stating: “All the member countries of the UN have a responsibility to follow up on the resolution of the Security Council”.¹⁴

4.3 Empirical findings from the United States

In this section, the empirical findings from the American case will be presented. The findings from the United States will be organized the same way as the empirical findings from the Norwegian case, beginning with the results of the quantitative content analysis and ending with the analysis of the level of policy certainty.

4.3.1 Results of quantitative content analysis

Table 4.3: The extent of the news coverage throughout this period, on average each day:

18. -26th of February	27th of February – 12th of March	13. - 17th of March	18. – 31st of March
2.9 articles a day	2.6 articles a day	2.4 articles a day	3.64 articles a day

Table 4.4: How many days is there a front page article about Libya? :

18. – 26th of February	27th of February – 1st of March	13. – 17th of March	18. – 31st of March
6 times	11 times	2 times	14 times

As one can see from table 4.3 and 4.4, the coverage of Libya was extensive in the first period, with an average of 2.9 articles a day on Libya during the first period. In six of these days, at least one of the articles was run on the front page of the newspaper. However, the coverage of Libya in The Washington Post in the first period began with a relatively small focus within the three first days after the violence and rebellion had broken out. The extensive coverage

¹⁴ Norwegian government website: http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/ud/pressemelder/pressemeldinger/2011/fn_libya.html?id=636202 (accessed 07.03.2013)

began on February 21, when the first article about Libya was run on the front page. The coverage in the commentary section was also extensive, with six opinion editorials and three editorials commenting on the situation in Libya.

While the coverage decreased with 0.3 articles a day in the second period, Libya was still the focus in an average of 2.6 articles a day, which is a rather intense focus throughout a relatively long period of time. Also, articles on Libya were run on the front page eleven out of the fourteen days, indicating the importance placed on this issue. The coverage within the commentary section was still extensive, with 15 opinion editorials. However, the focus on Libya on the editorial page was reduced, with two editorials in the fourteen days of coverage.

The coverage in the third period decreased with further 0.2 articles a day, but it is interesting to note that the coverage in The Washington Post during this period was still 2.4 articles a day. This was a period dominated by the earthquake in Japan, and The Washington Post is the newspaper in this analysis with the lowest decline in coverage. This may indicate the importance placed on the situation in Libya. Out of the five days, articles on Libya were also run on the front page on two days.

The last period, representing the period after the decision to intervene was taken, has the most extensive coverage of Libya. The coverage increased to 3.64 articles a day on average, and at least one article on Libya was run on the front page every day.

4.3.2. Framing

During the first period of the coverage in The Washington Post, the empathy-framing was very apparent, with 183 words falling within the empathy-frame (see appendix 2 for more). The coverage of Libya during this period was dominated by a clear emphasis on the suffering of civilians, and the violence Gaddafi is unleashing on them, enabling the construction of an 'innocent victim' frame of the Libyan opposition, while the Gaddafi regime falls into the 'brutal oppressor' frame. Words such as 'massacre', 'bloody' and 'violence' are used frequently to describe the situation in Libya, while Gaddafi is described as, among other things, a "tyrant who slaughters his own people" (February 25). Within this period, the focus on Libyans and their fight for democracy and freedom is less outspoken than in *Aftenposten*,

something that is also reflected in the keyword test (see appendix 2). Instead, the focus is to a greater extent on the tyranny of Gaddafi, and the atrocities he commits against his people. The three editorials from this period reflect this focus. The first one, from February 22, has the headline “Atrocities in Libya”, and strongly condemns Gaddafi’s actions in Libya. “The beleaguered dictatorship of Moammar Gaddafi was waging war against its own people and committing atrocities that demand not just condemnation but action by the outside world”. Thus, it is interesting to note that already five days after the violence broke out in Libya, Washington Post calls for something to be done. Another interesting finding is that the two last editorials from this period are both critical of Obama, criticizing his “slow response to a dictator’s atrocities”(February 24) and calling him “a passive president” who “has showed no intention of protecting the Libyans whom Gaddafi is slaughtering”(February 26). There is little critical coverage of the Libyan opposition in this period, something that is also reflected in the keyword test (see appendix 2). In addition, the attempts of Gaddafi to delegitimize the opposition by labeling them as drug addicts and Islamist extremists, is discredited in the articles in the newspaper.

With almost a doubling of support keywords (see appendix 2), the democracy and freedom frame becomes more apparent in the second period, establishing a narrative of this conflict as one where the opposition is fighting against a ruthless tyrant for basic human rights. In the same period, however, the frequency of critical keywords also increases. ‘Islamist/Islamists’ are used fourteen times in articles throughout this period, something that could indicate a more critical framing of the Libyan opposition. However, as was the case with Aftenposten, this never develops into a strong counterframe as the very few articles with this focus are rather nuanced, emphasizing that Islamic belief and democratic politics are not incompatible.

The empathy-frame in the second period is, as in the previous period, very dominant, and there is a strong focus on the suffering of the civilian population, reflected in the keyword test (see appendix 2). At the same time, there is also an extensive coverage focusing on the reaction of the Obama administration. Many of these articles highlight the uncertainty displayed by the administration, as well as the political disagreement when it comes to the question of what to do. It is interesting to note that the two editorials from this period, like the three from the previous period, are critical of the way the Obama administration has dealt with the situation in Libya. The first editorial, from March 1, argues that: “The United States should support, rather than fear, greater change”. This editorial touches on perhaps the most

important factor in the coverage of Libya within Washington Post, namely the question of whether the Arab revolution is something the West should support, as it seems to incorporate Western values such as the people's fight for freedom and democracy, or if one should fear the uncertainty of not knowing what will come next. In this editorial, the answer appears clear-cut; "The direction of events means that, more than ever, the American interest lies in encouraging more rather than less freedom and in reaching out to those Arabs who seek genuine democracy". The other editorial within this period, from March 3, argues for a consideration of a no-fly zone and criticizes the Obama administration for sending conflicting signals when commenting on the Libya situation. The editorial concludes that: "the United States must do what it can to help bring about Mr. Gaddafi's downfall".

In the third and shortest period, there is a clear support-frame emerging from the coverage of Libya. The focus is on the momentum that Gaddafi's forces are gaining, and the pressure the rebels are under. Libyans that are interviewed during this period are explicit about their need for an intervention, as well as the fear of what Gaddafi could do if he is not defeated (see appendix 2). The empathy-framing is, on the other hand, much less distinct than in the two previous periods, with a higher number of neutral/distance keywords. 'Fighter' is the keyword with highest frequency all together, indicating that in this period there is more of a focus on the fighting between the two groups, and less focus on the assaults on civilians. As with the previous editorials, the one from this period is critical of the Obama administration's response to the situation in Libya. The editorial from March 16, with the headline "Wanted: A strategy", begins by arguing that: "The United States watches as Moammar Gaddafi gains". It continues to argue that there are several reasons why something should be done in Libya. Gaddafi's military is weak, and many Libyans are desperate for change. Also, "(a) sacking of Benghazi will be accompanied and followed by a horrific bloodbath".

The media coverage in the fourth period, after the decision to intervene had been taken, continues the prior periods' focus on the suffering of the civilians and on the brutality of Gaddafi. Most of the Libyans interviewed express gratitude towards the international community for finally having decided to intervene. The rebels interviewed during this period also emphasize the necessity of an intervention. There is, however, a strong focus during this period on the political uncertainty and disagreements revolving around the intervention in Libya. Critical voices are raised, both from the Arab League, Russia, China, as well as politicians in Washington. Discussions around Obama's alleged lack of clarity regarding the

situation in Libya is a focus in several articles, and is also very much present in the commentary section in this period. There is an extensive amount of opinion editorials about Libya within this period, as well as four editorials, and the general tone of them is critical towards Obama's alleged lack of leadership and clarity. However, despite the critical coverage revolving around the uncertainty with regards to the international intervention in Libya, there were no articles inherently critical of the intervention in itself. While the effectiveness of a no-fly zone is questioned, as well as the cooperation among the allied countries, the intervention is generally portrayed as necessary.

4.3.3 Frequency of sources

The frequency of sources used in The Washington Post in the first period is interesting, as there was a rather low number of official sources, both American and foreign. Of the 163 sources all together, 20 represented official American sources, while 11 were official foreign sources. This represents 19 percent of all sources, less than a quarter. Over half of the sources quoted in articles on Libya were civilians, and of these civilian sources, 75.58 percent were Libyan sources. Hence, the civilians are indisputably the most dominant group of sources during this period, while Libyan official sources only constitute 11 percent of the total amount of sources.

In the second period, both the number of official sources as well as civilian sources increased. The percentage of official American sources increased to 24.23 percent of the total sources, while the percentage of official foreign sources increased to 10.38 percent. However, the amount of civilian sources still represented more than half the total amount of sources, and increased to 54.6 percent. Libyan official sources, on the other hand, decreased to a mere 6.15 percent. Of the civilian sources, the majority was still represented by Libyans, making up 78.7 percent of all civilians quoted.

In the third period, the use of civilians as sources became even more dominant, making up 63 percent of all the sources in this short time period. Libyan official sources decreased even further, to only 3.1 percent of all sources used, while the use of official American sources also dropped to the lowest of these three periods, making up 10.76 percent of all sources. After the decision to intervene was taken, the use of official sources increased dramatically. From representing only 16.91 percent of all sources in the former period, official sources now

represented 50.46 percent, half the sources quoted in the articles. Civilian sources were still being quoted rather extensively, representing 36.74 percent of all the 313 sources within this period. However, it represented the lowest frequency of civilian sources throughout all the four periods.

4.3.4 Level of policy certainty

In the case of the United States, the level of policy certainty is particularly interesting, as there seems to have been a very high level of policy uncertainty, as well as elite dissensus on the subject of Libya both within the Obama administration and the Senate. Despite intense coverage of the violence erupting in Libya after February 17, Obama gave few comments about the situation in Libya during the first days of violence. As *The Washington Post* wrote in an editorial February 24, “the president’s only comment during five days of mounting atrocities was a statement issued in his name by his press secretary late last Friday”. This lack of reaction by the president was later explained as a cautious stand due to worries that Gaddafi would retaliate against Americans in Libya if Obama were too critical of the Gaddafi regime (Mann, 2012). However, it is also representative of the way the Obama administration seemed to go about the topic of Libya: cautious and hesitant. Obama did issue an executive order on February 25, in which he strongly condemned Gaddafi’s action and ordered the blocking of any transfer of withdrawal of funds to the Libyan government, Gaddafi and his family.¹⁵ There was, however, strong skepticism within the administration of implementing a no-fly zone, which had been brought up by the British Prime Minister David Cameron on February 28 (BBC, February 28 2011).¹⁶ Defense secretary Robert Gates and military chief Mike Mullen both emphasized the risks involved in enforcing a no-fly zone and expressed caution regarding such a military intervention (Washington Post, March 2 2011).¹⁷

Other officials on the Obama team had, however, differing opinions from that of Gates and Mullens. Susan Rice, the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, and Samantha Power, the National Security Council staff director for multilateral affairs and human rights, had both

¹⁵ American government website: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/02/25/executive-order-13566-libya> (accessed on 12.02.2013)

¹⁶ BBC 28.02.2011. “Cameron: UK working on ‘no-fly zone’ plan for Libya”: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-12598674> (accessed 15.04.2013)

¹⁷ Washington Post 02.03.2011. “Pentagon hesitant on no-fly zone over Libya”: <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/03/01/AR2011030105317.html> (accessed 12.02.2013)

been dedicated to preventing mass killings after having witnessed the atrocities in Rwanda and Bosnia. In fact, Samantha Powers was the writer of “A Problem from Hell”, a book on America’s response to mass killings, in which she examined how governments could stop mass killings from happening (Mann, 2012). Hence, as James Mann writes in his analysis of the Obama administration, “Obama was thus confronted with conflicting views within his administration between proponents of realism, who urged him to stay out of Libya, and proponents of humanitarian intervention, who wanted him to act” (2012:289).

The dissensus that could be found within the Obama administration was also prevalent within the Senate. Senators John McCain and John Lieberman were vocal in their criticism of Obama, urging him to act in Libya. John Kerry, a democrat and Obama’s closest ally in the Senate, was also a strong advocate for an international intervention (Mann 2012), writing among others an opinion editorial in *The Washington Post* on March 11, in which he strongly argued for the implementation of a no-fly zone.¹⁸

The press briefings regarding Libya from this period confirm the policy uncertainty that seemed to prevail within the administration regarding whether or not to intervene. In a press briefing with press secretary Jay Carney on March 9, Carney answered vaguely on the question on when a decision on a no-fly zone within the administration can be expected to come: “We are in the process of reviewing a variety of options, which I’ve discussed from here, from Air Force One yesterday, and others obviously have discussed”.¹⁹ Thus, he avoids providing an answer to the question, a strong indication of there being uncertainty on this issue. When asked to comment on whether the patterns of events in Libya “quicken the need for a decision about how to intervene”, Carney continues to answer vaguely, saying: “We are continuing to review options, and we are obviously aware of the suffering in Libya and the violence there”.²⁰ When speaking about a possible no-fly zone, the complexity of the situation is emphasized: “it is very important that you are very clear about what it entails and what your goals are and whether those goals are achievable through that means”.²¹ These statements, which are unclear and vague, give strong indications of the uncertainty that prevailed within

¹⁸ Opinion editorial in *Washington Post*, 11.03.2011: “Libya: An Iraq redux?”

¹⁹ American government website: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/03/09/press-briefing-press-secretary-jay-carney-392011> (Accessed 12.02.2013)

²⁰ American government website: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/03/09/press-briefing-press-secretary-jay-carney-392011> (Accessed 12.02.2013)

²¹ American government website: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/03/10/press-briefing-press-secretary-jay-carney-3102011> (Accessed 12.02.2013)

the US executive, as Carney in a rather obvious manner tried to avoid answering the questions regarding a possible no-fly zone. On the night of March 15, however, Obama did approve military actions against Libya that would not only set up a no-fly zone, but also authorize “all necessary measures”. Susan Rice then took this proposal to the UN Security Council (Mann 2012:291)

Thus, within the Obama administration there did not seem to be a policy in place until March 15, indicative of a high level of policy uncertainty with regards to which policy to decide on. The press statements made by press secretary Jay Carney indicate the policy uncertainty within the executive, as they were vague and elusive, clearly shaped by the lack of a decision within the administration. If the administration had decided on a policy, the press statements would have been much more eager to promote a policy, and thus more clear and precise, as policy makers are likely to avoid any display or indications of uncertainty (Robinson 2002). There was also elite dissensus over the possible actions that should be taken against Gaddafi, both within the administration as well as the Senate.

4.4 Empirical findings from Denmark

After having presented both the empirical findings from Norway and the United States, it is time to move on to the empirical findings from the third country in this study, which is Denmark.

4.4.1 Results of quantitative content analysis

Table 4.5: The extent of the news coverage throughout this period, in average each day:

18. -26th of February	27th of February – 12th of March	13. - 17th of March	18. – 31st of March
3.22 pages on average	3.28 pages on average	2 pages on average	5.85 pages on average

Table 4.6: How many times is Libya mentioned on the front page during this period? :

18. – 26th of February	27th of February – 12th of March	13. – 17th of March	18. – 31st of March
4 large front page notices, 2 smaller front page notices	3 large front page notices, 2 smaller front page notices	0	11 large front page notices, 2 smaller front page notices

The coverage of the conflict in Libya was extensive in Berlingske throughout the first period, from February 18 to 26. As seen in the above tables 4.5 and 4.6, an average of 3.22 pages a day revolved around the situation in Libya, and it was also mentioned on the front page six of the nine days. Four of these front page notices were large, dominating most of the front page. Within the commentary section, there were three opinion editorials, six analysis/commentaries and one editorial regarding Libya during this period.

The second period, from February 27 to March 12, had an even more extensive coverage than the first one. During these fourteen days, Libya was covered an average of 3.28 pages a day, which is a very significant amount of coverage over such a long period of time. It was, however, not mentioned as many times on the front page. There were five front page notices, with three of these notices being large and dominating most of the front page. Within the commentary section, the focus on the situation in Libya was extensive, with ten analyses/commentaries, seven opinion editorials and one editorial.

In the third period, from March 13 to 17, there was a decline in coverage from 3.28 to 2 pages on average. This time period was, as in the other countries, dominated by the coverage of the earthquake in Japan. However, two pages on average a day still means that the conflict in Libya was a large part of the news focus, albeit to a lesser extent than the intensive coverage prior to this period. The coverage within the commentary section was likewise less extensive than in the previous periods, with three analyses/commentaries, one opinion editorial and one editorial.

In the fourth and last period, the coverage of the situation in Libya increased dramatically to an average of 5.85 pages a day during the fourteen days. That is an extensive coverage, and the conflict in Libya would most days completely dominate the news section. The importance

placed on the situation in Libya during this period is also reflected in the fact that Libya was mentioned on the front page thirteen out of the fourteen days, and in eleven of these days, Libya was the dominating news story on the front page. The focus on Libya within the commentary section was also extensive, with nine analyses/commentaries, seven opinion editorials and three editorials.

4.4.2 Framing

Within the first period of coverage in Berlingske, there is a very clear empathy-frame emerging. This inference is supported by the keyword test, with a clear dominance of empathy keywords (see appendix 3). The focus is on civilians and protesters being killed violently by Gaddafi, with explicit descriptions of the violence. These descriptions frame the situation as one in which civilians are under severe threat, being exposed to clear violation of abuse from the ones in power. This framing enables the constructing of an ‘innocent victim’ frame of the opposition, while Gaddafi becomes framed as a brutal oppressor’ frame. On February 21, the situation in Libya covers the front page, and the headline of the article in the paper reads: “Gaddafi drowns protests in blood”. The situation is clearly framed as one in which a tyrannical and brutal dictator is killing his own people. Words such as ‘bloodbath’, ‘bloody’ and ‘massacre’, as well as ‘tyrannical’ and ‘brutal’, are used extensively.

There is also a strong support-frame throughout the coverage of Libya during this period, with a focus on freedom and democracy, emphasizing support for the protesters and in many ways legitimizing the opposition’s goals. However, very early on in the Danish coverage, there is also a focus on the rather difficult situation the EU finds itself in, faced with a difficult dilemma; whether to support the new and unknown movements in the Arab world, or to support the old regimes which, despite being authoritarian, represented stability in the region. The only editorial within this period, from February 22, argues that the EU has to support the movements in the Arab world, arguing that the West has for too long failed the people within these regimes that are working towards freedom and democracy.

However, the contours of a critical framing can be seen in this period, as the words ‘Islamist/Islamists’ are mentioned fifteen times, many of these in an article from February 25

with the headline “Lene Espersen fears the Libyan Islamists”. Still, as with the coverage in Washington Post and Aftenposten, this possible threat of Islamism is being nuanced by the people interviewed, who generally emphasize that the Libyan opposition seems to fight for freedom and democracy, not an Islamic state. This is also emphasized by the Libyans interviewed in the articles from this period, who are eager to send out a non-threatening and peaceful image of themselves.

In the second time period, from February 27 to March 12, a clearer support-frame emerges, an inference that is also supported by the keyword test from this period (see appendix 3). While the focus on the possible threat of Islamist groups is all but gone, the focus on democracy and freedom is prevalent. The brutality of the suppressive and violent Gaddafi regime is highlighted, which again enables readers to empathize with the opposition and their fight against Gaddafi. During this period, the Libyans who are interviewed in the article begin to voice a demand for international support, increasing the pressure for international help. As was the case in the first period, Libyans interviewed in this period also seem interested in portraying a positive image of themselves to the rest of the world. “We hate bin Laden and what he did in the US. Our Islam is modern, and respects all people and their different religions” one man is quoted saying in an article February 27. The empathy-frame that was very prevalent in the first period is also dominating this period, with a total of 73 keywords connected to the empathy frame (see appendix 3). However, there is an increase of the use of more distant and neutral descriptions, such as ‘soldier/fighter’ and ‘Libyans’. Still, the Libyans are in this period mostly described as either ‘civilians/people’ or ‘protesters’, and while the focus is still on the Gaddafi forces committing killings, there is no coverage of the opposition taking part in the killings.

In the third period, there was a strong focus on the severe situation that the Libyan opposition found itself in. Although there are few keywords due to the short analysis period, the word ‘democracy’ is mentioned seven times, while ‘bloody/bloodbath/massacre’ are mentioned four times. This support-frame is prevalent in the articles, together with concern as to what Gaddafi may do if he manages to crush the opposition. “It will be a bloodbath, a massacre like the one we saw in Rwanda”, a member of The Arab League is quoted saying in an article on March 16. This is also reflected in the commentary section this period, and the only editorial from this period is gravely concerned about the situation in Libya.

The coverage in the last period, after the decision to intervene was taken, continues with a strong support-frame, particularly emphasizing the freedom and democracy- narrative that has prevailed throughout the three prior periods. This is also indicated by the keyword test (see appendix 3). It is interesting to note that the coverage, especially during the first days following the decision to intervene, has a very positive focus on the intervention. The necessity of intervening is emphasized both by unified Danish politicians and the Libyans that are interviewed in the articles. “The bombings are just what we needed”, a young Libyan tells Berlingske in an article on March 21, while another in the same article is quoted saying: “Denmark is among the best countries”, referring to the Danish choice to intervene.

However, as uncertainty regarding the leadership of the international intervention grows and the conflict within NATO becomes apparent throughout this period, a more negative focus on the intervention appears in the newspaper. While not questioning the necessity of an intervention, the articles do question the agenda and goal of the intervention. This focus is reflected in the commentary section as well. The last editorial from this period is critical of the uncertainty around the question of leadership in the war and the European countries that cannot agree on whether NATO should take the lead in the war or not. However, Denmark’s way of acting, firmly and decisively, is praised in the editorial.

4.4.3 Frequency and range of sources

The frequency of sources in Berlingske in the first period differs from that in Aftenposten and The Washington Post in that there was a rather high frequency of official sources, in all 38.27 percent. Of these, 17.28 percent were Danish official sources. While the civilian sources represented the largest group of sources in Berlingske in this period with 43.21 percent, this group of sources was not as dominant as they had been in the coverage in Aftenposten and Washington Post in this same period (see appendix 3 for more).

In the second period, the percentage of civilian sources increased significantly to 58.28 percent, and Libyan sources represented 85.22 percent of this group. Thus, in this period, Libyan civilian sources dominated much of the coverage. The percentage of official Danish sources decreased to 7.95 percent, while official Libyan sources dropped from 7.40 percent in the first period, to a mere 4.63 percent in this period. Foreign official sources contributed to a

quarter of all sources in this period, with 25.16 percent. The third period saw an extensive decrease of civilian sources, falling to 30 percent, while official Danish sources in this period represented the largest group of sources with 33.33 percent.

In the fourth period, civilian sources decreased further to 28.22 percent, while official sources now represented 57 percent of all sources. Libyan official sources remained low throughout all four periods, with the highest percentage being 10 percent in the third period. In this last period, the percentage fell to only 4.18 percent.

4.4.4 Level of policy certainty

In Denmark, politicians spoke out early about the situation in Libya, condemning the violence and expressing their concerns. The foreign minister of Denmark, Lene Espersen, went out publicly to condemn the violence against protesters in Libya on February 21.²² The same day, the foreign affairs spokesman of The Conservative Party, Naser Khader, said: “The fear of a mass exodus of refugees to Europe cannot make us condone Gaddafi’s brutality and protesters that are attacked... The EU has to be on the side of democracy”.²³ The following day, the then Danish Prime Minister Lars Løkke Rasmussen spoke out about Libya in a press meeting, saying that the situation in Libya was a cause for “deep concern”.²⁴

On March 1, Løkke Rasmussen held a press meeting in which he strongly condemned Gaddafi’s action, saying Gaddafi had “lost all legitimacy... It stands clear that Gaddafi cannot shape the future of Libya”.²⁵ While saying he was pleased with the sanctions that had been implemented against Gaddafi, he did not mention a no-fly zone or the possibility of a military intervention. Khader, on the other hand, supported the idea of a no-fly zone, even without a mandate in the UN, on March 4.²⁶ On March 10, Espersen said she kept all options open in Libya, even an intervention without a UN mandate. There was also broad political backing in Denmark for this.²⁷ However, Prime Minister Løkke Rasmussen seemed more hesitant, saying that: “it is important that a no-fly zone has a firm, legal base and support from the

²² Berlingske, February 21, 2011. “EU klar til opgør med Gaddafi” (Accessed on Infomedia 05.02.2013)

²³ Berlingske, 21 February, 2011. “EU under pres for at straffe Libyen” (Accessed on Infomedia 05.02.2013)

²⁴ Danish government website: http://www.stm.dk/_p_13357.html (Accessed 15.02.2013)

²⁵ Danish government website: http://www.stm.dk/_p_13366.html (Accessed 15.02.2013)

²⁶ Berlingske, March 4, 2011. “De arabiske lande truer Libyen med flyveforbud”. (Accessed on Infomedia 05.02.2013)

²⁷ Berlingske, March 10, 2011. “Dansk støtte til interventionen i Libyen” (Accessed on Infomedia 05.02.2013)

region”.²⁸ On March 16, Berlingske wrote that there was a political majority in Denmark in favour of a military intervention, even if the UN did not give a clear mandate. Espersen also opened up for such a possibility, saying: “We are willing to go very far in order to protect the civilian population”.²⁹ The following day, both Espersen and the prime minister said they could not rule out a military intervention, even without UN backing.³⁰ On March 18, Løkke Rasmussen announced in a press meeting that Denmark supported the UN resolution, and that they would participate in a military intervention.³¹

Thus, within the Danish government, there seemed to be a consistency and certainty from very early on when it came to the issue of Libya. The foreign minister, the prime minister, as well as foreign affairs spokesman Khader from the Conservative Party, spoke out about the situation in Libya early and they were all explicit in their critique and demand for actions against Gaddafi. From the news reports and press meetings studied, there does not appear to have been elite dissensus on Libya, and there was no disagreement on the necessity of a military intervention. Although Løkke Rasmussen was hesitant of an intervention without a UN mandate, there seemed to be little doubt that Denmark would participate in an intervention if the Security Council did pass a UN mandate. This is also reflected in both Løkke Rasmussen and Lene Espersen’s reaction to the UN decision. While Løkke Rasmussen hailed the UN resolution as “historic”, emphasizing that Denmark had a “historical obligation”³² to support the decision, Espersen seemed very content as she presented the, in her own words, “good news” that Denmark was sending fighter jets to Libya (Jakobsen and Møller, 2012). As Jakobsen and Møller argue in the article “Good News: Libya and the Danish Way of War” (2012), the decision to intervene in Libya enjoyed unprecedented support. All the parties in the Danish parliament voted in favor of intervening, the first time in Danish history (2012:115). It is interesting to note that, even on such a controversial issue as intervening without a UN mandate, there was a rather high level of elite consensus. As Jakobsen and Møller (2012) note, the government and a large majority of the parliament would have supported an intervention even without a UN mandate because of the perceived urgency to act in order to prevent genocide. It does say something about the political climate

²⁸ Berlingske, March 12, 2011. “Problemet har et navn. Det er Gaddafi, og han skal væk” (Accessed on 05.02.2013)

²⁹ Berlingske, March 16, 2011. “Flertal klar til Libyan-aktion uden FN” (Accessed on 05.02.2013)

³⁰ TV Nyhederne, 17.03.2011: “Løkke åben for angreb uden om FN”:<http://nyhederne.tv2.dk/article.php/id-38248719:løkke-åben-for-angreb-uden-om-fn.html> (Accessed 05.03.2013)

³¹ Danish government website: http://www.stm.dk/_p_13388.html (Accessed 15.02.2013)

³² Danish government website: http://www.stm.dk/_p_13388.html (Accessed 15.02.2013)

in Denmark at this time, and the sense of urgency that Danish politicians must have felt, when even The Socialist People’s Party, a party that had opposed the Danish participation in NATO’s intervention in Kosovo due to the lack of a UN mandate, would now open up for Danish involvement in a similar situation (Jakobsen and Møller 2012).

4.5 Findings from Britain

It is now time to turn to the empirical findings from the last country in this study, which is Britain.

4.5.1 Results of the quantitative content analysis

Table 4.7: The extent of the news coverage throughout this period, on average each day:

February 18 – 26	February 27 – March 12³³	March 13-17	March 18-31³⁴
3.66 articles	5.38 articles	2.2 articles	6.66 articles

Table 4. 8: How many days is there a front page article about Libya? :

February 18 – 26	February 27 – March 12	March 13-17	March 18-31
7 days	10 days	0 days	10 days

As seen in table 4.7 and 4.8 above, the coverage of Libya in the first period in The Telegraph was rather extensive, with an average of 3.66 articles a day, and with articles run on the front page seven out of the nine days. The two first days after the rebellion broke out, the coverage was scarce, but from February 20 and onwards, the situation in Libya was run on the front page everyday and the focus on Libya was very strong. The coverage in the commentary section was also relatively extensive, with five commentaries/analyses, three opinion editorials and two editorials.

³³ February 27 is missing from the data

³⁴ March 26 and March 27 is missing from the data

In the second period, the coverage increased to 5.38 articles a day, a very strong focus for such a long period of time. This is also indicated by the fact that an article on Libya was run on the front page ten out of the thirteen days of coverage. In the commentary section, there were seven opinion editorials, three commentaries/analyses and three editorials that focused on the situation in Libya.

As with the other newspapers, the coverage within The Telegraph decreased in the third period. From an intense focus in the second period, the coverage dropped to 2.2 articles a day in this period. While this still represents a certain focus on the situation in Libya, it is a significant decrease from the 5.38 articles in the prior period. There were no articles about Libya on the front page in this period, and the coverage within the commentary section was also less extensive, with two commentaries, one editorial and one opinion editorial focusing on Libya in this third period.

In the last period, the coverage increased to 6.66 articles a day, and the situation in Libya would, on most days, completely dominate much of the newspaper. The importance placed on this issue during this period is also indicated by the fact that an article on Libya was run on the front page ten out of the twelve days. The coverage was equally extensive within the commentary section, with nine commentaries/analyses, seven editorials and seven opinion editorials.

4.5.2 Framing

There is a very clear empathy-frame emerging from the coverage of Libya in the first period, an inference that is supported by both the keyword test (see appendix 4). The coverage on Libya is dominated by a strong emphasis on the suffering of the civilians in Libya and the violence committed by the Gaddafi regime. The words ‘brutal’, ‘massacre’ and ‘violence’ are used extensively. As in the other newspapers, The Telegraph’s coverage in this period contains graphic descriptions of the violence committed by Gaddafi, and the conflict is clearly framed as one in which the protesters are innocent victims, while Gaddafi is framed as a brutal oppressor. Moreover in several articles The Telegraph points out that Gaddafi’s forces consist of mainly mercenaries. These mercenaries are portrayed as “vicious killers” (February

20), hired to “carry out the ‘massacre’, reportedly killing men, women and children”. This enables the understanding of this conflict as one where the Libyan people are fighting ruthless soldiers, hired by Gaddafi to kill civilians. Thus, very early on, the conflict in Libya is framed within the British paper as one in which civilians fighting for their freedom are being killed by mercenaries, who “don’t care as long as they spread fear” (February 22).

The support-frame is also prevalent in the coverage in the first period, with an emphasis on the protesters being pro-democracy activists who fight for freedom, albeit with a less overt focus on democracy than in the Danish and Norwegian coverage. The commentary section generally reflects the framing within the news section, with an emphasis on the brutality of Gaddafi and the suffering of civilians. There are also several critical opinion editorials and commentaries criticizing the fact that Britain brought back Gaddafi from the diplomatic cold in 2004, after he renounced his weapons of mass destruction. This is seen by many as a grave error, as Britain by doing so turned a blind eye to the many human rights violations committed by Gaddafi. As one writer argues in an opinion editorial from February 21, “we have ended up providing the very tools that are being used so viciously to resist the fights for civil rights there”.

The second period is also dominated by a strong empathy-frame (see appendix 4), and the focus on the brutality of Gaddafi is extensive. However, the democracy and freedom-narrative is less overt during this period, and there is also a stronger focus on domestic political issues within Britain. Two scandals took up some of the coverage of Libya, namely the discovery that British universities had received donations from Gaddafi, and that a British diplomatic mission in Libya turned out to be a complete failure. There is, however, still a lot of emphasis on the difficult situation civilians find themselves in, and there is barely any presence at all of a critical-framing of the opposition (see appendix 4). The commentary section in this period continues to be critical of former British politicians’ dealings with Gaddafi, particularly Blair, as well as generally being supportive of the Libyan opposition and their fight against Gaddafi. The editorials in this period are rather critical, both of former Prime Ministers Blair and Brown, but also of Prime Minister Cameron. An editorial from March 2 criticizes Cameron for failing to gain international support for a no-fly zone over Libya, and also for cutting military expenditures while at the same time talking about military actions in a foreign country.

In the third period, both the empathy-frame and the support-frame decreased extensively (see appendix 4). The Libyans are to a lesser extent described as ‘civilians/people’ and more often as ‘soldier/fighter’. The coverage within this period was very focused on the fighting between the Libyan opposition and the Gaddafi forces, and the dire situation the Libyan opposition found themselves in at this time. The Libyans interviewed are asking for help, and talk about their fears for what Gaddafi might do if he manages to take control of Benghazi. “He will hang us all if he comes back here”, one rebel says (March 13), while another believes there will be a slaughter, with hundreds of thousands dying (March 14). Thus, although the empathy and support-frame is not dominant in this period, there is still a great sense of urgency being expressed in the articles from this period. This is also reflected in the commentary section during this period. The two commentaries, one opinion editorial and one editorial, are all very critical of the inactions of the West, particularly Obama’s lack of leadership, and warn about what may come if Gaddafi manages to crush the rebellion.

The fourth period is dominated by a strong empathy-frame, and the importance of the intervention in order to prevent a massacre of civilians is underlined several times throughout this period, with ‘civilians’ and ‘massacre’ being used extensively. The Libyans interviewed generally emphasize the importance of receiving foreign help to prevent Gaddafi’s atrocities. However, there is also a stronger focus in this period on the rebels committing killings in the conflict (March 20), and people loyal to Gaddafi speak out about their worries for a tribal conflict. Within the commentary section, there is a focus on the risks involved with such a mission. While Cameron is generally acknowledged for having acted in what is seen by many as a “noble cause” (opinion editorial, March 21), there is a prevailing fear in many of the editorials of this becoming a long and bloody war. As one editorial from March 21 argues: “If Libya is liberated from its homicidal dictator without much bloodshed, and a peaceful regime takes place, then the Prime Minister will deserve – and receive – enormous international credit. That is, however, a big if”.

4.5.3 Frequency and range of sources

The frequency of British official sources was relatively high throughout all four periods, differing from the other three countries. In the first period, however, the civilian sources represented the largest and most dominant group of sources within the coverage of Libya.

Making up 54.54 percent of all sources, in which 64 percent are Libyans, the non-official sources were far from marginalized in this first period. However, British official sources made up 20.97 percent of all sources, while foreign official sources made up almost ten percent. Thus, the official sources did represent a large group of sources in this period. Libyan official sources, on the other hand, made up 11.19 percent of all sources in this period.

In the second period, the percentage of British official sources increased to 22.16 percent, and foreign official sources increased to 16.5 percent, while civilian sources decreased to 47.17 percent, in which Libyans represented 83 percent. Non-official sources were still the largest group of sources, but official sources made up an even larger group of the total amount of sources than in the first period. Libyan official sources decreased to 9 percent in this period.

In the third period, civilian sources increased to the highest percentage throughout the four periods, 54.71 percent, while British official sources remained at around 20 percent. Libyan official sources increased to 11.32 percent. The fourth period saw a large increase in official sources, with British official sources representing 26 percent, and foreign official sources representing 23 percent. As with the other countries, civilian sources decreased quite a lot in this period, to 36.48 percent of the total amount of sources. Libyan official sources remained at around 10 percent.

4.5.4 Level of policy certainty

Turning to the political climate, the case of Britain is very interesting, as Britain would become a leading force in promoting a no-fly zone over Libya, thus indicating a very strong level of policy certainty within this country. When studying press statements and reports, it is obvious that the country had a strong focus on the situation in Libya from early on in the policy process, and that Libya was placed high on the political agenda soon after the violence had erupted. On February 22, Foreign Secretary William Hague gave a press statement where he expressed concerns for the situation in Libya. “The UK is gravely concerned about the situation in Libya, which is a danger to the people of Libya and could have serious implications for the wider region”, Hague said, before informing that Britain had taken the initiative to gather a meeting within the UN Security Council in order to address the situation

in Libya.³⁵ In the same press statement, Hague also indicated Britain's leading role in promoting measures against Gaddafi, saying: "The UK will continue to be active on every diplomatic front to address the deepening crisis in Libya, in close coordination with the US, EU and countries of the region".

Thus, already after a few days of fighting in Libya, the conflict had been raised to the top of the foreign policy agenda, and Britain had taken the initiative to arrange a UN Security Council meeting. The importance placed on this issue was also emphasized by Prime Minister David Cameron, who gave a speech in Egypt on February 22 as the first world leader to visit the country after the fall of dictator Mubarak. In this speech, Cameron said the West had been wrong in supporting Arab dictators, and promised that Britain would "back democracy campaigners seeking greater rights across the Middle East" (The Telegraph, 23 February). Thus, the British government early on in conflict spoke out against Gaddafi, condemning the violence, and also expressing support for the Arab people's fight for "human rights and freedom" (The Telegraph, February 23).

On February 28, Cameron gave a speech to the House of Commons in which he clearly emphasized the grave situation in Libya, saying: "(f)or the future of Libya and its people, Colonel Qadhafi's regime must end and he must leave".³⁶ In the same speech, Cameron told the House of Commons he had started drafting up plans for a no-fly zone, and he did not rule out the use of military force: "We must not tolerate this regime using military force against its own people. In that context I have asked the Ministry of Defense and the Chief of the Defense Staff to work with our allies on plans for a military no-fly zone." As a note from the House of Commons states, the British government was consistent in pressing for a no-fly zone in Libya since February 28, when Cameron for the first time opened up for military measures in Libya.³⁷ On March 7, it became known that France and Britain had been drafting a Security Council Resolution to propose a no-fly zone (The Telegraph, March 8).³⁸ On March 10, Cameron and then President of France, Nicolas Sarkozy, sent a letter to the Council of the European Union,

³⁵ British government website: <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-calls-for-un-action-on-libya> (Accessed 23.04.2013)

³⁶ British government website: <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/prime-ministers-statement-on-libya-2> (Accessed 23.04.2013)

³⁷ Briefing paper from House of Commons: <http://www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/SN05911.pdf>. (Accessed on 23.04.2013)

³⁸ Briefing paper from House of Commons: <http://www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/SN05911.pdf>. (Accessed on 23.04.2013)

in which they urged for support for a UN resolution that would authorize a no-fly zone over Libya.^{39 40} Cameron tried to persuade the other EU leaders to support a no-fly zone on a summit in Brussel on March 11, but faced great opposition from other EU-countries, particularly Germany. In the meeting, Cameron promised that Britain would not stand by as “the Libyan people are slaughtered” (The Telegraph, March 12). After the UN resolution was passed on March 17, Britain joined the coalition of countries who would enforce the no-fly zone, with Cameron saying it was “necessary, legal and right”.⁴¹ The decision to get involved in Libya was supported by the British Parliament, where 557 to 13 members of parliament voted in favor of the use of the armed forces to implement the United Nations Security Council resolution.⁴² This indicates a strong elite consensus on this issue within the country, also underlined by the fact that Ed Miliband, the leader of the Labor Party and also the opposition, welcomed the UN resolution.⁴³

All of this indicates a high level of policy certainty within the British government, and also a high degree of elite consensus. The British foreign secretary and the Prime Minister spoke out early on the issue, and they were clear in their call for action from the international community. Cameron took a leading role in promoting a no-fly zone over Libya, and from February 28 and onwards, there were little doubts that this was the policy that the British government was working towards. The Prime Minister’s speech in Egypt in support of the Arab revolts underlines how the British government seemed to view the situation in Libya: as a people’s revolt, a call for human rights and freedom. Cameron received quite a lot of political support for this stand, and several members of parliament would praise Cameron after the UN resolution was passed, calling it “breathtaking courage” and “superb leadership” (The Telegraph, March 19).

³⁹ The Guardian, 10.03.2011. “Letter from Davis Cameron and Nicolas Sarkozy to Herman Van Rompuy”.

⁴⁰ Briefing paper from House of Commons: <http://www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/SN05911.pdf>. (Accessed on 23.04.2013) (Accessed on 23.04.2013)

⁴¹ British government website: <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/libya-time-for-action-has-come> (accessed on 20.04.2013)

⁴² British government website: <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/mps-back-libya-action—2> (accessed on 23.04.2013)

⁴³ Briefing paper from House of Commons: <http://www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/SN05911.pdf>. (Accessed on 23.04.2013)

4.6 Summary of the empirical findings

In the sections above, I have presented the empirical findings from Norway, the United States, Denmark and Britain. These empirical findings relate to both the media coverage of Libya in the four respective countries, as well as the level of policy certainty within the governments in these countries, thus pointing to the domestic political climate that prevailed in the countries analyzed. However, what were the similarities and differences in media coverage amongst the four countries? And secondly, what were the similarities and differences in political climate? In this section, I will provide a summary of the empirical findings from the four countries studied, hopefully providing some clarity to these questions.

4.6.1 Media coverage

Having studied the coverage of Libya in the four respective countries, there are several important similarities that should be noted. Firstly, there was extensive coverage of the situation in Libya in all the four countries in the two first periods of the analysis, from February 18 to March 12. The importance placed on the situation in Libya in all the four countries is indicated both by the fact that Libya was a front page story in a majority of the days during this time, and also in the fact that the coverage in the commentary section was extensive as well. Thus, this was an issue that took up a great deal of the newspapers' space, both within the news section and in the commentary section. The coverage decreased in all the four countries during the third period, from March 13 to March 17. This decrease was most significant in the Norwegian coverage and the British coverage, where the coverage decreased by almost two pages (Norway) and 3.18 articles (Britain). The decrease was least significant in the American coverage, where the decrease during this period was only 0.2 articles. The coverage in all the four countries did increase substantially in the fourth period. However, while the difference between the first and fourth period in the Norwegian coverage was 0.71 pages, and the difference in the American coverage was 0.74 articles, the Danish and British coverage almost doubled in the fourth period compared to the first period, with an increase of 2.63 pages (Denmark) and 3 articles (Britain).

The coverage in all the four countries had a large amount of civilian sources throughout the three first periods. Particularly within the Norwegian coverage, the civilian sources dominated, representing 67.78 percent of all sources in the first period, and never falling below 62 percent in any of the three first periods. An interesting finding is that only 15.5 percent of the sources in the Norwegian coverage during the first period were official sources, whilst none were Norwegian official sources. The percentage of Norwegian official sources was generally low throughout all the three first periods, never exceeding 6 percent. In the American coverage, the amount of civilian sources never fell below 52.76 percent in the three first periods, and the amount of official sources was particularly low in the first and third period. However, in the second period, the use of official American sources represented a quarter of all the sources, thus making up a substantial part of the sources. The British and Danish coverage differed somewhat from the Norwegian and American coverage. Here, official sources did make up a significant proportion of the total amount of sources used in all periods. In the first and third period, the amount of official Danish sources was particularly high, whereas the percentage of British official sources was high throughout all periods, never falling below 20 percent. All the four countries, however, had a very low frequency of Libyan official sources throughout all the four periods, and they all had an extensive increase in the use of official sources in the fourth period, after the UN mandate had been passed.

With regards to the framing of the situation in Libya, there are striking similarities within all the four countries. The coverage of Libya was characterized by a very strong empathy-frame, and with a substantial focus on the sufferings of civilians and the violence committed by the Gaddafi regime. Gaddafi is described as a 'tyrant who slaughters his own people', and words such as 'massacre', 'bloody' and 'violence' are used frequently to describe the situation. Thus, the opposition in Libya falls very clearly into an 'innocent victim'-frame, while the Gaddafi regime on the other hand is framed as a 'brutal oppressor'. Also, the coverage in all the four countries expressed a strong support for the Libyan opposition, both implicitly through descriptions in the news section, and explicitly in editorials, commentaries and analyses. The Libyan opposition's goals were said to be freedom and democracy, and although there was a certain focus in all the newspapers regarding the possibility of Islamist groups becoming more powerful if Gaddafi was ousted, this possible counter-frame never got a strong foothold in any of the newspapers. The critical frame became nuanced by the sources in the coverage in all countries, and particularly by the Libyans interviewed, who were

generally concerned with emphasizing that they were moderate Muslims with democratic ideals.

The editorial coverage in the United States differs from that in Denmark, Britain and Norway in that the editorials are generally very critical of the Obama administration, as well as clearly calling for the politicians to act. The Norwegian and Danish editorials were much more supportive of the government's policy line. The editorials in *Aftenposten* appeared to have adopted the cautious approach to the situation in Libya that the government had taken, whereas the editorials in *Berlingske* clearly supported the more aggressive line that the Danish government had taken. The editorials in the British coverage, on the other hand, were somewhat critical, but mostly at how Britain had been dealing with the Gaddafi regime before, as well as with the lack of funding for the British military in a time when Cameron was suggesting another military intervention. However, the editorials did convey a strong support for the Libyan opposition, and called for political pressure to stop Gaddafi.

4.6.2 Political climate

The political climate in which the policy decision to intervene was taken varied within the four countries. In Denmark, there was a high level of policy certainty with regards to intervening in Libya, and there was a remarkably strong elite consensus. While the official decision to intervene came after the UN mandate was passed, the foreign minister had mentioned the possibility of an intervention, even without a UN mandate, on March 10, and there was broad political support for this around that time. The foreign minister had also spoken out on the issue of Libya early, and taken a clear stand in support of the Libyan opposition and international measures taken against Gaddafi. Through press statements and news reports it is easy to notice the importance that Danish politicians placed on the situation in Libya. The Danish politicians were present in the debate about Libya, particularly in the first and third period, and they emphasized the importance of acting in Libya to prevent a genocide. It does say something about the political climate in Denmark at this time, and the sense of urgency that Danish politicians must have felt, when even political parties generally opposed to military interventions opened up for the possibility of Denmark participating in an intervention in Libya, even without a UN mandate.

In Britain, there was also a high level of policy certainty, indicated both by the very clear appeals by the foreign secretary and the prime minister to take action against Gaddafi in order to stop the violence in Libya, and most strongly by the fact that the prime minister was the first to promote a no-fly zone. Cameron fought for an implementation of a no-fly zone in Libya from February 28, and he was on the forefront of diplomatic efforts to halt the Gaddafi regime's killings of the Libyan people. In addition to this, there did not appear to be any significant elite dissensus on the issue in Britain. The fact that the decision to intervene in Libya was supported in the parliament with 557 votes in favor, and only 13 against, supports the notion of there being a strong elite consensus in Britain. This indicates that there was a policy certainty within the British government already by February 28 on what actions should be taken in Libya, and also that there was elite consensus on the issue.

The political climate in Norway and the United States differed from that in Denmark and Britain, as in both of these countries there seemed to be a rather high level of policy uncertainty. In Norway, there was a remarkable absence of political debate or political engagement on the issue during the timeframe of this analysis. Whilst issuing some general statements on the situation in Libya, the MFA did not mention any word of a no-fly zone or an international intervention before March 9, and Norwegian politicians were barely present as sources in the coverage on Libya at all. When then state secretary Barth Eide did speak out on the issue of a no-fly zone, he seemed hesitant and did not give a clear answer. He also seemed reluctant to support a no-fly zone, indicative of a high level of policy uncertainty within the government. There was no political debate in Norway regarding what to do about the situation in Libya until March 16. While this demand represented a political dissensus emerging in Norway, it only emerged late in the policy process, and could not have affected the media coverage or the policy process in any way up to this date.

In the United States, President Obama did not make any public statements about the situation in Libya until February 25, and The Washington Post was critical of what they in an editorial on February 24 called a "passive president". There was a high level of policy uncertainty within the administration, indicated both in the very vague answers given on the press meetings with the press secretary of the White House, as well as the reluctance of both Obama and his senior officials to give any indications of whether or not they would support a no-fly zone. The case of the United States differs from the Danish, British and Norwegian case in that there was a rather strong elite dissensus in the United States on the issue of a

possible intervention. This dissensus was prevalent both in the administration, as Mann (2012) argues, and also in the Senate, with several senators calling for action on Libya and criticizing Obama for being passive.

Chapter 5: Analysis and discussion

After having presented the empirical findings in the previous chapter, it is now time to move on to the analysis- and discussion part of this thesis. The empirical findings from the four countries create the background for this chapter, where I will analyze and discuss the main findings from these countries with the aim of answering my four operational research questions, namely:

- 1. What were the central characteristics of the media coverage of the situation in Libya within the main national newspapers in Britain, Norway, the United States and Denmark?*
- 2. What characterized the domestic political climate in these four countries during the period of policy debate leading up to the intervention?*
- 3. What were the main differences and similarities in the media coverage and political climate in these four different countries?*
- 4. To what extent did the media coverage influence the countries' decision to intervene in Libya, and how can the case of Libya help us to answer the general research questions of this thesis?*

The chapter is divided into three sections. In the first section, I will analyze and discuss the similarities and differences in the coverage of Libya between the four countries. In the second section, I will analyze and discuss the political climate that dominated within the four countries, while I in the last section will analyze and discuss to what extent the media coverage influenced the countries' decision to intervene.

5.1 Similarities and differences in coverage between the four countries

There are some striking similarities in the coverage of Libya in all the four countries. First and foremost, it is important to note that they all had extensive coverage of Libya in the first period of the analysis, indicating that the great interest in and focus on Libya began almost immediately after the first protests began. While the coverage in Denmark and Norway was intense from the very beginning (February 18), it grew increasingly strong in Britain from February 20, and from February 21 in the United States. At this time, there was no political debate regarding Libya in either of these countries. Thus, it does appear that the media followed the surprising events unfolding in Libya with great attention, while the politicians to some extent may have been pressured or encouraged to react to this coverage. As Wolfsfeld (1997:25) argues, when the powerful lose control of the setting and framing of a conflict they are forced to react to events, instead of initiate and control them. In the case of Libya, where the extent of violence erupted fast and abruptly, there are several indications of the politicians having to react to what they heard through the media, and certainly not being the ones who were leading the news agenda within the media.

Non-official, civilian sources dominating the coverage

The analysis of the frequency and range of sources gives some important insight into the coverage within the four countries. It is particularly interesting to note the very low frequency of official Norwegian sources in the coverage in *Aftenposten*, and the very high frequency of civilian sources throughout the first three periods. The lowest percentage of civilian sources in this newspaper in the periods prior to the intervention was 62.5 percent, the highest being 75 percent. In this country, there also seemed to have been a no-policy line, indicating a high degree of uncertainty among the political elite as to how to react. In the American coverage as well, the frequency of official sources was low in the first period, but increased in the second period as debate about Libya started appearing in the newspaper. However, civilian sources dominated the coverage throughout the three first periods in *Washington Post*, as they did in *Aftenposten*. Particularly the Norwegian case, but also the first period in the American coverage, appear to be good examples of a situation that opens up for what Bennett (1990:107) calls “anomalous news narratives told through disparate social voices”. These are

situations in which the public opinion for some reason is in disarray, rendering it difficult for the journalists to apply an indexing of news according to the political debate. In this vacuum of political absence, there is an opening for social voices to be heard. The opposition in Libya was to a large extent describing their own situation, thus representing themselves, in the articles in *Aftenposten* and *Washington Post*. This is a rather important point, as people in crisis rarely have the possibility to represent themselves, as Shaw argues (1996). In his analysis of the international responses to several global crises, Shaw concludes that the media have a powerful role when it comes to the representation of the people in crisis. However, he argues that “[w]hat it is missing above all is the ability of people in conflict situations to represent themselves. Western-dominated global media rarely take seriously the self-representation of individuals, communities and organizations in zones of conflict” (1996:182). This ability to represent themselves, thus enabling the readers to see the people within the rebellion and not just view them as numbers and statistics, was also prevalent in the British and Danish coverage, providing the opposition in Libya with an ability to affect the framing of the conflict in all of the four newspapers. The narrative in the newspapers was very much affected by these social voices, namely Libyans, who were emphasizing the violence that Gaddafi was committing against his people. Thus, the official frames occupy a much less significant amount of space in the coverage (Wolfsfeld 1997:70), which is a very interesting finding, as it also opens up the possibility for these social voices to have a significant effect on the framing of the conflict within the newspapers.

This coincides to a large extent with Wolfsfeld’s (1997) analysis, in which he emphasizes the importance for the weaker part in a conflict to gain access to the news media, and thus enabling them to affect the framing of the conflict. In Wolfsfeld’s view, the media is at its most influential exactly in those instances when it is not following the official narrative, but focusing its attention on the challengers in a conflict. In these situations, the authorities, in this case the Gaddafi regime, lose their ability to control and initiate events, and thus their ability to affect the framing of a conflict. This opens up for the weaker side to promote their alternative frame to the media (1997:45). In accordance with Entman’s conceptualization, framing is a way “to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation” (1993:52). Thus, the ability to affect the framing of a conflict is of pivotal importance, because it enables the challengers to promote a perceived reality to the rest of the world, making this reality the

most salient in the coverage. This may provide the weaker group with political legitimacy, crucial if they are to be taken seriously within the international society, as well as enabling outside support, opening up for intervention by a third part (Wolfsfeld 1997).

A clear empathy and support-frame

When studying the framing of the conflict in Libya that was conveyed through the coverage in the newspapers in this study it seems that the opposition's access to the media, and the fact that they to a large extent represented themselves, may have been crucial for the framing that was constructed of this conflict. In particular, this can be seen in two aspects of the coverage; firstly, their ability to construct a strong 'innocent victim' frame, while highlighting the immensity of Gaddafi's brutality, making him the brutal oppressor. Secondly, their ability to prevent a powerful counter-frame that could have questioned their goals and unity as an opposition. The statements from the Libyans in the coverage in all the newspapers helped construct a dominant frame of injustice and violent oppression. They described what was taking place in their country as a massacre, accused Gaddafi of being evil and crazy, while to a large extent describing themselves as a unified people wanting freedom and democracy. Gaddafi's attempt to promote a counter-frame, accusing the opposition of being drug addicts and terrorists who wanted to destroy the country, failed. This was probably to a large extent due to Gaddafi's extremely low status within the international society, thus giving him little legitimacy to begin with. However, the fact that the opposition gained access to the news media, and efficiently promoted their framing of the conflict, may also have contributed to the negative image of Gaddafi conveyed through the media. As Wolfsfeld (1997:53) argues, in conflicts with a high level of violence, there is a great need within the media to allocate blame. A negative story about someone in power is a "good" news story, thus enabling extensive coverage. Also, if the authorities are blamed for the violence, they effectively lose their legitimacy, while providing the weaker side with a powerful 'innocent victim' frame to promote in the media. This frame became prevalent in the coverage of Libya in all the countries, making the coverage rather unambiguous. Gaddafi's bizarre televised speeches, and his apparent complete lack of diplomatic tact made for "good" news stories, as it contributed to the image of him as a deranged dictator killing his own people. Thus, this both enabled extensive coverage of the situation, as the news value in the conflict was perceived to be high, and increased the legitimacy of the opposition. The result was a rather unambiguous framing

of the conflict in Libya conveyed through the newspapers; the people rising up to a cruel dictator.

An unambiguous understanding of the conflict conveyed through the coverage

It is interesting to note this unambiguous framing of Libya in the coverage in all four newspapers, as it was not a given in the case of Libya. Libya is a tribal country where loyalty to the tribe has been perceived to be greater than the loyalty to the state. Thus, it is not seen as a very united country. Gaddafi had ruled the country with an iron fist for more than forty years, destroying most of the basis for a democratic society. Also, the eastern areas, where the main opposition in Libya originated, is known for being the area where Islamist extremist groups had their strongest foothold in the country, albeit to a very limited extent. Despite these factors, there was barely any focus at all in any of the newspapers on the probability of Libya turning into another Afghanistan or Iraq if the international society were to intervene, or a possible threat of an Islamic regime taking control of the country in close proximity to Europe's borders. A skeptical or critical counter-frame became completely overrun by the support frame, focusing on the West's responsibility to support the civilians in their fight for freedom and democracy. The message projected in the media, mainly in the news section, but also extensively in the commentary section, was that this was the time for the West to support the people in the Arab countries, after having enabled the autocratic regimes in this region to remain in power for decades. This framing was made possible by the way the Libyan opposition represented itself, as well-educated, united people that aimed for a good relationship with the West and a well-functioning democracy. Whilst being a Muslim country, they emphasized the importance of women rights and a secular state, thus creating an image of themselves as non-threatening and legitimate within the eyes of foreign politicians.

Critical editorials in The Washington Post calling for actions from the administration

The coverage in The Washington Post differs from that in Berlingske, The Telegraph and Aftenposten in one important way; the editorials here are very critical of the Obama administration, and explicitly call for "something to be done". The editorials in Aftenposten condemns the violence, and supports the Libyan opposition, but has a cautious approach to

the conflict which is very much in line with the Norwegian political reaction. Berlingske's editorials are equally supportive of its government's position, while the editorials in The Telegraph are more ambivalent towards the situation, criticizing how Britain used to turn a blind eye to the violent regime of Gaddafi, while also emphasizing the risks involved in a military intervention. The editorials in Washington Post, however, reflect the framing of the conflict, and side very clearly and explicitly with the opposition. Gaddafi is "committing atrocities", "waging a war against his people", "committing crimes against humanity", and "slaughters his own people". Obama is, on the other hand, "passive", he doesn't oppose "the depravities of a tyrant" and "has shown no intention of protecting the Libyans whom Mr. Gaddafi is slaughtering". There is little room for ambiguity in these types of descriptions. Here, the injustice and innocent victim frame promoted in the coverage of Libya, whose underlying theme is that "something must be done", is also expressed clearly within the editorials.

Higher percentage of official sources in Britain and Denmark

Berlingske and The Telegraph differ from the two other newspapers in that the frequency of official sources is high in the first period of coverage, consisting of 38.27 percent and 31.22 percent of the total amount of sources. The Telegraph has the highest percentage of domestic official sources, with 21.27 percent, while the Danish official sources represent 17.28. Thus, while civilian sources in both The Telegraph and Berlingske represented the largest group of sources in this first period of coverage, the official sources did make up a rather large percentage of the sources, enabling them to affect the framing of the conflict at least to a certain extent. This higher number of official sources may have something to do with the fact that the level of policy certainty was much higher in Denmark and Britain than in Norway and the United States. Danish politicians spoke out early about the situation in Libya, in clear support of the Libyan opposition and also emphasizing the international society's responsibility to support what they themselves labeled as freedom fighters and a democratic movement. The British prime minister was the leading force in promoting a no-fly zone over Libya, proposing this on February 28. Thus, the politicians here became involved in the coverage earlier. It is interesting to note that the percentage of official British sources was high throughout all the four periods, never falling below 20 percent. Thus, particularly in Britain, domestic official sources did contribute rather extensively to the coverage. However,

the social voices still represented the largest group of sources in all the three periods prior to the intervention. Thus, there is no indication of social voices being marginalized in these two countries, as they still make up a significant proportion of the total amount of sources, despite high policy certainty and elite consensus. This implies that an indexing of news according to official voices did not take place within the coverage in these countries, despite a high policy certainty. In addition to this, as mentioned previously in this section, Libyan civilians represented themselves extensively within the Danish and British coverage, and managed to affect the framing of the conflict conveyed through the media coverage. Therefore, in the case of Britain and Denmark, it appears that the official sources reacted to the framing of the conflict in Libya established mainly by social voices, and, instead of creating an official counter-frame, the official voices in these countries seem to have reinforced the social voices' narrative and framing, emphasizing the importance of supporting the people's fight for freedom from a brutal dictator.

5.2 Political climate

There are several interesting aspects worth analysing regarding the political climate within the four different countries in relation to the policy decision to intervene in Libya. As pointed out in section 4.6.2, the way the issue of Libya was approached politically differed to a large extent in the four countries. In Denmark and Britain, there was a high policy certainty and elite consensus regarding Libya, both in the government and parliament. As mentioned in section 4.4.4 and 4.5.4, the situation in Libya was perceived to be of great urgency and importance in both these countries. The threat of a massacre and the importance of protecting a legitimate fight for democracy were expressed both by the media, but also to a great extent by politicians.

High certainty and political consensus: Britain and Denmark

Peter Viggo Jakobsen and Karsten Jakob Møller (2012:107) argue that this strong political reaction in Denmark to a large extent can be explained by the fact that Libya, from a Danish perspective, was the perfect war for Denmark to fight, as it fitted perfectly within the Danish

Way of War. Denmark has in the last fifteen years changed their foreign policy line, from a stern opposition against using force in any other way than national self defense, to seeing force as useful tool in foreign policy, thus becoming part of the “strategic actors” club (p 107). Libya fitted the Danish strategy perfectly, as the intervention was justified as a measure to prevent a possible genocide in Libya, while the long-term goal was to support the establishment of a democratic country, which would serve Danish interests when it came to trade and stability. Lastly, it was the perfect case for Denmark to “do its bit”, thus proving its relevance and reliability to more powerful countries (2012:112). This may have affected the political climate in Denmark extensively, making the Danish politicians very susceptible to an empathy and support-framed coverage, and also influence the way they came to view and approach this situation.

In some ways, Britain differed from Denmark in the sense that the situation in Libya, at first glance, did not appear to be an issue that British leaders would want to become strongly involved in. The British coalition government had wanted to distance itself from the interventionist policies of the former British Prime Minister Tony Blair. An intervention in Libya appeared to be much more in line with Blair’s “liberal interventionism” than with the cautious foreign policy approach the Cameron government had promised when elected in 2010 (Clarke 2012:8). Also, Libya was not rated as an issue of strategic importance in Britain. Despite this, the strategic decision to promote an intervention in Libya was taken by Cameron himself in what seemed to be a rather spontaneous reaction to the situation that was unfolding (Clarke 2012). According to the Guardian, Cameron told political allies that he did not want Libya to become another Srebrenica, the terrible massacre that took place in Bosnia in 1995 and killed more than 8000 Bosnian Muslims, and promised he would do what he could to prevent this from happening (Clarke 2012).⁴⁴ This indicates that Cameron may to a certain extent have been affected by the framing of the conflict in Libya conveyed through the coverage in the media, which was very much dominated by a focus on the brutal killings of innocent civilians. However, he may also, like the Danish politicians, have been particularly perceptive to such a framing because he might have hoped to gain politically from the situation, despite the apparent lack of strategic importance. As Clarke (2012) argues:

⁴⁴ The Guardian, 02.10.2011: “David Cameron’s Libyan war: why the PM felt Gaddafi had to be stopped”. <http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2011/oct/02/david-cameron-libyan-war-analysis> (Accessed on 26.04.2013)

“For Britain itself, Libya represented a welcome success for a government that was trying to administer painful cuts in public expenditure, was criticized for cutting defense unwisely or too harshly, and which was still wrestling with generally negative perceptions over the continuing war in Afghanistan. It showed to the world a determined and competent side of British military policy” (Clarke 2012:7).

Thus, Cameron might have seen the situation in Libya as an ability to shift the focus from difficult political domestic issues, as well as to show some determination and competence. Also, Cameron may have used this situation as an opportunity to distance himself from his predecessor Blair, who faced strong criticism in opinion editorials and commentaries within The Telegraph for having brought the oppressive dictator Gaddafi in from the cold, something many believed was a betrayal to the victims of Gaddafi’s brutal regime, as well as the victims of the Lockerbie bombing. By taking a tough stand against Gaddafi, he could try to create an image of himself as a proactive leader who didn’t compromise when it came to values such as freedom and democracy, as well offering an opportunity to display leadership on the international stage

High level of policy uncertainty and elite dissensus: The United States

In the case of the United States, the situation differed significantly from Denmark and Britain. There was a very clear policy uncertainty within the Obama administration, indicated both in Obama’s vague and hesitant approach to the situation in Libya, and the press statements that never provided any clear answers to the questions of an intervention in Libya. In many ways, this reaction was telling of the situation the United States found itself in at this time. With President Obama having inherited two unpopular, expensive and messy wars in foreign countries, the Obama administration’s foreign policy ambition was to minimize the United States’ commitments overseas (Hallams and Schreer 2012). Seen within this context, the Obama administration was not likely to willingly take the lead and promote another intervention in a third Muslim country, without any indications of how long or costly such an intervention would become.

At the same time, there was strong elite dissensus on this issue, both within the administration, but also in the Senate and between the different sub-systems of the executive. While the Pentagon, represented by then Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and military chief Mike Mullen, uttered strong objections against an intervention, several senators were calling

for such an intervention. Also, as Mann argues (2012), the Obama administration was divided between opponents and supporters of an intervention. While some senior officials were skeptical towards an intervention, other senior officials, most prominently Susan Rice, Samantha Power and Hilary Clinton, became strong supporters of the intervention. As mentioned previously, both Rice and Powers had dedicated much of their work to preventing genocides after having witnessed the brutal massacres in Rwanda and Bosnia, and they became strong supporters for the intervention within the administration. Hilary Clinton, who initially seemed hesitant of an intervention, also became convinced of the importance of acting. It is believed that these three senior officials had a great impact in convincing President Obama to draft a resolution for the UN Security Council that would open the door for an intervention in Libya (Fermor 2012).

Therefore, the political climate within the US executive contained the perfect conditions for possible media influence, with both high policy uncertainty and elite dissensus, and what appeared to be two factions within the administration, one in favor of an intervention and the other against. These conditions open up for the media to take sides in the political debate, thus enabling critical coverage of the government, which again could have pressured the Obama administration into acting.

Policy certainty against an intervention without a UN mandate: Norway

In the case of Norway, the picture is rather complex. There was a high degree of uncertainty within the government, and a clear no-policy line throughout the three first periods, until Norway on March 18 gave its full support to a military intervention in Libya. There seemed to be somewhat of an elite consensus when it came to the no-policy line in Norway, as no opposition parties voiced any critique against this lack of policy until March 16, a whole month after the violence broke out in Libya. In accordance with Robinson's model, this indicates that an uncertainty of how to react not only prevailed in the government, but also among opposition parties in the Norwegian parliament, as a no-policy line is understood as a faulty line indicative of policy uncertainty (Robinson 2002:135). However, one could also understand this political approach to the conflict in Libya as in fact a dominant policy certainty against an intervention in Libya without a UN mandate. In order to understand this, one has to comprehend the pivotal role that the UN holds within the Norwegian foreign policy

thinking. In Norway, the support for the UN has been extensive, probably because as a small country it has perceived the UN to be a perfect international organ to promote its national interests, while also focusing on more ideal motives (Lunde et al 2008, Fermann 1995). The UN has constituted a cornerstone in the Norwegian foreign policy approach, and the then foreign minister Gahr Støre has also stated that the Norwegian participation in international operations should be rooted in the UN, and with a clear UN mandate (Haugevik 2008). This is an important factor when studying the political climate in Norway during the time when this policy dedication was taken, as it may have prevented the possibility of any influence from the media, as the policy line was in fact already established by a pivotal premise; no intervention without a UN mandate.

When one sees this in relation to another important factor, namely that it was assumed by both politicians and the media that the Security Council would not pass a UN mandate, it is easier to understand the lack of political debate regarding Libya within Norway. Norway could not affect a decision in the Security Council, whilst this at the same time constituted the premise for any Norwegian decision. Thus, it may have been perceived to be out of the hands of Norwegian politicians. The editorial on March 18 expressed this way of thinking, writing that “[in] this question, more powerful nations must set the terms”, acknowledging the fact that Norway could not make a real difference in this process, despite how much we may have wanted to stop the violence in Libya. Thus, as a small country with no possibility of affecting the Security Council’s decision, and with a strong consensus regarding the importance of a UN mandate in order to participate in an international operation, the terms were already set, and the decision of a possible intervention lay in many ways outside the powers of Norway.

5.3 Media influence

Did the news media influence the policy decision to intervene in the different countries? This again differs from country to country. As seen in the above section, an important condition for media influence is lacking in Denmark, namely policy uncertainty and elite dissensus. As Robinson argues, in the cases where there is policy certainty and elite consensus, the media will remain uncritical and help build support for official policy line (2002:31). What can be observed in Berlingske does in many ways confirm his assumptions. The media did enable the

construction of a framing of the conflict, whose underlying message was that “something must be done”, which was the policy line that the Danish government to a large extent also chose. The media, and particularly the editorials, remained uncritical of Danish politicians, and even praised the way Denmark had dealt with this situation (March 21). In this sense, what may be the case in Denmark is the media having an ‘enabling effect’, which means the media’s ability to “enable policy makers to act by creating a constituency for intervention” (Robinson 2002:40). As there was a clear empathy framing in Berlingske, combined with policy certainty and no critical coverage of the government, it may appear that the Danish politicians have used this pro-interventionist coverage to pursue their policy objective, in concordance with Robinson’s ‘policy-media interaction model’ (2002:41). As discussed in section 5.2, the Danish politicians may have perceived the conflict in Libya to be a perfect situation to act and gain politically. This would mean that the media did not have any influence to persuade or cause politicians to act in a certain way, but rather that the politicians used the media coverage to achieve their political goals.

The importance of context and framing: Denmark and Britain

However, there are several important points worthy of mentioning regarding the coverage in Berlingske that contradict some of Robinson’s ideas. Robinson argues that the enabling effect is closely related to the indexing theory, as the political elite have the ability to set the policy-making agenda, and that they utilize the media to suit their own end (2002:41). If that was the case, however, one should have expected that the coverage to a much larger extent would have followed the political elite, and that they would have dominated the frequency of sources. The civilian sources in the Danish coverage played an extensive role in the first two periods, albeit to a lesser extent than in Norway and the United States. Still, the frequency of civilian sources was particularly high in the second period, when the strongest support frame emerged, emphasizing the brutality of the Gaddafi regime. Although the Danish politicians at this point had given strong indications that they would support a military intervention, as Lene Espersen did on March 10 when she told the public she was keeping all options open, it was not clear that Denmark had a broad political backing for an intervention in Libya before March 16. Thus, although it is unlikely that the media coverage in Denmark had a direct or casual influence on the Danish decision to intervene, I believe it to be a simplification to thus conclude that the media coverage did not in any way influence the policy decision. It appears

that Robinson's model might be unable to capture some important aspects of the Danish coverage, as well as lacking to implement the contextual understanding of this conflict. Wolfsfeld (1997) and Shaw (1996) may contribute to some important insight here.

Firstly, the conflict in Libya erupted in the wake of a historic rebellion taking place throughout several Arab countries, in the Danish media this was often referred to as The Yasmin Revolution or the Arab Spring. These events were covered extensively in Western media, and the popular uprisings were portrayed as demands for change from the autocratic rulers in the region, as well as a cry for more freedom and democracy. With this backdrop, the Libyan conflict became framed in the Danish media from the very beginning as a popular uprising against a tyrant, and as a fight for freedom and human rights. Applying Wolfsfeld (1997) 'political contest model', one can say that the Libyan opposition from the beginning had the upper hand against the Gaddafi regime regarding access to the media and the ability to affect the framing of the conflict, as these rebellions to a large extent had already been framed as "the people vs. the ruthless tyrants". As Wolfsfeld writes, the media have a number of anti-authority frames to apply when covering a conflict if the opposition has the skills and resources to use them (1997:5). The Libyan opposition did manage to control much of the representation and framing of themselves and the conflict, and they became the dominant sources within the media. The Gaddafi regime, on the other hand, had little access to the media, and as Gaddafi from the beginning had been framed as a brutal oppressor, the 'bad guy' in the conflict, his attempts to delegitimize the opposition was usually taken as deranged statements from a delusional tyrant. In addition to this, his bad reputation and bizarre behavior further strengthened this image of a deranged dictator.

Also, while the representation of combatants and victims in distant conflict is typically indirect, as they seldom get to communicate their own information or create their own images (Shaw 1996:12), the people in Libya, opposition soldiers as well as civilians, represented themselves. We saw the people in the rebellion, and they could speak about the horrors of living under the Gaddafi regime, their hopes for freedom, and the violence they were exposed to. The sympathetic image they projected of themselves stood in stark contrast to the negative image of Gaddafi, making it easy to frame the villain and the victims in the conflict. This, I argue, may be of pivotal importance in influencing how the Danish politicians approached the situation. The coverage was dominated by a strong empathy and-support frame, with an emphasis on the suffering of civilians and the fight for democracy and freedom, which may

have affected the Danish politicians' response. Thus, although the Danish politicians may have seen the potential in taking action in Libya, as it suited their foreign policy objectives and there appeared to be little to lose politically, one cannot immediately jump to the conclusion that the Danish politicians thus led the media coverage, as the indexing theory would conclude. It may also be a complex interplay, in which the Libyan opposition managed to convey their framing of the conflict, creating a narrative of the situation that the Danish politicians in turn reacted to and saw the potential in exploiting to gain a political victory. However, without the extensive coverage of Libya, as well as the specific and unambiguous framing of the conflict, it is unlikely that the politicians would have acted the way they did.

The British case is very similar to the Danish case, as here as well was a high level of policy certainty, in addition to elite consensus. Similar to the Danish case, it seems likely to conclude that the media only had an enabling effect in Britain, as the media seemed to have enabled the politicians to act by creating a constituency for intervention. The extensive coverage and the strong empathy and-support frame did establish an understanding of this situation as urgent and serious, underpinning the importance of acting, which was also the policy line that Cameron chose from very early on. However, as was the case in Denmark, it seems plausible that the media in Britain had an influence on the policy decision, albeit not in the sense conceptualized by Robinson. The context of the Arab spring is likely to have been of great importance in Britain, shaping much of Cameron's initial approach to the issue of Libya. Cameron's speech in Egypt on February 23 indicates that he was greatly affected by the democracy-and freedom narrative that had emerged from the coverage of the Arab Spring. In addition to this, it appears that he had become affected by the strong empathy-frame that was conveyed through the coverage of Libya in particularly the first period. Cameron several times emphasized the importance of stopping Gaddafi's brutality, saying he wanted to prevent this from becoming another Srebrenica. The fact that Cameron may have viewed the situation in Libya as a way to gain politically, by showing leadership and competence on the international scene, may have made him more susceptible to the initial framing of the conflict, affecting how he approached the issue politically.

Thus, as with the Danish case, the framing of Libya, as well as the particular context of the Arab Spring in which this conflict emerged from, must be taken into consideration when assessing the influence of the media. While the media probably did not have any direct influence on Cameron's decision to promote a no-fly zone, this does not mean that the media

was rendered without any form of influence on the policy decision in Britain. It may very well have affected Cameron's understanding of the issue, shaping his political reaction to the conflict, and thus in some ways affecting his decision. Here as well, it appears to be a symbiotic relationship, as Cameron reacted strongly to the first coverage of the situation in Libya, which again placed the issue of Libya high on the political agenda, and enabled even more coverage on the issue, further strengthening the understanding of this as an important and urgent issue.

A case of media influence: The United States

The American case is an intriguing case, as you find both elite dissensus and high policy uncertainty within the Obama administration, as well as elite dissensus within the Senate. The coverage of Libya in Washington Post was also extensive in both the first and second period, the periods prior to when the decision to intervene was taken by Obama on March 15. The focus on Libya was also rather strong in the editorial section, particularly in the first period, and these were all strongly in favor of acting against Gaddafi to prevent him from killing his own people. While adopting a clear support frame towards the Libyan opposition, they were critical of Obama and were calling "for something to be done". It is important to note that these critical editorials began before any elite debate on the issue of Libya had started appearing in the newspaper. In addition to these factors, there was a very dominant empathy-frame in the coverage of Libya, particularly in the two first periods, and the violence against civilians was explicitly described. The coverage implicitly created an understanding of the urgency of acting to prevent a bloodbath and genocide in Benghazi, something the editorials also explicitly argued for.

Throughout the coverage of Libya in Washington Post, it was apparent that Obama in no way seemed to lead or control the coverage in Libya, but instead was forced to react to what was taking place. An indication of this is the critical editorial on February 24, accusing Obama of a slow response to the dictator's atrocities. The following day, February 25, Obama announced he would increase the pressure on Gaddafi. While there may be a variety of reasons why Obama chose to respond more strongly against Gaddafi at this point, e.g. the reaction of other countries such as Britain and France, it is also an indication that the Obama administration may have felt the need to respond to the massive media coverage. When

studying more closely, particularly the first period of coverage in Washington Post, there are several interesting points to be made. The coverage was extensive, particularly from February 21 and onwards. The situation in Libya dominated most of the front pages during the last six days of coverage in the first period, and while civilian sources represented over half the sources during this period, official American sources only represented 12.27 percent of the sources. To compare, academics interviewed in this period amounted to 11 percent of the sources. Thus, social voices affected the narrative of this conflict to a rather large extent, and as the coverage was dominating the news in this period and also took up much of the focus in the editorials, it seems unlikely that politicians could ignore or choose not to respond to the coverage.

Thus, in many ways, all the conditions of media influence were present in the United States, namely high political uncertainty, elite dissensus, as well as a coverage dominated by a clear empathy frame and strong support for the opposition in Libya, and critical focus on the Obama administration's reaction to the crisis. Obama and members of his administration seemed extremely cautious of intervening in Libya for a long period, but ended up advocating for not only a no-fly zone in Libya, but also the implementation of "all necessary measures" to protect civilians in the Security Council. To what extent did the media influence this decision? This is, unfortunately, impossible to clearly assess. As Carruthers (2000:208) points out, the impact of the media during humanitarian disasters "eludes empirical verification". As with any foreign policy decision, a variety of complex aspects may have played a part in affecting the policy decision. Geopolitical reasons, namely Libya's important location close to Europe as well as it being an oil-rich country, may have played a part, the same may the fear that prolonged instability in this country would destabilize the whole region. The LAS's surprising call for a no-fly zone was probably one of the most decisive factors, as no Western country would have intervened in yet another Arab country without the acceptance and support from Arab countries.

However, among these possible explanations, the influence of the media should not be ignored. The critical focus on Obama in Washington Post, as well as the empathy-framed coverage and supportive stance towards the Libyan opposition, may have played an important role during the long period of policy uncertainty in enabling those policy makers who advocated for intervention to convince other policy makers of this policy, in accordance with Robinson's model (2002:92). The rather explicit accusations of Obama being passive and

“ignoring Gaddafi’s slaughtering of civilians” may have pressured the Obama administration into responding more strongly to the violence in Libya. One should not underestimate the effect it may have had on Obama to be perceived as a passive president, hesitant to respond to clear human rights violations and support the people’s freedom struggle. Thus, here as well, the framing of the conflict may have played a pivotal part in the response by the politicians. The violence of the regime, and the human suffering, was in many ways magnified to such an extent that any critical or skeptical voices were completely ignored. The Libyans efficiently reached out to the media and gained access, thus enabling them to represent themselves as innocent victims and freedom fighters, and promote their version of the conflict to the media (Wolfsfeld 1997). This placed the conflict on the public agenda, and brought their case forward into the public light, emphasizing their legitimate goals. In this process, as Wolfsfeld (1997) argues, political actors come under pressure “to do something”. As he writes, “it is virtually impossible for political leaders to ignore any political conflict that is being placed so high on the public agenda” (1997:209).

Foreign policy conditions hinder a possible media influence: Norway

Turning to the Norwegian case, there are several interesting aspects. The coverage in Aftenposten is ambiguous, as it did have a strong empathy framing, and clearly supported the Libyan opposition. Thus, an underlying message that “something should be done” did characterize the coverage. At the same time, Aftenposten adopted then foreign minister Gahr Støre’s cautious stand towards acting on Libya, and also defended him against the criticism from the opposition (editorial March 18). It is interesting to note that Aftenposten adopts a much more realistic than idealistic approach to Libya, in stern contrast to Washington Post. As the editorial on March 18 concludes, “[on] this question, more powerful nations must set the terms”, acknowledging the fact that Norway could not make a real difference in this process, despite how much it may have wanted to stop the violence in Libya.

Thus, some of the conditions for media influence were present in Norway, while other important conditions were lacking. There was a strong empathy frame, as well as a support frame, which could have asserted pressure on the politicians to act. However, Aftenposten’s coverage was never critical of the government’s lack of policy in Libya, and it did adopt the government’s cautious stance in its editorials. While acknowledging the civilian tragedy that

was taking place in Libya, there was a certain acceptance of this issue not being something Norway could affect. *Aftenposten* also had little hope in the international community taking action, even as late as the day after the UN mandate was passed in the Security Council (editorial March 18).

Whilst there did emerge elite dissensus, this came too late in the process to make any difference with regards to the coverage. This indicates that, as Robinson argues, one pivotal condition for the media to have an influence is elite dissensus. As Robinson argues, in cases with elite consensus, “the media will remain uncritical and help build support for official policy line” (2002:31). However, another main condition in the Norwegian case was also in many ways lacking. It is plausible to argue that there in some sense was a very firm policy certainty within the Norwegian government, despite the apparent lack of policy. This policy certainty consisted of a firm political agreement not to intervene if the Security Council did not pass a mandate. Likewise, as Norway has been a stark supporter of UN mandates and international cooperation, it is unlikely that they would not participate if the UN did pass the mandate of a no-fly zone.

Therefore, the Norwegian case is interesting, as specific foreign policy conditions within this country seemed to have hindered a strong media influence. The media may have enabled the Norwegian decision to participate in the intervention in Libya following the UN mandate, as the strong empathy frame and support frame conveyed through the coverage made it easier for Gahr Støre to justify this policy decision after it had been taken. It may also have enabled the elite dissensus that did emerge in Norway, albeit late in the process. This dissensus seemed to a large extent to have been shaped by the framing of the conflict in the media, with the political opposition focusing on promoting democracy and preventing genocide in Libya. However, as the Norwegian government has such a staunch principle in their foreign policy of following the decisions taken within the UN, this seem to have been the determining factor in the case of Norway. This is also indicated by the fact that the Norwegian decision was not taken until after the UN mandate was passed. It is realistic to conclude that, in the case of Norway, the decision to intervene was affected mostly by the UN mandate itself, which Norway may have felt obliged to support and act in accordance with.

5.4 Concluding remarks

The analyses of the four different countries do provide some very interesting insight into the role of the media coverage in the intervention in Libya. First of all, the findings from the American case support Robinson's model, namely the assumption that the media can influence a policy decision under the conditions of policy uncertainty, elite dissensus and an empathy and critical-framing. In the United States, all these conditions were present, and it appears that the media coverage in this country may have played an important role in shifting the Obama administration's position from hesitant of a military intervention towards supporting an intervention. An interesting point here is that the critical editorials in *The Washington Post*, demanding that the Obama administration supported the Libyan opposition and stopped Gaddafi's slaughter on civilians, started before the political debate regarding a possible no-fly zone emerged in the media. The coverage was also extensive, with several articles run on the front pages, days before the elite dissensus appeared. This opens up for the possibility of a rather strong media influence, as it could indicate that *The Washington Post* played a part in setting the political agenda with regards to Libya, and thus affected the elite dissensus emerging on the issue. The politicians seemed to be responding to the extensive, empathy-framed coverage, which expressed strong support for the Libyan opposition. Also, the framing of the conflict, as one in which innocent victims were brutally killed by a deranged, anti-Western dictator, may have been crucial in providing this conflict with such an extensive coverage, and therefore demanding the attention of politicians.

The Danish and British cases also seem to confirm Robinson's assumption that, in those instances where there is a high degree of policy certainty among the decision makers and elite consensus, the media will remain uncritical and enable support for the official policy line (Robinson 2002). However, both cases differ somewhat from Robinson's assumption that the media in these instances will follow the lead of the political elite, as the coverage of Libya was not indexed according to official voices. These cases contradict the indexing theory to a large extent, as the media coverage in both Denmark and Britain began before the policy certainty and elite consensus were established in the country, and because social voices dominated much of the coverage. As the conflict in Libya happened suddenly, and the media coverage was extensive from the very beginning, it becomes an oversimplification to conclude that the media could not have had any influence on the policy decisions within these

countries. This points to a possible limitation with Robinson's model, namely its dependence on the indexing theory, as well as an inability to take into consideration the political context of a conflict. In both the Danish case and British case, it is plausible to assume that the context of the Arab Spring may have affected both the extent of coverage on Libya and the way the conflict was framed and thus perceived among both the public and politicians. The situation opened up for social voices to dominate much of the coverage, and thus establishing a narrative of the conflict based on social voices. This may have affected the way this situation was approached politically by the Danish and British politicians, in accordance with Shaw's theory of media influence. He argues that the media have an influence on the political response to crises, as the media is involved with the representation of people in global crises, showing their situation, and in this way are part of shaping the political reactions towards these crises (1996:12). The media can bring distant conflicts close to us, and thus reduce the emotional distance so that an audience becomes more involved in the conflict. This may influence a response by politicians, as they know that a response to a crisis can affect their standing in domestic politics (Shaw 1996).

Therefore, what might be the case in the in the Danish and British case is a symbiotic relationship between the media and the politicians with regards to the policy decision, something Robinson's model appears to oversee. The politicians can have responded to the initial framing of the conflict in Libya and the importance that was placed on this issue in the media. Because this media coverage found resonance among the Danish and British politicians, who were keen to support a democratic movement in the Middle East and condemn an unpopular dictator, they were susceptible to the framing in the media and spoke out early on the issue . This may again have enabled more media coverage on the situation, confirming the importance of the situation.

Another important point is that Robinson's model appears insufficient in explaining the possible media influence in the Norwegian case, as it fails to capture some important aspects of the political system in Norway or other countries. Within the foreign policy system in Norway, the UN has a pivotal role, and there is a strong consensus against participating in international operations without a UN mandate. Due to this consensus, there was no political debate regarding Libya within Norway until very late in the process, and few possibilities for the media to influence the policy decision, despite an apparent uncertainty within the government, as well as an extensive coverage, with a clear empathy-frame. This is of great

interest, because the media in Norway appeared to set the news media agenda, and therefore also seem to contradict the indexing theory and its assumption that the official voices are leading the media (Robinson 2002). Social voices affected most of the framing, and the situation in Libya was perceived to be a humanitarian tragedy, thus laying the foundation for clear calls for action. All of these conditions should point to a rather extensive influence of the media. However, as the Norwegian policy line has been to follow the decisions taken within the UN, this policy decision was in many ways out of reach for Norwegian politicians, and thus out of reach for the Norwegian media. Hence, it may be that Norway's lack of power within the international society renders the media here less influential than the American media, as the deciding factor in these types of foreign policy decisions in Norway does not so much depend on the Norwegian politicians, but on decisions taken in international organs such as the UN.

Chapter 6: Concluding chapter

The concluding remarks in the previous chapter have provided some useful and interesting insight into Robinson's 'policy-media interaction model', as well as assessed the extent to which the media influenced the policy decision to intervene in Libya in the four different countries. However, as mentioned in the outset of the paper, the aim of this thesis is not solely to look at the news media's influence in the decision to intervene in Libya, but also to gain a little more understanding of the role of the media in international humanitarian interventions. In this concluding chapter, the goal is to try to provide a comprehensive answer the general research questions of this thesis, which are as follows:

- To what extent is news media coverage a decisive factor in understanding why the international community chooses to intervene in some humanitarian crises, while not intervening in other?

- What influence did the media have on the political decision to intervene in Libya in from March 2011?

To what extent may the empirical findings from the four countries enlighten us to answer these general research questions? As the previous chapter shows, Robinson's 'policy-media interaction model' does provide a rather comprehensive understanding of the influence the media have had on the policy decision in the United States, confirming that the media do have an influence when the right conditions are present. However, there are still aspects of the media coverage that cannot be understood that well through this model. First of all, Robinson's model is primarily developed by studying foreign policy decision taken within the United States, and it seems unable to explain adequately the media influence in Norway, were there was a completely different political climate due to the particular premises that constitute the bases of the Norwegian foreign policy. Norway's dependence on the UN with regards to the decision of a possible intervention hindered a strong media influence, even though the conditions that should enable media influence to a large extent were present.

The model also seems somewhat inept to assess the influence that the media may have on politicians in the cases where the media is said to only have had an enabling effect, such as in

the case of Denmark and Britain. As the policy certainty and elite consensus in these countries were present, Robinson's model assumes that the media is rendered without any real influence, but instead follow the opinions of the politicians and index the news according to the official voices. However, because the extensive coverage began before there seemed to have been developed policy certainty on this issue, and because social voices to a large extent could affect the framing of the situation, the media did seem to have the opportunity to set the news agenda in these countries, contradicting the 'indexing theory'. The model also seem to fail to give a comprehensive understanding of the exact influence that the media did have in the case of the United States, as this case as in many ways contradicts the 'indexing theory' as well. While Robinson's model does show that there was media influence here, it is still implied in the model that this influence was dependent on elite dissensus. However, could there be aspects of the coverage on Libya that made the Danish and British politicians respond so strongly to this issue, and that also influenced the emergence of elite dissensus in the United States? And if so, could this mean that the media in these countries had a more extensive influence than Robinson's model opens up for? While excluding the possibility of any causal influence from the media on the policy decision to intervene in Libya, can the influence here lie beyond the causal, towards a more constitutive form of influence?

In order to try to provide comprehensive and exhaustive answers to the general research questions of this thesis, I have found it useful to compare the coverage in Libya with the media coverage in Syria, a case of non-intervention. As mentioned in the outset of this thesis, this additional analysis expands the normal structure of a conclusive chapter. However, this addition is fruitful to the conclusion of this thesis, as it hopefully can provide a clearer and more in-depth answer to the general research questions of the thesis. The case of Syria is interesting to compare to Libya as the two countries represent very similar conflicts, both emerging from the Arab Spring of 2011. By comparing the two cases, I might detect differences between the coverage that may have been decisive as to why the four countries chose to intervene in Libya, but have yet to do the same in Syria. Thus, in the following section, I will provide a brief analysis of the media coverage in Syria, as well as an analysis of the political climate which prevailed within these countries with regards to a possible intervention in Syria, applying the same method as used in the analysis on Libya.

6.1 The media coverage in Syria: A case of non-intervention

Similar to Libya, the timeframe of the analysis of the media coverage in Syria begins the day after the first large protests began. The protests took place on March 18, 2011, thus the timeframe of this analysis begins on March 19, and ends on April 17, consisting of a month of media coverage.

Table 6.1: Coverage of Syria in The Washington Post

March 19 – March 31	April 1 – April 17
1 article on average a day	0.70 article on average a day

Table 6.2: Coverage of Syria in The Telegraph

March 19 – March 31⁴⁵	April 1 – April 17⁴⁶
0.54 articles on average a day	0.50 articles on average a day

The quantitative analysis of the media coverage in Syria provides a significant finding; the coverage of the situation in Syria was comparatively scant. This indicates that the Syrian opposition did not manage to gain access to the media and thus affect the framing in the same extent as the Libyan opposition. It also indicates that the Syrian authorities were successful in closing off much of the country to foreign journalists and thus were able to control a large proportion of the coverage. Probably as a result, the coverage of the Syrian situation had a much lower focus than the situation in Libya. As seen in the table 6.1 above, The Washington Post had an average of one article a day about Syria during the period from March 19 to March 31, and it was the focus of just two editorials and one opinion editorial. Throughout the period of thirteen days, two articles of Syria were run on the front page. Albeit representing a certain focus on the situation in Syria, it is a significant difference from the first period of coverage on Libya, with 2.9 articles in average, an extensive amount of coverage in the

⁴⁵ March 26 and March 27 is missing from the data
⁴⁶ April 3, April 10 and April 17 is missing from the data

commentary section, as well as six front page articles during nine days. The differences become even more apparent when studying the coverage in April, when there were just 0.70 articles on average a day about Syria. Throughout seventeen days, there was only one opinion editorial written about Syria, no editorials, and only one front page article.

In *The Telegraph*, *Aftenposten* and *Berlingske*, the coverage of Syria was even less extensive than in *The Washington Post*. As seen in table 6.2 above, *The Telegraph* had 0.54 articles a day on the situation in Syria in March, and there were two front page articles about Syria in this period. Syria was also the focus of two editorials and one commentary. However, the coverage dropped to 0.5 articles a day in April, with no front page articles and no coverage within the commentary section. *Aftenposten* had only one full page article covering Syria in the period of March, while the rest of the coverage consisted of eight small notices. The situation was never mentioned on the front page. The coverage in April did increase to some extent, amounting to seven and a half full page articles in the seventeen days, in addition to three small notices. Although it is an increase from the coverage in March, it still only represent 0.44 pages on average a day during this period, in comparison to 3 pages and 2.75 pages on average in the first and second period of the coverage of Libya. There was no coverage at all in the commentary section about Syria neither in March or April, and no front page notices. That is a rather strong indication of the small focus this situation was given in *Aftenposten* during this timeframe. In *Berlingske*, the coverage in the period of March consisted of six pages in the news section, which amounts to 0.46 pages on average a day, as well as three analyses and one editorial. In April, there was no coverage in the commentary section, while the coverage in the news section added up to 6 ½ pages all together, as well as five small notices. This represents 0.38 pages on average a day, a very significant difference from the 3.22 pages and 3.28 pages on average in the two first periods in the coverage of Libya. Similar to *Aftenposten*, there were no front page notices of Syria during the periods of March and April.

There are similarities between the Libyan and Syrian coverage, if one look beyond the differences in extent of coverage. Both the Norwegian, British and American coverage of the situation in Syria have a dominant empathy frame, and there is a great focus on protesters and other civilians being killed by the security forces of the Syrian leader, Bashar al Assad. However, the support frame is not as apparent (see appendix 1,2 and 4), maybe as a result of the limited coverage that mostly focuses on the killings committed against protesters. While it

is emphasized in both the American, British and Norwegian coverage that these are pro-democracy protesters, and that they are protesting against a repressive regime for more freedom and democracy, there is an ambiguity in the coverage that could not be found in the coverage of Libya. First and foremost, Assad is different from Gaddafi in that he, despite the many human right violations and abusive behavior committed by his regime, manages to project a better image of himself through the media. Instead of erratic speeches filled with threats against civilians, which was Gaddafi's reaction to the rebellion, Assad claimed to have released political prisoners (Aftenposten and The Washington Post, March 27), and he promised legal reforms (The Washington Post, April 1). This made the image of Assad as a brutal oppressor less overt. Some sources in The Telegraph say they believe Assad to have spoken out against the use of force (March 28), and this newspaper also quotes Hilary Clinton describing Assad as a reformer (March 28). This coverage created a more ambiguous framing of the conflict, making it more difficult to fully comprehend it. The ambiguity lay also in the fact that a counter-frame to a certain extent managed to affect the coverage on Syria. Several articles, both in Aftenposten, The Telegraph and Washington Post, mentioned that Assad had supporters among the population. There was also a focus on the threat of sectarianism emerging if the Assad regime were to be ousted and the possibility of there being Islamists within the opposition, particularly in the coverage in The Washington Post.

Also, while the killings against protesters are clearly condemned, the coverage in neither Aftenposten, The Telegraph nor Washington Post uses the words 'massacre', 'genocide' or 'bloodbath'. Thus, the coverage does not convey the same sense of a need for urgent action as was the case in the coverage of Libya. While there are two opinion editorials and two editorials in Washington Post which focus on Syria, this do not represent a very intense debate on the issue. The Washington post does not criticise the Obama administration in the editorials, and there does not make any explicit calls for action to protect civilians here, as was the case with the editorials commenting on Libya.

The coverage in Berlingske is particularly interesting, because the coverage of Syria differs extensively from the coverage of Libya, not only in scope, but also in focus. The word 'democracy' is not mentioned once during the 30 days of coverage, and the support frame is very weak, particularly in March (see appendix 3). The conflict is portrayed as ambiguous, with a fragmented society, a multifaceted opposition, and with a leader that does have support in parts of the population. Another interesting point is that, as opposed to the very graphic

portrayals of the violence in Libya, the coverage of the violence in Syria is very subtle. Often, the killings committed by Assad's security forces are described indirectly, e.g. "have taken the life of", which contrasts sharply with the descriptions of the Libyan conflict, such as 'bloodbath' and 'slaughter'. Words such as 'massacre', 'bloodbath' and 'genocide' are never used, and at times, the violence committed by the security forces against the protesters are even rewritten into the euphemism such as "attempts to curb the unrest".

An interesting aspect of especially the Danish and British coverage is the rather high percentage of Syrian official sources. In *The Telegraph*, 31.5 percent of the total amount of sources in March is official Syrian sources, while this increased to 37.5 percent in April. In *Berlingske*, the numbers were 21 percent in March and 33 percent in April. While there is a relatively high frequency of civilian sources in both these newspapers (see appendix 3 and 4), the usage in particularly *Berlingske* differs from that in the coverage of Libya in that almost all the sources are quoted anonymously, e.g. "witnesses say" or "residents claim", and almost never directly quoted. There is just one Syrian civilian who is quoted directly throughout the articles in *Berlingske*. In *The Washington Post* and *Aftenposten*, the percentage of civilian sources is higher (see appendix 1 and 2), but here as well, the percentage of Syrian sources is much higher than in the coverage of Libya. In *Aftenposten*, Syrian sources represent 27.58 percent in April, while never exceeding 11.11 percent in the coverage of Libya. Likewise, the Syrian officials represent 20.89 percent of the sources in *Washington Post* in March, while never exceeding 11 percent in the coverage of Libya.

Moving on to the domestic political climate in these four countries at the time when Syria was a political issue, there was a much more reserved response to this situation compared to the response to the situation in Libya. The United States did not call for the removal of the Assad regime when the uprising broke out, and although condemning the violence, there was policy certainty within the US administration against an intervention in Syria. Secretary of State Hilary Clinton spoke out on CBS' "Face the Nation" on March 27, saying that the United States would not intervene in Syria as they had done in Libya, adding that each of these cases were unique and thus not comparable.⁴⁷ In a press briefing on March 28, Deputy National Security Advisor Denis McDonough confirmed this position when stating that the intervention in Libya had not created a precedent for the situation in Syria, clearly arguing

⁴⁷ *The Guardian*, 27.03.2011: "US will not intervene in Syria as it has in Libya, says Hillary Clinton". <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/mar/27/report-12-killed-syrian-port-city> (Accessed 03.05.2013)

that the Libyan case was unique and different from that in Syria.⁴⁸ In Britain, the country that had been the earliest to promote a no-fly zone in Libya, there were no such proposals for the situation in Syria. Foreign minister William Hague condemned the violence, but similar to the United State, did not make any calls for the removal of Assad or stronger actions against the violence.⁴⁹ The Danish politicians did not engage in this conflict at all during the timeframe, and except for a statement condemning the violence against protesters, there were no calls for actions by Danish politicians on this issue, in stark contrast to their reaction to the conflict in Libya.⁵⁰ In Norway, there weren't any politicians who spoke out in the newspaper regarding the situation in Syria, and there was only one press statement given on the issue. Moreover, while the press statement did condemn the violence in the country, it made no mention of the possibility of intervening in the country.⁵¹

6.2 Comparing Syria to Libya

There are some rather interesting points to be made when comparing the case of non-intervention in Syria with the case of intervention in Libya. There are striking differences in the media coverage of the two countries. The coverage of Syria was minimal, particularly in *Berlingske* and *Aftenposten*, both within the news section and the commentary section. Another important difference is that the coverage of Syria contained much less overt and explicit descriptions of violence and human suffering, and never used words such as 'genocide' or 'massacre'. While civilians, and particularly Syrians, made up a large part of the sources in the coverage on Syria, they were usually quoted indirectly, as 'witnesses say' or 'residents tell'. Official Syrian sources also make up a not insignificant proportion of all sources, between 17 to 37.5 percent, and they manage to create a much more ambiguous narrative of the conflict, unlike the coverage on Libya. In addition to this, several of the civilian sources did express support for Assad, and some also expressed concern regarding

⁴⁸ American government website: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/03/28/press-gaggle-press-secretary-jay-carney-and-deputy-national-security-adv> (accessed on 02.05.2013)

⁴⁹ British government website: <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/foreign-secretary-on-violence-in-syria> (Accessed on 02.05.2013)

⁵⁰ *Berlingske*, 21.03.2013: "Espersen bekymret for udviklingen i Syrien: <http://www.b.dk/globalt/espersen-bekymret-for-udvikling-i-syrien> (Accessed 02.05.2013)

⁵¹ Norwegian government website: http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/ud/pressesenter/pressemeldinger/2011/syria_vold.html?id=636490 (Accessed 02.05.2013)

how the situation in the country could develop without him as the leader. This indicates much more uncertainty and much less outspoken support for the opposition. The ‘innocent civilian’-frame of the opposition did not dominate in the coverage on Syria, and despite Assad’s history of oppressing opposition and brutally cracking down on any attempts at protest, the image of him portrayed through the media was much less negative than the one portrayed of Gaddafi.

With regards to political climate, there are also rather significant differences between Syria and Libya. The administration in the United States spoke out early on in the conflict in Syria, and made it clear that they would not intervene in Syria. Thus, while there was a strong policy uncertainty on the issue of Libya within the United States, this did not seem to be the case with the situation in Syria. There also seemed to be a political consensus in the country with regards to this policy decision, and generally little debate regarding this issue, as the minimal coverage within the commentary section indicates. In Denmark and Norway, the situation in Syria did not appear to be on the political agenda, and there was no political debate regarding a possible intervention in Syria. Besides condemning the violence committed by the Assad regime, the prevailing thought seemed to be that this was something the Syrians had to sort out themselves. Thus, in these countries, there was a lack of interest in the issue, and although this was never clearly articulated by the politicians in these countries, this lack of debate and interest in the issue might indicate that there was a political consensus behind not intervening.

6.3 Expanding the current theoretical knowledge

So how are we to understand the role of the media in the decision to intervene in Libya? And to what extent is news media coverage a decisive factor in understanding why the international community chooses to intervene in some humanitarian crises, while not intervening in other?

What this thesis has shown is that Robinson’s ‘policy-media interaction model’ is a useful, yet somewhat insufficient tool to understand the media’s role and influence in foreign policy decisions such as humanitarian interventions. It provides a very good conceptualization of conditions that are needed in order for media to be able to influence a policy decision, such as policy uncertainty and elite dissensus, as well as an empathy-framing that emphasizes the

suffering of civilians and conveys an urgency to act in order to prevent a ‘genocide’ or a ‘massacre’. In this sense, it represents a helpful theoretical compromise between the ‘indexing theory’ and the so-called CNN-effect, and manages to a large extent to reconcile these two theoretical assumptions by arguing that the media can influence policy decisions under certain conditions. However, drawing on the findings and insight from this thesis, there seem to be three important aspects that Robinson’s ‘policy-media interaction model’ is unable to fully take into account, which again appears to make the model less able to provide a comprehensive understanding of the possible influence the media may have on a foreign policy decision. The first aspect is the importance of non-official sources and their effect on the framing of the conflict, which may affect how a crisis is understood and subsequently approached politically. The second aspect is the importance of understanding the context both in which a crisis emerges, as well as the political context in which a policy decision is taken within a country. As seen in this thesis, this is an important aspect, as there may be political conditions within a country that hinder media influence with regards to a policy decision. The last aspect is the importance of understanding the indirect effects that may influence a policy decision. Such indirect effects are present both in the Norwegian case and in the American case, and understanding them are crucial in order to fully understand the media influence on a foreign policy decision.

Non-official sources dominating the coverage and shaping the framing of the conflict

The first theoretical limitation with Robinson’s model is that it takes as a starting point that an indexing according to official voices will take place if there is elite consensus on a foreign policy issue. Robinson’s model searches for a more or less direct, causal explanation of media influence; if there is elite dissensus and policy uncertainty, the media may have an influence. This influence lies, according to Robinson, in the media’s ability to take sides in debate, and frame the conflict in a way that pressures the politicians into acting. If there is elite dissensus on an issue, the framing will often become critical and empathy-framed, as the journalists may, intentionally or unintentionally, side with the critics and frame the situation accordingly. However, according to Robinson’s model, when there is an elite consensus on a policy decision the framing will remain supportive of the government’s policy. Thus, in these instances, the media will not have an influence on a policy decision. There is a major problem emerging with regards to this understanding of the concept of framing; what about the

instances where “anomalous news narrative” told through social voices shape the coverage of a conflict? My main argument is that the media in these particular instances may have an influence that cannot be measured directly, but can still be extensive. If social voices manage to dominate the coverage on an issue, and this coverage is extensive enough, it affects the way the politicians come to approach and understand that issue.

This argument is closely related to particularly Shaw’s (1996), but also Wolfsfeld’s (1997), theory of media influence; the media can influence the way an issue is approached, and subsequently the way the issue will be dealt with politically. In the case of Libya, the coverage was extensive from the beginning, and was framed early as a massacre of civilians, who were fighting for freedom and democracy. The news narrative appeared unambiguous, and thus easily understandable for the public; a deranged dictator was killing his people, and threatening a bloodbath and mass killings. In contrast, the coverage of Syria was scant, and although civilian voices dominated the coverage of this situation as well, the conflict was not very visible within the newspapers due to the minimal coverage. There was a lack of dramatic and visible headlines, front page articles, editorials addressing the issue, as well as civilian Syrians speaking directly about their situation. We did not see the people in the conflict, and the framing became more distant and less supportive of the opposition, which also made it more difficult to sympathize with and support their goals.

How important were these aspects with regards to the choice of intervening in Libya, and not in Syria? I argue that the influence of the media on the policy decision to intervene in Libya laid primarily in the media’s ability here to use non-official sources, making these non-official frames the dominant ones in the coverage, something that made the Libyan authorities lose legitimacy, and increased the legitimacy of the opposition. In accordance with Wolfsfeld (1997), they managed to gain access to the media and promote their narrative of the conflict. By doing so, they also managed to represent themselves in the conflict, enabling the strong empathy frame to emerge in the coverage of Libya. As Wolfsfeld writes, “if challengers receive a significant amount of space and time in major news media, it represents a *prima facie* that the news media had an influence on the conflict”, as it shifts the balance of power in the conflict and facilitates a third-party intervention (1997:72). The media also brought the conflict close to the audience, decreasing the distance between the readers and the civilians in Libya (Shaw 1996). This enabled extensive coverage on Libya, which demanded a political response. In the case of the United States, this was particularly apparent, as the demand for a

political response was explicitly made in the editorials, and the politicians to begin with seemed hesitant and reluctant to involve themselves in this foreign policy situation, but still chose to become involved. However, in the British and Danish case as well, it seems likely that the media set the agenda with regards to the situation in Libya, and that the politicians responded to the narrative of the conflict that was overridingly conveyed by non-official sources. When they responded to this coverage, this reinforced the importance of the conflict, as it placed the conflict on the political agenda, enabling further coverage.

In the case of Syria, however, the conflict never managed to attract the same media attention. The Syrian authorities were successful in controlling much more of the coverage and thus the framing of this conflict, as few international journalists were able to gain access to the country. The conflict therefore remained more distant to the audience, with fewer graphic descriptions of the violence and fewer stories from civilians within Syria. This may have affected the way politicians approached this foreign policy issue; they were much less overt in their calls for change in Syria, stating early on that they would not intervene. This indicates that the influence of the media in affecting how states act in foreign policy issues lies in their ability to shape the way a certain issue is understood and thus approached. In situations where an issue emerges suddenly, with non-official sources as the dominant sources, and extensive coverage characterized by graphic portrayals of violence, the influence of the media is substantial. The reason for this is that the media, under these conditions, are able to place an issue on the political agenda, both by shaping how the situation is understood politically and subsequently how the political response becomes. As the official sources do not manage to shape the narrative of an issue under these circumstances, politicians will have to react to the non-official narrative instead of initiate and control the narrative of the issue, opening up for instances of greater media influence.

Contextual understanding

The second aspect that Robinson's model seems unable to fully grasp is the political context within each country. As seen from the Norwegian case, it is important to assess the political conditions within a country, as there may be accepted practices within the foreign policy of a country that prevent any possible influence of the news media with regards to a foreign policy decision. Thus, understanding the national context in which a policy decision was taken is

critical, as political conditions can vary quite a lot between different countries. This again can hinder possible media influence, as was the case in Norway, where the dependence of a UN mandate functioned to create a high degree of policy certainty and consensus regarding the issue of Libya, therefore limiting the media influence. This affected the way this issue was approached politically; it was understood as an issue that Norway could not really affect, thus making calls for action irrelevant.

In addition to this, it is also important to look at the context in which a crisis emerges, as this can shape how that specific crisis is covered in the media, and subsequently understood and approached politically. In the case of Libya, the context of the Arab Spring appears to have shaped much of the initial coverage of this conflict, as well as the understanding of the situation. The Arab Spring was viewed as a popular revolt that could finally bring democracy to the Arab world, and the conflict in Libya became very much viewed in this way. The coverage of Syria, on the other hand, came in the wake of the intervention in Libya, in a conflict that had turned increasingly more uncertain and violent. Thus, as this conflict emerged as an issue on the international scene, the narrative of the Arab Spring had changed, and the initial optimism and hope for a peaceful and democratic transition in the Arab world had shifted towards one comprising of much more skepticism and worry for what was to come next in this region after the uprisings. Therefore, the coverage of Syria was shaped by a much stronger focus on the risks involved in intervening in the conflict, and less by a focus on the duty to protect the Syrian people in their fight for freedom, something that may have had an impact on both the extent of coverage in Syria and the way the conflict was framed.

Indirect influence

The last aspect that Robinson's model seems unable to fully explain is the presence of what might be called "indirect media influence" on a foreign policy decision. As this thesis has expanded the empirical scope of Robinson's model by including more countries in the study, such an indirect media influence can be seen in the case of Norway. This indirect influence stems from the media influence that was present in the United States, where the media did have an important role in affecting how this crisis was understood and approached by the Obama administration, and ultimately in influencing the policy decision to intervene in Libya. The decision within the United States to support an intervention was crucial for it to ever be

passed as a resolution by the Security Council, and subsequently for Norway to decide to participate in the intervention. Therefore, it is plausible to conceptualize a form of indirect media influence also in Norway, as the American policy decision was so pivotal for the Norwegian policy decision. Without an extensive and empathy-framed media coverage within the United States there may not have been a policy decision taken in Norway either.

Another form of indirect influence can be seen in the case of United States, where the Obama administration in many ways was placed under a dual pressure, both from the American media but also from the political decisions of countries such as Britain to promote a no-fly zone in Libya. The fact that other countries were working towards an intervention may have reinforced the pressure within the media towards the Obama administration “to do something”, and may also have provided greater bargaining power for the fraction within the administration that supported an intervention. Both the indirect media influence and the indirect political influence present in the findings in this thesis indicate the importance of expanding the empirical scope when studying the possible media influence on foreign policy decisions, as such decisions are usually never taken in complete isolation within a country, but are a result of both international negotiations and also the choices made by other countries. As no country operates within a political vacuum, they will at least to a certain extent be affected by the dealings of other countries. This is an important aspect that must be considered in order to fully understand the factors that influence a country’s decision to intervene.

Drawing on the insight from this thesis, I argue that the media coverage can be a decisive factor in understanding why the international community chooses to intervene in some humanitarian crisis, while not in others. The media coverage of a crisis shapes the understanding of that specific crisis, and subsequently the way it is approached politically. Thus, if a situation is being framed as an immense humanitarian catastrophe, politicians have to respond accordingly, calling for something to be done. The more easily comprehensible the issue is framed, with a clear ‘innocent victim’-frame and a ‘brutal oppressor’-frame, the more difficult it is for the international community to avoid taking action. However, this is not the same as arguing for a powerful media, or to say that media can have a direct influence on how states act. Instead, it may strengthen the argument against applying static models to measure possible media influence, as well as against conceptualizing media influence as an independent entity that can be measured. The important point is to assess to what extent

official sources manage to affect and lead the coverage on a foreign policy issue, and thus affect the way that issue comes to be understood. The more independent the media are in portraying a crisis, and the less dependent the media are on official sources, the more likely it is that the media may influence the way a crisis is approached, and thus the political reaction to the crisis.

In addition, it is important to fully understand the political context in which a foreign policy decision to intervene has been taken. As this thesis has shown, it seems necessary to assess the political conditions within a country, as there may be particular accepted practices within the foreign policy of a country that can hinder media influence, such as in the case of Norway. Also, it is critical to understand the context in which a foreign policy issue emerges, as this can influence both the importance placed on that particular issue and the way the media coverage is being framed. Lastly, one should try to study a country's foreign policy decision within a broader empirical scope, introducing more countries into the analysis, as this can give a more comprehensive understanding of why a decision was taken, as it opens up for indirect influence that may come from other countries.

It is important to note that the limited scope of this thesis makes it more difficult to provide any strong and conclusive answers to the general research questions of this thesis. As the analysis material only consists of articles from one newspaper from each country, and also of a limited amount of press statements and other official documents, there is a certain possibility that the findings in this thesis are not representative of the actual media coverage of Libya in the four countries during the timeframe of analysis, nor the political climate amongst the countries. Also, as media influence is such an illusive and difficult concept to assess and measure, it is doubtful that one can ever fully comprehend the impact and influence of the media on any foreign policy decisions.

However, this thesis has provided some interesting findings with regards to the influence of media coverage in the intervention in Libya, indicating that the media may have played a quite extensive role in the policy decision to intervene in this country. Also, by comparing Libya to Syria, the empirical findings in this thesis indicate the media can be a decisive factor in understanding why the international community chooses to intervene in some humanitarian crisis, while not in others. The empirical findings point to the importance of assessing to what extent non-official sources manage to affect and lead the coverage on a foreign policy issue,

and thus affect the way that issue comes to be understood. The more independent the media are in portraying a crisis, and the less dependent the media are on official sources, the more likely it is that the media may influence the way a crisis is approached, and thus the political reaction to the crisis. As a last contribution, it has also expanded the theoretical understanding of Robinson's 'policy-media interaction model', pointing to three additional aspects that can provide a more comprehensive understanding of the possible influence the media may have on a foreign policy decision. Hence, a useful point of departure for assessing and understanding the role of the media in a foreign policy decision might be to study a possible case of intervention through Robinson's 'media-policy interaction' model, while also integrating these three aspects to the model, namely the importance of the sources who affect the framing, the context in which a crisis emerges and also the domestic political context in which a policy decision is taken, and lastly any possible indirect influence from other countries. This can enable us not only to just assess whether or not media influence was present in a foreign policy decision, but also get a deeper understanding of how media coverage of a crisis may have affected the understanding of a crisis and subsequently the political reaction towards the crisis.

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Appendix 1: Findings from the Norwegian case

1. Results of keywordtest February 18-26:

<i>Empathy Frame</i>		<i>Distance/neutrality frame</i>	
Keywords	Frequency	Keywords	Frequency
1. Mennesker/ personer/sivile	24	1.Soldat/ kriger	2
2. Demonstranter	50	2. Muslim	0
3. Drept/drepte (killings committed by Gaddafi)	43	3. Usikker/usikkerhet	0
4.Vold/ voldelig (violence commited by Gaddafi)	10	4. Dårlig organisert /ledet	0
5. Flyktninger	0	5. Menn	1
		6. Libyans	0
Totalt	127	Totalt	3

<i>Support Frame</i>		<i>Critical Frame</i>	
Keywords	Frequency	Keywords	Frequency
1. Regimemotstander	8	1.Islamister/islamistisk	0
2. Demokrati	1	2. Terrornettverk/ terrorister	2
3. Demokratiforkjemper/ demokratibevegelse	3	3. Farlig	0
4.Frihet/frigjort	3	4. Voldelige/nesynsløse	0
<i>Negatively loaded descriptions of the Gaddafi regime</i>		5. Banditter/forbrytere/kriminelle	3
5.Tyrannisk/ brutal	11	6. Okkupanter/okkupere	1
6. Blodbad/ blodig/ massakre	8	7. Drepe/drept (killings committed by the opposition forces)	1
7. Folkemord/ massedrap	5		
Total	39		7

2. Results of keywordtest February 27 – March 12

<i>Empathy Frame</i>		<i>Distance/neutrality frame</i>	
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Keywords	Frequency	Keywords	Frequency
1. Mennesker/ personer/sivile	24	1.Soldat/ kriger	2
2. Demonstranter	5	2. Muslim	12
3. Drept/drepte (killings committed by Gaddafi)	17	3. Usikker/usikkerhet	0
4.Vold/ voldelig (violence committed by Gaddafi)	1	4. Dårlig organisert /ledet	0
5. Flyktninger	4	5. Menn	4
		6. Libyans	7
Totalt	51	Totalt	27

<i>Support Frame</i>		<i>Critical Frame</i>	
Keywords	Frequency	Keywords	Frequency
1. Regimemotstander	2	1.Islamister/islamistisk	15
2. Demokrati	22	2. Terrornettverk/ terrorister	1
3. Demokratiforkjemper/ demokratibevegelse	1	3. Farlig	0
4.Frihet/frigjort	19	4. Voldelige/nesynsløse	0
<i>Negatively loaded descriptions of the Gaddafi regime</i>		5. Banditter/forbrytere/kriminelle	0
5.Tyrannisk/ brutal	0	6. Okkuperanter/okkupere	0
6. Blodbad/ blodig/ massakre	7	7. Drepe/drept (killings committed by the opposition forces)	0
7. Folkemord/ massedrap	0		
Total	51		16

3. Results of keywordtest March 18 – 31

<i>Empathy Frame</i>		<i>Distance/neutrality frame</i>	
Keywords	Frequency	Keywords	Frequency
1. Mennesker/ personer/sivile	58	1.Soldat/ kriger	6
2. Demonstranter	6	2. Muslim	0
3. Drept/drepte (killings committed by Gaddafi)	22	3. Usikker/usikkerhet	1
4.Vold/ voldelig (violence committed by Gaddafi)	0	4. Dårlig organisert /ledet	2
5. Flyktninger	14	5. Menn	5
		6. Libyans	9
Totalt	100	Totalt	23

<i>Support Frame</i>		<i>Critical Frame</i>	
Keywords	Frequency	Keywords	Frequency
1. Regimemotstander	0	1. Islamister/islamistisk	3
2. Demokrati	11	2. Terrornettverk/ terrorister	3
3. Demokratiforkjempet/ demokratibevegelse	2	3. Farlig	0
4. Frihet/frigjort	1	4. Voldelige/nesynsløse	0
<i>Negatively loaded descriptions of the Gaddafi regime</i>		5. Banditter/forbrytere/kriminelle	0
5. Tyrannisk/ brutal	0	6. Okkupanter/okkupere	0
6. Blodbad/ blodig/ massakre	4	7. Drepe/drept (killings committed by the opposition forces)	0
7. Folkemord/ massedrap	0		
Total	18		6

4. Results of analysis of frequency and range of sources

February 18 -26

Total amount of sources	Official Norwegians	Official Foreign	Former government officials, now experts	Academics	Civilans	Libyan officials and Libyan media	How many Libyans where among the civilians?
90	0	14	0	5	61	10	32
Percentage of total amount	0%	15.55%	0%	5.55%	67.78%	11.11%	52.46% of total civilians

February 27 – March 12

Total	Official	Official	Former	Academics	Civilians	Libyan	How
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amount of sources	Norwegians	Foreign	government officials, now experts			officials and Libyan media	many Libyans where among the civilians?
136	7	27	1	11	85	5	59
Percentage of the total amount	5.15%	19.85%	0.73%	8.1%	62.5%	3.67%	69.4 % of total civilians

March 13 – 17

Total amount of sources	Official Norwegians	Official Foreign	Former government officials, now experts	Academics	Civilans	Libyan officials and Libyan media	How many Libyans where among the civilians?
12	0	3	0	0	9	0	7
Percentage of the total amount	0%	25%	0%	0%	75%	0%	77.78 % of total civilians

March 18 – 31

Total amount of sources	Official Norwegians	Official Foreign	Former government officials, now experts	Academics	Civilians	Libyan officials and Libyan media	How many Libyans where among the civilians?
225	27	71	4	10	98	15	51
Percentage of the total amount	12%	31.55%	1.78%	4.44%	43.44%	6.66%	52%

5. Keywordstest for Syria-case, period March 19-31 and April 1-17

March 19-31

<i>Empathy Frame</i>		<i>Distance/neutrality frame</i>	
Keywords	Frequency	Keywords	Frequency
1. Mennesker/ personer/sivile	3	1.Soldat/ kriger	0
2. Demonstranter	22	2. Muslim	0
3. Drept/drepte (killings committed by Gaddafi)	10	3. Usikker/usikkerhet	0
4.Vold/ voldelig (violence commited by Gaddafi)	0	4. Dårlig organisert /ledet	0
5. Flyktninger	0	5. Menn	0
		6. Syrians	4
Totalt	35	Totalt	4

<i>Support Frame</i>		<i>Critical Frame</i>	
Keywords	Frequency	Keywords	Frequency

1. Regimemotstander	0	1. Islamister/islamistisk	0
2. Demokrati	0	2. Terrornettverk/ terrorister	0
3. Demokratiforkjemper/ demokratibevegelse	0	3. Farlig	0
4. Frihet/frigjort	6	4. Voldelige/nesynsløse	0
<i>Negatively loaded descriptions of the Gaddafi regime</i>		5. Banditter/forbrytere/kriminelle	0
5. Tyrannisk/ brutal	1	6. Okkupanter/okkupere	0
6. Blodbad/ blodig/ massakre	0	7. Drepe/drept (killings committed by the opposition forces)	0
7. Folkemord/ massedrap	0		
Total	7		0

April 1 -17

<i>Empathy Frame</i>		<i>Distance/neutrality frame</i>	
Keywords	Frequency	Keywords	Frequency
1. Mennesker/ personer/sivile	12	1. Soldat/ kriger	0
2. Demonstranter	17	2. Muslim	0
3. Drept/drepte (killings committed by Gaddafi)	13	3. Usikker/usikkerhet	0
4. Vold/ voldelig (violence committed by Gaddafi)	0	4. Dårlig organisert /ledet	0
5. Flyktninger	0	5. Menn	0
		6. Syrians	5
Totalt	42	Totalt	5

<i>Support Frame</i>		<i>Critical Frame</i>	
Keywords	Frequency	Keywords	Frequency
1. Regimemotstander	1	1. Islamister/islamistisk	1
2. Demokrati	5	2. Terrornettverk/ terrorister	0
3. Demokratiforkjemper/ demokratibevegelse	4	3. Farlig	0
4. Frihet/frigjort	2	4. Voldelige/nesynsløse	0
<i>Negatively loaded descriptions of the Gaddafi regime</i>		5. Banditter/forbrytere/kriminelle	0
5. Tyrannisk/ brutal	1	6. Okkupanter/okkupere	0
6. Blodbad/ blodig/ massakre	0	7. Drepe/drept (killings committed by the opposition forces)	1
7. Folkemord/ massedrap	0		
Total	13		2

6. Results of analysis of frequency and range of sources for Syria-case

March 19- 31

Total amount of sources	Official Norwegians	Official Foreign	Former government officials, now experts	Academics	Civilans	Syrian officials and Syrian media	How many Syrians where among the civilans?
16	0	0	0	0	13	3	10
Percentage of total amount	0%	0%	0%	0 %	81.25%	18.75%	83.33%

April 1 -17

Total amount of sources	Official Norwegians	Official Foreign	Former government officials, now experts	Academics	Civilians	Syrian officials and Syrian media	How many Syrian s where amon g the civilan s?
29	0	3	0	3	15	8	66.66 %
Percentage of the total amount	%	10.34%	0%	10.34%	51.72%	27.58 %	% of total civilia ns

Appendix 2: Findings from the American case

1. Results of keywordtest February 18-26:

<i>Support Frame</i>		<i>Critical Frame</i>	
Keywords	Frequency	Keywords	Frequency
1. Regime opponent	0	1. Islamists/Islamist	0
2. Democracy	2	2. Terror connections/ terrorists	0
3. Pro-democray /democracy movement	4	3. Dangerous	0
4. Freedom/ liberated	3	4. Violent/ruthless	0
<i>Negatively loaded descriptions of the Gaddafi regime</i>		5. Criminals/thugs	2
5. Tyrannical/brutal	8	6. Occupants/occupying	0
6. Bloodbath/bloody/massacre	14	7. Kill/killed (killings committed by the opposition forces)	2
7. Genocide/mass killings	2		
Total	33		4

<i>Empathy Frame</i>		<i>Distance/neutrality frame</i>	
Keywords	Frequency	Keywords	Frequency
1. People/civilians	78	1. Soldat/ kriger	0
2. Demonstrants/protesters	37	2. Muslim	1
3. Kill/killings (killings committed by Gaddafi)	36	3. Usikker/usikkerhet	0
4. Violence/violent (violence committed by Gaddafi)	31	4. Dårlig organisert /ledet	0
5. Refugees	1	5. Menn	8
		6. Libyans	6
Totalt	183	Totalt	15

2. Results of keywordtest February 27- March 12

<i>Support Frame</i>		<i>Critical Frame</i>	
Keywords	Frequency	Keywords	Frequency
1. Regime opponent	1	1. Islamists/Islamist	14
2. Democracy	12	2. Terror connections/ terrorists	3
3. Pro-democray /democracy movement	1	3. Dangerous	0
4. Freedom/ liberated	14	4. Violent/ruthless	0
<i>Negatively loaded descriptions of the Gaddafi regime</i>		5. Criminals/thugs	0
5. Tyrannical/brutal	5	6. Occupants/occupying	0
6. Bloodbath/bloody/massacre	20	7. Kill/killed (killings committed by the opposition forces)	1
7. Genocide/mass killings	9		
Total	62		18

<i>Empathy Frame</i>		<i>Distance/neutrality frame</i>	
Keywords	Frequency	Keywords	Frequency
1. People/civilians	79	1. Soldat/ kriger	16
2. Demonstrants/protesters	22	2. Muslim	0
3. Kill/killings (killings committed by Gaddafi)	22	3. Usikker/usikkerhet	0
4. Violence/violent (violence committed by Gaddafi)	29	4. Dårlig organisert /ledet	0
5. Refugees	8	5. Menn	5
		6. Libyans	15
Totalt	183	Totalt	36

3. Results of keywordtest March 13- March 17

<i>Support Frame</i>		<i>Critical Frame</i>	
Keywords	Frequency	Keywords	Frequency
1. Regime opponent	0	1. Islamists/Islamist	2
2. Democracy	4	2. Terror connections/ terrorists	1
3. Pro-democray /democracy movement	0	3. Dangerous	0

4. Freedom/ liberated	5	4. Violent/ruthless	0
<i>Negatively loaded descriptions of the Gaddafi regime</i>		5. Criminals/thugs	0
5. Tyrannical/brutal	3	6. Occupants/occupying	0
6. Bloodbath/bloody/massacre	4	7. Kill/killed (killings committed by the opposition forces)	0
7. Genocide/mass killings	0		
Total	16		3

<i>Empathy Frame</i>		<i>Distance/neutrality frame</i>	
Keywords	Frequency	Keywords	Frequency
1. People/civilians	20	1. Soldat/ kriger	22
2. Demonstrants/protesters	5	2. Muslim	1
3. Kill/killings (killings committed by Gaddafi)	12	3. Usikker/usikkerhet	0
4. Violence/violent (violence committed by Gaddafi)	4	4. Dårlig organisert /ledet	0
5. Refugees	1	5. Menn	1
		6. Libyans	7
Totalt	42	Totalt	31

4. Results of keywordtest March 18- March 31

<i>Support Frame</i>		<i>Critical Frame</i>	
Keywords	Frequency	Keywords	Frequency
1. Regime opponent	0	1. Islamists/Islamist	1
2. Democracy	5	2. Terror connections/ terrorists	0
3. Pro-democracy /democracy movement	0	3. Dangerous	0
4. Freedom/ liberated	3	4. Violent/ruthless	0
<i>Negatively loaded descriptions of the Gaddafi regime</i>		5. Criminals/thugs	2
5. Tyrannical/brutal	8	6. Occupants/occupying	0
6. Bloodbath/bloody/massacre	6	7. Kill/killed (killings committed by the opposition forces)	7
7. Genocide/mass killings	4		
Total	26		10

<i>Empathy Frame</i>		<i>Distance/neutrality frame</i>	
Keywords	Frequency	Keywords	Frequency
1. People/civilians	156	1. Soldat/ kriger	21

2. Demonstrants/protesters	13	2. Muslim	3
3. Kill/killings (killings committed by Gaddafi)	21	3. Usikker/usikkerhet	0
4. Violence/violent (violence committed by Gaddafi)	4	4. Dårlig organisert /ledet	2
5. Refugees	3	5. Menn	6
		6. Libyans	17
Totalt	197	Totalt	49

5. Results of analysis of frequency and range of sources

February 18-26

Total amount of sources	Official American sources	Official Foreign	Former government officials, now experts	Academics	Civilians	Libyan officials and Libyan media	How many Libyans where among the civilians?
163	20	11	10	18	86	18	65
Percentage of total amount	12.27%	6.75%	6.14%	11%	52.76%	11%	75.58% of total civilians

February 27 – March 12

Total amount of sources	Official American sources	Official Foreign	Former government officials, now experts	Academics	Civilians	Libyan officials and Libyan media	How many Libyans where among
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260	63	27	6	6	142	16	the civilans?
Percentage	24.23%	10.38%	2.3%	2.3%	54.6%	6.15%	111
of total amount							78.7%
							of total civilians

March 13- 17

Total amount of sources	Official American sources	Official Foreign	Former government officials, now experts	Academics	Civilians	Libyan officials and Libyan media	How many Libyans where among the civilans?
65	7	4	8	3	41	2	38
Percentage	10.76%	6.15%	12.3%	4.6%	63%	3.1%	92.68%
of total amount							of total civilians

March 18- 31

Total amount of sources	Official American sources	Official Foreign	Former government officials, now experts	Academics	Civilians	Libyan officials and Libyan media	How many Libyans where among the civilans?
313	119	39	13	5	115	22	86

Percentage 38% 12.46% 4.15% 1.6% 36.74% 7% 74.78%
of total amount of total civilians

6. Keywordstest for Syria-case, period March 19-31 and April 1-17

March 19-31

<i>Empathy Frame</i>		<i>Distance/neutrality frame</i>	
Keywords	Frequency	Keywords	Frequency
1. People/civilians	45	1.Soldat/ kriger	0
2. Demonstrants/protesters	41	2. Muslim	3
3. Kill/killings (killings committed by Gaddafi)	25	3. Usikker/usikkerhet	0
4.Violence/violent (violence committed by Gaddafi)	14	4. Dårlig organisert /ledet	0
5. Refugees	0	5. Menn	4
		6. Syrians	10
Totalt	125	Totalt	17

<i>Support Frame</i>		<i>Critical Frame</i>	
Keywords	Frequency	Keywords	Frequency
1. Regime opponent	0	1.Islamists/Islamist	1
2. Democracy	0	2. Terror connections/ terrorists	1
3. Pro-democray /democracy movement	5	3. Dangerous	0
4.Freedom/ liberated	11	4. Violent/ruthless	3
<i>Negatively loaded descriptions of the Gaddafi regime</i>		5. Criminals/thugs	0
5.Tyrannical/brutal	5	6. Occupants/occupying	0
6. Bloodbath/bloody/massacre	0	7. Kill/killed (killings committed by the opposition forces)	2
7. Genocide/mass killings	0		
Total	21		6

April 1-17

<i>Empathy Frame</i>		<i>Distance/neutrality frame</i>	
Keywords	Frequency	Keywords	Frequency
1. People/civilians	50	1.Soldat/ kriger	0
2. Demonstrants/protesters	40	2. Muslim	0
3. Kill/killings (killings committed by Gaddafi)	25	3. Usikker/usikkerhet	0
4.Violence/violent (violence committed by Gaddafi)	14	4. Dårlig organisert /ledet	0
5. Refugees	0	5. Menn	6
		6. Syrians	8
Totalt	125	Totalt	14

<i>Support Frame</i>		<i>Critical Frame</i>	
Keywords	Frequency	Keywords	Frequency
1. Regime opponent	0	1.Islamists/Islamist	0
2. Democracy	0	2. Terror connections/ terrorists	0
3. Pro-democracy /democracy movement	6	3. Dangerous	0
4.Freedom/ liberated	10	4. Violent/ruthless	0
<i>Negatively loaded descriptions of the Gaddafi regime</i>		5. Criminals/thugs	0
5.Tyrannical/brutal	0	6. Occupants/occupying	0
6. Bloodbath/bloody/massacre	0	7. Kill/killed (killings committed by the opposition forces)	9
7. Genocide/mass killings	0		
Total	16		9

7. Results of analysis of frequency and range of sources for Syria-case

March 19 -31

Total amount of sources	Official American	Official Foreign	Former government officials, now experts	Academics	Civilans	Syrian officials and Syrian media	How many Syrians where among the civilians?

67	8	4	4	0	37	14	27
Percentage of total amount	11.94%	5.97%	5.97%	0%	55.22 %	20.89%	72.97%

April 1 -17

Total amount of sources	Official American	Official Foreign	Former government officials, now experts	Academics	Civilians	Syrian officials and Syrian media	How many Syrians where among the civilians?
67	4	0	0	3	48	12	36
Percentage of the total amount	5.97%	0%	0%	4.48%	71.64%	17.9%	76.59 % of total civilians

Appendix 3: Findings from the Danish case

1. Results of keywordtest February 18-26:

<i>Empathy Frame</i>		<i>Distance/neutrality frame</i>	
Keywords	Frequency	Keywords	Frequency
1. Mennesker/ personer/sivile	15	1.Soldat/ kriger	0
2. Demonstranter	27	2. Muslim	2
3. Drept/drepte (killings committed by Gaddafi)	21	3. Usikker/usikkerhet	0
4.Vold/ voldelig (violence commmited by Gaddafi)	10	4. Dårlig organisert /ledet	0
5. Flyktninger	2	5. Menn	1
		6. Libyans	3
Totalt	75	Totalt	6

<i>Support Frame</i>		<i>Critical Frame</i>	
Keywords	Frequency	Keywords	Frequency
1. Regimemotstander	1	1.Islamister/islamistisk	15
2. Demokrati	21	2. Terrornettverk/ terrorister	1
3. Demokratiforkjemper/ demokratibevegelse	2	3. Farlig	0
4.Frihet/frigjort	8	4. Voldelige/nesynsløse	0
<i>Negatively loaded descriptions of the Gaddafi regime</i>		5. Banditter/forbrytere/kriminelle	1
5.Tyrannisk/ brutal	12	6. Okkupanter/okkupere	0
6. Blodbad/ blodig/ massakre	20	7. Drepe/drept (killings committed by the opposition forces)	0
7. Folkemord/ massedrap	2		
Total	64		16

2. Results of keywordtest February 27 – March 12

<i>Empathy Frame</i>		<i>Distance/neutrality frame</i>	
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Keywords	Frequency	Keywords	Frequency
1. Mennesker/ personer/sivile	24	1.Soldat/ kriger	10
2. Demonstranter	24	2. Muslim	0
3. Drept/drepte (killings committed by Gaddafi)	16	3. Usikker/usikkerhet	0
4.Vold/ voldelig (violence committed by Gaddafi)	7	4. Dårlig organisert /ledet	2
5. Flyktninger	2	5. Menn	2
		6. Libyans	7
Totalt	73	Totalt	21

<i>Support Frame</i>		<i>Critical Frame</i>	
Keywords	Frequency	Keywords	Frequency
1. Regimemotstander	0	1.Islamister/islamistisk	2
2. Demokrati	17	2. Terrornettverk/ terrorister	0
3. Demokratiforkjemper/ demokratibevegelse	0	3. Farlig	0
4.Frihet/frigjort	8	4. Voldelige/nesynsløse	0
<i>Negatively loaded descriptions of the Gaddafi regime</i>		5. Banditter/forbrytere/kriminelle	0
5.Tyrannisk/ brutal	10	6. Okkupanter/okkupere	0
6. Blodbad/ blodig/ massakre	13	7. Drepe/drept (killings committed by the opposition forces)	1
7. Folkemord/ massedrap	0		
Total	48		3

3. Results of keywordtest March 13-17

<i>Empathy Frame</i>		<i>Distance/neutrality frame</i>	
Keywords	Frequency	Keywords	Frequency
1. Mennesker/ personer/sivile	3	1.Soldat/ kriger	1
2. Demonstranter	0	2. Muslim	0
3. Drept/drepte (killings committed by Gaddafi)	3	3. Usikker/usikkerhet	0
4.Vold/ voldelig (violence committed by Gaddafi)	0	4. Dårlig organisert /ledet	0
5. Flyktninger	0	5. Menn	0
		6. Libyans	2
Totalt	6	Totalt	3

<i>Support Frame</i>		<i>Critical Frame</i>	
Keywords	Frequency	Keywords	Frequency
1. Regimemotstander	0	1. Islamister/islamistisk	0
2. Demokrati	7	2. Terrornettverk/ terrorister	2
3. Demokratiforkjemper/ demokratibevegelse	0	3. Farlig	0
4. Frihet/frigjort	0	4. Voldelige/nesynsløse	0
<i>Negatively loaded descriptions of the Gaddafi regime</i>		5. Banditter/forbrytere/kriminelle	0
5. Tyrannisk/ brutal	0	6. Okkupanter/okkupere	0
6. Blodbad/ blodig/ massakre	4	7. Drepe/drept (killings committed by the opposition forces)	0
7. Folkemord/ massedrap	0		
Total	11		2

4. Results of keywordtest March 18- March 31

<i>Empathy Frame</i>		<i>Distance/neutrality frame</i>	
Keywords	Frequency	Keywords	Frequency
1. Mennesker/ personer/sivile	79	1. Soldat/ kriger	8
2. Demonstranter	3	2. Muslim	3
3. Drept/drepte (killings committed by Gaddafi)	15	3. Usikker/usikkerhet	0
4. Vold/ voldelig (violence committed by Gaddafi)	2	4. Dårlig organisert /ledet	1
5. Flyktninger	11	5. Menn	11
		6. Libyans	6
Totalt	110	Totalt	29

<i>Support Frame</i>		<i>Critical Frame</i>	
Keywords	Frequency	Keywords	Frequency
1. Regimemotstander	0	1. Islamister/islamistisk	0
2. Demokrati	22	2. Terrornettverk/ terrorister	2
3. Demokratiforkjemper/ demokratibevegelse	0	3. Farlig	0
4. Frihet/frigjort	11	4. Voldelige/nesynsløse	0
<i>Negatively loaded descriptions of the Gaddafi regime</i>		5. Banditter/forbrytere/kriminelle	0
5. Tyrannisk/ brutal	10	6. Okkupanter/okkupere	0

6. Blodbad/ blodig/ massakre	16	7. Drepe/drept (killings committed by the opposition forces)	0
7. Folkemord/ massedrap	7		
Total	66		2

5. Results of analysis of frequency and range of sources

February 18-26

Total amount of sources	Official Danish	Official Foreign	Former government officials, now experts	Academics	Civilans	Libyan officials and Libyan media	How many Libyans where among the civilians?
81	14	17	1	8	35	6	21
Percentage of total amount	17.28%	20.99%	1.23%	9.87%	43.21%	7.40%	60% of total civilians

February 27- March 12

Total amount of sources	Official Norwegians	Official Foreign	Former government officials, now experts	Academics	Civilans	Libyan officials and Libyan media	How many Libyans where among the civilians?

151	12	38	0	6	88	7	75
Percentage of the total amount	7.95%	25.16%	0%	3.97%	58.28%	4.63%	85.22 % of total civilians

March 13-17

Total amount of sources	Official Norwegians	Official Foreign	Former government officials, now experts	Academics	Civilans	Libyan officials and Libyan media	How many Libyans where among the civilians?
30	10	4	1	3	9	3	7
Percentage of the total amount	33.33%	13.33%	3.33%	10%	30%	10%	77.78 % of total civilians

March 18-31

Total amount of sources	Official Norwegians	Official Foreign	Former government officials, now experts	Academics	Civilians	Libyan officials and Libyan media	How many Libyans where
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							among the civilians?
287	81	80	5	28	81	12	65
Percentage of the total amount	28.22%	28.87%	1.74%	9.75%	28.22%	4.18%	80.24 %

6. Keywordstest for Syria-case, period March 19-31 and April 1-17

March 19-31

<i>Empathy Frame</i>		<i>Distance/neutrality frame</i>	
Keywords	Frequency	Keywords	Frequency
1. Mennesker/ personer/sivile	6	1.Soldat/ kriger	0
2. Demonstranter	20	2. Muslim	0
3. Drept/drepte (killings committed by Gaddafi)	11	3. Usikker/usikkerhet	0
4. Vold/ voldelig (violence committed by Gaddafi)	2	4. Dårlig organisert /ledet	0
5. Flyktninger	0	5. Menn	0
		6. Libyans	5
Totalt	39	Totalt	5

<i>Support Frame</i>		<i>Critical Frame</i>	
Keywords	Frequency	Keywords	Frequency
1. Regimemotstander	0	1.Islamister/islamistisk	1
2. Demokrati	0	2. Terrornettverk/ terrorister	0
3. Demokratiforkjemper/ demokratibevegelse	0	3. Farlig	0
4.Frihet/frigjort	0	4. Voldelige/nesynsløse	0
<i>Negatively loaded descriptions of the Gaddafi regime</i>		5. Banditter/forbrytere/kriminelle	0

5. Tyrannisk/ brutal	1	6. Okkuperanter/okkupert	0
6. Blodbad/ blodig/ massakre	1	7. Drept/drept (killings committed by the opposition forces)	0
7. Folkemord/ massedrap	0		
Total	2		1

April 1-17

<i>Empathy Frame</i>		<i>Distance/ neutrality frame</i>	
Keywords	Frequency	Keywords	Frequency
1. Mennesker/ personer/sivile	12	1. Soldat/ krigere	0
2. Demonstranter	24	2. Muslim	3
3. Drept/drepte (killings committed by Gaddafi)	10	3. Usikker/usikkerhet	0
4. Vold/ voldelig (violence committed by Gaddafi)	4	4. Dårlig organisert /ledet	0
5. Flyktninger	0	5. Menn	2
		6. Libyans	3
Totalt	50	Totalt	8

<i>Support Frame</i>		<i>Critical Frame</i>	
Keywords	Frequency	Keywords	Frequency
1. Regimemotstander	0	1. Islamister/islamistisk	1
2. Demokrati	0	2. Terrornettverk/ terrorister	0
3. Demokratiforkjemper/ demokratibevegelse	0	3. Farlig	0
4. Frihet/frigjort	6	4. Voldelige/nesynsløse	0
<i>Negatively loaded descriptions of the Gaddafi regime</i>		5. Banditter/forbrytere/kriminelle	0
5. Tyrannisk/ brutal	2	6. Okkuperanter/okkupert	0
6. Blodbad/ blodig/ massakre	6	7. Drept/drept (killings committed by the opposition forces)	4
7. Folkemord/ massedrap	0		
Total	14		5

7. Results of analysis of frequency and range of sources for Syria-case

March 19 -31

Total	Official	Official	Former	Academics	Civilans	Syrian	How
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amount of sources	Danish	Foreign	government officials, now experts			officials and Syrian media	many Syrians where among the civilians?
19	3	2	0	4	6	4	2
Percentage of total amount	15.79%	10.52%	0%	21%	31.57%	21%	50%

April 1 -17

Total amount of sources	Official Danish	Official Foreign	Former government officials, now experts	Academics	Civilians	Syrian officials and Syrian media	How many Syrians where among the civilians?
24	1	1	0	1	13	8	10
Percentage of the total amount	4.16%	4.16%	0%	4.16%	54.16%	33.33%	76.92% of total civilians

Appendix 4: Findings from the British case

1. Results of keywordtest February 18-26:

<i>Support Frame</i>		<i>Critical Frame</i>	
Keywords	Frequency	Keywords	Frequency
1. Regime opponent	0	1. Islamists/Islamist	1
2. Democracy	8	2. Terror connections/ terrorists	2
3. Pro-democracy /democracy movement	5	3. Dangerous	0
4. Freedom/ liberated	9	4. Violent/ruthless	0
<i>Negatively loaded descriptions of the Gaddafi regime</i>		5. Criminals/thugs	0
5. Tyrannical/brutal	7	6. Occupants/occupying	0
6. Bloodbath/bloody/massacre	7	7. Kill/killed (killings committed by the opposition forces)	1
7. Genocide/mass killings	2		
Total	38		4

<i>Empathy Frame</i>		<i>Distance/neutrality frame</i>	
Keywords	Frequency	Keywords	Frequency
1. People/civilians	71	1. Soldat/ kriger	1
2. Demonstrants/protesters	61	2. Muslim	0
3. Kill/killings (killings committed by Gaddafi)	31	3. Usikker/usikkerhet	0
4. Violence/violent (violence committed by Gaddafi)	26	4. Dårlig organisert /ledet	0
5. Refugees	3	5. Menn	2
		6. Libyans	7
Totalt	192	Totalt	10

2. Results of keywordtest February 27- March 12

<i>Support Frame</i>		<i>Critical Frame</i>	
Keywords	Frequency	Keywords	Frequency
1. Regime opponent	0	1. Islamists/Islamist	2
2. Democracy	2	2. Terror connections/ terrorists	2

3. Pro-democray /democracy movement	0	3. Dangerous	0
4.Freedom/ liberated	7	4. Violent/ruthless	0
<i>Negatively loaded descriptions of the Gaddafi regime</i>		5. Criminals/thugs	0
5.Tyrannical/brutal	10	6. Occupants/occupying	0
6. Bloodbath/bloody/massacre	5	7. Kill/killed (killings committed by the opposition forces)	1
7. Genocide/mass killings	2		
Total	26		4

<i>Empathy Frame</i>		<i>Distance/neutrality frame</i>	
Keywords	Frequency	Keywords	Frequency
1. People/civilians	112	1.Soldat/ kriger	18
2. Demonstrants/protesters	15	2. Muslim	0
3. Kill/killings (killings committed by Gaddafi)	24	3. Usikker/usikkerhet	0
4.Violence/violent (violence committed by Gaddafi)	9	4. Dårlig organisert /ledet	1
5. Refugees	20	5. Menn	30
		6. Libyans	6
Totalt	180	Totalt	55

3. Results of keywordtest March 13- March 17

<i>Support Frame</i>		<i>Critical Frame</i>	
Keywords	Frequency	Keywords	Frequency
1. Regime opponent	0	1.Islamists/Islamist	4
2. Democracy	0	2. Terror connections/ terrorists	1
3. Pro-democray /democracy movement	0	3. Dangerous	0
4.Freedom/ liberated	3	4. Violent/ruthless	0
<i>Negatively loaded descriptions of the Gaddafi regime</i>		5. Criminals/thugs	0
5.Tyrannical/brutal	4	6. Occupants/occupying	0
6. Bloodbath/bloody/massacre	2	7. Kill/killed (killings committed by the opposition forces)	0
7. Genocide/mass killings	0		
Total	9		5

<i>Empathy Frame</i>		<i>Distance/neutrality frame</i>	
Keywords	Frequency	Keywords	Frequency
1. People/civilians	16	1.Soldat/ kriger	12
2. Demonstrants/protesters	0	2. Muslim	0
3. Kill/killings (killings committed by Gaddafi)	8	3. Usikker/usikkerhet	0
4.Violence/violent (violence committed by Gaddafi)	1	4. Dårlig organisert /ledet	1
5. Refugees	0	5. Menn	3
		6. Libyans	4
Totalt	25	Totalt	20

4. Results of keywordtest March 18- March 31

<i>Support Frame</i>		<i>Critical Frame</i>	
Keywords	Frequency	Keywords	Frequency
1. Regime opponent	0	1.Islamists/Islamist	1
2. Democracy	7	2. Terror connections/ terrorists	3
3. Pro-democracy /democracy movement	0	3. Dangerous	0
4.Freedom/ liberated	2	4. Violent/ruthless	0
<i>Negatively loaded descriptions of the Gaddafi regime</i>		5. Criminals/thugs	1
5.Tyrannical/brutal	4	6. Occupants/occupying	0
6. Bloodbath/bloody/massacre	19	7. Kill/killed (killings committed by the opposition forces)	11
7. Genocide/mass killings	0		
Total	32		16

<i>Empathy Frame</i>		<i>Distance/neutrality frame</i>	
Keywords	Frequency	Keywords	Frequency
1. People/civilians	143	1.Soldat/ kriger	15
2. Demonstrants/protesters	1	2. Muslim	0
3. Kill/killings (killings committed by Gaddafi)	17	3. Usikker/usikkerhet	1
4.Violence/violent (violence committed by Gaddafi)	11	4. Dårlig organisert /ledet	0
5. Refugees	5	5. Menn	10
		6. Libyans	24
Totalt	177	Totalt	50

5. Results of analysis of frequency and range of sources

February 18-26

Total amount of sources	Official British sources	Official Foreign	Former government officials, now experts	Academics	Civilians	Libyan officials and Libyan media	How many Libyans where among the civilians?
143	30	14	3	2	78	16	50
Percentage of total amount	20.97%	9.79%	2.1%	1.39%	54.54%	11.19%	64.1% of total civilians

February 27 – March 12

Total amount of sources	Official American sources	Official Foreign	Former government officials, now experts	Academics	Civilians	Libyan officials and Libyan media	How many Libyans where among the civilians?
212	47	35	7	4	100	19	83
Percentage of total amount	22.16%	16.5%	3.3%	1.88%	47.17%	8.96%	83% of total civilians

March 13- 17

Total amount of sources	Official American sources	Official Foreign	Former government officials, now experts	Academics	Civilians	Libyan officials and Libyan media	How many Libyans where among the civilians?
53	11	6	0	1	29	6	24
Percentage of total amount	20.75%	11.32%	0	1.89%	54.71%	11.32%	82.76% of total civilians

March 18-31

Total amount of sources	Official British sources	Official Foreign	Former government officials, now experts	Academics	Civilians	Libyan officials and Libyan media	How many Libyans where among the civilians?
307	80	71	12	1	112	31	93
Percentage of total amount	26%	23.12%	3.9%	0.32%	36.48%	10.1%	83% of total civilians

6. Keywordstest for Syria-case, period March 19-31 and April 1-17

March 19-31

<i>Empathy Frame</i>		<i>Distance/neutrality frame</i>	
Keywords	Frequency	Keywords	Frequency
1. People/civilians	9	1.Soldat/ kriger	0
2. Demonstrants/protesters	20	2. Muslim	0
3. Kill/killings (killings committed by Gaddafi)	12	3. Usikker/usikkerhet	0
4.Violence/violent (violence committed by Gaddafi)	6	4. Dårlig organisert /ledet	0
5. Refugees	0	5. Menn	0
		6. Syrians	4
Totalt	47	Totalt	4

<i>Support Frame</i>		<i>Critical Frame</i>	
Keywords	Frequency	Keywords	Frequency
1. Regime opponent	0	1.Islamists/Islamist	1
2. Democracy	0	2. Terror connections/ terrorists	0
3. Pro-democray /democracy movement	0	3. Dangerous	0
4.Freedom/ liberated	2	4. Violent/ruthless	0
<i>Negatively loaded descriptions of the Gaddafi regime</i>		5. Criminals/thugs	0
5.Tyrannical/brutal	1	6. Occupants/occupying	0
6. Bloodbath/bloody/massacre	3	7. Kill/killed (killings committed by the opposition forces)	0
7. Genocide/mass killings	0		
Total	6		1

April 1-17

<i>Empathy Frame</i>		<i>Distance/neutrality frame</i>	
Keywords	Frequency	Keywords	Frequency
1. People/civilians	23	1.Soldat/ kriger	0
2. Demonstrants/protesters	12	2. Muslim	0
3. Kill/killings (killings committed by Gaddafi)	9	3. Usikker/usikkerhet	0
4.Violence/violent (violence committed by Gaddafi)	5	4. Dårlig organisert /ledet	0

5. Refugees	0	5. Menn	0
		6. Syrians	1
Totalt	49	Totalt	4

<i>Support Frame</i>		<i>Critical Frame</i>	
Keywords	Frequency	Keywords	Frequency
1. Regime opponent	0	1. Islamists/Islamist	0
2. Democracy	0	2. Terror connections/ terrorists	0
3. Pro-democray /democracy movement	3	3. Dangerous	0
4. Freedom/ liberated	3	4. Violent/ruthless	0
<i>Negatively loaded descriptions of the Gaddafi regime</i>		5. Criminals/thugs	0
5. Tyrannical/brutal	1	6. Occupants/occupying	0
6. Bloodbath/bloody/massacre	0	7. Kill/killed (killings committed by the opposition forces)	2
7. Genocide/mass killings	0		
Total	7		2

7. Results of analysis of frequency and range of sources for Syria-case

March 19 -31

Total amount of sources	Official British	Official Foreign	Former government officials, now experts	Academics	Civilans	Syrian officials and Syrian media	How many Syrians where among the civilans?
16	1	0	0	0	10	5	10
Percentage of total amount	6.25%	0%	0%	0%	62.5%	31.25%	100%

April 1 -17

Total amount of sources	Official British	Official Foreign	Former government officials, now experts	Academics	Civilians	Syrian officials and Syrian media	How many Syrians where among the civilians?
16	1	2	0	0	7	6	5
Percentage of the total amount	6.25%	12.5%	0%	0%	43.75%	35.5%	71.43% of total civilians