Hypocrisy and "Friction" in International Organizations: The Case of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000)

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DECLARATION

I, Jenny Kathrine Lorentzen, declare that this thesis is a result of my research investigations and findings. Sources of information other than my own have been acknowledged and a reference list has been appended. This work has not been previously submitted to any other university for award of any type of academic degree.

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ABSTRACT

The complexity of understanding the implementation of gender issues across various institutionalized levels is becoming increasingly important for the UN, and for the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) in particular. This thesis looks at the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) in DPKO as a global process through a method inspired by multi-sited ethnography. While it is not a thesis about the shortcomings of implementing Resolution 1325 in DPKO, it concerns the dynamics that affect such an implementation process. Studying policy and process across three levels of analysis allows for an approach that is able to grasp interaction, dynamics, and interplay between headquarters, the field mission, and the member state. I use the theoretical framework of organized hypocrisy to explain the outcomes of the dynamics and interplay between the levels of analysis, in order to highlight how International Organizations operate in, and are affected by, a complex external environment, and how their actions are a result of this. This does not mean that DPKO intentionally uses hypocrisy to avoid gender issues; rather I use the theories of hypocrisy to explain dynamics that affect the implementation process. In my understanding of the global aspect of the process of implementing Resolution 1325 across the levels of analysis, I apply the concept of "friction". "Friction" is understood as encounters and interaction between the levels of analysis that affect and inform the issues in the "women, peace and security" agenda as these travel across geographical and conceptual spaces. By taking this approach to the issues of "women, peace and security" in DPKO I place these issues within a larger context, allowing for the study of Resolution 1325 as a case and not as an isolated process or event.

LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

BRICS	Brazil, China, India, China, South Africa
C34	Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations
CSW	Commission on the Status of Women
DFS	Department of Field Support
DPA	Department of Political Affairs
DPET	Policy, Evaluation and Training Division
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
ECOSOC	United Nations Economic and Social Council
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
HQ	Headquarters
IO	International Organization
JPO	Junior Professional Officer
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MINUSTAH	United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti
MOD	Ministry of Defense
NAM	Non-Aligned Movement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OMA	Office of Military Affairs
OROLSI	Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions
OSAGI	Office of the Special Adviser of Gender Issues and Advancement of Women
PCC	Police-Contributing Country
R2P	Responsibility to Protect
SGBV	Sexual and Gender Based Violence
SRSG	Special Representative for the Secretary-General
TCC	Troop-Contributing Country
UN	United Nations
UN Action	UN Action Against Sexual Violence in Conflict
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund

UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNOCI	United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire
USG	Under Secretary-General
UN Women	United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women

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Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Introduction

The complexity of understanding the implementation of gender issues across various institutionalized levels is becoming increasingly important for the UN, and for the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) in particular. While it can be argued that the recognition of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) has been primarily at the rhetorical level, "women, peace and security has emerged as an issue area that can no longer be overlooked by either the UN or its member states" (Tryggestad 2009: 552). In this thesis I write about how International Organizations (IOs) handle conflicting pressures and demands from their external environment, and focus on the implementation of Resolution 1325 on "women, peace and security" in DPKO. The shortcomings of implementing Resolution 1325 in DPKO have been widely documented by critical voices (see Anderlini 2007; Cockburn 2007; Porter 2007; Raven-Roberts 2005; Whitworth 2007). This is not a thesis about those shortcomings; it is a thesis about why these shortcomings tend to persist. It is about the UN bureaucracy and the UN's constituency. The UN does what Nils Brunsson (1989) refers to as talk, very well. Many would say it is what the UN does best. It executes decisions, albeit not always with the same success. What it sometimes does not achieve at all, according to its critics, is action. I aim to show why this type of hypocrisy is a necessary part of the workings of the UN system, and I am using the implementation of Resolution 1325 as a specific case.

This qualitative study will investigate how the interplay between the different levels of analysis affects the implementation process. The levels of analysis include the member state, headquarters, and the field mission. It will seek to shed light on this topic by looking at what strategies actors apply in order to affect the work and implementation process, and whether there are any discrepancies in how needs and priorities are defined across the levels of

analysis. The framework applied in order to grasp the process and levels of analysis is inspired by methods of "studying-through" and "multi-sited ethnography" (see Chapter 2). The process of implementing Resolution 1325 in DPKO cannot be studied as a process that is isolated from its external environment. It must be studied as a global process, carried out across a global space of distance and differences, with DPKO as a part of that process. This process produces what Anna L. Tsing (2005) calls "friction"; global encounters which both drive the process forward and causes it to move more slowly. Looking at the case of implementing Resolution 1325 in DPKO as global encounters across distances and differences enable us to better understand how policy is created, informed and modified in this process, and how that affects its implementation in DPKO.

I study DPKO as an international bureaucracy in order to understand what actors and circumstances influence their work. The starting point for the inquiry is the criticism raised against the UN and DPKO that the implementation of Resolution 1325 has taken place primarily at a rhetorical level (see Chapter 4 for an overview). While a multitude of policy papers and guidelines have been produced, being able to implement the resolution means successfully transforming broad policy commitments into practical procedures and integrating these into the organization's daily work. For my research I focus on the way DPKO has worked to integrate gender perspectives into peacekeeping and programming, also referred to as gender mainstreaming. The analysis is based on qualitative interviews carried out during fieldwork in New York City and Oslo, interviewing DPKO staff and government officials. It also builds on a desk study on Côte d'Ivoire. More sources include policy documents and other official documents, official statements and reports, as well as other literature.

1.2 Why Study "Women, Peace and Security" in DPKO?

The adoption of Resolution 1325 is often described as groundbreaking (Tryggestad 2009), and it forms the basis for later resolutions on "women, peace and security" (see UN Security Council Resolutions 1820, 1888, 1889, 1960). This is a heavily researched topic, but I hope to contribute new insights by applying an approach that focuses on the interplay between different levels of the implementation process. While it can be argued that the recognition of Resolution 1325 has been primarily at the rhetorical level, "women, peace and security" has emerged as an issue area that can no longer be ignored by the UN or its member states

(Tryggestad 2009: 552). Since DPKO has been subject to large efforts of institutionalization of the principle, and peace operations have been directly targeted and mandated by Security Council resolutions to implement Resolution 1325, their work seems the obvious choice for my study.

It is an aim of this study to contribute to understanding the factors at work when the issues of "women, peace and security" are being implemented (or not) in the work of DPKO. The study will be rooted in constructivist International Relations theory on International Organizations and global governance (see for example Barnett and Finnermore 2004). I will also draw on sociological theory, particularly the literature on "organized hypocrisy" as first described Nils Brunsson (1989; 2002). I believe this literature may provide useful frameworks when seeking to enhance understanding of the behavior of IOs and what factors influence their behavior. Further, the concept of "organized hypocrisy" is well suited for analyzing how external factors affect organizational behavior. By taking a process-oriented approach, I aim to shed light not only on the influence of member states, but also the interplay between member states, the UN system (or bureaucracy), and the "conditions on the ground". It is thus an aim of this study to provide to a deeper understanding of the workings of international bureaucracies. Finally, it should also be a contribution to the debate surrounding the application of gender perspectives in peacekeeping operations.

1.3 Research Questions

- What factors and actors affect the implementation of issues of "women, peace and security" in DPKO?
- How are needs and priorities defined at the different levels of analysis?
- How does the interplay between the different levels of analysis affect the implementation process?

1.4 Operationalization

In order to answer the specific research questions, certain operationalizations and clarifications must be made. The research questions build on an assumption that there is a gap

between what is being said and done when implementing Resolution 1325 in DPKO. They also assume that the preferences and ideas of actors involved in the process may vary for different reasons. I aim to uncover these variations and their effect on the implementation process, and the interviews provide the most important primary data for this purpose. The desk study contributes a case for whether these ideas transform into the intended practice on the ground, and whether the policy directions coming from headquarters provides an approach that meets the actual needs and challenges peace operations are meant to tackle. By "implementation process" I refer to the integration of a gender perspective in planning, programming and reporting in all of DPKO's work related to carrying out peacekeeping operations. I have chosen these variables in order to limit the scope of my research. Gender is commonly understood as referring to the social attributes and opportunities associated with being male and female. These attributes, opportunities and relationships are socially constructed, context- and time-specific, and changeable (United Nations 2010a).

1.5 Scope and Limitations

While the adoption of Resolution 1325 happened in 2000, and marks the starting point for my study, I build my study on informants' perceptions of the situation. People's experiences are acquired over time, which expands the scope accordingly. It is important to note that the study will be context-specific, and it may not support generalizations beyond its context. On the other hand, it may contribute to theoretical insights into the study of IOs across conceptual spaces and not as cut off from their externalities.

1.6 Thesis Outline

I will start by outlining the methodological and theoretical framework in Chapters 2 and 3 before moving on to an overview of the criticism raised against DPKO on the implementation of Resolution 1325 in Chapter 4. In Chapter 5, I will give an empirical account of the different levels of analysis. This will form the basis for the main analytical part of the thesis, which follows in Chapter 6. Chapter 7 concludes and reflects upon the findings in Chapter 6.

Chapter 2: Methodological Framework

2.1 Research Design

The purpose of this study is to investigate the factors that influence the process of implementing Resolution 1325 in DPKO by looking at how needs and priorities are defined across different levels of analysis, and the interplay between these. This research is designed as a case study of the implementation of 1325 in DPKO, but it also carries elements of a cross-sectional design. Research has been conducted at several locations, all at one point in time. Due to the nature of the unit of analysis, and the complexity of its external environment, neither research design in its pure form served the intended purpose. I found it necessary to draw on insights from other disciplines, particularly anthropological research, to gain a full understanding of the subject matter. My study combines the elements of both research designs in order to gain an understanding of the policy and process of implementing Resolution 1325 in DPKO.

As I rely heavily on fieldwork and interviews, both participant methods of observation, my framework holds a perspective "from below". This means there has been an interaction between the researcher, myself, and what I study, and I rely on and recognize the knowledge of the actors who are "in" the case (Mjøset 2009: 49). In addition to the interviews, I used theoretical sampling throughout the research in the collection of other data. The analysis builds on the interviews, as well as policy documents and official documents, publications, reports and other relevant literature. Fieldwork notes, detailed notes, and transcripts also fed into the analysis. When a qualitative research strategy is employed within a cross-sectional design the relationship between theory and research tends to be inductive, meaning that theory is generated from data. It is however important to note that my inductive approach carries an

element of iterative strategy, meaning that the relationship between theory and data is reflected upon theoretically throughout the working process (Bryman 2008: 12, 54).

2.1.1 Multi-sited ethnography

The method of choice is inspired by multi-sited ethnography. Multi-sited ethnography challenges the conventional idea of ethnography as involving a rather long term stay in a field site of choice. The objective in multi-sited ethnography is the study of social phenomena that cannot be accounted for by focusing on one single site (Falzon 2009: 1). As Falzon (2009: 2) writes, "Research design proceeds by a series of juxtapositions in which the global is collapsed into and made an integral part of parallel, related local situations, rather than something monolithic or external to them. In terms of method, multi-sited ethnography involves a spatially dispersed field through which the ethnographer moves – actually, via sojourns in two or more places, or conceptually, by means of techniques of juxtaposition of data".

I study the social process and action related to the implementation of UNSC resolution 1325 in three different sites:

Site	Level of analysis	Nature
DPKO Headquarters	International	Bureaucracy
The Norwegian Government	National	Member State
UNOCI	Local	Field Mission

The first two sites were researched through fieldwork and interviews, while the latter was subject to a desk study, as in what is referred to as conceptual movement above. However, many interviews provided me with information directly or indirectly relevant to each level of analysis.

2.1.2 Studying through: The study of Policy and Process

Multi-sited ethnography builds on the notion that space is socially produced (Falzon 2009: 4). Social constructivism has been increasingly utilized in the study of International Organizations within the discipline of International Relations (see for example Barnett and

Finnermore 2004). Reinhold (1994: 477-479) further describes the method of "studying through" as tracing the ways in which power creates webs and relations between actors, institutions and discourses across time and space. This cannot simply be observed in one locale, but must be studied at different sites in order to "grasp the interactions (and disjunctions) between different sites or levels in policy processes". Multi-sited ethnography traces "the policy connections between different organizational and everyday worlds", and it "treats 'policy communities' as not just rhetorical, but as contested political spaces" (Shore and Wright 1997: 15). "Policies are typically used as tools for governments" which means that they can also be "tools for *studying* systems of governance". By studying policy, it becomes possible to analyze the "connections between levels and forms of social process and action, and exploring how those processes work in different sites". The field of study is thus to be perceived "as a social and political space articulated through relations of power and systems of governance" (Shore and Wright 1997: 14).

2.2 Fieldwork, Interviews and informants

Fieldwork was carried out during a two-week stay in February 2012 in New York, United States, and over a period of 3 months in Oslo between January and April 2012. The short fieldwork to the United States made it possible to interview UN staff and Norwegian Government Officials based in New York. It would have been ideal to be able to have a longer fieldwork, because of issues of access to informants, and because new issues and possible new informants surfacing during the course of my stay. The timing of my fieldwork in New York coincided with the starting up of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C34) on 21 February 2012. The C34 is an annual event and large priority setting body for DPKO, and it is a forum for discussions of peacekeeping policy and practice among member states. Being in New York at the opening of these discussions was an asset since it meant that these issues were already on the agenda, and informants had already given these topics thought and deliberation. Access to interviewees was relatively easy in most cases. Most people working on the issues of "women, peace and security" consider it an important subject and welcome research on the issue area, and I received plenty of help in connecting with other possible informants. One obstacle was that these people are often very busy, and some had difficulties making time for an interview, also due to the fact that the time of my fieldwork to New York coincided with important events for the people I was interested to

meet. I experienced a public holiday, "President's Day", in the middle of my stay, as well as the annual meeting of mission police commanders held in New York, which also presented challenges that made access to informants less easy. However, many went out of their way to meet me, sometimes even outside their normal working hours. The target population was mainly government officials and DPKO staff, as well as other relevant actors who in some way had a relationship to DPKO. I used a purposive sampling technique, and snowball and theoretical sampling as I went along conducting the interviews.

I have deliberately chosen not only to speak to members of the Gender Advisory Team in DPKO, but also others working in other departments, as well as people in other parts of the UN system with a working relationship with DPKO. I have spoken to people in three departments in DPKO, including the Office of Operations, Office of the Rule of Law and Security Institutions (OROLSI), and current and former members of the Gender Advisory Team. I also spoke with people in UN Women and UNDP, as well as someone representing civil society and one New York diplomat from a permanent mission to the United Nations other than Norway. In the Norwegian Government I have spoken to actors working with DPKO and peacekeeping, gender and Resolution 1325, or both. Some of these interviews took place in New York, while others were conducted in Oslo. The representativeness of the sample is strong in the way that it contains variation but with all interviewees having a working relation to the research topic. Variation in the sample is an asset when I seek to map people's experiences of a certain phenomena, or process. Talking to all these people, including UN bureaucrats, diplomats, and the more activist voices such as civil society and UN Women, has allowed me to observe nuances and variation in people's experiences of the process of implementing Resolution 1325 in DPKO. I believe the representativeness of the sample to be good within the scope of my research. An ethnographic account of all three levels of analysis could give a more accurate description of the phenomena, but that would be far beyond the limitations of this thesis. Because I do not wish to inflict any harm upon the people who were so kind as to talk to me and share their insights with me, I limit the amount of information linked to the specific citations in the text in order to preserve the anonymity of my informants. I have not used citations from all the interviews, but they all provided important background information and are therefore included in the complete list of interviews attached at the end of this thesis.

I chose semi-structured interviews because I believe this approach to be well-suited for exploring the relationship between discourse and reality, and for uncovering power structures, as well as the experiences and perceptions of the actors. The semi-structured interviews contain a series of questions, but the sequence of questions can be varied. Questions are in a relatively general form, and there is the possibility to ask further questions in response to significant replies (Bryman 2008: 196). Semi-structured interviews are more appropriate since the questions are quite specific and of a less personal character, as well as easing the collection and processing of material. In the preparatory phase I designed an interview guide that I used as a basis for all the interviews (see Appendix I). Semi-structured interviews are often associated with cross-sectional design in qualitative research. All interviews were conducted at one point in time, between January and April 2012, seeking to reveal factors that influence the process of implementing Resolution 1325. This interest in influence suggests a connotation to investigating causality. Establishing causality within this kind of research design is not possible according to criteria of validity as understood in quantitative research, but an interest in causes and effects, as understood by "influence", is still possible when emphasis is given to people's *experiences* of something (Bryman 2008: 44, 48-49).

I recorded most of the interviews, except in a few cases where the location did not allow for a good recording environment, and I resorted to taking detailed notes. Some informants also expressed a wish not to have the interview recorded, however all agreed to me taking detailed notes. While taking notes can never give you the same detail level as a recording can, it was also important to respect the wishes of my interviewees. In order to get as much detail as possible out of these interviews, I made a more detailed and ordered rewrite of my notes right after the interview. All transcriptions were done within a reasonable time after the interview so that they were fresh in my memory for a more accurate transcription, and to make theoretical sampling possible. This allowed me to adapt during my fieldwork and to explore topics that appeared to be of new or increased relevance. Analysis of data from the interviews was eased by the fact that I was using semi-structured interviews.

2.3 Document Analysis

I used many official documents for my analysis (see bibliography). These were easily accessible online and mainly consisted of Security Council Resolutions, reports of the

Secretary-General, policy and guidelines produced by DPKO, governmental action plans, and other official reports and publications. Documents outside the public domain were not available. This is not surprising, since organizations are usually regarded as closed settings. As Shore (2011: 170) writes, gaining entry to study the worlds of policy elites is often difficult as access is granted by people with careers at stake and who dislike being made objects of academic research. However, organizations increasingly find it necessary to publicly display their work as demands of transparency and accountability arise from both member states and civil society.

The documents referred to in this section are those gathered from official sources, and have not been produced specifically for social research. Including such documents in the analysis has one clear advantage that it adds data to the description. A second advantage is that since they have not been created for the purpose of social research, they are non-reactive (Bryman 2008: 515). Reactivity refers to the response of research participants to the fact that they know they are being researched (Bryman 2008: 698). Non-reactive data has a higher degree of validity. However, one must apply caution when attempting to treat them as depictions of reality; the people who write these documents probably have a particular point of view they wish to get across. The UN knows that they are being watched, not only by researchers, but also by member states, NGOs and civil society, and many of the documents are produced in order to please an audience. Many of the documents are also the result of negotiations and deliberations, which is common, but particularly relevant in the UN context. Therefore, the documents I had at hand could not be considered objective accounts of reality, but had to be examined in the context of other sources of data. These documents are useful for my analysis when regarded as policy tools, and they represent the tangible aspect of the policy work produced by the different actors. They tell us something about how the actors want to present themselves, and this is why they are especially relevant for my research.

2.4 Ethical Problems and Considerations

Since I have interviewed mostly government officials and UN staff, I do not believe that they should consider potential harm arising from participating and giving me their opinions. However, some may feel that it could damage their professional reputations (Shore et. al. 2011: 50), so I have sought to ensure the highest possible degree of anonymity in my work. I

have also tried my utmost to show discretion and confidentiality, and take data protection measures. It is difficult to estimate whether giving all details about the research could possibly contaminate answers, however I judged this to pose a minor risk and therefore I made efforts to allow participants to receive the full necessary and true information about the study in order to participate under informed consent (Bryman 2008: 113-123).

2.5 Reflection on Research Criteria in Qualitative Research

I have tried to give a detailed account of my research in order to ensure the highest possible degree of replicability. However, replication is not likely to be possible, as Lars Mjøset (2009: 47) writes: "Some cases were the case in a particular context and will not necessarily ever happen the same way again. Other cases are produced again and again by an ongoing process, but we are then […] eager to evaluate it and possibly change it." It is thus unlikely that a similar study will generate the same results.

The internal validity of a qualitative study is usually quite weak, but as already mentioned, a focus on people's experiences of what influences a given subject of research may justify an interest in causes and effects and suggests a strong internal validity within a qualitative paradigm. I use a *contextualist* strategy to support any generalizations made from my research (Mjøset 2009: 52), explained as generalization only within specified contexts. Within this framework general theory and universal range theory must be distinguished. I make no effort to establish a universal range theory, however "even a single case analysis can contribute to growth in knowledge when it is developed with reference to knowledge already accumulated in one or more local research frontiers" (Mjøset 2009: 60, original reference in Mjøset 2006).

The structure of DPKO and the UN compared to other IOs is somewhat unique. However, if looking at the implementation of other issue areas with important similarities in this specific organization or similar, the external validity may be stronger. Generalizability in qualitative research concerns general structures rather than single social practices, so the variance in the sample also increases the generalizability of the findings, since it highlights the invariance, or regularities in the phenomena of study (Gobo 2004: 435). Through applying several methods to gather data for my analysis, such as observation, interviews and document analysis, a triangulation of the results is achieved, which increases the credibility and validity of the study (Denzin 1978).

I have tried to be as objective as I can in my research, but as in the case of any qualitative research the personal views of the researcher will almost always affect the way findings are interpreted. In order to minimize this bias, I make an effort to stay true to the views expressed by the informants, and to offer space to differing views that have emerged during my research.

2.6 Summary

In this chapter I have given an outline of the methodological approach to my study. Drawing on methodological insights from related social disciplines and applying them to the study of International Organizations in International Relations enable me to take a multi-level approach to the implementation process and look at how policy can be traced across the field of study. The use of several methods of observation, interviews and document analysis has allowed for a triangulation of the results.

Chapter 3: Studying Hypocrisy in International Organizations

3.1 Introduction

This chapter starts with an overview of the study of International Organizations, with a particular emphasis to the constructivist tradition in International Relations. It further outlines the main tenets in theories of organized hypocrisy, as first described by Nils Brunsson (1989). The combination of the constructivist paradigm in International Relations with the insights of sociological organization theory is unproblematic since constructivism is concerned with the study of the social construction of meanings and phenomena in International Relations.

3.2 Theoretical Perspectives on International Organizations

Theories of International Relations have traditionally treated IOs as arenas or structures through which others act. These others are usually represented by the state, thus reflecting a view of IOs as merely tools for states (Barnett and Finnermore 2004: 4). Realists see institutions, or IOs, as a reflection of the distribution of power in the world, having no independent effect on state behavior. Liberal institutionalists on the other hand, have claimed that institutions can affect state behavior by altering state preferences because cooperation will reduce transaction costs and alleviate fears of unequal gains (Keohane and Martin 1995: 45; Mearsheimer 1994: 7). Constructivist theory treats IOs as autonomous and powerful actors in their own right, yet they should not be understood as unitary actors consciously deciding whether or not to be true to their words (Weaver 2008: 4, 17). Traditional International Relations theory has considered sovereignty the basis of authority, inferring that

only states can possess authority. However, as Barnett and Finnermore (2004: 5) states, "authority is conferred in differing degrees and kinds on actors other than states".

Barnett and Finnermore (2004) argue that IOs exhibit autonomy when they do more than their creators intend. This often happens when staff has to transform broad mandates into workable doctrines and procedures. IOs also tend to develop their own views and organizational cultures to promote what they see as good policy. Further, when IOs implement mandates and define tasks they often do so in a way that requires more intervention by more IOs. When treating IOs as bureaucracies they must also be understood as authorities in their own right, inferring that IOs have autonomy through the authority they possess. This authority takes different forms and has different sources. Bureaucracies tend to make impersonal rules that are politically safe and comfortably routine rather than effective, and IOs need to portray themselves as impartial and serving the will of member states rather than exercising power in order to be viewed as legitimate. This is also true for DPKO, and makes it possible for DPKO to appear more legitimate than states (Barnett and Finnermore 2004: 2-3, 5, 10).

3.3 Organized Hypocrisy

When we speak of hypocrisy in daily life it usually carries a negative connotation. Saying one thing and then acting in a different way may cause critique and condemnation. This is also true for IOs, when they display ideals and identities that conform to certain norms or expectations while their actions seem to contradict these ideals or norms. The problem for IOs is that they depend on these ideals for legitimacy and survival, in the way they also depend on resources from their external environment, such as funding from member states in the case of the UN (Weaver 2008: 4). For organization theorists, organized hypocrisy may not carry the usual negative connotation; it can represent a constructive way of handling conflicting pressures from the external environment. Theories of organized hypocrisy in organizations assume some extent of autonomy on behalf of the organization. IOs such as the UN are more susceptible to hypocrisy because of their nature. When the external environment is of a complex nature, as is often the case for IOs, it increases the likelihood of contradicting expectations and demands and organized hypocrisy may function as a strategic tool for organizational survival. Furthermore, IOs often develop informal cultures and structures and these may also differ from their environment (Lipson 2007: 11-12; Krasner 1999; Weaver

2008: 4-6). Organized hypocrisy can be described as a situation where actors respond to norms with symbolic action, while simultaneously violating these norms through instrumental behavior (Lipson 2007: 6).

Stephen Krasner (1999) describes the most famous account of organized hypocrisy within International Relations where he applies the concept to the principle and practice of sovereignty in international society. Writing from a realist perspective, he builds on insights from rationalist and institutionalist theory arguing that norms will always be challenged, but the justifications for these challenges may change over time. In Krasner's analysis, organized hypocrisy implies that while sovereignty has been a persistent feature of relations between states, the norm has often been violated. He argues that international rules, such as norms of non-intervention and human rights, can be contradictory, and there is no authority structure to help arbitrate these controversies. Krasner further claims that political and social environments are characterized by two logics of action in order to respond to such controversies. Logics of consequences see political action and outcomes as the product of rational behavior intended on maximizing a given set of preferences, while logics of appropriateness refer to political action as a product of rules, roles, and identities that stipulate appropriate behavior in given situations. If appropriateness is unambiguous and the consequences of alternative courses of action unclear, the behavior of actors is likely to be determined by their roles, thus by applying a logic of appropriateness. If, however, actors have multiple and contradictory roles and rules, or no rules at all, but results of different actions seem obvious, they will adhere to a logic of consequences. He states that in the international system, logics of consequences will be dominant (Krasner 1999: 3, 5-6). However, the original formulation of hypocrisy in organizations was by organization theorist Nils Brunsson (1989), in his research on domestic organizations. The term has also been applied to Peacekeeping Operations (Lipson 2007), the World Bank (Weaver 2008), and to Agricultural Trade in the World Trade Organization (Bukovansky 2010).

3.4 Hypocrisy as Survival Strategy

Catherine Weaver (2008) has written on hypocrisy in the World Bank. She defines hypocrisy as "mainstreaming gaps" between what the World Bank says and does. When the Bank takes on goals and tasks that challenge its mandates, modus operandi and raison d'être, it comes

under pressure to change, but is uncertain about its identity and path to reform. In Weaver's analysis, hypocrisy can be a natural, enduring, and even necessary feature of Bank life. IOs have the power to define meanings and norms of good behavior, however being accused of hypocrisy may undermine their authority and limit their normative and material influence. These aspects are important because IOs depend on conferred legitimacy from their environments, as well as material, and financial, support. IOs must therefore appear to be acting responsively to environmental demands in order to survive. When such demands clash, we are likely to see cases of hypocrisy (Weaver 2008: 3-5). Not only may environmental demands be conflicting or contradicting, but organizations may also develop their own distinct culture. These cultures may develop over time as organizations respond to and interpret the world in which they operate. When a dichotomy exists between the internal bureaucratic culture of an organization and the external environment we are likely to see organized hypocrisy employed as a way to seek conferred legitimacy. Hypocrisy employed in this manner represents a strategic tool to tackle the complex environment in which an organization operates, thus highlighting the functional aspect of hypocrisy. If on the other hand hypocrisy becomes a liability, it may become a source of dysfunction and a threat to organizational survival in itself (Weaver 2008: 5-6).

Strategic reform is often portrayed as the "cure" for hypocrisy, however such reform may reflect inconsistent environmental pressures and consist of contradictory goals that further impedes the success of reform. Meanwhile, as Weaver points out, changes are often initiated as a result of learning and advocacy within the organization. In this case, the intent to change should be seen as genuine, but still results may be lacking. To engineer such change in large organizations with grandiose bureaucracies requires systemic cultural change to take place in the organization. That, however, can be very difficult. Whether or not staff members believe in the intent of reform, or see it as a rhetorical tool to please donors and other external environment becomes a crucial issue. Reform is likely to fail if staff perceives some shifts or goals as rhetorical, or if goals are inconsistent or clash with existing ideologies, norms, structures or routines. In the end such attempts to change may have unintended consequences, including hypocrisy, which is what Weaver refers to as "hypocrisy trap" (Weaver 2008: 7-8, 179). In her study of the World Bank, Weaver found that the success of reform was most likely in areas consistent with the existing bureaucratic culture. However, the "rhetorical" reform may be necessary for organizational survival, as it is a way for IOs to seek conferred legitimacy. Thus we see that there is a curious connection between legitimacy, hypocrisy and

survival. "The path to survival is precarious when legitimacy is sought through organized hypocrisy" (Weaver 2008: 12-13).

According to Weaver (2008: 5), the degree of autonomy is important for the type of hypocrisy we may observe. Weaver focuses her analysis on *bureaucratic hypocrisy*, more common in large IOs with bureaucracies consisting of permanent (rather than seconded) staff and service-oriented missions. These are thus more likely to develop distinct organizational cultures with preferences and actions that cannot be directly related to the interests of powerful member states. In Lipson's analysis of peacekeeping, and Bukovansky's work on agricultural trade in the WTO, hypocrisy is exhibited by the member states and institutionalized in the rules of the regime, not the bureaucracy, and these studies are more related to Krasner's conception of sovereignty as organized hypocrisy. However, they all build on Nils Brunsson's initial work.

3.5 The Organization of Hypocrisy

Nils Brunsson developed the concepts of *the organization of hypocrisy* and *organizational hypocrisy* in the first edition of his book *The Organization of Hypocrisy. Talk, Decisions and Actions in Organizations* (1989). In the second edition (2002) he further elaborated these concepts; especially the latter then termed *organized hypocrisy* (Brunsson 2002: xiii). The organization of hypocrisy is the situation when inconsistent, conflicting, or contradictory demands are handled by reflecting these demands, and incorporating them into organizational structures, processes and ideologies. Organizational structures and processes are thus *decoupled*, and can respond to their corresponding external demands without being much affected by their inconsistency. The term hypocrisy is here used in a broad sense. Organized hypocrisy on the other hand, applies the term of hypocrisy in a narrower sense. Here, he refers to how "organizations may talk in one way, decide in another and act in a third", in order to satisfy conflicting demands from outside or inside the organization (Brunsson 2002: xii-xiii). He further argues that talk and decisions may actually reduce the likelihood of consistent action, thus there is a reverse causality between outputs; talk and decisions compensate for actions in the opposite direction (Brunsson 2002: xiv). In this sense, the actions are related, so they are not decoupled. This is what Lipson refers to as *counter-coupling* (Lipson 2007: 10).

Although relating to Krasner's study, Lipson (2007: 8-9) argues that Krasner's conception of organized hypocrisy is less suited for the study of IOs, as Krasner makes rulers the units of his analysis. These are rational, unitary actors who are distinct from their environments and pursue exogenously given goals. Organizations on the other hand, exist in more open environments and with boundaries that are hard to delineate, as they both affect and are affected by their environment (Barnett and Finnermore 2004). Nils Brunsson (1989, 2002) operates with a perspective that perceives organizations as possessing porous boundaries, and as constituted by and reproduced by their environments. Because of the distinction between closed and open systems, Brunsson's conception is superior for the analysis of organizations (Lipson 2007: 10-11). Indeed, because the borders between the organization and its environment are so porous, it becomes difficult to determine where these borders should be drawn, or whether or not we are talking about a case of *organized hypocrisy* or *the organization of hypocrisy*.

3.6 Political and Action Organizations

Brunsson also uses the distinction between two ideal types of "political" and "action" organizations that give useful insights to the analysis. "Action" organizations depend solely on action for legitimacy, and the exchange of resources with its environment is sufficient for its survival. "Political" organizations depend on the reflection of inconsistent norms for legitimacy (Brunsson 2002: 14). "Political" organizations operate in institutional environments characterized by conflicting values and preferences and have incorporated these contradictions into their internal structures. If these structures are decoupled, they can operate individually and respond to different external demands without being much affected by the inconsistencies between them (Lipson 2007: 9). In Weaver's analysis, these types are seen as ways for organizations to cope with external pressures. Hypocrisy is most likely to arise and endure when there is a conflict between material and normative demands from the external environment, and internal structures and culture. In the face of these demands, organizations are likely to decouple and create gaps between formal and informal structures. In other words, there will be a dissonance between what is said and done, and organizations may develop distinct "political" and "action" roles (Weaver 2008: 5).

3.7 Summary

In this chapter I have described the main theoretical frameworks for the study of International Organizations and hypocrisy. Theorists argue that organizations tend to display hypocrisy when faced with conflicting pressures and demands from their external environment. This may take the form of *organized hypocrisy*, when organizations comply with existing norms through symbolic action while violating the same norms through actual behavior. In the case of *the organization of hypocrisy*, the organization might incorporate these inconsistent demands from its environment into organizational structures and processes, creating a situation where separate structures can tend to conflicting demands. Since International Organizations depend on their external environment for survival, hypocrisy may be a functional and necessary feature of the workings of an organization in a world where such conflicting demands exist.

Chapter 4: "Women, Peace and Security" in DPKO

4.1 Introduction

Many women's advocates and activists celebrated the unanimous adoption of UNSC Resolution 1325 as a historical breakthrough for the recognition of women's role in the prevention and solution of armed conflict, of the ways in which conflict affects women and men differently, and how the needs of men and women therefore need to be addressed specifically (see Anderlini 2007; Cockburn 2007; Tryggestad 2009; Whitworth 2007). However, since its adoption, many have criticized the resolution and its implementation, as well as agencies or actors responsible. I will go through some of that critique here, after briefly introducing Resolution 1325 and its significance in the UN and international politics.

4.2 Putting "Women, Peace and Security" on the UN Agenda

There are four areas in which Resolution 1325 calls upon member states and all parties to take action: First, to promote the participation of women in decision-making and peace processes; second, to integrate gender perspectives and training in peacekeeping; third, to protect women in armed conflict; and fourth, to mainstream gender issues in UN reporting systems and programmes related to conflict and peacebuilding (Bellamy and Williams 2010: 361).

Since its unanimous adoption in 2000, Resolution 1325 has been followed by several related resolutions. Resolutions 1820 (2008), 1888 (2009), 1889 (2009), and 1960 (2010), all relate to the issue area of "women, peace and security". The importance and the "groundbreaking nature" of resolution 1325 lies in the fact that it was the first formal recognition of women's

role in matters of peace and security, and it also linked what have traditionally been regarded as "soft" issues with hard security issues (Anderlini 2007: 7; Tryggestad 2009: 542). As described by Tryggestad (2009: 542) this happened in "a particular historical context in UN affairs as well as international relations more generally."

The process leading up to its adoption was one of advocacy and knowledge creation, with important actors including academics, a transnational advocacy network of women's and human rights' NGOs, a group of member states, a UN inter-agency network of women's advocates, and a strong lobby of individual women's advocates from NGOs and from within the UN system (Tryggestad 2009: 539-540). A series of conferences on women's issues were organized between 1975 and 1995, and the 1995 Beijing Conference, which resulted in the Beijing Platform of Action, is regarded as one of the most important precursors to the adoption of Resolution 1325 as it was the first to make women and armed conflict a priority issue area. Other important conferences include the Beijing + 5, and the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna (Tryggestad 2009). In the 41st session of the Commission on the Status of Women (CSW) in 1997, resolutions were adopted on mainstreaming the gender perspective into all policies and programmes in the United Nations system, and a definition of gender mainstreaming was agreed upon:

> Gender mainstreaming is the process of assessing the implications for women and men of any planned action, including legislation, policies and programmes, in all areas and at all levels, and as a strategy for making women's as well as men's concerns and experiences an integral dimension of the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and programmes in all political, economic and social spheres so that women and men benefit equally and inequality is not perpetuated. The ultimate goal is to achieve gender equality. *(ECOSOC 1997/2)*

DPKO has been subject to major changes and strategic reform over the last 20 years. Since the Cold War, UN peacekeeping operations have taken on larger mandates and have developed into what is usually referred to as multifunctional peace operations. These include a larger degree of statebuilding, peacebuilding, humanitarian relief and development work (Bellamy and Williams 2010). As a result of this changing nature in UN peacekeeping, Boutros-Ghali's *Agenda for Peace* (1992) and the *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations* (2000), the "Brahimi report", addressed the new challenges of

comprehensive and multifunctional peace operations. While these reports seemed to ignore the gender perspective, work on this issue was still going on within the UN system. A study on "Mainstreaming a Gender Perspective in Multidimensional Peace Support Operations" originated within DPKO in cooperation with the Office of the Special Adviser of Gender Issues (OSAGI). This study was discussed at a workshop in Namibia in March 2000 and resulted in the Windhoek Declaration and the Namibia Plan of Action. These documents were presented to the Security Council during Namibia's Security Council Presidency later that year, resulting in the adoption of Resolution 1325. Namibia thus assumed the political leadership of putting the issues of "women, peace and security" on the UN agenda. Other particularly active member states were Bangladesh, Canada, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the Nordic countries. These member states were instrumental in funding many of the meetings and seminars on issues of women, peace and security that were organized by the NGO community, with whom they worked closely. The NGO community became very important in the process of providing the members of the Security Council with information about the issue area (Tryggestad 2009). This also reflects a special characteristic of Resolution 1325, being one of the very few with a civil society movement behind it (Cockburn 2007: 143).

It should be noted that Resolution 1325 lacks mechanisms for ratification, compliance or verification. It is of a noncoercive nature, but carries a normative imperative for future behavior. While it can be argued that the recognition of Resolution 1325 has been primarily at the rhetorical level, "women, peace and security has emerged as an issue area that can no longer be overlooked by either the UN or its member states" (Tryggestad 2009: 552). While a large part of the literature on Resolution 1325 remains critical towards the resolution and its implementation, Torunn Tryggestad (2009) offers a somewhat more optimistic account by focusing on the normative and political implications of the entry of women's issues on the UN security agenda. However, she maintains that "actual inclusion of women into strategic thinking and policy development is still dependent on the lobbying of dedicated norm entrepreneurs among member states, UN bureaucrats, and non-governmental organizations" (Tryggestad 2010).

4.3 Critics of the Resolution and its Implementation

Since my study builds on the assumption that there is a gap between talk and action, it is necessary to go through some of the main criticism in more detail here. I will first consider some of the feminist criticism raised against Resolution 1325, before moving on to the critique more directly pointed at the (lack of) implementation and the UN system in general, and DPKO in particular, which relates more to my research questions.

4.3.1 Feminist critique

Sandra Whitworth (2007) focuses on the internal culture and masculinity of military culture as obstacles to implementation of Resolution 1325. Writing from a critical feminist perspective, she does not emphasize the need for the UN to live up to its rhetoric, but how it must change the understandings of "women, peace and security" which have been produced by the UN and feminists that have engaged with the UN on these issues (Withworth 2007: 18). This is a concern shared by many feminist scholars, who are critical of the image of women as victims, and of the way the UN has been able to establish certain understandings of women, and by so doing, silencing other understandings that are less adaptable to the way the UN system works with these issues (Cockburn 2007; Pratt and Richter-Devloe 2011; Shepherd 2011). Some have argued that the focus in 1325 on armed conflict, as opposed to other forms of structural violence, marginalizes discussion on those other structural factors that are an obstacle to women's agency (Shepherd 2011). Cynthia Cockburn describes how some elements of Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF), a prominent member of the NGO community that was central to the process of getting the issues in Resolution 1325 onto the agenda of the Security Council, were less satisfied with the way the resolution turned out. With only vague mention of women's role in preventing war and no mention at all of ending war in itself, the resolution did not resonate with WILPF's explicitly feminist and anti-militarist stand. Resolution 1325 further neglected to address the "gender regime that causes women's victimization in war and their exclusion from peace processes" (Cockburn 2007: 147-148).

Sandra Whitworth is also concerned with the role of individual states, in the way that their self-understandings has contributed to legitimize missions and national militaries. The critique is directed at the behavior of national soldiers in peacekeeping missions, and the

crisis of masculinity that emerges when the image of a peacekeeper is fundamentally at odds with the roles soldiers are expected, and created, to perform (Withworth 2007: 86). I would argue that this relates to the operational critique I will discuss in detail below, as it considers the role of peacekeepers deployed by member states.

4.3.2 Institutional criticism: Lack of coherence and commitment

Elisabeth Porter (2007: 190-191) writes that mandates made explicit in Resolution 1325 are not systematically implemented, and adequate implementation is an enormous challenge given the lack of funding and political will. She also states that the remaining challenges of the Resolution lies in the weakness of the language of the Resolution, the lack of political will among member states, and that most people do not know that it exists. She stresses that there is a need for specific targets and benchmarks to monitor and evaluate the implementation of Resolution 1325 (Porter 2007: 19).

Angela Raven-Roberts (2005) gives an elaborate critique of the UN/DPKO and their inability to "walk the walk". Her work builds on her experience as a programme manager in DPKO, and she rates the lack of conceptual coherence, a bias against gender equality within the UN, and a lack of effective systems of management and evaluation as main obstacles to gender mainstreaming in the UN (Raven-Roberts 2005: 43-44). The lack of conceptual coherence is described as the problem of several discourses on gender and peacekeeping existing at the same time without concern regarding coherence in policy. Further, the number of UN agencies involved in peacekeeping, humanitarian and development work mean that policies for UN interventions, including those concerned with gender issues, come from many parts of the UN and are not coordinated and agreed on across different departments.

According to Sanam N. Anderlini, a "lack of clarity at normative level contributes to lack of effective implementation" (Anderlini 2007: 197). Anderlini (2007: 193) identifies three weaknesses of the international system in her effort to explain the lack of implementation; the normative and conceptual challenges, institutional and structural issues, and what she calls the "Triple-A Syndrome". Contextualizing her argument in a wider normative setting, she explains how the "women, peace and security" agenda is caught between minimalist and maximalist notions of peace which have both been part of the UN system since the beginning. Despite the increased focus on human security in the UN system, she argues that the

normative shift towards a more people centred concept of security has not been made despite its apparent advantages. She further argues that the UN system is driven by its member states agendas and not necessarily the needs of their citizens, and thus traditional state and national security paradigms continue to dominate (Anderlini 2007: 193-196). The "Triple-A Syndrome", of *apathy*, *ad hoc practice* and *amnesia*, also refers to institutional and structural issues in the international system and in the UN. Anderlini describes apathy as the commitment gap shown through inaction and lack of leadership despite rhetorical commitment and policies produced. Focusing on the progress that is being made, she makes the argument that this progress is characterized by ad hoc practice and of not being mainstreamed into the activities of the programs or institutions. Here she also points at the role of donors in perpetuating ad hoc practice when they are not consistent in their strategies towards including a gender perspective in all their interactions with the UN system or other agents. Finally, amnesia reflects the way good practices get lost through a lack of strong documentation, and the use of short-term consultants who take knowledge with them as they leave (Anderlini 2007: 213-218).

The commitment gap described by Anderlini is also apparent in other parts of the literature, and can be seen in the context of Tryggestad's argument of how actual inclusion of the women, peace and security agenda is dependent on dedicated norm entrepreneurs. Porter (2007: 190) also maintains that women remain under-represented in the institutional, formal mechanisms of peace negotiations and security enhancement, and are absent or marginalized from negotiating tables, political decision-making opportunities and senior policy and judicial advisory positions. She states that "these problems exist within the UN itself", highlighting the small number of female Special Representatives of the Secretary-General. In her description of the internal culture and the workings of the UN system, and particularly DPKO, Raven-Roberts (2005) maintains that there exists a bias against gender equality, as well as ignorance and misconceptions of gender issues. Jobs within emergency and especially militarized environments are by many at the UN seen as "naturally male". Raven-Roberts observes that there has been an emphasis on bringing ex-military personnel into humanitarian and peacekeeping work, as well as bitterness among some male staff that their years of experience and chances for promotion are becoming more limited as a result of increased attention to gender issues. She also claims that there is a sense among some staff members not only of being above national or international laws, but also to renounce codes and principles established by the organization. Staff for UN peacekeeping missions are recruited for specific

missions, seconded, or posted to the field when necessary, or when not wanted elsewhere. Although formal career structures and systems of recruitment exist, these are often overlooked in the urgency of establishing a mission. Time constraints, as well as the high personnel turnover resulting from the temporary nature of missions and the insecurity of jobs due to unpredictability in funding, work against gender equality and mainstreaming in DPKO. These factors also work against making sure and establishing procedures for staff receiving good training and briefings before missions, and the institutionalization of policies in their aftermath, which relates to the criticism of lacking systems for evaluation and management. In this area there is also the problem with the lack of systems of accountability for managers, and the way many tasks in the field are often subcontracted to NGOs without good systems for monitoring and evaluation, and thus the absence of accountability mechanisms (Raven-Roberts 2005: 48-56). Similar arguments can be found in Anderlini's work, where she too identifies institutional challenges such as cases where "differing interpretations of 'gender mainstreaming' create confusion and impede progress" (Anderlini 2007: 202). She also identifies the problem of what she calls the "cafeteria approach", where individuals select elements they deem important, regardless of the policies and mandates that direct them (Anderlini 2007: 198).

4.4 Summary

When considering the relevant literature we see that the feminist critique is of a more conceptual character, while the institutional criticism can be largely seen as referring to a lack of coherence and commitment on behalf of the UN, mainly in terms of lack of political will and obstacles rooted in UN organizational features and internal culture. Anderlini does consider the role of member states, but the gravity of her argument rests on organizational features particular to the UN. My analysis will therefore focus on the factors and actors outside the UN/DPKO, and how they may affect the implementation process. However, in a situation where many actors and factors are at play, it cannot be so easy as to say that member states dictate the actions of the DPKO. Thus, some sort of autonomy on behalf of the organization will have to be accounted for. My focus will therefore be on the results of the interplay between all these different factors and actors on the process of implementing Resolution 1325.

Chapter 5: Empirical Findings

This chapter outlines the empirical findings gathered through interviews, observation and document analysis that will create the background for further discussion in Chapter 6. I will go through each level of analysis separately here, before moving on to an integrated approach in the analysis. The first section outlines the bureaucracy, where emphasis is given to informants' experiences of gender mainstreaming at UN headquarters. The second is about the field mission, focusing on issues that are unique to this level and that possibly cause "friction" in its relationship to other levels, and to the implementation of Resolution 1325. The member state is the topic for the third section, which outlines Norway's particular priorities and efforts in promoting the "women, peace and security" agenda in DPKO.

5.1 The Bureaucracy: DPKO Headquarters

This section seeks to map the efforts of implementing Resolution 1325 in DPKO headquarters. It outlines the priorities and challenges in relation to the implementation process as seen from headquarters and describes the experiences of DPKO staff when it comes to mainstreaming gender perspectives, as well as addressing the role of headquarters in relation to the other levels of analysis. It aims to describe what influences the priorities of the work in headquarters, and which pressures are more pertinent at this level of analysis.

The first office for peacekeeping activities in the UN was the Office for Special Political Affairs, created in 1961 by then Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld. The expansion in peacekeeping missions and the complexity of operations after the Cold War led to the creation of the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) in 1992 as part of a restructuring of the UN Secretariat. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon proposed a more radical restructuring in 2007, which provided DPKO its current form (Bellamy and Williams 2010).

DPKO has 4 offices; Office of Operations, Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions (OROLSI), Office of Military Affairs (OMA), and Policy, Evaluation and Training Division (DPET). All of these have subdivisions and units, and the Gender Advisory Team is located within the Policy, Evaluation and Training Division. The Department of Field Support (DFS), closely linked to DPKO, is responsible for logistics and recruitment. While the Office of Operations has direct oversight with operations, others mainly have a policy and advisory role.

A range of reports, policy, and guidance represents some of the efforts towards the implementation of Resolution 1325 in the UN and in DPKO. Since the adoption of Resolution 1325 in 2000, the Secretary-General has issued twelve reports[1], and the Security Council has released nine presidential statements on "women, peace and security". Four additional resolutions on "women, peace and security" have later been adopted by the Security Council, all unanimously[2]. Gender concerns have been part of all mission mandates since 2004 (Bellamy and Williams 2010: 373), and a system-wide action plan for the implementation of Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) was created in 2005 and published by the Secretary-General. DPKO adopted a policy directive and an action plan in 2006, and has created operational guidelines for the implementation of a gender perspective for the police and the military. Further, a 10-year impact study on the implementation of Resolution 1325 was published by DPKO in 2010. A comprehensive set of indicators were produced and released in the Secretary-General's report S/2010/498 in 2010. On the occasion of the tenth anniversary of Resolution 1325, the Security Council requested the Secretary-General to propose a strategic framework to guide the UN's implementation of the resolution over the next ten years which resulted in the *The UN Strategic Results Framework on Women, Peace and Security 2011-2020*.

Quite a few structural changes have also taken place as part of the implementation of Resolution 1325 and the "women, peace and security" agenda in DPKO. The first Gender Adviser in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations was appointed in August 2004, while the first staff in gender affairs was deployed in 1999, to Kosovo and East Timor (Interview

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[1] Eleven reports on "Women and Peace and Security", and one report on Conflict-related Sexual Violence (2012).
[2] UNSC Resolution 1820 (2008), UNSC Resolution 1888 (2009), UNSC Resolution 1889 (2009), UNSC Resolution 1960 (2010).

2012a). After the appointment of a gender adviser in 2004, a Gender Team was created in the Peacekeeping Best Practices Section. All units in headquarters are supposed to have Gender Focal Points. A Gender Task Force with representatives from all DPKO components was established to monitor progress on the action plan created in 2006. DPKO now has Gender Units in all integrated missions, and gender focal points in the smaller, traditional missions such as in Cyprus, Syria, Jordan, Pakistan, and Kosovo. The creation of the positions of Women Protection Advisers was requested by the Security Council in Resolution 1888 (2009), and pending implementation in missions at the time of writing. The Gender Advisory Team at DPKO headquarters currently has five officers; the head of office, two officers working on empowerment issues, one gender trainer, and one who works on sexual violence. Their role is to advise the people working in the field on gender issues. In the field, DPKO has a total of 120 people working on gender issues. According to one of my informants, operations are usually another department, but the gender team in DPKO works directly with the field officers on a daily basis. In smaller missions, the gender team works with the gender focal points. They work internally in giving advice to the field, and the SRSG of every mission. In missions, they hold senior management meetings with all senior management on how gender should be addressed. The mission usually has a task force with a focal point from each section, and they then work with the focal points to ensure the integration of a gender perspective in their respective section (Interview 2012a). The Gender Advisory Team in headquarters does not tell the field officers what to do, but they create policy and guidance, with input from the field that should enable and facilitate implementation on the ground. In this sense, they provide a supportive role. It was also noted that it is not the mission's gender advisers that should implement issues related to Resolution 1325 in the field. Their job is to facilitate, aid, and organize so that people in the field can integrate the policies into their work (Interview 2012e).

DPKO is located within the UN Secretariat, and it is one of the UN entities responsible for carrying out the mandate outlined in the UN Charter of maintaining international peace and security. This daunting task contributes to a perception of peacekeeping as a noble function, and influences the people who work for this purpose and thus the organizational culture. This picture can only be sustained externally if the UN is seen to be delivering on its tasks and fulfilling its mandates. UN peacekeeping has sustained several blows in this regard, notably when not intervening in Rwanda in 1994. This event sparked a series of debates about reforms of UN peacekeeping. The extensive criticism outlined in Chapter 4 should also be seen as a

reaction to the perception of the organization acting in contrast to its mandates and organizational principles. "Women, peace and security" has become a part of the mandate of DPKO through the adoption of Resolution 1325 and other resolutions on the issue area, as well as through the mandates given to all missions. The next section is about how DPKO has worked to integrate gender perspectives, and what the impressions and experiences of my informants were on that issue.

5.1.1 Informants experiences of gender mainstreaming in DPKO HQ

The production of policy and guidelines was an area highlighted when informants spoke about progress. Many informants also expressed their content with the efforts of DPKO to mainstream gender perspectives. As already mentioned, DPKO has been very active in producing policy and guidance material on the implementation of Resolution 1325 in the past few years, and it was also clear that DPKO staff were satisfied with the organization's achievements in this regard. One informant in DPKO said that it was now time to take stock of achievements, to monitor and analyze how all the tools that have been produced are being applied. It was also said that taking the step from having a framework in place to applying that framework is very difficult (Interview 2012a). On the other hand, many expressed views similar to an informant from the Norwegian Government: "They [DPKO] have to do what they are asked by the Security Council on paper, but the real commitment is not necessarily there among all their staff, including at high level, and thus it is not certain that they prioritize implementation as much as we wish they did" (Interview 2012m). Almost all interviewees questioned the commitment of UN and DPKO personnel. They spoke of attitudes and cultural issues, and skepticism to gender issues and gender equality. One informant said that there are very few who will argue directly against the contents of the "women, peace and security" agenda, however many are holding back and some are concerned that it interferes with internal affairs (Interview 2012m).

An issue that was mentioned by several informants was the actual expertise of the people who get gender in their title. It seemed that many get gender in their functional title because it's political, without having or receiving any training on gender (Interview 2012c; Interview 2012f). Many also questioned the commitment of senior leadership in the organization, concerned that "it is not driven from the top or the core of the organization" (Interview 2012m). This lack of accountability in senior management was an issue brought up

repeatedly, both in headquarters as well as for the missions. One informant insisted that there was a problem of making it "trickle down" the organization; after having done a lot in headquarters, implementation in the field was now an area that needed to be prioritized (Interview 2012i).

Members of the Gender Advisory Team at DPKO also expressed being met with resistance in their own organization. One of my informants in the Gender Advisory Team told me that merely saying that they have a policy was usually very ineffective. Convincing people to integrate gender perspectives into their work often consisted of explaining why it would make their job easier if they do so, which requires the gender adviser to know something about everything that gender covers (Interview 2012a). This refers not only to resistance, but also a lack of understanding and knowledge of what Resolution 1325 entails. "When you focus on only increasing the numbers of women, you forget that it is a man's responsibility as well to do the work around gender" (Interview 2012a). According to a former member of the Gender Advisory Team, "there was some confusion about the tasks of the gender unit" (Interview 2012e). One informant told me that "gender is challenging to work with because there are so many other challenges and needs all the time which makes it hard to raise your voice and tell people to prioritize this" (Interview 2012e).

Challenges in access to decision-makers and lack of political will and accountability in senior management was also an important aspect, as well as limitations in funding and human resources. Since 2010, DPKO and UN Women has held Global Open Days in the missions, where women are invited to talk about their concerns and address the leadership of the mission. According to one informant, the initiative arose because missions lacked outreach to communities, women's organizations, and the grassroots, who are often brought to the Security Council but tend to be blocked from accessing mission leadership (Interview 2012f). Open Days happened in most missions in 2010 and resulted in a report to show what women ask for, but according to one informant in DPKO, the formal voicing of these concerns has had little effect. "The concerns of women in post conflict countries are the same every year. And every year the senior management at the UN does not do anything about them" (Interview 2012a).

Another example of resistance is the inclusion of gender concerns in Technical Assessment Mission reports. One informant explained how gender was often left out of these reports, so it

was argued that there should be a gender expert or a person responsible for the inclusion of gender issues on the team. However, since there are so many thematic issues in the missions it is hard to argue that gender is more important than other issues, and if gender was to have its own expert on the team so should every other thematic issue or section. Obviously this was not feasible, and as my informant explained, "that was used against us" (Interview 2012e). Another challenge brought up was that while the field was always asking for more staff, headquarters found that difficult to accommodate. According to one informant, "constantly asking for more staff when you do not have concrete results to show looks less credible, and a problem with the work in gender is that it produces little concrete results except on paper, and it is difficult to measure" (Interview 2012e).

When speaking to people in DPKO who were not attached to the Gender Advisory Team, their approach to the implementation of gender perspectives differed from that of gender advisers or Norwegian Government officials that I spoke with. One of my informants in DPKO admitted that compared to other priorities "it often comes in second", and said that "you have to pick your battles". Although emphasizing the importance of gender issues, the same informant also said that "implementation of activities on the ground will always lead to complex challenges, and when faced with operational dilemmas national ownership has primary importance, and comes before many other key priorities, among them gender" (Interview 2012c). A former DPKO staff member also admitted that it was easy to forget the gender perspective when working on other issues in other settings (Interview 2012e). This shows that there are many things to take into consideration regarding the priorities that must be assessed in the daily work of UN staff, as priorities may vary across the different sections and units in DPKO depending on the work they do, their goals and aims, as well as the specific setting. I will discuss this further in Chapter 6.

5.1.2 Setting the agenda

The mandates and resolutions were given as the "bible" for the work of the Gender Advisory Team in DPKO headquarters (Interview 2012a). I got the impression that the work in headquarters is strongly guided by the provisions of the Security Council, and requests from member states. I was also given the impression that when the Security Council requests something, DPKO is obligated to do it. DPKO staff remarked several ways member states might influence their work, including the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations

(C34), which was highlighted as a main priority setting body. Member states may request specific things or actions through the final document, which again influences the work in DPKO. One of my informants in DPKO also said that merely by asking for work to be done on a specific issue area, member states can influence the work of DPKO (Interview 2012a). Another important way member states were said to influence the work of DPKO staff was by funding specific projects. I was told that if they have a project, they might approach member states and ask if they are interested in supporting that initiative. Sometimes meetings with member states where DPKO informs them of their work and any new initiatives may result in member states getting involved, and this may result in funding opportunities (Interview 2012b). Headquarters hosts an annual gender advisers meeting in New York where gender advisers from all missions come together and discuss issues and come up with some priority areas to work on for the next year. These are included in a report, but this is not a binding document in the same sense as Security Council Resolutions, C34 report, or policy directive, and is often forgotten when faced with new and pressing challenges (Interview 2012e).

UN Action Against Sexual Violence in Conflict, the united effort of 13 UN entities with the goal of ending sexual violence in conflict, was also mentioned as an influence. One informant expressed concern that there was a tendency that some heavy contributors regarded sexual violence as more important than other aspects in Resolution 1325, and that this might have a negative effect on the overall implementation of the resolution (Interview 2012e). The issue area of "women, peace and security" rests in several departments, which leads to claims to ownership, authority and legitimacy. Notably, DPKO does not do programming, only quick impact projects (Interview 2012f). One of my informants explained how "there seems to be some turf battle among different UN entities" (Interview 2012i). Another informant explained that while activities are carried out by other agencies in integrated missions these are still reported as part of mission activities, and a common complaint among other UN agencies is that DPKO may take credit for these activities (Interview 2012f). Defining policy and priority areas is thus also influenced by other actors within the UN System, and this shows the variety of ways different actors may affect what happens on the issue area of "women, peace and security" in DPKO.

One informant also stated that "sometimes there seems to be a bit of a disconnect between Security Council and member states requests" (Interview 2012b), referring to how the Women Protection advisers have been requested since 2009, but at the same time missions are

being downsized. A general remark was that they were constantly being asked to do more, but with less resources, and that funding issues represented an influence on what they were able to achieve (Interview 2012b). A representative from the NGO community told me that they struggle very hard to influence the Security Council, which remains non-transparent. "We push on those concrete points that are coming from the field, that are coming from our colleagues, our members, who are saying that this is what the situation is in the field, this is what is really necessary in terms of the 'women, peace and security' agenda […] and what comes out on the other side is the result of a political discussion" (Interview 2012o). We see that there is friction between the Security Council and the field, as well as between the member states, the Security Council, and DPKO. The Security Council is constituted of member states, but it is a forum in which they all have to reach a large degree of consensus, and it is also of great importance for its members to have a say in what comes out as a result because its decisions are authoritative. How individual members states operate outside of that context may thus differ from Security Council demands and decisions, which causes "friction" in member states' interactions with DPKO. DPKO operates in a complex external environment, a characteristic commonly attributed to IOs. The increased scale and complexity of peacekeeping operations has increased the range of demands and pressures to which DPKO needs to rise to address, including promoting international peace and security, human rights, and the protection of civilians, as well as gender mainstreaming. DPKO must be seen as complying with mandates and international standards and norms in order to keep receiving support, both financially and politically.

5.1.3 Summary

In this section we have seen that a range of structural and rhetorical shifts have taken place in headquarters. At the same time, many of the same issues were brought up as central to the critical literature reviewed in the previous chapter. Tensions between the field and headquarters were revealed, as the field continued asking for more staff without having concrete results to show. Gender issues compete for attention with other issues that are also important, and priorities may vary among staff and across units. National ownership was brought up as an important issue that took priority over other issues. Different actors within the UN system also influence policy and priority areas, and this sometimes leads to competing claims of ownership and authority. The requests coming from member states and the Security

Council may not always be aligned, and staff experienced receiving conflicting demands in this respect.

5.2 The Field Mission: United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI)

"Côte d'Ivoire has so many problems, this [sexual violence] is just one of the many" (Interview 2012d). As this statement illustrates, staff in missions are faced with different challenges that affects their work everyday. They cannot possibly address them all at once, and must necessarily make priorities in order to be able to carry out their work. In this section I will outline some of the challenges and pressures faced by field missions on the ground, specifically UNOCI, and how they relate to the implementation of Resolution 1325, to show why there may be differences in how needs and priorities are defined between headquarters and the field.

The United Nations has been present in Côte d'Ivoire since 2003. The mandate was first given as a political mission, but was expanded to a peacekeeping mission by Security Council Resolution 1528 in 2004, establishing The United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI). UNOCI was deployed to monitor the implementation of the 2003 peace agreement that ended the Ivorian civil war. A comprehensive renewal of the mandate was done in Resolution 1739 (2007). UNOCI's current mandate consists of monitoring of the cessation of hostilities and movements of armed groups; disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, repatriation and resettlement; disarmament and dismantling of militias; operations of identification of the population and registration of voters; reform of the security sector; protection of United Nations personnel, institutions and civilians; monitoring of the arms embargo; support for humanitarian assistance; support for the redeployment of state administration; support for the organization of open, free, fair and transparent elections; assistance in the field of human rights; public information; and law and order. In addition, as a provision of the Ouagadougou Peace Agreement as of March 2007, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) of UNOCI is mandated to "certify that all stages of the electoral process provide all the necessary guarantees for the holding of open, free, fair and transparent presidential and legislative elections in accordance with international standards" in Resolution 1765 (2007).

While the original mandate outlined in Resolution 1528 (2004), reaffirmed Resolution 1325 and made references to the needs of women, children, and girls in the fields of disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, repatriation and resettlement, and assistance in the field of human rights, Resolution 1739 (2007) also gives specific reference to Resolution 1325 in paragraph 7: "*Urges* UNOCI to take into account the rights of women and of gender considerations as set out in Security Council resolution 1325 as a cross-cutting issue, including through consultation with local and international women's groups, and requests the Secretary-General, where appropriate, to include in his reporting to the Security Council progress on gender mainstreaming throughout UNOCI and all other aspects relating to the situation of women and girls, especially in relation to the need to protect them from gender-based violence". According to my informant in DPKO, UNOCI has always had a gender advisor, and currently has a team of four people (Interview 2012a). At the time of this fieldwork, DPKO was recruiting a senior gender adviser for UNOCI, a position that had been vacant for approximately a year prior to that (Interview 2012d).

5.2.1 Challenges at the field level

In order to understand the complex environment in which UNOCI carries out its mandate, I will give a brief description of the challenges posed to peace and security in Côte d'Ivoire. A key issue in Côte d'Ivoire has been identification process and preparing for elections. Côte d'Ivoire has a long history of immigration from neighboring countries, particularly Mali, Guinea and Burkina Faso. This dates back to the colonial period, when workers from Burkina Faso were first brought as forced labor for cocoa plantations. The continuation and scale of immigration since the 1960s illustrate Côte d'Ivoire's status as an economic "hub" of the region. Linguistic and ethnic groups are largely concentrated geographically, often in proximity to related groups in neighboring countries. Felix Houphouët-Boigny, president from 1960 until his death in 1993, originated from the region first planted with cocoa by French colonial planters and Ivoirian planters from the 1930s. His ability to exercise political influence from the 1940s was due to the wealth accumulated by some of these planters. His follower, Henri Konan Bedié, also originates from the same area, which has given this area a sense of natural political centralization. Even though Côte d'Ivoire's history of immigration is long and complex, and many former immigrants have spent generations living as Ivoirians, there is a tendency towards categorizing people living in the Northern part of the country as "immigrants" as a means of delegitimizing them as "real" citizens (McGovern 2011: 11-14).

President Felix Houphouët-Boigny encouraged Africans from other countries to contribute to and benefit from the wealth of his country. By the late 1980s, the economy was suffering due to falling cocoa prices on the world market. At his death in 1993, a succession struggle between the President of the National Assembly, Henri Konan Bedié, and Prime Minister Alassane Ouattara over who was to assume the position as interim leader of the country sowed the seeds of *Ivoirité*; the pseudo-intellectual justification to an instrumentalized xenophobia that was meant to exclude Ouattara from politics. Bedié became the interim leader, and the next year presidential elections were held with Ouattara's candidacy excluded, resulting in Bedié being elected president in 1994 (McGovern 2011: 16-17). The politics of *Ivoirité* also excluded a large part of the population from Ivorian nationality, and created tensions between the different groups in the country leading to disputes over citizenship and land ownership. As a result, many people have been without identification papers for a very long time, and would therefore be excluded from voting in any elections. Identification of the population was thus a high priority before elections could be held.

Bédié also started changing the role of the army by replacing soldiers by technocrats, and sidelining officers with ties to his political opponents. A feeling of marginalization among senior officers and fear of exclusion and discrimination among many junior officers brought on a coup d'état lead by General Güei in 1999. Güei added Article 35 to the Ivoirian constitution, which requires both parents of anyone running for president to be Ivoirian citizens, rather than just one as had been the outlined in constitution until then. This excluded both Bedié and Ouattara as opponents, leaving only Laurent Gbagbo as his main rival for the 2000 elections. Gbagbo won the elections and became president, but only after a series of violence between groups supporting Güei, Ouattara and Gbagbo (McGovern 2011: 18-19). Another coup attempt in 2002 led to what is known as the first civil war, which resulted in a de facto partition of the country with the national forces concentrated in the Southern part while rebel groups, under the *Forces Nouvelles*, were in control of the northern territories. The 2002 civil war that caused UN engagement erupted again in 2005 when Gbagbo launched airstrikes against rebels. Elections were again postponed and the 2007 Ouagadougou peace agreement secured the leader of the *Forces Nouvelles*, Guillaume Soro, the position of prime Minister in the Government. Elections kept being postponed due to the ongoing identification process and lack of demobilization and demilitarization of militia groups (Boutellis 2011). The pressure to hold elections was increasing, and in June 2010, Security Council Resolution

1933 called for progress in all areas, but gave priority to holding elections and completing the identification process.

UNOCIs mandate was last extended until 31 July 2012 in Resolution 2000 (2011). During the post-election crisis, a stronger mandate was given to UNOCI as a result of the escalation of violence in the country and the rising toll of civilian casualties. Resolution 1975 (2011) tasked the UNOCI, along with French troops, with "impartially implementing its mandate, to use all necessary means to carry out its mandate to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence [...] including to prevent the use of heavy weapons against the civilian population". UNOCI also received assistance through the re-deployment of troops from the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), mandated though Security Council Resolutions 1951 (2010) and 1968 (2011). This also included the re-deployment of two military utility helicopters and three armed helicopters. This is rare, according to one of my informants in DPKO, since member states are often reluctant to contribute armed helicopters due to their high economic cost (Interview 2012d). UN peacekeeping operations usually have a very small military component compared to NATO operations, for example, which means that UN operations may sometimes face greater operational challenges (Interview 2012j).

Processes of disarmament and demobilization and security sector reform have been especially challenging in Côte d'Ivoire. "The lack of political will on the part of the government and the failure to build trust between the parties are often cited as the primary reasons for the failure to integrate security forces and launch a successful DDR process ahead of the elections" (Boutellis 2011: 6). This failure to address the issues of a divided army and a divided country before the elections is by many regarded as the main reason for the crisis (see Boutellis 2011). Also highly problematic is that the justice system is not impartial with corruption endemic. The justice system and the rule of law more or less collapsed during the crisis, with prisons being shut down which allowed prisoners to escape. The issue of impunity has been on the agenda for a long time, and only increased during the crisis. The proliferation of arms is also a big problem in Côte d'Ivoire. This is also a problem in relation to sexual and gender-based violence, and after the crisis humanitarian organizations reported that sexual violence continued, and that there was even a normalization of sexual violence against women and girls in the western region (International Rescue Committee 2011). There has been an increase in criminal activity since the beginning of the crisis, and an escalation in reported cases of sexual violence. The report of the Secretary-General on conflict-related sexual

violence released in January 2012 (S/2012/33) identifies perpetrators from several parties involved in the conflict in Côte d'Ivoire.

One of my informants in DPKO said that sexual violence was never a big issue in Côte d'Ivoire before the post-election crisis, except in the western part of the country, and it was not used as a weapon in war, rather it was a question of lack of discipline and impunity for perpetrators (Interview 2012d). Although the Ivoirian Government claims that abuse is committed not by soldiers but by people who have just picked up a uniform and a gun, my informant insisted that discipline within the armed forces is a big issue. There were also isolated incidents during the crisis where women associated with President Ouattara were targeted. Reporting on women and sexual violence had increased since the crisis (Interview 2012d).

A problem that was brought up by several informants was the limited funding for ongoing training, as well as follow-up and evaluation, because "donors are more likely to fund short term things" (Interview 2012f). Many informants mentioned high personnel turnover as a challenge in the field, and one informant raised the concern that without ongoing training "you have no way of evaluating how this impacts on how they do their job" (Interview 2012f). The UN military peacekeepers rotate every 6 months, but not on a similar cycle, so trainings need to be more frequent. Several of my informants from the Norwegian Government highlighted the role of the member states, indicating that a successful implementation of Resolution 1325 was dependent on the member states (Interview 2012i; Interview 2012k; Interview 2012l). Military, police and civilian personnel in missions are contributed by the member states for each mission, therefore the responsibility for training was often referred to as member states' responsibility, because they do pre-deployment training of troops and police (Interview 2012b).

5.2.2 Relationship with host government

The Government of Côte d'Ivoire has had a troubled relationship with the French ever since the French refused to intervene on its behalf against rebels in 2002. They did eventually intervene to stop the rebels advancing on Abidjan, but this raised tensions between France and the Government of Côte d'Ivoire, and episodes of violent clashes and anti-French protests followed (Boutellis 2011). Gbagbo also played on a discourse that the crisis was largely

caused by external influences, and UNOCI became targets of attacks during the post-election crisis following the 2010 Presidential elections.

When a peacekeeping mission is established it must be done in accordance with the principles and legal provisions established in international law and the UN Charter. The principle of request or consent must be fulfilled in order for a peacekeeping mission to be set up and deployed, and contributing countries must make resources and contingents available. Missions are mandated by the Security Council, and are then set up from headquarters. The status of a peacekeeping operation in the host country is determined by articles 104 and 105 of the UN Charter and by the 1946 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations. According to these, the host government should grant the peacekeeping operation the legal capacity and all privileges and immunities necessary for the fulfillment of its purposes. The legal status of a peacekeeping operation is similar to that of any UN agency. The principle of request or consent builds on the sovereignty of state actors in international relations, but contemporary conflicts often tend to be of an intrastate nature, demanding consent from non-state parties as well (De Brito 1997).

In a complex situation like the one in Côte d'Ivoire, there may be a perception of foreign imposed restrictions on national sovereignty. The mission has to give fair and impartial treatment to all parties, but the various parties may perceive their enemy to be under the protection of a foreign power. The mission must try to develop a constructive working relationship with both parties, which demands flexibility in that relationship. This can be especially difficult when atrocities are committed by both parties to the conflict. As one of my informants in DPKO explained, "We have to work with the realities on the ground. It is an important question whether the host government thinks it is an important issue. If the national authorities refuse something, there are limits to what we can do" (Interview 2012c). As already mentioned, the presence of a peacekeeping mission may seem as a restraint on the sovereignty of the government, because peacekeeping missions often take on tasks that are usually associated with the government. This also creates a problem for the mission, because at the same time they do not wish to relieve the host government of its responsibilities. Mandates often reflect this difficult relationship, as they often define the tasks of the mission in terms of offering support to the local government in various issues or processes.

The relationship to the host government is thus of crucial importance to the functioning and achievements of the peacekeeping mission. The relationship with the host government in Côte d'Ivoire worsened during the post-election crisis after UNOCI certified the outcome of the second round of the presidential elections, which declared President Ouattara the winner (Interview 2012d). Another problem for peacekeeping missions once on the ground is that of impartiality and neutrality, and this was a particularly delicate issue in Côte d'Ivoire during the past crisis as the UNOCI was accused of not remaining impartial. It is almost impossible for the UN to remain neutral in a situation of this kind. This dilemma became apparent after the Cold War and was consequently addressed by Lakhdar Brahimi in the "Brahimi Report" (2000): "Impartiality for such operations must therefore mean adherence to the principles of the Charter and to the objectives of a mandate that is rooted in those Charter principles. Such impartiality is not the same as neutrality or equal treatment of all parties in all cases for all time, which can amount to a policy of appeasement."

None of my informants from the Norwegian Government or the Gender Advisory Team in DPKO brought up the relationship to the host government as an important issue influencing their work or the work of DPKO. However, informants in DPKO not related to the Gender Advisory Team brought it up.

5.2.3 The Role of the SRSG

Almost all of my informants highlighted the role of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) as important for implementation and attention to gender issues in the field. They also expressed concern that senior leadership of missions is not held accountable. The SRSG is the head of the mission, and is at the same hierarchical level as the Under Secretary-General (USG) of DPKO. Informants sometimes described tensions between headquarters and the field missions as originating from issues related to the hierarchical structure of DPKO, arguably due to the large military component associated with peacekeeping. As outlined in Chapter 4, the military aspect has always been a contentious issue when it comes to the implementation of gender issues and gender mainstreaming, both in headquarters and in the field.

Many informants gave a great significance to the personal conviction of the SRSG. There was a large consensus among my informants that if the SRSG of a particular mission did not

embrace the "women, peace and security" agenda, it would not be implemented. Another aspect that was brought up in relation to implementation of gender issues in the field was the authority of the SRSG. When asked about the implementation in the field, one of my informants in DPKO said that "A strong SRSG with a good and candid relationship to the host government can make a significant impact" and described a strong SRSG as one that "understands the UN and how things work in headquarters as well as in the field, and is able to use the resources of the entire UN system and the position of the SRSG in the best way" (Interview 2012c). This was supported by the views expressed by another informant on the achievements of the SRSG of the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) in the context of the SRSG's good relationship to Liberia's president Ellen Johnson Sirleaf. "The two of them have spoken together and just look at the influence these two have had on the development of a country", highlighting the importance of the president and the SRSG getting along and having a good relationship, and adding that they were both women (Interview 2012k). President Johnsen Sirleaf's past as Director of the United Nations Development Programme's Regional Bureau for Africa, also suggests she has knowledge of the workings of the UN system. Her attention to gender issues has made her a great ally for elements within the UN working on gender, making it easier for them to pursue their agenda. This example also illustrates the importance of having a willing host government, as well as the importance of dedicated individuals willing to champion a particular cause.

A member of the Gender Advisory Team at headquarters stressed that the implementation of a mission's mandate lies under the responsibility of the SRSG, including references to gender, stating that the responsibility for gender was not in the hands of the gender team, but the SRSG (Interview 2012a). Many informants expressed a view that the aspects of a mandate concerning gender issues were subject to optional implementation and reporting on behalf of the SRSG because little demand was put forward in order to hold the SRSG accountable for these aspects of the mandate. It was a common view that gender staff in the missions faced several limitations in carrying out their daily work, or making an impact on the work of the mission. Their placement within the mission and having access to the highest levels of management were given as influential factors in this regard (Interview 2012a; Interview 2012e). One of my informants saw it as a big obstacle "that nobody is really accountable for the work, and that nobody gets access to the management that can make those decisions" (Interview 2012a). In some peacekeeping operations, the gender advisers are part of the senior management team, which means that they sit in meetings with senior management. But

according to one of my informants "more often they are not, and then they do not necessarily know what is going on" (Interview 2012e). The ability to navigate within the mission and to establish good working relationships with senior management was also mentioned as very important for gender advisers to be able to carry out their work. One informant highlighted the communicating and social skills of individuals as important in this regard, however once having established a good working relationship with individuals in senior positions it was a big problem that these would then be leaving the mission when their period of deployment ended (Interview 2012e).

Another issue that surfaced during conversations I had with informants was a tension between headquarters and the field mission. While missions are supposed to consult with headquarters when they do programming, according to one of my informants this does not always happen (Interview 2012d). The same informant also had an impression that there was "limited interaction between field and headquarters with regards to planning". Tensions were often related to hierarchy and rank, and I was told that some SRSGs are very autonomous and independent, and thus less easy to deal with from headquarters' perspective (Interview 2012e). Another issue that was mentioned was the distance between headquarters and the field, not only physically, but also to how staff in the field may feel that there is a lack of understanding coming from headquarters (Interview 2012e; Interview 2012j). Missions are supposed to report to headquarters, and the head of the mission- the SRSG, also reports to the Security Council. The Secretary General releases reports on the specific peacekeeping operation on a regular basis. However, given the high rank of the head of the mission, a lot of authority lies within the mission itself. The interaction and consultation with headquarters is thus subject to personal initiative and preference, and I was also told that each mission is different (Interview 2012b). This seems to reflect the large influence the SRSG has over the mission, but also the uniqueness of the situation in which each mission operates.

5.2.4 Summary

The peacekeeping operation in the field will necessarily face other or stronger pressures than what is felt at headquarters, especially in relation to the operational challenges, and challenges with the relationship with the host country. This special relationship sometimes results in weaker mandates, but it also creates a situation where the mission must be flexible in order to ensure its functioning and survival. Tensions between headquarters and the missions were

reflected in the role of the SRSG, who has large authority and autonomy, and can influence the mission to a large degree. This also suggests that the mission and headquarters are separate structures tending to different pressures from the external environment. There was also an element of tension regarding headquarters' distance from the field physically, but also as lacking understanding of the situation.

In the case of Côte d'Ivoire, holding elections were given priority over processes of disarmament and demobilization, and security sector reform. Addressing these issues would consequently entail addressing issues such as lack of discipline and impunity, which would be enhancing the security for women as well. Donors appear more likely to fund short-term delieverables, but nonetheless expect a big outcome. Finally, many informants highlighted the personal qualities of dedicated individuals who can communicate with management as well as partners in host government as important for successful implementation of mandates, and for ensuring adequate attention to gender issues in the field.

5.3 The Member State: Norway

In this section I will go through the priorities involved in promoting the "women, peace and security" agenda from the perspective of the Norwegian Government. I will also describe the ways in which Norway tries to influence the work of DPKO, and what strategies they may employ. This is to map the potential influence Norway may have as a member state on the priorities in DPKO, as well as how the field is defined from the perspective of the Norwegian Government. It will also assist in creating a better understanding of the external environment in which DPKO operates, as I consider the member states to be central to what constitutes that external environment.

The Nordic countries have lead the way in officially mainstreaming gender equality, and Norway is considered one of the most gender equal countries in the world (World Economic Forum 2011). Women participate almost equally with men in the workforce, in political parties, and in the government. There is broad agreement that the success of the Norwegian nation-state is largely a result of the full and active participation of women in political and economic life. Gender equality is therefore perceived as necessary to ensure sustainable economic growth and development. The Norwegian Government has close ties with the NGO community, including women's organizations. The Nordic countries were also intimately

involved in many of the processes that led up to the adoption of Resolution 1325, especially when it comes to funding many of the meetings of the NGO community that provided information to the Security Council (see also 4.2).

Gender equality and gender issues have a large focus in Norwegian foreign policy. When Norway's Foreign Minister Jonas Gahr Støre presented the Government's foreign policy priorities for the next year in a speech to the Norwegian Parliament on 14 February 2012[3], he described Norway's work on UN Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) on "women, peace and security" as a major, high-priority area in Norwegian foreign policy. According to the Norwegian Government's status report on "women, peace and security" (Departementene 2011a), bilateral development assistance for projects in conflict and post-conflict countries that seek to promote gender equality as a primary or subsidiary goal amounted to just over NOK 2 billion in 2010. In addition, contributions were made to UN Women and UN Action as well as other UN entities. In the Norwegian Government's strategic plan for "women, peace and security" 2011-2013 (Departementene 2011b), five priority areas are outlined: peace processes and peace negotiations; International operations; post-conflict situations and peacebuilding; sexual violence in conflict; and reporting and accountability. The different aspects of Norway's work on "women, peace and security" are the responsibility of four ministries. Coordinated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, this also includes the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Justice and the Police, and the Ministry of Children, Equality and Social Inclusion. Norwegian Government officials expressed that gender issues have a high priority, which is in line with the official government policy.

The Norwegian self-image as an international actor revolves around Norway being a small country and a peace nation, sharing parts of its economic surplus with other countries through aid. By contributing to the international community through the UN system, so that Norwegian interests coincide so that by pursuing its own interests, Norway is also serving the common good. Norway also supports a world order guided by rules and norms because this is what serves a small country best, and Norway's engagement in the UN can be seen as a project to create a better organized world. Norway is a strong supporter of UN reform, because a strong UN is associated with a world guided by legal principles and not military strength (Leira et al. 2007). One of my informants said that "peacekeeping is one of the UN's

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[3] See Norwegian Government Website 2012a.

most central instruments" (Interview 2012j). This can be viewed in the context of Norway as a peace nation, and as adhering to a world order guided by rules and norms. Combined with the domestic focus on gender equality, Norway's strong support and engagement with the "women, peace and security" agenda fits well into this picture.

Many informants highlighted the idea of Norway as a country leading the way by example, and as one of my informants said "it is expected of us to take a leading role on this" (Interview 2012i). I was told that the UN regards Norway as a country pushing the "women, peace and security" agenda (Interview 2012h) and one informant in the UN system also said that "my impression is of Norwegians as advocates for Resolution 1325 (Interview 2012f). The image of Norway as promoting the "women, peace and security" agenda internationally thus resonates well with informants both in the Norwegian Government and in the UN system. Norway having authority in this area was also highlighted, and one informant said that "it is a field where Norway is listened to" (Interview 2012i). Another informant from the Norwegian Government explained that "I think it also gives us legitimacy, that we can show that we are making efforts at home" (Interview 2012h). Arguably, having a focus on these issues in the Norwegian armed forces could be seen as strengthening that authority and commitment.

The Norwegian armed forces have however also struggled to implement Resolution 1325. One informant said that contrary to the impression in DPKO that gender perspectives are a core issue in the Norwegian armed forces, these issues have been largely absent (Interview 2012e). It has been a goal for the Norwegian Government to increase the number of women who participate in peacekeeping operations. All of my informants from the Norwegian Government mentioned this issue, and it was described as one out of two focus areas in their policy regarding DPKO, the other being the integration of gender perspectives, especially through training (Interview 2012i). All of them also mentioned the issue of getting the first female force commander in a UN peacekeeping operation, and that there was a Norwegian candidate that had been presented for this job. This was highlighted as a "very concrete example" of what they do. This has been a priority issue for the Norwegian Government for the past year or so, but according to one informant it is very hard to achieve because Norway has no troops on the ground (Interview 2012l). What was brought up in response to this was that it would send an important symbolic message, because all women appointed in senior positions up until this point had been appointed on the civilian side, and not in the military.

The view that women must be appointed to positions of authority was also reflected in the way some of the informants talked about the issue of recruiting more women for international operations. One informant said that it should not be about the number of women, but the positions they hold; that they need to be in positions of authority (Interview 2012k). However, when talking about the implementation of Resolution 1325 in Norway, one informant expressed concern that increasing the number of women in peace operations had become the main focus in the Norwegian Armed Forces, because it was the most tangible aspect of Resolution 1325. This had then led to an effort at changing that focus, and broaden the efforts towards the implementation of Resolution 1325 (Interview 2012h).

Another aspect often highlighted by informants was the benefits of applying a gender perspective in peacekeeping and military operations. Important issues were operational effectiveness and an enhanced understanding of the situation, which would lead to better performance and successful implementation of mandates. However, many spoke of resistance and challenges related to this, that gender perspectives were perceived as an irrelevant or disturbing element to people's work. One informant attributed these challenges to a lack of understanding of what it means and therefore difficulties with seeing the utility value of implementing gender perspectives into the work of the military, for example (Interview 2012h).

The fulfillment of mandates was described as very important by informants in the Norwegian Government, both related to the Norwegian Armed Forces acting in international operations, as well as in the Norwegian Government's political work pressing towards implementation of Resolution 1325 in DPKO. It was used as an argument for why gender perspectives should be implemented, and this seemed both politically motivated, in the sense that mandates must be fulfilled, but also operationally motivated, in that mandates will be easier, faster and more successfully implemented when gender perspectives are integrated. This is interesting when considering the large focus directed towards the Security Council, as well as the resources spent on exercising political pressure towards both the Security Council and relevant member states. If mandate implementation is an incentive towards achieving the "women, peace and security" agenda, the mandates must be there in order to be fulfilled.

5.3.1 Influence

Applying political pressure was a very important aspect when talking to employees in the Norwegian Government, and it was highlighted by all of my informants as a main strategy for advancing the "women, peace and security" agenda. Great importance was given to maintaining political pressure, bringing up the issue on every occasion and to always keep pushing the agenda. Affecting the decisions and outcomes in the Security Council was described as important, and gender perspectives were said to always be a checkpoint when negotiating new mandates. "In addition to affecting that something happens, and what happens, in the Security Council, we contribute direct support both politically and financially to parts of the system that need to deliver on this. DPKO is one example, but also UN Women" (Interview 2012m).

When it comes to efforts at directly influencing the priorities of DPKO, the Norwegian Mission to the United Nations in New York takes part in the intergovernmental processes that conducts guidance on the priorities and frameworks of DPKO, and also has a direct dialogue with the Secretariat, including meetings with top management of DPKO. According to several of my informants, they address Resolution 1325 in all relevant forums with DPKO, and it is a central issue in the statement in the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C34) and the Special Political and Decolonization (Fourth) Committee (Interview 2012l; Interview 2012m). The Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C34) is the annual session where member states come together to discuss peacekeeping policy. A very important event, the C34 was just starting up while I was doing my fieldwork in New York. The C34 consists of about 140 member states, with the goals of advancing peacekeeping policy and to direct the Secretariat/DPKO. It consists of guiding DPKO on what to do, and also reacting to what DPKO has done. The session ends with the production of a report, which several of my informants, both in DPKO and other, highlighted as an important priority setting mechanism. The report deals with all central issues regarding peacekeeping operations, and has its own section on gender and peacekeeping. Although the report is meant to direct the work of the Secretariat, it is partly instructive of how one should work with peacekeeping operations generally. Every year the Secretary-General issues a report on the implementation of the recommendations of the Special Committee. However, as one of my informants explained, "it is the Security Council that mandates peacekeeping operations, and the Security Council members do not necessarily take the report into consideration when doing that" (Interview 2012j). According to one of my informants, although it is not supposed to be like this, it

becomes a situation of "us" versus "them" between the major Troop.contributing countries (TCCs) and Police-contributing countries (PCCs), and the top financial contributors (Interview 2012n). The member states of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) act in a unitary fashion, but the support of 1325 varies among these countries. Those who take part in the C34 are often the military advisers from the different Missions to the UN. As one of my informants said, "these will probably be more concerned with what they consider important operational issues, which do not necessarily include gender" (Interview 2012j).

The budget for UN peacekeeping is allocated through a system based on the scale of assessments from the UN's regular budget. All member states contribute, but the 5 permanent members of the Security Council pay an additional charge. Member states also make voluntary contributions in addition to this (Bellamy and Williams 2010). The top financial contributors to peacekeeping operations are: The United States (27.14%), Japan (12.53%), United Kingdom (8.15%), Germany (8.02%), and France (7.55%). Norway contributed 0.87 % of the budget for peacekeeping in 2011 (Interview 2012i), which is a small contribution, however relatively large compared to the size of the population (Leira et al. 2007). Other than direct support to peacekeeping operations, member states may support specific projects, deploy seconded personnel, support positions or the production of guidelines, manuals or other materiel. Many informants in the Norwegian Government highlighted this as one of the ways Norway can influence the work of DPKO. Norway has supported the creation of guidelines and manuals in DPKO headquarters, as well as positions in DPKO and elsewhere, such as providing experts on gender issues to the field. A team of 5 Norwegian police officers, experts on sexual- and gender-based violence are deployed at the United Nations Stabilization Mission to Haiti (MINUSTAH) to contribute to awareness of the importance on the gender perspective and build gender violence competence and capacity in the Haitian National Police Service (HNP). They are running a Norwegian funded project with a successful outcome (Interview 2012k). Norway supported the first position of a gender adviser in DPKO, and worked to include it in the UN's regular budget. Norway also funded one Junior Professional Officer (JPO) position over a period of 4 years in the Gender Advisory Team at headquarters between 2005-2008 (Interview 2012e). Financing positions in the gender team in headquarters was an issue from the beginning. One informant explained that these were not originally part of the regular budgeting process that takes place in the Administrative and Budgetary Committee of the General Assembly (5th committee). "It takes time before the 5th committee decides to support or prioritize something new, so in the

beginning you have to rely on support from dedicated member states, such as Norway in this case" (Interview 2012e). Norway and many others have pushed on numerous issues such as the creation of new guidelines. One informant described this as a collaboration that often happens in the back room, between the people in the Gender Advisory Team in DPKO and members of the different missions to the UN, where they ask for things like support to push certain issues in their own organization. "Having member states pushing issues from the outside, especially strong member states such as Norway, is important because there are so many other things that are also competing for attention" (Interview 2012e). In addition, the "women, peace and security" agenda and the issues outlined in Resolution 1325 are addressed in speaking points, conversations with other member states, and meetings with for example UN Women (Interview 2012l; Interview 2012m). Promoting an image of Norway as a leading actor and to ally with relevant stakeholders such as UN Women, were also given high priority. Another example of a political alliance is the Friends of 1325 Group, which I will elaborate on below. I will now give a brief description of some channels outside DPKO that the Norwegian Government works with to influence the implementation of Resolution 1325 more broadly, but which also affects DPKO.

The Friends of 1325 Group

The Friends of 1325 Group is a group of concerned member states which was formed as a result of the adoption of Resolution 1325. It consists of 44 member states and is cross-regional. It used to be a very Western group, but has been gaining more members from the global South lately, which informants highlighted this as a positive development, in order to avoid framing the image of "women, peace and security" as a Western idea. The Friends of 1325 Group is an informal network which identifies its two main tasks as 1) talking to the UN and letting them know that member states are watching, more precisely advocacy directed at the UN system, and 2) advocacy with the Security Council directly. The group interacts with several UN agencies, including DPKO, DPA, OCHA, UN Women, UNFPA, UNDP, and the Office of the SRSG for Conflict-related sexual violence. The group also includes members of the Security Council, and one of their activities is to have meetings with member states where they prepare for meetings or discussions in the Security Council, gather information, inform the members, and plan strategic action. According to one informant, "it seems that the negative voices are always more vocal, so we encourage that member states speak up" (Interview 2012n). One of my informants said that the activity and the frequency of meetings in the group has gone down over the last year, and referred to recent policy achievements

such as the adoption of more Security Council resolutions on "women, peace and security" as an explanation for this (Interview 2012m).

UN Women

Cooperation with UN Women is a top priority for the Norwegian Government, and it does this by supporting the mandate and role of UN Women. The outspoken goal of Norwegian policy in this area is that UN Women shall make the UN system as a whole deliver better on issues of gender equality and women's rights.[4] One informant described UN Women as an internal advocate and "watchdog" within the UN system (Interview 2012m). The establishment of UN Women is part of the work on UN reform, which Norway considers itself an active and critical champion of. Several informants referred to UN Women as an important ally in the work on implementing gender perspectives, and that making this alliance is a priority for the Norwegian Government (Interview 2012l; Interview 2012m). Norway is a board member and one of UN Women's top financial contributors, and according to one of my informants has a "larger formal and also indirect contact and influence in UN Women than we have in the Security Council" (Interview 2012m).

Troop-Contributing Countries, Police-Contributing Countries, Member States

Efforts towards supporting the implementation of Resolution 1325 were also visible in how the Norwegian Government works with other member states. As already mentioned, the implementation in the field was seen as dependent on member states. In addition to supporting the creation of guidelines and manuals, the Norwegian Government funded a new e-learning course on "women, peace and security" in 2011. Some informants talked about the challenges in getting TCCs and PCCs to train their personnel and make use of the guidelines that had been created by the UN (Interview 2012i; Interview 2012k; Interview 2012l). Norway collaborates on a Centre for Gender in Military Operations located in Sweden, and an aspiration of the centre was that other countries participate in courses held by the centre (Interview 2012h). The Norwegian Government also makes an effort to dialogue with important member states on the importance of training on gender perspectives and the protection of women. An example of this that was mentioned during several interviews was a conference held in New Delhi, India, where protection against sexual violence was a part of the program. One informant experienced that it was challenging to dialogue with the Indian

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[4] See Norwegian Government Website 2012b.

generals on the need to train their troops on women's protection issues, explaining this in terms of how some Indian generals did not always consider it to be important, but also that it is difficult for Norway as a small contributor, both financially and in terms of personnel, to promote norms upon the rest. "We want to contribute the norms but we do not contribute troops to the UN. That is a problem for us" (Interview 2012i).

5.3.2 Summary

Gender issues have a large focus in Norwegian foreign policy, and the Norwegian Government attributes great importance to the political pressure it directs at relevant actors. Another main strategy was alliances with strategic partners in the UN system and member states. Norway also makes good use of its money to promote the "women, peace and security" agenda in the UN system outside regular budgeting processes, mainly contributing to positions or projects in DPKO headquarters. Compared to large contributors, Norway is still a small contributor in terms of troops and funding but makes a big effort to make their voice authoritative in normative matters: By projecting the nation as a leading actor they are also perceived as such by many others. However, like DPKO Norway has also struggled to implement Resolution 1325 in its own armed forces. When considering the operational effectiveness of implementing gender perspectives, mandate fulfillment was highlighted as a goal in itself. It thus becomes important to try to affect the content of mandates and this must be seen in relation to the large focus on political pressure.

Chapter 6: Hypocrisy and "Friction" in DPKO

6.1 Introduction

In the previous chapter, I have outlined the different pressures and demands that affect the implementation of Resolution 1325 in DPKO. In this chapter, I will examine further the pressures felt by staff and the organization itself to show how this creates situations of hypocrisy, and further explain how that can be viewed as both natural and necessary. Understanding the actors and factors that affect the implementation of issues of "women, peace and security" in DPKO are relevant to determine whether we can observe hypocrisy in DPKO. How needs and priorities are defined across the different levels of analysis tell us something about possible sources of friction regarding to policy. I also look at the interplay between the different levels of analysis and how that affects the implementation process, which highlights the organizational or institutional issues that may be a source of "friction". The interplay between the different levels displays how some pressures are felt stronger at some levels of analysis than others, and that may cause tensions. I show that in order to cope with this issue, structures become separated so that they may respond to the pressures more pertinent to their particular situation. I frame this in terms of Brunsson's concept of *the organization of hypocrisy*, and aim to show what functions these incidents of hypocrisy may serve in DPKO. The discussion on the role of individuals in International Organizations is important because organizations are not coherent actors. Hypocrisy may be displayed by individuals, or by the organization as a whole. I aim to nuance the view of hypocrisy as constituted in the organization in this part of my analysis. I end this chapter by tracing the policy developments of the issue area of "women, peace and security" across my field of study. The way needs and priorities are defined across the levels of analysis, as well as the

interplay between these levels, tells us something about connections and interactions between the levels of analysis and how these connections affect the process both in terms of policy and implementation. This is important because policy is not created in a vacuum. It is produced and informed through "friction"; interactions and encounters across sometimes geographical and conceptual differences, with many stakeholders trying to affect the outcome. Studying these connections enables us to study how ideas and policy travel across distances and differences, and are produced and enacted through global encounters.

6.2 International Bureaucracies: Agents in World Politics

The understanding of DPKO as an international bureaucracy is fundamental to my analysis. According to Barnett and Finnermore (2004), IOs are constituted as bureaucracies, created by states as necessary to organize an increasingly complex world. IOs embody the four central features to modern bureaucracies: hierarchy, continuity, impersonality and expertise. In order to have agency, IOs must have authority. They draw their authority from several sources, most notably the rational-legal authority they embody by being constituted as bureaucracies, delegated authority, expert authority, and moral authority (Barnett and Finnermore 2004). Due to their bureaucratic nature, IOs can appear more legitimate than states, and are often asked to perform the tasks member states cannot or do not wish to perform themselves (Barnett and Finnermore 2004).

UN peacekeeping is a good example as such, because the UN Charter made no real provision for peacekeeping operations as we know them today. Member states were finding it increasingly difficult to mandate interventions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, thus this weakness of Chapter VII led to development of alternative means that depended more on initiatives of the UN than of national governments (Mathiason 2007: 151). This need for a neutral actor that could intervene in conflicts underlines the importance of the rational legal authority inherent in bureaucracies (Barnett and Finnermore 2004) that enables them to take on such a role. DPKO also has delegated authority from its member states, including being mandated with implementing Resolution 1325. The UN also draws its legitimacy and authority from the Security Council and the UN Charter, which was drafted after the Second World War when the victors sat down to create an organization that would ensure the maintenance of peace and security in the world. The Security Council is regarded the highest

organ in matters of international peace and security, and its decisions are authoritative through the legitimacy of the victors who constituted it, as well as its claim to represent the common will of international society. The world has changed however, since the creation of the UN and the Security Council. Today, wars are no longer only fought between states; in fact they are more commonly of an intrastate nature. The number of sovereign states is much higher than it was when the UN was created, largely due to decolonialization, and the rising power of the BRICS have affected the Permanent 5's status as superpowers. This has sparked debate and requests for UN reform, and many states in the global South now question the legitimacy of the Security Council (Tryggestad 2009: 549).

The specialized gender advisers are one example of how DPKO has expert authority in the field of "women, peace and security". Having expert knowledge is also central to the rational legal authority IOs possess. IOs are often given tasks in which there is not much relevant knowledge available, which creates an opportunity to become the possessors of that expertise and authority, and also creates room for expansion. The UN Secretariat relies heavily on moral authority due to the organization's status as protector of international peace and security (Barnett and Finnermore 2004: 15). This also implies that the UN claims to be the representative of the international community's interests. Making gender issues a part of that package, is of huge importance to the status and validity of the issues outlined in Resolution 1325.

Impersonal rules are at the basis of bureaucracy (Barnett and Finnermore 2004: 18). While being seen to carry out impersonal rules grants DPKO authority, this also has other effects. IOs may fail because of states, for example when they are not properly resourced to carry out their delegated tasks. However they also generate their own mistakes. Division of labor can create tunnel vision among staff, and standardized rules and norms can make it difficult to respond to unique situations. These are what Barnett and Finnermore (2004: 8) call the "pathologies" of IO behavior. Hypocrisy may enable IOs to respond to unique situations that arise (see section 6.5). Another way that IOs may generate failure is when constantly seeking to expand their mandates. As mentioned in Chapter 4, the initiative that led to the adoption of Resolution 1325 also originated from within the UN. Barnett and Finnermore (2004) also write that IOs will try to expand in such a way that creates more tasks for IOs. In this way, they seek to legitimate their existence and authority in new fields. DPKO have tended to see

intervention as insufficient rather than overambitious, creating increased need for their existence and relevance in expanded fields (Campbell et al. 2011: 15).

The UN's authority creates the basis of the scope of the autonomous action possible for DPKO. Barnett and Finnermore (2004: 27) distinguish five types of IOs' autonomous relations with states. First, IOs may exercise autonomy to further state interests. IOs are created with some degree of autonomy in order for this to be possible, but IOs still have to determine what those interests are and how best to serve them. One could argue that having received a broad mandate in Resolution 1325, which Norway enthusiastically supported, gave DPKO the space to further Norwegian interests in this regard. Findings imply that to a large degree this has also been the case. As described in the previous chapter, member states seek to affect policy and process in many ways, not only through the formal mechanisms such as the Security Council and the C34, but also through direct financial or political support. Investing in other entities within the UN system such as UN Action or UN Women will also affect the work on implementing Resolution 1325 in DPKO. This may be productive, as it may act as an incentive for promoting the agenda if successful. However it can also create side effects of internal contestation over priorities and ownership. Strategic alliances with UN Women or the Gender Advisory Team, as well as member state to member state cooperation or financing positions in the Gender Team at headquarters, all represent alternatives that are especially relevant for Norway since it is a small state that has money but little influence in the Security Council. The way the UN system functions makes it necessary to invent practices that bypass the formal processes in order to get new initiatives up and going. Member states thus have many ways to influence what happens in DPKO, but there are also examples of initiative from within the organization. DPKO can seek out member states and get them to support projects, or have them press certain issues with management. But as one of my informants in the Norwegian Government said: "without funding it is hard to get anything done" (Interview 2012k). By making itself available to DPKO, Norway has been able to draw advantage from the autonomy the organization possesses in order to further the "women, peace and security" agenda. Secondly, IOs may act where states are indifferent. There are also processes that happen within DPKO that member states are not part of, that they cannot know or control. One informant explained this as relating to recruitment on junior levels, just because someone gets a new position it is not certain that the right person has gotten the job (Interview 2012e). Third, IOs may fail to act, and therefore fail to carry out state demands. This is where the issue of hypocrisy is most central. The reasons for failing to integrate Resolution 1325

comprehensively throughout the organization are more thoroughly discussed in the following sections. Fourth, IOs may act in ways that run against state interests. As described in the previous chapter, many may feel that there are more important issues, but must nonetheless accept that gender perspectives are now part of the areas of focus in DPKO. Finally, IOs may change the broader normative environment and states' perceptions of their own preferences so that they are consistent with IO preferences. At the time of the adoption of Resolution 1325, "the issue area was seen by members of the Council as having low priority and few, if any, serious implications for them in practice" (Tryggestad 2009: 544). The "women, peace and security" agenda has gained resonance with an increasing number of member states and publics, and as highlighted by one informant, there might be resistance but very few will argue directly against the contents of the "women, peace and security" agenda.

6.3 Inconsistent pressures and demands

IOs depend on their external environment for conferred legitimacy in order to survive. Issues of "women, peace and security" are more relevant for DPKO than for many other entities in the UN system, and the initiative also came from within. The logic behind DPKO embracing the "women, peace and security" agenda is clear-cut: It will lead to more effective peacekeeping, a better fulfillment of their mandates, and a more sustainable peace. As several of my informants explained, absorbing this perspective will make their job easier. One aspect of the expectations UN peacekeeping must live up to is the neutrality and the apolitical nature of missions. Due to the changing circumstances in International Relations, the UN has made an effort to modify this view. The UN therefore refers to the impartiality of missions, however faces difficulties because it is still expected to be neutral by many, especially those who do not benefit from their actions in a given situation. In addition to maintaining international peace and security they must uphold international law, defend human rights, and more recently, as in the case of UNOCI, protect civilians. Many will argue that in order to protect civilians a regime change is necessary, and therefore the mission becomes impartial and indeed political. This is not only relevant to UNOCI, but also applies to situations such as the 2011 NATO intervention in Libya, which was mandated by the Security Council applying the principle of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). The "women, peace and security" agenda must also be seen in this context. It is perceived as political by parts of its external environment, and as Tryggestad (2009: 549) writes, "Many G-77 countries have criticized

Resolution 1325 because they perceive it as being representative of a larger package of liberal ideas primarily promoted by the affluent countries in the North". The fundamental argument of existence of IOs, which is the claim to universality and as neutrally carrying out the requests of its member states, may thus be threatened.

Demand for UN peacekeeping has been on the rise since the end of the Cold War, while at the same time member states are increasingly reluctant to provide troops and other personnel, and budgets are constantly under pressure to be downsized. In integrated missions, the UN serves as an umbrella uniting different components such as humanitarian, development, and peacebuilding directives, in addition to the traditional peacekeeping mandate. In a country situation, neutrality and the apolitical nature of missions are often impossible. Issues of "women, peace and security" are often seen as a Western idea, not perceived as neutral by many member states, and holding various normative claims. This is a general problem with "soft" security issues in the UN context; the human security paradigm is controversial but has nonetheless taken hold in international society. The UN seeks legitimacy through being perceived as impartial, and it also seeks legitimacy through the fulfillment of mandates that are politically sensitive. The norms and values it is supposed to embody and reflect, such as national self-determination, individual human rights, development, and peace, are not wholly consistent with each other. Further, norms such as sovereignty and multilateralism are not necessarily consistent with the actions the organization must execute through its peacekeeping operations (Lipson 2007: 12). The incompatible nature of these values can be explained in terms of pressure to reconcile different bases of authority (Barnett and Finnermore 2004: 26). DPKO struggles to reconcile their rational-legal authority as a rule-following impersonal actor, and their moral authority as representing the common interest of the international community when protecting international peace and security, with their expert authority in the field of "women, peace and security".

The statement by one informant in DPKO that "requests are coming from all angles" (Interview 2012b) illustrates the multitude of pressures and demands the organization's staff are faced with. Since IOs depend on their external environment for conferred legitimacy and survival, they must be seen as tending to the requests coming from that external environment. When these requests are inconsistent, the organization must find a way to cope with that situation and incongruity. The external environment can be defined as all actors and factors affecting the implementation process, including member states. The boundaries between

DPKO and its external environment are hard to delineate, since the organization can in no way be seen as independent from member states. In fact, IOs are supposed to portray themselves as impartial servants of member states in order to appear legitimate. This bureaucratic aspect must also be matched with appropriate action, especially in the case of DPKO since peacekeeping operations represent the most prominent instrument of the UN for maintaining international peace and security. Member states comprise and inform the products of the Security Council, and also set priorities through the UN's special committees. In addition, there is a range of ways they can affect the work of the organization, and they try to do so through different strategies, many of which were outlined in the previous chapter. One of my informants said that many countries from the global south probably feel that there are a lot of other challenges related to operational military issues that they see as more important than gender (Interview 2012j). As member states may not always be on the same page as to what priorities rank highest in different work areas of DPKO, this may create situations where staff in the organization face conflicting pressures.

The inconsistency in demands can be easily observed in the way requests to downsize missions are coupled with appeals to increase efficiency and fulfillment of increasingly comprehensive mandates. This refers back to how member states expectations may not always be realistic, such as when mandates and missions are more susceptible to short-term funding. However, the large expectations coming from the external environment must be seen in the context of the organizations own desire to expand. Mandates display the policy of the organization and its priorities, and must include all relevant aspects in order to be perceived as legitimate and politically correct. According to one of my informants, many cross-cutting issues such as national ownership and gender have in many regards become "catch-phrases", which are often included in mandates and reports, but are often not specified, explained or necessarily operationalized (Interview 2012c). Mandates must also tend towards the different interests of invested parties, such as orienting to the priorities of the host government of a mission. As described in section 5.2.2, sometimes weak wording of the mandates may be seen as reflecting this issue. Mandates, which have a large influence on DPKO's work, are thus very comprehensive, but at the same time they may be weak and not clearly operationalized. This creates both the opportunity and need for hypocrisy.

6.4 Hypocrisy for survival

DPKO has made great efforts to adopt the "women, peace and security" agenda within their mandate and integrate it into daily procedures. This effort to internalize the policy directions coming from the Security Council can be explained through pressures from its external environment and commitment coming from within the UN and DPKO itself. We see that there has been a range of structural and rhetorical shifts in DPKO since the adoption of Resolution 1325 in 2000. This suggests that the people working on gender issues in the organization possess the authority, autonomy and resources to effectively implement Resolution 1325. However, the data suggests that this is only true in theory and it seems that in practice the "women, peace and security" agenda has not been fully internalized. Complaints about the level of seniority, lack of commitment in senior management, being sidelined, no access to senior leadership, and lack of funding characterized the description of challenges in the implementation process, which boils down to a lack of political will and commitment in the organization itself. However, we should also allow ourselves to consider that what is often perceived as variation in commitment can be attributed to other things such as conflicting demands, and whose persistence allows for the continuation of hypocrisy. The lack of internalization reflected through hypocrisy allows the organization and its staff to seemingly comply with organizational mandates, while effectively making different priorities in their daily work. The large production of policy and rhetorical commitment coming from headquarters is a necessary part of DPKOs efforts to be seen as legitimate actor in the field of "women, peace and security". This is also done to ensure its institutional survival, and reflects the connection between legitimacy, hypocrisy and survival. Notably, continued efforts to expand will create an increased need for hypocrisy.

Security Council mandates are very broad and instruct missions to carry out many challenging tasks. While mandates often embody the inconsistency and complexity of DPKO's external environment, staff members are tasked with interpreting them and may face other pressures or challenges in their daily work that affects implementation. The Gender Advisory Team prioritizes gender issues, while other units will make other issues their top priorities, for example national ownership. Even if they are aware that they should integrate gender perspectives, they may be uncertain about how to do it. Peacekeeping operations today include a number of thematic areas that are all of great importance, with staff working in different areas each arguing that their area is the most important. The Security Council

requests that everything be done at once, while all these priorities must be united and implemented by staff in the missions. When faced with the realities on the ground, problems that are not accounted for in headquarters or in the Security Council may arise and force staff to prioritize their daily work, so when faced with conflicting demands, staff ultimately have to make choices that will affect the implementation of mandates. For example, the mission has to be responsive to the host government in order to function in the field, and a bad relationship with the host government can have dire consequences for the functioning of the mission, as well as the mission's achievement and mandate implementation. Gender perspectives should be integrated, but are not always top priority when faced with a set of challenges. Hypocrisy makes it possible to make these priorities, and makes it possible for the mission to function.

The fact that people are struggling with understanding what Resolution 1325 and gender perspectives actually are and how they can be implemented into their work, may affect prioritization resulting in gender issues becoming sidelined on a larger scale. If you do not have the resources or expertise on gender in the mission, hypocrisy becomes a way of survival. In Côte d'Ivoire, issues related to rule of law, justice, impartiality, discipline, and impunity are all pressing issues that need to be dealt with, and they all affect the situation and safety for women in the country. Arguably, one needs to restore the rule of law and the justice systems in order to address the situation of women in the country. Writing on the UN's response to gender-based violence (GBV) in Liberia, Schia and de Carvalho (2009) argue that understanding the root causes is often absent from the policies of the UN, and a focus on efforts to address GBV happens at the expense of other processes such as judicial reform and training of new legal specialists. In this case, the focus on symptoms instead of root causes creates a flawed approach. In Côte d'Ivoire, priority was given to holding elections and completing the population identification process, consequently sidelining issues of disarmament, demobilization, and security sector reform. The concern for increased rates of sexual violence since the crisis is related to the collapse of rule of law and justice systems since the crisis, as well as widespread impunity and a lack of discipline. Ensuring that these processes are comprehensively executed will indeed guarantee more safety for women as well. This includes training judges in gender issues, and making sure witnesses can be protected. This is dependent on support and funding from donors, going beyond short-term funding and quick impact projects.

6.5 Political and action roles

Brunsson's ideal type of political organization depends solely on reflecting inconsistent norms in its environment, but as he also states no such organization will be found in the real world (Brunsson 2002: 20). Most organizations have to be good at both reflecting inconsistencies and producing action, which is also true for DPKO. As already mentioned, peacekeeping is considered one of the most important instruments for the UN. As Lipson (2007: 13) writes, the UN's legitimacy depends not only on reflecting the commonly held norms of its member states, but it is also expected to accomplish complicated tasks such as peacekeeping. The changes in international relations since the end of the Cold War have created circumstances for DPKO to expand, but has also produced an environment with more complex demands. Thus the "political" aspect has become relatively stronger and DPKO has been forced to rethink its identity. This challenge has inspired change in DPKO, and the result has been an expansion of its range of activities and responsibilities. Some argue that this has caused DPKO to take on mandates that were too large, turning peacekeeping into an overly ambitious project (Paris 2004), and resulting in peacekeeping's ambitions not being matched with sufficient action, which must therefore be compensated for by talk and decisions.

In order to make an impact outside the bureaucracy, the UN must maintain its action role. Because IOs cannot be understood strictly in the sense of political or action organizations, it is useful to apply Weaver's (2008: 5) perspective, that these organizations develop distinctive "political" and "action" roles. Taking on these different roles serves a pragmatic purpose when an organization's internal structure and culture conflicts with demands from its external environment. Here, organizational preferences and behavior may differ from those in its external environment (Weaver 2008: 5). The focus on national ownership was not reflected in the way informants in the Norwegian Government spoke about the implementation of gender issues. The relationship to the host country was important for DPKO staff, but seemed not to be taken into consideration when creating policy on the implementation of Resolution 1325. If my findings are correct, one could understand the gender team as a structure that responds to certain pressures from the external environment, but one which is often at odds with the internal culture of the rest of the organization. Taking on different roles becomes a solution to the problem of inconsistent demands, and when it is done by creating separate structures tending to conflicting demands from the external environment, it represents what Brunsson refers to as *the organization of hypocrisy*.

6.6 The Organization of Hypocrisy

Considering that the Gender Advisory Team seems to be functioning as a separate structure within DPKO, it was remarkable how one of my informants referred to a "1325-mafia" based in Oslo. First of all, it is an interesting choice of words since "mafia" often implies a tightly knit group of trusted associates. This suggests that having separate structures tending to different demands is also the case for Norway. Although having gained supporters and resonance at a rhetorical level, the "1325-mafia" pushes the "women, peace and security" agenda, are a tightly knit group, and are to some extent regarded as being cut off from the rest of their organizational context. Secondly, it is notable that the 1325 mafia should be located in Oslo, and not somewhere in the UN system such as UN Women. However, this reinforces the image of Norway as an international champion of the "women, peace and security" agenda. We see that internal structure and culture does not necessarily differ from the external environment, it may in fact reflect its inconsistency and variation. Variation in member states priorities can be seen as reflected in the organization, and the way Norway has also struggled to implement Resolution 1325 into its armed forces, can be seen as reflected in the way DPKO has struggled with the same issues in the field. Increasing the number of women has been central in both the Norwegian Armed Forces, the Norwegian Governments policies on 1325, and in DPKO. It is also one of the aspects directly addressed in Resolution 1325. Norway has made progress in this area, whereas this is difficult for DPKO because they are reliant on member states contributing the personnel. Many informants were content with the advances in DPKO when it comes to policy production, and as already mentioned, DPKO has achieved progress in this regard. In part due to efforts of member states such as Norway, conditions have been favorable that enabled DPKO to produce a lot in terms on policy, but a similar presence and pressure has not been seen at the field level. The actual implementation on the ground is far more susceptible to other pressures. The initiative coming from Norway which presented a female candidate as force commander was said to have a large symbolic value, however they have not been successful in arranging this so far. One informant in the UN system said that since the Norwegians do not have any troops on the ground, the candidate would get a difficult job (Interview 2012f). Providing troops to peacekeeping operations would thus be important not only to get support for this case in the UN, but also for it to actually have an impact if it was to happen. A focus on contributing normative and

political pressure through symbolic action on behalf of the member state allows for the continuation of hypocrisy in DPKO as well, but the symbolism of this issue is important because Norway wishes to be seen as a leading actor and expert in the field of "women, peace and security". Authority does not necessarily lie in what results come from such practices, but that those practices are actually happening. Leira et al. (2007: 22) writes that the impression of Norway as a UN activist depends more on money than on the number of blue helmets.

The structure of DPKO gives the SRSG a big role in priority setting for the mission, within the mandate of the mission. For the field missions, who are directly mandated by the Security Council to perform tasks such as mainstreaming gender perspectives, interpreting mandates and fulfilling them at best effort is a challenge. Access to funding and qualified personnel, and the size of the operation relative to the tasks they are supposed to perform, affects priority-setting. Broad mandates open for personal qualities and interests to affect their interpretation, which makes the mission's performance and achievements on gender dependent on the preferences of those interpreting the mandates. It seems that once the Security Council has given the mandate and the operation has been established, the SRSG is ultimately responsible for mandate and mission, including gender issues. Although the Security Council Resolutions are regarded as the "bibles" of the missions, the organization of hypocrisy makes it possible to adapt priorities to the situational context and reflecting personal preferences. Headquarters serves an advisory role and is mainly accountable for policy production. The primary responsibility of fulfillment of the mandate lies with the SRSG, and people working in gender in missions face problems with making their work impact the mission in a comprehensive way. While gender officers answer to certain pressures coming from HQ and member states, they fulfill the criteria of having gender posts in all missions, but are often unable to make the desired impact. The SRSG has other constituencies he or she must answer to, including requests from headquarters, the host government, imminent threats to peace and stability, and threats to the legitimacy of the mission. Demands on the policy side are handled in headquarters, which creates a separate structure that allows working outside of Security Council politics. By incorporating these inconsistent or conflicting demands into the organizational structures and processes, these may respond to their corresponding external demands without affecting each other substantially. This allows for the personal preferences and capabilities of the SRSG to affect the mission to a large degree, and to make decisions in the heat of the moment in order to ensure the functioning and survival of the mission.

6.7 The Role of Individuals in International Organizations

The focus of this thesis is on the process of implementing Resolution 1325, and the interaction between the different levels of analysis. This implies taking a systemic view of hypocrisy as it can be observed in the organization. However, IOs should not be understood as unitary actors, they are made up of individuals who bring their personal preferences and views into the organization. This also explains why we are able to observe both cases of *organized hypocrisy* as well as *the organization of hypocrisy*. I therefore argue that the concept of bureaucratic hypocrisy can also be applied to DPKO. Taking ownership of the issue area, and the building up of expertise also suggests this, as it increases the degree of autonomy on behalf of the organization.

Informants often highlighted the personal qualities of people in the organization as important for achievements, and this was a big issue concerning the heads of missions, the SRSGs. The authority of the individual and his or her ability to manage the external environment was given great importance, but also their understanding of the UN system and commitment to the cause. For people working in gender it was also an issue how well you were able to communicate with top management and getting along with other parts of the system. Explaining to people why it would make their job easier when integrating gender perspectives was mentioned as one strategy in this respect. One informant also explained that those who seemed to be listened to the most were pragmatic and able to convey the message in a way that was logical (Interview 2012e). In the field, gender officers were said to have to be able to navigate both across and up the mission. In Liberia, the UN has found an important ally in the country's president, and this example also shows that the importance of dedicated individuals is not confined inside of the organization, but that they may also be found in its external environment. The role of individuals in IOs has been explored by several scholars in the field of International Relations and global governance (see Neumann 2000; Schia 2011). For a more comprehensive analysis of the role and autonomy of DPKO staff, see Hennum (2010).

6.8 Tracing Policy and Process

Having looked at how the interplay between the different levels of analysis affects the implementation process focusing on organizational features, I will now look at how policy is created, negotiated and modified through interaction between the levels of analysis based on the data gathered through my study. Studying the process of implementing Resolution 1325 is indeed the study of policy moving across a field or space. People in such a field inhabit different worlds, but their actions in one place may still have consequences far beyond, particularly when actors have power backed by institutions (Shore 2011: 93).

The UN made their vision authoritative when passing Resolution 1325 (see Shore and Wright 2011: 13; Barnett and Finnermore 2004), but as already mentioned, the members of the Security Council were probably not aware of the importance of the Resolution. This left space for interpretation of the resolution and its operationalization into the practices of the UN and DPKO to be contested as it translates into concrete situations. As Shore and Wright (2011: 19) writes, "policy worlds open up ambiguous spaces in which actors and agents compete for influence. [and] use tactics and strategies to make of that policy something different than what its authors intended." As described in Chapter 4, there was interaction between elements in civil society and elements in DPKO in the process that led to the adoption of Resolution 1325. Müller (2011) writes about how civil society was maintaining a position outside the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) while at the same time trying to ally with and influence elements within the organization without being co-opted. I argue that this may also be the case with Resolution 1325, and in addition, I would argue that the same strategy has been used by Norway as well as other stakeholders in the UN system, who are seeking to strengthen elements they agree with, and even modify policy to create an outcome more in line with their priorities. When open for interpretation, you have competition for interests, apparent in how the issue of sexual violence was perceived as more important than other aspects of the resolution by some actors. We see that there is a complicated web of actors trying to influence the outcome in terms of policy. The civil society movement needed the UN however, both for the Resolution, which creates a legitimate framework, and for institutionalizing the policy and practices. However, some parts of the movement that were central to the processes leading up to the adoption of Resolution 1325 experienced that in this process of interpretation and operationalization, policy was interpreted within the UN

framework which created an understanding of gender, and the "women, peace and security" agenda that did not fully resonate with their views.

When the resolution was adopted, elements in the UN took ownership of the issue area and start creating policy and building up expertise. Because DPKO was directly mandated by Resolution 1325 to integrate gender perspectives and training in peacekeeping, and because there were actors who took initiative here, DPKO came to take on this task. Headquarters can be seen as a mediating organ between the Security Council and the field, by translating policy into something meaningful with input from the field. Norway, and others, want to influence how that is done. Indeed, IOs often take on a role of facilitating consensus among states, as brokers between civil society and governments, and among governments (Mathiason 2007: 93). As brokers they present themselves as honest, neutral, and objective. Member states come together in the Security Council and in the C34 to discuss and negotiate priority areas and mandates, and these forums are important as priority setters for the work of DPKO because what happens there is of great importance for further policy production in headquarters.

Although having made efforts directed at other member states to further the "women, peace and security" agenda, Norway has directed the heaviest, most coherent, and coordinated pressure regarding policy work in headquarters. Affecting policy at the highest levels in the UN has been an important priority for the Norwegian Government, given the importance attributed to UN Security Council Resolutions and mandates. Mandate implementation was presented as a goal in and of itself, and is important for legitimacy, thus being able to implement mandates is of great importance. Integrating gender perspectives will lead to easier and better mandate implementation, not only on specific references to gender, but also in other areas. Impacting the content of mandates therefore becomes a priority issue. "Women, peace and security" is a norm and value-driven process that aims at changing the whole constituency, and is not only relevant to the UN. Turning "women, peace and security" into a technical issue, an instrument for better mandate implementation, is a solution to the problem of having to change the whole constituency. One informant representing the NGO community told me that since mission mandates have been called the bibles of the mission, they focus a lot of their work towards affecting those mandates. "Then it almost doesn't matter how much an individual is committed to the 'women, peace and security' agenda. If they have been told they have to do it, then they have to do it. Which I guess may be one of the advantages to it

being a military structured organization" (Interview 2012o). This is typical bureaucratic behavior, and presenting a political issue as a technical solution also limits the possibility for democratic process, and may over time render resistance to silence. However, this should not be perceived as a finalized process, but as an ongoing part of the policy production and negotiation we see around the issue area of "women, peace and security".

Norway has made great contributions and been a key supporting actor to the implementation of Resolution 1325 in DPKO. While civil society, and especially the NGO community, were behind the movement that led to the adoption of the Resolution, Norway was among the member states that supported the development from the beginning and they have been especially supportive of DPKO. As described earlier in this chapter, Norway was able to use the autonomy of DPKO to further its own aims. However, correlation is not causality. Indeed, Barnett and Finnermore (2004) also argue that states and IOs may end up with the same policies but for different reasons. Norway supports UN reform and a world order regulated by norms and rules through the UN, while DPKO seeks conferred legitimacy and authority, as well as expansion, and aims at securing the future need for their expertise in matters of "women, peace and security". Similarly, when talking about implementation in the field, one informant highlighted how it had helped that the US had taken a lead on the issue, "but they have a very instrumental approach, as in women know where the weapons are, so talking to them will give us more intelligence. But from a Norwegian perspective we think that if we are supposed to provide security to the local population we have to talk to the whole population, not just the men" (Interview 2012i).

The way needs and priorities are defined across the levels of analysis can be understood as the connections between these levels. Briefly summarized, the survival of the mission is the most important for the field level, including the relationship with host government and dealing with immediate pressures and issues. Headquarters should be seen as a mediating organ between the different pressures and demands arising from the external environment, and is mainly responsible for responding in terms of policy. Priorities are aligned with Norway on gender elements, but other units may be more aligned with particular mission priorities. The priorities for the Norwegian Government are related to support to the UN and a world order guided by rules and norms, affecting policy developments at the highest level, and being perceived as experts in issues of "women, peace and security". In her work on global connections, anthropologist Anna L. Tsing (2005) describes "friction" as the way aspirations for global

connection come to life. She states that science and politics depend on global connections and spread through aspirations to fulfill universal dreams and schemes. Tsing's analysis is based on events in the rainforests in Indonesia, but her insights are useful to my analysis, given the universal aspiration of the issues outlined in Resolution 1325. They are called aspirations just because that is how we should perceive them, and not as finished achievements (Tsing 2005: 7). Universalities are central to Tsing's analysis, and she focuses on the kind that "can only be charged and enacted in the sticky material of practical encounters" (Tsing 2005: 1). She further argues that emergent cultural forms are persistent but unpredictable effects of global encounters across difference. In her analysis such emergent cultural forms are represented by forest destruction and environmental advocacy, while I argue that the "women, peace and security" agenda may be perceived as such an emergent cultural form for the purpose of understanding how "friction" across the issue area affects the implementation in DPKO.

Here, I apply the concept of "friction" in order to make sense of some of the inherent problems in Resolution 1325 and the "women, peace and security" agenda. Because "universalism is implicated in *both* imperial schemes to control the world and liberatory mobilizations for justice and empowerment" (Tsing 2005: 10), they are never fully the same in every locality or setting. As already stated, Resolution 1325 claims universality, but is perceived as political by parts of its external environment. "Friction" is exactly this global encounter, as the ideas embodied in Resolution 1325 travel across distances and differences. It is by studying these connections that we are actually able to study the global. The three levels of analysis are globally interconnected and Resolution 1325 can be understood as a global social project, with policies as the tools created to advance it. According to Tsing (2005: 8) "those who claim to be in touch with the universal are often bad at seeing the limits and exclusions of their knowledge". The SRSG of a mission has great power to define the nature and priorities of the mission, while headquarters offer operational support and produce policy. Policies in this case are tools for distributing norms, and as policies are implemented in missions, there is interaction. The interactions between the levels of analysis highlight friction that is created when policy is carried out across levels. Interpretation and operationalization of broad mandates creates meetings between different policy worlds, as between UN Security Council decisions and specific host country situations. Cases of hypocrisy as described in the above sections can thus be understood as global encounters representing "friction", however, "friction" is more than just these cases of hypocrisy. If imagining the free spread of ideas as a result of globalization, "friction" is when such ideas

are socially informed by particular contexts. Focusing on the interaction that then happens, Tsing argues that "friction" is not a synonym for resistance; it is not only about slowing things down, but it is also required to keep global power in motion (Tsing 2005: 6). This interaction may also be productive, creating new initiatives and efforts at advancing the "women, peace and security" agenda. The encounter between DPKO and the "women, peace and security" agenda has resulted in both structural and rhetorical shifts in the organization. While critics continue to point out the gaps, this encounter should be seen as a case of "friction" that has been central to shaping how the issue area has evolved and expanded. By making these changes, the organization makes itself vulnerable to criticism, and must continue to expand its activity in the issue area. The particularities that have made Norway a key supporter for these issues in DPKO must therefore be understood to represent such a case of "friction", a global encounter that is part of shaping the universal aspiration of Resolution 1325. This allows us then to consider, like Tsing does in her analysis, "universals not as truths or lies but as sticky engagements" (Tsing 2005: 6). Another example of "friction" in this sense is the linking of "soft" issues with hard security issues in the Security Council. It can also be seen when DPKO, and the Norwegian armed forces, engage with gender issues. Through these encounters, issues of "women, peace and security" are affected by the particular context. As we have seen, outcomes may vary, but one example is the effort at transforming gender perspectives into a technical issue of mandate implementation.

Chapter 7: Conclusion

As stated at the outset, the intention of this study was not to document shortcomings in the implementation of Resolution 1325 in DPKO, but to develop an understanding of what factors and actors may affect such an implementation process. In answering my research questions, I have made an effort to show how hypocrisy and "friction" manifests itself in International Organizations, and in the process of implementing Resolution 1325. This process is not an isolated development taking place in DPKO, but it is taking place globally. Hypocrisy and "friction" are concepts through which it is possible to understand and describe the dynamics of this process, dynamics that we are able to observe when taking a multi-level approach.

As an international bureaucracy, having expert knowledge in the field of "women, peace and security" increases the authority and legitimacy of DPKO. The expansion that has taken place with the adoption of the "women, peace and security" agenda in DPKO has created space for increased pressures to fulfill the obligations the organization has committed to in this respect. Pressures and demands are raised through formal and informal channels, with the Security Council and the C34 representing such formal forums where member states seek to affect policy and set priorities for the work of DPKO. Additionally, there are many strategies that bypass these formal mechanisms. These include making alliances with relevant entities within the UN system, within DPKO, and funding specific initiatives. IOs possess a certain degree of autonomy and they use this autonomy in different ways. We have also seen that member states are able to use this autonomy to further their own aims.

The normative environment also constitutes certain pressures. Sometimes the tasks DPKO are mandated to fulfill clash with their basic claim for legitimacy as neutral actors carrying out the requests of member states. Since member states have different priorities, this means that DPKO must be very good at managing their external environment in order to continue to be perceived as legitimate actors. The complex nature of the external environment causes

inconsistencies in expectations and demands, and mandates often reflect these inconsistencies. Mandates are therefore sometimes weak and not clearly operationalized, which leaves space for interpretation in their application, creating favorable conditions for hypocrisy.

The rhetorical and structural shifts that have taken place in the organization represent an effort to respond to pressures from its environment at headquarters level. When translating these commitments into practice, there is "friction", such as when policies created at headquarters encounter specific settings. When the mandate has not been fully internalized in the organization, we see an inconsistent approach to its implementation, often understood as a lack of political will and commitment. But this lack of commitment can also stem from the pressures and demands inflicted upon the organization and its staff by the external environment. The ability to make decisions and priorities to deal with context-specific or immediate concerns is crucial to the organization's survival, which highlights the functional aspect of hypocrisy. This is most easily observable at the level of the field mission, where both *organized hypocrisy* and *the organization of hypocrisy* ensures the mission's ability to function and survive. Because the field mission experiences other pressures than what is felt at headquarters, its ability to function as a separate structure allows it to adapt and survive.

My findings imply that the relationship with the host country as well as the host country situation are factors that impact on the missions ability to fulfill its mandates, how it chooses to do so, and how priorities are made. The personal conviction and preferences of the SRSG are also important in shaping the mission, due to the organizational structure and institutional arrangements. The process of implementing Resolution 1325 is not independent from this; it is affected and shaped by these circumstances. Member states need to consider going beyond short-term funding in order to deal with root causes that affect the process of implementing issues of "women, peace and security" in the field.

DPKO is an organization that has prominent political and action roles, which makes it even more susceptible to hypocrisy because it has to respond in both talk and action. The field mission must be seen as carrying out its action role, and needs headquarters to mediate the political role so that it is able to carry out its work. That does not mean that the field mission is not affected by political pressures. It is highly sensitive to accusations of impartiality, but it is nonetheless its primary focus to carry out the action. *The organization of hypocrisy* can also be observed at headquarters, where the Gender Advisory Team can be seen as a separate

structure responding to specific requests from the external environment. It is important to note in this regard, that the internal structure of DPKO may in fact reflect the inconsistency and variation in its external environment. Norway has also struggled to integrate the issues in Resolution 1325 into its armed forces and focuses on symbolic action and political pressure to set a precedent and to be seen as a leading example. In Norway's case, for the symbolic act of presenting a female candidate for force commander to have the desired impact, I argue that it must be accompanied by increased troop contributions.

While focusing on how hypocrisy manifests itself at a systemic level, it is important also to mention how individuals can play a role. Personal qualities as well as authority and ability to navigate the UN system and the external environment will impact on achievements. These individuals may be found in the organization itself, but they may also exist in its external environment. This is also "friction" in the sense that it is an encounter between the organization's policies and an individual which has the ability to shape and advance these further. When looking at how policy travels, we see that there is a range of actors trying to affect the outcome using different strategies. When headquarters translate policy into something meaningful, others want to affect how that happens. The interactions between the levels of analysis must be understood as global encounters across distance and difference, and therefore the implementation of Resolution 1325 must be seen as a global process. "Friction" drives this process forward, but also causes it to move more slowly. It can be observed in those encounters that result in hypocrisy, but also those that have different outcomes.

My study has showed that the process of implementing Resolution 1325 in DPKO shares characteristics associated with how hypocrisy has been studied in International Organizations. This does not mean that DPKO intentionally uses hypocrisy to avoid gender issues; rather I use the theories of hypocrisy to explain dynamics that affect the implementation process. Both the concept of *organized hypocrisy* and *the organization of hypocrisy* are applicable to the processes that take place in DPKO. By looking at the interplay between the different levels of analysis, I have been able to show that hypocrisy can be perceived as a path to survival. It is constituted both in how individual staff members have to make choices when faced with challenges and conflicting pressures in their work, and in the way different structures serve conflicting demands. Separate structures may impede the implementation of 1325, but they also serve a critical function, as they ensure the ability to respond to unique situations and secure the survival and functioning of a mission. By taking an approach that focuses on

process across three levels of analysis, I have been able to show how policy is produced, informed, and implemented, through a global process of interaction and encounters across these levels. The complexity of these encounters infers that this process is not at all straight-forward, with the different levels interacting through formal and informal encounters, crisscrossing the levels of analysis.

While many issues and processes can be studied from afar, actually being able to talk to the people involved in the process has been of crucial importance to my analysis. Many things happen outside formal processes, and can thus not be traced solely through studying relevant literature or official documents. Because the nature of policy production is so complex, it is important to study the process. As I have showed through my analysis, policy is produced, informed, and enacted through much more than written documents or official statements. The multi-sited approach makes it possible to show how this is a global process, involving actors outside the New York office buildings of UN Headquarters. Had I focused on only one level, I would not have been able to grasp the particularities of this process.

My study also situates Resolution 1325 in a larger context, where it rightfully belongs. By studying the implementation of Resolution 1325 as a specific case, I have been able to show how its implementation is not a case of "do" or "don't"; it is not neutral or apolitical to its constituency as Resolution 1325 embodies "friction". I have discussed the irony of its universal appeal both in terms of how it represents conflicting demands and expectations from DPKO's external environment, as well as how this allows it to travel and expand across the levels of analysis. Without a multi-level approach, and the focus on process rather than isolated actions and events, I would not have been able to grasp this global aspect of Resolution 1325. Ironically, these characteristics, the inherent "friction" it embodies, is what keeps it in motion and advances the agenda, while at the same time it is what constrains its universal aspirations. Turning issues of "women, peace and security" into a technical issue of mandate implementation is indeed "friction" itself, because it is the encounter between different policy worlds. The encounters that seem odd and out of place are indeed the most productive, in the sense that they inform and shape policy as it moves across distances and differences. These encounters require further research, and they must be studied as a holistic process that travels across different levels of analysis. IOs can therefore not be understood as cut off from their externalities, and we can learn much more from studying them across conceptual, and even geographical, spaces.

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List of Interviews

Interview 2012a, DPKO, New York, Spring 2012.

Interview 2012b, DPKO, New York, Spring 2012.

Interview 2012c, DPKO, New York, Spring 2012.

Interview 2012d, DPKO, New York, Spring 2012.

Interview 2012e, DPKO, Oslo, Spring 2012.

Interview 2012f, UN, New York, Spring 2012.

Interview 2012g, UN, New York, Spring 2012.

Interview 2012h, Norwegian Government Official, MOD, Oslo, Spring 2012.

Interview 2012i, Norwegian Government Official, MFA, Oslo, Spring 2012.

Interview 2012j, Norwegian Government Official, MFA, Oslo, Spring 2012.

Interview 2012k, Norwegian Government Official, MFA, New York, Spring 2012.

Interview 2012l, Norwegian Government Official, MFA, New York, Spring 2012.

Interview 2012m, Delegate from UN Permanent Mission in New York, New York, Spring 2012.

Interview 2012n, New York Diplomat (non-Norwegian), New York, Spring 2012.

Interview 2012o, Civil Society Representative, New York, Spring 2012.

Interview 2012p, Researcher, New York, Spring 2012.

Interview 2012q, Researcher, Oslo, Spring 2012.

Appendix I: Interview Guide

1. Do you mind telling me about your work in relation to Resolution 1325 (and DPKO)?

2. The implementation of the Women, Peace and Security agenda at the UN/DPKO; successes, challenges

3. Can you say something about obstacles to the implementation process?

4. The relationship between DPKO and other important stakeholders (TCCs, PCCs, member states, other UN agencies or entities)

5. How would you describe the effect of applying a gender perspective to peacekeeping?

6. How is the relationship between headquarters and the field missions?

7. What priorities do you/your department consider more important?

8. Who are more influential in defining the priorities of the work of DPKO?

9. Where does the initiative come from? (From the ground, from the interests of member states)

For Norwegian Government employees:

10. How does the Norwegian Government (work to) influence the work of DPKO?

11. Can you say something about cooperation/partnership with other member states, NGOs, UN agencies?

Security Council

Resolution 1325 (2000)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 4213th meeting, on 31 October 2000

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 1261 (1999) of 25 August 1999, 1265 (1999) of 17 September 1999, 1296 (2000) of 19 April 2000 and 1314 (2000) of 11 August 2000, as well as relevant statements of its President, and *recalling also* the statement of its President to the press on the occasion of the United Nations Day for Women's Rights and International Peace (International Women's Day) of 8 March 2000 (SC/6816),

Recalling also the commitments of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (A/52/231) as well as those contained in the outcome document of the twenty-third Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly entitled "Women 2000: Gender Equality, Development and Peace for the Twenty-First Century" (A/S-23/10/Rev.1), in particular those concerning women and armed conflict,

Bearing in mind the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the primary responsibility of the Security Council under the Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security,

Expressing concern that civilians, particularly women and children, account for the vast majority of those adversely affected by armed conflict, including as refugees and internally displaced persons, and increasingly are targeted by combatants and armed elements, and *recognizing* the consequent impact this has on durable peace and reconciliation,

Reaffirming the important role of women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts and in peace-building, and *stressing* the importance of their equal participation and full involvement in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security, and the need to increase their role in decision-making with regard to conflict prevention and resolution,

Reaffirming also the need to implement fully international humanitarian and human rights law that protects the rights of women and girls during and after conflicts,

Emphasizing the need for all parties to ensure that mine clearance and mine awareness programmes take into account the special needs of women and girls,

Recognizing the urgent need to mainstream a gender perspective into peacekeeping operations, and in this regard *noting* the Windhoek Declaration and the Namibia Plan of Action on Mainstreaming a Gender Perspective in Multidimensional Peace Support Operations (S/2000/693),

Recognizing also the importance of the recommendation contained in the statement of its President to the press of 8 March 2000 for specialized training for all peacekeeping personnel on the protection, special needs and human rights of women and children in conflict situations,

Recognizing that an understanding of the impact of armed conflict on women and girls, effective institutional arrangements to guarantee their protection and full participation in the peace process can significantly contribute to the maintenance and promotion of international peace and security,

Noting the need to consolidate data on the impact of armed conflict on women and girls,

1.   *Urges* Member States to ensure increased representation of women at all decision-making levels in national, regional and international institutions and mechanisms for the prevention, management, and resolution of conflict;

2.   *Encourages* the Secretary-General to implement his strategic plan of action (A/49/587) calling for an increase in the participation of women at decision-making levels in conflict resolution and peace processes;

3.   *Urges* the Secretary-General to appoint more women as special representatives and envoys to pursue good offices on his behalf, and in this regard *calls on* Member States to provide candidates to the Secretary-General, for inclusion in a regularly updated centralized roster;

4.   *Further urges* the Secretary-General to seek to expand the role and contribution of women in United Nations field-based operations, and especially among military observers, civilian police, human rights and humanitarian personnel;

5.   *Expresses* its willingness to incorporate a gender perspective into peacekeeping operations, and *urges* the Secretary-General to ensure that, where appropriate, field operations include a gender component;

6.   *Requests* the Secretary-General to provide to Member States training guidelines and materials on the protection, rights and the particular needs of women, as well as on the importance of involving women in all peacekeeping and peace-building measures, *invites* Member States to incorporate these elements as well as HIV/AIDS awareness training into their national training programmes for military and civilian police personnel in preparation for deployment, and *further requests* the Secretary-General to ensure that civilian personnel of peacekeeping operations receive similar training;

7.   *Urges* Member States to increase their voluntary financial, technical and logistical support for gender-sensitive training efforts, including those undertaken by relevant funds and programmes, inter alia, the United Nations Fund for Women and United Nations Children's Fund, and by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and other relevant bodies;

8.   *Calls on* all actors involved, when negotiating and implementing peace agreements, to adopt a gender perspective, including, inter alia:

(a)   The special needs of women and girls during repatriation and resettlement and for rehabilitation, reintegration and post-conflict reconstruction;

(b)   Measures that support local women's peace initiatives and indigenous processes for conflict resolution, and that involve women in all of the implementation mechanisms of the peace agreements;

(c)   Measures that ensure the protection of and respect for human rights of women and girls, particularly as they relate to the constitution, the electoral system, the police and the judiciary;

9.   *Calls upon* all parties to armed conflict to respect fully international law applicable to the rights and protection of women and girls, especially as civilians, in particular the obligations applicable to them under the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Additional Protocols thereto of 1977, the Refugee Convention of 1951 and the Protocol thereto of 1967, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women of 1979 and the Optional Protocol thereto of 1999 and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child of 1989 and the two Optional Protocols thereto of 25 May 2000, and to bear in mind the relevant provisions of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court;

10.   *Calls on* all parties to armed conflict to take special measures to protect women and girls from gender-based violence, particularly rape and other forms of sexual abuse, and all other forms of violence in situations of armed conflict;

11.   *Emphasizes* the responsibility of all States to put an end to impunity and to prosecute those responsible for genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes including those relating to sexual and other violence against women and girls, and in this regard *stresses* the need to exclude these crimes, where feasible from amnesty provisions;

12.   *Calls upon* all parties to armed conflict to respect the civilian and humanitarian character of refugee camps and settlements, and to take into account the particular needs of women and girls, including in their design, and recalls its resolutions 1208 (1998) of 19 November 1998 and 1296 (2000) of 19 April 2000;

13.   *Encourages* all those involved in the planning for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration to consider the different needs of female and male ex-combatants and to take into account the needs of their dependants;

14.   *Reaffirms* its readiness, whenever measures are adopted under Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations, to give consideration to their potential impact on the civilian population, bearing in mind the special needs of women and girls, in order to consider appropriate humanitarian exemptions;

15.   *Expresses* its willingness to ensure that Security Council missions take into account gender considerations and the rights of women, including through consultation with local and international women's groups;

16.   *Invites* the Secretary-General to carry out a study on the impact of armed conflict on women and girls, the role of women in peace-building and the gender dimensions of peace processes and conflict resolution, and *further invites* him to

submit a report to the Security Council on the results of this study and to make this available to all Member States of the United Nations;

17. *Requests* the Secretary-General, where appropriate, to include in his reporting to the Security Council progress on gender mainstreaming throughout peacekeeping missions and all other aspects relating to women and girls;

18. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

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