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Declaration

I, Qinwen Gao, declare that this thesis is a result of my research investigations and findings. Sources of information other than my own have been acknowledged and a reference list has been appended. This work has not been previously submitted to any other university for award of any type of academic degree.

Signature.....

Date.....

Abstract:

China's recent engagement in Africa has attracted a lot of attention. China has become a major economic force in Africa with a big amount of trade, investment and aid. Some criticisms, if not a demonization of China, often use a double-standard to measure the Chinese engagement in Africa compared with the Western one. This study tries to find information from the executors of the Chinese engagement in Africa and to make a balanced appraisal. The objectives include: 1. to assess the Chinese road to Africa; 2. to explore the chief feature of Chinese engagement in Africa; 3. to evaluate the impact on Africa's development by China's engagement.

The outcome embodies three points: 1. the rapid growth and diversified constitution necessitate an effective regulation on Chinese people in Africa; 2. the Chinese no-strings attached policy doesn't impose any universalistic rules to Africa and leaves the self-determination to Africa; 3. Africa needs to find an appropriate way of development by itself, while China serves as both an opportunity and a challenge. To achieve mutual benefits and to develop the China-Africa relationship in a sustainable way, both China and Africa need to regulate the cooperation, especially when the scope is broader and the actors are diversified. Since the regulation of Chinese engagement in favor of African economy and citizens depends particularly on Africa, African countries should get motivated. A lack of an appropriate way of development is the most pressing problem for Africa. China's own development is a process of experiments, in the words of Deng Xiaoping: "we are crossing the river by feeling the stones." Chinese way of engagement leaves the autonomy to Africa. Africa can find its way to solve its problems. In this process, if the Sino-African relations are well managed, China could be helpful in many aspects.

Based on my findings, I argue that Sino-African mutual benefit is possible if Africa well uses the chance presented by China. It depends on Africa to regulate the Chinese engagement in favor of its own benefits.

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Acronym list:

BBC	-	British Broadcasting Corporation
CCTV	-	China Central Television
CEO	-	Chief Executive Officer
DAC	-	Development Assistance Committee
ODA	-	Official Development Assistance
OECD	-	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
FOCAC	-	Forum on China-Africa Cooperation
GDP	-	Gross Domestic Product
IFI	-	International Finance Institution
IMF	-	International Monetary Fund
PRC	-	People's Republic of China
SME	-	Small and Medium Enterprise
SOE	-	State Owned Enterprise
UN	-	United Nations
UNSC	-	United Nations Security Council
WTO	-	World Trade Organization

1. Introduction

China has become the largest new investor, trader, buyer and aid donor in several African countries, and a major new economic force in sub-Saharan Africa as a whole (Rotberg, 2008). China has given US\$ 5.5 billion in development aid to Africa between 2000-2007, and cancelled more than US\$ 10 billion in debt owed by African countries, which now account one third of Chinese development assistance (Phnelt and Abel, 2007). Throughout Sub-Saharan Africa, Chinese companies are building vital infrastructures (Zafar, 2007), including “houses, roads, bridges, railways, airports, ports, telecommunications, power networks, water supply and drainage systems, and hospitals through means such as assistance, project contracting, investment cooperation, and expanding channels of financing” (Chinese State Council, 2010). Chinese trade with sub-Saharan Africa is growing at 50 percent a year (Rotberg, 2008). About 40 percent of Africa’s total exports to Asia are to China; about 30 percent of Asia’s total exports to Africa are from China (Ibid: 4). In 2008, China’s trade with Africa totaled US\$ 107 billion. Although China-Africa trade volume dropped to US\$ 91.07 billion in 2009 as a result of the international financial crisis, China became Africa's largest trade partner that year for the first time (Chinese State Council, 2010). Since 2000, driven by the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), China's investment in Africa has been growing rapidly, gradually forming a pluralized investment pattern. Meanwhile, Africa has also become active in its investment in China, and the business of a number of African enterprises is fast growing in the Chinese market. In 2009, Chinese investment in Africa had overtaken Britain’s and France’s, and stood only behind that of the US (Sautman and Yan, 2009), rocketing to US\$ 9.33 billion by the end of 2009.

Official estimates of the number of Chinese in Africa vary dramatically. Xinhua, China's official news agency, estimates as many as 750,000 Chinese working or living “for extended periods” on the continent (French and Polgreen, 2007). Perhaps one of the most telling signs of increased migration between the two regions is the rising number of weekly flights

between China and Africa (Politzer, 2008). In 2007, Chinese airlines began launching one flight per week between Beijing and Lagos, Nigeria's largest city (ibid). Currently, three Chinese air companies offer routes to Africa: China Southern Airlines, China Eastern Airlines, and Hainan Airlines, which offers nonstop flights from Beijing to Cairo three times per week and a route from Beijing to Johannesburg via Guangzhou twice per week (ibid). In July 2008, Emirates Airline also began offering six flights per week to Guangzhou, with connections in Dubai for those coming from Cape Town, Lagos, Cairo, Addis Ababa, and Nairobi (ibid). Now you can find Chinese families living in a small village in Chad or Ethiopia as retail dealers or doctors.

At present, the two distant continents are closely connected. As stated by Rotberg (2008): *China and Africa desperately need each other. China cannot easily grow without Africa. Nor can sub-Saharan Africa (a collection of forty-eight disparate countries) subsist and now prosper, without China. Africa and China, in Auden's terms, have at last met, and their recently forged and continuously reinvigorated, mutually reinforced, interactive relationship is already tight and will for decades grow even stronger, more thoroughly intertwined.*

But meanwhile, contrary to the rosy picture of friendship and mutual benefit, some Western and African journalists and politicians maintain that China is a new colonizing power, exploiting Africa's natural resources and harming its quest for democracy and human rights. Some have voiced concerns over how Chinese-owned firms treat African workers (Walsh, 2006) and their neglect of local environment. Some criticize that Chinese exports crowd out African goods. The blame for the collapse of African local industry is also laid at the door of Chinese traders and investors. BBC even broadcasted a documentary series named "The Chinese are coming" in 2011. In this series, the Chinese are importing large amounts of oil from Angola; Chinese chicken traders are outcompeting local business in Zambia's Lusaka Market; and in Congo, the working conditions in a Chinese smelting plant are worrying, etc. After all, a fierce debate is going on about Chinese's role in Africa.

Now the Sino-African trade and Chinese investment in Africa are widely spread in 49 African countries, covering a wide range of sectors. Following the Chinese state-owned enterprises

and organizations, China's private business sector is growing rapidly in Africa. Since more and more Chinese have an experience in Africa and they are the actors on stage, it is necessary to hear their voice. Their motivations, behaviors and feelings definitely need to be taken into account when assessing Chinese engagement in Africa.

1.1 Problem statement

Many arguments claim Chinese recent grand involvement (or reentrance) into Africa has already negatively influenced African development and this trend will sharpen. Yet different opinions linger in our ears. Not a few people consider this as a favorable turn for Africa. The cause of the debate is linked to different stands and different interpretations, and most importantly different sources of information. Beijing's role in Africa--- like that of all other foreign actors--- is diverse, and its effect on the continent varies widely, depending on local economic and political circumstances (Taylor, 2009: 3). However, what I want to discuss is not a specific problem in a specific country but opinions towards Chinese appearance in Africa as a whole which is historically and socially unitary. The Chinese people who go to Africa basically hold similar purposes and the influence they bring to the development of different African countries is probably in a same way. Sub-Saharan Africa accounts for the vast majority of Sino-African trade (Taylor, 2009: 2), and it is on sub-Saharan Africa that this thesis focuses. This study tries to find information from the executors of the Chinese engagement in Africa and to make a balanced appraisal. Combined with the political economy in China, the data obtained demonstrates that economic interests are the main driver instead of a single strategic agenda. African countries need to make an effort to regulate the order of this engagement in cooperation with the Chinese side. Sino-African relations can result in a win-win situation if African states make full use of the deals done with China.

1.2 Objectives and research questions

Based on the problem statement above, the objectives and research questions of this thesis are as follows:

Objective 1: to assess the Chinese road to Africa

Questions:

1. What's the constitution of Chinese people in Africa?
2. What motivates them to go to Africa?
3. What's the role of Chinese government in managing Chinese activities in Africa?
4. What are the challenges in Chinese engagement in Africa?

Objective 2: to explore the chief feature of Chinese engagement in Africa

Questions:

1. What are the main differences between Chinese and Western engagement in Africa?
2. Why is there such a difference?
3. Will there be any change in this feature?

Objective 3: to evaluate the impact on Africa's development by China's engagement

Questions:

1. What kind of advantages and disadvantages does Africa have in its development compared to China?
2. To what extent and in what ways do African countries benefit from the Sino-African relationship?
3. What are the challenges that Chinese involvement poses to Africa?

1.3 Justification

The growing significance of the China-Africa relationship has led to a burgeoning 'grey' literature in the popular and business press (Ajakaiye and Kaplinsky, 2009). The information is anecdotal, and often highly prejudicial, generally generated by journalists from the west

writing for an audience which is increasingly feeling the competitive pressure exerted by Chinese economic and political actors in Africa (Ibid). Most works regarding Chinese engagement in Africa come from the West, which is keen to brand China as irresponsible and reckless. It is however doubtful that the criticism is a genuine concern for African welfare rather than the jealousy of a competitor (Taylor, 2009). The Chinese people in Africa must have some ideas about the real China in Africa. Unfortunately much of this is poorly informed. In the academic domain of African studies, the opinions of Chinese people in Africa should be crucial in understanding Sino-African relationship and to some extent help to dispel the various myths about Chinese engagement in Africa, whether the positive description as friendly cooperation or the skeptical ones as “rogue donor”. Besides, as an important economic, social and political factor in Africa, their opinions might impact the further Chinese engagement in Africa.

Although the Western development workers and Africa have been questing the way of development of Africa for a long time and have been seeking for a change, the reality is still disillusioning. The “structural adjustment” initiated by western government and adopted by African government seems to be a failure. The idea of turning to China as an alternative for prosperity has captured the imagination of many ordinary Africans, although others fear the threat of competition from the Chinese industrial juggernaut, and the rise of Chinese traders competing in local African markets (Brautigam, 2009). In some countries, a Chinese model is sketched. For example, an economic model of Special Economic Zone has already been imported from China (Davies, 2008). The Chinese people in Africa have experienced Chinese economic take-off and witnessed African stagnation. They are supposed to have some original ideas about the Chinese influence on African development. They are entitled to assess the possibility of a win-win situation.

1.4 Structure of the thesis

The thesis is organized into 5 Chapters, among which this introduction is Chapter 1, which includes the problem statement, objectives and justification of the study. After, I will present

the literature review in Chapter 2, where I firstly provide the explanations of some concepts appearing in this thesis, such as neocolonialism, development aid and resource curse; secondly contextualize and discuss both Chinese policy towards Africa and the political economy of China; and then reveal the ongoing debate on Chinese engagement in Africa. Chapter 3 provides the methods employed during the study, including data collection and data analysis. Chapter 4 is the main part of this thesis. I analyze and discuss the findings of this study. Corresponding to the research objectives, I present the findings through three parts including the diversification of Chinese actors in Africa; the no strings attached policy and the impact on African development. In Chapter 5 as the conclusion, I sum up my findings of the study, give my recommendations and offer some opinions about future research.

2. Literature review

In this chapter, I present a conceptual and contextual framework, because I think it is necessary to outline some background information before discussing the issue. In the first part, I will explain some concepts appearing in this thesis. In the second part, first, I will provide the Chinese policies towards Africa and political economy in China so that it is easier to understand the motivations and actions of Chinese people in Africa. Then, I will outline the ongoing debate about Chinese engagement in Africa.

2.1 Conceptual background

2.1.1 Neocolonialism

At the beginning, the term “neocolonialism” was widespread used, particularly in reference to Africa, soon after the process of decolonization through a series of national independence movements in the colonies following World War II. After the independence, some national leaders and critics argued that these countries were being subjected to a new form of colonialism, exercised by the former colonial powers and other developed countries.

Obadina (2000) described neocolonialism as a new form of imperial rule stage managed by the colonial powers to give the colonized the illusion of freedom. At the 1961 All-African People’s Conference held in Cairo neo-colonialism was defined as “the survival of the colonial system in spite of the formal recognition of political independence in emerging countries which become the victims of an indirect and subtle form of domination by political, economic, social, military or technical means”(Obadina, 2000). According to Nkrumah (1965), “the essence of neo-colonialism is that the State which is subject to it is, in theory, independent and has all the outward trappings of international sovereignty. In reality its economic system and thus its political policy is directed from outside.”

To determine whether countries or transnational economic institutions are practicing

neocolonialism, we should first assess if they involve themselves in the affairs of less powerful countries, or saying in another way, if they employ aid, financial, and trade policies to dominate less powerful countries. Second, we need to estimate if they control a single market fixing and imposing unequal conditions to the weaker nations who are often characterized with raw materials and cheap labor. Thus the question of who are neocolonialists of Africa needs careful and detailed analysis.

2.1.2 Development aid

Foreign aid is, simply speaking, goods, technical services or finance provided at below market prices or for free to governments or population groups. The development aid is often reported as Official Development Assistance (ODA) now. According to Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD, ODA comprises funding from official agencies to developing countries (those with a per capita income below a regularly adjusted threshold) and to multilateral institutions (such as the United Nations Development Program or the World Bank) (Brautigam, 2009). This funding has to meet two criteria. First, the purpose of the funding must be primarily to promote economic development and welfare in the recipient country. Second, it must be given on a concessional basis (Brautigam, 2009: 14). It could be either grant or concessional loan. We can divide development aid into two categories, bilateral aid and multilateral aid. Bilateral aid refers to government to government aid. Multilateral aid bases on funding gathered by multilateral agencies, such as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, regional Development Banks, etc. ¹

Despite nearly sixty years of aid, wealthy countries still do not have a way to ensure that their assistance will actually promote development (economic, social, sustainable, people-centered – however it is defined) and reduce poverty (Brautigam, 2009). Convictions about how aid can best foster development change regularly. From an early occupation with infrastructure and industry, to, later, integrated rural development programs and (briefly) basic human needs, we shifted to structural adjustment, then governance and democracy, Grameen Bank-inspired

¹ Based on a lecture given by Stein Terje Vikan in Norwegian University of Life Science on Sep. 2010

microfinance, conditional cash transfers, and so on (ibid). Donor countries set dozens of conditions that recipients had to meet before they could receive installments of money. Theoretically, if a country in economic crisis took enough steps to liberalize markets, increase efficiency, and reduce the heavy hand of the state, it would gain access to credit from the World Bank, the IMF, and the rest of the global banks (ibid). In contrast, the Chinese non-interference policy requires no additional conditions before offering aid to recipient countries apart from not recognizing Taiwan. This external precondition does not constrain the recipient countries from running their development programmes according to their own ideas. Usually, it becomes a bargaining chip that is used by some recipient countries to ask for more aid. However, considering the effects of the aid, the Chinese non-interference aid policy needs a balanced appraisal.

2.1.3 Resource curse thesis

The idea that rich natural resources can be more an economic curse than a blessing began to emerge in the 1980s. In this light, the term “resource curse thesis” was first used to describe how countries rich in natural resources were unable to use that wealth to boost their economies and how, counter-intuitively, these countries had lower economic growth than countries without such an abundance of natural resources (Auty, 1993). Historical experience shows that rich endowments of oil and metals may weaken a government’s incentives for diversification and promote wasteful expenditure (Zafar, 2007). The industrialization of these countries often gets hindered. Capital intensive natural resources abundance also creates opportunities for rent-seeking behavior which is often associated with corruption (ibid). Above is the internal influence of natural resources. Externally, resources often motivate conflicts, and shape strategies of global powers based on interests. Usually, the geography and political economy of natural resources can explain the violation of sovereignty around valuable resource areas and trading networks. As such, armed conflicts in the post-Cold War period are increasingly characterized by a specific political ecology closely linked to natural resources.

Resources can be both an opportunity and an obstacle in Africa's development. It depends on how Africans manage it. With regard to the impact of China on Africa or the impact on China in Africa, the predictions of "resource curse" will depend on the comparative advantage and especially regulation endowment of Africa. This condition is also applicable to resource-poor countries. But resource-rich countries should be extremely careful towards other countries' intervention, the purpose of which is often a control of resources. In this respect, China's non-interference policy could reduce this risk.

2.2 Contextual background

2.2.1 The PRC's policies towards Africa

The PRC's presence in Africa is not new. Since the founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC), due to the isolation from the U.S. and Europe, China pursued to unite the Asian and African countries. Despite some fluctuations in the bilateral relations, certain principles have remained constant, like equal treatment, respect for sovereignty and common development (Li, 2007). To accurately judge China's strategic consideration of Sino-African relations, it's necessary to understand both continuity and transformation in China's policy towards Africa.

From the establishment of the PRC in 1949 to its economic opening in 1978, China's policy towards Africa was ideologically motivated. China placed itself on the front line of the struggle against colonialism, imperialism and revisionism in the third world (Li, 2007). During this period, China supported the political struggle for African independence and provided free aid to Africa. The aid projects resulted in positive impressions in the minds of African people, laying a solid foundation for the Sino-African relations. By 1978, China had established diplomatic relations with 43 African counties (ibid).

From 1978 to late 1980s, the end of the Cultural Revolution witnessed a short period of decline in China-African relations. The focus of the government was changed to domestic economic development. Accordingly, relations between China and the West heated up.

China's policy towards Africa cooled down and also shifted to practical goals like "developing together", by attaching importance to economic and technological cooperation. The government encouraged state owned companies to bid on contracts, and form joint-ventures abroad (Brautigam, 2009).

The 1990s was a period of consolidation. The events of Tiananmen in 1989 resulted in a severe crisis in China's relations with the West but didn't affect its relations with the third world (Taylor, 2004). It was still the old friends who gave China the necessary sympathy and support (Taylor, 2004). Since 1992, Chinese foreign minister would visit Africa first every year. Sino-African relations have been developing in all fields.

In 2000, the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), which comprised 46 of 53 African countries, encouraged the economic cooperation to enter a new realm by pledging debt relief, training programs and an investment fund. The need for export markets and imports of raw materials is considered to be a stimulation of a closer involvement of China in Africa. In January 2006, China issued its African White Paper aimed at seeking the establishment of a new strategic partnership with Africa marked by an intensification of dialogue on the political front combined with closer economic cooperation. In November 2006, a high-level China-Africa summit of FOCAC, with the participation of 48 African heads of state, was held in Beijing to cement trade and investment relations between the world's largest developing country and the continent with the largest number of developing countries.

2.2.2 Political economy of China

The functioning of the world economy is determined by both markets and the policies of nation-states (Gilpin, 2001). According to Gilpin (2001), the political purposes, rivalries, and cooperation of states interact to create the framework of political relations within which economic forces operate: States set the rules that individual entrepreneurs and multinational firms must follow, while economic and technological forces shape the policies and interests of

individual states and the political relations among states. For this reason, both political and economic analyses are required to understand the actual functioning and evolution of a country's economic policy.

During the first three decades after the establishment of PRC, Chinese economic ties with the outside world were very few. According to Li (2006), China made a strategic transformation of foreign and domestic policies in 1982. The emphasis was shifted to economic development. Gradually China's understanding of the current international theme had changed from "War and Revolution" to "Peace and Development". The notion that economy should serve diplomacy changed to that of diplomacy serving economy. This transformation has promoted a rapid economic growth. This extraordinary economic growth has led to the need to obtain more raw materials and energy and to exploit a larger market. In December 2001, China was admitted to the WTO. That year, China's tenth five-year plan marked the escalation of China's own globalization, "with Chinese characteristics" (Brautigam, 2009). Africa and other parts of the developing world gained a lot of importance for economic and political reasons, although its strategic stress still centered on the United States, Europe and Japan. Beijing's engagement in Africa could address three central political and economic challenges (Brautigam, 2009): First, Chinese rapid economic growth was already outpacing its natural resources base. Second, Beijing wanted to establish a reputation as a rising but responsible power and convince other developing countries that China's rise would be peaceful. Third, China needed to expand to new markets, and manage the upgrading of its increasingly "mature" domestic industries.

However, in contrast to the past, China's foreign diplomacy has been driven not only by the government's learning skill and strategic concerns with respect to national and economic security, social stability and foreign strategy, but also by the enterprises' strong commercial motives to "go abroad" and the personal incentives of their management (Taylor, 2009). Indeed, the more China liberalizes, the less easy it is to control private businesses domestically, let alone abroad. Even the largest Chinese companies, which remain under direct government control, may be spurred on by the competition to behave autonomously

(ibid).

2.2.3 The ongoing debate

China's active involvement in Africa has drawn attention and critics not only from Africa but especially from the West. Numerous Western journalists and politicians maintain that China is a new colonizing power, exploiting Africa's natural resources and harming its quest for democracy and human rights. Some African critics fear the threat of competition from the Chinese industrial juggernaut and the rise of Chinese traders competing in local African markets, although the idea of China as a model for prosperity has captured the imagination of many ordinary Africans (Brautigam, 2009). Meanwhile, others have voiced concerns over the lack of social and environmental responsibilities of Chinese-owned firms. But also many people from different standpoints believe Chinese action to be beneficial to African development. The Chinese government claims that their activities in Africa will result in a win-win situation. Here the debate is going on about Chinese engagement in foreign aid, trade and investment in Africa.

2.2.3.1 Neo-colonialist or development partner?

From some western perspectives, Chinese foreign aid, trade and investment in Africa are associated with a scramble for raw materials. Critics have claimed that, for the most part, Africa is exporting oil and other raw materials to China while importing cheap manufactured Chinese goods—an exchange remarkably similar to that of the colonial era (Taylor, 2009). Indeed, the accusation that China is a new colonizing power, exploiting Africa's natural resources and flooding the continent with low-priced manufactured products while turning a blind eye to its autocracies is at the core of most critiques of China's current engagement with Africa (Tull, 2006; Taylor, 2009).

Meanwhile, some scholars point out that Chinese activities in Africa harm African interests in much the same manner that Western policies do, through disadvantageous terms of trade, the

extraction of natural resources, oppressive labor regimes, and support for authoritarian rulers, all common features of the modern world system (Sautman and Yan, 2009). The fact that Africa exports raw material and imports finished products is by no means unique. Rather it characterizes virtually all of Africa's bilateral trade relations (Taylor, 2009).

The opposite side claims Chinese-African relations were established long before China's need for raw materials on the basis of mutual sympathy and common development instead of colonization. At present, the oil drilling and exploration rights that China has obtained have been secured through international bidding mechanisms in accordance with international market practices, posing no threat to any particular country (Li, 2008). According to Chinese foreign minister Yang Jiechi at a press conference, "The fact is that China's import of oil from African countries takes up only 13 percent of Africa's total oil export. And the figures of European countries and the US are each above 30 percent. China accounts for only 1/16 of the total external investment in Africa's oil sector. We are far behind the US and European countries."¹ Some people recognize that Sino-African relations are processes not of colonization but of globalization, involving the reintegration of China into the global economy- a project that has hitherto enjoyed the enthusiastic support of the capitalist West (Taylor, 2009). On the pragmatic level, China has been seeking for mutual benefit with Africa as a development partner. The investment by Chinese enterprises in this field has expanded the financial sources for African development, raised the value of such resources, and facilitated local infrastructure construction and economic development (Chinese State Council, 2010). For instance, Chinese and Malaysian enterprises have cooperated with Sudan in oil exploitation, and helped that country establish a modern petroleum industry featuring integrated upstream and downstream operation, which substantially increased Sudan's financial revenue and played an essential role in improving the livelihood of the local people (ibid). On the ideological level, China never issued orders to African countries and its engagement in Africa will offer a chance to enhance its image at home and abroad as a

¹ Foreign Affairs Ministry of the PRC, 2010. *Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi Answers Questions from Domestic and Overseas Journalists on China's Foreign Policy*.

<http://big5.fmprc.gov.cn/gate/big5/www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t662388.htm> [Accessed on 1 March, 2011]

peacefully rising but “responsible” power (Brautigam, 2009), quite the opposite from a “colonial” power.

2.2.3.2 About non-interference policy

“We like Chinese investment because we have one meeting, we discuss what they want to do, and then they just do it. There are no benchmarks or preconditions.”

-Sahr Johnny, Sierra Leone ambassador to Beijing, 2005 (Zafar, 2007)

Nevertheless, the West criticizes that the unconditional aid and investment undermines the initiatives Western countries have undertaken. They have endeavored to use conditional aid as a means to fight corruption and improve standards of governance in Africa. In contrast, China helps “rogue” regimes, like Sudan and Zimbabwe, regardless of their style or quality of governance and of their human rights records (Phnelt and Abel, 2007). In return, these regimes provide China with resources. Besides, Chinese economic efforts often focus on what may be called niche markets suffering from western-imposed sanctions, because they are able to derive huge profits from rates of return on foreign direct investment (Tull, 2006).

Another saying is, “although justifiable disquiet surrounds those aspects of Chinese engagement in Africa that may undermine political and economic reform, much of Africa’s predicament is complex, so erecting a scapegoat to blame makes little sense- beyond masking ulterior anxieties regarding China’s African sojourn (Taylor, 2009: 109)”.

However, some critical theories believe the western approach of solving world poverty through intervention to be reductionist (making everyone and everything follow the same rules) and totalitarian (implying total control) (Peet and Hartwick, 2009). For the Chinese government, non-interference is a necessary condition for a normal bilateral or multilateral relationship. It is the basis for equality among countries and for integrity of sovereignty and territory. Some people argue that conditional aid or investment is just a way of self-deception, while sanctions and military intervention only make the ordinary people more miserable. For

Chinese companies, business is business, and they are less risk-averse than their western counterparts. They are willing to go to war-torn states where the challenging political and economic environment is considered as an opportunity (Tull, 2006). And in those places they are the only hope to the ordinary people for a change.

2.2.3.3 Competition versus compatibility

Some observers state that most African producers are simply not in a position to compete with Chinese companies even in Africa's domestic markets, as they are unable to undercut Chinese production costs and prices (Tull, 2006). Local retailers, too, are faced with rapidly increasing business competition from expatriate Chinese traders (Tull, 2006). Some show that the rising exports from China to sub-Saharan Africa result in a displacement of a number of industries especially for the cases of textiles and clothing, as well as machinery and equipment. China's exports to Africa have also been sharply criticized- portrayed as low quality goods which poorly serve consumers and cause the decline of African manufacturing (Sautman and Yan, 2009).

Nevertheless, some evidences show that the economic activities of Chinese entrepreneurs can make a positive contribution to local development (Brautigam, 2003 cited in Tull, 2006). China's rise enlarges the market for exports from Africa to China, stimulating competition and in return innovation within Africa (Taylor, 2009). Africa's major export products to China used to be cotton and phosphate, among other primary products. In recent years, steel, copper, chemical fertilizers and electronic items produced in Africa have successively entered China's market. In addition, intersectoral complementarities between Africa and China do exist (Broadman, 2007). Since 2000, basic consumer goods do not predominate among Chinese exports any more, but rather "machinery, electronic equipment and high- and new-tech products" (Sautman and Yan, 2009). The electronic and mechanical products can only be compatible with African products. The Chinese commerce has resulted in a wider variety of consumer goods on the market and lower daily expenses of local families.

Africa's industries have been in decline for a long time, certainly prior to the arrival of the Chinese on the scene (Taylor, 2009: 82). African imports from China mainly displace imports from elsewhere and have little effect on local production (Sautman and Yan, 2009). Chinese exports to the rest of the world also have not had the commonly asserted crushing effect on African exports (Sautman and Yan, 2009). The Export Similarity Index, a measure of overlap between the values of products countries export, is only 4% for China and the whole of Africa and almost exclusively involves textiles and clothing (ibid).

2.2.3.4 Low social and environmental standards, common phenomenon?

Western media have devoted substantial attention to the Non-Ferrous Company-Africa (NFC) Chambishi copper mine in Zambia. The upshot of these reports is that "the Chinese" are Africa's super-exploiters (Sautman and Yan, 2009). Then, exploitative working conditions were reported by Zambian employees in Chinese enterprises across the country. Workers complained of working long hours without break and of having few days off (Mutesa, 2010). Chinese employers are also noted for paying low wages to African employees and for the disparities in wages between Chinese and local workers performing the same tasks. On the other hand, hydropower dams, concessions for tropical hardwood and large rainforest plantations, roads, and large-scale mining all pose risks for the environment in Africa (Brautigam, 2009).

Yet as one investigative journalist pointed out, the problem of mine safety in Zambia was not uniquely Chinese (Brautigam, 2009). In fact, in the year up to October 2005 there had been only one fatality inside the Chinese mine itself, while more than twenty workers had died inside Mopani copper mines, a Swiss-Canadian-Zambian joint venture (Brautigam, 2009). The bad working condition is also typical in smaller local African companies. A comparative study would likely reveal that both Chinese and Western enterprises in Africa have oppressive conditions (Sautman and Yan, 2009). It should be noted however, that Chinese investments in Africa are much less profitable than those of Western countries (ibid). Besides, the complaint is considered as a cultural difference by Chinese entrepreneurs. Chinese people

work until they finish and then rest (McGreal, 2007, quoted in Mutesa, 2010). China's own development success began with similarly low wages that allowed more people to find jobs (Brautigam, 2009). In any case, the good thing is China already began to realize the importance of social responsibility. Environmental policies have also been put in place at home and overseas. New guidelines were published outlining the environmental and social responsibilities of banks and forestry companies overseas (Brautigam, 2009). This is at least a practical move.

3 Research Methods

I will in this chapter provide the methods I have used to carry out the study. First, I will present the overall research strategy and design, before describing the methods of data collection and data analysis. After, I will present some limitations of the research process and the research methods.

3.1 Research strategy and design

This study builds on an overall objective, which is to investigate the opinions of Chinese people in (or once in) Africa about Chinese engagement in Africa. To follow this objective, I applied qualitative research as the research strategy which emphasizes words rather than quantification in the collection and analysis of data (Bryman, 2008). The qualitative research focuses on the ways in which individuals interpret their social world and embodies a view of social reality as a constantly shifting emergent property of individuals' creation (ibid: 22). This exactly fits my research purpose. As the object of my study is a specific population---Chinese people in Africa, which can be considered as a case, I have chosen the case study design. The basic case study entails the detailed and intensive analysis of a single case (ibid: 52). This approach tends to be inductive, which means that results will be induced by generalization. Exponents of the case study design often favour qualitative methods, such as participant observation and unstructured interviewing, because these methods are viewed as particularly helpful in an intensive, detailed examination of a case.

3.2 Data collection

In order to carry out the research, I have collected both primary and secondary data. I'd like to emphasize the importance of secondary data in my study. Because of the lack of time and resources, I resorted to secondary data which is of good quality. The secondary data has supplemented my primary data and has allowed me more time on the analysis and

interpretation of data.

3.2.1 Sampling method

The potential interviewees of my study are quite scattered and I needed to contact interviewees who were far away from me. Because the individuals are difficult to contact, I used convenience sampling. A convenience sample is simply available by chance to the researcher (Bryman, 2008). It was also not feasible to enumerate the total Chinese population in Africa. So the mode of tracing suitable respondents was through the use of “snowball” sampling. Quite clearly, such techniques cannot possibly claim to produce a statistically representative sample, since they rely upon the social contacts between individuals to trace additional respondents (Beardsworth and Keil, 1992: 261, quoted in Bryman, 2008: 459). Through this sampling, I was able to conduct twelve interviews. Through some experiments, Guest et al. (2006, cited in Bryman, 2008) found that, by and large, data saturation was achieved once around twelve transcripts had been thematically analyzed. The respondents include four Chinese diplomats dispatched by Ministry of Foreign Affairs, two Chinese officials from Ministry of Commerce, one Chinese official from Ministry of Culture, one Chinese official from Ministry of Science and Technology, one correspondent from CCTV, one administrative manager from China National Petroleum Corporation, one management assistant and one marketing staff from Zhongxing Telecommunications Equipment Cooperation. They have experiences in African countries as follows: Botswana, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Nigeria, Niger and Sudan. And Before the interviews, the objectives of the research were made clear to all the interviewees.

The sampling process proved not easy. Originally, I preferred to interview people both from governmental sector and private sector. However, it turned out to be difficult to get access to respondents from the private sector. The first three persons I contacted are from embassies. And then the persons they introduced to me are all from the governmental sector. At last, I got in touch with a person from a privatized state owned enterprise and he introduced one of his colleagues to me. Although the sample is not definitely representative, I don't think this will

bias the research remarkably. Based on the Chinese national conditions, people probably share the same opinions. What I want to reveal are overall opinions, not necessarily individual opinions. The advantage to interview the officials is that they know systematically about the issue.

3.2.2 Semi-structured interviews

The qualitative interviewing in my study took the form of semi-structured interviews, which means that I design an interview guide in advance. Questions may not follow on exactly in the way outlined on the schedule (Bryman, 2008). Questions that are not included in the guide may be asked as the interviewer picks up on things said by interviewees (ibid: 438). But, by and large, all the questions will be asked and a similar wording will be used from interviewee to interviewee (ibid: 438). So this kind of interviewing is very flexible and thus suitable for my study aimed at people's opinions. Two rounds of interviews were taken. The second round of interviews incorporated new ideas emerged from the first round. The data used in the study were collected in January and February 2011. Because the interviewees were scattered in different places, interviews were conducted mainly through telephones and video-conferences. Due to the problem of online facilities, three interviews were carried out through email correspondence. Also, I have assured people's anonymity for those who wished.

As I planned, two types of interview guides were used because of different backgrounds of interviewees, one for the governmental officials and one for businessmen. The interview guide for the officials is prone to policies and international relations, and the other one to more practical problems, like benefits and losses. Because most of my interviews were carried out online, I found it difficult. By video-conference or telephone, it is uncomfortable to talk with a stranger, unlike face-to-face interviews where you may get familiar with each other quickly. But through the machine, it was different and I felt urgent. I always tried to finish the interviews as soon as possible with the feeling that the interviewees had other things to do and I should not waste their time. For me, the email interviews were better, because the replies were often detailed and considered. But the problem is, the written answers couldn't

necessarily concentrate on crucial points. To make up these weaknesses, I took the advantage as a Chinese to talk with people who have related knowledge about the issue and to browse Chinese internet forums for useful information.

3.3 Data analysis

After the transcription of the interviews, I tried to look for emerging and relevant themes. So I adopted a thematic analysis approach. More specifically, first I grouped questions which aimed at a similar element and then searched for themes in the responses for each group of questions. After, I looked at the responses of each interview and identified the theme in each response. At last I made a diagram to represent the relationship between the themes and the responses. So I can clearly see the trends emerging.

As I mentioned above, due to the limitations of my primary data collection, I resorted to a lot of documents which I also needed to analyze. I applied the qualitative content analysis. It comprises a searching-out of underlying themes in the materials being analyzed (Bryman, 2008). The processes through which the themes are extracted are often not specified in detail (ibid). The extracted themes are usually illustrated- for example, with brief quotations from a newspaper article or magazine (ibid). These themes are expected to be complementary with the themes resulted from interviews.

3.4 Limitation of the study

Due to the time and budget constraints, the scope of the study was limited to only a dozen of interviewees. The limitations are obvious on what I can carry on and how much research I can do. The study subject is characterized by controversies. Although the interviewees were supposed to answer the questions truthfully, I can't guarantee I got totally sincere and independent answers. Some seemed not generous and patient enough to share their opinions with a stranger at the distance. I have tried to make the questions comfortable, but they did sometimes avoid direct response to certain questions because of political or economic stand.

In addition, all the interviews were taken in Chinese. There might be inaccuracy during the translation. Moreover, I relied a lot on secondary resources when it comes down to social, economic data and so on. There is a risk that errors exist in these data.

4. Results and discussion

The following part is the analysis and discussion of my main findings, which comprises three sub-chapters. The first sub-chapter will deal with the rapid development of private sector in Africa. Here I will present the motivations of the Chinese private investors or traders, their development and the problems they provoke. In the second part, I will discuss the no strings policy which is a special feature of China. The third part constitutes an analysis of the African development and the Chinese impact on it.

4.1 Diversification of Chinese actors in Africa

Even 20 years ago, we saw a strong bilateralism in the Sino-African relations, based on high-level diplomacy whereby Chinese state policy has been a key determinant in the nature and scale of migration to Africa (Mohan and Tan-Mullins, 2009). Since the late 1990s, the constitution of Chinese diaspora in Africa has diversified. Except for the official institutions and state-owned companies, private sector has been emerging as a main force in Africa (Interview, 2011). In recent years, this tendency has become quite obvious. Chinese businessmen are opening restaurants and selling a variety of goods, from ice cream to motor cycles and from clothing to cell phones, almost all over Africa (Interview, 2011). With the deepening liberalization in China, the notion that a unitary strategic action relentlessly pushing forward a single agenda in Africa or elsewhere, needs to be treated with caution (Taylor, 2009). And the idea of the strategic use of economic relations by Beijing as a means of achieving political objectives is not necessarily true. On the contrary, many of the Chinese people in Africa are independent of any state direction. This diversification of Chinese people in Africa has issued a challenge to the government as it is hard to identify what the firms or

individuals are doing outside of China (Interview, 2011). Now, “The behavior of thousands of newly settled Chinese businessmen and the conduct of the African communities in which they live and work will matter as much as the diplomacy and concessions made at the government level.” (Alden, 2007:128) Table 1 displays the different stages of Chinese businessmen engaging in Africa. To be clearer, Chinese State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) are still a major force operating extractive industries, engineering and construction, while smaller enterprises largely operate in trade services, manufacturing and also some engineering and construction.

Table 1: Growth Stages of Chinese Companies in Africa (Gu, 2009)

Stages	Main features
Stage One: 1949-1980s	Limited number of Chinese companies, mainly implementing Chinese Governments development Aid Projects
Stage Two: 1980s-mid 1990s	Large national and provincial level State-owned Trading Companies, closely associated with diplomatic agenda; few private companies.
Stage Three: Mid 1990s-2000	Emergence of large State-Owned Enterprises mainly resource-seeking, strategic asset-seeking, and infrastructure investments; Increasing number of private companies start exploring African market.
Stage Four: 2000 – 2005	Expansion of large State-Owned Enterprises and private companies; emergence of clustering development strategy e.g. Trade zones; industry parks.
Stage Five: 2005—present	Acceleration of private companies in various sectors and continued expansion of SOEs; the development of clustering industry strategy.

4.1.1 The motivation of the rapid extension of Chinese private sector in Africa

After some SOEs “going out” according to the “open-door” policy, Chinese policymakers

created additional tools and instruments to promote more trade and investment overseas during the 1990s (Brautigam, 2009), such as financial support, organization of delegations and propaganda of investment environment abroad (Interview, 2011). Local governments were also integrated in the process. Provinces with relatively faster economic growth, like Zhejiang, Fujian and Guangdong, were actively promoting the overseas activities of their companies, especially the labor-intensive, less competitive “mature” industries, like textiles (see, e.g., Brautigam, 2009). With the reforms of China’s policies towards emigration, many people had the choice to go abroad. Since 2000, the FOCAC has encouraged more Chinese companies or individuals to recognize Africa and to realize the opportunities there (Interview, 2011). At the same time, public management reforms were going on throughout the whole country. The trading companies and economic cooperation corporations owned by Chinese ministries were further separated from their parent ministries and pushed to operate as independent companies, responsible for their own profits and losses (Brautigam, 2009). In the early 2000s, some of the large SOEs would be closed down or merged, and almost all small and medium-sized firms would be privatized (ibid). And following the economic liberalization and privatization, China has more than 40 million private SMEs (small and medium-sized enterprises), which account for 99% of Chinese companies, making up 60% of Chinese exports (MOFCOM, 2007, cited in Gu, 2009). Without any backer patron, these companies had to find commercial opportunities more actively. Africa has offered a good choice to them. The vast continent is a huge market in the eyes of Chinese investors as well as their competitors from India and Brazil, since Africa has a shortage of supply in consumer goods (Interview, 2011). Additionally the labor and raw materials are cheaper there. As another advantage, regional trade agreements in Africa have helped reduce barriers and liberalize trade in the last two decades (Zafar, 2007).

Specifically, Chinese private firms have gone to Africa to do business for four major reasons: Firstly, the large market in vast parts of Africa is attractive to Chinese traders and investors, while the domestic market is tending to be saturated (Interview, 2011). New markets can keep them from the fierce competition in domestic market. Secondly, there is a need to relocate the mature factories (textiles, shoes, electronics, etc.) which have faced overcapacity. Thirdly,

particularly, a limited number of textiles and clothing manufacturers established processing factories in Africa in order to increase their sales and, the idea was to circumvent U.S. and EU protectionist trade restrictions on products from China by changing the country-of-origin of their goods and gaining access to these developed markets under their preferential trade agreements with Africa (Gu, 2009). Fourthly, some investors are spurred by a strong entrepreneurial spirit. As an interviewee (2011) said, “it’s too hard to establish a business in China due to the competition, and Africa is an ideal place to realize the dreams of the young people”. They are less risk-averse than their Western counterparts, especially in war-torn states, such as Angola, DR Congo and Sierra Leone (Tull, 2006). Even though the profit margins are very low to begin with, and supply chains are weak, the hope is that, in the long term, they will become strategically very effectively placed to expand into leading positions (Gu, 2009). Among others, cheap raw materials also attract many people to trade on or invest in minerals or metals, for example. Figure 1 displays the result from China-Africa Project Survey conducted by Jing Gu in 2007 and 2008 both in Africa and in China. Market, less competition and transfer of excessive production capacity ranked the first three as reasons for investing in Africa.




Figure 1: Reasons for investing in Africa (Gu, 2009)

How do the private enterprises and individuals enter the African market? There are mainly four types. First, some SMEs were encouraged by the government and they benefit from the

support of state banks, including loan and information. Second, some individuals had worked earlier in SOEs which had projects in Africa. After the closure or privatization of the SOEs, the staff continued to develop their own business in Africa, taking advantage of their familiarity with the local market. I also heard some aid workers have stayed in Africa after their tasks were accomplished, opening clinics, for example (Interview, 2011). Third, most entrepreneurs from the Southeast coastal provinces, like Zhejiang, Guangdong, or Fujian, benefit from their close ties with the Chinese communities in Africa (Interview, 2011). For example, it is estimated that there are over 1 million overseas Zhejiangese and, with many based in Africa (Gu, 2009). Thanks to their personal relations, most people began by trading with Africa, which leads on to their decision to invest. Fourth, Dobler (2008: 248, cited in Mohan and Tan-Mullins, 2009) notes, however, that a new pattern is emerging in Namibia where new migrants enter through a 'more commercialized form of chain migration' involving intermediaries who are paid for their services.

4.1.2 The role of Chinese government

Some mainstream press from the West always label Chinese government as authoritarianism. So many people think that what Chinese companies do in foreign markets are from the order of the government with power-politics objectives, and that is to say, there is a unitary strategy behind the activities of Chinese companies. But actually this is not true, also including the Chinese activities in Africa. Although the central government has a broad Africa policy, it has to be mediated via the economic interests of private corporations and the political motivations and aspirations of local state officials who, with growing autonomy, may not share the enunciated central vision (Pearson, 1999, cited in Taylor, 2009: 5). For the private corporations, business is business. Interests are their incentive to go to Africa, just like western companies (Interview, 2011). What the government does is macro level adjustment and control, for example, assisting industrial restructuring by helping mature industries relocate overseas (Brautigam, 2009). However, the local officials entrusted with enforcing policy, sometimes overlook it due to irresponsibility or local protectionism considering investments abroad as a loss of tax revenues (Gu, 2009). As one Chinese company's CEO

puts it, “We heard there are some policies, but we don’t know what they are about” (ibid).

Even though the Chinese SOEs know well the state’s foreign policies and should respect them, there is still flexibility during execution and the SOEs often have a large degree of autonomy. With a broad policy in mind, their activities in Africa are strongly driven by commercial motives to “go abroad” and the personal incentives of their management (Chen Shaofeng, 2008, cited in Taylor, 2009: 58). They may be spurred on by the competition to behave autonomously (Taylor, 2009). So the SOEs are not merely an extension of state policy. They are also involved in open competition and international tendering. Profits take the priority. So they have no substantial difference with their counterparts, except the much longer engagement of Western companies. There are two main advantages that the Chinese SOEs got from government: First, they get financial support from the state. Second, they are often engaged with aid programs, especially the construction companies (Interview, 2011). This has made their access to local market much more easily. Undeniably, these advantages have greatly promoted the competitiveness of Chinese SOEs.

4.1.3 A need for regulation towards Chinese enterprises and individuals in Africa

Following the diversification of Chinese actors in Africa, many state officials as well as some other people involved have realized a need for regulating the Chinese enterprises and individuals there (Interview, 2011). Many Chinese entrepreneurs and workers behave disagreeably in Africa. Some disrespect the local customs, some generate community opposition and others are selling low-quality or pirated goods, etc (Interview, 2011). For example, in Mauritania, alcohol is under taboo throughout the country, but a few Chinese neglected this custom and caused bad influence (ibid). And another example is that, the African local waxes are reported vastly pirated by some Chinese producers. There are even a few rogue Chinese who collude with corrupt African statesmen, seeking exorbitant profits. They are destroying the Sino-African friendship and debasing the Chinese reputation in international community (ibid). They also provide ornaments to the anti-Chinese rhetoric which springs from lobbyists with political agendas informed by their paymasters (see, e.g.,

Taylor, 2009).

The reasons behind this situation concentrate on three factors: Firstly, the Chinese government has weak control over the private enterprises and individuals overseas (Interview, 2011). As a Chinese idiom says, even a very long lash will not reach it. The Chinese government has taken a lot of measures trying to regulate the behaviors of the Chinese people in Africa, but the government has nothing to do if they don't observe the demands (Interview, 2011). On the eve of the summit of FOCAC in 2006, the state council, China's cabinet, issued "Nine principles" to "encourage and standardize enterprises' overseas investment": abide by local laws, bid contracts on the basis of transparency and equality, protect the labor rights of local employees, protect the environment, implement corporate responsibilities and so on (Zhou, 2006). But the effects are limited. Secondly, on one hand, some host countries lack strict regulations or laws towards some bad behaviors (Interview, 2011). Or the implementation is often lax due to corruption. Thus some opportunists are making use of the loopholes (ibid). On the other hand, state policy of the host country often affects migrants' self-perception and mobilization (Mohan and Tan-Mullins, 2009). The attitude of the state and people towards migrants can influence the behaviors of these foreigners. Where the reception is hostile, migrants may be tempted to organize in clandestine ways, orienting their lives more exclusively to their homelands (ibid: 599). Thirdly, the average educational level is low among the small entrepreneurs and workers (Interview, 2011). Most of them are rural migrant workers. To earn their lives, some have no choice but to go to distant Africa to sell their labor, while some small entrepreneurs go there to seek their first fortune. Sometimes they are eager to earn money in short term by hook or by crook. Many of them don't know much about local regulations and customs and, some lack the legal consciousness (Interview, 2011).

4.2 No strings-attached policy

Among the queries or rebukes raised towards Chinese engagement in Africa, almost every one can be raised towards the Western engagement in Africa, like importing raw materials while exporting manufactured goods or harming local environment. So many Chinese complain of

the double-standard applied by the West towards China. But the no strings attached policy is typically Chinese and can be regarded as a feature of Chinese engagement in Africa. Unlike Western aid and businesses, the Chinese mode has no demands for transparency, human rights, democracy or environmental protection according to a given standard. This policy is being questioned a lot by many journalists and some scholars. Nevertheless, according to Chidaushe (2007), this gentle, friendly, caring attitude appears to many Africans as a welcome contrast with the exploitation and heavy handed top-down relationship which has typified the West's approach. But as China's importance and influence increase in Africa and in multilateral institutions, China is doing its efforts to be a responsible power in its own way. Some people think its foreign policy should also change according to this purpose and international situation. In this part, I will answer the following questions. Will China still insist on the non-interference policy? As an emerging axis of global power, what role will China play in Africa?

4.2.1 Why no strings attached?

Mutual non-interference has been a main principle in the PRC's foreign policy since almost sixty years ago. It opposes any form of interference at the bilateral level in each other's internal affairs. Its elaboration and implementation have historical, practical and ideological reasons. It is the fundamental standing point of China's foreign policy to strengthen its solidarity and cooperation with numerous developing countries and also its cooperation with developed countries (Interview, 2011). It's based on the belief that a country and its people know best the problems of its development, and they should have the right to look for the most suitable way for themselves (ibid). In addition, China considers itself as a brother instead of a patriarch of Africa (ibid).

4.2.1.1 A policy based on Chinese culture and historic experiences

Chinese culture is strongly influenced by Confucianism and Daoism. Confucius (551–479 BC)

believed in living by the “doctrine of the mean” or “golden mean” (Zhong Yong) which means no excess no deficiency. He emphasized “Ren”- benevolence or humanity, “Yi”- righteousness, justice and sincerity, and “Li”- rites, correctness of social relationships. Daoism emphasizes tranquility, calm and modesty. Laozi (around 571-472 BC), the founder of Daoism, maintained respect of nature, reduction of personal desire and no action. He said, “Where there is non-interference, there is order¹.” Following this, China has the culture of tending to be non-aggressive and defensive, like “subduing action with inaction”. Especially about internal affairs, “even an upright official finds it hard to settle a family quarrel”. This kind of idea is deeply rooted in China and has great influence on Chinese people. And it’s also reflected in the state’s foreign policy, such as self-determination and mutual non-interference.

The PRC was established during the cold war era after a hard struggle against invaders. Thus, Chinese leaders were very aware of the fact that China had to sustain its sovereignty and the best policy was non-interference (Ranjan, 2011). Premier Zhou Enlai had been projecting an independent foreign policy including mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs. In 1954, Zhou Enlai formulated “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence” with his Indian and Burmese counterparts, and added two more principles- equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. But until the Bandung Conference, the concept got further recognition by more than twenty countries from Asia and Africa. Influenced deeply by Chinese traditional ideas, like “Don’t exert onto others what you don’t desire yourself (Confucius)²,” Zhou Enlai asked the leaders at the Asian-African conference in 1955, “We are against the outside interference. How could we want to interfere in internal affairs of others?” The principles were widely acclaimed by people who had lost sovereignty and independence during the colonial period and who certainly didn’t want the history to repeat. This standpoint has provided the basis of Chinese foreign policy since then. Now non-interference also serves as the foundation for Chinese foreign aid and investment in Africa (Interview, 2011). Moreover, recognizing the different interpretations of human rights from some other countries, China must be quite

¹ The Chinese original is “为无为，则无不治”.

² The Chinese original is “己所不欲，勿施于人”.

sensitive to any intervention under the plea of human rights.

The non-interference principle also gets echoes at the United Nations Charter which said in article 2(4), “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations”. It further claims in article 2(7) that “nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter”. These regulations are in keeping with the Chinese policy and have been well observed by the PRC. For the foreseeable future, non-interference policy will continue to be a main foreign policy in China (Interview, 2011).

4.2.1.2 Failure of “Washington Consensus” for Africa

The U.S. and World Bank claim to be fighting poverty in Africa, but after two decades of structural adjustment the conditions of the African poor have worsened, with indices of exploitation and deprivation increasing by geometric proportions (Campbell, 2007: 129). Why? In general, it’s the imperialism of economic policy, the undemocratic notion that a few thousand Western experts steeped in neoclassical/ neoliberal economics know what policy regime works best for a world of others (Peet and Hartwick, 2009: 98). The reform policy concerns the destiny of numerous nations and people. But for its design, we find fewer references even to “country ownership,” the IFI euphemism for brief consultation with the local finance ministry, home to economists also trained in American or British universities (Peet and Hartwick, 2009: 98). Instead, it’s a prescription by the experts with inspections every 6 months (ibid). Sometimes, they just fool themselves. In the words of one former cabinet minister in Zambia, their relationship with the West is a game of cat and mouse: donors try to nail down agreement on as many conditions as they can before writing their cheques and then try to insist on the most ambitious definition of the original remit when evaluating subsequent performance; debtor government try to concede as little as possible

without jeopardizing the aid and then try to insist on as modest an original understanding as they can (Szeftel, 2000).

In 1989 Williamson coined the term “Washington Consensus” to refer to the policy reforms imposed when debtor countries in Latin America were called on to “set their house in order” and submit to strong conditionality - what Latin America needed, according to Washington (Peet and Hartwick, 2009). Here we find G8 countries, or rather their treasury departments, in collusion with the IFIs, telling poor countries how they must run their economies if they want to receive debt relief (ibid: 98). In this structural adjustment disguising an imperialism of expertise, business is more or less dressed in terms of liberation from poverty (ibid).

It is clear that Washington Consensus policies were widely put in place and just as broadly failed- in their own terms of producing economic growth (Peet and Hartwick, 2009: 93). Even the “augmented Washington Consensus” is in fact a grab bag of miscellaneous policies conceived under various political-economic positions within conventional circles, some from the right (“flexible labor market” means attacking unions) and some from a kind of renewed liberal concern (social safety nets and “targeted poverty reduction”) that to our minds reflects a guilty conscience about the misery inflicted on the world by neoliberal policies- “liberal neoliberalism” (ibid: 94). There is no hint of social transformation here, no changing power structures, no mention of reducing social inequalities, just a safe prescription for a mild illness (ibid: 94). Thus in Africa, there is a growing realization that traditional relations and partnerships with the West have not helped Africa overcome the structural obstacles to eradicating poverty and reversing its economic marginalization (Rocha, 2007).

For many among Africa’s ruled who are physically and intellectually exhausted by two decades of economic ‘reform’ supposedly adapted by African governments but driven by Western governments, donors and the IFIs, China represents hope that another world is possible in which bread comes before the freedom to vote (Obiorah, 2007). This would be a dramatic change in the traditional patterns of the Western dominance over African affairs and would diminish Western political and economic leverage over the continent, thereby

constituting a major challenge to Western hegemony over the political, economic and development discourse in Africa and internationally (Rocha, 2007: 16). Joshua Cooper Ramo has called the pro-China perspective the “Beijing Consensus”, which includes a commitment to innovation and constant experimentation instead of to one-size-fits-all neoliberal projects; a rejection of per capita GDP as the be-all and end-all in favor of equal concern for sustainability and equality in policy making; and self-determination and opposition to international hierarchies (Taylor, 2009).

4.2.1.3 “The friendship should never be forgotten.”

During my interviews, I often heard the words “our black brothers” and two interviewees said almost the same sentence, “Our black brothers sent us back to the UN; we should remember this favor and the friendship for ever.” (Interview, 2011) This reflects to a certain extent the sentiments held by Chinese people towards Africa. Based on similar experiences of colonies and economic stagnation, there exists a sense of identity and sympathy. Partly for this reason, African countries and China have mutually supported each other in international society. China, who in some cases suffers from the policy of containment of some countries, especially needs the support from its African brothers, such as the resumption of the legitimate right of RPC in the UN in 1971 (Interview, 2011). This kind of relationship is different from that between the West and Africa. Western countries have been playing the role of patriarch of Africa since the colonial era (Interview, 2011). Some consider themselves as savior of Africa by civilizing the savages (Campbell, 2007). This discourse reproduces the culture of imperialism and continues with the international non-governmental organizations representing the modern missionaries in Africa (ibid: 135). For this difference, China couldn’t be identified with the structural change policies.

It can be argued that China’s engagement in Africa is also driven by interests not only by friendship. In contrast to the past, Chinese main ties with Africa have shifted gradually from aid to economic and trade cooperation (Interview, 2011). According to the white paper on China-Africa economic and trade cooperation released by the Information Office of the State

Council on Dec 23 2010, trade, investment, infrastructure and capacity building have been and will still be pushed forward in an all-round way. This is also an opportunity to Africa. Having called for more trade than aid, Africa is therefore more likely to benefit from China's approach, which differs significantly from the West's (Chidaushe, 2007: 112). The base of the Sino-African partnership is "mutual benefit and progress, friendly consultation, pragmatism and high efficiency", and this relationship leaves little space to conditioned aid or even sanctions.

4.2.2 Still non-interference?

China's emergence as a major global power required the Chinese government to pay attention to its international image as responsible and to ensure a peaceful rise to other countries. As China's cooperation with other countries develops and the number of overseas Chinese increases, China must play a certain role in the international communities (Interview, 2011). This meets the idea "diplomacy for people." In recent years, China has begun to take a less confrontational, more sophisticated, more confident, and, at times, more constructive approach toward regional and global affairs (Medeiros and Fravel, 2003). In contrast to a decade ago, the world's most populous country now largely works within the international system: It has embraced much of the current constellation of international institutions, rules, and norms as a means to promote its national interests; and it has even sought to shape the evolution of that system in limited ways (ibid). To fulfill its international responsibilities, China has increased its involvements in disaster reduction and relief, peacekeeping missions and multilateral security arrangements in the international sphere. Africa is an important arena where China puts these actions in practice.

4.2.2.1 Peacekeeping in Africa

There is a dramatic expansion in deployments of Chinese peacekeepers (civilian police, military observers, engineering battalions and medical units) to United Nations operations: since 2000, when China deployed fewer than 100 peacekeepers, there has been a 20-fold

increase (Gill and Huang, 2009). As of December 2008, China was the fourteenth largest contributor to UN peacekeeping operations, providing more troops, police and observers to UN operations than three other permanent members of the UN Security Council: Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States (ibid). Nearly three-quarters of China's contributions are concentrated in Africa, a reflection of its keen interest in peacekeeping efforts in Africa. The continued deployment and redeployment of Chinese units throughout Africa, for example, suggests a gradual accrual of operational knowledge and a better understanding of the political and security dynamics and complexities on the ground (ibid). Beijing has also stated to the UN that enhancing regional peacekeeping capacity in Africa in order to meet ongoing challenges to security and stability is a Chinese priority. This active participation is not only a demonstration of its support for the UN, but also an embodiment of the fulfillment of its responsibilities as a major world power (ibid).

China is currently involved in all six UN missions in Africa: in the Cote d'Ivoire (UNOCI), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), Liberia (UNMIL), Sudan (UNMIS), Darfur (UNAMID), and the Western Sahara (MINURSO). The Chinese have also been involved in past missions in Namibia in 1989-90 (UNTAG), Mozambique in 1993-94 (ONUMOZ), Liberia in 1993-97 (UNOMIL), Burundi in 2004 (ONUB), both past Sierra Leone missions, in 1998-99 (UNOMSIL) and 1999-2005 (UNAMSIL), and Ethiopia and Eritrea in 2000-2008 (UNMEE).¹

China remains generally cautious towards the use of peacekeepers, particularly with regard to the so-called "humanitarian intervention" by some nations or international organizations (Interview, 2011). The classic "doctrine of humanitarian intervention" entails the intervening state's unilateral appreciation of the factual situation as well as its own evaluation as to whether it has legal grounds to take military action against a state committing or tolerating serious violation in its own territory in order to protect the nationals of the intervened country (Sunga, 2006). But now it is also possible that some humanitarian interventions are justified by UN resolutions. However, some people argue that when some states use military forces in

¹ Reference to UN website <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/about/dpko/>

another state, they are typically driven by their narrow national interests- grabbing territory, gaining geo-strategic advantage, or seizing control of precious natural resources, under the guise of human rights or democracy. Differently, Beijing's conditions for peace operations are that military force should be deployed only with the host government consent, UNSC authorization and the guarantee that Chinese core interests will not be jeopardized (Taylor, 2009). In such cases as Zimbabwe and Myanmar, China has so far resisted calls from human rights advocacy groups and some Western governments to pursue intervention based on humanitarian justification (Gill and Huang, 2009). In short, China will continue to review interventions on a case-by-case basis, which means that there will be limits to its participation and China will be unlikely to offer active support to international intervention when the international community is divided and the intended host government is opposed (ibid).

However, in recent years, China's support for peacekeeping operations in East Timor, Haiti and Darfur all point to a more flexible view of intervention. When there is broad international consensus around a specific intervention, China has tended to lend its support (Gill and Huang, 2009).

4.2.2.2 From Sudan to Libya

According to its non-interference policy, China has used its veto at the UN Security Council to block attempts to actively censure Sudan for the civil war in Darfur. Chinese Assistant Foreign Minister Zhai Jun remarked, "The Darfur issue is ultimately about development, and only economic and social development in the region can bring about a fundamental solution to this issue."¹ The Chinese government had been emphasizing on dialogue and equal negotiation while opposing the use of force. But this attitude was criticized a lot by the West who claimed that China neglected the crimes against humanity in Sudan. Under this pressure, China's policy appears to be evolving as it realizes the need to exhibit its disagreement with

¹ Remarks by Chinese Assistant Foreign Minister Zhai Jun on Humanitarian Situation and Reconstruction for Development in Darfur at 2nd High-Level Consultation on Darfur. <http://www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/securitycouncil/regionalhotspots/africa/darfur/t365625.htm> [Accessed on 15 March, 2011]

Sudanese government and to be more active in the international community. For instance, it has supported UN Security Council resolutions authorizing peacekeepers for Darfur and placed modest pressure on Khartoum to allow a UN peacekeeping deployment. Chinese diplomats now seek to mediate on the Darfur issue by clarifying the options open to Khartoum and building trust as a means of reaching a practical consensus (Taylor, 2009: 54). Collectively with other forces, China pushed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Sudan that ended the 20-year-old civil war between the North and South.

In 2011, after the breakout of the turbulence in Libya, China has been acting more decidedly. China backed a British-French measure to impose an asset freeze, travel ban, and arms embargo on the Libyan regime of Muammar Qaddafi.¹ The Chinese government urged the international community to earnestly fulfill the United Nations Security Council 1970 resolution on Libya to avoid further civilian casualties, and take peaceful measures such as dialogue to settle the current crisis. Meanwhile the government still insisted that “during the decision-making process, Libya's sovereignty, territorial integrity and unification should be respected, the security and interests of the Libyan people and foreigners in Libya should be guaranteed and the concerns and opinions of the Arab and African countries should be listened to”². Later, China abstained on a United Nations Security Council vote to implement a no-fly zone in Libya, because as mentioned above China still hesitates about using force to deal with international affairs. However, France, Britain, the US, etc. insisted on the attack. Nevertheless, here we can find some signs of evolution in China’s foreign policy. China is playing a new role in international community, by exerting more influence.

4.3 Impact on Africa’s development

China has been a successful developing country in the era of globalization. It was one of the

¹ Libya sanctions: China's new role at the UN.

<http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/the-monitors-view/2011/0228/Libya-sanctions-China-s-new-role-at-the-UN>

[Accessed on 15 March, 2011]

² China urges int'l community to fulfill UN resolution on Libya, 2011.

http://www.gov.cn/misc/2011-03/12/content_1823452.htm [Accessed on 18 March, 2011]

poorest countries in the world in 1980 (Dollar, 2008). Since initiating economic reform after 1978, its economy has expanded at a steady rate over 8% per capita, leading to a dramatic poverty reduction: the share of the population living beneath the World Bank's "cost of basic needs" poverty line declined from over 60% at the beginning of economic reform in 1978 to 7% in 2007 (ibid). African countries who have been struggling against the stagnation are of course interested in what lessons they can take from China. Besides lessons, if any, now China also has an important influence on Africa as a participant.

4.3.1 Disadvantages in Africa's development compared to China

Africa has a lot of advantages in its development, like large in area, abundance in resources, and so on. Different countries in Africa have different advantages and problems in development. Here I want to concentrate on the disadvantages, compared with China, which are pervasive in Africa as a whole. With the purpose of problem solving, we may get some inspirations from the comparison. Specifically, the development in Africa has more or less such disadvantages: unstable political situation, laggard infrastructure, lack of efficiency, and lack of technology.

Unstable political situation. Many African countries face a high level of ethnic diversity and widespread ethnic conflict. One main reason for this conflict was rooted in the modern map of Africa drawn by the Western colonialists. When they created the new boundaries, they paid no attention to ethnic, cultural, and linguistic criteria and often put bitter enemies together or divided homogeneous groups into separate countries (Sandbrook, 1985). Moreover, the religious differences, such as Christianity, Islam or traditional religions, aggravate the conflicts. Also, the colonial institutions inherited by the independent state continued to be authoritarian. Clientelism and corruption dominates the African politics. In the patron-client relationship, the patrons who are the politicians in power determine the size and the distribution of government revenue, while the clients elect and support their patron politically in return for economic benefits derived from the association with the patron (Kurer, 1993). Under such a political system, the national wealth always concentrates in the hands of a few

“social elites”, while most of the nationals remain quite poor (Interview, 2011). But in China, the political situation is relatively stable since the end of the Cultural Revolution. Although the political system is criticized by many western reports, it suits the national conditions and has solved a lot of problems in China (Interview, 2011). To some extent, this system fostered the rapid development in China.

Laggard infrastructure and lack of efficiency. The most urgent problem for Africa is the low level of industrialization (Interview, 2011). Colonial powers in Africa had put barriers to industrialization and sustainable development by structuring the economies of their colonies “in a self-serving fashion” (Sandbrook, 1985). After the independence, most African countries’ economy still depends on exporting raw materials. To change this situation and start manufacturing, there are two important preconditions: reliable infrastructures and high work efficiency. But both seem lacking in Africa. In many African countries, the competitiveness of their industry is largely constrained by unreliable access to power and water, bad transport infrastructure, and low efficiency of customs and clearing. In contrast, people are always struck by the quality of infrastructure in China: good roads, reliable power, world-class ports, and excellent cell phone coverage throughout the country (Dollar, 2008). For many African countries, the formal trade regime is as open as China’s, but problems in customs and ports mean that the actual connection of African firms to the global market is weaker (ibid). Some interviewees also voiced concerns on African people’s work attitude, like low efficiency, lateness, break of one’s word. This might have something to do with the old economic patterns. But this, if it’s true, could be a stumbling block in Africa’s development. In contrary, Chinese people are very hard-working and disciplined. They don’t fear bad working conditions and finish their work strictly following the requirements.

Table 2: Investment climate and openness indicators, China and Africa (Dollar, 2008)

	China	Africa	ETH	GHA	KEN	NGA	TZA	UGA
Days to obtain telephone line, 2006	7.1b	34	154.9a	n.a.	99.4b	n.a.	23.3	12.8
Sales lost	1.2	4.0	4.6	n.a.	8.0	n.a.	9.5	10.0

from power outages, 2006 (%)								
Days to register a property, 2006	32	110	43	382	73	80	123	97
Average import tariff, 2006 (%)	2.1	13.3	18.5	n.a.	6.2	n.a.	n.a.	13.7
Longest time to clear imports customs, 2007(days)	12.3	22.2	25	n.a.	18.1	n.a.	26	17.1
Cost to export, 2006, per Container (US\$)	335	1561	1700	822	1980	798	822	1050

Note: a refers to data of 2002; b refers to data of 2003; n.a. refers to data unavailable.

Lack of technology and skill. The skill base of labors in many African countries is lower than that of China (Interview, 2011). The necessary technology to develop manufacturing is largely absent (ibid). Another big problem for Africa is its brain drain. Many talents flow to the developed counties, while the educational level of numerous ordinary people is relatively low. In this regard, the technology level of Chinese companies has been developing a lot and now China possesses some high and new technology companies which are even famous throughout the world. China has the tradition to attach much importance to education and it has applied the “Nine-year Compulsory Education” since 1986. It should also be stressed that China, in its own experience, adopted a number of measures that were aimed at maximizing the capacity building for Chinese workers and firms that came from the direct investment (Dollar, 2008). The country has always had strict limits on the number of workers that foreign investors could bring into the country (ibid).

Africa's rich natural resources should have been an advantage in its development. But actually resources serve as a double-edged sword for Africans (Interview, 2011). The "resource curse" is appearing in some African countries. Resource abundant countries tend to become more intensive in resource-based exports and less intensive in lower end, labor-intensive manufactures (Zafar, 2007). However, it would be in Africa's best interest to use the opportunity presented by the great interest in the continent's natural resources to put in place adequate policies, laws, regulations and systems to effectively manage not only the act of extracting resources but also the manner in which the products of the extraction processes are managed (Rocha, 2007: 28). China and other countries' interest in Africa's resources and market can be explored as the push to development. It will be Africans' task to ensure that the relations between Africa and China do not repeat the centuries of underdevelopment and exploitation (Campbell, 2007: 136).

4.3.2 The role of China in Africa's development

Certainly, China is important to Africa as a rising stakeholder on the continent. At present, how can they profit from the Chinese policies in Africa? According to the white paper on China-Africa economic and trade cooperation released by Chinese State Council on Dec 23 2010, China highlights trade and mutual investment in a broader scope, together with infrastructure construction, capacity building and people's livelihood improvement in Africa. With this booster, Africa would be able to develop its manufacturing, improve the infrastructures and advance the technology and skills. The Chinese model of "special economic zone" has been introduced to Africa. How will it perform there? We should wait and see.

4.3.2.1 An opportunity for Africa

In 2007, the China-Africa Development Fund was set up and it has approved investment in over 30 projects, covering agricultural development, machinery manufacturing, electric power,

building materials, industrial parks, mining and port logistics, among other fields (Chinese State Council, 2010). This fund encourages foreign investment in Africa which could be a shortcut to development based on Chinese experience. At a time when the western official and private sectors have shied away from investing in African factories, the “international product life cycle” is pushing Chinese “mature” industries, mainly manufacturing, overseas (Brautigam, 2009). According to Harvard professor Raymond Vernon, the production of commodities such as textiles, or radios, or computers will typically shift offshore to lower-cost locations (ibid: 92). This is a good opportunity for Africa to develop its manufacturing. In South Africa, for instance, the Chinese companies are making television sets — and most of their workers are black Africans, not Chinese; and in Zambia's Copper belt, they will soon manufacture copper cables, a much sought-after, value-added product (Germain, 2010).




Figure 2 Distribution of China's Direct Investment in African Industries (by the end of 2009) (Chinese State Council, 2010)

Poor infrastructure is the bottleneck for the development of many African countries. Chinese has been attaching great importance to supporting Africa’s infrastructure. By the end of 2009, China had provided assistance for the construction of over 500 infrastructure projects in Africa, including the Belet Uen-Burao Highway in Somalia, the Friendship Harbor in

Mauritania, the Mashta al Anad-Ben Jarw Canal in Tunisia and so on. There are still a large number of projects under construction or at hand. African countries, together with China, should examine and supervise the projects with international norms, ensuring welfare to local people. Meanwhile, as a lesson, China has been able to rapidly expand its infrastructure network by borrowing at commercial interest rates and servicing the resulting debt through appropriate prices for power, roads, rail, and telecom (Dollar, 2008).

A lack of technology and skills hinders the development of Africa. China and Africa have conducted educational cooperation. By the end of 2009, 107 schools had been built in Africa with Chinese assistance, and 29,465 African students had received Chinese government scholarships to study in China (Chinese State Council, 2010). At present, the Chinese government offers about 5,000 scholarships to students from African countries each year (ibid). China also cooperated with the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, and signed the South-South Tripartite Agreement with Mauritania, Ghana, Ethiopia, Gabon, Sierra Leone, Mali and Nigeria, sending to these countries more than 600 Chinese agricultural experts and technicians (ibid).

4.3.2.2 Overseas economic zones

Countries should not blindly copy China or any other model: the measures adopted in China would not have exactly the same effect if adopted somewhere else (Dollar, 2008). But Dollar (2008) suggested that countries can learn from each other and bring these lessons to bear on solving their own unique development challenges.

At the beginning of the “reform and opening-up” in China, foreign investors were directed to a number of special economic zones which were favored with different tax and special national policies. These areas also drew concentrated infrastructure investment by local government. The development of the special economic zones drove the economic development of whole China. Until now China has been pushing forward the building of overseas economic and trade cooperation zones in Africa. These overseas zones are built and

operated by Chinese enterprises and attract Chinese and foreign enterprises to move in and gradually form industrial clusters. The Chinese companies moving to these zones will get support from Chinese government. China is building six economic and trade cooperation zones in Zambia, Mauritius, Nigeria, Egypt and Ethiopia, having invested US\$ 250 million in infrastructure construction (Chinese State Council, 2010). “The Chinese want to start manufacturing instead of just importing raw materials.” (Brautigam, 2009) At least it is an alternative to the aid business as usual.

4.3.2.3 A challenge to Africa

Undoubtedly, Chinese people come to Africa to pursue their own interests. These outsiders like others have broken the old development mode in Africa. Their arrival make some people's life better off while putting some in an awkward situation. Disadvantageous terms of trade or oppressive labor regimes do exist and are still being used by some Chinese entrepreneurs. Some Chinese projects and factories continue to be destructive to the environment in Africa with harm to local people and animals. Low quality products or even fake products made by Chinese companies are filling African markets. The bad behaviors of some Chinese individuals could even influence on local social stability. Measures need to be taken to stop such actions. The cooperation with the Chinese side is also necessary. One may argue that Africans have the initiative in their hands because it's in their place. So it depends on Africa how to face these challenges. If well managed, China could be used to solve some problems in Africa's development. If not, Africa could only fall far more behind.

5. Conclusions and recommendations

This study is conducted with the aim of assessing Chinese engagement in Africa from the perspectives of Chinese people in Africa. In accordance with the objectives of the study, I want to find out the characteristics of Chinese involvement in Africa. After the study, I find that many problems in China's activities are not unique but rather in common with other

countries' engagement in Africa. However, China in Africa has its own features and needs both the African and Chinese sides to regulate and improve the relationship. More specifically, the outcome embodies three points: 1. the rapid growth and diversified constitution necessitate an effective regulation on Chinese people in Africa; 2. the Chinese no-strings attached policy doesn't impose any universalistic rules to Africa and leaves the self-determination to Africa; 3. Africa needs to find an appropriate way of development by itself, while China serves as both an opportunity and a challenge. The study demonstrates that it is up to Africa to manage its relationship with China to obtain a chance of development. Mutual benefits are possible.

5.1 Conclusions

In this part, I will answer the research questions one by one:

1. Since the late 1990s, the constitution of Chinese people in Africa has diversified. Except for the official institutions and state-owned companies, private sector has been emerging as a main force in Africa. In recent years, this tendency has become more and more obvious.
2. The flow of Chinese people to Africa was determined by the reforms in China's economic policy and emigration policy. Specifically, there are four main motivations for the private sector: First, access to new markets; Second, relocation of excessive production capability; Third, increasing sales in other foreign markets via exports from Africa; Fourth, an entrepreneurial spirit of establishing businesses.
3. The private sector is largely independent of China state actions. What the government does is just macro level adjustment and control. But usually, the private enterprises are spurred on by the competition to behave autonomously. Even the SOEs often have a large degree of autonomy.
4. Following the diversification of Chinese actors in Africa, there is a need for regulating the Chinese enterprises and individuals there. Some companies and individuals behave disagreeably in Africa. To a certain extent, they are destroying the Sino-African friendship

and debasing the Chinese reputation in international community.

5. The Chinese engagement in Africa is quite similar to the western one, in regards of trade and investment. The main difference lies in China's no-strings attached policy, particularly towards aid.
6. The elaboration and implementation of the non-interference policy have historical, practical and ideological reasons. It is the fundamental standing point of China's foreign policy to strengthen its solidarity and cooperation with numerous developing countries and also its cooperation with developed countries. It's based on the belief that a country and its people know best the problems of its development, and they should have the right to solve them by themselves.
7. China's emergence as a major global power has required the Chinese government to pay attention to its international image as responsible and to ensure a peaceful rise to other countries. China has increased its involvements in disaster reduction and relief, peacekeeping missions and multilateral security arrangements, etc. in the international sphere.
8. Africa has its advantages in development, such as vast land with rich resources. Compared with China, the development in Africa has generally such disadvantages: unstable political situation, laggard infrastructure, lack of efficiency, and lack of technology. Additionally, the "resource curse" is appearing in some African countries.
9. China is important to Africa as a rising stakeholder on the continent. China can serve as an opportunity to foster manufacturing, infrastructure construction, and capacity building in Africa.
10. China also poses a lot of challenges to Africa, like disadvantageous terms of trade, low environmental standards, inferior commodities and so on. Challenges always come together with opportunities. It depends on Africa how to face them.

5.2 Recommendations

During my research, I found that many people voiced their concerns on the disagreeable behaviors of some Chinese enterprises and individuals. There exist external and internal

factors that determine such a situation. External factor is the lack of effective regulation. Internal factors are the relatively low cultural sensitivity of some Chinese and some people's eagerness for profits. To resolve the problem, the most important thing is intergovernmental cooperation. The cooperation can cover, for example, information exchange, establishing and enforcing together the rules. Especially, the African states should get motivated to regulate and control the foreign investors or traders for the sake of their own benefits. A tighter legal framework that would ensure enforcement of serious customs and excise policies (Taylor, 2009: 170) is needed. On the Chinese side, the money-mad social atmosphere is worrying and drawing much attention now. On behalf of Africa, Chinese government could offer more training classes before the enterprises and individuals go abroad. (This has been put in practice but the scope is limited.) Some Chinese should be taught to pay attention to their own behaviors and should learn more about the host countries' customs and laws.

No-strings attached policy is a quite controversial feature of Chinese engagement in Africa. The good thing is it doesn't impose any universalistic rules to Africa and leaves the space of self-determination to African people. "A lack of an appropriate way of development" (Interview, 2011) is the most pressing problem for Africa. What is more, Africa's essential problem in development is its continuing dependence on the former colonial powers, politically, economically and intellectually. To move on from the present dilemma, Africa should determine its own fate, whether it is the matter of the structural reform, or the use of natural resources.

According to Foucault, a French poststructuralist, societies have unevenly developing courses. We should respect differences and favor micro politics---people being allowed to define and solve their own problems (Peet and Hartwick, 2009). So the problems in Africa's development can only be solved by Africans who know better about the situation and especially by reforms from their leaders who are expected to find the appropriate way of development for Africa. China's own development is a process of experiments, in the words of Deng Xiaoping: "we are crossing the river by feeling the stones." Africa may also have a try in looking for its own way by doing some experiments. In this process, China can be

helpful in terms of fund, technology and infrastructure. Mutual benefits are possible if Africa uses the chance presented by China well.

5.3 The future research

Both China and Africa have drawn a lot of attention to their developments. The development of these two areas concerns the prosperity of the planet. China in Africa connects the two hot spots together. If the relationship is well managed, mutual benefits can be achieved. There are disagreements on the role of China in Africa. Until now, many comments on this issue have taken off from western capitalist values, sometimes as a result of the jealousy of a competitor or the hostility inherited from the Cold War. Some criticisms, if not a demonization of China, often use a double-standard to measure the Chinese engagement in Africa compared with the Western one. My work is just an attempt to balance the opinions dominated mainly by one side. The way ahead is still long in understanding the complex relationship among different interests. I believe it is highly necessary to do more research in this field. I hope to see more works with objective to evaluate the Chinese engagement in Africa. This is important since there is an ongoing debate on this issue. I also expect to involve myself in deeper researches in this field if I have the chance.

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Appendix I

Interview guide for semi-structured interviews with officials

1. Occupation? Dispatched by which institution? What's your main work in Africa?
2. What's the difference between imagined Africa and real Africa?
3. What is the constitution of Chinese people in Africa?
4. Do you know the tendency of the number and constitution of Chinese people in Africa?
5. What are the good things brought by the Chinese people?
6. What are the bad things brought by the Chinese people?
7. What are the influences of Chinese commodities on African local market?
8. Do you know how Chinese enterprises treat local employees and the environment?
9. Is there a regulation by Chinese government on enterprises in Africa?
10. What's the difference between Chinese aid and Western aid?
11. Which do you think is more effective?
12. What's the role of Africa in China's foreign policy?
13. What do you think the natural resources weigh in Sino-African relationship?
14. Is there any difference in the processes of exploring natural resources between China and the West?
15. Is there any difference between the Sino-African relationship and the Afro-Western relationship?
16. What's the biggest problem in Africa's development?
17. What are the other problems?
18. Is there anything Africa can learn from China?
19. What are their advantages in development, compared with China?
20. Are you optimistic or pessimistic towards Sino-African relations?
21. Do you want to be anonymous?

Appendix II

Interview guide for semi-structured interviews with businessmen

1. Which company do you belong to?
2. What's the main business of your company?
3. What's the scale and history of your company in Africa?
4. How do you think of the prospect of development of your company in Africa?
5. Why did your company come to Africa?
6. What's your main work in Africa?
7. What's the difference between an imagined Africa and the real Africa?
8. What is the constitution of Chinese people in Africa?
9. Do you know the tendency of the number and constitution of Chinese people in Africa?
10. What are the good things brought by the Chinese people?
11. What are the bad things brought by the Chinese people?
12. What are the influences of Chinese commodities on African local market?
13. Dose your company have local employees and what's the proportion?
14. What do you think of these employees?
15. Is there a regulation by Chinese government on enterprises in Africa?
16. What's the role of Chinese government in the operations of your company or other companies?
17. Is there any difference in the processes of doing business between China and the West?
18. Is there any difference between the Sino-African relationship and the Afro-Western relationship?
19. What's the biggest problem in Africa's development?
20. What are the other problems?
21. Is there anything Africa can learn from China?
22. What are their advantages in development, compared with China?
23. Are you optimistic or pessimistic towards Sino-African relations?
24. Do you want to be anonymous?

