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I, Roald Larssen, declare that this thesis is a result of my research investigations and findings. Sources of information other than my own have been acknowledged and a reference list has been appended. This work has not been previously submitted to any other university for award of any type of academic degree.

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Abstract

Brazil has for centuries been identified as a country destined for greatness due to its resources and size. Yet, its politicians and leaders have not made the vision come true. This has left the South American country as a somewhat sleeping giant in international politics.

President Lula came close to fulfill the vision of greatness. From 2003 to 2010, Brazil emerged as a pivotal actor. Its international commitment grew formidably. Yet, despite of representing the same party and being Lula's handpicked successor, Dilma Rousseff seemed to give the vision little attention as changes in the foreign policy were introduced.

This case study analyses why changes in Brazil's foreign policy occurred after the inauguration of Rousseff. It does so by first identifying changes. This is done by comparing the foreign policies of Lula and Rousseff on four areas: Brazil's global role, Brazil and regionalism, the relation between Brasília and Washington, and the topic of human rights. Three central changes are found: 1) A move from expansion and activism to cool down and agenda setting in Brasília's global role. 2) A rhetorical drift of emphasis in human rights from economic, social and cultural rights to civil and political rights. 3) A changed US-Brazil relation from distant and fruitful cooperation to warm and friendly ties before ending up cold. When putting the three together, changes are defined as a cool down of activism and foreign affairs activities.

After identifying what kind of changes have occurred, the thesis is able to analyze why it happened. Four levels of analysis in foreign policy analysis laid the foundation for four variables to explain changes: economic power, emotions, lacking party support, and bureaucratic influence. Findings suggest that the four variables differ in explaining changes. While economic indicators conclude that Dilma's Brazil was more powerful than Lula's Brazil, literature findings suggest that President Rousseff was challenged by far bigger economic problems. In addition, the international structure was less favorable. The variable, economic power, can thus partly explain why Brazilian foreign policy changed. Emotions and bureaucratic influence are more successful in explaining changes. Collected data strongly suggest that emotions received from early experience to 1985 influenced Brazilian foreign policy. And the thesis reveals that the bureaucratic actor Itamaraty failed to convince Dilma about foreign affairs' importance. Budget cuts and a disinterested president left Itamaraty with little influence. This resulted in a passive foreign policy. Lastly, findings suggest that it is hard to prove if lacking party support influenced Brazilian foreign policy. Although not proven, it is likely that lacking support made Dilma use much time on consolidating and legitimating her presidency.

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List of Acronyms

ABIN	Agência Brasileira de Inteligência
BRIC	Brazil, Russia, India, and China
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa
DCA	(US-Brazil) Defense Cooperation Agreement
EU	European Union
FHC	Fernando Henrique Cardoso
FPA	Foreign policy analysis
FPDM	Foreign Policy Decision Making
FTAA	Free Trade Area of the Americas
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IR	International Relations
Lula	Luiz Inácio da Silva
NPT	Non-Proliferation Treaty
NSA	National Security Agency
PDT	Partido Democrático Trabalhista
PMDB	Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro
PT	Partido dos Trabalhadores (the Brazilian Workers' Party)
R2P	Responsibility to Protect
RWP	Responsibility While Protecting
TRIPS	Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
UN	United Nations
UNASUR	Union of South American Nations
UNHRC	United Nations Human Rights Council
UNSC	United Nations' Security Council
WB	World Bank
WTO	World Trade Organization

1. Introduction

The Portuguese conquistadors arrived on the shores of Brazil at the turn of the Sixteenth Century. They were greeted with great wealth. Further explorations revealed a land with somewhat endless resources. European colonization, resource exploitation, and economic growth followed. So it happened that Brazil got coined a country of the future, a country destined for greatness.

Hundreds of years passed. Brazil did not fulfill its prophecy of greatness. Corruption, poverty, lacking political will, poor infrastructure, epidemic inequality, fluctuating growth, high level of bureaucracy, and violence are some of many timeless barriers that have challenged development.¹ The long list of challenges has therefore made the argument that Brazil will forever remain a country of the future.

Yet, domestic barriers do not necessary block the creation of a powerful international actor. Several historical cases of emerging states prove this. Moreover, the election of Luiz Inácio da Silva, popularly known as Lula, made Brazil began to live up to its promise. Remarkable developmental progress and economic growth was achieved during his presidency. Riordan Roett goes as far to claim that Lula transformed Brazil into a modern nation.² In addition, Lula's foreign policy suggested that Brazil had finally found its place in the center of international politics. Lula seized an opportunity to draw international attention and recognition the country. The image of Brazil as an uninfluential colossus began to shatter. So it happened that Brazil became a key actor in international affairs.

Brazil seemed finally to have the needed self-confidence to fulfill its destiny in the era of Lula. Thus the main foreign policy challenge for Lula's successor, Dilma Rousseff, was to maintain and use Brazil's position to promote national interests. However, while Brazil's influence increased throughout Lula's presidency, its international key role seemed to diminish after Rousseff's election. It looked like Dilma's Brazil did not share Lula's emphasis for the vision of Brazil a great state with power status. Hence it is reasonable to think that Brazilian foreign policy underwent significant changes after her inauguration.

Changes in Brazil's foreign policy are on one hand not uncommon. Despite of its comparative advantages, domestic and international shifts have challenged foreign policy continuity. This is especially the case after the country turned democratic. The different presidents did not seek a consistent foreign policy. Hence the foreign policy evolved

¹ Robb, *A Death in Brazil*; Sharma, "Broken BRICs"; Onis, "Brazil's Big Moment," 111; Sharma, "The Ever-Emerging Markets"; Roett, *Brazil on the Rise*, 160-161.

² Roett, *The New Brazil*, 107.

constantly. As a result, Brazil's international role is difficult to term. Yet, Brazil has emphasized a continuation of several foreign policy goals. This is has to do with the Brazilian Ministry of External Relations' influence. The institution has enjoyed a somewhat traditional monopolistic power over decision making. Preserving and securing national autonomy has for instance been strongly favored.³ Autonomy can shortly be defined as independent formulation and conducting of policies. The foreign policy has thus historically sought to keep the country away from other state's direct influence and intimidation. To achieve this, Brazilian presidents have implemented different strategies.⁴ The acts have resulted in foreign policy changes.

Continuity is for instance hard to identify in the foreign policies of Fernando Collor de Mello and Itamar Franco. The two were Brazil's first post-Cold War presidents. Over a period of four years, Brazil changed its autonomy strategy several times according to Tullo Vigevani and Gabriel Cepaluni.⁵ Brazil sought establishing good relations with developed states to begin with. This was carried through participation in international regimes. Hence autonomy was attempted through international participation. The strategy changed by distancing Brazil from dominant developed states on a later stage. A renewed emphasize on participation emerged, before falling back to distancing again. By seeking autonomy through distance, Brazil tried to oppose great powers' policies. International regimes' norms and principles were therefore cautiously approached. Franco's successor, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, implemented a more active foreign policy.⁶ Moreover, autonomy was again attempted through active participation in key international institutions and organizations.⁷

Change was central in the rhetoric that won Lula presidency. However, the election of Lula in 2002 caused anxiety in the financial world due to the fear of leftism.⁸ The president candidate had promised to transform Brazil during his campaign. And in his inauguration speech, Lula continued to pledge for radical change of direction:

³ Burges, *Brazilian Foreign Policy after the Cold War*, 2; Vigevani and Ramanzini Júnior, "The Changing Nature of Multilateralism and Brazilian Foreign Policy," 64; Vigevani and Cepaluni, *Brazilian Foreign Policy in Changing Times*, 3; Christensen, "Brazil's Foreign Policy Priorities," 273; Lampreia and Cruz Júnior, "Brazil: Coping with structural constraints," 98.

⁴ Vigevani and Cepaluni, *Brazilian Foreign Policy in Changing Times*; Vigevani and Ramanzini Júnior, "The Changing Nature of Multilateralism and Brazilian Foreign Policy," 68.

⁵ Vigevani and Cepaluni, *Brazilian Foreign Policy in Changing Times*, 51.

⁶ Hakim, "Two Ways to Go Global," 153.

⁷ Vigevani and Cepaluni, *Brazilian Foreign Policy in Changing Times*, 53.

⁸ Onis, "Brazil's Big Moment," 118; Roett, *The New Brazil*, 110; Leira, *Brasil: Kjempen våkner*, 140.

‘Change. That is the key word. That was the great message that Brazilian society delivered during the October election. Hope finally defeated fear and society decided that this was the time to walk new roads...’.⁹

The election of Lula made Brazil pursue autonomy through diversification.¹⁰ Greater emphasis was therefore put on partnerships with emerging states instead of developed states. The new approach moved Brazil away from the group of nations not affiliated with global leadership, and placed the country to the center of global politics. As a result, Brazil emerged as a pivotal actor. Its diplomatic ties and activity grew significantly: ‘Brazil’s international responsibilities are far greater today than they were at any time in history’.¹¹ Foreign policy continuity was therefore overshadowed by changes after Lula’s inauguration.¹²

Lula brought the Brazilian Worker’s Party, Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT), in power for the first time in 2003. His re-election in 2006 secured four more years. Hence the election of Dilma Rousseff marked a continuation of the PT in power. Rousseff was not only Lula’s handpicked successor. She was also his Chief of Staff, a somewhat Prime Minister role, for five years. It was thus reasonable to expect that Rousseff would follow broad parts of Lula’s foreign policy. Yet, despite of representing the same party, being handpicked, and naming her coalition ‘For Brazil to keep on changing’ during the 2010-presidential election, Rousseff did not follow up Lula’s international expansion. And the foreign policy of Dilma, as she is universally referred to in Brazil, gave Brazil a less central role in issues of international affairs.¹³ Although foreign policy changes after presidential inaugurations are not uncommon, Lula’s and Dilma’s Brazil presented for instance distinctive visible profiles on the global stage. The master thesis’ research question is therefore: why did changes in Brasília’s foreign policy occur after Dilma Rousseff’s inauguration?

1.1 Research Questions and Objectives

Brazil is a federative republic. It is divided into one federal unit and twenty-six states.¹⁴ *Brasília* is the one federal unit. Moreover, the unit is also the federal capital of Brazil. It is

⁹ BBC, “Brazil’s Lula promises change.”

¹⁰ Vigevani and Cepaluni, *Brazilian Foreign Policy in Changing Times*, 86.

¹¹ Stuenkel, “Brazil’s Foreign Policy under Dilma Rousseff.”

¹² Lima and Hirst, “Brazil as an intermediate state and regional power,” 22.

¹³ Stuenkel, “Could Marina Silva put Brazil’s foreign policy back on track?”; Andrew Downie, “Rousseff’s Angry U.N. Speech Signals Brazil’s Shift on the World Stage”; Liby-Alonso, “Is Brazil entering a new phase in foreign affairs under Dilma Rousseff?”; Stuenkel, “Brazilian foreign policy.”

¹⁴ Store norske leksikon, “Brasils politiske system.”

here Brazil's federal political power can be found. Hence it is in Brasília the Brazilian Ministry of External Relations, often referred to as Itamaraty, the president, and the federal government are located. The term Brasília refers thus to the key decision makers of Brazilian foreign policy. By referring to *Dilma Rousseff's inauguration*, the master thesis seeks to uncover why changes occurred in Brazilian foreign policy after January 1, 2011.¹⁵ By doing so, the thesis is based on the perception that changes have occurred. As a result, the main objective is to identify what changes occurred in Brazilian foreign policy after the election of Rousseff, and explain why changes took place.

To be able to identify what kind of changes occurred, we need to start by looking at Lula's foreign policy. This leaves us with the following sub-research question: what were the priorities and goals in Brazil's foreign policy from 2003 to 2010? Foreign policy is however a wide concept. Several topics can be used as cases in order to identify changes. We will look at four areas of foreign policy conduction with great emphasis in Brazilian foreign policy.¹⁶ The four areas are the global role, regional approach, the US-Brazil bilateral tie, and the topic of human rights. Human rights can be said to not earn as much emphasis as the first three areas. The topic was primarily selected because it proved to be a potential source of change before Dilma took office. Hence the second objective is to examine Lula's approach on the four areas.

Because the thesis seeks to compare Lula to Dilma, the third objective is to analyze the same areas under Dilma. The second sub-research question is thus as follows: how were the areas approached during President Rousseff's first period? The two sub-questions are necessary for looking into the third sub-research question; how do the foreign policies of the two presidents differ? This question is asked in order to identify what kind of changes took place. By confirming that differences can be found, we can start analyzing the thesis' main research question. The process is started by asking a fourth sub-research question: what theories are potentially usable to explain the suggested differences? Hence the last objective is to identify theories that can explain the main research questions.

1.2 The Thesis' Outline

We have already been through the thesis' idea part. To answer the research question, we will start by looking at foreign policy theory in the following chapter. We will conceptualize

¹⁵ Rohter, *Brazil on the Rise*, 273.

¹⁶ Montero, *Brazilian Politics*, 117; Rohter, *Brazil on the Rise*, 245; Reid, *Brazil: The Troubled Rise of a Global Power*, 241-244; Tickner, "Rising Brazil and South America," 372; Engstrom, "Brazilian Foreign Policy and Human Rights," 838; Burges, *Brazilian Foreign Policy after the Cold War*, 17-42.

foreign policy before taking a brief look at foreign policy analysis. The goal of chapter two is therefore to present a theoretical conceptualization of foreign policy.

Chapter three presents the thesis' first part of analysis and findings as it addresses changes in Brazilian foreign policy from 2003 to 2014. To begin with, the chapter defines changes, and presents developments in Brazilian foreign policy before Lula's presidency. Four areas of foreign policy conduction are then looked into in order to demonstrate differences in two foreign policies. The chapter is a necessary step to select theories that might explain why changes occurred. Hence chapter three acts like a background for chapter four, which presents four theoretical approaches to analyze foreign policy. The four theories are based on four different levels of influence: the international system, the individual leader, domestic political contestation, and bureaucratic politics.

Chapter five concerns the master thesis' methodology and research design. We look at why qualitative method was chosen as research method, and argue the case of terming the master thesis a case study research. We depart from there by presenting the unit of analysis and reflections around the choice. Four independent variables were selected to analyze why changes occurred are then presented. After giving accounts of variables, we look at two methods of data collection that was chosen. Lastly, the chapter ends by giving an account for the chosen strategy and method of data analysis.

The second presentation of the master thesis' findings and analyzes is found in chapter six. The chapter addresses the main research question. How the international system might have affected Brazilian foreign policy is analyzed in chapter 6.1. The sub-chapter begin by arguing that Brazilian politics have been influenced from the outside throughout centuries. Then it carries on by presenting structural developments in the Post-Cold War era that pounded the way for Lula and Brazil. Moving on from there, the following two sub-chapters analyze the power of Lula's and Dilma's Brazil in means of economic purchasing power. Lastly, we compare and discuss Brazil's power in order to see if changes can be explained by a decline in Brasília's power.

Chapter 6.2 addresses how emotions can explain foreign policy change. To begin with, a linking of human rights' to the definition of change is given. Then the attention is moved over to presenting the environment the leaders grew up in and developed their personality in. The following two chapters present a psychobiography of two individuals' life and experiences from early experiences to 1985. The last sub-chapter discusses whether their emotions from the defined time period can explain changes.

Chapter 6.3 concerns the problem of not having support within a party's ranks, and its implications for Brazilian foreign policy. A brief introduction is given to Brazilian politics and ideological thinking within the PT. The party members' support of the former and the current Brazilian president is then given attention. We will look into how the party's ideology and policies were followed up and implemented in the two administrations foreign policies. The thought behind this approach is to investigate whether sources of mistrust and coalition building can be found on the background of lacked support. Lastly, we look at how party support can have influenced Brasília's foreign policy.

Chapter 6.4 looks at bureaucratic influence. A brief introduction is given about Itamaraty, the chapter's bureaucratic actor. The focus is then moved to traditional principles and goals that can be regarded as national interests. This has to do with Itamaraty's long termed relative autonomy and great degree of domestic legitimacy. We depart from there to look at how the values have been represented in Brazilian foreign policy from 2003 to 2014. By doing so, the institution's influence under the administrations of Lula and Dilma is sought analyzed. The chapter is rounded up with a discussion over whether Itamaraty's bureaucratic influence has led to changes or not.

Lastly, chapter seven evaluates findings and finalizes the thesis with a conclusion.

2. Theorizing Foreign Policy

Foreign policy can be defined as 'a policy pursued by a nation in its dealings with other nations, designed to achieve national objectives'.¹⁷ However, a given state interacts not only with states. The United Nations (UN) is for instance an important international actor. By taking the UN in mind, we have ventured into the study area of International Politics. This study area focuses on interactions between states.¹⁸ Interactions can be bilateral or multilateral. It can also take place within or without international organizations where states are members.

Not all international actors have governmental ties. Several non-governmental organizations like Amnesty International and Red Cross can affect governments' decisions. This is also the case of multinational companies like McDonald's, Toyota, and IKEA. By taking non-state actors in mind, we have moved into the study area of International Relations

¹⁷ Dictionary.com, "Foreign policy."

¹⁸ Fermann, "Utenrikspolitiske målsettinger og virkemidler," 33.

(IR). The study field focuses on interactions between states and with transnational actors.¹⁹ Hence foreign policy includes many levels and elements for governmental interaction with non-domestic actors. Elements can be goals, guidelines, methods, strategies, directives, agreements, etc. Thus foreign policy is a concept of ‘aims and measures that are intended to guide government decisions and actions with regard to external affairs, particularly relations with foreign countries’.²⁰ Foreign policy is so driven by national interests and concerns. Yet, organizations also execute foreign policy. One example is the European Union’s (EU) sanctions against Russia due to the Ukraine crisis that began in 2014.²¹ Consequently, foreign policy is a wide concept. As a result, foreign policy can be approached and analyzed in several ways.

2.1 Foreign Policy Analysis

Foreign policy analysis (FPA) is an IR sub-discipline study field. It aims to ‘explain foreign policy, or, alternatively, foreign policy behavior, with reference to the theoretical ground of human decision makers, acting singly and in groups’.²² In short, FPA is a branch of political science trying to explain the mechanisms and results of foreign policies. The sub-discipline analyzes how domestic and external factors and actors influence foreign policy. Hence its goal is to outline, analyze, explain and/or predict cases of international affairs.

FPA came into being with the works of Richard Snyder, James Rousenau, and Harold and Margaret Sprout at the turn of the 1960s.²³ Over time, the founding works evolved into three main branches of FPA. Because of foreign policy’s extensive and broad definitions, FPA is a wide theoretical area. This leaves researchers with several theories applicable as analytical and explanatory tools. What kind of tools one chooses is dependent on the research question(s).

The thesis seeks to uncover why changes occurred after Dilma’s inauguration. Hence it is reasonable to use theories that explain foreign policy changes. *Change* is however a little researched topic. Actors like states and institutions are static subjects of incremental shifts.²⁴ The lack of research was addressed twenty-five years ago in Charles F. Hermann’s “*Changing Courses: When Governments Choose to Redirect Foreign Policy*”. A more recent

¹⁹ Fermann, “Utenrikspolitiske målsettinger og virkemidler,” 34.

²⁰ Jackson and Sørensen, *Introduction to International Relations*, 252.

²¹ BBC, “Ukraine conflict.”

²² Hudson, “The history and evolution of foreign policy analysis,” 14.

²³ Ibid., 13.

²⁴ Alden and Aran, *Foreign Policy Analysis*, 92.

book, David A. Welch's *Painful Choices: A Theory of Foreign Policy Change*, seeks to build a theory about foreign policy change.

Nonetheless, it is problematic to follow Hermann's and Welch's theories for several reasons. For a start, they define *change* as a fundamental and radical foreign policy redirection.²⁵ Although I recognized there have been changes in Brasília's foreign policy, I would not define them as big shifts. Moreover, sources of change depend on context. Thus it is better to start by identifying what kind of changes took place. The step is followed up by using theories that look at sources of foreign policy. By doing so, a review of FPA combined with identified changes is the rationality behind explaining changes. The rationale of doing so is evident as Welch tests theoretical assumptions in cases where leaders fear loss of power. As a result, we will look at what kind of changes is identifiable in Brazilian foreign policy from 2003 to 2014.

3. Addressing Changes in Brazilian Foreign Policy

The word *change* signifies transformation of an object. By implementing *changes* into the research question, the thesis claim that differences in Dilma's and Lula's foreign policies can be found. Hence distinctions and variances need to be identified. However, changes can be identified as big or small transformations. I decided to define changes as adjustments. This is because the two foreign policies are not remarkable different. Hence small differences are regarded as changes. Occurred changes are therefore referred to as developments that signalize distinctions when comparing two foreign policies. We will begin addressing changes in Brazilian foreign policy by looking at post-Cold War developments before the era of Lula.

3.1 Brazilian Post-Cold War Foreign Policy Developments

Fernando Collor de Mello had little time to influence Brasília's foreign policy. He was discharged due to corruption charges in late 1992.²⁶ Moreover, his party did not represent any defined ideology or program. The focus was on the leader and political power.²⁷ Even so, key foreign policy changes are identifiable. The domestic market was opened to world trade, the industry was encouraged for modernization, and Mercosur was established. Additionally, a

²⁵ Hermann, "Changing Course," 5; Welch, *Painful Choices*, 8.

²⁶ Rohter, *Brazil on the Rise*, 143; Vigevani and Cepaluni, *Brazilian Foreign Policy in Changing Times*, 46; Robb, *A Death in Brazil*, 238.

²⁷ Roett, *The New Brazil*, 84.

closer connection to Washington was sought. Yet, when the wanted benefits failed to appear, the bilateral tie was reverted by distancing Brazil from the United States.

Collor's vice president, Itamar Franco, became acting president in 1992. Because domestic challenges stole Franco's attention, Itamaraty increased its influence.²⁸ This led to a strengthening of participations in international forums. Additionally, better relations with developed states were sought. However, Brazil began to deepen its relations with developing states as well.

The periods of the two first presidents lasted four years. It was turbulent years because of pressure from domestic and international actors. As a result, Brazil conducted different autonomy strategies throughout the years. On a general level, the idea of sovereignty, expansion of the domestic market, and economic protectionism were policy key elements. The objective was to strengthen Brazil's influence by increasing its bargain power.²⁹

FHC, as Fernando Henrique Cardoso is nicknamed in Brazil, took office in 1995. Autonomy was attempted secured through international participation during FHC's eight years of presidency. National interests were thus pursued cooperatively by adhering to international organizations and institutions. By doing so, Brazil sought influence over the principles and rules the international system is based on. Democratic values and economic freedom were emphasized.³⁰ Although Brazil's ruling elite had recognized regionalism's importance since the 1970s,³¹ Latin America had drawn little attention.³² FHC changed this by giving regionalism priority.

Foreign policy changes are found at the end of Cardoso's presidency. FHC began carefully to criticize Washington's unilateralism. He also tried to increase cooperation with other developing states.³³ The change claimed place in the 2002-presidential election debate,³⁴ an election Lula's Workers Party won for the first time by a landslide.³⁵

²⁸ Vigevani and Cepaluni, *Brazilian Foreign Policy in Changing Times*, 47.

²⁹ Ibid., 48-49.

³⁰ Ibid., 54.

³¹ Malamud, "A Leader Without Followers?," 6.

³² Tickner, "Rising Brazil and South America," 368.

³³ Vigevani and Cepaluni, *Brazilian Foreign Policy in Changing Times*, 77-78.

³⁴ Roett, *The New Brazil*, 101-102; Christensen, "Brazil's Foreign Policy Priorities," 275.

³⁵ Williamson, "Lula's Brazil."

3.2 Brazilian Foreign Policy in the Era of Lula

The policies of FHC and Lula made Brazil emerge as an influential actor in international politics.³⁶ FHC implemented important economic reforms that choked Brazil's notorious inflation. The most important was the Real plan. It strengthened and stimulated the economy after the introduction in 1994 when FHC acted as the Minister of Finance.³⁷ Lula took therefore control over a somewhat stabilized Brazil. Yet, Lula did far from come to a set table as the economy was under pressure with many problems unsolved. And despite Brazil's increased international reputation, the country was far from fulfilling its destiny as a global key actor. However, Lula introduced changes that greatly affected Brasília's foreign policy. For instance, far more resources were dedicated to secure Brazil a permanent seat in United Nations' Security Council (UNSC).

3.2.1 Brazil's Global Role

A permanent UNSC seat was a core foreign policy goal during Lula's two president periods.³⁸ The goal was expressed in several contexts, and considerable attention was drawn to issues of international security. Brazil was notably critical of military interventions. Brasília raised a sharp voice on Washington's invasion of Iraq in 2003.³⁹ It also played a moderating role in several global crises. Most remarkably, Brazil sought a central negotiator role in Iran's controversial nuclear program. The program has been a thorny conflict for several years as negotiations have produced few results. The problem is that the Tehran-regime claims to develop nuclear power for peaceful means. Several other states believe that Iran develops nuclear weapons. Containing the nuclear program was therefore one of many cases Lula had discussed with Barack Obama. Talks made Lula think he had Washington's support to offer a nuclear fuel swap deal between Turkey, Iran, and Brazil.⁴⁰ However, the United States and major international actors discredited the deal by concluding that further sanctions were a better solution. Iran must take much blame. Tehran stated a continuation of enrichment shortly after the handshakes.⁴¹ Hence little progress was found. Nonetheless, Lula felt betrayed. Brasília openly expressed its frustration. A symbolic response came in the

³⁶ Cervo, "A ascensão do Brasil no cenário internacional," 7; Trinkunas, *Brazil's Rise*, 11; Tickner, "Rising Brazil and South America," 368.

³⁷ Rohter, *Brazil on the Rise*, 144.

³⁸ Malamud, "A Leader Without Followers," 16; Vigevani and Cepaluni, *Brazilian Foreign Policy in Changing Times*, 92; Rohter, *Brazil on the Rise*, 226; Ricupero, "Foreign policy after Lula," 7.

³⁹ Amorim, "A Política Externa Brasileira no governo do Presidente Lula (2003-2010)," 217.

⁴⁰ Bodman, Wolfensohn and Sweig, *Global Brazil and U.S.-Brazil Relation* , 66.

⁴¹ Reid, *Brazil: The Troubled Rise of a Global Power*, 239.

UNSC with a ‘no vote’ to implement further sanctions against Iran. The event was remarkable as it was the first time Brazil had voted against the US in the Security Council.⁴²

Several explanations can shed light over Brasília’s involvement. For a start, Brasília had put little faith in sanctions’ effectiveness. Lula believed instead that further sanctions would make Iran more isolated and dangerous.⁴³ Secondly, international attention and prestige was brought upon Brazil by taking on a negotiator role. Hence its influence would increase with success. Thirdly, Lula believed that the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) had lost part of its meanings. This had to do with the rise of nuclear nations like India, North Korea, Pakistan, and Israel. Pointing to the fact that nuclear states had done little to honor obligations, Lula viewed the NPT as a tool to impose unjust on the rest of the world.⁴⁴ By stating that Iran had the same right as India to persuade a civil nuclear program, Brazil challenged the United States. A line can be drawn to Brazil’s policy on its own nuclear industry. The country resisted implementation of additional protocols by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Brasília’s actions are rather complicated as its navy and politicians have both been sources of resistance against the IAEA.⁴⁵ Even so, involvement in a conflict out of its traditional influential sphere signalized an approach of becoming a global power. Brasília might have tried to show that the time of Washington’s indispensable actor role in the region had passed. Lula wanted to show that Brazil was a future power to count with. Lastly, Celso Amorim, Lula’s Minister of External Relations, defended his country’s involvement as an approach of taking the responsibility that comes with a seat in the UNSC.⁴⁶ By claiming so, Brazilian diplomats sought to preempt further UN sanctions in order to solve a thorny conflict.

Taking leadership in the United Nations’ peacekeeping mission in Haiti is another example of an active moderating role. Historically, Brazilian armed forces have dedicated resources for participation in peacekeeping missions abroad. This has to do with Brazil’s tradition of supporting multilateral operations. Yet, although involvement in peacekeeping missions is a traditional objective in Brasília’s foreign policy, taking leadership was something new. As a result, the role became a tool for getting international recognition. Moreover, it was an act to show readiness for a permanent seat in the UNSC. Issues of peace

⁴² Sweig, “A New Global Player,” 176; Reid, *Brazil: The Troubled Rise of a Global Power*, 240.

⁴³ Stuenkel, “Lula’s Weekend Trip to Tehran.”

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Montero, *Brazil: Reversal of Fortune*, 170.

⁴⁶ Amorim, “A Política Externa Brasileira no governo do Presidente Lula (2003-2010),” 222.

and security were dominated by the West after the Cold War's end. Brasília's active role in such cases was therefore remarkable in many senses.

Lula's Brazil became a symbol of a new multipolar world order as emerging states became influential. Brazil found itself in the front seat by taking an active global role. Notwithstanding partnership with emerging states was shaped at the end of FHC's second term, his foreign policy put Brazil as a leader of regional coalition building.⁴⁷ To preserve autonomy and gain global influence, Lula's Brazil changed its strategy by reaching out to a wider range of states.⁴⁸ Lula broke with FHC when selecting preferred non-regional partners. While FHC had prioritized cooperation with Western states, Lula favored cooperation with African, Asian and Middle Eastern countries.⁴⁹ By doing so, Brasília sought to increase cooperation with non-traditional partners. Examples of this was the forging of tighter ties to China, South Africa, and Iran; creating South-South alliances in order to diminish ties and dependence to higher developed states. Hence Lula's South-South approach became an active strategy of global power diffusion.⁵⁰ Vigevani and Cepaluni coins therefore Lula's strategy as autonomy through diversification.⁵¹

Focus on multilateral trade formed and strengthened strategic diplomatic ties with emerging states. A leadership role was for instance created by encouraging dialogues and cooperation among emerging states. For instance, Brazil's took on a diplomatic leadership role in the G20 group.⁵² This was also the case in the Doha round of the World Trade Organization (WTO). In its strategy for global influence, Brasília became a spokesman for a more economically and socially balanced world. Thus trade diversification and partnership with emerging markets gained strong emphasis. China became therefore Brazil's major trading partner at the end of Lula's era.⁵³

Policy coordination and trade within the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India, and China), took much of the South-South emphasis. The intention was to build a coalition for developing states. The idea was to counterbalance the developed states' power in international regimes.

⁴⁷ Burges, *Brazilian Foreign Policy after the Cold War*, 4.

⁴⁸ Cervo and Lessa, "An Assessment of the Lula Era," 6; Christensen, "Brazil's Foreign Policy Priorities," 272; Rohter, *Brazil on the Rise*, 157.

⁴⁹ Montero, *Brazil: Reversal of Fortune*, 157-158; Amorim, "A Política Externa Brasileira no governo do Presidente Lula (2003-2010)," 232.

⁵⁰ Christensen, "Brazil's Foreign Policy Priorities," 272; Vigevani and Ramanzini Júnior, "The Changing Nature of Multilateralism and Brazilian Foreign Policy," 67.

⁵¹ Vigevani and Cepaluni, *Brazilian Foreign Policy in Changing Times*, 86.

⁵² Malamud, "A Leader Without Followers?," 17; Montero, *Brazilian Politics*, 122.

⁵³ Montero, *Brazil: Reversal of Fortune*, 164.

In addition, Brazil sought to promote a more balanced economic world. To achieve both goals, Brazil joined the creation of BRIC as an informal group. Amorim put it clear: ‘we are changing the way the world order is organized’.⁵⁴ By doing so, the club of four states tried to convert their economic influential power into greater geopolitical stature.⁵⁵ Exclusive annual meetings took place to form a common agenda.

The establishment of the IBSA Dialogue Forum presents another example of coalition building. The act was an effort to coordinate the policies of Brazil, India and South Africa in multilateral institutions.⁵⁶ Another thought behind was to promote South-South cooperation and exchange.⁵⁷

3.2.2 Brazil and Regionalism

The active moderating role was also visible in cases of regional security. For instance, when Ecuador went through a domestic crisis in 2005, Lula sent Amorim to help solving the crisis.⁵⁸ And Brasília was the creator behind the Group of Friends of Venezuela in 2003.⁵⁹ The object of this group was to protect Venezuela’s democratization process. It also sought to stabilize its fractured political life after the failed 2002-coup attempt.

A more successful coup d'état took place in another Latin American country six years later. Honduras became the scene of international attention when the military removed the president from power. Brazil, alongside with most the world's states, condemned the act. And once again Brasília took on the role as a mediator. However, Brazil was more or less drawn into the role. The ousted president took refuge at Brazil's embassy in Tegucigalpa, the capital of Honduras. Nonetheless, Brazil and Argentina offered to step in as negotiators when oppositional forces threatened to destabilize Bolivia in 2008.⁶⁰ The conflict began with demonstrations against Bolivia's president and a call of strengthened autonomy in eastern provinces. It turned violent when protesters took over gas and governmental infrastructures. Although Brazil indirectly alluded to the use of force,⁶¹ the conflict was eventually solved by talks.

⁵⁴ Roett, *The New Brazil*, 135.

⁵⁵ Malamud, “A Leader Without Followers?,” 16.

⁵⁶ Stephen, “Rising Regional Powers and International Institutions,” 290; Christensen, “Brazil’s Foreign Policy Priorities,” 276;

⁵⁷ Malamud, “A Leader Without Followers?,” 16.

⁵⁸ Stuenkel, “Is Brazil the New Regional Champion of Democracy?.”

⁵⁹ Christensen, “Brazil’s Foreign Policy Priorities,” 277.

⁶⁰ Valdez, “Bolivian political clashes spark diplomatic crisis.”

⁶¹ Roett, *The New Brazil*, 133.

Latin America was also viewed geopolitically strategically important for Brazil's desired leadership role.⁶² There are several reasons for this. Regionalism was for instance viewed as a necessary step to gain a global role. Regional backing can lead to accumulation of bargaining power in relation to powerful states. Thus by promoting regional cooperation, Brasília's global influence could increase. This approach pictures regional leadership as a springboard for global key role insertion. Forming regional leadership was therefore prioritized on a number of issues.⁶³

However, Brazil met regional resistance in its pursuit of a permanent UNSC seat for instance. Argentina showed little support of Brazil's candidature for a permanent seat.⁶⁴ And for the post of director general in the WTO, Argentina supported Uruguay's candidate instead of the Brazilian candidate. Despite of being Brazil's small neighbor, Uruguay was also a source of resentment. This had to do with low gains from Mercosur membership, and Brazil's refusal to intervene in Uruguay's border dispute with Argentina. Moreover, regional states supported a Colombian instead of a Brazilian candidate in the Inter-American Development Bank's presidency election in 2005.⁶⁵ Lastly, Chávez's Venezuela was playing a joker role throughout Lula's periods. The country challenged Brazilian leadership on several occasions.

Regionalism was also favored due to its importance for economic growth through export and trade. Additionally, Lula used regional integration to preserve Brazil's superiority in the region.⁶⁶ A strong Mercosur became of great importance. Mercosur is a South American organization designated to promote free trade and movement of people, goods, and currency between its members. In the era of Lula it became also a symbol leftist ideologies and progressive political activism.⁶⁷ Mercosur was primarily created to establish a good relation between Brazil and Argentina. From there it evolved to multilateralism and regional cooperation. Although Mercosur has been a foreign policy cornerstone since its establishment,⁶⁸ the intergovernmental organization saw great emphasize to counter Washington's influence in South America.⁶⁹ Hence trade diversification found also place on a

⁶² Burges, "Brazil as Regional Leader," 58; Bernal-Meza, "Pensamento Internacional na era Lula," 199; Christensen, "Brazil's Foreign Policy Priorities," 273; Amorim, "A Política Externa Brasileira no governo do Presidente Lula (2003-2010)," 227.

⁶³ Saraiva, "Brazilian foreign policy towards South America during the Lula administration," 160.

⁶⁴ Malamud, "A Leader Without Followers?," 9.

⁶⁵ Ibid., 10.

⁶⁶ Bernal-Meza, "Pensamento Internacional na era Lula," 201

⁶⁷ Malamud, "A Leader Without Followers?," 7.

⁶⁸ Ibid., 6.

⁶⁹ Christensen, "Brazil's Foreign Policy Priorities," 274-275.

regional level. Another example strengthening this statement was Brasília's approach to the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). The FTAA was a Washington led proposal for cutting down trade barriers between Americas' states. By taking a leadership role among the developing states, Brazil sought to remove agricultural subsidies and free trade of agricultural goods. Washington found thus little support on its emphasis of intellectual property rights protection and trade service expansion. Brazilian resistance made the FTAA never evolve closer than the draw board.

The strong emphasis on Mercosur strengthened regional integration. A trade agreement between Mercosur and the Andean Community, the other main South American trading bloc, was signed in 2003.⁷⁰ The integration of the two put regional cooperation on a higher level. It led for instance to the establishment the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) in 2008.⁷¹ Instead of focusing on intra-regional trade, the organization deals with regional cooperation on political, environmental, security, infrastructural, social and cultural issues. Because cooperation of regional security is one of UNASUR's functions, the organization gained great importance in Brasília's security strategy.

3.2.3 Washington's and Brasília's Bilateral Relation

Even though the South-South approach led to a pressure of global power diffusion, direct confrontations or bad relations with developed states was not sought. On the contrary, good relations and cooperation was kept with the United States and European states.⁷²

Recognizing the importance of the bilateral relation, George W. Bush invited Lula for a visit after his election win in 2002. The visit turned out to be positive for the bilateral relation. Even though the relation never reached a significant peak, cooperation stayed productive and strong despite of Lula's leftism.⁷³ Trade grew from 28.2 to 60.7 billion USD between 2002 and 2008.⁷⁴ And private investments saw increased activity levels. Yet, several cases of disagreements were present.⁷⁵ Washington put for instance barriers for Brazilian orange juice, while Brasília implemented retaliatory tariffs on American cotton. Moreover,

⁷⁰ Christensen, "Brazil's Foreign Policy Priorities," 275.

⁷¹ Encyclopædia Britannica, "UNASUR."

⁷² Vigevani and Cepaluni, *Brazilian Foreign Policy in Changing Times*, 86; Vigevani and Ramanzini Júnior, "The Changing Nature of Multilateralism and Brazilian Foreign Policy," 68.

⁷³ Rohter, *Brazil on the Rise*, 230-231.

⁷⁴ Bodman, Wolfensohn and Sweig, *Global Brazil and U.S.-Brazil*, 68.

⁷⁵ Montero, *Brazilian Politics*, 128; Bodman, Wolfensohn and Sweig, *Global Brazil and U.S.-Brazil Relations*, 68.

controversial decisions like Lula's closer relation to Iran put severe constraints on the relation.

Nonetheless, security cooperation with regional countries and the United States saw also important continuation. Brazil has traditionally based its security policy on multilateralism.⁷⁶ Regionally, the thought of cooperating with the US has been to fight internal threats and keep non-American states out of regional affairs. The fight against narcotics is a good example of a case that can be classified as an internal threat. Organized crime is by far the region's big problem, while illegal drug-trade is its spine. Bolivia is today one of the cocaine industry regional strongholds. The country is also poor. As a result, it is in need of support for combating the illegal industry. Brazil got invited to play part. By recognizing it lacked experience and resources, Brasília contacted Washington. Cooperation followed. The US provided funding and experience. Brazil put foots on ground to enforce the law. A second example of security cooperation was the signing of the Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA), a bilateral agreement between Brasília and Washington. The DCA concerns collaboration on defense, intelligence and security issues. It was signed at the end of Lula's second term.

However, the cooperation with the US on security issues was challenging. Brazil feared it would strengthen Washington's regional influence. It was therefore an act of balancing. While putting barriers against Washington's regional influence, Brasília also supported the US in cases of democracy promotion and stabilization operations.⁷⁷ Furthermore, Lula's Brazil was critical to Washington led military interventions. Brasília stressed that security issues should go through a multilateral approach.⁷⁸ Brazil has a tradition of being against military intervention.⁷⁹ It is a strong defender of sovereignty. The US-Brazil relation could therefore be described as 'warm though obscure'.

3.2.4 Human Rights' Foreign Policy Placement

Lula came to build controversial friendly ties with authoritarian regimes through the South-South strategy. Lula visited for instance notorious human rights abuse countries like Libya, Syria, and Egypt. By doing so, Lula found himself sided with state leaders that held a strong dislike of democratic values. Moreover, the Brazilian president defended and became friends

⁷⁶ Montero, *Brazil: Reversal of Fortune*, 168.

⁷⁷ Ibid., 168.

⁷⁸ Christensen, "Brazil's Foreign Policy Priorities," 277; Vigevani and Ramanzini Júnior, "The Changing Nature of Multilateralism and Brazilian Foreign Policy," 65; Tickner, "Rising Brazil and South America," 373.

⁷⁹ Spektor, "Humanitarian Interventionism Brazilian Style?"; Tickner, "Rising Brazil and South America," 369.

with authoritarian state leaders like Fidel Castro, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, and Hugo Chávez. The latter was described as a great state leader by Lula: ‘Chavez is without a doubt Venezuela's best president in the last 100 years’.⁸⁰ Hence it can be claimed that strategic interests trumped basic human rights concerns.

Further controversies are identifiable. The Brazilian delegation at the UN’s Human Rights Council (UNHRC) became notorious for turning its back to human rights abuses.⁸¹ Resolutions were either blocked or ignored by abstaining from voting. Brazil distanced itself therefore from regional democracies like Argentina and Chile. As a result, the country got aligned with the UNHRC’s notorious human rights violators. Hence it could look like Brazil was a democracy that broke away from democratic values. For instance, Brasília supported Beijing with a carte blanche, and turned the back to the Darfur genocide.⁸² Lula also endorsed the winner of a disputed Iranian election in 2009. He hushed the election dispute by saying: ‘I don’t know anyone, other than the opposition, who has disagreed with the elections in Iran’.⁸³

Lula’s close relations to dubious regimes made The Washington Post call him ‘the best friend of tyrants in the democratic world’.⁸⁴ Lula defended the ties by calling them strategic partnerships. Additionally, a belief that human rights would be more successful promoted through dialogue and cooperation stood strong in Brasília.⁸⁵ And the mantra of Celso Amorim was ‘it’s not up to Brazil to go around handing out certificates of good or bad behavior’ according to Mac Margolis.⁸⁶

Even so, it can be claimed that Lula ignored human rights in his foreign policy to a certain degree. However, human rights has several conceptualizations. Human rights is a concept of moral and ethic values that applies on all individuals regardless of ethnicity, social status, gender, nationality, age, and so on. Hence it can be said to be a collection of fundamental values. The origin of human rights is hard to identify. Different cultures have influenced the human rights. Its values have evolved under the influence of philosophy, politics, religion, law, and ethics. Because its ideas have developed over centuries, the definition is wide.

⁸⁰ Spiegel Online, “SPIEGEL Interview with Brazilian President Lula.”

⁸¹ Ricupero, “Foreign policy after Lula,” 14.

⁸² Engstrom, “Brazilian Foreign Policy and Human Rights,” 839; Ricupero, “Foreign policy after Lula,” 14.

⁸³ Daremblum, “How Brazil Deals with Dictators.”

⁸⁴ Diehl, “Lula: Stonewalled by Iran.”

⁸⁵ Amorim, “A Política Externa Brasileira no governo do Presidente Lula (2003-2010),” 238.

⁸⁶ Margolis, “Brazil’s Same-Old, Same-Old Samba.”

There are several ways to implement human rights in foreign policy. This has to do with its many definitions. For instance; one state can choose to promote gender equality, access to education, salary level, political opposition, a population's basic needs, cultural and/or ethnical discrimination, and/or freedom of expression in its foreign policy. Two objectivities behind Lula's approach were openly expressed. The strategy was an approach to promote a more democratic international system. The reason was Western states' hegemonic position in world politics. Hence Lula's willingness to cooperate with dictatorships was as a push for broader multilateralism. Secondly, the strategy was as a method to create a fairer economically balanced world. Lula sought economic ties outside the core in an approach of balancing the world economy. A reason for this was to stimulate the economy in less wealthy countries. Economic growth can combat a given state's challenges, and develop it into a modern nation. Thus one can say that human rights got interpreted as uneven development.

Yet, human rights have been associated with uneven development for decades in Brazil.⁸⁷ Even so, uneven development, which was emphasized in several of Lula's statements, can have different meanings. It came to mean promotion of good health by fighting global poverty and hunger in the era of Lula.⁸⁸ A reason for why Brazil expanded ties to many developing states is thus found in a foreign policy that corresponded with domestic policy elements. Brazil sought to reduce domestic inequalities and install active development policies.⁸⁹ Hence parts of the domestic policy became internationalized. Eradication of poverty and hunger was therefore foreign policy elements. In addition, the interpretation became an important aspect for global influence and multipolarity. The use of development aid saw priority as a tool to gain influence in the Global South. Brazil was therefore pictured as a global development power by academics.⁹⁰

3.3 Brazilian Foreign Policy in Dilma's First Presidential Period

Dilma Rousseff became Brazil's fifth post-Cold War president in 2011. Even though Brazil's first female president took office in a time Brazil was surfing on a big wave of self-confidence, there were several challenges waiting. Moreover, Dilma had big shoes to fill as Lula's hand-picked successor. Additionally, Brazil's foreign policy was in a special need of

⁸⁷ Cervo, "A ascensão do Brasil no cenário internacional," 20; Dauvergne and Farias, "The Rise of Brazil as a Global Development Power," 906-908.

⁸⁸ Dauvergne and Farias, "The Rise of Brazil as a Global Development Power," 910-911; Cervo, "A ascensão do Brasil no cenário internacional" 20; Ricupero, "Foreign policy after Lula," 14.

⁸⁹ Christensen, "Brazil's Foreign Policy Priorities," 273.

⁹⁰ Dauvergne and Farias, "The Rise of Brazil as a Global Development Power."

care. The country's international role and reputation had increased significantly. Thus one of Dilma's main objectives was to consolidate Lula's achievements, while putting her name in Brazilian politics. An important step to make this happen was to gain the long wanted permanent seat in the UNSC.

3.3.1 Brasília's Global Role

A continuation of the South-South approach took place during Rousseff first presidential period.⁹¹ For instance, Brazil's development agenda saw few changes after Dilma's inauguration.⁹² And the strategy of power diversification was still emphasized: 'The world for us is a multipolar one'.⁹³

Yet, Dilma was selective in choosing diplomatic partnerships. She was less eager to embrace some authoritarian leaders.⁹⁴ The bilateral relations to Venezuela and Iran became for instance colder. Brazil did not only reconsider relations where authoritarianism governed. Historically, Israel has had good ties with Brazil.⁹⁵ While the diplomatic tie had grown stronger the last twelve years, Brazil had also reached out to other neighboring states. Palestine became for instance a significant receiver of development aid. Thus when Israel intervened on the Gaza Strip in 2014, a diplomatic crisis erupted. Brasília denounced the intervention and followed up by summoning home its ambassador. Other Latin American countries followed Brazil as the country recommended states to follow. Israel responded by calling Brazil a 'diplomatic dwarf', signalizing a collision course between the two countries.

The BRIC partnership saw continuation as innovations and developments were implemented. The group of four expanded to five during Dilma's first year when South Africa became a member. The group acronym was therefore changed to BRICS. A year later, the idea of a BRICS Development Bank was launched. The Development Bank became official when Brazil hosted the yearly summit in 2014.⁹⁶ It was presented as an alternative to the Washington dominated World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Hence the world took a further step to multipolarity. Even though the yearly summits of the

⁹¹ MercoPress, "Latinamerica and Mercosur, priorities of Brazil foreign policy ratifies Rousseff"; Liby-Alonso, "Is Brazil entering a new phase in foreign affairs under Dilma Rousseff?"; Downie, "Rousseff's Angry U.N. Speech Signals Brazil's Shift on the World Stage"; The Economist, "Brazil and its backyard"; Bull, "Ingen venstreorientert pygmé."

⁹² Dauvergne and Farias, "The Rise of Brazil as a Global Development Power," 908.

⁹³ Leahy, "FT Interview."

⁹⁴ Downie, "Rousseff's Angry U.N. Speech Signals Brazil's Shift on the World Stage."

⁹⁵ Bull, "Ingen venstreorientert pygmé"; Amorim, "A Política Externa Brasileira no governo do Presidente Lula (2003-2010)," 235-236.

⁹⁶ BBC, "Brics nations to create \$100bn development bank."

BRICS could be viewed as an important symbol of political commitment and shift of global power, cooperation on issues of commercial, political, and cultural interests followed also throughout the years of Dilma's presidency. The IBSA Dialogue forum was on the other hand left to a more unclear future. The 2013-summit that would celebrate the group's tenth anniversary of formal launch was cancelled. And no formal meeting took place in 2014.

Even so, the IBSA's survival was not dependent on leaders' summits. Cooperation on issues like education, agriculture and trade prevailed. Yet, the seemingly lower level of activity under Dilma suggests a drawback of Brasília's potential global key role. And Brazil grew also skeptical to the BRICS-idea in civil society and academic circles.⁹⁷ Economic growth had slowed down, and benefits of the partnership were hard to prove. Moreover, Brazil became wary of China and how national interests could jeopardize cooperation. Because China feared that India or Japan might get permanent UNSC seats, Beijing blocked Brasília's candidate and reformation propose.⁹⁸ This is just the top of what made cooperation challenging between the BRICS. The countries differed in political system, domestic challenges, and national interests.

Nonetheless, Brazil continued to express its emphasis on a permanent UNSC seat.⁹⁹ To work for a reform, Brasília's followed up its global actor role by setting the agenda of Responsibility While Protecting (RWP) at the UN in February 2012.¹⁰⁰ RWP addresses the responsibilities that come with intervention justified by Responsibility to Protect (R2P). As a result, Brasília took on the role as an agenda setter. Brasília seemed not afraid of confronting the permanent seat members of the UNSC in order to gain widespread attention and admiration.

However, Brazil scaled down its role shortly after 2011. Implemented policies led to the debate of whether Brazilian foreign policy was on retreat or on track back to normalization after Lula's expansion.¹⁰¹ Regardless of side taken in the debate, the policy decisions compromised Brazil's candidate for a permanent UNSC seat. For a start, Brazil played a less visible role. This is evident in the role of the Brazilian presidents. Dilma played a less active and visible role by travelling much less than Lula.¹⁰² Decreased visibility in

⁹⁷ Stuenkel, "In Brazil, civil society and academia remain skeptical of the BRICS concept."

⁹⁸ Rother, *Brazil on the Rise*, 244-245.

⁹⁹ MercoPress, "Obama praises Brazil but falls short of backing bid for UN Security Council"; MercoPress, "Brazil calls for "true reform" of Security Council and the "re-launching" of global economy."

¹⁰⁰ Stuenkel, "Brazil's enigmatic retreat."

¹⁰¹ Stuenkel, "O risco do recuo estratégico brasileiro"; Lopes, "Recuo estratégico ou normalização da curva?."

¹⁰² Stuenkel, "Brazil's Foreign Policy under Dilma Rousseff"; The Economist, "Brazil and its backyard."

international cases gave Brazil less attention. Secondly, after setting RWP on the agenda, Brazil did not follow up by debating the agenda. Instead the country seemed to distance itself from the topic. As a result, Brazil also distanced itself from being a leading spokesman for the Global South.

Addressing the agenda of RWP can be viewed as the important strategy of continuation for global influence. Brazil played the role of a meditating bridge builder during the era of Lula. The withdrawal from the debate damaged Brazil's credibility as a global actor. Brazil failed to follow up its own incentive. Furthermore, Brasília evaded away from key security issues like Ebola and ISIS. Brasília was also silent on the war in Ukraine.¹⁰³ Its apparent tolerance of Moscow's 2014-involvement in the annexation of Crimea breaks away with the traditional defending of sovereignty. Brasília abstained from condemning the annexation. Yet, Brazil did not stay silent when Israel invaded Gaza in the summer of 2014.

A stop in the expansion of diplomatic representation abroad is another example of withdrawal from a global key role. For instance, Lula's anticipated embassy in Afghanistan which was supposed to be the 140th Brazilian embassy abroad. It was never opened. Afghanistan has been a thorny issue for years when it comes to international security. By not participating actively, Brazil could not take part in discussions of Afghanistan's future. Nor could Brasília express itself as a key actor in security issues.

Syria was another important topic of international security. Brasília turned down an invitation to participate in 2014-talks about Syria in Geneva¹⁰⁴. The act clearly jeopardized Brazil's glorified ambitions. Moreover, rumors had it that a process of closing down several newly opened embassies were under consideration at the end of Dilma's first term.¹⁰⁵ If rumors were correct, Brazil's South-South leadership would be compromised due to the lack of diplomatic representation. After all, it is important to have its own independent access to information on the ground if one wants to become a global key actor.

Although one should be careful about rumors, a reduction in the admission of diplomats is concrete example of drawback from international expansion. Eighteen candidates got employed at the end of Dilma's first term.¹⁰⁶ This is the lowest numbers in two decades. Around hundred diplomats became employees of Itamaraty every year during Lula's second term. Lack of diplomatic staff can jeopardize desired results due to resource

¹⁰³ Leahy, "Brazil's foreign policy stance leaves it in wings on global stage."

¹⁰⁴ Engstrom, "Brazilian Foreign Policy and International Human Rights Promotion," 19.

¹⁰⁵ Stuenkel, "Brazilian foreign policy: Game over?."

¹⁰⁶ Stuenkel, "Is Brazil abandoning its global ambitions?."

constraints. Moreover, Brazil's cases of institutional reformation demand were compromised by a decreased diplomatic network. In addition, the country found it harder to participate in debates about major international issues. Thus findings suggest that Brasília's global role decreased under Dilma.

Even so, a late example of an international key role initiative was Rousseff's willingness to represent the agenda of Internet governance. Brazil drew international attention in April 2014 when the country hosted an international conference on Internet reform.¹⁰⁷ The goal of the conference was to discuss the future of Internet governance. Topics like reforms, privacy, and the right freedom of association were addressed. By hosting the event, Brazil could be looked at as guardian of net neutrality, and a defender of equal access and freedom of expression. Moreover, the country found itself once again in the role of an agenda setter. Hence Brazil sought influence through a role of agenda setting. Yet, the thought behind the summit can as well be found in Edward Snowden's leakage of American espionage material. As a result, Brasília might have seen the need of more clear regulations.

3.3.2 Brazil and Regionalism

South America continued to be a challenge in Brazilian foreign policy. Brazil's neighbors became increasingly wary of Brazil's economic growth and influence. Regional states feared the birth of a hegemon that was bound to exploit and dictate its neighbors. Yet, despite of being the region's economical powerhouse, Brazil was still unwilling to play a visible leadership role. This had to do with a timeless fear. Brazil feared its surrounding Spanish speaking neighbors would jointly go against the country.

Dilma's first trip abroad was to Argentina. This suggests that regionalism would play a central role in her foreign policy. Another early example of emphasis on regionalism was the turning away of a British Falkland Island protection ship. It was bound for docking in Rio de Janeiro in January 2011.¹⁰⁸ Yet, the ship had to go to Chile for docking. This was the first time Brazil had committed such an act. The act suggested that Rousseff could back Argentina's claim on the Falkland Islands. However, it can also reveal a strategy for power diversification by sending a message to Britain. Additionally, it might have been an act to please the PT's left-wingers. Of equal importance is the fact that the Latin American region had become very important for Brazilian foreign policy. Its economic ties to regional states had grown considerably the last decades.

¹⁰⁷ Pinheiro, "Brazil Assumes Leadership in Future of Internet Governance."

¹⁰⁸ Yapp, "Royal Navy's Falklands ship turned away by Brazil."

Igor Fuser, professor of International Relations at the ABC Federal University in São Paulo, claims that Dilma was skeptical to projects of regional integration.¹⁰⁹ And he adds that Dilma chose a more distant relation to Latin American partners. For instance, Dilma praised Chávez regional contribution after his death on one hand. She also noted clearly that the countries have had its disagreements on certain issues. This suggests a restrain between the two countries. This is more evident as Venezuela went into growing instability after Chávez's death. Although the country still held the potential to destabilize the region, Brazilian support for the regime decreased. Brasília looked with dissatisfaction over how the Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro's had handled economic challenges and the country's political opposition.¹¹⁰ Dilma sought dialog with the opposition. However, she also stated that undemocratic efforts to topple Maduro would not be accepted. Thus Brazil's regional limited influence was unveiled in some sense. Brasília did little more than offer hopes for the unrest to end. On the other hand, the protection of democratic values and regional stability was a core foreign policy goal under Dilma.¹¹¹

Venezuela was not the only country that went through turbulent times. Other countries that experienced domestic unrest were Bolivia and Peru. And Argentina faced an economic meltdown. Nonetheless, the events did not weaken the regions role in Brasília's foreign policy. Brazil continued to tighten its relations to its regional neighbors. Hence regionalism saw a continuation of importance.¹¹² Marco Aurélio Garcia, Lula's and Dilma's special advisor on foreign affairs put it clearly:

‘We insist on the issue of South American integration as a factor of economic development. Brazil and other countries face the same production constraints. Commercial and energetic infrastructure are important factors of integration’.¹¹³

As regional integration was emphasized despite of Dilma's suggested skepticism, Mercosur continued to play an important role. And regionalism was still important for Brazil's security policy. While Brazil had grown stronger during the era of Lula, some of its neighbours became presumably weaker. As violence can spill over borders, weak neighbours were recognized as Brasília's biggest security threat. An important foreign policy objective

¹⁰⁹ Bevins, “Brazil’s Rousseff takes nuanced approach to foreign policy.”

¹¹⁰ Winter, “Brazil grows wary of Venezuela under Maduro, reduces support.”

¹¹¹ Stuenkel, “Is Brazil the New Regional Champion of Democracy?.”

¹¹² MercoPress, “Latinamerica and Mercosur, priorities of Brazil foreign policy ratifies Rousseff”; MercoPress, “Brazil’s reviewing its foreign policy but South America remains the “anchor”.”

¹¹³ Zanini, “Foreign Policy in Brazil.”

was therefore to support political stability and governance of its neighbours. This can explain Dilma's approach on Venezuela which we began the sub-chapter with. A second important security topic was the fight against organized crime. Closer regional cooperation was promoted to combat the drug industry.¹¹⁴

3.3.3 Washington's and Brasília's Bilateral Relation

The denouncing of the Tehran regime was likely viewed with satisfaction in Washington due to its dislike of the regime. The same can be claimed when the Brasília-Tehran relation got frozen. In addition, Dilma chose a more muted foreign policy approach that might have annoyed Washington less. Hence the acts opened the possibility of closer ties between Brasília and Washington.

Even though Dilma was skeptical to Washington's global agendas, she sought to improve the relationship.¹¹⁵ Meetings between Obama and Dilma in 2011 revealed an emphasis from both actors to strengthen the cooperation on bilateral, regional, and global levels.¹¹⁶ Washington's view of Brasília as an important actor was evident. The first meeting between Obama and Dilma took place during propounded pressure in the Middle East. Positive developments in the relation resulted in settled disputes and agreements. The three-decade long ethanol subsidy dispute was for instance resolved. In 2012 Washington removed its subsidies to protect domestic production.¹¹⁷ Working together, a plan to promote the alternative fuel source was initiated. A new phase in the bilateral relationship was therefore formed.

However, US-Brazilian relations got a major setback in 2013. Leaked documents from Snowden proved that the National Security Agency (NSA) had tapped into the Brazilian president office.¹¹⁸ NSA was accused of severe espionage in Brazil. The scandal grew by including Internet surveillance and oil espionage.¹¹⁹ Cooperation decreased as Brasília reacted with diplomatic outrage. Dilma became the first Brazilian president to say no to a state visit in Washington DC.¹²⁰ She gave Washington a cold shoulder and openly criticized the United States in the United Nations' General Assembly. The acts gained Dilma popularity

¹¹⁴ Montero, *Brazil: Reversal of Fortune*, 171.

¹¹⁵Ibid., 158; Downie, "Rousseff's Angry U.N. Speech Signals Brazil's Shift on the World Stage."

¹¹⁶ Bodman, Wolfensohn and Sweig, *Global Brazil and U.S.-Brazil Relations*, 64.

¹¹⁷ Winter, "Insight: U.S. and Brazil - At last, friends on ethanol."

¹¹⁸ Downie, "Rousseff's Angry U.N. Speech Signals Brazil's Shift on the World Stage."

¹¹⁹ BBC, "Brazil asks US to explain internet surveillance"; Watts, "NSA accused of spying on Brazilian oil company Petrobras."

¹²⁰ Downie, "Rousseff's Angry U.N. Speech Signals Brazil's Shift on the World Stage."

and respect. She was for instance included in Foreign Policy's yearly annual ranking of influential global thinkers of 2013.¹²¹

Yet, Folha de São Paulo reported about dubious activities preformed by the Brazilian intelligence service on a later stage. Agência Brasileira de Inteligência (ABIN) had conducted espionage on the activities of diplomats from the United States, Iran, Iraq, and Russia during Lula's presidency.¹²² Even so, the espionage activities were not conducted on foreign soil. Moreover, the leakage of Snowden revealed far more disturbing activities. As a result, Snowden's acts lead to a historic low point in the bilateral relationship for the remaining two years of Dilma's first presidential period.

3.3.4 Human Rights' Foreign Policy Placement

An interview with the Washington Post suggested an early changed in the foreign policy orientation towards issues of human rights. Pointing to Iran, Dilma criticized human rights abuses few weeks before becoming acting president.¹²³ She also distanced herself from Brazil's abstentions on human rights resolutions. The rhetoric was followed up by supporting a UN human rights monitoring of Iran after Dilma's inauguration¹²⁴:

‘President Dilma Rousseff’s inauguration in early 2011 was marked by a change in the approach towards the UN Human Rights Council (HRC) by voting on country-specific resolutions on traditional allies, for instance Iran (2011) and Sri Lanka (2014, reversing its earlier abstention back in 2009).’¹²⁵

However, my interviewees disagreed whether a change on Brazil's interpretation of human rights found place after Dilma's inauguration. They all accepted that some kind of reorientation found place through a changed rhetoric. Yet, they disagreed to what degree the rhetoric was really followed up. Although Dilma gave Iran a cold shoulder, the act in the UN did not condemn Tehran. It opened up an investigation to get the facts right. Even so, Lula's former Minister of External Relations criticized the decision by claiming the decision put severe barriers on future dialogues with Tehran.¹²⁶ And when the Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was not invited to Brazil during a Latin America tour, his top advisers claimed

¹²¹ Foreign Policy, “The 100 Leading Global Thinkers of 2013.”

¹²² Ferraz, “Salas usadas pelos EUA foram monitoradas por agência brasileira.”

¹²³ Weymouth, “An interview with Dilma Rousseff, Brazil's president-elect.”

¹²⁴ Gómez, “Why Iran-Brazil friendship has gone cold”; Engstrom, “Brazilian Foreign Policy and Human Rights,” 838.

¹²⁵ Arantes, “Brazilian Attitudes Towards Sovereignty and the Responsibility to Protect,” 42.

¹²⁶ MercoPress, “Brazil's UN vote on Iran marks first great difference between Dilma and Lula da Silva.”

that several years of good relations had been shattered.¹²⁷ The change in Brasília's relation to Tehran signifies therefore a great break with Lula's foreign policy in other senses as well. Firstly, a promising relationship was turned upside down. Secondly, it broke with the diversification strategy because Iran could have been a strong ally. Although severely strangled by sanctions, Iran has a potential of becoming a regional power. Hence it can also suggest that Dilma put less emphasis on a Brazilian global key role.

Even though Dilma distanced herself from some authoritarian leaders, party influence made Brazil continue its emphasize on development as a seek of reducing the gap between rich and poor states.¹²⁸ Brazil continued therefore to have good relations with Cuba. And despite the Castro regime have ruled the Cuba for several decades with an iron fist; Dilma went visiting the country.¹²⁹ The goal of the trip was to improve the bilateral economic cooperation, and expand Brasília's influence in the region. Even though a hunger-striking dissident died in a Cuban jail a week before the visit, human rights issues were not on the agenda. Or as Garcia put it: 'we will not tell them what to do'.¹³⁰ There are several reasons behind this statement. Although Brazil might be concerned about the human rights situation, it has no authority to demand changes due to absolute sovereignty. However, this is only formally true as there are ways around the concept. A state can for example use a 'carrot and stick' approach to influence a given regime. Even so, Brazil has been a strong defender of sovereignty for several decades. Cases where sovereignty trumps the obligations to protect human rights, like Brazil's view on the civil war in Syria, are therefore identifiable.

Brasília's fear of damaging the bilateral relation with Havana is a slightly different explanation. Brasília and Brazilian companies have invested large amounts in Cuba. The best example is the construction of a big port in Mariel and constructions in its special economic zone. Hence national interests prevailed. A third reason can be share of political ideology. The PT and the Castro-regime can both be found to the left in the political scale. Some forces within the PT are even strongly leftist. Hence, by sharing some ideological values, it was easier to criticize Iran than Cuba.

Fourthly, the regional level was also of great importance. Cuba is Latin America's strongest oppositional actor to the US. Opposing Washington is in itself a popular regional approach. Large part of the region is hostile to the American hegemony. This is especially

¹²⁷ Romero, "Iranian Adviser Accuses Brazil of Ruining Relations."

¹²⁸ Dauvergne and Farias, "The Rise of Brazil as a Global Development Power," 907-908.

¹²⁹ Boadle, "Rousseff to visit Cuba, focus on post-embargo era."

¹³⁰ Ibid.

connected to events during the Cold War. The period has several examples of Washington putting sovereignty to the side. Hence, diplomatic ties and regional reputation would be damaged by criticizing Cuba. Thus it is hard to combine the roles of criticizing Cuba and pursuing regional leadership. This has also to do with a strong regional consensus of including Cuba in regional trade and cooperation.

A fifth and last reason can be that Brasília did not view the human rights situation as a case of great concern. Garcia said after the vote in the UN over Iran that ‘from now onwards Brazil will analyze, case by case’.¹³¹ The quote suggests that Brazil wanted to look into cases of concern separately and independently. This seems to be the case as Garcia followed up by saying: ‘our concern is that votes are not selective, not only against the countries in the South (hemisphere), that we can address in a balanced way all situations’.¹³² By doing so, he addressed to the US base of Guantánamo Bay, where prisoners were stripped of all human rights. Hence Garcia pointed out that Western countries also conduct violations of human rights. Even so, Dilma defied Havana in some sense by offering a tourist visa to Yoani Sánchez, a prominent Cuban dissident blogger. Sánchez was invited to attend a conference in Brazil. What makes it more remarkable is that the invitation was sent shortly before Dilma’s visit on the island.¹³³

Dilma’s relation to Cuba might give the impression that the president had a Janus-faced approach on human rights in foreign affairs. On one hand, she was committed to civil and political rights. On the other hand, Dilma ignored the rights in some cases. For instance, when dictators like Bashar al-Assad and Muhammad Gaddafi were threatened by raging civil war; Brazil abstained from defending democratic oriented rebel factions or voting in the UN over human rights abuse resolutions.¹³⁴ And when Shirin Ebadi, an Iranian former Nobel Peace Prize winner, visited Brazil in 2011, Dilma gave her a cold shoulder by declining to see her.¹³⁵

Yet, Brazil came to accept that state sovereignty is conditional on protecting civilians in the case of Libya. Brasília indirectly supported actions against Gaddafi’s regime by not voting against. Brasília had in addition voted in favor of sanctions against Libya a month

¹³¹ MercoPress, “President Rousseff’s foreign policy “will emphasize human rights (South and North)”.”

¹³² Ibid.

¹³³ Darembium, “How Brazil Deals with Dictators.”

¹³⁴ Borger, “Libya no-fly resolution reveals global split in UN”; Margolis, “Brazil’s Same-Old, Same-Old Samba.”

¹³⁵ Margolis, “Brazil’s Same-Old, Same-Old Samba.”

before.¹³⁶ However, Brasília was afraid that the support could be used to topple Gaddafi and send Libya into chaos. Antonio de Aguiar Patriota, Dilma's first Minister of External Relations, made the case that humanitarian intervention ‘might be misused for purposes other than protecting civilians, such as regime change’.¹³⁷ This is one of the reasons why Brazil abstained from voting *yes* on a no-fly zone over Libya. The case of humanitarian intervention in Libya made Dilma call for a tighter regulations over R2P interpretations: ‘the Security Council must ensure the accountability of those to whom authority is granted to resort to force’.¹³⁸

3.4 The Foreign Policies of Lula and Dilma: A Comparison

Lula’s Brazil sought increased cooperation with both traditional and non-traditional states. Examples of traditional states are European countries and the United States. Several African and Asian states, such as Iran and South Africa, can be viewed as non-traditional states. This resulted in an expansion of diplomatic ties and responsibilities for its global actor role. South-South alliances were forged to weaken the dependence on developed states. It was also a approach to challenge Washington’s hegemony. As a leadership role was created by encouraging dialogues between developing states, Lula’s Brazil was also very active on the global stage. The wish for a permanent seat in the UNSC was for instance expressed firmly through speeches and efforts as Lula’s Brazil took a mediator role in issues of global concerns. The country took also on leadership in peace keeping operations.

By setting the agenda of RWP and Internet governance, Dilma’s Brazil sought in some sense a global key role as an agenda setter. Yet, Brasília scaled down its role by not follow up debating on RWP. Additionally, developments such as less diplomatic representation abroad, rumors of closing down several embassies, breaking diplomatic ties, reducing the admission of new diplomats, and evading away on key international security issues suggest a cool down of Brasília’s global actor role. The decisions damaged Brazil’s credibility as a key actor. It also weakened Brazil’s South-South leadership role and ambitions for a permanent UNSC seat. Although findings suggest a more skeptical approach, Brasília followed up the Lula’s emphasis on the BRIC(S) and the IBSA Dialogue Forum. Even so, we can conclude that Brazil played two different global roles under Lula and Dilma.

¹³⁶ Engstrom, “Brazilian Foreign Policy and International Human Rights Promotion,” 18.

¹³⁷ Spektor, “Humanitarian Interventionism Brazilian Style?.”

¹³⁸ Ibid.

Regionalism became a central aspect of Brazil's foreign policy first and foremost after the Cold War. Its importance saw emphasized continuation under both Lula and Dilma. Latin America was geopolitically important for economic growth and Brazil's desired global actor role. Security reasons also affirmed regionalism's importance. However, findings suggest that Dilma was skeptical of regional integration. She also chose a more distant relation to Latin American partners. And Brazil's mediator role in issues of regional concerns was somewhat scaled down by less activism.

Lula had a fruitful bilateral relation to Washington. Trade and cooperation grew between the states. Thus, even though Lula challenged Washington's hegemony through diversification, a good relation was kept. Yet, the relation was not free of problems. Lula criticized Washington's unilateralism, cases of disagreements saw continuation, and Lula stayed critical of Western hegemony. The relation was thus also distant. Attempts to improve the bilateral relation occurred after Dilma's inauguration. A deepening in the relation developed. Yet, the revelations of espionage scandals challenged its sustainability. So it happened that the bilateral relation went from being good to bad. Thus we can say Lula had a good, though distant relation with the US. Dilma's Brazil went on the other hand from being a friend to become an antagonist of the United States. Hence the two presidents offered a different foreign policy orientation to Washington.

Human rights are commonly categorized into two groups: economic, social and cultural rights, and civil and political rights.¹³⁹ The first group focuses on basic needs and livelihood; access to health care, housing, culture, education, science, work, adequate living standard, and so on. Hence the group can termed socio-economic human rights. The latter group concerns with the rights to life, legal protection, and political participation. Examples are the rights of religious freedom, freedom of speech, political opposition, fair trial, and protection from discrimination. Thus the group contains rights that express an individual's rights to participate in a given state's political and civil life. In addition, the group affirms the individual's protecting of freedom from violations. By keeping the group divide in our head, findings suggest unequal emphasis. While Lula focused largely on socio-economic human rights, Dilma put more of the focus on civil and political rights. We can therefore identify a difference in the interpretation and conduction of human rights.

Because differences have been identified, we can conclude that changes have occurred. The claim of changes is supported by literature. Although Rousseff continued large

¹³⁹ FN-sambandet, "Hva er menneskerettigheter?."

parts of Lula's foreign policy during her first presidential period¹⁴⁰, changes also occurred.¹⁴¹ We can therefore say that Brazilian foreign policy has witnessed continuity on one hand. On the other hand, changes of emphasis, values, and relations have occurred.

My study suggests three central changes. First and foremost, a move away from expansion and activism to withdrawal and agenda setting is suggested for Brasília's global role. Lula's Brazil expanded its diplomatic ties and played an active global role in international affairs. Dilma reduced Brasília's global commitments, revalued diplomatic ties, and became an actor of agenda setting. Take for instance the goal of a permanent seat in the UNSC. Although both presidents recognized its importance, their strategies differed on how to achieve it.

A second central change suggests a shift of emphasis on human rights in Brasília's foreign policy. However, my interviewees claimed that it was mostly rhetoric. No significant changes were implemented in Brasília's foreign policy orientation on the topic. Yet, the rhetoric had for instance a huge impact on Brazil's relation to Iran as the bilateral tie got constrained. Even so, interviewees pointed to Dilma's lacking interest in presidential diplomacy and activism led to the cool down. Hence only a rhetorical drift from economic, social, and cultural rights to civil and political rights seems to have found place.

The third central change suggests upheavals in Brazil-United States relations. The bilateral relation was distant but fruitful in the era of Lula. However, the relation became warmer before ending up cold during Dilma's first presidential period. Findings suggest that Snowden's NSA revelations were the reason behind.

The last two central changes led to reconsiderations of diplomatic ties. While Dilma indirectly cut diplomatic ties to Iran, she more or less froze the ties to the United States. By combining the two changes with the first change, we get a less expanding and active Brazil with re-evaluated diplomatic ties. The changes can therefore be defined as: cool down of activism and foreign affairs activities. Activism refers to Brazil's innovative international role, and its strong effort to promote changes. Foreign affairs activities invoke the following up of a key actor role, international commitments, and diplomatic bilateral ties. Hence cool down refers to withdrawals from Lula's foreign policy on activism and foreign affairs activities. The changes the thesis will try to explain are thus why Dilma reduced Brazil's

¹⁴⁰ MercoPress, "Latinamerica and Mercosur, priorities of Brazil foreign policy ratifies Rousseff"; Liby-Alonso, "Is Brazil entering a new phase in foreign affairs under Dilma Rousseff?"; Downie, "Rousseff's Angry U.N. Speech Signals Brazil's Shift on the World Stage"; The Economist, "Brazil and its backyard."

¹⁴¹ Montero, *Brazil: Reversal of Fortune*, 158; Reid, *Brazil: The Troubled Rise of a Global Power*, 244; Engstrom, "Brazilian Foreign Policy and Human Rights."

level of activism and international activities. In order to do so, we will turn our attention to theories that might explain this.

4 Theorizing Foreign Policy Change: Four Levels of Explanations

A cool down of activism and foreign affairs activities might be connected to the international system of states. Its structure pulls and pushes states to conduct and adopt different foreign policy strategies according to IR perspectives. Hence the international structure influence on what states seek. As a result, the international system influence what Brazil wants. Because the structure went through changes from 2003 to 2014, the source(s) behind the changes might be external. A system level approach might thus explain the cool down of activism and foreign affairs activities.

4.1 The International System

Brazil is one of 193 sovereign states.¹⁴² Sovereignty signifies a state's absolute power over a given territory. Hence no foreign actors can challenge a given state's domestic decisions. Nor can actors intervene in domestic affairs. Even so, actors violate sovereignty due to the absent of a superior actor greater than states. Without an enforcement tool of state compliance present, states are the most powerful actors. Its absence highlights the main difference between domestic and international security. The international system of states has therefore an anarchic structure.

Several IR system level perspectives present different theories to how anarchy influences interactions between states. Alexander Wendt, a leading constructivist, claims 'anarchy is what states make of it'.¹⁴³ Wendt view international politics as a social creation that change over time. Interactions between states can establish, strengthen, weaken, or cut diplomatic ties. Thus states can reproduce or transform the structure. In order to identify what states want, it is necessary to look at the type of cultural anarchy that exists at a given time in a given region.¹⁴⁴ Although Social Constructivism gained large ground in IR after the 1990s due to the unexpected collapse of the Soviet Union, it is not a substantive IR theory.¹⁴⁵ Nor does it offer substantial theoretical premises. Wendt's Constructivism IR perspective builds

¹⁴² United Nations, "Member States of the United Nations."

¹⁴³ Wendt, "Anarchy is what States Make of it," 424.

¹⁴⁴ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 233; Jackson and Sørensen, *Introduction to International Relations*, 216.

¹⁴⁵ Barnett, "Social Constructivism," 162; Jackson and Sørensen, *Introduction to International Relations*, 211; Carlsnaes, "Actors, structures, and foreign policy analysis," 121.

on Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann's *The Social Construction of Reality* from 1967. In short, the book's message is that ideas and experiences shape the meaning of human interaction. Ideas and experiences are not static; they are created, changed and re-created through social interactions.¹⁴⁶

Neoliberalism offers another approach on how anarchy influences interactions and the likelihood of conflicts. Some neoliberals state that democratic states are more peaceful than authoritarian states.¹⁴⁷ Others claim trade interdependence and cross-border exchanges led to mutual dependence. A third group claim trust impairs anarchy through institutionalism. All three shares a strong belief in progress as modernization, greater happiness and/or increased liberty by embracing the positive sides of cooperation.¹⁴⁸ Realism offers on the other hand a skeptical approach to cooperation.

Three schools of Realism are identifiable: classical realism, neorealism/structural realism, and neoclassical realism. Neorealism focuses on the global anarchy's influence on states' interactions. It does so by claiming structural constraints determine international events. Hence the international structure regulates interactions and state interests.¹⁴⁹ Due to the absence of an actor with greater power than states, no actors are comparable to states. This claim makes neorealism state centric. Statism is one of three elements that unite the schools of Realism.¹⁵⁰

States can only rely on themselves because of anarchy. Neorealists recognize global institutions and organizations as international actors. Yet, their powers are questionable. The actor groups do not have independent enforcement mechanisms.¹⁵¹ This makes them a tool for powerful nations. Moreover, this makes uncertainty and low level of trust rule. Thus selfish acts are common to ensure a state's survival, Realism's second umbrella element.

Conflicts are unavoidable.¹⁵² States will identify threats of survival from time to time. And security is not guaranteed in a global anarchy. Hence no actors can help a state when it gets into trouble. This has to do with the absence of a central authority with the power of

¹⁴⁶ Berger and Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality*.

¹⁴⁷ Jackson and Sørensen, *Introduction to International Relations*, 106-113.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid., 100-101; Beach, *Analyzing Foreign Policy*, 21.

¹⁴⁹ Lamy, "Contemporary mainstream approaches," 127; Jackson and Sørensen, *Introduction to International Relations*, 79; Nye, "Power and foreign policy," 17-18; Beach, *Analyzing Foreign Policy*, 17-18.

¹⁵⁰ Dunne and Schmidt, "Realism," 93; Robinson, "Internasjonal politisk teori," 376; Carlsnaes, "Actors, structures, and foreign policy analysis," 120.

¹⁵¹ Jackson and Sørensen, *Introduction to International Relations*, 66; Beach, *Analyzing Foreign Policy*, 18.

¹⁵² Lamy, "Contemporary mainstream approaches," 130; Beach, *Analyzing Foreign Policy*, 35; Jackson and Sørensen, *Introduction to International Relations*, 66.

protecting states from aggressive actors. Although this does not imply instability and chaos, states have to provide their own security. Besides states have to keep an eye out for trouble. A state cannot trust another state; states are egoistic by nature.¹⁵³ Survival is only assured by self-help, Realism's third and last umbrella element.

Military power becomes crucial by following this logic. Hence neorealism looks at foreign policy as security policy. States seek to preserve and enhance security by the accumulation of power to survive. Coordinated efforts take only place when an actor can increase power and influence.¹⁵⁴ Thus cooperation is challenging as concerns of relative and absolute gains govern. Nonetheless, neorealists disagree on whether states have other interests apart from survival. Moreover, they differ over what the interests are. One way to approach the debate is to coin the school into two variants: offensive and defensive structural realism.¹⁵⁵ In this way foreign policy goals and conductions are either defensive or offensive. Because a state's position influences national interests, the power distribution and the amount of sought power explains the offensive or defensive approach.

Offensive structural realism claims competitive pressure results in aggressive actions. The goal is to increase power and eventually gain a hegemonic position.¹⁵⁶ Anarchy makes the world a dangerous place as all states are potential enemies to each other. Hence it is difficult to calculate the level of power to ensure survival. This leads to power maximizing; the stronger, the safer. However, global hegemony is close to impossible. Consequently, offensive realists like John Mearsheimer claim that the main foreign policy goal is to maximize power and seek regional hegemony when possible.¹⁵⁷

The strong focus on states' egoistic nature does not imply a world engulfed in conflicts and chaos. States are rational actors. According to defensive structural realists like Kenneth Neal Waltz, the balance of power concept makes war less likely as states can check its power to other states.¹⁵⁸ Power balancing is less resource consuming than trying to alter the power structure. Additionally, a rational state does not conduct acts of uncalculated risks. Such actions might jeopardize security and survival. Hence states seek status quo by trying to

¹⁵³ Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*.

¹⁵⁴ Lamy, "Contemporary mainstream approaches," 129.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid., 129; Beach, *Analyzing Foreign Policy*, 39; Jackson and Sørensen, *Introduction to International Relations*, 84-85.

¹⁵⁶ Dunne and Schmidt, "Realism," 101.

¹⁵⁷ Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*.

¹⁵⁸ Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 118.

maintain the structured positions.¹⁵⁹ Thus the goal is to uphold enough power to ensure survival and preserve the relative position in the global anarchy.

IR theories explain foreign policy conduction by analyzing developments and broad trends over time. Neorealism argues that long run stability and/or change in the international structure affects a given state's foreign policy. Hence the focus is on external pressures rather than thoughts and beliefs of domestic decision-making actors. As a result, neorealism might explain changes by looking at the development of Brasília's power and position in the international structure. Yet, domestic and international actors also influence a given state's foreign policy:

‘Foreign policy is neither a fish nor fowl in the study of politics, but an empirical subject matter straddling the boundary between the internal and the external spheres of a state’.¹⁶⁰

Thus one can claim that domestic concerns and priorities also influences what a given state want. This is the case of Brazil. Different domestic groups and actors influence Brasília's foreign policy decisions.¹⁶¹ Findings have already suggested for instance that Brazilian presidents have great influence. Hence we cannot only focus on the international system in explaining changes.

There are several stages connected to foreign policy making and conduction. Steven L. Lamy presents four phases that are worth exploring when looking into and writing foreign policy cases.¹⁶² We will look at the second phase called formulation phase. By doing so, the thesis turns the attention away from a system level to foreign policy decision-making (FPDM). This type of theory has its strength in explaining why a given state conducts unexpected decisions in relevance to its power and position in the international structure. Yet, FPDM can also be divided into several levels of analysis. Valerie M. Hudson identifies at least seven levels that can influence the decision-making process.¹⁶³ The levels can be analyzed through different approach. Starting with the individual leader, we will look at three levels.

¹⁵⁹ Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 126; Wohlforth, “Realism and foreign policy,” 39.

¹⁶⁰ Carlsnaes, “Actors, structures, and foreign policy analysis,” 113.

¹⁶¹ Rohter, *Brazil on the Rise*, 219.

¹⁶² Lamy, “Teaching foreign policy cases,” 250-251.

¹⁶³ Hudson, *Foreign Policy Analysis*, 34.

4.2 The Individual Leader

There are many examples of a state leader's central role in forming a given state's foreign policy. Yet, a leader's role and influence in decision-making have been a debate throughout time. Leadership was for instance used to explain foreign affairs in the turbulent 30s and 40s.¹⁶⁴ This had to do with the dominance of leaders like Churchill, Mussolini, Stalin, and Hitler in international politics.

The leader has a central role in classical realism. Associated with the works of Thucydides, Niccolò Machiavelli, and Thomas Hobbes, the school presents a pessimistic view of human nature and its influence on international politics. According to Hans Morgenthau, conflicts are natural and unavoidable because humans seek power.¹⁶⁵ Since humans and their inherently flawed nature govern states, countries will always seek power. Political outcomes are thus predicted by taking the seat of the individual leader.

Focus on leadership and classical realism fell in disfavor for system level theories during the Cold War. This had to do with the ideological war between West and East. The failures of structural theories to predict and explain the collapse of the Soviet Union returned interest to leadership. The approach proved its importance in understanding conflicts that involved strongmen. Examples are states like Iraq, Zimbabwe, and North Korea. This made neorealism overshadowed by neoclassical realism. The school combines neorealism's structural arguments with classical realism's leadership emphasis to explain what states seek.¹⁶⁶

David A. Welch's book *Painful Choices: A Theory of Foreign Policy Change* gives the leader a central role over foreign policy and changes. Welch makes the perception that foreign policy change is rare. When it happens, the source is the leadership's fear of losing power.¹⁶⁷ However, changes do not have to be drastic. A leader can impose incremental changes over a period of many years. Moreover, his or her successor can follow the policy of incremental changes. Hence imposed changes are the work of the former leader. Nonetheless, a leader needs to have the conviction, power, and energy to oversee changes.¹⁶⁸ The president is the leader in Brazil. He or she is both head of the state and head of government. Changes in foreign policy can thus be leader driven when the Brazilian president has enough influence to impose his or her beliefs, ideas, and visions.

¹⁶⁴ Hudson, *Foreign Policy Analysis*, 39.

¹⁶⁵ Jackson and Sørensen, *Introduction to International Relations*, 72.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid., 87.

¹⁶⁷ Welch, *Painful Choices*, 8.

¹⁶⁸ Hermann, "Changing Course," 11.

By taking an individual leader approach, one can make the mistake of taking the actors influence for granted. Thus it is important to stress the issue of the two leaders' dependence on power to influence Brazilian foreign policy. The power of the president of the Federative Republic of Brazil, Presidente da República Federativa do Brasil, is extensive.¹⁶⁹ The leader of Brazil selects the individuals to cabinet ministers and their subordinates. By being the head of state and the head of government, the president leads the executive branch of the government and is the commander of the Brazilian military. He or she has the authority to veto or conduct a partial-veto on any kind of legislation. However, the National Congress can override the veto. Yet, its members need an absolute majority vote.

The president has also the power to set up legislations. Moreover, the state leader has virtually a set up monopolist position in certain areas of policy making.¹⁷⁰ When taking foreign policy making in mind, the administrations of Cardoso and Lula strengthened the president's power significantly.¹⁷¹ In addition, Brazil's leader can also influence the annual budget by making defined guidelines by enact laws. There are additionally other spheres the president can intervene in through legislative decree power and the support from the National Congress. Hence the Brazilian president has considerable power. There are therefore several examples of Brazilian presidents' influence in decision-making. Findings suggest that Dilma's election constrained Brazil's relation to Iran. We have also read that the presidents implemented different strategies to secure autonomy. Lastly, the actor's influence and power is in the center of Matias Spektor's *18 Dias: Quando Lula e FHC se uniram para conquistar o apoio de Bush*. The book explains for instance how FHC and Lula cooperated to calm down the US's fear of leftism after Lula's election. Hence it is reasonable to think that the Lula and Dilma influenced Brazilian foreign policy. It is highly likely the leaders' different emphasis led to a cool down of activism and foreign affairs activities.

Nonetheless, Brazil is not solely represented by a leader. The National Congress has for instance great power. Pressure for changes might therefore have come from the National Congress. New actors might have seized key positions and gained influence. We will therefore turn our attention to other domestic political actors.

4.3 Domestic Political Contestation

The thought of political organizations affect decision-making, lies in the assumption that actors need support from politicians to legitimate power. Which these domestic politicians

¹⁶⁹ Montero, *Brazilian Politics*, 63.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid., 63.

¹⁷¹ Cason and Power, "Presidentialization, Pluralization, and the Rollback of Itamaraty," 121-122.

are, depends on several factors. Even so, all governments need supports to legitimize its power. Thus if policy shift is present from one or more powerful actors, a change in foreign policy is likely to happen.¹⁷² Can pressures from Brazilian politicians have led to changes?

Brazil is a representative democratic republic. To seize power, its politicians need backing from the defined institutions. The government is therefore dependent on support for its foreign policy conduction. Hence the state institution with legislative power is important actors of decision making. In the case of Brazil, it is the National Congress that holds legislative power in Brazil. There are many examples of its influence. The National Congress handicapped for instance much of Collor's presidency.¹⁷³

The National Congress can be a source of foreign policy changes in several ways. Political actors can reconsider their beliefs and/or interpretations. And issues can threaten existence. National goals are therefore influenced by domestic political conditions as state leaders desire to remain in power.¹⁷⁴ The ruling regime can be forced to adjust its foreign policy to prevent collapse, or remain stubbornly on the course. This takes us to a third approach for how the political system can affect foreign policy; new actors might gain ruling power. Moreover, the political system can be the object of a big transformation in a coup or revolution.

Building of coalitions is an important factor behind policy change. The presence of collective policy dissatisfaction creates a political alliance. This makes a coalition become a cooperation treaty. By forming a coalition, actors seek to join forces for change. Hence pressure makes the ruling regime to change course.

Party coalitions secured Lula and Dilma majority rule.¹⁷⁵ Yet, restraints against their administrations can be formed among coalition partners and/or within the PT. Thus threats of penalizing in the presence of political dissatisfaction can influence policies. Lula was for instance dependent on balancing the support from a coalition of ten parties.¹⁷⁶ All suggested political matters close to his party's heart was therefore not implemented. This has to do with interest conflicts, agreements across party boundaries, and loyalty to actors. Lula's and Dilma's governments included politicians from the left and right to get majority rule. Both governments were for instance dependent on the support from the Partido do Movimento

¹⁷² Hermann, "Changing Course," 7.

¹⁷³ Roett, *The New Brazil*, 84.

¹⁷⁴ Ripsman, "Neoclassical realism and domestic interest groups, 176.

¹⁷⁵ Leira, *Brasil: Kjempen våkner*, 162.

¹⁷⁶ Reid, *Brazil: The Troubled Rise of a Global Power*, 147.

Democrático Brasileiro (PMDB).¹⁷⁷ This is a Brazilian right wing party with controversial high ranking members like José Sarney and Edison Lobão. The two are controversial because of their roles and connections to the previous military regime. Hence both presidents had to balance on a razor's edge by trying to impose party policies and seeking support.

Coalition building can be viewed as an act of selfishness. The actors involved join forces with other actors of overlapping interests to serve self-interests. Politicians have so the power to affect and change the foreign policy course. Yet, the people's representations are not the only source of that suggests domestic struggle. Bureaucrats, employees of the state, have also influential power.

4.4 Bureaucratic Politics

Analysts collect and interpret data. Ministers, agency heads, and regime representatives make choices. Finally, governmental departments put in place the policies. Hence foreign policy involves a large number of actors. One should thus examine the bureaucratic conditions involved. Yet, this is a complex research operation. There are several bureaucracies involved in decision making. Take the Ministries of Trade, Foreign Affairs, and Defense for instance. Even so, one cannot ignore bureaucracies' influence:

‘While the game of international relations may be played according to national interests, there is also a second game being played within each government, a game of personal and/or organizational interest and ambitions, which may in fact be more determinative of a nation’s foreign policy than the game of national interests’.¹⁷⁸

When taking a bureaucratic approach, the thought is not that the complete bureaucratic state body wants change. The focus is rather placed around the assumption of a group within the system feel the need of change.¹⁷⁹ A reason for the need of change can be that the actor might have better insight in failures and barriers of a given policy. Hence the group can be in better position than the government when it comes to interpret efficiency. If this is the case, an actor might apply bureaucratic influence to influence the government.

The bureaucratic influence approach views policy decisions as a political battle between many actors. The actors have different interests. They also disagree on the idea of national interests. Decision-making is thus viewed as a struggle of internal bargaining. Hence foreign policy is not the act of a leader or political actors. In fact, scholars drew attention to

¹⁷⁷ Wells, “Meet the Kingmakers of Brasília”; Rohter, *Brazil on the Rise*, 266.

¹⁷⁸ Hudson, *Foreign Policy Analysis*, 101.

¹⁷⁹ Hermann, “Changing Course,” 11.

bureaucracy because the focus on individual leaders and/or the international system is too narrow.¹⁸⁰ The major breakthrough came with Graham Allison's book *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* in 1970s.

Even though bureaucratic politics is a well researched area, few theories exists.¹⁸¹ Many decision tree models are instead the result. The models look at the bureaucratic process of decision making. By following a checklist of factors, it is possible to explain the outcome of a political struggle. Thus the core is to reveal how different bureaucratic actors affect decisions by pulls and bargains. This makes decision-making a bargain struggle between influential bureaucratic actors with organizational self-interests. The influence of a given institution depends on its position to the leaders. Although there are many employees in a given institution, all employees embrace the bureaucratic positions and policies. As a result, involved actors promote the interests of their respective institutions.

Some bureaucratic actors are the national elite. This has to do with status and influence. Itamaraty is for instance an elite institution in Brazil. It enjoyed asymptotic monopoly over Brazil's foreign policy until the elections of Cardoso and Lula.¹⁸² Moreover;

‘Itamaraty is not just a Ministry among others, it is an institutional line of continuity from the very concept of the Brazilian state, an organization that has come to embody the heart and soul of ‘national being’, and expresses this as a watchdog of national foreign policy’.¹⁸³

Neoclassical realism looks at state leader's autonomy in elite debates about national interests.¹⁸⁴ By combining classical realism with neorealism, neoclassical realists like Benjamin Fordham claims domestic and international interests interact.¹⁸⁵ Moreover, neoclassical realists claim that leaders will not always seek rational national interests. Opportunities and constraints represented in the international structure can be illusory.¹⁸⁶

Yet, national interest is a vague concept. Neoclassical realists theorize whether leaders follow their own definition of national interests. When domestic constraints are weak, leaders can pursue their own definition.¹⁸⁷ In cases when domestic constraints are on the other hand strong, leaders must take actors in the account when conceptualizing national interests.

¹⁸⁰ Alden and Aran, *Foreign Policy Analysis*, 6.

¹⁸¹ Beach, *Analyzing Foreign Policy*, 135.

¹⁸² Cason and Power, “Presidentialization, Pluralization, and the Rollback of Itamaraty,” 120.

¹⁸³ Puntigliano, “Going Global,” 30.

¹⁸⁴ Beach, *Analyzing Foreign Policy*, 62.

¹⁸⁵ Fordham, “The limits of neoclassical realism,” 251.

¹⁸⁶ Beach, *Analyzing Foreign Policy*, 64.

¹⁸⁷ Dueck, “Neoclassical realism and the national interest,” 139.

Nonetheless, domestic actors only affect what states seek in specific contexts. Although domestic factors influence the timing and approach, the international system resolves the policy's content.

5. Methodological Considerations

While qualitative research focuses on non-quantifiable measurements, quantitative research does the opposite. Qualitative research refers to the character of things; quantitative research refers to the measures of things. While the first is based on text analysis, the second seeks to find a pattern in numbers. A qualitative research design was considered as a better research choice for the master thesis because the research question does not seek to measure a phenomenon. Moreover, quantitative research generalizes by analyzing a substantial number of units.¹⁸⁸ Thus the method requires a large number of cases to detect generalizable patterns with the use of statistical tools. Yet, the research question is analyzed through a small numbers of units. Thus I could not base my research on a quantitative design. Additionally, I support the claim that the social world is far too complex to be generalized in the thesis' context.

A fourth point when selecting research design, is that the thesis' research question plays the ball into the hands of qualitative method by using the interrogative word *why*.¹⁸⁹ Thus the nature of my research question influenced me to select a qualitative approach. Lastly, I was in the need of flexibility. I was unsure about data availability of Dilma's foreign policy. The president had not finished her first period when the research process began. In addition, a literature review suggested little research of her foreign policy had been done. Thus flexibility was necessary, an element which is not present in a quantitative research design. My research approach was therefore not linear, but spiraling throughout the research process. As a result, I sometimes went back to the process of data collection when data analysis proved difficult. This could not have been possible with a quantitative research design.

By choosing a qualitative research design approach, I had several different research methods to base my thesis on: experiment, survey, history, archival analysis, or case study. The latter was chosen.

¹⁸⁸ Beach, *Analyzing Foreign Policy*, 228.

¹⁸⁹ Berg and Lune, *Qualitative Research Methods for the Social Sciences*, 3.

5.1 Research Method: Case Study Research

A case study research can be defined as the study of a single unit. There are 193 states in the world. In this thesis we look at foreign policy of one state. Hence the thesis is a case study of Brazil. Yet, there are many definitions of case study research. Robert K. Yin operates with a two folded definition of case study research. Yin clarifies the method's scope and feature, and its all-encompassing method. He also gives an account for research design, data collection, and analytical approaches.¹⁹⁰ Moreover, Yin claims there are three important conditions when selecting case study research as method. The first condition is the form of research question. Case studies are favored by *how* and *why* questions.¹⁹¹ The latter question word is present in my research question.

Yin's second condition questions the extent of a researcher's required control over behavioral events. According to Yin, a case study does not need control of behavioral events.¹⁹² Moreover, relevant behaviors must under no circumstances come under the reach potential manipulation. This is the case of my thesis as I have small influence. The second condition is therefore also present.

The third condition, a focus on the present-day, is also present because my thesis sheds light on contemporary events in Brazilian foreign policy from 2003. One might say the research is close to conducting a history method design. Yet, the difference from doing history and case study research is the potential of interviewing persons involved in occurring events.¹⁹³ Moreover, a case study allows the researcher to directly observe events. The method also offers a wider range of research tools to answer research question.

Because all three conditions are present in my research, my research method can be defined as a case study research according to Yin. Additionally, Berg's and Lune's definition of case study research fits the research project's profile because of the thesis' demand for descriptive and detailed information about Brazilian foreign policy:

‘A method involving systematically gathering enough information about a particular person, social setting, event, or group to permit the researcher to effectively understand how the subject operates or functions’.¹⁹⁴

¹⁹⁰ Yin, *Case Study Research*, 16-17.

¹⁹¹ Ibid., 29; Johannessen, Tufte and Christoffersen, *Introduksjon til samfunnsvitenskapelig metode*, 200.

¹⁹² Yin, *Case Study Research*, 12.

¹⁹³ Ibid., 12; Berg and Lune, *Qualitative Research Methods for the Social Sciences*, 304.

¹⁹⁴ Berg and Lune, *Qualitative Research Methods for the Social Sciences*, 325.

Although case study research is a well-used method, there are no defined blue prints or manuals of how to conduct the method.¹⁹⁵ Researchers operate with different numbers and elements for a case study research design. A research design describes the process of how a researcher connected data to the research question. We will start by looking at the unit of analysis.

5.2 Unit of Analysis

Unit of analysis can for instance be individuals, events, or a social setting. The thesis case is defined as Brazilian foreign policy, which it seeks to explain changes in. Moreover, it is bounded with a defined time. The master thesis' unit of analysis is therefore Brazil.

Brazil is a country of great interests for several reasons. The country has for a long time been viewed as a potential powerful and influential state due to its size and resources. Brasília grew up from its historically small and unsure international role because of FHC and Lula. After decades of political turmoil and turbulent growth, the world's fifth largest country went through a continuously democratic consolidation period combined with an economic boom. The economic growth has placed Brazil as the seventh largest economy in the world.¹⁹⁶ This has brought financial wealth to the country. The region's largest stock market is located in Brazil, which is also to be the fourth largest in the world.¹⁹⁷ And in 2009, three of the world's top ten banks were Brazilian.¹⁹⁸ Additionally, the city of São Paulo has the Southern Hemisphere's largest business activity level.¹⁹⁹

It is not all about financial muscles. Brazil has a highly efficient agriculture policy, which has made the country self-sustainable in food production.²⁰⁰ Moreover, the country has vast natural resources: large deposits of uranium and natural gas, unlimited potential amounts of wind and solar power, and the largest quantity of arable land and fresh water in the world.²⁰¹ The discovery of large areas of offshore petroleum has entrenched the country's position as a potential key exporter of fossil fuels. Offshore findings have placed Brazil in the top ten ranking of countries with the largest oil reserves.²⁰² In addition, the country is world

¹⁹⁵ Johannessen, Tufte and Christoffersen, *Introduksjon til samfunnsvitenskapelig metode*, 199; Berg and Lune, *Qualitative Research Methods for the Social Sciences*, 337; Yin, *Case Study Research*, 27.

¹⁹⁶ The World Bank, "GDP (current US\$)."

¹⁹⁷ Roett, *The New Brazil*, 121; Onis, "Brazil's Big Moment," 122.

¹⁹⁸ Jenkins, "China banks eclipse US rivals."

¹⁹⁹ Rohter, *Brazil on the Rise*, 6.

²⁰⁰ Sten Inge Jørgensen, *Globale utfordringer*, 41.

²⁰¹ Davidson, *Brazil Is the New America*, 304.

²⁰² Onis, "Brazil's Big Moment," 111.

leading in mining and biofuel technology.²⁰³ Lastly, Brazil became energy self-sufficient in 2006.²⁰⁴ Hence Brazil matters.

However, limiting the research to Brazil can give the thesis a trivial approach. International politics is still dominated in great degree by Western actors. Brazil withdrew also in some sense from Lula's expansion and his administration's effort in seeking a global key role. Moreover, Brazil has a history of booms and bursts. This led us to the suggesting that its destiny of greatness will forever remain a dream of the future. Yet, the human written history has seen countless influential actors rise and vanishes.

The implications of Brazil's rise are another important and debated topic in IR. This has to do with the idea of global power distribution. Brazil's resources and growth has fueled the country's confidence to place itself in the center of international politics to fulfill its self-proclaimed destiny. It can therefore be claimed that we are witnessing the conjunctures of a new and powerful actor. Moreover, Brazil's rise among others emerging states on the international scene have fueled the debate of whether the world is in a unipolar, bipolar or multipolar. Much literature has discussed the consequences of unipolarity, bipolarity and multipolarity throughout decades of academic writing. Thus how states can influence each other and the international system of states is of great interest. Hence distribution of power is an important concept in IR. Hence this thesis should found enthusiasm for everyone interested in power distribution, and Latin American and Brazilian foreign policy

Lastly, Brazil is challenging as a unit of analysis. The country is of continental size with a population around two hundred billion. Its history is rich and full of controversies. Brazil has experienced a boom-and-bust economic development on several occasions. It has also experimented with different types of regimes. Political institutions have come and gone, offering abundant political traditions. In addition, the country's political life is full of drama and power struggles. Brazil is itself an exceptional melting pot of identities and classes. Its population is united under the Portuguese language and the Brazilian national identify. In short:

‘Study of a complex country like Brazil is a challenge, particularly because it offers for the student of politics examples of virtually every major area of potential concern’.²⁰⁵

²⁰³ Onis, “Brazil’s Big Moment,” 112-114.

²⁰⁴ Roett, *The New Brazil*, 119; Rohter, *Brazil on the Rise*, 175.

²⁰⁵ Montero, *Brazilian Politics*, 7.

5.3 Defining and Operationalization of Variables

Variables are needed to look into the unit of analysis. It is common to separate between dependent and independent variables in research. A dependent variable is what the researcher wants to measure or explain.²⁰⁶ The master thesis' topic dependent variable is changes in Brazilian foreign policy. Hence the outcome of the dependent variable is either adjustments or status quo.

The independent variable is a type of variable that seek to explain. It can therefore also be called explanatory variable due to its crucial role as being the study's proposition(s) of research. An independent variable's role is thus to shed light on hypothesis and/or theories that can be connected to the dependent variable.

I have relied on theoretical assumptions when forming four independent variables. The variables are based on four levels of analysis in FPA that might explain a cool down of activism and foreign affairs activities.

Brazil was a subject of push and pull from the international system. Hence explanations for the changes might be found in its structure. The system level is relevant for explaining changes because the power structure saw transformation between 2003 and 2014. The school of neorealism is of special interest for the thesis. Findings can point to that Lula conducted a type of offensive realism, while Dilma adhered to a more defensive approach. Lula's foreign policy had an expansive approach to maximize power. It also includes diplomatic involvements outside Brazil's traditional sphere of interests. Brazil's role in negotiations over the Iran nuclear program is a great example. Moreover, a cautious pursuit of regional hegemony is identified due to strong regional focus and efforts to weaken Washington's influence. Dilma's Brazil seems to have put less emphasis on power maximization. President Rousseff did not conduct acts of uncalculated risks that could jeopardize Brazil's security and survival. However, the same can be said about Lula. Nonetheless, Dilma's foreign policy had a more muted approach by the cool down of activism. Rousseff's Brazil was also less outspoken and controversial. Although her foreign policy led to a cool down of activism and diplomatic activities, findings also suggests an emphasis on regionalism and continuity from Lula's foreign policy. Hence Dilma withdrew on some foreign policy issues, while she pursued status quo on others. The strategy can thus in some senses be identified defensive.

²⁰⁶ Johannessen, Tufte and Christoffersen, *Introduksjon til samfunnsvitenskapelig metode*, 298.

Neorealism can be used as an analytical tool to understand Brazil's behavior. This can be done by looking at the distribution of power and Brazil's structural position. A reason for change might be found in a weakened or a structurally content Brazil. However, the problem is neorealism's strong focus on military strength. Brazil's survival was not sought through military power. Nor is the country a powerful actor in traditional military sense. Its underfunded armed forces witnessed an investment wave in the Twenty-First Century.²⁰⁷ Yet, estimates suggest that the armed Brazilian branches did not experience larger investments from Lula than Dilma.²⁰⁸ On the contrary, investments were bigger under Dilma. Military power seems thus little likely to explain changes. As a result, using neorealism as an analytical tool can be proven little fruitful in this case. However, power is a highly contested concept.²⁰⁹ Hence other sources of power might explain foreign policy changes.

One of Joseph S. Nye, Jr. many good definitions of power are: 'the ability to attain the outcomes one wants, and the resources that produce it vary in different contexts'.²¹⁰ The use of power can be divided into two groups of conduction: high politics and low politics. The first is directed towards security policy and a state's survival. The latter focuses on daily life interactions, such as good life related issues, international trade, and communication.²¹¹ Thus when talking about power, one has to clarify *the power to do what*. The *what* can be to produce preferred outcomes of national interests in the context of foreign policy. By doing so, power is defined as the ability to conduct an efficient foreign policy. Since statecraft is shortly defined as 'the use of instruments at the disposal of central political authorities to serve foreign policy purposes',²¹² we can define statecraft as foreign policy power. Statecraft tools can be categorized into three types: diplomatic, economic, and military. The first type of tool is defined as soft power with the ability to pull. The latter two are hard power concepts. Their functions are mainly to push. By combining the two types of power into effective strategies, a state use *smart power*.²¹³ However, soft power is hard to calculate. Because Lula's expanding foreign was economically expensive and Brazil has emphasized diplomacy and economic power, I chose to define power as economic purchasing capability. The thesis'

²⁰⁷ Trinkunas, *Brazil's Rise*, 13; Patu and Gielow, "Projetos militares lideram investimentos do governo federal"; Kozloff, "Wikileaks Cables Portray a Different Side of Brazil's Lula da Silva"; Rother, *Brazil on the Rise*, 240.

²⁰⁸ Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, "SIPRI Military Expenditure Database."

²⁰⁹ Nye, "Power and foreign policy"; Østerud, "Makt og maktbruk i internasjonal politikk."

²¹⁰ Nye, "The Future of American Power."

²¹¹ Lamy, "Contemporary mainstream approaches," 134.

²¹² Mastanduno, "Economic statecraft," 204.

²¹³ Nye, "Power and foreign policy," 20.

first variable is therefore termed *economic power*. The line of reasoning suggests Brazil's power had declined after Dilma's inauguration. As a result, the variable's hypothesis claims that a less economically powerful Brazil was forced by the international structure to conduct a cool down of activism and foreign affairs activities.

Six indicators of economic activity were used to measure Brazil's power. Data was collected from the WB. The two first indicators are annual Gross Domestic Product (GDP), and annual GDP percentage growth. GDP is an economic estimate of the performance of a given country. It is defined as 'the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products'.²¹⁴ On one hand, GDP give an indication over whether the national economic policy is a success or failure. On the other hand, GDP is dependent on numerous factors outside the reach of political economy. Nonetheless, trade can also indicate a state's economic status. Trade surplus signifies in short a healthy economy with larger levels of export than import. By looking at current account balance measured in percent of GDP, the third indicator is defined as 'the sum of net exports of goods and services, net primary income, and net secondary income'.²¹⁵ Hence a surplus in the indicator suggests that a given state has a higher value of net foreign assets than liabilities.

Growth can be a misguided measurement of economic power. A state can have large amounts of debt. The fourth indicator looks therefore at external debt stocks. The indicator is defined as 'debt owed to nonresidents repayable in currency, goods, or services'.²¹⁶ Since we look at an indicator of debt, it is reasonable to look at an indicator of wealth. The fifth dataset gathered from the WB concerns thus total reserves including gold.²¹⁷ Lastly, by subtracting external debt from reserves, an indicator I termed balance was used. The first, fourth, fifth, and sixth indicators were measured in current billions of US dollars. There were no data available for 2014 during the research. As a result, the time was limited from 2003 to 2013.

I compared Brazil's economic data to fourteen powerful and potentially competitive states to determine Brazil's position. The following states were selected: the G8; the United States, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and Russia, the BRICS; Russia, India, China and South Africa, and regional powers; Argentina, Chile and Venezuela. By comparing Brazil's power with fourteen states, I could see if Brazil's position in the

²¹⁴ The World Bank, "GDP (current US\$)."

²¹⁵ The World Bank, "Current account balance (% of GDP)."

²¹⁶ The World Bank, "External debt stocks, total (DOD, current US\$)."

²¹⁷ The World Bank, "Total reserves (includes gold, current US\$)."

global anarchy had changed. In order to compare Lula to Dilma, the average values of the indicators during Lula's eight and Dilma's three years as presidents were calculated. I expected to see a fall in Brazil's ranked position because of the hypothesis' formulation.

Changes might also be explained approach the individual leader level. Examples reveal that Brazilian presidents have influenced Brazilian foreign policy. Hence Dilma can be a source behind change. Several theories and approaches seek to analyze what motivates the Brazilian presidents' decisions.²¹⁸ We will look at emotions. For a start, emotion can be defined as 'an affective state of consciousness in which joy, sorrow, fear, hate, or the like, is experienced, as distinguished from cognitive and volitional states of consciousness'.²¹⁹ A feeling of fear, happiness, sorrow, etc. is a shorter definition. Despite of being an important topic in psychology, analyzing leaders' emotions is a little used approach in FPA. The approach has been ignored because rational choice emphasis.²²⁰ However, more attention has been drawn to how emotion can influence decision-making recent years. Its importance is pointed out in Rose McDermott's *Political Psychology in International Relations*:

‘Emotions can facilitate motivation and arousal... Emotion arouses an individual to take action with regard to an imagined or experienced event. Emotion can also direct and sustain behavior in response to various situations’.²²¹

Building on McDermott's contribution, emotion can in short be defined as a source behind a reaction or reactions. Hence Brazilian presidents' emotions can be sources of foreign policy change. *Emotions* is thus the thesis' second variable. Yet, where do emotions come from, and how do emotions become reasons behind leaders' decisions?

Psychobiography is an approach that mixes the research fields of psychology and biography. The approach seeks to analyze individuals with historical significance. This is done by deploying psychological theory and research. While a biography tend to focus on every notable event in an individual's life, a psychobiography focuses on specific events to understand why something happened. Jerrold Post has spent large parts of his life analyzing state leaders. He operates with four components in his method called anamnesis.²²² Post's first component to analyze leaders compares a defined time period of the individual to the

²¹⁸ Hudson, *Foreign Policy Analysis*, 39-72; Alden and Aran, *Foreign Policy Analysis*, 14-30; Beach, *Analyzing Foreign Policy*.

²¹⁹ Dictionary.com, "Emotion."

²²⁰ Hudson, *Foreign Policy Analysis*, 48.

²²¹ Ibid., 48.

²²² Post, *The Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders*, 102-104.

domestic and international context. The second part analyses the individual's personality, while the third looks into the person's worldview. The fourth component analyzes a person's leadership style.

The object of a psychobiography is to offer explanations about the motives and decisions behind an individual's actions. By doing so, experiential and emotional factors that can affect motivation and decision-making are in focus.²²³ Post's first component is a psychobiography approach. It uses parallel lines to look at a selected leader's development in the historical context of his or her nation. The component looks therefore into the individual's family background, early sources of influence, and life experiences.

We will take a psychobiography approach on Lula and Dilma in order to analyze the second variable. By doing so, the goal is to describe their historical and cultural constraints. This is done to see if early emotions can be sources of foreign policy changes. The timeframe is limited from their birth year to 1985. By doing so, their childhood and early experiences are objects of analyze. So are experiences and emotions from the time the military governed Brazil. Brazil's twenty-one years of military dictatorship is a period that affected Lula and Dilma. It is reasonable to think that experiences from the period influenced their perception of reality. The period is thus believed to be rich of emotions. Hence the second variable's hypothesis is that emotions from early childhood to 1985 have caused foreign policy changes.

Domestic political contestation is the third level of approach we will use to explain changes. Brazilian politics is a balancing act. Elements of interest conflicts, agreements across party boundaries, and loyalty bounds to various actors are common. To navigate through this rough sea of different interest, one needs to be a good captain. If dissatisfactions arise, press for policy change might occur. Hence problems of getting support from the elected representatives of the people can be the result. This suggests a scenario of domestic political struggle where bargains and horse-trading deals can lead to changes. The domestic political system becomes so a suspect of foreign policy change. Building on this, identifying an influential coalition against President Rousseff's leadership within the PT, its coalition partners, and/or the National Congress might shed light on the research question.

However, identifying sources of coalitions is challenging. Actors can operate openly or in the shadows. Moreover, although some actors might work against Dilma's domestic policies, they might support her foreign policy visions. A great insight on the debates of foreign policy cases is therefore needed. We will focus on coalition building on a party level.

²²³ Hudson, *Foreign Policy Analysis*, 58.

By doing so, attention is brought on to what degree the two leaders represented the values of the PT through implementing its ideas into policies. This has to do with the dependency of coalition building with other parties. The PT could not trump through its party program because it was dependent on other parties to secure majority rule.

In order to analyze to what degree party politics was followed, the PT's core values was sought identified. By doing so, party support and popularity of Lula and Dilma came into attention. This was done to analyze whether a basis for inner-party coalitions existed and could challenge Lula's and/or Dilma's administrations. By looking at Lula's and Dilma's popularity within the party, the theoretical assumption is that support from the party signifies low level of resistance and small chances of coalition building. Hence low degree of support generates resistance and chance of coalition building. Moreover, great support makes it more painless to rule. It also makes decision-making straightforward as less time and resources are needed on debating and lobbying. Thus the opposite scenario, little support, makes governing far more challenging. Lack of trust concludes in coalition(s) against the leader. This jeopardizes policy support. The variable's hypothesis is therefore that the PT's weaker supportiveness of Dilma caused foreign policy change because domestic political struggles took much of her time. This makes *lacking party support* a third variable.

Bureaucratic politics is the last level we will look at. It is also another approach to analyze domestic struggle. Itamaraty has traditionally held an independent role with strong influence over Brazilian foreign policy. The institution has therefore been able to shape Brazil's national interests in foreign affairs over decades. However, Itamaraty's influence has diminished over the years by giving space for presidential diplomacy. In addition, Brazil's democratization process has opened up for other domestic actors. The case of Lula's involvement in Iran's nuclear program talks is an example presidential diplomacy. Moreover, Lula was highly influential and visible in the making of Brazilian foreign policy. This can suggest that Itamaraty's influence was weak. Hence we might have an explanation for why Lula decided and could strengthen Brasília's diplomatic ties with Iran. As Brazil has traditionally been eager to minimize conflicts and avoid making enemies at all costs,²²⁴ the Iran case shows a break with the past. It also goes against Itamaraty's traditional policy of not taking side in a key global issue. By reversing the relation with Tehran, Dilma went back to a more traditional conduction.

²²⁴ Rohter, *Brazil on the Rise*, 247.

Itamaraty's influence is dependent on domestic constraints according to the school of neoclassical realism. As we will see in chapter 6.1.4, a contrasting degree of domestic constraints can be found. Great optimism and patience ruled amongst Brazilians when Lula took office as Brazil's president. Dilma was greeted with economic troubles and a large number of domestic challenges. Hence it is likely that a rollback of presidential power over foreign policy found place. The cool down of activism and diplomatic activities can also suggest more influence to Itamaraty. Lula's unusual expanding foreign policy over short time broke with the several traditions of continuity. As this approach was less emphasized by Dilma, one can say that Brazilian foreign policy went back to a somewhat state of normalization. By saying so, normalization refers to a larger embrace of principles that have seen continuation by Itamaraty for several decades, and a less visible global actor role. This delivers us the assumption that Itamaraty's influence grew under Dilma.

Itamaraty is dependent on strong bureaucratic influence to find support for its values. We need therefore to explore whether Itamaraty's influence changed between the presidencies of Lula and Dilma. Additionally, it is crucial to explore if a change in its influence affected Brazilian foreign policy. To analyze the two points, Itamaraty's idea of national interests is of great interest. Moreover, a comparison of the concept is crucial to see if it corresponded with the foreign policies of Lula and Dilma. By doing so, it becomes potentially possible to explain why changes occurred if one of the presidents' foreign policies favored the institution's vision of national interest. *Bureaucratic influence* is therefore the fourth and last independent variable. Hence my fourth hypothesis was that a more influential Itamaraty led to a cool down of activism and diplomatic activities.

5.4 Data Collection

I had several different methods for collecting data by selecting a qualitative research design for my case study. The most commonly used methods are interview, observation, and focus group interviewing for qualitative studies.²²⁵ Furthermore, Yin claims six methods are commonly used in case study research: interviews, direct observations, participant-observation, archival records, physical artifacts, and documentation.²²⁶ My data collection was primarily based on the latter, a data collection method I termed literature study.

²²⁵ Johannessen, Tufte and Christoffersen, *Introduksjon til samfunnsvitenskapelig metode*, 33.

²²⁶ Yin, *Case Study Research*, 105.

5.4.1 Data Collection Method 1: Literature Study

I define literature as books, journal articles, interviews, reports, official statements, think tank blogs, public documents, and news reports. By doing so, I used different kinds of written sources. The data collection method was preferred due to availability of large amounts of published data about the thesis' topic.

I was already in possession of a few books about foreign policy theory, and Brazilian politics before starting the data collection. A quick literature review gave me some indications of ideas for my thesis. More importantly, the books' references lists gave me further literature sources. My data collection began thus with a method called snowballing.²²⁷ By looking at books' references lists, I discovered relevant literature sources for my thesis' topic. Moreover, I was aware that relevant and good sources might be accessible at libraries. I went therefore to libraries. Lastly, I looked at syllabuses and reading lists from universities offering subjects relevant for the thesis.

Articles were of great essence for the thesis. The literature type is more updated on contemporary events. It is faster to publish articles as it is less time-consuming writing articles than books. Furthermore, the regular process for an author is to write several articles, then a book. Additionally, several topics of foreign policy are too narrow to write a book about. There are for instance few books about Brazilian foreign policy. The topic is often presented as a chapter in books about Brazil. I executed therefore purposive searches in the databases of Google Scholar, JSTOR, Ebrary, and the University of Oslo's library.

The process of purposive searches was conducted by using and mixing key words like *Brazil*, *Brasília*, *Itamaraty*, *Lula*, *Dilma*, *Rousseff*, *foreign relations*, *human rights*, *diplomacy*, *the PT*, *Partido dos Trabalhadores*, *the Brazilian Worker's Party*, *foreign relations*, *international relations*, *foreign policy*, and *Brazilian*, followed by truncation and commands like *and*, *not* and *or*.²²⁸ The use of truncation and commands were dependent of database. It was not a necessary method for limiting down results on some databases.

Search engines and databases offered vast sources of information. JSTOR offers for instance access to a wide range of academic works, books, magazines, and journals. Yet, accessible data was restricted because of the sources' need to be added to databases.²²⁹ In the case of JSTOR, purposive searches revealed that only pre-published magazine articles were accessible. Foreign Affairs and Foreign Policy offers vast amounts of useful electronically

²²⁷ Berg and Lune, *Qualitative Research Methods for the Social Sciences*, 52.

²²⁸ Lotte Rienecker and Peter Stray Jørgensen, *Den gode oppgaven*, 200-201.

²²⁹ Berg and Lune, *Qualitative Research Methods for the Social Sciences*, 28.

published articles. The same goes with important foreign policy think tanks like Council on Foreign Relations, Post-Western World, Chatham House, the Brookings Institution, and Center for Strategic and International Studies. I conducted therefore also purposive searches on respective Internet sites and news outlets.

Large parts of my research are based on Internet sources. This is a potential hazard as everyone can upload texts and other materials to Internet.²³⁰ Hence information on Internet can jeopardize the validity and reliability of data. There is also a great difference in integrity and quality of sources. Thus I had to stay critical about findings in cyberspace, and conduct good research ethics. This was done by looking at the author, publisher, corroboration, time of publish, domain name etc. My Internet sources are therefore from reputable sources. Searches were also only conducted on acknowledged search engines and databases. Even so, the quality of obtained data was important to keep in mind regardless of source type as it influenced the thesis' success of measurement.

5.4.2 Data collection Method 2: Interview

The strength of a literature study is its exact source of information. Because a literature study is dependent on sources' descriptive accuracy and objectivity, I based my research on multiple forms of documented sources to secure reliability. Even so, my literature sources could contain biased information, and/or different sources could have deliberately withheld data. The literature sources also presented a risk of incompleteness. In order to cross check the results of my literature study, a second methodological technique was therefore chosen: interviews. By implementing more than one data-collection strategy, I choose to conduct data triangulation.²³¹

An interview is a valuable source of systematic evidence because the method is particularly useful in process-tracing research.²³² Yin regards the method as a key source of evidence for case study research.²³³ This has to do with the method's ability to be fluid and flexible when gathering data because the interviewer operates on two levels. While following the line of inquiry, the interviewer also needs to ask conversational nonthreatening questions. This gives the method a form of a guided conversations approach rather than a structured

²³⁰ Berg and Lune, *Qualitative Research Methods for the Social Sciences*, 28-31.; Rienecker and Jørgensen, *Den gode oppgaven*, 202-203; Johannessen, Tufte and Christoffersen, *Introduksjon til samfunnsvitenskapelig metode*, 92-93.

²³¹ Berg and Lune, *Qualitative Research Methods for the Social Sciences*, 5; Yin, *Case Study Research*, 119.

²³² Bleich and Pekkanen, "How to Report Interview Data."

²³³ Yin, *Case Study Research*, 110.

query. The type of interview I conducted can therefore be called in-depth interview. By doing so, answers could not be given with a yes or a no. I therefore gave the interviewees the chance to reflect on experiences and impressions. This was done to let them present the information they found appropriate. As a result, I got the chance of asking about facts and personal opinions to analyze a complex phenomenon by collection deep and vivid data.

Interviewees were defined as individuals with great knowledge, firsthand experience, and insight of Brazilian foreign policy. This made me limit interviewees to employees of Itamaraty. The interviewees had also to be employed in the years when Lula and Dilma governed. The latter criterion was crucial to shed experiential lights over the differences in two foreign policies.

Because I looked for individuals with expertise, knowledge, and experience on Brazilian foreign policy conduction, I choose to perform what can be termed elite interviews.²³⁴ Attention was therefore moved from secondary sources to primary sources because the interview group has the main responsibility for Brazilian foreign policy and daily conduction. I therefore sought to uncover how individuals directly involved in foreign affairs experienced the president change. Interviews were thus used to either support or challenge my findings, or shed light on new findings. As the interviews were estimated to take thirty to forty minutes, I conducted what Yin has termed shorter case study interviews.²³⁵

My questions were formulated as open ended questions to reveal the discourses, opinions, and attitudes of the institution's employees. This made a presence of reliability and validity risks. I believed that the interviewees would be more positive towards Lula than Dilma. Brazilian foreign policy has been describing having its golden age under Lula. The opposite can be said about Dilma's first period. Moreover, concerns connected to reliability was how conversation skills affected answers; questioning if answers could be replicated. As validity concerns, some of my questions were very open. A risk of not measuring what I sought to measure was thus present.

I had no contacts to begin with. Contact with potential interviewees where tried established through e-mails. Interview inquire letters were sent to Itamaraty's main office building in Brasília, twenty-three embassies around the world, and individuals that I had acquired contact information from friends. The inquire letter was written in Portuguese and English. If the contacts agreed to participate in my research, I gave them the choice of conducting an interview over phone or e-mail. By doing so, I offered two different interview

²³⁴ Lilleker, "Interviewing the Political Elite," 207.

²³⁵ Yin, *Case Study Research*, 111.

methods. There were three reasons for this. Firstly, it was reasonable to think that my interviewees had a busy schedule. Ethical considerations were thus considered. An interview can take much time from an already busy schedule. I therefore let interviewees choose what kind of interview method suited them best. I also let them to choose the time of the interview within a specified period.

Secondly, all the Brazilians I have met prefer conversations in Portuguese. Thus I was afraid that potential interviewees would be scared away and/or feel constrained to perform interviews. Although I was unsure if this was the case of my interview group because members are trained to master other languages fluently, I chose to do it. The problem is that I read and write Portuguese, but mastering the language orally is difficult because of challenging pronunciations. Moreover, Brazilians have many dialects of Portuguese. This makes the language sometimes confusing and misunderstandings very easily. The two worries could jeopardize my research. This has especially to do with advanced terminology which is found in foreign policy cases. I could therefore not perform telephone interviews in Portuguese. As a result, I gave my interviewees the options to write answers in Portuguese.

Lastly, telephone and e-mail was chosen because I had little money to visit overseas representations. I tried to contact different overseas installations to uncover whether experiences depended on regions. A categorization of answers based on regional locations was thus tried. It was believed that experiences could have been different in countries and regions where Brazil's presence is much stronger. However, the plan was turned away as it was hard to get hold of interviewees.

I began the interview contact process early in February. The process of acquiring interviewees took long time as getting access proved challenging. Taking Itamaraty's busy schedules and tradition of opaqueness in mind,²³⁶ it was not surprising that most of the inquiries were directed to other individuals or never saw response. I was therefore only able to conduct five interviews. Despite of the small number of conducted interviews, all of them shared more or less the same views. The exception was one interview. Two interviews are found in appendix number ten as examples of large differences in answers.

All of the interviewees wanted to conduct e-mail interviews. Two were planned to be conducted on Skype, but the interviewees' tight schedule led to reschedules and changed interview methods. Interviews were thus conducted in an asynchronous environment which meant delays in the interaction. Although this represented a lot of waiting for me, the benefits

²³⁶ Faria, Lopes, and Casarões, "Itamaraty on the Move," 476.

were that the interviewees could reply when they had time. In addition, interviewees could use time to think about the answers rather than being challenged by stress and fatigue in a busy schedule. Moreover, it was comfortable for me as I got the answers in written and did not have to focus on taking notes while listening to the interviewees. It also saved time as interviews were already transcribed. On the other hand, the method did not allow me to act with spontaneity and raise questions if openings to interesting topics occurred. Neither did it allow me to reformulate questions if misunderstanding occurred. Furthermore, during an interview there is also a lot of non-verbal communication present. Hence parts of communication were missing. And although I knew who the person replying on the e-mail was, the person's identity was not guaranteed because I did not meet him or her.

The interview contained fifteen questions. The questions are found in the appendix. They were largely formulated in the 'who, where, why and how'-framework. After the interviews were conducted, I organized the questions into four themes of foreign policy changes. Additionally, the answers were color coded accordingly to presidency. Questions 1-4 were organized to the topic of Brazil's global role as the questions shed lights on why Lula sought a global key role, how and why the role changed after Dilma, and whether the interviewees thought the change in Brazil's global role could be connected to economic challenges. The following four questions were formulated to look into the president's influence and the topic of human rights. The questions tried to uncover how the interviewee experienced continuation in post-Lula Brazil, how Dilma followed up her early rhetoric on human rights, in what way Lula and Dilma had differed on human rights in foreign issues, and why the difference occurred. Questions 9-12 sought to look at the PT's decision-making influence by inquiring about the party's influence. The remaining three questions shed light over Itamaraty's influence by asking how the institution influenced the foreign policies of Lula and Dilma, and how the interviewee's work got affected by Dilma's inauguration.

5.5 Method of Analyzing

At least four general strategies and five analytic techniques can be used to link data to study propositions.²³⁷ I choose to rely on theoretical propositions as a general strategy. Theoretical study propositions were therefore used to lead me through the analysis.

I chose pattern matching as an analytic technique. It was selected because the method's idea is to reveal differences and similarities by comparing variables with a predicted pattern. In the case of differences, I first identified four areas where changes could

²³⁷ Yin, *Case Study Research*, 136-168.

have taken place. I then followed up by collecting data of the areas before and after Dilma became president. By doing so, I could see whether a pattern in the two foreign policies could be found in four areas. We saw different patterns in three of four areas in chapter three.

I used the same approach in chapter six. Four variables that I thought could explain why changes occurred were analyzed before and after Dilma's inauguration. Hence the analytical technique suited my main research question well. If cited differences between the two presidents could be identified in any of the four variables, the internal validity of the research would be enhanced.

6 Four Hypothesis to Why Changes Occurred in Brazilian Foreign Policy

Why did a cool down of activism and foreign affairs activities find place after Dilma's inauguration? We will try to start explaining changes by looking at the system level.

6.1 The International System: Economic Power and Foreign Policy

Since the Portuguese arrived at its shores, Brazil has been strongly influenced from the outside. The Portuguese had in short five objectives for Brazil. In its pursuit of power, Portugal wanted to civilize, explore, populate, conquer, and dominate Brazil. The country's richness was thus early exploited to fuel European ambitions. For instance, the tree that gave Brazil its name became highly valued and almost drawn to extermination. And the country was in its early colonial history divided into thirteen large areas. The Portuguese upper-class got concessions to govern these areas. They could rule as long as tributes were paid to the Portuguese Crown.

Later international events and changes in global economy continued to influence the country. Examples are many: the abandonment of slavery, a boom and bust history of outside resource demand, industrialization, and the international democratic wave which Samuel P. Huntington have termed the Third Democratic Wave. Brazilian politics has therefore regularly been influenced by the outside.²³⁸ Hence it is reasonable to think that structural constraints caused change in Brazil's foreign policy from 2003 to 2014.

6.1.1 Post-Cold War Developments That Pounded Way for Lula and Brazil

The Cold War's aftermath brought the US in a hegemonic position as the world's only true superpower. Washington accounted for approximately a quarter of the global economic

²³⁸ Montero, *Brazilian Politics*, 26; Lima, and Hirst, "Brazil as an intermediate state and regional power," 22-25.

output and half of the world's expenses on military.²³⁹ Due to the new unipolar power structure, international politics became dominated by Western states.

Unipolarity had several implications for international politics. First of all, the power structure was unbalanced. Washington was indirectly given a global police role. This resulted in a growing embrace of interventions based on humanitarian concerns, and more or less unilateral operations like the invasion of Iraq in 2002. Unfortunately for the US, the dominance made the world aware of the faults and dangers of a hegemon. Efforts were therefore carried out to counter the defaulted distribution.

Washington's unique position led also stronger global spread of Western oriented democratic ideas and values. Democracy became viewed as the only acceptable form of government to achieve national progress. Democratic accountability developed thus into a cure for the world's many challenges. This caused adverse outcomes. Democratization aid saw emphasis before structural, cultural, and historical barriers that challenged development. Developing states was forced to look outward rather than inward for policies on development issues. A forging of political interdependence among states took place.

Lastly, the US's global leadership led to an intensified globalization process. This generated identified winners and losers as inequality between and within states rose. Global justice movements advocated fairer trade rules in a world where capital flight ruled in the name of economic liberalization and free trade. Yet, Western states were also negatively affected. Competition from developing countries made companies conduct investments abroad. The result was increased unemployment and innovation at home. And reformations in the name of economic liberalization gave a global rise of emerging economies. A process of economic power diffusion developed as several states became potentially capable of challenging the US hegemony. The BRIC(S) was for instance coined as a symbol of global power distribution change. The group was social constructed in 2003 by a Goldman Sachs report. The report claimed that the accumulated GDP of the BRICs will pass the today's G7, the world's seven major advanced economies, by the end of 2040.²⁴⁰ More importantly, it gave Lula's Brazil a boost of confidence and international attention.

6.1.2 Brazil's Economic Power in the Era of Lula

Brazil's economy was under pressure when Lula took office in 2003. This had largely to do with international setbacks like the Asian financial crisis. The country's foreign reserves had also

²³⁹ Nye, "The Future of American Power," 2.

²⁴⁰ Jørgensen, *Globale utfordringer*, 35; Roett, *The New Brazil*, 109.

decreased over time, and the economic growth was unstable. Furthermore, the Brazilian currency, the Real, had dropped against the dollar. In addition, Brazil's external debt constituted forty-five percent of its GDP.²⁴¹ More severe, crucial economic challenges threatened economic growth. Despite of FHC's flow of reforms and stabilization efforts, Brazil had several economic bottlenecks unsolved.

Even so, data collected from the WB, which is graphically displayed in appendix number one, suggests that the Brazilian economy grew significantly in the era of Lula compared to other post-Cold War presidents' periods.²⁴² The growth under Lula was accomplished by choosing a middle way between state intervention and economic liberalism. Continuation of FHC liberalistic programs was on one hand followed. Interest rates were for instance kept high while an inflation targeting policy was maintained. On the other hand, structural reforms were initiated and implemented. For example, stronger enforcement made revenues rise as expenditures earned more focus. This resulted in increased tax income. Furthermore, cost cutting measures were implemented.

Active domestic policies were also implemented to stimulate economic development and fight the inequality gap. The social security system saw reformations without interfering with the rich elite's interests. Brazil's elite gained in some cases from reformations. Social programs created for instance an increase of purchasing power. And the economy got further stimulated by reducing the inequality gap. The reduction was followed with wage and employment increase. Thus increasing demand and multinational companies' continuation of investment secured the economic interests of the elites. At the same time millions were lifted out of extreme poverty.

The successful balancing act between an economic liberalistic policy and state intervention was part of a policy coined lulismo. The concept is given attention in chapter 6.3.4. Even so, domestic reforms did not alone cause economic boost. The global economy saw a strong growth and expansion. This was caused by low interest rates and financial liquidity during Lula's first six years of presidency.²⁴³ The winners were export oriented countries like Brazil. The country's trade surplus increased from 2.6 billion US dollars in 2001 to 46.1 billion in 2006.²⁴⁴ An international high demand for beef, several sources of energy, and soybeans secured growth throughout Lula's presidential periods. In addition,

²⁴¹ Roett, *The New Brazil*, 110.

²⁴² The World Bank, "GDP (current US\$)."

²⁴³ Ricupero, "Foreign policy after Lula," 6.

²⁴⁴ Roett, *The New Brazil*, 114.

Brazil's large discoveries of gas and oil consolidated international attraction. As a result, foreign investments increased.

Investments were not only concentrated on the oil and gas industry. International companies invested for instance in Brazil's developing ethanol industry. And foreign banks created competition. As a result, Brazilians enjoyed lower interest rates and returns for Brazilian banks. Strong growth due to domestic demand and high commodity prices, made it easier for Brazilian companies to conduct overseas investments.

Findings suggest a strengthening of Brazil's economic purchasing power. Yet, how did the economic growth influence the country's position in the international structure? When looking at annual GDP, check appendix number two with processed data from the WB for details,²⁴⁵ suggests that Brazil's power grew. Brazil is identified as having the eleventh largest GDP in 2003. Numbers for 2007, the start of Lula's second presidential period, reveals that Brazil passed two states; Russia and India. At the end of his presidential period, additional two states were passed. This leaves Brazil with the seventh largest GDP ranked economy in the world.

Regionally, Brazil's economy was far larger than the economies of Argentina, Venezuela and Chile to begin with. The gap grew larger throughout the era of Lula. When taking the BRICs in mind, Brazil started out at a third place. The country ended up second after China. Of the G8 states, only Russia was behind Brazil when Lula took office. However, Brazil passed Canada and Italy before Lula's eight years of presidency had ended. Washington's and Beijing's economic muscles remained far stronger than Brasília's economic power. And Tokyo's economy was closer the triple than the double in size when compared to Brasília's GDP in 2010.

Even so, Brazil had an average annual growth of 1246 billion US dollars according to the data collected from the WB. Eight states scores higher: Canada, China, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the USA. Hence Brazil is given a ninth place when looking at the average GDP growth from 2003 to 2010 on a global scale. When taking a regional approach, Brazil is found on first place.

Despite of good numbers in annual GDP growth, Brazil struggled to sustain the rapid growth. This can be seen in appendix number three. Here collected data and a graph visualize data from the WB's growth indicator of the fifteen countries measured in percent.²⁴⁶ Brazil's economy grew modest in 2003, though followed up with a 5.71 percent growth in 2004. 3.16

²⁴⁵ The World Bank, "GDP (current US\$)."

²⁴⁶ The World Bank, "GDP growth (annual %)."

percent signalizes slower growth in 2005. Yet, the numbers of the following two years reveals increasing growth with respectively 3.96 and 6.10 percent. Although the value for 2008 is estimated quite well with a 5.7 percent growth, it represents a smaller value than the previous year. However, the number of 2009 is more alarming as the value is only 0.33 percent. Then again, the value of 2010 suggests a strong growth of 7.53 percent.

Brazil is not alone with turbulent numbers. This is especially visible after the global financial crisis of 2007. Yet, Brazil recovered fast from the crisis due to solid financial fundamentals.²⁴⁷ When looking at Brazil's positions in growth percent of GDP, the country was ranked as number eleven in 2003. It was positioned as number six in 2007. Brazil had climbed to a fourth place in 2010. On an average, data from the WB suggests that Brazil's economy grew annually with 4.06 percent from 2003 to 2010. Six other states get stronger estimated values: Argentina, Chile, China, India, Russia, and Venezuela. This places Lula's Brazil in a global seventh place and a regional fourth place in the comparison of the period's average economic growth in percent.

Values of current account balance which were first available from 2005 in the WB's database,²⁴⁸ suggest an alarming deficit for Brazil. This is visualized by a negative graph in appendix number four. Looking away from 2009, Brazil's account balance decreased annually from 2005. It started with a surplus of 1.59 percent of the GDP, though ended with the negative value of 2.12 in 2010. The five years accounted for gives Brazil an average annual balance of -0.41. Six countries had larger deficit: France, India, Italy, South Africa, The UK and the USA. Hence Lula's Brazil is ranked ninth when it comes to the global comparison of account balance. The indicator gives a regionally fourth place.

Data of external debt stocks is sparse because only six countries are represented.²⁴⁹ However, findings reveal that Brazil's debt declined the three first years. After a period of decrease, the external debt grew the remaining five years. Brazil had the largest amount of debt in 2003. It was passed by China before 2004, a position that was held to the end of 2010. Hence it might come as little surprise that Brazil had at an average the second highest debt in the period. Lula's Brazil ends thus up with a global fifth place and a regional fourth place in the comparison of external debt.

²⁴⁷ Roett, *The New Brazil*, 121.

²⁴⁸ The World Bank, "Current account balance (% of GDP)."

²⁴⁹ The World Bank, "External debt stocks, total (DOD, current US\$)."

The last dataset, total reserves including gold, reveals that Brazil's reserves grew throughout Lula's periods.²⁵⁰ Moreover, the country ended up as number six in 2010 by having passed Italy, South Africa, and Germany. On an average, Brazil's reserves had an annually growth of 143 billion US dollars annually. Brazil is only beaten by China, India, Japan, Russia, and the United States. Hence, when taking reserves in mind, Brazil's rank is sixth globally and first regionally.

Lastly, the balance indicator gives Brazil the value of -104 billion US dollars. However, Brazil is not alone with a negative value. Only China and India offers positive values of the six states with external debt data availability. Even so, Brazil has the largest deficit value of the states; -103.94. This qualifies the country for the bottom positions as number six globally and fourth regionally.

6.1.3 The Economic Power of Dilma's Brazil

Brazil was in the Twentieth Century one of IMF's biggest clients. It was also one of the most frequent clients.²⁵¹ Brasília had to turn to the IMF for emergency help as recent as 1999. Ten years later, the situation had turned upside down as Brazil had become one of IMF's main creditors. Furthermore, the country's foreign currency reserves had grown large. In addition, Brazil had earned a coveted investment-grade ranking by major international credit rating agencies.²⁵² In short, Brazil's economy had historically never been more diverse, stable, and stronger.²⁵³

One can thus claim that Dilma came to a set table. As a result, one might say that all the hard work had been done. Yet, occasionally it is more challenging to keep something stable and floating rather than oversee a continuation of growth after great progressive steps. Moreover, even though Brazil enjoyed great growth under Lula, several domestic challenges had been left untouched:

‘Despite its recent progress, numerous problems continued to plague Brazil, including high public debt, a rigid fiscal structure, uneven progress on reducing structural economic distortions such as further tax and pension reforms, social pressures for higher investment in education, health, and security that constrain growth, an upward trend

²⁵⁰ The World Bank, “Total reserves (includes gold, current US\$).”

²⁵¹ Rohter, *Brazil on the Rise*, 139.

²⁵² Roett, *The New Brazil*, 116; Rohter, *Brazil on the Rise*, 167.

²⁵³ Rohter, *Brazil on the Rise*, 170.

in government primary spending, relatively high government debt ratios, and generally the glacial pace of structural reforms'.²⁵⁴

Untouched economic bottlenecks like low productivity, lack of efficient governmental spending of GDP, high labor costs and taxation, and poor infrastructure made inflation defy economic growth. Hence an accelerating inflation challenged the economy and Dilma's approval rating. Steps to decelerate growth due to the danger of an overheated economy and galloping inflation were taken.²⁵⁵ However, the steps proved hard to take. Unpopular methods like raising interest rates and expanding fiscal policy were needed. Credit was available to a lesser degree because Brazilians used large parts of their money to repay loans on consumer goods like cars and televisions. Fighting inflation became thus also crucial to maintain the support from the individuals that had elected Dilma.

State intervention methods were used to stimulate the economy. Tax cuts were implemented, and credit from state banks saw subsidizations. Moreover, price control on fuel, currency, and energy was tried, as well as cut in public spending. Lastly, Dilma launched a suggested crusade on corruption through reforms and laws by citing that a zero tolerance on the issue. Yet, fighting corruption is expensive. Bribing has always been widespread in Brazil. Corruption is therefore in some sense institutionalized. Hence uncertainty hit the financial market when authorities launched investigations. Nobody knew for certain who was clean or not. Although the fight against corruption earned Dilma great approval ratings, the crusade created a lot of enemies.

The policies of President Rousseff's government seemed to damage rather than recover the economy.²⁵⁶ An article published in the Economist goes as far as classifying her policies as disastrous.²⁵⁷ The promised growth went therefore missing. Investments decreased due to skepticism. Brazil's productivity fell down to the levels found during the 1970s according to Raul Gallegos.²⁵⁸ The result was turbulent values for Brazil's GDP, which can be seen in appendix number one. On one hand, collected data from the WB suggests that Brazil's GDP grew with around 334 billion US dollars from 2010 to 2011. On the other hand, data suggests decline in GDP from 2011 to 2013. And after a few years of economic

²⁵⁴ Roett, *The New Brazil*, 118-119.

²⁵⁵ Rohter, *Brazil on the Rise*, 273; Reid, *Brazil: The Troubled Rise of a Global Power*, 161.

²⁵⁶ Reid, *Brazil: The Troubled Rise of a Global Power*, 161-162.

²⁵⁷ The Economist, "Rough weather ahead."

²⁵⁸ Gallegos, "Brazil's President Is Running Scared."

stagnating growth, Brazil fell into a recession in 2014.²⁵⁹ As a consequence, Standard & Poor's downgraded Brazil's investment rating to BBB-.²⁶⁰

Economic troubles followed Dilma's government to the end of her first presidential period. The early aftermath of the 2014-presidential election reveals a sign of desperation. Policies Dilma had attacked and criticized were embraced as economic proposals from the candidate she defeated in the 2014-election were somehow implemented.²⁶¹ This prompted national jokes that claimed Aécio Neves had actually won the election.

Yet, one can not only blame domestic policies for economic troubles. Taxes and control methods on short-term capital inflow were for instance early implemented. This was done because Brasília thought it was a victim of an American currency war.²⁶² And Dilma's government blamed in fact the global economy for Brazil's weak performance:²⁶³ 'Even really organized countries are having problems getting better growth'.²⁶⁴ Although Dilma blamed the global economy for Brazil's poor growth, values which can be found in appendix three reveals that Brazil's growth was weaker than regional countries. This is alarming since Brazil received around forty percent of South America's foreign direct investment in 2011.²⁶⁵

Nonetheless, deceleration of China's economy did for instance stop the rise in commodity prices. More critically, a global decrease in commodity prices found place. Commodity production of export products like soybeans and iron ore was important sources of economic growth in the era of Lula. Dilma's Brazil got thus hit hard by an end of a commodity supercycle. In addition, the backside of the commodity boom had made Brazil less competitive as the costs of conducting business in the country had been raised. It was for instance cheaper to import Brazilian iron ore from South Korea than to buy it in Brazil. This had to do with poor infrastructure and bureaucracy.²⁶⁶ Foreign competition was therefore damaging the domestic work market.

Several states tried to export themselves out of the global financial crisis' aftermath. However, Brasília did act to the danger of turning the country into a market of dumped goods: 'This country does not just assemble stuff. We want a country that produces, that

²⁵⁹ Reuters, "Brazil Fell Into Recession in First Half of Year, as Investments Dropped."

²⁶⁰ Edgerton and Colitt, "Rousseff Approval Falls First Time Since 2013 Protests."

²⁶¹ Leahy, "Dilma Rousseff puts Brazil back on path to economic orthodoxy."

²⁶² Reid, *Brazil: The Troubled Rise of a Global Power*, 161.

²⁶³ Antunes, "5 Reasons Why Brazil's President Dilma Rousseff Should Not Be Re-Elected"; Reid, *Brazil: The Troubled Rise of a Global Power*, 162.

²⁶⁴ Reuters, "Brazil Fell Into Recession in First Half of Year, as Investments Dropped."

²⁶⁵ Montero, *Brazil: Reversal of Fortune*, 165.

²⁶⁶ Reid, *Brazil: The Troubled Rise of a Global Power*, 161; Leira, *Brasil: Kjempen våkner*, 293.

creates knowledge and applies it here; we want a skilled workforce'.²⁶⁷ Brazil turned therefore to methods that could be branded protectionism. A raise in taxes and tariffs on imported equipment and assembled goods that contained large amounts of imported components became a further step of implementing the local content policy.

Literature findings suggest a considerable weakening of Brazil's power because of economic restraints. Yet, annual GDP estimates indicate in some sense the opposite. Even though Brazil witnessed growth in 2011,²⁶⁸ and the following years suggested decline, Brazil remained in its position as having the seventh largest economy. The country's average value for the first economic indicator is also seventh on a global scale. And Brazil is found on first place on a regional comparison.

However, WB data visualized in appendix three reveals that the annual percentage growth of GDP did not remain status quo.²⁶⁹ While 2011 saw a growth of 2.73 percent, the next year produced a poorer result with a value of 1.03 percent. A moderate growth was accomplished again in 2013 with a 2.49 percent growth rate. This resulted in an average growth rate of 2.085. As a result, Brazil's growth was a few decimals weaker than Canada's growth. The average value places Brazil at a ninth place globally and fourth regionally. Other countries that get a higher ranking are Argentina, Chile, China, India, Russia, South Africa, and Venezuela.

Brazil had not experienced such a slow growth in the economy since the days of Fernando Collor according to Anna Edgerton and Raymond Colitt.²⁷⁰ Yet, the contexts are very different. Brazil's economy was much bigger in the era of Dilma. Hence it was harder to achieve impressive growth rates. Furthermore, the period was highlighted by domestic and international growth barriers. Lastly, the odds were against Brazil. States coined as emerging markets have historically faced numbers of setbacks. One-third of the concept's members have managed an annual growth of five percent or more over a decade.²⁷¹ Only a quarter out of these kept the growth rate for two decades, and around ten percent of the states kept the growth rate for three decades.

Brazil loses ground in the third economic indicator, current account balance, as well. While data suggests a deficit of 2.12 percent in 2011, the deficit of the GDP increased to 2.41

²⁶⁷ Leahy, "FT Interview."

²⁶⁸ The World Bank, "GDP (current US\$)."

²⁶⁹ The World Bank, "GDP growth (annual %)."

²⁷⁰ Edgerton and Colitt, "Rousseff Approval Falls First Time Since 2013 Protests."

²⁷¹ Ruchir Sharma, "Broken BRICs," 3.

and 3.61 in the two following years.²⁷² Some countries followed Brazil's pattern, while others turned the negative trend around. For instance, countries like the United States, India, Chile and Canada had a more positive account balance value in 2013. Despite of this, Brazil get downgrade one position on the global ranking. The country remains at a regionally fourth place. It should be noted that the 2013-value for Venezuela was not available.

The external debt stocks indicator presents a continuation of the negative trend. Brazil's values continued to increase²⁷³ with an average growth of 442 billion US dollars every year. As a result, Brazil remained status quo positions on the regional and global rank of average values. Some sort of status quo seems also to prevail in the case of estimates for the fifth economic indicator. Although Brazil saw a decline in the value of its reserves in 2013,²⁷⁴ its average value gives actually Dilma's Brazil a better position than Lula's Brazil after calculation. This is connected to a decline in India's reserves. The decline makes Brazil able to pass the country and achieve a fifth place globally, and maintain a regionally first place.

The last indicator, balance, gives only China a positive value for the years from 2011 to 2013. Even so, Brazil's position seems to have been strengthened as calculations reveal a negative value of 81 billion US dollars. Although the number is negative, it is the second strongest ranking among the six countries. Hence Brazil ends up with a global second place and a regional first place. This can be explained by an increase in reserves.

6.1.4 Economic Power, a Source of Foreign Policy Changes?

The first variable was named *economic power*. We took a system level approach because it was assumed that a transformed international structure had caused foreign policy changes. Moreover, the key for how Brazil interacts might be found in the anarchy's structured power distribution and how much power Brazil seeks. As a result, Brazilian foreign policy is considered influenced by its relative power and position in the international structure. By defining power as economic purchasing capacity and comparing average values, we can analyze if Brazil was more powerful before or after the inauguration of Dilma.

A comparison and calculation of the average values is found in appendix seven. When first looking at annual GDP growth, the averages value put Brazil at a regional top position for both presidents. Yet, the global average values places Lula's Brazil at ninth and Dilma's

²⁷² The World Bank, "Current account balance (% of GDP)."

²⁷³ The World Bank, "External debt stocks, total (DOD, current US\$)."

²⁷⁴ The World Bank, "Total reserves (includes gold, current US\$)."

Brazil at seventh. However, the tide turns in favor for Lula in the averages values of the annual GDP percentage growth rate. Although both ends at the bottom regionally, Lula is placed seventh and Dilma ninth globally. The third indicator, percentage of GDP in current account balance, presents the same trend. Brazil is ranked at the bottom regionally for Lula and Dilma, and respectively ninth and tenth globally.

The average values are regionally and globally identical, four and five, when it comes to total external debt stocks. Yet, Dilma scores one value higher than Lula in total reserves on a global scale. Both have top regional positions. Lastly, the balance indicator presents the biggest difference between Lula and Dilma. Lula's average values positions his government at a global sixth place and a regionally fourth place. Dilma is found in a second and a first place.

The thesis' first variable was embedded on the hypothesis that a less economically powerful Brazil was forced by the international structure to conduct a cool down of activism and foreign affairs activities. This seems not to be the case. Taken the scores together, Dilma 'win' 3-2 over Lula on a global level. The score is 3-0 on a regional level because three of the regional values are equal, while three are stronger for Dilma. The victory can be surprising. The growth rate in percent was stronger, the account balance was more positive, and the external debt stocks level was lower in the era of Lula. Additionally, literature findings suggest a considerable weakening of Brazil's power due to economic restraints. Nonetheless, the comparison of average values suggests that Brazil's economic power was stronger under Dilma than Lula. Hence the attempt to quantify economic power meets controversy. Several critical voices can therefore be raised. For a start, the calculated average values are not measured over an equal distributed period. Values for Lula are measured by eight years. Dilma is only represented with data from the first three years of her presidency. Secondly, IR theories are better to explain foreign policy when developments are analyzed over long time. Eleven years of data can be viewed insufficient.

Thirdly, the focus tends to be on GDP size and growth rates when looking at economy as power in IR. Hence some of the used indicators are less important. The US has for a long time been the world's most indebtedness country. This fact does not stop the country's reorganization as one of the most powerful countries in the world due to its GDP. Hence the thesis' conceptualization of economic power can be criticized on the grounds of economic indicators. There are several ways to measure a given states economic state. It is possible that we would get a different result by the use of other indicators. Current account balance is one of two main indicators to measures the trade of a given state. Moreover, there are for instance

several ways to measure a given state's debt. And although Brazil has the region's largest economy, other regional states can be viewed richer because of stronger GDP per capita estimates.²⁷⁵ Thus one can claim that Brazil lacks an economic leverage to be considered powerful. Transfer of large amounts of money to poorer neighbors in terms of annual GDP can be hard to justify since Brazilians are considered poorer.

The selection of states can also have influenced the results. There are several other states that could have rightfully been included in the comparison. Mexico is one example. And even though a state has great power, the actor might not know how to maximize the gains out of it, or how to use the power. Hence the ability to mobilize and use capabilities is crucial aspects the use of power. Lula seemed to be the right person for the right time. This seems not to be the case of Dilma, although she cannot be blamed for all the faults in Brazilian economy. Nonetheless, developments in the international structure are important as well. The structure favored Lula much more than Dilma. Lula was given a unique window of opportunity. The emerging of new markets and trade partners was a structural change that led to growth in Brazil's economy because of an increased demand of commodities.²⁷⁶ High demand meant increased prices, which led to raised income and production encouragement.

Moreover, the 2007-financial crisis weakened Washington's economy. Europe followed in the economic decline. Yet, emerging states like China and India continued their economic growth. A prospect of polycentrism arose. The traditional dominant powers faced decline while big developing states were given the opportunity of proliferation. This gave Lula's Brazil unprecedented visibility. It also moved some degree of power from the G8 to the G20. And regionally, a leadership vacuum was somewhat created. The United States concentrated heavily on Asia, and the fight against terrorism, while Mexico and Argentina focused on intern challenges. Lastly, Washington's economy and legitimacy were also severely damaged by the interventions and defeats in Iraq and Afghanistan. The events drew the world further to multipolarity. Hence the international structure was somewhat tailor-made for Lula's expansion and diversification policy.

While Brazil's economy stagnated, the United States' economy was on the path of recovery when Dilma took office. This signalized a self-assured comeback of the US, if it can be claimed that the superpower was gone for a period despite of being tied down in Afghanistan and Iraq, and facing economic decline. As a result, emerging states got less manoeuvre space. This might have led Brasília to be more cautious and less visible.

²⁷⁵ The World Bank, "GDP per capita (current US\$)."

²⁷⁶ Reid, *Brazil: The Troubled Rise of a Global Power*, 146.

Moreover, the deceleration of China's growth made the tide turn to the disfavour of Brazilian export. Poor international growth made China and India the period's only true emerging states. Furthermore, the Syrian uprising and the pro-Russian unrest in Ukraine drafted the conjunctive of a new Cold War scenario with the United States and Europe on one side, and Russia, and in some cases also China, on the other side. Brazil seemed to have found itself in the middle. This suggests that Brasília was unsure of how to position itself in the international structure. In the case of Syria, criticism of Brazil by China and Russia influenced Brasília to turn around on its violence condemnation of the al-Assad regime.²⁷⁷

Distinctive domestic context at the start of the presidents' periods matters as well. Lula took office in a period where great optimism and patience ruled among Brazilians despite of economic struggles. Millions were unemployed, ready to join Brazil's workforce in large numbers.²⁷⁸ Low employment was not the situation when Dilma took office. Hence a cheap factor of economic boost was not present. And President Rousseff faced more severe economic struggles from the start. Constraints resulted in strikes and demonstrations on a later stage because Lula had avoided confronting several domestic challenges. As untouched domestic challenges jeopardized growth, the sustainability of Lula's foreign policy is a central question. There is a strong consensus that his foreign policy course of expansion and activism could not go on forever. Even Lula's supporters share this thought.²⁷⁹ Hence a change was in some sense inevitable. By thinking so, a withdrawal from expansion is explained by economic factors. As domestic challenges threatened the sustainability, the international structure played a minor role in altering Brazil's foreign policy.

However, my interviewees only partly blamed economic problems for the change in Brazil's global role. They put most of the blame on Dilma's disinterest of international affairs. Furthermore, they claimed she had problems understanding the importance of international relations. Pointing to the fact that Brazil's global role shrank shortly after Dilma's inauguration, they concluded that Dilma's disinterest was a source of change as much as economic problems. Moreover, the foreign policy continued its course blindfolded as Dilma would have nothing to do with it. If foreign policy related issues needed new directions, the issues affected stopped up because Dilma gave little attention. Things that did not need her attention, carried on according to the interviewees. Yet, one interviewee claimed

²⁷⁷ Engstrom, "Brazilian Foreign Policy and International Human Rights Promotion," 19.

²⁷⁸ The World Bank, "Unemployment, total (% of total labor force) (modeled ILO estimate)."

²⁷⁹ Stuenkel, "Brazil's Foreign Policy under Dilma Rousseff."

that Brazil's global role had not changed as the country continued to emphasize its permanent state goals.

Yet, Dilma gave more attention to domestic rather than international issues because of the inherited challenges.²⁸⁰ Economic issues and policy drafting took therefore a lot of her attention. The drawing away from activism and foreign affairs activities can thus be explained by a change of attention. However, some of the domestic issues, such as development of energy resources, affected the foreign policy by implicating neighbor states. By promoting democracy in Paraguay, which have Brazil's largest operating hydroelectric facility on its border, Brazil's energy security was ensured. Moreover, regional integration on security issues like smuggling of drugs and arms affected the daily life of Brazilian citizens. And the self-sustainable Brazilian agriculture was further stimulated by promoting multilateral trade negotiations.

Lastly, defining power in economic terms is problematic. Firstly, doubts of accountability on Brazil's key role candidature can be raised if important goals are strongly dependent on economic growth. It is not a role a country can drop in and out on. The role is built and legitimated over time. A country like Brazil cannot therefore afford to stop conducting foreign affairs. Nor can it show signs of retreat during periods of weak economic growth. Hence economic power can yet again be claimed of being insufficient to explain changes. The Vatican City State has for instance great influence, though a small economy. And the world's largest state, Russia, has a slightly smaller annual GDP growth rating than Brazil. Russia has on the other hand much larger influence. Both examples have to do with other forms of power, which is my second point. Many different categories of power can be found because of the concept's many meanings. Waltz suggests that state's ranks depends for instance on indicators such as resource endowment, political stability and competence, and population and territory size, in addition to economic capability and military strength.²⁸¹ Thus one can say that my research is severely limited.

Power is identified as military strength in neorealism. Calculations of military strength can also be problematic. Nuclear strikes can for instance take out the defence of a given state. Yet, although weapons of mass destruction can take out battalions, it cannot hold foreign territory. Nonetheless, military strength can be measured by several methods. Two ways to calculate military power is looking at military spending and/or military expenditures.

²⁸⁰ Liby-Alonso, "Is Brazil entering a new phase in foreign affairs under Dilma Rousseff?"; Montero, *Brazil: Reversal of Fortune*, 158; Johnson, "Dilma's Power Problem."

²⁸¹ Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics," 50.

However, large investments can be used on small sized armed forces. It is cheaper to equip the infantry with rifles than give the air force modern jets. As a result, think tanks like Global Firepower use several indicators to rank states military strengths.

Global Firepower ranked Brazil as number 22 out of 126 states for 2013.²⁸² It is however not possible to go back in time to see how Brazil's position has developed from 2003 to 2013. Even so, Brazil has never fit the label as a big military power. It has been involved in few wars and has a relatively small enrollment numbers of soldiers. Few threats can be also identified. Brazil has historically preferred diplomacy over military solutions. Due to the lack of external threats, the role of the armed forces has traditionally been to guard Brazil's border and ensure domestic stability. Hence the country can be labeled a pacifistic and little aggressive state. Military power is therefore less interesting than economic power when analyzing Brazil's foreign policy. Nonetheless, we depart from the power debate to look at the individual leader level to see if emotions can explain changes.

6.2 The Individual Leader: Emotions and Foreign Policy

The interpretation of human rights can be found connected to the cool down of activism and foreign affairs activities. Lula's high level of activism made him chose side with authoritarian state leaders on several occasions. Moreover, it made Brasília seek closer ties to authoritarian regimes in a move of forming strategic partnerships and gain international influence. As a result, the diplomatic activity level rose. Dilma offered on the other hand a different view on cooperation with states connected to human rights abuses. She was selective in choosing partnerships. For instance, Brazil froze cooperation with Iran. Findings suggest that the reason was Tehran's human rights violations. Early rhetoric pointed to similar acts could happen to other countries as well. And Brazil's relation to Venezuela saw for instance constraints. These developments signalized a departure from Lula's foreign policy since flourishing relations were turned cold. It also resulted in a cool down of Brazil-Iran bilateral activities. Dilma's statements before and after taking office suggest that foreign policy change originated from the individual leader.

Brazil has not strongly prioritized human rights in its foreign policy despite of being a signatory of all major conventions and treaties. This has to do with Brasília's strong valuing of international law and state sovereignty, which often come into conflict with human rights. Moreover, Brasília has stayed highly critical of an international human rights regime. This is

²⁸² Global Firepower, "The complete Global Firepower list puts the military powers of the world into full perspective."

because the regime has been looked on as, hypocritical, ineffective, and a tool of the developed states.²⁸³ This reflects upon the country's nationalist tradition as the agenda of the outside world is viewed with suspicion. Historically, the country's approach to human rights fits in some sense the idea of a Janus-face: while giving international support to declarations and resolutions, Brazil has had several domestic cases of controversies.²⁸⁴ This was particular the situation when the country was a military dictatorship. Human rights violations were common during the period. Yet, there are still several cases of abuses today.²⁸⁵

Nonetheless, human rights claimed its rightful place in the foreign policies of Lula and Dilma. However, findings suggest that the two leaders valued it differently. While Lula focused on socio-economic human rights, Dilma put more of the attention on civil and political rights. By using Post's first component, we will turn our attention for answering why. As the first component is a psychobiography discussion approach, we will look at the roles and experiences that can explain foreign policy change on the ground of emotions

6.2.1 Setting the Scene

Lula was born few months after the Second World War's end. Simultaneously, and two years before Dilma's birth, Getúlio Vargas' brutal dictatorship ended. The army forced Vargas resignation.²⁸⁶ A short period of "reinstated" democracy followed. However, cycles of instability in the following years undermined the governments. The period was therefore marked by brief interim governments and economic challenges.

Brazil became a military dictatorship when the Armed forces forged a coup d'état against the democratically elected government of João Goulart in 1964.²⁸⁷ The coup came in the middle the Cold War. This was a period Washington and Moscow used the world as a chess board in a competition of ideological global influence. The US feared especially Communism in what it termed as its backyard; Latin America. Washington supported therefore numerous military coups in the region, sometimes directly with covert operations.²⁸⁸ Some claim that Brazil became one of the chess game's pieces when the

²⁸³ Engstrom, "Brazilian Foreign Policy and International Human Rights Promotion," 17; Stuenkel, "Is Brazil the New Regional Champion of Democracy?."

²⁸⁴ Engstrom, "Brazilian Foreign Policy and Human Rights," 836.

²⁸⁵ Human Rights Watch, "World Report 2014: Brazil"; Freedom House, "Freedom in the World 2014: Brazil."

²⁸⁶ Julsrud and Buvollen, "Brasils historie."

²⁸⁷ Robb, *A Death in Brazil*, 325.

²⁸⁸ Devine, "What Really Happened in Chile," 27.

military replaced Goulart because his social reforms sparked fears of instability and Communism.²⁸⁹

The period was positive for Brazil in some senses. The agriculture and manufacturing sectors saw large investments. Jobs were created. Furthermore, the country's poor infrastructure was strengthened. However, the positive sides were overshadowed by the negative impacts that come with dictatorship. The period was marked by severe human rights violations and economic troubles. Individuals that opposed or could be identified as oppositionists got marked for life, or just simply vanished, because political parties were unlawful. Basic rights like reunions, and the freedom of the press and expression were not tolerated. Lula was one of many individuals that came to oppose these and other restrictions the military regime imposed.

6.2.2 Lula's Background

Lula comes from a poor background, he is what Brazilians call *povão*²⁹⁰; of the people. He was born in a region called the Northeast in Brazil. This is Brazil's third largest region. It is also a little developed region. At the time of Lula's birth, the region's economical situation was bad. So was its harsh climate. This had made Lula's father go south to find work shortly before Lula was born.²⁹¹

Lula grew up without his father. However, his mother and six siblings were there for him. The family was surrounded by poverty. Life was hard. They lived in a small house and struggled to survive. Lula recalls thus his childhood with few enjoyable moments.²⁹² Hence when a forged letter from Santos arrived with the message of emigrate south; the big family went on a long journey to seek better living conditions.

It was Lula's older brother that forged a letter claiming that his father wanted the family in Santos. As a result, Lula's father was not happy to see them.²⁹³ Even so, the family got united. And life in the city gave new opportunities. Santos is close the country's industrial heartland. However, life was hard with an often drunk father and an unhappy mother.²⁹⁴ Lula dropped early out of school to help feeding his family. On a later stage, Lula moved with his siblings and mother to São Paulo in a pursuit of a better life.

²⁸⁹ Reid, *Brazil: The Troubled Rise of a Global Power*, 99; Steiner and Trubek, "Brazil - All Power to the Generals," 464.

²⁹⁰ Rohter, *Brazil on the Rise*, 252.

²⁹¹ Bourne, *Lula of Brazil*, 1.

²⁹² Ibid., 3.

²⁹³ Ibid., 4.

²⁹⁴ Ibid., 7.

Lula was eighteen years old when the military seized control over Brazil.²⁹⁵ He paid little attention to the military coup.²⁹⁶ His main interests were women and football. Life was still hard because of poor livelihood and little food. After years of different kind of jobs, Lula had become a full time worker as a lathe operator. Yet, he left the work and was unemployed for eight months due to disagreements over wage.²⁹⁷ A new job was eventually found as a night shift lathe turner. Happiness prevailed. However, he was marked for life both physiological and physical when an accident led to the loss of his little finger on the left hand some time later. As if the pain was not enough, Lula had to wait for the manager to arrive in the morning. The manager took him to see several doctors before he got treated. Although he got a large sum as compensation for accident, Lula was left with a psychological mark for several months.²⁹⁸

During the following years, Lula experienced and observed a number of metalworkers' strikes. He also changed jobs. Yet, it was not before 1968, around the time when the military tightened its grip and governmental murder and torture started, that an elder brother called Chico, a unionist belonging to the illegal Communist Party, convinced a reluctant Lula to join the Worker's Union:

‘I was a lathe operator. I was getting good enough pay and I had a girlfriend. I wanted to play football. I wanted to go out dancing. I didn't want to know about union things’.²⁹⁹

The end of the 1960s was marked with heightened tension. Strikes, sometimes turning violent, were numerous. 1969 was thus an important year for Lula. Moreover, he gained a position in his workplace's union, where his status was growing.³⁰⁰ However, Lula's life changed completely in 1971.³⁰¹ His wife, whom he married in 1969, and the child she was carrying died. No medical personal had discovered she was with hepatitis. Although it made him depressed, it also made Lula ware of the importance of social assistance.³⁰²

Life moved on as he got married again three years later. Lula had meanwhile become a fulltime union official with the responsibility over a social security department. More

²⁹⁵ Encyclopædia Britannica, “Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva.”

²⁹⁶ Robb, *A Death in Brazil*, 97; Bourne, *Lula of Brazil*, 17.

²⁹⁷ Bourne, *Lula of Brazil*, 15.

²⁹⁸ Ibid., 16.

²⁹⁹ Robb, *A Death in Brazil*, 97.

³⁰⁰ Bourne, *Lula of Brazil*, 18; Robb, *A Death in Brazil*, 97-98.

³⁰¹ Bourne, *Lula of Brazil*, 24.

³⁰² Ibid., 24.

importantly, he found himself as a president of the union the Steel Workers' Union of São Bernardo do Campo and Diadema the year after he got married.

1975 was another key year that would shape Lula. It was the year when his brother Chico got arrested because of a national anti-communist sweep.³⁰³ Lula was in Japan on a Toyota congress when he got the message. Even though he was advised not to return, Lula flew home without getting arrested. Back on Brazilian soil, he became radicalized: ‘what was the logic of arresting a worker simply because he was against social injustice?’³⁰⁴ He lost sense of fear as his presidential role grew on him. Lula started routines of visiting factories and hold discussions with its workers. Furthermore, as more members joined and alliances with leaders of other unions were made, Lula’s and the unions’ influence grew. This was accomplished because Lula’s union took their claims direct to the labor tribunal instead of the government’s union federation. The union won therefore for the first time a wage raise in 1976.³⁰⁵ As a result, Lula became a national figure. Even so, Lula was still not much interested in national politics.³⁰⁶

A more political orientated Lula can be identified after the election of his second term in 1978.³⁰⁷ It was in this period he launched a movement against the military regime’s economic policy. Although the coming strike waves were not organized by Lula in the start, one factory was on strike practically every day in 1978.³⁰⁸ The year presented the first of several waves of strike by metalworkers. The government hesitated because of an unpredictable situation with strikes erupted all around. As a result, strikes were successful and workers got increased income. On the other hand, the strikes were viewed as a threat by employers and their governmental allies. As the mass movement it had become, the Brazilian unions gained power and influence. Thus when the call for general strike came in the following year, Brazil was in unrest. Violence from the state authorities threaten to crack down the strike, though Lula urged them to continue. As the conflict sharpened, the strike spread beyond the state of São Paulo and the metalworkers. Deals were worked out, though followed with new strikes the following years. As Brazil’s economy was running into trouble, the military regime was walking on a razor’s edge. In the middle of all turmoil Lula was already underway on creating a workers’ party.

³⁰³ Bourne, *Lula of Brazil*, 27-28.

³⁰⁴ Ibid., 29.

³⁰⁵ Robb, *A Death in Brazil*, 99.

³⁰⁶ Bourne, *Lula of Brazil*, 35.

³⁰⁷ Robb, *A Death in Brazil*, 99.

³⁰⁸ Bourne, *Lula of Brazil*, 36.

Lula continued to fight for workers' rights in the beginning of the 1980s. A strike declared illegal by the regional labor court, got Lula and other central leaders arrested. They found as violators of the National Security Law.³⁰⁹ However, the strike went on because Lula had decentralized the union's organization. Moreover, the union met support from the Brazilian population, which provided food and money.

Lula was treated well in the prison. Even so, he and the other union prisoners went on a hunger strike. And when the workers' strike was called off on the outside, the prisoners were released after thirty-one days in prison.³¹⁰ The release cut Lula's prison sentence by three years and five months.³¹¹

The end of the 1970s brought large changes to Brazil. Amnesties for Brazilian dissidents, a gradual opening of the society, and a greater emphasis on human rights made it look like the days of the military regime was coming to an end. This affected Lula. His life took a new turn when he finished his second term as union president and assumed leadership of the newly established Brazilian Workers' Party. Yet, the PT was not all Lula's work. Its member consisted of thousands of individuals that had been radicalized while fighting for rights.

The poor elections result in the 1982-election of state governor showed that Lula and the PT had a long way to go. However, this did not stop Lula from leading a national wide campaign for direct elections of president. He organized mass demonstrations in the following years. Despite the efforts, he witnessed that the National Congress appointed Tancredo de Almeida Neves as president, and José Sarney as vice president, in 1985.

6.2.3 Dilma's Background

Dilma was born in Belo Horizonte, where she grew up in a middle class family. This gave her access to private school, piano lessons, and servants.³¹² She grew thus up in a comfortable environment. Her father was a Bulgarian immigrant, who is rumored to have been an ex-Communist that fled Bulgaria.³¹³ He married a teacher. Together they got three children.

³⁰⁹ Encyclopædia Britannica, "Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva."

³¹⁰ Bourne, *Lula of Brazil*, 44.

³¹¹ Encyclopædia Britannica, "Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva."

³¹² Rohter, *Brazil on the Rise*, 260.

³¹³ BBC, "Dilma Rousseff,"; Glick, "Power Woman Dilma Rousseff,"; Sofia News Agency, "Who Is Who."

Dilma was sixteen years old when the military took power.³¹⁴ Later in the same year she started studying at the Colégio Estadual Central,³¹⁵ the Central State High School. Here she fell in love with Cláudio Galeno Linhares, who she married 1968.³¹⁶

The school strongly influenced her political views. Its environment was greatly leftist and critical of the current regime.³¹⁷ Here she came into touch with leftist thoughts and ideologies. And as Dilma became involved in student politic groups and supported the left side, she became strongly opposed of the military regime.³¹⁸ Dilma went further through a radicalization process at the school by joining Política Operária, the Worker's Politics. She came into contact with the Marxist-Leninist movement through her involvement in student politics. Its influence was strong. Dilma became a member of a group called Comando de Libertação Nacional, National Liberation Command, before she turned twenty-one.³¹⁹ This was a radical group that opposed the military regime through violence. Linhares was also a member of the group.

The relationship with Linhares was challenging. They were both active in the fight against the military regime. This made the young couple wanted by the authorities. Crackdowns of illegal movements took often place. Dilma was for instance forced to halt her university studies, a bachelor degree in economics, and go underground when members of her organization got arrested in 1969.³²⁰ Since the couple had come under the radar of the police, they had to sleep different places every night. As more raids followed, the organization chose to smuggle the two out of the city some weeks later. The route made them go into hiding in Rio de Janeiro. Yet, hiding and conducting underground activities were hard in the city. Linhares was sent to Porto Alegre by the organization. Dilma was left behind to help the organization. In a meeting she met Carlos Franklin Paixão de Araújo, who sheltered Linhares. They fell in love, and married at a later stage.

Dilma's rebellious career took a new turn after meeting Araújo. He was one of the leaders in VAR Palmares, a Marxist-Leninist inspired political-military group that had come into creation after the merge of Comando de Libertação Nacional and Vanguarda Popular Revolucionária. The group became infamous for big robberies and kidnappings. Although

³¹⁴ Ray, "Dilma Rousseff."

³¹⁵ Terra Brasil, "Quem é Dilma Rousseff, a primeira mulher presidente do Brasil."

³¹⁶ Ray, *Dilma Rousseff*.

³¹⁷ Terra Brasil, "Quem é Dilma Rousseff, a primeira mulher presidente do Brasil"; Reid, *Brazil: The Troubled Rise of a Global Power*, 159.

³¹⁸ Rohter, *Brazil on the Rise*, 260.

³¹⁹ Ibid., 260.

³²⁰ Ibid., 260.

there are different versions about Dilma's role, she most likely coordinated armed operations and administered obtained values from raids.³²¹ Since her early days as an activist, she had taught her fellow fighters in Marxist theory and written for an underground newspaper. Dilma had therefore earned great respect and influence within the group as a bright thinker. As she blamed eye problems for not allowing her use weapons, the current president of Brazil denies of having carried out any acts of violence.³²²

Rousseff was sent to São Paulo after the group split into two factions the same year. The reason behind the split was disagreements over how the group should topple the regime. Her role was to keep the group's weapons safe in the metropolitan city. The stay in São Paulo was short because a guerrilla fighter gave away information during a torture session. The victim of the torture was escorted to a bar to point out a fellow revolutionist. Here the police was waiting for Luiza,³²³ Dilma's codename. As she felt something was wrong, Dilma tried to leave the bar. A policeman caught her attention and searched her. Three years of underground fighting ended.³²⁴ The apprehension early in 1970 came as a surprise for her family. They did not know anything about her guerrilla activities.³²⁵

Dilma was not treated well by the authorities. Before prosecution, she was tortured for around twenty-two days.³²⁶ Under the charge of subversion, Dilma was sentenced to three years in prison. The sentencing conditions were heinous because she got classified as a terrorist. Rousseff was therefore subjected to periodical torture. The methods went from electrical shocks and beatings to being hung upside down and called names. The objective was to make her name other members in her group. However, she kept her mouth shut.

The today's Brazilian president was released after a reduction in her sentence. However, Dilma had suffered greatly. Rousseff left the prison around ten kilos lighter and with severe damage on her thyroid glands.³²⁷ After a short stay in Belo Horizonte to recover strength, she moved to Porto Alegre to be closer to imprisoned Araújo, and to resume the education. Four years later, she graduated from the city's university with a bachelor degree in

³²¹ Stuenkel, "Who is Dilma Rousseff, Brazil's potential next President?"; Rohter, *Brazil on the Rise*, 260-261; Globo, "Dilma Rousseff concede a entrevista da vitória na bancada do JN."

³²² Brooks, "Ex-guerrilla to be Brazil's first female president."

³²³ Leira, *Brasil: Kjempen våkner*, 83.

³²⁴ Ray, "Dilma Rousseff"; Stuenkel, Who is Dilma Rousseff, Brazil's potential next President?"; Boadle, "Rousseff to visit Cuba, focus on post-embargo era."

³²⁵ Terra Brasil, "Quem é Dilma Rousseff, a primeira mulher presidente do Brasil."

³²⁶ Stuenkel, "Who is Dilma Rousseff, Brazil's potential next President?"; Leira, *Brasil: Kjempen våkner*, 83; Reid, *Brazil: The Troubled Rise of a Global Power*, 159.

³²⁷ Gómez, "Why Iran-Brazil friendship has gone cold."

economics. In the following years before the regime change, Dilma worked as an advisor for various actors. She was also involved in the amnesty work of political prisoners. As the regime's iron grip was getting weaker, Dilma became involved in politics within the legal framework and Partido Democrático Trabalhista (PDT).³²⁸ It was within this party her less radical political career began, which would lead to the PT and the Brazilian president title several years later.

6.2.4 Emotions, a Source of Foreign Policy Changes?

The second variable was named *emotions* because I thought feelings could have been a source behind foreign policy changes. One source behind the cool down of activism and foreign affairs activities can be found in the interpretation of human rights. We looked therefore at how experiences might have a different interpretation of human rights ideas. This had to do with a hypothesis stating that emotions from early childhood to 1985 have caused foreign policy changes.

Lula and Dilma had two completely different childhoods. Lula had a tough start in life. He comes from a poor background. Since Lula grew up in poverty, his experiences and emotions can explain why he viewed human rights as poverty reduction. Dilma was on the other hand raised up in a comfortable middle class environment. Lula dropped out of school and worked hard as a shoe shiner, street vendor, and factory worker in order to help his family. Dilma could enjoy a soft start in life with far less worries of basic needs. While Dilma liked appreciated her time by reading books, Lula worked hard to help feeding the ones he loved. Messages from books might have influenced her thinking early. So might her father because of his alleged background as Bulgarian ex-Communist. Lula's father was on the other hand absent much of his childhood.

Their early experiences and class backgrounds formed the scenario for their coming experiences during the military dictatorship. Lula was for months he was without job. He struggled to feed himself and the family. Lula also struggled to find job. When he got a new job, he had to walk to the workplace with no money for lunch in the start. This made him feel embarrassed.³²⁹ Hence we can identify an experience of poor living conditions he likely carried with him. Furthermore, the accident that cost his little finger made him go to different hospitals to receive treatment. This had to do with lacking healthcare and social assistance for the poor population, a factor that became more visible when his wife and unborn son died.

³²⁸ Leira, *Brasil: Kjempen våkner*, 89.

³²⁹ Bourne, *Lula of Brazil*, 16.

The event made Lula bitter over the inadequate condition of the Brazilian health service. Taken the experiences together, the emotions it created might explain why Lula focused on for instance combating poverty and hunger.

Lula also came to know an environment where individuals that stood up for workers' rights were spied on and arrested. Even though the thought behind the many waves of strikes was about increasing wages, it was also acts of raising social awareness. The accident that cost Lula his little finger revealed a situation of poor safety for workers. Basic services were poorly developed in Brazil; the country was top placed in scores of global social inequality. Hence the experience of lacking rights might have influenced Lula's policy. In addition, Lula was a fulltime union official with the responsibility over a social security department for a defined period. The fact that Lula was a union president on a later stage corresponds largely to why he emphasised socio-economic rights for the well being and benefits of workers. Lula's idea behind the PT was that the union structure had not enough power to deliver the workers' need.³³⁰

Acts from the military regime pushed Lula more or less directly to interest in worker's rights. It was not before the 1968-crackdowns that a reluctant Lula was convinced to join the Worker's Union. Thus one can claim that Lula might not have focused on socio-economic rights if he never was pushed. Moreover, he took further radicalized steps due to the arrest of his brother. And the crackdowns of demonstrations with crowds gathering around him became oxygen for Lula as he grew to become a national figure. The events led to a lost sense of fear. Hence Lula emphasis of human rights might have been largely formed during the period by fighting actively for worker's rights. Dilma fought on the other hand actively for political rights and revolution. Thus the two fought for different rights during the period. Dilma's fight for political right can be found connected to the coup d'état and early radicalization. She went through a radicalization process at the school because of its leftist and military regime critical environment. Here Dilma became involved in student politic groups and came into touch with leftist thoughts and ideologies. This sparked her fight against the regime and fight for political rights. Hence the regime had an early influence on her.

Even though Dilma followed Lula's development model to raise awareness on socio-economic rights, the Brazilian foreign policy underwent changes because of her view on authoritarian regimes. Where Lula would stand by and embrace some dictators, Dilma

³³⁰ Bourne, *Lula of Brazil*, 51.

stepped away in some cases. The reason for this can also be found in Dilma's experiences between 1964 and 1985. Despite her role is debated from being a terrorist mastermind to a banker,³³¹ Dilma was tortured during the period. As being a victim of dictatorship, she came to have a more critical view on authoritarian leaders. The experience with torture must have been undoubtedly traumatic. In fact she rarely speaks of it.³³² The treatment left big emotional scares in her. And it seems to have influence her as president. When Dilma was asked if her background as a political prisoner gave her large sympathy for other political prisoners, the answer was clear:

‘There is no question about that. Due to the fact that I experienced personally the situation of a political prisoner, I have an historical commitment to all those that were or are prisoners just because they expressed their views, their public opinion, their own opinions’.³³³

And when Dilma came into the topic about human rights abuses in Iran, she showed little tolerance for actions conducted by Tehran: ‘There is no nuance; I will not make any concessions on that matter’.³³⁴ The two different backgrounds concluding in two contrasting approaches in diplomatic ties are striking in the case of Iran. Despite Amorim have stated ‘this idea that Brazil is a good buddy of Iran is a distorted version of events launched by the US press and was followed by the rest’,³³⁵ Lula gave human rights in the country little attention. National interests were given preference. Lula even told the protestors of the disputed election in 2009 to just get over the defeat. By doing so, he compared them to upset football fans. Lula paid little attention to their position, nor their fate. Brazil was in fact one of few countries to endorse the election.³³⁶

Dilma openly criticized the Tehran-regime of its abuses on the other hand. Torturing methods and crackdown on dissidents were especially in her focus. The two approaches can be explained by Lula's valuing of income and health issues, and Dilma's emotions from torture. Findings suggest that Dilma suffered more than Lula when it comes to psychological and physiological torments. She experienced violations of human rights at first hand by torture. It is therefore very reasonable to think that emotions from the horrific experiences have been in Dilma's luggage for the rest of her life. Hence it is very likely that Dilma's

³³¹ Rohter, *Brazil on the Rise*, 260-261; Folha de São Paulo, “Autenticidade de ficha de Dilma não é provada.”

³³² Associated Press, “Rousseff in tears as Brazilian report details junta’s killings and torture.”

³³³ Weymouth, “An interview with Dilma Rousseff, Brazil’s president-elect.”

³³⁴ Ibid.

³³⁵ MercoPress, “Brazil’s UN vote on Iran marks first great difference between Dilma and Lula da Silva.”

³³⁶ Montero, *Brazil: Reversal of Fortune*, 170.

background made her more aware of political and civil rights than Lula. Yet, this logic goes against the treatment of Shirin Ebadi. Dilma would likely embrace such a visit. Both have a background as victims of political persecution. Moreover, a meeting would reinforce her previous statements and dedication to human rights. Even so, there can be several reasons for why a meeting could not be scheduled. Reasons can range from tight time schedule to not wanting further damages on the bilateral relations between Brazil and Iran.

Yet, is it possible to prove that the emotions have affected the two individuals' view on human rights in foreign affairs? 'The effects of emotion on decisionmaking are diverse, and not all effects are yet understood' according to Hudson.³³⁷ Even though Dilma states that experiences in prison formed her, and Lula grew aware of social rights as a worker, it is hard to state to what degree this formed their view on human rights issues. Hence it is hard to prove that emotions led to change. There are several examples of state leaders that have background as prosecuted oppositionists that turn their back on human rights when they come into power. Take for instance Lenin, Robert Mugabe, and Fidel Castro. Although one can question to what degree the three were tortured, they were all victims of oppression that became national heroes and oppressors of human rights. The brain is undoubtedly a very complex organ. It can be claimed that an individual's own emotions are not understood by the person. Hence it is hard to prove that given experiences have caused given outcomes. Even so, it is hard to think that the experiences did not affect them as emotions from experiences shape what we are and become.

However, Lula and Dilma were both put in prison. Hence the two suffered from repression from an authoritarian regime. Yet, Lula was far better treated. He was able to visit the dentist, got visits from his family, went visiting his mother when she go sent to hospital, and attended her burial.³³⁸ The contrasting treatments between Dilma and Lula can be explained by latter's popularity as a well known union leader. The military regime might have feared reprisals if something happened to Lula. Dilma was another case because she was connected to a militant group, suggesting lesser popularity and sympathy in the population at that time. Moreover, the two represents different method of resistance and different degree of radicalism; civil disobedience versus armed struggle. Thus they were punished differently. The result was outbreak of contrasting emotions. This comes especially into focus when Lula commented about sentenced prisoners that conducted hunger strikes in Cuba:

³³⁷ Hudson, *Foreign Policy Analysis*, 48.

³³⁸ Bourne, *Lula of Brazil*, 44.

‘I don’t think a hunger strike can be used as a pretext for human rights to free people. Imagine if all the criminals in São Paulo entered into hunger strikes to demand freedom’.³³⁹

The statement was controversial of many reasons. First of all, Lula conducted a hunger strike himself while in prison. Lula shot himself in his foot by criticizing individuals that were in the same situation out of the same reasons. Secondly, the statement made the prisoners become common criminals in Lula’s eyes. However, they had been practicing human rights. Thirdly, Lula accepted the Castro regime’s abuses of human rights indirectly by rising a supporting rather than a critical voice.

It seems to be evident that emotions from early life experiences to the military regime’s fall formed the two as humans and politicians. Their backgrounds have affected Brazilian foreign policy also in other ways than human rights. No Brazilian presidents have ever travelled as much, nor attended as many international conferences, as Lula.³⁴⁰ He was therefore remarkably visible in foreign affairs. This can have its reason in his background as union leader and the attendance of numerous conferences. The strong level of activism as a union leader was transformed over to his role as president. This explains the foreign policy’s remarkably high level of activism. Hence his previous role under the military regime is a reflection of his presidency role. In the case of Dilma, Brazil’s global role took the turn to become a global agenda setter. Dilma’s Brazil raised international attention by discussing cyberspace related issues like reforms, privacy, and the right freedom of association. Hence Brasília defended equal access and freedom of expression on a global scale.

Marco Aurélio Garcia plays the ball straight to my hypothesis in an interview:

‘Lula da Silva always underlined social questions, Dilma on the other hand will keep that sensitivity but wants to emphasize human rights issues which are linked to her past as a political prisoner’.³⁴¹

We can thus say that emotions influenced Brazilian foreign policy. Yet, the presidents are far from the only actors to have influenced change. A wide range of involved actors can be identified as Brazilian decision-making is complex³⁴². And although the Brazilian president has great power, he or she cannot truly govern the country alone. The leader is not a

³³⁹ Daremblum, “How Brazil Deals with Dictators.”

³⁴⁰ Davies, “The axis of Brazil.”

³⁴¹ MercoPress, “President Rousseff’s foreign policy “will emphasize human rights (South and North)”.”

³⁴² Milani, “Atores e agendas no campo da política externa brasileira de direitos humanos.”

person with supreme power. He or she is in the need of support. We will therefore turn our attention to party politics and coalitions building.

6.3 Domestic Political Contestation: Party Support and Foreign Policy

Brazil has a dramatic history with cycles of instability. This has led to colossal transformations of the country over time. Its history has strongly shaped Brazilian politics as state-formation and the state's centrality have evolved over time. Brazil has for instance experienced with different regime types in short time of living. The political life has therefore undergone large changes.

Some elements of the political life have seen continuity.³⁴³ For instance, self-interests, political survival at dire costs and corruption has prevailed. Additionally, power, influence, and political patronage are important elements in a society that can be viewed oligarchic. Political parties have their foundations overshadowed by personalities. Leaders and individuals of various fractions are known to change political parties and form new coalitions to gain power: 'In Brasília, politics operates as a complex game of shifting alliances, where favor-swapping is obligatory and the PMDB is often the kingmaker'.³⁴⁴ For example, 230 of 513 congressmen switched parties between 1995 and 1998.³⁴⁵ This describes an environment where it is hard to know who one can trust completely and who is on which side. Hence Brazilian politics can in some sense be viewed as classical realism in practice.

The complex political life has affected the Brazilian Workers' Party. The PT has met challenges within its own ranks and in the forming of coalitions to govern the country. Great leadership and representation of the PT's interests can be viewed crucial for avoiding policy dissatisfaction from within the party. Hence by addressing reasons for foreign policy changes, it is fruitful to look at if the leaders represented the PT's interests in an acceptable degree while in power. Yet, what are the PT's interests and values? We will start looking at the PT's ideological background.

6.3.1 An Introduction to the Brazilian Workers' Party

Partido dos Trabalhadores was founded the 10th of February 1980 in São Paulo.³⁴⁶ Lula became its leader. Its establishment found place after a long debate of whether the coming party should merge with the PMDB or not. Lula embraced the idea of a broad movement at

³⁴³ Montero, *Brazilian Politics*, 11-26.

³⁴⁴ Wells, "Meet the Kingmakers of Brasília."

³⁴⁵ Reid, *Brazil: The Troubled Rise of a Global Power*, 147.

³⁴⁶ Ibid..

first. Yet, Lula changed his mind on a later stage. It was believed that a new socialist party with a working class foundation was necessary to break Brazil's elitists' power monopoly in order to create a socialist society without exploiters.³⁴⁷ Hence the party leaned far to the left from the start. It was an umbrella of different Marxists branches. Union and social movement leaders, moderate intellectuals, European inspired social democrats, liberation theology influenced Catholics, and far-left remnants of Marxist hardliners were the dominating groups. The PT was thus formed out as a heterogeneous group organized from below. It did not identify itself with a specific leftist ideological movement. The party chose to define itself as socialist party. What kept the members together was Lula. The party has therefore from its start been identified with a single individual.

Nonetheless, the PT was devoted to becoming a leftist mass organization in its early years. By being ambivalent of representative democracy, the party represented several radical approaches on politics. For instance, the PT had strong ties to international anti-imperialist actors.³⁴⁸ Moreover, the party 'advocated the repudiation of Brazil's external debt, the nationalization of the country's banks and mineral wealth, and radical land reform'.³⁴⁹ Lastly, delegates of the PT put the foot down on signing the drafted constitution after the military had stepped away from power.

Lula's personality and the party's radical approach made the PT famous. Before the Cold War's end it was known as one of the most celebrated leftist party in South America. Even so, the radical approach made it hard to gain good election results. Although the PT had some success in earning mayor positions in Porto Alegre and São Paulo, electoral politics was challenging and election results were bad. However, the trends turned around when Lula became Brazil's uncontested leftist leader during the 1989-presidential campaign.³⁵⁰ Yet, voters remained skeptical to the party's policies. Radical socialistic values had influenced the party early. And the party was still committed to class struggle by winning power on a far-left platform. Even so, the PT could not be viewed as a Communist movement even though it had members to the far left.

Lula and the PT got more moderate in the 1990s. There are several explanations for the party's transformation.³⁵¹ First and foremost, its politics represented an outdated form of socialism. This started a process of rethinking within the party. However, the move toward a

³⁴⁷ Samuels, "From Socialism to Social Democracy," 1000.

³⁴⁸ Cason and Power, "Presidentialization, Pluralization, and the Rollback of Itamaraty," 127.

³⁴⁹ Samuels, "From Socialism to Social Democracy," 1002.

³⁵⁰ Reid, *Brazil: The Troubled Rise of a Global Power*, 141.

³⁵¹ Samuels, "From Socialism to Social Democracy," 1005-1019.

more center leftist politic was challenging because each single step needed negotiation. The national leadership contained members from all the internal competing groups, and decisions were made in a democratic form of consensus.³⁵² Furthermore, the move away from aspects of old fashioned socialism did not include a clear break with past politics. The slow-moving process was full of tension and contradictions.³⁵³ Yet, a clear distance to its early socialist rhetoric came before the 2002-campaign with a letter addressed to the Brazilian public. Lula won the minds of Brazilians as the voters found the PT's moderation to be credible and acceptable steps away from radical thinking.³⁵⁴ Even so, not all party members supported the moderation line. This created an environment of resistance which would challenge the presidencies of Lula and Dilma.

6.3.2 The PT's Support of Lula

By being the indispensable leader of the PT and becoming more popular than the party, Lula had a great upper hand for the influence of the party. It was he who made peace with the liberal policies of FHC in the letter issued to Brazilians.³⁵⁵ The act was followed up by public declaration of support. Even though Lula had never been a Marxist, liberal market powers were afraid of his intentions. The fear gained legitimate ground by Lula's pledge to change in his inauguration speech. However, he stressed that changes had to come over time in the right moments. And Lula's government proved to play a good balancing act between gradual social change and status quo.

Party ideology largely prevailed in large degree. Poverty and income inequality was reduced during Lula's presidency. Economic stability and growth was also accomplished. Of domestic social policies, the continuation of FHC's federalized Bolsa Escola led to Bolso Família. This is a program that requires families to keep children in school to receive money from the authorities. Pro-Uni was another program that helped low-income students with scholarships so they could attend university studies. A third program was Minha Casa Minha Vida. It made ownership of housing affordable to Brazilian families with low-income. Lastly, the minimum wage's real values were increased significantly while credit availability rose. Hence we can say that the domestic policies had a leftist profile. However, this was not the

³⁵² Reid, *Brazil: The Troubled Rise of a Global Power*, 141-142.

³⁵³ Samuels, "From Socialism to Social Democracy," 1003.

³⁵⁴ Ibid.

³⁵⁵ Reid, *Brazil: The Troubled Rise of a Global Power*, 142.

case to begin with. Lula's administration was slow to implement efficient social policies to end for instance hunger.³⁵⁶

Lula was able to continue parts of FHC's economic policy because of ideological change within the PT, promises to the population, government coalition with center-right parties, and an inherited IMF agreement. The problem is that Lula's moderation line and the commitment to uphold neoliberal policies created tension within the party. Capitalism was/is interpreted as some sort of evil within the party's ranks by left hardliners. The neoliberal policies had therefore been condemned before the party came into power.³⁵⁷ The fiscal policy was for instance thus a subject of strong abandon pressure.³⁵⁸ Hence there were forces within the PT that worked against Lula's economic policies. In addition, party forces had hoped for a more radical transformation of Brazil. And several implemented domestic reforms were not favored by members of the PT.³⁵⁹

Moreover, considerable challenges were not confronted adequately or approached at all. Examples are the unwieldy tax system, unjust pension system, and poor education and infrastructure quality. As a result, several members on the left wing broke away.³⁶⁰ In addition, the PT created a 'new class' during Lula's presidential periods according to Francisco de Oliveria.³⁶¹ Former union leaders, who had become party members, were given power and richness. Because members were appointed to federal ministries by Lula, a system of dependency and dispenses patronage were created. As Lula's had believed that the union structure had not enough power to deliver the workers' need, a betrayal of the idea behind the PT took place because the new class' elites changed approach: 'their task now being to press for redundancies, sell-offs and shut-downs, in pursuit of high returns on their investments'.³⁶²

Tensions were also created due to Lula's approach to the IMF as the institution can be viewed as a tool for securing developed state's interests. It's policies create in some senses dependency by filing demands in order to obtain financial loans. The demands can be viewed as an attack on a given state's sovereignty. Hence the institution can be believed to be a tool to maintain the core state's hegemony and exploitation of the developing nations. Yet, programs like Bolso Família can also be viewed as a dependency tool. The individuals that are

³⁵⁶ Reid, *Brazil: The Troubled Rise of a Global Power*, 146.

³⁵⁷ Samuels, "From Socialism to Social Democracy," 1004.

³⁵⁸ Reid, *Brazil: The Troubled Rise of a Global Power*, 146.

³⁵⁹ Ibid., 144.

³⁶⁰ Ibid., 145.

³⁶¹ Oliveira, "Lula in the Labyrinth."

³⁶² Ibid., 10.

benefiters might grow dependent of governmental funding. As a result, they are turned into obedient voters for the PT. Thus it can be claimed that the party also used manipulative methods and caused exploitation.

Corruption scandals suggested that power was more about individual gains rather than fulfilling the ambitions of a grass-root movement. Lula's administration was haunted by corruption scandals. One of the most infamous, the 2005-mensalão scandal, revealed that the PT had paid bribes to its coalition parties for voting on government bills. Political turmoil made Lula lose many government aides and long term PT members. For instance, Lula's two early favorites and potential successors fell in separate corruption scandals. Although Lula was not implicated in any of the scandals, the loss of key individuals and scandals might have weakened the reputation of both Lula and the PT. However, there are several observers that claim the corruption scandals was a somewhat blessing for Lula. With political heavy weighters gone, Lula consolidated power and became 'free to pursue a more vigorous personal agenda that included a greater emphasis on international travel and diplomacy'.³⁶³

Even so, the PT's leftist hardliners got strong influence over Brasília's foreign policy. It was here the party's ideology became largely visible.³⁶⁴ As long as the business interests of the elites were upheld, the PT was left with strong influence over Brasília's foreign policy.³⁶⁵ Lula's Brazil could therefore for instance seek a determined South-South approach. The strategy can be found inspired by Marxism's IR theoretical view of core states exploiting periphery states.³⁶⁶ By doing so, Lula's strategy is interpreted as an approach of promoting trade and cooperation between periphery states. Thus the strategy's goal is a weakening of the periphery's dependency bounds to core states. In addition, the strategy can be claimed to originate from the Marxism's idea of solidarity for poor states. The belief that cooperation amongst equals strengthens states positions in the international anarchy is present. The approach can also be viewed as a method to pressure for the need of reforming global governance by making institutions more democratic and fairer.

Brazil's position in global trade negotiations is good example of party ideology influence. Cason and Power claim that Lula's Brazil took a more aggressive position. The approach can be reflected upon the party's view on how Brazil should orient itself in showing

³⁶³ Roett, *The New Brazil*, 115.

³⁶⁴ Reid, *Brazil: The Troubled Rise of a Global Power*, 244; Almeida, "Uma política externa engajada," 162.

³⁶⁵ Cason and Power, "Presidentialization, Pluralization, and the Rollback of Itamaraty," 128-129.

³⁶⁶ Jackson and Sørensen, *Introduction to International Relations*, 172.

solidarity to the peripheral states.³⁶⁷ Examples of this were Brasília's approach in the WTO and G20. Moreover, Lula's opposition against the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) is a great example of leftist activism. Lula went in the front lines of criticizing pharmaceutical companies' exploitation of developing states and broke the patent on HIV drugs.³⁶⁸ He did so by arguing that a life is has a higher value than profit.³⁶⁹

Lula positioned himself as a leader of the world's poor out of ideological view and his background. While trade disputes were sought settled in the WTO, periphery states' agendas were tried pushed through by a leadership role in the G20. Even so, Lula's Brazil ended up with feet in both camps. This suggests that Marxists thinkers did not have unlimited influence over decision making. As corresponding with his pragmatic style, Lula sought not to illegitimate the international system.

Brasília's foreign policy was thus not consumed by leftism. A division of the foreign policy into three parts kept the hardliners of the left at bay.³⁷⁰ The division can also be looked as a method for keeping the regime's coalition satisfied. The party's left wing was delegated responsibility for regional and South-South issues. Marco Aurélio Garcia, Lula's foreign policy adviser from 2007, was appointed leader for the first group. The latter group was led by Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães, Itamaraty's Secretary General until 2009 when Antonio de Aguiar Patriota replaced him. The first two are considered as being hardliners of the left. This made parts of the foreign policy strongly leftist.³⁷¹ Yet, issues of economic and long-term national interests were left to Amorim and the career diplomats of Itamaraty. Lula's own ideas and beliefs also shaped Brasília's course in foreign affairs. His decision-making influence was strengthened during the presidency.³⁷² The president's pragmatic personality oversaw the three parts and used it as podium for increasing Brazil's reputation and role on the international stage.

³⁶⁷ Cason and Power, "Presidentialization, Pluralization, and the Rollback of Itamaraty," 129.

³⁶⁸ Jack and Lapper, "Brazil overrides Merck patent on HIV drug"; Associated Press, "Brazil to break Merck AIDS drug patent."

³⁶⁹ Dauvergne and Farias, "The Rise of Brazil as a Global Development Power," 911.

³⁷⁰ Burges, "Brazil as Regional Leader," 56; Visentini, "The Brazil of Lula," 24.

³⁷¹ Kozloff, "Wikileaks Cables Portray a Different Side of Brazil's Lula da Silva"; Burges, "Brazil as Regional Leader," 55.

³⁷² Cason and Power, "Presidentialization, Pluralization, and the Rollback of Itamaraty," 128.

6.3.3 The PT's Support of Dilma

Three barriers of support can be identified before Dilma took office as president. As we took notice of in the previous chapter, Dilma started her less radical political career in the PDT. The party has its background in Getúlio Vargas' ideas, a dictator that Brazilians have a hate and love relation to. PDT describes itself as a social democratic political party. It can thus be made the assumption that the party shares some values with the PT as they both are leftist parties.

Yet, as we have also noticed, politics in Brazil is rather complicated. On one hand, the PDT forged a local alliance with the PT in Rio Grande do Sul. On the other hand, the PDT opposed Lula in the 2002 and 2006 elections.³⁷³ However, Dilma had left the party by this time. Rousseff changed her party loyalty when the local alliance between the PT and the PDT broke before the turn of the century. Dilma was offered to continue as State Minister of Energy under the PT's flag.³⁷⁴ The problem is that it was suggested Dilma changed party loyalty in order to keep her job. By following this logic, members of the PT could question Dilma's ideological stand. The PT has traditionally required high commitment from its members and does not favor "political converters".³⁷⁵ This challenged Dilma's presidency as skepticism was sown.

Secondly, Dilma rose fast within the party's ranks. She became noticed by Lula as a sharp mind during her efforts to draw up energy policy in during the 2002-presidential election. This earned her a post as energy minister, a surprising move as the campaign leader of the group was expected to get the title. Over time, hard work and corruption scandals made Dilma come closer to Lula. As key members in the PT were removed, Lula turned to Dilma to fill the vacuum. Dilma became therefore the Chief of Staff in 2005.

Dilma found herself positioned among the highest ranking members of Brazil's executive branch by becoming a senior aide to Lula. The fast rise in the party's hierarchy signalized trouble. Some groups became jealous about her fast track rise.³⁷⁶ Dilma's rise was grounded in handpicking rather than voting because of Lula's admiration, and her distance from the corruption scandals. Additionally, Lula had a close relation to Dilma. The father-daughter relation between Lula and Dilma proved to be yet another potential source of jealousy and rivalry within the party as well.

³⁷³ Rohter, *Brazil on the Rise*, 261-262.

³⁷⁴ Reid, *Brazil: The Troubled Rise of a Global Power*, 159-160; Rohter, *Brazil on the Rise*, 262.

³⁷⁵ Reid, *Brazil: The Troubled Rise of a Global Power*, 147.

³⁷⁶ Rohter, *Brazil on the Rise*, 277.

Thirdly, Dilma's political characteristics made members within the PT worry about her candidacy.³⁷⁷ This had to do with her in some sense boring personality instead of having a populist and inspiring character. To be on personal levels with the voters is important in Brazil. Dilma had in addition never run for a public office position. Concerns were raised if a person that had never held elected office would be able to control a coalition of more than ten parties. Moreover, Dilma had little experience of being in the spotlight. She had instead managed campaigns and written candidate policy papers before Lula's persuaded her.

Despite of three concrete challenges to begin with, Dilma became Brazil's first female president. However, several efforts of power challenging took place throughout her presidency. Jealousness and dismantling support can for instance be seen as the reason behind the replacement of José Eduardo Dutra. He was the president of the PT and an ally of Dilma, who got replaced by Rui Falcão, the vice president, in 2011.³⁷⁸ Although Dutra supposedly resigned due to health issues,³⁷⁹ Falcão was closely connected to two of Dilma's rivals in the power hierarchy of the PT; Delúbio Soares and José Dirceu. The latter person was Lula's earlier Chief of Staff. He was also viewed as Lula's successor. However, both fell due to corruption scandals during Lula's first period. And in November 2013 Dirceu was finally sentenced to jail.³⁸⁰ Power rivalry or not, Falcão put an early horn in the side of Dilma in his inauguration speech: 'In 2010, everything was on behalf of Dilma... Now it's everything for the Workers Party'.³⁸¹ This suggests tensions within the party from Dilma's inauguration, and maybe a call for policy changes.

The PT's support of Dilma continued therefore to be a source of challenge through the presidency. We saw previously that her corruption crusade created political enemies. Some of the enemies came from the PT. Moreover, Dilma's personality and leadership style continued to generate worry. For instance, seven ministers were sacked by Dilma in her first year as president.³⁸² The acts might suggest an intrusive president. The claim's rightfulness is strengthened because Dilma was described as a determined and goal focused president. She had a reputation of being a strict and boring technocrat with a big temper and great political commitment. As a result, Dilma became infamous for making ministers upset and howling. In cases where policies were not followed up or significant efficiency was not found, Dilma

³⁷⁷ Rohter, *Brazil on the Rise*, 264.

³⁷⁸ Bonin and Lima, "Dutra anuncia saída, e Rui Falcão deve assumir presidência do PT."

³⁷⁹ Ibid.

³⁸⁰ Reid, *Brazil: The Troubled Rise of a Global Power*, 149.

³⁸¹ Rohter, *Brazil on the Rise*, 277.

³⁸² Reid, *Brazil: The Troubled Rise of a Global Power*, 161.

would go behind the back of the ministries to deal directly with the subordinates. This suggest that Dilma was less cooperative than Lula

The tactic of going behind the backs was not received well by party and coalition members.³⁸³ Hence another source of conflict is found. Moreover, Dilma's acts of decelerating growth due to an overheating economy and growing inflation, generated unpopularity among individuals in the PT's ranks.³⁸⁴ This had to do with unpopular policy choices, such as limiting the minimum wages' rise and reducing government spending. However, the acts revealed presidential decisiveness. And Dilma showed decisiveness to act by forcing resignations of cabinet members that in most cases were connected to corruption scandals. By lacking the charisma and popularity, small scandals could destabilize her government. Dilma responded therefore quickly and decisively. This gave her increasing popularity among Brazilians, and historically great approval polls.

President Rousseff followed up on popular party policies. For instance, a cut in the tax on personal income was conducted, and the money level of Bolso Família was raised by ten percent.³⁸⁵ Although this reveals cases of solidarity policies by helping the poor individuals, the changes might have been implemented with the years' elections in mind. Yet, her government implemented from its early start what can be defined policy instruments. Examples are reduction of electricity tariff and exemption of tax in basic food products.

Reforms were also implemented to please the coalition's right-centered parties. For instance, the cost of labor saw decrease in payroll taxes. Dilma defended this by saying: 'This is important because we don't want to penalise those who employ people'.³⁸⁶ Even so, critics came from several sources. For instance, the opposition in the National Congress criticized much of the policies by identifying them as sources of low growth and rising inflation.³⁸⁷

State intervention and centralization of power suggested a socialistic domestic policy profile. Yet, several Janus-faced controversies occurred despite the socialistic profile. The environment can be called a victim for progress and economic growth. Dilma pushed actively for the building and completing of several dams situated at the Amazon basin. Issues of human rights were other victims. Indian tribes became displaced, and working conditions for hired laborers was poor.³⁸⁸ The latter factor escalated into onsite strikes and violence. Thus

³⁸³ Reid, *Brazil: The Troubled Rise of a Global Power*, 160.

³⁸⁴ Rohter, *Brazil on the Rise*, 273.

³⁸⁵ Gallegos, "Brazil's President Is Running Scared, Bloomberg View."

³⁸⁶ Leahy, "FT Interview."

³⁸⁷ Jornal do Brasil, "Aprovação de Dilma é fruto de "medidas progressistas," afirmam aliados."

³⁸⁸ Romero, "Amid Brazil's Rush to Develop, Workers Resist."

one can say that with progress come sacrifices. One of the sacrifices was ironically workers' rights; rights that the PT had early sworn to defend.

Strikes took not only place around dam projects. Public workers sought higher pay and better career prospects through waves of strikes from May 2012.³⁸⁹ While the group had enjoyed wage increases during Lula, Dilma had failed to do the same. Because the group has always been an important support base, party concerns found place. Other important relations were also in trouble. For example the social movements of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender rights have traditionally enjoyed good relations with leaders of the political left. The group saw a significant increase in their rights during the era of Lula. This was also the case early in Dilma's first presidential period. Dilma supported the struggle against homophobic practices. However, Dilma stepped down and suspended sex education material which was viewed containing anti-homophobia material.³⁹⁰ On one hand, the act jeopardized Dilma's and the PT's popularity within the groups. On the other hand, it was an important act in order to keep the parties' coalition operational. Yet, Dilma paid old debts by defending and supporting the criminalization of homophobia in the 2014-election campaign.³⁹¹

Dilma's government also persuaded what can be viewed liberal economic policies. Privatization is one good example. It is also in stark contrast to Marxism and state ownerships. And the sale of infrastructure concessions on road and rail was for example emphasized by Dilma: 'We want partners from the private sector of any origin'.³⁹² The somewhat liberal market policies created tensions from left-wingers as it did with Lula.

Dilma's friendly approach to Washington was a case of controversy within the PT. The seemingly closer approach to Washington was met with disagreements among left wingers' ranks. The US is not a popular country in the region because Washington has several times violated Latin American state's sovereignty. Moreover, the region's many left oriented factions looks at the US's embrace of capitalism and liberal economic policies as exploitation and abuse of the poor.

However, the bilateral relation between the United States and Brazil has been peaceful and cooperative. Washington has needed Brasília's support in order to achieve aspects of its

³⁸⁹ Barrucho, "Brazil strikes headache for President Dilma Rousseff."

³⁹⁰ BBC, "Brazil sex education material suspended by President."

³⁹¹ Folha de São Paulo, "Após debate, Dilma defende criminalização da homofobia"; Globo, "Após debate, Dilma defende criminalização da homofobia."

³⁹² Leahy, "FT Interview."

foreign policy agendas,³⁹³ and vice versa. Moreover, trade, scientific cooperation, and security are examples of issues that have connected the countries tighter together. Nonetheless, Brasília's relation to Washington has been a balancing act between cooperation and competition. Hence taking a stand against the Americas' hegemonic is a popular move in the region.

Even so, the PT continued to influence the foreign policy. For instance, Dilma's condemnation over Israel's military activities on the Gaza Strip might have been an effort to please hardliners of the left. This has to do with the group's view on the conflict and support of Palestine. And Dilma kept large parts of Lula's ministers. Her government differed first and foremost by adding more women to the government. As the foreign policy course saw continuation with adaptations, President Rousseff continued to emphasize multipolarity. Moreover, Brasília's foreign policy was still left under strong party influence. Marco Aurélio Garcia was kept as a special foreign policy advisor. This signalized a path of continuity of what has been termed 'parallel diplomacy'.³⁹⁴ The term describes a foreign policy highly influenced by presidential advisers, politicians, and party ambitions. Hence party influence prevailed. Furthermore, Dilma also appointed the previous Secretary General of the Ministry of External Relations, Antonio de Aguiar Patriota as Minister of External Relations. However, Dilma grew weary of Patriota and replaced him on a later stage with Luiz Alberto Figueiredo, an individual Rousseff was much more fond off.³⁹⁵ Eduardo dos Santos became the new Secretary General of Itamaraty.

6.3.4 Lacking Party Support, a Source of Foreign Policy Changes?

According to Hermann, the domestic political system is depended on two premises in order to affect a given state's foreign policy: a change in the domestic system, and that the change influence a given government's foreign policy.³⁹⁶ A change in the domestic system does not necessary mean a structural adjustment. The domestic system can trigger change if its politicians do not support policies, or work against the state leader in a democratic state. If this is the case, a coalition can be build against the leader. As a result, lacking support make it harder for the state leader to govern. It also forces the leader to focus on methods for gaining support.

³⁹³ Hakim, "Two Ways to Go Global," 154; Lima, and Hirst, "Brazil as an intermediate state and regional power," 33.

³⁹⁴ Ricupero, "Foreign policy after Lula," 5.

³⁹⁵ The Economist, "Freelance diplomacy."

³⁹⁶ Hermann, "Changing Course," 10-11.

I made *lacking party support* a third variable. Its hypothesis state that the PT's weaker supportiveness of Dilma caused foreign policy change because domestic political struggles took much of her time. Findings suggest that the hypothesis is right. It seems likely that party individuals might have affected Dilma's presidency. Lula's and Dilma's different party backgrounds formed their party members' support before the inauguration. Lula was the PT's indispensable leader. He was more popular than the party. Moreover, he was central in founding the PT. Dilma became on the other hand a party member when a local state alliance broke. Her background of changed party loyalty created tension and suspicions about her political stand. Dilma's close relation to Lula, and fast rise within the party ranks, was in addition a source of jealousy, rivalry, and flawed support. And Dilma's lacking political experience and her somewhat boring personality made members worry about her candidacy.

Furthermore, cases revealing lack of support followed Dilma throughout her presidency. Yet, Lula met also opposition from party members during his presidency. Tension came primarily from leftist hardliners. This was most notably caused with the partly continuation of FHC's liberal economic policy and cooperation with the IMF. Moreover, considerable challenges were not confronted adequately or approached at all. And several implemented domestic reforms were not favored by members of the PT. There were also individuals that had hoped for a more radical Brazil. Critical voices were therefore raised. As a result, members broke away from the party. Others were forced to leave as corruption scandals found place. Yet, there were also former hardliner Trotskyites like Andre Palocci that turned to moderation and pragmatism. Former hardliners within the party shared Lula's vision of globalization as a phenomena Brazil could not say yes or no to.³⁹⁷ And the aftermath of the corruption scandals made Lula freer.

It seems a more supportive Workers Party made it easier for Lula than Dilma to lead the country as presidents. Although Dilma was not a highly unpopular president without support, collected data suggest that she struggled more than Lula with support. President Rousseff's personality combined with some unpopular political choices, Janus-faced controversies, and a great number of strikes were also sources of dissatisfaction. Dilma met many challenges out of her control. However, several of the tests were had its background in her government's political decisions. This can present on one hand a reason for why Dilma gave far more attention to domestic issues rather than international affairs. On the other hand, priorities were identified as domestically. Improvement of the country's health and education

³⁹⁷ Reid, *Brazil: The Troubled Rise of a Global Power*, 145.

system was high on the list. So was reducing poverty and improving the infrastructure. All four can be viewed as important socialist goals in order to drive a country out of poverty and ensure progress in development. In addition, the high placed agenda goals could also be viewed important due to the hosting of the World Cup in 2014 and the Olympic Games in 2016. The importance of avoiding negative reviews and show that Brazil can arrange big international events might have influenced President Rousseff to prioritize domestic issues. Moreover, Dilma was little interested in issues of foreign affairs according to Marcus Vinicius Freitas: ‘Rousseff doesn’t like foreign policy and Brazilian presidents historically don’t pay attention to it because it doesn’t bring votes’.³⁹⁸ This might explain why only two out of forty-two pages of Dilma’s campaign manifesto in 2014 was dedicated to foreign policy.³⁹⁹ Dilma’s lacking interests of foreign affairs was recurring source of foreign policy change in all the interviews I conducted.

How the leaders cooperated and delegated work made a large difference in their support. As a president, Lula was a delegator strongly disliking policy details and paperwork. He was highly dedicated to improve the lives of Brazil’s population. Lula wanted to implement large changes. However, he was realistic about what he could do and not do. Brazilian politics can be metaphorical viewed as rough water. Lula revealed himself as a great navigator. He focused on dealing with big decisions. Findings suggest that Dilma was on the other hand decisively and intrusive. Moreover, she was strongly detailed and goal focused. Despite of having a great political commitment, she lacked Lula charisma and was viewed as a boring technocrat with little will for consensus. Her personality suggests that cooperation was harder with Dilma than with Lula.

The term *lulismo*, coined by Lula’s former spokesman André Singer, is crucial in order to understand how Lula found support and governed efficiently. Lulismo offers a theory about the changes the PT went through before and during the 2002-presidential campaign.⁴⁰⁰ The changes signalized a paradigm shift for the PT. Moreover, it explains Lula’s reconciliation path of combining parts of FHC’s economic policies with strong distributive party policies while maintaining good relations with conservative actors. The approach created a model of conservative modernization in which the state put considerable efforts in helping the country’s poor, while not affecting the established economic order negatively. Lula is located in the center of the theory. He is portrayed as a man capable of bridging the

³⁹⁸ Downie, “Rousseff’s Angry U.N. Speech Signals Brazil’s Shift on the World Stage.”

³⁹⁹ Zanini, “Foreign Policy in Brazil.”

⁴⁰⁰ Werneck, “Cientista político André Singer explica sua tese sobre o lulismo.”

political world of left and right. Lula showed this ability early by attending The World Economic Forum in Davos and a World Social Forum in Porto Alegre. By attending them both, his pragmatic style with feet in both camps sent a message to the two worlds of rich and poor. Hence the central element of understanding Lula's support is lulismo; Lula's trumping personal power over the PT's collective power, which was made possible first and foremost due to his charismatic personality and popularity.

Although lulismo is deeply linked to Lula's charisma, the PT did not form a political cult embedded on Lula's personality. Nor did Lula ask to be its almighty leader: 'Lula has never sought to shape the PT to perpetuate his personal legacy'.⁴⁰¹ It can therefore be claimed that Brazil witnessed a following of lulismo after Dilma's election. This has to do with a continuation of the former president's policies. However, the problem was that Dilma lacked Lula's charismatic personality and pragmatic approach.

Lula did not disappear after Dilma's succession as president. He continued his involvement in politics. Lula's popularity made him remain a highly powerful actor within the PT. Thus it might look like Rousseff stayed as a puppet within the party despite of being the country's president. This has to do with Lula's influence as he pulled many of the party's strings. Even though he stayed out of politics for a period because of cancer, his influence was not challenged or questioned. This was especially the case during the 2014-presidential elections campaign, where Lula was active for securing Dilma votes.⁴⁰² And with the help of Lula, Dilma won re-election. Critical voices questioned if Dilma could have won a second period without his support. One can thus yet again question the support of her candidacy. Nonetheless, Lula's high involvement in the PT could undermine Rousseff's role as president. Party member might have questioned her influence and who is really in command. Thus it might have been harder to assume responsibility. Moreover, the president's power and influence was potentially weakened.

Nonetheless, the PT's ideology influenced Brazil under both presidents through reforms and introduced social programs. In cases of foreign affairs, Brazil became strongly influenced by the PT from 2003 to 2014. No Brazilian parties have ever dominated the foreign policy so strong according to my interviewees. Marco Aurélio Garcia got especially powerful. He operated independently from Itamaraty with almost absolute power in regional issues. This made Latin America the most affected issue of foreign policy affected by the PT. As a result, Brazil sought closer ties to leftist regional countries.

⁴⁰¹ Samuels and Zucco Jr., "Lulismo, Petismo, and the Future of Brazilian Politics," 153-154.

⁴⁰² MerocPress, "Dilma with Lula da Silva's magic, re-elected in rich-poor divided Brazil."

It was therefore in foreign policy issues that the party's ideology and policy became most visible. This led both presidents to seek a South-South strategy, an approach corresponding with Marxist thoughts. An ideological continuation of Lula's foreign policy was largely secured by keeping several individuals of Lula's ministers and staff. According to my interviewees, the foreign policy got copied without authorization from Dilma. It was no need for her authorization because of disinterest.

Even so, changes occurred. Although findings suggest that the PT's members were more supportive of Lula, it is hard to uncover if and to what degree the PT's support of Dilma caused a cool down of activism and foreign affairs activities. Lacked support can surely be a reason for why Dilma's Brazil was less active. Her presidency was full of domestic struggles. Dilma might have been forced to withdraw from the international scene as party struggles stole much time. Yet, other individuals could have carried on.

Dilma's friendly approach and increased bilateral activities with Washington was controversial within the PT. The closer approach met disagreements among left wingers' ranks. The NSA scandal that caused bad bilateral relations must thus have been a relief. Not only did it cause a drop in the activity level, it also made Dilma highly critical of the United States. The view suited several leftist party members. Yet, although the espionage scandal must take much of the blame, forced change due to lack of party support might as well influenced the US-Brazil relation. It can be the case might that the anti-American leftist wing gained more influence. As a result, a coalition could have pushed for a change in the right moment.

However, the act could also have found place to boost Dilma's popularity. Few regional leaders have damaged their reputation by standing up against Washington. Nationally it was a strategic choice to hold Washington at distance due to the election in 2014. A trip to Washington would have made her look weak and submissive. By cancelling and standing up, Dilma took a principled position few other state leaders dared to take. Several states around the globe were affected by the scandal, though few were as outspoken as Brazil. Brasília expressed its displeased view on the highest level of diplomacy.

The drop in diplomatic activities between Brazil and the United States made the former ambassador to Washington, Rubens Ricupero, warn about ideology influence on the foreign policy.⁴⁰³ He is not alone to criticize Brasília's approach on Washington and the PT's influence. For example, Roberto Abdenur accused Brasília out of ideological reasons for

⁴⁰³ Downie, "Rousseff's Angry U.N. Speech Signals Brazil's Shift on the World Stage."

ignoring great opportunities to strengthen its bilateral tie with Washington. Although the relations had been good, it could have grown much stronger according to Abdenur.⁴⁰⁴ The critic came after his retirement as ambassador in Washington. Hence he had good insight and experience behind the statement. However, although Lula's Brazil presented an anti-American rhetoric in several occasions, Brasília did not want to distance itself from Washington. Brasília wanted to establish a strong bilateral relation.⁴⁰⁵ As leftist hardliners like Dirceu supported this approach, the question of whether the PT influenced Dilma's approach to Washington remain highly open.

Another domestic actor that has traditionally influenced Brazil significantly through bureaucratic influence is Itamaraty. By looking at the institution influence, we well take another approach on domestic struggle actors in order to explain changes.

6.4 Bureaucratic Politics: Bureaucratic Influence and Foreign Policy

Itamaraty has the first line of representing Brazil abroad. The bureaucratic institution has therefore the primary responsibility of conducting foreign relations with other states. The institution's role is to maintain diplomatic relations with foreign states, international institutions, and organizations. It also assists the president in foreign policy formulation.

Itamaraty is a big institution with many thousands employees. At the top we find the Minister of External Relations. The cabinet officer, who is appointed and dismissed by the president, is an individual with the responsible for the general administration of Itamaraty. The individual is also responsible to formulate, implement, monitor and evaluate Brazil's foreign policy. The Secretary General is the second person in command. This person is a former career diplomat with the responsibility for all foreign policy operations and administrative issues. He or she takes over the control of Itamaraty when the Minister of External Relations is abroad.

The two leaders are the most important individuals in Itamaraty's structure. The institution is organized in several departments under them. One has for instance European, African, Human Rights, and International Organizations departments. The many departments can imply an inner struggle for influence on the course of Brazil in for instance what to focus on; South America, Africa, or ties with EU. Yet, as already expressed, actors are expected to follow their bureaucratic positions and policies. We will therefore turn our attention to the Itamaraty's thoughts of national interests.

⁴⁰⁴ Burges, "Brazil as Regional Leader," 55.

⁴⁰⁵ Spektor, *18 Dias*.

6.4.1 An Elite Institution's Conception of National Interests

The name Itamaraty comes from the time when Brazil took the steps from being an Empire to become a Republic in 1889. This was a period where José Maria Da Silva Paranhos Junior enjoyed great influence on Brazilian foreign affairs.⁴⁰⁶ Baron Rio Branco, which he is famously known as, is regarded as the father of Brazilian diplomacy.⁴⁰⁷ During his time as Brazilian Minister of External Relations, Brazilian foreign policy was formed under the idea of unified nationality rather than representing a political fraction's ideology. Hence a hypothetical start of Brazilian foreign policy continuity can be identified. And since Baron Rio Branco was considered a great statesman after considerable diplomatic achievement and living in Rio de Janeiro's Palace of Itamaraty, the Ministry of External Relations became known as Itamaraty.

Reforms following in the Twentieth Century further consolidated Itamaraty's influence on Brazilian foreign policy. One of the most significant changes came in 1966. The role of Itamaraty's Secretary General was strengthened as the organization was given greater independence from the Brazil's federal government.⁴⁰⁸ Changes due to the end of the Cold War also affected Itamaraty as Brazil has faced new challenges and demands. This gave the institution greater decision-making influence.⁴⁰⁹

Itamaraty has enjoyed long term relative autonomy and great degree of domestic legitimacy. The institution has therefore been able to form Brazil's foreign policy throughout time and across different regime types. As a result, Brazilian foreign policy has certain traditional principles and goals. These can be regarded as national interests in foreign affairs. In the centre stands Itamaraty's grand vision of Brazil as a grandiose country.⁴¹⁰ Due to its richness and geographical size, Itamaraty views Brazil as a country destined for greatness. However, the destiny idea is also embraced by other Brazilian institutions.⁴¹¹ Hence it is not an idea that only Itamaraty embraces. Nonetheless, Brazil is a country without great military strength. The Ministry of External Relations has therefore given preference to economic diplomacy in its pursuit of fulfilling Brazil's destiny.

The lack of military strength and incentives has made Itamaraty embrace a defensive position on diplomatic approach. Moreover, non-aggressive principles as defending

⁴⁰⁶ Puntigliano, "Going Global," 31; Burges, "Brazil as Regional Leader," 53-54.

⁴⁰⁷ Reid, *Brazil: The Troubled Rise of a Global Power*, 245.

⁴⁰⁸ Puntigliano, "Going Global," 32.

⁴⁰⁹ Ibid., 50-51.

⁴¹⁰ Reid, *Brazil: The Troubled Rise of a Global Power*, 241; Montero, *Brazilian Politics*, 118.

⁴¹¹ Montero, *Brazilian Politics*, 119.

sovereignty, supporting universalism, seeking downscaling of conflicts by peaceful mediation, paying high respect for international law, pacifism, supporting non-intervention and neutrality are all traditional core principles for Brazilian foreign policy.⁴¹² Brazil seeks to be everyone's friend. This has to do with internal codes and attitudes. Brazilian diplomats practice *jeito*,⁴¹³ an ingenious method of bargaining over disagreements. By finding compromises in the belief that everyone is on good terms, differences are non-existing, and all actors seek the same goal. Put into practice, Brazilians thinks there is always a way out of a conflict. The country takes therefore rarely sides as Brazil seeks to be everyone's friend.

An approach like this can backfire Itamaraty's principles as values can be found themselves in conflict. Core beliefs can thus be vague defined in practice and be dependent on context. Nonetheless, Brazil has fought in a very few numbers of wars since its independence. Even though it participated on the Allies' side at the later stages of the Second World War, we have to look back to the Nineteenth Century to find the only major wars Brazil fought.⁴¹⁴ This is a unique when taking into the mind that the country shares borders with ten states. An emphasis on multilateralism and international organizations is therefore strong. This is especially the case of Brazilian post-Cold War foreign policy. After the wall fell down, organizations became identified as tools to gain influence in a globalized world.⁴¹⁵

However, the international role of Brazil is complex because of its history, culture, and the many global events that have affected Brazil.⁴¹⁶ The legacy of colonialism, poverty, low development, and slavery has shaped Brazil by making its population of cultural diversity. Because of its size, the country is a multiregional state with noticeable provincial differences. Yet, Brazilians view themselves as Brazilians rather than smaller national groups. It is a country of multiculturalism, not multinationality. This has made a national identity of uniqueness. Even so, Brazilians from the different states view each other differently. And the elites of Brazil have looked at the country to be a part of the West on religious and cultural grounds.

⁴¹² Lima and Hirst, "Brazil as an intermediate state and regional power,"; Rohter, *Brazil on the Rise*, 247; Montero, *Brazilian Politics*, 129-130; Tickner, "Rising Brazil and South America," 369-370; Reid, *Brazil: The Troubled Rise of a Global Power*, 243; Vigevani et al., "O papel da integração regional para o Brasil."

⁴¹³ Rohter, *Brazil on the Rise*, 34.

⁴¹⁴ Ibid., 240.

⁴¹⁵ Puntigliano, "Going Global," 35.

⁴¹⁶ Reid, *Brazil: The Troubled Rise of a Global Power*, 242.

6.4.2 Itamaraty's Influence under Lula

A process of breaking down Itamaraty's monopolistic influence began during FHC's presidency. Lula continued on FHC's decentralization of Itamaraty's power.⁴¹⁷ A good example of this is the strengthening of CAMEX, an institutional unit focusing on trade policy. This forced Itamaraty surrender parts of its decision-making influence.

A decrease of Itamaraty's power does not necessarily lead to a loss in its bureaucratic influence over foreign policy. Lula's international expansion and focus on international affairs corresponds with Itamaraty's vision of a grandiose country destined to become a powerful actor. Several interviewees pointed out that Itamaraty was in fact the main architect behind the strategy. Larry Rohter has termed Lula's foreign policy as a quest of 'becoming a serious country'.⁴¹⁸ The French president is rumored to call Brazil an unserious country to not be counted on after a fishing dispute in the 1960s.⁴¹⁹ The remark's authenticity is irrelevant as the constructed identity left deep remarks in Brazilian political life. Over the decades, Brazil tried to break with the image. Lula succeeded by drawing international attention and recognition. Hence at least one national interest objective was supported.

Lula's Brazil went firmly against Washington's invasion of Iraq. The act was interpreted as a breach of international law.⁴²⁰ Little gain compared to costs was found, and Washington's justifications were viewed suspiciously. The position was therefore based on principles and conviction. We can thus identify another example that suggests Itamaraty's values prevailed. Furthermore, a peaceful conflict mediation approach was chosen by interfering in Iran's nuclear program. And when a serious situation involving Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela threatened the region's stability, Brazil stepped in as a mediator and solved the case.⁴²¹

The mediator role was also followed up when Evo Morales, Bolivia's president, decided to nationalize Bolivia's natural gas industry in 2006.⁴²² Lula did not choose a confrontation approach on La Paz despite national interests were at stake. Hence we are again given the impression that Itamaraty's principles prevailed. Non-aggressive principles were used to handle the crisis. However, the approach can also reveal that political ideology interests affected the foreign policy. Ideological belief and sympathy might as well explain

⁴¹⁷ Cason and Power, "Presidentialization, Pluralization, and the Rollback of Itamaraty," 121.

⁴¹⁸ Rohter, *Brazil on the Rise*, 223-249.

⁴¹⁹ Larry Rother, *Brazil on the Rise*, 223.

⁴²⁰ Amorim, "A Política Externa Brasileira no governo do Presidente Lula (2003-2010)," 217.

⁴²¹ Burges, "Brazil as Regional Leader," 58.

⁴²² Cason and Power, "Presidentialization, Pluralization, and the Rollback of Itamaraty," 133.

Lula's recognition of Bolivia's nationalization right. Moreover, both countries were governed by parties on the political left. Hence ideology prevailed. This is clearer when the opposition threatened to destabilize Bolivia in 2008. Lula decided to allude with the use of military force.⁴²³ This can make us believe that ideology trumped national interest. And since national interest principles like defending sovereignty and non-intervention, conduct a pacifistic line, and neutrality was partly ignored, it seems like Itamaraty's influence was weaker than the PT's. However, we saw in the previous chapter that the PT was given responsibility over regional issues. We are therefore able to explain the approaches by foreign policy divisions.

Brasília's approach to crises in Bolivia is one of many questionable cases that made some of Itamaraty's prominent retired ambassadors criticize Lula's foreign policy. Rubens Ricupero claimed for instance that the foreign policy was hijacked by individuals' and party ideas.⁴²⁴ We have already seen that the PT strongly influenced the foreign policy. The party also influenced Itamaraty through forced changes. Itamaraty's system of admittance was for instance transformed by downplaying foreign languages knowledge. There was also an increase in public examination numbers.⁴²⁵ This was done to make it possible for Brazilians with different ethnic and social backgrounds become employees of Itamaraty. The change was meant to portraying Brazil's diversity abroad,⁴²⁶ and to sustain the increased activism. It is still early to say what significance the reforms had on Itamaraty. Research suggests that the implemented changes will likely influence the foreign policy when the newcomers have rose in the hierarchy.⁴²⁷

The admittance reform led to a significant rise in diplomatic representation abroad. Higher demand of employees was caused by Lula's expansion. Itamaraty earned on this by making the institution grow. With increased size, it is reasonable to think that the institution gained more power. Yet, the reforms were in some ways an inside coup from the PT. Itamaraty is a prestige institution which is often looked up on to be aristocratic. Some of its employees parade picturesque last names from the country's early history. Put on the edge, these individuals are sworn to protect the county from the outside evil that is responsible for many of Brazil's problems. This opens up for an interesting interpretation: Itamaraty's growth can be viewed as a class struggle. By making admittance more open, the institution became a better representation of the population. The lowering down on the admittance made

⁴²³ Roett, *The New Brazil*, 133.

⁴²⁴ Ricupero, "Foreign policy after Lula," 5.

⁴²⁵ Faria, Lopes and Casarões, "Itamaraty on the Move," 473

⁴²⁶ Ibid., 475

⁴²⁷ Ibid.

thus the Itamaraty's prestige somewhat weakened. This had to do with shrunken values of exclusiveness.

The PT's increasing influence created tenses between the government and Itamaraty. For instance, Guimarães forced ideological thoughts on the institution. His anti-imperialist writings became mandatory readings.⁴²⁸ Thus political thoughts and ideology started to creep into Itamaraty. A watershed in the conflict can be noted in 2007. An unsigned manifesto claimed that promotions were based on political belief and not professional experience and merit. This caused fierce discussions.

Although the foreign policy was influenced by members of the PT and its ideology, Lula maintained and used Itamaraty's professionalism and knowledge for what it was worth.⁴²⁹ Moreover, the strategic position in formulation and implementing foreign policy was given back to Itamaraty.⁴³⁰ In addition, the cooperation between Lula and Amorim has been recognized as an important source behind Brazil's rise on the global arena. Lula's Minister of External Relations was also largely visible. Amorim travelled more than Lula. He visited 101 countries and conducted 467 visits during his time as head of Itamaraty.⁴³¹

However, there were cases where Lula decided not to listen to Itamaraty's expertise. For instance, the Foreign Ministry warned about Lula's fast-tracking approach of raising Brazil's international image and building domestic pride.⁴³² The approach's fast expansion and seek of a permanent UNSC seat proved unsustainable as he reached too far. The result was a setback for Brazilian foreign policy. And although the previous mentioned three parts diversion of Brazil's foreign policy was successful,⁴³³ it had a significant drawback on regionalism. While Brazil's global role was highly active, the same cannot be said about its regional role. Regional states demanded therefore substance and not only words. Lula stayed on his course. This made regional states turn their attention to Venezuela, which could challenge Brazilian leadership.

Lula held a strong belief in cooperation through international organizations. An emphasis on multilateralism was therefore shared. Moreover, Lula's Brazil did not use military power. Hence the principle of pacifism was largely kept. However, neutrality was at

⁴²⁸ Burges, "Brazil as Regional Leader," 55; Kozloff, "Wikileaks Cables Portray a Different Side of Brazil's Lula da Silva."

⁴²⁹ Almedia, "O Brasil como ator regional e como emergente global," 15.

⁴³⁰ Visentini, "The Brazil of Lula," 24.

⁴³¹ Amorim, "A Política Externa Brasileira no governo do Presidente Lula (2003-2010)," 227.

⁴³² Rohter, *Brazil on the Rise*, 245.

⁴³³ Burges, "Brazil as Regional Leader," 56.

stake because of Lula's involvement in foreign affairs. Take involvement in the Iranian nuclear program for instance. And his diversification strategy and forging of ties to the Global South makes neutrality questionable. On the other hand, the presidents of Israel, Palestine, and Iran visited Brazil within a period of two weeks in 2009.⁴³⁴ This signals a great degree of neutrality due to the three countries relationship to each other. In addition, this suggests that universalism was present in large degree. The idea of universalism can be viewed as unconditional receptiveness towards all countries. Brasília held diplomatic ties to both developed and developing nations. This act reveals that universalism was highly present.

Yet, Lula stood by some defined leaders in several occasion. Lula's relation to Hugo Chávez is a great example of tight bounds. Itamaraty's influence can in fact be found weakened due to growing presidential diplomacy. Presidential diplomacy was a new development in Brazilian politics after the end of the Cold War. Brazilian presidents were involved in diplomacy at a low level before the administrations of Cardoso and Lula.⁴³⁵ Traditionally, presidents travelled little. They were left to summits and state visits in context where the outcome was largely already arranged and agreed on. However, this was not the case with Lula. He traveled more than sixty times in his first term. In total he travelled to 83 countries and conducted 259 visits.⁴³⁶ Lula thus continued, although increased, Cardoso's diplomatic presidential visibility. Even so, this does not mean that Itamaraty's diplomats were put on the sideline. When the frequencies of travels abroad were increased, the degree of contact with other foreign officials on Brazilian territory was decreased. The act gave therefore room for also other actors. In addition, a withdrawal from presidential visibility could give critics the claim that Brazil's foreign relations were at stake. Lastly, Lula's extensive travelling can be explained by his strong interests in foreign travel and global popularity.⁴³⁷

6.4.3 Itamaraty's Influence under Dilma

There are several factors pointing to that Itamaraty regained much of its traditional decision-making influence in Dilma's first presidential period. Because Dilma paid much attention to domestic affairs, she had little time for foreign affairs. As a result, Brazil's first female president travelled far less than her predecessor. In addition, she had a less visible role on the

⁴³⁴ Amorim, "A Política Externa Brasileira no governo do Presidente Lula (2003-2010)," 235.

⁴³⁵ Cason and Power, "Presidentialization, Pluralization, and the Rollback of Itamaraty," 121.

⁴³⁶ Amorim, "A Política Externa Brasileira no governo do Presidente Lula (2003-2010)," 227.

⁴³⁷ Cason and Power, "Presidentialization, Pluralization, and the Rollback of Itamaraty," 128.

global stage. It is therefore reasonable to think that Itamaraty was given much of the responsibility over Brazil's foreign policy.

Dilma was not a confrontation leader like Lula had been. While Lula was a careful supporter of the anti-Western hegemonic coalition, Dilma seemed to place Brazil more in a neutral position. Additionally, Rousseff was silent when other countries denounced Gaddafi's violations against his own population.⁴³⁸ And Brazil abstained from voting over the authorization of a no-fly zone in Libya when the case was up in the UNSC.⁴³⁹ Hence it can be suggested that the principle of neutrality saw emphasis.

The same can be said about the principles of pacifism, support of multilateralism, and peaceful conflict mediation. For instance, when Paraguay witnessed what Dilma termed a coup d'état, Brasília sought peaceful conflict mediation by using 'carrot and stick'.⁴⁴⁰ However, a pro-democracy strategy was revealed when Paraguay was suspended from Mercosur. By doing so, Brasília gave a clear answer to anti-democratic developments. And despite Dilma decided to put Iran out in the cold, an emphasis of universalism can also be found.

Brasília approach on Gaddafi's Libya can be viewed as a continuation of Lula's South-South power diversification strategy by not jeopardizing the diplomatic ties between the two countries. Hence one can believe Dilma inherited Lula's and Itamaraty's grand vision of an influential Brazil. This is evident as the president has followed broadly the same politics of Lula. Yet, Dilma choose a lower profile role and less emphasis. Visionary emphasis was therefore smaller.

The role of Marco Aurélio Garcia continued to highly influence Brazilian foreign policy to a leftist direction. By enjoying the decisive voice over regional foreign affairs, Brasília did not always follow what Itamaraty viewed as national interests. One good example of this claim is Bolivia and the treatment of Roger Pinto. A constrain in Dilma's relation to Itamaraty can be identified in August 2013. One year before, a Bolivian opposition senator had taken refuge in Brazil's La Paz embassy. The background was political persecution according to Roger Pinto, the asylant. Although Brazil granted him asylum, he was not allowed to leave Bolivia because Morales' refusal of granting Pinto a safe-conduct out of Bolivia. And because Morales is an ally of the PT, no actions were conducted.⁴⁴¹ Yet,

⁴³⁸ Elizondo, "Latin America's sudden silence on Gaddafi."

⁴³⁹ Borger, "Libya no-fly resolution reveals global split in UN."

⁴⁴⁰ Bull, "Paraguay: et elite-kupp i Brasils bakgård."

⁴⁴¹ The Economist, "Freelance diplomacy."

after 455 days, Brazil's chargé d'affaires in La Paz was worried about Pinto's health. He was therefore escorted him to Brazil. Even though the Brazilian opposition hailed the act, the PT and Dilma disapproved the act strongly. Rumors have it that Dilma got surprised and provoked by the embassy's employees.⁴⁴² Party interests seemed yet again to trump national interests. The act cost Antonio Patriota his job, despite of his claim of having no knowledge of the act. Patriota was replaced by Luiz Alberto Figueiredo.

Figueiredo seemed not to be the right man to restore Itamaraty's traditional influence. Instead of attending a peace conference, he decided to visit Natal and participate in an opening ceremony of a football stadium.⁴⁴³ Furthermore, he turned out to be an invisible minister in public debates. However, it is not certain that Patriota misses his old job. He spent half of his time talking to students, academics, and NGOs.⁴⁴⁴ Patriota found himself engaging the civil society in debates in order to convince the population of the importance of foreign affairs and its costs. Although there are few ministers that have spent as much time in debating, it was necessary acts. Public outrage around money usage had made Itamaraty unpopular. The minister found himself defending Brazilian foreign policy much of the time in order to get support for its costly vision of Brazil. This is remarkable because 78 percent of Brazilians supported how Lula had conducted his foreign policy.⁴⁴⁵

Spending time debating suggests a lack of institutional trust from the president, who herself implemented budget cuts. The cuts put restrictions on foreign affairs activities. The main challenge for Itamaraty's shrunken budget was thus to convince Dilma about foreign policy's importance. President Rousseff was little interested. Funding of overseas activities became therefore a big problem for Itamaraty. Budget cuts combined with the growth of Itamaraty's size compromised the operation of embassies and consulates. The situation was so critical at the end of Dilma's first period that future electric bills went an unclear future ahead.⁴⁴⁶

Almost all of my interviewees shared the frustration of budget cuts. They all agreed that Itamaraty's performance was jeopardized. Cuts made simple things like travelling to meetings and giving consular services challenging. Moreover, aspects like cooperation projects and cultural events became harder to arrange. And employee salaries became

⁴⁴² Cruz et al., "Dilma Fires Foreign Minister After Bolivian Senator Flees to Brazil."

⁴⁴³ Stuenkel, "Brazilian foreign policy."

⁴⁴⁴ Stuenkel, "Brazil's top 10 foreign policy challenges in 2014."

⁴⁴⁵ Amorim, "A Política Externa Brasileira no governo do Presidente Lula (2003-2010)," 239

⁴⁴⁶ Mello, "Itamaraty diz não ter como cobrir despesas."

delayed. One interviewee put the situation on the edge by saying Itamaraty was operating in a survival mode.

Dilma's foreign policy can be characterized as passive and hesitant compared to Cardoso's and Lula's foreign policies because Itamaraty was given little attention in Rousseff's first term.⁴⁴⁷ No presidents have valued Itamaraty as low in recent Brazilian history. Hence it seems that Itamaraty's influence was weak. It failed to reveal its importance to the public and the president. Yet, it is hard for the general public to see how their lives are affected by the foreign policy. Thus it is also hard to see the consequences of budget cuts. Hence debates and a visible Minister of External Relations were crucial to stop the dismantling of the active and expanding foreign policy. This was hard as cases of controversies jeopardized the institution's reputation. For example, critical voices were directed at Itamaraty when a former congressman, who had been twice convicted of embezzlement, was made ambassador to Angola.⁴⁴⁸

Reformations also affected Itamaraty in the era of Dilma. An extreme process of centralizing decision-making is identifiable. As a result, Brazil's Minister of External Relations and his ministry was given little independency. This resulted in a less visible international role. Changes at the top of Itamaraty can also explain why the institution suffered setbacks under Dilma. Garcia and Patriota were both highly involved in South American foreign affairs. This made interests conflicts visible. While Garcia favored friendship with international political allies, Itamaraty favored neutral long-term interests.⁴⁴⁹ Brazilian foreign policy went through a clash of interests. Itamaraty was bound to lose the fight because of Dilma's disinterest. Additionally, Itamaraty was weakened because one of Itamaraty's two most important individuals was less skilled than his predecessors. Eduardo dos Santos lacked Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães Neto's competence when it comes to bureaucratic influence and budget negotiations.⁴⁵⁰ Itamaraty was therefore delegated less resources in Dilma's first term.

6.4.4 Bureaucratic Influence, a Source of Foreign Policy Changes?

The thesis fourth and last variable, *bureaucratic influence*, presented another approach to analyze a potential domestic struggle over decision making. By looking at Itamaraty's influence, we took a bureaucratic approach. The cool down of activism and diplomatic

⁴⁴⁷ Stuenkel, "Could Marina Silva put Brazil's foreign policy back on track?."

⁴⁴⁸ Leitão, "Novo embaixador em Angola é ex-deputado com 2 condenações".

⁴⁴⁹ The Economist, "Freelance diplomacy."

⁴⁵⁰ Stuenkel, "Brazilian Foreign Policy."

activities can suggest increased influence to Itamaraty. Lula's foreign policy was remarkably in many ways. In some sense it gave Brazil a key role out of nothing. Although it finally saw to fulfill Brazil's long waited destiny, it somewhat rocketed Brazil in the center with fast developments over short time. The country found itself in unusual roles. And its expanding approach over short time broke with the several traditions of continuity. By stopping the expansion and in some returning Brazilian foreign policy back to normalization, we can be led to believe that Itamaraty's influence grew under Dilma. Since we discovered earlier a contrasting degree of domestic constraints between the two presidencies, a rollback of presidential power over foreign policy can have found place.

However, the hypothesis that a more influential Itamaraty led to a cool down of activism and diplomatic activities seems wrong. Findings suggest that Itamaraty was more influential during the era of Lula. Although research point to that the institution influenced the foreign policy under Dilma, it had less maneuver space because of funding issues. Hence it seems like the changes was a result of a less influential Itamaraty.

Yet, it is hard to measure the bureaucratic influence of an institution. I have tried by identifying some principles that can be connected to Itamaraty. The problem is that while Lula for instance in some cases defended sovereignty as a principle, the emphasis was gone in other cases. And although several of Itamaraty's principles of national interests have been identified in Dilma's foreign policy, literature findings suggest that the president gave the institution limited attention and influence. And even though values of Itamaraty can be found in the foreign policies, this does not necessary mean institutional influence. Actors can share the institution's values of national interests.

Even so, both presidents implemented changes that weakened Itamaraty's influence. Lula gave for instance more power to CAMEX, and opened the institution for a wider perspective of Brazilians. The latter combined with further reforms made political ideology creep into the institution. This threatened Itamaraty's political non-alignment policy. And because the approach saw continuation under Dilma, one might think that the institutions independency was further weakened. Moreover, an extreme process of centralizing decision-making found place. This gave Itamaraty less maneuver space.

Presidentialization is mentioned as a factor that can shed light over Itamaraty's influence. Foreign policy was conducted largely at the Ministry of External Relation's in Brasília before presidentialization's entry. The introduction gave greater influence to the president in decision-making. Thus it jeopardized Itamaraty's influence and Brazilian foreign policy continuity. Lula showed large interest in foreign policy and wanted to make much in

little time since he had a defined time to rule. However, Itamaraty is used to think strategies and interests in a long-term perspective. Thus an unbalance occurred. Lula let Itamaraty's experience and values influence Brazilian foreign policy. Yet, he also adhered to political ideology. Hence, even though political ideology affected the foreign policy, Itamaraty's concept of national interests had a say in decision-making. Even so, in cases of where interests were caught in crossfire, political ideology seems to have prevailed.

The approach was also used under Dilma. However, President Rousseff showed limited interest in diplomacy and foreign affairs. This explains why she was little visible on the global scene of international politics. More importantly, this led to a low influence for Itamaraty. As little attention was given to international issues, Brazilian foreign policy might have experienced a cool down of emphasis. The combination of a president with little interests for international affairs and severe budget cuts greatly limited Itamaraty's influence and maneuver space.

Dilma's disinterest affected greatly how Itamaraty worked. There were fewer decisions to be made because of her lacking interest according to several of the interviewees. One individual claimed that since there was nothing to decide, there was nothing to do. Itamaraty continued with their daily tasks and waited for a more interested president. A good indication on Itamaraty's influence can therefore be how the presidents supported and used the institution. Without support, the institution is somewhat left alone. Brazilians are not much aware of the world outside. Nor does the population have much knowledge in how they are affected by the foreign policy. As a result, interests are small. The claim is strengthened by the fact that issues of foreign affairs are most visible in political campaigns. Here cases are presented negatively in an effort to criticize opponents. Thus the concept is more used as a tool of attack rather than a tool of defense. Hence the reveal of benefits are not emphasized. This has been the practice of political campaigning in Brazil for a long time.⁴⁵¹ Sérgio Amaral, former ambassador in London and Paris, put it as simple as this:

‘Our exposition to the outside world is small. The closest border to São Paulo is 2,000 kilometers away. When I lived in Geneva, it was a few minutes bike ride to another country. We have always been inward-looking. Foreign issues have never been perceived as relevant. This has been changing slowly because of globalization and the

⁴⁵¹ Zanini, “Foreign Policy in Brazil.”

advance in communications, but in an electoral campaign, the space for that is still small. It is not in the agenda of the population'.⁴⁵²

This gives us the following conclusion: without presidential support, there are few to stand up for Itamaraty. Lula maintained and used Itamaraty's professionalism, experience, and knowledge to give Brazil a global key role. Yet, Lula also trumped the institutions views in several cases. Dilma put little efforts into confirming to the world that Brazil had become a "serious country". The president's lacked interest resulted in little attention and public support for Itamaraty. The Minister of External Relations was thus forced to focus on debating rather than conducting foreign affairs. Because Itamaraty missed individuals with bureaucratic influence, the institution's budget concerns were not given much thought. Since actors that are less favored by the president struggles to get attention, we are left to believe that the institution lost influence under Dilma. The loss of influence suggests foreign policy changes as Itamaraty struggled to keep the wheels going due to budget cuts. Dilma's foreign policy was therefore more passive and hesitant when compared to Lula.

7. Conclusion

The object of identifying priorities and goals in Brazil's foreign policy from 2003 to 2010 was approached by looking into four areas of foreign policy conduction. Starting with the global level, Brazil's involvement in Haiti and the Iranian nuclear program were two remarkable foreign policy developments. The two cases are important because issues of peace and security were previously dominated by the West. Brasília's active role in conflict moderation marked a symbolism of multipolarity. Moreover, the cases are a good example of Brazil's global strategy. Brasília actively sought an international key role with an overhanging goal of becoming a permanent member of the UNSC. Cooperation was tried with both traditional and non-traditional partners, whereas a strategy of power diversification by favoring cooperation with the Global South was high on the agenda. Bilateral and multilateral South-South alliances like the BRIC and the IBSA were forged to diminish dependence to developed states. In addition, a leadership role was created by encouraging dialogues between developing states.

Continuing with the regional level, the active moderating role was also visible in cases of regional security. Latin America was important for several reasons. Regional backing was viewed as springboard for Brazil's desired international leadership role. Regional emphasis

⁴⁵² Zanini, "Foreign Policy in Brazil."

was also linked to economic growth, trade diversification by countering Washington's regional influence, and to preserve regional superiority. Mercosur and regional integration efforts saw therefore great emphasis. However, several cases reveal regional resistance against Brasília's pursuit of a global key role and regional leadership from neighboring states.

The diversification strategy did not seek direct confrontations or bad relations with developed state. On a bilateral level, good relation and cooperation was kept as trade and cooperation grew between Brazil and the United States. Yet, several cases of disagreements and concerns are found. The relation could therefore be described as 'warm though obscure'.

Lula's diversification strategy built controversial friendly ties with authoritarian regimes. Human rights' credibility in Brasília's foreign policy was challenged as Lula visited several authoritarian states. Moreover, the president found himself sided with authoritarian state leaders. As he spoke warm of them, and the Brazilian delegation at the UNHRC became notorious for ignoring human rights abuses, human rights were not given much attention. Yet, human rights have many meanings. It was interpreted as uneven development by for instance promoting health issues in the fight against global poverty and hunger in the era of Lula.

The four areas were somewhat conducted differently during Dilma's first presidential period. Dilma's administration presented a continuation of the South-South strategy for Brazil's global role. Cooperation with the Global South was sought as power diversification was followed. And despite of suggested skepticism, the BRICS and the IBSA was important aspects of Brazil's struggle for multipolarity. A global key role was sought by setting the agenda of RWP and giving attention to Internet governance. However, the global role saw withdrawals throughout Dilma's period. Brasília did not follow up debating on RWP. Furthermore, less diplomatic representation abroad, rumors of closing down embassies, reduction in the admission of new diplomats, the evading away on key international security issues, and revaluations of diplomatic relations suggests that Dilma's Brazil did not seek a global key role. The developments jeopardized Brazil's ambitions for a permanent UNSC seat, weakened its Global South leadership role, and damaged Brazil's credibility.

A leadership role was not sought clearly despite of being the regional economic powerhouse. Domestic unrest and challenges added up with regional integration skepticism can suggest that Dilma was skeptical to regional cooperation. Yet, regionalism was an important foreign policy area because of economic development and security issues. Latin America was thus a highly emphasized area for Brasília foreign policy.

The bilateral tie between Brasília and Washington saw a deepening in the two first years of Dilma's presidency. Long lasted disputes were settled as cooperation grew. Hence

the bilateral relation was also emphasized. However, espionage scandals challenged prosperity and sustainability. The relation went from being good and fruitful to bad and cold as Dilma went from being Obama's friend to become an antagonist.

Lastly, the topic of human rights went through transformations as early rhetoric and developments suggest changes. Moreover, Dilma distanced herself from authoritarian regimes and Brazil's previously abstentions on human rights resolutions. Nonetheless, the relation to Cuba suggests a Janus-faced approach on human rights in foreign affairs. And Dilma was committed to civil and political rights in some cases, while she in other cases gave the rights lesser attention.

By comparing the four areas in the two presidencies, we can ask how the foreign policies of the two presidents differ. Because changes were defined as developments that signalize distinctions, several changes can be identified. Although few changes can be found on Brazil's approach to Latin America, several changes are found in Brasília's global role. While Brazil's global actor role was drawn to the center of international politics in the era of Lula, findings point to that Dilma favored a less active and expanding foreign policy. Brazil tried to influence international politics by becoming an agenda setter. And despite both presidents wanted a permanent seat in the UNSC, the two presidents gave Brazil a different visible roles. The leadership role Lula sought was turned away by Dilma. Although the diversification strategy saw continuation, it was adjusted to become somewhat undefined. It became for instance less controversial by reconsidering diplomatic ties. Moreover, findings suggest that Lula focused largely on socio-economic human rights, while Dilma gave civil and political rights more attention. Hence a difference in the interpretation and practice of human rights is suggested to have found place. A difference can also be found in the bilateral relation with the US. Brasília and Washington have traditionally had a peaceful and cooperative bilateral relation on one hand. On the other hand, it has balanced between cooperation and competition. The relation was neither warm nor cold in the era of Lula. However, it went from being increasingly warm to cold during Dilma's presidency.

The research left us with three central changes: 1) A move from expansion and activism to cool down and agenda setting in Brasília's global role. 2) A rhetorical drift of emphasis in human rights from economic, social and cultural rights to civil and political rights. 3) A changed US-Brazil relation from distant and fruitful cooperation to warm and friendly ties before ending up cold. By putting them together, changes was defined as a cool down of activism and foreign affairs activities.

In order to explain why changes occurred, we looked first at the system level. It was suggested that the structural constraints had led to changes because Brazil has been strongly influenced by the outside through centuries. This led to the thought that changes could be explained by Brazil's relative power and position in the international structure. A reason for change was thus believed to be found in a less powerful Brazil after Dilma's inauguration. Power was defined as economic purchasing capability, and measured by six indications of economic activity. The first variable, *economic power*, was therefore formed under the hypothesis that a less economically powerful Brazil was forced by the international structure to conduct a cool down of activism and foreign affairs activities.

A comparison with fourteen states was conducted under the assumption that Brazilian foreign policy is determined by its position to other great powers. Taken the average scores of all six indicators together, Dilma 'wins' 3-2 over Lula on a global level and 3-0 on a regional level. The comparison of average values suggests that Brazil was stronger under Dilma than Lula despite the growth rate in percent was stronger, the account balance was more positive, and the external debt stocks level was lower in the era of Lula. Hence we can say that Brazil's power did not decline after Dilma's inauguration. This suggests that the hypothesis was wrong. Added up with the fact that Brazil's GDP was larger during Dilma's presidency, despite of slower growth, we can say that Dilma's Brazil was more powerful.

However, even though Dilma's Brazil is suggested more powerful, the tide turns when looking at the international structures' developments from 2003 to 2014. The structure's distribution of power counts as well to explain changes. Lula was given a unique window of opportunity which offered good conditions for a global key role; the emerging of new markets and trade partners, increased demand of commodities, economic decline for developed states, and US legitimacy challenges. These four developments opened up for a prospect of changed economic polycentrism and a move of power from the G8 to the G20 as the world took steps away from unipolarity towards multipolarity. Hence the international structure was somewhat tailor-made for Lula's expansion and diversification policy. This was not the case for Dilma's Brazil. While Brazil's economy had a stagnating growth, the United States' economy was on the path of recovery. Emerging states got therefore less manoeuvre space, while China's growth saw deceleration. Moreover, the Syrian uprising and the pro-Russian unrest in Ukraine drafted the conjunctive of a new Cold War scenario with Western states on one side, and Russia, and in some cases also China, on the other side. This might have led Brasília to seek a more cautious and less visible role. Hence developments in the international structure can explain foreign policy changes.

Even so, several critical voices can be raised against the conclusion of economic power. Critics can be placed in defining power as economic purchasing capability and the usage of the six indicators to measure Brazil's power. While the concept of power has several definitions, some of the economic indicators are less important. The focus tends to be on GDP size and growth rates when measuring economic power in IR. Hence the thesis' conceptualization of economic power can be attacked on the selection of economic indicators. Additionally, a given state's economic health can be measured in several ways. Not only is it possible that we would get a different result if other indicators were used, findings could also have shown another conclusion. The same goes with the selection of states. And the calculated average values are not measured over an equal distributed period. Lula is represented by eight years. Data of Dilma covers only three years. In addition, structural IR theories are used to explain foreign policy when developments are analyzed over long time. Eleven years of data can be recognized as insufficient data. And although a state has great power, the actor might not know how to use it or maximize the gains out of it. Hence the ability to mobilize and use capabilities is crucial aspects the use of power. The attempt to quantify economic power can therefore be viewed controversial.

Even so, the troubling economy made Dilma turn her attention to domestic issues rather than foreign policy decisions. Lula took office in a period with great optimism, unemployment, and patience. Dilma faced another scenario with severe economic challenges, unsolved bottlenecks, and high employment. Untouched domestic challenges from Lula's presidency can question the sustainability of Lula's foreign policy. A strong consensus claim that his foreign policy course could not go on forever. Hence changes were inevitable. Thus the economical situation can be connected to changes. Since domestic challenges threatened the sustainability, the international structure might have influenced the foreign policy on a small scale.

Interviewees agreed that economic difficulties caused changes in Brazil's global role. However, they also put a lot of the blame on Dilma's disinterest of foreign affairs as well. Brazil's economic power can thus in some senses explain changes. A diverse economy, domestic economic continuity and reforms, demands from the global economy, and a changed international structure were all important factors behind the growth and decline of Brazil's power. The factors explain why Brazil's economy grew rapid under Lula, and why it struggled under Dilma. Although collected data sets reveal Dilma more powerful, literature findings paint the image of an economically weakened Brazil. Hence the first variable has presented a partly covered explanation for foreign policy changes.

The second variable for answering why changes took place, *emotions*, was formed out of the hypothesis that emotions from early childhood to 1985 caused foreign policy changes. As a result, we looked at if the individual leader could have influenced Brazil's foreign policy. Dilma's different rhetorical emphasis of human rights was used as a background case because it is connected to the cool down of activism and foreign affairs activities. This has to do with Dilma's less willingness to cooperate with authoritarian states, which led to decrease in diplomatic activities and activism. To answer why she was reluctant to cooperate, we look into their backgrounds in search of emotions that could explain foreign policy changes. By doing so, a psychobiography of the leaders was approached.

We found several examples of experiences that could have left deep emotions in the two leaders. More importantly, there are many examples of experiences that have led to different emotions for the leaders. For a start, Lula and Dilma experienced a completely contrasting childhood. Lula came from a poor background. Dilma was raised up in a comfortable middle class environment. Lula had to work as a child to make his family survive. Dilma enjoyed a comfortable lifestyle of private school, servants, and piano lessons. Hence they were exposed to different challenges and struggles early. It is likely that this made them develop different emotions and perception of life.

Moreover, Lula fought for worker's rights while Dilma fought for political rights and revolution during the military dictatorship. The two represents therefore two different methods of resistance against the military regime. Lula was a worker and a state union representative. Dilma was involved in student movements against the regime. She was a member of a Marxist guerrilla. The experiences of poor livelihood, unemployment, poverty, lacking healthcare, poor social assistance, social inequality, and poor safety and rights for workers are all experiences that have probably developed into emotions that offer reasonable suggestions to why Lula interpreted human rights as combating poverty and hunger.

Although the experience of being hungry and poor must have been hard, the experiences Dilma went through seem worse because she was tortured for around twenty-two days. The experience might have made her hateful for dictators with little respect for human dignity. Hence her emotions have made it hard to cooperate with authoritarian states. Dilma has confirmed that she holds large sympathy for political prisoners. In practice, this led to a turnaround on Brasília's relation to Tehran, and reconsiderations of other diplomatic ties due to a more critical view on authoritarian leaders.

The military regime period's context influenced them both strongly. Lula got pushed into the Worker's Union because of the regime's crackdowns and bad handling of the

worker's demands. In a time where his life went up and down, Lula was transformed from a anxious and shy speaker into a national figure with several of thousands workers relying on his words. The audience loved him, and he loved the audience. The oxygen of publicity made him unafraid and he became the president that some identifies as the most popular Brazilian ever lived. In the case of Dilma, her fight for political rights can be suggested to be connected directly to the coup d'état. Dilma became radicalized at the school because of the school's leftist and military regime critical environment. Through participation in student politic groups she was served leftist thinking, which ignited regime criticism and a fight for political rights. Hence the regime influenced them both directly and left them with emotions.

However, it is difficult to prove directly that two individuals' emotions have affected Brazilian foreign policy. It is hard to claim that their views were formed during the period as the human mind is very complex. And there are examples of state leaders with horrific experiences that do not support human rights when given power. Nonetheless, it is also hard to think that the experiences did not affect them. Experiences shape what we are and become by producing emotions. Thus it seems very likely that experiences shaped them rather than the opposite. Because the Brazilian president has considerable power and resources to influence the foreign policy, the way was open for the individual leader to use his or her leverage in issues like human rights. Moreover, findings suggest that their backgrounds have influenced the foreign policies in other ways as well. Take for instance the extensive travels of Lula and his attendance in many international conferences. This gave him much publicity, close to a reflection of his union presidency role. Hence he followed up his previously activism level. And in the case of Dilma, Brazil's global role was turned to become a global agenda setter on for instance cyberspace rights.

We can say that it is very likely that Lula's and Dilma's emotions have influenced Brazilian foreign policy. Experiences and emotions were brought into politics by the individual leaders. Their backgrounds affected Brazilian foreign policy and became sources of change. The second independent variable has therefore presented a good explanation of why changes occurred. And my second hypothesis seems to be correct

Departing from the individual leader level, we arrived at domestic political contestation. The PT was identified as a potential source of policy change. Party members might have pressed for change by being less supportive of Dilma. By looking at the two presidents' support from the PT, the theoretical assumption was that great support signifies low level of disagreement and chances of coalition building against the president. Little support suggests vice versa. And while great support makes decision-making comfortable as

less time and resources are needed on debating and lobbying, little support makes governing far more challenging. The hypothesis was therefore that the PT's weaker supportiveness of Dilma caused foreign policy change because domestic political struggles took much of her time. This made *lacking party support* the third variable.

Findings reveal that both presidents met opposition from party members. Yet, collected data suggest that domestic political struggles had a stronger presence in the era of Dilma. First of all, changed party loyalty, fast hierarchical rise, and lacking political experience jeopardized the support of her presidential candidacy. Although she gained an upper hand and became president, cases revealing lack of support followed Dilma throughout her presidency. Findings suggest that her personality, unpopular political choices, controversies, and a great number of strikes caused dissatisfaction within the PT. Yet, Lula faced also opposition from party members during his presidency. Tension came primarily from leftist hardliners due to the continuation of liberal economic policy, cooperation with the IMF, lacking confrontation of considerable domestic challenges, and implementation of several un-favored party reforms. Additionally, some individuals had hoped for a more radical Brazil. As a result, members broke away from the party. Even so, Lula's starting point as president was softer than Dilma's start. He was the party's indispensable leader and a founding figure.

A source of big impact in the presidents' support can be found in their leadership style. Lula was a delegator with a strong dislike of policy details and paperwork. This made him focus on big decisions. Dilma was on the other hand strongly focused on details and goals. She was also described as a decisively and intrusive technocrat. More crucially, she lacked Lula's charisma. The term *lulismo* becomes here of great importance. Lula is portrayed as a man capable of bridging the political world of left and right. His pragmatic style with feet in both camps made cooperation easier. Lula followed a moderate reformist line that focused on reducing the country's epidemic poverty while not affecting the established economic order negatively. Dilma's continuation of the former president's policies made President Rousseff follow *lulismo*. However, Dilma lacked Lula's charismatic personality and pragmatic approach, two central factors of Lula's popularity. Moreover, as Lula continued to play a central role in the party after the end of his presidency, party members might have questioned Dilma's influence and who is really in command. This suggests it was challenging to assume responsibility and control.

Nonetheless, the PT's ideology influenced Brazil domestically under both presidents through reforms and introduced social programs. And internationally, Brazil became strongly

influenced by the party. According to my interviewees, there has never been a time in Brazilian history that a party has influenced the foreign policy so much. It was therefore in the foreign policy that the party's ideology became strongly visible. The phenomena found place under both presidents. It made Brazil seek diversification through a South-South strategy. An ideological continuation of Lula's foreign policy was largely secured by keeping several individuals of Lula's ministers and staff, and Dilma's dislike of foreign affairs. As she did not give the outside world much attention, Lula's foreign policy got copied and saw continuation without authorization from Dilma.

Yet, foreign policy changes occurred. Dilma's Brazil oriented itself closer to the United States for instance. Due to the PT's politically left orientation, it is strongly possible that members viewed the approach with disbelief. However, it is hard to conclude that party members were the source behind the approach's turnaround. There is a big difference between rhetoric and policy implementation in politics. Even though Lula held a strong anti-American rhetoric, he sought closer ties. And although findings suggest that party members were more supportive of Lula, it is hard to uncover if and to what degree the PT's support of Dilma affected the US-Brazil relation. However, it seems reasonable that changes were caused by party struggles that took much of Dilma's time. It might have been the case that Dilma was forced to stay home and focus on horse trading due to dissatisfactions. Yet, this is hard to prove as well, especially because the party got great decision-making influence. Even so, findings suggest that a more supportive Workers Party made it easier for Lula than Dilma to lead the country as presidents. Moreover, Lula had greater influence. And the aftermath of the corruption scandals further consolidated Lula's power. Although Dilma was not a highly unpopular president without support, collected data suggest that she struggled far more with support among the party's members. As a result, Dilma was subject to stronger levels of pressure, which might have caused her to turn away the attention away from international issues. Yet again, it is hard to prove this. Hence the third variable's contribution to the debate of what caused changes remains open. Although it cannot be proven, it is likely that party support led to foreign policy changes.

Bureaucratic influence was the fourth and last independent variable we looked into in order to explain why changes occurred. By doing so, we looked at Itamaraty's influence. This was done because a different degree of domestic constraints could be identified for the two presidents. Hence a factor that can affect Itamaraty's influence was present. Moreover, observations point to that Brazilian foreign policy went back to a state of normalization in Dilma's first period. Normalization was referred to as a larger embrace of principles that have

seen continuation by Itamaraty for several decades, and a less visible global actor role. Making the assumption that a rollback of presidential power over foreign policy found place due to a less active President Rousseff, and that the rollback gained Itamaraty, the hypothesis stated that a more influential Itamaraty led to a cool down of activism and diplomatic activities.

However, principles Itamaraty has emphasized over decades can be found in both foreign policies. It is thus hard to analyze Itamaraty's influence by basing the research on Itamaraty's concept of national interests. For instance, there are cases where Lula defended sovereignty strongly, while the principle was put on the sideline in others. And while several of Itamaraty's principles can be found in Dilma's foreign policy, findings suggest that President Rousseff gave the institution little attention. Hence the hypothesis seems to be wrong.

Even so, reformations made Itamaraty's influence weakened under both presidents as centralization of power challenged the institutions independency. Moreover, the increase in recruitment of employees jeopardized Itamaraty's traditional autonomy as the new members were trained to obtain the PT's ideology rather than serving the state. Thus political ideology started to influence the political non-alignment institution. Yet, one might say that Itamaraty's increase in size made it more powerful. However, the institution was dependent on strong bureaucratic influence in order to find support and exert its influence. This was less problematic during the era of Lula than Dilma. Although there were cases where Lula trumped Itamaraty's principles and Lula operated in a short-term perspective, Lula maintained and used Itamaraty's professionalism and experiences in order to give Brazil a global key role. Dilma did not because the president was less interesting in giving Brazil such a role. The two presidents had two differing interests in international affairs. This gave Itamaraty two contrasting influential roles.

Respect and attention from the Brazilian president is important in order to gain power and influence in Brasília. Actors close to the president and cabinet members are able to push through their visions and projects. Meanwhile, actors with little bureaucratic influence struggle to be heard. Itamaraty found itself in the latter position as even budget concerns were given seemingly little attention in Dilma's first presidential period. Although findings clearly suggest that Itamaraty's level of influence affected the foreign policy, it seems like the changes was a result of a less influential Itamaraty. Hence the hypothesis is wrong. However, a cool down of activism and foreign affairs activities is explainable by the combination of Itamaraty's large budget cuts and a disinterested president. The two factors greatly limited the

institution's influence and maneuver space as its capacity and availability to engage in international affairs saw a limitations. Thus it was a less influential Itamaraty that led to foreign policy changes. Itamaraty had failed to convince its importance as a tool for promoting the Dilma's interests.

Changes can be explained by five words: Dilma's disinterest over international issues. By giving foreign policy a metaphor of car, one can say that FHC built the car. Lula adjusted it and drove it. Dilma parked it. Yet, Dilma is not the only source behind changes. The thesis has proved that there are many sources that drive Brazilian foreign policy. Hence there are many factors behind changes in Brazilian foreign policy between Dilma and Lula. Moreover, several of the sources are connected. For instance, economic troubles affected Itamaraty's influence.

We have looked at four levels that proved to be sources of foreign policy change in different degrees. The system level explains changes partly. By defining and comparing power as economic purchasing capability, we were shown that Dilma's Brazil was stronger than Lula's Brazil. This went against my hypothesis and the logic of cool down by using economic power as indicator for foreign policy status quo. However, literature findings suggest that Brazil had far bigger economic problems during Dilma's presidency. And the international structure was less favorable for Dilma. Hence the international structure influenced Brazilian foreign policy by making a continuation of Lula's policy challenging. The variable can thus partly explain why Brazilian foreign policy changed.

The individual leader level is more successful in explaining changes. The research on emotions point to the fact that it is very reasonable to think that leaders' emotions influenced Brazilian foreign policy. Because the two leaders had different backgrounds which led to differing experiences and emotions, Brazilian foreign policy witnessed a cool down as Dilma choose not to cooperate with some authoritarian regimes.

It is harder to prove that the domestic political contestation level influenced Brazilian foreign policy. Lula was for sure much more popular than Dilma within the party. And Dilma's support was on several occasions under attack. However, one needs greater insight than what I have provided in order to clarify if the PT's weaker supportiveness of Dilma caused foreign policy change. Although I have failed to prove it, it is likely that domestic political struggles took much of her time. The lacking support forced Dilma probably to use more time on consolidating and legitimating her presidency. This might have made her stay more home than Lula. The third variable's explanation for foreign policy change remains therefore open.

The bureaucratic politics level can explain changes. Although my hypothesis was proven wrong, the variable reveals that Itamaraty suffered decreased influence because of budget cuts and a disinterested president. Itamaraty failed thus to convince Dilma about its importance. This made Brazilian foreign policy passive, which again led to a cool down of activism and foreign affairs activities.

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
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
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Appendix no.1: Brazil's Annual GDP Growth from 1990 to 2013




Appendix no. 2: Annual GDP Growth Comparison from 2003 to 2013

Country/Year	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Argentina	\$ 157	\$ 183	\$ 223	\$ 264	\$ 330	\$ 406	\$ 378	\$ 463	\$ 558	\$ 603	\$ 610
Brazil	\$ 552	\$ 664	\$ 882	\$ 1.089	\$ 1.367	\$ 1.654	\$ 1.620	\$ 2.143	\$ 2.477	\$ 2.249	\$ 2.246
Canada	\$ 888	\$ 1.018	\$ 1.164	\$ 1.311	\$ 1.458	\$ 1.543	\$ 1.371	\$ 1.614	\$ 1.779	\$ 1.821	\$ 1.827
Chile	\$ 78	\$ 101	\$ 124	\$ 155	\$ 173	\$ 180	\$ 172	\$ 218	\$ 251	\$ 266	\$ 277
China	\$ 1.641	\$ 1.932	\$ 2.257	\$ 2.713	\$ 3.494	\$ 4.522	\$ 4.990	\$ 5.931	\$ 7.322	\$ 8.229	\$ 9.240
France	\$ 1.848	\$ 2.124	\$ 2.204	\$ 2.325	\$ 2.663	\$ 2.924	\$ 2.694	\$ 2.647	\$ 2.863	\$ 2.687	\$ 2.806
Germany	\$ 2.502	\$ 2.816	\$ 2.858	\$ 2.998	\$ 3.436	\$ 3.747	\$ 3.413	\$ 3.412	\$ 3.752	\$ 3.533	\$ 3.730
India	\$ 618	\$ 722	\$ 834	\$ 949	\$ 1.239	\$ 1.224	\$ 1.365	\$ 1.708	\$ 1.880	\$ 1.859	\$ 1.877
Italy	\$ 1.570	\$ 1.799	\$ 1.853	\$ 1.943	\$ 2.204	\$ 2.392	\$ 2.186	\$ 2.127	\$ 2.278	\$ 2.092	\$ 2.149
Japan	\$ 4.303	\$ 4.656	\$ 4.572	\$ 4.357	\$ 4.356	\$ 4.849	\$ 5.035	\$ 5.495	\$ 5.906	\$ 5.954	\$ 4.920
Russia	\$ 430	\$ 591	\$ 764	\$ 990	\$ 1.300	\$ 1.661	\$ 1.223	\$ 1.525	\$ 1.905	\$ 2.017	\$ 2.097
South Africa	\$ 168	\$ 219	\$ 247	\$ 261	\$ 286	\$ 273	\$ 284	\$ 365	\$ 404	\$ 382	\$ 351
United Kingdom	\$ 1.944	\$ 2.298	\$ 2.412	\$ 2.583	\$ 2.963	\$ 2.792	\$ 2.309	\$ 2.408	\$ 2.592	\$ 2.615	\$ 2.678
United States	\$11.511	\$12.275	\$13.094	\$13.856	\$14.478	\$14.719	\$14.419	\$14.964	\$15.518	\$16.163	\$16.768
Venezuela	\$ 84	\$ 112	\$ 146	\$ 183	\$ 230	\$ 316	\$ 329	\$ 394	\$ 316	\$ 381	\$ 438




Appendix no. 3: Annual GDP Percentage Growth Rate Comparison

Country/Year	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Argentina	8,84	9,03	9,20	8,36	8,00	3,10	0,05	9,14	8,55	0,95	2,93
Brazil	1,15	5,71	3,16	3,96	6,10	5,17	-0,33	7,53	2,73	1,03	2,49
Canada	1,93	3,14	3,16	2,62	2,01	1,18	-2,71	3,37	2,53	1,71	2,02
Chile	3,96	6,04	5,56	4,40	5,16	3,29	-1,04	5,76	5,84	5,38	4,07
China	10,03	10,09	11,31	12,68	14,16	9,63	9,21	10,45	9,30	7,65	7,67
France	0,82	2,79	1,61	2,37	2,36	0,20	-2,94	1,97	2,08	0,33	0,29
Germany	-0,72	1,18	0,71	3,71	3,27	1,05	-5,64	4,09	3,59	0,38	0,11
India	7,86	7,92	9,28	9,26	9,80	3,89	8,48	10,26	6,64	4,74	5,02
Italy	0,15	1,58	0,95	2,01	1,47	-1,05	-5,48	1,71	0,59	-2,27	-1,93
Japan	1,69	2,36	1,30	1,69	2,19	-1,04	-5,53	4,65	-0,45	1,75	1,61
Russia	7,30	7,18	6,38	8,15	8,54	5,25	-7,82	4,50	4,26	3,44	1,32
South Africa	2,95	4,55	5,28	5,60	5,55	3,62	-1,53	3,14	3,60	2,47	1,89
United Kingdom	4,30	2,45	2,81	3,04	2,56	-0,33	-4,31	1,91	1,65	0,66	1,73
United States	2,81	3,79	3,35	2,67	1,77	-0,26	-2,80	2,53	1,60	2,32	2,22
Venezuela	-7,76	18,29	10,32	9,87	8,75	5,28	-3,20	-1,49	4,18	5,63	1,34




Appendix no. 4: Percentage of GDP in Current Account Balance Comparison

Country/Year	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Argentina	N/A	N/A	2,37	2,94	2,23	1,66	2,20	0,29	-0,41	-0,19	-0,79
Brazil	N/A	N/A	1,59	1,25	0,11	-1,70	-1,50	-2,21	-2,12	-2,41	-3,61
Canada	N/A	N/A	1,88	1,37	0,78	0,22	-2,94	-3,51	-2,76	-3,42	-3,21
Chile	N/A	N/A	1,16	4,63	4,31	-1,84	2,04	1,65	-1,22	-3,41	-3,42
China	N/A	N/A	5,87	8,55	10,11	9,30	4,87	4,01	1,86	2,62	1,98
France	N/A	N/A	-0,47	-0,56	-1,00	-1,71	-1,32	-1,27	-1,72	-1,54	-1,43
Germany	N/A	N/A	4,68	5,80	6,93	5,81	5,91	5,73	6,05	7,14	6,86
India	N/A	N/A	-1,23	-0,98	-0,65	-2,53	-1,92	-3,19	-3,33	-4,92	-2,62
Italy	N/A	N/A	-1,60	-2,46	-2,34	-2,73	-1,80	-3,30	-2,89	-0,26	0,97
Japan	N/A	N/A	3,72	4,01	4,86	2,93	2,89	3,96	2,14	0,99	0,69
Russia	N/A	N/A	11,05	9,33	5,55	6,26	4,12	4,42	5,11	3,53	1,63
South Africa	N/A	N/A	-3,45	-5,27	-7,00	-7,36	-3,99	-1,92	-2,35	-5,24	-5,85
United Kingdom	N/A	N/A	-2,46	-3,17	-2,40	-1,47	-1,60	-3,12	-1,26	-3,61	-4,26
United States	N/A	N/A	-5,69	-5,82	-4,96	-4,67	-2,64	-2,97	-2,96	-2,85	-2,39
Venezuela	N/A	N/A	17,22	14,42	6,94	10,19	0,69	2,24	7,71	2,89	N/A




Appendix no. 5: Total External Debt Stocks Comparison

Country/Year	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Argentina	\$ 161,12	\$ 165,69	\$ 128,19	\$ 119,06	\$ 120,99	\$ 122,99	\$ 127,74	\$ 120,79	\$ 132,74	\$ 133,04	\$ 136,27
Brazil	\$ 235,91	\$ 220,69	\$ 188,36	\$ 194,30	\$ 238,44	\$ 262,95	\$ 281,65	\$ 352,36	\$ 404,05	\$ 440,51	\$ 482,47
Canada	N/A										
Chile	N/A										
China	\$ 206,53	\$ 244,55	\$ 281,11	\$ 320,80	\$ 371,72	\$ 378,47	\$ 445,94	\$ 559,77	\$ 710,23	\$ 750,75	\$ 874,46
France	N/A										
Germany	N/A										
India	\$ 118,88	\$ 123,64	\$ 121,20	\$ 159,53	\$ 204,06	\$ 227,11	\$ 256,31	\$ 291,65	\$ 336,85	\$ 395,07	\$ 427,56
Italy	N/A										
Japan	N/A										
Russia	N/A										
South Africa	\$ 37,14	\$ 43,18	\$ 44,74	\$ 59,38	\$ 72,83	\$ 70,70	\$ 81,36	\$ 107,13	\$ 116,12	\$ 144,87	\$ 139,84
United Kingdom	N/A										
United States	N/A										
Venezuela	\$ 38,11	\$ 39,19	\$ 45,35	\$ 43,92	\$ 56,76	\$ 66,84	\$ 81,94	\$ 97,08	\$ 110,73	\$ 118,93	\$ 118,76



Appendix no. 6: Total Reserves, including Gold, Comparison

Country/Year	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Argentina	\$ 14,16	\$ 19,66	\$ 28,08	\$ 32,02	\$ 46,15	\$ 46,39	\$ 48,01	\$ 52,21	\$ 46,27	\$ 43,22	\$ 30,53
Brazil	\$ 49,30	\$ 52,93	\$ 53,80	\$ 85,84	\$ 180,33	\$ 193,78	\$ 238,54	\$ 288,57	\$ 352,01	\$ 373,16	\$ 358,82
Canada	\$ 36,27	\$ 34,48	\$ 33,02	\$ 35,06	\$ 41,08	\$ 43,87	\$ 54,36	\$ 57,15	\$ 65,82	\$ 68,55	\$ 71,94
Chile	\$ 15,84	\$ 16,00	\$ 16,93	\$ 19,40	\$ 16,84	\$ 23,08	\$ 25,29	\$ 27,83	\$ 41,94	\$ 41,65	\$ 41,09
China	\$ 416,20	\$ 622,95	\$ 831,41	\$ 1.080,76	\$ 1.546,36	\$ 1.966,04	\$ 2.452,90	\$ 2.913,71	\$ 3.254,67	\$ 3.387,51	\$ 3.880,37
France	\$ 70,76	\$ 77,35	\$ 74,36	\$ 98,24	\$ 115,49	\$ 103,31	\$ 131,79	\$ 165,85	\$ 168,49	\$ 184,52	\$ 145,16
Germany	\$ 96,84	\$ 97,17	\$ 101,68	\$ 111,64	\$ 135,93	\$ 138,56	\$ 179,04	\$ 215,98	\$ 234,10	\$ 248,86	\$ 198,54
India	\$ 103,74	\$ 131,63	\$ 137,82	\$ 178,05	\$ 276,58	\$ 257,42	\$ 284,68	\$ 300,48	\$ 298,74	\$ 300,43	\$ 298,09
Italy	\$ 63,26	\$ 62,39	\$ 65,95	\$ 75,77	\$ 94,11	\$ 105,65	\$ 131,50	\$ 158,48	\$ 169,87	\$ 181,67	\$ 145,72
Japan	\$ 673,55	\$ 844,67	\$ 846,90	\$ 895,32	\$ 973,30	\$ 1.030,76	\$ 1.048,99	\$ 1.096,07	\$ 1.295,84	\$ 1.268,09	\$ 1.266,85
Russia	\$ 78,41	\$ 126,26	\$ 182,27	\$ 303,77	\$ 478,82	\$ 426,28	\$ 439,34	\$ 479,22	\$ 497,41	\$ 537,82	\$ 509,69
South Africa	\$ 8,15	\$ 14,89	\$ 20,62	\$ 25,59	\$ 32,92	\$ 34,07	\$ 39,60	\$ 43,82	\$ 48,75	\$ 50,69	\$ 49,71
United Kingdom	\$ 39,55	\$ 44,34	\$ 43,59	\$ 47,04	\$ 57,27	\$ 53,02	\$ 66,55	\$ 82,36	\$ 94,54	\$ 105,19	\$ 104,42
United States	\$ 184,02	\$ 190,46	\$ 188,26	\$ 221,09	\$ 277,55	\$ 294,05	\$ 404,10	\$ 488,93	\$ 537,27	\$ 574,27	\$ 448,51
Venezuela	\$ 20,82	\$ 23,41	\$ 29,80	\$ 36,72	\$ 33,76	\$ 43,07	\$ 34,32	\$ 29,67	\$ 27,93	\$ 29,47	\$ 20,28



Appendix no. 7: Average Values of Economic Indicators

	Lula		Dilma	
	Global average rank	Regional average rank	Global average rank	Regional average rank
Annual GDP growth	9	1	7	1
Annual GDP growth %	7	4	9	4
Current account balance	9	4	10	4
Total external debt stocks	5	4	5	4
Total reserves	6	1	5	1
Balance	6	4	2	1

Appendix no. 8: Interview Questions in English

Brazil's global role (and the international structure)

- 1) Large amount of academic writings connects Brazil's rise as a key actor on the global stage with Lula's presidency. In short, what factors made it possible for Brazil to seek an international key role after 2003?
- 2) How did Brazil's global role change after the inauguration of Dilma Rousseff?
- 3) Why did Brazil's global role change?
- 4) Why and to what degree do you agree with the following statement: Dilma turned away from Lula's expanding and active foreign policy conduct because of economic decline? *Expansive* is referred to as a central global actor role and a sought of stronger diplomatic ties with non-traditional actors, while *active* is referred to the visible role of the Brazilian president in international issues.

The President's influence and the case of human rights

- 5) Brazilian presidents have in various degrees influenced Brazil's foreign policy. What elements of continuation from Lula's foreign policy did you experience in Dilma's first presidential period? By referring to *elements*, I wonder if you experienced changes in emphasis, strategies, values, or if for instance new ideas were introduced.
- 6) President Rousseff signalized another foreign policy approach on human rights issues shortly before taking office in a highly cited interview with the Washington Post. Dilma gave hints of reviewing diplomatic ties with states connected to human rights violations. In what way did Dilma follow up this rhetoric?
- 7) How did the foreign policies of Lula and Dilma differ on issues of human rights?
- 8) Why did the two respective foreign policies differ on human rights?

The decision-making influence of the PT

- 9) The PT, the Brazilian Workers' Party, governed at the federal level in a coalition government from 2003. How did the PT's ideology influence Brazilian foreign policy from 2003 to 2010? By using the word *influence*, I wonder how much power the Workers' Party had in forming Brazil's foreign policy according to its political ideology.
- 10) In what way did the PT's ideology influence Brazil's foreign policy under Dilma's first presidential period?
- 11) Which of the two presidents' foreign policies did the PT influence most?
- 12) Why did the PT have a stronger leverage in one of the foreign policies?

Itamaraty's influence in foreign policy decision making

- 13) Itamaraty has traditionally held an independent role with a somewhat monopolist influence over Brazil's foreign policy. How did Itamaraty influence Brazilian foreign policy in the era of Lula? By using the word *influence*, I wonder how much power the institution had in forming Brazil's foreign policy according to its concept of national interests.
- 14) How did the election of Dilma affect Itamaraty's influence in foreign policy decision-making from 2011 to 2014?
- 15) In what way was your work affected by the election of Dilma?

Appendix no. 9: Interview Questions in Portuguese

O papel do Brasil no mundo (e a estrutura internacional)

- 1) Muitos acadêmicos relacionam a ascensão do Brasil como um ator-chave no cenário mundial com a presidência de Lula. Resumidamente, quais fatores possibilitaram ao Brasil buscar um papel chave internacionalmente após 2003?
- 2) Como o papel internacional do Brasil mudou após a posse de Dilma Rousseff?
- 3) Por que o papel internacional do Brasil mudou?
- 4) Responda em qual grau você concorda com a seguinte afirmação e justifique sua resposta: ‘Dilma se afastou da condução de política externa expansionista e ativa de Lula devido ao declínio da economia’. *Expansionista* é utilizado para designar a busca por um papel central internacional e ao estreitamento laços diplomático com atores não tradicionais. Já *ativo* se refere ao papel notável do presidente brasileiro em questões internacionais.

A influência do presidente e a questão dos direitos humanos

- 5) Os presidentes brasileiros têm influenciado a política externa em diversos graus. Quais elementos de continuidade da política externa de Lula você presenciou no primeiro mandato de Dilma? Por elementos, eu me pergunto se você experimentou mudanças nas ênfases, estratégias e valores, ou se, por exemplo, novas ideias foram introduzidas.
- 6) A presidente Dilma Rousseff sinalizou outra abordagem sobre a política externa em matéria de direitos humanos, um pouco antes de assumir o cargo, em uma famosa entrevista com o Washington Post. Dilma deu indícios de uma possível revisão de laços diplomáticos com estados ligados a violações dos direitos humanos. De que forma Dilma deu seguimento a esta retórica?
- 7) Como se diferem as políticas externas de Dilma e Lula em relação às questões de direitos humanos?
- 8) Por que as duas respectivas políticas externas se diferenciam em relação aos direitos humanos?

A influência do PT na tomada de decisões

- 9) O PT, o Partido dos Trabalhadores, tem governado no âmbito federal em um governo de coalizão desde 2003. Como a ideologia política do PT influenciou a política externa brasileira entre 2003 e 2010? Ao usar a palavra *influência*, eu gostaria de saber qual a importância do Partido dos Trabalhadores na formação da política externa do Brasil de acordo com a sua ideologia política.
- 10) De qual forma a ideologia do PT influenciou a política externa brasileira durante o primeiro mandato presidencial de Dilma?
- 11) Entre os dois presidentes – Lula e Dilma, qual teve sua política externa mais influenciada pelo PT?
- 12) Ainda sobre a pergunta anterior, por que o PT teve mais influencia na política externa de um presidente que do outro?

A influência do Itamaraty na tomada de decisões

- 13) Itamaraty tem tradicionalmente mantido um papel predominante, com uma influência um pouco monopolista sobre a política externa do Brasil. Como o Itamaraty influenciou a política externa brasileira na era Lula? Ao usar o termo *influência*, eu me pergunto o qual a importância da instituição na construção da política externa do Brasil de acordo com o seu conceito de interesses nacionais.
- 14) Como a eleição de Dilma afetou a influência do Itamaraty na tomada de decisões entre 2011 e 2014?
- 15) De que modo seu trabalho foi afetado pela eleição de Dilma?

Appendix no. 10: Two Differing Interviews Transcribed

Q1

A1: Acredito que há duas dimensões que podem ser relevantes para explicar o papel internacional do Brasil.

A primeira dimensão, no âmbito internacional, está marcada pela desconcentração poder mundial, na direção de uma ordem multipolar. O que caracteriza esta nova multipolaridade é a maior diversidade histórica e de níveis de desenvolvimento entre os atores envolvidos; sua maior dispersão geográfica no globo; e a importância do peso regional dos principais atores. Ao lado das potências tradicionais do Norte global, dos EUA ao Japão, passando pelos países da Europa Ocidental e a Rússia, países emergentes, como o Brasil, a China, a Índia e a África do Sul, são hoje chamados a atuar como atores centrais nas questões geoconômicas e geopolíticas globais.

A segunda dimensão é doméstica e está relacionada aos avanços obtidos no Brasil nas últimas décadas, que fortaleceram nossas credenciais como uma sociedade moderna, democrática, pacífica, multiétnica, situada entre as maiores economias do mundo, socialmente mais justa e confiante em seu futuro.

As transformações no âmbito internacional, aliadas à acrescida importância econômica, política e diplomática do País, tornam inevitável uma maior presença brasileira no mundo.

A2: Foi um conjunto de fatores. O Presidente Lula e seu chanceler, Celso Amorim, de fato procuraram desenvolver uma política externa ativa e independente. Essa parte se deve a Lula. Entretanto, a repercussão dessa nova postura da política externa brasileira só foi tão grande porque a economia do Brasil vinha crescendo, a pobreza e a desigualdade caindo e o país tinha derrotado a hiperinflação. Tudo isso foi feito no governo anterior, de Fernando Henrique Cardoso. Além disso, o Brasil favoreceu-se de uma conjuntura econômica internacional muito favorável. Portanto, houve de fato méritos da decisão política de Lula, que não teria tido efeitos tão grandes sem a estabilidade e a base institucional criada pelo governo anterior.

Q2

A1: Não acredito que o papel internacional do Brasil tenha mudado. A política externa brasileira tem objetivos de Estado permanentes – muitos deles, inclusive, estão inscritos na Constituição Federal (artigo 4º).

A execução da política externa – seja agora, seja nos períodos anteriores – tem como objetivo a inserção internacional do Brasil e a defesa dos interesses do Brasil no mundo. De maneira mais particular, a política externa é um instrumento para apoiar o projeto de desenvolvimento do País.

A2: Dilma Rousseff não se interessa pessoalmente por relações internacionais e parece ter dificuldades em entender sua importância. Tampouco sabe distinguir política internacional de diplomacia. O papel internacional do Brasil tem diminuído desde o início de seu governo e provavelmente continuará diminuindo até o fim do seu segundo mandato. Como na época de aumento do papel internacional do Brasil, há dois fatores: o político e o econômico. Aliado ao desinteresse da Presidente por assuntos internacionais, está o baixo crescimento econômico que o país teve nos últimos anos e terá nos próximos anos. Uma economia estagnada não ajuda um país a aumentar seu papel internacional, assim como uma Presidente despreparada e desinteressada.

Q3

A1: Ver resposta anterior.

A2: Pelo dois fatores acima: baixo interesse político da Presidente e estagnação econômica, que limitam as iniciativas internacionais, especialmente na área de cooperação.

Q4

A1: A orientação da política externa brasileira permanece sendo a de coadjuvar o projeto de desenvolvimento econômico, social, cultural e político-institucional do Brasil.

A Presidenta Dilma Rousseff tem procurado imprimir à política externa um sentido estratégico e pragmático. Percebendo as relações exteriores como componente importante para a prosperidade do País, nossa ação diplomática busca atuar na promoção de nossos objetivos e na construção das condições externas indispensáveis à consecução do nosso projeto de país.

O papel desempenhado pelo Brasil no cenário internacional é resultado do peso econômico, político e diplomático do País – fatores que, por sua vez, decorrem de um conjunto de políticas bem-sucedidas adotadas pelo Brasil nas últimas décadas. Hoje somos chamados a atuar como um dos principais atores do sistema internacional.

Nossos interesses são geograficamente globais. Nossas relações, escolhas e ações externas desconhecem exclusivismos. O Itamaraty busca consolidar sua presença expressiva em outros países e sua influência junto a governos e sociedades, reforçando parcerias estratégicas nos cinco continentes. Essa opção revela-se cada vez mais acertada em um mundo crescentemente multipolar.

A2: Concordo parcialmente. Como afirmado anteriormente, há o fator pessoal. Ela não dá importância a questões internacionais. O declínio da economia acentua a diminuição do papel internacional do Brasil.

Q5

A1: Como mencionei acima, os valores e interesses que orientam a política externa brasileira são permanentes.

Evidentemente, a conjuntura internacional pode apresentar desafios próprios do momento. Assim, a política externa da Presidenta Dilma Rousseff, por exemplo, buscou promover a discussão internacional de tópicos como a "Responsabilidade ao Proteger" e o "Direito à Privacidade na Era Digital", temas que adquiriram maior saliência nos últimos anos – o primeiro, em função sobretudo da recorrência do recurso a soluções militares quando a diplomacia seria o melhor instrumento; o segundo, por conta das denúncias de espionagem na Internet realizadas por determinados governos.

A2: A principal mudança foi a ausência de novas direções ou de grandes projetos da política externa. A principal continuidade também foi a ausência de novas direções ou de grandes projetos. O que vinha sendo feito, continuou sendo feito; o que precisaria de direcionamento político em nível presidencial, parou ou deixou de acontecer. O Ministério de Relações Exteriores foi desprestigiado, perdeu orçamento e está hoje em uma situação de penúria inédita.

Q6

A1: Minha atuação diplomática não envolveu diretamente a área de direitos humanos, de modo que eu não teria elementos para responder adequadamente à pergunta.

A2: Não deu seguimento a essa retórica. A única mudança foi um certo afastamento do Irã. Esse afastamento, entretanto, também pode ser creditado ao fato de que um engajamento com aquele país necessita de iniciativa diplomática em nível presidencial. Como não há iniciativa presidencial em nível diplomático de qualquer espécie, o Brasil se afastou do Irã.

Q7

A1: Idem.

A2: Não diferem. Ambas as políticas priorizam a retórica de defesa dos direitos humanos, mas não a colocam em prática no campo internacional. Os laços com Cuba e Venezuela, por exemplo, são idênticos sob ambos os presidentes. Mais uma vez, não falta de uma nova política, a política sob o governo Dilma é apenas a continuidade da política do governo anterior, de Lula, pois não esforço de formulação de política externa por parte do governo Dilma. A situação a lastimável e não faz jus ao histórico de excelência da diplomacia brasileira.

Q8

A1: Idem.

A2: Não acho que elas se diferenciem. Houve a retórica inicial, mas mesmo ela foi abandonada com o tempo, por falta de iniciativa.

Q9

A1: A formulação da política externa brasileira observa procedimentos que, na minha experiência pessoal, contribuem para dotar de coerência, solidez e legitimidade a atuação externa do Brasil. Esse traço fortalece as posições defendidas pelo Brasil e distingue a atuação externa do País.

Eu não saberia dizer se houve influência de partidos sobre a política externa brasileira.

A2: Influenciou na aproximação dos países governados pela esquerda, especialmente na América Latina. Marco Aurélio Garcia, assessor especial de Lula e Dilma para assuntos internacionais tornou-se um chanceler paralelo desde que PT tomou o poder. Atua de maneira independente ao Itamaraty. Tem poder de decisão quase absoluto em questões relacionadas à América Latina, área em que a política externa do Brasil passou a ser fortemente afetada pela inclinação do PT em aproximar-se de governos de esquerda. A entrada da Venezuela no Mercosul e o afastamento do Brasil de países da Aliança do Pacífico, como Peru, Chile e Colômbia pode ser diretamente relacionada à atuação do PT e de Marco Aurélio Garcia.

Q10

A1: Idem.

A2: Como em todas as outras áreas, tudo continuou como no governo Lula. Nada mudou. Marco Aurélio Garcia continua dando o tom nas relações do Brasil com países de esquerda, especialmente na América Latina.

Q11

A1: Idem.

A2: Não há diferença. A política externa de Lula, influenciada pelo PT, foi apenas copiada e continuada, sem alterações, por Dilma. Não houve esforço de reformulação de política externa em nenhuma área.

Q12

A1: Idem.

A2: Não, a influência continua a mesma. E em ambos os casos, é bem alta, mais alta do que em qualquer governo anterior.

Q13

A1: Ao Itamaraty cabe o papel de "auxiliar o Presidente da República na formulação da política exterior do Brasil, assegurar sua execução e manter relações com Estados estrangeiros, organismos e organizações internacionais" (Decreto 7.304/2010).

A política externa brasileira é orientada por princípios de Estado e é pautada por princípios como: não interferência nos assuntos internos de outros países; resolução pacífica dos diferendos entre países; respeito aos direitos humanos; e defesa do multilateralismo.

Evidentemente, o Itamaraty é a primeira linha de representação e de negociação do Brasil no exterior. Cabe ao Ministério o papel de ajudar a sociedade e os agentes econômicos e sociais brasileiros a melhor compreender o mundo, nossos interesses e a própria agenda diplomática brasileira.

Mas a atuação do Brasil no exterior, coordenada pelo Itamaraty, busca ser o mais fiel reflexo dos valores e interesses da sociedade brasileira. Por isso, o Itamaraty atua em permanente coordenação com todos os órgãos de Governo e em consulta com o Congresso, a sociedade civil e os agentes econômicos.

A2: Afora a questão da aproximação com os países governados pela esquerda, especialmente na América Latina, o Itamaraty foi fundamental na formulação da política externa de Lula. A aproximação com a África, com os grandes países emergentes, o desafio a consensos estabelecidos por países desenvolvidos conforme os interesses desses países, tudo isso foi formulado pelo Itamaraty.

Q14

A1: As funções atribuídas ao Itamaraty no atual governo são as mesmas desempenhadas anteriormente.

A2: A influência é que há menos decisões a serem tomadas, devido à falta de interesse da Presidente pelo tema e pela queda da iniciativa brasileira no âmbito internacional. Não havendo sobre o quê se decidir, não há decisões a serem tomadas. O Mínisterio apenas toca o dia-a-dia e espera que o próximo presidente tenha maior interesse por política externa.

Q15


A1: Posso dizer que meu trabalho foi mais afetado pelas mudanças nas minhas funções – típicas da carreira diplomática – do que pelo mandato presidencial.

Em [REDACTED], eu havia sido removido [REDACTED] [REDACTED] ([REDACTED]) para [REDACTED] [REDACTED] ([REDACTED]). Embora me ocupasse de temas econômicos em ambas as Missões, as agendas eram em boa parte distintas, o que, evidentemente, teve reflexo sobre o trabalho que desempenhei.

Em [REDACTED], fui removido para a [REDACTED] ([REDACTED]) [REDACTED] ([REDACTED]) para trabalhar na [REDACTED] [REDACTED], onde estou lotado no momento. Nesta unidade, vinculada ao [REDACTED], estou encarregado de alguns temas da agenda política internacional do Brasil, que são bastante distintos daqueles de que vinha tratando nas duas lotações anteriores.

Em todas as funções, entretanto, o compromisso institucional com a defesa dos interesses do Brasil no exterior – em suas variadas dimensões – sempre foi uma constante.

A2: O corte de verbas do Ministério limita a atuação de todos os diplomatas. Não há mais projetos de cooperação, não se consegue viajar para reuniões, as delegações brasileiras passaram a operar em regime de sobrevivência, não há eventos culturais, os serviços consulares começam a cair em qualidade. Talvez o maior sinal do sucateamento do Itamaraty seja o atraso nos salários dos diplomatas e de outras carreiras relacionadas ao serviço exterior brasileiro. A frustração é grande. Não fosse o extremo profissionalismo dos diplomatas brasileiros, nossa diplomacia já teria parado. Nenhuma outra categoria de servidores públicos no Brasil continuaria trabalhando depois de 3 meses de atrasos nos salários.



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