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Declaration

I, Kjersti Kanestrøm Lie, declare that this thesis is a result of my research investigations and findings. Sources of information other than my own have been acknowledged and a reference list has been appended. This work has not been previously submitted to any other university for award of any type of academic degree.

Signature.....

Date: May 15, 2015

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Abstract

Brazil's largest city, São Paulo, faces a huge housing deficit. Many people are affected by the housing problem, and the demand for decent housing is high. The roofless movement in São Paulo is extensive, and has been since it emerged in the beginning of the 1980s. Hundreds of thousands of people are organized in or affiliated with the movement. Their main repertoire is occupying buildings and land to pressure the local government to prioritize social housing projects. Recently the movement has had an upswing in activity; the number of occupations has tripled during mayor Fernando Haddad's (PT) term.

This thesis explores the roofless movement in São Paulo and its root causes, characteristics and challenges. It shows that the massive and persistent socio-economic inequality contributes to explain the prevalence of the roofless movement. It also looks into the internal fragmentation, and goes in depth on two roofless organizations within the movement; the Roofless Workers Movement – *Movimento dos Trabalhadores Sem-Teto* (MTST) and the Roofless Movement of São Paulo – *Movimento Sem-Teto do São Paulo* (MSTS). Even though they belong to the same social movement, they differ on a range of characteristics, one of them being political affiliation. Historically the roofless movement has had strong ties to the Worker's Party PT. This thesis looks into how some roofless organizations have found new political allies, and how this affects the movement as a whole. There have been few studies on roofless organizations with bonds to the political right. This study gives new insight on this issue.

Currently, the movement faces a range of challenges, both towards the external environment, and internally within the movement. Lack of political leeway makes progress on the housing issue slow, and fragmentation within the movement may in the long-term lead to a weakening of the movement's demands. This thesis goes in depth on these challenges; it aims to deepen the understanding of an important social movement – the roofless movement in São Paulo.

List of acronyms

- ARENA:** *Aliança Renovadora Nacional* / National Renewal Alliance
- BNH:** *Banco Nacional da Habitação* / National Housing Bank
- BRL:** Brazilian real (100 BRL = 33,2 USD, 03.05.15)
- CUT:** *Central Única dos Trabalhadores* / United Workers' Central
- CDHU:** *Companhia de Desenvolvimento Habitacional e Urbano* / Company of Housing and Urban Development
- FCP:** *Fundação da Casa Popular* / Foundation of Public Housing
- FLM:** *Frente de Luta por Moradia* / Front in the Struggle for Housing
- MCMV:** *Minha Casa Minha Vida* / My House, My Life (federal housing program)
- MDB:** *Movimento Democrático Brasileiro* / The Brazilian Democratic Movement
- MMPT:** *Movimento de Moradia Para Todos* / Movement for Housing for All
- MST:** *Movimento dos Trabalhadores Sem Terra* / The Landless Workers Movement
- MSTI:** *Movimento dos Sem-Teto do Ipiranga* / The Roofless Movement of Ipiranga
- MSTS:** *Movimento Sem-Teto do São Paulo* / The Roofless Movement of São Paulo
- MTST:** *Movimento dos Trabalhadores Sem-Teto* / The Roofless Workers Movement
- PCdoB:** *Partido Comunista do Brasil* / The Communist Party of Brazil
- PM:** *Polícia Militar* / Military Police
- PMDB:** *Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro* / The Brazilian Democratic Movement Party
- PP:** *Partido Progressista* / The Progressive Party
- PSB:** *Partido Socialista Brasileiro* / The Brazilian Socialist Party
- PSD:** *Partido Social Democrático* / The Social Democratic Party
- PSDB:** *Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira* / The Brazilian Social Democratic Party
- PSOL:** *Partido Socialismo e Liberdade* / The Socialism and Freedom Party
- PT:** *Partido dos Trabalhadores* / The Workers Party
- PV:** *Partido Verde* / The Green Party
- SEHAB:** *Secretaria Municipal de Habitação* / The Municipal Secretary of Housing
- SMO:** Social Movement Organization
- ULCM:** *Unificação das Lutas de Cortiços e Moradia* / Unification of Struggles for Tenements and Housing
- UMM:** *União dos Movimentos de Moradia* / Union of Housing Movements

ZEIS: *Zonas Especiais de Interesse Social* / Zones of Specific Social Interest

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1 Introduction

1.1 Introduction

São Paulo is Brazil's largest city and the most populous in Latin America, counting about 11,9 million inhabitants. If the surrounding municipalities are included, the number is more than 19 million (IBGE, 2014). The city is the third largest urban center in the world (Weise, 2012), and the financial hub of Brazil, which is now the seventh largest economy in the world after sliding back from number six in 2012 (Tavener, 2013). The past century, São Paulo has been an important industrial center. It has attracted migrants from all over Brazil, and immigrants from abroad, searching for work. It is now a financial powerhouse and a huge melting pot. São Paulo is currently the richest state in Brazil, with a GDP equivalent to Turkey's GDP (The Economist, 2014). Despite this, the socio-economic inequality remains high. In the latest census conducted in São Paulo the GINI-coefficient was 50,3¹ (IBGE, 2010). Compared to the country with the lowest inequality, Sweden, which scores 25,0 (UNDP, 2014) the number is striking.

During the past two years, under the leadership of mayor Fernando Haddad (PT), the number of occupations of buildings and land by *roofless* has tripled in São Paulo. The numbers are significant, from January 2013 until December 2014, almost 700 occupations had been carried out (Bergamim Jr., 2014). This development must be viewed in the context of São Paulo's huge housing deficit, but also the current political situation. São Paulo is one of the cities in the world with the highest housing deficit. However, numbers vary considerably. Numbers from São Paulo's Housing Secretariat (SEHAB) show that 889 808 households live in "inadequate conditions" (Secretaria de Habitação, 2010). According to certain media reports, however, São Paulo faces a housing deficit of 1 217 550 homes (O Estado de São Paulo, 2010a). Regardless of which numbers are correct; the demand for housing is high. Housing is an important political issue, and at the beginning of his term mayor Haddad promised to construct 55 000 new units for social housing (Bergamim Jr., 2014). Most of those houses are still not built.

¹ The higher the GINI-coefficient is, the higher the inequality is.

Despite progressive legislation on the right to housing, the municipality has failed to fulfill promises. The major housing problem becomes very obvious in São Paulo, where the *roofless movement* has a long tradition of occupying abandoned land or buildings. While walking around in the center of São Paulo, it is impossible not to notice occupied buildings, marked with signs and banners from different roofless organizations. The definition of roofless is wider than homeless, and comprises more than people simply living on the street. The definition can be summarized as: “All people affected by the housing problem, be it because of lack of housing or of living under precarious conditions” (Boulos, 2014: 53). Or simply; “without a roof of one’s own” (Earle, 2012: 106). 22 million people can be considered roofless in Brazil, and it is believed that as much as one quarter of these live in São Paulo (Boulos, 2014). Thus, while there is a huge housing deficit in the whole country, São Paulo is especially affected.

The roofless movement of São Paulo is extensive, and has been for decades. The movement emerged in the beginning of the 1980s, together with a more general anti-dictatorship movement, in the periphery of São Paulo. At this time the center of São Paulo was reserved for the elite, and a place where the poor were forgotten (Miagusko, 2012). The roofless movement kept strong during the military dictatorship², unlike many other social movements in similar regimes elsewhere (Buechler, 2007). Even though the movement has experienced waves of mobilization and demobilization, and has been alternating between strong and weak, the movement remains a significant political actor. Many hundred thousand people participate in the roofless movement in São Paulo, while at the same time being members of various different roofless organizations.

The roofless movement’s main strategy is occupying empty buildings or deserted land, to put pressure on the local government to construct houses or apartments for people in need. The strategy of occupying is widespread and common in Brazil, and internationally most famous because of the rural occupations conducted by the Landless Workers Movement (MST) from 1984 onwards. Ever since the roofless movement emerged in São Paulo, it has been characterized by being divided into numerous social movement organizations (SMOs) with somewhat different structures and strategies. Many of these organizations have gathered in

² The military dictatorship in Brazil lasted from 1964 – 1985.

coalitions and networks, while some have chosen a more autonomous style. While most of the roofless SMOs cooperate on certain issues, other SMOs have split with the rest.

Most of the roofless organizations either have had or have close ties to the Workers Party (PT), either politically or financially (or both). This political bond has been challenged after PT came to governmental power. 13 years have passed since president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva was elected president on a political program focused on poverty reduction and based on social issues. In 2003 PT entered office for the first time in history, and many have been left disappointed about what they have been able to achieve. The huge June protests in 2013 related to the upcoming Football World Cup made this disappointment utterly visible. In March 2015 new “million protests” again put an immense pressure on the PT government. This political situation has also affected the roofless movement, who may seem less unified than before. One of the most visible SMOs within the roofless movement in São Paulo is now supporting the right wing political party PSDB, although the majority of the SMOs still have close ties to PT. This thesis wants to explore the diversification that recently has emerged within the roofless movement in São Paulo, and what challenges this may cause.

1.2 Problem statement and research questions

The point of departure for this thesis is the overall impression of São Paulo as a city with a huge housing deficit and with an extensive roofless movement claiming their rights. The fact that the municipality of São Paulo is not able to substantially reduce the housing deficit is a serious concern, both for politicians, and obviously for the roofless. The situation leaves many people in a devastating situation, and it puzzles an outside observer that the progress remains so slow. The objective of this thesis is to explore the roofless movement, but also to look into how the different SMOs within the movement act differently to reach their goals. To explore this situation, the following problem statement has been formulated: *What are the root causes for the roofless movement in São Paulo, and what are its main characteristics and challenges?*

The thesis focuses on two subcases within the roofless movement, two SMOs with radically different approaches to the current situation. On the one hand: the Roofless Workers’ Movement (MTST – *Movimento dos Trabalhadores Sem-Teto*), and on the other: the Roofless Movement of São Paulo (MSTS – *Movimento dos Sem-Teto do São Paulo*). As most other roofless SMOs in São Paulo, the two organizations are normally named with the abbreviation

connected to their name (MTST and MSTS). However, as these two organizations have very similar abbreviations, the organizations will be referred to as *Trabalhador-Sem-Teto* (MTST) and *Sem-Teto* (MSTS) throughout the thesis to avoid unnecessary confusion.

Trabalhador-Sem-Teto erupted from their mother organization MST and was established in 1997, as an organization that clearly differentiated itself from the existing roofless organizations, in the periphery of São Paulo. It is today the largest roofless organization in São Paulo. Trabalhador-Sem-Teto occupies vacant land in the urban periphery, and aim to achieve housing projects at the same land as they occupy. Trabalhador-Sem-Teto has historically had close ties to PT, but emphasize that they are autonomous of political parties. The same year that Trabalhador-Sem-Teto was established several roofless organizations emerged in the city center; today in fact most roofless organizations reside in the center of São Paulo. One of these is Sem-Teto. Sem-Teto was formally established in 2012, but made an abrupt change when they in 2013 broke with former allies in the roofless movement, and started to support the political right wing party PSDB. Sem-Teto for the most part occupies abandoned buildings in the city center.

To be able to answer the mentioned problem statement, the following research questions have been formulated:

1. What are the social origins of the big roofless movement in São Paulo and why is it able to persist?
2. How do different *political opportunities* affect the roofless movement?
3. How do the social movement organizations (SMOs) *frame* their grievances?

The first research question touches upon the underlying causes for the roofless movement, and the fact that it is not obvious that a city with a large housing deficit has a huge roofless movement. Not only does the movement exist, it is also very visible in the public sphere, and present in the political landscape. The question will let me go deeper into the root causes of the movement, and why it is able to mobilize so broadly over time.

The second research question focuses on the external factors that affect the roofless movement, such as the political system and elite allies. Changes in this external environment can explain the development of the movement. The question opens up for exploring the

relationship between the roofless movement and political parties, thereby also the role of leadership in the movement. Following this I will look into the issue of *clientelism*; where political support is traded for goods or services.

Framing is the interpretation of reality that individuals respond to when they decide to participate in collective action. Framing provides means for articulating problems and develops a reason for movement activity (Caniglia & Carmin, 2005). The third research question takes as a point of departure that grievances are the underlying cause for mobilizing. However, the different social movement organizations (SMOs) within the roofless movement frame these grievances differently. An effective framing has consequences for the success or failure of a social movement, and this research question will enable a discussion about this.

To be able to answer these research questions, I will draw on social movement theory that focuses on how and why people engage in collective behavior. I have chosen a qualitative research approach, which has allowed me to focus mainly on the perceptions of the individuals participating in the roofless movement.

1.3 Structure of the thesis and chapters

The thesis is structured as follows. In *chapter 2* I present the theoretical framework that will be used to structure the analysis in this thesis. *Chapter 3* presents and explains the qualitative research approach that I have used. I explain how I chose my case and subcases, and discuss the pros and cons with my data gathering methods. I also highlight possible strengths and weaknesses with my findings. In *chapter 4*, I look at the background and policy context, which will provide a backdrop for the analysis. The roofless movement of São Paulo did not emerge in a vacuum; the historical context is crucial to understand the current situation. *Chapter 5* presents the case; the roofless movement, and goes in depth on the subcases; Trabalhador-Sem-Teto and Sem-Teto. The chapter provides my informants perceptions on the current situation and analyses their perceptions in light of the theoretical framework. Their perceptions are elaborated on by contributing with some analysis of media content. *Chapter 6* discusses and compares the findings in chapter 5 in light of the research questions and the theoretical framework, and puts the analysis into a larger context. Finally, *chapter 7* sums up my main findings and provides some conclusions, which responds to the research questions and problem statement. Added to this are some questions for further analysis.

2 Theoretical framework

Theory is a way of systemizing different existing phenomena. One may say it is a way of simplifying the truth, but also a necessary tool when collecting, organizing and processing research data (Berg & Lune, 2004). The theoretical position of the researcher involves choosing certain theories and concepts over others. These choices ultimately influence the results of the research, and omit alternative ways of interpreting the research data. This chapter will outline the theoretical framework that will be used for the analysis.

2.1 Social movement theory

Social movement theory aims to explain how and why people mobilize for change. The theory is interdisciplinary; sociologists, economists, historians and political scientists have participated in developing the theory (Della Porta & Diani, 1999). The field has expanded since the 1960s, more recently the study of *contentious politics* has become one of the most prominent parts within research on social movements. Even though the different approaches share some fundamental understandings (they are concerned about how and why social movements are formed) research on the topic remains fragmented, and it is premature to speak of an integrated theory of social movements (Della Porta & Diani, 1999). To understand the differences within the roofless movement in São Paulo we need to understand how and why people mobilize. The theory can help us understand how these differences sometimes turn into conflicts between different SMOs.

Social movement theorists have acknowledged that social movement organizations (SMOs) are unique entities within social movements. The SMOs provide an important basis for mobilization within the broader social movement and therefore deserve special consideration within research. There is ongoing work on how to bridge social movement theory and organizational theories (Caniglia & Carmin, 2005). The different perspectives within social movement theory have established enduring trends in SMO-research, and the theory is helpful to explain and explore characteristics and differences between the SMOs within the broader movement. As this thesis analyzes different SMOs, to be able to say something about the movement as such, we need to define what social movements and SMOs are. The next section will therefore provide a definition of these concepts.

2.1.1 Definition of Social Movement and Social Movement Organizations (SMOs)

This thesis limits itself to go in depth on two roofless SMOs within the roofless movement, but will use this insight to be able to say something about the movement as a whole. It is therefore important to make an analytical distinction between a social movement and SMOs, as an overlap may create analytical confusion (Della Porta & Diani, 1999).

There is no consensus on how to define a social movement. The different definitions emphasize different aspects of a movement, and are often overlapping. Della Porta and Diani (1999: 17) define social movements as informal networks, based on shared beliefs and solidarity, which mobilize about conflictual issues, through the frequent use of various forms of protest. Sidney G. Tarrow (2011: 9) on the other hand defines social movements as “collective challenges, based on common purposes and social solidarities, in sustained interaction with elites, opponents and authorities”. Both these definitions are valuable, and partly resemble each other. However, to some extent, they emphasize different aspects of a social movement. Where one is more concerned about the aspect of protest, the other focuses more on the actors involved. For this study, both of these aspects are important. Also, it should be noted that it is common defining social movements as having some kind of internal solidarity, as both these definitions do. This thesis will challenge that assumption, and show that not all parts of a social movement are always solidary. Therefore, a combination of these two definitions will be used throughout this thesis. We can thus say that social movements are informal networks, which mobilize about conflictual issues, through the frequent use of various forms of protest in sustained interaction with elites, opponents and authorities.

Research has shown that within a social movement there is a plurality of organizations, with different organizational goals, that coexist (Della Porta & Diani, 1999). It is widely accepted that social movements and the organizations involved in the movement, are not the same thing (Della Porta & Diani, 1999). While someone is a member of an organization, he/she is a participant in a movement (Della Porta & Diani, 1999). To understand the dynamic of the different organizations within the movement is central when we study collective behavior. A social movement is normally made up of various different parts such as networks, groups, NGOs and organizations. Even though the movement does not equate with the organizations within it, the organizations often play an important part in the movement. There are diverse views on what kind of organizations that should be classified as SMOs. Some emphasize that SMOs rely on contentious action, others suggest the ideological basis of the organization is

more important than the tactics they employ (Caniglia & Carmin, 2005). Initially within the research on SMOs, most researchers agreed on McCarthy and Zald’s definition (in Della Porta & Diani, 1999: 140) who defined a SMO as “a complex organization whose goals coincide with the preferences of a social movement and which tries to realize those goals”. However, another definition sees SMOs as “associations of persons making idealistic and moralistic claims about how human personal or group life ought to be organized that, *at the time of their claims making*, are marginal to or excluded from mainstream society” (Lofland 1996 in Della Porta & Diani, 2006: 140).

This research will show that the goals of the various SMOs do not always coincide with the movement as a whole, even though one may be lead to believe that initially. Alliance building may seem as a sensible option, in an environment where many SMOs operate on the same issues and on behalf of similar projects (Della Porta & Diani, 2006). However, cooperation does not always occur because the SMOs compete for the same acknowledgement and support from the same social base. They are mobilizing from the same limited source. Some SMOs however do not compete over the same base source, because they appeal to a different sector of public opinion (Della Porta & Diani, 2006). Table 1 summarizes these relationships. Following this, the latter definition of SMO is thus more useful for this research. The roofless that are organized in the roofless movement are excluded from mainstream society, but through the SMOs they make claims about how their lives ought to be.

Table 1:

	Cooperation	Lack of cooperation
No competition (for similar constituency)	Noncompetitive cooperation	Neutrality
Competition (for similar constituency)	Competitive cooperation	Factionalism

Table 1: Patterns of interorganizational relations among SMOs. (Della Porta & Diani, 2006: 157)

Social movements are first created, then they grow, they achieve success or failure, and eventually they dissolve or become insignificant. This is what we can call the movement’s *life cycle*. When a movement succeeds the demands they promote may become institutionalized, and replaced by more formalized organizations. When this happens with a movement, one

may say that it becomes redundant. Institutionalization has used to be considered the natural evolution for social movements and SMOs. The fact is that SMOs rarely get institutionalized, because they disintegrate before they reach that stage. Some dissolve because their aims are achieved, some because of internal conflicts. Most SMOs have a short life expectancy, and if there are not enough benefits of staying in a SMO, members' loyalty may change back to the movement as a whole (Della Porta & Diani, 2006). The SMO may be seen as a temporary instrument of interference, although this thesis will show that temporality may in fact last for a long time.

This thesis will present, analyze and contrast two different SMOs within the roofless movement in São Paulo and use these as examples to show how the movement uses different approaches to reach its goals. The research will not limit itself to one theoretical perspective, but rather adopt various analytical concepts that are helpful to answer the main characteristics and differences within the movement. In the following I will elaborate on the four main analytical concepts that will be used throughout the thesis, namely resource mobilization, political opportunity structures, collective identity and leadership.

2.2 Resource mobilization

Social movements are most likely to be created in environments open to social movements, but often in situations where there are polarizing differences between people. These differences may be economical or differences in values or ethics. The backdrop for all collective mobilization is *grievances*. Grievances stem from a shared perception between individuals that they are being denied something they should have had access to, such as for instance rights, opportunities or respect. People experience grievances individually, but for them to be developed into a social movement, these grievances need to be shared with others.

Social movements are often characterized as *collective behavior*. The collective behavior perspective focuses on how individual grievances in a system of injustice, give people incentive to engage in collective action. This structural approach explains collective action as crisis behavior (Della Porta & Diani, 1999). The aggression individuals hold is a result of a range of frustrated experiences. Often collective action emerges where the existing system is insufficient or unjust, which provides the movement with a justification for their action (Della Porta & Diani, 1999). Often social movements emerge because of an initiating event, which thereafter creates a chain reaction. This is a common approach within social movement

theory, but the approach does not capture *how* these people join forces to create change, and how these movements comprised of individuals aim to create new norms in society.

The *resource mobilization perspective* however explains what conditions enable discontent to be transformed into mobilization. It argues that collective action is a rational response that only can occur when adequate resources are available (Caniglia & Carmin, 2005). The grievances in society are ubiquitous, and rational individuals know what they want to change, and calculate the cost and benefit of participating in collective action. Even though people mobilize because of a certain grievance, the initial grievance is often elaborated on when movements evolve. The resource mobilization perspective, which has dominated the research on social movements, is critical towards an explanation that blames structure for why people engage in social movements. It is far more concerned with the rationality of the individuals joining social movements and how they mobilize people and acquire resources to accomplish the movement's goals. They join because they have an interest in joining (Melucci, 1989).

According to this perspective protest is more likely to occur when there is an organization in place that has sufficient resources to bring people together in collective action (McCarthy 1977 in Turner, 2013). In the case of Brazil, the Christian base communities provided such resources, and helped providing support for social movements that emerged in the early 1980s, such as MST and the rural trade unions (Houtzager, 2001). These resources were crucial for the social movements, as their demands gained strength.

The resource mobilization perspective has been important in the development of research on SMOs (Caniglia & Carmin, 2005). The structure within a movement or SMO is decisive for the chances of acquiring these resources. A well-organized group, or SMO, will better be able to create allies with those in power, draw media attention and attract supporters. The more formalized these SMOs are, the more routinized tasks, clear division of labor, hierarchical decision making and membership criteria they have (Caniglia & Carmin, 2005). Less formalized SMOs do not have routinized decision structures, they adapt to meet demands and are more likely to be influenced by individual leaders (Caniglia & Carmin, 2005). The degree of formalization thus both facilitate and impede goal achievement, resource acquisition, legitimacy and the ability to mobilize (Caniglia & Carmin, 2005). Informal SMOs are often able to mobilize quickly, adapt to changing situations and have few barriers towards engaging

in disruptive action. Centralized organizations on the other hand facilitate rapid mobilization as the clear hierarchy reduces conflict and ambiguity (Caniglia & Carmin, 2005).

The capacity a SMO has to mobilize thus depends on resources available to the group, both material, such as money, benefits, services and work, and non-material, such as authority, moral engagement, faith and friendship (Della Porta & Diani, 1999). What kind of resources a group inhibits is crucial for what mobilization tactic they choose. When resources increase, the chance is better for a protest to succeed. The resource mobilization perspective seeks to understand how organizations contribute to a movement's coordination and stability, but is also helpful to research the internal structure of a roofless organization (Caniglia & Carmin, 2005). The theory fails, however, to explain other political opportunities, such as opportunities from state elections, or charismatic leaders (Turner, 2013).

2.3 Political opportunity structure

The *political opportunity perspective* argues that the actions of the movement depend on the existence (or lack of) a specific political opportunity. These external factors affecting social movements are what we often call political opportunity structures (or sometimes political process approach); factors which limit or empower collective actors. The opportunity structure refers to such things as the relative openness or closure of the institutionalized political system, the stability or instability of the broad set of elite alignments that upholds a polity, the presence or absence of elite allies and the state's capacity or propensity for repression (McAdam et al., 2001). According to this theory these changes explain the formation or development of a social movement.

The political opportunity perspective focuses on the success and failure of a movement or a SMO, rather than its structure and internal processes. The external factors constrain and shape the outcomes of a SMO (Caniglia & Carmin, 2005). The way the organization protests thus reflects external conditions, and how the SMO interprets the institutional environment, which implies that they are rational actors, a feature they share with the resource mobilization perspective (Della Porta & Diani, 2006).

In addition to the motivational framing, the *repertoire* of a social movement is dependent on the structure of the political system (democratic institutions, existence and structure political parties, possibilities of direct participation), level of repression and cultural traditions

(Haunss, 2007). Within these settings, the repertoire applied is adapted to fit the specific setting at the time. A repertoire can be defined as the “whole set of means [a group] has for making claims of different types on different individuals” (Tilly 1986: 168 in Della Porta & Diani, 2006). The modern repertoire of social movements has changed little since the French revolution. Boycotts, barricades, petitions and demonstrations are still present and strong in the sphere of protest today (Della Porta & Diani, 1999). However, new forms of protest have emerged alongside these. Modern protest is more often transnational in nature. New media, and internet in particular, has transformed the capacity of social movements (Della Porta & Diani, 2006).

The strength of a movement’s contentious activity is not constant; the activity comes in waves, a phenomenon often referred to as *cycles of protest* or *protest waves* (Della Porta & Diani, 2006). The concepts are often used interchangeably, but I prefer the term wave to cycle, as the term wave does not to the same extent indicate regularity. The first movement to engage in contentious action lowers the cost for the movements that comes after. Victories obtained by some movements change the political order and provokes countermobilization (Della Porta & Diani, 2006). This pattern has consequences for the action repertoire. At initial stages of protest, the most disruptive tactics are often chosen, but if the same tactic is used over and over again, the shock factor will be lost. Changes in protest tactics thus goes along with changes in the external environment, such as response from the authorities or media (Della Porta & Diani, 2006).

2.4 Collective identity

An aspect that is left out from the two former perspectives is the importance of identity. The resource mobilization perspective tends to treat ideas as given, in other words; ideology is not important for mobilization (Snow & Benford, 1988). However, movements *do* produce meanings for those who participate, but also the movement’s opponents and other observers. An essential component of collective behavior is symbolic production and the construction of *collective identity* (Della Porta & Diani, 1999). This concept is missing in much research on social movements, but Alberto Melucci (1989) claims it to be a key analytical dimension when researching social movements. The collective identity is produced by interacting individuals, and is a product of tensions and negotiation (Melucci, 1989). Collective identity refers to the shared values, beliefs, attitudes and norms within the movement and the SMOs (Caniglia & Carmin, 2005). Collective identity may help close the gap between theories

concerned with how collective actions forms and how they find their motivation. Participants are motivated to join movements, in part because the movement resonates with the individuals personal values and beliefs (Caniglia & Carmin, 2005). Movements create identities, and *frame* their goals.

Framing is a tool used to mobilize (Snow & Benford, 1988), and has also been applied to SMOs, to facilitate interpretation and provide means for articulating problems and develop a reason for movement activity (Caniglia & Carmin, 2005). A proper framing consists of three components: first, a diagnostic framing (problem definition), secondly a prognostic framing (how can the problem be resolved) and thirdly the motivational framing (incentive for the individual to participate) (Snow & Benford, 1988). Successful interplay between the three framing components, in addition to sufficient resource mobilizing, explains a movement's success. The two first create consent in a movement, while the motivational framing addresses the problem of developing strategies and forms of action; the *repertoire*.

The ultimate goal is for the individuals within the movement and the movement itself to share opinion, so called *frame alignment*. The degree of frame alignment depends among other things on the thoroughness of the framing effort, but also how much relevance the framing has to the participants (Snow & Benford, 1988). An important aspect of framing alignment is so-called *frame bridging*. This happens when a movement incorporates interpretations of reality produced by sectors of public opinion, which may otherwise stay unconnected (Della Porta & Diani, 2006). Another important form of frame alignment is *frame extension*: when specific concerns of a movement are related to more general goals, in contexts where the connection is not necessarily evident (Della Porta & Diani, 2006). The overarching frame within a movement is often referred to as the *master frame*. A master frame is at best shared by multiple SMOs, other social movements and large populations outside the movement.

This constructivist turn within research on social movement organizations has given important insight into framing within SMOs, but also the cultural aspects of the SMOs. The identity of a SMO links it to the external environments, and may enhance access to resources, through how the identity of the SMO is portrayed to potential donors (Caniglia & Carmin, 2005).

2.5 Leadership

The role of leadership in social movements should not be underestimated. All the mentioned three perspectives within social movement theory touches upon the role of leaders, but for this thesis the concept will be used as a separate analytical category. Even though social movements often reject authority on principle, we should consider the distribution of power within the organization when we want to understand how SMOs differ from each other (Della Porta & Diani, 2006). Power within an organization can be more or less centralized, or more or less hierarchical (Della Porta & Diani, 2006). Leaders often have multiple roles; they play an important part in mobilizing resources, they establish connections to political allies and media, and may contribute to create a sense of collective identity. There is a range of styles among leaders in social movements; charismatic, intellectual, ideological, administrator, pragmatic and agitator to mention a few. The role of leadership will be important throughout this thesis, as it also enables a discussion about *clientelism*. Clientelism is often associated with leaders at different levels who deliver patronage (support, help, benefits etc.) in return for services and/or votes (Törnquist, 1999). In this thesis clientelism will be defined as a type of leadership where followers, as well as loyalty from the followers, are obtained by offering material benefits.

These four aspects of social movement theory are overlapping, and can in different ways help us understand the characteristics of the roofless movement in São Paulo, but also the SMOs within it. They are not mutually exclusive, but approach social movements and SMOs from different directions (Della Porta & Diani, 1999). Each of the analytical concepts outlined above provide us with explanatory instruments, when we try to explore contemporary social movements. Resource mobilization, political opportunity structure, collective identity, leadership, framing, repertoire and protest waves will be important analytical concepts throughout the analysis.

3 Methods

3.1 Research method

The first decision a researcher needs to make is to choose between a quantitative and qualitative approach. Simplified one can say that in contrast to quantitative research, where things are counted, qualitative research “refers to the meanings, concepts, definitions, characteristics, metaphors, symbols and description of things” (Berg & Lune, 2004: 3). The line between quantitative and qualitative research is however not entirely clear, and there has been an increasing attention towards mixed methods, where quantitative and qualitative research is combined (Yin, 2014). In relation to the research questions of this thesis, however, an entirely qualitative research methodology was most suitable. The methodology chosen has important impact on the whole research process. It affects how a researcher does her sampling, how data is gathered and how data is analyzed. In the following these steps will be outlined in detail.

3.1.1 Sampling

In a sampling process the researcher wants to find subjects that can represent the population, but the “rules” for sampling are stricter in quantitative research than in qualitative research (Berg & Lune, 2004). In quantitative research nonprobability sampling is much more common than in qualitative research, where probability sampling is more often used. In a case study, in general a researcher chooses between a single case study or a multiple case study (Yin, 2014). It is also common to distinguish between different single case studies, depending on the intent of the analysis. A holistic design has no logical subunits, while an embedded design is a special variant of a single case study, where several sub-cases within the main case are studied individually and then together in an integrated way (Yin, 2014). While a holistic case study may become too abstract, the embedded case study may end up forgetting to return to the larger unit of analysis – the main case (Yin, 2014). The subcases in an embedded case study are selected through sampling or cluster techniques. This is what was done for this research.

Selecting the case and subcases

Case studies may give detailed insight into a social context, the different actor’s perceptions, and developmental pathways (Andersen, 1997). Even though case studies are often criticized

for only being appropriate for the exploratory phase of an investigation, Yin (2014) maintains that case studies are well suited for being explanatory as well. The most important sampling for this thesis was about choosing subcases within the main case; the roofless movement. This thesis does not aim to be statistically representative, nor does it search to generalize directly from case to universe, but wants to explore the variation within the roofless movement of São Paulo. The main case is therefore the roofless movement as such, while the subcases were chosen because they represent presumed extreme opposite cases within the roofless movement. In theory, extreme opposite cases are similar cases that differ on certain key factors. For instance, even though both cases belong to the roofless movement, they differ radically in size, in locations they occupy (center/periphery) and in political convictions/affiliations. Within the roofless movement, various other subcases could have been chosen, and each of them would have given interesting insight into the roofless movement as such. However, the subcases have been chosen as they represent fundamentally different approaches to the issue of housing, and may give interesting insight into a rather recent shift in political alliances within the roofless movement. Trabalhador-Sem-Teto and Sem-Teto constitute interesting poles in this sense. By focusing on these two SMOs I thus acknowledge that interesting information about other SMOs within the movement will be left out. However, a brief overview of the most important SMOs within the roofless movement will be outlined in Table 1, on page 8, and may provide a deeper understanding of the context the two SMOs operate in.

3.2 Data gathering methods

My entrance into Trabalhador-Sem-Teto was through a contact at the University of São Paulo, who gave me her contacts and recommendations. After this I used the convenience method to get in contact with more informants within the SMO. The entrance into Sem-Teto was far more coincidental and random. While observing occupied buildings in the city center, I had passed the building Cinema Marrocos several times. The size and the beautiful building caught my interest, as it differentiated itself from several other occupied buildings, mostly in ordinary apartment buildings. The initial contact with the SMO was simply knocking on the gate, and asking to get in. I was introduced to the coordination, and after this I used the convenience method to get in contact with other dwellers.

3.3 Participatory observation and informal conversations

During my stay in São Paulo I spent several whole days in different occupations. I spent most time with activists from Trabalhador-Sem-Teto's biggest occupation, Nova Palestina. In Nova

Palestina I observed daily life; how food was prepared and eaten in each communal kitchen, how clothes were washed in provisory washing tents, how the campsite was burning hot in the plastic tents under the sun, how children were playing, how people gathered for assemblies. I participated at a party (the celebration of one year since the land Nova Palestina is located at was occupied), at demonstrations organized by Trabalhador-Sem-Teto in the main shopping street Avenida Paulista in the center of São Paulo and in various meetings in the occupation.

I spent less time in Sem-Teto's biggest occupation Cinema Marrocos, but enough to get a general feeling of the daily life there too. In some cases it is necessary to spend a lot of time in a setting to get a complete understanding, however you learn a lot from only spending some time observing (Travers, 2001). This occupation was more closed than Nova Palestina, being a building in the middle of the center, and not open land in the periphery. Nevertheless, I never experienced problems when I asked if I could enter the building. I observed the *porteiro*³ always checking IDs, that people mainly spent time in their own apartments with separate kitchens, the elevator always operating with a proper elevator employee, cars driving in and out of the building and people renovating and constructing new rooms. I did not participate in any specific events organized by Sem-Teto. Even though they arranged regular meetings for the dwellers, I did not have the chance to participate in any of these. It should be noted that Sem-Teto in general had fewer open events than Trabalhador-Sem-Teto. According to the dwellers themselves the occupation used to be more open and have more events before, when they for instance had regular parties organized by outsiders inside the cinema, open to the public.

In both occupations I made clear that I was there as a researcher, and explained what my project was about. However, to not disturb the natural setting I entered into I made sure that I did not walk around with my recorder, pen and paper visible the whole time. I believe this made me able to observe the organizations' daily life in a more genuine manner. During this observing I came across people who wanted to talk to me, without creating an interview situation. These informal conversations gave me further insight and additional information about the two different organizations, which have not been recorded.

³ Portuguese for doorman or gatekeeper. To have a *porteiro* is very common in Brazilian residential areas.

3.4 Interviews

The interviews conducted were semi standardized. A semi standardized interview is placed somewhere in between of a standardized and an unstandardized interview, and includes some planned questions and topics. The interview is carried out systematically, but the informants are allowed to elaborate and digress on the questions asked (Berg & Lune, 2004). This is the benefit of semi standardized interviews; the informants answer around the topics that the researcher expect, but allow the informants to contribute with their own understandings of the topic.

There are several ways of safeguarding interview data; audio recording and manual notes being the most common of these. Both techniques have their advantages and disadvantages; interviewing without any recording device may leave the informants more relaxed and at ease, but at the same time, valuable information may be lost as the researcher does not have time to note down everything. On the other hand recording leaves the researcher to fully concentrate on the informant, and provides the researcher to crosscheck information afterward. However recording is exposed to possible technical failure, and is followed by time-consuming transcribing. All the interviews (except one) for this research were recorded, and additional notes were taken manually throughout all interviews. This technique was chosen because it was more convenient to concentrate on what the informants said, especially since language was a barrier, even though I speak Portuguese quite well. The research was conducted without a translator, and details that was lost because of this during the interview, were kept recorded. The transcribing process afterward has been very time consuming, but also crucial, and valuable.

In addition to the interviews and conversations I collected valuable information at a seminar called “Direito a Cidade” – “Right to the City”, 28.09.14, at the Art Bienal of São Paulo, at the modern museum of art. The famous urbanist and architect Raquel Rolnik moderated the seminar. The seminar was interesting as it put the matter of housing deficit in an international context⁴. I also attended a public meeting the 11th of December 2014 at Praça Roosevelt in the center of São Paulo called “Aula pública sobre o direito a cidade” – “Public class on the

⁴ The program for the debate can be found here: <http://www.31bienal.org.br/pt/post/1629> (accessed 20th March 2015).

right to the city”, organized by the urban collective Arrua⁵. Trabalhador-Sem-Teto’s national coordinator Guilherme Boulos was the main speaker at this event.

3.5 Ethical dilemmas

Ethics in research revolve around issues such as harm, consent, privacy and confidentiality of data (Berg & Lune, 2004). Taken down to the basics, a researcher should make sure to *do no harm* (Berg & Lune, 2004: 61). When I spoke to people in the field I made sure they knew what my role was, and that I was there by virtue of being a researcher. Whenever I wanted to conduct an interview I made sure the informant knew that the information was confidential, and asked them if they were comfortable with me using their name and if I could record the conversation. According to Yin (2014) the most desirable option is to reveal the identity of the informants, but protecting the participating individuals should always be prioritized. All but two informants had no problems with me using their full name, and all informants let me record our conversation. However I have chosen to render many informants with their first name exclusively, as it gives little additional information to render their whole name. This way I have also made sure that their privacy and confidentiality is protected. The exceptions are leaders in the SMOs and the politicians, who are considered official persons. They have been rendered with their full name. I did not make informants sign a contract of informed consent, but considered the informants to have enough information about what they were participating in, and experienced them to be at ease with the situation.

A researcher should also make sure to avoid bias when conducting a research (Yin, 2014). One test of this is the degree to which the researcher is open to contrary evidence than expected. To totally avoid bias is hard, but I believe I have been open towards my informants, avoided to ask leading questions and also treated the SMOs similarly, when it comes to asking critical questions.

3.6 Validity and reliability

Validity can be understood as how well the research responds to the real world, the legitimacy of the research and the integrity of its conclusions. Reliability can be understood as the quality of the measurement, in other words how consistent a research is (Yin, 2014).

⁵ More about the collective here: <http://coletivoarrua.org/> (accessed 23rd of March 2015).

This thesis is based on interviews with members of the two SMOs that compose my subcases. In addition to this I have spoken to members from other SMOs within the roofless movement, both because the information I received from my informants not necessarily should be taken at face value, but also because these additional informants could help me create a more consistent picture of the situation, and also place my two subcases in a broader context. To add on this I conducted two interviews with politicians (from PT and PSOL) and one with a researcher on social movements. Throughout my stay in São Paulo I also tried to bring about interviews with a politician from PSDB and the Municipal Secretary of Housing (SEHAB) to balance my data. Within the period I spent in São Paulo, my continuous attempts did not reach through. I did however have some limited communication with the SEHAB via email, but they refused to let me conduct a proper interview. However, as the focus in this thesis is the perceptions within the social movement, I eventually found to have collected the information I missed out on, elsewhere. This research focuses mostly on the perceptions of the members of the different SMOs, and not views from the local government or state institutions, although some information from these levels occurs.

By using social movement theory, and a “bottom-up”-perspective, this research may give new and interesting insight about the roofless movement as a whole, and about the two subcases in particular. The recent fragmentation within the movement has been poorly researched, and as Sem-Teto is such a new organization, secondary data about them is therefore mainly retrieved from media sources. There are no published academic researches on the SMO, and the information gathered about Sem-Teto is therefore more limited than the information available about Trabalhador-Sem-Teto. Trabalhador-Sem-Teto has been thoroughly researched, and there exists various case studies about the SMO, with differing approaches. This has consequences for the validity of the research, as information about Sem-Teto is more bound to few sources. The information gathered from Sem-Teto is also more dependent on information from the coordination in the organization, as I spent more time with them than participating in activities with ordinary members of the SMO, as was the situation with Trabalhador-Sem-Teto. In general I spent less time with Sem-Teto than with Trabalhador-Sem-Teto.

In sum I have conducted quite a few interviews, 22 in total, and in addition I have received information through informal conversations, participatory observation and media content. Despite this, I cannot be sure that my informants are statistically representative within their

organization, or that their perceptions are similar to other members of their SMO. Trabalhador-Sem-Teto is a huge organization, with more or less 100 000 members in São Paulo, each of these with their personal stories, different backgrounds and perceptions on their participation in the roofless movement. There is always a risk of biased information, where informants have a certain interest in how they portray reality. In a situation where different SMOs within the roofless movement compete within the same environment, this is especially relevant. Even though this thesis cannot give a complete understanding of the roofless movement, nor the SMOs within it, I believe the findings that will be presented will give interesting and new insight into a complex movement.

3.7 Analyzing the data

When analyzing data there are two common approaches; deductive and inductive. The former works from the general to the specific, while the latter works the opposite way; from specific observations to broader generalizations. These approaches are often presented as exclusive, but there are alternatives that supplement these two approaches. *Abduction* is the most commonly used approach in case based research processes (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2009). It is not a mix of inductive and deductive approaches, but adds new elements; it includes *understanding* as well (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2009: 4). The process of analysis is characterized by an alternation between the study of previous data and empirical data that are both continually reinterpreted in light of each other. This is what I have done in this research. My process of analysis started during the time I collected data, and the analytical framework has evolved throughout the time I have spent working on the thesis. I relied on theoretical propositions from social movement theory; theoretical framework is important for how data is understood. Relying on theoretical propositions is a common strategy when analyzing case study data (Yin, 2014). But my theoretical propositions were constantly challenged by the data I collected. This helped me organize my findings and the entire analysis, as the theory helped me point to relevant contextual conditions that needed to be described as well as what needed to be explained. I am thus not testing hypothesis, but presenting analytical framework that works well to analyze the data I collected.

4 Background and policy context

The roofless movement of São Paulo did not emerge or persist in a vacuum. It is impossible to understand the ups and downs of the movement and the internal diversification, without understanding the historical background for the current situation. This section will look at the historical backdrop for the roofless movement, but also go into how the movement has evolved since the early 1980s onward.

The roofless movement of São Paulo, and Brazil more in general, has a backdrop with long historical lines. The social movements in Brazil have emerged in a society characterized by high inequality. This social inequality can be traced far back in history, back to slavery. This period cemented the idea of an elite as the governing class. Do Rio Caldeira (2000) argues that because the Brazilian national elite never were deeply divided over the case of slavery (as was the case in the United States), or involved in a civil war over the issue, the various institutions inherited from slavery, such as physical chastisement, has been able to persist relatively unchallenged. This includes the police, who since its creation in the early 19th century has had a constitutive practice of violence and arbitrariness, which has shown a remarkable continuity up until today (do Rio Caldeira, 2000). At the time of slavery, which ended in 1888 (do Rio Caldeira, 2000), Brazil was a rural country, and the elite was often rich farm owners in the countryside. This structure was maintained when people started migrating from the countryside to the urban areas, and is a feature that is still strong in the Brazilian society as a whole. The strong economic elite was consolidated through the years of dictatorship, and is still visible through the great inequality in the country. Compared to countries with comparable levels of GNP per capita, the inequality in Brazil is significant. The GINI-coefficient for inequality in Brazil is 54,7. In comparison, the neighboring countries Argentina and Uruguay has a GINI of 44,5 and 45,3 respectively. United States scores 40,8 and India 33,9. The lowest registered GINIs are found in Norway and in Sweden, with a score of 25,8 and 25,0 respectively (UNDP, 2014).

Even though the housing deficit of São Paulo is a local situation, today it is fruitful to see the problem in a larger and global context of urban struggles; a struggle characterized by neoliberal management, with a privatization of a concentrated (geographical and social) economical surplus (Harvey, 2008). The neoliberal city is characterized by free markets and

free trade, and is a place where the defense of property rights becomes the most important political interest (Harvey, 2008). One of the consequences of such a policy is an intensification of the class power of the rich elites. The urban area of São Paulo is and has been an attractive spot for this kind of management. It is a mega city, attracting millions of workers, and is an attractive place for investment. With the economical surplus in the hands of few, the result of this policy is a “city of walls” (do Rio Caldeira, 2000).

The neoliberal management of São Paulo is not a unique model, but a way of managing urban areas globally. It is however important to understand how this model works locally, to be able to grasp how and why the roofless movement has occurred and sustained. One of the main challenges to create urban reform in Brazil is the enormous concentration of urban land and the power wielded by the private property sector. The property rights remain incredibly strong. Urbanization has played an important role in the absorption of capital surpluses, with no concern of the wellbeing of the urban masses. It is the search for profit, which drives the capitalist dynamic. From time to time such a situation will end in revolt by those excluded from control of this surplus (Harvey, 2008). The roofless movement is just one of many examples of such revolt. Their logical demand is democratic control over the production and use of this surplus (Harvey, 2008), the question is whether the social movements manage to remain consistent in their demand.

4.1 Growth of São Paulo

Until the end of the 19th century São Paulo was considered a small town. From 1854 to 1954 the city grew from 30 000 to more than 2,5 million inhabitants, and exploded after that, into what we now can call a megacity⁶ (Rolnik, 2000). It was the coffee boom at the beginning of the 20th century that dramatically changed the city. São Paulo became an economic center, and migrants and immigrants both from other parts of Brazil and from abroad – mainly the north-east – travelled to São Paulo searching for work (Rolnik, 2000; Earle, 2012). The industrialization and rapid urbanization gave the city the motto: “*São Paulo não pode parar!*” – “São Paulo cannot stop!” and people believed progress was the city’s destiny (do Rio Caldeira, 2000).

At this time, even though people were prosperous about the future of the city, housing deficit was already a problem. Most of the migrants that came to São Paulo ended up living in the

⁶ Cities with populations that exceed 10 million people are often referred to as megacities.

periphery, at a time where the center was reserved exclusively for the elite. The idea of having one's own house (*casa própria*) is a cemented idea in Brazil, an idea that has been consolidated through various housing programs. Several smaller housing programs were started from the 1930s onward, but the first national housing project, with the goal of constructing affordable houses for low-income classes started in 1946; *Fundação da Casa Popular* (FCP), the Foundation of Public Housing (Azevedo, 2013). Launched at the symbolically important date May the 1st there was little doubt that the government aimed for support from the working classes. Although designed to be an institution with control of own resources and, therefore with great operational autonomy, the FCP ended up relying solely on funds from the federal budget. The following conflict with the federal states resulted in a big failure for the FCP (Azevedo, 2013).

4.2 Military dictatorship

The national crisis in the beginning of the 1960s, concerning high inflation, led to a political struggle, which culminated in the 1964 coup, and the beginning of the military dictatorship (do Rio Caldeira, 2000). The FCP ended when the coup d'état threw Brazil into a new era of dictatorship, as the FCP was considered too close tied to the old regime. The military dictatorship lasted until 1985. The new rule shut down political organizations, and replaced them with two political parties, established by the military rule; ARENA and MDB (Skidmore, 1988). The military rule was concerned about economic growth, and performed well economically in the beginning. At the start of the 1970s the GDP (gross domestic product) grew with 12 percent annually (do Rio Caldeira, 2000). While there was a huge economical growth, there was no political participation from the people or distribution of wealth. The inequality persisted and was cemented during this era. In the 1980s Brazil went into a severe economic crisis, so severe that the decade came to be known as “the lost decade” (do Rio Caldeira, 2000). The GDP dropped and unemployment grew. The effects were especially bad in São Paulo, where the rapid industrialization was followed by industries closing down (do Rio Caldeira, 2000).

It was the political party ARENA that governed Brazil during the dictatorship. The new governance was not particularly interested in providing rights for the poor, but despite this the government started a new social housing program, *Banco Nacional de Habitação* (BNH), the National Bank of Habitation. According to Azevedo (2013) the new housing program was launched to create political order. Established in 1964, the program sought to win sympathy

of the masses that had supported the government that was overthrown that same year (Azevedo, 2013). In addition, the program helped stimulate the national economy and create jobs. The problem of the program, however, was that it did not target the people that needed it the most. Housing politics during the 1970s and 1980s was characterized by construction of social housing in the extreme periphery, especially in the far south of the city. In this way the people with least resources were placed far away from the city center, and far away from public goods. A side effect of this lumping together of social housing in the southern periphery also contributed to an acceleration of irregular occupation of land in the same area; the southern periphery of São Paulo is where you today find most favelas and irregular allotments (Rolnik, 2000).

The military regime restructured the police forces into their current form, when the former patrolling forces were united under the auspices of the military police (PM – *Polícia Militar*), subordinate to the army from 1969 (do Rio Caldeira, 2000). This reform was created to face the strong opposition that was starting to grow. Since 1988, with the new constitution, each state PM was subordinated to the state governor, which also is in charge of a civil police force in charge of judiciary and administrative tasks (do Rio Caldeira, 2000). The police have always used a lot of violence, especially towards the poorer part of the population, which has taught this part of the population both to distrust the justice system, but also fear the police (do Rio Caldeira, 2000). The police violence was especially dreadful during the 1980s and 1990s – in 1992 1 500 people were killed by the police only in São Paulo. Democratization did not eradicate the violent style of the PM (do Rio Caldeira, 2000).

It was at the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s, that Brazil took a turn towards democratization. Starting in the middle of the 1970s, the working classes in São Paulo started to organize a range of political activities that affected the dominant rule. A new type of trade union movement emerged (later this movement was to be known as CUT – *Central Única dos Trabalhadores*), and at the same time neighborhood based social movements emerged in the peripheries with support from the catholic church, putting forward the idea that they had “the right to have rights” (do Rio Caldeira, 2000). This was also the period when the roofless movement emerged.

In the early 1980s, when the government started to allow reorganization of political parties, the trade union and various social movements founded the Workers Party (PT), the first party

in Brazil that was not created or commanded by the elite (do Rio Caldeira, 2000). The relationship with civil society organizations has since been part of the PT identity. A large number of party members within PT are or have been social activists (Bruera, 2013). Thus, many members within the social movement in São Paulo have what we can call multiple identities: they are members of a housing social movement organization and PT members at the same time. The social movements and the political opening created an enthusiasm for the military dictatorship to end. The movement *Diretas Já* – Direct Elections Now – united this hope (do Rio Caldeira, 2000). Large demonstrations were carried out in all large cities around the country; in São Paulo the movement gathered one million people in the streets in April 1984 (do Rio Caldeira, 2000). It was the largest political demonstration by then in Brazilian history. That same month the National Congress voted to deny the people to vote for the next president, and decided that the next president should be elected by the National Congress, who to a large extent were directly appointed by the military regime (do Rio Caldeira, 2000). Tancredo Neves, who had support by the people, was elected, but died before taking office. Vice President José Sarney, who was the former leader of the military dominated political party, took his place. In 1986 Brazilians elected a Constitutional Assembly that wrote a new constitution, with participations of groups all over the country who mobilized to send in petitions and lobby to get their demands incorporated into the constitution (do Rio Caldeira, 2000). The constitution was promulgated in 1988.

4.3 Democratization and new constitution

Within democratic states the constitution represents the basic, fundamental law of the state, it defines how the state will be organized and what powers and authorities that lie in the government (Turner, 2013). It is the overarching law in a democratic country. In the Brazilian society the 1988 Constitution has had high resonance. It marked the end of the military regime, and the beginning of democracy. With its partly progressive content it set stage for an egalitarian society.

Adequate housing had already been recognized as part of the right to an adequate standard of living in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Habitat, 2008). After this, many states incorporated the right to housing in their own constitutions, including Brazil, outlining the States responsibility to ensure this right:

Article 6: Are social rights to education, health, work, housing, leisure, security, social security, protection of motherhood and childhood, and assistance to the helpless, in accordance with this Constitution (Senado Federal, 2013 [my highlighting]).

The constitution contains articles that claim that property should fulfill its social function and an entire chapter on urban policy (article 5, 182 and 183 in Senado Federal, 2013), in an attempt to establish certain limitations to the property rights (Rodrigues & Barbosa, 2010). Even though the Constitution established the concept of social function of the city and urban property, it included no provision for formally regulating these rights (Reali & Sérgio, 2010). Neither was there any national housing project at this time, after the extinction of the National Housing Bank in 1986 (Cardoso, Thêmis, & de Sousa, 2011). Until 2008, the political housing initiatives went on to depend on strong local initiatives, instead of being a responsibility of the Brazilian state. The constitutional articles 182 and 183 mentioned above, were not given regulatory force until 2001, with the introduction of the federal City Statute (Rodrigues & Barbosa, 2010).

In 1989 Brazilians could finally vote for president. The two candidates were the conservative Fernando Collor de Mello and the leader of PT, Lula da Silva. Fernando Collor was by far better trained in mass media than Lula, and the Brazilians “elected the mass-media product of the conservative oligarchies” who was believed to modernize Brazil (do Rio Caldeira, 2000: 50).

4.4 Concurrent powers in São Paulo

The prevalence of the concurrent powers – municipal, federal and state – remains a significant feature of Brazilian government, so even though conservative presidents governed Brazil after the democratization, the introduction of direct elections on mayors in 1985 opened up the way for radical mayors (Maricato, 2010). Before 1985 the governor had appointed the mayor. Both mayors and governors are now directly elected every four years. In municipalities with more than 200 000 voters, both the mayor and the governor must be elected by more than 50 percent of the vote. If absolute majority is not reached, a second round is held (Utsumi, 2014). This change would later become important for Lula’s election campaign, as these mayors paved way for him (Biekart, 2005). Before the elections of mayor were democratized, the mayors were often from the political right.

The separation of powers has not made the governing of São Paulo easy, as it is not always clear which political level that has the responsibility for what. The mayor of São Paulo shares responsibility with the state governor for the provision of many public services (Bruhn, 2008). The São Paulo mayor does not control police forces (the state governor controls both the military and civil police), except a small metropolitan guard that is limited to security for public buildings (Bruhn, 2008). In some cases it may be difficult to know what power to target with demands, in comparison to a structure where the powers of the governor and the mayor is shared. The difficulty of governing with this system becomes especially evident when different political factions govern the different political levels. This is what is the situation in São Paulo today. Because of a high rate of party switching (except for PT members that remain rather loyal) it is often more analytically interesting to look at political factions, rather than parties (Bruhn, 2008). Simply put, the political factions revolve around PT to the left and PSDB to the right, both parties who originated in opposition to the military dictatorship, but that have gone through major changes since then.

The municipality of São Paulo elected their first mayor from PT in 1988, Luiza Erundina. She was in office from 1989 to 1992. The next PT mayor was elected in 2000, Marta Suplicy. In the context of housing she is most known to have started an ambitious program of urban reconstruction of São Paulo's city center, focusing on social housing through the program *Morar no Centro*, Live in the Center. It was her administration that proposed the implementation of a new Master Plan in accordance with the recently approved City Statute.

4.5 Urban legislation and the right to the city

The federal law called the City Statute emerged in 2001 after years of social pressure from the social movements. It was based on the idea of *The Right to the City*. The concept was first used by the French sociologist Henri Lefebvre in his 1967 book *Le Droit à la Ville* (H. Lefebvre, 1967), but has been elaborated by a number of other researchers after him, most prominently by the American geographer David Harvey. The right to the city is an effective formulation of a set of demands, and is more an idea than a consistent theory. However the writings of scholars such as Lefebvre and Harvey are often referred to as *critical urban theory*. Critical urban theory insists that another, more democratic and sustainable urbanization is possible, even if this process is currently suppressed by the current practice (Brenner, 2009). To claim the right to the city is thus to claim some kind of shaping over the

processes of urbanization (Harvey, 2012). When Lefebvre wrote about the right to the city, he was quite clear on that it was not the right to the existing city that is demanded, but the right to *a future city* (Marcuse, 2009). A right which is both a cry and a demand, a cry out of necessity and a demand for something more (Marcuse, 2009). The right to the city stresses the need to restructure the existing power relations that underlie the production of *urban space*, shifting control away from capital and the state and toward urban inhabitants (Purcell, 2002).

The right to the city is far more than the individual liberty to access urban resources: it is a right to change ourselves by changing the city. It is, moreover, a common rather than an individual right since this transformation inevitably depends upon the exercise of a collective power to reshape the processes of urbanization. The freedom to make and remake our cities and ourselves is, I want to argue, one of the most precious yet most neglected of our human rights (Harvey, 2010: 1).

The City Statute has three guiding principles; the concept of social function of the city and property, fair distribution of the costs and benefits of the urbanization, and democratic management of the city (Rodrigues & Barbosa, 2010). The law was intended to create a new urban order and equity in the large cities.

The City Statute required municipal authorities to create Master Plans (*Plano Diretor*), which created widespread mobilization within the social movements to participate in designing it (Rodrigues & Barbosa, 2010). The roofless movement began to demand participation in the whole process of urban planning. The social function of property, outlined in both the Constitution and in the City Statute, is now subordinated The Master Plans. Concerning housing, the Master Plans opened for the implementation of so called ZEIS, Zones of Special Social Interest. Some of these zones were situated in central districts, which had been abandoned and thereafter occupied; other zones were in the periphery. The idea of the ZEIS was to encourage public and private investment for financing quality social housing to attract new residents. Popular participation in the process was required (Rodrigues & Barbosa, 2010).

When José Serra (PSDB) succeeded Marta Suplicy in 2004, most of the programs she had started closed, and many of the advancements accomplished in 2002 with the Master Plan was

brought down. Only a few of the projects that were almost completed were upheld (Bruna & Gouveia, 2008).

4.6 PT to power

While PT lost power in São Paulo, The Workers Party (PT) had come to presidential power for the first time in history, when Lula was elected president in 2002. 2003 marked a shift in Brazilian history, when PT entered the presidential office. Decades of mobilization and social struggle was the basis of the victory, and prolonged support from trade unions and the social movements. The Landless Workers Movement (MST) was perhaps the most important social movement in this sense, as they with their more than one million members mobilized the electorate to vote for PT (Biekart, 2005). PT has traditionally been favorable of the social movements in the country, and many roofless organizations have had close ties to the party. In this sense the political change was seen as a turn to more openness towards the roofless movement. PT has historically had many voters within the low-income sectors and the social movements and many of these voters had high hopes for what was now going to happen.

With Lula in power, one can once again see signs of a more coherent and stable housing strategy (Cardoso et al., 2011). In the second half of 2008 the Brazilian government started to take moves in response to the global financial crisis. Housing rose to become an important instrument to appease the crisis. By assisting the most affected sectors, mainly the infrastructure sector including constructing, the government hoped to decrease the negative effects on Brazilian economy (Cardoso et al., 2011). Thus, in March 2009 the government announced the new housing program *Minha Casa Minha Vida* (MCMV), My House, My Life.

MCMV is primarily funded through the Growth Acceleration Program (PAC), a federal infrastructure-upgrading program. The *Caixa*, the government owned bank, is responsible for contracting entrepreneurs. The Caixa is also responsible for selecting the participants in housing projects, together with the municipal housing authorities (SEHAB), and for supervising the financial transactions between the government and the participating individuals. Initially the program was meant to provide housing for seven million people living under sub-optimal conditions, with a budget of 34 billion BRL⁷ to construct one million houses (Valença & Bonates, 2010).

⁷ Approximately 11,3 billion USD, 02.05.2015.

Minha Casa Minha Vida has received widespread attention, also internationally. Together with social programs such as *Bolsa Família* (Family Allowance) and *Fome Zero* (Zero Hunger), MCMV has been part of “the sunshine story”, where Lula according to the World Bank (2010) has lifted 20 million people out of poverty between 2003 and 2009. In Brazil, however, the popularity of the program is far from unanimously. The roofless movement has been one of its big critics. Following private company logic, the MCMV has suffered from the idea of “the more we build for the less money, the better”. In this way many families have ended up with small houses/apartments (minimum floor area is 32 square meters) with bad quality (Valença & Bonates, 2010). Instead of turning the bonus in production back into the housing projects, the bonus is converted into company profits (Cardoso et al., 2011). It has become a “housing project governed by a business logic” (Cardoso et al., 2011: 5). What turned out to be an efficient policy against financial crisis, and create jobs, was not necessarily an efficient housing policy (Cardoso et al., 2011: 5).

While Lula had come to power nationally, the political right kept in power in São Paulo. Following José Serra (PSDB) as mayor of São Paulo was Gilberto Kassab from PSD. He was in office as mayor from 2006 – 2013. It would take 10 years from Lula came to power, until São Paulo again elected a PT mayor. In 2013 Fernando Haddad (PT) was elected mayor of São Paulo, as of today he is still in office. While PT is back in office in São Paulo municipality, the governor remains right wing. The current governor is Geraldo Alckmin (PSDB). Political and administrative discontinuity is a constant challenge for the city development municipality of São Paulo. There is no long-term strategy, a problem that also concerns the roofless movement.

Today metropolitan São Paulo has a population of more than 19 million people, living in 38 municipalities. The municipality of São Paulo itself has a population of 11,9 million people (IBGE, 2014). While the city of São Paulo has continued to grow, the status of the city center has been on a decline; the elites have moved out of the center, to the south-west, and elite businesses likewise (Earle, 2012). The unpopularity of the city center has left empty buildings as a symptom. According to the Census record from 2010, 290 000 residential properties were empty, in addition to these abandoned office buildings, factories and hotels (O Estado de São Paulo, 2010b). In Brazil in total, 6.1 million houses were vacant in 2010 (IBGE, 2010b). Even though the roofless movement historically has been most active in the periphery, it is today most active in the center.

One may argue that it was the states inadequate response to the massive population growth that has left São Paulo in the present situation; hundreds of thousands living under precarious conditions and between 50 and 65 per cent of the land illegally or irregularly occupied (Earle, 2012). If the inadequate response was deliberate, it definitely cemented the segregated city, where poor workers were left to live in the outskirts, where zoning and planning laws did not apply (Earle, 2012). The monopoly power of private owners has left the poor in an unfavorable situation. The scarcity of land has left the owners in a situation where speculation is extremely affordable, leaving property prices and rental prices sky high. The mega city São Paulo is heavily affected by housing speculation, which recently has drastically increased the rental costs. From January 2008 to December 2012 the average house prices rose by 159% (98% inflation-adjusted) (Global Property Guide, 2014). This has worsened the situation for people already struggling to pay their rent. For many people the prices have been unbearable, and left many roofless.

5 THE ROOFLESS MOVEMENT IN SAO PAULO

5.1 A diverse and strong movement

The roofless movement remains the most organized popular struggle within the urban social movements in Brazil (da Glória Gohn, 2014). Since it emerged in the beginning of the 1980s, the majority of the movement has maintained strong bonds to PT. Trabalhador-Sem-Teto and Sem-Teto are far from the only organized SMOs within the roofless movement of São Paulo. To make an exhaustive list of all SMOs is almost an impossible task, as many SMOs are short-lived, others have emerged, but then decided to merge with existing SMOs, and others have just recently been established. *União dos Movimentos de Moradia* (UMM), and *Frente de Luta por Moradia* (FLM), who are often referred to as if they were independent organizations, are in fact collectives or coalitions who unite separate SMOs who struggle for housing. Together with Trabalhador-Sem-Teto these are the most important forces in the present roofless movement. Sem-Teto is important as they represent a fundamentally different approach than the majority of the other SMOs, and thus challenge the existing “order”. Table 2 on the following page is an attempt to capture the most important roofless SMOs in São Paulo of today, however it should be noted that the table is not exhaustive.

Since the roofless movement emerged in the beginning of the 1980s a part of the movement has turned rather institutionalized, affecting through juridical work. The victory of the City Statute is a result of this kind of pressure. Others have turned to NGOs for support, and mostly fight for redevelopment of favelas, against evictions and removals, and to increase delivery of governmental programs. The third strand is SMOs characterized by widespread occupation, both in the center and in the periphery, and both public and private property (da Glória Gohn, 2014). This is what is here referred to as the roofless movement.

The roofless movement of São Paulo is today comprised of a conglomerate of tenfold of different SMOs who occupy, characterized among other things by complicated abbreviations. They are very visible, both because of the hundreds of different occupations, but also because of frequent demonstrations in the city center. The roofless movement must be seen as an important political actor, with potentially huge influence on housing politics.

Table 2:

Roofless organizations/SMOs:	Comments:
Movimento dos Trabalhadores Sem-Teto (MTST)	<p>Emanated from MST in 1997. Still strong bonds to the mother organization, but is now autonomous.</p> <p>Historical ties to PT, now also receive strong support from far left parties such as PSOL.</p> <p>Officially supported Dilma Rousseff (PT) in her 2014 presidential election campaign, but claim to have no formal ties to the party.</p>
União dos Movimentos de Moradia (UMM)	<p>Established in 1987.</p> <p>National union of various SMOs from different parts of the country. Close ties to PT.</p>
Frente de Luta por Moradia (FLM)	<p>Union, established in 2004. Close ties to PT. Consists of the following SMOs:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Unificação das Lutas de Cortiços e Moradia (ULCM) • Movimento Sem-Teto do Centro (MSTC) • Movimento de Moradia da Região do Centro (MMRC) • Fórum de Moradia e Meio Ambiente do Estado de São Paulo (Fomaesp) • Fórum de Mutirões • Associação de Mutirões • Movimento Quintais e Cortiços da Região a Mooca • Movimento Terra de Nossa Gente • Sem-Teto pela Reforma Urbana • Movimento de Moradia da Zona Norte • Movimento Centro-Norte
Movimento Sem-Teto do São Paulo (MSTS)	<p>Established in 2012 and erupted from FLM in 2013.</p> <p>Supports PSDB at a local level.</p>
Movimento de Moradia para Todos (MMPT)	Erupted from FLM, but remain close ties to FLM and PT.
Movimento dos Sem-Teto do Ipiranga (MSTI)	Alleged bonds to PSDB. Supported José Serra during his rally for mayor in 2012.

Table 2: Overview of SMOs within the roofless movement in São Paulo.

The following section will present the findings for this research broken down to the two subcases, the SMOs; Trabalhador-Sem-Teto and Sem-Teto. The findings are for the most part based on interviews with the informants, which will give insight into how the two SMOs operate, and how the members perceive the actions of their respective SMO. The chapter also contains findings based on media content. The chapter will be divided in two; first the

findings concerning Trabalhador-Sem-Teto, and then findings concerning Sem-Teto. Additional findings are added at the end of the chapter.

The findings are organized according to the main analytical concepts outlined in chapter 2; resource mobilization, political opportunity structure and collective identity. The role of leadership in the two SMOs will also be explored. A summary of the main findings is to be found at the end of the chapter, in Table 3 on page 59.

5.2 Movimento dos Trabalhadores Sem-Teto, MTST (“Trabalhador-Sem-Teto”)

The Roofless Workers Movement (MTST - *Movimento dos Trabalhadores Sem-Teto*) is the biggest roofless organization in Brazil, and organizes approximately 100 000 people in São Paulo alone, according to the movement itself (G. Boulos, personal communication, 2014). The organization has a long history that can be traced back to the establishment of their mother organization, The Landless Workers Movement, *Movimento sem Terra* (MST), in 1984. The actual establishment of Trabalhador-Sem-Teto was not until 1997, but the organizational structure was already well elaborated within MST when the organization was born. They still maintain close bonds to MST, but have been an autonomous organization since the beginning. The two organizations have similar ways of organizing themselves, but as opposed to MST, striving for rural reform, Trabalhador-Sem-Teto strives for urban reform. The organization has a clear political ideology, placed on the political left side. Although they are often portrayed as, or accused of, having formal ties to the Workers Party PT, the organization deny such ties, and claim to be autonomous from political party politics. They concentrate their work in the periphery by occupying deserted land. This way Trabalhador-Sem-Teto differentiates themselves from most other roofless SMOs, who are mostly occupying abandoned buildings the center.

Trabalhador-Sem-Teto received international attention in 2014, when they occupied abandoned land close to the Itaquera football stadium in São Paulo, where the 2014 Football World Cup was to have its kickoff. The occupation fittingly held the name *Copa do Povo* – The Peoples Cup. Today Trabalhador-Sem-Teto holds 17 occupations in the region of São Paulo, ranging from 100 participating families to 8000. Currently Trabalhador-Sem-Teto’s biggest occupation within the municipality of São Paulo is *Nova Palestina* – New Palestine,

situated far south in the periphery, in Jardim Angela (see picture in the appendix). This occupation has been the base for this research of Trabalhador-Sem-Teto.

Jardim Angela, 29th of November, 2013: The huge, abandoned piece of land stretches itself over a small hilltop far south in São Paulo. On one side, a small, beautiful river running into a small lake. On the other, a recently opened ecological park, with paths between the tall trees. Both surrounded by favelas⁸. The area, one square kilometer dry clay ground in total, was once owned by three cousins with military rank. Two of the cousins have passed away, and the piece of land has been left abandoned for more than a decade. That era is now to be closed. Lurking around in the darkness are people carrying big plastic bags, lumber, old tree doors and corrugated iron. They are many, and there are more to come. At the end of the long night, the land has been filled with sheds, and red flags have been hoisted. The land has been occupied, and gotten its name: Nova Palestina (description based on informal conversations).

This happening is characteristic of how Trabalhador-Sem-Teto operates. In this case 8000 families were mobilized, and Nova Palestina became Trabalhador-Sem-Teto's currently biggest occupation.

Resource mobilization

Trabalhador-Sem-Teto occupies in the periphery of urban areas, but also identify with the periphery. Many of their occupations are outside of São Paulo municipality, in surrounding municipalities in the outskirts of São Paulo. Abandoned land in the urban periphery, which does not fulfill its social function, is carefully pointed out as target for occupation. These areas are places where many people live in precarious conditions, areas who have not been prioritized in city planning. The quality of public transport⁹, health care and education is poor and there are few formal job opportunities. Before the actual occupation the area of interest has been thoroughly researched to detail. This way negotiation with the government for housing projects at the occupied soil can start immediately. Details are kept secret, so that no one is able to stop them, and activists are mobilized to participate just before the actual occupation. Members who have participated in earlier occupations participate in new occupations, and new activists are mobilized through word of mouth. Often members recruit

⁸ Favelas are informal settlements by low-income population, characterized by lack of public services. Often referred to as "slums", even though this word does not cover the phenomenon well.

⁹ To get from the city center of São Paulo (Praça República) to the occupation Nova Palestina requires three metro changes, in addition to a busride. The stretch may take four hours one way in rush traffic.

relatives and friends, and normally participants in an occupation belong to the neighborhood where land is occupied. Guilherme Boulos (personal communication, October 9, 2014) explains how Trabalhador-Sem-Teto identify themselves with the periphery:

*The periphery is where the poor are in play. They are segregated regions with little public services. That is the face of the periphery. And that is why it has a lot of potential. There has been a lot of resistance there. (...) We emerged in the periphery*¹⁰.

Most members of Trabalhador-Sem-Teto participate in the organization because of necessity. A minority of the members are so-called *social activists*, who are not roofless. Most members of Trabalhador-Sem-Teto are workers from the periphery, who have poorly paid jobs in the informal sector, or are currently unemployed. Many are single mothers with little education. Some are migrants from the northeast of Brazil, who have come to São Paulo in search for a better life. Some have been living on the street. Some are disabled, and unable to work. They live in risk areas, often share housing with their parents or other relatives, and it is common to spend as much as 80 percent of the income on housing (J. Basso, personal communication, October 23, 2014). A common denominator for these people is a sense of falling outside of society, and little knowledge about how to change their own situation.

As many roofless are also poorly educated, Trabalhador-Sem-Teto sees it as their responsibility to educate their activists about what rights they have. Local coordinator Bete in Nova Palestina explains that they have meetings within the occupation where people are educated in their rights. “We teach people about their rights, this is how we recruit” (Bete, personal communication, November 11, 2014). 34-year-old Maria, a dweller in Nova Palestina, was recruited this way. She completed primary school, but never completed secondary. When she became pregnant at 18, she quit school. She hopes her children will be able to get a better education than she did, and blames poor education for lack of knowledge about her rights:

My 9-year-old son has told me that when he grows up, he wants to be a militant. Sometimes he pretends to hold a microphone and pretends to lead an assembly. (...) Did you think the same way when you were 9? No, I knew nothing. I did not know

¹⁰ All the interviews have been transcribed and translated by me.

about my rights. But now I know, and I teach my children (personal communication, October 23, 2014).

Local coordinator and mother of two, Bete (30) agrees:

My motive is to show my son why I am here, and teach him about his rights. When he grows up he will show his children his struggle, and tell them “Your grandmother was here, she fought for you” (personal communication, November 11, 2014).

Fulfilling fundamental rights is at the backbone of Trabalhador-Sem-Teto’s goals. In the words of regional coordinator Jussara Basso: “What is the ultimate goal of Trabalhador-Sem-Teto? Rights, rights, rights” (personal communication, October 23, 2014). But in addition to the mere right of housing, Trabalhador-Sem-Teto educates people in their rights in general. Housing is seen as a gate opener to fulfill more of these rights. A clear finding is that even though Trabalhador-Sem-Teto is part of the roofless movement, housing is not their ultimate goal. Their frame extension is successful; they are able to connect housing to other basic rights in an effective manner. As pointed out in their principles:

Trabalhador-Sem-Teto fights for housing, and is an organization of roofless. The right to housing is the central banner of our organization. But it is not the only one: the worker which does not have access to the right to decent housing – the roofless – does not either have the right to education, to health care, public transport, basic infrastructure in their neighborhood and a lot of other necessities (MTST, 2013).

The number of members in the organization is a huge benefit and strength for Trabalhador-Sem-Teto, and the organization continuously work to mobilize more people, and create new land occupations. The most common way of getting involved is by word of mouth. Some relative or friend has heard about a new occupation and convinces other people to join. Trabalhador-Sem-Teto’s occupations are characterized by being thoroughly organized, down to every little detail. To keep an organization with around 100 000 members efficient, requires order. Trabalhador-Sem-Teto is a clear hierarchical organization, with a national coordinator, state coordinators, coordinators at the municipality level, a coordinator for each occupation, and several coordinators within each occupation, most of them women. There is a difference

between ordinary members and the *militantes*¹¹ in the organization. Militants normally have more responsibility, acquired through long and faithful service, and organizational schooling. Within the occupations each shed that has been put up is numbered B1, B2, B3 and so on (“B” for *barraco* – shed). The sheds are made of material that the activists have found, such as plastic bags, wooden planks, old posters and so on. All the sheds belong to a certain group, called “G’s”. Each G has a communal kitchen, and a coordinator for each G is responsible for holding account of the members belonging to it.

Being part of a Trabalhador-Sem-Teto occupation does not necessarily mean to be living on the actual occupied land. An occupation is considered to be all the people taking part in the process, both dwellers and others. While 8000 families are considered part of Nova Palestina, and have built their own shed within the occupation, only approximately 300 families actually live in the camp (Bete, personal communication, November 11, 2014). The others are participating because they have interest in being part of the group that may be elected to receive housing. There are however certain requirements to be considered a member of an occupation, regular presence being one of them. Those who participate in an occupation without residing in it, have to keep in regular touch with the physical occupation. Therefore each “G” keeps lists where members sign their presence. 30 days leave in a row qualifies for dismissal from the occupation, unless the member has good and documented reasons for absence, such as illness. The members are in addition expected to participate in all common activities, such as demonstrations and assemblies. Assemblies are held every Monday night at 19. At these meetings the members are informed about the political involvement of the occupation, what kind of discussion there has been with the government, and they plan coming activities, such as demonstrations, parties, assemblies. More everyday issues are also discussed, such as how to provide enough food, what to construct, or how take care of security. The meetings are conducted by the coordination, but all members have the right to participate and contribute with their opinions. “There is hierarchy in organizing, but not in command”, claims regional leader Jussara Basso (personal communication, October 23, 2014), and adds: “we have no leader, but are a collective who take joint decisions”.

¹¹ A *militante* is a person who is vigorously active in support of a cause, often a political cause. A militant may in some contexts be expected to be more confrontational or aggressive than an activist that is not militant. In this context, and throughout the thesis, a militant should be understood as an activist who devotes most of his or her time to the struggle.

Despite the huge number of members, Trabalhador-Sem-Teto is an organization with few financial resources. Trabalhador-Sem-Teto does not charge their members any money for participating in the movement, but all members have to contribute with alimentation or other products that the collective might need. They receive some financial support from NGOs and the church¹², but most of the daily operation of the organization is based on donations and voluntary work (G. Boulos, personal communication, October 9, 2014). The occupations hold a library with donated books, and a shelf with donated clothes, where members can help themselves. None of the activists or militants in the organization receives remuneration, not even the coordination; most members are ordinary workers, and part time activists. However, some activists spend all their time in their occupation, and are unemployed. This has several explanations; some simply struggle to find a job. Others do not earn enough from their job to be able to pay for both rent and childcare and thus find staying in the occupation with their children as a better option. Also, it is tempting to stay in the occupation as there are no expenses and members are granted both a roof and alimentation. Trabalhador-Sem-Teto therefore potentially attracts people with no money at all, as they do not charge their members money for participating. On one side, this is a positive aspect of the organization; it does not differentiate between people. On the other hand one may look at it as a way of pacifying people. Some members, who have had a job, and in this way contributed to society, have chosen to quit their job to be a full time activist.

Political opportunity structure

Because of their historical ties and history, a frequent allegation against Trabalhador-Sem-Teto is that they have close ties to PT. Some even claim that there are financial bonds between the party and Trabalhador-Sem-Teto, an accusation that in general is held against the SMOs within the roofless movement. The accusations are not difficult to understand, for several reasons. When asked what party they voted for in the presidential elections, all the informants from Trabalhador-Sem-Teto for this research answered that they voted PT (personal communication). Whether they were urged to vote for PT by the coordination or not, remains unclear, but what is clear is that the organization decided to officially support Dilma Rousseff (PT) at the end of her 2014 presidential campaign, when it seemed to be a close race between Rousseff and Aécio Neves (PSDB). Trabalhador-Sem-Teto participated in several election events, and manifestations during her election campaign. When confronted with this regional coordinator Jussara Basso explains their choice as: “*Entre ruim e pior*

¹² He does not explicitly refer to specific NGOs or churches.

ficamos com ruim” – “Between bad and worse, we stick to bad” (personal communication, October 23, 2014).

The coordination denies any official affiliation with the party PT. They claim to prefer to stay independent. They do not believe that the solution is to be found within the party politics, according to Basso:

Many people believe we have close ties, but no. (...) We do not view elections as a process of change. We will never find a political coalition that will meet our goals. We want political reform! (...) This year we chose to support Dilma in the elections because Aécio Neves could seize power. But we will continue to demonstrate against her as well (personal communication, October 23, 2014).

A municipal councilor from the far left political party PSOL claims that Trabalhador-Sem-Teto sometimes contacts both his party and PT to ask for concrete financial support for some cause, but claims that their relation is different than the other SMOs who he claims have become dependent on financial support from PT.

Trabalhador-Sem-Teto is not this way. We in PSOL view Trabalhador-Sem-Teto with more affection than many of the other roofless organizations. They did not create a financial relation to solve their issues. But sometimes they will ask us for financial support for a certain, concrete cause. I view this support as legitimate and correct. But these issues are flammable (T. Vespoli, personal communication, December 9, 2014).

An advisor to a PT municipal councilor admits that PT supports many of the roofless SMOs¹³, but denies that they support any SMO with direct remittances. He claims the support goes as far as paying for things such as buses to demonstrations or production of pamphlets, but adds:

It is no goal for us that the roofless movement should be a part of the party. The relationship was stronger when PT was in opposition, because we were both in

¹³ He is not concrete on which SMOs in our personal communication.

opposition. Today, with PT in office, it is different. There is no dependence (E. Mineiro, personal communication, December 19, 2014).

As the municipal councilor from PSOL mentions; “these issues are flammable”. Dependence between political parties and social movements is a taboo, as the social movements lose autonomy when they are coopted. If a social movement is coopted to a large degree, the result may be a division and weakening of the movement as such, a non-wanted development for Trabalhador-Sem-Teto, as their more radical demands then will be eradicated. There is however little doubt that gaining a position in PT may be tempting for individuals in the roofless movement, both because of status, and because it may represent a proper wage.

It is clear that many members of Trabalhador-Sem-Teto vote for PT, but when asked whether there are members of Trabalhador-Sem-Teto who have positions within PT, Guilherme Boulos answers that no one from Trabalhador-Sem-Teto are standing for election, but that some are now working within the municipality for PT (personal communication, October 9, 2014). He does however not want to give any names on these people, and claims that he himself has no other political ambitions than continuing his struggle within Trabalhador-Sem-Teto.

Trabalhador-Sem-Teto has chosen to remove themselves from the other SMOs, and currently have no formal bonds to the other SMOs within the roofless movement of São Paulo. Instead they are members of various networks, one of these being *Resistência Urbana*, Urban Resistance, a national movement that fights for urban reform and the rights for urban workers. They also keep close ties to *Coletivo Juntos*¹⁴, and *Passe Livre*¹⁵. According to Guilherme Boulos he would like to keep closer bonds to the other roofless SMOs, but explains the reason for the absence of cooperation with different ideology.

We would like an alliance with these [other SMOs], but our visions are too different. The ideology as well? Yes, we are clear about being anti-capitalists. Our rights can only be secured by fundamental changes. Thus we are not a housing organization per se, but a broader organization. This makes us stand out from the other SMOs (personal communication, October 9, 2014).

¹⁴ National youth movement. More about the movement here: <http://juntos.org.br/> (accessed 20th April 2015).

¹⁵ The free fare movement. More about the movement here: <http://mpl.org.br/> (accessed 20th April 2015)

It is clear that Trabalhador-Sem-Teto differ from the other SMOs: they occupy in the periphery, they have a huge number of members, they claim to be autonomous of political parties; they are trying to find “their own way”, as Jussara Basso puts it:

We are a pressure group, and seek to find our own way. (...) There are meeting points [with the other SMOs], although we have stronger ties to other urban movements, such as Passe Livre, Coletivo Juntos and Resistência Urbana (personal communication, October 23, 2014).

One may claim that this “own way” has made it easier for Trabalhador-Sem-Teto to enter into agreements with the authorities, than for other SMOs. It seems as if there is a fair chance of getting a house through Trabalhador-Sem-Teto as they have been successful when it comes to achievement of housing projects. In 2014 the municipality assigned housing projects for two of Trabalhador-Sem-Teto’s largest occupations; Copa do Povo and Nova Palestina.

MCMV Entidades was created after pressure from the roofless movement, and comprises 2 percent of all the MCMV projects that are carried out. MCMV Entidades is directed towards families with less than 1600 BRL in income monthly, and thus fits well for Trabalhador-Sem-Teto’s social profile. The difference between MCMV 1, 2 and 3 and MCMV Entidades, is the extent to which the movement itself participates in the process; it encourages cooperative participation. MCMV Entidades allows the SMOs to take the initiative to choose the project, contract an entrepreneur, construct the houses and choose who should live in them. The program is thus not in favor of the entrepreneur, but in favor of the movement itself. They can themselves decide the size of each apartment and where they should be built. According to Guilherme Boulos (personal communication, October 9, 2014) Trabalhador-Sem-Teto are able to build apartments of 75 square meters, when other entrepreneurs build 40 square meters. “The profit that the entrepreneurs normally are left with, are put into the houses instead”, he points out (G. Boulos, personal communication, October 9, 2014).

Trabalhador-Sem-Teto in general seems to be very critical towards the MCMV project, but MCMV Entidades is one small strand of the project that fits the movement well. Guilherme Boulos explains the criticism:

MCMV was not created to solve the problem. It was not created as a housing program, but rather an economical project, created to benefit the huge companies. (...) The logic [of the program] is private, and is part of a privatization of the housing policy. The constructors decide everything; they conduct everything, with no care for urban planning. It is about lucrativeness, not quality. Most houses are built in the periphery and are of poor quality. In this sense the project is very bad and urbanistically terrible. The program needs a fundamental change to become a popular program (G. Boulos, personal communication, October 9, 2014).

The process from an occupation is carried out until houses are built can take many years. Some members participate in various occupations before they are granted a house, even though the idea is that people who participate in an occupation are granted housing in the housing project that is planned for the land they have acquired. The reason for this is that a huge occupation may get a housing project with relatively few housing units, or an occupation may be unsuccessful and not lead to any houses at all. When an occupation succeeds, however, the idea is that the community the members have created within the occupation will live on when the members get their homes. But even if many members of Trabalhador-Sem-Teto acquire housing after participating in the organization for some years, the struggle is not over. Members are expected to continue the struggle to better the local environment surrounding the housing project, such as better transportation, healthcare and education system, and to acquire more housing projects for those who are still roofless¹⁶. The name of Trabalhador-Sem-Teto's occupations often has names that even tie them to the global struggle. They struggle for a more equal Brazil, and ultimately, a more equal world. Nova Palestina bring our minds to the Middle East, and the struggle for land for the Palestinian people. Another example is *Faixa de Gaza*, the Gaza Strip, another of Trabalhador-Sem-Teto's occupations (J. Basso, personal communication, October 23, 2014).

Collective identity

As with the names of the occupations, symbols play an important part in all activities organized by Trabalhador-Sem-Teto. In the assemblies, who are carried out once a week, the red Trabalhador-Sem-Teto-flag is always present. Slogans are frequently proclaimed, such as “*MTST – a luta é pra valer!*” – “MTST – the fight is for real”. *Misticas* are also an important

¹⁶ Nova Palestina was granted a housing project in the middle of 2014. When the project was launched at the one-year anniversary for the occupation, the members were told that the next struggle was to achieve a metro line out into the periphery, where Nova Palestina is situated.

part of any Trabalhador-Sem-Teto activity. The word is untranslatable, but refers to a (often nonverbal) performance, drawing on Christian mysticism, that incorporates themes central to the goals of the organization, and is a way of affirming confidence in the struggle. The *mística* is intended to create a collective identity among the group members. By requiring members to take part in such regular activities, the members keep active and in close contact with other activists. They get to know each other well and create a feeling of good fellowship. They are also constantly reminded about the *luta*¹⁷, and how they are fighting to succeed.

The collective identity within Trabalhador-Sem-Teto cannot be underestimated. It is in fact a motivation to continue the struggle for many of the members. The members of Trabalhador-Sem-Teto have a very strong organizational affiliation. The informants for this research report that they joined Trabalhador-Sem-Teto by coincidence, but that they have been “absorbed” into the organization. Being part of the organization has become a lifestyle, an activity for life. Local coordinator Bete (personal communication, November 11, 2014) intends to continue the struggle indefinitely: “I will not refrain. I will never refrain from the organization. I will continue until God asks me to stop, for all the others who need housing, transport...”. Dweller Daniel, a father of six who has been spending 10 years of his life living on the street, experiences a sense of fellowship that he has been looking for earlier in his life:

Trabalhador-Sem-Teto is like a family. It is what I have been looking for. We are a collective. We discuss and debate. We may disagree, but we only quarrel with words. Trabalhador-Sem-Teto is like smoking a cigarette for the first time. You get addicted. It is Trabalhador-Sem-Teto to death (Daniel, personal communication, November 11, 2014).

Members of Trabalhador-Sem-Teto highlight how much Trabalhador-Sem-Teto has meant to them and their lives, how important the commitment to the organization is. They are drilled in organizational slogans and participate in an array of different organizational events. They *are* Trabalhador-Sem-Teto. Members give an impression that it is quite random that they entered this specific organization, but members of Trabalhador-Sem-Teto are incorporated into a big *family*. Many members of Trabalhador-Sem-Teto report however, that they had little or no knowledge about Trabalhador-Sem-Teto before they were convinced to join an occupation.

¹⁷ Portuguese for struggle.

They even had prejudices and were skeptical of the organization, as they based their impression on what they had heard from the media. Despite this, they interpreted joining the organization as an opportunity. They had little to lose. Many portray how being a member of Trabalhador-Sem-Teto has changed their life. For the first time many of the members felt that they were part of a community based on respect and equality. Some describe it as becoming part of a family. Being part of the community is a good in itself.

It may seem as if those who experience Trabalhador-Sem-Teto as a new family and as a collective with common identity, find it easier to stay, than those who don't. Some simply find it too difficult to stay in an occupation. Life in an occupation is hard. You have to live on few resources, below sheds of bad quality in pouring rain and burning sun, and constant threat of eviction and repression. Since the beginning of the occupation, several families have left because it became too tough. According to Trabalhador-Sem-Teto's regional coordinator, Jussara Basso, Trabalhador-Sem-Teto has also had recurring problems with the police forces:

We face a lot of repression, also from the police. From time to time the police repression is even armed. They claim to look for drug dealers and such. In Portal de Povo¹⁸ in Morumbi we were forcefully thrown out, it was very violent. The military police is commanded by the state [of São Paulo], they don't let us do many things. In our occupations we have strategies to keep them out. We don't want any confrontations (personal communication, October 23, 2014).

Living under these conditions, often with children, is tough. In addition, many members experience prejudices. Informants, such as Maria in Nova Palestina, underpin this: "When I tell people that I am part of Trabalhador-Sem-Teto, some people tell me I am a bum. But I answer them that I am not a bum, I am a worker" (personal communication, October 23, 2014). She has also experienced how parents at her son's school are negative to her having her children living in the occupation. "I told them that they could come visit. Have a picnic here. Many don't know what the reality is like in here, it is well organized and safe". Members of Trabalhador-Sem-Teto are constantly faced with attitudes like these. Some cannot stand it. In the words of local coordinator Bete: "Those who are still here have been strong, thank God. It is hard to live here because many don't want us here. The strong stay,

¹⁸ One of MTST's land occupations.

the weak leave. The strong resist, the weak walk away” (personal communication, November 11, 2014).

The collective identity cannot, however, fully account for members’ participation and endurance in the movement. There are other incentives to be an active member of Trabalhador-Sem-Teto, apart from it being a social meeting point, and a place to temporarily reside. Those who participate actively are prioritized in the housing line, when the organization successfully acquires housing projects. National coordinator Guilherme Boulos has no qualms with electing people this way:

Naturally we prioritize the most active members. This is a legitimate way of selection and justified by all the members in the organization. There is no obligation to participate, those who want to participate do, and those who don’t want to don’t (personal communication, October 9, 2014).

Leadership

Although the organization claims to be hierarchical in organization, but not in command, there is little doubt about that the coordination take important decisions which not all members can take part in. This comes to choices as of where to occupy, how to communicate with media, who to send to negotiations with the government and so on. Several of the informants for this research however, who are dwellers and not militants, explain that they prefer to have it like this. They trust the coordination to do informed choices, and do not want to be closer tied to the decision-making. When asked whether she receives enough information from the coordination, dweller Ana, an unemployed single mother, answers: “I prefer that the coordination pass the information on to us, I get enough information through them” (personal communication, November 18, 2014). Dweller Ediana agrees. On question on whether she would like to be a part of the coordination, she answers: ”I prefer to be a bit on the side” (personal communication, November 18, 2014).

The coordination and the militants are trained in political issues, and are thus well capable of doing informed choices. National coordinator Boulos is even known to be an intellectual. Unlike most of Trabalhador-Sem-Teto’s members, he is not a roofless, but decided to take part in Trabalhador-Sem-Teto when he was a philosophy student at the university. He is son of two doctors and from the middle class. This is a feature that characterizes several activists

in the organization, people Boulos terms *social activists*. These activists typically come from the student movement or from the union. Militants and social activists in Trabalhador-Sem-Teto often use the concept of the right to the city in their rhetoric, when talking about housing politics. Boulos often attends meetings and seminars where he discusses the right to the city; during this research I attended two such meetings¹⁹. In the invitation for one of these events the following questions were posed: “For whom are the cities built? What are the economic and political interests that drive their development? And how do popular strands resist the force of money that raises and destroy beautiful things?” (Monteiro, 2014). These kinds of events are open to the public, but normally attended by academics, students and the media. This is a typical example of successful frame bridging; Trabalhador-Sem-Teto has incorporated a rhetoric produced by other sectors of public opinion, than the roofless typically belong to.

Most militants, however, are roofless who want to continue the struggle for other than themselves. The heterogeneous militancy in Trabalhador-Sem-Teto may make it easier to attract support from civil society. One way to acquire this is through media. Boulos’ educated manner of expressing himself grants him important space in the media. He does for instance have his regular column in the newspaper Folha de São Paulo, where he addresses current issues (Folha de São Paulo, 2015a). The space in media is in general, however, still limited, and one of Trabalhador-Sem-Teto’s political goals is therefore media reform. Boulos explains why:

We are looking for space within the big media. The monopoly within the big media, however, makes the access very restricted. The social movements in general are left with little space. The biggest criminalization is not from the police, but by journalists, and generally by people negative towards our work. These kinds of perceptions legitimize criminalization (personal communication, October 9, 2014).

This is not to say that the movements never enter the media stage, as mentioned Trabalhador-Sem-Teto’s national leader is quite well at acquiring space in the media. Also, naturally, Trabalhador-Sem-Teto’s occupations reaches the big media whenever they occupy, as their occupations are big and very visible. They are impossible to overlook. The problem is how

¹⁹ The complete programs can be found here: <http://www.31biental.org.br/pt/events/1637> and here: <https://www.facebook.com/events/1725824894310015/> (accessed 24th March 2015).

they are portrayed. To make sure that Trabalhador-Sem-Teto get unbiased information out to their followers, they are also active in social media. With more than 41 000 followers on their open Facebook page, 2658 in their closed Facebook group and more than 4600 followers on Twitter (as of 19th of April 2015), they reach many people when they mobilize for demonstrations. These social media channels are also tools for keeping people updated on the organizations activities, and are actively used to mobilize. Despite little help from the mainstream media, Trabalhador-Sem-Teto has always had a large amount of members (and is growing), and relatively broad support both in civil society, and among parts of the elite. They are also well respected among the other roofless organizations, among other things for their strategies, and for their strength due to the number of people involved (informal conversations). Demonstrations organized by Trabalhador-Sem-Teto are often very visible and efficient. Being such a big organization, they have a huge advantage, as they are able to mobilize many people from the organization, and from the civil society in general, at short notice. Demonstrations organized by Trabalhador-Sem-Teto may mobilize more than 15 000 people (both members and supporters). In these demonstrations there are likely to be participants from other movements, organizations and political parties as well, such as CUT, PT, PSOL and Colectivo Juntos.

5.3 Movimento dos Sem-Teto do São Paulo, MSTs (“Sem-Teto”)

The Roofless Movement of São Paulo (MSTs – *Movimento dos Sem-Teto do São Paulo*), is an organization that differs from Trabalhador-Sem-Teto in various ways. Despite participating within the same movement, and the similar acronym, Sem-Teto, has little to do with the former. The organization is smaller than Trabalhador-Sem-Teto, organizing approximately 7000 people, according to the movement itself (W. Brito, personal communication, November 27, 2014). Their main method is occupying buildings in the center. The organization arose in the favela Heliópolis in the district Sacomã, under the name Movimento dos Sem Teto do Sacomã, when 12 people decided to occupy a faculty at the University of São Marcos, which had been abandoned for three years. A couple of months later the occupation had attracted 2000 people, according to the organization itself. At this time Sem-Teto were affiliated with the housing union *Frente de Luta por Moradia* (FLM – Front in the Struggle for Housing). In 2013, however, after internal disagreements between the leaders, Sem-Teto decided to erupt from FLM. Officially founded in 2012, Sem-Teto thus makes part of the new wave of organizations that occurred in São Paulo 2012 onwards. The organization has attracted quite a lot of media attention, both because they have occupied

strategic and visible buildings in the center, but also because of their unusual political alliance with the right wing party PSDB.

Rua Conselheiro Crispiano, 1st of November, 2013: São Paulo's venerable cinema, inaugurated in 1952, is situated just between the Municipal Theatre and Avenida São Joao, in the heart of the city center. The 11 floor tall building has an impressive entrance, revealing ancient greatness. It is through this entrance 500 people occupies the cinema and barricades the entrance with wooden plates. Cinema Marrocos falls in the hands of the organization Sem-Teto, who mark their victory with huge banners at the front, covering two columns by the entrance (description based on personal communication).

The organization currently holds seven occupations in São Paulo; the occupation Cinema Marrocos in Rua Conselheiro Crispiano being the largest and most famous of these (see picture in the appendix). It is this occupation that has been the base for this research on the organization. The huge cinema with 11 floors is situated in the heart of São Paulo center, between the Municipal Theatre and the well-known Avenida São João. The municipality bought the building in 2006, with the intention to use it as the Municipal Secretary of Education (Gonçalves, 2014). After 2006, however, the building was left empty, until Sem-Teto occupied the building on the 1st of November 2013. 500 families reside in the building, and in December 2014 the organization was expecting to receive 170 more, around 720 people in total, who had been thrown out of another of Sem-Teto's occupations (W. Brito, personal communication, November 27, 2014).

Resource mobilization

The main repertoire of Sem-Teto is similar to Trabalhador-Sem-Teto. They also occupy. But unlike Trabalhador-Sem-Teto who limits themselves to occupy land, Sem-Teto occupy buildings, mainly in the city center. This way, they resemble the majority of the other SMOs in the roofless movement. Sem-Teto however, has no consistent strategy when it comes to *where* to occupy, at times they occupy in the periphery as well. However, most of their occupations are situated in the city center. The attractive location in the middle of the center is crucial when it comes to mobilizing people. The center is an attractive place to live, but a place where poor people do not have access because of the high rental costs. Many members in Sem-Teto come from the periphery of São Paulo, a good deal of them from the favela Heliópolis, where the organization emerged. Some of these point to the fact that they save

money on transport, and now use 10 minutes to walk to a job they used to spend 2,5 hours each way to get to with public transportation (informal conversations).

Douglas, a lawyer who works for Sem-Teto's legal department, claims that the reason for why the cinema was chosen in particular, was because of its size (personal communication, November 27, 2014). It is able to house a lot of people, and it also used as the organizations headquarter. Living inside Cinema Marrocos resembles living in an ordinary apartment complex, people mostly stay inside their own rooms/apartments, some of which are relatively spacious. Most apartments are organized as ordinary apartments, with a kitchen section, a living room section and a sleeping room section. Most dwellers have a TV, a stove and a refrigerator. Some individuals dispose a separate room, while most dwellers share with their family. In many ways one may say that dwellers in Cinema Marrocos are granted a chance of having decent housing at an attractive location, for as long as they are able to keep the building occupied.

The demography among the dwellers varies a lot. Most dwellers are workers (both informal and formal jobs), who work in the city center and now have a much shorter travel to work than they did before. Some are unemployed or disabled and not able to work. Some are well educated, such as "Kinley" who is a lawyer. He views living in Cinema Marrocos as a way of saving money and ascribes the opportunity to stay in the center as the reason for why he decided to enter this occupation: "I used to pay 1300 BRL for renting an apartment in the center, now I pay 200!" (Personal communication, December 18, 2014). There is also a great deal of immigrants residing in the occupation. People from places such as Senegal, Haiti, Bolivia, and Chile live there. The floors in the building is divided according to ethnicity and sexual orientation, a decision the residents themselves have approved of, according to the leaders (W. Brito, personal communication, November 27, 2014). This has implications for how well the dwellers know each other. People who knew each other from before they entered the occupation, cluster together in groups for practical reasons (such as common language), rather than getting to know the other dwellers.

Most members of Sem-Teto report that the choice of participating in Sem-Teto was coincidental. Many did not know anything about the organization when they joined, and some report that they have been active in other roofless organizations and occupations before. Several informants report that they do not remember the names of the SMOs they used to belong to (informal conversations), which might indicate a low degree of identity connected

to these organizations. The same might be the case for Sem-Teto. The lack of affiliation to the organization itself may result in that dwellers abandon Sem-Teto if life in Cinema Marrocos gets harder (because of for instance repression from the police), if the place gets too crowded or if another roofless SMO can offer a better deal (such as lower rent in a more convenient place).

Sem-Teto charges their members for participation; they finance their costs through rental payment. The organization acknowledges differences in people's income, and the contributions therefore vary between the members. All families in Sem-Teto's occupations must pay a monthly rent, spanning from 80 BRL to 200 BRL per family, depending on income. For these money Sem-Teto provide their services: an apartment with cheap rent, a porteiro who takes care of security, an elevator employee, water and electricity, and general guidance. All the elected members of the coordination also receive remuneration, between 724 BRL up to 1000 BRL each month (W. Brito, personal communication, November 27, 2014). The remuneration is not, however, enough to survive. Most members of the coordination have other jobs apart. The organizations' general secretary, Wladimir Brito, for instance, works as a taxi driver. That Sem-Teto charge their members for participating is not unique, it is in fact a quite standardized method among many SMOs in the center. The grading of payment in relation to income is fair, and 80 BRL in rent for a whole family is affordable in a family where at least one person has a job. However, in an occupation with more than 500 families it is timely to ask what the profits go to.

Political opportunity structure

As opposed to most other roofless organizations in São Paulo, Sem-Teto experience that the dialogue with the municipality is worse after mayor Haddad (PT) came to power. "The dialogue is non-existing!" (W. Brito, personal communication, November 27, 2014). The organization has therefore turned to the governor, Geraldo Alckmin, from PSDB. He has visited the occupation various times, and a wall inside of the occupation is decorated with campaign material for PSDB. The front page on the organizations Facebook page is of José Serra together with president in Sem-Teto, Robson Nascimento Santos. Serra is former governor from PSDB (2007 – 2010), was presidential candidate in 2002, running against Lula, and was mayor of São Paulo between 2005 and 2006.

Sem-Teto's political turn clearly separates them from the other roofless SMOs, who for the most part believe PSDB opposes the movement. In the words of Antonia Nascimento, leader of FLM:

MSTS should not support PSDB. An organization should not have ties to any political party the way they do. If you have too close ties to a political party, you will start to depend on it entirely (...) When we got the new leadership (PT) we realized that they were more open to dialogue with the movement as such. (...) We won fights before Haddad also, but the difference is that he listens to us. (...) PSDB was hard to collaborate with, when they were in position. It is easier now, with a broader representation [in the city council] (A. Nascimento, personal communication, December 16, 2014).

Regional coordinator Jussara Basso from Trabalhador-Sem-Teto finds it peculiar that a SMO from the roofless movement has ties to PSDB: "PSDB are the extreme right, they are very focused on the elite. When PT came to power, the social agenda was taken into account and we were more listened to." (J. Basso, personal communication, October 23, 2014)

Wladimir Brito (personal communication, November 27, 2014) on his side explains the political turn in a quite pragmatic manner. According to him Sem-Teto proposed a housing project for mayor Haddad (PT), a so-called *mutirão*²⁰. When the municipality supposedly did not even look at the project they sent the exact same project to the governor. "We did not expect an answer, but less than a month afterwards we were invited to a meeting" (W. Brito, personal communication, November 27, 2014). According to Brito the governor liked the project, but could not start working on it because of the election campaign. That was allegedly when Sem-Teto decided to support PSDB. The organization still has high hopes for the housing project to be realized.

Sem-Teto claims it is irrelevant *where* they are granted housing projects. "It does not matter. It can be wherever. We will take whatever we receive" (W. Brito, personal communication, November 27, 2014). When it comes to how to prioritize and elect people to be part of the

²⁰ *Mutirão* is the name for collective work to achieve an end, based on aid provided free of charge. Most often the word is used to describe a process of constructing affordable housing, where all the people included in the housing project participate in the construction, without receiving any payment.

housing project, Brito is critical towards Trabalhador-Sem-Teto's strategy. As already explained, Trabalhador-Sem-Teto choose their most active members first.

I disagree with that. Before the Caixa chose who went first, based on age, health condition, whether you were a woman with kids. They should be responsible for choosing. I think the SMOs who choose among their members favor those they like the most, not those who have fought hardest (W. Brito, personal communication, November 27, 2014).

The members in Sem-Teto do not necessarily share the same political conviction as the leaders, and the informants for this research report that if they are to occupy again, they might just as well occupy together with another roofless organization. Only one of the informants voted for PSDB in the elections, while the others voted *nulo*²¹ or PT. One informant was even planning to start his own party (personal communication, 2014). This indicates a low level of frame alignment; the members of the organization do not support the leaders in the organization. They agree on the problem definition (need for housing), but not how to solve the issue (what elite allies will help solve the issue better). Sem-Teto's members are committed to the struggle for housing, but not to the specific roofless organization. Their members seem to be more pragmatic; the organization has occupations close to where they work, it is cheaper than participating in some roofless SMOs, the standard of the apartments they occupy is good.

An additional incentive to join Sem-Teto, as is an incentive for every roofless, is the hope of getting a house of ones own. But contrary to Trabalhador-Sem-Teto, Sem-Teto has yet to show to any successful projects. "As long as this organization has existed, not one single house has been given to us" (W. Brito, personal communication, November 27, 2014). The reason why people choose to stay in the occupation, cannot be explained by a feeling of collective identity, or clear hopes of actually getting a house. The biggest incentive for many of the dwellers in Cinema Marrocos is to stay where they are as long as they can. If the plan fails, and they get thrown out, Abigail and Jéssica's plan is to move back to Héliopolis where they come from, find a part time job, and rent a house together with their families. They do

²¹ A vote registered as *nulo*, zero, is equivalent to not giving vote to any candidate, and a manner of expressing that no candidate is worth voting for.

not want to continue in Sem-Teto and occupy another place (personal communication, November 27, 2014).

Other roofless SMOs have reacted negatively towards Sem-Teto's political strategy, and the perceptions of several informants have underlined this. Nazare from FLM says: "There is a lot of drug selling within Sem-Teto" (personal communication, December 13, 2014). Antonia Nascimento, also from FLM, adds: "They have no social ideology, they are more about business" (personal communication, December 16, 2014), and Edinalva Franco from MMPT even claims: "They are dangerous" (personal communication, November 4, 2014). These accusations may be rhetorical outcries because of Sem-Teto's different political strategy – they have become an enemy instead of an ally, disappointment because Sem-Teto split with FLM – which has made FLM lose valuable activists, or actually true. It should be noted that the accusations from Sem-Teto towards the other SMOs are equally strong, but more often accusations of corruption:

FLM have activists working for the municipality on a salary of 6000 BRL a month! That is why they achieve housing projects. They even get to stay in hotels while waiting for a house! We are left with nothing. (...) Is this a manner of paying for votes? Of course! It is very obscure what happens inside the offices of the municipality (W. Brito, personal communication, November 27, 2014).

Sem-Teto parted from FLM in 2013, and took a clear choice to distinguish themselves from the rest of the roofless SMOs. They adopted their own style, where individual choice can be seen at the core value. Wladimir Brito explains that they disagreed with FLM on organizational issues, and that this was why they parted.

Everyone had to pay for collective goods [in FLM occupations]. If a dweller had bought for instance a container of gas for his or her kitchen it would be confiscated at the gate, to be used in the shared kitchen. Everyone had to contribute with goods for the collective. We do not have a communal kitchen here. We only gather (with the others) when we are occupying and when we do not have any place to stay. It is each person for himself. (...) All the organizations charge their members to participate in an occupation. The difference is that we take joint decisions on what we want to use

the money for. Do you still have any cooperation with FLM? No, not at all. Nada nada nada (W. Brito, personal communication, November 27, 2014).

Collective identity

Dwellers in Cinema Marrocos are required to participate in the regular meetings every Friday night at 21, in demonstrations organized by Sem-Teto, and participate in new occupations organized by Sem-Teto. Apart from this the dwellers have few tasks within the occupation, except from keeping the hallways clean and tidy. Excluding meetings on Fridays, there are few regular activities in the occupation, which unite the members of the organization. There is however offered English classes, by a volunteer teacher, but the classes are not widely used. There used to be parties held by bystanders inside the cinema, where participants paid the entrance by donating food to the occupation, but these happenings are no longer arranged. The lack of common activities has certain implications for the organization. It leaves the organization to be more dependent on strong leadership, as there is little common identity and fellowship between the members of the organization, and thus less sense of responsibility for the organization as such. It may seem as dwellers in Sem-Teto occupations feel that they pay the coordinator for a service that they are granted, while they have little sense of responsibility for the survival of the organization.

The dwellers do in general have little contact with each other, and keep to themselves inside their apartments. There are few joint activities that tie the dwellers together in a community. A dweller explains that she feels quite safe because the porteiro keeps track on who is left in and out, but generally do not trust the other people in the occupation:

Do you know the other dwellers well? No. (...) I am afraid that my things can get stolen, so we don't become friends with the other dwellers. We greet each other and are polite, but never drink coffee together or have a conversation. You never know what can happen. A neighbor can kill another in two minutes. I don't trust anyone, so I prefer not to get friends here (Jéssica, personal communication, November 27, 2014).

This statement is quite strong, and underpins the bad impression the other SMOs have of Sem-Teto. Even the dwellers in Cinema Marrocos themselves do not portray a safe environment.

As in Nova Palestina, the members of Sem-Teto report that they are met with a lot of prejudices when they tell people that they are members in a roofless organization. Abigail, who lives in Cinema Marrocos, has experienced this in various ways. When she called a company to ask if they could help her install cable TV in her room, they replied that they did not provide services for people living in “places like that”. She has also experienced direct repression on the street: “People look at us with disgust when we walk out of this building; they look at us as if we were animals” (personal communication, November 27, 2014). In addition to direct repression towards individuals in the occupation, the occupation as a whole is living under constant fear of eviction. Wladimir Brito points out that they have had no problems with the police forces, and explains that the state (of São Paulo) intervened, and chose not to send the military police, when the municipality wanted to throw the occupation out. He claims, however, that the metropolitan guard, who is controlled by the municipality, is bullying them.

We have not had problems with the police here in Cinema Marrocos, but the metropolitan guard has given us problems. They are for instance standing in the way by the entrance when people want to get in and out (W. Brito, personal communication, November 27, 2014).

Even though Brito explains that the occupation Cinema Marrocos have not been troubled by the police, several other Sem-Teto occupations have. At the time where the interviews for this research were conducted, 70 families were moving into Cinema Marrocos, families who had been thrown out from another Sem-Teto occupation. The PM is often violent when conducting *reintegração de posse* – repossession. In September 2014, for instance, a FLM occupation was brutally evicted with shooting and teargas in Avenida São João, about hundred meters from Cinema Marrocos (Ponte, 2014). That repossessions are brutal is more often the rule than the exception.

Sem-Teto has attracted a lot of attention, not only because they have occupied a famous and visible building, and because of their political affiliation. There are examples of more controversial recent occupations that have dragged attention to Sem-Teto. In November 2014 they occupied a building that was recently renovated and dedicated to 72 families from the roofless organization ULCM (Unificação das Lutas de Cortiços e Moradia) (Globo, 2014). The

building had been bought by the municipality and was renovated for social housing. The occupation received a lot of media attention, and was condemned by the rest of the roofless movement, and by many in the civil society. Even members of Sem-Teto who were informants for this research did not support the act. “I think it was nonsense. It was for someone else. It was silly” (Abigail, personal communication, November 27, 2014). Sem-Teto was also accused for ruining a demonstration against an announced increase in bus fares in January 2015. A bomb was thrown into the crowd of people at the time the demonstration passed the occupation Cinema Marrocos. Participants in the march claimed to have seen the bomb be thrown out of a window in the occupation (Sanz & Brito, 2015). Actions as these distance the organization from the rest of the roofless SMOs, and makes clear that Sem-Teto are not “playing by the rules”. They even hamper the task for the rest of the roofless movement and their moral allies.

Leadership

The coordination in Sem-Teto is elected every second year. In addition to president, vice-president and general secretary, each occupation elects a treasurer, a legal department, a person responsible for accounting, and a local coordinator (W. Brito, personal communication, November 27, 2014). In Cinema Marrocos the leaders are often to be found in the office in second floor, and they all reside in the occupied building. Abigail and Jéssica report that they trust the coordination.

Yes, we need to trust those who help us. They have helped us more than the municipality has. (...) The money we pay to the coordination is used for services such as the elevator. In addition they help us if we need to go to the doctor. Generally, they help us a lot (Abigail, personal communication, November 27, 2014).

This is a typical example of clientelism. The members, and their loyalty, are obtained by offering them material benefits.

When it comes to social media Sem-Teto have a far less open style than Trabalhador-Sem-Teto. They do not have any Facebook page, but have a closed profile where people may add the organization as a friend, where they are called “Msts Msts Msts”. As of 24th of February

Msts Msts Msts has 539 friends²². They have no Twitter profile. The closed style may signalize that it is not important for Sem-Teto to acquire massive support within civil society. As long as they are able to keep their few allies close, they are happy with that.

5.3 Summary of findings

The findings show that the members of the two SMOs to some extent participate in the roofless movement for similar reasons, but that their opinions are formed differently after spending time in their respective SMO. It becomes quite clear that Trabalhador-Sem-Teto aim for a more sustainable organizing than Sem-Teto. Trabalhador-Sem-Teto are more thoroughly organized, and their have more support among their members than in Sem-Teto.

Table 3 briefly summarizes the findings that have been presented so far, broken down to the main theoretical concepts. The following chapter 6 will discuss the findings that have been presented so far in light of the research questions and problem statement, and put the findings in a larger context.

Table 3:

	TRABALHADOR-SEM-TETO	SEM-TETO
RESOURCE MOBILIZATION	<p>Mobilization of roofless/activists: By word of mouth, coincidence, through family or friends. Members are recruited from the neighborhood where the occupation is situated.</p> <p>Mobilization of financial resources: No fees for participating in the organization, but members are expected to donate food and utensils by ability.</p>	<p>Mobilization of roofless/activists: By word of mouth, coincidence, through family or friends. Many members have moved from the periphery to be able to live in a central situated occupation.</p> <p>Mobilization of financial resources: All members pay a monthly fee/rent for participating. Covers rental costs, water, electricity, security, elevator operator.</p>
POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURE	<p>Political allies: Claim to be autonomous, but supported PT during election campaign</p>	<p>Political allies: Supports PSDB at a local level.</p>

²² For this research I added the organization as a friend in November 2014, but as of April 2015 I had not been accepted.

	<p>Dialogue with local authorities/ municipality: Better when PT came to power in São Paulo, but not satisfactory.</p> <p>Repertoire: Occupies abandoned land in the periphery. Frequent and large demonstrations. Frequent use of social media to distribute information.</p> <p>Repression: Recurring repression from the military police (PM). Receives a lot of media attention, but often portrayed negatively.</p>	<p>Dialogue with local authorities/ municipality: Bad, non-existing.</p> <p>Repertoire: Mostly occupies buildings in the center, sometimes buildings in the periphery. Occasional demonstrations. No clear strategy on how to distribute information.</p> <p>Repression: Little trouble with the military police. Have experienced “bullying” from the metropolitan guard. Receives a lot of media attention, because of political affiliation.</p>
COLLECTIVE IDENTITY	Very strong, many members describe the organization as a family.	Weak. Members view the organization as a service body.
LEADERSHIP	<p>Internal organization: Claim to be hierarchical in organization, but not in command. Organized in several different levels: national, regional, and several in each occupation. The national coordinator Guilherme Boulos, is well respected among members, and act as a leader even though he claims not to be.</p> <p>Salary: No member, including the coordination members, receives remuneration for their work.</p>	<p>Internal organization: Clear difference between leadership and members. The coordination are often to be found in the headquarter office.</p> <p>Salary: All members of coordination receive remuneration. Porteiro and elevator operator are employed and paid monthly salary.</p>

Table 3: Brief summary of findings broken down to the two SMOs.

6 DISCUSSION OF THE FINDINGS

Chapter 5 has provided an in-depth presentation and discussion of the two subcases; Trabalhador-Sem-Teto and Sem-Teto. The following chapter will discuss the findings that have been presented in the preceding chapter, and link them to the main case, the roofless movement. This chapter will go back to the problem statement, and try to provide some answers to: *What are the root causes for the roofless movement in São Paulo, and what are its main characteristics and challenges?* The research questions that were formulated in chapter 1 will guide the presentation. Section 6.1 will focus on research question 1) “What are the social origins of the big roofless movement in São Paulo and why is it able to persist?” Section 6.2 will discuss research question 2) “How do different *political opportunities* affect the roofless movement?” Finally, section 6.3 will look into research question 3) “How do the SMOs frame their grievances?”

It should be noted, that the sections will overlap to some extent. Each section will not answer the related research question exhaustively, but leave some of the discussion and answers to the remaining sections. For instance, the social origins of the roofless movement affect the movement’s framing. At the same time, the policy of rights and the discourse around the right to housing, which is the mainstay in the movement’s framing, is closely connected to the political opportunities. Also, it is hard to understand how the SMOs frame their grievances, without understanding how the political opportunities affect the movement.

This said; in section 6.1, the concept *resource mobilization* will be prominent. By applying this analytical concept we will be able to understand why individuals engage in collective action, the underlying reason for why there exists a roofless movement. At the same time *collective identity*, may contribute to help us understand how the movement has been able to persist over time. Section 6.2 can best be answered by taking use of the analytical concept *political opportunity structure*. The current political situation has become a political opportunity for the roofless movement in various ways that will be discussed here. The section will also look at the recent protest wave in São Paulo and discuss the impact of it. Section 6.3 will discuss how the SMOs *frame* their grievances, and the importance of *leadership* will become apparent in this section.

6.1 Social origins and persistence of the roofless movement

Even though São Paulo suffers a major housing deficit it is not obvious that it has a huge organized roofless movement. There are various other examples of cities with a high housing deficit that does not have an organized roofless movement, to the extent that São Paulo has. The reasons for why there is a strong roofless movement in São Paulo are many. However, the root cause of the movement is grievances in society. As mentioned in section 2.2, social movements are often created in situations where there are big differences (economic or other) between people. The number on inequality in São Paulo makes it clear that this is the case here.

Members are easy to mobilize for the roofless SMOs in São Paulo, as there are a huge number of people in need for housing and a roof. Even though there are clear differences within the roofless movement on how to mobilize resources, in many ways one may say that the roofless movement as a whole mobilizes on the same grounds; grievances in society. The grievances in the Brazilian society are omnipresent, many people are living in precarious conditions, and many can be defined as roofless. In this situation people are being denied a right they should have; housing. The findings in this research points to that the majority of the members participate in roofless SMOs by coincidence, and in many instances they do not commit informed choices when they chose to enter a roofless SMO. In many cases people are encouraged to participate by a friend or relative, and become part of an organization without knowing much about the costs and benefits of becoming a member. Some are even afraid to join, but decide to trust those who encourage them, without really understanding why. To some extent this gives us important insight into what a desperate situation many of these people are in; they are willing to risk all to become a part of an occupation. They have nothing to loose. The structures in society thus explain why people mobilize; they share their grievances with others, and thus decide to organize in collective behavior. The resource mobilization perspective fails to grasp why people engage in collective action by randomness, as it believes that individuals are rational; they know what they want to change in their life, and calculate the costs and benefits of engaging in collective action. But the findings in this research points to that individuals are often not capable of calculating costs and benefits of participation before they are actually participating. The diversification within the roofless movement may therefore have lead to a growth in numbers of participants, as the SMOs and their occupations are “everywhere”, they are impossible to miss out on. Roofless do not have sufficient information about which SMO is the best to join, they are willing to join anyway.

The threshold to join the movement may have become lower as the occupations have increased.

However, the choice of joining an SMO may be easier when there is a well-organized SMO with sufficient resources to bring people together. Trabalhador-Sem-Teto is a good example in this sense. They are thoroughly organized, and the internal structures are routinized. This may make it easier to engage and become a member. Sem-Teto on the other hand is less organized and more dependent on individual leaders. Because of this they are more able to adapt to changing situations, as there are fewer people involved in the decision-making processes. This may also explain why it has been easier to change political allies, as will be discussed in the following. At the same time it may feel less reliable to join Sem-Teto, because there may be abrupt changes within the organization; it is not a stable alternative.

Collective identity keeps people in the movement

Within social movement theory, there are attempts to differentiate between different SMOs, depending among other things on what kind of resources they mobilize. There are professional movement organizations, mass protest organizations and grassroots organizations, to mention a few. It is hard to categorize the SMOs in this research this way, as the style of the SMOs are overtly overlapping. However, what we *can* do is make a distinction of how the two SMOs mobilize and what kind of internal structure they have. The choice whether to mobilize people's "time" or "money" is decisive (Della Porta & Diani, 2006). The two cases in this research clearly place themselves on each side of this scale. Social movement organizations with limited material resources, such as money, may substitute this with symbolic resources (Della Porta & Diani, 2006). The costs of participating are transformed into benefits through the intrinsic value of participating. SMOs who have strong personal relations often survive through periods of little protest, as the organizational activity can rapidly be taken up again. The members stay in the movement, as the movement or SMO has become their "family". On the other hand, organizations that are solely dependent on their members paying a fee may create passive members, as the only thing expected from them is financial contribution (Della Porta & Diani, 2006).

The two SMOs in this research clearly place themselves on each side of this scale. Where Trabalhador-Sem-Teto keep their members loyal through creating a sense of collective identity and belonging, Sem-Teto keep their members as long as they can provide a

satisfactory service in change for money. In many ways Trabalhador-Sem-Teto “adopted” the organizational structure from their mother organization MST. They have followed the path from their mother organization that is occupying land in the rural Brazil. Trabalhador-Sem-Teto does the same in the urban periphery. They even adopted many of their members. When the organization thus was established in 1997, it was already robust, and ready to expand. This was a resource other SMOs in the roofless movement did not have. Trabalhador-Sem-Teto has had a lot of success in keeping their activists within the organization. Many dwellers want to become militants, and many want to keep on as activists or militants in the organization also after they have won their individual struggle for housing. The resources within Trabalhador-Sem-Teto are both material and non-material. Their biggest material strength is the amount of members, who are willing to spend *time* on the struggle. These people spend their time to produce services for other members, such as food, security and education. When it comes to non-material resources, Trabalhador-Sem-Teto has created a strong sense of collective identity, which appeals to their members. The costs of participating (living under hard conditions in occupations, risk of violent evictions etc.) are transformed into benefits through the intrinsic value of participating. The members have collective faith in the struggle; they fight alongside their friends and family (not necessarily biological family). The collective identity with the fellow activists creates a sense of responsibility, and a moral engagement. The fight is not over until everyone have won. To some extent the ideology of Trabalhador-Sem-Teto is also an important resource mobilizer. The social activists (the activists who are not roofless) sympathize with Trabalhador-Sem-Teto because of their political vision, not necessarily only because they are “in need” – a good example of frame bridging. In this way the social activists, dwellers and militants have one common identity, even though they come from different backgrounds. They all want to change society, and long for a system change.

Sem-Teto on the other hand is a quite new organization. According to della Porta and Diani (2006), new SMOs shape their organization with inspiration from existing SMOs, therefore the historical shaping of the roofless movement is interesting, also when we want to understand newer SMOs, such as Sem-Teto. Also, Sem-Teto has a history that can be traced further back than their formal years of existence, the organization has existed for around ten years in an informal structure. When they erupted from FLM, they decided to create a new organization, operate by themselves, and change political affiliations. But the internal organization is to some extent similar to other roofless SMOs. They started as a small

organization with few resources, but the organization has over time mobilized a lot of material resources. They have a significant number of members, and quite a lot of financial resources, which they acquire through monthly fees/rent from their members. These financial resources are used for remuneration for the leaders, and employees, who then provide their paid services. It seems as it is the material resources that appeal to peoples interest to join; low cost rent, a relatively nice room or apartment, good location, help from the leaders, than non-material. As Sem-Teto clearly do not have a consistent political direction, as the recent change in political ally suggests, the ideology is not decisive for why people decide enter or to stay in the organization. The members are mobilized into the organization by coincidence, and there are no strong bonds that will tie the members to the organization into the future. Several members do not agree with the leaders political affiliations, but decide to stay in the occupation because of convenience. Members of Sem-Teto are not members because they share the same political conviction or because they feel tied to the organization because of a collective identity. One could imagine a scenario where members of Sem-Teto broke with Sem-Teto to join another roofless SMO. This scenario is less likely to happen for members in Trabalhador-Sem-Teto, who have a stronger relationship to the SMO as such.

Mobilization often depends on entrepreneurs or leaders to transform the masses of individuals into movements or SMOs. These entrepreneurs or leaders work to improve the organizational structure, but also make sure that the movement efficiently works towards collecting financial resources, supporters, media attention and political alliances. These resources are necessary for the organization to be effective. The structure within the existing SMO is decisive for acquiring resources. Well-organized groups will be more capable to attract supporters, media attention and create allies. The various SMOs have different resources, and are therefore more or less capable of keeping members loyal to their organization. The findings for this research points to that there to some extent is a discrepancy between the leaders' decisions and the members' wishes and desires, a topic that will be addressed later.

6.2 Different interpretation of political opportunities

The resources acquired by the SMOs, do not emerge in a vacuum. The opportunity structures weaken or strengthen their ability to mobilize and how efficient their framing is. While the resource mobilization perspective, which has just been explored, focuses on internal processes within the social movement, or the SMOs, the political opportunity perspective argues that the

actions of the movement depend on the existence (or lack of) a specific political opportunity. It is these external factors that affect social movements, and limit or empower them. The external factors can explain both the formation and the development of a social movement. The repertoire of a SMO reflects the external conditions, such as the political situation. There are various such external factors that affect the SMOs. Openings in the political opportunity structure may also make room for a SMO to develop new frames. There are ranges of political opportunity structures that have shaped the roofless movement through the history, and that affects it now.

Political interest in the movement

The current diversification within the roofless movement in São Paulo has made it clear that the movement is no longer solely associated with the political left and/or PT's domain. Different parts of the movement have approached different political factions. Theoretically put; the different SMOs have interpreted the opportunity structures differently. Although there is reason to believe that the majority of the roofless movement still has tight bonds to PT, the discontent with PT in government is now more visible than ever. It is therefore more legitimate to criticize PT than before, both because of failure to fulfill the movement's demands, but also because of the general bad reputation that surrounds PT now. This discontent has also manifested itself within the social movements. The linkage between PT and the roofless movement and the roofless SMOs was less problematic when PT was not in governmental power, but when Lula came to power in 2003 these bonds put a huge pressure on PT to fulfill the wishes of the social movements. The problem has been that they have not. The housing deficit is still huge, and political projects that do not ensure the right to the city are still being implemented. PT promotes a policy that both focuses on development and poverty reduction through social programs and at the same time have concerns for further economical growth. "Brazil is an example of a social democracy at peace with today's capitalism, in a context where neoliberalism, and now its crisis, call into question the viability of such a model, especially in Europe" (Cândido Grzybowski in da Glória Gohn, 2014: 53 [my translation]).

In this situation it is no surprise that people search for alternatives to get their demands fulfilled. The strategy of relying solely on PT's goodwill and political priorities has certainly not succeeded satisfactory. The situation is also favorable for PSDB, as they may try to challenge PT's "supremacy" within the field of social issues. By allying with the roofless

movement (or parts of it), they may earn goodwill in the civil society more in general, if they are believed to be sincere. Nevertheless, even though PSDB may want to portray themselves as a party concerned with social issues, PT is still the political party alternative that is most concerned about the demands from the social movements. However, they have been in office for more than 10 years, and many voters are left disappointed. It might be this disappointment that has created an opening for the political right into the roofless movement. It is no longer only PT that has an interest in having a good dialogue with the roofless movement. Politicians of any political affiliation should have a strategic interest in keeping a good relation to the roofless movement, for the simple fact that participants of the movement are potential voters, and they are many. To be able obtain votes from a big SMO may actually become decisive in an election campaign. As already discussed, it was the social movements who mobilized before the elections in 2002, and who must take some honor for PT getting to power. The political opportunity has been strengthened by the way São Paulo is concurrently governed by PSDB and PT, as the two parties are constantly fighting for power. In some situations it is not easy to know which power governs what. This discrepancy between governing levels has become a tool for some roofless organizations, such as Sem-Teto.

Sem-Teto represents a very atypical SMO within the roofless movement. They are not the first SMO to support and be supported by the political right, but they are by far the biggest and newest addition to this narrow tradition. The strategy for roofless organizations to support the political right is not entirely new, but a very uncommon strategy. Today, the number of roofless organizations with ties to PSDB is very small. In addition to Sem-Teto, Movimento dos Sem-Teto do Ipiranga (MSTI), have some bonds (W. Brito, personal communication, November 27, 2014). According to an article in Folha de São Paulo, members of MSTI who attended campaign meetings for PSDB in 2012, scored points that were used for an internal ranking within the organization. The points were supposedly used for defining who were appointed by the SMO for housing programs and not (Gama & Lima, 2012). The campaign meetings they attended were in favor of José Serra (PSDB), who ran for mayor against Fernando Haddad (PT).

Beneficial alliances

Changes in protest tactics goes along with changes in the external environment, such as response, or lack of such, from the authorities. Sem-Teto's tactic is a stab in the side to the municipality, who are not fulfilling their goals fast enough. The best way of doing this is

turning to PT's political enemy, PSDB. Sem-Teto's choice of occupying Cinema Morocco's was thus not coincidental. It was public property, belonging to the municipality, and in many ways a manifestation of the municipality's poor implementation capacity (the building was bought by the municipality in 2006, but was left abandoned until it was occupied in 2013). The general secretary of Sem-Teto, Wladimir Brito, claims that the dialogue with the municipality is bad, and that they are searching for new alternatives.

We are not against the other organizations, but at the same time we notice that they receive while we don't. Our occupation is a protest against the municipality. We are asking for our rights. The dialogue with the government is non-existing! (W. Brito, personal communication, November 27, 2014).

One could believe that Sem-Teto has allied with PSDB because they believe better to attend the demands of their members this way. But as there are no good indicators that PSDB will provide housing for the roofless faster or better than PT, there may be other explanations as well. There is a fair chance that the coordination in Sem-Teto benefits financially from their cooperation with PSDB, and that they have received money from the party, to ensure votes from their membership base, even though the coordination denies such transactions (Douglas, personal communication, November 27, 2014).

It is not always easy to determine what kind of relationship an organization has to a political party. Such relationships are associated with cooptation and corruption, themes neither the parties nor the organizations want to reveal. Vote buying is widespread in Brazil, and there is little doubt that the roofless movement would provide a lot of voters for political parties, if votes were being bought. Even though Sem-Teto is open about their support to PSDB, they do not admit to receive any financial support. The same goes for the other SMOs who take part in this research. However, many of the SMOs accuse other roofless organizations for having financial bonds to political parties. Sem-Teto explicitly claims that PT buys votes from members in FLM (W. Brito, personal communication, November 27, 2014). These accusations cannot be properly confirmed or disproved in this thesis, but are questions for further analysis.

What however is clear from the findings in this research is that SMOs with ligations towards PT, or who are connected to the political left (such as Trabalhador-Sem-Teto), seem to be

bothered by the state controlled PM to a larger extent than Sem-Teto who is not. Sem-Teto, on their side, claim to have been bullied by the metropolitan guard. As mentioned earlier, São Paulo's mayor does not control police forces, except for the metropolitan guard, which is smaller and limited to secure public buildings. The governor, on the other hand, controls both the military and civil police (Bruhn, 2008). This finding may imply that the different political levels protect the SMOs who they receive support from, and bully the SMOs they do not receive support from. This research cannot properly confirm the problem that the SMOs claim to have had with the PM and metropolitan guard. It is deemed to rely on the statements from the informants. There is therefore a chance that the SMOs name and shame, to create an impression of repression, that is not entirely true, but politically tactical.

While the PM is one instrument easily accessible to repress SMOs, media is another. Protest tactics are affected by the response from the media. An important resource for social movements is to what extent they are able to get media attention. A well-organized SMO will be more capable of acquiring media attention, but even a huge and well-organized organization as Trabalhador-Sem-Teto meets huge obstacles. Brazilian media is highly privatized and monopolistic, a heritage from the dictatorship (1964 - 1985), and traditionally skeptical towards social movements whose aim is to change society. Many social movements are not treated neutrally and given a fair treatment, but rather scapegoated. Interestingly it seems as if there is a difference between how the governor and the mayor are being treated by the media as well. This is particularly interesting because different political factions govern the two levels. According to an article in Carta Capital (Bocchini, 2014) a big São Paulo newspaper hired three so called *setoristas* (journalists who follow and write exclusively on one topic) when Haddad (PT) was elected mayor. No such position existed when Gilberto Kassab (formerly DEM, now PSB) was mayor of São Paulo. The three new employees were responsible to follow the prefecture. At the same time no journalist was hired as *setorista* for the governor-level. This might indicate that the media prioritizes to follow Haddad's (and PT's) each step, while Alckmin (and PSDB) is let loose. In other words, when Haddad fails to achieve his promises, they are broadcasted wider, than if Alckmin does.

It is quite clear that the fault of the housing deficit is not entirely that of PT. In fact many informants for this research point to that getting PT back to power locally has increased the quality of dialogue. As mentioned, during mayor Haddad's term, the number of occupations has tripled, compared to the term before him (Bergamim Jr., 2014). When trying to explain

this increase, informants for this research underline how the PT leadership, both nationally, but locally in particular, has had more interest in dialogue. The advisor to a PT representative in the city council agrees on that PT has increased the quality of the dialogue, however he points to the fact that the dialogue has given few results (E. Mineiro, personal communication, 2014). He blames that on the composition of the Municipal Secretary of Housing (SEHAB). Haddad (PT) chose the engineer José Floriano de Azevedo Marques Neto to lead the Secretary (who was appointed by the Minister of Cities, Aguinaldo Ribeiro from the Progressive Party (PP)). The appointment must be interpreted in the light of the composition of the local government, where PT does not possess enough power to appoint all Secretaries. The local coalition government is based on support in the city hall, and comprises representatives from the parties PT, PSB, PMDB, PCdoB and PV (Agostine, 2012). Leader of FLM, Antonia Nascimento, affirms this impression:

There is no good dialogue between the movement and the SEHAB. Even if PT is in power, the political right manages the SEHAB. Their agenda is against the movement (A. Nascimento, personal communication, December 16, 2014).

Even though openness due to PT in power has been important to many SMOs, the composition of the local political coalitions makes progress hard in some areas. With the right wing political party PP directing the SEHAB, for instance, progress remains slow. Many of the SMOs in São Paulo are therefore still true to PT, and believe they have better solutions than the other political parties. In some cases the relationship is very close. PT has always been accused for co-opting the roofless movement. By absorbing members of the movement, they are able to ensure future support from the movement. To some extent, this is true. Many members from different roofless SMOs are now in office for PT²³. A problem with co-option is the uneven treatment of the SMOs. Those with members with powerful positions in the party may potentially have a greater chance of being assigned projects. And being granted projects gives the organization incentive to mobilize people to give this party their vote.

Internal fragmentation

Most roofless SMOs that support PT are gathered in networks or alliances. The presence of networks within social movements is important. Even though the SMOs to some extent are

²³ Advisor to a PT municipal councilor, Edilson Mineiro, who was interviewed for this research, is one of many examples of this.

competitors, they mostly have good relations and unite fronts when necessary. Table 1 on page 8 is useful to understand the relationship between SMOs. Following the table, many of the SMOs within the roofless movement of São Paulo place themselves in the box “competitive cooperation”. They compete for the same members, but unite in fronts or networks to cooperate. Both FLM and UMM are examples of this. The two main SMOs in this research, however, place themselves differently within this table. Trabalhador-Sem-Teto claim that they *want* more cooperation with the other roofless SMOs, but that it is impossible as their ideology is too different. They have therefore prioritized to participate in networks that are more concerned about urban struggle more in general, such as Resistência Urbana. Sem-Teto have deliberately broken out of the alliance they had with FLM, and chosen to operate alone. Following Table 1, the two SMOs in this research have created a situation of *factionalism* within the movement.

That SMOs compete for the same resources (mainly potential members) may explain why many SMOs shame and name each other. Some underscore how unserious Sem-Teto is, others even call them “dangerous”. On the contrary Sem-Teto claim that all the other SMOs are “in it for the money” and that they are “bought” by PT – they do not want people to get involved in another SMO than their own, and therefore put the others in a bad light (see section 5.3). It should however be clear that Trabalhador-Sem-Teto still cooperate with networks who support the roofless movement in general, thus one can say that they have fractioned, but not because they are negative towards the other SMOs in the roofless movement, but because their ideology and style differs too much from the rest. Somewhat they place themselves in the middle of “competitive cooperation” and “factionalism”. Sem-Teto however has clearly fractioned. Sem-Teto has parted from the rest of the roofless movement, and created a political alliance, with what many within the roofless movement would call the enemy.

A fractioning or fragmentation of the movement may lead to weakening of the movement as a whole. Instead of merging small SMOs together and unite forces, the roofless movement also contains smaller SMOs who refuse to cooperate. Smaller SMOs have a lesser chance to survive over a long time span, and a huge fragmentation may lead to the dissolution of a social movement. There is however little chance that this will happen with the roofless movement of São Paulo in near future. The movement as a whole is far too extensive, and their demands far too important, for the movement to dissolve. What might happen, however,

is that some roofless SMOs may cease to exist, when the protest wave is on a low. If such a situation arises, it is likely to believe that the members of such SMOs will continue their struggle in a different SMO, if their bond to the specific SMO is not too strong. The SMO is a temporary place for carrying out the struggle, while the movement as such is more permanent. The strongest SMOs (such as Trabalhador-Sem-Teto) will however be able to keep their resource base until a new protest wave occurs, as their members have strong bonds to the SMO itself. One may also interpret the fragmentation as a positive opportunity for the roofless movement; it may in fact lead to a strengthening of the movement as a whole. The big number of SMOs makes the movement more visible than before, and it is even easier to attract new members. Mobilization of roofless thus becomes easier. Also, the movement as such may be strengthened by strong networks who oppose the fractioned elements; one actor that is on the outside of the collective (in this case Sem-Teto) will thus not necessarily matter all that much.

Occupying to restore justice

Despite internal differences, there is one common goal between the SMOs in the roofless movement, which links them together: housing. But as the SMOs within the roofless movement have differing organizational goals, they also apply different strategies. These strategies are formed by how much resources the organization inhabits, how they interpret the political opportunities and how the organization frame their goals. Disagreement about strategies is also an issue of disagreement between coordination and leaders, findings point to that Trabalhador-Sem-Teto has larger support in their actions than Sem-Teto (see sections 5.2 and 5.3). In general, and in addition to frequent demonstrations, the roofless movement's most apparent and frequent form of action is occupying (of buildings and/or land). Occupying is widespread and common, but there are different types of occupations, some more legitimate than others.

In general occupation is the main repertoire within the roofless movement in São Paulo. The question of whether occupations are legal or not remain rather unclear; it depends on how the occupations are interpreted. On the one hand it may be seen as an illegal act, but not as illegal as the offense the state is carrying through by not fulfilling the constitutional right to housing. At the same time, the roofless movement is often accused for being those who are doing the illegal act, even though property owners do not fulfill the social function of their property. Contention is often on the brink of illegality, but often the illegal repertoire is necessary to

restore injustice. Thus the civil disobedience of occupying can be understood as breaking the law to make injustice visible. If the action was perceived as legal, and totally unproblematic, the shock factor would have been lost, and the movements would have gotten less attention.

The occupations fulfill a number of functions (Earle, 2012); generally they highlight the huge housing deficit and emphasize that the state is incapable of upholding the right to housing. The occupations in the city center additionally draw attention to the amount of abandoned buildings and call for centrally located social housing. Occupations are a way of enforcing the articles concerning housing in the Constitution, as the occupations provide temporarily housing for the occupants (Earle, 2012). Contained forms of contention have the advantages of being accepted and familiar to people, and are therefore easier to employ without great risks (McAdam et al., 2001: 41). This may to some extent explain the high number of occupations in São Paulo; people are used to them, and do for the most part not perceive them as dangerous or extremely radical projects. They are often carried out in the same way every time, and are not seen as a threat towards ordinary people. They are portrayed as a strategy to obtain human rights. There are however strong forces aiming to portray the repertoire differently. Media often describe occupations as “invasions” and contribute to uphold the movement’s bad reputation (Schwartz, R., personal communication, 2014). In the highly unequal and divided Brazilian society, many people do not socialize with people from a different class. With help from the mass media, the members of the roofless movement are often faced with prejudices. Occupations are a way of creating a new relationship between the state and the society; the state as the lawbreaker and the social movement as implementing the law by making sure the social function of property is being upheld, and implementing the right to housing (Earle, 2012). However, it should be noted, that both supporters and opponents of the roofless movement perceive different types of occupations differently. It is easier to justify occupations of buildings that have been abandoned for many years, or land that does not fulfill its social function, than occupying land or buildings that already are in use.

Breaking the norms

As noted, at initial stages of protests the most disruptive tactics are often chosen as the shock factor in the repertoire is important. The shock factor within the roofless movement is no longer that they occupy (they do that all the time), but rather where and when. The occupation Nova Palestina was not chosen because of the shock factor. It can in this sense be understood

more as a strategic place to occupy, as the land was easy to obtain. They did not disturb anyone by occupying there, the land was well suited for housing projects, and the land affordable as is situated far out in the periphery. Other Trabalhador-Sem-Teto occupations have been more shocking. The occupations Chico Mendes and Copa do Povo provide good examples of this. Chico Mendes is situated in Morumbi, in a small hillside, next to a residential area with high cost *condominios*²⁴. The idea of the occupation is to demonstrate that the area is not only for the rich elite, but should also be open for low-income workers living in social housing projects. The occupation initially met a lot of repression by people residing in the nearby houses, which threw stones and water from their balconies and screamed to the dwellers in the occupation (“Deis Reals” and Dayana, personal communication, November 21, 2014). The occupation Copa do Povo, on the other hand, was strategically carried out before the Football World Cup. The occupation was situated close to the football stadium Itaquera, and attracted international media attention, as it made visible the paradox between spending millions of dollars on new football arenas, while thousands of people are roofless. The occupation was important for Trabalhador-Sem-Teto as they once again made clear that they are an important political actor, who mobilizes many people.

Sem-Teto on the other hand has applied forms of occupying that have not been as positively received. As mentioned in section 5.3, they broke the norms within the roofless movement when they occupied a building that was destined for another roofless organization (Globo, 2014); it was about to fulfill a social function. Following how the roofless movement in general justifies their actions – they occupy to claim their right, and shed light on how land and buildings are left empty and do not fulfill their social function – they should not occupy a building that is in use. If they do, the argument of a “politics of rights” falls away. By operating outside the norms Sem-Teto did certainly not enforce the bonds to other SMOs, but rather made the gap between Sem-Teto and the other roofless SMOs larger.

The benefit of autonomy

While MST played an important role in mobilizing for PT’s victory in 2002, they soon turned over to an oppositional role, demanding structural agrarian reform. Since PT came to power MST have positioned themselves in a role critical of PT and its socio-economic policies. Trabalhador-Sem-Teto has played a similar role. History clearly ties both MST and

²⁴ Portuguese for apartment complex.

Trabalhador-Sem-Teto closer to PT than other political parties, but they choose to remain autonomous and critical of their policy in government. They have become what we can call PT's "critical friend". Before the presidential elections in 2014, the friend came to the rescue. Trabalhador-Sem-Teto actively supported PT in the election campaign, when it became clear that the race would be close between Rousseff (PT) and PSDB's candidate Neves.

Even though there is little doubt that Trabalhador-Sem-Teto is benevolent to PT, they insist that they are politically party autonomous. This autonomy is a political tool that makes it easier for the organization to put pressure on the political level. One may say they have adopted a *pressure group strategy*, where they aim to affect political decisions; independent on what party is governing. This allows them to be flexible, but also trustworthy in their claims. A recent example of such a strategy is the demonstrations outside the city hall, before the new Master Plan for São Paulo was going to be approved (Toledo, 2014). Massive pressure from Trabalhador-Sem-Teto (and other groups from the civil society) made sure that the new plan included areas designated for affordable social housing. Among the liberated areas was the soil where Trabalhador-Sem-Teto had their occupation Copa do Povo.

Trabalhador-Sem-Teto have found their niche – occupying in the periphery and getting housing through MCMV Entidades while they tend their relationship with PT as their critical friend. PT has a lot to win when they acquire projects to Trabalhador-Sem-Teto, as they know that their critical friend will save them in bad periods (such as the elections in 2014, where Trabalhador-Sem-Teto mobilized to vote for PT). A movement's strategy is affected by the political opportunities that the movement is granted, but also by the action of countermovements who respond to the same political opportunities. This is a situation Trabalhador-Sem-Teto has carefully taken advantage of. Their strategy of staying in the periphery, and only aiming for MCMV Entidades projects, keep them more unaffected than other SMOs operating in the center.

While Trabalhador-Sem-Teto cries out for a total upheaval of the existing political and socio-economic system, it seems as Sem-Teto are satisfied with housing and not much more. This makes it easier for Sem-Teto to create political party affiliations, as this may help them to name and shame the "enemy", who has not provided enough housing: the municipality. Trabalhador-Sem-Teto on the other side does not believe the solution is to find within party

politics, and therefore remain relatively autonomous, so that they can criticize any political enemy.

Taking the streets

In addition to occupying land and buildings, another frequent repertoire within the roofless movement is demonstrations. While the roofless movement has been demonstrating frequently since its establishment, demonstrations have recently become more normalized. It is a tool for a larger part of the civil society, both organized and non-organized. The biggest protests Brazil had seen since the *Diretas Já* demonstrations almost 20 years earlier, started with an outcry over expensive bus tickets (Benson & Levine, 2013). The transition from one year to the next meant an increase in the bus tickets from 2,85 BRL to 3,05, a huge increase for the poorer parts of the population. Protests that started off with a few hundred people, organized by the organization *Passe Livre* (often translated to the Free Fare Movement) in January 2013 exploded. Demonstrations spread to other Brazilian cities, as a reaction towards the massive police force that was used against the first demonstrations (Braathen & Kasahara, 2014). In June between 500 000 and one million people (depending on the source) took to the streets in São Paulo to show their discontent with the government. When explaining the demonstrations it is however far too easy to only point to the increased bus fares. "It is not only the 20 cents", became a popular motto under the demonstrations to underscore that point exactly. Some claim that the demonstrations can better be grasped as a *collective affirmation of the right to the city* (Rolnik, 2014). Accessible public transportations were only one of many ways to ensure this right. People also demanded end of corruption, end of police violence, and generally more democracy. The demonstrations pointed their critique towards the PT government. In addition, the right to housing came up as an important question, following forced evictions during preparations for the World Cup, which was to be held the following year (Rolnik, 2014). The timing for the protests was thus not coincidental. Because of Brazil's role as host nation, the international media had already started their interest in the country. The protests were broadcasted internationally, leaving the demonstrators to put an immense pressure on the government.

It might seem as if the protests in 2013 opened up for a wave of protests. 13th of March 2015 there were big demonstrations in support for the sitting government. Participants included members from CUT, social movements from the political left, and PT themselves. Both MST and Trabalhador-Sem-Teto participated as well. The protests followed the unfolding of the

huge Petrobrás scandal, where a range of PT politicians, and even Rousseff, has been accused for corruption (Jiménez, 2014). One of the main paroles was against a privatization of Petrobrás, but also a general support to the PT government (Carta Capital, 2015). Two days after, the 15th of March 2015 a number of smaller demonstrations, starting in 2014, culminated in huge demonstrations all over Brazil. These demonstrations had involved groups from the political right and to some extent the extreme right. Some of these have demanded impeachment for president Rousseff (PT), and the return of 1964. Many of the protesters had a clear PDSB affiliation. The protests seemed well organized, with participants in many cities around the country. People in general protested against corruption, and against Rousseff and PT (Folha de São Paulo, 2015b). There is no consensus about how many people actually participated in the demonstrations. Typically, numbers vary a lot, depending on the source. The military police counted one million people on Avenida Paulista in São Paulo the 15th of March, while the newspaper Folha de São Paulo counted 210 000 people (Globo, 2015). Discrepancies in this kind of numbers are not uncommon. After the protests 15th of March, critics have claimed that the PM count more protesters when the demonstration is against the PT government, than when it aims to support the government. At the same time, many claim that the numbers of protestors in the demonstrations the 13th of March were downgraded. Political scientist and columnist André Singer interprets the recent demonstrations in a classical left – right perspective, for and against the sitting rule. He notes that the political right has not been able to put a significant number of people on the street since before 1964, and that the most recent demonstrations therefore may represent a shift in Brazilian history (Singer, 2015).

It is legitimate to claim that São Paulo has recently been in the middle of a protest wave. Not only the roofless movement is strong, a range of social movements and groups have been mobilizing the past years, with at times completely contradictory demands. Following della Porta and Diani's definition (2006), social movements are characterized by frequent use of protest. Recently, groups from the political right have also taken the streets, which has been very atypical in Brazilian history. According to social movement theory, however, this should be expected. The first movement to engage in contentious action lowers the cost for movements who come after. Victories obtained by some movements may provoke a countermobilization. The different protest-tools a social movement uses are what we call their repertoire. Their strategies can be defined as how the SMOs choses within this repertoire depending on how an organization mobilizes resources, how they frame their issues and how

they interpret the political opportunities. The tactics a movement uses is often formed by how it is received by the external environment, such as the authorities and the media. Like the recent 2015 March protests, who have been carried out by supporters of PSDB, Sem-Teto have met relatively little repression. This can be explained in whom they have chosen as political ally. The conservative right in São Paulo is in charge over both the military police, and possesses much power within the media. Thus, even though dwellers in Sem-Teto meet prejudices by people in the street, they are believed to be less at risk of receiving repression from the military police, as they feel that the governor protects them. Social movements use various repertoires to solve conflictous issues, but as has become clear; SMOs within a social movement can also choose different strategies. Recently the most apparent protest tool within the social movements has been that of demonstrating.

The June protests in 2013 may have contributed to strengthen the roofless movement, as they have seen that mobilizing can lead to change. Also, it made clear that the concept *right to the city* is alive, and on the streets. The massive attention the protests received, helped the movement mobilize, and they are now stronger than before. The June protests may have created a feeling of protesting being more legitimate, and work to sensitize people about what rights they have. At the same time they did also create a more hostile environment for the social movements, with a lot of repression from the military police (Rolnik et al., 2013). Trabalhador-Sem-Teto's national coordinator Guilherme Boulos believes the demonstrations in 2013 had important impact for the roofless movement. However, he does not believe the impact is solely positive:

The June protests changed a lot of things in Brazil, to the better and to the worse. The good side was that protests suddenly became legitimate; no longer were the only people protesting "the vagabonds". Before the protests people were demotivated, but the events strengthened the importance of social mobilizing. Also, it made clear that people protesting in the streets are able to pressure for change. On the bad side, the protests pulled the extreme right out of the closet²⁵. They have now become more visible than before (personal communication, October 9, 2014).

²⁵ At the time this interview was conducted, the massive protests in March 2015 had not been carried out. However, two times during the autumn 2014 protesters in São Paulo demanded the return of the military dictatorship in Brazil (Uribe et al., 2014; Lima & Machado, 2014).

The participants in the protests in June 2013 were to a large extent people affiliated with the political left or the political center. They wanted to demonstrate their disappointment with the PT government, show discontent towards how they prioritized, and how they do not fulfill the demands of the social movements. The demonstrations may have strengthened the general disbelief in the PT government, and therefore strengthened the political opposition, from the political right. The demonstrations did also provoke a countermobilization, from the opposite political wing.

The interviews for this research were carried out before the huge protests in March 2015. These protesters were to a large extent affiliated with the political right. Although the interview data for this thesis does not include perceptions on these demonstrations, the demonstrations make clear the big divide in the Brazilian population, which is now also visible within the roofless movement. One may say that new elite allies grew out of the June protests. The political right became a more legitimate ally, and it became easier to criticize PT than before. The political tension between the right and the left has become a political opportunity.

6.3 Different framing of the grievances

The political opening granted by the transition from dictatorship to democracy was very important for the roofless movement. This was also when the right to housing became included into the Constitution, and since then has the *right* to housing has been a part of the roofless movement's framing. The progress in Brazilian legislation must be seen as an opportunity structure for the roofless movement as a whole.

Both the government and the citizens of a country are bound by the Constitution, therefore the social movements can use the Constitution to give legitimacy to their demands, and pressure political actors (Turner, 2013). This is what we can call a rights based approach, where the state is the duty bearer because of national legislation (Hickey & Mitlin, 2009). The political actors in their turn are given their power through the Constitution, so social movements using demands from the same legislation may force political actors to decide whether to follow the principles and rights in the constitution or not (Turner, 2013). Even though Brazilian legislation is progressive on the issue of housing, the legislation has not been conducted the way many social movements were hoping for. The various SMOs have accused different actors of being responsible of the poor implementation of the law.

The SMO's *framing* is used to mobilize; it develops a reason for the organizational activity. According to Snow and Benford a social movement's success or failure depends on its framing (Snow & Benford, 1988: 199). In the example of the roofless movement they may frame the aspect of social life (being "roofless") as problematic (does not fulfill fundamental rights), then identify what can be done with this (pressure government) and find a solution to it (get housing) and then call people to engage in the movement to do something about the problematic situation (occupy).

Lucy Earle (2012) claims that the roofless movement in São Paulo justifies their actions with regard to the legislation²⁶. She claims that the movement articulates a "politics of rights", referring to the constitutional right to housing, and thereby legitimizes their occupations (Earle, 2012). The politics of rights articulated by the roofless movement is supported by the change in what the organizations name themselves. In the middle of the 1990s, there was a considerable increase in roofless organizations that went from being "housing organizations" to "roofless (*sem teto*) organizations". When an organization prefers to label itself roofless, it portrays itself as being without ("*sem*") something. In other words, they are without a right that should have been theirs (Miagusko, 2012). The findings for this research support this claim. The roofless movement of São Paulo has constructed a master frame of injustice, where they target the political actors unwilling or unable to challenge this injustice. The difference between the SMOs is which actors are deemed responsible for the injustice.

The principles outlined in the Constitution, and thereafter the City Statute and Master Plans, are the main legislative regulation on housing. It is this legislation that in many ways justifies pressure from the roofless movement. They claim their right, and point to the responsibility the government has, that they do not fulfill. A grand obstacle for this pressure to become significant is lack of knowledge. People are not aware of the progressive legislation, as the consolidated and prevailing norm is that of property rights. An important role for the SMOs is thus to make people aware of what rights they have. The ways the two SMOs in this research articulate their politics of rights differ. They both frame the situation as unjust, a situation where basic rights are not fulfilled. The problem definition is thus similar within the two organizations: people lack housing, and we need to do something about it. However,

²⁶ Earle has specifically researched the União de Movimentos de Moradia (UMM - Union of Housing Movements), but her findings are relevant for a broader part of the movement.

Trabalhador-Sem-Teto, and most other SMOs within the roofless movement, go further than this. They frame *the right to the city*.

The right to the city is a useful frame for urban social movements (Boer & De Vries, 2009), and one that Trabalhador-Sem-Teto has applied. Many other SMOs within the roofless movement have also adopted this rhetoric, among these the SMOs affiliated with FLM (see for example FLM, 2010). There are various reasons for why the concept is useful as a frame (Boer & De Vries, 2009). First of all, it has a clear message and simplifies complex political processes. In example, if decisions are made in the city council to construct new high cost apartments in a neighborhood, destined for high cost households, this will increase the rental costs and force low cost households out of the neighborhood. The concept of “the right to the city” states that it is the right of all the inhabitants in the city to shape the future of their city, and no one should have the power to force a person out of ones neighborhood. They should therefore protest against such policy. Secondly, the concept is flexible and can be applied for various different movements, in example both the roofless movement and the movements concerned with for instance better and cheaper public transport. Third, the concept provides an understandable rhetoric, which does not compromise on the radical political line that it originates from (Boer & De Vries, 2009).

The concept of the right to the city has gone through a revival the past decade not because of Henri Lefebvre’s intellectual legacy, but rather because of what has been happening in the streets and among the social movements (Harvey, 2012). São Paulo is one of many examples of this; the reason why the right to the city was implemented in the City Statute should be explained by the strength of the urban social movements at the time. The incorporation of this concept in national legislation is unique, and in theory makes Brazil stand out as progressive when it comes to urban rights. It is a concept that is actively used by the roofless movement itself, both, as Harvey (2008) suggests, a working slogan and as a political ideal.

The importance of leadership

Even though Trabalhador-Sem-Teto is extremely concerned about portraying themselves as an organization without a leader, the role of national coordinator Guilherme Boulos should not be undermined. He is a professor in psychoanalysis and has also graduated in philosophy. He is an intellectual, and his way of absorbing academic theory into the rhetoric of the organization is important. When he speaks about the right to the city, he is able to convince

supporters, also within the academic sphere. The concept of the right to the city is widely used in his speeches, and a living concept in his rhetoric. This way Boulos is able to broadcast the struggle and collect supporters within a wide range of sectors. In other words, the frame extension in *Trabalhador-Sem-Teto* works well; the concrete issue of housing is clearly connected to a wider urban perspective. The organization manages to connect the issue of housing, to a broader perspective of urban rights more in general. They manage to bridge the gap between the movement's goal, and goals that are important in the civil society as a whole. They reach out to sectors of society that are not necessarily roofless, and thus create important allies and networks with other SMOs and social movements.

Sem-Teto, on the other hand, has no intellectual leader articulating the right to the city. This corresponds well with their political affiliations; PSDB perform politics that has not been especially concerned about the welfare of the masses; they are a party for the elite. If the alleged bomb throwing from Cinema Marrocos into a demonstration organized by the Free Fare Movement (see page 58) is true, this underscores how *Sem-Teto* deliberately remove themselves from the rest of the roofless movement, and in general movements sympathetic to the rhetoric of the right to the city. *Sem-Teto* nevertheless frame housing as a right, and they have employed two lawyers in the coordination to underscore the importance of law in their framing. As long as the municipality is not able to grant that right, they will. But *Sem-Teto*'s leader(s) are more concerned about administrating the organization, and providing services to their members. The leadership in *Sem-Teto* has clear traces of clientelism; members are offered material benefits in return for their loyalty (loyalty may here be understood as paying the rent each month). Statements by dwellers in Cinema Marrocos underline this. Whether the coordination also wishes to trade these material benefits in return for votes for PSDB, cannot be confirmed in this thesis. Informants for this research (see section 5.3) voted for a range of different parties in the 2014 elections. If they were urged by the coordination to vote for PSDB, it is at least clear that they did not entirely fulfill these wishes.

Sem-Teto are "putting the goal into practice" by providing shelter for people in need (Della Porta & Diani, 2006: 144). Housing is a right, and they will provide that right, even if it is temporarily. General secretary in *Sem-Teto*, Wladimir Brito, is concerned about what will happen to all the dwellers if *Sem-Teto* gets thrown out of cinema Marrocos:

You can imagine how it will be. But we cannot leave these people to live on the street. I do not aim to become the biggest organization, but I want to give people a good alternative and give people a place to live (W. Brito, personal communication, November 27, 2014).

That Sem-Teto has turned their back on the municipality by entering an alliance with PSDB, may however not be the best way to acquire these rights. Historically PSDB have not been a proponent for the rights of the roofless, or the poor more in general. The way PSDB opposed Marta Suplicy's (PT) urban reforms (see page 28/29), is an example of this. Several informants for this research underpin that impression. A city councilman for the leftist political party PSOL, says: "It is strange that PSDB are associated with the roofless movement. They are constantly fighting against them." (T. Vespoli, personal communication, December 9, 2014.) Nazare from FLM reports, "PSDB are totally against the roofless. The mayor is fighting for the people, the governor is fighting against them" (personal communication, December 13, 2014). It is of course clear that these informants are not neutral, but they also make clear how Sem-Teto's alliance with PSDB has been received. There is a huge importance of *individual rights* in Sem-Teto's rhetoric, a rhetoric that fits well into the rhetoric of PSDB. While Trabalhador-Sem-Teto focus on the collective right to the city, Sem-Teto focuses on the individual right to housing.

The way the SMOs frames their struggle has implications for the expectations the members are met with. Trabalhador-Sem-Teto's approach to the housing issue is broad; they want political reforms, and an urban reform. They are critical toward the neoliberal urban governing, and believe a more equal and just city is possible. They expect their members to continue the *luta* (struggle) for the whole collective, after getting housing for themselves and their family. The *luta* is not over until a better future city has been built. On the contrary it may seem as members in Sem-Teto look at housing, or simply a roof, as their only incentive to be part of the organization. People pay the leaders to get shelter, and when the individual has got what they fight for (housing) the struggle is over. One may thus say that Trabalhador-Sem-Teto has a more holistic, ideological and collective approach to the issue of housing as a right, while Sem-Teto's approach is more pragmatic and individualistic.

7 Conclusion

This thesis has explored the roofless movement in São Paulo, Brazil, and discussed its root causes, characteristics and challenges. In this final chapter I will summarize my findings.

The main root cause of the roofless movement in São Paulo is grievances in society. In addition to the huge housing deficit, rental costs have sky rocketed, and people with few financial resources are left in a vulnerable situation. While São Paulo has grown, both in size and economy, the inequality has persisted. The economical growth has been far from beneficial to all. The number of roofless in São Paulo is striking. The roofless movement seeks to change public housing policy, and is an important actor in this sense. They have taken advantage of the partly progressive legislation on housing, and framed housing as a right. The movement is characterized as being extensive and strong, even though the strength of the movement has been fluctuating ever since the movement emerged in the early 1980s. The capacity to mobilize people has persisted, and seems to have been strengthened recently.

The political situation helps explain the strengthening of the movement. When PT came to power nationally in 2003 it was a huge political opportunity for the movement. Hopes were high; their demands would finally be met. Unfortunately, the result was not as uplifting as hoped. The housing deficit persisted, and the movement was left disappointed. A new political opportunity arose when PT got the mayor of São Paulo in 2013. This shift created an environment more open to dialogue with the greater part of the roofless movement. This political opportunity was however interpreted differently within the roofless movement; a minor part of the movement created an alliance with the political right, governing the state level of São Paulo. The roofless movement is now, more than ever, characterized by being fragmented.

The problem in São Paulo is not the lack of houses; in 2010 more than 290 000 houses were empty. Neither the lack of finances, the municipal budget is huge. The problem is the lack of political leeway to make necessary changes. Even though the concurrent governing of São Paulo city and state has become a political opportunity for certain roofless SMOs, it is an obstacle to the roofless movement as a whole. The constant horsetrading between the different political factions leads to slow progress in decreasing the housing deficit. It is not always easy

to know which political level that has the responsibility for what policy area. In a situation where the state of São Paulo is governed by PSDB, and the municipality is governed by PT, this challenge increases, as the two levels are not interested in a good cooperation.

Given the current situation in São Paulo, a megacity with an enormous housing deficit that has persisted for decades, and where the roofless movement tirelessly has fought to better the situation with few results, it is not surprising that some SMOs brake with the prevailing norms and apply new tactics. Sem-Teto, one of the two subcases that have been researched in this thesis, is a clear example in this sense. Instead of continuously believing in left wing party PT's ability to change the situation, they have entered into a political alliance with potentially tactical advantages. By supporting the right wing party PSDB at a local state level they are able to pressure the municipality, run by PT. At the same time the political right may (at least strategically) challenge PT's hegemony on social issues, such as housing, by supporting certain roofless SMOs. The remaining question is how prolonged this mutual support will be. The various roofless SMOs demand results, and it is not likely that PSDB will serve results faster than PT will. There is rather a fair chance that Sem-Teto will be left disappointed, as they have been with PT, and realize that the only thing the alliance served to was to make life harder for PT and the municipality (in addition to possibly a temporary beneficial financial situation). They might, in other words, have become PSDB's useful idiots.

Trabalhador-Sem-Teto on the other hand has chosen a tactic where they are not as bound by their relation to political parties. They do receive support from political parties, but have not entered into a situation where they depend entirely on any political party. In this situation they are more able to criticize both political sides with weight and legitimacy. Because of their huge number of members, they are not an actor that can be overlooked. Trabalhador-Sem-Teto can be described as a pressure group that continuously pressures the local government to fulfill their demands. They are successful in achieving results, which make them attractive to join or support. The strong focus on cultural aspects and collective identity leaves the organization less vulnerable to disintegration, as there are always a massive number of activists and trained militants to take over if some individuals refrain.

The roofless movement faces a range of challenges. The most obvious one is the lack of results; their demands are not sufficiently met – the housing deficit and socio-economic

inequality persists. Even though the concurrent governing of São Paulo has been a political opportunity to parts of the movement, it has been a challenge to the greater part. The constant political and administrative discontinuity creates a situation where there is no consistent strategy to reduce the housing deficit.

The movement also faces more internal challenges that this thesis has drawn attention to. The fragmentation of the movement may weaken the movements' demands. The most obvious fragmentation is due to the different political allies. The greater part of the roofless movement have close bonds to political parties, either morally, financially or both. In such situation, the movement is vulnerable to co-option, but also corruption. This thesis has also pointed to the fact that some SMOs are more opportunist than others. The movement is not always internal solidary, even though social movements are often defined as such. Some roofless SMOs seem more concerned about the well-being of their own members, than the more overarching struggle. These factions within the movement even seem willing to thwart the rest of the movement for their own gain. They focus on the individual right to housing, not the collective right to the city.

Due to the limitations of this research, there are obviously perceptions and views that are left out. This thesis presents a small segment of the whole roofless movement and there will therefore be some uncertainty concerning to what degree the findings in this research are valid for the movement as such. I do, however, believe that my empirical findings are thorough; I have conducted a fair amount of interviews and included a broad range of different informants. The contradictions within the movement are generalizable, but the perceptions on this contradiction will naturally vary, depending on the informant.

7.1 Questions for further investigation

There are naturally many aspects I have had to exclude because of the limits for a Master thesis. My contribution to the research field has however been to go in depth on the contradictions within the roofless movement, and explore parts of the movement that have thus far not been researched thoroughly. As of today there has been no published academic work on the SMO Sem-Teto, although they play an important part in the current situation of the roofless movement. Whether their strategy is efficient or not remains unanswered in this thesis, but further ahead it would be interesting to investigate what kind of results their political alliance has led to. My choice of applying an entirely qualitative approach has also

had its limitations. By using a quantitative approach (or a combination of the two) I could have gotten further insight into the achievements of the specific SMOs, by for instance looking into the number of achieved housing projects. Another option could have been drawing upon organizational theory to be able to go further into the characteristics of each SMO, and their strategies. These are issues for further investigation.

This thesis has also touched upon sensitive issues such as co-option and corruption between political parties and the roofless movement. This topic is extremely interesting, and deserves further attention. While I have provided some information about these issues, and insinuated that co-option and corruption might be occurring within the roofless movement, these topics have far from been given enough attention to be able to draw clear conclusions.

Although the roofless movement of São Paulo obviously is a local case, it contains features that can be found in similar movements elsewhere. Housing deficit is a phenomenon that affects people all over the world; it is an international problem, with specific local traits. Housing deficit has recently become a major problem in places where this used to be a smaller concern. As a result of the financial crisis the housing deficit has for instance boomed in Southern Europe, and in the United States. A comparative research of roofless movements in different parts of the world would be interesting to conduct, to better understand what common traits they have and challenges they meet. Housing deficit is a global concern; this is only one of many reasons for why the roofless movement in São Paulo deserves larger attention.

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9 Appendix

9.1 List over interviews

Name	Title and affiliation	Remarks
Maria	Local coordinator, occupation Nova Palestina (MTST)	Interview 23.10.14, recorded
Jussara Basso	Regional coordinator, MTST	Interview 23.10.14, recorded
Rosana Schwarts	Researcher and Ph.D. in social history.	Interview 27.10.14, recorded
Edinalva Franco	Leader MMPT	Interview 04.11.14, recorded
Guilherme Boulos	National coordinator, MTST	Interview 09.11.14, recorded
Bete	Local coordinator, Nova Palestina (MTST)	Interview 11.11.14, recorded
Daniel	Lives in the occupation Nova Palestina	Interview 11.11.14, recorded
Ediana	Lives in the occupation Nova Palestina	Interview 18.11.14, recorded
Ana	Lives in the occupation Nova Palestina	Interview 18.11.14, recorded
Dayana	Local coordinator, Chico Mendes (MTST)	Interview 21.11.14, recorded
“Deis reais”	Local coordinator, Chico Mendes (MTST)	Interview 21.11.14, recorded
Aginaldo	Lives in the occupation Cinema Maroccos (MSTS)	Interview 27.11.14, recorded
Abigail	Lives in the occupation Cinema Maroccos (MSTS)	Interview 27.11.14, recorded
Jéssica	Lives in the occupation Cinema Maroccos (MSTS)	Interview 27.11.14, recorded
Douglas	Lawyer, legal department, MSTS	Interview 27.11.14, recorded
Wladimir Ribeiro Brito	General secretary, MSTS	Interview 27.11.14, recorded
Toninho Vespoli	Municipal councilor, PSOL	Interview 09.12.14, recorded
Nazare	Cultural coordinator, FLM	Interview 13.12.14, recorded
Daniel	Living in occupation, FLM	Informal conversation, 13.12.14, not recorded. Good notes.
Antonia Nascimento	Leader of FLM	Interview 16.12.14, recorded
“Kinley”	Living in the occupation Cinema Maroccos, MSTS.	Interview 18.12.14, recorded. Background noise made it hard to transcribe.
Edilson Mineiro	Advisor to municipal councilor Nabil Bonduki, PT	Interview 19.12.14, recorded

9.2 Interview guide

Introduction:

My background.

My thesis.

Confidentiality, anonymity, can I record?

Background:

About the occupation and the specific SMO.

How did you become a member?

What is your background? (Education, job, children etc.)

The roofless movement/SMO:

How is the SMO organized?

How are people mobilized?

How do you plan an occupation?

Who are the roofless?

What are their strategies?

Who holds responsibility within the SMO? Hierarchy? Leaders? Who does what?

What kind of financial resources does the organization inhibit?

Do they meet any repression?

Housing policy:

Perceptions on the current housing policy. Who are responsible for the housing deficit?

Why has the number of occupations increased recently?

What occupations are most efficient to get housing?

How is the cooperation with the political level? Any bonds to political parties?

Who are the supporters/opponents? Politicians? Media? Students? Civil society? The church?

How do you negotiate with the government?

Is there any cooperation with other segments of the roofless movement? Perceptions on the other SMOs.

Goals:

What is the main goal of the roofless movement/SMO? How to achieve this/these goals?

What goals are already achieved?

9.3 Pictures



Picture 1: Cinema Marrocos, MSTs's biggest occupation. Photo: Kjersti Kanestrøm Lie



Picture 2: Nova Palestina, MTST's biggest occupation. Photo: Kjersti Kanestrøm Lie



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