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The pros and cons for trophy hunting contribution to biodiversity conservation and to local development and economies at large

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Master of Science

International Environmental Studies



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Mathieu Sylvain Detalle

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
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Declaration

I, Mathieu Sylvain Detalle, declare that this thesis is a result of my research and findings. Sources of information other than my own have been cited and a reference list has been appended. This work has not previously been submitted to any other university for award of any type of academic degree.

Date.....14.06.2021.....

A handwritten signature in black ink, consisting of a series of loops and a long horizontal stroke extending to the left.

Signature.....

Acknowledgement

After finishing highschool, if someone would have told me that my life as a student would end after 8 years of university, after living 3 years in another country and during a global pandemic, I would have thought that person was insane. But here I am, finishing my 3rd degree in Norway during the covid19 pandemic. This semester was definitely an emotional roller-coaster. And I would not have succeeded without the right people around me.

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Abstract

Trophy hunting is a controversial topic. On one hand, opponents of trophy hunting denounce an unethical practice, killing the same animals that are supposed to be protected while the benefits are reaped by wealthy private actors. On the other hand, proponents of trophy hunting argue that by generating revenues, it can then provide much needed incentives for wildlife conservation and management as well as socio-economic benefits for local communities, private landowners and national economies at large. This research aims to provide an understanding of the factors that influence trophy hunting's sustainability and its contribution to wildlife and biodiversity conservation and national and local economies. By analysing related governance systems using the environmental governance systems (EGS) and legitimacy framework outlined by Vatn (2015), are used to understand actors interests and perceptions of trophy hunting, how they view and interact with each other, and highlight where and which improvements can be done in such systems. This research also assesses the role of institutions and policies in local participation in CBNRM programmes as locals have a key role in successful biodiversity conservation initiatives.

Based on secondary data collected through a qualitative literature review, results have identified major factors which influence trophy hunting's potential and credibility as a conservation and development tool. Top-down management approaches which do not include all actors, especially locals in the decision making process and where power, revenues and benefits are unevenly distributed; bad governance and weak institutions related issues such as corruption, mismanagement and illegal hunting; and the disregard of hunting quotas and required biological characteristics as well as the absence of population's monitoring undermine the practice of trophy hunting. On the other hand, bottom-up approaches with inclusion of local communities in decision making process and the recognition of their land and user rights; governance systems with strong institutions and policies as well as legitimacy and power devolution are important prerequisites which allow trophy hunting to contribute to conservation and development. This research also raised the question of how much power and influence international institutions should have on the management of natural resources by countries and their governments.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Introduction

Trophy hunting is broadly defined as the shooting of selected wild animals for their trophies, usually large and charismatic mammals such as elephants, and carnivores such as bears and lions, but also other animal species all over the world. Parts of the animal, typically its head, skin, antlers or horns, is kept to be displayed as a trophy (Leader-Williams, 2009). Hunters usually pay a fee to legally hunt and kill specific individuals. Fees include the legal permit, hunting licences, payments to tour operators and outfitters when applicable to potential guides, payments to taxidermists and travel, accommodation and equipment as well as the trophy export price when applicable (Sheikh & Bermejo, 2019). It is an international and lucrative practice; trophy hunts, also called safari hunts are often expensive with costs ranging in several ten thousand dollars. Auctions for specific permits (i.e., for specific individuals) can reach up to \$400,000 and even more (Baker, 1997; Festa-Bianchet, 2003). In the literature, trophy hunting is also referred to as a type of sport hunting or recreational hunting (Cohen, 2014).

The potential contributions to conservation and wildlife management, to national economies and local socio-economic development as well as ethical and sustainable

considerations of trophy hunting make it a highly controversial and debated practice (Leader-Williams, 2009). On one hand, proponents of trophy hunting claim that revenues generated from the removal of a few selected individuals from a species can be reinvested into the protection and conservation of that same species and their habitats. It is then an effective tool for the conservation and management of natural resources, particularly in community-based natural resource management (CBNRM) programmes involving local communities (Di Minin, Leader-Williams, & Bradshaw, 2016; Dickman, Cooney, Johnson, Louis, & Roe, 2019). They argue that the biological and ecological impacts on both hunted populations and ecosystems are minimal since hunting quotas and selection processes are determined to ensure the sustainability of species and populations (Milner-Gulland, Bunnefeld, & Proaktor, 2009). Further, they affirm that such generated revenues contribute to national economies while providing socio-economic benefits in rural areas, supporting livelihoods and promoting local development (Jones, 2009; Victor K Muposhi, Gandiwa, Bartels, & Makuza, 2016). Regarding ethics, proponents of trophy hunting find the removal of a few selected individual is morally acceptable since it is contributing to the greater good (Dickson, 2009). Furthermore, the hunt is done by experienced hunters under supervision from professional guides, which minimise bad shooting and suffering of animals.

On the other hand, opponents of trophy hunting claim that the practice rarely benefits conservation and only do so in the right circumstances, meaning when trophy hunting is well-regulated by institutions and laws, managed in a sustainable and scientifically based way and including local communities and contributing both economically and socially for their livelihoods (Di Minin et al., 2016; P. Lindsey, Frank, Alexander, Mathieson, & Romanach, 2007; Ripple, Newsome, & Kerley, 2016; Sheikh & Bermejo, 2019). For them, the frequent association of trophy hunting with corruption is a major problem, as institutions fail to enforce hunting legislations, such as take-off quotas, causing significant negative biological and ecological effects and making the practice biologically unsustainable (Loveridge, Searle, Murindagomo, & Macdonald, 2007; Ripple et al., 2016). Moreover, many claims that trophy hunting revenues and benefits are unevenly distributed, with elites and other stakeholders reaping most of it, which goes against the “contribution to local and national economies” argument in favour of trophy hunting (Jones, 2009; Kideghesho, 2008; P. Lindsey et al., 2007). Furthermore, many hunting companies operate from countries other than the one where hunts take place, preventing payments and revenues from hunting to cross borders and contribute to economies of developing countries.

Opinions and arguments about trophy hunting differ at every scale, from local communities to landowners, to scientists, to local and international institutions. On one side, conventions such as the Convention of Biological Diversity (CBD) and the Convention on Trade in Endangered Species (CITES), which are international treaties signed by multiple states, support trophy hunting, either directly or indirectly, through support of sustainable development and sustainable use of wildlife. Regarding wildlife use and the role of local people, CITES states the following:

“... the sustainable use of wild fauna and flora, whether consumptive or non-consumptive, provides an economically competitive land-use option. [...] unless conservation programmes take into account the needs of local people and provide incentives for sustainable use of wild fauna and flora, conversion to alternative forms of land use may occur.” (CITES, 1992).

The influences and agendas of the above-mentioned institutions as well as the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) or International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) have been the objects of harsh criticisms. While the position of the latter regarding trophy hunting remains unclear, IUCN's criteria for species conservation have also been criticized (Martín, 2009). Many wonder if these institutions are still relevant to tackle the worldwide decline of wildlife and are also questioning the colonialism approach of it, dictating developing countries how to manage their own resources (Kideghesho, 2008; Koro, 2019; Wiersema, 2017). On the other side can be found different major international animal welfare NGO, which are against trophy hunting, such as the International Fund for Animal Welfare (IFAW), People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) and World Animal Protection (WAP). IFAW recently published a report entitled “Killing for trophies – An analysis of global trophy hunting trade” which criticises the lack of assessment of the trophy hunting industry's impacts and the fact that CITES classified trophy hunting as “non-commercial trade”, therefore increasing the number of species than can legally be hunted for that purpose.

When it comes to ethics, certain aspects of trophy hunting are particularly debatable, for instance, the finality of killing for the purpose of displaying a body part or even canned hunting, a practice where trophies are collected from animals bred in captivity and killed in enclosed areas. Ethics are fundamental in such debate since one might argue that most conservation activities originally started in response to the biodiversity crisis, implying ethical concerns (Minteer & Miller, 2011). In addition to questioning trophy hunting's respect of animal rights and welfare, opponents argue that sacrificing a few individuals for the greater good is morally

wrong and that putting a price on an animal life is both unethical and would favour certain species over others, meaning that less valuable species will get less protection than valuable ones (Dickson, 2009; Korsgaard, 2012). At last, economic benefits alone should not justify trophy hunting which is why biological, ecological, social and ethical factors need to be accounted for (Ghasemi, 2020).

Although views and opinions about trophy hunting vary a lot in the literature, scientists agree that governance plays a major role in the success or failure of natural resources conservation and management approaches, particularly in CBNRM programmes and overall land use, both on public and private land. While such programmes have been identified as major components of natural resources and local development governance systems, they involve many stakeholders who do not necessarily see things eye to eye and often seek to serve their own interests. Institutions are a key component of governance and natural resource management. However, institutions and policies within governance structures are not always seen as fair and equitable, especially in developing countries where governmental institutions are often synonymous with a more difficult access to both lands and resources for local communities as well as highly unbalanced power relations (Roe, Pathak, & Gutierrez, 2000). When decisions and policies are not perceived as justified by the governed actors, authorities are questioned thereby undermining the legitimacy of governance systems and therefore its effectiveness and sustainability (Tallberg, Bäckstrand, & Scholte, 2018; Vatn, 2015). Understanding actors motivations, views and interactions with each other is key to improve the legitimacy of governance systems. By influencing people's action, legitimate governance plays a major role into reducing and avoiding cases of corruption or mismanagement, but more importantly also influence conservation outcome (Vatn, 2015). The need for appropriate governance and policies is key for trophy hunting to contribute to both conservation objectives and to economies at large.

1.2 Problem statement and research objectives

One major argument in favour of trophy hunting is its contribution to wildlife conservation and socio-economic development. By generating revenues, it can then provide much needed incentives for wildlife conservation and management as well as socio-economic benefits for local communities, private landowners and national economies at large. However, governance problems such as corruption, nepotism, mismanagement and illegal hunting undermine trophy hunting's potential and credibility as a conservation tool. Such problems alter the distribution of revenues and benefits, the sustainability of the practice and the power relations between

actors, increasing conflicts within and between them. Nevertheless, actors from both sides of the trophy hunting debate agree on the important fact that trophy hunting can benefit society if well-managed and done under the right circumstances (Campbell, 2013). Therefore, for trophy hunting to be recognized as a conservation and development tool, it must be associated with strong governance systems and professional institutions which provide for sustainable use, fair distribution of revenues and benefits and the full inclusion and respect of locals rights and cultures. Otherwise, many may argue that this favourable argument is invalid, and that the existence of such practice should be put to an end.

The aim of this research is to provide an understanding of the factors that influence trophy hunting's sustainability and its contribution to wildlife and biodiversity conservation and national and local economies. By analysing related governance systems using Vatn's environmental governance systems (EGS) and legitimacy framework (Vatn, 2015), the goal is to understand actors interests and perceptions of trophy hunting, how they view and interact with each other, and highlight where and which improvements can be done in such systems. This research also assesses the role of institutions and policies in local participation in CBNRM programmes as locals have a key role in successful biodiversity conservation initiatives.

Objectives

- 1) Identify the factors that influence i) trophy hunting biological sustainability, and ii) trophy hunting contributions to local development and to economies at large.
- 2) Evaluate the legitimacy of governance systems related to trophy hunting.
- 3) Elaborate on what needs to be done to prioritize and improve factors having a positive influence on i) and ii) as well as minimize factors having a negative influence on i) and ii).



Chapter 2: Theoretical background

This theory chapter is composed of four sections. First, I will introduce the concept of institutions and the roles they play in governance systems. The second section will present the concept governance as well as related concepts. The third and fourth section aims to outline the two theoretical frameworks which will be the main analytical tools of this paper. They are 1) the Environmental Governance Systems (EGS) framework and 2) the legitimacy framework, both as developed by Vatn (2015). These sections will also highlight the relevance of these tools for this research and how they will be used.

2.1 Institutions and their roles in governance systems

As previously emphasized, humans' relations and actions are key components of environmental governance systems, as one goal of governance is to improve such relations and actions. Understanding what motivate people to act a certain way is definitely a very complex issue. In theories of human action, the concept of rationality is critical. However, it is difficult to give a definition to such a concept. Rationality can refer to one's ability to reflect and argue on our inner thoughts and reasoning or to act according to one's beliefs and reasons (Krausz, 2004). Some authors such as Von Mises (2016) argue that all actions are rational but what rationality is based on depend on the person. Most theories make the distinction between the individual and the social rationality.

Individual rationality, also named in the literature as economical rationality or formerly the rational choice theory, emphasizes selfishness (Vatn, 2015). It implements the following assumptions. First, one's preferences are "rational" in the sense that one has the ability to sort out options depending on the number of advantages him/her can get out of it. Second, one has full information, being aware of all possible options and all of their outcomes. Third, one will always choose the option which is the best for one's own benefits. Last but not least, in this representation of rationality, the "I" rationality, one's preferences are not influenced in any way by social processes nor institutions and therefore are not context-dependent (Vatn, 2015).

On one hand, many claims that human actions are motivated by the sole purpose of individual benefits, i.e., individual rationality (Reginster, 2000). On the other hand, others argue that motivation can arise from the will to behave in an appropriate way, according to the norms in place in the system (Krausz, 2004). In other words, the motivation to do what is "right" by not only considering his/her own interests but also the interests of other persons involved such as interests of a group to which one belongs. In contrast to individual rationality, here it is assumed that preferences are culturally and socially constructed, at least to a certain extent (Vatn, 2015). Also, this model of rationality acknowledges that preferences can both individual and social. Social rationality is divided in two groups which are the "We" and "They" rationality. In the "We rationality", one is acting for the interests of a group he/she belongs to. A good example of "We" rationality would be Hardin's "The Tragedy of the Commons" even though it was criticized for confusing a case of open-access property for a common access property (Feeny, Berkes, McCay, & Acheson, 1990). The "They" rationality is one acting for the benefit of others, similar to altruism (Vatn, 2015).

Institutions can act as rationality contexts since they help our decision-making process in several situations, pushing us to act according to an individual or social rationality (Vatn, 2015). They do so by providing an expectation of which type of rationality should be use in specific contexts. In a family context, institutions would push a parent to act according to social rationality, as children must be taken care of, and their interests come before parent's interests. On the other hand, if you are a trader who buys and sells stocks or commodities and represents a company, you will more likely acts according to an individual rationality because the more profits the company gets, the more money you will make. Trophy hunters tend to do the same, the better the trophy is, the bigger is the reward (i.e., more recognition, more fame from its peers).

There is no universal definition of institutions in scientific literature as different social theories have distinct opinions and understanding of what institutions are and of their various forms. Across social sciences, many define institutions as influential actors, hence a government or an NGO would be considered an institution while being a potential actor in the system. While this is a common opinion when studying environmental governance, this research will adopt a constructivism-based definition of institutions, as defined by Vatn (2015):

“Institutions are the conventions, norms and formally sanctioned rules of a society. They provide expectations, stability and meaning essential to human existence and coordination. Institutions support certain values, and produce and protect specific interests.” (p. 78)

Institutions are formative instruments of human behaviour which means that new institutions are created by individuals who themselves have been influenced by institutions. This illustrates the social constructivism understanding of institutions, recognizing that actors perceptions, interests and value are influenced by institutions and the global environment within which actors evolve and operate (Vatn, 2015). People are introduced to institutions while growing up as they help shaping people’s interpretations of their respective environments. However, people are not necessarily aware of their existence nor that they are human constructs as they are integrated in societies. The social constructivism perspective provides an understanding of institutions impacts on human behaviour, which is essential when analysing environmental governance issues. Furthermore, institutions are closely related to power, which is broadly defined as the capacity of an individual (or group) to achieve its own interests and control its environment by influencing other’s actions. Institutions have different influence on trophy hunting stakeholders, as they may empower some of them to the detriment of others. Three main types of influence on power are identified in such context:

- *Normative power* which is a power reinforced by people’s interpretation and understanding of existing conventions and norms that they agree with (Pellandini-Simányi, 2014).
- *Positional power* which refers to one’s position in a system or hierarchy which can then influence other actors property rights and involvement in decision-making processes.
- *Coordination power*, ability to coordinate different actors towards a common goal.

Vatn acknowledge the importance of these types of power for environmental governance, as institutions have the capacity to reduce potential conflicts, but also to empower or disempower actors. The latter fact creates unbalanced power relationships, reduce positive

interactions and coordination between actors. Institutions contribute to the functioning of society, by formatting and coordinating human behaviour as well as managing conflicts. In the case of environmental governance, these conflicts are related to access and use of natural resources.

2.2 Governance and related concepts

There is no universal definition of the concept of governance as it means different things for different actors. In this research, I will use the definition provided by Vatn who defines governance as:

“It encompasses both processes and structures. The process element refers to the shaping of priorities, how conflicts are acknowledged and possibly resolved, and how the coordination of people’s actions regarding resource use is facilitated. The structural aspect refers to how these processes are organized and “administered.” (Vatn (2015), p. 133)

When it comes to trophy hunting, since it is question of how to use and manage the natural resource that is wildlife, environmental governance applies because it focuses on the management and protection of environmental resources. It is important to specify that, while there is a distinction between politics and governance in most of the literature, Vatn includes politics and governments into his definition as he sees them as major actors in governance.

Governance is a complex concept which includes processes, actors, structures and interactions between and within these. Therefore, sub-concepts can be found within governance. An important one is the concept of resource regimes which refers to environmental governance institutions, meaning institutions related to the use and protection of environmental resources and processes. Vatn (2015) distinguishes between two sets of institutions, here rules, in a resource regime:

- 1) Rules defining access to resources,
- 2) Rules defining interactions within and between the different actors who have access to such resources.

Property and use rights, in addition of related norms and conventions, are covered in the first set. These rights are embodied by access to resources and information as well as rights to manage, to sustainably use and rights to information. A third party, meaning other than a user or and/or owner of the resource, such as the state shall make sure such rights are upheld. The

distribution of rights depends on the type of property. In the literature, four groups are most commonly used to defined property rights:

- **Private property:** allocate the property ownership to one or multiple individuals (other than the state). The owner has control over who has property access as well as rights and obligations regarding the use of potential resources on the property (e.g., private lands for canned hunting).
- **Common property:** similar to private property except for the fact that there are multiple owners. Common property can still have private property rights (e.g., communal lands used in CBNRM).
- **State property:** also found in the literature as public property, the ownership belongs to the State. More likely to have multiple purposes, such as dedicated to public use or protection from certain types of use while having rights and obligations regarding the use of potential resources on the property.
- **Open access:** characterised by the absence of property, meaning absence of property and use rights.

The second set of rules regards rules for interaction which take place within and between the different social actors (i.e., the different stakeholders in a trophy hunting governance system). These interactions can be direct or indirect and include cooperation, coordination, communication and competition. Vatn identifies four types of interaction, which are trade, state command, community rules and no rules. As depicted in Table 2, each combination of property rights and types of interactions leads to different socio-economic and environmental outcomes. The later influence political actors actions related to the resource regime.

Table 1: Idealized resource regimes. Source: Vatn (2015, p. 143)

	Type of property and use right	Private	State or public	Common	Open access
Type of interaction	Trade	x			
	Command		x		
	Community rules – cooperation, reciprocity			x	
	No rules defined				x

Resource regimes marked with an “x” are the most commonly used.

2.3 The EGS framework

Inspired from Ostrom’s institutional analysis and development (IAD) framework (Ostrom, 1990), Vatn’s EGS framework aim to facilitate analyses of successful or unsuccessful environmental governance from local to global scales. The framework adopts a social constructivism perspective, emphasizing the two-way relationship between institutions and actors, and helps identify potential issues, such as possible differences of opinions or interests between stakeholders, and solutions regarding the current state of the resource. While both the IAD and the EGS frameworks focus on institutions and actors, the EGS framework includes more of them in the system instead of limiting itself to the political sphere (Vatn, 2015). Institutions such as resources regimes as well as the property and use rights mentioned in the previous section are key components of the framework. When adding different actors to the mix, it forms the concept of governance structure. Vatn distinguishes three types of actors, defines as the following:

- “**Economic actors**, holding rights to productive resources” (Vatn, 2015, p. 143).
- “**Political actors**, defining the resource regimes and the rules for the political process” (Vatn, 2015, p. 143).
- “**Civil society actors** that offer legitimacy to political actors and define the normative basis for the society” (Vatn, 2015, p. 143).




Figure 1: Environmental governance systems (EGS) framework. Adapted from Vatn (2015, p. 153)

Although they are different types, Vatn emphasizes that an actor might belong to multiple of these types, potentially all three. Therefore, the governance structure includes resource

regimes, the different types of actors as well as additional institutions outside of the resource regime, such as constitutional institutions, or institutions within the civil society.

As illustrated by Figure 1, interactions between actors and institutions have an effect on the outcome, meaning the state of the resource, which in our case is wildlife. Likewise, the state of the resource influence actions of both economic and political actors. With all elements and interactions between actors that it encompasses, environmental governance is often linked with conflicts and coordination, as it might provide solutions for the former and initiate processes for the latter (Paavola, 2007; Underdal, 2002; Vatn, 2015). The EGS framework includes other major elements such as technologies and infrastructures. However, while the latter will be mentioned in this research, the focus will be on actors and resource regimes. In the present research, I first use the EGS framework to analyse how different governance systems, particularly resource regimes can lead to different outcomes. Secondly, I will use it to discuss how potential changes in resource regimes might lead to better outcomes that is helping trophy hunting to reach its possible contributions to development and conservation.

2.4 The legitimacy framework, a way to evaluate governance systems

The definition of governance mentions the identification and potential resolution of conflicts as well as the facilitation of acts of coordination regarding the use of resources (Vatn, 2015). Despite providing a better overview of governance systems, the EGS framework does not evaluate governance systems nor their outcomes, meaning it does not lay out a way of stating if a governance system is “good” or “bad”. The previous sections highlight how actors have difference preferences and interests and what influence them, e.g., as with trophy hunting. It implies that governance will prioritise some actors’ interests to the detriment of other interests, creating winners and losers (Vatn, 2015). Therefore, it would be unrealistic to believe that there is a universal way to classify a governance system as either “good” or “bad”. In addition, actors’ perceptions play a huge factor in a sense that what one might considers “good” or “right” may be consider as “bad” or “wrong” by another. Among the relevant criteria for the evaluation of trophy hunting governance systems, there is legitimacy.

2.4.1 What is legitimacy?

While often mentioned in political sciences, governance theories and institutional analyses, there is no universal definition of legitimacy and multiple conceptions of it (Schmelzle, 2012).

It can refer to justified authority, justice, decision-making processes, outcomes and actors perceptions (Koppell, 2008; Schmelzle, 2012; Suchman, 1995; Vatn, 2015; Zürn, 2004). In order to lay out how this concept will be use in this paper, I will refer to its interdisciplinary definition provided by Suchman (1995) who spells it out as the following:

“Legitimacy is a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions.”(p. 574)

In his definition, Suchman emphasizes the socially constructed dimension of legitimacy. He argues that this concept is based on the interpretation of one’s acts or behaviour by different group of people, each of these groups having their own norms and values. Legitimacy is therefore subjective. What or who is perceived as legitimate differs from one person to another (Suchman, 1995). As long as the actions of the government are concordant with one’s beliefs and values, the government will be perceived as a legitimate entity. However, one’s neighbour might have different beliefs and values and therefore will not see it as such. Legitimacy is paramount for institutions as it improves the way they are judged by different actors and other institutions (Koppell, 2008). Going back to the example above, a government perceived as legitimate will more likely get more support and trust by citizens (Suchman, 1995).

The conceptual framework of legitimacy as depicted by Vatn (2015) will be used to evaluate the legitimacy of trophy hunting related environment governance systems. According to this framework, legitimacy can be evaluated through two sub-types of legitimacy which are input and output legitimacy. The former refers to the legitimacy in processes while the latter deals with legitimacy in results. The term “output” used by authors such as Bäckstrand (2006) in legitimacy theory is the equivalent of the term “outcome” found in environmental governance theory (Vatn, 2015).

2.4.2 Input legitimacy

Input legitimacy refers to the fairness and appropriateness of the decision-making process regarding all actors involved (Vatn, 2015). It touches upon the required conditions for such process to reach legitimacy which includes how different interests are considered and dealt with and how power is delegated. Vatn (2015) explains that legitimacy here act as justification of authority, the authority to decide. The main concept on which input legitimacy is based is procedural justice, meaning that all actors are provided with the same level playing field. The latter concept is also linked with participation theories as well as processes’ transparency and

accountability. This is relevant for trophy hunting since the transparency and accountability of multiple management processes such as the establishment of quotas, the delivery of hunting permits and concessions as well as the distribution of revenues helps to evaluate and improve the governance in numerous countries (Child, 1996; IUCN, 2016).

2.4.2.1 Participation and procedural justice

According to Rawls (2020) procedural justice is about equal opportunities. Vatn (2015) acknowledges that there are multiple interpretations of what can be considered to be fair or equal opportunity in scientific literature. However, he emphasizes that participation is key, no matter which interpretation you refer to. In a governance context, equal opportunity means that all actors should receive the same chance to participate in the governance process. Therefore, this concept is strongly related to democracy, equal opportunity to be engaged in decision-making processes (Vatn, 2015). When it comes to define participation in a governance context, Vedeld (2019) states the following:

“[...] participation relates to power, its control, distribution and to classical democracy questions in a society concerning who decides what, when, where, how and why.” (p. 1)

Hence, participation is related to institutions, power relations, resources management and people's behaviour and therefore to public, private and political spheres (Vedeld, 2019). Participation has a major role in the success or failure of top-down and bottom-up approaches. In top-down approaches for instance, local people are often consulted last (if consulted at all) or after the decision process (Vatn, 2015). The latter's outcomes will more likely not be seen in a good light at local level. However, when communication between actors contributes to increase local participation, it will provide trust and legitimacy (to an extent) to the decision-making process and implementation of its outcomes (Poto & Fornabaio, 2017) Although participation and procedural justice being key components of legitimacy, it is important to point out that they are not necessarily associated with legitimate outcomes.

2.4.2.2 Transparency and accountability

Transparency refers to the right of accessing information. This includes information concerning the process itself, meaning what was discussed and what arguments justified it, along with the manner with which this information is made public (Vatn, 2015). Data coming from one sphere such as political to another such as public might not be understandable without reformulating first. This information must be delivered in due time to whom it might concern and allow the latter to know how they were treated during the decision-making process (Vatn, 2015).

Accountability refers to how decision-makers ended up being in this specific position, meaning how they acquired the authority to decide and how did they end up being responsible (Vatn, 2015). This authority was delegated either by a superior to a subordinate or by a subordinate to a superior to complete a specific task. It is the concept of hierarchical accountability. In most cases, one wants to be sure that such authority was legally given or delegated or gave to whoever might be in charge.

2.4.3 Output legitimacy

Output legitimacy is composed of three different dimensions: distributive justice, policy effectiveness and policy efficiency (Vatn, 2015).

2.4.3.1 Distributive justice

Distributive justice concerns the different principles on which the distribution of costs and benefits related to any specific activity in a society (Vatn, 2015). However, the notion of justice is not the same for all which is illustrated by the existence of different approaches to justice based on moral philosophies in scientific literature (Vatn, 2015). Relevant approaches to justice for this research are briefly detailed in Table 2, which described principles also applies for groups of individuals (i.e., local people or other trophy hunting stakeholders).

Table 2: Some examples of principles of distributive justice. Source: Vatn (2015, p. 167)

Principle	Criteria for distribution
Strict egalitarianism	Each individual should have the same level of material goods and services
Resource based principle	Each individual should have access to the same number of resources. This is related to equal opportunity.
“Desert”-based principle	Each individual should be rewarded according to effort, which is true for input of work, capital or loss.

In a trophy hunting context, distributive justice is important to make sure that local people do not end up carrying most of the costs but rather benefit from related hunting or conservation activities. Furthermore, actors’ perceptions of distributive justice might explain potential conflicts if such distributions are judged as unfair or disregarding of actors’ interests. Procedural justice and distributive justice are closely related, as the perception of the latter might be influenced by outcomes and therefore also influenced how the former is perceived by actors, that is the notion of equal opportunity (McLean, 2020).

2.4.3.2 Policy effectiveness

The second component of output legitimacy is policy effectiveness, how good is the policy at reaching its goals and targets (Bäckstrand, 2006). While trying to reach the latter, Vatn (2015) emphasize that one should pay attention to certain issues. First, resources or funds must be allocated to compensation as the outcome will more likely create “losers”. Second, one must be sure to pick the correct targets. Third, one must avoid leakages, meaning that a policy might reach its goals while having a negative impact in another area (Vatn, 2015). Regarding trophy hunting, a leakage could be the following: A policy aims at reducing the quotas of delivered hunting permits in an area to prevent overharvesting of a species. What could end up happening is that local people, who do not hunt for trophies but for the sole purpose of consumption, could get less permits as officials prioritize delivering permits to trophy hunters. Issues such as mismanagement and corruption are undermining the effectiveness of trophy hunting related policies.

2.4.3.3 Policy efficiency

Efficiency is a term that comes from economic theories and refers to policy’ outcomes produced at the lowest costs (Vatn, 2015). Two types of costs must then be considered. First, “opportunity” costs, which are basically the consequences created by the policy outcomes. For instance, if an area where wildlife is used for economic purposes becomes a protected area, there will be a need to compensate individuals who lost their income sources in the process. However, as previously mentioned, this is rarely the case. Second, transactions costs need to be accounted for, that is all costs involved in the decision-making process which led to the policy’s outcomes. While the concept is relevant for legitimacy, one must notice that policy efficiency relates to the concept of costs efficiency, a theoretical economic concept, and that maximising benefits is more complicated in reality, especially when it comes to environmental issues (Vatn, 2015).



Chapter 3: Methodology

This chapter provides an overview of the methodological decisions made in this research. As stated in Chapter 1, the following research objectives were formulated:

- 1) Identify the factors that influence i) trophy hunting biological sustainability, and ii) trophy hunting contribution to local development and to economies at large.
- 2) Evaluate the legitimacy of governance systems related to trophy hunting.
- 3) Elaborate on what needs to be done to prioritize and improve factors having a positive influence on i) and ii) as well as minimize factors having a negative influence on i) and ii).

3.1 Research strategy – Qualitative research

When it comes to defining a research strategy, most researchers usually make the distinction between quantitative and qualitative research, although an argument can be made to combine both (Bryman, 2012). While it is up to the researcher to opt for one of the two options, epistemological and ontological positions as well as research objectives are more likely the base of which research strategy is adopted. In the case of this research, I adopted a qualitative research approach. The latter tends to be associated with an epistemological position, meaning

that social concepts are understood through analysing actors' interpretations of their social environment (Bryman, 2012). Regarding ontological considerations, it often takes a constructionist stance which implies that social properties are outcomes of the interactions between individuals rather than predetermined facts unrelated to interactions (Bryman, 2012). Since this study is about a controversial topic involving many actors, opinions and interests vary a lot, from similar to conflicting. Therefore, a qualitative research strategy was deemed appropriate.

3.2 Research design – Narrative literature review

Due to the uncertainty caused by the current pandemic, I decided to base my full thesis on a review of the literature regarding trophy hunting and related environmental governance systems. As the aim of this research is to provide an understanding of factors influencing trophy hunting' contributions to wildlife and biodiversity conservation on one hand and to national and local economies on the other, this literature review suits what Bryman (2012) defines as a *narrative review*:

“[...] they seek to arrive at an overview of a field of study through a reasonably comprehensive assessment and critical reading of the literature. (p. 102)

Such review allows the researcher to first get a broad understanding of the initial topic, for instance in our case what is trophy hunting, why is it controversial, how is it related to both social and environmental issues, before providing a deeper perspective of certain aspects related to the topic such as the specific contribution mentioned above and the roles of governance in such systems. Also called review article in scientific literature, they can act as guideline for actors involved in a specific field and help them in their decision-making process. Furthermore, thanks to the broad or in-depth topic overview that they provide, narrative reviews are useful bases for future empirical researches (Paré & Kitsiou, 2017). Bryman (2012) emphasises the flexibility of narrative literature reviews, particularly for studies including an inductive theoretical approach.

However, the aim of my research is not just to provide an overview of trophy hunting main issues but also to highlight a “gap” in scientific literature, that is the relationship between trophy hunting's contributions, i.e., to conservation and both local and national economies, and the legitimacy of associated governance. Therefore, I decided to integrate some elements of a systematic review to my research design, as it will help me to achieve my research objectives. According to Bryman (2012), systematic reviews aim to provide advice and information for

actors involved in a specific field, in addition to be suited to answer the “What works?” type of question. This is in line with my personal goals as I hope this research will contribute to a better understanding of the trophy hunting practice and of the conditions under which the latter can be implemented and thrive. Moreover, one of the main critiques to narrative review is their lack of focus and their wide scope (Bryman, 2012). By adding methodological elements of systematic reviews, I also aim to counter (to some degree) this argument. This will be elaborate in the limitations section.

3.3 Data requirements

The subject of interest, that is trophy hunting was determined ahead of data collection. Data requirements were then identified, based on the research objectives presented in section 1 of this chapter. The first objective required information regarding the practice of trophy hunting, how, when, where and why such a practice is implemented, reasons why one would advocate for it and why one would reject it. Secondary data consisting of scientific and grey literature were used for this objective, including articles where opinions, interests and points of view of different actors involved were represented. Moreover, as the original research design was to interview local people in South Africa (see section 3.5.1 of this chapter), this literature review will focus on literature about trophy hunting happening in African countries.

Vatn’s EGS framework was used to identify actors (political, economic, civil society), resource regimes, other institutions and interactions within trophy hunting’s governance systems, which contributed to both my first and second objectives. Since our second objective consists of analysing and evaluating the level of legitimacy of the above-mentioned governance systems, it was necessary to gain knowledge about the latter before starting such analysis. As explained in Chapter 2, legitimacy is a subjective concept, which highlight the importance of selecting literature covering all actors perceptions of trophy hunting governance and whether they perceived such governance as legitimate.

The secondary data collected for the first and second objectives was used to fulfil the last objective of this research. The main aims of the latter are to elaborate on the relationship between the success or failure of trophy hunting’s implementation and the legitimacy of associated governance on one hand, and to highlight what improvements can be done for trophy hunting to fulfil its conservation and socio-economic goals and at which levels.

3.4 Data collection

After establishing the data requirements of each research objective, data collection was carried out by searching for literature through electronic databases. Data were collected mostly from scientific articles as well as NGO's and government reports, news articles and other public documents. The three main search engines used for scientific literature were Oria (i.e., NMBU's online library search), Web of Science and Google Scholar. There are a few books which are referred to a lot in this research as core elements of the literature used:

- *Environmental Governance: Institutions, Policies and Action* by Vatn (2015) as main tool for the conceptual and theoretical framework chapter,
- *Social Research Methods (4th edition)* by Bryman (2012) as main tool for the methodology chapter,
- *Politicians and Poachers: The Political Economy of Wildlife in Africa* by Gibson (1999) and *Recreational Hunting, Conservation and Rural Livelihoods: Science and Practice* by Dickson, Hutton and Adams (2009) for their major contributions to both the overall understanding of the topic and their relevance for the analysis.

In order to define the boundaries and scope of the research area, a list of keywords was defined. The latter included trophy hunting, governance, legitimacy, biodiversity, conservation, local and national development, local, controversy, mismanagement, corruption, poaching, community-based natural resource management, sustainability. Data sources were selected by purposive sampling, meaning they are selected by the researcher depending on indications (i.e., the scope) of the research objectives. Sources are chosen after their potential to contribute to answer one of the research objectives. However, as emphasized by Bryman (2012), online search engines are very useful tools when it comes to find out sources, but they do not evaluate the quality of the latter. To assess such quality, this research will adopt the four criteria developed by Scott (1990) which are *authenticity*, *credibility*, *representativeness*, and *meaning*.

Authenticity refers to the reliability and trustworthiness of the source's origin (Bryman, 2012). It is a major criterion not only in social research but in scientific research overall as the integrity of sources must be guaranteed by the researcher (Mogalakwe, 2006). The authenticity of a source might be challenged in specific context such as an obvious lack of clarity and/or errors regarding the content or if the article/document is attributed to the wrong author.

Credibility concerns what Scott (1990) referred to as evidence of the source, whether the results presented in the source are free from error and distortion, meaning from intentional or unintentional misrepresentation and misinterpretation (Mogalakwe, 2006).

Representativeness applies to certain type of documents more than others, for instance personal documents such as letters or diaries (Bryman, 2012). The nature of such documents is very specific, and it is therefore more difficult to compare these with other documents of the same nature. The point is to assess if a source is representative of other relevant documents which are about the same topic (Mogalakwe, 2006).

The purpose of meaning is to establish if a source is clear and comprehensible, both regarding results and research in relation to similar documents. In literature reviews, documents can be interpreted in different ways depending on the type of data they are based on. The researcher must refer to the context within which the source was produced to assess its meaning as a whole (Mogalakwe, 2006).

3.5 Limitations and challenges

3.5.1 The covid-19 pandemic and its impact on the research design

When I first started to work on my thesis project, the original plan was for me to do my field work in Africa, most likely South Africa, where I would interview different trophy hunting stakeholders, mostly focusing on local people. However, the current covid-19 pandemic started a few weeks later and, as it was impossible at the time to predict the magnitude that this event will reach, field work became uncertain. Time passed, borders and international travel started to shut down and improvements seemed unlikely. Therefore, it was decided that the idea of field work had to be abandoned. Another possibility to replace field work was to conduct interview online through a digital platform. When it comes to respondents, it could have targeted either stakeholders directly or indirectly involved in trophy hunting activities in South Africa or switch the focus to trophy hunting stakeholders here in Norway. Despite the advantages of online interviews in pandemic times, neither of these options seemed appealing to me as for the former I thought that finding respondents would end up being too difficult and for the latter it was not really the same type of respondents I was interested in interviewing.

None of the above options would have changed the research strategy as conducting interview to collect data is part of qualitative research. However, the pandemic did alter and slow down the research process as well as made studying condition more difficult as the

university's campus would switch being open and close depending on the government's restrictions.

3.5.2 Limitations of mixing narrative and systematic literature reviews elements

As explained in the research design section above, elements of systematic reviews were integrated to the narrative literature review design of this research. However, it is important to point out that both of these types of reviews have their pros and cons which means that combining them into a mix format does not only have advantages.

When it comes to including or excluding an article from the review, both narrative and systematic literature reviews have been criticised for their lack of justification. Such lack can also be linked to biased interpretations during content analysis (Paré & Kitsiou, 2017). This research follows a theoretical approach which is both inductive and deductive. Which can be a problem as far as narrative literature reviews are concerned since theory is supposed to be part of the outcomes (Bryman, 2012). Inductive approach can cause problem if new theoretical issues would appear during the research process as it might change the interpretation of the content analysis (Bryman, 2012). Last but not least, a major critique to narrative reviews is that they can be difficult to reproduce because of both their wide scope and the potential biases of the researcher. While adding elements of systematic reviews help defining a more precise scope for the research, one could argue that mixing elements from both type of reviews does not make it easier to reproduce.

However, by including elements from systematic research, the goal is not only to provide more complete answers to the research objectives but also to balance some pros and cons of both methods. Systematic review's elements bring an aspect of rigor to the methodology as narrative review's methodology is often considered unclear and difficult to reproduce (Bryman, 2012; Paré & Kitsiou, 2017). On the other hand, a narrative review is emphasizing content analysis whereas systematic reviews have been criticised for focusing too much on the methodology to the detriment of content analysis (Bryman, 2012).



Chapter 4: Findings

4.1 Trophy hunting and local development

One of the main arguments in favour of trophy hunting is its contributions to local and rural development, especially in African developing countries, and to national economies at large. It is argued that revenues and benefits from trophy hunting contribute to the sustainability and proper functioning of wildlife conservation areas, whether it be private, state (other than national parks) or community owned areas such as in CBNRM programmes. CBNRM is a concept in which local communities are able to sustainably use the land and natural resources they have stewardship over while benefiting from it (Gruber, 2010; Mbaiwa, 2015; Roka, 2019). It combines environmental conservation goals and rural development and supports local livelihoods. Originally, the CBNRM concept aimed to be a solution to the famous “tragedy of the commons” situation, popularised by Garrett Hardin (Roka, 2019). In the latter, it is claimed that individuals with access to a common-pool of resources are lacking rules on how to use them sustainably. Individuals will use the resources according to their own self-interests rather than restraining themselves for the greater good. Inevitably, this leads to over-consumption, resources depletion and environmental degradation. However, it should be emphasized the tragedy of the commons is controversial as interpretation and opinions of it vary a lot within the scientific community. In opposition to conventional top-down management approaches, CBNRM requires governments and institutions to outsource some authority and rights to local communities so they can actively decide on land use and participate in the correct management

of natural resources that they are using and also get economic benefits from them (Armitage, 2005). Trophy hunting can provide a form of income as well as other benefits, to local communities who either own or have user rights or live close-by the lands on which trophy hunting activities take place, e.g., local villages located in buffer zones around national parks. Incomes can come from jobs directly related to wildlife conservancies and hunting activities such as guarding, skinning, tracking or other services, or come in the form of dividend payments. Wildlife conservancies and game management areas are areas close to national parks or reserves and act as buffer zones, reducing the latter from human disturbances (Loveridge et al., 2007; Victor K. Muposhi, Gandiwa, Bartels, Makuza, & Madiri, 2016). Local communities can live in these areas, where regular hunting, trophy hunting, tourism related activities and sometimes small-scale agriculture are allowed. Income generated by such activities can be shared with locals, either as an income or as benefits from projects in which wildlife conservancies invest in such as increased access to education or to health care (Jones, 2009). Hunted animals can also be made available as a source of meat. The Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE) started in 1989 in Zimbabwe is a well-known example of CBNRM which, despite political and economic uncertainties, continue to contribute to conservation and local development (Jones, 2009; Mapedza & Bond, 2006). The CBNRM approach is, however, not always successful. Other African countries such as Namibia and Botswana have adopted CBNRM programmes with different degree of success. On one hand, Namibia is considered as a primary example of CBNRM success in Africa as most of them are successful in achieving many of their conservation and human development goals (Nuulimba & Taylor, 2015). In the case of Botswana, Mbaiwa (2015) emphasizes that CBNRM success has been heterogenous and dependent on several political, social and economic factors, especially institutional framework effectiveness. Zimbabwe represents another interesting case, where CBNRM programmes were promising before the emergence of political, economic and social instabilities in the country (Mapedza & Bond, 2006). The latter caused a drastic reduction in support and benefits for CBNRM programmes. Lastly, it is important to notice that locals getting some benefits from CBNRM is not synonym of conservation success (Garner, 2012).

Although the non-consumptive tourism industry (either ecotourism or photographic tourism) is also susceptible to generate revenues and benefits for local communities, scientists argue that trophy hunting holds a few advantages over the various form of tourism (Jones, 2009; P. A. Lindsey, Roulet, & Romañach, 2007; Victor K Muposhi et al., 2016). The practice can

potentially be implemented in remote areas, e.g., areas in countries with ongoing conflicts such as the Central African Republic, Chad or the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Indeed, unlike ecotourism, trophy hunts do not require as much infrastructure to be in place. Moreover, despite ecotourism generating important revenues, the income per client is significantly higher when it comes to trophy hunting since such hunts are worth thousands, if not dozens of thousands, of dollars. Also, revenues from trophy hunting per unit of land are higher than other type of land use, and give opportunities to arid marginal and communal land with lower volume of rainfall to be used and to generate value (Child, 2004). The combination of these factors then allows such revenues to be generated while reducing potential environmental impacts (P. A. Lindsey et al., 2007). However, the combination of hunting activities and non-consumptive tourism may be difficult to implement because of both practicalities and conflicts of interests. Lastly, areas which are home to trophy hunting operators may reduce illegal hunting or poaching because poachers will be exposed in encounters with hunters, guides or locals conducting activities in the field.

Overall, when local communities perceive financial, material and non-material benefits from trophy hunting activities and are involved in decision-making processes regarding lands and resources management, it creates the right attitudes and relationships regarding both hunting and hunting for conservation (P. A. Lindsey et al., 2007). Then trophy hunting can both act as a wildlife conservation tool and contribute to local development and empowerment.

However, in many cases, these so-called developments and local empowerment are surrounded by controversy. First of all, the sole fact of donating some form of revenues to local communities without their active participation in management and resource use is not a synonym of development contribution. These revenues must outweigh the costs that local people have to pay from wildlife conservation activities (Dube, 2019; Mayaka, Hendricks, Wesseler, & Prins, 2005). For instance, the number of hunting permits which used to be delivered to local people before the implementation of a wildlife conservancy or land with trophy hunting concessions might decrease since permits now need to be allocated to trophy hunters (Thomsen, Lendelvo, Coe, & Rispel, 2021). The revenues must then cover the cost of losing meat if not enough permits are delivered for local hunts in addition to trophy hunts. Secondly, economic benefits are not enough to contribute to local development if other aspects are neglected. For instance, traditional hunting often plays important social and cultural roles in most community livelihoods. Some argue it should not be cancelled in favour in trophy hunts but rather should be integrated in overall wildlife management and CBNRM (Thomsen et al.,

2021). This kind of issues raises the question of roles and rights of the different institutions and stakeholders as scientists wonder about the level of authority that both governmental and local institutions should have and on who should decide how to manage and sustainably use a specific pool of resources (Dale et al., 2020; Ntuli & Muchapondwa, 2018; Roe et al., 2000).

Despite cases where trophy hunting actively contribute to local development, there are also cases where local livelihoods are negatively impacted by hunting operators. In their report *Losing the Serengeti: The Maasai Land that was to Run Forever*, Mittal and Fraser (2018) highlight the negative impacts of two foreign hunting companies, respectively based in the US and in the United Arab Emirates, on the Maasai people in northern Tanzania. These companies have either bought lands that were occupied by the Maasai for generations and/or been granted hunting licence on those same lands. Since then, local communities have been evicted from their land and their access to major resources such as grazing areas and watering holes have been restricted or denied (Mittal & Fraser, 2018). Moreover, severe accusation of violence and persecution were made against both hunting companies as well as the local police associated with them (Mittal & Fraser, 2018).

Many authors agree that the distribution of revenues in the trophy hunting industry is affected by corruption (Gibson, 1999; Kideghesho, 2008; P. Lindsey et al., 2007). Not only does it alter the fairness of revenues distribution but also has a negative impact of the sustainable aspect of the practice (i.e., hunting concessions distribution process, the determination of quotas as well as limitations for local people). This leads to a lack of trust and the development of negative attitudes from local communities towards both trophy hunting and wildlife conservation. Moreover, at the national scale, relationships between corruption and illegal markets undermine legal institutions and deprive national economies of significant revenues. Therefore, many authors emphasize the need for transparency and better institutions, legislation and regulations to ensure a fair distribution of revenues and benefits on one hand (Dube, 2019; Jones, 2009; Mayaka et al., 2005; Thomsen et al., 2021) and on the other hand to acknowledge local people's rights and roles in the sustainable management of wildlife resources (Kideghesho, 2008; Koro, 2018). It seems unfair that local communities who live alongside wildlife populations, which allow sustainable offtakes, are being excluded and kept away from any benefits while foreigners and private operators have given legal and full access to the same resources. Local's rights and active roles in wildlife management have been marginalised more than included and recognised by both international and national institutions and legislations (Goldman, 2011). Some representatives of African voices such as environmental journalist

Emmanuel Koro or the rural Community Leaders Network (CLN) also emphasizes the negative influence of Western medias and institutions such as CITES regarding how African people handle their natural resources (Koro, 2018). They argue Africans are able to manage their own resources without being accountable to Western countries (Koro, 2019). As long as this debate goes on, with no compromise nor solutions being found, it will likely negatively impact conservation outcomes (Goldman, 2011).

In addition of governance problems, corruption and mismanagement of wildlife resources and revenues, highly controversial practices such as canned hunting, also referred to in the literature as “put-and-take” or “captive bred” hunting, bring attention and scrutiny from medias, international opinion and even local communities. As emphasized by Prisner-Levyne (2020), there is no legal definition of canned hunting. In this paper, I will refer to canned hunting as being the following: *hunt for animals bred in captivity on game ranches, destined to be killed in confined areas with little or no chance to escape, for trophy collections.*

Such practice raises many ethical issues and welfare concerns towards animal populations and hunting per se. While the main arguments to justify canned hunting are the generation of revenues for the country’s economy, for private landowners, as well as reducing hunting pressure on wild populations and consequently contribute to wildlife conservation, some scientists argue that the latter contribution has not been scientifically established (P. Lindsey, Alexander, Balme, Midlane, & Craig, 2012; Prisner-Levyne, 2020). Moreover, even if such a contribution would be proven, opponents argue it would not outweigh ethical and welfare issues and therefore could not act as a justification to the practice. Furthermore, canned hunting is not regulated by international laws which makes difficult any potential assessment of its sustainability and animals’ living conditions. It might be part of the reasons why some trophy hunting operators do not recognize canned hunting as being part of the trophy hunting industry in a time where their industry is already subject to several controversies (P. Lindsey et al., 2012).

The combination of wildlife mismanagement, inadequate governance, illegal activities (e.g., poaching, corruption, violation of human-rights) and ethically questionable practices (e.g., canned hunting) contributes to fuel the suspicion and controversy surrounding trophy hunting while undermining potential contributions to wildlife conservation and national, rural and local development.

4.2 Trophy hunting and national economies

While literature mainly focuses on the potential economic impact of trophy hunting for local development, such impact can be measured at national level as well. Outside of local communities, other landowners will perceive benefits. As shown in Table. 1, for governments, benefits mostly arise from delivering different kind of permits or by perceiving fees either on trophies or concession. As far as private actors such as hunting operators are concerned, benefits arise from commercial fees for the hunted animals, accommodation and transport and by prices of all the assistance provided during hunts and for other services (Booth & Chardonnet, 2015; Snyman et al., 2021). Furthermore, money generated within the trophy hunting sector is not only reinvested in natural resources management and conservation but benefit other economic sectors. Saayman, van der Merwe, and Saayman (2018) studied the economic impact of money spent by trophy hunters in South Africa. Their results highlight that, by increasing the demand for certain goods and services, hunters increased the production of the related sectors. They identified agriculture, manufacturing, transport, communication and financial and business services as the main activity sectors who significantly, directly or indirectly, benefit from revenues generated by trophy hunting related activities (Saayman et al., 2018). While Child (2004) emphasizes the lack of assessment of economic multiplier effect for trophy hunting, Saayman et al. (2018) findings show that in South Africa in 2012, for every South African Rand

Table 3: Potential income sources for governments and hunting operators. (Source: Booth and Chardonnet, (2015))

Beneficiary	Income source	Basis for payment
Government	Permits	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Authority to hunt. • Export of trophies. • Temporary firearms import permits. • Other government taxes.
	Government trophy fees	Government trophy fees or game licences for various species on quota. The fee is usually paid by the hunting operator, if not by the client.
	Concession fee	Right to hunt in a specific area set out in a contract.
Hunting operator or outfitter	Commercial trophy fee	Fees paid by the client to the hunting operators for the animals that they have taken (include the government trophy fees mentioned above).
	Daily rates	Fees received by hunting operators for daily support services.
	Other services	Fees paid by clients to cover the cost of the trophy package and export, etc.

(R) spent by trophy hunters, the multiplier effect was 2.84 meaning that R2.84 were produced in other sectors for each R1 spent by trophy hunters.

Trophy hunting has a higher contribution to the overall gross domestic product (GDP) of some countries than other type of consumptive tourism activities. For instance, in Namibia, trophy hunting economic contribution is four times higher than coastal angling and represent 9 per cent of the Namibian nature tourism, against 0.7 per cent for coast angling (Barnes & Novelli, 2007). On one hand, an opponent of trophy hunting could argue that it should be possible for countries in similar position to Namibia to generate 100 per cent of their tourism revenues through non-consumptive tourism activities without resorting to consumptive. On the other hand, proponents would respond by again highlighting the quantity of revenues generated by a low volume of hunters (or other consumptive activities clients) which also imply a lower cost of infrastructure development as trophy hunters do not look to spend their safari in luxury, unlike tourists. In addition of generating incentives for wildlife conservation at local levels, trophy hunting revenues could allow governments to allocate more funding for conservation and natural resources management and fighting against illegal hunting, despite the fact that few governments do so (Child, 2004; Gibson, 1999). However, in most countries, funding allocated to conservation is insufficient. Gibson (1999) illustrates that by using the example of Zambia during the rise of the wildlife market in the 1980s, where scientists estimated costs of wildlife protection up to \$400/km² for rhinos while the budget was only \$4/km². Such numbers illustrate a problem which is not exclusive to Zambia but concerns most African countries and that is the absence of investment in the Zambian wildlife sector, whether due to investors lack of trust or the lack of environmental policy encouraging long-term investments. More importantly, in most African countries, there is a lack of understanding and appreciation of the value of wildlife in key ministries such as finance and environment (Gibson, 1999; Roe et al., 2000). Child (2004) highlights the potential of Zambia wildlife resources if the latter had proper economic support and management. Under the right conditions, he estimated that trophy hunting alone could generate up to \$250 million per year for the national economy. In a scenario where such activities would stop, it would be an important loss for the Zambian economy and for proper management, conservation and sustainable use of wildlife.

While many actors from local to national levels claim that the hunting industry is important for both national GDPs and local developments, economic benefits can only justify conservation in adequate governance systems, which consider all actors voices and interests and has the ability to tackle corruption and mismanagement issues.

4.3 Governance, corruption and mismanagement

The relationships between governance and conservation outcomes are complex and operate at different scales, from local to governmental, and involves many stakeholders such as hunting operators and landowners, especially when it comes to corruption. Many authors agree that corruption, under different forms, is more likely to appear where institutions are weak and fail to enforce the laws (Barret, Gibson, Hoffman, & McCubbins, 2006; Leader-Williams, Baldus, & Smith, 2009; Smith, Biggs, John, Sas-Rolfes, & Barrington, 2015; Wang & Rosenau, 2001). In this paper, I will refer to the definition used by Wang and Rosenau (2001) who describe the concept of corruption as:

“The collaboration between public officials and private actors for private financial gains in contravention of the public’s interest” (2001, p. 2).

Regarding trophy hunting, corruption can take many forms, from hunting operators breaking the rules/laws by ignoring/misusing biological and ethical quotas, circumventing exporting trophies regulations or arranging for illegal hunts of certain species; local councils embezzling revenues from either tourism or hunting; gaining hunting concessions and exclusive hunting rights without competition as in the Maasai case mentioned in section 4.1, to government officials getting bribes for granting hunting concessions or approving illegal uses (Barret et al., 2006; Gibson, 1999; Leader-Williams et al., 2009). Gibson (1999) illustrates how corruption and nepotism can undermine conservation effort by using events that happened during Zambia’s Second Republic in the 1970s. Back then, President Kaunda was the head of a one-party state and showed strong support to wildlife conservation, trying to tackle the rising poaching crisis (Gibson, 1999). However, members of his own government, motivated by greed, took upon themselves to counter Kaunda’s efforts by opposing policies which could have reinforce anti-poaching and conservation activities (Gibson, 1999). Therefore, national parks and conservation agencies ended up having not enough resources nor authority to prevent the rise of poaching activities which would also involve some of their own members (Gibson, 1999).

When it comes to the different stakeholders in wildlife conservation and trophy hunting, particularly in developing countries, significant power imbalances make it easier for some elite groups to control or influence both revenues, land and user rights and therefore ownership or and/or exclusive access of certain areas (Thompson & Homewood, 2002). Consequently, local communities who were promised social and economic benefits but were victim of injustice or

persecutions are not going to be inclined to support conservation programs and trophy hunting related activities even though improvements could appear in the future. Such improvements concern being fully integrated in decision-making processes, regarded as main conservation actors and for getting social and economic benefits. Poor governance and corruption create a history between locals and other actors, which is detrimental to wildlife management and sustainable use and will have negative impacts on future actions and make improvements harder to implement (Abebe, Jones, Solomon, Galvin, & Evangelista, 2020; Ullah & Kim, 2020).

Another issue, which can be the consequence of bad governance and on management levels, as well as being also often associated with the wildlife industry, is poaching (Adams, 2009; Jones, 2009). Defined as the illegal use or harvest of wildlife resources, it can take different forms depending on the stakeholders involved and reasons behind the act itself (Montgomery, 2020). The commercial poaching of wildlife trophies, such as elephant ivory or rhino horns, increased during the last decades, as such trophies are economically extremely valuable on international black markets. Commercial poaching might happen at lower scale with locals people hunting for household needs or selling meat of illegally hunted animals on local markets, also called “poaching for the pot” in the literature, although the argument can be made that the term poaching is inadequate (Lubilo & Hebinck, 2019). Despite measures being implemented to tackle such poaching, both at national and international levels, the issue remains considerable and leads to many human conflicts, some of them with involvement of arms and which are violent. In her article about green militarization, Lunstrum (2014) uses the case of the Kruger National Park in South Africa to illustrate how militarization can be linked with conservations activities. Located at the border with Mozambique and Zimbabwe, the rhino populations living in the park are the targets of heavily armed poachers, often poor Mozambicans. These locals are hired by other stakeholders (e.g., middlemen of criminal organisations or corrupt officials) who often provides the “necessary” weapons, before being sent to the protected area to do the dirty work (i.e., killing and harvesting). Facing potential encounters with armed rangers, they risk their lives for a price’s fraction of the “good” they bring back, the rest going the middlemen their employers and middle (Lunstrum, 2014). However, authors such as Lunstrum (2014) and Duffy et al. (2019) also emphasize the fact that the militarisation of conservation approach should be criticized and reflected on because of its excluding and authoritarian roots as well as outcomes which go against conservation purposes. Alternatives approaches should emphasize dialogue, try to understand human motivation

behind poaching as well as improving and develop better conservation practices which will provide better outcomes for both wildlife and people involved (Duffy et al., 2019).

Commercial poaching reached an international threat level similar to other organized crimes markets as the poaching of certain species, especially rhinos and elephants has become the main activity of wildlife trafficking criminal syndicates. In addition of killing wildlife, poaching is related to many crimes such as homicide and violence, corruption of customs and government officials, illegal transport of goods and threat to public safety (Balázs, 2016). It is a very organized industry which, as long as it is not tackled, has serious environmental and social consequences (Panjabi, 2014). Balázs (2016) highlight that poaching was the second most lucrative criminal market after international drug trade in the early 2000s and expresses the concern that poaching will sooner or later be linked to terrorism if it has not been already.

Poaching can also be done for the sole purpose of meat consumption (Montgomery, 2020). It is not unusual for locals to engage in this kind of activities, particularly in case of disagreement with other stakeholders or in CBNRM with unfair regulations and unequal power relations. When local hunting and harvesting quotas are either reduced or cancelled in favour of trophy hunting quotas, it can be very difficult for the poorest locals to make ends meet as they are the one who depends the most on the harvest of these natural resources (Eliason, 2012). Therefore, if the incomes owed to them for not having access to wildlife resources or for not killing wildlife in case of human-wildlife conflicts are insufficient, they can resort to poaching both as a way to subsist and/or as an act of protest against regulations deemed unfair (Eliason, 2012; Jones, 2009; Montgomery, 2020).

4.4 Biological consequences

On one hand, proponents of trophy hunting argue that the industry respects proper management, which sets sustainable hunting quotas as well as the selection criteria, meaning taking off individuals from proper age and sex classes. Therefore, they claim that potential biological impacts are not significant and do not affect animal populations under the correct levels of governance and management (Di Minin et al., 2016). On the other hand, opponents raise concerns regarding the sustainability and biological impacts of these hunts, which they claim for the most part, do not respect regulations. Even in cases where appropriate and sustainable quotas and conditions are set, it does not mean they will be respected (i.e., mismanagement and corruption issues).

Unlike regular hunting, trophy hunters are looking for specific physical characteristics when choosing their prey. Individuals with those specific phenotypes represent more valuable trophies. Therefore, physically strong individuals with long tusks, large horns or darker mane would be targeted (IUCN, 2016) Moreover, for a majority of species, such characteristics would correspond with male individuals, highlighting the concept of sexual dimorphism, which refers to the differences in external appearance between males and females of the same species (Ralls & Mesnick, 2009). This implies that more male and often outstanding individuals are targeted for trophy hunting practices.

Removing such males in hunted populations can have multiple demographic consequences and can lead to population decline because it may affect intraspecific competition and reduced reproduction and hence recruitment to the population. These phenotypes favoured by hunters are synonym of reproductive success for males in many species such as lions *Panthera leo*, bighorn sheep *Ovis canadensis* and African elephants *Loxodonta africana* (Coltman et al., 2003; Poole, 1989; Whitman, Starfield, Quadling, & Packer, 2004). If too many mature and often dominant males are being removed, it may affect the sex ratio and reproductive success by reducing probability for females to mate, alters breeding time and calves birth, among other reasons. Not only could it negatively impact the demography of these species, but also increase the anthropogenic pressure of genetically selecting traits which are not synonymous with reproductive success, meaning smaller horns for instance, to improve survival. Moreover, if such a pressure alters the selection of traits which has been, until now, naturally optimal, it can be difficult to reverse the process and come back to the initial selected traits (Coltman et al., 2003).

For species which have a high level of sociability such as lions and African elephants, the removal of only a few individuals can still be detrimental for the population as a whole. As far as elephants are concerned, females live in groups where the oldest individuals, which are often the largest, are called matriarch (McComb, Moss, Durant, Baker, & Sayialel, 2001). The latter provide, via accumulated knowledge, benefits to the group, especially mothers, such as higher survival rates and higher reproductive success (McComb et al., 2001). The removal of such individuals, which are more likely to be targeted by trophy hunters, may harm elephant herds.

Loveridge et al. (2007) describe another “social phenomenon” within prides of lion. They describe what they called the “vacuum effect”. When males of prides are removed for trophy hunting purposes, other males will take over his pride and, if the former dominant managed to have cubs before dying, will commit infanticide. This way, new males maximise their own

reproductive success with the females (Packer et al., 2011). Excessive removal of males can lead to an increase of infanticide, reducing cub survival with possible consequences for the species' demography. Among ungulate populations, Mysterud, Coulson, and Stenseth (2002) highlight the relationship between the removal of older dominant males and calves mortality. Due to their lack of experience, young males tend to have less reproductive success with and are less efficient when it comes to inseminate females which can cause delayed conception and therefore later birth. Calves that were born late have a lower weight (due to not putting enough mass on during autumn) which leads to lower winter survival rates. Individuals who manage to survive winter might be physically weaker, reducing future reproductive success both for males and females (Mysterud et al., 2002).



Chapter 5: Discussion

5.1 The pros and cons of trophy hunting

There are cases where trophy hunting is an unsustainable practice, which does not respect sustainable quotas, which takes place to the detriment of local populations and wildlife, and which only benefits the greed of private actors. These cases are often characterised by weaker institutions and policies, i.e., by weaker governance, corruption and a disregard of locals rights and interests. However, this research has identified some major elements that allow trophy hunting to work both as a conservation and socio-economic development tool, especially combined with CBNRM approach.

5.1.1 Bottom-up management approaches and the inclusion of local people

In order for trophy hunting to reach its goals and CBNRM programmes to be successful, a key factor is the inclusion of all actors involved in decision-making processes (Child, 2006; Roe et al., 2000). Therefore, the first and most needed action is the implementation of legislation and regulations which include locals in this process. Local communities need to be one of the main actors, if not the main, when it comes to decision-making related to wildlife

management instead of being relegated to the rank of secondary actors who just gives its consent for the implementation of projects coming from a top-down approach. Goldman (2011) argues that such recognition of local's rights and roles in wildlife management should be a basic human right, as its impacts the livelihoods of these people. However, literature shows that the inclusion of local people is far from being universally recognised and implemented (Dube, 2019; Mittal & Fraser, 2018). Even in cases where legislation and regulations have been implemented, local people's rights and roles may not be recognised by governments and institutions (Ntuli & Muchapondwa, 2018). When local communities are disempowered and excluded from decision-making processes, it is not only associated with loss of potential economic benefits, but it also hurts wildlife conservation (Child, 2006). The development of negative attitudes and perspectives towards wildlife pushes locals to start using wildlife to compensate for negative externalities (Dube, 2019). In more extreme cases, locals have been evicted from their own lands, facing intimidation and violence from both representant of the State (i.e., the police) and private actors (i.e., private security forces) who used conservation as an excuse to take possession of lands in order to make profit (Mittal & Fraser, 2018).

Through her example of Maasai and wildlife conservation in Tanzania, Goldman (2011) illustrates that the cause of conflicts between locals and other actors is often not the conservation of wildlife in itself but rather conservation approaches. The latter decisions and actions are often synonym of loss of control and access to lands for locals which negatively impact their livelihoods (Goldman, 2011). Also, financial issues related to corruption are also a source of conflict (Leader-Williams et al., 2009). More importantly, if locals rights and access over lands were respected and left unaltered, it would still be possible to conduct conservation initiatives with potentially even better outcomes due to higher participation and positive attitudes towards wildlife when the latter generates money which directly contributes to livelihoods (Child, 2006; Goldman, 2011; Ullah & Kim, 2020).

Issues related to bad governance such as corruption and mismanagement threaten trophy hunting outcomes. Once all actors have been included, it is crucial that revenues must be distributed in a fair and equitable way among them in order to assure that those who bear the costs of such conservation are rightfully compensated. Results show that in some cases revenues and benefits from wildlife use such as trophy hunting can be reaped by powerful and private actors, leaving few resources for local and national economies and depriving them from potential development (Jones, 2009; Kideghesho, 2008; P. Lindsey et al., 2007). As most of the revenues are collected by outsiders actors, African governments are less inclined to invest in

the wildlife sector as they fail to see the socio-economic benefits of it (Child, 2004). When powerful actors are collecting most revenues and benefits while the costs and responsibilities are assigned to actors least able to afford them, it is synonymous with governance problems (Wall & Child, 2009). Governance structures which are full of inequalities and which lack transparency and accountability do not help conservation nor local and national development (Wall & Child, 2009). On one hand, it threatens the sustainability and respect of quotas while on the other hand it denies actors, mostly locals, their due revenues and benefits. To prevent such issues and the bad influence of elites groups or institutions, their positions and powers must be challenged. By strengthening the environmental governance of trophy hunting systems, focusing on resources regimes, it will improve the transparency and accountability of revenues distributions and other management related processes (Thompson & Homewood, 2002). Actors, including customers (i.e., trophy hunters) can contribute to this strengthening process by putting pressure on governments and hunting operators for the development of improved national or international policies and a better distribution of revenue (Smith et al., 2015). By doing so, if most of the revenues actually go to African countries instead of ending up in the operators' bank accounts abroad, it may improve the understanding and appreciation of wildlife's value by African governments.

Top-down approaches have many flaws when it comes to wildlife conservation and management. However, the combination of locals' inclusion and the fairness of revenues and benefits distribution allows for more successful CBNRM programmes, where the right attitudes and perspectives regarding the value of wildlife have been developed, avoiding the "tragedy of the commons" situation. This is illustrated by Ostrom (1990) who show how important the development of local institutions is for the management of common-pool resources. Which is why bottom-up approaches have the potential to produce better conservation and development outcomes. Using the case study of the Luangwa Valley Project in Zambia, Child (2006) illustrates the efficiency of a bottom-up approach. By directly involving locals, such approach had a significantly higher participation level, produced more revenues and benefits (e.g., by finishing project such as building schools), invested more of these revenues in wildlife management, all this while being more financially accountable (Child, 2006). Those promising results are related to the empowerment of local communities. If bottom-up strategies provide for good outcomes, then governments which pursue implementation of top-down approaches are missing out on important opportunities. The implementation of any kind of management

approach requires good governance and legitimate institutions to reach its conservation and development goals while preventing issues such as mismanagement and corruption.

5.1.2 The importance of governance and legitimacy

From the reviewed literature, it appears that legitimacy is closely related to the success or failure of CBNRM approaches as well as obtaining sustainable and socio-economically benefits from trophy hunting. In successful cases of CBNRM such as Namibian conservancies, authors such as Child (1996), Ostrom (1990) and Murphree (2000) emphasize the efficiency of devolution. The latter refers to the delegation of power to govern to a subnational level such as regional or local. An early CBNRM programme which has become a model of other initiatives addressing involved power devolution was CAMPFIRE, a government initiative in Zimbabwe which started in 1989. It showed promising outcomes before being affected by political instability in the country (Mapedza & Bond, 2006). By delegating authority and responsibilities over resources, in particular wildlife, governments grant legitimacy to conservancies which has a positive influence on multiple factors (Murphree, 2000). First of all, the principle of power devolution can also apply within conservancies or other CBNRM programmes in order to create sub-level of authority. The latter will then facilitate the implementation of better management through an easier and faster decision-making process. Moreover, the inclusion of local people is far from trivial in such a context. The fact that locals legitimately receive “powers” is correlated with the recognition of locals’ rights and knowledge related to natural resources management. It illustrates that the government put locals to the rank of main actors when it comes to decision-making related to wildlife management. Therefore, one could argue that being given the above-mentioned authority and responsibilities will have a positive impact on the level of participation within conservancies (Nijhuis, 2021). Participation is among the main factors that contribute to the environmental and socio-economic success of CBNRM approaches. However, government institutions are often reluctant to delegate authority and rights to local communities as it is synonymous with a loss of power (Murphree, 2000; Yuliani, 2004).

When it comes to common-pool resources management approaches, more specifically CBNRM, Murphree (2000) highlights the relationship between legitimacy and the success and failure of CBNRM. He illustrates the advantage of power devolution through policies approaches that aim to place jurisdiction and authority at local or communal levels (Murphree, 2000). The “Small is Beautiful” approaches are synonymous with reduced management

transaction costs and increased transparency. In addition, the latter are more accepted by locals than cases where non-local and distant institutions are the only source of jurisdiction and authority.

In addition to the distinction between input and output legitimacy, Murphree (2000) and Vatn (2015) make the distinction between internal and external legitimacy. Both input and output legitimacy can be evaluated from an internal and/or an external basis. The former refers to the evaluation of the legitimacy by actors who are part of the process while the latter regard evaluation by actors not included in the process (i.e., external). Internal legitimacy improves the management of common-pool resources, in this case wildlife, increase cohesion and participation and take into consideration local knowledge and history between actors. According to Murphree, internal legitimacy is one of the major causes of failure for CBNRM initiatives when not accounted for during planning, despite a growing quantity of scientific researches emphasizing the importance of legitimacy for such initiatives (Murphree, 2000).

On the other hand, external legitimacy as an evaluation of a tierce actor, for instance the government, can be useful if internal legitimacy fails. However, when governments are not impartial in the sense that they have their own interests in local resources, they will not be inclined to support local institutions, therefore undermining local authority and legitimacy for the sake of keeping control over resources. Murphree (2000) claims that it is the reason why governments would rather resort to *decentralisation* rather than power devolution. Decentralisation is also about delegating authority and responsibilities but maintain a hierarchical accountability, for instance between a conservancy and the government (Yuliani, 2004). Despite being similar, power devolution amplifies the notion of independence as conservancies and other CBNRM projects would be primary accountable to its own people before needing to answer to superior actors in the hierarchy (Murphree, 2000; Yuliani, 2004). This could explain why many governments do not take part in power devolution as they maintain a better control over resources by using decentralisation instead. The latter is related to top-down management approaches which themselves are related to failure of CBNRM initiatives (Booth & Chardonnet, 2015; Murphree, 2000; Nuulimba & Taylor, 2015; Roe et al., 2000).

The results of this research illustrate the benefits and importance of both the “Small is beautiful” type of approach and legitimacy when it comes to CBNRM. Power devolution and therefore empowerment of locals is more beneficial than imposing national or international authorities and institutions. Legitimacy can help including local people in decision process

related to natural resource management as well as legitimizing their land and use rights, both being major components of CBNRM success (Child, 1996; Nelson, 2010).

As far as trophy hunting is concerned, these conditions allow for a fairer distribution of its revenues and benefits among all actors, contribution both to local and to economies at large, a higher participation level within CBNRM programmes, an appreciation of the value of wildlife and more sustainable management regimes. In addition, it may provide governments with a better understanding of the value of wildlife, as well as key guidelines on what to incorporate in conservation initiative and how to maximise revenue potential (i.e., revenues contribute to national economies via taxation). Lastly, it may improve the way mainstream media and some international NGOs portray and understand the practice of trophy hunting and socioeconomic importance.

5.1.3 The importance of wildlife population's monitoring

Regarding the biological consequences of trophy hunting, it seems that negative demographic impact can be avoided when scientifically based hunting quotas have been established (Whitman et al., 2004). Moreover, other factors mentioned above such as strong institutions and policies, as well as high level of participation within CBNRM will help reduce illegal hunting, reducing outside pressure on populations. However, when quotas become subject to modification, the precautionary principle should always apply in order to prevent negative demographic impact and assure the sustainability of individuals harvesting (Loveridge et al., 2007; McComb et al., 2001). Governments must have the scientific knowledge and financial abilities to manage and monitor wildlife populations to assure the sustainable outcomes of consumptive-use practices such as trophy hunting. Unfortunately, authors such as Gibson (1999), Smith et al. (2015) and Trouwborst, Loveridge, and Macdonald (2019) showed that such abilities are often lacking as governments rarely invest in wildlife sectors without good enough revenues perspectives. Similarly, when concessions and licenses are sold to rich private actors in circumvention of proper allocation procedures, it is difficult to assess if hunting quotas are sustainable and biological requirements are respected. Institutions also need to be strong enough to be able to tackle governance issues such mismanagement and corruption which otherwise are detrimental to wildlife populations (Smith et al., 2015). If African countries want to manage their natural resources themselves without intervention from the rest of the world, they need to make sure they have such strong, transparent and accountable institutions in addition of financial resources.

Moreover, it is important to emphasize that even though animal populations might not be demographically affected, meaning the number of lions is increasing for instance, it does not mean that they cannot be negatively affected by other factors such as reduced genetic diversity, altered reproduction rates or society structures (Leader-Williams, 2009; Loveridge et al., 2007). Such complex monitoring is hard to implement as it requires competences, knowledge and a lot of financial resources.

5.2 The controversy around trophy hunting and the role of international actors

Institutions are definitely among the main factors which influence the success or failure of wildlife management and CBNRM. Major international institutions such as CITES, IUCN, CBD have set worldwide guidelines and recommended legislation for international wildlife management. However, opponents of trophy hunting such as animal welfare or animal rights NGOs are pressuring these major institutions in order to reduce, limit or even ban hunting and trophy hunting in particular, which influences how the practice is handled and how it is portrayed in mainstream medias.

Most of trophy hunting opponents' arguments are due to ethical reasons. Their philosophy is based on animal ethics rather than on the biological aspect of wildlife conservation, unlike most of trophy hunting's proponents (Lecocq, 2007). When scientific evidence becomes irrelevant from the ethical perspective, it becomes a problem in the sense that actors from both sides end up in a never-ending debate. Lecocq (2007) emphasizes that, as much as both perspectives must be respected, it is unlikely for them to find agreements as they are based on argument coming from different fields.

These ethical actors such as the above-mentioned institutions have enough influence to reach the political sphere and therefore becoming another source of conflict between African developing countries and western developed countries. In an article about the accountability and responsibility of CITES authority, Hutton (1997) writes the following:

“CITES has become a tool for the developed world's booming animal protection industry to pursue an agenda fundamentally at odds with that of the Convention: the prohibition of trade.” (1997, p. 1)

Not only does Hutton question the efficiency and legitimacy of CITES decisions regarding the management of Southern wildlife, but he also highlights the fact that CITES ends up being

a tool used in the global North vs South conflicts (Hutton, 1997). Authors such as Kideghesho (2008) and Koro (2019) have similar opinions on the matter. It is hard to blame African countries for having feelings of persecution, oppression and living under the influence of neo-colonialism when the USA and Europe/Northern countries maintain the right to interfere and influence the management of resources controlled by African/Southern countries but not the other way around (Kideghesho, 2008; Koro, 2019). The legislation implemented by major international institutions such as CITES or CBD and encouraged by other organisations or NGOs (i.e., IUCN, WWF, IFAW and others) often limits Africa/Southern countries sustainable use of wildlife (Hutton, 1997).

Moreover, reasons that justify major institutions decisions are somehow inconsistent. The case of ivory trade ban is a good example of disagreement involving actors from every scale, from local to international, while showing the inconsistency in decision-making processes (Biggs & Holden, 2019; Biggs et al., 2017; Hutton, 1997). On one hand, CITES has prohibited all trade of ivory since 1989, with the main argument that it helped to tackle elephant poaching, illegal trade and contribute to their conservation. A handful of African countries such as South Africa, Namibia and Zimbabwe are the proponents of a regulated trade that would concern specific individuals such as those dying from natural death or killed for animal control (Biggs et al., 2017). In the case such regulation would be adopted, the benefits could be used to perpetuate elephants conservation and contribute to local development. Moreover, from proponents' point of view, it is only fair that the ones who bear the cost of elephant conservation should be able to benefit from it as locals are the one who suffers from crops destruction or even attacks from the biggest mammals of Earth (Biggs et al., 2017). As emphasized in Chapter 2, if conservation of a species has to be implemented, those who bear the cost of such conservation must understand reasons and be compensated to do so (Child, 2004). The main argument against such regulation of ivory trade is that could facilitate illegal trade in countries with low governance and create an increase of demand for ivory which would amplify poaching activities and therefore would threaten elephant populations (Biggs et al., 2017; Hutton, 1997). However, elephant populations of countries which advocate for a regulated ivory trade have recovered in numbers and there is a political will to fight and prevent illegal trade if such regulation should ever be implemented (Hutton, 1997). If the main reason to ban ivory trade in the first place was to protect decreasing elephant populations, why not give the possibility to certain government to legally trade their stocks of ivory, accumulated via animal control, appropriate management or natural death, and use the revenues from it as incentives for both

conservation and development at local and national scale? One possibility would be to monitor the effects of such legalisation on elephant populations and illegal markets before deciding if the initiative should continue.

When it comes to issues related to trophy hunting, the influence of international institutions, especially NGOs, is a key component of the debate. African countries are the ones who are dealing with these wildlife populations and yet receive criticism (i.e., accusation of corruption and inability to administratively manage) and get directions on how to manage their wildlife by European and Northern actors (Hutton, 1997). That is why, proposition to ban trophy hunting, a practice which can generate much needed incentive for conservation, local and national economies, is going to be perceived by African actors as illegitimate and as a violation of the authority that African governments devolve to conservancies as well as a complete disregard for local rights and livelihoods (Nijhuis, 2021). To which extent should these institutions and actors have the right and authority to take decisions about the management of specific resources happening mostly in African countries is questionable and open to debate.

Conclusion

To summarise, this research highlights the importance of legitimate governance and professional and competent institutions and control of corruption and mismanagement when it comes to proper natural resources management, which is a prerequisite for sustainable trophy hunting. It is clear that trophy hunting can act as a conservation and socio-economic development tool with promising outcomes provided that the above-mentioned prerequisites are in place and implemented. Switching from top-down to bottom-up management approaches as well as giving more authority and responsibilities to local communities appears to be the key to successful wildlife management. It is important also to recognise that it is first and foremost national governments who have the stewardship of their national resources while international institutions can provide advice and support. It will be interesting to see if such changes will be more adopted, if at all, in the future.

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