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A Discourse Analysis of Pakistan's Foreign Policy towards Afghanistan 1978-1988 and 2001-2008

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MSc International Relations

**A Discourse Analysis of Pakistan's Foreign
Policy towards Afghanistan
1978-1988 and 2001-2008**

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NMBU

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Declaration:

I, Rahmat Hashemi, declare that this thesis is a result of my research investigation and findings. Sources of information other than my own have been acknowledged and a reference list has been appended. This work has not been previously submitted to any other university for award of any kind of academic degree.

Signature:

Date:

Acknowledgement

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Thank you.

Abstract:

This thesis analyzes the *discourse* of Pakistan's foreign policy towards Afghanistan in two critical periods, 1978-1988 and 2001-2008. These two periods are significant because in both periods Pakistan was ruled by military dictators and Afghanistan was occupied by foreign powers. Between 1978 and 1988, the government of Pakistan assisted Afghan resistance guerillas—Mujahideen—to resist the Soviet occupation and its client regime in Afghanistan. However, between 2001 and 2008, the government of Pakistan cooperated with the United States to invade and subsequently occupy Afghanistan. Pakistan's Afghan policy, in these two periods, appear contradictory. Therefore, I chose to analyze the discourse that underpinned its foreign policy. Using discourse analysis, I explore how the state of Pakistan constructed the language of its Afghan policy, what national identity was made salient in Pakistan, and where the lines between Self and Other were delineated in these two periods in order to pursue the seemingly contradictory foreign policy courses on Afghanistan. Having explored the fascinating discourses of Pakistan's Afghan policy in the mentioned time-spans, I arrived at the conclusion that despite the apparent contradictions, there were at least two unaltered foreign policy objectives embedded in the discourses. First was Pakistan's foreign policy objective to foster or retain a strategic partnership with the United States, and second was its long-term objective to have a pliant government in Afghanistan.

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1. Introduction

In the last forty years, Pakistan played a critical role in Afghanistan. It helped end one foreign occupation in Afghanistan, and then facilitated the grounds for another foreign occupation. In the 1980s Pakistan played a key role in assisting Afghans to resist and finally repulse the Soviet occupation. In 2001, Pakistan once again played a critical role in Afghanistan, only this time it facilitated the occupation of Afghanistan by the United States and its NATO allies. During both these momentous periods, Pakistan was ruled by military dictators—General Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq and General Pervez Musharraf. With such a backdrop of Pakistan's shifting role in Afghanistan, one's interest arises in Pakistan's foreign policy discourse on Afghanistan—especially the language and practices that the state of Pakistan employed to form national identity, delimit the Self and Other, construct subject positions and metaphors, and depict certain representations of Afghanistan in order to rationalize its foreign policies towards Afghanistan. Many excellent books and scholarly articles discuss Pakistan's foreign policy towards Afghanistan, but the available literature on the subject lacks a discourse analysis of Pakistan's foreign policy towards Afghanistan in two critical periods, 1978-1988 and 2001-2008, when Pakistan was directly involved in bringing about a regime change in Afghanistan. With the objective of satisfying this research interest, I engage with the following research questions in the course of this thesis:

1.1. Research Questions

The research questions are structured such that there is one overarching question which encompasses the entire study and three sub-questions that essentially break down and further clarify the different aspects of the original question.

Overarching Research Question:

What are the defining characteristics of Pakistan's foreign policy discourse on Afghanistan, in the expression of the key actors within Pakistan, and how does Pakistan's foreign policy discourse on Afghanistan from 1978 to 1988 under General Zia-ul-Haq compare with its foreign policy discourse on Afghanistan in the period from 2001 to 2008 under General Pervez Musharraf?

Sub-questions:

1. Who is the main actor engaged in Pakistan's foreign policy discourse on Afghanistan?
2. What are the defining characteristics, in the discourse on Pakistan's foreign policy towards Afghanistan, as expressed by the main actor?
3. How do various understandings of 'Self' and 'Other' in Pakistan impact its foreign policy towards Afghanistan?

1.2. Literature review

Books and scholarly articles on Afghanistan-Pakistan relations are plentiful; but the literature gets scarcer as the topic is narrowed to Pakistan's foreign policy towards Afghanistan. It gets to almost naught when the topic is further narrowed on Pakistan's foreign policy *discourse* on Afghanistan. In this section, I have chosen to review some of the most pertinent works on Pakistan's foreign policy towards Afghanistan.

'The Bear Trap: Afghanistan's Untold Story,' authored by Mohammad Yousaf and Mark Adkin and published by Jang Publishers Lahore in 1992, is a classic on Pakistan's foreign policy towards Afghanistan in the 1980s. In this book, the authors describe with fascinating details the joint US-Pakistan covert operations in support of the Afghan Mujahideen, anti-communist resistance guerillas, to fight a Soviet-backed communist regime in Kabul from 1978 to 1992. In addition to detailed descriptions of Pakistan's role in the Soviet-Afghan war, the book gives a wide-ranging account of the United States role in the conflict. It also gives useful insights into the US-Pakistan alliance on the issue of Afghanistan and why this alliance did not last after the 'Cold War' came to an end in 1991. The Bear Trap is a must read for any type of analysis of Pakistan's foreign policy towards Afghanistan (Yousaf, Adkin, & Yusaf, 1992).

'Pakistan and the Emergence of Islamic Militancy in Afghanistan,' authored by Rizwan Hussain and published by Ashgate Publishing Limited in 2005, is a historical account of Pakistan's foreign policy towards Afghanistan. It is a rich source of background information on the topic. Hussain traces the source of the contentious relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan back to the geopolitical rivalries of colonial Britain and Tsarist Russia in the 19th century. The author describes how the colonial border legacies and later the 'Cold War' conflict shaped the contentious relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Hussain also discusses the internal political structures of Afghanistan and Pakistan and the regional security environment surrounding these two neighboring states to put in perspective their foreign policies vis-à-vis each other. The book also discusses Pakistan's perennial rivalry with India and how this rivalry shapes its foreign policy towards Afghanistan (Hussain, 2005).

'The Pashtun Question: The Unresolved Key to the Future of Pakistan and Afghanistan,' authored by Abubakar Siddique and published Hurst & Company Limited in 2014, is mostly a discussion of the border contentions between the two states and the Pashtunistan issue,

which also makes a significant portion of Chapter three in this thesis. Siddique's account is rich on the history, genealogy, tribal structures, and the nature of politics among Pashtun people who straddle a vast region in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. The author, who himself is a Pashtun from Pakistan, provides useful insights about Pakistan's role in shaping political ideologies among its Pashtun population and the themes and patterns of its foreign policy towards Afghanistan. On several issues, Siddique's arguments compliment the arguments presented by Rizwan Hussain in the preceding paragraph (A. Siddique, 2014).

'Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military,' authored by Hussain Haqqani and published by Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in 2005, is strictly speaking not about Pakistan's foreign policy towards Afghanistan, but it contains substantial chapters on the subject ever since 1947 when Pakistan was established as a sovereign state. Haqqani, once a senior Pakistani diplomat of ambassadorial ranks, presents an insider's analysis of the strategic objectives behind Pakistan's Afghan policy. As the title of his book suggests, Haqqani's analysis concentrates on the relationship between the military and religious establishments in Pakistan and how this relationship has influenced Pakistan's domestic politics and its foreign policy choices. Haqqani is very liberal in critiquing Pakistan's security establishment's¹ outlook, but he sounds rather conservative in his rather sparing discussion of the United States strategic partnership with the same entity in Pakistan ever since 1947. Regardless of this later caveat, Haqqani's account is one of the most insightful on the subject (Haqqani, 2010).

¹ 'Pakistan's security establishment' is defined in chapter 3

1.3. Approach

A state's foreign policy discourse underpins its foreign policy. It is not the foreign policy itself but rather the language and practices that are discursively employed to rationalize and make intuitive a certain choice of foreign policy. Therefore, studying the discourse behind a state's foreign policy necessitates a discourse analytical framework which is explained in detail in the next chapter. Discourse analysis is a theoretical and methodical approach to explore the discursive pillars that supports a foreign policy. In that sense, a discourse analysis of a state's foreign policy delves a layer deeper than, for example, a Realist or Liberal approach towards foreign policy analysis. Unlike the later analytical approaches, discourse analysis does not rely on pre-given concepts, categories, and identities. Rather it unpacks and analyzes the very concepts, categories, and identities that otherwise seem intuitive in mainstream analytical frameworks (Hansen, 2013). Since the purpose of this thesis is to unpack the discourse behind Pakistan's foreign policy towards Afghanistan in the two periods mentioned above, I decided that discourse analysis was an appropriate approach for this study.

Prominent scholars in the field of discourse analysis caution that conducting discourse analysis requires familiarity with the language, culture, and history of a subject matter, be it a state or a region (Dunn & Neumann, 2016). I chose my research subject and the analytical approach while keeping this advice in mind. I have lived in both Afghanistan and Pakistan for several years and I am familiar with the cultures, histories, and the official languages of both these countries.

1.4. Research design

In, *Security as Practices*, Lene Hansen describes three research models for conducting a discourse analysis of a state's foreign policy: model (1) focuses on a state's official foreign

policy discourse in which researchers limit their analysis to the statements and practices of the top officials of a state, such as the president, army chief, the foreign minister, members of parliament, and senior bureaucrats. Among the key objectives of this research model are exploring the official efforts at national identity formation, analyzing how a discourse is intertextually anchored, and examining how it deals with alternative discourses. Model (2) has a broader scope. In addition to texts produced by the senior officials of a state, it includes the foreign policy discourses of political parties, the media, prominent academics, and even corporate institutions in a given state. This model situates the official discourse in relation to the other discourses in order to understand its relative dominance and its potential for instability. Model (3) further expands the scope of research materials to include texts that do not explicitly engage with foreign policy, or which are engaged with foreign policy but has a marginal role such as film, fiction, television, photography, and even computer games.

All the three models are structured along their decreasing link to the official foreign policy discourse of a given state. In other words, Model (1) is an integral part of all the three models (2013, pp. 59-64). Keeping in mind, the allotted time and the scope for a master's thesis, I chose research model (1) for this study, which means the research materials in this study are limited to the statements and practices made by high-ranking officials within the state apparatus of Pakistan.

1.5. Research Material and Timeline

Discourse analysis requires not only a clear delimitation of contents but also of timelines (Hansen, 2013; Neumann, 2008). Hansen recommends that discourse analysts use a 'key event' as a beginning when setting a timeline for their study (2013, p. 32). I used the year 1978 as the beginning of my first timeline because several important events took place in that year. In 1978, General Zia-ul-Haq declared Nizam-e-Islam (Islamic system) in Pakistan.

In the same year a communist regime seized power in Afghanistan which marked the beginning of an armed resistance—Afghan Jihad—backed by the government of Pakistan under General Zia-ul-Haq.² I chose to cap this timeline in 1988, because that year the Soviet Union began the withdrawal of its troops from Afghanistan and a mysterious plane crash killed General Zia-ul-Haq on 17 August 1988. For the next period, 2001-2008, I used General Musharraf's dramatic policy turnaround on Afghanistan after 9/11 as the key event to mark the beginning of the second timeline. The closure of the second timeline is 2008 when General Musharraf resigned from his post as the head of state and the chief of army staff.

For the two time periods, 1978-1988 and 2001-2008, I have used primary sources such as General Zia-ul-Haq's and General Pervez Musharraf's addresses to the Pakistani nation, their speeches in the United Nations General Assembly, their interviews to the press, and their interventions during foreign policy debates in the parliament of Pakistan. The texts of most presidential speeches are translated in English and published in *Pakistan Horizon*; a scholarly journal published by the Pakistan Institute of International Affairs. The texts of official briefings to the parliament of Pakistan and parliamentary debates on foreign policy are published in Urdu³ language in the archival section of Pakistan's National Assembly website. When available, I also used statements made by General Zia-ul-Haq during informal speeches delivered to limited audiences, for example, during inauguration ceremonies and public rallies. General Pervez Musharraf published an autobiographical memoir, *In the Line of Fire*, in 2006 while he was still in power. I used the memoir as a primary source, but remained cognizant of the possibility that the contents of the memoir could have been filtered and tailored to fit a certain narrative. In addition to the statements made by Generals Zia and Musharraf, I also used statements by the foreign minister and

² The communist coup was followed by a full-fledged Soviet invasion in December 1979.

³ Translation is a sensitive process. I paid particular attention to retain the original meaning when translating from Urdu to English.

members of Pakistan's parliament when available. Nevertheless, the focus of this study remained on the statements and practices performed by the two heads of state, General Zia and General Musharraf, because during their time in power these leaders headed not only the civilian apparatus of the state but also the broader 'security establishment' of Pakistan.⁴

For the background section, which is chapter 3 in this thesis, I used secondary sources including books and scholarly articles. There was no time limitation for the selection of secondary sources. The secondary sources used in this thesis are available in libraries in Norway.

1.6. Thesis Structure

In addition to this introductory section, chapter 1, there are five more chapters in this thesis. The next section, chapter 2, explains the theory and method of discourse analysis in order to define the theoretical framework for this thesis. Chapter 3 provides a detailed topical background of Afghanistan-Pakistan relations in order to help the reader place the next two chapters in context. This may sound redundant for readers who are familiar with this topic. Chapter 4 is an analysis of Pakistan's foreign policy discourse on Afghanistan between 1978 and 1988. Likewise, chapter 5 is an analysis of Pakistan's foreign policy discourse on Afghanistan between 2001 and 2008. And finally, chapter 6 wraps up the discussion with a conclusion and recommendation for future research in the subject area.

⁴ More on this topic in chapter 3

2. The Theory and Method of Discourse Analysis

In this chapter I define what is meant by discourse, then I layout my understanding of discourse theory, and finally I define the essential elements of discourse analysis as a method. The purpose of this exercise is to elaborate the discourse analytical tools used to analyze Pakistan's foreign policy discourse on Afghanistan in the periods selected for this study.

2.1. Definition

Discourse, at a minimum, is a communicative exchange. Social communications rely on the use of language. Language is structured in a grammatical sense but also in a social sense (Ferdinand de Saussure cited in Jørgensen & Philips, 2002, p. 10-11). From a grammatical perspective, there are endless possibilities of using language, but the social structure of language allows only for limited possibilities. Not all grammatically correct statements have meaning in a social sense. And yet not all grammatically correct and socially meaningful statements are acceptable in a social sense. The social structure of language entails certain norms on what can be said and what cannot be said; it delimits what is appropriate and what is inappropriate in a given social context. These socially sanctioned norms of language constitute discourse. Therefore, discourse is not only a communicative exchange but also the norms and rules that govern social exchanges. This brings us to the following definition of discourse:

A particular way of talking about and understanding the world or an aspect of the world (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002).

The above definition of discourse implies that discourse is more than just ‘talking’ and ‘understanding’ about the world. Rather discourse is defined as ‘*a particular way*’ of talking and understanding about the world. It is this ‘*particular way*’ addition in the definition that constitutes the social structure of language—norms that govern social communications. Communications take place in a temporal continuum. The past is linked to the present by means of language. Communicative exchanges rely on past concepts and categories in order to be intelligible. The past is constantly evoked in present communications when we use intersubjective concepts and categories that we have learned as language. Julia Kristeva calls this feature of discourse ‘intertextuality’ (cited in Lene Hansen, 2013, p. 55). According to Kristeva, intertextuality is ‘the insertion of history into a text and of this text into history (Rear, 2013, p. 21).’ “Intertextuality refers to the condition whereby all communicative events draw on earlier events (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 73).” Through intersubjective concepts and categories, the past is linked with the present. It gives the present a certain trajectory, which could be modified to an extent, but cannot be cut off altogether. The inevitable connection of the past with the present brings us to a richer definition of discourse. According to Michel Foucault:

[...Discourse] is made up of a limited number of statements for which a group of conditions of existence can be defined. Discourse in this sense is not an ideal, timeless form [...] it is, from beginning to end, historical – a fragment of history [...] posing its own limits, its divisions, its transformations, the specific modes of its temporality (cited in Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002, p. 12).

The connection with history makes the above definition more comprehensive. However, it may still be enriched by including not only communicative exchanges—i.e. oral and written statements—but also social practices as part of the discursive domain. The concepts and categories used in discourses are not sterile communicative tools—they come with meanings that shape power relations among social subjects. Discourses create social roles

or subject positions such as ‘teacher’ and ‘student’ or ‘doctor’ and ‘patient’ (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, pp. 14-15). These subject positions come with built-in power relations that restrain or enable the occupants of these positions in different ways. For example, the occupant of a teacher’s subject position gives it certain prerogatives over the subject position of a student. Similarly, a doctor’s subject position entails the power to question a patient about very private issues which would otherwise be deemed inappropriate in a different social setting. Therefore, by creating subject positions and making them meaningful, discourses guide not only our communicative exchanges but also our social inter-actions. According to Iver Neumann, “[...] discourses provide packages for how to live and how to behave [...] (2008, pp. 75-76).” Individuals hold multiple subject positions depending on the social context. A person may be a mother at home, a teacher in school, and a patient in hospital. These various subject positions are socially sanctioned manuals for different sets of social practices. The realm of discourse includes both statements and practices. With the addition of this new element, we may now introduce the following definition of discourse:

[...] discourses are systems that produce a set of statements and practices that, by entering into institutions and appearing like normal, construct the reality of its subjects, and maintain a certain degree of regularity in a set social relations (Dunn & Neumann, 2016).

This definition has several important features. It clearly mentions both statements and practices as elements of discourse. Physical objects that convey meaning such as monuments, statutes, art works and so on are read as textual statements. The definition implicitly includes the temporal (historic) element of discourse by mentioning ‘institutions’ or institutionalization of certain statements and practices which are accepted as ‘normal’ often with the passage of time. In discourse analytical terms statements and practices that are institutionalized over time are called ‘discursive practices’ (Neumann, 2008, p. 45). The

above definition also mentions the socially constructed nature of subjects or subject positions. Discourses are not fixed and inalterable, but as the above definition states, discourses do retain a certain degree of regularity. The most striking element in this definition is the attribution of a productive nature to discourses. The definition states that “discourses *produce* [emphasis added] a set of statements and practices [...]” It builds on Michel Foucault’s statement that discourses are “practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak” (cited in Dunn & Neumann, 2016, p. 20). This implies that discourses are not some docile statements and manuals for actions but rather proactive producers of social reality. This productive feature of discourse is what forms the link between knowledge and power (Neumann, 2008, pp. 3-4). Discourses create the preconditions for action, telling us what is natural to do (or not to do) in a given context. There is a dialectical interplay between discourse and the users of discourse—each affecting the other. As social beings we have a symbiotic relationship with discourses. Discourses shape, guide, and make meaningful our social reality, and by constantly engaging in them we breathe life into discourses.

Discourses set the norms for social speech and practice, but they are not fixed or inalterable structures. Definitions of discourse that define it as *fixed* systems are, therefore, misleading. For instance, Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall define discourse as a “system of knowledge through which meaning is produced, *fixed* [emphasis added], lived, experienced, and transformed (Barnett & Duvall, 2005).” Discourses are never *fixed*; they are only partially *normalized* and always susceptible to change. If discourses were fixed systems of knowledge, then they could be called the *reality* of social life rather than *discourses*. While discourses are generally enduring structures, there is also room for agency and change. Dominant discourses are constantly challenged by marginal discourses; and getting to understand the point of friction between rival discourses is what provides the most interesting insights. Sometimes, like in the case of Pakistan’s abrupt foreign policy turnaround on Afghanistan after September 11, 2001 (a subject discussed in detail in chapter five), the state suddenly drops a mainstream discourse and taps into a previously

marginal discourse in order to justify and make understandable a new set of foreign policy choices. In short, discourses are prone to evolution, change, and displacement by rival discourses. According to Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, discourses are inherently instable and in constant struggle for stability with other competing discourses (cited in Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 29). This distinction between a fixed structure of discourse and a more fluid and inherently instable structure of discourse is what makes Laclau and Mouffe's poststructuralist understanding of discourse more pertinent to this discussion.

2.2. Discourse Analysis as Theory

It is important to recognize that discourse analysis is both a theory and a method of analysis. These two aspects of discourse analysis go in tandem. One cannot use discourse as a method of analysis without subscribing to the theoretical and methodological foundations of discourse theory (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 4). Two important theoretical aspects of discourse theory are its ontological and epistemological foundations. Ontology is the study of the nature of reality. It engages with the question of how the world is. Discourse theory subscribes to a relativistic ontology which means that the nature of social reality is not fixed but rather relative and emergent. Ontological relativism rejects the notion that there is a fixed objective reality to be discovered once and forever. Reality is, according to relativism, socially constructed. An attempt at describing social reality means constructing it simultaneously. Descriptions of social reality depend on the interpretations of the describers. Therefore, the kind of questions that discourse analysis seeks to engage with are 'how possible questions' (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 14). It is not interested in describing what the world consists of, but rather how it turned out to be like that, how it is maintained, and how it is challenged over time (Neumann, 2008, p. 19). This constructivist ontology of discourse theory has implications for how we gain access to social reality which brings us to epistemology (Hollis, 1990).

Epistemology is the study of the nature of knowledge. It engages with the question of how we can access reality, or in other words, how we can gain knowledge about reality. Since discourse theory takes as its premise that reality is emergent and socially constructed, then accessing or gaining knowledge about such reality means relying on the principle of interpretivism. According to this principle, there isn't a privileged perspective on social reality. No one can step outside society and describe it from a neutral position. Neither can social reality be isolated in a research laboratory without altering its nature. Therefore, social reality is interpreted—and simultaneously constructed—from within (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002). An interpretivist mode of investigation—as opposed to a rationalist or empiricist one—allows for a multiplicity of interpretations. Interpretivism means that statements about social reality are not *objective descriptions* but rather *subjective interpretations*. Hence discourse theory is founded on a constructivist ontology and an interpretivist epistemology.

In discourse theory, language is a key element in both ontological and epistemological sense (Hansen, 2013, pp. 18-24). It is a constituent building block of discourse and simultaneously an interpretive tool for accessing the reality of discourse. According to Jacques Derrida, language is a network of signs attributed to objects by social convention, and meaning is established not by the essence of a thing itself but through a series of juxtapositions where one object is identified in its relative difference from others (cited in Hansen 2013, p. 19). Language does not reveal essential meaning in the object to which it refers; rather language is a collection of signs or codes that the speakers of a language have assigned to various objects. Meaning is established only when the speakers of a language collectively agree and internalize that such and such signs refer to such and such objects (Neumann, 2008, pp. 2-3). For example, there is no essential meaning in the sound 'river' until all English speakers agreed that it refers to a body of water that flows inland. A river is identified in its relative difference from a 'lake', for instance, which is another sign for a body of standing water as opposed to a flowing body of water. There is, however, nothing in the physical essence of a body of water to dictate that it be called a 'river' or a 'lake'. All

signs in a language and their meanings are socially constructed and attributed to physical objects by social convention.

A common feature in most definitions of discourse is a focus on the use of language and linguistic categories and concepts in describing and interpreting reality (Hansen, 2013; Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002; Neumann, 2008). Our access to reality is mediated through language. Language not only enables us to represent reality but also contributes to its construction. From this perspective, language is more than merely a channel through which information is communicated; language generates the social world and makes it meaningful (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 9). Scholars in the field of discourse analysis agree that language is more than just a medium in understanding social reality (Ibid). Language in use is performative—it does things, rather than neutrally reflecting an objective reality. In addition to facilitating social communication, language constantly interferes in our expression and understanding of reality. It is important to recognize that language gives us not an objective reflection of an existing reality but rather a subjective projection of a constructed reality. Understood in this way, language is not a dead medium. When in use, language has a peculiar agency of its own (Duranti, 2004). Because language is both a medium and the building blocks of social reality, the use and interpretation of linguistic categories and concepts are of primary importance in discourse analysis.

2.3. Discourse Analysis as Method

Discourse analysis is about identifying a discourse (or a set of discourses), revealing how it produces and partially fixes meaning through language, and by doing so what practices it facilitates as the normal course of action. Kevin Dunn and Iver Neumann define discourse analysis as an examination of how and why things appear the way they do, and how certain actions become possible. “In general, discourse analysts tend to interrogate the ways in which specific systems of meaning production have been generated, circulated,

internalized, and/or resisted (Neumann, 2008, p. 4).” A central objective of discourse analysis is to unmask taken-for-granted, common-sense understandings of the world and transforming them into potential objects for discussion and criticism, and thus opening a space for alternative understandings (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 178). The later definition of discourse analysis makes it a critical research project. Critical research investigates and exposes imbalanced power relations in society and formulates normative perspectives with possibilities for positive change (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 3).

There are various approaches of conducting discourse analysis. The two main approaches in the field are social linguistic (also called structuralist) and poststructuralist. The focus of a social linguistic approach is primarily on textual analysis while poststructuralism has a broader focus. In addition to textual analysis, poststructuralism includes all social practices in the realm of discourse and considers it as text. “[...] everything—gestures, monuments, films, dress, grave goods, and so on—can be read *as* text (Neumann, 2008, p. 39).” The difference between structuralist and poststructuralist approaches is not whether there is a discursive and a non-discursive realm. Both of these approaches recognize the existence of an external physical reality, but the difference between them lies in whether physical reality can retain meaning without discourse. Structuralists recognize the existence of a non-discursive physical reality that has meaning in its own right. In other words, structuralists maintain that there is an ‘autonomous’ non-discursive realm. Poststructuralists also recognize the existence of an external reality, but they dispute the claim of structuralists that physical reality has meaning independent of discourse (Hansen, 2013, p. 22). “For poststructuralists, everything is filtered through discourse (Neumann, 2008, p. 9).”

2.3.1. Representation

Reality does not render meaning on its own. Social phenomena are interpreted, framed, and represented through language. Representations are interpreted versions of reality that

build on specialized terminology, images, history, metaphors, and phrases (Neumann, 2008, pp. 33-34, 116-120). An event may be re-presented with a particular set of terminology and contextual details in order to evoke certain imageries and give credence to a particular narrative. For example, in the 1980s the government of Pakistan represented Afghan refugees in Pakistan in the context of the early days of Islam when Prophet Mohammad (PBUH) and his companions had sought refuge in the city of Medina. Such a representation had given millions of Afghan refugees a welcome reception among the local population. On the contrary, the same Afghan refugees in Pakistan were represented with a different set of terminology after the year 2001. Usually government officials in Pakistan discussed Afghan refugees in the context of national security, terrorism, crimes, drugs, and so on.

In addition to shaping narratives, identities and subject positions are constructed, consolidated, and promulgated through representations. Therefore, identifying representations is a key task in mapping discourses. A discourse is considered dominant when its representations of reality are widely accepted as true (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, pp. 47-48).

2.3.2. Identity and Subject Position

It is within discourses that identities are formed (Hansen, 2013, p. 21). Identity is formed through a process of linkage and differentiation (Ibid). To give a subject (or an object) an identity means positively linking it with certain attributes and negatively differentiating it from other attributes. For instance, Pakistan's national identity as an 'Islamic Republic' is positively linked with a particular religion, its history, and all the set of attributes that come with the religion of Islam. Simultaneously the linkage with the religion of Islam negatively differentiates Pakistani national identity from non-Islamic states. For a state to be identified as Islamic there needs to be other states without this distinction. Identity is about the demarcation of Self from Other. But there isn't always a sharp divide between the

Self and Other, rather there are degrees of linkage to Self and differentiation from Other (Hansen, 2013, pp. 37-54). In other words, what may be defined as Other in one level of identification, could well be part of the Self in another level of identification.

According to Stuart Hall, identity is not fixed; it is a process of becoming rather than a state of being. Identity is not “‘who we are’ or ‘where we came from’, so much as what we might become, how we have been represented and how that bears on how we might represent ourselves (Hall, 1996, p. 4).” In other words, identity is a projection of what is demanded (Bauman, 1996). Hall suggests that identification—emphasizing the process of identity formation/projection—rather than identity as a fixed and static entity is a more appropriate term to use in a discourse analytical sense. Identification, to Hall, is a process which is never completed. Like discourses, identities are instable and always prone to change. “Identities are thus points of temporary attachment to the subject position which discursive practices construct for us (Hall, 1996, p. 6).”

In International Relations, identity and foreign policy are closely interlinked. A state seeks to project a particular national identity in order to justify certain foreign policy choices. At the same time the policy choices that the state enacts reinforces the very identity that it used to justify the policies (Hansen, 2013, p. 21). Alexander Wendt reasons that a state’s national identity forms the bases of its national interests (Wendt, 1992). Lene Hansen agrees that identity and foreign policy are mutually constitutive, but unlike Wendt, Hansen does not presume a causal effect of identity on foreign policy. According to Hansen identity and foreign policy are interlinked through discourse but they do not stand in a causal relationship with one another (2013). Nevertheless, mobilizing a particular national identity makes certain foreign policy choices look natural and intuitive.

Nations do not have a fixed national identity; rather every nation has multiple layers of identity. For example, people living in Pakistan have multiple identities as members of a religion (Muslim, Hindu, Christian), members of an ethnolinguistic group (Punjabi, Pashtun, Baloch) members of a socio-economic class (Farmers/Workers, Landlords/Capitalists) and so on. All these identities exist simultaneously but the level of commitment to either of them varies depending on the dominance of certain discourses. Discourse plays a major role in highlighting the salience of certain identities while shadowing others (Wendt, 1992). We construct our worldviews and define our friends and enemies based on our salient identity (Ibid).

For instance, when the Muslim identity of Pakistan is salient (like Pakistan in the 1980s under General Zia-ul-Haq) its foreign policies towards Afghanistan, a Muslim-majority neighbor, takes a course quite different from its foreign policy towards Afghanistan when Pakistan's salient identity is based on secular territorial nationalism (like Pakistan in the 2000s under General Pervez Musharraf). Pakistan's national identity and its foreign policy discourse on Afghanistan in these two periods—1980s and 2000s—is the focus of this thesis.

2.3.3. Key Signifiers

Discourses are formed by the partial fixation of meaning around key signifiers that are called 'nodal points' in discourse analytical terms. "A nodal point is a privileged sign around which the other signs are ordered; the other signs acquire their meaning from their relationship to the nodal point (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 26)." Nodal points are central concepts such as 'state' from which other concepts such as sovereignty, national security, and foreign policy, for instance, derive their meaning. Among these concepts, the concept of 'state' serves as a nodal point. The other concepts take their meaning in relation to this central concept.

Metaphors are powerful signifiers. Metaphors are the use of substitute words for phenomena that are not literally linked to the word. Metaphors often simplify meanings and evoke related images. For example, a state using the metaphor of 'brother' for a neighboring state evokes certain memories and emotional affinities that relate to the word 'brother.' Metaphors also help in establishing certain subject positions. For example, a state calling a smaller neighboring state a 'younger brother' implies certain roles for both states with different power relations.

Identifying key signifiers in a discourse is essential for discourse analysis. The cluster of related terms, concepts, and familiar metaphors which are employed to sustain a particular discourse are also called 'interpretive repertoire (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 107).'

2.4. Foreign Policy in Discourse Analysis

In conventional terms "foreign policy is the sum of official external relations conducted by an independent actor (usually but not exclusively a state) in international relations (Hill, 2015, p. 4)." In discourse analytical terms, foreign policy may be defined as a political discourse whereby states mobilize particular identities of the Self and Other and articulate certain representations of national interests and the international environment using socially constructed concepts and categories to make certain courses of action normal and necessary. Foreign policy discourses "make intelligible some ways of being in, and acting towards, the world, and operationalizing a particular 'regime of truth' while excluding other possible modes of identity and action (Milliken, 1999)." A discourse analysis of foreign policy investigates the discursive linkage of identity with policy (Hansen, 2013, p. 51). The relation between identity and foreign policy is mutually-constitutive. According to Hansen, identity is both constitutive of and a product of foreign policy (Ibid). "Thus, at the center of

political activity is the construction of a link between policy and identity that makes the two appear consistent with each other (Ibid, p. 28). An essential purpose of foreign policy discourse is to make the link between identity and policy as compatible as possible. Generally, the more stable the link between identity and policy the more dominant the foreign policy discourse. Foreign policy discourses are destabilized when the link between identity and policy is weakened (Ibid).

2.4.1. Identifying Foreign Policy Discourses

Discourses are analytical construction rather than empirical objects (Hansen, 2013). This means that a researcher cannot locate a foreign policy discourse in one particular place. Rather the researcher needs to identify a foreign policy discourse by closely examining a large number of text—official letters, speeches by key leaders (heads of states, foreign ministers), official policy statements, and so on—to distinguish the repetitive use of certain concepts and categories that aim to construct certain identities of Self and Other and thus make space for certain policy actions more feasible than alternative ones. The researcher studies how these texts refer to one another, how they frame current and past events, what common concepts, categories, and metaphors are used to construct representations of reality and what aspects of history are reproduced in the texts and in what contexts. The content of each individual text would be different from the others, but the totality of all texts would have a common theme and a coherent pattern which should allow the researcher to identify a particular foreign policy discourse (Ibid).

2.5. Methodology

Several International Relations theories could be used to undertake this research project. Among the most well-known IR theories are Realism and Liberalism (and their variants, Neo-realism and Neo-liberalism). However, a major flaw with these mainstream IR theories

is the fact that they pre-suppose a given reality of international relations and rely on a number of unquestioned assumptions. For example, both Realism and Liberalism take for granted the assumption that states, as units of the international system, are rational and self-interested entities (Dunne, Kurki, & Smith, 2013). Neo-realism particularly assumes that all states, independent of their internal compositions, behave in a similar—rational—manner. This assumption leads to a mistaken conclusion that ‘since states behave in a rational manner then it must be possible to predict their behavior.’ It mistakenly ignores the internal compositions of individual states such as their forms of government, the beliefs, practices, and perceptions of their leaders, and so on. The unquestioned set of assumptions that the mainstream IR theories rely on make them, in my opinion, inadequate and narrow in scope to address the complex nature of the research questions posed in this thesis.

In contrast, Post-structuralism questions the foundational assumptions of Realism and Liberalism. For Post-structuralism, the field of International Relations and pretty much all the concepts and categories associated with it are socially constructed. There is nothing pre-given about the behavior, identities, and interests of states that could not have been different. All the characteristics attributed to states are socially constructed and therefore subject to critical analysis. Post-structuralism emphasizes the importance of individual agency and treats IR structures as discourses which are outcomes of social interactions, ideas, and beliefs. There are no fixed underlying forces that could objectively determine the mechanism of International Relations. For Post-structuralist scholars the task is not to look for some law-like forces that explains the international system, but to understand the meanings that actors in the international system attach to each other’s statements and practices. This kind of approach gives post-structuralism a wider scope and deeper analytical freedom, making it suitable for this research project.

2.5.1. Reliability

The post-structuralist position that reality is socially constructed and subject to individual interpretations, by no means imply that all interpretations of the world are equally valid. Interpretations of the world need to be backed by reasoned arguments and founded on systematic research methodologies. A commonplace criticism of Post-structuralist scholarship concerns its reliability which deals with the question of whether different analysts analyzing the same body of texts would arrive at the same results. Lene Hansen addresses this question in the following words, “the methodology of discourse analysis insists on readings based on explicit discursive articulations of signs and identities and that one has to pay careful attention how signs are linked and juxtaposed, how they construct Selves and Others, and how they legitimize particular policies (2013, p. 45).” Therefore, according to Hansen, “if analysis overlooks important signs, if it exaggerates or downplays the degree of difference between Self and Other, or if it fails to identify the connection between identities and policies, then it makes a weaker reading (Hansen, 2013, p. 45).” The question of reliability in discourse analysis goes back to the ontological and epistemological foundations of poststructuralism. Different interpretations of the same body of texts could mean that different dimensions of social reality—which is not a given but an emergent phenomenon—are illuminated. The point, however, is that scholars of discourse analysis should clearly and faithfully layout their research questions, methodologies, the body of texts under analysis, and their personal relationships with the subject matter.

2.5.2. Validity

For a research project to be valid, the research questions must be suited to the research objective. They must capture the scope and depth of the research objective. Also, the selection of reading materials must be driven by the nature of the questions. In order to satisfy such concerns of validity, it is important that the selected materials be qualitatively relevant and quantitatively adequate to answer the research questions. In other words, the research questions must measure what they were intended to measure and the reading

materials must be adequate and relevant to satisfy the research questions (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 123). In the research project at hand, the over-arching research question pertains to the defining characteristics of Pakistan's foreign policy discourse on Afghanistan between 1978 and 1988 and how the discourse of this period compares with Pakistan's foreign policy discourse on Afghanistan in the period between 2001 and 2008. In order to satisfy this objective, the research material selected for this study includes the statements and practices performed by top Pakistani officials such as the heads of state, military chiefs, foreign ministers, and members of parliament in the time-spans specified for this project.

2.5.3. Author's Positionality

No one resides outside discourses. Nor can anyone step outside discourses and describe social reality from an objective perspective. Researchers, like everyone else, are part and products of their social environments (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, pp. 22-23). Therefore, all descriptions of society, including this one, are subjective interpretations. I recognize that my own positionality as a citizen of Afghanistan could be a source of bias in the selection, analysis, and interpretation of the texts. As an Afghan citizen I have been exposed to certain discourses that maybe affecting my ability to distance myself from my personal emotions and preconceptions. In this research project, I intend to map out how certain articulations of national identity in Pakistan affected its foreign policy outlook on Afghanistan—not to draw judgements on the rightness or wrongness of those policies. Although my personal attachment with the subject matter could be a source of weakness, but it may also be a source of strength since my personal knowledge, experiences, and language skills enables me to go beyond the literal interpretations of the texts and to complement them with cultural and historical contexts (Nexon & Neumann, 2006).

3. A History of Bilateral Contention

3.1. Introduction

Before presenting a discourse analysis of Pakistan's foreign policy towards Afghanistan in the two periods specified for this study, a brief history of Afghanistan-Pakistan relations helps to contextualize the study. This chapter is a rundown of the general contours of Pakistan's relations with Afghanistan. The aim is to familiarize the reader with the major trends and patterns of Afghanistan-Pakistan relations and to identify the main actor in Pakistan's foreign policy towards Afghanistan. I also invite the reader to notice the extent to which Pakistan's foreign policy towards Afghanistan has been influenced by the United States' priorities in South Asia. The following paragraphs is an attempt to show how two global conflicts involving the United States—the so-called Cold War⁵ and the so-called War on Terrorism⁶—shaped Pakistan's foreign policy towards Afghanistan. In addition to highlighting the United States influence on Pakistan's foreign policy towards Afghanistan, this chapter, as a beginning, looks at the contested nature of the colonial boundary between Afghanistan and Pakistan and how it effects the relationship between the two countries.

3.2. Border Contestation

Relations between the governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan were strained from the day Pakistan was established as a sovereign state on 14 August 1947. The government of Afghanistan opposed the creation of Pakistan when Britain decided to divide its Indian colony into two states—the Republic of India and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. The reason behind the Afghan government's opposition was a longstanding irredentist claim of

⁵ 'Cold War' was a misnomer for countries like Afghanistan where it was fought with very violent means

⁶ 'War on Terrorism' was oxymoronic, because 'war' and 'terror' complement rather than negate each other

Afghanistan over the Pashtun-populated regions lying south of the Durand Line⁷ (Omrani, 2009; Rome-I-Sultan, 2004).

The Durand Line, running for over 2,400 kilometers, is the colonial name of the boundary that separates Afghanistan from Pakistan. It was drawn by the British rulers of colonial India between 1893 and 1896 to demarcate British India's northern boundaries with Afghanistan ("India ", 2017). The Durand Line ran through the heartlands of Pashtuns⁸ dividing the ethnic nation into two states—Afghanistan and British India. In 1947 when Britain decided to grant independence to its Indian colony, the Pashtun-populated regions in colonial India were incorporated into the newly-found state of Pakistan. At the time, the government of Afghanistan and the leading Pashtun political movement in India, Khudai Khedmatgar, protested the British decision (A. G. Khan & Narang, 1969; K. A. W. Khan, 1987). Until this day no government in Afghanistan has recognized the Durand Line as a legitimate border between Afghanistan and Pakistan (Hussain, 2005). Afghanistan still maintains its claim on the Pashtun-populated regions in Pakistan (Omrani, 2009).

As of 2010 there were an estimated forty to fifty million Pashtuns living in Afghanistan and Pakistan combined. It was estimated that around half of Afghanistan's approximately 25 million citizens were Pashtuns and about fifteen to twenty percent of Pakistan's 174 million citizens were Pashtuns. Although the absolute number of Pashtuns in Pakistan far exceeds the number of Pashtuns in Afghanistan, but in Pakistan, unlike in Afghanistan, the Pashtuns are a minority (A. Siddique, 2014, p. 12).

⁷ Named after Sir Mortimer Durand, the British foreign secretary of colonial India between 1884-1894

⁸ Also known as 'Pakhtuns', 'Pathans', and 'Afghans'

In practice, Pashtun tribes on both sides of the Durand Line do not heed the British-drawn boundary (Roberts, 2003, p. 29). They often travel across the boundary line without legal documents. A clause in the Durand Line agreement known as “easement rights” allows for cross border social and commercial interaction for the tribes straddling the Line (Musharraf, 2006, pp. 263-264). Nationalist Pashtuns in both Afghanistan and Pakistan believe that the Durand Line was not a voluntary arrangement. They argue that the British coerced Amir Abdul Rahman Khan, Afghanistan’s ruler in 1893, to accept the boundary. Therefore, the argument maintains, the British rulers of India deemed it necessary to seek renewed commitment to the Durand Line agreement from Amir Abdul Rahman Khan’s successors—Amir Habibullah Khan in 1905 and Amir Amanullah Khan in 1919 (Hussain, 2005, p. 65; Roberts, 2003, pp. 38,41). Had the agreement been in good faith between two sovereign states, then there would not have been a need for the British to renegotiate the issue with successive rulers in Afghanistan. A second line of argument among Pashtun nationalists contends that the Durand Line was more of a ceasefire-line rather than a borderline. It did not specifically delimit the line of partition but roughly showed the parties’ areas of influence (Omrani, 2009). According to this argument, the Durand Line was not meant to be a permanent international border from the outset (“Afghanistan,” 2017). Pashtun nationalists also contend that despite its questionable nature the Durand Line agreement held water as long as the British ruled India. Once the British left the region, it was null and void (K. A. W. Khan, 1987; Omrani, 2009; A. Siddique, 2014).⁹

To counter these arguments, the state of Pakistan invokes the principle of *res transit cum sua onere* in international law which allows succeeding states to claim the borders of their preceding states (Hussain, 2005, p. 65). Hence, Pakistan, as a successor state to British India, considers itself a legitimate heir of the bilateral agreements between Afghanistan and British India. The Durand Line agreement, according to Pakistan’s position on the issue,

⁹ These are just examples of some arguments not an exhaustive list of all arguments.

marked the borders between Afghanistan and British India at least half a century before the state of Pakistan was established. Therefore, Pakistan sees no reason to renegotiate this matter all over again. The government of Pakistan also points out to the western and northern borders of Afghanistan with Iran and the Central Asian Republics which were also delineated with British intervention. If British drawn boundaries were subject to renegotiations, according to Pakistan, then would that mean that Afghanistan's northern and western borders were also open to renegotiations (Pillalamarri, 2015)? In short, Pakistan rejects Afghanistan's claim on the Pashtun-populated regions in Pakistan. For Pakistan, this issue was closed a long time ago. It considers the Durand Line as a settled international border between the two states ("Splintering Relations?: Durand Line is a 'settled issue', says FO," 2012).

Legal arguments aside, the government of Afghanistan has always maintained a claim that the Pashtun regions south of the Durand Line accede to Afghanistan or attain independence. This matter is popularly known as the 'Pashtunistan issue' (A. Siddique, 2014). In 1949 the government of Afghanistan formally revoked all the colonial-era agreements with Britain and officially declared its support for Pashtunistan (Hussain, 2005, p. 65). During the 'Cold War', the 'Pashtunistan issue' took on a global importance when the Soviet Union declared its support for Afghanistan and the United Kingdom and the United States backed Pakistan's position on the issue (Siddiqi, 1960, p. 80). In 1954 and 1955 Pakistan became a founding member of two US-sponsored defense pacts in the region, Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, SEATO, and the Baghdad Pact, also known as the Central Treaty Organization, or CENTO. In reaction to Pakistan's alignment with the United States, Soviet leaders, Nikita Khrushchev, the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and Soviet Prime Minister Nikolai Bulganin visited Afghanistan in December 1955 and voiced their support for Afghanistan's position that an 'impartial plebiscite' be held in the Pashtun regions of Pakistan so that the inhabitants of the region, the Pashtun people, could decide their own fate (Hussain, 2005, p. 71). Pakistan, then a close ally of the United States, disregarded the Soviet call for plebiscite. In fact, in 1960 Pakistan's foreign

minister, Manzur Qadir, proposed that a referendum be held in Afghanistan to determine whether the Pashtuns of Afghanistan would want to join Pakistan or stay in Afghanistan (Siddiqi, 1960, p. 32).

In the 1960s and 1970s a discernable pattern emerged in the official relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The government of Afghanistan, with political and financial support from the Soviet Union, backed leftist ethno-nationalist groups, especially among the Pashtun population of Pakistan. And the government of Pakistan, with political and financial support from the United States and Britain, supported conservative Islamist groups within its own territory and in neighboring Afghanistan. According to Hussain Haqqani, a former Pakistani diplomat, “By the early 1960s, Pakistan’s intelligence agencies were encouraging Pakistan’s Islamist political groups to pursue a forward policy of seeking ideological allies in Afghanistan (Haqqani, 2010, p. 167).” Haqqani gives two reasons for Pakistan’s policy of supporting Islamist groups within its territory and in Afghanistan: One, to unite the various ethnolinguistic groups in Pakistan under the banner of a state-sponsored Islamic ideology which in turn would defuse the centrifugal forces of ethno-nationalism in Pakistan. Two, to increase Pakistan’s influence in neighboring Afghanistan, which the security establishment of Pakistan had long envisioned as its sphere of influence. In Haqqani’s words, “Pakistan emphasized its Islamic ideology with the hope of blunting the challenge of ethnic nationalism supported by Afghanistan, tied Afghan aspirations for a Pashtunistan to an Indian plan to break up Pakistan, and sought U.S. assistance in pursuing an agenda of regional influence (Haqqani, 2010, p. 159).”

3.3. Main Actor in Pakistan’s Foreign Policy

The government of Pakistan has two parallel structures—the civilian administration, which usually comes to power through general elections every five years, and the state’s permanent security establishment or simply the ‘Establishment.’ According to Stephen

Cohen, a prominent American scholar on Pakistan and South Asia, an enduring legacy of General Ayub Khan, the second president of Pakistan in the 1950s, was the institutionalization of “an informal political system that tied together the senior ranks of the military, the civil service, key members of the judiciary, and other elites (Cohen, 2004, pp. 68-69).” Today this informal but powerful ‘politico-military’ community is known as the “Establishment” (Ibid). The Establishment “resembles a classic oligarchy and its roots lie deep in the psychology of the British Raj [...] (Ibid).” Quoting a reputed Pakistani scholar and politician, Syed Mushahid Hussain, Cohen estimates that the number of this oligarchic community was as small as 500 individuals in the year 1996. The level of cooperation between civilian governments and the security establishment of Pakistan differs from government to government. Usually individuals close to the Establishment occupy key government positions in Pakistan even under civilian rule. But under military rule the entire government structure is directly controlled by the security establishment. Loyalty to some core principles—including adherence to a particular narrative of Pakistan—is imperative within this community. Holding a high-ranking position in the civilian administration of Pakistan does not necessarily mean that one becomes a member of the Establishment. On the contrary, one may be a member of the Establishment even without holding a formal position in the government. Membership in the Establishment depends on “adherence to a broad set of values and norms, including a particular understanding of the idea of Pakistan (Cohen, 2004).”

Many academics and Pakistani government officials refer to the security establishment of Pakistan with different names. Husain Haqqani, a former Pakistani diplomat, uses the terms “Establishment”, “military establishment”, and “civil-military complex” interchangeably to refer to this entity (Haqqani, 2010, pp. 15, 23 & 37). A Pakistani writer and journalist, Abubakar Siddique, defines the Pakistani security establishment as “an elite group composed of pro-military politicians, bureaucrats, judges, and generals (A. Siddique, 2014, p. 128).” Referring to the Pakistani security establishment, Rizwan Hussain, an Australia-based scholar of Pakistani origin, gives the following description, “by the mid-

1950s, state power in Pakistan was essentially wielded by a pro-Western ruling elite comprising senior military officials, civilian bureaucrats and politicians hailing from feudal landowning classes (Hussain, 2005, p. 59).” Anatol Lieven, a leading British scholar on Pakistan, uses the following phrases to refer to the same entity, “Pakistani military and associated institutions” and “the security establishment of Pakistan” (Lieven, 2012, pp. 166, 185, & 188).

There is consensus among foreign and Pakistani scholars that the leading institution which makes and executes Pakistan’s foreign policy towards Afghanistan, is the country’s security establishment (Cohen, 2004; Haqqani, 2010; Hussain, 2005; A. Siddique, 2014). Among other things, a major objective of Pakistan’s foreign policy was to partner with the United States in containing Soviet communism during the ‘Cold War’ (Cohen, 2004, p. 72). Since the early days of Pakistan’s creation, the security establishment of Pakistan promoted “Islamic Nationalism” and was skeptical of leftist politics (Cohen, 2004, p. 70 & 72). Pakistan’s security establishment was not necessarily motivated by a desire to transform Pakistan into an Islamic state governed by Islamic law, but by a worldview in which ‘Islamic Nationalism’ served to consolidate internal unity and advanced key foreign policy objectives (Ibid, p. 70). “Often personally secular, the Islamic nationalist worldview is shaped by the notion of grievance, not by the principles of Islam [...] (Ibid, p. 70).” According to Cohen, senior members of the security establishment, including its founders General Ayub Khan and General Yaha Khan, “disdained” Islamist political parties, but they nevertheless maintained close relations with them in order to advance state policies (Ibid, p. 72).

The security establishment’s promotion of ‘Islamic Nationalism’ was meant to foster a national identity for Pakistan. “Since the country’s inception, Pakistan’s leaders have played upon religious sentiments as an instrument of strengthening Pakistan’s identity (Haqqani, 2010, p. 2).” In 1956 Pakistan was the first country in the world to add the

religious appellation in its official name—the ‘Islamic Republic of Pakistan’ (Haqqani, 2010, p. 25). Pakistan’s founders represented it as the ‘bastion of Islam’ (Ibid, p. 24). The first prime minister of Pakistan, “Liaqat Ali Khan was not a religious man himself and most members of the first constituent assembly [of Pakistan] were members of the country’s secular elite.” The decision to declare Pakistan as an Islamic state had been influenced by the realization that Pakistanis had multiple identities. Fear of ethnic and linguistic divisions in Pakistan had driven the founders of Pakistan to promote a state-sponsored Islamic identity that subsumed the sub-national ethnolinguistic identities. “Emphasis on Islamic unity was seen as a barrier against the potential tide of ethnic nationalism, which could undermine Pakistan’s integrity (Ibid, p. 15).” Islamic nationalism was viewed as a potent force that could maintain unity in Pakistan and simultaneously advance Pakistan’s foreign policy objectives (Hussain, 2005).

3.4. ‘Cold War’

Political developments in Pakistan were not taking place in isolation from other events and processes in the world; rather they seemed to be integral to the broader policy of ‘Containment’ employed by the United States during the ‘Cold War’. Among other things, Containment entailed forging regional alliances to restrict the spread of communism in key regions around the world (Kennan, 1946). The United States had recognized the significance of Pakistan’s strategic location even before Pakistan was inaugurated as a sovereign state. In April 1947, which was about four months before Pakistan attained independence, a US government report written by the Joint Strategic Plans Committee on South Asia highlighted the importance of the geographic location of Pakistan to the large oil reserves in the Persian Gulf region and its proximity to the Soviet Union, described in the report as “our ideological enemies” (Husain, 1985). In July 1947, still a month before the state of Pakistan had come in existence, George Marshall, then the US Secretary of State, wrote to President Truman that the future state of Pakistan would be the largest Muslim

majority country in the world and that it would be situated in “one of the most strategic areas in the world” (Husain, 1985).

Throughout the ‘Cold War’, Pakistan was a strategic ally of the United States. It was described as “the most allied” of American allies (Cohen, 2004, p. 302). American and British policy-makers had long recognized the importance of a strong Islamic state in South Asia to contain communism. “Islam was assumed to confer a natural immunity to communism; Pakistan was at once both explicitly Muslim and near the world’s two great communist powers [China and the Soviet Union] (Ibid).” In 1950, William Kerr Fraser-Tytler, a veteran British soldier and diplomat who served in Afghanistan and British India for much of his life, proposed that Afghanistan and Pakistan be “fused” together in order to create a stronger Muslim “bastion” in South Asia to withhold communism. “There remains a British and American interest in the maintenance of Muslim integrity in Southern Asia,” wrote Fraser-Tytler (Fraser-Tytler & Gillett, 1967, pp. 297,300). In his closing remark on this subject, Fraser-Tytler predicted that the two countries—Afghanistan and Pakistan—“will” be fused together “if not peacefully, then by force” (Ibid, p. 300).¹⁰

In 1953 after a visit to Pakistan, John Foster Dulles, then the US Secretary of State, noticed that the “strong spiritual faith [i.e. Islam] and martial spirit of Pakistani people would make them a dependable bulwark against communism (Roberts, 2003, p. 149).” In 1955 Dulles’s observations culminated in the formation of the US-sponsored Baghdad Pact—a joint regional security pact in which Pakistan was a partner in addition to three other Muslim countries, Turkey, Iraq, and Iran. The purpose of the Baghdad Pact was to increase security cooperation among the Muslim states of South and West Asia in order to contain the Soviet Union (Sisson, 1985). Dwight Eisenhower, the president of the United States in 1957,

¹⁰ Fraser-Tytler’s vision for Afghanistan and Pakistan had a lasting impact on Pakistani strategists in the years to come (See ‘Pakistan between Mosque and Military’ p. 165-167)

instructed John Foster Dulles and CIA's head of external operations, Frank Wisner, that in order to contain the Soviet Union in the Middle East and South Asia "We should do everything possible to stress the 'holy war' aspect [of Islam] (Weiner, 2008, p. 158)." Assessed in the context of the 'Cold War', it appears that Pakistan's foreign policies during the 'Cold War' complemented the United States' policy of Containment.

In the 1970s something extraordinary happened in Pakistan's foreign policy direction. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, an elected prime minister of Pakistan, began to distance Pakistan from the Western bloc and eventually declared it a non-aligned state in the 'Cold War' matrix. "Bhutto sought to dilute the Pakistan's military dependence on the United States and the army's linkage to the Americans (Cohen, 2004, p. 79)." Consequently US military and economic aid to Pakistan declined (Haqqani, 2010, p. 105). Domestically, Bhutto advanced a hybrid of socialism which he called "Islamic socialism" (Ibid). According to Haqqani, these changes were "anathema" to the founding principles of the Pakistani security establishment which enjoyed close relations with United States (Ibid). In July 1977 the Army Chief of Pakistan, General Zia-ul-Haq, staged a coup and declared martial law. He arrested Bhutto and subsequently hanged him. Under General Zia, the government of Pakistan revived and reinvigorated the Islamic nationalist character of Pakistan and realigned Pakistan with the United States (Haqqani, 2010; Hussain, 2005).

3.5. Afghan Jihad

General Zia-ul-Haq's commitment to Islamic Nationalism was different from that of his predecessors. "Whereas Zia ul-Haq's predecessors had seen Islam only as an instrument of policy, Zia ul-Haq had the fire of a true believer." (2010, pp. 131-132)." Husain Haqqani, who held senior positions in the government of Pakistan for nearly two decades, describes General Zia as a faithful believer. According to Haqqani, Zia was born and raised in a religious family. He prayed five times a day and never drank alcohol (Ibid). One of the first

things that General Zia-ul-Haq did after becoming the Chief of Army Staff was to change Pakistan Army's motto to '*Iman, Taqwa, Jihad fi Sabil Allah*' (faith, piety, and jihad for the sake of God) (Haqqani, 2010, p. 112). General Zia-ul-Haq's personal commitment to Islamic Nationalism had important implications for Pakistan's foreign policy towards Afghanistan. Islamic Nationalism, for General Zia, was not a means but an end. Unlike Bhutto, who sheltered and supported Afghan dissident groups affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood¹¹ to pressure and extract concessions from Afghanistan, General Zia-ul-Haq wanted these groups to prevail in Afghanistan (Haqqani, 2010; Hussain, 2005).

In 1978 a Soviet-sponsored communist regime seized power in Afghanistan which facilitated the occupation of Afghanistan by nearly a hundred thousand Soviet troops. The communist regime and the subsequent Soviet occupation, which lasted from December 1979 to February 1989, triggered an armed resistance in Afghanistan known as the Afghan Jihad. In the 1980s over three million Afghan refugees took shelter in Pakistan. During the Afghan Jihad, the security establishment of Pakistan in close cooperation with the United States' Central Intelligence Agency trained an average of 20,000 Afghan Mujahideen (religiously motivated resistance fighters) every year (Haqqani, 2010, p. 194); and facilitated the deployment of about twenty to thirty thousand more international Muslim volunteers from around the world—including Osama bin Laden—to fight against the Soviets in Afghanistan (Musharraf, 2006; Yousaf et al., 1992). Pakistan's foreign policy discourse on Afghanistan in this period merits detailed discussion. For that reason, I have dedicated chapter four to this subject.

¹¹ In 1973 Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's government secretly allowed 'Jamiat-e-Islami Afghanistan' and later 'Hezb-e-Islami Afghanistan' to settle in Pakistan and receive military training (see Hussain Haqqani, page 171-175).

3.6. 'Strategic Depth'

Although Pakistan and the United States jointly supported the Afghan Mujahideen, there was an important distinction in their motivations. Whereas the United States wanted to contain Soviet communism in Afghanistan, Pakistan, in addition to containing communism, wanted a 'friendly' Islamic government in Afghanistan to help it confront its perennial rival, India. This difference in their motivation had important implications for the United States and Pakistan's policies toward Afghanistan once the 'Cold War' ended.

In May 1988, the Soviet Union began withdrawing its troops from Afghanistan in accordance with an international agreement, the Geneva Accords (Shahi, 1988). Five months later, in August 1988, General Zia-u-Haq was assassinated in a mysterious plane crash in Bahawalpur, Pakistan (Yousaf et al., 1992). The withdrawal of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan, tempted the security establishment of Pakistan to set up what General Zia-ul-Haq had called a "very friendly" government in Afghanistan (Haqqani, 2013, p. 153). The security establishment of Pakistan had envisioned that a 'friendly' Islamic government in Afghanistan would provide the Islamic Republic of Pakistan a reliable fallback position or 'strategic depth'¹² in times of crisis with India. According to Haqqani, "In the years between 1988 and 2001, Pakistan's military and national security apparatus had defined Pakistan's vital national interests as maintaining and expanding its nuclear capability, forcing India out of Kashmir, and securing 'strategic depth' in Afghanistan (2010, p. 162)."

Ever since 1947, Pakistani military strategists were concerned about Pakistan's land defenses. They feared that Pakistan's elongated geography lacked depth which made the entire country vulnerable vis-à-vis India (Haqqani, 2010, p. 165). The supposed lack of

¹² The phrase is commonly used in the literature *about* Pakistan's foreign policy towards Afghanistan, but not mentioned in Pakistan's foreign policy discourse on Afghanistan in the two periods specified for this study.

depth in Pakistan's land defenses was first recognized by the British. In 1946, a year before, Pakistan was granted independence, a British cabinet mission to India reported that "the two wings of Pakistan contained the two most vulnerable frontiers in the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent and for a successful defence in depth, the area was too small (Siddiqi, 1964, p. 4)."¹³ Once unleashed by the British, this concept then lived a life of its own. Successive military leaders in Pakistan echoed the same concern about Pakistan's geographic layout. In 1956, General Ayub Khan, then the Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army said that, "In spite of the great length of territory in West Pakistan, there is no depth in area (Ibid)." Aslam Siddiqi, a veteran Pakistani foreign policy and defense strategist in the 1960s, proposed several remedies to compensate for the perceived vulnerabilities of Pakistan's land defenses. In his book, *Pakistan Seeks Security*, Siddiqui analyzed Pakistan's land defenses and then proposed the following, "So here, towards the west [i.e. Afghanistan], Pakistan can have depth in defence (Siddiqi, 1960, p. 53)." In a subsequent analysis, *A Path for Pakistan*, Siddiqi postulated that the Hindukush mountain range, which is deep inside Afghanistan, was historically the natural line of defense for the areas that now constituted Pakistan. In his words, "The real line of defence of the subcontinent, however, lies in the Hindu Kush Range of Maintains (Siddiqi, 1964, p. 16)."

By the 1980s, and perhaps even 1970s, the security establishment of Pakistan sought to compensate for this perceived weakness in Pakistan's defenses by seeking a regime change in neighboring Afghanistan. An Islamic government in Afghanistan, it was thought, would be a natural ally of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan (Haqqani, 2010, pp. 159-167). Afghanistan's landmass could provide Pakistan 'strategic depth' on its Western flank, while its eastern flank, bordering India, was under constant threat of war.

¹³ Bangladesh was part of Pakistan until 1971.

In April 1992 the Afghan Mujahideen toppled the communist regime in Kabul. The fall of the Soviet-backed communist regime in Afghanistan and the victory of the Pakistan-backed Mujahideen groups in Afghanistan opened the space for the security establishment of Pakistan to move on and realize the 'strategic depth' doctrine. But now two new developments stood in its way. One was the breakout of a multidimensional civil war among the various Mujahideen groups in Afghanistan, and the other was a paradigm shift in the United States' outlook towards global politics. The complex civil war in Afghanistan made it difficult for the Pakistani security establishment to install a 'very friendly' government in Afghanistan. Some Mujahideen factions such as Hezb-e-Islami of Gulbaddin Hekmatyar still maintained close ties with Pakistan. But other Mujahideen factions such as Jamiat-e-Islami of Burhanuddin Rabbani and Etehad-e-Islami of Abdul Rab Rasul Sayyaf—which the security establishment of Pakistan had trained, equipped, and financed for years—turned their backs on Pakistan and forged new alliances with Pakistan's regional rivals, including India (Haqqani, 2010, p. 238). On the global level, the United States, after the dismemberment of the Soviet Union in December 1991, no more viewed communism as a global threat. The United States changed course in global politics and rapidly dropped its 'Cold War' alliance with Pakistan (Haqqani, 2010, pp. 226-230).

In 1990, just a year after the Soviet troops withdrew from Afghanistan, the United States suspended all military and most economic aid to Pakistan (Blood, 2002). Citing Pakistan's nuclear program, the United States also imposed an arms embargo on Pakistan and unilaterally cancelled a previously finalized F-16 fighter jets sale to Pakistan (Fair, 2011). In 1992 the US ambassador in Islamabad, Nicholas Patt, warned that the United States might include Pakistan in the list of state sponsors of terrorism (Dawn, 2012). The purpose behind the US support for Pakistan during the 'Cold War' was to contain the Soviet Union. Once the Soviet Union was dismantled, the United States sought to contain Pakistan's regional aspirations. Since the creation of Pakistan in 1947, this was arguably the first time that US and Pakistan's interests in the region diverged. In the post-'Cold War' era, the United States abandoned its 'Containment' strategy and wanted Pakistan to follow suit. But

Pakistan had its own reasons to continue advancing what were once elements of the United States' Containment strategy in South Asia. In order to maintain internal cohesion against ethno-nationalism and to advance its foreign policy objectives, Pakistan's security establishment continued supporting pro-Pakistan Islamist organizations in the region even after the 'Cold War' ended (Haqqani, 2010).

Between 1992 and 1996 Afghanistan was experiencing one of the deadliest civil wars in its modern history (Gopal, 2014). The country had practically disintegrated along ethnic, tribal, and linguistic lines. There were thousands of rival warlords (former Mujahideen commanders) who ruled over hundreds of personal fiefdoms (Giustozzi, 2003). In 1994 a movement of religious students, *Taliban*, mobilized against the feuding warlords in Afghanistan (Zaeef, 2010). Within two years, the Taliban managed to take control of two thirds of Afghanistan including the capital, Kabul. By 1998 over 90 percent of the country, including all the five major urban centers was under Taliban control (Ibid). By virtue of their religious education, the Taliban professed in an Islamic ideology and established a government titled the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. In 1997 Pakistan recognized the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan as the official government of Afghanistan (Ibid). The security establishment of Pakistan reckoned that the religious orientation of the Taliban leadership would prevent them from forging an alliance with secular India. According to General Musharraf, it was strategic calculations of a regional dimension that convinced Pakistan to recognize the Taliban government despite strong reservations from the United States which had refused to recognize the Taliban government (Musharraf, 2006). The US government opposed the Taliban government on the grounds that the Taliban had given refuge to Osama bin Laden (See Zaeef, 2010).

3.7. 'War on Terrorism'

After the 11 September 2001 attacks in the United States, Pakistan took a sharp U-turn in its foreign policy towards Afghanistan. The dramatic change in Pakistan's foreign policy was the result of a naked threat by the United States. On 12 September 2001, General Collin Powell, the US Secretary of State, called Pakistan's President, General Pervez Musharraf, and delivered this blatant threat, "You are either with us or against us (Musharraf, 2006, p. 201)." Simultaneously, Richard Armitage, Collin Powell's deputy, met General Mahmud Ahmed, the Director General of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence, and warned him in even lesser diplomatic language. According to Musharraf, Armitage warned his chief of intelligence that if Pakistan chose not to cooperate with the United States in its soon-to-come invasion of Afghanistan, then it should prepare to be "bombed back to the Stone Age (Ibid)." Under General Musharraf, Pakistan's security establishment "war-gamed" to see whether Pakistan could withstand a US onslaught. But the answer was no (Ibid). "On the other hand, the benefits of supporting the United States were many (Musharraf, 2006, p. 203)." In addition to "obvious" economic advantages and the removal of US sanctions, Pakistan would once again be allowed to join the US-led Western club. In General Musharraf's words, "after being an outcast nation following our nuclear tests, we would come to the center stage (Ibid)."

Just like Musharraf had predicted, once again the United States celebrated Pakistan as a 'major non-Nato ally' lifting sanctions against it and supplying it with billions of US dollars and modern military equipment (Rohde, 2004). But despite its economic perks, General Musharraf's alliance with the United States was highly unpopular not only with the people of Pakistan but also within its military. According to Anatol Lieven, a veteran author on Pakistan affairs, "Since 9/11, the Pakistan military has been forced into an alliance with the US which a majority of Pakistani society—including the soldiers' own families—detests (Lieven, 2012, p. 175)." The implications of General Musharraf's decision to side with the United States in invading Afghanistan were far reaching for Pakistan's relations with

Afghanistan and its domestic stability. Pakistan's foreign policy discourse on Afghanistan and its national identity formation in the period between 2001 and 2008 was a striking negation of its foreign policy discourse on Afghanistan and national identification under General Zia-ul-Haq from 1978 to 1988. In order to have a detailed discussion on Pakistan's foreign policy discourse on Afghanistan between 2001 to 2008, I have dedicated chapter five to this subject.

3.8. Chapter Conclusion

The main actor in Pakistan's foreign policy towards Afghanistan is the country's security establishment. The civilian government, which is elected by the people of Pakistan, has little role in influencing foreign policy choices vis-à-vis Afghanistan. Ever since 1950s, the security establishment of Pakistan enjoyed close relations with the United States. In fact, it is hard to separate Pakistan's foreign policy towards Afghanistan from the United States' foreign policy towards Afghanistan. Although initial tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan emanated from the raw nature of the Durand Line, the 'Cold War' and later the US 'War on Terrorism' each played a significant role in shaping Pakistan's foreign policy choices towards Afghanistan. From 1947 until 1991, Pakistan was a close ally of the United States in South Asia. Its foreign policy towards Afghanistan, in this period, was deeply influenced by that of the United States. When the 'Cold War' ended in December 1991, the United States lost interest in the region. The period between 1992 until 2001 was arguably the only time that Pakistan's foreign policy towards Afghanistan was shaped by its rivalry with India rather than its partnership with the United States. However, in September 2001, when the United States set up plans to invade Afghanistan, Pakistan once again re-aligned its foreign policy with that of the United States' and joined the US-led war on Afghanistan.

In sum, Pakistan's partnership with the United States during the 'Cold War' and the 'War on Terrorism' was the main factor that shaped its foreign policy towards Afghanistan. In the

course of these US-sponsored global wars, two distinct discourses underpinned Pakistan's foreign policy towards Afghanistan. In the next two chapters, I undertake a discourse analysis of Pakistan's foreign policy towards Afghanistan in these two distinct periods—1978 to 1988 and 2001 to 2008.

4. Pakistan's Foreign Policy Discourse on Afghanistan 1978-1988

4.1. Introduction

This chapter is a discussion of Pakistan's foreign policy discourse on Afghanistan from December 1978 to August 1988 focusing on the practices and statements made by senior officials of the state of Pakistan. This period covers the last ten years of General Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq as the president and the chief of army staff of Pakistan. It also roughly coincides with the ten years of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and the Afghan resistance known as the Afghan Jihad. Pakistan played a pivotal role in assisting the Afghan Mujahideen, religiously-motivated resistance fighters, to fight back the Soviet occupation. In the 1980s over three million Afghan refugees sheltered in Pakistan and tens of thousands of Mujahideen fighters were armed and trained by the government of Pakistan (Reidel, 2014, p. 88; Yousaf et al., 1992). Pakistan's foreign policy discourse on Afghanistan in the 1980s had a strong idealistic overtone. As discussed in this chapter, religious identity played a central role in Pakistan's self-identification and its delineation of Self and Other on the international level. A striking feature of Pakistan's foreign policy discourse on Afghanistan in the 1980s is its close resemblance with the United States' foreign policy discourse on Afghanistan in the same period.

The first part of this chapter is an analysis of Pakistan's national identity formation, followed by Pakistan's understanding of Self and Other and how the 'Cold War' dynamics shaped this process. The second part presents an analysis of the official representations of Afghanistan in Pakistan's foreign policy discourse that made certain foreign policy choices vis-à-vis Afghanistan as natural and necessary. The main takeaways from this chapter are summed up in the conclusion.

4.2. National Identity Formation

General Zia-ul-Haq, the military ruler of Pakistan from 1977 to 1988 sought to cultivate the Islamic identity of Pakistan. In a landmark address to the people of Pakistan delivered on 02 December 1978, General Zia introduced *Nizam-i-Islam* (Islamic system) in Pakistan. In the speech General Zia reminded the people of Pakistan of the original purpose they and their forefathers had sought to establish a separate state in South Asia. In the opening lines of his address, General Zia stated that “The Muslims of the Indo-Pakistan Subcontinent had pledged to introduce the [Islamic] system on the very day they made a demand for a separate homeland on the basis of being a separate nation (“Documents December 1978—May 1979,” 1979, p. 277).” In a subsequent speech delivered on 10 February 1979, General Zia repeated the same point, “Collectively also we had decided before the birth of Pakistan that we shall establish a separate homeland where we could live according to our own faith (ibid, p. 284).” In the later speech, General Zia posed a rhetorical question to the people of Pakistan, “What is the meaning of Pakistan?” He then answered the question himself in the next sentence, “There is no God but one God (ibid, p. 284).”¹⁴ In Urdu language these two lines rhyme together well, and subsequently became one of the catchiest national slogans among Pakistanis.

Presenting *Nizam-i-Islam* as a “complete code of life” (ibid, p. 277), General Zia articulated the philosophical, practical, and legal aspects of the system. *Nizam-i-Islam*, according to General Zia, had a philosophical dimension which pertained to professing belief in the religion of Islam. There was no “compulsion” in this aspect of the system. Non-Muslim Pakistanis, such as Hindus, Sikhs, and Christians, were free to practice their religion.¹⁵ But since more than 95 percent Pakistanis were Muslims, he invited them to benefit their lives according to the injunctions of their religion. This meant performing “*ibadat*” which

¹⁴ Professing belief in this statement, which is originally in Arabic, is the primary condition for being a Muslim.

¹⁵ In his public addresses General Zia does not say much about the non-Muslim minorities of Pakistan.

General Zia introduced as the practical aspect of Nizam-i-Islam. *Ibadat* related to daily rituals such as offering prayers, paying annual Zakat,¹⁶ and abstaining from usury. General Zia passionately encouraged the people of Pakistan to punctually offer their prayers five times a day. In his speech he insisted that the head of government departments should lead communal prayers in their offices. During Friday prayers, he issued instructions that “all shops and business centers should close down (ibid, p. 278).”

The Nizam-i-Islam reforms included changes in the education system of Pakistan. General Zia warned that the existing education system alienated the new generations from the foundational ideology of Pakistan. He introduced a revised school curriculum which was designed “to rear a new generation wedded to the ideology of Pakistan and Islam (“Documents December 1978— May 1979,” 1979, pp. 284-285).” In the new curriculum Urdu language was the medium of study in public schools, Arabic was added as a foreign language in addition to English, and there were new subjects on the history of Islam (ibid).¹⁷ Besides restructuring the public education system, General Zia also helped establish tens of thousands of religious schools or madrassas. According to one count there were only 900 madrassas in Pakistan in 1971. By the end of General Zia’s tenure in 1988, there were 8,000 officially registered madrassas in Pakistan and another 25,000 unregistered ones (Reidel, 2014, p. 59). At the inauguration ceremony of a Madrassa in 1987, General Zia professed that Islam did not differentiate between religious affairs and worldly affairs. He said, there was no separation between public and private life or between politics and faith. General Zia vowed to introduce religion in every walk of life, promising that his government would unify religious and worldly affairs. To achieve this objective, he said “many mosques and madrassas are being built and have already been built (“Inauguration Of Siqarah Academy by Gen Zia Ul Haq,” 1987).”

¹⁶ According to Islamic law every Muslim must pay an annual tax according to a certain proportion of the person’s overall wealth.

¹⁷ For more on this topic see Haqqani (2010) p. 149-150

In addition to the changes in the education system, Nizam-i-Islam had an extensive legal aspect which included introducing Islamic jurisprudence and setting up Shariat Benches (Islamic Courts) in parallel with the existing civil courts. Now, people had a choice to settle their legal issues in the old civil courts or resort to the new Shariat courts. In the closing lines of his speech, General Zia-ul-Haq reminded the people of Pakistan that establishing an “Islamic society” had been the desire of the revered founding father of Pakistan, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, who is commonly known as ‘Qaid-i-Azam’ or ‘The Great Leader’ in Pakistan. “Today we are taking a practical step towards the ideological destination which was set by the Muslims under the inspiring leadership of Qaid-i-Azam 38 years ago (ibid, p. 280).” Later when confronted with a question that Mr. Jinnah personally did not perform Muslim rituals, General Zia’s replied, “I did not meet him personally but those who were very close to him say that after the establishment of Pakistan he even started performing the rituals (ibid, p. 302).” General Zia’s representations of Pakistan’s history in religious terms was a discursive practice to make salient the Muslim identity of the Pakistani nation. He accused the country’s political class for failing to fulfill this foundational aspiration of the Pakistani people. “Many a politician exploited the name of Islam and many a ruler did what he pleased in the name of Islam. But even after the lapse of 30 [sic] years [since the birth of Pakistan], there was hardly any mentionable progress in that direction (“Documents December 1978— May 1979,” 1979, p. 277).”

General Zia-ul-Haq’s speeches had several distinct discursive aspects. When addressing the nation, General Zia spoke in impeccable Urdu, the national language of Pakistan. The choice of language was in contrast with many other Pakistani politicians who spoke in English or had long sections of their speeches peppered with English terminology. For instance, on the second day of Pakistan’s foundation in August 1947, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the founding father of Pakistan, addressed the nation. His speech, however, was entirely scripted in English language (Pakistan Broadcasting, 2011). Breaking with that tradition, General Zia

spoke in fluent Urdu and occasionally invoked selective episodes of early Islamic history to contextualize current events. The choice of Urdu for his national speeches was a discursive practice aimed at reviving the national language of Pakistan. In another break with established norms in Pakistan, General Zia began his speeches of December 1978 and February 1979 by making a reference to the Islamic calendar, *Hijri Qamari*. Although officially the government of Pakistan used the Gregorian calendar, the use of the Islamic calendar to mark the date of his monumental speeches was a new beginning that communicated an important message about the Muslim identity of Pakistan ("Documents December 1978— May 1979," 1979, pp. 277, 283).

4.3. Delimiting the Self and Other

The Self for General Zia was not only the Pakistani nation but the entire Muslim World. In his speeches delivered in international fora, General Zia left no doubt that Pakistan and the rest of the Islamic world shared a common past and would share a common future. Speaking to the General Assembly of the United Nations on 01 October 1980, General Zia opened his speech with the following line, "Today the World of Islam is on the threshold of the 15th century of its glorious and eventful history ("THE PRESIDENT OF PAKISTAN, GENERAL MOHAMMED ZIA-UL-HAQ'S SPEECH BEFORE THE 35TH SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY, ON 1 OCTOBER 1980," 1980)." In the next paragraphs, General Zia made it clear that he was speaking on behalf of the entire Muslim World. It is a great honor, he said, that "I have been given this opportunity to address the Thirty-fifth Session of the United Nations General Assembly on behalf of 900 million fellow-Muslims in the commemoration of such an epoch-making event in human history (ibid)." At least thirteen times in this speech General Zia mentioned the "Islamic World" or "the World of Islam." That number raises up to twenty-nine if one counted other variations of these terms such as "Muslim world", "Islamic Ummah", "Islamic community" and so on (ibid). Noticeably what was absent in the speech was a mention of the phrase 'Pakistani nation.' In General Zia's worldview, Pakistan was the "fortress of Islam" (Haqqani, 2010, p. 149); and

as the ruler of this 'fortress' he gave the impression of representing not only the people of Pakistan but the entire Muslim World. He also defined an international mission for the military of Pakistan. On 23 March 1979, while addressing a gathering of Pakistan's armed forces, General Zia defined the international mission of Pakistan's military in the following words:

The secret of your greatness lies in the fact that you are the servants and soldiers of Islam. A soldier of Islam is not merely wedded to one piece of territory, but he also defends the entire Islamic ideology. There can be no greater honour for a Muslim either in this world or in the hereafter than the service of Islam.

General Zia's definition of Self as the Muslim World did not necessarily exclude the West as the Other, or at least not the radical Other. Although not part of the Muslim World, General Zia represented the Western World as fellow monotheists who believed in the same series of divine Books. In Islamic theology, Jews and Christians are called 'people of the book' because of their beliefs in divine revelations—the Torah and the Bible (Kaplan, 1990, p. 109). Quoting a verse from the Holy Quran, General Zia highlighted this point in a speech to the United Nations General Assembly in 1980, "Those who believe (what Mohamad [PBUH] revealed), and those who are Jews, Christians, Sabians or whoever believes in Allah and the Day of Judgement, they shall have their reward ("THE PRESIDENT OF PAKISTAN, GENERAL MOHAMMED ZIA-UL-HAQ'S SPEECH BEFORE THE 35TH SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY, ON 1 OCTOBER 1980," 1980, p. 6)." In the same speech General Zia emphasized the Adamic and Abrahamic origins of Islam. "We Muslims are bound by our faith to believe in all the Prophets and the revealed Books from Adam to Prophet Mohammad (peace be upon him) who is the last of the Prophets (ibid)." The emphasis on the Adamic and Abrahamic origins of Islam was a recurring theme that General Zia also highlighted in his speech at the Islamic Summit Conference in Mecca in 1981 ("Documents December 1980—February 1981," 1981, p. 208)."

In General Zia's worldview, the Other was the godless Soviet Union which was imposing the atheistic ideology of communism on the Muslim population of neighboring Afghanistan—not so much the United States or the Western World (*Majlis-e-Shoora of Pakistan: Joint Sittinig Debates* 19 April 1987, pp. 24-25). General Zia's characterization of the United States, which was considered as the leader of the Western World, was generally positive. Although there is not much mention of the United States in his earlier speeches delivered before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. But in his later speeches delivered after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan he identifies the United States as an "old ally" with whom Pakistan would retain its "friendship" for years to come ("Documents December 1980—February 1981," 1981, p. 34; *Majlis-e-Shoora of Pakistan: Joint Sittinig Debates* 19 April 1987, p. 23)."

In return for his positive characterization of the West, General Zia enjoyed widespread support from the West, especially from the United States and the United Kingdom. Under General Zia, Pakistan became the second largest receipt of US military and economic aid—coming second only after Israel (Dawn, 2012). General Zia's policies were usually represented in a positive light. For example, speaking about the enactment of Nizam-i-Islam, a reporter for a London-based journal, *Impact International*, asked General Zia why he was not expanding his "Islamization" program "which has been generally well received" to other sectors of life such the "economic sector" ("Documents December 1978— May 1979," 1979, p. 281). Reid Collins, a reporter from CBS which is a leading American news corporation, interviewed General Zia on February 14, 1979. In a question about General Zia's Islamization program Mr. Collins called the process a "spiritual renaissance" (Ibid, p. 293). Regarding Pakistan's support for the Afghan resistance fighters and refugees in Pakistan, John McLaughlin, a senior news anchor for CBS in 1987, told his American audience that "Pakistan gains enormous satisfaction from helping her Islamic brothers escape Soviet tyranny ("Zia Ul Haq interview BY JOHN MCLAUGHLIN," 1987)." Robert D.

Kaplan, an American journalist who worked in Pakistan in the 1980s, observed that most Western expatriates—government operatives, aid workers, and even some reporters—who lived in Pakistan at the time sympathized with General Zia’s policies. Some Westerners in Pakistan even grew long beards, according to Kaplan (Kaplan, 1990, pp. 19, 35-37, 51).

In many ways Pakistan’s foreign policy discourse on Afghanistan in the 1980s resembled the United States’ foreign policy discourse on Afghanistan in the same period. Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, the US government promoted a discourse that highlighted the Islamic identity of the Afghan people. For instance, in January 1980 in his first public reaction to the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan, President Carter of the United States characterized the Soviet invasion as an attempt by a “powerful atheistic government” to subjugate a “fiercely independent Muslim people (“Address to the Nation on the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan,” 1980).” In February 1980, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Carter’s National Security Adviser, visited Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan where he made statements intended to highlight the Islamic identity of the Afghan people:

We know of [your] deep belief in God and we are confident that [your] struggle would succeed. That land over there [pointing to the direction of Afghanistan] is yours. You will go back to it one day because your fight will prevail, and you will have your homes and your mosques back again. Because your cause is right and God is on your side (Brzezinski, 1980).

The emphasis on the Islamic identity of the Afghan people in the 1980s appeared to be a coordinated theme among US allies. In 1981 the prime minister of the United Kingdom, Margret Thatcher, paid a visit to an Afghan refugee camp in Pakistan where she reminded a crowd of Afghan refugees of the reason why they had fled their country. “You left your country because you refused to live under a godless communist system which is trying to destroy your religion and your independence (Kaufman, 1981).” In 1982 the Central

Intelligence Agency of the United States presented a video briefing to President Reagan of the United States. The briefing recommended that “The faith of the Afghan people and the Muslim religion is a strong barrier to counter the communism’s dogma of atheism (*Afghanistan: The Gallant Struggle* 1982).” Employing such a religion-imbued language about Afghanistan and the Afghan people was discursively constitutive of a reality that the United States and its allies sought to construct in Afghanistan during the 1980s. In other words, containing communism in Afghanistan required popularizing a discourse that emphasized the Islamic identity of the Afghan people. Reviewed in the context of the ‘Cold War,’ it transpires that Pakistan’s foreign policy discourse on Afghanistan in the 1980s was complementary of a discourse that the United States sought to promote at the time.

4.4. Intertextuality and Subject Positions

In his address to the United Nations General Assembly, General Zia cited key episodes from early Islamic history to highlight the sacred status of refugees or *Muhajireen*. In Muslim faith ‘refugees’ are not mere asylum seekers; rather there is an entire discourse on this subject in early Islamic history which gives this subject position a more sacred meaning. The holy Qur’an has said the following verse about the sacred status of refugees:

To those who leave their homes in the cause of Allah, after suffering oppression, We will assuredly give goodly home in this world; but truly the reward of the Hereafter will be greater. If they only realized [this]! [They are] those who persevere in patience, and put their trust on their Lord. –Qur’an 16:41 42—(Shahrani, 1995, p. 187)

To his audience in the United Nations, General Zia explained how the Islamic calendar, *Hijri Qamari*, had commenced with the fateful migration, *Hijra*, of Prophet Mohammad (PBUH)

about fourteen hundred years ago. Before establishing the first Islamic polity, Prophet Mohammad (PBUH) and his close companions had become refugees, *Muhajireen*, in the neighboring town of Medina—about 450 kilometers from Mecca—the Prophet’s (PBUH) ancestral hometown. When the refugees—the Prophet (PBUH) and his followers—arrived in Medina, the residents of Medina welcomed them with generosity and compassion. According to sacred Islamic texts, the residents of Medina shared their houses and their food with the arriving refugees. Therefore, the residents of Medina, who helped the refugees, were called *Ansars*—or the Helpers—which is also a highly revered status in Muslim traditions. Representing that historical epoch to contextualize current events, General Zia announced to the United Nations General Assembly that, “This first Islamic polity symbolized the happy blending of the citizens of Medina—called *Ansars* or the Helpers—and the *Muhajireen*, or the refugees, from Mecca (ibid).”

In the 1980s General Zia intertextually connected this early chapter of Islamic history with the situation in Afghanistan. Afghanistan was occupied by over a hundred thousand Soviet troops since December 1979, and as a result nearly three million Afghan refugees migrated to Pakistan. General Zia employed these powerful subject positions—Refugees and Helpers—to characterize the relationship between the Afghan refugees in Pakistan and local Pakistanis. Speaking to the parliament of Pakistan in March 1985, General Zia said that “If I tell you the stories of current *Muhajireen* [Afghan refugees] and *Ansars* [the helping Pakistani citizens], your memories will reach back to fourteen hundred years ago (*Address by the President of Pakistan*, 1985).” He told the parliament emotional stories of Pakistani citizens sharing their livelihood with the arriving refugees from Afghanistan. “They tell their refugee brothers, “take brother, half the bread is yours and half is mine, one room is yours, one is mine, this is my house, this is my land, this is my cattle [...] come share it with me (ibid, p. 18).” At one point in 1988, while briefing the National Assembly of Pakistan, General Zia emphasized that Afghan refugees had a right to be in Pakistan more so than the people of Pakistan. He said, “Muhajireen [Afghan refugees] are our brothers and this land [Pakistan] is also theirs, rather they have more right on this land than we do, because they

have come here as refugees (*Majlis-e-Shoora of Pakistan: Joint Sitting Debates* 07 April 1988, p. 43).” Such stories and assertions may or may not have been descriptive of actual events, but they were nonetheless important to constitute an understanding of reality required to underpin Pakistan’s policies towards Afghanistan in the 1980s.

In addition to employing the subject positions of ‘Refugees’ and ‘Helpers’, the foreign policy discourse of Pakistan under General Zia-ul-Haq represented Afghanistan not only as a fellow ‘Muslim’ country but as a ‘neighboring Muslim’ country. Highlighting this special relationship between the two countries, Sahabzada Yaqub Khan, the Foreign Minister of Pakistan in 1985, said that, “Afghanistan, moreover, is a *neighboring Muslim country* [emphasis added] to whose people our own are bound by deep rooted ties of religion, history and culture (*Majlis-e-Shoora of Pakistan: Joint Sitting Debates*, 24 December 1985).” According to Islamic traditions, Muslims are all brothers and sisters and for that reason all Muslims have certain rights and responsibilities vis-à-vis each other. In addition to preaching for universal solidarity among all Muslims, the religion of Islam requires the believers to observe special solidarity with their neighbors. The rights and responsibilities of neighbors are well defined and highly emphasized in Islamic faith. According to one tradition, the Prophet (PBUH) said, 'A man is not a believer who fills his stomach while his neighbor is hungry (*Al-Adab Al-Mufrad*).'" The representation of Afghanistan as both ‘Muslim’ and a ‘neighbor’, implied that Pakistan had certain responsibilities to discharge vis-à-vis Afghanistan—a point that General Zia made explicit in October 1985, when he spoke at the UN General Assembly:

Pakistan cannot remain unconcerned over the tragedy of the Afghan people who are linked to us by indestructible bonds of common geography and history and a glorious spiritual and cultural heritage rooted in rich traditions, nurtured and strengthened over many centuries ("Documents ", 1985).

In the foreign policy discourse of Pakistan in the 1980s all Muslim countries were brothers and defined as part of the global Self ("Documents December 1980—February 1981," 1981, pp. 207-215). But Afghanistan, because of being a neighbor as well, was a degree closer to Self than the rest of the Muslim world. It was what General Zia called "a younger brother" to Pakistan (*Address by the President of Pakistan*, 1985, p. 17). The subject position of a 'younger brother' attached to Afghanistan had certain nodal qualities because it implicitly defined power relations between the two countries. In South-Asian culture a younger brother has a subordinate role to his older brother. Usually younger brothers are required by tradition to seek advice, or even permission, from their older brothers when taking important decisions. In some cases, older brothers can also take decisions for their younger brothers. Good younger brothers often obey their older brothers. In return for their obedience, older brothers are expected to come to the help of their younger brothers in times of crisis. By helping the Afghan refugees and supporting the Afghan resistance fighters, Pakistan, under General Zia-ul-Haq, viewed itself as playing the role of an 'older brother' vis-à-vis Afghanistan. In return, Pakistan expected Afghanistan to behave as a 'younger brother' which implied that Afghanistan seek Pakistan's advice when taking important decisions. Such expectations from Afghanistan were notable in General Zia's statements about Afghanistan. For example, in 1988 when the Soviet Union agreed to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan, General Zia said that Pakistan had "earned the right" to install a "very friendly" government in Afghanistan (Haqqani, 2013, p. 153). In other words, Pakistan, having played the role of an 'older brother', could now take decisions for Afghanistan.

4.5. Representations of Afghans and Afghanistan

In the 1980s the representations of Afghan people in Pakistan's foreign policy discourse took almost mythical proportions. Sahabzada Yaqub Khan, the Foreign Minister of Pakistan in 1984, described Afghans as an "indomitable" nation ("Documents June - August 1984,"

1984, p. 206).” Generally, Pakistani officials compared the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan with the failed attempts by the British Empire to dominate Afghanistan in the 19th century. Gohar Ayub Khan, the chairman of Pakistan’s senate in 1985, reassured the parliament of Pakistan that the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan was doomed to fail, because “The Afghan race...have [sic] always been known to be warriors and have always been known to resist aggression (*Majlis-e-Shoora of Pakistan: Joint Sitting Debates*, 24 December 1985, p. 30).” Ayub Khan reminded the parliament of the humiliating defeat of the British Empire in Afghanistan in 1842 when a British force of 17,000 troopers was reduced to just one man, Col. Briden. “He, too, was saved so that [he] should go to the rest of the world and tell the story as to what happened to the British forces in Afghanistan (*ibid*).” Referring to the Afghan Durrani Empire that ruled over much of India in the 18th century, General Zia said that “Afghans who have come along ruling others, will not accept others to rule them (*Majlis-e-Shoora of Pakistan: Joint Sitting Debates* 19 April 1987, p. 24).” Qazi Hussain Ahmed, a senior member of Pakistan’s parliament, described Afghanistan as “no ordinary country (*ibid*, p. 66).” He reminded the parliament that Afghanistan was highly admired by Alama Mohammad Iqbal—one of Pakistan’s highly revered founding fathers. In his lifetime (1877-1938) Iqbal had authored a litany of poems extolling Afghans for their ‘valor’ and ‘free spirit.’ Qazi Hussain Ahmed ended his emotional intervention by reciting some lines from Alama Iqbal’s poems about Afghanistan. In one of his well-known poems, which Qazi Hussain Ahmed quoted in parliament, Iqbal referred to Afghanistan as the “heart of Asia” (*ibid*, p. 66).

In Pakistan’s foreign policy discourse, the Afghan resistance fighters who fought against the Soviet occupation were called ‘Mujahideen.’ Just like the Muhajireen, the term Mujhaideen has sacred meaning in the religion of Islam. Mujahideen is a plural term of ‘Mujahid’ which in Arabic language means ‘the one who struggles.’ It is derived from the term ‘Jihad’ which means ‘struggle’. Jihad has various meanings in different contexts, but one of its most common connotations is a ‘holy war’ against a foreign aggression (Knapp, 2003). In that context, the term ‘Mujahideen’ is often interpreted as ‘holy warriors.’ In Islamic theology,

there is an extended discourse about the sacred status of Jihad. Mujahideen, or the ones who engage in Jihad for the sake of God, have a highly revered status according to Islam. Based on these religious injunctions, General Zia passionately appealed to the people of Pakistan to assist the Afghan Mujahideen. “If we aren’t doing something for them, we should at least raise our hands and ask God Almighty to give these Afghan Mujahideen victory [voice trembling in emotional breakdown] (“General Zia-ul-haq's speech about Afghan Jihad," circa 1980).”

Speaking about the valor and sacrifices of the Mujahideen, General Zia told the parliament of Pakistan that the “Afghan Mujahideen tied coffins to their heads¹⁸ and practically began their Jihad of liberation with bare hands against a foreign occupation (*Majlis-e-Shoora of Pakistan: Joint Sittinig Debates* 19 April 1987, pp. 25, 26).” His admiration for the Afghan Mujahideen was plentiful. “It is their selflessness, their resolve, the charisma of their blood that, God willing, the miracle of the 20th century is transpiring (*Majlis-e-Shoora of Pakistan: Joint Sitting Debates* 07 April 1988, p. 37).” The miracle, that General Zia was referring to, was the impending defeat of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. When speaking about the Afghan Mujahideen and the Afghan Muhajireen (refugees), General Zia hardly ever gave the impression of a foreign leader speaking about the citizens of another country. For General Zia-ul-Haq, Afghans, represented as the Mujahideen and the Muhajireen, and the people of Pakistan, represented as the Ansars, were like brothers who were having an emotional reunion. In his speech at the UN General Assembly in October 1980, General Zia had hinted at the “happy blending” of Muhajireen and Ansars before the establishment of “the first Islamic polity” about fourteen hundred years ago (“THE PRESIDENT OF PAKISTAN, GENERAL MOHAMMED ZIA-UL-HAQ'S SPEECH BEFORE THE 35TH SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY, ON 1 OCTOBER 1980," 1980).

¹⁸ In Islamic tradition ‘coffin’ is a piece of white cloth in which the deceased are wrapped before burial

In addition to these emotional descriptions of Afghanistan, there were also voices within the Pakistani foreign policy elites rationalizing Pakistan's support for the Afghan Mujahideen in realpolitik terms. In 1985 Begum Kulthum Saifullah Khan, a female member of Pakistan's parliament, reasoned that the Afghan Mujahideen were not only fighting for themselves but for the defense of Pakistan as well. "Like a shield they have devoted their lives for us (ibid, p. 92)." This argument, that the war in Afghanistan was a defense of Pakistan, was not a standalone comment by a single parliamentarian, rather it was a recurring theme in Pakistan's foreign policy debates. Mian Mohammad Zaman, another member of Pakistan's parliament, repeated the same argument in a joint session of Pakistan's National Assembly (Ibid, p.125). Allowing a quick peek into the realpolitik reasons for Pakistan's Afghan policy, General Zia made a similar argument in 1986. He said, "if you ask the truth, Afghanistan's issue [the war in Afghanistan] is Pakistan's defense (*Majlis-e-Shoora of Pakistan: Joint Sitting Debates*, 08 July 1986, p. 20). He rephrased the same argument in 1987, "[The Afghans] are fighting their own war but I say they are also fighting Pakistan's war (*Majlis-e-Shoora of Pakistan: Joint Sitting Debates* 19 April 1987, p. 26)." In 1988 General Zia warned the parliament of Pakistan that if the Soviet Union was occupying Afghanistan today, tomorrow might be the turn of Pakistan (*Majlis-e-Shoora of Pakistan: Joint Sitting Debates* 07 April 1988, p. 36).

In contrast to the positive representations of the Afghan Mujahideen in the foreign policy discourse of Pakistan, the representation of the Soviet-backed communist regime in Kabul was usually in negative and derogatory terms. Pakistan did not recognize the legitimacy of the communist regime and often dismissed it as a puppet of the Soviet Union. In 1985 the Foreign Minister of Pakistan called it a "puppet regime" that stood totally rejected by the vast majority of the Afghan people (*Majlis-e-Shoora of Pakistan: Joint Sitting Debates*, 24 December 1985, p. 12). In 1987 Pakistan's Foreign Minister rejected any form of direct dialogue with the "puppet government" in Kabul (*Majlis-e-Shoora of Pakistan: Joint Sitting*

Debates, 20 April 1987, p. 43). When speaking to foreign audience, General Zia often used terms like the “Karmal regime”¹⁹ (“Documents September—November 1981,” 1981), or the “Kabul regime” (“Documents,” 1988, p. 186; “Documents December 1980—February 1981,” 1981, p. 212) to denote the lack of legitimacy and the limited jurisdiction of the communist government. But when speaking to his domestic audience, General Zia minced no words in his description of the communist regime in Afghanistan. In 1987, while speaking to the National Assembly of Pakistan, General Zia used the terms “masters” and “puppets” to characterize the relationship between the Soviet Union and the Afghan communists (*Majlis-e-Shoora of Pakistan: Joint Sitting Debates* 19 April 1987, p. 24).

In the 1980, most Mujahideen fighters and Afghan refugees in Pakistan came from rural Afghanistan (Coll, 2004, p. 56) . At the time, Pakistani government officials showed a marked preference for the traditionalist rural Afghans compared to the modernized educated urban citizens of Afghanistan. For instance, Brigadier Mohammad Yousaf, who ran Pakistan’s military assistance program for the Afghan Mujahideen from 1983 to 1987, wrote in his memoir that, “By the middle of 1985 my experience had given me the knack of picking a good [Mujahideen] Commander on our first meeting. I found that the smart, sophisticated, and talkative [Afghan] man was seldom reliable, whereas the scruffy fellow in stinking clothes usually made an admirable leader (Yousaf et al., 1992, p. 121).”

4.6. Alternative discourses

Despite its overwhelming dominance, Pakistan’s foreign policy discourse on Afghanistan in the 1980s did not go unchallenged. There were critical voices within Pakistan that challenged the dominant discourse and asserted alternative narratives. Usually the

¹⁹ Babarak Karmal was the Soviet-backed president of the communist regime in Kabul.

proponents of alternative foreign policy discourses were left leaning ethno-nationalists, social liberals, and IR Realists who feared that Pakistan's foreign policy was endangering the state's security and national interests. For instance, Javed Hashmi, a member of Pakistan's parliament, cautioned the government of Pakistan not to get too emotional in its foreign policy towards Afghanistan. Citing a cliched maxim in Realist international relations, Hashmi warned that there were 'no permanent friends or enemies in foreign relations; only a country's interests remained permanent' (*Majlis-e-Shoora of Pakistan: Joint Sitting Debates*, 24 December 1985, p. 43). Another member of Pakistan's parliament, Syeda Abida Hussain, cited the same quote when debating Pakistan's Afghan policy in 1987 (*Majlis-e-Shoora of Pakistan: Joint Sitting Debates*, 20 April 1987, p. 69).

Other critics in Pakistan's parliament often warned that the Government's Afghan policy was endangering Pakistan's security. Abdul Hameed Jatoi, a senior member of parliament in 1985, criticized Pakistan's Afghan policy calling it a policy "dictated" by the United States. He warned that it was not in Pakistan's interest to get involved in super power rivalries (*Majlis-e-Shoora of Pakistan: Joint Sitting Debates*, 24 December 1985, p. 57). Raising the specter of a Soviet invasion of Pakistan, Jatoi reminded the parliament that the Soviet Union had already warned Pakistan "that if you don't correct your internal situation then we will have to intervene (ibid)." He likened the conflict in Afghanistan to a "burning tomb" in which Pakistan was unnecessarily getting stuck. "It is our foreign policy that is taking us towards destruction." he lamented (ibid. p. 58)." Presenting similar arguments, another member of Pakistan's parliament in 1987, Syeda Abida Hussain, called Pakistan's Afghan policy a "treason" against the people of Pakistan. She accused the government of flattering the United States and disregarding the interests of its own people (*Majlis-e-Shoora of Pakistan: Joint Sitting Debates*, 20 April 1987, p. 71).

Several members of Pakistan's parliament refuted the Government's narrative about Afghan refugees. Many questioned why the Government had allowed over three million refugees to

settle in Pakistan. “Do you know that there are saboteurs among them?” asked a member of parliament in 1985 (*Majlis-e-Shoora of Pakistan: Joint Sitting Debates*, 24 December 1985, p. 60). “Today there are bombs going off in Peshawar [where most Afghan refugees lived].” “This is all because of our wrong foreign policy (Ibid).” Another member of parliament, Silvat Sher Ali Khan Pataudi, derogated the Afghan refugees as “our fully armed guests” who would pose a serious threat to the security of Pakistan like the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon (ibid, p. 98). The comparison with the situation in Lebanon was stressed by other members of parliament as well (ibid, p. 100). Usually the critical voices referred to the Afghan refugees as a “burden” on Pakistan (ibid). Some critics in the parliament warned that the settlement of millions of Afghan refugees in Pakistan was altering the demographic balance of bordering regions where the state of Afghanistan already had territorial claims. “The refugees claim that this is their land.” warned Dr. Sher Afgan Niazi, a senior politician and member of parliament in 1985. “The Pashtunistan that was never built is now being built without a bullet being fired (ibid, p. 122).” In a chilling reminder of Afghanistan’s territorial claims, Mrs. Dureshawar Mazari, said, “We have forgotten that it is the same Afghanees (sic) who, under a non-communist regime, had voted against our country’s entry into the U.N. and encouraged the creation of Pakhtoonistan (sic) and hostile actions like burning our consulate in Jalalabad (ibid, p. 129).”

Although such alternative discourses existed at the time, but they were unable to successfully challenge the official foreign policy discourse. The official discourse—which was systematically propagated by the government of Pakistan and favorably echoed in Western capitals—was far more entrenched. Moreover, the proponents of alternative discourses risked being persecuted because they were often portrayed as paid agents of foreign powers. In 1987 General Zia warned that certain foreign powers, a reference to the Soviet Union, and their Pakistani agents were planting bombs in the cities of Pakistan and then casting the blame on the Afghan refugees in order to spread hatred between the “Mujhajireen” and “Ansars” (*Majlis-e-Shoora of Pakistan: Joint Sitting Debates* 19 April 1987, pp. 26-27).

4.7. Chapter Conclusion

Having examined the texts of more than a dozen speeches and foreign policy debates in the parliament of Pakistan, I concluded that Pakistan's foreign policy discourse on Afghanistan from 1978 to 1988 had a strong idealistic overtone. The government of Pakistan, in this period, mobilized the Islamic identity of the Pakistani people. For General Zia-ul-Haq, the Self was not only the Pakistani nation but the entire Muslim World. Within such a definition of Self, Afghanistan was deemed closest to Pakistan because of its being both a Muslim and a neighboring country. Pakistan's foreign policy discourse in the 1980s drew a distinction between the 'people of Afghanistan'—who were represented in positive terms like Muhajireen and Mujahideen—and the communist government in Kabul—which was characterized as a puppet of the Soviet Union. The subject position of a 'younger brother' attached to Afghanistan implied that Pakistan viewed itself in a guardian's role vis-à-vis Afghanistan. Such a characterization of the relationship between the two countries allowed for a foreign policy of intervention in Afghanistan.

Interestingly, Pakistan's foreign policy discourse on Afghanistan in the above-mentioned period closely resembled that of the United States. In the 1980s, Pakistan's self-identification and foreign policy discourse was taking shape in the context of the 'Cold War'. During the 'Cold War' the United States viewed the religion of Islam as a natural barrier against communism in South Asia. Viewed in the context of the 'Cold War', it appears that Pakistan's foreign policy discourse on Afghanistan in 1980s complemented a much broader discourse of 'Containment' which was advanced by the United States and its allies to restrict the spread of communism.

In order to put the findings in this chapter in perspective, the discussion in the next chapter focuses on Pakistan's foreign policy discourse on Afghanistan from 2001 to 2008—a time period when Pakistan was ruled by another military ruler, General Pervez Musharraf, and Afghanistan was once again occupied—this time by NATO-American forces.

5. Pakistan's Foreign Policy Discourse on Afghanistan 2001-2008

5.1. Introduction

On 19 September 2001—eight days after the 11 September attacks in the United States—General Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan's military ruler from 1999 to 2008, appeared on Pakistan television in full military outfits, flanked by a national flag on the left side and a Pakistan army flag on the right side, and a portrait of Pakistan's founder, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, hanging behind him. General Musharraf was about to give an important speech which people in Pakistan had been expecting for some time. A few days earlier, on 12 September 2001, the United States had given Pakistan an ultimatum: 'you are either with us or against us' (Musharraf, 2006, p. 2001). Now General Musharraf was facing his nation to inform it of which side Pakistan would be fighting on. In a 30-minute-long speech Musharraf delivered the verdict: Pakistan would fight alongside the United States. General Musharraf declared that Pakistan would provide intelligence, air space, and its land routes to facilitate the United States invasion of Afghanistan. He cautioned the people of Pakistan that "Since 1971,²⁰ this is the most critical period in the nation's life ("Pakistani President's Address ", 2001)." Musharraf appealed to the people of Pakistan to use their "wisdom" in such difficult times and avoid emotional decisions. "On the one hand, if we make any mistakes, they can culminate in very bad ends; and on the other hand, if we make the right decisions, they would be very fruitful for us (ibid)."

Below is a discussion of Pakistan's foreign policy discourse on Afghanistan from September 2001 to August 2008. It begins by analyzing General Musharraf's statements and practices aimed at redefining Pakistan's national identity, followed by his understanding of Self and

²⁰ In 1971, Bangladesh, which was previously East Pakistan, was separated from Pakistan in the aftermath of a war with India.

Other. The section after that analyzes the intertextual connections and the subject positions employed in the new foreign policy discourse. Representations of Afghans and Afghanistan are discussed next, followed by a short discussion of alternative discourses. At the end, a conclusion closes the chapter.

5.2. National Identity Formation

In his landmark speech of 19 September 2001, General Musharraf carefully redefined the Muslim identity of Pakistan and relegated it to a secondary status. Instead, he cultivated a territorial nationalist identity for Pakistan ("Pakistani President's Address ", 2001).

For General Musharraf, being a Pakistani and protecting Pakistan's interests was going to be above everything else. "Pakistan comes first, everything else is secondary." he told the people of Pakistan (BBC, 2001)." Musharraf left no doubt that he was only concerned about Pakistan, not other countries. He made no distinctions for Islamic and neighboring countries either. "Dear countrymen, at this moment, I am only concerned about Pakistan (Ibid)." In a subsequent address to the Pakistani nation on 12 January 2002, he made the point even clearer, "We must concern ourselves with our own country. Pakistan comes first. We do not need to interfere and concern ourselves with others ("Documents," 2002b, p. 297)." In this later speech General Musharraf reminded the people of Pakistan of their national identity, "we must remember that we are Pakistanis. Pakistan is our identity, our motherland ("Documents," 2002b, p. 291)." During the remaining years of his tenure, General Musharraf introduced a new national motto, "Pakistan first," which he repeated in his public speeches (Musharraf, 2006, p. 143).

In order to lend support to his territorial nationalist definition of Pakistan's identity, General Musharraf invoked the founding fathers of Pakistan, particularly Mohammad Ali

Jinnah. Unlike General Zia, who had depicted Mohammad Ali Jinnah as a practicing Muslim, General Musharraf depicted Mr. Jinnah as a nationalist figure who believed in a pluralistic moderate society ("Documents," 2002b, p. 292). General Musharraf presented his policies as if they were the dreams of Mohammad Ali Jinnah. In a speech at the UN General Assembly on 12 September 2002 he said that, "We in Pakistan are determined to transform into reality the vision of our founding Father, Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah; for a progressive, modern, democratic, Islamic²¹ state ("Documents," 2002a, p. 110)." Besides erecting several national monuments, General Musharraf also renovated the mausoleum of Mohammad Ali Jinnah. "I asked the army to beautify the Quaid-e-Azam's mausoleum in Karachi and make it a fitting tribute to the father of the nation (Musharraf, 2006, p. 320)." Musharraf closely associated himself with Mohammad Ali Jinnah. When faced with popular domestic opposition, he warned people that they were betraying the dreams of their founding father. For example, speaking at the parliament of Pakistan on 17 January 2004, he warned that Pakistan had deviated from the vision of its founding father (*Majlis-e-Shoora of Pakistan: Joint Sitting Debates*, 17 January 2004, p. 3). On 30 December 2004, General Musharraf opened his address to the nation by asking a rhetorical question, "[...] what has happened to the Pakistan of the Quaid-e-Azam[?]" ("Documents," 2005, p. 157)." He then quickly added that he was "correcting" the deviated course of Pakistan (Ibid).

According to General Musharraf, Pakistan had strayed from its original path during the decade of the 1980s. In his memoir, *In the Line of Fire*, General Musharraf referred to the 1980s, when General Zia was ruling Pakistan, as a "dreadful decade" and denounced General Zia's policies as "regressive Islamization" (Musharraf, 2006, pp. 63, 161). He blamed General Zia for introducing religious extremism in Pakistan. "We were once a perfectly normal, religiously harmonious society [...] How did we reach the present-day epidemic of terrorism and extremism (Musharraf, 2006, p. 274)?" The culprit, according to

²¹ The appellation "Islamic" is part of the official name of Pakistan. Its mention here does not imply a state ruled by Islamic law.

Musharraf, was General Zia. “The entire decade of 1980s saw extremism rise, encouraged by Zia (ibid, p. 275).” By characterizing the 1980s as a deviation, General Musharraf was implying that his policies were not something new but only a ‘correction’ of a deviated course which the founding father of Pakistan had set for the people of Pakistan. In other words, he was only “reclaiming” Pakistan (Musharraf, 2006, p. 277).

General Musharraf also sought to inculcate his vision of Pakistan to the new generations. He made changes in the national school curriculum and introduced new regulations for religious schools—madrassas—in Pakistan (Musharraf, 2006, pp. 280, 308). The reforms were initially encouraged by US officials. On 16 October 2001, just days after the US invasion of Afghanistan had commenced, Collin Powell, the US Secretary of State, and General Musharraf held a joint press conference in Islamabad, Pakistan. In the conference, Powell made the following remarks about the need for educational reforms, “I am confident that as Pakistan moves forward it will put in place an education system that will teach respect for all faiths, that will be balanced and will be concerned as much about teaching youngsters for a bright future as it will about teaching them false lessons about evil people (“Documents,” 2002b, p. 239).” Soon after Powell’s visit, General Musharraf addressed the nation on 12 January 2002 and introduced what he called a new “strategy” for madrassas. Among other subjects, he required madrassas to teach two new subjects—Pakistan Studies and English (“Documents,” 2002b, pp. 295-296). The objective of these educational reforms was to cultivate a different interpretation of Islam. In Musharraf’s words, “[...] we are initiating a discourse on Islam, with enlightened scholars, to influence the minds of the masses in the right direction (Musharraf, 2006, p. 280).”

The Madrassa strategy included restrictions for mosques as well. In his 12 January 2002 speech, General Musharraf complained about the “misuse” of mosques²² where, according to him, some prayer leaders or imams were preaching “hatred.” “It is imperative that we teach true Islam i.e. tolerance, forgiveness, compassion, justice, fair play, amity and harmony, which is the true spirit of Islam” (ibid, p. 295). In the same speech, General Musharraf introduced a new set of laws called the “Madrassa Ordinance” to regulate the madrassas and mosques in Pakistan. According to Musharraf, “If any Madrassa (religious school) is found indulging in extremism, subversion, militant activity or possessing any type of weapon, it will be closed (ibid, p. 300).” Often the language used by General Musharraf to describe madrassas was negative. For example, he referred to madrassas as “a thorny issue,” he vowed to rid society of “Talibanization,”²³ and he committed to “harmonize relations between Pakistan and its madrassas” (“Documents,” 2006, p. 205; Musharraf, 2006, p. 310). Domestic reactions to Musharraf’s educational reforms were mixed, but he received much applause in the United States for his policies. On 25 June 2003, President Bush hosted General Musharraf at Camp David where he praised him in the following words:

One of the things that [Musharraf] has done that is most impressive for the long-term stability of Pakistan is to address education reform [...]. He is dealing with the madrassas in a way that is productive and constructive. He is working on a national curriculum that will focus on basic education. (“Documents,” 2003, p. 162)

Following such strong expression of support from the US president, General Musharraf felt confident to punish the violators of his Madrassa Ordinance. On 3 July 2007, he ordered a

²² Almost every Madrassa has a mosque attached to it. The imams of mosques are often teachers at madrassas.

²³ Taliban is the plural form of ‘Talib’ which is Arabic for ‘student.’ In Pakistan and Afghanistan, the term means a student of the Madrassa system.

military operation against a mosque, Lal Masjid, and a women's madrassa, Jamia Hafsa, in Pakistan's capital, Islamabad. These two institutes were established in 1988 with the blessings of General Zia-ul-Haq (Q. Siddique, 2008, p. 12). Jamia Hafsa and its adjacent Lal Masjid had hundreds of religious students who largely opposed General Musharraf's pro-American policies. In July 2007, the administration of Lal Masjid and some students of Jamia Hafsa were accused of engaging in vigilante policing in their neighborhood which prompted the government to launch a military operation against them (Anthony, 2007). The operation, which involved the army and special forces, turned out to be deadly. More than a hundred people were killed in the operation including many female students of the madrassa, Jamia Hafsa ("Court demands Red Mosque answers," 2007). Two weeks later General Musharraf ordered the building of the madrassa to be bulldozed to the ground (Sheikh, 2009). When the military operation was completed, General Musharraf addressed the nation and asked in a plaintive voice, "What kind of Islam the Lal Masjid and Jamia Hafsa were propagating ("Documents," 2007, p. 139)." Earlier in his speech of 12 January 2002, Musharraf had warned the madrassas in Pakistan to teach what he had called "true Islam" ("Documents," 2002b, p. 295).

From a discursive perspective, General Musharraf's statements and practices were aimed at redefining Pakistan's national identity in a manner that would make it compatible with his new foreign policy discourse, particularly the post-9-11 discourse on Afghanistan, which was quite unpopular with the majority of people in Pakistan—a point that Musharraf himself admitted ("Documents," 2002b, p. 238; Musharraf, 2006, p. 332). In order to make his foreign policy discourse understandable, General Musharraf sought to redefine the identity of Pakistan, push its Islamic foundations to a secondary status, and to promote a territorial nationalist identity for the people of Pakistan.

It is notable that General Musharraf was promoting territorial nationalism, not religious, ethnic, or linguistic nationalism. He was not particularly attached to the religious identity

of Pakistan, nor was he attached to any ethnic or linguistic identity. In fact, General Musharraf was not even proficient in Urdu, the national language of Pakistan. When addressing the nation, Musharraf often used a mixture of Urdu and English or at least inserted English terms and phrases amid Urdu-language speeches. Musharraf was not shy to admit that he was not “brilliant” in Urdu during his school years. By his own account, Musharraf could not read and write in Urdu language well until he was in the 10th grade of high school (Musharraf, 2006, pp. 26, 29). He fondly recounted that in childhood he had attended the English medium St Patrick’s Catholic Missionary School in Karachi and later the Forman Christian College in Lahore which, according to Musharraf, was for “anglicized modern students” (Musharraf, 2006, pp. 27, 31). Pakistani government officials who spoke in English made a positive impression on Musharraf. For example, he expressed pleasure when his cabinet members introduced themselves in “impeccable,” “Americanized,” and “perfect” English (Musharraf, 2006, p. 146).

The territorial nationalist identity that General Musharraf was cultivating downplayed the emphasis on language and religion and focused primarily on the national interests of Pakistan. According to Musharraf, “National interest should remain supreme above personal and political interest (“Documents,” 2002c, p. 140).” General Musharraf’s definition of national interests was often in material rather than ideological terms. For example, in an address to nation on 5 April 2002, General Musharraf presented a long list of material gains, such as debt cancellation, US economic aid, and new trade agreements with the US and EU. After 9-11, he said, “We have saved the economy. We have preserved the national interest. This is our achievement (“Documents,” 2002c, p. 142).”

5.3. Delimiting the Self and Other

The Self, for General Musharraf, was the citizenry of the state of Pakistan. Territorial nationalism, by definition, was limited to the geography of the state. However, the

spectrum from Self to Other was not drawn in terms of territorial boundaries. Now, the degree of difference from Self to Other ran an asymmetric pattern. While the Self included the 'patriotic' citizens of Pakistan, it excluded what General Musharraf called 'religious extremists' and 'terrorists.' In fact, the latter were categorized as the radical Other in the US 'War on Terrorism' in which General Musharraf considered Pakistan a frontline state (Musharraf, 2006, p. 3). That is to say that the Other was now situated within Pakistan in addition to, of course, Afghanistan whose Taliban rulers General Musharraf identified as "extremists", "international pariahs" and "obscurantist clerics" (Musharraf, 2006, pp. 200, 203).

For General Musharraf the Other, after September 2001, was 'religious extremists' and 'terrorists' whom he called a major threat to Pakistan. "We have to safeguard ourselves against internal dangers [of extremism]. I have always been saying that internal strife is eating us like termite ("Documents," 2002b, p. 302)." He repeated the same line of argument using the metaphor of 'termite' again in his address to nation on 30 December 2004. "Pakistan faces internal challenges in the form of extremism and terrorism.[...] If we do not check it, which we are doing, then internally this menace will eat us like termite ("Documents," 2005, p. 165)." Following his decision to join the United States in its invasion of Afghanistan, General Musharraf seized every opportunity to denounce 'religious extremism' and 'terrorism.' For example, in his 12 January 2002 address to nation, which was less than 4,000 words in total, Musharraf used the terms 'terrorism' or 'terrorist' fourteen times and the terms 'extremism' or 'extremist' sixteen times ("Documents," 2002b). later, in a speech to the parliament of Pakistan, he urged the people of Pakistan to "wage a Jihad against extremism" (*Majlis-e-Shoora of Pakistan: Joint Sitting Debates*, 17 January 2004, p. 6).

In this new definition of Self and Other, which emerged virtually overnight, Afghanistan under the Taliban government fell in the category of Other. General Musharraf had made it

clear in his 19 September 2001 speech that he was only concerned with Pakistan. He had asked the people of Pakistan, on 12 January 2002, to concern themselves with Pakistan alone, and not with other countries. In the later speech, Musharraf also issued restrictions on those Pakistani citizens, organizations, and political parties who were sending support to Afghanistan ("Documents," 2002b, p. 299).

Evidently, Pakistan's definition of Self and Other under General Musharraf was influenced by the post-9-11 definition of Self and Other delineated by the United States. Although in the context of Musharraf's territorial nationalism, everyone except the citizenry of Pakistan was in the realm of Other, but because of "self-interests" and "self-perseveration" it was "fruitful" for Pakistan to realign with the West in the new global divide of Self and Other that President George Bush had laid out in his famous line— 'with us or with the terrorists.'

General Musharraf cherished Pakistan's re-entry into the Western alliance which, in his words, had brought Pakistan back to the "center stage" after years of being an "outcast nation" (Musharraf, 2006, p. 203). In a joint press conference with Collin Powell on 16 October 2001, Musharraf celebrated the "rejuvenated" relationship between Pakistan and the United States ("Documents," 2002b, p. 230). On 12 November 2001, General Musharraf visited the United States where he issued a joint statement with President George W. Bush. The statement said that the two presidents "reaffirmed the strength and vitality" of US-Pakistan relationship. "They welcomed the revival of this longstanding partnership [...]" (ibid, 268)." On 25 June 2003, President Bush said that the United States had "no better partner in our fight on terror than President Musharraf." He identified Musharraf as a "courageous" leader and a "friend" of the United States ("Documents," 2003, pp. 155, 162). On 07 December 2004, Musharraf visited the United Kingdom where a joint statement between him and Prime Minister Tony Blair hailed the "re-energized partnership" between their two countries ("Documents," 2005, p. 149).

It remains a question whether the people of Pakistan, the civilian government, and even the security establishment of Pakistan in its entirety ever accepted General Musharraf's radical re-definition of Self and Other. At least twice on record General Musharraf admitted that most people in Pakistan were against his decision of siding with the United States. In response to a question in a press conference on 16 October 2001, General Musharraf conceded that the "majority of the people in Pakistan are against the operation in Afghanistan ("Documents," 2002b, p. 238)." He also admitted in his memoir, *In the Line of Fire*, that "[...] a majority of Pakistanis do oppose our cooperation with the West in the war on terror (Musharraf, 2006, p. 332)." In an interview with CNN on 23 October 2001, Musharraf said that his decision to join the US alliance had caused "a bit of confusion in the minds of the Pakistanis" ("Documents," 2002b, p. 257).

'A bit' of confusion was probably an understatement. Musharraf's joining the US-led alliance was highly unpopular in Pakistan. For years, the people of Pakistan had been taught that Afghanistan was a brotherly Muslim country. People in Pakistan were emotionally attached to Afghanistan for ethnic, cultural, and religious reasons. General Musharraf's decision to side with the United States earned him serious animosities among his own people. Even his personal bodyguards turned against him. In his memoirs, Musharraf recounts how members of his own "security detail" and officers in the Pakistan Air Force were involved in near-miss assassination attempts on his life (Musharraf, 2006, pp. 247, 254). Even senior military officers in the security establishment of Pakistan were displeased with Musharraf's decision to side with the United States. Mullah Abdul Salam Zaeef, Afghanistan's ambassador in Pakistan in September 2001, recalled that General Mahmud Ahmed, the Director General of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence at the time, and General Jailani, a senior military officer, visited him in his house and broke into tears (Zaeef, 2010, p. 148). Zaeef recalled that in the meeting General Ahmed insinuated to him that he wished to have Musharraf assassinated (ibid, p. 147-148). According to a Pakistani

journalist, Syed Saleem Shahzad, “Pakistan’s policy turnaround on the Taliban [government in Afghanistan] after the US invasion of Afghanistan had disillusioned the whole of the middle cadre of the country’s armed forces (Shahzad, 2012, p. 85).”

General Musharraf’s sudden change of foreign policy discourse on Afghanistan necessitated a radical re-definition of Self and Other which happened too hurriedly to be internalized by the people of Pakistan. The outcome, as documented by Shahzad, was a state of confusion, internal insurrections, insubordinations, mass defections, and a chain of assassination attempts against General Musharraf and his close lieutenants (2012). The tenuous link between Pakistan’s salient national identity²⁴ and its new foreign policy explains this growing wave of instability. According to Lene Hansen, “foreign policy discourse can be conceptualized as a simple model centered on creating a stable link between identity and policy (2013).” When the link between identity and foreign policy is weak, as in the case of Pakistan under General Musharraf, the discourse that underpins foreign policy is internally inconsistent and vulnerable.

5.4. Intertextuality and Subject Positions

Remarkably General Musharraf made frequent references to the early years of Islam to justify his new foreign policy. Like General Zia-ul-Haq in 1978, General Musharraf also recounted the *Hijra* or migration of Prophet Mohammad (PBUH) from Mecca to Medina to set the stage for his argument. His argument, however, was quite novel. He selected certain events from early Islamic history and interpreted in a manner to make the case that his foreign policy was not in contradiction with Islam. For instance, in his address to nation on 19 September 2001, Musharraf used the fateful migration of Prophet Mohammad (PBUH) to

²⁴ Pakistan was established on the basis of its Muslim identity.

argue that in testing times even the Prophet (PBUH) had made difficult sacrifices such as abandoning Mecca, his ancestral hometown, and migrating to Medina. “Islam’s calendar started with Hijra—migration—when Prophet Mohammad [PBUH] himself went from Mecca to Medina to save Islam (ibid).” General Musharraf spent more than six minutes of his 30-minute-long speech to interpret certain aspects of the *Hijra* that would support his decision of siding with United States. “After migration, when the Prophet [PBUH] reached Medina then he entered a friendship treaty with his enemies, the Jews in Medina. This was his wisdom (ibid).” Here, General Musharraf implied that in times of difficulty, Islam allowed Muslims to make alliances with non-Muslims. Like his predecessors had done in the past, General Musharraf presented Pakistan as the ‘fortress of Islam’ which, according to him, was now in grave danger. “Pakistan is considered to be the fortress of Islam and if this fortress is harmed, Islam will be harmed (2001).”

Using the metaphor “fortress of Islam” meant a privileged position for Pakistan, akin to the status of a headquarter of the Muslim world. Often a fortress is the most important position to defend in comparison to peripheral outposts. This metaphor was also used by General Zia to denote a leadership position for Pakistan in the 1980s. Now General Musharraf was using it to argue that the “fortress of Islam” must remain secure even if the ‘peripheries’ may have to be sacrificed.

The treaty with the Jews of Medina, according to Musharraf, gave the Prophet [PBUH] ample time to prepare for war with the “infidels” of his hometown, Mecca. Here, General Musharraf implicitly elaborated on the distinction between the Jews of Medina and the ‘infidels’ of Mecca. In Islamic theology, Jews and Christians are called ‘people of the book’ who, like Muslims, are monotheists. Islam requires Muslims to treat the monotheistic ‘people of the book’ more favorably than adherents of polytheistic religions such as Hinduism. The followers of polytheistic religions are called *Mushrikeen*, which means those

who attribute companions or partners to God.²⁵ In Islamic theology, *Mushrikeen* are placed at the far end of Otherness (Khadduri, 2006, p. 75). In his speech of 19 September 2001, General Musharraf repeatedly emphasized a grave threat that Pakistan faced from its predominantly Hindu neighbor, India. He went on to warn India against any mis-adventure and called on it in English, “lay off!”²⁶ (2001). Here, the point that Musharraf was implicitly making was that his military alliance with the United State was meant to preserve and strengthen Pakistan—‘the fortress of Islam’—against its ‘real’ enemy which was the predominately Hindu India—and not necessarily the ‘people of the book’ in the West.

In the speech, General Musharraf recounted another incident from early Islamic history to show that the Prophet (PBUH) was not taking emotional decisions in interstate affairs. He described how the Prophet (PBUH) had reached a peace treaty with the non-Muslim tribes of Mecca. During the treaty of Hudaibiyah, which was negotiated with the tribes of Mecca in 628 A.D., the Prophet (PBUH) had accepted certain harsh terms despite strong opposition from his own companions (Watt, 1999, p. 31). In Hudaibiyah, when the draft of the agreement was finalized the negotiators from Mecca objected to the title under Prophet Mohammad’s (PBUH) name which referred to him as the ‘Messenger of God.’ The Prophet (PBUH) promptly deleted the title under his own name and then signed the agreement. When the Prophet (PBUH) deleted the title under his name, Hazrat Umar bin Khattab, a close companion of the Prophet (PBUH), strongly protested. However, the Prophet (PBUH) asked him to restrain himself. In his address to the Pakistani nation, General Musharraf used this incident to argue against those in Pakistan who would oppose his decision. “The Prophet’s reply [to Umar] was: ‘you are at the moment talking with emotions’ (“Pakistani President’s Address”, 2001).” By re-presenting Islam as a compromising religion, free of

²⁵ In Islamic theology associating companions to God is considered apostasy.

²⁶ The warning to India was interesting, because in September 2001 the ultimatum of sending Pakistan ‘back to stone age’ had come from the United States, not India.

emotional decision-making, General Musharraf sought to make his new foreign policy acceptable in the context of early Islamic history.

In his subsequent speeches, however, Musharraf played down the emphasis on the threat from India and highlighted “religious extremists” and “terrorists” as an internal threat to Pakistan. He said that Pakistan could withstand the external threat posed by India, but the internal threat posed by ‘religious extremists’ was consuming Pakistan from within, like ‘termites’ (“Documents,” 2002b, p. 302).

After September 2001, the subject position of ‘extremists’ and ‘terrorists’ were highly effective discursive tools that many governments around the world employed to crush internal dissent and justify external military interventions. During his tenure, General Musharraf also made generous use of these subject positions to dehumanize his internal opponents to the level of ‘termites’ and then dealt with them with virtual impunity. In his memoir, Musharraf, notes that his government made millions of dollars by extraditing hundreds of alleged Al-Qaida figures to the United States. “We have earned bounties totaling millions of dollars. Those who habitually accuse us of “not doing enough” in the war on terror should simply ask the CIA how much prize money it has paid the government of Pakistan.” he wrote in his memoir (Musharraf, 2006, p. 237). But not all the individuals extradited to the United States were members of Al-Qaida. Among the individuals that General Musharraf had extradited to the United States was Afghanistan’s ambassador to Pakistan, Mullah Abdul Salam Zaeef, who was accredited to the government of Pakistan and enjoyed diplomatic immunity at the time of his arrest and extradition (Zaeef, 2010, pp. 167-172). In his memoir, Musharraf names most of the extradited individuals but makes no mention of the Afghan ambassador’s extradition.

5.5. Representations of Afghans and Afghanistan

A curious feature of Pakistan's foreign policy discourse related to Afghanistan between 2001 and 2008 was how little was said about Afghanistan, at least in the official domain. General Musharraf's discussions about Afghanistan were conspicuously short. For example, in the last pages of his memoir, after spending six pages talking about the conflict in Kashmir²⁷, Musharraf wrote, "Let me say a few words about Afghanistan [...]" (Musharraf, 2006, p. 303). He laid out the story of Afghanistan's multi-decade conflict in two short paragraphs. Then he switched subjects to the conflict in Palestine which he covered in six paragraphs (ibid, p. 304-305).

General Musharraf described Afghanistan as a "wretchedly poor" country which, he said, was an "ideal heaven for terrorists" (ibid, 209). In his address to the parliament of Pakistan on 17 January 2004, he mentioned Afghanistan only in the context of 'terrorism' (*Majlis-e-Shoora of Pakistan: Joint Sitting Debates*, 17 January 2004, p. 4). At least twice in his public statements, Musharraf mentioned Pakistan's 'western border' without naming Afghanistan. For instance, on 7 October 2001 he said, "Pakistan remains conscious of its responsibilities on the western border and we remain extremely conscious that any movement of the important troops deployed there for sealing the border is a serious concern to the international community also ("Documents," 2002b, p. 285)." Once again during an interview with BBC on 24 May 2002, he said, "First of all, we need to seal Pakistan from any outside influences and that's what we are doing, especially on the western border. We want to seal the western border ("Documents," 2002c, p. 169)." The omission was discursively significant. In such a formulation, Afghanistan was no more mentioned by name but rather described as Pakistan's 'western border' which, arguably, did not evoke the memories and emotions attached to the name of Afghanistan.

²⁷ Kashmir is a contested region between Pakistan and India.

General Musharraf's description of Afghan refugees in Pakistan was also devoid of emotions. He often mentioned the Afghan refugees in Pakistan in the context of economic constraints on Pakistan (Musharraf, 2006, p. 222). In response to a question about the incoming refugees from Afghanistan in the wake of US invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001, General Musharraf said that "Pakistan is prepared to accept the aged, the children, the women and the injured. But we cannot open the flood gates for all the refugees ("Documents," 2002b, p. 258)." In his speech at the United Nations General Assembly on 19 September 2006, Musharraf suggested that the Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan were a breeding ground for terrorists, and that the UN should assist Pakistan in repatriating the refugees back to Afghanistan. Interestingly, General Musharraf was himself a refugee from India. In his memoir, he recounted his family's migration from India to Pakistan in 1947 when Musharraf was a child. He made a discursive connection of his family's migration with affection and dedication for Pakistan, but drew no parallels with the *Hijra* or for that reason with the Afghan refugees in Pakistan.

In many ways Pakistan's foreign policy discourse on Afghanistan under General Musharraf was in direct contradiction with its foreign policy discourse on Afghanistan under General Zia-ul-Haq. But there was one important similarity between the discourses. Just like General Zia had spoken of establishing a 'friendly' government in Afghanistan, General Musharraf also emphasized that Pakistan wanted a 'friendly' government in Afghanistan. In October 2001, during the heat of US invasion of Afghanistan, General Musharraf told CNN that "being a Pakistani, I would certainly like to have a friendly Afghanistan on our western border ("Documents," 2002b, p. 254)." He repeated the same message when the British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, visited Pakistan on 7 January 2002, "I have informed the British Prime Minister of our desire to have a friendly Afghanistan, peaceful and strong Afghanistan ("Documents," 2002b, p. 280)." In the context of Pakistan's foreign policy discourse on Afghanistan, the term 'friendly' connotated more than its literal meaning. For Pakistan, a

'friendly' Afghanistan meant that the future government of Afghanistan would prioritize its relations with Pakistan over India. But unlike General Zia, who invoked the common bonds of religion with Afghans to argue for a 'friendly' Afghanistan, General Musharraf's calls for a 'friendly' Afghanistan were void of common values. Therefore, instead of appealing to the people of Afghanistan, Musharraf made the case for a 'friendly' Afghanistan to his Western allies—the US and the UK. The assumption was that these Western powers, because of their overwhelming military and political influence on the post-2001 government in Afghanistan, would take into consideration Pakistan's interests, ensuring a 'friendly' regime in Afghanistan.

5.6. Alternative Discourses

Pakistan's official foreign policy discourse on Afghanistan from 2001 to 2008 was not an outcome of a gradual endogenously driven shift of paradigm, but rather a result of an abrupt foreign policy change that took place in response to US pressure in September 2001. Therefore, it may be called a 'dominating' discourse rather than a 'hegemonic' discourse. The new discourse was dominating in the sense that it was backed by the sheer power of government; yet it wasn't hegemonic in the sense that it did not permeate the various strata of Pakistan's body-politic. In fact, it was quite alien for most people in Pakistan, including senior government officials. In 2001, tens of thousands of Pakistanis took to the streets and denounced Musharraf's foreign policy as a "betrayal" of fellow Muslims in neighboring Afghanistan (Harding, 2001).

The new foreign policy discourse on Afghanistan was avidly resisted by several strands of alternative discourses. However, the discourse advocated by the Mutthaida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA), which was a coalition of six religious parties, was the most vocal and forceful. In fact, the MMA was formed in 2002 in order to jointly oppose General Musharraf's foreign policy turnaround on Afghanistan (J. Khan, 2014, p. 302). For the religious parties of MMA,

Afghanistan was still a 'neighborly Muslim' country, and they saw no difference between the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980s and the US occupation of Afghanistan post-2001 (ibid). The alternative foreign policy discourse that the MMA promoted was in line with the foreign policy discourse on Afghanistan that the security establishment of Pakistan had promoted under General Zia-ul-Haq in the 1980s. However, under General Musharraf, proponents of the later discourse risked being labelled as 'religious extremists' and even 'terrorists.'

5.7. Chapter Conclusion

Pakistan's foreign policy discourse on Afghanistan between 2001 and 2008 was largely characterized by phrases like 'national interest,' 'self-preservation,' and slogans such as 'Pakistan first,' reminiscent of Realism in international relations. With Musharraf adopting a Realist approach, Afghanistan was treated as just another state that Pakistan had to deal with. Afghanistan's status as a Muslim country was irrelevant in this new outlook and its status as a neighboring country was important only in the context of 'national defense' because Afghanistan constituted, what General Musharraf liked to call, the 'western border' of Pakistan.

Like in the 1980s, Pakistan's foreign policy discourse on Afghanistan in the period discussed above was directly influenced by the United States' foreign policy discourse on Afghanistan. In September 2001 General Musharraf—at the behest of the United States—sought to turn around the course of a foreign policy towards Afghanistan that the security establishment of Pakistan had advanced at least since 1978. This was evidently a challenging undertaking given that a change of foreign policy in general also entailed a change of discourse on Afghanistan. Pakistan's pre-2001 discourse on Afghanistan was deeply entrenched not only within the government and the security establishment of Pakistan but also among the people of Pakistan. Hence, to make his new foreign policy

discourse on Afghanistan acceptable or even understandable, General Musharraf sought to redefine and relegate the Muslim identity of Pakistan to a secondary status. Instead, he promoted a territorial nationalist identity for Pakistan. However, this dramatic turnaround was confronted by decades of a systematically-infused discourse based on Pakistan's Islamic identity. The outcome of this dramatic shift was a state of mass confusion, identity crisis, and internal strife that reached its peak in 2007 when General Musharraf ordered a lethal military operation against a mosque, Lal Masjid, and a women's madrassa, Jamia Hafsa, in the middle of Pakistan's capital, *Islamabad*—which literally translates as the '*settlement of Islam.*'

6. Thesis Conclusion

From the discussions in the preceding chapters one may conclude that two global conflicts involving the United States—the ‘Cold War’ and the ‘War on Terrorism’—were the primary influencers of Pakistan’s foreign policy discourses on Afghanistan. In the period between 1978-1988 Pakistan’s foreign policy discourse on Afghanistan had an idealistic overtone where the common bond of Islam was invoked to highlight a shared identity between the peoples of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Emphasizing a shared Muslim identity was necessary to facilitate a policy of intervention to unseat a communist government in Afghanistan during the ‘Cold War’. After September 2001, when the United States launched its ‘War on Terrorism’ and subsequently invaded Afghanistan, Pakistan’s foreign policy discourse on Afghanistan adjusted accordingly. The new foreign policy discourse between 2001-2008 adopted a Realist tone, depicting Afghanistan as just another state on the ‘western border’ of Pakistan. Pakistan’s national identity formation in this period emphasized territorial nationalism and the primacy of national interests defined in material terms. The emphasis on a territorial nationalist identity was deemed necessary to sell Pakistan’s facilitating role in the US-led invasion of Afghanistan which unseated yet another government in Afghanistan—this time the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.²⁸

We learned in the discussion above that the main actor in Pakistan’s foreign policy on Afghanistan has been the security establishment of Pakistan. Between 1978-1988 and 2001-2008 Pakistan was ruled by uniformed generals who came to power through coup d’états backed by the security establishment. Although Pakistan’s foreign policy discourses on Afghanistan under General Zia-ul-Haq and General Pervez Musharraf were in plain contradiction with each other, there were at least two important similarities—both General Zia and General Musharraf defended their close alliances with the United States of America

²⁸ The ‘Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan’ was the official name of the Taliban government in Afghanistan.

and they both spoke of having a 'friendly' Afghanistan. The apparent contradiction in their foreign policy discourses on Afghanistan is hard to understand without considering these two enduring features of Pakistan's foreign policy. Whether Pakistan's discourse on Afghanistan represented Afghans as 'mujahideen' and 'muhajireen' or 'terrorists' and 'extremists,' the security establishment of Pakistan seem to have pursued two unaltered objectives. One, to foster a strategic partnership with the United States in return for US political, economic, and military assistance. And two, to turn Afghanistan into a 'friendly' neighboring state that would behave like Pakistan's 'younger brother' in its regional rivalries, primarily with India.

From a theoretical perspective the above empirical case shows that between 1978-1988 the link between national identity and foreign policy was well established. On the contrary, between 2001-2008 the abrupt change of foreign policy necessitated a rapid re-formation of national identity. Hence, the link between foreign policy and national identity was not well established. This confirms Lene Hansen's position that when the link between identity and policy is weak—as in the case of Pakistan between 2001-2008—the result maybe an unsteady foreign policy discourse and a general state of instability (Hansen, 2013, pp. 25-28).

Finally, as a recommendation for future research in this topic, I noticed that in the last years of General Musharraf's rule, the post-2001 government of Afghanistan accused Pakistan for secretly aiding a Taliban-led insurgency in Afghanistan. Around the same time, Musharraf laid accusations against the Afghan government for availing its territory to India to interfere into Pakistan ("Documents," 2006, p. 199). The accusation and counter-accusation added a new twist in Pakistan's foreign policy discourse on Afghanistan. In *Directorate S*, Steve Coll, a longtime observer of Pakistan's foreign policy towards Afghanistan, speaks of a dual foreign policy strategy followed by Pakistan (Coll, 2018, p. 200). A future research project

analyzing Pakistan's post-2008 foreign policy discourse on Afghanistan in the context of its rivalry with India would provide more interesting insights on this subject.

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