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# **In Pursuit of Significance:** A Foreign Policy Analysis of Pakistan

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Masters of Science in International Relations

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## Declaration

I, Karoline Thorstensen, declare that this thesis is a result of my research investigations and findings. Sources of information other than my own have been acknowledged and a reference list has been appended. This work has not been previously submitted to any other university for award of any type of academic degree.

Signature..........

Date... 1st June 2020 .....

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## Abstract

Pakistan is a young country with a significant foreign policy record. Within a short timeframe, it went from being a front-line state to an insignificant actor, and back to a front-line state again with significance on the world stage. This thesis seeks to enhance the understanding of the South Asian country's foreign policy and aims to answer the research question "what are the drivers of change in Pakistani foreign policy?". The thesis is a within-case study where the periods 1989-1998 and 1999-2009 are compared and discussed. The dataset used to answer the research question is comprised of the speeches given by Pakistani representatives in the United Nations' General Assembly debate, which are held yearly in New York. These are analyzed with a theoretical framework grounded between Realism and Constructivism, with focus on analytical concepts such as national role conceptions, and with the State as the main unit of analysis. The research shows that the drivers of change in Pakistan's foreign policy is its national role conceptions. These roles are again influenced by the global political context, Pakistan's existential conflict with India, and Pakistan's Muslim identity.

*Key words: Pakistan, foreign policy, drivers of change, national role conception, UNGA*

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## Introduction

*“Our foreign policy is one of friendliness and goodwill towards all the nations of the world. We do not cherish aggressive designs against any country or nation. We believe in the principle of honesty and fair play in national and international dealings and are prepared to make our utmost contribution to the promotion of peace and prosperity among the nations of the world. Pakistan will never be found lacking in extending its material and moral support to the oppressed and suppressed peoples of the world, and in upholding the principles of the United Nations Charter” (Foreign Policy, n.d.)*

This is how Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan, outlined his new country’s foreign policy goals in a broadcast to the people in the United States in 1948. Foreign policy is a way for states to establish priorities on the international stage (Kazimi, 2012), and a possibility to assert its identity. When Pakistan partitioned from India and became independent in 1947, it immediately had to define its foreign policy objectives, which initially were just ensuring its “security and sheer survival” (Kazimi, 2012, p.289). The analyst Khalid Bin Sayeed wrote in 1966 that when it comes to foreign policy, “almost every action of Pakistan can be interpreted as being motivated by fear of India” (Jaffrelot, 2016, p.3). In the early years, Pakistani leaders were convinced that those who ruled in New Delhi did not support the partition of the two countries, and that they craved what Hindu nationalists called *Akhand Bharat* – a (re)unified India (Jaffrelot, 2016). Jinnah expressed these views too, stating that the Indian Congress was to be regarded as “avowed Enemies of the Pakistani State working for its overthrow” (Jaffrelot, 2016, p.3).

In addition to an existential conflict with India that has culminated in violence several times, Pakistan has over the past 70 years had to establish its foreign policy with different regional and global backdrops, including two prolonged wars of a global nature taking place on the western side of its border in Afghanistan. Today we are seeing an increasingly unsettled world once again, where Pakistan “faces daunting foreign policy challenges” (Lodhi, 2020) as global rivalries once again dominate the international political stage and Pakistan needs to assert itself. These strategic challenges for Pakistan include a trade war between Washington and Beijing, as well as an increasingly Hindu nationalist government in New Delhi. Indeed, big powers and populist leaders are steering world politics in 2020, and their “unilateral actions and rejecting of international norms” (Ibid) will implicate how Pakistan pursues its foreign policy.

The objective of this research is to examine the foreign policy of Pakistan and achieve an understanding of what it is that drives Pakistani foreign policy, beyond the relationship with India. In the words of Ahmed (2010, p.318), the foreign policy of Pakistan “is an important and challenging subject”, and the country’s strategic relevance has varied over time. This relevance has had implications for Pakistan’s role at the international level and affected the foreign policy possibilities and options for policy makers (Rizvi, 2004). Its quest to ensure strategic security vis-à-vis India has led Pakistan to pursue different strategies to establish a status as a significant and important country both regionally and globally, with varying degree of success. Being regarded as significant has enabled Pakistan to have strong allies to safeguard it from neighboring hostility. In relation to this, Jinnah’s vision for Pakistani foreign policy, with its principles of honesty and fair play, and promoting peace and prosperity, can seem paradoxical.

### Research question

Understanding the underlying motivations and goals of an actor’s foreign policy is important in International Relations, so as to better understand the international structure, and how the structure again affects countries. This research aims to understand the foreign policy behavior of Pakistan – a country often talked about in relation with Afghanistan or India, or its turbulent relationship with the US, but rarely understood as an independent actor with strategic goals beyond security. Although there is much literature on Pakistani foreign policy, it is mostly dominated by talk of security and state survival. This thesis explores the motivations behind the foreign policy; the drivers of change. Hence, the research question this thesis aims to answer is, “what are the drivers of change in Pakistani foreign policy?”.

### Structure of thesis

The theoretical framework is the second chapter in this thesis and is where I will establish the theory and concepts that the research is constructed by. I will first discuss different views of foreign policy in International Relations, and then discuss how to study foreign policy. I will then present the analytical concepts I will use to build my analysis, before outlining my chosen theoretical approach. Following this, I will go through the methodological approach used to conduct the research. Here I will acknowledge some of the issues with replicability in qualitative research, but also outline how I have carried out the study.



The data set I chose to best answer my research question is the yearly United Nations General Assembly debate speeches. This has been chosen because it is a yearly document, taking place at the same place and time each year, to the same audience. The UNGA is an arena where world leaders come together and present their foreign policy strategies and ambitions, which is why it makes for an interesting content analysis.

However, before I start the analysis of the data collected, I will outline the main trends in Pakistan's diplomatic history and the regional context that it has had to navigate its role in. The case study is built around two time periods: 1989-1998, and 1999-2009. I will initially analyze the first time period, starting with an assessment of the overall political situation before the 10 years' worth of UNGA speeches will be analyzed, and main findings discussed. This will then be repeated for the time period. Finally, I will have a systematic discussion of the two time periods, before I identify the drivers of change in Pakistani foreign policy and with that answer my research question. Lastly, I will discuss how the case corresponds to the theory.

## Theoretical framework

Foreign policy can be expressed in different ways: When governments declare war against other governments. When governments decide to establish trade routes with each other. When governments seek allies, and alliances. When state leaders shake hands, or don't shake hands, with other leaders. When governments send aid or peacekeeping missions to each other. The way state leaders or governments talk about other state leaders or governments. *Where* and *when* governments talk about other governments. All of the above are examples of situations where foreign policy is being carried out. But what exactly is foreign policy, and how can we study it?

## Theoretical approaches to foreign policy

The different theories of International Relations have different views of the international system, states, and foreign policy. Realism was for a long time the only mainstream theoretical approach in International Relations, with its focus on the nation state, and power, and that the nation-state is the principal actor in international relations (Hudson and Day, 2020). The nation-state retains the supreme political authority in the world, and its foreign policy is a reaction to events outside the state (Ahmed, 2010), according to Realists. The state is a rational actor, meaning it is pursuing objectives to safeguard its security, relative power and development. This is because of the nature of the international system, which, in the words of Ahmed (2010), “breeds insecurity, distrust, suspicion and fear”. This anarchic nature of the system also means that there is no sovereign authority to govern states (Adigbou, 2007). This thesis is to a large extent grounded in the Realist tradition, with a focus on the state.

As Morin and Paquin (2018) highlights, the system leads each state to compete for power in order to reduce its insecurity, and it seeks to enhance its relative power vis-à-vis potential enemies. In this sense, if a state sees its neighbor as a potential threat, it will try to become equally strong, or stronger, than its neighbor. This in turn will lead the neighbor to fear political intimidation and see its best interest in increasing its strength (Ibid). This point is interesting when analyzing Pakistan, as it has continuously argued that acquiring nuclear weapons was only done to achieve strategic parity vis-à-vis India (Haqqani, 2013).

Hudson and Day write that a country's level of military capacity is an important national attribute that has “a clear impact on foreign policy” (2020, p.176). Having military superiority can enable what the two authors call “coercive diplomacy” (ibid), where one part can press for

its own advantage more aggressively than otherwise. Indeed, Realists assert that acquiring power is the proper, rational and inevitable goal of foreign policy (Evans and Newnham, 1998). For Realists, power is conceptualized as both a means and an end, and it refers to the ability of a state “to influence or change the behavior of others in a desired direction, or the ability to resist such influences on one’s own behavior” (Ibid, p.465). Because every state is given the same treatment in front of the UNGA, power is not a central concept in this thesis, and therefore Pakistan’s power would be hard to measure through my data set.

Security is a more central concept to consider in this thesis. According to Realists, security is only achieved by balancing power within the international system. Indeed, Realism emphasizes the importance of military power in a dangerous, unpredictable world. In this world, the strongest state can impose the order and pursue the interest as it suits them (Adigbou, 2007). Equally, the possession of nuclear weapons can have a significant impact on foreign policy situations. This is according to Hudson & Day the case for the India-Pakistan relationship after 1998, when the Kashmir situation and other foreign policy issues came under new light as the two countries conducted nuclear tests.

Neoclassical realism is a strain of Realism that looks beyond only the structural explanations of actors’ behavior and recognizes that domestic sources of international behavior are equally important. Waltz (1996, in Hill, 2016) argue that the international system was dominant in “certain key respects”, and that it represents a balance of power that has its own rules, but he maintains that the domestic situation also plays a big role in foreign policy. Adigbou introduces domestic sources of foreign policy in his article on national role conception and analysis of Nigeria. Domestic sources of foreign policy are also interesting in the case of Pakistan, where domestic pressures have influenced the politicians’ firm stance against its neighbor India, as well as Pakistan’s relations to Afghanistan and to some extent the world powers. However, Neorealism’s focus on levels of analysis is a weakness in foreign policy studies, as it can be more useful to look at explanations of particular units when studying foreign policy (Hill, 2016; Hudson and Day, 2020; Morin and Paquin, 2018).

In contrast to Realism, Constructivists note that identity, or the definition of self, is an important motivator in foreign policy. And since identities can change, so can interests of a state (Morin and Paquin, 2018), Constructivists argue. This is against Realist thinking that interest is static, and that states do not change their internal positioning. However, having done extensive research on Bangladesh, Ayoob notes that the troubled relationship with India is part of Bangladesh’s definition of self, and therefore inevitable (Ayoob, 2011). Mehta (2011) also argues that since states are nation-states, they are often driven by a sense of their own national

identity or a sense of honor. Mehta sees identity and sense of honor as the context in which interests are defined, and defines 'honor' as being about moral psychology and continues to say that it encompasses "a series of insecurities, fears, and hopes that nations have acquired through the process of their formation" (2011, p.34). The way that these are expressed depends on the context, which makes it more elusive than ideas and interest that states can express through their foreign policy. Mehta also argues that to a certain extent, states in South Asia have "relied on a fear of the other to secure their identity" (2011, p.35)

Similarly, Morin and Paquin praise the definition Neumann gives on identity: "identity is forged by transforming differences into otherness" (Neumann, 1999, in Morin and Paquin, 2018, p.262). "The cultural boundary of the 'self' is defined in relation to how the 'other' is presented" (Ibid). Continuing on this definition, Morin and Paquin states that the 'other' does not share the characteristics that the 'self' attributes to itself. These two perspectives will be interesting to adapt to the analysis of Pakistan, to see if the framing of foreign policy is shaped by its relationship with India and its idea of self.

National identity is related to culture, which also is a political tool driven by discourse and interaction (Hudson and Day, 2020). However, it is very difficult to grasp what culture is, and how to study it in relation to foreign policy (Ibid). But despite not always tangible, culture can play an important role in the studies of foreign policy, which itself is also both a product of and a component of culture, according to authors Hudson and Day (2020). While it was neglected in most of the twentieth century, cultural differences have been taken more seriously in the post-9/11 world (Ibid). Language is another factor that is related to culture. Morin and Paquin highlights the way known theorists such as Neumann, Hansen and Waever have examined the language of foreign policy, and its dominant discourses.

The emphasis on these language studies is usually on national discourses, and it has been seen that foreign policy is important "because it reinforces (for the most part undesirably) national and statist culture" (Hudson and Day, 2020, p.124). Hill writes that the study of language is a source of understanding mindsets and actions in foreign policy and remains a "relatively untapped resource" (Hill, 2016, p.11). This focus on Constructivist concepts goes against the initial Realist thinking of the thesis but placing the analysis at the intersection between the two approaches will make for a more interesting analysis. Indeed, looking at the way Pakistan talks about its foreign policy might help answer the research question of what the drivers of change are.

Hudson and Day (2020) also explore how ways of communication can build this 'self' and 'other', and refer to Banerjee, who argued that each state has a 'psychocultural structure'

that contains a variety of action rules, coded in a 'language of acts' (Banerjee, 1991, p.319). The 'language of acts' is a sort of social script, which shapes the way situations and actions are interpreted and communicated in the national culture. This not only applies within a nation, but Banerjee conceptualizes it as inter-nation culture (Ibid). Analyzing this in the case study I have chosen might however prove difficult, as the setting of the speeches are with an audience of diplomats and heads of government, and not the people. The way the foreign policy elites talk about foreign policy towards the Pakistani people might be different than the way they talk about it in the face of their international peers, so there would be room for a broader research done in the future.

It is however interesting to look at the case Banerjee gives to show how different culture and language of acts can be demonstrated, which is that of India and Pakistan in the time after the partition. For Nehru and India, the 'other' was the British colonial power, whereas for Jinnah and Pakistan, the 'other' was embodied by Hindu India. For Jinnah, Great Britain symbolized positive attributes, such as reliance on religion and support for the abolition of social inequalities, which Jinnah saw in contrast to India and Hinduism's focus on caste inequality and the impurity of non-Hindus (Banerjee, 1991). Both Hudson & Day and Morin & Paquin states the example Banerjee gives of India and Pakistan when outlining the importance of 'self vs. the other'.

What is more, both sets of authors argue that these fundamental understandings contributed to differences in the foreign policy of India and Pakistan. This difference was not only evident in the two countries' policy towards each other, but also their relations with other states: India joined the nonalignment movement during the Cold War, whereas Pakistan aligned itself with great powers in order to stand equal against India (Hudson and Day, 2020; Morin and Paquin, 2018). Thus, the foreign policy the two countries chose depended on a number of domestic factors, such as identity, notion of self and honor, but also on the wish to enhance its power in face of the 'other'. Foreign policy is heavily attached to domestic qualities, such as identity, language and view of self, but also the international and regional geostrategic location of the state.

### What is foreign policy

According to Webber and Smith, foreign policy traditionally has been a "world of states" (Webber and Smith 2002, p. 11), as the international order is based on the state-system established at Westphalia in 1648, and comprised by a multiplicity of sovereign states (Evans

and Newnham, 1998). These nation states are coexisting in a condition of anarchy, only ordered by a framework of diplomacy and balance of power. However, the globalized world has brought on a range of new agents, many of them ultra-national or non-governmental. The nation state has been left behind as a main unit of analysis by some International Relations scholars (Morin & Paquin, 2020), but it remains an important actor. The international system is made up of these sovereign states, and states' foreign policy is created in order to have a standing in the international system (Kazimi, 2012).

'Policy' means that the actor (the state) is making a conscious effort and that there are intentions behind the actions it takes or signals (Hill, 2016). As put by Evans and Newnham, policymaking is the decision to "embark upon certain programs of action (or inaction) in order to achieve desired goals" (1998, p. 440). 'Foreign' signals that the policy is towards other nation-states, or at least towards actors outside of its borders. 'Foreign policy', then, is the "terms on which a state wishes to conduct its international relations" (Kazimi, 2012, p.287).

'Framing' is the first stage in formulating a foreign policy, and I would argue that it is perhaps the most important when trying to understand a country's foreign policy. That a political problem or situation is 'framed', means that it is formulated in a way that it resonates with a broader political framework that is familiar to the audience, or the citizens of a state (Morin and Paquin, 2018). The political issue is named, interpreted and simplified to be made into policy later on, but the way it is defined will also orient the terms of the debate (Morin and Paquin, 2018, p.42). The opportunity the UNGA debate presents to framing a country's foreign policy is one of the reasons why I have chosen it as my dataset. Speaking in front of the GA is a unique way for state leaders to present their country's foreign policy goals, and to analyze how they frame issues and conflicts.

The main purpose of foreign policy, according to Kazimi (2012), is for the state to establish its role on the international stage, and to give the state a clear voice and identity on the international arena. The domestic environment forms the background against which policy is made – background that include geographical position, nature and level of development of the economy, its ideology and fundamental values (Evans & Newham, 1998).

Hill (2016) writes that foreign policy has been neglected in the academic field of International Relations, which was due to a preoccupation with explaining the dynamics of the international system as a whole, and a doubt about the independence of states within IR. International Relations should refocus, and analyze political choice and decision and understanding the interplay between the state and its external context, Hill argues. Indeed, that

is the purpose of this research, as I try to understand the drivers of change in Pakistani foreign policy.

There are seven main expectations connected to foreign policy for most states, according to Hill (2016, p.52). These are listed from most particular to most general: i) The maintenance of territorial integrity and social peace against external aggression; ii) advancing prosperity; iii) protecting citizens abroad; iv) projecting identity abroad; v) making decisions on interventions abroad; vi) fostering a stable international order; vii) protecting the global commons (Hill, 2016, p.52-4). Through this list, it is clear that according to Hill, foreign policy is filled with competing political outlooks, interests and values. A possible fault of the chosen data is that there typically is no domestic debate about the content beforehand, as leaders have been known to present their government's outlook without much dispute. Hence, the leader might say something that is not in line with the official, pursued foreign policy goals of the state. Looking at this in another way, one could say that it is more interesting this way too – as no leader is accountable to the GA as such and might stand more freely to speak their country's point of view without thinking about re-electability.

Concerning the actors of foreign policy, Hill writes that the members of what he calls the “foreign policy elite” varies widely from country to country (2016, p.60). In most cases, it is expected that the head of government be heavily involved in the foreign policy of the state. The departmental minister is then the expert, or specialist, but other key ministers such as defense, finance or trade are all somehow involved in the making of foreign policy (Ibid, p.63). However, I have not found any evidence to suggest that the speech writers for the GA debate interventions comprise this big of a group of stakeholders. Yet, Hill states, leaders might not wish to ‘waste’ time on foreign affairs, as it is the perhaps more pressing issues domestically that will get them reelected in next election. But many heads of government still end up by having a distinct impact on the foreign relations of their countries, as the UNGA is an example of. The UNGA speeches are a unique chance for the head of state to lay out their country's priorities themselves and give their own construction and presentation of the country's foreign policy.

When it comes to creating foreign policy there can be domestic friction, as the process and policy itself can be splintered by powerful internal agents and elements running their own line. Hill argues that this has been the case for many years in Pakistan, where he claims the various branches of civil and military intelligence services have been undermining official policy in ways that “go well beyond” normal bureaucratic politics (Hill, 2016, p.101). Concerning a country's level of military capacity, Hudson and Day write that this is an

important national attribute that has a clear impact on foreign policy (2020, p.176). Having military superiority can enable what the two authors call “coercive diplomacy” (ibid), where one part can press for its own advantage more aggressively than otherwise. Equally, the possession of nuclear weapons can have a significant impact on foreign policy situations. This is according to Hudson & Day the case for the India-Pakistan relationship after 1998, when the Kashmir situation came under new light as the two countries both had successfully conducted nuclear tests.

Beyond being an important national attribute, the military is one of the key institutions of the state. Siddiqa (2011) suggests that the way it operates depends on how it is perceived by policymakers, or the operational space it has in the political system. If the political establishment is weak, the military can claim more political space. Siddiqa suggests that the nature of the civilian-military relations is not purely an issue of control, but also to what extent military force is relevant to the political goals of the stakeholders. The military can be used as a policy tool, and its utilization depends upon the nature of the country’s politics.

### Foreign Policy Analysis

The study of foreign policy has diverted from the more basic, generalizing questions of ‘national interests’, ‘global governance’ and ‘clash of civilizations’ since its inception (Hudson and Day, 2020). Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) emerged at a time when other theoretical approaches challenged the assumption of Realists that the state is a “single, coherent actor pursuing clear interests” (Hill, 2016, p. 8). The ideas of rationality, coherence, national interest and external orientation were issues FPA scholars wanted to challenge. States remain the central area of research in FPA, but other actors are not overlooked, as usually is the case for Realism scholars (Ibid). So, while FPA holds the state as the central entity, its methods can be used to study all types of actors in international relations (Hill, 2016, p.8).

Researchers of foreign policy “navigate continuously between constructivism, institutionalism and realism”, as Morin and Paquin puts it (2018, p.11) Indeed, FPA as a field have, according to Morin and Paquin (2018, p.7) ‘given up’ trying to develop a highly generalizable theory. Instead, there is a diversity in theoretical models and methodological approaches, the main of which have been discussed previously in this chapter. However, some IR scholars make a distinction between theories of international politics and theories of foreign policy, and also in the sub-field of FPA it is common to focus on neorealist, neo-liberal institutions and constructivist accounts of the foreign policy behavior of states. This is in line with the theoretical approach of this thesis.



There are many ways to identify and assess foreign policy, and Morin & Paquin (2018, p. 19) mentions government's public declarations such as policy statements, official speeches, government reports to parliament and white papers are possible sources of information to bring into analysis. However, the two authors warn to treat all sources that explicitly state the objectives of a state's foreign policy goals with caution, as the state might say one thing, and do another (Ibid). Thus, discourse analysis alone usually does not suffice in "identifying the specific goals actually pursued by foreign policy" (Ibid, p.21), but I believe that the UNGA speeches will provide valuable insights into the framing of policy for Pakistan and indicate what it is that drive foreign policy coming from Islamabad.

### National interest

The concept of national interest can be used as an analytical tool to identify the goals or objectives of foreign policy (Evans and Newnham, 1998). According to Ahmed (2010), the key to understanding international politics is the concept of interest in terms of power. In a definition borrowed from Rosenau (1968, p.34, in Ahmed, 2010) Ahmed writes that national interest means "what is best for a national society" or "what is best for a nation in foreign affairs" (2010, p.317). 'National interest' draws from intuitive thinking rather than from sound theoretical justification and explanation (Paquin 2010, in Morin and Paquin, 2018). The concept has been used to describe the foreign policy goals of nation-states (Ahmed, 2010). There is not a theoretical agreement on what it constitutes in the literature reviewed, but according to Evans and Newnham (1998), national interest applies only to sovereign states and relates specifically to foreign policy, in that the internal variety usually being characterized as the "public interest". Yet, national interest means different things to different schools of thought (Saxena, 2019).

For important IR scholar Hans Morgenthau 'national interest' was of central importance in understanding the process of international politics. His thesis was that the acquisition and use of power is the primary national interest of a state (Evans & Newnham 1998), and thus national interest can fall under the theoretical Realist umbrella. National interest can also mean military power for Realists, but for Constructivist theorists, national interest is what the state makes of it (Saxena, 2019). Thus, for one country the national interest can be increased international trade, but for another, it can be more isolation from the global financial market.

Ayoob (2011) dives deep into the difference between 'national interest' and 'foreign policy', both of which are key terms for Realist theorists of IR. He argues that the geographic

location of a state, its external security and economic environments, its inherent capabilities vis-a-vis other relevant states, and the response of other states is central to the way a state defines its 'national interest' and 'foreign policy' objectives. One foreign policy can also have several simultaneous objectives (Morin and Paquin, 2018, p.26), and so national interest can take different forms. National interest can function as the "yardstick by which the actions taken by a state toward the external actors are evaluated" (Saxena, 2019, p.126). Another concept that can take on different forms, and most definitely influence a country's foreign policy, is its national role conception.

### National role conception

A 'national role conception' can be one of the key drivers in making foreign policy (Hudson and Day, 2020, p.136), and can also have a correlation to national interest. This concept describes a national syndrome that affects the nation's external relations (Ibid). Having a national role not just constructed, but also accepted by other actors, is important because "roles reflect the claims on the international system" (Adigbuo, 2007). Although the study of national role conception for long was neglected in the field of IR, defining a role and having it accepted by other actors is one of the basic objectives of a state (Adigbuo, 2007).

Adigbuo argues that mainstream IR theories are inadequate for understanding non-Western states and introduces role theory as a comprehensive framework to fill a gap. He does not propose that role theory can replace any of the IR theories, but rather seeks to supplement the existing theories with the role framework. In doing this he can give a more comprehensive way to study less-researched states' foreign policy, which in the case of Adigbuo was Nigeria. He argues that role analysis gives the researcher the necessary tools to integrate or even merge various traditions of IR. Role theory is situated outside of realism, as its central concern has been with patterns of human conduct, or, "roles with expectations, identities and social positions, social structure and individual responses" (Adigbuo, 2007). Still, using role theory within an overarching realist approach will give a stronger analytical framework.

Role theory for Adigbuo provides a comprehensive pattern of actors' behavior and attitudes. What is more, it constitutes a strategy for states for handling recurrent situations, and these types of roles are built through rhetoric and actions, under the framing of foreign policy that was discussed above. The ideas or traditions that dominate the role a nation takes on can change as the perspective of situations change, the dynamics of world politics change, or if there are big domestic changes. Some of the roles a state can assume includes "bridge", "defender of the faith", "regional protector", "liberation supporter", or "regional leader"

(Hudson and Day, 2020). Adigbuo (2007) also presents role labels in his article and reiterates that a state can have more roles than just one at a time, as he applies role theory “to a dynamic system of interacting roles” (Adigbuo, 2007).

Roles can also explain why states sometimes can act against its national interest. Adigbuo gives the example of Nigeria, which has one of the world’s lowest incomes per capita in the world, but on different occasions has prioritized sending aid to the Soviet Union or sponsoring liberation movements abroad. Such apparent anomalies can be explained by looking at the country’s role conception. Using national role conception as an analytical tool is interesting as it helps to assess the significance of identity, and, as Adigbuo puts it, it can even help underline potential conflicts that might arise from the clash of roles concealed as interests. National role conception can thus also help in identifying the national interest of a state (Adigbuo, 2007).

A possible issue with role theory is that it assumes that states are actors who behave consistently with specific roles with which they identify. However, national cultural norms can develop rapidly, an argument that Coral Bell (Bell, 2003, p.107, in Hudson and Day, 2020, p.137) illustrates by giving the example of New Zealand and Australia. The two states share geographical proximity, a brief history as modern states, and similar immigrant ethnic mix, but have “develop[ed] quite sharply separate identities and traditions” (Ibid). The same can, to some extent, be said for Pakistan and India. The two nations share a long history, diversity in ethnicity, and geographic location. Yet, since partition, they have built different national cultural norms.

### What approach am I choosing and why?

The theoretical approach chosen to answer my research question, “what are the drivers of change in Pakistani foreign policy?”, lies somewhere between Realist and Constructivist approaches to IR. After conducting a review of the literature on how to study foreign policy I realized that my underlying assumptions about the international system, the role of states, and reasons why states act the way they do, have led me to an approach that tries to integrate various traditions of IR, like the approach of Adigbuo. I agree with Realists that security and the state’s survival is the main priority, but also see immense added value in bringing in concepts such as national role conception in the analysis. The data I chose gives me a consistent expression of foreign policy over time to analyze, which will also enhance the data analysis.

For the analyzing the changes in Pakistan's foreign policy, the concept of national role conception stood out to me as interesting and useful. Analyzing how the Pakistani representatives engage different roles will give me insight in how they view their role in the world, and then how they make priorities in foreign policy. Role analysis also allow me to integrate different perspectives of IR. I consider that national interest as actually falling under Realism, as one of the Realist claims is that states mainly look out for their own interest, which usually is regarded as being power and/or survival. However, what influences that which is regarded as national interest might come from a Constructivist perspective. Hill's seven expectations of foreign policy will also provide me with a very consistent tool for analysis. The seven can fall under different IR perspectives, from Realism with maintaining territorial integrity, to Constructivism, with projecting identity abroad. Thus, the seven expectations of foreign policy framework also fall under my overarching, cross-cutting framework.

The two central concepts of national role conception and national interest, together with Hill's seven expectations, will provide me with the needed tools to answer my research question. I should be able to identify the drivers of change in foreign policy through the national role conception, and at least a couple of the foreign policy expectations. One weakness in my perspective is that I am not looking at the domestic reception of the foreign policy pursued, or the domestic discussions that was part of framing the foreign policy. The language used in the GA debate interventions should also be able to tell me something about the drivers of change in the policy.

Although the UN is an important actor in this thesis, my theoretical approach maintains that the state is the main actor in the international system. The UN is only serving as an organizer to bring together all the countries of the world to the General Assembly each year. Indeed, the UNGA is an arena that illustrates the role of the nation state as the central agent in the international system, regardless of the fact that we are living in a globalized world. The nation state is therefore the only actor analyzed in this thesis, with the most important one being Pakistan.

The UNGA speeches have a standardized audience, comprised of heads of state and high-level diplomats. It is a solid data set because the speeches are given once a year, every year. That said, some of the speeches have had a more dramatic and important context, such as the General Debate in 2001. It was pushed by two months, to November instead of the standard September date, because of the terrorist attacks that took place in the United States. Other important world events, such as the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold

War. This means that they also give a good starting point to identify structural changes on the international stage, which again can be a possible driver of change for countries' foreign policy.

Analyzing the UNGA debate interventions should give a clear idea of how Pakistan is establishing its priorities, as well as allow me to gain an image of how Pakistan wishes to define itself, its priorities, and create an identity on the world stage. As Kazimi (2012) put it – the purpose of foreign policy is for the state to establish its role on the international stage. What drives the foreign policy of Pakistan will be interesting to analyze in the final three chapters of this thesis.

## Methodology

### Research strategy

The aim of this thesis is to answer the research question “what are the drivers of change in Pakistani foreign policy?”. For this purpose, I have chosen a qualitative research design. As Bryman (2016, p. 374) explains, a qualitative research has an in-depth focus, concerned with understanding a specific phenomenon, with a limited scope when collecting and analyzing data.

My research approach has been to go back and forth between theory and the empirical study. However, the initial approach was deductive, in that I wanted to establish a theoretical framework as a departing point for the empirical study. The reasoning for this was that I wanted to optimize the theoretical validity of my findings and ground my findings in the theory. However, what I found was that by shifting between the theory and empiric reading I have ensured that my theoretical framework is grounded in the Pakistani foreign policy reality.

As I read more about the case study, I steered the theoretical review in the direction it became evident for me as a researcher that the analysis would go. Inductive research methods are more in my nature, although deductive research seems to be most common in International Relations scholarships. I leaned on the initial theoretical findings the whole way, but as I read and understood my case more, the concepts were established, and theory was adapted. This method did not compromise my research – if anything it made it stronger. This approach can also be labelled as an interpretative qualitative research design. This entails that the researcher allows concepts to emerge during the research process (Yenow and Schwartz-Shea, 2006), rather than starting with all concepts developed prior to the research being conducted. The interpretative methodology centers on “meaning-focus and person-centered concerns” in scientific explanations (Ibid, p. xii)

Since I wanted to focus on a specific country, a case study was the obvious choice in the research design. Case studies are a pillar in qualitative research, which often has a narrow time period and a specific theme. A challenge with qualitative research is the researcher’s individuality (Bryman, 2016). My underlying views of both Pakistan and world politics has influenced the research along the way, but I have actively sought out views that challenge my underlying convictions. This has been done through discussions with experts and with professors knowledgeable about Pakistan, as well as by reading broadly. The issue of individuality is less of a challenge in quantitative research, which is more focused on numbers and statistics, where the personal views of the researcher cannot, or at least to a much lesser degree, influence the findings.

## Research design

The main aim of this research has been to explore Pakistani foreign policy, which I as a researcher wanted to understand better. This is both due to personal interest in the country, but also because I was of the impression that while many in the West write and talk about Pakistan, they don't really offer accounts of what drives the country's foreign policy and relations with other countries. Through my studies of International Relations, I have had a geographical interest in the wider Middle East-region, with a particular focus on Turkey, and Pakistan fits into my regional specialization in the field. Pakistan is usually mentioned when talking about Afghanistan or the relation between Pakistan and India, but there do not seem to be much effort to understand the foreign policy motivations in Pakistan. I chose the case study before I had a finite research question and established the research design.

I have chosen a case study research design split into two time periods to answer the research question. A case study is a "research design that entails the detailed and intensive analysis of a single case" (Bryman, 2016, p. 688). In this research I wanted to bring forth the case of Pakistani foreign policy, and I am therefore concerned with the "complexity and particular nature of the case in question", as Bryman (2016, p. 60) puts it when explaining why researchers choose to conduct case studies.

My research design is a within-case-comparison, and the research question is to be applied on two periods in time: 1989-1998, and 1999-2009. The reason why these two periods was chosen was that although they are successive, they are very different on the international stage. The first time period, 1989-1998, initially saw the end of the Cold War, the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and 'the end of history' (Fukuyama, 1989). The liberal world order had emerged as superior, and the world system was unipolar. The United States was the sole, remaining superpower. Afghanistan was no longer under invasion from Soviet forces, and the world's attention drifted from the region. Yet, as the decade progressed, there was instability in the world regardless of the so-called end of history.

In the second time period, 1999-2009, the world entered the new millennia. With it, a lot of things changed on the world stage. Pakistan went through yet another military coup in October 1999, and General Musharraf took power. Two years into that period, the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the US took place, and what unfolded after came to be known as the 'war on terror'. Afghanistan was again in focus, and with it, so was Pakistan.

These two time periods were chosen because of the stark difference in the international system. Whereas the 1990s initially was the decade Liberalist ideas in International Relations

‘won’, the post-9/11 world saw the rise of Neorealist ideas and conflict. The two time periods were also chosen because of the different leaderships in Pakistan. In the early 1990s there was civilian leadership in Pakistan, disrupted in 1999 by General Musharraf.

As a researcher it was these two decades that stood out as the most interesting, though I could have chosen other time periods. The reason these were the most interesting to analyze is due to the global situation on the international stage, and the shifting situation both internationally and domestically. There would undoubtedly be reasons to analyze Pakistani foreign policy in a bigger perspective, from the early days of the Republic until today, but due to limitations not only in time, but also number of words allowed in the thesis, the smarter choice seemed to be to choose two.

### Data selection

To analyze Pakistan’s foreign policy, I have chosen to analyze a consistent set of documents – the yearly United Nations’ General Assembly opening session speeches. The UN is one of the most important arenas of international politics, and historically the UNGA’s General Debate has been used as a forum for big speeches and bold statements. The General Debate interventions are typically held by leaders of governments or their foreign ministers and delivered to an audience of delegations. The speeches are made public, and so reach a wide audience.

The UNGA’s general debate is where Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev banged his shoe on his desk in 1960 after taking offence from a statement by the Philippines’ delegation, Moammar Gadhafi rambled on about ‘everything’ for 96 minutes in 2009, Chavez indirectly called George W. Bush the ‘devil’ in 2006, or where Fidel Castro gave a speech lasting for 269 minutes, also in 1960, blasting “American aggression and imperialism”. Although Pakistani leaders have delivered more sober speeches, they have used the UNGA as a forum for expressing Pakistani foreign policy goals and principles.

The General Assembly speech, held every September, is a chance for leaders to position themselves, and their nations, on the world stage. Government’s official position on international political questions are put on record, and they can provide information on key national priorities. This data has been chosen for the ability to frame foreign policy and analyzing these speeches will enable me to answer my research question. This approach also gives a consistent set of data through documents that have the same importance, same time, and same audience each year. This data set should provide comparative data that will give a



strong analysis.

I have supplemented this with literature on Pakistan, and literature on its relations with other states. These relations are including but not limited to the United States, India, and China. The literature has been chosen after input from the thesis supervisor and professors at NMBU with special knowledge on Pakistan and the region, in addition to books and research institutes suggested by Pakistani friends. Most of the material have been written by Pakistanis. This was a conscious decision I made to get an authentic reading of history from a Pakistani perspective, but I have also kept in mind that it might give a biased image.

### Analytical Strategy & data collection

I decided on my research question, “what are the drivers of change in Pakistani foreign policy?”, together with my thesis supervisor as I started the research process one year before the thesis was due. This guided me in the research to the extent that I was looking for changes in the foreign policy, and what seemed to be the reasoning behind these changes. One of my presumptions has been that Pakistani foreign policy is influenced by world events, and that the leaders are trying to adapt to the on-going situation on the world stage. Thus, my analytical strategy has been to read and analyze the data in the light of world events and actions, and the geopolitical situation.

The data collection method has been to read through all the speeches between 1989 and 2009, which I found on the UN’s Dag Hammarskjöld Library online. The UNGA debate speeches are the originals. I created a document where I noted the year, UNGA session number and speaker, with name and position held in the Pakistani government. I then added a fourth column, where I compiled the main points of the speech held each year. The main points were then color-coded after topic to facilitate easier analysis as I started writing.

For the content analysis I wanted to find key words or phrasings to see how topics and themes of foreign policy are talked about and framed. Additionally, I have skimmed through speeches from other key years, to understand the country and leaders in different times. These were selected on a historical basis – for instance the first speech held by Pakistan under the General Debate, and the speech held after the revolution of 1979 in neighboring Iran. The UNGA speeches will provide me with a solid perspective on issues through the eyes of Pakistani leadership.

### Quality assurance and trustworthiness

The main source I have used is the UNGA speeches, which is a primary source. Additionally, I have used published reports and books on Pakistan and its relations to other countries. The books that have been used to support the knowledge in the case study to inform about the bigger historical situations might be subjective. These authors do not have objective approaches to history. According to Bryman (2016) “a single absolute account of social reality” is not feasible, and thus you need different ways of assessing qualitative research compared to quantitative, since the social scientist cannot reveal ‘an absolute truth’ about society (Bryman, 2016, p.384). The two primary criteria presented by Bryman to assess a qualitative study are trustworthiness and authenticity.

Authenticity is about whether the research represents different points of view in the research, help understand the social setting more, and other issues concerning the wider political impact of the research carried out (Ibid, p.393). The other criteria, trustworthiness, consists of four concepts: credibility, transferability, dependability and confirmability. In order to establish credibility, the researcher must have shown good practice, and submit research findings that shows that the investigator has understood the social world correctly. One issue of qualitative research is that it is oriented to the contextual uniqueness of the research subject, and transferability refers to the ability of the researcher’s findings to be transferred to other contexts. In qualitative research, transferability is ensured by providing a detailed and thick description of the phenomenon in focus, a database, that others can use to judge the possibility of transferring the findings to other contexts (Bryman, 2016, p. 385).

Dependability means ensuring that complete records for all phases of the research process are kept. This point is concerned with keeping interview transcripts, fieldwork notes, or other ways of recording. But dependability is also about keeping track of how the problem formulation or data analysis decisions are made in the research process. I have kept a research journal throughout my process, and in that way ensured dependability. The last point in assessing the research is confirmability. Confirmability is concerned with ensuring the researcher has been as objective as possible in their research. Also related to these points, is external validity. This refers to “the degree to which findings can be generalized across social settings” (Bryman, 2016, p.348).

Qualitative research is subjective, and this has an effect on the replicability and transferability, as the analysis comes down to my personal interpretation as a researcher. Transferability of this research is possible methodologically, but how you see Pakistan, world

politics and the international political structure will influence any other researcher's analysis. Bryman (2016) also mentions that qualitative research receives some criticism for being subjective and too impressionist, as it relies on the subjective interpretations of the researcher. This lack of potential for external validity or transferability is one of the limitations of qualitative research, and case study research in particular (Ibid). According to Bryman, the findings of a single case study cannot be applied to other cases. But it is this researcher's view that a case study research can be a great starting point for future research into structures, or foreign policy, or Pakistani politics.

The research design for this thesis is a case study, with a within-case-analysis. By comparing two time periods I will see what the drivers of change in Pakistani foreign policy are and answer my research question. The data supporting my thesis is content analysis of the United Nations General Assembly speeches held in the yearly General Debate by the Pakistani representative. These speeches will be analyzed, and theoretical concepts applied to them, which will then be discussed systematically in the conclusion of the thesis.

## Diplomatic history of Pakistan

This chapter will outline the main trends in Pakistani foreign policy up until 1989. The quest for security and economic development has been central to Pakistan's foreign policy since independence in 1947, but independence was also the beginning of the existential conflict between Pakistan and India. Islamabad has also had important relations with other world powers, though the most significant relationship in terms of world politics has been the United States. However, one of the first challenges to Pakistan's independence and global recognition was the single negative vote cast by Afghanistan to admit Pakistan as a member of the UN on September 30, 1947.

### Alignment with the West

In the early years the Pakistani foreign policy was dominated by its problems with India on the one hand, and the efforts to introduce itself to the world community on the other (Rizvi, 2004). Maintaining its territorial integrity and social peace proved to be a challenge for the newly established country. The sentiment among Pakistanis was that Indian leaders regretted the establishment of Pakistan, and some even talked about a possible reunification of the two countries (Ibid). The territory of Jammu and Kashmir has been disputed between India and Pakistan for more than half a century, and been a source of wars and continued conflict since the partition (Jaffrelot, 2016). Another early challenge was that both India and the Soviet Union supported Afghani claims on territorial sovereignty in Pakistan's North West Frontier Province. This led Pakistan to fear a potential attack from India and Afghanistan, backed by the Soviet Union.

Facing these threats from its neighbors, Pakistan tried to cultivate relations with the major powers – the United States and the Soviet Union – as well as with China. Pakistan was one of the first countries to recognize China when it did so in 1950, when Beijing was still isolated from the international community of states. Trade quickly ensued after this, as China traded its coal for Pakistani cotton across the border. In 1963, Pakistan and China granted each other status as 'most favored nation', which strengthened foreign policy ties between the two (Kazimi, 2012). But Pakistan also strived to have good relations with Muslim countries, and it worked towards peaceful cooperation among the Muslim states, early to try to establish itself as a leader of the Muslim countries. Indeed, preceding even its alliance with the US, Pakistan found its first allies in the Middle East. It signed treaties with Iran (1950), Iraq (1950), Syria (1950), Turkey (1951), Egypt (1951), Yemen (1952) and Lebanon (1952).

Jinnah had stressed neutrality as a principle of Pakistan, but on grounds of ideology he still gave preference to the United States over the Soviet Union. The Prime Minister, Liaquat Ali Khan also stressed Pakistan's neutrality, but he favored the United Kingdom over the United States (Kazimi, 2012). Jinnah primarily tried to sell the strategic location of Pakistan (Jaffrelot, 2016), which was well suited to American interests (Kazimi, 2012). After remaining officially neutral under the regimes of Jinnah and Liaquat, Pakistan entered into military alliances with the West under the rule of Governor-General Ghulam Mohammad in the mid-1950s. While Pakistan wanted help to stand up against India, the US wanted a strategic ally in encircling the Communist Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR) and China (Ibid, p.292), and so the two went into alliance with different priorities and security needs.

When Pakistan became a member of the South East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) and the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), two US-sponsored military alliances, it had officially gotten involved in Cold War politics. India regarded Pakistan joining SEATO and CENTO as Pakistan "bringing the Cold War to India's door" (Kazimi, 2012, p.289). Pakistan's ties with the West grew stronger in the end of the 1950s, as it received economic and military assistance after entering SEATO and CENTO, and the US helped Pakistan to build its defense and security apparatus. This alignment was important to Pakistan as it gained military strength in relation to India.

The relationship between Pakistan and the United States has "always been one of mutual exploitation heavily flavored with mutual suspicion" (Lieven, 2011, p.46), but Pakistan was recognized as a regional powerbroker in charge of containing Communism in Asia when the Korean war broke out. However, Pakistan's close relationship with the US and the West pitted it against Arab and Muslims states on several occasions (Jaffrelot, 2016). This was evident during the Suez crisis in 1956, when the relations plummeted as Pakistan sided with Britain and France against Egypt (Kazimi, 2012). This meant that Pakistan had alienated most of its Arab allies by the 1960s, and it failed to assert itself in the role as 'defender of the faith'. The aftermath of the 1967 Six Day War improved relations somewhat, but the solidarity Pakistan sought from the community of Muslim states remained elusive (Ibid).

Pakistan started feeling isolated on the world stage as its efforts to unite the Muslim world was not going anywhere, and it did not receive any support despite trying to bring the conflict in Kashmir on the international political agenda, nor did it receive much support facing problems with India in general. Additionally, the alignment with the West made its relationship with the Soviet Union grow colder, and relations it had been building with developing countries also deteriorated. However, the relationship between Pakistan and China survived the Pakistani

alignment with the West, as China “showed a remarkable understanding” of why Pakistan chose to lean on the West for security (Rizvi, 2004).

### Pluralist perspective in the 1960s

The Kennedy administration in Washington started cultivating India in 1961, as they saw India as a possible counterweight to China (Rizvi, 2004) in Asia. During a visit to Washington in 1961, President Ayub Khan said that Pakistan was the only country in Asia the US can trust to remain loyal if there is trouble (Ibid), but this was to little use, as the US continued to approach India. What is more, Washington’s support to India was given with less strings attached than what Pakistan had been given (Haqqani, 2013). This led Pakistan to try to diversify its foreign policy and diplomatic relations, and particularly improved relations with the Soviets and Chinese (Rizvi, 2004), as it could no longer trust the US to give Pakistan strategic security.

The Soviet Union subsequently took a more balanced approach to the Kashmir question, and China became more supportive of Pakistan’s territorial integrity. This again made the bilateral relations between Pakistan and the US worse, which was a trend that continued with wars between India and Pakistan in 1965 and 1971. When Pakistan and India went to war in 1965, China showed solidarity with Pakistan, while the US imposed sanctions on both warring parties. China has also sold arms to Pakistan since 1967, helping Islamabad balance its dependence on Washington, and has also assisted Pakistan later on in developing its nuclear bomb (Kazimi, 2012). What is more, Pakistan’s relationship with China was one of the cornerstones of its foreign policy between 1960 and 1980 (Kazimi, 2012). The two countries swapped some territory in Kashmir in 1962, after China and India had gone to war over their mutual, disputed border. China has also supported Pakistan on Kashmir through its permanent position on the UNSC. However, at the same time, the USSR vetoed any Kashmir-related UNSC resolutions, showing its support for India (Kazimi, 2012).

Pakistan pursued a more pluralist perspective on foreign relations after this and aimed at cultivating “mutually advantageous bilateral relations with all states” (Rizvi, 2004, p.15) on the basis of mutual interests. Pakistan chose not to participate in an Asian Collective Security System that was promoted by the USSR in 1969, after having grown tired of bloc politics. It also did not want to agitate Beijing, and so, when Pakistan facilitated rapprochement between the Chinese and the Americans in 1971, the USSR saw this as a threat. This led the USSR to not only support India during the war in East Pakistan, but also to accuse Pakistan of aggression against India during the war. The US and China avoided public criticism of Pakistani actions

in East Pakistan but extended some diplomatic support to Pakistan on the issue. However, as India and the USSR had acted jointly against Pakistan (Kazimi, 2012), Pakistan had felt let down from a lack of support by both the US and China (Jaffrelot, 2016).

### Pursuing Islamic leadership

Pakistan once again diversified its interaction in the 1970s, as it recognized North Korea, North Vietnam and East Germany in 1972, showing itself as a liberation supporter. Pakistan also gave more weight to developing its economic, trade and diplomatic missions with Eastern European states, and across Asia, Africa and South and Central America. This was the beginning of Pakistan identifying with, and championing, the causes and issues of the developing countries (Rizvi, 2004). This all happened after Zulfikar Ali Bhutto became head of what remained of Pakistan after the establishment of Bangladesh.

Bhutto adopted a doctrine of Islamic socialism, projecting the ideology of Pakistan's founders (Kazimi, 2012). According to Jaffrelot, Pakistan identified more closely and felt more connected to the Middle East after it lost Bangladesh and with it its geographical border with Southeast Asia in 1971. Prime Minister Bhutto went on a journey to Muslim countries in the Middle East and Africa following the secession of Bangladesh. His "journey of resistance" was aimed at collecting money for Pakistan, and funds for an "Islamic bomb" (Jaffrelot, 2016). Pakistan also felt vulnerable after the lack of support from the US in the Bangladesh conflict which is part of what pushed its relations with the Muslim world to a new height, particularly with the Gulf states (Ibid).

These improved relations materialized in economic assistance and diplomatic support to Pakistan, and served Islamabad's diplomatic, economic and security needs. Bhutto tried to build an Islamic alliance and was successful in cultivating personal relations with many Muslim state leaders, taking steps to establish Pakistan as a regional leader, or defender of the faith. His vision of a regional economic order within the greater Middle East region enabled him to convince the Organization of the Islamic Conference to hold their second summit in Lahore in February 1974.

When India announced on May 18, 1974 that it had tested a "peaceful nuclear device", Pakistan was shaken (Haqqani, 2013, p.206). It was seen by the US and the world as India showing strength directed towards China, but the view in Pakistan was that it was aimed squarely at Pakistan (Ibid, p.207). Bhutto geared efforts towards Pakistan gaining its own nuclear bomb. The US was 'infuriated' at Bhutto's attempt to counteract India's nuclear

explosion, and Bhutto pulled out of CENTO and SEATO (Ibid). The PM's determination can be seen as a way of trying to enhance the role of Pakistan after losing Bangladesh, and a reason for being given aid from the Gulf countries (Haroon, 2016). This was also in line with Bhutto's quest for Pakistan as a regional leader in the Muslim world (Ibid). In return for this, Pakistan have exported significant military efforts to Arab states, and by the end of the 1970s, Pakistan had sent almost 2000 military advisors and trainers to the Middle East (Ibid), while during the 1980s, approximately 50,000 Pakistani soldiers were serving in the region, which was a show for its wish for good relations.

While Islamabad's relations with the major powers to a large extent continued to be focused on bilateralism and mutual interests, much of China's South Asia policy was based on a secure and independent Pakistan. Relations warmed again with the Soviet Union and China, but the US grew increasingly wary of Pakistan's nuclear program (Rizvi, 2004). All military sales and economic assistance from the US to Pakistan came to a halt in April 1979 as it was discovered that Pakistan was setting up a uranium enrichment facility at Kathuta. Pakistan was also sucked into the rivalry between Tehran and Riyadh and the sectarian conflict in the aftermath of the Iranian revolution in 1979 (Kazimi, 2012).

### Pakistan as a significant actor

Pakistan remained a relatively liberal and moderate Muslim state until the 1970s (Jalal, 2011). Bhutto's alignment with the Muslim countries was also reflected at home, and Bhutto tried to gain popularity by increasing the role of Islam in Pakistan (Ibid). General Zia-ul-Haq assumed the presidency in 1978 after dismissing Bhutto. This was Pakistan's third military rule, and Zia remained in power until 1988. He started a process of Islamization in Pakistan, and although his measures were mostly superficial (Lieven, 2011), it was a significant step for Pakistan to reinforce its position among Muslim nations. The United States did not approve of Pakistan turning its back to democracy, and the dismay towards Pakistan's nuclear ambitions remained.

Pakistan became a front-line state when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan at the end of 1979. The military intervention of Afghanistan shook the Pakistani establishment, and it was seen as a violation of "independence and sovereignty of a neighboring, non-aligned, and Muslim state" by one of the two superpowers (Rizvi, 2004). The US was suddenly dependent on Pakistan to contain the Soviet Union, especially after it lost its ally Iran after the 1979 Revolution. Zia held a policy line for containment and combat against the Soviet presence in Afghanistan (Kazimi, 2012), as Pakistan, the US and Soviet Union engaged, trained and armed



Islamic militancy groups from both Afghanistan and the Middle East to have create an insurgency against the Soviet Union in the 1980s. The Pakistani army was offered billions of dollars during the anti-Soviet war in Afghanistan, plus F-16 fighter jets, to support the mujahedeen (Haqqani, 2013).

The war in Afghanistan was a way out of isolation for Pakistan, and Islamabad received massive military and financial aid under both Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan (Kazimi, 2012). China also endorsed Pakistan's position on the Afghanistan crisis. Some of the Islamic countries also supported Pakistan, through aid for the Afghan refugees but also economic cooperation. Saudi Arabia sponsored the Sunni, anti-Soviet mujahedeen fighting in Afghanistan, and pledged to contribute financially equal to the US. Saudi Arabia also has cultural and religious influence over Pakistan, as the Saudis have financed religious schools in Pakistan and there are a big number of Pakistani migrant workers in Saudi Arabia. The conflict in Afghanistan emphasized Pakistan's role in the Islamic world (Jalal, 2011), but relations with India deteriorated once again.

Even though the invasion of Afghanistan worked as a turning-point for Pakistani-US relations and a way out of isolation for Pakistan, the nuclear issue remained a strain on their relationship. The Pakistani government led by Zia "took complete advantage of the lifting of American pressure" (Ibid, p.294), and went ahead with its nuclearization program, while insisting they were not developing nuclear capabilities. Zia noted that there was a campaign in Western media "questioning Pakistan's nuclear intentions" (Haqqani, 2013, p.228), that he did not approve of. On allegations from US officials that he might be lying, he said that Pakistan "might not be a large of important country but it was an honorable one" (Ibid, p.226)".

The Soviet Invasion was an 'ad hoc' situation that had led to 'ad hoc' results in terms of western support for Pakistan (Haqqani, 2013). However, when the Soviets completed their withdrawal on February 15, 1989, the US shifted its interest from Afghanistan and left Pakistan alone to cope with the violent situation, as well as the millions of refugees. Relations between Moscow and Islamabad, on the other hand, were looking up. And the Afghan rebels that were trained by Pakistan, the US and Saudi Arabia provided Pakistan with strategic depth against India (Jalal, 2011).

## Empirical study

The formulation of my research question, “what are the drivers of change in Pakistani foreign policy?”, leaves the research strategy fairly open. Identifying the changes, and the drivers of change, for foreign policy can be approached in a number of different ways, from studying policy papers to the recordings of events. The way I have chosen to approach this is looking at the UNGA speeches. These will enable me to find patterns through time and examining key trends. In this chapter I will go through the data collected: the UNGA general debate interventions, divided between two chapters based on the time period. At the end of both chapters I will discuss the main findings. But first, I have briefly outlined the main international trends in the period, and how Pakistan navigate these.

## Pakistan 1989-1998

### Lost significance of Pakistan

Democracy returned to Pakistan in December 1988 when Benazir Bhutto became the Prime Minister in 1988, making her the first female head of government in the Muslim world. Over the next decade Pakistan would witness a pause from military rule, but Bhutto would change power with Nawaz Sharif twice in that time as neither held office for more than a few years at a time.

When the Soviet Union completed its withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989 Pakistan lost its status as a front-line state, and the US shifted its focus and priorities away from the region. With this, Washington abandoned all focus and any responsibility for the consequences of the war in Afghanistan (Kazimi, 2012), and left Pakistan with chaos on the other side of its border as well as millions of refugees. In this chaos the Taliban emerged from the Islamic militant groups sponsored by Pakistan, the US and Saudi Arabia, and the al-Qaeda established base in Afghanistan (Rizvi, 2004). Afghans had started to flee to Pakistan in the late 1970s, and by the end of 2001, the UNHCR estimated that there were over 4 million Afghan refugees in Pakistan. Pakistan was thus left with several problems in neighboring Afghanistan: millions of refugees, insecurity on its borders, and trying to facilitate the installation of a government in Kabul that could lead to stability in Afghanistan and the region. Additionally, insurgency broke out in the Indian-administered Kashmir in 1989, adding to the already tense situation. On top of this, Washington resumed its nuclear non-proliferation pressure on Islamabad.

American President Bill Clinton had a soft spot for India (Haqqani, 2013) and there was a “tilt to India” in 1991 (Lieven, 2011, p.45) as Washington wanted to rebuild damaged relations with India after the Afghanistan war (Rizvi, 2004). On top of four types of sanctions imposed by the US against Pakistan in the 1990s, it was even discussed if Pakistan should be declared a terrorist state for allowing its territory to be used by al-Qaeda and other militant groups (Ibid). An imposed identity for Pakistan as a country that was harboring terrorists started manifesting with this.

Pakistan’s relation with the Taliban was strong, and despite growing international criticism in the Kabul government, Pakistan was one of three states to recognize the Taliban as the official Afghan government right after Sharif’s election to a second term as PM in March 1997, alongside Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Islamabad was even advocating for the Taliban government to be given Afghanistan’s seat in the UN (Kazimi, 2012). A more stable Afghanistan was central in Pakistan’s national interest in the 90s, and so it wanted to support a government that it saw as friendly in the neighboring country (Jaffrelot, 2016). However, this move increased Pakistan’s international detachment from the West and sense of isolation on the world stage (Ibid).

The period since 1989 has been one of continuing tension between India and Pakistan due to the ongoing, allegedly Pakistan-supported, insurgency in Kashmir. India blamed the insurgency on Pakistan-based militant Islamic groups (Rizvi, 2004). Pakistani policy on India under all governments since 1989 has remained conditional on the resolution of the Kashmir issue (Sridharan, 2011, p.76). A significant development in the bilateral relationship came when India exploded nuclear devices again in May 1998. Pakistan waited for the world to condemn the nuclear explosions (Kazimi, 2012).

When international condemnation did not come, Pakistan saw it as necessary to carry out its own explosions to rectify the strategic imbalance in the region (Rizvi, 2004). And so, Pakistan detonated its first nuclear explosive devices and declared itself a nuclear weapons state (Khan, 2011). In addition to growing domestic pressure for testing, Pakistan also carried out the test explosions as a reaction to the reluctance of the West to impose sanctions on India, and the lack of credible security guarantees to Pakistan (Ibid). The architect of the nuclear program in Pakistan was Abdul Qadeer Khan, and nuclear capabilities are seen in Pakistan as “the final arbitrator of the nation’s survivability” (Khan, 2011, p.267).

## Fostering a stable international order

Most of the interventions in the UNGA General debate in the 1990s opened with the praising of a 'new era' and expressing a wish for increased global commitment to democratic values and the efforts to live in a more peaceful world. After the openings, all of the interventions welcomed the new UN member states and praising of developments on state sovereignty and independence. Every speaker mentioned all the newly established countries and welcomed them to the General Assembly. Abdul Sattar stated in 1993 that 130 nations had "emerged from the dark era of colonialism and alien domination". This was a trend that shows Pakistan was early to define itself as a liberation supporter, which can be because of its own efforts to be recognized as an independent state in the UN back in 1947. It also shows a perspective of the world as a place that is chaotic and dominated by the strongest (colonialism and alien domination), but with the potential to have a just and peaceful order.

Pakistan's 1989 speech was held by Nusrat Bhutto, wife of the late PM Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and senior member of her daughter Benazir Bhutto's government at the time. Bhutto opened her speech by stating that a new era of democracy had come to Pakistan since December 1988. In June 1989 Pakistan had proposed the establishment of an association of democratic nations, which Bhutto reiterated to the UNGA, stating that bringing together democracies would allow them to draw on each other's strengths. It is interesting to note that this was right after Pakistan had reinstated its own democracy, and maybe was looking for a way to gain democratic allies. She went on to praise how the East-West dialogue had eased international tensions and expressed that wishing to protect the global commons was a policy goal of Pakistan.

Foreign minister Yaqub-Khan opened his intervention in 1990 by praising the state of the world, and "the universal triumph of human values, the affirmation of freedom and of all those virtues giving meaning to life". A career diplomat, Yaqub-Khan spoke of the East-West rivalry being a "relic of the past" and said that cooperation and understanding was "the order of the day", expressing a world view in line with the West and its values being the 'winner' of the Cold War and a foreign policy language that matched it. This is in line with Hill's sixth foreign policy expectation; fostering a stable international order. Yaqub-Khan's successor Kanju, who was foreign minister under Sharif's first government, set a similar tone in 1991, but also voiced some concern, by stating that the "historic transformation sweeping the globe" had created a "blend of sanguine expectations and serious concern". He expanded on this, by stating that while the world had witnessed the "end of ideological confrontation between the

two super-Powers”, and the beginning of an era of increased cooperation and accommodation, “it has also experienced a devastating military conflict in the Persian Gulf”.

Kanju was newly installed as Minister of State for Foreign Affairs under Sharif and kept a sober world view when he stated that the hopes for peace were being dashed by continued threats to the security of small states. Kanju also expressed worry that “armed conflicts continue to fester” around the world, and that the end of the Cold War would culminate with another era of international tensions “on account of the hegemonic ambitions of major regional powers”. Here he must have been appealing to those who considered India as a possible regional power, underlining that Pakistan would not like to see that happening. He also underlined Pakistan’s contribution to, and belief in, the fulfillment of the objectives of the UN, and said that Pakistan welcomed the “relaxation of international tensions, universal movement towards democracy, upsurge of economic liberalism, the serious pursuit of arms control and growing respect for the deep-seated urge of peoples for the exercise of their right to self-determination”. By making this statement, Kanju echoed Pakistan as a champion of the stable world order, and its role as a defender of the UN’s values.

Kanju came back to the UNGA in 1992, still serving under Sharif’s first cabinet, and praised the ‘dawn of a new era’ while simultaneously expressing concern about the world facing “new and unprecedented problems” on both a regional and global level. He urged the nations of the world to build a “peaceful, stable and progressive international order”, which would only be possible through concrete steps agreed by the “vast majority of the international community”. This can be seen as directed towards Washington, and that Pakistan wanted the US to create stability in Afghanistan. Kanju presented an action plan to build a new global framework for peace and progress, based on building a new structure that would “check hegemonic ambitions and promote disarmament”, a solid nudge to India. He reiterated that after the end of the Cold war, threats “are most likely to be regional rather than global in origin and dimension”, establishing the conflict between India and Pakistan as growing in importance.

Kanju’s vision of the new international order was a place “where equity and fair play govern the conduct of States, where the weak live without fear of domination by the strong, where prosperity flourishes and human dignity is safeguarded”. Here he invoked roles for Pakistan as a liberation supporter and called for prosperity in the world as well as fostering a stable world order. With regards to the current and previous world orders he stated that an international order based on hegemony “will always remain unstable, because it is unjust”. Thus, he also wanted to show that Pakistan protects the global commons and is opposed to the

big powers dominating the world, and wanting to advance the independence of developing countries.

Development was on the agenda in Foreign Minister Ali's 1995 speech, when he urged the world to "seize [the] historic opportunity" to achieve a global consensus behind development. Ali was foreign minister under Benazir Bhutto's second cabinet, and he appealed to the world community to grab the opportunity to create a "lasting foundation for international peace and security". He continued by presenting his world view: the end of the Cold War had presented a chance to "build a new edifice of peace and prosperity", and a system where international relations could be conducted "in a spirit of justice, equality and democracy".

Expressing the Pakistani role conception as a leader of developing countries, Bhutto stated back in 1989 that it is a "hard economic reality" for developing countries, and that North-South dialogue was stalling because of the 'bad attitudes' of the North. Pakistan's role conception of being an advocate of developing countries was further employed as Ali, under Sharif's government, in 1995 went on by saying that the new, post-Cold War international system had raised hopes that poverty would cease to exist through international cooperation for development; that human rights, "especially the right to self-determination", would be promoted and protected; and that aggression "would be effectively and collectively challenged wherever and whenever it occurred". The FM concluded by saying that "regrettably, this has not happened", and deemed the hopes posed by the post-Cold War international order as crushed, as the major powers had not done enough to protect the global commons.

Benazir Bhutto echoed this disappointment in the once-promising new world order in 1996, when she stated that the world's "confidence in our ability to resolve conflicts has been visibly shaken after the experiences of Somalia, Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, Liberia, Rwanda and Burundi". She framed a view of the world as a place where conflicts continuously were allowed to fester. In the following year, a newly elected Sharif reiterated the crucial role the UN could and should play in these conflicts and praised the Pakistani contribution to the UN peacekeeping operations worldwide, in addition to the political and material contribution Pakistan makes "to build peace and promote prosperity". Pakistan as a champion of the UN's values and its commitment to the Charter was not to be doubted, as it was once more reiterated that Pakistan was protecting the global commons. This was while the conflict was still ongoing in both Afghanistan and Kashmir, and in face of allegations Pakistan was fueling the conflicts.

When he returned in 1998, Sharif was less optimistic, and said that the world community was "being propelled into a future which appears anarchic and insecure". This was of course after Pakistan and India were established as nuclear states, and put under US

sanctions. Towards the end of the decade he said that the world was “at a time of profound change and disturbing economic and political developments”, and that all must work together to continue with the “new vision and possibilities” so they are not “lost because of narrow prejudices and interests”. Of course, Pakistan’s national interest of obtaining nuclear weapons, which will be discussed later in the analysis, was seen by the world as increasing insecurity. Sharif was, however, trying to protect a possibility of a stable world order, which he saw as possibly disappearing. Upholding Pakistan as a protector of a stable world order must have seemed necessary, given the nuclear development, and trying to keep the world convinced that Pakistan was a protector of the global commons.

### Regional protector

Nusrat Bhutto addressed the allegations made by Kabul that Pakistan was to blame for continued conflict in 1989, calling these “baseless allegations of interference and violations of the Geneva accords”. This would continue to be a topic in the speeches, and it was reiterated again and again that “there never was, and never will be, interference from Pakistan”, as FM Ali put it in 1995, after having a longer segment of his speech focused on the situation in Afghanistan. Yaqub-Khan stated back in 1990 that Pakistan is interested only in “restoring a peaceful, sovereign, non-aligned and Islamic Afghanistan”. Additionally, the continued presence of the Afghan refugees in Pakistan was a frequent topic, as there were calls for the voluntary return of the 5 million refugees. The refugees would be highlighted as a show for how much Pakistan cares about and protect its neighbor, but also be highlighted as an issue of how drained Pakistan was from the Afghanistan conflict.

The issue of Afghanistan got less attention in 1991, but Kanju spoke about a “brightened prospect for a just political settlement”. He mentioned that Pakistan had held “extensive consultations” with the countries concerned in the Afghanistan conflict, and that Pakistan and Iran were working with the Afghan Mujahedeen to promote peace process in the country. Pakistan was thus a promoter of stability in the neighboring country and working towards peace. Kanju referred to the “heroic struggle” of the Afghan people against “foreign occupation”, and also wished for the “freedom and democracy” of the Afghans. Using these words can be seen as reaching out to Washington, where words such as “freedom” and “democracy” was favorable.

In the following year, Kanju applauded the “valiant people of Afghanistan” for having “finally regained control over their destiny” after an interim government assumed power in

Kabul in April 1992. He continued by saying that Pakistan was “determined” to establish “close and cooperative relations” with their neighbor “on their basis of sovereign equality and mutual respect”. Kanju thus envisaged another role for Pakistan to play in Afghanistan as a promoter of stability and peace for the Afghan people. The “foreign occupation” he denounced was directed to that of the Soviet Union, not the influence by Pakistan, or that of the United States or other Muslim countries. His use of words such as “freedom and democracy” was in line with Pakistan’s role as a liberation supporter, as well as maintaining its own territorial integrity and social peace against external aggression.

Foreign minister under Benazir Bhutto, Abul Sattar continued in the same vein in 1993, saying that the “accommodation achieved by the mujahedeen leaders, and the formation of a coalition government” was a reason for satisfaction. This would, in Pakistan’s view, promote stability in the region. In 1994 Sardar Ali urged the world not to forsake the Afghan people, as the civil war in the country had “compounded the suffering imposed on its people during the long and victorious struggle” against the foreign occupation. This was of course also bringing instability to Pakistan, so could also be regarded as Pakistan asking for help in the effort to bring stability to Pakistan’s borders.

Indeed, in 1996 Benazir Bhutto spoke of the consequences the war in Afghanistan had had on Pakistan, mentioning “the proliferation of arms and militancy in our region”, and also stated that it had led to a “drug culture” and “failed to equip our youth for employment in the modern world”. Sharif reiterated in 1997 that Pakistan “strives for peace and stability in its region”, and therefore “[sought] an early end to the conflict in Afghanistan”. This was after Pakistan had recognized the Taliban government as the ruling authority in Afghanistan, in hope to have a friendly government ruling the neighboring country that historically had been more aligned to support India.

### Liberation supporter

The Pakistani representatives in the UNGA debates always highlighted the ongoing conflicts in the world, and they all linked it back to Kashmir in one way or the other. In her 1989 speech Bhutto expressed sadness for that what she called the “tragedy of Palestine” was still ongoing, called for the “end of the racist regime” in South Africa, before praising the independence of Namibia as a sign that colonialism was ending. She went on about protecting minorities around the world, such as the Turks in Bulgaria, “whose rights must be ensured”. Bhutto’s way of touching on all the big conflicts of the time showed Pakistan as being concerned with the well-



being of those who struggled and promoting the end to these conflicts. But she then expressed a wish for the same to occur in Kashmir, portraying Kashmir as a neglected conflict. Foreign Minister Yaqub-Khan in 1990 praised the dialogue and promising solutions to conflict in Cambodia and Central America but asked why no solution was coming to the Kashmir issue.

In 1990 Yaqub-Khan also stressed that “problems must be resolved through consultation and compromise” and encouraged the UN to take a more active role in resolving regional and international problems. He claimed that India completely disregards the rights of the people, and that the unrest in Kashmir “is entirely indigenous in character”. This was of course after the insurgency in Kashmir had started, that India blamed Pakistan of sponsoring. He called the allegations that Pakistan has any involvement “baseless and unfounded”.

He then went on to condemn Israel for undermining “all initiatives aimed at a just and lasting solution” to the conflict with Palestine and the rest of the Middle East, stating that any solution “must encompass the withdrawal of Israel from all occupied Arab and Palestinian territories”. It was echoed by Sattar in 1993 that there can be no peace in the Middle East without the withdrawal of Israeli troops. It is clear that Pakistan voicing the rights of minorities went beyond that of just Muslims around the world, and it was projecting the role of liberation supporter, as well as protector of human dignity. This discourse and language used on Palestine and other conflicts was made stronger when speaking about Kashmir. Part of the motivation for speaking so extensively about all conflicts can have been a wish that someone other than Pakistan would speak up on Kashmiri self-determination.

Indeed, the 1991 speech by Kanju was largely centered on the Kashmir question, underlining its indigenous nature, but he also mentioned the situations in Palestine, Cyprus, Cambodia and South Africa. As a part of his 1992 “peace plan”, Kanju’s second objective was to “promote the fullest application of the principle of self-determination”, which he called the “bedrock of the present system of international relations between sovereign, independent states”. He projected Pakistan’s identity as a liberation supporter and continued by addressing both Palestine and Kashmir in this regard, stating that “peace and tranquility cannot return to South Asia” unless the latter dispute is resolved. Thus, Kanju also attached his speech to the role of Pakistan as a regional protector.

When Kanju welcomed the new members to the UN he stated that one of the new Member States was “being subjected to brutal aggression”. He referred of course to Bosnia and continued by stating that the country “deserves assistance in accordance with the Charter’s provisions on self-defense”, and that the UNSC should allow Bosnia to receive this assistance by lifting sanctions. This was another example of Pakistan projecting its role as protector of

human dignity and of the global commons, but also defender of the faith as Bosnia is a Muslim country. In 1993 Abdul Sattar echoed Kanju's rhetoric and stated that a "colossal tragedy" had taken place in Bosnia and Herzegovina" and that the "optimism generated by the end of the Cold War has been blighted". Sattar continued by saying that the "conscience of mankind has been outraged", and that the "UNSC succeeded [...] in denying the inherent right of a State to self-defense". The representatives called for a restructuring of the UN's Security Council a few times, but mainly focused on the UN General Assembly to take on a larger role and fulfill its mandate. Pakistan saw the mandate of the UN as important, but that the Security Council being outdated and not representative, portraying the world as still being dominated by world powers.

There were some positive events in the world at the time too, and Sattar said that the evolution in South Africa holds the "welcome promise of peace and freedom for all", and also applauded the progress made in the conflicts in Somalia, Mozambique, Liberia and Rwanda. Still, he acknowledged the "unfortunate developments" in Angola and the Armenian occupation in Azerbaijan, continuing the trend of highlighting conflicts around the world and asserting Pakistan's role as a liberation supporter.

The 1994 intervention by Bhutto's FM Sardar Ali was also stained by the conflict in former Yugoslavia. Ali stated that everyone present shared a "collective responsibility for the failure to halt and reverse Serbian aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina". He stressed that "the Bosnian Muslims must be allowed to exercise their right to self-defense", before shifting focus to the "grim and bloody struggle" that "is also going on in Jammu and Kashmir". and condemned the world for remaining silent on the issue, at the same time as maintaining Pakistan as a defender of the faith, and regional protector. Ali went on to condemn the behavior of India, stating that India had offered to resume talks with Pakistan on Kashmir, only to later display no desire for settlement of what it once again deemed to be "an integral part of India". The foreign minister then condemned the "major powers" for overlooking human rights violations "because of the lure of trade and profits with India". He also welcomed the truce in Tajikistan and stated that the UN-sponsored talks to be held in Islamabad that month held great promise, showing Pakistan a upholding the UN values. "We must build peace where it is broken", Ali stated, championing the wish for a stable international order.

Sharif had been reelected as Prime Minister in 1997, and he briefly mentioned that a "just and fair" settlement was needed on the Jammu and Kashmir dispute in accordance with the resolutions of the United Nations. He went further in 1998 when he labeled Kashmir as being an underlying cause of conflict between Pakistan and India. He said that Pakistan was prepared to "strengthen peace and stability in the region by mutually agreed measures" in order

to avoid war, and that Pakistan was waiting for dialogue with India to commence. Sharif added that Pakistan was also “engaged in a dialogue with several friendly countries” to the same end, and hoped for peace in the region, showing signs of Pakistan wanting to be a regional protector.

### Advocate for non-proliferation

Nusrat Bhutto said in 1989 that Pakistan always had “been at the forefront to promote international peace and stability” and been working towards removing “the nuclear threat that hangs over humanity”. She with this projected the Pakistani identity and role conceptualization as a defender of the stable international order. Bhutto also projected Pakistan as a regional protector, saying that Pakistan has pursued the goal of improving the security environment in its neighborhood since independence.

Every UNGA debate intervention speech echoed the words of Bhutto: that Pakistan support general and complete disarmament to remove the nuclear threat. In 1991 Kanju welcomed “[the] recent announcement by Bush on eliminating nuclear weapons” and said that Pakistan “has proposed disarmament measures to strengthen peace and stability in South Asia”. However, Kanju followed this up by stating that every country has “the sovereign right to determine its own legitimate defense needs”. This is also a sentiment that was repeated in all UNGA interventions by Pakistan. He continued by stating that it is “essential” to ensure controls on arms transfers to not have dangerous regional imbalances. In 1992 Kanju built on this, by saying that Pakistan desires good-neighborly relations with India, but to achieve this, it is “essential to have balance in the military capabilities”, which hinted at Pakistan’s ambition to have military parity towards India, despite working towards non-proliferation. One of Kanju’s objectives with his peace plan was to establish “viable structures for regional peace and security”, as envisaged in Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, projecting its wish to be a regional protector but also as an advocate for the UN values.

Kanju said that Pakistan has a unique regional position, standing “at the crossroads” of South Asia, Central Asia, China, West Asia and the Gulf – a region that was once the “subject of the great game between rival imperialist Powers”, hinting that the regional instability was because of interference from the powerful countries in Afghanistan. He continued by laying out a role for Pakistan as a “link between interlocking structures for economic and commercial cooperation” now that the Cold war was over and independent republics had emerged in Central Asia. This was a clear expression of Pakistan as a possible regional protector or regional leader. Lastly, Kanju said that the armaments race is “increasingly acquiring a regional

dimension”, but at the same time, he also said that it was “no longer utopian” to see the elimination of nuclear warheads. Sattar continued in 1993 to praise the progress towards this goal, and said that Pakistan had continued to “advocate efforts to eliminate the danger of proliferation in South Asia”. In 1994 Ali stated that the late Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto had proposed a nuclear free zone in South Asia already in 1972, though not mentioned Bhutto’s quest for a “Islamic bomb”. What is more, he claimed in 1995 that the end of the bipolar world had removed the “impediments to pursuing the goal of nuclear disarmament”, but this was apparently not the case in South Asia.

Benazir Bhutto voiced a concern in 1996 that South Asia did not have a “regional security system” and reiterated that Pakistan was working towards conventional arms control in the region. She outlined conditions: first, the negotiation of a mutually agreed ratio of forces; and secondly, measures would need to be put in place to prevent the possibility of a surprise attack, and third, the adoption of agreed principles for conventional arms control in South Asia. She invited the UN to start dialogue for peace and security in South Asia, with the involvement of the five permanent members of the Security Council, and other major powers. Having the UNSC involved in South Asia could also provide an opportunity to discuss Kashmir, but Bhutto did not address the two situations in relation to each other.

When Sharif spoke as newly instated PM in 1997, he announced that Pakistan “have demonstrated that we can master the most advanced technologies”, and that Islamabad now had the capability of “deter[ing] external aggression”. He announced that Pakistan “strives for peace and stability” in the region, but now could seek friendship and cooperation with “all our neighbors on the basis of equality” with confidence, hinting at the coercive diplomacy nuclear technology was about to bring to the relationship with India. At the same time, Sharif stated that Pakistan “strives for peace and stability” in South Asia, and that there must be an end to the “wasteful arms race” in the region. He slammed India for “repeatedly asserting that its nuclear option is ‘open’”, and that in the “absence of any assurances”, Pakistan will have to assume the worst. The assurances he talked about here would be from its allies to offer support against India. Sharif reiterated the strategic position of Pakistan: “located at the nexus of Central Asia, South Asia and the Middle East, Pakistan can contribute to and gain from the economic growth and interaction between these dynamic regions”, wanting to attract attention while Pakistan was isolated and without support from Washington.

Sharif returned in 1998, a year that “the nuclear cloud has cast its dark shadow over South Asia”. He denounced India for having rejected every initiative from Pakistan to promote a “nuclear-weapons-free zone, conventional arms restraint and a zero-missile zone in South

Asia”. Sharif also denounced ‘major Powers’ for having had a weak and ambiguous response to Indian nuclear weapons tests. “Once again, greater energy was devoted to restraining Pakistan than in responding to India”, Sharif claimed, and said that Pakistan felt threatened by India, and that it was not the one who had initiated tests, but rather that India had tried to “alter the strategic balance and threatened our security and stability”. Pakistan had waited 17 days “for the world to respond”, but “knew that no country could provide us security assistance against a nuclear India”, seemingly directed towards a lack of involvement from Washington beyond that of economic sanctions.

According to Sharif, Pakistan was left with no other choice than to “test and establish nuclear deterrence in self-defense”. He continued stressing that Pakistan had not violated any international norm, and that the sanctions and restrictions imposed on Pakistan by “some friendly countries” were unjust. He meant that Pakistan had done nothing wrong, and Sharif concluded that the nuclear tests were “designed to prevent the threat or use of force” against Pakistan, that it “served the cause of peace and stability” in the region, and that Pakistan “remain[ed] opposed” to an arms race, whether nuclear or conventional. This was Sharif stating that his country remained committed to the UN values and a stable international order, but that it was necessary for Pakistan to equip itself.

### Defender of the faith

Kanju opened the 1991 speech by praising the UNGA Presidency, which was held by Saudi Arabia. He praised his “dear brother”, and the special bond between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, tied with “common faith, shared values and common history” in the Muslim community, or Ummah. Referring to the global view on Islam, Kanju said that Muslims “espouse a faith which stands for peace and forbids wars of aggression” and continued by reciting a verse from the Quran about not initiating hostilities, and that Allah does not approve of aggression. Kanju repeated his Ummah-rhetoric in 1992, by referring to his “brothers in Somalia”.

In 1994 Sardar Ali said that the world “bear a collective responsibility for the failure to halt and reverse Serbian aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina”, and that a holocaust had taken place before the eyes of the world, with a language that tried to stress how grave the atrocities in Bosnia were. Ali continued, drawing on the religious/Islamic identity; “Pakistan and other Islamic countries are appalled at the UNSC’s recent decision to ease the sanctions against Belgrade” and that all Islamic countries supported the immediate lifting of the arms

embargo against Bosnia and Herzegovina. Pakistan was thus projected as a defender of the faith, and as standing up for the Muslim community.

Benazir Bhutto expressed in 1996, “on behalf of one billion peace loving Muslims”, deep concern over the “propaganda from certain quarters” that terrorism is something particular to the followers of Islam. With this, she also employed the role as a defender of the faith. While urging to acknowledge that “we are witnessing the rise of extremist fringe groups” in the post-Cold-war period, she firmly stated that there is no place in Islam for acts of terrorism. Ali in 1995 stated, “if one step is taken towards peace, the world of Islam is prepared to take two steps more”.

In 1998 Prime Minister Sharif suggested that the concept of Ummah offers a model for “a new concept of a global community”, in face of recession in the world economy, echoing attempts made by Pakistan in the past to create Muslim unity on the international stage. He continued by praising President Clinton’s “vision for affirming American’s deep respect for Islam”, stating that “we must work together to create greater understanding and harmony”, and wanting to ensure a universal, positive perception of Islam. Unfortunately, as history would go on, the view of Islam in America and the West would only worsen.

### Main findings first period

One of the more unexpected and interesting findings in the first period was that Pakistani interventions always start by welcoming the new member states to the General Assembly. This was taken to a new level in 1993 as Abdul Sattar welcomed the sovereignty of 130 nations from the “dark era of colonialism and alien domination” since the establishment of the United Nations, using a language of Pakistan as a liberation supporter for all countries. This trend not only shows that Pakistan defines itself as a liberation supporter, but also that it is driven by its own identity as a relatively new country fighting to be recognized on the world stage. Projecting this identity abroad is one of the seven expectations of foreign policy, and Pakistan did this in each General Debate intervention, and thus tried to have this role accepted by other actors. It was also clear that Pakistan took on the role as an advocate for the developing world, but this was not mentioned as frequently as the language of being a liberation supporter. However, some of the speeches talked about the unjust distribution of wealth in the world, and that poorer countries were being exploited from old, colonial heritage, structures.

As a champion for democratic rule Pakistan tried to foster a stable international order by creating a community of democratic states, much like it had tried in the past to create for

Muslim countries. This attempt to make Pakistan a central actor on the world stage among democratic states was not very successful, and Pakistan's new identity and role was not recognized. This was also a strategy to end the isolation of Pakistan on the world stage, and an attempt to make it a significant actor again. When Bhutto called the East-West rivalry a "relic of the past" it was in an attempt to embrace a new, stable world order. Most of the interventions also highlighted Pakistan's firm commitment to the UN Charter, showing it as a protector of the global commons.

Another role that was very clear was that of Pakistan establishing itself as a regional protector in the Afghanistan situation, and this was another strategy to become a significant actor again. Though it was repeated time and time again that Pakistan would not interfere in Afghanistan, Pakistan expressed many wishes for stability and prosperity for its neighbor. It was not highlighted that Pakistan recognized the Taliban government, but it explicitly wished to see the establishment of a stable government. The choice of words when talking about Afghanistan and the Afghan people, such as the "longing for freedom and democracy" was in line with the liberation supporter role, but the motivation for this was also Pakistan's own territorial integrity and social peace, as the first expectation of foreign policy. Kanju spoke of Pakistan as standing on the crossroads of South Asia, Central Asia, West Asia and the Gulf, voicing an ambition of regional leadership.

Where territorial integrity and social peace was the case in the Afghanistan question, Kashmir is a culmination of roles. Regional protector, defender of the faith, and liberation supporter all fit Pakistan's stance on Kashmir, in addition to its claims to the sovereignty of Kashmir. By tying all conflicts in the world to Kashmir, Pakistan tried to get international attention and action on Kashmir and the Kashmir question. Pakistan portrayed itself as a defender of the faith by mentioning Palestine and conflicts in Muslim countries with special attention, and also addressed the Saudi chairman of the GA as 'brother'. This, coupled with the historic quests for unity in the Muslim world, is evidence Pakistan tried to establish itself as a leader in the Islamic world. Yet, this role was often combined with that of liberation supporter, and Islam was not mentioned so much as a stand-alone topic in this period. The exception came late in the period, when Bhutto addressed issues of increased prejudice against Islam, and denouncing those connecting Islam with terrorism. Sharif suggested a new global community modelled on the Islamic Ummah, trying to bring the importance of Islam to the world stage.

A final role worth examining is Pakistan as an advocate for non-proliferation, which it clung hard to during the period. Pakistan claimed to lead the work internationally as an opponent of nuclear proliferation and tried to take initiative to have a regional security system

in South Asia repeatedly. All the interventions highlighted Pakistani efforts towards conventional arms control as well as nuclear. However, Pakistan confirmed its possession of nuclear weapons in 1998, and Sharif announced that a “nuclear cloud” had appeared over South Asia. Pakistan became a nuclear power because of insecurities vis-à-vis India, and Sharif reiterated this, stating that Pakistan had needed to achieve nuclear deterrence against India to foster a stable international order. Pakistan also saw the ability to self-defend as ensuring regional protection, since Pakistan wanted peace and stability on an equal basis with India. The official Pakistani line was that no international norm had been violated, and that Pakistan remained opposed to any arms race. Using this approach to talk about its nuclear capacity enabled Pakistan to uphold its identity and role as a staunch opponent to nuclear weapons. In the end, Pakistan was still protecting the global commons in its own eyes, while at the same time maintaining its security.

Pakistan’s General Assembly interventions in this period were defined by the Americans losing interest in the region, and of Pakistan. The topics covered in the speeches were broad, and much about the success of democracy in Pakistan, as well as around the world. But conflicts taking place around the world was also a dominating topic in the speeches, and Pakistan portrayed itself as a champion of those who are suffering, both Muslims and non-Muslims. The nuclear dilemma also defined this first period of the case study. It was evident that Pakistan was against nuclear arms worldwide, but still they ended up possessing it themselves in this period. One can wonder if the firm position against arms of all types presented a strategy for Pakistan to establish itself as against proliferation only to make it more accepted that it eventually got nuclear weapons, because then the world would understand that it only did so out of absolute necessity.

In sum, the world view defining this period was that Pakistan needed to re-establish itself as a democratic state in a ‘new world order’, but towards the end of the period the world seemed like a more chaotic place, and Pakistan was further out in the cold because it acquired nuclear arms.



## Pakistan 1999-2009

### A significant actor once again

General Pervez Musharraf seized power through a coup in October 1999, which saw the beginning of the fourth military regime in Pakistan. The Indian government initially refused to interact with his government, and the United States' President Clinton was displeased by the return to dictatorship in Pakistan (Rizvi, 2004). Later Clinton's successor George W. Bush indicated that the US would "objectively review bilateral relations" with Musharraf's government (Kazimi, 2012, p.295).

Bush's ambivalence towards Pakistan ended with the 9/11 attacks on the US by the al-Qaeda in 2001 (Haqqani, 2013). However, Pakistan found itself in a vulnerable position as Bush declared that every nation had a decision to make, to either be on the side of the US, or siding with terrorists in the days following the terror attack (Ahmed, 2010). Bush had also said that any nation that continues to host terrorists would be regarded as a terrorist regime (Ibid), a category Pakistan risked being placed under. Pakistan was told directly that they had to "either stand with the US in its fight against terrorism or stand against us. There was no maneuvering room" (Haqqani, 2013, p.310). Pakistani officials assured Washington that they had Pakistan's unqualified support (Ibid). Islamabad was with that involved in the 'Global War on Terror', and let the US use its airspace, military bases in Sindh and Baluchistan, and offered logistical support for the operations in Afghanistan. In return, Washington hinted that sanctions could be lifted, and Pakistan felt more secure vis-à-vis India with American troops in its territory.

At the same time, the UN General Assembly condemned the terrorist attacks and called upon its members to help in the global effort against terrorism, as well as not to allow the presence of terrorists in their territories. Influenced by UNGA resolutions, Pakistan had little choice but to turn its back on the Taliban regime in Afghanistan (Rizvi, 2004). Pakistan and the region was with this again the arena for big politics, and Musharraf's Pakistan was out of isolation as it once again was regarded a significant actor. This was in contrast to the previous period, where Pakistan was left behind to clean up the mess after the previous war in Afghanistan and Washington instead cultivated relations with India.

Reciprocating the access granted by Pakistan, the US lifted three categories of economic sanctions earlier imposed on Pakistan, and also sought better bilateral relations on trade and investment, socio-economic development and military modernization and supply of military equipment (Rizvi, 2004). Thus, in the post-9/11 war in Afghanistan, Pakistan got even more arms and money from the United States than it had in earlier times (Jaffrelot, 2016), and was

in a stronger position against a possible conflict with India. Still, Pakistan was continuously labeled as “a principal recruiting ground and logistical center for global terrorists” (Haqqani, 2013, p.313), particularly after terrorist attacks in Madrid and London that traced back to Pakistani-trained jihadists (Ibid).

Back in 1999 the relationship between India and Pakistan had taken a distinct turn for worse with the Kargil crisis, where Pakistani ‘irregulars’ occupied Kargil (Kazimi, 2012). Kargil was a territory India had seized from Pakistan in 1965, and Pakistan was forced to withdraw under international military pressure led by the US. Tensions were extra high because of the newly demonstrated nuclear capabilities of the two countries. Conventional war with India was averted at least five times between the mid-1980s and 2010, due to both obtaining nuclear capabilities according to Khan (2011). In fact, Khan (2011) further notes that had it not been for nuclear weapons, Pakistan’s response to “multiple security challenges” would have been “significantly more complicated”, and that especially in the War on Terror (Khan, 2011, p.268). Shortly after Pakistan declared itself a nuclear weapons state in 1998 the architect behind Islamabad’s nuclear capabilities A. Q. Khan came under fire for having transferred nuclear materials, technology and know-how to Libya, Iran and North Korea (Khan, 2011, p.270). This led to an international political crisis for Pakistan, but Musharraf’s newfound alliance with the West “allowed him to ride out the storm over the AQ Khan affair” (Kazimi, 2012, p.245).

The relationship with India did not improve much in the second period, and an attack by Kashmiri militants on the Indian Parliament at the end of 2001 resulted in the threat of war between India and Pakistan, only diffused by US diplomacy. The two countries were in dialogue between 2004 to 2008, but after an Indian ministerial report in 2007 claimed that Pakistan was willingly sponsoring terrorism, relations deteriorated once more (Sridharan, 2011). What is more, President Bush pointed to Pakistan’s ‘obsession with India’ as part of the problem in the relations between Washington and Islamabad. Haqqani (2013) quotes the former US President saying, “in almost every conversation we had, Musharraf accused India of wrongdoing” (p.313). Bush had spent much time and money to secure Pakistani cooperation against al-Qaeda and the Taliban yet found that the Pakistani army was “[spending] most of its resources preparing for war with India” (Ibid, p.313-14), which was in line with Pakistan’s national interest, but not in that of Washington.

In 2007 Musharraf had ruled Pakistan for eight years, and he was facing growing pressure domestically because of the close alliance with the West in the war in neighboring Afghanistan. American diplomats reached out to exiled Bhutto and Sharif (Haqqani, 2013),

and Bhutto asked for American support to go back to Pakistan to contest in elections. She returned on October 18, but her welcome was bittersweet as a suicide bomber detonated and killed 136 people, with hundreds more injured. Sharif broke his ten-year exile deal that had put in place by Musharraf, and also returned to Pakistan. Tragically, Benazir Bhutto was assassinated in a second suicide attack on December 27, 2007. Her political party Pakistan's Peoples Party, now led by her widower Asif Zardari, won the most seats in the following February 2008 election. Musharraf resigned as President in early September 2008, and Zardari took over the Presidency. Democracy had come once again to Pakistan.

### Fostering a stable international order

Pakistani Minister of Foreign Affairs Sartaj Aziz started his 1999 intervention by welcoming the new Member States, continuing the Pakistani role conception as a liberation supporter. Aziz stated that “peace remains the foremost challenge of our times” and repeated the earlier line that the hopes brought about by the end of the Cold war was shattered by conflicts around the world. The conflicts in Africa, the Balkans and the Caucasus, as well as Palestine, Kashmir and Afghanistan, “are painful reminders of the ascendance of war and the absence of peace”, Aziz also said in 1999. Aziz called for preventing war and achieving peace the year after as well, saying that the “solution is not difficult to find”, before continuing, “what is needed is a stronger commitment to action”, calling on the United Nations so hold states accountable under international law and the principles of the UN Charter.

Aziz also praised the endurance of democracy in Pakistan, saying that democracy is “empowerment of the people, based on strong institutions”. This voiced the previous initiative of Pakistan to create a community of democratic states, but was weakened when Pakistan went through a military coup months later. His speech was delivered just a month before Musharraf would depose Sharif in a coup, and Pakistan would leave its commitments to democracy behind, and its role conception as a democratic state with it.

Musharraf held his first UNGA speech in 2001, in a General Debate that was held in the shadow of the 9/11 terror attacks. In his words, the UNGA gathered “against the somber backdrop of the terrorist outrage that the world witnessed in shock and horror on that fateful day of 11 September”. The President continued by saying that the map of the world had changed, and the entire globe descended into a deep crisis. He delivered a strong message on behalf of Pakistan, one of “determination and resolve as well as a message of peace for all peoples.” He highlighted the Pakistani position as a regional protector and apparent wish to

play a stabilizing actor in Afghanistan, with its commitment to the war on terror. The Preisent continued; “we all must [...] unite to fight this scourge. Pakistan has followed words with actions”.

Changing topic, Musharraf spoke about the “harsh realities” in developing countries, showing that Pakistan was once again exploring playing a role as a leader of the developing countries, or as a bridge between them and the developed countries. Musharraf would be repeating this throughout his time speaking in front of the General Assembly, as he stated that he wanted to advance prosperity for developing countries, and change the unequal distribution of wealth in the world. Musharraf summarized his new Pakistan’s concern and world views nicely in 2003:

*“when the Berlin Wall collapsed hopes revived for a new age of cooperation and peace, free from ideological confrontations. Sadly, those hopes were dashed — by ethnic cleansing in Bosnia, and then in Kosovo; by the failure to end the occupation of Palestine, leading to the revived intifada against Israeli occupation; by the brutal suppression of the Kashmiri’s demand for self-determination and freedom from Indian occupation; by the unending war in Afghanistan and the international neglect which created a climate in which extremism and terrorism could breed; and by the series of international financial crises and the rise of poverty as a consequence of unequal economic globalization”.*

Interestingly, he only mentioned conflicts involving Muslims, but this is a topic I will come back to later in the analysis. In 2004 his tone was more confrontational, stating that a “profound transformation is under way in international relations”. In the place of the old “dangerous” balances of the Cold war, was now instead an equally dangerous and complex reality. Kasuri spoke in 2005 about the major threat terrorism posed for Pakistan, in an attempt to distance Pakistan from allegations that it was harboring terrorist. He then went on to praise Pakistan’s UN peacekeeping missions in Sierra Leone, Liberia, DRC and Burundi. The image projected of Pakistan was thus that of a state which upholds the UN values through extended participation in peacekeeping, and that the allegations of harboring terrorists was unjust.

Kasuri went on to say that Pakistan was “heartened” by the prospects of peace in Sudan, and he called for international attention and support for the situation in Somalia. “Pakistan will continue to contribute to the UN and international efforts for the restoration of peace and stability in Africa”, he said, before extending the same commitment to the Middle East, saying Pakistan would do “whatever it can” to help promote sustainable peace in the region. He said

that this again would diminish the threat of terrorism and extremism to the world and was showing Pakistan as a regional leader.

Musharraf returned to the GA session in 2006 to address the Assembly with the “deepest gratitude for the relief and financial assistance” that Pakistan received from “around the world” following devastating earthquakes in Pakistan’s northern regions in October 2005. Musharraf spoke about multilateral cooperation being key to “addressing the existing and emerging challenges of the twenty-first century”, which included terrorism, economic disparities, political disputes, and poverty. In his words, Pakistan had transformed into a “dynamic nation”, moving towards Jinnah’s vision of “a modern, progressive, Islamic and democratic republic”, reflecting that Musharraf considered himself a modern and legitimate leader. Kasuri had also been on the same topic the previous year, stating that Pakistan was “on the path” to lasting democracy, trying to gain legitimacy in the eyes of the Western countries.

The world was “marked by intensifying globalization of economies, production, trade and information, on one side; and by terrorist violence, poverty and disease, on the other” according to Musharraf back in 2004. He referred to a divide existing between the rich and poor countries, which he related back to the heritage of colonialism in the world. He was calling on the rich countries to take more responsibility to change the world order and wanted to establish a role for Pakistan as a defender for developing countries. Towards the end of his 2006 intervention Musharraf further discussed the problems he saw in the international economic situation, stating that “most developing countries find that international trade and financial structures are weighted against them”, which is a sentiment he repeated many times in the second period. Musharraf also took the initiative for UN reform, stating that it must be more representative of the changed realities on the world stage, with reference to the big increase of sovereign states since the UN’s creation and the lack of representation of the developing countries in the UNSC.

In 2007 it was Musharraf’s Foreign Secretary, Riaz Mohammad Khan, who held the intervention. He discussed that it was not the “clash of values or civilizations” that was the root of terrorism, violence and a “widening divisions among cultures and societies”. Instead, he argued, it is the “failure of the international community to address festering disputes and our collective inability to universalize the opportunities and benefits offered by the phenomenal advances of technology and globalization for the betterment of all peoples”. Again, Pakistan used its role conception as a liberation supporter and protector of the global commons to discuss the state of the world.

When Asif Zardari took to the podium in the General Assembly in 2008 it was just a month since he had become the 11<sup>th</sup> President of Pakistan. He was recently widowed after Benazir Bhutto's assassination, and called for an UN investigation into the assassination of his late wife. Zardari outlined two "great battles before mankind": first, the battle for democracy and liberty against dictators and the fight for universal human rights; and second, the battle against extremism and terrorism. Both of these had been significant for Pakistan in the 00s, as it had been under a dictatorship, and struggled with terrorism. Calling these two features the "great battle before mankind", Zardari tried to distance Pakistan from these identities. Zardari asked the leaders of the world whether or not they would "stand with us, just as we stand for the entire civilized world on the frontlines of this epic struggle of the new millennium", trying to establish Pakistan as a country standing by the global commons, even in difficult times.

When he returned the following year, he stated that having achieved democracy in Pakistan was of "great importance not only to our country, but also to our region and the world", showing the importance Pakistani leaders give itself in the international system. Zardari continued, saying that Pakistan's democracy already had "begun to deliver", and urged the rest of the world's democracies "to do more for the peace and development of the people affected by militancy and terror". In Zardari's words, "all nations seek security", and this is closely linked to peace. Thus, he continued, "equal security for all is important", stressing that security is vital in Pakistan's national interest.

### Regional protector

An important topic in the second time period was of course Afghanistan and the American-led 'War on Terror'. But pre-2001, Aziz spoke of the Afghan refugees in Pakistan, how vital peace in Afghanistan is for Pakistan, and how Pakistan had "persisted in promoting peace and reconciliation in Afghanistan". Additionally, Aziz talked about Pakistan as a target of terrorism from Afghanistan, but also Indian state terrorism in Kashmir, underlining the victimhood of the Kashmiris.

In 2001, Musharraf stated that Pakistan took a "deliberate, principled decision to join the world coalition in its fight against terrorism". He continued, stating that making this decision catapulted Pakistan, "once again", to the position of being "a front-line State in the battle against terrorism". He underlined that the Pakistani people accepted this, but that they still suffer from "a sense of betrayal and abandonment" from what happened in 1989 when they were abandoned by their allies and "left in the lurch" after the Soviet withdrawal from

Afghanistan. Musharraf did not hold back when stating how abandoned Pakistan felt, reiterating the suffering and sense of Pakistan standing alone.

Last time Pakistan was a front-line State, Musharraf explained, what they got in return was “3 million refugees, a shattered economy, drugs and a Kalashnikov culture, to be dealt with single-handedly and through our own limited resources”. Maintaining territorial integrity is one of the expectations of what foreign policy is supposed to do, and Musharraf stressed that he expected Pakistan’s “legitimate [security] concerns will be addressed”. Zardari would later echo the same sentiment, saying that violating our nation’s sovereignty is not helpful in eliminating the terrorist menace. Indeed, such actions could have the opposite effect”. Here Zardari came with a warning to his allies in the War on Terror that Pakistanis was uneasy about the conflict spilling over into Pakistan.

Zardari continued on this topic, saying that “just as we will not let Pakistan’s territory be used by terrorists for attacks against our people and our neighbors, so we cannot allow our territory and our sovereignty to be violated by our friends. Attacks within Pakistan that violate our sovereignty actually serve to empower the forces against which we fight together”. It was in Pakistan’s national interest to be part of the War on Terror as it helped strengthen its relative security towards India, but American drone attacks inside Pakistan was bad for Pakistan’s security, sovereignty, and the legitimacy of the government in Islamabad.

Musharraf’s 2001 speech presents extended evidence that Pakistan wished to underline the importance of its position and contribution, and how significant it was for Washington and the West. He explained that Pakistan had tried to prevent military action in the neighboring country by working with the Afghan government, “up to the last moment”, but with no success. In 2002 he continued in the same vein, saying Pakistan had “made major sacrifices in this war”, as the country was at the “forefront of the fight against terrorism”. The following year Musharraf talked about the global repercussion from the 9/11 attacks, saying that they “transformed security policies and changed geopolitical calculations”. He continued outlining Pakistan’s position – which was based on “our principles of humanity and national interest to support the war on terrorism”. This position was part of Pakistan’s national interest, and also part of Pakistan trying to assert itself as a regional protector and leader.

In 2001 Musharraf said that Pakistan “need financial and commercial support” urgently, and much of this support was given to the military. He also said, in 2003, that Pakistan will “do all it can to prevent terrorists from using our territory to disrupt Afghanistan”. In 2005 it was Foreign Minister Kasuri who held the intervention, and when speaking about Afghanistan he started by saying that it is the wish of Pakistan to “see the three million refugees whom we still

host return to their homes in safety and honor”. Bringing in honor is significant, as a sense of honor can be seen as part of the Pakistani identity, and this is projected to its relations with other states.

Kasuri also said that there should be no “self-serving questions or quibbling” about his country’s “commitment and contribution to peace and security in Afghanistan”. Musharraf, back on the podium in 2006, stated once again that peace and stability in Afghanistan is Pakistan’s “vital interest”, as it would “assure tranquility on our Western frontiers”. In Foreign Secretary Khan’s 2007 speech he reiterated this sentiment, saying that “no country stands to gain as much as Pakistan from peace and stability in Afghanistan”, and that he rejected “irresponsible comments and insinuations” that were “casting aspersions on our intentions and efforts”. These, Khan said, were coming from “certain sections of the international media”, and it was referring again to international allegations that Pakistan was harboring terrorists.

When Zardari held his intervention in 2008 he continued along some of the same lines, saying that “Pakistan is the great victim in the war on terror”, and that Pakistan was “left with three million refugees within our borders”. Zardari also said that Afghanistan and Pakistan were reaping “the bitter harvest sown towards the of the cold war”, and increasingly too was the entire world, after the world had “turned its back on Afghanistan”. In fact, “the world left South and Central Asia”. But Zardari insisted that Pakistan does not look back at history”. He went on extensively about how Pakistan is the victim of terrorism, and how they “have largely fought this battle alone”, after sharing airbases, airspace, intelligence and armed forces.

In 2008 Zardari stated that Pakistan “intends to be a model” in both the region and for the religion, blatantly expressing the role conception of a defender of the faith, as well as regional leader. The following year he addressed the Afghanistan issue solely by stating that Pakistan “calls upon the world to help the safe return of the three million refugees to their homes”, expressing that Pakistani resources were nearing exhaustion, but still protecting those who needed it.

### Defender of the faith

A trend during the second period was that Islam was more frequently spoken about, and the role as defender of the faith was more employed. Musharraf underlined in 2001 that terrorism “is not a Christian, Buddhist, Jewish or Muslim belief”, and instead, he wanted to draw attention to what causes extremism and extremist acts. Musharraf argued that it is unresolved political disputes that causes terrorism, and he mentioned “disputes in Bosnia, Kosovo, Palestine, Kashmir and other places”. Musharraf continued; “unfortunately, all these disputes



involve Muslims and, what is sadder, Muslims happen to be the victims in all of them. This fact tends to give a religious tinge to these otherwise political disputes. The lack of progress in resolving them has created in Muslims a sense of deprivation, hopelessness and powerlessness". Speaking the case of Muslims suffering through violent conflicts, he both took on the role as defender of the faith, and also showed Pakistan as protecting the global commons and the rights of peoples.

Musharraf accused "some quarters" of trying to utilize the War on Terror "as a vehicle to spread hatred against Islam and Muslims" in 2002, again standing up as a defender of the faith and Muslims. Also acting as a bridge between the Muslim world and the West, Musharraf called for a "sustained dialogue between the Islamic and Western nations" as being essential for overcoming the "veil of ignorance and prejudice and to promote harmony and cooperation". He called for religious and cultural diversity to be a "vehicle for complementary creativity and dynamism", and in 2003 he condemned the "clash of civilization" thesis, calling it a "travesty". In 2003 Musharraf suggested a strategy to build "harmony, promote moderation, oppose extremism and ensure justice" in the Muslim nations, and called on the international community to assist in achieving this.

The President said that the international community, and especially the "advanced countries of the West", must contribute its part in resolving political disputes and situations in which Muslim peoples are being suppressed, such as in Palestine and Kashmir; by rejecting attempts to equate terrorism with Islam; and by assisting the Muslim world in poverty alleviation and in socio-economic development". This message of tackling the "root causes" of terrorism was repeated in 2006, as he called the Middle East the "cauldron of conflict" in the world. This position was also championing the rights of the Islamic world, showing Pakistan as a defender of the faith and the Ummah. It was also in line with Musharraf calling out the unjust distribution of wealth in the world, and that poverty was a result of the rich countries not taking the responsibility of helping developing countries.

In his 2005 speech FM Kasuri highlighted President Musharraf's plan of "enlightened moderation", which was aimed at "simultaneously promote internal reform in the Islamic world and the active support of the international community to help resolve political disputes and address the socio-economic and development challenges" faced in the Islamic world. Khan in 2007 also talked about the role Pakistan can play in building "understanding, harmony", and "bridges among all cultures and peoples through initiatives". This all shows Pakistan as taking on the defender of the faith role on the international stage, linking back to its historic efforts of trying to unite the Muslim world.

Musharraf said in 2006 that he wanted to avoid a clash of civilizations. His envisioned a role for Pakistan to prevent that an “iron curtain descends between the West and the Islamic world”, and he also gave the message that Pakistan’s cooperation with the West in Afghanistan had “pre-empted several terrorist plots”, stressing the importance of the contribution, and denouncing any allegations that Pakistan harbors terrorists. He also saw Pakistan as playing a “constructive role in promoting peace and prosperity in South Asia, Central Asia and the Gulf region”.

In 2007 Foreign Secretary Khan also spoke of the increasing divide between the West and the Islamic world, expressing concern that Islamophobia was on the rise in the Western world. In this reality Pakistan wanted to promote “understanding, harmony and the building of bridges” between cultures and peoples, thus calling on Pakistan to fulfill the role of a bridge. When Zardari held his first speech in 2007 he envisioned a new era of peace and cooperation between East and West, and among people of all faiths. This would “enable us to avoid the clash of civilizations and the clash of religions, which is the terrorists’ ultimate goal.” Zardari’s speech was thus a renewed attempt for Pakistan to be a bridge between the West and the Islamic and developing world.

### Nuclear weapons-possessing advocate for non-proliferation

Speaking of the Kargil crisis, Aziz in 1999 said that Pakistan had “acted with restraint”, and that a war “between two nuclear-armed neighbors” must be avoided. This is the first evidence of the role nuclearization played in the conflict between Pakistan and India. The nuclear issue was now a reality, but Pakistan continued highlighting its official line of restraint. Pakistan was still feeling threatened by India, but this was now more directed towards acceptance on the international stage in light of the nuclearization. “Even the Indian offer of non-first use of nuclear weapons is designed to gain it acceptance as a nuclear-weapon state and to justify the acquisition of a massive nuclear arsenal as a second-strike capability”, Aziz stated, voicing the concern that Pakistan would be given sanctions while India would be accepted as a nuclear power. This would also have implications for the regional security, Aziz said, as “India’s pursuit of this doctrine will destabilize South Asia” because Pakistan would be compelled to enhance its nuclear and missile capabilities and operational readiness “to preserve deterrence”. He asked that countries “which intend to supply” India with conventional weapons to “reconsider their policies”, voicing concern for proliferation in the region.

In 2000 Aziz reiterated that it was not Pakistan who tested nuclear capabilities first in 1998, and that “restraint and responsibility remains the guiding principle” of Pakistan’s nuclear policy. The line was similarly presented by Musharraf in 2001, when he reached out a hand to India to discuss how to create a stable South Asian security mechanism in line with UN principles, also after stating that India tested nuclear first. Musharraf said in 2001 that “we want to live in the region with honor and dignity”, and this sense of honor and a stable regional order was expressed as important to Islamabad.

With regards to the Kashmir question, Aziz referred to the “Kashmiri freedom fighters” in 1999 and stated in 2000 that “Kashmir is not free”. It was given less attention in 2001 but was still included when Musharraf talked about conflicts fueling international terrorism and injustice for Muslims. In 2002 he accused India for “misusing the rationale of war against terrorism” to delegitimize the Kashmiri freedom struggle, as well as to “tarnish Pakistan with the brush of terrorism and draw a wedge between Pakistan and its coalition partners”, expression a concern that Pakistan could again be left by its ally in Washington and regarded as insignificant, which would increase its insecurity towards India.

Kashmir was again given extensive attention in 2002 by Musharraf went on about India’s “provocations and threats”. These had not worked, as “Pakistan cannot be coerced or frightened into compromising” their position on Kashmir. Pointing out the fragility of peace in South Asia, Musharraf blamed India for holding peace “hostage to one accident, one act of terrorism, one strategic miscalculation by India”. Musharraf invited India to dialogue in 2002 and 2003, and said in 2004 that it is only “through a sincere dialogue” Pakistan and India “can resolve all their differences”. He stated that historical evidence had shown that there was no military solution to the problems between India and Pakistan.

Playing on the foreign policy expectation of advancing prosperity, Musharraf stated that neither country “can achieve its ambition for social and economic progress in the absence of peace. We must achieve peace for the sake of the impoverished people of South Asia for their development and prosperity”. Foreign Minister Kasuri was speaking in a more positive tone in 2005, when he could announce to the General Assembly that relations with India were improving, as bilateral talks had started in 2004. Kasuri said he was hopeful that this could improve the situation for Jammu and Kashmir. Khan reiterated in 2007 that there were promising steps being taken in a peace process with India, as they were pursuing a solution on Jammu and Kashmir.

When Musharraf spoke in 2006, he outlined Pakistan’s strategic aim of utilizing Pakistan’s “unique geostrategic position” to build corridors for trade, energy and

communication linking South Asia, West Asia, Central Asia and China. This shows that Musharraf saw the role for Pakistan as a regional leader and trying to advance prosperity through foreign policy. His wish was that this regional integration, coupled with a peace process with India aimed at building confidence and resolving issues, would bring a stable security environment in the region. He also said Pakistan would do “whatever is necessary to preserve the credibility of our minimum defensive deterrence level”, showing that while committed to a more stable region, he was still aware of the possible re-escalation of conflict with India.

In 2006 he also put more weight on Pakistan’s wish to use nuclear technology for power generation, which Pakistan had a “legitimate requirement for”, to meet a rising energy consumption. As a “responsible nuclear state” he announced that his government would continue to seek this technology and that it would not accept “discrimination in the nuclear field”. This was reiterated in 2007 by Khan, when he expressed a wish for developing civil nuclear power generation under international safeguards”.

A nuclear deal between the United States and India was not well received in 2007, as Khan said this gave Pakistan “concerns over strategic stability”. He continued by stating that Pakistan will maintain their concerns, and that “despite our firm opposition to an arms race in South Asia” it might be necessary to build up their nuclear arsenal. Once again, the line that Pakistan’s nuclear and strategic assets “are solely for defensive purpose” was repeated, but Khan also reasoned that it was only after 1974 that this was needed – after the first Indian nuclear tests. He complained that the initiatives to keep South Asia free of nuclear weapons, as seen in the first period, received “scant response internationally”. He also reaffirmed that the response to the Indian tests in 1998 were only to establish deterrence, again claiming that Pakistan remained committed to the global commons and UN values despite having nuclear weapons.

Finally, Zardari in 2009 stated that “our neighborhood has witnessed decades of conflict”, through which Pakistan has suffered. He wished to emphasize regional efforts made for peace and stability and appreciated the “support and understanding” from the international community. He thus framed the standing of Pakistan on the international stage as an important country that many were willing to come to aid.

## Main findings second period

It was a challenge for Musharraf to have his government recognized after taking Pakistan away from democratic rule in 1999. But when the War on Terror was declared by Washington, Pakistan was an essential ally to have in its war in neighboring Afghanistan and was again regarded as a significant actor. Indeed, most of the speeches in the second period were mirrored by the War on Terror in neighboring Afghanistan. Pakistan joining the war on the side of the West helped it protect its strategic interest of territorial security, protection of its nuclear and missile programs, and gave it an economic boost.

The clearest role in the second period was Pakistan working to establish itself as a bridge between the West and the Islamic world. Musharraf in particular spoke extensively about Islam, and how it is the conflicts involving Muslims that fuel Islamic terrorism. Musharraf expressed a wish to ‘promote harmony, moderation, and ensure justice’ for the Muslim world, and called on the international community to assist in this effort. In doing this he employed both the role as bridge, but also as defender of the faith, liberation supporter, and a protector of human rights. He reiterated the injustice Muslims suffer every day, and with this framed a struggle for Muslims across the world for freedom, and within that a role for Pakistan as standing up for their rights.

A clear trend in the second period was thus that Islam was more talked about as the role of ‘defender of the faith’ was more employed. Not only did Musharraf talk highly about Islam, but he also called on the West to recognize Islam as a religion of peace. Musharraf saw Pakistan as a key player in promoting peace and prosperity in the Islamic world, as well as in its region. When Musharraf stated that he wanted to use Pakistan’s unique geostrategic position to promote and advance prosperity, and to build regional stability he expressed the role conception of being a regional leader. Thus, the role of regional protector was also stressed in the second time period, more than in the previous period, since the region now was a stage of conflict. Additionally, Musharraf said Pakistan would work to prevent a new ‘iron curtain’ from descending between the West and the Islamic world, which was a clear reference to the recent bloc politics during the Cold War.

Most of the speeches in the second period also repeated that the end of the Cold War had brought about hopes of peace and stability in the world. However, it was reiterated more that these hopes were quickly shattered, and calls were directed to the UN to live up to its potential in fostering a stable international order. Pakistan thus see the importance of the UN, especially to bring an end to conflict. Its worldview can thus be said to view the UN as the only

agent that can hold states accountable and protect the rights of peoples, but that it is not able to live up to its potential.

To this end Aziz, Musharraf, Kasuri and Khan said that the UNSC should be transformed into a more inclusive body, to make all states feel represented. Aziz also called on the UN to hold states accountable under international law and the principles of the UN Charter, and with this he took a firm stance to show that Pakistan wanted to stand by the UN principles. The Pakistani contribution to the UN peacekeeping missions were also highlighted, which shows that Pakistan deployed the role as a defender of the stable international order, champion of the UN Charter, and protector of human rights and dignity.

That Pakistan was an opponent of nuclear proliferation was also reiterated in the second time period, even as Pakistan then had tested its nuclear capabilities already. When Aziz reiterated in 2000 that it was not Pakistan who tested its arsenal first, he tried to build understanding internationally for Pakistan's position of self-defense and restraint. Pakistan held the position that it had tried to keep South Asia nuclear free, and only developed nuclear capabilities for creating stability and strategic parity with India. Pakistan also refused the role as a de-stabilizing actor in Kashmir, as it claimed to only maintain its territorial integrity against aggression from India.

The most challenging event for Pakistan in the second time period was the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. It had to decide whether to join the United States, or not join and remain isolated on the world stage. Joining Washington's war in Afghanistan freed Pakistan from the sanctions imposed after it became a nuclear state, strengthened its legitimacy internationally, and made it into a significant actor again. Still, a challenge for Pakistan was that it kept being accused of harboring terrorists, and with increased Islamic terrorism in the Middle East and Europe in the time period this accusation was pressing and damaging for its international standing.

## Conclusion

The aim of this thesis has been to answer the research question “what are the drivers of change in Pakistani foreign policy?”, and the data set chosen to answer the research question is the yearly speeches given by the Pakistani representative in the UNGA debates. The thesis started with a discussion on the different theoretical perspectives of foreign policy in International Relations, before I outlined my own theory. My theoretical approach has been grounded in elements of both Realism and Constructivism, with special focus on chosen analytical concepts such as national role conception, but with the state as the main agent. I then outlined and discussed the methodology chosen to answer my research question, where the case study approach and data set was presented. As argued, the UNGA is an arena for world leaders to outline their foreign policy objectives on the world stage in front of their peers. The following three chapters then covered the case study, starting with a historical account of Pakistani foreign policy, before the empirical research where I analyzed the data set in the two periods. Analyzing the two time periods have shown some consistent trends over time, and some differences in the way Pakistan is framing its foreign policy, which will be discussed in the next sub-chapter, followed by answering the research question by identifying the drivers of change, before the thesis ends with a review of how this corresponds to the theory.

## Comparisons across time

In the first time period Pakistan was trying to re-establish itself as a significant actor internationally without any major power backing it, as the world’s attention was drifting away from the region. This meant that Pakistan needed diversifying its foreign policy and it reinforced its different roles, from liberation supporter to regional protector. Pakistan tried to project itself as a champion for democratic rule after only just transitioning into democracy itself. This new role can be seen as a way of trying to get new allies, especially as the United States pursued stronger ties with India. It can also be seen as Islamabad reaching out to a new group of states, much like it tried to do towards Muslim countries in the 1970s under Bhutto. Another defining feature in this time period was the world view that Pakistan drew on when creating a discourse of its speeches. The speeches all praised the new post-Cold War world order and expressed hopes that it would advance prosperity and peace in the world, and that countries would reach new heights in cooperation and prosperity. Pakistan claimed to be protecting the global commons, and a stable international order.

However, with the changed international backdrop in the second period, post-9/11, Pakistan's attitude to the world also shifted. But that's not the only thing that changed: the domestic political situation was also transformed, as Musharraf staged a coup and dismissed Sharif in October 1999, leaving democracy behind. This of course meant that Pakistan could not continue pursuing the ambitions of establishing a league of democratic states and had to suspend projecting its democratic identity. The dominant discourse of Pakistan as a champion of the global commons thus had to be revised, but it did persist, only with a different backdrop.

What is more, Islamabad had to shift strategy for how to establish itself as it was isolated once again diplomatically, especially after achieving nuclear status. However, Musharraf benefited from the War on Terror in the way he was able to establish Pakistan as a bridge between the West and Muslims, expressing a need for an actor that was both an ally of the West, and a leader of the Muslim world. While Pakistan's alignment with the West historically had damaged its image as a leader of the Muslim world, it was able to unite a rhetoric of the two roles as defender of the faith and bridge in the second period. Musharraf also expressed concern of a new iron curtain descending, afraid of more conflict. Given the allegations of Pakistan harboring Islamic extremists and terrorists, a war between the West and Muslim world would be a disaster for Islamabad.

When Washington needed Pakistan again Musharraf did not take much time considering his options and joined the War on Terror as requested, which gave Musharraf's regime legitimacy on the world stage. Musharraf spoke extensively about the West needing to accept Islam as a religion of peace, and to grant freedom to persecuted and oppressed Muslim populations. Pakistan's way of talking about Islam showed that it recognized a suspicious sentiment of the West towards Islam and tried to tackle this emerging problem. The role of defender of the faith was employed to a larger extent in the second period, but it was coupled with the vision of Pakistan as a bridge. Pakistani representatives steadily showed a sense of honor towards their religion when talking about Islam in front of world leaders.

On the Afghanistan question, Pakistan consistently saw its role as being a regional protector throughout both time periods. Its wish for a peaceful development in Afghanistan led it to recognizing the Taliban government in 1997, but this support was withdrawn when the US declared their War on Terror. Joining this war was undoubtedly a strategic boost for Pakistan, as it enhanced its security vis-à-vis India, and less focus was given to the A.Q. Khan crisis, in addition to gaining an economic boost. This was particularly important after the isolation Pakistan experienced on the world stage in the 1990s when it stood by to watch Washington getting closer and closer to New Delhi. It is interesting to note that Pakistan was accused by



many of harboring terrorists and allowing them to operate within its borders. This role of indirectly supporting terrorists was a role imposed on Pakistan by many countries, but it was repeatedly rejected from the General debate podium.

After decades of slamming the world's powers for having nuclear arsenals and promoting non-proliferation, Pakistan declared itself a nuclear power in 1998. It continued to assert that this merely was an act of self-defense and a way to achieve regional stability. Interestingly, it played on its role as a champion for nuclear non-proliferation to legitimize its own nuclear weapons, as if it expected it to be seen as acceptable by the world. Indeed, it was seen by Pakistan as being in its national interest to develop its nuclear capability, so that it could ensure safety and relative power towards India. India has kept a grip on Pakistan and its foreign policy objectives since independence, and gaining nuclear capabilities was also seen by Pakistan as the only way of gaining strategic parity with India and eliminating regional structural insecurity. Indeed, Pakistan continued to describe its nuclear weapons and missile programs as a part of its policy of maintaining 'minimum credible deterrence' against security threat from India and reiterated that it was only responding to Indian nuclear tests. Although historically challenging, Islamabad has also seen Pakistan's geographic location as an opportunity and tried to benefit from it by making important allies, most significantly the US. Achieving nuclear weapons was a significant development in the region and enabled Pakistan the ability to stand up to India through coercive diplomacy.

That said, in both periods Pakistan's role in the region was projected as a possible regional leader that wanted to advance prosperity and build regional stability. Pakistan standing at the center of Asia means it has a unique strategic location, which it knows to play this to its advantage. It took on the role as a possible regional protector and expressed that it wanted to advance prosperity and build regional stability. This was consistent in both time periods, and it is interesting to note that there was not much difference between civilian and military leadership. Talk about security and stability was consistent in the two periods, and although the regional security situation was more pressing with the War on Terror, it was during the 90s that nuclear status was achieved.

As we have seen from Pakistan's diplomatic history it was early to seek military security and economic assistance, but the General Assembly speeches also persistently focused attention to the unjust distribution of wealth, the colonial legacy in the world, and rich countries taking advantage of the poor. Indeed, when Pakistan started pursuing an alignment with developing countries in the second half of the twentieth century it also started taking on a new role as champion of the developing countries, and this returned in the 00s. It called on the UN

to lower or remove barriers on movement of ideas, goods, information and individuals, so that the developing countries could benefit more. This showed that Pakistan regarded the world as unjust towards developing countries, and that the richer countries had to do more to reverse the balance between countries. It also framed the discussion by highlighting the unjust structure of the UNSC, stating that it does not consider the pleas of the developing world, portraying a world view of an unjust world order.

Pakistan's view of the world has also been dominated by feeling insecure facing India on the one hand, and a desire of having an increased role on the international political stage on the other through the two periods. Pakistan's role as liberation supporter was especially seen throughout the research. Islamabad was not afraid to talk about all the ongoing conflicts around the world, beyond that of its 'defender of the faith' role. This can of course be seen in relation to Pakistan's effort to make the world act on the Kashmir question. Kashmir sees a culmination of Pakistan's roles, from regional protector, to defender of the faith, to liberation supporter. It repeatedly called on the UN to act on Kashmir and ensure the rights of the Kashmiri people. The way Pakistan talks about the Kashmir question is another interesting point. Pakistani representatives labelled the insurgents in Kashmir as "freedom fighters", while India called it (domestic) terrorism, and thus the two had very different language on the situation in Kashmir, trying to influence international perception.

The commitment Pakistan makes to the international order is interesting. It has been active in UN's peace-keeping operations, repeatedly called for the UNSC to be more representative, and underlined Pakistan's pledge to uphold the UN values. It has tried to establish itself as a protector of the global commons, and even when Pakistan has carried out nuclear tests, it refuses to label it as breaking any international norms and instead reiterates that it is done in self-defense. Pakistan is trying to establish a role as a champion of the global commons, and defender of the international order. Indeed, even achieving nuclear status was framed as Pakistan protecting the global commons and being a regional protector.

### What are the drivers of change in Pakistani foreign policy?

Pakistan's geographical location has had major implications on its geopolitical position and foreign policy since its inception, as have the overall global political situation, with many important political events the last half century taking place in or around Pakistan. However, considering the above evidence and discussion, I have identified that the drivers of change in Pakistani foreign policy is its national role conceptualizations. Pakistan's wish to establish a

series of roles for itself have included the roles such as defender of the faith and liberation supporter. These two roles were the most consistent ones.

In the first period the roles as a regional protector, liberation supporter and advocate for nuclear non-proliferation were also important, but also significant was that Pakistan was showing itself as a defender of the global commons and promoting the stable world order. Pakistan was trying to be part of the international community of democratic states, and even taking a leading role in creating a formal community. In the second period the important roles were as a bridge between the West and Islamic world, but also as a defender of the faith.

Fueling these different role conceptions, and role ambitions, is Pakistan's wish to establish strategic parity towards India, and a wish to feel safe from threats from its neighbors. Indeed, while the drivers of change in Pakistani foreign policy is its different role perceptions, the existential conflict with India lies behind the roles. Trying to establish itself as a moral high ground by highlighting its contribution to the UN peacekeeping operations and commitment to non-proliferation, Pakistan establishes a language of itself as an honorable country that works towards protecting the global commons. Islamabad also suggests that its nuclear weapons do not break any international norms and was trying to use its identity as honorable to play down the severity of developing nuclear weapons in the first period. This is also extended in talking about itself as a liberation supporter by welcoming new countries each year, addressing on-going conflicts, both of which were geared towards advocating for Kashmiri independence.

The analysis presented in this thesis show how Pakistan has been framing foreign policy topics in the UN General Assembly debates. Already in the first General Debate intervention Pakistan portrayed itself as a liberation supporter, and as a country that does not shy away from conflicts. Comparing the two periods have showed that the most consistent role for Pakistan is that of liberation supporter, which can be tied to Kashmir. Consistently welcoming new countries to the GA and also never failing to talk about conflicts in the world has been a way for Pakistan to advocate for action to be taken on Kashmir.

Pakistan has had to navigate a challenging geopolitical situation since its inception, and this, coupled with changes both internationally and domestically has led to it playing on its roles to varying degree. Already in the first period I analyzed it was evident that Pakistan has many roles. It was also evident that Pakistan is not afraid of talking about conflicts, but it also seemed disappointed no one talked about Indian aggression or Kashmir. The fact that there was not much difference between the civilian and military leadership suggests that the national interest of Pakistan does not change much, but rather that the international backdrop on which it presents its foreign policy is more important than the domestic.

## Theoretical implications

The theoretical concept ‘national role conceptions’ has been the most important in this thesis, and in understanding the drivers of change in Pakistan’s foreign policy. Hill’s seven expectations have also been a useful framework for the analysis and will be discussed now. The first of these seven is the “maintenance of territorial integrity and social peace against external aggression”, which Pakistan has tried to do through opposing Indian threats, and advocate for Kashmiri sovereignty. “Advancing prosperity” has been fulfilled through Pakistan seeking allies to help build its economy, but also in working towards peace in Afghanistan. One interesting and surprising aspect is that Pakistan did not say anything about its significant diaspora in countries such as the UK, US, and Gulf countries, and thus did not concentrate on the third expectation of foreign policy: “protecting citizens abroad”. Expectation number five, on “making decisions on interventions abroad” was also not covered by the UNGA speeches.

One of the more important aspects of Pakistani foreign policy has been to “project identity abroad”, expectation number four, that has been discussed above through its roles and language of foreign policy. The language of acts is used to build a self, and Pakistan did this as it positioned itself as a liberation supporter, defender of the faith, and so on. The other important expectations are number six, “fostering a stable international order”, and number seven, “protecting the global commons”. Pakistan contribute significantly to UN peacekeeping, and has consistently promoted non-proliferation of all arms.

Hill’s fourth expectation of foreign policy, to “project identity abroad”, has been the most central for Pakistan, as seen through the UNGA speeches and subsequent discussion on national role conceptions. The national role conceptions theory provides a comprehensive pattern of attitudes to analyze, and that has been useful in analyzing Pakistani foreign policy. In line with the role theory, Pakistan’s roles have changed over time. A possible research topic for future research is to what extent Pakistan’s roles were accepted by other states.

Going forward it would also be possible to analyze Pakistani attitudes towards the world from a perspective of its national role conceptions. Metha’s (2011) assertion that states in South Asia historically have relied on a fear of the ‘other’ to define their identity is interesting in the case of Pakistan and its identity. Pakistan has felt vulnerable because of India from independence, and if doing more research, it would be interesting to look at the relationship with India in more detail from a role perspective. Another possibility for future research is to look at to what extent the Pakistani people identify with the leadership’s role conceptions, but that would be a step away from International Relations and towards other social sciences.

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