Pedagogy of the Powerful

Engaging Critically with the New Transnational Development Advocacy

By Simon Pahle

# Pedagogy of the Powerful

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ABSTRACT

Arguably, major obstacles to poverty reduction, dignity and security for the world's poor and oppressed sit in the Global North; in the way through which Northern governments, corporations and – ultimately – citizenries perpetuate wealth inequalities and power asymmetries across borders. This paper argues that the broader recognition of such structural obstacles to development has been accompanied by the rise of what is here labeled a Pedagogy of the Powerful – a momentous emergence of a broad range of transnational advocacy efforts seeking to promote development by way of targeting decisions made in the Global North.

The first part of the paper proposes a delimitation of the Pedagogy of the Powerful as a field of study. Key analytical concepts are borrowed from Robert Chambers, and the political ascendancy of the subject matter is associated with three formative transnational campaigns: The International Baby Foods Action Network vs. Nestlé; the International Campaign to Ban Landmines; and The Debt Relief Movement. The second part suggests some political circumstances that may be seen to have provoked and facilitated the rise of the Pedagogy of the Powerful.

The remainder seeks to contribute some analytical perspectives as to how students of development may engage themselves critically with these increasingly visible kinds of development interventions: The third part suggests that such interventions draw on four qualitatively different (but compatible) pedagogies, each with strengths and weaknesses that need to be carefully appraised. The fourth part distinguishes three types of legitimacy claims on which Pedagogy of the Powerful interventions typically rely. And just as with the different pedagogies, legitimacy claims present the pedagogues with thorny dilemmas, and ought to be subject to critical appraisal.

Keywords: transnational advocacy; NGO campaigning; new social movements; globalization

List of Acronyms

ATCA   Alien Tort Claims Act (USA)
CAFOD   Catholic Agency for Overseas Development
CAP   Common agricultural programme (EU)
CWC   Conventional Weapons Convention
ETI   Ethical Trading Initiative
EU   European Union
EURODAD   European Network on Debt and Development
GMO   Genetically Modified Organism
HIPC   Heavily Indebted Poor Countries
IBFAN   International Baby-Food Action Network
ICBL   International Campaign to Ban Landmines
IDS   Institute for Development Studies (University of Sussex)
IEH   Initiativ for etisk handel (Norwegian ETI)
ILO   International Labour Organization
IMF   International Monetary Fund
LSE   London School of Economics
NAFTA   North-American Free Trade Agreement
NCA   Norwegian Church Aid
NGO   Non-governmental organization
NIC   Newly industrialized country
OECD   Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OPEC   Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
SAPRI   Structural Adjustment Participatory Review Initiative (World Bank)
SAPRIN   Structural Adjustment Participatory Review International Network
WHO   World Health Organization
WTO   World Trade Organization

PREFACE

This paper is just as much inspired by my experiences working in the development enterprise as it is by *academia*: In my previous professional incarnation (2000-2006), I served as a campaign and policy advisor at Norwegian Church Aid (NCA). During this tenure I was given the opportunity to work on some very engaging issues (e.g., debt, trade and corporate social responsibility), and to meet a cross-section of people working with policy-making and global justice advocacy from across the world. It struck me that development NGOs and governmental and intergovernmental agencies, increasingly – at least in their 'presentation of self in everyday life' (if not always in their actual resource use) – concern them selves with the stuff going on in transnational advocacy interventions.

However, looking back at my own training (a Master degree in Development Studies from LSE), and most programs in Development Studies currently on offer at universities, it seems to me that these new momentous tendencies are not sufficiently reflected in our studies. True, our institutes increasingly (but far from always) offer courses that cover the thorny *issues that provoke* transnational advocacy interventions by global civil society – say, international trade agreements; North-to-South proliferation of arms; multinational corporations' complicity in resource conflict; or climate change. But the politics of these *interventions themselves* do not get much attention. This is doubly unfortunate: First, we fail to direct our students' attention to key sites of political contestation that increasingly shape development politics. Secondly, we fail to prepare them for the changing realities within the development enterprise – realities that most of them soon will have to relate to as practitioners.

In May 2006, while still at NCA, I was invited to sit on a panel during a joint roundtable conference hosted by IDS and Noragric (on occasion of their 40th and 20th anniversary, respectively). The topic was "how development studies must reinvent itself in order to promote development". In his concluding remarks, IDS director Lawrence Haddad concluded that Development Studies would have to redirect more efforts toward what he called "the Pedagogy of the Powerful". I had never heard the term before, but it perfectly condensed our preceding discussion. I

thought: Yes, that's it. That term epitomizes what we're missing, and where we're going. Afterwards, I told Haddad that I loved how the term played on Paulo Freire's famous *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, and asked him who had coined it, and if there was any stuff written about it. He redirected me to the work of his IDS colleague, Robert Chambers. (Chambers, however, uses the term "Pedagogy for the Non-Oppressed" which is a lot less catchy than Haddad's take.)

Soon thereafter, I took up my current position at NORAGRIC, and I thought it would be worthwhile to try to build up a MSC course entitled *Pedagogy of the Powerful*, in part as a response to Chambers'/Haddad's challenge. The idea was well received at the institute, and a pilot course was given in the autumn of 2007. Students showed a great deal of enthusiasm. I therefore resolved to continue to convene it for the duration of my tenure. As coursework, students are supposed to do a critical assessment of a civil society intervention of their own choosing (provided it falls within the Pedagogy of the Powerful demarcation – i.e., the case must be a *civil society* intervention *targeted at decision-maker/s in the Global North*, with the purpose of eventually *provoking change/s in the Global South*).

This paper is written as a "course companion": It is intended to provide students with some analytical perspectives that they may employ when doing their case studies; it brings together insights from many different fields and therefore also serves as a literature guide. However, it must be considered a 'working paper' in the literal sense – a work in progress; a construction site. I hope I will *have* to rewrite it – as I learn more about the field by emerging literature, by guest lecturers; and by the students and their case-studies.

I would like to express my spiritual and intellectual indebtedness to two of my then-colleagues at NCA Oslo: Fredrik Glad Gjernes and Tarje Wanvik Iversen.

1. NEW WAYS OF THINKING AND DOING DEVELOPMENT

Questioning whether conventional aid is *at all* helpful in terms of promoting development used to be the reserve of the politically incorrect fringes. This has changed: The question now preoccupies the very mainstream of the development enterprise[2]. Surely, the answer one arrives at must be determined by how one resolves to define 'aid' and 'development'. Nevertheless, some sobering facts arguably transcend such definitions: After a good 40 years of development aid, lasting freedom from poverty, insecurity and indignity is still illusive for the great majority of the world's people. One way of interpreting this sad fact is to conclude that aid is outright counter-productive: It sustains neo-colonial relations of power and creates disempowering 'client' attitudes amongst the poor and oppressed; donors' benevolent financial transfers are captured by the already mighty, or their commendable intentions are subverted through local dynamics of misappropriation or waste.

Alternatively, we may posit that the problem is not whether aid leads to development or not (it sometimes does, for some), but that the political, economic and cultural conditions both within developing countries themselves, and – importantly – in the world system enveloping them, are so forcefully pitted against positive development that aid is bound to remain a minor detail in the larger scheme of things. I ascribe to the latter view. Let me draw on an eminently pedagogical *tale of cows* first narrated and popularised by the British aid organisation CAFOD, to spell out the point: Imagine yourself being a dairy farmer in Jamaica, trying to make ends meet by raising livestock and selling dairy products. Even in the (unlikely) event that the best of aid agencies had established themselves with generous programmes in your local community (drilling bore wells, digging irrigation ditches, and providing all the extension services, micro-credit and training you could desire) the chances are overwhelming that your income would have been in steady decline over the last decade. Why?

Every day, Europe's 21 million cows receive some 2 dollars worth of subsidies each – statistically speaking, the average European cow has more wealth to her

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[2] For a review of the recent debate in Norway, see McNeill, 2007

name than the average human being in the Global South. In fact, annual subsidies to the dairy sector are big enough to buy all 21 million cows around-the-world air fares, and every cow would still have plenty of pocket money to spend on the trip. At the same time, subsidies incite dairy overproduction in EU, the surplus of which is processed into milk powder and dumped at world markets at half the real cost of production. Meanwhile, Jamaica has been forced, through World Bank and IMF structural adjustment, to lower its tariffs dramatically, and may not protect dairy farmers against import surges. Nestlé, controlling the processing and retail dairy market in Jamaica, has consequently replaced most of the milk from domestic farmers with imports from EU at dumping prices. Consequently, Jamaican farmers now supply a meagre 12% of domestic consumption. Small dairy farmers, in particular, have fared poorly: Their share of the domestic market has shrunk to 1/8 of its 1995-level[3].

In 1992, Wolfgang Sachs proclaimed: "The idea of Development stands like a ruin in the intellectual landscape. Its shadow obscures our vision"[4]. But, just 3 years later another scholar noted: "As the existing system crumbles around us, new and exciting alternatives are sprouting up in the rubble"[5]. During the 1990's the whole gamut of forces compelled to promote development – internationally and nationally oriented NGOs; solidarity movements; scholars; journalists and artists – actually seemed to have *found* new vision in the cooling shadow of the development ruin, and set out to recalibrate their efforts in qualitatively new ways. "NGO's have come to the sad realization that although they have achieved many micro-level successes, the systems and structures that determine power and resource allocation – locally, nationally and globally – remain largely intact"[6]. Meanwhile, *southern* NGOs have increasingly

> "replaced Northern NGOs as implementers [of aid projects in the Global South, and] have become more assertive in challenging power structures both within their own countries and internationally [Moreover, they] have called on their Northern counterparts to change the policies of *their own*

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[3] CAFOD, in Pahle 2006
[4] Quoted in Chambers 1997: 1744
[5] Thuvesson, in *ibid:* 1744
[6] Nyamugasira, quoted in Hickey and Mohan 2005: 246

> *governments*, recognizing that international policy is still largely driven by the OECD countries" [7]

Consequently, the last decade has seen a proliferation of novel development-related interventions which implicitly turn the yesteryear question of the development enterprise on its head: Instead of asking *"what's the matter with them, and what to do about it*?" such interventions ask: *"What's the matter with us, and what to do about it?"*

1.1. DEMARCATING THE PEDAGOGY OF THE POWERFUL AS A FIELD OF STUDY

It is the whole ensemble of interventions in the above spirit that I propose to subsume under the label *Pedagogy of the Powerful*. As a *field of study*, I propose that it be demarcated so as to comprise

> all civil society interventions – legal, political, cultural or scientific – targeted at decision-makers in the Global North (including governments, corporations and citizens), with the purpose of provoking changes that are thought to alleviate poverty, insecurity and indignity in the Global South.

A number of things ought to be noted about this proposition. First, since the label demarcates and names a *field of study*, the term 'pedagogy' is used in a general and descriptive sense – 'pedagogy' simply refers to "activities of teaching (...) activities that impart knowledge"[8]; or "strategies of teaching"[9]. I do *not* use the term pedagogy in the normative sense, i.e. as denoting "the *correct* use of teaching strategies"[10]. The distinction is important: This paper does not pretend to instruct the reader how to herself become a 'pedagogue of the powerful'. The intention is to present perspectives and analytical tools that may be employed when engaging critically with those who have already taken upon them to be the 'pedagogues' – namely, the range of civil society actors who conceive of and undertake the new

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[7] Coates and David 2002: 531, emphasis added
[8] Webster's Dictionary
[9] Wikipedia
[10] Wikipedia

transnational development advocacy. But 'to engage critically' does not necessarily mean to 'reject' or to 'disassociate from'. Quite the contrary: It is by engaging critically that we may come to identify with, our perhaps become – somewhere down the road – actors in the *Pedagogy of the Powerful*.

Second, while my demarcation may be a novelty, it covers a terrain whose every more and common is already well covered by a plethora of other study fields – note how this paper draws on and brings together important contributions from *transnational advocacy studies*[11]; *corporate social responsibility*[12]; *new social movement studies*[13]; *global citizen action*[14]; and *culture studies*[15]. The point is that the Pedagogy of the Powerful is *geographically narrower* than any of these fields (focusing on interventions in the Global North), yet *topically broader* since it traverses all of them. By delimiting the field in this way, I highlight a specific causal-spatial imagination which is prevalent in much of NGO and new social movement activities: One which emphasise the *Northern causes of Southern problems*. Moreover, it compels us to study, say, narrow litigation efforts against corporations or NGO advocacy in Northerm parliaments *alongside* cultural or journalistic manifestations (e.g., Bernhard Saupier's emotive documentary movie *Darwin's Nightmare;* or Joel Bakan's *The Corporation*).

Ensuring such a topical thickness within a geographically narrow terrain is not just to emphasise interesting *connections* – e.g., how the messaging of a film subtly frames a litigation or a parliamentary advocacy effort. It is just as much about foregrounding cultural manifestations as interventions that affect how we perceive and organize reality. In this respect, the *Pedagogy of the Powerful* should be thought of in terms of Jordan and Van Tuijl's inclusive – yet distinctly political – definition of *advocacy*:

> "Advocacy is an *act of organizing the strategic use of information to democratize unequal power relations*. This definition differs from others

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[11] Jordan and Van Tuijl, 2002; Khagram *et al* 2002

[12] Heap, 2000; Bendell, 2000

[13] Hickey and Mohan, 2005; Eschle and Maiguashca, 2005

[14] Edwards and Gaventa, 2001

[15] Laclau, 2005

> that tend to emphasize actions related to policy [It also differs from definitions which] outline advocacy relatively unspecified, simply as 'communication for change' […] Advocacy can very well be aimed at influencing reality rather than policy"[16].

Third, the emphasis on interventions in the Global North must not cloud our view of the multi-scalar nature of all global advocacy interventions. In one way or another, most such interventions have one foot in the Global South: That is where the putative *beneficiaries* of the interventions are; where much of the strategically used *information* is collected; and where the question of pedagogues' *legitimacy* begins and ends. Moreover, global advocacy campaigns typically have *multiple targets* across the North-South divide, on different geographical scales: Efforts may simultaneously target a corporate headquarter in Atlanta *and* a municipal pollution control board in rural Kerala. The key point here is simply to retain a focus primarily on the Northern part of the equation.

Interventions in the Global North are constrained and enabled by a context which is different from that of the Global South, and aspire to contribute something different: Advocacy in the Global South is commonly more a matter of enlivening and exercising conventional citizenship than a matter of 'pedagogy'. True, there is no want of the suspiciously rich in developing countries – who undoubtedly should be subject to a determined Southern pedagogy of the powerful – but their behaviour may not be easily affected, let alone provide for the major changes necessary, unless the larger political environment is realigned; it makes limited sense for Southern citizens to put plenty of efforts into holding their governments accountable unless their governments have a modicum of 'policy space' within which to exercise popular sovereignty. And the width of their 'policy space' is commonly determined by outside forces (international financial institutions, trade treaties etc). Furthermore, it is by projecting Southern grievances into Northern polities (or institutions controlled by Northern polities) – as opposed to merely amplifying them within Southern polities – that transboundary advocacy contributes something new to world politics.

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[16] Jordan and Van Tuijl, 2000: 2052; emphasis added

1.2. Rethinking Development: Chambers' Pedagogy for the Non-Oppressed

As noted above, academics from a broad range of fields have ventured to talk about the Pedagogy of the Powerful from their respective viewpoints. A singular contribution merits particular attention here: Robert Chambers' *World Development* editorial "Responsible Well-Being – A Personal Agenda for Development" (1997).

Chambers defines the objective of development as "responsible well-being for all" (which is intrinsically reliant on the capabilities that flow from livelihood security and must be premised on equity and sustainability); and he asserts that there is no way to achieve development other than through the *primacy of the personal*:

> "The neglect of the personal dimension in development at first seems bizarre. It is self-evident to the point of embarrassment that most of what happens is the result of what sort of people we are, how we perceive realities, and what we do and not do. Whether change is good or bad is largely determined by personal actions, whether by political leaders, official professionals or local people, by international currency speculators, executives of transnational corporations, NGO workers or researchers, by mothers, fathers or children, or by soldiers, secret agents, journalists, lawyers, police or protestors. Especially, what happens depends on those who are powerful and wealthy. One might have supposed then that trying to understand and change their perceptions, motivations and behaviours would have been at the centre of development and development studies […] Yet there have been few studies of individual officials as leaders […] There are quite a number of institutes devoted to development studies but there is, to my knowledge, no institute devoted to the study of greed and power" [17]

Chambers then resolves that the resounding *non-primacy* of the personal is a neglect of academic culture "with its anathema of evangelism, its value of objectivity" (ibid).

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[17] Chambers, 1997: 1749

> "For responsible well-being, it is especially the individuals who are powerful and wealthy who needs to change. This entails confronting and transforming abuses of power and wealth. For this one needs *a pedagogy for the non-oppressed* to enable us to act and think differently" [18]

A crucial task of such pedagogy is to "facilitate self-critical epistemological awareness among us", the knowledge-producers – about how we learn and mislearn, and how we construct reality for others. The principle may be illustrated by recalling the *tale of the cows*. Some scholars might decide to assemble the facts into a *state-centric* narrative: 'Since EU taxpayers effectively subsidize the cost of dairy products for Jamaican consumers, resources are actually freed and can now be spent more productively elsewhere in the Jamaican economy'. The point is not whether this version is infinitely more true or false than the *people-centric* version narrated by CAFOD (emphasising how 'poor farmers in a poor country lose their erstwhile livelihoods through regime interplays and the profit-maximizing behaviour of multinational corporations'), but that it is *qualitatively different*. The *Pedagogy of the Powerful* is in part about the differences between such narratives; which version one decides to narrate into the world is a distinctly personal matter with political implications.

Further key tasks which Chambers ascribes to the *pedagogy for the non-oppressed* is that it must "enable those with power and wealth to recognize the effects of their actions and non-actions"; and "enable those with more wealth and power to welcome having less". Drawing once again on the tale of the cows, we might suggest that there are EU policy-makers and World Bank directors who need to be more aware of the way in which their policies affect dairy farmers in Jamaica. This is, of course, precisely the task that CAFOD had taken upon itself – the campaign gave an important impetus (along with other campaigns on agricultural trade topics) toward ensuring a certain political recognition of some very unpleasant effects of EU's common agricultural programme (CAP). However, EU policy-makers do not device policy entirely for the sake of their own personal wealth and power. Those

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[18] *ibid*: 1750, emphasis added

who really need to 'welcome having less' in this case is, firstly, European agribusinesses and exporters, and, secondly, the farmers and workers whose livelihoods are tied to the provisions of CAP. These groups, however, have been somewhat offended by the campaign; farmers, in particular, do not feel privileged, and do consider the redistribution of taxpayers' wealth as an entirely legitimate contribution to the sustenance of Europe's agriculture and food security.

The ambition of this paper is not to begin the realization of what Chambers is calling for – an epistemological and attitudinal revolution in development studies, something which may or may not happen. My point is that there already *is* a *pedagogy of the powerful* – it is just not a property or a programme of *academia* but a momentous emergence of a broad range of transnational advocacy efforts. I propose here that we in *academia* begin by engaging critically and systematically with this 'real existing' *pedagogy of the powerful*. Still Chambers' writing should guide us: Not only do we borrow from him in naming the field at hand; we also ask whether and how this 'real existing' pedagogy addresses the tasks he poses: Is this where the required "critical epistemological awareness" is nurtured? How are "those with power and wealth enabled to recognize the effects of their actions and non-actions, and to welcome having less" in the field? Before I return to how we may pursue these questions more systematically (part 3 and 4), I suggest we revisit three formative *pedagogy of the powerful* cases.

1.3. DOING DEVELOPMENT DIFFERENTLY: THREE FORMATIVE CASES

1.3.1. The International Baby Foods Action Network *vs* Nestlé

For the last couple of decades, Nestlé has held a 40% share of the global market in breast milk substitutes (infant formula) – along with its dominant position in tangent markets such as dairy, instant coffee and processed chocolate. During the 1970's and 1980's, it transpired that its market penetration in the poorest of the developing countries was achieved by controversial means: The company had secured much of its market foothold by way of aggressive marketing and distribution in water-insecure communities. Consequently, mothers had used unsafe

water with the infant formula, and unknowingly infected their babies with water-borne diseases.

A boycott campaign started already 1977, becoming the first ever global consumer boycott of a multinational company. By 1984, the campaign had become a considerable PR liability for the company, and Nestlé pledged to align its practices with WHO's code for appropriate marketing of breast milk substitutes. But the boycott was re-launched in 1989 when it transpired that the company was breaking its promise, soliciting aggressive and innovative campaigning manifestations: An IBFAN-affiliated organization staged a protest outside the company's UK headquarters in Croydon, where a doll was being added to a growing pile every 30 seconds to symbolize the mounting infant death-toll caused by water-borne diseases. Nestlé is still subject to consumer boycotts in scores of Northern countries, as the company still produces and distributes its infant formula in manners that allegedly violate the WHO code[19]. Meanwhile, IBFAN won the 1998 *Right Livelihood Award* for its two decades of work for infants and mothers. Its pioneering consumer campaigning has been an inspiration for many other movements and remains a seminal case in the study of *corporate social responsibility*.

1.3.2. The International Campaign to Ban Landmines

Antipersonnel mines kill a human being every 20th minute and a total of 26,000 a year – "the vast majority is non combatants. They are civilians, often children, who stumble over the mines long after they have been forgotten by the fighters who put them there"[20]. In 1980, 76 governments signed a protocol to The Conventional Weapons Convention (CWC), pledging to limit the use of antipersonnel mines. But, by the 1990s, NGOs were still witnessing tremendous mines-related devastation in the communities of their humanitarian work, and concluded that the CWC protocol was largely ineffective. It seemed as if the spoils from producing and trading antipersonnel mines, accruing to Northern armament industries, compelled much more political will than its numerous humanitarian victims. An erstwhile coalition of 4 NGOs were set up to advocate for a total ban on antipersonnel mines. Within a

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[19] Heap, 2000: ch 2

[20] Florini, 2001: 33

couple of years, the coalition had grown to more than 1,000 NGOs across 60 countries.

Meanwhile, the government of Canada, subject to intense pressure from domestic civil society actors, had become frustrated with the stalled intergovernmental negotiations to revise the CWC further, and now formed a tacit, strategic alliance with ICBL. Such an alliance – between a vanguard government and an international NGO coalition on an issue requiring the enactment of a new instrument under international law – was a surprising innovation in international politics. On the back of massive civil society mobilization, with *Princess Diana of Wales* a popular figurehead for the cause, the Canadian government resolved to side-step the stalled UN process and called for a fast-track strategy establishing December 1997 as an absolute deadline for getting a new instrument in place. National NGO-coalitions affiliated to ICBL stepped up campaigning in scores of states, and through 1996 and early 1997 the number of governments expressing their commitment to Canada's initiative soared. Diana's sudden passing away in August 1997 seemed to amplify the dignified quality of ICBL's cause further, and in October the campaign was awarded the *Nobel Peace Prize*; obviously a tactical move to bolster the campaigns legitimacy in the run-up to the December deadline and the concluding intergovernmental meeting to be held in Ottawa. Eventually, 122 countries signed the *Ottawa Convention* (The Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Antipersonnel Mines and on their Destruction), thereby pledging to destroy their stockpiles within four years and to clear their own territories of mines within ten years. However, the main producers and proliferators of antipersonnel mines – US, China and Russia – had declined to relate to the *Ottawa Convention* altogether.

1.3.3. Jubilee 2000: Debt Relief for Developing Countries

The debt crisis that emerged in the aftermath of the global slowdown in the late 1970s and early 1980s was largely the consequence of runaway lending after the first oil price hike in 1973, and subsequent economic conjunctures: As OPEC countries' earnings were deposited into the Northern financial system, private banks were compelled to offer cheap and plentiful credit (with little heed for borrowers' long-term ability to service big debts) so as to offset the amassment of 'petrodollar'

liquidity surpluses at their accounts. However, in the late 1970s, the Northern economies were hit by deep recession as OPEC squeezed oil supply further, and prices hiked once again. Now, interest rates shot up and imports of primary commodities slowed down. For developing countries this conjuncture meant current account *catastrophe*: Owing to the energy price hikes, most countries' import bills had already grown considerably; now, their credit costs skyrocketed, while their import earnings plummeted.

Mexico tried to file bankruptcy in August 1982, only to be told that states may not go bust. In scores of countries, the 'lenders of last resort' – The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund – rushed in to bail out most of the private lenders, reducing debt servicing and credit costs for client countries albeit on strict conditions of structural adjustment. These typically entailed currency depreciation, trade liberalization, privatization of public enterprises and tight fiscal constraints, including termination of public subsidization to keep food prices and other necessities affordable for the poor. While such measures could be construed as 'necessary' if debtor countries' were to be able to service their debts at all, they certainly took their toll on the vulnerable.

The debt issue first came to the fore in the Northern public debate in 1986. At the time, murderous famines were ravaging the Horn of Africa, and Oxfam launched a campaign highlighting the scandal that starvation prone countries paid twice as much in debt servicing as they received in famine relief. The message to Northern policy makers and their constituents was that it was morally suspect to demand continued debt servicing in a context where debtor governments could only pay by simultaneously detracting from their core human rights obligations. This moral framing was soon mirrored in the concern of churches; the *1987 Pontifical Commission on Justice and Peace* proclaimed that "debt servicing cannot be met at the price of the asphyxiation of a country's economy, and no government can demand of its people privations incompatible with human dignity"[21]. The campaign thus managed to project unease about rich countries debt collecting onto the minds of masses of citizens, and it had the Thatcher government declare that it "favoured

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[21] Quoted in Donnelly, 2002: 156

cancellation of two thirds of the principal of bilateral debt owed by the poorest debtor countries"[22]. While this only affected the British bilateral debt (keeping debts owed to private banks and multilateral debts out of the fray) – and the government was slow to act upon its intent in the preceding years – the declaration established important principles regarding what debt amounts could be considered sustainable and for whom relief may be given. By 1994, the British, Swedish and Danish governments called for multilateral reduction, and at the *1996 Lyons Summit*, G7 leaders announced their joint intention to seek comprehensive debt relief for qualifying countries. At their fall meeting the same year, the World Bank and the IMF launched the *Heavily Indebted Poor Countries* (HIPC) *Initiative.*

The global movement for debt relief – which now comprised several networks of varying political hues and geographical belongings, including *'Fifty Years Is Enough', 'Rethinking Bretton Woods', EURODAD* and the *US Multilateral Debt Coalition* – countered that HIPC1996 was offering too little relief, for too few countries, on too restrictive and often inappropriate conditions. Indeed, throughout the first three years of its existence, only four of the forty applicant countries had succeeded in having *any* of their debt reduced, and typically only after the entrenchment of controversial structural adjustment policies. Consequently, campaigners sought to align diverse networks and to rally citizens behind the call for an improved instrument, under one, common heading: *Jubilee 2000.* The term was originally coined by faith groups who, by "invoking a biblical norm from the *Book of Leviticus* […], urged the international community to mark the Millennium by recognizing a period of 'jubilee' in which debts are cancelled"[23], soliciting the active support of *Pope John Paul II, the World Council of Churches* and Irish rock superstar *Bono.*

By 1999, *seventeen million people* across 160 countries had signed the Jubilee 2000-petition that was presented to the G7 leaders meeting in *Cologne* in June 1999. Subsequently, leaders agreed to an *enhanced HIPC* which would cancel $45 billion of bilateral and multilateral debts, on top of the $30 billion already suggested through the *Paris Club* of bilateral donors, and the $25 billion reserved through

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[22] *ibid:* 173

[23] *ibid*: 155

HIPC1996. Moreover, debt relief through the enhanced HIPC was allegedly to be conditioned not on traditional structural adjustment but on applicant countries submitting "a Poverty Reduction Strategy more explicitly tying debt relief to the funding of health and education, the provision of rural infrastructure, and job creation" (ibid: 165). While much of the same critique levied against the HIPC1996 remains relevant for HIPC1999, and the advocacy of the debt relief movement has not ceased, the Jubilee 2000 campaign remains an extraordinary achievement of the *Pedagogy of the Powerful* (Donnelly 2002; see also Collins et al 2001).

2. WHY THE EMERGENCE OF A PEDAGOGY OF THE POWERFUL?

My introductory reflections on why the Pedagogy of the Powerful has gained such momentum (i.e., the recognition of aid's incapacity to forge deep change) can constitute no more than a minor piece of larger puzzle. On its own, it would fail to bring our understanding very far, and it is at any rate a reflection of larger political conjunctures. In the following, I suggest five bigger pieces of the puzzle – some of which have *provoked* and others that have *facilitated* the rise of the Pedagogy of the Powerful.

2.1. PROVOCATIVE: CORPORATE GLOBALIZATION (THE END OF HISTORY I)

The end of the Cold War compelled Francis Fukuyama (1992) to predict 'the end of history': Western capitalism was now conceived of as the sole contender regarding how to organize economic production. However, the prediction extended beyond the assumption that every nation-state would opt for private property rights and allow markets to decide resource allocation and pricing *within its own confines*; it also assumed *regulatory convergence* between nation-states so that markets and private property rights would *cut across* (and eventually make redundant) state boundaries. Such a prediction has been partly vindicated by contemporary globalization: Financial markets were liberalized from the early 1980s and onwards; by the mid-1990s most countries seemed committed to the creation of a global free trade regime under the auspices of the World Trade Organization. In substance,

however, this has transpired to provide for a distinctly more *mercantilist-corporatist* world order than a genuinely *liberalist* one – and one which seems set to uphold the overall dominance of the Global North. While *finance capital* has been set free and the *property rights* outreach of big corporations has been partially secured through WTO-agreements, *trade in commodities* has been freed to a much lesser extent (and primarily in fields of interest for the Global North). Moreover, *labour does not flow at all* but is more geographically 'trapped' than ever before. Taken together, developing countries have been integrated into a global economy according *not* to their own advantages and needs but to those of others. In the process, they have surrendered many regulatory levers that industrialized countries employed in order to discipline capital (domestic or foreign) and used in order to help the formation of domestic capitalist classes committed to broader development objectives[24].

This is particularly disconcerting in light of the fact that the regulatory capacity of most developing countries was highly constrained to start with. Globalization – with its compression of time-space and concomitant proliferation of information about things happening in far-away places – has not merely exposed Southern governments' notorious *incapacity* to ensure rights protection and distribute the gains of capitalism; scores of investment and trade agreements seem to have reduced the number of *escape routes* from such a predicament. Meanwhile, as the assets and transactions of today's global corporations become seemingly 'stateless' and move more freely across borders, capital may incite 'competitive deregulation': Keen to attract footloose investors and traders, southern producers are pitted against each another, often creating a 'race to the bottom'. The consequence is that the social and environmental costs of business are paid for not by the corporations, their shareholders and consumers, but by local communities in the form of rights violations, indignity and habitat destruction.

In the heyday of Northern welfare capitalism, corporate legitimacy was conferred by the state: A company's 'licence to operate' flowed from acting in observance of law. Things are not as straightforward today, particularly not in the Global South. The commonplace argument of companies confronted with unfortunate social and

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[24] Wade, 2000; 2003

environmental consequences of their activities – that 'we obey the law' – is unconvincing precisely because the race to the bottom entices governments to *abstain* from enforcing laws, or enact laws that fail to protect the rights of the vulnerable or voiceless. It is developing countries' vulnerability to corporate abuses in the context of a 'regulatory vacuum' that has compelled increasing number of pedagogues to demand *corporate social responsibility* of companies[25].

But addressing individual companies' behaviour, as in *corporate social responsibility*, can only constitute one part of a larger effort toward offsetting the detrimental effects of globalization and ensuring 'development friendly' parameters for economic activity. Much of *governments'* policy-making – in particular structural policies (as opposed to narrow fiscal policies) – set decisive parameters for production, investment, trade and sourcing. A problem that seems to have been compounded by the onset of globalization is that such policies rarely benefit the poor. Many international trade agreements actually *prohibit* government policies that could have ensured a better regulatory balance between multinational investors and traders' rights on the one hand, and poor people's access to productive resources (seeds, credit, markets, water and infrastructure) on the other. As in the case of CAFOD and the tale of the cows, pedagogues increasingly engage in advocacy demanding that destructive subsidization in the Global North are abolished, and the policy space for developing countries' governments are widened, so that better balances may be struck.

With respect to the latter, a particular concern of the Pedagogy of the Powerful remains that of *regime interplay* – i.e. the way in which conditionality of the World Bank and the IMF paves the way for, and is subsequently institutionalized by, infinitely binding trade agreements. A much cited case is the predicament of the Mexican small-scale maize farmers: The World Bank and IMF first demanded steep tariff reductions during structural adjustment of the 1980s and early 1990s, opening the domestic market to recurring import surges of dumped US corn, crowding farmers out of their domestic markets. Such non-negotiable policies – beyond the reach of poor people's say, and to their marked disadvantage – were subsequently

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[25] Bendell, 2000; Heap, 2000

'locked-in' under international trade law by the enactment of the North-American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)[26]

2.2. FACILITATIVE: RISE OF GOOD GOVERNANCE AND RIGHTS-BASED APPROACHES (THE END OF HISTORY II)

The other and distinctly less controversial assumption embodied in 'the end of history' thesis was that *liberal democracy* was set to become the globally hegemonic form of government. The development enterprise and the UN system set out to aid this imperative through the emphasis on *good governance*. With the 'communist threat' gone, western leaders abandoned the yesteryear's pardon for human rights abuses of their geopolitical allies (recall the US doctrine: "yes, he's a crook, but he's our crook"). Throughout the 1990s, Northern governments and donors were eager to demonstrate the very opposite: that developing country governments would only win their support provided they respected their human rights obligation and the rule of law, and accepted to be held to account by their fellow countrymen through periodical, multiparty elections.

G*ood governance* also served ideological functions for the World Bank and IMF: The commonplace tendency of structural adjustment programs to incite political havoc and increasing inequalities – rather than sustained growth – could now be construed *not* as reflecting any problem with the Bretton Woods Twins' advices and conditionality *per se,* but as reflecting lack of accountability on the part of recipient governments. They promoted 'blue rights' (civil and political ones) with a particular emphasis on transparency and the rule of law (often serving as a mere euphemism for 'defining property rights', 'reducing transaction costs' and creating a 'conducive environment for investment'). However, through this rhetoric, the World Bank and the IMF rubbed the human rights genie out of the bottle. And, as it would turn out, this genie could be put to work for 'red rights' (economic, cultural and social rights) too.

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[26] A brief analysis in found in chapter 5 of Oxfam (2003): *Rigged Rules, Double Standards*.
http://www.maketradefair.com/assets/english/report_english.pdf

Indeed, the new emphasis on rights represented discursive resources with which civil society actors could legitimately stake a much greater claim in overall development policy. During *modernization theory's* hegemony over the development enterprise (*circa* 1945-1995) the emphasis had been on the societal trajectory of development; states were conceived of as the primary 'subjects'; economics was the means (whether of liberal, mercantilist or dependency hues); and civil society actors had no natural role in the framing of the development debate itself. However, with the new emphasis on rights, *human beings themselves* were invariably projected onto the forefront of the debate. This reconfigured the premises for discussing the meaning of development altogether. Policies that were previously framed in terms of their alleged capacity to create 'growth' or 'industrialization' were now framed in terms of their capacity to 'uphold' or 'undermine' the rights (or proxy notion such as 'entitlements' and 'livelihoods') of actually existing human beings. And in this respect NGOs and social movements were naturally competent.

Moreover, NGOs' hand was strengthened considerably through the formation of a 'discursive coalitions'[27] with prominent UN personalities. In the late 1990s, Kofi Annan mandated the *UN High Commissioner for Human Rights*, Mary Robinson, to ensure that human rights were 'mainstreamed' into all development efforts. Her subsequent articulation of the *Rights-Based Approach to Development* would have momentous consequences in the normative realm:

> "… A conceptual framework for the process of human development that is *normatively* based on international human rights standards and *operationally directed* to promoting and protecting human rights (…) into the *plans, policies and processes* of development (…)" [28]

The OHCHR explains that this approach requires emphasis on elements such as *accountability* (meaning the identification of *rights holders* and *duty-bearers*); *empowerment* (of rights-holders - as opposed to charity); *participation* (which is "active, free and meaningful"); *non-discrimination and attention to vulnerable*

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[27] See Hajer, 1995: 42-72 for a discourse analytical approach to policy making

[28] Quotes from UN pages on rights in development: http://www.unhchr.ch/development/approaches-04.html

groups; and, of particular importance here, making *explicit links between rights and policy* "[thus] *permitting no trade-offs between rights and development*".

The implicit onslaught on any grand theory conception of development is clear: A duty bearer – be it a government, a multilateral agency or a company – cannot sacrifice rights on the altar of efficiency, growth or transformations otherwise. This principled position does not merely preclude the celebrated development strategy of NICs such as South Korea, or contemporary China – both being premised on systematic, institutional violations of civil and political rights. Robinson was just as clear in her advocacy for economic, social and cultural rights, and where thus lending support to criticism of runaway globalization. In her address to the *2002 World Social Forum* she noted that:

> "… As they elaborate international trade and financial regimes, governments should bear in mind (…) that "human rights are the first responsibility of governments". It means, for example, that in discussing agricultural agreements, States should be examining the impact of trade liberalisation on the right to food and the right to development (…)[29]

2.3. PROVOCATIVE: DISTRIBUTIONAL FAILURES OF THE NATION-STATE

Since the end of empire and colonialism, the nation-state has become the hegemonic mode of organising politics across the globe. The nation-state construct was probably the only colonial legacy that the new elites of the South *neither could nor would rid* themselves of. Quite the contrary: The *Wilson Doctrine* – that every nation has the right to independent statehood – was the very bedrock of their emancipation. The nation-state is commonly taken to be the natural, immanent and evident way of organizing societies politically. However, even a cursory recollection of the original conception of the nation-state – that of 19th century *Europe* – reveals the extent to which it is a very contingent construct: It was through the amalgamation of absolutist state formation; the succeeding claim to

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[29] Speech manuscript at
http://www.unhchr.ch/huricane/huricane.nsf/view01/3A921A1D70C8E67EC1256B53006166EC?opendocument

popular sovereignty borne out of the Enlightenment and Revolution; the rephrasing of sovereignty into collectivist idea of the 'nation'; and its co-evolution alongside capitalism – a process of partly diachronic stages, spanning a couple of hundred years – that the nations-state came to be seen not just as a superior form of political organisation, but the evident form[30].

It is hard to refute the claim that, in the Global South, the nation-state as political organization has a dismal track record as regards wealth creation and redistribution. Notwithstanding the fact that the nation-state construct under some circumstances has proven itself to be an outright destructive blueprint for political organization (i.e., wherever self-proclaimed, 'imagined communities' are *not* at all neatly and homogeneously lumped together in space, but rather live interspersed on the same soil) even many seemingly stable developing countries are probably nation-states more in the name than in the gain. Recall what's in the concepts of 'state' and 'nation', respectively. First, the *state* is a sovereign political organisation of human beings whose key definitional characteristic is that it *enacts and enforces laws and collects taxes* across its territory, and with the privilege and duty of exercising its *monopoly of violence*.

It is fairly safe to assume that few developing countries, strictly speaking, are states in this respect: Few of them have ever collected taxes other than from a minor share of their populations, and most have persistent problems in terms of enforcing laws and retaining their monopoly of violence. Second, a group of people constitute a *nation* whenever they perceive of themselves as a single, overarching 'imagined community' – consequently, any individual group member would readily grant the same *citizenship* rights and duties that he claims for himself to any other member. The essence of the nation as *experienced social reality* is probably a feeling of a certain loyalty, fellowship with and trust toward other members of ones political organisation.

Unlike in developed countries – where people were moulded into 'imagined communities' through protracted *cultural standardization*, often by outright

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[30] Gellner, 1983

coercive means[31] – most developing countries had neither time nor the means to amalgamate their populations into nations before they were enlisted as individual entities in the state system. It goes without saying that whoever expects conjoined half-breeds of semi-states/non-nations to act *as if* they were European nation-states ought to be disappointed.[32] It is nevertheless clear that developing countries *have* been largely unsuccessful both in terms of creating *sustained capitalist growth*, and in terms of *redistributing* whatever growth has been achieved. Indeed, it must be hard to be economically productive wherever laws are poorly enforced – perhaps unless your business is *powerful* enough to get it the way it wants it no matter what; or *ruthless* enough to compensate for the attendant risks by cutting corners whenever possible. Yet, it must be even worse to *come in the way* of such businesses; or be vulnerable in the context of failing rights protection and the incapacity of one's political organisation to capture and redistribute benefits of growth.

But the failure of the nation-state to provide development certainly sits *outside* developing countries, too – namely in the *very success* of the nationalist doctrine in the Global North. Here, its contribution to immense wealth creation and redistribution is beyond dispute. In fact, the rights and duties embodied in the nation-state concept have become such powerful referents for people's thoughts and actions that they have assumed an almost unquestionable quality: Few urban Norwegian citizens ever pause to reflect on the fact that their government's trade policy effectively *obliges* them to buy their tomatoes and bovine meat from farmers in Southern Norway's 'bible belt'– people they do not have much in common with, let alone have ever met – rather than buying produce of equal if not better quality, and certainly at preferable prices, from Kenyan or Argentine farmers. By and large, very few ever question the wisdom of such arrangements. That's the power of the nation, and the loyalties it commands, at work. Consequently, Northern nation-states have remained relatively closed 'containers'; recycling substantial parts of the ever growing domestic wealth, while at the same time amassing wealth partly through cheap imports and resource extraction from the Global South.

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[31] Tilly, 1992

[32] Bayart, 1993

It would be wholly contrived to posit that most of the people involved in the *Pedagogy of the Powerful* conceive of developmental problems at this level of abstraction or with such a 'cosmopolitan' slant. Indeed, many still try to frame solutions within the imaginary of sovereign nation-states. Nevertheless, I still contend that the fundamental distributional flaws of the nation-state and its uneven workings across the global terrain are manifest not only in many of the problems they do address, but also in their tacit remoulding of citizenship ideas. It is quite clear that the *Pedagogy of the Powerful* experiments with the citizenship idea – defined as "that set of practices (juridical, political, economic or cultural) which define a person as a constituent member of society, and which as a consequence shape the flow of resources to persons and groups"[33] – cannot be couched within the idea of the nation-state. By effectively fusing participation and rights-based approaches across nation-states' boundaries, transnational advocacy

> "brings together the key elements of a *citizenship-based approach* that stresses political engagement at local, national and international levels. In global campaigns, the transmission of both progressive discourses and resources *across these levels* has offered rewards to the agency of local people in ways that were previously *unattainable within local and national political communities*"[34]

Thus, when European activists advocate for CAP reform in the name of Jamaican dairy farmers' right to livelihoods – at the expense of entitlements established for their countrymen – they certainly break with the conventional, nation-state based idea of citizenship exercise. While such inventive 'transmission of progressive resources across levels' may come some way in addressing the distributional failure of the nation-state, it also requires caution: Whenever such efforts bypass Southern governments altogether, they "undermine [conventional] national citizenship in favour of a form of *'global citizenship' that remains unattainable*" [35]

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[33] Turner, quoted in Hickey and Mohan, 2005: 253
[34] *ibid:* 246-247, my emphasis
[35] ibid: 247, my emphasis

2.4. PROVOCATIVE: POLITICAL DECADENCE IN THE GLOBAL NORTH

In their bestseller *The Globalization Trap (1996)*, Schumann and Martin reflect on how world elites and trend researchers conceived of the global futures during a 1995 'Global Braintrust'

> "[They] reduced the future to a pair of numbers, and a notion: *20-to-80* and *tittytainment* […] A mere fifth of the population will be required to produce the essential goods and services that the world society can afford. In all countries, this fifth will live an active and fulfilling life […] 'Tittytainment' is […] a combination of entertainment and tits. It refers less to sex than it does to the milk that flows from the nursing mother's breast: A mix of numbing entertainment and sufficient nutrition will make it possible to keep up the mood of the population […] Since the 1980s, Europeans have been afraid of the '40/60-society' [e.g. 'Thatcherism'], but that is not anymore describing the future model for distribution of wealth and social position. A '20/80-society' is emerging, in which the excluded masses must be tranquilized with *tittytainment*" [36]

One should avoid unduly romanticizing the post-war heyday of welfare capitalism in the Global North. It was an epoch of persistent patriarchy, increasing social alienation, considerable spiritual and social rigidities flowing from over-zealous statism, and no small amount of galvanizing fear of the 'other' (be it those on the other side of the 'iron curtain' and their nuclear armaments, or those failing to fit in with mainstream ideals of 'modernity' and 'progress'). Moreover, its wealth boom was amassed through a ridiculously polluting industrialization process and fuelled by structural exploitation of the Global South. Indeed, it is telling that the long boom came to a grinding halt in the wake of OPEC's formation and the subsequent oil price hikes.

Nevertheless, that *belle epoch* was marked by levels of political engagement – typically in 'old' social movements such as political parties and trade unions –

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[36] Schumann and Martin, 1996: 15-16; my translation from the Norwegian edition

which imbued the public sphere and people's lives with a sense of collective, political meaning and direction. It is hard to do away with the feeling that *today's* public sphere and individual life worlds are colonized by distinctly less 'progressive' qualities. The massive spilling into the public sphere of *porn, reality TV* and *gambling* combined with the sensational deflation in commodity prices (nominal garment prices in Norway are currently at 1983-levels) seem to keep increasing numbers engaged with their own bodily drives and daydreams of fame and fortune. This is so despite of – or perhaps because of – ever higher levels of general education and increasing information about the plight of 'the rest'. The prophecy of *tittytainment* has no less purchase today than it had in the mid-1990s.

The apparent political decadence of the Global North is not without its positive precursors, though: "Marx was famously wrong when he predicted the progressive immiseration of the proletariat […] [He] got the effects of accumulation under capitalism wrong: It can and often will raise the wages by increasing the demand for labour"[37]. It is hard to argue with the proposition that the dual forces of capitalism and popular sovereignty have proven a phenomenal blessing in material terms – in the Global North, that is. This is not to deny that the structural forces of globalization are gnawing away on the Northern welfare model. But this slow gnawing rarely comes across as particularly acute for the majority of Northern citizens: They feel well protected by an impressive crust of entitlements won over the last 200 years (even if the crust *is* getting thinner at the fringes). Thus, for most people, *the battles worth fighting for seem to be won*. Meanwhile, increasing numbers sense a certain entrapment: Caught between an information overload continuously insisting that the situation for the world's majority is acute, and a steady stream of *tittytainment* – which, for some, may be as alienating as comforting. Many resolve to make it personal. It is from their swelling ranks that the *Pedagogy of the Powerful* draws both its vanguard and its followers.

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[37] Bhagwati, 2004:122

2.5. FACILITATIVE: THE GROWTH AND RESTRUCTURING OF THE AID ENTERPRISE

A commonplace consequence of neo-liberal globalization has been the rolling back of the Northern public sector. While this might have affected the *constituents* of civil society organizations adversely, it has certainly benefited them *qua* organizations. By the late 1990s, the size of the non-profit sector in the five biggest OECD economies were USD 1,3 trillion – equivalent to the combined 1995 GDP of 50 poorest countries plus China and India (at the time). There are presently at least 15,000 registered transboundary NGOs (Florini, 2001). This formidable growth in the voluntary sector of the development enterprise is accompanied by increased funding toward implementing capacity of NGOs in South (Coates and David, 2002). This has not only given Northern pedagogues more capable and demanding partners in the South, but also necessitated a shift in the activity of Northern NGOs; typically towards advocacy. The biggest employer among the Norwegian NGOs, Norwegian Church Aid (NCA) – with an annual turnover in the vicinity of $100 million, comprising some 500 partner organisations across 70 countries – employs 135 staff in its Oslo HQ, compared to a mere 40 expats posted in the Global South (most of which are region-, country- or program directors.[38] By comparison, during the heyday of in-field implementation programs of the 1980's, more than 250 Norwegians were employed by NCA in Mali and Southern Sudan alone.

3. FOUR PEDAGOGIES: MAKING A DIFFERENCE – AND MAKING IT RIGHT?

Literature in tangent study fields typically conceives of transnational advocacy as either *confrontational* or *collaborative,* or as *combining* the two. In light of the broader topical scope of the *Pedagogy of the Powerful*, I propose that we expand the typology, and think in terms of four distinct 'pedagogies': *Dialogue; confrontation; mobilization; and culture jamming*. Many, but certainly not all, pedagogues and campaigns combine such pedagogies. Their *weighting* or

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[38] Numbers retrieved from http://www.nca.no/article/articleview/1825

sequencing often reflects the phase their effort is in: An erstwhile combination of *confrontation* and *mobilisation* may *be followed by dialogue* as the pedagogue has successfully proven herself to be a 'stakeholder' to reckon with. This was typically the case with Christian Aid's engagement with British supermarkets on the issue of their trading and sourcing practices: The organization set out with a broad confrontational campaign in which consumers collected supermarket receipts to demonstrate the purchasing power behind their demand and published scoreboards in newspapers. This provoked the institutionalisation of the *Ethical Trading Initiative* (ETI); ETI now operates in a distinctly collaborative spirit. Moreover, pedagogues sometimes move from one pedagogy to another and back again. This was the case with SAPRIN whose constituent member organization set out with a distinctly confrontational critique of the World Bank's structural adjustment programmes; subsequently got invited by the Bank to compile a *civil society review* of the programmes (SAPRI); only to find that their review was non-edible for the Bank who shelved the report.[39] Consequently, the constituent organizations withdrew from the dialogue and reverted to confrontational strategies.

Pedagogies are the means with which political change is produced. Thus, when studying specific interventions, we may seek to understand the character and inclination of the different pedagogies, and how they tend to produce different outcomes – both intended and unintended ones. However, this does not mean that we may device neat and standardized *monitoring and evaluation exercises* or *impact assessment* toolkits. The very globalization of advocacy itself; the diversity of civil society; of decision-making dynamics and the multiple layers of strategies and outcomes, militate against any quick fixes and standard approaches[40].

Three problems warrant particular mention here. First, all advocacy interventions (barring perhaps the most narrow of legalist approaches) are *inherently messy*: Targets are typically moving; allies come and go; messages and objectives are not always spelt out clearly – in fact they are often consciously and determinedly *not*. Second, most interventions rely on cooperation in one form or another: It is consequently naïve to believe that one may isolate the effort of any single actor or

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[39] SAPRIN, 2000

[40] Coates and David, 2002: 531

organization and conclude whether his/her intervention has been *decisively* progressive, good or successful. Thirdly, whenever the decision maker targeted is in a distinctly *adversarial* relationship with the pedagogue, one may ask both parties whether and how the advocacy effort has made a difference, but it makes little sense to take their answers at 'face value': A corporate decision maker may be enraged by a *naming and shaming* campaign, and be compelled to the discredit the pedagogue. Yet, the campaign may nevertheless force the company to change its behaviour.

3.1. DIALOGUE

Dialogues and partnerships have become an increasingly popular pedagogy among NGOs, as is evident in the growing number of lobbying efforts toward Northern governments and corporations. Cooperative and slow in nature, dialogues ensure access to 'insider' knowledge regarding what it takes to have the decision maker act constructively, and provides ample space for diverse inputs from the pedagogue. Reminiscent of 'the good conversation', dialogues allow mutually informed choices and joint targeted action. There are scores of dialogue examples in the *corporate social responsibility* field of the *Pedagogy of the Powerful* – ranging from NGO-business partnerships to promote sustainably managed forests (Forest Stewardship Council) and sustainably managed fisheries (Marine Stewardship Council) to safeguarding of societal interests in the development of GMOs[41]. NGOs are eager to lobby governments, too. Recall that two of the campaigns mentioned in the first part of this paper – the *Landmines Campaign* and *Jubilee 2000* – carved out alliances with some governments, alongside occasional confrontations and continuous popular mobilization. Lobbying may create self-sustaining political dynamics, through 'reverse lobbying'; that is, when decision makers seek out the support of pedagogues "in the belief that the latter [have] access to, and therefore influence on, voter or, more narrowly, on other policymakers"[42]. Since reverse lobbying is assumed to come into play when the pedagogue is seen to possess widely recognized moral authority, technical expertise or political clout due to a large membership, lobby capabilities are partly a product of other pedagogies, and on the pedagogue's credible claims to legitimacy.

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[41] Bendell, 2000
[42] Donnelly, 2002: 168

Some dialogues become *institutionalized* in 'multi-stakeholder' organization: This is the case with the British ETI (and the Norwegian sister organization, IEH): Here, NGOs, trade unions and companies have committed themselves to a lasting and professionalized collaboration so as to ensure that all imports of the business members are produced in accordance with a *base code* comprising core social and environmental standards. *Fair Trade Organizations* represent even deeper levels of institutionalization: The same type of actors as in ETI are involved, but here they have committed themselves to ensure that *some parts* of the business members imports are traded at guaranteed prices, and in accordance with relatively lofty standards; consequently, these imports may labelled as 'fair' and sold with a price premium to consumers. However, rather than relying on an ongoing dialogue in any literal sense, the interests and concerns of different parties have become condensed into the operating procedures of professional fair trade secretariats, and in rules on how business members' may source, pay for and market commodities.

There are several pitfalls with partnerships. They are typically vulnerable to claims that they *greenwash* or *whitewash* companies[43]. By endowing a minor chunk of a company's activity with a 'humanitarian alibi' and allowing the company's spin-doctors to make a whole lot of noise about its responsibility, partnership may help obscure that the company's *overall* or *core* activity may remain neither fair nor sustainable. Even if pedagogues are aware of such dangers and set out to design the partnership accordingly, they nevertheless find themselves in trouble. It can be surprisingly easy to extract promises from decision-makers behind closed doors; yet, mainstreaming such promises into corporate machineries is quite another matter, especially since promises can be broken with little cost. Whenever pedagogues invest moral capital in partnerships that fail to produce substantive change in corporate behaviour, they will typically have to stand up to accusations of 'selling out' or of being *co-opted;* consequently they may face a loss of popular following and credibility. A telling example is the ongoing debate as to whether the

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[43] Du Toit, 2001. See also http://www.businessethics.ca/greenwashing/;

Fair Trade system has been hollowed out by corporate feet-dragging and apparent misappropriation[44].

Such concerns are well-founded. However, engaging critically with *dialogue* as a pedagogy is not about rejecting dialogue as a potentially progressive pedagogy but about exploring *whether, how* and *under what circumstance*s pedagogues may effectively safeguard their integrity and attain progressive results while in partnerships with business[45].

3.2. CONFRONTATION

The *confrontational* pedagogy typically posses the inverse qualities of the dialogue: It seeks to hold to account the target decision maker – often by way of embarrassment; and invariably in the open, public domain. By 'naming and shaming' through media or public events, pedagogues point to the importance of the issue at hand; disclose and denounce the failure of the decision maker to act appropriately; and sometimes suggest how the decision maker *should* behave. Consequently, the target may be cajoled to make promises or grant concessions with a larger public audience as witness. Confrontation, then, is the quintessential NGO pedagogy. The emblematic case is that of the *International Baby Food Action Network* vs *Nestle*. The confrontational pedagogy avoids the pitfalls of the dialogue – by default: Since the pedagogue works *against* rather than *with* the decision maker, there cannot be talk of any cooptation or integrity infringement. Consequently, confrontations are favoured by pedagogues that are reluctant to 'dirty their hands' and eager to retain their 'purity' in political and identity terms.

That does not mean that 'naming and shaming'-style confrontations are without pitfalls: They almost invariably rely on media outlets to get their message through to a larger audience – which is necessary to affect the decision-maker. Mass media has great potential as a site for political contestation in the Global North. Working with media confronts pedagogues with considerable challenges:

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[44] http://avis.dn.no/artikler/avis/article6258.ece
[45] Pahle, 2007

"The genre and style of media coverage tend to construct a particular kind of storyline: David vs. Goliath, goodies vs. baddies and so on. Social movement stories are often easily presented in this mould, making them appealing subjects for media coverage […] [However, in the process of creating] media storylines, subtleties of [advocates'] framing are often lost. The science and knowledge claims involved may also be reconstructed" [46]

The storyline may create more noise than was intended, and the message may be given undesired spin that elicits the wrong responses. In short, then, the problem with the confrontational pedagogy is: Plenty effect, but on what premises and to what avail? It may not be all that difficult to hit a target forcefully. Yet, the blow is delivered from a distance – it may enrage the target and foreclose constructive engagement. In the worst of cases it may provoke responses that are outright harmful for the very people that were supposed to benefit from the intervention. A case in point is *Norwegian Church Aid (NCA) vs. Tommy Hilfiger*. Through its humanitarian work for Burmese migrants in the border city Mae Sot in Northern Thailand during the late 1990s and early 2000s, NCA and local partners had discovered that migrants were being held in bonded labour arrangements in local garment factories. The individual worker's permit to stay in Thailand was issued to and 'held in trust' by factory owners; this obviously facilitated extreme exploitation: In order to endure inhumane shifts and overtime, workers were given amphetamine in their drinks, and were forced to sign false salary statement inflating their actual pay. It then transpired that one of the larger factories served as sub-contractor for a manufacturer in Bangkok; consequently, the Burmese workers in Mae Sot were occasionally sewing garments for Tommy Hilfiger. Since Tommy had a quite ambitious 'code of conduct' governing its sourcing practices, NCA assumed that disclosing the situation in Mae Sot might compel the company to intervene and improve the situation for the Burmese workers. The organization invited a journalist of high standing to make a TV documentary about the dismal situation, which got primetime airing. Tommy retorted that the film was libellous; that the garments made in Mae Sot were counterfeits; and that their contractor in Bangkok was contractually obliged not to sub-contract its orders. Within the next

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[46] Leach and Scoones, 2007: 25

couple of months, however, the Mae Sot factories lost sizeable contracts with Bangkok, and hundreds of Burmese workers were fired and deported.

Taking decision makers to court (litigation) is the other key confrontational mean. Litigation, however, invokes the principles of the *rechtstaat* and may consequently be thought of more as a conventional advocacy and citizenship exercise than a transboundary *pedagogy*. Barring the most severe misdeeds – such as aiding and abetting crimes against humanity – developed countries legal systems rarely provide mechanisms for holding decision makers to account for actions committed in the jurisdiction of other countries. A notable exception merits attention here – the contested *US Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA)*. ATCA establishes that grave violations, no matter *where*, constitute a domestic tort if perpetrated by a US legal subject. This enables victims of grave overseas rights violations abetted by US companies to avail themselves of US courts to sue for violations of the 'law of nations'. Thus, in 2004, *Unocal* was forced to settle a lawsuit that had been brought against it for its alleged role in abetting slavery - by Burmese plaintiffs.

Litigation, too, has its pitfalls. Leach and Scoones note that it turns the courts into the ultimate arbiter. Far from being absolutely neutral and objective, the courtroom is a political space where some knowledge is rendered as 'evidence', while other knowledge is rendered 'biased', according to jurisprudence commonly determined by the very same unfair political order against which the litigation is a reaction. "This illustrates the argument made in social and anthropological studies of law: that law is not necessarily the neutral arbiter that it is sometimes made out to be"[47]. While the litigation itself has a built-in individualising and depoliticising tendency, pedagogues commonly turn it into a broader performative event: "The court room drama – or even its prospects – can be created as an event which may occasion high-profile demonstrations and stunts outside the courtroom, bringing associated media coverage[48].

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[47] *ibid*: 23
[48] *ibid*: 24

3.3. MOBILIZATION

In one way or another, the clout of an advocacy intervention eventually reflects its capacity to tacitly project the 'weight' of a *constituency* onto the target decision-maker. Using the pedagogy of *mobilization* is to make this 'weight' *explicit*. It typically involves mass rallies, petitions or consumer action, and may prove effective whenever the target decision-maker has a stake in 'winning the hearts and minds' of the people being mobilized. Recall the case of *Jubilee 2000*: Few politicians would dare to ignore a call supported by a groundswell of seventeen million voices. This does not mean that the political weight of mobilization is reducible to its mere 'body count': Modest numbers may suffice if the people mobilized are constituents that the decision maker is compelled to be particularly responsive too. During the Norwegian *Jubilee 2000* effort, the churches mobilized some 75,000 church members to sign the campaign petition. That is quite a crowd – but not exactly a groundswell. However, the Development Minister at the time was from the Christian Democratic Party, and she might have been particularly alert by the call from people deemed as her 'core constituents'. So, she embraced the debt relief cause with considerable determination, and made the Norwegian government a key driver in the process toward the enhanced HIPC.

A particularly popular variety of this pedagogy is that of *consumer mobilization*. There may be *friendly* consumer mobilizations, as when NGOs compel their Northern constituents to purchase *fair trade coffee* rather than their ordinary roast; and there may be *unfriendly mobilizations* as in *boycott* campaigns. There certainly are cases of successful consumer boycotts: Recall that millions resolved to boycott *French wine* during the mid-1990s in a reaction to nuclear tests with devastating effects on environment and people in French Polynesia; French wines lost some 50% of their market shares in Europe and the Far East, and President Chirac was eventually compelled to call off some planned tests. Yet, most boycott campaigns commonly create more fuzz than actual, lasting effects on decision makers' behaviour: The boycott against Nestlé is a case in point. The effects of other high profile boycotts – such as those against *MacDonald's; Nike* and *Shell* – remain mixed, at best.

But there are questions beyond those regarding clout to suggest that we engage critically with the pedagogy of mobilization. Hickey and Mohan (2005) are among those who warn that 'the participatory turn' in development praxis may result in the co-optation within grander disempowering agendas unless mobilizations are nested within wider political projects; invoke a broader sense of political citizenship; and engage themselves with underlying process of social change rather than discrete technocratic interventions. They distinguish between *imminent* and *immanent* development, "where the former is concerned with [a singular] willed development policy and the latter is concerned with the underlying process of development"[49].

They shed further light on the distinction by stating that mobilization should

> "not only bring people into the political processes, but also to transform and democratize the political process in ways that progressively alter the immanent processes of inclusion and exclusion […] which govern the opportunities of individuals and groups to claim their right to participation and resources [50]

A historic case of boycott that may be seen to fulfil such a lofty requirement, is Gandhi's call on the Indian bourgeoisie and middle strata to roll back their increasing purchase of British-made garments towards the end of the British Colony; by the 1930's such imports had effectively replaced much of the domestic garment production. First, far from a narrow protectionist campaign to bolster the interest of any domestic industrial segment, this call was anchored 'downwards' by being explicitly people-centric (as opposed to state-centric or business-centric efforts); the 'businesses' replaced by imports were largely small-scale, very labour intensive and artisan in character, and had previously provided an important livelihood option for millions of Indians. It thus had the character of invoking citizenship ideas amongst the partly disenfranchised. Secondly, the call was anchored 'upwards' in a larger political project of wider change – namely, in the progressive-nationalist campaign to rid India of its colonizers – and was thus just one amongst many manifestations of resistance, albeit a quite targeted one. Thirdly,

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[49] Hickey and Mohan, 2005: 241

[50] *ibid*: 251, emphasis added

Gandhi even anchored the call symbolically-spiritually, by making his own semi-naked person – continuously working a small, traditional spinning wheel – the figurehead of the call, thus uplifting a 'small people' facet of the Indian cultural repertoire to the forefront of middle class consciousness, while at the same time identifying himself directly and instantly with the poor masses.

The point is that in order for mobilizations to be truly transformative they ought to be an integral part of a wider effort to ensure citizen's power and contribute towards changes in the larger political game, rather than just 'band-aid' what's already skewed or broken. This does not suggest, however, that we shall be programmatically critical of mobilizations targeted at *singular decisions* in a *particular* arena – sometimes small changes might have momentous outcomes. In fact, a typical pitfall of mobilization as 'pedagogy' is quite often that it is insufficiently framed and targeted. Mobilizers are often inclined to 'populist' framing – using *empty signifiers* ('fair trade, not free trade'; 'another world is possible') to capture the hearts and minds of the many and align a series of demands into a discursively constructed 'chain of equivalence'[51].

The problem with an *empty signifier* is that once it is to be translated into discrete political decisions, the diverse demands that was hitherto subsumed under it, become disjointed from each other: As some constituent demands are ceded to while others remain ignored, they are realigned into a 'chain of difference' and the erstwhile coalition of demanders comes undone. There is no way of escaping from this problem other than by overthrowing the entire hegemonic formation that the mobilization is reacting to. But since that rarely is an option for pedagogues, they are commonly tempted to *abstain* from splitting their empty signifiers into neat and politically actionable demands. Think of the massive *Live8* rally targeted at the 2005 G8 Summit in *Gleneagles*: While it mobilized millions, it shied away from breaking its populist heading ('Make Poverty History') into sufficiently concrete demands. Consequently, G8 leaders could ascertain that they *had* met popular demands by pointing to the fact that they *did* resolve to increase aid funding and

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[51] Laclau, 2005; see also Phillips and Jørgensen, 2002

debt relief somewhat; no one could convincingly counter: "The exact demand of the millions was x and y, but *you* ceded just a half-x and a z".

3.4. CULTURE JAMMING

In some crucial ways, the pedagogy of *culture jamming* is radically different from the rest: The political logic of *dialogue, confrontation and mobilization* is about expressing demands, and make identified decision-makers act on them. Culture jamming, by contrast, rarely has a clear target or an articulate message – it is a 'deeper' pedagogy that targets the very ways in which people perceive of the world and their place in it. This is commonly done through the creation of *surprise, irony or alienation*, which subvert an established order of meaning. If, following Clifford Geertz, we think of man as an animal suspended in *webs of meaning* he himself has spun, then cultural activism is a pedagogy that "seeks to take back control of how our webs of meaning […] are created and disseminated"[52]. Whereas "the old resistance of barricades, marches or armed guerrillas intervened at points of *production, destruction or decision*, [this kind of resistance intervenes] at points of *potential, assumptions and consumptions*"[53]. According to Verson, its core desire is that of an 'insurrectionary imaginary' in which people are freed from what the famous Brazilian *theatre of the oppressed*-director Augusto Boal termed "the cop in the head". Cultural jamming aspires to change the ground rules according to which more explicit politics must be played out.

Culture jamming comprises a wide variety of activities that operate on the intersection of art, messaging, performance and politics. It includes the 'hacktivism' of the infamous *Yes Men* impostors, who created a fake WTO webpage (http://gatt.org) with the headline "WTO announces formalized slave market for Africa". It also comprises murals; political theatre; carnival and frivolity and rebel clowning. However, the most popular subdivision within this pedagogy is *subvertising* and *adbusting*; manipulation and morphing of the advertising language:

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[52] Verson, 2007: 173

[53] *ibid*: 174

"A 'subvert' mimics the look and feel of the targeted ad, promoting the classic 'double-take' as viewers suddenly realize they have been duped. Subverts create cognitive dissonance. It cuts through the hype and glitz of our mediated reality and, momentarily, reveals a deeper truth within"[54]

Culture jamming has its challenges, too: It is not immune to co-optation and counter-subversion. "One placard that got plenty of media coverage at the biggest 2003 anti-war march in London was 'Make Tea Not War' [depicting Tony Blair with a teacup upside-down on his head], a placard, it turned out, that was made by an advertising agency […] These days the battles happens more in the mental environment of advertising space and public relations trickery than in the streets"[55]

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[54] Adbusters, quoted in *ibid:* 178; a series of interesting subvertising cases in Klein, 2000
[55] The Vacuum Cleaner, 2007: 187

4. THREE DIMENSIONS OF LEGITIMACY – RIGHTFUL OR RIGHTEOUS PEDAGOGUES?

In the following I discuss three dimensions along which pedagogues claim *legitimacy* for their interventions: *Knowledge, representation and moral*. Note that these dimensions cannot be sharply distinguished from each other – in fact, they are commonly interwoven and mutually supportive. When pedagogues successfully convince others that the demands of their advocacy somehow represent the interests of people whose voices are otherwise muted, they simultaneously imbue their cause with *moral superiority* and allude to an *access to knowledge* that matters. I nevertheless threat them as separate here, so as to highlight the different assumptions and mechanisms that come into play in each dimension.

4.1. CLAIMING TO 'KNOW'

'How may *we* change so as to help the poor?' is a quintessential question in the *Pedagogy of the Powerful*. One way of framing an answer is by way of *knowledge*, suggesting that we can somehow discern the 'truth' about what changes will benefit the poor, and how. This may reflect distrust in conventional politics' capacity to represent the interest of the poor, or that Global or Northern decisions affect the poor through complicated casual chains whose workings can only be determined through careful study. In this regard, pedagogues increasingly rely on credible knowledge producers and thus involve 'epistemic communities' (academics, researchers) in their pedagogy. Epistemic communities' do not derive their influence from acting as 'agents' of any societal interest in the traditional sense, but rather on account of their credible claims to 'truth':

> 'Epistemic communities […] have (1) a *shared set of normative and principled beliefs*, which provide a value-based rationale for the social action of community members; (2) *shared causal beliefs*, which are derived from their analysis of practices leading or contributing to a central set of problems in their domain and which then serve as the basis for elucidating the multiple linkages between possible policy actions and desired outcomes; (3) *shared notions of validity* – that is, intersubjective, internally-defined criteria for weighing and validating knowledge in the domain of their

expertise; and (4) *a common policy enterprise* – that is, a set of common practices associated with a set of problems to which their professional competence is directed, presumably out of the conviction that human welfare will be enhanced as a consequence'[56].

Epistemic communities' influence rests entirely with their *shared causal beliefs* and *shared notion of validity*. Without these, their authoritative voices would cease; their members are assumed to forward policy advice *only to the extent* that the advice will stand up to internal scrutiny (i.e., rigorous debate; peer review and re-testing).

> "Increasingly, science is the resource called on to promote consensus, and experts are brought in to 'settle' political and social controversies. Yet, this 'scientization of politics' simultaneously brings about a 'politicization of science' […] political disputes tend to become technical disputes […]" [57]

Yet, if narrow science becomes a single-handed arbiter in political conflicts, it may allow technical terms to prevail – in a domain were root causes are hard to grasp in scientific terms. This concerns pedagogues, too. Therefore, they are not content to be mere recipients of knowledge, but set out to *shape* knowledge production actively. Leach and Scoones[58] suggest we pay attention to different ways in which 'pedagogues' of different hues engage with science in pursuit of political change, including:

> "a) disputing scientific claims; b) seeking to acquire a cachet of scientific authority by finding a scientific expert to validate their political stance; c) rejecting the scientific way of knowing and advancing their claims to expertise from some wholly different epistemological standpoint; and d) attempting to stake out some ground on the scientists' own terrain by questioning not just the uses of science, not just the control over science, but

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[56] Haas, 1992:3, emphasis added

[57] Epstein, quoted in Leach and Scoones, 2007: 16

[58] *ibid:* 17, drawing on Epstein

sometimes the very content of science and the processes by which it is produced"

Pedagogues are invariably engaged in complicated balancing act. On the one hand, they want to 'bask in the reflected glory' of *episteme*. But on the other, they know very well that the premises of knowledge may betray their cause. Engaging critically with the Pedagogy of the Powerful must therefore mean to keep a keen eye on the ways in which knowledge is constructed and made politically instrumental. As noted before, this is not so much a matter of finding out whether something is true or false; knowledge *is* inevitably socially constructed. But it means to remain critical about the extent to which counter-claims are considered; the extent to which the pedagogue is clear about the premises of his/her intervention and the likely biases entailed – in short: the extent of 'intellectual honesty'. This is particularly important in light of the fact that pedagogues use knowledge in is original format, but translate it into the realm of politics; fit it to suit the standard narratives of media; or to work with the larger dramaturgy of a film.

4.2. CLAIMING TO 'REPRESENT'

The most straightforward way of responding to the question 'how may we change so as to help the poor?' is to reply: *Ask the poor themselves what they want*. While this is unfeasible in the literal sense (indeed, it entails grafting an unduly banal action map onto a very complex political terrain), representation as a principle is nevertheless a central ground for claiming legitimacy in the Pedagogy of the Powerful. While "many NGO's deny the concept of representation, pointing out that local communities […] are able to adequately represent themselves"[59], transnational advocacy is premised precisely on the dispersed nature of decision making in the age of globalization, and the need for articulations across borders. Consequently, "it cannot be denied that NGOs are in fact *representing interests* when they operate with an expertise in a specific political arena and use that knowledge to carry a campaign concern to a new level of decision making"[60] Most Pedagogy of the Powerful interventions typically comprise *alliances between*

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[59] Jordan and Van Tuijl, 2002: 2053
[60] *ibid*: 2053

Northern and Southern actors, tacitly or explicitly invoking the idea that the former somehow represent the latter. However, Jordan and Van Tuijl remind us that there are no neat accountability mechanisms in transnational advocacy: Accountability requires a *formal medium*, such as votes or shares through which the representatives' mandate can be vindicated or withdrawn. Thus, representation in the narrow, conventional sense "does not provide a sufficiently viable conceptual and practical approach to come to terms with power relations as they emerge in the context of transnational NGO advocacy campaigns" (ibid: 2054)

Jordan and Van Tuijl nevertheless contend that we *may* assess representation, in a less formal conception, through the proxy notion of 'political responsibility'. First, we should scrutinize the *division of labour* between Northern and Southern actors, and whether it is clearly recognized who has expertise and knowledge in which political arena and whether the boundaries established by that expertise. Second, we should scrutinize the *way in which agendas are set, and strategy built*: "It is essential to […] lay out explicitly what one's objectives are and then develop a strategy with transparent goals. Among the issues that need to be recognized is *who bears the risks* associated with campaign positions" (ibid: 2055). Third, we should inquire into how *financial resources are raised and allocated*: "The availability of financial resources is a major factor contributing to lopsided relationships among NGOs [in networks or collaborative campaigns] as the bulk of resources is in the hands of a relatively small group of NGOs in the North". Not only are transparency and explicit agreements on these matters necessary; the responsibility for *raising funds should be clearly separated from advocacy*, so that fundraising concerns does not spill over into and unduly affect sensitive strategic decisions. Fourth, how does information flow? In advocacy, information is the most powerful tool, and the direction, density and quality of information flowing between partners is an important proxy for responsibility. Moreover, its articulation must be sensitive to multiple arenas and users. Fifth, to what extent are relationships formalized? Action committees, Memorandum of Understandings, production of joint newsletters between partners, constitute bonds of formalization (at declining levels of responsibility).

On the basis of such considerations, advocacy campaigns may be organized in a typology of four archetypical relationships of power, ranging from the *cooperative campaign* with the highest level of political responsibility and representation, via the *concurrent* and the *disassociated* campaigns with intermediate political responsibility, to the competitive campaign with no political responsibility at all:

Table 1. *Overview of campaign typologies*

Title Objectives	*Cooperative* Interlocking	*Concurrent* Compatible	*Disassociated* Conflicting	*Competitive* Opposing
Information	High frequency, global distribution, easily accessible, freely shared	Regular, multiphased, more tightly directed, freely shared	Infrequent, lopsided, difficult to access, shared with reservation	Minimal, no direct flow, inaccessible, not shared
Strategy	Continuous review, joint management, risks based upon most vulnerable	Frequent review, coexisting management, risks based upon national arena	Occasional review, management and risks exclusive to varying arenas	No review, single arena management, no recognition of risks
Level of political responsibility achieved	High	Medium	Low	None

Source: Jordan and Van Tuijl,
2000: 2056

This typology may be employed when we engage critically with specific Pedagogy of the Powerful interventions. However, important subtleties are not laid out here. The most common form of representation in transnational politics – 'representation through association' through alliances and networks – sometimes resemble *Baptist and Bootleggers Coalitions*. The term invokes a trait of US politics during the era of prohibition: Continued ban of alcohol sales was eagerly supported by both Baptists, on moral grounds, and by bootleggers who made large fortunes from selling alcohol on the black market. The primary characteristic of Baptist and Bootleggers coalition is that actors *pursue the same goal*, and rely *on each other to attain the requisite political clout*, but are *involved for different reasons*, reflecting different concerns and interest.

It is not hard to think of potential examples in the contemporary politics of globalization: First, consider La *Via Campesina*, a broad peasant movement of Northern and Southern small scale farmer organizations, respectively: Both parties share reliance on domestic agricultural market privileges for their livelihoods'

sustenance, and consequently share a dislike for globalization of agricultural trade. They therefore share in the call for *food sovereignty* for all countries ('WTO out of Agriculture'). A second potential case is the presently hibernating campaign of Northern and (some) Southern trade unions for a *social clause* in the WTO – i.e. a mechanism by which exporters' market access rights are suspended in the enforcement of core ILO labour standards. The two parties share a deep concern for the extent to which deepening trade integration creates a race to the bottom which detracts from enforcement of core ILO conventions.

Such coalitions are not inherently illegitimate. But the 'Baptist and Bootleggers' perspective compels us to scrutinize the *differences* that their shared cause tends to obscure, and the potentially iniquitous political outcomes of their shared effort: As campaign demands are translated into the complex politics, the outcome may turn out to produce results that are eminently *helpful for the one side* but *detrimental to the other*. In the case of *Via Campesina*, the ousting of agriculture of the WTO will certainly grant food sovereignty to the Northern constituents. But it is unlikely to afford effective sovereignty to developing countries; their extent of sovereignty is determined by World Bank/IMF conditionality and bilateral asymmetrical trade treaties, too. One-sided sovereignty might easily become a nightmare for Southern farmers. In the case of the demand for a social clause, its translation into politics may equip rich countries with a protectionist escape clause that may be abused to block imports from the South. In that case, Southern constituents may be affected negatively by the success of their own campaign[61]. The problem with either campaign is *not* that Northern parties withhold or skew information; it is just that the campaigns themselves are not sufficiently preoccupied with how the benefits and cost are distributed in the case of politically sub-optimal outcomes. Since *Via Campesina* does qualify as a concurrent campaign (perhaps even cooperative), we should at least complement Jordan and Van Tuijl's typology with critical attention to the 'secondary preference'-asymmetries of Baptist and Bootleggers coalitions.

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[61] TWIN-SAL, 1999

4.3. Claiming 'Moral Authority'

The final stylized way of responding to the question 'how may we change so as to help the poor?' is: *To do what is right*. Moral authority is, undoubtedly, a considerable force in transnational advocacy. While it may be amplified through credible claims to representation and knowledge, it commands a certain respect in its own right: Demands which come across as being motivated by unselfish moral reasoning has a dignified quality which demands grounded in self-interest cannot achieve – regardless of claims to knowledge and representation. Some pedagogues may invoke moral authority by virtue of sheer stature – recall how high church leaders played a crucial role in the campaigning for debt relief. This is precisely because clerics are supposed to be pious, and their actions governed not by self-interest but moral reasoning. But recall that the debt campaign also drew on moral resources that were *not* primarily attributes of the pedagogues themselves. Oxfam's interventions played on and reassembled existing standards for what's considered to be fair and reasonable by society at large, as when they successfully elicited public indignation by revealing that debtor countries' famine aid receipts equalled only half of what recipients spent in debt servicing.

Morals serve as 'weapons of the weak' "Non-state actors that are otherwise weak can exploit the legitimacy inherent in international norms to construct transnational networks and transform prevailing conceptions of state interests[62]. In such efforts, pedagogues engage in 'frame bridging' and 'frame amplification': When pedagogues argue that import liberalization in developing countries undermine economic rights of small scale farmers dependent on privileged access to home markets, they certainly *amplify* human rights as referents (instead of, say, 'efficiency' or 'growth'). But they also *bridge* human rights concerns with trade policy, and then shift the ground rules for discussing trade policy itself. Following Khagram et al, we may think of *ideas* as beliefs held by individuals, while norms are intersubjective ideas for proper behaviour. Moreover, we may distinguish between *causal* and *principled* ideas. Whereas the former corresponds to what I have labelled *knowledge claims* above (they are about cause and effect, and are

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[62] Thomas, quoted in Khagram *et al*, 2002a: 16

commonly supported by evidence), principled ideas are "about the rights and wrong […] they may be related to causal ideas, but cannot easily be resolved by appeals to evidence. When principled ideas are accepted by a broad range of actors, they *become norms*"[63].

Moreover, we may think of norms as having life cycles: Brought into being through a *norm emergence;* growing up to a norm threshold or *tipping point*; reaching its prime through a *norms cascade* and coming of age through *norm internalization*. Norm *emergence* is often signalled by an international declarations or a program of action; recall the declarations made by the UK, Danish and Swedish governments in the debt campaign. The *tipping point* corresponds to the enactment of the HIPC1996, followed by a *norms cascade* as increasing number of donors and different forums acknowledge that debt relief was the 'right thing' to do. It would be contrived to talk of full-fledged *norm internationalization* in the debt issue, since actors still contest the extent, modalities and implications in their varying rhetoric justifications or rejections of debt relief.

The major challenge facing pedagogues relying on morals is the peril of espousing moral discourses that the alleged beneficiaries do not concur with, or are outright offended by. This was the case with the *Jubilee 2000*. Recall that its moral mainstay was: *Can't pay – should be pardoned*. However, as this discourse took its hold over the debt debate during the 1990s, developing country actors increasingly saw themselves as being tacitly portrayed as *victims* of their own immaturity. Consequently, Southern advocates voiced the position that the debt crisis was not something that needed pardoning – it was just as much about *odious* lending, including to dictators and corrupt projects, and loans given on exploitative premises. Such Southern advocates increasingly espoused the qualitatively different moral principle: *Don't owe – shouldn't pay* [64]

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[63] *ibid*: 14

[64] Keet, 2002

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