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State versus Nonstate Influence: A discourse analysis of two actors at the UN Climate Negotiations

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MSc International Relations

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Negotiations

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Declaration

I, Marie Tangen Olafsen, declare that this thesis is a result of my research investigations and findings. Sources of information other than my own have been acknowledged and a reference list has been appended. This work has not been previously submitted to any other university for award of any type of academic degree.

Signature: *Marie Tangen Olafsen*

Date: May 27th, 2020

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Abstract

The Paris Agreement's bottom-up approach provides new responsibilities and spaces to influence for both states and nonstate actors participating at the UN Climate Negotiations. This thesis applies a discourse analysis to texts produced by both a state and a nonstate actor in the time period of 2011-2018 and asks two questions: "How does the Norwegian Government and Climate Action Network use discourse to frame their positions at the UN Climate negotiations?" and "How are the discursive representations produced by Climate Action Network and the Norwegian Government institutionalized in the outcomes of the negotiations?". The analysis identifies the use of four dominant environmental discourses: "limits and survival", "economic rationalism", "ecological modernization" and "green politics". Both the Norwegian Government and Climate Action Network reproduce parts of these discourses and combine them to frame their interests. The presence of these discourses can also be found in decisions made at the negotiations in the chosen time period. The limits and survival discourse and its focus on urgency and global solutions is still dominant, but also challenged by parts of the political rationality in ecological modernization. Economic rationalism is present in solutions offered to mitigate climate change, while green politics can be identified especially in the recognition of equity and "common but differentiated responsibilities".

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1 Introduction

United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres called 2020 “a pivotal year for how we address climate change” (United Nations Secretary General, 2020). To reach the goals of the Paris Agreement and limit global warming to 1.5°C or 2°C, countries must raise their ambitions when updating their national climate plans this year. The pressure to raise ambitions does however not only come from the international level. Millions of people around the globe have mobilized in the “Friday’s for Future” movement, showing that the demand for more climate action also exists on the grassroots level. The question still remains if this is enough to create a momentum for change and pressure countries to actually follow up with real emission reductions and measures to build resilience to climate change. This does not only depend on external pressure but is also closely linked to countries’ national interests in climate policy, and the effectiveness of the bottom-up approach in the Paris Agreement to raise ambitions.

States, or the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, have formal voting power at the UN Climate Negotiations and are therefore the primary agents for policymaking in this international regime. They are on the other hand not the only actors with interests in international climate policy. Nonstate actors, like businesses and NGOs, participate as observers to the negotiations and have their own interests and goals. Without formal voting power, they must work differently than states to influence policymaking. Both states and nonstate actors, however, define positions regarding topics on the agenda for the UN climate negotiations. In these positions, one can identify the use of dominant discourses on environmental issues. These discourses are used to frame the actors’ interests and goals. The production and reproduction of discourses influence both how an issue is framed, and also what solutions are proposed to solve this issue. By promoting certain policies and solutions through these discourses, other alternative solutions are overlooked. Producing and reproducing discourses is therefore one way that states and nonstate actors can influence both the process and outcomes of the negotiations.

With the adoption of the Paris Agreement in 2015, both states and nonstate actors received new responsibilities. The Paris Agreement represents a bottom-up approach to international climate policy, and therefore departs from the Kyoto Protocol. This approach is especially evident in how states, within some specified terms and conditions, are free to decide their targets for

emission reductions. These targets are called “Nationally Determined Contributions” and contrasts the set emission targets allocated in the Kyoto Protocol. This provides states with more agency and responsibility to set targets that are in line with the Agreement’s long-term goal. Some mechanisms to review states’ contributions and increase ambition are established under the Paris Agreement, but it also relies on external pressure to raise ambition to the necessary level. This is where nonstate actors are provided a new space for influence. Nonstate actors, like NGOs, have participated at the UN Climate Negotiations since the adoption of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in 1992. With the bottom-up approach in the Paris Agreement, their role has however changed. Their participation is officially recognized and valued in the Agreement. This means that their access to the negotiations should be guaranteed every year, and also that they should be allowed to give inputs to the various work streams under the UNFCCC. In addition, their activity on and outside the negotiation arena is maybe equally important to influence policymaking and to create a momentum for change.

This thesis studies two actors at the negotiations to shed light on how discourses frame interests and how this manifest in the outcomes of the negotiations. I have chosen Norway to represent the governmental side, and Climate Action Network to represent the nonstate side. Despite being a small state, Norway has managed to gain a prominent position at the negotiations. In addition, Norway have a national interest in being part of international climate cooperation. By seeking the status has a front runner and being motivated by national interests, Norway should have both the will and possibility to influence the outcome of the negotiations. This makes Norway a relevant actor to analyze. Climate Action Network is an international network of NGOs. The network have over 1300 member organizations in more than 120 countries (Climate Action Network International, n.d.). This makes them the biggest coalition of NGOs at the negotiations. NGOs are driven by other interests than states, but still participates in the negotiations with a goal to achieve a specific outcome. Climate Action Network’s size and long-lasting presence at the negotiations give them legitimacy, and therefore also the possibility to influence the negotiations. This makes the network a relevant actor to analyze in addition to the Norwegian Government.

1.1 Objective and research questions

The objective of this thesis is to understand how actors use discourse to frame their interests and how this influence the outcomes of the UN Climate Negotiations. I therefore aim to identify how the Norwegian Government and Climate Action Network use discourse to frame their positions, and if and how these representations become institutionalized in the outcomes of the negotiations. Although these two actors have no obvious connection, comparing them allow me to study the different interests a state and a nonstate actor have, and if they both are able to influence the outcomes of the negotiations. By doing a discourse analysis, I aim to compare how these actors reproduce environmental discourses. I will compare the results from the discourse analysis with decisions from each conference in the period of 2011-2018 to hopefully uncover whether a state and a nonstate actor have the same possibility to discursively influence this process or not. I therefore mainly aim to add to the existing literature on environmental discourses, as well as on the role of NGOs at the UN Climate Negotiations.

The research questions are formulated as follows:

1. How does the Norwegian Government and Climate Action Network use discourse to frame their positions at the UN Climate Negotiations?
2. How are the discursive representations produced by Climate Action Network and the Norwegian Government institutionalized in the outcomes of the negotiations?

1.2 Structure of the thesis

Chapter 1 introduces the topic of the thesis and presents the objective and research questions. Chapter 2 provides an historical overview of the development of the UNFCCC regime, to explain how the Paris Agreement differs from the Kyoto Protocol and how it came to be what it is today. This provides relevant context for the later discussion. The third chapter will present a review of central literature on the topic of discourse and climate justice, which will serve as the theoretical framework for the analysis and clarify how this thesis situates itself within existing literature on the topic. Chapter 4 presents and explains the methodological choices made for the thesis. Chapter 5 presents the discourse analysis, and therefore provides an answer to the first research question. The results from this is further discussed in chapter 6, which provides an answer to the second research question. In chapter 7 I round of the thesis with a summary of my findings and a conclusion.

2 UNFCCC: from Kyoto to Paris

In this thesis, I aim to identify how environmental discourses reproduced by both a state and a nonstate actor are institutionalized in decisions leading up to the adoption of the Paris Agreement and its work programme. It also departs from the claim that the new approach to international climate action offered by the Paris Agreement opens up a new space for nonstate actors to influence the negotiations and that it is dependent on this influence to raise ambition. I therefore find it relevant to first provide an overview of the development of the UNFCCC regime. This is to show how and why the Paris Agreement became what it is today and how this differs from the approach offered by the Kyoto Protocol. In addition, I will shortly present some literature that explains the role nonstate actors, or more specifically NGOs, have at the negotiations.

The Paris Agreement was adopted in 2015 and serves the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. The Framework Convention was adopted in 1992 and opened for signatures at the Rio Conference the same year. It brings the world's countries together in the effort to reduce GHG emissions and combat climate change. In its preamble, the Convention acknowledges that human activities have caused global warming, and that the largest shares of GHG emissions have originated in developed countries (FCC/INFORMAL/84/Rev.1, 1992). It also introduces the principle of "common but differentiated responsibilities", which today has become fundamental for the work under the Convention, also in the Paris Agreement. The objective of the Convention is laid out in Article 2, which states that the aim is to achieve "...stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system." (FCC/INFORMAL/84/Rev.1, 1992). It does however not provide specific targets for emission reductions, or a set time frame for when the objective should be achieved. What it rather does is to encourage the future adoption of legal instruments that follows this objective.

The Convention established the "Conference of the Parties" (COP) as the official meeting ground for the Parties to the Convention. The COPs have been held every year since 1995. At COP3 in 1997 the first legal instrument was adopted under the Convention, namely the Kyoto Protocol. The Protocol assigned set emission targets to what it refers to as Annex 1 countries. This includes both member states of the OECD as well as those states that was in the transition to a market economy at the time. The targets were quantified and legally binding, and

therefore represent a top-down approach to climate change cooperation (Falkner, 2019, p. 272). In an effort to respect the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities” developing countries, or non-Annex 1, was not assigned set targets.

The Kyoto Protocol further defines several flexibility mechanisms that Annex 1 parties can use to reach their set targets. These flexibility mechanisms allow countries to reach their targets by not only reducing their domestic emissions. First of all, it allows the use of emissions trading. Emissions trading is referred to in Article 17 of the Protocol as a supplement to domestic actions that Annex 1 parties can use to fulfil their assigned targets (Decision 1/CP.3, 1997). Secondly, the Protocol establishes the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). The Clean Development Mechanism is defined in Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol, and has the purpose to assist non-Annex 1 countries in achieving sustainable development (Decision 1/CP.3, 1997). It allows Annex 1 countries to implement emission reduction projects in developing countries and use the acquired reductions as part of their quantified targets set by the Protocol. Lastly, Joint Implementation is defined in Article 6 of the Protocol (Decision 1/CP.3, 1997). This mechanism is similar to the CDM, but rather allows Annex 1 countries to count emission reductions from projects in other Annex 1 countries towards their assigned target. Explained in more simple terms, both the CDM and Joint Implementation mechanism allow Annex 1 countries to reach their targets by reducing emissions abroad instead of only reducing their domestic emissions. These mechanisms were operationalized in the Marrakech Accords that were adopted at COP7.

The first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol was set to 2008-2012, with the goal of reducing overall GHG emissions by 5 percent below 1990 levels during this period (Decision 1/CP.3, 1997, Article 3.1). Results from this period show that most countries reduced their emissions more than required, leading to an overachievement of the overall goal (Shishlov, Morel, & Bellassen, 2016, p. 770). On the other hand, it is worth mentioning that global emissions increased in the same period because of economic growth in some developing countries (Metz, 2013, p. 152). This was accepted in the design of the Protocol, in a need to respect equity concerns from developing countries (Metz, 2013, p. 152). The Doha Amendment from 2012 establishes that the second commitment period will start in 2013 and end in 2020. Several countries withdrew from this period, and targets were set at unambitious levels (Metz, 2013, p. 154). It soon became clear that a new approach was needed, and in 2011, at COP17 in

Durban, Parties committed to negotiate a new legally binding agreement by 2015 for the period after 2020 (Metz, 2013, p. 154).

In 2015, at COP21, the Paris Agreement was adopted just in time following the timeframe laid out in decision 1/CP.17 (Decision 1/CP.17, 2011). It represents a much-needed shift in the UNFCCC regime, from the top-down focus with the set emission reduction targets in the Kyoto Protocol, to a bottom-up approach with “Nationally Determined Contributions” (NDCs) in the Paris Agreement. In addition, the Paris Agreement moves away from the division between Annex 1 and Non-Annex 1 countries, giving more responsibility to all states by following the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities”. In practice, this means that all Parties to the Agreement are responsible for implementing measures to meet its goals, while also being free to define how they intend to do so (Falkner, 2019). This solved some of the conflicts surrounding distribution of responsibility under the Kyoto Protocol. USA, for example, raised concerns about how the Kyoto Protocol divided countries into two groups and only gave set targets to one group (Falkner, 2019, p. 273). This issue became more relevant as big developing countries like China and India experienced growth and contributed more and more towards global greenhouse gas emissions.

The Paris Agreement does not automatically carry forward the flexibility mechanisms established by the Kyoto Protocol, but it does recognize the use of voluntary cooperation among Parties to allow for higher ambitions in emission reductions (Decision 1/CP.21, 2015, Article 6.4). Article 6 of the Agreement defines the use of voluntary cooperation in three ways. It establishes the use of internationally transferred mitigation outcomes, meaning country to country cooperation, a mechanism for an international carbon market, and the use of non-market approaches (Decision 1/CP.21, 2015, Article 6). The Agreement further highlights Parties’ responsibility to avoid double counting when engaging in voluntary cooperation. This means for example that the emission reductions that result from this type of cooperation can only be used to demonstrate achievement in one Party’s Nationally Determined Contribution (Decision 1/CP.21, 2015, Article 6.5). This article has on the other hand turned out to be the most difficult to operationalize, and the rules have not yet been agreed on and adopted. The disagreement between Parties are mostly focused on how to measure additionality, meaning that the emission reductions would not occur in the absence of the mechanism, and how to avoid double counting

(Roth, Echeverria, & Gass, 2019). The result of these negotiations will have consequences for the environmental integrity of Article 6.

The bottom-up approach in the Paris Agreement is not only articulated through the Nationally Determined Contributions, but also through its inclusion of nonstate actors. It recognizes the importance of engaging various actors in its preamble, and later make reference to the importance of scientific knowledge, indigenous knowledge, and local knowledge systems. In addition, Article 12 raises the importance of public participation and public access to information, meaning that Parties' measures should be taken in a cooperative manner (Decision 1/CP.21, 2015). Although this has no explicit reference to nonstate actors or NGOs, a later decision that operationalizes this article specifies more closely. It reaffirms the key role that a broad range of stakeholders play in ensuring Action for Climate Empowerment, and includes non-governmental organizations as one of these stakeholders (Decision 17/CMA.1, 2018).

The presence of NGOs at the UN Climate Negotiations did however not start with the Paris Agreement. NGOs and other nonstate actors have been present at the UN Climate Negotiations since the adoption of the Convention in 1992. Several scholars have directed their attention to the influence of NGOs in the period before and after the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol (Betsill, 2008; Gulbrandsen & Andresen, 2004; Tjernshaugen & Lee, 2004), and more recent attention has also been provided to the role of NGOs within the Paris Agreement (Allan & Hadden, 2017; Bäckstrand, Kuyper, Linnér, & Lövbrand, 2017). Betsill (2008), for example, assesses the influence of environmental NGOs in the negotiations about the Kyoto Protocol leading up to its adoption in 1997. Many NGOs participated actively in these negotiations, and already then Climate Action Network was the main umbrella that they organized under. This allowed the NGOs to share information, discuss issues related to the negotiations, and coordinate lobbying efforts (Betsill, 2008, p. 46). Bäckstrand et al. (2017) present a more recent study which looks at the role of nonstate actors at the negotiations. It therefore includes a broader range of actors in addition to NGOs. They highlight how the Paris Agreement officially recognizes the inclusion of actors other than states, and therefore engages nonstate actors in several official processes under the Agreement (Bäckstrand et al., 2017, p. 566). This opens up more opportunities for NGOs to promote their positions and influence the process and outcomes of the negotiations.

Although the Paris Agreement rests on a bottom up approach, it still needs review mechanisms to make sure that countries raise their ambitions. The Agreement establishes some official review mechanisms, but, as argued by a few scholars, it also relies on nonstate actors to increase ambition (Bäckstrand et al., 2017; Falkner, 2016). The first official review mechanism relates to the Nationally Determined Contributions. Parties are asked to submit new Nationally Determined Contributions every five years starting in 2015 (Decision 1/CP.21, 2015). This is to ensure that Parties update their targets to represent a progression and the highest possible ambition (Decision 1/CP.21, 2015, Article 4.3). For the bottom-up system to work, Parties must report their Nationally Determined Contributions in a transparent way to make national policies internationally comparable (Falkner, 2016, p. 1121). Article 13 of the Paris Agreement establishes a Transparency Framework to provide “...clarity and tracking of progress towards achieving Parties’ individual nationally determined contributions...” (Decision 1/CP.21, 2015, Article 13.5). This is therefore an important review mechanism, which also will provide nonstate actors with important information about how states implement measures and their progress in reaching their targets. This will allow them to monitor the effectiveness of the Nationally Determined Contributions, which is an important role of nonstate actors at the negotiations (Bäckstrand et al., 2017, p. 574).

The Paris Agreement further establishes the Global Stocktake to take stock of the progress made towards achieving the purpose of the Agreement (Decision 1/CP.21, 2015, Article 14.1). The Global Stocktake is also to be completed every five years, starting in 2023. Parties are asked to use the outcome of this process to update and enhance their actions and support, and also to enhance international cooperation for climate action (Decision 1/CP.21, 2015, Article 14.3). The process will be Party-driven and conducted in a transparent manner, also including non-Party stakeholders (Decision 19/CMA.1, 2018, Article 10). In the modalities for the process, three components are decided. The first is to collect and prepare information (Decision 19/CMA.1, 2018, Article 3a). Sources of input include among others reports from Parties, the latest reports from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, submissions from non-Party stakeholders and inputs to inform equity considerations. This information will be used in a technical assessment which will assess the progress towards achieving the goals of the Paris Agreement and opportunities for enhanced action and support (Decision 19/CMA.1, 2018, Article 3b). The

output from this assessment will be considered and discussed to inform parties on how they can update and enhance their actions and support (Decision 19/CMA.1, 2018, Article 3c).

The Global Stocktake is an important review mechanism, as it will clarify the collective progress in achieving the long-term goals of the Paris Agreement. It is also important to raise states' ambition, as it creates an arena for peer pressure where it will be possible to establish which Parties have delivered on their pledges and whether more ambitious pledges are needed to meet the goals of the Agreement (Falkner, 2016, p. 1121). This opens up the opportunity to use “naming and shaming” tactics towards those who fall short of international expectations (Falkner, 2016, p. 1121). The naming and shaming by nonstate actors is, according to Falkner (2016, p. 1122), the second mechanism that the Paris Agreement review system relies on. Bäckstrand et al. (2017, p. 574) also argue that both naming and shaming, and the showcasing of best practices, will be important to secure the effectiveness of the Paris Agreement. Nonstate actors play an important role in this, for example by monitoring and making details on states' Nationally Determined Contributions public (Bäckstrand et al., 2017).

On the other hand, the stocktake process will focus on the collective progress, rather than individual states' Nationally Determined Contributions. This therefore limits the ability of non-state actors and states to hold each other accountable, for example through acts of shaming (Bäckstrand et al., 2017, p. 571). In addition, both the Transparency Review and the Global Stocktake will be based specifically on scientific sources, and not input from all different stakeholders (Bäckstrand et al., 2017, p. 567). This also limits the influence nonstate actors can have on this process specifically. Since the first Stocktake has not yet been executed, it is not possible to conclude whether it will be a successful mechanism for higher ambitions or not. I therefore argue that it is more relevant to direct attention to the broader picture on how states and nonstate actors influence the process and outcome of the negotiations, which is the topic for this thesis.

2.1 Equity and “common but differentiated responsibilities”

As mentioned in the previous chapter, the Convention and the agreements that serve it are guided by a principle called “common but differentiated responsibilities”. This is an example of how the UNFCCC regime respects issues of equity related to climate change. In fact, equity is also referred to as one of its guiding principles (FCC/INFORMAL/84/Rev.1, 1992, Article 3.1).

These principles try to solve issues regarding the distribution of responsibility for climate change. Since climate change is a global phenomenon, there is no direct link between the causes and effects of it. Emissions of greenhouse gases from any location on the globe enter the atmosphere and affects the global climate, and the effects are dispersed across all regions of the world (Gardiner & Weisback, 2016, p. 16). This makes it difficult to distribute responsibility in an equitable way.

The principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities” is one of the most cited equity principles in the negotiations (Morgan & Waskow, 2014, p. 17). It aims to solve the equity dilemmas in distributing responsibility for climate change by expecting all countries to do something, but also by clarifying that their actions should be in line with their national circumstances and respective capabilities. Although the Convention does not clearly define what equity entails, it states that “...the developed country Parties should take the lead in combating climate change and the adverse effects thereof.” (FCC/INFORMAL/84/Rev.1, 1992, Article 3.1). In addition, the preamble notes that developed countries have responsibility for the largest share of historical and current global emissions of greenhouse gases, and also recognizes that developing countries are particularly vulnerable to the effects of climate change (FCC/INFORMAL/84/Rev.1, 1992). This means that there is an inherent understanding that developed countries have the biggest responsibility to address climate change. Both the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement serves the Convention, and therefore also respect the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities”. The Kyoto Protocol is, according to its preamble, guided by Article 3 of the Convention, which includes this principle. It is also referred to in Article 10 about national and regional programs (Decision 1/CP.3, 1997). In the Paris Agreement the principle is included in the preamble, as well as referred to in Article 4 on Nationally Determined Contributions (Decision 1/CP.21, 2015).

3 Theoretical framework

This thesis applies discourse to the topic of international climate policy, which means that it takes a theoretical standpoint by arguing that the development of policies at the UN Climate Negotiations are informed and shaped by discourses that are reproduced by different actors at the negotiations. These discourses influence how the the nature of the problem is described and which solutions are suggested and implemented. Some discourses, for example, promote the use

of market mechanisms, while others focus on justice issues. This chapter will first present some central theoretical claims about discourse in IR, and then explain four dominant environmental discourses that have influenced the development of climate policy. Secondly, the chapter will present some literature on the concept of climate justice, which also guides and informs the process of policymaking.

3.1 Discourse as theory

The concept of discourse is used widely across different disciplines, which means that it is difficult to identify one universal definition. Michel Foucault is one of the most influential scholars on the topic, and many approaches to discourse are influenced by his work. He defines discourse as "...a group of statements in so far as they belong to the same discursive formation." (Cited in Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 12). Discourses represent a fragment of history and are not a reflection of reality. Rather, they are regimes of knowledge that determine what is true and false (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 13). Although it is not possible to identify one universal definition of discourse, a common theme can be identified among different approaches to the concept. This is the broad agreement of discourses representing the *shared* meaning of different phenomena (Adger, Benjaminsen, Brown, & Svarstad, 2001; Dryzek, 2013; Neumann, 2008). This shared meaning is constructed when representations become statements and practices that over time are institutionalized and "normalized" through language (Neumann, 2008, p. 61). This thesis focuses on the importance of discourse in climate policy. It applies the concept both as a theory and as a method. As Jørgensen and Phillips (2002, pp. 3-4) argues, discourse should not be detached from its theoretical and methodological foundations when used as a method for analysis. I will therefore present the theoretical framework on discourse in this chapter before I present the methodological framework in chapter 4.

Within IR literature specifically, the concept of discourse is approached by different groups of scholars and within a variety of theories. It has traditionally been overlooked in mainstream theories like realism and liberalism, and can rather be found in more critical approaches to IR. The IR approach to discourse therefore crosses over and mixes strands of poststructuralism, post-modernism, social constructivism and feminist approaches (Milliken, 1999, p. 225). Although these approaches make differing claims about various phenomenon, there is a general theoretical commitment about discourse that gives them a common interest in the study of it (Milliken,

1999, p. 225). They share the interest in how textual and social processes are connected, to understand and describe this connection, and how it has implications for the way we think and act (George, 1994, p. 191). While all these approaches pay attention to discourse, poststructuralism is maybe the most influential approach when it comes to the theoretical claims about discourse in IR. It became part of the IR discipline in the 1980s, and were influenced by social and philosophical theories that had played a major role in the humanities since the 1970s (Hansen, 2017, p. 160). It adopts a critical attitude to world politics and raises questions about both ontology and epistemology (Hansen, 2017, p. 160).

The main ontological claim in poststructuralism highlights the significance of language. According to this claim, “things” are given meaning through the construction in language. These “things” include objects, subjects, states, living beings, and material structures (Hansen, 2006, p. 18). Language is understood as both social and political. The social understanding sees language as “...a series of collective codes and conventions that each individual needs to employ to make oneself comprehensible.” (Hansen, 2006, p. 18). More important for this thesis is the political understanding of language. Here, language is a site for the production and reproduction of subjectivities and identities. This further leads to the exclusion of other subjectivities and identities (Hansen, 2006, pp. 18-19). This claim is linked to the first of the three theoretical claims about discourse in IR, identified by Milliken (1999). Here, discourses are understood as systems of signification. These systems construct social realities (Milliken, 1999, p. 229). In this lies a belief in people as constructive of meaning. The systems of signification construct things and give knowledge about social reality by operating as background capacities that people can use to differentiate and identify things (Milliken, 1999, p. 231).

The second theoretical claim about discourses in IR is that they are productive or reproductive of the things they define (Milliken, 1999, p. 229). They create particular “regimes of truth” and thereby exclude other possible explanations. This is done by authorizing some actors or subjects with the power to speak and act, and further by defining knowledgeable practices (Milliken, 1999, p. 229). By doing this, discourses can define and enable certain policy practices, silence and exclude some groups from being part of policymaking, and create a certain common sense that disqualify other policy options. It is therefore both enabling and constraining at the same time. By explaining and analyzing discourse productivity, one can therefore identify dominant

forms of knowledge and allow for a critical examination of the practices it enables (Milliken, 1999, p. 236). This is connected to the ontological focus in poststructuralism, as it exemplifies the productive nature of language (Hansen, 2006). In addition, it can be connected to the epistemological focus in poststructuralism. In line with the ontological focus on language, the epistemological questions raised by poststructuralism revolves around how discourses construct identities, and how this is both constitutive of and a product of policy (Hansen, 2006, p. 23). This means that identities created by discourse can influence policymaking, but that they are also related to the social practices in which the discourse is produced (Hajer, 1995, p. 44).

The third theoretical claim in IR is that discourses are not fixed, but rather produced, reproduced and transformed over time. They are unstable, changeable and contingent to history (Milliken, 1999, p. 230). The knowledge and identities that a discourse constructs must therefore be articulated and rearticulated to uphold its “regime of truth” (Milliken, 1999, p. 230). One way that discourses are transformed is through contact with other discourses. This happens for example through intertextuality, which means “...how an individual text draws on elements and discourses of other texts.” (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 7). By referencing other texts, explicitly or implicitly, texts establish their own reading and mediates the meaning and status of others (Hansen, 2006, p. 55). The meaning of a text is therefore not given by only the text itself, but is also a product of other readings and interpretations (Hansen, 2006, p. 55). One can therefore investigate both the reproduction of discourses and discursive change by identifying intertextuality (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 7).

Some discourses achieve dominance over other discourses when competing in discursive struggles. A dominant discourse can be hegemonic, which is understood as the dominance of one discourse, or perspective, over another (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, pp. 6-7). To be labelled hegemonic, the discourse must both dominate thinking and be translated into institutional arrangements (Adger et al., 2001, p. 685). Hajer (1995, p. 61) highlights how these conditions often only are present to a certain degree in practical politics, and in such instances, we might therefore talk about “discursive domination” rather than hegemony. The next chapter will present some dominant discourses about the environment. These discourses construct different social realities and create different “regimes of truth” about the nature of environmental problems and thereby promotes different solutions and policy responses to these problems.

3.1.1 Discourses in climate policy

Environmental discourses have influenced the debate on and practice of environmental and climate policy for several years, also within the UNFCCC. Hajer (1995) and Dryzek (2013) are two scholars that have written influential work on the topic of environmental discourses. In his book from 1995, Hajer identifies ecological modernization as the new policy-oriented discourse emerging in the 1980s. Ecological modernization recognizes the structural character of environmental problems, but also claim that these problems can be solved within existing political, economic and social institutions (Hajer, 1995, p. 25). This means that it favors incremental change and aims at making the capitalist political economy more environmentally friendly (Dryzek, 2013, p. 171). The discourse tries to fulfill this objective by offering solutions to environmental problems that are in line with a focus on continued economic growth (Hajer, 1995, p. 26). Low-emission technologies are a classic example of such solutions (Dryzek, 2013, p. 172). In addition, it advocates for a partnership between governments, businesses, moderate environmentalists and scientists to restructure the capitalist economy (Dryzek, 2013, p. 174). A study by Pascoe, Brincat, and Croucher (2019) show how this discourse is still relevant in international policy-making on climate change. The Paris Agreement for example, emphasizes both technology and capacity-building as key tools for dealing with climate change (Pascoe et al., 2019, p. 83). These are examples of solutions that, in line with ecological modernization, make it possible to combine a consideration of the environment with continued economic growth.

Dryzek (2013) continues the work on ecological modernization, but also presents analyses of several other influential environmental discourses. The economic rationalism discourse is often linked to ecological modernization, as it is concerned with the cost and economic impact of climate change, and committed to the deployment of market mechanisms to solve environmental problems (Dryzek, 2013, p. 122). Where the ecological modernization discourse promotes incremental change, economic rationalism is even less reformist and rather favors business-as-usual. The solutions proposed by ecological modernization is in many instances what this political rationality in economic rationalism needs. The discourse further promotes and applies a logic of privatization and property rights to the environment (Dryzek, 2013, p. 125).

Privatization of environmental goods is however often difficult, especially regarding air and water. Economic rationalism solves this by introducing government-managed markets or quasi-

market incentives. Pollution rights, or “cap and trade”, is an example of the former, while “green taxes are an example of the latter (Dryzek, 2013, pp. 129-131). The Paris Agreement institutionalize parts of this discourse as it allows the use of market mechanisms to achieve mitigation targets (Pascoe et al., 2019, p. 82).

A discourse that differs from the rationality of both ecological modernization and economic rationalism is limits and survival. This discourse pays attention to the finite stocks of resources and carrying capacity of ecosystems, as well as the impact of population growth on human destiny (Dryzek, 2013, pp. 40-43). It communicates a sense of urgency to address climate change and necessitates radical change to solve this issue (Pascoe et al., 2019, p. 83). Limits and survival favors top-down control as a solution to climate change by highlighting the “...necessity of global climate stewardship and planetary carbon control.” (Bäckstrand & Lövbrand, 2019, p. 523). This discourse has been prominent in the climate policy arena for a long time. The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change carries this political rationality forward by giving the state and professional expert networks central roles in governing climate change (Bäckstrand & Lövbrand, 2019, p. 523). The top-down approach was clearly present in the Kyoto Protocol with its assigned targets for emission reductions.

The presentation of the three previous discourses shows a clear difference in the level of change that they promote, which brings us to the fourth and last discourse. This discourse is often called green politics and is the most radical discourse among the four. It regards structural change, or transformation, as the solution to climate change (Dryzek, 2013). This clearly separates it from the business-as-usual logic of economic rationalism and incremental change proposed by ecological modernization. Green politics gives agency to a variety of actors, including movements, parties, states, international organizations and individuals (Dryzek, 2013, p. 219). Bäckstrand and Lövbrand (2019, p. 526) frame this discourse within the concept of climate justice and describe its political rationality as critical to inequitable power structures in contemporary climate governance. It connects climate change to larger north-south issues, like poverty and trade (Bäckstrand & Lövbrand, 2019, p. 526). The logic of this discourse has been most prominent among climate activists who protest and demonstrate both inside and outside the venues of the UN Climate Negotiations (Bäckstrand & Lövbrand, 2019, p. 526).

3.2 Climate justice

As mentioned in the previous chapter, the concept of climate justice is often used by climate activists to address certain issues related to climate change. Climate justice is on the other hand also a concept that is used much more widely by scholars, states and nonstate actors. It does not have one single definition, but revolves in a broad sense around questions of how the burdens of combating climate change should be distributed among countries and other actors (Duus-Otterström & Jagers, 2012, p. 746). As Sayegh (2017, p. 346) writes, “Climate change becomes a concern of justice because mitigation and adaptation impose burdens on agents around the globe.” Although the Convention nor any of the agreements that serves it make explicit reference to climate justice, it is embedded through the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities” (Fisher, 2015, p. 74). In this lies an understanding of the concept revolving around the difference in historical responsibility for causing climate change between developed and developing countries. States at the negotiations therefore see climate justice commonly as a struggle between global “Northern” and “Southern” states within the UNFCCC process (Chatterton, Featherstone, & Routledge, 2013, p. 607). The rest of this chapter will show how understandings of climate justice differs between various actors, and also where the concept originated from in the first place.

The discipline of IR has traditionally been more focused around concepts like anarchy and security rather than morality and global justice issues, but some scholars have also directed attention to and engaged theoretically with the concept of climate justice (Falkner, 2019; Schlosberg & Collins, 2014; Shue, 2014). In scholarly literature, some main theoretical approaches to climate justice can be identified. First off all, scholars have provided attention to the issue of historical responsibility. This approach to climate justice is based on a basic polluter-pays principle, and argues that some states have contributed more to causing climate change and therefore have the primary responsibility to act and pay the costs caused by past emissions (Schlosberg & Collins, 2014, p. 365). Falkner (2019) discusses how normative arguments are reflected in the main outcomes of the UN Climate Negotiations and highlights how especially principles of distributive justice were incorporated in the UNFCCC through the “common but differentiated responsibilities” principle. This is connected to historical responsibility. He further argues that the Kyoto Protocol fulfils normative principles, by for example establishing a strict divide of commitments between industrialized and developing countries (Falkner, 2019, p. 272).

Secondly, scholarly literature has focused on rights-based approaches. This includes both a development rights approach and a human rights approach. The former argues that all states should have the right to develop out of poverty before taking responsibility to mitigate climate change, while the latter highlights how climate change violates basic human rights (Schlosberg & Collins, 2014, p. 365). Shue (2014) is one scholar that has directed attention to this. In his book “Climate Justice: Vulnerability and Protection” he argues that the lack of urgency to act on climate change among the world’s national states “...constitutes a violation of basic rights as well as a failure to seize a golden opportunity to protect rights” (Shue, 2014, p. 297). In the same book, Shue offers some reflections around the right to development, focusing on what the rich and the poor can ask from each other. Because, as the emissions of greenhouse gases must decrease, many countries are still dependent on increasing these emissions to be able to develop out of poverty (Shue, 2014, p. 70). Questions of justice and equity therefore certainly arises when the rich asks the poor to settle for economic activity compatible with per capita emissions well below the present levels of the rich (Shue, 2014, p. 70). While the development rights approach clearly reflects the language in the UNFCCC “common but differentiated responsibilities” principle, the human rights approach has more connections to how grassroots movements and climate activists approaches the concept of climate justice. This will be discussed next.

The academic understanding of climate change differs from those that can be identified among climate activists. Here, literature often distinguishes between climate activists in elite NGOs and grassroots movements. Among elite NGOs, climate justice positions include among others the development rights approach, a north/south approach, a human rights approach and a commitment to carbon markets (Schlosberg & Collins, 2014, pp. 365-366). Among grassroots movements, the idea of climate justice was originally focused on removing the causes of climate change and addressing the unequal impacts of the oil industry (Schlosberg & Collins, 2014, p. 366). In addition, it included an understanding of the concept of “just transition” where vulnerable communities are provided assistance in the transition to a post-carbon economy (Schlosberg & Collins, 2014, p. 366). Later, issues around historical responsibility and individual and collective rights, have also been included in the grassroots understanding of climate justice (Schlosberg & Collins, 2014, p. 367). This shows a concern with unequal power relations

between and within states, fossil fuel exploitation, and indigenous people's rights, which have been identified as a common focus for climate activists (Chatterton et al., 2013, p. 606).

As the previous paragraphs show, several different understandings of climate justice can be identified among different actors. The concept itself builds originally on principles within the environmental justice tradition. This tradition provides a framework of principles which can be connected to today's understandings of climate justice. First of all is the principle of distributive justice. This principle raises questions about who enjoys the benefits and who shoulders the burdens of environmental intervention, who have caused the problem and who has the ability to pay for its costs (Svarstad & Benjaminsen, 2020, p. 3). These questions are closely linked to the principle of "common but differentiated responsibilities" institutionalized in the UNFCCC, which acknowledges the common concern in distributive justice that some people are more affected by climate change and that those who have caused the problem should cover the costs and compensate those who have carried these costs (Svarstad & Benjaminsen, 2020). It is also connected to the historical responsibility approach to climate justice.

The second principle in the environmental justice framework that can be linked to climate justice is recognition. Justice as recognition directs focus to how some social groups and individuals are less recognized than others. This principle can therefore be seen as both a justice dimension in itself, and as an underlying case of unjust distribution (Svarstad & Benjaminsen, 2020, p. 4). This principle has clear connections to the understandings of climate change identified among grassroots movements. It can also be connected to the literature on environmental discourses, as these principles have clear relations with the green politics discourse. This discourse focuses not only on power imbalances between countries and individuals, but also includes and gives agency to a range of stakeholders, like indigenous people and grassroots activists. According to research by Bäckstrand and Lövbrand (2019), this discourse has risen under the label of climate justice in the post-Copenhagen era of the UNFCCC regime. This is further linked to the third principle in environmental justice, namely procedural justice. This principle involves issues of decision-making and power, which are also present in the two former principles (Svarstad & Benjaminsen, 2020). In addition, procedural justice can be identified in grassroots movements, who focus on how their exclusion from decision-making has enabled inequitable distribution (Schlosberg & Collins, 2014, p. 361).

3.3 Summing up the framework and filling a gap

This chapter has introduced a review of some central literature on the topic of discourse and climate justice, which also presents the theoretical framework for my analysis. The analysis will be framed by the theoretical claims about discourse, while the literature that identifies environmental discourses will be an important reference point for my discourse analysis. By combining the literature and theories on discourse and climate justice, I aim to contribute to the existing literature on the topic of environmental discourses and how different actors reproduce these discourses. Scholars have already directed much attention to the institutionalization of discourses in international environmental and climate policies (See for example Bäckstrand & Lövbrand, 2006; Bäckstrand & Lövbrand, 2019; Pascoe et al., 2019). This literature makes it clear that discourses are influential at the UN Climate Negotiations but offers less attention to how specific actors use these discourses to frame their positions and influence the negotiations. In addition, I have identified a gap in IR literature regarding climate justice. Although some IR scholars have discussed the concept, the literature is still quite limited. By comparing the use of discourse by two actors, Climate Action Network and the Norwegian Government, I aim to contribute to filling this gap and provide an interesting discussion of how discourses frame interests and to what extent different actors influence the outcomes of the negotiations. How I applied discourse analysis as a method to this issue will be explained in the next chapter about methodology.

4 Methodology

4.1 Data and data collection

The research conducted for this thesis follows a qualitative strategy. This strategy usually emphasizes words in the collection and analysis of data (Bryman, 2016, p. 33). A qualitative strategy is interpretivist because it tries to understand the social world by examining how its participants interpret that world. In addition, it implies that interactions between individuals constitute social properties (Bryman, 2016, p. 375). This study aims to shed light on the use of discourse in the UN Climate Negotiations and is therefore oriented towards how language influence actions. This makes a qualitative strategy a logical choice. The study has two research questions and the data collected to answer these questions are described below.

Within a qualitative research strategy one can choose from a range of methods for data collection and analysis. This study was guided by the framework of grounded theory and collected data from existing documents. In grounded theory, units are sampled through purposive sampling, or more specifically theoretical sampling. This entails that you sample units that are relevant for your theory (Bryman, 2016, p. 411). In this case the theory is discourse and the units are documents produced by the Norwegian Government and by Climate Action Network.

Using documents as a data source is specifically relevant to the objective of this thesis because it provides historical insight and a means of tracking change and development (Bowen, 2009, pp. 29-30). This will enable me to identify and investigate the use of discourse and if and how it changes in the chosen time-period. In addition, the events that are investigated in this study have already happened and can no longer be observed. This makes documents an effective data source (Bowen, 2009, p. 31). By using material that already exists in the public domain, limited effort is also needed to collect data. It requires data selection, not collection (Bowen, 2009, p. 31). This means that the analysis of the materials can be given more emphasis (Bryman, 2016, p. 534). A discourse analysis is a comprehensive method, and using existing materials was therefore favorable for this study with a limited time frame and resources.

4.1.1 Research question 1: How does the Norwegian Government and Climate Action Network use discourse to frame their positions at the UN Climate Negotiations?

I chose to analyze two different types of documents from each actor in the time period 2011-2018 to answer the first research question. I limited my search to these 8 years to cover the period from when Parties in 2011 decided to work “speedily” towards a new agreement to be adopted in 2015, and also the years after and until the work programme for the Paris Agreement was adopted in 2018. This means that I am able to analyze the development of discourses from before, during and after the adoption of the Paris Agreement. The two types of documents I have selected is high level statements held at the COPs and policy documents for the negotiations. These documents are all published publicly on the internet. The high-level statements are held in plenary at the COPs, where Parties and non-Party stakeholders get a chance to voice their concern and also present their solutions. These documents can therefore be said to represent how different actors at the negotiations wish to present themselves and be perceived by others. The policy documents produced by the Norwegian Government and Climate Action Network

respectively represent their priorities and position regarding the topics at the negotiations. These documents therefore give a more detailed insight into the development of policy over time, and how priorities for the negotiations may have shifted, which will be important for identifying discourse. I collected 33 texts in total for the analysis.

Norway's high-level statements (in Norwegian: *hovedinnlegg*) were collected from regjeringen.no. I had to access the historical archive to find the documents prior to 2013, but this was also easily available on the webpage. I chose the category "taler og innlegg" (speeches and posts) and used the search words "klimaforhandlinger" (climate negotiations) and "cop" separately. This allowed me to find some, but not all statements. I therefore also limited my search to the specific years that were missing and used the city hosting the COP that specific year, for example Durban, as a search word to find the last documents. Norway held one high level statement for each conference, excluding in 2015, when there was an additional statement by Prime Minister Erna Solberg. The result of this search was therefore a total of nine texts that could be used for my analysis. The NGO high-level statements were sampled from the official UNFCCC webpage (unfccc.int), except for one which were sampled from climatenetwork.org. I went into the page for each specific conference and found the high-level statements, which were categorized as ENGO statements. The statement from 2014 was not published on the UNFCCC webpage, but was possible to find on the webpage of Climate Action Network. The result of this selection was eight texts, one statement from each COP. See Appendix 1 for a list of all high-level statements.

The Norwegian policy documents (in Norwegian: *strategi, posisjonsnotat*) were also sampled from regjeringen.no. Same as earlier, I had to use the historical archive to access documents posted before 2013. I chose the category "nyheter og pressemeldinger" (news and press releases) in both archives and used the same search words as previously. I also had to make the extra round of searching the city and specific year to find all documents. I was able to find the document for each COP within the chosen time period, which resulted in eight texts. For the Climate Action Network policy documents, I collected all texts from climatenetwork.org. All their policy documents are posted under publications and sorted by year, which made it quite easy to find the right documents. The only issue was that each year didn't use the same category to describe the policy documents. The document for COP17 was categorized as "CAN views",

for COP18 it was “CAN submission”, while the rest of the years used the category “CAN annual policy document”. By looking at the title and the introduction to the documents I concluded that they all seemed to be written for the same purpose and therefore could be used in my analysis as policy documents. This also resulted in eight texts to be used for my analysis. See Appendix 2 for a list of all policy documents.

4.1.2 Research question 2: How are the discursive representations produced by Climate Action Network and the Norwegian Government institutionalized in the outcomes of the negotiations?

In addition to the documents for the discourse analysis, I have identified relevant decisions from each COP in the period from 2011-2018. These decisions will be used to answer the second research question. The decisions I have chosen all represent a step towards the adoption of the Paris Agreement in 2015, and towards the adoption of the Paris Rulebook in 2018. I will compare the results from the discourse analysis with the text in these decisions. This will allow me to identify which discourses or discursive representations are present in the outcomes of the negotiations, and I will therefore be able to compare the influence the Norwegian Government and Climate Action Network had on these decisions. The decisions are listed below.

- COP17 in Durban launched the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (Decision 1/CP.17, 2011).
- At COP18 in Doha, Parties agreed on an outcome pursuant to the Bali Action plan (Decision 1/CP.18, 2012) and adopted a decision to advance the Durban platform for Enhanced Action (Decision 2/CP.18, 2012).
- COP19 produced the Warsaw outcomes, which includes several decisions that represent a move ahead to the new agreement to be adopted in 2015, for example an advancement of the Durban Platform (Decision 1/CP.19, 2013).
- COP20 in Lima established the Lima Call for Climate Action (Decision 1/CP.20, 2014).
- At COP21 in Paris, the Paris Agreement was finally adopted (Decision 1/CP.21, 2015).
- At COP22 in Marrakech, Parties decided on preparations for the entry into force of the Paris Agreement, and welcomed the Marrakech Partnership for Global Climate Action (Decision 1/CP.22, 2016).

- COP23 in Bonn launched the Fiji Momentum for Implementation (Decision 1/CP.23, 2017).
- At COP24, the guidelines for the implementation and operationalization of the Paris Agreement was agreed on in the so called “Katowice Climate Package” (FCCC/PA/CMA/2018/3/Add.1, 2018; FCCC/PA/CMA/2018/3/Add.2, 2018).

4.2 Discourse as method

To analyze the 33 texts for the first research question, I chose to use the method of discourse analysis. Using discourse analysis as a methodological strategy means that one is interested in different versions of reality created through language (Bryman, 2016, pp. 531-532). This entails a focus on answering social questions rather than linguistic ones (Potter & Wetherell, 1994, p. 48). In this also lays a depiction of discourses as constructive because it constitutes a particular view of social reality. It is further a form of action, because language can be used to for example attribute blame or present yourself in a particular way. Lastly, it is rhetorically organized. This means that by presenting a version of events through discourse, the actor want to persuade others (Bryman, 2016, p. 534). This chapter explains the framework I used to identify discourses in the different documents and the process of doing the analysis.

4.2.1 Framework for analysis

The theoretical claims about discourse in IR that was presented in chapter 3 explains several functions of discourse, but it does not provide a specific framework for analyzing such discourses. This might be seen as a weakness of the IR approach to discourse. I have therefore chosen to build on this by introducing an approach to discourse analysis that is presented by Adger et al. (2001) as my framework. Adger et al. (2001, p. 684) identifies three aspects of the discourse analysis which form the framework I used. First, I identified discourses by analyzing regularities in expressions. Contrary to doing a linguistic analysis to identify discourses, I have chosen to direct my focus on the content of the discourses. This means that I aim to uncover the meaning of the text; what it actually says. Since I have chosen to identify existing environmental discourses in the documents produced by the Norwegian Government and Climate Action Network, I looked for characteristics in the content that was in line with these familiar discourses. These discourses, known as “limits and survival”, “economic rationalism”, “ecological modernization”, and “green politics”, were explained in chapter 3. It builds mainly

on the work of Hajer (1995) and Dryzek (2013), with recent studies by Bäckstrand and Lövbrand (2019) and Pascoe et al. (2019) showing their relevance today.

Secondly, I looked at the actors producing, reproducing and transforming discourses. In this case the actors are the Norwegian Government and Climate Action Network. This step therefore mainly entailed looking at and comparing how these actors reproduce the familiar environmental discourses, and how and why they are used to frame their position and interests at the negotiations. Lastly, I studied the social impacts and policy outcomes of discourses (Adger et al., 2001, p. 684). This entailed looking at how the reproduction of environmental discourses promotes certain solutions and policies over others, and how this is institutionalized in the outcomes of the negotiations. The next chapter will clarify how I combined this approach to discourse analysis with the framework of grounded theory.

4.2.2 Process of analysis

For my analysis, I combined the theoretical framework of discourse analysis with the framework of grounded theory. Grounded theory is one of the most used frameworks for analyzing qualitative data (Bryman, 2016, p. 572). This framework leads to the identification of theory, which in this instance are discourses.

The initial phase of the process consisted of reading each document to uncover important elements and regularities. This means that the text was coded using an open coding approach. I identified concepts as I read, building on new concepts when they emerged. These concepts were later grouped in categories, which is in line with the definition of open coding by Strauss and Corbin (Cited in Bryman, 2016, p. 574). Some of the categories that appeared from the open coding process was for example how the text described climate change, which solutions were proposed and how the text distributed responsibility for climate action. I chose to use open coding because I did not know in advance what the documents would say and therefore wanted to be sure that I would not lose important elements of the text if it did not fit in any pre-made categories.

The categories that was identified through open coding was compared to the environmental discourses presented earlier. I used the books by Hajer (1995) and Dryzek (2013), as well as the articles by Bäckstrand and Lövbrand (2019) and Pascoe et al. (2019) as references for the discourses. I compared my data from the different documents and went back and forth between

my data and the different categories until they were all saturated, meaning that there was no new data to uncover and the different discourses were identified. At this point I could conclude my data collection as I knew that “(a) no new or relevant data seem to be emerging regarding a category, (b) the category is well developed in terms of its properties and dimensions demonstrating variation, and (c) the relationship among categories are well established and validated” (Strauss & Corbin cited in Bryman, 2016, p. 412).

Through this process of analysis, I identified a large degree of consistency in each actors’ use of discourse. Both the Norwegian Government and Climate Action Network showed a specific commitment to some discourses, but also combined certain elements from different discourses to make them fit with their position and interests. I also compared the results from both actors and could identify both similarities and differences in which discourses were reproduced and how they were used to frame different issues. This will be discussed more closely in chapter 5 and 6, which will use the results of the discourse analysis and the theoretical framework to answer the two research questions.

4.3 Reliability and validity

The relevance of both reliability and validity as criteria to assess qualitative research is debated, as both concepts are difficult to achieve in this type of research. Some aspects of this thesis can on the other hand be highlighted as measures that contribute to its reliability and validity.

Reliability concerns the question of whether the results of a study is repeatable (Bryman, 2016, p. 41). This chapter has described in detail how the collection and analysis of data was done. In addition, the documents that was collected for the analysis is publicly available online. This makes it more possible for others to collect the same data and replicate the same study. Secondly, using a well-known framework for analysis, in this case discourse analysis, also contributes to the reliability of the research since it provides others with the necessary guidelines on how the analysis was conducted. On the other hand, social research always involves an element of interpretation, which means that although someone is using the same documents and framework for analysis, the conclusions can still be different.

Validity is concerned with “...the integrity of conclusions that are generated from a piece of research.” (Bryman, 2016, p. 41). This is especially related to how generalizable the results of a study is beyond its specific research context (Bryman, 2016, p. 42). For qualitative research that

is based on case studies and small samples, like the research done in this thesis, validity is problematic to assess (Bryman, 2016, p. 384). Transferability has therefore been proposed as an alternative criterion to evaluate qualitative research (Bryman, 2016, p. 384). By presenting thick description of the specific case investigated for this thesis, I have strengthened the transferability of the research as it gives others a basis to decide the possibility of transferring my findings to other cases (Bryman, 2016, p. 384).

4.4 Ethical considerations and limitations

Earlier in this chapter I argued for the relevance of using documents as data for this study. There are however also some disadvantages of using documents, which the researcher should be aware of. Documents are often written to convey a message that is favorable for the authors it represents, and may also be linked to other documents or represent a response to other documents (Bryman, 2016, p. 560). It might therefore be necessary to combine documents with interviews to uncover the whole truth of the case in question. The absence of interviews in this study can therefore be seen as a limitation, as it could have contributed with interesting perspectives to the analysis. By applying a discourse analysis to these documents, I must on the other hand be aware of the social context in which the documents were written and the interests the authors had when writing the specific documents. Analyzing the documents within a comprehensive framework like discourse analysis therefore mitigate some of the limitations of not doing interviews, since it allows me to recognize that documents are simply not a reflection of reality, but rather written with distinctive purposes (Bryman, 2016, p. 561). Another possible limitation is that I have chosen to focus only on the COPs, both when collecting high-level statements and policy documents, and for the decisions. The reason I do not include documents from the yearly intersessional meetings in the UNFCCC is because the function of these meetings is usually to prepare for the next COP, or to discuss details that did not reach agreement on the previous COP. This means that no big decisions are usually made at these meetings, they are mostly made at the COPs.

When it comes to ethical considerations in research, using public documents as a data source eliminates most of these considerations compared to what is necessary when doing interviews or processing personal information about participants in a study. One thing to consider is however that some of the documents I analyzed was written in Norwegian, and any references or

statements used in this thesis is my own translation of the text. This means that some meaning might have been lost in the process. By focusing on content over linguistic features in my discourse analysis, I have tried to solve this issue to the best of my abilities. A second ethical consideration I would like to discuss is my role as a researcher. In my instance, I find it important to disclose that I have myself participated as an NGO representative to the UN Climate Negotiations, and thereby also participated in meetings with the Climate Action Network. I represented the Norwegian youth organization Changemaker at the COPs in 2017 and 2018, and at the intersessional meeting in 2019. This means that I do not approach the issue as an outsider, which makes it difficult to be fully objective. This is a common challenge in social research, and the most important thing is therefore that I am aware of my position. I however also see this experience as a strength, as it gives me a deeper understanding of the issue being discussed. This was especially helpful when collecting the relevant decisions from the negotiations and when analyzing the content of these decisions.

5 Discourse analysis

In this chapter I will explain how environmental discourses are reproduced by both the Norwegian Government and Climate Action Network at the UN Climate Negotiations. As presented in chapter 3, the environmental discourses in question have already been identified by several authors. The comprehensive works by Hajer (1995) and Dryzek (2013) show the historical significance of these discourses, while recent studies conducted by Bäckstrand and Lövbrand (2019) and Pascoe et al. (2019) show how they are still, albeit to varying degrees, present in the UN Climate Negotiations and climate policy in general. Bäckstrand and Lövbrand (2019) look at climate governance discourses in the Post-Copenhagen era. Their study suggests that “green governmentality” (limits and survival) has remained prominent, while “ecological modernization” has emerged to challenge the UN as the center of global climate policy. In addition, the “radical civic environmentalism” (green politics) discourse has returned under the banner of climate justice. Pascoe et al. (2019) identify the presence of these discourses in scientific reports on climate change, and also how they are institutionalized in the Paris Agreement. According to their study, “economic rationalism” dominates in the latter context, while “ecological modernization” and “survivalism” (limits and survival) are also present,

although to a lesser extent. The following analysis will show how these discourses are still relevant and reproduced, both by the Norwegian Government and by Climate Action Network.

5.1 The Norwegian Government

When analyzing the 17 documents written by the Norwegian Government some clear patterns of discourse were identified. First of all, the economic rationalism discourse was prominent through the whole period between 2011-2018. This was combined with an ecological modernization-logic on solutions to climate change. A commitment to the limits and survival discourse was also quite prominent, while green politics was identified to a lesser extent. The next chapters will explain and give examples of how Norway follows and reproduces these discourses in high-level statements and policy documents. It will also show that Norway adopts some parts of the different discourses and combines them to fit with their political position.

5.1.1 Cost effectiveness and a win-win scenario

When analyzing the different texts, it became clear that international cost-effectiveness was a prominent focus for Norway at the negotiations in the period between 2011 and 2018, which is in line with Norway's overall priorities laid out in two Parliament settlements from 2008 and 2012 (Energi- og miljøkomiteen, 2008, 2012). These settlements will be discussed more closely in chapter 6. This approach to climate policy relies on flexible solutions, or more specifically market mechanisms, to be fulfilled. A commitment to market mechanisms is a central characteristic of the economic rationalism discourse (Dryzek, 2013, p. 122). Norway presented these types of mechanisms as important mitigation solutions at multiple occasions between 2011 and 2018. When describing the Kyoto Protocol at the High Level Segment in 2011, former Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg referred to "...a global carbon market that is beneficial for both developed and developing countries" (Stoltenberg, 2011). This quote clearly states a positive view of using market mechanisms to mitigate climate change. Statements like this have also been prominent in Norway's policy documents. One example is from 2012, where the document states that working for a new market-based mechanism within the Convention is one of Norway's main priorities for COP18 (Miljøverndepartementet, 2012a, p. 5).

When the negotiations to create a new Agreement started, Norway kept its position on market mechanisms and advocated for it to be included in the final text. The policy document from 2013 states that the main priorities for Norway towards the new agreement include the consideration

of cost effectiveness and flexible implementation. In addition, it says that Norway will work for an international price on emissions and effective international markets for emissions trading (Klima- og miljødepartementet, 2013). A focus on market-based mechanisms is also present among Norway's priorities for the COP in 2014 (Klima- og miljødepartementet, 2014b). These arguments are again illustrative of Norway's commitment to international cost-effectiveness and the economic rationalism discourse. This further means that a focus on solutions that are compatible with economic growth, and a commitment to business-as-usual rather than transformative change, can be identified in Norway's approach to climate policy.

The business-as-usual rationality in the economic rationalism discourse was also communicated by Norway as a concern for the cost and economic impacts of climate change in both the high-level statements and policy documents. Former Minister of Climate and Environment Tine Sundtoft said in her speech at COP19 that "It cannot be a question of either achieving growth or tackling global warming. It must be both." (Sundtoft, 2013). This was followed up with a reference to the need for stimulating research and technology development, as well as a commitment from Norway to support climate friendly technology in domestic policies (Sundtoft, 2013). Here, Norway combines economic rationalism with the discourse of ecological modernization to achieve a scenario where solutions to climate change are in line with the logic of continued economic growth. The intersection of these two discourses often occur, as ecological modernization presents the innovative and technological solutions that the political rationality of economic rationalism is dependent on (Pascoe et al., 2019, p. 84). It therefore shows how Norway combines the two discourses to create a win-win scenario.

Win-win scenarios communicated through ecological modernization are also present in other arguments made in the documents produced by the Norwegian Government. Prime Minister Erna Solberg said in her speech that "Putting a price on emission and phasing out fossil fuel subsidies will make businesses and consumers around the world more climate friendly." (Solberg, 2015). This statement is mainly a reflection of the win-win rationality in ecological modernization, although it does share some crossovers to economic rationalism. Marketizing emissions is a central solution in economic rationalism and the reference to consumers depicts the world's population as economic actors, which is also a common characteristic of economic rationalism (Dryzek, 2013). The statement is on the other hand more in line with ecological modernization as

it moves away from a focus on self-interest and business-as-usual. Phasing out fossil fuel subsidies communicates a commitment to more climate friendly energy sources, which is a strong argument coming from an oil-producing country like Norway. Promoting low-emission technologies is a well-known characteristic of the ecological modernization discourse (Dryzek, 2013, p. 172). In addition, the quote gives political agency to businesses and consumers, not regarding states as the only actors with the power to initiate change and therefore providing a more bottom-up approach to climate cooperation. This partnership between different actors is important to achieve the restructuring of the capitalist economy that ecological modernization promotes (Dryzek, 2013, p. 174).

5.1.2 The urgent need for a global response

The discourse analysis did not however only identify Norway's commitment to international cost-effectiveness and win-win solutions, but it also identified the frequent use of words and phrases that communicate a sense of urgency, especially in Norway's high-level statements. Some examples are "...issue of critical importance to human mankind" (Stoltenberg, 2011), "...the world's most urgent business..." (Sundtoft, 2013), "Climate change is accelerating." (Helgesen, 2016), and "...the coming years are critical." (Klima- og Miljødepartementet, 2018b). These all show Norway's commitment to the limits and survival discourse, which communicates a sense of urgency to address climate change and necessitates radical change to solve this issue (Pascoe et al., 2019, p. 83). Norway also often relied on science or other expert opinions when talking about the urgency of climate change and the need for a quicker response. This is also a characteristic of the limits and survival discourse. Various IPCC reports and the UNEP Gap reports are most often cited, and examples include "The UNEP Gap report confirms that we are lagging behind." (Helgesen, 2017), and "The signal from the IPCC special report is loud and clear: the target is still within reach, but the coming years are crucial." (Klima- og Miljødepartementet, 2018b). This is an example of intertextuality, as by drawing on other texts, Norway participates in the reproduction and transformation of this discourse.

By continuing to describe climate change as an urgent issue Norway also communicates the need for solving this issue, and that this has been a priority for Norway both before and after the Paris Agreement was adopted. It communicates that climate change is high on Norway's political agenda. Prime Minister Erna Solberg raised the importance of urgent action in 2015 by stating

that “COP21 must be the turning point in our efforts to transform the global economy and make the transition to low-emission societies.” (Solberg, 2015). By giving this statement, Solberg commits to the radical change promoted by limits and survival and thereby also creates a conflict with the business-as-usual logic in economic rationalism. The latter part of the statement does on the other hand communicate a sense of optimism, which often is found in both economic rationalism and ecological modernization. By combining elements from these three discourses, Norway acknowledges that climate change requires radical change to be solved, but also believe that this transition can be combined with economic growth by for example using market mechanisms or investing in and developing new green technology. A similar combination of discourses was identified by Pascoe et al. (2019) in the case of Papua New Guinea’s leader statements and Intended Nationally Determined Contributions. They found that the logic of radical change was linked to economic rationalism by advocating for market-based mitigation mechanisms (Pascoe et al., 2019).

Although the limits and survival discourse asks for radical change, it does not raise the need for a new framework to achieve this. It rather believes that it can be achieved within the existing UN framework and therefore presents the UN as the global center of climate policy (Bäckstrand & Lövbrand, 2019). The discourse therefore favors top-down control by highlighting the “...necessity of global climate stewardship and planetary carbon control.” (Bäckstrand & Lövbrand, 2019, p. 523). This rationality is also reproduced by Norway. Several of the texts showed commitment to the UNFCCC and its existing institutions, sometimes also advocating against the establishment of new institutions. The strategy for the Paris negotiations made working to avoid new institutions without clear functions a priority for Norway, and favored the use of existing institutions within the UNFCCC over establishing new ones to implement work stream 2; Increased mitigation ambition by 2020 (Klima- og miljødepartementet, 2015). The year after the adoption of the Paris Agreement former Minister of Climate and Environment Vidar Helgesen further showed Norway’s commitment to the regime by stating that “Norway is deeply committed to the Paris Agreement and international climate cooperation” (Helgesen, 2016).

Another part of the political rationality in the limits and survival discourse is viewing climate change as a global action problem, which means that all states must take action and increase their ambition. States are therefore seen as the primary agents to enforce change (Bäckstrand &

Lövbrand, 2019). This is confirmed by the Paris Agreement through especially the establishment of Nationally Determined Contributions and references to the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities”. Nationally Determined Contributions give states the power to decide their targets for emissions reductions, while the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities” specify that all states should take action, but that the level and type of action is particular to each state. By advocating for emission cuts to be done by both developed and developing nations, Norway adheres to this political rationality. This was a main priority for Norway towards the negotiations in 2013. More specifically, Norway worked for an agreement including all countries and providing quantified targets for industrialized countries and “big” development countries. This implies that “smaller” developing countries should not be obliged to cut emissions. The document does on the other hand also state that this should be flexible to make sure that both the big emitters today and in the future are given commitments in line with actual responsibility and capacity (Klima- og miljødepartementet, 2013).

The rationality of “universal” participation stayed persistent in Norway’s rhetoric after 2013. Contrary to earlier years which focused more on the responsibility of major emitters, more emphasis was later put on action by *all* countries. One example is from the high-level statement in 2014, where former Minister for Climate and Environment Tine Sundtoft stated that Norway wanted an agreement where all countries participate fully and completely (Klima- og Miljødepartementet, 2014a). The policy document from the same year does on the other hand not communicate such a strict rhetoric around participation, rather stating that the content of commitments can vary between countries, and also specifying that the least developed countries are exempt from some demands (Klima- og miljødepartementet, 2014b). The difference in use of discourse between these two documents is interesting. It shows that Norway follows the principle of distributive justice in the environmental justice framework when allocating the responsibility for climate action, which can be explained by the fact that Norway also showed some commitment to the green politics discourse.

Bäckstrand and Lövbrand (2019, p. 526) frame the green politics discourse within the concept of climate justice and describe its political rationality as critical to inequitable power structures in contemporary climate governance. Although Norway’s commitment to green politics is less institutionalized than the other discourses presented in this chapter, it can be identified

specifically around questions of climate change impact and distributional responsibility. Statements like “We share a feeling of urgency...because the cost of impact from climate change adds to the burden of the poor...” (Miljøverndepartementet, 2012b) and “We recognize the importance of sustained support for developing countries.” (Helgesen, 2017), acknowledges the inequitable power structures between developed and developing countries, and is therefore in line with parts of green politics’ rationality. Norway also includes references to equity in terms of commitments in the Paris Agreement, often specifying that the least developed countries are exempt from or have less responsibility in following up some commitments (See for example Klima- og miljødepartementet, 2014b, 2015, 2017; Stoltenberg, 2011). This can be connected to a north/south understanding of climate justice, and to both the principle of distributive justice and historical responsibility.

5.2 Climate Action Network

The analysis of the 16 documents written by Climate Action Network revealed a clear commitment to both limits and survival and to the green politics discourse, which were often combined to get arguments across. It also identified a commitment to ecological modernization, mainly when suggesting solutions to climate change. Climate Action Network further reproduces some references to the economic rationalism discourse, while at the same time also explicitly dissociating from some of its logic. As with Norway, Climate Action Network combines some parts of different discourses rather than adhering to the whole logic of one discourse. How this comes across will be explained in the next chapters.

5.2.1 Urgency and the importance of equity in climate action

A focus on the urgency of climate change is central to Climate Action Network’s communication and priorities towards the UN Climate Negotiations. The limits and survival discourse is firstly visible in how they describe the issue of climate change. This description is characterized by a focus on the urgency of taking action to solve the climate crisis combined with a pessimistic outlook on the future. In 2011, the high level statement directed attention to the lack of ambition and to the “gigatonne gap” in climate finance (CAN International, 2011a), which clearly shows a disappointment with the actions taken by states at this point. The statement held in 2012 builds on this by claiming that “The world faces deeply distressing prospects as this COP ends.”, and “We cannot afford to wait.” (CAN International, 2012a). This is an example of a juxtaposition,

where the contrast of disparate events is used to make people change their mind and take action (Keck & Sikkink, 1999, p. 97). When expressing the urgency of climate change, Climate Action Network also often backs its arguments with science. One example is “The science cannot be clearer. Climate impacts are worsening, and we are responsible.” (CAN International, 2015). The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change is often referenced and is the main source of scientific evidence. This is an example of intertextuality, and it also shows that Climate Action Network draws on the same sources as Norway when reproducing discourses.

A commitment to the limits and survival discourse further comes across in how Climate Action Network gives states the responsibility to act on the urgency of climate change. By providing them with both the responsibility and the power to implement the necessary solutions, states are given political agency similar to what is often found in reproductions of the limits and survival discourse. This comes across by how the majority of their demands are directed at states, or Parties, at the negotiations. Examples are “Parties must work together...” (CAN International, 2013b), “...call on all governments to commit to divest from fossil fuels to stay on a 1.5°C pathway.” (CAN International, 2017a) and “Here in Lima, governments must show clear and tangible progress on an agreement that will be finished in Paris...” (CAN International, 2014a). The last quote shows how demands directed at states are combined with a belief in the UN system to act as a central power to solve climate change. Climate Action Network shows a stable commitment to a binding, legal agreement within the UNFCCC regime throughout the whole period. This means that although states have the power to implement the solutions, Climate Action Network acknowledge that individual action by states are not enough. The rationality of global action and coordination to address climate change is therefore also present in Climate Action Network’s reproduction of this discourse.

Although states are given political agency and responsibility, the analysis identified a difference in how demands were directed at these states. Developed countries were continuously provided with the most responsibility, while action expected from developing countries were often contingent on factors like financial support. For example “Agreement that global emissions will peak in 2015 which means that developed countries need to reduce their emissions much more quickly, and provide support for developing countries to take more mitigation action.” (CAN International, 2012b), “Global peaking of emissions is critical and requires developed countries

to undertake much deeper mitigation actions than what has been currently pledged which ensures rapid reduction in emissions.” (CAN International, 2013b) and “Include leadership by developed countries as well as encouragement for developing country Parties to move towards economy-wide absolute emission reduction targets.” (CAN International, 2018). These quotes show a clear concern with justice in terms of distributing responsibilities for climate action. Developed countries are expected to bear the brunt of emission reductions, while developing countries are encouraged to be more ambitious, and should be provided with support to enable this. The quotes also express a sense of urgency, which means that Climate Action Network combines the urgency of the limits and survival discourse with the equity focus of green politics when distributing responsibility for climate change. In addition, it is a clear reference to the principle of distributive justice in the environmental justice framework.

By framing developed countries as responsible for the emissions that has caused climate change and giving them the responsibility to both increase mitigation ambition and support developing countries, Climate Action Network uses the green politics discourse to create a causal story that establishes who bears the responsibility of climate change (Keck & Sikkink, 1998, p. 27). This can give Climate Action Network leverage, as it exposes the gap in level of action and responsibility among developed countries. One example can be found in a text from 2014: “Developed countries should take the lead by not only increasing their own ambition but also providing the necessary means of implementation for realizing mitigation potential within developing countries.” (CAN International, 2014b). In addition, being an international network allow Climate Action Network access to stories about people who are directly affected by climate change, which can also be used strategically in their communication to increase leverage. One example is from the negotiations in 2013, where the Climate Action Network representative stated in the high level statement that “If you stand in solidarity with Mr. Yeb Sano, and those in the Philippines, who have spent the last two weeks burying the dead, then act now.” (CAN International, 2013a). Here, the devastating impacts of Typhoon Haiyan is used to underline why states must act on climate change.

A concern with the distribution of responsibility for climate change is connected to the green politics discourse. Green politics is maybe the most radical out of the four discourses, as it regards structural change, or transformation, as the solution to climate change (Dryzek, 2013). In

addition, it gives political agency to a range of different actors, including movements, parties, states, international organizations and individuals (Dryzek, 2013, p. 219). This rationality is reproduced in Climate Action Network's documents, together with a wider focus on inequitable power structures. The demand for structural change comes across in how Climate Action Network refuses that climate change can be solved within a business-as-usual system. One example is from the Paris Negotiations in 2015, where they ask for the new Agreement to give the signal that continuing business-as-usual is not compatible with a 1.5°C world, and also argues for the Agreement to be transformative (CAN International, 2015). When it comes to inequitable power structures, Climate Action Network brings this down to a more individual level by raising concerns regarding gender equity, indigenous people and showing a clear commitment to the human rights' issues within climate change. In 2015, they for example called for "...parties to respect, protect, promote and fulfill human rights, including the rights of indigenous peoples." (CAN International, 2015). Similar calls were made in several of the texts during the period (See for example CAN International, 2013b, 2016; CAN International, 2018). Here, Climate Action Network not only reproduces the green politics discourse, but also references both the principles of recognition and procedural justice found in the environmental justice framework.

5.2.2 A fair win-win strategy

As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, Climate Action Network communicates a divided commitment to the logic in the economic rationalism discourse. First of all, the Network showed a concern for the impact climate change has on economic growth. In 2011, the risk of not reaching the target of maximum 1.5°C global warming was linked to catastrophic consequences for economic growth (CAN International, 2011b). A similar logic was expressed in 2014, when they argued that "Mitigation costs are bound to increase if action on reducing emissions is delayed..." (CAN International, 2014b). These references to the economic rationalism discourse are different than those of Norway, as the latter is more in line with a focus on self-interest. Climate Action Network rather uses the logic of economic rationalism to underscore the importance for acting on climate change, which is also combined with the urgency rationality found in the limits and survival discourse. This can be interpreted as a strategic choice. By referring to the economic incentives of acting on climate change, Climate

Action Network speaks to the rationality followed by Norway and most probably also other industrial countries at the negotiations.

Creating economic incentives for climate action was also used by Climate Action Network when arguing for a transition to a low-carbon society. One example is from 2011, when low-carbon sustainable development was presented as the prerequisite for poverty reduction and economic development (CAN International, 2011b). Or from 2015, “The Paris Agreement must signal a comprehensive long-term vision of a world freed of poverty through the social and economic opportunities created by the transition to a low-emission and climate resilient future.” (CAN International, 2015). These examples clearly show a turn away from the political rationality in economic rationalism to a more specific focus on the economic opportunities offered by different solutions to climate change, which is rather in line with the logic of ecological modernization. This win-win rationality might also be a strategic choice, as it would speak to states’ self-interest and give them an incentive to act on climate change.

Several of the specific solutions that Climate Action Network proposes to tackle the urgency of climate change is also framed by the logic of ecological modernization. Technological development and capacity-building are highlighted as important solutions, more specifically as ways to respond to climate change in a fair and equitable way. One example from 2014 represents how this rationality is used several times during the period of 2011-2018. Climate Action Network argues that “All countries must take ambitious mitigation action, but developed countries have to take the lead in reducing emissions and providing the necessary support including finance, technology and capacity building.” (CAN International, 2014b). This argues in line with the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities”, combined with solutions often proposed in the discourse of ecological modernization. The focus on developed countries taking the lead is further another sign of the commitment to the green politics discourse that was presented earlier.

The turn away from the political logic in economic rationalism is also illustrated by Climate Action Network’s position towards both market mechanisms as a mitigation tool, and towards fossil fuels. The network seems to accept the use of market mechanisms, which can be connected to the commitment to carbon markets identified as part of elite NGOs’ understanding of climate justice (Schlosberg & Collins, 2014). On the other hand, Climate Action Network propose

several factors that the use of market mechanisms is contingent on. First of all, they should be supplementary to domestic action, which is a contrast to Norway's focus on international cost effectiveness. Secondly, these mechanisms should not "...undermine the fundamental need to decarbonize all economies..." (CAN International, 2013b). This therefore also draws on the need for transformation found in the green politics discourse.

When it comes to fossil fuels, Climate Action Network shows a stable commitment to phase out subsidies to this industry and to "...accelerate the ongoing transition away from dirty fossil fuels..." (CAN International, 2014b). In 2018 they further expressed that "Growth in green industries outpaces nearly all others, providing jobs and benefits to communities; yet a false narrative of "jobs-versus-environment" is employed by incumbent, high-polluting industries to protect their economic self-interest." (CAN International, 2018). Growth in green industries is presented as a win-win solution, while polluting industries are put in a negative light because of their sole focus on economic self-interest. By communicating the contrast between green industries and high-polluting industries, Climate Action Network clearly wants to create a distance between their position and the business-as-usual and self-interest focus in economic rationalism.

6 Discussion

Chapter 5 presented how the Norwegian Government and Climate Action Network use different discourses to frame their positions at the negotiations. These positions are closely linked to their interests in international climate policy. Norway is a Party to the Convention and to the Paris Agreement. This means that Norway has formal voting power at the negotiations, and the right to talk and express opinions in negotiation meetings. Climate Action Network is not an official party, but the UNFCCC opens for nonstate actors to participate as observers to the negotiations. Since they can't express their opinions in the negotiation meetings or exercise power through voting, they must use other strategies to influence the process and outcome of the negotiations. Analyzing the actors producing and reproducing discourses is the second aspect of the framework for discourse analysis I presented in chapter 4. In the next two sections I will therefore explain the motivation and interests of these actors and why they choose to follow a certain discourse. In the third section I will compare the results from my discourse analysis with the relevant decisions from the negotiations in the period of 2011-2018 and assess year by year

how different discursive representations are reproduced and institutionalized in the negotiation outcomes. This will therefore answer the third aspect of discourse analysis, namely policy outcomes.

6.1 The Norwegian Government: driven by national interests

To explain and analyze why Norway uses certain discourses at the negotiations, it is important to establish what goals and interests Norway has when participating in the UNFCCC. This is closely linked to why Norway decided to become a member of this international regime in the first place. Just before the negotiations to establish the Convention started in the 90s, Norway changed its approach to climate policy. There was a shift in policy focus from a domestic approach to an international approach. Hovden and Lindseth (2004) calls this a shift in discourse, from the “national action” discourse to the “thinking globally” discourse. In the national action discourse, reductions in domestic GHG emissions to achieve international obligations are emphasized (Hovden & Lindseth, 2004, p. 66). One way that this discourse was realized in Norway’s environmental policy was by identifying the transport sector as the key sector for reducing emissions (Hovden & Lindseth, 2004, p. 66). The shift to the thinking globally discourse did on the other hand mean that Norway began stressing the need for an international and flexible approach to combating climate change, including international cost effectiveness (Andresen & Butenschøn, 2001, p. 341). One of the main arguments in this discourse is that one should make sure to reduce global emissions as much as possible at the lowest price, instead of prioritizing reductions in Norway’s domestic emissions (Hovden & Lindseth, 2004, p. 66). Reducing emissions in Norway is more costly than doing it in other (developing) countries. This approach therefore rests on the need for an international system of cooperation for emission reductions, which became a central position for Norway and explains the commitment to establishing the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.

The discourse analysis in chapter 5 further revealed that the focus on international cost effectiveness still is an important position for Norway. This came across especially in Norway’s commitment to the economic rationalism discourse. In addition, Norway has enshrined this position in the Parliament through two settlements from respectively 2008 and 2012¹. These settlements lay out the guiding principles and main positions of Norway regarding climate policy

¹ Usually known as «Klimaforliket» in Norwegian.

(Energi- og miljøkomiteen, 2008, 2012). This focus must be seen in combination with Norway's continued dedication to the oil- and gas industry. Calculations show that depletion of today's coal-, oil- and gas fields will have impacts that are not consistent with the goal of maximum 2°C global warming (Aall, 2016). This means that some fields that are already in production must be closed, that production cannot be started on new fields, and that we certainly cannot look for new ones (Aall, 2016). Still, Norway has performed a policy that more or less shields the oil industry from climate-related measures, as the industry is still considered important for income creation (Benjaminsen & Svarstad, 2018, p. 38). Norway is therefore dependent on international mechanisms, like a carbon market, to be able to decouple its oil industry from climate policy. This explains why Norway is a) committed to the international climate regime, and b) why Norway reproduces the rationality from economic rationalism, and to some degree ecological modernization, when framing its position at the UN Climate Negotiations.

Norway is not only dependent on international cooperation to fulfil their priority of international cost effectiveness, but the Government has through several years also showed an ambition to become an international front runner in climate policy. This has been consistent in Norway's principles and main priorities for climate policy since the 90s and is today also embedded in the two settlements from 2008 and 2012. These settlements both make reference to the ambition of Norway being a driving force for the adoption of a new agreement after the Kyoto Period (Energi- og miljøkomiteen, 2008, 2012). In the 2008 settlement, an international agreement was presented as the most important element in climate policy. It states that the Government will work for an ambitious international agreement that encompasses as many countries as possible, and that Norway must contribute to emissions reductions in developing countries and growing economies (Energi- og miljøkomiteen, 2008, p. 1). This position was continued in the settlement from 2012, and clearly shows Norway's commitment to a global solution for climate change, and to the economic rationalism discourse.

Norway has employed several strategies in their efforts to gain the status as a front runner at the negotiations. Lahn and Rowe (2016) identifies how Norway has sought the position as a front runner by acting as a bridge-builder, policy entrepreneur or driving force, and by being a generous economic contributor to the UNFCCC. The role of being a bridge-builder has among others included acting as a facilitator to promote consensus and being perceived as trustworthy

and knowledgeable at the negotiations (Lahn & Rowe, 2016, p. 133). This role has been defining for Norway's climate diplomacy (Lahn & Rowe, 2016, p. 134). Norway has further combined the role of being a bridge-builder with the role of being a policy entrepreneur or driving force by for example contributing with new ideas (Lahn & Rowe, 2016, p. 127). This combination was possible because of Norway's status as a small state, which makes it easier to acquire "moral authority" (Lahn & Rowe, 2016, p. 135). Lastly, Norway has sought the position as a front runner by being a generous financial contributor to the UNFCCC. This shows Norway's commitment to the regime and can therefore enhance their status (Lahn & Rowe, 2016, p. 127).

Norway's commitment to international climate action was recently reinforced on two different occasions. First of all, Norway did in September 2019 declare a doubling of their support to the Green Climate Fund. This is a fund that serves the Convention, and which does, according to Prime Minister Solberg, contribute to reaching the goals of the Paris Agreement (Statsministerens kontor, 2019). This underscores Norway's position as a generous financial contributor. Secondly, Norway did, as the first industrial country, update its Nationally Determined Contribution under the Paris Agreement in February 2020. This contribution lays out Norway's new target for emission reductions, which is set to 50-55 % cut in emissions by 2030 compared to 1990 levels, to be achieved in collaboration with the EU (Norway - NDC update, 2020). This is a considerable increase from the first Nationally Determined Contribution which had the target of 40 % emission reductions by 2030. It is therefore in line with Article 4.3 of the Paris Agreement, which states that the updated Nationally Determined Contributions should represent a "...progression beyond the Party's then current nationally determined contribution..." (Decision 1/CP.21, 2015). When publicly announcing the new target, Minister for Climate and Environment Sveinung Rotevatn, expressed the importance of Norway taking charge and showing a good example, not least to influence EU and other countries to enhance their targets (Solvang, Knezevic, & Cosson-Eide, 2020). This statement is a clear example of Norway's ambition to be a front runner in international climate policy. It also shows Norway's continued focus on international cost effectiveness, as reaching the target in collaboration with the EU gives Norway access to the EU emissions trading system.

6.2 Climate Action Network: On the quest for justice

Climate Action Network is not a Party to the Convention, but still have interests at the negotiations. As is typical for NGOs, this network is also value driven (Kaldor, 2003, p. 14). For Climate Action Network, this comes across especially in their commitment to climate justice and a fair response to climate change. This position is framed mainly in the green politics discourse. Climate Action Network does not have national interests like Norway and other states but are rather driven by different values and justice principles. Their goals at the negotiations therefore include changing states' positions in line with what they deem as the common good, and thereby to influence the outcomes of the negotiations. My discourse analysis revealed that Climate Action Network often front the position of developing countries, and demands developed countries to respond, in line with the principle of distributive justice and a north/south approach to climate justice. In these instances, Climate Action Network's credibility is increased because they represent member organizations from both developed and developing countries, which asserts that they are not only working *for* developing countries, but also *with* them (Keck & Sikkink, 1998, p. 13).

To achieve their goals and influence the outcomes of the negotiations, Climate Action Network uses several strategies. First of all, they perform information politics by acting as alternative sources of information. Information can be used to influence policy-making by framing it as either right or wrong (Keck & Sikkink, 1998, p. 19). This is done by for example publishing reports on different topics, producing policy briefs for the specific negotiations, and by submitting more specific input to expert groups within the UNFCCC. On the negotiations, they also publish a daily newspaper called ECO. This includes updates on the progress in the negotiations, and the Network's opinions and analysis of this. Being a network enhances their position as an alternative source of knowledge and information since it allows for the transmitting of messages, and for information to flow between the different members. This is key for networks to be influential and effective (Keck & Sikkink, 1998, p. 18).

Several mechanisms within the Paris Agreement allows NGOs and non-state actors like Climate Action Network access to information about how states are implementing policies and the progress they are making in reaching their Nationally Determined Contributions. This refers mainly to the Transparency Framework and the Global Stocktake. States are obliged to submit

transparency reports every other year and the first one is due in 2024 (Decision 18/CMA.1, 2018). It will include information on among others progress in achieving Nationally Determined Contributions and on financial, technological, and capacity-building support provided by developed countries to developing countries (Decision 1/CP.21, 2015, Article 13). In the Global Stocktake, collective progress on achieving the long-term goals in the Paris Agreement will be assessed and will therefore provide insight into whether states are on the right track or not (Decision 19/CMA.1, 2018). These mechanisms will therefore provide important information for Climate Action Network's influence in the future.

Secondly, Climate Action Network oversees the action by states and makes sure that their discursive positions are followed up in practice. This falls in the strategy of accountability politics, which is used to expose the distance between discourse and practice by holding governments accountable for the commitments they express publicly (Keck & Sikkink, 1999, p. 97). One way that Climate Action Network exposes contradictory actions by states or other actors at the negotiations is by handing out the "Fossil of the Day" award. This award is usually given to either a specific state, a group of states, or other actors at the negotiations. It can be awarded on the basis of action (or lack of it thereof) at the negotiations, or on the basis of contradictory domestic policies. One example of the latter is when Norway was awarded the "Fossil of the Day" in 2017 because of the Norwegian Government's decision to allow new oil exploration in the Arctic. Environmental NGOs sued the Norwegian Government because of this decision, and the trial was starting only the day after Norway was given the award at the negotiations. As Climate Action Network writes in the explanation for the award "That it is even necessary for environmental organizations in Norway to sue the government, in the first place, is a clear example of a country neglecting the fundamental principle of common but differentiated responsibility." (Climate Action Network International, 2017). By sharing this information, Climate Action Network uncovers that Norway's discursive representation of being a front runner in climate policy is not followed up in practice back home. By mobilizing and using such information strategically, Climate Action Network can persuade, pressure and gain leverage over more powerful actors, like states (Keck & Sikkink, 1998, p. 2).

In the previous chapter I explained that being a small state enables Norway to gain "moral authority". This "authority" is on the other hand even more common among nonstate actors, like

Climate Action Network. Keck and Sikkink (1998) calls this moral leverage, and it represent the third strategy that Climate Action Network can use to gain influence at the negotiations. Moral leverage involves the mobilization of shame (Keck & Sikkink, 1998, p. 23). This is therefore linked to Climate Action Network's information politics, as "shaming" relies on framing something as wrong and therefore also relies on access to information. In my discourse analysis, I uncovered that Climate Action Network sometimes direct negative attention to developed countries and their lack of action at the negotiations. Developing countries, on the other hand, being the countries most affected by the impacts of climate change, are rather framed as victims. My discourse analysis shows how the texts often make reference to these countries being least responsible, but at the same time experiencing the worst consequences. In addition, the same obligations that are given to developed countries are usually not given to developing countries as well. By choosing a side like this, Climate Action Network establish a clear distinction between "right" and "wrong", and it might also lead to the mobilization of moral leverage. This is because by gaining the support of governments in developing countries, they have more leverage towards the targeted developed countries who most likely value the "good opinion" of others and wish to stay in the normative community of nations (Keck & Sikkink, 1998, pp. 23, 29).

6.3 Institutionalization of discourses in outcomes of the negotiations

It is now clear that both the Norwegian Government and Climate Action Network have certain interests when participating at the negotiations, and that these interests are connected to the discourses they use. This also means that they aim to influence the decisions made during the negotiations to be in line with their interests. In this chapter I will discuss if and how these two actors influence the outcomes of the negotiations by presenting the chosen decisions from each year and discussing which discourses are reproduced and institutionalized in these. This chapter therefore represents the third part of my framework for discourse analysis, namely how discourses influence policymaking.

6.3.1 COP17: Enhanced action and a momentum for change

At COP17 in Durban, the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP) was established. This group got the mandate to "...develop a protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with the legal force under the Convention applicable to all Parties..." (Decision 1/CP.17, 2011, Article 2). It also decided that this work should be

concluded no later than 2015 (Decision 1/CP.17, 2011, Article 4). This means that it got the mandate to work on what was later adopted as the Paris Agreement four years later. The same decision also launched a work plan to enhance mitigation ambition and to explore ways to close the ambition gap (Decision 1/CP.17, 2011, Article 4). The ambition gap refers to the gap in current action for emission reductions and what is necessary to reach the 2°C goal.

The decision to establish the ADP reflects especially one of the discourses identified in the analysis of both the Norwegian Government and Climate Action Network. It has clear references to the limits and survival discourse. Already in the preambular text it states that "...climate change represent an urgent and potentially irreversible threat to human societies and thus requires to be urgently addressed by all Parties..." (Decision 1/CP.17, 2011). This is in line with the way that both Norway and Climate Action Network uses this discourse. On the other hand, the same paragraph makes reference to "...the widest possible cooperation by all countries..." (Decision 1/CP.17, 2011), which is more in line with Norway's discursive position. This is because Norway voiced the importance of the 2015 agreement to include commitments to reduce emissions for both industrialized countries and developing countries (Miljøverndepartementet, 2011). Climate Action Network did however rather focus on countries' contribution to be in line with their historic emissions and capability, and that developing countries should take the lead (CAN International, 2011b). This position represents a commitment to distributive justice and can be connected to the fact that Climate Action Network also adheres to the green politics discourse.

It is not only Norway's discursive representations of the limits and survival discourse that are reproduced in the decision. It also includes some of its more specific asks for the negotiations. Norway listed several priorities in their policy document for the negotiations in 2011. Two of the main priorities was for Parties to agree on an outcome that brings us closer to a holistic and binding climate agreement and the importance of closing the ambition gap (Miljøverndepartementet, 2011). Both of these are institutionalized in respectively Article 2 and 4 of the decision (Decision 1/CP.17, 2011). This shows how discourses not only construct a shared knowledge of climate change, but also how it informs policymaking. Through the institutionalization of the limits and survival discourse, several facts are reproduced as "regimes of truth". This is for example that UN is the center of climate policy, which connects to the

commitment to creating a new agreement within this regime, and the focus on climate change as an urgent issue that needs a global response.

Climate Action Network also adheres to the limits and survival discourse, which means that they too participate in the reproduction of its “regimes of truth”. They had similar priorities as Norway for COP17, asking for a “...mandate to negotiate a legally binding instrument...” and for measures to close the “gigatonne gap” (CAN International, 2011b). Since both actors had similar priorities, it is difficult to determine if one had more influence on the outcome than the other. What can be identified however, is that Climate Action Network had other priorities that were not included in the decision. To close the ambition gap, they for example demanded that developed countries agree on targets of at least 25-40 % below 1990 by 2020 (CAN International, 2011b). Although the decision acknowledges the need to raise ambition and close the gap, it does not specify any targets for developed countries (Decision 1/CP.17, 2011). This means that Climate Action Network’s demands were only partially inscribed in the final decision.

6.3.2 COP18: New determination to adopt a legal instrument

The outcome of COP18 in Doha resulted in several decision and two of them are specifically connected to the development of a new agreement. Parties first agreed on an outcome in accordance with the Bali Action Plan (Decision 1/CP.18, 2012). The Bali Action Plan was adopted at the negotiations in 2007. This decision established a working group for long-term cooperative action to enable the full implementation of the Convention and launched a process to agree on an outcome and adopt a decision at COP15 (Decision 1/CP.13, 2007). No new agreement was made in 2009, and as already mentioned, Parties later agreed to work towards the adoption of a new legal instrument at COP21 in 2015. The decision made at COP18 includes outcomes on the five main categories of the Bali Action Plan: shared vision, mitigation, adaptation, technology and financing (Decision 1/CP.18, 2012). Secondly, a decision was made that advances the Durban Platform which were established the previous year (Decision 2/CP.18, 2012).

The outcome of the Bali Action Plan continues the institutionalization of the limits and survival discourse. It acknowledges the urgency to reduce emissions, and gives Parties the responsibility to take this action (Decision 1/CP.18, 2012). The same rationality is present in the decision that

advances the Durban Platform. It also makes reference to the urgency of climate change and shows commitment to the multilateral regime (Decision 2/CP.18, 2012). This is in line with how both the Norwegian Government and Climate Action Network uses this discourse. In the policy document, Climate Action Network mentions an agreed outcome for the Bali Action Plan as an important outcome of COP18 (CAN International, 2012b). This means that parts of their position were included in the outcomes of the negotiations. On the other hand, Climate Action Network further asks more specifically for this to include an agreement on comparable effort, carbon budgets and common accounting for non-Kyoto developed countries and nationally appropriate mitigation actions for developing countries (CAN International, 2012b). Parties did not agree on this at COP18, but rather decided to establish a work programme with the mandate to explore both common elements for measuring and comparable effort, and that this work should be concluded by 2014 (Decision 1/CP.18, 2012). This means that their position was only partially included. Norway did not raise very specific demands for this outcome decision in their policy documents, but rather states that the result should be either substantive decisions, or decisions for further work (Miljøverndepartementet, 2012a). This means that the establishment of work programmes is in line with their position.

The outcome of the negotiations in 2012 also includes solutions that can be linked to the economic rationalism discourse. As presented in chapter 5, Norway uses this discourse to frame their position to combine climate action with continued economic growth. Decision 1/CP.18 (2012) lays out several measures for enhanced national and international mitigation action. This includes market mechanisms, which is suggested as a solution to enhance cost effectiveness and promote mitigation. This means that the logic of cost effectiveness, which has long been an important priority for Norway's international approach to climate policy, is reproduced in the outcome of the negotiations in 2012. The decision further affirms that the use of markets should avoid double counting of efforts and facilitate an increase in ambition for developed countries (Decision 1/CP.18, 2012). This specification is in line with Norway's position and also means that the position of Climate Action Network is present in the text, as this was two of their demands for a new market-based mechanism (CAN International, 2012b; Miljøverndepartementet, 2012a). It also shows that although there is a difference in how Climate Action Network and the Norwegian Government reproduces the economic rationalism discourse, they do agree on some specific contents of solutions in line with this discourse.

One of the categories in the Bali Action Plan is technology development. The enhancement of action on this area is included in the COP18 decision (Decision 1/CP.18, 2012) . The win-win logic in ecological modernization, which often includes technology as a solution to climate issues, is therefore also institutionalized in the outcome of the 2012 negotiations. As the previous discourse analysis showed, this is a logic that Norway also shows commitment to, since the solutions proposed by ecological modernization is compatible with the business-as-usual rationality of the economic rationalism discourse. The decision further includes the provision of capacity-building related to technology development to support developing countries (Decision 1/CP.18, 2012). This is raised as an essential element by Climate Action Network (CAN International, 2012b). Such measures are often mentioned by Climate Action Network when laying out a fair and equitable response to climate change. This is further linked to the green politics discourse, which is the last discourse I will discuss.

The outcome of the 2012 negotiations includes some references that can be compared to especially how Climate Action Network uses the green politics discourse to underscore the importance of equity in climate policy. It decides among others that efforts should be taken on the basis of equity and “common but differentiated responsibilities”, mentions developed countries’ responsibility to support developing countries and states the importance of adaptation action to reduce developing countries’ vulnerability (Decision 1/CP.18, 2012). This is in line with the focus on power imbalances that has been present in Climate Action Network’s argumentation throughout the whole period studied in this thesis, and also the principle of distributive justice. Norway’s policy document acknowledges the needs of the least developed countries but does not show the same commitment to power imbalance and justice issues as Climate Action Network (Miljøverndepartementet, 2012a). So, although Norway also has shown some commitment to parts of the green politics discourse, this was limited in the position for this negotiation.

6.3.3 COP19: Another step in the right direction

At COP19 in 2013, parties agreed on the Warsaw outcomes. This package includes several elements, including the establishment of a mechanism to address loss and damage caused by climate change and a rulebook for reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation. The decision most relevant for the development of a new agreement is however a further

advancement of the Durban Platform (Decision 1/CP.19, 2013). This advancement includes among others a timeline for the new agreement and measures to close the ambition gap.

As the previous years, the limits and survival discourse stays prominent in the 2013 advancement of the Durban Platform. Words like unequivocal and urgent are used to explain climate change issues, and it provides attention to the ambition gap and shows commitment to the multilateral regime (Decision 1/CP.19, 2013). This is in line with both the Norwegian Government and Climate Action Network's discursive representations. Norway asked more specifically for the agreement to be legally binding and to include all countries, and for it to decide quantified commitments for both industrial countries and "big" developing countries (Klima- og miljødepartementet, 2013). Climate Action Network also recommended that the agreement should be legally binding. They similarly asked for economy wide emission reduction targets, but specified that this should count only for countries with high responsibility and capacity (CAN International, 2013b). The further advancement of the Durban Platform includes a reference to the legal force of the Agreement, and that it should be applicable to all Parties (Decision 1/CP.19, 2013, Paragraph 1). This is more in line with Norway's position. Although the decision asks for Parties to implement the quantified economy-wide emission reduction target under the Convention, it does not clarify that the new agreement will include such targets. It rather invites parties to prepare for their intended Nationally Determined Contributions as a step towards a new agreement (Decision 1/CP.19, 2013, Paragraph 2b). This is therefore not in line with either of the two actors' positions.

As laid out in chapter 5, Climate Action Network often combines an urgency focus with the green politics discourse to highlight power imbalances and the skewed impacts of climate change. This rationality is to a lesser extent present in the further advancement of the Durban Platform. While Climate Action Network clearly prioritizes questions of equity in the policy document, for example by asking for an "Equity Reference Framework" for both mitigation and climate finance commitments (CAN International, 2013b), the decision from COP19 is less specific with regards to equity. It does however emphasize the need for adaptation to reduce vulnerability in developing countries, which can be linked to the focus on power imbalances in the green politics discourse. It also gives specific "urges" to developed countries, in line with the principle of "common but differentiated responsibilities", or the principle of distributive justice

in the environmental justice framework (Decision 1/CP.19, 2013). Building on the equity focus, it was also clear from my discourse analysis that Climate Action Network connects this to technological development and capacity-building in developing countries. Norway did on the other hand have a more win-win approach to this, by focusing on the importance for low emission technology coupled with their business-as-usual logic. These are two different references to solutions often found in the ecological modernization discourse. Decision 1/CP.19 (2013) do make a reference to technology and capacity building as a support that should be increased by developed Parties and is therefore in line with especially Climate Action Network's reproduction of this discourse.

6.3.4 COP20: The last push towards a new agreement

At the last conference before the adoption of the new agreement in 2015, Parties agreed on an outcome called the Lima Call for Climate Action. This decision includes several important steps, including a timeline, deciding the general content of the agreement and its guiding principles, and also a draft negotiation text on the main elements in the new agreement (Decision 1/CP.20, 2014).

The limits and survival discourse continues to stay strong in the negotiations, as the decision made at COP20 forwards the concern about the gap between the current pledges and the level of ambition needed to keep global warming under 2°C or 1.5°C (Decision 1/CP.20, 2014). The name of the decision, "Lima Call for Climate Action", also communicates a sense of urgency in responding to climate change. For Climate Action Network, it was a priority that the outcome of COP20 included an urge for all countries to revise their pre 2020 mitigation commitments and actions (CAN International, 2014b). Norway's policy regarding pre-2020 mitigation ambition is not as demanding, rather stating that there should be a continued focus on increasing ambition before 2020 and that this should primarily include supplementary international measures and collective action, for example by exploring technical solutions for renewable energy, forests, and carbon capture and storage (Klima- og miljødepartementet, 2014b). The position of Climate Action Network was partly included in the decision, which makes a reference to the enhancement of ambition in the pre-2020 period in order to "...ensure the highest possible mitigation efforts under the Convention by all Parties" (Decision 1/CP.20, 2014, Paragraph 18). In addition, it forwards Norway's position by deciding to continue the technical examination of

opportunities with high mitigation potential (Decision 1/CP.20, 2014, Paragraph 19). This means that it, similar to Norway, combines elements of the limits and survival discourse and the ecological modernization discourse.

The ecological modernization discourse is also visible in how the Lima Call for Climate Action decides that the new agreement will address technology development and capacity-building, as well as giving a vague reference to market mechanisms by including “international cooperation” as an opportunity to be explored to increase mitigation ambition (Decision 1/CP.20, 2014, Paragraph 18). The demand from Climate Action Network that the agreement includes technology development and capacity-building to reduce the power imbalance between developed and developing countries is therefore reflected in the decision. Further, international cooperation is, as previously explained, an important principle in Norway’s climate policy. Although the reference to such mechanisms is vague in the decision, the draft negotiation text found in the annex to the decision, does include market mechanisms as an option for Parties to use in meeting their commitments (Decision 1/CP.20, 2014). This means that one of Norway’s central demands for the new agreement is included in the decision, and also that Norway’s use of the ecological modernization discourse in combination with the economic rationalism discourse is institutionalized.

The Lima Call for Climate Action further decides that the new agreement should be applicable to all Parties, while also committing to the reflection of “common but differentiated responsibilities” in the new agreement (Decision 1/CP.20, 2014). This is a reflection of the position of both the Norwegian Government and Climate Action Network. Norway specified in their policy document that the divide between Annex 1 and Non-Annex 1 countries from the Kyoto Protocol cannot be forwarded in the new agreement, but that the approach should be dynamic and should implement “common but differentiated responsibilities” (Klima- og miljødepartementet, 2014b). Climate Action Network agrees that all countries should take action on mitigation, but is more specific than Norway when distributing responsibility by demanding that developed countries take the lead (CAN International, 2014b).

The demand from Climate Action Network that developed countries should take the lead is used in combination with a demand for support to vulnerable developing countries (CAN International, 2014b). This is explained by their commitment to the green politics discourse,

which addresses power imbalances between and within countries. Norway reproduces similar arguments, for example by arguing that the agreement should include commitments for all countries with the financial capacity to support action and measures in poor and vulnerable countries (Klima- og miljødepartementet, 2014b). The establishment of the Lima Call for Climate Action respects that some countries are particularly vulnerable to the effects of climate change and the responsibility of developed countries to provide financial support to these countries (Decision 1/CP.20, 2014). This differentiation of responsibility is also a reflection of the distributive justice principle. Similarly to the previous year, Climate Action Network asks for decisions on an equity review of Intended Nationally Determined Contributions at COP20 (CAN International, 2014b). This is not included in the final decision, which rather states that Parties, when communicating their Intended Nationally Determined Contributions, should include information on how this contribution is fair and in line with their national circumstances (Decision 1/CP.20, 2014, Paragraph 3).

6.3.5 COP21: History is made in Paris

At the 21st meeting of the Parties to the Convention, the Paris Agreement was finally adopted. The long-term goal of the agreement is laid out in Article 2, which states the goal of “Holding the increase in the global temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above preindustrial levels...” (Decision 1/CP.21, 2015). The other articles include commitments related to especially three main topics: mitigation, adaptation, and loss and damage. In addition, it lays out commitments for Parties to provide climate finance.

The limits and survival discourse stay persistent in the negotiations and several examples of the discourse can also be found in the Paris Agreement. The preamble of the Agreement refers to climate change as an urgent threat and recognizes the need for an effective and progressive response (Decision 1/CP.21, 2015). This is a reproduction of the same urgency rationale that was identified in both the Norwegian Government and Climate Action Network’s discursive representations. Article 2 presents the long-term goals of the Agreement, and states that it “...aims to strengthen the global response...”. Framing climate change as a global issue that needs a global response is also in line with how the limits and survival discourse was identified in the analysis in chapter 5. More specifically, Climate Action Network demands in their policy

document that all key elements of international climate action is addressed in the agreement (CAN International, 2015). This is reflected in the Paris Agreement, which does fulfil Climate Action Network's demand by including commitments related to loss and damage, adaptation, finance, technology and a long-term vision for mitigation (Decision 1/CP.21, 2015).

One aspect of the Paris Agreement that might seemingly conflict with the limits and survival discourse, is its bottom-up approach. The limits and survival discourse has advocated for the importance of other actors in among others reviewing Parties' ambitions, but this has only stayed on a technical level (Bäckstrand & Lövbrand, 2019, p. 524). It therefore still promotes states as the primary agents and the UN as the center of global climate policy. By providing states with the power to decide their own targets in the Nationally Determined Contributions, the Paris Agreement however institutionalizes a bottom up approach that follows the political rationality in limits and survival. Norway's position for the negotiations in 2015 was in line with this (Klima- og miljødepartementet, 2015). This was however not the case in 2013, where Norway advocated for quantified commitments for both industrial countries and "big" developing countries, similar to the top-down approach in the Kyoto Protocol (Klima- og miljødepartementet, 2013). The shift might be explained by external factors, as the bottom-up approach in the Paris Agreement was partly a result of some countries' discontent with the allocation of quantified targets in the Kyoto Protocol (Falkner, 2019). Climate Action Network advocated for dynamic differentiation in Parties' commitments under the Paris Agreement, like Norway also did in 2015 (CAN International, 2015). This is fulfilled by the Nationally Determined Contributions and the reference to "common but differentiated responsibilities".

The fact that the Paris Agreement gives more agency to non-Party stakeholders, is however a clearer example of how the bottom-up approach conflicts with the limits and survival discourse. This rather shows a commitment to ecological modernization, which advocates for partnerships among a variety of actors to achieve the necessary changes in the current economic order. A commitment to this discourse therefore represents a challenge to the UN as the center of global climate policy (Bäckstrand & Lövbrand, 2019, p. 525). Being a nonstate actor, it is quite obvious that Climate Action Network have advocated for such an inclusive approach. Their position for the Agreement included among others for the participation of civil society actors in the review of Parties' contributions, and for the Agreement to include a stand-alone provision that

“...reaffirms the commitment of parties to public participation, access to information, education, training and awareness raising...” (CAN International, 2015). This last demand is recognized both in the preamble of the Agreement and in Article 12, which is allocated to this issue alone (Decision 1/CP.21, 2015).

As mentioned previously, Climate Action Network also advocated for the inclusion of loss and damage in the Paris Agreement. Article 8 addresses this issue, and therefore fulfills Climate Action Network’s demand for the Agreement to anchor this as a stand-alone issue (CAN International, 2015). Climate Action Network has worked consistently for the recognition of loss and damage in the UNFCCC. This is an issue that some developing countries already experience, because climate change impacts in some instances exceeds any possible adaptation measures. That the recognition of this issue is often promoted by Climate Action Network can therefore be linked to their commitment to the green politics discourse and several justice principles. Norway had however a different position on this topic, which was not fulfilled. The Norwegian Government did not see loss and damage as a stand-alone issue, but rather argued for it to be included as a part of the work on adaptation, and only as long as it does not involve responsibilities for compensation (Klima- og miljødepartementet, 2015). Norway’s reluctance to include this issue in the agreement can be linked to their commitment to the economic rationalism discourse, as Norway shows a concern with the cost or possible compensation responsibility that loss and damage might entail.

The inclusion of loss and damage can be seen as a recognition of equity issues, as it is largely a concern for the most vulnerable countries who have least historical responsibility for climate change. The Paris Agreement does however also address equity more specifically, as the preamble mentions both equity and “common but differentiated responsibilities” as guiding principles (Decision 1/CP.21, 2015). This means that the Agreement does reflect Climate Action Network’s ask for a dynamic differentiation of climate action obligations, and more specifically the demand for these principles to be included in the preamble of the Agreement (CAN International, 2015). Norway have also consistently advocated for a differentiation in demands and expectations directed at different countries, but did not mention this as a specific part of the preamble (Klima- og miljødepartementet, 2015). What they did prioritize however is that the preamble includes references to human rights, rights of indigenous people and of women and

children, as well as mentioning just transition and decent work (Klima- og miljødepartementet, 2015). These can be connected to the green politics discourse and more specifically both the principle of recognition and of procedural justice. This position was shared with Climate Action Network and was also institutionalized in the preamble of the Paris Agreement.

Climate Action Network has combined the equity focus of the green politics discourse with solutions presented by the ecological modernization discourse, like asking for developed countries to support developing countries through the transfer of technology and capacity-building (CAN International, 2015). The Paris Agreement includes commitments regarding both technology development and capacity-building, and therefore reproduces some of this logic. The equity focus produced by Climate Action Network is present in how it is stated that developing countries shall receive support to implement the commitments in this Article (Decision 1/CP.21, 2015, Article 10.6). The Paris Agreement does however also present a more win-win oriented approach, which is a common characteristic of ecological modernization. This is visible in how Article 10, which establishes a Technology Framework, also highlights the importance of innovation to effectively respond to climate change and achieve economic growth (Decision 1/CP.21, 2015). This win-win rationality was identified in the discourse analysis of the Norwegian Government. As a priority for COP21, they included that financial resources should be mobilized to increase the capacity of developing countries to reduce emissions (Klima- og miljødepartementet, 2015). This is not only a win-win argument, but since it also enables Norway to continue the focus on international cost-effectiveness, it is also in line with their reproduction of the economic rationalism discourse and a focus on self-interest.

The Paris Agreement institutionalizes the economic rationalism discourse in line with Norway's position by also providing states with the opportunity to use market mechanisms to achieve mitigation goals. This is grounded in Article 6 of the Agreement (Decision 1/CP.21, 2015). This has been a central demand from Norway for the new agreement and is explained by their focus on international cost effectiveness. Climate Action Network has kept their position on such mechanisms since the negotiations on a new agreement started, which especially includes the use of market mechanisms by developed countries only to increase ambition in emissions reductions (CAN International, 2015). The final text in the Paris Agreement reflects this demand, by stating that "Parties recognize that some Parties choose to pursue voluntary cooperation in the

implementation of their nationally determined contributions to allow for higher ambition in their mitigation and adaptation actions and to promote sustainable development and environmental integrity.” (Decision 1/CP.21, 2015, Article 6.1). In addition, the Agreement includes the demand from Climate Action Network that the use of market mechanisms should not lead to a double counting of emission reductions, which was also a part of Norway’s position (CAN International, 2015; Klima- og miljødepartementet, 2015). This is secured in Article 6.5, which states that the emissions reductions achieved through the market mechanism, cannot be used to demonstrate achievement of both the host Party and the other Party’s nationally determined contribution (Decision 1/CP.21, 2015).

6.3.6 COP22: First step towards implementing the Paris Agreement

In 2016, the first step towards implementing the Paris Agreement was made. Parties agreed on a decision that among others welcomes the entry into force of the Paris Agreement, presents a timeline for the adoption of the work programme and underscores the need for enhanced action prior to 2020. The need for enhanced action articulated in the decision is combined with the urgency rationale in the limits and survival discourse, for example in how it both stresses “...the urgency for the completion of the work programme under the Paris Agreement...” and underscores “...the urgent need for the entry into force of the Doha Amendment...” (Decision 1/CP.22, 2016). The Doha Amendment is a decision where new emission reduction targets were agreed on for the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol, which ends in 2020. As identified before, these discursive representations are present in both how the Climate Action Network and the Norwegian Government reproduces this discourse. Norway highlighted the importance of progress on the work programme at COP22 (Klima- og miljødepartementet, 2016), while Climate Action Network underlines the urgency of action, arguing that “...we must shift attention towards rapidly scaling up ambition, which has lagged behind in the past few years.” (CAN International, 2016).

The discourse analysis in chapter 5 also uncovered that by combining the limits and survival discourse with other discourses, different arguments are formed. Climate Action Network combines the urgency of climate action mainly with the unequal distribution of consequences that countries experience due to climate change, in line with the principle of distributive justice and a north/south approach to climate justice. Norway on the other hand, often combined the

urgency rationality with win-win solutions from the ecological modernization discourse, creating an argument where continued economic growth is compatible with mitigating climate change. Both these arguments are present in the Paris Agreement, which both recognizes the urgency for climate action, acknowledges the vulnerability of some countries, and proposes technology development and market mechanisms as solutions. The reference to the Paris Agreement in the decision from 2016 is an example of intertextuality and means that the discursive representations in the Paris Agreement are also reproduced.

6.3.7 COP23: *The Fiji momentum*

At COP23, Parties continued the work on implementing the Paris Agreement and adopted the Fiji Momentum for Implementation. This decision includes a plan for the completion of the work programme and for pre-2020 implementation and ambition. In addition, it launches the Talanoa Dialogue. The mandate and features of this dialogue is noted in the annex to the decision as an informal note by the Presidencies of COP22. The Talanoa Dialogue was established in line with decision 1/CP.21, which decided that Parties would have a facilitative dialogue in 2018. This dialogue will take stock of the collective efforts of Parties in reaching the long-term goal of the Paris Agreement (Decision 1/CP.23, 2017).

The Fiji Momentum for Implementation continues the institutionalization of the limits and survival discourse through several quotes that communicate the urgency of climate change, for example “Underscoring the importance of keeping the momentum and continuing to uphold the spirit and vision of the Paris Agreement” and “*Noting* that all Parties share the view that pre-2020 implementation and ambition are of utmost importance” (Decision 1/CP.23, 2017). This discourse was also clear in Climate Action Network’s policy document and high-level statement for the 2017 negotiations. The policy document states that “Urgent international action is needed to limit the warming to 1.5°C, and the window of opportunity to achieve this is closing fast.” (CAN international, 2017b), while the high-level statement makes reference to the increasing number of record-breaking extreme weather events (CAN International, 2017a). Norway’s high-level statement includes similar arguments highlighting the needs for increased ambition and the consequences that follow if we don’t (Helgesen, 2017), while the policy document shares a discontent with the progress on the Paris Agreement work programme (Klima- og miljødepartementet, 2017).

The decision to establish the Fiji Momentum for Implementation also includes an informal note on the Talanoa Dialogue, laying out its mandate and features. In this text, a reference to the ecological modernization discourse can be identified. This is its focus on including a broad range of actors, both Parties and non-Party stakeholders, to provide input to the discussion. The Norwegian Government formulated some positions for the Talanoa Dialogue. This included that the dialogue mobilizes broadly, that it will promote practical solutions and give political signals of Parties' fulfilment of the Paris Agreement, and that it will be based on the IPCC Special Report on 1.5°C (Klima- og miljødepartementet, 2017). Norway's position on broad mobilization can be connected to the discourse of ecological modernization, which promotes collaboration of a broad range of stakeholders to solve issues related to climate change. Climate Action Network's position on this matter is more specific, as it includes demands for both the scope and the design of the dialogue (CAN international, 2017b). Some of these demands are included in the informal note, for example that the dialogue will consist of a preparatory and a political phase, that its outcome is enhanced ambition and that it will consider inputs from states and nonstate actors (Decision 1/CP.23, 2017). In addition, it also fulfils both actors' specific demand that the dialogue will be informed by the IPCC Special Report.

6.3.8 COP24: Paris rulebook is adopted

The main purpose for the negotiations in 2018 was to finalize and adopt the work programme for the Paris Agreement. Parties did, although on overtime, manage to agree on what became the Katowice Climate Package. This includes 16 decisions that operationalize the different articles in the Paris Agreement. Rules for Article 6 about volunteer cooperation for emission reductions was on the other hand delayed, as Parties failed to agree on an outcome at COP24. For the following analysis, I will focus on decisions connected to the core functions of the Paris Agreement that clearly institutionalize the discourses identified in chapter 5.

The Katowice Climate Package, or the work programme for the Paris Agreement, includes guidance on how the different articles of the agreement should be implemented. This means that it references the Paris Agreement and therefore reproduces the same discourses as that text. This includes the limits and survival discourse, which continues to dominate in the UNFCCC regime. The main mechanism of the work programme that reproduces this discourse might be the Global Stocktake. The main purpose of this mechanism is to take stock of collective international

progress and achieve greater ambition, which is clearly connected to the both the focus on global action and urgency in limits and survival. In addition, it decides that the process will be “Party-driven”, and therefore regards states as drivers of change (Decision 19/CMA.1, 2018, Article 2). For Climate Action Network, a clear position on the modalities for the Global Stocktake was for it to include and give necessary attention to four work streams: mitigation, adaptation, loss and damage, and financial flows (CAN International, 2018). Norway did on the other hand advocate for the inclusion of three workstreams: mitigation, adaptation, and support (Klima- og miljødepartementet, 2018a). This difference in policy can be explained by how loss and damage have been a priority for Climate Action Network for a long time, most likely explained by their commitment to different justice principles, while for Norway, loss and damage rather entails new responsibilities for compensation. The final decision is mostly in line with Norway’s position, as it decides that the Stocktake will consider mitigation, adaptation, and means of implementation and support (Decision 19/CMA.1, 2018). It does on the other hand also clarify that it “...may take into account, as appropriate...” loss and damage, making it voluntary for Parties to inform on their efforts related to this topic (Decision 19/CMA.1, 2018).

The work programme further decides that the Global Stocktake will allow for the participation of non-Party Stakeholders, which is a reference to the broad cooperation between different actors advocated by to the ecological modernization discourse. This recognition of non-Party stakeholders is further included in other decisions in the work programme, for example in the modalities for the work on “education, training, public awareness, public participation and public access to information”, and in the modalities for national adaptation plans (FCCC/PA/CMA/2018/3/Add.2, 2018). This bottom-up approach is a contrast to the limits and survival discourse, which favors top-down steering. The institutionalization of this discourse might therefore challenge the UN as the center of climate policy by providing more agency to nonstate actors like businesses and NGOs. The Norwegian Government included a position on promoting the right to information and involvement by civil society in their policy document for COP24, which shows that although Norway is committed to the UN as the center of climate policy, they also contribute to the reproduction of the bottom-up approach institutionalized in the negotiation outcomes (Klima- og miljødepartementet, 2018a). Climate Action Network, being a non-Party stakeholder, also has a clear position on the inclusion of civil society on several work streams. They for example advocated for non-Party actors, specifically civil society, to be

included in the development and implementation of Nationally Determined Contributions, to participate in the transparency framework, and give input to the Global Stocktake (CAN International, 2018). This means that their position was only partially institutionalized, since the work programme refers to non-Party stakeholders in its modalities for the Global Stocktake, but not specifically in the other work streams mentioned in Climate Action Network's demand.

As has been pointed out several times, the solutions proposed by the ecological modernization discourse is often used in combination with the political rationality in the economic rationalism discourse. Market mechanisms are often advocated by economic rationalism, which was reproduced by Norway through their focus on international cost effectiveness. The inclusion of market mechanisms in the Agreement was a clear priority for Norway during the negotiations of the new agreement. For the work programme, Norway focused specifically on deciding on a guide on how to avoid double counting and secure environmental integrity when using an international market for emissions reductions (Klima- og miljødepartementet, 2018a). Climate Action Network had similar demands, while also specifying that any use of such mechanisms should help enhance ambition of Nationally Determined Contributions (CAN International, 2018). The guidance on this Article was not included in the final work programme, as Parties failed to reach consensus on the issue. The draft text proposed by the President shows that Parties did not agree on, among others, the rules to avoid double counting (Katowice Texts, 2018). This means that although especially Norway and to some extent Climate Action Network participates in the institutionalization and legitimation of market mechanisms through the economic rationalism discourse, their discursive representations are dependent on the consensus among Parties to be included in the final decision.

The work programme guides the implementation of the Paris Agreement. This means that it automatically includes a recognition of equity and "common but differentiated responsibilities" in line with Article 2 paragraph 2 in the Agreement (Decision 1/CP.21, 2015). This is also specifically mentioned in the preamble of the work programme. Both the Norwegian Government and Climate Action Network have highlighted the importance of "common but differentiated responsibilities" in the Agreement and the guidance for its implementation. This can be connected to both the principle of distributive justice and the green politics discourse. Other elements of the green politics discourse can also be identified, such as its reference to

knowledge of indigenous people as part of adaptation communication and its recognition of the importance of capacity-building in countries with the least capacity (FCCC/PA/CMA/2018/3/Add.1, 2018). This both reflect the focus on power imbalance and how it gives agency to several actors. In addition, it is a reflection of climate justice through the principles of recognition and procedural justice.

7 Conclusion

The objective of this thesis was to understand how different actors use discourse to frame their interests and how this influence the outcomes of the UN Climate Negotiations. By applying a discourse analysis to several texts written by the Norwegian Government and Climate Action Network, and by comparing the results from this analysis with outcome decisions from the UN Climate Negotiations, I argue that this objective has been fulfilled. The thesis further had two research questions. To conclude, I will therefore first sum up the main findings for each of the two research questions, and then propose a way forward on this topic.

7.1 Research question 1

The first question I aimed to answer was “How does the Norwegian Government and Climate Action Network use discourse to frame their positions at the UN Climate Negotiations?”. This question was discussed in chapter 5, where I presented the results from my discourse analysis. The analysis made clear that the two actors participate in the reproduction of four dominant environmental discourses: “limits and survival”, “economic rationalism”, “ecological modernization” and “green politics”. Both actors combined elements from two or more of these discourses to frame their positions. This is an example of how different discourses interact, which means that both actors also participate in the transformation of these discourses.

The analysis further shed light on similarities and differences in how the two actors’ use the specific discourses. First of all, both actors showed a commitment to the limits and survival discourse and its logic of urgency. The way that this urgency was used to frame, and underline arguments were however different between the Norwegian Government and Climate Action Network. For Climate Action Network, communicating the urgency and severity of climate change impacts was also a way to communicate its unfairness and unequal distribution of consequences. This means that it was often combined with the green politics discourse. Norway

did on the other hand combine this discourse with their business-as-usual logic, stating that climate change is urgent but can be solved with green technology and market mechanisms. It was also used by Norway to underline the importance of broad participation in the Paris Agreement.

Secondly, I identified a difference in how the two actors used the economic rationalism and the ecological modernization discourse. The rationality in these two discourses allowed Norway to frame their focus on cost-effectiveness and business-as-usual within a win-win scenario.

Climate Action Network did on the other not adhere to the business-as-usual logic of economic rationalism, but rather used its focus on economic cost to provide incentives for climate action. And the focus on technological solutions in ecological modernization was rather framed as an important solution to level out the power imbalance between developed and developing countries. This focus on power imbalances is common in the green politics discourse, which were frequently used by Climate Action Network. Norway also shared concerns about the distributional injustice of climate change, and therefore participates in the reproduction of this discourse too.

7.2 Research question 2

The second question I aimed to answer was “How are the discursive representations produced by Climate Action Network and the Norwegian Government institutionalized in the outcomes of the negotiations?”. This question was discussed in chapter 6, where I compared the findings from my discourse analysis to outcome decisions from the UN Climate Negotiations in the period of 2011-2018.

In chapter 6, I revealed that limits and survival are dominant through the whole time period. This is in line with the findings in the articles by both Bäckstrand and Lövbrand (2019) and Pascoe et al. (2019). The negotiation outcomes especially reproduced the political rationality of urgency and the need for a global response to combat climate change. Both the Norwegian Government and Climate Action Network participated in reproduction of such discursive representations, making them both participants in the reproduction of this discourse at the negotiations. In addition, the outcome decisions combine this discourse with both the focus on distributive justice found in Climate Action Network’s discursive representations, and with “business-as-usual” solutions often promoted by the Norwegian Government.

As the theoretical framework establishes, discourses change over time. When it comes to the limits and survival discourse, it stayed quite consistent over the 8-year time period I studied. It always involved the commitment to a global response and states as the primary agents of change. The latter focus did however become more prominent throughout the period, as more focus was put on the actual commitment by Parties, for example by referring to the ambition gap and pre-2020 ambition. This change might be connected to the rise of the ecological modernization discourse during the development of the Paris Agreement. It explains the increasing responsibility given to individual states, as the ecological modernization discourse has a more bottom-up approach that advocates for a partnership between governments and different nonstate actors. The limits and survival discourse do not traditionally provide such agency to nonstate actors, meaning that the introduction of the ecological modernization discourse was important to establish the bottom-up approach in the Paris Agreement. This also confirms that ecological modernization is challenging UN as the center of global climate policy (Bäckstrand & Lövbrand, 2019).

Both the Norwegian Government and Climate Action Network participates in the production and reproduction of the ecological modernization discourse. In the negotiation outcomes it did both promote win-win solutions that are compatible with economic growth and connect these solutions to distributional justice. This means that the “regimes of truth” constructed by Climate Action Network through this discourse are present in outcomes such as the Paris Agreement and the work programme. Win-win solutions promoted by the Norwegian Government are also present in the negotiation outcomes, which combines the solutions and political rationality found in the ecological modernization discourse and in the economic rationalism discourse. The latter are more specifically institutionalized through the establishment of international cooperation, or market mechanisms, to reduce emissions. The combination of technological development and a market-approach to mitigation reveal a certain commitment to business-as-usual, rather than transformation. An interesting finding is that the focus on market mechanisms is also combined with the limits and survival discourse, as it specifies that it should be used to increase ambition. In addition, there is a focus on environmental integrity. These were both central demands from Climate Action Network regarding the use of market mechanisms and to some degree Norway. This move away from a business-as-usual logic might be explained by how the economic

rationalism discourse is often combined with the ecological modernization discourse, who promotes incremental change.

Lastly, I discussed the institutionalization of the green politics discourse in negotiation outcomes. As has been pointed out before, this discourse is mostly used by climate activists demonstrating outside the negotiation arena (Bäckstrand & Lövbrand, 2019). My analysis did however identify that elements of this discourse was institutionalized in some of the negotiation outcomes.

Regarding the two actors I studied, Climate Action Network is the one that participates most in the reproduction of this discourse, while the Norwegian Government also showed some commitment to its political rationality. One way that the discourse is institutionalized in the UNFCCC is through the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities”, which is a guiding principle in the Paris Agreement. This shows that the issue of distributive justice is present in the regime. Secondly, there was several references to especially the recognition of knowledge of indigenous people when implementing various climate measures, meaning that there is also a reference to both the principles of recognition and procedural justice.

7.3 Way forward

By applying a discourse analysis to international climate policy, this thesis aimed to shed light on the role of discourse at the UN Climate Negotiations and the space for states and nonstate actors to influence the outcomes of the negotiations through the use of discourse. The previous summary of my main findings show that environmental discourses are used by both a state and a nonstate actor, and that they also are institutionalized in the outcomes of the negotiations. It is however difficult based on my analysis to establish whether the Norwegian Government or Climate Action Network influence the outcomes more than the other, as it is not possible to establish a direct causal link between their positions and the outcomes. The content in the final decisions also relies on other factors, for example the position of the other states and nonstate actors at the negotiations. What my analysis however shows, is that both actors participate in the production and reproduction of discourses and that these discourses are later institutionalized as part of the decisions made at the negotiations. This underlines the importance of discourses in both framing interests and influencing the making of climate policy.

A way forward on this issue could include investigating the space for such influence more specifically in the Global Stocktake and the Transparency Framework. These processes will be

important to raise ambition and will potentially reveal the effectiveness of the bottom-up approach presented by the Paris Agreement. In addition, it would be interesting to assess more closely the influence of NGOs at the negotiations, and whether the space for such influence has actually increased with the adoption of the Paris Agreement. Lastly, I suggest that future studies on the topic of international climate policy in IR should provide more attention to the topic of climate justice. As highlighted in my analysis, the Norwegian Government and Climate Action Network are both committed to different principles of climate justice, showing that this is a concern for both states and nonstate actors participating in international climate policy.

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Appendixes

Appendix 1: List of High-Level Statements

“Speech at COP17”, Statsministerens kontor, 2011

“Solhjell i Doha: Det hastar”, Miljøverndepartementet, 2012

“Norges hovedinnlegg under klimaforhandlingene i Warszawa”, Klima- og Miljødepartementet, 2013

“Norge vil ha en ambisiøs klimaavtale”, Klima- og Miljødepartementet, 2014

“COP21: The Sámi way of life is threatened by climate change”, Klima- og Miljødepartementet, 2015

“Statement at COP21”, Statsministerens kontor, 2015

“Norges innlegg i Marrakech”, Klima- og Miljødepartementet, 2016

“Norges hovedinnlegg under klimaforhandlingene i Bonn”, Klima- og Miljødepartementet, 2017

“The Norwegian National Statement: The UN Climate Conference in Katowice”, Klima- og Miljødepartementet, 2018

“CAN International High Level Segment Intervention”, UNFCCC.int, 2011

“CAN Intervention: High Level Event, 7 December, 2012”, UNFCCC.int, 2012

“National Wildlife Federation, on behalf of environmental non-governmental organizations”, UNFCCC.int, 2013

“CAN Intervention: Joint High Level segment of COP and CMP - statement from observer organizations, COP20, Dec 11, 2014”, Climate Action Network, 2014

“Climate Action Network International, on behalf of environmental non-governmental organizations”, unfccc.int, 2015

“Ms. Ernestine Johnson of U.S. Climate Action Network on behalf of environmental non-governmental organizations”, unfccc.int, 2016

“Ms. Janet Kachinga of Climate Action Network on behalf of environmental non-governmental organizations”, unfccc.int, 2017

“CAN International on behalf of environmental non-governmental organizations”, unfccc.int, 2018

Appendix 2: List of Policy Documents

“Norges forhandlingsposisjon i Durban”, Miljøverndepartementet, 2011

“Norges posisjoner COP 18 / CMP 18 Klimakonferansen i Doha, Qatar”, Miljøverndepartementet, 2012

“Norsk strategi for FNs klimakonferanse i Warszawa”, november 2013, Klima- og miljødepartementet, 2013

“Strategi for klimaforhandlingene i Lima”, Klima- og miljødepartementet, 2014

“FNs klimaforhandlinger”, Klima- og miljødepartementet, 2015

“FNs klimaforhandlingene i Marrakech 2016 - norsk strategi for forhandlingene og oppfølging av Parisavtalen”, Klima- og miljødepartementet, 2016

“Strategi for klimaforhandlingene på den 23. partskonferansen under Klimakonvensjonen”, Klima- og miljødepartementet, 2017

“COP24: Norsk strategi for forhandlingene og oppfølging av Parisavtalen”, Klima- og miljødepartementet, 2018

“Durban Expectations: Necessary, ambitious and achievable steps for COP17/CMP17”, Climate Action Network, 2011

“Doha Milestones and Action: COP18/CMP8 must increase short term ambition and establish a clear path to 2015”, Climate Action Network, 2012

“Warsaw: On the Road to Paris”, Climate Action Network, 2013

“Lima: Raising the Curtain on Paris”, Climate Action Network, 2014

“The Paris Package: A Springboard for Sustained, Transformative Change”, Climate Action Network, 2015

“Marrakech: Galvanizing Ambition”, Climate Action Network, 2016

“Pacific COP: Solidarity and Action to Realize the Promise of Paris”, Climate Action Network, 2017

“Katowice: Spurring the Paris Agreement to Action”, Climate Action Network, 2018



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