



Norwegian University of Life Sciences
Faculty of Landscape and Society
Department of International Environment
and Development Studies, Noragric

Philosophiae Doctor (PhD)
Thesis 2019:69

Contentious Forests: From Global Climate Change Policies to Bolivian Forest Communities

Omstridte skoger: Fra global klimapolitikk til
lokale skogsamfunn i Bolivia

Cecilie Karina von Hirsch

Contentious Forests: From Global Climate Change Policies to Bolivian Forest Communities


Omstridte skoger: Fra global klimapolitikk til lokale skogsamfunn i Bolivia

Philosophiae Doctor (PhD) Thesis

Cecilie Karina von Hirsch

Norwegian University of Life Sciences
Faculty of Landscape and Society
Department of International Environment and Development Studies

Ås 2019



Thesis number 2019:69
ISSN 1894-6402
ISBN 978-82-575-1629-1

To David, Inti Amaru and Hauk Amaru

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Acknowledgements.....	ix
Abstract	xi
Sammendrag.....	xiv
Acronyms and Organisations.....	xvii

PART I

1. INTRODUCTION	1
1.1 Objectives and Research Questions.....	5
1.2 Dissertation Structure	6
2. FOREST GOVERNANCE AND REDD	8
2.1 Environmental and Forest Policies in Latin America.....	8
2.2 From RED to REDD+	12
2.3 REDD+ Contestations	16
3. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK	18
3.1 Political Ecology - an Overarching Analytical Framework	18
3.2 Environmental Governance	20
3.3 Power.....	21
3.4 Scale	24
3.5 Subaltern Agency and State-Society Relations	25
3.6 Networks	28
3.7 Discourses and Narratives in Environmental Governance	29
3.8 Contested Values and Ideologies in Environmental Governance.....	31
4. BOLIVIA	35
4.1 Location and Geographical Areas	35
4.2 Demography, Indigenous Peoples and Land	37
4.3 Agricultural Expansion and Forest Governance in the Lowlands (1950s–1980s)	39
4.4 Privatisation, Environmental Protection and Democratisation (1980s–1990s).....	39
4.5 The 1996 Forest Law.....	41
4.6 From Protest to Unity	43
4.7 Recent Contestations over Development and the Environment	47
4.8 Recent Changes in State-Society Relations.....	50
4.9 Current Threats and Challenges in the Forest Sector	52
4.9.1 Climate Change Policies and REDD in Bolivia	53
5. METHODOLOGY	56
5.1 Doing Critical Research	56
5.2 Qualitative Research as a Methodological Approach.....	58
5.3 Reflexivity and Research Relationships.....	60

5.3.1 Positionality in the Research	60
5.3.2 Topic, Case Selection and Access	62
5.4 Data Collection.....	69
5.4.1 Key Informants and Cooperation with Local Actors.....	70
5.4.2 Workshops.....	74
5.4.3 Direct and Participant Observation	76
5.4.4 Interviews and Conversations.....	78
5.4.5 Documents.....	81
5.5 Data Analysis	82
5.5.1 Paper specific analyses.....	84
5.5.2 Triangulation, Trustworthiness and Authenticity	87
5.6 Ethical Considerations and Research Challenges.....	89
5.6.1 An Activist and/or Researcher.....	91
6. SUMMARIES OF INDIVIDUAL PAPERS	94
7. SYNTHESIS AND CONCLUSION	104
7.1 Responses to REDD: Contesting and Reshaping REDD in Latin America	105
7.2 Possibilities and barriers for local and subaltern groups to shape forest policies and interventions in forest areas.....	108
7.3 Discursive Framings, Narratives and Knowledge in Struggles over Forests.....	111
7.4 Broader Contributions of this Dissertation.....	113
References	117

FIGURES

Figure 1 Papers and Publication Status	7
Figure 2 REDD Developments from 2005 to 2015.....	15
Figure 3 Satellite map of South America and Bolivia.....	36
Figure 4 Map of Bolivia	37
Figure 5 Constitution and Relevant Articles	46
Figure 6 Location of TIPNIS.....	49
Figure 7 Overview of Fieldwork in Bolivia	64
Figure 8 Fieldwork Areas Visited in Bolivia	67
Figure 9 Geographical Areas and Actors	68
Figure 10 Categories of Actors.....	69
Figure 11 Papers and Interactions with Actors.....	71
Figure 12 Workshops Organised by Author.....	76
Figure 13 Documents Analysed	82

PART II: COMPILATION OF PAPERS

Paper I: Aguilar-Støen, M., Toni, F. and **Hirsch, C.** (2016). Forest Governance in Latin America: Strategies for Implementing REDD. In de Castro et al. (eds) *Environmental governance in Latin America. Conflicts, projects and possibilities*. London: Palgrave Macmillan, pp.205-233. <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-137-50572-9>

Paper II: Aguilar-Støen, M. and **Hirsch, C.** (2015) REDD+ and Forest Governance in Latin America: The Role of Science-Policy Networks in Bull, B. and M. Aguilar-Støen (eds) *Environmental politics in Latin America. Elite dynamics, the left tide and sustainable development*. London: Routledge, 171–189.

Paper III: **Hirsch, C.** and Aguilar-Støen, M. Rejecting and Reshaping REDD: Contestations over Forest and Climate Change Policy in Bolivia. Manuscript under review in *Development and Change*.

Paper IV: **Hirsch, C.** (2017). Makers and shapers of environmental policy-making: Power and participation in forest legislation in Bolivia. *Journal of Rural Studies*. 50, pp.148-158. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrurstud.2016.11.013>

Paper V: **Hirsch, C.** (2017). Between Resistance and Negotiations: Indigenous Organisations and the Bolivian State in the case of TIPNIS. *Journal of Peasant Studies*. <https://doi.org/10.1080/03066150.2017.1394846>

Appendices

Appendix 1: List of Selected Interviews

Appendix 2: Observations and Participation in Bolivia 2011-2012

Appendix 3: Research Assistants and Key Informants

Appendix 4: Workshop Programs

Appendix 5: Errata

Acknowledgements

The completion of this dissertation would not have been possible without the support and encouragement from a wide range of people, who, in different ways, have supported me along the journey. Most importantly, my deepest gratitude goes to my family, to my life partner David – gracias por tu apoyo, comprensión, ‘resistencia’ y paciencia, te amo, cada día más, te lo debo todo, and to the two most beautiful and loving boys in the world, Inti Amaru and Hauk Amaru, for coping with this process and for their endless love and hugs, jeg elsker dere over alt. I am grateful to my parents for their endless support, to my friends and family, in Norway and in Ecuador. A warm thanks to our niece Rebeca for staying with us the last two months before I handed in the dissertation, helping with Hauk, Ramona the dog and the house. Gracias Rebe, por todo lo que has hecho por nosotros. To my beloved grandmother (mormor), who passed away on 26.06.19, thank you for always showing interest in my work, for your care for me and my family, I know you would’ve been very proud of me.

I wish to express my gratitude for being part of the BOREDD project (2011-2016), which was supported by the Research Council of Norway (grant nr. 412121). A warm and special thanks goes to Professor Mariel Aguilar-Støen, coordinator of the BOREDD project and Professor at the Centre for Development and the Environment (SUM), University of Oslo, my supervisor, mentor and friend, for always believing in me, encouraging me, challenging me, bearing with me, and for never letting me down. I am immensely impressed by your work ethic, working capacity, professionalism, solidarity, empathy and endless engagement. You are an excellent supervisor, co-worker, Professor and coordinator. I am proud of the work we have done together, including the three articles that form part of this dissertation and also two articles in a parallel project, our cooperation on REDD events and REDD insight papers. I care deeply about you, and I am forever grateful. Without you this dissertation would never have seen the light of day. The world needs more academics and people like you!

I am very grateful to Professor John Andrew McNeish, my supervisor at Noragric, Norwegian University of Life Sciences (NMBU), for valuable insights, encouragements, facilitation, openness, language corrections and for sharing his extensive knowledge about Bolivia and indigenous peoples. I also thank Professor McNeish for providing me with contacts in Bolivia and for our interesting conversations about Bolivia, TIPNIS and natural resource governance. I warm thanks also to Professor Pål Vedeld for valuable inputs, constructive feedback and encouragement. Thanks also to Professor Arild Angelsen and Arild Vatn for inspiration. I am

also very grateful for the support from Noragric and its staff, especially Josie Teurlings, who was extremely helpful during the last weeks of my dissertation work and helped me to the very end! Thanks also to my fellow PhD students and researchers at Noragric for always welcoming me and creating an inclusive and enriching academic environment.

I would like to thank everyone at SUM, my place of work from 2011-2016, for providing a warm and inclusive work environment, and space for a variety of discussions about development and the environment. A special thanks to the excellent staff with Gitte Egenberg and later Kristoffer Ring as heads of office, as well as the team with Terje Røysum, Hilde Holsten (later Charlotte Kildal), Anne-Line Sandåker and Manhar Harmansen, for helping with technical and practical issues at all times. I am grateful to former director Professor Emerita Kristi Anne Stølen and current director and Professor Sidsel Roaldkvam for support and encouragements. I would also like to express my great appreciation to Professor Emeritus Desmond McNeill for valuable discussions, for joint work on REDD insight papers and for his engagement and care for all the PhD students who have formed part of the SUM Research School. A warm thanks to Maren Aase for her work with the SUM Research School and all her encouragement. I also thank Benedicte Bull and Erik Berge at the Norwegian Latin America Research Network (NorlarNet) for always creating an inclusive, critical and interesting environment for discussions about Latin America. To all my fellow PhD students and the rest of the great people at SUM, you are all extraordinary. Keep up the good work!

A huge thanks also goes to discussants at different stages, in mid- and end seminars, conferences and in peer review processes. A special thanks to Anna Sveinsdóttir, Susanne Normann, and Maren Christensen Bjune, for valuable comments and inputs at different stages of the dissertation. I also wish to thank my workplace since 2016, the Agency for Urban Environment, City of Oslo, and all my colleagues, for their encouragements.

I am grateful to all the people and organisations in Bolivia with whom I have collaborated with and interviewed. I feel very privileged to have been able to spend time with you and exchange ideas about forests, socio-nature relations and struggles for justice and equity. Gracias por todo! A special thanks to AFIN and Rolando Vargas, COSUT and Jaime Villanueva, University of Cordillera, CIPCA, CEJIS, FAN, UNITAS/Nina programme and Walter Limache, Norwegian Peoples Aid and Natalia Wray, and all my friends at CEADL.

Abstract

This dissertation sets out to critically examine contestations over the governance of forest areas across scales, ranging from global climate change policies and national strategic projects to local forest communities in Bolivia. The dissertation includes several interrelated cases of contestations over the governance of forest area including: responses to the climate change mitigation initiative Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation (REDD) in Latin America and in Bolivia specifically; the emergence of an alternative to REDD in Bolivia; the struggles to make and shape new forest legislation in Bolivia and the contested road construction plan in the protected forest area and indigenous territory Isiboro Sécore (TIPNIS). The cases are closely interrelated, as they cross in time (2010-2013), across scales, and across the struggles and interests of the actors involved. The dissertation consists of this introduction and five interrelated papers, and contributes to an improved understanding of the complex interplay between different actors, values, scales and interests in the governance of forest areas, the connection between politics, power and space, as well as an improved understanding of power-laden knowledge struggles and the dialectics between politics “from above” and struggles “from below”. The dissertation contributes to 1) understand and analyse different responses to the international climate change mitigation initiative Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation in Latin America (REDD), and the interplay between different actors who engage to reshape and contest REDD; 2) analyse possibilities and barriers for local and subaltern groups to shape forest policies and interventions in forest areas across local, national and global scales, and 3) examine how discursive framings, narratives and knowledge are used in struggles over forests.

The associated research questions reflect the contributions from the five papers:

1. How do different countries engage with REDD in Latin America, and how do different actors within these countries get involved in activities seen as necessary for the future implementation of REDD on the ground? (Paper I)
2. How has science-policy networks emerged as new elites in the development of REDD preparations in the Amazon countries? (Paper II)
3. How has REDD been contested and reshaped in domestic policy-making in Bolivia, and how do different interests, values and non-forest-sectoral negotiations influence and shape forest policy outcomes across scales? (Paper III)
4. What are the possibilities and barriers for local and subaltern groups to advance their demands in forestry policy-making processes in Bolivia? (Paper IV)

5. How has micro-political relations and strategic state projects affected the conflict over a road-building project crossing the national park and indigenous territory Isiboro Sécure (TIPNIS) in the Bolivian Amazon, and how have discursive framings been used to legitimize, advance or marginalise certain solutions, ideas and interests? (Paper V)

The data has been collected using a multi-method qualitative approach, with four fieldwork periods at multiple sites in Bolivia, with a total stay of 23 weeks in the time period July 2011-January 2013. Data collection has included direct and participant observation of relevant events and meetings, in-depth interviews and informal conversations, workshops and group discussions, collaborations with local actors and document analysis.

The cases provide insight into different aspects of forest policies and governance of forest areas at interacting scales, as well as the social, material and discursive struggles involved. I aim to understand how socio-environmental interactions, discursive power and geopolitical power relations impact on the governance of forest areas across scales. I use political ecology as an overarching analytical framework together with critical environmental governance. The study engages concepts such as power, scale, agency, participation and state-society relations, science-policy and alternative networks, discourses and narratives in environmental governance and knowledge production.

The findings contribute to insights about how REDD has been contested and reshaped in Latin America, through different country responses as “assertive”, “accommodating” and “resisting” strategies, and how different actors have engaged to shape the processes. On one hand, science-policy networks have largely controlled framings, arenas and knowledge about REDD, on the other hand, alternative networks have emerged to challenge and reshape REDD, including indigenous organisations and state-society alliances in Bolivia. REDD has become a “new layer” in the contestations over forests and interacts with already existing conflicts, though also leads to new proposals, alliances and solutions as frictions occur. The Joint Mechanism for Mitigation and Adaptation and Sustainable Management of Forests and Mother Earth in Bolivia, as well as the parallel writing of a new forest law, constitute important potential changes of forest governance in Bolivia, however, the implementation and advancements of these have been hampered by the prioritisation of agricultural interests, strategic geo-political projects as well as tensions in state-society relations illustrated with the conflict over the road construction project in TIPNIS.

The findings contribute to insights about possibilities and barriers for local and subaltern groups to shape forest policies and interventions in forest areas, including coalition-building, strategic framings, state responsiveness, participatory spaces and cross-scalar tactics. I analyse 1) the role of subaltern groups in the making of new forests policies in Bolivia; 2) indigenous organisations' relations to the state in the struggle connected to the road construction project in TIPNIS; and 3) subaltern demands concerning REDD and the Joint Mechanism.

Finally, the findings contribute to insights about how discursive framings, narratives and knowledge are used in struggles over forests policies and interventions in forest areas. I demonstrate how narrative strategies work as a means to legitimise and position subaltern actors and how discourse-coalitions have enabled subaltern actors to advance their demands. On the other hand, oversimplified discourses and stereotypical narratives obscure internal differences and communities' real-life challenges. Furthermore, I demonstrate how power relations are embedded in specific framings of socio-environmental relations, the institutionalisation of certain concepts which are used to advance specific interests and positions and in how science-policy networks produce, order and spread REDD framings.

The dissertation's main contributions can be summarised as follows:

- A cross-sector and multi-actor perspective, as well as a dual focus on both discursive and material practices, is crucial to understand the governance of forest areas.
- Environmental governance is shaped in dialectical relationships between programmes and initiatives "from above" and responses and initiatives "from below", where actors involved operate across scales.
- Important insights can be obtained by empirically examining the micro-politics of environmental conflicts, and by employing a relational perspective to analyse the dynamics between small-scale interactions and geo-political decision-making.
- Employing a dual analysis of elite and subaltern actors' roles in environmental governance and networks, as well as the combination of different power perspectives, contributes to improved understanding of the dynamics of environmental policy-making and contested processes.

Sammendrag

Omstridte skoger: Fra global klimapolitikk til lokale skogsamfunn i Bolivia

Denne avhandlingen er en kritisk analyse av kampen om forvaltning og styring av skogsområder. Studien beveger seg på tvers av ulike nivåer, fra global klimapolitikk og nasjonale utviklingsprosjekter, til lokale skogsamfunn i Bolivia. Avhandlingen inneholder flere sammenhengende caser om konflikter rundt hvordan skogsområder kontrolleres og forvaltes. Casene inkluderer responsen på klimainitiativet for å redusere utslipp fra avskoging og skogforringelse (REDD) i Latin Amerika og Bolivia spesielt, fremveksten av et alternativ til REDD i Bolivia, kampen for å utvikle og forme ny skoglovgivning i Bolivia og den omstridte byggingen av en motorvei gjennom nasjonalparken og urfolksterritoriet Isiboro Sécure (TIPNIS). Casene henger tett sammen, på tvers av tid (2010-2013), skala, interessekonflikter og aktører.

Avhandlingen består av denne introduksjonen og fem artikler, og bidrar til en bedre forståelse av det komplekse samspeillet mellom ulike aktører, verdier, skala og interesser i styring og forvaltning av skogsområder, forbindelsen mellom politikk, makt, rom og kunnskap, og dialektikken mellom politikk som kommer «ovenfra» og kamper «nedenfra». Avhandlingen bidrar til 1) å forstå hvorfor det har oppstått ulik respons til det internasjonale klimainitiativet REDD i Latin Amerika, og interaksjonen mellom ulike aktører som former eller yter motstand mot REDD; 2) å analysere lokale og subalterne gruppers muligheter og barrierer til å forme skogpolitikk og inngrep i skogsområder, på tvers av lokale, nasjonale og internasjonale nivåer; 3) å undersøke hvordan diskurser, narrativer og kunnskap er brukt i kampen om skogsområdene.

Avhandlingens forskningsspørsmål reflekteres i bidraget fra de fem artiklene:

1. Hvordan responderer ulike land i Latin Amerika på REDD, og hvordan involveres ulike aktører i aktiviteter som anses som nødvendige for implementering av REDD? (artikkel I)
2. Hvordan har nettverk på tvers av vitenskap og politikk vokst frem som nye eliter i planleggingen av REDD i Amazonas landene? (artikkel II)
3. Hvordan har REDD blitt utfordret og omformet i Bolivia, og hvordan blir skogpolitikk påvirket og formet av ulike interesser, verdier og forhandlinger utenfor skogsektoren og på tvers av nivåer? (artikkel III)
4. Hva er lokale og subalterne gruppers muligheter og barrierer for å fremme krav i utforming av ny skogpolitikk i Bolivia? (artikkel IV)

5. Hvordan har mikropolitikk og strategiske statsprosjekter påvirket konflikten over et veiutbyggingsprosjekt i nasjonalparken og urfolksterritoriet Isiboro Sécure (TIPNIS) i det bolivianske Amazonas, og hvordan benyttes diskursive innramninger for å legitimere, fremme eller marginalisere ulike løsninger, ideer og interesser? (artikkel V)

Datainnsamlingen ble utført ved hjelp av kvalitative metoder, hovedsakelig fordelt på fire feltarbeidsperioder i ulike områder i Bolivia, med totalt 23 uker i tidsperioden juli 2011 til januar 2013. Datainnsamlingen har inkludert direkte og deltakende observasjon av relevante hendelser og møter, intervjuer og uformelle samtaler, workshops og gruppediskusjoner, samarbeid med lokale aktører og dokumentanalyser. Casene gir innsikt i ulike aspekter ved skogpolitikk, styring og forvaltning av skogsområder på tvers av ulike nivåer, så vel som de sosiale, materielle og diskursive kampene i disse prosessene. Jeg søker å forstå hvordan sosio-miljømessige interaksjoner, diskursiv makt og geopolitiske maktrelasjoner påvirker forvaltning av skogsområder på tvers av nivåer. Jeg bruker politisk økologi som et overordnet analyserammeverk, sammen med kritiske analyser av miljøstyresett. Studien benytter begreper som makt, skala, handling, deltakelse og stat-samfunnsrelasjoner, nettverk, diskurser og narrativer i miljøstyring og kunnskapsproduksjon.

Funnene i denne avhandlingen bidrar til innsikt i hvordan REDD i Latin Amerika har vært omstridt og blitt transformert. Studien ser blant annet på ulike lands strategier og respons til REDD, kategorisert her som «fremoverlente», «tillepende» og «motstandskraftige», og hvordan ulike aktører har engasjert seg for å forme prosessene. På den ene siden har nettverk på tvers av vitenskap og politikk kontrollert innrammingen, arenaer og kunnskap om REDD. På den andre siden har alternative nettverk vokst frem for å utfordre og omforme REDD, inkludert urfolksorganisasjoner og stat-samfunnsallianser i Bolivia. REDD representerer et ekstra «lag» i striden over skogsområder og interagerer med eksisterende konflikter, men fører samtidig til nye forslag, allianser og løsninger når det oppstår friksjoner. Forslaget til fellesmekanisme for utslippsreduksjon og klimatilpasning i bærekraftig forvaltning av skog i Bolivia, så vel som den parallelle utviklingen av en ny skoglov, utgjør viktige potensiale for endringer av skogforvaltning i Bolivia. Samtidig har implementeringen og videreutviklingen av disse initiativene for bærekraftig skogforvaltning blitt hindret av mektige jordbruksinteresser, strategiske geopolitiske interesser, samt spenningen i relasjonen mellom staten og sivilsamfunnet illustrert ved konflikten over veiutbyggingen i TIPNIS.

Funnene bidrar videre med innsikt i hva som skaper muligheter og barrierer for lokale og subalterne grupper til å forme politikk og inngrep i skogsområder, inkludert bygging av koalisjoner, strategiske innramminger, statlig respons, rom for deltakelse og taktikk på tvers av nivåer. Jeg analyserer 1) subalterne gruppers rolle i utvikling av ny skogpolitikk i Bolivia, 2) urfolksorganisasjoners relasjon til staten i kampen over veiutbyggingen gjennom TIPNIS og 3) subalterne krav relatert til REDD og den nye fellesmekanismen for skog i Bolivia.

Funnene bidrar også til innsikt i hvordan diskurser, narrativer og kunnskap blir brukt i striden over skogpolitikk og intervensjoner i skogområder. Jeg viser hvordan narrative strategier benyttes som et virkemiddel for å legitimere og posisjonere subalterne aktører og hvordan diskurskoalisjoner har gjort det mulig for subalterne aktører å fremme krav. På den annen side viser jeg hvordan overforenklede diskurser og stereotypiske narrativer fordekker interne forskjeller og lokalsamfunnenes reelle utfordringer. Jeg viser også hvordan maktrelasjoner er innebygget i spesifikke innramminger av sosio-miljømessige relasjoner, institusjonaliseringen av begreper som benyttes for å fremme visse interesser og posisjoner, og hvordan nettverk på tvers av vitenskap og politikk produserer, anordner og sprer REDD innramminger.

Avhandlingens hovedbidrag kan oppsummeres slik:

- En forståelse av forvaltning og styring av skogsområder fordrer perspektiver som går på tvers av sektorer og aktører, med fokus på både diskursiv og materiell praksis.
- Miljøpolitikk og forvaltning er formet av dialektiske relasjoner mellom initiativer «ovenfra» og respons og initiativer «nedenifra», der involverte aktører opererer på tvers av nivåer.
- Viktig innsikt kan oppnås ved bruk av empiriske analyser av makt og mikropolitikk i miljøkonflikter, og ved å benytte et relasjonelt perspektiv for å analysere dynamikken mellom småskala interaksjoner og geopolitisk beslutningstaking.
- En analyse av både elite og subalterne aktørers rolle i miljøpolitikk/-forvaltning og nettverk, inkludert kombinasjonen av ulike maktperspektiver, bidrar til en bedre forståelse av dynamikken i slike omstridte prosesser.

Acronyms and Organisations

APG	Asamblea del Pueblo Guaraní (Assembly of the Guaraní People)
ABT	Autoridad de Bosques y Tierra (The Forests and Land Authority)
ADEMAF	Agencia para el Desarrollo de las Macrorregiones y Fronteras (Agency for Development in the Macro Regions and Border Areas)
AFIN	Asociación Forestal Indígena Nacional (National Indigenous Forest Association)
BOLFOR	Bolivia Sustainable Forest Management Project (Proyecto de Manejo Forestal Sostenible de Bolivia)
CDM	Clean Development Mechanism
CEDIB	Centro de Documentación e Información Bolivia (Documentation and Information Centre Bolivia)
CEDLA	Centro de Estudios para el Desarrollo Laboral y Agrario (Centre for the Study of Labour and Agrarian Development)
CEJS	Centro de Estudios Jurídicos e Investigación Social (Centre of Legal Studies and Social Investigation)
CFB	Camara Forestal de Bolivia (Forestry Chamber)
CI	Conservation International
CIDOB	La Confederación de Pueblos Indígenas de Bolivia (Confederation of Indigenous Peoples of Bolivia, former Indigenous Confederation of the Bolivian East, Chaco and Amazon)
CIFOR	The Center for International Forestry Research
CIPCA	Centro de Investigación y Promoción del Campesinado (Centre for Research and Promotion of Farmers)
CIPOAP	Central de Pueblos Indígenas Originarios de la Amazonía de Pando (Central of the Indigenous Peoples of the Amazon region of Pando)
CIRABO	Central Indígena de la Región Amazónica de Bolivia (Indigenous Central of the Amazon Region of Bolivia)
CMIB	Central de Mujeres Indígenas del Beni (Central of Indigenous Women of Beni)
CMPPC	Conferencia Mundial de los Pueblos sobre el Cambio Climático y los Derechos de la Madre Tierra (World People’s Conference on Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth)
CNAMIB	Confederación Nacional de Mujeres Indígenas de Bolivia (National Federation of Indigenous Women in Bolivia)
CNMCIQB “BS”	Confederación Nacional de Mujeres Campesinas Indígenas Originarias de Bolivia “Bartolina Sisa” (The Bartolina Sisa National Confederation of Campesino, Indigenous, and Native Women of Bolivia)
COICA	Coordinadora de las Organizaciones Indígenas de la Cuenca Amazónica (Coordinating Body of the Indigenous Organisations of the Amazon Basin)
COMIFAG	Commission des Forets d’Afrique Centrale (Central African Forest Commission)
CONAMAQ	Consejo Nacional de Ayllus y Markas del Qullasuyo (National Council of Ayllus and Markas of Qollasuyu)
CONISUR	Consejo Indígena del Sur (Indigenous Council of the South)

COP	Conference of the Parties
COPNAG	Central de Pueblos Nativos Guarayos (Central of the Native Guarayo Peoples)
COSUT	Fundación Comunidad Sostenible (Sustainable Community Foundation)
CPEMB	Central de Pueblos Étnicos Mojeños del Beni (Central of the Mojeño Ethnic Peoples of Beni)
CPESC	Coordinadora de los Pueblos Étnicos de Santa Cruz (Coordinating Body of the Ethnic Peoples of Santa Cruz)
CPIB	Central de Pueblos Indígenas del Beni (Central of the Indigenous Peoples of Beni)
CPI LAP	Central de Pueblos Indígenas de La Paz (Central of the Indigenous Peoples of La Paz)
CPIOAP	Central de Pueblos Indígenas Originarios de la Amazonía de Pando (Central of the Indigenous and Originary Amazon Peoples of Pando)
CRN	Coalition for Rainforest Nations
CSCIB	Confederación Sindical de Comunidades Interculturales de Bolivia (Confederation of Intercultural Communities of Bolivia)
CSUTCB	Confederación Sindical Única de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia (The Syndicalist Confederation of Bolivian Peasant Workers)
ECM	Extended Case Methodology
ESFOR	La Escuela de Ciencias Forestales (The Forest Science School)
FAN	Fundación Amigos de la Naturaleza (Friends of the Earth Bolivia)
FAO	Food and Agricultural Organisation United Nations
FCPF	Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (World Bank)
FES	Función Económica y Social (economic and social function)
FIP	Forest Investment Programme
FOBOMADE	Foro Boliviano sobre Medio Ambiente y Desarrollo (Bolivian Forum on Environment and Development)
FONABOSQUE	El Fondo Nacional de Desarrollo Forestal (National Forest Development Fund)
GCF	Green Climate Fund
GHG	Greenhouse Gas
GIZ	German Society for International Cooperation (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit)
GMO	Genetically Modified Organisms
IADB	The Inter-American Development Bank
IBIF	Instituto Boliviano de Investigación Forestal (The Bolivian Forest Research Institute)
IIRSA	Iniciativa para la Integración de la Infraestructura Regional Suramericana (Initiative for the Integration of the Regional Infrastructure in South America)
ILO	International Labour Organisation
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INE	El Instituto Nacional de Estadística (The National Institute of Statistics)
INESAD	Instituto de Estudios Avanzados de Desarrollo

INRA	(Institute for Advanced Development Studies) Instituto Nacional de la Reforma Agraria (National Institute of Agrarian Reform)
IPCC	The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
IPHAE	El Instituto Para el Hombre, Agricultura y Ecología (Institute of People, Agriculture and Ecology)
JMA	Joint Mitigation and Adaptation
JMA/Joint Mechanism	Joint Mechanism for Mitigation and Adaptation and Sustainable Management of Forests and Mother Earth (Mecanismo conjunto de mitigación y adaptación para el manejo integral y sustentable de los bosques y la Madre Tierra).
Law 1551	Law 1551 of Popular Participation (Ley 1551 de Participación Popular, 1996)
Law 1654	Law 1654 of Decentralisation (Ley 1654 de Decentralización Administrativa, 1994)
Law 1715	Law 1715 of Agrarian Reform (Ley 1715 del Servicio Nacional de Reforma Agraria, 1996).
Law 300	Framework Law 300 of Mother Earth and Integral Development to Living Well (Ley 300 Marco de la Madre Tierra y Desarrollo Integral para Vivir Bien, 2012)
Law 337	Law 337 of Support to Food Production and the Restitution of Forests (Ley 337 de Apoyo a la Producción de Alimentos y Restitución de Bosques, 2013)
LIDEMA	Liga de Defensa del Medio Ambiente (Environmental Defence League)
MAS	Movimiento al Socialismo (Movement to Socialism)
MAYA	Ministerio de Ambiente y Agua (Ministry of Environment and Water)
MNR	Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (Revolutionary Nationalist Movement)
MRE	Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs)
MRV	Measurement, Reporting and Verification
NEP - SG	National Environmental Policy Support Group
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NICFI	Norway's International Climate and Forest Initiative
NMBU	Norwegian University of Life Sciences
NORAD	The Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation
NPE	Nueva Política Económica (New Economic Politics)
NRC	Norwegian Research Council
OBIE	Observatorio Boliviano de Industrias Extractivas (Bolivian Observatory of Extractive Industries)
OICH	Organización Indígena Chiquitana (Chiquitano Indigenous Organisation)
PNCC	Programa Nacional de Cambio Climático (National Programme for Climate Change)
PRATEC	Proyecto Andino de Tecnologías Campesinas
REDD	Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation

Rio+20	The United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development 2012
SAP	Structural Adjustment Programmes
SERNAP	Servicio Nacional de Áreas Protegidas (National Service of Protected Areas)
SF	Superintendence for Forests (La Superintendencia Forestal)
TBO /OTB	Territorial Base Organisations (Organisaciones Territoriales de Base–OTBs).
TCO	Tierras Comunitarias de Origen (Original’ Communal Lands)
TIM I	Subcentral Territorio Indígena Multiétnico (Multiethnic Indigenous Territory Subcentral)
TIOC	Territorio Indígena Originario Campesino (Original Indigenous and Peasant Territory)
TIPNIS	Territorio Indígena Parque Nacional Isiboro Sécore (Isiboro Sécore National Park and Indigenous Territory)
UAGRM	Universidad Autónoma Gabriel René Moreno (Autonomous University of Gabriel René Moreno)
UC	Universidad de la Cordillera (University of Cordillera)
UMSA	Universidad Mayor de San Andrés, La Paz (Higher University of San Andres, La Paz)
UMSS	Universidad Mayor de San Simón (Higher University of San Simón, Cochabamba)
UN	United Nations
UNCSD	United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNITAS	Unión Nacional de Institución para el Trabajo de Acción Social (National Union of Labor Institutions for Social Action)
UN-REDD	The United Nations Programme on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

1. INTRODUCTION

The protection of the world's tropical forests has received increased attention in the past decade due to the role forests play in the global carbon cycle. Forests are key for the functioning of local and global ecosystems and act as both storage and sinks of carbon dioxide (CO₂), one of the most potent greenhouse gases (GHG) in climate change. Forest loss accounted for 12 per cent of anthropogenic GHG emissions between 2000 and 2009 (Smith et al., 2014). Between 2010 and 2015 there was a global annual net loss of 3.3 million hectares of forest, of which 2 million hectares were in South America (FAO, 2015). Deforestation connected to agricultural expansion, infrastructure development, resource extraction and human settlements is a major threat to tropical forests and local livelihoods in Latin America (Hecht, 2014).

This dissertation critically examines the political ecology of forest governance and the tension between global efforts, national projects and local implications, with linkages across scales, sites and networks (Peet et al., 2011b; Perreault et al., 2015). In order to do this, I analyse specific interventions and policy changes affecting forest areas in Latin America and in Bolivia particularly. Close to one-third of the world's total land area is covered by forests (FAO, 2015) and around 1.6 billion people depend on forests for their livelihoods (UN, 2015). Nearly half of the world's tropical forests are found in the Amazon region and forests cover 40 per cent of land areas in South America. Among the 10 countries losing the most primary tropical forests in the world is Brazil (1st), Colombia (4th) and Bolivia (5th) (Weisse and Goldman, 2019). In this dissertation I analyse cross-scalar and interrelated interventions and policies affecting forest areas and local livelihoods. These processes include the global policy initiative Reduced Emission from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD), national forest policies and the conflict over of a planned road construction through the Isiboro Sécure National Park and Indigenous Territory (TIPNIS) in Bolivia. I demonstrate how these processes are interlinked across scales and across the struggles and strategies of the different actors involved.

I focus on the interactions between the variety of actors, interests and values in the contested processes over how to govern forests, as well as the emergence of new alliances, spaces and networks across scales. I analyse the struggles by local communities and subaltern groups in

attempts to shape policies and interventions, and how they form part of a wider set of political, social and economic processes with national and global linkages.

The cases and interrelations between the cases that I analyse in this dissertation underline the complexity of protecting, managing and transforming forests, as a range of actors frame, propose, effectuate and contest different solutions. I understand forests to be natural formations characterised by trees, ecosystems and species, but also as political land-use zones (Vandergeest and Peluso, 2015) as well as cultural and social spaces with significance for local livelihoods. The fact that tropical forests are unevenly distributed both globally and nationally, with strong geopolitical, economic and ideological interests connected to conservation, land-use change and extraction of resources, makes the governance of forest areas complex, contested and fragmented. Through these processes forests are turned into political and contested spaces (Peluso and Vandergeest, 2011; Vandergeest and Peluso, 2015).

REDD is a global policy initiative that involves assigning an economic value to the role forest ecosystems play in carbon capture and storage and the implementation of measures to monitor, report and verify the reduction of carbon emissions when avoiding deforestation and forest degradation (Angelsen, 2009; Angelsen et al., 2018). Incentivisation of the reduction of land-use related emissions in tropical forest countries appeared on the agenda of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 2005. It was argued that reducing deforestation was a cost-effective and quick means to reduce carbon emissions (Stern, 2006) and that tropical and sub-tropical countries should be rewarded for reducing deforestation and improving conservation. REDD was later expanded to also include sustainable forest management, enhancement of carbon stocks and forest conservation (REDD+)¹. From initially being viewed largely as a market-based policy framework (Bumpus and Liverman, 2009), the initiative has developed into a hybrid mechanism making use of both market- and non-market-based approaches (Corbera, 2017b; Angelsen et al., 2018). REDD+ links the North and South through the transfer of funds and also through complex sets of technologies, institutions and discourses (Bumpus and Liverman, 2011) which has proven to be both technically and ethically challenging (Angelsen et al., 2018).

This new position that forests are afforded on the global agenda has resulted in a variety of multi-scale, multi-purpose and multi-actor projects (Aguilar-Støen, 2015). Forests are

¹ Throughout the dissertation, I use REDD to refer to both REDD and REDD+ unless otherwise specified.

increasingly found at the intersection of complex webs of opposed interests, needs, rights, knowledge and meanings, ruling out simple governance solutions (Forsyth, 2005; Forsyth, 2009; Larson, 2011; Vandergeest and Peluso, 2015; Angelsen et al., 2018). As a global initiative with local and national solutions, cross-scalar interactions are pivotal in instances where policies “from above” meet demands and claims “from below”. I argue that REDD has become a “new layer” in the contestations over forests and interacts with already existing conflicts, though also leads to new proposals, alliances and solutions as frictions occur (Tsing, 2004).

Bolivia is the country with the sixth largest extension of tropical forests in the world, with close to 59 million hectares of forest covering over half of the country area (FAO, 2010). Bolivia is an interesting case study not only because it has large tropical forest areas and deforestation challenges but also because of grassroots movements demanding justice in environmental governance. Moreover, the Movement to Socialism (*Movimiento al socialismo*, MAS) government (2006-present) has portrayed itself as a leading critic of market-based approaches to climate and forest policies and has proposed an alternative to REDD, internationally as well as nationally. At the same time as the Bolivian government was launching the alternative mechanism with a focus on “holistic and integral” forest governance, discussions were held regarding the inherent challenges in the domestic framework for forest management, as well as contested interest struggles across forest conservation, indigenous rights and local livelihoods facing geopolitical interests and national strategic projects of extraction, infrastructure, redistribution and agricultural expansion (see e.g. Haarstad and Campero 2012; Bebbington, 2013) . The case of the government-backed road construction in TIPNIS in 2011 had wide-reaching consequences for debates about development, conservation and local community rights in Bolivia (McNeish, 2013; Hirsch, 2017), including debates about forest governance and global climate change mechanisms such as REDD.

I approach the study of contentious forest governance through the lens of political ecology and critical human geography. I pay specific attention to differentiated and conflicting values and interests in human interactions and transformative actions over nature (Perreault et al., 2015; Leff, 2015). I focus on the spatiality of contentious forest governance (Leitner et al., 2008) with tensions and dialectics between international policy efforts, national priorities and local struggles, socio-political contestations over risks and benefits, recognition, equity and

participation, and the discursive struggles and knowledge-claims in these interactions (see, e.g., Zimmerer and Bassett, 2003; Forsyth, 2003; Robbins, 2004; Peet et al., 2011b; Wolford and Keene, 2015: 574). This study highlights the fact that forest politics are not merely about the interplay of interests and material resources but also include the ideas, knowledge-claims and discourses that shape the nature and limits of governance arrangements (Adger et al., 2001; Forsyth, 2003; Forsyth, 2005; Goldman et al., 2011).

I suggest that the transformation and conservation of forest areas is affected by historic as well as changing state-society relations, geo-political struggles and contested scalar relations (Larson and Petkova, 2011; Müller et al., 2014) and must therefore be seen in relation to powerful and contested interests and values in land-use change, agriculture, conservation, infrastructure development, redistribution, indigenous rights, extraction and natural resource management. This further implies that there are no quick technological or economic solutions to change how forests are governed, but that efforts are needed across sectors, scales, and interests, in order to approach sustainable and equitable forest governance. My intervention is based on a comprehensive empirical study of these relationships and a close interaction with different actors and processes in the field, coupled with the study of international, national and local debates and policy-making over time. In the following, I present the objectives and research questions of this dissertation.

1.1 Objectives and Research Questions

This dissertation contributes to an improved understanding of the complex interplay between different actors, values, scales and interests in the governance of forest areas, and the dialectics between politics “from above” and struggles “from below”. I combine different interrelated cases to give a rich understanding of these complex interplays.

The main objectives of this dissertation are:

1. To understand and analyse different responses to REDD in Latin America, and the interplay between different actors who engage to reshape and contest REDD.
2. To analyse possibilities and barriers for local and subaltern groups to shape forest policies and interventions in forest areas across local, national and global scales.
3. To examine how discursive framings, narratives and knowledge are used in struggles over forests.

The dissertation consists of a synthesising chapter and five papers. Below I present the associated research questions and contributions from the five papers:

1. How do different countries engage with REDD in Latin America, and how do different actors within these countries get involved in activities seen as necessary for the future implementation of REDD on the ground? (Paper I)
2. How has science-policy networks emerged as new elites in the development of REDD preparations in the Amazon countries? (Paper II)
3. How has REDD been contested and reshaped in domestic policy-making in Bolivia, and how do different interests, values and non-forest-sectoral negotiations influence and shape forest policy outcomes across scales? (Paper III)
4. What are the possibilities and barriers for local and subaltern groups to advance their demands in forestry policy-making processes in Bolivia? (Paper IV)
5. How has micro-political relations and strategic state projects affected the conflict over a road-building project crossing the national park and indigenous territory Isiboro Sécuré (TIPNIS) in the Bolivian Amazon, and how have discursive framings been used to legitimize, advance or marginalise certain solutions, ideas and interests? (Paper V)

1.2 Dissertation Structure

The dissertation consists of a synthesising chapter (Part I) and five papers (Part II). The synthesising chapter starts with this introduction. In the following Chapter 2 I introduce central elements that form the backdrop for contemporary forest governance in Latin America and outline the development of REDD+ in global climate change negotiations and related contestations. In Chapter 3, I present the analytical framework, and in Chapter 4 the Bolivian context is presented. I present the methodological approach and provide a detailed description of how my research was conducted and of the methods used for the collation and analysis of the data it has produced in Chapter 5. In Chapter 6, the summaries of the five academic papers are presented. In Chapter 7, I provide a synthesis of the main findings and discuss their broader collective significance as well as responses to the research objectives of this dissertation.

Figure 1 Papers and Publication Status

	Title of paper	Publication Status
Paper I	Forest Governance in Latin America: Strategies for Implementing REDD	Published book chapter, 2016. Aguilar-Støen, M. Toni, F. and Hirsch, C. (2016). Forest Governance in Latin America: Strategies for Implementing REDD. In de Castro et al. (eds). <i>Environmental governance in Latin America. Conflicts, projects and possibilities</i> . London, Palgrave Macmillan., pp.205-233 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-137-50572-9
Paper II	REDD+ and Forest Governance in Latin America: The Role of Science-Policy Networks	Published book chapter, 2015. Aguilar-Støen, M. and Hirsch, C. (2015) REDD+ and Forest Governance in Latin America: The Role of Science-Policy Networks in Bull, B. and M. Aguilar-Støen (eds) <i>Environmental politics in Latin America. Elite dynamics, the left tide and sustainable development</i> . London, Routledge, pp.171–189.
Paper III	Rejecting and Reshaping REDD: Contestations over Forest and Climate Change Policy in Bolivia	Manuscript under review in <i>Development and Change</i> , May 2019. Hirsch, C. and Aguilar-Støen, M.
Paper IV	Makers and shapers of environmental policy-making: Power and participation in forest legislation in Bolivia	Paper published, February 2017. Hirsch, C. (2017). Makers and shapers of environmental policy-making: Power and participation in forest legislation in Bolivia. <i>Journal of Rural Studies</i> . https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrurstud.2016.11.013
Paper V	Between Resistance and Negotiations: Indigenous Organisations and the Bolivian State in the Case of TIPNIS	Paper published, November 2017 Hirsch, C. (2017) Between Resistance and Negotiations: Indigenous Organisations and the Bolivian State in the case of TIPNIS. <i>Journal of Peasant Studies</i> . https://doi.org/10.1080/03066150.2017.1394846

2. FOREST GOVERNANCE AND REDD

In this chapter I introduce key aspects of policies affecting the governance of forest areas, including climate change policies and the formation of REDD initiatives. I start with a brief introduction to environmental and forest policies in Latin America. This is followed by a summary of the history of the formation of REDD+ and the ways in which REDD has been contested.

2.1 Environmental and Forest Policies in Latin America

Recent and emerging trends in environmental governance in Latin America are embedded in a multifaceted and changing multi-scale context. These trends include issues such as environmental citizenship, the ‘return of the state’, as well as new global geopolitical relations (Baud et al., 2011). The cases discussed in this dissertation should be understood in a context shaped by three interconnected factors, related to the role Latin American countries and actors, have played in global debates about natural resource governance, the environment and climate change (Baud et al., 2011; De Castro et al., 2016). In this section, I highlight how the renewed focus on natural resource and environmental governance in Latin America in the 2000s coincided with what has been known as the “pink-tide” (Bull and Aguilar-Støen, 2015). Second, I emphasize the strengthened position of indigenous peoples and grassroots movements, demanding redistribution, recognition and participation in environmental governance. Third, I draw attention to the unclear and contradictory environmental and resource policies.

The ascendance to power of left-wing governments in Latin America in the 1990s and 2000s was to a large degree supported by large grassroots mobilisations which emerged as a reaction to neoliberal policy reforms and their socio-economic consequences (Perreault, 2008; Haarstad, 2012a; Bull and Aguilar-Støen, 2015; De Castro et al., 2016). Social movements have, especially since the 1990s, played a particularly important role in Latin America, seeking to change existing systems or challenge injustice, inequality and development models (Bebbington and Bury, 2013). Furthermore, a massive commodity boom based on the expansion of mining, oil exploitation and agro-industrial development provided these governments with substantial revenues (McNeish and Logan, 2012; Haarstad, 2012a; Bull and

Aguilar-Støen, 2015). These revenues have, for example, sponsored generous welfare programmes which have, along with higher employment rates, led to falling poverty rates and even improved inequality in many Latin America countries (Webber, 2017). However, Latin American left-wing governments have been criticised for not challenging underlying class structures and failing to implement tax reforms. When commodity prices fell new conflicts emerged, many of which were related to the extraction of natural resources such as minerals, oil and hydrocarbons, as well as the agro-industry (McNeish and Logan, 2012; Bull and Aguilar-Støen, 2015). Contestations regarding neo-extractivism in Latin America (Gudynas, 2009) have included reactions to uncertainty and risk perception related to capital accumulation and land dispossession (Harvey, 2004); demands for benefits and redistribution of land and resources; rights-based demands for consultations and participation in decision-making; or a combination of them all (Peet and Watts, 2004; Haarstad, 2012a; Bebbington and Bebbington, 2012, p.33). However, the conflicts and contestation that have occurred, have also created new possibilities for cooperation (Haarstad and Campero, 2011; Bebbington and Bebbington, 2012; Bull and Aguilar-Støen, 2015).

As a result of decades of mobilisations and pressure from indigenous peoples and their allies, many countries in Latin America ratified the International Labour Organisation 169 Convention on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples (ILO 169) (Van Cott, 2000) in the 1990s². The ILO 169 convention recognises the cultural identity of indigenous people, affirms indigenous land rights and recognises the term “territory” to refer to indigenous lands³. Constitutional reforms in various countries, including Bolivia, Colombia, Nicaragua and Guatemala, have recognised multicultural and multi-ethnic nations and included indigenous rights to land (Sieder, 2002). Several Latin American countries embarked on a series of legal reforms to guarantee indigenous groups and communities’ land rights, access and use rights to natural resources, including forest areas. These reforms, however, have been criticised for not challenging structural inequalities (Sieder, 2002; Hale, 2005). Following the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 (The

² Indigenous peoples can be distinguished by their history, marginality, customary institutions, territoriality, cultural distinction, language and self-identification. In many Latin American countries “indigenous” is a specific legal and cultural category. According to the ILO convention 169 the term “indigenous” signifies the descendants of the original inhabitants before colonisation, who continue to identify themselves as a community and maintain traditional institutions.

³ Article 13 of the ILO 169 convention states: “The use of the term lands in Articles 15 and 16 shall include the concept of territories, which covers the total environment of the areas, which the peoples concerned occupy or otherwise use.”

Earth Summit), several changes to environmental policies were also proposed across the region. The idea of “community conservation” gained currency and local communities were seen as central actors for protecting natural resources (Ribot and Larson, 2005). These ideas also resonated with ideas regarding the privatisation of nature conservation (Vogel, 1992). Forest conservation initiatives were promoted through “sustainable management” models which included Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), local communities, private companies, local governments and donor support.

The governance of forest areas in Latin America went through significant changes as a result of privatisation and decentralisation policies in the 1990s and 2000s (Larson et al., 2006; Larson et al., 2007). Neoliberal reforms in Latin America entailed free trade agreements, privatisation of public utilities, the titling and privatisation of property titles and resources, flexible environmental and labour regulations, as well as cuts in public expenditure (Brannström, 2004; Liverman and Vilas, 2006). Institutional conditions were improved for private investments and private participation in the forest sector, which were viewed as essential for development and economic growth. Concurrently, an increased formal emphasis on rights-based development led to improved local participation in resource governance and community forestry (Larson et al., 2008). Consequently, new reforms were introduced, shifting forest governance from being largely controlled by the state to being managed by local governments, communities, non-governmental organisations and private actors, supported by international and bilateral donors (Larson et al., 2007). The system for private forest concessions was expanded and new economic and market-based mechanisms were introduced, such as forest certification. With private forest concessions, logging companies gained extraction rights for commercially valuable forests. Both decentralisation and privatisation policies brought about new challenges (Larson et al., 2007; Larson et al., 2008). Local elites involved in agriculture, forest extraction or cattle ranching activities were, in many cases, strengthened by the reforms. The reforms merely improved conditions for private investments and did not include adequate institutional arrangements for the participation of local communities (Larson and Ferroukhi, 2003; Larson et al., 2006). Practices excluding local people from access to forest resources, forest areas and economic benefits prevailed and were, in some cases, exacerbated by the reforms (Larson et al., 2006).

In many Latin American countries the state apparatus was left weakened as a result of neoliberal policies from the 1990s and 2000s, coupled with little political will to protect forest

areas and intrusive commercial activities in forest areas with little public control (Larson, 2008; Pacheco et al., 2011). The expanding presence of private and non-governmental actors in areas with little state presence, such as indigenous territories, has challenged marginalised actors and fostered mistrust, though has also opened possibilities for new alliances (Haarstad, 2012a; Hindery, 2013; McNeish and Logan, 2012; Bull and Aguilar-Støen, 2015; McNeish et al., 2015). In the 2000s indigenous organisations were at the forefront of many conflicts over natural resource governance (Van Cott, 2005; Dangl, 2007; Perreault, 2008). They demanded consultations, autonomy, benefits and access to land and resources, and in many cases the mobilisations had impact on policy reforms with regard to land use and resource extraction. Coalition-building across indigenous peoples and environmental organisations opened up new opportunities for indigenous peoples to influence legislative agendas and national and international processes.

With the left-wing governments coming to power in the 2000s, there were clear hopes connected to equitable and sustainable natural resource use (Baud et al., 2011; Bull and Aguilar-Støen, 2015; De Castro et al., 2016), strengthening indigenous and community rights and climate justice (Chatterton et al., 2013). In 2007, the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2007) was passed as law in Bolivia. At the United Nations (UN) Climate Change Conference of the Parties (COP) in Copenhagen in 2009, several Latin American delegates voiced firm positions about the ‘ecological debt’ of Northern countries towards the South (Baud et al., 2011), and the Bolivian president Evo Morales invited the world to the World People’s Conference on Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth in April in Cochabamba 2010. Later the same year, Bolivia passed a Law for the Defense of Mother Earth (2010), which formed the basis for the Universal Declaration for the Rights of Mother Earth. Twenty years after the first Rio conference, at the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development, Rio+20 in 2012, Bolivia’s government discursively challenged the green economy discourse, and later the same year, launched an alternative to a market-oriented REDD model.

As I will discuss later, contrasting interests and a lack of overall implementation of these ideas has resulted in frustration and conflict. In the following section I present the development of REDD and REDD+ in global climate change policy debates.

2.2 From RED to REDD+

The importance of protecting forests in climate change policies has gained increased attention in the last decade. The UNFCCC contains two strategies to address climate change, mitigation and adaptation, both of which are relevant to the governance of forest areas. Mitigation refers to reducing GHG emissions and enhancing sink opportunities to stop global warming, whilst adaptation entails coping with what is already occurring as a result of climate change and reducing the adverse impact of and vulnerability to climate change (IPCC, 2007). The UNFCCC (1992) has established principles of common but differentiated responsibility: the precautionary principle, the right to sustainable development and an open economic system.

The world's first GHG emissions reduction treaty, the Kyoto Protocol, was adopted in 1997 and later ratified in 2001. The Kyoto Protocol reflects the dominant principles in global environmental governance, including flexibility, market mechanisms and economic incentives. The Protocol led to the formation of solutions such as pricing mechanisms, carbon markets and offsets (Bridge and Perreault, 2009; Liverman, 2015). The term "carbon markets" refers to CO₂ equivalent (CO₂e) emission trading whereby a price per ton is set, and emission permits can be bought and sold. By pricing GHG emissions, carbon markets are viewed as a means of fostering economic growth while mitigating GHG production (Meckling, 2011). When carbon trading was first introduced it was rendered in purely technical terms and presented as the only means to create the flexibility needed to limit carbon emissions at the lowest possible economic costs (Stephan and Lane, 2015). In reality, carbon trading has proven to be political and widely contested (Bumpus, 2011; Lohman, 2012; Corbera and Martin, 2015; Corbera, 2017a) and has been criticised for serving powerful business interests (Bailey, 2007; Bumpus and Liverman, 2011). With carbon offsets, a new commodity has been created that links the North and South through complex sets of technologies, institutions and discourses (Bumpus and Liverman, 2011).

The roots of REDD extend back to the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol. Article 2 of the Kyoto Protocol (UNFCCC, 1998) refers to the protection and enhancement of sinks and reservoirs of GHGs, afforestation and reforestation activities and sustainable forest management practices. Reducing deforestation and forest degradation was not high on the agenda until 2005. Led by Papua New Guinea and Costa Rica, the Coalition for Rainforest Nations (CRN) was formed, aiming to reconcile forest stewardship with economic development and to be included as part

of carbon markets under the Kyoto Protocol. In 2005, the CRN requested that Reducing Emissions from Deforestation (RED) in developing countries as well as approaches to stimulate appropriate action be included in the agenda. The CRN argued that by generating credits from RED activities, tropical forest countries could gain access to carbon markets and in so doing, create incentives for the protection of forests. The idea was to provide financial rewards to tropical forest countries to preserve forests (with their store of carbon) and compensate for lost forest-related income. This was to be done through the pricing of environmental services and the assignment of property rights to carbon (Bumpus and Liverman, 2011).

In 2007 the Central African Forest Commission (*Commission des Forêts d'Afrique Centrale – COMIFAC*) suggested that also emission reductions from forest *degradation* be included, and Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD) was born. Pressure from a range of forest countries, academics and NGOs motivated by an emphasis on conservation and sustainable forest management resulted in the transition from REDD to REDD+ in 2008 (Angelsen, 2009). The recognition of the value of conservation and sustainable forest management fostered progress towards REDD+ and the potential to increase co-benefits (e.g., protection of ecosystem services, poverty alleviation, improved governance and biodiversity conservation) was also improved. The Cancun Agreements (UNFCCC, 2010, p.12) confirmed REDD+ and encouraged developing country parties to “contribute to mitigation actions in the forest sector by undertaking the following activities (...): (a) reducing emissions from deforestation; (b) reducing emissions from forest degradation; (c) conservation of forest carbon stocks; (d) sustainable management of forests; and (e) enhancement of forest carbon stocks”.

The Cancun Agreement (UNFCCC, 2010) further suggested that developing country parties develop a) a national strategy or action plan; b) a national forest reference emission level; c) a national and transparent national forest monitoring system; and d) a system providing information on how safeguards are addressed. Between 2010 and 2015 REDD+ was intensely debated in international negotiations, regarding financing options, safeguards for participation of indigenous and forest-based communities, as well as reference levels, result-based financing and measurement, reporting and verification (MRV) (Angelsen et al., 2012; Angelsen, 2013; Angelsen et al., 2018). In 2014 the topic of non-market approaches was raised and Bolivia, concerned with integral forest governance, introduced a proposal on Joint

Mitigation and Adaptation (JMA) efforts. In 2015 a decision was made at COP21 in Paris to encourage alternative policy approaches, such as “joint mitigation and adaptation approaches for the integral and sustainable management of forests” (Decision 16/CP.21).

However, despite significant progress, discussions continue about the content of a REDD+ mechanism. Substantial funding is needed for a full-scale implementation of REDD+ and both market-based and non-market-based mechanisms are being discussed (Angelsen et al., 2018). Up to 2019, willing states and multilateral institutions have financed REDD efforts, and the future inclusion of REDD in carbon markets remains uncertain (Angelsen, 2013; Angelsen et al., 2018). Multilateral channels for REDD financing include the UN-REDD programme, the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF), the Green Climate Fund (GCF), and the Forest Investment Programme (FIP). In addition, there are bilateral initiatives and pilot projects run by NGOs or private actors. REDD’s evolution from 2005 to 2015 is summarised in Figure 2.

Figure 2 REDD Developments from 2005 to 2015

Year Conference of the Parties (COP)/Commission/Accord/Plan

2005 COP 11, Montreal: The Coalition of Rainforest Nations proposed that “Reducing Emissions from Deforestation” (RED) be included in activities that generate carbon credits.

2007 The Central African Forest Commission (COMIFAC): COMIFAC proposed that emission reductions from forest degradation also be included.

2007 COP 13, Reducing emissions from deforestation in developing countries: approaches to stimulate action (Decision 2/CP.13).

2008 COP 14, Poznan: The role of conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks in reducing emissions was recognised.

2009 COP 15, The Copenhagen Accord: Important discussions on financial resources, drivers of deforestation and forest degradation, monitoring, safeguards and measurement, reporting and verification (MRV) took place. Decision 4/CP.15 regarding “Methodological guidance”.

2010 COP 16, Cancun Agreements: REDD was expanded to REDD+ and the phased-approach was introduced. Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention.

2011 COP 17, Durban: Financing options, safeguards and reference levels were discussed. Guidance on information systems on safeguards and forest reference levels, Decision 1/CP.16.

2012 COP 18, Doha: Measurement, reporting and verification (MRV) procedures and financing were outlined. Agreed outcome pursuant to the Bali Action Plan.

2013 COP 19, Warsaw: Decision of work programme for results-based finance, in order to scale up and improve the effectiveness of financing for REDD+ activities was made. Modalities for national forest monitoring system, and measuring, reporting and verifying.

2014 COP 20, Lima: Non-market approaches were considered. The government of Bolivia presented a proposal on Joint Mitigation and Adaptation (JMA) efforts.

2015 COP 21, Paris: A non-binding decision was made to encourage action to implement and support policy and incentives for REDD+, as well as for alternative policy approaches, such as joint mitigation and adaptation approaches for the integral and sustainable management of forests. Decision 16/CP.21.

Source: UNFCCC secretariat (2016)

2.3 REDD+ Contestations

Initially, REDD was largely presented as a “technical fix” and a triple “win” for climate, biodiversity conservation and sustainable development (Stern, 2006). Since its introduction REDD has, however, been the subject of discussions across a range of ideological, institutional and financial perspectives (Corbera and Schroeder, 2011; Angelsen et al., 2018). Scholars have problematised REDD from different perspectives and focus areas (Angelsen and McNeill, 2012), including governance structures for REDD (Vatn and Vedeld, 2011), the political economy of REDD (Brockhaus and Angelsen, 2012), REDD as ecosystem services (Corbera, 2012), land tenure and REDD (Cronkleton et al., 2011; Larson, 2011; Dokken et al., 2014), social dimensions of REDD (Hall, 2012); local implications (Sunderlin et al., 2014), and rights-based and pro-poor perspectives (Myers, 2007; Larson, 2011; Nasi et al., 2011; van Dam, 2011; Brown, 2013; de Jong et al., 2014; Aguilar-Støen, 2015).

The inclusion of REDD as part of the global carbon market has been criticised by both academics and developing countries’ governments for allowing polluters to continue with business as usual and for encouraging a net-sum game for global emissions (Bumpus and Liverman, 2011). How and whether REDD+ should include goals for economic and social development, livelihoods and rights of forest dwelling and indigenous communities, has been debated both within and outside the formal negotiations. Environmental and indigenous organisations have pushed for safeguards and participation in decision-making, rights to consultation, negotiations and benefit-sharing (Schroder, 2010; Wallbott, 2014; Osborne et al., 2014; Aguilar-Støen, 2017; Osborne, 2018). Carbon rights are disputed, particularly whether rights should be tied to the state or land titles or be considered as separate rights (Corbera et al., 2010; Bumpus and Liverman, 2011; Osborne, 2015). The question of scale has been debated: whether to implement efforts at a project scale or employ a national programme-based approach (Angelsen, 2009; Forsyth, 2009; Vatn and Vedeld, 2011). In practice, the national programme-based view has gained prominence in the official negotiations, whereas the former exists as NGOs and private initiatives implement pilot projects and seek connection with the voluntary carbon markets (Madeira et al., 2010; Angelsen et al., 2018).

REDD+ efforts have been introduced in many tropical forest countries. REDD preparations and pilot projects have included different focus areas, such as changes in tenure regimes,

providing economic returns for locals, monitoring activities, local forest management and capacity building (Haong et al., 2013; Sunderlin et al., 2014; Maraseni et al., 2014; Angelsen et al., 2018). Some reports have demonstrated that REDD+ can be beneficial for local communities, whilst other projects have fostered social inequalities and ignored local problems (Blom et al., 2010; Cronkleton et al., 2011; Leggett and Lovell, 2012; Dokken et al., 2014; Sunderlin et al., 2014; Angelsen et al., 2018). Concerns have been expressed regarding the lack of law enforcement capacity in many countries, weak regulatory frameworks, corruption, illegal wood trade, unequal land distribution, lack of respect for indigenous territories and fears that powerful elites will capture REDD funds (Myers, 2007; Pacheco et al., 2010; Larson, 2011; Larson et al., 2010; Larson et al., 2011; Nasi et al., 2011; van Dam, 2011; Hall, 2011; Hall, 2012; de Jong et al., 2014; Aguilar-Støen, 2017). Others have pointed to risks of misconduct in carbon accounting and monitoring, poorly designed policies, as well as the over simplification of socio-ecological contexts, and the causes and solutions about deforestation and degradation of forests (Brown, 2013; Corbera, 2017b). The critique of REDD+ by several developing countries, NGOs and indigenous organisations has been connected to “climate justice”, along with demands for benefits and participation (Schroeder, 2010; Chatterton et al., 2013). Furthermore, criticism is related to the so called new carbon economy, where new forms of expertise and consultancy in the development of carbon projects and monitoring, measurement, reporting and verification, have emerged (Bumpus and Liverman, 2011).

In the following chapter I will introduce the analytical framework.

3. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

In this study I aim to understand how both socio-environmental interactions and geopolitical power relations impact on the governance of forest areas across scales. In my analysis I pay particular attention to the strategies of various actors to advance their concerns and interests regarding access to, control over and governance of forest areas, including the role of networks and the politics of scale. I have also sought to study how these dynamics, and that which makes it possible for marginalised groups to influence policies and interventions. I also recognise how power is embedded in how societies use, control, gain access to and institutionalise different narratives and discourses about socio-environmental relations, and explore the framings that are used to legitimise, promote or suppress specific solutions and interests in the interactions under study. In what follows I explain in more detail the concepts and perspectives that guide my analysis. I start by introducing political ecology as an overarching approach.

3.1 Political Ecology - an Overarching Analytical Framework

Political ecology is a critical approach that combines insights from political economy, including interaction of political and economic processes and issues of power and resource distribution, with ecological and social concerns, in order to understand the complex relationship of human society with the non-human natural environment (Perreault et al., 2015). Political ecology aims to counter simplistic and deterministic explanations of what causes environmental degradation and expands on earlier theoretical perspectives offered by post-Marxist, post-structuralist, post-colonial and feminist geography, political anthropology and cultural ecology (Peet et al., 2011a; Perreault et al., 2015). Political ecology is centrally concerned with unequal power relations in environmental governance and that which shapes access to, control over and exclusion from the distribution and exploitation of natural resources and ecosystems (Bryant and Bailey, 1997; Perreault et al., 2015). The second generation of political ecology studies is also concerned with the conflicting discourses, knowledge-claims and construction of environmental knowledge involved in socio-environmental struggles (Adams, 2001; Robbins, 2004; Paulson and Gezon, 2005; Perreault et al., 2015).

The first wave of political ecology studies, known as the structuralist phase, was inspired by historical materialism, structuralism and Marxist studies (see, e.g., Shanin, 1971; Frank, 1969; Wallerstein, 1974). These studies focused on unequal power relations and conflicts in a global capitalist political economy and aimed to reveal the interests at work in struggles over the governance of the environment, as well as the influence of scalar relations on environmental degradation processes and marginalised communities (Bryant and Bailey, 1997; Khan, 2013). Much of the political ecology of the 1980s and 1990s also entailed detailed ecological analysis, and the interactions between humans and their biophysical environment (Walker, 2005). As political ecology evolved as a field of research, it was criticised for downplaying the agency of grassroots actors to resist their marginal position in environmental governance and its disregard of the importance of micro-politics (Watts 1990) as well as symbolic contestations (Moore, 1993). This led to several studies that focused on local resource conflicts from an agent-based perspective (Watts, 1990; Bryant and Bailey, 1997) and the role of social movements in socio-environmental struggles (Peet and Watts, 1996; 2004). A second wave of political ecology studies emerged concurrently with post-structuralism and many of its proponents were inspired by discourse analysis and science and technology studies in the study of knowledge and power in environmental governance processes (Fairhead and Leach, 1995; Bryant, 1998; Escobar, 1998; Fairhead and Leach, 2003; Forsyth, 2003; Goldman et al., 2011). Post-structuralist political ecology acknowledged that discourses, ideas and knowledge about socio-environmental relations impact the ways in which the environment is governed.

As Liverman (2015) has argued, political ecology can provide powerful insights into climate change and forest policies from local to global scales, interweaving material nature with drivers of emissions and deforestation, vulnerabilities, agency of actors and the narratives they embrace to explain, debate and promote the causes and solutions. Forest and climate change policies highlight questions of environmental and social justice, connecting activism and policy (Liverman, 2015, p.303), the intersection between poverty and environmental degradation, as well as politicised debates about development, conservation and land use. I use political ecology as a framework for investigating the interconnections and interactions of actors and processes across scales. I also pay particular attention to power relations and to how discourses and contestations shape the outcome of initiatives “from above”, as less powerful actors respond “from below”.

3.2 Environmental Governance

In this dissertation I am concerned with environmental governance particularly focused on four areas: 1) the spatiality and scale of environmental governance; 2) negotiations of power asymmetries; 3) participation and agency of non-state actors and their relations to state projects; and 4) knowledge and framing (Perreault et al., 2015). I approach the practices of environmental governance through the study of concrete relations between different actors – whose voices get heard and who shapes and makes decisions (Bridge and Perreault, 2009).

The term “governance” is often used to describe a shift from state-centric notions of regulation and management, acknowledging that authority operates on multiple spatial scales and involves multiple actors (Lemos and Agrawal, 2006). At its core, the concept “governance” refers to fundamental questions of how “organisation, decisions, order and rule” are achieved in society (Bridge and Perreault, 2009, p.476). Research on governance processes focuses on the forms and geographical scales of socio-political institutions, identifying key actors, networks and organisations involved and analysing how relations among them change (Bridge and Perreault, 2009; Bulkeley, 2005).

The use of the concept “environmental governance” has been criticised by political ecologists for depoliticising environmental concerns and reducing them to environmental problems that are amenable to technical or economic solutions (Bridge and Perreault, 2009). REDD represents an example of an initiative that focuses on such solutions, yet at the same time pressure and active participation from various stakeholders has directed attention to other non-economic and non-technical dimensions of forest conservation. In this dissertation I look at environmental governance empirically and analyse actually existing outcomes of environmental governance at national and local scales. In doing so I acknowledge the historical, cultural, social and political complexity of and interplay between different arrangements, actors and ideas in policy processes, negotiations and contestations of struggles related to natural resources and land (Bridge and Perreault, 2009; Cleaver, 2012; Perreault et al., 2015; De Castro et al., 2016).

The concept of environmental governance refers to a shift in the manner, organisations, institutional arrangements and spatial scales by which formal and informal decisions are made regarding the use of nature (Bridge and Perreault, 2009, p. 475). From a political ecology

perspective, the term “politics” encompasses a larger sphere than its traditional connotation and addresses the diversity of actors and processes operating across scales. With “politicised environment” I refer to how environmental problems are intrinsically connected to the political, social and economic context within which they are created (Bryant and Bailey, 1997).

Encounters between different actors, discourses, values and interests in the transformation of forest areas are at the core of the environmental governance processes I have studied. The increasingly important influence of non-state actors (e.g., social movements, NGOs, corporations, think tanks, international lobbyists, non-governmental donors, associations, consultants and international institutions) on the way natural resources are controlled and distributed and on the ways decisions are made has been recognised by several scholars (Bridge and Perreault, 2009; Bock, 2014; Bull and Aguilar-Støen, 2015; de Castro et al., 2016). With this shift, new forms of alliances and governance of the environment, operating across scales and networks, have emerged (Bulkeley, 2005; Bixler et al., 2014). These new forms of governance blur the relations between “private” and “public” and challenge questions of authority and legitimacy (Jessop, 2007; Bridge and Perreault, 2009). These insights have been important for this dissertation with regard to explaining and identifying the variety of actors involved in governance and transformation of forest areas and in REDD initiatives, across state and non-state spheres, across sectors and across scales. I study these encounters from a relational perspective (Jessop, 2007), acknowledging the dynamics and diversity of relations between different social forces and the state, which I will return to in 3.5.

3.3 Power

Power analysis is a central part of political ecology (Perreault et al., 2015; Svarstad et al., 2018) and critical studies of environmental governance (Cleaver, 2012). The concept “power” refers here to the forces that cause something to occur or impede something from occurring, and that shape and influence action and practices (see Hayward, 2000; Foucault, 2002; Lukes, 2005; Hayward and Lukes, 2008). I hold that the combination of power perspectives constitute an important strength of political ecology, in according with scholars such as Svarstad et al. (2018); with the inclusion of both actor-based power analyses, as well as structural and discursive power. Analysing and revealing power in this dissertation entails

looking into 1) who controls and shapes actions and decision-making arenas concerning the governance of forest areas, and how they do so; 2) how certain structures and institutions impede or facilitate action; 3) how power is embedded in practice, knowledge and language about socio-environmental relations; and 4) how power relations shape and are shaped by scalar relations.

From the literature, three broad approaches to power can be identified (Svarstad et al. 2018); 1) agent-based power, 2) structural power/domination and 3) discursive power. I concur with Svarstad et al. (2018), that these perspectives overlap, and that the weight given to each in analyses, should depend on the empirical situation. In this dissertation, employing an agent-based, or actor-oriented power perspective entails identifying 1) who affects and shapes the course of governance, law or policy processes; 2) who has the ability to exclude or include different actors, values and interests in these processes and 3) who has the power to control the agenda, how they do so, and with what resources (Lukes, 2005).⁴ Power manifests itself in the control over the distribution of risks and benefits in different interventions and policy processes (Bryant and Bailey, 1997; Lukes, 2005). Agent-based power, is often related to the issue of power resources (e.g. Bourdieu, 1986; Giddens, 1984), which can be political, or symbolic, with different mechanisms to influence governance processes and policy-making (Clever, 2012; Svarstad et al., 2018). In observable conflicts, actors involved express and act upon certain preferences openly. Power, however, can also work in more hidden forms, such as when potentially controversial issues are excluded from the agenda, and decisions are made behind the scenes or in closed spaces (Cornwall, 2000; Lukes, 2005). In actor-oriented power analyses, agency is central. Power can be reflected in “collective power” or “power with” (Lukes, 2005), as in the work of alliances and the gathering of forces in networks and movements, who, as collective forces, are able to shape or change policies and practice. Agent-based power perspectives also often acknowledge how actors are constrained and enabled by structures, face restrictions from powerful actors or structural limitations from institutions (Clever, 2012; Svarstad et al., 2018). I return to agency, in 3.5.

⁴ An “agent-based” view of power or “power as capacity” implies that power is something that is held by actors. “Agent-based” power concerns having “power over” someone and the “power to” do something, implying the subordination of one actor’s will by the will of another and the resources that underpin this capacity (Lukes, 2005)

A more structural view of power reveals how agents are enabled to or hindered from participating in decision-making, by, for example, their roles, functions and identities in a larger system (Isaac, 1987). In Marxist power analyses human agency is constrained and produced by historical social structures (Watts, 1983; Harvey, 2003), where agency is seen to reproduce structure and structural relations limit the exercise of power. In Neo-Marxist perspectives, however, focus on economic structures, is combined with focus on the agency of actors and resistance (e.g. Hall et al., 2011).

From Foucauldian inspired perspectives (Foucault, 1980) power can be seen as embedded in practices, rules, language, procedures and techniques (Hayward, 2000) that enable or hinder agents' possibilities to participate, obtain access to information and shape decisions, excluding or including different ideas, identities and knowledge systems (Valdivia, 2015). This implies that power relations both enable and constrain actors' freedom and "render possible and impossible, probable and improbable, particular forms of conduct, speech, belief, reason and desire" (Hayward 2000, p.8). This perspective is also reflected in studies of "governmentality", for example in how governments are seen as to administer its citizens to act in accordance with certain priorities (Foucault, 1991; Valdivia, 2015). Poststructuralist approaches to power, focus on discourse analysis, and how power is exercised through establishment and maintenance of discourses and narratives, which again influence decision-making. Discursive power is exercised when actors produce discourses and succeed in getting other groups to adopt and reproduce the same discourses, which is beneficial for themselves (Svarstad et al., 2018). In environmental issues today, two or more parallel and competing discourses are often observed (Agder et al. 2001; Svarstad, 2005). I will return to the issue of discursive power in 3.7.

In my analysis I approach power by focusing on how power can manifest in actors' control over access to forest resources, lands and ecosystems (Paper V); control over and access to knowledge, framings and decision-making processes (Papers I, II and III); the prioritisation of issues and control over the agenda (Papers III, IV and V); the power of alliances and joint struggles (Papers II, III, IV and V); and the scalar spatiality of power (Paper III).

3.4 Scale

Scale is an inherent feature of political ecology (Sayre, 2015). In this dissertation I recognise the complex spatialities of forest and climate policies, environmental degradation and ecological interdependence (Bride and Perreault, 2009). I conceptualise scale as a relational (Sayre, 2011; 2015), power-laden and contested construction that actors strategically engage with in order to legitimise or challenge existing power relations, and as political (and unstable) spatial manifestations of socio-environmental relations (Bridge and Perreault, 2009, p.485). In the course of these struggles new scales are constructed and the relative importance of different scales is reconfigured. This process is full of friction with numerous negotiations and struggles between different actors as they attempt to reshape the scalar spatiality of power and authority (Leitner, 1997; Leitner et al., 2008). Conceptualising scale as relational, polyvalent and co-implicated allows me to reconnect the spatial with the political in the analysis. I contend that scales are active, dynamic and composed of multiple social relations (Leitner et al., 2008; Massey, 2005) and that the dialectical relations between scales help to understand the outcomes studied in this dissertation (see Geenen and Werweijen, 2017). I acknowledge both the ecological processes and socio-political capacities that reside in different spatial scales, and the way particular scales become privileged by different interests as the appropriate sites of participation or decision-making (see Adger, 2001; Brannstrom et al., 2004; Bridge and Perreault, 2009, p.485).

Further, I recognise the relation between biological processes and political-economic processes (see, e.g., Swyngedouw 2004; 2007). Forest ecosystems are specific to places and landscapes; concurrently, the usage, extraction and protection of forest are affected by national and global trends and policies, and also affect the global commons. Forest resources and lands are often regulated at national and local levels by different institutions and actors. It follows from this that processes on one scale can only be understood in relation to processes on other scales, where the scalar identity of an environmental problem is not given but is socially produced, contested and constructed (Haarstad and Campero, 2012). Working across scales illuminates both the causes and consequences of forest degradation and forest transformation by connecting what happens in local areas to processes and relations beyond the local scale (e.g., Blaikie and Brookfield, 1987: 64-74). Scales are processual, are always in the process of construction and are never finished or closed (Massey, 1999). In the different

papers included in this dissertation, I examine how shifting scalar relations emerge and how these relations shape and are reshaped by relations between political actions from above and from below.

3.5 Subaltern Agency and State-Society Relations

This dissertation is also concerned with local agency and how subaltern actors engage in attempts to reshape and shape policies and interventions related to forests and climate change (see also Bryant and Bailey, 1997; Robbins, 2004; Peet and Watts, 2004; Cleaver, 2012) as well as equity and the distribution of benefits and burdens in the processes studied (Brown and Corbera 2003). My analysis will show that the ways in which existing initiatives, policies and interventions unfolded were shaped and challenged by subaltern groups. I pay attention to how marginalised groups attempt to advance their interests, needs and rights, and what constrain or facilitate the advancement of their interests and facilitate or hinder their participation in decision-making arenas. Subaltern groups refer here to groups that are politically, economically and/or socially marginalised (Guha, 1982; Green, 2002). Marginalised groups express agency through strategies of resistance and contestation, manoeuvrings and negotiations (de Certeau, 1984), challenging current institutions and structures and the status quo (Cleaver, 2012). I see agency as relational, and as shaped by historical and political processes (Cleaver, 2012). Agency can be expressed in relation to the state, but also in relation to other actors; and alliances can be formed across civil society sectors and also with state actors (Lukes, 2005; Jessop, 2007).

In relation to climate and forest policies, the state plays a mix of often contradictory roles, exerting control over resources and people and regulating and implementing policies through different instruments, interventions and projects related to economic and strategic interests, food security, indigenous rights and the conservation of nature (Perreault, 2009; Neuman, 2015; Robertson, 2015). I consider state-society relations as contingent and situational; they can be reconfigured, reasserted and negotiated (Jessop, 2007). I conceptualise the state as a “social relation and a site of strategic action by different parts of civil society” (Brigde and Perreault, 2009, p.483) with varied natures, apparatus and boundaries, emphasising the dialectics of structure and agency and the balancing of different interests and social forces (Jessop, 2007). I view the state as encompassing diverse interests (Robertson, 2015; Wolford

and Keene, 2015) and as composed of actors, agencies and institutions which are part of broader social, political and economic structures (Li, 2005); “a terrain of struggle in which multiple and shifting interest collide, converge or are transformed” (Wolford and Keene, 2015, p.581). Thus, the state is fragmented in form and nature with a diversity of interests held by different stakeholders, and also with a variety of relations with civil society. McNeish (2008) proposes an understanding of the state (see Blom Hansen and Stepputat, 2001) in Bolivia where governance and authority is in a “continuous process of construction”, and to recognize the “ability and agency of non-elite, marginalized, peasant communities in their own language of the state” (2008:21). Governance in this perspective is multi-sited and multi-scaled and is a product of social and political mobilisations (Prudham, 2004; Perreault, 2005).

Civil society can be seen as a sphere of political struggle and contestation over ideas and norms and as an arena in which to articulate new ideas and visions (Jessop, 2007). Social movements and organisations work both *within* dominant rules and also attempt to transform them to establish alternative systems from the outside (Forsyth, 2003). Collective mobilisations around environmental issues encompass issues that emerge from the relations that “society” establishes with “nature” (Bebbington and Bebbington, 2012, p.20). “New” social movements have moved beyond claims related to social issues and are, according to Peets and Watts (2004), “linking economic and ecological justice” (the politics of distribution) with human rights and cultural identity (the politics of recognition) (Martin et al., 2016). Strategies have shifted from resistance to protest and from protest to proposal.

Scholars argue that participation should be seen as a dual process including both collective action and mobilisation from below, coupled with enabling policies and inclusion in planning and policy making (Gaventa, 2004; Cornwall, 2004; Hickey and Mohan, 2004). Scholars such as Chilvers’ (2009) call for a focus on space and scale in environmental participation. Cornwall (2000, p.34) argues that power relations shape spaces of interaction between actors and interests. It is through exercising their agency and through the capacity to organise and create spaces of participation that marginalised groups can influence practices, policies and structures (Cornwall, 2000; Lukes, 2005; Cornwall and Coelho, 2007). On the other hand, coalition-building and strategic framings may also work as exclusionary for certain identities, groups and interests that do not have access to influence dominant narratives or be part of coalitions, and by that blur intra-community differences and power relations (Clever, 2012). Employing the concept of “collaborative spaces”, I refer in this dissertation to the arenas that

combine initiatives from civil society with state responsiveness, with the possibility for transformation in procedural and distributional justice (Paavola, 2004). As Demeritt (2015) argues, participation is important for both fulfilling rights to participation, as well as ensuring legitimacy for policies and projects

At present, indigenous peoples' struggles commonly focus on how to consolidate their territories, how to control areas from the entrance of third parties, how to make autonomous decisions, how to be consulted and how to resolve conflicts over rights, interests and practices. Important for this dissertation is how these territories become a link of interaction with the state, as the state can have strategic interests tied to lands and resources within them, and also how indigenous organisations use the territories as a scale through which demands and rights can be claimed, and relations can be established with the state, international actors and networks. For indigenous movements the notion of "territory" has been pivotal in their struggles (Sieder, 2002; Postero, 2010; Fontana, 2014). Territories are not necessarily geographically delimited areas but are results of dynamic processes of re- and de-territorialisation (Rocheleau, 2011). As Halvorsen (2018, p.1), argues, territories can be viewed as the appropriation of space in pursuit of political projects. It is thus important to consider how territories are viewed, promoted and practiced as organisational, cosmological, traditional and cultural spaces. Indigenous people view territory as the central axis around which their lives revolve, and territories are also closely related to indigenous peoples' rights to use, reside, live in and protect certain land areas, based on history, traditions and their presence in these areas prior to colonisation (Sieder, 2002; Postero, 2010). Indigenous peoples claim focus on the struggle for reclaiming territory as well as self-determination and autonomy in governing their relationship with nature and the non-human (Ulloa, 2015, p.327). This is linked to indigenous peoples' rights to self-determination and consultation about activities that affect their areas and creates a special relation with the state and public authorities. However, tying indigenous identities to specific spatial territories, with preferred access to land resources and power, is also fraught with problems (Li, 1996; Peluso and Harwell, 2001).

In my analysis I shed light on the micro-politics that inform both conflict and cooperation, including the complexities and contradictions in motivations, interests and actions, the agency of grassroots actors in attempts to influence larger structures and processes in the governance of forest areas and how they interact with various state agencies and processes across scales,

as well as how these respond. I analyse the possibilities and constraints of subaltern actors to advance their interests, needs and rights in the face of new forest policies and laws (Paper IV), how subaltern groups have interacted across scales and in networks to advance their demands and interests regarding REDD policies (Papers II and III), development interventions such as in the case of TIPNIS (Paper V) and with whom they form alliances. Next, I turn to the concept of networks.

3.6 Networks

I find “networks” a useful term with which to conceptualise coalitions of actors who interact based on, for example, certain values or interests, and can be defined as a social system where actors develop certain patterns of interaction and communication aimed at specific goals or issues (see, e.g., Castells, 1996; Bressers and O’Toole, 1998; Bixler et al., 2016). Networks can include the interconnection of actors and interests across non-governmental organisations, consultants, research institutions, private companies, communities as well as donors and states. By rescaling processes networks have the potential to bypass or subvert conventional hierarchies of power (Leitner, 2004, p.246). With networks I also highlight agency as resting not only with individuals or specific actors, but in the dynamic interaction among different actors.

The notion of networks is, for example, useful to understanding the interconnections of actors involved in REDD policy and projects, including science-policy networks. In Paper II we suggest a view of science-policy networks as new types of elites, where elites are defined as “groups of individuals that, due to their control over natural, economic, political, social, organizations or symbolic (expertise/knowledge) resources, stand in a privileged position to influence in a formal or informal way decisions and practices with key environmental implications” (Bull and Aguilar-Støen, 2015, p.18). Science-policy networks, viewed here as interactions between actors involved in the co-production of specific knowledge and the social order related to a field (Forsyth, 2003), can be seen as elites with regards to their control of resources such as the production, circulation and promotion of specific frames or knowledge, and also control of access to policy making arenas.

Alternative networks related to natural resource and forest governance are emerging and their role in socio-environmental struggles varies and shapes governance outcomes. These

networks encompass actors concerned with human, environmental and indigenous peoples' rights and are connected across countries (Peet and Watts, 2004). For issues related to forests, forest communities are increasingly linked to networks of alliances with other groups based on temporary or more strategic shared interests. Through these interactions they enhance their access to information and also gain experience in shaping policies and interventions in their areas (Cronkleton et al., 2008). Struggles become inter-scalar and cross-scalar, where working across scales becomes an important strategy for the movements to advance their claims at different scales (Williams, 1999).

At the same time, the motivations for the struggles may differ between the different groups involved as well as across different scales. Communities and local actors may engage in different alliances and networks of a tactical character to fulfil needs and interests, or more strategic alliances for long-term changes. Alliances have, for example, been formed between environmentalists and indigenous peoples. Indigeneity has become a recognised source of political and moral legitimacy, and indigenous identities have been strategically used to counter development projects and are often portrayed as exhibiting conservation ethics (Merlan et al., 2009; Horowitz, 2015). These portrayals of indigenous peoples have also been challenged on the grounds that they tend to simplify, exoticify and misinterpret, as indigenous groups and local communities have multifaceted concerns, including community members' material well-being (Horowitz, 2015). Networked governance can allow for previously excluded groups to be engaged in various processes of government across scales (Bixler et al., 2016). On the other hand, however, networks can also facilitate participation in such a way that only particular voices are heard and subsequently, only particular natures are valued.

In the following section I will take a closer look at the role of discourses and narratives in environmental governance.

3.7 Discourses and Narratives in Environmental Governance

The governance of forest areas is not only a result of material struggles and interests but also of competing knowledge-claims, discourses and narratives about the environment, forests and climate change. Discourses and narratives are relevant as they describe shifts in spatial, administrative and political relations of governing nature and also explain causes and promote solutions for different environmental problems; they thereby have the potential to produce

particular forms of social order. Power relations can be revealed by looking at the dynamics by which certain assumptions, concepts or explanations are granted strength and credibility and in how ideas are diffused and stabilised within common narratives and discourses (Roe, 1991; Jasanoff, 1990; Adger et al., 2001; Forsyth, 2003; Goldman and Turner, 2011).

Discourse in this context is defined as a knowledge or truth regime about a topic or as a shared meaning of a phenomenon (Barnes and Duncan, 1992; Dryzek, 1997; Agder et al., 2001). Barnes and Duncan (1992, p.8) define discourses as “frameworks that embrace particular combinations of narratives, concepts, ideologies, and signifying practice”. Narratives can be seen as socially shared accounts or stories (Harre et al., 1999), framed within a specific discourse consisting of various arguments or statements (Roe, 1991; 1999). Narratives can appear as stories that provide scripts and justifications for action. Certain assumptions gain strength and credibility, in large part because they are linked together, diffused and stabilised within narratives (Roe, 1991; Fairhead and Leach, 2003; Agder et al., 2011). Discourses and narratives can thus be employed to promote or block the promotion of specific interests or solutions (e.g. Escobar, 1996) and may reinforce, challenge or create new or existing governance arrangements as they gain support and influence (Peluso, 1992; Zimmerer, 1993; Adams, 1993; Escobar, 1996; Bryant, 1998).

However, discourses can also simplify topics and can deviate across scales. For example, national discourses on a topic can deviate from global discourses on the same topic, even when promoted by the same actor. This also underlines that discourses can be seen as structures in so far as they also affect action and practice, yet they can also be challenged and changed. As Agder et al. (2001) argue, discourses can situate, shape and control how people think about environmental problems and the solutions that are promoted. At the same time, powerful counter-discourses can also challenge dominating discourses.

In the cases included in this dissertation I attempt to analyse how and why particular framings, discourses and narratives are promoted, contested, and changed. I explore how particular framings are produced and render certain actors or solutions illegitimate or legitimate, how certain explanations of forest degradation, conservation and associated solutions can penalise some actors whilst benefitting others (Forsyth, 2003; Goldman et al., 2011) and also how they change across scales according to different strategies. I describe, in Paper II, how power is embedded in science-policy networks that control both the framings

and the decision-making arenas concerning REDD. I demonstrate, in Papers IV and V, that different definitions of environmental and developmental problems and their solutions render different responses that both include and exclude different options and rationalities (see also Forsyth, 2003; Demeritt, 2015). I explore in Paper IV the mechanisms and rules of forest, land and resource management that affect people and ecologies, such as the current forest law in Bolivia. I address how different actors are framed and promoted as the “rightful forest managers”, how the role of different actors is defined (Papers III and V) and how the institutionalisation of definitions or concepts affects policy and project implementation (Papers II and V).

In Paper I, regarding REDD in Latin America, the term “black-boxing” is used to refer to the lack of a clear definition of REDD and the implications of this, such as the hybridisation of REDD and the large support for the initiative. In political ecology black-boxing has been used to refer to processes of knowledge production and institutionalisation to analyse how “facts” are rendered valid and unquestioned in order to obscure the specific dynamics that occur, based on the work of Latour (1999)⁵. It refers to the way certain phenomena, solutions or knowledge claims (e.g., policies, concepts, specific solutions, management models or technologies) become and act as “facts” (Forsyth, 2003; Goldman et al., 2011). Political ecology researchers seek to identify the actors and power relations involved in attempting to transform these claims into accepted truths⁶. Lastly, I will take a closer look at how different values and ideologies affect and are contested in environmental governance.

3.8 Contested Values and Ideologies in Environmental Governance

Instruments and mechanisms for environmental governance are grounded on certain ideas about what nature is and on the role different actors play in relation to forest resources and lands. These ideas, in turn, lead to different opinions about what nature can offer and how, for whom and for what reasons forests should be conserved, transformed and managed (McAfee, 1999; Gómez-Baggethun et al., 2010). The “value” of forests is closely related to how people treat and relate to nature and affects the organisation, consumption, protection, management

⁵ Latour (1999, p.304) defines black-boxing as “[T]he way scientific and technical work is made invisible by its own success. When a machine runs efficiently, when a matter of fact is settled, one need focus only on its inputs and outputs and not on its internal complexity.”

⁶ Black-boxing can also refer to the way certain decisions are not revealed to the public and are removed from the agenda, the way the “inner complexities” of technology, procedures or policies are considered mysterious or taken for granted, or the way certain concepts are fixed to a certain definition while disregarding other definitions (Bull and Aguilar-Støen, 2015).

and extraction of resources, land and ecosystems (Vatn, 2005). The degree to which certain ideas and values are institutionalised in policies and interventions in forest areas influences the socio-environmental impact they have. As my analysis suggests, the value people attach to forests is contested, as are the solutions for how to govern forest areas (see also Turner, 2009).

With neoliberalism, neoclassic economic theory has regained a strong foothold in environmental governance models, mechanisms and policies (Liverman, 2004)⁷. In the context of forests and REDD a neoclassic economic perspective suggests that market assessments will establish the “willingness to pay” for different “services” that nature provides. The idea to introduce payments for environmental services (PES) emerged from this and includes an assessment of who pays what for which environmental services (Vatn, 2010; Wunder, 2005; Wunder, 2013). These rational choice models are based on the premise that choices are individually calculative and what is needed is sufficient information in conjunction with the transformation of environmental goods into commodities. The essence of “commodities” is to have conceptual and definitional boundaries for goods, with individual property rights attached and a presumed independence between goods and agents (Vatn, 2005, p.315). However, as scholars have argued (e.g., Polyani, 1957), this independence is fictive when it comes to nature. With commodification, production for use is replaced by production for exchange, new goods and services are made available for commodity form and money plays an increasing role (Prudham, 2009). However, commodification of nature can only be partial, as argued by Prudham (2005; 2009), and there will always exist social struggles and contestations over the allocation of biophysical nature as nature is unruly (Robbins, 2004; Bakker, 2015). Transforming environmental values into commodities creates ethical concerns and challenges and deprives nature of much of its meaning and worth (Vatn, 2005, p.314; Bakker, 2007). Moreover, “pricing” based on individual evaluations is also problematic as it does not capture ethics and morality as social phenomena nor the interdependencies and relations between humans in their interactions with the natural environment (McKean and Ostrøm, 1995; Vatn, 2005; Corbera et al., 2007). Forests, and carbon, are not exempt from this. The existing framework of REDD, carbon credits and monitoring, has abstracted trees and forests from their social and ecological context (Demeritt, 2001).

⁷ Neoliberalism is viewed here as a development orthodoxy derived from neoclassic economics that emerged in the 1980s as specific policy-oriented prescriptions. These policy-oriented prescriptions concern opening trade and markets, macroeconomic stabilisation and the expansion of market forces within national economies with, for example, widespread privatisation and minimising the role of public and state.

The commodification of nature has been seen as contrasting with the worldview of indigenous cultures such as in the Andes in Latin America who value the interconnectedness between humans and between humans and the environment. In indigenous cultures the sacred is attached to nature, and the natural environment is important for identity, belonging and the organisation of societies. In recent times these values have been transformed into ideas about “nature’s own right” (Vatn, 2005, p.315), wherein nature should be protected for its own sake. These views have been seen in contrast to consumption-based cultures in developed countries and anthropogenic views accounting solely for human interests and needs and denominating the natural environment as “resources” or “services”, often expressed in quantified and monetary terms. However, as people, cultures and systems are in dynamic interaction, this division is not so clear-cut, and in practice, different hybrids of ideas and management forms or frictions emerge (Tsing, 2004).

The use of market mechanisms in environmental governance is a contested issue among scholars as well (Brown and Corbera, 2003; Osborne, 2015). Whilst some scholars categorically reject capitalist models in environmental governance (e.g., Matulis, 2014) others attempt to nuance different forms of market-based approaches and their consequences for livelihoods and local ecosystems (Corbera and Kosoy, 2008; Pirard, 2012)⁸. Some scholars have suggested that the transfer of economic payments may be conceived as recognition of communities’ roles as stewards of global public goods, as the redistribution of financial revenues (Rosa et al., 2003) and as a way to diversify livelihoods (Corbera et al., 2007). Corbera (2015) and McDermott et al. (2015) argue for a focus on actual material outcomes for local actors acknowledging that local actors can negotiate and manoeuvre rules and governance models according to their own interests and benefits. On the other hand, scholars such as Matulis (2014) argue that advancing capitalist forms of governance will lead to the oversimplification of ecological complexity. Market-based approaches are, according to Matulis, “antithetical to ensuring social and ecological well-being”; they are “anti-democratic” and displace alternative forms of resource management, excluding poor and indigenous peoples (2014, p. 156). As such, these mechanisms may replace other non-economic-based governance mechanisms. Vatn (2005) also warns that market-based

⁸ Pirard (2012), for example, distinguishes between four types of market-based forest conservation: 1) self-organised markets for timber and non-timber forest products; 2) created markets based on tradable permits (cap and trade or artificial scarcity) such as carbon markets; 3) regulatory price signals such as taxation schemes and subsidies; or 4) voluntary price signals such as forest certification schemes.

mechanisms can induce logics of individualism and competition in societies previously structured upon values of community and reciprocity. Certain institutional arrangements or rationalities can also facilitate the commodification of forest ecosystems. This has, for example, been the case for the rationalities of “participation” or “consultation” (Cook and Kothari, 2001).

These different views of how to relate to and value nature provide the basis for much of the contestations about national and local forests’ governance mechanisms, development interventions in forest areas and discussions of REDD projects. The opposition to REDD in Bolivia has been related to these views, as a mixture of ideological ideas against market mechanisms, a strengthened role of the state in natural resource governance and alternative ideas from indigenous cultures such as Mother Earth and Living Well (*Buen vivir*). In addition, the opposition is also related to actual experiences with state, private or NGO control over lands, resources, funds and decisions-making arenas. I return to this issue in the next chapter about Bolivia as well as in Paper III.

4. BOLIVIA

In this chapter I present the context of forest governance in Bolivia. Bolivia has vast natural resources and a plethora of ecosystems, a large population of indigenous peoples and rural communities, strong social movements and, from 2006, a self-defined pro-poor, pro-indigenous and pro-environmental government. Bolivia is also an exceptional case in Latin America because of the position the Bolivian government has taken in the international REDD negotiations and in its attempts to reshape REDD. At the same time, the country faces numerous challenges in balancing different needs, interests and rights in the governance of forest areas and natural resources.

The challenges in the forest sector provide an important background for discussions about the introduction of new mechanisms and programmes such as REDD (see Paper III), demands for a new forest law in Bolivia (see Paper IV) and the relations between the state and indigenous organisations (see Paper V). I present key policies and policy changes that have impacted the governance of forest areas in the past 30-40 years, including factors that have formed agricultural expansion and forest governance in the Bolivian lowlands prior to the 1980s, privatisation, environmental protection and democratisation in the 1980s and 1990s as well as the Forest Law of 1996, which is still in force. I furthermore introduce the current political context in Bolivia through the emergence of the Movement to Socialism (MAS) in the 2000s and the new constitution in 2009. I discuss current contestations in Bolivia related to contradicting and conflicting interests and concerns regarding development, livelihoods and the environment. The conflicts are closely related to state-society relations, which have undergone important changes in the past decade. I will also briefly introduce some of the current threats and challenges facing the Bolivian forest sector. Finally, I discuss how REDD and climate change policies have been introduced in Bolivia.

4.1 Location and Geographical Areas

Bolivia is a landlocked country of 1.1 million square kilometres. The country is highly diverse both in terms of its ecology and population. There are three main geographical areas: the highlands in the west, including the Andes Mountains; the central valleys and semi-tropical temperate regions of the Yungas; and the tropical lowlands to the east and north of the Andes. The lowlands of Bolivia are largely comprised of the Amazon basin system (in the departments of Pando, Beni and North La Paz), the Amazon pampas (Beni), tropical forest

areas, the Chaco grasslands in the south-east and a large area of agricultural land, concentrated in the department of Santa Cruz. Half of Bolivia is covered by forests, with a total of 53 million hectares (Müller et al., 2014), and almost 80 per cent of the forests are located in the lowlands. Bolivia has high forest density, superseded in Latin America only by Brazil (Crowther et al., 2015). The Bolivian forests are mostly tropical and deciduous. Closed, moist lowland rainforests cover a large part of the north-eastern part of the country and are part of the Amazon Basin system. Areas of dry tropical forest and savannah are also found in the lowlands. Forest loss, however, is a challenge in Bolivia. In 2018 alone 154 448 ha of tropical primary forests were lost, connected to transformation of forests to large-scale agriculture and pasture (Weisse and Goldman, 2019).

Figure 3 Satellite map of South America and Bolivia



Source: Google Maps 2019 <https://www.google.com/maps/place/Bolivia/@-22.6108078,-75.9900894,7307683m/data=!3m1!1e3!4m5!3m4!1s0x915edf8977bba295:0x1c9ec2bb0115edbf!8m2!3d-16.290154!4d-63.588653> Retrieved 29.05.2019

Figure 4 Map of Bolivia



Source: Google Maps 2019 <https://www.google.com/maps/place/Bolivia/@-16.1813784,-71.5803886,6z/data=!4m5!3m4!1s0x915edf8977bba295:0x1c9ec2bb0115edbf8m2!3d-16.290154!4d-63.588653>
Retrieved 29.05.2019

4.2 Demography, Indigenous Peoples and Land

In 2012, Bolivia had a population of over 10 million people (INE, 2012). 36 indigenous groups – recognised by the national constitution – comprise between 50–62% of the population (INE, 2001; 2006; 2012). The indigenous groups represent a wealth of historical, cultural, social and economic practices and organisational forms. The majority of the indigenous peoples belong to the Quechua and Aymara highland groups. The lowlands of Bolivia have traditionally been populated by smaller sedentary, semi-sedentary and nomadic indigenous peoples spread across large areas (5–10% of the total population). The remaining population is mainly mestizo (a mix of indigenous peoples and immigrants, mostly Europeans). In addition, there are recent immigrants from Europe and North and South America, many of which have settled in the lowland department of Santa Cruz.

Historically, land distribution in Bolivia has been marked by irregularities. Lowland cultures have lost vast territories and still struggle to legally recuperate these lands (Morales et al., 2013). Indigenous communities in the Amazon have traditionally moved around as hunters and collectors, covering vast territories. After the colonisation of Bolivia in the sixteenth century, missionaries played an important role in establishing settlements in the lowlands and used the local inhabitants as labour on the plantations of the Catholic missions (Tyuleneva, 2010; Canedo Vasquez, 2011). A millenarian belief in “La Loma Santa” (The Holy Mountain), a mythical place of happiness and abundance, led several indigenous groups to migrate across the Amazon area at the end of eighteenth century (Fundación Tierra, 2010; Canedo Vasquez, 2011). The Bolivian Amazon area was largely unaffected by large-scale economic activities until the nineteenth century (Assies, 2006; Reyes-Garcia et al., 2014). Some cattle ranching was introduced by Jesuits in the seventeenth century, though it was not until the late nineteenth century that commercial interests arrived, with the extraction of rubber and quinine⁹ and later cattle ranching and agriculture (Reyes Garcia et al., 2014). Cattle ranching took over after the collapse of the rubber markets and the commercialisation of beef and forest products was enhanced with air transport in the 1940s (Reyes Garcia et al., 2014), and later the road connection between the lowlands and the highlands.

In 1952 a Nationalist Revolution led by the National Revolutionary Movement (MNR) dramatically restructured the land sector through land reform. Indigenous peoples and rural residents were introduced into the nation as “campesinos” (peasants), and land from larger landholdings in the highlands and valley areas was redistributed. Rural residents in the highlands were granted land and organised into unions, which became a powerful political force based on peasant class identity (Albó, 1996; 2002; Assies, 2006). The landholdings in the lowlands were exempt from the expropriation process and many large landholdings remain intact today (Fabricant and Gustafson, 2011; Morales et al., 2013). As a result of the fallout from the revolution, class struggles and ethnicity have largely merged, and identities, such as indigenous and peasant, have been employed interchangeably in struggles for recognition, lands and rights in Bolivia (McNeish, 2002; Assies and Salman, 2005; McNeish, 2013). This fusion of identities is also reflected in the diversity of the organisations and groups in contemporary Bolivia.

⁹ Quinine is a natural cinchona alkaloid which is frequently used in the prevention and therapy of malaria.

4.3 Agricultural Expansion and Forest Governance in the Lowlands (1950s–1980s)

The expansion of the agricultural frontier in Bolivia began with the modernisation of large-scale agriculture after the 1952 Revolution (Redo et al., 2011). The construction of roads facilitated the arrival of migrant settlers and loggers to the Amazon. Oil and rubber, in addition to vast areas of land, attracted new actors to the area. The foreign settlers expanded cattle ranching and land was consolidated in their hands. During the military dictatorship in Bolivia (1964–1982), land was concentrated in the hands of national elites and foreigners. In the 1970s and 1980s, agriculture expanded in the lowlands, especially in Santa Cruz, with state subsidies and support from the United States. Demand for cotton and sugar combined with subsidies led to the beginning of large-scale deforestation in the department of Santa Cruz. At the same time, the rich biodiversity of the lowlands attracted conservation organisations to the area. The first national park, Sajama National Park, was established as early as 1939 in Oruru and was followed by several others in the 1960s and 1970s.

In 1969 the Bolivian Forestry Chamber (*Camara Forestal*) was founded to promote the interests of private actors involved in the forest sector. Logging companies operated without state regulation until 1978 and forest companies harvested select and valuable species such as mahogany, cedar and oak, with little regulation and state control. Contracts for exploitation lasted for five, 10 or 20 years and companies paid fees to the state according to the volume of trees extracted. No planning for the sustainable use of forests and forest resources nor forest protection policies existed during this era. Logging companies intruded on large forest areas and, in many places, caused a drastic reduction in highly valued tree species. Company practices further failed to provide conditions for forest regeneration and the protection of biodiversity in local areas. Several areas were damaged by timber extraction and the construction of access roads, affecting the lands, ecosystems and livelihoods of local communities

4.4 Privatisation, Environmental Protection and Democratisation (1980s–1990s)

In 1982 democracy was introduced in Bolivia when the military regime came to an end, one result of which was the re-emergence of a range of civil society organisations. At the same time, neoliberal policies were implemented, following the conditionality of loans from the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. In 1987 a new policy package titled the New Economic Politics (NEP) was

introduced and included the implementation of large-scale processes of decentralisation and privatisation. Public companies were privatised and the economy was largely deregulated and liberalised. The SAPs led to increased support for forest logging activities and export-oriented agriculture (Hecht, 2005; Pacheco, 2006; Redo et al., 2011). The country increased its exports in sectors such as natural gas, soya and wood. Cattle ranching activities were expanded and the SAPs encouraged large-scale soybean production, which had a significant impact on forest areas (Kaimowitz et al., 1999; Killeen et al., 2008). Cash-crop production and large-scale land holdings as well as commercial logging largely affected forest areas and indigenous peoples' traditional territories. Pressure on indigenous lands led to protests by the lowland indigenous groups, such as the March for Life in 1990. Indigenous groups, together with NGOs and donors, demanded the strengthening of indigenous land rights and protested against both state and private actors' interventions in their areas, including unsustainable logging activities (Morales et al., 2013). At the time, indigenous rights were on the international agenda, and as a result of both national and international pressure, Bolivia ratified the ILO 169 Indigenous and Tribal Peoples' Convention in 1991.

From 1993 three fundamental pillars of the Bolivian government's policy were initiated: selling 50 per cent of the shares in state companies; popular participation in governance; and educational reform. These pillars were operationalised in several laws, including Law 1654 of Decentralisation (*Ley de Decentralización Administrativa*, 1994), Law 1551 of Popular Participation (*Ley de Participación Popular*, 1996) and Law 1715 of Agrarian Reform (*Ley del Servicio Nacional de Reforma Agraria*, 1996). The decentralisation reform and the participation policy resulted in the establishment of 311 municipalities as well as the creation of Territorial Base Organisations (*Organizaciones Territoriales de Base-OTBs*). Participation from local communities, civil society associations and other non-governmental actors, as well as private companies, was facilitated and promoted (Medeiros, 2001; Perrault and Bridge, 2008). The Agrarian Reform law was established to organise, restructure and "clean up" the land registration system through a process called "saneamiento". This process entailed a land title regulation process through which lands were to be registered, measured, documented and titled. Land use was to be legitimised, based on the lands' economic and social functions (*Función Económica y Social - FES*), such as agricultural activities and the clearing of the land for such activities. Original communal lands (*Tierras Comunitarias de Origen, TCO*) were also recognised in the law, as a result of pressure from indigenous movements, NGOs

and donors¹⁰. The new policies, however, were subject to criticism. The Law of Popular Participation was, for example, criticised for excluding marginalised groups through its system of registering organisations and limiting participation to the prescribed parameters of state methodology (Jeppesen, 2001; McNeish, 2006, p.227)

Environmental policies in Bolivia were largely restructured in the 1990s (Perreault, 2005; 2009). The Law of Environment, which was implemented in 1997, resulted in the establishment of the National Service for Protected Areas (SERNAP) and a range of new state protected areas, while the Law of Decentralisation delegated roles and functions to municipalities and local actors. By the end of the 1990s a total of 26 areas were designated protected status, many of which overlapped with indigenous territories (Zimmerer, 2011; Reyes Garcia et al., 2014). The restructuring of environmental governance in Bolivia in the 1990s has important implications for the way forests are governed today. One of the most important laws governing the forest sector was created in 1996: The General Law of Forests. The law has been particularly contested, as I will discuss in the next section, and although several attempts have been made to rewrite or replace it (see Paper IV), it is still in force as of 2019.

4.5 The 1996 Forest Law

The aim of the 1996 forest legislation was to provide equitable access to forest resources for local and private actors and to promote sustainable forest management and standardised techniques for forest management. The regulations entailed the introduction of management plans for sustainable logging and forest inventories (Pacheco, 2006). Special rights to manage the forests were granted to original communal lands (*TCO*), communities and local groups. Private concession periods of 40 years were introduced together with management plans for logging. The management system stipulated that only 20 per cent of the management area could be harvested each year, with 20-year harvest rotation cycles. Instead of paying fees for extracted volumes, all actors were to pay fees according to the area exploited, in addition to a tariff. Financial decentralisation was to be managed through a fund (*Fonabosque*) and the Forest Superintendent (*La Superintendencia Forestal*) was placed in charge of monitoring management plans.

¹⁰ Both “indigenous” and “native” communal lands can also be used.

With the 1996 legal framework new interfaces of markets, the public, private actors and communities were created. Changes entailed that forest companies were obliged to negotiate directly with the property owners, including peasant and indigenous communities. Companies were left in charge of negotiating contracts for buying timber from the property owners, whereas independent forest consultants designed the management plans according to the law and were responsible for their follow up. The new legal framework was supported by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), through the Bolivia Sustainable Forest Management Project (BOLFOR) which was created in 1992. The BOLFOR programme strengthened business practices to foment exports and local business models for communities. In 2001 a total of 41.2 million hectares were recognised as land for permanent forest production (Supreme Decree No. 26075), 26 per cent of which was in protected areas (Pachecho, 2006; Müller et al., 2014). These areas could, by definition, be managed according to the new law, with management plans for logging. The renewal of the BOLFOR programme in 2004 (BOLFOR II) aimed to strengthen the supply and demand of legally harvested and certified timber and to provide training in forest business organisation and administration. These new instruments for forest governance facilitated the expansion of voluntary forest certification and increased the market for forest products. They further led to an increase in the value of forest wood exports and other non-forest related products.

Several challenges related to the 1996 forest law have been identified (Andersson, 2002; Pachecho, 2006; Müller et al., 2014). First, the law does not recognise the capacity of forest users themselves to make decisions about forest resources and communities have thus largely become dependent on external actors, including forest technicians and forest companies, to make decisions and to manage the timber within their areas. This has caused conflict between communities, companies, forest authorities and the independent forest technicians. Social participation has mainly been rhetorical and local forest users have little influence on the organisation of the management plans or the contracts entered into with forest companies. Small-scale forestry has proven difficult for small operators lacking adequate equipment, access to markets and technical knowledge. With few support mechanisms in place, local forest communities are under great pressure to enter into contracts with private companies. Second, much of the focus of the forest regulations is on fiscalisation and control, rather than facilitation and support. Forest authorities receive income mainly from fees, which makes them dependent on increasing patent collection. Third, the framework is poorly adapted to differences in local contexts and different ecosystems across the country. Fourth, the

implementation of the forest law has been characterised by lack of institutional capacity and enforcement (Contreras-Hermosilla and Vargas Rios, 2002; Müller et al., 2014). The forest sector has a high level of illegality, corruption and clientelism. Many communities struggle to control illegal logging in their territories and public forest agencies have limited capacity to monitor and control activities (Nasi et al., 2011). Finally, due to conflicting property and access rights, conflicts have emerged between community organisations, private companies with timber concessions and public agencies (Contreras-Hermosilla and Vargas Rios, 2002; Lidema, 2010; Müller et al., 2014).

As a result of both regulatory and institutional weaknesses, different actors are demanding changes both in the legal framework of the forest sector as well as the practices of public agencies and private actors.

4.6 From Protest to Unity

The history of foreign intervention in Bolivia, as well as elite control over land and strategic natural resources, led to a range of protests by marginalised groups such as indigenous peoples, peasant communities, neighbourhood associations and other social movements in the 1990s and 2000s (see, e.g., Perreault 2005; 2008). In particular, protests concerned the unequal distribution and governance of the country's natural resources and the devastating impacts of neoliberal policies in the 1980s and 1990s on the rural and urban poor (McNeish, 2002; Crabtree, 2005; McNeish, 2006; Dangl, 2007; Perreault, 2008; Postero, 2009; Postero, 2010). The coca leaf farmers (cocaleros) movement grew strong in the 1990s and 2000s. Following massive lay-offs in the mining sector in the highlands in the 1980s, large groups migrated to establish new livelihoods in the valleys and lowlands of Bolivia. Many of the miners became peasants and rural workers and brought their organisational traditions to the peasant organisations. Among the livelihood strategies adopted by these peasants was the cultivation of coca leaves. MAS emerged in the 1990s as a coalition of peasant and indigenous organisations, to address social and economic inequalities and marginalisation (Garces, 2011; Fabricant and Gustafson, 2011). The movement included formerly excluded groups in the political, economic and social arena, and called for fair distribution of land, resources and benefits. In the 2000s disparate groups across urban and rural divides, including the poor and middle class, gathered in large mobilisations to protect the country's resources from global and elite actors, and to demand local control and benefits over resources such as water and gas (Perreault 2005; 2008).

In 2005, the leader of MAS Evo Morales Ayma, an Aymara indigenous and cocalero union leader, won the presidential election. Morales was the first indigenous Bolivian president, representing a milestone in the country's history. The most important force supporting MAS was the Pact of Unity (established in 2004), an alliance uniting the five largest peasant and indigenous organisations in the Bolivian highlands and the lowlands (Garcés, 2011). The aim of the Pact of Unity was to change the country's constitution through a constituent assembly and introduce structural changes to benefit formerly excluded groups such as indigenous peoples, workers and peasants. MAS enjoyed considerable urban support, as well as support from the lowland indigenous movement. Support for MAS was based on its promise to establish a Constitutional Assembly to rewrite the country's constitution, foment the inclusion of formerly excluded groups, nationalise the oil and gas sector and advance land reform and land redistribution (Schilling-Vacaflor, 2010).

In 2006 the MAS government launched its "proceso de cambio" (process of change) programme, which refers to the structural transformation promoted by the Pact of Unity. The new government's first initiatives were to reinstate land reform, to establish a constituent assembly and to nationalise strategic natural resource sectors (Schilling-Vacaflor, 2010). The majority of land titled between 2006 and 2011 (53%) was original communal land (TCOs) or community property. In 2011 there were 258 TCO demands, of which 190 had been titled, comprising 20.7 million hectares. 55 of the titled TCOs, representing 12 million hectares, were situated in the lowlands (Fundación Tierra, 2011). The oil and gas sector was restructured, with important negotiations of contracts with international companies being undertaken. The state company was restructured and private companies had to negotiate new operating contracts resulting in increased revenues for the Bolivian State (Wanderley et al., 2012).

The constituent assembly was established in 2007 and the process of rewriting the constitution was finalised in 2009. The new constitution, which renamed Bolivia to "the Plurinational State of Bolivia" (2009), includes an expansion of indigenous, social and economic rights and introduces the idea of harmonious relations between humans and nature, through the concepts of "nature rights", "Living Well" and "Mother Earth". These concepts historically stem from Andean societies (Mannheim, 1991; Zimmerer, 2012) and have recently become part of the political discourse of indigenous Andean social movements in

Bolivia, Peru and Ecuador (PRATEC, 2002; Andolina et al., 2009; Escobar, 2010; Zimmerer, 2012; 2015). The concept of “Mother Earth”, or “pachamama” in Aymara and Quechua, refers to harmonious relations between humans and nature, the rights of communities and humans, as well as nature’s rights. The concept of “Living Well”, or “sumac kawsay” in Quechua and “suma qamaña” in Aymara (Medina, 2006; Delgado et al., 2010), refers to communities’ rights to a life-sustaining nature and reflects everyday concerns related to livelihood, such as food, health, resources and socio-environmental relations (Kohl and Bresnahan, 2010, p.15; Zimmerer, 2012; 2015)¹¹. The concepts of Mother Earth and Living Well are enshrined in the Bolivian National Development Plan (Ministerio de Planificación del Desarrollo, 2009) and different actors in Bolivia have mobilised these concepts in environmental governance issues (Zimmerer, 2015).

The new constitution includes a range of rights for indigenous peoples, including rights regarding consultation, participation and the use and management of natural resources. Figure 5 summarises some of the most important changes concerning indigenous peoples’ rights and the governance of forests. Forests and forestland are considered to be of strategic importance for national development, and the state recognises the rights of communities and small operators to use forest resources (Art 386, Constitution of the Plurinational State of Bolivia). The constitution also introduced a new term in land management, namely Indigenous Original Communal Lands (*Tierra Indígena Originario Comunitario-TIOCs*), which replaced TCOs. The main difference between these two terms is that TIOCs can also be made on the basis of peasant communities and includes mixes of indigenous and peasant groups (Morales et al., 2013). This has caused considerable tension and debate in Bolivia, especially between the migrant peasant organisations leaving the lowlands for the highlands in search of land and the lowland indigenous organisations trying to protect their territories (Fontana, 2014).

In addition, the constitution has a strong emphasis on the industrialisation of natural resources and the strengthening of the role of the state in natural resource governance. Since taking office the MAS government has worked to strengthen the role of the state, including establishing and strengthening existing public companies, increasing control of strategic

¹¹ More recently, the concept of Living Well has been employed by different actors to emphasise collective well-being and sharing (PRATEC, 2002), to support intellectual perspectives of political ecology and global ecology (Gudynas, 2009) as well as environmental protection and social solidarity. Living Well has become popularised as the foundation of alternative, holistic belief systems. It is frequently utilised as part of an argument against Western development and materialism, to contrast the low carbon societies of the South with energy-consuming and polluting developed countries (PRATEC, 2002; Andolina et al., 2009; Gudynas, 2009; Zimmerer, 2012; 2015).

sectors such as oil, gas, mining and agriculture and improving education, health and basic infrastructure (Lalander, 2014; Pacheco, 2014). The state has increased its presence in the Amazon area through, for example, programmes for local development and increased state and military involvement in the management of protected areas. In 2010 the government established the Agency for Development in the Macro Regions and Border Areas (*Agencia para el Desarrollo de las Macrorregiones y Fronteras*, Ademaf). Ademaf has since introduced a range of activities to strengthen state presence in these areas and to integrate the Amazon and border populations through community development projects (e.g., health, education, telecommunications and the introduction of identity cards). In the following section I introduce some of the current contestations in Bolivia, which relate to balancing different interests and concerns related to development, livelihoods and the environment.

Figure 5 Constitution and Relevant Articles

According to the Constitution of Bolivia (2009):

- Indigenous, native and peasant nations have the right to be consulted, through their own institutions, on legislative measures affecting them and to participate in the benefits resulting from the exploitation of natural resources (Art. 15).
 - Indigenous, native and peasant nations have the right to use and exclusively manage the renewable natural resources in their territories and to participate in the organs and institutions of the state (Art. 18).
 - Indigenous, native and peasant nations have the right to participate in the design of public policies through “organised civil society” and to participate in the making of policies and “the collective construction of the laws” (Art. 241).
 - Indigenous, native and peasant nations have the right to participate in environmental governance and to be consulted and informed about decisions that affect the environment (Art. 343; Art. 345).
 - Forests and forest land are considered of strategic character for national development, and the state recognises the rights of communities and small operators to use forest resources (Art. 386).
 - Indigenous, native peasant communities situated within forest areas have exclusive entitlement to the use and management of the resources (Art. 388).
 - The state prioritises the integral and sustainable management of the Bolivian Amazon through participative administration (Art. 391).
 - State land is to be distributed to indigenous peoples, native, peasant, intercultural and original communities, Afro-Bolivians and peasant communities (Art. 395).
 - Important components of sustainable rural development are food security and sovereignty (Art. 405).
 - The state guarantees sustainable rural integral development, including agro-forestry (Art. 406).
-

4.7 Recent Contestations over Development and the Environment

The Bolivian government has actively employed the concepts of Mother Earth and Living Well, both in its national development agenda and its push for an alternative global agenda for climate justice and environmental governance (Lalander, 2014; Pacheco, 2014; Zimmerer, 2015). In the global arena, the Bolivian government has employed these concepts to secure leadership positions in global institutions. This includes the representation of indigenous peoples in high-level summits (e.g., the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development (Rio+20)) and in global climate change negotiations. In 2010 the concepts of Mother Earth and Living Well were at the centre of the Worlds Peoples' Conference of Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth (WPCCCRME) organised by the Bolivian government in collaboration with civil society actors. As other scholars have noted (e.g., Zimmerer, 2015), the concepts of Living Well and Mother Earth have underpinned the political legitimacy and moral authority of the Bolivian government. The government's embrace of these concepts also reflects the power of indigenous social movements within government (Lalander, 2014).

Significant disagreements have, however, emerged regarding the use of Living Well and Mother Earth in matters of environmental governance (Lalander, 2014; Zimmerer, 2015). In 2012 the Bolivian Plurinational Legislative Assembly passed the Framework Law of Mother Earth and Integral Development for Living Well¹², just months after the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development (Rio+20) in Rio de Janeiro. The original proposal for the law was developed over two years by indigenous peasant organisations in the Pact of Unity before being presented to the The Plurinational Legislative Assembly. However, in the final law presented by the government, several articles had been changed, removed or added. Articles concerning the establishment of consultation mechanisms was removed, articles concerning genetically modified organisms (GMOs) were changed and new mechanisms for environmental governance were added, for example the Mechanism for Mitigation and Adaptation for the sustainable management of forests and Mother Earth. These changes led to distrust and critique from different actors, particularly the lowland indigenous organisations and allied NGOs (personal comm.CIPCA, 2012).

¹² La Ley 300 Marco de la Madre Tierra y Desarrollo Integral para Vivir Bien


The government's commitment to the wellbeing of local, indigenous and peasant communities is also contradicted by the vast expansion of government-led resource extraction, with uneven benefits and burdens for local communities (Gudynas, 2013; Zimmerer, 2015). This has caused conflict and contestation in recent years, especially between the government, local communities and indigenous organisations (Haarstad, 2012a; Gudynas, 2013; Bebbington, 2013; McNeish, 2013). Communities across the country demand benefits and local consultations on decision-making and planning. Furthermore, communities protest against the negative consequences of the government's practices for local livelihoods.

In parallel, the continued focus on extractive industries, together with the state's increased involvement, has also allowed the government to obtain a greater share of the generated wealth. This increased income from extractive industries is, according to the government, used for social development and poverty alleviation (García Linera, 2012). According to the World Bank, Bolivia's economic performance over the past decade has been strong and has contributed to a significant reduction in levels of poverty and inequality (World Bank, 2015). Between 2002 and 2014 Bolivia's gross domestic product (GDP) grew by an average of 4.7 per cent annually, while the rate of investments more than doubled between 2003 and 2014. Large investments have been made in potable water, sewerage, schools, roads, hydrocarbon exploration, natural gas industrialisation and hydroelectric energy generation. Since 2006, in an attempt to strengthen state control over the economy, the government has nationalised pension funds, water, electricity and telecommunication companies, oil fields and mines. Moderate poverty has been reduced from 59 per cent in 2005 to 39 per cent in 2014, and extreme poverty has been reduced from 39.5 per cent in 2002 to 17 per cent in 2014. The Gini Index, an inequality indicator, fell from 0.60 to 0.47 in the same period (World Bank, 2019) and the number of households with access to electricity, drinking water and sanitation increased (INE, 2012).

Recent conflicts demonstrate how strategic national needs and interests can clash with local livelihoods and protection of ecosystems. As a landlocked country, Bolivia is largely dependent on road networks for transportation of goods and people. Roads are generally in a poor state. In 2015 Bolivia's road network extended 89,740 kilometres, of which 11.7 per cent was paved, representing the lowest road density in Latin America and the Caribbean (IADB, 2015). The current government has been eager to implement the Initiative for the Integration

of the Regional Infrastructure of South America (IIRSA). However, road projects and natural resource extraction (oil, gas and mining) can potentially affect national parks, split protected areas and have significant consequences for indigenous territories, communities, ecosystems and local livelihoods. This has been the case for the road building project running through TIPNIS, which I discuss in Paper V. Figure 6 shows the location of TIPNIS, between the Bolivian highlands and the lowlands, and the surrounding road network. The government planned to extend the road and connect San Ignacio de Moxos in the department of Beni with Villa Tunari in the department of Cochabamba. As discussed in Paper V, this has caused contestations and struggles between lowland and highland organisations, environmental movements and the government, as well as between the government and the lowland elite.

Figure 6 Location of TIPNIS



The image shows the main road network in Bolivia (yellow lines) and the location of TIPNIS, and illustrates the area where the road was planned. The current road connection between the highlands and lowlands (Trinidad) must either proceed via Cochabamba and Santa Cruz in the south-east or from La Paz via Coroico-Caranvi-Yucumo. Source: Google Maps 2019 <https://www.google.com/maps/@-15.9173225,-66.1767178,475789m/data=!3m1!1e3> Retrieved 29.05.2019

The state has also attempted to centralise the administration of protected areas which has, according to critics, decreased the possibilities for joint management with local communities and organisations as well as diminished the power of local communities to negotiate and influence decision-making processes in their areas (interview, SERNAP, 2011). The absence or inadequacy of consultation processes regarding projects and policies that affect local communities' livelihoods has also sparked tensions. Tensions surround recent oil and gas extraction projects, infrastructure development, policies on the environment and economic development, agricultural, land and forest protection policies, as well as indigenous self-determination and autonomy. For example, agriculture is the most important source of export earnings after the extractive sector. However, growth in the agricultural sector has been driven by a rapid expansion of the land frontier, resulting in deforestation, soil degradation and the depletion of water resources (Müller et al., 2014).

Some scholars (e.g., Webber, 2011) have therefore argued that the government's continued exploitation of natural resources has come at the expense of oppressed and marginalised groups. Gudynas (2009; 2013) argues that, in spite of a more active state and considerable redistribution, the Bolivian government continues to rely on its integration in international markets, the extractive appropriation of nature and weak economic diversification. The conflicts are also closely related to state-society relations, which have also undergone important changes in the past decade. Recent analyses also show that different sectors of the Bolivian society have varied access to state agencies, benefits and political processes (Haarstad and Campero, 2012; Fontana, 2014). In the next section, I introduce some of these changes.

4.8 Recent Changes in State-Society Relations

Since 2006 new forms of state-civil society alliances and constructions of participatory governance have emerged discursively and, to a varying degree, in practice (Schilling-Vacaflor, 2010). The government has established several arenas for civil society participation in policy-making, governance and policy implementation (Haarstad and Campero, 2011; 2012). Access to political arenas such as government ministries, the Constitutional Assembly and the The Plurinational Legislative Assembly has improved for formerly marginalised groups (i.e., peasants, indigenous peoples and women). Consequently, several grassroots leaders have obtained political positions. Representatives from social movements and NGOs

have moved into public offices and ministries and have greater representation in the The Plurinational Legislative Assembly. However, social movements are positioned neither inside nor outside the state or civil society; rather, their positions blur the boundaries between state, capital and the people. Social movement leaders and NGO activists, as well as academics and technocrats, engage in “boundary crossing”, blurring distinctions between state and civil society, public policy and political activism (Bebbington, 2015; Zimmerer, 2015).

The unprecedented participation of representatives from previously marginalised groups has had considerable impact on the workings of the ministries and has, at least for certain groups, led to sentiments of being included in the state¹³. At the same time, ministries of environment in Latin America are contested areas (Bebbington, 2015) and the Bolivian case is no exception. In Bolivia, the Ministry of Environment and Water has been an important political space for social movements to gain access to the state apparatus. However, the ministry has also been subject to high turnover and conflicts, among both leadership and staff, according to fieldwork observations in 2011 and 2012. This undermines the stability of the ministry and projects that are started by one team are not necessarily followed through by the next. The blurred lines between public and civil sector can also be seen in the support from independent advisors, who are not placed in the ministries but who nevertheless play important roles (e.g., as part of climate change negotiations teams).¹⁴ This underlines the importance of studying the “micro-politics” of policy-making, legislative change and cabinet dynamics (Bebbington, 2015).

In the following section I will briefly introduce some of the current threats and challenges confronting the Bolivian forest sector.

¹³ For example, the Ministries of Water and Environment and Rural Development and Land, which were established in 2009, have both been led by former leaders of social movements and national NGOs. The Minister of Interior at the time of the study, Carlos Romero, was also a former leader of a national NGO (CEJIS) and was one of the most prominent actors working for indigenous rights. The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Choquevanca, is an Aymara union leader.

¹⁴ For example, Rene Orellana, who has been in and out of the government as head of the Bolivian climate negotiation delegation and Minister of Environment and Water, and Diego Pacheco, who is a researcher and anthropologist and was the coordinator of the development of the Joint Mechanism for Mitigation and Adaptation and Sustainable Management of Forests and Mother Earth. Pacheco has also held various positions, such as delegation head and government advisor, and has recently become a vice-minister. In addition, Orellana and Pacheco played a pivotal role in developing the Law of Mother Earth in its current form.

4.9 Current Threats and Challenges in the Forest Sector

Bolivia has an extensive network of more than 66 protected areas, many of which contain vast forest areas. In addition, medium and large-scale landowners hold 47 million hectares of these forested areas. In 2011, 23 million hectares of forest were within indigenous territories and 3.8 million hectares were recently colonised lands. As such as 8.8 million hectares were under forest management, including both state land and private land, of which 5 million hectares were concessions (Morales et al., 2013).

Between 2010 and 2015 the net loss of forests in Bolivia was 289,000 hectares per year (FAO, 2015). Threats to the forest areas include the expansion of the agricultural sector (such as cultivation of soya, sugarcane, rice and coca), cattle grazing, colonisation and new settlers (both legal and illegal), illegal logging, forest fires, unsustainable management of forest resources, infrastructure development and preparations for extractive industries (Müller et al., 2014). The state's weak implementation of environmental regulations has left indigenous territories, forests and the environment at risk (Pacheco, 2007; Nasi et al., 2011; Redo et al., 2011). The threats to forest areas also reflect unequal access to land and resources, as well as the pre-eminence of economic interests over alternative forms of land use. In certain areas, particularly in Santa Cruz, permanent forestland has slowly been transformed for agricultural use (Pacheco, 2006). Cattle ranching, timber logging and agro-industry, in addition to oil and gas extraction, are the most crucial components of the lowland economy (Hecht, 2013; Müller et al., 2014; Høiby and Zenteno Hopp, 2015.) These sectors are largely controlled by a limited number of powerful families, many of whom are organised in the so-called Civic Committees (*Comités Cívicos*). Additionally, foreign actors increasingly hold land in Bolivia (Urioste, 2012). Foreign ownership of land is not new in Bolivia, however, more recently Brazilian and Argentinian actors have been taking over lands in the Bolivian lowlands through land ownership or rental.

Forest degradation persists, both in legal and illegal forms. This is, on the one hand, a result of poor follow-up from the state and company practices, but it is also due to problems inherent in the 1996 Forest Law. For example, the 20-year rotation system stipulated by logging regulation is not properly adapted to the Bolivian ecosystems where many species require more than 20 years for regrowth (Pers.com; Jaime Villanueva, La Paz 2012). Logging companies have, in many instances, failed to protect the areas they operate in, cutting down

valuable seedling trees or extracting more trees than allowed. The forest management framework has created a patron-client system between forest communities and forest companies who have control over the value chains and communication with public bodies, or between communities and forest technicians who are responsible for management plans. State land, defined as permanent forest areas, has been redistributed to small-scale farmers but without proper programmes for the management of forest protection. Abandoned forest concession areas on state land have also been colonised by farmers (either permanently or seasonally), and in certain instances, forest areas within large indigenous communities have been rented out or fallen victim to illegal resource extraction. National protected areas have been opened up to mining, gas and oil activities. At the same time, non-governmental organisations have in some areas had considerable impact on management and control.

Finally, I will shortly introduce how REDD has been introduced to Bolivia.

4.9.1 Climate Change Policies and REDD in Bolivia

I identify three phases in the climate change policies of the MAS government: first, the transition phase (2006-2009); second, the opposition phase (2009-2011); and lastly, the proposition phase (2011-present).

The transition phase was characterised by new political actors entering the arena and the formation of new institutions, as well as the legacy of the previous administration. The responsibility for climate change policies was placed on the National Programme for Climate Change (*Programa Nacional de Cambio Climático*) and on the Ministry of Sustainable Development, later renamed to the Ministry of Environment and Water. In 2006, there were several Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) projects in Bolivia, and in 2008 Bolivia expressed interest in becoming part of the UN-REDD programme. Bolivia was accepted in the programme as a pilot country later that year. Bolivia is also famous for having had the first REDD-like project globally, in the Noel Kempff national park. The Noel Kempff Climate Action Project was initiated in 1997. The project established direct relations with US energy companies, who were willing to pay for the conservation of the Noel Kempff Park, and in return were given the possibility of receiving future carbon.

In 2009 a national UN-REDD team was established in coordination with the World Bank Forest Carbon Facility Partnership and Germany, and in 2010 the five largest peasant and indigenous organisations formed the National Environmental Policy Support Group.¹⁵ However, after the Copenhagen COP15 in 2009, Bolivia's critical position towards REDD was strengthened. The Bolivian government demanded public funding for REDD, national sovereignty and meaningful participation of indigenous peoples and local communities.

The opposition phase of Bolivian climate change policies was characterised by opposition to carbon markets and REDD. In 2008 Bolivia left the Coalition for Rainforest Nations. Furthermore, in response to the failure of negotiations in Copenhagen in 2009, the Bolivian president, Evo Morales, announced that Bolivia would organise and host an alternative climate conference, the Peoples Conference on Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth, in Cochabamba in April 2010. The resulting Declaration on Forests (the Peoples Agreement, 2010) rejected REDD and carbon markets and called for a new mechanism that "respects the sovereignty of States and the right of the peoples to free, prior and informed consent". Other concerns raised included the dispossession of local people, reduction of forests to "mere carbon sequestration" and inclusion of plantations in the definition of forests. In November 2010, the government brought the Cochabamba declaration to the climate negotiations in Cancun and, in the final moments, refused to sign the agreement among nations. Despite the Cochabamba declaration, the Bolivian government signed a contract with the UN-REDD programme in November 2010, creating confusion among many civil society organisations and donors. In 2011 the government closed the Noel Kempff Climate Action Project and the CDM projects.

Finally, the proposition phase of Bolivian climate change policies has been characterised by the development of an alternative to REDD (Pacheco, 2014). In 2011 a project to develop an alternative mechanism to REDD was initiated in Bolivia, both for domestic issues and as an example of a global mechanism. In 2011 the Bolivian delegation in Durban proposed the new forest and climate change mechanism, which was to be based on public funding, "integral" forests management and a combination of mitigation and adaptation efforts. The project was re-launched in 2012 as the Joint Mechanism for Mitigation and Adaptation and Sustainable

¹⁵ CONAMAQ, the Syndicalist Confederation of Intercultural Communities of Bolivia (CSCIB), the Unified Syndical Confederation of Rural Workers of Bolivia (CSUTCB), the woman indigenous peasant organization (CBMCIQB-BB) and the eastern lowland Confederation of Indigenous Peoples of Bolivia (CIDOB).

Management of Forests and Mother Earth (the Joint Mechanism). At the same time, the UN-REDD project was put on hold in Bolivia after two years of inactivity. I explore the discussions about REDD in Bolivia and present more details regarding the process of policy change in environmental governance, as well as how the politics of scale shaped the outcomes, in Paper III.

In the following chapter, I present the methodology employed in this dissertation.

5. METHODOLOGY

In this chapter I start by introducing critical theory and critical realism, which form the basis of my understanding of science. I then present the qualitative research methods and extended case methodology employed in this study. A significant part of the chapter is dedicated to discussing the data collection methods employed and fieldwork conducted in Bolivia. I explain how the data were analysed for each of the dissertations' papers. In the final section of the chapter I discuss the ethical considerations of this study as well as factors that caused challenges during the study.

5.1 Doing Critical Research

This study has its basis in critical research. A critical researcher attempts to use academic work as a form of critique of society and to foment social change based on assumptions that power relations are social and historically constituted, that values and ideologies affect what we present as facts and with a focus on relations of marginalisation as well as privileges (Guba and Lincoln, 1994; Kincheloe and McLaren, 2000; Forsyth, 2001). These assumptions do not determine how a researcher sees the world, but help to devise questions and strategies to explore these issues (Kincheloe and McLaren, 2000). A critical theorist can be seen as a detective of new insights, searching for new and interconnected ways of understanding social change (Guba and Lincoln, 1994). Critical theory also attempts to identify who gains and who loses in specific situations. As such, critical research attempts to expose the forces that prevent certain groups from shaping the decisions that affect their lives and their surroundings, and their possibilities for doing so (Archer, 1998; Kincheloe and McLaren, 2000, p.309). Political ecology retains a methodological commitment to in-depth direct observation, qualitative research and a mix of methods, taking as a starting point that vital elements of nature-society relations cannot be read from social or spatial distance (Bridgeman et al., 2015). A critical researcher in political ecology is especially concerned with social change in relation to natural resources and the environment and human interactions with ecosystems and environmental governance, including the forces that prevent, shape or facilitate access to and control over lands, ecosystems, natural resources and related decision-making arenas (Forsyth, 2001; 2003 Perreault et al., 2015).

To explain complex phenomena such as environmental governance, I draw on critical realism to assess both the social, political and cultural dimensions of knowledge (the discursive and cultural construction of events and meanings) and the reality of the material dimensions of the problems (e.g., biophysical processes, landscape change, material resource flows and distribution of risks and benefits) (Forsyth, 2003; Bhaskar and Danermark, 2006; Bhaskar et al, 2010; Cornell and Parker, 2010; Bridge et al., 2015). Critical realism combines ontological realism – the belief that reality exists independently of our perception of it – and an epistemology of contextual constructivism (Bhaskar, 1979; 1991; Collier, 1994; Bhaskar, 2008). Contextual constructivism holds that knowledge of nature is constructed and reconstructed by human acts and interpreted using historically and culturally specific concepts (Burningham and Cooper, 1999; Newton et al., 2011). Social reality, in critical realism, cannot be reduced to individual motivations, powers or tendencies, but must be seen in their relations to underlying mechanisms and structures (Cornell and Parker, 2010). This implies the importance of analysing the dynamic interactions between structure and agency, including the barriers and possibilities for human action. This combination allows not only an analysis of different agents’ perceptions of events and processes, it also allows an analysis of the influence of wider forces affecting human agency and the way agency reproduces or transforms structures (Bhaskar, 1979; Burawoy, 2000).

Critical realism implies the view that there are multiple ways of constructing reality. The researcher can gain improved insights into this reality by “retroductive argumentation” and “judgmental rationality” (Bhaskar, 1979). “Judgmental rationality” points to the need to create and seek explanations that have considerable power to answer questions. “Retroductive argumentation” entails working back from empirical findings to possible explanations and employing creative imagination and analogies in constant dialogue and interaction between the empirical material and concepts (Ragin, 1994). The aim is not to generalise but to identify factors that are responsible for or have helped produce or facilitate a phenomenon. Theories and concepts are assessed and employed according to their ability to illuminate the empirical phenomena, including social relations with the non-human world, interactions between different actors, and the relations between agents and structure (see Bhaskar and Danermark, 2006; Bridge et al., 2015).

In critical studies “informed insights” (Guba and Lincoln, 1994) are acquired through various cycles of reflection and dialogue between the researcher and the researched, the researcher

and the academic community (e.g., peer review processes, discussions with colleagues and conference presentations) and the empirical material and concepts employed. Empirical studies and the collection of primary materials are therefore important for critical realists when collecting information about and interacting with agents and events in the field, in parallel with attempts to explain underlying mechanisms and structures. Through cycles of reflection (see Gibbs, 1988 for a similar view) findings are interpreted and reinterpreted, with the aim to present possible explanations and a greater and fuller picture of the complexities in the world. Critical theory is further oriented towards critiquing society, with the goal of contributing to social change through the analysis of various forms of oppression and knowledge construction (Forsyth, 2003), including social, political and cultural injustice.

As a researcher I recognise that I take part in a reciprocal and participatory relationship with what and who is being studied in the co-production of knowledge (Bridge et al., 2015 p.9), and am aware of my position within the research as an important part of the analysis. This entails that as a researcher I must be aware of my own worldview and positionality, and be reflective of the complicated relationship between the reality I aim to explore and myself as a researcher. This also implies an acknowledgement that “facts” are not neutral objects, but are the result of processes of knowledge production (Jasanoff, 2004). As such, I recognise that there are complex and differentiated knowledge relationships and that research is an ongoing process without closure. Knowledge will always be partial and incomplete. This implies that the analysis and findings I present in this dissertation are possible explanations. Analytical concepts and theories are in a constant process of contestation and reconstruction and there is a constant interaction between empirical material and analytical concepts.

5.2 Qualitative Research as a Methodological Approach

To collect the material for this dissertation I employed qualitative research methods, with an interactive and flexible research design (Maxwell, 2005, p.3; Denzin and Lincoln, 2011). The interactive and flexible design entailed a constant process of interconnecting the different components of the study and reassessing and adjusting the interlinkages among the research objectives, analytical framework, research questions, methods and study validity (Maxwell, 2005). I conducted this research in a “bricoleur”-like fashion, deploying different strategies, methods and the empirical material at hand (Becker, 1998, p.2; Dolittle, 2005) in a pragmatic, strategic and self-reflexive manner. I applied an “extended case methodology” (ECM),

focusing on connections and encounters across different actors, spaces and scales to analyse the complexity of the governance of forest areas. Case study methodology entails an intensive examination of the context, where the case is the focus of interest in its own right (Bryman, 2004). In ECM fieldwork is a process that requires on-going dialogue, including sensitivity and reflexivity, between the researcher and social actors relevant to the study (Prowse, 2008). I employed a multi-sited and multi-actor methodology, which means I collected information from various sites, arenas and across scales – international, national to regional and local – and I interacted with a variety of different actors and processes (Marcus, 1997). This was necessary to understand the complexities of the influences on the governance of forest areas and the variety of actors, processes and interests involved.

By exploring encounters and processes at various scales, both across Bolivia and in global forest governance in the case of REDD, across sectors and from more than one local site, I have gained in-depth insights about what affects the governance of forest areas. For example, I collected information about and interviewed actors connected to international processes (e.g., donors, representatives from the UNDP and World Bank offices in La Paz, members of transnational NGOs and international networks), bureaucrats and politicians from Bolivian public offices and ministries, both in the capital and in regional offices, national non-governmental organisations as well as local and regional indigenous, peasant and forest organisations related to forest areas in the lowlands of Santa Cruz, Beni, Pando and La Paz.

I employed direct and participant observations to gain insights from both inside and outside of the events and processes studied. I also studied the relations between indigenous organisations and different state and government actors involved in the conflict regarding the road construction project in TIPNIS. When the indigenous organisations mobilised in large protest marches in 2011 and 2012, I took part in these for shorter periods. I also collected important information from the analysis of documents and written materials including policy and project documents, NGO documents and reports, law proposals, current legislation as well as materials from both public and private bodies on the Internet. I constantly iterated theory and data to redefine my research questions and to contest and reconstruct the theoretical framework in a two-way process. Dialogue and reflexivity were key principles during my research process, and I recognise the inherent impact of power relations within social research (Prowse, 2008). In the following section I discuss reflexivity and research relationships.

5.3 Reflexivity and Research Relationships

Reflexivity includes being self-reflexive about background, commitments, relevant experiences and social position (see e.g. Nencel, 2014). Reflexivity is a process involving “self-critical, sympathetic introspection and the self-conscious, analytical scrutiny of the self as researcher” (England, 1994, p.82). Reflexivity also includes how my meetings with the participants during the study may have positioned me as a researcher, in terms of gender, age, ethnicity, sexual identity and class (Plowman, 1995). In my use of reflexivity, I am inspired by the work of Donna Haraway (1988) and her concept of “situated knowledge”, which involves situating the research and positioning and engaging the knowing self (Kobayashi, 2009). A reflexive approach to research requires acknowledging one’s own “intellectual autobiography” (Stanley and Wise, 1990, p.47) and unpacking how this may influence the construction of knowledge and the research process (Sundberg, 2015). I agree with researchers such as Pini (2004) who argues that self-reflexivity provides other researchers and the individuals studied a better understanding of the methods used and the results presented, in turn strengthening the validity of the research. Researchers speak from multiple and shifting positions, and the ways in which we represent knowledge are influenced by these positions. A reflexive examination of subjectivities in the process of research strengthens the trustworthiness of data and can raise questions of ethics, power and representation in the research process (Pini, 2004). In undertaking this research, I strived to reflect on my position in relation to others and the power relations embedded in these relations (Maxwell, 2005). I have emphasised “intersubjectivity”, seeking a sharing of knowledge and experience between the people being researched and myself as researcher. I also understand that as a researcher I am part of the production of knowledge (Shields and Dervin, 1993, p.67; Acker et al., 1996). In the next section, I take a closer look at positionality in this research.

5.3.1 Positionality in the Research

My background, including my nationality, gender, class and ethnicity as well as my contact networks and interests have served to open and close doors in different settings and phases of the study. It is therefore of importance to present my background in this chapter, and further reflect on how it may have influenced my work. Positionality can influence access to informants, the data gathered, the questions asked and the interpretations we make (Neely and Nguse, 2015). I strive to be explicit about the processes by which my data were obtained. I am aware that some identities afforded me more legitimacy than others. I concur with Pini (2004)

and Du Bois (1983) who argue that a reflexive approach benefits rather than detracts from the scientific nature of the research and enables the production of better science. I contend that my findings are more credible because of my attempts to be reflexive about the dynamics that occurred in the process of producing the findings (Sundberg, 2015). I concur with Sundberg's (2015, p.120) call for "ethics of enganglements", where researchers are self-reflexive and accountable about their political position, relations and the conditions that enable researchers to produce knowledge (Haraway, 1991; Neely and Nguse, 2015).

I am a person of privileged trained in the global North, conducting research regarding processes that links the global South and North. I write from a geopolitical and institutional position with Norwegian citizenship and as affiliated to two Norwegian universities. As a political ecologist I am situated in, and benefit from, the political-economic system that constitute part of my research subjects, and my position of privilege places me in asymmetrical relations with the people I study. I grew up in a middle-class home in Oslo, the capital of Norway, and I have an academic background in Human Geography and Social Anthropology (University of Oslo), Environment and Development Studies (the University of Portsmouth, United Kingdom, and the Norwegian University of Life Sciences) and Market Economics (the Norwegian Business School). During my work on this dissertation I completed PhD courses in environmental and developmental studies, as well as political ecology (the Norwegian University of Life Sciences, the University of Oslo and the University of Copenhagen). My identity as a Norwegian/Scandinavian, as well as my ties to two Norwegian universities, contributed to my access to different arenas during the study, including the Norwegian Embassy Office, the Swedish Embassy, the Danish Embassy and the World Bank office in Bolivia. I also had previous experience in the Bolivian context, having lived and worked there prior to the study, and have a close connection to Latin America in general. Since 2004 I have travelled, studied and worked in different countries in Latin America including Mexico, Guatemala, Ecuador and Bolivia, as a volunteer, a student and an employee in a solidarity and information organisation, The Norwegian solidarity committee for Latin America (*Latin-Amerikagruppene i Norge*, LAG). I made my first visit to Bolivia in 2007 and lived and worked there from 2008–2009. I am passionate about pro-poor, pro-environmental and social justice issues and I have engaged with organisations across Latin America, including indigenous and peasant organisations, worker's unions, youth organisations, women's organisations, left-leaning organisations and political parties, as well as a number of NGOs. I am fluent in Spanish. My background, including how I present

myself, with whom I work and how I am positioned by others, may have influenced different phases of the study.

During fieldwork I have interacted with both male and female informants, of whom a majority were men (see Appendix 1) and with different social groups. In the public offices and ministries, many of the employees were men. This was also the case in the leaderships of the NGOs and the leaders of the indigenous and community organisations. I also interacted with a number of women in the women's indigenous organisations, in academia, in positions of youth leadership and as employees (and sometimes leaders) in the NGOs, and some as part of the bureaucracy or advisors to the government. Several researchers argue for the importance of recognising how gender and sexuality may affect data collection and how researchers are met in the field (Smart, 1984; Caplan, 1993; Cupples, 2002). Regardless of attempts to disregard or dismiss our sexual identities and gender roles in research, the people we interact with will often construct these for us. In general, both men and women were open to conversations and sharing information with me during the study. Being a female facilitated my contact with females in the indigenous organisations. I was invited to their meetings, we shared rooms and they would, for instance, ask me for favours or advice. This closeness with the women also made it easier for me to see the patriarchal relations they were subject to and my own privileged position as a white female European. In the following I reflect on how my positionality and background have affected the research topics and case selection, and my access to relevant arenas and actors.

5.3.2 Topic, Case Selection and Access

The selection of case studies for this research was partly influenced by the research setting and timing, as well as access to actors and arenas. My decision was partly policy driven and partly interests driven, and also motivated by personal interests and engagement. The knowledge produced in this dissertation is shaped by and entangled with other researchers, projects and activities I have been involved in as well as the scholarly review processes (see also Neely and Nguse, 2015; Sundberg, 2015). The research project, of which the dissertations' papers are a part, was developed in collaboration with my master's degree supervisor (and later Phd co-supervisor) and Professor Mariel Aguilar-Støen in 2010. At the time, there was increasing interest in Norway in the global climate change mitigation initiative REDD. In 2007 the Norwegian government promised millions of Norwegian kroner

in funding for REDD initiatives. The Centre for Development and the Environment (SUM) at the University of Oslo, where Aguilar-Støen and I were placed, was eager to follow this new initiative. As Aguilar-Støen and I followed the discussions about REDD both in Latin America and globally, we realised that Bolivia stood out in its choice of an alternative path. Bolivia was uniquely suited to the study of challenges related to environmental governance and development interventions, with its vast natural resources, indigenous peoples, strong social movements and pro-environmental government. I also had a special interest in Bolivia due to my previous work there. In May 2010 Aguilar-Støen and I therefore developed a project titled “The role of civil society in environmental governance and climate change policymaking: a case study of the implementation of the UN-REDD programme in Bolivia” (BOREDD). A month before we submitted the project for scientific review and funding the World Peoples' Conference for Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth was organised in Bolivia. Bolivian officials, together with civil society allies and other allied governments, expressed their scepticism of market-based climate change mechanisms and their support for pro-poor and pro-indigenous initiatives. At the same time, the Norwegian aid-cooperation also engaged in support of the role of indigenous peoples in climate change and forest policies. These events informed and inspired the project description, and we were eager to explore these issues in practice.

The initial aim of the BOREDD project was to examine the implementation of the UN-REDD programme in Bolivia and the involvement of civil society actors and indigenous organisations in the process. Researchers at the Norwegian University of Life Sciences (NMBU), where I was later accepted as a PhD student, endorsed the project. The project was granted funding by the Norwegian Research Council in October 2010 and began in March 2011. At NMBU Professor John Andrew McNeish, a social anthropologist with vast experience in Bolivia, was assigned as my supervisor. The first months of the study were largely dedicated to studying documents, processes and literature related to REDD, in order to further develop the project. This was achieved through our contact with a variety of researchers working in the field. During these months I also assisted Aguilar-Støen in coordinating the Norwegian REDD Research Network, and we were in dialogue with Norway's International Climate and Forest Initiative (NICFI). We also set up a network for PhD students working on REDD (mainly from European universities) and organised several events, including a PhD workshop and a PhD course about REDD. I also assisted in the Real-Time Evaluation of Norway's International Climate and Forest Initiative - Lessons Learned

from Support to Civil Society Organisations (NORAD, 2012), conducted interviews with Norwegian officials and bureaucrats and contributed to writing the *Political and operational context* of the report. We also had close cooperation with other researchers at NMBU who worked on REDD, including Professor Arild Angelsen, Professor Pål Vedeld and Professor Arild Vatn. These activities and dialogues with different actors has contributed to a better understanding of REDD initiatives.

A significant part of the material for this study was collected in Bolivia. My fieldwork in Bolivia was conducted during four periods from 2011 to 2013, totaling over 23 weeks (see Figure 8). I commenced fieldwork in 2011 to map the relevant actors, identify areas and cases, policies, events and relevant studies, as well as to establish relevant contacts. In 2011 the conflict over the road construction project in TIPNIS was included as a case for reasons I will explain later. I conducted the second and third fieldwork excursions in 2012. In 2012 the process of developing a new forest law in Bolivia and the role of community forest organisations was also included as a case. I conducted the final fieldwork in January 2013. Figure 7 provides an overview of the different fieldwork periods and their focus.

Figure 7 Overview of Fieldwork in Bolivia

Time period	Topics
July 7–September 1, 2011	Status of REDD and REDD positions Mapping of actors involved in forest governance The TIPNIS march 2011
March 30–May 12, 2012	The TIPNIS march 2012 Status of REDD and the Bolivian alternative forest mechanism (The Joint Mechanism)
July 16–September 8, 2012	Consultation process regarding TIPNIS The Joint Mechanism for Mitigation and Adaptation and Sustainable Management of Forests and Mother Earth. The discussions about a new forest law
January 16–29, 2013	Forest legislation and future challenges for forest governance in Bolivia

When I arrived in Bolivia in 2011 I was already familiar with the national context due to my previous work in Bolivia. I was acquainted with the highlands and valley areas, especially La Paz and Cochabamba, as well as the city of Santa Cruz. I had also previously been to the Amazon area in the north of La Paz. I had contact with different actors, especially in La Paz, Cochabamba and Santa Cruz, including grassroots organisations, NGOs, the government and

state bureaucracy. The geographical areas I was less familiar with were rural and forest areas in the lowlands, including areas in the departments of Santa Cruz, Beni and Pando. With an established contact network in place, I had access to a plethora of civil society organisations as well as government and state actors. I started to map the actors involved in developing a national programme for REDD in Bolivia, and to map the civil society organisations that were included in the process, or had a specific opinions about REDD and forest management. Professor McNeish also provided me with contacts, such as with the University of Cordillera (*Universidad de la Cordillera*) and the Higher University of San Andres (*Universidad Mayor San Andres - UMSA*) in La Paz, as well as other researchers and former bureaucrats. Through these contacts, I was able to contact bureaucrats in the Ministry of Environment and Water and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. My contact network was also important for my relations with the indigenous organisations and meeting with the ministries and forest directorate, and provided me with credibility and legitimacy.

In 2011 the UN-REDD project was in the planning stage in Bolivia and I gained access to the actors involved in the official process, including the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) office in La Paz, the National Programme for Climate Change (PNCC) in the Ministry of Water and the Environment (MAYA), the World Bank office and donors, such as the German Society for International Cooperation (*Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit, GIZ*), as well as consultants connected to the process. I also gained access to former employees in the MAYA who had worked in the Ministry between 2006 and 2010. However, at the time, the government plan for the road construction project through TIPNIS was the focus of discussions and many of my interviews ended up in discussions about the conflict. As it turned out, the TIPNIS project had a major impact on the political climate and discussions about development interventions, protected areas, forest protection and indigenous peoples in Bolivia. The TIPNIS conflict was also a factor in the postponement of the planning process for the UN-REDD programme in Bolivia. It became clear to me that the TIPNIS case was essential to understanding the ongoing context for environmental protection and development interventions in Bolivia. I thus decided to include the TIPNIS conflict as one of my study cases and to follow parts of the indigenous marches in 2011 and later in 2012. The TIPNIS conflict was a unique arena to study and allowed me the opportunity to engage with a range of indigenous leaders and supporters of the march, to observe discussions about ongoing challenges between (and within) the indigenous organisations and the

government, and to gain insight into divergent views and opinions regarding forest governance (Paper V).

At the same time, there was little advancement in the planning process for the UN-REDD project in Bolivia and there was confusion about the position of the Bolivian government. The contract for the UN-REDD programme in Bolivia was signed in November 2010, yet in the international arena the Bolivian government was rejecting the initiative, as was also confirmed at the COP in Cancun December 2010. I started to gather information about the contestations and different opinions about REDD in Bolivia and the larger picture of policies affecting the governance of forest areas (see Paper III). Additionally, as a consequence of Bolivia adopting a new constitution in 2009, political ideas concerning socio-environmental relations, projects, policies and legislature were being developed, which included the forest sector. Discussions in different arenas focused on indigenous peoples and peasants' relations with nature and forests, the government's focus on agriculture and extractive industries and inclusive and sustainable environmental policies. Consequently, I decided to further study the process of forming the new forest legislation (see Paper IV).

As part of the BOREDD project, as well as a related research project titled "Environmental Governance in Latin America and the Caribbean" (ENGOV), Aguilar-Støen and I combined our cases in order to make our analysis of the REDD discussions comparative. Together with Associate Professor Fabiano Toni we developed one paper centring on the strategies of different Latin American countries in response to REDD (Paper I) and a second paper discussing the science-policy networks that emerged in relation to REDD discussions and initiatives in Latin America (Paper II). Paper II was developed through a larger discussion about sustainable development and the role of elites in environmental governance in Latin America (Bull and Aguilar-Støen, 2015). Finally, Paper III connects the discussions in Bolivia about environmental governance to the wider discussions about REDD.

As noted, the fieldwork was multi-sited and multi-actor, which entailed that I followed the discussions about the selected cases, REDD, the forest law and TIPNIS, and travelled to sites where relevant events took place. This led me to travel across Bolivia, including to La Paz, Cochabamba, Santa Cruz, Beni and Pando. La Paz was an important arena as it is home to the main government institutions, many organisations' headquarters and universities. Cochabamba is an important scientific hub for forest policies and management and is also a

meeting place for organisations. Santa Cruz is the main city in the lowlands, is the economic centre of Bolivia and is the location of the lowlands indigenous organisations' headquarters, such as the Confederation of Indigenous Peoples of Bolivia (*La Confederación de Pueblos Indígenas de Bolivia*, CIDOB) and the Forest Indigenous Association (*Asociación Forestal Indígena Nacional*, AFIN), the Forests and Land Authority (*Autoridad de Bosques y Tierra - ABT*) and the Forestry Chamber (*Camara Forestal de Bolivia*). As I will return to later, I also travelled to local communities with AFIN to Tumupasa in La Paz and Guarayos in Santa Cruz and with the Friends of the Earth (FAN) organisation to Riberalta in Beni. Figure 8 indicates the areas visited on a map of Bolivia. Figure 9 presents an overview of the geographical areas and important actors from whom I collected information.

Figure 8 Fieldwork Areas Visited in Bolivia



Source: Google Maps 2019 <https://www.google.com/maps/d/edit?mid=1uqA0S1dL1p9he7EVrC3LbWPGxhMLjHZs&ll=13.887646224702784%2C-68.21979157063697&z=7>

Figure 9 Geographical Areas and Actors

Area	Public/donor/multilat.	NGO, local, grassroots
La Paz	UNDP World Bank Embassy offices Ministry of Environment and Water Ministry of Foreign Affairs Ministry of Rural Development The Vice-Presidency SERNAP	Bartolina Sisa headquarters CIPCA main office Conamaq headquarters Conservation International CSCIB Interculturales headquarters CSCUTCB headquarters FOBOMADE Fundación Tierra main office Higher University of San Andres INESAD IPFHAЕ regional office LIDEMA NINA Programme/UNITAS office University of Cordillera
Tumupasa (LP)		AFIN regional representatives
Cochabamba		School of Forest Science
Santa Cruz	ABT main office	AFIN headquarter CEJIS headquarter CIDOB headquarter CIPCA regional office Friends of the Earth (FAN) Fundación Tierra regional office IBIF
Guarayos (SC)		AFIN regional representatives
Concepción (SC)	ABT regional office	
Trinidad, Beni	ABT regional office SERNAP regional office ADEMAP regional office	CEJIS regional office CIPCA regional office CPIB headquarter CPMB headquarter Subcentral de TIPNIS headquarter
Riberalta, Beni	ABT regional office	CEJIS regional office CIPCA regional office Fundación Tierra regional office IPHAE regional office TCO Chacobo Pacahuara TCO Cavineño
San Ignacio de Moxos,		CIPCA regional office
Cobija, Pando	ABT regional office	AFIN regional representative

5.4 Data Collection

As the fieldwork was multi-sited and multi-actor I employed a variety of methods to collect data in the field. I participated with a range of actors to collect the data and the analysis in this dissertation is also a result of dialogues with these different actors and a constant triangulation of the data. Neely and Nguse (2015) call for openness and reflexivity about the multiple persons and actors involved in a study, which I will present in this section.

The following methods and strategies were used to collect the data:

1. Key informants and cooperation with local actors
2. Workshops
3. Direct and participant observation
4. Interviews and conversations
5. Studying documents relevant to the cases

Discussions and conversations with a variety of actors were pivotal for developing an understanding of the topics explored and a nuanced insight into the material. I interacted with a variety of actors from indigenous and peasant organisations, community forest organisations (CFOs), NGOs, public authorities and ministries, as well as academics, forestry specialists and individuals from the private sector. I had extended contact with the National Indigenous Forest Association (AFIN) during the study period, as well as specialists in forest management. Figure 10 provides an overview of the actors I interacted with during the study.

Figure 10 Categories of Actors

Actor Category	Organisations
Staff and officials from relevant state agencies	National Programme for Climate Change (PNCC) The forest directorate in the Ministry of Environment and Water The Forests and Land Authority (ABT), both national and regional offices in Santa Cruz, Cobija, Trinidad and Riberalta The Ministry of Foreign Affairs The National Service for Protected Areas (SERNAP) in La Paz and the regional office in Beni
Indigenous and peasant organisations	Bartolina Sisa CIDOB CNAMIB CIPOAP CIRABO, COPNAG, CPILAP, CPIB, CPMB, CMIB

	Conamaq CSCIB CSUTCB National Indigenous Forest Association (AFIN)
NGO members	CEJIS (Santa Cruz and Trinidad) CIPCA (four regional offices) Conservation International COSUT FAN (central office and the regional office in Riberalta) IPHAE (two different regional offices) NINA
Actors from the private sector	Association Forestry Chamber
Donors	Swedish, Norwegian, Danish and German cooperation offices UNDP office in La Paz World Bank FCPF representatives
Researchers and academics	Cochabamba forest school Instituto Boliviano de Investigación Forestal (IBIF) Instituto de Estudios Avanzados de Desarrollo (INESAD) University of Cordillera

5.4.1 Key Informants and Cooperation with Local Actors

During the study I collaborated with a range of actors to gain access to different arenas and information. These contacts were pivotal for discussions about matters relevant for the study and to organise group discussions, meetings and workshops. McCusker (2015) has called for increased engagement between political ecologists and policy makers and implementers. This study is an example of research conducted through engaging with policy makers and implementers as well as grassroots organisations and marginalised groups. Organisations and individuals with whom I had contact prior to the study facilitated my access to many arenas through a “snowball” effect (Thagaard, 2002), and established contacts provided me with new contacts. Being familiar with the context also meant that I knew whom to contact, I was informed about relevant events in which I could participate and also knew the cultural codes to use to gain access to different arenas. When approaching individuals, organisations and actors I did not know beforehand I sent presentation letters by mail or delivered them in person, as was the case with the indigenous organisation CIDOB, the National Programme for Climate Change, the Ministry of Water and Environment, the Bolivian Forests and Lands Authority (ABT) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Figure 11 provides an overview of the interactions during data collection for the study, organised by the respective dissertation papers.

Figure 11 Papers and Interactions with Actors

Paper/Topic	Interactions
<p>Paper I: Forest Governance in Latin America: Strategies for implementing REDD</p> <p>Main topic: The strategy of the Bolivian government towards REDD</p>	<p>Interactions with actors from the National Programme for Climate Change (PNCC), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the UNDP office in La Paz and the World Bank office, as well as donors, academics and researchers at the University of Cordillera</p>
<p>Paper II: REDD+ and Forest Governance in Latin America: The Role of Science-policy Networks</p> <p>Main topic: The role of networks in REDD</p>	<p>Interactions with actors from the National Programme for Climate Change (PNCC), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the UNDP office in La Paz and the World Bank office, as well as donors, academics, researchers at the University of Cordillera and leaders of indigenous organisations.</p>
<p>Paper III: Rejecting and Reshaping REDD: Contestations over Forest and Climate Change Policy in Bolivia</p> <p>Main topic: Positions towards REDD among different actors in Bolivia</p>	<p>Interactions with actors from the National Programme for Climate Change (PNCC), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the UNDP office in La Paz and the World Bank office, as well as donors, academics, researchers at the University of Cordillera, leaders of indigenous organisations, and NGO members</p>
<p>Paper IV: Makers and Shapers of Environmental Policy-making: Power and Participation in Forest Legislation in Bolivia</p> <p>Main topic: Demands and inputs to the new forest legislation in Bolivia</p>	<p>Interactions with actors from migrant peasant organisations, the National Indigenous Forestry Association, forest communities and the Bolivian Forests and Lands Authority, as well as former bureaucrats and NGO members</p>
<p>Paper V: Between Resistance and Negotiations: Indigenous Organisations and the Bolivian State in the Case of TIPNIS</p> <p>Main topic: Demands and interactions regarding protecting the forest areas in TIPNIS</p>	<p>Interactions with actors from the indigenous organisations involved in TIPNIS, government advisors, public entities, Ministry of Environment and Water, INRA, ADEMAF, academics and NGO members</p>

During the study I had important relations with a group of persons who acted as key informants and door openers. Two research assistants helped me gather relevant documents and information. The first research assistant, a Bolivian master’s student, helped gather information and sent me updates by mail regarding the TIPNIS conflict when I was not present in Bolivia. She was present in the first of the two TIPNIS marches. The second assistant, who had worked as a forest director in the Ministry of Water and the Environment

in 2011, provided information about state forest programmes and policies and kept me up to date on relevant events. Through contacts provided by my supervisor, Professor McNeish, I also gained access to the Ministry of Water and the Environment, including the National Programme for Climate Change and the Forest Directorate. Through my previous network in Bolivia I also contacted donors and embassy offices such as the German Society for International Cooperation (GIZ) and the Norwegian, Swedish and Danish embassy offices. At a later stage I also had several meetings with ABT in Santa Cruz and three regional ABT offices in Trinidad, Riberalta and Pando. I also had key gatekeepers in different organisations and NGOs who I knew from previous work in Bolivia. See Appendix 3 for an overview of key informants, topics and the type of assistance they offered. In the following I present the key organisations and actors with whom I regularly interacted during the study.

Jaime Villanueva: Jaime Villanueva is former Forest director in the Ministry of Water and the Environment. He provided important insights into that which formed Bolivia's forest policies during 2006–2010, internal discussions about forest plans and how the Bolivian forest management model works, including its weaknesses and strengths. He also offered important inputs to the workshops I organised in La Paz and helped me with further contact with the School of Forest Sciences in Cochabamba and other former employees in the Ministry. We had several meetings and also communicated via e-mail. Villanueva also runs a small organisation called Sustainable Community (COSUT).

University of Cordillera: Researchers at the University of Cordillera in La Paz were helpful in providing important contacts and access to meetings, information, government advisors, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the interview with Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, Juan Carlos Alurralde, as well as with representatives from the UNDP office in La Paz. My first contact at the university was the rector, Ricardo Calla, who was Minister of Indigenous Affairs in Bolivia in 2003-2005. At the university I made contact with the former Vice-Minister of Environment (2006-2010), Juan Pablo Ramos, with whom I had two interviews and met on two other occasions, as well as a government advisor and researcher, Diego Pacheco. Diego Pacheco was the Deputy Chief of the Bolivian climate change negotiation team in 2011-2013 and the Coordinator for the Joint Mechanism for Mitigation and Adaptation and Sustainable Management of Forests and Mother Earth that Bolivia developed as an alternative to REDD. He was also a government advisor in the development of Law 300

of Mother Earth and Integral Development to Living Well¹⁶ and later the Vice-minister of Planning. I had two conversations with Pacheco and through him I was invited to participate in a meeting with the team that developed the Joint Mechanism; I was able to follow the process of developing the document that was internationally presented in 2012. I also participated in a master student class presentation led by the climate change negotiation leader (2011, 2012 and 2013), Rene Orellana (former Minister of Water and the Environment 2008-2010), who later became Minister of Planning and Development.

National Indigenous Forest Association (*Asociación Forestal Indígena Nacional, AFIN*): AFIN is a grouping of 150 affiliated indigenous community forest organisations formed in 2005, operating commercial forest management in indigenous territories in the lowlands. The AFIN has their headquarters in Santa Cruz. I had several meetings with the AFIN board representatives and their advisor, and the AFIN leadership participated in three of the workshops I organised. I also travelled with them to North La Paz to attend a national meeting with their board members in Tumupasa (La Paz) and we organised a workshop together in Guarayos (Santa Cruz) with representatives from the regional organisations of AFIN.

Nina Programme – National Union of Labor Institutions for Social Action (*Programa NINA – Unión Nacional de institución para el Trabajo de Acción Social, UNITAS*): UNITAS is a network comprised of 22 NGOs in Bolivia, with a joint programme called the Nina Programme. The NINA Programme is a management development and political training programme for Bolivia's indigenous and peasant organisations. I had earlier had contact with the network through the Norwegian Peoples Aid as a translator and had met Walter Limache, the leader of the NINA Programme, in 2009. He has vast experience with peasant and indigenous organisations in Bolivia. I held two workshops in the UNITAS office in La Paz and two workshops in Santa Cruz and Beni, as part of the NINA capacity programme with young indigenous and peasant leaders in 2012.

Friends of the Earth Bolivia (*Fundación Amigos de la Naturaleza, FAN*): FAN is a Bolivian NGO working on environmental issues with its headquarters in Santa Cruz and a regional office in Riberalta, Beni. Employees at the regional office in Beni were important door openers for visits to local communities in Riberalta. I travelled with two employees to the

¹⁶ Ley No. 300 de la Madre Tierra y Desarrollo Integral para Vivir Bien

communities in Riberalta and they provided me with information about local community forestry in Benian communities. I collaborated with FAN to conduct group interviews in four original communal lands in Beni: TCO Chacobo Pacahuara, TCO Multiétnico II (TIM II), TCO Tacana Cavineño and TCO Cavineño.

Centre for Research and Promotion of Farmers (*Centro de Investigación y Promoción del Campesinado*, CIPCA): I had several contact persons across the different regional offices of CIPCA in Trinidad, San Ignacio de Moxos, Riberalta and La Paz, and was invited to participate when CIPCA developed their proposal for a new forest law together with indigenous and peasant organisations. I also observed a large event organised by CIPCA for the national peasant organisations in Cochabamba, where I had access to the participants for discussions and the sharing of information.

Lykke Andersen: Another key informant was Lykke Andersen, Scientific Manager of Conservation International, who is a Dane and an economist. She is also director of the Institute for Advanced Development Studies (INESAD), and had earlier worked as an advisor to the forest team in the Ministry of Environment and Water, developing the Readiness Plan Idea Note (R-PIN) for Bolivia to participate in the FCPF World Bank programme. She was a good discussion partner who helped me understand political changes in Bolivia, and her knowledge and relations with climate and development policies was especially valuable.

Pavel Campero: I also had various conversations with Pavel Campero, who acted as Forest director in MAYA a shorter period in 2011. He was also an advisor in the Forest Directory, and as research assistant for this study.

5.4.2 Workshops

I organised five workshops with the aim of discussing forest management, forest policies and REDD in collaboration with AFIN and the NINA programme.

Workshop 1: The first workshop was organised in collaboration with AFIN. I collaborated with the AFIN advisor and together we developed a set of questions for the community forest organisations. At the workshop I delivered a presentation about national and international forest policies and the participants interacted and asked questions. The second part of the

workshop was interactive, and the participants were asked to answer the questions about community forestry, which I facilitated. In addition to the arranged question and answer section of the workshop I also spoke with the participants to discuss their answers after the formal part of the event.

Workshops 2 and 3: The second and third workshops were made part of two different capacity building programmes, one in Santa Cruz and one in Riberalta, organised by the NINA programme for local community youth leaders. There were 20 participants in the first workshop and around 40 in the second. I delivered a presentation about national and international forests policies, and in the second I asked participants questions about local forest governance and their relations with different actors. These workshops provided me with valuable information, the local context for forest and land management, and insights into positions and relations between different actors and the relations between state and government entities and non-state actors.

Workshops 4 and 5: The two last workshops were held in La Paz, one in 2012 and one in 2013. Workshop four included two topics: REDD and the formation of a new forests law. The fifth workshop was a follow-up of the fourth and focused on the reactions to Law 337 Support to Food Production and the Restitution of Forests which was implemented in 2012. Actors who attended these workshops were AFIN members, forest specialists from the University of San Andrés (*Universidad Mayor de San Andrés, UMSA*) and the School of Forest Sciences in Cochabamba (*La Escuela de Ciencias Forestales - ESFOR*), bureaucrats from the National Climate Change Programme (PNCC) and the National Programme for Protected Areas (SERNAP), the embassy office of Norway in Bolivia, the UNDP, as well as ex-negotiators in the Bolivian climate change team, the ex-director of forest in the Vice-ministry of Environment, and ex-employees in the Ministry of Environment and Water as well as members of NGOs such as COSUT, IPHAE, LIDEMA and CIPCA. For workshop four I invited AFIN, COSUT, CIPCA, IPHAE, Lidema and UMSA to give presentations about their proposals and inputs regarding a new forest law in Bolivia. I gave a presentation about my research and REDD policies. After the presentation, a plenary discussion about the Bolivian REDD programme was held. The workshop was essential to understand the different positions regarding REDD, actors and relevant events.

At the fifth workshop the same group of actors was invited and a representative of CIPCA delivered a presentation with critical comments on the new legislation affecting forest areas. This was followed by a joint discussion.

Figure 12 Workshops Organised by Author

Date	Topic	Participants	Location
August 10-12, 2012	Challenges in community forestry, new forest legislation and international climate and forest efforts	Community Forest Organisations, 20 local and regional representatives; organised in collaboration with AFIN	Guarayos, Santa Cruz
August 15, 2012	Challenges in community forestry, new forest legislation and international climate and forest efforts	Local peasant and indigenous representatives from the Riberalta area	Riberalta, Beni
August 23, 2012	Challenges in community forestry, new forest legislation and international climate and forest efforts	Local peasant and indigenous representatives from the Santa Cruz area	Santa Cruz
September 6, 2012	New forest law and REDD	Representatives from AFIN, IPHAE, CIPCA, COSUT, PNCC, SERNAP, government advisors, researchers and forest technicians; organised in collaboration with COSUT, coordinated by author.	La Paz
January 25, 2013	New legislation affecting forest governance	Representatives from AFIN, IPHAE, researchers, forest technicians; organised in collaboration with COSUT, coordinated by author	La Paz

5.4.3 Direct and Participant Observation

I employed direct and participant observation in order to immerse myself in the study and to collect information by observing, listening and engaging in relevant events. I undertook observations in different arenas where forest issues, REDD related policies and the TIPNIS conflict were discussed.

TIPNIS Marches and related events

In 2011 and 2012 I spent several days in two indigenous marches regarding the TIPNIS conflict. I was also present during the preparations for these marches, press conferences

during and related to the marches, as well as meetings, both public and internal among the organisations involved in the march. For the first TIPNIS march in 2011, I travelled to Trinidad and spent the first two days talking to the indigenous organisations and activists that were planning to march. I was present when the march set off and spent the first days with the march at the campsites between Trinidad and San Ignacio de Moxos, and returned to the march when they were close to San Borja. I participated in the same manner as the other activists present at the march. We marched at night and in the early morning, and when the sun emerged at around 10:00 the march would camp and wait for night. During the day the marchers prepared food, washed clothes and utensils, relaxed and sat in groups under shade. In the evening when the worst heat was over, there were meetings and further planning of the march's strategy. We slept four to five hours before marching again, getting up at 03:00 in the morning and marching until around 09:00 or 10:00. Being at the camp sites gave me a unique insight into the relations between the different regional indigenous organisations present, why they were marching, the support from different NGOs and activists present, the discussions about the government and the media. The press arrived almost every day to cover different stories from the march.

For the second TIPNIS march I also travelled to Trinidad where the march planned to start. The atmosphere was very different from the first march. There were divisions both within the indigenous organisations and between the regional organisations who are part of CIDOB. I remained for three days to observe the national meeting of the regional indigenous organisation CBIP when they were in the middle of discussions on whether or not to participate in the second protest march against the road construction in TIPNIS, and their negotiations with the government. I also participated in the negotiation meeting with government representatives.

Meetings, Seminars and Conferences

I was present in several meetings and events related to environmental and forest policies, REDD and the TIPNIS conflict (see Appendix 2). These included meetings between public entities and indigenous/peasant organisations, seminars on environmental issues, CIDOB national meetings with all the affiliated organisations, a CIDOB seminar, a national peasant meeting with Bartolina Sisa, CSUTCB and CSCIB organised by CIPCA, a meeting between the peasant organisation CSCIB and officials from the Vice-presidency and the Ministry of Water and the Environment to discuss a new forest law, a CIPCA workshop discussing their

proposal for a new forest law, a planning meeting for the government's proposal for the mechanisms for climate mitigation and adaptation in relation to forests CNAMIB national meeting in Beni, evaluation of the first TIPNIS march and possible negotiations with the government, CPIB national meeting with preparations and meeting with government and public officials regarding CPIB's demands to the government and the TIPNIS conflict, meeting at CPBM headquarters and with the TIPNIS subcentral about the forthcoming and second TIPNIS march, ABT inspection of indigenous communal land in Chiquitania and meetings and workshops with the National Forest Indigenous Association. These events were all important to understand the dynamics between different actors, demands for changes to forest legislation, demands from the indigenous movement in relation to natural resource governance in their territories, land management issues and local forest management.

Community Visits

I undertook visits to local forest communities in Guarayos (Santa Cruz), Riberalta (Beni) and Tumupasa (La Paz). These areas were selected in order to gather information from communities in different geographical and political sites in the country, to map their demands for a new forest law and to understand the challenges of local community forestry. In Guarayos I visited AFIN members and arranged the workshop previously mentioned. I travelled to Tumupasa with AFIN, where they organised a national AFIN meeting. In Riberalta I visited members of communities in the three original communal lands in collaboration with FAN.

5.4.4 Interviews and Conversations

Interviews were an important method for data collection in this study. I concur with Kvale and Brinkmann (2009) that interviewing is an active process and a social production of knowledge. I selected the interview participants based on purposeful selection (see Maxwell, 2005). Participants were actors that had voiced interests (in the media, in documents, on the internet or through protest actions) and promoted proposals about forest policies and the governance of forest areas. I used the snowball method, where one contact led to another (see Thagaard, 2002), to recruit the participants and door openers were essential to gain access to different arenas. In interview settings I provided details of my study (see Kvale and Brinckmann, 2009). It proved especially difficult to obtain written material when I requested these by mail or letters, which made the interviews especially important to obtain information.

I conducted semi-structured interviews with individuals in government ministries, relevant public agencies and NGOs as well as leaders and advisors of grassroots organisations, donors, academics, experts and community members (see Figure 11 for a list of categories of the different actors I interviewed and Appendix 1 for a detailed list of interviews). Interviews were an important part of my learning process, information gathering and analysis and were also used to crosscheck and triangulate the data gathered from document analysis, workshops, collaborations and observations. The topics and questions were prepared in advance though the questions were adjusted to the context and the knowledge and experience of the person interviewed. As an interviewer I tried to be a flexible and attentive listener. A large share of the interviews was conducted more as conversations than formal interviews. Formality was respected at the beginning of the interviews. I would introduce myself and the purpose of the study and I would then formally ask permission to use a recorder. As I gained more knowledge about the forest sector I was able to enter into substantial conversations and exchanges of information and knowledge with the participants, gaining a deeper insight. Interview topics concerned the challenges that the different actors experienced regarding the way forest areas are governed in Bolivia, their views about the national forest agenda and their interactions with the authorities and government actors or indigenous and community groups, the participants' positions concerning REDD and their interactions with NGOs, private actors, donors and international actors. More detailed questions addressed the following topics:

- A possible REDD mechanism in Bolivia and what it should look like, and different actors' involvement in designing proposals and strategies for efforts combining forest and climate change policies.
- Interactions between the state and civil society in forest policy-making regarding, for example, the development of a new forest law, co-management of protected areas and the forming of the Joint Mechanism.
- Views on forest policies, regulations, policy tools, forest authorities and forest technicians and the cost, benefits and risks of these policies as well as demands for changes.
- Collaborations between various actors and the challenges of collaboration and coordination in the forest sector.

- Views on the state's role in forest management.
- Views on human-nature relations, especially related to the governance of forest areas.
- The challenges of the current forest policies and the proposals for new programmes and policies, including new legislation.
- The relationship between forests, territories and control and access to them.
- Other policies, sectors and efforts that affect the governance of forest areas.
- The challenges and organisation of local forest management.

The interviews took place in offices, the headquarters of institutions and organisations, at cafes, at specific events, in the TIPNIS protest march or in local communities. Questions were adjusted to different groups and individuals (see Fontana and Frey, 2000). Each interview context was one of interaction and relation between the interviewees and myself. I recognise that the nature of the social dynamic of the interview can shape the knowledge generated (Fontana and Frey, 2000: 698). All interviews were conducted in Spanish, except with the Scandinavian representatives. The interviews lasted from fifteen minutes to two hours, depending on the research setting. For example, I conducted many short interviews with the indigenous leaders during the TIPNIS marches. In these short interviews I aimed to identify their argument, demands and narratives used about the conflict, and the relationships between the actors involved. In the longer interviews I also aimed to gain a better understanding of the context, strategies and tactics of the organisations and the actors' different opinions. Spending time with representatives from FAN and CIPCA as well as indigenous representatives from AFIN also provided a lot of background information.

Many of the informants were interviewed more than once. This was due to relevant changes and new occurrences in the political context, or the need to clarify information collected earlier, cross check information from other sources or respond to changes in the research focus. In addition to written field notes I audio-recorded most of the interviews, parts of the conversations and several of the meetings. Most respondents agreed to be recorded and did not seem influenced by the recorder. Several respondents also saw the audio-recorder as an important means to promote their version of the conflict in the case of TIPNIS or their position regarding forest policies. However, using an audio-recorder can be a barrier if the respondent lacks confidence or fears that the information may be used for other purposes. I

told all interviewees that they could at any point request that the recorder be turned off. Two of the respondents did not want me to use a recorder.

In addition to individual interviews, I conducted group interviews with the members of five local forest committees in Beni, which were organised in collaboration with the local FAN office in Riberalta. The interviews comprised three to ten participants. The questions were posed to the group of participants to answer. The questions focused on how the forest community organisations work and the challenges they face, their views and knowledge about forest management plans in their areas, collaborations and possible conflicts with different actors and relations with private companies and consultants, NGOs and the state. The group interviews allowed me to collect a large amount of information, as the participants complemented each other's responses. At the same time I was aware that the presence of the other participants or the representatives of FAN could have affected the participant's answers. The information from the group interviews was used to provide context to the understanding of local community forest management and cross-scalar demands about the new forest legislation, as well as how communities respond to new interventions, from policies and programmes to physical infrastructure projects.

5.4.5 Documents

During the study I studied a range of sources and documents about REDD, the Joint Mechanism, TIPNIS, forest legislation and the Bolivian context in general (see Figure 10 for an overview of the documents). The documents included legislative and policy documents; proposals for legislation and policies; documents from grassroots organisations, NGOs and public authorities; policy and project reports and declarations from the organisations; media articles, websites and public information and secondary data. For Paper IV, regarding a new forest law in Bolivia, I analysed the last accessible draft of the proposal for the forest law, which was shared in a group of NGOs and forest experts. I also studied NGO documents with inputs and proposals for new forest legislation and policies, including CIPCA's proposal for a law, CSCIB's presentation of inputs to a new forest law and Lidema's documents on forest legislation. For the article about TIPNIS I obtained documents from the indigenous organisations that participated in the march (such as declarations and press releases), the NGOs that supported the march and contracts that were established between several of the indigenous organisations and the government after the first TIPNIS march. Documents were

used to triangulate information obtained from the interviews and to provide information about the context.

In the next section I describe the data analysis methods and processes used in this study and in each of the dissertation’s papers.

Figure 13 Documents Analysed

Category	Details
Draft law proposals and input on the new forest law	CIPCA forest law proposal CSCIB PowerPoint presentation of their forest law proposal Lidema documents of inputs for a new forest law AFIN document of inputs for a new forest law Draft proposal circulated in 2012 for Law on Forests and Soils
REDD documents on Bolivia	UN-REDD national programme document
Bolivian alternative proposal Cochabamba declaration	Detailed in Paper III which concerns REDD positions in Bolivia
Laws and regulations	Detailed in Paper IV which concerns a new forest law
TIPNIS conflict documents	Detailed in Paper V which concerns TIPNIS Contracts from the negotiations between regional organisations and the government
Policies, plans, reports	Forest policies Forest programmes Results in the forest sector ABT reports

5.5 Data Analysis

Different kinds of data were gathered from the observations, interviews, workshops and documents. Throughout the study I maintained journals in which I recorded observations, events, and thoughts. I took field notes during interviews and meetings and wrote down my reflections between the interviews. After each interview or research activity I would write up notes and reflections that I used later in the process of data analysis. From each fieldwork period I had a field text consisting of field notes, documents, and media articles. From the field text I moved on to create a research text (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005) which consisted of further interpretations and notes.

The data was categorised and systematised according to:

- Information concerning actors involved in forest governance and the relations between the different actors, especially between the state and civil society actors.
- Relevant frameworks including policies and regulations affecting the governance of forest areas.
- Mapping of the different actors' perspectives and demands for changes in the forest legislation.
- Possibilities and limitations to shape forest policies for actors such as community and grassroots organisations (AFIN, CIDOB and CSCIB) and NGOs.
- The relations and meeting arenas between the ministries, relevant public offices (forest directorate, ABT) and their interaction with forest organisations and communities.
- Mapping of actors involved in discussing REDD, or other forms of experience with REDD and their ideas and opinions about REDD.
- Mapping of actors involved in the process of making the Joint Mechanism and how the document was developed.
- Mapping of actors in the TIPNIS conflict, the different arguments presented in the conflict and the relationship with forest based issues and the governance of forests areas.
- Mapping of powerful interests and actors that affect the governance of forest areas.
- Narratives and strategic framings concerning the positioning of actors or the advancements of rights and interests in the cases studied.
- The values and rationalities tied to the different actors' positions or demands.

I also organised much of the data chronologically in order to track the processes that occurred, according to their importance for the cases in question and I created diagrams to map the actors involved. The analysis was conducted in a number of cycles of reflection and through retroductive argumentation (Bhaskar, 1979), with a constant dialectic between the empirical material and the analytical framework. The categories constructed in my analysis are the product of the interaction between the informants and myself, and my alternation between the data and analytical framework at different phases of the analysis. As the data was collected, organised and analysed I developed temporary and working interpretations of the data using inductive logic and made possible interpretations. I continuously reflected on the data I collected and whether more data was needed to provide a coherent analysis. Concepts were

tried out and some were abandoned or modified and expanded to improve the analysis as it progressed.

Across the papers I also conducted analyses of framings which entailed identifying recurring concepts and narratives across observations, interviews and documents analysed. I identified framings that are used in the different struggles, concerning both how actors frame issues and their roles in interviews and conversations, or in the “public dialogue” including declarations, statements and reports. Narrative analysis has a specific focus on how people make sense of what has happened and their perspectives thereon, what kind of concepts and stories they use to present their versions and how they present themselves (and their group) in relation to other actors (Bryman, 2004). Furthermore, identifying frameworks entails to look at how the narratives are connected to larger discourses consisting of specific arguments or statements (Roe, 1991; 1999; Harre et al., 1999) and how they can provide scripts and justifications for action (Roe, 1991; Fairhead and Leach, 2003; Agder et al., 2011). I aimed at identifying arguments, demands and narratives used about the cases as well as the relationships between the actors involved.

5.5.1 Paper specific analyses

The data used for Papers I and II were analysed in the early phases of the project, in 2012 and 2013, with new information added in 2013. For Paper I, in which Professor Mariel Aguilar-Støen and Associate professor at the University of Brasilia, Fabiano Toni and I explore the different strategies of Latin American countries in response to REDD, we worked in a dialectical fashion among the three researchers involved. Each researcher gathered information about the processes in the corresponding countries, focusing on 1) actors involved; 2) rationalities used for responding to REDD; 3) the policy outcomes and actual responses; 4) possible diverging interests among actors; and 5) possible exclusions of actors and knowledge in the processes. Specifically, my findings contributed to the paper’s empirical section on Bolivia, and in general I contributed substantially to the discussion the findings and to writing the introduction, analysis and conclusion. The different strategies for advancing different interests and demands were identified and categorised. After identifying and describing each country’s strategies, the strategies were categorised according to their main features which we conceptualised as asserting, accommodating, and resisting.

Paper II was developed together with Professor Aguilar-Støen in the context of exploring the role of elites in environmental governance processes in Latin America, in relation to the parallel project of environmental governance in Latin America (ENGOV). In this paper information from Latin American countries studied by both Aguilar-Støen and myself were included, in addition to information about actors operating on the regional level in Latin America. I contributed with insights from my fieldwork and my own empirical material from Bolivia and readings about REDD, while Aguilar-Støen used her empirical material from other countries as well as secondary sources. I contributed substantially to framing the analysis and to writing all sections of the paper. The article is a further development of the argument of different strategies to shape and control REDD knowledge and early phase projects. We focused on actors with specific REDD resources and what we term science-policy networks. Information regarding a range of non-governmental actors (NGOs, research institutions and consultants) identified as involved in the countries studied was gathered and analysed, as was information regarding projects and consultancy that emerged in Latin America and is internationally related to REDD. Part of this information was gathered from secondary sources including a range of documents, websites and donor information. We then proceeded to analyse the networks of actors that were dominating the discussions and arenas about REDD in Latin America. We also looked into the funding of REDD initiatives. During this process we also focused on “counter-networks” or alternative networks that have become important arenas for discussions and attempts to influence the REDD debate, especially those involving indigenous organisations.

Paper III, which I co-authored with Professor Aguilar-Støen, focuses on Bolivia’s response to REDD. The paper was developed through various cycles of analysis and reflection. In the early phase of the study (2011-2012) I mapped the planning of the UN-REDD process in Bolivia, the actors involved and the background to Bolivia’s response to REDD. I also mapped the positions of the indigenous organisations and the relevant NGOs based on data collected in interviews, workshops and observations in terms of how they viewed and understood REDD and their perceived possibilities and threats. The process, which was the initial object of analysis, did not, however, advance any further. In the second phase (2012-2014) of the analysis I mapped the process of the development of an alternative mechanism for REDD and undertook new interviews as well as a dialogue with the team that developed the Joint Mechanism. In addition, I analysed relevant documents and compared them with what transpired in the international REDD negotiations. Interactions with other REDD

researchers in a seminar we organised on REDD (2012), in one of the PhD courses I attended (2013) and in various conference panels about REDD in which I participated, as well as close collaborations with Aguilar-Støen, affected further insights about REDD in Latin America and Bolivia. Finally, the analysis was framed with a scalar perspective and argument.

In Paper IV, in which I focus on the development of a new forest law in Bolivia, I analysed data from interviews, workshops, observations and conversations in local communities. Many of the participants had been involved in discussions about the weakness of the current forest law and had developed inputs for what they thought needed to be changed. In addition, I gathered information from local communities in different locations on practical challenges regarding the current forest management system. I organised the data collected according to the critique of the current forest regime, as expressed in both workshops and interviews, and according to the type of critique I also mapped the different actors involved in the discussions about the new forest legislation. The analysis then focused on the demands for a new law presented by forest community organisations and peasant migrant organisations and how they attempted to influence the forest law-making process. In this analysis I conducted new interviews as well as entered into communication by mail with key informants to augment the data. Further, I analysed documents and news from the media regarding the forest law. I then organised the information chronologically and mapped the different policies and regulations. In the process of analysing the material I identified recurring framings and narratives. Lastly, in order to gain a deeper understanding I analysed information about the new proposed legislation and economic interests affecting forest areas, as well as major relevant events. I also expanded the analysis of economic interests affecting forest areas, based on input from one of the reviewers from the *Journal of Rural Studies* where the paper was published.

Paper V, which concerns the TIPNIS conflict in Bolivia, was also developed in a number of cycles. In the first cycle after the TIPNIS march in 2011 I mapped the different actors and interests involved in the march according to arguments for and against the road construction based on interviews with the different actors involved in the conflict. My first analysis was presented at a conference in 2011 (Hirsch, 2011). In the second cycle I mapped the various strategies of the indigenous organisations including the negotiations and interactions with the government after the 2011 march. This mapping was informed by data collected from new interviews, my participation in the march in 2012 and by analysing a range of documents about the conflict. The second analysis was presented at a conference in 2012, after which I

refined the analysis based on input from the audience. In a third cycle, following the submission of the paper to the *Journal of Peasant Studies*, I reframed the analysis using a "strategic relational approach" (see Jessop, 2007). The third analysis focused on the relation between state actors and the indigenous organisations as well as interests across the local and national scales. I conducted a critical discursive analysis which entailed revealing power relations in the way narratives and concepts operated and were strategically used by different actors.

5.5.2 Triangulation, Trustworthiness and Authenticity

In order to assess this study, I employ an alternative to reliability and validity inspired by Lincoln and Guba (1985), which entails an emphasis on "trustworthiness" and "authenticity". Trustworthiness entails *credibility*, *transferability*, *dependability* and *confirmability*. *Credibility* concerns how believable the findings are and whether the research is carried out according to good practice. Triangulation was used as an important form of assuring the credibility of this study. The use of multiple methods, multiple sources of data, multiple actors and multiple theories characterises the process of data triangulation (Patton, 2002; Yin, 2009; Maxwell 2005: 4). I have sought to ensure credibility by following codes for good practice, documenting my steps and triangulating the sources and methods of analysis. I also constantly returned to my notes and interview recordings in order to seek more information when contradictions arose in the data during the analysis. Throughout my dissertation I triangulated data through (a) the use of multiple methods of data collection including interviews, participation, observations and discussions; (b) referring to multiple sources of data from organisations, public authorities and academic literature; and (c) cross-checking the data collected across sources. Long-term involvement, intensive observation and interviews with detailed transcripts, note taking and respondent validation were used. Asking confrontational questions and the triangulation of information was important in order to verify the validity of the information I collected. The advantage of having close contacts in Bolivia provided me the opportunity to contact some of my key informants for follow up questions, and we have kept in close contact through e-mail since my return to Norway.

Transferability concerns whether the findings can apply to other contexts. I believe that the analysis Aguilar-Støen and I conducted of the different responses by Latin American countries to REDD (Papers I and II) is useful to the larger picture of how REDD is being implemented across tropical countries. Nevertheless, as our analysis also demonstrates,

different countries have approached REDD in different ways due to different contexts and power relations in environmental governance. Bolivia represents a contextual uniqueness, though parts of the analysis of the Bolivian cases (Papers III, IV and V) can also serve as important insights for similar topics in environmental governance, state-society relations and forest governance in other settings.

Dependability concerns the application of the findings at other times, and *confirmability* concerns whether the researcher has allowed their values to intrude on the findings (Bryman, 2004: 30). I kept records of the different phases of the research process, including the research questions and topics, selection of participants and lists of interviews with comments. I systematised my field notes and I have elaborated on the decisions I made during data analysis. I reflected on and have made an attempt to document how my values and theoretical inclinations may have affected the study and, I argue, the analysis is in itself a product of the interactions I engaged in over the course of this study. The numerous discussions I had with various actors as well as researchers during the study, and the review processes the dissertation's papers underwent before they were published, have all strengthened the analysis.

Authenticity (Guba and Lincoln, 1994) concerns the political impact of the research. The criteria for authenticity are *fairness*, *ontological authenticity* and *educative authenticity* (Bryman, 2004: 276). *Fairness* concerns whether the research represents the actual range of viewpoints among the actors in the study. In the presentation of the empirical material of this study I have sought to present a depiction of the different viewpoints of the actors involved in the forest sector in Bolivia. However, I have also reported on the main narratives in these conflicts, which means that in some cases local disagreements may not have been captured. *Ontological authenticity* concerns whether the research can help the various actors involved gain a better understanding of their social surroundings and *educative authenticity* concerns whether the actors gain a better understanding of the perspectives of other actors. I believe that by presenting the range of views I encountered during the study and exploring the power relations inherent in the topics and relations explored, this study may contribute to such understandings. By organising a range of workshops in Bolivia and facilitating discussions among different participants during the study I believe that I helped some of actors involved gain a better understanding of the forest sector in Bolivia as well as international forest

policies. In the next section I present the ethical considerations of this research and the steps I took to ensure the study was conducted in accordance with ethical standards.

5.6 Ethical Considerations and Research Challenges

A series of ethical considerations were taken into account in this research project. These include care with the selection of the research objectives and research questions, the methods employed, the data collection and analysis processes and the dissemination of the results. Critical approaches including political ecology have guided the design of the methodology and informed the ethics of my study. The study was conducted in accordance with the guidelines provided by the Norwegian National Committee for Research Ethics in the Social Sciences and the Humanities (NESH). I followed what Fontana and Frey (2000) term “common sense and responsibility” in conducting the research and considered the impact of the study on the respondents first, the study second and finally myself.

Important ethical guidelines have included (see, e.g., Thagaard, 2002): 1) informed consent and information about the research; 2) confidentiality and protecting the privacy of informants; and 3) avoiding negative repercussions for those involved. Throughout the study, in interactions with those involved, I provided information about the overall purpose of the study, the main features of the research design, my role as a researcher and whether there were any risks connected to participation in the study. In the process of collecting and processing data I made efforts to obtain participants’ consent and to protect the data collected. None of the information reported in this study is of a personal nature and the identities of non-official figures have been anonymised. I took special care to secure the anonymity of local community members and indigenous and peasant representatives. Part of the study data was obtained in public and open arenas including, among others, open seminars and public mobilisations, protestors’ communications with the media and press conferences. These data were considered public and were not protected in terms of anonymisation.

A potentially sensitive component of the information obtained during the study concerns conflicts of interests or personal conflicts between organisations and individuals and between the authorities and the local organisations involved in tense conflicts about the governance of forest areas, including TIPNIS. Throughout the study I engaged in dialogue with different actors to strengthen, nuance, contest and triangulate the information obtained. I do not believe

that my research has led to harm or disrespect of different views and values. I experienced one particular disagreement regarding my analysis and presentation of results at a conference. The incident took place at an academic conference in Amsterdam in 2014 where I presented my preliminary analysis of the TIPNIS conflict (see Paper V). I argued that the indigenous organisations involved in the conflict employed a variety of strategies and tactics. Amongst the strategies I presented were the indigenous organisations' negotiations with the authorities and their informal alliances with political parties. Attending my presentation was a key indigenous leader from the TIPNIS conflict. He did not agree with my analysis. In his opinion, the parts of the indigenous movement that had chosen to negotiate with the government could not be seen as true representatives of the movement but were rather "co-opted" and "manipulated" individuals who had "sold out". The government, in his view, was authoritative and had purposely divided the indigenous movement. Following this disagreement I nuanced my analysis though maintained my overall argument (i.e., that the organisations involved in the conflict chose different paths), as I had sufficient evidence to support my claims. I also contend that it would not be beneficial for the indigenous communities and organisations to be presented as having one opinion, one voice and common objectives. I believe it is important to shed light on conflicting relations within a movement or group and how its members engage in different strategies and tactics, which is a more accurate presentation and also coincides with critical realist perspectives. This is also why, as Wolford and Keene (2015) argue, some political ecologists have abstained from researching social movements. The intimacy researchers obtain with such movements makes it difficult to report on their contradictions. I believe that having access to different actors and perspectives such as the indigenous and the peasant organisations, different NGOs and public and government offices has strengthened my analysis. I had the chance to confront different actors with arguments from the "other side" and go beyond the narratives presented. Through this I also gained insights into unequal power relations between certain NGOs and local people, between leaders/authoritative persons and people, within the state apparatus, between public actors and communities or organisations and between myself and interview participants.

During my study I found myself in contexts which can be considered of a private nature or as internal arenas and discussions. I have not reported on these contexts explicitly or directly. Conducting participant and direct observations and being in a field for an extended period of time (as well having worked in Bolivia earlier) may also (inevitably) lead to personal relationships and friendships with some participants. On the one hand, this may lead to

valuable insights and information. On the other hand, the use of such information requires special attention and consent. In this study I was careful to always state my role as a researcher and the objectives of my study and the importance of gaining insights into the different positions regarding the use and control of forest areas in Bolivia. I often used a recorder when conducting interviews for the study, or took notes whilst talking to participants, in order to underline my role as researcher. Nevertheless, no personal or strategic internal information from the organisations has been revealed in this dissertation.

In line with the NESH guideline on sharing research findings, I disseminated my research through a variety of means. I published the dissertation papers in scientific journals, I published popular articles (McNeish and Hirsh, 2011; Hirsch and McNeish, 2011; Hirsch, 2012) and compilations of insights from field studies about REDD+, in collaboration with other PhD and master's students (see Hirsch et al., 2012a; Hirsch et al., 2012b; Hirsch et al., 2012c; Hirsch et al., 2012d; Hirsch et al. 2012e). I gave interviews (see NorLARNet; Hoffman, 2016) and several presentations for Norwegian NGOs, activists, students and public authorities. In Bolivia, the preliminary results and the objectives of the study were discussed in the workshops I organised as well as with key informants.

The main challenges I encountered in this study relate to the political dynamics in Bolivia and the instability of the processes studied, such as the postponement and fragmented implementation of the UN-REDD programme and the lack of finalisation of the new forest law. The focus of the study was, therefore, developed continuously, corresponding to empirical developments on the ground. In particular, the fact that the UN-REDD programme did not materialise in Bolivia as planned changed the initial focus of the study. Viewed in a different light, the changes in Bolivia provided new opportunities including the study of the TIPNIS conflict and the forest law-making process. These cases have formed important backdrops for discussions about the shaping of forest policies and programmes by different actors, as well as the contestations over access to and control over forestland and resources and indigenous territories and rights in Bolivia.

5.6.1 An Activist and/or Researcher

As a political ecologist I move between critical and normative positions, and there are challenges related to what Lofthus (2015, p.179) calls “engaged scholarly activism”. It can be

specially challenging conducting research on conflictive topics. Researchers can, for example, face challenges when their position may be perceived as being supportive of one of the parties in a conflict. Wolford and Keene (2015, p.574) point to the challenges associated with conducting research on social movements, as these may have a specific message they wish to transmit and many researchers end up working *with* the movements and not *on* them. I aimed to work *on* the conflict and selected cases and attempted to understand the different parties involved. However, as I had previously worked with grassroots movements in Bolivia I was associated with a certain political stance and values. Organisations and individuals I had previously been in contact with knew me as part of a solidarity network. This also led to expectations of me as a supporter of the indigenous organisations, while others expected me to support the MAS government. Once I included the contestations regarding the case of TIPNIS in my study, especially the disagreements between the government and the lowlands indigenous organisations, this identity became particularly sensitive. Being associated with one of the parties in the conflict was potentially problematic for the future of the research, creating trust issues and potentially impeding access to different arenas, in particular the other party in the conflict. I therefore decided to keep a low profile during the fieldwork. To cope with these challenges, it has been important to seek different perspectives and triangulate information from the various actors and sources involved in this study (Lofthus, 2015).

The indigenous representatives in the TIPNIS march were particularly cautious of who they allowed access to the marchers and campsites. During the marches CIDOB kept a register of all the “non-indigenous” people present in the march, and we all received an accreditation/certificate which we had to show when entering the marchers’ camp, which was guarded. Whilst present in the protest marches in 2011 and 2012 I was considered an “international activist” that could defend and promote their cause. Being present at the marcher’s camp sites also led to tasks being assigned to me, such as contributing to spreading information to other activists. I had to take special care about information obtained and shared in internal meetings. Leaders of the march explained that there had been intruders in the march, secretly recording conversations and sending the information to opponents of the march. I explained that I was conducting research and that I would not spread any information that could do harm to those studied, and that it was important to present different viewpoints in the conflict so that outsiders can gain a better understanding. I took great care to not reveal my sources and to protect detailed information about the interviews I conducted.

Furthermore, although I was present in the TIPNIS march as a researcher, actors who wanted to discredit the march could use my presence against the march itself. By positioning me as a foreigner they could accuse the march of being supported by foreign forces, delegitimising the march through declaring it subject to manipulation (as later happened with other international activists). It could also affect the research and potentially affect my access to government actors later in the study. I therefore attempted to keep a low profile in the march and on the campsites and avoided the press. Due to wanting to keep a low profile and the increased military presence in TIPNIS I decided not to enter the TIPNIS area. I kept contact with government and public officials as well as different indigenous and peasant organisations, and avoided taking a clear stance in my interaction with different parties as well as in my interactions in social media. This was necessary in order to have access to the different parties involved and to have access to information from the multiple sides of the conflict.

In the next section, I present summaries of the five papers.

6. SUMMARIES OF INDIVIDUAL PAPERS

Paper I: Forest Governance in Latin America: Strategies for Implementing REDD.

To analyse the diversity in which REDD is evolving in Latin America, the paper uses illustrative examples of countries and actors pursuing different strategies in their response to REDD. The paper examines (1) how different countries engage with REDD; and (2) how actors engage in different practices for the future implementation of REDD. REDD “in the making” interacts with different approaches to combating deforestation, technical capacities, institutional and political settings, social and economic contexts. The paper also demonstrates how actors have different potentials to exert power and to access arenas to influence REDD-related policy-making. The three different country strategies are conceptualised as ‘assertive’, ‘accommodating’ and ‘resisting’ strategies.

The “assertive strategy”, exemplified with Brazil, is characterized by efforts made by the central government to frame REDD within an existing or emerging forest-climate policy framework, made possible by a leading government, advanced technical capacity, and support from non-governmental organisations and local administrations. Countries following directions set at the global level and efforts to accommodate their programmes characterize the second strategy of countries like Colombia and Costa Rica. Colombia has largely left the initiative in the hands of private actors and local authorities, whilst Costa Rica employs a hybrid governance model combining the involvement of private actors and a centralised controlled REDD programme. Open rejection of certain aspects of REDD, or no involvement, characterize the “resisting strategy”, exemplified with Bolivia. Bolivia opposes the use of carbon markets to finance REDD, has a commitment to civil society demands, and promotes indigenous’ and community rights, and an anti-commodification rhetoric. Concurrently, divergent opinions about REDD exist in Bolivia, resulting in different strategies to reshape REDD and broaden the perspective on forests and carbon. The different responses to REDD illustrate how the “black-boxing” of REDD has led to the emergence of different strategies to approach REDD and how actors have taken advantage of the uncertainty of what REDD is.

The paper further identifies three approaches employed by actors involved in early REDD planning, implementation and readiness projects; 1) knowledge production and dissemination, 2) creation of technologies or standards to legitimize or validate projects and 3) enrolment in new, emerging or alternative networks. Access to networks and knowledge production has

been pivotal for participation in REDD preparations. The direction of REDD+ in Latin America is largely shaped by a constellation of certain actors in networks (see Paper II), promoting a narrative in which specific technical standards and economic mechanisms offer the best solution to combat deforestation. NGOs and private research and consultants with international links have dominated these networks. Alternative ideas from domestic researchers, indigenous organisations, or local government have been marginalised. Simultaneously, the widespread questioning of forests as “carbon” has led to a broadening of the initiative to accommodate disparate interests, ideologies and representations of forests. Alternative networks have provided indigenous organisations with information about REDD and served as arenas to voice their concerns and to create alternatives. The critique and rejection of REDD has resulted in a broadening of the focus to multiple aspects of forests and their related environmental functions.

The findings form an important backdrop to understanding how REDD is evolving differently across countries, how different actors and interests have shaped the planning and implementation of REDD and the contestations thereof. The proposed governance models depend on each country’s historical trajectory of environmental governance and the resources, knowledge and legitimacy of the different actors involved. The paper demonstrates how REDD+ is perceived as both an opportunity for improving environmental governance, yet also as a possible threat to national sovereignty and local interests, rights and values depending on the scale, focus and actors involved.

Spanish version of article:

Aguilar-Støen, M., Toni, F. and Hirsch, C. (2015b). Gobernanza forestal en América Latina. Estrategias para implementar REDD+. In F. de Castro, B.Hogenboom y M.Baud (coord), *Gobernanza ambiental en América Latina, Buenos Aires: CLACSO. pp.265-296.*

Paper II: REDD+ and Forest Governance in Latin America: The Role of Science-Policy Networks.

The paper examines the role of science-policy networks in REDD preparations in the Amazon countries. We argue that these networks largely control the production and promotion of certain framings of REDD and control access to arenas for policy-making by excluding and including certain knowledge, projects and actors. The networks include influential groups that control the definition of areas, projects, management models, and actors that participate in REDD projects. We demonstrate that, to a large degree, NGOs, consultants, think tanks and international research institutions dominate these networks, with support from development cooperation, multilateral agencies and private actors. Access to these networks, including specific knowledge, arenas and technical language, makes it possible for certain actors to define REDD projects and validate them as REDD.

We identify three strategies that are used to shape and engage with REDD: “knowledge production and dissemination”, “creation of technologies/standards to legitimise or validate projects” and the “enrolment in emerging networks”. The first strategy refers to how knowledge about REDD has been produced and disseminated. The second strategy refers to how science-policy networks have created and used certain standards or techniques to legitimise REDD projects and to define what a REDD project is, including the appropriation of Free Prior and Informed Consent and so-called participatory techniques. The third strategy refers to alternative networks as counter movements to the dominant science-policy networks. These networks contain alternative ideas about REDD, including social aspects and the rights of indigenous peoples. By enrolling in alternative networks the participating actors’ concerns have been shared and brought to the international level.

The paper also demonstrates that REDD funding has fostered cooperation and alliances between specific science and policy networks in which certain concepts and arguments are constructed and legitimated. REDD has offered a new regime of profit-making possibilities, serving certain interests, trading carbon offsets and the development of new forms of expertise, standards and consultancy. The actors involved in the dominant science-policy networks are recast as “REDD-experts” defining the limits to how knowledge and actors are involved in REDD policy-making. By producing, systematising and spreading information about ‘REDD’ these networks contribute to defining who decides what a REDD project is

and, consequently, how questions related to environmental and social justice in forest governance are addressed.

The paper contributes to the understanding of actors and interests that are shaping the planning and implementation of REDD in Latin America. The paper demonstrates that science-policy networks involved in preparations for REDD initiatives not only frame REDD in their interests but also control access to policy-making arenas through excluding or including certain knowledge, projects and actors. The paper sheds light on how control over the production and promotion of certain framings of REDD have been used to advance certain interests.

Paper III: Rejecting and Reshaping REDD: Contestations on Forest and Climate Change Policies in Bolivia.

The paper uses a case-study from Bolivia to discuss how REDD was contested and reshaped in domestic policy-making between 2008 and 2014. The paper looks at how different interests, values and non-forest-sectoral negotiations influence and shape forest policy outcomes across scales. The paper analyses the Bolivian responses to REDD and the emergence of an alternative forest and climate change mechanism: The Joint Mechanism for Mitigation and Adaptation and Sustainable Management of Forests and Mother Earth. The paper argues that the change in position from pragmatic and enthusiastic support for REDD to a critical and domestically adapted alternative is related to 1) the balancing of ideology and pragmatism in environmental governance, 2) domestic conflicts and interests related to natural resources, and 3) divergent indigenous positions and local REDD experiences.

The paper focuses on relevant state agencies on one hand, and indigenous organisations on the other. The paper argues that the divergent REDD positions locally have had an impact at the national and global scale. These findings suggest that domestic design, planning and implementation of REDD involves a series of jumps in scales and that strategies change across scales. Different experiences with state and non-state actors, REDD named projects, changing alliances and tactical moves to protect territories and strengthen their autonomy are factors that explain the indigenous organisations' positions. Different positions also co-exist across and within state and government institutions and demonstrate that interests and positions within the government and the bureaucracy are seldom monolithic, and that the role of strategic alliances should not be ignored. The case demonstrates how strategies change across scales, where Bolivia maintained one position internationally whilst following a more pragmatic parallel strategy nationally, and that strategic priorities and powerful interests have influenced the policy outcomes. We argue that the Joint Mechanism was a move to merge and reconcile interests and also to create strategic alliances with the agricultural sector.

The findings suggest that actors involved in the promotion, reshaping and rejection of REDD relate to different scales in which the Bolivian REDD initiative has been shaped nationally, internationally and locally, and include actors who successfully mobilised to form alliances with the government or with international REDD actors. Globally, due the Bolivian position, non-market based mechanisms have been placed on the agenda of climate change policies, as has the importance of forests for both mitigation and adaptation. Domestically, however,

important steps need to be taken to reconcile agricultural, extraction and forest protection interests and to reverse the market-oriented regulations in force. Until now, power has largely resided in the agricultural and extraction sector. The strengthened role of indigenous organisations with an increasing extension of forests in their territories represents an important counterweight. At the same time, steps are being taken to strengthen the role of the state in environmental and forest management. Nonetheless, environmental goals are often neglected and the holistic management model requires further development. The forming of alliances to develop solutions is pivotal for the future of forests in Bolivia. Bolivia has demonstrated an important challenge to the market oriented approach though also exemplifies the difficulties inherent in domestic implementation. Our study suggests that the politics of scale are fundamental to understand how the dialectical relationship between global initiatives “from above” and responses “from below” shape outcomes at various scales. Vested interests and power struggles outside the forest sector also influence these relationships. As the case demonstrates, other non-sectoral priorities (i.e., agriculture, infrastructure, minerals and oil) influence both governments and rural and indigenous organisations’ positions. This suggests that more fruitful initiatives for forest conservation require cross-sectoral dialogue and efforts.

Paper IV: Makers and shapers of environmental policy-making - Power and participation in forest legislation in Bolivia.

The objective of this paper is to assess the possibilities and barriers for subaltern actors' participation in environmental policy making. The paper analyses the process of developing new forest legislation in Bolivia. I focus on the demands and influence of indigenous forest community organisations and migrant peasant organisations in the process of the creation of new forest legislation. I argue that participation in the legislation process was facilitated by subaltern strategies such as coalition-building and the strategic framings of their demands, the responsiveness of public and government agencies and the creation of collaborative spaces and coalitions to advance demands. Coalition building both among local community organisations, and with actors such as NGOs and legal experts, has enabled community organisations to strengthen and negotiate their demands for changes in the forest legislation. These alliances have expanded the capacities of the organisations to advance their demands at different scales and to connect to public spheres with considerable technical and legal resources. On the other hand, participation has been limited by fragmented processes for inputs, selective inclusions and exclusions of actors and underlying state-society tensions due to conflicts over lands and resources. The paper demonstrates how subaltern actors adapt to changing policies and power relations by using different narrative framings as means to legitimise and position themselves in the debate about being “the rightful forest managers”. Finally, the study illustrates how agricultural and land-use interests have influenced the law-making agenda and the development of recent policies affecting forest areas. I relate the possibilities and limitations for participation to coalition building and framing of demands ‘from below’, coupled with state responsiveness, control of participatory arenas and different interests influencing forest governance and the legislative agenda. It highlights how strategic framings have been used to advance the interests of the actors involved, by presenting them as the rightful forest managers and protectors.

My findings also indicate responsiveness in state practices and among bureaucrats, public agencies and within the government, which contribute to foment and facilitate the participation of subaltern actors. Social organisations like the indigenous and the peasant organisations have been ‘invited in’ by state actors to provide input in the forest law-making process. Possibilities for participation in decision-making processes are largely directed to the organised civil society of large grassroots organisations, potentially excluding other non-

organised groups locally. Furthermore, professionalisation has increased the organisations' dependence on technicians to formulate their input. Lack of clear mechanisms and procedures regarding the involvement of affected parties seem contingent on the willingness of engaged bureaucrats. NGOs have been selectively involved and there has been a bias towards facilitating access for peasant organisations with close ties to the government. The tensions between the government and indigenous organisations regarding a road construction project through TIPNIS has led to selective involvement of indigenous organisations and representatives.

Finally, I argue that the participation of subaltern actors in the law-making process is vulnerable to powerful interests related to land use, extraction, agriculture and governmental strategic priorities. I found indications that strong interests in land use and related decision-making processes have affected the prioritisation of the new forest legislation, exemplified in the passing of legislation that benefits agricultural interests and the lack of approval of the new forest legislation. The presented findings illustrate the contestations over the governance of forest areas in Bolivia and highlight the fact that forests are turned into new sites of contestation over access to land areas, rights, resources, livelihoods, power and meaning.

Post-publication note: Bolivia adopted a Programme for Monitoring and Control of Deforestation and Degradation of forests¹⁷ after this article was submitted for publication. As of 2019 a new forest law has still not been passed.

¹⁷ The programme includes elements for a) monitoring of deforestation; b) monitoring, prevention, control and combat of forest fires; c) integral management of fires; and d) recuperation of forests in degraded areas.

Paper V: Between Resistance and Negotiations: Indigenous Organisations and the Bolivian State in the case of TIPNIS.

The paper analyses the conflict over a government mandated road construction project crossing TIPNIS in the Bolivian Amazon and the role of micro-politics and strategic framings of socio-environmental relations. I illustrate the changing constellations of social forces and interests involved in the conflict as well as the pressures and interests local communities and protected areas contend with. The mobilisations against the road construction show how struggles regarding control over land and forests are linked and de-linked with claims for participation, distributional justice and recognition. I demonstrate that natural resource struggles reflect not only broader tensions between different interests but also tensions within social groups and within the state. I highlight how the communities and indigenous organisations are subject to a range of different pressures and interests, both internally and externally, leading them in different directions of resistance and contestation, accommodation and agreement.

I argue that state-society relations should be viewed as dynamic and relational and that state and government responses in the TIPNIS conflict reflect the different social forces that interacted with and influenced state practices at different times. State projects are thus a result of the struggles of the different social forces trying to advance their interests and demands, moving in and out of state and civil society spheres.

The paper also highlights the importance of discursive framings in socio-environmental struggles. On one hand, framings have helped the indigenous organisations to attract attention to the conflict and to form alliances. On the other hand, however, poorly nuanced discourses risk obscuring differences and blurring the real-life challenges of the communities and the complex picture of human-nature relations in the TIPNIS area. It also exemplifies how other actors have taken advantage of the TIPNIS conflict to advance their own interests which do not necessarily coincide with the needs and rights of the communities affected. I also identified the strategic use and framing of concepts such as “intangible and ‘ecological” and how these concepts were used to advance different as well as contrasting interests. The discussion about the intangibility of parts of the TIPNIS area has also created tensions between different local groups and their livelihoods and interests.

The TIPNIS conflict demonstrates that there are few mechanisms in place to protect ecosystems and livelihoods in competition with strong economic and geopolitical interests. Forest areas represent different values and provide different benefits and livelihoods to different agents in Bolivia, depending on geographical location, resources, local groups' livelihoods, and historical governance of the area. Forests that are situated in strategic areas for subsoil resources like gas and oil, plans for strategic infrastructure projects, agricultural areas under expansion or in areas receiving migration are particularly vulnerable. Tensions are also created when an area has historically had weak state control and where the state increases its interventions, affecting local communities in different ways. In parallel, the case is also indicative of how different political and social forces can take advantage of such socio-environmental conflicts with both intended and unintended consequences for local communities and ecosystems.

7. SYNTHESIS AND CONCLUSION

This dissertation sets out to critically examine contestations over the governance of forest areas across scales, ranging from global climate change policies and national strategic projects to local forest communities in Bolivia. The dissertation consists of five papers, in addition to this introduction, which contribute to an improved understanding of the complex interplay between different actors, values, scales and interests in the governance of forest areas, the connection between politics, power and space, as well as an improved understanding of power-laden knowledge struggles and the dialectics between politics “from above” and struggles “from below”. The dissertation has three interrelated objectives:

1. To understand and analyse different responses to REDD in Latin America, and the interplay between different actors who engage to reshape and contest REDD.
2. To analyse possibilities and barriers for local and subaltern groups to shape forest policies and interventions in forest areas across local, national and global scales.
3. To examine how discursive framings, narratives and knowledge are used in struggles over forests.

To contribute to these objectives the dissertation includes several interrelated cases and empirical studies of contestations over the governance of forest areas, including responses to the climate change mitigation initiative REDD+ in Latin America and in Bolivia specifically, the emergence of an alternative to REDD in Bolivia, the struggles to make and shape new forest legislation in Bolivia and the contested road construction in the protected forest area and indigenous territory Isoboro Sécure (TIPNIS). The cases provide insight into different aspects of forest policies and governance of forest areas at interacting scales, as well as the social, material and discursive struggles involved. The dissertation demonstrates the complexities of social interactions in governing forest areas, alongside geo-political, environmental, social and economic interests, contested values and knowledge claims as well as how forests are increasingly converted into sites of contestation. In the following I elaborate on the three research objectives of the dissertation.

7.1 Responses to REDD: Contesting and Reshaping REDD in Latin America

In this dissertation I analyse responses to REDD+ and how the initiative has been contested and reshaped in Latin America and in Bolivia specifically, from 2008 to 2013. The study demonstrates the characteristics of different responses to REDD and REDD+ initiatives in the region and the power struggles involved in the marginalisation and prioritisation of actors, governance models and knowledge. The different country responses to REDD, conceptualized as “assertive”, “accommodating” and “resisting” strategies, reflect different histories and practices of environmental governance, including the role of the state versus non-state actors, the emerging position of subaltern actors and the role of networks and scalar interrelations. The findings illustrate that REDD initiatives do not take place in a vacuum, but rather interact with ongoing political processes and become socialised within a geo-historical, economic and cultural context. The findings demonstrate that the challenges associated with deforestation in the region are as political as they are technical. An overly technical and economic focus, risks deemphasising and depoliticising the causes of deforestation, bringing with it consequences and risks for local livelihoods and ecosystems.

The analysis proposes that new science-policy elites (Bull and Aguilar-Støen, 2015) have emerged in connection to the introduction, design and implementation of REDD in the region. Their power has been constituted through the arenas and knowledge which these networks control. Science-policy elites have gained pre-eminence due to their control of specific knowledge resources and their privileged access to policy-making arenas, leading to control over what has been perceived and presented as valid knowledge and tools for REDD initiatives (see also Bumpus and Liverman, 2011). The findings concur with Bock’s (2014) argument that expertise should be seen as politicized (see also Peet et al., 2011). The study contributes to the further nuancing of the understanding of how political factors influence the ways in which certain knowledge and actors are considered experts (Forsyth, 2003; Goldman et al., 2011), investigating what and whose expertise is included and excluded as well as presenting a better understanding of the role played by consultants, NGOs and development cooperation in shaping environmental policy in Latin America.

The study further shows how certain actors have had a privileged position in the REDD debates. For example, NGOs retain the technical and rhetorical expertise that facilitates their participation in different arenas across scales. This position make certain NGOs a privileged set of boundary organisations (Guston, 2001), who can contribute to challenge and break resistance against REDD, both locally and among state bureaucrats, and to clear the way for the implementation of pilot projects. As knowledge-providers to governments, donors and other actors, NGOs have gained access to important policy-making forums. Simultaneously, local knowledge from local resource institutes or local organisations can be excluded.

The bias towards certain technologies and models for REDD, including the use of market mechanisms and economic instruments, has not gone unquestioned in the region. The portrayal of ecologically simplified forests and forests as carbon offsets has met resistance across the region, especially in Bolivia and among indigenous organisations. Moreover, the perceived distributional and procedural aspects of REDD initiatives have been debated and the downplaying of forests as social spaces has been rejected by alternative networks. The cases also underline how REDD is contested with regard to the initiative's potential differential social and geopolitical effects, as well as whether the initiative will challenge or cement already existing asymmetries in land distribution, access to and control over forest areas, exclusive governance models and knowledge. In Bolivia, highland peasants and migrant movements fear and resist unequal spatial distribution of projects, lands and funds, whereas the lowland indigenous organisations, fear entrance of migrants in communities and also forest areas. This demonstrates how REDD becomes a new layer of contestation interacting with conflicts that already exist. The TIPNIS conflict also illustrates this point.

At the same time, debates about REDD have allowed for the emergence of alternatives and the reshaping of REDD initiatives, and also discussions about forest governance across scales, as demonstrated in the case of Bolivia. Indigenous organisations have challenged the narrow focus on forests as carbon storage and have resisted NGO, state and private actors' capture of REDD funds and control over decision-making processes. Concurrently, REDD has been viewed as an opportunity to consolidate indigenous rights to land, strengthen local forest management and to control land areas (see also Brown, 2013). There have been divergent positions across the indigenous movement (Ulloa, 2015) and the positions have changed over time and across scales, adapting responses to tactical moves, alliances and experiences (Wolford and Keene, 2015).

The widespread questioning of REDD in Bolivia led to the development of an alternative mechanism to accommodate disparate interests, ideologies and representations of forests and environmental governance. The mechanism demonstrates how friction (Tsing, 2004) can lead to new alliances and solutions, though the lack of advancements in both the Joint Mechanism and the new forest law demonstrates the continued power of agricultural and extraction interests (see also Høiby and Zenteno-Hopp, 2015). The contradictions between the Bolivian government's international position and domestic policies have led to a loss of legitimacy for the government's intentions regarding forest governance. The Bolivian case exemplifies the importance of the politics of scale, revealing changing strategies across national, local and international scales, as well as the existence of different strategies and interests within the government, supporting studies of strategic relations (Jessop, 2007). The responses to REDD have been influenced by ideological positions, struggles over land-use and redistribution as well as competing discourses of socio-environmental relations and priorities according to place and scale. However, the anti-market and anti-commodification discourse of the Bolivian government clashes with the dominant practices in the Bolivian forest sector, shaped by neoliberal governance models from the 1990s which have failed to be replaced in spite of various demands and efforts, as the case with the Bolivian forest law illustrates. Also, it clashes with the ongoing prioritisation of agricultural expansion, and extractive industries, at the cost of forests conservation.

Concurrently, the proposals Bolivia have voiced internationally have contributed to the recognition of non-market-based approaches, the combination of mitigation and adaptation goals in climate and forest policies, and forests as integrated and multifunctional wholes. This is an important contribution as adaptation initiatives in international negotiations have predominantly focused on reducing the impact of events related to climate change, and less on development-oriented approaches such as diversifying livelihoods (Burton, 2009; Forsyth, 2013). Furthermore, mitigation initiatives have in many manners been prioritised over adaptation. Few efforts combine adaptation and mitigation through a focus on poverty reduction, enhancing livelihoods and the sustainable use of resources. As argued by Forsyth (2013), new initiatives which integrate climate change policy, agriculture and food security offer more possibilities for development dividends than sequestration alone.

7.2 Possibilities and barriers for local and subaltern groups to shape forest policies and interventions in forest areas

In order to analyse the barriers and possibilities for subaltern groups to shape forests policies and interventions in forest areas I looked into different interrelated cases, including 1) the role of subaltern groups in the making of new forests policies in Bolivia; 2) indigenous organisations' relations to the state in the struggle connected to the road construction project in TIPNIS; and 3) subaltern demands concerning REDD and the Joint Mechanism. I address Chilvers' (2009) call for a focus on space and scale in environmental participation and nuanced studies of the "openings and closings that occur through relations between actors, knowledge and power within and outside participatory spaces" (p.412).

The extent to which subaltern groups have been involved in shaping new forest policies in Bolivia has depended on factors such as coalition-building, strategic framing of demands, state responsiveness and the creation of participatory spaces. In the crafting of new forest legislation social organisations were "invited in" (Cornwall, 2004) to give their input, creating a sense of procedural justice (Paavola, 2004) and their knowledge and demands were included as substantive elements for a future law. State responsiveness was, however, contingent on varying degrees of engaged bureaucrats, a bevy of competing agendas, political and economic priorities and tensions between different interests, resulting in a fragmented and restricted participation processes (Jessop, 2007). The failure to renew the forest legislation demonstrates the powerful position of the agricultural sector with the continued legacy of neoliberal forest policies resulting in forests being abstracted from their social and ecological contexts. Migrant peasants have increased their access to forest areas which has led to the creation of tensions with existing local communities. However, the lack of knowledge about and support of sustainable forest management can constitute a challenge and threat to forest areas to which migrants relocate.

The analysis of the TIPNIS conflict sheds light on contested introductions of infrastructure in indigenous territories and forest areas and on the dynamics of micro-political relations in environmental governance. The TIPNIS protest also contributes to a better understanding of contradictions in the actions and discourses of subaltern groups, the divisions and changing alliances that occur in such conflicts as well as the set of pressures indigenous and forest

communities are subject to. Indigenous communities position themselves as part of, against and beyond the state (see also Zimmerer, 2015), responding to their own sense of territorialisation and livelihood concerns. These ideas clash, at least in part, with Western donors' ideas for the national implementation of REDD as well as attempts to re-centralise forest governance in Bolivia. The relations between indigenous groups and the state (as in the case of TIPNIS), the forest law process and the making of the Joint Mechanism, has in many cases entailed a blurred distinction between state and civil society, where governance and authority is in a continuous process of negotiation and contestation involving different agents across state and civil society (Blom-Hansen and Stepputat, 2001; Jessop, 2007; McNeish, 2008: 21; Perreault, 2009). There is an unresolved tension between the increased involvement of state actors in environmental and natural resource governance and the parallel strengthening of indigenous autonomy (see also Aguilar-Støen, 2017), in which the authority and legitimacy of the state regarding environmental governance is questioned.

The study also demonstrates how coalition building (Lukes, 2005), collaborative spaces and alternative networks can work to strengthen joint demands, expand capacities and facilitate access to relevant processes, spaces, resources and knowledge. Collective mobilisations such as in the case of TIPNIS, as well as the subaltern demands for a new forest law, show how environmental issues are linked to distributive justice, recognition and social inequality (Peet and Watts, 2004; Martin et al., 2016), and also how different framings are adapted to different scales and in different interactions. The cross-scalar and spatial tactics employed by the indigenous organisations highlight how they negotiate with the government, NGOs and international networks in a series of scalar jumps. With strategic alliances (Horowitz, 2015) and the discursive coupling of indigenous livelihoods and conservation practices, the TIPNIS alliance has attracted both international and national support and gained leverage to negotiate their demands. Subaltern groups including indigenous organisations operate within fractured and overlapping governance landscapes and make use of the possibilities that emerge, demonstrating the complexity and heterogeneity of subaltern strategies in environmental initiatives as well as how they continuously have to adapt to face different pressures exerted on their territories and ways of living (Ulloa, 2015).

The shaping of REDD initiatives in the region has largely occurred in closed spaces with selective influence from local actors, expertise and experiences (Cornwall, 2004; Bumpus and Liverman, 2009). Science-policy networks have largely defined REDD's terms in the region

and thereby defined the marginalisation of others from potential benefits and participation. Such networks have a form of agency in the creation of environmental knowledge which becomes validated and reinforced across scales. Access to REDD networks is thus not open to all affected or interested stakeholders. Activists seeking to influence REDD debates have to choose between working within dominant rules or establish alternative and competing networks (Forsyth, 2003; Taylor, 2012). In this way, networks become important resources to advance alternative views and values. Concurrently, by engaging in alternative networks, indigenous organisations have gained access to information and voiced their concerns, combining demands for recognition and participation in environmental struggles (Peet and Watts, 2004; Martin et al., 2016).

The REDD pilot project in Bolivia exemplifies how indigenous organisations resist elite capture of funds, fear external control of lands and local resources and have the ability to shape local initiatives to create more positive local impacts. However, although the Joint Mechanism has included local demands, the lack of actual participation in the design of the initiatives has, together with the TIPNIS conflict, led to lack of support for the mechanism among lowland indigenous groups in Bolivia. This underlines Pavoola's (2004) argument for procedural justice as a necessary element of inclusive policy-making and environmental governance and addresses Baud et al.'s (2011) call to nuance the politics of inclusion and exclusion. It also corresponds to Demeritt's (2015) proposal for using participation as both normative steering (legitimacy and rights to participate) and epistemic checking (the quality of an effort).

The case about the forest law in Bolivia also contains important lessons for participation and recognition in the design of future REDD initiatives across scales, where a plethora of interests and rights must be handled. These lessons include the need for 1) mechanisms that ensure equity across local groups with contrasting interests and access to lands and state agencies, 2) capacity-building across groups with different lifeworld and livelihood practices, and 3) moving beyond local communities as "receivers" of funding or projects, or as pieces in NGO-private collaborations. This resembles Brown's (2013) arguments for creating a "social contract" in which the rural poor are recognised as key stewards, participate fully in the design and implementation of REDD programs, and are provided with the necessary political, technical and financial capacities. However, as Corbera (2017b) points out, and which is demonstrated by the lessons learned from the forest law process in Bolivia, working with

participation and recognition of local groups in REDD projects is not sufficient. REDD developments have to include, and transform, large-scale and commercial actors driving deforestation and forest degradation. As long as commercial timber management is still encouraged in the forest sector with poor public control, the agricultural sector continues to expand its frontier at the cost of forests, and infrastructure and extraction projects are prioritised, then the forests, local livelihoods, and the global climate remain at risk.

7.3 Discursive Framings, Narratives and Knowledge in Struggles over Forests

The cases in this dissertation also underline how environmental governance becomes a result not only of the struggles over material interests, but also of competing knowledge-claims and strategic framings regarding the environment and how to govern it. Different socio-environmental narratives and discursive framings have been strategically used by different actors to promote values, needs and interests in the cases studied, and to shape which identities and groups, interests and demands are included and excluded, in the REDD processes, the case of TIPNIS and the discussions about a new forest law. On one hand, narratives and framings are used to legitimise and advance certain solutions, values and interests over others (Forsyth, 2003; Goldman et al., 2011). On the other hand, the study also demonstrates how narratives and framings can have both intended and unintended consequences, such as being misused by other actors to promote their interests (see also Sundberg, 2003; 2004), failing to present real life challenges of local communities, or covering up the underlying structural issues that need to be resolved in order for a just and sustainable forest regime to emerge.

Narrative strategies have worked as a means to legitimise and position subaltern actors in the debate about the rightful forest managers in discussions about new forest policies in Bolivia, and discourse coalitions (Hajer, 2005) have enabled subaltern actors to advance their demands, at least temporarily or in certain arenas. In the case of TIPNIS, a broad alliance was made possible, in part, because the TIPNIS movement framed the case as a common indigenous and environmental struggle. On the other hand, the narratives used by the indigenous and peasant organisations related to the new forest law, and in the TIPNIS conflict, demonstrate how complex relations are simplified and made stereotypical (Wolford and Keene, 2015). Simplifying discourses may also pit social groups against each other and obscure the underlying structural issues that need to be resolved (see also Benjaminsen,

2015). The dissertation also demonstrates how framings and narratives are not static but rather develop and adapt to new scenarios over time, as a result of counter-framings that attempt to delegitimise and challenge existing framings (Adger et al, 2001). Oversimplified discourses with certain representations risk obscuring internal differences and blur the real-life challenges of the communities, including the complex picture of human-nature relations and the different pressures on their lands and related ecosystems (see also Ulloa, 2015; Yeh and Bryan, 2015). This also resembles Sylvains' (2002: 1081) argument about "strategic essentialism" as well as what Tsing (1999, p.160) refers to as "representational strategies".

In the TIPNIS case I demonstrate how discursive framings legitimise or advance certain solutions, ideas or interests over others and obscure real-life challenges on the ground (Goldman et al., 2011). I demonstrate the importance of analysing the ways in which power relations are embedded in specific framings of socio-environmental relations (ref. "intangible" and "the ecological road"), and how these framings are used strategically to advance certain interests or to suppress others. The case also highlights how discursive framings had a powerful impact on the local understanding of the road construction project and how the government attempted to reframe the project as the "ecological road" to address its critics and the protests. Furthermore, another example, is how President Morales criticised the marchers' demand for funds from REDD, blaming these for leading to the "privatisation and transnationalisation" of forests and for standing in opposition to Bolivia's official policy against carbon markets (Fundación Tierra, 2012). This contribution illustrates the power of discursive framings to shape which identities and groups, interests and demands are included and advanced in socio-environmental conflicts. The examples presented reflect struggles over meaning in the TIPNIS conflict and the power that lies in the institutionalisation of certain concepts which are used to advance specific interests and positions.

The study further demonstrates how certain framings, values and visions gain prominence and how the science-policy networks promoting such ideas gain the power to define how REDD should look in specific contexts. By producing, ordering and spreading information about REDD science-policy networks contribute to defining what a REDD project in Latin America is. Consequently, this influences how questions related to environmental and social justice are addressed. Private actors and research institutions with international links have been creating knowledge and disseminating information about REDD in Latin America. At the same time, public institutions and national research centres have not had the same possibilities to

influence the international debate. The debates about REDD also show how dominant discourses about, for example, carbon markets and technical mechanisms have largely been isolated from the unequal social, economic and environmental relations embedded in the system on which these depend (Giddens, 2009; Marino and Ribot, 2012).

There exist in Bolivia large discrepancies between the government's discursive strategies and what happens on the grounds as well as between written and implemented policy (McCusker, 2015). Concurrently, the increased discursive focus on climate and environmental justice, and the Bolivian government's attempt to reclaim an international as well as national role in environmental governance, has created a momentum which has allowed domestic actors to claim national programmes and policy-changes related to forest areas and governance. Bureaucrats, experts and allies in civil society have used this political space to create an alternative to REDD and to form a new forest regime. Still, the implementation of these policy changes are hampered by the context of weak environmental policy institutions and strong political and economic interests affecting forest areas, including agriculture, infrastructure development and the peasant movement's access to land. The domestic challenges in the Bolivian forest sector, including the legacy of neoliberal legislation, have largely been neglected in the official discourse about "holistic" forest management and the "non-commodification" of nature.

In the following, I will present the dissertation's broader contributions to debates about environmental governance and political ecology.

7.4 Broader Contributions of this Dissertation

The dissertation offers five main contributions to political ecology and critical studies of environmental governance.

First, the dissertation demonstrates how a cross-sector and multi-actor perspective, as well as a dual focus on both discursive and material practices, is crucial to understand the governance of forest areas. The analysis demonstrates the importance of employing an interdisciplinary approach and a multi-sited, multi-actor methodology to investigate processes that affect control, use of and access to forest areas and related policy-making arenas. The dissertation

demonstrates the importance of a focus on multiple actors and processes to understand complex decision-making processes, including the formation of interest coalitions and how they affect the governance of forest areas. The dissertation further demonstrates that the governance of forest areas goes beyond forest policies per se, and must also include processes of agricultural, land-use, resource and infrastructure policies, as well as the interactions between the state, local communities and non-governmental actors (Larson, 2011). The dissertation challenges dominant approaches to understanding environmental governance such as rational choice and technical approaches, and argues for the use of critical political ecology and critical environmental governance, which consider social, political, cultural and historical aspects as well as power relations to be inherent to the study of environmental governance across scales (Cleaver, 2012; Bull and Aguilar-Støen, 2015; Perreault et al., 2015).

Second, the dissertation demonstrates how researchers can gain important insights by studying actual interventions affecting environmental governance and by connecting these struggles across scales (Bulkeley, 2005; Baud, 2011; Cleaver, 2012). The dissertation demonstrates how environmental governance is shaped in a dialectical relationship between programmes and initiatives “from above” and responses and initiatives “from below”, and how actors involved also operate across scales and how the governance of forest areas is inter-scalar. The study contributes to the discussion of how shifting scales in environmental governance shape strategies and outcomes at the local, national and the global level. The question is not only about the various scales of environmental governance, but also about how scales shape one another and the trajectories of politics that emerge in this relationship (Massey, 2005).

Third, the dissertation demonstrates how important insights can be obtained by examining the micro-politics of environmental conflicts, and by employing a relational perspective to analyse how small-scale interactions can have implications for geo-political decision-making (McNeish and Logan, 2012; Cleaver, 2012). The use of a strategic-relational approach in which multiple relations and interactions are studied (Jessopp, 2007), also contributes to filling a gap in political ecology studies, which have tended to see the state as a monolithic entity or ignored it altogether (Perreault et al., 2015) and where studies of elites lack nuance (Bull and Aguilar-Støen, 2015). Through the different cases analysed in this dissertation, I demonstrate a variety of government responses, indicating that there are also different

projects, strategies and practices within the state (Jessop, 2007) which have different consequences in interaction with various social forces and reflect multiple expressions of resource sovereignties (McNeish, 2012; McNeish and Logan, 2012). I have also taken into account, as scholars such as McCusker (2015) and Funder and Marani (2015) call for, engagement with bureaucrats in state agencies in order to understand the policy processes and the contestations that occur within the state and how they interact with social forces and various interests and demands from society.

Fourth, the dissertation underlines the importance of employing a dual analysis of elite and subaltern actors' roles in environmental governance and the study of networks. This calls for a closer scrutiny of the dynamics of the interaction of elite and non-elite actors in environmental policy-making. This dissertation includes such a dual analysis of both how elitist environmental movements influence environmental policy-making in REDD discussions as well as how subaltern actors attempt to advance their claims, by for example engaging in alternative networks. Such an analysis contributes to political ecology studies, which have tended to black box elites, and also promotes a shift of the study of power relations away from a state-centric perspective to a focus on different societal forces (Bull and Aguilar-Støen, 2015; Perreault et al., 2015). The dissertation also demonstrates the importance of analysing subaltern strategies and how subaltern groups should not be homogenised (see also Peet and Watts, 2004). Alliances can also occur across subaltern and elite actors, as demonstrated by the TIPNIS case, as tactical and temporal moves.

Lastly, I have in this dissertation combined different power perspectives, from agent-based to structural and discursive power, and have contributed to what is one of political ecology's strengths as argued by Svarstad et al. (2018). I have given a multi-faceted and nuanced focus on agency, in dialectical interaction with structural relations. I have looked at forms of power in the strategies and collaborative forces of different actors, and connected agency (including barriers and possibilities) to political economic structures such as those of extractive industries, infrastructure and agricultural expansion, as well as the discursive formations and the power of knowledge.

Based on the findings in this dissertation I contend that to understand and change how forest areas are governed we need to take into account the multiple dimensions and functions of forests and their value for different actors and interests. The governance of forest areas is

embedded within historical, ecological, economic, cultural and social contexts and is shaped by political struggles, environmental change and contested values and images of socio-nature relations, conservation and development. This further implies that there are no quick technological or economic fixes to change how forests are governed or to obtain socially just and ecologically sound forest governance. Rather, cross scalar, cross-sector and multi-actor collaborations are needed to ensure just and sustainable governance of forests areas.

References

- Adams, W. M. (1993). Sustainable development and the greening of development theory. In F.J. Schuurman (ed.), *Beyond impasse: New directions in development theory*. London: Zed Books, pp. 207-22.
- Adams, W.M. (2001). *Green development: Environment and sustainability in the third world*. London: Routledge.
- Adger, W.N. (2001). Scales of governance and environmental justice for adaptation and mitigation of climate change. *Journal of International Development*, 13(7), pp.921-931.
- Adger, W. N., Benjaminsen T. A., Brown, K., and Svarstad, H. (2001). Advancing a political ecology of global environmental discourses. *Development and Change*, 32(4), pp.681-715.
- Aguilar-Støen, M. (2015). Global forest conservation initiatives as spaces for participation in Colombia and Costa Rica. *Geoforum*, 61, pp.36–44.
- Aguilar-Støen, M. (2017). Better safe than sorry? Indigenous peoples, carbon cowboys and the governance of REDD in the Amazon. *Forum for Development Studies*, 44(1), pp.91-108.
- Aguilar-Støen, M. and C. Hirsch. (2015). REDD+ and forest governance in Latin America: The role of science-policy networks. In B. Bull and M. Aguilar-Støen (eds.), *Environmental politics in Latin America. Elite dynamics, the left tide and sustainable development*. London: Routledge, pp.171–189.
- Aguilar-Støen, M., F. Toni and C. Hirsch (2015). Latin American approaches to Reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation REDD. In F. de Castro, B. Hoogenboom, and M. Baud (eds.), *Environmental Governance in Latin America. Conflicts, Projects and Possibilities*. London: Palgrave Macmillan, pp.205–233.
- Aguilar-Støen, M., Toni, F. and Hirsch, C. (2015b). Gobernanza forestal en América Latina. Estrategias para implementar REDD+. In de Castro, F., Hogenboom, B. Baud, M. (coord), *Gobernanza ambiental en América Latina*, Buenos Aires: CLACSO, pp. 265-296.
- Albó, X. (1996). 40 Naciones en una. *Cuarto Intermedio* No. 36.
- Albó, X. (2002). Pueblos indios en la política. *Cuadernos de Investigación* 55. La Paz: CIPCA, Plural Editores.
- Andersson, K. (2002). Explaining the mixed success of municipal governance of forest resources in Bolivia: Overcoming local information barriers. *Natural resource management*. Washington, D.C: World Bank.
- Andolina, R., Laurie, N. and Radcliffe, S.A. (2009). *Indigenous Development in the Andes: Culture, Power, and Transnationalism*. Duke University Press.
- Angelsen, A. (2009). *Realising REDD+: National strategy and policy options*. Bogor, Indonesia: Center for International Forestry Research (Cifor).

- Angelsen, A. (2013). *REDD+ as performance-based aid: General lessons and bilateral agreements of Norway*. No. 2013/135. Wider Working Paper .
- Angelsen, A., Brown, S., Loisel, C., Peskett, L., Streck, C. and Zarin, D. (2009). *Reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD): An options assessment report prepared for the government of Norway*. Washington, D.C.: Meridian Institute.
- Angelsen, A., M. Brockhaus, W. D. Sunderlin and L. V. Verchot (2012)(eds), *Analysing REDD+: Challenges and choices*. Bogor, Indonesia: CIFOR.
- Angelsen, A. and McNeill, D. (2012). The evolution of REDD+, in A. Angelsen, M. Brockhaus, W. D. Sunderlin and L. V. Verchot (eds), *Analysing REDD+: Challenges and choices.*, Bogor, Indonesia: CIFOR, pp.31–49.
- Angelsen, A.; Martius, C.; de Sy, V.; Duchelle, A.E.; Larson, A.M.; Pham, T.T.; (eds) (2018). *Transforming REDD+: Lessons and new directions*. Bogor, Indonesia: Center for International Forestry Research, CIFOR.
- Archer, M. *et al.* (1998). *Critical Realism: Essential Readings*. London, New York: Routledge.
- Assies, W. (2006). Bolivia: land tenure legalization in a pluricultural and multiethnic country. Paper prepared for the International Symposium *At the Frontier of Land Issues: Social embeddedness of Rights and Public Policy*, 17.
- Assies, W. and Salman, T. (2005). ‘Ethnicity and Politics in Bolivia.’ *Ethnopolitics* 4, pp.269-297.
- Bailey, I. (2007). Neoliberalism, climate governance and the scalar politics of EU emission trading. *Area*, 39(4), pp.431-442.
- Bakker, K. (2007). The “commons” versus the “commodity”: Alter-globalization, anti-privatization and the human right to water in the global south. *Antipode*, 39(3), pp. 430-455.
- Bakker, K. (2015). Neoliberalization of nature. In T. Perreault, G. Bridge, and J. McCarthy, (eds.), *The Routledge Handbook of Political Ecology*. London: Routledge, pp.446-456.
- Barnes, T.J. and Duncan, J.S., (eds) (1992). *Writing worlds: discourse, text and metaphor in the representation of landscape*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Baud, M., de Castro, F. and Hogenboom, B (2011). Environmental governance in Latin America: Towards an integrative research agenda. *European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies*, (90), pp. 79-88
- Bebbington, D. H. (2013). Extraction, inequality and indigenous peoples: Insights from Bolivia. *Environmental Science & Policy*, 33(0), pp. 438-446.
- Bebbington, A. and Bebbington, D. (2012). Extractive industries, narratives of development and socio-environmental disputes across the (ostensible changing) Andean region, in H.

- Haarstad (ed.), *New Political Spaces in Latin American Natural Resource Governance*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 17–38.
- Bebbington, A. and Bury, J. (eds). (2013). *Subterranean Struggles: New Dynamics of Mining, Oil, and Gas in Latin America*. Austin: University of Texas Press.
- Bebbington, A. (2015). At the boundaries of La Política: Political ecology, policy networks and moments of government. In T. Perreault, G. Bridge, and J. McCarthy, (eds.). *The Routledge Handbook of Political Ecology*. London: Routledge, pp. 198-207.
- Becker, H.S. (1998). *Tricks of the trade: How to think about your research while you're doing it*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Becker, C. D. and León, R. (2002). Indigenous forest management in the Bolivian Amazon: Lessons from the Yuracaré people. *Forests, Trees and People Programme - Forestry Department Working Paper No. 3*. The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.
- Benjaminsen, T. (2015). Political ecologies of environmental degradation and marginalization. In T. Perreault, G. Bridge, and J. McCarthy, (eds.). *The Routledge Handbook of Political Ecology*. London: Routledge, pp.354-365.
- Bhaskar, R. (1998). *The Possibility of Naturalism: A Philosophical Critique of the Contemporary Human Sciences*. Psychology Press.
- Bhaskar, R. (1979). *Philosophy and the Human Sciences*. Brighton: Harvester Press.
- Bhaskar, R. (1991). *Philosophy and the Idea of Freedom*. Oxford, UK & Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell.
- Bhaskar, R. (2008). *A Realist Theory of Science*. 4th ed. London: Routledge.
- Bhaskar, R. and Danermark, B. (2006). Metatheory, interdisciplinarity and disability research: a critical realist perspective. *Scandinavian Journal of Disability Research*, 8, pp. 278–297.
- Bhaskar, R., Frank, C., Høyer, K.G., Næss, P., and Parker, J. (Eds.) (2010). *Interdisciplinarity and climate change transforming knowledge and practice for our global future*. New York: Routledge.
- Bixler, P., Wald, D., Ogden, L., Leong, K., Johnston, E. and Romolini, M. (2016). Network governance for large-scale natural resource conservation and the challenge of capture. *Frontiers in Ecology and the Environment*. 14(3), pp. 165–171.
- Blaikie, P. and Brookfield, H. (Eds.) (1987). *Land Degradation and Society*. London and New York: Methuen, 299 pp.
- Blom, B., Sunderland, T. and Murdiyarsa, D. (2010). Getting REDD to Work Locally: Lessons Learned from Integrated Conservation and Development Projects. *Environmental Science and Policy* 13(2), pp. 164–172.

Blom Hansen, T. and Stepputat, F. (2001). *States of Imagination. Ethnographic Exploration of the Post-colonial state*. Duke University Press.

Bock, S. (2014). Politicized expertise: An analysis of the political dimensions of consultants' policy recommendations to developing countries with a case study of McKinsey's advice on REDD+ policies. *Innovation: The European Journal of Social Science Research*, 27(4), pp. 1–19.

Bourdieu, P. (1986) The forms of capital. In J. Richardson (Ed.) *Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of Education*. New York: Greenwood, pp.241-258.

Bressers, H.T.A. and O'Toole, L. J. (1998) The selection of policy instruments: a network based perspective. *Journal of Public Policy*, 18 (3), pp. 213–239.

Bridge, G., McCarthy, J., and Perreault, T. (2015). Editors' introduction. In T. Perreault, G. Bridge, and J. McCarthy, (eds.). *The Routledge Handbook of Political Ecology*. London: Routledge, pp.3-18.

Bridge, G. and Perreault, T. (2009). Environmental Governance. In Castree, N., Demeritt, D., Liverman, D. and Rhoads, R (Eds). *A companion to environmental geography*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, pp.475-497.

Brockhaus, M. and Angelsen, A. (2012). Seeing REDD+ through 4Is: A political economy framework, in A. Angelsen, M. Brockhaus, W. D. Sunderlin and L. V. Verchot (eds). *Analysing REDD+: Challenges and choices*. Bogor, Indonesia: CIFOR, pp. 15–31.

Brown, K. and Corbera, E. (2003). Exploring equity and sustainable development in the new carbon economy. *Climate Policy*, 3(1), pp.41-56.

Brown, M. (2013) *Redeeming REDD. Policies, incentives and social feasibility for avoided deforestation*. London and New York: Routledge, 330 pp.

Bryant, R.L. (1998). Power, knowledge and political ecology in the third world: a review. *Progress in Physical Geography: Earth and Environment*, 22 (1), pp. 79-94.

Bryant, R. L. and Bailey, S. (1997). *Third World Political Ecology*. London: Routledge.

Bryman, A. (2004). *Social Research methods*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Bulkeley, H. (2005). Reconfiguring environmental governance: towards a politics of scales and networks. *Political geography*, (24) 8, pp. 875-902.

Bull, B. and Aguilar-Støen, M. (eds) (2015). *Environmental Politics in Latin America: Elite Dynamics, the Left Tide and Sustainable Development*. London: Routledge Studies in Sustainable Development.

Bumpus, A. G. (2011). The matter of carbon: Understanding the materiality of tCO₂e in carbon offsets. *Antipode*, 43, pp. 612–638.

- Bumpus, A.G. and Liverman, D. (2009). Accumulation by decarbonization and the governance of carbon offsets. *Economic Geography*, 84(2), pp.127 – 155.
- Bumpus, A. G. and Liverman, D. (2011). Carbon colonialism? Offsets greenhouse gas reduction and sustainable development, in R. Peet, P. Robbins and M. J. Watts (eds). *Global Political Ecology*. New York: Routledge, pp. 203–224.
- Burawoy, M. (2000). *Global Ethnography: Forces, Connections, and Imaginations in a Postmodern World*. Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press.
- Burningham, K. & Cooper, G. (1999). Being Constructive: Social constructionism and the environment. *Sociology* 33(2), pp. 297-316.
- Burton, I. (2009). Climate change and the adaptation deficit. L. Schipper and I. Burton (eds). *The Earthscan Reader on Adaptation to Climate Change*. London: Earthscan pp. 89-97.
- Brannstrom, C. (2004). *Territories, commodities and knowledges: Latin American environmental history in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries*. London: Institute of Latin American Studies.
- Canedo Vasquez, G. (2018). Bolivia and Its Transformations in the Light of “Seven Erroneous Theses about Latin America”. *Latin America Perspectives*, 45 (2), pp. 142-153.
- Caplan, P. (1993). Introduction, in Bell, D., Caplan, P. and Karim, W. (eds). *Gendered Fields: Woman, Men and Ethnography*. London: Routledge.
- Castells, M. (1996). *The Rise of the Network Society: The Information Age: Economy, Society, and Culture, Volume I*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
- de Certeau, M. (1984). *The practice of everyday life*. Translated by S.F. Rendall. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Chatterton, P., Featherstone, D., Routledge., P. (2013). Articulating Climate Justice in Copenhagen: Antagonism, the Commons, and Solidarity, *Antipode*, 45 (3), pp. 606-620.
- Chilvers, J. (2009) Deliberative and participatory approaches in environmental Geography in Castree, N., Demeritt, D., Liverman, D. and Rhoads, B. (eds). *A companion to environmental geography*. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, pp. 400-417.
- Cleaver, F. (2012). *Development Through Bricolage. Rethinking Institutions for Natural Resource Management*. London: Routledge.
- Collier, A. (1994). *Critical Realism. An Introduction to Roy Bhaskar’s Philosophy*. London: Verso.
- Contreras-Hermosilla, A., Vargas Rios, M.T. (2002). *Social, Environmental and Economic Dimensions of Forest Policy Reforms in Bolivia*. Washington, DC: Forest Trends and CIFOR. 39p.
- Cook, B. and Kothari, U. (2001). *Participation: The New Tyranny?* London: Zed Books

- Corbera, E. (2017a). Foreword – The carbon offsetting dilemma (foreword). In Paladino, S. and Fiske, S. (eds.). *The Carbon Fix; Forest Carbon, Social Justice and Environmental Governance*. Routledge.
- Corbera, E., (2017b). Redeeming REDD. Policies, incentives and social feasibility for avoided deforestation, by M.I. Brown. Book review, *The Journal of Peasant Studies*, 44 (2), pp. 502-506.
- Corbera, E. (2015). Valuing nature, paying for ecosystem services and realizing social justice: A response to Matulis. *Ecological Economics*, 110, pp. 154-157.
- Corbera, E. and Martin, A. (2015). Carbon offsets: accommodation or resistance? *Environment and Planning A*, 47(10), pp. 2023-2030.
- Corbera, E. and Brown, K. (2010). Offsetting benefits? Analysing access to forest carbon. *Environment and Planning A*, 42(7), pp.1739-1761.
- Corbera, E., Brown, K., Adger, N.W. (2007). The equity and legitimacy of markets for ecosystem services. *Development and Change*, 38 (4), pp. 587–613. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-7660.2007.00425.x
- Corbera, E. and Kosoy, N. (2008). Equity implications of marketing ecosystem services. *IMCAFS Basins & Coasts Newsletter*, 3, pp.16-23.
- Corbera, E. and H. Schroeder, (2011). Governing and implementing REDD+, *Environmental Science & Policy*, 14 (2), pp. 89–99.
- Corbera, E. (2012). Problematizing REDD+ as an experiment in payments for ecosystem services. *Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability*, 4 (6), pp. 612-619.
- Corbera, E., Estrada, M., May, P., Navarro, G. i P. Pacheco, (2010). Rights to forests and carbon: insights from Mexico, Brazil and Costa Rica. *Working Paper*, Bogor, Indonesia: Center for International Forestry Research.
- Cornell, S., Parker, J., (2010). Critical realist interdisciplinarity, in: Bhaskar, R., Frank. C., Hoyer, K.G., Naess, P., Parker, J. (Eds.), *Interdisciplinarity and Climate Change Transforming knowledge and practice for our global future*. New York: Routledge, pp. 25-34.
- Cornwall, A. (2000). *Beneficiary, Consumer, Citizen: Perspectives on Participation for Poverty Reduction*. Sida Studies 2, Stockholm: Sida.
- Cornwall, A. (2004). Spaces for transformation? Reflection on issues of power and differences in participation in development. In S.M. Hickey, and G. Mohan. *Participation: From Tyranny to Transformation*. London: Zed Books
- Cornwall, A. and Coelho, V.S. (2007). *Spaces for Change? The Politics of Participation in New Democratic Arenas*. London: Zed books

Crabtree, J. (2005) *Patterns of Protest: Politics and Social Movements in Bolivia*. London: Latin American Bureau.

Cronkleton, P, Leigh Taylor, P, Barry, D., Stone-Jovicich, S. and Schmink, M. (2008). *Environmental Governance and the Emergence of Forest-Based Social Movements*. Bogor, Indonesia: Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR),

Cronkleton, P., Bray, D.B. and Medina, G., (2011). Community forest management and the emergence of multi-scale governance institutions: Lessons for REDD+ development from Mexico, Brazil and Bolivia. *Forests* 2, pp. 451-473. doi:10.3390/f2020451

Crowther, T. W., H. B. Glick¹, K. R. Covey, C. Bettigole¹, D. S. Maynard, S. M. Thomas, J. R. Smith, G. Hintler, M. C. Duguid, G. Amatulli, M.-N. Tuanmu, W. Jetz¹, C. Salas, C. Stam, D. Piotta, R. Tavani, S. Green, G. Bruce, S. J. Williams, S. K. Wiser, M. O. Huber, G. M. Hengeveld, G.-J. Nabuurs, E. Tikhonova, P. Borchardt, C.-F. Li¹, L. W. Powrie, M. Fischer, A. Hemp, J. Homeier, P. Cho, A. C. Vibrans, P. M. Umunay, S. L. Piao, C. W. Rowe, M. S. Ashton, P. R. Crane & M. A. Bradford (2015). Mapping tree density at a global scale. *Nature*, 525, pp. 201–205.

Cupples, J. (2002). The Field as a Landscape of Desire: Sex and Sexuality in Geographical Fieldwork, *Area* 34 (4), pp. 382–390.

Dangl, B. (2007). *The Price of Fire: Resource Wars and Social Movements in Bolivia* Oakland: AK Press.

De Castro, F., Hogenboom, B., and Baud, M. (2016) (Eds.) *Environmental Governance in Latin America*. Hampshire: Palgrave McMillan

de Jong, Wil, Dennis del Castillo Torres and Angel Salazar. (2014). Carbon cowboys in Peru and the prospects of local REDD governance. *Portes: Revista Mexicana de Estudios Sobre la Cuenca del Pacifico*, 8, (16), pp. 61–83.

Delgado, F., Rist, S., and Escobar, C., (2010). *El desarrollo endógeno sustentable como interfaz implementar el Vivir Bien en la gestión boliviana*. La Paz: Plural.

Demeritt, D. (2001). The construction of global warming and the politics of science. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, 91(2), pp.307-337.

Demeritt, D. (2015) The promises of participation in science and political ecology. In Perreault, T., Bridge, G. & McCarthy, J. (eds.). *The Routledge Handbook of Political Ecology*. London and New York: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, pp. 224-234.

Denzin, N. K., & Lincoln, Y. S. (2005). *The SAGE handbook of qualitative research*. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.

Dokken, T., Caplow, S., Angelsen, A., Sunderlin, W.D. (2014). Tenure issues in REDD+ pilot project sites in Tanzania. *Forests*, 5, pp. 234–255. doi: dx.doi.org/10.3390/f5020234

Dolittle, A.A. (2005). Stories and Maps, Images and Archives: Multimethod Approach to the Political Ecology of Native Property Rights and Natural Resource Management in Saba, Malaysia. *Environmental Management*, 45, (1), pp. 67-81.

Dryzek, J.S. (1997). *The Politics of the Earth: Environmental Discourses*. New York: Oxford University Press.

DuBois, B. (1983). Passionate scholarship: notes on values, knowing and method in feminist social sciences. In Gloria Bowles & Renate Duelli Klein (Eds.), *Theories of women's studies*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, pp. 105-117.

England, K.V.L. (1994). Getting Personal: Reflexivity, Positionality, and Feminist Research. *The Professional Geographer*, 46 (1), pp. 80-9.

Escobar, A. (1998). Who's Knowledge, whose Nature? Biodiversity, conservation, and the political ecology of social movements. *Journal of Political Ecology*, 5 (1), pp. 53-82.

Escobar, A. (2010). Latin America at a Crossroads: Alternative Modernizations, Postliberalism, or Postdevelopment?. *Cultural Studies*, 24 (1), pp. 1-65.

Fabricant, B. and Gustafson, N. (eds). (2011). *Remapping Bolivia, Resources, Territory, and Indigeneity in a Plurinational State*. Santa Fe: School for Advanced Research.

Fairhead, J. and Leach, M. (1995). False Forest History, Complicit Social Analysis: Rethinking Some West African Environmental Narratives. *World Development*, 23, pp. 1023-1035.

Fairhead, J. and M. Leach, (2003). *Science Society and Power: Environmental Knowledge and Policy in West Africa and the Caribbean*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

FAO. (2010). *Global Forest Resources Assessment 2010 – country report Bolivia*. FAO Forestry Paper Rome Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.

FAO. (2015). *Global Forest Resources Assessment 2015. How are the world's forests changing?* 2nd Ed. The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.

Fontana, A., and Frey, J. H. (2000). Interviewing: The art of science. In N. K. Denzin and Y. S. Lincoln (eds.). *Collecting and interpreting qualitative materials*. Thousand Oaks: Sage, pp. 47–78.

Fontana, L.B. (2014). Indigenous peoples vs peasant unions: land conflicts and rural movements in plurinational Bolivia. *The Journal of Peasant Studies*. 41 (3), pp. 297-319.

Foucault, M. (1991). Governmentality. In Burchell, G., C. Gordon and P. Miller (eds.) *The Foucault effect: studies in governmentality*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Forsyth, T. (2001). Critical realism and political ecology. In Stainer, A. and Lopez, G. (eds). *After postmodernism: critical realism?* London: Athlone Press, pp. 146-154.

Forsyth, T. (2003). *Critical political ecology: The politics of environmental science*. London: Routledge.

Forsyth, T. (2005). The Political Ecology of the Ecosystem Approach for Forests. In Sayer, J. and Maginnis, S. (eds) *Forests in Landscapes: Ecosystem Approaches for Sustainability*. London: Earthscan, pp. 165-176.

Forsyth, T. (2009). Multilevel, multiactor governance in REDD+. In Angelsen, A., with Brockhaus, M., Kanninen, M., Sills, E., Sunderlin, W.D. and Wertz-Kanounnikoff, S. (eds). *Realising REDD+: national strategy and policy options*. Bogor, Indonesia: CIFOR. pp. 113-122.

Forsyth, T. (2013). Community-based adaptation: a review of past and future challenges. *Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change*, 4 (5), pp. 439-446.

Foucault, M. (1980). Two lectures. In C. Gordon (ed) *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972–1977*. New York: Pantheon, pp. 78–108.

Foucault, M. (2002). *Order of Things*. London: Routledge Classics.

Frank, A.G. (1969). *Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America*. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.

Fundación Tierra. (2010). *INFORME 2010: Territorios Indígena Originario Campesinos en Bolivia entre la Loma Santa y la Pachamama*. La Paz: Fundación Tierra.

Fundación Tierra. (2012). *La marcha indígena por el TIPNIS. La lucha en defensa de los territorios*. La Paz: Fundación Tierra.

Funder, M and Marani, M (2015). Local Bureaucrats as Bricoleurs. The Everyday Implementation Practices of County Environment Officers in Rural Kenya. *International Journal of the Commons* 9(1), pp.87–106.

Garcés, F. (2011). The Domestication of Indigenous Autonomies in Bolivia: From the Pact of Unity to the New Constitution. In Fabricant, B. and Gustafson, N. (eds). *Remapping Bolivia, Resources, Territory, and Indigeneity in a Plurinational State*. Santa Fe, School for Advanced Research, pp. 46–67.

García Linera, A. (2012). *Geopolitics of the Amazon: Patrimonial-Hacendado Power and Capitalist Accumulation*. La Paz – Bolivia: La Vicepresidencia del Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia.

Gaventa, J., (2004). Towards participatory governance: assessing the transformative possibilities. In: Hickey, S., Mohan, G. (Eds.), *From Tyranny to Transformation*. London: Zed Books.

Geenen, S., & Verweijen, J. (2017). Explaining fragmented and fluid mobilization in gold mining concessions in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. *The Extractive Industries and Society*, 4(4), pp. 758–765.

- Gibbs, G. (1988). *Learning by doing: a guide to teaching and learning methods*. Oxford: Further Education Unit.
- Giddens, A. (1984). *The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Giddens, A. (2009). *The Politics of Climate Change*. Cambridge: Polity
- Goldman, M. and Turner, M. D. (2011). Introduction. In M. Goldman, P. Nadasdy and M. D. Turner (eds). *Knowing Nature: Conversations at the Intersection of Political Ecology and Science Studies*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, pp. 1-23.
- Goldman, M., Nadasdy, P. and Turner, M.D. (2011). *Knowing Nature: Conversations at the Intersection of Political Ecology and Science Studies*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Gotkowitz, L. (2007). *A Revolution for Our Rights: Indigenous Struggles for Land and Justice in Bolivia, 1880-1952*. Durham: Duke University Press.
- Gómez-Baggethun, E., de Groot, R., Lomas, P.L., and Montes, C., (2010). The history of ecosystem services in economic theory and practice: From early notions to markets and payment schemes. *Ecological Economics*, 69(6), pp. 1209–1218.
doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2009.11.007
- Green, M. (2002). Gramsci Cannot Speak: Presentations and Interpretations of Gramsci's Concept of the Subaltern. *Rethinking Marxism: A Journal of Economics, Culture & Society*, 14(3), pp. 1-24.
- Guba, E.G and Lincoln, Y.S. (1994). Competing Paradigms in Qualitative Research. *Handbook of Qualitative Research 2*. London: SAGE publications, pp. 163-194.
- Guha, R. (1982). *Subaltern Studies VI: Writings on South Asian History and Society*. Oxford: University Press.
- Gudynas, E. (2009). Diez tesis urgentes sobre el nuevo extractivismo. *Extractivismo, política y sociedad*, pp. 187-225.
- Gudynas, E. (2013). Development alternatives in Bolivia: The impulse, the resistance, and the restoration. *NACLA Report on the Americas*, 46(1), pp. 22-26.
- Guston, D.H. (2001). Boundary Organizations in Environmental Policy and Science: An Introduction, *Science, Technology, and Human Values*. 26(4), pp.399–408.
- Haarstad, H (ed). (2012a). *New Political Spaces in Latin American Natural Resource Governance*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Haarstad, H. (2012b). Extracting justice? Critical themes and challenges in Latin American natural resource governance. In H. Haarstad (ed) *New Political Spaces in Latin American Natural Resource Governance*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp.1-16

- Haarstad, H., Campero, C., (2011). Participation in the Bolivian Hydrocarbon Sector: the 'double Discourse' and Limitations on Participatory Governance. *URBECO report 04/11*. Bergen: Center for Urban Ecology, University of Bergen.
- Haarstad, H. and Campero, C. (2012). Extraction, regional integration, and the enduring problem of local political spaces. In: Haarstad, H. (ed.) *New Political Spaces in Latin American Natural Resource Governance*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 83-106.
- Hajer, M. (2005). Coalitions, practices, and meaning in environmental politics: From acid rain to BSE. In Howarth, D., and Torfing, J. (eds.). *Discourse theory in European politics: identity, policy and governance*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 297-315.
- Hale, C. (2005). Neoliberal multiculturalism. The Remaking of Cultural Rights and Racial Dominance in Central America. *Political and Legal Anthropology Review*, 28(1), pp.10-19.
- Hall, A. (2011). GETTING REDD-Y: Conservation and climate change in Latin America. *Latin American Research Review* 46, pp. 184–210.
- Hall, A. (2012). *Forests and climate change: The social dimensions of REDD in Latin America*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Hall, D., P. Hirsch and T. Murray Li. (2011). *Powers of exclusion: land dilemmas in Southeast Asia*. Singapore: National University of Singapore Press.
- Halvorsen, S. (2018). Decolonising territory: Dialogues with Latin American knowledges and grassroots strategies. *Progress in Human Geography*. doi10.1177/0309132518777623
- Haraway, D. (1988). Situated knowledges: The science question in feminism and the privilege of partial perspective. *Feminist Studies*, 14(3), pp.575–599.
- Haraway, D. (1991). *Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: The Reinvention of Nature*. New York: Routledge
- Harre, R., Brockmeier, J. and Muhlhausen, P. (1999). *Greenspeak: A study of environmental discourse*. London: SAGE Publications.
- Harvey, D. (2003). *The new imperialism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Harvey, D. (2004). The 'new' imperialism: accumulation by dispossession. *Socialist Register*, 40(40), pp.63-87.
- Hayward, C.R. (2000). *De-facing Power*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hayward, C.R. and Lukes, S. (2008). Nobody to shoot? Power, structure, and agency: A dialogue. *Journal of Power*, 1(1), pp.5-20.
- Hecht, S. B. (2005). Soybeans, Development and Conservation on the Amazon Frontier. *Development and Change*, 36(2), pp.375-404.

- Hecht, S.B. (2014). Forests lost and found in tropical Latin America: The woodland 'green revolution'. *The Journal of Peasant Studies*, 41(5), pp.877–909.
- Hickey, S., Mohan, G., (2004). *Participation: from Tyranny to Transformation? Exploring New Approaches to Participation in Development*. London: Zed Books.
- Hindery, D. (2013). *From Enron to Evo Pipeline Politics, Global Environmentalism, and Indigenous Rights in Bolivia*. University of Arizona Press.
- Hirsch, C. (2012). Urfolk mot urfolk i Bolivia. *Verdensmagasinet X*, (5), pp.36- 43
- Hirsch, C. (2011). Bolivia and the TIPNIS conflict: positions, actors and interests. Presentation in panel "Grassroots and the state" at the NorlarNet conference.
- Hirsch, C. (2017). Makers and shapers of environmental policy making: Power and participation in forest legislation in Bolivia. *Journal of Rural Studies*, 50, pp.148-158.
- Hirsch, C. and McNeish, J.A. (2011). *Tracks through the jungle: Bolivia and the TIPNIS conflict*. NorLARNet: Norwegian Latin-American Research Network.
- Hirsch, C., Aguilar-Støen, M., McNeill, D. (2012a). Insights from the Field. REDD+ and indigenous peoples. Based on PHD research at European Universities. Centre for Development and the Environment.
- Hirsch, C., Aguilar-Støen, M., McNeill, D. (2012b). Insights from the Field. REDD+ and the role of local actors. Based on PHD research at European Universities. Centre for Development and the Environment.
- Hirsch, C., Aguilar-Støen, M., McNeill, D. (2012c). Insights from the Field. REDD+ and tenure rights. Based on PHD research at European Universities. Centre for Development and the Environment.
- Hirsch, C., Aguilar-Støen, M., McNeill, D. (2012d). Insights from the Field. Monitoring in REDD+. Based on PHD research at European Universities. Centre for Development and the Environment.
- Hirsch, C., Aguilar-Støen, M., McNeill, D.(2012e). Insights from the Field. REDD+, Indigenous Peoples, The role of the state, NGOs and other actors, Monitoring, Implementation and Tenure Rights. Insight document based on master thesis at Norwegian universities (until May 2012). Centre for Development and the Environment.
- Hoang, M.H., Do, T.H., Pham, M.T., van Noordwijk, M., Minang, P.A., (2013). Benefit distribution across scales to reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD+) in Vietnam. *Land Use Policy*, 31, pp.48–60. doi:10.1016/j.landusepol.2011.09.013.
- Horowitz, L.S. (2015). Local environment knowledge. In Perreault, T., Bridge, G. and McCarthy, J. (eds). *The Routledge Handbook of Political Ecology*. London: Routledge, pp.235-248.

Høiby, M. and Zenteno Hopp, J. (2015). Bolivia: emerging and traditional elites and the governance of the soy sector. In B. Bull and M. Aguilar-Støen (eds), *Environmental Politics in Latin America: Elite Dynamics, the Left Tide and sustainable development*. Oxon: Routledge, pp. 51-68

the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB). (2015). *Bolivia will improve road quality and safety with IDB support*. News release September 24, 2015. Available at: <https://www.iadb.org/en/news/news-releases/2015-09-24/network-of-paved-roads-in-bolivia%2C11258.html> [Accessed 30.15.2019].

El Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE). (2001). *Bolivia - características de población y vivienda. Censo Nacional de Población y Vivienda*. La Paz: Instituto Nacional de Estadística, [Results of the 2001 Census - Household Level].

El Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE). (2006): Instituto Nacional de Estadística. Encuesta de Hogares. Available at: <http://www.ine.gob.bo/anda/ddibrowser/?id=2>. [Accessed 15.05.2019].

El Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE). (2012). *Bolivia - Características de población y vivienda. Censo Nacional de Población y Vivienda*. La Paz: Instituto Nacional de Estadística, [Results of the 2012 Census - Household Level].

IPCC (2007). Summary for Policymakers. In Metz, B. Davidson, O.R., Bosch, P.R Dave, R. Meyer L.A. (eds). *Climate Change 2007: Mitigation. Contribution of Working Group III to the Fourth Assessment. Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change*. Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press,

Jasanoff, S. (1990). *The Fifth Branch Science Advisers and Policymakers*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Jasanoff, S. (2004). *States of Knowledge: The Co-Production of Science and the Social Order*. London: Routledge.

Isaac, J.C. (1987). Beyond the Three Faces of Power: A Realist Critique. *Polity*, 20(1), pp.4-31.

Jeppesen, A. (2001). Reading the Bolivian landscape of exclusion and inclusion: The law of popular participation. In N. Webster and L. Engberg-Pedersen (eds). *In the Name of the Poor*. London: Zed. 30-52.

Jessop, B. (2007). *State Power: A Strategic-Relational Approach*. Cambridge: Polity.

Kaimowitz, D., Thiele, G. and Pacheco, P. (1999). The effects of structural adjustment policies on deforestation and forest degradation in lowland Bolivia. *World Development* 27(3), pp.505–520.

Khan, M. (2013). Theoretical frameworks in political ecology and participatory nature/forest conservation: The necessity for a heterodox approach and the critical moment. *Journal of Political Ecology*, 20(1), pp.460-472.

Killeen, T.J., J.K., Guerra, A., Calzada, M., Correa, L., Calderon, V., Soria, L., Quezada, B. and Steininger, M.K. (2008). Total historical land-use change in eastern Bolivia: Who, where, when, and how much? *Ecology and Society*, 13(1).

Kincheloe, J. L., & McLaren, P. (2000). Rethinking critical theory and qualitative research. In N. Denzin & Y. Lincoln (Eds.), *Handbook of Qualitative Research*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, pp.279–314.

Kobayashi, A. (2009). Situated Knowledge, Reflexivity. In R. Kitchin and N. Thrift (eds). *International Encyclopedia of Human Geography*, pp. 138-143.

Kohl, B. and Bresnahan, R. (2010). Bolivia under Morales. Consolidating Power, Initiating Decolonization. *Latin American Perspectives*, 37(3), pp.5-17.

Kvale, S. and S. Brinckmann. (2009). *Interviews: Learning the craft of qualitative research interviewing*. Los Angeles: Sage.

Lalander, R. (2014). Rights of nature and the indigenous peoples in Bolivia and Ecuador: A Straitjacket for Progressive Development Politics? *Iberoamerican Journal of Development Studies*, 3(2), pp.148-173.

Larson, A. (2011). Forest tenure reform in the age of climate change: Lessons for REDD+. *Global Environmental Change*, 21(2), pp.540-549.

Larson A., and Ferroukhi L. (2003). Conclusiones. In Latina, Ferroukhi, L. (ed.). *Gestión Forestal Municipal en América* San José, Costa Rica: CIFOR/IDRC. pp. 213-233.

Larson, A. M. and E. Petkova. (2011). An Introduction to Forest Governance, People and REDD+ in Latin America: Obstacles and Opportunities. *Forests* 2(1), pp. 86-111.

Larson, A., Pacheco, P., Toni, F., and Vallejo Larios, M. (2006). *Exclusion e inclusion en la foresteria latinoamericana: hacia donde va la descentralizacion?* La Paz, Bolivia: CIFOR and IDRC, La Paz.

Larson, A. M., Pacheco, P., Toni, F. and Vallejo, M. (2007). Trends in Latin American forestry decentralisations: legal frameworks, municipal governments and forest-dependent groups. *International Forest Review*, 9(3), pp. 734–747.

Larson, A.M., Cronkleton, P., Barry, D. and Pacheco, P. (2008). *Tenure Rights and Beyond: Community access to forest resources in Latin America*. Bogor, Indonesia: CIFOR.

Larson, A. M., Barry, D., Dahal, G. R., Colfer, C. J. P. (eds.) (2010). *Forests for People: Community rights and forest tenure reform*. London: Earthscan.

Latour, B. (1999). *Pandora's hope: essays on the reality of science studies*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Leff, E. (2015). The power-full distribution of knowledge in political ecology. In T. Perreault, G. Bridge, and J. McCarthy, (eds.). *The Routledge Handbook of Political Ecology*. London: Routledge, pp.64-75.

- Leggett, M. and Lovell, H. (2011). Community perceptions of REDD+: a case study from Papua New Guinea. *Climate Policy*, 12(1), pp.1-20.
- Leitner, H. (1997). Reconfiguring the spatiality of power: the construction of a supranational migration framework for the European Union. *Political Geography*, 16(2), pp.123–143.
- Leitner, (2004). The politics of scale and networks of spatial connectivity: transnational interurban networks and the rescaling of political governance in Europe. In E. Sheppard and R.B. McMaster. *Scale and Geographic Inquiry: Nature, Society, and Method*, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd, pp.236 – 255.
- Leitner, H., Sheppard, E., and Sziarto, K. M. (2008). The spatialities of contentious politics. *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, 33(2), pp.157–172.
- Lemos, M. C. and Agrawal, A. (2006). Environmental governance. *Annual Review of Environment and Resources*, 31, pp.297-325.
- Li, T.M. (1996). Images of Community: Discourse and Strategy in Property Relations. *Development and Change*, 27(3), pp.501-527.
- Li, T.M. (2005). Beyond “The State” and failed schemes. *American Anthropologist*, 107,(3), pp. 383–394.
- LIDEMA. (2010). *Informe del Estado Ambiental de Bolivia 2010*. La Paz. Bolivia: LIDEMA
- Lincoln, Y. S., and Guba, E. G. (1985). *Naturalistic inquiry*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
- Liverman, D. (2004). Who Governs, at what scale and at what price? Geography, environmental governance, and the commodification of nature. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 94(4), pp. 734-738.
- Liverman, D. (2015). Reading climate change and climate governance as political ecologies. In T. Perreault, G. Bridge, and J. McCarthy (eds.), *The Routledge Handbook of Political Ecology*. London: Routledge, pp.303-319.
- Liverman, D. and Vilas, S. (2006). Neoliberalism and the Environment in Latin America. *Annual Review of Environment and Resources*, 31, pp.327–63.
- Lofthus, A. (2015). Political ecology as praxis. In T. Perreault, G. Bridge, and J. McCarthy, (eds.), *The Routledge Handbook of Political Ecology*. London: Routledge, pp.179-187.
- Lohmann, L. (2012). Financialization, commodification and carbon: The contradictions of neoliberal climate policy. *Socialist Register*, 48(85), pp.85–107.
- Lukes, S. (2005). *Power: A radical View*, 2nd ed. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Madeira, E. M., Sills, E., Brockhaus, M., Verchot, L. and Kanninen, M. (2010). *What is a REDD+ pilot? A preliminary typology based on early actions in Indonesia* (Vol. 26). Bogor, Indonesia: CIFOR.

- Mannheim, B. (1991). *The Language of the Inka since the European Invasion*. University of Texas Press.
- Marcus, G. E. (1997). Enography in/of the world system: The emergence of multi-sited ethnography. *Annual Review of Anthropology*, 24(1), pp.95-117.
- Marino, E. and Ribot, J. (2012). Adding insult to injury: Climate change, social stratification, and the inequities of intervention. *Global Environmental change*, 22(2), pp.323-558.
- Maraseni, T.N., Neupane, P.R., Lopez-Casero, F., Cadman, T., (2014). An assessment of the impacts of the REDD+ pilot project on community forests user groups (CFUGs) and their community forests in Nepal. *Journal of Environmental Management*, 136, pp.37-46. doi:10.1016/j.jenvman.2014.01.011.
- Martinez-Alier, J. (2001). Mining conflicts, environmental justice and valuation. *Journal of Hazardous Materials*, 86(1-3), pp.153-170.
- Martin, A., Dawson, N., Coolsaet, B., Corbera, E., Fraser, J., Lehmann, I., Rodríguez, I. (2016). Justice and conservation: the need to incorporate recognition. *Biological Conservation*, 197, pp.254-261.
- Massey, D. (1999). Power-geometries and the politics of space-time: The Hettner-Lecture in Human Geography 1998. Presented at the Heidelberg Department of Geography, University of Heidelberg.
- Massey, D. (2005). *For space*. London ; Thousand Oaks, Calif: SAGE.
- Maxwell, J.A. (1996). *Qualitative research design: an interactive approach*. London: Sage Publications.
- Maxwell, J.A. (2005). *Qualitative Research Design: An interactive approach*. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.
- Myers, E.C. (2007). Policies to Reduce Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD) in Tropical Forests. *Resources for the Future Magazine*, 07-50.
- Matulis, B.S., (2014). The economic valuation of nature: a question of justice? *Ecological Economics*, 104, pp.155-157. doi:1016/j.ecolecon.2014.04.010.
- McAfee, K., (1999). Selling nature to save it? Biodiversity and green developmentalism. *Environment and planning D: society and space*, 17(2), pp.133-154.
- McCarthy, J. and S. Prudham (2004). Neoliberal nature and the nature of neoliberalism. *Geoforum* 35(3), pp.275-283.
- McCusker, B. (2015). Political ecology and policy: a case study in engagement. In: T. Perreault, G. Bridge, and J. McCarthy, (eds.), *The Routledge Handbook of Political Ecology*. London: Routledge, pp. 188-197.

- McDermott, C.L., Irland, L.C. and Pacheco, P., (2015). Forest certification and legality initiatives in the Brazilian Amazon: Lessons for effective and equitable forest governance. *Forest Policy and Economics*, 50, pp.134-142. doi:10.1016/j.forpol.2014.05.011
- McKean, M. and Ostrom, E. (1995). Common property regimes in the forest: just a relic from the past? *Unasylva*, 46(180), pp.3-15.
- McNeish, J. A (2002). Globalisation and the reinvention of Andean tradition: The politics of community and ethnicity in highland Bolivia. *The Journal of Peasant Studies*, 29(3/4), pp.228-269.
- McNeish, J.A. (2006). Stones on the road: The politics of participation and the generation of crisis in Bolivia. *Bulletin of Latin American Research*, 25(2), pp. 220-240.
- McNeish, J.A. (2008). Constitutionalism in an Insurgent State: Rethinking Legal Empowerment of the Poor in a Divided Bolivia. *Rights and Legal Empowerment in Eradicating Poverty*, pp.69-96.
- McNeish, J. (2012). On Curses and Devils: Resource Wealth and Sovereignty in an Autonomous Tarija, Bolivia. In McNeish, J.A & Logan, O (eds) (2012) *Flammable Societies: Studies in the Socio-Economics of Oil and Gas*. Pluto Press: London & NY, pp. 47-69.
- McNeish, J.A. (2013). Extraction, Protest and Indigeneity in Bolivia: The TIPNIS Effect. *Latin American and Caribbean Ethnic Studies*, 8(2), pp.221-242.
- McNeish, J.A. and Logan, O. (eds) (2012). *Flammable societies: Studies in the socio-economics of oil and gas*. London: Pluto Press.
- McNeish, J.A., Borchgrevink, A. and Logan, O. (eds) (2015) *Contested powers: The politics of energy and development in Latin America*. London: Zed Books.
- McNeish, J.A. and Hirsch, C. (07.10.2011). Den lange marsjen - Bolivias urfolks kamp for sine territorier. *Klassekampen*.
- Meckling, J. (2011). The globalization of carbon trading: Transnational business coalitions in climate politics. *Global Environmental Politics*, 11, pp.26–50.
- Medeiros, C. (2001). Civilizing the Popular?: The Law of Popular Participation and the Design of a New Civil Society in 1990s Bolivia. *Critique of Anthropology*, 21(4), pp.401-425.
- Medina, J. (2006). *Suma Qamaña. Por una convivencia postindustrial*. La Paz: Garza Azul Editores.
- Merlan, F., de Costa, R., Greenhouse, C., Hale, C.R., Kymlicka, W., Ramos, A.R., Sissons, J. and Merlan, F., (2009). Indigeneity: Global and local. *Current anthropology*, 50(3), pp.303-333.
- Ministerio de Planificación del Desarrollo (2009). *El Plan Nacional de Desarrollo "Bolivia Digna, Soberana, Productiva y Democrática para Vivir Bien*. 2009-2014.

- Moore, D. (1993). Contesting terrain in Zimbabwe's eastern highlands: political ecology, ethnography, and peasant resource struggles. *Economic Geography*, 69(4), pp.380-401.
- Morales, M., Gianotten, V., Devisscher, M., and Pacheco, D. (2013). *Hablemos de tierra. Minifundio, gestión territorial, bosques e impuesto agrario en Bolivia*. La Paz: Plural Editores.
- Müller, R., Pacheco, P. and Montero, J.C. (2014). *The context of deforestation and forest degradation in Bolivia: Drivers, agents and institutions*. Bogor, Indonesia: CIFOR.
- Muradian, R. and Martinez Alier, J. (2001). South–North materials flow: history and environmental repercussions. *Innovation: The European Journal of Social Science Research*, 14 (2), pp. 171-187.
- Nasi, R., Putz, F.E., Pacheco, P., Wunder, S. and Salvador, A. (2011). Sustainable forest management and carbon in tropical Latin America: the case for REDD+. *Forests*, 2(1), pp.200-217.
- Neely, A.H. and Nguse, T. (2015). Relationships and research methods: entanglements, interactions, and diffraction. In: T. Perreault, G. Bridge, and J. McCarthy, (eds.), *The Routledge Handbook of Political Ecology*. London: Routledge, pp.140-149.
- Nencel, L. (2014). Situating reflexivity: Voices, positionalities and representations in feminist ethnographic texts. *Women's Studies International Forum* Vol. 43, pp. 75-83.
- Neumann, R.P. (2015). Nature Conservation. In Perreault, T., Bridge, G. and McCarthy, J. (eds). *The Routledge Handbook of Political Ecology*. London: Routledge, pp.391-405.
- Newton, T. et al. (2011). Responses to social constructionism and critical realism in organization studies. *Organization Studies*, 32(1), pp.7-26.
- NORAD (2012). *Real-Time Evaluation of Norway's International Climate and Forest Initiative - Lessons Learned from Support to Civil Society Organisations*. Evaluation conducted by LTS International in collaboration with Indufor Oy, Ecometrica and Christian Michelsen Institute. Report 5/2012 Evaluation. Norad Evaluation Department. <https://norad.no/globalassets/import-2162015-80434-am/www.norad.no-ny/filarkiv/evalueringsavdelings-filer/evaluation-report-civil-society-climate-and-forest-initiative-2012.pdf>
- Osborne, T. (2015). Tradeoffs in carbon commodification: A political ecology of common property forest governance. *Geoforum*, 67, pp.64-77.
- Osborne, T. (2018). Indigenous REDD: Carbon Markets and Territorial Land Rights in the Amazon Rainforest. In Bigger, P and J. Dempsey, Reflecting on Neoliberal Natures. *Environment and Planning E*.
- Osborne, T., Bellante, L. and von Hedemann, N. (2014). Indigenous Peoples and REDD+: A Critical Perspective. *Indigenous Peoples' Biocultural Climate Change Assessment Initiative*. IPCC. Christensen Fund

- Paavola, J., (2004). Protected areas governance and justice: theory and the European Union's habitats directive. *Environmental Science and Policy*. 1 (1), 59e77.
- Pacheco, D. (2014). *Una mirada a la política de bosques en Bolivia: por la descolonización de las políticas*. La Paz, Universidad de Cordillera.
- Pacheco, P. (2006). *Descentralización forestal en Bolivia. Implicaciones en el gobierno de los recursos forestales y el bienestar de los grupos marginados*. CIFOR..La Paz: Plural editors.
- Pacheco, P. (2007). El regimen forestal boliviano: una mirada retrospectiva a diez anos de su implementacion. *Recursos Naturales y Ambiente* 49-50, pp.58-67.
- Pacheco, P., Aguilar-Støen, M., Börner, J., Etter, A., Putzel, L. L. and Diaz, M. D. C. V. (2010). Landscape transformation in tropical Latin America: Assessing trends and policy implications for REDD+. *Forests*, 2, pp.1–29.
- Pacheco, P., Barry, D., Cronkleton, P. and Larson, A. (2011). The Recognition of Forest Rights in Latin America: Progress and Shortcomings of Forest Tenure Reforms. *Society & Natural Resources*, 25(6), pp.556-571.
- Patton, M.Q. (2002). *Qualitative Research & Evaluation Methods*. London: Sage Publications.
- Paulson, S. and Gezon, L.L. (2005). *Political ecology across spaces, scales, and social groups*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University.
- Peluso, N. L. (1992). *Rich Forests, Poor People: Resource Control and Resistance in Java*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Peluso, N.L. and Harwell, E. (2001). Territory, custom, and the cultural politics of ethnic war in West Kalimantan Indonesia. In N.L. Peluso and Watts, M. (eds.), *Violent Environments*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 39-62.
- Peluso, N.L. and Vandergeest, P. (2011). Political ecologies of war and forests: Counterinsurgencies and the making of national natures. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 101(3), pp.587-608.
- Peet, R. and Watts, M. (eds.) (1996). *Liberation ecologies: environment, development and social movements*, London: Routledge
- Peet, R. and Watts, M. (eds.). (2004). *Liberation Ecologies: Environment, Development, Social Movements*. Oxon: Routledge.
- Peet, R., Robbins, P. and Watts, M. (2011a). Global Nature. In R. Peet; P. Robbins and M. Watts (eds.), *Global Political Ecology*. Abingdon UK: Routledge, pp.1–48.
- Peet, P., Robbins, P. and M. Watts (eds.). (2011b). *Global Political Ecology*. Abingdon, UK: Routledge.

- Peluso, N.L. and Vandergeest, P. (2011). Political ecologies of war and forests: Counterinsurgencies and the making of national natures. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*: 101 (3), pp.587-608.
- Peoples Agreement (2010). *World People's Agreement on Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth*. Tiquipaya, Cochabamba, Bolivia. Available at: <https://pwccc.wordpress.com/2010/04/24/peoples-agreement/> [Accessed 24.10.18].
- Perreault, T. (2005). State restructuring and the scale politics of rural water governance in Bolivia. *Environment and Planning A* 37(2), pp.263-284.
- Perreault, T. (2008). *Natural gas, indigenous mobilization and the Bolivian state*. Geneva, Switzerland: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development.
- Perreault, T. (2009). Assessing the limits of neoliberal environmental governance in Bolivia. In J. Burdick, P. Oxhorn and K. Roberts (eds.), *Beyond Neoliberalism in Latin America? New York*: Palgrave Macmillan, pp.135-156.
- Perreault, T., Bridge, G. and McCarthy, J. (2015). *The Routledge Handbook of Political Ecology*. Oxon: Routledge.
- Pini, B. (2004). On being a nice country girl and an academic feminist: using reflexivity in rural social research, *Journal of Rural Studies*, 20(2), pp.169-179.
- Pirard, R. (2012). Market-based instruments for biodiversity and ecosystem services: a lexicon. *Environmental Science & Policy* 19, pp.59–68.
- Plowman, S. (1995). Engaging reflexivity and positionality: Qualitative research on female single parents and residential location choice. *New Zealand Geographer*, 51(1), pp.19-21.
- Polanyi, K. (1957) (original 1944). *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time*. Boston: Beacon Press by arrangement with Rinehart & Company Inc.
- Postero, N. G. (2009). Now We Are Citizens: Indigenous Politics in Postmulticultural Bolivia *PoLAR: Political and Legal Anthropology Review*, 32(2), pp.343-346.
- Postero, N. G. (2010). The struggle to create a radical democracy in Bolivia. *Latin American Research Review*, pp.59-78.
- PRATEC (Proyecto Andino de Tecnologías Campesinas) (Ed.) (2002). *Allin Kawsay: El bienestar en las concepciones andino-amazónicas*. Lima: PRATEC.
- Prowse, M. (2008). Locating and Extending Livelihoods Research. Creating and sharing knowledge to help end poverty. *Brooks World Poverty Institute Working Paper*, 37.
- Prudham, S. (2004). Poisoning the well: neo-liberalism and the contamination of municipal water in Walkerton, Ontario. *Geoforum* 35(3), pp. 343-359.
- Prudham, S. (2005). *Knock on Wood: Nature as Commodity in Douglas-Fir County*. New York: Routledge.

Prudham, S. (2009). Commodification. In Noel Castree, David Demeritt, Diana Liverman, and Bruce Rhoads (eds.). *Companion to Environmental Geography*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, pp.123-142.

Prudham, S. (2015). Property and commodification. In. Perreault, T., Bridge, G. and McCarthy, J. (eds). *The Routledge Handbook of Political Ecology*. London: Routledge. pp.430-445.

Quijano, A. (2000). Colonialidad del poder y clasificación social. *Journal of World-Systems Research*, 5(2), pp.342–386.

Ragin, C.C. (1994). *Constructing Social Research: The Unity and Diversity of Method*. Newbury Park, California: Pine Forge Press.

Redo, R. Millington, A. and Hinderey, D. (2011). Deforestation Dynamics and Policy Changes in Bolivia's Post-neoliberal Era. *Land Use Policy* 28(1), pp.227-241. DOI: 10.1016/j.landusepol.2010.06.004

Reyes-García, V., J. Paneque-Gálvez, P. Bottazzi, A. C. Luz, M. Gueze, M. J. Macía, M. Orta-Martínez and P. Pacheco. (2014). Indigenous land reconfiguration and fragmented institutions: A historical political ecology of Tsimane' lands (Bolivian Amazon). *Journal of Rural Studie*., 34(0), pp.282-291.

Ribot, J., & Larson, A. (Eds.) (2005). *Democratic decentralization through a natural resource lens*. London: Routledge

Robbins, P. (2004). *Political Ecology: A Critical Introduction*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing

Robertson, M. (2015). Environmental governance: political ecology and the state. In Perreault, T., Bridge, G. and McCarthy, J. (eds) *The Routledge Handbook of Political Ecology*. London: Routledge, 457-466.

Rocheleau, D. (2011). Rooted networks, webs of relation, and the power of situated science: Bringing the models back down to earth in Zambrana. In M.J. Goldman, P. Nadasdy and M.D. Turner (eds.), *Knowing nature: Conversations at the intersection of political ecology and science studies*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, pp.209-225.

Roe, E.M. (1991). Development narratives, or making best of blueprint development, *World Development*, 19(4), pp.287-300.

Roe, E. (1999). *Except-Africa, Remaking Development, Rethinking Power*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.

Rosa, H., Barry,D., Kandel,S. and Dimas, L. (2003). *Compensation for Environmental Services and Rural Communities. Lessons from the Americas and Key Issues for Strengthening Community Strategies*. San Salvador: Fundación PRISMA.

Sayre, N. F. (2011). Commentary: Scale, rent, and symbolic capital: Political economy and emerging rural landscapes. *GeoJournal* 76(4), pp.437-439.

- Sayre, N. F. (2015). Scales and politics. In T. Perreault, G. Bridge, and J. McCarthy, (eds.), *The Routledge Handbook of Political Ecology*. London: Routledge, pp.504-516.
- Schilling-Vacaflor, A. (2010). Bolivia's New Constitution: Towards Participatory Democracy and Political Pluralism? *GIGA Working Paper GIGA*. No. 141.
- Schroeder, H. (2010). Agency in international climate negotiations: The case of indigenous peoples and avoided deforestation. *International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics*, 10(4), pp.317-332.
- Shanin, T. (1971). *Peasants and Peasant Societies*. Middlesex: Penguin Books.
- Shields, V. R. and Dervin, B. (1993). Sense-Making in Feminist Social Science Research: A Call to Enlarge Methodological Options of Feminist Studies. *Women Studies International Forum* 16 (1), pp.65- 81.
- Sieder, R. (2002). *Multiculturalism in Latin America*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Smart, C. (1984). *The ties that Bind: Marriage and the Reproduction of Patriarchal Relations*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
- Smith P., M. Bustamante, H. Ahammad, H. Clark, H. Dong, E.A. Elsiddig, H. Haberl, R. Harper, J. House, M. Jafari, O. Masera, C. Mbow, N.H. Ravindranath, C.W. Rice, C. Robledo Abad, A. Romanovskaya, F. Sperling, and F. Tubiello, (2014). Agriculture, Forestry and Other Land Use (AFOLU). Chapter 11 In Edenhofer, O., R. Pichs-Madruga, Y. Sokona, E. Farahani, S. Kadner, K. Seyboth, A. Adler, I. Baum, S. Brunner, P. Eickemeier, B. Kriemann, J. Savolainen, S. Schlömer, C. von Stechow, T. Zwickel and J.C. Minx (eds.). *Climate Change 2014: Mitigation of Climate Change. Contribution of Working Group III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change*. Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press.
- Stanley, Liz and Wise, Sue (1990). Method, methodology and epistemology in feminist research processes. In Liz Stanley (ed.). *Feminist praxis*. London: Routledge. pp.20-60.
- Stephan, B. and Lane, R. (eds). (2015). *The politics of carbon markets*. London: Routledge.
- Stern, N. (2006). *The economics of climate change: The Stern Review*. London: H.M. Treasury.
- Sundberg, A. (2015) Ethics, entanglements, and political ecology. In T. Perreault, G. Bridge, and J. McCarthy, (eds.), *The Routledge Handbook of Political Ecology*. London: Routledge, 117-126.
- Sundberg, J. (2003). Masculinist Epistemologies and the Politics of Fieldwork in Latin Americanist Geography. *The Professional Geographer* 55(2), pp.181-191.
- Sundberg, J., (2004). Identities-in-the-making: Conservation, gender, and race in the Maya Biosphere Reserve, Guatemala. *Gender, Place and Culture*, 11(1), pp.44-66.

Sunderlin, W.D., Ekapatni, A.D., Sills, E.O., Duchelle, A.E., Kweka, D., Diprose, R., Daggart, N., Ball, S., Lima, R., Enright, A., Torres, J., Hartanto, H. and Toniolo, A. (2014). *The challenge of establishing REDD+ on the ground: Insights from 23 subnational initiatives in six countries* (Paper 104). Bogor, Indonesia: CIFOR.

Svarstad, H. (2005). A global political ecology of bioprospecting. In Paulson, S. and L. Gezon (eds.) *Political ecology across spaces, scales and social groups*. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, pp.239-256.

Svarstad, H., Benjaminsen, T. and Overå, R.(2018). Power theories in political ecology. *Journal of Political Ecology*. 25.

Swyngedouw, E. (2004). Globalisation or 'glocalisation'? Networks, territories and rescaling. *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 17(1), pp. 25-48.

Swyngedouw, E. (2007). Technonatural revolution: the scalar politics of Franco's hydro-social dream for Spain, 1939-1975. *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, 32, pp.9-28.

Sylvain, R. (2002). Land, Water and Truth': San Identity and Global Indigenism. *American Anthropologist*, 104(4), pp.1074–1085.

Taylor, P.J. (2012). Agency, Structuredness, and the Production of Knowledge within Intersecting Processes, in D. Goldman; P. Nadasdy and M. Turner (eds), *Knowing Nature. Conversations at the Intersection of Political Ecology and Science Studies*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 81–98.

Thagaard, T. (2002). *Systematikk og innlevelse. En innføring i kvalitativ metode*. Bergen: Fagbokforlaget.

Tsing, A. (1999). Becoming a tribal elder, and other fantasies of green development. In Tania Li (ed.). *Transforming the Indonesian Uplands*. Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Press, pp.157-200.

Tsing, A. (2004). *Friction: An Ethnography of Global Connection*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Turner, M.D. (2009). Ecology, natural and political. In N. Castree, D. Demeritt, D. Liverman, & B. Rhoads (eds.). *A companion to environmental geography*. Malden: Blackwell, pp. 181–197.

Tyuleneva, V. (2010). *Cuatro viajes a la Amazonía boliviana*. . La Paz, Bolivia: Foro Boliviano sobre Medio Ambiente y Desarrollo. pp.155.

Valdivia, G. (2015). Eco-governmentality. In Perreault, T., Bridge, G. and McCarthy, J. (eds). *The Routledge Handbook of Political Ecology*. London: Routledge, pp.467-480.

- Ulloa, A. (2015). Environment and development. Reflections from Latin America. In: Perreault, T., Bridge, G. and McCarthy, J. (eds). *The Routledge Handbook of Political Ecology*. London: Routledge, pp.320-331.
- UN (2015). *Forests*. United Nations. Sustainable Development Knowledge Platform. <https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/topics/forests> (Last accessed 29.06.2019).
- UNFCCC (1992). *United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 1992*. Available at: <https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf> [Accessed 29.05.19].
- UNFCCC (1998). *Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework convention on climate change*. United Nations.
- UNFCCC (2010). *FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1. Report of the Conference of the Parties on its sixteenth session, held in Cancun from 29 November to 10 December 2010. Decision 1/CP.16*. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.
- UNFCCC secretariat (2016). Key decisions relevant for reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries (REDD+). Decision booklet REDD+. https://unfccc.int/files/land_use_and_climate_change/redd/application/pdf/compilation_redd_decision_booklet_v1.2.pdf [Accessed 04.07.19].
- Urioste, M. (2012). Concentration and “foreignisation” of land in Bolivia. *Canadian Journal of Development Studies / Revue canadienne d'études du développement*, 33(4), pp.439-457.
- Van Cott, D.L. (2000). *The Friendly Liquidation of the Past: The Politics of Diversity in Latin America*. Pittsburg: University of Pittsburgh Pre.
- Van Cott, D.L. (2005). *From Movements to Parties in Latin America: The Evolution of Ethnic Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- van Dam, C. (2011). Indigenous Territories and REDD in Latin America: Opportunity or Threat? *Forests* 2(1), pp.394-414.
- Vandergeest, P., and Peluso, N.L. (2015). Political Forests. In R. Bryant (ed.), *The International Handbook of Political Ecology*. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, pp. 162-175
- Vatn, A. (2005). *Institutions and the Environment*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Vatn, A., (2010). An institutional analysis of payments for environmental services. *Ecological Economics*, 69(6), pp.1245-1252.
- Vatn, A. and Vedeld, P. (2011). Getting ready! A study of national governance structures for REDD+. *Noragric Report*, (59).
- Vogel, J. H., (1992). *Privatisation as a Conservation Policy*. South Melbourne: CIRCIT.
- Walker, P.A. (2005). Political ecology: where is the ecology? *Progress in Human Geography*, 29(1), pp.73 – 82.

Wallbott, L. (2014). Indigenous peoples in UN REDD+ negotiations: “Importing Power” and lobbying for rights through discursive interplay management. *Ecology and Society*, 19(1). doi:10.5751/ES-06111-190121

Wallerstein, I. (1974). *The modern World System I: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century*. New York: Academic Press.

Wanderley, F., Mokrani, L and Guimaraes, A. (2012). The Socio-economic Dynamics of Gas in Bolivia. In McNeish, J.A & Logan, O (eds) (2012) *Flammable Societies: Studies in the Socio-Economics of Oil and Gas*. Pluto Press: London & NY, pp.176-200.

Watts, M. (1983). *Silent Violence: Food, Famine and Peasantry in Northern Nigeria*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Watts, M. (1990). Review of land degradation and society, by Piers Blaikie and Harold Brookfield, 1987. *Capitalism, Nature, Socialism* 4(12331), pp.123–31.

Webber, J. R. (2011). *From rebellion to reform in Bolivia: Class struggle, indigenous liberation, and the politics of Evo Morales*. Chicago, Il.: Haymarket Books.

Webber, J.R. (2017). *The Last Day of Oppression and the First Day of the Same. The Politics and Economics of the New Latin American Left*. London: Pluto Press.

Weisse, M. and Goldman,L. (2019). The world lost a Belgium-sized area of primary rainforests last year. *Global Forest Watch*. Last updated 25th of April 2019. <https://blog.globalforestwatch.org/data-and-research/world-lost-belgium-sized-area-of-primary-rainforests-last-year> [Accessed 29.06.19].

Williams, R. W. (1999). Environmental injustice in America and its politics of scale. *Political Geography*, 18(1), pp.49–73.

Wolford, W. and Keene.S. (2015). Social Movements. In Perreault, T., Bridge, G. and McCarthy, J. (eds), *The Routledge Handbook of Political Ecology*. London: Routledge, pp.573-584.

World Bank. (2015). *Bolivia - Country partnership framework for the period FY16-FY20*. Washington, D.C.: World Bank Group.

World Bank (2019). The World Bank In Bolivia. Overview. Last updated Apr 09, 2019. <https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/bolivia/overview> [Accessed 05.07.19].

Wunder, S., (2005). *Payments for Environmental Services: Some Nuts and Bolts*. Bogor, Indonesia: CIFOR.

Wunder, S., (2013). When payments for environmental services will work for conservation. *Conservation Letters*, 6(4), pp.230–237.

Yeh, E.T. and Bryan, J. (2015). Indigeneity. In Perreault, T., Bridge, G. and McCarthy, J. (eds), *The Routledge Handbook of Political Ecology*. London: Routledge, pp.531-544.

Yin, R. K. (2009). *Case study research: Design and methods*. 4th Ed. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Zimmerer, K.S. (1993). Agricultural biodiversity and peasant rights to subsistence in the central Andes during Inca rule. *Journal of Historical Geography*, 19(1), pp.15-32.
doi:10.1006/jhge.1993.1003.

Zimmerer, K.S (2011). 'Conservation booms,' land use transitions, and environmental governance in Latin America, 1985-2008 (Mexico, Costa Rica, Brazil, Peru, Bolivia). *Latin American Research Review*, 46(3), pp.452-474.

Zimmerer, K.S. (2012). The indigenous Andean concept of kawsay, the politics of knowledge and development, and the borderlands of environmental sustainability in Latin America. *Pmla*, 127(3), pp.600-606.

Zimmerer, K. S. (2015). Environmental governance through “Speaking Like an Indigenous State” and respatializing resources: Ethical livelihood concepts in Bolivia as versatility or verisimilitude?. *Geoforum*, 64, pp.314-324.

Zimmerer, K. S., Bassett, T., (eds). (2003). *Political Ecology: An Integrative Approach to Geography and Environment-Development Studies*. New York: Guilford Press.
Press.

**PART II:
COMPILATION OF PAPERS**

PAPER 1

The following paper is a book chapter published by Palgrave Macmillan in *Environmental Governance in Latin America. Conflicts, projects and possibilities* in 2016 as Open Access <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-137-50572-9>

Aguilar Støen, M., Toni, F. and **Hirsch, C.** (2016). Forest Governance in Latin America: Strategies for Implementing REDD. In de Castro et al. (eds) *Environmental governance in Latin America. Conflicts, projects and possibilities*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

8

Forest Governance in Latin America: Strategies for Implementing REDD

Mariel Aguilar-Støen, Fabiano Toni and Cecilie Hirsch

Introduction

Global interest in and attention to forests have grown as concerns about global warming and climate change have taken a heightened position in international policy debates. Forests have been repositioned in international arenas as repositories of global value for their contribution to carbon sequestration and climate mitigation (Fairhead and Leach, 2003; Peet, Robbins and Watts, 2011). In this context, Latin American forests are seen as globally important in fighting climate change.

Carbon emissions in developing countries, particularly in Latin America, are related mostly to land-use and land-cover change. In Latin America, energy accounts for only 28% of regional emissions, whereas land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF) accounts for 67% (Barcena et al., 2010). Forests cover about 11.1 million km² and savannahs 3.3 million km², comprising several different types of vegetation. The region as a whole has the world's greatest forest loss (Pacheco et al., 2010). Most of the forest conversion in Latin America occurs in the Amazon basin. Some countries are already being pressed to reduce emissions related to land-cover change, particularly deforestation. Political pressure comes from the international arena in many forms and is exerted by several actors: sovereign states, international organizations, media, civil society networks and others.

Several Latin American governments have turned to climate policies as an opportunity to improve environmental governance. Current discussions focus on a set of policies known as REDD in developing countries plus carbon-sequestering forest activities. REDD was originally

designed as a payment for environmental services – that is, a voluntary transaction where a well-defined service (or a land-use system likely to secure that service) is being “bought by a buyer from a provider, if and only if the provider secures the service provision” (Wunder, 2005). REDD is based on the idea that it is possible to reduce deforestation by offering economic compensation to forest users for not changing the use of forestlands. It is seen as a win-win approach that would potentially address the trade-offs between forest conservation and economic development. Some analysts claim that REDD projects have the potential to generate enough money to end deforestation in tropical countries (Nepstad et al., 2009).

Although originally presented as an “apolitical” technological fix (cf. Li, 2007), REDD has encountered much criticism, and early proposals faced fierce political resistance. The neoliberal idea of the commodification of nature seemed repellent to individuals and even to countries, which fear that developed countries would use their economic power to increase or leave unaddressed their carbon emissions at the expense of developing countries. There were also fears that REDD would benefit actors who have historically been responsible for deforestation, such as ranchers and large-scale farmers, while excluding the less privileged forest-dwellers, who cannot bear the transaction costs of carbon markets and do not even have the title to their lands (Boyd, Gutierrez and Chang, 2007; Blom, Sunderland and Murdiyarto, 2010).

REDD proved to be much more complex than a simple carbon-market arrangement. Since it is a project “in the making”, it necessarily leaves room for bargaining and negotiations as to how forest and climate policies will take shape in specific contexts. As a result, REDD quickly moved from strictly carbon storage to having multiple objectives, including biodiversity conservation and the enhancement of local livelihoods (Angelsen and McNeill, 2012). This even more complex mechanism is not yet settled. There are important struggles at international, national and local levels to define how REDD should be implemented.

REDD can be seen as a multilevel project of environmental governance. By environmental governance we mean “a set of mechanisms, formal and informal institutions and practices by way of which social order is produced through controlling that which is related to the environment and natural resources” (Bull and Aguilar-Støen, 2015: 5). Some decisions regarding REDD are taken at the global level, other decisions are taken at the national level and finally actions, projects and initiatives are implemented at the local level. This complexity might result in the hybridization of REDD, and, as the idea is appropriated by different

actors, such hybridization might also result in subtle or open power struggles among actors at the different levels.

REDD emerged as a global initiative from the climate negotiations, but it is going to be implemented in countries with very different approaches to combating deforestation, technical capacity, institutional and political settings, levels of decentralization of forest governance, budgets and so forth. Therefore it is possible to expect REDD to unfold in quite different ways across the region. To understand and analyse the diversity in which REDD is evolving in Latin America, in this chapter our analytical focus will move across different scales and will make use of some paradigmatic examples, with special emphasis on the countries representing such cases. Our analysis will show that despite their initial opposition, some groups of actors support REDD and are taking advantage of the new opportunities that the scheme offers. REDD initiatives, for example, have become an economic opportunity for both state and national governments as well as for international and regional environmental NGOs.

This chapter is organized as follows. After this introduction, we present our main analytical argument. The following section examines the phased approach to implement REDD in Latin America. In the third section, we present what we have identified as three general strategies to implement and shape REDD across the region. In the next section, we discuss some examples of how pilot projects are taking off in the region. Finally, we present our conclusions.

Hybrid environmental governance and REDD

Forests in Latin America are territories where several conflictive interests meet. However, there is no consensus on the conceptualization of the causes and consequences of deforestation. Diverse conceptualizations of deforestation are closely related to claims over forest management and over resources (Fairhead and Leach, 2003). Forests are socially, culturally, ecologically, economically and symbolically valuable to different actors, including indigenous peoples, local users, governments, corporations, illegal cartels, NGOs, nations and the globe, albeit in different ways and for different reasons (Fairhead and Leach, 2003). All these actors have different potentials to exert power and access arenas to influence REDD-related policy-making.

The very notion of “environmental governance” implies that there is some sort of hybridity in terms of the actors, and in the mechanisms and practices it involves. This means that both public and private

actors participate on various scales, in producing models and frames for governance. By focusing on REDD we pay attention to emergent governance arrangements that include state actors, subnational governments, multilateral institutions, scientists, NGOs and business (Karkkainen, 2004).

The conceptualization of REDD, its formulation, negotiation and implementation involve a range of actors because the necessary resources for such tasks are not controlled by a single entity. As our analysis will suggest, these resources function as sources of legitimacy for the participation of different actors in REDD. By legitimacy, we mean who is making “the rules of the game” in REDD preparations and negotiations. We see legitimacy as a source of power to create and support certain policies and practices, while simultaneously hindering others. Legitimacy rests, among other things, on the shared acceptance of rules by different groups of actors with shared interests on the issue to be governed (Bernstein, 2004).

REDD, however, is still a project “in the making”. Because of that, this chapter only aims to examine two processes: (1) how different countries engage with REDD; and (2) how different actors within these countries get involved in a range of activities seen as necessary for the future implementation of REDD on the ground. In other words, our analysis will not focus on the outcomes of the REDD initiative because such outcomes are still uncertain.

Our proposition in this chapter is that REDD as a concept has been “black-boxed” (Latour, 1987; Forsyth, 2003; Goldman, Nadasdy and Turner, 2011). By that we mean that those engaged in REDD do not consider it necessary to further discuss or question what REDD means. This does not imply, however, that there are no other actors – who perhaps are not directly involved in REDD negotiations – who actually question and challenge the initiative. REDD policy-making reflects how different interests are negotiated between different actors on various geographical scales. In this chapter we will argue that a “distortion” of REDD – from a simple market mechanism to a complex multistakeholder, contested political processes – is one of the ways that the idea gets wide support from a range of actors and makes the hybridization we refer to above possible. REDD as a concept is broad and vague enough to permit different interpretations that would fit the goals of different actors (Angelsen and McNeill, 2012). This has allowed countries in Latin America to pursue different paths regarding the emphasis given to how to finance REDD (fund based or carbon markets) and what issues should be addressed before REDD actions are implemented.

To support our proposition we discuss three different strategies used by Latin American countries to engage or resist the REDD initiative. Also, the “distortion” works at more local levels by allowing different actors to get involved in planning activities. We will also discuss planning activities in the Amazon region to support our proposition and will show how there are some key resources that galvanize the participation of certain actors in REDD preparations. By key resources, we mean resources that can be “traded” to gain legitimacy to participate in REDD processes at local levels. As we will show below, access to networks and knowledge production are among such key resources.

REDD in Latin America and the phased approach

In 2010, during the conference of the parties of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), governments agreed to adopt a phased approach for REDD. The idea of a phased approach came from a report (Angelsen et al. 2009) prepared by the Meridian Institute for the Government of Norway. The idea put forward by the report by Angelsen et al. (2009) was adopted by the UNFCCC Cancun agreement¹ (Agrawal, Nepstad and Chhatre, 2011). The Cancun agreement stipulates that countries participating in REDD should implement activities by phases. These phases are (1) development of national REDD strategy plans and capacity-building; (2) implementation of national plan and demonstration activities; and (3) results-based actions with full measuring, reporting and verification. So far, most Latin American countries involved in REDD are in Phase 1. Guyana is in Phase 1 but has already received funding from Norway that would correspond to phases 2 and 3; Brazil is in Phase 2, entering Phase 3 (Figure 8.1).

There are many mechanisms for financing Phase 1, including public funds from the countries implementing REDD or from donors: the Forest Investment Programme supported by the Climate Investment (Multilateral Investment Banks), the UN-REDD programme, and the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) of the World Bank. The latter two are the main sources of funding, and some countries such as Bolivia,² Peru and Ecuador have applied to both. On the other hand, Brazil established its own Amazon Fund in 2008, through which reduced deforestation is going to be financed in the country. Guyana established the Guyana REDD investment fund (GRIF) in 2010 as part of a cooperation agreement with Norway in the framework of the Low Carbon Development Strategy (LCDS) of Guyana.³ The LCDS of Guyana was prepared by the consultancy firm McKinsey,



Figure 8.1 Latin American countries in relation to their participation in REDD and the phased approach

and Guyana's president embarked upon an international campaign to attract funding for the initiative. Venezuela and French Guyana do not participate in any REDD initiatives under the United Nations or the World Bank.

In 2013, Norway was the single major financial contributor to the UN-REDD Programme, FCPF, the Brazilian Amazon Fund and the GRIF. Norway contributes 82% of the total budget of the UN-REDD Programme, 44% of the total budget of FCPF, 87% of the total budget of the Amazon Fund, and 100% of the GRIF.⁴ The country is one of the major players in defining REDD at the global level and has some influence on the way in which REDD is advancing at national levels.

The incorporation of the phased approach launched by the Meridian report in the UNFCCC's Cancun agreement contributes to stressing a particular way of prioritizing the activities necessary for the implementation of REDD. This particular approach is being reproduced in national contexts because its proponents believe in the technical superiority of the approach and because it promotes comparability and compatibility between countries, but not necessarily a solution to the problem of deforestation (Fairhead and Leach, 2003). As it might seem obvious to most, the driving forces behind deforestation vary enormously, as do the political and economic settings in each country, the interests and alliances among different actors, and the roles played by the state and non-state actors. The challenges associated with deforestation

in the region are as political as technical, but the phased approach de-emphasizes other dimensions of the problem.

In the phased approach, institutional arrangements and technical capacity to measure deforestation are emphasized. REDD will rely on the specific target of measuring reduced emissions from deforestation. In Latin America, in addition to Brazil, only Mexico and Costa Rica have comparable technical capacity in place to measure forest-cover change. Consequently, a strong emphasis in readiness preparations in all other countries in Latin America is currently placed on strengthening technical infrastructure to monitor forest change.⁵ A strong emphasis on measuring and monitoring forest cover has a depoliticizing effect on the understanding of deforestation's causes, consequences and risks to impose control mechanisms that might harm local livelihoods (Scott, 1998). If the causes and consequences of deforestation are not properly understood in each country, it might be that those who live closer to forested areas bear the blame for deforestation and the responsibility for avoiding it.

The three REDD strategies in Latin America

Several Latin American countries (Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, Peru and Venezuela) have been sceptical about offsets from carbon emissions trading, as declared by the countries at the BASIC Ministerial Meeting on Climate Change in Foz do Iguaçu, Brazil, in September 2013.⁶ The ministers called for environmental integrity and stressed that “results-based payments shall not be used to offset mitigation commitments by Annex I countries [industrialized countries]”. The ALBA⁷ countries have held the same position.

Although the ideas that led to the intellectual elaboration of REDD in part emerged in Brazil (Santilli et al., 2005), the country opposed any attempts to include forests and deforestation under the scope of the Kyoto Clean Development Mechanisms. Without Brazil, any such mechanism would be doomed to fail, considering the magnitude of the country's tropical forests and its rate of deforestation. It is argued that, because of the long history of early initiatives to conserve forests in the region, Latin American countries are in the lead of early efforts to implement REDD (Hall, 2011).

Governments in Latin America have taken different approaches to implement and shape REDD efforts. We have identified three strategies. The first, which we will refer to as the “assertive strategy”, is characterized by efforts made by the central government to frame REDD within

an existing or emerging forest-climate policy framework. Brazil, Mexico and Guyana, for example, are employing this strategy. Countries following guidelines or directions decided at the global level and efforts to accommodate such guidelines in the national context characterize the second strategy, which we will call the “accommodating strategy”. Costa Rica, Guatemala, Argentina, Chile, Honduras, Panama, Paraguay, Uruguay, Peru, Colombia, Ecuador and Suriname are pursuing this strategy. Open opposition to certain aspects of REDD or a lack of initiative to implement REDD characterize the third and last strategy, which we will call the “resisting strategy”. The countries following this path are Nicaragua, Bolivia, Venezuela and French Guyana. In the paragraphs below we will use one or two countries to illustrate each of the strategies. First we present the assertive strategy because this represents one pole in the continuum between taking the lead and resisting a project. Next we present the accommodating strategy, which represents the situation of most Latin American countries and thus represents the middle ground of the continuum. We finish with the resisting strategy at the other end of the continuum.

The assertive strategy: Brazil

While most other countries in Latin America were still working to put human capacity in place to deal with REDD within their ministries of the environment, Brazil launched the Amazon Fund in 2008. This, however, represents the way in which the position of Brazil evolved from resistance to leadership.

For many years the Brazilian Government was a fierce opponent of any attempts to include forest- and land-use change in the international negotiations to reduce carbon emissions. This position was justified on the grounds that developed and developing countries share common but differentiated responsibilities concerning global warming. Many opponents of such proposals were afraid that carbon credits would allow rich countries to keep pouring carbon into the atmosphere at the expense of developing countries. Furthermore, Brazil was concerned with any potential threats to its sovereignty and control of its forests resources, particularly in the Amazon. Any clause addressing deforestation could be interpreted as an obstacle to developing the region as the state saw fit.

Even though President Lula himself supported this realist view, as he made clear in 2007 during the opening of the UN General Assembly (Hall, 2008), change in the Brazilian position came from within the government. When President Lula took office in 2003, he appointed Marina Silva, a former senator and rubber tapper leader, as minister of

the environment. She promoted some institutional changes that ultimately led to a turnaround in the Brazilian official position. The first change came by opening up new opportunities for participation of civil society organizations in policy-making. Knowledge networks formed by activists and scientists developed stronger ties with government officials and became more influential. A related second change was an administrative reform in the Ministry of the Environment. In 2007, Silva created the Secretariat of Climate Change and Environmental Quality, whose top officials were committed to the creation of carbon compensation mechanisms.

Activists and scientists had been discussing proposals to create compensation mechanisms to pay for avoided deforestation since the early 2000s (Santilli et al., 2005). By the time their peers ascended to the new secretariat, the government's efforts to control deforestation were already paying off. Therefore the idea of being compensated by reducing deforestation made much more sense to government officials.

Another crucial component of the policy network supporting compensation was Amazonian state governments. As proposals evolved towards compensating carbon stocks, governors saw an opportunity to channel resources into their states, particularly where there are vast areas under protection. Protected Areas (PAs) have traditionally been considered a burden for state and municipal governments. The benefits of conservation are global, but the perceived costs are local, particularly due to land-use restrictions. The economic losses imposed on states could therefore be, at least partially, offset by this new source of revenue. In 2009, a few months before the UNFCCC COP 15, the governors of all nine Amazonia states met and wrote a letter to the president, pointing out that Brazil was lagging behind other developing countries in the carbon market. They argued that if Brazil was to receive more funds from carbon credits and to reduce its own carbon emissions, REDD mechanisms had to be included in the international carbon market under the UNFCCC (Toni, 2011).

The Amazon Fund was launched as a means to obtain funding from donors to finance the Plan of Action for Protection and Control of Deforestation in the Legal Amazon. The Amazon Fund was created within the Brazilian National Bank of Social and Economic Development (BNDES). The mobilization of civil society, particularly international NGOs⁸ and other environmentalists since the 1990s, and the engagement of politicians at the state and federal levels have been important for the advancement of REDD-like ideas based on assumptions of the efficiency of economic payments for environmental services to curb deforestation (Hall, 2011). These ideas are also supported by several governors in the

Brazilian Amazon and coincide with those of the president and the minister of the environment, contributing to create conditions necessary for the Brazilian involvement in REDD. For the Amazon Fund, the government of Brazil pledged to allocate US\$500 million, but it is estimated that an additional investment of US\$1 billion per year would be required to fully implement the plan (Meyer, 2010).

Brazil has the technical capacity to monitor changes in forest cover through remote-sensing technology and to ensure transparency to deal with the fund through institutional structures and mechanisms. By 2008, Brazil had already put in place some of the conditions to be enabled by Phase 1. This in part explains Norway's support of the Amazon Fund, which placed Brazil in phases 2 and 3. The Norwegian support of the Fund is contingent on demonstrating avoided deforestation against a historical baseline (results-based payments). Norway's involvement is also based on ideas of economic rationality, altruism and self-interest⁹ as a humanitarian/environmental protection actor.

The establishment of the Brazilian Amazon Fund can be explained by the combined effect of the activities and initiatives of NGOs, state governors in the Amazon region, and politicians in key positions (the president and the minister of the environment). Norwegian support through Norway's International Forest and Climate Initiative (NIFCI) gave the scheme the final thrust to get the fund started. The Amazon Fund is important for advancing the Brazilian approach to REDD. This approach is well established in existing Brazilian institutions and is in accord with the country's views and priorities.

Brazil's REDD strategy has been characterized by a strong involvement of the central government, but NGOs and lower levels of the public administration have also played a role. The advanced technical capacity of Brazil in terms of remote-sensing and the establishment of a historical baseline of forest cover place the country in a privileged position in regard to the phased approach promoted at the international level. The alliance of Brazil and Norway for financing the Amazon Fund has given Brazil's strategy a very advantageous starting point.

Brazil's approach to financing REDD efforts has been based on the idea of a centralized fund that would allow the country to avoid the voluntary carbon market for financing reduced deforestation. However, the growing involvements of other networks, particularly those in which governors of the Amazon states are involved, have pushed the country towards additional mechanisms for financing avoided deforestation, particularly through their partnership with the governors of California and Illinois.¹⁰

In the following subsection we present the accommodating strategy, which is used by most countries in the Latin American region as mentioned above. To illustrate we use the cases of Colombia and Costa Rica.

The accommodating strategy: Colombia and Costa Rica

REDD preparation activities in Costa Rica and Colombia have advanced quite differently from those in Brazil. Colombia has the most decentralized public administration in Latin America. Over 40% of total government spending is allocated by subnational governments against an average of 15% in the rest of Latin America (Alesina, Carrasquilla and Echavarría, 2005). The administration of forest and other natural resources is also decentralized (Alvarez, 2003). Costa Rica, on the other hand, represents a case of highly centralized forest governance. We will first describe Colombia and subsequently Costa Rica.

The lead for the REDD process in Colombia has been taken by the private sector, particularly business-friendly international NGOs (BINGOs), and not by the central government. Colombia has one of the most decentralized environmental administrations in Latin America. Local environmental authorities (Regional Autonomous Corporations (CARs)) are in charge of the management and administration of all natural resources and environmental issues in the area of their jurisdiction. Although CARs receive a portion of their budget from the central government, they also generate income through tax revenues that come from projects implemented in their jurisdiction. In this way CARs hold significant power to decide the direction of both environmental conservation and development projects.

The Colombian Government highlights the involvement of the private sector in the financing of environmental conservation efforts in various white papers (e.g. the National Strategic Plan for Green Markets produced by the Ministry of the Environment and the National Development Plan 2005–2010). A general perception from the Colombian Government is that private investments with little state regulation in remote forest regions are more economically efficient because they lower their intervention costs and could also offer better-adapted development options. A quote from an official of the Ministry of the Environment illustrates the position:

The market in a way takes care of redistributing the resources at local levels. It is a lot simpler . . . it lower our costs . . . so, if the state does not receive the [REDD] money it does not need to invest in the regions

where they are receiving the money... well that is good... the government does not need to invest in those regions; in a way they take care of themselves.

All BINGOs operating in Colombia and some local NGOs expressed the same view during our interviews; they too want to increasingly involve private funds in current forestry and development mechanisms.

Within this context, REDD preparations have been largely led by NGOs. The BINGOs working in the country (WWF, Conservation International (CI), The Nature Conservancy (TNC)),¹¹ in collaboration with the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and one local NGO/consulting firm (Corporación Ecovera), created the Colombia REDD Table in 2008 (Mesa REDD-Colombia). Other private organizations (the Fund for Environmental Action and Children (FAAN), the Natural Patrimony Fund and the Nature Foundation) as well as the Ministry of the Environment and the Institute for Environmental and Meteorological Studies (IDEAM) joined the Colombia REDD table a year after its creation. Participation in the REDD table was not open to all those who were interested. Instead, the control of certain resources (i.e. knowledge, networks and technologies) legitimate and facilitate their participation. Civil society organizations, universities and others who are not considered "REDD experts" by the terms established by the REDD table are excluded.

The REDD table in Colombia has positioned itself as a legitimate network to be consulted or to provide inputs on various REDD-related issues. For instance, the funds provided by the FCPF for REDD preparation activities are administrated on behalf of the government by an NGO (FAAN). The REDD table is the most active and important network that disseminates information concerning REDD in Colombia and that reports to the World Bank.¹²

The Colombia REDD table strongly supports the inclusion of carbon markets in the mechanisms to finance REDD. This has also been the position of Colombia in the international climate negotiations, in which it has insisted on countries' freedom to choose between different financial sources, markets and/or an international fund. The voluntary carbon market is a salient project among members of the Colombia REDD table, partially due to the engagement of international and some local NGOs with actors interested in, connected to or involved with the carbon business. These actors include the local public environmental authorities (CARs), national and international business partners (i.e. mining and energy-producing companies, plantation companies, forest

companies, carbon-marketing companies), international research organizations, development cooperation agencies, and indigenous and Afro-Colombian leaders. These engagements would allow the channelling of funds from a range of private businesses directly into carbon-market projects that could eventually become part of REDD.

The REDD programme in Costa Rica is seen as a means to strengthen and broaden the Payment for Environmental Services (PES) programme. PES emerged in Costa Rica in the 1990s as a response to the perceived problem of deforestation and forest loss. Between 1986 and 1991, the country lost 4.2% of forest cover per year (Sanchez-Azofeifa, Harriss and Skole, 2001), suggesting that Costa Rica had one of the highest deforestation rates in the world. The launching of REDD occurred ten years after Costa Rica became the first country in the world to establish a system of PES in 1997. The financial structure of the Costa Rican PES programme is a hybrid of market-like mechanisms, subsidies and state regulations. This is evident in the way that the programme is funded: while it receives 3.5% of the revenues from a tax on fossil fuels, it also depends on loans from the World Bank, from a series of grants from the Global Environmental Facility (GEF), from NGOs, from contracts with national companies (Pagiola, 2008) and from international governments. The German Government, through the German Reconstruction Credit Institution (Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW)), provided US\$12 million for a five-year contract in 2007, and in 1996, Norway bought 200,000 tonnes of carbon-emission reduction credits for US\$10 per tonne (Russo and Candela, 2006). The REDD national strategy is being discussed within the framework of the national PES programme. Because the current PES programme is unable to cover the demand for payments for environmental services, which is very high, REDD is seen as an avenue to increase the coverage of the national PES.

Costa Rica applied to the FCPF in 2008 to fund the REDD readiness preparations.¹³ A grant was approved in 2010. In Costa Rica, public institutions are leading the REDD readiness preparations. The PES experience and Fondo Nacional de Financiamiento Forestal (FONAFIFO) largely shape the REDD process. FONAFIFO's board of directors is the REDD coordinating entity in Costa Rica. The board will include one representative from indigenous people's organizations and one representative from civil society.

FONAFIFO carried out a series of dissemination and outreach activities to engage with different stakeholder groups. As for indigenous peoples, it has invited the Indigenous Integral Development Associations (Asociación de Desarrollo Integral Indígenas (ADIIs)) to participate

in information meetings and activities. Indigenous leaders contest the legitimacy of the ADIIs in representing indigenous peoples. In 1982, in an effort to make the indigenous territories legible to the state (cf. Scott, 1998), the Government of Costa Rica established the ADIIs as the legal representative bodies of indigenous peoples.

To carry out PES in indigenous territories, the government designated the ADIIs as the collective representative institutions of indigenous peoples vis-à-vis FONAFIFO. The ADIIs became responsible for distributing the benefits from PES in indigenous territories and for helping FONAFIFO to implement PES in the indigenous *resguardos*. Currently, indigenous leaders challenge this decision, arguing that the ADIIs are official government bodies that “represent” and govern each indigenous territory by law, but do not necessarily represent or respect traditional ways of organization and are not accountable to indigenous peoples. FONAFIFO carried out a series of early information dissemination workshops and it has engaged in an initial dialogue about the REDD process with a range of stakeholder groups, and with indigenous peoples in the Atlantic and Pacific areas through the structure of the ADIIs.

Costa Rica recognizes carbon, insofar as it is considered an environmental service, as property of the landowner, by law. The country has chosen a national approach to reduced emissions accounting and the development of a national baseline for avoided deforestation. At the international level, Costa Rica, similar to Colombia, advocates for a mix of funding for REDD. The approach in Costa Rica is towards a centralized REDD programme. In Colombia, on the other hand, the approach is towards a decentralized system. These two different approaches reflect the way in which forest governance is understood in the two countries. In the following subsection we will analyse the third and last strategy, using Bolivia as the example.

The resisting strategy: Bolivia

Bolivia has resisted REDD as part of carbon markets and offsets, based on the idea of environmental justice and the non-commodification of nature. The current Bolivian position on REDD was first communicated in a letter to the General Assembly of the United Nations in 2008, emphasizing “direct compensation from developed to developing countries, through a sovereign implementation that ensures broad participation of local communities...”. In its second communication to the UNFCCC in 2009, Bolivia stated that the country did not support carbon markets “or the possibility of developing new flexibility in this area”, and called for domestic action for emissions reduction,

under the argument that the “carbon market allows developed countries to continue to pollute at home while developing countries face unfair restrictions”.

The position was not a complete rejection of REDD but rather an attempt to reshape it and to broaden the international perspective on both forests and carbon. Different actors were involved in the planning of a national joint programme in Bolivia, beginning in 2008, and Bolivia was one of the first pilot countries in the UN-REDD programme from 2009 onwards. A REDD team was set up in the Ministry of the Environment (MAYA) as part of a larger national strategy for curbing deforestation (*Estrategia Nacional de Bosque y Cambio Climatico*, MAYA, 2009). The setting up of a national REDD programme was supported by German (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ)) and Danish cooperation at the time, and a parallel process was started with the FCPF of the World Bank. The UN-REDD programme was presented for civil society actors in 2010, and four indigenous and peasant organizations approved a capacity-building plan.

Beginning in 2010, different currents both inside and outside the government caused confusion about the Bolivian position. At the People’s Conference for Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth in Cochabamba in April 2010, where many Bolivian officials also participated, a declaration rejecting all forms of REDD/REDD+/REDD++ was presented.¹⁴ Following the conference, the negotiation team from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (with representatives from the *Unidad de Madre Tierra*) brought the Cochabamba position to the climate negotiations in Cancun as promised, while the Ministry of the Environment signed off on the UN-REDD programme on the condition that UN-REDD would respect the Bolivian position against carbon markets.¹⁵ The collaboration with the World Bank was halted, and Bolivia never handed in a signed version of the formal document *Readiness Plan Idea Notes* (R-PIN).

The confusion and lack of advancement of the UN-REDD programme in the 2008–2011 period also opened up the arena for private actors and NGOs to get involved in REDD-like activities. Local communities have reported that private actors (represented by NGOs, a Santa Cruz-based company and local businessmen) contacted communities, asking them to sign “REDD contracts” that involved the lease of land for 90–100 years, in exchange for untouched conservation areas and the “selling of oxygen”. The government later stopped the attempts.

In 2008 the national NGO Friends of Nature Foundation (FAN), with support from the Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation, set up an

indigenous REDD project in the Amazon (Beni Department). The government, originally a partner in the project, withdrew in 2010. Several regional and local indigenous organizations also withdrew, making the argument that the NGO would have too much power over the project and the resources involved. Furthermore, the local communities participating in the project rejected the component regarding quantifying emissions reductions, and the project was left only with select components that addressed sustainable forest management, the enforcement of Brazil nut collection and enhanced control of the area against illegal logging. The project was in operation until 2012.

Later in 2011, a conflict between the central government and the lowland indigenous organization Confederación de Pueblos Indígenas de Bolivia (CIDOB) over a road-building project through the national park TIPNIS led to a rupture in contact among the ministries, public agencies and the indigenous organization, hampering the possibilities for further dialogue about the UN-REDD project. The plan for initiating the participatory planning process for the UN-REDD programme was set on hold. Meanwhile, CIDOB called for direct REDD funding to indigenous areas and for the self-management of funds.

A parallel process was started in 2011 to develop a mechanism for the sustainable management of forests, and joint climate-change mitigation and adaptation efforts. The process involved a number of national NGOs, academics and public entities, such as the Authority for Forest and Land (ABT), the National Institute for Agricultural Innovation (Iniaf) and the Forest Directorate in MAYA. Bolivia hoped that the mechanism could be supported through an alternative REDD scheme outside the carbon market. The mechanism was included in the Law of Mother Earth in 2012, with an emphasis on holistic management of the forests. A team was set up to facilitate the exchange of information and meeting arenas. As public entities had poor official records of deforestation in Bolivia, the participation of the NGOs (e.g. FAN) with such expertise was crucial for the team. Former officials, the Noel Kempff Museum of Natural History and representatives from research institutions and social organizations contributed with important experience and information, forming a final project document that was presented to the UN-REDD in 2012.

In 2011, Bolivia informed the policy board of the UN-REDD programme about its desire to modify its original National Programme document. Two contradictory communications, which were sent from Bolivian officials to the policy board in December 2011 and March 2012, led the board to freeze the funds and send a high-level mission to Bolivia

in June 2012. The mission concluded that there were several challenges concerning the mechanism (e.g. the lack of an incentive system based on verified reductions of emissions, the targeting of drivers, and the lack of full participation from the indigenous organization CIDOB in the making of the mechanism) and that the project was not eligible for full financing by the UN-REDD programme. Later, contrasting declarations about the participation of indigenous organizations in the making of the mechanism were also communicated to the UN-REDD policy board. The mission finally recommended that the National Joint Programme be implemented in its original form, and that it neither be redrafted nor replaced with the new Bolivian mechanism. Bolivia agreed to continue with the programme, and a small part of the UN-REDD financing was channelled to the mechanism (such as the register of all forest initiatives, forest inventory and the mapping of land-use change).¹⁶

The proposal for an alternative mechanism was marginalized by powerful REDD donor countries in the international negotiations, claiming it would lead to the fragmentation of the REDD project. Finally, in 2013, Denmark, Switzerland and the EU granted support of over US\$43 million to the Bolivian mechanism. At the international level, Bolivia has worked insistently with the inclusion of non-market-based approaches, such as joint mitigation and adaptation – methodological issues related to non-carbon benefits – and it continues with its strong opposition to carbon-market mechanisms.

Due to opposing currents both within and outside the Bolivian Government, different actors in Bolivia have pursued slightly different strategies to influence and shape REDD, from complete rejection to the reshaping of the initiatives, locally, nationally and internationally. However, the rejection of carbon markets has been a common position across the majority of actors involved, as well as the integration of indigenous rights and the recognition of different functions of the forests. The role of indigenous organizations and indigenous autonomy is still to be defined in the Bolivian mechanism, along with clear strategies to work with the drivers of deforestation.

In the following section, we shift our focus to analyse ongoing efforts at local and national levels. We will focus on demonstration and readiness activities, and the actors involved in them.

REDD projects in Latin America

An important component of the planning phase of REDD is demonstration and readiness activities. These are projects implemented

at the local level to test the options available for countries and communities. REDD projects can be seen as a means to understand how REDD will unfold on the ground; REDD demonstration activities are seen as means to learn lessons for future REDD implementation. These early implementation projects influence debates about REDD, the ways in which so-called co-benefits are being addressed, and who is involved and who benefits from REDD.

In principle, REDD country strategies to be defined in Phase 1 are the first step in the implementation of REDD national policies. National REDD strategies would define the current situation in each country and the direction in which the country is going to move in terms of reduced carbon emissions from deforestation, addressing so-called co-benefits and defining who would benefit from economic payments. In practice, however, numerous REDD projects are taking place before the design of a country's REDD strategy is finished or in parallel with its development. Early implementation projects are informing the policy-making process in each country and at the global level. Proponents of REDD projects stand in a better position than other actors, who do not have any experience with such projects, to influence REDD debates because not having knowledge about REDD is a barrier for being included in the official debates.

We have identified three approaches employed by actors involved in early REDD planning, implementation and readiness projects, and the consequences of such approaches. The first one is knowledge production and dissemination. Second is the creation of technologies or standards to legitimize or validate projects. The third approach is enrolment in new, emerging or alternative networks. In what follows we analyse these three approaches by highlighting who is involved, the resources mobilized to employ each approach, and the outcome. It is worth saying that these approaches are not mutually exclusive, and different actors within each country put distinct emphasis on each of these approaches.

Creation of knowledge and dissemination of information

Our findings indicate that, to a great degree, networks involving NGOs and international research institutions with support from development cooperation agencies and private actors are creating and disseminating knowledge about REDD in the region. These networks systematize information about REDD in Latin America and at the global level. They are having a great influence in defining what a REDD project is, who the legitimate implementers are, who will benefit from it and how. The Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR), the NGO Global

Canopy Programme,¹⁷ and the voluntary REDD database¹⁸ created at the Oslo Climate and Forest Conference in 2010 produce compilations and databases that include all types of REDD-like projects.

The majority of REDD projects are being initiated or planned by private actors in private lands, including national and international private companies, and local and international NGOs (WWF, CI, WCS, TNC, IUCN and Rainforest Alliance). In some cases, pilot projects are executed with the participation of state governments in coalition with BINGOs. Fair-trade cooperatives, carbon certifiers and research institutions are also involved in pilot projects. Pilot project proponents act as *de facto* researchers, testing REDD implementation modalities, and producing information and knowledge about the projects.

As for funding sources for the projects, development cooperation aid money, particularly from Norway and Germany, as well as private funds, is the most important source. But here it is necessary to explain in more detail what types of private fund are involved. The range is wide and includes (1) direct investments in particular projects from investors from the USA, Europe, China and India; (2) direct investments from companies (e.g. the largest Brazilian mining company, Vale); (3) investments that private companies make in BINGOs; and, similarly, (4) partnerships between local NGOs and private companies as part of their CSR portfolio; (5) a plethora of alliances among domestic NGOs and local-level environmental authorities (CARs), national and international business partners (mining and energy-producing companies, plantation companies, forest companies and carbon-marketing companies), international research organizations, development cooperation agencies and indigenous leaders.¹⁹ These alliances influence the emphasis given to particular components in the projects.

The outcome of this approach is that private actors and research institutions, which are often international organizations, are creating knowledge and disseminating information about REDD in Latin America. The consequence of this is that these actors position themselves better than public institutions or national research centres and have better resources to influence the international debate. Even Bolivia, with a government strongly sceptical about NGOs, saw the need to include these actors as they have better forest data (e.g. maps) than the government. The way in which they gain this privileged position is by accessing funding from private sources or international development cooperation agencies, coupled with the privileged position in neoliberal environmental governance that they have maintained since the 1990s. To overcome complex issues such as those related to ownership of the land, most

projects are initiated or planned on private lands. In the following subsection, we focus on measurements to validate REDD projects.

Measures to validate projects

NGOs, corporations and research institutions are involved in creating standards to certify carbon offsets that can be traded in the voluntary carbon market or in a future REDD carbon market. Organizations involved in pilot projects are also creating standards to demonstrate how they involve local populations in REDD projects.

An illustrative example of this is the Rainforest Standard™ (RST). This was developed by Columbia University in New York in collaboration with private environmental funds from Bolivia, Peru, Brazil, Ecuador and Colombia. According to its proponents, “this standard integrates carbon-accounting, socio-cultural/socio-economic impacts and biodiversity outcomes into one single REDD standard²⁰”. Projects certified with Royal Forest Society (RFS) can be registered in the Climate Community and Biodiversity Alliance (CCBA)²¹ and in the Verified Carbon Standards (VCS),²² to be traded in the voluntary carbon market.

The alliances and associations built among NGOs, the private sector and research institutions contribute to the creation of facts, standards, knowledge and concepts seen as accepted “truths” (cf. Goldman and Turner, 2012). These accepted truths are shaping the direction of REDD in the Amazon basin before governments have managed to put a plan of action into place. For example, in Colombia, where the readiness process is still incipient, BINGOs and local NGOs managed to include the RST as a standard to certify REDD projects by the government in the national REDD strategy. Projects that do not comply with the RST will not be included in the national REDD register of Colombia, and their proponents will not be invited to participate in the debate.

In the following subsection, we focus on alternative channels that different actors are using to engage in REDD. These are particularly relevant in creating a counterbalance to mainstream views and values.

Alternative channels

REDD networks as described above, in which BINGOs and local NGOs, development cooperation agencies, private actors, government agencies and research institutions participate, are channels where REDD knowledge is being produced and circulated. Such networks have a form of agency in the creation of environmental knowledge that is validated and re-enforced at different levels. Access to REDD networks is not open to all of those who could be interested or affected by REDD policies and

projects. Participation in REDD networks is conditioned by overriding narratives on deforestation and by the role of monetary incentives in tackling deforestation (see Forsyth, 2003). Activists seeking to influence existing networks may have to decide between working within such dominant rules and establishing alternative and competing networks (Forsyth, 2003; Taylor, 2012). In this way, networks become important resources to advance alternative views and values.

Initially, indigenous peoples were sceptical about REDD and rejected carbon markets because they did not consider them to be offering real solutions to climate change (see the Anchorage declaration adopted by the participants at the indigenous people's global summit on climate change in 2009).²³ Indigenous organizations in the global South criticize carbon markets and carbon-sequestration projects for their oversimplified portrayal of ecosystems and forests, and for ignoring the socioeconomic, political and institutional implications of carbon sequestration for indigenous peoples.

Indigenous people's organizations in Latin America, and particularly in the Amazon basin countries, have since engaged in existing networks that support REDD, or in alternative networks that are sceptical about REDD and carbon markets. The different paths taken by different indigenous people's organizations are in part explained by previous engagements with other organizations and by their own experiences with REDD. Indigenous people's organizations' choice of position is also influenced by their experiences of negotiating with their governments, and the organization's own visions and priorities.

During the 12th session of the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Peoples in 2013, indigenous people's organizations presented two opposing views on REDD, later communicated at COP19 in Warsaw. Some organizations oppose REDD on the grounds that it weakens existing national legal frameworks to protect indigenous people's rights, particularly in regard to territorial and collective land rights, consultation and autonomy, and their opposition to carbon markets and the commodification and fragmentation of nature. Other organizations look at REDD as an opportunity to strengthen the land rights of indigenous peoples and their local management, and to control their territories with the help of direct funding.

The experience of some indigenous people's organizations with so-called "carbon cowboys", particularly in Brazil, Peru, Bolivia and Colombia, has made them extremely aware of some of the risks that REDD projects might entail. Peruvian, Brazilian, Bolivian and Colombian indigenous organizations denounced the fact that

indigenous leaders signed disadvantageous contracts with private companies. On the other hand, some groups are already developing long-term land-use plans that involve REDD mechanisms defined in their own terms. That is the case of the Suruí in Brazil (Toni, 2011).

The Suruí live in a 247,000 Ha reserve in the state of Rondonia, and 93% of their land is still preserved (Suruí, 2009). The Suruí population was 5,000 people when they first made contact with non-indigenous Brazilians, but currently only about 1,000 individuals live inside their lands or in the nearby cities. During the 1980s an intense migration of non-indigenous people to the Western Amazonia took place. By the end of that decade, the population had decreased to roughly 250 members.

Despite this drastic reduction of their population, the Suruí started to organize themselves in the 1980s. They created the Metareilá Suruí Association in 1989 to defend and preserve the Suruí's cultural and territorial patrimony.

In 2000, Metareilá started a participatory diagnosis to assess the potential of the Suruí and their territory. Based on this diagnosis, it designed a plan for the use of the territory for coffee cultivation (one of the crops introduced to their land by the invaders), for the management of Brazil nuts, and for the restoration of areas degraded by illegal logging.

With the support of other NGOs (Associação de Defesa Etnoambiental Kanindé, Amazon Conservation Team, Forest Trends, Idesam), the Suruí decided to set aside 13,575.3 Ha of forests for 30 years, which will avoid emissions that average 7,423,806.2 tonnes of CO₂. The project was validated in conformance with the Climate, Community and Biodiversity Standards in 2012 (RA-VAL-CCB) and with the Verified Carbon Standard in 2013. Despite the broad alliance that prepared the project, Metareilá has full rights over carbon credits and will be the sole recipient of the financial benefits.

The design of the Suruí Carbon Project included an extensive consultation process, training for community members, development of a baseline for carbon accounting, and analysis of the legal framework regarding indigenous peoples and forest carbon. The Suruí initiated this process in accordance with their own demands; they saw the sale of carbon credits as an opportunity to complement a long-term plan for the development of their community.

Conclusion

In this chapter we have looked at different strategies employed by Latin American countries and actors in their meeting with the global forest

and climate initiative, REDD, from resistance to accommodating to assertive strategies. Brazil has been one of the major actors in the initiative after it changed its strategy from resistance to a more offensive approach and managed to align REDD with its own domestic interests. A strong actor such as Brazil has the resources, knowledge and power to shape REDD in its interests, and with the focus on results-based payments, the country is in a privileged position. It has also succeeded in sovereignty issues in international negotiations, such as those related to monitoring, reporting and verification/national forest monitoring systems.

The experiences of the countries that have followed the accommodating strategy show how the history of environmental governance in each country affects the implementation of the REDD initiative. Colombia has, to a large extent, left the initiative in the hands of private actors and local authorities, while Costa Rica has applied a model of “hybrid” governance and a centralized REDD programme. Bolivia has stood out in Latin America as one of the fiercest opponents of carbon markets, something that has affected its possibilities and willingness to take part in the initiative. Bolivia’s commitment to the inclusion of civil society demands in environmental governance and the anti-commodification rhetoric has formed its responses to the global initiative. However, there are divergent opinions, especially among the indigenous organizations, about the right path to follow. Indigenous organizations with recognized titles to their land believe that REDD can bring new opportunities. However, although Bolivia’s position has been similar to that of Brazil to a large extent, with national sovereignty and opposition to offsets as focal points, Bolivia has instead been seen as the “activist state” that is trying to fragment REDD. It was not until 2013 that Bolivia won support for its alternative mechanism to forest and climate efforts.

These three strategies illustrate how the “black-boxing” of REDD has allowed for the emergence of quite different hybrid models of negotiating environmental governance at the international level.

Our research reveals that there is a constellation of actors shaping the direction of REDD+ in Latin America. That constellation varies from country to country and includes among others, donors, BINGOs and national NGOs, research institutions, and in some cases different levels of government. Through their engagements in networks that promote and advance a narrative in which markets and monetary compensations offer the solution to deforestation, these actors are in a privileged position to participate in the co-production of knowledge and policy, and to advance their agendas.

For some governments, engaging in REDD – at least at the discursive level – does not conflict with their priorities in other sectors, such as oil exploitation, soy expansion, the expansion of large-scale cattle-ranching, and mining and infrastructure development, which all represent threats to the forests and further deforestation. REDD is seen as an alternative that will allow for the ending of trade-offs between forest conservation, poverty alleviation and economic development. A good example of how this change is unfolding can be found in the partnership between Norway and Brazil. Thanks to REDD, Brazil became the largest receiver of Norwegian development cooperation aid, which is an enormous paradox given that Brazil is one of the fastest-growing economies in the world. At the same time, but not necessarily as a consequence of such collaboration, Brazil has drastically decreased deforestation in the Amazon.

NGOs have the technical and rhetorical expertise to participate in negotiations in national and international arenas. They also have connections with farmers, indigenous and traditional populations, government officials and bureaucrats. That makes them a privileged set of boundary organizations (Guston, 2001) that can help to break resistance against REDD and to open channels for the implementation of pilot projects. They have been particularly strengthened by REDD due to this role. They are becoming knowledge-providers to governments, donors and local organizations, which has opened the doors for them to policy-making forums. Environmental NGOs are now in a better position to offer business alternatives to corporations and other private actors. Aside from their role as boundary organizations, they are also brokers in REDD implementation and have a direct stake in the negotiations.

The black-boxing of REDD has allowed for the construction of a large and diverse network that supports the initiative. The widespread questioning of the market premises of REDD has led to a broadening of the concept to accommodate disparate interests, ideologies and representations of what forests are and why they should be conserved. That is why countries that have been vocal against REDD, such as Brazil until the mid-2000s, are engaging in REDD preparedness. Accordingly, some groups that initially opposed the mechanism, such as indigenous populations, have pilot projects in their lands as REDD might offer an alternative to strengthen their land rights. However, many indigenous organizations remain critical of carbon markets.

The way in which REDD is going to be financed is still an open question. Although it was born as a market mechanism to trade carbon, political mobilization from different actors has resulted in discussions

that challenge the market orientation of REDD, and many actors in the Latin American region advocate for a global public fund to finance the initiative. The political opposition of several actors in Latin America has also resulted in a broadening of the focus of REDD to multiple aspects of forests and their related environmental services. In some countries, at the domestic level, it is increasingly assuming the format of a public policy, whereas in the global arena it resembles what Angelsen (2013) has called a “performance-based aid” mechanism. This means that development cooperation funds are used to finance REDD on the condition that countries demonstrate that they achieve certain levels of performance in terms of reduced deforestation.

Notes

1. <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2010/cop16/eng/07a01.pdf>. See also Angelsen et al. (2009: 3).
2. The final Readiness Plan Idea Note (R-PIN) was never signed by the Bolivian authorities.
3. <http://www.lcds.gov.gy>.
4. Other donors contributing to UN-REDD are, in order of the size of their contribution, the EU, Denmark, Spain, Japan and Luxembourg. Germany provides 34% of the total budget of the FCPF. Other donors include Australia, the UK, the USA, Canada, the European Commission, the Nature Conservancy and two private companies: BP Technology Ventures, an alternative energy company with venture investments in projects specific to biofuels, wind and solar energy; and CDC Climat, a company that includes emissions trading and energy investments in its portfolio. The other contributors to the Amazon Fund are Germany and the Brazilian oil company, Petrobras. Sources: <http://mptf.undp.org/factsheet/fund/CCF00>; http://www.forestcarbonpartnership.org/sites/fcp/files/2013/FCPF%20Carbon%20Fund%20Contributions%20as%20of%20Dec%2031_2012.pdf; http://www.amazonfund.gov.br/FundoAmazonia/fam/site_en/Esquerdo/doacoes/; http://www.guyanareddfund.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=101&Itemid=116.
5. See Readiness Preparation Plans of Colombia, Peru, Ecuador, Guyana and Suriname.
6. In addition to the four BASIC countries (Brazil, South Africa, India and China), representatives from Argentina, Fiji (as chair of the G77 and China), Paraguay, Peru and Venezuela were at the BASIC meeting. <http://www.twinside.org.sg/title2/climate/info.service/2013/climate130904.html>
7. The Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America is a regional organization launched in 2004 and is made up of eight countries: Antigua and Barbuda, Bolivia, Cuba, Dominica, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and Venezuela.
8. Brazilian environmentalists and NGOs (Instituto Socio Ambiental (ISA), Greenpeace, Instituto Centro de Vida (ICV), Instituto de Pesquisa Ambiental

da Amazonia (IPAM), TNC, CI, Amigos da Terra Amazonia Brasileira (AdT), Instituto do Homem e Medio Ambiente (IMAZON) and WWF-Brazil) launched the Zero Deforestation Campaign. This was based on ideas of strengthening the participation of state governments in forest governance, payments for environmental services, strengthening of protected areas and support for indigenous peoples.

9. According to the former Norwegian oil and energy minister Terje Riis-Johansen, the allocation of Norwegian money to the Amazon Fund contributes to opening doors for the Norwegian oil industry in Brazil. Paradoxically, thanks to the commitment to the Amazon Fund, Brazil – one of the largest and fastest-growing economies in the world – has since 2009 become the largest recipient of Norwegian foreign development aid. <http://www.dn.no/energi/article1975276.ece> «rainforest millions open oil doors».
10. The Governors Climate and Forest Task Force (GCFT) brings together subnational-level authorities from Brazil, Mexico, Peru, Indonesia, countries in Africa, and the governors' offices of California and Illinois. In this project, California and Illinois will potentially be able to purchase carbon offsets from projects in developing countries, as part of the cap-and-trade programme of these states, which will use a market-based mechanism to reduce greenhouse gases. The GCFT receives funding from the Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation, ClimateWorks, the Climate and Land Use Alliance, the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad), and the David and Lucile Packard Foundation. Collaborating partners include NGOs from Brazil (Institute for the Conservation and Sustainable Development of Amazonas -DESAM and Amazon Environmental Research Institute – IPAM), Indonesia (Kemitraan), Mexico (ProNatura), a transnational private company (ClimateFocus), and the US-based private research organizations the Carnegie Institution for Science and the Woods Hole Research Center.
11. WWF, CI, TNC.
12. See the report of the due diligence mission of the World Bank to Colombia, 15–27 January and 22–23 March 2012. <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2012/04/16508452/colombia-fcpf-redd-readiness-project-aide-memoire-april-18th-25th-2012>
13. In addition to the FCPF, other sources of funding include GIZ through the REDD-CCAD-GIZ programme, which has financed different activities in Costa Rica with special emphasis on forest reference level; the Norwegian development agency (Norad); and USAID.
14. Later it turned out that the Bolivian officials were against the total rejection of REDD.
15. The UN-REDD team respected the Bolivian position at the time and said they would not intervene in the funding for the Bolivian programme.
16. In total, US\$1.4 million. *Source:* Diego Pacheco.
17. The REDD desk is funded by the Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation, the Climate and Land Use Alliance, the Department of Climate Change and Energy Efficiency of the Australian Government, GIZ and USAID.
18. <http://reddplusdatabase.org>.
19. Interview FAN; interviews Colombia.
20. <http://cees.columbia.edu/the-rainforest-standard> and interview FAN.

21. The CCBA is a partnership between research institutions (CATIE, CIFOR, and ICRAF), corporations (the Blue Moon Fund, The Kraft Fund, BP, Hyundai, Intel, SC Johnson, Sustainable Forestry Management, and Weyerhaeuser) and NGOs (CARE, CI, TNC, the Rainforest Alliance and WCS).
22. The VCS was established in 2005 by the Climate Group, the International Trading Association and the World Business Council for Sustainable Development. It is one of the world's most widely used carbon-accounting standards. Projects across the world have issued more than 100 million carbon credits using VCS standards. VCS headquarters are in Washington, DC, with offices in China and South America.
23. http://www.unutki.org/downloads/File/Events/2009-04_Climate_Change_Summit/Anchorage_Declaration.pdf

References

- Agrawal, A., Nepstad, D. and Chhatre, A. (2011) "Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation", *Annual Review of Environment and Resources* 36: 373–396.
- Alesina, A., Carrasquilla, A. and Echavarria, J.J. (2005) "Decentralization in Colombia" in A. Alesina (ed.), *Institutional Reforms. The Case of Colombia* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press).
- Alvarez, M.D. (2003) "Forests in the Time of Violence", *Journal of Sustainable Forestry* 16(3–4): 47–68.
- Angelsen, A. (2013) *REDD+ as Performance-Based Aid: General Lessons and Bilateral Agreements of Norway*. Working Paper (s.d.:WIDER).
- Angelsen, A., Brown, S., Loisel, C., Peskett, L., Streck, C. and Zarin, D. (2009) *Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD): An Options Assessment Report. Prepared for the Government of Norway* (Washington: Meridian Institute).
- Angelsen, A. and McNeill, D. (2012) "The Evolution of REDD+", in A. Angelsen, M. Brockhaus, W.D. Sunderlin and L.V. Verchot (eds), *Analysing REDD+ Challenges and Choices* (Bogor, Indonesia: CIFOR).
- Barcena, A., Prado, A., Samaniego, J. and Malchik, S. (2010) "Climate Change: A Regional Perspective", *Unity Summit of Latin America and the Caribbean Riviera Maya*. ECLAC; IDB. Riviera Maya, Mexico.
- Bernstein, S. (2004) "Legitimacy in Global Environmental Governance", *Journal of International Law and International Relations* 1(1–2): 139–166.
- Blom, B., Sunderland, T. and Murdiyoso, D. (2010) "Getting REDD to Work Locally: Lessons Learned from Integrated Conservation and Development Projects", *Environmental Science and Policy* 13(2): 164–172.
- Boyd, E., Gutierrez, M. and Chang, M. (2007) "Small-Scale Forest Carbon Projects: Adapting CDM to Low-Income Communities", *Global Environmental Change* 17(2): 250–259.
- Bull, B. and Aguilar-Støen, M.C. (eds) (2015) *Environmental Politics in Latin America: Elite Dynamics, the Left Tide and Sustainable Development* (London: Routledge Studies in Sustainable Development).
- Fairhead, J. and Leach, M. (2003) *Science Society and Power: Environmental Knowledge and Policy in West Africa and the Caribbean* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

- Forsyth, T. (2003) *Critical Political Ecology. The Politics of Environmental Science* (New York: Routledge).
- Goldman, M., Nadasdy, P. and Turner, M.D. (2011) *Knowing Nature: Conversations at the Intersection of Political Ecology and Science Studies* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press).
- Guston, D.H. (2001) "Boundary Organizations in Environmental Policy and Science: An Introduction", *Science, Technology, and Human Values* 26(4): 399–408.
- Hall, A. (2008) "Paying for Environmental Services: The Case of Brazilian Amazonia", *Journal of International Development* 20(7): 965–981.
- Hall, A. (2011) "GETTING REDD-Y Conservation and Climate Change in Latin America", *Latin American Research Review* 46: 184–210.
- Karkkainen, B.C. (2004) "Post-Sovereign Environmental Governance", *Global Environmental Politics* 4(1): 72–96.
- Latour, B. (1987) *Science in Action: How to Follow Scientists and Engineers Through Society* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press).
- Li, T.M. (2007) *The Will to Improve. Governmentality, Development and the Practice of Politics* (Durham: Duke University Press).
- Meyer, P.J. (2010) *Brazil-US Relations* (Washington, DC: Library of Congress Congressional Research Service).
- Nepstad, D., Soares-Filho, B.S., Merry, F., Lima, A., Moutinho, P., Carter, J., Bowman, M., Cattaneo, A., Rodrigues, H., Schwartzman, S., McGrath, D.G., Stickler, C.M., Lubowski, R., Piris-Cabezas, P., Rivero, S., Alencar, A., Almeida, O. and Stella, O. (2009) The end of deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon. *Science* 326:1350–1351.
- Pacheco, P., Aguilar-Støen, M., Börner, J., Etter, A., Putzel, L. and Diaz, M.d.C.V. (2010) "Landscape Transformation in Tropical Latin America: Assessing Trends and Policy Implications for REDD+", *Forests* 2(1): 1–29.
- Pagiola, S. (2008) "Payments for Environmental Services in Costa Rica", *Ecological Economics* 65(4): 712–724.
- Peet, R., Robbins, P. and Watts, M. (2011) "Global Nature", in R. Peet; P. Robbins and M. Watts (eds), *Global Political Ecology* (Abingdon UK: Routledge), 1–48.
- Russo, R.O. and Candela, G. (2006) "Payment for Environmental Services in Costa Rica: Evaluating Impact and Possibilities", *Tierra Tropical* 2(1): 1–13.
- Sanchez-Azofeifa, G., Harriss, R.C. and Skole, D.L. (2001) "Deforestation in Costa Rica: A Quantitative Analysis Using Remote Sensing Imagery", *Biotropica* 33(3): 378–384.
- Santilli, M., Moutinho, P., Schwartzman, S., Nepstad, D., Curran, L. and Nobre, C. (2005) "Tropical Deforestation and the Kyoto Protocol", *Climatic Change* 71(3): 267–276.
- Scott, J. (1998) *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition have Failed* (London/New Haven: Yale University Press).
- Suruí, A.N. (2009) "Projeto Carbono Suruí", Presented at the *Curso para Lideranças Comunitárias, Pagamentos por Serviços Ambientais*. http://www.katoombagroup.org/documents/events/event33/Apresentacoes/EstudodeCaso_Almir_Surui_1.pdf, date accessed 13 September 2014.
- Taylor, P.J. (2012) "Agency, Structuredness, and the Production of Knowledge within Intersecting Processes", in D. Goldman; P. Nadasdy and M. Turner (eds), *Knowing Nature. Conversations at the Intersection of Political Ecology and Science Studies* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press), 81–98.

- Toni, F. (2011) "Decentralization and REDD+ in Brazil", *Forests* 2(1): 66–85.
Wunder, S. (2005) *Payments for Environmental Services: Some Nuts and Bolts*, Occasional Paper No. 42 (Jakarta, Indonesia: CIFOR).



Except where otherwise noted, this work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported License. To view a copy of this license, visit <http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/>

PAPER II

The following paper is an accepted manuscript of a book chapter published by Routledge in *Environmental politics in Latin America. Elite dynamics, the left tide and sustainable development* on 13/11/2014, <https://www.routledge.com/Environmental-Politics-in-Latin-America-Elite-dynamics-the-left-tide/Bull-Aguilar-Stoen/p/book/9781138790261>

Aguilar Støen, M. and **Hirsch, C.** (2015) REDD+ and Forest Governance in Latin America: The Role of Science-Policy Networks in Bull, B. and M. Aguilar-Støen (eds) *Environmental politics in Latin America. Elite dynamics, the left tide and sustainable development*. London: Routledge.

Chapter 10:

REDD+ and forest governance in Latin America: The role of science-policy networks

Mariel Aguilar-Støen and Cecilie Hirsch

Introduction

Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD) was originally presented as a technological fix (Li, 2007) to confront the global problem of deforestation and to reduce global carbon emissions, but the focus of REDD quickly moved from strictly carbon storage and uptake to multiple objectives (Angelsen and McNeill, 2012). The *plus* was added to REDD to signalise a stronger commitment, that the so-called ‘co-benefits’ of forest conservation (e.g. protecting biodiversity and livelihoods) are included on an equal footing with carbon functions¹. The inclusion of additional objectives into the REDD project reflects the diversity of actors involved in REDD arenas and their ability and power to advance their agendas (Brockhaus and Angelsen, 2012). REDD is based on the idea that it is possible to reduce deforestation and forest degradation by offering economic compensation to various actors (for not) changing the use of forest lands.

Global interest and attention on forests has grown as concerns about global warming and climate change have taken a heightened position in international policy debates. Especially after the presentation of the Stern Review in 2006, forests have been re-positioned in international arenas as repositories of global value for their contribution to carbon sequestration and climate mitigation (, Fairhead and Leach, 2003, Stern, 2006; Peet et al., 2011).

In Latin America, forests cover about 11.1 million km² and savannahs 3.3 million km² comprising several different types of vegetation (Pacheco et al., 2010). The region as a whole has the world’s highest rate of forest loss; deforestation and land use change account for nearly three-quarters of greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) in the Amazon region (Hall, 2012). Brazil accounts for five per cent of global GHG emissions, fourth after China, the US and Russia (Hall, 2012). Consequently, the situation of the Amazonian forests is seen as an issue of global concern for climate mitigation.

About 20 percent of the total rural population in Latin America uses forest resources to support their livelihoods. Ten million people in the Amazon basin make a living in tropical forests ranging from small-scale agriculture to large-scale cattle ranching; many are also involved in timber felling, processing, trade and provision of services around forest activities, or non-timber forest products. Economic activities taking place in or around forests constitute important sources of employment and income and can also make contributions to the broader economy through taxes. There are significant trade-offs between forest conservation and economic development. As the role of forests in climate-change mitigation has gained global importance, the debate about the trade-offs has become more relevant (Pacheco et al., 2010). REDD is seen as a win-win approach that would potentially address the trade-offs between forest conservation and economic development. Forests are economically, socially and symbolically valuable to different actors, including to indigenous peoples, local users, governments, corporations, illegal cartels, NGOs, nations and the globe, albeit in different ways, and for different reasons (Fairhead and Leach, 2003). All these actors have different possibilities to exert power and to access arenas to influence REDD-related policy making.

In this chapter we argue that science-policy networks have emerged as new elites in the development of REDD preparations in the Amazon countries, and we examine their role in these processes. A further question we address in this paper is whether REDD science-policy networks affect the position and ideas of other elites, and how. The chapter builds on on-going fieldwork in the region as well as literature review and review of secondary sources. It is organized as follows. After this introduction we explain how we can understand science-policy networks as elites, we then examine the development of REDD projects in the Amazon basin, discuss examples of the involvement of REDD science-policy networks in the process of REDD planning and the outcome of such involvement. The next section discusses REDD science-policy networks as elites. The section is followed by a discussion on the effect REDD science-policy networks may have on elite reorientation. Finally a section with conclusions is presented.

Science policy networks as elites

We argue that science-policy networks, defined as interactions between groups of people and organizations that are implicated in the co-production of knowledge and social order (Forsyth, 2003), can be conceptualized as elites insofar as they control key resources: the production

and promotion of specific knowledge (or “frames”) and access to policy-making forums (see Chapter 2). Networks refer here to coalitions of actors who share values, interests and practices, and can be defined as a social system in which actors develop durable patterns of interaction and communication aimed at a specific issue (Bressers and O’Toole, 1998). Ideas, values and resources circulate within networks, and by this the networks may set the limits or boundaries of how reality is to be understood or to set apart what constitutes expert and non-expert knowledge.

Certain actors can control the co-production of environmental science by fostering linkages between specific science and policy networks, this might happen for example by providing funds for certain type of research or research institutions, or by engaging certain actors in research or implementation projects. Various scholars have discussed the embedded nature of knowledge production (Harding, 1986; Haraway, 1988; Forsyth, 2003). Scientific knowledge is created by people within particular institutions with situated and partial perspectives and consequently the questions science aims to answer are biased and respond to partial interests. Science production is organized within both centres of power and subaltern regions, hence knowledge has a geo-historical origin and knowledge production is relevant to legitimize certain social orders (Mignolo, 2002). The notion of “Science-policy networks” used in this chapter builds from discussions within political ecology (Forsyth, 2003; Fairhead and Leach, 2003; Goldman et al., 2011), feminist critiques of science (e.g. Harding 1986; Haraway 1988), Science and Technology Studies (Latour, 1987; Jasanoff, 1990) and post-colonial critiques of knowledge production (Quijano, 2000; Mignolo, 2002). Science-policy refers to the joint enforcement rather than a neat division between science and policy (Jasanoff, 1990). With network(s) we want to highlight agency as resting not with individuals but in the dynamic interaction among different actors. Here networks are seen as in a dialectic relation with the institutional and structural context, with a conception of power and agency that acknowledges both the influence of actors on networks and the impact of the structural context in which networks operate (Goverde and van Tatenhove, 2000, Forsyth, 2003).

REDD projects and the Amazon Basin

An important component of the planning phase of REDD are the so-called demonstration and readiness activities. These are REDD-like projects implemented at the local level to test the different options available for countries and communities. “REDD projects” are means to understand how REDD will unfold on the ground and to provide lessons for future

implementation. Early implementation projects influence debates about REDD, the ways in which so-called co-benefits are being addressed, who is involved and benefits from REDD.

In principle, “REDD strategies” supported by UN-REDD, the World Bank FCPF or bilaterally, are the first step in the implementation of REDD national policies. These strategies will define the current situation in each country, and the direction in which the country is going to move in terms of reduced carbon emissions from deforestation, addressing co-benefits and defining who would benefit from economic payments. In practice however, a myriad of projects are taking place in parallel with the design of a country’s official REDD strategy. Consequently, proponents of “REDD projects” stand in a better position than other actors who do not have the same resources and power to define such projects, and to influence REDD debates. Simply because not having the necessary knowledge is a barrier for being included in the debates.

We have identified the following strategies employed by actors involved in early projects and the consequences of such strategies. The first strategy is “knowledge production and dissemination”. The second strategy is the “creation of technologies or standards to legitimize or validate projects”. The third strategy is “enrolment in emerging or alternative networks”. In what follows we analyse these three strategies highlighting the actors involved, the resources mobilized for employing each strategy and the outcome.

Knowledge production and dissemination

Several scholars have provided insights into the close ties between knowledge and power and between the co-production of knowledge and social order (Foucault, 1980, Latour, 1987; Jasanoff, 1990; Quijano, 2000, Mignolo, 2002; Forsyth, 2003; Fairhead and Leach, 2003, Goldman et al., 2011). Others have highlighted the various and conflicting interpretations of REDD as an idea and of the aspects that should be emphasised (Angelsen and McNeil 2012). REDD debates are characterized by a very complex and technical language that is not readily accessible to those who do not have experience with REDD. Paradoxically, to get information about REDD it is necessary to participate in forums and networks where knowledge about REDD is being produced, often in the form of international conferences or national level forums. Accessing such forums requires to have previous knowledge about REDD, as our interviews with some local NGOs and leaders of indigenous organizations indicate². In this way, controlling knowledge production and dissemination is an important factor in shaping

who will participate in REDD debates and how, and consequently the direction REDD is going to take. Our research shows that dissemination to local communities has been fragmented and dependent on particular networks' access to these communities and their interest in presenting REDD in certain manners.

The first outcome we identify is that in lieu of a definition, any project defined as REDD by proponents supported by REDD science-policy networks, can become a REDD project. Knowledge produced by or about such projects is circulating and being accepted as "REDD relevant" knowledge. However, to be able to define that a project is in effect a REDD project its proponents must be able to access the networks where knowledge is validated. Barriers to access such networks include for example lack of funding or ideological discrepancies.

Our findings indicate that to a great degree, networks involving NGOs and international research institutions with support from development cooperation agencies and private actors are creating and disseminating knowledge about REDD at different levels. These networks systematize information about REDD in the Amazon basin and are having a great influence in defining what a REDD project is, who the legitimate implementers are, who will benefit from it and how.

To illustrate, research institutions like the Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR), "the REDD desk" by the NGO Global Canopy Programme³, the "voluntary REDD database"⁴ created at the Oslo Climate and Forest Conference in 2010 and the "knowledge database"⁵ of the initiative Governors' Climate and Forest Taskforce- GCFT⁶ produce REDD-Project's⁷ catalogues⁸ and databases. The projects included in these catalogues comprise projects for avoided deforestation and carbon capture, and also projects designed to increase carbon sequestration through plantations⁹ and other activities such as eco-tourism, fair-trade coffee and cacao production.

The first CIFOR study trying to systematize REDD local projects (Wertz-Kanounnikoff and Kongphan-apirak, 2009) explicitly recognizes (p.1) that "a limitation of [their] survey is the lack of any clear definition of what constitutes a REDD demonstration activity. Despite these shortcomings this survey offers insights on current trends to inform future REDD investments (sic)". The second CIFOR study (Madeira et al., 2010) defines REDD as "activities aimed at directly reducing emissions from deforestation and degradation in geographically distinct and

contiguous areas, which are identified by their proponents as REDD and are operating under official agreements with some level of government”.

The second outcome we observe is that pilot project proponents, most of whom are networks of private actors, act as de facto researchers testing REDD implementation modalities and producing information and knowledge about the projects. Most REDD projects in the Amazon basin are initiated or planned by private actors including national and international private companies, and local and international NGOs (World Wildlife Fund (WWF), CI, WCS, TNC, International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN), and Rainforest Alliance) in private lands. In some cases pilot projects are executed with the participation of state governments in coalition with BINGOs. Fair trade cooperatives, carbon certifiers, and research institutions are also involved in pilot projects.

The third outcome we identify is that, because of their involvement in capacity building activities, networks of private actors are in a dominant position to spread their ideas and knowledge about REDD.

Aside of being direct proponents of REDD projects; these networks are involved in capacity building activities. Since navigating the REDD landscape requires highly specialized knowledge and the process of creating and legitimizing REDD projects is complex, a new form of expertise and consultancy has emerged. International and local NGOs, as well as consultant firms and individuals are being re-casted as “REDD experts” in the process. This gives them considerable leverage in defining what REDD would be, repackaging their own projects as REDD and also opens the doors to policy-making arenas at national and international levels.

Knowledge production is highly selective when it comes to who defines problems and who participates in policy making, what the problems is and the solution for it (Beymer-Farris and Bassett, 2012, Goldman et al., 2011). By producing, systematizing and spreading information about REDD projects the networks identified above contribute to define who decides what a REDD project in Latin America is, who participates in them and consequently how related questions are going to be addressed. Findings made by these networks are also published through international networks where they contribute to the production of learned lessons that influence future REDD projects. Creating and disseminating knowledge also contributes to

enhancing the reputation of those actors involved in the network, ultimately reinforcing their power in discourse formation.

Creating techniques to legitimize or validate projects

Networks of NGOs, corporations and research institutions are involved in creating standards to certify carbon offsets that can be traded in the voluntary carbon market or in a future REDD carbon market. Organizations involved in pilot projects are also creating standards to demonstrate how they involve local populations in REDD projects. We conceptualize such standards as techniques. With technique we mean procedures designed to govern the conduct of those involved in REDD projects (Foucault, 2002).

The fourth outcome we identify is that networks of private actors, NGOs and research institutions are involved in creating mechanisms to regulate and control the behaviour of other actors. An illustrative example of this is the Rainforest StandardTM (RFS). This standard was developed by Columbia University in New York in collaboration with private environmental funds from Bolivia, Peru, Brazil, Ecuador and Colombia. According to its proponents, “this standard integrates carbon-accounting, socio-cultural/socio-economic impacts and biodiversity outcomes into one single REDD standard¹⁰”. Projects certified with RFS can be registered in the Climate Community and Biodiversity Alliance (CCBA)¹¹ and in the Verified Carbon Standards (VCS)¹² to be traded in the voluntary carbon market. The alliances and associations built between NGOs, the private sector and research institutions contribute to the creation of facts, standards, knowledge and concepts seen as accepted “truths” (Goldman and Turner, 2012). These accepted truths are shaping the direction of REDD in the Amazon basin before governments have managed to put in place a plan of action. For example, in Colombia where the readiness process is still incipient, BINGOs and local NGOs managed to include the RFS as a standard to certify REDD projects by the government in the national REDD strategy. Projects that do not comply with the RFS will not be included in the national REDD register of Colombia, and their proponents are not invited to participate in the debate.

The fifth outcome we identified is that private actors are appropriating disputed concepts, like Free Prior and Informed Consent/Consultation (FPIC), giving such concepts meanings that accommodate their interests with little involvement of states or affected actors. In addition to setting standards to validate and include projects in REDD, pilot project’s proponents are

creating techniques to include local populations in planning and implementation of “benefit sharing” arrangements of the project.

Our empirical material suggests that private companies are using concepts like FPIC emptying them from meaning, and wrongly presenting them as “Free Prior and Informed Consultation” instead of “Free Prior and Informed Consent¹³”. How to implement this concept is unclear for most countries in the region. FPIC is among the claims of indigenous peoples’ discourses on participation in natural resource governance in the region, but it is unclear how to implement it (Haarstad, 2012). International jurisprudence emitted by the Inter American Court of Human Rights has stressed that implementing FPIC and consultations with indigenous peoples is the responsibility of states (Yrigoyen, 2011), and not NGOs nor private actors as is often practiced.

In addition, the situation for other rural populations who are not indigenous is unclear, such as migrants or squatters. In the case of squatters for example, in Brazil private companies are signing contracts and memorandums of understanding (MoU) with local communities. These MoUs include provisions as to how to solve land disputes and how to share benefits arising from the sale of carbon. They are usually implemented without the involvement of the state. All the activities to be implemented by the project are decided by private companies who claim to have obtained FPIC from local (indigenous and non-indigenous) populations. In many instances, private companies have the sole power to decide the terms under which local communities are going to participate and benefit from a REDD project. Land conflicts between private companies and local communities are often solved through the conditions determined by the company, which do not necessarily secure a just solution for all parties. In cases where indigenous groups have been granted land titles for their territories, poor migrant peasants in the area with weaker legal ties to the land might be excluded in the processes. Indigenous organization may also have stronger international alliances to support their participation in international negotiations than other groups (such as those tied to COICA).

Enrolling in emerging and alternative networks

The sixth outcome we observed is that by enrolling in alternative networks, actors and networks of actors who do not share the mainstream approach to REDD are also bringing their concerns to international arenas. Participation in REDD networks is conditioned by overriding

narratives about the role of economic incentives in tackling deforestation. Activists and other actors seeking to influence existing networks may have to decide between working within such dominant rules or establishing alternative and competing networks (Forsyth, 2003, Taylor, 2012).

Initially, many indigenous peoples' organizations were sceptical to REDD and rejected carbon markets for considering that they do not offer real solutions to climate change (see the Anchorage declaration adopted by the participants at the indigenous peoples' global summit on climate change in 2009¹⁴). Indigenous organizations in the global south criticized carbon markets and carbon sequestration projects for their oversimplified portrayal of ecosystems and forests and for ignoring the socio-economic, political and institutional implications of carbon sequestration for indigenous peoples (Schroeder, 2010).

Indigenous peoples' organizations in Latin America and particularly in the Amazon basin countries have since engaged in networks supporting REDD or in alternative networks that are sceptical to REDD and carbon markets. The different paths taken by different indigenous peoples' organizations are in part explained by previous engagements with pro REDD NGOs and by their own experiences with REDD named projects, as well as experience with government's policies and the organization's own visions and priorities.

The Coordinating Body of Indigenous Organizations in the Amazon Basin (COICA¹⁵) in alliance with its associated national organizations are defining and proposing a model of indigenous peoples' REDD. The position of COICA is that REDD should be defined based on the priorities of indigenous peoples to guarantee the territorial land rights of indigenous peoples, through holistic management plans that secure the livelihoods and rights of indigenous peoples and the titling and consolidation of indigenous territories. COICA's vision places greater emphasis on addressing the drivers of deforestation such as oil exploitation, mining, dams, large infrastructure and agribusiness, which are also seen as serious threats to indigenous peoples' rights and livelihoods. COICA's indigenous REDD plans also stress the multiple services/functions of ecosystems in addition to carbon sequestration and the implementation of pilot REDD projects lead by communities and indigenous organizations. Internally in COICA there has been disagreement about carbon markets, where parts of the organizations are sceptical whilst others are open for carbon markets under regulation and transparency, respecting indigenous rights. COICA has voiced that they view carbon markets

as threats and that signing contracts concerning carbon credits is risky, and advocates for an international carbon fund^{16 17}. COICA has engaged with both private actors (such as the Ford Foundation), a variety of NGOs and the World Bank, who support REDD market schemes.

The experience of some indigenous peoples organizations with so-called “carbon cowboys”, particularly in Brazil, Peru, Bolivia and Colombia have made them extra aware of some of the risks REDD projects might entail. Peruvian, Brazilian, Bolivian and Colombian indigenous organization have denounced that community leaders signed disadvantageous contracts with private actors¹⁸. While the Peruvian, Bolivian and Brazilian governments took action against the “carbon cowboys” the Colombian government was more passive. The regional COICA offers a channel for collectively raising awareness about the threat of carbon cowboys at the international level. COICA has access to international forums where irregularities can be denounced. Such forums might offer better pathways to influence national governments in more effective ways. As it has been the case with other indigenous peoples’ demands, these actors are using international arenas (e.g. United Nations forums) to support the advance of their REDD agendas at national levels. Having access to information and knowledge about REDD is a critical condition for the effective participation of indigenous peoples and for their possibilities to benefit from REDD in a fair way. However, information is not enough if it does not allow for addressing the concerns of indigenous peoples and strengthening their rights.

Finally, other actors are becoming increasingly engaged in opposing REDD for a variety of reasons. The seventh outcome we observe is that governments or alternative networks that resist or oppose the mainstream view of REDD are also bringing their concerns to the international arena, but so far have failed to gather support to re-open a discussion of the definition of REDD. This proves the power of the dominant version of REDD.

Opponents argue that REDD might entail threats to human rights, food security (e.g. by higher food prices, exclusions from areas or change in local livelihoods), rural poverty alleviation and biodiversity conservation. Notable among REDD opponents are certain governments from the Amazon basin. The ALBA bloc¹⁹ supported Bolivia’s proposal to reject the idea of seeing forests as simply carbon-offsets to be traded in the carbon market, and to opt for a new alternative mechanism. Scholars supporting their position point to the insecurities related to the pricing of carbon, effectiveness of offsets and the related unequal terms of trade, the opening up of the arena for a variety of private actors through the carbon market, and the

control they can potentially get over certain areas and processes, threatens both national and local sovereignty (Bumpus, 2011). The Alba countries also supported the Bolivian idea for climate funding from an alternative tax. The Bolivian alternative mechanism was supported by a range of developing countries and like-minded in Doha²⁰, and in 2013 Denmark, Switzerland and the EU granted a support of over 43 million USD to the Bolivian mechanism. Bolivia further won support for their insistence on working for non-market based approaches for the funding of climate change initiatives in Doha. The Bolivian position on carbon markets, the Cochabamba declaration from 2010 and the proposed alternative mechanism have all been marginalized at the international level by both strong REDD countries and BINGOs.

New elites: funding, science-policy networks and REDD

REDD is a broad and vague enough idea as to allow different interpretations of it that can fit the goals of different actors (Angelsen and Mc Neil 2012). This has permitted that different actors define differently the actions necessary to implement REDD at local levels. In the process, certain narratives, values and visions gain prominence and those promoting such ideas gain power to define how REDD should look like in specific contexts. Controlling the production of knowledge seems to be a prominent strategy of different actors to position themselves in the REDD debate in the Amazon countries.

A further mechanism involved in the production of science-policy is funding. Certain industrialised countries are financing REDD through development cooperation money. Through funding these countries and agencies foster cooperation and alliances between science and policy networks. Take the example of how readiness preparations for REDD are financed. There are two main mechanisms for financing phase 1²¹: through the UN-REDD program or through the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) of the World Bank. Some countries like Bolivia²², Peru and Ecuador have applied to both. On the other hand Brazil established its own Amazon fund in 2008 to finance reduced deforestation in the country. Guyana established the Guyana REDD investment fund (GRIF) in 2010 as part of a cooperation agreement with Norway in the framework of the “Low Carbon Development Strategy” (LCDS) of Guyana²³. Venezuela and French Guyana do not participate in any REDD initiative.

Norway is the single major financial contributor to the UN-REDD, FCPF the Brazilian Amazon fund and the GRIF. Norway contributes with 82 percent of the total budget of the UN-REDD; with 44 percent of the total budget of FCPF; with 87 percent of the total budget of the Amazon fund and with 100 percent to the GRIF²⁴. Norway is one of the major players in defining REDD at the global level but also influences the way in which REDD is advancing at national levels.

Initially, Norway supported only Brazil through bilateral assistance, and channelled most of the funds through the FCPF or the UN-REDD program. Later Norway decided to support Guyana by supporting the GRIF, but realized subsequently that conserving the forests in the Amazon basin required supporting all the countries in the region and new programs were underway as we conducted fieldwork. However, one country was excluded: Bolivia. The reasons for not supporting Bolivia relate to the country's opposing position to carbon markets and the perceived Bolivian "activism" and ambiguity in international negotiations, as well as resistance to financing the alternative mechanism Bolivia has presented at international climate negotiations and other forums²⁵. Norwegian bureaucrats have referred to the Bolivian alternative as a "fragmentation of REDD" and as "unfinished", albeit Bolivia has agreed to measure and monitor carbon. The Bolivian alternative proposes a combination of mitigation and adaptation in forest efforts, as well as acknowledging the different functions of forests beyond carbon, starting with protected forest areas and indigenous territories. The initiative has received little REDD money per se (only a small share from UN-REDD). This shows that if a country or a group of countries (e.g. Bolivia and the ALBA bloc) present a different position or wants to develop different mechanisms for REDD, this position stands little chance to receive any economic support.

As of funding sources for demonstration projects, development cooperation aid money as well as private funds are the most important sources. Private funds include direct investments in particular projects from investors from the USA, Europe, China and India; direct investments from companies (e.g. from the largest Brazilian mining company Vale); investments that private companies do in BINGOs or in some cases a national NGO "sells" a project to actors from the industry to become part of the industry's corporate social responsibility portfolio. National NGOs have in some cases like in Colombia alliances and cooperation with local level environmental authorities (CARs), national and international business partners (mining and energy-producing companies, plantation companies, forest companies and carbon

marketing companies), international research organisations, development cooperation agencies and indigenous leaders²⁶. These alliances influence the emphasis given to particular components in the projects, particularly in regard to carbon markets and market mechanisms for trading carbon offsets.

Our empirical material suggests that large international research centres and universities receive more economic support and are in a better position to engage in transnational networks than Latin-American ones. For example while Columbia University in the United States receives ample support, our Colombian interviewees from the national university claim to have been excluded from the Colombian REDD table, a network of mostly NGOs that leads the REDD talks in the country. Colombian academics claim to have produced alternative procedures to measure forest carbon that are more appropriate for the tropical context. However, this knowledge is not enough to affect policy making. The knowledge required to participate in the REDD debates, is not just any type of knowledge. It has to be maintained and strengthened through particular networks in which different concepts and arguments are socially constructed and legitimated through complex processes that have produced new dominant forms of expertise and consultancy (Fairhead and Leach, 2003, Bumpus and Liverman, 2011).

Science-policy networks or actors within such networks might take advantage of the opening of policy spaces to effect change and promote their interests. Prominent among them in the Amazon basin countries are BINGOs and national NGOs in coalition with private actors and research institutions. As we have seen, networks can bring about coalitions between actors with seemingly disparate interests such as NGOs, business, academics etc. to pursue specific goals at particular times. Networks are not place bounded and might include trans-national links between people who share common analytical perspectives, values, discourses and interests. Thus a pertinent question here is if “science-policy networks”, as related to REDD and climate change, might affect the dominant ideas of other elites. A related question is if that is the case, how these science-policy networks are influencing other elites’ orientation.

REDD science-policy networks and elite re-orientation?

At the global level, as it has been the case with other issues related to climate negotiations (e.g. Forsyth 2003 p. 143) science-policy networks can influence the position of different

actors. In the case of REDD, although neither the only factor nor the most important, reports prepared by non for profit organizations that are part of REDD science-policy networks, have been used in the discussions of the conference of the parties to the UNFCCC. An important impact of such report-making is for example the adoption of the “phased approach” to REDD launched by a report (Angelsen et al., 2009) hosted by the Meridian institute, and commissioned by the government of Norway. The “phased approach” has now been adopted by most governments in the Latin American region for preparations to REDD, this is an example of the influence science-policy networks have on national processes and governments.

REDD science-policy networks are influencing, although not necessarily re-orienting, the position of other elite actors. For example, various transnational and national companies, such as mining and energy producing companies, plantation companies, forestry companies and carbon market companies engage in REDD demonstration activities by funding specific projects. Since dominant REDD science-policy networks have ideological positions that do not conflict with the ideological position of corporations, it has been possible to establish alliances between them. Our findings concur with those of (Meckling, 2011), who shows how a transnational business coalition (energy firms and energy-intensive manufacturers) have actively promoted the global rise of carbon trading.

Angelsen and McNeill (2012, p.36-38) identify four broad ideological positions on REDD: market liberalism, institutionalism, bio-environmentalism and social greens. These positions differ in the way in which the role of forests in economic and social terms is perceived and thus in how REDD should be implemented. Market liberals emphasize the role of markets, commodification of environmental services and forests for economic growth and development and privilege the involvement of the private sector in REDD, and their position relies on a strong emphasis on carbon markets, some private actors and governments in the region identify with this position. Institutionalists emphasize the design of institutions, governance models and legislation to protect the environment and guarantee human wellbeing, for them both state and markets and other mechanisms are necessary for the success of REDD, this position is prominent among donors. The position of bio-environmentalists is based on the idea of ecological limits demanding ambitious targets for reduction in emissions and deforestation rates; their vision does not conflict with that of market liberalists in relation to the role of carbon markets, this position is common among NGOs. Social greens draw on

radical social and economic thought and argue that society and the environment are inseparable entities. They emphasize a “rights based approach” for REDD. These are also often critical to carbon markets. Most of the actors involved in networks producing knowledge or designing techniques to govern REDD identify with the first three positions, whereas those involved in alternative networks identify themselves with the fourth position. Narratives behind these positions are powerful frames conditioning the position and the options seen as available by most bureaucrats in the environmental public administration of the Amazon countries. However, environment ministries and related offices stand in a less privileged position than for example parts of the public administration related to sectors that generate income through the exploitation of natural resources.

Resource extraction continues to be central for the economies of most Amazon countries (Bebbington and Bebbington, 2012) often at the expense of forests. Mining, gas and oil extraction are the most important activities to generate economic revenues for most of the countries in the Amazon basin. The development of infrastructure such as hydropower and road building are also priorities for these countries. All these activities are in most of the cases planned to occur in forest areas. In addition, the agricultural frontier is expanding in many of the Latin American countries. Therefore we cannot affirm that REDD elites have a strong influence in the Amazon countries’ broader development policymaking or in the visions of development. Guyana is an interesting exception.

Former president of Guyana, Bharrat Jagdeo launched a campaign to attract funding for the country’s “Low Carbon Development Strategy-LCDS” of which REDD is an important part. Prior to the campaign lead by Jagdeo, a report was commissioned to McKinsey and company to estimate the value of Guyana’s rainforest. McKinsey has since 2008 been the market leader in REDD advice. The advice provided by McKinsey & Co. is highly influenced by government and business interests (Bock, 2014).

With the report in his hands, Jagdeo visited Europe to seek alternatives for protecting the entirety of the Guyanese rainforest in exchange for economic incentives²⁷. In 2009 Guyana and Norway signed a Memorandum of Understanding for funding up to USD 250 million over five years. We argue that president Jagdeo, an economist himself with a wide network of contacts in high level policy-making, business and NGO circles²⁸ managed “to speak” the right language with other like-minded politicians like former prime Minister of Norway, Jens

Stoltenberg and to get support from Norway for its LCDS. It is worth mentioning that in addition to Guyana, McKinsey & Co. has produced REDD reports for the governments of Brazil, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Indonesia, Papua New Guinea and Mexico (Bock, 2014) all of which receive support from Norway.

Guyana's LCDS is perhaps the most ambitious strategy for climate change mitigation in the region. Guyana uses REDD as the primary framework of the LCDS. LCDS' goals include contributing to global carbon abatement through forest conservation, making the country's economy low in carbon emissions and more sustainable and lifting Guyana's population out from poverty. The LCDS aims to incentivize Guyana to develop its economy and infrastructure in a manner that reduces carbon emissions²⁹ which in turn will finance Guyana's LCDS. The development of the LCDS and its funding occurred in part thanks to the influence of science-policy networks in which former president Jagdeo was involved.

Conclusion

This chapter is based on a relational definition of elites based on their control over resources, including financial, political, and discursive, as well as natural resources, knowledge and expertise as discussed in chapter 2. We have examined the role of science-policy networks in the development of REDD preparations in the Amazon countries, and we have argued that they can be conceptualized as elites given that they control specific resources, in this case the production and promotion of certain framings of REDD and access to arenas for policy making by excluding and including certain knowledge, projects and actors. These networks are supported by specific discourses (such as market liberalism), or economic and legal structures, and can also be aligned with other elite interests. The networks include influential groups that control knowledge and framings, and thereby the definition of areas, projects, models, and actors that participate in REDD.

We have identified three strategies employed by different actors; knowledge production and dissemination, creation of technologies/standards to legitimize or validate projects and the enrolment in emerging networks.

We have shown that these networks to a large degree are dominated by NGOs, consultants, think tanks, international research institutions with support from development cooperation

agencies and private actors. These groups of REDD experts might further become new technocratic elites as discussed in Chapter 2. More importantly than the specific actors, is the kind of knowledge, projects and models that are accepted as REDD. Access to these networks, specific knowledge, arenas and technical language facilitates and makes it possible for the same actors to define REDD projects and validate them as REDD. Barriers to access these networks can both be related to funding and ideological discrepancies. The networks are not completely closed, as in the case of indigenous peoples, where we see the opening and closing of networks, depending on their openness to economic mechanisms, where indigenous allied with international NGOs can access important international arenas. Networks including private actors are giving stronger emphasis to carbon markets and carbon trading, and with their involvement in capacity building activities, they are in a dominant position to spread their ideas and knowledge about REDD.

We have also shed light on the funding mechanisms for REDD, and the actors involved in funding, both industrialized countries through development cooperation, and private actor's involvement. Funding fosters cooperation and alliances between specific science and policy networks, in which certain concepts and arguments are constructed and legitimated. On the other hand, alternative ideas, such as those from indigenous organizations (e.g. COICA), the alternative climate justice movement and Bolivia, or domestic researchers (such as in Colombia), have been given little space to develop further alternatives to the dominant REDD regime upheld by science policy networks, partly due to the belief in the technical superiority of the phased approach, economic and market mechanisms, specific standards for monitoring and verification and exclusionary technical language.

Links have also been made between the science policy REDD networks and other elite interests. We have seen how a range of different private actors and companies support REDD activities, forming alliances, and promoting certain models. REDD has offered a new regime of profit making possibilities through a possible carbon market, trading carbon offsets, but also in developing a new form of expertise, standards and consultancy. Cross-national alliances have also emerged between private actors and local authorities, facilitated by NGOs and research institutions. The private actors dominance in REDD in Latin America has further led to the appropriation of disputed concepts, such as FPIC, with consequences for the involvement of local communities and indigenous peoples.

In addition, we discuss whether these science policy networks affect the position and ideas of other elites, and how. As we have seen, other elites, such as those based on economic resources (land and capital) can support with funding and find possibilities for control over areas and profits, and support the carbon offset model for their own interests.

In conclusion, we see that as a result of REDD, a new network of elite actors is emerging, who generate and disseminate knowledge about REDD forming a new form of expertise and consultancy. The actors involved in the dominant science policy networks are recast as “REDD-experts”, defining the limits for what actors and knowledge can participate in policy-making arenas at national and international levels. By producing, systematizing and spreading information about REDD these networks contribute to define who decides what a REDD project in Latin America is, and consequently how questions related to environmental and social justice are going to be addressed.

How sustainable are the models that these science policy networks are promoting? There is a danger that alternative ideas, knowledge and more domestically suitable models of environmental governance and knowledge will be excluded from REDD processes in Latin America, which will have impacts for both people and nature.

References

- Agrawal, A., Nepstadd, D. and Chhatre, A. (2011) Reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation. *Annual Review of Environment and Resources*, 36, 373–396.
- Angelsen, A. and McNeill, D. (2012) The evolution of REDD+, in A. Angelsen, M. Brockhaus, W. D. Sunderlin and L. V. Verchot (eds), *Analysing REDD+: Challenges and choices*. CIFOR, Bogor, Indonesia, 31–49.
- Angelsen, A., Brown, S., Loisel, C., Peskett, L., Streck, C. and Zarin, D. (2009) *Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD): An Options Assessment Report Prepared for the Government of Norway*. Meridian Institute, Washington, DC.
- Bebbington, A. and Bebbington, D. (2012) Extractive industries narratives of development and socio-environmental disputes across the (ostensible changing) Andean region, in H. Haarstad (ed.), *New Political Spaces in Latin American Natural Resource Governance*. Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 17–38.
- Beymer-Farris, B. A. and Bassett, T. J. (2012) The REDD menace: Resurgent protectionism in Tanzania's mangrove forests. *Global Environmental Change*, 22, 332–341.
- Bock, S. (2014) Politicized expertise: An analysis of the political dimensions of consultants' policy recommendations to developing countries with a case study of McKinsey's advice on REDD+ policies. *Innovation: The European Journal of Social Science Research*, 1–19.
- Bressers, H.T.A. and O'Toole, L. J. (1998) The selection of policy instruments: a network-based perspective. *Journal of Public Policy*, 18 (3), 213–239.
- Brockhaus, M. and Angelsen, A. (2012) Seeing REDD+ through 4Is: A political economy framework, in A. Angelsen, M. Brockhaus, W. D. Sunderlin and L. V. Verchot (eds), *Analysing REDD+: Challenges and choices*. CIFOR, Bogor, Indonesia, CIFOR, 15–31.
- Bumpus, A. G. (2011) The matter of carbon: Understanding the materiality of tCO₂e in carbon offsets. *Antipode*, 43, 612–638.
- Bumpus, A. G. and Liverman, D. (2011) Carbon colonialism? Offsets greenhouse gas reduction and sustainable development, in R. Peet, P. Robbins and M. J. Watts (eds), *Global Political Ecology*. Routledge, New York, 203–224.
- Fairhead, J. and Leach, M. (2003) *Science Society and Power: Environmental Knowledge and Policy in West Africa and the Caribbean*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- Forsyth T 2003 *Critical Political Ecology: The Politics of Environmental Science*. Routledge, New York.
- Foucault, M. (1980) Two lectures, in C. Gordon (ed.), *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972–1977*. Pantheon, New York, 78–108.
- Foucault, M. (2002) *Order of Things*. Routledge Classics, London.
- Goldman, M. and Turner, M. D. (2011) Introduction, in M. Goldman, P. Nadasdy and M.

- D. Turner (eds), *Knowing Nature: Conversations at the Intersection of Political Ecology and Science Studies*. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL.
- Goldman, M., Nadasdy, P. and Turner, M. D. (2011) *Knowing Nature: Conversations at the Intersection of Political Ecology and Science Studies*. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL.
- Goverde, H. and Van Tatenhove, J. (2000) Power and policy networks, in H. Goverde, P. Cerny, M. Haugaard and H. Lentner (eds), *Power in Contemporary Politics: Theories, Practices, Globalizations*. SAGE Publications, London, 96–111.
- Haarstad, H. (2012) Extracting justice? Critical themes and challenges in Latin American natural resource governance, in H. Haarstad (ed.), *New Political Spaces in Latin American Natural Resource Governance*. Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1–16.
- Hall, A. (2012) *Forests and Climate Change: The Social Dimensions of REDD in Latin America*. Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham.
- Haraway, D. (1988) Situated knowledges: The science question in feminism and the privilege of partial perspective. *Feminist Studies*, 14, 575–599.
- Harding, S. (1986) *The Science Question in Feminism*. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY.
- Jasanoff, S. (1990) *The Fifth Branch Science Advisers and Policymakers*. Harvard University Press, Cambridge.
- Latour, B. (1987) *Science in Action: How to Follow Scientists and Engineers through Society*. Harvard University Press, Cambridge.
- Lawlor, K., Weinthal, E. and Olander, L. (2010) Institutions and policies to protect rural livelihoods in REDD+ regimes. *Global Environmental Politics*, 10, 1–11.
- Li, T. M. (2007) *The Will to Improve Governmentality Development and the Practice of Politics*. Duke University Press, Durham.
- Madeira, E. M., Sills, E., Brockhaus, M., Verchot, L. and Kanninen, M. (2010) What is a REDD+ pilot? A preliminary typology based on early actions in Indonesia. *CIFOR Infobrief* 8 pp.
- Meckling, J. (2011) The globalization of carbon trading: Transnational business coalitions in climate politics. *Global Environmental Politics*, 11, 26–50.
- Mignolo, W. (2002) The geopolitics of knowledge and the colonial difference. *The South Atlantic Quarterly*, 101, 57–96.
- Pacheco, P., Aguilar-Støen, M., Börner, J., Etter, A., Putzel, L. L. and Diaz, M. D. C. V. (2010) Landscape transformation in tropical Latin America: Assessing trends and policy implications for REDD+. *Forests*, 2, 1–29.
- Peet, R., Robbins, P. and Watts, M. (2011) Global nature, in R. Peet, P. Robbins and M. Watts

(eds), *Global Political Ecology*. Routledge, Abingdon, 1–48.

Quijano, A. (2000) Colonialidad del poder y clasificación social. *Journal of World-Systems Research*, 2, 342–386.

Schroeder, H. (2010) Agency in international climate negotiations: The case of indigenous peoples and avoided deforestation. *International Environmental Agreements: Politics Law and Economics*, 10, 317–332.

Stern, N. (2006) The economics of climate change. *The Stern Review*, London, i–27.

Taylor, P. J. (2012) Agency structuredness and the production of knowledge within intersecting processes, in M. Goldman, P. Nadasdy and M. D. Turner (eds), *Knowing Nature Conversations at the Intersection of Political Ecology and Science Studies*. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL, 81–98.

Wertz-Kanounnikoff, S. and Kongphan-Apirak, M. (2009) Emerging REDD+: A preliminary survey of demonstration and readiness activities. *CIFOR Working Paper*, ix + 44 pp.

Yrigoyen, R. (2011) El derecho a la libre determinacion del desarrollo la participacion la consulta y el consentimiento, in M. Aparicio (ed.), *Los derechos de los pueblos indigenas a los recursos naturales y al territorio: Conflictos y desafios en America Latina*. Icaria, 103–146.

¹ From here we will only use the term REDD, although it includes REDD+

² Interviews Colombia, Bolivia and COICA

³ The REDD desk is funded by the Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation, the Climate and Land Use Alliance, the Department of Climate Change and Energy Efficiency of the Australian Government, the German Agency for Development Cooperation (GIZ) and the US Agency for International Development (USAID)

⁴ <http://reddplusdatabase.org>

⁵ <http://www.gcftaskforce-database.org/Home>

⁶ <http://www.gcftaskforce.org/> the GCFT brings together subnational level authorities from Brazil, Mexico, Peru and countries in Africa, Indonesia and the governors' offices of California and Illinois. In this project California and Illinois will potentially be able to purchase carbon offsets from projects in developing countries, as part of the cap-and-trade program of California and Illinois, which will use a market-based mechanisms to lower GHG. The GCFT receives funding from Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation, ClimateWorks, Climate and Land Use Alliance, the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad) and the David and Lucile Packard Foundation. Collaborating partners include NGOs from Brazil IDESAM and IPAM, Indonesia Kemitraan, Mexico ProNatura, a transnational private company ClimateFocus, and the American based private research organizations Carnegie Institution for Science and Woods Hole Research Centre.

⁷ CIFOR produces this catalogue as part of the project "Global Comparative Study on REDD (GCS-REDD)" funded by the Norwegian NIFCI with a total grant of NOK 80 million (2009-2012).

⁸ <http://www.forestclimatechange.org/redd-map/about.html>

⁹ the database "included all forest carbon projects because of the difficulty in distinguishing REDD schemes from afforestation/reforestation projects across all countries" (CIFOR 2013)

¹⁰ <http://cees.columbia.edu/the-rainforest-standard> and interview FAN, Colombia.

¹¹ The CCBA is a partnership among research institutions (Tropical Agricultural Research and Higher Education Center (CATIE), CIFOR and International Centre for Research in Agroforestry (ICRAF)), corporations (The Blue Moon Fund, The Kraft Fund, BP, Hyundai, Intel, SC Johnson, Sustainable Forestry Management and Weyerhaeuser), and NGOs (Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere (CARE), CI, TNC, Rainforest Alliance and WCS).

¹² The VCS was established in 2005 by the Climate Group, the International Trading Association, and the World Business Council for Sustainable Development. The VCS is one of the world's most widely used carbon-

accounting standards. Projects across the world have issued more than 100 million carbon credits using VCS standards. The VCS headquarters are in Washington, D.C., with offices in China and South America.

¹³ Interviews in Colombia with the private company CI Consult. The ILO 169 convention on the rights of indigenous and tribal peoples living in independent countries establishes that states signatories of the convention are obliged to obtain “free prior and informed consent” to actions that affect their lands, territories and natural resources. UN REDD has pledged to uphold the UN declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and to extend the principle of FPIC to indigenous peoples and other forest dependent communities. Lawlor, K., Weinthal, E. and Olander, L. (2010) Institutions and policies to protect rural livelihoods in REDD+ regimes. *Global Environmental Politics*, 10, 1–11.

¹⁴ http://www.unutki.org/downloads/File/Events/2009-04_Climate_Change_Summit/Anchorage_Declaration.pd

¹⁵ COICA (*Coordinadora de las Organizaciones Indígenas de la Cuenca Amazonica*) is an umbrella organization composed of organizations of indigenous peoples from Peru (AIDSEF), Guyana (Amerindian Peoples Association (APA)), Bolivia (Confederation of Indigenous People of Bolivia (CIDOB)), Brazil (Coordination of Indigenous Organisations of the Brazilian Amazon (COIAB)), Ecuador (Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of the Ecuadorian Amazon (CONFENIAE)), Venezuela (Amazon Indigenous People Regional Organization (ORPIA)), French Guyana (FDAG), Suriname (Organization of Indigenous People in Suriname (OIS)) and Colombia (Organization of Indigenous Peoples of the Colombian Amazon (OPIAC)).

¹⁶ Interview Edwin Vasquez, president of COICA and his presentation at the REDD workshop in Ås.

¹⁷ COICA (2012) Consolidation of Indigenous Territories: Condition and Indicator concerning REDD+. Holistic Management Alternative for Territories as a Source of life (or “Indigenous Amazonian REDD+”).

¹⁸ Interviews Colombia (CI, IRSA), Edwin Vasquez, AIDSEF-Peru, interviews Bolivia

¹⁹ a Latin American alternative trade bloc consisting of Antigua and Barbuda, Bolivia, Cuba, Dominica, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Venezuela

²⁰ 20 countries including China, India, Iran, Iraq, Egipto, etc

²¹ In 2010 during the conference of the parties to the UNFCCC, governments agreed to adopt a phased approach for REDD. The idea of a phased approach was adopted by the UNFCCC Cancun agreement, Agrawal, A., Nepstad, D. and Chhatre, A. (2011). Reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation. *Annual Review of Environment and Resources*, 36, 373–396. The Cancun agreement stipulates that countries participating in REDD should implement activities by phases. These phases are: 1) development of a national REDD plan and capacity building; 2) implementation of national plan and demonstration activities; and 3) result-based actions with full reporting and verification. <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2010/cop16/eng/07a01.pdf> see also page 3 in Angelsen et al. (2009).

²² The final R-PIN was never signed by the Bolivian authorities

²³ <http://www.lcds.gov.gy>

²⁴ 24 Other donors contributing to UN-REDD are in order of the size of their contribution the European Union, Denmark, Spain, Japan and Luxembourg. Germany provides 34 percent of the total budget of the FCPF. Other donors include Australia, UK, USA, Canada, European Commission, The Nature Conservancy and two private companies: BP Technology Ventures an alternative energy company with venture investments in projects on biofuels, wind and solar energy; and CDC Climat, a company that includes emissions trading and energy investments in its portfolio. The other contributors to the Amazon fund are Germany and the Brazilian oil company Petrobras. Sources: <http://mptf.undp.org/factsheet/fund/CCF00>; www.forestcarbonpartnership.org/sites/fcp/files/2013/FCPF%20Carbon%20Fund%20Contributions%20as%20of%20Dec%2031_2012.pdf; www.amazonfund.gov.br/FundoAmazonia/fam/site_en/Esquerdo/doacoes/; www.guyanareddfund.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=101&Itemid=116

²⁵ Interviews Bolivia and the Government of Norway’s Climate and Forest project

²⁶ Interview FAN; interviews Colombia.

²⁷ <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/7603695.stm>

²⁸ 28 In 2008 Britain’s Prince Charles urged business leaders to act to save the world’s rain-forest; he called Jagdeo’s initiative one of the best for fighting against climate change. Jagdeo met informally with Stoltenberg during the meeting organized by Prince Charles www.stabroeknews.com/2008/archives/09/15/prince-charles-applauds-jagdeo-climate-change-proposal/. In 2013 Jagdeo and Prince Charles chaired a meeting of the commonwealth expert group on climate finance. In 2012 the international NGO IUCN appointed Jagdeo as IUCN high level envoy for sustainable development in forest countries and patron of Nature. www.iucn.org/news_homepage/?9405/A-Presidential-drive-for-sustainable-development-in-forest-countries.

²⁹ <http://www.uncsd2012.org/content/documents/Revised-LCDS-May-20-2010-draft-for-MSSC.pdf> The consultant firm McKinsey and Co. prepared the technical analysis for the LCDS. Then president of Guyana Bharrat Jagdeo embarked in an international campaign to gather financial support for the strategy.

PAPER III

The following paper is a manuscript submitted to *Development and Change* in May 2019, which is p.t. under internal review.

Hirsch, C. and Aguilar-Støen, M. (manuscript submitted to *Development and Change*, May 2019). Rejecting and Reshaping REDD: Contestations over Forest and Climate Change Policy in Bolivia

Rejecting and Reshaping REDD: Contestations over Forest and Climate Change Policy in Bolivia.

Hirsch, C. and Aguilar-Støen, M.

1. Introduction

This paper uses a case study from Bolivia to discuss how the international climate change mitigation initiative Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation (REDD) was contested and reshaped in domestic policy-making between 2008 and 2014. We look at how different interests, values and non-forest-sectoral negotiations influence and shape forest policy outcomes across scales. We focus on Bolivia's responses to REDD, how participation in REDD initiatives have been contested and rejected, and how this led to the emergence of an alternative to REDD. Central to our argument is the notion of "politics of scale".

Launched as a global climate change mitigation policy program for reducing emissions from deforestation, RED was proposed by the Rainforest Alliance in 2005 in order to release funding for tropical forest countries from countries in the Global North. The program was expanded to include forest *degradation* in 2006, and renamed REDD. Countries from the Global South have been central in promoting and shaping the initiative. REDD builds upon the idea of creating a value for the carbon stored in forests by offering incentives to forest-rich countries to reduce greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) from forested lands (Angelsen, 2009). The global REDD initiative derives from the idea of including market-based mechanisms (e.g. Payments for Environmental Services - PES) and the involvement of private actors in environmental and climate efforts, and has gained pre-eminence during the past two decades (Bridge and Perreault, 2009; Castree, 2010). Underpinning this move is the belief that "un-priced" or "un-owned" nature, after being priced and inserted into global markets, can create revenue streams and support conservation (Vatn, 2005; 2015). REDD was formed in this context in order to incentivise forest protection (Corbera, 2012). One of the central ideas of market-based mechanisms for forest conservation is that through measuring, reporting and verifying carbon pools, forest-rich countries can enjoy economic support for the CO₂ that is not released into the atmosphere (Stern, 2006). Transfer of economic payments may be conceived as a recognition of communities' roles as stewards of global public goods, as a means to redistribute financial revenues from the haves to the have-nots (Rosa et al., 2003) and as a means to diversify livelihoods (Corbera, 2015). Results-based payments in REDD

have, however, largely gone untested (Angelsen et al., 2018). Carbon credits derived from REDD projects have been excluded from international compliance markets and REDD projects have mainly been financed through donor support (Angelsen and McNeill, 2012; Angelsen et al., 2018). International funding for REDD remains scarce and demand through carbon markets is lacking (Angelsen et al., 2018).

Initially, the Rainforest Alliance suggested linking REDD to carbon trading and including it as part of the offset mechanism in the Kyoto system for developed countries' emission reduction obligations. Payments were proposed to be provided post-achievement of emission mitigation outcomes. REDD has since been subject of much academic debate, including discussions about the scale of implementation, finance, which actors to involve, who should benefit, what kind of activities to support and how to create co-benefits beyond merely capturing carbon (Angelsen, 2009; Bumpus, 2011; Corbera and Schroeder, 2011; Larson and Petkova, 2011; Nasi et al., 2011; Corbera, 2012; Hall, 2012; Angelsen et al., 2015; Osborne, 2015; Angelsen et al., 2018; Osborne, 2018).

Demands from affected actors have led to the inclusion of conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks: REDD+ (Angelsen et al., 2012), as well as a stronger focus on co-benefits. Sceptics have questioned REDD as a means for rich countries to evade their historic responsibilities to reduce domestic GHG emissions, transferring the burden to poor forest countries (Bumpus and Liverman, 2011; Corbera, 2017). Carbon trading and offsetting in REDD has been widely debated (Corbera and Martin, 2015; Osborne, 2015; Corbera, 2017; Osborne, 2018), and has been rejected by environmental justice advocates and developing countries such as Bolivia, for possibly leading to the privatisation and commodification of forests, with consequences for local livelihoods and national sovereignty (Nasi et al., 2011; Pacheco, 2014; Stephan and Lane, 2015). Critics of REDD fear that elite and foreign actors will gain control over forest areas at the cost of local and national actors and reap the benefits from efforts undertaken locally and nationally (Nasi et al., 2011; Osborne et al., 2014; Osborne, 2018). Several scholars are preoccupied with how to strengthen community forestry through REDD (Cronkleton et al., 2011; Larson et al., 2008; Blom et al., 2010). The lack of consensus regarding how REDD should be designed and work has caused the initiative to move from a constructed, market-based mechanism to a hybrid state-private effort involving a range of actors and interests (Angelsen and McNeill, 2012; Angelsen et al., 2018).

The majority of forestland in Bolivia is state held, while 24% of forests are on indigenous lands (Müller et al., 2014). The forest sector has been dominated by private companies, either through forest concessions or logging contracts (Müller et al., 2014). Twenty-nine million hectares are classified as permanent forest production areas (*Tierras de Producción Forestal Permanente, TFPF*) destined for sustainable forest management (Supreme Decree 26075, 2001). Many local communities live in or near forest areas, though without public support or necessary resources they are unable to protect forest areas from deforestation and degradation (Müller et al., 2014; Hirsch, 2017a). Lack of livelihood opportunities, unclear land rights and a poorly adopted legal framework have led communities to enter into unfavourable logging contracts with forest companies, as they have little ability to negotiate fair terms and prices (Pacheco, 2006; Morales et al., 2013). Local communities face challenges in controlling forest areas and are often victims of pressure, illegal logging and unsustainable practices (Hirsch, 2017a). Recent political changes have led to increased inclusion of former excluded groups, such as peasants and indigenous peoples as well as a strengthened role of the state in Bolivian environmental governance. Indigenous movements have introduced belief systems that aim to balance nature and human needs in state policies, conceptualised as “Mother Earth” (*Madre Tierra*) in the highlands and as “the Holy lands” (*La Loma Santa*) in the lowlands, and principles of collective well-being and sharing such as “Living Well” (*Vivir Bien*) (Medina, 2006; Delgado et al., 2010; Zimmerer, 2012)¹. These concepts have been popularised as the foundation of alternative holistic belief systems and are frequently utilised in opposition to Western development, individualism, materialism and consumerism (Andolina et al., 2009; Escobar, 2010; Gudynas, 2010; Zimmerer, 2012). It is against this backdrop that Bolivia offers an interesting opportunity to empirically approach debates related to forestry and REDD policies.

Using an extended case study methodology and multi-sited ethnography (Marcus, 1997; Burawoy, 2000) our empirical material derives from over 100 interviews as well as observations undertaken between 2011–2013 in Santa Cruz, Beni, La Paz and Pando. Research participants were chosen based on relevance, focusing on marginal actors affected by forest policies, public actors who are responsible for forest policies and international

¹ “Vivir Bien” is the translation into Spanish of indigenous expressions in Quechua (*Sumac Kawsay*) and Aymara (*Suma Qamaña*).

climate change efforts. The first author conducted semi-structured interviews with public servants, professionals, academics, donors, private actors, activists, indigenous and peasant leaders and community members. In addition to one-on-one interviews the first author organised five group discussions in forest-based communities and five workshops with relevant actors, and attended meetings, events and mobilisations in which policies affecting forests were discussed. Interviews and observations were complemented with secondary sources including policy documents, media coverage, legal documents and public statements.

The following section presents our conceptual framework. We then present the Bolivian response to REDD followed by an analytical section explaining the Bolivian turn. The discussion and conclusion sections are presented thereafter.

2. Conceptual framework

In this paper we attempt to reveal power relations at work in contestations over access to and control over forest areas (Forsyth, 2003; Perreault et al., 2015) and also scrutinise the contradictions in forest conservation and other land use and resource policies across scales. As we will discuss below, contestations over forests are intrinsically connected to the political, social and economic context within which they are embedded (Bryant and Bailey, 1997; Perreault et al., 2015). Bolivia was one of the first countries to join the United Nations REDD programme (UN-REDD) in 2007. With 58.7 million hectares of forests Bolivia has the sixth largest extension of tropical forests in the world (FAO, 2010; 2015; Cuéllar et al., 2012). Large scale agricultural activities including soy production and cattle ranching, and to some extent small-scale agriculture, resulted in an annual loss of 290 000 hectares of forests between 2010 and 2015 (FAO, 2015; Høiby and Zenteno Hopp, 2015). Unsustainable timber extraction, forest fires and illegal grazing leads to forest degradation, mainly due to lack of public control and capacity to oversee management areas (Müller et al., 2014). Bolivia initially applied for funding from the UN-REDD and the World Bank Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF), though the Bolivian REDD program never materialised as originally planned. Bolivia launched its own interpretation of a national effort to curb deforestation in 2012: the Joint Mitigation and Adaptation Mechanism for Holistic and Sustainable Management of Forests and Mother Earth (hereafter “Joint Mechanism”). We conceptualise the global REDD initiative as political action “from above” and the response from the Bolivian government and affected communities as political action “from below”. We

argue that the dialectical relation between these scales help to understand the Bolivian outcome (Geenen and Werweijen, 2017). Our study contributes to the discussion of how shifting scales in environmental governance shape strategies and outcomes at national and global levels.

Environmental governance, understood as the way societies are organised to manage, control, protect and transform ecosystems, lands and natural resources, is grounded on particular ideas of what nature is, what it can offer, to whom, how and for which reasons it should be conserved and managed (McAfee, 1999; Bridge and Perreault, 2009). Environmental governance arrangements encompass a range of actors beyond the state, including community actors, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), consultants, private corporations and transnational institutions (Bridge and Perreault, 2009; Bulkeley, 2005). The degree to which certain ideas and values are institutionalised in policies and interventions reflects the power relations at work (Forsyth, 2003; Bridge and Perreault, 2009) and the strategic alliances that have formed (Jessop, 2007). As we demonstrate in our analysis, policy-making processes reflect not only interests connected to forests, but are also an expression of the politisation of the environment (Bridge and Perreault, 2009). In this article we suggest that responses to REDD initiatives should be understood in the context of historic or current exclusionary state, private, and foreign control over lands, resources and decision-making arenas, as well as different alliances in socio-environmental struggles across scales (Forsyth, 2009). Discussions about what REDD is or should be are reflected in different positions among public agencies, donors, indigenous organisations, NGOs, academics and consultants at different scales (Hein and Garrelts, 2014; Osborne et al., 2014). The responses to REDD have varied between Latin American countries and among different interests domestically (Hall, 2012; Aguilar-Støen et al., 2015; Aguilar-Støen and Hirsch, 2015). Responses to REDD relate, for example, to the understanding of what REDD(+) entails, the degree of public, private and community involvement in planning and implementation, the values and ideas of the different actors involved and the power relations among the actors (Aguilar Støen and Hirsch, 2015). We contend that scales are active and dynamic and are composed of multiple social relations (Leitner et al., 2008; Massey, 2005). The question concerns not only the various scales involved in environmental governance but also how they shape one another and the trajectories of politics that emerge in this relationship (cf. Massey, 2005). Scales are processual, always in the making and they are never finished or closed (Massey, 1999). Conceptualising scales as relational, polyvalent and co-implicated allows us to reconnect the

spatial to the political in our analysis.

This contribution examines how shifting scalar relations emerge and how these relations shape – and are reshaped by – relations between political actions from above and from below. We conceptualise scale as a relational, power-laden and contested construction that actors strategically engage with in order to legitimise or challenge existing power relations. In the course of these struggles new scales are constructed and the relative importance of different scales is reconfigured. This process is full of friction, with numerous negotiations and struggles between different actors as they attempt to reshape the scalar spatiality of power and authority (Leitner, 1997; Leitner et al., 2008).

3. The Bolivian response to REDD: a joint mechanism

“The Plurinational State of Bolivia questions the linking of forests to global carbon markets for ethical reasons since this authorizes the effective conversion of Mother Earth, considered sacred by Bolivian society, into a commercial commodity, thus allowing the transfer of responsibilities for mitigation of climate change from developed to developing countries, fostering the latter to continue subsidizing the former. In addition, these arrangements, mediated by the market, may lead to the loss of sovereignty by States and people with regard to the use and management of their natural resources.”

The text above is an excerpt from the Joint Mitigation launched by Bolivia in 2012 as an alternative to REDD². The text condenses the Bolivian government’s position on climate change and REDD, formed in 2008-2012, and includes elements of climate justice, responsibilities, anti-commodification and pro-sovereignty. The process leading to the development of the mechanism was complex and reflects not only how different positions towards REDD were reconciled by the government, but also changing priorities across scales and within the bureaucracy, as well as Bolivia’s global ambitions versus domestic priorities and local interests.

The first response to REDD in Bolivia (2006-2008) was pragmatic and involved only few actors. Our interviews indicate that the Ministry of Environment and Water (MAYA), which

² In Spanish: Mecanismo Conjunto de Mitigación y Adaptación para el Manejo Integral y Sustentable de los Bosques y la Madre Tierra.

at the time was responsible for Bolivia's climate change policies, considered REDD as a funding mechanism suitable for the avoidance of deforestation and to compensate actors involved in preventing deforestation. Bolivia announced its interest to participate in the UN-REDD programme in 2007 and submitted an application for quick-start financing to the World Bank Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) in 2008. The first phase of the REDD programme was planned to include capacity-building among state institutions and civil society and demonstration activities in forest areas (UN-REDD, 2009). At this stage REDD was viewed as a contribution to solve challenges such as poor public control and protection of forest areas (Müller et al., 2014). A joint national REDD program was developed with support from the German Society for International Cooperation (GIZ) including municipal pilot projects, and an application for funding was submitted to UN-REDD in 2009 and approved in March 2010. Representatives from the major indigenous and peasant organisations approved the national REDD program in early 2010 (UNDP interview, 2010). Concurrently, new policies were developed: a National Strategy for Forests and Climate Change, Plans for Integral Forest and Land Management, the creation of the national Forest and Land Authority to merge forest and land issues and the liquidation of private forest concessions.

Just two years later, in 2011, Bolivia requested UN-REDD to support the Joint Mechanism. A team to develop the mechanism was created, led by advisors from the University of Cordillera, a La Paz based research centre housing prominent leftist researchers, together with former and present bureaucrats from the Ministry of Environment and Water, NGO representatives, the Noel Kempff Mercado Museum of Natural History and economists from the Institute for Advanced Development Studies. The team also gathered inputs from peasant and indigenous organisations. The Law of Mother Earth and Integral Development for Living Well (2012) provided the framework for the Joint Mechanism. The law promotes active state involvement in environmental governance, social participation, sustainable production systems, protection of environmental functions and food sovereignty, and prohibits the change of forests land use to other uses, except when related to projects of national interest and public utility. According to the law, "holistic" mixed management systems should fulfil a variety of functions for humans, nature, agriculture and forestry. The law endorses the "non-mercantilisation" of environmental functions, harmonious relations between humans and nature and a rejection of the commodification of nature. It emphasises "functions" over "services", as a clear rejection of PES and market-based mechanisms. In the spirit of the law,

the Joint Mechanism entails recognition of the multiple functions of forests, the dual importance of forests for both climate change mitigation and adaptation, the non-commodification of nature, community benefits as well as support for “Holistic Forest and Soil Management Plans”. Holistic plans will be developed for territorial units such as indigenous territories, communities or municipalities in order to control deforestation and foment sustainable forest management, in return for both financial and non-financial benefits. The Joint Mechanism aims to link agriculture and forestry and strengthen the country’s food sovereignty (Government of Bolivia, 2012). The UN-REDD policy board was, however, reluctant to support the Joint Mechanism as it was considerably different from the initial program, and froze the funds in order to evaluate the situation (UN-REDD, 2012).

4. Explaining the shift towards the Joint Mechanism

How can this change in position from the pragmatic and enthusiastic support of REDD to a critical and domestically adapted alternative be explained? Below we argue that this change is related to 1) the balancing of ideology and pragmatism in environmental governance, 2) domestic conflicts and interests related to natural resources and 3) divergent indigenous positions and local REDD experiences. In our analysis we highlight how divergent strategies used by various actors across scales and alliances influenced both each other and the emerging positions.

4.1 Balancing ideology and pragmatism in environmental governance

The eyes of the world were on South America during the first decade of the twenty-first century, as many governments turned to the left (Bull and Aguilar Støen, 2015). President Evo Morales from the Movement to Socialism (MAS) government (2006-present) attempted to make its mark with a new environmental and climate discourse (Zimmerer, 2015). After the failure of the 2009 climate change negotiations in Copenhagen the Bolivian president announced an alternative conference, the World Peoples’ Conference for Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth, to be held in Cochabamba in April 2010, popularly known as the Cochabamba Conference. The conference reflected the convergence of social and environmental struggles from anti-capitalist, anti-neoliberal and indigenous rights movements from across the world (Fabricant, 2012; Buckley, 2013). The promotion of “Mother Earth”

and “Living Well” was for many equal to the rejection of the commodification of nature, neoliberal environmentalism and neo-colonialism (García Linera, 2012; Buckley, 2013; Zimmerer, 2015). In preparation for the conference the Bolivian government and grassroots organisations advanced a joint position against carbon markets (MAYA, 2010) which was strengthened during the Cochabamba conference. The conference’s forest working group declared that it was “unacceptable to reduce native forests and jungles to a mere measurable amount of carbon”. The final agreement from the conference states that:

We condemn market mechanisms, such as REDD and its versions + and ++, which are violating the sovereignty of peoples and their rights to free informed prior consent; as well as the sovereignty of national States, the customs of Peoples and the rights of Nature (People’s Agreement, 2010).

Shortly after the conference Bolivia’s official collaboration with the World Bank FCPF was terminated due to the program’s emphasis on carbon markets (Ministry of Foreign Affairs interview, 2011). The Peoples’ Agreement was adopted as Bolivia’s official policy just before the Conference of the Parties (COP) 16 in Cancun in December 2010, where the Bolivian delegation later refused to sign the UN Framework Convention for Climate Change. Bolivian government officials criticised offset mechanisms as a way for industrialised countries to buy themselves out of their obligations and viewed carbon monitoring as potential foreign control over forests (Ministry of Foreign Affairs interview, 2011). A statement from the Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs (interview 2011) explains the position:

Markets and carbon, it’s like giving free rein to continue contaminating... Annex 1 countries ... need to change their way of living and not by buying offsets... They view forests only as the capture of carbon, but the forests are so much more: life, indigenous peoples, ecosystems, biodiversity.

In our interviews bureaucrats and government advisors criticised the lack of possibilities for REDD countries to choose alternative funding as long as carbon markets were promoted as the most viable option, volatile carbon prices, lack of predictability for stable funding, as well as the powerful position of private actors and Annex 1 countries. Monitoring involving external and foreign actors was seen as a threat to the country’s sovereignty. Due the government’s position, Clean Development Mechanism projects were terminated and sales of carbon credits from Bolivian projects were stopped. However, the anti-carbon market position did not entail a total rejection of REDD. The Vice-Ministry of Environment and Biodiversity was working in parallel to prepare the Bolivian UN-REDD programme. An interview with a

UN Development Programme (UNDP) officer in La Paz revealed that the UNDP had signalled respect for Bolivia's anti-carbon market position and the Vice-Minister therefore saw it as possible to proceed with the programme. In spite of the position expressed internationally, the UN-REDD National Joint Programme was signed by the Vice-Minister in October 2010, which caused confusion among donors and civil society. The UN-REDD funds were transferred to Bolivia in December 2010, approved in the national assembly and transferred to the Ministry of Environment and Water in June 2011. Concurrently, the responsibility for the climate change negotiations was transferred to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), where scepticism to REDD was strong.

The above demonstrates that while some parts of the Bolivian government attempted to take a leading role globally, others attempted to follow the pathway established by UN-REDD nationally. In parallel, however, on the domestic scale, conflicts over natural resource governance reached a peak in 2011. In the face of new extraction and infrastructure projects indigenous organisations were claiming their right to be consulted and to have control over land and decisions-making processes (Fabricant and Gustafson, 2011; McNeish, 2013). These demands, however, partly clashed with strategic interests related to national projects of infrastructure and extraction. One conflict in particular affected the development of and discussions concerning the UN-REDD programme: the road building project through the national park and indigenous territory Isiboro Sécure (TIPNIS). The conflict had consequences for different policy areas and the relations between the government and the lowland indigenous movement (McNeish, 2013; Hirsch, 2017b), which also affected REDD.

4.2 TIPNIS: domestic resource and interest conflicts

Regaining control over as well as protecting lands and resources is key in indigenous and peasant struggles, and Bolivia has a history of civil society mobilisation against foreign and elite control over natural resources (Perreault, 2006; 2009; Dangl, 2007; Postero, 2007; McNeish, 2008; Haarstad, 2012). Due to these struggles the 2009 Bolivian constitution (Bolivian Constitutional Assembly, 2008) lays a strong foundation for state and democratic control over natural resources and foments indigenous and local communities' rights and participation in environmental governance.

In June 2011 a seminar to kick-start the UN-REDD programme was planned. In parallel, however, indigenous organisations mobilised to protest against the road construction in TIPNIS. The lowland Confederation of Indigenous Peoples of Bolivia (CIDOB) and parts of the highland indigenous organisation Council of Ayllus and Markas of Qullasuyu (CONAMAQ) led the march. Participating organisations viewed the TIPNIS case as emblematic of indigenous struggles across the country.

Since 2006 the highland indigenous and peasant organisations have gained increased political influence in the MAS government, evident in the adoption of the concept of Mother Earth in government policies and the implementation of social programmes benefitting peasant and indigenous communities (Garces, 2011; Zimmerer, 2012; Lalander, 2014), for example. On the other hand, lowland indigenous communities have historically been fragmented both geographically and organisationally, with weaker links to the national government. A land reform with a basis in the 1952 Revolution led to the distribution of lands to small-scale peasants in the highlands. Over generations these lands have been subdivided into small plots (Morales et al., 2013). Due to increased fragmentation of lands, land scarcity and harsh living conditions in the highlands many individuals have migrated to the valleys and lowlands. With the financial crisis in the 1980s thousands of laid-off miners migrated to rural areas to find new livelihoods. Internal migration has created a new group of land and forest managers, often leading to local conflicts (Fontana, 2014; Müller et al., 2014). A new land reform instituted in 2006 sped up the solution of many land claim conflicts and by 2015 85% of the land was titled, of which the majority was allocated to peasant and indigenous communities (Morales et al., 2013; Zimmerer, 2015).

Lowland indigenous organisations protested against interventions in indigenous territories without adequate environmental and social impact assessments, consultation and local benefits, and feared that highland settlers and extractive industries would enter the park (Hirsch, 2017b). The protest against the road construction was situated in a larger contestation over extractive industries, new infrastructure projects and the expansion of the agricultural frontier (Bebbington and Bebbington, 2011; Haarstad, 2012; Bebbington, 2013; McNeish, 2013). The government's attempt to balance extraction and protection of natural resources, local livelihoods and distribution of benefits led to debate and conflict (Haarstad, 2012; Bebbington, 2013; Lalander, 2014) as well as divisions across indigenous and peasant organisations (Fabricant and Gustafson, 2011; Fontana, 2014). The government justifies

extraction projects with increased state income for infrastructure (roads, electricity and water) and social development projects (García Linera, 2012) and argues for the advancement of the agricultural frontier to secure the country's food sovereignty (Pacheco, 2014). Concurrently, forests and protected areas are poorly respected and mechanisms to reduce the advancement of the agricultural frontier are lagging behind (Pacheco, 2014; Müller et al., 2014). Although the government has voiced its commitment to local communities' well-being and environmental protection, resource extraction has expanded with uneven local benefits (Gudynas, 2010; Bebbington, 2013; Zimmerer, 2015). The continued focus on extractive industries has caused conflicts and contestations (Haarstad, 2012; Bebbington, 2013; McNeish, 2013; Lalander, 2014), of which the TIPNIS conflict is an example. The TIPNIS park contains important forest areas and debates about how these forests should be governed, protected and managed emerged (Hirsch, 2017b). The TIPNIS conflict had a direct impact on the relationship between the government and lowland indigenous groups, and led to the division of the indigenous movement as well as increased tensions with the peasant migrant movement (McNeish, 2013; Zimmerer, 2015; Hirsch, 2017b).

Through interviews conducted during the 2011 protest march, disagreements about international funds, including the REDD funds, came to light. Critics feared that REDD, similar to other historical experiences, would lead to increased external control over lands and resources, disregard of indigenous peoples' rights, and elite capture of funds by NGOs, the state, private actors or community leaders. Others saw opportunities in REDD for more autonomous control of indigenous territories, and the marchers demanded that REDD funds be directly allocated to indigenous territorial organisations. The following quotation from the marcher's demands is illustrative.

Regarding REDD and the Green Fund: We demand that the government recognize our right to receive directly the remuneration (payment) for compensation for mitigation of greenhouse gases that our territories serve (environmental services).

The marchers had lost trust in the government and suspected it of having captured the UN-REDD money. These tensions resulted in a lack of arenas in which to discuss REDD, as well as a great deal of uncertainty. The UN-REDD project was at a standstill from 2010 to 2011. The Vice-Minister, who had signed the UN-REDD agreement, left office due to the TIPNIS conflict. His successor, the former chief of Bolivia's highway authority, approved the

environmental licence for the road and expressed scepticism towards REDD. Due to the TIPNIS conflict the government restrained contact between public bodies and organisations involved, as these were considered destabilisers (García Linera, 2012; 2015; Hirsch, 2017b). This also hampered any further dialogue about REDD. In parallel, lowland indigenous organisations were forming their own positions and experiences regarding REDD.

4.3 Divergent indigenous positions and local REDD experiences

Indigenous organisations' positions towards REDD have changed over time, according to place-based strategies and experiences, ideological standpoints and alliances across scales. In 2010 the five largest indigenous and peasant organisations approved the UN-REDD programme. However, scepticism grew with the government's anti-carbon market position and fears of external, foreign and private control over forest areas. This led to an anti-REDD position among highland indigenous and peasant organisations (Pacto de Unidad, 2011; interviews, 2012), who have historically organised against neoliberal and imperialist policies (Dangl, 2007; Fabricant, 2012). The highland peasant movement also opposed international funding to lowland indigenous territories, fearing restriction on peasant migrants' access to forest areas and unjust distribution of benefits and funds (interviews, 2012).

On the other hand, the lowland indigenous organisations adopted a pragmatic position to REDD. Since 2008 the lowland indigenous organisation CIDOB has been open to REDD, promoting the direct transfer of funds to indigenous territorial organisations and respect for indigenous rights. This view was reflected in the Peoples' Agreement (2010), which called for "the acknowledgment of peoples' collective rights to their lands and territories as the best strategy and as a priority in preventing deforestation and forest degradation and in protecting native forests and jungles".

Different factors influenced CIDOB's approach to REDD. An important factor is the community leaders' wish to attract funding to their communities in order to consolidate their territories, as they enjoyed little state support and felt themselves politically disregarded. According to our interviewees, the indigenous organisations' negotiation position was strengthened through the land titling process. Lowland communities have historically faced pressure from diverse interests including landlords, the rubber business, cattle ranchers, private companies, and more recently, NGOs (see García Linera, 2012). The 1952 land

reform was not implemented in the lowlands, leaving many land holdings from the colonial era intact. In the 1990s indigenous mobilisations for land rights led to the legal establishment of the first native communal lands (Morales et al., 2013), followed by a national land reform law in 1996 that included original communal lands (Tierra Comunitaria de Origen, TCO). According to a CIDOB leader interviewed in 2011, REDD was perceived as an opportunity to secure funding to protect their territories through increased physical control measures and as an opportunity to strengthen income generating projects. It was also a reaction to centralisation, government control of funds and stricter bureaucratic procedures in forest management. In interviews, indigenous leaders criticised the public forest authorities' increased bureaucracy associated with the control of forest management as "unnecessary interference". Due to their recent experiences with the Indigenous Fund from the hydrocarbon tax the CIDOB leadership was sceptical about a centrally managed REDD fund, fearing that the government would distribute resources and lands to peasant settlers (CIDOB, 2011). The 2011 CIDOB assembly therefore encouraged affiliated regional organisations to sign contracts with NGOs and international actors including the World Bank in order to finance REDD activities in indigenous territories. This signalled a continued struggle for indigenous autonomy and the rejection of the state's involvement in resource governance in lowland territories.

The indigenous organisations' experience with a local REDD project led by a national NGO (*Fundación Amigos de la Naturaleza, FAN*) and funded by Denmark, the Netherlands and the US-based Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation (2009–2012) in north of Beni, also influenced the indigenous organisations' position. Originally, the Bolivian State participated in the "Indigenous REDD" programme, however, due to the Peoples' Agreement (2010) the government withdrew from the project. Two regional indigenous organisations turned down the project, fearing that the NGO would capture the majority of the funds. The project entailed support to monitor forest areas, management of Brazil nut collection and a strengthened position in management and sales of timber. The project represented an opportunity for local communities to cope with the exclusion that the Bolivian forest regime entailed; it taught community representatives how to negotiate better terms with private companies and provided capacity-building on forest demarcation and logging. However, the NGO was criticised for taking a large share of the funds and community leaders opted for increased autonomy in administration. The indigenous leaders also rejected monitoring of forest carbon, due to a fear that had been created when private actors had offered 40-90 year

contracts for leasing lands to “buy oxygen” under the label of REDD (Santa Cruz workshop, 2012). Community members feared local extraction of oxygen and exclusion from their own lands (see Aguilar-Støen, 2017).

CIDOB leaders were also affected by discussions about REDD in networks such as the Coordinator of Indigenous Organisations of the Amazon River Basin (COICA). While COICA condemns private actors’ engagements in unfavourable REDD contracts with communities, the organisation also collaborated with the World Bank, who actively promotes carbon markets. According to a COICA advisor interviewed in 2012, the organisation upheld a pragmatic position to carbon markets under public control. In 2012 COICA proposed a REDD scheme across the Amazonian area, including territorial management, adaptation and mitigation measures, direct compensation, public control of funding, no offsets and the targeting of drivers of deforestation (COICA, 2012a; 2012b).

The indigenous organisations were later divided in their support of the Joint Mechanism. Parts of CIDOB expressed uncertainty, mainly because they argued they had not been consulted in the design process. Instead, they officially promoted the original UN-REDD programme and regional indigenous REDD programmes with COICA. COICA’s position also influenced the UN-REDD policy board’s decision to not fully support the Joint Mechanism.

5. Discussion

We argue that the divergent REDD positions that emerged in Bolivia have had an impact on the national and global scale. This suggests that the domestic shaping of REDD involves a series of jumps in scales and that strategies change across scales (see Table 1).

Different experiences with state and non-state actors, changing alliances and tactical moves to protect territories and autonomy are factors that explain the indigenous organisations’ positions. The indigenous organisations have resisted NGO, state or private capture of REDD funds, lands and control over decision-making. Distrust of the government affected how the organisations viewed the role of state agencies in REDD and the Joint Mechanism. In parallel, possibilities for local benefits from REDD were embraced, based on strategic territorialisation and livelihood concerns (Zimmerer, 2015). Bolivian indigenous organisations are not

exceptional; both pro- and anti-REDD positions have been voiced amongst South American indigenous leaders (Toni et al., 2011, Osborne et al., 2014). Indigenous organisations operate within a fractured governance landscape, making use of the possibilities that emerge, which demonstrates the complexity and heterogeneity of their tactics in environmental initiatives (Hinderey 2013; Ulloa, 2015; Yeh and Bryan, 2015). These ideas clash, in part, with Western donors' ideas of the national implementation of REDD as well as with attempts to recentralise forest governance.

Different positions co-existed across the Bolivian State bureaucracy and in the government, such as in the Ministry of Environment and Water and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This can partly be explained by their different roles and goals at different scales, as well as their alliances at various scales. The forest team in MAYA (2006-2011) largely consisted of environmentalists with ties to lowland communities committed to forest conservation and with a good relationship with donors. Political leaders and bureaucrats in the MFA had a strong ideological foothold in the anti-neoliberal movement as well as close relations with the peasant and indigenous movement from the highlands. This demonstrates that interests and positions within the government and the bureaucracy are seldom monolithic and that the role of strategic alliances should not be ignored (Jessop, 2007). It also points to changing strategies across scales, where Bolivia maintained one position internationally whilst following a parallel more pragmatic strategy nationally (Bebbington, 2015). Our case also suggests how other priorities and powerful interests influenced the policy outcomes. From the COP negotiations in Copenhagen to the Cochabamba Conference in 2010, a strategic approach to reject REDD was followed by the government. The Bolivian government maintained a position against carbon markets and promoted indigenous rights, integral forest management and sovereignty in monitoring and implementation, supported by many civil society organisations, environmental justice networks and certain states (Wallbott, 2014).

The Joint Mechanism was a move to merge positions and reconcile interests (see, e.g., Bebbington, 2015), and also to create other strategic alliances such as with the agricultural and peasant sector. The government managed to capture international funding, satisfy local demands and create a long-term strategy for an alternative to REDD and carbon markets. The domestic implementation of the Joint Mechanism, however, entails several challenges, and although in principle it works to join agricultural and forest interests, it faces contested priorities in Bolivia's environmental and resource governance across scales. Agricultural and

extractive interests are largely prioritised and resource exploration and extraction is permitted in protected forest areas (National Development Plan, 2016: 265; Hirsch, 2017a). Law 337 of 2013 (Support to Food Production and the Restitution of Forests legalised forest clearing between 1996 and 2011 (Müller et al., 2014) and foments large scale food production (Hirsch, 2017a). Settlers have been granted access to forests, though often without plans and support for sustainable management (Müller et al., 2014). The forest legal framework has not been amended to the Joint Mechanism, maintaining the neoliberal legacy. A new forest law was proposed in 2013, though no consensus was reached (Hirsch, 2017a). The current Forest Law (1996) is largely contradictory to “non-mercantilisation”, “holistic” and “multi-functional” forest governance (CEDLA and OBIE, 2011); it is timber-focused, prioritises private interests and unregulated markets and gives private companies power over the forest-value chain (Arteaga, 2011; Hirsch, 2017a). Poorly adapted management tools entails dependency on external actors and provides few incentives for locally adapted agro-forestry systems (Becker and León, 2002; Redo et al., 2011; Müller et al., 2014). Communities are incorporated into commercial forest management as suppliers of timber, yet not as beneficiaries and “holistic” forest managers.

From 2008-2013 private concessions were reduced from 4.4 million to 2.1 million hectares (PDES, 2016). Concurrently, indigenous and peasant communities have increased forest management areas from 3.3 million to 6.2 million hectares. Forest concessions were replaced by “special temporary authorizations” (Supreme Decree 0726, 2010), however, due to poor public follow up (see also CEDLA and OBIE, 2011; Müller et al., 2014), communities were left in legally unclear relations with companies (Hirsch, 2017a). With poor public control forests are left damaged and often with limits for timber extraction exceeded. A further discussion of these barriers is beyond the scope of this article.

Globally, the Joint Mechanism has been challenged by strong forces behind the dominant REDD model (Aguilar-Støen and Hirsch, 2015). In international negotiations the Bolivian proposal was met with skepticism, and some even see it as a threat to the advancement of the REDD initiative. In conversations with Norwegian bureaucrats, they explained that few delegates treated Bolivia’s non-market position seriously. Indeed, it was largely disregarded as ideology and activism performed by “unexperienced delegates” (Wallbott, 2014).

UN-REDD finally decided to support parts of the Joint Mechanism, and it was granted funding from the European Union, Japan and Australia in 2013. At the COP 18, in Doha in 2013, non-market based approaches gained increased attention because of the Bolivian proposal (Decision 39 and 47, CP 18). This goes to show that Bolivia has placed non-market based approaches on the agenda and has contributed to a focus on programmes that view forests in a holistic manner, their functions for mitigation, adaptation and livelihoods, and the joining of forest and agricultural interests. This collaboration is particularly relevant considering that many of the drivers of deforestation lie outside the forest sector. Our results offer a nuanced explanation of findings presented by other researchers. For example, Minang et al. (2014) compared four countries' efforts to implement REDD and concluded that despite working from the same funder's models, progress was strongly influenced by national governance circumstances. Our study rather shows how implementation is affected by dialectical relations between multiple scales, actors and interests.

6. Conclusion

In this paper we have used a case study from Bolivia to discuss how international climate initiatives involving forests are contested and reshaped when they enter the domestic policy-making arena and how responses to REDD have been formed and changed across scales and by changing alliances.

Our findings suggest that actors involved in promoting, reshaping or rejecting REDD, whether discursively or during actual negotiations, relate to different scales in which the Bolivian REDD initiative has been shaped. First is the national scale, where public actors in Bolivia initially had a positive and pragmatic approach to REDD. The approach changed between the COP negotiations and the Cochabamba Conference in 2010. The pragmatism that our interviewees described was based on interests to attract funding to a marginalised sector, but was exchanged for a more tactical approach to pursue an alternative in line with the government's international climate justice discourse. Further is how actors at local scales successfully mobilised to form alliances with the government (highlands organisations) or with international REDD actors (lowlands organisations). This suggests that "domestic implementation" of REDD involves a series of jumps in scales in which a range of actors and interests are involved.

Globally, due to the Bolivian position, non-market based mechanisms have been placed on the agenda for climate change policies, as has the importance of forests for both mitigation and adaptation. Domestically, however, important steps need to be taken to reconcile agricultural, extraction and forest protection interests and to reverse the market-oriented regulations in force. Thus far power has largely resided in the agricultural and extraction sector with private interests occupying a privileged position. An important counterweight is the strengthened role of indigenous organisations, with an increasing extension of forests in their territories. At the same time, steps are being taken to strengthen the role of the state in environmental and forest management. However, environmental goals are often neglected and the holistic management model is under development. The forming of alliances to develop solutions are pivotal for the future of forests in Bolivia. Bolivia has demonstrated an important challenge to the market oriented approach, but also exemplifies the difficulties in implementation domestically. Our study suggests that the politics of scale are fundamental to understand how the dialectical relationship between global initiatives “from above” and responses “from below” shape outcomes at various scales. These are also influenced by interests and power struggles outside the forest sector. As the case demonstrates, other non-sectoral priorities (i.e., agriculture, infrastructure, minerals and oil) influence both governments’ and rural and indigenous organisations’ positions. This suggests that more fruitful initiatives for forest conservation require cross-sectoral dialogue and efforts.

Table 1. Bolivian forest and climate change policies across scales

Date	Domestic/National	Global	Local/Indigenous organisation
2007	Preparation - World Bank FCPF	COP 13, Bali: REDD is included in the Bali Roadmap, Decision 2/CP.13	
2008	Application submitted - WBFCPF	COP 14, Poznan: President Evo Morales rejects market mechanisms	
2009	National Strategy for Climate Change and Forests National Forest and Land Authority (ABT) UN-REDD application submitted	COP 15, Copenhagen: Bolivia opposes carbon markets, demands compensation for mitigation activities	The Indigenous REDD-FAN programme is initiated
2010	The National Joint Program (NJP) is accepted The Cochabamba conference takes place The UN-REDD programme is signed	COP 16, Cancun: The Cochabamba declaration as the Bolivian official position REDD+ is introduced Bolivia refuses to sign the UNFCCC agreement	The Bolivian government withdraws from the Indigenous REDD-FAN programme
2011	The forerunner to the Joint Mechanism is presented Bolivia requests the UN-REDD to amend the Bolivian NJP	UN-REDD funds are frozen COP 17, Durban: Bolivia presents the forerunner to the Joint Mechanism Paragraph 67 decision 2/CP.17. establishes that non-market alternatives can be developed	CIDOB III National Assembly calls for Holistic REDD programs The TIPNIS protest march
2012	The Law of Mother Earth UN-REDD high level mission in Bolivia	COP 18, Doha: Joint Mechanism is launched With Decision 39 and 47 of CP 18, non-market based approaches gain increased attention and a working program was established.	The Indigenous REDD-FAN programme is concluded COICA presents a regional Indigenous programme Indigenous organisations are divided in support to the Joint Mechanism.
2013	Law 337 Support to Food Production and the Restitution of Forests A proposal for a new forest law is presented.	COP 19, Warsaw: REDD-plus introduced	

References

- Aguilar-Støen, M. (2017). Better Safe than Sorry? Indigenous Peoples, Carbon Cowboys and the Governance of REDD in the Amazon. *Forum for Development Studies*. ISSN 0803-9410. 44(1): 91- 108.
- Aguilar-Støen, M. and C. Hirsch (2015). REDD+ and forest governance in Latin America: The role of science-policy networks, in B. Bull and M. Aguilar-Støen (eds), *Environmental Politics in Latin America. Elite Dynamics, the Left Tide and Sustainable Development*, London: Routledge, pp. 171–189.
- Aguilar-Støen, M., F. Toni and C. Hirsch (2015). Latin American approaches to “Reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation REDD”, in F. de Castro, B. Hoogenbom, and M. Baud, eds, *Environmental Governance in Latin America. Conflicts, Projects and Possibilities*, London: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 205–233.
- Andolina, R., Laurie, N. and Radcliffe, S.A. (2009). *Indigenous Development in the Andes: Culture, Power, and Transnationalism*. Duke University Press
<https://doi.org/10.1215/9780822391067>
- Angelsen, A. (2009) *Realising REDD+: national strategy and policy options*. Bogor, Indonesia: CIFOR. 361p.
- Angelsen, A. and McNeill, D. (2012) The evolution of REDD+, in A. Angelsen, M. Brockhaus, W. D. Sunderlin and L. V. Verchot (eds), *Analysing REDD+: Challenges and choices*. Bogor, Indonesia: CIFOR, 31–49.
- Angelsen, A.; Martius, C.; de Sy, V.; Duchelle, A.E.; Larson, A.M.; Pham, T.T.; (2018) (eds.) *Transforming REDD+: Lessons and new directions*. Bogor, Indonesia: CIFOR.
- Arteaga, W. (2010) Procesos de discusión para el diseño de la nueva Ley Forestal. Mapa de actores. Documento de Coyuntura. La Paz: CEDLA.
https://www.cedla.org/sites/default/files/Coyuntura%2018_PDF.pdf. Last accessed 27.01.19.
- Bebbington, D. H. (2013). Extraction, inequality and indigenous peoples: Insights from Bolivia. *Environmental Science & Policy* 33, pp.438-446.
- Bebbington, J. (2015). At the Boundaries of La Política: Political ecology, policy networks and moments of government, in G. Bridge, J. McCarthy and T. Perreault (eds) *Handbook of Political Ecology*. London: Routledge.
- Bebbington, A. and Bebbington, D. H. (2011) An Andean Avatar: Post-neoliberal and neoliberal strategies for securing the unobtainable, *New Political Economy*, 15(4), pp.131–145
- Becker, C. D. and León, R. (2002). Indigenous forest management in the Bolivian Amazon: Lessons from the Yuracaré people. *Forests, Trees and People Programme - Forestry Department Working Paper No. 3*. The Food and Agriculture Organization.

- Blom, B., Sunderland, T. and Murdiyarmo, D. (2010). Getting REDD to Work Locally: Lessons Learned from Integrated Conservation and Development Projects, *Environmental Science and Policy* 13(2), pp.164–172.
- Bolivian Constitutional Assembly (2008), *Asamblea Constituyente de Bolivia. Nueva Constitución política del estado*. Congreso Nacional. Octubre 2008. Approved in 2009.
- Bryant, R. L. and Bailey, S. (1997). *Third World Political Ecology*. London: Routledge.
- Buckley, K.M. (2013) Situating contestation at the World People's Conference on Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth In Buckley, K.M. *Global Civil Society and Transversal Hegemony. The Globalization-Contestation Nexus*. Oxon: Routledge.
- Bulkeley, H. (2005). Reconfiguring environmental governance: towards a politics of scales and networks. *Political geography*, 24(8), pp.875-902.
- Bull, B. and Aguilar-Støen, M.C. (eds) (2015) *Environmental Politics in Latin America: Elite Dynamics, the Left Tide and Sustainable Development*. London: Routledge.
- Bumpus, A. G. (2011) The matter of carbon: Understanding the materiality of tCO₂e in carbon offsets. *Antipode*, 43, pp.612–638.
- Bumpus, A. G. and Liverman, D. (2011) Carbon colonialism? Offsets greenhouse gas reduction and sustainable development, in R. Peet, P. Robbins and M. J. Watts (eds), *Global Political Ecology*. New York: Routledge, pp.203–224.
- Burawoy, M. (2000). *Global Ethnography: Forces, Connections, and Imaginations in a Postmodern World*. Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press.
- Bridge, G. and Perreault, T. (2009). Environmental Governance. In Castree, N., Demeritt, D., Liverman, D. and Rhoads, R.. *A companion to Environmental Geography*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.
- Castree, N. (2010). Neoliberalism and the Biophysical Environment: A Synthesis and Evaluation of the Research, *Environment and Society: Advances in Research*, 1(1), pp.5–45.
- EDLA and OBIE (2011). Análisis de las políticas del sector forestal. Bosques. Cambian las normas y el discurso, pero no el dominio de las empresas madereras. Centro de Estudios para el Desarrollo Laboral y Agrario (CEDLA) and Observatorio Boliviano de Industrias Extractivas (OBIE).
- CIDOB (2011). Resolución de la III Comisión Nacional 2011. Trinidad, Bolivia: La Confederación de Pueblos Indígenas de Bolivia.
- COICA (2012a). Alternativa de REDD+ Indígena Territorios de Vida Plena para enfriar el planeta. Quito: Coordinadora de las Organizaciones Indígenas de la Cuenca Amazónica.
- COICA, (2012b). Consolidation of Indigenous Territories: Condition and Indicator concerning REDD+. Holistic Management Alternative for Territories as a Source of life (Indigenous Amazonian REDD+).

- Corbera, E. (2012) Problematizing REDD+ as an experiment in payments for ecosystem services. Current Opinion in *Environmental Sustainability*, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.bbr.2011.03.031>.
- Corbera, E. (2015) Valuing nature, paying for ecosystem services and realizing social justice: A response to Matulis. *Ecological Economics*, 110, pp.154-157.
- Corbera, E. (2017) Foreword – The carbon offsetting dilemma. In Paladino, S. and Fiske, S. (eds.) *The Carbon Fix; Forest Carbon, Social Justice and Environmental Governance*. London: Routledge.
- Corbera, E. and Martin, A. (2015) Carbon offsets: accommodation or resistance? *Environment and Planning A*, 47(10), pp. 2023-2030.
- Corbera, E. and Schroeder, H. (2011). Governing and implementing REDD+. *Environmental Science & Policy* 14(2), pp.89-99.
- Cuéllar, S, Rodríguez, A., Arroyo, J., Espinoza, S. and Larrea, D. (2012). Mapa de deforestación de las tierras bajas y los yungas de Bolivia 2000–2005–2010. Proyección Sistema de Coordenadas Geográficas, Datum WGS84. Santa Cruz de la Sierra, Bolivia: Fundación Amigos de la Naturaleza (FAN).
- Cronkleton, P., Bray, D.B. and Medina, G., (2011). Community forest management and the emergence of multi-scale governance institutions: Lessons for REDD+ development from Mexico, Brazil and Bolivia. *Forests* 2, pp.451-473.
- Dangl, B. (2007). *The Price of Fire: Resource Wars and Social Movements in Bolivia* Oakland: AK Press.
- Delgado, F., Rist, S., and Escobar, C., (2010). *El desarrollo endógeno sustentable como interfaz implementar el Vivir Bien en la gestión boliviana*. La Paz: Plural.
- Escobar, A. (2010). Latin America at a Crossroads: Alternative Modernizations, Postliberalism, or Postdevelopment? *Cultural Studies* (24) 1, pp.1-65.
- Fabricant, N. (2012). *Mobilizing Bolivia's Displaced: Indigenous Politics and the Struggle over Land*. North Carolina: UNC Press.
- Fabricant, N. and Gustafson, B. eds (2011). *Remapping Bolivia, Resources, Territory, and Indigeneity in a Plurinational State*. Santa Fe: School for Advanced Research.
- FAO (2010). Global Forest Resources Assessment 2010 – country report Bolivia. FAO Forestry Paper Rome Food and Agriculture Organization.
- FAO (2015). Global Forest Resources Assessment 2015. *How are the world's forests changing?* 2nd Ed. The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.
- Fontana, L.B. (2014). Indigenous peoples vs peasant unions: land conflicts and rural movements in plurinational Bolivia. *The Journal of Peasant Studies* 41(3), pp.297-319.

Forsyth, T. (2003). *Critical political ecology: The politics of environmental science*. London: Routledge.

Forsyth, T. (2009). Multilevel, multiactor governance in REDD+. In: Angelsen, A., with Brockhaus, M., Kanninen, M., Sills, E., Sunderlin, W.D. and Wertz-Kanounnikoff, S. (eds) *Realising REDD+: national strategy and policy options*. Bogor, Indonesia: CIFOR.

Garcés, F. (2011). The Domestication of Indigenous Autonomies in Bolivia: From the Pact of Unity to the New Constitution. In Fabricant, B. and Gustafson, N. (eds). *Remapping Bolivia, Resources, Territory, and Indigeneity in a Plurinational State*. Santa Fe: School for Advanced Research

García Linera, A. (2012). *Geopolitics of the Amazon: Patrimonial-Hacendado Power and Capitalist Accumulation*. La Paz: La Vicepresidencia del Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia.

García Linera, A. (2015). Sobre el papel de las Organizaciones No Gubernamentales (ONG) en Bolivia y su financiamiento. *Rebellion* 19.08.15. <http://rebelion.org/noticia.php?id=202285>
Last accessed 01.02.2019

Geenen, S., and Verweijen, J. (2017). Explaining fragmented and fluid mobilization in gold mining concessions in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. *The Extractive Industries and Society*, 4(4), pp.758–765.

Government of Bolivia (2012). Mecanismo de mitigación y adaptación para el manejo integral y sustentable de los bosques y la madre tierra. La Paz.

Gudynas, E. (2010). Tensiones, contradicciones y oportunidades de la dimensión ambiental del Buen Vivir. En: I. Farah H. y L. Vasapollo (eds) *Vivir bien: ¿Paradigma no capitalista?*, La Paz: CIDES-UMSA y Plural.

Haarstad (ed.), (2012) *New Political Spaces in Latin American Natural Resource Governance*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Hall, A. (2011) GETTING REDD-Y Conservation and Climate Change in Latin America, *Latin American Research Review* 46, pp.184–210.

Hall, A. (2012) *Forests and Climate Change: The Social Dimensions of REDD in Latin America*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing,

Hein, J., and Garrelts, H. (2014). Ambiguous involvement: civil society actors in forest carbon offsets – the case of Climate Community and Biodiversity Standards (CCB). In M. Dietz & H. Garrelts (Eds.), *Routledge Handbook of the Climate Change Movement*. London: Routledge, pp.429–448

Hinderey, D. (2013) From Enron to Evo Pipeline Politics, Global Environmentalism, and Indigenous Rights in Bolivia. Series: *First Peoples: New Directions in Indigenous Studies*. University of Arizona Press.

Hirsch, C.K. (2017a). Makers and shapers of environmental policy making: Power and participation in forest legislation in Bolivia. *Journal of Rural Studies* 50, pp.148- 158.

- Hirsch, C. (2017b). Between Resistance and Negotiations: Indigenous Organisations and the Bolivian State in the case of TIPNIS. *Journal of Peasant Studies*. DOI: 10.1080/03066150.2017.1394846
- Højby, M. and Zenteno Hopp, J. (2015). Bolivia: emerging and traditional elites and the governance of the soy sector in B. Bull and M. Aguilar-Støen (eds) *Environmental Politics in Latin America: Elite Dynamics, the Left Tide and sustainable development*. Oxon: Routledge
- Jessop, B. (2007). *State Power: A Strategic-Relational Approach*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Lalander, R. (2014). Rights of nature and the indigenous peoples in Bolivia and Ecuador : A Straitjacket for Progressive Development Politics? *Iberoamerican Journal of Development Studies*. 3(2), pp.148–173.
- Larson, A. (2011) Forest tenure reform in the age of climate change: Lessons for REDD+ *Global Environmental Change* 2(21), pp.540-549.
- Larson, A. M. and E. Petkova (2011). An Introduction to Forest Governance, People and REDD+ in Latin America: Obstacles and Opportunities. *Forests* 2(1), pp.86-111
- Larson, A.M., Cronkleton, P., Barry, D. and Pacheco, P. (2008). Tenure Rights and Beyond: Community access to forest resources in Latin America. *Occasional Paper no. 50*. Bogor, Indonesia: CIFOR.
- Leitner, H. (1997). Reconfiguring the spatiality of power: the construction of a supranational migration framework for the European Union. *Political Geography*, 16(2),pp.123–143.
- Leitner, H., Sheppard, E., and Sziarto, K. M. (2008). The spatialities of contentious politics. *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, 33(2), pp.157–172.
- Liverman D.M. (2004). Who governs, at what scale and at what price? Geography, environmental governance and the commodification of nature. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*. 94(4), pp.734-738
- Marcus, G. E. (1997). Enography in/of the world system: The emergence of multi-sited ethnography *Annual Review of Anthropology*, 24, pp.95-117.
- Massey, D. (1999). *Power-geometries and the Politics of Space-Time: Hettner Lecture 1998*. Heidelberg: Department of Geopgraphy, University of Heidelberg.
- Massey, D. (2005). *For space*. London, Thousand Oaks, Calif: SAGE.
- Matulis, B.S. (2014). The economic valuation of nature: a question of justice? *Ecol. Econ.* 007 (Special Section — Payments for Environmental Services: Reconciling Theory) 104, pp.155–157.
- McAfee, K. (1999). Selling nature to save it? Biodiversity and green developmentalism. *Environment and Planning D-Society & Space* 17(2), pp.133-154.

McNeish, J. (2008). Constitutionalism in an Insurgent State: Rethinking Legal Empowerment of the Poor in a Divided Bolivia Rights and Legal Empowerment In D. Banik, *Eradicating Poverty*, Farnham: Ashgate

McNeish, J.-A. (2013). Extraction, Protest and Indigeneity in Bolivia: The TIPNIS Effect. *Latin American and Caribbean Ethnic Studies*. 8(2), pp.221-242.

Medina, J. (2006). *Suma Qamaña. Por una convivencia postindustrial*. La Paz: Garza Azul Editores.

Minang, P.A., Van Noordwijk, M., Duguma, L.A., Alemagi, D., Hoan Do, T., Bernard, F., Agung, P., Robiglio, V., Catacutan, D., Suyanto, S., Armas, A., Silva Aguad, C., Feudjio, M., Galudra, G., Maryani, R., White, D., Widayati, A., Kahurani, E., Namirembe, S. & Leimona, B. (2014) REDD+ Readiness progress across countries: time for reconsideration, *Climate Policy*, 14:6, pp.685-708.

Ministry of Environment and Water, (2010). Ministerio de Medio Ambiente y Agua, Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia. *Resultados y conclusiones. Pre-conferencia de los pueblos indígenas originario campesino y organizaciones sociales de Bolivia sobre Cambio Climatico y derechos de la madre tierra. 29 y 30 de marzo de 2010*. Cochabamba, Bolivia.

Morales, M., Gianotten, V., Devisscher, M., and Pacheco, D. (2013). *Hablemos de tierra. Minifundio, gestión territorial, bosques e impuesto agrario en Bolivia*. La Paz: Plural.

Müller, R., Pacheco, P. and Montero, J.C. (2014) The context of deforestation and forest degradation in Bolivia: Drivers, agents and institutions. *Occasional Paper 108*. Bogor, Indonesia: CIFOR.

Nasi, R., Putz, F.E., Pacheco, P., Wunder, S. and Salvador, A. (2011) Sustainable Forest Management and Carbon in Tropical Latin America: The case of REDD. *Forests*, 2, pp.200-217

Osborne, T. (2015). Tradeoffs in carbon commodification: A political ecology of common property forest governance. *Geoforum*, 67, pp.64-77.

Osborne, T. (2018). Indigenous REDD: Carbon Markets and Territorial Land Rights in the Amazon Rainforest. In Bigger, P and J. Dempsey, Reflecting on Neoliberal Natures. *Environment and Planning E*.

Osborne, T., Bellante, L. and von Hedemann, N. (2014). Indigenous Peoples and REDD+: A Critical Perspective Indigenous Peoples' Biocultural Climate Change Assessment Initiative. IPCC. Christensen Fund.

Pacheco, D. (2014). *Una mirada a la política de bosques en Bolivia: por la descolonización de las políticas*. La Paz: Universidad de Cordillera.

Pacheco, P. (2006). *Descentralización forestal en Bolivia. Implicaciones en el gobierno de los recursos forestales y el bienestar de los grupos marginados*. La Paz, Bogor: CIFOR. Plural.

Pacto de Unidad. (2011) Posicionamiento de los Pueblos Indígenas Originarios Campesinos y Afro Bolivianos del Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia para la CMNUCC. Bonn, June 2011.

Peoples Agreement (2010). World People's Agreement on Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth. Tiquipaya, Cochabamba, Bolivia.

<https://pwccc.wordpress.com/2010/04/24/peoples-agreement/> last accessed 24.10.18

Perreault, T. (2006) From the *Guerra del Agua* to the *Guerra del Gas*: Resource governance, neoliberalism, and popular protest in Bolivia, *Antipode*, 38(1), pp.150-172.

Perreault, T. (2009) Assessing the limits of neoliberal environmental governance in Bolivia, in Burdick, J. Oxhorn, P. and Roberts, K. (eds.) *Beyond Neoliberalism in Latin America?* New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp.135-156.

Perreault, T., Bridge, G. and McCarthy, J. (2015) *The Routledge Handbook of Political Ecology*. Oxon: Routledge.

Postero, N. (2007) *Now We Are Citizens, Indigenous Politics in Post-Multicultural Bolivia*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. (294pp)

PRATEC (Proyecto Andino de Tecnologías Campesinas) (Ed.) (2002). *Allin Kawsay: El bienestar en las concepciones andino-amazónicas*. Lima: PRATEC.

Redo, R. Millington, A. and Hinderey, D. (2011). Deforestation Dynamics and Policy Changes in Bolivia's Post-neoliberal Era. *Land Use Policy* 28(1), pp.227-241. DOI: 10.1016/j.landusepol.2010.06.004

Rosa, H., S. Kandel, and L. Dimas. (2003). *Compensation for environmental services and rural communities*. San Salvador: PRISMA

Stephan, B. and Lane, R. (eds) (2015). *The politics of carbon markets*, London: Routledge.

Stern, N. (2006) *The economics of climate change*. *The Stern Review*, London, i–27.

Ulloa, A. (2015). Environment and development. Reflections from Latin America. In Perreault, T., Bridge, G. and McCarthy, J. (eds) *The Routledge Handbook of Political Ecology*. London: Routledge.

Toni, F., Ferreira, I.A. and Ferreira, I.N. (2011) 'Adapting to emerging institutions: REDD+ projects in the territories of the Suruí and Cinta-Larga indigenous peoples', *ICARUS II Conference in Climate Vulnerability and Adaptation*, University of Michigan, USA.

UN-REDD (2009). National Program Document. First Version for the UN-REDD Secretariat. 17-19 March FAO, UNDP and UNEP

UN-REDD (2012). Report on the High-Level Mission to Bolivia and Recommendations to the UN-REDD Policy Board Ninth policy board meeting 26-27 October (2012) Brazzaville, Republic of the Congo, UN-REDD programme.

Vatn, A. (2005). *Institutions and the Environment*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

Vatn, A., (2015). *Environmental Governance. Institutions, Policies and Actions*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

Wallbott, L. (2014). Indigenous Peoples in UN REDD+ Negotiations: “Importing Power” and Lobbying for Rights through Discursive Interplay Management. *Ecology and Society*. 19. 10.5751/ES-06111-190121.

Yeh, E.T. and Bryan, J. (2015). Indigeneity. In Perreault, T., Bridge, G. and McCarthy, J. (eds) *The Routledge Handbook of Political Ecology*. London: Routledge.

Zimmerer, K.S. (2012). The Indigenous Andean Concept of Kawsay , the Politics of Knowledge and Development, and the Borderlands of Environmental Sustainability in Latin America. *Publications of the Modern Language Association of America*. 127. 600-606. 10.1632/pmla.2012.127.3.600.

Zimmerer, K. S. (2015). Environmental governance through “Speaking Like an Indigenous State” and respatializing resources: Ethical livelihood concepts in Bolivia as versatility or verisimilitude? *Geoforum*. Vol. 64, pp.314–324.

PAPER IV

The following paper is a published paper in the Journal of Rural Studies.

Hirsch, C. (2017). Makers and shapers of environmental policy-making: Power and participation in forest legislation in Bolivia. *Journal of Rural Studies*.50, pp.148-158.
<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrurstud.2016.11.013>



Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Journal of Rural Studies

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/jrurstud

Makers and shapers of environmental policy making: Power and participation in forest legislation in Bolivia

Cecilie Hirsch ^{a, b, *}

^a Department of International Environment and Development Studies (Noragric), Norwegian University of Life Sciences (NMBU), PO. Box 5003, NO 1432 Ås, Norway

^b Centre for Development and the Environment (SUM), University of Oslo (UiO), PO. Box 1116, Blindern, 0317 Oslo, Norway

ARTICLE INFO

Article history:

Received 13 November 2015

Received in revised form

7 October 2016

Accepted 15 November 2016

Available online xxx

Keywords:

Forest governance

Law making

Participation

Indigenous peoples

Peasants

Subaltern actors

ABSTRACT

The objective of this paper is to assess the possibilities and barriers for subaltern actors' participation in environmental policy making. To discuss this issue I focus on the case of the creation of new forest legislation in Bolivia and the involvement and influence of actors such as indigenous forest community organisations and migrant peasant organisations in the process. How can subaltern actors be makers and shapers of environmental policies, and whose interests and demands are considered, included and excluded in these processes? The case study demonstrates that on the one hand, participation has been made possible and facilitated by subaltern strategies such as coalition building among different actors and strategic framings of their demands, combined with public and government agencies' responsiveness and the creation of 'collaborative spaces'. On the other hand, participation has been limited by fragmented processes for inputs, selective inclusions and exclusions of actors and underlying state-society tensions. Finally, the study illustrates how agricultural and land-use interests have influenced the law-making agenda and the development of recent policies affecting forest areas.

© 2016 Published by Elsevier Ltd.

1. Introduction

The way forests are governed affects marginal groups' livelihoods, rights, access to land and resources, social and cosmological life (see e.g. [Sunderlin et al., 2005](#); [Larson et al., 2007, 2008](#)). Several academics argue for increased attention to marginalised groups' possibilities to participate in environmental policy and decision making (see e.g. [Forsyth, 2005, 2009](#); [Demeritt, 2015](#); [Perreault et al., 2015](#); [Cornwall, 2011](#); [Smith and Pangsapa, 2008](#); [Haarstad and Campero, 2011](#); [Peet and Watts, 2004](#); [De Castro et al., 2016](#)), a call to which this article attempts to respond. Approaches to participation range from instrumental ones related to participation as means to share knowledge and information, secure sustainability and cost-effectiveness, increase legitimacy and the quality of policies and outcomes, to those related to social justice, citizenship perspectives and participation as a right ([Demeritt, 2015](#); [Cornwall, 2011](#); [Smith and Pangsapa, 2008](#); [Hickey and Mohan, 2004](#)). Bolivia, a country with vast forest areas, was one of the first countries in the world to test out legislation to institutionalise participatory development in the 1990s ([Medeiros, 2001](#)). The country has

recently enshrined constitutional and legal provisions for public participation in governance ([Schilling-Vacaflo, 2010](#); [CPEPB, 2009](#)). The objective of this article is to assess the possibilities and limitations for subaltern groups to be 'makers and shapers' of new forest legislation in Bolivia ([Cornwall and Gaventa, 2000](#)), and the interests and demands that are prioritised in the process. I do so by employing ethnographic qualitative methods within a political ecology approach (cf. [Perreault et al., 2015](#); [Robbins, 2004](#)), focusing on two subaltern groups (cf. [Green, 2002](#)). The study acknowledges the need to combine environmental and social justice concerns in addressing changing rural contexts (see e.g. [Smith and Pangsapa, 2008](#)). In the next section the analytical framework is presented, followed by the methodology. I then introduce the Bolivian context, before presenting the findings. I relate the possibilities and limitations for participation to coalition building and framing of demands 'from below', coupled with state responsiveness, control of participatory arenas and different interests influencing forest governance and the legislative agenda.

2. Participation in environmental governance

Participation has been widely studied, related to issues such as development, project planning, community-based initiatives, policy making, governance and implementation (see e.g. [Cook and](#)

* Department of International Environment and Development Studies (Noragric), Norwegian University of Life Sciences (NMBU), PO. Box 5003, NO 1432 Ås, Norway.
E-mail address: cecilhi@sum.uio.no.

Kothari, 2001; Hickey and Mohan, 2004; Cornwall, 2011; Haarstad and Campero, 2011). Here I will present some overall arguments from the literature, and relate these to the field of environmental governance, defined here as 'a set of mechanisms, formal and informal institutions and practices by way of which social order is produced through controlling that which is related to the environment and natural resources' (Bull and Aguilar-Støen, 2015:5). Instrumental approaches to participation have largely been used by governments and project implementers to obtain legitimacy for projects or policies, and have been criticized for not leading to substantial changes, for serving the interests of the powerful few and for co-opting and manipulating groups (Cook and Kothari, 2001; Hickey and Mohan, 2004). Others argue that participation can increase the quality of the policies/science, based on the knowledge and experience of the actors involved (Demeritt, 2015). The move towards 'participation' in the 1980s and 1990s as part of decentralisation and privatisation policies was largely focused on concrete participatory arenas, projects and programmes outside of the state and public spheres (Bliss and Neumann, 2008; Cook and Kothari, 2001; Stiefel and Wolfe, 2011). These initiatives have been criticised for not addressing structural inequalities and for not creating avenues to influence policy and decision making (see e.g. Pacheco, 2006; Hickey and Mohan, 2004).

Normative approaches point that participation is a right, a part of citizenship, and an end in itself with transformational potential (see e.g. Hickey and Mohan, 2004), and resemble arguments for procedural and distributional justice (Paavola, 2004). Procedural justice refers to the recognition and involvement of different groups' interests, needs and rights in planning and decision making (Paavola and Adger, 2002). To paraphrase Arnstein (1969, in Cornwall, 2011:3), participation refers to 'the redistribution of power that enables the have-not citizens, presently excluded from the political and economic processes, to be deliberately included in the future'. Citizenship perspectives (see e.g. Smith and Pangasapa, 2008) often focus on enhancing the position of excluded groups in decision-making processes combining concepts of entitlements and obligations. Applying this argument to the forest sector, communities and other marginalised groups have a right to be involved in the design of forest policy as affected citizens or as indigenous peoples. Their participation may lead to important inputs for how forests should be governed to support their rights and livelihoods, and consequently for the sense of being included (Paavola, 2004). The 'transformative' turn in the participation debate in the 2000s (Hickey and Mohan, 2004) renewed the emphasis on citizenship, and the importance of getting participation 'back in' in state and public spheres (Gaventa, 2004; Cornwall, 2004, 2011; Cornwall and Coelho, 2007). Scholars argue that participation should be seen as a dual process including both collective action and mobilisation from below, coupled with enabling policies and inclusion in planning and policy making (see e.g. Haarstad, 2012; Gaventa, 2004; Cornwall, 2004; Hickey and Mohan, 2004). Collective action can enhance participation through mobilisations and social pressure directed towards the state (Gaventa, 2004; Cornwall, 2011), as well as contain projects of autonomy and resistance. As such, participation depends on the strategies, will, and capacity of civil society actors to mobilise (Cleaver, 2012). Coalition building among social groups and organisations; between social organisations and figures within government and bureaucracy; or with academics, technocrats or professional associations, can work to strengthen joint demands and facilitates access to relevant processes, spaces, resources and knowledge (ref. 'power with', Lukes, 2005). The adoption of a common discourse (i.e. 'discourse coalition', Hajer, 2005:302) in which different objectives and viewpoints overlap, can reinforce joint demands. Collective actors can share and create common framings (Snow, 2012) or 'environmental narratives'.

These are defined here as repetitive patterns of environmental explanation and socio–environmental relations, which can be used to advance certain interests and values, and to provide direction (see Roe, 1991; Adger et al., 2001; Wolford and Keene, 2015). Collective framings and positioning in debates can inspire and legitimise actions, and work as shared understandings of a problem and its solutions (Snow and Benford, 2000). However, environmental narratives and framings are not static, and may change according to contexts. Coalition building and strategic framings may also work as exclusionary for certain identities, groups and interests that do not have access to influence dominant narratives or be part of coalitions, and by that blur intra-community differences and power relations (see e.g. Cleaver, 2012).

Several scholars underline the importance of openness and willingness to share power to enhance and facilitate participatory processes (Cornwall, 2004; Gaventa, 2006; Schonleitner, 2004). According to Moore and Teskey (2006:3), 'a government/public authority is responsive if it makes some effort to identify and then meet the needs or wants of the people'. State responsiveness includes how government/public authority facilitates citizens' access to state agencies, information, resources and social services, with increased attention to previously ignored claims and rights (Gaventa and Barrett, 2012). Responsiveness is influenced by state accountability, transparency, mechanisms for engaging citizens and attitudes of state–society engagement (Gaventa and Barrett, 2012). At the core are power relations, defined here as the mechanisms that shape and control 'spaces of participation' (Hayward, 2000; Gaventa, 2006; Cornwall, 2004). 'Invited spaces' refer to spaces initiated by the powerful, such as government and public agencies, where certain interests, rules and ideas set the framework for who is invited and what knowledge and demands are to be included or excluded (Cornwall, 2002, 2004). 'Claimed spaces' refer to spaces created from below and are led by civil society's demands for inclusion (Cornwall, 2002, 2004). In between, we find a set of relations which I here call 'collaborative spaces', including those arenas that combine initiatives from civil society with state responsiveness, with the possibility for transformation in procedural and distributional justice. I acknowledge that state responsiveness has limitations, related to resources and state capacity, and as affected by different and conflicting interests both within the state apparatus and by different state–society coalitions (Wolford and Keene, 2015; Jessop, 2007).

Scholars have pointed to the importance of viewing participatory processes as taking place in wider governance arenas, affected by a spectrum of contrasting interests, structures of governance, political economic relations and dominant discourses (Tarrow, 1994; Cornwall, 2004; Gaventa, 2006; Forsyth, 2005; Haarstad and Campero, 2011). Emergent forms of environmental governance involve a range of actors and interests beyond the state, across scales and sectors, including academics, Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), grassroots organisations and private actors, technicians and companies. Pacts over natural resource management established among different sectors result in hybrid and contested governance arrangements (Cleaver, 2012; Bulkeley, 2005; Lemos and Agrawal, 2006). As noted by Forsyth (2005), forest policies frequently have clear or concealed relationships with other political objectives and interests regarding access to and control over land and resources. As Hecht (2014:1) argues, forest dynamics in Latin America are influenced by a range of factors, including historical relations and colonial legacies, social pressure, social and rural development policies, new government agencies, markets, migration, international policies and the commodification of nature.

3. Methods

To evaluate participation in environmental policy-making processes, I undertook multi-sited and multi-scaled ethnographic fieldwork in Bolivia in 2011, 2012 and 2013 (Paulson and Gezon, 2005; Marcus, 1997; Denzin and Lincoln, 2011). I have collected qualitative data from local forest communities, as well as from regional and national policy processes related to forest governance. Methods included semi-structured interviews with different actors in the forest sector, group discussions, observations and participation in relevant events (see Table 1), as well as a mapping of actors involved in drafting proposals for new forest legislation (see Table 4). I have had extensive interaction with the National Indigenous Forest Association (AFIN), a grouping of 150 affiliated indigenous community forest organisations formed in 2005, operating commercial forest management in indigenous territories in the Bolivian lowlands. The ethnographic material has been triangulated and complemented with information from secondary sources such as organisational documents and legal documents. An analysis of a draft proposal for a new forest law from 2013 was conducted to identify whose overall demands and interests had been included. The struggles of social collectives to shape new forest legislation have received particular attention. Narratives and framings about forest governance have been identified from documents, interviews and group discussions. I use the term 'indigenous' to refer to collectives with a special attachment to their territories organised collectively around ethnic identities (self-identification) with pre-colonial origin, and 'peasants' as those organised in peasant unions, although these identities are interchangeable. This study has aimed to capture the essence of the organisations' demands as presented in collective mobilisations and documents, and does not detail on divergent positions within communities and organisations, based on, for example, gender, class and age. It should be noted that the law-making process has not been completed as of 2016. The bulk of the field data is from 2011 to 2013 when the draft proposal was under preparation, and has been updated with relevant happenings from 2013 to 2016.

In the analysis below I refer to empirical sources as personal communication, workshops (W) or observations (O) or directly citing the documents reviewed.

4. Participation and forests in Bolivia

Forests make up almost half of the land area in Bolivia (ca. 50 million ha) of which 80 per cent is located in the lowland area (Cuéllar et al., 2012). Almost half of the population identifies as part of one of the 36 recognized indigenous groups (INE, 2012), of which the majority lives in the highland and valley areas, and smaller groups are spread across the lowlands. Peasant and indigenous identities have been used interchangeably in struggles for recognition, rights and land (Gotkowitz, 2007; Assies and Salman, 2005). Rural residents were granted land and organised into peasant unions after the revolution in 1952, becoming a powerful political force in the highlands (Albó, 1996, 2002). In the 1970s, the peasant organisations Syndicalist Confederation of Intercultural Original Communities of Bolivia (CSCIB) and the Unified Syndical Confederation of Rural Workers of Bolivia (CSUTCB) were formed. In the 1980s and 1990s, the indigenous identity was revitalised with increased international attention to indigenous rights coupled with local struggles for recognition (Postero, 2009). The lowland indigenous organisation Confederation of Indigenous Peoples in Bolivia (CIDOB) was formed in 1982 with support from donors and NGOs.

Participation has been used and contested in different ways throughout the Bolivian history, and has gradually been expanded and redefined since the country returned to democracy (Haarstad and Campero, 2011). Mobilisations for indigenous land rights led to the legal establishment of native communal lands (TCO - Spanish acronym) in the 1990s (Medeiros, 2001), and access to land and forests was improved for communities and local actors (Pacheco, 1998, 2006). The 1990's participation policies integrated social organisations into the governance structure of the state, decentralised power and led to greater involvement of civil society in public affairs (López, 2007). However, these policies were blamed for reorganising past racist exclusions (Postero, 2009) and for limiting

Table 1
Overview of data collected.

Methods	When	Information collected
1. Workshops		
Indigenous and peasant local leaders and representatives from Beni (W1) and Santa Cruz (W2)	2012	Local experiences and demands for changes in the forest legislation, relations with public agencies
NGOs, forest professionals and AFIN, La Paz (W3)	2012	Experiences with the current forest regime, input for a new forest law, global forest policies
Forest community organisations from AFIN, national meeting in Guarayos, Santa Cruz (W4)	2012	
NGOs, forest professionals and AFIN, La Paz (W5)	2013	Reactions to Law 337 'Support to Food Production and the Restitution of Forests'
2. Visits to indigenous communal lands		
La Paz: Tacana	2012	Experiences with the forest regime and demands for change, relations with authorities/state/NGOs
Santa Cruz: Guarayos, Chiquitano		
Beni: Chacobo Pachuara, Cavineño, Tacana Cavineño and Multiétnico		
3. Semi-structured interviews		
Over 100 interviews with the forest authorities (ABT, Forest Directorate, Vice Ministry of Environment), indigenous organisations, forest community organisations, migrant peasant unions, government actors (Ministry of Environment and Water, Vice Presidency), NGOs, forest professionals, academics	2011–2013	Experiences with the forest regime, inputs to a new forest regime, efforts to participate in the law-making process
4. Observations		
The Confederation of Indigenous Peoples of Bolivia (CIDOB) VIII indigenous march (O1)	2011	Demands to the government, TIPNIS conflict
Center for Peasant Research and Development (CIPCA) seminar (O2)	2012	Full draft proposal discussed, 'Law of Integral Forests'
Land and Territory meeting with peasant organisations, Cochabamba (O3)	2012	Land rights, peasant movement's demands
Meeting between Ministry of Environment and Water, Vice presidency and The Syndicalist Confederation of Intercultural Original Communities of Bolivia (CSCIOB) (O4)	2012	Inputs to the new forest legislation
National workshop for the regional indigenous forest organisations in AFIN, Tumasapa (O5)	2012	Challenges and cooperation in the forest sector
Document analysis		

participation to prescribed parameters of a state methodology (McNeish, 2006:227) and state designed organisational forms (Medeiros, 2001). Decentralisation processes were criticised for providing limited autonomy and access to decision-making arenas for local actors (Kaimowitz et al., 2001; Pacheco, 2006; Pacheco et al., 2011). Participation has largely been understood by former governments as a right to be informed or to collaborate, without involving citizens in policy and decision making (Haarstad and Campero, 2011). For example, the Law of Environment from 1997 is limited to recognising the right to be informed (art. 93), and the right to participate in management (art. 92).

4.1. Changes in the 2000s

During the 2000s large mobilisations took place in Bolivia, many of which were related to land and natural resources, with indigenous and peasant organisations at the forefront of the struggles (Perreault, 2008; Postero, 2009). The five largest indigenous, peasant and native organisations were brought together in the so-called Unity Pact in 2004, forming an important alliance which brought the Movement for Socialism (MAS) and president Evo Morales to power in 2006. The MAS ascension to power led to an important shift in political leadership and the state bureaucracy, where peasant and indigenous organisations, NGOs and leftist professionals entered the arena (Zimmerer, 2015; Haarstad, 2012; Postero, 2010). With the land reform starting in 2006, land has been allocated to peasants and indigenous communities (Fundación Tierra, 2010; Zimmerer, 2015). Peasant and indigenous organisations in the Unity Pact were active in the making of the new Bolivian constitution in 2007–2009 (CPEPB, 2009; Garcés, 2011; Schilling-Vacaflor, 2010), the drafting of the law of Mother Earth in 2010–2012 (Zimmerer, 2015), and the MAS government has aimed to institutionalise relations with popular organisations by holding regular conferences with their representatives (Haarstad and Campero, 2011).

The new constitution strengthens indigenous and collective rights, supports the inclusion of marginalised groups in environmental governance and recognizes the rights of nature through the concept of Mother Earth (CPEPB, 2009). 'Mother Earth' in Bolivia originates from Andean indigenous cosmologies, and refers to balanced human–nature relations and reciprocity between people and the environment (see e.g. Zimmerer, 2015). However, the concept is contested among both academics, organisations and state actors, and has been filled with different content (see e.g. Zimmerer, 2015; Lalander, 2014). Participation is defined as a right and as part of citizenship in the constitution, and the constitution enshrines 'collective law-making', referring both to the consultation of civil society and their active involvement in the drafting of laws (CPEPB, 2009). The Law 144 for Productive Agricultural Community Revolution (2011) and recent forest policies (MDRAYMA, 2008) guarantee the participation of peasant, indigenous and native groups in forest management (art. 10). These changes have led to a new context in which one could assume greater state responsiveness to social demands and the creation of collaborative spaces. This study contributes to empirically examine how and whether this new context of newly won rights and political changes, improves possibilities for participation and state responsiveness in environmental policy making.

4.2. Contradictions in Bolivian environmental governance

Critics point to the contradictions in the current government's policies (2006–) and the new constitution (2009), with a renewed focus on natural resource extraction and industrialisation on the one hand, and indigenous and nature's rights on the other

(Bebbington, 2013; Gudynas, 2013; Haarstad, 2012). The MAS government has expanded the state's presence in rural areas, through resource extraction, infrastructure development, production initiatives, social projects and increased control activities (García Linera, 2012; Zimmerer, 2015; Bebbington, 2013). Certain state interventions have led to protests locally, nationally and even internationally, such as the plans to build a road through the national park and indigenous territory Isiboro Sécuré (TIPNIS) (see e.g. McNeish, 2013). The government promotes the expansion of the agricultural frontier as part of the 'integrated and sustainable management of forests' and the country's 'food sovereignty' (Pacheco, 2014), but the contents of these ideas are still vague and are subject to ongoing discussion (W3, 2012). The Law of Mother Earth (2012) foment an integral approach to forest management acknowledging its different functions, and prohibits the transfer of land use from forest to other uses, but also allows exceptions for 'projects of national interests and public utility'.

The national Forest and Land Authority (ABT) was created in 2009. New forest policies include increased state control over forests and the dismantling of private concessions (Supreme Decree 0726), the institutionalisation of community forestry (Supreme Decree 29643) and land distribution from public land, including settlements in forest areas (Supreme Decree 0257). New initiatives have been implemented to foment agro-forestry, and new production projects have been initiated. As recent studies indicate, forest governance is contested in Bolivia (Arteaga, 2010; Müller et al., 2014). With decades-long lack of state control, illegal logging activities are widespread, and private forest concessions areas and management plans introduced with the Forest Law in 1996 have not been subject to state monitoring (see e.g. Müller et al., 2014). A market-oriented and technical forestry model still prevails as part of the 1996 forest legislation, and homogenous instruments are implemented across cultural, socio-economic and biological heterogeneous contexts (W3, 2011). The land reform of 1996 institutionalised a bias towards the agrarian sector. Land is defined as having economic and social function (FES, Spanish acronym), which in practice has prioritised activities such as agriculture and cattle ranching (Müller et al., 2014). Today, approximately 200,000 ha of forests are lost annually, mainly due to cattle-ranching (50%), large-scale agriculture (30%), and small-scale agriculture (20%) (Müller et al., 2014). 24 per cent of forests are on indigenous land (Müller et al., 2014). Communities are vulnerable to illegal logging and unequal relations with intermediaries and private companies (see e.g. Becker and León, 2002; W4, 2011). Of all management plans in 2011, 60 per cent of these were on indigenous lands (ABT, 2011). Private companies interact in direct contracts with communities, which bear the responsibilities and risks for the management plans. The management plans require the use of approved forest technicians. Companies largely control the forest value chains, including the pricing, transport and refinement of logs, as well as the forming of contracts with the communities (Arteaga, 2010; personal communication AFIN, 2012). Lack of technical support and exclusionary procedures make communities dependent on external actors to meet financial and administrative requirements (see also Becker and León, 2002; Pacheco, 2006; W4, 2012). Unequal land distribution and the legal insecurity of land in the highlands, along with the government's settlement programs, have led to continued migration to the lowlands. Approximately 70 per cent of the rural population in Bolivia are highland peasants, which are increasingly land-poor, as their land has been subdivided over generations since 1952 (Achtenberg, 2013). In 2012 there were 298 indigenous territories titled in Bolivia, with the largest ones in the lowlands. Migration creates pressure on forests, protected areas and existing indigenous territories (Fundación Tierra, 2010; Morales et al., 2013). What I described above forms the backdrop

Table 2
Relevant policy changes.

Period	Relevant forest policies and laws	Participation
1990s	Law 1715 National Agrarian Reform Service Law (INRA) (1996), recognising native communal lands (TCO, Spanish acronym) and requiring economic and social function (FES, Spanish acronym)	The law of Popular Participation 1996 Decentralisation Cultural recognition of indigenous peoples
2000s	Forest Law 1700 (1996), introduced private concession system and forest management plans	
2006 →	Mobilisations for more inclusive natural resource governance and benefits for the people Law 3545 Agrarian Reform (2006) Supreme Decree 29643, Community Forest Organisations (2008) Supreme Decree 0257, Human Settlements Fund (2009) New constitution (CPEPB, 2009) Supreme Decree 443, National plan for reforestation and forestation (2010) Law 144 Productive Agricultural Community Revolution (2011) Law 071 Rights of Mother Earth (2011) Law 300 Mother Earth and Integral Development for Living Well (2012) Law 337 Support to Food Production and the Restitution of Forests (2013)	Demands for a Constituent Assembly Participation recognized 'in the formulation of state policies' and 'in the collective development of laws' (art. 241–242), and citizens can initiate legislation (art. 162) Law 341 (2013), Participation and social control. Stipulates that citizens can 'present legal initiatives or other norms', and are obliged to support the legislative organ in the 'collective construction of laws' (art. 9) Law 3760 Rights of Indigenous Peoples

for the discussions for new legislation affecting the forest sector. Table 2 sums up relevant policy changes for the forest sector and participation in governance.

4.3. Coalition building and strategic framings

Based on new policies for forest management and the new constitution (CPEPB, 2009), discussions started for a new forest law in 2009–2010 (see Arteaga, 2010; CEDLA, 2011a,b). The organised migrant peasants in CSCIOB and the indigenous forest community organisations in AFIN have actively attempted to influence the making of new forest legislation, and have employed different strategies to do so. Their strategies involve coalition building across scales, as well as framings of their demands (see Table 3). By engaging in coalition building through AFIN, local forest community organisations have accessed new channels of influence, such as meeting arenas with public authorities and joint arenas to share knowledge and form joint demands, as confirmed by interviews with AFIN (2012). These channels have facilitated collective negotiations with the forest authorities locally and regionally, cooperation with NGOs, and strengthened the organisations as a common force nationally (W4, 2012; O5, 2012; personal communication AFIN, 2012). Alliances between NGOs and grassroots organisations, also exemplify how specific demands for a new forest regime have been framed and advanced. At the World Peoples Conference for Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth, indigenous peoples' participation, visions and knowledge in forest governance was highlighted, and market-oriented mechanisms and forest plantations were rejected (Peoples' Agreement, 2010). During the time I was engaged in participant observation in the TIPNIS indigenous march in 2011, it became evident that the indigenous organisations had demands related to control of indigenous territories, indigenous autonomy, new forest authorities with local knowledge and competence, as well as less state control, requirements and bureaucracy in forest management.

Coalition building has been important in developing concrete proposals for new forest legislation. Inputs to new forest legislation were developed by NGOs such as the Center for Peasant Research and Development (CIPCA) together with associated local communities; the migrant peasants (CSCIOB); the lowland indigenous organisations (CIDOB); and forest community organisations in AFIN, as confirmed by observations and interviews. CIPCA organised a range of local and national workshops in 2011 and 2012 (CIPCA, 2012c), and created a full law proposal with the help of legal experts that was sent to the Ministry of Environment and Water, government advisors and assembly committees (CIPCA, 2012a). The

forest community organisations in AFIN organised workshops in 2010, and in alliance with NGOs and CIDOB, promoted their demands in national assembly committees and to the Ministry of Environment and Water (W4, 2012; CEDLA, 2011b; personal communication AFIN, 2012). Based on inputs from regional and local workshops and with the help of a legal expert,¹ the migrant peasants from CSCIOB developed a law proposal of their own in 2012. The close political alliance between the migrant peasant movement and the MAS government (see also Fontana, 2014), facilitated a creation of spaces to advance their inputs, such as joint workshops with the Forest Directorate and meetings with ABT (personal communication ABT, 2012), the Ministry of Environment and Water and the Vice-presidency (O4, 2012).

The ways demands are framed and adapted to different scales have been an important factor for the positioning of the organisations in the debate. Demands for controlled pricing of wood, planning of forest management and state follow-up of existing regulations – have been directed towards local offices of ABT (AFIN, 2010; W4, 2012). Despite the prevailing scepticism to the current forest legislation, workshops with forest community organisations (2012) also revealed that many of these organisations support commercial logging due to the income it provides. Forest management plans have also been used as a stepping-stone to formalise land rights (personal communication ABT Riberalta, 2012). The community organisations demand support to control activities such as illegal logging and the entrance of third parties into their territories, independent community forest technicians and community companies (W3, 2012). Demands have also been directed to the ministries and to the legislative assembly committee, including issues that are poorly addressed in the existing legislation, such as territorial control, indigenous rights and autonomy, and diversified forest governance. Indigenous territorial organisations are experiencing increased pressure on their land, and fear migrant peasants' entrance (personal communication CIDOB, 2012). In their narrative, their roles as 'protectors of nature' and forest stewards, based on collective indigenous models and territories, are contrasted with the migrant peasants who are strategically framed as 'destroyers of nature', 'individualistic', 'capitalist' and 'intruders' into their areas. The community organisations expressed an ambivalent position towards state practices, both as a protector of communities' interests, but also a threat to their territories through extraction projects (personal communication AFIN, 2012). The forest

¹ the former director of the National Program for Climate Change, Carlos Salinas.

²Friends of the Earth Bolivia.

community organisations were largely critical of private companies and intermediates that control the economic and legal processes, and promote the launching of indigenous community forest businesses and community technicians. Discussions with forest community organisations (W4, 2012) also revealed disagreements on whether to support the commercialised wood management system. Finally, a topic of concern was internal distribution of forest income, and decision-making processes internally (W4, 2012; O5, 2012). Women, in specific, have blamed the structure and workings of the forest community organisations for excluding them (personal communication women group Guarayos, 2012).

For the migrant peasants, forests are largely seen as areas for possible cultivation and business opportunities to improve and diversify their livelihoods (personal communication CSCIOB, 2011). The migrant peasants build their arguments for gaining access to forest areas on their rights to land and perceived future role as food producers and entrepreneurs protecting and managing forests. They connect their demands for land to the food sovereignty discourses of the government, and in line with the government agricultural policies (personal communication CSCIOB, 2012; O4, 2012). This illustrates the dominance of agricultural interests in forest politics, and the prominent role the government has assigned to agriculture in development. Organisations are thus indirectly restricted to act within a certain development model. The migrant peasants have recast themselves as 'forest managers', and call for a redefinition of forests and forms of access, promoting a role for themselves in agro-forestry, forest plantations, community industries and reforestation activities. The migrant peasants want to keep the state at arm's length (personal communication ABT, 2012), preferring local community control to replace state control (O4, 2012). They fear policies that will exclude them from forest areas. Scepticism was also framed towards indigenous communal organisations involved in forest management with private companies (O3, 2012). Migrant peasants, with limited access to land, view large indigenous territories in the lowland as unjust, compared to the small land plots in the highlands (O3 2012; see also Fontana, 2014).

These framings reflect the tensions that exist between the migrant peasant movement and lowland indigenous organisations, which have also limited a broader coalition between the two. There are also commonalities in the demands of the indigenous and peasant organisations, related to the diversification of forest management, recognizing the variety of functions that forests serve, and forms of agro-forestry that benefit the communities. Table 3 presents these general positions and strategic framings. It should be noted that in practice, these boundaries are blurred, and also continuously changing.

4.4. State responsiveness and spaces for participation

State and government actors have facilitated the creation of some arenas to collect inputs for the forest legislation. In interviews from 2011 and 2012 representatives from ABT, the Forest

Directorate and the Ministry of Environment and Water, expressed the importance of gathering inputs from affected actors. ABT set up a technical committee in 2011 together with NGOs, indigenous organisations and private entities (CICPA, 2011). The process was reinitiated by the Vice Presidency in 2012. Four working groups were established, including the forest authorities, the ministry, national and international experts, and processes to hold hearings were initiated regionally. Interviews and observations showed how engaged bureaucrats invited civil society actors to attend meetings, or encouraged written inputs from grassroots organisations (personal communication Forest Directorate, 2012; O4, 2012; see Table 5). ABT was responsible for regional consultations regarding the new legislation, and regional ABT offices were instructed to gather inputs from relevant stakeholders (personal communication ABT Riberalta, 2012). However, observations in Riberalta and interviews in Cochabamba demonstrate how the process of involving civil society actors was fragmented and poorly planned. The regional meetings organised by ABT were announced late or were cancelled, and only certain actors participated (observation Riberalta, 2012; personal communication director of Technical Forest College ETSF, 2012). Only the peasant migrant organisation CSCIOB was formally invited by the ministry and the technical-judicial committee of the Vice Presidency to give input in the initial phase (O4, 2012), and workshops were organised between regional offices of ABT and local peasant unions (personal communication ABT Beni, 2012). According to the Forest Directorate (personal communication, 2012) the involvement of the peasant organisations was a directive from the government, and the forest directorate was used as a channel for dialogue with the migrant peasant coordinating organisation (CSCIOB) (personal communication Forest Directorate, 2012). In addition, access to the ministry depended on certain engaged bureaucrats, a channel vulnerable to selective relationships and high staff turnover (personal communication Forest Directorate, 2012). During the course of this study, the people in the roles of both the forest director and the deputy minister were changed three times, clearly affecting the relationship with civil society organisations (personal communication AFIN, 2012; personal communication Forest Directorate, 2012). Table 4 shows the different sequences in the law-making process, and Table 5 shows the actors involved.

The involvement of lowland indigenous organisations was influenced by the ongoing conflict in which indigenous organisations mobilised against the government project for building a road through the national park and indigenous territory Isiboro Sécure (TIPNIS) in 2011 and 2012 (observations 2011; 2012), without proper consultation and environmental studies. The conflict had severe consequences for the relationship between the government and the lowland indigenous organisations (see also McNeish, 2013), and communication between ABT and CIDOB was stalled (personal communication CIDOB, 2012). The Deputy Minister of Environment withdrew from his position in 2010 and his team followed suit in protest over political pressure to approve the environmental licence for the road construction. This significantly affected the

Table 3
Positions and strategic framings.

Framings	Indigenous forest organisations	Migrant peasants
Own role	Protectors of nature, historical forest stewards	Food producers and entrepreneurs, future forest managers
Enemies	Peasants as 'destroyers of nature', 'individualistic', 'capitalist', 'intruders'. Private companies and intermediates	Indigenous territories, protected areas, large forestry companies, large scale agrobusiness
State's role	Government's extractive projects	Support to community control and production projects
Joint demands	Protector, support to and consolidation of indigenous autonomy	
	Diversification of forest management	

Table 4
Sequence in the law-making process.

2008	National policy for integral management of forests (MDRayMA, 2008)
2009	New National Constitution (CPEPB)
2010	Proposal for a forest law
2011	ABT technical commission established
2012	Process reinitiated by Vice Presidency The law was set on the agenda of the Plurinational Legislative Assembly in October 2012
2013	Draft law discussed in the National Assembly
2014	A new Forest Law defined as a priority by MAS
2015	Election year – MAS and President Morales win the election
2016	Forest law on list over laws to be passed in 2016

Table 5
Actors involved in the making of a new forest law.

Actor	Actor Name	Role in forest sector	Role in law-making process
State	The National Forest and Land authorities (<i>de ABT</i>)	Control of forest management and permissions for clearing	Collecting input at regional levels, technical advisors at national level
	The Ministry of Environment and Water	Forest conservation, reforestation, forestation	Overall policy development
	The Ministry of Rural Development and Land	Development of rural areas, land distribution	Input on land issues
	National Institute for Agricultural and Forest Innovations (INIAF)	Investigation and innovations in agriculture, forest and food production	Input
	The Ministry of Foreign Affairs	International forest, food and climate policies	Input
	The Forest Directorate The Vice Presidency	Developing regulations and implementing projects Law-making coordination	Direct contact with actors in forest sector Took the initiative to reinitiate the forest law in 2012
Elected organs	National Assembly Commissions	Responsible for creating, changing and passing legislation	Involvement of stakeholders
Indigenous organisations	Confederation of Indigenous Peoples in Bolivia (CIDOB)	Many indigenous communities live in and are dependent on forest areas	Developed a chapter for the new forest law
	National Indigenous Forest Association (AFIN)	Indigenous forest community organisations involved in forest management	Developed a document with a range of inputs to the forest law
Peasant organisations	Syndicalist Confederation of Intercultural Original Communities of Bolivia (CSCIOB)	Highland and valley people who migrate to the lowlands, organised in peasant unions	Developed a full forest law proposal with the help of a legal expert
NGO	Centre for Peasant Research and Development (CIPCA)	Technical and economic support to community forest management	Developed a full forest law proposal
NGO	Institute for People, Agriculture and Ecology (IPHAE)	Social and technical support to communities	Asked by the ministry of Water and Environment to give inputs to the law process
Private actors	Forest Chamber (<i>Camara Forestal</i>), private association of forest companies	Involved in commercial forest management	Marginal role
Experts	Academics Universities Forest professionals	Expertise	Advisors to the official draft proposal, as well as for the organisations

channels for dialogue between the ministry and the lowland indigenous organisations, and the indigenous movement split in two branches: one government-friendly and the other opposed to the government's TIPNIS approach (McNeish, 2013). The 'government-friendly' part of CIDOB was invited to give input to ongoing law-making processes (personal communication CIDOB, 2012), and AFIN, who proclaimed to be neutral in the conflict, was also kept as a dialogue partner, especially at regional levels with ABT (personal communication AFIN, 2012).

As interviews with NGOs (personal communication CIPCA, 2012; personal communication IPHAE, 2012; personal communication FAN², 2012) show, they were treated ambiguously in the process. Some NGOs that collaborated with the government were invited to give their input to the drafting process (personal communication IPHAE, 2012). On the other hand, the government rejected influence from certain NGOs. As an advisor in CIPCA stated in 2012 (personal communication): 'The government was not very responsive as they prefer direct contact with the grassroots organisations, and the NGOs are left out'. This NGO scepticism has also been confirmed in official statements by the government,

especially by Vice President Álvaro García Linera, who claims that NGOs are not representative and suggests that many of them are working for external interests (see e.g. García Linera, 2012). Instead, the government calls for public participation primarily through grassroots movements, and has argued that NGOs should not be meddling with internal political issues (García Linera, 2015). This position of the government is however not applied to all NGOs, but leads to that certain NGOs are left standing in a weaker position to influence such processes.

4.5. Forest governance and land-use interests

In 2012 and 2013, national assembly commissions, relevant ministries and state bodies, the technical-judicial team of the Vice Presidency, and regional organisations from Beni, Pando and Santa Cruz, participated in national negotiations for the new forest law (CIPCA, 2013a; Cámara de Senadores, 2013; see Table 4 for actors involved). The result of these negotiations was a draft bill titled "Forests and Soils" (*Anteproyecto de Ley de Bosques y Suelos*) (CIPCA, 2013b). The draft bill was finally sent to the president in October 2013. An analysis of the draft law demonstrates attempts to reduce the power of private forest companies, recentralisation and increased state control, the inclusion of community rights and

² Friends of the Earth Bolivia.

interests, especially those articulated by the peasant organisations, and a renewed focus on integrated forest management with food sovereignty and agroforestry as important elements. It establishes the non-commodification and non-privatisation of environmental functions, but at the same time supports the continued commercialisation of forest and non-forest products. Interculturality, participation and community management elements are included, coupled with centralised forest management. The proposed bill facilitates forest management undertaken by both indigenous communities and peasants organisations, and diverse forms of forest uses and functions are acknowledged, especially for 'food security with sovereignty'. The draft legislation suggests that all companies operating in the sector must be placed under public control, which will focus on food security, national production, and state forest lands. Furthermore, it suggests that all community forest businesses would be nationalised under the state as 'public-community companies', and forests are defined as both natural forests and plantations. These issues indicate some of the priorities made for new forest legislation, with attempts to reconcile agricultural, food production and forest protection interests, national and local interests.

During the process of drafting the forest bill another law with implications for forest areas was enacted. The government engaged in negotiations with the agribusiness sector in the lowlands of Bolivia in 2012 (personal communication ABT Santa Cruz, 2012) and in the beginning of 2013 the law 337 'Support to Food Production and the Restitution of Forests' was passed. The official goal of the law is to deal with areas of illegal forest clearing that occurred between 1996 and 2011, and to engage land owners in food production and forest restitution. Large landowners are only required to pay limited fines for the illegally deforested areas and retribute 10–20 per cent of the lands with reforestation. The rest of the land will go under a plan for 'food production'. Smallholders are exempt from these requirements, and will only have to pay the low fines. The speedy progress of this law illustrates the government's prioritisation of agricultural and food production interests, as well as its focus on keeping the peasant movement content. The law was criticised by lowland indigenous organisations and NGOs. They blamed the law for legalising deforestation and changes to land use that are contrary to the Mother Earth Law, and for giving the agribusiness sector an effective amnesty for their historic responsibility for deforestation (W5, 2012; CIPCA, 2013c). Organisations were disappointed that land which in their opinion should have been returned to the state, instead remained in the hands of private landowners, while the government continued to distribute state forest land (CIPCA, 2014b). The expansion of the agricultural frontier to secure food production has drawn further criticism. Opponents argue that these areas will largely be used for agro-export and soy production by a growing peasant elite (see also Høiby and Zenteno Hopp, 2015), that far less land is needed to secure domestic food production (Suárez Añez, 2011) and that family agriculture is a more important contributor to food production than large scale agri-business (CIPCA, 2015b). The prioritisation of agro-industrial interests was further confirmed in July 2013 at the national meeting for the Agro-industrial sector (*Encuentro Agroindustrial Productivo*). Powerful actors from the industrial, and agro-industrial sectors, as well as the Vice President Alvaro García Linera, attended the meeting (IBCE, 2013). The event reaffirmed the importance of food and agricultural production, with Law 337 as one of the prime mechanisms for governing the intersection of agriculture, food production and forest governance. Organisations continued to promote a new forest law in 2014 (CIPCA, 2014a), and the MAS government included the approval of a forest law as part of its agenda. However, in 2014, the then-director of ABT and active promoter of the new forest law Cliver Rocha, was

unexpectedly replaced by Rolf Kohler, an agrarian engineer from Beni (CFB, 2014), and the law process was left behind. At the Summit for Agriculture and Livestock (*Cumbre Agropecuaria Sembrando Bolivia*) in 2015, which brought together private sector interests and government representatives to set the agenda for the future of the agro-livestock sector – and in the government's plan for future development (Law 650) – priorities were also clearly stated (CFB, 2015). These include the expansion of allowed forest clearing (5–20 ha per property), an extension of the period to meet the economic and social function (FES) requirements from 2 to 5 years, as well as a guarantee to distribute public lands to indigenous, natives and peasant communities. As of September 2016, the forest law has still not been passed, despite continued calls for progress (CIPCA, 2015; Cámara de Diputados, 2015a, 2015b), indicating both the conflicts of interest in the forest sector, and the prioritisation of other interests and values, particularly related to agriculture and land use.

5. Discussion and conclusion

In this article, I have attempted to assess participation in environmental policy making, by focusing on the case of creating new forest legislation in Bolivia, and the involvement of subaltern actors in the process. I have identified both possibilities for participation, as well as limitations, and the interests and demands that have been prioritised in these processes. Civil society struggles in Bolivia have led to changes in the constitution and in legislation, where there has been a shift from merely participation as information, to the right to participation in the making and shaping of policies (cf. Cornwall and Gaventa, 2001; CPEPB, 2009). My findings and analysis indicate that participation has been made possible and facilitated by coalition building and the strategic framing of demands 'from below', coupled with state responsiveness and the forming of collaborative spaces. Coalition building both among local community organisations, and with actors such as NGOs and legal experts, has enabled community organisations to strengthen and negotiate their demands for changes in the forest legislation (cf. Gaventa and Barrett, 2012). These alliances have expanded the capacities of the organisations to advance their demands at different scales and to connect to public spheres with considerable technical and legal resources (Lukes, 2005; see also Kröger, 2011). The study also demonstrates how subaltern actors adapt to changing policies and power relations, by using different framings (see also Aguilar-Støen, 2015). The use of framings and narrative strategies has worked as a means to legitimise and position subaltern actors in the debate about the rightful forest managers (cf. Roe, 1991). Migrant peasants have been able to advance their demands through a discourse coalition (cf. Hajer, 2005) with agricultural interests and government policies. Many of the demands expressed by these organisations were included in the draft law. The position of the migrant peasants also confirms that peasants are moving beyond identities as agricultural producers and rural workers, and into new arenas of forestry and environmentalism (cf. Hecht, 2014). The indigenous forest organisations simultaneously support and challenge the current government administration (see also Zimmerer, 2015) as well as the forest regime, and act at different scales with different framings to advance their rights and demands, underlining the collaborative force of the gathering of the local and regional forest community organisations under one national umbrella.

There are also indications of openness and responsiveness in state practices and among bureaucrats, public agencies and within the government which contribute to foment and facilitate participation (cf. Cornwall and Coelho, 2007). The social organisations have been 'invited in' (cf. Cornwall, 2004) to give inputs to the forest law-making process, through ABT consultation meetings,

workshops with the Forest Directorate and the initiatives of the Vice presidency for collecting inputs, creating a sense of procedural justice (Paavola, 2004). Attempts to establish collaborative spaces have been made, for example between the peasant movement and public agencies such as the forest directory and the forest authorities. The formalisation of a collaboration between indigenous forest community organisations in AFIN and the forest authorities (ABT) indicates a responsiveness to parts of their demands (personal communication AFIN, 2016).

There are however a number of limitations. Participation is largely directed to the organised civil society of large grassroots organisations, potentially excluding other non-organised groups locally, such as women and elderly who do not have the same capacity to participate (see also Haarstad and Campero, 2011). In the processes, there is also an increased professionalisation, which increases the organisations' dependence on technicians to formulate their inputs. Furthermore, there is a lack of clear mechanisms and procedures for whom and how to involve affected parties, and the extent and forms of involvement seems contingent on the willingness of engaged bureaucrats. Turn-overs in ministries and public agencies are also a threat to processes of involvement and continuity. NGOs have been selectively involved, and there has been a bias towards facilitating collaborative spaces for the peasant movement. The disapproval of parts of the indigenous movement after the TIPNIS conflict, has led to a selective involvement (c.f. Cook and Kothari, 2001), where a part of the movement has been excluded from such processes. Tensions have emerged between different visions for, rights and identities tied to, the territories, land and resources, as well as between local autonomy and the desire for a centralised, sovereign state (see also Fabricant and Gustafson, 2011). The discursive strategies employed also run the risk of pitting migrant peasants against indigenous communities, and by that covering over the underlying contested property and rights issues that need to be resolved, and preventing the forming of a joint force for a new just and sustainable forest regime.

Finally, findings indicate that strong interests to control land use and related decisions-making processes have affected the prioritisation of the new forest legislation, exemplified with the passing of legislation that largely benefits agricultural interests and the lack of approval of the new forest legislation. This also indicates an ongoing conflict between conservation, agriculture and land-use interests, and points to future challenges in combining these. I have demonstrated above how participatory processes in environmental policy making do not happen in a vacuum, and that underlying political–economic relations have affected the prioritisation of legislation affecting forest areas and also the inclusion and exclusion of specific interests, ideas and actors (c.f. Lukes, 2005; Forsyth, 2005). I contend that subaltern actors' participation in the law-making process is vulnerable to powerful interests related to land use, extraction, agriculture and governmental priorities (see also Haarstad and Campero, 2011), and demonstrate how these interests can influence the environment of others (Bryant and Bailey, 1997:39; Lukes, 2005). With the lack of a joint agreement in Bolivia for how to govern the forests and who the rightful forest managers are, the trees will continue to be cut down. Equitable, just and sustainable forest management will depend on efforts to obtain territorial justice, procedural justice and land distribution in the future, as well as addressing structural problems and power imbalances in the forest, agricultural and land-use sectors.

These findings have implications for our understanding of how rural landscapes are formed, and highlight that forests are turned into new sites of contestation over access to land areas, rights, resources and livelihoods, power and meaning (see also Hecht, 2014). Economic and social interests, migration, new policies and different models for environmental governance lead to new forms of rurality

which affect the autonomy and rights of rural people. The findings further have implications for international policies related to climate and forest governance, such as involving communities in initiatives for Reducing Emissions for Deforestation and forest Degradation. New forms of rurality demand analyses that move beyond places, across scales and spaces, where the rural-urban division becomes blurred and where categories such as agricultural-forest, local-regional and national-international are intertwined (see also Hecht, 2014). Political ecology analyses respond to this complexity, underlining the importance of multi-actor, multi-sited, interdisciplinary and cross-scalar studies. The study also points to the need for future studies on the challenges ahead in securing the livelihoods, rights, food and access to land for peasant and indigenous communities, combined with environmental protection and sustainable management.

Acknowledgements

This work was supported by the Norwegian Research Council (grant number) 204110. I am grateful to my supervisors, Associate Professor Mariel Aguilar-Støen and Professor John Andrew McNeish for valuable discussions, inputs and support, two anonymous reviewers and editor Professor Michael Woods for their constructive comments, to David Vasquez for support and valuable discussions and to all the organisations and informants in Bolivia who have contributed to this study.

References

- ABT, 2011. Informe de la ABT gestión 2011. Transformando el régimen forestal y agrario para transitar al modelo de manejo integral y sustentable en los bosques y tierras. Aut. Fisc. Control Soc. Bosques Tierra, 92pp.
- Achtenberg, E., 2013. Bolivia: the Unfinished Business of Land Reform. *NACLA Rebel Currents*. <http://nacia.org/blog/2013/3/31/bolivia-unfinished-business-land-reform>. Last accessed 04.10.16.
- Adger, W.N., Benjaminsen, T.A., Brown, K., Svarstad, H., 2001. Advancing a political ecology of global environmental discourses. *Dev. Change* 32 (4), 681–715.
- AFIN, 2010. Propuestas de normas forestales, desde la experiencia de las organizaciones forestales comunitarias para su consideración en la nueva normativa forestal. Internal document. November 2010. Asociación Forestal Indígena Nacional.
- Aguilar-Støen, M., 2015. Exploring Participation in New Forms of Environmental Governance: a Case Study of Payments for Environmental services in Nicaragua. *Environ Dev Sustain*, vol. 17, pp. 941–958.
- Albó, X., 1996. 40 Naciones en una. En: *Cuarto Intermedio* No 36.
- Albó, X., 2002. Pueblos indios en la política. Cuadernos de Investigación 55. CIPCA. Plural Editores, La Paz.
- Arnstein, S., 1969. A ladder of citizen participation. *JAIP* 35 (4), 216–224.
- Arteaga, W., 2010. Procesos de discusión para el diseño de la nueva Ley Forestal. Coyuntura 18. CEDLA, La Paz.
- Assies, W., Salman, T., 2005. Ethnicity and politics in Bolivia. *Ethnopolitics* 4, 269–297.
- Bebbington, D.H., 2013. Extraction, inequality and indigenous peoples: insights from Bolivia. *Environ. Sci. Policy* 33 (0), 438–446.
- Becker, C.D., León, R., 2002. Indigenous Forest Management in the Bolivian Amazon: Lessons from the Yuracaré People. Forests, Trees and People Programme - Forestry Department Working Paper No. 3. FAO, UN.
- Bliss, F., Neumann, S., 2008. Participation in International Development Discourse and Practice. 'State of the Art' and Challenges. Working Paper. Institute for Development and Peace.
- Bryant, R.L., Bailey, S., 1997. *Third World Political Ecology*. Routledge, London.
- Bulkeley, H., 2005. Reconfiguring environmental governance: towards a politics of scales and networks. *Polit. Geogr.* 24 (8), 875–902.
- Bull, B., Aguilar-Støen, M., 2015. Environmental Politics in Latin America. *Elite Dynamics, the Left Tide and Sustainable Development*. Routledge, Oxon.
- De Castro, F., Hogenboom, B., Baud, M., 2016. Environmental Governance in Latin America. Palgrave MacMillan, Hampshire.
- CIPCA, 2012. Propuesta de ley integral de Bosques. Internal document. Centro de Investigación y Promoción del Campesinado.
- Cleaver, F., 2012. Development through Bricolage. Rethinking Institutions for Natural Resource Management. Routledge, London.
- Cook, B., Kothari, U., 2001. *Participation: the New Tyranny?* Zed Books, London.
- Cornwall, A., 2002. Making Spaces, Changing Places: Situating Participation in Development. IDS Working paper, 170. Institute of Development Studies, Brighton.
- Cornwall, A., 2004. Spaces for transformation? Reflection on issues of power and

- differences in participation in development. In: Hickey, S.M., Mohan, G. (Eds.), *Participation: from Tyranny to Transformation*. ZED Books, London.
- Cornwall, A., 2011. *The Participation Reader*. Zed Book, London.
- Cornwall, A., Coelho, V.S., 2007. *Spaces for Change? The Politics of Participation in New Democratic Arenas*. Zed books, London.
- Cornwall, A., Gaventa, J., 2000. From Users and Choosers to Makers and Shapers: Repositioning Participation in Social Policy. IDS Working Paper 127., IDS 2001.
- Cuellar, S., Rodríguez, A., Arroyo, J., Espinoza, S., Larrea, D., 2012. Mapa de deforestación de las tierras bajas y los yungas de Bolivia 2000–2005–2010. Proyección Sistema de Coordenadas Geográficas, Datum WGS84. Santa Cruz de la Sierra. Fundación Amigos de la Naturaleza (FAN), Bolivia.
- Demeritt, D., 2015. The promises of participation in science and political ecology. In: Perreault, T., Bridge, G., McCarthy, J. (Eds.), *The Routledge Handbook of Political Ecology*. Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, London and New York, pp. 224–234.
- Denzin, N.K., Lincoln, Y.S., 2011. *The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Research*. Sage, London.
- Fabricant, N., Gustafson, B. (Eds.), 2011. *Remapping Bolivia: Resources, Territory, and Indigeneity in a Plurinational State*. School for Advanced Research, Santa Fe.
- Fontana, L.B., 2014. Indigenous peoples vs peasant unions: land conflicts and rural movements in plurinational Bolivia. *J. Peasant Stud.* 41 (3), 297–319.
- Forsyth, T., 2005. The political ecology of the ecosystem approach for forests. In: Sayer, J., Maginnis, S. (Eds.), *Forests in Landscapes: Ecosystem Approaches for Sustainability*. Earthscan, London, pp. 165–176.
- Forsyth, T., 2009. Multilevel, multiactor governance in REDD+. In: Angelsen, A., with Brockhaus, M., Kanninen, M., Sills, E., Sunderlin, W.D., Wertz-Kanounnikoff, S. (Eds.), *Realising REDD+: National Strategy and Policy Options*. CIFOR, Bogor, Indonesia, pp. 113–122.
- Fundación Tierra, 2010. *INFORME 2010: Territorios Indígena Originario Campesinos en Bolivia entre la Loma Santa y la Pachamama*. Fundación Tierra, La Paz.
- Garcés, F., 2011. The domestication of indigenous autonomies in Bolivia: from the Pact of unity to the new constitution. In: Gustafson, N., Fabricant (Eds.), *Remapping Bolivia, Resources, Territory, and Indigeneity in a Plurinational State*. School for Advanced Research, Santa Fe.
- García Linera, A., 2012. *Geopolitics of the Amazon: Patrimonial-hacendado Power and Capitalist Accumulation*. Vicepresidencia del Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia, La Paz - Bolivia.
- Gaventa, J., 2004. Towards participatory governance: assessing the transformative possibilities. In: Hickey, S., Mohan, G. (Eds.), *From Tyranny to Transformation*. Zed Books, London.
- Gaventa, J., 2006. Finding the spaces for change: a power analysis. *Dev. Pract.* 3 (6), 23–33.
- Gaventa, J., Barrett, G., 2012. Mapping the outcomes of citizen engagement. *World Dev.* 40 (12), 2399–2410.
- Gotkowitz, L., 2007. *A Revolution for Our Rights: Indigenous Struggles for Land and Justice in Bolivia, 1880–1952*. Duke University Press, Durham.
- Green, M., 2002. Gramsci cannot speak: presentations and interpretations of Gramsci's concept of the subaltern. *Rethink. Marxism A J. Econ. Cult. Soc.* 14 (3).
- Gudynas, E., 2013. Development alternatives in Bolivia: the impulse, the resistance, and the restoration. *NACLA Rep. Am.* 46 (1).
- Haarstad, H., 2012. Extracting justice? Critical themes and challenges in Latin American natural resource governance. In: Haarstad, H. (Ed.), *New Political Spaces in Latin American Natural Resource Governance*. Palgrave Macmillan, New York.
- Haarstad, H., Campero, C., 2011. Participation in the Bolivian Hydrocarbon Sector: the 'double discourse' and Limitations on Participatory Governance. *URBECO – report 04/11*. Center for Urban Ecology, University of Bergen.
- Hajer, M., 2005. Coalitions, practices, and meaning in environmental politics: from acid rain to BSE. In: Howarth, D., Torfing, J. (Eds.), *Discourse Theory in European Politics: Identity, Policy and Governance*. Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, pp. 297–315.
- Hayward, C.R., 2000. *De-facing Power*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- Hecht, S.B., 2014. Forests lost and found in tropical Latin America: the woodland 'green revolution'. *J. Peasant Stud.* 41 (5), 877–909.
- Hickey, S., Mohan, G., 2004. *Participation: from Tyranny to Transformation? Exploring New Approaches to Participation in Development*. Zed Books, London.
- Høiby, M., Zenteno Hopp, J., 2015. Bolivia: emerging and traditional elites and the governance of the soy sector. In: Bull, B., Aguilar-Støen, M. (Eds.), *Environmental Politics in Latin America: Elite Dynamics, the Left Tide and Sustainable Development*. Routledge, Oxon.
- INE, 2012. *Bolivia - características de población y vivienda*. Censo Nacional de Población y Vivienda. Instituto Nacional de Estadística, La Paz.
- Jessop, B., 2007. *State Power: a Strategic-relational Approach*. Polity Press, Cambridge.
- Kaimowitz, D., Pacheco, P., Mendoza, R., Barahona, T., 2001. Municipal governments and forest management in Bolivia and Nicaragua. In: Palo, M., Uusivuori, J., Mery, G. (Eds.), *World Forests, Markets and Policies the Netherlands Dordrecht*. III, pp. 303–312.
- Kröger, M., 2011. Promotion of contentious agency as rewarding movement strategy: evidence from the MST-paper industry conflicts in Brazil. *J. Peasant Stud.* 38 (2), 435–458.
- Lalander, R., 2014. Rights of nature and the indigenous peoples in Bolivia and Ecuador: a straitjacket for progressive development politics? *Iberoamerican J. Dev. Stud.* 3 (2), 148–173.
- Larson, A.M., Pacheco, P., Toni, F., Vallejo, M., 2007. Trends in Latin American forestry decentralisations: legal frameworks, municipal governments and forest-dependent groups. *Int. For. Rev.* 9, 734–747.
- Larson, A.M., Cronkleton, P., Barry, D., Pacheco, P., 2008. *Tenure Rights and beyond: Community Access to Forest Resources in Latin America*. Occasional Paper no. 50. CIFOR, Bogor, Indonesia.
- Lemos, M.C., Agrawal, A., 2006. Environmental governance. *Annu. Rev. Environ. Resour.* 31, 297–325.
- López, J.L., 2007. *El Derecho a la libre determinación de los Pueblos Indígenas en Bolivia*. Latinas Editores, Oruro.
- Lukes, S., 2005. *Power: a Radical View*, second ed. Palgrave Macmillan, New York.
- Marcus, G.E., 1997. *Ethnography in/of the world system: the emergence of multi-sited ethnography*. *Annu. Rev. Anthropol.* 24, 95–117.
- McNeish, J.-A., 2006. Stones on the road: the politics of participation and the generation of crisis in Bolivia. *Bull. Lat. Am. Res.* 25 (2), 220–240.
- McNeish, J.-A., 2013. Extraction, protest and indigeneity in Bolivia: the TIPNIS effect. *Lat. Am. Caribb. Ethn. Stud.* 8 (2), 221–242.
- MDR&MA, 2008. *Ministerio de Desarrollo Rural, Agropecuario y Medio Ambiente. Política Nacional para la Gestión Integral de los Bosques*. República de Bolivia, La Paz.
- Medeiros, C., 2001. *Civilizing the Popular?: the law of popular participation and the design of a new civil society in 1990s Bolivia*. *Critique Anthropol.* 21 (4), 401–425.
- Moore, M., Teskey, G., 2006. *The CAR Framework: Capability, Accountability, Responsiveness: what Do These Terms Mean, Individually and Collectively? a Discussion Note for DFID Governance and Conflict Advisers*. DFID Governance Retreat, 14–17 November.
- Morales, M., Gianotten, V., Devisscher, M., Pacheco, D., 2013. *Hablemos de tierra. Minifundio, gestión territorial, bosques e impuesto agrario en Bolivia*. Plural Editores, La Paz.
- Müller, R., Pacheco, P., Montero, J.C., 2014. *The Context of Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Bolivia: Drivers, Agents and Institutions*. Occasional Paper 108. CIFOR, Bogor, Indonesia.
- Paavola, J., 2004. Protected areas governance and justice: theory and the European Union's habitats directive. *Environ. Sci.* 1 (1), 59–77.
- Paavola, J., Adger, W.N., 2002. *Justice in Adaptation to Climate Change*. Working Paper 23. Tyndal Centre for Climate Change Research, Norwich, UK.
- Pacheco, P., 1998. *Ministerios y gestión forestal en el trópico boliviano*. CIFOR, CEDLA, Fundación TIERRA, BOLFOR, La Paz.
- Pacheco, P., 2006. *Descentralización forestal en Bolivia. Implicaciones en el gobierno de los recursos forestales y el bienestar de los grupos marginados*. CIFOR. Plural editores, La Paz.
- Pacheco, D., 2014. *Una mirada a la política de bosques en Bolivia: por la descolonización de las políticas*. Universidad de Cordillera, La Paz.
- Pacheco, P., Barry, D., Cronkleton, P., Larson, A., 2011. *The recognition of forest rights in Latin America: progress and shortcomings of forest tenure reforms*. *Soc. Nat. Resour.* 25 (6), 556–571.
- Paulson, S., Gezon, L.L., 2005. *Political Ecology across Spaces, Scales, and Social Groups*. Rutgers University, New Brunswick NJ.
- Peet, R., Watts, M., 2004. *Liberation Ecologies: Environment, Development and Social Movements*. Routledge, Oxon.
- Perreault, T., 2008. *Natural Gas, Indigenous Mobilization, and the Bolivian State. Identities, Conflict and Cohesion Programme United Nations Research Institute for Social Development*, 27.
- Perreault, T., Bridge, G., McCarthy, J., 2015. *The Routledge Handbook of Political Ecology*. Routledge, Oxon.
- Postero, N.G., 2009. *Now we are citizens: indigenous politics in postmulticultural Bolivia*. *PolAR Political Leg. Anthropol. Rev.* 32 (2), 343–346.
- Postero, N.G., 2010. *The struggle to create a radical democracy in Bolivia*. *Lat. Am. Res. Rev.* 45. Special issue.
- Robbins, P., 2004. *Political Ecology: a Critical Introduction*. Blackwell Publishing, Oxford.
- Roe, E.M., 1991. *Development Narratives, or making best of blueprint development*. *World Dev.* 19 (4), 287–300.
- Schilling-Vacaflor, A., 2010. *Bolivia's New Constitution: towards Participatory Democracy and Political Pluralism? GIGA Working Paper GIGA*. No. 141.
- Schonleitner, G., 2004. *Can Public Deliberation Democratize State Action? Municipal Health Councils and Local Democracy in Brazil. Politicising Democracy. The New Local Politics of Democratisation*. Palgrave Macmillan, Hampshire.
- Smith, M.J., Pangsap, P., 2008. *Environment and Citizenship. Integrating Justice, Responsibility and Civic Engagement*. Zed Books, London.
- Snow, D.A., 2012. *Framing and social movements*. In: Snow, D.A., della Porta, D., Klandermans, B., McAdam, D. (Eds.), *The Wiley-Blackwell Encyclopedia of Social and Political Movements*. Wiley Blackwell.
- Snow, D.A., Benford, R.D., 2000. *Framing processes and social movements: an Overview and assessment*. *Annu. Rev. Sociol.* 26, 611–639.
- Stiefel, M., Wolfe, M., 2011. *The many faces of participation*. In: Cornwall, A. (Ed.), *The Participation Reader*. Zed Books, London.
- Suárez Añez, R.V., 2011. *Como entender la crisis alimentaria en Bolivia*. PROBIOMA, Santa Cruz.
- Sunderlin, W.D., Angelsen, A., Belcher, B., Burgers, P., Nasi, R., Santoso, L., Wunder, S., 2005. *Livelihoods, forests, and conservation in developing countries: an overview*. *World Dev.* 33, 1383–1402.
- Tarrow, S., 1994. *Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action and Politics*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- Wolford, W., Keene, S., 2015. *Social movements*. In: Perreault, T., Bridge, G.,

McCarthy, J. (Eds.), *The Routledge Handbook of Political Ecology*. Routledge, London.

Zimmerer, K.S., 2015. Environmental governance through “Speaking like an Indigenous State” and respatializing resources: ethical livelihood concepts in Bolivia as versatility or verisimilitude? *Geoforum* 64, 314–324.

Legal sources

CPEPB (2009) Constitución Política del Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia. Forest Draft Law, Anteproyecto de Ley de Bosques y Suelos (2013).
 Law 300/Ley Marco de la Madre Tierra y Desarrollo integral para vivir bien (2012).
 Law 337/Ley de Apoyo a la Producción de Alimentos y Restitución de Bosques (2013).
 Law 341/Ley de participación y control social.
 Law 650/Ley Agenda Patriótica del Bicentenario 2025 (2015).
 Law 1715/Ley del Servicio Nacional de Reforma Agraria (1996)
 Supreme Decree 0257 Fondo de Asentamientos Humanos.
 Supreme Decree 0726 Autorizaciones Transitorias Especiales, (2010).
 Supreme Decree 29643 Organizaciones Forestales Comunitarias.

Web sources

Cámara de Diputados. 2015a. En 11 meses de trabajo, la Asamblea Legislativa Plurinacional aprobó 120 leyes. <http://www.diputados.bo/index.php/noticias/2906-en-11-meses-de-trabajo-la-asamblea-legislativa-plurinacional-aprobo-120-leyes> Last accessed 15.15.16.

Cámara de Diputados. 2015b. Se incrementara por ley superficie para desmonte productivo. <http://www.diputados.bo/index.php/noticias/2493-se-incrementara-por-ley-superficie-para-desmonte-productivo> Last accessed 15.05.16.

Cámara de Senadores 2013. Comisión de Política Internacional <http://senado.gob.bo/sites/default/files/transparencia/Informe%20Gestion2012-013Parte2.pdf>.

CEDLA. 2011a. Pueblo Tacana pide una Ley forestal favorable a los pueblos indígenas. <http://www.cedla.org/content/21414> Last accessed 15.04.16.

CEDLA. 2011b. Asociación Forestal Indígena con propuestas para la Ley de Bosques <http://www.cedla.org/content/21422> Last accessed 15.04.16.

CFB. 2014. Cámara Forestal de Bolivia. Entrevista a Cliver Rocha horas antes de su reemplazo. <http://www.cfb.org.bo/noticias/institucional/entrevista-a-cliver-rocha> Last accessed 20.04.16.

CFB 2015. Cámara Forestal de Bolivia. Mesa 1 Tierra y estructura agraria, cumbre agropecuario. Sembrando Bolivia. <http://www.cfb.org.bo/noticias/economia-comercio/mesa-1-tierra-y-estructura-agraria-cumbre-agropecuaria-sembrando-bolivia> Last accessed 15.15.16.

CICPA . 2011. Avanza la elaboración de propuesta de Ley de Bosque. <http://www.cipca.org.bo/index.php/noticias/noticias-2011/2016-claudiavediapacheco-sp-1705183666> Last accessed 15.04.16.

CIPCA 2012a. CIPCA entrega Propuesta de Ley Integral de Bosques a entidades del Estado y a Organizaciones Sociales. <http://www.cipca.org.bo/index.php/noticias/noticias-2012/2772-cipca-realiza-propuesta-de-ley-de-bosques> Last

accessed 15.04.16.

CIPCA 2012b. Una Ley de Bosques para Vivir Bien. <http://www.cipca.org.bo/index.php/cipca-notas/cipca-notas-2012/2651-una-ley-de-bosques-para-vivir-bien> Last accessed 15.04.16.

CIPCA 2012c. CIPCA socializa Propuesta de Ley Integral de Bosques en Beni, Pando y Santa Cruz. <http://www.cipca.org.bo/index.php/noticias/noticias-2012/2728-cipca-socializa-propuesta-de-ley-integral-de-bosques-en-beni-pando-y-santa-cruz> Last accessed 15.04.16.

CIPCA 2013a. Inicio socialización, análisis y reflexión de la Propuesta de Ley de Bosques y Suelos con organizaciones sociales. <http://www.cipca.org.bo/index.php/noticias/noticias-2013/2995-inicio-socializacion-analisis-y-reflexion-de-la-propuesta-de-ley-de-bosques-y-suelos-con-organizaciones-sociales> Last accessed 20.04.16.

CIPCA 2013b. Bloque Oriente respalda propuesta de Ley de Bosques y Suelos. <http://www.cipca.org.bo/index.php/noticias/noticias-2013/2996-bloque-oriente-respalda-propuesta-de-ley-de-bosques-y-suelos> Last accessed 20.04.16.

CIPCA 2013c. Una ley que estimula la ampliación de la frontera agrícola y perdona a los predadores del bosque. <http://www.cipca.org.bo/index.php/cipca-notas/cipca-notas-2013/2808-una-ley-que-estimula-la-ampliacion-de-la-frontera-agricola-y-perdona-a-los-depredadores-del-bosque> Last accessed 15.05.16.

CIPCA 2013d. Bloque Oriente define 2014 como el año de la reforma agraria. <http://www.cipca.org.bo/index.php/noticias/noticias-2013/3021-bloque-oriente-define-2014-como-el-ano-de-la-reforma-agraria> Last accessed 15.05.16.

CIPCA 2014a. Bloque oriente reafirma su alianza y trabaja propuestas de políticas públicas <http://www.cipca.org.bo/index.php/noticias/noticias-2014/3051-bloque-oriente-reafirma-su-alianza-y-trabaja-propuestas-de-politicas-publicas> Last accessed 20.04.16.

CIPCA 2014b. El mundo rural en los planes de gobierno. <http://www.cipca.org.bo/index.php/cipca-notas/cipca-notas-2014/3131-el-mundo-rural-en-los-planes-de-gobierno> Last accessed 20.04.16.

CIPCA 2015. El Bloque Oriente socializa su propuesta en mesas de trabajo de la Cumbre Sembrando Bolivia <http://www.cipca.org.bo/index.php/noticias/noticias-2015/3402-el-bloque-oriente-socializa-su-propuesta-en-mesas-de-trabajo-de-la-cumbre-sembrando-bolivia> Last accessed 20.04.16.

CIPCA 2015b. La frontera agrícola en Bolivia: transgénicos, deforestación y seguridad alimentaria. <http://www.cipca.org.bo/index.php/cipca-notas/cipcanotas-2015/3390-la-frontera-agricola-en-bolivia-transgenicos-deforestacion-y-seguridad-alimentaria> Last accessed 15.15.16.

CFB 2015. Conclusiones de la Cumbre Agropecuaria – Sembrando Bolivia. <http://www.cfb.org.bo/noticias/economia-comercio/conclusiones-de-la-cumbre-agropecuaria-sembrando-bolivia> Last accessed 15.05.16.

García Linera, A. 2015. Sobre las ONGs. Respuesta de Alvaro García Linera. <http://www.alainet.org/es/articulo/171823> Last accessed 08.08.16

IBCE 2013. Encuentro Agroindustrial Productivo. http://ibce.org.bo/images/publicaciones/ce_214_encuentro_agroindustrial_productivo.pdf.

Peoples' Agreement (2010) World People's Agreement on Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth. Tiquipaya, Cochabamba, Bolivia. <https://pwccc.wordpress.com/2010/04/24/peoples-agreement/>Last accessed 15.04.16.

PAPER V

The following paper is a published paper in the Journal of Peasant Studies.

Hirsch, C. (2017) Between Resistance and Negotiations: Indigenous Organisations and the Bolivian State in the case of TIPNIS. *Journal of Peasant Studies*. Published online.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/03066150.2017.1394846>

Hirsch, C. (2019) Between Resistance and Negotiations: Indigenous Organisations and the Bolivian State in the case of TIPNIS. *Journal of Peasant Studies*. 46 (4), pp.811-830.



Between resistance and negotiation: indigenous organisations and the Bolivian State in the case of TIPNIS

Cecilie Hirsch

To cite this article: Cecilie Hirsch (2019) Between resistance and negotiation: indigenous organisations and the Bolivian State in the case of TIPNIS, *The Journal of Peasant Studies*, 46:4, 811-830, DOI: [10.1080/03066150.2017.1394846](https://doi.org/10.1080/03066150.2017.1394846)

To link to this article: <https://doi.org/10.1080/03066150.2017.1394846>



Published online: 27 Nov 2017.



Submit your article to this journal [↗](#)



Article views: 287



View Crossmark data [↗](#)



Citing articles: 3 View citing articles [↗](#)

Between resistance and negotiation: indigenous organisations and the Bolivian State in the case of TIPNIS

Cecilie Hirsch

A government-driven road-building project, crossing the national park and demarcated indigenous communitarian native land Isiboro Sécore (TIPNIS) in the Bolivian Amazon, has caused considerable debate, divisions and conflict. Based on extensive fieldwork in Bolivia, I examine the conflict between 2011 and 2013, focusing on specific cases of micro-politics with examples of changing strategies, local negotiations and strategic framings in the interactions between the indigenous organisations and the state involved in the conflict. I show that the evolution of the conflict has been affected by these micro-political issues, as well as strategic state projects. Secondly, I focus on how discursive framings have legitimised advanced or marginalised certain solutions, ideas and interests.

Keywords: political ecology; indigenous peoples; social movements; state-society relations; resource conflicts

1. Introduction

A government-driven road-building project, crossing the national park and demarcated indigenous communitarian native land Isiboro Sécore (TIPNIS) in the Bolivian Amazon, has caused considerable debate, divisions and conflict.¹ After a six-year standstill following widespread protests by local indigenous organisations back in 2011, the Bolivian government enacted a law opening the way for the 300-km road in August 2017. This analysis of the TIPNIS conflict sheds light on contested introductions of infrastructure in indigenous territories and forest areas, and the dynamics of micro-political relations in environmental governance. Whilst revealing internal developmental tensions within Bolivia, the conflict is indicative of broader challenges in the balancing of different interests, needs and rights in development interventions, which affect indigenous territories and valuable ecological areas. Finally, this contribution demonstrates the importance of analysing the ways in which power relations are embedded in specific framings of socio-environmental relations, and how these framings are used strategically to advance certain interests, or suppress others.

The TIPNIS conflict must be seen in the context of increased demands for social and economic redistribution, recognition of indigenous rights, and protection of indigenous territories and marginalised groups' participation in decision-making (McNeish 2013; Laing 2015; Sanchez-Lopez 2015; Zimmerer 2015), as well as regional geo-political struggles

¹*Territorio Indígena y Parque Nacional Isiboro Sécore – TIPNIS.*

over positions, areas and natural resources (see e.g. Haarstad 2012). Defenders of the road-building project, with the Bolivian government at the fore, have argued for the strategic importance of the road for national integration and development: to connect the Bolivian highlands with the lowlands; to increase state presence in the Amazon area; and to facilitate improvements of local infrastructure and poverty reduction in communities in TIPNIS (see e.g. García Linera 2013). The TIPNIS conflict reached its peak in 2011 and 2012, with two indigenous protest marches. Indigenous organisations have protested against the lack of consultation and proper impact assessments in the planning of the road, and later the government's attempts to convince them to accept the road. In 2012, the government conducted a local consultation process regarding future interventions in TIPNIS, which ultimately led to local divisions. According to official records, the majority of the communities accepted what was portrayed as an 'ecological road' (OEP 2013), whilst the consultation process was criticised for being misleading and failing to allow free and informed consent (APDHB 2013).

The TIPNIS park (1,225,347 hectares) is situated on the border area between the departments of Beni and Cochabamba, and is home to 65–70 communities. In 2009, 1,091,656 hectares of TIPNIS were classified as indigenous communitarian native lands (Tierra Comunitaria de Origen – TCO) for the local indigenous groups Mojeños, Yurucarés and Chimanes, comprising ca. 12,400 inhabitants (see e.g. INE 2001; Guzman 2012).² In addition, more than 20,000 agricultural settler families from the Bolivian highlands have migrated to the park since the 1970s, inhabiting an area of 100,000 hectares (Fundación Tierra 2012). The settler area now includes both indigenous and mixed communities, many of which are organised in the Indigenous Council of the South (Consejo Indígena del Sur, CONISUR). With the settlers' presence, the area has suffered from deforestation and degradation (Vargas Rios et al. 2012). The indigenous communities within the TCO are organised in the subcentral of TIPNIS and the subcentral of Sécuré. The park is also home to cattle ranchers, forest loggers and small tourism projects. Significant oil reserves exist in the area (Fundación Tierra 2012), which are also thought to be a catalyst for the proposed road project. The National Service for Protected Areas (SERNAP) is responsible for the management of the park, and has divided the area into three zones: a nucleus zone with strict protection restrictions (*Zona de protección estricta*); a second zone for traditional community use (*Area de uso tradicional*); and a third zone for small-scale natural resource extraction (*Zona de aprovechamiento de recursos naturales*).

In 2008, the Bolivian government signed a contract with the Brazilian company OAS to construct a highway to connect Cochabamba and Beni, a distance of approximately 300 km, financed with loans from the Brazilian Economic and Social Development Bank (BNDES). Demands for a road to connect the two departments had been made for some time, and the road was declared a priority in 2006 by the Evo Morales government (The Government of Bolivia 2006). The section crossing TIPNIS will span 177 km, of which a considerable section has already been cleared. An environmental licence, in regard to the road's impacts on local ecosystems and landscape change in the park, was approved by the Vice Ministry of Environment in 2010, and the project was approved by the National Assembly in 2011.

The TIPNIS conflict is frequently referred to in political and academic debates regarding indigenous rights and environmental concerns related to extraction and infrastructure

²TCOs are recognised under the National Agrarian Reform Service Law, INRA 1996 (Ley del Servicio Nacional de Reforma Agraria). The category entails that the land cannot be subdivided, sold or rented, and is collectively managed by indigenous organisations.

development projects, consultation processes and local communities' participation in decision-making (see e.g. Canessa 2012; Fundación Tierra 2012; Morales 2013; Laing 2015). The conflict has challenged the extraction-based development model in Bolivia and the government's credibility as being pro-indigenous and plurinational (McNeish 2013; Laing 2015; Sanchez-Lopez 2015). However, in the academic literature, little attention has been paid to the micro-political relations, such as interactions between the indigenous organisations and public bodies, as well as the strategic discursive framings in the conflict, and their consequences for the outcomes. In this contribution, I study the conflict with a strategic relational approach to the complexity of interests involved and the balancing of social forces (see e.g. Jessop 2008). Employing a political ecology perspective, I focus on narratives and strategic framings of socio-environmental relations. By highlighting the significance of micro-politics and the changing strategies of the indigenous and state actors, along with discursive framings and hegemonic projects, this paper adds to existing literature on the TIPNIS conflict, and to our understanding of complex socio-environmental struggles over values and access to areas, positions, rights and natural resources. I argue that, in order to fully understand such conflicts, it is necessary to pay attention to the micro-political dynamics at play. I assert that discursive framings in the conflict have played a particular role in the outcomes, both in legitimising or advancing certain solutions, ideas or interests over others, and in obscuring real-life challenges on the ground.

1.1. *Political ecology and relational approach*

By combining the analysis of material and discursive processes, that shape access to and control over natural resources, political ecologists aim to gain a better understanding of marginalisation and contestation in socio-ecological conflicts (Peet and Watts 2004; Perreault et al. 2015). Political ecologists hold that discourses, ideas and knowledge regarding socio-environmental relations have consequences for the ways in which the environment is governed; and that power is embedded in the ways we use, control, gain access to and institutionalise different narratives and discourses (see e.g. Forsyth 2003; Wolford and Keene 2015, 580; Horowitz 2015; Li 2004). Different framings of environmental and development problems render different responses, with consequences for the inclusion and exclusion of different solutions, actors and rationalities (Forsyth 2003). In this paper I consider how discursive framings related to the TIPNIS conflict are used to advance, legitimise or delegitimise particular interests and solutions (see also Snow et al. 1986; Hajer 1995; Snow 2012; Wolford and Keene 2015). In utilising this perspective, I also reveal the ways in which simplistic narratives can obscure the socio-environmental challenges unfolding on the ground and how narratives change in meetings with counter-framings (see also Benford and Snow 2000; Snow 2012). Environmental governance thus becomes a result not only of the struggles over material interests, but also of competing knowledge-claims and strategic framings regarding the environment and how to govern it.

The second analytical focus in this essay is the ways in which power is embedded in strategic relations, state–society interactions and micro-politics. I analyse state–society interactions as dynamic and relational, where the state is seen as ‘a terrain of struggle in which multiple and shifting interests collide, converge or are transformed’ (Wolford and Keene 2015, 581). I understand ‘micro-politics’ as being multiple, small interactions between the state and wider society, with changing power relations among actors involved (Jessop 2008). A strategic-relational perspective provides insights into how different social forces affect state power and responses; how actors move in and out of state and civil society spheres with differential access; and how some strategies, interests, actors, time

horizons or coalitions are privileged, or marginalised, due to strategic selectivity (Jessop 2008). Different social forces interact with state bodies and the government, affecting the realisation and prioritisation of projects and interventions. These dynamic relations also entail shifting relations between civil society and the state. On this basis, I argue for the need to look into ‘micro-politics’ to understand the outcomes of the conflict. In this paper, I further illuminate the hegemony of certain projects related to strategic selectivity, with consequences for the exclusion and inclusion of different actors, interests and ideas (cf. Hayward 2000; Gaventa 2006).

A multi-sited ethnography with qualitative methods (Marcus 1997; Burawoy 2000) was used to collect and form the empirical basis for this study. I visited Bolivia four times between 2011 and 2013, and spent a total of 23 weeks in the field. This paper is based on 100 semi-structured interviews and conversations with indigenous representatives and other activists who participated in the mobilisations concerning TIPNIS, as well as with politicians, bureaucrats, advisors, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and academics. I joined parts of the indigenous’ protest marches in 2011 and 2012, and attended meetings in indigenous, peasant and other non-governmental organisations, as well as between the government and indigenous organisations. The information collected through interviewing and observing has been complemented by relevant information from policy documents, laws, statements, media articles and organisations’ reports, as well as written agreements between the authorities and the indigenous organisations.

1.2. *Bolivia – a process of change*

Bolivia has undergone important political changes in the past decade, particularly connected to the election of the indigenous and coca-growers’ union leader Evo Morales, in 2005, who represents a coalition of social movements in the Movement Towards Socialism (MAS). Indeed, Bolivians frequently refer to the past decade of political and social transformation as ‘*el proceso de cambio*’ (the process of change), distinct from earlier historical shifts. Large-scale mobilisations regarding the country’s natural resources, protests against the implications of neoliberal policies for local livelihoods, and demands for the political, economic and social inclusion of marginalised groups in the 1990s to 2000s form the backdrop of this process (see e.g. Gotkowitz 2007; Postero 2007; Perreault 2008; Fabricant 2012). In 2004, the five largest peasant and indigenous organisations were unified in the so-called Pact of Unity, with a common goal to reform the country with a new national constitution (Schilling-Vacaflor 2010; Garcés 2011). Large-scale reforms were initiated, including the writing of the new constitution in 2007–2009 (CPEPB 2009), a land reform and increased state control of the country’s strategic natural resources (ECLAC 2015). Plans for infrastructure were revived, including the TIPNIS road, and a range of social projects were initiated.

State–society relations are also changing in Bolivia. Previously excluded and marginalised groups are gaining access to political arenas such as the state bureaucracy, the plurinational assembly and the ministries. At the same time, the Bolivian government (2006–) has also been challenged by different social forces. On one hand is the powerful right-wing civic movement representing lowland economic groups’ interests (see e.g. PIEB 2003) and the political opposition parties. More recently, the government has met critique from indigenous organisations, and also urban groups that originally supported the government but now feel unrepresented in the ‘process of change’. There has thus been a fragmentation of the Pact of Unity, due to conflicting agendas across ethnic, geographical and socio-cultural dimensions. The government has been criticised for its economic reliance on extractive

industries, poor implementation of environmental policies and conflicts with local indigenous communities, resulting from the implementation of extraction projects and infrastructure development, without proper consultation, inclusion, distribution and redress (see e.g. Bebbington and Bury 2013; Hinderey 2013; Bebbington 2013). In the following, I present some of the contestations in the TIPNIS conflict, and draw on specific events and interactions as the basis of my analysis.

2. Findings and analysis

2.1. Coalitions, demands and divisions

The opposition to building a highway through TIPNIS has been strong, with the involvement of different actors at different times. Local indigenous organisations have criticised the lack of consultation with affected communities before the decision was made, and for not involving them in planning the route of the road, as well as disregard of local needs, and lack of proper environmental impact assessments (CIDOB 2012; Fundación Tierra 2012; Guzman 2012). The opposition from indigenous organisations has been formed by the larger context of historic marginalisation. Lowland indigenous communities have traditionally lost vast territories due to unequal land distribution, resource extraction activities and agricultural expansion (see e.g. Morales et al. 2013; Reyes-García et al. 2014). Previous protests led to the establishment of the first communitarian native lands (TCOs) in the 1990s, which were protected in the Law of the National Institute for Agrarian Reform in 1996 (Bolivian State 1996; Morales et al. 2013). Since 2006, a number of TCOs have been titled, among them the TCO in TIPNIS, in 2009. However, many lowland areas are experiencing increased pressure from migrant settlers, agricultural expansion, the development of infrastructure and extraction projects, and indigenous organisations are working for the consolidation and autonomous control over their territories to counteract this pressure.

In 2010, the lowland indigenous organisations, represented by the Confederation of Indigenous People of Bolivia (*Confederación de Pueblos Indígenas de Bolivia* – CIDOB), started to show their discontent with the MAS government, primarily because they felt marginalised and without political influence. Grave disagreements started to emerge in the Pact of Unity, of which CIDOB also formed a part. The approval of the road through TIPNIS in 2011 was, for many lowland indigenous leaders, the final straw, in what they saw as the disregard for their demands, values and rights. Local TIPNIS leaders reached out to national and regional indigenous leaders to form a larger movement, by framing TIPNIS as an emblematic case for future threats to indigenous territories across the country. A range of lowland indigenous organisations joined the protest from across the Chaco, Oriental and Amazon area, but also highland indigenous groups from the National Council of Ayllus and Markas of Qullasuyu (*Consejo Nacional de Ayllus y Markas del Qullasuyu* – Conamaq). The protests culminated in a large indigenous march in 2011, backed by hundreds of community members from the TIPNIS area, with support from NGOs, urban activists, the media, certain politicians and lowland civic groups. This broad alliance was, in part, possible because the TIPNIS movement framed the case as a common indigenous struggle, and, at the same time, connected it to the protection of the area's ecological value of national and global significance. In parallel, the protest corresponded to the lowlands' right-wing opposition's attempts to delegitimise the government and to protect their geopolitical power position in the lowlands, who discursively also joined the opposition to the road.

Symbols, such as 'the heart of fresh water' (*corazón de agua dulce*) and 'the lung of the world' (*pulmón del mundo*), as well as the 'holy lands' of local indigenous communities

(*tierra santa, la loma santa*) were used in the framings of the TIPNIS movement (observations, Beni, August 2011). A joint discourse coalition (Hajer 1995) was formed, which strengthened the movement's force and voice, while including actors with divergent agendas. The coalition gathered behind a shared narrative concerning the possible consequences of the road: the planned road would both open a transport corridor to concession sites for the extraction of oil resources in the park, and facilitate the entrance of more migrant settlers. The settlers would, according to this narrative, cut down the forests and destroy the soil with coca cultivation, lead to the further deforestation and degradation of the forests and dispossess the local communities (Contreras Baspineiro 2012; Fundación Tierra 2012; Guzman 2012). In this narrative, the government was portrayed as a perpetrator of injustice, an extractivist and developmentalist state that had abandoned the lowland indigenous peoples (observations, Beni, August 2011; Contreras Baspineiro 2012). The migrant peasants were portrayed as the villains: capitalist, individualistic and destroyers of nature (interviews with marchers, Beni, August 2011; interview with Fundación Tierra, Santa Cruz, July 2011; Contreras Baspineiro 2012; Fundación Tierra 2012). The local communities that were part of the communitarian indigenous land in TIPNIS were, in contrast, presented as the heroes: the true indigenous peoples of the area and protectors of nature (interviews with marchers, Beni, August 2011). Parts of the protest movement also warned against Brazil's sub-imperial interests, and saw the project as an expansion of infrastructural plans in the Initiative for the Integration of Regional Infrastructure in South America (IIRSA) (Fundación Tierra 2012; Molina 2013).³

The TIPNIS conflict thus connected groups across class, ethnicity, scales and places (cf. Robbins 2011), but also led to major divisions and contested alliances. A variety of actors supported the TIPNIS movement, albeit with different agendas. For example, urban-based activists and NGOs provided their communication skills, advice and equipment, for what they viewed as a struggle against a dominant state with little regard for local communities, rights and the environment (observations, Beni, August and September 2011). The right-wing civic movement, encompassing committees of Santa Cruz and Beni, provided material support, and their youth representatives joined parts of the march (observations, Beni, August 2011; Fabricant and Postero 2013). Their agenda was tied to the protection of their economic interests and privileged historical position, as well as a general opposition to the MAS government. Support from the civic right-wing committees and from foreign donors was questioned, also internally in the march (interviews with marchers, Beni, August 2011; Fundación Tierra 2012). The civic committees were criticised for having previously paid little attention to indigenous and environmental causes, and thus for taking advantage of the marchers (see also Fabricant and Postero 2013). The march also received strong coverage from private and public media, as well as alternative and international media (observations, Beni, August and September 2011). The media represented a pivotal channel for communication with urban areas, to confront the government and to spread the master narrative of the march. Among them were also media companies owned by economic interest groups in opposition to the MAS government (see e.g. Lupien 2013). They spent considerable resources to be present and in covering the conflict (observations, Beni, August 2011 and March 2012). These examples also demonstrate how different actors attempted to take advantage of the conflict for their own benefit and interests, under the same discursive umbrella.

³According to García Linera (2013) this specific road section is not part of IIRSA.

Given the breadth of the alliance of indigenous organisations supporting the march, many different demands were put forth in an official list of demands (CIDOB 2011). The marchers demanded participation in law and policymaking regarding consultation processes, forests, hydrocarbon and mining, protected areas and autonomy, as well as the national development plan. Socio-economic demands included land issues and basic services, and communication, education and health projects. The marchers demanded support for local projects from the Indigenous Fund, based on the hydrocarbon tax income (*Fondo de Desarrollo para los Pueblos Indígenas Originarios y Comunidades Campesinas*), and transparency and fairness in the distribution of funds. They also called for access to funding from programmes connected to the climate change initiative Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation (REDD), and the global Green Fund. Locally based demands included those regarding the TIPNIS road, and concerns regarding extraction activities in Aguarague National Park and mining pollution in the Pilkomayo River in Tarija. The mobilisation, in line with other experiences elsewhere in the world, illustrates that struggles for control over land and natural resources become entwined with claims for ecological and distributional justice, recognition and participation (cf. Peet and Watts 2004). However, differences among regional indigenous organisations also resulted in internal conflicts and divisions. For example, the organisation of the Guarani (APG) opened direct negotiations with the government. Being the largest lowland organisations, APG attempted to promote regionally based demands. There were also internal disagreements in the march regarding how to approach the government and public bodies, where some of the leaders were leaning more to negotiating with the government than others. This illustrates how struggles over resources reflect not only broader tensions between social groups and interests, but also tensions within these groups (see also Turner 2004). Similarly, Li's (2015) analysis of mining conflicts in Peru illustrates how alliances emerge and produce new identities, emphasising shifting, ambiguous and also contradictory collaborations.

2.2. *Negotiation attempts and micro-politics*

To offer a more nuanced analysis of micro-political relations in the conflict, I take a closer look at events taking place during the march. The government made several attempts to open negotiations with the marchers in 2011, albeit with limited results. The indigenous leaders in the march rejected dialogue due to their mistrust of the government (interviews, CIDOB August 2011). Among the marchers were MAS-friendly leaders, others with ties to the opposition, and those who were non-partisan, which led to different opinions regarding how to approach the government (observations, Beni, August 2011). President Morales was viewed by many of the marchers as having abandoned the lowland indigenous organisations, in favour of the highland organisations and the migrant organisation (interviews with marchers, Beni, August 2011; see also Fontana 2014; Fundación Tierra 2012).

The march's leadership initially demanded direct negotiations with President Morales, a demand that was never met (field notes 2011). During the march, several ministers were sent to negotiate with the protesters, but without a mandate to discuss the road, the marchers rejected these negotiation attempts (observations, August and September 2011; Fundación Tierra 2012). The Minister of Foreign Affairs, David Choquehuanca, a former union and indigenous leader, attempted to initiate negotiations and solve a dispute when migrant peasants blocked the road for the marchers. The situation became chaotic, and later, the government accused the marchers of supposed attempts at harassing the minister. This incident was followed by a violent police action against the marchers in the town of Chaparina on 25

September 2011, which led to widespread protests nationally and attracted international attention (see Fundación Tierra 2012; McNeish 2013). The Chaparina police action severely damaged the credibility of the government and exacerbated anti-government sentiments among the communities, the organisations and the march's supporters.⁴ The Defense Minister, Cecilia Chacon, resigned in protest over the police action. Protests led to the release of the captured marchers (Fundación Tierra 2012).

In October 2011 the marchers reunited, and continued to La Paz, with greater force and support than ever. Due to great pressure and support, the march's leadership and the government began negotiating the marchers' demands. The result was an agreement responding to all of the demands of the march (see Fundación Tierra 2012) and, finally, the enactment of Law 180 to protect TIPNIS.⁵ For the marchers, an official negotiation process with the president was viewed as the safest way to achieve their demands. The government accepted only indigenous representatives around the negotiation table and excluded actors such as NGOs and advisors. The case demonstrates that the scale of the negotiations and the perceived legitimacy of the negotiation partners were of special importance in landing the negotiations. The government changed their strategy over the course of the march, which also indicates different opinions about how to handle the marchers within the government, as well as the increased pressure from the outside. Table 1 presents a timeline of important events related to the TIPNIS conflict. In the next section, I take a closer look at what I refer to as the larger 'state projects', which have affected the conflict.

2.3. *State projects and strategic selectivity*

The TIPNIS conflict should be viewed within the wider context of what I refer to as 'state projects', which are the result of the joining of social and government interests and forces. The following examples further illustrate the micro-political relations that have affected the outcomes of the conflict and the blurred lines between civil society movements and the state.

The first example is the state project of reclaiming national sovereignty and integration. The government has implemented this project since 2006, in response to demands from a range of sectors and a broad movement of both rural and urban organisations, largely through infrastructure development, attempts to nationalise natural resources and recentralisation (see e.g. García Linera 2013; Haarstad 2012). The government has increased the presence of the state in the Amazon and border areas, arguing for local development and the control of illegal activities, such as through the government agency for the development of macroregions and border areas ADEMAF (*La Agencia para el Desarrollo de las Macroregiones y Zonas Fronterizas*) and military posts. According to the Vice President, Alvaro García Linera, an increased state presence will counter the historical control of the Amazon and lowland area by actors such as missionaries, private tourism, ranchers, private resource extraction firms, paramilitary forces, lumbermen and intermediaries (García Linera 2013). By connecting Beni and Cochabamba with a road, the transport of goods and people between the highlands and the lowlands would be facilitated, and transport through the lowland economic centre of Santa Cruz would be avoided (Fundación Tierra 2012).

⁴The government handled the incident poorly, and parts of MAS blamed the police for having acted without a mandate (interview, MAS advisor, March 2012). Although the government called for investigations in 2011, the case remains unresolved as of August 2017.

⁵Ley 180 de Protección del Territorio Indígena y Parque Nacional Isiboro Sécuré, 24 October 2011.

Table 1. Timeline of events related to the TIPNIS conflict.

1965	Creation of the Isiboro Sécure National Park
1970s	Migrants start to arrive at the park
1985	The Bolivian Congress acknowledged the necessity for a road to connect Cochabamba and Beni (Act. No 171)
2006	The road to connect San Ignacio de Moxos with Villa Tunari is declared priority by the Bolivian government
2008	A construction contract is signed between the Bolivian government and the Brazilian company OAS
2009	The area is defined as a communitarian native land (TCO)
2011	The TIPNIS protest march, part of CIDOB VIII national march, presents 16 demands to the government
	October: Negotiations in La Paz; law 180 halts the road construction
2012	Conisur march; presents demand about a consultation in TIPNIS
2012	Negotiations between regional indigenous organisations and the government
2012	Law 222 about a consultation process in TIPNIS is promulgated
2012	The second TIPNIS march, part of the CIDOB IX national march, rejects the consultation project
2012	Consultation process in TIPNIS from May to November

This indicates the reason economic interest groups from Santa Cruz were interested in halting the road-building. The road would lead to improved government control over valuable lowland areas, where the state has historically been absent. Improving state presence would counter the lowlands' opposition's struggle for regional autonomy, especially concerning natural resource governance (Haarstad 2012; Fabricant and Postero 2013). A new road would lead to significant changes in economic dynamics, largely benefiting Beni, Cochabamba and La Paz (Fundación Tierra 2012), and foreign interests, such as Brazil. According to the government narrative, the road would facilitate state and military control of the area to avoid illegal settlements, deforestation and other illegal activities, such as narco-criminality, pirate logging and hunting (García Linera 2013). In 2013, to join their arguments for increased control and environmental concerns, the government established an 'Eco-battalion' in TIPNIS, with increased military patrol of the area, and designation of local youths as park guardians (*La Razon* 2012). The Eco-battalion was largely promoted as an environmental protection initiative, as its name implies. Nonetheless, the local TIPNIS organisations opposing the road have seen it as an attempt to curb their opposition.

The second example is the state project of redistribution and socio-economic development, which has included land reform, small-scale agricultural production projects, social services and basic infrastructure, largely made possible by the hydrocarbon tax and extraction projects (see e.g. Haarstad 2012; Lalander 2014; Zimmerer 2015). This project is strongly supported by the peasant sector and parts of the indigenous organisations. Both government representatives and bureaucrats have justified the road project by referring to the communities' much-needed access to water, electricity, housing and health services, as well as economic opportunities (interview with ADEMAF, Trinidad, August 2012; interview with the Vice Minister of Environment, La Paz, May 2012). This argument convinced indigenous peoples affiliated with CONISUR, and they left the CIDOB umbrella in 2012, while strengthening their ties with the peasant movement. The road-building was strongly supported by peasant leaders (see also Contreras Baspineiro 2012), whose constituents would benefit from better access to the lowlands. Highland peasants are among those being resettled in the lowlands (in Beni, Pando and Santa Cruz), under the government's

settlement programme, and have an interest in better access and communication with the area. With increased attention towards TIPNIS, the government implemented a range of local projects in the communities and declared their commitment to combatting poverty in the area.

The final example is the contested state project to protect 'Mother Earth'. When MAS gained power in 2006, there were high hopes regarding fomenting environmental justice and protection (see also Zimmerer 2015). However, despite the government's discursive focus on environmental protection, the implementation of environmental policies has not been prioritised. Early on, the road-building was criticised internally during the planning process, by the National Programme for Protected Areas (SERNAP Rumbol 2011) and the Vice Minister of Environment, for its possible harm to ecological systems and local livelihoods. From 2008 to 2010, the indigenous groups of TIPNIS engaged in dialogue with the Vice Minister of Environment, Juan Pablo Ramos, illustrating the openness to indigenous concerns at the time. Other parts of the government downplayed environmental concerns. Ramos resigned in 2010, after refusing to sign the environmental licence for the road section through TIPNIS (interview with Ramos, La Paz, July 2011). He was replaced by Cintia Silva, the former chief of the road authorities (*Administradora Boliviana de Carreteras*, ABC) and an ally of the peasant migrant movement, who later approved the licence (Fundación Tierra 2012). This incident illustrates contesting initiatives within the government apparatus, as well as the impact of actors in positions of power on the outcomes of the conflict. In another example of these internal contestations, the director of SERNAP, Adrian Nogales Morales, a former TIPNIS indigenous leader, refused to approve the environmental assessment report for the road through TIPNIS without proper consultation with the communities. His disapproval was, however, ignored by the government, and in 2011 he was pushed out of office (Hinderey 2013). A proposal for joint natural park management, developed by local indigenous organisations in collaboration with SERNAP, was also rejected at the time by powerful actors including the Ministry of Energy and Hydrocarbon (interview with SERNAP, La Paz, September 2012). The leading figure of the TIPNIS protest, Fernando Vargas, played a pivotal role, as a public servant in SERNAP, in the development of this proposal. The lowlands indigenous leaders promoted the decentralisation of management responsibilities in protected areas, and autonomous administration of funds. This view was supported by parts of SERNAP, while other actors argued for more centralised control (interview with SERNAP, La Paz, September 2012).

The different projects illustrate that state interests are not constant and fixed, but rather are the result of struggles among different social forces trying to advance their interests and demands, in dynamic relations with state actors and processes (cf. Jessop 2008). Governance and authority can thus be seen as being in a continuous process of construction and contestation by different agents (see also Blom Hansen and Stepputat 2001; Jessop 2008; McNeish 2008, 21). These examples underline how resource struggles are embedded in wider power struggles between different ideas, identities and interests (see also Perreault et al. 2015; Wolford and Keene 2015).

2.4. Discursive complications and contradictions

Discursive framings have influenced and shaped the conflict in a variety of ways. Through the forming of the strategic discourse coalition, the TIPNIS movement managed to attract attention and form alliances (see also Hajer 1995; McNeish 2011; Wolford and Keene

2015). At the same time, poorly nuanced discourses also obscured local differences and blurred the real-life challenges of the communities and the complex picture of human–nature relations that exist in the park (see also Ulloa 2015; Yeh and Bryan 2015). For example, local groups in the park have engaged with commercial interests, including logging, caiman hunting, tourism projects and cattle ranching. Logging has been practiced for decades in TIPNIS, in designated areas approved by state bodies, in private forest concessions overlapping community areas, and through contracts between community leaders and companies, some of which have been illegal (Contreras Baspineiro 2012; Fundación Tierra 2012). The authorities have enacted poor control over forest management in these areas, which has resulted in severe degradation of several areas (interviews with ABT, La Paz and Santa Cruz, July and August 2012). These practices of potential environmental degradation were largely silenced by the anti-road protesters, which left limited ground to explore solutions for these local challenges and the pressures on the communities. At the same time, supporters of the road used these practices to question the credibility of the local indigenous leaders as environmental protectionists (observations, 2011 and 2012). Logging contracts between indigenous leaders and forest companies, as well as maps of forest management sites, were made public to support these claims (unofficial CD distributed in 2012; García Linera 2013). President Morales also criticised the marchers' demand for funds from the climate mitigation initiative REDD, blaming these for leading to the 'privatisation and transnationalisation' of the forests, and for being against Bolivia's official policy against carbon markets (Fundación Tierra 2012). Furthermore, the government has framed support from foreign environmental activists and organisations as attempts at 'environmental colonialism' (García Linera 2013, 27). These examples illustrate how framings have been used to promote certain interests and positions, with selective communication. The downplaying of environmental degradation practices has further led to counter-framings against the communities.

2.5. *The case of 'intangible'*

Two concepts have been of specific importance in the conflict: the 'intangibility' of TIPNIS, and the 'ecological road'. These concepts were strategically used and framed in the conflict, and were also adapted to advance different (and contrasting) interests (see Peet and Watts 2004). The concept of the 'intangibility' of TIPNIS is a legal category which entails a special protection of the area as 'untouchable'. Law 180 to protect TIPNIS was initially presented in the national assembly by indigenous parliamentarians on behalf of the marchers, in October 2011. The law proposal put forth the definition of TIPNIS as 'intangible', and prohibits extractive and commercial activities that generate environmental liabilities, as well as settlements of outsiders, logging activities and the construction of the road. When the president passed Law 180 in October 2011, it was seen as a great victory by the marchers. However, in the following months, the implementation of the law caused conflicts and confusion. The special protection, the 'intangibility', embedded in the law, was applied to the entire TIPNIS territory, including additional restrictions on community areas, inspections, and the halting of local commercial projects (e.g. caiman hunting, logging and tourism). The enforcement of the 'intangible' article led to local dissatisfaction, and the government was blamed for making the situation worse for the locals (interviews with CIDOB, Santa Cruz, 2012; Guzman 2012). Local communities began to oppose the 'intangibility' in TIPNIS because of its negative impact, and the issue caused severe local divisions.

During the months after the enactment of the law, the protest movement became diffused into regional and local strategies. Parts of the lowland indigenous organisations engaged in local negotiations with the government (observations, Beni, March 2012; see section 2.6). In parallel, the government-allied organisation CONISUR launched a counter-march, supported by national peasant leaders (Contreras Baspineiro 2012; Guzman 2012). The CONISUR marchers demanded a consultation process to decide whether TIPNIS should remain ‘intangible’ or be opened up to ‘development’ projects, including the road. In February 2012, following negotiations between pro-road (‘pro-consultation’) activists and the government, Law 222, regarding the consultation of the indigenous peoples in TIPNIS, was enacted.⁶ The negotiation and swift resolution of the CONISUR demands demonstrates the peasant movements’ privileged access to the government, and the strategic selectivity of the groups’ interests (Jessop 2008). The enactment was seen as another attempt to enforce the government’s will and was in direct conflict with Law 180 to protect TIPNIS (interviews with CIDOB and TIPNIS Sub-central, February and March 2012; Guzman 2012). Whilst ‘intangibility’ entailed protection of their territories for some, for others, it was viewed as a threat to their livelihoods.

2.6. Regional negotiations and the ‘ecological road’

The following case is illustrative of the dynamic relations between government representatives and indigenous organisations, as well as the micro-politics of negotiations. The case also highlights how discursive framings had a powerful impact on the local understanding of the road-building project, and how the government attempted to reframe the project as the ‘ecological road’ (*carretera ecológica*) to address its critics and the protests.

In the months following the national negotiations in October 2011, the government was actively engaged in fulfilling the marchers’ demands, negotiating with local communities and implementing local development projects across the lowlands. One of these negotiations took place in March 2012, when the regional indigenous organisation of Beni (*Central de Pueblos Indígenas del Beni – CPIB*) met with government representatives, the Bolivian road authority (ABC) and the land registration office (INRA) in Trinidad, Beni. More than 200 indigenous representatives from 14 indigenous groups in Beni were present, including communities from TIPNIS (Sécure Subcentral). At the meeting, the government’s representatives presented advancements in addressing the 2011 marchers’ demands, including the status of local land claims and titling processes (presented by INRA; observations, Trinidad, March 2012), and discussed possible support for local production projects. At the same time, the road authorities presented the proposal of an ‘ecological road’, a road that according to the authorities would have low environmental impact, and be adapted to local ecosystems and the needs of the local communities. The authorities put considerable effort into convincing the indigenous representatives of the environmental protection measures that would be taken, although no technical studies had been undertaken to support this (interview with former Vice Minister of Environment, June 2012). Digital pictures were displayed on the meeting room walls, portraying road infrastructure traversing different landscapes, with elevated roads, bridges crossing forested areas, trees forming a tunnel over a road, and designs for natural animal trails over highways (observation, Trinidad, March 2012; copy of the ABC presentation, obtained 2012). The audience reacted with both curiosity and scepticism, as the following quotes illustrate:

⁶Ley 222 de Consulta de los Pueblos Indígenas del TIPNIS, 7 February 2012.

- 'How will you ensure that the colonos [migrant settlers] will not move into the area?'
- 'How will the road benefit communities that are distant from it?'
- 'How will you make the animals use the bridges?'
- 'How can this road help us to get better medical attention?'

A former indigenous leader from TIPNIS sub-central, working for a national NGO, raised his hand and said: 'We were never consulted in this process, and you have failed to take into account the environmental importance of this area'.

A woman from the Secure area of TIPNIS stood up and proclaimed: 'I am from TIPNIS, the definition of the park as "intangible" has punished us; we are not allowed to do anything there anymore: cut wood, catch crocodiles, or our small tourism projects. We want to be consulted about the TIPNIS law'.

At the back, one of the locals raised his voice: 'Our brothers and sisters in TIPNIS should decide for themselves what they want'.

These quotes illustrate the variety of local hopes and concerns. The government representatives gave assurances that the communities would be consulted about the road project, and Interior Minister Carlos Romero gave a compelling speech about the lowlands indigenous communities as 'pivotal actors in the process of change', referring to historic events such as the 1990 indigenous march, the land reform and the new constitution (observations, Trinidad, March 2012). The local communities presented a long wish list of local development projects to the minister. These demands were included in the final agreement between the government, the regional Beni government and the CPIB organisation (Ministry of Government 2012), and a sense of accomplishment was prevalent among the participants (observations, Trinidad, March 2012). At the same time, and despite the lack of consensus on these matters, the indigenous organisations' support for the coming consultation process and for an 'ecological road' was included in the agreement (Ministry of Government 2012). The following day, President Morales arrived, and the agreement was celebrated in public. At the event, the indigenous Beni leader Melba Hurtado called for the establishment of a new national lowlands indigenous organisation (observation, Trinidad, March 2012), excluding the TIPNIS protesters. The event marked a clear division in the lowlands indigenous movement, between those who negotiated with the government and those who continued to protest. Similar contractual agreements were made between the government and several regional indigenous organisations, which led to a loss of support for the 2012 TIPNIS march.⁷ Contracts were written, promising indigenous lowlands organisations' participation in future law-making and planning; land distribution and local projects (e.g. production, infrastructure) were initiated (Ministry of Government 2012; see Table 2). These negotiations caused divisions locally and nationally and led to claims that the government was attempting to divide the movement. Locally, however, regional leaders obtained support from parts of their communities. As a result, a range of projects were started in local communities across the lowlands. The agreements illustrate how a number of indigenous leaders across the lowlands took advantage of the leverage that had emerged in the TIPNIS conflict to create pressure to fulfil local and regional demands. The responses of local communities and indigenous groups are not given, but include different responses and contingent strategies, which are enmeshed in structures of power, market relations, institutions and property regimes (see also Wolford and Keene 2015).

⁷Contracts obtained by author between the government and the Chiquitano organisation (OICHE), the Guaranis (APG) and indigenous from north La Paz (CPILAP).

Table 2. Examples of contracts between the government and regional indigenous organisations.

Indigenous organisation	Examples of contracts made with the government
The indigenous organisation of Beni, CPIB (Central de Pueblos Indígenas de Beni) 19 April 2012	Fulfil all land claims from CPIB by the end of 2013 Refurnish CPIB headquarters and construct local headquarters Permission for tourism projects in TIPNIS Establish a regional secretary for indigenous development Guarantee an ecological road in TIPNIS
The indigenous organisation of North La Paz, CPILAP (Central de Pueblos Indígenas del Norte de La Paz) 26 February 2012	Forest management rights in former forest concessions within indigenous lands Formulate and reach consensus for a Law of Consultation Support from government programmes to projects Joint management of protected areas Telephone cabins and a vehicle
The Chiquitano organisation, OICHE (Organización Indígena Chiquitano) 31 March 2012	Remove third parties from indigenous lands Secure water for consumption and irrigation Justice for Chaparina 2011 Respect of indigenous institutions Health, education, communication, identity cards and housing projects

2.7. *Continued resistance and changing strategies*

In parallel to the negotiations, TIPNIS protestors continued to oppose the road-building and the government's attempts to convince the local communities of its benefits. The following illustrates how the protesters changed their strategy to respond to the government's acts. The TIPNIS road protesters answered the government strategy with yet another march in 2012 and changed their discursive framings to oppose the planned consultation process. However, the 'second' TIPNIS march gained less attention nationally and had lower representation from indigenous organisations, and there was little interaction with the government. As a result, the protesters returned to TIPNIS and started a campaign from within the area, using the landscape to resist the consultation process, which was begun in May 2012. Rivers were blocked with wires strung across them; and activists occupied landing strips, preventing planes with official delegations or government representatives from landing (interviews with local TIPNIS leaders, Trinidad, June 2012). Information was disseminated to encourage communities to resist participation in the consultation meetings, and leaflets were circulated claiming that the government would distribute indigenous lands to peasant communities (observation, Trinidad, June 2012).

Before and during the arrival of the official delegations, the government implemented a range of local projects in the TIPNIS area, including housing developments, small production projects, installation of telephone masts, and provision of food, kitchen utensils, school materials and boat motors (interview with ADEMAF, Trinidad, March 2012; interview with the Vice Minister of Environment, La Paz, June 2012). Fifteen official delegations were sent to TIPNIS to consult with 69 communities. Communal meetings were

organised by the officials, often in collaboration with community leaders. The official delegations provided information regarding Law 180 and the term ‘intangible’, the building of the ‘ecological road’, measures to protect the park and reduce illegal settlements (e.g. with military presence), and local development visions (OEP 2013); and they asked for the local communities’ opinions on all of the aforementioned issues. Finally, the community members attempted to form a consensus in each community for or against keeping the ‘intangibility’ of TIPNIS, and their conditions for accepting the road. The consultation process lasted until November 2012, and the results of the consultations were made public in January 2013 (OEP 2013). According to the report of the Supreme Election Tribunal (OEP 2013), 11 of the 69 communities rejected the consultations, all belonging to the TIPNIS Sub-central. All but one of the remaining communities stated that they wanted to annul Law 180 and the ‘intangibility’, because the law was seen as hindering local projects. Fifty-seven communities accepted the road, but demanded the assurance of an ‘ecological road’, smaller roads to benefit the communities, an environmental assessment and assurance that the government would design and discuss the route of the road with the local community leaders (Guarachi 2012; OEP 2013). The results demonstrate the power of the framings of the ‘ecological road’ and the ‘intangibility’ of TIPNIS, which convinced many of the locals to accept the road. However, whilst the communities presented a range of conditions for the road to be built, the government focused solely on a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to the road, in its official communication about the consultation results.

The consultation process was criticised by various bodies, such as the Joint Report of the Catholic Church, the Permanent Assembly for Human Rights in Bolivia (APDHB 2013) and the Bolivian ombudsman. The APDHB report criticised the official delegations for giving poor and biased information, and the consultation process for being neither ‘prior’ to the decision nor ‘free’, due to the government’s project implementation and lack of respect for the local indigenous organisations. The TIPNIS protesters argued that the government created divisions and pressured the locals into accepting the road, by offering to implement local projects and also by consulting with ‘false communities’, which according to them were small groups, presented as entire communities in the official reports (interview with TIPNIS leader, La Paz, September 2012).

The road-building remained paralysed from 2012. In 2013 the government launched a strategy to eradicate extreme poverty in TIPNIS (Rivas 2013). The TIPNIS movement slowly lost its collaborative force, as indigenous leaders chose different paths to advance local claims. Parts of the movement joined up with the lowland right-wing opposition in Beni,⁸ and others with the government; some became part of new political coalitions, such as the Global Greens; and yet others have attempted to advance their case at an international level.⁹ The different alliances and strategies in the conflict illustrate how the indigenous organisations involved have engaged cooperatively, pragmatically and at times in

⁸Parts of the TIPNIS movement participated in the local elections in Beni in 2013, but obtained only 2.4 percent of the vote (Rivas 2013). When offered a seat in the Benian government by a right-wing opposition party, the indigenous representative, Pedro Nuni, accepted (*La Razon* 2013).

⁹An international campaign is ongoing to file the case of Chaparina with the Inter-American Human Rights Commission. In collaboration with the Global Greens, the TIPNIS leader, Fernando Vargas, ran as a presidential candidate in 2014. In the election, CIDOB proclaimed their independence from political parties. The Green Party obtained 2.7 percent, which was not sufficient (three percent) to gain representation in the Pluri-National Assembly (TSE 2014).

contradiction, in flexible and shifting coalitions with changing contingent strategies (de Certeau 1984; Hinderey 2013).

3. Conclusion

This contribution illustrates the power of discursive framings to shape which identities and groups, interests and demands are included and advanced in socio-environmental conflicts. The examples presented reflect struggles over meaning in the TIPNIS conflict, and the power that lies in the institutionalisation of certain concepts, which are used to advance specific interests and positions. I demonstrate how discursive framings and narratives have affected different stages of the conflict and its outcomes, such as the case of ‘intangibility’ and the ‘ecological road’, and how simplified or stereotypical narratives concerning local conditions in TIPNIS have led to the exclusion of important topics from the agenda. The conflict illustrates how the local communities and indigenous organisations were subject to a range of different pressures and interests, both internally and externally, which led them in the different directions of resistance and contestation, accommodation and agreement.

By focusing on micro-political relations, such as the interactions between indigenous organisations and the government, I have revealed a complexity of interests and strategies in the conflict. Furthermore, I have examined the conflict within the larger context of what I term ‘state projects’, and demonstrated how the strategic selectivity of certain state–society alliances affected the conflict, including the hegemonic position of the joint projects for strengthening national integration and the redistribution initiatives. The mapping of the movements and actors across state–society boundaries reveals the strategic selectivities of the government, and the practices that privilege particular social forces, interests and actors over others. Because of its political inclinations, the current government administration is more permeable to certain social forces than others, as the case of the peasants illustrates, offering structural privileges to some, but not all. Particular hegemonic projects have been constructed and supported, whilst other projects lose, such as the case of environmental protection and the protection of indigenous territories. The case of the TIPNIS conflict shows that environmental protection has not gained proper momentum in Bolivia. There are great challenges to achieving fair governance of indigenous territories and protected areas which are in strategic locations or which contain strategic resources.

Recent events in Bolivia indicate that the government is moving forward with the road-building in TIPNIS. In August 2017, the government declared that the road will be built, and Law 266 for development in TIPNIS was approved by Bolivia’s Senate, removing the status of intangibility. Since the victory of MAS in the national election in 2014, there has been a continued focus on developmental and extraction policies, along with a focus on national integration and redistributive policies. As an example, Supreme Decree 2366 from 2015 authorises the exploration and exploitation of oil and gas resources in national parks. The decree states specifically that extractions in protected areas will be designated to fight extreme poverty in local communities (Decreto Supremo 2366, art. 1). In TIPNIS, 10 schools and three health centres have been built. It remains to be seen whether the proposal for an ‘ecological road’, which will require substantial technical and environmental assessments, represents a sustainable and viable option or only a rhetorical strategy, risking grave consequences for ecosystems and livelihoods.

Acknowledgements

This work was supported by the Norwegian Research Council (grant number 204110). I am grateful to my supervisors, Associate Professor Mariel Aguilar-Støen and Professor John Andrew McNeish, for valuable discussions, inputs and support; two anonymous reviewers and Editor-in-Chief Saturnino M. ('Jun') Borrás Jr for their constructive comments; David Vasquez for support and valuable discussions; and all the organisations and informants in Bolivia who have contributed to this study.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Funding

This work was supported by the Research Council of Norway, under grant number 204110. The research council has not had any involvement in the design, collection, analysis or interpretation of data, nor writing the report and not in the decision to submit the paper for publication.

References

- APDHB. 2013. *Bolivia: Informe de Verificación de la Consulta Realizada en el Territorio Indígena Parque Nacional Isiboro-Sécure La Paz*. Asamblea Permanente de los Derechos Humanos de Bolivia. <http://fidh.org/IMG/pdf/bolivia609esp2013.pdf> (accessed July 28, 2016).
- Bebbington, D.H. 2013. Extraction, inequality and indigenous peoples: Insights from Bolivia. *Environmental Science & Policy* 33: 438–46.
- Bebbington, A., and J. Bury. 2013. *Subterranean struggles. New dynamics of mining, oil, and gas in Latin America*. Austin: University of Texas press.
- Benford, R.D., and D.A. Snow. 2000. Framing processes and social movements: An overview and assessment. *Annual Review of Sociology* 26: 611–39.
- Blom Hansen, T., and F. Stepputat. 2001. *States of imagination. Ethnographic exploration of the post-colonial state*. Durham: Duke University Press.
- Bolivian State. 1996. Ley de Servicio Nacional de reforma agraria. Ley N° 1715 de 18 de octubre de 1996.
- Burawoy, M. 2000. *Global ethnography: Forces, connections, and imaginations in a postmodern world*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Canessa, A. 2012. Conflict, claim and contradiction in the new indigenous state of Bolivia. *Working Paper Series* 22. Berlin: Research Network on Interdependent Inequalities in Latin America.
- CIDOB. 2011. *Resolución de la III Comisión Nacional 2011*. Trinidad: Bolivia La Confederación de Pueblos Indígenas de Bolivia.
- CIDOB. 2012. *VIII marcha indígena: La defensa del Tipnis unió a toda Bolivia. Bolivia plurinacional. Año 3/No.4. Marzo 2012*. Santa Cruz: CIDOB.
- Contreras Baspineiro, A. 2012. *Coraje, memorias de la octava marcha indígena por la defensa del TIPNIS*. La Paz: Industria Grafica. "J.V." Editora.
- CPEPB. 2009. *Constitución Política del Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia*. Sucre: Constituent Assembly.
- de Certeau, M. 1984. *The practice of everyday life*. Trans. S.F Rendall. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- ECLAC. 2015. Social Panorama of Latin America. *Briefing paper*. Social Development Division and the Statistics Division of the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean.
- Fabricant, N. 2012. *Mobilizing Bolivia's displaced: Indigenous politics and the struggle over land*. Durham: The University of North Carolina Press.
- Fabricant, N., and N. Postero. 2013. Performing the 'wounded Indian': A new platform of democracy and human rights in Bolivia's autonomy movement. *Identities* 21 no. 4: 395–411.
- Fontana, L.B. 2014. Indigenous peoples vs peasant unions: Land conflicts and rural movements in pluri-national Bolivia. *The Journal of Peasant Studies* 41, no. 3: 297–319.
- Forsyth, T. 2003. *Critical political ecology: The politics of environmental science*. London: Routledge.

- Fundación Tierra. 2012. *La marcha indígena por el TIPNIS. La lucha en defensa de los territorios*. La Paz: Fundación Tierra.
- Garcés, F. 2011. The domestication of indigenous autonomies in Bolivia: From the pact of unity to the new constitution. In *Remapping Bolivia, resources, territory, and indigeneity in a plurinational state*, ed. N. Fabricant and B. Gustafson, 46–67. Santa Fe: School for Advanced Research.
- García Linera, A. 2013. *Geopolitics of the Amazon. Patrimonial-Hacendado power and capitalist accumulation*. La Paz: Vicepresidencia del Estado Plurinacional. Presidencia de la Asamblea Legislativa Plurinacional.
- Gaventa, J. 2006. Finding the spaces for change: A power analysis. *Development in Practice* 3, no. 6: 23–33.
- Gotkowitz, L. 2007. *A revolution for our rights: Indigenous struggles for land and justice in Bolivia, 1880-1952*. Durham: Duke University Press.
- Government of Bolivia. 2006. The National Development Plan 2006–2011. *Plan de desarrollo nacional. Bolivia Digna, Soberana, Productiva y democrática para vivir bien*. La Paz: Bolivia.
- Guarachi, A. 2012. En el Tipnis 55 comunidades apoyan vía por el parque; el Gobierno anuncia construir una carretera ecológica. *La Razón Digital*. http://www.la-razon.com/index.php?url=/nacional/Tipnis-comunidades-Gobierno-construir-carretera_0_1738026274.html (accessed June 30, 2016).
- Guzman, I. 2012. *VIII marcha Indígena en Bolivia. Por la defensa del territorio, la vida y los derechos de los pueblos indígenas*. La Paz: CIPCA.
- Haarstad, H. 2012. Extracting justice? Critical themes and challenges in Latin American natural resource governance. In *New political spaces in Latin American natural resource governance*, ed. H. Haarstad, 1–16. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Hajer, M. 1995. *The politics of environmental discourse*. Oxford: Clarendon.
- Hayward, C.R. 2000. *De-facing power*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hindery, D. 2013. *From Enron to Evo pipeline politics, global environmentalism, and indigenous rights in Bolivia*. Series: First peoples: New directions in indigenous studies. Tucson: University of Arizona Press.
- Horowitz, L.S. 2015. Local environment knowledge. In *The Routledge handbook of political ecology*, ed. T. Perreault, G. Bridge, and J. McCarthy, 235–48. London: Routledge.
- INE. 2001. Bolivia - características de población y vivienda. *Censo Nacional de Población y Vivienda*. La Paz: Instituto Nacional de Estadística.
- Jessop, B. 2008. *State power: A strategic-relational approach*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Laing, A.F. 2015. Resource sovereignties in Bolivia: Re-conceptualising the relationship between indigenous identities and the environment during the TIPNIS conflict. *Bulletin of Latin American Research* 34, no. 2: 149–66.
- Lalander, R. 2014. Rights of nature and the indigenous peoples in Bolivia and Ecuador: A straitjacket for progressive development politics? *Revista iberoamericana de estudios de desarrollo / Ibero-American Journal of Development Studies* 3, no. 2: 148–73.
- La Razon*. 2012. Presidente crea regimiento ecológico "Juan Maraza" en el TIPNIS. 2012. *La Razon*, August 29. http://www.la-razon.com/nacional/seguridad_nacional/Presidente-regimiento-Juan-Marzana-TIPNIS_0_1678032256.html (accessed May 10, 2017).
- La Razon*. 2013. Gobernador electo de Beni confirma que Pedro Nuni aceptó Subgobernación en el TIPNIS. *La Razon*, February 6. http://www.la-razon.com/nacional/Gobernador-Beni-Pedro-Subgobernacion-TIPNIS_0_1774622583.html (accessed May 10, 2017).
- Li, T.M. 2004. Environment, indigeneity and transnationalism. In *Liberation ecologies: Environment, development, social movements*. 2nd ed., ed. R. Peet and M. Watts, 339–70. London: Routledge.
- Li, F. 2015. *Unearthing conflict: Corporate mining, activism, and expertise in Peru*. Durham: Duke University Press.
- Lupien, P. 2013. The Media in Venezuela and Bolivia attacking the 'bad left' from below. *Latin American Perspectives* 40, no. 3: 226–46.
- Marcus, G.E. 1997. Ethnography in/of the world system: The emergence of multi-sited ethnography. *Annual Review of Anthropology* 24: 95–117.
- McNeish, J.-A. 2008. Constitutionalism in an insurgent state: Rethinking legal empowerment of the poor in a divided Bolivia rights and legal empowerment. In *Eradicating poverty*, ed. D. Banik, 69–96. Farnham: Ashgate.
- McNeish, J.-A. 2011. Rethinking Resource Conflict. *Background Paper for the World Development Report 2011*. World Bank, Washington.

- McNeish, J.-A. 2013. Extraction, protest and indigeneity in Bolivia: The TIPNIS effect. *Latin American and Caribbean Ethnic Studies* 8, no. 2: 221–42.
- Ministry of Government. 2012. Convenio Tripartito Marco Programático y político entre el gobierno nacional, el gobierno autónomo de Beni y la Central de Pueblos Indígenas del Beni – CPIB. Ministerio de Gobierno. Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia.
- Molina, P. 2013. Sobre la Geopolítica Vicepresidencial, el TIPNIS y el IIRSA. Fobomade. <http://www.fobomade.org.bo/art-1943> (accessed July 18, 2016).
- Morales, W.Q. 2013. The TIPNIS crisis and the meaning of Bolivian democracy under evo morales”. *The Latin Americanist* 57, no. 1: 79–90.
- Morales, M., V. Gianotten, M. Devisscher, and D. Pacheco. 2013. *Hablemos de tierra. Minifundio, gestión territorial, bosques e impuesto agrario en Bolivia*. La Paz: Plural Editores.
- OEP. 2013. *Informe de observación y acompañamiento de la consulta, previa, libre e informada a los pueblos indígenas del territorio indígena y parque nacional isiboro secure (TIPNIS)*. Órgano electoral plurinacional. Tribunal supremo electoral.
- Peet, R., and M. Watts, eds. 2004. *Liberation ecologies: Environment, development, social movements*. 2nd ed. London: Routledge.
- Perreault, T. 2008. Natural Gas, Indigenous Mobilization, and the Bolivian State. Identities, Conflict and Cohesion Programme United Nations Research Institute for Social Development: 27.
- Perreault, T., G. Bridge, and J. McCarthy, eds. 2015. *The Routledge handbook of political ecology*. London: Routledge.
- PIEB. 2003. *Comité Cívico pro-Santa Cruz. Grupos de poder y liderazgo regional; análisis sociopolítico y cultural, 1980-2000*. La Paz: Fundación PIEB.
- Postero, N.G. 2007. Now we are citizens: Indigenous politics in postmulticultural Bolivia. *PoLAR: Political and Legal Anthropology Review* 32, no. 2: 343–46.
- Reyes-García, V., J. Paneque-Gálvez, P. Bottazzi, A.C. Luz, M. Gueze, M.J. Macía, M. Orta-Martínez, and P. Pacheco. 2014. Indigenous land reconfiguration and fragmented institutions: A historical political ecology of Tsimane’ lands (Bolivian Amazon). *Journal of Rural Studies* 34, no. 0: 282–91.
- Rivas, M. 2013. Ofrece erradicar en 3 años la pobreza extrema en el TIPNIS. *La Razon*. 23 de enero de 2013. http://www.la-razon.com/nacional/Ofrece-erradicar-pobreza-extrema-TIPNIS_0_1766223365.html (accessed July 27, 2016).
- Robbins, P. 2011. *Political ecology: A critical introduction*. New York: Wiley.
- Sanchez-Lopez, D. 2015. Reshaping notions of citizenship: The TIPNIS indigenous movement in Bolivia. *Development Studies Research* 2, no. 1: 20–32.
- Schilling-Vacaflor, A. 2010. Bolivia’s new constitution: Towards participatory democracy and political pluralism? GIGA Working Paper GIGA. No. 141.
- SERNAP – Rumbol. 2011. Evaluación Ambiental Estratégica del TIPNIS – EAE [Online]. http://www.cambioclimatico.org.bo/derechosmt/092011/280911_1.pdf (accessed September 15, 2016).
- Snow, D.A. 2012. Framing and social movements. In *The Wiley-Blackwell encyclopedia of social and political movements*, ed. D.A. Snow, D. della Porta, B. Klandermans, and D. McAdam, 470–5. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.
- Snow, D.A., E.B. Rochford, S.K. Worden, and R.D. Benford. 1986. Frame alignment processes, micromobilization, and movement participation. *American Sociological Review* 51: 464–81.
- TSE. 2014. Tribunal Supremo Electoral. <http://www.oep.org.bo/index.php/procesos-electorales/elecciones-generales-2014> (accessed July 6, 2016).
- Turner, M.D. 2004. Political ecology and the moral dimension of resource conflicts: The case of farmer-herder conflicts in the Sahel. *Political Geography* 23: 863–89.
- Ulloa, A. 2015. Environment and development. Reflections from Latin America. In *The Routledge handbook of political ecology*, ed. T. Perreault, G. Bridge, and J. McCarthy, 320–31. London: Routledge.
- Vargas Rios, M.T., N. Garzon Rivero, E. Osinaga Rico, and R. Müller. 2012. *Compensación por servicios ambientales de carbono. Una alternativa para reducir la deforestación en el TIPNIS*. Fundación PIEB / Fundación NATURA Bolivia / Embajada de Dinamarca.
- Wolford, W., and S. Keene. 2015. Social movements. In *The Routledge handbook of political ecology*, ed. T. Perreault, G. Bridge, and J. McCarthy, 573–84. London: Routledge.
- Yeh, E.T., and J. Bryan. 2015. Indigeneity. In *The Routledge handbook of political ecology*, ed. T. Perreault, G. Bridge, and J. McCarthy, 531–44. London: Routledge.

Zimmerer, K.S. 2015. Environmental governance through “Speaking like an Indigenous State” and respatializing resources: Ethical livelihood concepts in Bolivia as versatility or verisimilitude? *Geoforum; Journal of Physical, Human, and Regional Geosciences* 64: 314–24.

Cecilie Hirsch is a PhD candidate at the Faculty of Landscape and Society, at the Norwegian University of Life Sciences, and a PhD fellow at the Centre for Development and the Environment, University of Oslo. She works on issues such as environmental governance, environmental conflicts, indigenous peoples, social movements, hydropower development, climate change and forests policies in Latin America, using a political ecology approach. Email: cecilhi@sum.uio.no

Appendices

Appendices

Appendix 1: List of selected interviews

Date	Name	Rec	Organisation and role (ref. Acronyms and Organisations)	M/ F	Place	Comment
12.07.11	Paulino Guarachi Huanca	No	Researcher, Fundación Tierra/Land	M	La Paz	One interview
13.07.11	Javier Gomez	Yes	Director, CIPCA	M	La Paz	One interview Contact over mail
14.07.11	Juan Pablo Ramos	Yes	Researcher, University of Cordillera, Former Vice Minister Environment and Biodiversity	M	La Paz	Two interviews, workshop
15.07.11	Diego Pacheco	Yes	Researcher, University of Cordillera, Advisor, MFA, and Coordinator of The Joint Mechanism	M	La Paz	Two interviews, workshop
15.07.11	Ricardo Calla	Yes	Rector, University of Cordillera	M	La Paz	Several conversations, contact over e-mail
15.07.11	Eduardo Forno	Yes	Director, Conservation International	M	La Paz	One interview
15.07.11 31.08.11 30.04.12	Karen King Nach Arleth	No	Program analyst, United Nations Development Programme	F	La Paz	Three interviews, and contact over e-mail.
18.07.11 03.05.12 07.09.12	Walter Arteaga	No	Researcher, CEDLA	M	La Paz	Three interviews and contact over e-mail.
20.07.11	Emilia Varela	Yes	Coordinator, University of Cordillera	F	La Paz	One interview
20.07.11	Marcus Nordgren	Yes	Advisor, CIPCA La Paz, CIPCA Riberalta	M	La Paz	Two interviews
20.07.11	Jenny Gruenberger Pérez	Yes	Director, Lidema	F	La Paz	One interview
20.07.11	Carlos Fuentes Lopez	Yes	Advisor, National Climate Change Program, Ministry of Environment and Water.	M	La Paz	Two interviews, contact over e-mail.
04.05.12		No				
21.07.11 05.09.12	Trond Augdal	No	Norwegian state representative in La Paz, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs	M	La Paz	Two conversations
21.07.11	Luis Arteaga	No	Chief of Wildlife, Ministry of Environment and Water	M	La Paz	One interview.
26.07.11	Nataly Ascarrunz	Yes	Director, The Bolivian Forest Research Institute	F	Santa Cruz	One interview
28.07.11	Alcides Valdillo	Yes	Director regional office Santa Cruz, Land (Tierra)	M	Santa Cruz	Two interviews

Appendices

15.08.11 17.08.11	Pedro Nuni	Yes	Indigenous Parliamentarian – Plurinational Legislative Assembly	M	Trinidad	Several short interviews
15.08.11	Community repr.	Yes	APG	M	Trinidad	One interview
15.08.11	Community repr.	Yes	CPMB	F	Trinidad	One interview
15.08.11	Community repr.	Yes	Conamaq	M	Trinidad	One interview
15.08.11	Justa Cabrera	Yes	CNAMIB	F	Trinidad	One interview
15.08.11	Inocencio	Yes	Asambleista Indigena Beni	M	Trinidad	One interview
15.08.11	Community repr.	Yes	CPIOAP	M	Trinidad	One interview
15.08.11	Community repr.	Yes	CANOA	M	Trinidad	One interview
15.08.11	Community repr.	Yes	APG	M	Trinidad	One interview
16.08.11	Community repr.	Yes	APG	M	March, Trinidad - SIM	One interview
17.08.11	Community repr.	Yes	OICHE	M	March Trinidad- SIM	One interview
17.08.11	Community repr.	Yes	CIRABO	M	March Trinidad- SIM	One interview
21.08.11	Aniceto Ayala Lopez	Yes	Secretary of Climate Change, CIDOB	M	San Ignacio de Moxos	One interview
21.08.11	Jose Ortiz	Yes	CPILAP	M	San Ignacio de Moxos	One interview
21.08.11	Judith Rivero	Yes	CNAMIB	F	San Ignacio de Moxos	In TIPNIS march
24.08.11	Employee	Yes	FAN	M	Santa Cruz	Several conversations
24.08.11	Rolando Vargas	No	Advisor and secretary, AFIN	M	Santa Cruz	Various conversations, contact over mail
03.08.12						
10.12.12						
11.12.12						
26.08.11	Xavier Claros	No	SERNAP	M	La Paz	One interview
27.08.11	Celso Padillo	Yes	APG, president	M	March SIM - San Borja	One interview
28.08.11	Community repr.	Yes	CIDOB	F	March SIM - San Borja	One interview

Appendices

28.08.11	Employee	Yes	SERNAP		M	Marcuh SIM - San Borja	One interview
28.08.11	Employee	Yes	CIPCA		M	Marcuh SIM - San Borja	One interview
29.08.11	Rafael Quispe	Yes	Former president, Conamaq		M	Marcuh SIM - San Borja	One interview
30.08.11	Lykke Andersen	Yes	Scientific Manager, Conservación Internacional Bolivia		F	La Paz	Several conversations
31.08.11	Carlos Fuentes Lopez	No	Responsible for Forest and Climate Change programme, PNCC		M	La Paz	One interview
31.08.11	Juan Carlos Alurralde	Yes	Vice chancellor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs		M	La Paz	One interview
31.08.11	Carla Ledesma	Yes	MFA		F	La Paz	One interview
16.04.12	Community repr.	No	CNAMIB, several representatives		F	Trinidad	Several small
17.04.12	Community repr.	No	CNAMIB, several representatives		F	Trinidad	Several small
17.04.12	Community repr.	No	CMIB, several representatives		M	Trinidad	Several small
17.04.12	Community repr.	No	CPIB, several representatives		M	Trinidad	Several small
18.04.12	Community repr.	No	Subcentral Secure		M	Trinidad	Several small
18.04.12	Community repr.	No	CPIB, several representatives		M	Trinidad	Several small
25.04.12	Community repr.	No	CPMB		M	Trinidad	Several small
26.04.12	Director Trinidad	Yes	ABT		M	Trinidad	One interview
27.04.12	Employee	No	CIPCA, advisor		M	Trinidad	Several conversations
27.04.12	Employee	No	CIDOB, advisor		M	Trinidad	One conversation
28.04.12	Employee	No	CIPCA, advisor		M	Trinidad	Several conversations
09.05.12	Walter Limache	Yes	NINA		M	La Paz	Several conversations
09.05.12	Member of directory	Yes	CSUTCb		M	La Paz	One interview
26.06.12	Forest community repr.	No	AFIN, local representatives		M	Tumupasa	Several small
27.06.12	Forest community repr.	No	AFIN, local representatives		M	Tumupasa	Several small
28.06.12	Forest community repr.	No	AFIN, local representatives		M	Tumupasa	Several small
10.08.12	Community repr.	No	Interviews, AFIN		M	Guarayos	Several small
11.08.12	Community repr.	No	Interviews, AFIN		M	Guarayos	Several small
11.08.12	Community repr.	No	Interviews, COPNAG		M	Guarayos	Several small
11.08.12	Community repr.	No	Interview, COPNAG – women		F	Guarayos	Several small

Appendices

12.08.12	Employee	Yes	Advisor, PUMA CONFOR		M	Guarayos, SC	One interview
13.08.12	Employee	Yes	ADEMAF, local representative Trinidad		M	Trinidad	One interview and sharing of documents
27.08.12	Community rep.	Yes	CSCIB		M	Cochabamba	One interview
28.08.12	Forest ingénieur	Yes	ABT		M	Santa Cruz	One interview
29.08.12	Member of directory	Yes	Directory, CIDOB (parallel)		M	Santa Cruz	One interview
29.08.12	Melba Hurtado	Yes	President, CIDOB (parallel)		F	Santa Cruz	One interview
29.08.12	Employee	Yes	ABT, inspections of forest concessions		M	Santa Cruz	One interview
31.08.12	Employee	Yes	ABT employee		F	Santa Cruz	One interview
31.08.12	Employee	Yes	ABT employee		M	Santa Cruz	One interview
01.09.12	Member of directory	Yes	Subcentral de TIPNIS		F	Trinidad	One interview
01.09.12	Community rep.	Yes	TIPNIS Subcentral		M	Trinidad	One interview
17.02.12	Hanne Krogstadmo	No	Advisor, Regnskogsfondet, Rainforest		F	Oslo	Two meetings, mail contact
27.09.12							
15.04.12	Alejandra Moreira	No	MFA		F	La Paz	One interview
20.04.12	Ceadesc	No	Advisor		M	Cochabamba	One interview
22.04.12	Community rep.	No	CIRABO		M	Riberalta	Various conversations
30.04.12	Jaime Villanueva	No	COSUT		M	La Paz	Various conversations
08.05.12	Natalia Calderon	No	FAN		F	Trinidad	One interview
08.05.12	Juan Lira	No	President, AFIN		M	Santa Cruz	Various conversations
24.07.12							
20.07.12	Pavel Campero	No	Director of Forestry, Ministry of Environment		M	La Paz	Various conversations and contact over mail
17.08.12	Community rep.	No	CIRABO			Riberalta	Several conversations
18.08.12	Employee	No	ABT Riberalta		M	Riberalta	One interview
19.08.12	Employee	No	Fan Riberalta		M	Riberalta	Several conversations
20.08.12	Oscar Balderas	No	CEJIS Riberalta		M	Riberalta	One interview, and conversations

Appendices

28.08.12	José Luis Laguna	No	ABT, advisor	M	Santa Cruz	Various conversations and contact over mail
02.09.12	Eva Ohlsson	No	Swedish embassy section	F	La Paz	One conversation
02.08.12	José Luis Osinaga	No	ABT	M	Santa Cruz	One interview
06.08.12	Jurgen Czerwenka	No	SERNAP	M	La Paz	One conversation
15.08.12	Armelinda Zonta	No	IPHAE Riberalta	F	Riberalta	One interview
27.08.12	Community rep.	No	Small interviews with Bartolina Sisa, CSUTCB and CSCIB	M F	Cochabamba	Several small
30.08.12	Employee	No	ABT personnel, inspections of TCO	M	Chiquitania	Conversation during the day
01.09.12	Employee	No	ABT personnel, regional office, Cobija		Cobija, Pando	
20.01.13	Nele Marien	No	Consultant	F	La Paz	One interview Workshop
27.01.13	Janette Maldonado	No	Director Forest School (ESFOR, UMSS)	F	Cochabamba	One conversation. Workshop
27.01.13	Doris Villarpando	No	Former bureaucrat in the Ministry of Environment		La Paz	One interview and workshop
27.01.13	Eric Arias	No	Former bureaucrat in the Ministry of Environment	M	Cochabamba	One interview

Appendices

Appendix 2 Observations and Participation in Bolivia 2011-2012

Field-work	Date	Event	Organisers	Location
1	July 19, 2011	Seminar on indigenous autonomy	Fundación Tierra	Santa Cruz
1	July 20, 2011	Seminar on indigenous autonomy, continued	Fundación Tierra	Santa Cruz
1	July 26, 2011	REDD seminar	Consultants	Santa Cruz
1	August 11, 2011	TIPNIS solidarity seminar	FOBOMADE	La Paz
1	August 15-21, 2011	TIPNIS march	CIDOB and Conamaq	Trinidad- San Ignacio de Moxos
1	August 19, 2011	Open meeting with two government ministers about the TIPNIS march	Bolivian government	San Ignacio de Moxos
1	August 26-28, 2011	TIPNIS march	CIDOB and Conamaq	San Borja
2	April 12, 2012	Expert meeting about indigenous rights and TIPNIS, including representatives from the Defense of the People and United Nations	Defensa del Pueblo	La Paz
2	April 14, 2012	Preparation meeting with CIDOB, before Rio+20	University of Cordillera	Santa Cruz
2	April 16-17, 2012	CNAMIB national meeting in Beni, evaluation of the first TIPNIS march and possible negotiations with the government	CMIB	Trinidad
2	April 17-19, 2012	CPIB national meeting with preparations and meeting with government and public officials regarding CPIB's demands to the government and the TIPNIS conflict	CPIB and the Bolivian government	Trinidad
2	April 19, 2012	Presentation of the agreement between the Bolivian government and the Department of Beni, with CPIB	CPIB and the Bolivian government	Trinidad
2	April 25, 2012	Meeting at CPBM headquarters and with the TIPNIS subcentral about the forthcoming and second TIPNIS march	CPMB and TIPNIS subcentral	Trinidad
2	April 27, 2012	Second TIPNIS march	CIDOB and Conamaq	Trinidad, San Ignacio de Moxos
2	May 9-10, 2012	Conference on issues about the Bolivian Amazon, Foro Amazónico	Foro Amazónico	La Paz

Appendices

2	June 26-28, 2012	National workshop for the regional indigenous forest organisations	AFIN and Caritas	Tumupasa
2	July 30, 2012	Meeting between CSCIB (migrant peasants), PNCC, the forest directory and Vice-presidency where the peasants presented their proposal and inputs for a forest law	The Vice-Presidency	La Paz
2	August 2, 2012	Team meeting for developing the Joint Mechanism for Mitigation and Adaptation and Sustainable Management of Forests and Mother Earth.	Diego Pacheco, government advisor and researcher at University of Cordillera	Santa Cruz
2	August 8, 2012	Meeting to evaluate the CIPCA proposal for a new forest law	CIPCA	Santa Cruz
2	August 27, 2012	Meeting about land rights and territory with the peasant organisations Bartolina Sisa, CSUTCB and CSCIB	CIPCA	Cochabamba
2	August 30, 2012	Forest management inspection of indigenous communal land in Chiquitania	ABT	Concepción, Santa Cruz

Appendices

Appendix 3 Research Assistants and Key Informants

Research assistants and key informants	Main topic	Type of assistance/collaboration
Research Assistant 1	TIPNIS conflict	Collection of information about the TIPNIS conflict (September 2011–April 2012)
Research Assistant 2	State forest governance, forest law	Collection of information about state legislation and regulations (September 2012)
Jaime Villanueva, former Forest director in the Ministry of Water and Environment University of Cordillera	Forest governance, forest management systems, forest policies, forest ecology	Collection of information about that which formed the forest policies during 2006–2010, and various internal processes in the Ministry of Water and the Environment
	Relationship between state and civil society, TIPNIS conflict, REDD in Bolivia	Help with the organisation of interviews with government consultants, the UNDP office and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
AFIN	Community based forestry, indigenous communities	Development of questionnaires for community based organisations and joint workshops with local forest organisations; joint travels to forest communities in Guarayos (Santa Cruz) and Tumupasa (La Paz)
NINA Programme	Peasant and indigenous organisations, local community organisation	Facilitation of the organisation of four workshops
FAN	Community based forestry	Collection of information about community forestry in Riberalta, joint visits to communities in Riberalta
CIPCA offices in La Paz, Santa Cruz, Trinidad, San Ignacio de Moxos and Riberalta	Peasant and indigenous organisations, TIPNIS march, new forest law	Sharing of information about the TIPNIS march Indigenous and peasant inputs to a new forest law
CEJIS	Indigenous rights	Sharing of information about the TIPNIS march and demands of indigenous organisations
Lykke Andersen	Climate and REDD policies in Bolivia	Sharing of information and discussions about forest and climate policies

Appendix 4

Program Workshop New Forest Law, REDD and Alternative Mechanism

**PROGRAMA
MESA DE TRABAJO
LA NUEVA LEY DE BOSQUE EN BOLIVIA E INICIATIVAS PARA EL MANEJO
INTEGRAL Y SUSTENTABLE DE BOSQUE**

Lugar: UNITAS

Calle Luis Crespo # 2532, entre Calle Rosendo Gutierrez y Plaza Andrew, Zona de Sopocachi
Jueves 6 de septiembre 08.30-16.00

15-20 minutos para cada presentación, con 5 minutos de preguntas de aclaración. Después de todas las presentaciones compartimos insumos, experiencias y comentarios.

HORA	TITULO	RESPONSABLE
08:30-08:45	Bienvenida, introducción y ronda de presentación de participantes	Cecilie Hirsch, Candidata PHD, Centro de Desarrollo y del Medio Ambiente (SUM), Universidad de Oslo
08:45-09:10	A 16 años de la Ley Forestal 1700	Jaime Villanueva, FUNDESNAP
09:10-09:35	Tenencia territorial y de bosques con perspectiva de género, incidencia en los procesos de gobernanza forestal en el contexto amazónico	Kiyomi Nagumo, Instituto Para la Humanidad, la Agricultura y Ecología (IPHAE)
09:35-10:00	Propuestas de las Organizaciones Forestales Comunitarias para la nueva ley forestal	Juan Lira, presidente de la Asociación Forestal Indígena Nacional (AFIN)
10:00-10:25	Propuesta para la nueva ley de bosque (Obs.: en proceso de trabajo)	Ricardo Rojas, CIPCA
10:25-10:50	Mitigación y Adaptación	Emilio Garzia Apaza, PHD, Instituto de Investigaciones Agronómicas, Ambientales y del Cambio Climático
10:50-11:15	Mecanismos de Reducción de Deforestación	Lykke Andersen, directora Center for Environmental-Economic Modeling and Analysis (CEEMA), Institute for Advanced Development Studies (INESAD)
11:15-11:30	Refrigerio	
11:30-13:00	Ronda de insumos, comentarios y debate	Moderador: Cecilie Hirsch
13:00-14:30	Almuerzo	
14:30-16:00	Reunión de estrategia - De aquí a dónde? Como crear sinergias y alianzas para un nuevo régimen forestal equitativa y sustentable	Todos los actores interesados

Program Workshop 5

Estimad@os tod@s

Les invitamos todos para el taller sobre la Ley de Apoyo a la Producción de Alimentos y Restitución de Bosques el día mañana viernes 25 de enero para seguir con el tema de Bosque y Manejo Integral.

El taller empieza a las 14.30 y dura hasta ca. 17.30

El taller se llevará a cabo en UNITAS en la Ciudad de La Paz en Calle Luis Crespo # 2532, entre Calle Rosendo Gutierrez y Plaza Andrew, Zona de Sopocachi.

AGENDA

1. Noticias sobre políticas de Bosque:
 - El taller nacional del Mecanismo de Mitigacion y Adaptacion (Septiembre 2012)
 - El Mecanismo y COP 18 en Doha
 - Avances sobre la Ley de Bosque e incidencias
 - Resumen de la conferencia de ESFOR (por confirmar)
 - Alianzas e iniciativas interesantes para avanzar con el Manejo Integral de Bosque
2. Análisis de la Ley de Apoyo a la Producción de Alimentos y Restitución de Bosques
3. Trabajo conjunto en adelante

Appendix 5: Errata

Errata list

PhD candidate: Cecilie Karina von Hirsch

Thesis: Contentious Forests: From Global Climate Change Policies to Bolivian Forest Communities

Date: 21.10.19

Sid e	Line	Original text	Corrected text
vi	145	Aguilar Støen	Aguilar-Støen
vi	150	Aguilar Støen	Aguilar-Støen
vi	163	(2017) Between	(2017). Between
vi	169	List of selected interviews	List of Selected Interviews
vi	172	Workshop programs	Workshop Programs
xii	340	Assembly of the Guaraní Peoples	Assembly of the Guaraní People
xii	340	Asociación Forestal de Indígenas Nacional	Asociación Forestal Indígena Nacional
xii	340	Central Indígena de la Pueblos Originarios Amazónicos de Pando	Central de Pueblos Indígenas Originarios de la Amazonía de Pando
xiii	340	(of Intercultural Communities of Bolivia)	(Confederation of Intercultural Communities of Bolivia)
xiii	340	Extended case methodology	Extended Case Methodology
xiii	340	El Fondo Nacional de Desarrollo Forestal	El Fondo Nacional de Desarrollo Forestal (National Forest Development Fund)
xiii	340	Greenhouse gas	Greenhouse Gas
xiii	340	(Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit,)	(Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit)
xiii	340	Genetically modified organisms	Genetically Modified Organisms
xiv	340	(Ley 300 Marco de la Madre Tierra y Desarrollo Integral para Vivir Bien)	(Ley 300 Marco de la Madre Tierra y Desarrollo Integral para Vivir Bien, 2012)
xiv	340	Law 337 Law 337 of Support to Food Production and the Restitution of Forests (Ley 337 de Apoyo a la Producción de Alimentos y Restitución de Bosques 2013)	Law 337 Law 337 of Support to Food Production and the Restitution of Forests (Ley 337 de Apoyo a la Producción de Alimentos y Restitución de Bosques, 2013)
xiv	340	Measurement, reporting and verification	Measurement, Reporting and Verification
xiv	340	(Bolivian observatory of extractive industries)	(Bolivian Observatory of Extractive Industries)
xv	340	(Higher University of San Andres , La Paz)	(Higher University of San Andres, La Paz)
xv	340	Unión Nacional de institución para el Trabajo de Acción Social	Unión Nacional de Institución para el Trabajo de Acción Social
1	362	40% of land areas in South America.	40 per cent of land areas in South America.
6	493	The dissertations consist of	The dissertation consists of
7	507	Aguilar Støen In de Castro et al (eds)	Aguilar-Støen In de Castro et al. (eds).

7	507	Aguilar Støen, M. and Hirsch, C. (2015)	Aguilar-Støen, M. and Hirsch, C. (2015).
7	507	Hirsch, C. and Aguilar Støen, M.	Hirsch, C. and Aguilar-Støen, M.
8	524	(Baud et al. 2011; De Castro et al. 2016).	(Baud et al., 2011; De Castro et al., 2016).
9	footnote 2	to ILO	to the ILO
11	617	Aguilar-Støen, 2015,	Aguilar-Støen, 2015;
13	683	(see Angelsen, 2009).	(Angelsen, 2009).
13	696	how safeguard are	how safeguards are
16	736	How and whether REDD +	How and whether REDD+
16	740	Osborne et al,	Osborne et al.,
16	741	Osborne, 2018;).	Osborne, 2018).
16	743	al., 2010; Bumpus and Liverman, 2011;	al., 2010; Bumpus and Liverman, 2011;
17	753	Sunderlin et al, 2014;	Sunderlin et al., 2014;
22	930	(Lukes, 2005; Cornwall, 2000).	(Cornwall, 2000; Lukes, 2005).
26	1062	Cornwall (2000: 34)	Cornwall (2000, p.34)
26	1065	(Lukes, 2005; Cornwall, 2000; Cornwall and Coelho, 2007).	(Cornwall, 2000; Lukes, 2005; Cornwall and Coelho, 2007).
27	1085	As Halvorsen (2018, p.1), argue,	As Halvorsen (2018, p.1), argues,
28/ iv	1111/87	3.6 Networks	3.6 Networks
30	1209	Demeritt, 2015; Forsyth, 2003).	Forsyth, 2003; Demeritt, 2015).
31	footnote 5	define	defines
33	1272	(Vatn, 2005: 315)	(Vatn, 2005, p.315)
38	1410	(Assies and Salman, 2005; McNeish, 2002; McNeish, 2013).	(McNeish, 2002; Assies and Salman, 2005; McNeish, 2013).
47	1680	2012 the Bolivian The Plurinational Legislative Assembly	2012 the Bolivian Plurinational Legislative Assembly
51	footnote 13	of Interior at	of Interior at
53	1853	REDD Bolivia	REDD in Bolivia
54	1880	Coalition of Rainforest Nations.	Coalition for Rainforest Nations.
56	1964	(Kincheloe and McLaren, 2000, p.309; Archer, 1998).	(Archer, 1998; Kincheloe and McLaren, 2000, p.309).
60	2051	(England, 1994: 82).	(England, 1994, p.82).
62	2143	(see also Neely and Nguse, 201;	(see also Neely and Nguse, 2015;
67	2275	<i>(Asociación Forestal de Indígenas Nacional, AFIN)</i>	<i>(Asociación Forestal Indígena Nacional, AFIN)</i>
69	1217	Figure 5	Figure 10
70	2337	Figure 12	Figure 11
74	2244	in collaboration AFIN	in collaboration with AFIN
91	2961-2962	dissertation. In line	dissertation. In line
98	3192	We argue that	We argue that
100	3256	Tt highlights	It highlights

101	3282	power and meaning	power and meaning.
104 /v	3341/11 8	SYNTHESIS AND CONCLUSION	SYNTHESIS AND CONCLUSION
105	3399	(see also Peet et al.2011).	(see also Peet et al., 2011).
111	3572	development	developments
112	3612	Tsing (1999: 160)	Tsing (1999, p.160)
112	3621	'ecological road'	"ecological road"
	3623- 3624	'privatisation and transnationalisa- tion'	"privatisation and transnationalisation"
115	3708	(McNeish 2012;	(McNeish, 2012;
115	3723	(Bull and Aguilar-Støen 2015;	(Bull and Aguilar-Støen, 2015;
117	3750	Adams, W. M. (1993)	Adams, W. M. (1993).
117	3774	"Reducing	Reducing
117	3780-81	REDD+ In F de Castro, B Hogenboom y M Baud (coord), <i>Gobernanza ambi- ental en América Latina</i> , Buenos Aires: CLACSO., pp. 265-296.	REDD+. In de Castro, F., Hogenboom, B. Baud, M. (coord), <i>Gobernanza ambiental en América Latina</i> , Buenos Aires: CLACSO, pp. 265-296.
118	3849	(eds) (2013)	(eds) (2013).
119	3849	Bebbington, A. and Bury, J. (eds)	Bebbington, A. and Bury, J. (eds).
119	3852	Bebbington, A. (2015) At	Bebbington, A. (2015). At
119	3853	(eds.),	(eds.).
119	3856	Becker, H.S (1998).	Becker, H.S. (1998).
119	3864	Benjaminsen,T. (2015)	Benjaminsen,T. (2015).
120	3886	pp. 165–171, doi: 10.1002/fee.1252	pp. 165–171.
120	3892	Projects,	Projects.
120	3910	(eds.),	(eds.).
120	3918	(Eds),	(eds).
121	3948	(eds),	(eds).
121	3958	<i>Change,</i>	<i>Change.</i>
121	3974	Chatterton P; Featherstone D; Routledge P (2013)	Chatterton, P., Featherstone, D., Routledge., P. (2013).
121	3987	Contreras-Hermosilla, A. a. Vargas Rios, M.T.	Contreras-Hermosilla, A., Vargas Rios, M.T.
122	3997	Corbera, E., (2017b)	Corbera, E. (2017b).
122	4001	Corbera, E. (2015)	Corbera, E. (2015).
122	4035	<i>Participation: From Tyranny to Transformation</i> . S.M. Hickey, and G. Mohan.	In S.M. Hickey, and G. Mohan. <i>Participa- tion: From Tyranny to Transformation</i> .
123	4079	(eds.),	(eds.).
123	4085	Sunderlin,W.D., (2014).	Sunderlin,W.D. (2014).
124	4088	Dolittle, A.A (2005):	Dolittle, A.A. (2005).
124	4108	(eds)	(eds).
124	4111	(1995)	(1995).
124	4125	(Eds.),	(eds.).
125	4152	(1980)	(1980).
125	4155	(2002)	(2002).
125	4179	2004.	(2004).

126	4226	(2001)	(2001).
127	4244	(eds.),	(eds.).
127	4262	(1991)	(1991).
127	4272	(2000)	(2000).
128	4299	(2012a)	(2012a).
128	4303	Hirsch, C., Aguilar-Støen, M.; McNeill, D. (2012b)	Hirsch, C., Aguilar-Støen, M., McNeill, D. (2012b).
128	4307	Hirsch, C., Aguilar-Støen, M.; McNeill, D. (2012c)	Hirsch, C., Aguilar-Støen, M., McNeill, D. (2012c).
128	4311	Hirsch, C., Aguilar-Støen, M.; McNeill, D. (2012d)	Hirsch, C., Aguilar-Støen, M., McNeill, D. (2012d).
128	4315	Hirsch, C., Aguilar-Støen, M.; McNeill, D.(2012e)	Hirsch, C., Aguilar-Støen, M., McNeill, D.(2012e).
128	4325	(eds),	(eds).
129	4350	(eds)	(eds).
129	4364	(eds),	(eds).
130	4385	(eds)	(eds).
130	4389	, 37(3), pp.5-17.	, 37(3), pp.5-17.
130	4423	(eds.),	(eds.).
131	4434	pp.236 - 255	pp.236 – 255.
132	4484	pp.153-170	pp.153-170.
132	4512	pp.275-283	pp.275-283.
132	4513	(2015)	(2015).
132	4533	J (2012)	J. (2012).
132	4546	<i>Klassekampen</i>	<i>Klassekampen</i> .
136	4665	(2009)	(2009).
136	4669	Routledge,	Routledge.
137	4699	(Eds.),	(eds).
137	4702	(eds),	(eds).
138	4744	(2015)	(2015).
138	4769	(eds.),	(eds).
138	4775	(Ed.),	(ed).
138	4777	(eds)	(eds).
139	4808	(2012)	(2012).
139	4817	(ed.),	(ed).
139	4824	(Eds.),	(eds).
139	4830	(eds),	(eds).
140	4834	(eds),	(eds).

ISBN: 978-82-575-1629-1

ISSN: 1894-6402



Norwegian University
of Life Sciences

Postboks 5003
NO-1432 Ås, Norway
+47 67 23 00 00
www.nmbu.no