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Assessment of Relocation Programmes for Street Vendors in Bogotá, Colombia.

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The Faculty of Landscape and Society

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Declaration

I, Paula Alejandra Cabezas Corredor, declare that this thesis is a result of my research investigations and findings. Sources of information other than my own have been acknowledged and a reference list has been appended. This work has not been previously submitted to any other university for award of any type of academic degree.

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ABSTRACT

The informal sector causes controversy in countries, especially in developing countries where there is no efficient control. This sector of the economy is characterized by avoiding paying taxes and operating under the radar. Tax evasion generates deficits in countries' budgets, but it is undeniable that this sector offers other opportunities for a part of the population and boosts the national economy.

In Colombia, rural-urban migrations generated a surplus population with low educational levels. The migrating population faced labour pressures and were forced to look for other economic alternatives. Hence, street sales became more and more notorious in the cities. Initially, the government tried to prohibit these activities. But after, they noticed that these new activities were contributing to fighting poverty and unemployment.

The cities grew massively and therefore, governments attempted to implement policies to regulate street vendors. Regulations are difficult to implement because street-vending is accepted as a form of work, but they are occupying public space and exploiting it for personal benefit. Furthermore, street vendors foment congestion and the deterioration of cities and have been linked to mafias and illegal activities.

For the purpose of controlling these activities, governments have ineffectively implemented relocation and training policies. This is why the current administration has a big challenge and changed its approach. The Institute for Social Economy included street vendors in the designing phase to understand the dynamics of the streets and be able to implement cost-effective activities that meet beneficiaries' demands.

In light of the above, these policies seek not only to reclaim public space but also to offer an improvement in their living conditions. Therefore, the objective of the thesis was to assess the relocation programs and determine success or failure factors according to the perceptions of the participants. From a sample of 116 participants, it was identified that programs that offer added value performed better. Additionally, results show that an increase in income does not represent an improvement in the general welfare. Consequently, non-economic factors should be applied in future programmes.

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1. Introduction

Informal employment is a topic that causes controversy. Debates around its definition, policy-making only confirm its importance, especially in developing economies. The informal sector provides income security for a large portion of the population (Chen, 2007). There is a widely held belief that informal economic activities result from a lack of opportunities in the formal sector (Castells and Portes, 1989). However, this sector has grown so much that now it includes entrepreneurs and small businesses.

Small enterprises in the informal sector hold a common denominator: their operations and revenue are not reported or regulated by state entities. By not assuming the tax duties, the informal economy affects the taxation system and social security contributions (Castells and Portes, 1989). In addition to tax evasion, there are more visible challenges that cities experience. Cities are the cradle for the development of irregular commercial activities on the streets.

This type of trade is promoted by street vendors; who fall under the self-employed category and have a market because of their low-cost products offer (Bhowmik, 2005). Street vendors take over public spaces around cities. Thus, pedestrians feel that it is a problem since they make it difficult for passers-by to pass and congestion increases in the streets. Crowded streets promote disorder and even insecurity for citizens.

According to Lewis (2013) and his Theory of Economic Growth, activities in the informal sector should be reduced in economic upswings. Paradoxically the industrialization of Latin American countries in the 1950s did not generate a decrease in the informal employment rate (Castells and Portes, 1989). This result can be a consequence of two phenomena. First, the great incentive to evade taxes in the informal sector and, second the lack of guarantees and stability offered by the formal sector.

Due to public order and labour conditions issues, governments around the globe have attempted to regulate this sector (Peña, 1991). Nevertheless, flaws in the design and implementation of such policies have not allowed the successful integration of street vendors into the formal economy. Undoubtedly, the informal sector not only keeps growing in size, but in importance (Gershuny, 1979).

In Colombia, the informal employment rate has remained stable since 2007 (DANE, 2017). In Bogotá, the capital city, the rural to urban mobilizations in 1970 gave rise to the presence of street vendors (Donovan, 2004). At first, the government tried to veto them, but then they realized that it was a secondary solution to combat poverty and thus, they included them in the planning (Portes, 1989).

In Bogotá, it is estimated that out of 51.781 street vendors, only 8.9% have been relocated and 30.4% are 60 years or older (Council of Bogotá, 2018). As they are already integrated into the city's dynamics, the control of informal sales has become a priority challenge for district mayoralties, who must seek solutions to find a balance between the right to work and the misuse of public property.

This study will be addressed to people who used to commercialize articles evading taxes, commonly called "street vendors" and have participated in any of the government's programmes. By not declaring taxes, they were not regulated by the state, which negatively impacted the national economy. Therefore, the government implemented relocation programmes, not only to control the streevending activities, but also to improve their working conditions. The objective of this thesis research is to assess the performance of government programs, determining how the government's agenda alter and/or better beneficiaries' livelihoods. Hence, this study aims at identifying which and how some factors determine the success of the programs.

1.1. Background

1.1.1. The Informal Sector:

The informal economy represents a challenge for governments because it affects the efficiency of a country's economic system. However, the effort to control this sector is overshadowed by the lack of existing information and the desire of practitioners to remain hidden (Schneider, 2003). Unable to find a source of reliable information, governments have not been able to create and implement effective policies to control informality.

Designing an effective policy becomes complex because it is an under-explored sector. Hence, this study will be based on one of the broadly accepted definitions of two main concepts: *The informal sector and informal employment.*

- *Informal sector:* employment (production or trade) within an unregistered enterprise (ILO, 1993)
- *Informal employment:* Informal employment is characterized by a lack of "labour legislation, taxation, social protection or entitlement to certain employment benefits" (ILO, 2003, pg 51)

Despite being very broad concepts, it gives us clarity about the biggest difference between the formal and informal sector. Which is that the informal economy does not comply with the proper documentation and business activities are not reported to the designated tax entities. From there, different activities practised within informality arise. The International Labour Office (2003) defines as informal employment the following types of jobs:

- Owners and employers of informal/unregistered enterprises
- Family workers, such as housekeepers working in their own home or someone else's.
- Employees who work for an unregistered enterprise or are domestic workers. For instance, gardeners or plumbers who do not hold a legal contract and do not declare taxes.

The term *enterprise* is important to define as "any unit engaged in the production of goods or services for sale or barter" (ILO, 2003, pg. 48). In this order of ideas, self-employed street vendors fall under this category.

Also, of interest are the causes that shape this sector. Certain conditions allow the development of these activities. According to Schneider (2005), there are four main factors that influence the shape and size of the informal economy:

- Tax and social security contributions: The duty to pay taxes directly affects one's decision to remain in the informal economy. Subsequently, the greater the profit difference before and after the payment of taxes, the greater the incentive a person would have not to formalize.
- The intensity of Regulations: The creation of new regulations such as labour licenses, hygiene, trade, among others implies obstacles for people who wish to create a company. Thus, many resist engaging with officialdom for practical and economic reasons.
- Public sector services: There is a deficit to provide good public services because the state does not collect the entire amount of taxes. To alleviate this deficit, governments

usually increase tax rates. This creates a vicious circle, where tax increases and tax evasion mutually reinforce each other. Low quality of service encourages people to remain in the informal sector because they don't see value in paying taxes.

- Public opinion: There is an accepted demand for goods and services that come from the informal sector because they are cheaper than the formal ones. Hence, the existence of demand stimulates the supply of the informal sector.

These patterns are generally present in developing countries, where income inequality may breed conflict between citizens and law enforcement agencies (Schneider, 2005). Therefore, the informal sector offers people the capacity to produce income, especially those living in poverty because of unemployment, education and labour skills barriers.

1.1.2. Bogotá Context

In his first term as mayor (1998-2000), Enrique Peñalosa based his government administration on defending and ordering the public space to promote security in the city of Bogotá (Llorente & Rivas, 2005). For this, his team developed a plan for the construction of parks, libraries and meeting points, as well as the Transmilenio mass transport system.

In addition, the Administrative Department of the Defence of Public Space was created to "Contribute to the improvement of the quality of life in Bogota, by means of an effective defence of public space, an optimal administration of the real estate heritage of the city and of the construction of a new culture of the public space, which guarantees its collective use and enjoyment and stimulates community participation" (Defensoría del Espacio Público, 1996).

His vision was guided by the theory of broken windows, which states that the deterioration of material goods, such as broken windows that might seem insignificant, can attract vandalism and increase insecurity in a community (Burch, 2015). Peñalosa was inspired by the success of this policy in New York City, where the interruption of small acts of vandalism significantly reduced the crime rate and homicide rate (Burch, 2015). In addition, Peñalosa encouraged citizen participation with a proposal of "zero tolerance" towards acts that would damage the safety in the streets and foment fear in the citizenry.

Although his policies were aimed at improving the quality of life in Bogotá, the large population of street vendors was adversely affected. Street vendors have been, in many cases, unfairly linked to criminal activities, insecurity, and illegal commerce of products, such as drugs and adulterated alcohol. Hence, government interventions cause controversy. On the one hand,

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the public supports the elimination of pockets of insecurity and the embellishment of the city. On the other, they are aware that for many, it is the only source of income and, therefore, it is important to provide opportunities that guarantee the securing of the minimum vital. Article 53 of the political constitution of Colombia states that citizens are entitled to receive a minimum vital remuneration. The minimum vital represents the material resources that a person needs to ensure a dignified and autonomous life. Thus, evictions would hinder the possibility of street vendors and their families to obtain this economic compensation because street sales are street vendors' only source of income.

Enrique Peñalosa was elected again as mayor for the 2016-2019 term. With the same objectives, Peñalosa implemented a plan to recover the public space, but this time from a social inclusion perspective. Together with the Institute for the Social Economy (IPES), seven commercial alternatives programmes were developed/reinforced to assist the transition of informal vendors to the formal sector. Each programme is aimed at different demographics. Subsequently, these policy changes raise questions and concerns about the real benefit for the participants and if they meet the beneficiaries' expectations/aspirations. The debate continues because for the government their main goal is to formalize informal activities, but it does not necessarily mean that the programmes will benefit participants' livelihoods. The following commercial alternatives are the on-going programmes (IPES, 2019):

1. REDEP Programme (Red de Prestación de Servicios al usuario del Espacio público in Spanish, Public Services User Network of the public space): This programme has two options. The first one, urban kiosks which are distributed along the sidewalks of the city. And the second one, the meeting points, which are urban spaces with public toilets and parking for bicycles. They are strategically located in opened, spacious and crowded areas.
2. Institutional Fairs: This programme has two types of fairs. Permanent Fairs, which operate all year round and Temporary Fairs, that are set up during a specific time of the year (e.g. Christmas Fair).
3. Market Places: IPES aims at implementing an efficient food supply and distributions system. As well as enhancing the commercial activities of the market places, the programme aims to attract tourism and enhance regional integration. IPES manages 19 public market places.
4. Mecato Social (over 60): This programme focuses mainly on people over 60 years of age or a population with a disability over 18 years of age. It is an alternative to continue selling their packaged products within public or private companies' buildings. This

programme seeks to dignify and improve the working conditions of a vulnerable population.

5. Shopping Centres: IPES manages 34 commercial spaces, called commercial points, which are distributed in every locality of Bogotá.

1.2. Problem formulation

1.2.1. Problem Statement

Relocation programmes have been implemented in the recent past to counter increasing activity in the informal sector. Different administration policies and approaches have been taken up by the major city hall to protect the public interest of the collective urban areas. However, these policies have had little success because the interests of the street vendors have not been made a priority.

The real success of these programmes is yet to be studied, as researchers have focused more on the public space vs minimum vital ongoing legal battle. Since its creation, IPES has worked to improve the living conditions of the street vendors who voluntary decide to participate. IPES develops programmes that foster the identity of the merchants and the essence of social commitments while safeguarding the public space.

IPES's endeavour to improve and transform street vendors' livelihoods is the focus of this study. IPES's responsibility towards a vulnerable community sets the basis for investigating traits that guarantee a successful and sustainable implementation. However, it is important to clarify that this study is limited to the subjective assessments of programme participants and programme employee; this study does not assess these programmes from a governmental or socioeconomic perspective.

1.2.2. Objectives and Research questions

Objective 1: To determine factors that might affect outcomes for the beneficiaries, according to their perceptions.

- How do variables related to identity affect the degree of success that programme beneficiaries perceive?
- How do the type of programme and time in informal activities affect the degree of success of that programme beneficiaries perceive?

Objective 2: To understand the difficulties to execute these programmes and the challenges in the implementation process.

- Are there some programmes that perform better than others? If so, why?
- What are the main challenges in the design and implementation of these policies?

1.2.3. Rational and motivation of the study

The researcher was born and raised in Bogotá and during the time she studied her professional career, she had a lot of interaction with street vendors. The University is located in a square that is very crowded and thus, street vendors have good opportunities there. She remembers wondering why so many people would choose to sell things on the streets. Street vendors were nice and hard-working people who have potential to do other activities. The researcher was so sure that they could be like those who worked in offices and businesses in the productive sector of the country.

Later, she learned that it is another form of work, which grew every year that I advanced my studies, then I was concerned about other aspects such as knowing what policies the government handled in relation to how to manage the informal economy. Likewise, to understand if those who made street sales were mostly women and why, in the same sense know why the seemed to belong to a lower socioeconomic stratum and many other questions that remained in her head.

For all the above reasons and wanting to deepen on the reasons that lead these people to dedicate themselves to the work of street vendors motivated her to have it as a topic in my master's degree thesis. And, above all to leave some knowledge that contributes to formalize and grow this type of economy, for the benefit of them and the country.

2. Literature Review

2.1 Theoretical Framework

From the existent literature, it was possible to identify three issues related to street vending. In the first place, formal/bureaucratic barriers to formal market entry. For instance, the big legal and economic challenges people face when they desire to open their own business. In the second place, the formal labour market regulations and worker's benefits, which arise as costly and demanding in administrative terms. Lastly, the battle about the use of public space and property rights priority against people's right to work.

2.1.1. Formal/Bureaucratic barriers to formal market entry

The institutionalist school examines the burden of the institutions on the people. De Soto (1989) explains how migrants from rural areas encountered a mercantilist system where the government controlled the vast majority of the economy. People must acquire public permits to be able to develop their economic activities, which De Soto (1989) interprets as obstacles to entering the market due to the cost and lengthy process.

To prove this, De Soto and his team conducted an experiment. In Perú, they simulated to open and register a couple of small ventures. The team found that the processes were not only time consuming but expensive as they were not able to produce and obtain income while waiting around seven months for the permits (De Soto, 1989). The high costs sort of force people to enter the informal economy because the burden of formalizing is impossible to pay or compensate. The author calls this phenom "the informal revolution" because the costs of being informal will always be lower than the cost of formalizing.

While it would be interesting to test this in the rest of the Latin American countries, it appears as if getting into the formal economy is only for the privileged classes with enough initial capital to invest. As a result, the inequality gap grows and politics become more of a business than a democracy. Wealthy families are very involved in governmental activities, and they are therefore getting economic benefits because of their political connections (De Soto, 1989).

Consequently, lower classes are left without an institution that represents their interests. But in poor countries, lower classes constitute most of the society. In countries like Perú, Egypt, and Haiti the formal economy is strikingly small, almost as a minority (De Soto, 1989). Indeed, the

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author emphasizes the benefits that would take place when eliminating access barriers and combining both economies. On the one hand, informal enterprises would be registered to have access to credits and financial benefits. On the other hand, the market would be one big well full of opportunities for all.

But the question is would institutions be able to integrate these two economies? Since its independence, Latin America has tried to replicate the Capitalist American model. In the twentieth century, Latin American countries did not reach the level of development of other developing countries. Cordeiro (2007) believes it's a failed century because the governments implemented a mercantilist system.

Further on, in the twenty-first century, economic openness gave the region hope of economic growth. However, the challenge was more than just open the economy to free commerce. The Latin-American economies had to harmonize the system in terms of investments, fiscal and monetary coordination (Cordeiro, 2007). Additionally, to completely integrate the system, governments needed to include educational, social, political and ecological issues.

The lack of a robust system has negative effects on the economic capacity of countries. De Soto (2000) states that people are not able to produce capital because their assets are not integrated into the system. For instance, people who have built houses on land where property rights are undefined won't be able to sell, trade, mortgage their property and, will therefore not be able to obtain capital from it.

On the contrary, in developed countries, people's assets are represented by a legal document. Hence, documentation will support any initiative of trade or credit, enabling the possibility of investment. In that order of ideas, the undocumented assets of the Latin-American citizens will never allow them to get into the financial system. Considering the importance of the financial market to promote new businesses investments; lower classes will remain in a disadvantaged position until the government recognises their property rights.

According to De Soto (2000), unrepresented assets account for USD $9.3 trillion which are not included in the national economies, which is the proof of their ability to create wealth, even though they break the law. This type of legal concerns does not occur in most of the western countries. Their systems allow them to create capital through a title, a security or a contract (De Soto, 2000). Thus, a legitimate system optimizes the value of an asset by making it divisible, combinable and available for trading (De Soto, 2000).

A legitimate system was adopted in the US to fulfil the social and economic demands of its citizens, which additionally, allowed the cooperation between the private sector, government and civil society (De Soto, 2000). De Soto's theory about the lack of strong institutions in a country can be very damaging is supported by other studies (Scully, 1998, Boettke, 1994, Lebang, 1996). Others state how harmful weak institutions can be. Fist, the costs of transaction are higher and therefore, less capital is generated (North, 1990). Second, anything that negatively affects the capital formation is contra productive because capital is the foundation subsistence of production (Bauer, 2000). Third, property rights foster innovation and entrepreneurship, which leads to capital accumulation (Kerekes and Williamson, 2008). Lastly, Mauro (1995) found a positive correlation between legitimate property right system and the level of economic growth of a country.

Weak institutions have left people with no other choice than to find new ways to have access to decent livelihoods. Due to the unequal conditions in Latin America, De Soto (1987) supports the informal economy because it is outside the system and people can create progress by their own means. A well-managed informal sector is capable of fostering economic growth among the low classes, despite its competition (De Soto, 1987).

These economical barriers create even more inequality. Not only the entry costs are higher, but also the consumption prices increase (De Soto, 1987). Therefore, the formal economy operates with prices that only upper classes can afford, separating, even more, the two economies. The challenge of integrating the two economies is huge. One national price would not be advisable, considering the extreme inequality in third world countries. It wouldn't be desirable to average the prices, as they can be too high for the poor and too low for the rich (De Soto, 1987). That standpoint questions the actual efficiency of the formal economy in third world countries. It also challenges the possibility of merging both economies in countries where it's almost as if the population has broken into two systems that work on their own, interrelate but do not merge.

Apart from costly bureaucratic barriers, Loayza (1997) affirms that the expansion of informal economies arises within nations that have excessive taxes and a government that is unable to control the system. His study of Latin American countries shows that the higher the tax burden the bigger the informal sector. Furthermore, it shows that the informal sector could be reduced as the quality of institutions improved. Lastly, the informal sector appears much more appealing because the formal costs are too high.

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However, Loayza (1997) stresses that being informal entails other costs and disadvantages. Informal vendors are exposed to penalties, fines, eviction and seizure of goods. Hence, they have restricted access to public services and rights, especially the right to private property. The drawbacks street vendors face almost every day directly affect their welfare and personal development.

These drawbacks are beyond their control (Loayza, 1997). First, police are not on their side, thus, if confiscations take place, they are most likely to lose their merchandise. Second, they are unable to prove financial resources, they are locked out from the capital markets, financial services and insurances. Third, they could only receive benefits from the government, which in third world countries are of poor quality, and therefore, they don't have access to proper health care systems or pension plans. Moreover, the government is an important actor as it regulates and enforces systems, it can contribute to the expansion or reduction of the informal sector (Loayza, 1997).

Alongside weak institutions, lower classes have been impacted by the development structure of their countries. Hart's (1973) research about the informal economy and urban unemployment in Ghana identified a labour force that operated within the economy, but outside of the formal regulations of the government. The population was identified as unskilled, illiterate and migrants (Hart, 1973). Hart (1973) suggested that inflation, unfair wages, and high job requirements forced people to find other solutions to obtain income and that the government of Ghana needed to reconsider their economic strategy due to the new variants and complexities of the economy.

Hart (1973) was also able to determine that economic incentives drive the population to enter the informal economy because it offers them the possibility to increase their real wages. In other words, if the informal sector offers better wages and better working conditions, the labour force would never want to make the transition just for the sake of being in the formal sector.

To understand the relationship between the formal and informal sector, it is important to understand the differences between them. The informal sector has been built up of activities that are easy to execute and require very little capital, thus only small units of production are needed (Tokman, 1982). Subsequently, low levels of productivity and capital accumulation characterizes this sector (Tokman, 1982).

The informal sector is initiated with whom lack proper remunerated employment, they found in the informal economy a way of making an income that supports them and their families. Their initiative to find new solutions and explore new industries should be leveraged in a positive way. Their lack of resources and obstacles to entering the market puts them in a disadvantaged position. Yet, they have contributed to the unemployment and poverty reduction and therefore, governments should boost their potential.

One might think that unemployment is the main reason for people to enter the informal economy. Furthermore, Tokman (1982) describes two irregularities that shaped the structure of the informal sector in Latin America:

- Migrations: Rural to urban migrations increased the labour force in the cities. In 1950, 55% of the labour force was engaged in agricultural activities, while in 1980, around 35% continued in this field. The surplus of labour offer that could not be met by the formal sector resulted in people developing informal economic activities.
- Premature urbanization: The transition from agricultural activities was very abrupt and industrial knowledge was not transmitted fast enough, which created a disruption between the labour force demand and supply.

In addition to these irregularities and during the industrialization era, Latin-American states reduced their fiscal expenditure and privatized part of the public enterprises. Hence, the government was not the primary source of employment anymore and it lost its ability to support the formal sector. On the other hand, private companies became more efficient and cut down employment slots. All these changes build up the conditions for the creation and development of the informal sector. As a result, between 1950 and 1980, it is estimated that 6 out of 10 new jobs were created in the informal sector (Tokman, 2007). In doing so, structural changes put more pressure on the labour force, and even legitimized the informal sector, as it became part of the normal urban dynamic.

The dynamics developed two forces that drove the labour force to create new income opportunities. First, livelihood strategy, the informal sector offers opportunities for those who can't be absorbed by the formal economy and as the labour force increases, they are obliged to find self-solutions (Tokman, 1995). Second, productive decentralization, which means that modern adjustments due to globalization have led to more efficient systems and fewer job vacancies (Portes, Castells and Benton, 1989).

2.1.2. The formal labour market regulations and worker's benefits

Alongside entry costs and barriers, the formal or legal sector is characterized by labour market regulations. Labour regulation aims at improving employees' lifestyles and working conditions. These regulations ensure benefits such as social security, vacation payment, health care insurance, among others.

One might think that the strengthening of institutions would incentivise people to enter the formal sector. However, Heckman (2000) scrutinized changes in Latin America, after the introduction of mandated benefits. While these social security programmes did improve workers conditions, they harm the incentive of private companies to hire more employees.

Indeed, Heckman (2000) shows that job security mechanisms increase inequality when only some workers get access to them. Furthermore, those mechanisms do not really boost the formal sector because they reduce labour demand which might contribute to the expansion of the informal sector.

This duality of weak versus strong institutions is important in the Latin-American context because of the unequal environment. The different conditions of the populations make it difficult to implement bills that benefit everyone. As well as, the ability of some groups to influence policy results in biased regulations.

The Colombian government implemented a labour reform under the 789 Law of 2002, "By which rules are issued to support employment and expand social protection and some articles of the Substantive Labour Code are modified" (Bogotá's Mayor Office, 2002). The aforementioned labour reform was appointed as protectionist. Many believed that would negatively impact employers and employees, and even would promote the informal economy (Amarante, Arim and Santamaría, 2005).

The reform sought to establish clear parameters for labour conditions and reduce unemployment and underemployment (Bogotá's Mayor Office, 2002, p. 27). By safeguarding employees' rights and promoting contract flexibility, the reform was able to formalize part of the economy. The data speaks for itself: 378.000 people affiliated to Family Compensation Funds, 603.000 in Professional Risks, 483.000 in the contributory health system 483,000 and, 850.000 new workplaces were registered (Nuñez, 2005, p. 10).

As Nuñez (2005) states the labour reform had a twofold approach. On the one hand, it aimed at improving labour conditions through unemployment subsidies, training and formalization. On the other hand, its implementation intended to increase the flexibility of the labour market, through the introduction of flexible working hours and, the reduction of dismissal costs. Hence, what is questioned is the real effect, as the labour reform did achieve the creation of more jobs and the reduction of informality (Pérez, 2004). If those reforms really work, then why not reinforce them?

In a globalised world, companies in countries where labour legislation is not strict could gain a competitive advantage (Pahle, 2011). This happens because they incur in fewer expenses and can adjust to international prices. Even though unions were interested in applying the International Labour Organization (ILO) labour standards to the World Trade Organization (WTO) country members, governments were averse to support this initiative (Pahle, 2011). In other words, labour unions wanted their governments to implement international labour legislation, in order to, internationally standardised working conditions.

Interestingly, many of the developing countries opposed the proposition. Governments are reluctant to increase labour protection because it reduces the competitive edge of businesses that are exposed to international competition (Pahle, 2011). Formal companies may outsource services from informal enterprises to be more competitive or solely reduce cost (Chen, 2012). Thus, there exists an unsolicited trade-off between international competitiveness and labour conditions. The latter is only an instance of the complexity of the labour regulations.

As already mentioned, the formal sector is guided by regulations and strategic lines. One of the regulatory mechanisms that fall under the formal sector is the existence of a minimum wage. The minimum wage is a constraint that while guarantees a minimum income, it creates a break-even point that separates the formal and the informal economies. In fact, Maloney and Nuñez (2004, p. 127) suggest that a 9% increase in the minimum wage may have resulted in a 1.4% reduction in employment. Therefore, formal jobs loss its appeal, if people are able to earn an inflow equal to or greater than the minimum wage.

Economic incentives drive people's preferences and choices. In developing countries, street vendors are willing to break the law and be fined and harassed, as long as, they are able to earn some money to support their families. In the end, street vendors are claiming and hoping for improving their life conditions (Sarria, 2008)

2.1.3. The battle about the use of public space and property rights priority against people's right to work.

At the time of the conquest, the Spaniards brought to Latin America a medieval city model. The new cities revolved around the market squares, which supplied the commercial needs of the settlements (García-Doménech, 2015). Urban meetings in the public space allow both commercial and social interaction, which characterizes Mediterranean urban culture (Garcia-Domenech, 2015). In this context, commercial relationships shaped a pattern of interaction in the public space in the colonial period. In addition to commercial activities, public space allows citizens to express and interact.

Intrinsically, public space is of social, political and cultural interest. However, postmodern society stopped seeing public space as a place of social interaction and represented it as a place full of dangers (Amendola, 1997). For this reason, the outdoor space was replaced by shopping centres and, the appropriation of public space became controversial (García-Domenech, 2015).

In light of the above, public space belongs to all citizens and, has a lot of commercial potentials. Hence, questions about how to economically exploit it, without sacrificing aesthetics or public benefit generate a debate between society and government. Although street sales were considered part of urban development in the colonial era, in modern times they present problems for the city. Modern cities face traffic and congestion problems, which also negatively impacts formal trade (Rocha, Sanchez and Garcia, 2009). The excessive presence of street sales reduces the supply of public space and devalues commercial activities (Scotchmer, 2002). Hence, the recovery of public space is essential to foment public order and invigorate the commercial activities in crowded areas (Donovan, 2004).

To counteract this situation, governments implement recovery of public space policies. The first policies in Bogota emerged between 1998 and 2003, which were weak and did not decrease street sales (Velásquez, 2013). Moreover, it is important to understand the political and legal discourse was developed around the use of public space and the right to work in Colombia.

The Colombian Political Constitution established in Article 82 as the duty of the State "to ensure the protection of the integrity of public space and its destination for common use, which prevails over the particular interest", consistent with the above, Article 24 determines that "every Colombian has the right to move freely through the national territory."

The Constitutional Court on several occasions has reviewed the implications of public space, considering that it is linked to the quality of life of citizens. On this matter, they pointed out:

> "The Constituent of 91 tried to give special protection to public space. Colombia being a social State of law, must guarantee a series of social and collective rights such as recreation, the use of free time, and the enjoyment of a healthy environment (article 52 CP) that depend on respect for public space. "(Constitutional Court of Colombia judgment C-211, MP Iván Humberto Escrucería Mayolo, 2017).

Similarly, the same sentence explained that: The protection and preservation of public space address constitutional imperatives such as (i) Ensure its use to common use, (ii) prevalence of general interest on the subject, among others.

However, it is also necessary to analyse the social reality of informal vendors and emphasize that they have constitutional rights that protect them. The Court in the aforementioned judgment C-211 of 2017, indicated that the State should give special protection to those who, by economic condition, physical or mental are in circumstances of manifest weakness. In addition, it pointed out that there are several provisions in the Constitution, such as that work has a fourfold nature because it is a value, a principle (articles 1 and 53), a right (article 25) and an obligation (article 25). Additionally, the state should promote a work placement for people of working age (Article 54); and that the State will intervene to give full employment to people and ensure, in a progressive manner, that individuals, particularly those with lower incomes, have effective access to all basic goods and services (Article 334).

The ILO in Convention 150 has fostered that the Member States protect the informal economy, evident in Article 7:

> "Any Member that ratifies this Convention shall promote the expansion of the functions of the labour administration system, (...), relating to the working and living conditions of certain workers who, for legal purposes, cannot be considered as persons in employment situation, such as people who are employed on their own account in the informal sector, as understood by the national practice "(International Labour Organization Convention C-150, 1978).

Despite the convention, The Constitutional Court in the T-772 judgment of 2003, did not question the power of eviction of public space by the authorities but established parameters of

how it should be exercised, without it ending in arbitrariness, abuse, or leaving side the constitutional principles (Constitutional Court of Colombia, sentence T-772, MP Manuel José Cepeda Espinosa, 2003).

In the same ruling, the corporation indicated the duty and the constitutional authority to advance policies and measures aimed at recovering and preserving the public space, under the following conditions (Constitutional Court of Colombia, sentence T-772, MP Manuel José Cepeda Espinosa, 2003):

> "(i) they must move forward following due process and giving those affected a dignified treatment, (ii) they must respect the legitimate expectations of those affected, (iii) they must be preceded by a careful evaluation of the reality about which they will have to have effects, with the follow-up and update necessary to keep correspondence in its scope and characteristics with said reality, in order to ensure the effective enjoyment of fundamental constitutional rights, and (iv) cannot be advanced in such a way that it is disproportionately injured the right to the vital minimum of the most vulnerable and poorest sectors of the population, nor in a way that deprives those who do not have economic opportunities in the formal sector of the only licit means of subsistence available to them "(Constitutional Court of Colombia, sentence T-772, MP Manuel José Cepeda Espinosa, 2003).

As mentioned before, street sales generated employment for those who were out of the formal economy. Whether due to internal or external factors, the presence of street vendors required some kind of regulation. That is why to understand today's problems, it is important to comprehend the basic regulations that have been governing these procedures.

In 1972 the Popular sales fund or "Fondo de Ventas Populares" in Spanish was created through the Agreement #25 (Council of Bogotá, 1972). But none roles or responsibilities were assigned to it. This was just the first attempt to organizing and gathering the street vendor population. It wasn't until 1977 that the government entrusted the fund with the developing of programmes to (i) build and customize provisional or permanent points of sale, (ii) foster and promote popular sales and small industries and (iii) assist members with health insurance, training, housing, and leisure courses (Popular Sales Fund, 1977).

It is clear how broad and nonspecific these programmes were designed, which caused an unregulated market on the streets. Other than registering and handing out credentials to street

vendors, the government did nothing to organize and find solutions to solve the issue. As the city expanded, street sales became more popular and even normal for citizens.

In the light of the worsening situation, in 1999, Enrique Peñalosa took measures to evict a large part of the street vendor population from the most crowded areas of the city. Consequently, 1016 street vendors initiated a constitutional complaint against the administration of Enrique Peñalosa pleading that their constitutional right to freedom and equality (art 13), right to work (art 25) and the fundamental rights of children (Art 44) were violated.

The constitutional court granted the protection action, to those persons who were able to demonstrate with carnets or authorizations that the State had permitted their economic activity in the streets. Therefore, it was determined that the police evictions were arbitrary and violated the principle of legitimate expectations and the right to work (Constitutional Court of Colombia judgment, 1999). This verdict is so important as it established the first legal procedures and commitments of the government to protect and create solutions for the street vendors.

The sentence SU-360 of 1999 declares that even though the Capital District of Bogotá "is responsible for enforcing for all citizens the rules regarding protection and access to public space", they are not allowed to evict street vendors as they would be "suddenly in total unemployment, with frank deterioration for their way of life, which implies the spread of poverty" (Constitutional Court of Colombia judgment, 1999). Accordingly, the sentence SU-360 outlawed arbitrary evictions and prescribed special procedures for relocation and the implementation of new strategies to benefit those who were willing to cooperate with the recuperation of public space. It is worth mentioning that many protection actions were denied because this sentence only applied to those who were able to prove they were covered by the principle of legitimate expectations.

The principle of legitimate expectations became street vendors' base for any constitutional complaint. However, the appropriation of public space for individual benefits is also condemned by the constitution. Therefore, authorities needed explicit regulations given the simultaneous occurrence of two constitutional rights. Given the importance of constitutional rights in a social State of law, the sentence T-772 of 2003 addressed this issue. The constitutional Court identified the duality between two obligations of the state and therefore, established criteria and conditions to execute public recovery space policies, different types of street vendors and included the guarantees of due process. Lastly, the sentence defined that

"the police actions tending to recover materially the public space will constitute pathways of fact; it is essential to respect, in any case, the right of defence of those who may be injured in their basic interests" (Constitutional Court of Colombia, sentence T-772, MP Manuel José Cepeda Espinosa, 2003).

The sentence T-772 of 2003 sort of instituted a hierarchy of the constitutional rights, in which the rights to dignity, minimum vital and due process of street vendors were somehow above the article 82 of the constitution that states that "It is the duty of the State to ensure the protection of the integrity of public space and its destination for common use, which prevails over the particular interest" (Constitutional Court of Colombia, sentence T-772, MP Manuel José Cepeda Espinosa, 2003). This sentence is also the outcome of 31 years of political disputes between the city hall, the police department, and street vendors.

With the legal framework laid out, the city hall started to promote initiatives to find solutions. Therefore, the administration of Luis Eduardo Garzón (2004-2007) designed and implemented new relocation strategies (Velásquez, 2013). Additionally, they formally created an organism "By which basic rules are issued on the structure, organization, and operation of the agencies and entities of Bogotá, Capital District, and other provisions are issued" (Agreement 257 of 2006).

In 2006 the Institute for the Social Economy - IPES was established. It forms part of the Secretary of Economic Development and has the following functions:

- Define, design and execute programmes, in accordance with the development plans and policies drawn up by the District Government, aimed at providing alternatives for the sectors of the informal economy through the formation of human capital, access to credit, insertion in the markets of goods and services and the relocation of commercial or service activities.
- Manage the procurement of resources with public entities, private companies, foundations or Non-Governmental Organizations - national and international NGOs to expand the management capacity of the entity and strengthen the execution of programmes and projects.
- Carry out operations of organization and relocation of informal activities that take place in the public space.
- Manage the market places in coordination with the policy of food supply.

- Carry out operations of construction and adaptation of analogous and related spaces with the public space with a view to its regulated economic use.
- Execute programmes and projects to support microenterprises, family businesses, associative companies, small and medium enterprises and implement microcredit.

In view of its duties, IPES has been developing and implementing programmes that reconcile both of the constitutional rights and align with the United Nations sustainable development goals. However, the police department continued deploying public space recovery evictions and two more sentences were issued, in order to formalize and institute the guarantees of due process. Therefore, sentence C211-2017 determines that it is unconstitutional to arbitrarily evict a verified street vendor, without offering him/her a compatible and pre-planned solution.

However, the duality persists in The Colombian Political Constitution, which established in Article 82 as the duty of the State "to ensure the protection of the integrity of public space and its destination for common use, which prevails over the particular interest". Likewise, Article 24 determines that "every Colombian has the right to move freely through the national territory." The Constitutional Court on several occasions has reviewed the implications of public space, considering that it is linked to the quality of life of citizens.

For this reason, the Constitutional Court Sentence C-211 of 2017 emphasizes that the measures must minimize the negative impact for the sellers, they must meet the principles of legality, good faith, and legitimate trust which implies that the State cannot change the rules that regulate a situation with individuals without a transition being granted so that they adjust their behaviour to the new regulation.

The Court emphasized that the administration must grant a transition plan and implement public policies that counteract the impacts on informal traders. These programmes should be based on studies that meet the needs of the people evicted, where they are not forced to bear a disproportionate public burden. The authorities must strive for the recovery of public space and at the same time guarantee the right to work, the minimum vital and due process of the informal vendors, who act on the principle of legitimate trust, have as their only source of income the public space.

In conclusion, if arbitrary evictions take place, police deployments would be violating the fundamental rights to work, the vital minimum and dignity of the street vendors who can demonstrate their legitimate trust right. While it is true that there is a protection of public space

and there is legitimacy in police action, it is also true that there is a due process that needs to be followed to guarantee fairness for the community.

The whole debate about overlapped constitutional rights brings out other components that need to be considered in this problematic. The sentence C-211 of 2017 enforces the obligation to protect those informal vendors who are in a "situation of manifest weakness or subjects of special constitutional protection". This characterization of vulnerability had not been properly defined until 2018 when the City Hall issued the Resolution 070 "by which establishes the methodology to assess the degree of vulnerability of the informal vendors that occupy the public space" (Bogotá's Mayor Office, 2018).

In this regard, IPES included in their assessments the vulnerability index developed by the National Department of Planning, which by means of 14 variables measure the probability that the household is below the poverty line, thus, the higher the probability the more vulnerable the household is. The resolution also includes applicable law of Populations of Special Constitutional Protection.

The Special Constitutional Protection applies to those who are not on equal terms for any of the following reasons in the Resolution 070 (Bogotá's Mayor Office, 2018):
- Victim of Armed Conflict
- Disability condition
- Ethnic group
- Men/women single family head of household
- LGBTI condition
- Elderly people (over 60 years old)

2.1.4. Summary of Principles

The social state of the law
In the first article of the political constitution of 1991, Colombia was introduced as the Social State of Law. (Political Constitution of Colombia, art 1, 1991). This concept entails a fundamental change in the country's structure. It entails reinforcing the idea that the State should respect the freedoms of citizens. Thus, the state order would be fair and would recognize the rights of citizens through laws. Laws that must protect the fundamental rights established in the constitution and that will always prevail.

The rule of law establishes a rational state in which coercive ideas are eliminated, such as the subjection of power, the law over man, the centralization of power and forces the rulers to guarantee the freedoms and rights of citizens.

In other words, the government must always prioritize the fundamental rights of citizens and seek alternatives that promote their freedoms and therefore, they would be judged fairly. (Political Constitution of Colombia, art 1, 1991). Hence, the fundamental rights described in the constitution will always be a constitutional priority.

The principle of legitimate trust

Larenz (1985) explains that this concept protects the trust that an individual has in the behaviour of another. And it is very important to protect that trust because that condition will generate a peaceful and collective life, as well as peaceful acts of cooperation. Thus, it is understood that citizens act in good faith. In the T-020 of 2000, it is established that legitimate trust is a principle that protects the citizen of the modifications that may occur in a new government. That is, in the case of street vendors, the principle of legitimate trust applies. Due to the fact that if past administrations have allowed or have not hindered activities in public space, new administrations cannot make it impossible for people to continue with their economic activities without prior warning or due process.

Right to work

Article 25 of the Colombian political constitution establishes that "Work is a right and a social obligation and enjoys, in all its forms, the special protection of the State. Everyone has the right to a job in decent and fair conditions. "

Likewise, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UN General Assembly, 1948), established in Article 23 the following:

"1. Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of their work, to just and favourable conditions of work and to protection against unemployment.

2. Everyone has the right, without any discrimination, to equal pay for equal work.

3. Every person who works has the right to an equitable and satisfactory remuneration, which assures him, as well as his family, of existence worthy of human dignity and that will be supplemented, if necessary, by any other means of social protection ". Hence, Colombia being a Social State of the Law is obliged to protect and guarantee that its citizens have access to a decent job, with fair conditions.

Public Space

"The public space is the set of public buildings and the architectural and natural elements of private buildings destined by nature, uses or affect the satisfaction of collective urban needs that transcend the limits of the individual interests of the inhabitants.

Additionally, the Colombian Constitution in its Article 82 holds the State responsible for the protection "of the integrity of the public space and its destination for common use, which prevails over the private interest."

Freedom of movement

The Article 24 of the Political Constitution states that: "Every Colombian, with the limitations established by law, has the right to move freely through the national territory, to enter and leave it, and to remain and reside in Colombia. " This article has been expanded to the street vendors debate because Article 13 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (United Nations, 1948), states that "everyone has the right to move freely (...) in the territory of a State ". Therefore, the fact that street vendors occupy a portion of public space and impiety the free passage of citizens violates their right to free locomotion.

Minimum Vital

The minimum vital is a constitutional principle that was institutionalized in the 53 Article of the Colombian Political Constitution. It protects the purchasing power of a citizen and compels the State not to diminish the living standards of the citizen (Barona, 2010).

The minimum vital constitutes "the portion of the income of the worker or pensioner who are destined to finance their basic needs, such as food, housing, clothing, access to home public services, recreation, health care, prerogatives whose ownership is essential to realize the right to human dignity, a founding value of the constitutional legal order " (Judgement T-211, 2001). In other words, the minimum vital is the amount of money that would guarantee a dignified life, it's established in the Political Constitution of Colombia, which entails that it has to be assured by the government.

Due process

Article 29 of the political constitution of Colombia establishes that due process will be carried out in all judicial and administrative circumstances. It stipulates that "Whoever is accused has the right to the defence and assistance of a lawyer chosen by him, or ex officio, during the

investigation and trial; to a due public process without undue delay; to present evidence and to controvert those that are brought against him; to contest the condemnatory sentence, and not to be judged twice for the same act ".

In other words, due process guarantees that the people involved in legal terms have a fair process and that the results are not altered without any support.

Vulnerability

According to the Department of National Planning (2007), vulnerability is the probability that a person lives with low levels of well-being. This definition was reinforced in the sentence T-244 of 2010 where it was established as a "multidimensional process that influences the risk or probability of the citizen of being injured or damaged before changes or permanence of external or internal situations". In social and collective terms, vulnerability represents a state of fragility and helplessness in the face of a situation that negatively affects their well-being (Judgment t-224).

3. Methodology

The research design is a very important aspect because it guides data collection and analysis processes (Bryman, 2012). However, the researcher should adopt a flexible approach, and be able to reshape the study if necessary, as he/she acquire more knowledge (Scheyvens & Storey 2003). Especially, when a study employs both quantitative and qualitative data, the study must integrate the data to enrich and complement the purpose of the research.

A mixed methods research is developed in this study because both quantitative and qualitative data are integrated. This type of design seeks to complement and extend the scope of the study (Bryman, 2012). A mixed methods approach was chosen because it provides a range of aspects that wanted to be covered by the researcher. The researcher believes the concepts of the mixed-methods approach (Triangulation, Completeness, Offset and Process) bring elements that will enhance the study (Bryman, 2012). Even though the two data sets (qualitative and quantitative) don't correspond to each other, the mixed methods research would provide a more complete answer for the research questions. As one method could fill up the gap left by the other one. Additionally, the quantitative method can show a very rigid picture of social patterns and, the qualitative method can, therefore, bring concepts to life.

3.1 Research design

This study was based on an explanatory sequential design, to try to explain the reasons behind people's perceptions of factors of success. However, the quantitative method takes the leadership role in drawing relationships and conclusions. The qualitative method was used to have a deeper understanding of differences among participants.

In this study, the quantitative approach was applied through a survey questionnaire, whereby beneficiaries answered closed-ended questions about their social and economic status. Despite, the closed-ended questions, some participants were willing to share interesting deeds

with the researcher. The close-ended questions were raised in order to collect data on the impacts of beneficiaries after completing the government's programmes. This method addressed Objective 1 (See section 1.2.2) of the study because it collects data that allowed the researcher to find traits and perceptions of the participants. This method captured the relationship between their personal traits and the programme.

The qualitative part is twofold as it explores a) emotions, opinions and experiences of the beneficiaries that were used to explain the patterns, and b) an open interview with an IPES employee to assess their biggest challenges when implementing this type of programmes. This method seeks to address Objective 2 (See section 1.2.2).

3.2 Selection of study area

Taken from https://www.google.com/maps/place/Bogot%C3%A1,+Bogota/@4.6482837,-74.2478938,11z/data=!3m1!4b1!4m5!3m4!1s0x8e3f9bfd2da6cb29:0x239d635520a33914!8m2!3d4.7109886!4d-74.072092 [Accessed 12 May 2019]

Bogotá is the capital of Colombia and is administratively divided into 20 localities. Each locality has its own Minor Mayor and a Local Administrative Board (Cultura Recreación y Deporte, 2019).

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The IPES programs have been implemented in Bogota, the capital of the country. In order not to reveal detailed information that may affect the participants of the study, in line with NSD principles, specific locations will not be mentioned. The programs are distributed throughout the city, and the localities chosen for the study were: Suba, Engativá, Chapinero, Teusaquillo, and La Candelaria. These locations were chosen due to time and budget limitations. Within these general localities, two meeting points, 47 kiosks, 13 establishments for people over 60, one shopping centre, one permanent fair and one temporary fair were studied.

3.3. Nature and sources of data

3.3.1. Primary data collection

The researcher collected primary data, via surveys to test our hypothesis. Through this quantitative study, traits and characteristics were analysed to find associations between the perception of success and the beneficiaries. Hence, each question represented a variable from which information was obtained to find out significance among variables. Variables act as a mean to explain situations, and reactions when one of them changes (Bryman, 2012). Variables are categorized into binary categorical, ordinal/scale variable, numerical and ordinal.

The questionnaire was comprised of 46 questions. Among which, 14 were used to describe the characteristics of the sample, 3 were used as dependent categorical variables, 4 were used as binary categorical variables and 9 were used as independent variables in the models. It is always important to identify the variables and their roles. Each question represents a variable, according to the answers we can test a regression model and make conclusions.

1. For the first models, a binary logistic regression was performed and therefore, the dependent variables are binary categorical. The following yes/no questions defined the binary dependent variables:

Variable	Question
Expectation fulfilment	Were your expectations fulfilled?
Mental conditions improved	Have your working conditions improved, in terms of mental demands?
Health conditions improved	Have your working conditions improved, in terms of health?

Increase in income	Have you perceived an increase in your personal income?

Likewise, for the ordered logistic regressions, the dependent variables were categorical. This means that the answers were on scale from 1 to 5, where 1 represented strongly disagree, 2 disagree, 3 neutral, 4 agree and 5 strongly agree. The following ranked variables were considered:

Variable	Question
Labour conditions improved	How much do you agree with the following question? "The IPES programme improved my labour conditions?"
General welfare improved	How much do you agree with the following question? "The IPES programme improved my general welfare?"
Programme success	How successful do you think the programme is?

The reason behind choosing these variables was to identify any relationship between them and the independent variables. The independent variable is a variable that cannot be impacted or influenced by others. Furthermore, they have control over the dependent variables. In this case, the independent variables for the models were:

1. Identity variables

Variable	Type of answer	Type or variable
City of Origin	From Bogotá or born in another part of the country	Binary categorical
Age		Numerical
Gender	Female or male	Binary categorical
Marital status	Single, married, cohabiting, divorced or widower	Categorical
Number of dependants		Numerical

Years of formal schooling		Numerical
Head of household	Yes or no	Binary categorical

2. Informal activities variables

Variable	Type of answer	Type or variable
Programme enrolled	Meeting points Kiosks Permanent fairs Marketplaces Temporary fairs Shopping Centres Over 60 programme Other	Categorical
Time in informal activities		Numerical

3.3.2. Secondary data:

Secondary data was also included in the study. Secondary data analysis takes place when one study employs the data that somebody else has analysed first (Bryman, 2012). Secondary data complements areas that were not included in the primary data. It also makes the conclusions more robust as secondary data serves as benchmarks in different topics, broadening the scope of the study and offering new interpretations (Bryman, 2012).

The secondary data used in this study was theoretical, historical and legal information. For the theoretical part, the study includes previous investigations and papers that contributed to understanding the informal economy phenom, especially in Latin America. For the historical part, studies about how the different Colombian administrations have tackled this issue were reviewed. This historical part gave the researcher a new perspective and a deeper

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understanding of the importance of IPES as a control body in Bogotá. The legal part reviews the normativity that regulates the way IPES operates, the way police can intervene, and the constitutional rights that legally protect streets vendors.

3.4. Sample selection procedure

According to Bryman (2012), the sample is a proportion of the population from which the required information is extracted for research and analysis. To choose a sample, one can use the probability or non-probability approach. For the purpose of the study, with a limited resource, the convenience non-probability method was the most suitable and easy approach. The sample was elaborated on a non-probabilistic convenience procedure due to availability and accessibility (Bryman, 2012).

The sample was developed from the following criteria:

- Target population: The target population is the group of people that share the same attribute and is interesting for the researcher. In this particular case, the target population was all participants involved in any of the IPES programme offers. The researcher was not able to find any data that documented the total number of beneficiaries.
- Available population: The three biggest groups of the IPES programmes are: relocation, credit/entrepreneurship and education training. The researcher could not get access to people enrolled in credits/ entrepreneurship and education programmes. Due to data privacy regulations, IPES is not allowed to disclose personal information about beneficiaries to the public. Therefore, the researcher focused her study on relocation programmes because those places are easy-accessible and, reliable to find beneficiaries.
- Studied population: As mentioned before the localities where the study took place were: Suba, Engativá, Chapinero, Teusaquillo, and La Candelaria. The sample was collected from December 15th, 2018 and January 25th, 2019. The localities were selected due to accessibility and the researcher's security perception. Some of the areas where these solutions are located are not very safe and therefore were excluded. The researcher was able to interview 116 participants.

3.5. Limitations

The researcher is aware of the limitations of a non-probabilistic sampling method. The probability sample method ensures that every member of the population has the same chance to be selected for the study (Bryman, 2012). This method is effective because the sample can be representative, keeping the sampling error as low as possible (Bryman, 2012). On the other side, the non-probability method misses the random selection. Therefore, some participants are more likely to be selected than others (Bryman, 2012). However, the convenience non-probability method employed was suitable and straightforward because the researcher did not count with the whole population information and did not have the resources to do a probability sample design. This means that the sample might be biased because beneficiaries from the kiosk programme were more likely to take the survey than beneficiaries from other programmes.

Another limitation of this non-probability method is that even though the findings allege something, one cannot generalise because it's uncertain that the sample is representative (Bryman, 2012). Considering that this study relies on the subjective assessments of programme participants and IPES employees; the findings may not apply for the rest of the population.

A logistical limitation was the timing the data collection took place. Since it was in December, the researcher found many urban kiosks, meeting points, permanent fair tents closed. Undoubtedly, this reduced the chances of including more participants in the sample. It is important to mention that the December-January period is when the majority of elementary and high schools have holidays. Therefore, it is a very common time for families to take travel to warmer areas. This represents a lower demand for goods, and good timing for beneficiaries to also take a break, as they might not commercialize as much as usual.

The final limitation the researcher was able to notice was some kind of reluctance from the beneficiaries. Some of them did not want to participate, claiming that they did not want to get into any trouble with IPES. Others claimed that they have already participated in many surveys and did not really see the point of it. Additionally, some of the beneficiaries who agree to participate did not really seem very involved and were given really quick answers to be done with the survey. Nevertheless, the majority of them showed a lot of interested, e when the researcher told them it was for an international master thesis. They saw in it as an opportunity to transmit a message.

3.6. Ethics in Field Research

Ethics in social research are controversial but have been taking more significance in recent years (Bryman, 2012). According to Diener and Crandall (1980), there are four issues that may arise in any study, and the following section explains how they were addressed by the researcher.

- Harm to participants: Harm can happen in several aspects. For instance, "physical harm; harm to participants' development; loss of self-esteem; stress", as Bryman (2012, p. 135) puts it. To avoid harming the participants, all the surveys were done anonymously. This means that no one will be able to trace them back and harm them for their answers. Stressed was handled by reassuring them that the research did not need personal data such as Name, ID number, address, etc. Loss of self-esteem was handled by congratulating them for pursuing the programme and being a successful beneficiary. In some cases, to gain their trust, it was needed to buy some merchandise from them, and then they seemed more relaxed.

- Lack of informed consent: Bryman (2012) states that informed consent is a key element for social research, as participants are entailed of receiving as much information as they need. For this purpose, all of the participants were greeted and asked if they wanted to be part of a study for a Master thesis. Some of them agreed immediately, others asked for more information and asked for my ID student card. Some agreed by seeing the ID student card and others wanted more information. Six participants asked for more information. Hence, the researcher showed them the translated into Spanish NSD letter, and they were satisfied with it. Other beneficiaries did not want to participate at all.

- Invasion of privacy: To avoid an invasion of privacy and as mentioned earlier, all participants were asked to agree on participating. Besides, the questionnaire did not contain any question which was disrespectful or too private. The experiences they share emerged from the casual conversations the researcher had with participants.

- Deception is involved: To avoid deception, the researcher was very clear and straightforward towards the participants. Some of them, asked if the researcher could intercede and demand extra benefits for them. In such cases, the researcher explained

how she had no relationship with the government and that she could therefore not get involved.

4. Results and Findings

The primary data collected was analysed in four sections. Section 1 is a description of the sample; the information was discriminated by genre and personal characteristics. Section 1 provides an overview of the participants of the study and their personal traits. Section 2 is a description of the overall performance of the programme. This section includes qualitative inputs that try to explain why people answered the way they did. Section 3 encompasses binary logistic regressions that show relationships between the people's identity characteristics and the binary categorical performance variables. Lastly, Section 4 is constituted by three ordered logistic regression where the performance ranked variables were used as dependent variables. And, the independent variables were the same identity and programme variables, used in Section 3.

4.1. Sample characteristics and distributions

From a sample of 116 people, 60.3% were male and 39.7% were female. A high level of internal migration to the cities is registered as 52.9% of the males and 47.83% of the females had migrated to Bogotá, which means that 50.9% of the participants have migrated to the city. This is consistent with the rural-urban migration during the 1980s, that hyper populated Bogotá and led to the expansion of the informal sector (Donovan, 2002).

The average age of the sample is 52 years old; however, the majority of the studied population are in intermediate adulthood (46 to 59 years old) and represent 44% of the participants. Surprisingly, seniors and youth are equally present, with 26.7% each category. IPES (2016) in

an internal study, also identified the average to be 52 years old. However, in the same study (IPES, 2016), they identified a more even sample in terms of genre. 51.9% males and 48.1% females, out of 49.851, which implies that the study's sample could be a bit biased.

As expected the majority of the population is in the lower strata. In Colombia, the social stratum is a public policy that describes the socioeconomic level of a person, where 1 represents the lowest economic level and 6 the highest (Uribe-Mallarino, 2008). From the sample, 70.7% come from the most underprivileged social and economic strata (strata 1 and 2).

Men of the sample show a lower level of commitment than women in terms of marital status, as 55.7% are not married or cohabiting, compared to 50% of females who are involved in a relationship. Nevertheless, both genres are usually head of household (85.7% of males and 71.7% of females) and their family nucleus mean is 3.5 members.

In terms of education level, there is a notorious difference between male and female participants. While it is generally believed that women have less access to education, females in this sample performed better with 28.3% of illiterates against 44.3% men; 43.5% of the females completed primary school against 38.6% of men; 21.7% of the women graduated from high school compared to 14.3% of men and, 6.5% of females have post-secondary studies in contrast to 2.9% of males.

Another strong belief is that street vendors live in rented accommodation, which was confirmed by 75.9% of the sample. As well as, 70% have subsidized health insurance. Borja, Barreto and Sánchez (2008) found in his study that good health is one of the most important conditions for them to be able to work. However, 14.7% of the studied population do not have any type of health insurance. This is a high percentage, considering that Colombia is a Social state under the rule of law, where access to healthcare is a constitutional right.

In terms of the type of employment before entering the informal economy, 38.8% of the sample was in the formal sector, the rest had always been informal in several different ways. 30.2% said that selling on the streets had been their only job, 22.4% was working for informal facilities such as restaurants, bakeries or convenience stores. 6% worked as independent service providers such as construction and transport and 2.6% worked in agriculture which implies they are immigrants who entered the informal sector immediately.

With the aim of understanding and analysing the causes and factors that led the participants to engage in informal activities, they were asked to share with the researcher why they entered the informal sector and what influence had their social network had in the process. The most common reason for entering the informal sector was low costs (30.2%), followed by lack of government support (20.7%) and unemployment/necessity (18.1%). Additionally, while 44% started by their own initiative, the rest was introduced by family (37.1%) and friends (18.1%). The researcher considered a low family network rate, due to the assumption that families usually maintain their informal activities within their family circle.

4.2. General Performance

As the objective is to address whether the programmes have improved participant's livelihoods or not, the category "neutral" in the scale variables will be considered as if it HAD NOT improved their livelihood. The researcher assumes that having the same level of welfare is not a better situation.

4.2.1. Labour Conditions

Table 1 represents an overview of the sample's opinion about how much they believed the IPES programmes had improved their working conditions and general welfare. The majority of people (59.5%) believe that the government programme contributed to improving their labour conditions. The sum of the options with a lower score (strongly disagree, disagree, neutral) is 40.5% of the population. This implies that there are still missing factors that need to be improved to equally benefit all the participants.

In a similar study, Donovan (2002, p. 96) found that 67% of the programme beneficiaries perceived an improvement in their working conditions, in terms of, cleanliness, garbage removal and noise. Even though Donovan (2002) only interviewed beneficiaries relocated to Commercial Centres, it provides a benchmark for the present study. Thereupon, the beneficiaries' perceptions were discriminated by the programme they participated in.

Table 1: Beneficiaries responses about labour conditions and general welfare perceptions by the level of agreement.

		Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly agree	Grand Total
Labour conditions	Count	18	12	17	30	39	116
	%	15.5%	10.3%	14.7%	25.9%	33.6%	100.0%
General welfare	Count	22	13	24	26	31	116
	%	18.1%	11.2%	19.0%	25.0%	26.7%	100.0%

Table 2 illustrates the summary of beneficiaries' perceptions by the programme. The programmes which obtain that highest ranking were Over 60 programme, Meeting Points and Permanent Fairs. Likewise, the programmes which present the weakest performance in terms of labour conditions are Market Places, Temporary Fairs and Kiosks. With regard to Shopping Centres, the perception is very similar to Donovan's study, which implies that some of the same issues may persist.

Table 2: Beneficiaries labour conditions perceptions by programme.

	Kiosks	Market Places	Meeting points	Over 60 program	Permanent fairs	Shopping Centres	Temporary fairs	Grand Total
Did not improve	48.9%	80.0%	8.3%	15.4%	10.0%	33.3%	70.0%	40.5%
Improved	51.1%	20.0%	91.7%	84.6%	90.0%	66.7%	30.0%	59.5%

Table 1 also shows the sample's answers about their welfare perception. Participants were asked if they believed that the IPES programmes had improved their general welfare. We see some differences in the perception of labour conditions and welfare. In this case, there is a reduction in the percentage of people that believe the programmes improved their welfare (51.7%). Consequently, the answers show an increase in their level of disagreement (48.3%). This variation could entail another flaw of the programme. To understand this variation, programme discrimination was also performed and is illustrated in Table 3.

It should be recalled that this administration adopted an inclusive approach. Including street vendors in the design of the programs contributes in identifying the target and improves the result of the programs (Warsono, Priyanto & Riyanto, 2016). The importance of understanding street vendor's reality is portrayed in the success of relocation programmes in Indonesia. In the city of Surakarta, the successful relocation programmes included and analysis of the

operational needs, a socialization phase and a communication strategy (Warsono, Priyanto & Riyanto, 2016).

During the field work, these three elements were also identified. First, only street vendors know the dynamics and the need of the market. Thus, it makes sense to include, as they mentioned very interesting inputs that the researcher had never though of. For instance, the tough competition they experience and their need to innovate. The insecurity risks they are exposed to, as many claimed they have been gun-robbed. The intern logistic they perform every day to have enough product offer. For these and many other reasons, it is vital to include them in the design of the programmes, as well as, to follow up to learn from mistakes.

The socialization phase is also critical. Many of the participants feel undermined because of the way police treated them, and the exposure to hard weather conditions of pollution. Thus, it is only normal that they feel inferior and abandoned by the governments and society itself. The researcher believes that self-esteem workshops would boost the potential of the programmes because the participants would be motivated.

The communication is important because the government has to prove the programmes are worthwhile. That they will indeed improve their life conditions, participants need to know and experience the value added of the programmes. Otherwise, it would be very difficult to engage more participants and to keep the programmes running.

As Table 3 displays, the newest programmes (Over 60 and meeting points) performed better than the other. The results of including street vendors in the development of the programmes are positive in this case.

Table 3: Beneficiaries general welfare perceptions by programme

	Kiosks	Market Places	Meeting points	Over 60 program	Permanent fairs	Shopping Centres	Temporary fairs	Grand Total
Did not improve	61.7%	100.0%	16.7%	23.1%	0.0%	33.3%	70.0%	48.3%
Improved	38.3%	0.0%	83.3%	76.9%	100.0%	66.7%	30.0%	51.7%

The only programme that presented an increase in its perception was Permanent Fairs. In the case of Shopping Centres and Temporary Fairs, participants reckon that labour conditions and

general welfare mean almost the same since these indicators have no variation. The rest of the participants expressed an interesting trait. While they voiced that their labour conditions had improved, it didn't necessarily apply for their general welfare. This is shown in the decreasing level of agreement of the Kiosks, Market Places, Meeting Points and Over 60 programme.

The Contraloría de Bogotá is the public control body that evaluates entities within the District. In 2012, the Contraloría de Bogotá only 53% of the kiosks were active. This means 192 out of 365 beneficiaries were actively using the kiosks. Contraloría de Bogotá (2012) reported that the design of the kiosks did not protect beneficiaries from the weather. Additionally, beneficiaries reported armed robberies, because they do not have a security system. Some of the kiosks were located in non-commercial areas, causing that the beneficiaries abandoned them and return to street vending.

To understand better, in what terms had beneficiaries' conditions improved or deteriorate. Participants were asked 6 yes or no questions, to determine which aspects had had the greatest variation. The issues are displayed in the following table.

Table 4 represents yes/no questions participants were asked. We see a categorical difference, which could explain their perception of the efficiency of the programmes. The highest ranked improvement was mental conditions. People meant that the fact that they didn't have to worry about evictions or police prosecutions was a huge relief.

Physical conditions and health improvement percentages don't vary so much. This suggests that people associate their health with their physical condition. It makes sense to believe that people that are still exposed to all the street problematic did not perceive much improvement, compared to people who were relocated to in-doors facilities.

Table 4: Programme's success evaluation components.

	No	Yes
Rest Periods	38.8%	61.2%
Physical Conditions	12.9%	87.1%
Mental Conditions	8.6%	91.4%
Health	16.4%	83.4%
Expectations	49.1%	50.9%
Income	25.0%	75.0%

4.3. Identity and perception binary logistic regressions

Binary logistic regressions were performed in order to find associations between income, expectations fulfilment and mental conditions and, personal and programme characteristics of participants.

4.3.1. Income

Binary regressions are associative models, which allow identifying the relationship between the explanatory variables and the response variable (Hosmer, Lemeshow & Sturdivant, 2013). Income is analysed because it's a very important determinant for beneficiaries. Thus, the programmes have to guarantee at least the same average income that they used to have when they were in the streets. It's also an important indicator that will incentivize them not to abandon their alternative.

The first model was only run with seven personal variables, which are: city of origin, gender, marital status, economic dependents, age, years of education and head of household. The model showed significance in the city of origin and age variables. Therefore, it is clear that these variables have some effect in the model. To analyse the magnitude of the effect, the odds ratios were interpreted. Odds ratios represent how many times the probability of something happening increases or decreases (Hosmer, Lemeshow & Sturdivant, 2013). For age, the odds ratio is smaller than 1, thus, the probability of answering that the income increased is smaller as the person gets older. Hence, older people perceive lower income. This is interesting because the reasons might not be directly related to the programmes. An older person might work fewer hours than a younger one. Additionally, the younger person could offer more innovative merchandise. For example, one of the youngest beneficiaries sold warm biscuits, which he heated in a microwave. This is an extra service that he only he had, which could represent more inflow. Additionally, he mentioned how important it was to provide good customer service, to acquire regular customers. Older people might not have the same patience or interest in providing a good service.

The other relevant variable is "City of origin". Its odds ratio describes that the probability of a person who was not born in Bogotá admits that his/her income had increased is 2.62 times higher than a person who had been born in the capital. This implies that migrants estimate more economic rewards than people born in Bogotá. Further studies should analyse income levels among migrants and non-migrants, to really assess these perceptions. For a person who comes from a rural area, the income increase perception might be higher than a person

who was born in the city. This result was expected, as people from rural areas usually migrate to the city seeking better opportunities.

For the second phase, two more variables that are directly related to the programmes were added. These variables are type of programme and time in informal activities. This regression showed 4 significant variables, city of origin, gender, time in informal activities and type of programme. In that order of ideas, the most significant variables were analysed.

City of origin: As in the first model, if a person was not born in Bogotá, his/her probability of answering that his/her income had increased is five times higher than a person born in Bogotá.

Gender: Males will have about the twice as high probability of responding that his income has increased compared to women.

Time in informal activities: Since it is a numerical variable, the probability is interpreted by the fact that this variable increase in one unit. In this case, the probability of a saying that his/her income increased is nine times higher for each additional year that the beneficiary had been in informal activities. I find this a very engaging result. The fact that a person who has remained in the informal sector for a long time and notices an economic benefit can be interpreted as a positive result. The longer a person had been in the informal economy, the more he/she manages the dynamics of the sector. Hence, the researcher believes that the message the more experienced people is transmitting is that formalizing is profitable.

Type of programme: It is a very important variable because it is possible to identify differences within the programmes. In this case, the reference category is "Kiosks". Hence, all the participants of the other programmes are more likely to state an increase in income. Meeting points represent the highest probability of a positive answer. Permanent fairs, market places and over 60 programmes follow in that order. Last come shopping centres and temporary fairs.

Another interesting result due to the nature of the alternatives. All the alternatives have the same commercial concept behind it. The kiosk alternative was on one of the first implemented policies. Thus, kiosks served as a pilot project for relocation programs, which can explain its lower score. A positive outcome is that IPES learned from the feedback, and included street vendors to design future policies such as meeting point and over 60 programmes. Beneficiaries opinions support the notion that more inclusive policies work better than imposing ones.

Table 5: Binary regression for the increase in income

Independent Variable	Model 1		Model 2	
	Coefficient	Odds Ratio	Coefficient	Odds Ratio
Q3: City of Origin	0,3594	2,6233	0,0062**	5,2935
Q5: Age	0,7648	0,9411	0,7192	1,0121
Q6: Gender	0,2884	0,5789	0.0648.	3,0397
Q7: Marital Status	0,1605		0,4086	
Single		0,9760		1,8675
Other		0,4042		4,1676
Q9: Economic Dependants	0,4344	8,5126	0,6024	8,5126
Q10: Head of Household	0,9284	1,0741	0,2855	2,0592
Q11: Years of education	0,8795	0,9549	0,2681	9,0052
Q15: Time in Informal Activities			0.0416*	9,4671
Q19: Type of Programme			0.0020**	
Market Places				9,5607
Shopping Centres				8,6532
Meeting Points				5,4716
Temporary Fairs				1,5007
Permanent Fairs				3,7710
Over 60				1,2736

Level of significance: * 0.05 ** 0.01 *** 0.001 .0.1

AIC: 134,65   120,53

4.3.2. Expectations Fulfilment

This model is displayed in Table 6, the relationship between the expectations of the beneficiaries and the identity variables is not strong enough to interpret. However, when the programme variables are added, we obtain that marital status, age and head of household become significant.

Regarding the type of programme, the reference variable is still "kiosks", the odds ratios show a result similar to the previous variable (increase revenue). With that said, the participants of the other programmes have still a higher probability of saying that their expectations were fulfilled compared to the kiosk's beneficiaries. The participants who presented the highest probability of giving a positive answer were the shopping centres beneficiaries. Likewise, the participants with the least probability of answering positively were the participants of the temporary fair. This result sustains the concept of newer policies. It makes sense that people with access to toilets and security have a higher level of agreement than the people of kiosks. They are still exposed to many dangers and conditions.

As the type of programme variable, time in informal activities also delivered a strong result. The variable entails that the probability of a person saying that their expectations were fulfilled will be 8.97 times higher per each additional year that the person had spent in informal activities. That is, the longer a person has been performing informal activities, the more likely it is that that person states that the programme did, in fact, satisfied his/her expectations.

Marital status also presents relevance in this model. In this case, involved is the reference variable. The odds ratios show that a person who is single, divorced or a widower will more likely say that their expectations were fulfilled in comparison to a person who is married or is cohabiting. This shows the level of expectation variations. A person with a family or just a partner might have different future prospects. It would be very interesting to explore more deeply what are the long-term expectations differences. Hence, if a significant difference is found, IPES could include a future prospect mechanism in the programmes.

Age is another relevant variable in this model. This numerical variable estimates that the person's probability of saying that his/her expectations were fulfilled will be 1.08 times higher per additional year in his/her lifetime. In other words, the older the person, the higher the probability of answering that the programme had satisfied his/her expectations.

Lastly, the least strong variable is head of household. This is an interesting variable as heads of households carry a heavier burden than the one who does not have to economically support a family. Surprisingly, a head of household person yielded a 1.86 times higher probability of answering yes in this question than a person who is not head of household. This variance represents how the level of expectations differs, a person with a higher economic burden might be more satisfied with some improvement. While a person who does not have to economically support others could have higher expectations.

According to the IPES satisfaction study (2016), participants whose expectations were fulfilled and were satisfied lauded the good infrastructure and the provision of cleaning and security services. That could be behind the participants of the kiosk programme answers. They are the ones who are spread out in the city. Hence, they do not share a common area with several participants. They do not count with the service of public toilets and private security and, they do not perceive an additional cleaning service. Consequently, all the benefits IPES (2016) highlights do not apply for kiosks participants, and it has put them as the least satisfied beneficiaries.

Table 6: Binary regression for expectations fulfilment

Independent Variable	Model 1		Model 2	
	Coefficient	Odds Ratio	Coefficient	Odds Ratio
Q3: City of Origin	0,5489	0,7857	0,7795	1,1926
Q5: Age	0,3818	0,9850	0,0243*	1,0857
Q6: Gender	0,5913	0,7988	0,1908	4,5314
Q7: Marital Status	0,1605		0,0018**	
Single		1,8033		7,3690
Other		4,8925		6,2868
Q9: Economic Dependants	0,8494	1,0265	0,1114	1,4268
Q10: Head of Household	0,4188	0,6520	0,0562.	1,8524
Q11: Years of education	0,8795	1,0095	0,3728	9,1367
Q15: Time in Informal Activities			0,0009***	8,9728
Q19: Type of Programme			1,574e-12***	
Market Places				7,8159
Shopping Centres				7,8104
Meeting Points				4,3614
Temporary Fairs				1,0719
Permanent Fairs				5,7375
Over 60				1,6241

Level of significance: * 0.05 ** 0.01 *** 0.001 .0.1

| AIC: | 171,66 | | 110,56 | |

4.3.3. Mental Conditions

Both models are displayed in Table 8 and 9. In the first model, where only identity variables are considered. The model showed that age is a relevant variable with an odds ratio 0.93, which means that a person's probability of saying yes to a mental improvement is 0.93 times lower per each additional year in his/her lifetime. Thus, a senior person is more likely to say that their mental conditions did not improve. In other words, the younger age groups will be more likely to say their mental conditions have improved, compared to seniors.

In the second model, "Type of Programme" yielded high significance, with a confidence level of 99%. For the first time, participants in the Kiosks programme do not show the worst performance. Market place beneficiaries are less likely to respond that their mental conditions have improved because of the IPES programmes. This could be because they don't really perceive a relevant Government management body. Besides the support to renovate the

building's facilities, participants did not seem to have much interaction with IPES. The group that has a higher probability of responding positively is the group of permanent fairs. And the group that has a lower probability of responding positively are the participants of the over 60 programme.

These overall results are very interesting because out of all the programmes, kiosks are the ones who are the least innovative and do not represent a significant change. Beneficiaries only get a small but authorized place to sell their goods. But they are still exposed to weather, robberies, pollution and noise from the street. While the people at fairs, for instance, get a much bigger and secure place. Many of the fair's beneficiaries stated that they feel very safe because they collectively pay for a 24/7 security guard. In terms of the other programmes, such as meeting points, over 60 programme, market places and shopping centres, they are also located in commercial and crowded areas where police and private security are always around.

Time in informal activities also yielded as a significant variable. From the odds ratio, it is possible to say that a person's probability of saying yes to mental conditions improvement will be higher per every additional year in informal activities. In other words, the more time a person has been involved in informal activities, the more likely he/she is to answer that his/her mental conditions have improved.

Further on, age and years of marital status will be interpreted. For the variable age, the pattern continues, as an older person is more likely to say that his/her mental conditions have improved. In this case, the probability of saying yes is 1.28 times higher per additional year of a lifetime. For marital status, the variable shows that a person who is married or cohabiting is less likely to state that his/her mental conditions have not improved. While a single person's probability to say a positive answer is 5.4 times higher.

For gender, the odds ratio states that males have a higher probability of affirming that their mental conditions improved. Additionally, the probability of saying yes to this question increases twice per financially dependent person. As well as, it increases 2.37 time, per additional year of schooling.

As said before, participants expressed their relief because they did not have to hide from the police anymore. Borja, Barreto and Sánchez (2008) define security as one of the decisive factors that affected street vendors' living conditions. This might explain that market places beneficiaries had not perceived an improvement in their mental conditions. Since they have never been relocated and have had their place for many years (43.4 years average), it clearly shows why they don't really notice IPES's management.

Table 7: Binary regression for mental conditions

Independent Variable	Model 1		Model 2	
	Coefficient	Odds Ratio	Coefficient	Odds Ratio
Q3: City of Origin	0,9132	0,9221	0,9997	3,5253
Q5: Age	0,0211*	0,9323	0,003***	1,2877
Q6: Gender	0,9683	0,9670	0,00013***	1,2350
Q7: Marital Status	0,3097		0,00016***	
Single		0,4130		5,4616
Other		0,1531		0,0000
Q9: Economic Dependants	0,3371	1,3051	0,0012**	2,0576
Q10: Head of Household	0,1685	3,6510	0,0017**	1,1254
Q11: Years of education	0,4696	1,0922	0,0018**	2,3711
Q15: Time in Informal Activities			0,00004***	5,4684
Q19: Type of Programme			0,000000003***	
Market Places				0,0000
Shopping Centres				1,2233
Meeting Points				3,4782
Temporary Fairs				2,4253
Permanent Fairs				8,8429
Over 60				1,0442

Level of significance: * 0.05 ** 0.01 *** 0.001 .0.1

AIC: 74,96   32

4.4. Determinants of ranked performance variables

This section follows the dynamic of the previous section. The difference is that in this section the dependent variables are ordered/scale. Besides that, two models were run by variable. In the first place, only identity variables are included. And in the second instance, the programme variables are added.

4.4.1. Labour Conditions

The models are displayed in Table 10 and 11. The first model that only includes identity variables did not show any significant variable. Similarly, to the previous section, when the programme variables are added, the model shows more significance. In regard to labour conditions, the question was to rank from 1 to 5 their agreement with a statement. The statement was "The IPES programmes have improved my general welfare". The variables that

directly impact the model are the type of programme, gender, years of education, age, time in informal activities and city of origin, in that correspondent order.

Regarding the type of programme, as in the previous section, the kiosk programme is the reference variable. Having said that, the odds ratios show that a person who participated in the marketplaces or temporary fairs are less likely to agree about the IPES improving their labour conditions than a beneficiary from the kiosk programme. Obviously, the reason behind these answers need to be further studied, but some participants mentioned details worth mentioning.

> *Market places:* "They did provide workmanship to renovate the floors and toilets of the marketplace. But we collectively raised the money for the materials. I wake up every day at 3 in the morning, go to the central marketplace (Corabastos) and buy the fruits I commercialize. I have no car and can't afford a taxi, I have to take public transport with heavy lumps to be able to supply every day. And that happens to the majority of us." This statement raises a very important point in the labour conditions of people working in the market places. In Bogotá, there is one big warehouse which is the "delivery point" for all the agricultural inputs that arrive in the capital city from the rest of the country. That might be the cheapest place to buy food in Bogotá. And it's the most important source of food supply and distribution of the city. However, to obtain the best and freshest goods, people need to go very early in the morning before everything is sold. On the description of the programmes, IPES claims that they will implement a supply system, to connect the big central marketplace to the rest of the smaller market places. However, from their statements, it was notorious that they weren't aware of this and that this is a big burden for them, as most of the participants wake up very early in the morning and to go and buy the fruits, vegetables and plants that they commercialize.

> *Temporary Fairs:* Temporary fairs are organized by season. I visited a Christmas fair that only happens once a year. This means that the rest of the year, participants need to find another type of activities to obtain income. The temporary fairs do not guarantee stability to the beneficiaries, as they are not able to constantly work.

On the contrary, beneficiaries from the meeting points, permanent fairs, shopping centres and over 60 programmes are the beneficiaries who more likely will say that their labour conditions have improved as a result of the IPES programme.

The gender pattern differs on this model, from the previous section. Interestingly, in this case, females were more likely to answer that their labour conditions have improved after participating in the IPES programmes. In regard to years of education, the model shows an

interesting effect. The odds ratio implies that for every additional year of education, the person more likely will say that his/her labour conditions have not improved. Hence, the higher the level of education, the more the level of disagreement with that statement.

The odds ratio for age shows that for every additional year of the age range, the probability of the person to say that his/her working conditions have improved is 1.05 times higher. Thus, the older the person, the more likely he/she will answer an improvement in his/her working conditions. Conversely, the time in informal activities' odds ratios suggests the opposite to age. In this case, the probability of a person confirming an improvement in his/her labour conditions decreases for each additional year involved in informal activities. Lastly, the pattern of city or origin persists in this model. A person who was not born in Bogota is twice more likely to answer that his/her working conditions have improved.

Table 8: Labour conditions logistic regression

Independent Variable	Model 1		Model 2	
	Coefficient	Odds Ratio	Coefficient	Odds Ratio
Q3: City of Origin	0,6437	1,1806	0,0574.	2,2166
Q5: Age	0,2634	1,0173	0,0133*	1,0584
Q6: Gender	0,0817	0,5229	0,0087**	0,3451
Q7: Marital Status	0,6794		0,2722	
Single		1,2433		1,6021
Other		1,9514		4,1095
Q9: Economic Dependants	0,9648	1,0053	0,6012	1,0780
Q10: Head of Household	0,3945	0,6610	0,1846	0,4927
Q11: Years of education	0,1179	0,9169	0,0016**	0,8184
Q15: Time in Informal Activities			0,0322*	0,9554
Q19: Type of Programme			0,000000005***	
Market Places				0,1387
Shopping Centres				2,8837
Meeting Points				8,4660
Temporary Fairs				0,2687
Permanent Fairs				71,8209
Over 60				3,1151

Level of significance: * 0.05 ** 0.01 *** 0.001 .0.1

AIC: 369,05   328,74

4.4.2. General Welfare

In regard to the general welfare, the participants also had to rank from 1 to 5 their perception towards if the IPES programs had improved their general welfare. In this model, type of program shows the highest statistical significance and takes kiosks as the reference variable. The beneficiaries from temporary fairs and market places have a smaller probability of saying that they agree with the statement that says that the IPES program has improved their general welfare. By way of conclusion, beneficiaries from over 60 program, permanent fairs, meeting point and shopping centres programs will more likely agree with the statement.

As presented in Table 9, years of education and time in informal activities also showed significance. Both presented odds ratios smaller than 1. Just like the answer to labour conditions, people with more years of schooling and people with long experience in the informal sector will have a smaller probability of agreeing with the statement. The gender pattern continues, as a male is less likely to have a high perception of the IPES programs improving his general welfare. Namely, women will more likely agree with the statement. Lastly, age has the same behaviour as in the previous section. Each year of life will increase 1.05 times the probability of agreeing with the statement.

IPES (2016) inquired about the improvement of participants' quality of life during their time in the program. There are some differences in comparison to the present study that are exposed in the following table:

Response	Present study	IPES satisfaction study
Improved	49.1%	57%
Remain unchanged	20.7%	6%
Worsened	30.2%	37%

The main difference is in the "remain unchanged" option, which could be explained by the way the question was made. In the IPES (2016) satisfaction study, there were only those three options. While in the present study, there was a 1 to 5 scale, and neutral (Number 3) was defined as "remain unchanged".

After conducting the field work, the researcher got many ideas about why general welfare might have improved. Even though the questionnaire was close-ended, participants voluntarily

added some personal input. The researcher got the idea that the fact that they didn't have to worry about police operations improved their welfare, as one beneficiary mentioned.

"Evictions are awful. Police mistreat us a lot and most of the times we lose our merchandise. These programs offer safety which does make the difference because it takes off a huge weight off your shoulders".

Furthermore, the programme provides added value in terms of storing. They are able to safely store their merchandise and thus, their logistical operations were enhanced, as one of them stated:

"I think one of the biggest benefits is that I don't have to carry the merchandise every day anymore. I can lock it in and I know it won't get stolen. I was never able to find a reliable person close to the area I used to work at who could keep my goods overnight. There were always some items disappearing from my trolley. That is why I decided to carry it back and forth every day, but it was really heavy. Hence, I am so glad I get to store it in a safe place now. I think it had greatly improved my health, as my back does not hurt anymore."

As stated before, the kiosk programme scores very low compared to the others. The researcher observed that this is the least innovative option. Participants are still located on the street, which for them does not really represent a major improvement. About this, one participant said:

"I am still on the streets. I still get wet when it rains and am exposed to the sun when it's warm. And don't even get me started on the pollution. I am located in a good, crowded place, and I appreciate that. However, cars and weather are still my number one worry. I can't go to the toilet during the day, because there are no facilities around. I think there's so much room for improvement still".

Another worry that kiosks participants have is their accentuated competition. Not only they compete against other street vendors who have not enrolled in the programs and sell very similar merchandise. But they have to keep low prices to be able to compete against low-priced food stores, as one beneficiary suggested:

"Yes, this kiosk has improved some aspects. However, I have always worked around this area and have had my regular customers. I have also been selling the

same products (snacks, candy, cigarettes, etc). So, I don´t think the change has been so noticed by my customers. Additionally, they opened a low-cost department store last year around here, and now, people prefer to go and buy there because it's almost half price. I have noticed that many of my customers do that. We are still good friends but I understand that they want to buy what's cheaper."

These are some of the issues mentioned by the participants. They are aware the programmes are advantageous in some ways. But they also raise some important issues that should be considered when designing these programs.

Table 9: General Welfare logistic regression

Independent Variable	Model 1		Model 2	
	Coefficient	Odds Ratio	Coefficient	Odds Ratio
Q3: City of Origin	0,6260	0,8420	0,5704	1,2512
Q5: Age	0,7396	1,0048	0,0322*	1,0490
Q6: Gender	0,2260	0,6423	0,0450*	0,4576
Q7: Marital Status	0,5645		0,2583	
Single		0,9870		1,2541
Other		2,7253		5,2426
Q9: Economic Dependants	0,4672	1,0921	0,3780	1,1332
Q10: Head of Household	0,5371	0,7478	0,2616	0,5572
Q11: Years of education	0,4862	0,9632	0,0141*	0,8643
Q15: Time in Informal Activities			0,0212*	0,9550
Q19: Type of Programme			0,000000004***	
Market Places				0,1688
Shopping Centres				4,4984
Meeting Points				8,6453
Temporary Fairs				0,3176
Permanent Fairs				53,2242
Over 60				3,0021

Level of significance: * 0.05 ** 0.01 *** 0.001 .0.1
AIC: 359,58 341,32

4.4.3. The success of the programme

For the last model, participants were asked to rank from 1 to 5 the success of the program. As presented in Table 10, the most significant variable is the type of program. Just like the

previous sections, the beneficiaries who have less probability of ranking the program as successful are the marketplaces and temporary fairs beneficiaries. On the other hand, permanent fairs and shopping centres beneficiaries are the most likely to give a good score than beneficiaries from the meeting points, kiosks and over 60 programme.

Time in informal activities, gender, and years of education do not significantly change in this model. Nevertheless, the model shows a new significant variable, head of household. The odds ratio suggests that a person who is indeed head of household would have a smaller probability of giving a good rating to the program.

Borja, Barreto and Sánchez (2008) identified the negative response from street vendors towards public space recovery policies. His study calls on the inclusion of all the stakeholders involved in this matter. This is reflected in the fact that people that have participated longer in informal activities were not taken into account when former city mayors developed these policies. IPES has inclusion programs where beneficiaries are asked about their main constraints. This is an improvement from previous policymakers, and it is reflected in the newer beneficiaries.

Donovan (2004) highlights the importance of creating and implementing coherent public policies that consider the needs of the target population, and that are sustainable in the long term. After many failed policies, relocation programs were implemented in the 90s. In the first instance, the popular sale fund and the media spread the message about the success of the relocation programs (Donovan, 2004). Beneficiaries experimented an improvement in terms of cleanliness, waste management and noise pollution.

Regarding this actual study, it appears as if the shopping centres group has improved its income and therefore their perceptions towards the government's programs. The shopping centres group reports the second highest probability in revenue growth, which is an improvement from previous studies (Olea and Huertas, 1996). Equally, they have the second biggest odds ratio when it comes to the success of the program.

Donovan (2004) detected a major deficiency in his study. The markets were not specialized, people were selling a little bit of everything. Indeed, he cross-market compared the shopping centres and found that 51.9 % of the beneficiaries of a book-specialized shopping centre stated an increase in their income. This might explain why shopping centres beneficiaries expressed a better result, the shopping centre the researcher visited was specialized in crafts and toys. However, this is just an insight from the researcher, the reasons why people in shopping centres report improvement nowadays needs to be further studied.

Comparing these results to the IPES satisfaction study (2016), people stated some positives and negatives aspects of their commercial alternative. The most important aspects for the respondents were location and consequently, the flow of customers. That explains why temporary fairs did not receive a good score. The flow of customers is not constant. Regardless of location or scope, the participants of temporary fairs are in a disadvantaged position in comparison to the other programs.

Other important aspects that the IPES (2016) identified were the range of products and labour capital. Those features mark a big difference among the commercial alternatives, and influence participant's answers. Participants of permanent fairs and shopping centres likelihood of saying the programmes are successful is 34 and 18 times higher respectively than kiosks participants. In that order of ideas, the range of products acquires relevance in explaining the success of the programs. Kiosks participants only commercialize snacks, cigarettes and bottled beverages, which indicated that they compete against convenience stores, supermarkets and other street vendors who have not joined the IPES programmes. By contrast, permanent fairs and shopping centres have a different product offering that drives people to reach out and make a product-specific purchase.

Another flaw the researcher perceive was an inconsistency between the design of the programme and the participant's experience. One of the characteristics of the program is to be a transitory solution while getting into the formal market. However, I met beneficiaries who have been in the same spot for 10 years or more. One of them expressed their expectations, and said the following:

> *"I really hope to be able to save up some more to invest in a real place. I don't want to commercialize on the streets all my life. I know this is an improvement, I feel safe here, but I really do hope one day I am able to expand my business and open my own place. Even though I think the program has benefited me a lot, I expect IPES to follow up on my process and push me forward to grow personally and professionally"*

As this beneficiary expressed, real success would entail saving enough money to be able to leave the streets. Some might expect to find a formal job and some might expect to open their own business. Therefore, the success of the programme could be assessed in whatever future prospects they have.

Independent Variable	Model 1		Model 2	
	Coefficient	Odds Ratio	Coefficient	Odds Ratio
Q3: City of Origin	0,7667	1,1094	0,2527	1,5588
Q5: Age	0,0662	0,0726	0,2702	1,0247
Q6: Gender	0,1325	0,5719	0,0373*	0,4379
Q7: Marital Status	0,6518		0,1466	
Single		1,3339		1,8190
Other		1,6768		4,1895
Q9: Economic Dependants	0,6565	1,0557	0,3036	1,1528
Q10: Head of Household	0,5499	0,7172	0,0815.	0,4199
Q11: Years of education	0,4558	0,9586	0,0553.	0,8894
Q15: Time in Informal Activities			0,01167*	0,9508
Q19: Type of Programme			0,000000005***	
Market Places				0,3083
Shopping Centres				18,0575
Meeting Points				8,0647
Temporary Fairs				0,4244
Permanent Fairs				34,2812
Over 60				2,8557

Level of significance: * 0.05 ** 0.01 *** 0.001 .0.1

AIC:	384,77	341,76

4.5. Complementary results about beneficiaries' perceptions

Due to restriction in the models, some variables were left out of the regression. However, these questions provide valuable information that will be disclosed in this section.

4.5.1. The critical factor for success

Figure 1 shows people's perceptions of critical factors that guarantee a successful day of sales. 27.6% of the sample stated that customers were fundamental for an excellent day. Participants meant that a flow of pedestrians was essential, all the participants were always located in crowded areas. However, they claimed to be lucky because many of their peers were located in bad and dangerous areas. Moreover, participants stated the importance of offering polite and personalized customer service. It seemed as if they really try to capture regular customers to have some type of fixed sales. This was noticeable as a customer approached during the survey and the beneficiaries knew their names.

The second key factor according to the participants was suppliers. They meant that having a supplied and organised stand looked more appealing to customers than an almost empty and messy stand. Additionally, some stated the importance of having the money to pay out the suppliers, as the cost of the merchandise has to be paid when the delivery is made. A worth studying aspect of suppliers is the fact that candy/snacks suppliers are usually big and formal companies. Some participants stated that they had the same supplier when they were selling on the streets. This relationship should be further studied.

The third key factor was consistency. Participants meant that in order to create a network of regular customers, the public needed to know they were there. For this, participants stated that they should open their stands, following a regular timetable. Some of them point out that there were some participants who wanted to make money and obtain results with minimum effort.

Figure 1: Critical factors to guarantee success

4.5.2. Social Network Influence

The risk of a vicious circle in the informal economy is developed within families. Tokman (1978) explains how the informal structure is based on hiring family members for a very low and even none income. This is a productive unit in which there is no clear division between the capital owner and the wage earner. Tokman (1978) asserts that salary is not the usual remuneration, as the income usually goes to common interests and benefits such as home maintenance and foodstuffs.

The researcher had a presumption and was expecting to find a higher family influence rate. As displayed in Figure 2, the majority of the participants (44%) started economical activities in the informal sector by their own initiative. Hence, that vicious circle might be losing ground. None

of the 116 participants was in the company of other (younger) persons, which can be interpreted as an absence of minors working in Colombia.

Fernanda Wanderley in "Memorias" book (2013) expressed her surprise over the fact that she did not see kids working in the streets. Wanderley (2013) compared the situation of Bogotá, Colombia to La Paz, Bolivia where she outlines how the childcare system in Bolivia does not work as it supposed to and parents, especially mothers, are obliged to take their kids to work. Elaborating on this issue, it represents problems for both, the parents and the kids. The kids are exposed in the street to risks and health problems, likewise, parents need to attend the child's needs, and will be therefore less productive (Wanderley, 2013).

In Bogotá, the Secretary of Social Integration and the Secretary of Education have joint forces to provide steady places for children. The Secretary of Social Integration fosters the use of public kindergartens, which are free of charge (link). According to Bogotá's Mayor Office, kindergartens are designed to look after children from 0 to 5 years and develop educational activities to help kids make the transition to elementary school (link). As per this study, these social integration practices have worked in the capital of Colombia, as any child was seen out in the streets working together with their parents. It should be emphasised that the study was developed during a holiday period (Dec 2018 - Jan 2019), and therefore, the researcher expected to see minors on the streets.

Figure 2: Social Network Influence

4.5.3. Reason to enter the Informal Sector

To understand whether the Colombian informal economy is influenced by institutionalist or structuralist drivers, participants answer the following question. "Q18: Why did you decide to develop informal economic activities?". The answers are displayed in Figure 3. In this case, the institutionalist reasons were:

- Low cost: As De Soto (1987) puts it, the cost of entering the formal sector is higher than the informal sector. 30.2% of the participants expressed that this was the reason why they decided to develop informal activities.
- Lack of government support: This reason entails that participants felt abandoned by the government. Without any type of support from the government, they had no choice but to explore the informal sector. 20.7% of the sample stated that this was the reason why they enter the informal sector.
- Legal procedures: Just as low cost, legal procedures present a barrier for people who want to start a business. Permits, contracts, Chamber and Commerce certificate, among others, are not only costly but time-consuming. People can't afford to hang on without income for too long, and that is why they decided to try out luck in the informal sector. 11.2% of people in the study said this was the reason why they started economic activity in the informal sector.

The sum of these institutionalist reasons (62.1%) shows that the weak institutions of the country have affected people and drove them to be involved in the informal economy. This is an important highlight because governments can then apply policies to tackle the root of the problem. In Colombia, it appears that weak institutions have driven people to dismiss the formal sector and build up the informal economy. Efforts to strengthen institutions need to be established on a national level, but every region has the responsibility to execute the policies.

On the other side, the structuralist reasons are linked to people's livelihood strategy and how the formal sector is not able to provide job positions for all. The structuralist answers participants provide were:

- Unemployment: 18.1% of the sample said that the reason to enter the informal sector was unemployment. This answer comes in third place, after low costs and lack of government support. In the view of the researcher, this result is surprising because she expected unemployment/necessity to be the main driver.
- Schedule flexibility: This reason entails more than just schedule independence. Participants meant that not having a boss was a relief. They decided how much labour load would take, and thus, they enjoy being the owners of their time. 9.5% of the participants said this was the reason to enter the informal economy.
- Sales volume: This answer implies that they reach a high level of sales and therefore a quite high income. Tenjo (2012) points this issue out, as he was able to verify that some informal employees obtain a higher income than the minimum wage. 8.6% of the participants said this was the reason to enter the informal economy.

Figure 3: Reason to enter the informal sector

4.5.4. IPES public officer perspective

To have some insight from the IPES, the researcher had the opportunity to interview the Subdirector of Informal Network Management. The interview took place at the organization's premises and, it was developed through a semi-structured questionnaire in Spanish. The semi-structured interview allowed the interviewer to ask general questions and, further explore topics that she considered important (Bryman, 2012).

The first question was: What are the biggest challenges IPES faces when implementing these programs? The following three issues were described by the interviewee as barriers to enforcing the relocation programs.

● General distrust: He states that *"The population expresses a high level of mistrust towards IPES because IPES has not been constant and has disappeared from the political and public agendas of past administrations. Therefore, IPES has lost credibility before the street vendors community. There was also a time where IPES did not implement any new activities, and right now, the administration of Enrique Peñalosa is addressing those problems".*

To address this problem, IPES created a "local government" group, which makes the first contact with the population. They have the mission of establishing a dialogue with the street vendors and generate trust towards the alternative offers. This administration has designed new alternatives (meeting points, over 60+ and others). Thus, it is challenging to get people signed up for the program when they have a sense of this belief.

The aforementioned matter underlines the importance of a social inclusion approach. That is why the new alternatives ranked better than the old ones. Because the local government group took the time to talk to the people and understand the dynamics of the street. Hence, they could leverage a trader's skills and give the public space a proper use.

Wanderley (2013) emphasises the importance of identity. She claims that the maximization of ownership of the programme is determinant of success. Thus, these spaces develop an identity that empowers beneficiaries and, keeps them motivated. However, these programs need some control and follow up, that is the second challenge mention by the IPES official.

- ● Governance of locations: The sub-director expresses how being more present in the areas has contributed to improving the IPES operation. His words were *"This administration has reinforced the fact that IPES is the entity responsible for administering the commercial alternatives. That is why we started a formalization process, which entails contract implementation and other activities that have allowed us to improve the way we implement the programs. However, we found other drawbacks in the way. For instance, we found a senior population that has been in these spots. Hence, for them, the formalization process stopped the minute they got the alternative. They didn't go on to the next step, so they stayed there, and right now, it is hard to find a substitute activity for them due to their age."*

The age topic was reflected in the studied population as well. Only 9% of the sample was under 35, which demonstrates that the relocation programmes are tailored to an older population. The IPES sub-director explained that the younger population were enrolled in an employability program. IPES has agreements with public and private companies/organizations which request a labour force with determined characteristics. Thereafter, IPES is able to train beneficiaries and assign them directly a formal job.

The IPES sub-director also stresses how commerce, in general, is changing and the internet is shaping new trends. Furthermore, IPES fosters e-commerce courses, as a contingency plan, to prevent appropriation of public space. As the public space management changes, new normativity is institutionalised, and that causes the third challenge mentioned by the IPES official.

- ● Interpretation of the normativity: About that, he said *"Case-law has established new requirements, which are always interpreted in absolute favour of street vendors. They are interested in the maximisation of benefits; thus, the alternatives don't really fulfil all their expectations. For instance, income is a major issue because on the streets they have a high income, considering the low production cost. Conversely, during the*

formalisation process, they must pay other costs, such as shared administrative costs, leasing costs, use of public space cost, among others. These extra costs and extra rules are circumstantial barriers that they don't like. Or that, they won't find in the streets"

The interpretation of law matter is linked to the history and culture of the city. As mentioned before, the government was very permissive in the beginning because it was a way to tackle poverty and unemployment. Thereafter, measures were taken when the streets were overrun by street vendors and, some dynamics were already established. Hence, to break this former inadequate dynamic caused conflict among the street vendor community and the government. The government has invested significant resources in this matter. However, they don't seem to be enough, thus, the sub-director pointed out the fourth challenge.

- Optimisation of resources: *"With limited resources, we have to aid a lot of people. There will never be enough resources for this population. It is a population that is constantly growing. And the trend is that if the parents are street vendors, the next generation will probably do the same. Additionally, regardless of the labour conditions, it is a profitable activity. We have done some non-formal studies to characterise them. We found that the minimum they make is 1.200.000 COP (385.15 USD) and the maximum is 6.000.000 COP (1925.73 USD), with minimum production cost. In addition, they enjoy the freedom of mobility and time. They have developed a dynamic that works for them, and it's profitable. For example, we have identified the orange juice sellers. They sell orange juice from 5.00 to 10.00 in the morning. But their orange suppliers have a huge logistic operation behind, that is very profitable. Thus, to relocate the orange juice sellers will   affect the orange suppliers."*

It is worth highlighting that the minimum wage in Colombia is 828.116 COP (265.79 USD). Hence, the economic incentive of performing informal activities is obvious, and therefore difficult to fight if the alternatives don't offer a higher inflow. Regarding the minimum wage, this study favours Maloney and Nuñez (2004) theory, which states that a set minimum wage will encourage all of those who make a higher income. But it is hard to fight because there is a market for the goods that street vendors commercialise, as they offer cheaper prices to the public as well. This is mentioned as the fifth and last challenge by the IPES sub-director.

- Customers (the public) don't question where the goods come from: *"People are more concerned about fulfilling an immediate need and, forget that the food could be exposed and in bad condition. The decision of buying on the streets will depend on customer's purchase power and the acceptance of the citizens in general. Hence, we*

have to convince people that not everything they sell on the streets is good or cheap. Citizens believe that buying on the streets is cheaper and, don't really question the sourcing".

Thereof, the sub-director stresses that the main objective of IPES is to offer commercial activities to enable street vendors to leave the public space. Other organizations and the local police are in charge of the evictions and recuperation of public space. The numeral 6 of article 140 of the New Police Code states that "anyone who promotes the use or illegal occupation of public space, could get a fine for violating the Police Code. These measures would need further study to verify if they actually work or are a burden for the citizens (Congreso de Colombia, 2016).

The second question was in regard, the participant's concern about the market and its high degree of competition. These concerns came mostly from people who sell snacks and candy. About this, the sub-director agreed with them and said *"It is true that especially kiosks beneficiaries, have trouble selling their goods. But, kiosks were designed for selling only snacks and candy, and eventually, they started changing or adding more good to their portfolio. We have found that they sell biscuits, fresh juice."*

The researcher found that kiosk participants had microwaves and other extra services, that could make them more appealing to attract customers. Thus, the need for innovation is important in a tough market. To this, the sub-director answered: *"Yes, I understand they need to innovate. But, they are breaking the law by having all these extra items. They don't comply with waste treatment and hygienic handling of food. So, the kiosk turns into a kind of restaurant, and we are trying to control these issues. It is not easy, but we need to have more control".*

Moreover, these control strategies might appear as a shock for participants because they are still on the streets, doing what they do best which is commercialized. But beyond that, they are registered in a program with new rules and regular follow-ups, which goes against what they were used to. However, it is difficult to find a balance between how much control to enforce and how much freedom participants should have. Participants expressed a lack of follow up. To which the sub-director responded:

"From this sub-direction, we have two follow-up groups. One that is in a change of monitoring the on-the-street alternatives (kiosks, meeting points, fairs). The other one is in charge of the commercial points (shopping centres, over 60+). The commercial points group is stricter because they need to pay rent and IPES serves as the sole administrator, that group need to be on top of all the things; such as cleanliness, public

services payments, rent payments. Participants complain about the lack of control, but when we control they complain about excessive control. But it is true, that the follow up of participants of on-the-street alternatives is quite low and, we are working on it."

5. Discussion and conclusions

The complexity of the informal sector is undeniable, thus the challenge for governments is considerable, as informality represents a big portion of the local economy. Attacking causes such as weak institutions or low demand for formal sector would not necessarily mean that street sales would disappear. Street vendors are part of the dynamics of cities in developing countries and are accepted by society. Therefore, relocation programs can be a great opportunity to integrate these two sectors and potentiate the whole economy.

The fact that the informal sector is underexplored also represents a challenge for governments. However, the theory states that people will have a strong incentive to remain informal if the costs of being formal are higher. In addition to the cost of formality, if the licenses/permits are time consuming and difficult to obtain, people will have more reasons to stay in the informal sector.

Staying in the informal sector implies tax evasion, which can represent a "saving" for families. But people would not have incentives to enter the informal sector if they received the added value of paying taxes. In other words, the lack of quality of services offered by the state, such as health and pension plan, infer in the decision-making process. In this order of ideas, strong institutions could reduce the size of the informal sector, as the benefits of being formal would incentivize people to be part of the system.

All citizens expect the government to be efficient in the management of public resources. Therefore, the state has a great responsibility to protect public space. As public space belongs to all the inhabitants of a country, the discussion of public space focuses on how it should be exploited. The government must guarantee its aesthetics and security, as well as leverage the commercial potential of public space.

Therefore, police interventions about public space cause controversy. On the one hand, public space does belong to all the citizens and should be seen a safe and clean place to interact. On the other hand, it represents the only way for many families to obtain income. Authoritarian evictions have not have not had good results; in fact, they have weakened the development of

policies that, in addition to controlling the informal sector, could solve the problem and benefit street vendors.

Therefore, the main challenge the government currently faces is the recovery of the confidence of a population that feels oppressed and forgotten. That is why IPES has adopted an inclusive approach. In doing so, IPES is able to boost the commercial potential of the public space, by offering alternatives that will foster the economy of the country and benefit participants. The inclusion of street vendors in the design of the programmes has shown positive results, as newer programmes performed better than the ones imposed by previous mayors.

In addition to this inclusion approach, there are some personal variables that show an overview of the beneficiaries and their differences. In terms of individual factors, the regression showed the following results:

> *City of origin* only has a significant effect when explaining the income change and labour conditions improvement. Those models imply that a person who migrated to the capital of the country had more probability of stating that their income and their labour conditions improved, in comparison to a person who was born in Bogotá. Because these results are based on perceptions, it cannot be said that migrants earn more income than locals. However, it can infer that migrants perceive a higher increase in their income because their previous income was much lower. Therefore, the new income represents an improvement in working conditions.

> *Age* has an interesting effect. The older the person, the more likely he/she is to admit that his/her expectations were fulfilled, his/her mental and labour conditions improved, as well as perceiving an improvement in his/her general welfare. By contrast, the older the person, the probability of claiming that his/her income increased or his/her health improved is reduced. In this case, two important variables go against each other. Expectations are met because adults improve their overall well-being, even if their income does not increase. The fact that they do not have to worry about the police, and in the case of those over 60 who have access to new services, reflect an improvement in their mental and working conditions. The reasons why they do not perceive an increase in income should be further explored, as the causes do not necessarily have to be linked to the nature of the programmes. For instance, they may work fewer hours or fewer days of the week due to their age.

> *Gender* has different behaviours according to the nature of the models. In binary logistic regressions, males are more likely to answer positive answers about income,

expectations and mental conditions. On the other side, females are more likely to respond positively to ordered logistic regressions. Thus, females are more likely to say that their labour conditions and general welfare had improved. Like income, this inconsistency must be analysed in detail. A person's background is definitive in the perception of these categories. It is very surprising that for men, an increase in income does not necessarily translate into an improvement in their overall well-being. But for women, there is an improvement in their general well-being, despite not noticing an increase in their income.

In the same way, *time in informal activities* yielded a value higher than one in the binary logistic regressions. Hence, the probability of admitting that their income had increased, their expectations were fulfilled, and their mental conditions had improved would be higher, by additional year that a person had been involved in informal activities. On the contrary, in the ordered logistic regressions, a person's probability of agreeing with the statement was lower, by each additional year he/she had been involved in informal activities. These results are very important because they show that an increase in income does not necessarily represent an improvement in the living conditions of an individual. In society, we have the notion that more income represents improvement. However, this result tells us that there are other factors that are affecting their lives and therefore, should be addressed.

Marital status only presented significance in the binary regressions. Both yielded similar results. A person who was involved, which means he/she was married, or cohabiting had a lower probability of saying that their mental conditions had improved or that the IPES program was successful. In the same way, a person who was head of household would be less likely to think that the IPES program is successful. This considers the extra-burden of having a family, which is essential in the implementation of the programmes. This implies that the needs of an involved person are different, and thus, they should get additional support.

According to *years of education*, people with more years of education would be more likely to state that their mental conditions had improved, due to the IPES program. Moreover, the more years of schooling a participant has the lower ranking, in terms of labour conditions, general welfare and perception of success. These results make completes sense, as a person with more education would expect a reward for the time invested and the skills acquired.

Finally, the type of program plays an important role in most of the models. This variable is significant in 6 out of the 7 models that were run.

In general terms, the majority of the sample studied believe the programme has improved their living conditions (59.5%). The programmes that performed better were Meeting points, Over 60 and Permanent Fairs. These programmes seem to offer richer benefits, which entails that their design is different. Indeed, those programmes were included input from street vendors. Hence, IPES was able to implement the 60 over programme in companies' buildings, where beneficiaries work indoors and have a fixed customer base. Meeting points seem as an improvement of kiosks. They belong to an urban complex with toilet facilities and security guards. The structure design is bigger, which protects them from the weather. Lastly, permanent fairs have the advantage to be a specialized market and yielded a positive performance because of the additional benefits it offers. The permanent fairs beneficiaries are able to innovate and sell a wide variety of products, which attracts a specific-purchase type of customers.

On the other hand, the programmes that did not obtain a good score were kiosks and temporary fairs. These two programmes are older than meeting points and over 60, thus the non-inclusive approach might have influenced its negative performance. Kiosks are not well design, and do not represent a significant change in beneficiaries' working conditions. They are still exposed to the weather and insecurity in the city. Some of them were located on not-crowed areas, and therefore abandoned because they did not get any customers. Location was the most important reason for success according to beneficiaries, because it represents how much they will be able to sell in a day.

Location is such an important factor but was not considered when designing the kiosk programme in the first phase. This issue may have been avoided if they had taken into account street vendors' insight. This lack of understanding of street dynamics is also reflected in temporary fairs. They do not represent a fixed income, which might not guarantee the minimum vital for those beneficiaries.

The minimum vital became the shield of street vendors in the battle about public space, so relocation programmes must be able to offer this economic compensation. In fact, the programmes must be able to fulfil all the promised aspects. The current administration has the great challenge of gaining the trust of street vendors that has been lost throughout the years because of inefficient policies. This administration, with its inclusive approach, has a great advantage in promoting the collaboration of vendors, and it is hoped that they can take advantage of it.

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Appendix

Appendix 1: Binary logistic regression for income – Model 1

```
> Anova(GLM.1, type="II", test="LR")
Analysis of Deviance Table (Type II tests)

Response: Income.dummy
                          LR Chisq Df Pr(>Chisq)
Q3..City.of.origin          4.1767  1   0.040983 *
Gender                      1.1079  1   0.292529
Q7..Marital.status          0.7125  2   0.700308
Q9..Economic.dependency     0.1791  1   0.672170
Q5..Age                     8.0075  1   0.004658 **
Q11..Years.of.education     0.3835  1   0.535744
Q10..Head.of.household      0.7021  1   0.402070
---
Signif. codes:  0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1
```

```
(Dispersion parameter for binomial family taken to be 1)

    Null deviance: 130.46  on 115   degrees of freedom
Residual deviance: 116.65  on 107   degrees of freedom
AIC: 134.65

Number of Fisher Scoring iterations: 4


> exp(coef(GLM.1))  # Exponentiated coefficients ("odds ratios")
                              (Intercept)
                               71.2497375
Q3..City.of.origin[T.Migrated to Bogotá]
                                2.6233169
                          Gender[T.Male]
                                0.5789481
              Q7..Marital.status[T.Other]
                                0.4042535
             Q7..Marital.status[T.Single]
```

Appendix 2: Binary logistic regression for income – Model 2

```
Call:
glm(formula = Income.dummy ~ Q3..City.of.origin + Gender + Q7..Marital.status +
    Q9..Economic.dependency + Q5..Age + Q11..Years.of.education +
    Q10..Head.of.household + Q15..Time.in.informal.activities +
    Q19..Type.of.Program, family = binomial(logit), data = Dataset)

Deviance Residuals:
    Min       1Q     Median       3Q       Max
-2.11562   0.00003   0.36898   0.64142   1.80154

Coefficients:
                                          Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept)                                3.44201    1.93323   1.780   0.0750
Q3..City.of.origin[T.Migrated to Bogotá]   1.66648    0.65723   2.536   0.0112
Gender[T.Male]                            -1.19080    0.68052  -1.750   0.0801
Q7..Marital.status[T.Other]               -0.87524    1.22487  -0.715   0.4749
Q7..Marital.status[T.Single]               0.62461    0.60982   1.024   0.3057
Q9..Economic.dependency                   -0.16103    0.20503  -0.785   0.4322
Q5..Age                                    0.01207    0.03360   0.359   0.7195
```

```
Q5..Age                                    0.01207    0.03360    0.359   0.7195
Q11..Years.of.education                   -0.10477    0.09585   -1.093   0.2744
Q10..Head.of.household[T.Yes]              0.07152    0.79477    0.090   0.9283
Q15..Time.in.informal.activities          -0.05476    0.02820   -1.942   0.0522
Q19..Type.of.Program[T.Market Places]    -20.76818 2695.91697   -0.008   0.9939
Q19..Type.of.Program[T.Meeting points]    -0.60300    0.99465   -0.606   0.5444
Q19..Type.of.Program[T.Over 60 program]   -2.06069    0.89560   -2.301   0.0214
Q19..Type.of.Program[T.Permanent fairs]   -0.97524    0.98540   -0.990   0.3223
Q19..Type.of.Program[T.Shopping Centers]  15.97345 2035.68095    0.008   0.9937
Q19..Type.of.Program[T.Temporary fairs]   -1.89663    0.82109   -2.310   0.0209

(Intercept)                                .
Q3..City.of.origin[T.Migrated to Bogotá] *
Gender[T.Male]                             .
Q7..Marital.status[T.Other]
Q7..Marital.status[T.Single]
Q9..Economic.dependency
Q5..Age
Q11..Years.of.education
```

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```
Q10..Head.of.household[T.Yes]
Q15..Time.in.informal.activities          .
Q19..Type.of.Program[T.Market Places]
Q19..Type.of.Program[T.Meeting points]
Q19..Type.of.Program[T.Over 60 program]   *
Q19..Type.of.Program[T.Permanent fairs]
Q19..Type.of.Program[T.Shopping Centers]
Q19..Type.of.Program[T.Temporary fairs]   *
---
Signif. codes:  0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1

(Dispersion parameter for binomial family taken to be 1)

    Null deviance: 130.462  on 115  degrees of freedom
Residual deviance:  88.532  on 100  degrees of freedom
AIC: 120.53

Number of Fisher Scoring iterations: 17
```

```
> exp(coef(GLM.4))  # Exponentiated coefficients ("odds ratios")
                        (Intercept)
                        3.124962e+01
Q3..City.of.origin[T.Migrated to Bogotá]
                        5.293521e+00
                        Gender[T.Male]
                        3.039785e-01
            Q7..Marital.status[T.Other]
                        4.167623e-01
           Q7..Marital.status[T.Single]
                        1.867520e+00
               Q9..Economic.dependency
                        8.512683e-01
                                Q5..Age
                        1.012139e+00
                 Q11..Years.of.education
                        9.005293e-01
            Q10..Head.of.household[T.Yes]
                        1.074140e+00
```

```
        Q15..Time.in.informal.activities
                        9.467140e-01
  Q19..Type.of.Program[T.Market Places]
                        9.560752e-10
  Q19..Type.of.Program[T.Meeting points]
                        5.471689e-01
 Q19..Type.of.Program[T.Over 60 program]
                        1.273656e-01
 Q19..Type.of.Program[T.Permanent fairs]
                        3.771025e-01
Q19..Type.of.Program[T.Shopping Centers]
                        8.653247e+06
 Q19..Type.of.Program[T.Temporary fairs]
                        1.500735e-01
```

```
> Anova(GLM.4, type="II", test="LR")
Analysis of Deviance Table (Type II tests)

Response: Income.dummy
                             LR Chisq Df Pr(>Chisq)
Q3..City.of.origin             7.4776  1   0.006247 **
Gender                         3.4077  1   0.064892 .
Q7..Marital.status             1.7900  2   0.408615
Q9..Economic.dependency        0.6109  1   0.434431
Q5..Age                        0.1292  1   0.719265
Q11..Years.of.education        1.2260  1   0.268185
Q10..Head.of.household         0.0081  1   0.928448
Q15..Time.in.informal.activities 4.1506 1   0.041621 *
Q19..Type.of.Program          20.7738  6   0.002014 **
---
Signif. codes:  0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1
```

Appendix 3: Binary logistic regression for expectations fulfilment – Model 1

```
Call:
glm(formula = Q28..Expectations ~ Q3..City.of.origin + Gender +
    Q7..Marital.status + Q9..Economic.dependency + Q5..Age +
    Q11..Years.of.education + Q10..Head.of.household, family = binomial(logit),
    data = Dataset)

Deviance Residuals:
    Min       1Q   Median       3Q      Max
-1.8724  -1.1477   0.5816   1.1265   1.5272

Coefficients:
                                          Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept)                               0.962779   1.158244   0.831    0.406
Q3..City.of.origin[T.Migrated to Bogotá] -0.241112   0.402915  -0.598    0.550
Gender[T.Male]                           -0.224547   0.418448  -0.537    0.592
Q7..Marital.status[T.Other]               1.587714   1.189053   1.335    0.182
Q7..Marital.status[T.Single]              0.589657   0.408002   1.445    0.148
Q9..Economic.dependency                   0.026242   0.138261   0.190    0.849
Q5..Age                                  -0.015094   0.017346  -0.870    0.384
```

```
Q11..Years.of.education                          0.009459   0.062433   0.152    0.880
Q10..Head.of.household[T.Yes]                   -0.427599   0.532215  -0.803    0.422

(Dispersion parameter for binomial family taken to be 1)

    Null deviance: 160.78  on 115  degrees of freedom
Residual deviance: 153.66  on 107  degrees of freedom
AIC: 171.66

Number of Fisher Scoring iterations: 4


> exp(coef(GLM.6))   # Exponentiated coefficients ("odds ratios")
                        (Intercept)
                          2.6189645
Q3..City.of.origin[T.Migrated to Bogotá]
                          0.7857539
                      Gender[T.Male]
                          0.7988783
                      ...........
            Q7..Marital.status[T.Other]
                          4.8925528
            Q7..Marital.status[T.Single]
                          1.8033703
              Q9..Economic.dependency
                          1.0265893
                            Q5..Age
                          0.9850196
              Q11..Years.of.education
                          1.0095043
          Q10..Head.of.household[T.Yes]
                          0.6520728

> Anova(GLM.6, type="II", test="LR")
Analysis of Deviance Table (Type II tests)

Response: Q28..Expectations
                        LR Chisq Df Pr(>Chisq)
Q3..City.of.origin        0.3594  1     0.5489
Gender                    0.2884  1     0.5913
Q7..Marital.status        3.6587  2     0.1605
Q9..Economic.dependency   0.0360  1     0.8494
Q5..Age                   0.7648  1     0.3818
Q11..Years.of.education   0.0230  1     0.8795
Q10..Head.of.household    0.6537  1     0.4188
```

Appendix 4: Binary logistic regression for expectations fulfilment – Model 2

```
Call:
glm(formula = Q28..Expectations ~ Q3..City.of.origin + Gender +
    Q7..Marital.status + Q9..Economic.dependency + Q5..Age +
    Q11..Years.of.education + Q10..Head.of.household + Q15..Time.in.informal.act
    Q19..Type.of.Program, family = binomial(logit), data = Dataset)

Deviance Residuals:
    Min        1Q     Median       3Q       Max
-2.50980   -0.58913   0.00002   0.35397   2.38428

Coefficients:
                                            Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept)                                 -1.87912    1.88634  -0.996  0.31917
Q3..City.of.origin[T.Migrated to Bogotá]     0.17619    0.62981   0.280  0.77967
Gender[T.Male]                              -0.79155    0.60935  -1.299  0.19394
Q7..Marital.status[T.Other]                  4.14104    2.04228   2.028  0.04260
Q7..Marital.status[T.Single]                 1.99729    0.71083   2.810  0.00496
Q9..Economic.dependency                      0.35545    0.23367   1.521  0.12821
Q5..Age                                      0.08224    0.03831   2.147  0.03182
Q11..Years.of.education                     -0.09029    0.10287  -0.878  0.38012
Q10..Head.of.household[T.Yes]               -1.68610    0.91427  -1.844  0.06515
Q15..Time.in.informal.activities            -0.10839    0.03721  -2.913  0.00358
Q19..Type.of.Program[T.Market Places]      -18.66710 4484.82458  -0.004  0.99668
Q19..Type.of.Program[T.Meeting points]       3.77539    1.29212   2.922  0.00348
Q19..Type.of.Program[T.Over 60 program]      2.78756    1.07240   2.599  0.00934
Q19..Type.of.Program[T.Permanent fairs]     20.16771 3115.89016   0.006  0.99484
Q19..Type.of.Program[T.Shopping Centers]    20.47614 3317.07723   0.006  0.99507
Q19..Type.of.Program[T.Temporary fairs]     -2.23312    0.89699  -2.490  0.01279

(Intercept)
Q3..City.of.origin[T.Migrated to Bogotá]
Gender[T.Male]
Q7..Marital.status[T.Other]                 *
Q7..Marital.status[T.Single]                **
Q9..Economic.dependency
Q5..Age                                     *
Q11..Years.of.education
Q10..Head.of.household[T.Yes]               .
```

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```
Q15..Time.in.informal.activities              **
Q19..Type.of.Program[T.Market Places]
Q19..Type.of.Program[T.Meeting points]        **
Q19..Type.of.Program[T.Over 60 program]       **
Q19..Type.of.Program[T.Permanent fairs]
Q19..Type.of.Program[T.Shopping Centers]
Q19..Type.of.Program[T.Temporary fairs]       *
---
Signif. codes:  0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1

(Dispersion parameter for binomial family taken to be 1)

    Null deviance: 160.78  on 115  degrees of freedom
Residual deviance:  78.56  on 100  degrees of freedom
AIC: 110.56

Number of Fisher Scoring iterations: 18
```

Appendix 4: Binary logistic regression for mental conditions – Model 1

```
Call:
glm(formula = Q25..Mental.Conditions ~ Q3..City.of.origin + Gender +
    Q7..Marital.status + Q9..Economic.dependency + Q5..Age +
    Q11..Years.of.education + Q10..Head.of.household, family = binomial(logit),
    data = Dataset)

Deviance Residuals:
    Min       1Q   Median       3Q      Max
-2.7535   0.2031   0.2940   0.4276   0.9514

Coefficients:
                                                Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept)                                      5.02134    2.26198   2.220   0.0264 *
Q3..City.of.origin[T.Migrated to Bogotá]        -0.08106    0.74371  -0.109   0.9132
Gender[T.Male]                                  -0.03351    0.84504  -0.040   0.9684
Q7..Marital.status[T.Other]                     -1.87616    1.40722  -1.333   0.1825
Q7..Marital.status[T.Single]                    -0.88414    0.80866  -1.093   0.2742
Q9..Economic.dependency                          0.26632    0.29235   0.911   0.3623
Q5..Age                                         -0.07009    0.03305  -2.121   0.0340 *
```

```
Q11..Years.of.education                          0.08822    0.12710   0.694   0.4876
Q10..Head.of.household[T.Yes]                     1.29501    0.92435   1.401   0.1612
---
Signif. codes:  0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1

(Dispersion parameter for binomial family taken to be 1)

    Null deviance: 68.132  on 115  degrees of freedom
Residual deviance: 56.964  on 107  degrees of freedom
AIC: 74.964

Number of Fisher Scoring iterations: 6


> exp(coef(GLM.8))  # Exponentiated coefficients ("odds ratios")
                          (Intercept)
                            151.6141465
Q3..City.of.origin[T.Migrated to Bogotá]
                              0.9221398
```

```
                       Gender[T.Male]
                            0.9670457
           Q7..Marital.status[T.Other]
                            0.1531777
          Q7..Marital.status[T.Single]
                            0.4130682
              Q9..Economic.dependency
                            1.3051591
                              Q5..Age
                            0.9323105
              Q11..Years.of.education
                            1.0922272
          Q10..Head.of.household[T.Yes]
                            3.6510284
```

```
> Anova(GLM.8, type="II", test="LR")
Analysis of Deviance Table (Type II tests)

Response: Q25..Mental.Conditions
                        LR Chisq Df Pr(>Chisq)
Q3..City.of.origin        0.0119  1    0.91323
Gender                    0.0016  1    0.96833
Q7..Marital.status        2.3441  2    0.30973
Q9..Economic.dependency   0.9213  1    0.33712
Q5..Age                   5.3122  1    0.02118 *
Q11..Years.of.education   0.5227  1    0.46968
Q10..Head.of.household    1.8954  1    0.16859
---
Signif. codes:  0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1
```

Appendix 5: Binary logistic regression for mental conditions – Model 2

```
Call:
glm(formula = Q25..Mental.Conditions ~ Q3..City.of.origin + Gender +
    Q7..Marital.status + Q9..Economic.dependency + Q5..Age +
    Q11..Years.of.education + Q10..Head.of.household + Q15..Time.in.informal.act
    Q19..Type.of.Program, family = binomial(logit), data = Dataset)

Deviance Residuals:
        Min             1Q         Median              3Q            Max
-0.000199002   0.000000021   0.000000021   0.000000021   0.000207195

Coefficients:
                                          Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept)                                -297.23   45692.49  -0.007    0.995
Q3..City.of.origin[T.Migrated to Bogotá]     33.50    7590.18   0.004    0.996
Gender[T.Male]                             -720.50   77765.66  -0.009    0.993
Q7..Marital.status[T.Other]               -1066.59  124386.24  -0.009    0.993
Q7..Marital.status[T.Single]                -83.50   10684.01  -0.008    0.994
Q9..Economic.dependency                      55.98    5930.35   0.009    0.992
Q5..Age                                      34.79    3662.17   0.010    0.992

Q11..Years.of.education                      35.40    4016.94   0.009    0.993
Q10..Head.of.household[T.Yes]               290.24   30668.79   0.009    0.992
Q15..Time.in.informal.activities            -28.23    3109.94  -0.009    0.993
Q19..Type.of.Program[T.Market Places]     -1036.23  159387.80  -0.007    0.995
Q19..Type.of.Program[T.Meeting points]       77.23 2817011.24   0.000    1.000
Q19..Type.of.Program[T.Over 60 program]    -478.89   53776.33  -0.009    0.993
Q19..Type.of.Program[T.Permanent fairs]    -163.61   54234.67  -0.003    0.998
Q19..Type.of.Program[T.Shopping Centers]    142.96   81379.18   0.002    0.999
Q19..Type.of.Program[T.Temporary fairs]    -471.14   49220.79  -0.010    0.992

(Dispersion parameter for binomial family taken to be 1)

    Null deviance: 68.13213452504  on 115  degrees of freedom
Residual deviance:  0.00000022723  on 100  degrees of freedom
AIC: 32

Number of Fisher Scoring iterations: 25
```

```
> exp(coef(GLM.9))  # Exponentiated coefficients ("odds ratios")
                             (Intercept)
                            8.181470e-130
Q3..City.of.origin[T.Migrated to Bogotá]
                            3.525324e+14
                            Gender[T.Male]
                            1.235054e-313
             Q7..Marital.status[T.Other]
                            0.000000e+00
            Q7..Marital.status[T.Single]
                            5.461649e-37
                   Q9..Economic.dependency
                            2.057682e+24
                                  Q5..Age
                            1.287715e+15
                  Q11..Years.of.education
                            2.371127e+15
              Q10..Head.of.household[T.Yes]
                            1.125441e+126


        Q15..Time.in.informal.activities
                            5.468442e-13
   Q19..Type.of.Program[T.Market Places]
                            0.000000e+00
  Q19..Type.of.Program[T.Meeting points]
                            3.478299e+33
   Q19..Type.of.Program[T.Over 60 program]
                            1.044238e-208
  Q19..Type.of.Program[T.Permanent fairs]
                            8.842925e-72
Q19..Type.of.Program[T.Shopping Centers]
                            1.223342e+62
  Q19..Type.of.Program[T.Temporary fairs]
                            2.425370e-205

> Anova(GLM.9, type="II", test="LR")
Analysis of Deviance Table (Type II tests)

Response: Q25..Mental.Conditions
                                   LR Chisq Df       Pr(>Chisq)
Q3..City.of.origin                    0.000  1        0.9997208
Gender                               14.579  1        0.0001344 ***
Q7..Marital.status                   17.466  2        0.0001612 ***
Q9..Economic.dependency              10.451  1        0.0012261 **
Q5..Age                              13.016  1        0.0003088 ***
Q11..Years.of.education               9.714  1        0.0018292 **
Q10..Head.of.household                9.803  1        0.0017423 **
Q15..Time.in.informal.activities     16.761  1 0.000042386766 ***
Q19..Type.of.Program                 50.503  6 0.000000003727 ***
---
Signif. codes:  0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1
```

```
Call:
polr(formula = Q1..Labour.conditions ~ Q3..City.of.origin + Q5..Age +
    Gender + Q7..Marital.status + Q9..Economic.dependency + Q10..Head.of.househo
    Q11..Years.of.education, data = data, Hess = TRUE, method = "logistic")

Coefficients:
                                             Value Std. Error  t value
Q3..City.of.origin[T.Migrated to Bogotá]   0.16604    0.35931  0.46210
Q5..Age                                    0.01722    0.01543  1.11606
Gender[T.Male]                            -0.64833    0.37534 -1.72731
Q7..Marital.status[T.Other]                0.66857    0.95104  0.70299
Q7..Marital.status[T.Single]               0.21780    0.36301  0.59998
Q9..Economic.dependency                    0.00532    0.12070  0.04408
Q10..Head.of.household[T.Yes]             -0.41385    0.48772 -0.84855
Q11..Years.of.education                   -0.08671    0.05550 -1.56221

Intercepts:
    Value    Std. Error t value
1|2 -1.8887  1.0191     -1.8533
2|3 -1.2338  1.0084     -1.2235
3|4 -0.5408  1.0039     -0.5387
4|5  0.5456  1.0047      0.5430

Residual Deviance: 345.057
AIC: 369.057

> Anova(OrdRegModel.9, type="II")
Analysis of Deviance Table (Type II tests)

Response: Q1..Labour.conditions
                        LR Chisq Df Pr(>Chisq)
Q3..City.of.origin       0.21387  1    0.64375
Q5..Age                  1.25074  1    0.26341
Gender                   3.02981  1    0.08175 .
Q7..Marital.status       0.77293  2    0.67945
Q9..Economic.dependency  0.00194  1    0.96488
Q10..Head.of.household   0.72496  1    0.39452
Q11..Years.of.education  2.44438  1    0.11795
---
Signif. codes:  0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1
```

```
> exp(coef(OrdRegModel.9))
Q3..City.of.origin[T.Migrated to Bogotá]
                              1.1806171
                              Q5..Age
                              1.0173655
                      Gender[T.Male]
                              0.5229161
          Q7..Marital.status[T.Other]
                              1.9514539
          Q7..Marital.status[T.Single]
                              1.2433381
              Q9..Economic.dependency
                              1.0053345
          Q10..Head.of.household[T.Yes]
                              0.6610988
              Q11..Years.of.education
                              0.9169457
```

Appendix 7: Ordered logistic regression for labour conditions – Model 2

```
Call:
polr(formula = Q1..Labour.conditions ~ Q3..City.of.origin + Q5..Age +
    Gender + Q7..Marital.status + Q9..Economic.dependency + Q10..Head.of.househo
    Q11..Years.of.education + Q15..Time.in.informal.activities +
    Q19..Type.of.Program, data = data, Hess = TRUE, method = "logistic")

Coefficients:
                                            Value Std. Error t value
Q3..City.of.origin[T.Migrated to Bogotá]  0.79598    0.42333  1.8803
Q5..Age                                   0.05683    0.02351  2.4170
Gender[T.Male]                           -1.06368    0.41386 -2.5701
Q7..Marital.status[T.Other]               1.41331    1.10658  1.2772
Q7..Marital.status[T.Single]              0.47137    0.41096  1.1470
Q9..Economic.dependency                   0.07513    0.14382  0.5224
Q10..Head.of.household[T.Yes]            -0.70784    0.53554 -1.3217
Q11..Years.of.education                  -0.20029    0.06428 -3.1160
Q15..Time.in.informal.activities         -0.04555    0.02178 -2.0914
Q19..Type.of.Program[T.Market Places]    -1.97522    1.05791 -1.8671
Q19..Type.of.Program[T.Meeting points]    2.13606    0.72723  2.9373
```

```
Q19..Type.of.Program[T.Over 60 program]    1.13629    0.65320  1.7396
Q19..Type.of.Program[T.Permanent fairs]    4.27418    1.21961  3.5045
Q19..Type.of.Program[T.Shopping Centers]   1.05910    0.71354  1.4843
Q19..Type.of.Program[T.Temporary fairs]   -1.31389    0.54500 -2.4108

Intercepts:
    Value   Std. Error t value
1|2 -1.5898  1.2332    -1.2892
2|3 -0.7856  1.2293    -0.6391
3|4  0.1427  1.2329     0.1157
4|5  1.6890  1.2425     1.3594

Residual Deviance: 290.7453
AIC: 328.7453
```

```
> Anova(OrdRegModel.9, type="II")
Analysis of Deviance Table (Type II tests)

Response: Q1..Labour.conditions
                              LR Chisq Df    Pr(>Chisq)
Q3..City.of.origin               3.611  1       0.057410 .
Q5..Age                          6.126  1       0.013318 *
Gender                           6.866  1       0.008785 **
Q7..Marital.status               2.602  2       0.272222
Q9..Economic.dependency          0.273  1       0.601220
Q10..Head.of.household           1.760  1       0.184673
Q11..Years.of.education          9.889  1       0.001662 **
Q15..Time.in.informal.activities 4.585  1       0.032246 *
Q19..Type.of.Program            49.794  6 0.00000000517 ***
---
Signif. codes:  0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1
```

```
> exp(coef(OrdRegModel.9))
Q3..City.of.origin[T.Migrated to Bogotá]
                        2.2166076
                          Q5..Age
                        1.0584743
                   Gender[T.Male]
                        0.3451833
         Q7..Marital.status[T.Other]
                        4.1095420
        Q7..Marital.status[T.Single]
                        1.6021817
          Q9..Economic.dependency
                        1.0780246
        Q10..Head.of.household[T.Yes]
                        0.4927095
          Q11..Years.of.education
                        0.8184934
     Q15..Time.in.informal.activities
                        0.9554682
```

```
        Q15..Time.in.informal.activities
                               0.9554682
    Q19..Type.of.Program[T.Market Places]
                               0.1387312
    Q19..Type.of.Program[T.Meeting points]
                               8.4660262
    Q19..Type.of.Program[T.Over 60 program]
                               3.1151900
    Q19..Type.of.Program[T.Permanent fairs]
                              71.8209239
    Q19..Type.of.Program[T.Shopping Centers]
                               2.8837605
    Q19..Type.of.Program[T.Temporary fairs]
                               0.2687726
```

Appendix 8: Ordered logistic regression for general welfare – Model 1

```
Call:
polr(formula = Q2..General.welfare ~ Q3..City.of.origin + Q5..Age +
    Gender + Q7..Marital.status + Q9..Economic.dependency + Q10..Head.of.househo
    Q11..Years.of.education, data = data, Hess = TRUE, method = "logistic")

Coefficients:
                                            Value Std. Error  t value
Q3..City.of.origin[T.Migrated to Bogotá] -0.17194    0.35272 -0.48748
Q5..Age                                   0.00488    0.01469  0.33227
Gender[T.Male]                           -0.44269    0.36691 -1.20653
Q7..Marital.status[T.Other]               1.00259    0.97117  1.03235
Q7..Marital.status[T.Single]             -0.01301    0.35615 -0.03654
Q9..Economic.dependency                   0.08817    0.12111  0.72803
Q10..Head.of.household[T.Yes]            -0.29060    0.47115 -0.61680
Q11..Years.of.education                  -0.03747    0.05381 -0.69638

Intercepts:
    Value   Std. Error t value
1|2 -1.9168  0.9801     -1.9557
2|3 -1.2329  0.9716     -1.2689
```

```
Intercepts:
    Value   Std. Error t value
1|2 -1.9168  0.9801     -1.9557
2|3 -1.2329  0.9716     -1.2689
3|4 -0.4375  0.9630     -0.4543
4|5  0.6839  0.9624      0.7106

Residual Deviance: 359.5842
AIC: 383.5842
```

```
> Anova(OrdRegModel.9, type="II")
Analysis of Deviance Table (Type II tests)

Response: Q2..General.welfare
                       LR Chisq Df Pr(>Chisq)
Q3..City.of.origin      0.23758  1     0.6260
Q5..Age                 0.11046  1     0.7396
Gender                  1.46593  1     0.2260
Q7..Marital.status      1.14375  2     0.5645
Q9..Economic.dependency 0.52858  1     0.4672
Q10..Head.of.household  0.38100  1     0.5371
Q11..Years.of.education 0.48501  1     0.4862

> exp(coef(OrdRegModel.9))
Q3..City.of.origin[T.Migrated to Bogotá]
                             0.8420271
                               Q5..Age
                             1.0048919
                         Gender[T.Male]
                             0.6423046
            Q7..Marital.status[T.Other]
                             2.7253206
           Q7..Marital.status[T.Single]
                             0.9870704
                Q9..Economic.dependency
                             1.0921763
            Q10..Head.of.household[T.Yes]
                             0.7478123
                Q11..Years.of.education
                             0.9632192
```

Appendix 9: Ordered logistic regression for general welfare – Model 2

```
Call:
polr(formula = Q2..General.welfare ~ Q3..City.of.origin + Q5..Age +
    Gender + Q7..Marital.status + Q9..Economic.dependency + Q10..Head.of.househc
    Q11..Years.of.education + Q15..Time.in.informal.activities +
    Q19..Type.of.Program, data = data, Hess = TRUE, method = "logistic")

Coefficients:
                                          Value Std. Error t value
Q3..City.of.origin[T.Migrated to Bogotá]  0.22417    0.39565  0.5666
Q5..Age                                   0.04786    0.02268  2.1107
Gender[T.Male]                           -0.78172    0.39450 -1.9816
Q7..Marital.status[T.Other]               1.65682    1.06178  1.5604
Q7..Marital.status[T.Single]              0.22646    0.39783  0.5692
Q9..Economic.dependency                   0.12513    0.14204  0.8810
Q10..Head.of.household[T.Yes]            -0.58467    0.52087 -1.1225
Q11..Years.of.education                  -0.14582    0.05965 -2.4446
Q15..Time.in.informal.activities         -0.04598    0.02037 -2.2568
Q19..Type.of.Program[T.Market Places]    -1.77871    0.96120 -1.8505
Q19..Type.of.Program[T.Meeting points]    2.15702    0.69385  3.1088
```

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```
Q19..Type.of.Program[T.Meeting points]       2.15702     0.69385   3.1088
Q19..Type.of.Program[T.Over 60 program]      1.09902     0.60948   1.8032
Q19..Type.of.Program[T.Permanent fairs]      3.97451     0.97527   4.0753
Q19..Type.of.Program[T.Shopping Centers]     1.50374     0.70833   2.1229
Q19..Type.of.Program[T.Temporary fairs]     -1.14676     0.55358  -2.0715


Intercepts:
    Value    Std. Error t value
1|2 -1.4740   1.1778     -1.2515
2|3 -0.6173   1.1734     -0.5261
3|4  0.4985   1.1706      0.4259
4|5  2.1276   1.1843      1.7966


Residual Deviance: 303.3268
AIC: 341.3268

> Anova(OrdRegModel.9, type="II")
Analysis of Deviance Table (Type II tests)

Response: Q2..General.welfare
                                LR Chisq Df     Pr(>Chisq)
Q3..City.of.origin                 0.322  1        0.57042
Q5..Age                            4.586  1        0.03223 *
Gender                             4.015  1        0.04509 *
Q7..Marital.status                 2.707  2        0.25833
Q9..Economic.dependency            0.777  1        0.37806
Q10..Head.of.household             1.260  1        0.26163
Q11..Years.of.education            6.017  1        0.01417 *
Q15..Time.in.informal.activities   5.303  1        0.02129 *
Q19..Type.of.Program              50.331  6 0.000000004035 ***
---
Signif. codes:  0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1
```

```
> exp(coef(OrdRegModel.9))
Q3..City.of.origin[T.Migrated to Bogotá]
                          1.2512876
                            Q5..Age
                          1.0490277
                     Gender[T.Male]
                          0.4576162
          Q7..Marital.status[T.Other]
                          5.2426007
          Q7..Marital.status[T.Single]
                          1.2541496
             Q9..Economic.dependency
                          1.1332993
          Q10..Head.of.household[T.Yes]
                          0.5572875
             Q11..Years.of.education
                          0.8643168
       Q15..Time.in.informal.activities
                          0.9550618
```

```
        Q15..Time.in.informal.activities
                              0.9550618
    Q19..Type.of.Program[T.Market Places]
                              0.1688559
   Q19..Type.of.Program[T.Meeting points]
                              8.6453432
  Q19..Type.of.Program[T.Over 60 program]
                              3.0012185
  Q19..Type.of.Program[T.Permanent fairs]
                             53.2242934
Q19..Type.of.Program[T.Shopping Centers]
                              4.4984654
  Q19..Type.of.Program[T.Temporary fairs]
                              0.3176647
```

```
Call:
polr(formula = Q22..Success.of.the.program ~ Q3..City.of.origin +
    Q5..Age + Gender + Q7..Marital.status + Q9..Economic.dependency +
    Q10..Head.of.household + Q11..Years.of.education, data = data,
    Hess = TRUE, method = "logistic")

Coefficients:
                                          Value Std. Error t value
Q3..City.of.origin[T.Migrated to Bogotá]  0.10387    0.35033  0.2965
Q5..Age                                  -0.02777    0.01528 -1.8174
Gender[T.Male]                           -0.55872    0.37309 -1.4976
Q7..Marital.status[T.Other]               0.51692    0.87815  0.5886
Q7..Marital.status[T.Single]              0.28815    0.36185  0.7963
Q9..Economic.dependency                   0.05425    0.12190  0.4450
Q10..Head.of.household[T.Yes]            -0.34219    0.46500 -0.7359
Q11..Years.of.education                  -0.04225    0.05688 -0.7428

Intercepts:
     Value    Std. Error t value
1|2 -3.3960   1.0578     -3.2106
2|3 -2.4781   1.0372     -2.3892
3|4 -1.7124   1.0266     -1.6681
4|5 -0.9320   1.0199     -0.9137

Residual Deviance: 360.7766
AIC: 384.7766

> Anova(OrdRegModel.9, type="II")
Analysis of Deviance Table (Type II tests)

Response: Q22..Success.of.the.program
                        LR Chisq Df Pr(>Chisq)
Q3..City.of.origin        0.0880  1    0.76670
Q5..Age                   3.3739  1    0.06624 .
Gender                    2.2627  1    0.13253
Q7..Marital.status        0.8559  2    0.65186
Q9..Economic.dependency   0.1977  1    0.65657
Q10..Head.of.household    0.5459  1    0.45999
Q11..Years.of.education   0.5560  1    0.45589
---
Signif. codes:  0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1
```

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```
> exp(coef(OrdRegModel.9))
Q3..City.of.origin[T.Migrated to Bogotá]
                               1.1094587
                                 Q5..Age
                               0.9726093
                            Gender[T.Male]
                               0.5719388
              Q7..Marital.status[T.Other]
                               1.6768616
             Q7..Marital.status[T.Single]
                               1.3339548
                   Q9..Economic.dependency
                               1.0557452
               Q10..Head.of.household[T.Yes]
                               0.7102168
                  Q11..Years.of.education
                               0.9586296
```

Appendix 11: Ordered logistic regression for success of the programme – Model 2

```
Call:
polr(formula = Q22..Success.of.the.program ~ Q3..City.of.origin +
    Q5..Age + Gender + Q7..Marital.status + Q9..Economic.dependency +
    Q10..Head.of.household + Q11..Years.of.education + Q15..Time.in.informal.act
    Q19..Type.of.Program, data = data, Hess = TRUE, method = "logistic")

Coefficients:
                                          Value Std. Error t value
Q3..City.of.origin[T.Migrated to Bogotá]  0.44394    0.38978    1.139
Q5..Age                                   0.02445    0.02218    1.102
Gender[T.Male]                           -0.82556    0.40011   -2.063
Q7..Marital.status[T.Other]               1.43260    0.96442    1.485
Q7..Marital.status[T.Single]              0.59833    0.40040    1.494
Q9..Economic.dependency                   0.14221    0.13799    1.031
Q10..Head.of.household[T.Yes]            -0.86759    0.50108   -1.731
Q11..Years.of.education                  -0.11717    0.06154   -1.904
Q15..Time.in.informal.activities         -0.05044    0.02025   -2.491
Q19..Type.of.Program[T.Market Places]    -1.17665    0.96552   -1.219
Q19..Type.of.Program[T.Meeting points]    2.08751    0.69667    2.996
```

```
Q19..Type.of.Program[T.Meeting points]      2.08751    0.69667    2.996
Q19..Type.of.Program[T.Over 60 program]     1.04934    0.63351    1.656
Q19..Type.of.Program[T.Permanent fairs]     3.53460    0.84336    4.191
Q19..Type.of.Program[T.Shopping Centers]    2.89357    0.83018    3.485
Q19..Type.of.Program[T.Temporary fairs]    -0.85705    0.50403   -1.700

Intercepts:
    Value   Std. Error  t value
1|2 -2.2840  1.2026     -1.8993
2|3 -1.1459  1.1884     -0.9642
3|4  0.0210  1.1864      0.0177
4|5  1.2553  1.2009      1.0453

Residual Deviance: 303.7628
AIC: 341.7628
```

```
> Anova(OrdRegModel.9, type="II")
Analysis of Deviance Table (Type II tests)

Response: Q22..Success.of.the.program
                              LR Chisq Df       Pr(>Chisq)
Q3..City.of.origin              1.308  1          0.25279
Q5..Age                         1.216  1          0.27020
Gender                          4.334  1          0.03735 *
Q7..Marital.status              3.839  2          0.14668
Q9..Economic.dependency         1.058  1          0.30369
Q10..Head.of.household          3.033  1          0.08159 .
Q11..Years.of.education         3.673  1          0.05530 .
Q15..Time.in.informal.activities 6.361 1          0.01167 *
Q19..Type.of.Program           49.562  6 0.000000005755 ***
---
Signif. codes:  0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1
```

```
> exp(coef(OrdRegModel.9))
Q3..City.of.origin[T.Migrated to Bogotá]
                          1.5588320
                            Q5..Age
                          1.0247501
                     Gender[T.Male]
                          0.4379904
           Q7..Marital.status[T.Other]
                          4.1895906
          Q7..Marital.status[T.Single]
                          1.8190824
            Q9..Economic.dependency
                          1.1528233
        Q10..Head.of.household[T.Yes]
                          0.4199634
            Q11..Years.of.education
                          0.8894353
       Q15..Time.in.informal.activities
                          0.9508149
```

```
Q19..Type.of.Program[T.Market Places]
                    0.3083105
Q19..Type.of.Program[T.Meeting points]
                    8.0647803
Q19..Type.of.Program[T.Over 60 program]
                    2.8557786
Q19..Type.of.Program[T.Permanent fairs]
                    34.2812246
Q19..Type.of.Program[T.Shopping Centers]
                    18.0575945
Q19..Type.of.Program[T.Temporary fairs]
                    0.4244140
```

Appendix 12: Overview of sample characteristics

| | | Gender | | | | |
| | Male | | Female | | Total | |
	No.	Per cent	No.	Per Cent	No.	Percent
ORIGIN						
From Bogotá	33	47.1	24	52.2	57	49.1
Migrated to Bogota	37	52.9	22	47.8	59	50.9
Total	70	100.0	46	100.0	116	100.0
SOCIAL STRATA						
Low low	3	2.6	2	1.7	5	4.3
Low	44	37.9	33	28.4	77	66.4
Medium low	22	19.0	9	7.8	31	26.7
Medium	1	0.9	2	1.7	3	2.6
Total	70	60.3	46	39.7	116	100.0
AGE GROUP						
Youth	2	1.7	1	0.9	3	2.6
Early Adulthood	19	16.4	12	10.3	31	26.7
Intermediate Adulthood	29	25.0	22	19.0	51	44.0
Elderly	20	17.2	11	9.5	31	26.7
Total	70		46		116	100.0

MARITAL STATUS						
Single	39	55.7	18	39.1	57	49.1
Married	13	18.6	5	10.9	18	15.5
Cohabiting	18	25.7	18	39.1	36	31.0
Divorced	0	.0	2	4.3	2	1.7
Widower	0	.0	3	6.5	3	2.6
Total	70	100.0	46	100.0	116	100.0
FAMILY NUCLEUS						
1	11	9.5	3	2.6	14	12.1
2	7	6.0	11	9.5	18	15.5
3	21	18.1	10	8.6	31	26.7
4	12	10.3	11	9.5	23	19.8
5	13	11.2	4	3.4	17	14.7
6	4	3.4	5	4.3	9	7.8
7	2	1.7	0	.0	2	1.7
8	0	.0	2	1.7	2	1.7
Total	70	60.3	46	39.7	116	100.0
NUMBER OF PEOPLE WHO FINANCIALLY DEPEND ON THE PARTICIPANT						
0	17	14.7	6	5.2	23	19.8
1	14	12.1	18	15.5	32	27.6
2	19	16.4	11	9.5	30	25.9
3	10	8.6	6	5.2	16	13.8
4	6	5.2	3	2.6	9	7.8
5	2	1.7	2	1.7	4	3.4
6	2	1.7	0	.0	2	1.7
Total	70	60.3	46	39.7	116	100.0
HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD						
No	10	14.3	13	28.3	23	19.8

Yes	60	85.7	33	71.7	93	80.2
Total	70	100.0	46	100.0	116	100.0
EDUCATION LEVEL						
Illiterate	13	44.3	31	28.3	44	37.9
Primary School	20	38.6	27	43.5	47	40.5
Secondary School	10	14.3	10	21.7	20	17.2
Post-Secondary School	3	2.9	2	6.5	5	4.3
HOUSING						
Own	4	3.4	10	8.6	14	12.1
Leased	57	49.1	31	26.7	88	75.9
Familiar Unit	8	6.9	5	4.3	13	11.2
Other	1	0.9	0	.0	1	0.9
Total	70	60.3	46	39.7	116	100.0
HEALTH INSURANCE AFFILIATION						
Beneficiary	4	3.4	1	0.9	5	4.3
Contributory	4	3.4	8	6.9	12	10.3
Subsidized	49	42.2	33	28.4	82	70.7
None	13	11.2	4	3.4	17	14.7
SOCIAL NETWORK						
Family	24	20.7	19	16.4	43	37.1
Friends	13	11.2	8	6.9	21	18.1
Own Initiative	33	28.4	18	15.5	51	44.0
Other	0	.0	1	0.9	1	0.9
PREVIOUS TYPE OF EMPLOYMENT						
Formal employment	32	27.6	13	11.2	45	38.8
Only employment	18	15.5	17	14.7	35	30.2
Other informal	15	12.9	11	9.5	26	22.4
Independent	4	3.4	3	2.6	7	6.0

Agriculture	1	0.9	2	1.7	3	2.6
REASON TO ENTER INFORMAL SECTOR						
Lack of government support	17	14.7	7	6.0	24	20.7
Legal procedures	9	7.8	4	3.4	13	11.2
Low costs	18	15.5	17	14.7	35	30.2
Sales Volumes	6	5.2	4	3.4	10	8.6
Schedule flexibility	7	6.0	4	3.4	11	9.5
Unemployment/Necessity	11	9.5	10	8.6	21	18.1
Other	2	1.7	0	.0	2	1.7

Appendix 13: Questionnaire and variables

Variable name	Question	Coding	Nature of the variable
Q1: Labour conditions	How much do you agree with the following question? "The IPES program improved my labour conditions?	Strongly disagree 1 Disagree 2 Neutral 3 Agree 4 Strongly agree 5 No answer 999	Dependent variable Ordinal/Scale variable
Q2: General welfare	How much do you agree with the following question? "The IPES program improved my labour conditions and my general welfare?	Strongly disagree 1 Disagree 2 Neutral 3 Agree 4 Strongly agree 5 No answer 999	Dependent variable Ordinal/Scale variable
Q3: City of origin		Bogota 1 Other 0	Binary Categorical

Q4: Social strata		Low-low 1 Low 2 Medium-low 3 Medium 4 Medium-high 5 High 6	Ordinal
Q5: Age			Numerical
Q5.1: Age group		Youth Early adulthood Intermediate adulthood Seniors	Categorical
Q6: Gender		Female 1 Male 0	Binary Categorical
Q7: Marital status		Single 1 Married 2 Cohabiting 3 Divorced 4 Widower 5	Categorical
Q7.1: Marital status		Single Involved Other	Categorical
Q8: Family nucleus	# of people in the family nucleus		Numerical
Q9: Economic dependency	# of people that depend economically on you		Numerical
Q10: Head of household	Are you the head of household?	Yes 1 No 0	Binary Categorical
Q11: Years of education	How many years of formal schooling do you have?		Numerical
Q11.1: Educational level		Illiterate Primary Secondary Post-Secondary	Categorical

Q12: Housing		Own 1 Leased 2 Familiar unit 3 Other 4	Categorical
Q13: Health insurance		Beneficiary 1 Subsidized 2 Contributory 3 None 4	Categorical
Q14: Pension Plan	Are you affiliated to a Pension Plan?	Yes 1 No 0	Binary categorical
Q15: Time in informal activities	How long had you been involved in informal activities?		Numerical
Q16: Social Network	Social Network influence in informal activities	Family 1 Friends 2 Own initiative 3 Other 4	Categorical
Q17: Form of employment	Form of employment before entering the informal sector	Formal employment 1 Only employment 2 Independent 3 Other informal 4 Agriculture 5	Categorical
Q18: Reason	Why did you decide to develop informal economic activities?	Sales Volume 1 Legal procedures 2 Schedule Flexibility 3 Low costs 4 Lack of government support 5 Unemployment/Necessity 6 Other 7	Cardinal
Q19: Type of Program	What type of program did you sign for?	Meeting points 1 Kiosks 2 Permanent fairs 3 MarketPlaces 4 Temporary fairs 5 Shopping Centres 6 Over 60 program 7 Other 8	Categorical

Q20: Easiness	How easy was it to meet the requirements of the program?	Very hard 1 Hard 2 Neutral 3 Easy 4 Very easy 5	Ordinal/Scale variable
Q21: Complete	How long did it take for you to complete the program?		Numerical
Q22: Successful	How successful do you think the program is?	Very unsuccessful 1 Unsuccessful 2 Neutral 3 Successful 4 Very Successful 5	Ordinal /Scale variable
Q23: Breaks	Have your working conditions improved in terms of rest periods	Yes 1 No 0	Binary categorical
Q24: Physical Conditions	Have your working conditions improved in terms of physical conditions	Yes 1 No 0	Binary categorical
Q25: Mental Conditions	Have your working conditions improved in terms of mental conditions	Yes 1 No 0	Binary categorical
Q26: Welfare	Have your working conditions improved in terms of welfare	Yes 1 No 0	Binary categorical
Q27: Health	Have your working conditions improved in terms of health	Yes 1 No 0	Binary categorical

Q28: Expectations	Were your expectations fulfilled?	Yes 1 No 0	Binary categorical
Q29: Schedule	How important is for you to be able to manage your own timetable?	Not important at all 1 Not important 2 Neutral 3 Important 4 Very important 5	Ordinal/Scale variable
Q30: Get in touch	How did you hear about the IPES programs?	Census 1 Association 2 Social network 3 Townhall 4 Other 5	Categorical
Q31: Critical factors	Mention one factor that you think benefits your livelihood	Location 1 Consistency 2 IPES/ Program 3 Stability 4 Commodity 5 Customers 6 Innovation 7 Suppliers 8	Cardinal
Q32: Income	Did your income increase?	Yes 1 No 0	Binomial Categorical