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Creating and Recreating Security:
Exploring the Hybrid Security Sector Reform in Afghanistan, and Its Creation of Local Forces.

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Declaration

I, Ibrahim Sakhi Afridi, declare that this thesis is a result of my research investigations and findings. Sources of information other than my own have been acknowledged and a reference list has been appended. This work has not been previously submitted to any other university for award of any type of academic degree.

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Acknowledgements

Abstract

In 2018, the Afghan government created the Afghan National Army – Territorial Force (ANA-TF) to deal with the growing Taliban insurgency, and provide physical security in rural areas. The ANA-TF becomes the latest experiment within locally raised forces in Afghanistan. The Afghan government and its international allies, mainly the United State, have been creating local forces since the international community's intervention in 2001. However, most of these locally raised forces have failed in providing security for the rural communities. Instead, they have turned into predatory forces, serving the interests of local commanders rather than the villagers they were meant to protect. This thesis aims to explore why these forces were created, what lessons can be drawn from their performances, and how they can be applied to assist the newly created ANA-TF. By analysing and discussing the performances of the most prominent and longest running local force, Afghan Local Police, I provide the ANA-TF with recommendations for how it can avoid repeating the mistakes of the past.

Acronyms and Abbreviations

AIHRC	Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission
ALP	Afghan Local Police
ANA	Afghan National Army
ANAP	Afghan National Auxiliary Police
ANA-TF	Afghan National Army – Territorial Force
ANBP	Afghan New Beginnings Programme
ANP	Afghan National Police
ANSF	Afghan National Security Forces
AP3	Afghan Public Protection Program
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
EU	European Union
HRW	Human Rights Watch
ICG	International Crisis Group
IDLG	Independent Directorate of Local Governance
LDI	Local Defence Initiative
MoD	Afghan Ministry of Defence
MoI	Afghan Ministry of Interior
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NDS	National Directorate for Security
OECD	Organisation for European Economic Co-operation and Development
SSR	Security Sector Reform
SIGAR	Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction
U.N.	United Nations
UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
U.S.	United States

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Chapter One: Introduction

1.1. The Liberal Peace and Security Sector Reform

The *liberal peace* has profoundly influenced the international community's post-Cold War interventions in conflict-affected and post-conflict countries. It is based upon two fundamental assumptions. First, security and development are inextricably linked. Second, the promotion of democracy to conflict-affected or post-conflict countries will enhance peace and development both domestically and internationally. As a result, liberal peace interventions aim to reconstruct a country's core institutions in line with Western democracies, and assist the process of peacebuilding.

Despite liberal peace intervention being the dominant form of post-Cold War peace intervention, the majority of interventions have been unsuccessful (Hameiri, 2009, p. 56). The main reason for its failures is related to its over-emphasis on the promotion of democracy, and the belief that the Western democratic system is the only political system that can enhance peace and prosperity. Scholars such as Boege, Brown & Clements (2009) have argued that the social realities Western democracies are built upon do not exist elsewhere. Therefore, imposing Western political ideas over non-Western countries is counterproductive if the aim is state-building and peacebuilding. Critics such as Boege et al. (2009) and Weigand (2015) propose hybrid political systems as a solution to the many failures of the contemporary state-building and peacebuilding efforts. A hybrid political system combines elements from Western democracies and local traditional systems to produce a political order that has legitimacy and is considered 'home grown" rather than imposed by foreigners (Weigand, 2015, p. 4).

One of the core elements of the liberal peace intervention is *security sector reform* (SSR). SSR aims at transforming the subject country's security sector entirely by reforming both its civilian, military and police actors simultaneously (Sedra, 2010, p. 16). However, in many cases such a holistic approach to security sector is impossible. Thus, the SSR efforts have to be contextualized to the realities on the ground. The contextualization can come in the form of a monopoly model or a hybrid model. The monopoly model identifies state-security as the first step of state-building and aims at giving the state a monopoly over legitimate means of coercion by disarming non-state armed factions. The hybrid model, on the other hand, prioritizes human-security and thus does not aims at centralizing means of coercion, but

instead combines state and non-state actors to best provide security for the population (Anderson, 2010, p. 12).

Although Afghanistan has been subjected to various attempts of state-building and regime support since the 1950s, these efforts are beyond the scope of this thesis. The focus of this thesis will be restricted to the post 9/11 state-building and peacebuilding efforts undertaken by the international community. The reason for focusing on the post 9/11 period is due to its relevance for the topic of this thesis.

1.2. The Liberal Peace and Security Sector Reform: Afghanistan

Following the September 11th, 2001 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, D.C., the United States (U.S.) and its international allies invaded Afghanistan as part of a broader Global War on Terror, to topple the Taliban regime which was providing refuge to the leaders of the terrorist organization responsible for the attacks. A combination of American Special Forces, air power and Afghan anti-Taliban militias belonging mainly to the non-Pashtun Northern Alliance, lead to the fall of the Taliban regime within months (Monten, 2014, p. 182).

After the fall of the Taliban, a group of international actors and their Afghan counterparts consisting mainly of the Northern Alliance leaders met in Bonn, Germany under the supervision of the United Nations (U.N.). The actors present at the conference discussed the political future of- and state-building efforts in Afghanistan. The Taliban were not included in these talks. The conference resulted in the formation of an interim government with Hamid Karzai as President, and the various Northern Alliance leaders as Cabinet Ministers in the government. The Bonn meeting also "set out benchmarks to establish key institutions of a sovereign and democratic state, including a transitional government, a new constitution, presidential elections by September 2004, and parliamentary and provincial council elections by October 2005" (Ayub, Kouvo & Wareham, 2009, p. 9).

Although the security situation of Afghanistan was addressed during the Bonn meeting, it was first at the G8 meeting in Genève 2002 that a proper plan for the Afghan security sector reform was set. Despite being a 'holistic' approach on paper, the initial SSR process adopted a monopoly approach that aimed at building strong Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) in parallel with a national Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration's (DDR) programme aimed at giving the Afghan state a monopoly over

legitimate force by disarming non-state armed factions. However, due to the slow development of both ANA and ANP discussed later in detail, and the reluctance of the Afghan society to disarm through the DDR process, the U.S. and Afghan governments started applying a hybrid model of SSR. The focus was no longer disarming and acquiring the state's monopoly over means of coercion, but instead cooperating with the non-state actors to provide physical security in the rural areas.

The adoption of the hybrid model and the cooperation between state and non-state actors resulted in various locally raised forces. The most prominent and longest running locally raised force is the Afghan Local Police (ALP). The ALP was established as a result of the failures and difficulties faced by several of its predecessor programs. The ALP aimed to provide physical security in rural areas that either lacked or had limited presence of Afghan- or international security forces. In theory, this village-level force would consist of local men recruited through cooperation between U.S. Special Forces, local village elders, and local government officials. In practice, however, the ALP recruiting processes were hijacked by local strongmen, who recruited people who were loyal to them. This resulted in the ALP becoming a predatory force pursuing local commanders' patronage and interests, instead of providing security to the villagers, as was previously the case with commander-led small militias.

As a response to the gradually increasing insurgent activities, the inability of the ANA to meet set targets, and the failures of the ALP, the Afghan government established yet another local force in February 2018, called Afghan National Army – Territorial Force (ANA-TF). The ANA-TF is expected to operate in areas that are under full or partial control of the Afghan government. Based upon a process of local recruitment, the ANA-TF is set to provide physical security in rural areas by preventing insurgents from re-entering the areas, providing Afghan National Army (ANA) and international security forces with information about insurgents' whereabouts, and building stable relationship between the people and the government through district authorities (Clark, 2019). Due to its recent establishment and delayed deployment, there is no current literature available on the performances of the ANA-TF.

So, while it is too early to assess the possible achievements of the ANA-TF, the question thus arises of why build yet another local force when the majority of the previous programmes either have failed or have not lived up to the intended expectations? Moreover, how can this

new ANA-TF be assisted to avoid facing the same problems as the ALP and its predecessor programmes?

1.3. Objective and Research Questions

In this thesis I aim to discuss the strategic shift in security sector reform, and the various local forces established as a result of the shift. The main focus of this thesis will be on the performance of the ALP and what key lessons can be learned and applied to assist the ANA-TF in achieving its targets.

1.3.1. Problem Statement

The different local forces, which were created following the shift from monopoly to hybrid model, have failed in providing security for the people in rural areas. In many cases, they have intensified the existing rivalries and conflicts in the areas they were/are deployed. Despite these documented failures, the U.S. and Afghan government continued to perpetuate this hybridised model, establishing local force after local force. Can lessons be drawn from the failures of the Afghan Local Police and its predecessor program to ensure future reiterations can achieve greater success, and what might that reiteration look like in the case of the ANA-TF?

1.3.2. Research Questions

In this thesis I aim to answer the following research questions:

> What is the basis for establishing the Afghan Local Police (ALP) and what lessons can be drawn from the performances of the (ALP) in terms of delivering more appropriate and effective physical security?

> How can these lessons be applied to assist the development and deployment of the Afghan National Army – Territorial Force (ANA-TF)?

1.4. Thesis Structure

The structure of this thesis is as following: Chapter 2 describes and explains the methodological approach undertaken to acquire the necessary data needed to answer the research questions. Chapter 3 describes and discusses liberal peace with a focus on security sector reform, and how it was applied in Afghanistan. Chapter 4 is divided into two parts: the first part presents how the Afghan government has traditionally governed the rural areas

through local police forces. The second part presents four of the post-2001 experiments within locally raised forces conducted by the U.S. and the Afghan government. The analysis of the first three will be semi-detailed; meanwhile the fourth (ALP) will be extensively explored as it will be used to address the research questions. Chapter 5 presents and discusses the ALP deployments in Kandahar and Kunduz provinces. The former is considered a success story of ALP, while the latter is an example of constraints and failures faced by the ALP approach. Chapter 6 presents the newly established ANA-TF and its mandate. Chapter 7 is divided into two parts: first part analyses the findings presented in chapter 5. The second part uses the analysis to provide a series of recommendations for ANA-TF establishment and deployment.

Chapter Two: Methodology

This chapter focus on the methodological approach adopted for this thesis. It explains the research strategy, the collection of data, the type of sources used to acquire the necessary data, and how it is analysed. This chapter also considers the ethical responsibilities of a researcher and the limitations of this thesis.

2.1. The Qualitative Research Approach

This study applies a qualitative research. Bryman (2016) describes qualitative research as a research strategy that is concerned with understanding a specific phenomenon through strategic collection and analysis of data (p. 374). During the collection of data, qualitative research usually emphasizes words instead of numbers and uses the collected data to generate a theory about the phenomenon of the investigation. Bryman presents two other key features that differentiate qualitative research from quantitative. First, the interpretivist epistemological position which aims at understanding the social world through the interpretations of it by its participants, rather than taking a natural scientific approach which emphasizes the existence of objective truth about the social world. Second, the constructionist ontological position which perceives the social realities as outcomes of the interactions between individuals, rather than something separate from them (2016, p. 375). Not only does the unstructured and flexible nature makes qualitative research strategy adjustable to the specific needs and objectives of the researcher, but also enables the researcher to observe and acquire information that would have been ignored or excluded through a more structured research design (Brymann, 2016, p. 397). This type of research approach makes it possible to use different sources of data and different methods of data collection and analysis, and is

therefore, a suitable method for a remote study, like this one of the Afghan Local Police. Although suitable, but such a research approach has been criticized for its limitations.

The criticism generally covers three areas. First, qualitative research receives criticism for being to impressionist and subjective, relying heavily on the researcher's subjective interpretations. A challenge faced by such a personal approach to research is that important information might be overlooked or excluded because the researcher does not consider it important enough. The importance of researchers' subjectivity also makes qualitative studies hard to replicate. The second criticism directed at qualitative research is regarding the use of a small number of units when collecting the data. A small number of sample units makes the scope of the findings restricted, and unable to apply to other relevant cases. In other words, due to the small number of participants in qualitative studies, the findings cannot be generalized. The third criticism of qualitative research relates to its transparency. It is hard to establish what has been done, and how the researcher arrived at the conclusion he or she arrived at (Brymann, 2016, p. 398-399). Qualitative research proposes trustworthiness as criteria to ensure quality in research, and thus answer its critics and overcome its limitations.

2.2. Trustworthiness

Unlike quantitative research which evaluates the strength of research through validity and reliability, Bryman (2016) proposes trustworthiness as better suited criteria for assessing and evaluating the quality of qualitative research (p. 384). The reason why the application of validity and reliability to qualitative research is contradictory, is that both criteria presuppose that there exists absolute truth about social reality. Trustworthiness, on the other hand, suggests that there does not exist a single account of social reality, but instead multiple accounts (Ibid.). The following four criteria are used to evaluate a study's trustworthiness:

Credibility and Desk Research

Credibility emphasizes the existence of multiple accounts of social reality. In order to produce a credible account of social reality, the researcher is required to conduct the research process in a way that is acceptable to the people being studied. This includes conducting research according to ethical practices and submitting the findings to the participants for their confirmation and approval of the researcher's understanding of their social reality, also known as respondent validation (Bryman, 2016, p. 385). Credibility can also be achieved through triangulation which ensures greater confidence in findings by using more than one method or

source of data when studying a social phenomenon (Ibid., p. 386). Although the initial plan was to conduct semi-structured interviews and ensure credibility through respondent validation combined with triangulation, due to logistical and security related issues, this research ended up being a desk research based study. This means that this thesis builds on secondary data. Furthermore this study ensures credibility through triangulation by combining several different sources consisting of books, academic articles, news reports, and NGO's reports based on hundreds of interviews.

Transferability

Transferability refers to the ability of a researcher's findings to be transferred to other contexts. In qualitative research, transferability is ensured by providing a detailed and thick description of the phenomenon in focus, a database, that others can use to judge the possibility of transferring the findings to other contexts (Bryman, 2016, p. 385). This study provides a semi-detailed account of the phenomenon known as state-building, security sector reform, how the Afghan Local Police were established and its performances - both positive and negative. Despite the lack of information about the Afghan National Army - Territorial Force, this study has included as much information as possible, which was drawn from the few articles that have been written about it.

Dependability

Dependability is considered as qualitative research' answer to reliability in quantitative research. In quantitative research, reliability is concerned with whether the conducted research will present the same result if repeated (Brymann, 2016, p. 41). Similarly, in qualitative research, dependability is used to investigate data reliability by providing a detailed description of the research process, the collected data, and the methods used for analysis. In other words, keep a complete record of all phases of the research (Brymann, 2016, p. 384).

Confirmability

Confirmability refers to the researcher's objectivity when conducting research. Although qualitative research recognizes that ensuring complete objectivity is impossible, the researcher is expected to act in good faith, and avoid personal values and theoretical inclinations from overly influencing the research process and the findings (Brymann, 2016, p. 386). Although I am from Afghanistan and have heard stories about the abuses committed by militias both to

my close- and far relatives, I base my conclusions entirely on the secondary data I read and analysed. This study ensures confirmability by citing sources as much as possible.

2.3. Research Design: Case Study

Bryman (2016) defines research design as a framework for collecting and analysing data (p. 40). The research design adopted for this study is case study. A case study is a detailed and intensive analysis of a single case within its actual context (Kohlbacher, 2006). A case can take many different forms; it can be a community, a family, an event, or even an organization. An essential element of a case study is to be clear about the unit(s) of analysis (Bryman, 2016, p. 60-61). The case for this study is security provision in Afghanistan, and the units of analysis are the different local forces created to provide security in Afghanistan.

2.4. Data Collection

This sampling strategy applied in this study is purposive sampling, which aims at strategically collecting data relevant to the case (Bryman, 2016, p. 407-408). There are several ways one can conduct purposive sampling. The type of sampling chosen for this study were the typical case sampling and theoretical sampling. Bryman (2016) defines typical case sampling as "sampling a case because it exemplifies a dimension of interest" (p. 409). Theoretical sampling, on the other hand, is a strategy of collecting data to generate a theory. In this study, typical case sampling is used to gather information about the different experiments within local forces; meanwhile, theoretical sampling can assist generating theory for the future development and deployment of ANA-TF.

2.5. Secondary Data

Secondary data is any available written record that contains data collected by others than the researcher who is using them. Secondary data can be collected from various archives, official documents, books, magazines, mass-media outputs, and different internet sources. Due to the high number of producers of secondary data, Bryman (2016) argues that it is essential to be critical and careful regarding the source of data. He presents the following four criteria that every researcher should consider when assessing the quality of secondary data:

1) *Authenticity*. Is the evidence genuine and of unquestionable origin?

2) *Credibility*. Is the evidence free from error and distortion?

3) *Representativeness*. Is the evidence typical of its kind and, if not, is the extent of its untypicality known?

4) *Meaning*. Is the evidence clear and comprehensible?

Amongst the online sources, 'Google Scholar' is presented by Bryman (2016) as a handy tool when collecting secondary data (p. 108). Google scholar gives the researcher access to academic literature such as peer-reviewed papers, articles, books, theses, and abstracts published by academic publishers. The secondary data used in this study is collected from academic literature accessed mainly through google scholar. The data also includes reports produced by Non-Governmental Organization's (NGO) such as Human Rights Watch, International Crisis Group, Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission amongst others.

2.6. Analysis

As mentioned earlier in this chapter, one of the ways qualitative research ensures quality is through triangulation. When collecting data, the use of different sampling methods and sources ensures triangulation. Similarly, combining different methods of analysis ensures triangulation when analysing data. The methods of analysis applied in this study are content analysis and case study analysis.

According to Elo & Kyngäs (2007), content analysis is a method of analysing data and testing theories to enhance understanding of the data (p. 108). Bryman (2016) consider content analysis the most common approach used in qualitative research to analyse data by searching out the underlying themes existing within the data (p. 563). The process of content analysis is divided into three phases: preparation, organizing and reporting (Elo & Kyngäs, 2007, p. 110). Case study analysis, on the other hand, does not consist of different phases. In a case study, data collection and analysis are developed iteratively, allowing theory development grounded in empirical evidence (Kohlbacher, 2006).

Elo & Kyngäs' (2007) open coding approach to data was adopted when analysing the data. Notes and headings were written in the text while reading it. The notes and headings were reread through and expanded in certain cases to include enough information to describe every aspect of the content. Similar notes and headings were then categorized into groups to bring together data that belong together. For example, the articles about the ALP were marked with notes and comments while reading it. Marks and comments that were similar were then

grouped under a 'higher' heading. The categorization and grouping of similar themes made it easier to interpret and create meaning of the data.

2.7. Ethical Considerations

According to Bryman (2016), the discussions around ethical responsibilities in social science can be broken down into four main areas: 1. Whether there is *harm to participants*; 2. Whether there is a *lack of informed consent*; 3. Whether there is an *invasion of privacy*; and 4. Whether *deception is involved* (p. 125). Every researcher is expected to ask themselves the four questions mentioned above and conduct their research in a manner that avoids harming-, invading the privacy of- or deceiving the participants involved. This research does not contain any primary data nor does it reveal any sensitive information that might harm someone. Furthermore, it did not need anyone's consent to publish. Since this study is based on secondary data, I have made sure to give credit to the source by citing their work wherever needed.

2.8. Limitations

One of the limitations related to qualitative case study research is its potential for external validity or generalizability (Bryman, 2016, p. 62). Bryman argues that a single case study cannot yield findings that can be applied generally to other cases. Similarly, the findings of this study cannot be generalized or applied to another context than the one studied. Even though the creation of local forces finds place in another countries as well, Afghanistan's cultural, ethnic, religious or other context-specific factors make the findings unique to Afghanistan resulting in this study being non-applicable to other countries.

Another limitation of this study is its remote nature. As previously mentioned, this study is based on secondary data accessed through the internet and physical written literature. It bases its findings and recommendation on the works of other researchers, who might have written their research for a different purpose. This study could have been enriched by collecting primary data through interviews of Afghan citizens, who are exposed to these forces daily to ensure triangulation. In addition, it is important to keep in mind that the primary reports used to gather information about the cases in this thesis are relatively old.

The main reports are from 2011, 2012 and 2015. I have tried to find more recent studies and sources, but all the new literature I encountered used the very same reports from 2011, 2012 and 2015 as sources for their findings. Furthermore, based on the literature reviewed for this

thesis, there were no other reports or studies that have provided such a detailed analysis of the ALP in these two provinces as these did. More recent reports or detailed studies could have been helpful in comparing and assessing if the ALP's performances have changed during this time.

Chapter Three: Theoretical Framework

This chapter presents some key concepts used to explain the international community's involvement in Afghanistan, and the various local forces established. Although the main theoretical focus of this thesis and this chapter is the security sector reform, it also discusses the liberal peace intervention. Given that the security sector reform is a core element of the liberal peace intervention, and is influenced by it, I consider it important to discuss before exploring security sector reform (SSR).

3.1. The Liberal Peace Intervention

Following the end of the Cold War, the world witnessed an increase in international interventions in conflict-affected and post-conflict countries. According to Heathershaw and Lambach (2008), the aims of such interventions were to reconstruct a country's core structures and institutions in line with the Western, Weberian state model; and to support the transition from war to peace (p. 272). The former is referred to as state-building, while; the latter as peacebuilding. The main drivers behind these interventions were individual Western states, leading international organizations, and international financial institutions. Their aim is not just to achieve organizational reform and support the reconciliation processes, but also to impose a set of reforms that can liberalize the economy, modernize the society, introduce democracy and induce political stability – also known as *liberal peace* (Heathershaw et al., 2008, p. 272.).

Mac Ginty (2010) argues that, every post-Cold War intervention conducted, in the name of 'the international community', has been heavily influenced by liberal peace (p.578). Liberal peace intervention is based upon two fundamental ideas. First, the notion that security and development are interlinked. The second, the promotion of democracy and democratization of war-torn societies will enhance peace, order, and stability both domestically and internationally (Andersen, 2011, p. 5). The former is commonly known as the security-development nexus, meanwhile the latter as the liberal peace thesis.

3.1.1. Security-Development Nexus

Development requires security, and security is impossible without development. This is a claim that has been repeated so many times within contemporary discourse on state-building. Duffield (2005), refers to this "as an accepted truth of the post-Cold War era" (p. 142). The assumed interlinkage between security and development has attracted the attention of national and global policymaking. For example, the late Kofi Annan, United Nations Secretary-General at the time, stated in 2004 that "development and security are inextricably linked" and "a more secure world is only possible if poor countries are given a real chance to develop" (as cited in, Stern & Ojendal, 2010, p. 5). Also, the European Unions' (EU) European Security Strategy of 2003, which operates as EU's main strategic document on development and security, consider security as "a precondition of development" and violent conflict not only "destroys infrastructure" but also encourages criminality and "deters investment" (as cited in Keukeleire & Raube, 2013, p. 558). In other words, in order to achieve development, violent conflicts must be prevented. As a result, the promotion of political and economic development is considered necessary for achieving lasting peace and security. Lasting peace and security can be achieved by fighting the root causes of violent conflicts; poverty, inequality and repression. This fighting of violent conflicts' root causes shifts the focus from the conventional state-centred development and security to 'human-centred' development and security[1]. Since states are seen as the fundamental units upon which the international system is built, the liberal peace proposes that both international order, and human security and development can be achieved simultaneously by improving the state (Andersen, 2011, p. 6).

3.1.2. The Liberal Thesis

The improvement of existing states is achieved by states adopting liberal values such as democracy, human rights, the rule of law and good governance. These liberal values have their origin in the liberal peace thesis which is built on two fundamental claims. The first being that, democracies are more peaceful than non-democracies because they never (or rarely) go to war with each other. Second, democracies have developed mechanisms to solve domestic and foreign conflicts against other democracies in a peaceful manner (Layne, 1994, p. 8).

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[1] 'Human security' and 'human development' takes the peoples' welfare, safety and freedom as starting point instead of states' security and development.

One of the major promoters of democracy and democratization is the United States (U.S.). According to Layne (1994), American policymakers who have embraced the ideas of liberal peace thesis see the spread of democracy as an antidote to America's future wars and insecurity (p. 5). President Clinton stated in his 1994 State of the Union address that "the best strategy to ensure our security and to build a durable peace is to support the advance of democracy elsewhere" (as cited in, Owen, 1994, p. 87). Until this very day, the U.S. alongside other major donor countries and international organizations intervene in other non-democratic countries to expand democracy and democratization (Knack, 2004, p. 252). Their interventions combine the ideas of security-development nexus and the liberal peace by deploying military troops to uphold peace and stability, and civilian 'peacebuilders' to transform the country into a Western Weberian democratic state by reforming its political and economic structures. However, the liberal peace intervention has been criticized on many fronts.

3.2. Critique of The Liberal Peace Intervention

One of the main criticism received by the promoters of liberal peace is related to the security-development nexus and how it is defined and interpreted. For instance, Chandler (2007) criticizes the security-development nexus for lacking an agreement on how the two concepts should be defined. He argues that before the end of the Cold War, security concerns were focused mainly on the military threats posed towards the geo-strategic interests of Western states. While development policies, were concerned with supporting political allies and proposing market-based solutions to development blockages (p. 365). However, as time passed, the definitions of both security and development changed and lost its 'clear' distinctions. A report published by the International Peace Academy in 2006 highlights this:

> Both policy and academic debates face a common problem: how to define development and security, which are broad and elusive concepts. Development has multiple dimensions from human rights to environmental sustainability, from economic growth to governance. Similarly, the concept of security has gradually expanded from state security to human security and now includes a range of military as well as non-military threats that recognize no borders. This naturally leads to a dilemma: What should be integrated with what? As a result, there is a panoply of theory, policy, and practice on the interplay between security and development (as cited in, Chandler, 2007, p. 367-368)

Such observation showcases the challenges faced by academics and politicians regarding the definition and contents of both concepts. Chandler, interprets the 'panoply' as a state of confusion and incoherence. Unsurprisingly so, he argues, instead of being a coherent set of policies, the security-development nexus has become a set of contradictory policy statements that appear more like a "rhetorical wish lists than seriously considered policy options" (2007, p. 368).

The liberal peace is also criticized for its assumption that the statehood model best capable of providing security, justice and development is the Western Weberian model found in the OECD (Organisation for European Economic Co-operation and Development). The argument is that wherever a state is unable to provide at least one of these three fundamental state functions, transforming it to the OECD model state with strong and stable central institutions is considered the best solution. Schrøder and Kode (2012) criticize such state-building practices for neglecting the history of the modern European statehood. They argue that the formation of the current strong and democratic European state with a *legitimate* monopoly over the use of force was not due to foreign support or adopting of ideal-type polities. For them this rather evolved organically through participation, negotiation, and cooperation between state and non-state actors (p. 36). In other words, the strong state institutions and monopoly over the use of force emerged as a result of and reflected the particular social realities of Europe. Therefore, imposing the European statehood model on countries that do not share the same culture, identity and experiences is counterproductive, because it may not result in a stable and legitimate state.

Boege and colleagues (2009) continue the criticism of the contemporary liberal peace-inspired state-building by supporting Schrøder and Kode' claim that such a Western Weberian state hardly exists outside the OECD (p. 14). Therefore, instead of insisting on building a state in line with the democratic values shared by OECD states, it would be much more 'fruitful' to adapt the state-building efforts to the actual social and political realities on the ground. Boege et al. (2009) and other 'post-Weberian' scholars such as Weigand (2015) and Acemoglu, Robinson & Santos (2013) suggest that state-building efforts should combine elements of Weberian state with local traditional institutions that exist on the ground to develop what they call a hybrid political system. In a hybrid system, the central state has to share core governance domains of security, representation, and welfare with other decentralized non-state actors. Similarly, the Weberian notion of state monopolizing means of coercion cannot

exist, because the state has to share the responsibility for security provision with other non-state actors (Boege et al., 2009, p.18; Weigand, 2015, p. 4; Acemoglu et al., 2013, p. 6).

Despite these critiques, the liberal peace interventions' SSR component makes it relevant for this thesis, as its attempt to explore the basis for the establishment of ALP. Therefore, the focus of the next section will be on how the liberal peace intervention provides security and reform a subject country's security sector through SSR.

3.3. Security Sector Reform

SSR as a framework emerged on the international security and development policy scene in the late 1990s as a response to the weak and poorly governed security sectors of developing countries and fragile states (Van de Goor & Van Veen, 2010, p. 88). SSR has become an (if not the) core element of contemporary state-building policies and practices. It is also widely perceived as a precondition for stability and sustainable development in post-conflict countries (Sedra, 2010, p. 16).

SSR addresses a country's security problems and tries to improve the situation through institutional reforms (Wulf, 2004, p. 338). The objectives of the institutional reforms are according to OECD (2008, p. 21)

1) to establish effective governance, oversight, and accountability in the security sector,

2) improve the delivery of the security and justice services,

3) develop local leadership and ownership of the reform process,

4) ensure sustainable delivery of justice and security services

Such an approach can be described as 'holistic' as it seeks to reform a country's security sector by converging two strategies which were before pursued separately by the international community. The strategies of building a strong and stable security institutions in states that have limited enforcement capacity; and the promotion of checks on arbitrary executive power by promoting the rule of law are pursued in parallel. The rule of law will ensure the legitimacy of the security institutions and put restrictions on the use of coercion and violence by the state's security institutions (Schrøder et al., 2012, p. 32 & 35).

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Anderlini and Conaway (2004) divide the state's security institutions into four groups[2]: 1) groups with the authority and instruments to use force such as militaries, police, paramilitaries, intelligence services; 2) institutions that monitor and manage the security institutions such as government ministries, parliament, civil societies; 3) structures responsible for maintaining the rule of law such as the judiciary, the ministry of justice, human rights commissions, traditional justice mechanisms, prisons; and 4) non-state security forces such as armed opposition movements, militias and private security companies (p. 31). According to this holistic approach, a successful SSR requires a parallel reform of all these different actors and institutions in order for them to support one another. For example, successful reform of the military and police is dependent on parallel reforms in the judiciary system. Although sound in theory, such a comprehensive approach is challenging in practice (Brzoska and Heinemann-Gruder, 2004, p. 124).

According to Schrøder and Kode (2012), the ambitious goal of SSR to build effective and legitimate security institutions in line with Western democracies is hard to achieve in post-conflict countries. Even though building competent state and security institutions is relatively easy for donor countries, ensuring its legitimacy through the rule of law is much more challenging. As mentioned earlier, the rule of law, which ensures democratic governance and accountability in European countries, is the outcome of long historical processes that over time transformed the state-society relations. Therefore, for the rule of law to emerge in post-conflict countries, one need to consider the local realities and state-society interactions. However, contemporary state-building efforts such as SSR where political institutions are funded and built by external actors ignores and neglects the importance of state-society relations. As a result, state institutions, which might be effective, lack legitimacy because they were not the outcomes of state-society interactions which include negotiations and cooperation (Schrøder et al., 2012, p. 38).

Similarly, the holistic SSR's intention of reforming the various different actors and institutions within security sector in parallel is difficult to achieve in practice. Sedra (2007) illustrates this very problem by examining the SSR programmes in Iraq and Afghanistan. His assessment of both countries shows that in both cases the military- and police reform were prioritized without necessary corresponding reforms in the other parts of the security sector,

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[2] It is important to clarify that a country's security institutions are not limited to the ones mentioned here. OECD (2008) provides a comprehensive list of the different actors and institutions that plays a role in ensuring state and its citizens' security (p. 22).

such as judicial or penal reform. As mentioned earlier, successful reform of military and police requires a successful parallel reform of the judiciary system. In both Afghanistan and Iraq, the judiciary reform received the least amount of attention and resources. Hence, the military and police forces grew without a proper judicial system to deliver adequate law enforcement.

To cope with the challenges faced by such a holistic SSR approach, Andersen (2010) argues that the SSR strategies are often divided into two competing models: a universal state-centred *monopoly* model, and a *hybrid* model tailor-made for the social and political realities in post-conflict states (p. 12).

3.3.1. Monopoly Model

The monopoly model, which is by far the dominant approach to SSR, considers the Weberian model of the state as the only political order that can ensure good governance and democratic accountability. Max Weber defines state as "a human community that (successfully) claim the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory", and the state, according to Weber, is the only entity entitled to ascribe other institutions or individuals with the right to use physical force (as cited in, Gerth & Mills, 1946, p. 78-79). Therefore, the monopoly model aims at monopolizing means of coercive force on behalf of the state. State monopoly over coercive force is considered the first step in reforming a country's security sector and transforming the country into a liberal democracy. This is based on the assumption that the state needs a certain level of capacity (state institutions) before it can be subject to democratic reforms of effective governance, oversight, and accountability. Paris (2004) describes this approach as 'institutionalization before liberalization'. This implies that institutions need to be built before they can be liberalized (p. 8). Similarly, in order to ensure that state can provide security and protection to its citizens, it must first monopolize and possess more coercive power than any other actor in the country, before enforcing the rule of law.

Lawrence (2012) presents two challenges faced by such a state-centric approach to SSR in fragile and post-conflict states. The first challenge lays in the economic resources required to develop and sustain the state institutions that can provide security and justice throughout the country. The costs for this are often far higher than what the host state's revenue and foreign aid can provide. For example, the resources Afghanistan spent on its security between 2004 and 2005 were equivalent to 494 percent of domestic revenue (Byrd & Guimbert, 2005, p.

42). However, it was still insufficient to extend state-based security throughout the country. Second challenge arises from legitimacy. The state-centric approach aspires to build state institutions that enjoy broad authority and legitimacy in the eyes of the population. However, in fragile and conflict-affected states where the state has been absent or been a source of insecurity and injustice, local communities turn to alternative authorities for justice and security. In such cases, state institutions lack widespread respect and legitimacy (Lawrence, 2012, p. 4). As a solution to the lack of resources and legitimacy, some scholar propose alternative approach, also known as the *hybrid* model.

3.3.2. Hybrid Model

In contrast to the monopoly model, the hybrid model is based upon the assumption that the Western Weberian-style state, based on state monopoly over legitimate coercive force, rarely exist outside OECD. Ebo (2007) illustrates this point by referring to the post-colonial states in Africa and argues that the states there have "hardly had a monopoly of legitimate force at any point in time" (p. 37). Therefore, instead of assuming that the Western state model is the appropriate model for conflict prevention, security provision, development and good governance, and enforcing it upon other societies, we should turn our focus towards models that draw upon the strengths and resilience of the communities in question and work with existing institutions on the ground (Boege et al., 2009, p. 14).

The hybrid model of SSR proposes that instead of insisting that the formal state should have a monopoly over means of coercion, the focus should instead be on working together with the non-state authorities and security providers to "maximize their strengths and minimize their weaknesses" (Baker, 2010, p. 217). The hybrid model suggests that effective SSR can only be achieved if the reforms are based on realistic assessment of how security and justice is actually provided in the societies in question, rather than basing it on normative ideals (Weberian-state) that can only result from a multi-year evolutionary change (Andersen, 2011, p. 13; Brzoska & Heinemann-Gruder, 2004, p. 129).

A challenge facing the hybrid model is how to incorporate the various non-state security and justice providers into a national political structure. Supporters of the hybrid model solve this challenge by establishing links between the non-state actors[3] and state in order to build a

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[3] Non-state actors in this case refers to traditional governance institutions, societal structures such as village communities, and traditional authorities such as village elders, clan chiefs and strongmen (Boege, Brown, Clements & Nolan, 2008, p.7).

coherent system that can ensure regulation, accountability and democratic governance. Albrecht and colleagues (2010) see this link between the state and the non-state actors as an alternative route towards state-building. Instead of strengthening its central institutions, the state can extend its control to areas where it lacks or has limited influence by cooperating with local non-state actors (p. 82). This way, the state can increase its authority and legitimacy by cooperating with non-governmental authorities that enjoy local communities trust and respect.

Despite their apparent differences, both monopoly and hybrid model share key characteristics that distinguish them from the ideal holistic SSR model described in section 3.3. Unlike the conventional SSR models holistic approach, both monopoly and hybrid model attempts to contextualize their efforts to the actual realities on the ground in the societies subjected to the SSR. This contextualization entails a choice made between state security and human security. Based on an assessment of the social and political realities on the ground and the objectives of the intervention, either state-security (monopoly model) or human-security (hybrid model) is prioritized. This goes against the conventional SSR model which attempts to achieve both state-security and human-security simultaneously (Andersen, 2011, p. 13).

The differences between and the adoption of either monopoly or hybrid model tells us something about the priorities made, and what the SSR intends to achieve. The following section describes and discusses how these different concepts were applied in Afghanistan.

3.4. Security Sector Reform – Afghanistan
3.4.1. The Holistic Lead-Donor Approach

Following the fall of the Taliban towards the end of December 2001, a diverse set of Afghan and international actors met in Bonn, Germany to discuss the political future of Afghanistan. The U.N.-assisted and supervised meeting resulted in the Bonn Agreement, which set the course for U.S. and NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization)-supported state-building efforts in Afghanistan (Ayub & Kouvo, 2008, p. 649-650). The UN and the wider international community adopted a 'light footprint' approach and created the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) to assist the implementation of the policies agreed on in the Bonn agreement. The aim of the light footprint approach was, at least on paper, to ensure Afghan ownership and leadership of the state-building and reconstruction efforts. Therefore, UNAMA did not have a strong leadership- or coordinating role in the Bonn agreement. The reconstruction of the different sectors of the Afghan state was to be ensured

through cooperation between lead donor nations and the relevant ministries of the Afghan government (Suhrke, 2013, p. 4; Ayub et al., 2009, p. 9).

A similar approach was adopted for the reform of the Afghan security sector. Although concerns regarding Afghanistan's security were addressed indirectly at Bonn, it was first at the G8 security donors meeting in Geneva in spring of 2002 that the agenda was set and groundwork laid for SSR process in Afghanistan (Brzoska & David,2006, p. 85).

The Afghan SSR process was divided into five pillars: military reform, police reform, counter-narcotics, judicial reform, and the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants (Sedra, 2006, p. 96). The responsibility for supervising and overseeing each pillar was given to individual lead-donor nations. The U.S. were responsible for military reform, Germany for police reform, United Kingdom (UK) for counter-narcotics, Italy for judicial reform, and Japan for DDR.

One of the main reasons behind giving individual nations leading role for the different pillars was to ensure their long-term engagement, and simultaneous development of the different pillars (Sedra, 2003, p. 8). However, the lead nation approach resulted in a fragmented and donor-driven SSR. To illustrate the fragmented nature of Afghan SSR, Ayub et al. (2009) give the example of the different approaches adopted by the U.S. and Germany regarding the Afghan National Police (ANP). The German approach focused on developing an extensively trained small Western-style human-centric law enforcement police force. The U.S., on the other hand, adopted a state-centric approach that focused on less training and bigger police force so it can assist the military in offensive counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations (p. 11; Sedra, 2013, p. 373).

According to Sky (2006), the lead nation approach to the Afghan SSR suffers from the following shortcomings: lack of shared vision of security between the Afghan government and the international donors; lack of Afghan leadership because the international community rather than the Afghan government, determines security-related priorities; imposing of a non-Afghan state-model based on Western liberal ideas without regarding the circumstances, capacities and traditions of the country; financially unsustainable without foreign aid; and lack of adequate linkage between the different pillars (23-25). Barno and colleagues (2011) argue that the objective of the donors has been to put 'an Afghan face' on Western reforms, strategies, and processes rather than to identify and empower Afghan agency (p. 2).

Now that the process of the Afghan SSR is described and some of the problems faced by the lead donor-approach are discussed, we will turn our attention towards how the SSR process was contextualized to the social and political realities in Afghanistan.

3.4.2. Monopoly Model – Afghanistan

Following the Geneva meeting, the international community appears to have adopted the monopoly approach to SSR in Afghanistan. The military reform aimed at building a strong central Afghan National Army (ANA), which could be present throughout the country. The police reform aimed at creating an effective, democratically accountable, and rights-respecting ANP based on Western-type of law enforcing police. Meanwhile, DDR programs such as Afghan New Beginnings Programme (ANBP) were established to disarm illegally armed groups, dismantle armed factions and reintegrate ex-combatants back to society, in order to give state monopoly over means of coercion (Sedra, 2006, p. 101).

However, the ANA, the most successful pillar of SSR, did not develop fast enough due to various reasons such as low salary, absence of modern bank system to deliver money to soldiers' families, no career oath, poor living conditions, and intensified Taliban insurgency resulting in high ANA casualties. Similarly, the ANP did not develop as fast as intended or needed. Although relatively well trained, their low salary, lack of equipment, and the difficult working conditions exposed them to corruption and opportunities for abuse of power. The DDR, on the other hand, was relatively successful in disarming ex-combatants. From its start in February 2003 and its end in July 2005, the first phase of ANBP had disarmed and demobilized over 63,000 ex-combatants and collected almost 58,000 weapons (Sedra, 2011, 473). However, according to Giustozzi (2008), the program failed in encouraging the reintegration of fighters (p. 173). Only a few of the ex-combatant joined ANA; many others joined local militias (Suhrke, 2011, p. 142). Another DDR programme was launched to absorb warlords and key figures into relevant Ministries in order to get control over their militias. According to Giustozzi (2009), the government did achieve some success in getting some control over their militias, but many provincial strongmen continued to resist the expansion of state power into the periphery (P. 90).

When the monopoly approach failed in its attempts on de-militarizing civilians and non-state armed factions in order to give the state a monopoly over means of coercion, the international community, with the U.S. in the lead, turned to the hybrid model.

3.4.3. Hybrid Model - Afghanistan

Traditionally, the central Afghan government has been dependent on negotiations and compromises with local traditional power structures both for justice and security provisions (Ayub et al. 2009, p. 11). Therefore, recognizing the actual social and political realities on the ground, the U.S., from 2006 and onwards, started re-establishing local militia forces to secure the rural areas and boost the Afghan military power to fight the growing insurgency (Suhrke, 2013, p. 9). Although the U.S. did support and arm various local militia forces before 2006, the main focus of this thesis is restricted to some of the post-2006 local forces re-established by the U.S.

The following chapter will present and discuss some of the various local forces established as a result of the shift from monopoly to hybrid SSR model. The chapter illustrates how the local traditional forces and authorities in the rural areas were activated and mobilized to provide security in the rural areas.

Chapter Four: Local Forces in Afghanistan

This section begins with a brief introduction to the practices of locally raised forces in Afghanistan, by briefly summarizing some of the Afghan state's historical experiences with locally raised law-enforcement forces. This section is not meant to provide a comprehensive overview of all the local law-enforcement forces that have existed in the country, but instead, to provide a semi-detailed chronology of the main models or mechanisms established since 2001. It is important to state from the outset, the majority of these modern day experiments within locally raised forces have been conducted by the international community, mainly the United States, either with or without the active consent of the Afghan government.

The final section of this chapter focuses on the most prominent and longest-running local policing model known as the Afghan Local Police (ALP). By virtue of being well-documented and scrutinized, it not only provides a wealth of material for review but helps extrapolate a number of generalisable issues around the whole concept and context of locally raised forces.

4.1. Historical Practices of Local Forces in Afghanistan

The Afghan population consists of different tribes and ethnicities, and it has been this way throughout the entire history of the country. The existing differences between the tribes and ethnicities found within the country have led it to never to unify culturally. However, at a

political level, the country has been united occasionally, but the central government has never been able to control and exercise its absolute power over the entire country (Moyar, 2014, p. 3).

Throughout its history, the Afghan state has mostly been restricted to cities, allowing the vast rural areas of the country to be controlled and governed by the rural communities themselves. These communities have controlled and governed their areas through traditional governing bodies and secured their communities through locally raised security forces (Karokhail & Schmeidl, 2009, p. 326).

In order to govern and ensure law and order in these rural communities, the central governments have had to acknowledge and provide these communities with a certain level of autonomy to govern their areas. These communities have in return assisted the central government with their loyalty and own local forces (Barfield, 2010, p. 20). These local forces have been utilized throughout the history of Afghanistan, both by the rural communities themselves to secure their autonomy and provide security, and the central governments to ensure law and order, maintain peace between tribes in the rural communities, and to assist the national forces against foreign threat and internal uprisings (Munoz & Jones, 2010, p. 33).

From the time of Abdur Rahman Khan (1880s), the central government and the army have relied on local forces to establish order and security in rural Afghanistan. How successful the use of local forces was, has varied from ruler to ruler. The most well known successful example of the use of local forces in establishing security in rural communities, was under the Musahiban Dynasty which lasted from 1929 to 1978. During that time, the central government built strong central government forces, including a strong army. These forces were occasionally used for crushing revolts and mediating inter- and intra-tribal disputes. Locally raised forces, on the other hand, were used to establish order in the rural Pashtun-dominated areas such as Loya Paktia (Munoz & Jones, 2010, p. 33). These local forces were not paid directly by the government. Instead, the tribal authorities received aid in different forms such as privileged status, property, money, and exclusion from military services in return for their loyalty and cooperation. The local leaders then used these resources, through local councils to raise and fund local forces, and this strategy proved useful in establishing security and order in rural areas (Ibid., p. 34; Barfield, 2010, p. 20).

4.1.1. Arbakai

Historically, the most well-known local force in the Pashtun-dominated Southeast of the country has been the Arbakai. Many of the various auxiliary programs tried out by the U.S. post-2001, relied heavily on interpretations of this traditional Pashtun local force. (SIGAR, 2017, p. 102).

The Arbakai is a tribal-based community policing system based upon the customary tribal code of Pashtuns, *Pashtunwali[4]*, and has existed for centuries in Southeast Afghanistan (Tariq, 2008, p. 3). Tariq (2009) emphasizes the importance of distinguishing between the local forces Arbakai and Militia. He argues that the terms have been used interchangeably by recent scholars, and points out the apparent differences between the two. He sees militias as hired security groups working either on behalf of a weak government or for the interests and benefits of powerful warlords (p. 20). The Arbakai, on the other hand, is viewed by Tariq as (1) unpaid volunteers (2) who are neither hired by the government nor warlords and (3) their responsibilities are approved and recognized as the common good by the community. Their job is to maintain law and order, enforce and implement the *Jirga*'s[5] decision, and to protect and control the border and boundaries of the tribe or community they are serving (Tariq, 2008, p. 3).

According to Karokhail and Schmeidl (2009), the re-emergence of Arbakai in recent time took place in Paktia province after the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001. The different communities in Paktia were concerned about the eagerness of the local strongmen to fill the power vacuum left behind by the Taliban. Thus, they called for a jirga, and leaders of all significant Wandas (sub-community level) attended. The jirga aimed to come up with a plan on how to fulfil government functions until a new state government is created and functioning. Shortly after the jirga, each community created its Arbakai force to deal with the threat the community was facing. The size of the Arbakai depended on the magnitude of the

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[4] Kakar (2004) describes Pashtunwali/Pakhtunwali as a Tribal Code of Honour where honour gives you the rights, protection, and support of the Pashtun community (P. 3). Munoz & Jones (2010) describes Pashtunwali as a customary law which the local communities use to resolve their disputes in the absence of state authority – or sometimes in opposition to it (P. 21). According to both Kakar and Munoz & Jones, Pashtunwali shapes daily life through concepts such as honour, hospitality, bravery, revenge, and sanctuary.

[5] Rafi (2002) describes Jirga as the historical and traditional institution and gathering of Afghans (Pashtuns) which for centuries have resolved all the tribal, national political, social, economic, cultural and even religious conflicts through authoritative decision making (cited in Wardak, 2003, P. 3). According to Carter and Connor(1989), the Jirga operates according to Pashtunwali and settles almost all issues in tribal Pashtun areas unless assistance is required from another tribe or the government (P. 7).

threat the community was facing. Some communities were facing threats from local criminal gangs, while others were facing insurgents (p. 320).

4.2. The Afghan – U.S. Created Local Forces Post-2001

According to Goodhand and Hakimi (2014), the international community's efforts to fill the power vacuum left behind by the fall of the Taliban regime, have been contradictory and often ill-considered. On the one hand, the interventions focused on centralizing the means of coercion, meanwhile, on the other hand, the international forces continued to support and fund local power brokers, creating militias, and deploying private security companies who either operated above or below the law in their fight against the insurgency (p. 6).

When this opposite and ill-considered approach to centralize the means of coercion and de-militarize the Afghan society failed, the Afghan government and the U.S. Special Forces followed up with experiments in local- and community-oriented police and militia forces. These experiments included programs such as Afghan National Auxiliary Police (ANAP), Afghan Public Protection Program (AP3), Community Defense Initiative (CDI), Local Defense Initiative (LDI), Critical Infrastructure Program (CIP), counterterrorism pursuit teams, Kandahar Strike Force, and Arbakai (Goodhand & Hakimi, 2014, p. 9).

Some of these programs were initiated locally by regional strongmen, provincial governors, and by the communities as the growth in insurgency increased the demand for local forces to protect the communities. Others were pushed for by U.S. forces, sometimes in coordination with the Afghan government. ANAP and AP3 were two such programmes initiated by the U.S. and supported by the Afghan government, while LDI was initiated solely by the U.S. without the approval and consent of the Afghan government.

4.2.1. Afghan National Auxiliary Police (September 2006 – September 2008)

The U.S. created ANAP in September 2006 as a temporary force to increase local security in areas facing threats from the Taliban. The pilot ANAP program took place in Zabul province (SIGAR, 2017, p. 62).

In theory, the ANAP officers were supposed to be vetted and chosen locally by the community governors, councils, elder leadership, and were responsible for staffing checkpoints and local police patrols (Goodhand & Hakimi, 2014, p. 10).

In reality, however, according to Human Rights Watch (HRW) and Afghan Analyst Network (AAN), these officers were rarely vetted, selected locally or suited to do community-based policing (2011, p.19; 2010). Lefevre (2010) also illustrates how the ANAP recruits were not representative of the community they were meant to serve by looking at the recruits for the second class of ANAP trainee program in Zabul. Out of the 200 recruits, only 16 were from Zabul. The rest were from the neighbouring cities such as Kandahar, Uruzgan, and Kunduz. Their belonging to other communities also raised questions about their allegiance. According to Lefevre (2010), some of them openly stated their allegiance to a local strongman instead of the community they were meant to serve or to the Afghan government (p. 6). Despite this, and the fact that ANAP officers received less training than the uniformed ANP officers, they still received salaries comparable to ANP and were employed closer to their homes (Perito, 2009, p. 9; SIGAR, 2017, p. 63).

Hakimi (2013) points to the lack of Afghan or International accountability mechanisms and how it exposed ANAP to corruption, human rights abuses, and made it an instrument for the local power brokers to exploit (p. 393). ANAP quickly became a predatory force strongly aligned with local power brokers instead of the government. Perito (2009) argues that the ANAP also became vulnerable to insurgent infiltration due to its poor vetting and raised concerns about insider attacks from potential Taliban infiltrators (p. 9).

A combination of the abovementioned factors led to the failure of the ANAP initiative. Some of the ANAP members became members of the ANP after meeting a set of requirements set by the Afghan government and the U.S. forces, while the rest got terminated and the program dissolved September 30, 2008 (SIGAR, 2017, p. 63).

4.2.2. Afghan Public Protection Program (March 2009 – July 2010)

AP3 was the next experiment in community-based local forces. It was launched in March 2009 as a part of the American focus on increasing the size of Afghan security personnel, because a large number security personnel was claimed to be the cure for Afghanistan's security problems. Wardak province became the pilot location for AP3 because of its deteriorated security situation, and its strategic location close to Kabul (Perito, 2009, p. 9). The AP3 was intended to achieve improved security in the communities by conducting security operations against insurgents, denying them safe havens, and preventing them from attacking critical infrastructure and facilities. Improved security would lead to more

significant development and improve local populations' confidence in the government (HRW, 2011, p. 44)

In theory, similar to the ANAP, the local *Shuras*[6] (traditional community councils) had the responsibility of selecting the recruits for the force. Meanwhile, the Ministry of Interiors' (MoI) intelligence officers and National Directorate for Security (NDS) officers were responsible for the vetting (Goodhand & Hakimi, 2014, p. 10).

In reality, however, minimal vetting was conducted, and the recruits were chosen by a few local elders and local power brokers including prominent jihadi commanders (Hakimi, 2013, p. 391). One such commander was Ghulam Mohammed Hotak, who was appointed the provincial commander of AP3. He brought with him around 500 men, many of them former *mujahideen*[7], and they got incorporated into AP3 without any council selection or any form of vetting (Lefevre, 2018, p. 2).

Similar to ANAP, the AP3 recruits received several weeks less training than the regular ANP and ANA recruits, but their salaries were roughly the same. The combination of less training, closeness to one's homes, and almost equal salaries made AP3 more attractive to recruits than ANP and ANA (SIGAR, 2017, p. 101).

Command and control of AP3 also proved to be challenging. On paper, AP3 was under the provincial ANP command structure. The AP3 district-level commanders were supposed to report to district level ANP chief. In practice, however, AP3 operated as an entirely separate force. Being almost double the size of ANP, with a provincial commander in Ghulam Mohammed – who made it clear that he only answered to U.S. military and MoI in Kabul, the ANP had little or no control over AP3 (Lefevre, 2018, p. 2).

The program was claimed to be a 'success' but was never expanded to other provinces because of its slow progress, and was more resource-intensive and bureaucratic than initially foreseen. The U.S. and the Afghan government, instead, turned their focus and resources towards further development of the regular ANP, and other easily manageable programmes. The AP3 programme continued to be active until October 2010, before a plan was made to

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[6] Ask, Harpviken and Strand (2002) define S*hura* as a place where all men in the community can meet to discuss issues of mutual interest. Its membership is not fixed, but varies from one meeting to the next; in principle, all adult men have the right to attend. The members would be mainly elders and people with religious knowledge, as well as those who have economic power or social power (p. 5). According to Hakimi (2012), shuras are institutions of local governance (p. 6)
[7] Refers to the Islamist militia fighters who fought Soviet Union in Afghanistan during the Cold War.

incorporate its personnel into AP3's successor programme, the ALP (SIGAR, 2017, p. 102; Lefevre, 2018, p.3)

4.2.3. Local Defence Initiative (July/August 2009 – July 2010)

The LDI, previously known as Community Defence Initiatives (CDI) and later continued as Village Stability Operations (VSO), were created partly out of frustration with the slow progress and high costs of AP3. The U.S. security forces wanted to experiment with smaller security programmes involving local communities in their fight against insurgents (Hakimi. 2013, p. 393: Lefevre, 2018, p. 3; SIGAR, 2018, p. 111)

The LDI aimed to identify local communities that seek outside help against insurgents, and assist the local population to provide their security through defensive 'neighborhood' programs U.S. and Afghan special operations teams would be deployed to live and operate in the chosen villages (Goodhand & Hakimi, 2014, p. 11). Their focus would be to improve traditional governance through village councils, establish or co-opt village defense forces, and improve development by fighting poverty, unemployment, lack of education and other sources that encourage support for insurgents. (Lefevre, 2010, p. 3)

Similar to the ANAP and AP3 programmes, LDI recruitment would also go through the local councils. In reality, however, no specific council was established to select recruits and manage the programme. The most controversial part of LDI, however, was maybe that the Afghan government had not formally approved the programme (Hakimi. 2013, p. 393), it only had the approval of a few government officials. The programme was entirely developed and implemented by the U.S. military in close cooperation with local power brokers. Hamid Karzai, the then President of Afghanistan, did not approve the programme until its last phase when it got incorporated into ALP. (SIGAR, 2018, p. 11; Lefevre, 2018, p. 3)

4.3. Afghan Local Police (August 2010 -)

The latest U.S. experiment within the locally raised police forces in Afghanistan is the ALP. It came into existence after many previous attempts, including the ones mentioned above, either failed or did not live up to expectations (Sedra, 2014, p.7).

ALP is a security programme created by the U.S. Special Forces in collaboration with local elders and government officials in rural communities of Afghanistan (Hakimi. 2013, p. 389). The country's president at the time, Hamid Karzai, was initially against the idea of building another militia force because of the abusive track records of the previous militias that either

already existed or were created by the U.S. (Ibid., p. 393). As Hakimi points out, Karzai was not against the creation of militias per se, but rather the idea of U.S. funded and commanded local forces without any links to any central government institutions. To counter this, Karzai offered that he would authorize new local security forces only if they would be under the control of the ANP and the MoI (Moyar, 2014, p. 12). Karzai and the Afghan government viewed ALP as an opportunity to absorb all private militias and former village and district level defense programs under the command of MoI (SIGAR, 2018, p. 113).

He also insisted on calling the new local forces "Police" rather than a militia. Unlike militia, often associated with the abusive militias of the 1990s, the term "Police" has positive connotations in the minds of the Afghan people (Moyar, 2014, p.12)

The ALP was officially authorized in August 2010 and incorporated all previous militia formations under the MoI (Hakimi. 2013, p. 389). Given the previous experiences with uncontrolled and unregulated militias and their abusive behaviours and actions, the President also approved the plan and assigned MoI to create an instruction manual which would regulate the creation, use, support and oversight of the ALP (AIHRC. 2012, p. 14). Senior personnel from the MoI and ALP headquarters created the Afghan Local Police Procedure of Establishment, Management and Activity (referred to as ALP Establishment Procedures in this thesis) in 2012, and revised the Procedures in 2014. These Procedures set conditions for the establishment, recruitment, operational activities, functional obligations, limitations, salaries, and authorizations of the ALP (SIGAR, 2015, p. 8).

4.3.1. Establishment

The objective of establishing ALP is to provide security in areas that are facing actual security threats and prevent insurgents and other illegally-armed groups from influencing these areas (AIHRC. 2012, p.21). The aim is to provide arms and training to local Afghans, enabling them to defend their communities against threats posed by insurgents and other illegally-armed factions (Vincent, Weigand & Hakimi, 2015, p. 5). Also, increase the population's trust in the government and expand its authorities into these insecure areas in order to achieve better governance and development (Goodhand & Hakimi, 2014, p.24).

ALP is established in areas where there is a dire need for its existence and where the local people are ready and consent to its establishment (AIHRC, 2012, p. 21). Priority is given to areas that either lack the presence of Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) or

International Forces, or their presence is weak or challenged by insurgents and other illegally-armed groups. Prioritized are also communities where the local population either have demonstrated active resistance to the insurgency, or they recently have asked the central government for assistance in their fight against insurgents (Vincent et al., 2015, p. 5).

4.3.2. Mandate

According to the ALP Establishment Procedures, ALP is responsible for security functions in the communities the force is established. Despite having the term 'Police' in their name, the ALP is not police. They can neither arrest nor investigate anyone and cannot interfere in the duties assigned to the law enforcement police, the ANP. However, ALP can interfere in circumstances of actual violence, and also perform law enforcement duties when requested by the ANP (AIHRC, 2012, p. 18; Vincent et al., 2015, p. 5).

The ALP is meant to be a pro-governmental defensive force at the village level, lightly armed in order to deter insurgents in the communities they are assigned. The ALP cannot operate outside the geographical area they are responsible for, and cannot be used from one district to another (AIHRC, 2012, P. 31). As a result of their lightly armed and defensive nature, the ALP depend on the assistance of ANSF and international forces in cases where they encounter heavily armed insurgents or other illegally-armed factions (Vincent et al., 2015, p. 5).

4.3.3. Recruitment

The Department of Local Police in cooperation with Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG) conduct the recruiting for ALP. Individuals who are perceived eligible to serve after the assessment and guarantee of local traditional councils are recruited (AIHRC, 2012, p. 15; Goodhand & Hakimi, 2014, p.22). The recruits should not belong to one specific group or ethnicity in a multi-ethnic village. ALP members should represent the different groups and ethnicities living in the villages they serve, and also include members from armed opposition who have joined the peace- and reintegration process.

The essential requirements for recruiting ALP members, according to the ALP Establishment Procedures, are that the members should be fit and healthy men in the age group 19 to 45. They should be patriotic Afghan citizens and loyal to the development of the country. They should also have the capacity to distinguish between friends and enemies, and should not be a member of any illegally-armed group. Once these requirements are met and the intelligence

institutions of the country do not have any reservation against the person, he can be recruited (AIHRC, 2012, p. 15)

4.3.4. Command structure

According to the ALP Establishment Procedures, the ALP is established and operates within the police structure under the direct leadership and supervision of MoI. The MoI has the overall responsibility for ALP on the national level, and they possess the power to create, downsize, dissolve, and disarm ALP units (AIHRC, 2012, p.14).

At the provincial and district level, the management responsibilities fall to ANP Provincial Chief of Police and the District Chief of Police in case of the latter. They are responsible for facilitating ALP operations by, for example, providing logistical support. The responsibility for the day to day activities of the ALP fall to the ALP's District Leaders and Checkpoint Leaders (SIGAR, 2015, p. 2).

Having discussed the different forces created in the country, their objectives, challenges and developments, I now turn to discuss in detail some of the ALP performances in Kandahar and Kunduz. How did the ALP performed in these two provinces? What can this tell us about the ALP as a functional entity, and how local power dynamics plays a role in their functionality?

Chapter Five: ALP performances in Kandahar and Kunduz

As mentioned, the ALP Establishment Procedures is the "user manual" on how and where to establish ALP, how the recruitment should take place, and how the ALP's chain of command should look like. In reality, however, the implementation of these procedures varies from province to province.

In this section I explore the experiences Kandahar province and Kunduz province, have had with ALP. These experiences are based on the in-depth studies conducted by Human Rights Watch (HRW) in 2011, United States Institute of Peace in 2014, and International Crisis Group (ICG) in 2015. Kandahar and Kunduz provide each a unique angle to understand the performances of ALP. One illustrates a success story, while the other illustrates how ALP's chain of command can break down, or get hijacked, and how it can exacerbate tensions which insurgents can exploit. The studies mentioned above focus on how ALP has contributed to reducing violence in general, the ANP's control over the ALP units, and how the ALP affects the tensions between ethnicities, tribes, and local power holders.

5.1. Kandahar

Kandahar is the main centre of Southern Afghanistan. The province has an important historical role as Afghans consider it the birthplace of the modern day Afghanistan, and the central district, Kandahar city, has operated as the stronghold and secret capital of the Taliban (Schetter, Glassner & Karokhail, 2006, p. 4). Unlike Kunduz, the rivalries in Kandahar were not between ethnicities, but rather between confederations of the same ethnic group. Historically, the rivalries in Kandahar have been between the Pashtun confederations Durrani and Ghilzai. Each confederation comprises of several tribes; thus rivalries continues on the tribal level within the same confederation, and between different branches, and sub-branches within these tribes (Derksen, 2015, p. 54). Unlike Pashtun tribes in the southeast of the country, the tribes in Kandahar are structured in a hierarchical manner, where each tribe has an elite class descending from either business families, landowner families, families involved in drug trades, and other recent money-making ventures such as monopolizing transportation.

The major tribes also have either one or few powerful strongman with their private militias competing for control over the province, and to exceed their influence to national level decision-making (Schetter et al., 2006, p. 5, 16). These strongmen successfully converted their private militias into the regular army and police units during the DDR efforts in 2003. The ICG report from 2003 illustrates the competition between the major tribes and how they controlled different core positions in the provincial government: the governor at the time was Gul Agha Sherzai, a Barakzai by tribe; thus the Barakzais dominated the posts in the governor's office. Alikozai tribe dominated the police and military; meanwhile, the Popalzai tribe had few official posts, but the president of the country at the time, Hamid Karzai, belonged to their tribe (p. 20-21).

5.1.1. Provide Security, Reduce Violence and Deter Insurgents

Districts from Kandahar province are often used as references on the effectiveness and success of the ALP programme (Felbab-Brown, 2016, p. 259). The province was amongst the first to adopt the ALP program in 2011. The ALP units in Kandahar claimed to patrol communities instead of remaining confined to their checkpoints, they enjoy greater cooperation with other Afghan forces, and the provincial ANP headquarters effectively enforce discipline and provide support and resources to the ALP units (ICG, 2015, p. 17).

The ALP units were assigned to Arghandab, Maruf, Khakrez, Maywand, and Shah Wali Kot districts in 2011, before it expanded to Ghorak, Panjwai, Arghistan, Mya Neshin and Zhari by summer 2014. These districts had a combined force of 3070 ALP members by summer 2014 (Ibid., p. 18). However, the effect of their presence on violence has varied from district to district. According to ICG (2015), in the five districts where ALP was introduced first, violence levels doubled from 2010 to 2014, while the other five districts with ALP presence have not, on average, witnessed any significant changes in violence. In the remaining seven districts where there were no ALP units, violence halved during the same period (p. 19).

Despite the variation in the impact ALP have had on violence, the supporters claim that ALP units provide a buffer between Taliban-influenced areas of the province and the main populated zones (Ibid. p. 20). They illustrate it by giving the examples of districts Khakrez, Arghandab, and Kandahar City. In Khakrez, the levels of violence decreased for a few months during 2011, before it doubled the following year, and continued rising during 2013 and 2014, meanwhile, the number of violent incidents were halved both in Arghandab and Kandahar City (Mogelson, 2011). The reason for the rise in violence in Khakrez, according to analysts interviewed by ICG, was that Khakrez lies on Taliban's infiltration routes from the periphery to the populated areas and that their encounters with ALP units had resulted in increased violence (p. 19).

5.1.2. Local Recruitment

The district of Arghandab is amongst the earliest ALP locations and often highlighted as an excellent example of ALP effectiveness in Kandahar province. Arghandab is a relatively homogenous district without major tensions and conflicts. About 80% of the population belongs to the Alikozai tribe (Felbab-Brown, 2016, p. 263). To illustrate the local nature of the recruitment process of the ALP in Arghandab district, Luke Mogelson (2011) gives the example of Tabin and Nagahan areas. In Tabin, villagers were regularly killed by Taliban and hanged from trees, and they prevented people from their farms and traveling to Kandahar City to sell their harvests. Thus, when the police chief of Tabin, Muhammad Issak came back from Kandahar City with 90 of his officers in 2010 and asked the villagers to send their sons with them to fight the Taliban and protect their villages, every clan responded by sending two or three of their boys to join him.

Nagahan area was previously chosen for the Community Defence Initiative (Lefevre, 2018, p. 4), and Muhammad Nabi, who had fought alongside the U.S. in 2001, was put in charge of

recruiting local members to fight Taliban. His force was successful in pushing the Taliban out of the area. As an act of desperation, a Taliban suicide bomber infiltrated and blew himself up in a wedding with several hundred guests including Nabi and other ALP members. Nabi survived the blast, but many were killed and injured with a majority of women and children. The attack galvanized the community against the Taliban and sent their sons to join the ALP.

5.1.3. Inclusive Recruitment

In Zhari district of Kandahar, the ALP units were reorganized to include a broader array of tribal and political factions such as Taliban, which resulted in a significant fall in violent incidents (ICG, 2015, p. 21). The supporters of ALP view the recruitment of former Taliban fighters as a positive strategy towards stability and reducing violence. Critics, on the other hand, view this as a strategy of Taliban to access financial support from the ALP program and form their own militias (Ibid.). They also fear that the recruited Taliban members might defect and re-join the Taliban once the opportunity arises. Alternatively, even worse, the recruited Taliban might be infiltrators who might conduct insider attacks such as the one in Panjwai district, where an ALP officer poisoned and killed his commander and several colleagues (Nordland, 2013). According to Afghan military analyst, Atiqullah Amarkhel, such attacks are disastrous, not only in terms of loss of human life but they also critically undermines the trust and confidence amongst ALP (quoted in Nordland, 2013).

In an interview with Afghan 24 TV Channel, Kandahar's Police Chief Abdul Raziq was questioned about the ability of the Taliban to infiltrate the security forces of Kandahar. Raziq replied that the police forces possess several systems to uncover infiltrators. However, individual incidents might occur due to human errors, but in general, the enemy cannot infiltrate and have a base in our police forces (Ariana TV Official, 2018, 30:25).

5.1.4. Command Structure – Strong Discipline and Oversight

Unlike Kunduz, where the provincial Police Chief complained about lack of control over ALP units, the provincial Police Chief in Kandahar, General Abdul Raziq, said he had full control over the ALP units in his province (ICG, 2015, p.19). Abdul Raziq was known for his harsh and brutal discipline methods, but also for giving cash bonuses to ALP commanders from his personal funds, arranging loans with moneychangers, and emergency supplies of bullets for ALP units. As a result, according to the ICG report, there were no rogue ALP units in the

province, and ALP gained the trust of the people even in communities that might otherwise resist ALP (2015, p. 20).

Despite police headquarters' control over ALP and the absence of rogue units, stories about their role in kidnapping, torture, forced disappearances, and summary execution is widespread (HRW, 2015, p. 73). However, based on interviews conducted by ICG (2015), these stories are attributed to the police in general, as the local public cannot distinguish between ALP and ANP, especially when they conduct joint operations (p. 20). According to HRW (2015) the security forces in Kandahar, mainly ANP, but also ALP in joint operations, have been involved in kidnapping, torture of prisoners, prisoners disappearing and then being found dead, and extrajudicial executions (p. 73 – 83).

The harsh tactics of the ALP and ANP under the leadership of Abdul Raziq has also concerned the local officials. They are worried about the 'take-no-prisoners' tactics applied by Abdul Raziq and his forces. In a major battle against insurgents in Zhari district in 2014, where some of the 51 recovered bodies looked like they were executed outside battle (ICG, 2015, p. 20). Abdul Raziq praised the efforts of the ALP- and ANP officers, and their reluctance to take prisoners. He justified his take-no-prisoner order by referring to the corrupt nature of the judicial system, where, according to him, insurgents can bribe their way out of prisons (Sedra, 2014, p. 8).

The supporters of ALP often describe the harsh tactics of ALP and ANP in Kandahar along with the strong leadership of Abdul Raziq as part of the reason why insurgents have been prevented from encroaching on the central districts and kept in the rural districts away from the populated areas. Abdul Raziq's control and leadership had also raised questions about ANP's and ALP's future if he was killed. After surviving 28 attacks, General Abdul Raziq was killed in an insider attack 18. October 2018 (Amiri, 2018, 23:15; Al-Jazeera, 2018). Taliban took responsibility for the assassination. His murder supported the claim of his supporters that General Abdul Raziq was the fiercest enemy of the Taliban (Ruttig, 2018).

5.1.5. Summary

The credit for the success of ALP in Kandahar can be given to its homogenous makeup. The majority of the population is Pashtun belonging to different tribes. Although some inter- and intra-tribal rivalries do exist, they are not at the level of Kunduz. The local uprising of the people against the Taliban in districts such as Arghandab ensured the local nature of ALP. In

addition to the support of the people, the robust control and discipline enforced by the powerful ANP Police Chief Abdul Raziq ensured that abusive ALP units were held accountable for their actions. The ALP units also had the backing of the ANP and received supplies and funds when needed.

5.2. Kunduz

Kunduz is a strategically important province consisting of different ethnicities such as Pashtuns, Tajik, Uzbek, Arab, Turkmen, and Baluch. The secret of its ethnically heterogeneous nature is the waves of migration that took place since the 1850s (Dirkx, 2017, p. 382). This ethnic makeup of the province also created conflicts regarding land, resources, and political representation. During the 1920s, Pashtuns arrived with the support of the Afghan state. Over the next decades, the effect of the Pashtun arrivals was a total shift in power structures where large, mainly Uzbek, landholdings were handed out to Pashtuns, all influential officials' positions were given to Pashtuns, and the language spoken in the provincial government was Pashtu. This practice excluded other ethnicities such as Uzbek, Tajik, Arab, Turkmen, and Baluch from direct access to the state (Schetter et al., 2006, p. 7; Patterson, 2004, p. 4).

The strategic location of Kunduz also made it a source of conflict. The province connected Mazar- e Sharif, the commercial centre of the north to the northeast, and Kabul to Tajikistan through the Hindu Kush mountains. As a result, the province became a significant drug trafficking hub and a valuable military asset for the government. The province became a major battleground during the civil war of the 1990s, where the different ethnicities provided support for different armed factions (Dirkx, 2017, p. 382).

A combination of its strategic location, ethnic diversity, state favouritism of Pashtuns, and have been a major battleground under the civil war, Kunduz was and still is ruled by localised 'rules of law' where each village is led by a commander from the civil war of 1990s (Schetter et al., 2006 p. 8).

5.2.1. Provide Security, Reduce Violence and Deter Insurgents

It is into this mess of ethnic- and tribal rivalries, and power struggles between local power brokers, that the ALP is inserted and requested to provide security and deter insurgency. In the early stages of the programme, ALP units were assigned to the following districts;

Kunduz, Chardara, Imam Sahib and Dashte Archi before it expanded to Aliabad in 2014. These districts had a combined assigned force of 1325.

According to ICG (2015), the presence of these ALP units has neither increased security nor reduced violence in the province (p. 15). In Kunduz, Chardara, Imam Sahib, and Dashte Archi districts, violence increased 25 to 30 percent from 2010 to 2014, meanwhile in the districts without the presence of ALP units, there was no increase in violence in the same period. Instead of bringing stability, the ALP units alongside local militias have according to Felbab-Brown (2016) contributed dangerously to instability and political exclusion of Pashtuns, and have pulled Taliban into the province and enabled them to persist there (p. 272)

Despite the increase in violence and instability, the ALP commanders and officers continued to claim they are contributing to decreasing violence and providing stability and security. Even from the relatively stable district of Aliabad, officers claimed they were being attacked by the Taliban every night, emphasizing the importance of their existence (ICG, 2015, p. 15). However, when the province was under attack during a major Taliban offensive in spring 2015, the districts Aliabad, Imam Sahib, and Kunduz collapsed, and the ALP units offered little resistance in stopping the offensive.

5.2.2. Ethnic Rivalries, Ethnic Marginalization, and Imbalanced Recruitment

The ALP units in Kunduz have been accused of igniting and worsening the already existing ethnic and tribal rivalries (Felbab-Brown, 2016, 272). Their misbehaviours have provoked uprisings in many villages. According to ICG (2015), in Chardara district – a Pashtun majority district where Mir Alam, a dominant Tajik commander, heavily influenced ALP recruitment, excluding Pashtuns from ALP, the ALP members were accused of murder, maiming and disrespecting the locals, leading local villagers to arm themselves and forced the ALP units from their outpost. With the support of government forces, the ALP tried to re-take the outpost but failed. Similar uprisings took place in other parts of Chardara, leading most of the district to fall under insurgent control (ICG, 2015, p. 15; Baczko & Dorronsoro, 2016, p. 6).

Such local resistance often occurred in Pashtun areas patrolled by non-Pashtun ALP. If we recall, the ALP Establishment Procedures emphasize the importance of community representation when recruiting ALP officers. However, these procedures were circumvented

by U.S. Special Operation Forces in parts of Kunduz, because they allegedly could not find Pashtun volunteers, and also by commanders like Mir Alam (ICG, 2015, p. 16).

To illustrate the ethnic rivalries caused by the ALP; Pashtun elders in Archi district refused to send their sons to join ALP and fight for the local administration which was Uzbek-dominated. As a result, the ALP members in the district are mostly Uzbeks. The Pashtun villagers in Archi district accuse them of mistreating, looting, illegal taxation, and summary executions. Meanwhile, the non-Pashtun ALP commanders deny these accusations and blame the Pashtuns for being less loyal to the central government than other ethnic groups. These accusations and ethnic rivalries ensured a continuation of the fighting between Pashtun villagers and non-Pashtun ALP units, forcing the ALP units out of the district in 2014, and allowing the Taliban in (Ibid., 16; Baczko & Dorronsoro, 2016, p. 7; Dirkx, 2017, p. 392).

According to Dirkx (2017), the marginalization of- and preying upon Pashtuns by the Tajik, Uzbek and Turkmen militias funded either directly by the U.S. or through U.S. funded programmes such as the ALP, forced the Pashtuns to 'fall into the hands of the Taliban' and contribute to its resurgence (p. 393).

5.2.3. Command Structure – Weak Discipline and Oversight

The oversight of the ALP program in Kunduz was handed over to MoI and NDS when the U.S. Special Operation Forces' village teams left the province in August 2013. As mentioned earlier, according to ALP Establishment Procedures the ALP units report to ANP Province Chief of Police on the provincial level, and ANP District Chief of Police on the district level. In reality, however, provincial officials from both MoI and NDS, report that they feel powerless and cannot modify the behaviour of ALP units because they are outnumbered by the ALP and the additional 2000 armed men in the province who do not belong to any formal security forces. The provincial officials gave a three-folded explanation of their powerlessness: they were outnumbered and did not possess enough firepower to confront the ALP commanders; they feared a possible confrontation with ALP units would leave behind military vacuum which could create opportunities for insurgents; and political impediments from the government, where leaders protected ALP members from their factions (ICG, 2015, p. 16).

Felbab-Brown (2016) gives the example of Faizak and Qaderak to illustrates the government officials' and local powerbrokers' influence on local authorities, and how they prevent them

from taking actions against misbehaving ALP-units and pro-government militias. Faizak and Qaderak, both commanders of pro-government militias associated with Mir Alam, massacred 11 Pashtun boys and men in 2012 in a village they previously had attacked several times. The Pashtun community labelled the militias as ALP units and demanded the units' dismantle. They blamed the U.S. for sponsoring and the actions of those militias and demanded the prosecution of the perpetrators. However, Mir Alam and Vice-President Fahim exercised their influence and prevented any meaningful prosecution of the perpetrators (p. 269).

5.2.4. Re-Activation of Militias

During the Taliban offensive in 2015, the killing of some ALP members by Taliban and the desertion of others lead to the destruction of many ALP units. The Afghan army did send battalions to Kunduz city to prevent it from falling into Taliban hands, but they soon returned to their bases in Kabul. Due to the slow response from the ANP in deploying more equipment and police officers, and the fear of an appearing power vacuum that needed to be filled, the provincial officials had to find other ways to replace the lost ALP units and fill the power vacuum. The replacement came in forms of anti-Taliban and pro-government militias which either belonged to or were associated with government officials. In a few weeks, as many as 1000 militia members were recruited without any form of vetting, logistical support, and supervision that the ALP Establishment Procedures requires (Felbab-Brown, 2016, p. 272). Before this rapid recruitment of 1000 militia members, Kunduz province is believed to have had between 3000 and 10000 'irresponsible' militiamen (Gran, 2012).

According to Felbab-Brown (2016), the hastily recruited militias in Kunduz following the Taliban offensive in 2015 surpassed the misbehaviours of pre-existing militias and ALP. The misbehaviours were so severe that even some Hazara and Tajik communities, whom traditionally have been victims and enemies of the Taliban, chose to join the Taliban during their takeover of the province later that year (p. 272).

5.2.5. Empowering a Local Commander

The initial mobilization and empowering of anti-Taliban militias in Kunduz province accelerated in the lead-up to 2009 presidential elections. According to Derksen (2015), during the lead-up to the presidential elections, President Karzai and other influential government officials influenced the elections in their favour through local political appointments, and by supporting or withholding support from local militias (p. 37). As a result, when the provincial

authorities led by governor Engineer Mohammad Omar, who was concerned with the rise of the Taliban and elections-related security, requested additional ANP and ANA forces to deal with the problems, his request was rejected (Dirkx, 2017, p. 383). Instead, he was told to recruit and support local militias to deal with the problem of the Taliban and secure the elections. The governor gave the responsibility of recruiting and supporting militias to the NDS which started recruiting former jihadi commanders who had fought Taliban alongside the U.S. in 2001 (Goodhand & Hakimi, 2014, p. 33).

One such powerful jihadi commander was the local Tajik powerbroker Mir Alam. His militias were amongst the first militias that were targeted by the governments DDR programmes in 2003. However, according to Derksen (2015), Mir Alam successfully manipulated the DDR efforts by disarming a portion of his militia, handing in some of his arms while hiding away the remaining (p. 35). At the same time, Mir Alam made sure that all his rival commanders were disarmed through DDR. That way, he established himself as the dominant figure in the province (Felbab-Brown, 2016, p. 267). In addition to being the most powerful powerbroker, Mir Alam was also the brother-in-law of General Mohammad Daud, who was the chief of NDS in Kunduz. At the national level, Mir Alam had the backing of Vice-President at the time, Mohammad Qasim Fahim (HRW, 2015, p. 49).

In the lead-up to the presidential election in 2009, when the governor of Kunduz assigned NDS to recruit and support local militias to secure the elections, the NDS chief according to Afghan Analyst Networks' reporter Hewad (2012) recruited anyone introduced to him by Mir Alam. This way Mir Alam made sure that the commanders who were loyal to him were recruited and supported by the government.

The ALP programme was established in Kunduz province in 2011. Mir Alam's militias were not formally integrated into ALP, but according to Hewad (2012), HRW (2015) and Goodhand & Hakimi (2014), most of, if not all, ALP commanders were linked either to Mir Alam or his rival commander, Mohammad Omar. Alam was not supported directly by the ALP, but through his influence over ALP commanders and his brother-in-law as the chief of NDS, Mir Alam had access to the money and weapons brought in by the establishment of ALP. Mir Alam used these resources to strengthen his position as a powerbroker, and engaged through his militias and the ALP units loyal to him, in predatory behaviour such as killings, extortion, and rapes, especially against Pashtuns across Kunduz province (Dirkx, 2017, p. 391). According to a HRW (2011), militias associated with Mir Alam have been accused of

murders, kidnappings, displacement of families, looting, robberies, and the authorities are powerless and unable to bring the perpetrators to justice (p. 35). When confronted with all these accusations, Mir Alam answered the following in an interview with HRW:

"Whoever says that I have arbakis (militias) and supporting them is completely wrong. I am not denying that I was not a jihadi commander, but all people under my command have been disarmed through the DDR and DIAG[8] process." (HRW, 2011, p. 36)

5.2.6. Summary

The ALP never received a proper chance to succeed in Kunduz. The province's ethnic, tribal, and political rivalries which have existed for decades would never allow such a force to perform effectively. The ALP was hijacked by a local power broker who through his close relationship with NDS chief and the backing of the country's Vice President, recruited militias and commanders loyal to him. The ALP went from protecting to prey on the very civilians they were assigned to protect. Due to lack of resources, and political pressure from Kabul, the district level- and provincial level ANP were unable to enforce discipline and hold abusing ALP units accountable for their actions. The abusive behaviours of the local pro-government militias and the ALP alongside the lack of accountability forced the Pashtuns and some Hazara communities in the arms of the Taliban.

Chapter Six: Afghan National Army – Territorial Force

The Afghan National Army – Territorial Force (ANA-TF) was created partly as a response to the failures of ALP and the growing Taliban insurgency. Due to its recent establishment, a sufficient period of time has yet to pass within which a body of literature can develop on the ANA-TF. The available written literature is limited to describing its strategic intentions and objectives. I was unable to find any analysis or a report about the performances of the ANA-TF. Due to a shortage of literature, the content of this section is based primarily on the translated version of the presidential decree and the insight provided by Afghan Analyst Networks', Kate Clark (2019). A military review written by Major Brad Townsend[9] will also be used to put the content in context.

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[8] Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups
[9] Major Brad Townsend served as the lead planner in Resolute Support CJ5 (strategic plans) section responsible for the creation of the ANA-TF from 2017 to 2018,

6.1. Establishment

In July 2017, Afghan President Ashraf Ghani discussed the possibility of creating a force modelled on the Indian Territorial Army with the commander of NATO Resolute Support (RS), Gen. John Nicholson. A team consisting of RS planners and their Afghan counterparts in the Ministry of Defence (MoD) were assigned to study the Indian Territorial Army and its applicability to the Afghan context. In addition to the Indian models, domestic Afghan models such as the ALP and the Soviet tribal regiments of the 1980s were studied. The planning team presented their findings and recommendations to the senior leadership of the Afghan government for consideration.

Relying on the findings presented by the planning team, President Ghani signed a presidential decree on 4th February 2018 to establish the ANA-TF. Based on the findings from the Indian models and lessons learned from the failures of the domestic forces, Ghani stated that ANA-TF formation should have the following four fundamental principles as its basis:

1. Locally Recruited: The members of the Territorial Forces (excluding cadre) will be residents of the district in which they will serve.

2. Nationally Trained: Professional forces require sufficient, appropriate, and consistent training based on a proven model. ANA-TF will receive ANA training by national cadre at ANA military training centers.

3. Nationally Led: In order to guarantee its consistency and effectiveness, the ANA-TF will be led by a regular cadre drawn from existing MOD organizations and will be an integral part of the ANA.

4. Affordable and Sustainable: Afghanistan must have a national security architecture that is sustainable and affordable over time, solely by the Afghanistan government. The ANA-TF will be significantly less expensive and easier to sustain than the ANA (as cited in, Townsend, 2019, 77-78).

6.2. Purpose and Employment

The presidential decree describes in detail what duties and responsibilities ANA-TF should and should not undertake. The ANA-TF will operate in areas that are under full or partial control of the government. Their responsibilities can be summarized as follows: provide security by preventing insurgent movement and activities within the area they serve in;

establish stable relations between the government and the people through local authorities; provide ANA and Special Forces information about insurgent activities; and enable ANA to conduct further offensive operations by taking over their defensive duties of securing liberated districts.

The duties that ANA-TF will *not* perform can be summarized as follows: conduct offensive operations independently; replace the ANA in base security roles; conduct operations outside their assigned area or act as quick reaction force for ANA-TF in other districts; nor conduct civil policing (Townsend, 2019, p. 78; Clark, 2019).

ANA-TF is expected to be a cost-effective security provider filling the gap between the ANP and the ANA. Before ANA-TF, the ANP played the security provider role in areas that were liberated by the ANA. However, the ANP is trained and equipped to conduct civil policing, not provide security and protect civilians from insurgents. Therefore, the ANA had to do both liberating and securing the liberated areas, which proved inefficient and expensive. The ANA-TF's mandate is to operate between the ANP and ANA by providing security in liberated areas, which will allow the ANP to do civil policing and the ANA to conduct offensive operations.

6.3. Organization and Structure

ANA-TF falls under the MoD and follows the command structures of ANA. To ensure greater cooperation with the ANA, the ANA-TF is organized and structured in the same manner as the regular ANA; into companies where each company operate within a single district as an integral part of the ANA battalions. The MoD has decided that the locally recruited members will only serve at the squad level and below. ANA officers will fill the positions above the squad leader. The ANA battalions commanders will have tactical control when operating together with ANA-TF in their areas. Due to the geographical limitation of the ANA-TF, its administrative and operational control is placed at the ANA brigade level to ensure uninterrupted logistical support (Townsend, 2019, p. 78-79; Clark, 2019)

6.4. Terms and Conditions of Service

The Afghan experience of abusive militias alongside the failures and unprofessionalism of the post-9/11 created local forces have led the government to implement specific measures to prevent the new ANA-TF from repeating the mistakes of the past. The ANA-TF operates under specific terms and conditions to ensure professionalism and to avoid militialike

behaviour. The leadership of ANA-TF is given to the better trained and disciplined ANA. To ensure national control and avoid localism, every ANA officer who serves as a cadre of an ANA-TF company cannot be from the district in which they serve. Similarly, if an ANA-TF officer who have served successfully one year and been promoted to ANA, he cannot serve as a cadre of ANA-TF company in his home district. He can serve as cadre for ANA-TF company in other districts. The local recruits receive a salary equivalent to 75% of a regular ANA officer. An ANA officer who serves as cadre for an ANA-TF company will continue receiving the same salary as a regular ANA officer (Townsend, 2019, p. 79; Clark, 2019)

6.5. Recruiting

The first fundamental principle that should operate as the basis for the establishment of ANA-TF is that the members should be recruited locally from the districts they are meant to serve in (see section 6.1). The district level recruitment ensures a middle ground between village-level recruitment (in case of ALP) and provincial level. Since ANA-TF will operate on the district level, recruiting on the provincial level would not fill the locally recruited criteria as a province consists of districts with different tribes and ethnicities. Men between 20 and 40 years old are recruited from districts by the regional corps commander in collaboration with Afghan National Army Recruiting Command (ANAREC), the provincial and district governor. Although officials interviewed by Afghan Analyst Network included local elders as vouchers for the recruits, the official decree limits the vouching role of local elders only to former ANSF members who want to join ANA-TF. The selected recruits are sent to the regional National Afghan Army Volunteer Centres (NARVC) which transports them to ANAREC in Kabul, where they receive the same medical, and background screening as the regular ANA recruits receive (Townsend, 2019, p. 80; Clark, 2019).

6.6. Training

After the ANAREC in Kabul has completed the screening of the recruits, they are transferred to the Kabul Military Training Centre (KMTC). Following the second fundamental principle from section 6.1, the recruits receive the same 12-week basic training that all ANA recruits receive. The recruits are trained together as a company by dedicated cadre who select the best performing recruits as team and squad leaders. Simultaneously, the assigned ANA cadre are educated about the role, concept, and the mission of ANA-TF before they are united with the newly trained ANA-TF soldiers and transported to Regional Military Training Centre (RMTC) closest to their home district. At the RMTC, the soldiers receive another five weeks

of training revolving around the unique equipment and mission of the ANA-TF, before returning to their home districts and taking over local security duties (Townsend, 2019, p. 81; Clark, 2019).

6.7. The Deployment and Performances of ANA-TF

There exist very little information about the performances of ANA-TF. AAN's Clark (2019) was given a list of the different locations where ANA-TF companies are deployed, but told not to publish it due to the threat ANA-TF is facing from the Taliban. However, one location that has been mentioned both in media and by the government is Jaghori district in Ghazni province. Jaghori district is an interesting location as it does not meet the criteria set for the establishment of ANA-TF companies. There is no regular army base near the district which can support and cooperate with ANA-TF companies. Although the population of Jaghori is almost entirely Hazara, the district itself is on the Pashtun-Hazara 'border' which creates concerns regarding the ANA-TF's potential use in ethnic disputes.

However, these challenges were ignored. The agreement for the deployment of two ANA-TF companies was reached after successful lobbying by powerful Hazara government officials. After Taliban attacks on Jaghori and its neighbouring districts in October and November 2018, the ANA-TF deployment accelerated alongside the uprising of other local forces. The government allowed the uprising of local forces and supported them by the deployment of ANA-TF in order to win the populations support in the upcoming presidential elections. The deployment of ANA-TF at the same time as the local force's uprising ensured that the ANA-TF was considered local force.

The establishment of the two ANA-TF companies in Jaghori strayed away from the original model which requires a long-term presence of regular ANA base that can support ANA-TF companies. The ANA soldiers existing in Jaghori were deployed following the Taliban attacks. The fear was that once the ANA-TF companies are trained, the ANA will leave back to their permanent base 70 to 80 kilometres away from Jaghori. Instead of operating as an integral part of regular ANA battalion, the ANA-TF companies will be sharing joint bases with the ANP, ALP and the new uprising force.

The recruitment was also conducted without proper involvement of the local community. No formal information nor consultation was done, only posters encouraging people to apply were posted in the markets. The 'abandoning' of the establishment procedures in favour of getting

boots on the ground, can be interpreted as early signs of ANA-TF following in the footsteps of the ALP (Clark, 2019).

Even before the deployment in Jaghori, several Afghan military experts had raised concerns regarding the creation of another locally raised militia. The concerns revolved around ANA-TF's recruitment. One military expert was quoted to have said that "the concern is what kind of people are going to be hired and recruited, what kind of people are going to be trained, what kind of people are going to be equipped and what kind of jobs skills will they have" (Ansar, 2018a). Although the presidential decree provides a detailed account of what types of people that will be recruited, and how they will be trained and equipped, some military experts remain unconvinced. In addition to questioning the idea of building another militia force, another expert shares the same worries regarding the recruits: "Such a plan will not be in the interests of Afghanistan - that we move towards building militia forces. People who are newly recruited will work in the interests of local lawbreakers, in the interest of politicians and members of parliament and they will consider only their own people" (Ansar, 2018).

In addition to military experts, some parliament members were also concerned about the problems another locally recruited force might create. Parliament member Abdul Hai Akhunzada is quoted to have said that "in some provinces the territorial army will have good results while in some others it may create more problems" (Ansar, 2018b).

Patricia Gossman, a senior Afghanistan researcher at Human Rights Watch, has questioned whether the recruits for the ANA-TF will come from existing militia forces, and how the MoD will hold members of existing militias accountable. According to her, there also does not exist any 'oversight mechanisms' that can hold members of ANA-TF accountable for abuses they might commit (Gul, 2018).

6.8. ANA-TF and ALP – Similarities and Differences

Since the ALP was one of the locally raised forces studied by the planning team when researching the creation of the ANA-TF, they share several similarities. Both ALP and ANA-TF are forces consisting of locally mobilised men, trained and equipped to secure their communities. Both forces are meant to be defensive forces with limited weaponry and geographical remit. These limitations are put in place to prevent them from operating outside their assigned area. Furthermore, neither ANA-TF nor ALP are permitted to undertake duties

assigned to ANP and ANA. These duties include law enforcement and offensive operations against insurgents or criminals.

Although both forces appear quite similar at first glance, there are clear differences between ANA-TF and ALP. First, unlike ALP which operates at the village level, the ANA-TF companies will operate at the district level where the soldiers can be deployed anywhere within the district. Second, contrary to ALP which follows the ANP's command structure and falls under the MoI, the ANA-TF follows the ANA command structure under the MoD. The ANA has generally had far better command and control than the ANP. The ANA-TF will be subject to the advanced disciplinary and military justice system of the ANA. The MoD has also had better accountability record than the MoI and has avoided becoming a victim of factional or criminal interests. Third, whereas the ALP units are locally trained and lead by local commanders with their own agendas and interests, the ANA-TF companies, in order to enforce MoD command, control, and accountability, are trained and lead by professional ANA officers. The ANA officers leading ANA-TF companies cannot belong to the district in which they serve. Fourth, unlike ALP members who train for three weeks and stay at their homes, the ANA-TF soldiers receive the same training as the regular ANA soldiers (12 weeks) which includes human rights, the rule of law, and humanitarian law, and live together with regular ANA soldiers in their barracks.

Chapter Seven: Analysis

In order to comprehend what the basis for establishing the ALP and which lessons can be drawn from ALP's performances in terms of delivering more appropriate and effective physical security, but also how can these lessons be applied to assist the development and deployment of the ANA-TF, in this chapter I will analyse the shift from monopoly to hybrid SSR, and the factors that contributed to the successes and failures of the ALP.

This chapter is divided in two main sections. The first one, analyses the shift in security sector reform in Afghanistan from the monopoly model to hybrid model which explains why ALP and similar programs were created. The second, focuses on the lessons learned from the ALP performances in Kunduz and Kandahar, and how these can be applied to prevent ANA-TF from following in the footsteps of ALP and its predecessors. The second section is divided into three sub-sections. The first discusses the factors that ensured the ALP successes in Kandahar. The second discusses what went wrong with the ALP in Kunduz. The final sub-section provides some lessons ANA-TF can take from the experiences of Kunduz and

Kandahar. These lessons will prevent ANA-TF from encountering the same problems as the ALP and its predecessors.

7.1. The shift from monopoly to hybrid SSR in Afghanistan

As mentioned earlier in section 3.4., following the fall of Taliban in December 2001, various international and Afghan actors - consisting mainly of anti-Taliban militia leaders from Northern Alliance who assisted the U.S. in their fight against the Taliban regime, met in Bonn to set a plan for the political future of Afghanistan. While developing the plan, the reform of Afghanistan's security sector was identified as a precondition for further state-building and peacebuilding efforts in the country.

The international community adopted a monopoly SSR approach to reform the Afghan security sector. The aim was to give the Afghan state a legitimate monopoly over means of coercion by disarming any non-state armed group that could pose a threat to the monopoly of the state. The five pillars of Afghan SSR process aimed at achieving a legitimate state monopoly by reforming the various actors within the Afghan security sector. However, due to lack of coordination, collaboration, resources, and shared understandings amongst the donor countries, and their Afghan counterparts the five pillars did not develop adequately or in parallel.

The U.S. with its expertise and abundant resources developed the ANA and later the ANP much faster than, for example, Italy and its reform of the judicial system. Meanwhile, the DDR efforts, lead by Japan, could not keep up with the pace of the US and its eagerness to increase the security forces numbers in their counterinsurgency efforts. Germany, as the lead donor for ANP, also struggled to keep up with the U.S. and develop a big police force fast. The German attempt to establish a Western style law-respecting police force contradicted with the U.S. wish of increasing security forces numbers. Therefor, the U.S. took over the training of ANP. As a result, the ANP went from being a law-enforcing police force, whose aim was to serve the people, to becoming a para-military force that aimed to protect the state and assist the U.S. in their counterinsurgency operations (Skinner, 2008, p. 300). These unparalleled developments resulted in the increase of security forces, but at the same time in the non-existence of civilian counterparts. The non-existence of these counterparts meant that there was no real accountability and rule of law. Hence leading the public to perceive the national forces as illegitimate.

Once the monopoly approach failed in giving the state a monopoly over legitimate use of force, the international community, mainly the U.S., started to establish local forces based on the traditional justice and security institutions that have existed in Afghanistan for centuries.

Since the centralization of the power in the 'hands' of the central state was opposed by traditional authorities in the rural areas of the country, a change in security provision and counterinsurgency was required. The U.S. and the international community recognized the challenges and thus adopted the hybrid model of SSR where they cooperated with traditional justice and security providers that were based locally in the rural areas. Several locally raised forces were established with the help of traditional councils such as jirgas and shuras in an attempt to adapt the SSR to the realities on the ground.

In theory, the involvement of local councils and local population through their leaders and elders appeared as a solution to the failures faced by the monopoly model with regards to legitimacy of the forces. However, in practice the inclusion of local councils made the locally raised forces vulnerable. This is because the local forces were exposed to local strongmen that manipulated and captured the forces for personal interests.

The shuras and jirgas, the traditional local governance institutions, that the Afghan state had historically cooperated with to govern the rural areas did no longer exist. Decades of war had destroyed the traditional governing institutions. The same institutions that once consisted of respected and trusted elders and leaders, in most of Afghanistan are now controlled and influenced by local strongmen, who influence the decision making processes in their favour (Hakimi, 2012, p. 13-15). Something that the new model did not considered.

The initial monopoly SSR approach to reform the Afghan security sector failed in giving the Afghan state a legitimate monopoly over means of coercion by disarming the non-state armed actors and building a large and effective enough security apparatus. Therefore, the international community and the Afghan state had to adopt the hybrid model of SSR and call upon and cooperate with traditional justice and security providers to establish locally raised forces. The following section analysis the factors that ensured the successes and failures of the ALP.

7.2. ALP Success Factors

After reviewing and analysing the in-depth studies conducted by Human Rights Watch in 2011, Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission in 2012, United States Institute of

Peace in 2014, and International Crisis Group in 2015 in addition to various written pieces on ALP, this thesis identifies the following factors as primary reasons for the ALP successes in Kandahar: *homogenous region, proper and local recruitment,* and *robust control and oversight by the ANP.*

7.2.1. *Homogenous Population*

Unlike the multi-ethnic makeup of Kunduz, the population of Kandahar is almost entirely Pashtun. A homogenous ethnic population ensures the elimination of inter-ethnic rivalries and conflicts which can result in abusive behaviour by the ALP units (see section 6.1.2 for abuses committed by ALP). Although some inter- and intra-tribal rivalries within the same ethnic group did exist and still do, the major tribes have ensured some form of 'balance' by controlling different sectors of the provincial government. Avoiding the more severe ethnic-based rivalries that exist in other provinces in the country.

This indicates that the chances of success for the ALP increases the more homogenous a region is. As mentioned in section 4.1., the population of Afghanistan is a heterogenous population consisting of various different ethnicities, and different tribes within a same ethnicity. A Kandahar-like homogenous region hardly exist elsewhere in the country, which makes ALP success challenging to generalize for other provinces of the country

7.2.2. *Proper and Local Recruitment*

The guidelines for ALP establishment highlights the importance of local recruitment and the involvement of the community through community elders as preconditions for a successful ALP. The recruitment in Kandahar, especially the district of Arghandab, can be considered done according to these guidelines. The U.S. trainers with their Afghan counterparts lived in the villages for six weeks to study the village composition and the political actors. Once enough knowledge about the villages was developed, the training team with the help of community elders recruited men they considered suited for the ALP (Felbab-Brown, 2016, p. 267).

As a result of the inflictions brought upon them by the Taliban, every clan in the villages of Nagahan and Tabin sent two or three of their men to join ALP and defend their villages. In Zhari district, the ALP units were re-organized to include a broader array of tribal and political factions to achieve representative ALP units, which resulted in a reduction in violence in the district.

Such properly conducted recruitment which involved community members, elders, local police and the NDS, ensured that the right people were recruited. A locally lead, recruited and representative unit with the trust and backing of the community tends to work in the interest of the community. They fight harder and stand their ground more often because they have nowhere else to retreat to as their homes and families are in the same villages[10]. Meanwhile, a non-local whose family and home are somewhere else will end up escaping once the fighting intensifies.

Like in the previous section, the local context of Arghandab does not exist elsewhere in the country. The homogenous nature where almost all of its population belongs to a single tribe, eliminates the tensions that exist in multi-ethnic and multi-tribal contexts. The history of the brutality of the Taliban and the restrictions put upon the farmers to prevent them from trading with the province capital, Kandahar City, and a Taliban suicide bomber attacking a wedding, were factors that combined contributed to the successes of ALP in Arghandab.

Felbab-Brown's (2016) observation, excluding the spontaneously emerging part, can be used to summarize the successes of ALP in Kandahar:

> "In Afghanistan, militias, including the ALP, seemed to have the least proclivity toward abuse of local and rival communities when they have emerged spontaneously from the local community, when they faced a particularly abusive external force (such as an outside Taliban faction), and when major rifts and conflicts were absent from the community of the militia's origin" (p. 259).

An addition to Felbab-Brown's observation, in the case of Kandahar, is the role that Abdul Raziq plays in ALP successes.

7.2.3. Strong ANP Control and Oversight

The ALP successes in Kandahar has been accredited to the robust control and discipline enforced by the provincial ANP Police Chief, Abdul Raziq. As mentioned earlier, Abdul Raziq not only controlled ALP, he also supplemented the ALP units salary from his own private funds and provided loans through money changers. Abdul Raziq also ensured that the ALP units had the backing and support of the ANP whenever required.

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[10] Muzhary and Clark's (2018) review of ALP in Yahyakhel district of Paktika province illustrates this very point.

Unlike the provincial ANP chiefs elsewhere in the country, Abdul Raziq did not let himself get influenced nor pressured by government officials when dealing with abusive ALP units. His strong control and accountability of ALP units ensured legitimacy and the public's trust in both ANP and ALP, and preventing ALP units from abusing and preying on the community members.

Interestingly enough, his active role and influence over ALP also raise several questions. If Abdul Raziq is paying part of ALP units' salary from his private funds, supplying them with extra bullets, and arranging loans with his money changer friends, is he not then treating the ALP as an extension of his private militias? Moreover, what does his refusal to get influenced by government officials when dealing with ALP units, says about the ALP's command structure under the Ministry of Interior?

7.2.4. Strict Provincial Police Chief or Charismatic Commander?

Based on the literature reviewed and analysed for this thesis, the successes of ALP in Kandahar appears to be due to the strong personal control of Abdul Raziq, and not the system and structure of the ALP. Since the ALP program in itself is too weak to achieve successes on its own, Abdul Raziq had to use his status, funds, and network to prevent ALP units from preying on the citizens. One could argue that Abdul Raziq's supporting and financing of ALP is fine as long as he prevents the abuses of local populations. The problem with such an argument is that it neglects the personal interests of Abdul Raziq. Matthieu Aikins, a freelance journalist, has published several articles about Abdul Raziq and his rise to power. According to Aikins (2009), when Abdul Raziq was the chief of border police in his hometown, Spin Boldak, which is located at the Afghan-Pakistan border, he was heavily involved in the drug trade and used the police to control the drug trades from Pakistan to Afghanistan. When Abdul Raziq became the Provincial chief of ANP, he used his influence and the police force to lure eleven men belonging to a rival tribe from Kabul to Kandahar. The men were killed to settle old scores and avenge Abdul Raziq's brother's death, before presenting them in media as Taliban insurgents (2011). Based on Aikins articles, HRW (2015) and ICG (2015), Abdul Raziq appears as just another powerful commander protecting and increasing his power base through the ALP.

Hence the successes of ALP in Kandahar raises more questions than answers. If the success of ALP are due to the control enforced by Abdul Raziq, and not the ALP program itself, how can it achieve successes elsewhere? Not all provinces have an equally strong ANP police chief,

who through his charismatic personality and power base, ensures ALP successes. Furthermore, now that Abdul Raziq is dead, how will the future of ALP unfold?

Despite the questions raised regarding the role of Abdul Raziq, ALP in Kandahar is relatively successful compared to other provinces. The following section presents and analysis the factors that lead to the failure of ALP in Kunduz.

7.3. ALP Failure Factors

The literature review and analysis conducted in this thesis identifies the following factors as reasons for the failure of ALP in Kunduz: *heterogenous population*, *improper recruitment*, *weak control and oversight by the ANP*, and *empowering of a local commander*.

7.3.1. Heterogeneous Population

The heterogeneous makeup of Kunduz's population has been described as one of the main reasons for why the ALP failed in the province. The province has had ethnic, tribal, indigenous versus non-indigenous rivalries for decades. Raising a local militia in such a contested environment requires a cautious approach that takes the different rivalries and conflicts into consideration. The failure of the ALP planners to consider these different factors made the local force a tool that intensified local rivalries and benefitted individual commanders rather than the communities.

Since the majority of Afghanistan's provinces are heterogenous, the chances of repeating the mistakes of Kunduz are high. Putting together representative and legitimate ALP units in areas where different ethnic groups and tribes compete for land, political positions, or resources is highly challenging. In such regions, ALP can be considered legitimate by one ethnic group, but illegitimate by a rival ethnic group.

7.3.2. Improper Recruitment

The recruitment for the ALP in Kunduz was anything but conducted in accordance with the instructions provided by the ALP establishment procedures. Unlike in Kandahar where the ALP planning teams lived in and studied the villages for weeks before recruiting members, the ALP planning teams in Kunduz only visited the villages once a week. The limited presence of ALP planning teams made it possible for influential figures such as Mir Alam to influence the recruitment process in his favour.

As mentioned in section 6.2.2., Mir Alam exercised his influence in Pashtun majority districts such as Chardara, to recruit Tajik men who were loyal to him. Thus, the ALP in Chardara were not representative of the population living there. With the already existing ethnic rivalries, Tajik dominated ALP units in Pashtun dominated areas meant trouble. These non-Pashtun ALP units were involved in murders, illegal taxation, and looting alongside other abuses[11]. As a result, the Pashtun communities perceived the ALP as yet another private militia preying on community members.

Improper recruitment has been a problem for ALP and its predecessor programs from its early days. Almost everywhere ALP has been established, the recruitment process has been influenced either by powerful local commanders, local governmental officials, provincial police chiefs, or other influential figures located centrally in Kabul but with power bases in the periphery. Arghandab is the only district known to the author where the ALP establishment has been conducted close enough to the establishment procedures. But again the realities on the ground in Arghandab, which ensured ALP's successes, cannot be replicated elsewhere in the country.

7.3.3. Weak ANP Control and Oversight

Unlike Kandahar where the provincial ANP Police Chief had full control over the ALP units, the provincial ANP officials felt powerless when dealing with abusive ALP units. As previously mentioned, the ANP was unable to enforce discipline and hold abusive ALP members accountable due to three reasons. First, the ANP was outnumbered by the ALP and additional militia in the province. Second, ANP feared that a clash with ALP would leave behind a power vacuum that insurgents would fill. Third, the political pressure from government officials preventing them from taking actions against ALP commanders loyal to them. The weak ANP combined with the abusive behaviour of ALP units forced the local population, especially in Pashtun dominated villages with non-Pashtun ALP units, to arm themselves and protected their families and properties from ALP. The ALP that was supposed to protect the locals from insurgents behaved in a similar manner as the insurgents they were supposed to fight. The inability or unwillingness of ANP to hold abusive ALP units accountable for their actions pushed the locals in these villages into the arms of insurgents.

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[11] See T.Dirkx (2017) and ICG (2015) for more on the abuses committed against Pashtun by non-Pashtun ALP units.

ANP control and oversight over ALP units is one of the most important mechanism to ensure that the ALP perform their duties according to their mandate. However, as discussed throughout this thesis, the ANP has been unable in some cases to enforce discipline over ALP nor its predecessor programs. In other cases, the ANP has been unwilling due to their close relationship with the commanders of the abusive ALP units. Similarly, centrally located political officials often support their ethnic, tribal or political allied ALP members and commanders whenever in trouble. The lack of control from ANP has given ALP the freedom to exploit and abuse the public as they want. Without accountability or any authority to answer to, the ALP commanders operate and use the resources provided to them through ALP establishment to pursue personal interest.

7.3.4. *Empowering of a Local Commander*

If we were to combine all the factors that contributed to ALP's failure in Kunduz into one factor, it would be the empowering of Mir Alam. Every other contributing factor mentioned above is in one way or another directly related to Mir Alam[12].

First of all, before the establishment of ALP, Mir Alam had re-activated his and his allies militias in the lead up to the 2009 presidential elections. Many of these militias were then incorporated into the ALP. Although none of his private militias were formally incorporated into the ALP, many of the ALP units were loyal to him. Secondly, he influenced the recruitment processes in the different districts of Kunduz, recruiting and appointing individuals loyal to him. Thirdly, he had the support of the provincial NDS chief (his brother in law) and the vice president of the country at the time. Thus whenever an ALP unit loyal to him was accused of crimes, he would use his networks to prevent the provincial officials from holding the ALP units accountable for their actions. Many of his militias and ALP units loyal to him have been accused of targeting Pashtun villages and abusing the villagers.

The failure of the ALP in Kunduz can be summarized by Felbab-Browns (2016) observation, for as he states, "In communities contested along ethnic, tribal, or indigenous versus non-indigenous lines, or with intense conflict over land and legal and illegal resources, the rise of militias intensified local conflicts and resulted in predation on communities"(p. 259). An addition to his observation is the weak nature of the ANP in Kunduz, which were unable to control nor enforce discipline by holding the abusive ALP units accountable for their actions.

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[12] See section 6.1.5. for more on Mir Alam.

Similar to the ALP in Kandahar, where the ANP provincial chief Abdul Raziq through his influence and control regulated the behaviour of ALP, the lack of ANP control in Kunduz enabled Mir Alam to use his power and network to use ALP to pursue his personal interests. The various literature reviewed and analysed in this thesis shows similar pattern in other provinces[13] where local powerful figures influences ALP establishment to recruit own people and then use ALP to serve personal interest rather than villages'. Wherever the ALP has been hijacked by a local strongman, the people victimized by the ALP has turned to insurgents such as Taliban for justice and security provision.

7.4. The lessons learned from the ALP performances and recommendations for ANA-TF

The successes of ALP in Kandahar were due to their adaptation and application of the ALP establishment procedures. The establishment of ALP units involved local communities in the recruitment process, which ensured local ownership of the force. In addition to the involvement of community members, the ANP ensured to enforce discipline and control over ALP units. The ANP also cooperated well with the ALP units and supported them whenever needed.

The failures of ALP in Kunduz were due to the lack of importance given to the guidelines provided by the ALP establishment procedures. The lack of representative community involvement when recruiting personnel for the ALP, the weak control and oversight by the ANP, and the strong influence of individuals such as Mir Alam were important factors that led ALP to become an abusive local force, aiming to serve personal interests rather than the communities.

As mentioned earlier, before establishing the ANA-TF the planning team studied ALP and their successes and failures. Looking at the establishment guidelines of ANA-TF, it is clearly visible that attention has been given to the control and discipline aspects of establishing a new force. The leadership is put in the hands of nationally lead ANA officers and MoD instead of local commanders and their supporters in MoI. In addition to the duties and functions of ANA-TF, the duties and functions they are not supposed to undertake are also clearly defined and described. However, if we recall the ANA-TF companies deployed in Jaghori district (see section 6.7), the guidelines provided by the establishment procedures were not followed.

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[13] For example Nur-ul Haq in Shahabuddin, Baghlan (Mogelson, 2011); Khalil Hotak in Andar, Ghazni (Clark and Muzhary, 2018); Mullah Neda Muhammad in Khas Uruzgan, Uruzgan (HRW, (2011).

Based on the overview presented in this thesis on some of the experiences of the ALP units in Kandahar and Kunduz, I propose the following recommendations to be factored into a further promotion of the ANA-TF:

1. *Increase local community involvement.*

   The experiences of ALP in Kandahar proves that the involvement of local community prevents local forces from preying on the community members. It also ensures the legitimacy of the force as it will be considered locally owned.

2. *Establish functional cooperation between the ANA and ANA-TF.*

   Avoid locating ANA-TF companies in bases together with ANP and ALP units such as in Jaghori. ANA-TF companies should be located and live together with regular ANA battalions. This will increase socialization, cooperation and shared understanding between the ANA and ANA-TF soldiers. As mentioned earlier, the ANA is generally better disciplined, trained and less corrupt than the ANP and ALP.

3. *Ensure uninterrupted supply line to the ANA-TF companies to avoid logistical shortages.*

   Avoid delayed salary payments. The salaries of the ALP members and its predecessor programs often went missing. Once the salaries were delivered, they were either too late or too little. The ALP members had to find other ways to make for the lost or delayed income, and preying on local villagers was often seen as an easier and lucrative way.

   An additional point to be noted is that, although the ANA-TF is considered a sustainable option for the Afghan government, the salary at 75% of regular ANA-level might at some point become a challenge for the struggling Afghan economy. The government should have a back-up plan for such times.

4. *Enforce ANA discipline and control over the ANA-TF companies.*

   As discussed throughout this thesis, one of the main reasons for ALP failures was the weak discipline and control enforced by the ANP over ALP units. The ANA generally are much more disciplined and has relatively stronger control and command structure under the Ministry of Defence. Enforcing ANA discipline and control over ANA-TF companies will solve the issue of weak control and discipline.

5. *Create institutional accountability*

The Ministry of Defence (MoD) should create an accountability mechanism to make sure that misbehaving or abusing ANA-TF companies or individual soldiers can be held accountable for their actions. A major problem with the ALP and its predecessors was that there was no accountability mechanism that could hold abusive ALP units accountable for their actions. Neither was there a plan for how to disband an abusive ALP unit. Therefore, the MoD should have a mechanism for disbanding abusive ANA-TF companies.

6. *Clear defined ANA-TF Instruction manual*

The Ministry of Defence should convert the guidelines outlined by the Presidential decree of 4th February 2018 into a clearly defined ANA-TF Instruction manual that leaves little room for interpretation. This manual should cover and clearly describe every aspect of ANA-TF from its purpose and employment, organization and structure, terms and conditions of service, recruitment to training.

The aim of these recommendations is to take lessons from the performances of ALP and its predecessor programs, and avoid repeating the same mistakes again.

Chapter Eight: Conclusion

Despite the existing criticism received by the liberal peace theory, and the state-building and peacebuilding efforts inspired by it, the liberal peace is still prevalent. As discussed in chapter 3, the U.S. and other Western countries in addition to major international organizations have adopted and promote liberal peace-inspired state-building. Although some parts of the theory and its inspired state-building efforts can be considered relatively stable, its SSR component has suffered repeated flaws. Its holistic approach to reform a country's security sector looks sound in theory, but it is often challenging to achieve in practice. The donor countries' interests, the host government's interests, and the political and social realities on the ground in the subject country are some of the factors that challenges the implementation of holistic SSR strategies. Thus, both the international actors and the host actors involved, have to contextualize the SSR process through either a monopoly model or a hybrid model, depending on if state-security (monopoly) or human-security (hybrid) is being prioritized.

By analysing and discussing the Afghan SSR process and the various locally raised forces, in this thesis I have illustrated that the basis for the establishment of the ALP was the shift from

the monopoly SSR model to hybrid model. When the initial monopoly SSR's efforts failed in giving the Afghan state a monopoly over legitimate means of coercion, the international community and the Afghan government adopted the hybrid approach which shifted the focus from centralizing to decentralizing the means of coercion. This shift lead to the establishment of local forces such as the ALP and its predecessor programs in response to the growth in insurgency and insecurity in the rural areas. Although adopting a hybrid approach remains a logical path to follow, the only way such a model can succeed is if it is followed by a more holistic reform undertaken in a coherent and coordinated manner across the entire security sector. Until this happens, the ANA-TF, which was created due to the failures of the ALP and the growing Taliban insurgency, requires assistance and guidance to reach its intended goals. Due to their similar nature and duties, the ALP performances provides several key lessons that the ANA-TF can apply to avoid itself from becoming yet another abusive local force. In this thesis I also identified the involvement of the local community members in the recruitment processes, proper ANA training and discipline, functional cooperation between the ANA and ANA-TF, clearly defined instruction manual, and an accountability and control mechanism that regulates the behaviours of abusing ANA-TF companies or members, as key factors in assisting the ANA-TF.

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