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Offense/defense balance and Kashmir issue between India and Pakistan

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Abstract

This study is conducted to determine the impact of Offense/defense balance (ODB) on the conflict between India and Pakistan. The dissertation consists of four different cases: the 1962 War between India and China, the 1971 Indo-Pak War, nuclear experiments by India and Pakistan in 1998 and the Kargil war of 1999. Two cases selected when war did break out and the other two cases when the situation was close to war, but the war did not break out.

The dependent variable of the study is the outbreak of war and the independent variable is ODB. To measure ODB, the author adopted two methods that are subjective measure and objective measure. An objective measure is calculated using the Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) data, whereas subjective is analyzed by comparing the official's statements passed by Pakistani and Indian officials before, during and after the war.

The results of the study show that during the war of 1962 between China and India, Pakistan did not consider ODB, even though it was a golden chance for Pakistan to attack India. Instead, Pakistan favored peace in the region and refrained from attacking India. In 1971 war, Kashmir conflict was not the primary cause of war but indirectly Kashmir was playing a key role in the tension between Pakistan and India. In the case of 1998, India did the nuclear test just to limit the Pakistan role in the Kashmir. In response, Pakistan conducted nuclear tests of its own. Pakistan's atomic experiments reflect that Pakistan was considering ODB favoring the defense. In the case of the 1999 Kargil War, the role of ODB was limited because the Kargil war was due to the secret operation of Pakistan paramilitary forces.

Kashmir seems to be the bone of contention between India and Pakistan. The offense/defense balance has some explanatory power when it comes to the India-Pakistan relationship. However, there are also many other important factors.

Keywords: ODB (offense/defense balance), military budget, defense spending, Kashmir conflict, and war

Acknowledgments

I dedicate this work to my beloved father Ch. Noor Alam (Late) who died on 30th of April 2019 just few days before the deadline for submission of my thesis. I also dedicate this thesis to my wife and kids (Dua Fatima and M. Zaroon) who were always there supporting me while completing this work. I cannot forget the continuous support of my dear brother (Aamir Saeed).

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Chapter 1

Introduction

The offense/defense balance is one of the significant theories in International Relation, it is important in realism because it offers a way out of the conflicts caused by anarchy. According to Glaser and Kaufman, the offense/defense balance is "the ratio of the cost of the offensive forces the attacker requires to take territory to the cost of forces the defender has deployed" (1998, p. 44-45). In international politics, it is considered an optimistic version of realism. Shiping Tang stated that offense/defense theory is very important in international politics and it is dominating thinking of many security and international relation theorists (2010, p. 213-214).

Proponents of offense/defense theory argue that whenever defense has a competitive advantage over the offense, time major wars can usually be avoided. Moreover, through proper and carefully designed arms control measures, the chance of war can be further reduced. Conversely, if there is no way of separating between offensive and defensive weapons, arms races and conflict are likely.

Offense/defense theory has been applied to clarify a number of topics, including alliance behavior, military doctrine, military rivalry, nuclear strategy, and conventional arms control. Van Evera stated Offense/defense applications are broad and also help to demonstrate the causes of World War I. It is applied to examine and understand causes and possible solutions for too many problems related to ethnic and civil war. Moreover, it has been used in defining foreign policies of innovative countries to carp US majestic policy. Most importantly, it has been used in determining and predicting political relations in the post-cold war. In addition to this to determine the size of independent states in the international system (2001).

While offense/defense theory is popular, it has its detractors. They argue that the foundation of the theory is weak, underdeveloped, no agreed definition and measurement of the dependent variable (Lieber, 2005).

Purpose of the Study

While the offense/defense balance is popular in IR theory, it has rarely been tested empirically. Thus, the purpose of this dissertation is to determine the importance of offense/defense balance in the context of Kashmir conflict between India and Pakistan. Pakistan and India fought the number of battles on Kashmir conflict and still matter is yet to be resolved. The main reason due to which Kashmir issue is not settled is both countries claim over Kashmir as their part. On Kashmir issue,

numerous wars had been fought between Pakistan and India. Both countries claim Kashmir as part of them that's why they always try to have control on Kashmir.

Importance of Kashmir Conflict

Kashmir is located between two nuclear countries (Pakistan and India) and both countries claim Kashmir to be their part. They fought many battles on the issue of Kashmir, including wars in 1947, 1965, 1971, and 1999. The conflict of Kashmir began when British Raj came to an end in India and United India was divided into two parts, Pakistan and India. According to the June plan normally known as Plan of 3rd June 1947 in which it was announced that Muslim majority areas would have to join Pakistan and other remaining areas would have to join India. In the year of 1947, the prince of Jammu and Kashmir signed an agreement with Hindustan. According to this agreement, he joined India, but it was the violation of the partition rule because Muslim majority states should join Pakistan and others to India. As a result, the Muslim majority population of Kashmir raised voice and refused to join India. In this connection, Pakistan also showed its displeasure and war of 1948 occurred on Kashmir issue just due to injustice with state of Jammu and Kashmir. During the war Pakistan captured a certain portion of Kashmir and known as Azad Kashmir and still administered by Pakistan. Later on, India totally ruled out the concern Pakistan and Kashmiri population and conducted elections in Indian administered Kashmir in the year of 1951. In 1953 Chief Minister of Indian Administered Kashmir Sheikh Abdullah got arrested and dismissed by pro-Indian authorities. He was the leader of the governing National Conference, it is the reality that once when he initiated some pro-referendum gesture and interrupted official accession to India, he was dismissed and arrested.

Pakistan and India fought the number of battles on Kashmir conflict and the matter is yet to be resolved. Pakistan claims that Kashmir is lifeline line for them, and India claims that Kashmir is a fundamental part of India. At that time both countries are committed to providing an opportunity to people of Kashmir to decide through referendum either to join Pakistan or India. But still both countries and UNO not able to do referendum in Jammu and Kashmir. Thus, Kashmir conflict is a source of constant tension between India and Pakistan. The purpose of this dissertation is analyzing to what extent changes in the offense/defense balance can explain variations in the conflict in this important relationship.

Research Question

This dissertation's contribution to the literature is offering a test of the empirical validity of the offense/defense balance. To do this, I compare its predictions to the conflict between India and Pakistan. The precise research question is:

"To what extent can the offense/defense balance explain variations in the level of conflict between India and Pakistan".

This involves evaluating whether the level of conflict between India and Pakistan was at its highest when offense war had a clear advantage.

Argument

Overall the results of the dissertation show that to some extent the role of ODB is obvious between India and Pakistan. During the war of 1971, India was thinking that Pakistan is vulnerable due to the insurgency in East Pakistan so it's the time to attack Pakistan. India was not considering the role of ODB and they were thinking India is more powerful and can defeat Pakistan, which reflects the evidence of them not considering the ODB. Main military installation and equipment were in West Pakistan and to reach East Pakistan.

The role of ODB is also obvious in the case of 1998 when India tested its nuclear power then India was waiting for the Pakistan response. India was assessing the Pakistan reaction. In response to Indian nuclear tests, two weeks later Pakistan tested its nuclear capability and simply create the balance. While in the case of 1962 war and Kargil war of 1999 the role of ODB exists but not obvious and worth noted.

Literature Review

Theorizing on the offense/defense balance has a long history, it originates (Clausewitz, 1940; Quester's 1977; Hart, 1932). There are the number of historical examples exists in the existing body of literature on the topic of offense/defense balance. These studies mainly illustrate the destabilizing consequences or outcomes of offensive superiority. There are numerous studies discussed the concept of the perceived advantages of the offense and defense.

Jervis introduced two variables. The first is the "offense-defense balance", which measures whether it is easier to attack the territory or to defend it. The second variable is "Offense-defense differentiation". which captures the idea of whether the forces that support the offensive mission are different from those forces that support the defensive mission. The fundamental prediction and forecasting about offense-defense balance propagate that whenever there is an increase in the advantage of being offensive then the chances of security dilemma become more severe (1978, p. 187). Moreover, arms race increases and become intense war becomes more likely. On the other hand, whenever the offense has an advantage, states can enjoy a high level of security. Resultantly arm race becomes intense because whenever one of the states add forces then its opponent will have to make larger addition to defend its position or to restore its ability to defend.

Jack S Levy stated to explain the concept of offense-defense balance in terms of defeat of enemy forces (1984, p. 222-223). Levy argues that the offense-defense balance is determined by a wide range of factors. These factors are a defeat of enemy forces, the ease of territorial conquest, tactical mobility, protection and safeguarding of population, relative resources expended during the offense and defense of the territory, the incentives associated to strike first and the characteristics or attributes to armaments.

Van Evera narrated that war causing an effect with respect to offense-defense balance (2001). He made systematic efforts in his study and traced the theoretical impacts of the offensive/defensive balance with respect to the likelihood of war. The main aspect of his study was the use of a conceptual device of the security dilemma. The security dilemma is the situation in which a country makes moves to get military strengths, making alliances and committing to use weapons. Through this, he identified different linkages between offensive superiority and war. Security dilemma provides a base either to enter into a war or not. As a result, the security dilemma plays a vital role in determining the offense-defense balance. Overall, he discussed offensive superiority and defensive superiority and described the linkages between them (2001).

Glaser and Kaufmann discussed in detail the conditions offense defense variables are the key. Furthermore, they argued that the nature of Offense-defense balance, whether offense-defense (OD) are distinguishable, in addition to this, whether a state could avoid another associated negative security spiral. They stated that when Offense defense balance (ODB) favors defense and the opposing forces in favor of offense, are distinguishable and can be segregated from the forces that favor defense then countries seeking security and these states build and established defensive

forces at less risk as compared to others (1998, p. 44-82). They did this without threatening antagonist or adversary capability to defend itself. This strategy is reassuring defense posture in such a way that signals a benign or kind type of motives, resultantly encourages and give space to cooperation and helps in going in favor of cooperative arms control policies. In addition to this, it has the potential to improve and increase political relations during time.

For this purpose, offense-defense variables are crucial in determining the state environment related to its security and considered to be vital to the causal logic. It can be said the analysis of the Glaser's is very strong and complete. This theory is a valuable addition in the literature of international politics and relations because it is discussing the variables of offense-defense balance and each state can estimate variables and could plan war tactics accordingly. This theory is based on offense-defense variables and these variables are specifically related to its faith related to the ability of the states to gauge and assess the offense defense balance and overall shaping of military policy accordingly. This ability of the theory undermines its explanatory and normative power (Glaser and Kaufmann, 1998).

Ted Hopf used the offense/defense balance to analyze whether bipolar systems are more stable than multipolar ones. Overall his empirical conclusion is based on the multipolar system and this very system preceded two World Wars and bipolar based on cold war. Kenneth Waltz argument has the weakness to some extent due to the small number of cases and overall related failures with respect to considering alternative explanations for different stages and levels of war during these three different War periods. Furthermore, Ted Hopf discussed offense-defense balance on technical grounds, offense and defense have their own advantages and these advantages are separated on the basis of tactical and strategic categories (1991, p. 475-493).

The tactical offensive advantage is that the one able to seize or grab a chunk of associate in nursing enemy space and territory at a lower and fewer price to oneself than it needs to the defender to safeguard or defend it or to reclaim it. Once there's military science and strategic offensive advantage, then one will expect frequent and lots of wars. Moreover, one will expect future gain from the beginning and initiating war. However, the most side should that has got to that has to be thought of is that the length of the war should be short, and wrongdoer must be able to overrun opposition or opponent as quickly as attainable. During this case, battle casualties should be high, given the disproportionate losses typically sweet-faced by the military on the offense or assaultive aspect.

On the other hand, once there is a strategic offensive advantage however a plan of action defensive advantage, just in case of wars can still be frequent, this state of affairs secure huge gains because of simple conquest. During this state of affairs once initial resistance is overcome however not generally or frequent as within the former state of affairs it becomes doubly offense case. During this state of affairs, the fundamental measure is long because of that initial confrontation or resistance and casualties ought to be a lot of severe as compared to the previous case. The prospect of war will be high due to inter-polar warfare. In the case of strategic defensive advantage and tactical offensive advantage again the war frequency will be on the higher side. Due to the ability to capture, seize and hold the enemy territory, but not as frequent as in two previous cases. In this case, an incentive for warfare is very less and the wartime period be short because in this scenario when limited aims and advantages are achieved then there is no further advantage of war continuity. In this specific case, casualties will be on the lower side due to the ease of attacking limited territorial gains. Consequently, inter-polar wars should be less frequent because these wars lack in prospective strategic gains.

Finally, where there is combine the advantage of being strategic and tactical defensive then wars will become frequent because of double disincentives at the same time. The occurrence of wars becomes short due to comparative pointlessness of trying to press home the attack. In this scenario due to the absence of strategic warfare overall casualties will be very limited or lower but will be higher as compared to the previous case. In this case, the purpose is to achieve aims in a limited short time period so advantaged to a defender. To sum up still very fewer chances of inter-polar war as compared to the previous case. It happens due to the same double disincentives.

Research Methodology

Sample Size of the Study

The sample of the study is the Kashmir conflict between Pakistan and India. I am going to look at two cases when war broke out. In addition, I will look at two cases when the situation was close to occurring war, but the war did not occur, in order to ensure variation in the dependent variable.

As our methodology is the case study so we will analyze the case studies of 4 different events between India and Pakistan.

- Two events will be when there was War occurred between India and Pakistan so we will take two events of 1971 and 1999 Kargil War for this purpose.
- Two events we will take into this thesis where conditions were very serious and when the situation was close to occurring war, but the war did not occur between India and Pakistan for this purpose we will take the first case in 1998 when Pakistan experiment their Atomic Bombs. The second event is the 1962 war between India and China. This was because the war gave Pakistan an excellent opportunity to attack India, which it chose not to use.

Collection of study data

There are two main methods used to collect data namely primary and secondary data sources. Our data is often of a sensitive nature. Thus, much of the primary evidence is not publicly available. In particular, it is impossible to get access to Indian and Pakistani archives. As a result, we have to rely on available secondary sources for the data collection. A detailed list of all the sources is available at the end of the thesis in references sections.

Variables of the study

Dependent Variable

The dependent variable of the study is the likelihood of the war.

Independent Variables

Independent variable of the study is (Offense/defense balance) ODB. Due to its contested nature, I measure in two different ways. One is an **objective measure**, trying to capture what the ODB should be according to the theory. The other is a subjective measure, trying to gauge what policymakers thought the ODB was.

As an objective measure, I use defense spending per men under arms. The purpose to use this objective measure is that an offensive advantage depends on mobility. Thus, it usually relies on more expensive equipment than defensive weapons, such as tanks and airplanes. By implication, it should reflect itself in higher military spending per soldier. Also, not that this is not a perfect measure, because some defensive technologies can be expensive.

For data, I rely on CINC (Composite Index of National Capability) of the Correlates of War Project. CINC calculate the power of countries on the basis of 6 different sub-measures. Two of the main sub-measure of CINC are defense budget of a country the size of its military. After getting these amount form CINC we can calculate Budget per Army person of Pak and India as well. (Singer, David, Bremer and Stuckey, 1972)

Second is a **subjective measure**, I look at statements of key policymakers (Army, Politicians, Establishment, think tanks, etc.) relating to the offense-defense balance. If they make statements such as "we should attack first before the other country do" this is evidence in favor of policymakers caring about the ODB and finding it favoring the offense. Conversely, if they want to wait and see how the other side acts, this is evidence in favor of them believing the ODB favoring defenses. Weaker evidence in favor of the ODB is if they want to accelerate an incident. If policymakers make statements such as "we are likely to win because we are more powerful", this is evidence of them not considering the ODB. This is because they then simply care about relative capabilities.

Methodological calculations

All the data related to CINC from 1947 to 2012 is taken from the website of correlates of war and the full link is given in the list of references.

Case 1

Calculation of CPI adjusted total defense spending of Pakistan and India in 1962

Formulas for the calculations total defense spending and defense spending per men under arms are stated below, (Singer, David, Bremer and Stuckey, 1972);

Case of Pakistan

$$\text{CPI adjusted total military spending of Pakistan} = \frac{\text{Total Spending}}{\text{CPI Value}} \times 100$$

$$\text{CPI adjusted total military spending of Pakistan} = \frac{196440000}{30.3} \times 100$$

CPI adjusted total military spending of Pak in 1962 = \$ 648316831

Case of India

$$\text{CPI adjusted total military spending of India} = \frac{\text{Total Spending}}{\text{CPI Value}} \times 100$$

$$\text{CPI adjusted total military spending of India} = \frac{909968000}{30.3} \times 100$$

CPI adjusted total military spending of India in 1962 = \$ 3003194719

Calculation of defense spending per men under arms: Case of Pakistan (China and India 1962 War)

Formula to calculate defense spending per men under arms

To calculate budget per army person we must divide the defense budget of a country by military size.

$$\text{Defense Spending Per Men Under Arms of Pakistan in 1962} = \frac{\text{Defense Budget of a Country}}{\text{Military Size}}$$

$$\text{Defense Spending Per Men Under Arms of Pakistan in 1962} = \frac{196440000}{249000}$$

Defense Spending Per Men Under Arms of Pakistan in 1962 = \$788

Values of currency changes with time due to inflation rate so in order to get the most reliable data for comparison I will use CPI (Consumer Price Index) data. In order to do that I will divide the value of defense spending per men under arms with CPI average value and then multiply with 100. So the calculations are given below.

$$\begin{aligned} &\text{CPI Adjusted Defense Spending Per Men Under Arms} \\ &= \frac{\text{Defense Spending Per Men Under Arms}}{\text{CPI Value}} \times 100 \end{aligned}$$

$$\text{CPI Adjusted Defense Spending Per Men Under Arms of Pakistan in 1962} = \frac{788}{30.3} \times 100$$

CPI adjusted defense spending per men under arms of Pakistan in 1962 = **USD 2604**

Now according to our data after adjustment of interest rate defense spending per men under arms of Pakistan in 1962 was USD 2604.

Calculation of defense spending per men under arms: Case of India (China and India 1962 War)

To calculate defense spending per men under arms we must divide the defense budget of a country by military size.

$$\text{Defense Spending Per Men Under Arms of India in 1962} = \frac{\text{Defense Budget of a Country}}{\text{Military Size}}$$

$$\text{Defense Spending Per Men Under Arms of India in 1962} = \frac{909968000}{800000}$$

Defense Spending Per Men Under Arms of India in 1962 = \$1138

As I have calculated the value of defense spending per men under arms of India in 1962. In order to make an authentic comparison, I must take into the consideration of interest rate which changes over time. So again, I will use CPI data for the calculation of CPI adjusted defense spending per men under arms of India.

$$\begin{aligned} &\text{CPI Adjusted Defense Spending Per Men Under Arms of India} \\ &= \frac{\text{Defense Spending Per Men Under Arms}}{\text{CPI Value}} \times 100 \end{aligned}$$

$$\text{CPI Adjusted Defense Spending Per Men Under Arms of India} = \frac{1138}{30.3} \times 100$$

CPI adjusted defense spending per men under arms of India in 1962 **USD 3754**

Case 2

CPI adjusted total defense spending of India and Pakistan, 1971

CPI adjusted total spending of both Pakistan and India during the war of 1971 were as follows,

Case of Pakistan

$$\text{CPI adjusted total military spending of Pak} = \frac{727215000}{40,5} \times 100$$

CPI adjusted Total military spending of Pakistan = \$1795592592

Case of India

CPI adjusted total military spending of India = $\frac{1924810000}{40,5} \times 100$ CPI adjusts total military spending of India = \$ 4752617283

Defense spending per men under arms: Case of Pakistan (1971)

$$\text{Defense Spending Per Men Under Arms} = \frac{727215000}{404000}$$

Defense Spending Per Men Under Arms = \$1800

$$\text{CPI Adjusted Defense Spending Per Men Under Arms} = \frac{1800}{40.5} \times 100$$

CPI adjusted defense spending per men under arms of Pakistan= **USD 4444**

Calculation of defense spending per men under arms: Case of India (1971)

$$\text{Defense Spending Per Men Under Arms} = \frac{1924810000}{1560000}$$

Defense Spending Per Men Under Arms = \$1233

$$\text{CPI Adjusted Defense Spending Per Men Under Arms} = \frac{1233}{40.5} \times 100$$

CPI adjusted defense spending per men under arms of India in 1971 = **USD 3046**

Case 3

CPI adjusted total defense spending of India and Pakistan: Case of 1998

Case of Pakistan

CPI adjusted total military spending of Pak in 1998 = \$ 2501840491

Case of India

CPI adjusted total military spending of Ind in 1998 = \$ 8339877301

Pakistan Defense spending per men under arms: Case of 1998

CPI adjusted defense spending per men under arms of Pakistan= **USD 4240**

India defense spending per men under arms: Case of 1998

CPI adjusted defense spending per men under arms of India in 1998 was **USD 6415**

Case 4

CPI adjusted total defense spending of Indian and Pakistan, 1999

Case of Pakistan

$$\text{CPI adjusted total military spending of Pak} = \frac{3523000000}{166.6} \times 100$$

CPI adjusted total defense spending of Pakistan during 1999 = \$ **2114645858**

Case of India

$$\text{CPI adjusted total military spending of Pak} = \frac{13895000000}{166.6} \times 100$$

CPI adjusted total defense spending of Pakistan during 1999 = \$ **8340336134**

Defense spending per men under arms: Case of Pakistan (Kargil War 1999)

$$\text{Defense Spending Per Men Under Arms} = \frac{3523000000}{590000}$$

Defense spending per men under arms of Pakistan = USD 5971

$$\text{CPI Adjusted Defense Spending Per Men Under Arms} = \frac{5971}{166.6} \times 100$$

CPI adjusted defense spending per men under arms of Pakistan= **USD 3584**

Defense spending per men under arms: Case of India (1999 Kargil War)

$$\text{Defense Spending Per Men Under Arms} = \frac{13895000000}{1300000}$$


Defense spending per men under arms of Indian during 1999 = USD 10688

$$\text{CPI Adjusted Defense Spending Per Men Under Arms} = \frac{10688}{166,6} \times 100$$

CPI adjusted defense spending per men under arms of India in 1999 = **USD 6416**

Comparison of CPI adjusted defense spending per men under arms between India and Pakistan

In this section, I will compare the CPI adjusted defense spending per men under arms of India and Pakistan. For this purpose, I have calculated the figures for all the available data from 1947 to 2012. The below graph shows the variation in the defense spending of India and Pakistan.



The graph clearly shows that after the independence of Pakistan from British Raj it pay more attention towards its army as compared to India. Huge variation can be seen as the amount the defense spending per men under arms of Pakistan from 1947 to 2012. For instance, during the war of 1971 statistics shows that Pakistan was spending \$4,444 per army men. On the other hand, India was spending \$3,046 per men under arms during the war of 1971. The comparison clearly shows that Pakistan was spending more as compared to India. The main reason for spending more on per men under arms was due to the continuous threat from India. Moreover, this shows that Pakistan was in the defensive position and was spending to more to avoid war, but the circumstances were

not in Pakistan favor and India had taken full advantage of being offensive due to internal disturbances and worst law and order situation in East Pakistan.

If we look at the above graph, then figures of India have more variation as compared to Pakistan. On average CPI adjusted spending per men under arms of India is near to defense spending per men under arms of Pakistan. But after 2003 Indians defense spending per men under arms was increasing with rapid growth. India was enjoying the advantage of being offensive over Pakistan because of its large army, size and equipment (majorly during 1971). During 2009 defense spending per men under arms of India raised up to \$13,930 which was a lot. The graph further shows that after independence India was not facing too many external threats that is why per men budget was on the lower side but with the passage of time, India started to expend more and more as compared to Pakistan. While in case of Pakistan a lot of ups and downs can be observed.

Conclusion

This study is based on the case study and the purpose of the study is to discuss and determine the role of offense/defense balance in the context of Kashmir conflict between India and Pakistan. The study is qualitative in nature and main sources of the data are books and journals published on Indo Pakistan War of 1965, Indo Pakistan War of 1971, Indo Pakistan War of 1999, Indo China War 1962 and articles of the political conditions of India and Pakistan in 1998 when India experiments Atomic Bombs.

Chapter 2

Case of India and Pakistan war of 1971

Introduction

The 1971 war known to be the shortest and famous war fought between two neighboring countries namely India and Pakistan. Due to this part Pakistan. Today world Bangladesh was known as East Pakistan from 1947 to 1971. Due to the 1971 Indo-Pak war, Pakistan disintegrated, and Bangladesh emerged as a new country on the world map. This brings devastating results for Pakistan. India utilized its strategic position and fully supported to Mukti Bahini and Sheikh Mujeeb-Ur Rehman. India trained Bengali insurgent groups and provide financial support to them. In the month of December 1971, India directly entered into a war with Pakistan. The war total period was 13 days. There are numerous studies discussed the Indo-Pak war of 1971 (Javaid & Sahrai (2016, p. 249-251).

They discussed the various aspects of the 1971 war. The war of 1971 was the most significant and vital war since 1947. Pakistan disintegrated due to this war and East Pakistan appeared as a new country on the world map and known as Bangladesh. The main reason behind the Pakistan disintegration was the civil discontent and insurgency in East Pakistan. It was due to social, economic and political difference incurred between both parts of the country. Civil unrest was slowly converted to civil war in East Pakistan. The major population from East Pakistan were not satisfied with the government and they were thinking that they are not getting the due and legitimate share in the national profit and earning. To address the issue and to satisfy the masses of East Pakistan, Field Marshall General Ayub Khan launched economic and political policies namely to conduct local body elections establishing jute industries in East Pakistan. In addition to this, people from East Pakistan were taken into military and civil institutions. However, these policies proved to fail, and unrest kept on increasing day by day.

There are many other researchers discussed the context of 1971 war fought between two neighboring countries. Lyon discuss in his book that, 1971 war was fought for 13 days and the war period war ranges from 3rd December 1971 to 16 December 1971. On 16th December 1971 known as fall of Dhaka in the history of Pakistan. In the recent past, this war is known for its shortest duration of 13 days as well. There is no doubt that Bengali nationalist forces were agitating against West Pakistan. The main nationalist force emerged against Pakistan rulers were known as Mukti Bahini. This force was backed and supported by Mujeeb Ur Rehman. He was the founder of political

Party Awammi League and this party was based in East Pakistan. Sheikh Mujeeb Ur Rehman was demanding political autonomy for East Pakistan (2008, p. 113).

Cohen and Haqqani narrated the background of Indo Pak war of 1971 and claimed that the real conflict between two wings was started after the general election of Pakistan in the year of 1970. The political leadership of both sides refused to accept each other political dominance. Resultantly, civil discontent taking place in East Pakistan. Due to this unrest, Pakistani army started operation to curb the unrest. This unrest was a great opportunity for India to take action against Pakistan and make situation worst. India did the same and start backing militancy and unrest in East Pakistan. Initially, there was civil unrest in East Pakistan that caused military operation on later stages but due to Indian involvement in Pakistani internal affairs, it had become the direct conflict between India and Pakistan. Resultantly, both countries forces turned into direct war. There were heavy damages to civilian lives, properties, etc. Due to geographical position Pakistan army were not able to fight at their full capacity and resulted in defeat (2004, p. 97) and (2010, p. 8).

There are many other researchers deliberated the general election of 1970 was held in Pakistan, Lieven (2012, p. 3-6) was one of them. They discussed the election held on in Pakistan and the election was held on 7th December 1970. The main opponent was two political parties namely Pakistan People's Party. It was leading by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and another party was Awammi League and Sheikh Mujeeb Ur Rehman was leading it. Awammi League secured 160 seats and Pakistan People's Party secured 81 seats. It was a democratic right of the Mujeeb Ur Rehman to form a government, but Zulfikar Alai Bhutto refused to accept his majority. Somehow, Mujeeb Ur Rehman was not a trustworthy leader for the Pakistani establishment. This situation further escalated and turned into a political and violent movement against the Pakistan administration.

Unrest in East Pakistan and Pakistan failure to deal with it caused rebellion and civil war against Pakistani administration. Sooner the agitation converted into war and Mukti Bahini leaded this war against Pakistan. It was a great occasion for India to enter a war to support Mukti Bahini against Pakistan. Indian involvement further escalates the situation as a result of the war between two neighboring countries occurred namely India and Pakistan. The result of the war was very dangerous for Pakistan because on 16 December 1971 Pakistan was split and a new state emerged from Pakistan known as Bangladesh.

Why the war broke out

History pages show that Pakistan and India fought numerous wars namely war of 1947, 1965, 1971, and 1999. Ganguly and Lee narrate 1971 war in the context of Kashmir and described that almost all wars were fought due to the Kashmir conflict because both countries claim Kashmir as their part since 1947 the year of both countries' independence from British rule. This study mainly carried out to discuss and understand the Kashmir issue (2002, p. 157).

Both India and Pakistan fought numerous battles and Cheema discussed in his article about the wars fought due to the Kashmir issue. The war of 1965 plays a vital role and accumulate tension amongst Pakistan and India. The 1965 war was fought between India and Pakistan between April 1965 and September 1965. The conflict began due to Operation Gibraltar which was designed by Pakistan Army and purpose was to infiltrate forces into Jammu and Kashmir. Later in the month of September 1965, India attacked Pakistan. He describes after 1965 The Tashkent Contract was signed amongst India and Pakistan. From the Indian side, Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri signed on the agreement and from Pakistan side, Pakistani President Ayub Khan signed on the agreement. It is worth noted that PM of the Soviet Union, Aleksei Kosygin played the mediation role. In the agreement, both India and Pakistan agreed to maintain the Kashmir position as it was before the war. In addition to this, both sides agreed to the withdrawal of troops as per requirements of the Line of Control (LOC). The 1971 war was mainly fought on the issue of East Pakistan and Kashmir conflict played a minor role throughout the 1971 war (2015, p. 46-49).

It is the fact that the core reason of the 1971 war was East Pakistan, but Jammu and Kashmir conflict between two neighboring countries could not be put aside. Based on The Tashkent Agreement India recaptured valley area between rivers of Dras and Suru. Meanwhile, on 30th January 1971 Indian plane was hijacked from Indian controlled Kashmir to Lahore. Apparently, the plane was hijacked by two separatists from NLF formally known as National Liberation Front. Pakistan provided asylum to Mujahideen known as freedom fighters. In response, the message conveyed to the Indian government to release political prisoners and stop brutalities by Indian forces in Indian controlled Kashmir. Hijackers demanded to release 36 freedom fighters and India refused to do so. In response, hijackers blew up the plane. Indian government accused Pakistan and asked for the compensation. Pakistan refused and in response, India banned Pakistani flights over her territory (Cheema 2015, p. 46-49).

Malik (2002), considered that hijacking of Indian plane was probably the first act of militancy that was carried out in Indian controlled Kashmir (ICK) that was organized by some Kashmiri group. Indian ban on Pakistani airlines to use her territory was the main and central role in the war of 1971. Due to ban, Pakistan was unable to strengthen its forces in the shape of supply chain and logistics in East Pakistan. East Pakistan was not directly connected to Pakistan and Indian aerial route was the only direct connection but due to ban, Pakistan had to assume another longer route to supply reinforcement to forces in East Pakistan. In East Pakistan, forces were involved in encountering civil war with Bengali Mukti Bahini. This was started in April 1971 to December 1971. It is worth noted that Bengali Mukti Bahini was backed by India. During the 1971 war, India violated the sections of The Tashkent Agreement related to Kashmir. Even no UN involvement was observed related to Kashmir during and after the war of 1971. India deployed heavy artillery and forces on the LOC during the war of 1971.

Johnson discussed the Shimla agreement and its aftermaths. The main purpose of the Shimla agreement was to end Indo-Pak conflict and to bring peace in Kashmir. But it failed to do so because after Shimla agreement India started to reject the option of any third mediator to resolve the issue between India and Pakistan. In this connection UN role even rejected by India in the resolution of Kashmir conflict. The UN Security Council Resolution 47. It was adopted on April 21, 1948, provides a base for the right of self-determination for the people of Kashmir but after Shimla accord, India started to reject the role of any third party between India and Pakistan to resolve issues made situation worst especially Kashmir conflict. Furthermore, the Indian government drew up Shimla agreement on 2 July 1972 and claim that Pakistan and India should have to settle Kashmir issue bilaterally and not through United Nation or any other party. It is the fact still Pakistan is doing its efforts and supporting the role of UN in resolving Kashmir conflict (2005, p. 105-110).

Malik (2002), the study revealed that after the incident of hijacking Indian plane in the year of 1971, the most significant event happened was related to kidnapping Indian diplomat Ravindra Mahtre in England. The group accepted the responsibility were new appearance and disclosed their identity as Kashmir Liberation Army (KLA). At that time mostly it was considered that it is a close association to JKLF. In exchange of Mahtre, the kidnapers demanded to release a Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF). The name of the leader was Maqbool Butt and numerous additional detainees who were confined in the Indian jails. Before any reply from Indian authorities, Mathre was found to be dead and the situation becomes worst. In response on 11th February 1984, the leader of JKLF named

Maqbool Butt was executed. This event becomes large-scale agitation activity in the Kashmir valley, and it is the fact since 1984 a swift increase in agitation activities can be observed.

Offense/defense balance & India and Pakistan War of 1971

In numerical terms to discuss India and Pakistan balance with respect to population, economics, military size and equipment are meaningless. Initially, India was not in the situation of internal war, but Pakistan was in deep trouble and was trying to control internal insurgency against the country. India was looking at the whole situation and found offense as a competitive advantage over the defense and attacked Pakistan. It is a well-known phenomenon that offensive advantage makes war more likely and there are many reasons for it. Out of many reasons the first reason is that war under this situation is decisive, quick and profitable. The analysis of the 1971 war clearly shows that the war duration was very short in the history of almost 13 days. Moreover, the war was quick, decisive and profitable for India. Pakistan was unable to defend his territory and lost the battle. Moreover, Pakistan not just lost the war but also separated into two parts. Jervis (1978, p. 187) argued that it is a well-known phenomenon that offensive advantage makes war more likely. Same the case of 1971 war and India had utilized its best option of having the gain of being offensive. Resultantly greedy states find war more eye-catching and profitable.

On the other hand, Pakistan was in a defensive position as Glaser and Kaufmann (1998, p. 44-82), stated that when Offense defense balance (ODB) favors defense and the opposing forces in favor of offense, are distinguishable and can be segregated from the forces that favor defense then countries seeking security and these states build and established defensive forces at less risk as compared to others. During the 1971 war, Pakistani forces were favoring defense because during 1971 offense were not in their favor. But India was in an offensive mood because during that specific time India had offense advantage over defense and Pakistan were doing its defense.

The study of Ted Hopf (1991 p. 162), states that tactical offensive advantage is that the one able to seize or grab a chunk of associate in nursing enemy space and territory at a lower and fewer price to oneself than it needs to the defender to safeguard or defend it or to reclaim it. During 1971 every factor was in the favor of India. Moreover, India utilized tactical offensive advantage in her interest. India had adopted an offensive advantage because she was expecting future gain from the


beginning and initiating war. During 1971 battle casualties were very high, that gives India the disproportionate losses typically sweet-faced by the military on the offense or assaultive aspect.

ODB & its measurement

Calculations of Independent Variable (Offense/Defense Balance):


In this case of 1971 war as per **objective measure**, I measured ODB (Independent Variable) by using CINC sub-measures values.

CPI adjusted total military spending of India and Pakistan, 1971



The above graph shows that CPI adjusted total military spending of India is far more than Pakistan. The main reason for it was the total number of military personnel. In the case of Pakistan, the total army size during 1971 war was 404,000 and in case of India, it was 1,560,000. Previously in case of CPI adjusted defense spending of Pakistan per men under arms were more as compared to India because of the difference in the size of the military. The difference in the size of military impact can be seen in the above graph.

Comparison between Pakistan and India’s CPI adjusted defense spending per men under arms:



The above bar chart clearly shows that during the year of 1971 Pakistan CPI adjusted defense spending per men were far more than India. Pakistan was spending \$4,444 and India was spending \$3046. In the case of India, the number was low as compared to Pakistan and this number suggests that India should find it difficult to attack but the 1971 war shows this was not really the case. On the other hand, Pakistan was trying to be on the defensive side even were spending more as compared to India.

Causalities and other losses during the India and Pakistan war of 1971

There are normally rough estimations related to losses faced by India and Pakistan during the war of 1971. These losses include deaths of civilians and army personnel, damages to airfields, damages to, etc.

The war of 1971 left significant impact on the people of East Pakistan and West Pakistan. There are different figures about the causalities in East Pakistan. Indian support to Mukti Bhani’s was devastating for Pakistan army.

The deaths during the period of 267 days was unbelievable. Some inquiry committee published that Pakistani army killed majority of Bengalis in 5 different regions. Pakistan army killed 95,000 Bengalis in Comilla, 100,000 in Chittagong, 75,000 in Jessore, 150,000 in Khulna, and 100,000 in Dacca. Total Bengalis slaughtered in eighteen areas is 1,247,000. The Pakistani armed force and united

paramilitary gatherings murdered around one out of each sixty-one individuals in Pakistan generally speaking; one out of each twenty-five Bengalis, Hindus, and others in East Pakistan. Rummel also narrated that some figures about the number of dead Bengalis was very less which is 300,000. It shows that there are no actual figures about the casualties during 1971 war (Rummel, 1994, p. 331).

There are numerous studies conducted to discuss the damages and losses incurred during the war of 1971. Lyon (2008, P. 113-115) and Kapur (2010, p. 1-115) claim that during the war of 1971 there were in between 2500 to 3843 Indian casualties. The study of Destradi (2012, p. 1-200) and Ganguly (1995, p. 167-169) claims that during the war 1 naval aircraft and 1 Frigate of Indian were destroyed. Moreover, there were damages to numerous western Indian airfields. The study of Graham (2011, p. 297-301) described that Pakistan claims during the war of 1971 to destroy 130 IAF (Indian Air Force) Aircraft but as per Indian sources 45 IAF Aircraft were destroyed. Different figures are provided by the different scholars roughly 45 IAF Aircraft was destroyed during the war of 1971.

Furthermore, during the war 9000 personnel of the Pakistan army had died, 25000 wounded and 97368 captured. In addition to this, 2 Pakistani destroyers were destroyed along with 1 "Minesweeper", "1 Submarine", "3 Patrol vessels", and "7 Gunboats". On the other hand, Pakistani sources claim that during the war 42 PAF (Pakistan Air Force) Aircraft were destroyed. As per Indian claims, 94 PAF Aircraft was destroyed. Neutral sources claim that during the war 75 PAF Aircraft was destroyed (Pakistan Defense, 2012).

Subjective measure for measuring ODB (Independent Variable)

In order to measure ODB (Independent Variable), another measure is a subjective measure where I will analyze and discuss the statements of the officials during the war of 1971. The purpose to discuss and quote these statements are in the context of offense/defense balance. Here the main task is to compare official's statements in the context of below-mentioned statements,

- "we should attack first before the other country do"
- "they want to accelerate an incident"
- "we are likely to win because we are more powerful"
- "they want to wait and see how the other side acts"

Army perspective during the Indo-Pak war of 1971

The study of Sharma (1998) stated the role of the Indian army and their chief in 1971 war. He stated in the article, during the Indo-Pak war of 1971, the chief of the Indian army was Field Marshal Sam Manekshaw. In April 1971 during a meeting, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi asked Manekshaw “if he was prepared to go to war with Pakistan” (Aviation and Defense Universe, 2015). The general’s response was not satisfactory and even he offered his resignation he said “Most of his armored and infantry divisions were deployed elsewhere, only twelve of his tanks were combat-ready, and they would be competing for rail carriages with the grain harvest. He also pointed out the Himalayan passes would soon open up with the forthcoming monsoon, which would result in heavy flooding” (Aviation and Defense Universe, 2015).

The Indian army chief offered resignation and left the room, but Indian Prime Minister refused. In response, Manekshaw said, "he could guarantee victory if she would allow him to handle the conflict on his own terms and set a date for it” (Aviation and Defense Universe, 2015). Indra agreed and allowed him to handle the issue alone. After approval from the Prime Minister, Manekshaw launched several preparatory operations in East Pakistan. He started to equip Mukti Bahini. As per historians, almost 3 brigades of regular Bengali troops were trained for infiltration in East Pakistan. Moreover, 75000 guerrillas were trained. The Indian army chief equipped these Bengalis with arms and ammunition. The main purpose of these activities was to harass the Pakistani army deputed in East Pakistan.

The purpose of all these activities was to accelerate the incident. Initially, India hesitated and directly not entered in a war with Pakistan. But they supported Mukti Bahini followers with training programs, arms, and ammunition. Through this, they accelerate the incident in East Pakistan. Insurgent activities in East Pakistan made the situation worst and India found the situation conducive and directly entered in the war with Pakistan. The main reason for entering into the war was because they were feeling they are likely to win the war. The situation and all other circumstances were in the favor of India. As per the subjective measurement of our independent variable (ODB), such activities show weaker evidence in favor of the ODB. On the other hand, if we look at the actions and statements of Indian Army Chief, he was not convinced to start war initially with Pakistan. But after collaboration with Mukti Bahini when he felt now, they are powerful, and they can strike and defeat Pakistan. Such acts and statements reflect evidence of them not considering the ODB. But there is little evidence that India was considering the ODB.

At the time of the 1971 war, Yahya Khan was the president and army chief of Pakistan. Yahya Khan's statement must be seen in the context of India's role in backing the Mukti Bahini and the insurgency in East Pakistan (LaPorte 1972, p. 97-108). LaPorte also stated that in response to Indian confrontation with Pakistan later Pakistan decided to attack Indian territory because Pakistan was aware how India is going to damage Pakistan. Initially, they started a confrontation with Pakistan through the use of Mukti Bahini and later they directly involved in a war with Pakistan. On November 23, 1971, the president of Pakistan Yahya Khan told to the US that India began a sustained attack on Pakistan and now the war is imminent. He reported, "The offensive launch by Indian armed forces must be met by us with all the force at our command". In the perspective of ODB, this statement reflects that Pakistan entered into war with India after their direct involvement in East Pakistan. Pakistan entrance into direct war with India shows that ODB favoring offense when an enemy has left no option. Yahya Khan's statement reflects that Pakistan was considering ODB favoring the defense.

According to the above statement, it shows that Yahya Khan was observing the conditions and anticipating the attacks from India armed forces. His declaration on 25th November 1971 was not much offensive. Because of the prevailing crises in East Pakistan, he was making his forces ready for a counterattack which reflects the evidence in favor of Pakistan believing the ODB favoring the defense.

Sheikh Mujeeb-Ur-Rehman role in 1971 war

The studies of Agarwal (2014), Jahan (1972) and Nair (1990) discussed the political, economic and law and order situations in East Pakistan. These studies also explained and discussed the 6-point agenda of Sheikh Mujeeb-Ur-Rehman as well. East Pakistanis were facing discrimination in civil, military and other mainstream jobs. Moreover, the Bengali ethnic group were feeling that Pakistan administration is showing prejudice towards the people of East Pakistan. The people of East Pakistan started to question discrimination. Furthermore, the Awammi League leader Sheikh Mujeeb-Ur-Rehman gave six-point agenda to address and resolve the issues. These six points' agenda plays a vital role in the disintegration of Pakistan. Moreover, defense offense balance can be directly related to the six-point agenda because actions and reactions from all parties were connected to these 6 points agenda. The six-point agenda was announced by Sheikh Mujeeb-Ur-Rehman in the month of June 1966. According to Agarwal (2014, p. 23), six points were,

- Taxation and revenue collections should be separated in the federating units and the Federal government will have the right to get its share to fulfill their financial needs.
- One of the major points was where he stated that the Government should deal only with Defense and Foreign affairs.
- He also demanded two different currencies for the two wings or to have one currency with separated reserve banks.
- Financial aspects inconsistencies between the two Wings will vanish through a progression of monetary, monetary, and legitimate changes.
- The Constitution ought to accommodate a Federation of Pakistan in the genuine sense based on the Lahore Resolution and for a parliamentary type of government dependent on the matchless quality of a legitimately chosen lawmaking body based on the general grown-up establishment.
- A volunteer army or paramilitary power must be made in East Pakistan, which at present has no safeguard of its own.

The six-point agenda was considered to be an offensive approach from Sheikh-Mujeeb-Ur-Rehman. Pakistani establishment had taken 6 points agenda as a direct confrontation with Pakistan. Moreover, Sheikh Mujeeb Ur Rehman points were considered throughout Pakistan as agenda of separatism from Pakistan. This offensive move from Mujeeb made Pakistani establishment hostile and they started to consider Mujeeb as a traitor (Thorp, 1987 p. 143-167). The famous speech delivered by Sheikh Mujeeb Ur Rehman to make efforts to get freedom from Pakistan. Sheikh Mujib Ur Rahman made his famous speech dated on March 7, 1971. He said that "The struggle this time is for our freedom. The struggle this time is for our independence" (Ahmad, 2016). Mujeeb statements were a direct challenge and threat for Pakistan. If we compare this statement in the context of offense-defense balance, then we come to know that Mujeeb Ur Rehman was in an offensive mood and his offensive statements also made Pakistan offensive in response.

To sum up I must say Mujeeb-Ur-Rehman statements can be best described as "they want to accelerate an incident" which was the weaker evidence in favor of the ODB.

Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and Indo-Pak war of 1971

There are many studies that discussed Bhutto statements and their role in the separation of East Pakistan namely Kapur (1987, p. 176-179), LaPorte (1972, p. 97-103). In continuation to the previous reporting of Dawn Newspaper Zaidi (2017), published an article and discussed the different

statements passed by Bhutto the founding leader of Pakistan People's Party during the war of 1971. Bhutto was the person that was not accepting the Awammi League won during the election of 1970 held in Pakistan. Once during that era, Bhutto said, "Majority alone does not count". Moreover, threatening to elected representatives of West Pakistan he said, "I will break the legs of any West Pakistani representative who proceed to Dhaka". On March 3, 1971, a session of National Assembly called by Yahya Khan and addressing to the session Bhutto said "udhar tum, idhar hum" or "(You rule in the East, we will rule in the West)". (Zaidi, 2017)

Comparison of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto Statements

During the era of war, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto made the number of statements. Most of the statements were offensive and that clearly shows the hate he had for Bengalis. Here we must compare below-mentioned statements with her remarks.

- "we should attack first before the other country do"
- "they want to accelerate an incident"
- "we are likely to win because we are more powerful"

The famous statements passed by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto were,

- "Majority alone does not count".
- "Udhar tum, idhar hum' or "(You rule in the East, we will rule in the West)".
- "I will break the legs of any West Pakistani representative who proceed to Dhaka"

These all statements of the Bhutto were synonyms to "they want to accelerate an incident". Actually, the statements made by him were actually so abusive and there is no doubt that his statements made the situation so worst and these statements somehow fulfill the agenda of Pakistan opponents.

Initial Indian response to the conflict

Agarwal discussed Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi statements pertaining to 1971 war. Initially, Pakistan was trying to suppress internal insurgency and was not thinking about Indian involvement in internal affairs. However, India felt Pakistan a weakened state and using the exodus of a large population of East Pakistan (Bangladeshi refugees) into the geographical boundaries of India made

a humanitarian crisis for India. In this context, India started moral support to the people of East Pakistan and started to support their freedom movement from Pakistan. India started to support Bengali people freedom from Pakistan in early April 1971. In the month of April 1971, the Prime Minister of India Indira Gandhi permitted Bangladeshi government to operate from Calcutta India. Initially, Indira Gandhi disapproved direct action against Pakistan and provided guerilla training to Bangladeshi fighters against Pakistan (2014, p. 27).

Indian Prime Minister Indra Gandhi statements

The famous statement made by Indian Prime Minister in which she said, “When the time comes, we will do it”. On May 24th, 1971 she boldly said during Indian parliament session "there can be no lasting stability or peace on this subcontinent. We have pleaded with other powers to recognize this. If they take heed, we shall be constrained to take all measures as may be necessary to ensure our own security.” (Sisson and Rose, 1991, p.153; Haider, 2009).

Comparison of Indra Gandhi statements

We have designed three statements and analyzed these statements with the statements of the top officials to understand the phenomenon in the context of offense/defense balance. Indira Gandhi famous statements during the 1971 war were,

- “When the time comes, we will do it. There can be no lasting stability or peace on this subcontinent. We have pleaded with other powers to recognize this. If they take heed, we shall be constrained to take all measures as may be necessary to ensure our own security” (Haider, 2009).

The Prime Minister of India statements clearly shows that initially she was indulging in guerilla warfare and waiting for a suitable time to enter the war against Pakistan. Overall Indra strategy was like below-mentioned statements.

- “they want to accelerate an incident”
- “we are likely to win because we are more powerful”

The prime minister of India was quite aware that this is a favorable situation for them to enter into war with Pakistan. Moreover, initially, they were accelerating the incident and were involved in guerilla warfare. They had provided a political office to Bengalis in Calcutta to operate their government and provided training to Bengalis against Pakistan. Later, when they feel they got success in preparing a favorable situation for them then they directly entered a war and defeated

Pakistan easily. They not only defeated Pakistan but also got success to split Pakistan into two parts namely Pakistan and Bangladesh. Different statements by the Indian Prime Minister portray the weaker evidence in favor of offense/defense balance.

Agarwal (2014, p. 35) discussed the role of world powers and said that there were many other forces namely China, The Soviet Union (Now Russia) and the United States trying to mediate between India and Pakistan and purpose was to avoid war and searching for a political solution mainly between Pakistan and leader of Awammi League Sheikh Mujeeb-Ur-Rehman. On November 23, 1971, the president of Pakistan Yahya Khan told to the US that India has begun a sustained attack on Pakistan and now the war is imminent. He reported, "The offensive launched by Indian armed forces must be met by us with all the force at our command".

Conclusion

This chapter discussed the Indo-Pakistani war of 1971 in detail. There were numerous reasons behind the war of 1971 especially civil war in East Pakistan. Moreover, this chapter includes why India entered into war and why supported Mukti Bahini. Most importantly this chapter discussed Offense/defense balance with respect to India and Pakistan War of 1971. Overall India got the advantage of being offensive during the war of 1971. During the war of 1971 statistics shows that Pakistan was spending \$4444 per military men. On the other hand, India was spending \$3046 per men under arms during the war of 1971. India was spending less as compared to Pakistan and it was expected that India will be entered into a war because of financial hardships but it is worth noted that India entered into war and won the war as well.

Chapter 3

Case of 1999, Kargil War between Pakistan and India

Introduction

The Kargil War was incurred during the year of 1999. This war purely fought in Kashmir and is out of a few instances fought between two nuclear powers in a conventional manner. It was fought in the Kargil area of Kashmir. It is located in the surrounding areas of Line of Control (LOC). India gave the name to Kargil war as Operation Vijay. This operation was carried out to clear Kargil sector.

This war was based on the secret operation carried out Pakistani paramilitary forces and was disguised that Kashmiri militants started the operation against India. According to MacDonald, the incident incurred on the Indian side of LOC. It is known as a de facto border with respect to Kashmir for both India and Pakistan. Initial stages of the war Pakistan refused its involvement and said independent Kashmiri insurgents are involved in the incident. Later, documents left behind the casualties and statements of the Pakistan PM and Chief of Army staff (COAS) confirm that Pakistani paramilitary forces involved in the insurgency. This operation was led by General Ashraf Rashid from Pakistan side. Later on, Indian recaptured its major area along with the help of the Indian Air Force. The remaining area evacuated by Pakistani forces after the involvement of international diplomatic opposition (MacDonald, 2017, p. 27-53 and 64-66).

The Kargil consisted largely of high-altitude warfare in mountainous terrain. This posed significant logistics issues for both Pakistan and India. Kargil war is one of the very few instances of a conventional war fought between two nuclear states. India tested its nuclear capability in the year of 1974, while Pakistan had been developing its nuclear capability secretly. A couple of weeks before 28 May 1998 India once again tested its nuclear capability after its first test in 1974. India had shown aggression to Pakistan and pressurize Pakistan. In response to Indian test after a couple of weeks on 28 May 1998, Pakistan tested 6 nuclear bombs and demonstrated its nuclear capability (Lavoy, 2009, p.180).

Why the war broke out

The below-mentioned picture shows the geographical position of Kargil district. Kargil district is the part of Jammu and Kashmir. It is located near Skardu district of Pakistan and Srinagar district of Indian administered Kashmir. Kargil is a part of the Ladakh area and compared to India it somehow near to Pakistani administered Jammu and Kashmir.



After the 1971 war, there were few incidents in which Pakistan and India involved directly into any confrontation. During 1980 both Pakistan and India confronted each other on the issue of Siachen Glacier. Both countries want to have control over Siachen Glacier because its strategic position is vital in the context of Kashmir. The major skirmishes on the issue of Siachen Glacier were observed during 1980.


Later during 1990 insurgency movements in Kashmir was increasing. Pakistan was backing many Kashmiri groups to escalate tension and conflict of Kashmir. Apart from these incidents, both countries were reluctant to enter into direct conflict. They were fighting in geographical regions of Kashmir and were avoiding spreading the war area. Later on, India tested its nuclear capability on 11 May 1998 and then on 13 May 1998. The tension between both neighboring countries surged. India directly threatened Pakistan through the nuclear test because the main purpose of the nuclear test was to limit the Pakistan role in Indian administered Jammu and Kashmir. The tension was continuously building since 1989 after start of military insurgency in Indian administered Kashmir.

There was a great pressure from the Indian public to do a nuclear experiment just to threaten Pakistan and limit its role in Indian administered Kashmir. In response to Indian nuclear test and to counter Indian war tactics Pakistan tested its nuclear power on 28 May 1998 just after couples of weeks of Indian nuclear test. Pakistan nuclear test once again balances the power between two countries and chances of the expected war between India and Pakistan receded. Moreover, to bring peace in the region both India and Pakistan signed a Lahore Declaration in Feb 1999. The main theme of the Lahore Declaration was to search a peaceful solution of Kashmir issue. Lahore declaration was an agreement between India and Pakistan, and it was signed on 21 February 1999. It was decided on a historic summit held in Lahore city of Pakistan. This declaration has its significance because both countries parliament ratified the agreement in the same year. The main purpose of this declaration was to control the operational use of nuclear weapons and also to decide about the peaceful resolution of the Kashmir issue between both countries. (Acosta, 2003, p. 7; Hagerty, 1999, p. 112-128).


During the 1998 to 1999 Pakistani forces launched an operation namely "Operation Badar". The purpose of this operation was to cut the connection between Kashmir and Ladakh region. Moreover, Pakistan plan was to assert pressure on India. Pakistan was thinking if they will get success to cut the connection between Ladakh and Kashmir then automatically Indian will take away from the Siachen Glacier. This will put pressure on India and force it to agree to a negotiated settlement of the border Kashmir dispute. In addition to this Pakistan thought this will internationalize the Kashmir issue and will provide a speedy solution to the conflict. The Jammu and Kashmir is an undecided territory between India and Pakistan as it is accepted by the UN as well. Pakistan always argued that the international community should recognize the Kashmir issue as a core issue between India and Pakistan. Moreover, to reduce the tension in the region and to promote peace the international community should play the role of facilitator and should help to resolve the Kashmir issue. Somehow aim was also to boost the morale of the decades-long rebellion movement in Indian administered Kashmir (MacDonald, 2017, p.63-64).

Objective measure

CPI adjusted total defense spending of India and Pakistan, 1999



The above graph shows that CPI adjusted total military spending of India is far more than Pakistan. The number shows that total military spending of India was approximately 4 times more than Pakistan. In the case of Pakistan, the total army size during the 1999 war was 590,000 and in case of India, it was 1300,000. But if we look at the calculation of defense spending per men under arms in the next section then Pakistan per men spending is more than half of defense spending per men under the arm of India.



CPI adjusted per men under arms defense spending comparison: Kargil War, 1999

The above bar graph compares CPI adjusted per men defense spending between India and Pakistan during the Kargil war of 1999. During 1999 war of Kargil Pakistan was spending USD \$3584 per men under arms. On the other hand, India was spending \$6416 per men under arms. It clearly shows that there is a great difference in per men under arms spending in terms of the dollar. India was spending almost 50% more as compared to Pakistan. The bar graph also shows the difference in per men spending at the time of the 1999 war. Moreover, during 1999 the total Indian army was about to 1300,000. On the other hand, the Pakistan army was around 590,000. Indian army is almost double to Pakistan army in number so the case of spending as well. When it comes to the economy, the India GDP was almost four times that of Pakistan. There is no comparison between India and Pakistan. India is spending double from Pakistan. Irrespective of this Pakistan is competing with India. It is because Pakistan is trying to protect its territory and applying defensive strategies as compared to Indian offensive strategies.

Casualties and other losses during the India and Pakistan Kargil War of 1999

It is to be worth noted that the casualty figure is a matter of considerable controversy. Both India and Pakistan fought this war in Kargil and surrounding areas of LOC. During the war, 527 Indian soldiers died during the war. Moreover, 1363 soldiers were wounded. They further claim that Pakistani forces captured one Indian soldier as a prisoner of war. In addition to this Pakistan air force able to shoot down 1 fighter jet of India and 1 fighter jet was crashed during the war. Furthermore, Indian sources claim that 1 helicopter was shot down by Pakistan army personnel. The Former Chief

of Pakistan Army in his statement admitted that 1600 Indian soldiers died during the Kargil war (Joeck, 1999, p. 141) and (Jacob, 2018).

Pakistan also suffers losses during the Kargil war an independent source claims that 700 Pakistani soldiers were killed during the war. As per Pakistani officials, 453 soldiers were killed during the war along with 8 army personnel captured by Indian forces and the status of them was as a prisoner of war. The study quoted Musharraf statement in which he said that only 357 soldiers died and more than 665 were wounded during the war. The study also quoted the statement of Nawaz Sharif the PM of Pakistan during the war. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif said in his statement that 2700 to 4000 Pakistani soldiers were killed during the war. This number was quoted in a white paper issued by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif party known as PML (N). In response to Nawaz Sharif statement that 2700 to 4000 soldiers were killed. The white paper explained that almost 3000 Mujahedeen's (Term used for Freedom fighter in Kashmir), officers and soldiers were killed (Rediff NEWS, 2012).

There are studies quoted Indian claims with respect to losses suffered by Pakistan during the war. Indian official sources claim that during the Kargil war 737 to 1200 Pakistani soldiers were killed during the war. They further claim that 249 Pakistani soldier's bodies were found on the Indian side of LOC. Out of a total of 249 soldiers, 244 were buried on the Indian side. Moreover, Indian sources claim that more than 1000 Pakistani soldiers were injured during the war (Tellis et al., 2002, p. 85).

Subjective measure for measuring ODB (Independent Variable)

Subjective measure for measuring our ODB (Independent Variable) is to analyze and discuss the statements of the officials during the war of 1999. The purpose to discuss and quote these statements are in the context of offense/defense balance. Here the main task is to compare official's statements in the context of below-mentioned statements,

- “we should attack first before the other country do”
- “they want to wait and see how the other side acts”
- “they want to accelerate an incident”
- “we are likely to win because we are more powerful”

It is the fact that directly we cannot find these types of statements from the officials, but we can relate statements passed by the officials during the war.

Nawaz Sharif role during and after the War of 1999

Nawaz Sharif was the PM of Pakistan during the era in which the Kargil war was fought between two neighboring countries. Initially, the role of Nawaz Sharif was not prominent. The main reason behind this was the civil-military relationship. The aftermaths of the war clearly show that the relationship between Nawaz Sharif and General Pervaiz Musharraf was very poor. Later stages Nawaz Sharif disown army actions and said in one of his statement that he was not aware of the war. This operation is solely managed and started by General Musharraf. After the war in one of his statement, Nawaz Sharif said: "he was unaware of the plans, and that he first learned about the situation when he received an urgent phone call from Atal Bihari Vajpayee, his counterpart in India". The main responsibility of the Kargil war is on General Musharraf and just two or three of his cronies. General Musharraf the chief of Pakistan Army said in one of his statement that "Sharif had been briefed on the Kargil operation 15 days ahead of Vajpayee's journey to Lahore on 20 February." (Wheeler, 2010).

Nawaz Sharif was just trying to avoid war and his statements during and after the war clearly show he was confused. Moreover, he tries to prove the world that he is against the war and he has not said with respect to Kargil war. It's just the army adventure. We can conclude that Nawaz Sharif was a defensive position. Given that Sharif – to the best of our knowledge – was not in favor of war, he did not make any statements relevant to the offense-defense balance.

General Musharraf role in Kargil War, 1999

Kargil was fought in between May and July 1999. This war was purely fought in the geographical area of Jammu And Kashmir State. Kargil and surrounding areas are mountainous and mostly snow glacier covered the area. During the era of war Chief of Army Staff (COAS) of Pakistan, armed forces were General Pervaiz Musharraf. Generally, Musharraf considered as the main planner of the war. Pakistani administration thought that Kargil is located on a strategic position. The Kargil war is significantly very important because this war depicts civil-military relationship and their complications as well. (Musharraf, 2006, p. 97).

During the era of war in Pakistan, the ruling party was Muslim League Nawaz (PMLN) and the prime minister was Nawaz Sharif. The relationship between Nawaz Sharif and General Musharraf was not good because Nawaz Sharif blames Musharraf and said he has not informed about the war and as a head of state Musharraf made a mistake. Later on somehow Nawaz Sharif disowned the war and

said this operation is solely started and handled by Army and civilian government has no way to answer the criticism from the Nawaz Sharif in one of the statement General Musharraf said "Sharif had been briefed on the Kargil operation 15 days ahead of Vajpayee's journey to Lahore on 20 February" (ZEE NEWS, 2006).

In the perspective of ODB General Musharraf was favoring the below-mentioned statement,

- "they want to accelerate an incident"

There could be many reasons but the main reason due to which General Musharraf wanted to accelerate the incident was to sever Kargil from Ladakh. Moreover, to sever Kargil from Ladakh mean to occupy Siachen Glacier. In addition to this, later stages to negotiate the core issue of Kashmir with the India government. The main theme of General Musharraf was to occupy Siachen Glacier and on the cost of it to negotiate Kashmir issue with the Indian government and to highlight Kashmir issue internationally.

Atal Vajpayee role during and after the Kargil War of 1999

Atal Bihari Vajpayee was the PM of India during the Kargil war of 1999. He dealt with the situation with wisdom and sent a "secret letter" to U.S. President Clinton. The main theme of the letter was based on to pressure Pakistan to withdraw forces from the Indian Territory. The letter contains the famous statement from Indian Prime Minister that "we will get them out, one way or the other". This statement clearly shows that he did not rule out to cross Line of Control (LOC). Later on, Nawaz Sharif ordered militants and forces to withdraw positions. Mostly militants were reluctant and were not ready to withdraw from Kargil because they thought they were in a good position, but The Northern Light Infantry withdrew from Kargil area. Later on, militants were killed by the army or forced to withdraw, and this was beyond the announcement of Pakistan to withdraw. There is no doubt during the war Pakistan position was strong, but Atal Bihari Vajpayee leadership handled the situation smartly and got success to end the war (Riedel, 2002, p. 10-14).

Atal Bihari Vajpayee initially tried to avoid the war but at later stages, he wrote a letter to Clinton in which he clearly adopted the hard line and responded that if Pakistan wants to accelerate the situation. In response, they will opt for each option to defend their country.

In addition to that, this statement of Indian Prime Minister resembled with one of our proposed statement "they want to wait and see how the other side acts" so such statement is the evidence in favor of them believing the ODB favoring the defense.

Indian Army Chief role during 1999 War

The core difference between Pakistan and India during the war era was the military-civil relationship. In India, the civilian government was dealing the all related issues to the war. Atal Bihari Vajpayee was the prime minister of India and he managed the situation through diplomacy and relationship with the world. I was unable to find any statement from the Indian Army Chief that can portray their offensive or defensive behavior.

United States role and Kargil War of 1999

The United States plays a mediator role during the war and try to convince both sides to adopt the policy of restraint. Moreover, on 4 July 1999, The Prime Minister of Pakistan visited the USA to seek support and to resolve the issue between two neighboring states. President Clinton rebuked Nawaz Sharif and said to him "use his contacts to rein in the militants and withdraw Pakistani soldiers from Indian Territory." Later on, in his autobiography, Clinton revealed that "Sharif's moves were perplexing" since the Indian Prime Minister had traveled to Lahore to promote bilateral talks aimed at resolving the Kashmir problem and "by crossing the Line of Control, Pakistan had wrecked the bilateral talks". On the other hand, he applauded India and said in one of his statement that "Indian restraint for not crossing the LOC and escalating the conflict into an all-out war." (Riedel, 2002, p. 10-14) and (Clinton, 2004, p. 799).

Throughout the war, the United States acts as an intermediary and try to convince both countries to avoid war and go for the settlement. Moreover, both India and Pakistan seek help from the United States. It clearly shows both accepted USA as a facilitator and mediator.

Conclusion

The existing body of knowledge clearly shows that Kargil was just a misadventure initiated by the Pakistan Army and associated militants. Misadventure is because of the rift between the Pakistan Army and the civilian government of Nawaz Sharif. It clearly shows no war can be a win without taking on board all the stakeholders. On the other hand, India played very well on the diplomatic front. In the perspective of ODB, I must say Kargil war was purely based on secret operation initiated by the Pakistan Army along with Mujahedeen (a term used for freedom fighter in Indian Administered Kashmir). The war and secret operation clearly show Pakistan had taken ODB into consideration because due to winter and heavy snowfall Pakistan consider itself strong enough to attack Indian interests in the Ladakh region district known as Kargil. Pakistan army main purpose was to have control on Siachen Glacier because of its strategic importance in the context of Kashmir issue. In response, India just shows its retaliation when came to know about Pakistan secret operation in the Kargil.

Chapter 4

1962 India Vs China War

Introduction

The war of 1962 erupted between India and China due to the Sino Indian border conflict. Mostly, India and Pakistan seem to be convoluted in the conflict, but it was the first-time war erupted with another neighboring country China. The 1962 war can be traced back to the 1959 Tibetan uprising. Tibet is a part of China but since 1959 Tibetan people are demanding freedom from China. Here the worth noting why China considered India as their enemy. The main reason behind this was to grant shelter to Dalai Lama. Tibetan uprising started in China in 1959. India granted political asylum to Dalai Lama the supreme leader of Tibetan people. This support also made China angry (Garver, 2006. p. 12).

Background and prevailing situations of Pakistan and India

The war erupted due to both China and India claim on bordering areas known as Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh. According to Indian claim, Aksai Chin was the part of Ladakh region of Jammu and Kashmir. But China claimed Aksai Chin as a part of Xinjiang. The dispute arises due to the Himalayan border. Moreover, the disputed area between both countries was located in the surrounding of "Aksai Chin and North East Frontier Agency". The main argument that must be noted why Aksai Chin is important for India and China. Aksai Chin connects Chinese regions of "Tibet and Xinjiang". The below map clearly shows that where Aksai Chin area was located. Because of the geographical location of this area, both countries were claiming to own this area.



Initially, Pakistan also had a dispute on Aksai Chin and Pakistan were considering it as their part because Aksai Chin was a part of Ladakh area of Jammu and Kashmir. However, on 13 October 1962 Pakistan and China started negotiation on the conflict. After negotiation over the disputed border area in 1963 Pakistan and China solved the Aksai Chin border conflict based on McMahon Line. McMahon Line was decided between British and Tibetan representatives in 1914 held in Simla convention. British Colonial administrator Henry McMahon proposed the line between Tibetan area of China and Northeast region of India. According to this settlement, Trans Karakoram Tract left in China. Trans Karakoram Tract is an area of more than 2700 sq miles located in the north of Karakoram. It includes the Shaksgam valley and Raskam valley. Moreover, Pakistan and China decided to renegotiate in the occurrence of clearance of Kashmir conflict. It clearly shows that both Pakistan and China settled the issue and further decided to compensate each other when the Kashmir issue between Pakistan and India will be settled. But this dispute is still pending between India and China. Abstract shows that the war of 1962 between India and China was on this issue (Garver, 2004 p. 9-20).

The core cause of conflict among Pakistan and India is Kashmir. Moreover, we cannot say that the affiliation between Pakistan and India were great even before and during the 1962 war. Even the conflict of Kashmir was heating the environment. In the middle of 1962 issue of Kashmir arose in front of the United Nation Security Council (UNSC) but the Soviet Union vetoed the resolution saying it's a revival of earlier resolution. The Soviet Union veto on Kashmir issue during 1962 known as 100th vetoing to UN resolutions. On June 22, 1962, Ireland presented the resolution on Kashmir in UN and purpose of this resolution was to hand over the disputed territory from Indian control to Pakistan. The western world was angry on both Soviet Union and on India because the 99th Soviet Union veto was related to calling for a ceasefire in "India blitzed Portuguese-held Goa". To favor India Soviet Union vetoed the resolution and whole western world was thinking against the Soviet Union and India. Moreover, India and the Soviet Union were a close ally to each other like today China and Pakistan.

The study of Cheema further explained the Kashmir role in his study, and he narrated that, India conducted the election in 1957 and then in 1962 in State of Jammu and Kashmir. Furthermore, Indian authorities displayed election as an alternative to the plebiscite. Through these elections, they somehow succeeded with limiting the role of opposition parties in the Jammu and Kashmir (2015, p. 53).

Here the question can arise that what was Pakistan's reaction to this? I have searched many articles and books to know about Pakistan response in Indian administered Kashmir election but failed because found no credible source. But I think Pakistan was just trying to maintain the peace in the region than might it possible that Pakistan gave no importance to the election.

Cheema also narrated in the article that Alastair Lamb very famous diplomatic historian who has written many books related to Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan and most Sino-Indian problems and disputed with reference to border areas, conducted a survey during the era of 1954-64 and the main purpose of the survey was to know the internal political development in Indian administered Kashmir. The survey concluded that most of the Kashmiris were unhappy about their union with India. From 1948 to 1953, Sheikh Abdullah was running the government in Indian administered Kashmir. The style of Sheikh Abdullah was autocratic leadership and one-party agenda was prevailing in the state. Despite being an autocratic type of leader, he was popular in the state. In 1953 after his removal there was no alternative for India. He was replaced by Bakshi Ghulam Muhammad and he won the election with the full support of Indian central government. Elections conducted in the state in the 1957 and 1962 but opposition parties were not allowed to practically participate in the election (2015, p. 53).

Given the dispute over Kashmir, the question is why Pakistan did not join China in the war with India. After all, the 1962 war provided a great window of opportunity to Pakistan settle the conflict in his favor. The main reason was the Aksai Chin conflict between China and Pakistan. As per records bone of contention between China and India was this border dispute and they came into the war on this dispute. Moreover, Pakistan had the same conflict with China even before the 1962 war Pakistan offers India to adopt common defense which later India refused. Even during the war of 1962 President of Pakistan Ayub Khan offered India to deploy its forces in Himalia area through the frontier of Pakistan. There is no doubt that Kashmir was the burning issue before and after the war of 1962. However, Pakistan did not yet fully trust China before 1962. Moreover, Pakistan had also conflict on the border area with China. Pakistan and China settled their border issues via mutual understanding. The cooperation and collaboration between Pakistan and China can be seen during the war of 1965. It all happens due to Pakistan and China experience during the 1962 war (Palit, 1991).

Objective measure (ODB independent variable)

The 1962 war was fought between China and India. The war has special importance for Pakistan because Pakistan did not attack India. There was a golden opportunity for Pakistan to attack India because India was involved in a war with China due to border area conflict in Jammu and Kashmir. Even Pakistan had some sort of conflict with China. Pakistan did not attack India and even offer support to India. There are many reasons due to which Pakistan not attacked on India but the main reason due to which Pakistan not attacked on India because at that time Pakistan had not a good relationship with China.


In the case of China and India 1962 War, we have to do necessary calculations to evaluate objective measure, given that India and Pakistan never fought each other. Thus, I only rely on the quantitative measure using the CINC scores and statements of key figures at the time. ODB calculation involves objective and subjective measures. Objectives measures are based on the quantitative study and subjective measures based on qualitative research. To calculate subjective measures, we have calculated CPI adjusted total Defense Spending of Indian and Pakistan. After calculating CPI adjusted total defense spending of both countries, we have presented the calculation via a bar graph. Moreover, we have calculated CPI adjusted Per Men defense Spending and make a comparison between Pakistan and India via bar graph.

CPI adjusted total defense spending of Indian and Pakistan: China and India 1962 War CPI adjusted total spending of both Pakistan and India during the China and India 1962 War were as follows,

CPI adjusted total military spending of Pak in 1962 = \$ 648316831

CPI adjusted total military spending of India in 1962 = \$ 3003194719

Graphical representation




The above graph shows that CPI adjusted total military spending of India was more than four times of total military spending of Pakistan in 1962. The main reason for it was the total number of military personnel. In the case of Pakistan, the total army size during 1962 war was 249000 and in case of India, it was 800,000. Data shows that in 1962 the military size of India was more than three times of the total military size of Pakistan.

If we do a comparison between Pakistan and India with respect to the defense budget, then we come to know that the Indian military budget more than Pakistan. Moreover, they had a bigger army and had a huge economy in terms of GDP, etc. Irrespective of this Pakistan was competing with India. It was because Pakistan was trying to protect its territory and applying defensive strategies.

CPI adjusted Per Men defense Spending Comparison: China and India 1962 War

The below-mentioned bar graph compares CPI adjusted Per Men defense Spending between India and Pakistan during the era of 1962 when war was fought between China and India. During 1962 Indo China war, Pakistan was spending USD \$2604 per men. On the other hand, India was spending \$3754 per men under arms. It clearly shows that there is a difference in per men spending in terms of the dollar. India was spending almost 30% more as compared to Pakistan. Moreover, during the

1962 era, the total Indian military was about to 800,000. On the other hand, the Pakistan army was around 249,000.



As we have calculated the figures for CPI adjusted total defense spending and CPI adjusted defense spending per men under arms of India and Pakistan. Calculations reflect that total there is a huge difference in the total defense spending of India and Pakistan (India has more than 4 times of Pakistan).

Subjective measures

Subjective measures are based on the analysis of the top official’s statements before and during the war. Moreover, based on top officials statements we have to make an analysis of how these statements play a role in escalation and de-escalation of the war. During the war, Pakistan did not mobilize its forces against India. The president of Pakistan Ayub Khan stated his point of view and clarify the situation that Pakistan will not exploit the situation. This allows India to safely transfer their soldiers from the Pakistan frontier to the Himalayas (Devereux, 2009 p. 71-75). During the era of 1959 to 1962 Pakistan attitude towards India was very productive. Even in 1959 Ayub Khan the president of Pakistan offered India joint defense proposal (Makeig, 1987 p. 271-275). Ayub Khan even was ready to offer goodwill gesture during the war of 1962 to India. The main reason was the same conflict of the border with China (Lersk, 1974, p. 267-271).

The role of Pakistan was positive even Pakistan were capable of initiating war with India. The role of Pakistan expressed by Bruce Riedel; a former CIA official has its own importance. He stated his opinion is his book "JFK's Forgotten Crisis: Tibet, the CIA and the Sino-Indian War", that "Pakistan was clearly capable of initiating war with India but decided in 1962 not to take advantage of India's vulnerability," (DAWN, 2015; Riedel, 2015).

Moreover, Bruce Riedel disclosed in his book that Prime of Minister of India Nehru asked the USA for the military assistance. In response ambassador of America to Pakistan Walter McConaughey had a meeting with the president of Pakistan Ayub Khan and said, "to send assurances to Nehru that Pakistan would not take advantage of India's war with China". The president of Pakistan Ayub Khan said, "the Americans and Pakistanis work together to seek the surrender of Indian territory just as the Chinese were grabbing land" (2015).

In response ambassador of United States to India J K Galbraith escalated a distressing message to both United States and Pakistan and said, "for God's sake that they keep Kashmir out." In response, the US immediately informed the Indian government about the situation and told them to escalate a message to the President of Pakistan Ayub Khan. Kennedy's message to Ayub Khan was a similar too then UK Prime Minister Harold Macmillan in the message both said to Pakistan to avoid any hostile aggression against India because Pakistan move will be inconsistent and violation to SEATO and CENTO Treaties. Furthermore, Bruce Riedel wrote in his book that "The Americans told Pakistan that the Chinese attack was the most dangerous move made by Mao since 1950 and that they intended to respond decisively," (Riedel, 2015; DAWN, 2015).

The whole situation shows that there were numerous reasons due to which Pakistan avoided entering a war with India. Since 1959 Pakistan was trying to build a better relationship with India that's why Pakistan not enter into a war and were not wanted to exploit the vulnerable situation of India. Furthermore, Pakistan had a border conflict with China and even offer common defense to India against China before 1962. During this time Pakistan was also feeling a threat from China due to its border issue. Pakistan was not in a position to trust China because there was no reason to trust due to border conflict adjacent to Jammu and Kashmir. In addition to this international pressure was also a key that refrains Pakistan from entering into a war. The role of the international community was vital. Countries like USA, UK, and the Soviet Union also exert pressure on Pakistan to not enter a war with India. These were the most common and important reasons due to which Pakistan refrain itself entering into a war with India. Once there was even a time when President of

Pakistan Ayub Khan showed a very good gesture and offered India that Indian army could be transferred and deployed safely to the Himalayas from the frontier of Pakistan. This gesture also shows that Pakistan was even not interested to enter into war with India.

Why war did not break out

The role of Pakistan during the 1962 war was productive. Before the 1962 war between China and India, there was a conflict of the disputed area between Pakistan and China. Because of this conflict, Pakistan was ready to help India and offer the co-operation for the joint defense mechanism in order to keep Pakistan and India away from any danger or attack from China. But Pakistan's offer was not treated nicely by India and they refused to have a joint defense approach. Today, even we cannot imagine such type of gesture from Pakistan towards India. But it is a fact that prior to 1962 and even during 1962 Pakistan try hard to make the relationship good with India. Moreover, it is also a fact that before 1962 India and China war Pakistan relationship with China was not good.

Relationship between China and Pakistan was just a normal relationship. In addition to this, Pakistan tried to make good relationship with India and even offer a common defense against China aggression, but India rejected the offer. We can conclude if India had accepted Pakistan offer of common defense prior to 1962 war then the war between India and China would have been less likely. The Indian attitude reinforces Pakistan to join China and to establish a good relationship with China. During the war, Pakistan did not attack India, even though it was a great opportunity for Pakistan to free Jammu and Kashmir because both China and India were involved in a direct war on a bordering area of Jammu and Kashmir. Here we can conclude why Pakistan did not enter into a war with India because the relationship between Pakistan and China were not good and they were not trusting each other at that time. That was the main reason due to which Pakistan show hesitation to enter into a war. But after the setback of India in the 1962 war, Pakistan started to build a better relationship with China. Even Pakistan resolved the border issue with China. But the border issue between China and India is still disputed.

The situation was in favor of Pakistan. Even ODB were favoring to Pakistan. Moreover, chances of likelihood of war was also increases but Pakistan considers other long-term issues and decided to not enter into a war. Pakistan prefer not to enter into the war against India due to the different factors which we have discussed.

Conclusion

The 1962 China and India war was the golden opportunity for Pakistan to attack India. Pakistan was in conflict with India since 1947 and it was a great opportunity to free Kashmir, but Pakistan avoided to enter into a war with India. There were many reasons due to which Pakistan did not enter in a war. Since 1959 Pakistan was trying to build a better relationship with India that's why Pakistan not enter into a war and were not wanted to exploit the vulnerable situation of India. Moreover, Pakistan had a border conflict with China and even offer common defense to India against China before 1962. In addition to this, the role of USA, UK, and the Soviet Union also exert pressure on Pakistan to not enter a war with India.

Chapter 5

Case of 1998 Pakistan and India atomic experiments

Introduction

This chapter is related to Pakistan and India atomic experiments in May 1998. Both countries tested their nuclear capabilities in the same month. This chapter discusses the background of both India and Pakistan nuclear tests. Moreover, this chapter discussed the tension between India and Pakistan since 1989. Kashmir conflict plays a key part in the nuclear test of both countries. Both countries nuclear test was due to tension in Kashmir. The nuclear experiments of both countries were due to immense public pressure due to the geopolitical situation of the region especially due to the 1989 liberation military struggle started in Indian administered Kashmir.

In 1989 In India Janata Dal party formed the government. Janata Dal was an Indian political party formed on the birth anniversary of Jayaprakash Narayan. It was formed under the leadership of V. P. Singh. It was formed through a merger of the number of parties including Janata Party factions, Indian National Congress and the Jan Morcha united. Later on, dissolved party in 1999. Since 1988 the Janata Dal party was led by the V.P. Singh. After becoming the PM of India V.P. Singh downplayed the diplomatic relationship with the PM of Pakistan Benazir Bhutto. The relationship between India and Pakistan were very tense because of the Kashmir issue. Because India blamed Pakistan for the insurgency activities taken place in Indian administered Kashmir. Moreover, India started its missile technology named Prithvi missiles.

In India, the public was urging the government to do the nuclear test to pressure Pakistan. The Indian government and public were trying to limit the role of Pakistan in Indian administered Kashmir. In 1995 then PM of India Narasimhan Rao near to test the nuclear capability. The program was halted due to American intelligence reports that India is going to test the nuclear bomb in the Pokhran test range in the province of Rajasthan. Moreover, President Bill Clinton warns India and said stop the preparations for the Test. Moreover, PM Benazir Bhutto of Pakistan issued severe and alarming statements against India. This pressure somehow stops India testing the nuclear power second time (Kapur, 2006; Menon & Nigam, 2007; Subramanian, 2004; Khan 1993 p. 129-140)

Pakistan tried to maintain peace in the region and even offered India peace rhetoric agreement in a Conference on Disarming and the spokesperson of Pakistan said, "an equal and mutual restraint in conventional, missile and nuclear fields", (United Nations, 1998). In April Pakistan once again

offered India to do an agreement for the peace in the region but in India, the public pressured the government and Indian Prime Minister ordered to test the nuclear capability. Finally, India tested its nuclear capability on 11 and 13 May 1998. On 13th May 1998 Indian Prime Minister appeared before the press conference and issued a statement "Today, at 15:45 hours, India conducted three underground nuclear tests in the Pokhran range. The tests conducted today were with a fission device, a low yield device, and a thermonuclear device. The measured yields are in line with expected values. Measurements have also confirmed that there was no release of radioactivity into the atmosphere. These were contained explosions like the experiment conducted in May 1974. I warmly congratulate the scientists and engineers who have carried out these successful tests." (Datta, 2010 p. 49)

Background of 1998 Atomic tests made by Ind and Pak

Since 1989 there was a continuous tension amongst India and Pakistan and again the central issue was Kashmir conflict. The situation becomes worse when the Prime Minister of Pakistan Benazir Bhutto elevated the issue of Kashmir in the United Nation (UNO) in 1995. In UN the speaker of "Pakistan National assembly Yousaf Raza Gillani" said: "Continuously Kashmir issue is going to endanger the peace and security in the region". In response to Pakistan National Assembly speaker statement then head of Indian delegation Atal Bihari Vajpayee retaliated and said, "UN resolutions only call upon Pakistan— the occupying force to vacate the "Jammu and Kashmir Area." (Haider, 1995).

The situation becomes worse with the passage of time and became worse in 1998 when BJP won the general election in India and Atal Bihari Vajpayee became the Prime Minister of India. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) is one of the famous and current governing party in India. It is the largest political party of India and its core opponent party is Indian National Congress. In relations to the depiction in the Indian parliament and provincial state assemblies, BJP is one of the largest political party in the country. Moreover, in terms of primary membership, it is known as one of the largest political party in the world. In Pakistan, the PML (N) was governing the country under the leadership of their supreme party leader Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif. The situation deteriorated when the PM of India Atal Bihari Vajpayee issued a statement on 25 February 1998 and said: "take back that part of Kashmir that is under Pakistan's control." The situation worsens day by day and Pakistan were also ready to respond to India. On 28 March 1998, the PM of India enquired from scientists to make arrangements about the unswerving possible time to test the nuclear capability. The purpose

of this move was to threaten Pakistan and to limit the role of Pakistan in the context of Kashmir. (Abbas, 2017; Menon & Nigam, 2007; Subramanian, 2004; Khan 1993 p.129-140)

Pakistan atomic experiments 28th May 1998

Pakistan responded strongly to India's nuclear test and Prime Minister of Pakistan said: "that his country would give a suitable reply to India." The Foreign Minister of Pakistan Gohar Ayub responded and said "Pakistan is prepared to match India, we have the capability. We in Pakistan will maintain a balance with India in all fields" (Sublette, 2001). On 13 May 1998, the Foreign Minister of Pakistan once again appeared in the media and said about the Indian leadership that "India has gone berserk and was acting in a totally unrestrained way." Moreover, the initial response of the Prime Minister of Pakistan was unclear because he not clear whether to go for the test or not. He said in his statement that "We are watching the situation and we will take appropriate action with regard to our security". International leadership was also trying to restrain Pakistan from doing a nuclear test. But the general public of Pakistan, Army, and political leadership were putting pressure on Pakistan to test the atomic bomb. On 28th May 1998 finally, Pakistan tested its nuclear capability under the code name of Chaghi-1. The main role in testing the nuclear capability was of the founding Pakistani scientist Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan. Pakistan had tested its nuclear power after 15 days of Indian test and it was done just in the response of India (Singh, 1998 p. 77; Krepon, 2008 p. 51; Roy, 1998; Sublette, 2001).

In response to the Indian Nuclear test, Pakistan tested its nuclear capability on 28th May 1998. Pakistan nuclear test reduced the chances of war instead of an increase in the chances of war with India. There were more chances of war if Pakistan would not test its nuclear capability in May 1998. Simply the Pakistan nuclear test reduced the chances of war.

Objective measures (Independent Variable, ODB)


The year 1998 has great importance in the history of Pakistan and India. Both countries were near to a devastating war, but the war did not happen. This year is important for both India and Pakistan. India declared its atomic power on 18 May 1974. On this date, India tested its atomic bomb power soon after defeating Pakistan in 1971. India showed its clear dominance in the region until the year of 1998. In 1998 India once again tested its nuclear capability on 13 May 1998. The common information that one can note is the selection of the May month because India had chosen the

month of May in 1974 and once again chosen may for the atomic test in 1998. India tested its nuclear capability second time on 13 May 1998. This test was a clear threat to Pakistan. In response after a couple of weeks on 28 May 1998, Pakistan tested its nuclear capability under the code name of Chagai-I. Pakistan tested 5 underground nuclear tests simultaneously. Pakistan tested its nuclear capability just to balance the power in South Asia. For further and detail investigation here I will measure ODB (Independent Variable) by using CINC sub-measures values. Offense defense balance is an independent variable of the study.

India and Pakistan CPI adjusted total defense spending: Case of 1998


CPI adjusted total spending of both Pakistan and India during 1998 are as follow,

Graphical Presentation



The above graph shows that CPI adjusted total military spending of India is more than three times of Pakistan total defense spending. One of the main reasons for it was the total number of military personnel and defense budget allocation. In the case of Pakistan, the total army size during 1998 was 590,000 and in case of India, it was 1300,000. Previously in case of CPI adjusted defense spending of India per men under arms were more as compared to Pakistan because of the difference in the size of the army. Here in both cases, Indian spending was more compared to Pakistan.

CPI adjusted per men under arms defense spending Comparison: India, Pakistan Case of 1998



The above-mentioned bar graph listed India and Pakistan on the x-axis and their spending on the y-axis. The graph shows that CPI adjusted per men defense spending of India was far more than Pakistan. Indian spending was \$6415 and Pakistan spending were \$4240. The main reason behind this was the economy and military size of India. There is no comparison between Indian and Pakistan economy. Moreover, India military is among the top 3 in the world in terms of size. But Pakistan is just competing with India in terms of technology and warheads. No doubt Pakistan is competing with India just on the basis of ODB balance.

Subjective measures

The analysis of the subjective measures depends upon four statements which we have already discussed in the methodology section. In light of those statements, the statements of the top officials from India, Pakistan and from the world is analyzed.

There is no doubt since 1989 the situation between India and Pakistan very tense. The tension was mainly due to the Kashmir issue. In 1995 the speaker of Pakistan National assembly Yousef Raza Gillani said in UN “Kashmir issue as continue to endanger the peace and security in the region”. In response to Pakistan National Assembly speaker statement then head of Indian delegation Atal Bihari Vajpayee retaliated and said, "UN resolutions only call upon Pakistan the occupying force to vacate the "Jammu and Kashmir Area" (Haider, 1995; Pattanaik, 2019 p. 159-172).

The situation became worst with the passage of time and became worse in 1998 when BJP won the general election in India and Atal Bihari Vajpayee became the PM of India. In Pakistan, the PML (N)

was governing the country under the leadership of their supreme party leader Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif. Things got even worse when the Prime Minister of India Atal Bihari Vajpayee issued a statement on 25 February 1998 and said: "take back that part of Kashmir that is under Pakistan's control." On 28 March 1998, the Prime Minister of India asked scientists to make preparations about the shortest possible time to test the nuclear capability. The purpose of this move was to threaten Pakistan and to limit the role of Pakistan in the context of Kashmir. (Sharma, 1998, p. 30-33; Varshney, 1991)

United States response

The spokesperson of the USA delivered a robust declaration and condemned the India test further said, "a serious intelligence failure of the decade" in detecting the preparations for the test". (Begleiter, 1998; Kapur, 2005 p. 127-152; Walker, 1998 p. 505-528)

The reaction of Canada, Japan

Canada and Japan strongly condemned the Indian nuclear test and even imposed a ban on India. Moreover, these countries put a ban on loans and grants except humanitarian aid. But it is worth noting that there was a number of countries who have not condemned the Indian test namely France, United Kingdom, Russia, and many others. Moreover, China issued a strong statement and said that "The Chinese government is seriously concerned about the nuclear tests conducted by India," and that the tests "run counter to the current international trend and are not conducive to peace and stability in South Asia"(Yang, 2016; Walker, 1998 p. 505-528).

Pakistan political views after Pakistan atomic experiments

In Pakistan, nuclear detonation was meet street celebrations. Then Prime Minister of Pakistan Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif addressed to the nation and said " The mission has, on the one hand, boosted the morale of the Pakistani nation by giving it an honorable position in the nuclear world, while on the other hand, it validated scientific theory, design and previous results from cold tests". Different scientist worked very hard during that time and the most important contributor are Munir Ahmad Khan, Ishfaq Ahmad, Dr. Samar Mubarak and Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan. All of the scientist worked with best of their abilities and enable Pakistan to stand in the list of the countries who are atomic power. (Khan, 2012 p. 283)

United States' condemnation to Pakistan test

The United States condemned Pakistan test and then President of the United States criticize Pakistan and India and said: "Two wrongs don't make a right" (FILKINS, 1998). In response, the United States, the United Nations, and Japan put a ban on Pakistan.

Keeping in mind the scenario discussed above we simply argue that India was just trying to test Pakistani response. But Pakistan responded more than Indian expectations and create a balance in the region. Otherwise, there were chances that India would attack Pakistan. The whole scenario can be expressed through the below-mentioned statement of the subjective measures,

- "they want to wait and see how the other side acts" (this is the evidence in favor of them believing the ODB favoring defense)

Why war didn't break out

There were numerous reasons due to which war did not break out. The main reasons were, the international pressure on both India and Pakistan because world powers were not favoring war between two neighboring nuclear states. Moreover, the United Nations and many other countries put sanctions on both Pakistan and India, and this definitely limits Pakistan and India capability to go for the war with a vulnerable economy situation. In addition to this, the most important reason due to which war did not happen was the Pakistan nuclear test. In response to the Indian nuclear test, Pakistan tested its nuclear capability creates balance in the region. There is no doubt the this was the prominent and most significant thing happened due to which region able to maintain and feel the peace. Otherwise, there were chances that India could attack Pakistan. All the reasons mentioned have a certain weight, but this is prominent among many.

Pakistan and India were just trying to pressure each other. But it is obvious sometimes it has been observed that situation get worse and cannot be controlled. India tested its nuclear capability to satisfy its public sentiments against Pakistan. But due to Indian nuclear test whole region peace was on stake. In return, there was great pressure from the Pakistani public to answer the Indian nuclear test. As a result, Pakistan tested its nuclear capability. Fortunately, the war did not break out. Otherwise, there were great chances of war broke out. The international community acts sensibly and they ask both Pakistan and India to deescalate the situation and maintain peace in the region. Moreover, Pakistan nuclear test also stops India to indulge herself in a war with Pakistan. India is a

larger country as compared to Pakistan. Pakistan has only one option to secure its independence in a war with India to exercise the option of nuclear bomb and India know it very well. Due to this India normally hesitate to involve in a direct war with Pakistan after the 28 May 1998.

Conclusion

The case 1998 clearly suggests that Pakistan tested its nuclear capability in response to Indian nuclear test. This further shows that Pakistan nuclear test created balance in the region. Otherwise, India was in an offensive mood. Pakistan did a nuclear test in defense and create a balance in South Asia. If Pakistan did not respond, then definitely there were chances of the devastating war in the region. Pakistan nuclear capability is the symbol of balance and peace in South Asia because Pakistan is competing with India just on the basis of its nuclear and missile technology otherwise there is no comparison between two.

The case of 1998 best describes the role of ODB. Initially, India showed its aggression against Pakistan and tested its nuclear capability. Indian approach was totally based on aggression and offense. In response, Pakistan did nuclear tests to secure its independence. The Pakistan move was totally in their defense otherwise there were chances that India would attack Pakistan. But Pakistan did a nuclear test and secure its independence. Here we can say that Pakistan created a balance that can be expressed in terms of ODB. So, it can be observed that in 1998 Pakistan was considering ODB favoring the defense.

Chapter 6

Discussion and Analysis

Discussion and Analysis

The prime focus of this study was to discuss offense-defense balance in the context of Kashmir struggle between India and Pakistan. For this purpose, we have selected four different cases to determine and evaluate the role of offense-defense balance amongst India and Pakistan. The cases were 1962 war fought between India and China, Indo-Pak war of 1971, Pakistan and Indian nuclear bomb testing in 1998 and Kargil war Of 1999. This study evaluated the impact of these four cases on both Indian and Pakistan in the context of Kashmir. There is no doubt the role of offense-defense balance is vital but, in this study, we also found that there are many other factors that are important for decisions about going to war. Pakistan and India came into being in 1947. Pakistan emerged as a country out of United India in 1947. As per partition rule, Muslim majority states would have to join Pakistan and other to India.

The Jammu and Kashmir were the Muslim mainstream state and would have joined Pakistan, but its ruler chose to join India instead. The result was a war where India holds most of Kashmir, but Pakistan gained a share of it. Moreover, it is the fact that the war of liberation is still on in the “Indian administered Jammu and Kashmir”. Both Pakistan and India fought many battles on the issue of Kashmir including 1947, 1965, 1971 and 1999 wars. The study finding shows that the prime cause of the war between Indian and Pakistan were Kashmir conflict. The study also shows that Kashmir was not a prime cause of the 1971 war but indirectly the role of Kashmir was vital because Pakistan and India's relationship solely based on the Kashmir issue. Both countries are rival to each other due to Kashmir conflict. To determine the intensity of Kashmir conflict between Pakistan and India we have conducted this study in the light of 4 cases. Moreover, we try our best to make a comparison that how offense-defense balance impact on Pakistan and India.

The research question of the study was to what extent can the offense/defense balance explain variations in the level of conflict between India and Pakistan? This research question is the base for the discussion and analysis of the study. Moreover, the dependent variable of the study was the likelihood of war and the independent variable of the study was ODB which were determined through two different ways namely objective and subjective measures. As an objective measure, I

use defense spending per men under arms. In addition to this, the subjective measure evaluated the extent to which statements by policymakers and generals conformed to the following states,

- “we should attack first before the other country do” (this is evidence in favor of policymakers caring about the ODB and finding it favoring offense)
- “they want to wait and see how the other side acts” (this is evidence in favor of them believing the ODB favoring defense)
- “they want to accelerate an incident” (weaker evidence in favor of the ODB)
- “we are likely to win because we are more powerful” (this is evidence of them not considering the ODB)

The 1962 war was battled amongst China and India. It was a golden opportunity for Pakistan to attack vulnerable India. If we apply this condition in the perspective of ODB then we can say Pakistan would adopt the fourth statement of subjective measure “we are likely to win because we are more powerful” (this is evidence of them not considering the ODB this is evidence of them not considering the ODB)”. Definitely, Pakistan was more powerful because India was already losing the war from China. The chances of the likelihood of war were very high. Even Pakistan was somehow willing to attack India due to Kashmir conflict, but the war did not happen because there were many other factors that oppose Pakistan to not enter into a war with India.

The prime factor was Pakistan cold relationship with China due to border conflict alongside Jammu and Kashmir State. Moreover, Pakistan was trying to build a good relationship with India due to China as a threat to both countries. Moreover, international pressure was also there. As a result, Pakistan opted to not enter into a war with India otherwise it was a great chance for Pakistan to defeat India and increase dominance in the region. Pakistan decision to not attack India was due to its policy to maintain a good relationship with India. Moreover, Pakistan was not trusting China due to border conflict. There is no doubt that during 1962 ODB were favoring Pakistan to attack India but Pakistan consider other factors in mind and gave less importance to ODB.

During the 1962 war between China and India ODB were in the favor of Pakistan. Likelihood of war (chances of war) was also on the higher side in terms of ODB philosophy. Irrespective of all these benefits offering by ODB, Pakistan did not attack India. If Pakistani establishment would keener towards ODB (Offence advantage) advantage, then Pakistan would attack India, but Pakistan did not

attack India. The role of Kashmir conflict was also prominent in the 1962 war, but war was being fought between China and India. The most important thing that must be noted, the 1962 war was also fought due to Kashmir conflict because both China and India were claiming the bordering area of Kashmir. Kashmir border conflict caused a war of 1962.

The second case of this study was related to the Indo-Pak war of 1971. This war was primarily fought in East Pakistan. Initially, the role of India was limited. There was an insurgency in East Pakistan against the establishment of West Pakistan. Pakistan deployed its forces in East Pakistan to counter the insurgency. No one was thinking India would exploit the situation and can turn the situation in their favor. With the passage of time insurgency activities increases and become a prominent threat for Pakistan. When India observed that the situation could be in their favor if they support the insurgency in East Pakistan. They did the same and helped insurgents in the form of training, arms, and ammunition, funding, declaring Calcutta as the capital of Bengali insurgents, etc.

The question is why India did this? There are many reasons due to which India do this the main reason was an outstanding conflict of Kashmir between two neighbors because since 1947 both were in great tension and due to Kashmir relationship between India and Pakistan remain always intense. Moreover, ODB was favoring India into a greater extent. Pakistan was in a vulnerable situation and this situation was offering India greater advantages. India was in a good position to attack Pakistan. Moreover, ODB subjective measure statement “we are likely to win because we are more powerful” is also applicable in this case. The situation was totally in favor of India. Pakistan was vulnerable and India was waiting for the suitable time to enter into the war. India did what Pakistan did not opt in the war of 1962 fought between China and India. The war only lasted 13 days. Pakistan lost the war due to a local insurgency, Indian attack and long distance from West Pakistan. As a result, Pakistan disintegrated, and East Pakistan becomes Bangladesh on the World map.

The third case of the study was the nuclear test of Pakistan and India in 1998. Since 1947 Pakistan and India have somehow black clouds on their relationship. The relationship between Pakistan and India become worse especially in 1989. Before 1989 the liberation movement in Kashmir was civilian and political but first-time militancy started in Indian administered Jammu and Kashmir in this year. India always blamed Pakistan to support militants. In India, there was huge support for the

government to do a nuclear test to build more pressure on Pakistan. The situation in Kashmir was also worsening and India was also under a great deal of pressure. Moreover, to pressure India decided to test its nuclear capability in May and tested the second time its nuclear power on 11 and 13 May 1998. India not only tested its nuclear capability to pressure Pakistan but there were chances if in response Pakistan will not show its nuclear capability then India would attack Pakistan. Through this test, India tries to counterinsurgency in Jammu and Kashmir.

Pakistani establishment issued numerous statements to condemn the Indian test and in response, Pakistan also said that reply would be given. Finally, on 28 May 1998, Pakistan tested its nuclear capability under the code of Chaghi-1 in the Chaghi district of Baluchistan Pakistan. Both India and Pakistan faced international pressure and sanctions. If Pakistan would not test its nuclear capability, then there were chances that India would attack Pakistan to prove its dominance in the region. Initially, Indian response was similar to explained by the ODB subjective measure statement "they want to wait and see how the other side acts". After testing nuclear capability Indian was just waiting and seeing the Pakistan response. Because Indian future policies and decision about the war were depending upon the reaction of Pakistan. India waited till 28th May 1998. If Pakistan would remain silent then the likelihood of war was higher and even India was waiting and planning to attack Pakistan.

There was immense international community pressure on Pakistan to not test its nuclear capability. They were thinking if Pakistan would test its nuclear capability then the whole region would be under danger, but Pakistan was thinking differently. Pakistan was thinking if they would not test nuclear capability then India would attack Pakistan. On 28th May 1998 Pakistan tested its nuclear capability and through this way Pakistan simply create a balance in the region. If Pakistan would not test its nuclear capability, then the likelihood of war would be increased, and Pakistan could face a war with India and the result would be devastating for Pakistan. Pakistan in response shows its defense and in defense, Pakistan tested its nuclear capability.

The fourth case was the Kargil war of 1999. This war was fought within the geographical boundaries of Jammu and Kashmir. The Kargil war was initiated by Pakistan paramilitary forces along with Kashmiri militants. The main purpose of this war was to cut the Indian supply route. Moreover, Pakistan wanted to highlight the Kashmir issue on the international level. Initially, due to heavy

snowfall, India didn't know about Pakistan paramilitary movement in the region and aggression against India. Pakistan was also trying to capture Siachen Glacier. There is no doubt Siachen Glacier has strategic location and control on it means to have control on Kashmir affairs. This war was started by Pakistan and it was a secret operation. The major purpose on the backend to highlight the Kashmir issue and to accelerate the freedom movement in Indian administered Kashmir. Simply Pakistan was favoring subjective measure of ODB statement "they want to accelerate an incident". But no doubt this statement is weaker evidence of ODB. Likelihood of war was high when India came to know that Pakistan secretly attacked India especially in the district of Kargil then India in response retaliated. The war was limited to the Kargil area. Both countries and international forces try to settle the issue within the geographical boundaries of the Kargil. Later on, both Pakistan and India agreed to maintain peace in the area. The Kargil conflict is also a key role in the conflict of Kashmir because it was purely fought in Jammu and Kashmir and a primary focus of this war was either to free Kashmir from India or to highlight the issue on the international level.

Conclusion

This study clearly shows that Kashmir conflict is the core issue between India and Pakistan. Moreover, the issue is a constant cause of tension between neighboring nuclear powers. It is the responsibility of the Pakistan, India, United Nation Organization (UNO) and the international community to give an opportunity to Kashmiri people to decide their future either they want to go with Pakistan or India. Finally, I must say to maintain peace in the region Kashmir conflict must be resolved under the United Nation Security Council Resolution-47.

To sum up, I must say that the role of ODB cannot be overruled but it is the fact that under certain circumstances both Pakistan and India considered other factors as well. Both countries did not just rely on ODB philosophy, but they consider other geopolitical factors as well.

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