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Securitization of Somali Refugees: Case Study of Kenya

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"Kenya, having taken into consideration its national security interests, has decided that hosting of refugees has come to an end", senior Interior Ministry official Karanja Kibicho.

AKNOWLEDGEMENT

I wish to extend my gratitude to my family and friends for the constant encouragement and push that helped me finish the writing. It has not been an easy journey and without your support I would not have gotten this far.

To my parents and siblings for your endless love and support, I love you!

I want to thank my supervisor, Mohamed Husein Gaas, who has believed in my ability and encouraged me to push through. For the advices that has led to the buildup of this research.

To all participants who gave their time and to my guide in Eastleigh for getting me the various respondents who turned out to be very resourceful.

To Him my Exceeding Great Reward!

ABSTRACT

In May 2016, the government of Kenya decided to close down all refugee camps in the country. This was due to an increase in the levels of insecurity in the country. But later on, the decision to close down Kakuma camp was later reversed with the government explaining that links to insecurity was found only in Dadaab camp whose majority population is the Somalis. This in itself argues as securitization act by the Kenyan government to the Somali refugees. As noted in the study, securitization of refugees has been a growing trend in the world. Therefore, this thesis studies how the Kenyan government has securitized Somali refugees. Drawing from qualitative research and discourse analysis this study considers the securitization of the Somali refugees through labeling them as threat by the Kenyan government. This helps understand the narrative created by the Kenyan government towards Somali refugees. The study finds out that the Copenhagen School speech act approach is too narrow as securitization of Somali refugees is not only done through labelling them as threat but as demonstrated in the paper through acts. Following some of the literature by other researchers, this thesis finds the Copenhagen School theory limited in its explanation of the role of audiences in the non-western context as some sectors, not considered as audiences play a significant role in the decision whether or not to legitimize the securitization move. It further argues that the governments should find reliable solutions of dealing with the refugee situations in their borders other than securitizing them.

Figure 1: Picture of the Ifo camp, which is part of the Dadaab camp that was to be closed down by the Kenyan government (Jerome, 2018)

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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 STATEMENT OF PROBLEM

Kenya's security has been on the decline since 2011 (Karumba, 2012). There has been an upsurge in violent attacks in the country from Al Shabaab, a terror group in Somalia. On the May of 2016, the Kenyan government published an official statement on its position to hosting refugees within its borders (Daily Nation, 2018). The then Interior permanent secretary stated that putting into consideration the country's national security, refugees were now required to go back to their countries (Kibicho, 2018). The decision made was to initially close down all the camps in the country which are the Kakuma and Dadaab camps. But the decision was later reversed to closing down the Dadaab camp only. This was followed by a brief explanation that after their investigations, the government had observed that the Dadaab camp was being used as a hideout place by the Al Shabaab, a terror militia group in Somalia (Nkaisery, 2018).

This thesis dwells on how Kenya has resulted to sending back refugees in the name of security. Over the years, Kenya has experienced repeated influx of refugees (Clottey, 2018). According to the UNHCR (Un.org, 2018), in 2014 the number of refugees in the world increased to 14.4 million. And this has also been witnessed in different parts of the world and has become a global affair especially with the Syrian civil war happening. Research has shown that repeated refugee influx into host countries has created controversy and strain with claims that the situation is 'a luxury that poor countries can no longer afford' (Cutts 1998, p 71). Refugees will always seek refuge in countries that are more politically stable. But with states trying to control migration into their borders, they have come up with different policies to make it harder for asylum seekers to find refuge in their countries as refugees are considered to be a burden (Edwards, 2009).

While refugees bring into countries significant flow of resources in form of international humanitarian assistance and human capital, they also impose threats on security, economic and environmental strain on their host countries (Kibreab, 2003). And so the political actors have taken up this social issue and has labeled it as a threat to the national security so as to lock out refugees. This has resulted in host countries taking extreme measures and sending back refugees

to their countries despite the situation in the refugees' countries (Jacobsen, 1996). Kenya has not been left out in this. with the influx of refugees in Kenya for over two decades now, the government feels that the refugees have become a burden both security wise and economically (Migiro, 2018).

In the recent years, there has been security threats in Kenya caused by the Al Shaabab terrorist group who the government claims finds refuge within the refugee camps. Al Shabaab, a Somali terror based group, has been launching organized and deadly attacks on Kenya. The most hit parts of the country are the coastal regions and the North Eastern region with an incident that caused an outcry in the Kenyan public for the government to do something. In April 2015, 174 people mostly students were killed in an assault by Al Shabaab militants in a university in North Eastern Kenya. The militant group took responsibility of the attack and stated that it attacked the university because it is at war with Kenya (BBC News, 2018). The group was also behind the Westgate shopping mall attack where 67 people were killed and more than 170 people wounded (Cat & Graham, 2014).

The coastal towns have also been a target for the attacks especially in the towns of Lamu, Malindi and Mombasa with the group taking responsibility for all these attacks. Security experts claim that the attacks are a retaliation to the Operation Linda Nchi (Mwangi, 2017). This is a coordinated military mission between the Somalian and Kenyan military that began in October 2011 when troops went into the conflict zones of Southern Somalia. By mid-2014, cumulative attacks began affecting Kenya's tourism industry as western nations issued travel warnings to their citizens. Hotels laid their staff off due to low numbers of tourists visiting in the coastal regions (U.K., 2018). And with this, there has been an increasing and significant number of terror attacks carried out by local Kenyans who have recently converted into Islam (Hiiiran.com, 2018). According to diplomats, Muslim areas are also vulnerable for recruitment (U.S., 2018).

The government had initially announced to close both the Dadaab and Kakuma refugee camps but later withdrew Kakuma sanctions (Nkaisery, 2018). With this argument, the government finds Dadaab camp, which is almost 100 kilometers from Somalia, a breeding ground for the Al Shabaab group. It gives them the opportunity to easily move in and recruit youths into the group as majority of them are Somalis who are predominantly Muslims. The government still stands

with its argument that Dadaab camp in specific is being used by the group as a hideout and a training ground for the terrorists (Migiro, 2018). The current radicalization of the local youth into the terror group can be looked at on different angles. Unemployment of the youth is one factor that makes them a vulnerable and an easy target to the group (Jerejian, 2018). Previous research done on the topic of radicalization have come into a conclusion that marginalization can also be a factor that leads to the youth being absorbed into the radical groups (Jerejian, 2018 pg. IV).

This study focuses on why the government has chosen to close only the Dadaab camp leaving refugees with limited options on what to do next. In the hosting of refugees, it is part of the Kenyan government to offer security to the refugees in the camp. In as much as its responsibility is ensuring the safety of its citizens from external attacks, the closure of the camps would be against refugee policy based on the principle of asylum and non-refoulement (Meron, 1995). The principle of non-refoulement prohibits states from expelling or returning a refugee to any situation in which their life or freedom would be in jeopardy (Mogire 2009, p 19). With many of the refugees not willing to go back to Somalia due to the instability in the country, the government has an upper hand in sending them back. Voluntary repatriation is recognized under article v of the Organization of African Unity in 1969 refugee convention. It clearly emphasizes on the importance of the refugees having to voluntarily want to go back home (Amnesty International, 2018).

In securitization, an object is often labeled as a security threat and by referring to them as 'security issues' then they become security problems (Wæver, 1995). The Kenyan authorities portray Somalis as being synonymous to terrorism. The mere act of speech creates the opportunity for Kenya to take urgent actions that might be seen as undemocratic but are permitted under the circumstances. In this instance it would be shutting down the camp and sending all Somali refugees away from Kenya. For some people however they argue that the move to close down the camp is being short sighted (Vito, 2016). While it may offer some temporal solutions, it does not help address issues in the long term and might be in fact counterproductive. To fully understand securitization, the perception and attitude of the individual actor- citizens- must be taken into account. This is noted in the later sections of the work where I analyze their views on the decision of the closure of the camp and their attitude

towards the subject. Detailed account will be given on how the government of Kenya has used the discourse of security to address the challenging situation of refugees in the country both in speeches and in acts.

Securitization especially of refugees is a growing trend throughout the world and there is therefore a need for a better understanding on how to tackle immediate issues rather than using undemocratic means to solve such issues. Therefore, using Kenya as a study case, the study is both academically and socially significant. This study enriches the knowledge of the theory that is in use academically. The findings of this research will be useful to academia in enriching the literature that is mostly based on the western settings and also policy makers in order to avoid making irrational decisions in the name of security.

1.2 ANALYTICAL FRAME

The use of theories in social science research is common. Social researchers try to make sense of social life by identifying order and regularity in complex situations (Ragin 2010, p 31). The theories are better understood as models which are used to describe, analyze or predict a situation in a limited environment. It is with this reason that I chose to use securitization theory as my analytical framework to better understand the current social affair in Kenya.

Securitization theory as a framework, which will be discussed later in the paper, brings the political sector back into focus. Authorities that securitize certain issues-- that are deemed as dangerous threats—do so out of political gain (Balzacq, 2010). The notion that a threat rises to the top of a security agenda requires a substantial response ismenk brought to light using securitization theory. Securitization as a framework is used as a critical tool to understand the political dimension of an issue that is presented as a political threat (Voppen, 2017). When using securitization theory as a tool of analytical frame, it is always important that the issue, threat, be identified and also be a focus of public attention or debate. With this, public debates and attention will be aroused among the public (Balzacq 2010 p 32).

To understand the theory while using it as an analytical framework, the definition of the theory is broken down to help understand the context.

Actor- "The agent who presents an issue as a threat through a securitizing move" (Balzacq et al 2016, p 495)

Referent object- "Things that are seen to be existentially threatened and that have a legitimate claim to survival" (Buzan et al 1998, p 36)

Audience- "Individuals or groups that have the capability to authorize the view of the issue presented by the actor and legitimize the treatment of the issue" (Cote 2016, p 548)

These definitions are to help discuss the research questions more objectively and also help the reader understand the terms that I will be using in the discussion.

In Kenya, the issue of closing the camps has been in the public since 2013 when the government first made its intentions clear (UN News Centre, 2018). And now with the government stating that it has made up its mind, it then has become highly publicized in the local community with both the local and international media covering the events as they happen (Migiro, 2018). Policy issues and court cases have also arisen from this. Therefore to understand this situation, using securitization theory as a framework would be valid. This thesis looks at a current situation that has only caught the attention of researchers in the past years. Though the decision to close down the camps had been made by the government since 2013, the recent call for the closure was the one that caught the attention of the world.

However, since most of the research on securitization focuses on European or other Western countries, there is a real gap in academia that describes securitization theory in non-western countries. Therefore, the understanding of elements of securitization, such as the audience, is not yet developed adequately, especially in non-western settings. Perhaps the findings in this study will contribute to filling this gap in the literature. It will contribute to the deeper understanding of securitization theory through this case study research.

1.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The purpose of this study is to find out how the refugees have been discoursed as a security threat in the eye of the public in Kenya and how the Kenyan government has legitimized its move to close down the camp due to that. The main question that this thesis seeks to answer is-:

How has the Kenyan government securitized Somali refugees and used that to legitimize the closing down of Dadaab refugee camp and the responses that has generally been aroused in the general public arena?

The question is further divided into sub questions to better understand the topic.

1. How has the security narrative towards refugees in Kenya been constructed?
2. How does the Kenyan general public perceive it?
3. What other factors (socio economic) enhance the narrative?

1.4 PURPOSE OF THE RESEARCH

The securitization of refugees is a phenomenon that is becoming increasingly present throughout the world (Rygiel, 2008). It is therefore important that the study looks at the policies that actors come up with in the securitization process to help address the refugee situation in their countries. The study also traces back the security discourse in Kenya and understand the events in Kenya that led to the government declaring the immediate closure of Dadaab refugee camp. It aims to dig deeper and trace the roots of the security discourse and how it became established in Kenya. To understand this, I will use the securitization theory to try and make sense of the complicated situation in Kenya.

States will do anything within their means to avoid hosting or accepting refugees in their boarders (Travis, 2015). Most of these moves have come under sharp criticism as they are considered undemocratic and even at times inhumane (Rygiel, 2008). Therefore, this research is significant in the sense that it will show how security discourse is often used to address a challenging situation in the country.

Academically, it will contribute to the deeper understanding of securitization theory through case study research. Since most of the research on securitization focusses on European or other Western countries, there is a real gap in academia that describes securitization theory in

lessdeveloped countries. Therefore, this study situates its findings in a less developed context trying to bridge between the literature that has been written based on western countries and the less developed.

1.5 OUTLINE OF THE RESEARCH

Chapter one of the research outlines the problem statement of the thesis which is the Kenyan government labeling Somali refugees as a threat to the national security and calling for the closure of Dadaab camp and sending the Somali refugees back into Somalia which is still not stable. The government states that the camp is being used by the militia group as a hideout place for them. In the same chapter, explanation for the gap in literature is put forward hence giving a need to have a situated research done which will try and bridge the gap. Research questions are also outlined to give a focus on the aspects that the research will major on.

Chapter 2 gives background information on the key issues in this study. In this chapter, an introduction is given to help the reader understand the securitization process in Kenya. An overview of Kenya is given and factors that make it key in hosting refugees other than its geographical location; and also why it has had the largest blow in the Al Shaabab attacks. The chapter also focuses on the protracted refugee situation in Kenya and the role of the voluntary organizations to the refugees with regard to securitization. Chapter 3 will look at the research methodology which will include limitations, ethical considerations concerning fieldwork conducted in Kenya. Chapter 4 deals with the literature review. It is here that analysis of what other literature have with regards to securitization towards refugees. The chapter will also look at some counter discourses from various literature. In chapter 5, findings from the data is presented and discussion is also made in the same chapter. And in chapter 6 conclusion of the whole study is done.

2. BACKGROUND

2.1 INTRODUCTION

This section seeks to lay some background information to the topic in focus bearing in mind the key concepts in the study. A brief introduction of the country, Kenya, will be given. This is to make the reader familiar with the country and how the refugees came to being in Kenya. It will also look at some factors that make Kenya a better choice for the refugees take refuge in. With this, this section also seeks to understand why the Al Shabaab have viciously attacked Kenya especially after the 2011 invasion of the Kenyan army into Somalia. Is it the group revenging the invasion or there is more to the attacks than meets the eye? This is with the knowledge that Kenya is part of a force formed by other 4 countries that is under the auspice of AMISOM sent to Somalia to neutralize the Al Shabaab group's effect in Somalia. The chapter also focuses on the protracted refugee situation in Kenya and the effects it has on both the refugees and the host country and the role of the voluntary organizations to the refugees.

2.2 KENYA

Kenya is a country in Africa, East of Africa to be precise. It lies between latitude 5 N and 5 S and between longitude 34 and 42 E. It lies on the equator and its diverse land stretches to the rift valley and roughly to Lake Victoria with the Southern Eastern to the Indian Ocean. Tanzania borders Kenya to the South and South West, Uganda to the West, South Sudan to the North West, Ethiopia to the North and Somalia to the North East. The North Eastern regions of Kenya near the Ethiopia, Sudan and Somalia are mostly arid and semi-arid areas. With the 5 countries that border Kenya, 3 of the countries (Ethiopia, Somalia and South Sudan) have had political unrest in their countries. Kenya is seen as a power house in the East Africa region and is therefore deemed to be a more politically stable country (Anon, 2018) even with the ability to host refugees from neighboring countries.

In terms of economic development, Kenya has the largest GDP in the East Africa region (Oxford Business Group, 2018) and therefore makes it a powerhouse country in the region. It has had

positive relations with its neighbors especially Uganda and Tanzania trying to implement the East African Community policies.

For the purpose of this paper, I will look a bit more into Somalia in relation to the role it has played in Kenya's hosting refugees in its territory as majority of the refugees are from this country. It should therefore be noted that majority of the population living in the Dadaab camp are the Somali refugees.

2.2.1 Crisis in Somalia that led to creation of Dadaab camp

Somalia is located in the horn of Africa. It is bordered by Kenya to the Southwest and has the longest coastline on Africa's mainland. Its population is about 14.3 million.

Somalia has experienced one of the longest running conflict in the continent of Africa (Al Jazeera, 2018). Somalia gained its independence in 1960. Nine years later, President Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke was assassinated, triggering a military coup led by Colonel Siad Barre (Jaranson et al, 2004). While Barre initially worked to modernize and develop the country, the failure of the Ogaden War with Ethiopia in 1977 – which attempted to unite ethnic Somali people under one State – led to a critical weakening of the Government and the military, and gave rise to clanbased opposition groups (Tareke, 2000). These groups were violently repressed by Barre, leading to a full-scale civil war from 1989 to 1991, when the regime collapsed. The same year, Somaliland declared independence and began rebuilding its infrastructure and state apparatus. Puntland similarly transitioned to a more stable government through grass-roots, locally led development initiatives since 1998. While Somaliland and Puntland still experience conflict and disruption, both areas are more stable and prosperous than the SCZ, which is nonetheless the seat of the federal Government (Tareke, 2000). The period following 1991 was marked by numerous attempts to forge a central government and consolidate peace, supported by external actors. Transitional governments struggled to establish security and provide basic social services, but corruption, lack of inclusion and internal competition for power derailed their efforts. External actors have also become drivers of conflict due to their competing interests within Somalia (Laitin, 1979).

Somalia soon became ungovernable in 1991 after Siad Barre`s regime was stumbled. The atrocities committed by the regime and the clan based power struggles that followed later led to

the displacement of hundreds of thousands of Somalis (Laitin, 1979). The focus of this paper is from the period the Somalis started seeking refuge in other countries and particularly in Kenya.

According to the Joint return intention survey 2014 carried out by the IOM and the UNHCR agency, the refugee crisis happened in three phases. The first phase began in 1991 that followed the state collapse. Widespread conflict due to clan-based fighting and community breakdown followed the 1991 state collapse after the deposal of the Siad Barre administration. This spurred one of the longest-running humanitarian crises in the modern world Refugees hosted in Kenya soared to close to 300,000 by 1992. Violence was compounded by drought in 1991 and 1992. In 1997, widespread flooding and a decline in humanitarian aid caused additional complications, and spurred further displacement. There was relative calm between 1996 and 2006 but peace was shattered in the latter half of 2006 when the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), backed by the Ethiopian Army and with support from international strategic partners, expunged the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), who had been gradually gaining power(Ciisa-Salwe, 1996). Heavy fighting marked the change in power. In 2006, there were 27,094 new arrivals to Dadaab from Somalia. In the period 2001-2007, there were 59,238 new arrivals.

At the end of 2008 the TFG leader President Yusuf stepped down, with Ethiopia pulling out at the beginning of 2009. The ICU splinter group al-Shabaab emerged as a dominant force and there was widespread conflict. New arrivals in Dadaab from Somalia soared to 55,456 in 2008 alone. Further complications arose when Somalia and the Horn of Africa suffered a serious drought in 2011(Menkhaus, 2011). Conditions were already dire due to successive failed rains and food insecurity, restricted humanitarian access and the lack of political capacity to address the chronic situation. Throughout that year, 151,187 Somali refugees arrived in the Dadaab camps. At the height of the humanitarian crisis in 2011, Dadaab Camps hosted a total of 486,913 refugees. The refugees initially sought refuge in neighboring countries of Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti and later spread to countries even further (Menkhaus, 2011).

2.2.2 Factors that make Kenya a better host country for refugees
With this information on Kenya and how it became a host of the highest number of refugees in the world, it is important to understand why Kenya is a better choice for the refugees to seek refuge in Kenya despite Somalia having other countries as their neighbors.

In this section, I will look at 3 factors that I consider would be reasons why refugees would run to Kenya for help despite having other countries that are closer to them than Kenya is.

□   *Economic stability*

Kenya is the economic financial and transport hub in East Africa and its real GDP growth has been robust in recent years (Oxford Business Group, 2018). It is a key regional player with major communications and logistics hub with an important Indian Ocean port and strategic land borders with its neighbors (World Bank, 2018). Kenya's real GDP growth has averaged over 5% for the last 7 years (FocusEconomics | Economic Forecasts from the World's Leading Economists, 2018). Kenya has been ranked as a lower middle income country since 2014 because its per capita GDP crossed the World Bank threshold.

While there has been tremendous growth in entrepreneurial middle class who are highly qualified, the current government has put in place measures to improve the country's infrastructure (World Bank, 2018). This has been witnessed by massive road and rail construction projects given to the Chinese companies to handle. By seeking external investments in infrastructure development, this has led to the opening of the interior parts of the country by bringing business to those towns (FocusEconomics | Economic Forecasts from the World's Leading Economists, 2018). With international financial institutions and donors part of the growth of the country, Kenya has also raised capital in the global market bond. It issued its first sovereign bond offering in mid-2014 (Anon, 2018).

Tourism holds a significant place in Kenya's economy. Apart from boosting the economy, it also creates employment opportunities to the youthful generation who have access to loans to start businesses in areas most frequented by tourists. In 2015, World Bank noted that Kenya was still on course to being one of Africa's fastest growing economies (Oxford Business Group, 2018).

With the youthful and a growing population, dynamic private sector, improved infrastructure, highly skilled workforce and the key role that Kenya has to East Africa, refugees are more likely to be drawn towards seeking refuge in Kenya.

□   *Its location to the conflicted borders*

Kenya is strategically located in the East of Africa with its neighbors constantly at war. Sudan and Somalia have been having civil war in their countries since 1980s and this has caused instability in the regions (Plaut, 2013). In this section of the paper, I will focus on both the Somalia and Sudan case as refugees from both countries form the majority of refugees that Kenya is hosting.

While Kenya is not the best or most comfortable place for refugees to settle, its geographic location makes it one of the most accessible countries for refugees to come to for safety. The proximity of the camps to the borders is a matter of concern in itself. Once the refugees arrive from their countries, they are restricted at almost the borders of the two countries so that they do not go further into the host country. For example, the Dadaab camp is located approximately 100 kilometers from the Kenya-Somalia border while the Kakuma camp is located 125 kilometers from the South Sudan border (Crisp, 2000). This is against the Organizations for African Unity guidelines that state that refugee camps should be established at a reasonable distance from the sending countries.

The proximity of the camps to the countries in war is actually an invitation for them to have trouble permeating through the boarders (Burns, 2010). Camps are often established in regions that would rather be looked at as not useful economically. The region where the camps are located is semi-arid areas and was sparsely populated by the nomadic people in those regions. Placing the camps in such areas often lead to segregation and marginalization of refugees as they are not allowed to freely leave the camps as they want.

But with the close proximity to the country, refugees have no choice than to seek solace in Kenya.

□ *Kenya's good standing foreign policy with other countries*

Kenya being the region hegemony, it is expected to take up leadership position (Oxford Business Group, 2018). The country enjoys political and economic stability. And other countries come to benchmark Kenya for its growth. As far as relations with other countries stands, Kenya is so far enjoying a good standing with other countries (Anon, 2018). It has received massive support

from western countries in terms of grants and logistical help to help advance the country economically.

With the startup of the refugee camps in Kenya came as a suggestion from the western countries as they considered Kenya as the best place to host the refugees before they came up with a long term plan. Since the creation of it, Kenya has enjoyed massive support from both the UN and other countries to help it run the camps without any financial strain (Anon, 2018). And with pledge by the western countries to take some of the refugees in their country then it places Kenya at a good place for refugees to go.

Even with a start, Kenya enjoys good relations with its East Africa neighbors as it seeks to foster development in the region (Oxford Business Group, 2017). And so most of the refugees will seek refuge in Kenya with the thinking that it is a safe place for them. And with its good relations to the western countries (Oxford Business Group, 2017), most refugees tend to enjoy acceptance from such countries in the name of coming from Kenya. It is easy for the refugees to get permits for them to go to other countries that are willing to take them in.

With such to factors to consider, Kenya is therefore an attractive place for the refugees to seek refuge in.

But despite being a friendly host country, it has also been a target for the al Shabaab with the number of attacks counting 272 in between 2008 and 2015 (Cannon & Ruto Pkayla, 2017). With this, I will focus on why Kenya is on the receiving end of the attacks.

2.3 Attacks perpetrated by Al Shabaab in Kenya

Al Shabaab, translated from Arabic means 'The Youth'. The circumstance under which the Al Shabaab came into existence is still unclear (Jerejian, 2017). However, the group emerged as the radical youth wing of Somalia's now defunct union of Islamic courts, which controlled Mogadishu in 2006 before being forced out by the Ethiopian forces (BBC News, 2018). Since the overthrow of Dictator Mohammed Siad Barre, which resulted in governmental collapse in 1991, the political situation in Somalia has been unstable and chaotic. Competing warlords and clan conflicts increased tension and intensified the already unstable situation in the country. Counterterrorism expert Rob Wise (2011, p. 4) argues that the Ethiopian occupation of Somalia

from 2006 to 2009 contributed to the development of al-Shabaab's ideology of an Islamic state in Somalia, while also transforming the group from a relatively small Islamic movement into the most powerful and radical group in the country. The organization, which started out as a network of only a handful of people, became a powerful actor in the Islamic Courts Union and evolved into an organization conducting local governance after being considered both an insurgency group and a terrorist organization (Jerejian, 2017).

The group has been banned by both the US and the UK as a terrorist group. The group has been fighting Somalia's government and all its allies as they propagate the western ideologies. All this is for an attempt to impose a strict interpretation of Islamic law (Pflanz, 2018). Al Shabaab's current stronghold is in Somalia though over the last few years, al-Shabaab's power and reach has weakened (Jerejian, 2017). Its influence in Somalia has reduced since the AMISOM (Africa

Union Mission for Somalia) was deployed in Somalia to prop up the Somali National Government and some of its keys ports were seized by the army such as the Kismayo port (Jerejian, 2017). Despite the current turmoil, al- Shabaab remains active and a potent threat in both Somalia and surrounding countries (Williams, 2014).

2011 saw the Kenyan army join the AMISOM group and invade Somalia in an attempt to restore order in the country (Otieno, 2015). It was also as an attempt to safeguard Kenya from attacks perpetrated by the militia group. The government realized that it needed to protect its people and therefore sent the army in mid 0ctober to go to war against the Al Shabaab militia group in Somalia (Jimris, 2016). The security operation was named 'Operation Linda Nchi' which when loosely translated would be 'Protect the country'. As a result of this, Kenya underwent retaliatory attacks from the Al Shabaab. The attacks increased at least 9 times more than attacks that had occurred 45 months prior to the security mission (Otieno, 2015).

There were some minor attacks in Nairobi's Eastleigh area as well as parts in the Nairobi central business district where bombs were reported to have been used in the attacks. Incidences of bus bombings increased and this increased the fatalities with at least 20 people being killed in the different attacks and leaving scores of wounded people (Aljazeera.com, 2018). Attacks were also reported in the North Eastern region as well as the coastal region, with the infamous Mpeketoni

attacks killing 50 people (Jerejian, 2017). Since the Operation Linda Nchi was initiated to the year 2014, there were at least 264 people who had been killed by the Al Shabaab group and 923 injured (Wafula, 2014 in Jimris, 2016).

With all these attacks on the Kenyan soil, Westgate mall attack and the Garissa university attack were the deadliest attacks ever done in the history by the militia group (Otieno, 2015). In 2013, there was the Westgate mall attack which was considered the worst terror attack in 2013 (Jimris, 2016). This incident targeted the high end population as the mall was mostly visited by the expatriates and therefore attracted both the local and international media coverage having 69 people killed and more than 175 people injured according to the government's record (Cat & Graham, 2014). This attack led to the formation of a joint committee in the parliament to investigate the incident (Voppen, 2017). The committee reported that there had established links of the terrorists to the refugee camps and advised the camps be shut down. It was then after the attack on the Garissa University College that led to the government to take the decision of closing down the camps. This attack is the deadliest in Kenyan history that left 169 mostly students dead and left a bad taste in the mouths of Kenya and the government was prompted to take up the position of shutting the camps down (Voppen, 2017).

2.3.1 Why it is that Kenya bears the brunt of the Al Shabaab Attacks?

Somalia shares a border with 3 countries namely Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti. All these countries have borne the brunt attacks of the group. Currently, all the three countries as well as Uganda and Burundi have joined forces and sent their armed forces to Somalia under the auspices of AMISOM in support of the Somali National Government in Mogadishu. Despite this, Kenya has suffered an unusually high number of attacks from the Al Shabaab than any of its neighbors. This however has had an increase since 2011 when the Kenyan army invaded Somalia in an attempt to flush out the militia group and create a security buffer zone (Cannon & Ruto Pkayla, 2017).

This trend however cannot be explained by the geographical position or proximity of Kenya to Somalia. Cannon & Ruto Pkayla (2017) gives an example of Ethiopia and its stretch that falls as the border to Somalia as being twice as long as that of Kenya's and Somalia, 1600km versus 682km (p 1). Yet the attacks in Ethiopia between 2008 and 2015 was at 5 while that of Kenya

was 272 attacks (Cannon & Fujibayashi, 2018). This in itself illustrates that the group has a keen interest in Kenya in its agenda to propagate its ideologies and spread in the world. And so with Kenya being strategically located in the world, the Al Shabaab seizes that opportunity and attacks Kenya and not any other country in the East Africa region.

Research done by Merari (1993) cites that attacks in Kenya are both logical and opportunistic. Those attacks perpetrated by the group in Kenya exploiting opportunity spaces seek to raise attention to the group's existence and viability. Kenya has a free media which can operate and give news without fear of intimidation (Jimris-Rekve, 2016). While Kenya is the East Africa hub, most of the international media operate freely in Kenya with many of their outlets such as CNC, Al Jazeera and Xihua having their base for African operations in Africa (Jacobs, 2018).

BBC have their permanent correspondents based in Nairobi as well. And with Al Shabaab's need for international attention in order to thrive and survive, Kenya becomes a target for them. The attacks by the Al Shabaab in Kenya are often of a high magnitude and gruesome which calls for both the public and the international outcry hence becoming highly publicized (Cannon & Ruto Pkayla, 2017). The more attention it gets on a wider platform, the more relevant and powerful it possibly is. And as Margret Thatcher put it, terrorism will be quenched by starving it the oxygen to survive (Jr, 2018). It is therefore prudent for every democratic nation to learn how to do this.

Kenya being one of Sub Saharan Africa's most important states and also the East Africa hub (Oxford Business Group, 2018), its international standing and status becomes its undoing. The Al Shabaab takes advantage of Kenya's popularity and makes a conscious effort of attacking it (Bruton, 2018). One of the strategies the group uses is attacking areas that are constantly visited by the international tourists such as the coastal regions of Kenya or the high end malls such as the Westgate. This is with the ever increasing need to create terror even to the western world as well.

Corruption has been a major setback to security agencies in Kenya. There has been reported cases of where security officers have colluded with the Al Shabaab militants in aiding them to get access into the Kenyan territory (Daily Nation, 2018). The militia group has been known to take advantage of the corrupt officers and have used it to their advantage. With such knowledge,

it is important for the government if Kenya to try and solve the corruption menace before it completely destroys the country.

With an ever increasing flow of refugees in the country, a domestic political turmoil and a security threat caused by the Al Shabaab. In the 1990s, the government of Kenya was more receptive towards refugees as the crowd was more manageable then (BBC News, 2018). But with the recent attacks from the Al Shabaab who make claim that Kenya should withdraw its troops from Somalia had made Kenya to use refugees as pawns in the conflict (Burns, 2010). And with Kenya being a victim to the terror attacks planned by the Al Shaabab it is now taking the security threat seriously. There has been cases of Al Shabaab recruiting Somali population in Kenya as part of their fighters and this has made Kenya more alert and suspicious of the Somali population in Kenya (BBC News, 2017).

2.4 LIFE IN THE CAMPS

Dadaab represents a protracted refugee situation that has been characterized by extreme crowding and congestion (UNHCR, 2018). It was constructed in the 1992 when Somalis began to flee Somalia after the civil war erupted. Originally, Dadaab camp was meant to accommodate a maximum of 90,000 people but currently the number is almost more than thrice that (UNHCR, 2018). Dadaab camp is the largest refugee camp in the world hosting about 245,126 people as of April 2017, with almost 97% of its population as Somalis (Un.org, 2018). It is important to note that Dadaab camp is not a single camp but made up of 5 camps namely Dagahaley, Hagadera, Ifo, Ifo II and Kambioos that form it.

With limited space to expand the camp and also with resistance from the Kenyan authorities to establish and expand the camp (Clottey, 2018), crisis unfolds in the camps. Sanitation in the camps is not something to go by the normal standards as it deteriorates as the number of refugees increases (Abdi, 2015). The camp being only a temporal sanctuary for those fleeing the Somalia civil war has now 27 years later turned out to be a city. Some of the refugees inside the camp know of no other place other than the refugee camp (Migiro, 2018). 27 years is too long for generations to live in limbo. But even with it being home to them, their freedom to move in and out of "their home" is curtailed by the government unless one obtains a special pass (Clottey,

2018). With such hopelessness, dependency sets in on the aid that comes from the aid organizations.

The camps sit in part of a semi-arid area in Kenya, just about 100 kilometers from the border of Kenya and Somalia. And so with the lack of resources due to the semi-arid conditions of the place, the poverty level of the host community compounds the situation (Lindley, 2011). Protracted refugee situations always lead to tensions between the local communities and the refugees (Loescher & Milner, 2005). The area being semi-arid leads to fight over the already limited resources. The local communities always behold the refugees as a privileged group as they do not have to work to get food. Most of the services such as health, education and sanitary amenities are done freely. With them seeing vehicles transporting goods to the camps for the refugees creates resentment ("Kenya: Faith in a Protracted Refugee Crises", 2018). And so with this, security concerns become a major concern due to the tension that is between the local communities and the refugees.

Protracted refugee populations are more often viewed as an element in continuing conflict and instability (Loescher, 2008). According to most states, they view such refugee situations as one that bring economic development to a halt. With constant conflicts, they then are looked at as a source of security instability or threat to the host country which in turn translates to a regional and internal instability (Loescher & Milner, 2005). There has been security concerns about militarization of refugees in the camps as they are viewed as a vulnerable group ready to get out from the misery that they are living in (Milner, 2009). I will look at the different literature on such conditions in my literature review section. But my understanding of the whole issue would be that the states need to come up and draw new strategies on how to deal with such scenarios.

2.5 WHO MANAGES THE CAMPS?

The mandate of the international community in the refugee crisis is always to protect refugees as they victims of insecurity (Edwards, 2009). And this mandate is given to the United Nations for High Commissions for Refugees (UNHCR) internationally. But while UNHCR is mandated to manage the refugee populations, the international community has a responsibility in ensuring that they have the political goodwill to end conflicts so as to avoid protracted situations like that of refugees in Dadaab.

The management of the refugee camps in Kenya was delegated to the UNHCR and the department of the Refugee Affairs by the government of Kenya. But even with the management being under the government of Kenya, the state has failed to provide security to the refugees (Kirui & Mwaruvie, 2012). It has instead neglected them to live close to the border of the conflicted countries where they are running from. Areas which are prone to conflicts caused by illegal immigrants from neighboring countries, drought etc. The proximity of the camps to the conflict infested areas is an invitation to trickle down over the borders (Burns, 2010). And with the growing concern of insecurity caused by the Al Shabaab, the Kenyan government has given directives on the closure of the Dadaab camp. The government has backed its decision by stating that the most effective way to restoring security in Kenya is by closing down the camps as they have reasons to believe that the camp is being used by the Al Shabaab militants to recruit people into the group.

And while the country has accepted to offer a place of refuge for the refugees, it should be clear that camps were only a temporary place for the refugees to live before a solution was found. According to the UNHCR ("What is a Refugee Camp? Definition and Statistics | USA for UNHCR", 2018) 'a refugee camp is intended as a temporary accommodation for people who have been forced to flee their home because of violence and persecution'. UNHCR claims that the establishment of refugee camps must only be a last resort. A solution that maintains and encourages self-reliance of the refugees is always preferable (UNHCR, 2018). Nonetheless, camps are always the first choice to manage a "refugee crisis". But again, it is only logical that humanitarian help would be manageable and conducted in an efficient way if people were concentrated in one area (Ciisa-Salwe, 1996).

It has also been argued that the international community has stuck to "solutions"- reintegration, resettlement and repatriation, which will end the refugee situation and has refused to look at other options (Goodwin-Gill, 2008). This was just politicization of refugee problems in Africa during the 1980s. This has led to devastating consequences for the refugees as these methods no longer proves adequate (Darling, 2009). There are no compelling political or ideological reasons for Western states to resettle large numbers of refugees from Africa. Moreover, as a result of diminishing international support for long-staying refugee populations, local settlement began to

be perceived by most African host governments as politically and economically infeasible (Mogire, 2009).

It is also noted that the international community response to refugees has focused from the protracted refugee situations to ones that they consider high profile emergency situations (Loescher, 2015). This has led to the diversion of funds from drawn out crises to the emerging ones. For example, in 2013 the UK public donated $ 20M in the first 24 hours after an emergency in the Philippines. And in the same year, UNHCR received $36.5M to support its operations in Dadaab short of the $145M required (BBC News, 2018).

Also the international humanitarian organizations administering the camps often do so under different norms of culture, language and politics (Darling, 2009). Refugees who are facing the crisis will readily welcome any kind of help given to them and without their knowledge give consent to camp regimentation (Lindley, 2011). Once the emergency phase is over, the care and maintenance of the camps begin and this phase is met with a lot of inadequacy of the organizations to raise sufficient funds to continue administering camps beyond the emergency phase.

2.6 Conclusion

Despite Kenya being part of the AMISOM group, the Al Shabaab have made a conscious effort of attacking Kenya. This section tries to explain some of those reasons why Kenya to be specific has fallen prey to the Al Shabaab while giving the reader some background information about Kenya and the role it has played in acting as a host country to refugees. It also focuses on the refugee situation in Dadaab camp and also the living conditions which some researchers argue can make refugees susceptible to recruit by the Al Shabaab. Is it that due to the protracted situation that refugees are now a security threat? Or is it that they are now a burden to the host community?

Whether or not Kenya follows through on its threat to close the camps, the situation highlights the need to rethink how we handle this "new normal". There is need to look at the serious nature of protracted refugee situations and the consequences that it has on both the refugees and the host country. Long term solutions should be thought about to enhance the living conditions of the

refugees and also find a political will to end conflicts so as to ensure safe return of refugees during repatriation. This section also explains the role that the international community is playing in the protracted situation and the divided attention the refugees get from the international organizations. According to Hyndman (2000), argues that refugee regime has never been purely humanitarian but always with politics around it.

3. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

3.1 INTRODUCTION

In this chapter I will focus on the method used to collect data and will also describe some of the ethical considerations and limitations. The method that I chose to study this phenomenon was the qualitative research as it would give an in-depth insight into the words of the respondents (Bryman, 2012). Using this method, it helps us understand how people perceive the world that they live in.

However, the main objective of using the qualitative method is that it gives the researcher the opportunity to collect data and then build up the data on a theory or a concept (Bryman 2008, p 366). It allows us to focus on the respondents' innermost emotions where perceptions and conclusions are then drawn from. The basic assumption of this all is that the interviewer relies mostly with the respondents (Bryman, 2008). In itself, it could be a limitation. The answers given by the respondents could be untruthful or even the interviewer could put the answers to fit in to their liking. But in most cases, researches use both the primary and secondary data to verify or draw up conclusions (Flick, 2009, p. 75; Bryman, 2008, p. 521). In this research, I have used both interviewees and official documents to collect my data. More of the limitations will be discussed in the reliability and validity section.

3.2 RESEARCH DESIGN

A research design gives a framework for the data collection and analysis which guides the whole research process (Bryman, 2012). It therefore enables a researcher to make meaning of the phenomenon by being able to understand the social interactions between the phenomenon and the people. The research design which was applied in this study was the case study research design. The study was conducted within the Kenyan context to try understand how securitization works in a non-western context. A case study research attempts to investigate a phenomenon within its actual context. The whole essence of the case study is to try and explain why a certain situation unfolds in the way it does, the decisions taken, implementation and how the outcome of the whole thing. With this the researcher understands the real world case and hence able to infer the findings in different context.

The aim of this research was to find out how the Kenyan government securitized the Somali refugees by labeling them as a security threat to legitimize their action of closing down the camps. Hence, a case study approach was the best design to use. It helped the research focus on the actual events taking place in the context by examining the different actors involved in the study.

3.3 CHOICE OF LOCATION

The study area of this research was the Dadaab camp in the North Eastern region of Kenya. Unfortunately, this was not possible due to some challenges I faced as mentioned in the limitations section. I therefore considered doing the study in Eastleigh area in Nairobi which is popularly known as 'Little Mogadishu'. "Anyone would be forgiven for thinking they are right inside Somalia as they walk within Eastleigh area of Nairobi. The population is almost entirely Somali, save for a few indigenous people mingling in between" (Norwegian Council for Africa, 2008). This area hosts a large number of refugees who most of them have already integrated into the society and are now doing businesses in the area. There are also some refugees in the same area who have not yet earned the refugee status and have to be confined in the camps until registered by the UNHCR and the Refugee Affairs department. Such would constantly travel to and fro Dadaab camp and some would 'illegally' live in Eastleigh. With access to such refugees, then I would have the answers to the research questions which would be a better substitute though not equivalent alternative to the Dadaab camp.

There has been a bit of insecurity issues especially in the Eastleigh area with bombings happening in the area. On the November 2013, a bus was bombed in Eastleigh and this led to a raid in the place from the Kenyan police seeking to arrest Somali people who were labeled as sympathizers of the Al Shabaab. With such knowledge, I had to be careful while conducting my interviews lest I be labeled as a government official who had come to spy on the area. So I had to use people well known in the area to avoid suspicion during the interviews.

3.4 DATA COLLECTION INSTRUMENTS

In collection of data in this research, I use both the primary and the secondary sources (Bryman, 2008, p. 370). For the primary data, I conduct interviews among various respondents to get a variance of response from them. For the secondary data, newspaper article and search engines

have been used to find information that will back the primary data collected. Also official documents from government websites have been used to answer a research question for this study (Bryman, 2008, p. 369). This research takes a sociological approach to securitization which normally is through discourse analysis (Balzacq 2010, p 40). Most of the information will be found from interviews and newspapers. As it is a current and trending happening in Kenya, then the information required will be mostly from the newspapers and the from the interviews that I got from the interviews I conducted. Newspapers and internet sources were also part of the information collected (Bryman, 2008). Discourse analysis is the analysis of language beyond the sentence. It then translates into the understanding of how the theory, securitization theory, operates.

In collecting data, I used interviews as a tool to collect my data in the field. According to Laws (2008 in Odero, 2015) interviews offer a platform where respondents can talk about sensitive issues that they might not be able to express in a survey. The interview guide was constructed around the main and sub research questions. It would guide the respondents in addressing elements of interest in the study. This was important as it ensures some freedom for participants when answering the questions.

During the interviews, I used semi structured interviews to collect the data in the field. The guideline used in the semi structured interviews were guided by the topic to ensure that I gathered relevant information to the study. Having my interviews in a semi structured format helped me keep an open mind to new perspectives that might have been introduced by the respondents during the interviews (Laws 2008 in Odero, 2015). Information gathered would later be used to find the meaning of the study in question. Other than that, semi structured method is also an analysis that is straightforward and questions can be asked in a different way (Odero, 2015). I conducted 19 interviews with 1 government official, 2 NGO officials, 6 native Kenyans and 10 refugees.

3.5 CONDUCTING INTERVIEWS

While conducting the interviews, more emphasis was placed on the interviewees' point of view. According to Bryman 2012, their views helps us understand issues and events in a clearer way and therefore one is able to pick out what is relevant but closer to the truth (p 470). While

conducting the interviews, different issues where raised up that I did not expect to research on. As a matter of interest, I ended spending more than an hour interviewing the person just to get to know this other side of the story that was new to me. An audience must be able to understand the issue at hand for securitization theory to be applicable in the situation. In this case, all of the respondents were aware of the decision to close down the camp and also the decision by the high court that overruled the decision.

In January 2018, I conducted 19 semi structured interviews. I interviewed 10 refugees, 7 from which were from the Dadaab camp and 3 had recently acquired the refugee status. I interviewed 1 official from the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), 1 from Danish Refugee Council, 1 government official and 6 Kenyan citizens. I was invited to attend a seminar that was to be hosted in the Eastleigh area, which is infamously known as "small Mogadishu" but was later called off due to heightened insecurity caused by the elections. There was little activity from the NGOs as political instability in the country had created stagnation of activity and growth in all sectors. So with this, I had to keep pushing my interviews forward as officials were concerned about their safety in Nairobi. Interviews with the refugees in Eastleigh was a smooth one as it was easy for me to create contact due to mutual friends. The only challenging bit was having to get contact with the government officer as she kept postponing the meeting. But she finally gave me 30 minutes of her time which was really not enough as the meeting was constantly interrupted with incoming calls to her phone. One thing that I must clearly state is the fact that my side of the story as a Kenyan does not reflect in my writing and in the observations I make in this paper. Bias has been reduced after the interviews conducted and getting personal contact with the refugees.

Other than interviews, I also used information from media reports and this was crucial as it would help me understand discourses by different actors who are involved in the securitizing issue. Data gotten from the secondary information is used to enrich the study and also help me solve my second objective.

3.6 SAMPLING

In sampling, I used the purposive method to sample. Throughout the research, I used the purposive sampling methods as I needed the right people for the questions so as to get the right

data for my study. I was taken to meet the refugees and interview them specifically by my guide in Eastleigh. In the case of getting officials to talk to I opted to have the ones in the department dealing with refugees as they would only be meaningful to give data that was relevant to the study. And for the 6 people (citizens) that I interviewed, I used convenience sampling. With this kind of non-probability sampling method generalization of the findings cannot be made to the public (Bryman 2012, p 418). In qualitative research, sampling is done in a way that the data collected leads to the understanding of the phenomenon in natural settings, giving due emphasis to meanings, experiences and views of the participants (Mays & Pope, 2000 p 312).

3.7 SELECTION OF RESPONDENTS

The respondents were selected using the purposive method. While in the field, I contacted some officials who work with organizations that work in the Dadaab refugee camp. As I did not go to the camp, one of the officials recommended me to an individual in Eastleigh. I then used him as my contact and guide/translator throughout my study in that area. Despite being Kenyan, I needed someone more familiar with Eastleigh to help me in access the refugees who were from the Dadaab camp and had come to visit.

Since the assumption of this study is that the Kenyan government is labelling Somali refugees as security threat, I wanted to find out from the Somali on their views on the closure of the camps. The advantage in having to select my audience from Eastleigh was having different viewpoints considering that some of the Somalis who live there have fully integrated into the system. Most of the refugees I interviewed had the knowledge of Swahili language but where I met difficulties in language, I had a translator. To reduce bias during the interpretation, I ensured that the translator was not a refugee and had fully integrated into the system himself. For my part, I also made sure I kept the questions simple and straightforward to avoid ambiguity in the questions hence meaning being lost during translation.

I conducted 19 interviews. I conducted 19 semi structured interviews. I interviewed 10 refugees, 7 from which were from the Dadaab camp and 3 had recently acquired the refugee status. I interviewed 1 official from the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), 1 from Danish Refugee Council, 1 government official and 6 Kenyan citizens. Many respondents only agreed to be interviewed with the assurance that they would remain anonymous. The

request for anonymity was not only among Somali refugees but also staff from International Organizations. This is what I have done throughout the research. With this in mind, the data collected still holds relevance.

The data was then analyzed in a systematic way. I used the color coding system to draw out the pattern of the data analyzed. The reports, speeches and articles gotten from different media platforms were analyzed by identifying reoccurring schemes. So with this, I was able to find patterns and connections within the data. Data gotten from the interviews were also analyzed in the same way. Manually I used the color code to draw out the patterns from concepts and insights.

3.8 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

This study looks at how the government is using the Somali refugees as a scapegoat from their challenges. It is a controversial issue which has even raised debates in the international forums. It has also seen the Kenyan government being taken to court in an attempt to overthrow the decision made on the closure of Dadaab camp. When handling data, the most important task would be to protect the privacy and wellbeing of the participants.

With the matter being a sensitive one in this study, I presented a description to the respondents about my research. It is always advisable that the participants know what the research entails and what it is about. Any assumptions about this may lead to respondent bias.

Officials working with the government will not be willing to divulge information related to the same. And more of whether it is a political move. I also made sure that participation in the process of the data collection was voluntary. Most of the refugees were uncertain whether or not to participate in the interviews because of their illegal stay in the area. But with assurance that their identities would be protected then they agreed to it. At this point, informed consent was given verbally to continue with the interview. During the interview some seemed restless but I made it clear to the respondents that if they felt uncomfortable, then they were free to withdraw from the interview and that the information given earlier would not be used in the analysis of the research.

Another ethical dilemma that may arise in the field concerns compensation. It is important to clarify to the participants in the interview that no kind of compensations will be given to them. Taking the context of Eastleigh and the conditions of the refugee, it was of great importance that I clarify that I was not compensating anyone. I also had to let them know that I had no power to assist any of the refugees in the state that they were currently in.

3.9 LIMITATIONS

Credibility of all studies are increased by acknowledging limitations in the research. My main limitation was lack of doing a study in the Dadaab camp despite the fact that it is the main focus in the study. There is a requirement by the government of Kenya to acquire a license before one conducts a research in Dadaab. A body has been formed to issue licenses to both individuals and organizations seeking to go to Dadaab. I had to first apply through the body, pay a fee and then wait for the processing of the license. I applied on the 3rd of January and even up to date as I write my thesis I still haven't received a feedback from the board. With limited time in the field, I was forced to look for an alternative so that's how I ended up in Eastleigh. The advantage I got is that the refugees that I got to interview in Eastleigh were from Dadaab and had somehow gotten their way to Nairobi.

There was also the security issue. During my stay in Kenya, 2 bombings were reported by the local media of happening in the Northern Kenya. And this therefore increased security concerns about my travel to the camps. So with this, I have dwelt on studying other studies done on the camp to enlighten myself about the situation in Dadaab. Interviewing the refugees from Eastleigh has also helped me in my understanding.

The other challenge would be the sample size in some cases. Having one respondent as a government official to give information would not be as reliable. Having to interview more respondents then would increase to the richness of the data collected of the study by cross checking data from multiple sources. Cohen & Manion (2000) describe triangulation as an attempt to explain the richness and complexity of a phenomenon from different viewpoints. However, I used reports I got from media platforms to get the data that I needed. And since I am not generalizing my findings to the study, I believe the sample size will not affect the credibility of the study. Triangulation makes it possible to view things from different perspectives (Bryman

2012) and it is aimed at validating the same findings when you have triangulated the data and when you have several sources within the same study but which address different findings

Lastly, the topic being researched is a current development in Kenya. It is possible that once this research is finished, the scenario will have completely changed. Outlook on refugees is consistently evolving with lobbyists from different groups championing their views. Hence, it is difficult to come up with a conclusive report. But the main deal for this report is to find out how actors, in this case the Kenyan government, securitizes Somali refugees and uses them as a scapegoat to close down the Dadaab refugee camp.

3.10 CONCLUSION

This chapter goes through the research method used in the study. While I used the qualitative method as a suitable method, possible bias relating to selection of respondents would be possible. However, important measures were taken to ensure that misrepresentation of data during the qualitative process was reduced to the minimum.

4. LITERATURE REVIEW

4.1 INTRODUCTION

Kenya, the topic of refugee hosting has been widely covered in the public sphere, and has led to several policy decisions and court cases (Gaffey, 2016). Thus, the use of securitization theory to understand the developments in Kenya is legitimate.

The following parts of the section will dwell on the literature review of some of the key concepts in this study. In this section, I will give an overview of the securitization theory, as I will use it as a framework to analyze the case study in Kenya. This theory answers the research question of how the Kenyan government uses identity of the refugees to use them as a scapegoat of their challenges. Securitization theory provides researchers and analysts a framework to critically examine the motivations behind an act of security (Cote, 2016) and so I have opted to use it in this study. I will then focus on three different sections looking at the different literature studying the concepts. The first section will be literature on growing trends in securitizing refugees in different parts of the world and then how labels are constructed. It is now a common thing for refugees to be securitized and labeled as a threat to national security. I will also look at how protracted refugee situation is related to security; as in the case of refugees living in Dadaab camps have been through that phase. The last focus of this section will be literature focusing on the international refugee regime.

4.2 OVERVIEW OF THE THEORY

Securitization theory was developed by the Copenhagen School of Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, Jaap de Wilde and others in Copenhagen in the 1990s. The theory challenges the traditional approaches to security in IR (Buzan et al, 1998). It brought in a new perspective after much debate of whether security was objective or subjective (Cote, 2016). It asserts that issues are not essentially threatening in themselves rather it is by referring to them as security issues that they become security problems (Wæver, 1995). And as Taureck (2006) puts it, securitization is a political choice of the actor. The Copenhagen School came up with the theory that security was an act of speech, whether the threat existed or not. But it is how certain issues can be socially constructed as a threat in the society. The meaning of security language may not be the true representation of the reality but a potential to 'create one' (Stritzel, 2007).

The goal of securitization theory is to "capture a distinct social phenomenon, namely how some public problem becomes a security issue" (Balzacq 2010: 40). As a theory, securitization looks beyond the urgency that authorities sell to their audience and asks why a particular issue becomes securitized and not another. Authorities frame security threats in such a way that to do nothing would be neglectful to their duties.

Coming out of the IR tradition, securitization theory seeks to explain how issues are easily used in the political arena as issues that need urgent or undemocratic response (Buzan et al, 1998). However, Cote (2016) argues that the word 'act' in itself is problematic. Normally issues that are labelled as 'national security' normally emerge after a period of time. He argues that it is more of a process than an act. They are constructed overtime and of course with a group of people whose decision favor them (Taureck, 2006). And with this discourses are then created and labelling is made known to the audience.

For states to securitize there must be, or at the very least perceived to be, threats. There are various intimidations, which have been constructed and framed as being threatening to the state, and its citizens (Wæver, 1995). Certain questions need to be asked in order to clearly identify the identity of the object. These would include security for whom? For what? And by whom? With the answers that follow, reveal that certain issue areas become securitized and whether it is legitimate (Stritzel, 2007). Agents of the state have the ability of creating issues into the sphere of security by stating so (Wæver 1995 p, 56). This ability legitimizes certain actions that are considered politics as a necessity, due to its impending 'threat'.

The idea of speech act has a long history in philosophy and it states that by saying something, something is done. As Balzacq (2005) puts it, power is derived from using 'appropriate' words in conformity with established rules governing speech acts. The actors frame an issue and attempt to convince an audience to lift the issue above politics (Stritzel, 2007). By saying the words, something is done. Like betting, giving a promise, naming a ship. (Buzan et al 1998, p 26). Speech act actually constitutes reality in turn it triggers certain reactions. Hence threats are not just threats by nature but are constructed as threats through language. This comes in by how someone labels it (Wæver 1995, p55). To convince an audience to take extraordinary measures,

the securitizing actor must draw attention and often exaggerate the urgency and level of the threat.

Securitization happens when the audience agrees that an urgent and extraordinary move must take action. Actions are often legitimized under the language of "urgency" and "existential threats" and measures taken thereof would often be deemed as undemocratic in normal situations. Wæver (2015) the theory was made to protect politics against the disproportionate power by handing the success and failure of securitization to the audiences rather than the actor. Wæver voiced his preference for "desecuritization". This would be a return to normal politics.

In short, by labeling something as 'security', an issue is dramatized as an issue of supreme priority. One can therefore think of securitization as the process through which non politicized (issues are not talked about) or politicized (issues are publicly debated) issues are elevated to security issues that need to be dealt with urgency, and that legitimate the bypassing of public debate and democratic procedures. Because securitization enables emergency measures outside democratic control, Wæver (2000) generally opts for desecuritization, rather than securitization, as the preferable mode of problem solving.

This research will look at the societal security as its object is an identity. The theory challenges the traditional approaches to security that overly focus on security of state rather than on other referent objects. Adopting the framework entails challenging hegemonic ideas about the universality and objectivity of security and as Taureck (2006) argues it emphasizes ways in which knowledge is not merely out there but driven by interests. Security issue is treated not as a result of its objective qualities but rather as a result of what different people subjectively identify as security threats (Wæver 1995, p 56; Buzan et al 1998, p 29). It is therefore safe to say that this theory is not a neutral one but rather a political one.

4.3 GROWING TRENDS IN SECURITIZATION

Securitization of refugees and immigrants has been a growing trend in the current world all with the intention to seclude a certain type of people (Gerard, 2014). Though securitization of refugees started a while back after migration increased. Globalization has been a factor that has

led to the increase in migration (Gerard, 2014) leading to securitization. Presently, greater awareness of opportunities have been increased due to the enhanced networks. Technology has made it easier (Koser 2007) for people to travel to and fro in search of opportunities thus creating labor (Dauvergne, 2008). With this globalization has become the one thing that has influenced people to migrate (Lowry 2002, p 29). But Koser (2007) argues that there has been irregular migration due to policies that have been put in place by different governments in the world (p 188). Normally refugees and immigrants will be labeled as a threat to the 'national security' of the host country (Wæver 1995, p 56). Securitization processes construct and then marginalize certain groups as threatening and undesirable (Rygiel, 2008). Rygiel argues that securitization reveals the contested nature of citizenship as the marginalized groups are mostly the refugees, asylum seekers, immigrants, people of color etc. Huysmans' treatment of immigration illustrates how political objectives are inherent within securitization (Huysman, 2006). The governmental administration of immigration policy is superficially tantamount to border control; i.e. the identification and exclusion of criminals, terrorists, agents of hostile countries, and persons otherwise determined by law to be unwelcome (p42). This construction of security focuses on specific types of threats and threatening actors, without explicitly examining what is being secured. As a consequence, the focus is on exclusion, which is necessarily reactive and instrumental.

At the end of cold war national borders became irrelevant (Edwards 2009, p 770). However in the same breath, Edward (2009) notes that there has been conscious effort in the north to stop migration of individuals especially the asylum seekers from the south. It is however interesting to note that the cold war was part of the reason why the number of refugees increased. As noted by Edwards (2009), migration is happening from the global south to the north mostly because of the available opportunities and resources available in the north. And so with this, there has been conscious effort put by countries in the north to stop migration from individuals in the south (Edwards 2009, p 770).

In the aftermath of the 9/11 attack on the US, many countries have come up with policies that secure their borders and also restrict migrants from countries that are deemed as a security threat to others. Movements have however been formed to challenge the notions based on securitization (Travis, 2015). Movements such as 'No one is Illegal' and 'No Border movements' came up after Trump, US president, banned 7 Muslim country from entering the united States. According to a news report done by BBC News 2016, Trump claimed that immigrants from the 7 countries were a threat to the national security and it was now mandatory to 'check who comes in the country'. As Edward puts it, refugees are increasingly viewed as criminals, a threat to the national security and are often labelled as terrorists (p 775). Due to the securitization of immigration, state labels such individuals as threats instead of coming to their aid as victims of insecurity (Edwards 2009, p 784). As Gerard (2014) argues, security invocation has been key to legitimize use of force and has opened doors for states to take special powers and handle 'existential threats' (Buzan et al 1998, p 21). Muller (2004, p 280) states that identity management has enhanced securitization which by doing so has had certain groups constructed as a threat to the social body of the state.

Global migration numbers continue to rise and so is the policies restricting a certain group of people. According to the United Nations, it estimates that an estimated 258 million people live outside the country of their birth. This is an increase of 49% since 2000 (Un.org, 2018). The increase in the migration has been credited to the free movement of goods and services (Gerard, 2014) but restricts movement of migrant workers (Helleineir 2013, p 1508). Policies against movement especially for the global south gets stricter by the day. Stricter measures are developed to prevent workers from the global south to move to the north as they would pose health and safety risk (Travis, 2015). While those travelers from the north are highly prejudiced on the basis of race and economic status, as tourists and business travelers from developed countries are granted easy access (Helleineir 2013, p 1509).

In securitizing, undemocratic or unethical move can be taken by an actor to try and eliminate the 'threat' (Buzan et al 1998, p 21). And so with the refugees, they can be sent away from the host countries back to their homes where they are at a risk of threat of life (Edwards 2009, p 791).

This is against the non-refoulement principle. Study in literature indicates that protection of the refugees have been neglected all in the name of ensuring that the claim of asylum is true and that they are not a security threat themselves (Pratt 2005, p 2). The refugee system in the cold war was used as a war to make the US ideologies supreme against those of the Soviet Union (Lowry 2002, p 31).Now the discourse of security has evolved to criminalize refugees which is as a result of north south global divide, history of colonialism and also as a means to protect the status quo of the dominant western culture.

With the current refugee situation happening in Kenya, changes in policies have been noted (Lindley, 2011). A Lindley notes, there has been a change in the government policy from the previous one which had an open and laissez-faire approach towards refugees. But literature show that the government had such policies from when it accepted refugees (Pini, 2008). Pini notes that Kenya gave a condition for hosting the refugees was to have them in one place. And now with the current government, refugees are being sent home.

4.4 HOW ARE REFUGEES SECURITIZED

Refugees are often in need of protection as they are a group of people who have been forced from home by conflict and persecution (Un.org, 2018). The world is witnessing the highest levels of displacement on record. An estimated 65.6 million people have been forced out from their homes due to conflict in 2016 and among them are nearly 22.5 million refugees (Un.org, 2018). The UN Convention on the Rights of Migrants indicates that a migrant is an individual who makes a conscious choice to leave his country of origin to seek better prospects. This is expressed more candidly by Al-Jazeera a leading news broadcasting company that points out that: "The use of terminology is of critical importance in shaping our perceptions, attitudes and behaviors. Calling those who flee from persecution, inhumane treatment, torture, violence and war as "migrants" may have irreparable consequences on government policies and the lives of thousands of actual refugees (Al-Jazeera 2015).

Refugees have always been viewed as victims of insecurity (Edwards, 2009; Odero, 2015) but as Odero (2015) explains the labeling in refugee policy is related to short term political agenda to provide simple categorization. Zetter (1991) describes labeling as the definition of people who

are seen as objects of policy. In the Kenyan case, refugees have been used as an object to legitimize the closure of the camps and also change the refugee policies in the country. Jenkins (1994, p 197) says that categories put on people are influential to create and also reproduce social identities. The literature puts it that the impact of such categorization depends on the consequences of the cognitive internalization (p 7) and also the capacity of actors to make their 'identification on others count' (p 7). Gupte and Mehta (2007, p 67) argues that the top down labelling trend delivers need to intervene which translates to physical protection at best. The literature argues that labeling breeds violence because labeling excludes and marginalizes. As Rygiel (2008) puts it, labeling is done to a particular group of people whose citizenship in the country is highly contested. Furthermore when someone is socially excluded they are then positioned to enact the role that has been assigned to them by the label (Gupte & Mehta, 2007).If this is anything to go by, then probably the closure of the camps would be legitimate. But in the instance where Somali refugees have been labeled as a threat to national security in Kenya yet they are victims of insecurity leaves a lot to be researched on. As Jenkins (1994, p 197) puts it, labels are influential in creating and reproducing social identities. But as Horst (2006, p 15) argues 'the assumed identity of refugees creates and imposes an institutional dependency therefore to become a refugee is to accept the passive role of a recipient'.

This kind of instrumental language, when combined with representations of refugees as "unfortunate people" who are a "burden" to those countries in which they seek refuge, who pose a "danger of social and political unrest" and a threat to ethnic harmony, constructs the refugee as far more (or less, depending on one's perspective) than an individual lacking legal status and finding him/herself outside of his/her country of origin (Odero, 2015).

4.5 RELATION BETWEEN PROTRACTED REFUGEE SITUATION AND SECURITY

According to the UNHCR, protracted refugee situation is defined as 'one in which refugees find themselves in a long lasting and intractable state of limbo. Their lives may not be at risk but their basic rights and essential economic, social and psychological needs remain unfulfilled after years in exile. A refugee in this situation is often unable to break free from enforced reliance on external assistance' (UNHCR, 2008). Almost two thirds of the world's refugees are trapped in protracted refugee situations (Loecher & Milner, 2005). Such situations are often characterized

by long periods of exile which would occur in different set ups like camps, rural settlements and urban centers. In finding out the relationship between protracted refugee situation and security, the US has viewed international security policy through the prism of 'failing states' (Loescher & Milner 2005, p 7). However, Newman (2007) argues that terrorist groups have emerged from and operated within countries which haves strong stable states and a variety of systems of government.

Loescher & Milner (2005) views that long term refugee population are a critical element in on going conflict and instability (p 8). An example of this would be the Rwandese refugees who fled Rwanda to Uganda since the 1960s and came back as an organized group that later sparked the civil war that was the cause for the infamous genocide in Rwanda. This tension erupted into the infamous genocide that had over 500,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus killed (Schall, 2013). An article done by the local newspaper in Kenya, Daily Nation, compared Dadaab to a camp in Goma, Congo. It stated that the refugee camp was probably breeding the militia group; what a better way for the Al Shaabab to get into Kenya other than in the name of refugees (Daily Nation, 2018).

Recurring refugee flows generate instability in neighboring countries and triggers interventions by host states and regional actors. The literature also views refugee camps as bases for armed groups that are sources to insurgency, resistance and terrorists' movements (Loescher & Milner 2005, p 8). Militarization of refugee camps creates problem for the host country. Security concerns such as arms trafficking, drug smuggling, trafficking in women and children, and the recruitment of child soldiers and mercenaries arise in camps hosting long-term refugees. In Dadaab camps during the 1990s, these camps were renowned as the most violent in the world, with rape, murder and armed robbery almost daily occurrences. (Crisp, 2000). The reason why refugees in such situations are vulnerable is because they have developed a dependency attitude which makes them susceptible to any kind of influence (Horst, 2006). In a study done by Abdi (2005), the study shows that refugees have a diminished self-esteem due to prolonged encampment. And as Jacobsen (2003) puts it, refugees would be able to overcome the tension

and conflict in their host communities if they were allowed to move freely and work to pursue productive lives.

While viewing security in the local scenario, Loescher & Milner (2005) state that the prolongation of refugee crisis may also have indirect security implications. Tensions between refugees and the local population often arise as refugees are perceived to receive preferential treatment (Abdi, 2005). Local populations in refugee-populated areas feel aggrieved that refugees receive such basic services as health care and primary education while their own access to these basic services has been cut as a consequence of economic liberalization (Loescher, 2008). Even though the voluntary organizations are not mandated to serve Kenyans, there has to be a way in the future to balance this in as it is normal for the local community to feel neglected when they see refugees being offered their basic needs while they have to struggle to get theirs. In instances where refugees have been allowed to engage in the local economy, it has been found that refugees can have a positive impact on the economy (Odero, 2015).

According to the UNHCR, it has noted that over time states have become increasingly concerned about the movement of people within the national boarders and both in the global north and south have come to see the mass arrival and prolonged presence of refugees as a security concern (Betts et al, 2008). And so with the case of Nairobi, many in the government perceive the Somali refugee population as a security threat therefore coming up with a policy to restrain them in isolated refugee camps (Kagwanja & Juma, 2008). This policy was enacted after the perception was reinforced after reported links were found between the residents of Dadaab camps and the terrorist attacks in Kenya in 1998 and 2002 (Steiner, Gibney & Loescher, 2013).

4.6 INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE REGIME

Since the terror attack of 9/11, there has been a growing trend among the western countries to frame refugees as national threat (Saunders, 2014; Helleineir, 2013). And by doing so, they have now come up with strict measures in order to control migration (Edwards, 2009). Borders and camps have been problematized as 'spaces of exception' where power of the sovereign is manifested in excluding those who do not belong (Saunders, 2014). Such policies are considered to be betrayals to the humanitarian obligation of the refugee regime that is noted in the Refugee

Convention. Hyndman & Mountz (2008) argue that the policies that are being created demonstrate a paradigm shift from one of humanitarian obligation to that one that prioritizes the protection of national security interests. Bett (2004) argues that after the cold war, refugees are increasingly seen as a burden rather than assets. However, many scholars will agree that the refugee regime has never been purely humanitarian (Hyndman, 2000; Goodwin-Gill, 2008) and that there has always been politics around the refugee regime.

Throughout the League of Nations period, we see qualifications of asylum seekers get attached to the issuance of identity certificate. This was after much lobby from the humanitarian organizations that work to help the refugees (Glynn in Hyndman & Mountz, 2008). This document is intended to enable refugees travel in search of work, in a way that the issue of the document will not infringe the right of the state in supervising and controlling foreigners (Saunders, 2014). Article 1 of the Refugee Convention contains a formal recognition of the inherent role of political and social forces in refugee status but it does not guarantee the refugee the right to a political existence in the place where they settle. The development of the refugee regime in the inter war period reveals a fundamental conflict as its heart between actors who created it and those who work within it (aid workers etc.). The conflict is that those who instituted the regime saw the problem as the refugees themselves; whereas those who worked within attempted to solve. As Saunders (2014) puts it the imbalance in the Convention of the rights granted to refugees can be interpreted as an example of the conflict between humanitarian actors lobbying for rights and protections for refugees, and States interested primarily in shifting the burden of the refugee*s*.

The logic of the international refugee regime was developed according to the urgent need of the sovereign states to their concern for national security. Having the supreme decision to decide who can cross its borders and only be bound by obligations that will benefit them. An example would be an Italian representative wanted to remove a section where a refugee can appeal a decision if a state expels them from their country (United Nations Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons, 1951).

It is important to note that states founded UNHCR which lacks the mechanism to enforce provisions of the Refugee convention. Though UNHCR has been able to make important decision about refugees, it still an arm of a refugee regime oriented more towards shifting the burden of refugees from states onto other actors than towards providing real solutions for refugee themselves.

4.7 LIMITATIONS

The theory of securitization developed by the Copenhagen School is a theory that has stood out as a different approach towards the traditional realism theory in IR. It has received equal criticism as much as praise. But in this section, I will only dwell on two areas of the criticisms. One is the contextualization of the theory to situations that apply outside the western countries and two is the construction of security.

The theory has constantly been portrayed as a European contribution to debates over the social construction of security. Sheikh (2018) observes that securitization theory has from the beginning pointed at the audience as the filter between the speech act and the actors. Such a move would perhaps be one of the indicators of the Western Europe characteristics of a democratic state that is not applicable everywhere. Šulović (2010) help explain why some securitizing moves are more likely to be accepted by the audience than the other. In the context of this study, Kenya is not entirely democratic and therefore leaving the decision wholly to the audience to come up with the decision would be more than fictitious. Rita Floyd (2016) has argued that the theory should skip the idea of using the audience as is not applicable to all places. But instead measure the success of the securitization move by whether the move has been followed by a concrete action by the securitizing actor.

How do we know that we are dealing with a security threat? Securitization theory provides an answer though incomplete as it rules out that the meaning of security can vary contextually (Charrett, 2009). Contextual factors help explain why some securitizing moves are accepted by some audiences (Šulović 2010) though they are not conceptualized as constitutes of speech acts which is not in line with the claim that security is a social construction. There is tension between understanding securitization as a productive process by focusing on per the formative power of

the speech act, and as a constructed process by claiming that security is inter-subjectively constituted. This tension gave rise to critique by the so-called Second Generation of securitization analysts who argue that securitization cannot be properly understood outside historical and cultural context in which security discourse takes place. Thus, the very meaning of security is contextual. Finally, the framework of securitization is narrow in the sense that the nature of the act is defined solely in terms of the designation of threats to security (McDonald, 2008: 564). This claim is based on a commitment to the idea that security is constituted in oppositional terms: by designating that which it is not or that from which it needs preservation or protection (Weaver, 1995: 56). Sometimes it is more effective if security is conceptualized in terms of normative goals that should be achieved or expression of the core values that are in need of being protected, than if it is articulated only in terms of "from what and from whom it needs protection". Thus, seeing security as something negative per se does not represent a logical imperative anymore.

5. FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

5.1 HOW SECURITY DISCOURSE WAS ESTABLISHED IN KENYA

Kenya has always been ranking among one of the highest ranking countries affected by terrorism (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2014). Targeted for a long time, Kenya now faces constant threat from the Al Shabaab that has threatened the national security of the country (Lindley, 2011). And so the response of the government to tackle the problem has been to put stringent measures on movements of refugees (Horst, 2006) and eventually closing down the refugee camps. I will discuss how security discourse has been established through securitizing Somali refugees and how government officials are using the narrative of security to construct the discourse in which Somali refugees are viewed as security threat. According to Wæver (1998), an object is made to be a 'security issue' when said so. Therefore speeches have to be made to establish the discourse. This study finds evidence of labelling of Somali refugees though the Kenyan president, Uhuru Kenyatta and other government officials have rejected such claims on numerous occasions. The study also links not only speeches but actions taken by the government against the Somali refugees in the name of maintaining security. This section will dwell on how security discourse has been established over time.

The discourse of security has been constructed over a long time. One of the refugees I interviewed, 26 year-old-male stated that they were not taken back by the government's decision to close down the camp. "*We saw this coming. We have been receiving bad treatment from the government but now we don't know where to go because Somalia is not safe for anybody*". Securitization of refugees started a while back even before the government came to a decision to close down the Dadaab refugee camp. One of the refugees I interviewed, a 42 year-old lady narrated how the government wanted to get rid of the Somali refugees during the Usalama watch in Eastleigh. "I *remember how the police would come and arrest Somalis here and return them to Dadaab using force; I don't think it could get worse than that".* Most of the refugee respondents expected a similar operation to the Usalama Watch. Sentiments from the respondents are in line with a news article written by a Somali journalist Hujale (2016), where most of the refugees who were interviewed at that time felt the same. Many believe the authorities have long been trying to make life more difficult as a way to encourage refugees to

return home. In the article, Hujale explains that there had been up to 50% cuts to food rations, healthcare had deteriorated, and the shelters in this isolated arid region were still in poor conditions.

However, the closure of the camp came as a surprise to many as the government made the decision without consulting other involved stakeholders. The two NGO officials I interviewed shared similar sentiments of how the decision came as a surprise to them as well. Though it was not the first time for the government to state that it was closing down the camp, they gave a deadline and went ahead to disband the Department of Refugee Affairs to show the severity of the decision (Joseph, 2018).

Since the refugees came into Kenya, the government gave a condition that in order for camps to be established in Kenya, they had be within its borders (Pini, 2008). The government stated that if Kenya is to continue hosting the refugee population in Kenya then they must be in one location (Pini, 2008). This trend though adopted by the current government was placed in President's Moi regime (Voppen, 2017). In 1997, President Moi ordered for a mass arrest of refugees and foreigners in urban areas that saw many of them forcefully sent to the refugee camps (Veridame 1999). This was after Moi's concern that 'foreign spies and criminals masquerading as refugees had invaded Nairobi using business as a cover up for their activities (The East African 22 July 1997 in Veridame 1999 p, 71).

By developing such a policy, it was intended to keep track of the refugees' movement. Having an interview with the government official they stated that the policy was to have refugees in one place for easier management. If a refugee was to move outside the camp, they needed a special pass from the UNHCR office with a government stamp on it to better monitor their movement. Though this is against the 1951 Refugee Convention that states that refugees have the right to freely move within their host country (Weis & Cambridge University, 1995).

With the Kenyan army joining the African Union Mission to Somali (AMISOM) to fight the Al Shabaab saw an increase in the number of attacks carried out by the Al Shabaab in Kenya

(Jimris-rekve, 2016). These attacks caused the government to react and one of the response was the Usalama Watch. This is where a repeat of the scenario was seen in 2014 where the then minister for Interior, Ole Lenku gave a statement saying that;

"*…due to emergency security challenges all refugees residing outside the designated refugee camps of Kakuma and Dadaab are hereby directed to return to their respective camps with immediate effect. There are no other designated refugee camps outside these areas. Any refugee found flouting this directive will be dealt with in accordance with the law*" (quoted in Al-Jazeera 2014).

And with this directive saw mass arrest and detention of Somali refugees in the urban areas, Eastleigh area during the Usalama Watch. Usalama watch, meaning security in Swahili, as Amnesty International 2014) argues saw the Somali community being used as scapegoats in the counter terrorism operation. This watch can be seen as one of those struggles between the Somali community and the Kenyan state (Balakian 2016). But the whole operation was publicly condoned with one Kenyan interviewee reiterating saying, "*At least the government was responding to the attacks that the public was having to face almost daily. Though people died during the attacks, we were able to move freely again without fear of attacks from those Somalis*". Due to the recurring nature of the terror attacks in Kenya, there was always the concern of security in Kenya. Even a managing editor of a leading newspaper in Kenya wrote as quoted in Bruzzone (2014), "*…Somali has a big dream to blow us up…let's start shooting*". Such comments show how the narrative of Somali refugees as a security threat was being established in Kenya.

The Usalama watch operation began early April 2014 (Amnesty International, 2014) after 2 series of attacks happened in Kenya. One was a series of bombings in Eastleigh and the Mpeketoni attacks, town in Lamu, which had more than 60 people killed (Daily Nation, 2018). The Kenyan authorities rounded up Somalis and forcibly relocated them to the refugee camps in the Northern Kenya. The local media reported that the exercise was mainly used to remove any undocumented migrants from a community that had been portrayed as 'terrorists' by both the state and other Kenyans (Kerrow, 2018). An officer from one of the NGOs that I got to interview

stated that the government harassed and detained innocent Somali people who were legally residents in Kenya but were mistaken due to their physical appearance. On probing the government official on whether it is intentional for the operations to target the Somalis, stated, "*You know Kenya will always be a target for the Al Shabaab terror group and we all know these Somalis will always be the first catch for the Al Shabaab as an easy target for recruit. So to be on the safe side, we would rather confine them in one place to minimize the number of terror attacks in the country*".

However this may be seen as a misrepresentation as according to Jerejian (2017) terrorists have now moved from using the Somali populations as their target for recruit to the local Kenyan youth who are vulnerable due to lack of employment and marginalization.

In September 2013, there was an attack in one of the high end malls in Nairobi by the Al Shabaab group where 67 people died. The Westgate Mall attack was described as among the worst act of terror in 2013. After the attack, a joint committee was formed to investigate circumstances under which led to the attack (Williams, 2014). One of the recommendations that was drawn was to have both the Kakuma and the Dadaab refugee camps shut down and send refugees back to their original countries. How the government later reversed its decision of closing down Kakuma camp can be argued how it further spreads the narrative of Somali refugees as threat to the national security in Kenya. The attack on Garissa University College in April 2015 however attracted the attention of the government. In this attack, 147 people who were mostly students were killed. After the attack, links were traced to the Dadaab camp and the Deputy President gave a statement stating, "*We must secure Kenya at whatever costs even if it means losing business with Somalia*" (Monitor, 2018). It was shortly after this that a decision to close the refugee camps was made. The decision to shut down the camps also raise issues on how Somali refugees are used as scapegoats and labeled as security threats. Initially, the recommendation from the Joint committee was to shut down both the Kakuma and the Dadaab camps (Williams, 2014). However, the government later revised its decision and decided to only close the Dadaab camp. While speaking to a Somali refugee in Eastleigh on her outlook toward the decision, she said, "*I am not surprised with the decision as the government has always*

viewed us as a part of the Al Shabaab. However, there is no way we can go back to Somalia since there is still war". Another refugee said that they understand where the government was coming from with the decision to close down the camp but insisted that not all Somalis are part of the Al Shabaab group. An Ngo official stated that, "*the decision to close down the camp can be regarded as a policy that is being implemented to deal with insecurity that has allegedly been brought about by the Somali refugees in the country*".

During the World Humanitarian Summit in Istanbul, Turkey on 23rd May 2016, the deputy president of Kenya, William Ruto, stated that for the last 2 years the refugee camp has posed an existential threat to Kenya (Yackley, 2016). He claimed that the Dadaab refugee camps "*are a center for radicalization*" (Yackley, 2016). There has always been statements made by government officials making links between the deteriorating security situation in Kenya and the refugee hosting. The principal secretary in the Ministry of interior communicated the decision to close down the camps through a statement on the May 6th 2016 saying, "*Kenya, having taken into consideration its national security interests, has decided that hosting of refugees has come to an end*" (Daily Nation, 2016). The decision was later overthrown by the court as it was against the Refugee Convention principle of non-refoulement (BBC News, 2018). It was 6 months later that the then Interior minister, Joseph Nkaisery said that the closure had been postponed by 6 months but it would still be followed. But he also acknowledged that the situation in Somalia was still not stable yet.

During a 3 day visit to the northern region of Kenya, the president Uhuru stated that, "As Kenyans we have decided that the visitors we have been hosting for more than 23 years have to be helped to return to their country where they can continue with their lives" (Hadjir, 2018). With a twist to this, he added and said that Kenyans still recognized them as their brothers and sisters and that they shall continue to do business with them. Taking a softer stance on refugees, President Uhuru in a speech conveyed during the Intergovernmental Agency for Development (IGAD) in March 2017 said. "We believe that Somali refugees are entitled to a dignified life" (GoK, 2017). In a press conference, Uhuru stated that Kenya's policy and efforts was to hasten the repatriation and resettlement of the refugees (GoK, 2017). Presenting the closure of the

camps as a positive development for Somali refugees by the government officials should not be confused as change of decision. According to Balzacq 2010, he argues that the success of securitization is highly contingent upon the actor's ability to identify with the audiences feelings, needs and interests (p 9). And so with this kind of approach from the government might be a well thought move to target and reach a larger audience. Their narratives are tailored to suit the audiences they get as president and foreign affairs minister have the international audience while the interior ministry has the local audience. Amina Mohamed who was the then foreign affairs minister urged the international community to join hands in meeting the needs of refugees which would be to regain human dignity by helping in the repatriation process (Migiro, 2018).

Why target Somali refugees would be the question many would ask. Initially, the government was supposed to shut down all the refugee camp in the country according to a statement that was given by the principal secretary of the ministry of interior, Kibicho in May 2016 (Daily Nation, 2016). However, a statement followed after the announcements weeks later and clarified that it was only the Dadaab camp that was to be closed down and not Kakuma camp. Reasons given to this decision was that the government had established terror links to the Dadaab camp and that Kakuma had no serious security concerns (Zadock, 2018). As explained earlier in the background information, Dadaab's population by 97% is the Somali refugees and the rest would be Sudanese and Ethiopian refugees while Kakuma camp mainly hosts South Sudanese refugees and then the smaller percentage would be other nationalities. A statement given by Nkaisery who was the minister of the Interior ministry, said that that they had evidence that several attacks including the Westgate mall attack and Garissa University College attack were planned and deployed from the Dadaab camp (Gaffey, 2016).

During the security operation, Usalama Watch, the main focus or target was the Somalis and the police arrested anyone who had the physical appearance of one (Daily Nation, 2018). It was based on appearance where a Somali would be assumed to be tall, thin and fair skinned and even the texture of their hair greatly tells them apart from other people (Odero, 2015). During the Usalama watch, some right activists demonstrated the actions from the government stating that it

was quite evident that the target was the Somali refugees who the government would do anything to dispose them (Amnesty International, 2014).

The ruling made by the High court confirms that it is not the presence of the camps but rather the Somali group to be specific. The reading stated in part,

"…*the government's decision specifically targeting Somali refugees is an act of group persecution, illegal, discriminatory and therefore unconstitutional*" (High Court of Kenya, 2016 p 35).

It is therefore evident that the government of Kenya has been securitizing Somali refugees both in speech and in act. Somali refugees have been labeled time and again as security threat to the national security of the host country but it is quite evident that the government has even gone to the extent of sending them back to their country through the policies they have put in place.

5.2 AUDIENCE

In securitization theory, the concept of securitizing the audience is critiqued for being undertheorized and underdeveloped (Balzacq et al 2016, p 149). As a result, securitization scholars have tried to answer many questions surrounding the topic of audience acceptance, but criteria for what constitutes audience acceptance nevertheless remain vague (Lamer, 2018). In the Copenhagen school, the audience is defined as 'those the securitizing act attempts to convince to accept exceptional procedures because of the specific security nature of some issues (Buzan et al 1998, p 41). Thus the audience is depicted as an agent in the act of securitization. But even though the concept is underdeveloped, the role of audience cannot be simply rejected. The vagueness on audience in literature underlines the importance to further explain the role of the audience within the theory (Cote 2016, p 544).

The role of the audience goes beyond just agreeing to the securitization move but can also provide support. An empowering audience must agree with the claims being put forth by the actor (Balzacq 2010 p, 9). The agreement comes in two forms, formal and moral support. Formal support can be obtained from formal institutions while moral support from the general public (Voppen, 2017). Moral support is not sufficient for the actor that is why the formal institutions support is needed to back it up. For example, where a governing body passes a legislation that

legitimizes the action of the actor. In this thesis I will look at the audiences in the Kenyan public and since audiences does not necessarily mean the general public in a democracy (Cote 2016 p, 548), I will therefore look at different audiences in the Kenyan public and their reactions towards the securitizing actor.

5.2.1 Kenyan public (citizens)

Even though Kenya cannot be described as a liberal democracy state the public still has a relevant role to play as the audience. The audience is considered to play an important role especially in democratic democracies (Cote, 2016). An opinion poll done by the IPSOS in 2016 concerning the plans of the government to close down the Dadaab camps, 69% of the Kenyan population supported it (Gaffey, 2016). Considering the country is not liberally democratic, the percentage shows a majority of the Kenyans support the repatriation of the Somali refugees. This is also reflected in the conversations I had with Kenyans during the interviews. Keeping aside my personal opinions as a Kenyan, I only drew my conclusions from the interviews I conducted the Kenyan locals. From the interviews, most of the concerns were partly related to security reasons.

A 28-year-old lady Kenyan citizen said,

 "*It's a good thing that the government has finally decided to close down the camps. You know you can never be too sure which Somali is an Al Shabaab or who is innocent. Let them go back home and get readmission after a thorough checkup is done on them*."

With such comments, some insinuated that security had decreased due to the increase of refugees in the country and the fact that some can move freely in the country. It is also a clear indication that Somali refugees are easily seen as a threat to security even by the general public itself. These comments agree with findings from Edwards (2009 p, 775) who states that refugees are increasingly being viewed as criminals and a threat to the national security.

In addition to this, there had been several attacks in Nairobi where bombs were planted in buses and these were linked to terrorists of Somali origin (Al Jazeera, 2018). It was this that led to the Usalama watch operation that had hundreds of Somalis arrested and forcibly taken to Dadaab camp. One Kenyan respondent, aged 35, explains how that period influenced interactions

between Somalis and Kenyans. "*Fear gripped everyone due to the bombings that had become like a daily occurrence and if you happened to board the same bus with a Somali then people would start to alight the bus as they had associated Somalis with the bombings*". Such kind of tensions between the groups would have been bad if it had extended for a while which would have even been worse than the labeling itself.

The survey conducted by the IPSOS shows that 69% of Kenyans want Dadaab camp closed (Gaffey, 2016). But even with this, the 31% of the population who do not agree with the decision to close the camp would be on different grounds than them agreeing that refugees are not a threat to security. According to the interviews I conducted, some respondents reasoned more on humanitarian grounds rather than them agreeing that the Somali refugees are not the reason for insecurity in Kenya. A 38-year-old woman said, "*As much as I don't agree with their (Somalis) stay here, I also don't support the decision to close down the camps. Where will they go*?"

In this study, the reaction of the host community was not captured as I did not have the opportunity to visit those areas due to tensions heightened by the electioneering period. It would have been interesting to find out what their reaction would be as it is not captured as well in the IPSOS survey that was conducted in 2016.

5.2.2 HUMANITARIAN ORGANIZATIONS *United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR)*

UNHCR plays an important role in the securitization of refugees in Kenya as an audience. It was established so as to help out refugees in conjunction with host governments (UNHCR, 2018). The government of Kenya gave the UNHCR the responsibility of managing the refugee camps in Kenya in partnership with the department of Refugee Affairs. However, even with such partnership UNHCR was never consulted by the government in the decision to close down the camp. According to the UNHCR official I talked to stated that the decision came as a surprise to them as it did to everyone else. The deputy president Ruto tasked the UNHCR to repatriate the refugees within 3 months which if not done the Kenyan government would do it itself (Daily Nation, 2018).

Initially, it was reported that UNHCR stood out against the closure of the camp and argued that the time was not reasonable to repatriate such a large number of refugees in such a short time (Daily Nation, 2018). However, the United Nations secretary general, Ban Ki Moon in a press statement bowed down to the government's decision and decided to help the refugees go back to Somalia though on a voluntary basis (Namunane, 2016). But even with the UN's support, UNHCR still held that the time given was not feasible for such a move and asked the government to reconsider its decision. It should however be noted that the UNHCR signed a tripartite agreement with both the Kenyan and the Somali government to have voluntary repatriation of Somali refugees living in Kenya. This was seen as the first move that the UNHCR took in support of the government's intention even though it was years before the government decided to close down the camps (Voppen, 2017). Cote (2016) argues that previous interactions between the actor and the audience provides context for securitization process through UNCHR setting precedence by agreeing to support the government in the process further supports their role in securitizing refugees.

However, as days went by and the government did not back down from its initial decision to close down the camp then UNHCR agreed to support the repatriation of refugees though it had to be voluntary. Many of the refugees I interviewed viewed this as a betrayal from the UNHCR. A 56-year-old man said, "*Now even the UNHCR has turned against us. Who would want to leave voluntarily to go and face death in Somalia? That is what we ran from in the first place.*" From the responses I got from the respondents, many of them felt that the 'voluntary repatriation' being emphasized by the UNHCR was a disguise to the support it was giving for the Kenyan government. One of the refugees I interviewed said,

 "*UNHCR is an international organization and should be able to do more against the decision made by the government. It has the capacity to stop it but it seems like they are now partnering to send us away.*"

Most of the refugees viewed UNHCR's acceptance to voluntary repatriation as legitimizing the closure of the Dadaab refugee camp. It should be noted that even though the UNHCR had initially stood against the closure of the camp, most people do not view it as a genuine concern

for them. Most of the respondents I interviewed believe that UNHCR should have done more like suggesting other permanent solutions such as local integration or resettlement rather than repatriation. With this one can argue that the body as an audience legitimized the securitization move made by the actor.

- ⬜ *NGOs*

This section looks at the non-governmental organizations which mostly work in the humanitarian department in collaboration with the UNHCR (UNHCR, 2018). Those organizations that work in the refugee camps mostly do so as partners with UNHCR as the refugee camp is basically managed by the UNHCR (UNHCR, 2018). Most of the NGOs have voiced their opinions against the closure of the camps. In a joint statement given by a group of NGOs, they condemned the decision made by the Kenyan government terming it as "unfortunate" (NGO Joint statement, 2016). The statement was published four days after the initial statement. The Norwegian Refugee Council published a report 'Dadaab's broken promise' where it talked of need to remove the deadline for the closure of the camps so as to ensure safe and dignified return of Somali refugees (ReliefWeb, 2018).

However, this can be interpreted in the same way as UNHCR as the organizations being complicit to legitimize the securitizing move. None of them is bold enough to take up a different stand of having the refugees integrated or resettled. But when you look at it from a security angle, the officials seemed to agree that it was a challenge in the camps. One official confirmed that one needed a security personnel when you get into the camp. "*Ask yourself why you would need one if it was safe enough,*" he posed. Even though it was not clear what kind of security issues is being faced in the camps, what was clear was the lack of it and refugees being either the victims or perpetrators of insecurity.

5.2.3 INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

There has not been a major reaction from international community on the plans to close Dadaab refugee camp. As discussed earlier in the literature review section, securitization has been a growing trend. It is interesting to note that the Kenyan government has been following closely to the trend in western countries and have now adopted the trend. A statement given by Kibicho reflected that.

"Our action is taken at a time when a growing number of countries – rich and poor alike – globally are limiting refuge entry on the grounds of national security. For much lower populations than Kenya has hosted for decades. We understand their reasoning at a time when the International Community is challenged and, unfortunately, far too paralyzed in the face of metastasizing terrorist threats." (Kibicho 2016).

Therefore, the international community does not have the moral authority to stand up against the closure of the camp. There was a major crisis in Europe when refugees from Syria arrived and they were locked out from their borders (Hargrave, & Pantuliano, 2016). There has been fewer Somali refugees being resettled in third countries. America under the presidency term of Trump banned 7 countries from entering the USA in the name of national security. UK deported over 3500 migrants from Calais as they stated that they were protecting their borders from illegal immigrants. Using the same argument, UK eventually pulled out from the European Union so that they can have more control over its borders.

It would therefore be hypocritical for these countries to call out for Kenya that has hosted refugees for several decades yet themselves have shunned away from such responsibilities within their jurisdiction. And also, Kenya being sovereign, other countries cannot dictate it to undertake certain decisions other than influence its decision. So, on the 20th of May 2016 the European Union issued a statement stating that the closure of the camp was a concern but it would nonetheless fund the return and integration of Somali refugees (EU, 2016). And major donors such as US and UK have also come out to fund the repatriation program for the return of refugees back to Somalia (International Amnesty, 2016 p 6). This clearly shows the trend many western countries have taken to shun responsibilities of hosting refugees.

It is interesting to note that the decision made by the government to shut down the camps was later overruled by the high court of Kenya (BBC News, 2018). The case was brought before the court by a human right group which wanted to challenge the decision of the government in closing down the camps. The human rights group felt that it was unfair for the Somali refugees to be sent back home where there was no political stability at the moment (BBC News, 2018).

There was also the argument of having a certain refugee group being repatriated while other refugees remained.

The court as a formal institution rejected the securitizing effort by the government. The court has the capability (Cote 2016) to authorize the view of the issue and also legitimize the issue through security practice. And by the High Court ruling the decision as "unconstitutional therefore null and void" it brings about the perspective of the authority of audiences. The court initially was not part of the audience until the human rights group brought the issue before the court. But it used its authoritative position to react to the securitization effort.

5.3 OTHER FACTORS ENFORCING THE NARRATIVES
5.3.1 Refugees as a burden

During my research period as I was conducting the interviews, some factors were brought up by most of the respondents which after much analysis found them useful to highlight in this study. These factors were new to my research and I had to factor them in during my discussions. I believe that these are factors that could also enforce the narrative of Somali refugees being a threat to national security and using them as a scapegoat in the security discourse. Most of the respondents whom I interviewed seemed to talk about refugees in view of their economic value. Some labelled them as a burden while to others they were viewed as assets.

Bett (2014) argues that refugees are seen mostly as a burden rather than assets to the host country. And all resonated that the reason for the closure of the camps was in one way connected to this. In the Kenyan context, refugees are viewed as a burden especially from the locals. The responses I got from the locals reflected the feeling of having to deal with refugees who were a burden to their economy. And this has led to strife between refugees and the locals although it has turned out to be physical. One interview stuck out when a 36 year old Kenyan lady said,

 "These people (Somalis) are the cause of the rise of cost of living in Kenya. For money given freely and you have not worked for, you will use it carelessly. Businessmen love dealing with such people as they do not understand the value of money".

But talking to a 42 years old refugee man, he disputed the claim of having more money than needed by stating, "*We are given enough money to cater for our daily needs: but what is better than having freedom to move around and have your human dignity rather than having to depend on someone for your needs?*"

Gupte & Mehta (2007) show that discourses on refugee burden contributes to social stigma that depicts refugees as devalued objects. In the Kenyan context, there has been a lot of debate in the political arena about refugees being a burden that needs to be shared. Political actors are always putting forth the idea to the audience discussing how to either end the dependency level in refugees or how to 'share the burden or responsibility'. Amina Mohamed who was the then minister of Foreign Affairs urged the international community to join hands in meeting the needs of refugees (Mogire, 2016). The then minister of interior also stated that one of the reasons they wanted to close down the camp bedsides the security issue was because the refugees had become a burden to the nation's economy. He stated,

"*...that due to the presence of refugee camps, the country has been forced to bear economic consequences*" (Nkaisery, 2016).

However, a World Bank report showed that both the Dadaab and Kakuma camps contributed greatly to the regional economy and created employment opportunities for the host community (Verwimp & Maystadt 2015 p, 23). So, for the government it has sought to deal with this problem by labeling them as security threat so as to get away with the 'problem'. According to Gupte & Mehta (2007 p, 64), refugees are labeled as problems for host countries and interventions are needed to deal with the problem.

In one of the interviews with a 24-year-old female refugee who is a student in a local college, she said,

"*It is sad to be looked at as a beggar. One classmate asked me how it feels to not work but have money in my account every month. It may be an innocent question but that question shows how low people think of refugees*".

It is very evident that such a label to refugees has led them to be stigmatized as helpless people.

Moncrieffe (2006 p, 42), argues that labels influences stigmatization and discrimination.

In an interview with a 36-year-old male Kenyan citizen said,

"*They say an idle mind is the devil's workshop. If you are not busy with work and not worried where you will get your next meal then it is easier to be lured to activities which may be detrimental to the society you live in*".

With such kind of mindset in the people's mind, it is easier even for the audiences to be influenced in accepting the securitizing move being made by the securitizing actors about refugees being dependent on the country's economy.

Abdi (2005) argues that refugees who are dependent on aid tend to lose their self-esteem. If you get to a point where you can no longer fend for yourself then your human dignity is dashed. It is interesting to learn from one of the interviews I conducted of what the locals thought of the Somali refugees. In Kenya, there is a common saying that goes '*Mwanaume ni kujitegemea*" which when loosely translated means a person should be self-reliant implying that a person's dignity is found in them being independent. The locals therefore equate refugees to being too dependent on the aid they receive not understanding that it is beyond them to work as they are not permitted by the authorities in Kenya.

From the view of the humanitarian organizations, refugees are seen as a source of employment. It has been argued that these aid organizations are hypocritical in nature and take advantage of the emergencies in the name of publicity. "Calling out for the government's decision to be reversed is not for the refugees' sake but for their own sake so that they don't run out of business". These were words spoken by the refugees I got to interview who spoke out in disappointment that UNHCR had now secretly joined the government in the repatriation process though they came out as not supporting the decision. As the refugee put it, UNHCR asking for more time to repatriate the refugees was a strategy for them to still remain relevant in the field. As this research did not study the immediate host community of the Dadaab camps, it would be interesting to hear their views on this issue. What is their outlook on refugees? Has it been an advantage hosting them and has their economy improved so far?

5.3.2 Negative effects of living in limbo

Many of the refugees living in the Dadaab camp have been there for almost 3 decades now. They have seen a new generation born and brought up in the same camp but without the freedom to move around. This makes them totally dependent on aid organizations for their livelihood. With such, there is always negative effects that come along with dependency. As Abdi (2005) states, dependency diminishes self-esteem of an individual.

The issue of dependency is directly related to reduction of human dignity and also a change in the attitude towards life in refugees. There has been a lot of waste in terms of human skills and development of such due to lack of opportunities being availed to refugees. An interview with a 42 year-old refugee said,

"25 years is such a long time to live in the camps without having to run your life as you want. Having to wait for people to instruct you on what you should do can simply lower your dignity as a human more so as an adult".

According to Abdi (2005), prolonged encampment can diminish the self-esteem of an individual.

Another consequence of a protracted refugee situation is the insecurity in the area. An interview with one of the officials who works for an NGO confirmed that insecurity was a big thing in the camp. In fact, for the aid workers to move around the camps they needed security personnel. Whatever type of crime or insecurity is in the camp agrees with findings from a research done by Crisp (2000). The findings of Dadaab camp in the 1990s state that the camp was renowned as the most violent in the world with rape, murder and armed robbery almost on a daily occurrence. With such findings, we can deduce that crime in Dadaab did not start recently but instead started almost at the inception of the camps. On the side of crime, there is also the other aspect of insecurity created by terrorists. Loescher & Milner (2005) finds that camps can be used as bases for armed groups that are sources to insurgency, resistance and terrorist movement. But for a refugee to be influenced to such crime takes root in the case where they are totally dependent on others making them susceptible to influence. As one local shared his thoughts by stating,

"They say an idle mind is the devil's workshop. If you are not busy with work and not worried where you will get your next meal then it is easier to be lured to activities which may be detrimental to the society you live in".

Having nothing to do makes them a vulnerable group to easily be lured into criminal activities.

5.4 CONCLUSION

With the kind of ambiguity seen in the audiences and the role that they play in influencing the securitization move, it is then safe to say that only the critical audience needs conviction for the securitization move to take place. In the findings, 69% of the Kenyan public were convinced that the decision to close down the camps was the right one for them. 69% is a significant number that would be highly influence the decision. But surprisingly, the High court which would not be considered part of the audience ruled against the closure of the camps. It is important to note that the court in itself does not have the capacity to make a ruling without having the case forwarded to them by an interested party in the matter. So in this instance, if the human rights group had not acted on the decision then the High court would not be included as part of the audience even with the capacity it has to influence the decision. The Human right group does not have the formal authority to challenge the decision but got one after involving the court in the matter. Therefore, only the critical audience is needed to be convinced by the actor. With such ambiguity on the roles of the audiences, it is then important for further studies on audiences in the securitization theory. This shows that the drawing line of which audiences to include could be tricky. The concept of securitizing audiences should be broadly defined to include all dynamics in audiences. Limiting audiences to bodies that have authority to legitimize the effort would exclude those who have the authoritative position and can still react and influence the securitization process.

Roe 2008 argues that the audience could agree with the securitization but not with the 'extraordinary measures' taken by the actor. It is clearly evident from the interviews conducted where some Kenyan locals did not agree with the sending refugees back home on humanitarian grounds. NGOs did not support the time limit the government had placed on the repatriation. It is therefore important to note that the audience was likely to support the securitization move while still challenging the measures the actor was intending to use on the referent subject.

In cases where refugees are not allowed to integrate they then become more of a burden to the host country than assets. If included in the economy, I believe they can be an asset to it. In the case of Uganda's refugees who have been integrated into the community have proven beneficial to the economy even to the extent of employing the locals.

But there is need for the governments to think again how to handle the issue of refugees instead of victimizing them and labeling them as a burden to the host country. Impartation of skills in them will lead to both the refugees and the host countries benefiting from them.

6. CONCLUSION

This study was conducted so as to find out how the Kenyan government was using the securitization of refugees to promote and legitimize the plans of closing Dadaab refugee camp and the reactions that were aroused in the public arena. In this study, I look at how the government has continuously labeled refugees as security threats both in words and in actions. The government has used the security narrative to construct the security discourse against the Somali refugees. This has been made clear with words spoken by different political actors within the national and international platforms. The study also shows how the government has continued to develop the discourse with the kind of policies and actions taken against the Somali refugees. And this has now been used by the government to publicly linking Somali refugees to security incidents in the country. Even to the extent of paving way for the decision to close down the Dadaab camps.

In this study, I have illustrated how there has been a constant effort by governments in the world trying to secure their borders and how they have joined in the bid to label refugees as security threats. Discussions made by Koser (2007) argues that there has been an increase in implementation of policies put in place by different governments to secure their borders. It is not therefore not unusual that the study reveals a different reaction from the international community in response to the Kenyan government decision to close down the camps as compared to the 'humanitarian one' we would all expect. Instead of the usual sanctions they would have placed on Kenyan government if they followed their decision, then the international community promises to help fund the voluntary repatriation. Therefore, the findings of this research resonates with Edwards (2009) when he states that refugees are increasingly viewed as criminals, a threat to the national security and therefore often labeled as terrorists. There is however a need by the international community to look seriously into the nature and consequences of protracted refugee situations as the one in Dadaab. Long term solutions can be developed to make refugees' lives more bearable. This could be in form of providing them with skills, jobs, education etc. And it would also be important if they find a political will to end the conflicts that prevent safe and voluntary return.

As I write my thesis, Dadaab camp is still open as the decision to close it down was overruled by the High court of Kenya. The government has since stated that it would appeal the court's ruling but basically the whole discussion about closing down the camp has died out. But since making the decision to close down the camp, there has been different statements given by government officials that may seem to contradict each other. The findings in this study shows the statements from the officials in the ministry of interior and foreign affairs complement each other but are meant for different audiences. As Voppen (2017) puts it, the narratives put out by the political actors are not as a result of uncoordinated move but a pragmatic one to reach a variety of audiences. This therefore brings perspective to whole new aspect of the securitizing actor. The securitizing actor has always been viewed as one but according to my findings in the Kenyan context, there has been different facets to the securitizing actors. Therefore, actors can be one but with different facets.

The idea of audiences being multiple has been brought out during my study. In the Kenyan context, the audiences have been split up to basically discuss their reactions and what kind of authority or influence a certain group can have on the securitization move. It is interesting that this study finds out that some audiences (court) cannot be considered as one as they do not have formal authority to influence the securitization move. But it is until they are actively put into the position to act on their mandate that their decision influences the move. It is with this understanding that calls out for more research to be done on such audiences and the position of influence they have on the securitization move. And also have such audiences who do not have formal authority included in the audience group.

There is need for further research on the development of theoretical framework of securitization in non-western context. Studies done in such settings would help as most of the securitization literature is based on western set up where the roles of both the actor and the audience are clearly defined. In the context of Kenya, the findings show that it is not necessary for an audience to have formal authority to influence the securitization move.

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APPENDIX

INTERVIEW GUIDES

For refugees

1. How long have you been living in the camps?
2. Have you seen a change in the treatment you receive from the locals as well as government since you arrived in Kenya?
3. What are your thoughts on the decision to close down Dadaab camp?
4. Have you faced any kind of hostility from the government of Kenya before?
5. What is your opinion of Somali refugees in Kenya being regarded as supporters of Al Shabaab?

For government official and NGO officials

1. How has been refugee hosting policy changed since the inception of the refugee camps?
2. Do you believe the government of Kenya is actively targeting the Somali group?
3. Were other stakeholders dealing with refugees in Kenya involved in the decision to shut down the camps?
4. How did your organization react? Did it support the decision or actively try to reverse the decision?
5. What do you think is the way forward after the court overruled the decision to close down the camps?

For Kenyan locals

1. What is your opinion about Somali refugees in Kenya? Are they a burden or an asset in Kenya?
2. Do you agree with the government that Somali refugees are a threat to security in Kenya?
3. Do you support the closure of the Dadaab camp?