

This is an accepted manuscript of the following:

Johnsen, K. I., & Benjaminsen, T. A. (2017). The art of governing and everyday resistance: "rationalization" of Sámi reindeer husbandry in Norway since the 1970s. *Acta Borealia*, 34(1), 1-25. doi:10.1080/08003831.2017.1317981

The Art of Governing and Everyday Resistance: "Rationalization" of Sámi Reindeer Husbandry in Norway Since the 1970s

Kathrine I. Johnsen and Tor A. Benjaminsen

Department of International Environment and Development Studies (Noragric), Norwegian University of Life Sciences, PO Box 5003, NO-1432 Ås, Norway

Abstract

Since the late 1970s, a policy objective has been to rationalize Sámi reindeer husbandry in Norway. Among the government officials, there is, however, a concern that this objective has not been successfully met in West Finnmark due to "too many reindeer" and "too many pastoralists" degrading the pastures and jeopardizing the economy of pastoralism. Engaging with the concepts of "the art of governing" and "everyday resistance", we examined the state rationalization programme and how the main actors perceived it. We identified four "techniques of power" used by the state to stimulate "proper" pastoral practices: *discipline*, *neoliberal rationality*, *sovereign power*, and *truth*. Based on in-depth interviews with pastoralists and government officials, observations and written sources, we have sought to examine the public and hidden transcripts of the actors concerning the implementation of the rationalization programme. The analysis demonstrates how different examples of everyday forms of resistance are used by pastoralists to maintain control of their own livelihood and practices. A common strategy was to partly adopt and partly avoid state regulations. Individual responses to the rationalization programme were determined by personal desires and capacity, as well as relationships to and the behaviour of fellow pastoralists. Government officials presented the policies to the herding community as participatory, while in reality the state had gradually strengthened its control over reindeer husbandry. The governance of Sámi pastoralism since the 1970s affected power relations between the state and the pastoralists, as well as within the herding communities.

Corresponding Author: *Kathrine Ivsett Johnsen, Department of International Environment and Development Studies (Noragric), Norwegian University of Life Sciences, PO Box 5003, NO-1432 Ås, Norway. E-mail: katjohns@nmbu.no*

Keywords

Governance; pastoralism; rationalization; reindeer husbandry; resistance; Sámi

Introduction

During the 1970s, Norwegian government officials became increasingly concerned that too many reindeer and too many people engaged in pastoralism would cause overgrazing and jeopardize the economic viability of the Sámi reindeer husbandry (Ot. prp. 9, 1976-1977; Villmo 1978; Lenvik 1998). Also, there was a public perception that Sámi pastoralism had not progressed at the same pace as the rest of Norwegian society. Combined, these concerns formed the basis for a political reform of reindeer husbandry governance (Storli and Sara 1997).

The *Agreement on Reindeer Husbandry* between the Sámi Reindeer Herders' Association (NRL) and the Ministry of Agriculture and Food (LMD), together with the 1978 Reindeer Husbandry Act, are regarded as the two main instruments in the post-war political reform of Sámi reindeer husbandry. Through the *Agreement*, the state offered reindeer husbandry a similar support to what it offered agriculture and fisheries "on the understanding that the *rationality* and *efficiency* of production is ensured" (Paine 1994,159, italics in original).¹ The 1978 Act complimented the *Agreement* by introducing rules and regulations to enforce more economically efficient and environmentally sustainable practices. The political reform – often referred to as modernization, rationalization or optimization of Sámi reindeer husbandry (Bjørklund 1990, 2004; Lenvik 1990; Paine 1994, 2004; Berg 1996; Riseth 2000; H. Reinert 2008; Hausner et al. 2011) aimed to stimulate livestock-keeping practices that would optimize meat production and increase the income and welfare of pastoralists in accordance with the rest of Norwegian society (St. prp. 170, 1975-1976; Ot. prp. 9, 1976-1977). However, despite later revisions of policies and the *Agreement*² – and that "an enormous amount of money and planners' energy have been spent" to rationalize reindeer husbandry since the 1970s (Paine 1994,157) – the policy objectives have not been met everywhere. Although some herders in Finnmark have adapted to the policy objectives, West

Finnmark in particular seems to stand out as an area where pastoralists have not responded in accordance with the laws and regulations (Riksrevisjonen 2012; Riseth 2014).³

Investigating the background to this policy failure, this paper examines 1) the state vision for a rationalized reindeer husbandry and the techniques used to realize this vision; 2) the pastoralists' accounts of their responses to the rationalization; and 3) the authorities' claims about the rationalization project and process.

The article focuses on the perspectives of pastoralists from West Finnmark, but also includes some perspectives from pastoralists from the southern reindeer husbandry region. The two regions are often presented in the public discourse as having very different attitudes toward the rationalization of reindeer husbandry. The study is based on data from various sources. We conducted in-depth interviews with 19 pastoralists from the so-called "problem districts" in West Finnmark who have not – according to the authorities – kept a rational number of reindeer. We also did in-depth interviews with 4 pastoralists from the Røros area in the south and 16 government officials working with reindeer husbandry policies and regulations. We made observations and had informal conversations with pastoralists and government officials at a number of public seminars on reindeer husbandry regulations and field visits between 2012 and 2015. We participated in coffee break talks, followed the pastoralists' internal discussions on Facebook and engaged in discussions with scholars from the herding community. The text also draws on secondary sources such as policy and government reports, media sources and social media discussions, in addition to scholarly publications.

Using a grounded theory approach, we treated the data collection and analysis as interrelated processes (Corbin and Strauss 1990). "Grounded theory involves the progressive identification and integration of *categories of meaning* from data" (Willig 2013, 70; italics in original). Through conceptualizing the data, we explored theories that could shed light on our

observations. We found engaging with the concepts of "the art of governing" (Foucault 1991, 2008; Li 2007) and "everyday resistance" (Scott 1985, 1990) helpful in the analysis of how policies meet practice, and how the political reform of reindeer husbandry has affected power relations within the herding community as well as between the state and pastoralists.

When approaching an informant, we explained that we were interested in exploring alternative perspectives on the governance of Sámi reindeer husbandry, and we invited the informant to share his/her accounts. We collected many stories about pastoralists' responses in order to recognize patterns, repetitions and variation in the various representations; and we triangulated the data collected by comparing data from interviews with data from outside observations (e.g., Facebook discussions). We found that pastoralists often present some perspectives in public, while often expressing contrasting views in informal conversations among their peers. We did not have the same opportunity to observe "offstage" presentations of government officials. Instead, we examined how their accounts presented to different audiences varied (Scott 1990).

All quotes used in this article originating from Norwegian sources have been translated by the authors. The informants are anonymized, and we use codes to separate different informants from each other (e.g. informant number four, is labelled #04). In order to contextualize our study, we start by a short presentation of Sámi reindeer husbandry in Norway and West Finnmark.

Sámi Pastoralism Prior to the "Rationalization" Programme

In Norway, reindeer husbandry is recognized as an indigenous livelihood. According to national legislation, only people of Sámi descent may own reindeer, with the exception of a few concessions in the south. Reindeer herding areas cover about 40% of the Norwegian

mainland, from Finnmark in the north to the counties of Sør-Trøndelag and Hedmark (hereafter referred to as the Røros area) in the southern part of the country (see Figure 1).




Figure 1: Map indicating Sámi reindeer husbandry regions in Norway. Cartographer: Alf Bjørnar Eriksen, September 2015.

In West Finnmark, the interior south is used as winter pastures, while the coastal areas are spring, summer and autumn pastures. Most herds cross a number of municipalities on their migrations between winter and summer grazing areas. Traditionally, the use of seasonal pastures and the division of labour are organized within *siidas* (M. N. Sara, 2009). The *siidas* (not to be confused with the administrative units called "*siida* shares" introduced by the state in 2007) are kinship-based groups of herders and the customary management units within Sámi pastoralism (Bjørklund 1990; Paine 1994). It is important to note that within the *siida* herd, each reindeer is the private property of an individual. The tradition is to give new-borns, boys and girls alike, reindeer and a personal mark that is cut in the ears of the animals. As such, all individuals get a chance to develop their own herd. Also after marrying, the tradition is that both spouses keep ownership of their own reindeer and its offspring. The *siidas* are not static organizations. M. N. Sara (2009, 176) explains that "every *siida* unit is continuously formed by (...) the on-going practices and *siida*-members' participation in daily communication, discussions, decision-making, actions, and evaluation in response to events and processes in the social-ecological system." It is also important to note that the *siidas'* practices are diversified by their distinct local adaptation and knowledge (M.N. Sara 2009).

Bull et al. (2001) argue that the attitude of the society at large towards pastoralism correlates with the number of land-use conflicts between herders and other land-use interests. While public assessments at the end of the nineteenth century describe Sámi pastoralism in the north in positive terms, the increasing herder/farmer conflicts in the Røros area resulted in a very negative attitude towards pastoralism in the south (Bull et al. 2001). From the end of the 1880s the state started a process of dividing Sámi reindeer husbandry areas into smaller herding districts (Bull et al. 2001). All pastoralists belonging to a particular district were made responsible for damage caused on farmland by reindeer belonging to the district (M.N. Sara 2009). In Finnmark, only the summer pastures were divided into districts, but not until 1933,

40-50 years after the pastoralist areas further south (NOU 2001). The autumn/spring and winter pastures in the interior of Finnmark continued to exist as more autonomous and larger areas organized by the *siidas* (M. N. Sara 2009). The interior of Finnmark was regarded as "the nomads' country", an area without important natural resources or any potential for economic development (Bull et al. 2001, 265). It was only after the Second World War that infrastructure development opened this area for competing land-uses (Bull et al. 2001).

During the post-war period there was a national focus on integrating reindeer pastoralists into the modern welfare state (Arnesen 1979; Riseth 2000). The ethnographer Ørnulf Vorren, who assessed reindeer husbandry in Norway in 1946, described the need for a radical modernization and rationalization of herding practices. Vorren argued that especially in West Finnmark, the practices were "out of date" (1946, 217). He observed that in this region, the whole family still migrated with the herd throughout the year as in older times. Vorren argued that the pastoralists of West Finnmark had to alter their nomadic lifestyle and become more "modern" and "rational" "if this source of livelihood is not to be lost" (Vorren 1946, 220). Still, while pastoralism south of Finnmark had gradually become more settled since before the turn of twentieth century, pastoralism in West Finnmark continued to be fully nomadic until approximately 1960 (Paine 1994; Riseth 2000; M. N. Sara 2001).

After the war, and especially from the 1960s, reindeer husbandry all over Norway experienced extensive technological, economic and political changes with the introduction of obligatory schooling, establishment of slaughterhouses, housing schemes, and other forms of subsidies.⁴ Daily work operations became more mechanized (e.g. motorized vehicles made herding more effective) and the households became more dependent on the external market, also giving them a regular income for purchasing goods (Paine 1994; Riseth 2000). In the same period, Norway experienced a baby boom. The population of Sámi pastoralists tripled over a generation from the 1950s (O. K. Sara 2004:36). Amongst the authorities there was a

growing concern that too many pastoralists were building up their herds and creating internal land-use conflicts and overgrazing (Villmo 1978; Bjørklund 1990, 2004; Storli and Sara 1997; Lenvik 1998; Bull et al. 2001; Paine 2004). Simultaneously, there was a worry that the stocks, and thereby wealth, were unevenly distributed among the pastoralists (Bjørklund 1990). There was also a concern that some – especially in Finnmark – had lost too many animals during the war and could not sustain their families. Therefore, in contradiction to the worry about overstocking and overgrazing, the poorest families received state support to purchase reindeer to rebuild their herds from 1953 to 1978 (Bull et al. 2001).⁵

The concerns about the growing reindeer numbers and out-dated pastoral practices were reflected by the consultative committee established in 1960 to revise the Reindeer Husbandry Act of 1933. In 1966 it reported that the reindeer industry⁶ could only be safeguarded by a very rapid development – a development similar to what it took Norwegian agriculture several generations to achieve (Hætta et al. 1994). This development, the committee argued, should be facilitated by science and innovation that could adjust reindeer husbandry to "a new reality" (Storli and Sara 1997). Accordingly, scholarly experts, rather than practitioners, were appointed as advisors on the development process (Paine 1994; Riseth 2000).⁷ The science on how to optimize reindeer meat production through optimal herd composition and slaughter strategies, coupled with the authorities' concerns about too many reindeer and too many pastoralists, formed the value and knowledge-base for the political reform of reindeer husbandry governance in the 1970s.

The Art of Governing and Resistance

Social anthropologist Robert Paine studied Sámi pastoralism in northern Norway from the 1960s to the 1990s. In discussing the governance of herding and husbandry, he differentiated between "rationalization" and "modernization" (Paine 1994). Paine saw "modernization" as

changes that come of their own accord; e.g. motorized vehicles, electricity, and fewer family camps because the children attend school. The state's rationalization programme, however, he argued, reflected a particular form of modernization "informed by an economic ideology of equality combined with market efficiency" (Paine 1994:142). By making this differentiation, Paine articulated the paradox of how mechanization of reindeer husbandry "is a story of how modernization can buck, or run contrary to, rationalization" (1994, 155). While the objective of the rationalization programme was to encourage smaller herds with larger meat production per animal, access to vehicles made it possible for herders (independently of pastoral skills) to build and control larger herds.

Michel Foucault defined "government" as a "the conduct of conduct" aimed at guiding or affecting the behaviour of an individual or a group of people to achieve desired outcomes (Gordon 1991). According to Foucault, the art of governing could be studied by examining the "techniques of power" practiced to monitor, shape and control the behaviour of individuals (Gordon 1991, 3). In the book *The Birth of Biopolitics*, Foucault (2008, 313) identified four such techniques: 1) *discipline*, which seeks to stimulate certain behaviour by internalizing social norms and ethical standards with individuals, 2) *neoliberal rationality*, which provides incentive structures with a focus on maximizing individual benefit, 3) *sovereign power*, which is top-down construction of rules and threat of punishment if rules are not obeyed, and 4) governing according to *truth* as prescribed by religion, or particular conceptions of the nature and order of the universe, for example (Foucault 2008; Fletcher, 2010). These techniques of power are distinct, but interrelated concepts that might compete, conflict, or complement one another within different contexts. For example, Fletcher (2010, 175) explains, in efforts to address concerns about "overpopulation", a disciplinary approach might be sought to lower the birth rate through awareness raising and "framing extramarital sex and pregnancy as immoral and irresponsible", while a neoliberal approach might be to

simply reduce the welfare benefits provided for children. Introducing a compulsory one-child policy, for instance, would be to use sovereign power to shape behaviour.

However, governmental power is neither homogenous nor totalizing as it may be contested and resisted by target groups with the capacity for action and critique (Li 2007). State interventions may be limited by unintended consequences (e.g., when interventions produce effects that are contrary to the objective) or contestation about what should be achieved (e.g., when actors disagree about what constitutes an improvement and/or what is an acceptable cost of achieving the improvement) (Li 2007). Moreover, the state is not the only entity which applies the art of governing; different groups of actors (e.g. missionaries, scientists, political activists, pastoralists) have competing visions, mandates, and techniques for regulating human behaviour (Li 2007).

James C. Scott (1998) argues that wherever "government" is employed, those who are to be governed are able to ignore, avoid, fight, transform or reclaim the intervention. Cavanagh and Benjaminsen (2015) identify four different forms of community resistance to government action; nonviolent, militant, discursive and formal-legal. Furthermore, Hall et al. (2015) show in their essay on land grabbing and political reactions "from below", that land deals may have differentiated impacts among the actors and within the actor groups. Therefore, various land deals create multiple frontiers of struggles (e.g. against dispossession, against exploitation or about the terms of incorporation). As such, peasants' and local communities' responses to land deals might be organized or emerge as everyday resistance, but reactions from below may also be in the form of welcoming deals as opportunities for wage labour and improved livelihoods.

Tactics of non-compliance require little or no coordination or planning and include "foot dragging, dissimulation, false compliance, pilfering, feigned ignorance, slander, arson, sabotage, and so forth" (Scott 1985:29). Scott refers to these everyday acts of resistance as the

"weapons of the weak"; the "weak" being actors who defend their interests against more powerful and dominating actors. In some cases, resistance can be more effective when hidden than open, because direct confrontation may provoke a response from the elite that could lead to further loss to individuals or communities. Scott argues, however, that though the acts of hidden resistance do not openly "contest the formal definitions of hierarchy and power", it is possible to determine to what degree, and in what ways, marginalized actors accept the social order propagated by elites by studying their behaviour and "offstage" comments and conversations (Scott 1985, 33).

The "offstage" presentations, or "hidden transcripts" as Scott (1990, xii) calls them, are accounts that include the "weak's" critique of power and practices, as well as the dominating actors' "hidden transcript representing the practices and claims of their rule that cannot be openly avowed." The inferior conceals the critique from the elite; the elite conceals their claims from the inferior. Hidden transcripts can also be disguised in the form of rumours, proverbs, jokes, parodies, gossip, gestures, folktales, and so on (Scott 1990). "Public transcripts," on the other hand, are comments and conversations that the actors (the elite and the inferior) play out in each other's presence (Scott 1990). Scott (1990, 2) explains that while public transcripts can inform us about power, they are "unlikely to tell the whole story about power relations." Therefore, he recommends examining the divergence between the public and hidden transcripts as an approach to study structures of domination and patterns of resistance.

State Visions for Sámi Pastoralism and Techniques Used to Realize these Visions

Before discussing the actors' transcripts, we assess the rationality of the political reform of Sámi pastoralism by addressing the following questions as proposed by Li (2007). What are

the objectives of authorities of various sorts? How do they define the problems? What do they want to happen? What are the strategies and techniques used to make this happen?

As mentioned, the political reform of the 1970s was catalysed through two main instruments: the *Agreement on Reindeer Husbandry*, established in 1976, and the Reindeer Husbandry Act of 1978. Together, these instruments addressed the problem, as seen by the authorities: there were too many pastoralists and too many reindeer, especially in Finnmark. The objective was to transform Sámi reindeer husbandry into a more economically efficient and environmentally sustainable industry. The rationale (the vision) was that this would be achieved through standardized herd structures and slaughter strategies, centralized marketing, professionalized herders, "proper" reindeer numbers, and participation. The *Agreement* and the 1978 Act provided the techniques of power that would ensure the desired herding and husbandry practices: subsidies, concessions, co-management and capacity building of the pastoralists. In the following, we will present these techniques in more detail.

Through outreach on how to optimize meat production and economic awards, the *Agreement* aimed to stimulate increased calf slaughter and a higher ratio of productive female reindeer in the herds, which would produce more calves. The rationale was that younger animals have higher growth intensity than older reindeer. By slaughtering calves in the autumn, more nutrition would be provided for the pregnant females during winter and increase the weight and survival rate of the rest of the herd. The winter herds would be more sustainable and the pastoralists could live better with fewer animals. Subsidies were also provided for infrastructure investments (e.g. fences and vehicles) to stimulate more efficient herding. Furthermore, the *Agreement* regulated the meat prices and marketing of reindeer products. The herders were encouraged to concentrate on producing meat; the responsibility for slaughtering, processing, trading and marketing was transferred from the pastoralists

themselves to certified slaughterhouses and the Norwegian meat cooperative (*Norges Kjøtt og Fleskesentral*, currently named *Nortura*) (Sagelvmo 2004; E. S. Reinert 2006).

The authorities were aware that a higher ratio of productive females could stimulate a growth in reindeer numbers (Homstvedt 1979); the 1978 Act addressed this problem by regulating both herders and reindeer. While the Reindeer Husbandry Act of 1933 recognized reindeer husbandry as a "nomadic Sámi" (*flyttsame*) practice, the 1978 Act replaced the term "nomadic Sámi" with "reindeer owner" without distinguishing between active and sedentary reindeer owners (NOU 2001, 81). To regulate the recruitment of herders and the numbers of reindeer, the Act introduced a concession system for owning and managing reindeer – a system adopted from agriculture (Bjørklund 1990, 2004; M. N. Sara 2009). A concession gave the right to establish an operating unit (*driftsenhet*) consisting of a leader, a reindeer herd and its owners. An operating unit would typically include reindeer owned by the household members and extended family. With the introduction of the concession system, individuals who did not belong to an operating unit were excluded from the right to practice reindeer husbandry (Storli and Sara 1997). As such, the Act altered who could claim rights to engage in reindeer husbandry.

The 1978 Act gave the Reindeer Husbandry Administration a mandate to educate, guide and advise pastoralists on best practices, while it also gave pastoralists "increased responsibility and influence" (Ot. prp. 9, 1976-1977, 54) by introducing a new and broader reindeer husbandry administration and a hierarchical system of co-management boards responsible for interpreting, applying and enforcing the policy regulations (Paine 1994). The new government structure had three levels. The Reindeer Husbandry Board had a mandate to manage the industry on a national level, including the responsibility to regulate the reindeer numbers for the herding districts. The Regional Boards (discontinued from 2014) were responsible for the technical and political implementation of regulations; e.g. approving

applications for reindeer herding concessions (Labba et al. 2006). The state authorities appointed the members of the national and regional boards where herder representatives commonly constituted the majority. From 1996, when the 1978 Act was revised, the Sámi Parliament appointed the minority of the board members. On the local level, the District Boards had the responsibility for managing internal issues and attending the interests of the herding group in relation to the larger society. The District Boards consisted solely of herders belonging to the operating units of the herding district.

In 2007, the Norwegian Parliament adopted a new Reindeer Husbandry Act. "Too many reindeer" in Finnmark was still a main concern. The vision of the 2007 Act was to improve the efficiency of the management regime through internal self-management and increased participation (Reindrifftsforvaltningen 2009). The District Boards were given the responsibility to develop internal management plans by following a new set of rules (*bruksregler*) for planning seasonal pasture use, migratory routes and reindeer numbers. The management plans were to integrate state regulations and "traditional use" of pastures (Reindrifftsforvaltningen 2009). Furthermore, the 2007 Act sought to bring Norwegian law into closer conformity with traditional Sámi land management through re-establishing the *siida* as an important management unit for reindeer husbandry (Anaya 2011, 7; M.N. Sara 2013). The operating units were replaced by a new administrative unit – the *siida* share (*siidaandel*). However, while the name changed, there were few practical changes to the new units. The concession system continued; the *siida* share belonged to individual herders and only those who were part of the *siida* share unit could practice reindeer husbandry. Also, the 2007 Act strengthened the authorities' possibilities for using economic sanctions towards pastoralists that did not follow the regulations (Riksrevisjonen 2012). For example, the unit would not receive subsidies if it had a reindeer number above the approved limit.

We found that the authorities sought to shape, guide and affect the behaviour of pastoralists through a combination of methods that resonate with Foucault's "techniques of power". The subsidies and economic sanctions are examples of neoliberal governing. Regulation of prices and marketing, certification of slaughterhouses, management rules (*bruksregler*), the concession system and threats of punishment are examples of state sovereign power. The training, guidance and advice provided by the Reindeer Husbandry Administration are examples of governing based on discipline, while the state definition of rational reindeer husbandry and "proper" herding practices has gained a hegemonic position representing a commonly acknowledged "truth" in Norwegian society that regularly is presented in government reports, at conferences and in the media. This established truth says what Sámi reindeer pastoralism *is* and *ought* to be (Johnsen et al. 2015).

The Pastoralists' Own Accounts of their Responses to Rationalization

During the interviews and discussions with pastoralists from West Finnmark and the Røros area, there were particularly three measures related to rationalization that emerged as problematic: calf production, the concession system and the destocking process. In the following sections, we present and discuss the pastoralists' own accounts of how they resisted and adopted the regulations. It is important to note though, that not all of the pastoralists' actions are reactions to state governance. Their agency is obviously also affected by personal desires and social dynamics within the herding community.

Rational Meat Production: Calf Production

According to interviewed pastoralists from both West Finnmark and the Røros area, harvesting calves is neither economically, ecologically nor culturally sustainable. Without state subsidies, they argued, the state-promoted harvest strategy would vanish because it is not

profitable from a private economic perspective. Many pastoralists argued that if the calves could live another year, their volume and meat quality would be better and the bone-structure would have more marrow. Therefore, the herders explained, traditionally, the *varit* (one and a half-year old male) is the preferred animal to harvest. One pastoralist from West Finnmark (informant #05, March 2013) argued that restructuring a "traditional herd into an industrial herd" (that is, increasing the ratio of female reindeer) changes the herd's behaviour and grazing patterns. An "industrial" herd is not able to utilize the full variety of pastures within a herding district, he explained. Male reindeer are more tolerant of human disturbance and can graze in areas that females and calves avoid. Furthermore, a herd with many calves is more vulnerable during winters, when the snow conditions make it difficult for reindeer to access lichen through the snow (this is referred to as *guohtun* in northern Sámi) (Eira et al. 2010). Informants from both herding regions argue that, according to their traditions, calf harvest is not considered "the right thing to do". They explained that it is seen as insensible to separate calves from their mothers before the young ones are independent. The separation causes stress within the herd because the females, who have a strong connection with its offspring, will search for their calves and, as a consequence, sometimes get lost (Eira et al. 2016). In addition to decreasing the animal welfare, this also creates more work.

A former staff member of the Reindeer Husbandry Administration (informant #41, July 2014) said that many elderly pastoralists in West Finnmark had been worried that the *Agreement* and its subsidies would increase state control over Sámi pastoralism. A similar scepticism came from a pastoralist from the Røros area (informant #17, September 2014) who claimed that there was no need to subsidize reindeer husbandry, because "the reindeer is a type of animal that goes outdoors all year and finds its own food from renewable resources. Until 1976, reindeer husbandry managed well without state subsidies".

Though the informants from the north and south had a similar attitude towards calf slaughter, most of them practiced it at the time of the interviews. A herder from the Røros area (informant #10, May 2015) said that although his family did not support the state rationale for calf harvest, they had adopted the practice when it was introduced. He explained that his family did not think they had any choice; they interpreted this as an obligation. Other interviewed pastoralists from the south said that their families had first opposed calf harvesting, but then adopted the practice due to the economic incentives. Also, a pastoralist from West Finnmark (informant #15, July 2014) said that his family for a long period refused to harvest calves. "We did not sell calves until 1989", he said. He explained that their rationale for adopting the practice 13 years after the subsidies were introduced was that their herd size had increased extensively during the last decade.⁸ With the help of the subsidies, his family could generate income by slaughtering the smallest calves that would likely not outlast winter. Another pastoralist from the north (informant #05, July 2014) explained: "I do not think most people believed calf harvest was the future. People rather thought: 'OK, just let them give us subsidies for the calves, and we can harvest the calves that will not survive anyway'."

For many pastoralists, the *Agreement* and the 1978 Act introduced a system that did not make sense. While some subsidies were seen as very valuable as they made life and work easier (e.g. support for snowmobiles), there were other subsidies that were described as absurd. The interviewed pastoralists said there was suddenly a lot of money easily available. They made jokes about "money being thrown" at them, referring to various subsidies that they received without having requested them. Interviewed pastoralists in West Finnmark said they received subsidies for purchasing cheese, which they traded for more desired goods at the grocery store; and they continued working and kept funds received for taking time off and paying a replacement to look after the herd. In 1987, the director of the Reindeer Husbandry

Administration admitted that the economic improvements provided by the political reform had "in large part, been used not on consumption but on investments in more reindeer" (Paine 1994:163).

We found that those seemingly accepting the regulations (e.g. by harvesting calves) do not necessarily agree with the intentions behind the regulations. During interviews, pastoralists presented their hidden transcripts about the subsidies making jokes about how easy it was to access state funds, while maintaining that it was inappropriate to harvest calves. Instead of fighting the state, many kept quiet, or looked for ways to take advantage of the system, while they continued as long as possible to manage their herds in their own way. The lack of open resistance gives an impression of support, which is a convenient strategy by actors who realize that they have to continue dealing with the dominant actor, one way or the other (Scott 1990).

Rational Organization of Pastoralists: the Concession System

The 1978 Act defined reindeer husbandry as a "collective right" (*kollektiv næringsrett*) and ignored the customary right of individual pastoralists and the *siidas* to practice pastoralism (Ravna 2007). Through the concession system, the Act gave privileges and obligations to some individuals. Though formally the distribution of the concessions was based on the herders' operational reports (*driftsmelding*) for the previous years, interviewed pastoralists from West Finnmark claimed that in practice the distribution was more random. They explained that some families obtained one concession per active herder, some families received only one to share, while other families did not receive any concessions at all. In very few cases women were given a concession, which meant that in most cases women had to register their animals within someone else's unit (usually the unit of their husband, father or brother) in order to keep the right to own reindeer. Before the 1978 Act was revised in 1996,

only 10% of the registered unit leaders were women (NOU 2001:84). After the revision, spouses could hold joint leadership of a unit (Riksrevisjonen 2004).

When the 1978 Act was first introduced, the intention was to further collectivize reindeer husbandry by reducing the number of earmarks to one per concession unit. This was seen as a direct threat to the economic and social rights of the non-concession holders of the reindeer herding community, typically women and children (Haslie 2013). Losing the earmark would mean losing the possibility to claim ownership of reindeer. A pastoralist from West Finnmark (informant #09, July 2014) explained that when representatives from the Parliament came to discuss the new legislation at a public meeting in Kautokeino, all the women stood up to show their discontent. "All women present – we were fairly numerous – we stood up. And none of the men stood up. They just sat", the informant said. The open resistance had an impact; the law was altered to allow all reindeer owners to keep their personal earmark (Haslie 2013). Also, one of the informants from the Røros area (informant #25, July 2015), talked about local resistance to the state's attempt to cancel earmarks. Only one herding district adopted the collective herding system for a while, she said.

The concession system introduced a new administrative and legal hierarchy within the Sámi pastoralist community. The concession holders received and distributed internally the state subsidies and support, and decided how many reindeer the rest of the unit members could own. Most *siidas* in West Finnmark were divided into a number of concession units and interviewed herders referred to conflicting interests within the *siidas*, and within the units, which divided families. Some cases ended in court. For example, in 2005, a *siida* share leader filed a case against his sister for jeopardizing his livelihood (*Indre Finnmark tingrett*, 30 May 2006). The leader claimed he had the right to impose a reduction on his sister's reindeer number. He argued that his sister, who had a steady income from a job outside reindeer husbandry, had become a competitor by increasing her stock and not following the agreed

harvest plan. By not slaughtering as planned, the sister was threatening the concession unit's access to state subsidises, the leader argued. The sister, on the other hand, argued that her brother tried to reduce her stock below what would be economically viable, and that he did not treat the members of the unit equally. The court concluded that the *siida* share leader could establish his sister's reindeer number, but this number should not be below a viable level as the sister had an individual right to engage in reindeer husbandry, despite not having her own concession.

The concession system produced winners (the concession holders) and losers (all other reindeer owners). Lack of resistance toward the system could be interpreted as a legitimization of regulations, but it could also be understood as resignation or internalization of the policies, or a more opportunistic response by individuals to improve their livelihood or strengthen their relative power (Gaventa 1980; Hall et al. 2015). Based on studies of reindeer husbandry in northern Sweden, Beach (1981) shows how traditional Sámi organization and decision-making had been overruled by the national policies. He explains that whether an individual herder or a herding group resisted or complied with the Swedish rationalization measures depended on a number of inter-related factors; e.g., the personal economic flexibility of the herder, his/her desires for herd expansion or stability, and whether he/she was experiencing land-use conflicts. Moreover, Beach (1981:284) argues that one cannot overlook the fact that some pastoralists will benefit more from the Swedish forms of regulation than from the traditional Sámi forms. The claims made in the court case presented above are ones we recognize from the interviews with informants. Similar claims were also raised and discussed by participants at a seminar organized by Gáldu in Kautokeino in January 2015. Pastoralists argued that by giving concession holders the authority to take decisions about the reindeer of others, the 1978 and 2007 Acts challenged traditional decision-making within the *siida* where everyone who owns reindeer has a say.

The accounts presented by the pastoralists in our study indicate that they have, to some degree, maintained a more traditional governance structure, operating in the shadow of the Norwegian state. In the book *The Art of Not Being Governed*, Scott (2009) describes how tribal people in Southeast Asia sought to live in the shadow of the state as a measure to not be governed. He explains these shadow societies as "structures of political, cultural, economic, and often religious positioning", which contradict values of the dominant society (Scott 2009, 216). The idea of shadow societies is also discussed by scholars studying reindeer husbandry in Fennoscandia; e.g., Beach (1981) presents Swedish pastoralists' attempts to avoid the governance structures imposed on them, and Laakso (2008) discusses how Finnish pastoralists conduct their practices regardless of regulations. In the case of Norway, Bjørklund (2004, 135) notes that pastoralists adapt to state regulations "by accepting what could be used in their pastoral adaptation and rejecting the rest of the policy and its devices".

In our study, interviewed pastoralists from West Finnmark explained that they kept two management plans for reindeer husbandry: one made for the authorities (*distriktsplan*), which included only a minimum of information; and a "real" plan, which the *siida* used in their practical work with the herds that was not shared with the authorities. Likewise, herders in the north explained that while an elected leader of the District Board (i.e. a state-invented institution) was often a person that knows how to deal with bureaucratic terminology and reporting requirements, the "real" leader – the chief – of a herding group was a person with advanced experienced-based knowledge about pastoralism. A herder from West Finnmark (informant #04, June 2013) explained that the *siida* chief was not elected; it was a respected herder with deep knowledge of reindeer husbandry who provided leadership for the herding group. Legitimacy as "chief" lasted as long as he or she was the most trusted and respected amongst the *siida* members. "Still, it was clear that everyone was chief of their own animals", the herder stated. Also, one of the interviewed pastoralists from the Røros area (informant

#25, July 2015) referred to the important role of the "chiefs" as leaders and mentors within the household, the *siida* and even the larger herding community.

The pastoralists' shadow management represents a management regime that seems to have – amongst our informants – more legitimacy than the state governance regime. However, the tales of shadow governance form part of the hidden transcripts of the pastoralists (Scott 1990).

Rational Herd Sizes: Destocking

Due to concerns about overstocking, upper reindeer numbers for West Finnmark were set by the Reindeer Husbandry Board in 1987 and again in 2002 (see Figure 2), both times without the consent of the pastoralists and neither time the targeted reindeer numbers were met (Joks et al. 2006). The 2007 Act attempted to improve the efficiency of decision-making about reindeer numbers through participation. The pastoralists were given the responsibility to assess the number of reindeer that could be fed from the herding districts' pastures.

A working group commissioned by the Ministry of Food and Agriculture consisting of six pastoralists, two scientists and two government officials were given the mandate to develop a set of criteria that the District Boards could use to determine upper reindeer numbers and preparing internal herd reduction plans as appropriate (LMD 2008). From 2008 to 2011, most District Boards in West Finnmark developed destocking plans, but only a few districts got their plans approved. For the rest, the Reindeer Husbandry Board dismissed the districts' proposals, arguing that they would not secure ecologically sustainable herd sizes. The Reindeer Husbandry Board decided upper reindeer numbers and reduction plans on behalf of the districts, but the knowledge-base for decisions was not apparent; the decisions were not consistent with the criteria of the working group and they demanded large reductions. On average, the districts were required to destock by approximately 30%, a

reduction twice as large as what the District Boards had proposed (Johnsen 2016). According to interviewed herders, it did not help the districts that the majority of the Reindeer Husbandry Board were herders. There was a difference between herder members appointed by the Sámi Parliament and those appointed by the Ministry, they argued. The former tended to support the district proposals, while the latter tended to vote as the Ministry had instructed them. The informants also claimed that some members voted strategically to destock the herds of their competitors.




Figure 2: Reindeer numbers in West Finnmark and the Røros area for the period 1980-2016. Available data shows that reindeer numbers have been stable in the Røros area (South Trøndelag and Hedmark), while the stocks have fluctuated in West Finnmark. The red line indicates the state decisions on upper reindeer numbers for West Finnmark. The reindeer number in the Røros area is in accordance with the "carrying capacity". Source: personal communication with staff at the Norwegian Agriculture Agency, March 2015; Statens reindriftsforvaltning (2014); and Landbruksdirektoratet (2015; 2016).

Herders in West Finnmark interviewed in 2013 stated that they in general shared the authorities' concern that there were – at the time – too many reindeer. Still, they stated that they would not act upon the destocking decisions; they would "sit on the fence" and await the next move from the state (Johnsen et al. 2015). They explained that they felt misled by the

process and that the decisions were unfair. Moreover, there was an anticipation that the state would request a decision on upper reindeer numbers per *siida* share.

Unless we untangle the relative meanings of "too many reindeer", it seems as a paradox that the herders were unwilling to destock. When asked, the informants explained that rather than being worried about "overgrazing" as the authorities were, they worried that "too many reindeer" would lead to inter-mingling of herds and cause extra labour and potential conflicts with neighbouring *siidas*. Another worry to the informants was that if they implemented the destocking requirement it would be more difficult to claim pastures and hinder encroachment from competing pastoralists or other land-use interests. According to Paine (1996, 130), a herder who loses animals to other herds may recognize that he has "too many reindeer" to manage and that he needs assistance with the herding. But when the children are old enough to help out, the same number of reindeer might be considered "too few". Paine explained that in some contexts "too many reindeer" could mean too little pasture at certain seasons; e.g. in the case of frozen winter pastures. The state, on the other hand, defines the "proper" reindeer number based on the "carrying capacity" of an area. According to Paine (2004, 35), the notion of carrying capacity is "heavily politicized". He argues that the carrying capacity of an area is not fixed, but varies according to the pastoral adaptation to the land and socio-economic goals; e.g., "the target income for pastoralist; the target number of pastoralists; and the target optimal weight of animals" (Paine 1994, 162). In other words, normative standards and desires define the "carrying capacity" of an area (see also e.g., Benjaminsen et al. 2015 and Benjaminsen et al. 2016 for a critical assessment of the "carrying capacity" of Finnmark, and see e.g. Bårdsen et al. 2014 on how "carrying capacity" may change according to desired carcass weights).

Resistance to state control of the herd size started prior to the political reform of the 1970s. The state has regularly organized official counting of the stock. Earlier, these counts

were the basis for imposing taxes and for avoiding grazing conflicts between the nomadic pastoralists and the sedentary farmers (Bull et al. 2001). Today, the main purpose of the counting is to ensure that the stock do not exceed the "carrying capacity". During interviews, pastoralists from West Finnmark presented several stories from the past about how they hid reindeer to mislead the enumerators. A pastoralist (informant #09, July 2014) said that during Easter of 1956 the authorities used aerial photos to count reindeer on the tundra. She explained that her uncle and another pastoralist wanted to trick the enumerators, so "before [the herd] was photographed, NN1 and NN2 gathered half the herd and moved it to the neighbouring valley". Beach (1981) explains that also among the Swedish Sámi pastoralists it was common to let the reindeer scatter extensively throughout the pastures to prevent official counting of the herds.

Whether a district's reindeer number corresponds to the state-defined "carrying capacity" is not a good indicator for determining a pastoralist's attitude towards the destocking policies. For example, interviewed herders from West Finnmark argued that, generally, the size of herds with summer pastures on islands and peninsulas are more often within "carrying capacity" compared to herds that graze on the mainland during summer. A pastoralist (informant #22, March 2015) explained that animals by the coast feed on more nutritious vegetation and therefore, the calves grow relatively fast during summer. However, many of the calves do not cope well with the transition to less nutritious vegetation in the autumn pastures, the pastoralist argued. Another pastoralist (informant #05, July 2014) with summer pastures on an island said that his reindeer number was in accordance with the "carrying capacity". He explained that only the most adaptable animals would survive the transition to autumn pastures on the mainland. The less adaptable calves had to be slaughtered. The informant pointed out the irony in that the authorities regard him as one of the "good guys" due to his "proper" herd size, while in reality he strongly opposed both the state-set upper

reindeer numbers and the decision-making process. He said: "I am seen as one of those who follow the regulations (...) [However,] I would have let the herd grow ever so much, but it is not possible [with my pastures]. (...) There will not be too many reindeer, whatever I do."

From a traditional reindeer herder perspective, the objective is not to maximize production per animal as the state encourages,⁹ but to maximize production per unit area. This is a common approach among nomadic pastoralists living and working in marginal and variable environments (Benjaminsen et al. 2016). Also from this perspective, the stock can be seen as too high or too low. In the Norwegian public debate concerning rational reindeer husbandry, on the other hand, there is no worry about "too few reindeer".

The examples above show that the pastoralists and the authorities have different ways of understanding "too many reindeer". However, not everyone who maintains a relatively low reindeer number adopts the state rationale for optimal reindeer numbers. Districts with "too many reindeer" are punished by not receiving subsidies, and therefore, personal economy is a determining factor when deciding how to react to state regulations. Moreover, when a pastoralist wants to destock, this can be hindered by conflicts between or within the concession unit or the herding district. Interviewed pastoralists explained that the largest summer districts in West Finnmark consist of more than ten *siida* shares and include more than 100 reindeer owners, making it challenging to reach consensus on destocking plans. As a measure to enforce the destocking, the authorities made decisions on upper reindeer numbers per *siida* share unit in 2013. They also announced that units that did not destock accordingly would receive fines.

State Views on Rationalization

For decades, the Røros area has been regarded as a model area for reindeer husbandry, which has been presented as a contrast to the less optimal practices in West Finnmark (e.g. see

Lenvik 1998; Riseth 2000; Bårdsen et al. 2014). The adoption of a "modern" and "rational" reindeer husbandry model in the south is seen – by the authorities – as a testimony of the relevance and appropriateness of the policies and regulations. Lenvik (1998) claimed that within the reindeer husbandry regions the pastoralists in the Røros area had the most optimal combination of reindeer density, herd structure and calf harvest. A White Paper published in 2011 (St. meld. 9, 2011-2012) singles out the interior of Finnmark and the Røros area as the two reindeer husbandry areas in Norway with the most optimal natural conditions for calf and meat production. However, there was a large difference in the meat production between the two regions. Pastoralists in the north did "not fully utilize the potential for high production offered by favourable winter conditions" (St. meld. 9, 2011-2012:85). Herders in the Røros area harvested approximately 60% of annual calf production, while only about 20% of the calves were harvested in the interior of Finnmark. An interviewed government official (informant #35, August 2012) said: "In Southern Norway, they have adopted ways to optimize the meat production (...). In Finnmark, they have to a larger extent insisted that traditional knowledge is still valid". This statement is part of a public discourse that presents herding practices in Finnmark as irrational (Johnsen et al. 2015).

When comparing official statistics on reindeer numbers in West Finnmark and the Røros area between 1980 and 2016 (Figure 2), we find that the numbers in the south have been stable and in accordance with the state-set "carrying capacity", while in the north there are significant fluctuations that often bring these numbers above the "carrying capacity" (red line).¹⁰ The statistics seem to support the above argument that pastoralists in the Røros area generally accept the state's rationalization programme, while there seems to be other parameters regulating the reindeer number in West Finnmark. Examining the harvest, we find that the meat production per animal is significantly higher in the Røros area compared to West Finnmark (Figure 3). However, we also find that (although the annual variation is larger in the

north) the average meat harvest per square km is around 22 kilos in both regions (Figure 3): 21.8 and 22.4 kilos per square km in the Røros area and West Finnmark respectively.¹¹ From a traditional reindeer herder perspective, where the focus is on production per area unit, the practices in the two regions are equally rational. The two regions produce more reindeer meat per area unit than any other herding district in Norway.




Figure 3: Total meat production in West Finnmark and the Røros area for the period 1980-2016. The figure shows the production per animal (bars) and production per square km (line graph). Source: personal communication with staff at the Norwegian Agriculture Agency, March 2015; Statens reindrifstforvaltning (2014); and Landbruksdirektoratet (2015; 2016).

The White Paper (St. meld. 9, 2011-2012) referred to above gives the impression that reindeer numbers in the south have not been a concern to the authorities. However, correspondence between the regional Reindeer Husbandry Administration and the southern herding districts show that the authorities were worried about too many reindeer in two out of the three herding groups in the Røros area during the 1980s and early 1990s. A letter from the Administration, dated June 1993, appeals to the two herding districts to destock and adopt the state-recommended herd structure.¹² Nevertheless, the public presentation of conflicts

between the authorities and pastoralists related to reindeer numbers does not recognize that outside Finnmark these conflicts have also occurred.

When asked about differences in attitudes towards the "rationalization programme" in the northern and southern reindeer herding regions, a herder from the Røros area (informant #17, September 2014) explained:

There is not much difference between the challenges in the north and south. This is a common misconception I hear everywhere. The only difference is that in the south, we have been oppressed for a longer period. In the north, they have been allowed to carry on with their own business, because there were so few conflicts with agriculture. In the south, we have been forced to adapt to the state's rules, because here the agricultural interests have been stronger.

The informant explained that reindeer husbandry in the south, to a larger extent than in Finnmark, resembles an agricultural production system (i.e. being more stationary and enclosed into confined areas) due to state regulations dating back long before the 1970s.

Another informant from the Røros area (informant #24, July 2015) argued that the herders in Finnmark were able to stay more autonomous because they experienced less competition over the land and its resources from other interest groups. She argued that due to more interaction with "Norwegian" society, herders in the Røros area were also more "Norwegianized" than in the north and as such, when the rationalization programme was introduced in the 1970s, the north and the south had different experiences concerning state interventions. This difference between the north and the south is also recognized by Riseth (2000, 138) who explains that "the southern part of Sápmi was a frontier area for both non-Sami agricultural settlement and governmental regulation efforts". Gundersen and Ryssland (2013) argue that repercussions of

the extensive copper mining in Røros from 1644 to 1977, and that the granting of property rights to farmers for areas that previously had been part of "common" land, continue to cause conflicts between pastoralists and other land-use interests in the south.

Another informant from the Røros area (informant #23, March 2015) said that when the rationalization programme was introduced in the 1970s, many pastoralists in the south saw it as a mechanism they could use to justify continued reindeer husbandry in areas with conflicts between reindeer herding and agriculture. However, yet another pastoralist from the Røros area (informant #25, July 2015) argued that the "rationalization" of pastoralism in the south was only advocated by a few herders. The majority of the pastoralists were sceptical to the herd structure and production mode promoted by the new policy.

Independently of the regional differences in benefits of and attitudes towards the political reform, interviewed herders from both West Finnmark and the Røros area stated that they had not understood the consequences of the rationalization measures introduced. A herder from West Finnmark (informant #05, August 2014) explained that the political reform had introduced a new governance system, which herders had not been prepared for. Many of the informants described the reform and the restructuring of Sámi reindeer husbandry as "an experiment" that had large and negative consequences. A herder from the Røros area (informant #17, September 2014) said it this way: "It is an on-going experiment. [The state] has always experimented with reindeer husbandry. They have never bothered to understand the [pastoralists'] reality, and they have never tried to understand the fundamental principles of Sámi culture."

The authorities' public transcript about the rationalization programme blame the pastoralists in Finnmark for the failure of the rationalization policies in the north. According to interviewed government officials, the pastoralists had the possibility to participate and influence the destocking and other decision-making processes. One of the government

officials (informant #39, September 2012) claimed that no other regulations in Norway secure the same level of stakeholder participation as the reindeer husbandry policies. However, we found that the authorities presented different public transcripts about decision-making, depending on the audience they addressed. In seminar presentations targeting pastoralists, they minimized their own role. They claimed that pastoralists, through the co-management system and internal management plans, controlled and decided upon most issues related to reindeer husbandry, including setting upper reindeer numbers. But addressing Parliament, the Minister of Food and Agriculture emphasized the Ministry's strong and direct involvement in the destocking process in West Finnmark (Stortinget 2013).

Scott (1990, 14) explains that hidden transcripts are "specific to a given social site and to a particular set of actors". As such, the authorities' alternative presentation to the Parliament is publically available, but it takes place beyond the direct observation of the herders (Scott 1990, 4). The reality was that with "rationalization", the governance system changed from being predominantly self-organized to state-controlled (M.N. Sara 2009). The standardization of calf production and introduction of reindeer quotas are governance techniques designed to simplify the reindeer sector and to render it technical and thereby legible to government officials (Johnsen et al. 2015). However, governance based on these simplifications leaves little room for the herders' complex situated and local knowledge of reindeer and pastures, and may even undermine it (Laakso 2008). Moreover, the authorities' conceptions of relevant knowledge and "order of the universe" forms a prescription for appropriate pastoral behaviour (Fletcher 2010, 178) – conceptions that are maintained through the state's techniques of governing (Dean 2010, 42). The simplistic presentation of what pastoralism *is*, combined with the state vision for what it *ought* to be, has become an established truth that is regularly presented in government reports, at conferences and in the media (Johnsen et al. 2015). Moreover, the state failure to incorporate *siida* knowledge and management principles into the

governance of Sámi pastoralism is a source of tension in the internal relations within the herding community (Turi 2016:80).

Conclusion

This article has examined the state-led rationalization programme for Sámi reindeer pastoralism in Norway since the 1970s by addressing the state approach for making reindeer husbandry more rational and the main actors' accounts of this rationalization. We have addressed four "techniques of power" used by the state to shape herders' behaviour: *discipline*, stimulating an internalization of specific practices through participation and capacity building (e.g., requesting all herding districts to develop internal management plans and provide guidelines for estimating upper reindeer numbers); *neoliberal rationality*, providing economic rewards for adoption of specific practice of meat production; *sovereign power*, prescribing rules through laws and regulations (e.g. the introduction of the concession system); and *truth*, fostering a specific understanding of rational behaviour through repeated public presentations.

Despite the authorities' governing techniques, the rationalization policies were far from fully implemented in West Finnmark. Interviewed pastoralists shared accounts of their own strategies to resist the implementation of state regulations and maintain or gain control of their own livelihood and practices. Pastoralists produced public plans (public transcripts) for pasture use and labour in the District Boards according to state requirements, but they made more detailed plans for the operations within the *siida*, which they did not share with the authorities. Further, the pastoralists "weapons" of resistance included to publically oppose the state plans about introducing a collective herding system with only one earmark per operating unit; to manipulate reindeer counts by hiding animals; to accept subsidies, but ignore their intentions; and to keep a more traditional governance structure in the shadow of the Norwegian state.

Interviewed government officials were concerned that pastoralists in West Finnmark continued to keep "too many reindeer" despite the requirement to destock. In public presentations addressing herders, they emphasized the herders' role and responsibility in decision-making and minimized their own role. However, when addressing other audiences (e.g. the Parliament), the authorities emphasized their own control and strong and direct involvement in the process. Moreover, in reality, the political reform changed the previous governance system from being predominantly self-organized to state-controlled. The current governance of Sámi pastoralism, based on the authorities' conceptions of relevant knowledge and "order of the universe", leaves little room for the herders' complex situated and local knowledge of reindeer and pastures. Rather, the governance forms a prescription about what reindeer husbandry *is* and *ought* to be.

The policies have created winners and losers and skewed the power relations within the Sámi herding community, as well as between the state and the pastoralists. For example, while some pastoralists were able to get a concession and build up their stocks, others were not. The Sámi pastoralist population is a heterogeneous group of people that follow different family traditions for reindeer husbandry and herding. Between and within the herding regions, pastoralists operate in a variety of landscapes and ecosystems and face a variety of external challenges (e.g. weather, predators and land-use encroachments) that affect their livelihoods and influence their strategies to manage reindeer and pastures. Therefore, we cannot simply identify the supporters of the rationalization programme by pointing at those with "proper" herding practices according to the state. Nor can we identify pastoralists with "too many reindeer" as those opposing the policies. Our study shows that the herders' response to state regulations are determined by e.g., personal beliefs, desires and capacity, as well as their relationship to and the behaviour of their fellow herders.

Acknowledgements

We would like to express our appreciation to reindeer herders, government officials, and others who shared their experiences and insights with us. We also thank the participants of the project "The Economics and Land-Use Conflicts in Sámi Reindeer Herding in Finnmark: Exploring the Alternatives (*Dávvgas*)" as well as Emil Sandström, John-Andrew McNeish and two anonymous reviewers for constructive inputs, which helped us to improve the article. A special thanks to Alf Bjørnar Eriksen for producing the map. This work was supported by the Research Council of Norway under Grant number 215961.

Notes

¹ The *Agreement* was based on biannual negotiations until 1993 when they became annual (St. prp. 66, 1993-1994).

² The first *Agreement on Reindeer Husbandry* introduced subsidies for calf harvest and autumn slaughter as techniques to conserve winter pastures (Kvakkestad and Aalerud 2012). The subsidies from the *Agreement* became extensive from the early 1980s, but after some public criticism arguing that the subsidy system promoted herd increases, the subsidy system was adjusted from 1987/88 (Riseth 2000). Since then, the subsidies aimed to stimulate higher harvest rates, calf slaughter and autumn slaughter (Hausner et al. 2011). After 2003, the subsidy system was altered to emphasize production value instead of volume and currently, subsidies are tied to the following criteria: the unit's stock is within the state-set upper reindeer number; the value of the unit's meat production; calf harvest; and the leader of the *siida* share (together with his/her family) owns 85% or more of the unit's stock (Prop. 68 S, 2014-2015).

³ Finnmark is Norway's northernmost county and largest reindeer-herding region. Roughly 70% of the approximately 210,000 semi-domesticated reindeer in Norway are found in Finnmark. Nationwide there are 3150 reindeer owners; about 76% are registered in Finnmark. Approximately 55% of the all reindeer and 62% of all reindeer owners in Finnmark are found in West Finnmark (Landbruksdirektoratet 2016).

⁴ A state housing programme was introduced in 1958 (Lenvik 1998, 9).

⁵ Subsidies for restocking were dispersed in 1953, 1955, 1963-1971 and 1976-1978 (Hausner et al. 2011).

⁶ The state refers to reindeer husbandry as a "*næring*", which is commonly translated as "industry". In the late 1970s, pastoralism was legally regarded as an occupation rather than an inherited livelihood (Paine 2004, 30).

⁷ According to Riseth (2000), the knowledge-base for the reindeer husbandry politics was

developed during the 1970s by relatively few people.

⁸ According to the informant, the 1980s were particularly good years for reindeer husbandry. The weather conditions were optimal, there were few predators, survival rate of the reindeer was high and herds grew.

⁹ The state defines "production" as total kilos meat sold per animal in the spring herd before calving.

¹⁰ The upper reindeer numbers for West Finnmark was set to 90,100 animals in 1987, 64,300 in 2002, and 78,150 in 2011 (Joks et al. 2006; Statens reindriftsforvaltning 2014). The upper reindeer number for the Hedemark and South Trøndelag is set to 13,600 animals. Lenvik (1990) recommended an upper reindeer number of 85,000-90,000 in order to maximize the meat production in West-Finnmark, and Bårdsen et al. (2014) estimates that approximately 50,000 animals is an optimal reindeer number for West Finnmark.

¹¹ Our estimates are based on best available production data provided by staff at the Norwegian Agriculture Agency (personal communication, March 2015), as well as official reports on the state of reindeer husbandry (Statens reindriftsforvaltning 2014, Landbruksdirektoratet 2016).

¹² A copy of the letter was provided by the recipient (informant #24, July 2015).

References

- Anaya, James. 2011. "Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, James Anaya - The Situation of the Sami People in the Sápmi Region of Norway, Sweden and Finland." Human Rights Council, Eighteenth session, Geneva, September 12-30.
- Arnesen, Arne G. 1979. "Norsk rett - også for samer? Særlig om reindriftssamenes rettstilling før og nå." *Hefte for kritisk juss* 5 (1):15-24.
- Beach, Hugh. 1981. "Reindeer-Herd Management in Transition: the Case of Tuorpon Saameby in Northern Sweden." PhD diss., Studies in Cultural Anthropology, University of Uppsala.
- Benjaminsen, Tor A., Johan Borgenvik, Espen Sjaastad, and Andrei Marin. 2016. "Reintetthet, produktivitet og effektivisering: Om modeller, forskning og politikk." In *Samisk reindrift, norske myter*, edited by Tor A. Benjaminsen, Inger Marie Gaup Eira and Mikkel Nils Sara, 69-85. Bergen: Fagbokforlaget.
- Benjaminsen, Tor A., Inger Marie Gaup Eira, Erik Reinert, Hugo Reinert, Mikkel Nils Sara, and Hanne Svarstad. 2016. "Reindrift, makt og myter." In *Samisk reindrift, norske myter*, edited by Tor A Benjaminsen, Inger Marie Gaup Eira and Mikkel Nils Sara, 9-24. Bergen: Fagbokforlaget.
- Benjaminsen, Tor A., Hugo Reinert, Espen Sjaastad, and Mikkel Nils Sara. 2015. "Misreading the Arctic Landscape: A Political Ecology of Reindeer, Carrying Capacities and Overstocking in Finnmark, Norway." *Norsk Geografisk Tidsskrift—Norwegian Journal of Geography* 69 (4): 219-229. doi: 10.1080/00291951.2015.1031274.

- Berg, Bård A. 1996. "Government Intervention into Sámi Reindeer-Management in Norway: Has it Prevented or Provoked 'Tragedies of the Commons'?" *Acta Borealia* 13 (2):69-89.
- Bjørklund, Ivar. 1990. "Sami Reindeer Pastoralism as an Indigenous Resource Management System in Northern Norway: A Contribution to the Common Property Debate." *Development and Change* 21 (1):75-86.
- Bjørklund, Ivar. 2004. "Saami Pastoral Society in Northern Norway: the National Integration of an Indigenous Management System." In *Cultivating Arctic Landscapes: Knowing and Managing Animals in the Circumpolar North.*, edited by David G. Anderson and Mark Nuttall, 124-135. Berghahn, New York.
- Bull, Kirsti Strøm, Nils Oskal, and Mikkel Nils Sara. 2001. *Reindriften i Finnmark: rettshistorie 1852-1960*. Oslo: Cappelen akademisk.
- Bårdsen, Bård-Jørgen, Helge Berglann, Audun Stien, and Torkild Tveraa. 2014. "Effekten av høsting på produksjon og lønnsomhet i reindriften." *NINA Rapport 999*. Tromsø: Norsk institutt for naturforskning.
- Cavanagh, Connor Joseph, and Tor A. Benjaminsen. 2015. "Guerrilla Agriculture? A Biopolitical Guide to Illicit Cultivation within an IUCN Category II Protected Area." *The Journal of Peasant Studies* 42 (3-4):725-745. doi: 10.1080/03066150.2014.993623.
- Corbin, Juliet M., and Anselm Strauss. 1990. "Grounded Theory Research: Procedures, Canons, and Evaluative Criteria." *Qualitative Sociology* 13 (1):3-21. doi: 10.1007/bf00988593.
- Dean, Mitchell. 2010. *Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society*. 2 ed. London: Sage publications.

- Eira, Inger Marie Gaup, Ole Henrik Magga, and Nils Isak Eira. 2010. "Muohhtatearpmaid sisdoallu ja geavahus (Sámi Snow Terminology - Meaning and Usage)." *Sámi dieđalaš áigečála* 2010 (2):3-24.
- Eira, Inger Marie Gaup, Mikkel Nils Sara, Hanne Svarstad, and Svein D Mathiesen. 2016. "Å se som en stat eller som en samisk reineier: To forståelser av bærekraftig reindrift." In *Samisk reindrift, norske myter*, edited by Tor A. Benjaminsen, Inger Marie Gaup Eira and Mikkel Nils Sara, 27-48. Bergen: Fagbokforlaget.
- Fletcher, Robert. 2010. "Neoliberal Environmentalism: Towards a Poststructuralist Political Ecology of the Conservation Debate." *Conservation & Society* 8 (3):171-181. doi: 10.4103/0972-4923.73806.
- Foucault, Michel. 1991. "Governmentality." In *The Foucault Effect - Studies in Governmentality. With Two Lectures by and an Interview with Michel Foucault*, edited by Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon and Peter Miller, 87-104. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- Foucault, Michel. 2008. *The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1978-1979*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Gaventa, John. 1980. *Power and Powerlessness: Quiescence and Rebellion in an Appalachian Valley*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Gordon, Colin. 1991. "Governmental Rationality: An Introduction." In *The Foucault Effect - Studies in Governmentality. With two Lectures by and an Interview with Michel Foucault*, edited by Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon and Peter Miller, 1-52. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- Gundersen, Frode, and Sigurd Rysstad. 2013. *Reindriftsforvaltning, rettigheter og arealkonflikter. En studie av areal og rettighetskonflikter mellom reindriften og andre*

utmarksbrukere i Sør-Trøndelag i Norge og i Västerbotten og Jämtland/Härjedalen i Sverige i perioden 1980-2005. Ås: Universitetet for miljø og biovitenskap.

- Hall, Ruth, Marc Edelman, Saturnino M. Borrás, Ian Scoones, Ben White, and Wendy Wolford. 2015. "Resistance, Acquiescence or Incorporation? An Introduction to Land Grabbing and Political Reactions 'From Below'." *The Journal of Peasant Studies* 42 (3-4):467-488. doi: 10.1080/03066150.2015.1036746.
- Haslie, Anita. 2013. "Da minoritetskvinnene reiste seg." *Forskning.no*, 3 April. Accessed 29 July 2015. <http://bit.ly/1OBQ4Ee>.
- Hausner, Vera H., Per Fauchald, Torkild Tveraa, Elisabeth Pedersen, Johnny-Leo Jernsletten, Birgitte Ulvevadet, Rolf A. Ims, Nigel G. Yoccoz, and Kari Anne Brathen. 2011. "The Ghost of Development Past: the Impact of Economic Security Policies on Saami Pastoral Ecosystems." *Ecology and Society* 16 (3): Article 4. doi: 10.5751/es-04193-160304.
- Henriksen, John B. 2011. "Interne rettighetsspørsmål i reindriften i Finnmark: Noen problemstillinger og årsaksforhold. Utredning for Finnmarkskommisjonen". Accessed 29 August 2015. <http://bit.ly/1i9ywoX>
- Homstvedt, Svein. 1979. "Administrative ordninger i jordbruket som grunnlag for statistikk." Arbeidsnotat, 21 March 1979. Oslo: Statistisk sentralbyrå.
- Hætta, Johan Ingvald, Ole K. Sara, and Ivar Rushfeldt. 1994. *Reindriften i Finnmark: lovgivning og distriktsinndeling. Forslag til ny distriktsinndeling i Finnmark*. Alta: Reindriftsadministrasjonen.
- Johnsen, Kathrine Ivsett. 2016. "Medbestemmelse, makt og mistillit i reindriftsforvaltningen." In *Samisk reindrift, norske myter*, edited by Tor A. Benjaminsen, Inger Marie Gaup Eira and Mikkel Nils Sara, 195-220. Bergen: Fagbokforlaget.

- Johnsen, Kathrine Ivsett, Tor A. Benjaminsen, and Inger Marie G. Eira. 2015. "Seeing Like the State or Like Pastoralists? Conflicting Narratives on the Governance of Sámi Reindeer Husbandry in Finnmark, Norway." *Norsk Geografisk Tidsskrift - Norwegian Journal of Geography* 69 (4):230-241. doi: 10.1080/00291951.2015.1033747.
- Joks, Solveig, Ole Henrik Magga, Svein D Mathiesen, and Isak Mathis Henriksen. 2006. *Reintallet i Vest-Finnmark, Forskningsbasert vurdering av prosessen rundt fastsettelse av høyeste reintall i Vest-Finnmark*. Kautokeino: Sámi University College.
- Kvakkestad, Valborg, and Ellen Henrikke Aalerud. 2012. *Gjennomgang av de direkte og kostnadssenkende tilskuddene over reindriftsavtalen*. Oslo: Norsk institutt for landbruksøkonomisk forskning.
- Labba, Niklas, Svein-Ole Granefjell, Björn Linder, and Jan Åge Riseth. 2006. "Analyse av den samiske reindriftenes økonomiske tilpasning. Reinen - inntektskilde eller kulturforankring?" *Dieđut 2006:4*. Kautokeino: Nordisk Samisk Institutt.
- Laakso, A. M. 2008. "The Shadow Field of Reindeer Management: A Case Study from Finland." *Acta Borealia* 25 (2):138-159. doi: 10.1080/08003830802496703.
- Landbruksdirektoratet. 2015. "Ressursregnskap for reindriftnæringen for reindriftsåret 1. april 2013 - 31. mars 2014." Alta: Landbruksdirektoratet.
- Landbruksdirektoratet. 2016. "Ressursregnskap for reindriftnæringen for reindriftsåret 1. april 2014 - 31. mars 2015." Landbruksdirektoratet.no. Accessed 2 December 2016. <http://bit.ly/2ns34Zx>
- Lenvik, Dag. 1990. "Flokkstrukturering: tiltak for lønnsom plassering og ressurstilpasset reindrift." *Rangifer* Special Issue No. 4:21-35.
- Lenvik, Dag. 1998. "Utfordring og hovedstrategi i reindriftpolitikken." Internal memo 98-017, 11 March 1998, Ministry of Agriculture.
- Li, Tania Murray. 2007. "Governmentality." *Anthropologica* 49 (2):275-281.

- Marin, Andrei, and Ivar Bjørklund. 2015. "A Tragedy of Errors? Institutional Dynamics and Land Tenure in Finnmark, Norway." *International Journal of the Commons* 9 (1):19-40.
- NOU. 2001. "Forslag til endringer i reindriftsloven: Innstilling fra Reindriftslovutvalget oppnevnt av Landbruksdepartementet 5. november 1998." Regjeringen.no. Accessed 29 August 2015. <http://bit.ly/2n0zw2A>
- Ot. prp. 9. 1976-1977. "Om lov om reindrift." Stortinget.no. Accessed 2 December 2016. <http://bit.ly/2mMx92p>
- Paine, Robert. 1994. *Herds of the Tundra: A Portrait of Saami Reindeer Pastoralism*. Smithsonian Institution Press Washington, DC.
- Paine, Robert. 1996. "Saami Reindeer Pastoralism & the Norwegian State, 1960s-1990s." *Nomadic Peoples* 38:125-136.
- Paine, Robert. 2004. "Saami Reindeer Pastoralism: Quo Vadis?" *Ethnos* 69 (1):23-42. doi: 10.1080/0014184042000191816.
- Prop. 68 S. 2014-2015. "Reindriftsavtalen 2015/2016, og endringer i statsbudsjettet 2015 m.m." Regjeringen.no. Accessed 2 December 2017. <http://bit.ly/1a4UQLN>
- Ravna, Øyvind. 2007. "Forvaltningspraksis, rettsoppfatninger og løsningsmodeller i konflikter mellom bufehold og reindrift i områder sør for Finnmark 1938-1978." In *NOU 2007:14 Samisk naturbruk og rettsituasjon fra Hedmark til Troms. Bakgrunnsmateriale for Samerettsutvalget*, 545-606. Regjeringen.no. Accessed 2 December 2016. <http://bit.ly/2ml0HYQ>
- Reindriftsforvaltningen. 2009. *Veileder for utarbeidelse av bruksregler*. Alta: Reindriftsforvaltningen.

- Reinert, Erik S. 2006. "The Economics of Reindeer Herding: Saami Entrepreneurship between Cyclical Sustainability and the Powers of State and Oligopolies." *British Food Journal* 108 (7):522 - 540.
- Reinert, Hugo. 2008. "The Corral and the Slaughterhouse: Knowledge, Tradition and the Modernization of Indigenous Reindeer Slaughtering Practice in the Norwegian Arctic." PhD diss., Scott Polar Research Institute, University of Cambridge.
- Riksrevisjonen. 2004. "Riksrevisjonens undersøkelse av bærekraftig bruk av reinbeiteressursene i Finnmark." Dokument 3:12 (2003-2004). Stortinget.no. Accessed 2 December 2016. <http://bit.ly/2n2Oipn>
- Riksrevisjonen. 2012. "Riksrevisjonens undersøkelse av bærekraftig reindrift i Finnmark." Dokument 3:14, 2011-2012). Riksrevisjonen.no. Accessed 2 Decemner 2016. <http://bit.ly/2n6EP1Z>
- Riseth, Jan Åge. 2000. "Sámi Reindeer Management under Technological Change 1960-1990: Implications for Common-Pool Resource Use Under Various Natural and Institutional Conditions. A Comparative Analysis of Regional Development Paths in West Finnmark, North Trøndelag, and South Trøndelag/Hedmark, Norway." PhD diss., Department of Economics and Social Sciences, Agricultural University of Norway.
- Riseth, Jan Åge. 2014. "Ei bærekraftig reindrift?" In *Samiske tall forteller 7 - Kommentert samisk statistikk 2014*, edited by Faglig analysegruppe for samisk statistikk, 52-100. Kautokeino: Samisk høgskole.
- Riseth, Jan Åge, Niklas Labba, and Johan Klemet H. Kalstad. 2005. "Analyse av den samiske reindriftas økonomiske tilpasning—Et samarbeidsprosjekt mellom Nordisk Samisk Institutt (NSI) og Umeå Universitet (UU), Centrum för samisk forskning (CESAM)." *Rangifer* 10 (2005):69-78.

- Sagelvmo, Almar. 2004. "Næringsavtaler og næringspolitikk (første gang trykt i år 2000 i Landbruksdepartementets jubileumsbok)." In *Landbruksdirektøren fra Nord-Norge - Festskrift til Almar Sagelvmo*, edited by Magne Stubsjøen, 56-72. Oslo: Landbruksdepartementet.
- Sara, Mikkel Nils. 2001. *Reinen - et gode fra vinden: Reindriftens tilpasningsformer i Kautokeino*. Karasjok: Davvi girji.
- Sara, Mikkel Nils. 2009. "Siida and Traditional Sámi Reindeer Herding Knowledge." *Northern Review* 30 (Spring):153-178.
- Sara, Mikkel Nils. 2013. "Being Siida - on the Relationship between Siida Tradition and Continuation of the Siida System. PhD diss., Faculty of Humanities, Social Sciences and Education, University of Tromsø.
- Sara, Ole K. 2004. "Reindrift i utvikling." In *Landbruksdirektøren fra Nord-Norge - Festskrift til Almar Sagelvmo*, edited by Magne Stubsjøen, 34-40. Oslo: Landbruksdepartementet.
- Scott, James C. 1985. *Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance*. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.
- Scott, James C. 1990. *Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Scott, James C. 1998. *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition have Failed*. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.
- Scott, James C. 2009. *The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast Asia*. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.
- St. meld. 9. 2011-2012. "Landbruks- og Matpolitikken: Velkommen til Bords." Regjeringen.no. 2 Decemner 2016. <http://bit.ly/1F7psuU>

- St. prp. 66. 1993-1994. "Ny Hovedavtale for reindriften, reindriftsavtalen 1993-94, om dekning av kostnader vedrørende radioaktivitet i reinkjøtt og om endringer i statsbudsjettet for 1993." 2 Desember 2016. <http://bit.ly/2mKzs5d>
- St. prp. 170. 1975-1976. "Om hovedavtale for reindriftnæringen." 2 Desember 2016. <http://bit.ly/2mnRCyo>
- Statens reindriftsforvaltning. 2014. *Ressursregnskap for reindriftnæringen for reindriftsåret 1. april 2012 - 31. mars 2013*. Alta: Fagtrykk Idé AS.
- Storli, Inger, and Ole K Sara. 1997. *Reindrift før og nå*. Oslo: Landbruksforlaget.
- Stortinget. 2013. Innstilling fra kontroll- og konstitusjonskomiteen om Riksrevisjonens undersøkelse av bærekraftig reindrift i Finnmark. In *Referat Stortinget, Sak 1, 24.01.2013*. Stortinget.no. Accessed 2 December 2016. <http://bit.ly/2gw4aQa>
- Turi, Ellen Inga. 2016. "State Steering and Traditional Ecological Knowledge in Reindeer-Herding Governance: Cases from Western Finnmark, Norway and Yamal, Russia." PhD diss., Department of Geography and Economic History, Umeå University.
- Villmo, Loyd. 1978. "Derfor har jeg advart." *Reindriftnytt* 6:2-4.
- Vorren, Ørnulv. 1946. "Reindriften i Norge." *Norsk Geografisk Tidsskrift - Norwegian Journal of Geography* 11 (5-6):199-220. doi: 10.1080/00291954608551627.
- Willig, Carla. 2013. *Introducing Qualitative Research in Psychology*. 3 ed. Maidenhead: McGraw-Hill Education.