



Norges miljø- og  
biovitenskapelige  
universitet

Master's Thesis 2017 30 ECTS

Department of International Environment and Development Studies  
NORAGRIC

## The Role of the Police in Countering Radicalization and Violent Extremism in Bærum

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## **Declaration**

I Landing Nyassi, declare that this thesis is a result of my research investigation and findings. Sources of information other than my own have been acknowledged and a reference list has been appended. This work has not been previously submitted to any other university for award of any type of academic degree.

Signature

Date

## **Acknowledgements**

No one does everything alone and as such this research paper would not have been possible without the support and encouragement from others. I would like to express my sincere thanks and appreciation to my supervisor Stig Jarle Hansen for the support and encouragement.

My colleagues in the IR program you also deserve an acknowledgement for news of some of you handing in your theses added to the motivation for me to keep pushing even though sometimes I felt like quitting. To Fatoumata Faty I say thank you for the words of encouragement that helped me to pick up my pieces and move on in writing anytime I felt like not to continue.

Mari Oppedahl the SLT Coordinator at Bærum Kommune I say thank you for the tips on Literature and thesis topic.

Ingunn Bohman you are superb, thank you for the advice and giving me a chance to hand in my thesis this semester.

## **Abstract**

The police and their sister institution police security service (PST) security and intelligence gathering organs of the state have been given responsibility to implement most of the measures adopted in both the national and local action plans against violent extremism especially those measures that involve engaging the religious or faith communities. The role of the police needs to be properly examined in order to identify loopholes which might be detrimental to counter radicalization into violent extremism work.

This paper has examined how CVE policy documents both at the national and local level of Bærum have categorized the role of the police in countering all forms of violent extremism and how these documents have highlighted the causes and phenomenon of radicalization. This paper has also looked into how the issue of trust within the Muslim community towards the police and municipal authorities is addressed in both national and local policy documents on radicalization and violent extremism.

To give answers to the issues raised in the research questions the paper adopted a literature review and theoretical discussions on themes associated with the role of police and trust building mechanisms in CVE work. What came of the review and discussions is that police in carryout their role according to the measures developed by government policy may contribute to the weakening of trust within Muslim communities towards relevant authorities. This paper has argued that the police and their sister organization PST are all over the measures adopted to counter radicalization and violent extremism and that such a police presence is counterproductive because it may lead to suspicion and less police accountability.

## **Abbreviations**

Bærum Kommune	BK
Coordinated Local Crime prevention measures	SLT
Norwegian Ministry of Justice and Public Security	NMJPS
National Action Plan against Radicalization and Violent Extremism	NAPRVE
National Guide against Radicalization and Violent Extremism	NGRVE
Local Action Plan against Extremism	LAPE

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## 1.0 Introduction

The police and their sister institution police security service (PST) security and intelligence gathering organs of the state have been given responsibility to implement most of the measures adopted in both the national and local action plans against violent extremism especially those measures that involve engaging the religious or faith communities. The role of the police needs to be properly examined in order to identify loopholes which might be detrimental to counter radicalization into violent extremism work. Trust is a crucial pillar in engaging local communities. It is therefore relevant to probe on how is the issue of trust within the Muslim community towards the police is addressed in both the national and local counter violent extremism policy documents. It is equally important to also look at how the CVE policy documents both at the national and local level categorized the role of the police in countering all forms of violent extremism and how has these documents highlighted the causes & phenomenon of radicalization. These are very pertinent areas that need to be looked into in order to give a better understanding of the role police should play in countering radicalization into violent extremism at the community level. There is scanty empirical data on home-grown violent extremism; most of the available literature is mainly based on analysis of secondary data of research carried out in different demographic conditions and time frame (Dalgard-Nielsen, 2008, Ackerman & Lafree 2009 ; Dahlgaard Nielsen 2013). Radicalization and violent extremism are global challenges from Al-shabab in Somalia, Boko Haram in Nigeria, Islamic State in Iraq and Syria to racist right wing groups in Europe. Although these extremists groups may have lost ground in the battle fields but they continue to gain recruits in the West coupled with an increase in hate and right wing groups (Koheler 2016, Kennedy 2014; Pestano 2016). For there to be effective measures to counter extremism there needs to be continuous empirical research on what drives people into violent extremism and to what extent counter extremism measures are helping in the fight against violent extremism(Dalgard-Nielsen, 2008).

I intend to look at the role of the police in the SLT counter extremism measure adopted by the Municipality which is mainly community driven but at the same time seem police-directed because of the responsibilities placed in the hands of the police and sister unit PST. A lot of stake holders are involved in these measures at the community level from the police, local government, religious institutions and immigrant organizations with the SLT Coordinator being at the center of these initiatives (SLT Årsrapport 2014). The proper functioning of such a measure would be very instrumental to curbing extremism in the Municipality. It would also



help to identify the shortcomings of the adopted measures and give suggestions or recommendations. This paper begins by outlining the purpose of this study followed by research questions and research structure. A conceptualization of both trust and radicalization is undertaken to be followed suit with background information of the study. There after the SLT model is presented elaborating on its history and purpose and structure and followed by an overview of the main national policy document on radicalization and violent extremism; the national action plan against radicalization and violent extremism(NAPRVE) . There after Work with religious communities is expounded on before turning to the methods section of this paper. This is followed by a section on literature review on issues that revolve around the two research questions. After literature review two theories are presented; trust theory and radicalization theory. The final part of the paper comes in right after deliberations on theories with presentation of findings and discussions.

### **Research Purpose**

The purpose of the research is to examine the role of the police in SLT model of countering radicalization and violent extremism in Bærum Municipality. The research centers on the issue of trust and confidence amongst the Muslim community in the role of the police in countering violent extremism in Bærum. First is to identify the issue of trust and confidence in the role of police in countering violent extremism from literature. The literature review will contribute to addressing some of the research questions. The next step is to identify counter radicalization documents both at the national and municipal level followed by a discussion and analysis of how those documents have addressed the issue of trust and confidence within communities in CVE work both in theory and practice. My interaction with the Muslim community and my work as an intern at the SLT coordinator's office in Bærum would be an additional tool in the discussion and analysis of counter violent extremism policy documents.

### **Research Questions**

1. How has CVE policy documents both at the national and local level categorized the role of the police in countering all forms of violent extremism and how has these documents highlighted the causes & phenomenon of radicalization?
2. How is the issue of trust within the Muslim community towards the police addressed in both the national and local counter violent extremism policy documents?

## **Structure of Research**

The methodology to be used to answer the research questions of this study will be comparative in nature. For this comparison to be possible three intermediate steps are necessary: conceptualization of the issue of trust and the radicalization process and the factorization of the causes behind this phenomenon will be carried out. Second is a literature review capturing the two research questions and a study of the counter-radicalization action plan adopted by the SLT model in Bærum and presented at the municipal level in order to be able to discern the measures it propose. The third part would be analyzing of the content of policy documents by making use of information gathered in the literature review and personal experiences. The third part of this comparative approach which will be analyzing what is in the policy documents in relations to information gathered under literature review and reflecting the contexts and concepts developed for the research will fall under the findings section of this thesis. Cases of police CVE work in different parts of the world like U.S.A and Britain would be highlighted and discussed in relations to Norway. The Researchers do utilize case studies to contextualize different forms of violent extremism and for coming up with strategies that would meet a certain context of violent extremism and Duyvesteyn (2007) and Ranstorp (2006) took it further by postulating that utilizing relational analysis between and within cases helps give a better understanding in the field of counter violent extremism.

## **Conceptualizing trust**

Trust is very vital in any CVE work because without it the concept of cooperation and collaboration with the local community would be very difficult to materialize. Any system that is not built on trust would loss legitimacy and becomes unsustainable as Blind (2006:3) puts it trust is “one of the most important ingredients upon which the legitimacy and sustainability of political systems are built”. “Trust occurs when parties holding certain favorable perceptions of each other allow this relationship reach the expected outcomes”(Wheless and Grotz, 1997:251). Levi and Stoker (2000:496) states if there is trust between actors, people or within an organization such relationship will be devoid of “worry and the need to monitor the other party’s behavior, partially or entirely”. Government adjusts policy documents from time to time as demonstrated by the review of the national action plan against radicalization and violent extremism in order to meet new challenges and as Campo (2006) puts it trust becomes crucial anytime new policy is announced. If a relationship

between different actors on an issue for example fighting terrorism and violent extremism is built on trust it would help reduce transaction cost (Fukuyama 1995).

Some scholars use confidence and trust interchangeably while others make a distinction between them (Blind, 2006). The scholars who make a distinction between the two conceptualize them as follows; confidence is defined as a passive emotion given to the sociopolitical system as a whole while trust is a set of beliefs and commitment given to people (ibid). According to literature trust can be categorized as political or social but the two are not mutually exclusive of each other (Blind, 2006). Political trust is the “judgment of the citizenry that the system and the political incumbents are responsive and will do what is right even in the absence of constant scrutiny” (Miller and Listhaug 1990:358). Political trust is also further categorized into organizational and the individual political trust. “Both the organizational and the individual political trust depend on credible policy –making” (Blind, 2006:04). Another type of political trust is the rational/psychological political trust and according to Blind (2006:05) in the rational or psychological political trust “people search for sincerity and truthfulness in the personality, public appearances, speeches and behavior of their political leaders.” The different variants of political trust do not work separate but together which means the lack of trust in a government public official like minister can transform itself into distrust of the whole political system and even local efforts of cooperation and collaboration (Blind,2006). This is very relevant in Norway at the moment with regards to local efforts of cooperation and collaboration to fight against radicalization and violent extremism. The actions of the minister of immigration who is anti immigrant may have serious consequences in terms of trust and confidence between the local community and the various players including the police.

Political trust does not operate alone but operates alongside social trust. Social trust refers to the confidence that members of a social community have in each other (Blind, 2006). The trust that members of the community have for each other is a vital social capital, that trust together with civil engagement contribute to the uplifting of social trust in a particular society as a whole (Putnam,2000). Social capital is very instrumental in collective and collaborative action because it can be described as a “lubricant of interactions among people” (Arrow 1974:23).

Trust in all its forms; social and political is the cornerstone of good governance (Blind, 2006). Political trust is the main driving force of good governance (Hetherington, 2005). In the local

setting e.g Bærum municipality where the SLT model is used for counter radicalization and violent extremism work is synonymous to governance. If there is a high level of trust by community members to those in authorities it would greatly facilitate cooperation and collaboration work. According to Blind (2006:06) “A high level of trust in government and political incumbents benefits all of the citizens, especially minorities and people who are at a relative disadvantage in socio-economic and /or political terms.” In situation where the ministry of immigration is headed by someone who is hostile to immigrants this generates a disdain among the immigrant towards such a political incumbent which may affect their trust towards governments initiatives in their local communities including counter radicalization and violent extremism initiatives.

### **Conceptualizing radicalization**

Radicalization, terrorism and violent extremism are very complex issues that need concerted effort to comprehend in order to effectively counter them. Any effort that aims to address these issues needs to bank on theories that have been developed and shared with the public by various scholars. As this research paper is about the role of the police in countering violent extremism it is pertinent to conceptualize what law enforcement officers are having a stake in by digging into the theories various scholars have developed over the years to explain radicalization and violent extremism. Because of the complexity of the term it makes it difficult to pinpoint one single model that fits all cases of radicalization and violent extremism.

Some of the violent extremism cases are deemed homegrown while others have an international dimension. In conceptualizing radicalization discussions would revolve around radicalization as a state and a process. An in-depth discussion on radicalization as a process is carried out in theory section of this paper because that is what majority of contemporary scholars agree on.

### **1.1 Background Information**

Norway’s new counter violent extremism action plan reviewed in 2014 is inspired by Britain’s CONTEST which has four strands (Prevent, Protect, Pursue and Prepare)( Smith, 2015, Sunde, 2013:19 ). While Britain’s action plan distinguishes between terrorism and violent extremism from other types of crimes Norway’s action plan treats violent extremism like any other crime and engages in its prevention strategies in ways similar to preventing

other crimes like delinquency, thuggery and other acts of domestic violence. But they both have one thing in common in the prevention of violent extremism strategies which is engaging with the whole Muslim community and not only people believed to have intention to commit or directly facilitate violence or those targeted by recruiters( Barlett & Birdwell, 2010). Such a strategy of engaging the whole Muslim communities have been characterized in the U.K as counterproductive because it leads to stigmatization and weakens trust within communities ( DeHanas, Jones & O'Toole, 2011; Barlett & Birdwell, 2010) . As the Norwegian PST has made statements in its threat assessment that the greatest threat to security in Norway comes from the Islamist groups it is not clear how much of the action plan or measures both at national and municipal level would prevent other forms of violent extremism like those emanating from the far right. Bærum Municipality adopted the SLT model in 2013 although the model was introduced in Norway in the early 1990s. The model is inspired by the Danish Model SSP (Skole, Social, Politi) and around 184 municipalities in Norway have adopted this model of crime prevention (SLT Årsrapport 2014). Like other municipalities Bærum municipality on which this research focuses on developed and adopted the model for crime prevention called SLT in 2013((SLT Årsrapport 2014). Although the model has been developed and adopted by other municipalities in Norway like Oslo municipality what prompted Bærum to adopt the model is associated with the travel to war-zones like Syria by some of its youngsters. The travel to Syria by youngsters of Muslim minority in the community created worry that if nothing is done many more youth will also join the bandwagon of foreign fighters in Syria such action by the municipality has in a way helped in turning the tide on travels to Syria which has almost dried out at the moment. The travel to war-zone areas of youngsters and other petty crimes related with alcohol and substance abuse is what has led to the adoption of the SLT model in Bærum in 2013 which also culminated in the creation of a position of SLT coordinator (SLT Årsrapport 2014) Because the model involves cooperation between different sectors of the municipality and with the general public the role of the coordinator is to oversee this cooperation to prevent crime within the municipality (SLT & KRÅD, 2011). Asker and Bærum Police County is represented in the SLT model and a representative of the two counties from the police is responsible for meetings with the religious community. The role that the police play is therefore very essential in preventing violent extremism. Such a role needs to be handled with care in order not to stigmatize a particular group like immigrants or the general Muslim community and should also be handled with diligence in order not to leave out other extremist threats like those coming from the far-right. Avoiding stigmatization of the Muslim

community builds trust which can be very instrumental in cooperation with the police to counter violent extremism at the local level and not leaving out other violent extremism threats would help prevent a catastrophe like that of 22<sup>nd</sup> July 2011. We now turn the SLT Model itself.

### **1.1.3 The SLT Model**

SLT is a coordination model for local prevention measures of substance abuse and crimes and model makes sure that resources that are already available in the municipalities and the police are better coordinated and targeted to yield tangible results. It is a model developed and introduced in Norway by the national crime prevention council (KRÅD) in the early 1990s based on the Danish SSP model (SLT Årsrapport 2014, SLT & KRÅD, 2011). The target groups for SLT are children and young people of age 15 and below. In most of the municipalities there exists a police council which works in collaboration with SLT to fulfill the duty of crime prevention in the municipalities ( SLT & KRÅD, 2011, Hoel, 2012). “ Around 50% of the municipalities in Norway work according to the principles of the SLT-model”(Hoel, 2012:10) . According to the practical handbook prepared by SLT and the crime prevention council the following is how the police council and SLT complement each other:- Police Council is a liaison between senior management of the police and the municipality. Council discusses primarily overarching priorities and decisions at a strategic level, SLT is a coordination model for the substance abuse and crime prevention efforts by the police and municipality (SLT & KRÅD, 2011). It intervenes at all levels from top management down to the execution level. Police Council deals with all cases concerning everyone irrespective of age, SLT is mainly directed to children and young people and their parents.

The SLT model of crime prevention deals with setting up a systematic way of preventing crimes in the municipalities instead of solving or repairing crime related problems ( SLT &KRÅD, 2011). It is about analyzing where and how problematic behavior and crime occurs and then developing concrete measures to tackle causes of the problems.

The efforts must be diverse and directed towards social environments, ordinary people and physical surroundings. To ensure good and stimulating upbringing of children and young people and provide early help and support could contribute to less problematic behavior, substance abuse and crime. Crime is often associated with other problem areas. Crime prevention therefore is closely related to the society's general prevention. For example a measure intended to prevent substance abuse among young people can also prevent crime.

This is why it is important that the work of SLT in most places with efforts geared towards the prevention of substance abuse. In a nutshell the main objective of SLT is to prevent crime and other problems that will cost society direly.

SLT treats violent extremism like any other crime. This is why it adopts most of the measures of preventing other crimes to cover prevention of violent extremism. The inspiration may have come from the fact that in some cases people who end up committing violent extremist acts have been into substance, difficult youth age and petty criminality at some point.

The SLT model is organized through three levels based on experience in Norway and Denmark (SLT & KRÅD, 2011). When these three main functions are in place, there may be local adaptations from municipality size, resources and cooperative relationship.

The three levels help share the responsibility for management, coordination and execution of the preventive work. The three levels are as spelt out by SLT & KRÅD (2011) are:

1. The management level with local top leaders from the municipality and the police
2. The coordination level with corporate / entity - / middle managers of municipal and police
3. The execution level with all those who work with children and young people within the SLT network of participants in the municipality, police and voluntary sector.

As this thesis looks at the role of police in combating violent extremism in the SLT model of Bærum municipality it is important to discuss the first year report after the implementation of the SLT model. Bærum municipality took the decision to implement the SLT model of crime prevention in August 2012 and an SLT coordinator was appointed in May 2013. The work area for SLT in 2014 year was to implement the SLT structure and get the three levels in place (SLT Årsrapport 2014). A lot of the work has to do with creating awareness of the Model both within the municipality and outside through information dissemination meetings and SLT kick-off conference (SLT Årsrapport 2014)

The issue of violent extremism has characterized much of SLT work in 2014. They have worked with specific cases and prevention through dialog and knowledge exchange within the immigrant community in the municipality. It is in 2014 that the work to develop a local action plan against extremism started and at the moment the plan has been developed and available to the public. This work has shown that the municipality should continue working to prevent falling out of society and marginalization among young people.

There are some challenges that are highlighted which include the need to tackle substances abuse among young people in Bærum (SLT Årsrapport 2014). Such information is obtained from other actors like the police, child welfare and high schools. These institutions expressed concern on substance abuse and crime among young people in 2014 (SLT Årsrapport 2014). With regards to crime committed by persons under the age of 18 the police reported that in addition to substance abuse an increase in shop thefts and alcohol consumption has been one of the biggest challenges (SLT Årsrapport 2014)

Among the priority areas for 2014 in the SLT model with regards to radicalization and extremism among young people are outlined in the SLT (Årsrapport 2014) are; build a resource bank – develop and test strategies/measures/competence to expose, meet and deal with radicalization and extremism, establish procedures to deal with situations of young people that return from warzones. De-radicalization mechanisms could inform procedures of dealing with returnees. The most prominent de-radicalisation programs include religious rehabilitation, education, vocational training, social training, family program, physical program and post-care or release programs to facilitate the reintegration of released detainees, all of these activities might demand special services that makes it suitable to draw upon external resources (El-Said and Harrigan 2012; El-said 2015:10). This is why there are different stakeholders in the SLT model from the municipal authorities are known for implementing the welfare state services, the police to schools.

## **1.2 An overview of the NAPRVE**

An overview of the national action plan against radicalization and violent extremism (NAPRVE) is necessary because it is the main national policy document against radicalization and violent extremism. It is from it the NGRVE and LAPE get their inspiration from. The action plan to prevent radicalization and violent extremism in Norway with the theme “collective security – a shared responsibility” was first developed in 2010 under the watch of former minister of justice and public security Knut Storeberget. The plan was reviewed and adjusted under the watch of current minister of justice and public security Anders Anundsen in 2014. The new action plan was presented after the most deadly terror attack in history of Norway, the 22<sup>nd</sup> July terror attack that had devastating effect on both human life and property. The signatories to the plan range from the Prime Minister Erna Solberg to eight other ministers in addition to the minister of justice and public security and if there is anything it reflected the theme “collective security – a shared responsibility”. In the



introduction of the plan 22<sup>nd</sup> July 2011 attack that was orchestrated by a right wing extremist was cited. It would be interesting to see how much of what is proposed in national action plan gets translated into the local efforts of the municipalities especially Asker and Bærum where this study focuses on in countering all forms of extremism. It is therefore pertinent to make an overview of the national action plan (NAPRVE) which is the main national policy document on radicalization and violent extremism. I would look at the following; relevant changes, preventive strategies, prioritized areas and measures and actions in the event of concern.

**Relevant Challenges:-** The action plan has highlighted three main challenges that make it demanding in the prevention of radicalization and violent extremism. These three challenges are; 1.The emergence of the internet and social media as a virtual arena for radicalization. 2. International circumstances which have gained considerable influence on the threat situation. 3. The risk of increased polarization between different groups in the society.

The internet has become increasingly difficult to police because it is challenging to “distinguish potential threat perpetrators from the multitude of anonymous profiles on the internet that convey controversial messages that challenge the limit of freedom of speech. Like minded people don’t need to meet physically in this age of the internet to influence each other’s thinking to the level of perpetrating violent acts. This makes it easier for people who pose a threat to escape the security radar.

Global politics in relation to conflicts outside Norway had considerable influence on the threat situation here at home. Norway’s foreign policy and involvement in conflicts in other parts of the world especially in Muslim countries like Afghanistan, Iraq and dealings with Israel-Palestine conflict shaped the dynamics of potential enemies to Norway.

Extremists on both sides; right wing and AL-Qaeda inspired extremist capitalize on unfortunate events to polarize or drive a wedge between different groups in Norway. Actions of both sides influence each other. The proponents of Al-Qaeda inspired extremist are young people who are born and grown up in Norway and according to the action plan “These persons promote hate and violent rhetoric aimed at the western world and especially at Norway and Norwegian interest and symbols.” The extreme right wing according to the action plan are those who “defend a view of the world that is hostile to Islam or Immigration. The group is loose but it is pointed out in the plan “that a violent action by Islamic extremists may provoke a mobilization and coordination of Norwegian right-wing extremists”.(NMJPS, 2014:9)

**Preventive Strategies:** - The preventive strategies illuminated in the action plan against radicalization and violent extremism which is inspired by Britain's prevent strategy treats violent extremism like other crimes. In fact it is categorized as the most extreme form of hate crime (NMJPS, 2014). The weakness and strength of such a categorization would be discussed later in this paper. The efforts to combat radicalization and violent extremism are based on the same basic principles as the general crime prevention. The preventive strategies emphasize collaboration on crime prevention. It is an interdisciplinary approach in which different sectors of the municipalities cooperate at different levels to ensure intervention against crimes including violent extremism (NMJPS, 2014). It is in the spirit of collaboration the police council scheme was introduced in the autumn of 2006 in order to formalize cooperation between local police and municipal authorities (SLT, KRÅD, 2011; NMJPS, 2014). It is also in the same spirit of collaboration and coordination SLT model of crime prevention was introduced as well. According to the action plan nearly half of Norway's municipalities have SLT coordination.

In preventive approach collaboration is not only at the local level but at the regional (Nordic) and international (EU) and the rest of the world. Denmark, Sweden, Finland and Norway have established a formal network for the prevention of violent extremism. At the EU level Radicalization Awareness Network (RAN) was established by the European Commission in 2011 in order to share experience with practical efforts to combat radicalization. Norway has been an active participant in RAN since its inception.

**Prioritized areas and measures:-** Certain areas were identified and prioritized in the action plan and to ensure targets are achieved certain measures were developed within each prioritized area. There are five prioritized areas in the fight to prevent radicalization and violent extremism and they are:-

1. Knowledge and expertise
2. Cooperation and coordination
3. Prevent the growth of extremist groups and help promote reintegration
4. Prevent radicalization and recruitment through the internet
5. International cooperation

There are 30 measures adopted to help realize targets in the prioritized areas. Each measure is assigned to a ministry of the government and majority of the measures are under the purview of the ministry of justice and public security.

**Actions in the event of concern:** - Under the backdrop that radicalization those not occur overnight the action plan has highlighted certain signs if manifested by a person should raise concern. It is admitted in the plan that the signs listed are not exhaustive but nonetheless the plan went on the outline steps to take to handle such situations. The possible signs of concern as illuminated in the action plan are; statement/messages include the following; intolerance for others point of view, hostility to perceived enemies – us and them, Conspiracy theories, sympathy for absolute solutions, such as abolition of democracy, legitimizing violence, threats of violence in order to achieve political goals(NMPJPS, 2014). Interests/appearance/use of symbols include; providing and searching for extremist materials on the internet, changes appearance, style of clothing etc, Use symbols linked to extremist ideals and organizations, quits school or stops taking part in recreational activities etc. Activities includes; concerned with extremism on the internet and social media, takes part in demonstrations or in violent clashed with other groups, uses threats and violence as a result of extremism, hate crime, travel activities that may result in increased radicalization and contact with extremists. Friends and social networks signs of concern includes; changes network and social circle, associates with groups where threats, violence or other criminal activities are practiced, member of extremist group, networks and organizations(NMJPS, 2014)

### **1.3 Work with Religious Communities (Trossamfunn)**

In both national and local action plan for Bærum municipality there has been a call to engage the faith community either Muslim, Christian or other faiths but more emphasis is put on engaging the Muslim faith community and there are a myriad of factors that may be responsible for such emphasis, they range from the global terror dynamics, foreign fighters from Norway to the PST threat assessment that the biggest threat to security in Norway is from the Islamist extremist groups. Although most of the radicalization into violent extremism takes place outside the mosque it is still seen as a pivotal place of contact in the drive to engage the Muslim community. In the SLT model, one of the requirements of an SLT coordinator is that the person should have knowledge of the minority groups he or she would be engaging. In the local action plan against radicalization and violent extremism it is mentioned in measure number 5 which is connected to the national action plan measure number 15 which states that there should be a person who should be responsible for contact with the faith community. Such a person would be responsible for visiting mosques and places of worship of other faith communities in the Municipality.

According to measure number 5 it is the police that are responsible for contact with the faith communities but in collaboration other actors in the municipality. For there to be effective collaboration between the faith communities especially the Muslim community there needs to be trust and confidence between authorities which include the police and the community. But has the issue of trust been addressed in both national and local action plans? Has the delegation of point contact with the Muslim community to the police been critically looked at in terms of trust and confidence? What are the likely challenges of having the police all over most of the measures established to combat radicalization and violent extremism? These are pertinent issues or questions that need to be addressed in order to build trust which is very essential in any collaboration work with the Muslim community. This is very prudent because some research recently carried out show that close work between the municipalities and the police in terms of crime preventing or combating violent extremism may put the municipalities in a funny position because they may be perceived as the ones collecting information for the police.

One of the arenas where the faith communities are invited to per take in discussions is the dialog forums. Unlike the visits to mosques and other places of worship which is under the purview if the police, the dialog forums are under the responsibility of Bærum municipality's children and young people service. These forums take place four times in the year where agreed upon themes are taken up in discussions. In these forums the immigrant organizations are also part and parcel of the deliberations. This section on work with religious community who the police are designated both in the national and local action plan as the main point of contact is placed at the last part of this introduction chapter to give an idea on how the role of the police is categorized before venturing into the methodology section of this paper.

## **2.0Methodology**

The method of this research thesis is mainly qualitative in which literature review is used as the main tool in making sense of the policy documents on radicalization and violent extremism. As Limpottong and Ezzy(2005:02) puts it "...the best qualitative research depends on the creativity and insight of the researchers themselves" and as such researchers should choose methods that will help them answer the research questions or raise interest for support in inquiring into specific areas of interest with justifications. Qualitative research of literature review is utilized in this study mainly because it is relatively more flexible considering the fact that the study involves digging into policy documents which requires reasoning and

thinking. Skimming through relevant literature will also involve an iterative process that entails back and forth activities of different phases of the research (Cresswell 2003: 182-183, Braun & Clarke 2006:86).

### **Document Analysis**

“Document analysis is a systemic procedure for reviewing or evaluating documents – both printed and electronic (computer based and internet –transmitted material)” (Bowen, 2009:27) A review of the policy documents was carried out both in content and in themes related to the research questions. As an analytical method in qualitative research document analysis involves examining and interpreting data in order to give meaning, gain understanding and develop empirical knowledge (Bowen, 2009). I reviewed three policy documents, placed them in context and coded them for analysis as Bowen (2009:32) puts it “the reviewer takes closer look at the selected data and performs coding and category construction, based on the data’s characteristics to uncover themes pertinent to a phenomenon”. The three policy documents are selected for this study because they captured three relevant dimensions, the national action plan captures the overall national line of action against radicalization and violent extremism, and the national guide does the same but with a more practical approach and the local action plan is the main reference point for local efforts against violent extremism.

The data in this research comes from secondary sources as indicated mainly from the three policy documents and relevant literature addressing the two research questions. The coding of the content of the policy documents was instrumental in aligning relevant information into various themes that are of interest to this research paper which in essence encompasses both content and thematic analysis. The themes through which the contents of the policy documents were absorbed in an inductive manner are; contextualization of policy documents, categorization of the role of the police, the issue of trust, causes of radicalization, phenomenon of radicalization and countering all forms of violent extremism and in order to make sense of the review of policy documents a review of relevant literature was also carried out. To enable me to carry out the literature review I search different websites and directories from BIBS; the library data base of Norway to Google scholar and online newspapers. The information obtained from literature review verifies, gives support or adds meaning to information derived from the policy documents. Having access to a wide range of documents for preponderance of evidence especially when the study relies heavily or solely on documents is more recommended but when documents are being used for verification or

support even a small number can be an effective means of completing the research ( Bowen, 2009) Document analysis saves much time and energy normally involved in the collection of data and secondary data in the form of literature are relatively much easier to access (Harding, 2013:21).

The policy documents on radicalization and violent extremism were discussed under relevant themes in connection with the research questions and then filtered through relevant literature review and personal experience in order to bring out the research findings of this study. The police and their sister organization PST function in counter radicalization and violent extremism to fulfill the measures enshrined in these policy documents. The function or role of the police is undertaken in cooperation and collaboration with local authorities and the community. A platform that enables the police to have such collaboration and cooperation is the SLT model which many of the municipalities in Norway including Bærum have adopted.

### **Validity**

Validity of the research findings is very crucial in any research. In general validity is about as Flick (2006:37) puts it "whether the researchers see what they think they see". In other words it is the accuracy at which findings reflect the data (Harding 2013:171). It is however challenging to meet the objectives of a research without human influences (Flick, 2002, Mentz & Botha 2012). With all that validity is still a crucial part of qualitative research in determining whether "the research findings are accurate from the standpoint of the researcher, the participant or the readers of an account" (Creswell, 2003:195 -196). "Validity is an important key to effective research. If a piece of research is invalid then it is worthless" (Cohen et al 2011:179).

As for the meaning and application of validity in qualitative research Elliot (2005:22-28) postulated that it can be used in qualitative research methods but with an adjusted meaning from its original standpoint. This postulation is elaborated by Whittemore et al (2001:55) that "despite the incongruency between quantitative epistemology and qualitative methodology, translated standards of validity have proven to be useful criteria for demonstrating rigor and legitimacy of qualitative research".

Internal and external validity is how some scholars like Elliot ( 2005:22) , Cohen et al (2011:183), Mentz & Botha (2012:81) have grouped validity. "Internal validity seeks to demonstrate that the explanation of a particular event, issue or set of data which a piece of research provides can actually be sustained by the data" (Cohen et al, 2011:183). This study entirely made use of data in the form of literature review and as such I tried to link the

purpose of study to the literature review and analyzes of the policy documents in order to establish a relationship between what I intended to research and what I ended up actually doing based on the literature. In-depth description to convey the findings, stating the sources of information used in the study and admitting biases were as Creswell (2003) and Cohen et al (2011) puts it the main strategies employed to ensure internal validity in this study. On the other hand according to Cohen et al (2011:186) external validity is defined as "the degree to which results can be generalized to the wider population, settings, times or situations i.e. the transferability of the findings. Because local action plans or policy documents of radicalization and violent extremism are mirrored from the national action plan this study to a certain extent degree may be transferable to other municipalities in Norway. However scholars like Elliot (2005) and Cohen et al (2011) have pointed out that external validity is left to the readers' discretion to determine the extent to which results from a given research are transferable to another situation. I would therefore leave it to the discretion of the readers as far as external validity of this research paper is concerned.

### **Triangulation**

Triangulation is utilized in research to solve issues of inconsistency in findings that are likely to occur because of using one method or one theory (Liamputtong & Ezzy, 2005). "By combining multiple observation, theories, methods and data sources (researchers) can hope to overcome the intrinsic bias that comes from single methods, single- observer and single theory studies" (Denzin, 1989:307). Although this research has not utilized both primary data through field work and secondary data it has utilized both trust building and radicalization theories and in analyzing the data from policy documents and has made use of both content and thematic analysis tools under document analysis. Theoretical triangulation was used in this study and as Cohen et al (2011) puts it making use of alternative or competing theories instead of just using one is recommended because it helps to establish the validity of the research study. The radicalization theory that delved into various pathways as postulated by various scholars and the trust & trust building theory helped strengthen the theoretical triangulation of this study. Triangulation is pertinent because it is a powerful way of indicating the validity of a research (Cohen et al 2011).

### **Reflection of My Role**

"Acknowledging and understanding the researcher/context relationship is essential in any research (Bold, 2012:09). Butler -Kisher (2010:19) pointed out that in qualitative research, the finder need not apologize for assumptions, biases and identity, they should instead adequately

account for them. In another similar postulation Creswell (2003:182) suggests that it is pertinent for the researcher to furnish his personal details and how this may influence the research in qualitative studies in terms of biases, values and interests.

It is crucial to state that the research problem in this study got its roots from my personal experience in connection to my work as an intern at the office of the SLT coordinator in Bærum and my life in Norway as a Muslim and an African. I have lived in Norway for seven years before embarking on this research study. I am a frequent visitor of Mosques in Bærum and Oslo area and I have attended many workshops and seminars on refugees, integration, radicalization and social welfare. I have witnessed what I would term the unjust deportation of close friends and a university mate who have lived in Norway for many years. I have also experienced situations of racial profiling by police both in Bærum and Oslo area. Situations where I was stopped and asked to identify myself on several occasions while others; presumably white Norwegians in the same vicinity were not treated in the same way.

My own experiences, memories and observations (Liamputtong & Ezzy 2005:140-149) that I gathered during my stay in Norway coupled with my internship at the office of the SLT Coordinator in Bærum are to some extent my motivating forces to embark on this study. I see my experience over the past years in Norway as a field- based research experience in the form of police - community interaction process. However in this research study my experience and personal observation are mainly the sources of my motivation to carry out this research project.

As a result of my experience, observation and the fact that I am from a Muslim and immigrant background I cannot deny the presence of personal biases in this research paper. These biases to some extent are likely to have influence on the way I understood, analyzed and interpreted secondary data in the form of literature. This situation of the researcher is what Creswall (2003:182) calls "the personal-self becomes inseparable from the researcher -self " in a qualitative research. But I tried my best to minimize my personal biases by relying on what other scholars have stated in my analysis of policy documents, nonetheless it is important to note as Creswall (2007) puts it ; in a qualitative research review of data and analysis are shaped by the experiences of the researchers, gives extra access and room to use personal experiences relevant in answering the research questions.

### **Limitation of the study**



This study has some limitations. The main limitation is the absence of primary data from field work. The data of this study was mainly from secondary sources. It is indeed very regrettable that I could not come up with primary sources of data. Contributions from respondents from within the municipality would have influenced the findings of the research and primary data would have enhanced triangulation through more diversification of data source.

I could have also made a comparative analysis by looking at local policy documents on counter radicalization of other municipalities in Norway instead of focusing on only on Bærum Municipality that would have enhanced the generalization of the findings to a certain level within Norway.

### **3.0 Literature Review**

In this section the reader will come across what various scholars have deliberated on some of the issues raised in the research questions. The review and subsequent discussions in each of headings deals with matters revolving around how policy documents have categorized the role of the police in countering violent extremism and how these documents have dealt with the causes & phenomenon of radicalization and the issue of trust towards the police. Most of the literature is not specifically addressing the situation in Bærum Municipality but rather in similar western society settings in the United States and other parts of Europe but the discussions and analysis are brought back to Bærum. Police carry out their functions in different settings at the community level and different methods and strategies have been implemented in the past but these methods or strategies are continuously under review. Therefore to get an idea on the role of the police in counter violent extremism work and how trust within the community is crucial in this work a literature review is carried out here under various headings pointing to the role of the police and trust. In order to get a picture of how the role of police is categorized it is important start review on the approach of community policing.

#### **3.1 Community policing & the issue of trust in police-community relations**

An overview of community policing as a policing approach is relevant because it gives an idea on how the role of the police can be categorized in countering radicalization and violent extremism at the local level. The role of the police in protecting life and property is done using different strategies. One of the strategies that involve partnering with local citizens to protect life and property is community policing. The Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) of the United States stated that community policing in essence is collaboration between the

police and the community in which community problems are identified and solved together. It involves police building ties and working closely with members of the community. In this approach of securing a community trust between the police and the community is very vital because “without trust between police and citizens effective policing is impossible (BJA, 1994:vii). This means that to ensure a fruitful collaboration between the community and the police a lot of effort should be directed at trust building and police should be mindful of actions that may weaken trust. In police – community relations trust in police can enhance police effectiveness and also help to strengthen legitimacy of police actions (Lea and Young, 1984; Lyons, 2002; Sunshine and Tyler, 2003; National Research Council, 2004). Community policing can be trust building mechanism in the sense that it increases the perceptions of procedural justice because of its emphasis on seeking resident input and “getting to know” the community(Hawdon, 2008:184). It is an approach that increases contact between the police and members of the community and there is a growing body of evidence backing the postulation that perceptions of the police are influenced by community residents’ contact with police (Cheurprakobkit, 2000; Cordner & Jones, 1995; Hawdon et al., 2003; Paternoster et al., 1997; Stoutland, 2001; Tyler & Huo, 2002). According to Kessler (1999) community policing helps to reduce complaints about police. The relationship between community residents and the police are generally improved in a community policing approach (Greene,1999; Skogan, 1994; Skogan & Hartnett, 1997).

“Trust is the belief that a person occupying a specific role will perform that role in a manner consistent with the socially defined normative expectations associated with that role (i.e., what sociologists call the *actual role*)”(Hawdon, 2008:186). Trust therefore has to do with specific individuals occupying specific roles (Hawdon, 2008). An example is the trust that a wife has for her husband that he will perform his duties as a husband and this means trust is both role-dependent and role-specific (Hawdon, 2008). If we apply this notion of trust to police-community relations – the police will be trusted when the community believes the police would conduct themselves in a way that is consistent with the actual role of the police(ibid). The community expects the police to conduct themselves as professionals this encompasses executing their duties “within a set of fair, public and accountable guidelines” (Seron et al., 2004, p. 666; also see Weitzer & Tuch, 2004; see Deakin, 1988 for a detailed discussion of police professionalism).

“In some communities, it will take time to break down barriers of apathy and mistrust so that meaningful partnership can be forged. Trust is the value that underlies and links the components of community partnership and problem solving” (BJA, 1994: vii). Community

policing can be used to combat violent extremism and the Norwegian model of SLT contain some aspects of community policing because it involves the collaboration of the municipality other actors in the community including the police. This is why it crucial that policy documents address the issue of trust and trust building mechanisms. According to the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP, 2014) in the United States; of the key principles of using community policing to counter violent extremism is fostering and enhancing partnership with the community.

Community policing “Promotes leveraging the most valuable resource in any community- its members – by building relationships based on understanding, trust and respect”(IACP, 2014:vii). “Trusting partnerships are the cornerstone of community policing. When base on trust, transparency, respect and mutual understanding, partnerships can foster a common purpose of keeping communities safe from all types of violent extremism” (ibid). “Public service agencies such as the police must secure the support of the public if they are to provide efficient and effective services. Public support and perceptions of the police play an important role in dictating their efficacy and public institutions” (Bynum et al, 2003:441). This means that in community policing the police are equal stakeholders in addressing the safety and securing issues confronting the community. The ideals of community policy and police –community relations should inform policy on counter radicalization and violent extremism in order to properly categorized the role of the police and develop efficient trust building mechanisms.

### **3.2 The dilemma of where to Police; Violent Ideology and Violent Action**

There is a difference between violent ideology and violent action, the former does not necessarily leads to the later (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2008). This has created a dilemma in law enforcement institutions in the west and equally a dilemma on categorizing the role of the police. There are some who favor the enactment of laws that ban or restrict violent ideology and violent action all together but such an approach is raises alarms of encroachment on civil liberties and fundamental freedoms of expression. Policing violent ideology will be contrary to the very values of democracy and freedom of speech which are the foundations of western societies. But again allowing violent ideologies to flourish unchecked may lead to cases of violent action or terrorism. So where does one draw the line in policing violent ideology and violent action? Some argue that people should be allowed to express violent ideologies and it is only when violent ideology tries to restrict the freedom of others in society that it is should be put on check or banned. It is a very complex area to police because it is not clear cut as to

when violent ideology translates into violent action and thereby hampering the freedom of others. To rise above this dilemma of where to police counter terrorism or counter violent extremism policies are advocating for partnership between the police and the community and developing policing systems like community policing as discussed in the previous chapter. But this endeavor as Aziz (2014:147) puts it “is fraught with peril, both for collective civil liberties and the interest of the local police in preserving relationships of trust”. This means that the dilemma does not disappear even with community policing. It is a very complicated and daunting task to come up with a system that would uphold civil liberties and at the same time prevent incidences of violent action. Norway adopted a community type of policing in the 1990s and was successful in disrupting right wing extremist cells through its community outreach program and police counseling meetings and it was able to discourage many young people from joining right wing groups((Kunnskapssenteret, 2014; Smith, 2015). Such a policing strategy is partnership based between the community and the police. It is the same kind of community policing that most western government and terror experts are advocating for. It is believe with this kind of policing law enforcement would be able to strike a balance between policing violent ideology and action. Such a system for example in Britain’s prevent strategy law enforcement does not police violent ideology, it is only in extreme cases where freedom of others is at risk that violent ideology is put on check( Barlett & Birdwell, 2010; DeHanas, Jones & O’Toole, 2011 ). In this strategy police and local government authorities collaborate with Islamist groups that may harbor violent ideology to fight and neutralize those who carry out violent action. But such a strategy is being criticized by Muslim think tank organizations like Quilliam foundation who argue that entertaining dialogue and collaborating with those who harbor violent ideology only goes to strengthen extremism. The dilemma is even more pronounced when community policing is designed in such a way that violent ideology is banned. This form of law enforcement on extremism curtails civil liberties and divides the Muslim community between bad and good Muslims. Those who shun violent ideology and violent action are the good ones whole does who demand” a meaningful quid quo pro that ensures protection of Muslim communities’ civil rights and liberties are the bad ones”(Aziz, 2014:148). This shows that deciding on where to police whether violent ideology or violent action is a very contending issue that requires vigorous research by relevant authorities in order to inform policy in categorizing the role of the police and building trust with local communities as well.

### 3.3 Strategies for counter radicalization and violent extremism

Approaches or strategies of countering radicalization and violent extremism are categorized in different ways; some are categorized as offensive approaches and among offensive approaches is policing which is an area of interest for this research paper. It would therefore be pertinent to look at what some scholars have written about policing as an offensive strategy on countering violent extremism. Some scholars postulate that policing violent extremism is somehow different from policing other forms of crimes and as such ‘new’ and ‘softer’ forms that are marked by intelligence community and homeland security policing (Bettison, 2009; B.Brown, 2007; Oliver, 2006). G.R Newman & Clarke (2007) and Storbeck (2005) however argue that because policing approaches against violent extremism are determined by measures of criminal justice and crime prevention, the strategies can be both offensive and defensive. “while community policing and counter terrorism policing have traditionally been seen at opposite ends of the policing spectrum there is an emerging approach, evident particularly in the United Kingdom, that seeks to import the principles of community policing into national security”(Pickering et al, 2007:17). The discourse of importing principles of community policing into national security need to be done with caution, especially in countering violent extremism. The over securitization of every measure and reducing every contact between the police and community to a means of generating intelligence or collecting information may breed distrust or create suspicion. However good relations between the police and community which incorporate elements of public diplomacy are paramount in approaches where information of intelligence are needed from the community to combat violent extremism ( Bettison, 2009; Brown, 2007; Keelty, 2008).

In the U.K from where Norway gets inspiration from her prevent strategies they have community engagement officers who raise awareness of violent extremism and involve in intelligence gathering in the neighborhoods working hand in hand with schools liaison officers, interventions and local forums (Bettison, 2009). The work of such engagement officers is similar to that of Norwegian police and police security service in the SLT model of counter violent extremism. Policing has a more offensive role to play in arresting the function and capacity of terrorists and terrorist organizations (Agostino et al 2011: 43). Such an offensive role will involve as described by Kokoda foundation (2008:17) of starving terrorist groups “of their freedom of action through denial of space, finances and safe heavens and prevent their growth by acquiring intimate knowledge of their local environment and out maneuvering them politically within their space.

According to the IACP (2014:01) "countering radicalization to violence is frequently best achieved by empowering individuals and groups at the local level to build resilience against violent extremism." Because the root causes of violent extremism/terrorism are not static rather they are dynamic, fluid and constantly changing therefore strategies to combating violent extremism need to be embedded in consideration of the social, economic, political and historical context in which violence arises (Agostino et al, 2011). The dynamics of the factors causing violent extremism suggests that there should be continues research in order to develop strategies that are up to date. There is need for empirical research because majority of literature available in counter violent extremism is mainly secondary data and lacks primary data or empirical research basis (Crenshaw, 2000; Loza, 2007; Ranstorp, 2006). Collecting primary data in this field is very tedious and as such Rantorp (2006) suggests an alternative of research tapping into primary data available in national archives. Some scholars also postulate that to develop a better understanding of VE in order to come up with strategies that would work will require multidisciplinary social science, collaborative and field based (S.Atran, 2010; Crenlinsten, 2007; Loza, 2007; Ranstorp, 2006; Sinai, 2007).

As Crelinsten (2009: 7-8) puts it "How people talk about problems, frame them, and conceptualise them often determines what they do about them...restricting their imagination and narrowing their options". Understanding of violent extremism and countering violent extremism are mutually related (Agostino et al, 2011). This means that the manner in which radicalization or violent extremism is conceptualized is what informs how counter strategies are developed and applied (Coaffee, 2006; Goldsmith, 2008). "In addition, the ways in which countering violent extremism is understood reinforces and reproduces understandings of violent extremism" (Agostino et al, 2011:16). This suggests that our understanding of radicalization and violent extremism and the strategies we design to counter it influence each other both ways. Policy documents should therefore give room to expanding knowledge on radicalization and violent extremism and treat adequately every issue influencing better understanding of the problem and solutions to the problem. Among the issues influencing solutions to the problem of radicalization and violent extremism is the issue of trust to which we now turn to.

### **3.4 The issue of trust in CVE work**

"Counter violent extremism is a realm of policy, programs, and interventions designed to prevent individuals from engaging in violence associated with radical political, social, cultural, and religious ideologies and groups"(Holmer, 2013:02). Counter violent extremism

(CVE) work in communities is a delicate one and needs policies or programs that strengthen trust and not otherwise. Building trust in CVE work is gradual process but before venturing to discuss activities that strengthens trust in CVE it is prudent to first look at what weakens trust in CVE work from literature. Britain's prevent strategy from where Norway's counter radicalization and violent extremism program got inspiration has come under criticism from individuals, organizations and scholars. These criticisms are largely on policies of the program that weakens trust in communities.

One criticism of the program is the broad focus on all Muslims in a community which lead to Muslims feeling of being targeted. Instead of targeting those vulnerable to radicalization or those involved in acts of terror the programs targets the whole Muslim community ( Aly & Zeiger, 2015, DeHanas, Barlett & Birdwell, 2010). CVE programs that create "suspect community" may undermine resilience of that community against violent extremism (Ellis & Abdi, 2017). In a study of three European cities that was aimed at uncovering ways of reducing violent extremism Vermeulen (2014) found that programs that CVE programs that target an entire community results to unintended consequences of stigmatization which instead of reducing violent extremism made the communities more vulnerable to violent extremism. "Viewing a whole group as inherently suspicious proved conducive to the severe stigmatization of an entire community" (Vermeulen, 2014:208). In Norway the SLT model of counter radicalization and violent extremism follows the same route because the model engages the whole Muslim community rather those that are at risk of being radicalization. In fact organization that are known to harbor extremist ideologies like the Propheten's Ummah or Islamnet are not included in such engagements and are not represented in any dialogue session. In Britain the Prevent strategy " Despite the fact that it is widely accepted that extremists are a tiny minority in Britain, the strategy frequently appeared to be trying to effect change in all Muslim attitudes" DeHanas, Jones & O'Toole, 2011:02). Such experience of Britain and as research has shown in other European cities should inform policy makers in Norway to avoid actions or programs that stigmatize the minority community and thereby weakening trust and confidence on law enforcement officers or local government authorities.

A very close collaboration between the police and the local authorities could result in the police relying on local authorities for information on inhabitants of the community which may create suspicion thereby weakening trust between the local authorities and the community. In Britain's prevent strategy there was widespread suspicion that funding was being used to gather information on Muslim communities although this was denied by local authorities but

youth workers and councilors solidified these claims by asserting that they are coerced into providing information about individuals and some even claim that the local government was pressurized to become ‘an agency of the intelligence service’ (ibid). In Norway the NIBR, HiOA, JB & KS report of 2016 also raised the same issue of the police relying too much on local authorities for information on individuals. Such acts create suspicion thereby weakening trust of partnership with local communities especially minority communities.

### **3.5 Tendencies of Stereotyping the Muslim Community**

Stereotyping of the minority Muslim community may contribute to the weakening trust within the community towards the police or the authorities it is therefore pertinent to run a review on such tendencies that contribute to the weakening of trust. The review would also enable one to probe on how policy documents have addressed the issue of trust within the Muslim community towards the police

Across the globe the war on terror has a major impact on minorities of Muslim background in the west (Eid and Karim, 2014; Choudhury & Fenwick, 2011; Fekete, 2004; Fekete, 2006). Because of the fact that terror attacks that has made it to television screens around the globe have been mainly coming from Islamist groups it has led to portraying Muslims whether settled or immigrant in the west as the enemy within (Fekete, 2004). The media propaganda has gotten so high that it has created a national security agenda of securing the nation from an existential threat. This has resulted to a situation in which “national security agendas overlap with immigration control programs of the far right and integration measures imposed by governments reinforces Islamophobia” (Fekete, 2006:01).

The media has been the most powerful tool in stereotyping Muslims, although there has been efforts by some mainstream media to portray a fair image of Islam and Muslims many scholars postulate that the media are the most influential in shaping perceptions on Muslims and majority of these perceptions are negative (Aguayo, 2009; Gerges 1997; Trevino, Kanso & Nelson, 2010). Those involved in counter terrorism work are human and are likely to be affected by the negative portrayal of Muslims and Islam and the perceptions that emerge are likely to manifest in policies and in counter violent extremism work. Decades of negative media portrayal of the religion and its followers has resulted to distorted public perceptions of Islam and Muslims in general (Christensen, 2006).

In addition to media propaganda prominent politicians in the past has made remarks that cast stereotypes on Muslims and Islam. Tony Blair in his speech at his constituency in Sedgefield



talked about a threat that is real and existential that needs to be fought ‘whatever the political cost’ and that threat is ‘Islamic extremism’(Fekete 2004). The anti Islam right wing party in the Netherlands has also contributed to the rhetoric of demonizing Islam and stereotyping Muslims (ibid). In the run up to the elections of the United States of 2016 Donald Trump has used derogatory statements on Muslims and threatens to band them from entering the U.S when elected (Justice & Stanley, 2016). In Norway the immigration ministry is under the hands of the far right party known for spreading hate rhetoric against immigrants and Muslims. Such rhetoric whether intentionally or may in one way or the other contribute to shaping national terror legislations, policies, action plans and measures against terrorism or violent extremism. Counter terrorism measures or policy documents have become influenced by populist agenda and it has had tremendous impact on the relationship between Muslim communities and authorities in the fight against violent extremism. The Muslim communities are caught between a rock and a hard place. “Counter terrorism measures have the potential to stigmatize whole communities, to fuel resentment and even to bolster support for terrorist movements” (Choudhury & Fenwick, 2011: iii). Because of the fact that majority of those suspected of terrorist activities are identified as Muslims counter terrorism measures have the tendency of making ordinary Muslims who are also affected by the terrorist threat as anyone else feel they are constantly under suspicion(Fekete, 2004; Fekete, 2016; Choudhury & Fenwick, 2011).

Policing approaches or tactics also have a tendency of stereotyping or alienating Muslim communities in the West. In a situation where the demographic profile of Muslim population are of those who are poorer compared to the rest of the population it tend to give the conclusion that the young people of Muslims are at a higher risk of being involved in crime than the rest of the population (Spalek, 2005; Spalek & Imtoul, 2007). Such demography leads to crime prevention measures that target the young Muslim population than the population in general which may tantamount to stigmatization. When Muslims becomes victims of crime like hate crime their interaction and experience with the police can either negatively or positively influence trust and confidence with the police (Clancy et al 2001). If the police handle such crimes professionally and bring the perpetrators to book it may help strengthen trust otherwise if nothing is done it may help to further stigmatize the Muslim population as they are the problem. After carrying a literature review on the role of the police in different settings at the national and community level and how these affects trust it is

important to look at the theories concerning the issue of trust in counter violent extremists(CVE) work and radicalization.

## **4.0 Theoretical Foundation**

Theories upon which this study is built on are that of trust building and radicalization. The theoretical discussions start by looking at the trust theory and trust building mechanism to be followed by an in-depth analysis of the concept of radicalization and the various models explaining the process of radicalization. The police do not carry out their role in countering radicalization and violent extremism in a vacuum there are theories on the subject that shaped national and local policies that in turn influence the role of the police. Such theories may also influence the mode of cooperation and collaboration with the local communities to prevent crimes including violent extremism. It under this backdrop and because all Norwegian institutions that are involved in CVE view radicalization and violent extremism as a process this paper presents an in-depth discussion on seven models explaining radicalization process.

### **4.1 Trust Theory**

Theoretically trust is “an abstract concept but one whose origins are firmly rooted in experience; individuals’ interactions with other people and their past experiences with institutions create expectations about how they will be treated in the future” (Mishler and Rose, 1998: 5). The paramount role of experience in assisting us comprehend trust logically requires us to concentrate on what may be called cognitive, active, contingent or reflective trust which is “the residual belief in another person granted after consideration of his reliability (Govier 1997:68, check also Giddens, 1994, Levi 1998, Nooteboom, 2003). This is what Hardin (1993) refers to as ‘commonsense epistemology’ of trust which helps us to understand the capacity of ordinary citizens to trust institutions like the police. The ‘commonsense epistemology of trust takes the subjectivity of actual and potential trustors as a central theoretical and empirical concern (Goldsmith, 2005). Experiences of people determine their level of preparedness to trust and meaningful experiences requires interpretation and furthermore people differ in the lenses through which they interpret experiences (Goldsmith, 2005). The trust theory embodies different kinds of trust from innocent and implicit trust to contingent trust (Goldsmith, 2005). Innocent and implicit trust exists at a personal level between individuals for example between husband wife where as contingent trust exists between ordinary people and institutions such as the police (Goldsmith, 2005). From the perspective of building trust and demonstrating trustworthiness it is more befitting to

concentrate on contingent trust because it is the first stage, developmentally in the establishment of trust relations (Goldsmith, 2005). There are low –trust situations and advanced forms of trust, low-trust situations are that the trust relations between ordinary people and the government institutions like the police while the advanced – trust forms are the innocent or implicit trust which are obtained in person to person relationships for example between spouses(ibid).

Trust can be instrumental or virtuous. Instrumental trust is concerned about objectives which are both short and long term. It is instrumental in the sense that it seeks confirmation through exchange relations in which trust is well placed and virtuous trust makes assumptions about good character (Goldsmith, 2005). As stated earlier trust is also distinguished between interpersonal and institutional trust, the former being an advanced trust form and the later being a low-trust background (ibid). Against an institutional background, “new instances of trust are likely to be instrumental at early stages at least whereas virtuous trust makes assumptions about good character that makes it less watchful in nature” (Goldsmith, 2005: 448). Interpersonal trust and institutional trust are related because societies in which interpersonal trust is low are likely to display low levels of trust in institutions and to a certain extent interpersonal trust can compensate for public distrust in institutions (Gambetta, 1993; Mishler and Rose 1998). “A propensity to distrust can be both necessary and desirable as a means of self-protection, again according to prior histories of relationships”(Goldsmith, 2005: 448). To overcome distrust and in the process built trust will require tangible mechanism that would enable a change of disposition and capacity and in dealing with potential trustors(Goldsmith, 2005).

### **Trust building**

“Trust has to be learned, just like any other kind of generalization. . . . What it is sensible for a given individual to expect depends heavily on what the individual knows, both about the past and the future of the other person or other party to be trusted . . . . Experience molds the psychology of trust . . .” (Hardin, 1993: 508, 523, 525). According to Six (2003) there are three bases for trustworthiness and they are benevolence, dedication and ethics. Another dimension of trustworthiness according to Goldsmith (2005) is ability or competence. Ensuring accountability could be an instrumental trust building mechanism especially in trust towards an institution like the police and as such it is a central challenge of building trust. But as Goldsmith (2003) puts it the standards through which accountability takes shape must

follow the route of protective rather than regime policing. If the community and the police share a common interest of protecting every member of the community such a common ground becomes a solid foundation for building trust. This is done by proving benevolence (altruism) and a shared value framework (ethics) (Goldsmith, 2005). Accountability mechanisms should therefore be in place to address some performance in order to ensure different substantive and procedural outcomes. As Warren (1999) puts it what is ultimately required of trustworthy police institutions is consistency and reliability with respect to the performance of its main service function which is contributing to the safety of the citizens.

There are actions that are necessary for the building of trust and Six (2003) proposes three classes of 'key actions' needed for building of trust which are; *information, influence and control*. In the sharing of *information* disclosure of information in a timely and accurate fashion, provision of positive as well as negative feedback is essential; with regards to influence, seeking counsel from others, initiating and accepting changes to one's decisions as a consequence is paramount and in the issue of *control*, making oneself dependent on others, sharing responsibility, delegating tasks is crucial (Six, 2003: 203).

### **Policing and Trust**

Public or community trust towards the police has been a hot topic in police research over the past few years (Thomassen & Kääriäinen, 2016). The main reason for 'trust in the police' becoming a hot topic in police research of recent is because of the proliferation of studies suggesting that trust has a strong relation with legitimacy and willingness to cooperate and comply with the law (Hough, Jackson, Bradford, Myhill, & Quinton, 2010; Jackson, Bradford, Stanko, & Hohl, 2013; Murphy & Cherney, 2012; Tankebe, 2013; Tyler, 2001; Tyler, 2006; Tyler & Huo, 2002; Van Damme, 2015; Van Damme, Pauwels, & Svensson, 2015). Pinpointing trust building mechanisms as deliberated in the previous section on trust building is "thus not only interesting from an academic point of view but may also help inform policy and benefit the wider society (Thomassen & Kääriäinen, 2016:437). Extensive research in the field of policing and trust has suggested that the police institution is capable of shaping ordinary peoples' attitudes towards the institution through its day to day encounters with the public and empirical studies have uncovered a statistically significant relationship between contact experience and trust in the police (Bradford, Jackson, & Stanko, 2009; Jackson et al., 2013; Mazerolle, Antrobus, Bennett, & Tyler, 2013; Skogan, 2005; Skogan, 2006). Goldsmith (2005) suggests that a police institution can rebuild its trustworthiness by

acting fairly, transparently and respectfully. They need to typically adopt a proactive approach in building trust (Goldsmith, 2005). Levi (1998) elaborated on the element of transparency by postulating that it is through providing relevant information which the general public can verify for itself to gauge whether the police are performing well or they are not, or whether appropriate corrective active action is being taken is what constitutes transparency. Trustworthiness and legitimacy of the police increases when police officers conduct their duties in a way that advances “procedural justice” a postulation that is agreed upon by most scholars ((Matrofski, Snipes, & Supina, 1996; Paternoster, Brame, Bachman, & Sherman, 1997; Sherman, 1997; Tyler, Boeckmann, Smith, & Huo, 1997; Tyler & Huo, 2002; Tyler & Wakslak, 2004). “There is also a consensus, although not as widespread, that community policing, with its emphasis on seeking resident input and “getting to know” the community, increases perceptions of procedural justice more than traditional policing does” (Hawdon, 2008:184). Jackson and Bradford (2010) make a distinction between ‘confidence in policing’ and ‘trust in the police. They tend to associate the former with overall global confidence judgment in policing which encompasses confidence targets and good job measures and associate the later with community engagement which encompasses shared values e.g. to listen to concerns of the local people. ‘To say we trust you means we believe you have the right intentions toward us and that you are competent to do what we trust you to do.’ (Hardin, 2006: 17). Public trust towards the police is therefore an important performance measure that should be seriously taken into account in counter radicalization and violent extremism policy documents.

## **4.2 Radicalization Theory**

The relevance of the radicalization theory to this study lies in the first research question that is apart from question how the policy documents have categorized the role of the police in countering all forms of extremism has also probing on way policy documents have highlighted the causes and phenomenon of radicalization.

There is no agreed upon definition of the term radicalization. Some even argue that it doesn't exist or is a myth and others dissect the term into two; belief laden called cognitive radicalization and behavior laden called behavioral radicalization. The term is defined in various ways by different institutions. The Danish Intelligence Service( PET) defines radicalization as “...a process by which a person to an increasing extent accepts the use of undemocratic or violent means, including terrorism, in an attempt to reach a specific

political/ideological objective". The United Kingdom's Home office defines radicalization as "...a process by which people come to support, and in the same cases participate in terrorism". The Dutch Security Service (AIVD) defines radicalization as "growing readiness to pursue and or support – if necessary by undemocratic means – for reaching changes in society that conflict with, or pose a threat to , the democratic order." (Borum, 20011:12)

In Norway where this study revolves around its Intelligence agency moreover has a working definition of radicalization which is as follows; "...a process where a person increasingly accepts the use of violence in order to achieve political, religious or ideological objective" (PST, 2013 ). Almost all institutions or intelligence agencies in various governments and organizations agree that radicalization is a process. It therefore means that one does not spontaneously undertake acts of violence at one instance but goes through a gradual process. It is also quite evident that not all who undertake the process of radicalization end up carrying out acts of violence, there are some who exit from the process at some point. The debate or argument lies on what influences radicalization and how it takes place looking at the psychological, social, economic, identity and other factors involved.

As per the Norwegian Intelligence Service (PST) the radicalization process can be characterized as a tunnel. PST's concept of characterizing radicalization as a tunnel is synonymous to arguments put forward by scholars that radicalization occurs in stages or in the form of a pyramid. It is postulation that radicalization has an entrance point and an exit point of violent action or terrorism. But PST cautioned that not all who enter the tunnel end up completing the whole process and committing acts of violence. Norway's intelligence service argues that some people may only peek into the tunnel and others may stay there for many years. The degree to which people travel or time they spent in the tunnel varies. However according to PST (2013) those already in the tunnel approve use of violent methods and encourage others to commit violent attacks.

To better understand the complexity of radicalization it is prudent to skim through what various scholars have outlined on the subject. It is also important to state that given the complexity of the term radicalization there is not a one size fit all definition so knowledge of what various scholars have postulated on the subject would be tremendously useful.

### **4.2.1 Radicalization as a State: Attribution theory or Psychopathological theory**

When one is confronted with heinous attacks like that of 9/11, Madrid and London bombings it is extremely difficult to consider the perpetrators of such attacks as rational and mentally healthy individuals. On the other hand it is most convenient to categorize these people as mentally deranged. According to Silke (2008:103) “many researchers on terrorism have shared this view, and some have argued that terrorist groups are made up of a mix of individuals suffering from psychopathic or paranoid personality disorders.” As Quattrone (1982) puts it; what attribution theory teaches us is that we tend to look at our own behavior as something coming from situational or environmental forces, but that we view the behavior of other people as something coming from internal forces, such as their personality. We therefore tend to scout for any available evidence that fit in with our assumptions. Despite the severity and brutality of many terrorist attacks, the vast majority of research on terrorists has concluded that the perpetrators are not psychologically abnormal (Silke 2003; Horgan 2005). The fundamental attribution theory of viewing those who carry out violent attacks as mentally ill people was popular in the 1970s and influenced government policies ( Silke 2008). This widely held view has been shattered by many researches which have shown that terrorists are psychologically much healthier and far more than other violent criminals. Although the view of fundamental attribution on radicalization into violent extremism or terrorism is shattered as of today except in some lone wolves however this does not mean that there are no mentally insane people among violent extremists. The gist of the matter is even where as such mentally ill people are among terrorists they don't make very good terrorists because they are not capable of carrying out sophisticated attacks. “Overall people who carry out violent acts are highly mixed people of different backgrounds of social, economic and cultural situations” (Silke, 2008). The discussion or research nowadays centers on how people become terrorists and because those who carry out violent extremism are heterogeneous the manner in which they became radicalized to become terrorists also vary. This solidifies the argument that one does not become a terrorist spontaneously at one instance but for most people it is a gradual process.

### **4.2.2 Radicalization as a process**

There has been a general consensus over the years that radicalization into violent extremism or terrorism is not a condition or state of mental illness but a process and majority of those who undertake such a process are mentally sound people. Many years of terrorism research has strongly debunked the perception that it is only crazy people who engage in terrorism and

to a great extent scholars have realized that terrorism is not usefully viewed not as a “condition” but as dynamic “process” (Borum, 2011). It is the nature of the process that scholars are grappling with over the years. “A central guiding question in these efforts seems to be; how do people come to adopt violent extremist ideologies (radicalize), translate them – or not – into justifications or imperatives to use terrorist violence, and choose (or choose not) to engage in the violent and subversive activity in service of those ideologies” (Borum, 2011:15). To answer this question various scholars have charted out theories to help explain the phenomenon of the process of radicalization.

It is relevant to make a summary review on what various scholars have postulated on radicalization as a process the theories utilized. The reason for running such a review is because Norwegian policy documents view radicalization into violent extremism as a process and that is why I found it prudent to delve into the different theories put forward by various scholars in describing radicalization as a process. The first research question has also probed into how the policy documents have highlighted the causes and phenomenon of radicalization. However it is important to point out that these models of scholars remain underdeveloped and none of the models have a very firm social-scientific basis as an established cause of violent extremism. The objective is to give an over view and pinpoint the factors on which most of the scholars agree on in order to help shape our understanding of radicalization into violent extremism as understanding of this phenomenon will help in dissecting the government policy documents on radicalization and violent extremism

Wiktorowicz (2004) explains the journey which an individual or group goes through before joining an extremist organization or legitimizing violence (which can be term radicalization) in four stages or phases. He describes this journey as involving an “extensive socialization process that includes exposure to movement ideas, debates and deliberations, and even experimentation with alternative groups” (Wiktorowicz, 2004). It is important to state that Wiktorowicz(2004) did not specifically mention radicalization process in his four stage model but the journey he outlines clearly fits a radicalization process. In summary he introduced unjust events like blocked mobility, racism or political discrimination as what triggers a cognitive opening in the first phase. Imagination and narrative are factors in the second phase and social network which surfaces from the second to the final stage is also pertinent factor in the radicalization process. Identity construction and reconstruction is factor that stands out and the final phases bring out in-group and out-group identities.



Borum (2003) identified four separate stages in explaining the process through which any individual or group passes before reaching a point at which violence or terrorism is justified. Although he does not mention radicalization specifically in his model nor limit the model to a specific group of people. The model identified injustices (whether real or perceived) such as poor living conditions, economic deprivation and restriction as crucial factors in radicalization. The first two stages involve identifying injustices and putting them in perspective in relation to others and that's where identity also pops up. The last two stages involves figuring out who is responsible and putting forward a narrative of labeling the perceived perpetrators of injustice as bad and inhuman which makes violent action justifiable(Borum, 2003).

Moghaddam (2005) illustrates the route to joining extremist groups or perpetuating acts of terror in a five step staircase culminating into terrorism. Although like other previously presented models he also does not mention radicalization but the model can be used to explain radicalization. The five step staircase allegory model, range from the bottom where the population is located and towers up to the apex where acts of terror takes place. Each of the steps of the staircase has specific factors which influence the individual's decision to climb to the next step or remain where they are (Moghaddam, 2005). This model has received criticism in some quarters for postulating the road to terrorism in staircase transition from one level to another in linear fashion. According to Lygre et al (2011) the proposed transitions between the different steps are not backed by empirical evidence.

The New York police department model focuses on ideology mainly jahdi-salafi ideology explaining the process of radicalization. A model described as the religious conveyer belt in some quarters has come under criticism for mass surveillance of the Muslim community in New York (Rushin, 2011; Lane, 2012). The model clearly pin – pointed ideology as the driving force in the radicalization process (Silber & Bhatt, 2007). According to the model ideology is “the driver that motivates young men and women, born or living in the west to carryout autonomous jihad” (Silber & Bhatt, 2006:06). The model explains radicalization as a four stage process. Silber & Bhatt (2007) illustrated in their model events like; blocked mobility, alienation, discrimination and international conflicts which created personal crisis on individuals driving them to take the initial steps in the radicalization process. It is narrative shaped by ideology that becomes the driving force for further radicalization at the second and third stages although social networks play a pivotal role in the third stage. In the final stage the individual becomes willing to undertake full fledge jihad.

Sageman (2008) agrees that radicalization is process but not a linear one as expounded by other scholars he believes the process is influenced by four different dimensions which can surface at different times, develop at different speeds and relate to each other without having to follow a certain linear order(Sageman 2008, King & Taylor 2011). According to Sageman (2008) kinship relations and friendship bonds play crucial roles in the radicalization phenomenon and the recruitment into terror groups. Joining a group of likeminded people, individual ideas get validated by others and spread within the group (Sageman, 2008)

As indicated by other scholars Nesser (2010) also mentioned personal problems, social grievance and deprivation and identity problems as contributing causes to radicalization. He however pointed out that people don't have the same motivation or follow the same path in the process of radicalization. He illustrates his multiple-path model by distinguishing four main ideal categories of radicalized individuals in a cell; entrepreneur, protégés, misfits and drifters (Nesser, 2010). Nasser (2010) highlighted seminal contributing causes to radicalization as personal problems, social grievances and deprivation and identity related factors. He made a distinction between the four categories or archetypes he identified; describing the upper two entrepreneur and protégés as ideologically committed and as such political frustration in relation to those matters that affect people they identify with e.g Muslims, the perception of helplessness in influencing decision making as factors motivated them to join radical groups. On the other hand he attributes personal problems, networks, youth rebellion and lack of viable options to misfits and drifters.

Capturing radicalization in the form of a pyramid where those who sympathize with terrorists are at the bottom of the pyramid and terrorists or those who carryout violent acts are at the apex of the pyramid is the work of McCauley and Moskalenko (2008). As presented by other scholars they too concur that the pathways to radicalization differs from person to person and made a distinction between individual , group and mass radicalization. McCauley & Moskalenko (2008) model highlighted negative personal experiences such as physical violence and maltreatment as a contributing factor to the process of radicalization. They however stress that it is when these grievances are reference to the group the individual is aligned to then the chances of climbing up the pyramid are greater. Other factors like political grievances, social networks and friendship bonds are highlighted.

All the postulations of various scholars point to factors that are both in the individuals psyche and the forces surrounding the individual. One factor does not have effect independent of

other factors. Some of the postulations like that of Silber and Bhatt have been criticized for being the precursor in the stigmatization of Muslims. The model on which these postulations were embedded when it was adopted by the New York Police department resulted into mass surveillance of the Muslim community. Knowledge of these models and relating them to the experiences both at the national and local level may be useful in the drafting of national and local policy documents on counter radicalization and violent extremism and would also help us how policy documents have categorized the role of the police in countering all forms of extremism and how they have highlighted the phenomenon of radicalizations. We now turn to a presentation of relevant findings from the three policy documents.

## **5.0 Findings and Discussions**

The findings and discussions presented here are relevant information from the three policy documents: NAPRE, NGRVE and LAPE pertaining to the research questions. In the presentation first a contextualization of the policy documents is carried out followed by categorization of the role of the police in the policy documents. This is followed by the Issue of trust as deduced from the policy documents and then a presentation of causes and phenomenon of radicalization. Countering all forms of extremism comes at the end of the presentation of findings. The findings will be followed by discussions on the main findings that would in process invoke the two theories presented in this study.

### **5.0.1 Contextualizing the three policy documents**

The policy documents were brought up here to critically look at how they have addressed the issue of trust and confidence within the Muslim community towards the police and the municipal authorities in the fight against radicalization and violent extremism. In any findings context of relevant data especially secondary is very vital this is why a context of the three policy documents is presented before bringing forward the findings. The national action plan against radicalization and violent extremism (NAPRVE) was developed in 2011 and reviewed in 2014 three years after the most deadly terror attack in Norway. To put the 2014 version of the action plan against radicalization and violent extremism into context it is important to point out that the revised plan came into being around one year after the coming into office of a populist right wing government. A government in which the Norwegian Ministry of Justice and Public Security (MNJPS) is placed under the purview of a member of the far right part the people's party (FRP). It is also important to state that it came out at a time the Syrian conflict that has attracted foreign fighters from Norway and other countries in the west

because of the rise of the so-called Islamic state (IS) reached its 3<sup>rd</sup> year. It was at a time the Anders Breivik case the mastermind of the Oslo bombing and terror attack was already laid to rest because he was already sentenced to jail which was somehow a closure of the chapter of the deadliest terror attack in Norwegian history after 2<sup>nd</sup> World War.

The national guide against radicalization and violent extremism (NGRVE) is a practical policy guide for the prevention of radicalization and violent extremism. The guide acknowledges that preventing radicalization and violent extremism is an important social task that must be performed across social sectors and disciplines (NMJPS, 2015). The document is built up from the national action plan and it is intended to make it easier for the local communities to provide response when challenges arise. According to the NMJPS (2015) the document builds on the guidance section of the national action plan against radicalization and violent extremism which was presented in June 2014 and it is a follow – up on measure in the plan. The plan is prepared by the ministry of justice and public security with input from six other ministries.

The local action plan against extremism (LAPE) for Bærum municipality (BK) was produced a year after the 2014 revised action plan against radicalization and violent extremism. It was produced at a time many young people from Bærum have been travelling or on the verge of travelling to Syria to fight alongside the so-called Islamic state. This is why there is a specific section in the local action plan that deals with the issue of foreign fighters and follows up with their families. It is built on the measures outlined in the national action plan but adjusted to fit the reality of Bærum in some instances. “Bærum’s local action plan builds on the same principles of the national action plan and aims primarily at strengthening preventive aspects related to extremism”(BK, ABPD & SLT, 2015:03) . The action plan is produced by Bærum municipality (BK), Asker & Bærum police district (ABPD) and the unit coordinating local crime prevention measures (SLT). It is important to point out that while the national action plan is captioned national action plan against radicalization and violent extremism (NAPRVE), the local action plan is captioned as local action plan against extremism (LAPE). The reason of choosing extremism instead of violent extremism is however not conceptualized in the local action plan.

### **5.0.2 Categorization of the role of the police in the policy documents**

The role of the police in the 30 measures outlined in the national action plan against radicalization and violent extremism is not very clear but comes under those measures that are

directly under the purview of the Norwegian Ministry of Justice and Public Security (MNJPS). Because this paper is about the role of the police in the SLT model of counter radicalization and violent extremism it is therefore necessary to examine the responsibilities dedicated to the ministry of justice and public security through which the police in every district derive their functions and responsibilities.

The primary responsibility of the police is to secure life and property and as stated in the foreword message of the national action plan (NAPRVE) and signed by Prime Minister Erna Solberge and nine ministers “Being able to live our lives without fear of being exposed to hate and violence is a fundamental value of a secure society” (NMJPS, 2014:5). Norway’s preventive mechanism or measures treats radicalization and violent extremism like any other crime and such an approach is criticized in some quarters as ineffective in preventing radicalization and violent extremism because radicalization and violent extremism are classified as crimes but are unique and therefore need special preventive measures different from other crimes. The action plan however argues in a different direction by stating that “The Norwegian preventive efforts enjoy broad support. It is important to base the efforts to combat radicalization and violent extremism on the same basic principles as general prevention of crime “(NMJPS, 2014:13).

One however may wonder if radicalization and violent extremism are treated like any other crime why the need for a special action plan against radicalization and violent extremism when there is already an action plan on general crime prevention? These two action plans overlap on many issues and the local SLT for crime prevention overlap with the role of the police. This is why a recent report released by KS talked about the lack of clarity on what the police should do and what the municipal SLT should do. The action plan didn’t clearly state what the role of the police would be in their collaborative work with municipal authorities to curb radicalization and violent extremism.

The police council is made mention of as “a formalized corporation between the police and municipal authorities, where the goal is to help promote corporation on crime prevention and security in local communities” (NMJPS, 2014: 13). SLT is also made mention of as a model coordination of local crime prevention measures in the municipalities and the police are also represented in the SLT model. There is a possibility of overlap of roles in a municipality where two models or modes of corporation exist. To make matters even more complicated is the hint in the NIBR, HiOA, JB and KS (2016) report that there would be a radicalization

coordinator appointed by the police in the municipalities. What would be the role of that radicalization coordinator and how his/her role would be different from the SLT coordinator is not clear. All the three measures in the action plan under cooperation and coordination fall under the purview of the ministry of justice and public security.

Measure number 12 under cooperation and coordination in the national action plan is about improving the Norwegian Police Security Service's (PST) central advisory role on the preventive efforts.

Measure number 13 under cooperation and coordination in the action plan deliberated on preventative police contacts that they would be "established at relevant police districts to be points of contact in the event of concern about radicalization and violent extremism, provide advice and convey enquiries to the proper body" (NMJPS, 2014: 20). According to the national action plan preventative police contacts are going to be knowledgeable people on effective measures and available resources and they would be interlocutors between PST and the local collaborating parties. The plan went on to state that "PST will have a close dialogue and follow-up of the local preventative police contacts and give those contacts education and training in knowledge on relevant phenomena"(ibid).

According to the national guide the foremost role of the police is to prevent and combat crime in society or community. The government's line of action is that radicalization and violent extremism are treated like any other crime and it is therefore not a surprise that there is police and PST presence in most of the measures buttressed in the guide. The guide elaborated on the function and importance of police prevention contacts. The national guide stated that there are appointed special prevention contacts in the field of radicalization and violent extremism in police districts in Oslo, Asker and Baerum, Rømerike, Øst fold, Southern Buskerud and Telemark. The role of these special prevention contact officers according to the guide is to act as coordinators for concern about radicalization and violent extremism, advice, and mediate inquiries to the appropriate person in consultation with local PST. "Police prevention contacts should be a link between local PST and local police, in relation to coordinating events, cooperation and exchange of information between police and communities"(NMJPS, 2015:11). The national guide further states that "prevention contacts are an important point of contact in the local multidisciplinary collaboration"(NMJPS, 2015:11). Looking at the role of prevention contacts as elaborated by the national guide it seems to overlap with that of the SLT coordinator in the municipality which raises concerns of not clear responsibilities

between the police and the municipal authorities. This concern has been corroborated in the recent NIBR, HiOA, JB and KS 2016 report as stated earlier in the analysis of the national action plan.

The national guide carried out an elaborate explanation of how concern conversations that are mostly carried out by the police are done. These are conversations in which the police invites children or young people who are at the risk of committing crimes to sit down and discuss the situation with them. Sometimes parents of children or young people are invited too in those conversations. This is a method or measure that was very instrumental in neutralizing far-right extremist groups in the 1990s in Norway. But the degree to which such police concern conversations have contributed to preventing all forms of radicalization especially in minority communities is not certain.

When the local action plan against extremism (LAPE) was developed in 2015 Asker & Bærum were a separate police district of their own but as at now Bærum is under the purview of the Oslo police district. According to the local plan the municipality and the police should have an active and extensive role in the prevention of extremism (BK, ABPD & SLT, 2015). The plan went on to emphasize that the challenges in prevention work cannot be solved by the municipal authorities and the police alone but citizens of the community also have a responsibility in preventing extremism (ibid). This is a suggestion that for the role of the police to be successful it is going to be with the help of the cooperation and collaboration of citizens of the community.

There are priority areas identified in the local action plan some of which points to the role of the police. The police district responsible for Bærum area is among the police districts that have a police prevention contact that is to serve as the municipality's immediate contact in the police with regards to matters of extremism. The need for this contact person is mentioned in the national action plan and Bærum as explained in their local action plan has been one of the municipalities that are to receive state funding for this position. This police prevention contact will also link to the country's police security services (PST) and the collaboration partners and at the same time maintain an advisory role to the police council and SLT (BK, ABPD & SLT, 2015).

In the priority areas and measures the local plan spelt out a core group in which the police and PST has a role to play. This core group was established in the summer of 2014 and consists of two representatives from the municipality and two from the police district (BK, ABPD &

SLT, 2015). According to the local action plan the role of the core group is to formalize cooperation between the municipality, local community, police and PST and as well as prepare strategy for future work (ibid). The SLT coordinator is designated to be the leader of the group.

According to measure number 5 of the local action plan there is to be a religious community contact who would be visiting mosques and other religious communities and shall be under the purview of the police in partnership with the religious community. This measure is in compliance with national action plan against radicalization and violent extremism measure 15.

On sharing of information the local plan stated categorically that it is the police prevention contacts that would ensure the dissemination of information on radicalization and violent extremism to the operational areas as well as investigators to increase knowledge and awareness on the subject (BK, ABPD & SLT, 2015). The local action plan stated that there would be local guide as there is a national guide which gives practical information on what to do in situations of concern with regards to extremism. The guide according to the local plan is to be prepared by the police in consultation with the municipality. This falls under measure number 12 of the local plan which is in compliance with measure number 6 of the national action plan.

The Police are also tasked with raising awareness on extremism amongst youth in the municipality, there would be youth teams that are to focus on extremism in concern meetings. This falls under measure 13 of the local plan which is in compliance with measure 13 of the national action plan.

Measure number 14 of the local action plan states that the intelligence agency PST is tasked to make presentations on radicalization and violent extremism. The presentations are to be done at parent meetings and also to the municipal actors working with extremism cases. PST will also give advice and guidance to different actors involved in prevention work and they would also work to develop local prevention strategies.

The local action plan gave task of advice and guidance to the country's police security service PST which falls under measure 15 of the local action plan. According to the local action plan PST shall give advice and guidance to local police and other actors in prevention work, providing knowledge about the phenomenon of radicalization and violent extremism,



analyzing and helping to develop local prevention strategies. This measure is in compliance with measure number 12 of the national action plan.

Measure numbers 22 and 23 of the local action plan involves contact between the police/PST with the youth who are on the verge of radicalization and young victims of crime. In measure 22 the police/PST are task to call for a meeting if they suspect a child or young person is on the verge of radicalization, sometimes parents of the youngsters are also invited to those meetings. The meetings are voluntary and carried out according to method developed by PST. Measure number 23 is an assurance program that is also run by the police and meant to assure victims of crimes especially in situations where the offender of crime is not caught by the police that justice would take its course. The aim of the assurance program is to prevent hateful thoughts from developing in the victims up to the extent that they become perpetrators of crime (BK, ABPD & SLT, 2015). According to the local action plan this program is an important element in the prevention of hate crimes (ibid). An area where the municipality closely collaborates with the police and PST is in the follow – up with the family when a family member happens to travel to warzone. Measure numbers 29, 30 and 31 deal with issues of notification procedures, contacting family and follow up of the family respectively. To what extent will such collaboration yield results will depend on the level of trust within the community.

In the follow- up of individuals who have returned home from extremist warzones the police/PST have been given an extensive role to play according to the local action plan from clarification meetings with returnees , prosecuting to international police cooperation(BK, ABPD & SLT, 2015). Measure numbers 32, 34 and 35 which are clarification meetings, prosecution and international police cooperation respectively are all under the responsibility of the police/PST.

The measures that stipulate how to deal with the return of foreign fighters to Bærum are all under the responsibility of the police/PST. Measure numbers 36, 37, 38 and 39 which are notification procedure, follow-up, Exit program and prosecution respectively for foreign fighters who have returned to Bærum are all under the purview if the Police/PST.

### **5.0.3 The issue of trust as deduced from the policy documents**

Despite the government’s involvement in actions that weakens trust unfortunately in the national action plan against radicalization and violent extremism (NAPRVE) there is no

measure among the 30 measures that is dedicated to building trust within local communities. Even in the section that deals with knowledge and expertise there is no measure that is dedicated to research on building or improving trust and confidence within local communities. The minister of immigration has been criticized for allowing some of the vilest comments from far-right extremist sympathizers to run on her face book page. The government has also decided to revoke the refugee status of around 1600 Somalis based on what critics say circumstantial evidence (Norwaytoday1, 2016). This year the Norwegian police directorate made a unilateral decision not to recognize birth places of Norwegian citizens of immigrant background who are born in 35 countries around the globe majority of those countries fall in Sub-Saharan Africa ( Norwaytoday2, 2016).

Like the national action plan the issue of building trust and confidence within local communities is not explicitly explained in the national guide against radicalization and violent extremism (NGRVE). Apart from acts that may either strengthen or weaken trust in communities like cooperation, coordination and information sharing there are no concrete steps outlined in the national guide on trust building in the local communities. Although the national guide has outlined the roles that different stakeholders should play in concern situations it is emphasized that serious cases of concern should be reported to the police or PST (BK, ABPD & SLT, 2015).

The local action plan against extremism (LAPE) has also deliberated on cooperation and collaboration with the local community to combat violent extremism but failed to describe extensively on ways and means of building trust and confidence within the local community. PST plays a central role in cooperation in cooperation and collaboration with local communities to combat terror (BK, ABPD & SLT, 2015).

#### **5.0.4 Causes of radicalization & violent extremism**

On the causes of radicalization and violent extremism the national action plan (NAPRVE) is not very explicit in outlining the various causes in detail. It made mention of that there are many psychological and social factors that drive people in to the process of radicalization but did not go in detail to give examples. According to the action plan “there are more underlying factors that can help start or intensify a process of radicalization” (NMJPS, 2014:9). The action plan hinted on the root causes of radicalization by stating that “Norway’s foreign policy and security policy has resulted in changes in our potential enemies” (NMJPS, 2014:9).

Although the national action plan was not very explicit on the causes of radicalization it however highlighted the need for knowledge and expertise in combating radicalization and violent extremism. Under knowledge and expertise the action plan indicated research strategy as the first measure in combating radicalization and violent extremism. In fact the first 3 measures in the plan are on research which shows the government's line of action in uncovering the causes of radicalization and violent extremism and possible preventive work. The government has outlined the need for research on radicalization and violent extremism however the direction towards which research would go highly depends on the threat assessment of PST and PST has several times stated that the greatest threat to Norwegian security are the Islamist groups. It is evident that measure number 3 of the action plan focuses on "research on process of radicalization and motivating factors related to foreign fighters" (NMJPS, 2014:18). According to the plan this research project is launched to look into issues concerning processes of radicalization and motivating factors related to Islamic extremism and foreign fighters. Again critics would say this gives room for a focus on Islam and Muslim because a similar measure is not designed in the action plan for far right extremism.

The national guide against radicalization and violent extremism (**NGRVE**) elaborated in detail the underlying factors that can help start or intensify a process of radicalization. In explaining the factors that influence radicalization the national guide made use of what it calls a holistic model. "The holistic model is described through four circles. The innermost circle describes the individual level and refers to the explanations that are based on characteristics of the individual. The second circle describes social psychological/relational factors. The third circle represents community level and encircles the two, the point of both formal and informal institutions and social structures such as education, work and social networks. The outermost and fourth circle refers to the larger cultural and structural explanations" (NMJPS, 2015). In these four circles there are risk and protective factors. Risk factors are those factors that pushed the person or group into further radicalization while the protective factors are those that contribute to saving the person or group from further radicalization. "By reducing risk factors and enhancing protective factors risk for unfortunate development is lowered" (NMJPS, 2015).

The national guide mentioned perceived exclusion and injustice as part of risk factors that pushes a person or group into radicalization. "Common to many people that seek to join extremist groups have experienced exclusion; to not fit or feeling of failure at school among classmates, in the work place, in local community or society"(NMJPS, 2015:15). The inability

to establish links with established social groups which is a relational challenge and described as lack of social cohesion is also among the risk factors causing radicalization in some people. Domestic violence coupled with poor economy and unemployment are also listed as risk factors that may aggravate radicalization in some people. The feeling of being discriminated or marginalized in the community can also push some people into the arms of extremist groups especially if the affected people don't see any avenue of addressing their concerns. This means that there are a myriad of factors that cause radicalization and violent extremism and addressing one or more factors like lack of social cohesion and substance abuse doesn't necessarily mean addressing the problem of radicalization and violent extremism. There are people who are presumed to be well integrated or good economic status and from reasonably peaceful homes but end up being radicalized. There are also some people who are not well integrated, have poor economic status and experienced domestic violence but yet didn't end up being radicalized. The presence or absence of these so-called risk factors alone may not determine radicalization of a person or group, ideology either religious or political also plays a part. In the national action plan and the national guide there seems to be more emphasis on these risk factors than on ideology. There is little or no concrete measures for countering violent extremist ideology through engagement and debates in the public sphere. What happens in the public sphere are a token of conferences sometimes between people of different faith who tend to affirm what they have in common rather than countering violent extremist beliefs. Those who harbor violent ideology are not invited in such conference or dialogue forums but the irony is that those who harbor extremist belief are sometimes given platforms in television programs that are moderated by ill-equipped individuals who may not be able to effectively refute arguments from such people. Multiculturalism is being refuted in the public sphere and on the internet by individuals and extremist groups and if no concrete measures are developed to counter that in the media and in schools it may have effect on children to the extent that they develop anti-immigrant feelings even though they may not experience a troubled life.

### **5.0.5 Phenomenon of radicalization**

In the introductory part of the action plan (NAPRVE) radicalization as most scholars have postulated is described as “a process whereby a person increasingly accepts the use of violence to achieve political, ideological or religious goals” (NMJPS, 2014:7). The action plan further reiterates that it is radicalization that results to violent extremism which classified as the most extreme form of hate crime. According to the policy document violent extremism

is understood “to be activities of persons and groups that are willing to use violence in order to achieve their political ideology or religious goals” (NMJPS, 2014:7). Violent extremism is viewed like any other crime and it is portrayed in the action plan that if social and economic inequality is addressed and youth have a sense of belonging to the society that would help prevent radicalization into violent extremism. The action plan further elaborates on the process of radicalization by stating that it is characterized by two levels of development “a cognitive development towards a steadily more unilateral perception of reality, where there is no room for alternative perspective and further development where the perception of reality is experienced so acutely and seriously that violent actions appear necessary and just” (NMJPS, 2014:7). Because the action plan described violent extremism violent extremism as the most extreme form of hate crime here is how hate crime is understood as per NMJPS (2014) “criminal acts that are fully or partially motivated by negative attitude to a person or group’s actual or perceived ethnicity, religion, political affiliation, social orientation, gender expression or disability”

The national guide (NGRVE) in explaining the concepts, words and phrases in combating radicalization and extremism made a distinction between radicalization and being radical. It portrayed the later as positive and the former negative. “It is not illegal to be radical; often the term is used with a positively charged sign” (NMJPS, 2015). The guide went on to state that big positive changes in society have been achieved because of radical fueled in issue or change and give examples of Mahatma Ghandi, Martin Luther King, Nelson Mandela and Gloria Steinem.

As for the meaning of radicalization the guide concurs with many scholars and in what is written in the action plan that radicalization is a process by which a person or group increasingly accepts the use of violence as an instrument for achieving political, ideological or religious goals”(NMJPS, 2015). The guide stated that violent extremism may be a consequence of radicalization. It dismissed the one size fit all notion when it comes to radicalization by stating that it differs from person to person and group to group. “Radicalization may vary from person to person and from group to group and may occur within all kinds of beliefs, cultural background and political directions. The process can be gradual over long or shorter time but also emerge as an acute change in a person”(NMJPS. 2015). The guide further used the PST postulation of radicalization process as being the similitude of someone moving in a tunnel called the radicalization tunnel. The national guide stated that radicalization is comparable to being in a tunnel and that in a radicalization tunnel

an individual will be exposed to a narrow and one-sided view of the world. The guide however stated that there are no definite answers to what happens to a person in a radicalization process but a key issue stands out and that is lack of social cohesion. The national guide NMJPS (2015) went on to pinpoint certain traits that characterize the radicalization process and they include:- a unilateral worldview, a perception of owning the objective truth, a perception that purpose justifies the means, an enemy image of “we-and- the other” performances , which can be used to justify use of violence, an acceptance of the use of violence to achieve political goals, a feeling that the situation is so acute and severe that drastic actions are justified as necessary.

These traits marched what the various scholars have deliberated on in the beginning of this paper. The problem is, there is a possibility of people displaying many of these traits and yet not resort to the use of violence or join terror networks. This is what makes the prevention of radicalization and violent extremism work very complex and therefore requires continuous empirical research in order to uncover appropriate strategies or measures.

The local action plan (LAPE) rather than relying on the realities in Bærum to describe the phenomenon of radicalization and violent extremism relied on descriptions in the national action plan and that of Oslo commune. Although the term extremism is chose over the term violent extremism in the caption of the local action plan violent extremism is replicated in the definition of terms section that it is the most extreme form of hate crime. As for the municipal SLT which is the coordinating unit of all crime prevention measures it is stated that when it comes to radicalization and extremism the unit deals with all cases irrespective of age. Under normal circumstances the SLT should deal with cases involving younger people of age 18 and below. “SLT board of Bærum has decided that work related to extremism should encompass all individuals regardless of age” (BK, ABPD & SLT, 2015:06).

The local action plan admits that local work against extremism would be prioritized according to the annual threat assessments coming from PST. This means that PST indirectly dictates what direction local measures against radicalization and violent extremism would follow. The local action plan(LAPE) quotes PST that “Although the number of extremists in Norway is low, we still identify new people who appear to be in a radicalization.” The plan went on to state that according to PST Østland environment which includes Bærum happen to attract many of those radicalized and one of the challenges that PST stated is that these people get extremely radicalized before they identify them. May be it would have been easier to identify

such people before they get extremely radicalized if there were some mechanism at the local level that closely look into such cases devoid of the arm of government intelligence gathering.

### **5.0.6 Countering all forms of violent extremism**

The national action plan 2014 has raised both issues of Islamic forms of violent extremism which it calls the Al-Qaeda inspired form of extremism and far right extremism. The policy document attributed explicitly the promotion of hate and violent rhetoric to Al-Qaeda inspired form of extremism. The action plan state the following “the key proponents of Al-Qaeda inspired extremism are young persons who have grown up in Norway. These persons promote hate and violent rhetoric aimed at the western world especially at Norway and Norwegian interests and Symbols” (NMJPS, 2014:10). However the language used to describe Al-Qaeda inspired extremism did not pop up in the description of the far right extremism even though the far right is known for spreading hate and violent rhetoric against Muslims and migrants in general. Instead the national action plan described Norwegian right wing extremists as those who “defend a view of the world that is hostile to Islam or immigration” (NMJPS, 2014:10).

In the section of the action plan where relevant challenges are discussed complexity of the extremist groups in Norway of today is made mention of. The complexity is viewed from an ethnicity dimension. It is stated that Norwegian extremist groups in the 1990s were run by ethnic Norwegians and were rarely affected by international armed conflicts and events (NMJPS, 2014). But today according to the policy document the extremist groups are more ethnically complex. After outlining the challenges that counter radicalization and violent extremism face which are “emergence of the internet and social media as a virtual arena for radicalization, international circumstances, which have gained considerable influence on the threat situation and the risk of increased polarization between different groups in the society” (NMJPS, 2014:9). The action plan went on to explain how extremist groups fit into the challenges outlined. However it is the Al-Qaeda inspired form of extremism which is sometimes branded Islamic extremism that received buttressing on how it fits the outlined challenges and not far right extremism. The issue of foreign fighters and how it influence the threat situation is elaborated but very little is mentioned about the anti-Islam and anti-immigration slogans that spread on the internet and sometimes perpetuated by members of the far right party(FRP) that is part of the coalition government. Critics may say that as per the challenges in combating radicalization and violent extremism the action plan is pointing more towards the Al-Qaeda inspired form of extremism which somehow confirms the complain by some individuals at the local level that CVE work focuses more on Islam and Muslims. The

action plan in explaining about the AL-Qaeda inspired extremism stated that “Several young persons in Norway are easily enthralled by this group and may be in the initial phase of a process of radicalization. It is crucial that we prevent further radicalization and new recruitment among precisely these persons” (NMJPS, 2014:10). Again this statement in the action plan gives critics leverage to assert the biasness of the plan in the focus on Islamist groups despite Norway witnessing one of the greatest atrocities from someone harboring far right ideology 3 years ago at the time of reviewing the action.

Unlike the national action plan against radicalization and violent extremism the national guide did not make mention of Islam, Muslims or Al-Qaeda inspired form of extremism. The guide addresses the issues of radicalization and violent extremism in a generalized manner. The only instance that may have something to do with Islam or Muslims is where the guide outlined the procedure of holding conversation of concern with so-called foreign fighters upon their return to Norway or those who are on the verge of travelling to warzones as combatants . Most of the foreign fighters are from Muslim background or are converts to Islam. The degree to which these fighters or those who are on the verge of becoming foreign fighters pose as a threat to Norway may be very difficult to say because of lack of empirical evidence on attacks orchestrated by this group of people in Norway

The local action plan against extremism in the section captioned challenge picture and preparation of action plan it made it categorically clear which direction the action plan is to follow. It stated that “nationally, the police security service (PST) considered in its annual threat assessment that terrorist threat is heightened and it is extreme Islamism that pose the most serious threat” (BK, ABPD & SLT, 2015:4). The plan also maintains that many young people from Bærum have travelled to Syria but it however reiterated that the action plan is an action plan to prevent extremism regardless of ideological, religious or political conviction. Judging by the afore statement the action plan is supposed to work to prevent all forms of extremism but looking at the content of the plan one would discern that it is the extremism that has something to do with Muslims and Islam that is prioritized. The plan has a specific section that deals with foreign fighters and follows up with their families in Norway however the same is not replicated for threats coming from the far right and issues of hate crime. Perhaps it is verily the threat assessments that come from PST that dictate on what is prioritized in counter radicalization and violent extremism work.



## **5.1 Discussions on main findings**

The main findings in the previous section are brought forward here and made sense of in the form of discussions. This exercise is undertaken by invoking on the two theories of this study i.e. theories of trust and radicalization in order to shed light on the two research questions.

The discussion will focus mainly on what is uncovered from the policy documents with regards to the categorization of the role of the police and on the issue of trust in relation to the categorized role of the police.

### **5.1.1 Categorization of the role of the police by policy documents**

Under measure number 12 of the national action plan against radicalization and violent extremism (NAPRVE) it is the police security service (PST) that issues assessment of threat level in the country are given a central advisory role on preventive efforts. Could this be the reason why there is police presence in most of the preventive mechanism and models at the local level? I don't think too much police control and presence is an advantage to coordination and cooperation in countering radicalization and violent extremism at the municipal level. It is an irony that those who are tasked to research on radicalization and violent extremism are not given an advisory role on preventive efforts but it is instead the country's police security service PST that is given that role. This might be what is making matters complicated at the municipal level because as NIBR, HiOA, JB and KS (2016) report pointed out the role of the police and that of municipal authorities in combating radicalization and violent extremism is not very clear on what each should do.

Measure number 13 of NAPRVE advocates for a close work between PST, police, preventative contacts and the municipal authorities. In the local action plan of Bærum (LAPE) an area where the municipality closely collaborates with the police and PST is in the follow – up with the family when a family member happens to travel to a warzone. Measure numbers 29, 30 and 31 deal with issues of notification procedures, contacting family and follow up of the family respectively. Measure numbers 29 to 39 of LAPE that stipulate on how to deal with the return of foreign fighters to Bærum are all under the responsibility of the police/PST, a responsibility undertaken with the close collaboration with the municipal authorities and the community. The extent to which such collaboration yield desired results will depend on the level of trust within the community. Such a very close collaboration or working relation has been criticized because municipal authorities feel uneasy about it (NIBR, HiOA, JB & KS, 2016). In the NIBR, HiOA, JB & KS (2016) report municipal authorities made complains that the police ask them for information that they the police could have obtained by themselves,

therefore the municipal authorities fear that they might be seen by local people as if they are collecting information for the police.

The national guide against radicalization and violent extremism (NGRVE) in highlighting on the role of the police mentioned that each police directorate is obliged to establish a police council with each municipality but states that it is voluntary for each municipality to accept the scheme. The police councils according to the guide are meant to establish a common understanding of the problem, putting together the procedures for cooperation, allocation of responsibilities and preparing strategies so that concerns of radicalization and violent extremism can be handled at the local communities. According to the guide an evaluation of the police councils in 2014 shows that there are very good feedbacks on cooperation from the police and municipal authorities. But are the views and perceptions of the local people represented in such an evaluation in 2014? The answer to this question is relevant because NIBR, HiOA, JB & KS (2016) report is contrary to the purported feedback on cooperation between the police and local municipal authorities.

At the local level like Bærum a municipality that has adopted SLT, a model within which the police also have a role to play is very complex and there are no clearly spelt out responsibilities between the municipality and the police when it comes to countering violent extremism. The role of the police is blended into the SLT model in such a way that if not properly addressed could weaken trust within the community especially communities of minorities. One of the ways of reducing the complexity of the functioning of SLT model is for the police to establish full fledge community policing and work directly with the communities. The confusion in the role of the police in the SLT model can be attributed to what Cordner (1995:05) postulated that it “reflects a common organizational pathology called goal displacement by which over time, favored methods come to be seen as ends in themselves.” He further stated that to overcome this confusion community policing could be answer because the policing approach emphasizes that in our society the law is but a means to the greater ends of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness (Cordner, 1995). As elucidated in the literature review under community policing, the police are equal stakeholders in addressing the safety and securing issues confronting the community. Therefore the ideals of community policing and police –community relations should inform policy on counter radicalization and violent extremism in order to properly categorized the role of the police and develop efficient trust building mechanisms.

### **5.1.2 The issue of trust in relation to the categorized roles of the police**

Trust and confidence within local communities towards authorities in preventive work on radicalization and violent extremism is very vital. Without trust any designed preventive measure that requires collaboration from local communities is bound to fail. Unfortunately in the national action plan against radicalization and violent extremism (NAPRVE) there is no measure among the 30 measures that is dedicated to building trust within local communities. Even in the section that deals with knowledge and expertise there is no measure that is dedicated to research on building or improving trust and confidence within local communities. The reason why right wing extremist groups of the 1990s in Norway were easily neutralized through the Exit program ran by the police is because the extremists were ethnic Norwegians and the local Norwegian community cooperated because of mutual trust between the authorities and the local Norwegian communities. There are many factors that prevent the minority ethnic communities to fully cooperate with the authorities and it would have been very apt if the national action plan specifies a measure in which proper empirical research would be carried out by a competent body on how to build or improve trust and confidence in local communities. Although the national guide has outlined the roles that different stakeholders should play in concern situations it is emphasized that serious cases of concern should be reported to the police or PST (BK, ABPD & SLT, 2015). If measure number 12 of the NAPRVE gives the police security services (PST) a central advisory role in preventive efforts and also mandates them to issue threat assessments in the country it should raise the question of accountability; a pertinent issue building trust. I believe decision making powers in preventive efforts should be evenly distributed or at least it should be done in way in which the police and their sister institution PST could held accountable. The standards through which accountability takes shape must follow the route of protective rather than regime policing (Goldsmith, 2003).

There are certain actions that the police and the government authorities do that may greatly weaken trust in immigrant communities. The action plan has a number of measures on preventing harassment and hate expressions on the internet and prevention of hate rhetoric but unfortunately some members of the far-right party in government engage in anti-immigrant campaign and sometimes spread hate on the internet and on the media. From the minister of immigration allowing some of the vilest comments from far-right extremist sympathizers to run on her face book page, revoking of citizenship and refugee status of some migrants to the unilateral decision made by the police directorate not to recognize birth places of Norwegian

citizens of immigrant background who are born in 35 countries around the globe such actions may seriously erode trust within the migrant community towards the police. Such actions by the police and government officials seriously weaken trust and it seems issues like that are not given preference in the national action plan against radicalization and violent extremism. How such actions affect trust need to be fully researched and findings inculcated in future action plans. As long as the government continues to go after immigrants especially those with refugee status and revoking their statuses it would continue to heighten distrust and suspicion and thereby render cooperation and collaboration in counter radicalization and violent extremism work at the municipal level less effective. The absence of a concrete measure on trust building on the three policy documents has left much to be desired.

Lack of transparency breeds mistrust in CVE work. “Without a high degree of transparency an engagement strategy driven by federal agencies charged with intelligence gathering and law enforcement responsibility may run the risk of being perceived an effort to co-opt communities into the security process – providing tips, leads, sources and informants”(Bjelopera, 2012. Islamizing and Securitized CVE can greatly breakdown trust between the Muslim community and the local government authorities as in the New York police departments’ model which resulted in mass surveillance of Muslims in New York (Rushin, 2011, Lane 2012 . Such an approach may further radicalize those on the verge of radicalization because they are said to be anti-establishment or anti-authority and it may alienate the rest of the Muslim population. Poverty, low education level and low economic status does not necessarily lead to radicalization because there is little evidence therefore it becomes divisive and unhelpful when social and economic issues are Islamized and securitized (Barlett & Birdwell, 2010; Bjelopera 2012). These are trust weakening issues that should inform counter radicalization and violent extremism policy.

The politics at the national level or political system may also affect trust between local authorities and the residents of the community (Thomassen & Kääriäinen, 2016). This is more so if the government is run by an anti-immigrant party like in Norway. The right wing government in Norway has been working tremendously to curb migration into the Nordic country. It is also going after those who have already acquired refugee status and nullifying their status based on what critics say circumstantial evidence. Majority of the Muslims who suffer from the government ‘witch hunting’ are the Somali Muslim community where over one thousand of them are at the risk of losing their refugee status. Such actions by the state

may dire consequences on collaboration at the local level to combat violent extremism. When politics at the national level targets immigrants and policies that are hostile to immigrants are drawn it greatly weakens trust to authorities within local communities. The fact that the police and PST are all over the measures of counter radicalization and violent extremism the politics at the national level that are hostile to immigrants could further alienate minorities in CVE work. It is not a wise decision to place CVE work with faith communities under the responsibility of the police. “People tempted towards extremism are by definition anti-establishment in sentiments and are therefore unlikely to pursue proposals made by state security agencies (Sumpter, 2015). The Norwegian counter radicalization and violent extremism can be described as police-directed because many of the measures especially those measures dealing with issues of the Muslim community are under the purview of the police /PST. Such police directed CVE work weakens trust as people may perceive programs offering counseling, dialogue or similar assistance as intelligence gathering exercises aimed at future action against them (Sumpter, 2015). The future actions against them could be for insistence stripping them of refugee status or nullifying of residency as in the case of the Somali refugees.

Building trust within communities is very essential in CVE work and the public’s reception of CVE strategy is very crucial because the success of any CVE is dependent on a society’s awareness and vigilance towards violent extremists (Sumpter, 2015; Combes, 2013). To establish mutual trust between the communities and the police all activities that weaken trust should be avoided. In order to enhance trust within communities CVE should target those vulnerable to radicalization into violent extremism and not the whole Muslim community (DeHanas, Jones & O’Toole, 2011; Barlett & Birdwell, 2010). Instead of letting the police or PST to be responsible for engagement with Muslim communities that task should have been under the purview of local government authorities as terror expert Marc Sageman (2010) cautioned on challenges that are likely to arise by assigning police or intelligence agencies to lead community engagements programs because the people may see themselves as potential law breakers. Substantive relationship between local government authorities and communities helps restore trust within communities. The relationship should not be based on a token of meetings or few discussion forums in the year or when there is a crisis.

## 6.0 Conclusion

This paper has looked into the role of the police in countering violent extremism in Bærum municipality. This role is undertaken in cooperation and collaboration with the local municipal authorities and the community. A platform that enables the police to have such collaboration and cooperation is the SLT model that most of the municipalities including Bærum have adopted. There are policy documents that are developed both at the national and local level to give government and the local community a clear line of direction on how to counter radicalization and violent extremism. The study has examined how CVE policy documents both at the national and local level of Bærum have categorized the role of the police in countering all forms of violent extremism and how these documents have highlighted the causes and phenomenon of radicalization. The paper also looked into how the issue of trust within the Muslim community towards the police and municipal authorities is addressed in both national and local policy documents on radicalization and violent extremism.

To give answers to the issues raised the paper adopted a literature review on themes associated with the role of police and trust building measures in CVE work. What came of the review is that police in carryout their role according to the measures developed by governments contribute to the weakening of trust within Muslim communities. This paper has argued that the police and their sister organization PST are all over the measures adopted to counter radicalization and violent extremism and that such a police presence is counterproductive because it may lead to suspicion and less police accountability and thereby weaken trust. This has been corroborated in the literature review. Tasking a police security service unity PST that works on intelligence gathering too in matters of terrorism to collect information from local people and at the same time conduct meetings of concern with radicalized individuals or those on the verge of being radicalized and their families may create suspicion and less accountability and at the end of day the anticipated cooperation and collaborated becomes lacking.

The municipal authorities have also expressed concerned on the close collaboration between them and the police and their sister organization PST. They are concerned that they may be viewed by the local people as information collectors for the police. The Municipality authorities have in fact lamented in a NIBR, HiOA, JB & KS report of (2016) that the police have been requesting information from them that they thought the police could have obtained on their own. This shows a situation of lack of clear cut categorization on who should do what

and when between the police and the municipal authorities. The fact that Norwegian intelligence and relevant authorities described radicalization as a process this paper highlighted what various scholars have postulated on radicalization as a process and some of the models used to explain this process. This was relevant because our understanding of a problem determines what strategy or measure we would use or how we would categorize the role of an institution like the police to counter the problem.

In order to give answers to the issues raised in the two research questions the contents of the three policy documents were analyzed through the following predetermined themes; contextualizing policy documents, categorization of the role of the police, causes of radicalization, phenomenon of radicalization, countering all forms of extremism and the issue of trust. There are some findings that stand out; it has become apparent as uncovered in the findings that the Police and PST are all over the measures and occupied a central position in the implementation of the measures in both the national and local action plans against radicalization and violent extremism. This paper has suggested that decision making powers and responsibilities in preventive efforts should be evenly distributed or at least it should be done in way in which the police and their sister institution PST could held accountable. There are no specific measures in the policy documents that look at ways and means of strengthening trust within local communities towards the police and municipal authorities. There are many factors that may prevent the minority ethnic communities from fully cooperating with the authorities and this paper has shown that trust is a crucial factor. It would be very prudent if both the national and local policy documents specify a measure that entails proper empirical research to be carried out by a competent body on how to build or improve trust in local communities towards relevant authorities involved in counter radicalization and violent extremism.

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