



Norges miljø- og  
biovitenskapelige  
universitet

Master's Thesis 2016 30 ECTS  
NORAGRIC

# **Norway and Norwegian NGOs in International Climate Diplomacy: A Separate or Symbiotic Relationship?**

Heidi Vatne Braadland  
International Relations

The Department of International Environment and Development Studies, Noragric, is the international gateway for the Norwegian University of Life Sciences -NMBU). Eight departments, associated research institutions and the Norwegian College of Veterinary Medicine in Oslo. Established in 1986, Noragric's contribution to international development lies in the interface between research, education -Bachelor, Master and PhD programmes) and assignments.

The Noragric Master theses are the final theses submitted by students in order to fulfil the requirements under the Noragric Master programme "International Environmental Studies", "International Development Studies" and "International Relations".

The findings in this thesis do not necessarily reflect the views of Noragric. Extracts from this publication may only be reproduced after prior consultation with the author and on condition that the source is indicated. For rights of reproduction or translation contact Noragric.

© Heidi Vatne Braadland, August 2016  
heidivbraadland@gmail.com

Noragric  
Department of International Environment and Development Studies  
P.O. Box 5003  
N-1432 Ås  
Norway  
Tel.: +47 67 23 00 00  
Internet: <https://www.nmbu.no/om/fakulteter/samvit/institutter/noragric>

## Declaration

I, Heidi Vatne Braadland, declare that this thesis is a result of my research investigations and findings. Sources of information other than my own have been acknowledged and a reference list has been appended. This work has not been previously submitted to any other university for award of any type of academic degree.

Signature.....

**Date**.....

## **Acknowledgements**

Firstly I would like to express my greatest gratitude towards my supervisor, who has taken time out of her summer holiday to read through my chapters again and again.

I am also extremely grateful for the eleven people I interviewed; who took time out of their hectic day to meet with a master student.

I would also like to thank my family for their support. Thank you for letting me work in peace when I needed it, and for providing distractions when I needed to take a step back from the thesis.

I also wanted to thank the librarians at NORAGRIC for helping me find literature, bringing it in from other libraries, and for letting me keep some of the books since January. I promise the books are as good as new, even though I have taken them everywhere for months.

Lastly I want to thank all the friends I have made during these two years, and who has kept me company at the study halls at all hours of the week, for being a sounding board pitching ideas to, and for keeping this process as joyful as possible. Specifically I would like to thank Emmie, Brenda and Zuba for making me look forward to come to the study hall, and for sharing your treats and optimism with me. I also would like to thank Emmie, again, and Natasha for taking time out of their summer holiday to proofread my thesis, and for helping me when I cannot remember proper English in the stress.

## **Abstract**

Climate change and its consequences is a major challenge facing the world today, and it needs the world to come together to solve it, or to slow it down. This is the reason for the establishment of the United Nation's Framework Convention on Climate Change, which allows states to come together and discuss efforts against climate change with the goal of creating a strong international agreement on climate change. Non-state actors, such as NGOs, can be a huge contribution to this.

This thesis strives to place non-state actors within diplomatic theory, and explain the contributions they come with in diplomatic processes. In order to do this it looks at the climate negotiations within UNFCCC. This thesis narrows down to the roles and actions of the Norwegian government and official delegation, and that of the Norwegian NGOs. It also looks at the relationship between them, and how this as affected their impact at the negotiations.

The main theoretical framework is based on the writings of John Robert Kelley, who claims that official and non-official diplomats work separately within the same sphere, but that the states that have a close relationship with the NGOs, and actively interacts and use them, are those that will have most success in the future. James Der Derian's six paradigms are also used to show the complexity of the diplomatic evolution, and show tension points between the traditional and non-traditional actors in diplomacy. They also introduce the paradigm that this thesis is in, that of techno-diplomacy.

My findings suggest that Norway and the Norwegian NGOs do not work separately, but they work closely together, both prior and during the COPs. Their relationship is formal in the way that the formal delegation from Norway has two representatives from the NGOs. This relationship is mutually beneficial. The Norwegian NGOs gain access to closed negotiation rooms, and thus gets knowledge and information they can share with other NGOs. They also have a direct link to the top negotiators in Norway, which is beneficial when they want to influence the Norwegian positions and strategies. For the "official" Norway, this relationship gives them new perspectives and ideas they may not have thought of, and they get access to the international networks the NGOs have. They may also help in negotiations, by providing information gained through informal channels the Norwegian delegation is not privy to. It also helps Norway with its good international reputation, which again helps Norway in the negotiating process.

# Table of Contents

Declaration .....	iii
Acknowledgements .....	iv
Abstract .....	v
1. Introduction.....	1
1.1. Why study this? .....	2
1.2. Research questions .....	3
1.3. Diplomacy through the Centuries.....	4
1.4. Key concepts.....	7
1.5. Research Design Plan .....	8
1.6. Structure of thesis .....	9
2. Theory Chapter .....	10
2.1. IR and the Study of Diplomacy .....	10
2.2. Der Derian’s six paradigms of Diplomacy .....	12
2.3. New Diplomacy .....	16
2.3.1. Differences between official and non-official diplomats.....	18
2.4. Expectations for the Case Study .....	20
3. Research Design & Methods .....	22
3.1. Studying Non-State Actors in Diplomacy .....	22
3.2. The benefits of choosing qualitative research .....	24
3.2.1. Using a Case Study .....	24
3.3. The interviewing process.....	26
3.3.1. Sampling.....	26
3.3.2. Interview Subjects & Setting.....	26
3.3.3. Factors to Consider.....	28
3.4. Reliability, Validity & Limitations.....	29
3.5. Structure of the Analysis .....	30
4. Findings & Analysis .....	32
4.1. Before Paris .....	33
4.1.1. The years leading up to COP21.....	34
4.1.2. 2015.....	37
4.1.3. Reflections on the Relationship and Expectations .....	38
4.2. In Paris.....	39

4.2.1.	Roles of Norway and the NGOs in the Climate Negotiations.....	40
4.2.2.	Formal relationship .....	42
4.2.3.	The Impact of NGOs in Paris .....	46
4.3.	After Paris.....	47
4.3.1.	The Paris Agreement.....	47
4.3.2.	Why now? .....	52
4.3.3.	Predictions for the future.....	54
4.4.	Overall Findings and Conclusions.....	55
5.	Conclusion .....	57
6.	Bibliography .....	60
7.	Appendices.....	i
7.1.	Appendix I: Figure of decentralized diplomacy .....	i
7.2.	Appendix II: Short Interview Guide .....	ii
7.3.	Appendix III: Summaries of the various interviews.....	iii
7.4.	Appendix IV: Table of the various COPs, with comments .....	xviii
7.5.	Appendix V: Abbreviations.....	xix





# 1. Introduction

In December 2015, after almost two weeks of negotiating, the actors in the Paris COP21 came to an agreement – The Paris Agreement – to combat climate change. This agreement was merely one of many multilateral successes in 2015. In a session of the Norwegian Parliament on 11th of March, MP Bård Vegar Solhjell (SV) called 2015 an “unexpected success year” for international diplomacy, and called for research into why it went so positive in many diplomatic processes (Solhjell 2016).

The whole world came together when Paris hosted the 21th Conference of Parties in November/December 2015, and the subsequent agreement is supported by almost 200 states. The Norwegian Minister of the Environment observed that the agreement marks an historical shift in how the world deals with climate change (NRK 2015). As mentioned in the “bullet point”, this was but one of several successes in 2015. This master thesis explores this phenomenon of multilateral successes, and argues that these successes are, at least in part, due to the increasing influence of non-state actors in the diplomatic field; more specifically the NGOs.

This master thesis explores the effect of adding non-state actors into the diplomatic field. More to the point: This thesis argues that non-state actors impact both a) the agenda setting and b) the process of “diplomatic practice”. They do so by being a constant pressure on the official negotiators, by being a representation of the public opinion, and by providing the state actors the knowledge and information they need to come to the proper conclusions.

In this introductory chapter, I start by explaining why it is so important to study non-state actors within diplomacy, and why it is important to look at non-state actors’ impact on climate negotiations. I then go through the research questions for this thesis, as well as the main arguments. Next I look at diplomacy throughout the centuries, show common definitions, and place this thesis’s main scholarly works within a wider field; which I will be examining more closely in chapter 2. After this I explain choices I have taken with key concepts, and why I vary them. Following this I briefly outline the research design plan, which I will discuss more thoroughly in chapter three. I end this chapter by outlining the structure of this thesis, and what the other chapters will contain.

## **Non-State Actors and the Case Study**

'Non-state actors' is a broad term, including every actor that is not a state. Kelley (Kelley 2010, 108) identified 5 types of non-state actors in his diagram of decentralized diplomacy: Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), Religious leaders, Intelligentsia, Celebrities, and the private sector (see appendix I). This thesis mainly focuses on the **NGOs**; more specifically NGOs in climate diplomacy. Climate diplomacy is a great example of a diplomatic sphere where both state and non-state actors are very active.

To look more closely at NGOs and their impacts I use a case study about the international negotiations within the United Nation's Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and its annual Conference of the Parties (COPs); the role of Norway and Norwegian NGOs within them. The case study mainly concentrates on the COP21 Paris, which lasted from 30<sup>th</sup> of November till 12<sup>th</sup> of December 2015. I look closely at the actions of Norway and the Norwegian NGOs, and try to this way draw some conclusions about the impact of the NGOs on the UNFCCC processes, agenda setting, and on the Paris Agreement. It draws on official document, such as the final agreement, other official documents from the UNFCCC and statements made prior to the COP21 by both the Norwegian government and the Norwegian NGOs. In addition I draw on media articles and conduct interviews with state and NGO actors in Norway, as well as observers/bystanders.

## **1.1. Why study this?**

*"There has never been a better rime for studying diplomacy. The United States is rediscovering it. The European Union is reinventing it. The Chinese are inscribing it with their own characteristics. Even the Taliban is thinking about it"*(Sharp 2011, pp 716-7)<sup>1</sup>.

Climate Change is a serious challenge facing the world, and is predicted to only become worse and worse if the world does not start radical efforts in slowing it down. The efforts against climate change needs to come from a global level (Kissinger 1994), and the solutions are social and political, and will not come from the natural sciences (Lahn 2013).

The UNFCCC consists today of 197 member states, coming to an agreement with 197 positions needed to be taken into consideration is not an easy task. The increasing amount of non-state actors involved does not simplify the problem.

---

<sup>1</sup> In Murray et al. (2011)

Yet, the presence of the non-state actors may help keep the processes going in the right directions. NGOs are most often “cause-related”, in that they are fronting one specific cause, such as human rights, and are not as vested in the long term picture as states are, at least not in regards to fields lying outside their point of focus. By involving the non-state actors, such as the NGOs, they may help the official negotiators “stay on track”, and not dig themselves down in procedure.

Understanding the impact of adding non-state actors, in particularly NGOs, on the diplomatic field and the consequences of increasing their influence can help in how the world should and will respond to future problems and crises. Adding actors that are exempt from a larger picture, of a state’s national interests, can help keeping and maintaining focus on the problem in front of us, and may even help in bringing forth a solution.

Understanding how international actors interact with one another is important to know how the world works, as well as give an idea to improve the relations. It is important to focus on the non-state actors in world politics to encourage not only states to be interested in current events, and to help solve the issues; since they can operate on different levels than state actors can. The problems of climate change did not reach the political arena until it was pushed there by non-state actors, and it is due to them that the worlds’ politician gets more and more onboard “radical” efforts against climate change.

Traditionally diplomacy has involved state actors, bilaterally or multilaterally. There were fewer actors to relate to, and all of the actors were part of a larger picture. States have to act in a broad contest, always having its national interests in mind. Having fewer actors also means that it may be easier to reach an agreement or a consensus. There was also few states on the international diplomatic field, with the few “big” states was mostly from the western world. After the end of the 2nd World War and the following decolonization of the “third world” the states on the international stage has exploded. Today there are close to 200 state members in the UN (Pigman 2010). The UNFCCC is a perfect arena for the small states to conduct diplomacy, and not only on climate issues.

## **1.2. Research questions**

This thesis has two main research questions, though the second has several parts:

1. Where do non-state actors “fit in” in diplomatic theory and study?

2. How did Norway and the Norwegian NGOs work prior and during the COPs; what were their roles in the negotiations; how was their relationship; and did this translate to an impact (from the Norwegian NGOs) on the negotiations, both on the agenda setting and on the outcome?

In answering these two questions this thesis argues firstly, and on a general level, that: “the non-state actors have an increasingly (important) role within diplomatic theory”. Second it argues that “the symbiotic relationship between Norway and Norwegian NGOs benefits them greatly in the international climate negotiations”

### **1.3. Diplomacy through the Centuries**

Diplomacy has been practiced since the dawn of societies, but modern diplomacy is seen by most scholars as emerging in the 15<sup>th</sup> century; though there are those that are skeptical of this claim (Cohen 2013; Der Derian 1987). Der Derian is skeptical of the ability to clearly define when modern diplomacy starts, and believes that all the stages of diplomacy is interlinked, and shows a gradual evolution (Der Derian 1987). When speaking of diplomacy today, one is almost always describing Western diplomacy, though actors from all over the world participate.

Though the earliest writings hinting at diplomatic practice dates from around 2500 BC (Cohen 2013), the majority of the works date from the last few centuries (Cohen 2013; Der Derian 1987). Most of the earliest texts are notes, letters and memoirs written by diplomats, and convey their own experience at the diplomatic courts throughout Europe (Der Derian 1987). Works were also written to help the newly arrived diplomat in the field; practical guides such as the “*L’Ambassadeur et ses fonctions*” by de Wicquefort (1681) and “*De la manière de négocier avec les souverains*” de Callières (1716), both from the late 1600 and early 1700, as well as Satow’s “*A Guide to Diplomatic Practice*” (1917)<sup>2</sup> from the early 20<sup>th</sup> century.

The roles of the official diplomats were formalized in the “Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations” (Langhorne 2005; Sharp 2013; UN 1961).

The founder of modern diplomatic study was also a diplomat, the British Diplomat Sir Harold Nicolson’s works “*Diplomacy*” (1939)<sup>3</sup> and “*The Evolution of the Diplomatic Method*”

---

<sup>2</sup> Book titles and years cited from Der Derian (1987)

<sup>3</sup> Book title and year cited from Der Derian (1987)

(1954)<sup>4</sup> are used by many of the contemporary scholars as a foundation when trying to define diplomacy, diplomatic activities, and diplomatic actors (Der Derian 1987; Pigman 2010; Sharp 2013).

The fact that the diplomatic literature has been written by diplomats, thus aligning the *theory* of diplomacy with the *practice* of diplomacy has been reflected in the various definitions of diplomacy traditionally used. Nicolson preferred the definition set by the Oxford dictionary, that diplomacy was “the management of international relations by negotiations; the methods by which these relations are adjusted and managed by ambassadors and envoys; the business or art of the diplomatist” (Pigman 2010). This definition narrows diplomacy to specific activities and actors; the activities and actors of the state.

Traditionally this has been the dominating view in academia: a diplomatic actor is synonymous with a state actor (Pigman 2010). This made theorizing about diplomacy viewed as boring, and useless (Sharp 2011)<sup>5</sup>. Diplomacy was seen as having little importance in the international system, especially in American IR was diplomacy seen as having little to contribute with. Realist’s perspectives on power, military and economic power, were seen as the solution to keep the Soviet Union at bay during the Cold War (Wiseman 2011)<sup>6</sup>.

While the opinion on diplomacy was different in Europe were different, there is really one school within the IR that put weight on diplomacy and diplomatic theory; the English School (Der Derian 1987; Neumann 2002; Wiseman 2011). The English School lists diplomacy as one of five institutions that it studies, the others being international law, the balance of power, war, and the great power (concert)(Neumann 2002, p 17).

The English School scholars provide much of the writings on diplomacy at the latter half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Der Derian, which this thesis draws on, is considered to be member of the third generation of the English School, but is not popular within his own sub-field (Neumann 2002). The English School also gives us the second wave of definitions of diplomacy that are commonly used. Watson, of the second generation, has a definition of diplomacy that has been used by later academics. He believed that diplomacy was “negotiation between political entities which acknowledge each others independence” (Kelley 2010, p 100; Neumann 2002, p 9), or a more generic definition of diplomacy as “the dialogue between states”(Pigman

---

<sup>4</sup> Book title and year cited from Pigman (2010)

<sup>5</sup> In Murray et al. (2011)

<sup>6</sup> In Murray et al. (2011)

2010, p 7; Sharp 2013, p 70). While the latter still refers to state it opens up for various activities and venues, it is not limited to negotiations. The former opens up diplomacy even more, with not insisting that the only diplomatic actor is a state actor.

Der Derian's understanding of diplomacy is not limited to the institution: "What gives definition to a diplomatic system, I have argued, is not the structure itself, but the conflicting relations which maintain, reproduce, and sometimes transform it" (Der Derian 1987, p 106). His work with the six paradigms of diplomacy show that diplomacy precedes the emergence of the sovereign state, that it has existed parallel to it, and that diplomacy goes beyond merely the state as an actor (Der Derian 1987).

As mentioned earlier, there was little attention toward diplomacy as a study field in the latter half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century; or throughout the entire century since its failure to prevent the First World War (Sharp 2013). All this changed with the collapse of the USSR. Since the Second World War the world had experienced a bilateral power structure, and the balance of power between the two hegemony was maintained with economic and military power (Knutsen 1997; Wiseman 2011). After the collapse the power structure in the world shifted from a bilateral to a multilateral system, and there was a renewal of diplomacy. And as there became increasingly more focus on diplomacy as a political tool, the interest in diplomatic study and diplomatic theory increased as well (Sharp 2011).

Along with the renewed interest in diplomacy, came the questions and debates about what constitutes diplomacy (Pigman 2013). Pigman identifies three main debates that diplomacy revolves around:

1. What is diplomacy?
2. How much, or how little, has contemporary diplomacy changed from the past?
3. How does the theory of diplomacy fit with the practice of diplomacy?

A new wave of diplomatic scholars has introduced their own ideas about what diplomacy is and what constitutes diplomacy. The main concerns are about changes in diplomacy since the end of the Cold War, and whether or not non-state actors can be considered diplomatic actors. The scope of diplomatic actors, especially non-state diplomatic actors, has expanded. Some, such as Langhorne (2005) and Kelley (2010) writes generally about the role of non-state

actors in diplomacy, while other narrows the focus to specific types of non-state actors, such as Betsill and Correl's "*NGO Diplomacy*" (2008) and Cooper's "*Celebrity Diplomacy*" (2008)<sup>7</sup>. They all agree that something has changed within diplomacy, but differs in where they elect to focus.

Kelley (2010) will build, along with Der Derian (1987), the main theoretical framework. His definition of diplomacy is based on Watson's definition of acknowledged independence, but he also bases his understanding of diplomacy as having been shifted from an institution to a behavior (Kelley 2010). This is an elegant way of involving non-state actors in the diplomatic field, without going into the details about what type of activity constitutes a diplomatic actor.

## **1.4. Key concepts**

While this thesis is about climate diplomacy, I also use the term "climate negotiations". Negotiations, is according to Nicolson (1939)<sup>8</sup>, diplomacy, and since I have narrowed my case study to the UNFCCC, and the annual negotiations, I find no problem using the terms "climate negotiations" and "international climate negotiations" instead of diplomacy.

Another term that may appear confusing is "intersessional meeting". This was coined by one of the interview subjects, which I later adopted into the analysis, and refers to the meetings in the UNFCCC taking place outside of the COPs. Every year there are often two or more "preparatory" meeting, intersessional meeting, in order to let the bureaucrats meet and negotiate with each other. This leaves only the issues they could not agree on to the politicians at the COPs.

The analysis also uses the words "party" and "parties". This refers to the states that have adopted a specific agreement or protocol. The COPs are called thus because it is a conference of the parties, the member states to the UNFCCC. The term parties are also used to describe the member states to the Kyoto Protocol, and to the Paris Agreement. This can make it a bit confusing, since not all the member states of the Convention signed the Kyoto Protocol, for example.

---

<sup>7</sup> Title and years cited from Kelley (2010)

<sup>8</sup> Cited from Sharp (2013) and Pigman (2010)

## 1.5. Research Design Plan

The research design plan and methods will be more closely described in chapter 3, but I briefly outline it here.

The case study is the UNFCCC and its international climate negotiations, with a focus on the processes leading up to the COP21 and ending with the Paris agreement. The setting therefore expands from 1992 to 2016, and is divided in three: first the preparation part looks at documents from 1992 until 2015, with a special focus on 2015; all of it needs to be relevant for the process leading up to COP21. The next part concentrates on the COP21, and the setting is from 30<sup>th</sup> November till 12<sup>th</sup> December. The last part looks at the time after COP21 concluded, and amongst other things includes the text of the Paris Agreement, and the interview subjects' predictions for the future. Within this I interview actors from both the Norwegian state and the Norwegian NGOs, and observers/bystanders, as well as include media articles when deemed necessary.

The interviews provide me with ideas and perspectives, as well as a subjective view on the actions within the climate negotiations and the relationship between Norway and the Norwegian NGOs. The official documents and media articles allow me to triangulate the responses from the interview subjects and get a more objective end result.

A challenge with this type of case study is that it is limited to one country's actors, and thus it may be problematic to generalize to other states and actors. This thesis tries to overcome this in many ways, particularly with regards to the NGO actors. The perspectives of the Norwegian NGOs are similar to other NGOs, so the efforts of the Norwegian NGOs can be generalized to include a wider range of NGOs. For the state actors it is a little different. The almost 200 member states of the UNFCCC have almost 200 different interests and ambitions. Still, Norway can represent the general views of the Western world. However, both the literature and the various interview subjects point to the uniqueness of the relationship between the Norwegian government and the Norwegian NGOs, so may therefore not be representative for other states and their NGOs.

However, by sacrificing generalization for in depth analysis of the relationship between the "official" Norway and the Norwegian NGOs one gains the opportunity to look at the various mechanisms more closely, and explore more *why* it works, and not only that it exist and *how* it works.



Another concern may be that I was not at the COP21, and therefore lack first-hand observations. The interviews provide me with primary sources, since I conducted them myself, and did the analysis, though I rely on secondary sources such as official documents and media articles to triangulate the data. The COP21 was also over six months ago, so despite the fact that it is too soon to say anything about the long term effects of the Paris Agreement, the interview subjects' memory may have forgotten some of the details. By only focusing on Norway and Norwegian NGOs I lose the opportunity to examine other factors, and may miss other explanations to results I find; I will get a tinted result which does not reflect the reality.

Another limitation or problem this case study may have is that I will use snowball sampling; asking the interview subject to send me to the next person to interview. This may in the end give me only one side of the climate negotiation community; they may choose to send me to people sharing their view, and neglect to send me to people with opposing opinions.

Since I rely on official documents and on media articles available on the internet, it should be “easy” to replicate despite my addition of interview subjects. With regards to the interviews they seem to reflect the group their representing; the NGO actors had similar view with each other, as did the observers and the state actors. Thus it should not matter if one does not interview the specific persons I did, but I discuss this more in depth in chapter three.

## **1.6. Structure of thesis**

The thesis consists of 6 chapters, plus five appendices at the end. The first chapter introduces the thesis. The second chapter lays out the theoretical framework, while the third describes the research design, as well as the methods. The fourth chapter is a combined findings and analysis chapter, while the fifth chapter comes with concluding remarks. The sixth chapter consists of the references. The appendices have figures and tables not needed in the main text, as well as summaries of all the interviews conducted, and a list of abbreviations.

## 2. Theory Chapter

This chapter is about the theory of diplomacy. The purpose of this chapter is to attempt to place the non-state actors within diplomatic studies. While there are many great works on diplomacy, this thesis will focus on the writings of James Der Derian and John Robert Kelley; this is a natural choice because I look at non-state actors in the diplomatic literature. Der Derian looks at diplomatic actors as those left “outside”, but he also shows the complexities of the diplomatic evolution, and the evolution of the thinking about diplomacy. Kelley points to specific differences between official and non-official diplomats, and claims that although they operate within the same sphere, they work separately. Kelley also provides us with the opportunity to define diplomacy as a behavior, instead of as an institution. This is what the theoretical framework for the case study will be built upon. This is not to say that other scholars will not be subject to discussion, but merely that the foundation of my theoretical framework comes from these two fore-mentioned scholars<sup>9</sup>.

This chapter has four sub-sections. Firstly, I go through the IR literature on diplomacy. I try to place diplomacy and diplomatic studies within the wider IR, how it relates to various “theories” within IR, and I end with the current debates on diplomacy. Afterwards I explore a more nuanced perception of how to understand diplomacy and the transition from the “old” to the “new” diplomat, with Der Derian’s six paradigms of diplomacy. Following this I create my main theoretical framework for this thesis, which is John R. Kelley’s “New Diplomacy: Evolution of a Revolution” (Kelley 2010). I end this chapter by presenting my own expectations of the empirical findings in terms of the theoretical framework.

### 2.1. IR and the Study of Diplomacy

Diplomacy is the greatest tool the states have other than warfare in relations to other states, but it has been granted little focus in the wider International Relations (IR) field (Murray 2011; Sharp 2011). Until recently diplomacy has had its place in a corner of the wider IR, and developed independently of the rest of the IR (Melissen 2011)<sup>10</sup>.

---

<sup>9</sup> An important side-note before the next sections start: This thesis has drawn on the original article written by Kelley, but that has been reprinted as a chapter in Neumann and Leira’s four volume work on international diplomacy (2013). Thus, while the reference states “Kelley, 2010”, the page references coincide with the book.

<sup>10</sup> In Murray et al. (2011)

Traditionally diplomacy has been seen as an act between states and state actors (Kerr & Wiseman 2013; Pigman 2010); a diplomatic actor was indistinguishable from a nation-state actor (Pigman 2010). The classical works on diplomacy have been about the task and positions of the diplomats, practical “guides” instead for theoretical speculation about the origin. This can be seen clearly in the title of the works, such as Satow’s “A Guide to Diplomatic Practice” (1917)<sup>11</sup>, and the earlier works about diplomacy are often memoirs of diplomats themselves (Der Derian 1987; Murray 2011)<sup>12</sup>. Even the modern founder of diplomatic studies in academia, Sir Harold Nicolson, was a British diplomat (Pigman 2010).

Despite the similarity between the *theory* of diplomacy and the *practice* of diplomacy, Sharp (2013) insists that there are differences between them. He points to how followers of the various “thoughts” within IR theory look at diplomacy and diplomats.

Followers of the “realist theory” or the “school of realism” looks at the world in terms of power and anarchy, and for them it may be difficult to explain the role of diplomacy in international politics (Sharp 2013). In the realist perspective the greater the power a state has, the bigger role and importance they should have in international relations. This however, does not reflect the reality. Small states can play a much bigger role than their size and power would suggest (Hansen et al. 2013; Lahn 2013). Ideally, realists look at diplomacy as a tool for state power, for maintaining the balance of power, or merely as a form of communicating between two or more states all depending on which category of realism or realist theory they aligns themselves with; naturally, they all see diplomatic actors as state actors (Sharp 2013). Though there are some realist scholars that have written about diplomacy they do not clearly define what they mean by diplomacy (Kissinger 1994).

Diplomacy has a greater place within the “liberalist” school of IR, where the attention is more on “soft power” and interdependence among states than “hard power” such as military and economic power (Kelley 2010; Nye 2004; Sharp 2013). Still there are areas of contention on diplomacy here as well. Diplomacy and diplomats treat, or are supposed to treat, all states equally, so liberalists ask themselves why some states are to be sanctioned for harboring terrorists, while others does not (Sharp 2013)? Liberalists also have qualms about the equal treatment of states, and the fact that diplomats and diplomacy legitimates non-liberal regimes such as dictatorships and authoritarian regimes (Sharp 2013).

---

<sup>11</sup> Cited from Der Derian (Der Derian)

<sup>12</sup> Murray in Murray et al. (2011)

The third and last of the international theories that Sharp (2013) presents, is the “revolutionary” theory. Within this theory diplomacy is seen as the enemy due to its hindrance to progress and revolution (Der Derian 1987; Sharp 2013). Diplomacy has traditionally been an elitist activity (Der Derian 1987; Kelley 2010; Pigman 2010; Sharp 2011; Sharp 2013), and diplomats are rooted in procedures and rituals centuries old, and are reluctant to change.

The last 30 years have seen an uprising in debates about diplomacy; this by academics, politicians and even the general public (Kelley 2010; Pigman 2013; Sharp 2011; Sharp 2013). Pigman (2013) identifies three main questions that are up for debate:

1. What is diplomacy?
2. How much, or how little, has contemporary diplomacy changed from the past?
3. How does the theory of diplomacy fit with the practice of diplomacy?

The section above has been about the third question, and the sections below will examine the first two questions. This thesis will draw on the writings of Der Derian in order to get a more nuanced picture of the “old” and “new” diplomacy, as well as the transition from one to another, with his six paradigms of diplomacy.

While there are numerous works on non-state actors in diplomacy (see for example: Langhorne 2005; Pigman 2010; Sharp 2013), this thesis concentrates on the writings of J. R. Kelley. This because of his focus on diplomacy as being a behavior, instead of an institution (Kelley 2010, p 101), which allows for non-state actors to be considered as diplomatic actors. Kelley also provides a clear distinction between state and non-state actors in diplomacy, in terms of amongst others legitimacy, agility and authority (Kelley 2010). By drawing on the writings of Kelley one gets a clear distinction to align the analysis with, to either support or challenge his claims. Kelley does not only provides a distinction, he also gives a prediction of which kind of state will be most successful in the future; the most successful states will be those that manages to find a way to work closely with that states’ NGOs and civil society (Kelley 2010).

## **2.2. Der Derian’s six paradigms of Diplomacy**

The classical view of diplomacy and its development has correlated it to the concept of sovereignty and its development (Pigman 2010), but Der Derian thinks this is too simplified,

and in his book “*On Diplomacy*” (1987) he shows a more complex understanding of diplomacy and its development. Der Derian is associated with the English School, but has found more acceptance outside the English School than within it (Neumann 2002). His purpose with the book “*On Diplomacy*”, based on his doctoral thesis, was to create a genealogy of diplomacy. This was because he meant that in order to understand the present, and be able to give a prediction of the future; one has to understand the past.

Der Derian operates with six paradigms of diplomacy, which has evolved throughout the years (Der Derian 1987). These are: mytho-diplomacy, proto-diplomacy, diplomacy, anti-diplomacy, neo-diplomacy and techno-diplomacy. His paradigms are based on alienation theory, about where the “line” is between us and an “other”. He also stated firmly that his paradigms were not fixed, and that two or more paradigms could exist at the same time. Der Derian believes alienation theory has been neglected in terms of understanding the “rise of diplomacy” (Der Derian 1987, p 110). He looks at diplomatic relations as who are on the outside.

These paradigms, from the earliest mytho- stage to the latest techno-stage is his effort to show the development of diplomacy, and show that it is not a single, definitive split between the “old” and the “new” diplomacy, but rather that diplomacy has evolved since the beginning of societies. These developments started prior to the establishment of the sovereign state, and it shows where various factors and concepts within diplomacy emerged, and in the context they emerged. The first three can be said to show the development of what is known as “modern diplomacy”, while the last three shows the effort to move beyond the state centrality in diplomacy.

The mytho-diplomacy is the earliest paradigm, it is already here that the roots to diplomatic culture were sown, and we start to see the importance of rituals and symbols in diplomatic practice (Der Derian 1987; Kerr & Wiseman 2013).

In the next paradigm, proto-diplomacy, the seeds sown in mytho-diplomacy continue to grow, and we can see the start of a diplomatic culture (the *courtoise* and the *civilité*); which is important in today’s diplomacy (Der Derian 1987). We also see the emergence and dissolution of *droit d’aubaine*, which restricted what a foreign trader could own (Der Derian 1987, p 88). This in turn encouraged the church to issue “clerical immunity”, which has later been translated to diplomatic immunity (Der Derian 1987). What separates proto-diplomacy

from diplomacy is that the diplomatic relationships were hierarchical; it was between a sovereign and lesser lords (Der Derian 1987).

His third paradigm is the last of the “old school” of diplomacy paradigms, and this is what we can compare to modern, or traditional, diplomacy (Der Derian 1987). Der Derian defines diplomacy as “the mediation of the mutually estranged relations of states” (Der Derian 1987, p 111). His reasons for the last three paradigms was to prove that while traditional diplomacy emerged in the 17<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> century they did not pop out of thin air (Der Derian 1987). It is during this paradigm that the concept of sovereignty was firmly implemented in the international system (Der Derian 1987). But, it is not only “great power politics” such as military and economic power that matters; “it is as much ‘petty’ rituals and ceremonies of power as it is the ‘great’ events of power politics or the famous developments of international law that defines diplomacy (Der Derian 1987, p 114).

The last three of Der Derian’s paradigms tries to move beyond the state sovereignty in diplomacy. The first of these three is the paradigm of anti-diplomacy. This diplomacy reflects a point in time where some tried to abolish diplomacy completely (Der Derian 1987). They wanted to move beyond the states, and craved an international society where all were equals, despite where they came from; they wanted to ‘unify’ mankind (Der Derian 1987). It is under this paradigm that we find tendencies of liberalism, as well as the utopians; the utopians visions for a perfect world was the main inspiration for abolishing diplomacy, or going beyond diplomacy (Der Derian 1987 p 141). We also find the first threads of international liberal ideas that still exists in the mindset of diplomats today, for example the justification for going to war, which were: “defence against invasion; an alliance with another state invaded; and to free a nation from tyranny” (Der Derian 1987, p 145). These ideas remain to this day, despite the fact that the quest for the abolishment of diplomacy failed (Der Derian 1987).

Out of the ashes of anti-diplomacy came neo-diplomacy, where they kept the ideal of the previous paradigm, but did not go as far as demanding the abolishment of diplomacy (Der Derian 1987). Instead, the actors within neo-diplomacy tried to change diplomacy, and while they still operated with states they wanted to put limitations on the sovereigns, and increase the faith in the people (Der Derian 1987). Der Derian points to two events in history that show neo-diplomacy; the French and the Russian revolution. During the French Revolution they wanted to bring diplomatic practices out in the open, even to foreign leaders, to stop with ‘secret’ diplomacy (Der Derian 1987, p 175); they also wanted to abolish the elitist nature of

the *courtoise*. Both during the French and the Russian Revolution statements were released that showed their neo-diplomatic tendencies; they both stated in some form or another that the states should be ruled for and *by* the people, and not by an elitist aristocracy (Der Derian 1987). The problem the neo-diplomats faced, and which in the end became their downfall, was that they were not recognized on the international stage; they instead met massive opposition (Der Derian 1987).

The last of the six paradigms is the techno-diplomacy. It is called so due to the heavy influence the technological advances the last decades (prior to 1987) have had on diplomacy and diplomatic practices. These advances have completely transformed the way diplomats work (Der Derian 1987). Der Derian states that this last paradigm is his explanation of the way “states and non-state organizations now communicate and interact at the international level” (Der Derian 1987, p 202).

A challenge to the practice of diplomacy that Der Derian identifies is what to do with the “new” diplomats, that has not been taught the “rules of the game”; the diplomatic rituals and culture that is so important for the diplomatic community (Der Derian 1987). By having everyone adhere to the same culture, there is less chance for misunderstandings; misunderstandings that can have horrible international implications. Thus, while the “increased travel and commerce, improved modes of transportation and communication, technology heighten[s] the opportunities not just for co-operation, [...], but for confrontation as well” (Der Derian 1987, p 204). This relation between the state and non-state actors is precisely what this thesis focuses most on this dimension of understanding diplomacy. This is because techno-diplomacy finds a way to explain the increasing amount of non-state actors, as well as the developments within communication technologies, and still keep it within a diplomatic scope.

Der Derian’s paradigms are relevant for this thesis because they provide a more complex picture about the various mechanisms and stages of the diplomatic evolution, and it has identified places of tension which I will build on later. It shows that the emergence of non-state actors, or non-traditional actors, are nothing new, and that this has been a factor in diplomacy in various degrees for centuries, since the beginning of “modern diplomacy”.

Now that we have established the traditional view of diplomacy, and gone through various paradigms in how to understand diplomacy, it is time to reflect on how the emergence of non-state actors changed diplomacy and how it was practiced. How do NGO actors fit in

diplomacy? In order to do that this thesis draws on John Robert Kelley's article "New Diplomacy: Evolution of a Revolution" (2010).

### **2.3. New Diplomacy**

As mentioned earlier in this chapter, this thesis focuses on Kelley and his distinctions between official and non-official diplomats. Kelley looks into the phenomena of "new diplomacy", and how this relates to the power relationship between official and nonofficial diplomats (see appendix I). His main argument is that:

*"the beneficiaries of this new strain of power politics [e.g. information power] are non-state actors, who with great agility and efficiency are proving capable at bridging the multiplying information flows between the body politic and political action, even to the point of shaping policy in ways that today's diplomats cannot" (Kelley 2010, pp 100-1).*

He explains the consequences of this as "the age of diplomacy as an institution is giving way to an age of diplomacy as a behaviour" (Kelley 2010, p 101), and states that this is irreversible; that "diplomacy is now well beyond the point of opening itself up to the public – it is becoming enmeshed within the public domain" (Kelley 2010, p 101). He further in his article goes more specifically into the differences between official and nonofficial diplomats in authority, legitimacy and agility. The article starts with outlining what differs from traditional diplomacy, and how these differences came into being; trying to respond to the second debate identified by Pigman (2013).

Kelley starts his text with the question: "Is diplomacy solely the domain of the state?" (Kelley 2010, p 99). This is the very essence of traditional diplomacy; the monopolization of the state as the only diplomatic actor. Der Derian showed us above that this is a simplistic answer, and that there are many factors involved; the state alone does not give us the whole picture. Langhorne characterize the diplomacy seen today as "a wide range of human activities which owe little or nothing to geographical location, time of day and, most important of all, to government permission or regulation" (cited from: Kelley 2010, p 100).

Kelley claims that the diplomacy we see today is the emergence of a "new diplomacy", entirely separate from the traditional diplomacy, thus aligning himself within the "second debate" (Pigman 2013) in diplomacy. The intensity of the debate that has burst from the various claims that a new diplomacy is coming/ is here is evidence of the deep, deep, roots that -traditional) diplomacy has in the academic world (Kelley 2010). He states that there are



many factors for this transition, but he focuses on three of them. These are the: 1) the reassessment of “foreign affair institutions” post the Cold War, 2) “expanding the perception of international agency to include firms, [NGOs] and other actors” (Kelley 2010, p 99), and lastly 3) the explosion of information communication technologies (ICTs) both in terms of users, reach, and size (Kelley 2010). This thesis’ main focus will be the second, about agency, but number 1 and 3 was examined in the introduction, under the sub-section “Diplomacy through the Centuries”.

Kelley states that this “paradigm shift” is due to one part technology, and one part agency (Kelley 2010, p 101). For this thesis the focus is the changes of, and addition of, new actors; not so much the increasing use of the internet and other ICTs.

Traditionally, diplomacy has been seen as an “exclusive and specialist pursuit” (Kelley 2010, p 100), but even after states have attempted to make it more transparent and open, “diplomacy is going public on its own accord” (Kelley 2010, p 105). This is because the shift is coming from “the bottom up rather than the top down” (Kelley 2010, p 105). This shift from top-down to bottom-up is mirrored in the shift in negotiations about climate change efforts that have taken place since 2009, and will be examined more thoroughly in the “Findings & Analysis” chapter.

The idea of the emergence of a “new diplomacy” is not new, as shown by Der Derian (1987) it started during the French revolution, but Kelley states that this “new diplomacy” was merely a transformation/evolution of “old diplomacy”. It was the outward presence of diplomacy that shifted; the essence/the core of traditional diplomacy remain (Kelley 2010).

Not all agree with this distinction of a “new diplomacy”, and how this will weaken the state (and its actors). Kelley points to Juergen Kleiner, who saw three specific reasons/assumptions for why the diplomacy was, and would be, “firmly planted within the foreign ministry” (Kelley 2010, p 100):

*“First, conventional wisdom assumes that states retain exclusive control over the international agenda, dictating the priority of issue-areas and how to handle them. Second, the overriding condition for this form of management rests is inherently structural, that state initiative precedes all substantive international action. Third, as far as agency is concerned the order of diplomatic action remains unchanged, which is to say policy drives diplomatic action, and not the other way around” (Kelley 2010, p 100).*

Kelley faults these assumptions with the help of Langhorne. As seen above Langhorne sees diplomacy as happening anytime, anywhere and owing little or nothing to governments “permission and regulations” (Kelley 2010, p 100). Kelley is also highly skeptical of the notion that states “retain exclusive control” over the diplomatic agenda; later he points to the clear example of the international treaty to ban landmines, as only happening due to pressure from NGOs and Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) (Kelley 2010, p 114). He also claims that by focusing on economic and military power they, the state actors, miss the potential of “information power”, and are helpless when it undermines the national interests of the state, and its ability to “confer [...] influence to a new generation of actors on the global stage” (Kelley 2010, p 100); to allow actors to operate largely “unencumbered by sovereign controls” (Kelley 2010, p 100). As mentioned above, Kelley’s main argument involves this exact paradox of “information power”.

One reason that Kelley firmly believes that the state does not control the international agenda is the emergence of transnational concerns that defies borders. There are issues and challenges that the world faces, and will face, that is not limited to one country, or one region, and cannot be solved by a single actor. This affects how politics are managed, as Kelley puts it: “Politics everywhere, it would seem, are related to politics everywhere” (2010, p 103). One of these “transnational concerns” is the issue of climate change, and the complicated consequences that has started to be noticeable around the world. Even a realist scholar such as Kissinger states that debates and decisions on the efforts against climate change has to be taken on a global level, and not by a few states (Kissinger 1994).

Global warming does not concern itself with national borders, or with justice. Most (IPCC 2013; IPCC 2014) claim that global warming is due to the rich Western states, a consequence of the industrial age and evolution. It is more and more clearer that the worst consequences will hit the poorest developing countries, which had no involvement in its creation (Lahn 2013). Instead of leaving these poorest states to fend for themselves as much as they can, it has become an international responsibility to contain climate change and combat its consequences (Lahn 2013).

### **2.3.1. Differences between official and non-official diplomats**

But what are the differences between official and non-official diplomats? There are many, as Kelley points out throughout his article, but they can be categorized into five specific changes within diplomacy:

*“1; The current state of diplomatic institutions can be characterized as fragmenting, dividing its powers amongst a broad range of state and non-state actors and institutions. 2; At the same time, diplomacy is becoming more public: the “global public domain” is integrating social and technological networks to harness its developing capabilities. 3; New diplomacy possesses an advantage in its agility, relies on grassroots mobilization, and highlights the relevance of policy entrepreneurs. 4; Official diplomacy is and shall remain superior in areas of accountability and legitimacy, continuing to capitalize on its close proximity to policymakers. 5; New diplomats are competing with government action as well as compensating for governmental inaction” (Kelley 2010, p 107).*

Kelley talks about the concepts of authority and legitimacy, and claims that there has been a relocation of authority from the state to a “non-state entity or figure” (2010, p 102). Non-state actors are able to influence the state from outside, by assembling moral legitimacy (Kelley 2010, p 102). He states that: “these “new diplomats” simultaneously manoeuvre within the state system and command authority across it” (Kelley 2010, p 102). In terms of legitimacy he claims that “official diplomats rely on political legitimacy [...] new diplomats require moral legitimacy” (Kelley 2010, p 106). New diplomats use this moral legitimacy in combination with “access to political change agents” (Kelley 2010, p 115) with great success.

A problem that arises when the influence of the nonofficial diplomat increases is the accountability; the problem with handing out sanctions to for example NGOs in comparison with state institutions (Kelley 2010). NGOs often operate with a practice named “blaming and shaming” (Betsill & Corell 2008), but the state has little to no options on dealing out sanctions, either official or informal, to the NGOs.

There are also significant differences in the structure of the organization and institution. The state is a hierarchal structure, and policies and positions come from the top (Kelley 2010). This does not allow individuals to be influential on their own. In contrast most NGOs are structured horizontally, and the policies and positions come from the members, giving individuals, that are not the leader of said organization, plenty of opportunities to be heard. Kelley claims that there is an “unsolved riddle of how traditionally hierarchical official diplomatic organisations shall coexist with horizontal non-state networks in general and a new class of nonofficial diplomats in particular” (Kelley 2010, pp 104-5).

Kelley ends his article with a few issues that must be solved in the near future. He claims that one problem is finding out “the way diplomats, traditional and new, will join their energies for

the common good” (2010, p 115), and states that “the states that stand the greatest chance of political success in an information-driven environment will recognize these growth areas beyond the ministry” (Kelley 2010, p 115).

Kelley is firm when he states that: “Non-state actors present a formidable challenge to the state primacy in the diplomatic world and must be viewed as such” (Kelley 2010, p 115), but is this a bad thing? Are we changing state actors in diplomacy with non-state actors, or are we adding non-state actors to better be able to achieve a common goal?

## **2.4. Expectations for the Case Study**

While Kelley emphasizes the competitive nature between official and nonofficial diplomats, or actors, he also believes that:

*“Neither is perfectly positioned to pursue international action that is both innovative and responsible. To best serve the populations they claim to represent, old and new worlds of diplomacy should not arrange their practices along arbitrary institutional norms, but must instead focus on finding synergy amongst their respective behaviours” (Kelley 2010, p 102).*

This thesis studies this conundrum, in terms of Norway in international climate negotiations. Are the activities of the Norwegian government, and delegation, and the Norwegian NGOs separate or do they work in symbiosis? And what does this translate as in the international climate negotiation, using the UNFCCC and the annual COPs as examples?

Based on Kelley one would expect to find two separate “streamlines” both working towards a common goal, but with different views of how this common goal can be achieved. This thesis assumes that the common goal is the creation and implementation of an international agreement to combat and stop climate change, but that the various actors have different wishes for what this agreement should contain. Since the COP21 in Paris produced an international agreement, the Paris Agreement, in 2015 this thesis is retrospective.

Since the state and the non-state (NGOs) actors are presumed to work separately, one would expect to see little to no cooperation or meeting between them; if there is a relationship one would expect that it would be one-sided. However; if one finds links between them that hint to a symbiotic relationship this should translate as creating more chance of a success for both parties.

One would also expect that individuals in the NGOs feel more influential than their state counterparts, due to the variations in structure. The NGO actors should focus on these instances where they, as an individual or as a group, has influence of the procedures, while the state actors will probably focus on the collective delegation, and what they achieve together.

### **3. Research Design & Methods**

This chapter is about the methods used in this thesis, as well as the process undertaken throughout the writing of this thesis; the purpose being to give the reader a better understanding on how I have gathered the data and reached the conclusion given in the last chapter. This chapter is strictly about the process, and no analysis is presented here; that will come in later chapters.

This chapter has five main sub sections, some of them divided into a couple of more sub-sub-sections. In the first part I describe the process of finding out how I can study non-state actors in diplomacy, and the process of setting the “setting” of the case study. In the second section I write about the benefits of qualitative research, and why it fits with my case study. In the third section I go more into the details about what it means to use a case study as a method, and how mine is structured, as well as the analytical framework I use. In the fourth section I elaborate on the interviewing process, as well as listing benefits and problems with using interviews. In the last section I reflect on the reliability and validity of my thesis, as well as limitations it may have.

#### **3.1. Studying Non-State Actors in Diplomacy**

The previous chapter strived to show that non-state actors can be diplomatic actors, as well as pinpointing specific areas where they differ to state actors, or in Kelley’s words, to official diplomats. Kelley’s figure of the decentralized diplomacy (see appendix I) showed us that the concept of non-state actors involves a vast number of very different actors, all with their own agendas and perspective. For the purpose of this thesis I have narrowed the focus down to one type of non-state actors; that of the NGOs, the non-governmental organizations.

But NGOs are also a broad term (Betsill & Corell 2008), and can apply to numerous organizations focusing on their own narrow piece of the puzzle. Trying to study NGOs as a whole means studying in general terms, in order to fit all of them in. Instead I have chosen to concentrate on one type of NGO, but do take the others into consideration in the analysis.

I chose to concentrate my focus on the Environmental NGOs, or the ENGOS. This in turn led me to climate diplomacy. With this in mind I started to search for an appropriate case study that would allow me to study ENGOS impact on climate diplomacy. I landed on the United Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and its annual Conference of the Parties (COPs).

An issue that quickly arose is that the UNFCCC has at the moment 197 member states, and the COPs get more and more attention from the civil society and from the media every year. Combined this becomes a complex web of delegate and observers, bureaucrats, politicians and actionists, representatives from local, regional and national governments and so forth; in other words participants from all the corners of the world. The COP21 in Paris 2015 anticipated the arrival of around 50 000 participants; half of which were expected to be official delegates (COP21 2015).

In order to make sense of the international climate negotiations at the UN, I pinned it down to Norway and the Norwegian NGOs experiences, roles, and impacts on the COPs. I put the main focus on the COP21, the conference in Paris 2015 which resulted in an international agreement on efforts against climate change; the Paris Agreement.

When I started reading and researching into the UNFCCC and more specifically into the COP21 Paris I came upon another issue. The COPs are not isolated events; they are the annual conference where, among other people, the politicians come together to discuss and debate what the bureaucrats have negotiated the past year, or even the last few years. Therefore limiting my setting to the duration of the COP21 became impossible.

First I expanded the setting to the year of 2015; but later realized that I needed to look at the entire history and process of the COPs. The mandate for the Paris Agreement was given in 2011, at the COP17 Durban, but was given due to the failure of the mandate given in COP13 Bali to reach an agreement by 2009 at the COP 15 Copenhagen. The mandate given originally at the COP13, and the new mandate given at the COP17 were all about expanding the arrangement from the COP3 Kyoto, the Kyoto Protocol (Lahn 2013; UNFCCC n.d.-b; UNFCCC n.d.-c; UNFCCC n.d.-d; UNFCCC n.d.-f). The Kyoto Protocol was an international agreement on the efforts against climate change and had two periods: from 2008 till 2012, and from 2013 till 2020 (UNFCCC 1998). With this in mind I focused on the negotiations leading up to the COP21, taking into account the whole history of the UNFCCC.

After choosing the setting of the case study I needed to pick the method I would be using. An option would be to look at the participations, list them according to background and with this speculate on their impact. But participation does not equal impact or influence (Betsill & Corell 2008). A qualitative approach gives a more nuanced picture, and is therefore more useful when looking at the role and impact of NGOs in climate diplomacy.

## **3.2. The benefits of choosing qualitative research**

*“ That we despite all this knowledge [on the seriousness of climate change and its impacts] still face a serious climate change problem cannot be understood by natural science or by technology – it has to be understood socially and politically” (Lahn 2013, p 14; translated by author).*

As noted in the quote above, the efforts against climate change needs to be seen in a social and political perspective. For this reason it is more logically to look at the international climate negotiations in a qualitative rather than in a quantitative study. While both are applicable to social research the qualitative research gives us the possibility to get more subjective responses from the participants; if one chooses to use interviews as a method, which will be explained later in the chapter (Bryman 2012). A quantitative study is most often based on statistics and numbers (Bryman 2012) and may thus appear clinical to the average person. A qualitative study may provide a deeper impact on the regular person, thus making it more interesting for the reader, but one is also able to go “deeper” into the issue and study what is “behind” the numbers.

As mentioned above, participation does not equal influence (Betsill & Corell 2008), but by interviewing actors involved, while at the same time triangulating their responses with both official document and media articles, I hope to give a better picture of the events at the international climate negotiations, and the role and impact of Norway an of the Norwegian NGOs (Betsill & Corell 2008; Bryman 2012).

By looking at the “Norwegian Model” I hope to be able to give some speculative ideas on how relationship between a national government and its nations NGOs should conduct itself to give the best result in the efforts of combatting climate change. This may again be transferable to other challenges the world will face and are facing, such as the Migrant Crisis in Europe.

### **3.2.1. Using a Case Study**

A case study allows us to narrow down the field of study, while at the same time hopefully giving us the possibility to be able to make some general observations. This is not always so, and some case studies in qualitative research can become too “deep”; while explaining that



case study perfectly, one loses the possibility of applying it to other cases (Betsill & Corell 2008; Bryman 2012). My case study revolved around the COP21 Paris meeting. What one must take into consideration however is that the COP21, or any other COPs, are not isolated meetings -see above, and the analysis chapter).

COP21 is a suitable case for studying new actors in diplomacy because it was a conference that attracted all kinds of actors, both state and non-state actors, and at all levels on the society; including over a thousand Norwegians (Interviewee 4 13.05.2016). By focusing on climate diplomacy, or climate negotiations, you are narrowing your focus to a sub-field in diplomacy where non-state actors such as NGOs are highly represented, and where they themselves believe that they have had major impacts (Interviewee 2 04.05.2016; Interviewee 4 13.05.2016; Interviewee 6 08.06.2016; Lahn 2013).

My analytical framework leans on the analytical framework created by Michele Betsill and Elisabeth Corell (2008), but my primary objective differs. They want to be able to assert whether or not NGOs have influence in international environmental negotiations, and make the research more reliable. My primary objective however is to find how the involved actors perceive their own influence, as well as how they look at the relationship between themselves. Still, I use part of the guide Betsill (2008, p 21) presents in the Table 2.1, in terms of data type, a part of it, as well as using her suggestion for data source, which was official documents, news articles, and interviews.

The empirical part of this thesis are based on interviews and text analysis, and builds upon the Paris Agreement and other official documents from the COPs, as well as various news articles and interviews with various Norwegian actors. I look at the official documents, and compare them to statements made prior to COP21 of both the Norwegian government and of the Norwegian NGOs. I look at the overall themes, and of the specific points, or paragraphs within the Paris Agreement. In addition I look up media articles to confirm or challenge claims made by the actors in the interviews.

The analysis is based upon the subsection in the theory chapter named “New Diplomacy”, and focuses on the differences that Kelley identifies between official and nonofficial diplomats (2010), or as I also call them in the analysis state and non-state actors. The interviews is used to show how the actors directly involved think, and their thoughts and beliefs are supplied by news articles and by official documents as mentioned above.

### **3.3. The interviewing process**

For this thesis I decided to go with semi-structured interview. This is because it allows me to get answers to a few broad themes that are important for the analysis, but at the same time allowing the interview subjects to speak freely, and interpret the broad questions in their own way (Bryman 2012). When they were in doubt they could ask me what I meant by this and that question, or ask me to specify, and I would. But overall I did my best not to steer the interviews too much.

#### **3.3.1. Sampling**

I chose to use snowball sampling. Snowball sampling is a type of non-probability sampling, and means that you start with one or two subjects, and let them lead you to other contacts. Snowball sampling has also been called a form of convenience sampling (Bryman 2012). Snowball sampling does not allow you to get sampling unit that is representative to the population or a community, but this is not the point with this case study. I am not interested in finding out what the population of Norway thinks about climate diplomacy; but what the actors involved in climate diplomacy believe and experience. Therefore a sampling strategy of snowballing is perfect for my case, since it is the actors involved who really know the other actors in their “game”. I am directing my sampling purposively towards those I feel can give me the most relevant data. For this thesis I started with two interview subjects; one suggested to me by a lecturer at NMBU, and the other suggested to me by my supervisor. These were Interview subjects 1 and 2.

A potential problem with snowball sampling, other than that it is not representative of a population, is the possibility for the research to become skewed; the subjects only leading you to contacts that are similar to themselves, and thus not allow you to get the entire picture in the case study. I hope this is not a factor in my study; I feel that I have gotten a variety of interview subjects, from journalist and researchers, to prominent members of NGOs in Norway, and to various levels within the hierarchy that is the official Norwegian delegation to the COPs.

#### **3.3.2. Interview Subjects & Setting**

Initially I reached out to thirteen people, of which eleven agreed to meet me for an interview. Though I was left with 11 interview subjects, I kept the numbering system I had from the beginning. These eleven subjects are ordered into three categories, as can be seen in table 1.

## Interview Subjects

NGO actors	Observers	State Actors
No. 2	No. 1	No. 8
No. 3	No. 9	No. 10
No. 4	No. 13	No. 11
No. 6		No. 12

**Table 1: The categorization of the interview subjects**

I met each interview subject on a location they chose, and the atmosphere was calm and relaxed at every location. The setting varied from their favorite cafés, to meeting rooms, to offices, and I even conducted one interview outdoors. All the interviewees accepted to do the interviews in English, so that I could have all the data in the same language. At the same time I urged them to use Norwegian if they forgot how to say something in English, and I would later translate this. I clearly mark sections where I have translated the interviewees' words, or other texts in Norwegian. I taped the interviews on two devices, as to limit the risk of losing data, and I also took some notes. Afterwards I copied the recordings onto my computer, so I had them three places, and after letting the interviews sink in I wrote summaries of them; mostly within three days (see appendix III). I turned away from the idea of transcribing them, since I was more interested in the themes and ideas they brought up rather than the exact wording, but the key parts are in the summaries, and later in the analysis I bring in direct quotes from them as well. Of all the interview subjects only one requested to be anonymous, but in this thesis I have neglected to use their names and specific position, and instead turned the focus to their experiences, activities and their own reflections.

Interview No	Date conducted	Setting	Description; comments
No 1	Friday 6 <sup>th</sup> of May	Café	Freelance Journalist
No 2	Wednesday 4 <sup>th</sup> of May	Meeting Room	Norwegian coordinator among the NGOs, works in a well established NGO, and are involved in both domestic and international umbrella groups for NGOs
No 3	Monday 9 <sup>th</sup> of May	Outside, at Blindern	High up in a youth organization in Norway on environment

No 4	Friday 13 <sup>th</sup> of May	His office	Well experienced within the development NGOs in Norway
No 5	-----	-----	-----
No 6	Wednesday 8 <sup>th</sup> of June	Café	Experienced with NGOs domestic and international, has held a “dual role”. NB: Not at COP21
No 7	-----	-----	Former Minister of the Environment; declined due to conflict of interest with her current position
No 8	Wednesday 1 <sup>st</sup> of June	Meeting room	Member of the formal delegation from Norway
No 9	Friday 10 <sup>th</sup> of June	Café	Researcher
No 10	Tuesday 7 <sup>th</sup> of June	Meeting room	Member of the formal delegation from Norway
No 11	Tuesday 14 <sup>th</sup> of June	Meeting room	Member of the formal delegation from Norway
No 12	Thursday 30 <sup>th</sup> of June	Meeting room	Member of the formal delegation from Norway
No 13	Thursday 30 <sup>th</sup> of June	His office	Researcher. NB: Not at COP21

**Table 2: Specific information about the interviewing process**

The interview group consists of a variety of people, from young to middle aged, and from various backgrounds. In the NGO section I have a person representing youth (environmental) group, people from big NGOs in Norway; as well as one subject who “plays both fields” as will be explained clearly in the analysis chapter. With the observers, I have a journalist that has followed the COPs for years as a freelancer, as well as a couple of researchers that specialize in climate negotiations on an international level. In the state section I have representatives of both the bureaucrats and the politicians, and from various “levels” in the delegation hierarchy.

### **3.3.3. Factors to Consider**

The first four interviews were conducted prior to the intersessional meeting in Bonn, which were held in the latter half of May. This accounts for the time difference between interview 4 and interview 8. Important to consider is that of the first four interviews, three were representatives of the NGO; and that all the state actors were interviewed after the

intersessional meeting in Bonn. The meeting in Bonn was the first official meeting between the negotiators after the adoption of the Paris Agreement, and was amongst other things the first session of the “Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement”, or APA (UNFCCC 2016a). This may have had an impact on the replies given by the later interview subjects.

Two of the interview subjects (Interviewee 6 08.06.2016; Interviewee 13 30.06.2016) were not present at the COP21. I nonetheless decided to include them in my study as they provided both valuable background information and general observations.

### **3.4. Reliability, Validity & Limitations**

One limitation of qualitative research is the tendency it have to become too subjective (Bryman 2012), and this can be a challenge for this thesis. On the other hand, I have specifically asked the interview subjects their *subjective* opinions, for this is what I want to find out.

Reliability and validity is best suited to evaluating *quantitative* research, but can be adapted to *qualitative* research (Bryman 2012, pp 389-90). Reliability, or external reliability, refers to the ability to replicate the study, so that if another scientist did the same study he or she would get the same result (Bryman 2012, p 390). This is obviously a problem in qualitative research, and for my thesis, since my study is a specific moment. At the time I conducted the interviews, around 6 months had gone by since the COP21 Paris, and although the interview subjects remembered most of what happen, memory fades the more time passes. But I think that one could replicate m study, because it is possible to look at the general relationship between the official Norway and the Norwegian NGOs, and this will probably not change unless something drastically happens. The official documents and news articles I have used are available online, though I cannot guarantee that they will stay there forever. Internal reliability is not applicable to my thesis, since I have worked alone.

In terms of validity I have a bit of a paradox. Theoretically by studying one of the states in the COP circus one should be able to retract some general findings that could apply to other states, if not necessary all of the states. The problem is that all of the interview subjects have pointed to the uniqueness of the Norwegian situation. Norway balances on a thin line, and court both the small and the big states, the West and the East, and despite being a developed country it still has a good reputation with, and hold a favorable position for, the developing countries. The interview subjects pointed to the fact that Norway is not firmly in one group, or in one position, but can move among several, and that its position is fluid; Norway is more

about reaching a compromise than holding on to its original position. All this put together I would say that this thesis has a low validity, but at the same time maybe Norway's situation can be seen as an ideal situation that the other states should strive towards?

An alternative way to evaluate a *qualitative* study is to use the four criteria of trustworthiness. These are *credibility*, *transferability*, *dependability* and *confirmability* (Bryman 2012, p 390). *Credibility* refers to among other things the credibility of the interview subject, and if he or she's account of the reality is acceptable, and if it reflects others reality views; it is parallel to internal validity (Bryman 2012, p 390). Since I have eleven interview subjects in this thesis, and since they represent a various groups within Norway, I feel that their presentation of the events at COP21 and of the relationship between the official Norway and the Norwegian delegation is credible.

*Transferability* can be compared to external validity; that is the ability to transfer the study to other subjects. As mentioned before this should not be the central point to this thesis. But, if one switches out the words Norway, Norwegian NGOs, COP21 and Paris, one theoretically transfer this study to another state and its NGOs, but I cannot guarantee that they one get the same results as me.

Instead of focusing on reliability, which is better suited for quantitative research, one can rather focus on *dependability* in qualitative research (Bryman 2012). By *dependability* Bryman refers to the possibility one leaves for others to "audit" the study, by keeping records of the progress, and for the data. I have several copies of the recording of the interview, and in addition I have provided summaries of them in the appendices as well as a copy of the interview guide that has been used (appendices III and II, respectively).

The last of the criteria of trustworthiness is that of *confirmability*. This is about how much the researcher, that is me, have been affected by personal values and perception, and if this has lead the analysis, or if the researcher has been able to, if not being objective, acting in "good faith" (Bryman 2012, p 392). Though I have relied heavily on the various interview subjects, I have tried as much is possible to triangulate their responses and ideas on media articles, and triangulated their thoughts about their impact on official documents.

### **3.5. Structure of the Analysis**

I have chosen to combine my findings and analysis into the same chapter, and have structured it chronologically. The first section is the preparations towards the COP21. I have decided to

call this section for “Before Paris”. In here I start by laying out the process of the international climate negotiations through the UNFCCC from its beginning in 1992 to the present, and within this look at the impact of Norway and the Norwegian NGOs impact on the Norwegian positions. I have a separate sub-section focusing on 2015, and ends the section with a reflection part looking at how the climate negotiations correlates to the claims of Kelley in terms of how the state, official diplomats, and non-state actors, non-official diplomats, works separately within the same sphere.

The next section focuses on the Paris meeting itself, and looks more into the roles that the Norwegian delegation and the Norwegian NGOs held, their relationship with each other and problems with it, and end with a deeper look at the impact that the NGOs may or may not have had on the processes, including on the agenda setting.

The last section looks at the time after the end of the COP21. Within here I take a closer look to the text of the Paris Agreement, and compare it to statements made by NGOs and by the Norwegian government. I also look at alternative explanations to the success, in the sub-section named “why now?”; is the reason we got an agreement up to the impact of the civil societies, the NGOs, or does it have other explanations. I also speculate about the future, and what the Paris Agreement means for the future role and importance of the NGOs.

In addition to these three chronological sections, I end with an “overall” section where I look at the process as a whole, and analyze points that came up during the process, but that did not fit under one of the previous sections.

## 4. Findings & Analysis

This chapter combines the findings procured in the case study and analyzes them based on Kelley's work on new diplomacy, in which he argues that although the official and non-official diplomats work within the same sphere, they work separately. This emergence of the non-official diplomats he coins "new diplomacy", and states that official diplomats are losing key positions in terms of authority, agility and legitimacy to them. In order to do this structured the case study is split into three periods which I have called "Before Paris", "In Paris" and "After Paris". I have chosen this structure because it allows me to look at all the aspects of the UNFCCC's international climate negotiations that resulted in the Paris Agreement, and does not limit me to a specific year or time period and exclude crucial information.

Firstly, in my discussion of the preparatory phase, "Before Paris", I start by outlining the years leading up to COP21, and explain important phases in the UNFCCC's climate negotiations. I then concentrate on the year 2015, the year of the COP21, and look at the preparations in the months leading up to the Paris conference. Lastly I end with reflecting on the relationship between the "official" Norway and Norwegian NGOs during these years, and how this support or challenge the writings of Kelley; does Kelley's claim that official and non-official diplomats' share the same sphere but work separately hold up in the case of Norway and Norwegian NGOs?

Secondly, in my discussion of the period "In Paris", I start by briefly explain the process of the conference how many were present, and so forth. I then go more specifically into the roles of Norway and Norwegian NGOs during the COP21, and look more into the relationship between them during the meeting. While examining the relationship between them I also look at some tensions in the relationship, and how this relates to the theoretical framework. At the end I briefly look at the impact of both the NGOs and of Norway on the COP and on the Paris Agreement, and speculate for reasons for this impact, or lack of impact.

In the period "After Paris" I start the discussion by outlining the time that has passed since the COP21 took place, before I start looking more closely at the Paris Agreement. When looking at the Paris Agreement I look more deeply at the agreement text, and how this compares to inputs and policy asks from the NGOs prior to the Cop21, and to the Norwegian position brief. I also look at decisions made at COP21; that did not make it into the agreement, but are a part of the decisions made at the conference. After I have done this I look into why the



COP21 was different from other COPs; particularly why it was different from COP15 Copenhagen. I go through the differences between them and why multilateralism succeeded in Paris, but failed in Copenhagen. This is the section that lets me explore other explanations to the success of COP21, outside that of Norwegian and Norwegian NGOs influence. I end this period by looking to the future, and speculate about the role of the NGOs onward.

In each of these periods I bind the data to the theoretical framework laid down in previous chapters. Each period has data on the formalization of the relationship between the Norwegian government and delegation, and the Norwegian NGOs. It also looks at the possibilities for access the NGOs have to the “official diplomats”, and eventually how often they meet.

The exception is the aftermath. Here I look at if the Norwegian NGOs, and the Norway, got any of their cases through to the final agreement, and if this can be linked to the findings in the two prior periods. Although we cannot positively prove the connection, we can look at correlations and speculate. In the aftermath period I also take into account the interview subjects’ views of the future, and come with a few predictions about the role of the NGOs in climate diplomacy in the future.

In addition to these three sub-sections on the case study this chapter ends with one last sub-section, titled: Overall findings and conclusions. This sub-section contains reflections and findings that does not belong under *one* of the sub-sections above, but may be relevant for several of them. It looks at the differences within the Global Civil Society and the NGO community, as well as the differences between the European and the American NGOs. It also looks at how both the state and the non-state actors have described the relationship between them in a broad sense, and how this relates to Kelley’s claims. It also looks at Norway’s position within the climate negotiations, and look to see if this can be attributed, at least in part, to their close relationship to the Norwegian NGOs.

#### **4.1. Before Paris**

The United Nation Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) entered into force in 1994, and consists today of 197 members, or Parties (UNFCCC n.d.-a; UNFCCC n.d.-c). It is one of three Conventions adopted in Rio 1992, and UNFCCC main objective is to prevent “dangerous human interference with climate system” (UNFCCC n.d.-c). It was adopted at a time where the science had not positively identified the serious consequences humans have had on the climate, as they have now (UNFCCC n.d.-c), and were thus ahead of its time. In

the words of Bård Lahn (2013), the climate negotiations in the UN are “the international society’s most important tool in trying to answer the questions around the distribution of the effort against climate change” (Lahn 2013, p 15; translated by author).

In connection with the UNFCCC, the Parties meet annually, at the Conference of the Parties (COPs). At present time there has been 21 COPs, the 22<sup>nd</sup> is scheduled for 7<sup>th</sup> -18<sup>th</sup> of November in Marrakech, Morocco (UNFCCC 2016b).

In this section I outline and analyze the work leading up to the COP21 Paris. I do this by first going through the international climate negotiations starting with the first COP, and identify tensions between the various member states, particularly between the developed and the developing countries. These tensions are reflected on later in the analysis, and I position the Norwegian government and the Norwegian NGOs on them. I do this to explore Kelley’s claim that official and non-official diplomats work separately within the same sphere. As mentioned in chapter three the COPs is not isolated events; they are simply an annual conference to gather all the parties for direct negotiations on the issue points they still have not come to an agreement on in the intersessional meetings. This sub-section is divided in the years leading up to the Paris meeting, the year 2015, and end with a reflection part.

#### **4.1.1. The years leading up to COP21**

The first COP, COP1, was held in Berlin Germany in 1995. Negotiations started immediately and resulted in the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol two years later, in 1997. The Kyoto Protocol is a top-down approach, in that the Convention has set a target that the world has to reach, to avoid the biggest consequences of climate change, and then divided the responsibility among the Parties (UNFCCC 1998). More specifically it set a “cap”, a maximum for carbon emission, for the richest countries, and required the countries to send in quotas equal to their carbon emissions (Lahn 2013). If these countries failed to stay below their maximum, they needed to buy quotas from countries that managed to stay well below their limit, thus “trade” for emission rights; this is known as “cap and trade” (Lahn 2013). Two factors to take into consideration about the Kyoto Protocol later in the chapter: 1) Of the 197 Parties of the Convention, 192 Parties adopted the Kyoto Protocol. 5 states, or Parties, rejected the Protocol, among them the United States. Later, other states who originally signed the protocol signaled that they wanted to withdraw from the Protocol; 2) The Kyoto Protocol continue the divide of the world in two, Annex I and Non-Annex I countries as

established in the Convention text (UN 1992), and puts all the responsibility on the rich annex I countries, thus creating a clear bilateral differentiation of the world.

The Kyoto Protocol contains elements that are favorable to the Norwegian government. It gives the possibility for flexible mechanisms; lets Norway stay below the “cap” without needing to cut emissions “at home”. This ability of flexible mechanism, of cost efficiency (Interviewee 6 08.06.2016; Interviewee 8 01.06.2016) is one of the suggestions that Norway have invested in and fought for the last decades, in various forms (Lahn 2013). The “Norwegian Proposal” involves turning the solution to the problem of climate change and carbon emission cuts to an economic question. By taking a portion of the “quotas” for emission and sell them at an auction, one gets the possibility of collecting resources towards climate actions and mitigation that are not dependent on each countries national budgets (Lahn 2013, p 47). “The Norwegian Proposal” depends on a “top-down” agreements, so this is what the Norwegian government negotiated for, until it became clear that a “top-down” approach was political impossible after COP15 Copenhagen (Lahn 2013). Still, though the negotiations after Copenhagen has focused on a bottom-up approach, Norway still negotiates for mechanisms such as flexible mechanisms and cost efficiency to be a part of the agreement. The NGOs are also positive to a top-down agreement, but are skeptical to the “loophole” that allows rich countries to “cut emissions”, but not change anything domestically.

In 2007, at the COP13 Bali, the negotiations began for a new climate agreement, to take over after the mandate of the Kyoto-Protocol ends in 2020 (Kyoto-Protocols had two periods: 2008-2013 and 2013-2020). During the two weeks the Cop lasted, the negotiations centered on creating a mandate for a process that would hopefully end with an agreement at COP15 Copenhagen in 2009. The main issue was who was going to bear the financial burden (Lahn 2013); by the developing countries themselves, or by financial aid from the developed countries.

Despite disputes the COP13 ends with the Bali Action Plan (see appendix IV). The Bali Action Plan has two tracks towards a new climate agreement (Lahn 2013). The first track was called the Convention-track, and “described a broad negotiation process to discuss emission cuts in both rich and poor countries” (Lahn 2013, p 38; translated by author). The official name was “Ad-Hoc Working Group for Long-Term Cooperative Action under the Convention”, or AWG-LCA The second track would continue to discuss new emission goals for the rich countries, those that already had emission goals under the Kyoto Protocol. This

track was called the Kyoto-Track, or the “Ad-Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol” (Lahn 2013, p 38; translated by author), the AWG-KP.

There were huge expectations to a new agreement prior to COP15 Copenhagen, both by the NGOs (Interviewee 2 04.05.2016; Interviewee 3 09.05.2016; Interviewee 4 13.05.2016), but also by the various states (Interviewee 8 01.06.2016; Lahn 2013). Science had shown us what needed to be done, so the job for the negotiators was to just divide the task (Interviewee 2 04.05.2016). This showed itself to be more difficult than expected during the conference. The disputes were many, but for the purpose of this thesis only a few will be mentioned. There was a disagreement about how differentiation of countries should be handled; whether they should still be divided into Annex I and Non-Annex I countries, or if it should be about the size of the economies; those with big carbon emissions, and the small, poor states. There was also a wish from the rich countries, proposed by the United States, to shift the approach to a future agreement from top-down to bottom up. This would mean that the countries themselves decided how much they wanted to cut emissions, and was not forced by international agreements.

In addition to these factors, several interviewees also identified the bad organization of the Danish Presidency as an important explanation. During the COP15 rumors spread about “secret negotiations” between a few of the Parties; rumors that later proven to be true (Interviewee 1 06.05.2016; Interviewee 9 10.06.2016; Lahn 2013). Parallel to the ordinary negotiations The Danish Presidency, on the initiative of the Danish Prime Minister, had picked a few Parties, Norway included, to create a new agreement among themselves, that would later be voted on in plenum. The leaking of a new “Danish text” on the second day of the COP (Vidal 2009), which was mostly negotiated by rich countries, creates a bitter mood in the ordinary meetings; and does not help with the mistrust between the developed and the developing countries. The controversy around this text, and of the “secret negotiations” eventually lead to a collapse in the entire process; the highly anticipated summit ended with no agreement (Lahn 2013).

The Copenhagen COP dealt a weakening blow to the UN processes, and created doubt towards UN being the correct forum to debate climate change efforts. Most of the delegates and observers realized they would only get one more chance by the public (Interviewee 1 06.05.2016; Interviewee 2 04.05.2016; Interviewee 3 09.05.2016; Interviewee 4 13.05.2016;

Interviewee 6 08.06.2016; Interviewee 11 14.06.2016). The following two years the negotiations centered on creating a new mandate for a new agreement, and this was achieved in COP17 Durban. The negotiations had been heated the last couple of years, but at the end of the Durban Summit the Parties approved a new mandate, the Durban Platform (see appendix IV).

The Durban Platform signaled a new focus in the climate negotiations. Instead of strengthening the efforts against climate change for the period prior to 2020, the focus became to create a new agreement that would involve actions *from* 2020 (Lahn 2013)). The AWG-LCA was shut down, and a new group created, the “Ad-Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Ambition”, the ADP (Lahn 2013; UNFCCC n.d.-b), which would end in 2015, and the COP21.

While at this point we cannot say anything about the impact the NGOs will or will not have on the Paris meeting, we can start to analyze the impact they may or may not have had on the processes leading up to the Paris Agreement; the impact in previous COPs.

One of the interview subjects mentioned the impact that Norwegian NGOs, among others, have had on the REDD+ and the Norwegian’s “additional emission target” (Interviewee 6 08.06.2016), while another mentioned how the NGOs have changed the very language that the negotiators use when speaking to the general public (Interviewee 8 01.06.2016). The shift in language includes both phrases that were previously avoided, before the NGOs persuaded them, and as mentioned the simplification of the language, to make it more understandable for the general public (Interviewee 8 01.06.2016; Interviewee 9 10.06.2016).

#### **4.1.2. 2015**

The COP21 Paris was the end stop of the process that started in COP17 Durban. The expectations, while not as high as they had been before Copenhagen, were on everybody’s mind. In addition there was a sense from several that this would be the last chance to get an international agreement on climate change. Therefore the whole year of 2015 was busy for all the actors.

For the Norwegian delegation their main focus was to “map out” the positions of the other Parties; find out what they really meant, and not just what they said (Interviewee 8 01.06.2016). This had gone on for a couple of years, with bilateral and informal talks, but reached its peak in 2015. While the Norwegian government issued a position brief in

November (Klima- og miljødepartementet 2015b; Klima- og miljødepartementet 2015c) they also maintained that it was more important to reach a compromise than sticking tightly to their own positions. While mapping out everybody's positions, the Norwegian delegation also worked to get the possible new agreement as ambitious as possible, though in the press they "downplayed" their expectations (Interviewee 8 01.06.2016; Interviewee 10 07.06.2016).

For the NGOs, they worked within their organizations and networks to draft positions, and lobbying various countries whose views are either similar to the NGOs, or to countries that are vastly different to try and persuade them not to block parts of the negotiations (Interviewee 2 04.05.2016; Interviewee 3 09.05.2016; Interviewee 4 13.05.2016).

Prior to every COP and to the intersessional meetings, the Norwegian government invites the public, including the NGOs to "information meetings". At the first glance this seems as one-sided link. In 2015 the Norwegian delegation met with representatives from the NGOs nearly every other month, where they exchanged information, but the NGOs also came with written and oral inputs to the negotiators. This is a common practice/theme in the meetings between the Norwegian delegation and the Norwegian NGOs, and disputes Kelley's claim that official and non-official diplomatic actors work separately, but within the same sphere. These meetings, and the mutual exchange of information and ideas shows that they work together within the same sphere; they share a symbiotic relationship. It is not one-sided, as it may appear at first glance.

A specific event that was influenced by the NGOs of Norway's policy up to the COP21 Paris was initiated by the Norwegian delegation. They official delegation reached out to the Norwegian NGOs and asked them that if they managed to find some money, where should they put it? After looking at the suggestions by the civil society the negotiation leader gave his suggestion to the Minister of the Environment; in collaboration with the NGOs they had decided to double the Norwegian investment into the "Green Climate Fund", and extend the duration of the REDD+ (Interviewee 8 01.06.2016).

#### **4.1.3. Reflections on the Relationship and Expectations**

According to Kelley, the trend of these years should have shown these two actor groups, the state actors and the NGOs actors, working separately, but within the same sphere; the climate diplomacy and the COPs. Instead, as we have seen, the Norwegian government and delegation, and the Norwegian NGOs have a close relationship, which will be examined more

thoroughly later in this chapter. They have regular meetings, and send information to each other. Their relationship is symbiotic, not separate.

Kelley also stated that the states that managed to have a close relationship to their civil society or NGOs would have a better chance to succeed in their goals, both now and in the future. Can this be said for Norway? Has the close relationship with the Norwegian NGOs, both formal and informal, helped Norway in achieving its goals?

Before we try to answer this by shifting the focus on to the COP21 Paris meeting itself, this last paragraph briefly looks at the expectations the various interview subjects had to the conference. It presents them, and later in this chapter I see if their expectations were met, or even exceeded. Most of the interview subjects replied that they expected an agreement to come out of the Paris Meeting, but what they believed it would contain varied from person to person. Most was sceptic that it would contain something substantial, and would merely become a framework for future actions against climate change. This was a trend noted by several observers and experts (see expert study by CICERO: Kallbekken & Sælen 2015; Redaksjonen 2015). Interview subject 3 (09.05.2016) reflected that his expectations to the civil society mobilization were not met in Paris, but contributed this to the terror attack earlier in November 2015.

## **4.2. In Paris**

*“By and large, the Norwegian policy, the Norwegian mandate, the Norwegian vision for Paris by and large shared with a majority of the Norwegian NGOs” (Interviewee 8 01.06.2016)*

France hosted the COP21 Paris in November and December 2015. More specifically the conference lasted from the 30<sup>th</sup> of November till the 11<sup>th</sup> of December; though it ended on overtime, on the 12<sup>th</sup> of December. It hosted delegations of the 197 Parties of the UNFCCC, as well as numerous representatives and observers from every part of the Global Civil Society. Before it took place they expected almost 50 000 participants of various types, only half of them were “official delegates” (COP21 2015). The start of the meeting was overshadowed by the terrible terror attack that hit Paris only a few weeks before (Solberg 2015), and interviewee 3 noted that the mobilization of the civil society in the streets were not as huge as he expected prior to the attack (Interviewee 3 09.05.2016).

This sub-section first begins by analyzing the activities of the various actors, and the role that Norway and the Norwegian NGOs have in the climate negotiations, before it looks more closely at the formal relationship during the COP21. In the end it start to analyze the impact the NGOs may or may not have on the agenda setting in the negotiation.

### **Activities of the Actors**

Prior to looking at the relationship between the various actors, I will briefly outline what their activities were during the conference. The state actors did mostly the same things; they attended the various meeting from morning to night, kept the top negotiators informed, and write rapports back to Norway. There were some differences in what their main task was, some followed the Minister of the Environment, others were liaising with the NGOs, and other again sat around the negotiating tables. The activities of the state actors also shifted after the first week, when the Norwegian Minister of the Environment were asked to lead part of the negotiation; focusing on formulating the purpose of the agreement.

The NGO actors varied the most. Some of them focused on lobbying the various negotiators, some focused on the technical issues with the various proposals, and some again gathered and shared information through the various international networks.

#### **4.2.1. Roles of Norway and the NGOs in the Climate Negotiations**

Norway is a relatively small state in the world based on its population, but despite this it plays a remarkable role in the climate negotiations. Of the 11 interview subjects, most of them said at one point or another that Norway played a bigger role in the climate negotiations than one would expect; an NGO actor (Interviewee 2 04.05.2016) claimed that Norway “punches above its weight”, the researcher (Interviewee 9 10.06.2016) stated that it played a bigger role than the size would suggest, while a member of the Norwegian delegation (Interviewee 12 30.06.2016) noted that Norway’s role is bigger than its population would suggest. This “bigger” role is due to several factors, including Norway’s placement on the “edges” of the various coalition groups, its economy and financial contributions, and its international reputation. One is political, one is economic, and the third is in addition to the previous two also in part related to their relationship with the NGOs.

Norway is in many ways both outside and inside in the negotiations. Norway is a part of Europe, but is not a part of the EU. Since the EU speaks “with one voice” (Lahn 2013) and Norway has its own, Norway has more influence than its neighboring countries. Norway is



only member of one coalition group, the “Umbrella group”, which consists of several rich countries that falls outside the EU; this includes the United States, Australia, Canada, Japan, Russia, New Zealand, and Ukraine (Interviewee 1 06.05.2016; Interviewee 2 04.05.2016; Lahn 2013). This is a loose group, and does not speak with one voice. They are not fixed in their own positions, which allow Norway to discuss and negotiate with countries from the other groups. Therefore Norway may in some cases be close to the EU in their policy, and other cases to the United States. Norway is also not a former colonial power; despite the mistrust between the developed and the developing countries Norway enjoys a good reputation among the developing nations. Norway is seen as a “bridge-builder”, and is more focused on reaching a compromise than holding on to its own positions (Interviewee 8 01.06.2016; Lahn 2013; see also above in the sub-section "2015").

Norway is one of the biggest contributors in the UNFCCC (Interviewee 6 08.06.2016). In addition Norway invests heavily in the REDD + (Interviewee 6 08.06.2016; Interviewee 8 01.06.2016), and is a major contributor to the Green Climate Fund (Interviewee 8 01.06.2016; Klima- og miljødepartementet 2015c; Solberg 2015). This gives Norway a position to be heard, and also contribute to their reputation as highly invested in the efforts against climate change.

As mentioned above Norway enjoys a good international reputation within the climate negotiations. This is both due to their standing on the “edges”, and their financial contributions; but it can also be linked to their relationship with the NGOs. As noted a couple of times, and which will be elaborated more later in the thesis, Norway has a close and good relationship to the NGOs, both the Norwegian, and others. They have formalized the relationship with having two representatives of the NGOs in the formal delegation, and they are in regular contact with the NGOs; both to keep them informed, and to get inputs and suggestions from them. This unique relationship gives them a positive reputation in the NGO community. Norway’s good reputation has shown itself several times over the last decades; Harald Dovland, an experienced Norwegian negotiator was first asked to co-lead the AWG-KP, and later the ADP (Lahn 2013), and in Paris the Norwegian Minister of the Environment asked to lead the part of the negotiations focused on ambition in the Paris Agreement (King & Darby 2015).

The NGOs also plays various roles in the climate negotiations. A negotiator on the Norwegian delegation (Interviewee 8 01.06.2016) identified three key roles: 1. They advocate more

ambitious policies, and thereby pressure the individual governments to do more in terms of fighting climate change; 2. They “translate and simplify” the complexity in the negotiations and the diplomatic language, and are a key figure in informing the public, and make them understand what is happening; 3: they represent an input with their international networks, they have ideas and perspective that may be new to the negotiators, but that are very helpful to them. While the other interview subjects explained the NGOs roles differently, all but one of them can be categorized under these three. The exception was noted by one of the researchers (Interviewee 9 10.06.2016), who said that the NGOs also acted as “watch dogs” and made sure that the process was transparent and inclusive; that no Party was excluded from the discussions.

How does these roles of Norway and the NGOs relate to Kelley’s presentation of the roles of the official and non-official diplomats? The first role represents the influence NGOs may have on the various governments, and implies the notion that will be examined more closely later: it is easier to influence each individual state on their domestic policy, than it is to influence a collective group of states on an international policy. The second role is evidence of the NGOs “conquering” of the “information power”; which according to Kelley is one of three important powers in today’s society (the others being economic and military). What is important to note is that the role of informing the public that the NGOs possesses was mentioned by both the NGO actors *and* by the state actors. Indeed several of the state actors were highly positive on this, and noted that the NGOs did a crucial job, and that they themselves simply did not have the time to give all the interviews. Thus, what first appears as a solely NGO role proves itself to be part of the symbiotic relationship between the Norwegian delegation and the Norwegian NGOs. The third role is an even deeper indicate of this symbiotic relationship, the Norwegian diplomats and the NGOs can bounce ideas of each other, and since they have different backgrounds and perspectives, the outcome will hopefully become more nuanced solution to the world’s need.

#### **4.2.2. Formal relationship**

*“They want to [have a close relationship to the NGOs], they absolutely [want to]; clear order from political level that they are expected to have..., to take civil society into consideration, to include them to a certain degree” (Interviewee 4 13.05.2016).*

*“[The relationship] is based upon trust. So, if they know that you know what you are talking about, that you do your homework, that you are knowledgeable. Not only talking in slogans,*

*but actually know what, what are the implications of the different issues [...] you get a respectful treatment.” (Interviewee 4 13.05.2016)*

During the COP the Norwegian delegation tried to have “outreach” meetings with among others the NGOs every second or third day (Interviewee 8 01.06.2016). They also had one member in the formal delegation that was the liaison between the delegation and the NGOs, as well as two representatives of the NGOs in the formal delegation. This is quite unique since in the international society, though interview subject 8 (01.06.2016) stated that: “there are other countries that have, that have like a youth delegate in their delegation proper, but I think that I can count, [um], on one hand [those that have]. We’re not the only one, wouldn’t say unique” (Interviewee 8 01.06.2016). What makes this “dual role” possibility of the NGOs unique is that it shows that the relationship between Norway and the Norwegian government is more formal, and more developed than most others. This “dual role” of the representatives benefits both the Norwegian delegation and government, and the NGOs. The Norwegian negotiators get access to a new perspectives and ideas that they may not have thought of, and the NGOs may sit on information about other actors or parts of the negotiations that the delegation is not privy to at first. As interviewee 10 tried to explain it:

*“We have Norwegian NGOs, or Norwegian NGO representatives in international organizations coming to us and say: “Listen, [um] I think that if you propose this I am pretty sure that you would get support from...” maybe from China, or another country where you would not expect that support to come from ... Sometimes they come with proposals that they [pause], “well this is our proposal. We have some backing from, from some countries, but they are, they will probably be difficult... [Starts again] It might be difficult for them to propose it because they are part of a larger [pause, looking for the word] institution, or a constituency, [pause] but maybe if Norway, which has a slightly more free role to propose it, they could push inside their negotiations group to gather support, for example.” (Interviewee 10 07.06.2016).*

Here he points to two similar ways that the NGOs can help Norway in the negotiations. They have a different international network, and can thus find support for part in the negotiations where Norway would not look. They can also start with their own proposals, map where they might get support from, and present this to the Norwegian negotiators. This shows that Kelley’s prediction for which states will have better possibilities to achieve their goals (see section 2.4 above).

For the NGOs the representatives in the formal delegation allows them access to information that is restricted to most of the NGOs worldwide, but that they can share to them through their international networks (Interviewee 2 04.05.2016; Interviewee 4 13.05.2016). This again lets the Norwegian NGOs help other countries NGOs, and helps in creating and maintaining Norway's good reputation in climate negotiations. By having representatives in the formal delegation they get direct access to both bureaucrats and politicians at a high level. This close, or harmonically, relationship is best expressed by Lahn (2013) when he writes how during the COP13 Bali he, as a representative for a Norwegian youth environment organization can go up to the then Minister of the Environment of Norway, Erik Solheim, to ask about what a suggestion made at the podium really meant. As he stated: "It is good to be Norwegian in the UN" (Lahn 2013, p 28; translated by author). The fact that the dual role of the representatives allows them to go straight up to the Minister of the Environment and ask for a clarification on a complicated negotiation language and process speak of a unique relationship, and also implies that the representatives have the possibility to take their policy suggestions and positions directly to the highest political level. While they are only two people, with them they have the weight of the Norwegian NGO community. One of the interview subjects (Interviewee 4 13.05.2016) also implied this close relationship and access to the highest levels of delegations; when listing all the negotiation leaders he had met across the table he called them all by their first name, with familiarity.

Though most of the interview subjects declared that the relationship between the Norwegian government and delegation and the Norwegian NGOs were good, interview subject 9 (10.06.2016) noted that in 2015 there was a tension that had not been there before. This tension can be traced back to some statements of the Norwegian officials, and between a specific disagreement between the Norwegian position and what the NGOs demanded for the agreement. The case boils down to that the NGOs wanted a statement about the rights of, among other things the indigenous people, within the purpose of the agreement (ForUM 2015a; ForUM 2015b; Johnsen 2015). ForUM's input to the Norwegian government included a message that the Norway **had** to get into the operational part of the agreement, preferably in the purpose. This message was:

*"All Parties, shall, in all climate change related actions, respect, protect, promote and fulfil human rights for all, including the rights of indigenous peoples; ensuring gender equality and the full and equal participation of women; ensuring intergenerational equity; ensuring a just*

*transition of the workforce that creates decent work and quality jobs; ensuring food security; and ensuring the integrity and resilience of natural ecosystems”(ForUM 2015b)*

The Norwegian delegation on the other hand, and who had a leading role in the formulation of the purpose, worked hard for the purpose to be as short as possible, and only mention climate change. They felt that human rights, and indigenous rights, were outside of the mandate for UNFCCC (Klima- og miljødepartementet 2015c), and should only focus on climate change. This led NGOs to accuse Norway of being against human rights and indigenous people (see for example: Johnsen 2015; Vidal & Vaughan 2015), and the negotiation leader of Norway to release a statement (Klima- og miljødepartementet 2015a) clarifying that Norway was not against human rights, and was one of the countries working hardest for it, but that it did not belong under the purpose of a climate change agreement (Interviewee 8 01.06.2016). Instead, it is mentioned in the preamble of the agreement (UNFCCC 2015a).

The text produced by ForUM, and supported by various other NGOs, did make an appearance in the Paris Agreement, though edited, and in the preamble of the agreement and not the purpose. The text in the Agreement is as follows:

*“Acknowledging that climate change is a common concern of humankind, Parties should, when taking action to address climate change, respect, promote and consider their respective obligations on human rights, the right to health, the rights of indigenous peoples, local communities, migrants, children, persons with disabilities and people in vulnerable situations and the rights to development, as well and gender equality, empowerment of women and intergenerational equity” (UNFCCC 2015a, p 21).*

This disagreement shows that although the relationship between Norway and the Norwegian NGOs is close and complex, it is not perfect. There will still be disagreements between them which, as we can see above, can lead to “outrageous accusations from around the world”. Critiquing Norway for being against human rights and indigenous people, and not countries such as China, Iran, and Saudi Arabia, does not seem fair. The fact that the Norwegian negotiation leader, Aslak Brun, had to go out and clarify the Norwegian position also shows how far the matter was dragged out (Klima- og miljødepartementet 2015a). Interviewee 8, a member of the Norwegian delegation, reflected that if the relationship between Norway and the Norwegian NGOs had been even closer, if they had met with them twice a day during the COP instead of every second or third day, this “misunderstanding” may not have happened

(01.06.2016). This indirectly comments Kelley's claim that the most successful states in the future will have the best relationship with their NGOs.

### **4.2.3. The Impact of NGOs in Paris**

*“There was a huge civil society mobilization around that meeting. There were thousands, tens of thousands of people in Paris from all over the world; maybe thousand Norwegians [...]. I believe that having all those people out in the streets screaming and shouting and ... [pauses, starts over] Of course, only having a certain notion of, like a value based general idea about what is going on. They don't know the details of the negotiations and they don't know all the acronyms and all that. But it has an impact, because the, the politicians who take the big decisions they listen to waters; they listen to public pressure. So, I think it was very good that we had all that noise about it, that there were so many people” (Interviewee 4 13.05.2016).*

While it is hard to prove influence and impact, especially in a situation such as the COPs, where the annual conference of the 195 Parties is a place for the politicians to meet and discuss what the bureaucrats have negotiated over the year and the years prior; and which is observed by thousands of NGO representative. To find one line in this complex web of actors and strands of debate and decisions is hard or even impossible. Still, the interview subjects had issues where they felt that their organization, or the NGOs in general, had made an impact in the climate negotiations. This included both in the process, agenda setting, and in the agreement itself. Their impact on the Paris Agreement will be addressed later in this chapter, but we will in here look at their impact on the agenda setting and the Norwegian positions in the climate negotiations.

Loss and damages was one of the areas that a majority of the NGOs fought to be included in the end product. At the last meeting in Bonn it was not clear whether or not “loss and damages” would be included as a separate chapter in the Paris Agreement, as can be seen in the Informal note from the ADP issued on the 6<sup>th</sup> of November 2015 (UNFCCC 2015b, p 15). As shown later in this chapter this is an area that the NGOs won, and the issue would not be on the agenda if not for the pressure of the NGOs, as stated by interview subject 4 (13.05.2016), and implied in the before mentioned informal note (UNFCCC 2015b).

Kelley stated that one of the advantages non-official diplomats have over their official counterparts is their agility, and that they can rely on grass root mobilization. This is exemplified in the live feed from Reuters during the COPs (Reuters 2015) where they tweeted news, and announced marches and other actions against climate change. As the quote at the

beginning of this sub-sub-section showed, interview subject 4 (13.05.2016) stated that these people out in the street, all over the world, had an impact, and showed the politician where the world stands on actions against climate change, and that the politicians listened.

Interviewee 4 (13.05.2016) also implicitly pointed out another difference between the various actors that Kelley highlighted; the political vs moral legitimacy. In his quote above, interviewee 4 said that the people in the streets had a general idea based on values, thus morality, but had little to no knowledge of the details of the negotiation, the political and bureaucratic background. The political vs moral legitimacy also appears in the sub-section above, about the “tears in the relationship”. Norway was attacked as lacking morals, when they fought for the purpose chapter of the agreement to be as short as possible, and wished – and succeeded – to remove the mention of human rights, amongst them the rights of indigenous peoples, to the preamble of the agreement. This caused loud debate, and Norway was accused of being against human rights. They were attacked based on morals, and the NGOs used their moral legitimacy to criticize the Norwegian delegation, and the Norwegian government, for the lack of theirs. The Norwegian delegation, on the other hand, argued used their political legitimacy and argued for what was politically and realistically feasible and logical; the purpose of a climate change agreement should involve actions and aims to reduce climate change (Johnsen 2015; Klima- og miljødepartementet 2015a; Solberg 2015).

### **4.3. After Paris**

The COP21 Paris ended, a day over the scheduled time, with the adoption of the Paris Agreement. This was soon applauded in the media, and exceeded what most experts believed (see expert study by: Kallbekken & Sælen 2015). At the time this thesis is written, around six months has passed since the lights turned off in Paris, and people have gotten the chance to let the meeting to sink in. They may not remember every detail of the meeting, or their preparations towards it, but the most important parts are still there. Although it is still too soon to see all of the effects and consequences of the meeting and of the Paris Agreement, the interview subjects have also had the opportunity to reflect on what happened, see the first consequences, and see how the various Parties have taken the Paris Agreement into consideration.

#### **4.3.1. The Paris Agreement**

The Paris Agreement consists of 29 articles. The first article is about the definitions used in the agreement; article 2 is about the purpose of the agreement. Articles 3-14 are about how it

should be implemented/ done in terms of various fields, and how the work should be reviewed. Articles 15-29 involve the technicalities of the agreement, which parts of the convention text should apply to the agreement, about signature and ratification, about voting rights and withdrawal, amongst other areas. This thesis is not concerned about the technicalities of the agreement, and will therefore not go into every article. Instead it will take a closer look at some articles that have been mentioned by the various interview subjects, in a positive or negative light.

## **Article 2: Purpose of the Agreement**

One of the reasons that most of the interview subjects claimed that the Paris Agreement exceeded their expectations, can be seen in the purpose article of the agreement:

### *Article 2*

1. *This Agreement, in enhancing the implementation of the Convention, including its objective, aims to strengthen the global response to the threat of climate change, in the context of sustainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty, including by:*
  - (a) *Holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1, 5 °C above pre-industrial levels, recognizing that this would significantly reduce the risks and impacts of climate change;*
  - (b) *Increasing the ability to adapt to the adverse impacts of climate change and foster climate resilience and low greenhouse gas emissions development, in a manner that does not threaten food production;*
  - (c) *Making finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development.*
2. *This Agreement will be implemented to reflect equity and the principle of common, but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, in light of different national circumstances. (UNFCCC 2015a, p 22)*

The purpose of the agreement states that the Parties should strive to hold the temperature increase less than 1.5 °Celsius, which is more ambitious than the Norwegian diplomats expected. Nowhere in the Norwegian position brief does it mention 1.5 °Celsius, only below 2°Celsius. On the other hand both the ForUM and the WWF does focus on the need to stop



the increase in temperature to around 1.5 °Celsius, as does several reports on climate change (IPCC 2013; IPCC 2014).

Even though the mention of 1.5 °Celsius correlates with the wishes of various NGOs, one cannot conclude that its mention in the Agreement is solely due to the influence of NGOs. There are parties within the UNFCCC which also worked hard for this ambition; among others the small Island states, that are already feeling the consequences, and which in the worst case scenario may be swallowed by the oceans if climate change is not slowed down (IPCC 2014; Lahn 2013). How the various actors feel about the chances of staying below 1.5 °Celsius will be addressed later in this chapter, under “predictions for the future”.

### **Article 8: Loss and damages**

As mentioned above, CICERO conducted an expert study prior to the COP21 to predict the outcome. They had 105 experts answer a survey on what they believed would be a part of the agreement, and then analyzed the result. One of the points where there were most disagreement were on the issue of “loss and damages”. Out of 105 asked, only a quarter of them believed that the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damages associated with Climate Change Impacts (WIM) would be mentioned, and the experts also differed in what exactly a separate chapter about “loss and damages” would contain, some did not even believe there would be a separate chapter about it (Kallbekken & Sælen 2015).

The WIM is important for the NGOs. Prior to the COP21 ForUM, an umbrella group for Norwegian environmental and development NGOs, claimed in a written suggestion to the Norwegian government that the Agreement should have a separate chapter within the agreement; and that they in this chapter specified that WIM was an appropriate forum for agreement on “loss and damages” (ForUM 2015b). They also mentioned that loss and damages is not only about financial compensation, but that implementations such as an early-warning-system, and capacity building is equally important, and should be included in the agreement (ForUM 2015b). This focus on the importance of “loss and damages” is mirrored in the WWF International’s policy asks of COP21 (WWF Global 2015). They asked that “loss and damages” be included as a separate point in the agreement, and that it should be treated distinctly from adaptation. While ForUM emphasized the other areas apart from finance that was important within “loss and damages”, WWF International chose to focus on how climate change will hit the most “vulnerable places and peoples such as in low Island nations, mountainous regions” (WWF Global 2015, p 5) the hardest. While their approach was

different, they agree that “loss and damages” is an important issue to consider in tackling climate change.

“Loss and damages” was also an issue that repeated itself in the interviews. Interview subject 4 (13.05.2016) noted that “loss and damages” was one area where he felt comfortable in stating that NGOs had had an impact. He claimed that prior to the COP21 “loss and damages” had little interest among the official diplomats, but that after much pressure from most of the Civil Society it entered the debate, and became a part of the agreement. In fact, in the policy brief published by the Norwegian government it stated that Norway should work against making “loss and damages” a separate part of the agreement:

*“Norway should work to prevent decisions about loss and damages as a separate part of the agreement, but that this may possibly be included under adaptation and/or in the decisions. Any references to loss and damages should make clear that compensations will not be a part of the new agreement” (Klima- og miljødepartementet 2015c, p 10; translated by author)*

Later they include a mention of the WIM, and states that WIM should continue to have the responsibility on issues involving loss and damages in the future, but that this may be changed if it would lead to a strengthened compromise between the Parties (Klima- og miljødepartementet 2015c).

But what does the article actually say, and how does this reflect the views of the NGOs and of Norway? Article 8 consists of 5 points, or paragraphs, which deal with the issue of “loss and damages”. The first paragraph is a recognition by the Parties of the seriousness of “averting, minimizing and addressing loss and damages” (UNFCCC 2015a, p 26) that are associated with the consequences of climate change. The second, third and fifth paragraphs are about the WIM; that it should continue, that Parties should increase their “understanding, action and support” (UNFCCC 2015a, p 26) of loss and damages, including through the WIM, and that WIM should collaborate with other existing bodies and expert groups under the agreement. The fourth paragraph states:

#### **Article 8**

*4. Accordingly areas of cooperation and facilitation to enhance understanding, action and support may include:*

*(a) Early warning systems;*

- (b) Emergency preparedness;*
  - (c) Slow onset events;*
  - (d) Events that may involve irreversible and permanent loss and damage;*
  - (e) Comprehensive risk assessment and management;*
  - (f) Risk insurance facilities, climate risk pooling and other insurance solutions;*
  - (g) Non-economic losses;*
  - (h) Resilience of communities, livelihoods and ecosystems.*
- (UNFCCC 2015a, p 26)*

This shows a clear area of where the Norwegian NGOs policy has trumped the Norwegian government's position. The matter of "loss and damages" did receive its separate chapter within the negotiations, and was not tucked away under adaptations. This clearly shows that the pressure of NGOs has an impact in international climate negotiations; even though we cannot link it to a specific NGO, it can be seen as proof of Kelley's main argument. His main argument was that Non-official diplomat can shape "policy, in a way that today's diplomats cannot" (Kelley 2010, p 101). Loss and damages was a policy issue introduced by the NGOs, and according to interviewee 4 (13.05.2016), implemented in the Paris Agreement due to massive pressure from the NGOs.

What is important to note here is that while article 8, paragraph 4 mentions several of the factors that ForUM considered equally important than financial compensation, and even some that they did not list; it does not mention said "financial compensation". Indeed, nowhere in the article does it specifically deal with the issue of financial compensation. This was the second point in the quote from the Norwegian position brief, and it looks as if that was followed. Looking even closer at the issue, one finds that in the list of decisions made at COP21, that were not included in the Paris Agreement, section III paragraph 52: "Agrees that Article 8 of the Agreement does not involve or provide a basis for any liability or compensation" (UNFCCC 2015a, p 8). The article acknowledge the importance of addressing loss and damages, but at the same time it does not specify claims of financial reimbursement or similar. So while the NGOs got there way with loss and damages being included as a separate area within the agreement, it uses words such as should when speaking of specific activities for the Parties to address it.

### 4.3.2. Why now?

*“Larger push, from a larger part of the world for having an agreement this time”  
(Interviewee 10 07.06.2016)*

While it would be simple to claim that the success of Paris is entirely due to the efforts of the NGOs, there are many factors for why the world got an international agreement in 2015, and not one in 2009.

Many of the interview subjects mentioned that the world was not ready until 2015 for an international agreement, even though we had the Kyoto Protocol from the end of the 1990s. They felt that the consequences of climate change are much more visible today than even a couple of years previously. This has made it more acceptable to talk about global warming and climate change; the debate about whether or not they even exist has come to an end (Interviewee 6 08.06.2016). In other words the public opinion has caught up to the science. Since it today is common knowledge that the world is facing global warming and climate change, it is more public pressure to find a solution on the international stage. The mobilization of the civil society has increased every year; at the COP21 they expected several thousand participants from the civil society (COP21 2015). But at the same time as the civil society has increased its presence, the understanding that one has to change the expectations for what one can expect from an international agreement has increased as well. While the delegates and observers at COP21 believed that they needed an agreement at “all cost” (Interviewee 6 08.06.2016), the cost became the ambition, and not so much their own conservative positions (Interviewee 9 10.06.2016).

Since 2009 there has been a shift in the approach the international community takes towards an international agreement. Prior to 2009, as we can see with the Kyoto-Protocol (Lahn 2013; UNFCCC 1998), the approach had been a top-down approach. The international community found out how much the world needed to cut emissions, and then distributed this to the Annex 1 countries (the rich, developed states). The question then became one about distribution and resources. This is the approach that has suited Norway the most, particular when it has been imbedded with key phrases such as “flexible mechanisms”, and “cost efficiency”. These phrases lets Norway set very ambitious emission targets, and fulfill them, but at the same time not change anything “at home”. Instead Norway pays for “quotas”; they pay to cut emissions elsewhere, and take that into their own equation. The problem of climate change then becomes a financial problem. This is known, among other things, as the “Norwegian

Position” (Lahn 2013). This is a position that is not very popular among the NGOs, since it takes away the responsibility they feel Norway has to cut emissions *in* Norway; they simply pay their way out of the problem.

The United States never signed the Kyoto Protocol, and as the years went on more and more of the states that had signed it became reluctant to continue with their obligations to it (Lahn 2013). Starting properly from 2009, a different way of looking at the problem started to be debated in the international community. The approach shifted from a top-down approach, to a bottom-up approach (Interviewee 3 09.05.2016; Interviewee 4 13.05.2016; Interviewee 6 08.06.2016; Interviewee 9 10.06.2016; Lahn 2013). The idea in the bottom-up approach is that each country reports in what they feel they can realistically cut, and then the agreement is built around this; the agreement basically becomes a framework for sharing climate change actions between countries. This is easier for the countries to vote for, since it is themselves that decides how much they should cut, and not a supranational organ. As interview subject 9 (10.06.2016) puts it: “Bottom-up approach ... made it a lot more likely to get an agreement, but at the price of ambitions...” (Interviewee 9 10.06.2016). This shift from top-down to bottom-up mirrors a shifting trend in diplomacy in general that Kelley identifies (Kelley 2010, p 105).

This perception of the need to get an agreement “at all cost”, at the cost of ambition, is a perception that is also shared by most of the interview subjects. They commented that there has been a sense in their community that after the disaster of COP15 Copenhagen, this (COP21 Paris) would be the last chance to get an international agreement, a “get an agreement or die” moment. That this would be the last chance to get a multilateral agreement, and that if it had failed the global population would lose its fate in the Un processes, and look to national actions instead (Interviewee 2 04.05.2016; Interviewee 3 09.05.2016; Interviewee 6 08.06.2016).

The differences in organization prior and during the separate COPs are also highlighted as factors for their failure (COP15) and success (COP21). The French presidency did a magnificent job in preparing for the COP21 Paris, interview subject 4 (13.05.2016) said that they had started their work 18 months prior. The work they did consisted of among other things traveling around the world and meeting with the state representatives, trying to settle conflicts before the COP21 started, so that as little as possible would need to be negotiated at the meeting itself. They were also very deliberate in making sure they were seen as neutral,

and not too pro- anything. They also made sure that every part of the negotiations were “transparent”; of course most of the negotiating rooms were restricted, but people knew what was debated in them. This was one of the largest critiques to the COP15 Copenhagen, the secret meetings and backchannels that the Danish presidency started without informing everyone (see: Lahn 2013, chapter 5; Vidal 2009). The states were very critical to vote positively to processes they had been shut out from.

All in all the fact that the COP21 Paris resulted in an international agreement was due to a mix of years of preparations, and a little bit of luck. The luck bit contributed to the agreement being more ambitious than most expected prior to the meeting, and consisted of a unique possibility due to political events around the world. Among these events one can mention the bilateral agreement between the United States and China (Interviewee 8 01.06.2016; Interviewee 10 07.06.2016; The White House 2015) president Obama’s focus on climate policy, and a shift of government in Canada, resulting in more political will for an international agreement.

About the NGOs one can say that some of the interview subjects representing them felt that they had been too many in COP15 Copenhagen, there had been too many voices. Interview subjects 4 (13.05.2016) commented that the major differences between the various NGOs have lessened the last few years, and they speak more with one loud voice, than many softer voices. In Norway this is noticed a lot with the umbrella group ForUM (Originally: forUM for utvikling og miljø; in English: The Norwegian ForUM for Development and Environment), which gather most of the environment NGOs in Norway, and unifies their voice when talking to the government.

### **4.3.3. Predictions for the future**

At the end of each interview I asked the interview subject to come with their predictions of the future, whether they were optimistic or pessimistic in terms of climate change and how to combat the consequences, and how this would affect the role of NGOs in the future.

They shifted with being optimistic and pessimistic, but there were some areas that they agreed on: The consequences of climate change will get worse, no doubt about it. The consequences will also hit the poorest countries the hardest, those that already struggle the most, and who had nothing to do with creating global warming in the first place. They were also pretty skeptical to being able to reach the 2 °Celsius target outlined in the Paris Agreement, and felt that the 1,5 °Celsius target was downright impossible, unless something drastically changed

all over the world within the next two years. At the COP21, the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC) reported in pointed to a temperature increase of around 2,7 °Celsius (ForUM 2015b), and something has to drastically change if the temperature rise shall stay well below 2 °Celsius. At the present time only 22 states have ratified the Paris Agreement, and they stand for a merely 1,08 % of the global emissions.

This means that the NGOs will become more important in the years to come. The international responsibility has shifted from the international to the national level, and interview subject 13 (30.06.2016) believes that this means that the NGOs would get a greater role in the future. This is supported by Monica Araya (2015), who prior to the COP21 speculated that the role of NGOs would grow after the Paris Conference.

#### **4.4. Overall Findings and Conclusions**

This chapter has strived to discuss the claims set out by Kelley, in chapter 2 of this thesis through a discussion of Norway and Norwegian NGOs in the UFCCC climate negotiations. My findings have challenged Kelley's claim that the official and non-official diplomats works separately within the same sphere, at least when it comes to Norway; though bear in mind that Kelley is talking about all diplomacy, and only briefly mentions the issue of climate change. Still, the Norwegian case suggests rather the opposite reality than the one Kelley claims exist; the "official" Norway and the Norwegian NGOs have a symbiotic, and mutually beneficial, relationship.

This chapter has also gone a long way to support Kelley's claim that the most successful states will be those that find a way to work in collaboration with the NGOs. It is difficult to claim that the successes of Norway and the Norwegian NGOs is solely due to the relationship between them, but it is clearly pointing in that direction; at least in part. Norway and the Norwegian negotiators enjoy a good international reputation in climate negotiations, and are often asked to lead part of the negotiations. This may be because Norway is considered as a small, and neutral, state with a good reputation, but that reputation is in part due to their good relationship with the NGOs.

While this chapter has used the term NGOs, it has mostly focused on the Environmental NGOs (ENGOs); this due to the fact that this is about climate negotiations. However other types of NGOs has been mentions or implied, such as NGOs focused on human rights or indigenous peoples. Due to the fact that Norway is in Europe the NGOs have been mostly seen in a European perspective. Interviewee 6 (08.06.2016) noted that there are huge

differences between American and European NGOs, particularly on the issue of forestry. This was more notable before, since the American NGOs were most focused on the domestic policy making, but interview subject 4 (13.05.2016) stated that the differences between the largest NGOs, both between the European and American NGOs and between ENGOs and other types of NGOs (such as: BINGO= Business and Industry NGOs, and RINGO= Research Institution NGOs) are less now, and the entire civil society community appears more unified.

Other concepts may also need to be clarified more: While the theory chapter and the “method” chapter have been using the word *state*, both the UNFCCC and the various interview subjects have used the word *country*. Since this is in the text and interview quotes this chapter has relied more on the use of *country*. Also to take into consideration is the use of the term *Party* and *Parties*. In the context of this chapter, these refer to the member states of either the UNFCCC and or the Paris Agreement.

In this thesis I have also used both the concepts of NGOs, and of civil society. Civil society is all that is not under the states; thus, while NGOs are a part of the civil society, one cannot say that the civil society is a part of the NGO community.



## 5. Conclusion

This thesis has tried to answer where the non-state actors fit in diplomatic studies, and how the relationship between the Norwegian government and the Norwegian NGOs helped or hindered them in reaching their goals and preserving their interests in the UNFCCC negotiations.

Non-state actors in diplomacy have become more and more common, but they bring existential questions with them. They question the very definitions of what diplomacy is, and what constitutes a diplomatic actor. Many of the usual definitions of diplomacy from the last centuries has to be reassessed in order to give non-state actors a place within academic work on diplomacy since most emphasize the role of states or governments. It does not help that most of the scholars have their own definition of what diplomacy is. But changing the definition is not the only existential question that emerges: for if the emergence of non-state actors are new, then what has changed in diplomacy? Another question is differences, or lack of differences, between diplomatic theory and diplomatic practices. So, in order to give non-state actors its rightful place in diplomacy, one has to change the definition of what diplomacy and a diplomatic actor is; identify what has changed; and examine the differences between diplomatic theory and diplomatic practices.

Der Derian (Der Derian) looks more deeply into what has changed, by identifying six paradigms of diplomacy; them being: mytho-diplomacy, proto-diplomacy, diplomacy, anti-diplomacy, neo-diplomacy, and techno-diplomacy. These paradigms are not mutually exclusive, but they point to how one has thought of and practiced diplomacy throughout the centuries. He defines diplomatic actors from who is left outside, who that are considered “an other”.

Kelley (Cornago) elegantly avoids the problem of the definitions limited to states, by stating that diplomacy is a behavior, and not an institution. This allows him to look at non-state actors as diplomatic actors the same way as state actors in diplomacy and does not require official institutions; provided they behave as diplomatic actors. He sets up specific areas in where the state and the non-state actor differ, as well as how they differ. While he points to this separation between them, he also states that in the future it is the states that manage to create and maintain a symbiotic relationship with their NGOs that will have the most chances for success in diplomacy. This thesis draws on Der Derian and Kelley, particularly Kelley’s specific points of contention between the official and non-official diplomats.

In order to explore this separation, and the possibilities of a symbiotic relationship, this thesis uses a case study focusing on the UNFCCC's climate negotiations. To best be able to look at the effect of the type of relationship I limited myself to Norway and the Norwegian NGOs in the climate negotiations, and looking at whether or not their relationship contributed to their role in the negotiations. Thus, the setting is the "official" Norway and the Norwegian NGOs in the UNFCCC climate negotiation, with a special focus on the processes leading up to the COP21 and its outcome. I conducted interviews with state and non-state actors, as well as observers, and triangulated their responses with official documents and media articles.

What I found out about the relationship between Norway and the Norwegian NGOs challenged Kelley's (Kelley) claim that the official and non-official diplomats works separately within the same sphere. The Norwegian relationship is very well developed, and also more formal than most of the other states. Within the official delegation, there are two representatives of the NGOs; one from ForUM, and one representing the youth organizations. In addition the Norwegian delegation conducts meetings with the Norwegian civil society before every meeting, both the annual COPs and the intersessional meetings. In these meetings they inform the civil society of what is happening in the negotiations, and they receive inputs and written suggestions from the NGOs. These suggestions are taken into consideration when the Norwegian delegation, along with the government, is developing the Norwegian positions. The relationship also benefits the NGOs, particularly in the meetings. They allow the Norwegian NGOs unique access to information, which they again can share with the rest of the NGO community. Thus the relationship between the "official" Norway and the Norwegian NGOs are symbiotic, and not separate.

But this only challenges one point of Kelley's argument. He also states that those states that manages to create and maintain a good working relationship, a symbiotic relationship, to the NGOs, will have the best possibilities for success in the future. Thus, I started looking at the positions of the Norwegian government and the Norwegian NGOs, and compared them to the Paris Agreement. I looked at both places where they were in agreement, but also places that they differed. I found out that the NGO position, both of the Norwegian NGOs that was reflected in other states NGOs, where often in the Paris Agreement, but quite weaker than the NGOs hoped for. Two cases where the Norwegian government disagreed with the NGOs, are the ambition of slowing the temperature increase to well below 2 °C, and work towards keeping it below 1.5 °C, and the inclusion of the "loss and damages" as a separate section in the agreement. The 1.5 °C target was not mentioned in the Norwegian position brief, but was

a key aspect of the positions of the NGOs. It was included in the second article of the Paris Agreement, but it is not followed in the rest of the agreement. The “loss and damages” are included as article 8 in the Paris Agreement, but it does not mention financial compensation. Still, it may be seen as concrete proof of the impact of the NGOs, since prior to the pressure of the NGOs it had little attention among the official diplomats.

The Norwegian government and delegation also benefits from this intricate relationship. They get unique perspectives and ideas from the NGOs that they may not have thought about. The NGOs also help them in the negotiations, such as finding out information about other states positions and views through unofficial channels. They also enjoy a good international reputation, in parts from their good relationship with the NGOs, and this helps them in the negotiations.

My thesis shows that states benefit in having a good, symbiotic, relationship with their NGOs, also in diplomatic processes. The Norwegian case shows that the symbiotic relationship Norway has to its NGOs is of great value to the international climate negotiations; to climate diplomacy. Though the case with Norway may prove to be unique in the international system, it still shows how it could be done, to the benefit of states, NGOs and the international community at large.

The next step would be to see whether this is the case in other kinds of diplomacy. Europe faces a migrant crisis at the moment, and a possible future project could look at whether a symbiotic relationship with a state and its NGOs can help meet this crisis. The migrant crisis is but one of many crises and challenges that the world will have to meet in the future, and a better understanding of the contributions the NGOs come with, especially in collaboration with its state, may help the world in meeting these challenges better prepared.

## 6. Bibliography

- Araya, M. (2015). FEATURE: The role of non-state actors will grow after the Paris climate conference. *Climate & Development Knowledge Network*. Available at: [http://cdkn.org/2015/07/growing-role-non-state-actors/?loclang=en\\_gb](http://cdkn.org/2015/07/growing-role-non-state-actors/?loclang=en_gb) (accessed: 11.06.2016).
- Betsill, M. M. & Corell, E. (eds). (2008). *NGO diplomacy: The influence of nongovernmental organizations in international environmental negotiations*: Mit Press.
- Bryman, A. (2012). *Social Research Methods*. 4th ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Cohen, R. (2013). Diplomacy through the Ages. In Kerr, P. & Wiseman, G. (eds) *Diplomacy in a Globalizing World: Theories and Practices*, pp. 15-30. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- COP21. (2015). *Find out more about COP21*. Available at: <http://www.cop21paris.org/about/cop21> (accessed: 03.05.2016).
- Cornago, N. (2010). On the Normalization of Sub-State Diplomacy. In Neumann, I. B. & Leira, H. (eds) vol. 3 *International Diplomacy: The Pluralization of Diplomacy - Changing Actors, Developing Arenas and new Issues*, p. 25. London: Sage Publications Ltd.
- Der Derian, J. (1987). *On Diplomacy: A Genealogy of Western Estrangement*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd.
- ForUM. (2015a). *ForUM leverer innspill til norske myndigheter foran COP 21*: ForUM for Utvikling og Miljø. Available at: <http://www.forumfor.no/ressurser/politiske-innspill/forum-leverer-innspill-til-norske-myndigheter-foran-cop-21> (accessed: 05.05.2016).
- ForUM. (2015b). *Innspill til norske myndigheter foran COP21*: ForUM for Utvikling og Miljø. pp. 1-5.
- Hansen, S. J., Gaas, M. H. & Leira, H. (2013). Religion, Prestige and Windows of opportunity? (Qatari peace making and foreign policy engagement). *Department of International Environmental and Development Studies, Noragric, NMBU*.
- Interviewee 1. (06.05.2016). *Observer*.
- Interviewee 2. (04.05.2016). *NGO actor*.
- Interviewee 3. (09.05.2016). *NGO actor*.
- Interviewee 4. (13.05.2016). *NGO actor*.
- Interviewee 6. (08.06.2016). *NGO actor*.
- Interviewee 8. (01.06.2016). *State actor*.
- Interviewee 9. (10.06.2016). *Observer*.
- Interviewee 10. (07.06.2016). *State actor*.
- Interviewee 11. (14.06.2016). *State actor*.
- Interviewee 12. (30.06.2016). *State actor*.
- Interviewee 13. (30.06.2016). *Observer*.
- IPCC. (2013). Summary for Policymakers. In Stocker, T. f., Qin, D., Plattner, G.-K., Tignor, M., Allen, S. K., Boschung, J., Nauels, A., Xia, Y., Bex, V. & P.M. Midgley (eds) *Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- IPCC. (2014). *Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Johnsen, A. B. (2015). Organisasjoner raser mot Norges klimaforhandlere. VG. Available at: <http://www.vg.no/nyheter/utenriks/klimatoppmoetet-2015/organisasjoner-raser-mot-norges-klimaforhandlere/a/23572343/> (accessed: 25.06.2016).

- Kallbekken, S. & Sælen, H. (2015). Predicting Paris: Forecasting key outcomes from COP 21 using an expert survey. Oslo: CICERO Center for International Climate and Environmental Research. 1-8 pp.
- Kelley, J. R. (2010). The New Diplomacy: Evolution of a Revolution. In Neumann, I. B. & Leira, H. (eds) vol. 3 *International Diplomacy: The Pluralization of Diplomacy - Changing Actors, Developing Arenas and new Issues*, p. 19 pp. London: Sage Publications Ltd.
- Kerr, P. & Wiseman, G. (eds). (2013). *Diplomacy in a Globalizing world: Theories and Practices*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- King, E. & Darby, M. (2015). Five days to make history: What next at the Paris climate talks? *Climate Home*. Available at: <http://www.climatechangenews.com/2015/12/06/five-days-to-make-history-what-next-at-the-paris-climate-talks/> (accessed: 08.07.2016).
- Kissinger, H. (1994). *Diplomacy*. New York: Simon & Schuster Paperbacks.
- Klima- og miljødepartementet. (2015a). *COP21: Indigenous peoples, human rights and climate change*: Regjeringen. Available at: <https://www.regjeringen.no/no/aktuelt/cop21-indigenous-peoples-human-rights-and-climat-changes/id2466047/> (accessed: 02.06.2016).
- Klima- og miljødepartementet. (2015b). *COP21: Strategi for forhandlinger om ny klimaavtale i Paris*. Regjeringen.no: Regjeringen. Available at: <https://www.regjeringen.no/no/aktuelt/cop21-strategi-for-forhandlinger-om-ny-klimaavtale-i-paris/id2464506/> (accessed: 17.07.2016).
- Klima- og miljødepartementet. (2015c). *Paris 2015: Gjennomgang av forhandlingstemaer, bakgrunn og status, samt norske posisjoner for ADP2-12 - COP21*. Klima- og miljødepartementet. regjeringen.no: Regjeringen. 15 pp.
- Knutsen, T. L. (1997). *A History of International Relations Theory*. 2nd ed. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Lahn, B. (2013). *Klimaspillet: En fortelling fra innsiden av FNs klimatoppmøter*. Oslo: Flamme Forlag.
- Langhorne, R. (2005). The Diplomacy of Non-state Actors. *Diplomacy & Statecraft*, 16 (2): 331-339.
- Melissen, J. (2011). Diplomatic Studies in the Right Season. *International Studies Review*, 13 (4): 723-725.
- Murray, S. (2011). Diplomatic Theory and the Evolving Canon of Diplomatic Studies. *International Studies Review*, 13 (4): 719-722.
- Murray, S., Sharp, P., Wiseman, G., Crikemans, D. & Melissen, J. (2011). The Present and Future of Diplomacy and Diplomatic Studies. *International Studies Review*, 13 (4): 709-728.
- Neumann, I. B. (2002). *The English School on Diplomacy*: Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael.
- Neumann, I. B. & Leira, H. (eds). (2013). *The Pluralisation of Diplomacy - Changing Actors, Developing Arenas and New Issues*. International Diplomacy, vol. 3. London: Sage Publications Ltd.
- NRK. (2015). *Dagsrevyen - Lørdagsrevyen 12 des*. nrk.no: NRK.
- Nye, J. S. J. (2004). *Soft Power: the means to successs in world politics*. New York: PublicAffairs.
- Pigman, G. A. (2010). *Contemporary Diplomacy*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Pigman, G. A. (2013). Debates about Contemporary and Future Diplomacy. In Kerr, P. & Wiseman, G. (eds) *Diplomacy in a Globalizing World: Theories and Practices*, pp. 68-84. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- Redaksjonen. (2015). Forecasting key outcomes from COP 21. *News from CICERO*. Available at: <http://www.cicero.uio.no/en/posts/news/forecasting-key-outcomes-from-cop-21> (accessed: 08.07.2016).
- Reuters. (2015). *Conference of Parties - #COP21: Live news and updates from the Conference of the Parties - #COP21 The 2015 Paris Climate Conference*: Reuters. Available at: [http://live.reuters.com/Event/Conference\\_of\\_Parties\\_-\\_COP21?Page=0](http://live.reuters.com/Event/Conference_of_Parties_-_COP21?Page=0) (accessed: 20.07.2016).
- Sharp, P. (2011). Diplomats, Diplomacy, Diplomatic Studies, and the Future of International Relations and International Studies. *International Studies Review*, 13 (4): 716-719.
- Sharp, P. (2013). Diplomacy in International Relations Theory and Other Disciplinary Perspectives. In Kerr, P. & Wiseman, G. (eds) *Diplomacy in a Globalizing World: Theories and Practices*, pp. 51-67. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Solberg, E. (2015). Statement at COP21. *Government.no*. Available at: <https://www.regjeringen.no/no/aktuelt/cop15/id2464897/> (accessed: 15.07.2016).
- Solhjell, B. V. (2016). *Stortinget - Møte fredag den 11 mars kl. 9 (starts 52.58)*. Stortinget.no: Stortinget.
- The White House. (2015). *U.s. - China Joint Presidential Statement on Climate Change*. Available at: <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/09/25/us-china-joint-presidential-statement-climate-change> (accessed: 11.08.2016).
- UN. (1961). Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. *Treaty Series*, 500.
- UN. (1992). United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. *UN*. Available at: [http://unfccc.int/files/essential\\_background/background\\_publications\\_htmlpdf/application/pdf/conveng.pdf](http://unfccc.int/files/essential_background/background_publications_htmlpdf/application/pdf/conveng.pdf) (accessed: 04.07.2016).
- UNFCCC. (1998). Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. *UN*. Available at: <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.pdf> (accessed: 16.07.2016).
- UNFCCC. (2015a, 12.12.2015). *Adoption of the Paris Agreement: Draft decision -/CP.21*. Conference of the Parties, Paris: UNFCCC.
- UNFCCC. (2015b). *Work of the ADP contact group: Draft agreement and draft decision on workstreams 1 and 2 of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action*. <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/adp2/eng/11infnot.pdf>: UNFCCC.
- UNFCCC. (2016a, 16-26 May 2016). *Information for Participants*. 44th session of the UNFCCC Subsidiary Bodies (SBI/SBSTA) and 1st session of the APA, Bonn, Germany.
- UNFCCC. (2016b). *Marrakech Climate Change Conference - November 2016*: UN. Available at: [http://unfccc.int/meetings/marrakech\\_nov\\_2016/meeting/9567.php](http://unfccc.int/meetings/marrakech_nov_2016/meeting/9567.php) (accessed: 05.08.2016).
- UNFCCC. (n.d.-a). *Background on the UNFCCC: The international response to climate change*. Available at: [http://unfccc.int/essential\\_background/items/6031.php](http://unfccc.int/essential_background/items/6031.php) (accessed: 10.04.2016).
- UNFCCC. (n.d.-b). *Durban: Towards full implementation of the UN Climate Change Convention*. Available at: [http://unfccc.int/key\\_steps/durban\\_outcomes/items/6825.php](http://unfccc.int/key_steps/durban_outcomes/items/6825.php) (accessed: 15.07.2016).
- UNFCCC. (n.d.-c). *First steps to a safer future: Introducing The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change*. Available at: [http://unfccc.int/essential\\_background/convention/items/6036.php](http://unfccc.int/essential_background/convention/items/6036.php) (accessed: 01.05.2016).
- UNFCCC. (n.d.-d). *Kyoto Protocol*. Available at: [http://unfccc.int/kyoto\\_protocol/items/2830.php](http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/2830.php) (accessed: 01.08.2016).

- UNFCCC. (n.d.-e). *Meetings*. Available at:  
<http://unfccc.int/meetings/items/6237.php?filtbody=53> (accessed: 10.04.2016).
- UNFCCC. (n.d.-f). *Now, up to and beyond 2012: The Bali Road Map*. Available at:  
[http://unfccc.int/key\\_steps/bali\\_road\\_map/items/6072.php](http://unfccc.int/key_steps/bali_road_map/items/6072.php) (accessed: 20.07.2016).
- Vidal, J. (2009). Copenhagen climate summit in disarray after "Danish text" leak. *The Guardian*. Available at:  
<https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2009/dec/08/copenhagen-climate-summit-disarray-danish-text> (accessed: 25.05.2016).
- Vidal, J. & Vaughan, A. (2015). Climate talks: anger over removal of human rights reference from final draft. *The Guardian*. Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2015/dec/11/paris-climate-talks-anger-removal-reference-human-rights-from-final-draft> (accessed: 24.07.2016).
- Wiseman, G. (2011). Bringing Diplomacy Back In: Time for Theory to Catch Up with Practice. *International Studies Review*, 13 (4): 710-713.
- WWF Global. (2015). WWF Policy Asks for Paris UNFCCC COP21. 7 pp. Available at:  
[http://d2ouvy59p0dg6k.cloudfront.net/downloads/wwf\\_policy\\_asks\\_cop21.pdf](http://d2ouvy59p0dg6k.cloudfront.net/downloads/wwf_policy_asks_cop21.pdf)  
(accessed: 09.07.2016).





## 7. Appendices

### 7.1. Appendix I: Figure of decentralized diplomacy



**FIGURE 1** Decentralized diplomacy.

**Figure 1: Decentralized diplomacy, taken from Kelley(2010)**

## **7.2. Appendix II: Short Interview Guide**

What I want to find out: What Norway and Norwegian NGOs has done in relations to combatting climate change, in regards to the UNFCCC and the COPs

### **Themes:**

- How they look at the climate change challenges the world will face, and how they feel is the best way to combat them
- How they look at their role in terms of the COPs
- Do they feel that they have made a difference/ that they have influence
- What do they feel is different with the COP21 from the previous COPs
- How to they work together with the Norwegian government in regards to the COPs and climate change (if NGO actor)
- How did they experience the Paris conference

### **7.3. Appendix III: Summaries of the various interviews**

Although all but one interviewee declined to be anonymous, I have still strived to anonymize them here. For this thesis the group that they are representing is more important than their identity.

Interviewee 1: Freelance journalist. In the group representing observers

Process: My supervisor sent an email to the interviewee outlining my master thesis project, and giving my details. The interviewee replied positively, and I sent another email asking for a time to meet. After a week with no response, I sent another email asking for a time to meet. The interviewee replied, and suggested meeting Friday 6th of May, at 10, at a café near where he works.

Setting: Café; relaxed atmosphere, but with music in the background

Interview: He had a bit of trouble hearing my questions, so halfway we decided to switch table; this can be heard on both recordings, as I did not pause them. He talked about the process during both the Paris Meeting and the Copenhagen Meeting; about the things that differed between them, and why he believed one failed, and one was a success. He also talked about how the countries within the meetings are organized; this is also something that came up in interview 2, but interviewee 1 was more detailed. He also talked about how he observed the relationship between the Norwegian government and delegation and the Norwegian delegation. He also mentioned the role he believes Norway has in these negotiations. He talked about how important the openness of the side negotiations are, and contributed the “secret” back-door meetings at Copenhagen as a major reason for its failure; along with the work of the US and a few of its partners to come up with a brand new agreement, instead of the agreement they had negotiated for 3 years. He believed that the Paris Meeting was better organized, and stricter than the previous ones. He firmly believed that the Paris Agreement was the best they could get, even if it is not perfect. As for honoring it, he meant that the countries HAD to honor it, he did not see another choice, but that just as important was to sway the people’s opinions; leaders cannot do it alone, it has to be “followed” up on by everybody. As for his outlook on the future he switched between being optimistic and pessimistic, and depending on what he read in the media; pessimistic because of the scientific papers, positive for the progress with the electrical car and solar power. He mentioned the paradox with climate change being due to the riches countries, but that it is the poorest

countries that feel the consequences the hardest. The interview itself lasted approximately 22 min

Interviewee 2: The Norwegian coordinator among the NGOs, works in a well established NGO, and is active in both Norwegian Umbrella groups, as well as international umbrella organizations. Representing the NGO actors in this thesis

Process: A lecturer at NMBU sent an email to her contact, linking me to the email. The lecturer outlined the details, and the contact replied enthusiastically, and suggested meeting for coffee. I sent a reply asking for which time would be best. I got a response on Monday 2nd May, where the interviewee told me that we could meet Tuesday or Wednesday the same week. The interviewee also mentioned a conference held between the 16th and 26th of May in Germany on climate change. After a couple of emails back and forth, the interviewee suggested meeting in a café in Oslo Wednesday the 4th of May at 3 O'clock. When meeting we quickly decided to go back and hold the interview at a meeting room at WWF so that the recording the interview would be easier.

Setting: Meeting room

The interview: She was very eager to talk about her experience in the negotiations, and how she prepared for the meetings. She mentioned that the Paris meeting was the “big” one, with a lot of expectations, and a big risk of failure. She also stated firmly that the COPs are only a small part of a process that goes all year; in Preparations for Paris they had 5 meetings, this year they will only have 2. She talked about her experience with the international negotiations with ForUM that is an umbrella organization for NGOs concerned for environmental and development issues. She talked about how she had written a paper of suggestions, and after sending it out to several hundred co-workers around the world it was adopted as the strategy for her NGO. She talked about the relationship with the Norwegian government, but at the same time stated that it is very difficult to prove or measure if they have an influence. Though she also stated later that it is easier to influence small developing countries than the big developed countries; she mentioned how the delegations for small developing countries would come up to them to talk, and that later when they read up their speeches or statement it was what they had told them, sometimes the exact same sentences. She believed that they had to big expectations to the Copenhagen meeting, and that these expectations have been gradually lowered every year, at the same time the chance for getting an agreement has increased. She felt that the Paris Agreement was a success, but that the Paris Agreement would have been

seen as a failure just a couple of years ago. But it is also a big stepping stone in the right direction; but she was a bit sceptic in whether or not the countries would honor the Agreement, and looked towards the meeting in 2018 with hopeful expectations. She very firmly stated that the climate change was due to the richest countries, but that it was the poorest countries who felt the consequences first and strongest; thus it should be up to the riches countries to lead the way in dealing with the consequences. She was hopeful of the future. The interview itself lasted around 40 minutes.

Interviewee 3: High up in a youth environmental organization; representing the NGO actors.

Process: Interviewee 2 suggested some other contacts to interview, and sent of emails to three people; from now on interviewee 3, 4, and 5. Interviewee 3 replied quickly, and after a few emails back and forth, suggested meeting Monday 9th of May, at 17 O'Clock at his office in Oslo. He later sent an email asking if we could instead meet at Blindern.

Setting: Outdoors, at Blindern, Oslo

The interview: We sat down at a table in the UIO campus. He talked about his experience with the negotiation; he had been at the COPs since 2013. He talked about how he and a couple of others prepared for the COP21, with spending almost a month in Paris totally, and arriving a week before the conference started to be at the Youth Conference, a conference for the various youth organizations. He talked about how their work was mostly towards policy and lobbying since their organization was so small, but that the big organizations could focus more on the technicalities. He pointed to specific incidences where they have had influence, both on the wording of certain paragraphs, as well as the inclusion of intergenerational equity. He felt that in terms of being heard it went both ways. Some people were interested in hearing them out, but for some it was just a status; being able to say that they had listened to the youth. During the COP they met with the Norwegian delegation every other day, as well as trying to arrange meeting and talks with people that were on the fence, those that were supportive of them, and those that had a negative impact on the negotiations. This was mostly mapped out in the strategy meetings before the COP. He mentioned specifically Saudi Arabia as a negative influence in the negotiation that they tried to get a meeting with. In terms of Norway's role in the negotiations he was far more skeptical than the others. He pointed to the fact that Norway is seen as an international diplomat, and that they try to build bridges

between the various fractions in the negotiations. But he also pointed to the double standard, or the hypocrisy of Norway: Demanding a greener world while at the same time being one of the leading oil-nations in the world. He mentioned that this problem would be talked about in corridors. He felt that Norway's status has also sunken during the current administration, and that the prime minister had made some statements right before or during the COP that was very badly received. In terms of the other states he mentioned that they tried to influence the big states in the negotiations; he also mentioned that you cannot lobby China. He pointed to many reasons why the Paris meeting was a success, unlike the others. The approach was different; bottom-up instead of top-down as it has been. He also pointed to more leadership from the US and China, and the shift in Canada after they got a new prime minister. He also stated that the Climate Change has become much worse just the last few years, and more noticeable. He was not very pleased about the Paris Agreement, but admitted that it was probably the best we could get. He pointed to various weaknesses with the Agreement, such as it say that the "rich countries" should go ahead as an example, instead of shall. He also stated that though the agreement is legally binding, there are no sanctions. Upholding it would depend on each government, and this again can change when the government changes. He was more skeptical than the other interview subjects towards the future. The interview lasted a little over 20 min.

Interviewee 4: Well experienced within the development NGOs in Norway; representing the NGO actors.

Process: The interviewee replied on the email sent by interviewee 2, and wanted to meet. He suggested either having a short meeting on Friday the 13th of May, or a longer one during the first week in June, when he would return from the Bonn Conference. I replied that we could meet on Friday, and if needed take another interview in June. He confirmed, and said that he had half an hour, from 13 O'Clock, and to meet at his office.

Setting: His office,

Interview: He started by telling a little bit about his experience; that he had worked with development for 20 years. About the Paris meeting he said that it was a big meeting, which had lots of expectations; but that the French had done an excellent job in arranging it, and in "expectation Management". He said that the negotiations that culminated in the Paris Agreement started 4 years ago; and that the French started 18 months prior by travelling to the different countries to map out trouble areas in the negotiations. When talking about the

relationship between the Norwegian NGOs or Norwegian Civil Society and the Norwegian Government is based on trust; they will test you to see if you know what you are talking about, and if you “pass” that they will listen to you. He also firmly stated that there is a difference between the bureaucrats and the politicians; the politicians are harder to get a hold of, and harder to get them to listen to you. An area where he was certain that they had had influence was with the paragraph “loss and damage”. He also mentioned that the differences within the Civil Society has lessened the last few years, and that they now are presented as a more solid unit, instead of small fragments. In describing the Copenhagen meeting he described it with one word: a disaster. He believed that the Danes were the main reason for this, but also that the world was not yet ready. He saw many faults with the Paris Agreement, but also felt that it was the best Agreement we could have gotten. When describing Norway’s role in the negotiations he stated that Norway has high ambitions; that these negotiations are one of the few international processes that are highly invested, and that Norway sees their job as being “building bridges”; but that they do not follow up on the national level. They are also weak on finance. When reflecting on the future he claimed that one is “not allowed to be pessimistic, to give up”, but that he saw himself as a pragmatic. He believes we will see more dramatic consequences. He was sceptic towards predictions on the future, and that change is happening more rapidly than predicted. The interview lasted around 30 minutes.

Interviewee 5: -----

Process: Interviewee 2 sent her an email, but there was never a response

Interviewee 6: Active in the COPs on behalf of a Norwegian NGO for almost 10 years. NB:  
Not at COP21

Process: I sent him an email 26/5 where I presented myself and my topic for my master thesis, and asked if he was available for a short interview in the nearest future. He answered, and said he was available for a short interview on either the 8th or the 9th of June. I replied that I could both days, and he could decide. He chose Wednesday 8th at 3 O’clock, and a café he wanted to meet at

Setting: A café in Oslo, a lot of background noise

Interview: He met me at the café and we ordered coffees. He began by talking about how he came into the climate negotiation in 2008. After that he was involved with the COPs and the preparatory meetings for 4 years. After that he has followed them on and off. For most of the 4 year period he had a dual role, in that he was an observer in the Norwegian Delegation, for the NGOs. He was not at the COP20 Lima, and COP21 Paris. When describing the relationship between the Norwegian government/delegation and the Norwegian NGOs he first pointed to the fact that the Norwegian government is very interested in keeping a good relationship to the NGOs, which he contributes to Norwegian political culture. He also comments that this was particular for the last government (the red-green coalition). He also stated that the civil society delegate in the Norwegian delegation was established in 2008. The interview subject was the first to have this position. But even prior there was a culture of having close relationship to the NGOs, even during the COPs. The negotiation leader in the 90s (Harald Dovland) used to every day have a “norskingmøte” during the COPs, a meeting for all the Norwegians present at the COP and talk to them about what was happening in the negotiations. When asked about whether or not the Norwegian NGOs has made a difference in the official stand point from the Norwegian Government he replied that in some instances there are clear examples. He mentioned 2 clear examples, which showed different ways NGOs could influence the government, but they are prior to COP21: 1: REDD+ discussion, where NGOS were concerned about the consequences for one part of the agreement (the single focus on carbon), believing that it could lead to human right violations and could also be problematic for biodiversity. Therefore the Norwegian government, after being in discussions with Norwegian NGOs, came up with safe guards towards these concerns. The second was a more indirectly way of influencing, and was about the Norwegian emission reductions for 2020. Prior to Copenhagen, Norway had an emission goal of minus 30 % by 2020, but in the “regjeringserklæringen Soria Moria 2” the Norwegian government announced their willingness to increase this to 40 % if other countries also followed up; a conditional increase. This influence the Norwegian stand and approach to the COP15 in Copenhagen. During the various COPs he did a “bunch of stuff”, but mainly trying to make sense of what was going on; to be able to help the negotiators, but also to be able to inform the media. During the COP15 Copenhagen they had press meetings every day. In order to be able to influence the actors in the COP the Norwegian NGOs are dependent of working with other likeminded NGOs due to the sheer number of state actors. Even in the NGO society; or the



civil society; there is many various interests struggling to be heard over all the others. It is not one community, but several organizations that all feel that their priorities are the right one and/or the most important ones. This can make the mission to influence state actors difficult, since they do not speak with one voice. There are big differences and disagreements within the civil society, particular between European NGOs and American NGOs; different networks, different politics to navigate, even in your own niche of the civil society. He believes that the reasons the world got an agreement in Paris is because they shifted the expectations to a potential agreement to what was politically possible/feasible. He mentioned an article he wrote about this. He talked about the fact that in Copenhagen many countries negotiated for a type of “Kyoto” agreement, a top-down approach, which was not possible. In the years prior to COP21 Paris the expectations were shifted to a bottom-up approach, which made is much easier to get an agreement. There were also an extreme political will to get an agreement, “at all cost”; failing was not seen as an option. This was the last chance. When asked about Norway’s role within these negotiations he quickly said that obviously Norway plays a constructive role in the sense that they have always had a focus on achieving international agreement, and helping to achieve consensus in some form, rather than sticking to its own specific positions very strongly, so Norway has always been more of an helper; a “bridge builder”. They also invest a lot of money, has always been one of the highest, if not the highest financial contributor. Norway contributed more that the host nation for the COP15 Copenhagen. Norway has been extremely focused on cost efficiency in an agreement since the 90s (sale on quotas). This has put Norway on edge with various environmental NGOs. Today Norway has moved away from the US and is more closely to the EU, and it is difficult to say whether or not Norway is a “bad guy” in the negotiations (for the sale on quotas, buying for carbon reduction elsewhere). He is positive that the Paris Agreement will be upheld, since it is based on the fact that the various countries just rapport what they are willing to /able to reduce, they just needs to set some targets. The question will be what those targets are, and if they are big enough. Indications now say they are not, and needs to be radically scaled up in order to be able to combat climate change. A good thing about the agreement is the 5 year cycle, where countries have to increase their ambitions every 5 years, but there are no sanctions. Basically, the agreement is just a framework for how to share information about climate actions between nations. The agreement transfers the responsibility from the international to the national; the international effort will just be a sum of what each nation decides for themselves. The Paris Agreement makes international climate diplomacy less interesting, and place more emphasis on what happens on the national level. At the

moment he is very pessimistic in whether or not we will meet any of the temperature targets in the Paris Agreement. He feels a more interesting question is how we will deal with the climate change consequences. Despite this he is of the opinion that we still have many options that we have yet to use The interview lasted around 35 minutes.

Interviewee 7: Former Minister of Environment, declined due to conflict of interest with her current position

Interviewee 8: Member of the formal delegation from Norway

Process: Sent him an email on 30th of May, where I presented myself and the topic for my master, and wondered if he had the time for a short interview. I said I could meet in Oslo at any time. He replied Tuesday 31/5, and said he could at Wednesday any time, and at Thursday between 1 and 3. I said I could anytime, and to give me the time that were best for him. He replied, and we decided to meet at 11 O’Clock on Wednesday, at “Klima- og Miljødepartementet”.

Setting: Meeting room at KLD

Interview: He met me in the “lounge” of KLD, and led me to a meeting room. He started by talking about his background. He has had environmental negotiations has his main priority for five years, but has been involved a lot longer. He said that in an negotiation with this many actors you always have to look for the minimal outcome, the minimum that everyone can accept, but that the Paris Agreement is actually more than the minimal outcome, and therefore the meeting went above expectations. There were parts in the agreement that states normally would never accept, but it went through because everyone got something they really wanted into the agreement, and therefore were okay with swallowing other parts of the agreement. Norway played a vital role, and was one of 12 states that were asked by the French to lead negotiations. When reflecting on Norway’s role in climate negotiations, he said that there were two “concepts” that Norway were known for, and worked for. These were “pådriver”- advocate for... and “Bridge Builder”, trying to find a solution that is acceptable for all. He felt that Norway played a big part in formulating the Paris Agreement; and that you can find direct quotes from the Norwegian position in the Agreement. Why we got an agreement in Paris was due to several factor, he pointed among other thing to that the timing was right, and

that the effects of climate change is more visible now than before. It was also unique that every major state had a leader that was invested in getting a deal (China, US, Canada+++). He said that the Norwegian delegation and government works closely with the Norwegian NGOs, and that during 2015 they had meetings with them every month where they asked the NGOs for input; either in writing or in person. The relationship between them, while not unique, is special in that it is more structured, formal and developed than most states' relationship with their NGOs. The NGOs has two representatives in the formal Norwegian Delegations: One that is chosen by "forUM" (mentioned previously) and on that is a youth delegate, representing youth organizations in Norway. This youth delegate is particularly special; the interviewee said he could count on one hand the number of states that had a youth delegate. When asked to reflect on the role of Norwegian (environmental) NGOs in the climate negotiations he claimed that they have three major roles: 1: Advocates for a more ambitious policy; 2: informing the public; 3: representing an input from their international network. During the Paris meeting they had morning meetings every day for the delegation, and outreach meetings every 2-3 days with the Norwegian NGOs explaining what was happening. When talking about the criticism towards Norway and its delegation, he felt that most of it was unfair. The point of climate change conference is to get a climate agreement, not talking about jobs. He said that there are three main purposes with the agreement: 1: Cutting CO2 Emission; 2: adapting to climate change; 3: Finance. The rest that the various NGOs wanted to put in the purposes did not have anything there to do, but some of it is in the objectives. This does not mean that Norway was against job security or human right, but that this was not the right platform. He felt it unfair that Norway was criticized for not doing enough, when nothing was said against countries that did nothing. When looking towards the future he was both optimistic and realistic. He felt that the Paris Agreement was a good framework, but that it was dependent on political will. There is no international agreement that can control political will, and he wondered about the future, while hinting towards the election in the US, where Trump has stated that he will not sign or adhere to the Paris Agreement. At the end of the interview he stated that I had not asked about whether or not NGOs has influence, so I asked him if he felt they did. He said that the NGOs had influence, referring to various official statements that had direct quotes from various NGO's positions, as well as the fact that the NGOs had made them talk about global/climate justice differently; and they were also asked as to where they wanted money used, they chose the Green Climate Fund. At the end he gave me some more contacts to reach out to. The interview lasted a little over 30 minutes.

Interviewee 9: Researcher; representing the observers.

Process: I emailed him 1/6 saying he had been recommended by several people, and if he was available for a short interview. He replied, and suggested 9.30, Friday 10th of June, at a café.

Setting: Café in Oslo

Interview: He met up, and was first asked about his background. He has been at Cicero since 2002, and has an economic background. During the COPs his focus is only on a small part of the negotiations, in mitigation and equality equity. Norway has a good international reputation. When asked about Paris he said that the feeling was very collaborative, in that there was a sense in the air that this was the last chance to get an agreement. It was not easy, but there was a different spirit than previous COPs. There was also progress within the two weeks the COP lasted, which is unusual. When asked about Norway's role he claimed that Norway plays a much bigger role than their size would say. He mentioned an article from the Guardian from 2009, which claimed that Norway was one of the top 15 countries in the climate negotiations. He also pointed to the fact that Norwegian negotiators are often asked to lead parts of the negotiations, (eg. Harald Dovland asked to lead the ADP in 2012), or asked to take on special responsibilities. When asked about the relationship between the Norwegian government and delegation and the Norwegian NGOs he said that it is usually fairly good, and commented that it is usually the same people that attend year after year, so a special kind of trust is built up. He also mentioned the daily, or every other day, meetings where the NGOs can ask questions about what is happening in the negotiations. But he also claimed that there was a bit more controversy in the relationship during the COP21, he mentioned among other things that the Sami organizations felt that their rights and interests were ignored; and he also said that he had not witnessed this type of controversy before. NGOs also fight for more ambitious stand points, but the situation was a bit tenser this time. He does not think that the NGOs have much influence during the COPs, but that they have an influence "back home". They can press their positions on the home front; they even use the COPs to show what needs to be not on the national level. He feels that the NGOs use the international negotiations as leverage back home. During the COPs he believes that they are not there to have influence, but to insure transparency and inclusiveness, as "watch dogs" making sure that nobody is left out of the room; and that this is their most important role in the negotiations. During the COPs he focuses on the oral of the agreement, what it looks like, and within that he focuses mostly on mitigation. When asked why they got an agreement he commented that this was a last

chance for the UN negotiation form, and that the approach was also very different from previous COPs. This shift of approach made it easier to get an agreement, but at the price of ambition. When asked about PA he stated that it was the best agreement we could have got. He also claimed that the French presidency did a fantastic job in making sure that all the countries were involved. They also made sure not to be seen as pro-developed countries, which is what the Danes did, and one of the reasons for the failure in Copenhagen. The agreement does not make sure that we reach the target, but is more of a framework; it is the best you could realistically hope for. Prior to the COP21 the Cicero did a study to predict what would happen, using a combination of various methods and theories, such as statistics and game theory. He was positively surprised by the agreement, as were the majority of the interview subjects they had for the study. He then talked a bit about the “1.5” degree limit that the agreement set, and his skepticism towards it, but at the same time his understanding of why it is there. He feels that the agreement will be upheld, but is unsure about the content of the agreement. He is optimistic that the agreement will help us stop the worst consequences of the climate changes. The interview lasted around 15 minutes.

Interviewee 10: Member of the official delegation from Norway. Representing the state actors

Process: I sent him an email 1/6 outlining the topic of my master, and wondering if he was available for a short interview. He quickly responded, and said he could Monday and Tuesday afternoon. I replied, telling him to pick the time and place. He listed Tuesday at 14 O’Clock.

Setting: Meeting room

Interview: He came on board in COP20 Lima, Peru. Prior to the COP21 he believed that they would get an agreement, but did not expect so much that they got. When asked about the COP21 Paris he said it was a massive event and stressful for many people. There was the highest number of head of states present at one place in history. He also claimed that it was very well organized by the French. When asked about the Paris Agreement he claimed that we were lucky to have an agreement so ambitious. He felt that Norway had played a quite remarkably important job in the negotiations, and were seen as a facilitator rather than sticking to their original standpoints (were more interested in getting a consensus), and were quite crucial for the end result. When asked about NGOs roles he pointed to three areas where

they are very important: 1: making sure the world is informed; 2: force governments to speak in a language all understand; 3: help reaching backing, agreement from places not expected, and in that way support the official delegation in getting an agreement. In regards to the relationship the Norwegian NGOs has with Norway, he pointed out that they are lucky to have 2 official delegators within the Norwegian delegation, and that they this way has access to a lot more information that other NGOs do not, and can share this with them; they can inform/spread/share to other countries NGOs that do not have such a relationship with their own government. As this interview was quite late in the process, I did not ask him for other contacts. The interview lasted around 30 minutes.

Interviewee 11: Member of the official Norwegian delegation. Representing the state actors

Process: I sent him an email 1/6 outlining the topic for my master, and asking if he is available for an interview in June. He wrote that he could either the 13th or 14th of June. I told him to pick what suited him the most. He chose Tuesday 14th of June, at KLD

Setting: Meeting room at KLD

Interview: He started by saying that he had been in the Ministry (KLD) for 7 years, and involved in the climate negotiations for three years. In the last two COPs he had been the assistant to the Minister, helping organize her events, and make sure that she had all relevant documents. Prior to the COP21 he, and the Norwegian delegation, were realistic but hopeful: expected an agreement, but not sure what kind of agreement. When asked about Norway's role in the negotiations he claimed that Norway has a "privileged position". It is outside the EU, but part of the umbrella group which is not so fixed in its positions. As a whole Norway plays a constructive role, and were given charge of parts of the negotiations in both Lima and Paris. Norwegians are "pushing above our weight" and are seen in the international community as someone who can be reckon with. Norway also put the climate negotiations at a high priority. In terms of the relationship between Norway and Norwegian NGOs he said that it was good, and that there were close contact. The NGOs has two delegates in the Norwegian delegation, which build trust. The Norwegian delegations also receive positions from the NGOs prior to the negotiations that they take into consideration when forming the Norwegian stand point. As a whole the Norwegian government tries to be very open and accessible to the NGOs, and the relationship is fruitful for both parties. When talking about

the Paris Agreement he stated that it was more than we could have hoped for prior to the COP21. They knew that they could not get another Kyoto Protocol, and that the approach would this time have to be a bottom-up approach. Still, there are top-down aspects within the agreement, such as the report system and the ambition mechanisms. As a whole, the Paris Agreement was a victory for multilateralism and is viewed worldwide as a success. But what the future of the Paris Agreement will be depends on the next few years, but it was a bit difficult in Bonn (May 2016). But still the “Paris Spirit” lives on. He pointed to several differences between the COP21 and previous COPs, and why it was a success this time: A new approach: Bottom-up, which was very important; the diplomacy taking place the months and years before; the good bilateral relationship between USA and China; The good work the French put into arranging the conference + French diplomacy; this was also a chance that may not come again; it was now or never. When asked to reflect on the future he said that there were room for both optimism and pessimism: there are trends to new renewable energy; more and more are taking climate concerns into investments; The Paris Agreement has set a clear direction for the world. But the years leading up 2020-2030 will be very crucial. It is too late to stop all the climate change consequences, and not the challenge will be to limit them as much as possible. The interview lasted around 20 mins

Interviewee 12: Member of the official Norwegian delegation; representing the state actors.

Process: I sent him an email 3/6 outlining the topic of my master thesis, and asking if he had the time for a short interview. I got a reply back saying he was available for an interview on the 28th of June, at 10 O’Clock at KLD. He later rescheduled the interview to the 30th of June, at 14 O’Clock, at KLD.

Setting: Meeting room

Interview: I came back and started the interview. The first question he was asked was his experience, and he said that he had been involved in the COPs since 2013. When asked about his experience at the COP21 Paris, he said that it felt like a big deal, and that it was a steep learning curve for him; there were some that had been there since the first COP, and he were “new” in the game. There were long hours; it was an endurance race. The Minister got an extraordinary role in the negotiations, when she was asked to lead one of the side negotiations. He looked at Norway’s role in these negotiations as playing a bigger role than

their population would suggest. He said that the Norwegian delegation was a good team, with long experience (experienced). All in all he said that “Team Norway worked very well”. He felt that they were good at thinking outside the box in terms of getting a compromise, and that they enjoyed good reputation in the international community; he pointed as this as one of the reasons for why Norway and Norwegians have gotten so many key roles in the negotiations. He said that the current coalition is a “high ambition Coalition”, and that Norway built bridges. They also have plenty of contact with NGOs. This led the conversation over to the relationship between Norway (the Norwegian delegation) and the Norwegian NGOs. He talked a bit about the preparatory phase and how they prior to creating proposition they have meetings with the NGOs, and that they also receive written suggestions from the NGOs. When asked to reflect about why we got an agreement now he pointed to the different approach; form top-down to bottom-up. He also claimed that they (the international community) had mobilized much more climate finance, and that there had been an ongoing process of building down the segregation between the developed and the developing states. When asked to speculate about the future he said that we could see positive signs, and that he was fairly optimistic. But he also stated the importance of starting to invest today; and to avoid “lock-ins”. The interview lasted around 15 minutes.

Interviewee 13: Researcher; representing the observers.

Process: I sent him an email 3/6 outlining my topic, and asking if he was present at the Paris meeting, and if he was if he was available for a short interview. He replied, and said he was not at the Paris meeting. I later contacted him again when he was once again suggested by another interview subject, and asked if he still was available for an interview talking about the background and the relationship between Norway and the Norwegian NGOs. He said he could Thursday the 30th of June, and asked him if it was ok to come after I finished interviewing interview subject 12.

Setting: His office

Interview: I met him in his office and we started the interview. He is a researcher for Cicero, and has a PhD in climate negotiations. He is an observer at the COPs, but was not there at COP21 Paris, due to personal reasons. Still, this is his field of study, and I decided to interview him since he could provide background information and general observations. He



was first asked about Norway's role within these negotiations, and he replied that they play a bigger role than one would expect. They have some credibility within the international community; there is a clear distinction between developed and developing states in these negotiations, but Norway has respect, and can move around, in both of the camps. Some of Norway's positions are close to the EU's positions, while others are close to the US' positions. Since Norway is such a small state, and enjoy a good reputation, they are often given responsibility to find compromise between various actors. When asked about the Norwegian NGOs he talked about the pre COP's meetings, and how they (the NGOs) would receive information from the government, and that they in return could give them (the government) written inputs for the Norwegian positions. When talking about the relationship between the Norwegian delegation and the Norwegian NGOs he said that there exists fairly good relations, and that there is a cooperative and pragmatic spirit to the relationship. When asked about why an agreement now he said that they looked for the "lowest common denominator", and that the agreement is quite weak. Still, he felt that they had achieved more than was expected, and credited this to among other factors the good job the French host did. He also claimed that there has been a lot of work done, primarily by the French, in framing the climate action from a burden to a race against time; and that the bilateral agreement between the US and China was also important. The agreement itself is a shell, but it put in place a framework for future climate action. It also opens up a large role for the NGOs, in that they need to pressure their own governments for upholding their promises, and making them more ambitious. The interview lasted around 15 minutes.

## 7.4. Appendix IV: Table of the various COPs, with comments

Years and places retrieved from: (UNFCCC n.d.-a; UNFCCC n.d.-c; UNFCCC n.d.-e)

Year	COP	City and State	Comments
1995	1	Berlin, Germany	
1996	2	Geneva, Switzerland	
1997	3	Kyoto, Japan	Kyoto Protocol
1998	4	Buenos Aires, Argentina	
1999	5	Bonn, Germany	
2000	6	The Hague, Netherlands	
2001	7	Marrakech, Morocco	
2002	8	New Delhi, India	
2003	9	Milan, Italy	
2004	10	Buenos Aires, Argentina	
2005	11	Montreal, Canada	
2006	12	Nairobi, Kenya	
2007	13	Bali, Indonesia	The Bali-Action Plan
2008	14	Poznan, Poland	
2009	15	Copenhagen, Denmark	Disaster; failed to reach an agreement
2010	16	Cancun, Mexico	Cancun-Agreement
2011	17	Durban, South-Africa	Durban Platform
2012	18	Doha, Qatar	
2013	19	Warsaw, Poland	
2014	20	Lima, Peru	
2015	21	Paris, France	Paris Agreement
2016	22	Marrakech, Morocco	

## **7.5. Appendix V: Abbreviations**

ADP = Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action

ADP2= Actions pre-2020

APA = Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement

AWG-KP = Ad-Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol

AWG-LCA = Ad-Hoc Working Group for Long-Term Cooperative Action under the Convention

NDC = Nationally Determined Contribution

CSO= Civil Society Organization

CAN = Climate Action Network International

COP = Conference of the Parties

CTCN = Climate Technology Centre and Network

ForUM = Original: “ForUM for Utvikling og Miljø”; in english: “The Norwegian ForUM for Development and Environment”

ICT= Information Communication Technology

IR = International Relations

IPCC = Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change

LDCs = Least Developed Countries

NGO = Non-Governmental Organizations

BINGO = Business and Industry NGO

ENGO = Environmental NGO

RINGO = Research Institution NGO

REDD+= Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation in Developing Countries; an non-profit organization set up by the UN

WIM = Warsaw International Mechanism

UNFCCC = United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change



Norwegian University  
of Life Sciences  
XX