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Declaration

I, Lene Mølstre, declare that this thesis is a result of my research investigations and findings. Sources of information other than my own have been acknowledged and a reference list has been appended. This work has not been previously submitted to any other university for award of any type of academic degree.

Signature.....

Date.....

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ABSTRACT

My argument in this thesis is that there is an obvious lack of coherence between Norwegian agricultural policy and Norwegian REDD+ policy. This is because at the same time Norway support efforts in order to prevent further deforestation, Norway is also importing vast amount of soy for agricultural purposes. Due to Norway's prohibition on genetically modified soy, Brazil is the only option, where Norway can get the amount needed. Soy was previously known as a main driver of deforestation in Brazil, where vast amount of forest was cut down in order to expand the industry. Due to several factors, among them, the soy moratorium, the deforestation has slowed down. However, I still see it as problematic that Norway import soy, due to the social consequence the industry has.

Based on this, I ask what explains this lack of coherence and how are they hindering the Government in achieving policy coherence for development

The concept of Policy coherence for development means that policies outside the development sector should be supportive of or at least not undermine development policies. In this thesis policy coherence for development is a goal, where the causes of incoherence is an obstacle in achieving this goal.

I have found several possible causes of incoherence using primary and secondary sources. I've had 14 interviews with people from different sectors. Furthermore, I have tried to gain a deeper understanding of the why the different causes make it difficult to achieve policy coherence for development. This I have done by using different theoretical perspectives within organization theory and international relations theory.

The main finding in this thesis is that different interests is the leading cause of policy incoherence. IR-theory and realism, state that national interests will always come first. By using the instrumental perspective I learned that organizations are locally rational, meaning they will do everything necessary to achieve their goals and in negotiations, the strongest coalition will win. In a myth perspective, it will be difficult achieve policy coherence for development because the Government constantly has to adopt certain myths in order to gain legitimacy, which may result in policy incoherence.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

This thesis intends to explore the possible causes of the apparent lack of coherence between Norwegian REDD policy and Norwegian agricultural policy. It can be seen as a paradox that Norway imports large amounts of soy, a well-documented source of deforestation, and at the same time provide funds directly to Brazil to prevent further deforestation. Furthermore, the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) has implemented a concept called “Policy coherence for Development” (PCD), which denotes that national policies should, as far as possible, not interfere with development goals. The importance of PCD in Norway was emphasized in the first report on PCD:

“It is therefore important for Norway to make well-considered decisions that take into account the economic and social interests of developing countries in questions that may affect their situation and opportunities” (Report to the Storting, 2012:4)

In this thesis, PCD has to be looked at as a goal, where policy incoherence is an obstacle in order to achieve mutually reinforcing policies. It is my argument in this thesis that the import of soy render the efforts within the Norwegian International Climate and Forest Initiative ineffective.

The Brazilian Amazon is the largest tropical forest in the world and houses 20% of the world’s species and plants. Sadly, in three decades an area of the size of France has been cleared for land use (Azevedo-Ramos, 2008). When Greenpeace released the report *“Eating up the Amazon”* (2006), it became clear that soybean plantations were quickly becoming the leading driver of deforestation. The final destination for Brazilian soy has largely been the European market and China. Five years before the release of this report, Fearnside (2001) had already expressed his concern about soy becoming a driver of deforestation, which would be another powerful threat to biodiversity in Brazil.

In the same time-period in Norway, the agricultural sector was in the process of gaining a new structure. The conservative government at the time saw that it would be too expensive to support all 75 000 farmers and wanted to focus more on large-scale production. They therefore created incentives for small farms to merge. At the same time, they saw it necessary to increase production to keep up with the population increase (Løkeland-Stai & Lie, 2012)

Furthermore, up until 2001, bone meal was used as a protein in animal feed, but due to mad cow disease, this was prohibited (Pihlstrøm, 2002). With an increasing efficiency pressure and the need for new protein, soy replaced bone meal. As Figure 4 shows, there has been a rapid increase in soy import for agricultural purposes. In 2004, Norway imported approximately 420 000 tons of soy, two years later this was increased to almost 500 000 tons (Lindahl, 2014).

In 2006, the same year in which the Greenpeace report came out, the Stern review was released. This review stated that deforestation was responsible for 18% of greenhouse gas emissions and thus reducing deforestation would be the most cost-efficient way to reduce greenhouse gas emissions (Stern review 2006). Based on this review, environmental NGOs created massive political pressure and in 2007, Jens Stoltenberg promised 500 million USD to prevent further tropical deforestation. This was the start of the Norwegian Climate and Forest initiative. The year after, Norway signed a result-based bilateral agreement with Brazil, which promised up to 1 billion USD by the end of 2015 (MoE, 2016).

The aim of this thesis is to find the causes of this lack of coherence and further explain the causes using international relations theory and organization theory. To find the possible causes of incoherence secondary sources from the Norwegian Government, Norwegian civil society and OECD have been important. These sources along with 14 additional semi-structured interviews have made it possible to draw conclusions. A more detailed elaboration on methodology used in this thesis is presented in chapter 2.

1.1 Problem statement and Research Questions

The goal with this thesis is to find answers to this problem statement:

Which are the current explanations exist for the apparent lack of coherence between the Norwegian governments' REDD policy and current agricultural policy?

To answer the problem statement the thesis will be split into two objectives.

The first objective will be to connect the soy industry to Norwegian policies and NICFI.

1. How does Norwegian policies involve the soy industry in Brazil?

2. To what degree is there policy incoherence between NICFI and agricultural policy?

The second objective will aim to figure out the inter-ministerial communication between the ministries involved.

3. To what extent do the ministries collaborate?
4. To what degree is “Policy Coherence” a focus in the Norwegian Government?

1.2 Rationale and motivation behind this thesis

This thesis is a result of several experiences I have had through the years as a student. Here is a chronological overview of these. I was lucky enough to visit Brazil back in 2010, where I also visited the rainforest. That trip did a major impression on me, and I could not understand why someone would destroy it.

Some years later, I wrote a bachelor thesis on Norwegian aid and the focus on good governance, where I concluded that the focus on good governance was not an efficient way to help the poorest of the poor.

Due to the Climate and Forest Initiative, Brazil has been a major recipient of [environmental] aid. The NGO I am part of had a campaign regarding the use of soy in Norway, which I learned had previously been a main driver of deforestation in Brazil.

This thesis is a way of connecting all these experiences together. How can the aid given through NICFI become more effective and what can Norway do better in order to preserve the forest that made such a strong impression on me?

1.3 Structure of the thesis

In chapter 2, I will provide insight into the chosen methodology for this thesis. I explain and justify choices I have made in regards to it.

Chapter 3 will give a detailed overview of the core concepts I have used in my thesis, specifically policy, policy coherence and policy incoherence. This will provide the reader with an understanding of why the import of soy and having NICFI at the same time is problematic and needs to be questioned. Within section 3.1.2, there will be a literature review on the topic, where previous research on causes of policy incoherence are introduced. The

section include both where incoherencies may arise and why. Central authors behind research on policy incoherence are Paul Hoebink (2004) and Jacques Forster & Olav Stokke (1999).

Additionally in chapter 3, I will provide an overview of the theoretical framework, which will be used in order to analyze the suggested causes of incoherence. Theories that are explored are Organization Theory and International Relation Theory.

Chapter 4 introduces the empirical basis, where Norwegian agricultural policy will be discussed. The aim with this section is to highlight the Norwegian dependency on soy. Further, I will present the Norwegian International Climate and Forest Initiative and the goals with the initiative. Furthermore, the chapter will provide a historical overview on soy as a driver of deforestation.

In chapter 5, I will present my findings, which will be presented as a discussion between the secondary sources and the primary sources. It will also be an integrated analysis, where the theories presented are applied. The last section in chapter 5 will provide a further discussion, where all the loose ends are collected.

Chapter 6 is the concluding chapter, where I will summarize the findings and its relation to the problem statement.

However, before I start I have conducted a literature review in relation to what can cause policy incoherence.

1.4 Literature Review

Literature review is important in order to make sure the research doesn't replicate other research done, but rather is complimentary or new (Bryman, 2012). May et.al. (2006, in Hommels, at.al 2012) states that policy incoherence is an area that has been understudied, both theoretically and empirically.

Policy incoherence is naturally the opposite of policy coherence, and in large political institutions, it is given that issues with incoherence will arise. The government has to deal with many different parties, interest groups, NGOs and the citizens themselves, so it may be impossible to please all stakeholders (Hoebink, 2004).

The state of policy incoherence is a result of conflicting interests and values. It is also due to compartmentalization of political decisions and administration. Decision-makers representing one set of interest or values have a certain worldview. This might conflict from a different stakeholder with a different worldview (Stokke, 1999).

The OECD (1999, in Ashoff 2005) created a ‘toolbox for coherence’, where they mention several things that are needed in order to achieve policy coherence for development. Among other things, they mention that there is a need for political commitment, decision-makers need advice and a good analysis of issues in question. Further, they mentioned the need for a coordinating mechanism and inter-ministerial cooperation. This means if any of these are lacking, there is a bigger chance of policy incoherence.

In addition to this, the OECD (2006) lists four broad categories of possible causes of incoherence: Political decisions, lack of information and understanding, inadequate decision-making and lack of policy coordination. Political decisions refers to the fact that some decisions made often overshadow the development agenda. By the lack information and understanding, the decision-makers often misunderstand how policies within one area affect a different area. To make a proper decision, the decision-makers need to know how to get the information and have the capacity to use it. There is also a need for a proper coordination mechanism in order to achieve policy coherence for development.

Guido Ashoff (2005) supports the OECD when it comes to decision-making and coordination, but he also adds the area of societal and political norms, by this he refers to different values and interests. Carbone (2008:327) states: *“Politics is compartmentalized, each subsystem has its own logic reflecting perceptions, interests and values. To avoid incoherencies policies needs to be coordinated”*. In support of inadequate decision-making Stokke (1999:213) writes, *“(...) Not all actors carry the same political weight, nor do they have equal access to decision-makers at various level”*.

Ashoff (2005) also includes the conceptual area, which refers to the complexity of the development agenda. This is a rather important point. For example, the leader of the trade committee in South Africa stated that trade is more important than aid (Bildén,2011). Using this logic, Norway offers Brazil access to the Norwegian market, which is important for Brazil and their development. This relationship is thus coherent with development goals, to improve developing countries’ access to the Norwegian market. Nevertheless, the soy industry has several negative social and environmental effects connected to it, and by importing it for agricultural purposes, it creates policy incoherence towards other international development goals, such as improving livelihoods. This only shows the complex reality of the development sector, where coherence is hard to achieve.

The below chapter will further present and discuss the methodology I have used in order to gain a greater understanding of what can explain the apparent lack of coherence between Norwegian agricultural policy and REDD policy.

Chapter 2: Methodology: A qualitative study

Social research is an approach to gain more knowledge and a deeper understanding regarding a social phenomenon. A simplified definition of a qualitative study is that this type of study relates to texts, sounds and pictures, where interpretation of the data collected is important. The problem statement may decide which method one should use (Johannesen, Tufte & Christoffersen, 2010). Unlike quantitative studies, qualitative studies use few informants in order to get a deeper understanding of a subject. It provides a more informative description of the social world. The problem relating to qualitative studies is the subjective interpretation of the findings (Bryman, 2012). I chose a qualitative study so that I would have the ability to dig deeper, as sometimes the answers are in the details.

During the course of my research, I followed the steps mentioned by Bryman (2012: 364). I started out by creating the framework for the research, where I wrote my problem statement and research question. I primarily decided on environmental governance and institutionalism as theoretical framework. However, the more I read about the subject, I noticed that institutionalism or the more general theory regarding organizations would be more fitting.

The next step was to figure out where I could get the answers I needed. As this study seeks to find causes of policy incoherence, I saw it necessary to talk to people who makes policies, those who make decisions and those who influence those processes. In this study though, the use of secondary sources have been important. Government reports and NGO reports have been especially useful. The data collection process is elaborated on in detail below.

This thesis has loosely applied grounded theory as a method. Ground theory as a method is best applied when the problem statement is of an investigative nature. The goal by using grounded theory as a method is not necessarily to produce new theory, but rather provide a more thorough description of a phenomenon (Johannesen, Tufte & Christoffersen, 2010). In the context of this thesis, the initial hope was to provide new insight into what can cause incoherence. However, during the interviews, I found that the causes mentioned by my informants, were similar to existing research. Therefore, I changed the goal, where I wanted to provide different view on the causes, this was done through the use of different perspectives within Organization theory and International Relations theory.

The following sections will elaborate on the data collection process, coding and analysis, as well as reliability and validity in this thesis. Reliability and validity also address the limitations of this study.

2.1 Data Collection

I collected my data through both semi-structured interviews and document analysis of official reports. The first phase in the data collection was to figure out who to interview. Due to the main aim of this study it was crucial that the sampling was done purposively, in order to guarantee that the informant was relevant to the study (Bryman, 2012).

When figuring out who to interview I started using my own network within the NGO sector, although not all who were asked to take part in the research were able to. Nonetheless, they provided me with names of other possible informants. This is what Bryman (2012) calls snowball sampling. I further used criteria sampling in order to recruit more informants to the study (Ibid). The criteria was knowledge on either agricultural policy or NICFI. Both sampling methods were helpful, and I was able to conduct 14 interviews in total. I had nine interviews in person, one via telephone and four via email. The quality of the interviews was significantly different when comparing those that were done in person or telephone compared to those via email. This I see mainly due to the difficulty of explaining a question or asking follow-up questions.

Furthermore, 14 interviews were not enough to draw concrete conclusions. Therefore the use of secondary sources became important. These sources were mainly from the OECD, and the Norwegian Government, which I will come back to in 2.1.2.

2.1.1 Semi-structured Interviews

Interviews in qualitative research are less structured than in quantitative method of interviewing. In quantitative studies, questionnaires are more often used, which provides for a very structured interview. In qualitative studies it is more helpful to use less structured interviews as it is the informant's point of view that the researcher wants and it allows for follow-up questions. Furthermore, this method also allows a discussion between the informant and researcher and the informant is encouraged to keep talking, as many answers are found in the details (Bryman 2012).

There are mainly two types of qualitative interviews; unstructured and semi-structured interviews. An unstructured interview is where the researcher only mentions topics, not

necessarily questions. I decided I wanted to do semi-structured interviews, as there were certain questions I needed an answer to.

In order to do interviews I prepared an interview guide (appendix 2). Not all of the questions in the interview guide were asked, as I adjusted the questions based on whom I was talking to. The experiences with the interviews varied, some of the informants only needed the topic and went with it and others required more of a Q&A. I saw a clear difference between the ones I did an email interview with and those I talked to in person/telephone. The latter gave me the chance to respond to their statements and ask follow-up questions as well as give further clarification. There is a possibility of follow-up questions via e-mail as well, but it is very easy for informants either to ignore or forget.

The interviews were audio-recorded. I asked for consent out of ethical consideration. Ethics in research revolve around four principles: (1) harm to participants, (2) whether there is a lack of informed consent (3) invasion of privacy, (4) whether there is deception involved (Bryman, 2012). Out of the four principles, I only saw the second as something I had to do. I informed them how I intended to use the answers as a basis of my thesis. I also stated that I would delete the recordings and not share the answers with others. They all consented to be recorded.

Most of them also wanted notice if they were to be cited, this was so they could correct any information they had provided and that I had interpreted it correctly. Nonetheless, I have chosen to make the informants anonymous when referring and citing them in the write-up. I contacted them close to the hand-in date, which left little time for them to answer, so just in case I will make all of the interviews anonymous. Appendix 1 includes a list of the sectors my informant represent, out of the anonymity reasons mentioned above, the names are excluded.

Audio recording permits the researcher to pay full attention to the informant, as how they say it is also important. The downside with recording the interview is that many informants can be self-aware and become a more constrained informant, which can result in a less interesting interview (Bryman, 2012). I was optimistic about one interview (due to email conversation beforehand), but the interview did not match the expectation. If however, it is due to the recording aspect, I am not going to speculate into it further.

The interviews were conducted in Norwegian and later they were transcribed. When I transcribed the interviews I gained the opportunity to examine what the informants said more thoroughly. As Bryman (2012) mentions, the transcripts also makes it easier to repeat the

examinations. As the interviews were in Norwegian, I had to translate whatever information I used in the thesis. The downside of translating from one language to another is that some information may be wrongly interpreted, or even lost. This is another reason why I wanted the citations approved, so that they felt that they were correctly cited and represented.

Transcribing takes a lot of time, and to make sure that this wouldn't steal valuable time later, I purposely made it a habit to transcribe them on the same day as the interviews were conducted. This allowed me also to develop more topics for relevant discussions with other informants.

Many of the interviews proved helpful, although some information given was not always as relevant. Nevertheless, in qualitative studies you want detailed answers, as some information can appear irrelevant at a certain time, but turn out to be important at a later stage of the **project**.

2.1.2 Secondary sources

One should always try, as far as possible, to use primary sources. This means information provided by someone who has first-hand information regarding a phenomenon. I have collected primary data through semi-structured interviews. When the information provided by the primary sources is not enough, it is possible to use secondary sources. This is second-hand information, meaning the source have not experienced the phenomenon in question (Johannesen, Tufte & Christoffersen, 2010).

The informants did not always know what the causes were, so in order to get some kind of discussion going, I used the broad causes of incoherence presented by the OECD (2006). This indicate that secondary sources can be helpful in order to gain other actors' opinion on the matter.

A number of whitepapers have been used in this thesis and these have provided me with information regarding different political goals and decisions. Furthermore, Norwegian Official Report, especially NOU 2008:14 has been helpful as it explains the view the Norwegian Government has on 'policy coherence for development'. Reports deriving from the OECD has been useful as they have evaluated Norway's commitment to Policy Coherence for Development. Reports from governments and organizations like the OECD are great sources of information. Nonetheless, when reading official documents it is crucial to read with a critical mind, as these documents can be bias. The documents are written for a purpose and are written either for the government or by the government (Bryman, 2012).

For example, Norway has released reports regarding Policy Coherence for Development, however, they are written by the ministries themselves and has been criticized for being too self-gratulatory and not a critical examination of current practice (Norwegian Church Aid, 2014). Reports from NGOs have also been used, and are also to be considered biased, as the documents has a specific purpose.

Although the reports offer good information on ‘policy coherence for development’ there are rather limited amount of reports that actually address *causes of incoherence*. The mentioned OECD (2006) provides the four causes, but there is no extensive elaboration around them. Bjørn Hersoug’s report (2006, to the OECD) provides a deeper, though not extensive, understanding of the four causes. The book “Policy Coherence in Development cooperation” by Forster & Stokke (1999) on the other hand, address the causes more extensively. One chapter in this book has especially been valuable to this thesis as it has focus specifically on Norway.

Further, there are a number of other sources available on causes of incoherence, which frequently reference Forster and Stokke as well as the causes mentioned by the OECD. Their perception of policy incoherence was mentioned in the literature review, but has also been used in the discussion.

2.2 Coding and Analysis

Coding is a way of reducing the amount of data, not all information gathered is relevant to the project. The the downside by doing a qualitative study through interviews is that with all the relevant data, there is also a certain amount of irrelevant data collected. This you have to weed out by going through every interview (Bryman, 2012). In quantitative studies and surveys, the questions go straight to the point and it is possible to ignore the question if it seems irrelevant on a later stage.

By managing the data, flaws might be discovered and one might see which data that are missing (Bryman, 2012). Through my primary coding and analysis of the data, I discovered that the focus on NICFI and agricultural policy became more excessive than expected. NICFI and soy are apparently interesting topics for many. Looking at the informants, they had knowledge regarding soy or NICFI, but only a few had valuable information regarding political administration and reflections regarding policy incoherence. This concern made me have additional talks with political scientists.

Coding, also called thematic analysis, means extracting core themes that comes from interviews. Coding involves breaking down data to components, where they are given labels (Bryman, 2012). The coding made it easier for me to see the reoccurrences, and I was also able to connect several codes, where I ended up with four major themes. One major theme was “causes”. “Causes” was broken down further to sub-themes, which were the different causes of policy incoherence. By connecting the sub-themes, I ended up with three major categories, which could explain policy incoherence. These are presented in chapter 5.

My analysis of the data collected is done using three different theoretical perspectives. By applying different theoretical perspective, it allows the phenomenon to be explored from different points of view. The theoretical perspectives I have chosen to use will be used to further explain and understand why the certain causes is an obstacle to create policy coherence. Which perspectives the researcher use can depend on the background and what theory the research is based on (Johannesen, Tufte & Christoffersen, 2010).

2.3 Reliability and Validity in Qualitative research

There are two main criteria used to assess the quality of social research, and these are reliability and validity. It refers to whether or not you are measuring what you are supposed to be measuring, and if the collection method is good enough (Bryman, 2012). Since qualitative studies are based on words and opinions, it is hard to measure them, and in that way reliability and validity is irrelevant to qualitative studies. To address this, scholars have drawn parallels and adopted the meaning so the criteria are more suited to qualitative studies as well (Bryman, 2012)

Credibility is parallel to internal validity. Internal validity means “(...) *To what degree a researcher’s procedure and findings is correctly reflect the goal of the study and to what degree it represents the reality*” (Johannesen, Tufte & Christoffersen, 2010:230. translated by me). In this context, credibility questions if my findings are a credible representation of the social world I have researched. In order to achieve this, the informants are important, as this topic is not something that anyone would know about. In order to get good answers I chose to criteria sampling, so that I knew that the informant would have some pre-existing knowledge. In order to increase the credibility of my thesis, I had additional talks with political scientists in order to gain a greater understanding of policy incoherence, which also would improve the internal validity of my study.

Transferability is parallel to external validity. External validity refers to what extent the findings can be generalized across social settings. As qualitative studies generally go in depth, they use few informants, which makes it difficult to generalize. Nevertheless, by transferability it is encouraged to create a thick description of the social reality. This is so other researchers can judge whether the study can be transferred into other social settings (Bryman, 2012). Although not a goal with this study, it is possible that the findings can be transferred into a different social setting. In any larger democratic institution, where there are many different interests, the findings in this study can possibly explain why policy incoherence might arise there as well.

Dependability is the adopted meaning of reliability. Reliability concerns itself with whether or not the study is repeatable. This is also hard to do in a qualitative study, as it isn't possible to freeze a social situation. However, it is suggested in dependability, that the researcher provide complete records over the entire research process (Bryman, 2012). I do believe, if a different researcher were provided with the list of my informants and my interview guide, the researcher would conclude the same things.

Objectivity or confirmability in qualitative studies means to ensure objectivity in social research. This is to some extent impossible in social research, as the findings are interpreted in a subjective way. However, in order to improve confirmability, it is important that the researcher doesn't push personal values or beliefs in order to sway the research. This includes being aware of biases the researcher might have (Bryman, 2012). In this study, I was aware of my bias, where I initially was against the import of soy. This would mean I believed there was incoherence between the import of soy and NICFI. In order to gain a more balanced view on the matter, I asked the informants what they thought. By having the discussion, it increased the objectivity of the study.

Chapter 3: Theoretical framework

This chapter will provide an overview of the theoretical framework this thesis is based on.

Section 3.2 and 3.3 will focus on the theory that will be used to analyze and discuss my findings. Existing theories are crucial in social research. Theories can help understand and/or explain the social world, and help interpret the data (Bryman, 2012). The theories presented below will help explain why the findings contribute to lack of policy coherence.

Organization theory will be helpful to analyze how the structure of the Norwegian government can result in incoherence. Furthermore, the problem statement imply conflicting interests, which is why I see it necessary to understand why some interests are prioritized before other interests. In order to do so, I will provide an overview of realism and neo-realism within international relation theory.

I will start this chapter focusing on the theory regarding policy, policy coherence for development and policy incoherence. In this thesis, the concept of Policy Coherence for development (PCD) should be understood as a goal. The rationale behind PCD is to make sure that domestic policies, in the least, does not undermine development policies. Coherent policies will not only benefit developing countries, but it will also increase the efficiency of development policies (Forster & Stokke 1999; Ashoff 2005).

3.1 Policy

The term “policy” is a concept often used in this thesis and in political science it is often used interchangeably with public policy. There is not consensus regarding what policy or public policy is. Policy can take different forms, it can be a law, a regulation, a ruling or a decision. It can also be a combination of these, which govern an area (Birkland, 2011). There are several definitions on public policy and policy (Birkland 2011).

One definition of public policy is: “(...) *is the outcome of the struggle in government over who gets what*” (Birkland, 2011:8).

However, I see the definitions of “policy” as more relevant to this thesis. “*Policy is made in response to some sort of problem that requires attention*” (Birkland 2011: 8).

Or “*Policy is ultimately made by governments, even if the ideas come from outside the government or through the interaction of government and non-governmental actors*” (Birkland 2011:9)

I was not a decision on a higher level to start using soy in Norwegian agriculture. It was a response to two things: increased efficiency pressure in the agriculture sector and it became illegal to use bone meal in animal feed. Soy is a part of the “animal feed policy area”, the jurisdiction regarding this policy is located within the Norwegian Agricultural Authority, and it includes the regulation on the import of soy (Ministry of Food and Agriculture, 2015). The price of soy is regulated according to the price of grain. If the price of grain were to increase, it would stimulate the increase of grain production, as it would make it more profitable to produce grain. At the same time, the price of soy would also increase, which would make it favorable for farmers to use grain produced in Norway. Several environmental NGOs argue that the price on soy and grain is too low, which currently makes it favorable for farmers to use soy (Input to Agricultural negotiations, 2015).

NICFI on the other hand can be seen as a policy, more precisely a REDD policy. The question regarding NICFI is whether it is an environmental policy or a development policy. This is an interesting question posed on me by one of my informants. NICFI falls under the budget of development aid as it has development aspects related to it. However, the main goals are all connected to the environment, and is probably the main motivation behind it. That being said, the development aspects of it are also important, but in this case, they are rather positive side effects of an environmental initiative. This is an interesting discussion, but I will not address it further.

It is a paradox that Norway import soy, a known driver of deforestation and have a program that tries to prevent further deforestation. The paradox will be elaborated further on, in chapter 4. Nonetheless, it is my argument that the favorable conditions the Government is creating to import soy, is undermining NICFI. However, it is not as black and white and to what degree there is incoherence will be discussed further in chapter 5.

3.1.1 Policy Coherence [for Development]

In literature on political science and policy evaluation the causal link between policy and policy results are hard to determine. The same literature doesn't address how policies might interfere with other policies. These are issues policy coherence tries to address (Hoebink, 2004). Below are several definitions of policy coherence.

“The non-occurrence of effects of policy that are contrary to the intended results or aims of policy” (Hoebink 2004:8). He also presents a wider definition:

“Objectives of policy in a particular field may not be undermined or obstructed by actions or activities of government in that field or in other policy fields”

(Hoebink, 2004:8).

Tom Jones (2002) sees policy coherence as a mixed term, where it also includes policy coordination and policy consistency. The former involves various institutions in government who formulate policy working together. The latter means ensuring that policies are not internally contradictory. Further, he defines policy coherence as:

“It involves the systematic promotion of mutually reinforcing policy action across government departments and agencies creating synergies towards achieving the defined object” (Jones, 2002:391)

Forster and Stokke (1999) have created a more precise definition of policy coherence:

“Coherence may accordingly be defined as a policy whose objectives within a given policy framework, are internally consistent and attuned to objectives pursued within other policy frameworks of the system – as a minimum, these objectives should not be conflicting (...)” (Forster & Stokke, 1999:23).

In order to obtain greater policy coherence, the central government has to use mechanisms like inter-ministerial and intra-ministerial restructuring and coordination (Forster & Stokke, 1999).

Policy coherence is important in every field of politics. By not having coherent policies, it might render a policy ineffective, meaning it will make it harder to achieve set goals. Policy incoherence might also lead to inefficiency, where resources are wasted and lastly it can lead to a policy losing its credibility. If policy incoherence is a common occurrence it could in worst case also harm the legitimacy of the democracy (Ashoff 2005).

During the 70's, OECD countries agreed that domestic policies mattered as much as traditional aid. This notion was a part of the discourse of the “new international economic order”, where it called for structural re-organizing of the world economy. This new order meant to include and benefit the new states after decolonization. The issues to be dealt with was developing countries' access to markets, trade, technology and debt management. After the cold war, the same issues were addressed again, this time under “policy coherence for development agenda” (Vormedal and Lunde, 2015). Policy for development (PCD) can be defined as:

“Policy Coherence for Development means working to ensure that the objectives and results of a government’s development policies are not undermined by other policies of that same government which impact on developing countries, and that these other policies support development objectives where feasible” (OECD 2009:24)

The concept “Policy Coherence for Development” (PCD) appeared on the international development agenda when the EU first integrated it into the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. However, since Norway is not a member of the EU, it is through the OECD that Norway is committed to Policy Coherence for Development. It was in the context of the MDGs that Policy coherence for Development became evident in OECD practice (OECD, 2001).

The OECD acknowledges that PCD can propose a challenge for states, since it will create a split between groups interested in enhancing the standing of developing countries and groups interested in protecting domestic production (OECD, 2005). This problem was enhanced in the first Norwegian report on PCD.

“(…)It means striving to ensure that Norwegian and international policies promote development in poor countries, also outside the framework of development cooperation, as long as this does not clash unduly with the interest that Norway’s policies are primarily intended to safeguard” (Report to the Storting 2012:4).

Using the PCD perspective, it is possible to argue that the import of soy is undermining environmental and development goals promoted by NICFI.

3.1.2 Policy Coherence for Development in Norway

In 2006, the Minister of Development created a committee that would evaluate Norwegian policies outside the development sector, in order to see how these affected development goals. Their mandate included that they would recommend how Norwegian policies could further support development goals, such as economic growth and social development. The report was presented in 2008 and recommended among other things that the government should consider *“(…) institutional reforms, which will strengthen the political and administrative capacity to develop more coherent politics” (NOU 2008:32)*. It was acknowledged that developing countries are especially vulnerable to decisions made outside their borders. The need for coherent policies for development stems from the increased globalization and mutual

dependency. Domestic policies are increasingly influenced by international trends and power structure. At the same time, politics in Norway influences the possibilities in other countries (NOU, 2008) Later the same year a whitepaper was released, where the government expressed its intention to gain greater policy coherence (Whitepaper, 2008).

The new government that was elected in 2013, declared their commitment to coherent policies for development in their political platform: *“The government will pursue a coherent development policy, where measures in various sectors, will as far as possible, be pulling in the same direction”* (Sundvollen Declaration 2013:72, translated by me). The declaration also stated that the government intend to implement stricter demands on aid efficiency (ibid). The Government has further showed their commitment to coherent policies towards protecting human rights, but they specified that this would only be the focus of foreign and development policies, and not other sectors (Whitepaper, 2014).

The OECD’s Development Assistance Committee provides peer-reviews of Norway’s development cooperation. The DAC has conducted four reviews in total in regards to PCD. The review from 2005 notes that the policies are to a great extent coherent towards development objectives, but Norway’s agricultural policies is lagging behind (OECD, 2005). The peer-review released in 2008 noted that Norway is lacking a holistic approach to PCD: *“There is a need for institutional mechanisms for analysis, monitoring and policy feedback to deliver its broad vision”* (OECD 2008:31). As a response, the Government has released annual reports on PCD since 2011. The first report mention several areas where Norwegian policies that are in conflict with the PCD agenda (see Report to the Storting, 2012).

The first report on PCD stated:

“It is therefore important for Norway to make well-considered decisions that take into account the economic and social interests of developing countries in questions that may affect their situation and opportunities” (Report to the Storting, 2012:4)

I argue this is a negative way of explain why PCD is important. By this I mean that the report should also focus on why PCD is important for the donor countries as well. PCD will ensure that development policies become more efficient, effective and provide legitimacy. This will be addressed further in the section below.

The OECD has further noted that the reports have not inspired change in the different affected areas. The reports are coordinated through the MFA, but all ministries contribute, so there is

no critical, independent assessment of the policies in question. This strongly affects the credibility of the reports (OECD, 2013; Norwegian Church Aid, 2014).

The informants that wasn't working within the government sector, agreed with the conclusion from Norwegian Church Aid and the OECD. Informant 6 (2016) defends the reports, stating that the reports are meant to be an overview of the most challenging areas, not an arena where changes are proposed, nor an arena where ministries can judge each other's policies.

There has been an increased pressure on the Government to improve policy coherence for development by the civil society as well. Curtis wrote a report in 2010 called "*Doublethink: The Two Faces of Norway's Foreign and Development Policy*". The report mainly questions the Norwegian Pension Fund, Norwegian interests in oil prices and Norway as producer of weapons, while being known as a peace nation. He states: "*Overall, Norwegian government policy is incoherent in a broad sense. (...)*" (p 25).

Norwegian Church Aid (NCA) has produced two reports regarding policy incoherence in Norway. Both reports include the same areas as Curtis (2010), however, they further include areas like the trade and food security and criticizes Norway's role in the international debt debate. These areas overlap with other areas and affects developing countries' ability to reduce poverty (NCA 2011:30). In the second report, NCA (2014:5) writes: "*(...) It is a significant weakness that the Government hasn't managed to get a more extensive inter-ministerial coordination mechanism in place*".

In 2015, Forum for Development and Environment released a report "*Development beyond aid: Global challenges and National Reform*". The report recommend that the Government should implement a PCD unit and that each ministry, that have policies which affect developing countries, should have a contact person (Vormedal & Lunde 2015).


Based on the peer-reviews by the OECD and reports from the civil society, there has been little change and little effort to improve policy coherence for development. The reports released by the Government only points out problems, while has not resulted in real change.

3.1.3 Policy Incoherence

The literature review pointed out several causes of incoherence. This section will provide an overview of different classification or ways of analyzing policy coherence, which is mainly based on the work of Hoebink (2004) and his evaluation of the EU.


Hoebink (2004) has classified coherence and incoherence in four different categories. The first classification he states “Stems from the perspective of the viewer”. The viewer can have a restricted or a broad angle (see figure 1). It is in broad angle that the paradox in this thesis is visible. In the broad angle, he include different policy areas that most likely will affect development policies, for instance, agriculture policies. The second classification is overlapping with the first classification, and will not be addressed any further.

Figure 1: Classification 1: Different type of (in)coherence) Perspective (Hoebink 2004)



The third classification is vertical and horizontal types of coherence/ incoherence. The horizontal view refers to different policy areas within the EU. Here Hoebink (2004) includes trade, agriculture and environment. All of which are sources of policies that might clash with development policies. Vertical type refers to the different institutions that are involved in decision making, from international law to local governments.

Figure 2: Horizontal/Vertical Incoherence (Hoebink 2004)



The fourth possible classification is intended and unintended incoherence. Incoherence can be a result of circumstances outside the policymakers’ control, therefore it is necessary to separate between those two categories (Hersoug, 2006). Intended incoherence is where the policymakers accepts that objectives can’t be (fully) achieved due to conflicting interest (Hoebink, 2004). The third and fourth classification will be addressed further in chapter 5.

Picciotto (2005) also offers four possible areas where incoherence might arise, similar to what Hoebink has tried to illustrate. Type (ii) intra-country coherence I see as most fit to this thesis. This involves *“the consistency among several aid and non-aid policies of an OECD government in terms of their combined contribution to development”* (Picciotto 2005:312). This type is the heart of PCD, where the entire government has to be involved. By promoting PCD across the government departments, the different policies will reinforce each other, thus making it easier to reach the agreed goal. This is in reality hard to achieve, as we can’t expect politicians to abandon domestic concerns. Though the hope is to make decision-makers to think twice before adopting certain policies, which might have destructive impacts on developing countries (Picciotto, 2005).

This last argument is what this thesis boils down to, should Norway abandon soy in the sake of not adding pressure on the soy industry? What is most important, domestic food production

or the rainforest? I believe every government in the world would agree that domestic food production is far more important. This is a bit ironic, because if the rainforest is not preserved, we will see much more rapid increase in temperature, which again will affect food production all over the world.

3.2 Organization Theory

Organizational theory is useful to understand how the structure can influence the political outcomes. Most of this section will be based on Christensen, Egeberg, Lægreid, Roness and Røvik's book "*Organization Theory for the Public Sector*". The book has an English edition from 2007 and a Norwegian 3rd edition from 2015.

The problem statement seeks to find causes of policy incoherence, thus it make sense to see how the structure and norms affect decisions, to which organization theory can create a basis of discussion.

"An organization theory approach to the public sector assumes that it is impossible to understand the content of public policy and public decision-making without analyzing the way political-administrative systems are organized and their modes of operation" (Christensen et. al, 2007:1).

Within organization theory, I will elaborate on the instrumental perspective and the myth perspective. The perspectives will work as lenses or as two different ways to explain how the different suggested causes can create policy incoherence.

The myth perspective is part of the umbrella term 'institutionalism', where the cultural perspective is considered the traditional institutionalism and the myth perspective is neo-institutionalism (Christensen et.al, 2015). It is only the myth perspective that will be addressed here, due to its focus on how pressure from the outside influence the government.

The difference between institutionalism and instrumentalism is mainly that in the instrumental perspective looks at the formal structure of the organization (Christensen et.al, 2015).

The term "organization" is often used interchangeably with "institutions". Institutions can be formal through law or policy and they can be informal, like norms or habits. They are mechanisms for adjusting behavior and govern our lives. Organizations on the other hand are formed as a subject to existing higher-level institutions (Polski & Ostrom, 1999). With this definition, the Norwegian central government (cabinet office and parliament) can be understood as an institution. Ministries are then arguably organizations within the institution, created for a specific purpose. This thesis will look further into the relationship between the ministries and the central government, the inter-ministerial relationship and the collaboration with NGOs and other relevant interest organizations.

Goals are important for a formal organization, without goals there is no reason for the organization to exist. For instance, If Norway didn't have any environmental goals, it wouldn't be necessary to have a Ministry of the Environment. The different perspectives have different approaches to goals. An important characteristic of goals in a public organization is that they often start out as vague and complex, where they wish to address many concerns and have a high activity level (Christensen et.al, 2015).

The Norwegian government in its entirety is a bureaucratic system, with many different goals. A simplified description of the system is that the cabinet office and parliament is at the top of the pyramid and the different ministries answer to them. The different ministries address the different goals the government has. The cabinet office consists of the Prime Minister and the leaders of the different ministries. The Parliament consists of the opposition parties, to which the cabinet office answers to.

According to Mintzberg (1983) an organization has two fundamental characteristics, division of labor and coordination. The work is distributed to different actors within the organization, which involves specializing. If the organization is to function properly, there needs to be coordination between the different actors. Below I will elaborate further on vertical and horizontal specialization and coordination.

3.2.1 Instrumental Perspective

Public organizations, like the ministries are in this perspective instruments acting on the behalf of the society. Formal organizations have stable pattern of behavior and resources connected to their activities. Their tasks include implementing new reforms, in order to improve the current practice in the different sectors. The organizations are used as instruments to achieve goals that are considered important for further development of the society (Christensen et al, 2015). Food production is not only important because of the food, but it is also an important sector when it comes to employment. The Ministry of Food and Agriculture is used as an instrument to protect that interest and to improve the conditions for it.

Public organizations are often characterized as bureaucracies, where features from Max Weber's ideal bureaucracy are visible. The features often seen are hierarchy, division of labor and routines (Christensen et.al, 2015).

The formal structure of the organization is significant in the instrumental perspective. Formal norms are incorporated into organizational charter, rules, regulations, and job description. The

structure consists of positions and rules for who does what and how it supposed to be done. The “Rules for the Ministries” were formalized in a royal resolution in 1981 and was revised again in 1984. The rules address the relationship between superior and subordinate, it also formalizes division of labour within the ministries. Further, it addresses leader’s role and decision making (Rules for the Ministries, 1984).

The structure of the entire Norwegian government is a complex structure that involves a great deal of division of labor. The division of labor happens through vertical and horizontal specialization. Through horizontal specialization, the government body is separated into different ministries, which according to Luther Gulick (in Christensen et.al. 2015) is called sector principle. By having horizontal specialization, the government system become a heterogeneous political environment, which can result in conflicting interests. Vertical specialization entail tasks being assigned to a certain level in the hierarchy. This means that specific tasks are placed in a subordinate department or office (Christensen et.al, 2015). The NICFI administration is for example a result of vertical specialization.

Furthermore, within the ministry itself, the leader of the ministry have the vertical coordination responsibility, meaning he/she is responsible to the cabinet office and the parliament regarding activities within the ministry and its sub-departments (Christensen et.al, 2015).

The “Rules for the Ministries” specifically mention that horizontal coordination and collaboration, and that collaboration is necessary when two or more ministries are working within the same area.

“The head of the ministries and the subsequent leaders are to make sure that all sides of an issue has been explained, and when necessary make sure that cooperation between different offices and departments and with other ministries is done when needed” (Rules for the Ministries 1984, §2, section 3, translated by me).

In relation to vertical coordination, the rules say:

“A superior shall inform his or her subordinates of issues relating to their work (...)” (Rules for the Ministries 1984, §11, section 1, translated by me)

“Every decisions related to a superior, should be informed as soon as possible (...)” (Rules for the Ministries 1984, §11, section 2, translated by me)

If the rules are not followed, the division of labour or specialization can lead to a narrower range of understanding. This will result in the ministry being good at their job and fully understand what that entails, but it can also lead to a lack of knowledge and understanding of how their decisions and activities might affect another ministry. This imply that the structure of the organization can create conflict and in relation to this thesis, create incoherence (Christensen et.al, 2015)

Rationality is another concern within the instrumental perspective. Full instrumental rationality means that the organization have clear and consistent goals, a complete overview of options and consequences of set options. This would mean that the organization would choose the option, which gives maximum degree of goal obtainment (Christensen et.al, 2015). One can argue that NICFI was a result of weighing different alternatives, and that the decisions to implement it, was instrumental rational since it was the best way to achieve the wanted results.

Herbert Simon (in Evans & Newnham, 1998) argued that decision-makers rarely seek maximum goal-obtainment. They rather seek a solution that is good enough, which Simon calls 'satisficing'. He didn't see it as possible that someone would know every option and its consequences, so he developed the term "bounded rational" (Evans & Newnham, 1998; Christensen et.al, 2015).

Bounded rationality implies that the goals are unclear, inconsistent and the reality is complex. An organization will not have all the facts or knowledge regarding alternatives and consequences. They only know some of the options, due its limited capacity, thus decision-making is based on limited information. It takes time and resources to get all the information needed, making it impossible to gain full overview. This entails the organization striving after satisfactory goal-attainment rather than maximum (Christensen et.al, 2015).

Within the instrumental perspective, it is possible to distinguish between the hierarchical variant and a negotiation-based variant. In the former, the leader's understanding of means-end is a key factor. This variant is characterized with strong leaders, with a good overview of alternatives and who acts rationally. This means that the leader will make a calculated choice based on the logic of consequence. In this variant, the hierarchy sets the boundaries and there are clear lines, which separate the different roles and positions (Christensen el.al, 2015).

In the negotiation-based variant, there is room for different interests, negotiations and compromises between actors with conflicting goals. Using this variant the organizations [the

different ministries] can be understood as coalitions, where the actors act locally rational in order to serve their own interests. The actors are free to enter into a coalition with other actors outside the organization, who share the same interests (Christensen et.al, 2015). NICFI was a result of a coalition between important political actors as well as the environmental organizations behind the initiative (Hermansen, 2015).

Formulation of goals in the instrumental perspective has a significant role when it comes to the activities in the organization and there is an expectation of results according to the goals set. Overarching goals are developed at the government level, and the ministries will develop their own goals, which aim to maximize the achievement of the overarching goal. To obtain the goals, will depend on the capacity and the will of the members of the organization. Goals in the negotiation-based variant assume that the administrative system and its surroundings are heterogeneous. In the heterogeneous environment each coalition are instrumental rational in creating and pursuing their goals. Without looking at the bigger picture and without regards to other interests, it can lead to the rationality of the entire organization being weakened. However, goals can also be developed based on negotiations with other relevant organizations. This can increase the legitimacy of the organization (Christensen et.al, 2015).

3.2.2 Myth Perspective

The difference between the cultural perspective and the myth perspective is that the former is concerned with norms and values that have appeared in the organization through time. The myth perspective is more concerned with the values in the surrounding environment, which is constantly changing. The norms in the surrounding environment are called socially constructed norms, which in this perspective are called myths. The myths can be broad in the sense they include many different areas or they can be narrow, which entail one field of interest. The goal to reverse global warming is a broad myth, because it implies that many sectors need to change their behavior in order to obtain the goal (Christensen et.al, 2015).

The myth perspective is also called New Institutional School. The key notion within the perspective is that organizations are open systems, where the surroundings influence them. The socially constructed norms sets expectations on how they should function. This means that in order to seem legitimate, the organization has to adopt the myths.

"Independent of their productive efficiency, organizations which exist in highly elaborated institutional environments and succeed in becoming isomorphic

with these environments gain the legitimacy and resources needed to survive”
(Meyer and Rowan 1991:53).

The term ‘isomorphic’ means that the organization conform to the expectations stemming from the outside. This will lead to organizations looking similar. The government is expected to act and respond in certain ways, it is also expected to have certain degree of the ideal type of bureaucracy. In order to obtain legitimacy and support from the outside, the government will adopt myths (Krogh et. al, 1998).

While the cultural perspective concerns itself with values and norms that has been created through time and traditions. The myth perspective can be considered as a shell, where it concerns itself with the surroundings, and adjust thereafter. In order to keep these cultural traits, in a myth perspective the formal side of the organization separate itself from the informal side. This way the organization can continue as it always has, but externally it looks like it follow the socially constructed norms, thus seem more modernized (Christensen et.al, 2015, Krogh et.al, 1998).

NICFI is arguably a myth, created to respond to outside pressure to have a program that directly address deforestation in developing countries. A myth can be rationalized, which means two things. First, a rationalized myth means that scientific arguments are being used to create conviction that it can be used as an efficient measure to obtain certain goals. In the case of NICFI, these arguments came from the Stern-review (2006). Second, a rationalized myth can be institutionalized, meaning at a given time, it was the most efficient and natural way of organizing. This means that it becomes a part of the structure of the organization. In this context, NICFI is an institutionalized myth, as it also resulted in NICFI becoming an own department under the Ministry of the Environment (Christensen et.al, 2015).

Nonetheless, the myth can be adopted without having instrumental value. In this sense, the myth become window-dressing. This is when leaders talk about change in way they make people believe that something is done, but in reality, nothing changes. It is possible to argue that NICFI is window-dressing. By implementing NICFI, it showed a certain commitment to preserving the rainforest, which deserve credit. However, by continuing the import of soy, which arguably undermines the initiative. This is what Brunsson (2006) calls hypocrisy.

Politics is often connected to conflicting interests, this is mainly due to the heterogeneous environment it is a part of. The central government is often in contact with several interest organizations, like the two environmental organizations that initiated NICFI. Due to the many

interest organizations, the government will have to do its best to conform to the expectations that are put on them. This is how hypocrisy can arise, “(...) *hypocrisy are also a natural result of interactions between representatives of the diverse interests and ideas reflected by the organization*” (Brunsson 2006:29-30)

Goals in a myth perspective appear out of pressure from the outside. Goals in this perspective are only of symbolic nature and do not have instrumental effects. Furthermore, the goals are adjusted according to the environment outside the organization. The goals are more visions or symbols of a world that is easy, while the reality is very complex. Politicians often use visions in order to create hope of a better future, but they also provide politicians with a certain degree of flexibility, as they are not binding. An additional reason for why politicians tend to present visions is to gain legitimacy (Christensen et.al, 2015).

3.3 International Relation theory

IR-theory is mainly used to address the relationship and interactions between states. There are many perspectives within this theory, but realism and liberalism are the two dominating perspectives, where the former is explored further below.

Liberalism is an extensive and well-developed theory within IR, but simply put it can be understood as both as freedom (free markets, liberal values) and as cooperation. Cooperation can be through UN with the goal to enhance collective security (Newnham & Evans, 1998). It is possible to understand PCD in a liberal perspective, however, due to the limitations of this study, this will not be addressed further.

A central concept in IR is ‘power’ and realism is also known as ‘power-politics’. The traditional realist perspective is based on Morgenthau’s theory on how it is human nature to strive after power. Max Weber defined power as the ability to achieve goals despite other actor’s resistance. The distribution of power is a structural feature of a social system (Kalnes, Austvik Røhr, 2010). In this context, it means that initially, the different ministries are equal, however, when looking at their ability to obtain goals it is different (ibid). Furthermore, the neo-realist perspective is more concerned with the international power structure, and the current structure forces states to be protective. This can explain why some interests are more important for a state, i.e. domestic food production (ibid).

In order to understand why it is like that, we have to look at Norway in the international context, where it is a sovereign state and security, survival and self-help are core elements.

3.3.1 Realism and Neo-Realism

Realism in IR-context is the dominant tradition in the study of world politics (Dunne & Schmidt 2008). In a realist perspective, the world is an anarchy and survival of the state should be the primary national interest. Modern realism is based on the works of Hans Morgenthau and others, where as human beings it is in our nature to strive for power, which will affect how a state behaves. In this view, the goal with foreign policy is to gain power, as power is necessary in order to secure their own survival. Furthermore, in the realist perspective, each actor is rational and all actions done are in order to maximize their own self-interests (Evans & Newnham, 1998; Kalnes, Austvik & Røhr, 2010).

Raison d'état is a central theme within realism, it is a French term meaning 'reason of state'. The term refers to that necessity goes over considerations of morality. The term is the older notion of national interests. National interest is used in two ways in IR-theory. It can be an analytical tool to identify goals or it can be objectives of foreign policy. In both senses, they guide state behavior in relation to the external environment. At the root of the realism is the principle of national security and survival, and they are considered vital interests.

It is presumed in a realist perspective that all other policy preferences are subordinate to vital interests, and vital interests cannot be compromised (Evans & Newnham, 1998). National security is a fundamental value within realism, which is reflected in a state's foreign policy. Security is traditionally mentioned in the context of violence or war. In a more broad meaning, security also refers to human security, which in turn includes food security (Dunne & Schmidt, 2008).

Human security is an emerging concept in IR-studies, where the focus on security shifted from being state-centric to focus on individual security. This also includes food security. Food security means, "*ensuring that all people at all times have both physical and economic access to basic food*" (Dunne & Schmidt 2008:492).

The neo-realist perspective is also called structural realism. Kenneth Waltz, who created the foundation for neorealism, stressed the systemic factors of international politics. The international system is anarchic and there is no laws or supra-national government. Furthermore, neo-realism does not discard the theory behind power. In this perspective the

international structure forces leaders to gain power, as well as be self-sufficient in order to survive (Evans & Newnham, 1998, Kalnes, Austvik & Røhr, 2010). Using this perspective, the structure forces Norway to think of self-sufficiency. Thus, the import soy is a survival mechanism. Even though a realist argues that state should never be dependent on other states to ensure security, Norway needs to import soy because there are environmental constraints on what Norway can produce. If Norway were to produce the protein itself, it would have to be at the expense of something else (Informant 8, 2016)

Due to these arguments, it is possible to justify Norway's import of soy. Even though the import include a certain dependency on a different state, it has to be done in order to secure food production. In this sense, the import of soy is a lesser of two evils. The alternative is to import more food, which would have detrimental effects on employment and on food security in Norway.

It is possible to discuss whether there are alternatives to soy. The environmental and development organization Spire presented several alternatives in their report "Soyalandet" (Hougen, 2014). These alternatives are only in the research stage, but with so far promising results. To this, I would argue that Norway should increase their efforts to find other sources of protein, this would be an attempt to increase policy coherence towards NICFI along with the food security level.

Chapter 4: REDD Policy, Norwegian Dependency on Soy and Deforestation in Brazil

This chapter will provide background on Norwegian REDD policy, soy dependency and deforestation in Brazil. Deforestation in Brazil has its roots from when the country was a dictatorship. Back then, they started large infrastructure projects, which partly was due to efforts in hydropower. Furthermore, deforestation increased significantly during the 90's, which is mainly due to mechanized agriculture.

Most of the soy that Norway imports goes to fish farming sector. This is an important sector for Norway, as Norway will increasingly depend on the income from fish farming when oil and gas production slows down. However, I have chosen to focus only on soy in the agricultural sector and livestock production. Using both sectors, would require more extensive work load, and it would have to be necessary with interviews with people relating to that sector. I therefore saw it necessary to choose between the two, where agriculture was selected. This was mainly due to me being more familiar with the agricultural sector and knowing who to ask in regards to interviews.

The reason why Norway imports soy, is to meet an overarching goal within agricultural politics. The goals are food security, nationwide agriculture, wealth creation and sustainable agriculture. In relation to food security, it means that to “*produce enough, safe and varied food of good quality*” and it is the primary task of Norwegian Agriculture (Whitepaper 2011:15. translated by me). To produce ‘enough’ food, the sector needs soy as a protein, as there is no other alternative available

This chapter will start off by introducing the REDD policy in question, the Norwegian International Climate and Forest Initiative (NICFI). The goals behind NICFI has both development aspect and an environmental aspect (MoE, 2009).

4.1 Norwegian REDD policy – Norwegian Climate and Forest Initiative

During Conference of the Parties in Bali 2007, Jens Stoltenberg, the Norwegian Prime minister at the time, announced that Norway would contribute with 3 billion NOK every year, in order to preserve the remaining rainforest in developing countries. This marked the start of NICFI, the Norwegian [international] Climate and Forest initiative. The initiative has three main objectives: (1) to contribute to the inclusion of REDD+ under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (2) to contribute to early actions for measurable emission reduction from deforestation and forest degradation (3) to promote the conservation of primary forest, due to their particular importance as carbon stores and for their biological diversity (MoE, 2015). In addition, the government further notes that by preserving the rainforest, you also contribute to improving livelihoods of those who live off, in and near the forest. These goals are related to Norway's overarching foreign and development policy goals, which focus on human rights, poverty reduction and increased democratization. Further the Government stresses the need for increased aid efficiency (Norad, 2016)

The initiative was first formally proposed by two environmental non-governmental organizations at a hearing at the Parliament in October in 2007 (Hermansen, 2015). Before the official proposal, the organizations had been lobbying for NICFI and sent a letter to several politicians where it was rationalized by using arguments from the Stern Review (2006). Furthermore, NICFI was passed and the strategy was first noted in Proposition 1 (2008-2009). In the proposition soy was also acknowledged as a major driver of deforestation and as a challenge that would be difficult to address.

The initiative gathered much support from its first introduction. The reason why some politicians were hesitant was the question regarding where the money would come from. They

REDD/REDD+

- Deforestation accounts for 18% of the greenhouse gas emissions in the world (Stern review 2006)
- Reduction in deforestation and forest degradation is one of the most cost-efficient ways to fight global warming.
- REDD – Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation is an effort to create financial value for carbon stored in forests. It offers incentives for developing countries to reduce emissions from forested lands and invest in low carbon paths
- REDD+ includes the role of conservation, sustainable forest management and enhancement of forest carbon stocks (UN-REDD n.d).

Figure 3 REDD/REDD+

[the politicians] agreed that it should be under the development assistance budget (Hermansen, 2015).

To be formally recognized as official development assistance (ODA) through the OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC), the grants or aid has to have a clear objective of promoting economic development and welfare (OECD, n.d). Of this reason it is important to stress the development aspect of NICFI.

The management of NICFI was moved in its entirety to the Ministry of the Environment in 2014. However, as it is still considered foreign development aid, Norad, the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation also shares some responsibility for management of the initiative, especially budgetary issues (MoE, 2014).

NICFI was to be considered a pilot project as a new REDD mechanism in international climate regulation. The initiative is a result-based program, meaning that rainforest countries will be paid based on their success in combatting deforestation. Through bilateral cooperation, NICFI provides a direct cash incentive to protect the trees, thus supporting the idea behind REDD (Egede-Nissen, 2014).

Since the implementation in 2008 and up to 2013, 10,67 billion NOK has been provided. The money is allocated through multilateral channels (UN, World Bank, Regional development banks, civil society) and bilateral agreements. In 2008, Norway and Brazil signed a letter of intent of a cooperation regarding the rainforest. Later same year, Norway promised to contribute with up to one billion dollars by the end of 2015. Brazil showed excellent results, which resulted in Norway keeping the promise (MoE, 2016).


The timing of the establishment of NICFI is relevant when discussing motivation behind the initiative. For Norway to reach its target, to be carbon neutral within 2050, it is necessary with a system that allows Norway to finance emission reduction in developing countries, which is equivalent to domestic emissions (Report to the Storting, 2012). Thus, one of the primary targets in Norwegian environmental politics is to contribute to the establishment of a global, binding and long-term regime under the climate convention (Whitepaper, 2010). By establishing NICFI in 2007, it would be possible to have something to show for in Copenhagen 2009, "*The point is to gain experience prior to Conference of the Parties in Copenhagen, where the rest of the world can contribute to a system already in place*" (Solheim 2008:133. Translated by me).

4.2 Norwegian soy import

In 2013, Norway imported more than 900 000 tons soy, 80% coming from Brazil. Most of the import comes in the shape of beans, flour or concentrate. The increase in Norwegian soy import is mainly due to fish farming. Up until 2005, fishmeal was mainly used as the protein source in the fish farming industry. This practice however, was criticized, as the fish specie used to create fishmeal was not a sustainable practice and it could also be used for human consumption. Further, the access to fishmeal became constrained, so the next best thing was soy concentrate (Lindahl, 2014).

The reason why most of the soy comes from Brazil is that Norway has strict regulations on the use of animal feed based on genetically modified (GMO) raw materials. Brazil is one of the few countries in the world that offers GMO free soy (Lindahl, 2014). The graph below shows the total Norwegian import of soy, it includes soy in all shapes and forms. The soybeans imported are grinded in Norway, and turned into soy meal and soy concentrate. This is used as a protein addition in animal feed, particularly for cow, pig, chicken (soy meal) and fish (soy concentrate).

Figure 4: Total Norwegian soy import, 2004-2013. Tons (Source: Lindahl, 2014)




Denofa is the company that imports most of the soy to Norway, where the soybeans is mostly is produced in the state Mato Grosso. Blairo Maggi is the former governor of Mato Grosso, and his company Grupo Andre Maggi owns Denofa (Leira, 2014). In 2013, Denofa imported 420 000 tons of soybeans. This means that Denofa alone cover between 75-80% of the demand for soy meal in Norway (Ekern, 2013).

4.2.1 Soy in Agriculture

Earlier, Norway used bone meal as protein in animal feed for livestock, however, since the outbreak of mad cow disease, it was no longer allowed to use it for that purpose. Soy therefore replaced bone meal. The amount of soy that is used varies from each year, as it depends on Norwegian grain production. The graph below indicate how much soy is used in Norwegian agriculture since 2004, where the trend line shows that there has been a general increase. The reasons for increased use of soy are many, but one reasons is the increased demand for meat in Norway, which has put further pressure on production, and thus the import of soy. In 1999, the total meat consumption in Norway was 64.9 kilo per capita. In 2009, it had increased to 78.7 kg per capita. Between 1959 and 2009, it had more than doubled (Svennerud & Steine, 2011).

Meat production, mainly chicken and pork, will be substantially affected if the soy import ran into problems. This is due to the animal feed they get, is the only food they get. For cattle and sheep, it is an additional source of food. In 2014, 54% of the animal feed used in livestock production was based on imported raw materials (NHO, 2015b).

Figure 5: Soy for Agricultural Purposes 2004-2013 (Source: Lindahl, 2014)




Along with the increased production, there has also been an increase in the use of protein, not in each ration, but because the animals get more animal feed now than before. In 1990, the cow’s diet was 39% animal feed and in 2014, it was increased 44%. (Volden, 2016; Ekern, 2013). An additional cause of the increase is that the Norwegian grain the last few years has not been sufficient enough in regards to protein, only carbohydrates. Protein, like soy is rich on both, thus being a more favorable ingredient (Norwegian Agricultural Agency, 2016)

4.2.2 Soy and self-sufficiency

In 1976, the Ministry of Agriculture released Whitepaper 14:1976, where one of the goals stated was to be self-sufficient when it comes to dairy-products, eggs and meat. According to official statistics (see below), Norway has [almost] achieved this goal.

Figure 6: Self sufficiency level - Agricultural products (Source: Department of Health, 2015)




It was stated in 2014 that agricultural policy is supposed to stimulate increased production to increase self-sufficiency (Proposition 127 S, 2014). Self-sufficiency means to what extent a country can satisfy its own needs from domestic production (FAO, 2015). As the Minister of Agriculture said:

“We constantly produce more of the food that we consume. Norwegian agricultural production level has never been higher and in the last ten years our self-sufficiency has increased from 43% to 49%.” (Løkeland-Stai & Lie, 2012:108, Translated by me.)

The import of soybeans can be discussed in this context. The relationship between the import of soy and self-sufficiency is a paradox in itself, since the dependency on soy actually decreases Norwegian food security. If the delivery of soy is stalled or stopped, production of chicken will cease and production of pork will be substantially reduced (Ekern, 2013).

The statistics the Minister of Agriculture is referring to are based on food produced in Norway, but it doesn't take into account the raw materials the animals are fed. If you look at the graph below, it tells us that including imports of raw material, Norway's self-sufficiency level has been around 50%. However, if you remove imported raw materials for animal feed, the story is different. The self-sufficiency level decreases with almost 10% in 2014.

Figure 7: Self-sufficiency level - Total (Source: Department of Health, 2015)



In the calculation on self-sufficiency, a chicken produced in Norway, is considered a Norwegian produce, despite the fact that its feed consist of soy from Brazil. The same is with soybeans, in 2013 Norway used 204 468 tons of soybean meal in the production of animal feed for livestock. The statistic show that 78% of it is considered Norwegian, because the soybeans imported from Brazil is turned into soy meal in Norway. The remaining 22% is considered imported, as it is imported as a done product (Norwegian Agricultural Authority, 2013).

So far, this chapter has provided an overview of Norwegian REDD policy and the Norwegian dependency on soy. The following section will show how soy has been a primary driver of deforestation. Because of that, it is problematic that Norway import soy, while having NICFI in place.

4.3 Deforestation in Brazil

Brazil is the 5th largest country in the world, both in size and population. In the course of the last decade, the country has experienced strong economic growth and is now the 7th largest economy in the world. The economic growth along with investment in health and education has translated into poverty reduction with 30 million people leaving poverty behind (Norad, 2015).

The Amazon region covers 61% of Brazil’s land area and populates 20 million people. The region hosts the largest tropical forest in the world, with 20% of the world’s plant and animal

species (Azevedo-Ramos, 2008). Since the start of the military dictatorship 1964, large scale deforestation has been a problem in Brazil. (Julsrud & Buvollen, 2015).


The military dictatorship led to economic growth, however not one that benefitted the population, but rather the multinational companies and the government itself. They established among other things large hydro power plants, which became a big driving force behind deforestation, as this also demanded a massive infrastructure. The construction in the region demanded labour, and the government had re-settlement projects for people living along the coast. This led to indigenous people being forced out of their home. In the course of one generation, areas three times the size of Norway were deforested and degraded. Indigenous people were removed, animals and biodiversity was lost and the greenhouse gas emissions were massive (Julsrud & Buvollen, 2015; Leira, 2014).

Despite economic growth in this period, the dictatorship also resulted in massive foreign debt, which in the end caused its downfall (Julsrud & Buvollen, 2015) Parallel with the financial situation, you can also follow the level of deforestation. The crisis only enhanced the ecological problems, during the 90's 10% of the forest was cut down. In 1987 alone, 37 000 sq km disappeared (Julsrud & Buvollen, 2015). The causes of deforestation are complex interactions between direct and indirect drivers like dams, mines, logging and infrastructure. Mechanized agriculture is the newest threat to the Amazon, as Brazil quickly became the biggest producer and exporter of oranges, soybean and other products (Azevedo-Ramos, 2008).

The graph below shows the level of deforestation in Brazil. As seen in the graph, in the period 2003- 2007 there was a significant drop in the level of deforestation. The reasons for this drop are more intensified monitoring and controlling of illegal deforestation. There have also been a more efficient law enforcement, resulting in many arrests. In the same period, the price of soybeans decreased, also resulting in less deforestation (Azevedo-Ramos, 2008).

Furthermore, after a small increase in 2007-2008, the rates of deforestation rapidly decreased again. This can be seen in context with REDD and the Norwegian Climate and Forest Initiative. Although Brazil already had mechanisms in place before these two initiatives, REDD/REDD+ and NICFI furthered the commitment from other countries to contribute in preserving the remaining rainforest.

Figure 8: Deforestation of the Brazilian Amazon (Source: Mongabay 2015)



4.3.1 The soy industry – environmental and social implications

Brazil is the biggest exporter of soy in the world. Researchers expected in 2014-2015 that Brazil would set a new export record with 49 million tons (Hougen, 2014).

In a study from 2006, it was stated that between 2001 and 2004, Brazil’s mechanized agriculture increased by more than 3.6 million hectares, in Mato Grosso alone it was more than 540 000 hectares. Same study agreed with most scientists, that the cattle industry was the primary driver of deforestation. Nonetheless, large-scale mechanized agriculture, mostly for soybeans plantations, was catching up (Morton et.al 2006). Even though the cattle industry is the main cause of deforestation, owners of soy plantations tend to buy pastureland, pushing the cattle and the industry further into the woods (Azevedo-Ramos, 2008; Leira, 2014). This arguably means that soybean plantations continues to be an indirect driver of deforestation today.

The reason for increased production of soy was due to the spread of mad cow disease in Europe and the rise of China. China went from being a big exporter of soy, to the largest importer in short time (Azevedo-Ramos, 2008; Fearnside, 2001). As the demand for soy increased from both Europe and China, the price rose, resulting in higher production of soy

(figure 10). A contributing factor to the increased production was improved infrastructure resulting in lower transportation costs (Azevedo-Ramos, 2008).


As with all other commodities on the market, supply and demand set the price, and with the amount of soy Brazil puts on the market, it makes soy a cheap alternative for farmers to use in their animal feed. Future projection show that the price will continue to be low, which indicate that production will continue in the same pace, or even increase (Volden, 2016).

The moral problem relating to Norwegian use of soy is the exploitation of another country's land area. The NGO, Future in our Hands calculated that Norway used 560 000 tons of soy in agriculture and fisheries in 2013, which required 200 000 hectares of land. This is land that could otherwise be used for Brazil's own food production and development (Lindahl, 2014).

The state Mato Grosso provides Norway with most of its soy. The state produces 30% of the total production in Brazil (Lindahl, 2014). Mato Grosso is located in the crossing between the Amazon and the Brazilian savannah, the Cerrado. The soy production has more than doubled during the 2000s, particularly in Mato Grosso. The reason for this is Blairo Maggi, who was the governor in the state between 2003 and 2010. He is called the "king of soy", as he and his company is the biggest producer of soy in the world. Though, by the end of his time as governor, he was called "king of deforestation" (Leira, 2006).

Below you can see photos of the deforestation levels in Mato Grosso, the first one is from 1992 and second is from 2006. In the photos, forest appear as red. The river has different color due the reflection of sunlight in 1992.

Figure 9: Deforestation in Mato Grosso (Source: Earth Observatory, 2006)




Philip Fearnside expressed his concern over the soy industry already in 2001. At the time, soybeans were mainly planted at the Cerrado, bordering to the rainforest. His concern was that future demand, especially from China, would push the industry into the forest (Fearnside 2001). In 2006, Fearnside's prediction came true, when Greenpeace reported that the soybean plantations were becoming one of the primary drivers of deforestation and the rapid expansion of the industry was worrisome. In 3 years, the industry had destroyed 70 000 square kilometers of the Amazon. The report doesn't specify country when presenting that number, but this still accounts for six football pitches a minute (Greenpeace, 2006). Pictures from the Earth Observatory supported Greenpeace's concern.

In the aftermath of Greenpeace's report, production companies went together and agreed to not import or trade soy from areas that are deforested after 2006. The agreement is known as the soy moratorium. Grupo Andre Maggi is one of the signatories, which means that this affect the Norwegian importer, Denofa. Denofa on the other hand has promised that the soy does not come from areas deforested after 2004 (NHO 2015a).

The agreement intended to combine environmental preservation, but still allow the soy industry to continue in the same pace, however in a more sustainable way. It was the first voluntary agreement regarding zero-deforestation implemented in the tropics. It also led to similar agreements of other commodities as well, such as beef and palm oil. There is a consensus that the agreement is a success. In the two years before 2006, 30% of the soy expansion happened through deforestation. In 2014, it estimated that soy expansion was only to blame for 1% of the deforestation (Gibbs et.al, 2015). As the graph below indicates, the soy production has continued to increase while deforestation levels has gone down.

Figure 10: The Correlation between Soy and deforestation (Source: Murphy, 2015)



However, the agreement will only last until May 2016. Gibbs et. al. (2015) states that it is instrumental that the moratorium is extended, as ending it prematurely could risk increased deforestation due to further soy expansion.

Following that argument, that due to the soya moratorium the soy industry is no longer the biggest problem when it comes to deforestation, why then is it still a problem that Norway imports soy?

The answer is that there are more environmental problems connected to the soy industry as well as social problems. Historically, soybean production has been encouraged, since it is a legume, which fixes the nitrogen level in the soil for uptake (Clay, 2004). However, due to new varieties, improved nutrient input packages, and mechanized planting and cultivation, the soybeans plantations creates a monocrop (Clay, 2004).

By creating a monocrop, it makes it difficult to grow anything else on it later. Further, the monocrop result in higher soil erosion rates than what is sustainable. Sustainable use of soil means that soil creation level is higher or equal to what is lost through erosion. Soybean production leads to soil compaction, which is damaging. Despite this, soil classified as highly erodible is still being used for soybean production. Currently, soybean production doesn't need fertilizer, which means that the cultivation doesn't provide the soil with any nourishment. This will result in areas in the Amazon being exhausted (Clay, 2004).

An additional problem is that the expansion of the soy industry has been at the expense of the Brazilian savannah, the Cerrado. The Brazilian savannah is not covered by the moratorium. The Cerrado inhabits 5% of life on earth as well as 60 vulnerable animal species. Almost half

of the plants grown in the area doesn't exist anywhere else in the world (Hougen, 2014). The savannah is native vegetation, and has the same ability as the rainforest to store carbon. By disrupting this area, it becomes a source of greenhouse gas emissions. In 2009, the conversion of the Cerrado into soy plantations led to the release of greenhouse gases equivalent to half of UK's total carbon dioxide emission same year (Gibbs et. al, 2015; Clay, 2004.).

There are additional social problems related to the soy industry. I mentioned earlier, that indigenous people in Mato Grosso were displaced when the government started their re-settlement projects. However, in 1988, Brazil got a new constitution, which acknowledged indigenous people and gave them exclusive rights to their territories. The new constitution and the ILO convention on indigenous people's rights (no 169), is supposed to protect their rights and ensure that indigenous people are consulted when decisions are to be made on issues that involves them and their territory. Despite this, indigenous people in Brazil continue to be marginalized and discriminated against (Hougen, 2014).

Furthermore, the constitution states that all land that is cultivable, is supposed to serve the people, meaning it should benefit all. However, this is not the case, 2/3 of the land area is controlled by 3% of the population. Because of the expanding soy plantations, family farms are forced out of the area. The industry doesn't contribute to employment either, as only one worker is needed per 20 sq. km. This encourages urbanization, and puts more pressure on slum areas. In addition, the soy industry is exempted from paying taxes, nor is there any tax on soybean seeds. On other types of seed, there is 17% tax. This creates an additional incentive to produce soy rather than anything else (Hougen, 2014).

The economic success of the soy industry has created an added pressure on the industry to increase efficiency. To do this, farmers use pesticides that fights fungus and unwanted insects. Brazil alone, used 19% of the world consumption of pesticides, where 140 million liter was spread over Mato Grosso. The farmers spread pesticides using airplanes. The government has set boundaries where the plane can fly and at which altitude, but more often than not, the boundaries are not enforced (Hougen, 2014).

Furthermore, the pesticides gets caught in the wind and spread in a much larger area than it is supposed to. This results in pesticides getting in the groundwater, wells and in the soil. Earlier research showed that 9 out of 10 teachers at schools close to the flight zones have toxins in their blood and urine. All of the nursing mothers tested, showed traces of the same toxins in their breast milk (Hougen, 2014).

Chapter 5: Findings and Discussion

This chapter begins with a discussion focusing on the second research question, which asks to what degree there is policy incoherence. This is important to ask due to my bias, as both an environmentalist and as a student of development. The section will give an overview of the informants' opinions on the matter. The discussion will also include Hoebink's (2004) classification, regarding intended and unintended incoherence.

Section 5.2 will present the findings related to the problem statement. The causes presented are the result of the discussions with the informants and the use of secondary sources.

Fragmented decision-making is a broad category where it is stated that the decision-making system in Norway is fragmented, which was uncovered in the power enquiry (NOU, 2003).

Lack of coordination also includes inadequate collaboration between the ministries. According to Mintzberg (1983), coordination is one of the keys in order to have a fully functional organization, thus, the lack of coordination is possibly a cause of incoherence.

Section 5.3 will discuss the findings using the theoretical perspectives presented in chapter 3.

5.1 To what degree is there policy incoherence?

The implementation of the soy moratorium has been an important factor for the declining deforestation levels in Brazil. In addition, Norwegian providers of soy products have their own zero-deforestation agreement (see NHO-agreement, 2015). Despite this, my argument remains that the import of soy still renders NICFI inefficient, where the resources could be better spent. Due to this bias, I saw it as necessary to have a discussion with my informants whether or not there is coherence.

Carbone (2008) stated that in order to judge if there is policy coherence or not, will depend on which perspective one uses to look at the paradox, which also was stressed by Informant 8 (2016). Perspectives in this context means from which sector one is looking at the paradox.

From the development sector's perspective, it is possible to point out the moral obligation Norway has towards indigenous people and the environment itself (Informant 3, 2016). This moral obligation is one of the aspects that is covered by NICFI, as it is also about securing the livelihoods of indigenous people. The soy industry causes several problems for the local people. Earlier, the industry led to the displacement of people, as the larger plantations pushed small-scale farmers out. At the same time, the industry didn't lead to any job-

creation, leaving many people unemployed. Additionally, the industry use substantial amounts of pesticides, which poses a threat to their health. Thus, from this point of view, the import of soy remains a problem and is incoherent in towards the development goals of NICFI.

Looking at the paradox, where the goal is to preserve the remaining rainforest, several informants pointed out the fact that Norway import certified soy, thus the level of coherence towards this goal is disputable. By importing certified soy, Norwegian agriculture is doing the best it can with the options (or lack thereof) available. Soy plays a significant role in Norwegian agriculture and stopping the import would have devastating effects (Informant 8, 2016). On the other side, even though Norway import certified soy, it still puts pressure on the soy industry in Brazil (NOU, 2013), as well as the destructive impact the soybean cultivation has on the soil. An answer could be to start importing soy from other countries, but due to restrictions on GMO-based soy, Brazil is the best option.

By looking at the paradox from the agricultural sector's point of view, if Norway stopped importing soy today, they would have to import every product that comes from livestock production. The imported products would most likely still be containing soy, as Norway is only one of many countries that use soy in animal feed. The difference is that when Norway imports soy itself, the authorities will have control over what the animals eat and be sure that it is safe, in regards to GMO and deforestation. Informant 8 (2016) said it best: *"It's not the best thing for anybody to just stop, but it's about finding best-practice, while we search for things that can replace soy"*

Furthermore, in relation to deforestation, Informant 1 (2016) pointed out that by creating REDD as well as NICFI, it created a financial incentive to prevent further deforestation, where a rational actor would choose not to clear any forest for land use.

"The logic behind REDD is as long as we offer financial incentives to protect the rainforest and make it profitable to preserve the forest (...) Then, according to economic theory, a rational actor would choose to protect it. The soy market will correct itself accordingly. The soy producers will find other areas to produce soy, thus the market would solve the issue" (Informant 1, 2016).

Using this logic, there is no incoherence between the two policies when it comes to deforestation. The soy industry, being a rational actor, will find other areas to produce soybeans, as this is more profitable. Although the specific economic model he was referring

to was not mentioned, it is possible to draw a parallel to rational choice theory. The theory assumes that individuals are rational and utility maximizing. The people have all the information, where they weigh all the options and make a decision based on a cost-benefits analysis (Birkland, 2011).

Based on the arguments above, there is incoherence when it comes to the development aspect of NICFI. As long as the soy industry continues to be part of the “job-less” growth and pose a threat to local people’s health, the import of soy will be problematic. One can also argue that Norway supports its agriculture based on foreign resources, which could otherwise be useful to Brazil’s own development (Informant 3, 2016). In relation to the environmental and deforestation aspect of NICFI, it is possible to argue that there is coherence. That Norwegian import is not a problem, since the soy is guaranteed not to have caused further deforestation, thus not interfering with one of the primary goals of NICFI. However due to the general notion of supply and demand, Norway contribute to the increasing pressure on the industry and thus the rainforest.

Assuming that there is incoherence, using Hoebink’s (2004) classifications, this is a case of horizontal incoherence. Which means that policies from one area are in conflict with another. By enhancing horizontal coherence, will allow the benefits of globalization to be more equally shared (OECD observer, 2003) Furthermore, it is possible to discuss if this is an intended or unintended incoherence. Intended incoherence means that the government deliberately prioritizes some interest before others and accepts that the two policy areas cannot cohere. In cases where obvious incoherence exists, the most that can be done is creating awareness of the implications of the policies (OECD, 2002).

For it to be an unintended incoherence there has to be an information gap, where either the decision-makers did not know about the import of soy, or soy being a driver of deforestation. It was acknowledged in Proposition 1 (2008-2009), that soy was a major driver of deforestation, which means that the government was aware of the problem. It was even noted in the very same report that was used to justify NICFI, that soy was a problem. This could imply that the incoherence between NICFI and the soy import is an intended incoherence, meaning it is politically decided that this is how it is going to be.

On the other hand, it is not necessarily true that the decision makers knew about the import of soy. I will come back to this later, but since decisions regarding soy regulation in Norway is done in a different arena than the decision regarding NICFI, it is possible that at the time when NICFI was approved, that they didn’t know (or forgot) about the import. Nonetheless,

without asking the decision-makers at that time, it is not possible for me to find out what they did and did not know.

In addition to this, Norwegian agriculture is primarily criticized for being too protective by different organizations (see OECD, 2005),

“It’s no secret that there are conflicting interest between trade and agriculture. It would benefit developing countries to gain greater access to the Norwegian market” (Informant 6, 2016).

This makes soy a problem within a problem, where soy is a detail that is difficult for decision-makers to be aware off. Thus, the incoherence between NICFI and soy is possibly an unintended incoherence.

5.2 Causes of incoherence

“There is a disconnect between different sectors within the Norwegian administration. Every Ministry have their own goals in which they work towards. This disconnect appears in many different areas of politics, it is almost like the nature of politics” (Informant 4 , 2016).

The informant said that this was the answer to my question, but I also want to know what explains this disconnect, and it is also what I wish to discuss in the following sections.

During the interviews, some informants had difficulties answering what causes policy incoherence. Not because they did not want to, but due to the speculative nature or simply that they didn’t know. When this happened, I used the broad categories mentioned by the OECD (2006) and used these as points of discussion.

It might be that the answer is abstract, as Informant 3 (2016) said, *“It might be some underlying drivers that we can’t control”*. Although, this was not specified any further, it is possible to argue that the Ministries are being locally rational. This means that they are primarily concerned with their own goals and means to achieving them (Christensen et. al, 2015). On the agricultural side, the politicians are working to increase production and efficiency and to achieve this, import of soy is important. On the environmental and developmental side, you have politicians working to reach overarching environmental goals, along with improving livelihoods for indigenous people. The decisions regarding these two

areas are not done in the same arena, and without a strong coordinating mechanism, incoherence might arise. This will be discussed in the following sections.

The suggested causes are very much interrelated, and may be difficult to separate. What it boils down to though, is conflicting interests and how these are weighed in decision-making and how they are coordinated. Decision-making happens in regards to interests and there has to be some coordination mechanism to make sure that some policies do not overlap and work against each other. The following section will present the findings relating to conflicting interests. There will also be discussion on why some interests are prioritized before others.

5.2.1 Conflicting Interests

Conflicting interests appeared as the most prominent cause of incoherence throughout my research. The different interests is explained to me as the entire dynamic of politics, where the different ministries work to protect their interests (Informant 7, 2016). Then again, it is important to remember that most policies are developed in order to serve national interest and goals, which is probably the case for every country in the world (Informant 4, 2016; Whitepaper, 2008).

The political system is comprised of different stakeholders representing different interests and values. The different stakeholders pull the politics as a whole in several different directions, and thus become the core reason why we see policy incoherence (Stokke, 1999; informant 2, 2016). Conflicting interests calls for negotiation, compromise, and trade-offs (Vormedal & Lunde, 2015)

The primary goal with development policy is to improve developing countries' economic and social development. Other sectors within Norwegian politics exists in order to improve domestic development. This means at some point, different interests will cross paths, where initiatives done in order to protect Norwegian interests, will have a negative effect on developing countries (Proposition 1S, 2011)

One of the questions that I asked was if the different interests Norway has could be seen as a hierarchy. Among the informants, there was a consensus that there is a hierarchy, Informant 1 (2016) answered with a question,

“Yes, that is obvious [hierarchy exist]. But why is some policies prioritized and more important than others?”

The answer can be located within realism and the term *raison d'état*, where necessity, food production, goes before morality, development aid. Informant 7, (2016) stated it very simply:

“People need food, people get food from agriculture (...) and today Norwegian agriculture need soy to produce meat”.

Informant 8 (2016) supported his argument, but she added that

“If you first going to import soy, do it the best possible way”.

Due to the dilemma between domestic interests and foreign development interests, it reduces my problem statement down to a matter of priority. Soy is important for Norwegian food security and NICFI is an important environmental/development policy.

“Norwegian agriculture and development policies are generally areas where it is difficult to find common ground. Although it is an area where one are trying to find solutions that benefit the poorest countries” (Proposition 1S, 2013:308, translated by me).

How the government chooses to prioritize is where the potential policy incoherence might arise. Although the Government may have difficulty in prioritizing, the decisions will often go in the favor of national interests (Forster & Stokke 1999; Informant 9, 2016).

A certain degree of policy incoherence has to be expected in a democratic country, this is due to the pluralist political environment (Carbone 2008). Conflicting interests are in many instances resolved by compromises. Compromises is a way of making a political decision in a heterogeneous environment.

“Politics is based on compromises; everybody get some, nobody gets everything” (Informant 6, 2016).

Compromises may lead to incoherence, but instead of looking at incoherence as a negative thing, it might be better to look at it as the best-possible solution (Hoebink, 2004). In the case of soy, the soy moratorium along with the agreement between food and feed producers in Norway, can be considered as the compromise between Norwegian agricultural policies and REDD policies. Using this argument, there is no incoherence between Norwegian soy import, as this is the best option. Norway needs soy and NICFI want to preserve forest, thus Norway imports soy from areas not deforested after 2004. However, it is my argument that there is still incoherence, due to other environmental effect and social effects, which was mentioned in 4.3.1.

Interests will be discussed further in the following sections. Having an interest does not automatically mean that there is policy incoherence. It is when the decisions are made, how it is coordinated before and after implementation, that incoherence might arise. As Stokke (1999) claims, not all of the stakeholders have same access to the decision-makers, and decisions arenas vary from one area to another.

In section 5.3.1, I will discuss how the conflicting interests hinders the implementation of PCD. This will be discussed in the light of the realist perspective.

5.2.2 Fragmented Decision Making system and Information gap

Informant 3 (2016) answered with a hypothetical question when asked directly what the possible causes for incoherence are: *“What knowledge do they [the decision-makers] base their decisions on?”* Decision-making is a complicated process, where many interests are to be weighed. Many decisions are also made internally and not through the central government, which might create an information gap.

The OECD (2006) mentioned lack of understanding and inadequate decision-making as causes for incoherence. The former refers to the information and understanding on how policies affect other policies. The latter refers to the fact that adequate decision-making is dependent on proper information and the capacity to use it. It also involves the distribution of power within government and the level of participation in the process overall. This imply that with better informed decisions, where all actors are weighed equally, policy coherence will be possible (OECD, 2006; Hersoug 2006).

Between 1998 and 2003 there was undergone a power enquiry in Norway. One of the conclusions was that the Norwegian government had become fragmented (NOU, 2003).

“A fragmented state is a state broken into complex decision-making system with unclear lines in regards to levels and principles of governance. The overview is compromised (...) and the ability to coordinate is lost (...)”

(Tranøy & Østerud, 2001:10. Translated by me)

The fragmentation of the decision-arenas can very easily result in incoherencies. For example, the responsibility of regulating prices on soy has always rested with the Norwegian Agricultural Authority, meaning it is never an issue for high-level discussion. Thus, if there should be objections to the import, it might not be an accessible arena for everyone. The

implementation of NICFI was a high-level decision, however, today it is rather autonomous, where most of the decisions are made within (Informant 4, 2016). The ministries have the authority to make many decisions themselves, where the legal authority is vested in the Public Administration Act. This could indicate that these two never crossed paths. The separation of the decision-making system was later confirmed in one of the interviews

“Discussions and decisions regarding agriculture generally happens between agricultural interest organizations and the ministry of food and agriculture. (...) On the other hand, discussion and decisions regarding development questions happens on a different arena, with different actors” (Informant 6, 2016).

That being said, to some extent there has to be a fragmented decision-making system. If every decision that is made within the ministries were to be done by the central government, it would render the government very inefficient. On the other hand, the Government was encouraged to strengthen the administrative capacity to improve policy coherence, by doing so they would also improve the ability to coordinate different political decisions (NOU, 2008).

The separation of arenas is visible due to horizontal specialization, which entails the government being separated into different ministries. It can also be seen as an issue within vertical specialization as decisions are made at different levels within the ministry themselves. In order to make policies more coherent, before making a decision, the government should take into account the different levels within the government structure (Carbone 2008; Ashoff, 2005). The committee that were supposed to find incoherencies in Norwegian politics supported this argument when they encouraged the government to include more ministries when bigger decisions were to be made (NOU, 2008).

The fragmented system may imply that every ministry work for itself and do not look at their decision in the bigger picture, which could mean that the different ministries work with blinders on. This was on the other hand, was refuted:

“Since the Government system is built on different ministries, it’s not necessarily working with blinders on, but it’s about balancing different interests” (Informant 7, 2016)

In support of the informant’s statement, it is important to remember that different policy makers and decision-makers have a different understanding of reality. Policy incoherence are

often seen from a different sector's point of view (Hersoug 2006). This can be explained by looking at the ministries as bounded rational. Due to bounded rationality, it is difficult to get an overview and see the full extent of a decision. Afterwards, it is easy to say that the case was not properly examined. (Informant 6, Informant 7 and Informant 8, 2016).

The fragmented system may also create an information gap. When a decision is made it does not necessarily mean that information regarding the decision will cross the inter-ministerial borders. This might lead to a different ministry making a decision based on limited information.

On the other side, it is also about to what extent the decision-makers actively search for information (Informant 9, 2016). This means that if the government had showed a bit more will to gather information, to gain a greater understanding of the problem of deforestation, they would have figured out by creating NICFI, it could lead to incoherence.

“Policy incoherence is due to the fact that available information is not (...) promptly absorbed and processed by those concerned for decisions (...)”
(Ashoff, 2005:38).

The dedication and leadership from the center is crucial in order to obtain policy coherence. Political will is needed in order to formulate and implement the PCD agenda (Forster and Stokke, 1999; Vormedal and Lunde, 2015). The lack of will or dedication to search for the information needed can thus be another cause of incoherence.

Decisions are usually made with the best intent and with a distinctive purpose. However, it is possible that the different ministries have a different understanding of reality.

“There is a different understanding of reality, the ministry of food and agriculture might not see the same effects as the ministry of the environment”
(Informant 6, 2016).

Informant 1 (2016) mentioned that it looks different when you are working in the midst of it. The people involved, might not see the problem with importing soy while having NICFI in place. Because first, there is the soy moratorium, where the biggest Norwegian importer is a signatory. Second, Norwegian food and animal feed producers have their own agreement. Third, NICFI has created an economic incentive to keep those agreements, where they can make money for *not* clearing more forest. So not only are the producers bound by the different agreements to not clear more area, there is also an economic incentive to uphold the agreements. Using this perspective, NICFI is not only a rationalized myth (a myth with

scientific support), but it is also an institutionalized myth. Meaning, that it is an efficient way of securing certified soy. From this point of view, all of this makes sense.

Since different actors carry unequal political weight and unequal access to the decision makers, it can become difficult for some interest to get heard (Stokke, 1999). The development community and its interests are often ‘weaker’ since it does not have the same standing in the community and do not have powerful domestic interest groups to protect them (Carbone, 2008; Ashoff, 2006). Policy Coherence for Development can therefore be perceived as a benefit for the ‘weaker’ side, but a cost for those at the ‘stronger’ side (Hersoug 2006).

The power imbalance can also be also be discussed in relation to the coalitions mentioned in the instrumental perspective. Since goals and interests varies, they are also pursued in different political and administrative arenas. Some of the administrative arenas are specialized, giving them significant influence in decision-making (Stokke, 1999). Who is part of a coalition or the arenas also depends on the division of labor and specialization. Thus, the formal structure build the different channels the interest groups use in order to obtain their goals.

“The environmentalists managed to get important politicians onboard with NICFI. This is also how other interests (i.e. oil and gas or agriculture) work too. They use the channels they believe will get their interests heard (...). It is like this for every interests, and sometimes the proposals are approved and implemented. It varies from party to party, case to case, which organization they will listen too, and this way incoherence can arise” (Informant 9, 2016).

This meant that in order to obtain support for NICFI, it was natural to get the support from the Minister of Environment or Development (in this case, it was the same). This is how the formal structure affects the negotiations and decisions, and with weak horizontal coordination, incoherence will arise. It is possible that the prices surrounding soy was decided on the same day, but since discussions regarding the two topics happens on two different arenas, these interests never met.

The power enquiry (NOU, 2003) stated that there had been a shift in how people chose to influence politics, from organizing through different parties to organizing through the civil society. This could imply that the civil society gained more power.

One can argue that NICFI is a result of this shift, where the environmental organizations negotiated with the right people and used their lobbying skills, their increased influence power in order to get the initiative implemented.

“Interests, combined with our big environmental ambitions, explain why we have NICFI” (Informant 4, 2016).

“If lobbyism is done right, amazing things can happen, for instance getting a 3 billion NOK in support of a proposal” (Informant 9, 2016).

Despite the fact that the civil society have gained more power of influence, doesn't mean that the standing of development policies have changed. Development policies don't have the same strong backing as domestic interests have.

“The most important sectors in Norway have strong interests groups, where going against them would be very difficult” (Informant 9, 2016).

Hersoug (2006:13) also expressed his concern over the strong forces behind the agricultural sector:

I find that the reason for its obvious policy incoherence regarding the developing world are not either lack of information or bad institutions, but rather the influence and importance of agricultural parties and lobbies”

In conclusion, the fragmented decision-making system in the broad sense can explain why policy incoherence arise. The fragmentation give decision-makers and policy makers a different understanding on how the policies will affect other areas that can lead to policy incoherence. Additionally, there is an information gap as a result of the fragmented system, where all the information needed in order to make an informed decision doesn't reach where it is needed. The power imbalance between different stakeholders can also explain why decisions can create policy incoherence.

5.2.3 Lack of Coordination

To able to have coherent policies, where policies are supportive rather than interfering with each other, there is a need for a high-level coordination mechanism (Carbone, 2008; OECD, 2012). Informant 4 (2016) stated that all politics should ideally be coordinated, but it might be too difficult to achieve. However, one should not overstate the importance of coordination,

as lack of coordination does not automatically lead to policy incoherence (Ashoff, 2005). Even if Norway had an excellent system of coordination, it is possible that the situation would remain the same.

The government system is complex, with many different stakeholders, thus making it difficult to coordinate and to have oversight (Vormedal & Lunde, 2015). The hierarchy has many levels, which makes it difficult to get a complete overview and a challenge to coordinate as well.

“The ministries works within their area which sometimes will cross over someone else’s area. You will then end up with two ministries (or more), working within the same area, but pulling in different directions (...) The more coordinated it is from the top, the better chance there is for policies cohering (Informant 9, 2016).

Officially, the responsibility of coordination lies with the Prime Minister’s office. An attempt of coordination happens at the cabinet’s weekly meetings. If a bigger issue arise, which might affect other ministries, a formal note is written and sent out to affected ministries. Here changes are suggested or it is approved. These meetings are high-level, where the different ministers are informed about activities in the ministries (Informant 6, 2016). In the power enquiry (NOU, 2003) however, the Prime Minister’s office was criticized for their weak ability to coordinate.

The cabinet office has the overall responsibility for coordination, which it doesn’t seem to be coping with (...) There are constantly problems of coordination across the ministerial structure, which the Prime Minister’s Office doesn’t seem to have capacity to handle. Coordination across the fields have been neglected” (NOU, 2003:20. translated by me).

The government’s weak ability to coordinate can be discussed in the context of a fragmented decision-system. Although the central government makes many decisions, a great deal of decisions are made within the ministry itself. This makes coordination between high-level decisions and lower-level decisions difficult.

Informant 6 (2016) pointed out the cabinet office in Great Britain has the responsibility to assist the Prime Minister, in addition to *“ensure effective development, coordination and implementation of policy”* (Cabinet Office n.d.). Similar cabinet does not currently exist in Norway. Such coordination office was recently proposed by the World Wildlife Foundation

Norway, but in relation to the new sustainable development goals. Their suggestion was to implement a government committee, whose prime responsibility was to measure Norway's achievement of the different sustainability goals (WWF, 2015). This would demand greater policy coordination and possibly lead to a debate surrounding NICFI and soy import.

One of research questions was related to how the ministries collaborate,

“An administrative culture that promotes cross-sectoral cooperation and a systematic dialog between different policy communities contributes to the strengthening of policy coherence” (OECD, 1996, in Ashoff, 2005).

Although the responsibility of coordination mainly is the Prime Minister's office's responsibility, I would assume that close collaboration between the ministries would relieve the office of the additional work load. Rules for the Ministry (1984) specifically mention that the ministries need to cooperate when there are issues affecting two or more ministries. This is a form of horizontal coordination, which can happen through formal and informal communication. According to Informant 7 (2016), if there are cases that involves different policy areas, it will lead to close collaboration between the different actors involved. In the end, it's about adapting a balanced policy. Many problems however, are sorted out through informal dialog (Stokke 1999).

“The collaboration is to large extent, excellent, it's a constructive collaboration (...) If we are dealing with an issue, where other ministries have interests, we contact them to have an informal dialog or start a formal procedure. (Informant 11, 2016).

It was difficult for the NGO sector to know exactly how the ministries work together, but their experience with the ministries and politics in general, I believed gave them a unique insight to inter-ministerial collaboration.

“It is never enough [collaboration], there is always more to be done in big structures like the government. There are so many interest pulling in different directions, and there are so many things going on, making it difficult for everything to be perfect” (Informant 2, 2016)

Based on this last argument it is possible that lack of collaboration is not an issue when it comes to explaining policy incoherence. However, it is possible to include Informant 2's statement, and question if there is enough collaboration. It is difficult though, to know if the collaboration was done differently or more extensively if it

would improve policy coherence. Because there is still problems relating to different interests and how the different interests are weighed in negotiations and decisions.

5.3 Further discussion: Bringing PCD into the mix

This section intend to discuss the concept of PCD using the realist and neo-realist perspectives and the perspectives within organization theory. Further, I will use the theoretical perspectives to explain how they might hinder Norway in achieving policy coherence for development.

Policy coherence is a measurement in order to improve institutional effectiveness, but it is difficult, if not impossible, to have total policy coherence for development (Forster & Stokke, 1999). Policy incoherence is arguably unavoidable in a pluralistic political system. One of the reasons for that is the fragmented political system and the many interests a state has (Hommels, Egyedi & Cleophas, 2013; Carbone, 2008).

As mentioned earlier in this thesis, PCD can be perceived as a goal. The current government, made it an official goal in the political platform (see Sundvollen declaration). Official goals tend to be highly abstract and guides the government's behavior (Christensen et.al. 2015).

What does the goal "*The government will pursue a coherent development policy (...)*" (Sundvollen declaration 2013:73), actually mean? How do the Government intend to achieve this? Goals mentioned in the political platform are a result of negotiations in a heterogeneous environment, where the different stakeholders are locally rational. In such, many of the listed official goals are compromises. By formulating goals in an abstract way, it gives politicians a great deal of leeway, as well as it improves the legitimacy, both from internal and external actors. Due the level of abstractness, governments tend to use symbols, where it will seem as the government is doing more than it is actually doing (Christensen et.al 2015).

Furthermore, it is possible to view PCD as a myth, because the pressure to have coherent policies is coming from the outside environment. The pressure to adopt PCD primarily comes from the OECD, but increasingly from the civil society in Norway as well (see 3.1.2). PCD is not necessarily a rationalized myth, because the rationale behind coherent policies is that increased policy coherence will improve development policies' efficiency, but there isn't any scientific data to support this rationale.

After Norway was criticized for not having a sufficient overall approach to PCD (OECD 2008), Norway started releasing annual reports on PCD. Despite this effort, the reports was

criticized for not containing “*measurable indicators to track progress or address impact*” (OECD 2013:27). This implies that PCD as a myth has not had any instrumental effects, as it has not changed anything. Thus, the reports published by the Norwegian Government only function as window-dressing. The reports might indicate that the government is taking PCD seriously but it is only in order to please the OECD and the Norwegian civil society.

If Norway had followed the recommendations from the OECD provided in 2008, to implement an institutional mechanism, PCD as a myth would have been institutionalized, meaning it would be a logical way of addressing PCD. Another way of explaining an institutionalized myth is by looking at it like a routine that it has generally been accepted and have become a part of the organization (Selznick, 1975 in Hersoug, 2006). As long as it is not a routine for the Government to make sure that policies are coherent, or at least not undermine development policies, PCD will be difficult to achieve.

Based on the government reports that was mentioned in 3.1.2, it is clear that Norway has a ‘negative’ view on PCD, where they only see the benefits for developing countries. The negative view might explain why currently, the reports only function as window-dressing. An important aspect of policy coherence is that the government will easier achieve the goals within development, it will not waste resources, and policy coherence will provide better legitimacy. Legitimacy to the policy itself and the government as a whole. By focusing on that side, it is possible that the government would increase their efforts in to create coherent policies.

In conclusion, PCD in itself is a difficult goal in itself to achieve, because of its status as a myth, which has not been rationalized nor institutionalized. However, the causes mentioned in 5.3 makes it even harder for the Government to achieve PCD. I will now further explain how these causes are obstacles for achieving PCD by using the different theoretical perspectives. The causes are mainly the causes of incoherence in the paradox used in this thesis. Although it might be possible to generalize them, I will not discuss that further as I see the need to limit the extensiveness of this thesis.

5.3.1 How does Conflicting interest hinder PCD?

Conflicting interests and values along with the government's difficulty in prioritizing are the core reason why we see policy incoherence (Forster & Stokke 1999). This section will provide a discussion on why some policies are prioritized before others. This will mainly be discussed from the realist perspective.

In the light of both the realist and neo-realist perspective, states are rational actors in an anarchic world, where the chase for power and self-survival is central. Due to this, it is natural that domestic policies are prioritized. It is difficult to achieve PCD because everything a state does, in a realist perspective, has altruistic motivation. By increasing policy coherence, which Norway sees as mostly beneficial to developing countries, will therefore not have any purpose for Norway, as it will not benefit them in the same way.

To achieve PCD development in the paradox used in this thesis, will mean that Norway will either have to end NICFI or stop importing soy. Norway will, in the realist perspective not stop importing soy. This can be explained by *raison d'état* - where morality has to succumb to necessity. This means that the state will secure necessity before everything else.

“Agriculture is never high on list of priorities, however, it has a strong foundation” (Informant 8, 2016).

The strong foundation Norwegian agriculture rests on, is why in many cases the interests in that sector will come first. This was to some extent refuted by Informant 2 (2016) who mentioned that this was not always the case and referred to Norway's agreement with the least developed countries, regarding zero-tariffs on agricultural goods. This agreement sidelined Norwegian farmers' interest.

The continuing import of soy understood using a different core theme within realism, security. Human security and food security are vital interests, and vital interests can as mentioned in 3.3.1, not be compromised. It is, however, problematic to explain and justify the dependency on soy in the name of food security and self-sufficiency, as the dependency only weakens Norway's food security. With this in mind, I asked what Norway would do if access to GMO-free soy were reduced. *“We are not there yet. Right now there is a balance, and we will address this challenge when it comes”* (Informant 7 2016). Although the answer is reasonable, it also implies a short-term plan in regards to Norwegian food security. This

argument is not necessarily relevant to the discussion regarding policy incoherence, but it shows a level of short-term rationality that exist in the different sectors.

Short-term goal attainment is a critique the neo-realist perspective is faced with. Since the neo-realist is worried about the uncertainties caused by the anarchic global system, they aim for short-term goal attainment (Evans & Newnham 1998). This perspective makes it possible to understand why Norway continue to import soy, because the international structure forces states to be self-sufficient. Even though in this case, it entails being dependent on a different country, for Norway it is a necessary mean to an end. In the neo-realist perspective, it is thus hard to achieve policy coherence for development, because the states are forced to think about themselves first.

Furthermore, it is not beneficial for Norway to end NICFI either, as it provides Norway with power in international negotiations. Traditionally every state needs power in order survive. In this context, by having NICFI in place, it will provide Norway with more power in negotiations and give them an opportunity to continue to protect national interests in international negotiations. In a less altruistic way, NICFI is an important initiative in relation to stop global warming. Thus from this point of view, Norway will continue both and rather live with the incoherence.

If the government were forced to choose between either NICFI or soy, the realist perspective would argue that the government would choose the import of soy. This is because of self-interests, and the important role play in Norwegian agriculture.

“NICFI would have been harder to get through, if it demanded that Norway ended the import of soy, you would face massive lobby and probably loose”

(Informant 9, 2016)

The internal power structure in Norway can also explain why conflicting interests might make it difficult to achieve PCD.

In the instrument perspective, using the negotiation-based variant, there are coalitions of actors who share the same interests. Where goals in the different coalitions might end up colliding. In my thesis, I have put NICFI and environmental non-governmental organizations one the one side. On the other side, there are agricultural interest groups, farmer’s union and animal feed producers. It is possible to include the fish farming sector on this side as well. It is important to note that the reality is not like this, as the informant 8 (2016) said, who is a

representative from the agriculture sector, *“I knew about the import of soy, but I still supported NICFI”*.

However, for argument sake, these are coalitions and according to the negotiation variant the actors are locally rational in order to obtain their goals. Who ‘wins’ will depend on resources and who the actors in the coalitions are. Without going into discussions regarding funds, the agriculture coalition will be a strong force due to its strong standing politically, traditionally (long farming tradition) and culturally (part of Norwegian identity).

The influence that these strong interests groups have was a topic of discussion during my interviews,

“They [the oil sector and agricultural sector] have strong advocates and stronger influence power than those who speak on behalf of the environment and for indigenous people” (Informant 2, 2016).

Since the civil society has increased power and the agricultural and industry sector has a strong standing, it is difficult for the government to act in a way where everyone is pleased. One can argue that the strong interests groups forces the government to make certain decisions and adapt certain myths. For example when the government implement measures that benefit the oil sector, it will gain support and legitimacy from this sector. At the same time it will lose legitimacy from the environmental sector. In order to balance this out, the government will adapt environmental measure in order to regain support (Informant 9, 2016). This back and forth might increase the chance of policy incoherence, and thus making it difficult to create PCD.

In conclusion, by using central themes within the realist and neo-realist perspective, it is possible to see how policy coherence for development will be difficult. Carbone (2008) goes as far as to call it ‘mission impossible’. Based on *raison d’etat*, the government will always prioritize domestic interests first. In the case of soy, this is prioritized because it can be considered vital interests. Norway will also continue NICFI, in order to address the need for power in the international negotiations.

Furthermore, it is also possible to look at the power relations between the different interests groups. The power imbalance between interests groups protecting domestic interests and the groups that are protecting developing interest is significant and decisions often go in the favor of domestic interests because of *raison d’etat*. By looking at the paradox using the myth perspective, conflicting interests make it difficult achieve PCD because the Government

constantly has to adopt certain myths in order to gain legitimacy. This might result in policy incoherence.

5.3.2 How does the fragmented system and information gap hinder PCD?

In 5.2.2, it was stated that the Norwegian Government was fragmented, that many decisions are made separately, which makes it difficult for other ministries to know what is going on in the different ministries. This result in an information gap, which means that when making a decision, it is possible it is done without all the information. Further, my findings showed that the ministries can have different understanding of a decision or a policy.

In this section, I will discuss the findings further using the different theoretical perspectives within organization theory to explain how the fragmented system and the information gap might hinder policy coherence for development. In a realist perspective, decisions are made based on how it will benefit national interests. In a neo-realist perspective, the Government is forced by the international structure to make decisions that benefit national interests.

The instrumental perspective explain that decision-making is done in a heterogeneous environment, and is based on three different mechanisms. The first mechanism, a decision often goes in the favor of the ‘winning’ coalition. In this case, there are different ministries representing different interests, along with interests groups from the civil society. As mentioned earlier, the strongest coalition, which will depend on actors and resources, will ‘win’. The second mechanism is compromises. By compromising, the decision may gain greater legitimacy. Compromises may end up diffuse and be difficult to implement (Christensen et.al 2015). The last mechanism is when the decisions end up being a quasi-resolution. This involves that the different interests are given sequential attention, meaning the decisions are made according to the current situation (Christensen et.al, 2015). Adapted into this context, it would mean that the import of soy and NICFI are addressed at different times and because of the current situation, where there is no alternative for soy, the import of certified soy will have to suffice.

The different mechanisms may explain why the different decisions might make it difficult to achieve policy coherence. The first mechanism, the strongest coalition will win, and as explained in 5.2.2, coalitions relating to development often are weaker than domestic coalitions. Compromises can, as Hoebink (2004) stated, be the best possible solution.

However, the compromise between the import of soy and NICFI is certified soy. In this case the compromise doesn't change anything, because the industry in itself is problematic in relation to the environment and social impacts. Thus, compromises might result in policy coherence, but in this case it has not resulted in PCD. The last mechanism is a way for politicians to avoid addressing policy coherence. The term "quasi-resolutions" in itself imply that the decision is not good enough, but is a result of the current situation.

By applying the myth perspective, it is possible to understand the implementation of NICFI, despite the import soy. The Government as an organization is influenced by external pressure, and has to implement certain myths in order to gain legitimacy. The pressure can come from the civil society, public opinion or other interests groups. International organizations like the UN, WTO or OECD can also add pressure on the Government. This pressure creates norms on how the Government should function, how it is supposed to act and react (Christensen et.al, 2015)

The civil society had the public opinion and the opposing parties on their side when they lobbied for NICFI, which created the pressure on the Government.

The public opinion can be seen in relation to Al Gore's documentary "The Inconvenient Truth" and that it won two Oscars in 2007. This initiated or enhanced the green wave that Norway experienced and still experiences. The movie helped gaining more public support for the environmental cause, which was further strengthened when Al Gore won the Nobel Peace Price (Hermansen, 2015).

The year before, the Stern Review was released, which was valuable as it provided the environmental NGOs with all the arguments they needed in order to justify NICFI to the politicians. The NGOs lobbying for NICFI, consciously lobbied the opposing parties using the arguments in the Stern review (2006). By doing so, it added political pressure on the government (Hermansen, 2015). This political pressure along with the public opinion arguably created an expectation, to which the government had to respond. Sometimes it is necessary to give into the pressure and incorporate the norms in order to gain legitimacy (Christensen et.al, 2015).

The pressure to conform makes it difficult to achieve policy coherence for development, as the pressure can weaken the organization's ability to understand a problem and the routines to solve it, thus it weaken the government's ability to evaluate how other policies might be an obstacle for achieving the set goals (Krogh et.al, 1998). There was only a pressure to create

NICFI, to find causes that might make NICFI inefficient would require a different process (Informant 9, 2016).

Furthermore, in the myth perspective, a division between the formal and informal sides of the structure can arise. As mentioned earlier in the findings, the government is open for influence, but that does not automatically result in change. NICFI as a myth, was adopted as it can be considered rationalized (scientifically supported) and it became institutionalized, as it became the logical way of addressing deforestation. However, it has not led to real change, it has not had instrumental effects, because it has continued to import soy.

“It [NICFI] was easy to do in the sense that it didn’t demand that any other Norwegian interests had to be compromised” (Informant 9, 2016).

Using this argument, NICFI is window-dressing, where it was adopted in order to please the pressure from the outside. By adopting NICFI, the Norwegian government became a progressive environmental state in the international community and provided Norway with a strong card in international environmental negotiations.

This discussion regarding the decision-making system is based on the assumption that the organization – meaning the central government and the ministries are bounded rational, a term often used in the instrumental perspective. Instrumental rationality is an ideal form of rationality, where organizations make calculated decisions to maximize goal attainment.

As presented in the findings, one informant said that the different ministries might have different understanding of a policy. This might involve them not fully understanding the implication of their decisions. Not understanding something might indicate a lack of knowledge or information. The lack of understanding is best explained by the term ‘bounded rationality’. Ministries are locally rational, meaning they will do everything they can in order to achieve certain goals, but in the bigger picture, they are bounded rational. A bounded rational organization has limitations when it comes the capacity of finding the necessary information, where they have to select what information they will base their decision on. To gather more information, will demand time and resources, which often are in short supply when it comes to government organizations. Few policies are made with perfect information, where the information gap can limit the ability to achieve policy coherence for development (Christensen et.al, 2015; Hydén, 1999).

In conclusion, the public opinion and the political pressure created a socially constructed norm, a myth, which demanded a program that addressed deforestation. The Government in

this perspective implemented the myth in order to gain more legitimacy. On the other hand, since the Government is bounded rational, they lack the capacity to find information that would render the initiative inefficient. Thus, since Government is constantly pressured to adopt myths and as it is bounded rational, it makes it difficult to achieve policy coherence for development. In order to create policy coherence for development in this case would have to be achieved through a different process, where a different myth created pressure on the Government to create policy coherence between the two policies.

5.3.3 How does lack of coordination hinder PCD?

In section 5.2.3, it was mentioned several times, that coordination is crucial in order to achieve policy coherence for development. Thus, if proper coordination is lacking, this will be an obstacle in order to achieve PCCD. By using the perspectives in organization theory, it is possible to understand why coordination is difficult within the Government structure.

Lack of coordination, is arguably a symptom of a bureaucratic system. Here it is possible to include Hoebink's (2004) vertical and horizontal types of [in]coherence which was mentioned earlier. The instrumental perspective is also concerned with the horizontal and vertical structure of the government. A government require a great deal of specialization and division of labor where horizontally the government is separated into different ministries.

In 5.2.3, lack collaboration was mentioned as a factor of weak coordination. Collaboration was also mentioned as a specific 'tool' in order to achieve policy coherence for development (OECD 1996, in Ashoff 2005). Although the representatives from the government sector refuted that there was a lack of collaboration, the structure of the government might explain why collaboration is difficult. By having specialized organizations or in this case, ministries, it puts all the knowledge regarding an issue into one organization. As mentioned in 3.2.1, this might create a very narrow understanding of reality, making it hard to know when to collaborate with other ministries.

If the ministries do not collaborate, it thus creates a need for an additional coordination mechanism, where this responsibility currently rests in the Prime Minister's Office. Such mechanism is crucial for the organization to function properly. As noted by Mintzberg (1983), coordination gets more difficult the bigger the group is. In the instrumental perspective, it is possible to separate between vertical and horizontal coordination. Vertical and horizontal

coordination was also specified in the 'Rules for the Ministries' mentioned in 3.2.1. The rules said that the leaders must make sure that cooperation between ministries happens, and that sub-ordinates have to report to their leaders.

According to PCD, policies should not interfere with development policies. Proper horizontal coordination can ensure this. *"The existence of a central overview and coordination capacity is essential to ensure horizontal consistency among policies"* (OECD, 1996, in Ashoff, 2005). However, according to Christensen et.al (2015), horizontal coordination is weakened by vertical coordination. This is because specialization only strengthens vertical coordination, which compromises the ability to coordinate horizontally, there is no specialized mechanism that coordinate horizontally.

Vertical specialization is the hierarchy, where the ministries are separated into different agencies or departments. Vertical coordination can go both ways where it goes downwards in order to govern the organization. It goes upwards so the leaders get the information they need to make a decision. When it comes to policies, the ministries make suggestions for new policies and bring it up. If it is accepted, it goes down the hierarchy again as a policy.

The myth perspective can further explain why coordination might appear as weak. Informant 2 (2016) noted that Norwegian administration is very open and available for influence from the outside. Nonetheless, this is a matter of politeness from the Government side, where the input is noted but later ignored.

"Some parts of the different ministries work together, but the core remain separate" (Informant 8, 2016).

This is an example on how the organization or the ministries in a myth perspective separate the formal side from the informal side. By separating these two sides, it allows the organization to be unique and similar at the same time, where the primary tasks can still be done, despite the changes in the formal structure. They are unique because the ministry is still specialized. By adopting myths, the ministry from the outside can seem as it has conformed to the external pressure, but in reality it still continue as they did. How the ministry functions internally, is what the cultural perspective is concerned with (Krogh et. al, 1998, Christensen. Et.al, 2015).

The separation of the formal and informal side might also explain why coordination is so difficult. Earlier it was mentioned that some myths do not have any real instrumental effects,

meaning they adapt the myth, but only to the formal side where they function as a window-dressing. This also mean that the organization can continue as they did.

To use a metaphor, NICFI is a myth that only has been adapted to the formal side or structure of the Government, the outside shell. This could imply that the Government does not see the need to coordinate it with the work that remains in the core. The core in this metaphor might be the national interests like food production. This is because there is no pressure to coordinate it with internal core, only a pressure to implement the myth, in this case NICFI.

Thus, in order to achieve PCD, there is a need for coordination between the shell and the core.

Another way of looking at it is by look at the Government as an organized anarchy. Organized anarchies is a term first introduced by James G. March, Johan P. Olsen and Michael D. Cohen (Christensen et.al, 2015) To borrow their term, the political environment can be explained as an environment where time is a shortage, where actors come and go, along with problems and solutions. The problems and solutions can be viewed as myths, where the unpredictable situations require politicians to adapt to the shifting environment quickly, leaving the ability to coordinate weak. The constantly changing environment demand a great deal of flexibility, where steering is not possible, it is about adapting to the socially constructed norms. For this reason, there is no coordination between policies if it is not demanded.

In conclusion, in the instrumental perspective, the government is horizontally specialized into ministries, where all the knowledge regarding one topic is located in one ministry. This creates a need for extensive horizontal policy coordination in order to achieve policy coherence for development. Using the myth perspective, NICFI is only adopted into the formal structure, but it has not affected the work that goes on in the core. Therefore, there is a need for coordination between the formal and informal side in order to obtain policy coherence for development. By looking at the Government as an organized anarchy, the coordination ability is left weak, because of the demand for flexibility.

Chapter 6: Conclusive Summary

This thesis has set out to find explanations for the apparent lack of coherence between Norwegian agricultural policy and Norwegian REDD policy. In this case the agricultural policy in question is the import of soy, and the REDD policy is the Norwegian International Climate and Forest Initiative.

It is my argument through this thesis that it is a paradox that Norway import soy, a well-documented source of deforestation in Brazil, at the same time as they are contributing to the preservation of the same rainforest. This could be compared to pushing the brakes while keeping your foot on the accelerator. My argument is also my bias, which was important for me to address during the interviews and it also why I made it into a research question (RQ 2). This was in order to gain different perspectives on the matter.

The findings showed that there was different opinions on whether or not there is incoherence. From the perspective of the Government and the agricultural sector there is coherence between the two policies as Norway imports certified soy, meaning the soy comes from areas not deforested after 2004. The NGO sector agreed to some extent that there was an apparent lack of coherence, but they also added they were pleased that Norway imported certified soy. It is important to note that currently there is no alternatives available, so best practice in this matter is to import certified soy, it is.

An important aspect of NICFI, which is often forgotten, is the development aspect of it. Although it is not mentioned as one of the three main goals, it is an important side effect of preserving the rainforest and is also listed as a motivation behind the initiative (MoE, 2009). Additionally, the funding that is provided through NICFI is recognized as official development assistance through OECD's development committee. Based on these arguments I see that it is also important to ask whether there is policy coherence towards the development goals.

In section 4.3.1, the social effects of the soy industry was mentioned. Earlier the industry led to massive displacement of indigenous people, the industry has not provided jobs and the use of pesticides continue to be a threat to the local people's health. Based on this I argue that there is policy incoherence between the import of soy and NICFI.

The rationale of this thesis is rested on the concept of Policy Coherence for Development (PCD), which has become an important topic within the OECD. The concept of PCD means

that policies outside the development sector should support or at least not undermine the countries own development efforts. PCD should therefore be understood as a goal. As I see it, the import of soy undermine the efforts relating to the development aspect. Although it is disputable if the import of soy undermine the environmental efforts, Norway's demand continue to put pressure on the industry and thus also the forest. The Norwegian Government acknowledged this last argument in a Norwegian Official Report (NOU, 2013). Norway's commitment to PCD is disputable. The current Government should be commended as they integrated it into their political platform. Despite the efforts however, I have argued that the annual reports released only functions as window-dressing.

The OECD (2005) acknowledged that achieving PCD can be problematic, since it could possibly result in a split between interests groups trying to enhance the standing of developing countries and interests groups interested in protecting domestic production. This was also stated in the Report to the Storting (2012). It was also stated that it would be most problematic to achieve PCD between development policies and agricultural policies (Proposition 1S, 2013).

I chose to do a qualitative study because by asking for explanations, it is best to ask the people who create policies, make decisions and influence both processes for an explanations. By conducting 14 semi-structured interviews, I was able to get some answers relating to my problem statement. However, I used secondary and tertiary sources as well, in order to have enough data to draw conclusions. Based on the interviews and other relevant sources I was able to find three broad categories that explain the apparent lack of coherence between the two policies in question.

The first category, conflicting interests was the most prominent answer throughout my research. Conflicting interests need to also to be understood as the nature of politics, and is bound to appear in democracies. Democracies are pluralistic societies, where many different stakeholders represents different interests, which need to be weighed against each other. Some of the stakeholders are stronger and have more influence when it comes to decisions.

Why conflicting interests is problematic when it comes to achieving PCD, is because national interests often weigh heavier in political decision. Why this is, was best explained by using the realist perspective and the neo-realist perspective. In the realist perspective, a state as rational actor will always try to protect own interests before anything else, as central themes within the perspective is survival and power. In a neo-realist perspective it is the international

structure that forces the state to think of own interests first. An additional term used in realism is *raison d'état*, where necessity is more important than morality concerns.

The instrumental perspective provided a different view on why conflicting interests made it difficult to achieve PCD. In this perspective, there are different coalitions representing different interests. The coalition that will win will be based on resources and who the actors within the coalition are. Very often, the coalition representing domestic interests will win, due to the powerful interests groups that support them, where the development coalition often will be weaker. Policy coherence for development could therefore be considered a benefit for the development coalition, but a cost for the 'domestic' coalition.

The second explanation for the apparent lack of coherence, was the fragmented decision making system. This was mentioned as a broad category, where the fragmented decision-making system led to a knowledge gap. It was noted in the power enquiry (NOU, 2003) that the Norwegian government was becoming fragmented, that many decisions are made at many different levels within the Government structure. When a decision is made within a ministry, it does not automatically mean that every other ministry would know about it. Which means that when a different ministry make a decision, it is done with limited information. An additional topic within this category was the different understanding of reality, where decision-makers does not know how their decision might impact other policies within different areas.

The instrumental perspective best explains why the fragmented decision-making system make it difficult to achieve PCD. The instrumental perspective is concerned with the formal structure. The formal structure of the Norwegian Government is characterized by high level of division of labor and specialization. Each specialized area, the ministries, are locally rational, meaning they make decision based on what will lead to maximum goal obtainment. However in the bigger picture they are bounded rational, which explains why they might have difficult in understanding how their decision might affect other policy areas. Bounded rationality also explains that an organization, like the ministries, have limited capacity and resources to find the information needed in order to make an informed decision.

The last broad category that was presented in the findings was the lack of coordination. Carbone (2008) noted that in order to avoid policy incoherencies, policies need to be coordinated. An informant supported this and stated that the more coordinated it was from the top, the more coherent policies Norway would have (Informant 9, 2016). The power enquiry also concluded that the Prime Minister's office had neglected their responsibility to

coordinate policies coming from the different ministries (NOU, 2003). Due to this flaw, is why we might see that PCD will be difficult to achieve.

By using the instrumental perspective, it is possible to understand why coordination is so difficult. To gain PCD there is a need for horizontal coordination, a responsibility that lies with Prime Minister's office. It is the formal structure of the Government, that make it difficult coordinate policies. According to Christensen et.al (2015), vertical coordination only weakens the horizontal coordination, because the specialization only strengthen the ability to coordinate vertically and there is no specialized mechanism that ensure that policies are coordinated horizontally.

Further, it is possible to view the lack of coordination in myth perspective. In a myth perspective, organizations only adopt myth in order to seem more legitimate. Furthermore, in this perspective the formal side of the structure might separate itself from the informal side, this is so the organization may continue with business as usual, but seem more legitimate externally. This means that NICFI was adopted in order to gain legitimacy, but it didn't have any instrumental effects, as it didn't result in change. The external pressure only demanded a program that addressed deforestation, but it didn't demand anything else. So in order to achieve PCD in this case, it would have to happen through a different process.

These three broad causes are thus the explanations of why there is policy incoherence between NICFI and the import of soy. By using the different theoretical perspective, it has made it possible to gain a further understanding of why the different causes may lead to policy incoherence.

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Appendix 1: Informants

Informant No.	Sector
Informant 1	NGO
Informant 2	NGO
Informant 3	Research/academia
Informant 4	Research/academia
Informant 5	Research/academia
Informant 6	Government
Informant 7	Government
Informant 8	Interest group – agriculture
Informant 9	NGO
Informant 10	Political Scientist
Informant 11	Government
Informant 12	Political Scientist
Informant 13	Research/Political Scientist
Informant 14	NGO

Appendix 2: Interview Guide

Theme	Questions
Starter questions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Can I record this interview? - What is your responsibility at work? What is your area of interests?
Norwegian Climate policies	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - What do you think about Norwegian climate policies? - Internationally, so you consider Norway as a green nation?
Norwegian Agricultural politics	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - What do you think about Norwegian agriculture – when it comes to climate friendly policies, carbon footprint? - How can Norwegian agricultural become more climate friendly?
NICFI	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - What is your opinion on NICFI? - What do you think the biggest weaknesses of NICFI? - What do you think the motivation behind NICFI is?
Lack of coherence between NICFI and agriculture	To what degree is there policy incoherence
Soy import	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - What do you think about the importation of soy? - How important do you see the import of soy? - Do you see soy as a necessity in Norwegian agriculture? - What impact does the import of soy have on initiatives like NICFI? - What impact does the import of soy have on Norway as a “climate nation”?
Coherence in foreign and domestic climate policies	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - What do you think about the lack of coherence in REDD policy and the import of soy? - What do you think are the explanations are for the lack of coherence between import of soy and NICFI? - How can NICFI be effective while still importing soy? -
Communication and collaboration between ministries	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - How does the ministries collaborate? How do you see the collaboration between the ministries? - Can anything be done differently?

	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- How much communication is there between the ministries?
Common goals	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- Do you see NICFI as a common goal for the ministries?- Does the ministries have any common goals – regarding the environment?



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