



Norwegian University
of Life Sciences

Master's Thesis 30 credits
Faculty of Social Sciences
Department of International Environment And
Development Studies, Noragric

CHINA AS A GAME CHANGER IN AID AND DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS: A CASE OF NORWEGIAN AID AND DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS IN AFRICA

ASANTE ODURO MICHAEL
Msc. International Relations

The Department of International Environment and Development Studies, Noragric, is the international gateway for the Norwegian University of Life Sciences (NMBU). Eight departments, associated research institutions and the Norwegian College of Veterinary Medicine in Oslo. Established in 1986, Noragric's contribution to international development lies in the interface between research, education (Bachelor, Master and PhD programmes) and assignments.

The Noragric Master Thesis are the final theses submitted by students in order to fulfill the requirements under the Noragric Master programme "International Environmental Studies", "International Development Studies" and "International Relations".

The findings in this thesis do not necessarily reflect the views of Noragric. Extracts from this publication may only be reproduced after prior consultation with the author and on condition that the source is indicated. For rights of reproduction or translation contact Noragric.

© Name, May 2016
e-mail

Noragric
Department of International Environment and Development Studies
P.O. Box 5003
N-1432 Ås
Norway
Tel.: +47 67 23 00 00
Internet: <https://www.nmbu.no/om/fakulteter/samvit/institutter/noragric>

Declaration

I, Asante Oduro Michael, declare that this thesis is a result of my research investigations and findings. Sources of information other than my own have been acknowledged and a reference list has been appended. This work has not been previously submitted to any other university for award of any type of academic degree.

Signature.....

Date.....

Dedication

This research work is dedicated to Norwegian Police Service for their devotion and great service in saving my life when I was held hostage at Clarion Royal Hotel on Monday 8th December 2014. Had it not been for the help of the Police Negotiator Service, I would not have lived to complete this research. Their Selflessness and dedication will always be remembered.

Acknowledgement

My gratitude first goes to the Almighty God for his protection, care and strength of life throughout the process of this research. My gratefulness likewise goes to my supervisor Prof. Stig Jarle Hansen and co-supervisor Camilla Houeland who became sources of inspiration, knowledgeable comments and guidance throughout the process of this thesis. I do not know where far I could have gone without you, especially Camilla Houeland.

My research could not have completed without the assistance of large number of development co-operation agency staff that took time out of their busy schedules and made themselves available for the interview. Particular thanks must go to the staff of Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). In MFA, Harald Tollan arranged a meeting for a brief discussion on the research and contacted all the Norwegian diplomats in Africa both current and past for the interview. I profited a lot from the interviews with the Norwegian diplomats and I appreciate their humility and support. My thanks also go to the staff of Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD) for the interview and also making their library available to me throughout the research.

I would like to thank DAC Chairman and former Norwegian Minister of Environment and International Development Erik Solheim for his inspiration and ideas that provided valuable background for this thesis. My appreciation also goes to the African Diplomats and staff of some African embassies in Norway and Sweden who readily opened their doors for the interview. During the interview with these diplomats, I was able to take advantage of the insights in the activities of China and Norway in their respective countries.

Array of talented researchers and Journalist from Norway and other countries who were available for the interview were so helpful with their ideas and comments. Throughout the research process, I benefitted from valuable inputs from Dr. Simon Pahle during several meetings with him both in Norway and in Ghana. To all my family and friends who were supportive throughout the research process, I say AYIKOO (Well done) for your helpful comments and support.

Oslo, 10th May 2016
Asante Oduro Michael

Abstract

China's rapidly expanded aid, trade and investment in Africa since the turn of the millennium has attracted a lot of scholars' attention. Some scholars have criticised China's engagements as been driven by self-interest and argue that China's growing presence in Africa will influence other donor countries to use aid and diplomatic relations to pursue self-interest. Norwegian aid and diplomatic relations in Africa have increasingly been linked with this debate by some researchers and diplomats from Norway. They argue that Norwegian aid and diplomatic relations in Africa has changed from been altruistic and that Norway is using its aid and diplomatic relations in Africa to pursue self-interest as a consequence of China's growing presence in Africa.

The objective of this research is to explore from realists' perspective through the concept of interest that Norwegian aid has and always been motivated by interest. I argued that rather than moving from altruism to self-interests, Norwegian aid has shifted in character, and *kinds* of interests behind aid. Norwegian aid and diplomatic relations has shifted from diplomatic and security interests to economic interests as a consequence of growing Chinese engagements that has changed geopolitical scenario in aid and investment in Africa and the international system since 2000. Altruism has only been used to camouflage Norwegian self-interest.

China's growth in Africa has resulted in increased competition over African resources because of increased prices in natural resources especially in the oil sector, increased interests in investments and trade from foreign governments and entities. Africa now has strong consumer and purchasing power and has become more interested in trade and investment than aid. These changes in Africa as a consequence of China's growth have influenced Norway to make policy changes and take initiatives in aid and diplomatic relations such as increased FDI, mixing aid with business interest, strategic cooperation with oil resourceful countries, changes in diplomatic missions in Africa etc. The official and rhetoric motive by Norway is based on moral and humanitarian but realists' perspectives explain differently through the concepts interest. To the realists, Norway is using aid and diplomatic relations in Africa to pursue its economic interest in Africa.

List of Abbreviation

CMI	Chr. Michelsen Institute
NORAD	Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation
FOCAC	Forum for China-Africa Co-operation
OFD	Oil for Development Programme
CBD	China Development Bank
PRS	Poverty Reduction Strategy
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
OEEC	Organization for European Economic Co-operation
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
DWAA	Department of West Asia and African Affairs
SSA	Sub-Saharan Africa
SADCC	South African Development Co-operation Conference
WTO	World Trade Organization
HIPC	Highly Indebted Poor Countries
LIC	Low Income Countries
ITO	International Trade and Organization
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
ODA	Official Development Assistance
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MOC	Ministry of Commerce
IMF	International Monetary Fund
WB	World Bank
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
SAP	Structural Adjustment Programme
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
IDA	International Development Association

Table of Contents

Declaration	iii
Dedication	iv
Acknowledgement.....	v
Abstract.....	vi
List of Abbreviation	vii
List of Tables and Figures.....	x
1.0 INTRODUCTION.....	12
1.1 Focuses and Objective	12
1.2 Research Questions	17
1.3 Thesis Structure.....	18
2.0 THEORY AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK.....	21
2.1 Realism And National Interest	22
2.2.1 Realism and the Origin of aid.....	25
2.2.2 The Cold War Politics of Aid.....	26
2.3 Conceptualizing Aid.....	28
2.4 Rules And Standards For Aid.....	30
2.5.3 Economic and Commercial Interest.....	36
2.6 Conceptualizing Diplomacy.....	37
2.6.1 Diplomacy and Self-interest.....	38
3.0 METHODOLOGY.....	41
3.1 Case Study	41
3.2 Generalizability	42
3.3 Data Collection, Interpretation and Triangulation	44
3.4 Sources of Data Collection.....	46
3.4.1 Interviews.....	46
3.4.2 Other Primary Sources.....	50
3.4.3 Secondary Data	51
3.5 Reliability.....	51
3.6 Issues of Objectivity	52
4.0 BACKGROUND	54
4.1 Global Aid Trend.....	54
4.2 Global Aid before 2000.....	55
4.3 Global Aid after 2000.....	62
5.0 ANALYSING CHINESE ENGAGEMENTS IN AFRICA	65
5.1 History of Chinese Development Assistance in Africa.....	65
5.2 China in Africa Before 2000.....	66
5.2.1 From 1970: Economic Interest Driven	68
5.3 China in Africa From 2000.....	70
5.3.1 Naturally Resource-Backed Projects.....	72
5.3.2 Non-conditionality and Non-interference Engagements Policy	73
5.3.3 Increased Support for Private Investment.....	75
5.3.4 Mixed aid, trade and Investment	77
5.3.5 Emphasize on bilateral Aid	78
5.3.6 Strong Focus on Physical infrastructural Development	79

5.3.7 A win-win Economic Cooperation?	80
5.5 Realism and Chinese National Interest In Africa	85
5.6 Preliminary Observation	86
6.1 History of Norway in Africa.....	89
6.2.1 Project Based Development Assistance To Programme aid.....	90
6.2.2 Donorship To Conditionality.....	93
6.2.3 Focus on Liberation Struggle, Peace and Security?	93
6.2.4 Less Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Africa	94
6.2.5 Multilateral Support.....	95
Source NORAD	96
6.2.6 Bilateral Aid Focus On Africa.....	98
6.2.7 Emphasis On Development And Poverty Eradication?.....	101
6.3 Preliminary Observation	102
6.4 Norwegian Development Assistance After 2000.....	103
6.4.2 Bilateral Aid: Africa Focus And Expansion Beyond Priority Countries.....	106
6.4.3 Growing FDI And Norwegian Controlled Enterprises.....	108
6.4.4 Strategic Growth Energy, Oil And Export Cooperation	112
6.4.5 Changing Geographic and Diplomatic Relations	115
6.4.6 Shifting Development?	117
6.4.7 Shifting Focus on Russia Threat?.....	119
6.5 Preliminary Observation	121
7.0 CONCLUSION.....	122
APPENDIX 9.1.....	140
APPENDIX 9.3.....	142
APPENDIX 9.4.....	143

List of Tables and Figures

<i>Figure 1: Geographical Distribution of China's Development Assistance in 2009</i>	13
<i>Figure 2: Interview Sequence</i>	50
<i>Figure 3: Sector Distribution of Norwegian Development Aid to Africa from 1960-1998</i>	92
<i>Figure 4: Breakdown of Norwegian Aid for Economic and trade in Africa from 1960-1998</i>	92
<i>Figure 5: Norwegian Development Aid from 1960-1999 by Partner</i>	96
<i>Figure 6: Norwegian Global Support from 2001-2014</i>	107
<i>Figure 7: Norway's ODA levels, Personal remittances and Foreign Direct Investments, by region (1990-2013)</i>	111
<i>Table 1</i>	100
<i>Table 2</i>	105

1.0 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Focuses and Objective


China's increased involvement in Africa since 2000 is one of the most significant recent developments in the region and brings a lot of political consequences to many donor countries in Africa (Tull, 2006). In 1999 the value of China's trade with Africa was \$2 billion; by 2005 this had grown to \$39.7 billion and the figure is estimated to reach top the \$100 billion mark by the end of the decade (Taylor, 2006). By 2011, trade between China and Africa had grown to \$166 billion. In addition, at the fifth Forum on China-Africa Cooperation held in Beijing in July 2012, the Chinese President Hu Jintao pledged yet more support for Africa, including 100 schools, 30 hospitals, 30 anti-malaria centres and 20 agricultural technology demonstration centres (Kingsley, 2013).

The purpose of this thesis is to analyze changes in Norway's engagements in Africa and to identify if and how these changes could be linked to the increased China's engagements in Africa since 2000. To do this, the thesis use realists' perspective that defines international relations between states as always driven by self-interest. I argued that the conditions for pursuing self-interest through aid have changed due to China's increased engagements in Africa. China's trade and investment in Africa has improved Africa's infrastructural development, increased Africans purchasing and consumer power, boosted prices of Africa's natural resources and increased competition over Africa's natural resources. These have changed the condition for aid because African governments have become more interested in trade and investments other than aid.

Currently China buys more than one-third of Africa's oil and China's industries are getting raw materials such as coal from South Africa, iron ore from Gabon, timber from Equatorial Guinea and copper from Zambia (Kingsley, 2013). Sudan, Africa's third largest producer of oil, exports 60% of its oil to China, fulfilling 5% of China's needs while Angola has overtaken Saudi Arabia as the country's largest supplier of oil (E. Lammers, 2007.). While the share of Africa's exports to China rose from 1.3% in 1995 to 9.3% in 2004, Africa's to OECD countries declined within this period (E. Lammers, 2007.). China's growth in Africa is not only limited to economic investment but also development aid.

The geographical distribution of Chinese foreign aid as shown in **Figure 1** indicates that Africa received 45.7% of China’s foreign aid in 2009 (Xinhuanet, 2011). This indicates the Chinese priority of Africa in its diplomatic relations and foreign aid.

Figure 1: Geographical Distribution of China’s Development Assistance in 2009



Source: (Xinhuanet, 2011)

“China’s official aid takes many forms: Chinese medical teams in two-year missions, the construction of roads and bridges, agricultural technical assistance, the installation of a thermo-electric station in Minsk, an e-office system for Senegal or an MA-60 passenger jet for the Laos national airline” (Bräutigam, 2011, p. 754). China’s aid is characterized by no political or economic conditions, focus more on development of areas linked to resources vitally needed in China, mostly concessional loans, and the use of collateral resources as payment for loans.

China’s engagements in Africa has triggered a lot of debate within the international community and has become topic of research within the academic discourse with a growing interest in research environment from Stellenbosch to UK to US and to China itself. In the debates of China-Africa (Sino-Africa) relationship, both amongst scholars and practitioners, it has been argued that China’s engagements is driven by self-interest as in contrast to Western/Norwegian aid and diplomatic relations that is supposedly driven by altruism or development goals. That is, Western political forces and media have criticised China’s engagements in Africa for being driven by self-interest and argue that China is only in Africa

for Africa's economic resources (Sautman & Hairong, 2007). However, China's engagements have been explicit about their interest in Africa's natural resources and the need to ensure regular supply of raw materials for growing China's energy needs and this has changed the game for aid in Africa. China claim these engagements are not a clash of interest but a win-win game in which both Africa and China benefit. That is, China's engagements in Africa is generally motivated by political, economic and security interest. China's national interest lies in Africa's natural resources, building diplomatic leverage internationally and getting access to African markets for Chinese goods i.e. typically realist understanding of international relations. According to the realists, the promotion of a state's national interest in the international system is an iron law of necessity' (Baylis, Smith, & Owens, 2013).

Some scholars like Tull (2006) have also argued that Chinese growing presence poses serious challenge and bring many political consequences to many donor countries in Africa. That is the increased Chinese engagements in Africa with emphasis on business investments and extraction of natural resources has changed the game of aid and states relations in Africa. China has emerged as an important player in aid and diplomatic relations since the end of the cold war where the international state system was a bipolar because US and USSR were the super powers and state relations and the motivation to give or withheld aid was based on the interest of the US and USSR. The international state system changed to unipolar system with US as the super power. The US exercised most of the global economic and military influence and US interest controlled states within the international system (Waltz, 1964). The US and its allies used programme aid through US established multilateral institutions to control developing states' domestic politics and diplomatic relations with other states during this period. Realist argue that in a unipolar systems there is only one great power and faces no competition (Waltz, 1964). The emergence of a competitor therefore changes the international state system and relationship between states (Waltz, 1964). From the realists' perspectives China's emergence as a competitor in aid, trade and investment has changed the international system and the premise for using aid in the pursuit of national interests. China has worn the support of many African countries in the international arena and this has increased competition for the goodwill and support of the African governments in the international arena. States will have to compete with China for the goodwill of African leaders support in the international arena especially in the UN and other organizations. Moreover, China's expansion of African's infrastructure and increased prices of raw materials has made

investment more interesting for other actors like Norway who saw Africa not as economically interesting in the period before 2000.

The debate that China's growth in Africa will affect some donor countries has become a topic of discussion within the Norwegian media. The main issue of concern within the debate is that Norwegian aid has been increasingly linked to discussions of mixing own economic interests with aid. The RORG-network for instance debates over whether Norwegian foreign policy choices is for development purposes or self-interest (RORG-network, 2016). There are also political debates over whether Norway sticks to the definition of aid as defined by the DAC/ODA and whether Norway is seeking to redefine development to create more avenues for Norway's national interest through development aid (Regjeringen.no, 2016). Are these debates not suggestive that Norway's definition of aid is meant to achieve its national interest? In a news article published by Bergen Tidende in 2007, Alf Morten Jerve (Former research fellow CMI) concluded that Norwegian development has become a tool for political influence in the developing country and pursuance of Norwegian interest (Cathrine, 2007).

Some scholars and diplomats have also concluded that the Norwegian development aid that has been labeled as altruistic and delink from interests has changed and been influenced by Chinese growing presence in Africa to use aid to pursue national interests. As Engberg-Pedersen (Former Director of NORAD) admitted, there is a willingness from the Norwegian government to use aid to pursue national interest in partner countries from economic and security to climate negotiations (Gunnar Zachrisen, 2010). Diplomats like Veslemøy Lothe Salvesen and researchers like Simon Pahle and Nina Witoszek have all suggested that there is such a change from altruistic to pursuance of economic interest (Bistandsaktuelt, 2014). Former Norwegian Minister, Jonas Gahr Støre, commented that Norway cannot be afraid to promote its own interest in the world (Elling N. Tjønneland, 2012). The Norwegian Development and Environment Minister also admitted that the idea that aid is unpolitical is meaningless (Gunnar Zachrisen, 2010).

These debates has also been highlighted by a CMI report, which was commissioned by Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and NORAD in 2006 to "present and review the new Chinese engagement in Africa and to identify and discuss implications for Norwegian foreign and development policies" (Tjønneland, Brandtzæg, Kolås, & Le Pere, 2006). The report

argued, “China's development will affect the history of the twenty-first century, and perhaps nowhere more importantly than in Africa. The emergence of China introduces new opportunities for Africa, new challenges and new imponderables as well” (Tjønneland et al., 2006). Why would a small donor country like Norway conduct a report on China’s engagements in Africa? This shows how Norway has become concerned of the growing China’s engagements in Africa. Moreover, the Norwegian government on regular bases requests its diplomats in Africa to provide reports on Chinese engagements in their respective resident countries¹. Realists argue that one state’s effort to gain power, be it economic or military is always a concern for other states within the international system and the concerned state will have to take steps to protect its interest (Baylis et al., 2013). From the realists’ perspective China’s changing of geopolitical landscape in Africa through China’s style of mixing aid, trade and investment has become a concern for Norwegian government style of using aid to pursue its interest in Africa. This means that for Norway to be able to protect its interest, Norway will make policy initiatives and diplomatic changes to protect its interest.

Even though, there is a growing debate over the China’s increased engagements and its influence over Norway in Africa, how the increased Chinese engagements affect Norway’s diplomatic and development engagements on the continent, has hardly been subject for academic scrutiny. This research therefore explored how the increased Chinese engagements in Africa changed Norway’s diplomatic and development engagements on the continent and suggested that Norwegian aid has and always been motivated by interest. I argued that rather than moving from altruism to self-interests as argued by some researchers and diplomats, Norwegian aid has shifted in character, and *kinds* of interests behind aid. Norwegian aid has shifted from diplomatic and security interests to economic interests as a consequence of growing Chinese engagements that has changed geopolitical scenario in aid and investment in post 2000 African states and the international system.

In terms of setting, the scope of this research will take a historical look at Norwegian engagements in Africa before 2000 and juxtaposition it with the period from 2000 when China initiated a permanent Forum on Sino-Africa Co-operation (FOCAC), which symbolically marks the genesis of China’s growth in Africa. Even though China had been in Africa long before this date, their activities were massive from 2000 (Tjønneland et al., 2006).

¹ Interview with Norwegian diplomats

I chose to explore a case of Norway and China because Norway has been described in development aid as a country with altruistic motivation for aid (Degnbol-Martinussen & Engberg-Pedersen, 2003). On the other hand, China has been labeled as a country that seeks to promote its national interest through its engagements in Africa. I aim to challenge the perceived altruistic motivation for aid by Norway and argue that self-interest camouflaged with altruism is the main driving force for Norwegian aid. The broad areas of consideration shall be Norwegian and Chinese aid Practice, aid policies as well as other areas of cooperation with the African countries.

1.2 Research Questions

The main objective of this research is first, to explore whether Norwegian aid and engagements in Africa has changed since 2000 and secondly to investigate how the changes has been influenced by Chinese growth in Africa. In order to investigate this, I have chosen realists theoretical perspective to understand international relations between states and the role of aid within this. I will analyze Chinese and Norwegian aid policies and practices in Africa from historical perspective and case study method.

As noted earlier on, there has been a lot of debate over China's engagements in Africa with emphasis on their interest driven aid. This is mostly contrasted with the Norwegian or Western model of aid, which is painted as altruistic. However, there are indications that Norwegian interests in investment and trade with Africa, is increasingly influencing its aid to Africa: As China, they mix business and aid, with a significant increase in aid via business and strategic growth in relations with oil resource countries in Africa. Is Norway not using aid to pursue national interest like China? In order to explore these I have chosen the following research questions as a guideline for the research processes.

Main Research Question

- Has Norwegian aid and diplomatic relations to Africa changed due to the expansively growing Chinese engagements in Africa since 2000?

Hypothesis: Norwegian aid and diplomatic relations to Africa has changed because of Chinese growing engagements in Africa, and it is because China's engagements in Africa have changed the inter-state conditions to pursue self-interest through aid. This is based on realists premise that Norway use aid to pursue its national interests.

Sub Questions:

- How has the Chinese engagements in Africa changed the conditions for Norwegian pursuit of international power and self-interest through aid in Africa.
- In what ways has the Norwegian aid and diplomatic relations to Africa changed since 2000?
- How has the changes in Norwegian aid and diplomatic relations in Africa been shaped by the changing geopolitical scenario in Africa by China?

With these questions, I hope to provide critical analysis of China's engagements in Africa and examine how it has influenced Norway's development aid and diplomatic relations in Africa.

1.3 Thesis Structure

In this first Chapter, I explore the focus, the objective, the research questions and the outline of this research. I present the summary of the main issues arising from the topic, which include the Chinese engagements in Africa, its characteristics, changes in Africa by China and the challenges pose by China in Africa to the other donor countries especially Norway. I also explore the reason for the choice of the topic as well as my main objective of the topic. The setting of this research and the research questions, which served as a guide to the research, were some of the areas I touched on in the introduction. I conclude the introduction with the structure of my thesis.

Realist believes that the national interest of a state is the main driving force of states actions, decisions and behavior within the international arena. Chapter 2 covers the realists' assumptions regarding aid and pursuit of national interest through aid. I explain the theory and link it to Norway and China in Africa. I explore key concepts in the thesis, particularly the concept of aid and diplomacy. I explain the meaning of aid in the context of this thesis, identify the rules and standards for aid and explore the three main drivers of aid. I conclude the chapter by explaining the concept of diplomacy and how self-interest can reflect in the diplomatic relations of a state.

In chapter 3, I reflect on the key research method regarding my research. I explore why I chose case study as the best way to answer my research questions. The use of case study offers me the advantage to study the differences and similarities between Norwegian and Chinese engagements in Africa from historical perspective. Moreover, using case study

offered me the advantage to have a more holistic and in-depth analysis. I also discuss the validity, reliability and limitations of the research method. I discuss interviews and secondary data as the sources of data collection and why I chose those sources.

In chapter 4, I explore the global trend of aid especially in Africa from the period immediately after the Second World War. That is, the chapter takes a historical tour of aid in Africa and Sino-Africa relationship since 1955. The characteristics, drivers and global trend of aid within these periods are the focal point. The purpose is to lay a better foundation for understanding the trend of aid in Africa and contextualizes Norway and China in Africa.

Chapter 5 takes a historical tour of Sino-Africa relationship that dates back in the 1950s but which grew and drew the attention of other donor countries in Africa from 2000. China-Africa relations began after the first Asia-Africa conference in 1955, the Bandung Conference, as China attempted to establish its leadership over the third world countries (Lin Jones). I analyze China's engagements in Africa by identifying the motivation, guiding principles and characteristics of China's engagements before and after 2000. In doing this, I look at aid conditional ties, percentage of Aid, aid modalities, sector development of aid, diplomatic relations and other areas of cooperation with their African counterparts. I also discuss China and Rising Africa in the 21st Century. Since China has no published policy documents regarding aid in Africa, I explore some of the agreements China has made with some African countries as well as articles and literatures regarding Chinese aid policies.

Chapter 6 takes a historical tour of Norwegian aid policies and diplomatic relations in Africa. This tour will take a closer look at the history in terms of motivation for aid, interest and sector preference of Norwegian aid before and after 2000. I identify changes in the Norwegian trend and link the changes to the growing Chinese engagements in Africa. Norwegian aid policies, interviews, Norwegian government white papers on aid and diplomatic relations as well as news, articles and literatures on Norwegian aid were the main source of information at this stage.

Finally, in chapter 7, based on the information gathered in the various chapters I conclude on my findings. I go through each research question and summarize my findings on each of them. I also summarize realists' concept of self-interest and how it reflects in Norwegian aid and diplomatic relations in Africa. I agree that Norway's aid and diplomatic relations in

Africa has changed since 2000 and the changes can be linked to China's engagements as it has shifted the international system and conditions for Norway to pursue power. I suggest that Norwegian aid and diplomatic relations since its inception has been motivated by interest camouflaged in altruism and that has shifted in character and kinds of interests behind aid from being dominated by diplomatic and security interests to economic interests.

2.0 THEORY AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Since its emergence, Development assistance has been controlled by a multitude of actors and driven by different motives, goals and strategies that are together called national interest by the realists. The state, which is the principal donor and recipient of aid, is identified by the realists as the main actor that control and determine the national interest that shape the policies and practices of development assistance (Baylis et al., 2013). While some states are motivated by the desire to present themselves as generous nation others are motivated by the desire to extend their commercial interest beyond their boundaries, while others use aid in the pursuit of national security interest and for regional or global hegemony.

This chapter elaborates the realists understanding of how national interest serves to drive the giving of aid by donor countries. Realism is a school of thought within international relations that takes its assumption that power or self-interest is the main driving force of state's actions, whether in the domestic or international arena (Baylis et al., 2013). That is, the main interest of every state, be it domestic or international, is self-interest and that states should take steps to pursue its interest. I chose to use realism to draw the attention of researchers on the growing importance of realism even with the end of the cold war. During the cold war era USSR and US, together with their allies used aid to pursue their ideological, political and security interests. The end of the cold war and the fall of the Soviet Union, an important player in aid during the cold, was perceived by some scholars as an end of the use of aid as weapon to achieve national interest (Baylis et al., 2013). However, the emergence and growth of China has changed this scenario and dynamics of aid for many donor countries especially in Africa. China's engagement in Africa has resurfaced the importance of realists' national interest as a motivation for aid by states. The main theoretical question is;

How does states use development assistance to pursue national interest according to the realists?

This theoretical section forms the basis for examining why and how China's engagements in Africa change the scenario for Norwegian aid policies and diplomatic relations in Africa. That is, how has China's engagement in aid and businesses change the power dynamics for security, economic interest and diplomatic relations for Norway in Africa? Has China's

engagement changed the Norwegian ability to have power and access to security, diplomatic relations or economy in Africa?

The chapter is divided into three sections; first I examined the realists understanding of national interest through the work of Hans Morgenthau, a realist whose *“Politics Among Nations”* has made a great impact in the study of international relations (Morgenthau, 1985). Second, I explained how national interest played a key role in the origination of development aid and how national interest formed the aid policies of donor state during the cold war period. Thirdly, I examined the concept of aid, the basic rules and standards of aid and three main drivers of aid in the international system. The concepts are important as they provide a benchmark for assessing the Chinese engagements in Africa in order to identify how they differ from the traditional aid standard and understand the drivers of aid in Africa.

2.1 Realism and National Interest

One of the six principles of political realism identified by Hans J. Morgenthau in his *Politics Among Nation*, is national interest which is defined in terms of power and measured in terms of military and economic capabilities of a state (Morgenthau, 1985). Morgenthau argues that national interest is the main driving force that influences states behavior in the international system and without it “a theory of politics, international or domestic, would be altogether impossible” (Morgenthau, 1985, p. 5). Morgenthau asserted that the decisions or steps of a statesman –past, present and future has taken or will take in the political arena and international relations are driven by interest. This indicates that interest was, is and will continue to determine the behavior and policies of states in the international arena. Lancaster (2007), has argued that one of the best way to identify the national interest of a state is to analyze how the state devotes resources to such topic. To him, when a state establishes a political constituency for development aid with increasing budgets and staff along with progressive strenghtening of professional capacities and programs to inform the general public about development issues, it means that development aid is very important to the state. From rrealists’ perspective the Norwegian establishment and staffing of NORAD and MFA for development aid and foreign policies indicates how aid and diplomatic relations play an important part of Norwegian national interest.

In the realists’ explanation, the national interest of every state is survival and to survive is to possess power. Since power is measured by military and economic capabilities of states, the

national interest of every state should be to have access and control of military and economic resources in order to survive in the international arena and above all attain hegemony. Realists explicitly state two kinds of power, which include economic and military power; however, from their explanation we can identify ideological/diplomatic/political power that may not be a separate form of power/interests but a disguise for pursuing military/economic interests. States use aid to gain diplomatic power in the international state system especially within the international organizations as China has used aid to get diplomatic support in Africa against Taiwan.

Realists define economic power by the economic resources or capabilities of a state that enable the states to control and influence other states that are lacking the capacity to control or access such resources (Baylis et al., 2013). Morgenthau (1985) elaborated the importance of natural and materials resources such as geography, food, oil etc. to the power of a state hence he argues that the national interest of a state should aim at having access and control of these resources. To the realists, China's scrambling for natural resources and raw materials in Africa using aid, trade and investments as bait will be perceived as a means by which China is seeking to become an economic hegemonic power in the international arena by strengthening its material and economic power. Realists explain military power in terms of military resources of a state and a means to control the rise of other states. Realists argue that smaller states can resort to self-help system by forming alliance with other states within the system against hegemonic state (Baylis et al., 2013).

To the realist, China's growth is not a threat to only US and other bigger powers like France and UK but also to smaller states like Norway who also have economic interest in African oil and energy resources. Thucydides, a classical realist, cited the growth of Athenian power and the invasion of Melos (The Melian Dialogue), a small Island state, as an example of how the rise of a hegemonic state can serve as a threat to the interest and survival of both bigger powers and smaller states (Baylis et al., 2013). To the realist, China's scrambling for oil and energy resources, using aid, trade and investments as tools will result in competition for control and access to such resources. Norway, a smaller power and an interested state in oil and energy resources in Africa will have to take steps to prevent its interest in oil and energy resources from been vanquished by China. Realists argue that economic or military preparations of one state will create an unresolvable uncertainty for other states (Baylis et al., 2013). The uncertain state will therefore take steps to balance power with the other states and

this is what realists refer to as security dilemma. This scenario suggests that since China and Norway are all involve in oil and energy resources in Africa, the Chinese quest for economic power in Africa will be a source of insecurity for Norway and thereby influence Norway to make policy changes in aid and foreign policy relations in order to protect Norway's interest in Africa.

Realists argue that 'if the survival of a state or a number of weaker states is threatened by a hegemonic state, they should join forces and seek to preserve their own independence' (Baylis et al., 2013, p. 88). Morgenthau (1985) shares this viewpoint when he argues that states will use political and nonpolitical means such as technical cooperation with other states or international organizations in order to strive for power. Smaller states like Norway, may cooperate with other smaller states or international organizations when its economic interest are been threatened by economically powerful states like China in Africa.

This could also be linked to the realists' concept of self-help where the effort of a hegemonic state to maximize power triggers unresolvable uncertainty in other states to gang up through alliance system against such hegemonic state (Wheeler J. and Booth. K, 1992). To the realists states can adopt diplomacy or friendship through alliance with other states as a disguised means for military and or economic interests. China is strengthening its interest over global issues by forming good relations with African states and this will draw more support for China. Realists will view Norway's enormous support to multilateral institutions like UN, IMF and World Bank as a means of seeking help with other states. Norway is seeking to have influence over global political and economic issues that affect its interest through these global institutions because to the realists these institutions are nothing but arena for state politics (Karns & Mingst, 2004). Like China, Norway gets goodwill and allies in Africa in the international arena through aid to Africa. Moreover, Norway's support to the international multilateral institutions is motivated by enlightened self-interest of ensuring stability in the developing countries for long-term economic interest. This is because economic interest increased when prices and conditions improved for extraction and investments.

2.2 Realists analysis of Aid

The origin, implementation and the motivation for aid in Africa all warrant lengthy analysis and are likely to be the subject of controversy for decades to come. My goal here is to use realist concept of interest, as explained by Hans J. Morgenthau, to devise a framework for analyzing the origin and the role of aid during the cold war era.

2.2.1 Realism and the Origin of aid

Aid in Africa can be understood through the lenses of the realists because of the basic motivation by the donor countries at the time. National interest that the realists argue as the influencing factor in determining the actions of states was a key motivation for granting aid. The British, France and other former colonial masters use aid as a geopolitical strategy to hold on to the grip of their economic and political interest, which was achieved through colonialism. The US on her part, granted aid in response to the cold war to fight for world economic and political hegemony (Lancaster Carol, 2007). That is, Foreign aid was introduced as a response to the cold war.

Aid was introduced to serve as a means to maintain or achieve security and economic interest, which are the two main ways of measuring the power of a state according to Morgenthau (1985). This is because donor interest took precedence over the African needs at the time. The US, France and Britain who spearheaded the introduction of aid had their political and economic interest prioritized to the needs of the African states. While US used aid to promote her capitalist ideology and her global hegemonic aspirations in Africa, Britain and France used aid to maintain their colonial relationship and to have access, exploitation and control of their former colonial natural resources in Africa (Moyo, 2009).

Nkrumah (1966) argued that the introduction of aid that followed the fall of colonialism was meant to achieve objectives formally achieved through naked colonialism. The loosening of colonialist grips on Africa compelled them to grant independence to African states and that was followed by aid for African's development. Under cover of aid for Africa's development the donor countries devised innumerable ways to accomplish objectives formerly achieved by naked colonialism (Nkrumah, 1966). This explains why the Anglophone countries enjoyed and continue to enjoy much of their aid from Britain while the Francophone countries enjoy their aid from France. Moyo (2009: p14), maintains this argument that "aid became a means by which Britain and France combined their new-found altruism with hefty dollop of self-

interest- maintaining strategic geopolitical holds". From these perspectives, the idea of aid for development is only a camouflage for achieving security and economic interest.

Two main donor interests therefore served as a driving factor for the introduction of foreign aid in Africa; first as a geopolitical strategy for the former colonial powers such as Britain and France to continue to exert their control of African countries support in the international arena such as the UN over issues, which affect their interest. Second is to continue to maximize material and natural resources of their former African states. These two factors, the realists will argue, will serve as a means for these donors to increase their political and economic capabilities within the international system thereby attaining hegemony.

2.2.2 The Cold War Politics of Aid

The cold war present a clear example of how aid is used to pursue the concept of national interest propounded by Hans Morgenthau (1985). The research is looking at the role of national interest in aid provision during this period to help highlight the continuity of the trend of aid and the role of national interest leading to the period in which Chinese engagement became enormous in Africa.

During the cold war era Britain and France continued their commercial interest or maintained their political dominance in the former African colonies through development assistance to their former colonies while the US and USSR used aid as an ideological weapon to war against each other as a mechanism to attain economic and political hegemony (Lancaster Carol, 2007). International politics is all about struggle for power and the national interest of every state irrespective of its size is survival and attain hegemony (Morgenthau, 1985).

During the cold war, much of the battles for global hegemony between the US and the USSR were fought economically with aid as the choice of weapon. Aid became a key battle weapon to turn the world capitalist or communist with Africa becoming one of the battlefields for this war (Moyo, 2009). Many African states such as Democratic Republic of Congo and Ethiopia who were inclined to the communist ideology received a lot of aid from the Soviet Union while the US rewarded its supporters such as Mobutu Sese Seko of former Zaire with aid (Moyo, 2009). Aid was not offered based on any moral or the needs of the recipients' state but the ability of the state to ally itself with either the US or the Soviet Union. Schraeder et al. in their studies also emphasized the role of ideological posture of the African recipient

regimes arguing that the capitalist regimes which were willing to support US capitalist policies were targeted by the US aid policies (Schraeder, Hook, & Taylor, 1998). The world order during the cold war was purely based on national interest of the super powers with aid as a means of achieving this economic hegemony.

Another realist lexicon that was demonstrated during the cold war was the balance of power. Realists argue that states can seek balance of power to preserve the survival of their national interest within the international arena. Realists by balance of power mean that, states must ensure equilibrium of power to ensure that no one state or coalition of states is in a position to dominate all the others (Baylis et al., 2013). This balance of power mechanism was exemplified by the formal alliance system of the Warsaw pact for the Soviet and her allies namely Romania, Hungarian Peoples Republic, Bulgaria etc. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) with 12 founding members including Norway and US was meant to balance power with the Warsaw pact. Aid became a key mechanism to keep this alliance system and to attract more members into the alliance. Many African states that were willing to throw their support for the USSR or the US were rewarded with development aid. From the realists' perspective, Norway as a founding member of NATO means that Norway sought to protect its security and political interest through NATO. Being a small country, realists' explanation will assume that Norway's membership in NATO is the best way by which Norway can make a greater security and political influence over global issues that affect Norway's interest.

The realists' definition of national interest explains the determinants and nature of foreign aid in Africa from its genesis through to the cold war period. The strategic, economic and security interest of both the USSR and the US pursued through ideological or diplomatic means played a dominant role in the provision of aid to Africa while former colonial powers used aid to maintain their commercial interest or dominant relations with their African counterparts.

Some scholars argued that the ending of the cold war has led to the lesser importance of the role of national interest in aid provision in Africa because of the decline of economic and security interest competition of the USSR and the US. According to these scholars international politics has been transformed with the end of the cold war and that the realists' explanation of national interest in aid is no longer valid (Dunne, Kurki, & Smith, 2013). From the realists' perspective, the changing paradigm of the international arena with the end of the

cold war is only a shifting of power dynamics and that national interest is still a key motivation for aid by donor states. The growth of China after the fall of the Soviet Union presents an important global power that has replaced Russia in the world order. During the cold war, the international state system was a bipolar because USSR and US were the super powers and state relations and the motivation to give or withheld aid was based on the interest of USSR and US. The international state system changed to unipolar system with US as the super power after the end of the cold war. The US exercised most of the global economic and military influence and US interest controlled states within the international system (Waltz, 1964). The US and its allies used programme aid through US established multilateral institutions to control developing states' domestic politics and diplomatic relations with other states during this period. Realists argue that in a unipolar systems there is only one great power and faces no competition (Waltz, 1964). The emergence of a competitor changes the international state system and relationship between states (Waltz, 1964). From the realists' perspectives China's emergence as a competitor in aid, trade and investment has changed the international system and the premise for using aid in the pursuit of national interests. China uses diplomacy, which was an important instrument for pursuance of national interest during the cold war and has won the support of many African countries in the international arena. This has changed the diplomatic power for other states, as states will have to compete with China for the goodwill of African leaders support in the international arena especially in the UN and other organizations. Moreover, the promotion of democracy that has become a key-determining factor in western aid provision can be interpreted as the promotion of political ideology (democracy) against its counterparts and this from realists' perspective is not just political systems but for economic and security interests. The emerging multi-polar system following the end of the cold have all heightened the concept of national interest in aid provision in Africa.

2.3 Conceptualizing Aid

In a research process, it is important that the researcher defines key concept use in the research to ensure that everyone who reads or tries to replicate the research will work with the same definition and mental image (Berg, Lune, & Lune, 2004). It may happen that the reader may not agree with your definition of the concepts but since they understand the concept from your perspective they will understand and appreciate the concept and how it works effectively throughout the research (Bryman, 2012). I therefore chose to use this section to explain the concept of aid and diplomacy, which are the main concepts for this research work.

The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) defines aid or Official Development Assistance as:

“Flows of official financing administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as the main objective, and which are concessional in character with a grant element of at least 25 percent (using a fixed 10 percent rate of discount). By convention, ODA flows comprise contributions of donor government agencies, at all levels, to developing countries (“bilateral ODA”) and to multilateral institutions. ODA receipts comprise disbursements by bilateral donors and multilateral institutions” (IMF, 2003, p. appendix III).

This means aid refers to support from donor states to developing state which is primarily intended for economic, political, environmental, humanitarian and infrastructural development purposes (ruling out both military aid and export credits) and secondly, it is highly concessional (White, 2005). Aid is concessional in the sense that aid has more substantially generous terms than market loans and this is achieved through lower interest rates below market rate or by grace periods or combination of these (IMF, 2003,). China also defines aid by its “concessional and includes grants, zero-interest loans and concessional (low, fixed interest) loans” (Bräutigam, 2011, p. 2.2).

Using the OECD definition of aid for this research will make it difficult to evaluate China’s aid because China’s aid differs from OECD definition of aid in so many ways. The Chinese definition of aid includes many costs such as budget to finance military aid and loans in support of Chinese companies joint venture investments and these are not counted as aid by DAC (Bräutigam, 2011). Moreover, while DAC prevents members or donors from compelling the recipients to use aid to purchase goods and services from the donor country Chinese aid principle emphasize the equipment of Chinese manufacture (Bräutigam, 2011). The differences in definition of aid means that China’s aid will not fit into my thesis if I use the OECD definition of aid for this thesis. The definitions here are important for us to understand aid from both China and the Western donors’ perspective. Therefore, for the purpose of this research aid or development assistance is defined as the sum total of financial flows both concessional loans and grants from donor country and are either tied or untied to the procurements of goods and services.

Apart from being bilateral, thus from one country to another, aid could also be multilateral, which is from the donor country through an international organization such as World Bank or the UN agencies such as UNDP, UNICEF, UNAIDS etc. to developing countries. This research will specifically be looking at development aid, which emanates from the Norwegian government to Africa as ODA. This includes both bilateral and multilateral aid of Norway to Africa and explores how Norwegian national interest reflects themselves in their bilateral and multilateral policies and support. Donor countries are noted to use bilateral aid to a greater or lesser degree to pursue national interest (Maizels A. and Nissanke M. K., 1984). Norway channels a lot of their aid through multilateral institutions and from the realists' perspective, multilateral organizations are instruments for state politics where state can influence issues that affect their national interest. Norway through its multilateral aid can influence global political and economic issues that affect its interest.

2.4 Rules and Standards for Aid

The OECD Official Development Assistance or aid is governed by rules and standards. Rules and standards refer to principles and criterion that have been established by the OECD-DAC countries and are used as basis for approved model of aid. Thus, they are guidelines and reference document, which are published in the DAC guidelines and reference series to inform and assist members in their conduct of development co-operation programmes (OECD., 2006). Exploring these rules and standards are necessary for this thesis because they will serve as a yardstick for Norwegian aid policies in Africa. Moreover, the rules and standards will be used to contrast China's engagements in Africa.

Many of these rules were established by OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC), founded in 1960 as a forum to discuss issues surrounding aid and development in developing countries, while others originated from the Bretton Woods institutions and the informal "Paris Club" of official creditors (Bräutigam, 2010). Most of these rules and standards have been codified in five areas, which include transparency, tied aid and export credits, social and environmental protections, corruption and governance and management of debt.

Members of the DAC agreed to make their development assistance to the developing countries transparently known using standardized categories. This agreement is not only limited to members of the DAC but also, the 20 donors who are not members but report their

official development assistance through DAC². It is important to note that four of the most important donors but non-DAC members, including China, do not report their aid (Bräutigam, 2010).

On the principle of tied aid and export credits, DAC by its norms has addressed the tying of aid to make export credits more concessional. The norm prevents donors from compelling the recipient countries to use aid to purchase goods and services from the donor country. This norm was developed by DAC members in 1978, but has been quite slow in its effectiveness (Bräutigam, 2010). The norm was further boosted in 2008 when DAC members agreed to completely eliminate the tying of ODA to the 39 most highly indebted countries (OECD., 2009a). In addition to this standard is the establishment of level playing field for all donor countries through the separation of ODA from exports credits. The 1978 Arrangements on Guidelines for Officially Supported Export Credits and the 1992 Helsinki Package establishes minimum levels of concession that is based on current market rates (CIRR)³. The purpose is to discourage practices among donor countries in which some countries were drawing on their ODA to subsidize attractive packages for their exports.

Another standard, which remains at the heart of OECD, is the rules on corruption and good governance. The OECD, by the 1997 convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business, has established legal binding standards, which criminalize the bribery of officials in the form of “kickbacks” or “greasing the wheels” and has also provided a host of measures to make this effective (OECD., 2009b). The main purpose of this convention is to create equal platform for access and control of aid in the developing world by all donor countries. It is also meant to prevent the bigger donors like US, UK and France from using aid to access and control opportunities for the domestic companies at the developing countries to the disadvantage of smaller donor countries like Norway. The greasing of wheels also includes the use of aid to create more opportunities for domestic companies of donor countries in the developing world. The convention further rules on offering of aid to governments that are perceived to be corrupt. Government of many donor countries have embraced the agreement, since the end of the cold war, not to offer aid to governments that

². In addition to the DAC’s members, 20 donors currently report their aid to the DAC: Chinese Taipei, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Iceland, Israel, Kuwait, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Thailand, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates. <http://www.oecd.org/dac/47539494.pdf> (accessed August 2015)

³ Guidelines for Export credits <http://www.oecd.org/tad/xcred/> (Accessed in August 2015)

have come to power through coup or flawed elections and governments with poor human right records (Bräutigam, 2010).

In order to offer social and environmental protection, DAC has further established guidelines that emphasizes these protection. The OECD has a variety of guidelines that respect social and environmental impact assessment before offering aid for major projects. These include funding of projects such as hydropower projects, oil and mineral or extractive industry, the forestry industry etc. In 1999, OECD Ministers offered mandate to strengthen common Approaches on Environment and Officially supported Credits by the end of 2001(OECD., 2012). Members based on this mandate made recommendations on common Approaches on Environment and Officially Supported Export Credits in December 2003 and this has been revised over the years with latest in 2012 (OECD, 2012). The core of these recommendations was to ensure that development assistance or aid takes place within framework that respect and protect the social and the environment of the recipient country.

Another important rule that has been accepted in the offering of aid by the OECD countries is debt sustainability particularly for Low Income Countries (LICs). The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and International Development Association (IDA), an international financial institution that offers concessional loans and grants to the poorest developing countries, established the operational Framework for Debt Sustainability Assessments in LICs and this is highly respected by OECD donor countries (IMF and World Bank, 2005). The main objective of the framework:

“is to support low-income countries in their efforts to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) without creating future debt problems, and to keep countries that have received debt relief under the HIPC Initiative on a sustainable track” (IMF and World Bank, 2005, p. 2).

Under this programme, countries with few alternative sources of capital are granted debt relief after they have followed schedule conditions that include economic liberalizations, good macroeconomic management and good government practices. The countries then benefit by having their debt cancelled or reduced through complex system of rules and benchmarks however, sanctions are imposed on HIPC countries that receive new debts without meeting the guidelines on concessionality (Bräutigam, 2010). Many African countries qualify and have benefited from this HIPC initiative.

Many researchers in the development field have criticized China for not following these rules and standards and more of this will be explored in chapter 6.

2.5 Drivers of Aid

Foreign aid is an integral part of a state's foreign policy and may be conceived of as a foreign policy objective in its own rights or as an instrument to achieve other objectives (Stokke, 1989). The offering of aid from the realists' perspective is always driven by security and economic interest of the donor country. By drivers of aid, I am referring to the major reasons that are offered by the donor countries to justify their offering of aid to a developing country. This section examines the major explanations that are offered by some western donor countries including Norway in their offering of aid to Africa and counter these motives with realists' national interest as the principal motive for aid. It is important to explore the bases on which aid is offered in order to draw the line between these projected drivers and the pursuit of national interest. This section will therefore address this question: what major explanations are offered by Western aid donors to justify the offering of aid in the developing world and how do realists perceive these claims? The most important drivers of aid relate to humane internationalism, political and national security interest and economic and commercial interest (Degnbol-Martinussen & Engberg-Pedersen, 2003).

2.5.1 Humane Internationalism

The core of humane internationalism is an acceptance of the idea that citizens of the industrial nations have moral obligations to help people from poor countries who have access to poor resources (Stokke, 1989). This idea of an obligation to help the poor also exists in the relationship between the rich and the poor countries. This implies that the rich and industrial countries by humane internationalism have to respond to the needs of the developing countries as regards their social and economic development. Humane internationalism was very common in the early years of emergence of aid and is still the most common reason given by Western donors for offering of aid to the developing countries (Riddell, 1987). It has also been the most common explanation for development assistance by successive Norwegian government (Stokke, 1989).

Humane internationalism is usually combined with some form of enlightened self-interest on the part of the donor countries (Degnbol-Martinussen & Engberg-Pedersen, 2003). This is because moral obligation to offer aid to the developing countries is argued to be in the long-term interest of the donor countries themselves (Pearson, 1969). This implies that humane internationalism for aid, which focuses on promoting the poor and developing countries of social and economic development, is considered as instrumental for the promotion of the long-term values and national interest of the donor countries. This is because according to Stokke (1989), responding to the needs of the developing countries represents an extension internationally of the predominant socio-political values of the donor countries as reflected in their national social welfare policy. This is seen in the Western conditional ties of aid that have been accepted as rules and standard for aid by OECD donor countries such as good governance, human rights, press freedom etc. These norms are transferred into the developing world using aid as bait.

Olav Stokke (2009) admitted that there are sometimes hidden agendas that are camouflaged by altruistic explanations of aid policies. Humane internationalism for aid is propagated with the aim of promoting economic and social development and to alleviate the poor countries of human suffering, poverty and human rights abuses however, enlightened self-interest based on broader national interest of promoting trade and investment opportunities for the donor countries is the main motivation behind the dominant humane internationalism. Stable and prosperous environment of the developing countries is an important factor for trade and investment, hence the need to promote economic and social development of the developing countries through aid using humane internationalism to create conducive economic environment for trade and investment opportunities for the donor countries. It is therefore important that altruistic explanations be contradicted with policy implementations.

From the realists perspective the humane internationalism is only a camouflage because the main motivation for states' actions within the international system is interest. Realists admonish states to use whatever means to pursue and protect their national interest and to them humanitarian motive will only be a means of pursuing the interest of the donor countries in the developing world.

2.5.2 Political and National Security Interest

It is argued that rich and industrial countries often or usually administer large part of their development assistance to achieve geo-political interests. In this regard, aid can be used to form military and political alliances in connection with military aid (Degnbol-Martinussen & Engberg-Pedersen, 2003). This system was very common especially during the cold war era where the decision to provide or withheld aid was meant to achieve global hegemony by the USSR and the US (Moyo, 2009). Even though the cold war has ended, countries like Norway continue to allocate large amount of support to NATO and the United Nations as means of ensuring their national security. However, the most common explanations given by successive Norwegian government for support to NATO and UN is promotion of global peace and security (Stokke, 2013). This explanation of promoting global peace and security can be combined with enlightened self-interest of ensuring stable environment for the promotion of trade and investment opportunities for donor countries business. The Norwegian government oil for Development programme where the government offers assistance to developing countries in an effort to manage oil resources could be argued as a political alliance system by the Norwegian government to gain access and control of the oil resources of the African countries for the Norwegian oil companies.

Politically, aid gives diplomatic power in the international state system especially within the international organizations like UN, IMF, World Bank etc. Decisions within most of the organizations for instance the General Assembly of UN, are arrived at voting (Karns & Mingst, 2004). States therefore need alliances or friends in order to have majority support during voting on issues that affect their interest. China has used aid to get diplomatic support against Taiwan and moreover to have their seat within the UN Security council restored (Sorensen, 2010). Although Norway talks “altruistic”, they can gain disproportional power and support from African countries in the UN through good relations. Moreover, Norway’s huge support to the UN has given them greater role and influence over global issues that affects Norway’s interest. From the realists’ perspective, Norwegian huge engagements in Africa, UN and other international organizations are motivated by the desire to gain diplomatic power by winning more allies, support and influence over global issues of Norwegian interest.

2.5.3 Economic and Commercial Interest

Maintaining privilege access to resources and market is an important economic and commercial motivation for choosing recipient countries in the aid industry. The rich or the industrialized countries need regular supply of the raw materials and natural resources of the developing countries. They also need the developing countries market for trade and investment of their industrial goods and services.

Aid has been identified as a major instrument through which the industrial countries penetrate into the developing countries to entrench their commercial and economic interest. The British and France are among the countries accused of maintaining privilege access to the resources of their formal colonies through aid (Moyo, 2009). China's growing engagements in Africa has been identified as been predominantly motivated by its desires to enjoy unimaginable access to the African raw materials and market. Countries like Canada, Norway, Germany and USA did not play any role during the colonial era but have allowed their aid policies to be determined by their economic and commercial interest (Degnbol-Martinussen & Engberg-Pedersen, 2003).

Donor countries often use tied aid to protect their business interest in the recipient countries. While China is noted for exchanging its aid in Africa for African natural resources or creating business opportunities for its domestic companies, the diplomatic and aid policies of some DAC countries involves the interest of their domestic businesses in the developing countries. For instance Japan has officially included domestic business interest in their foreign aid goals while American agriculture and industries interest exert dominant role in the argument for giving aid to developing countries (Degnbol-Martinussen & Engberg-Pedersen, 2003). Degnbol-Martinussen & Engberg-Pedersen (2003) maintain that although it has been difficult for the domestic business of Nordic countries like Norway, the Nordic countries have adopted broad concessions to their business interest in the recipient countries. Nevertheless, domestic businesses are still able to exert a great influence in the foreign policy approach of the Nordic countries.

It is important to admit that donor countries may not necessary have a single motive to provide aid to the developing countries. Donor countries may have domestic interest at heart, the needs of the developing countries has in most cases been the main justification for the offering of aid. For instance, although China's engagements in Africa has been criticised by many scholars, as been purely interest, China praises its engagements in Africa as been win-

win game. Thus, China benefits as well as the African countries and that China's infrastructural, energy, transportation etc. contribution to Africa's development are visible. To the realists, interest is the main priority of every state and that political, economic and commercial interest which are essential for attainment of hegemony and survival of a state in the international system are the main motive for aid.

2.6 Conceptualizing Diplomacy

Diplomacy deals with the managements of inter states relations and also relations between states and other actors such as international organizations, multinational companies, international financial institutions etc. (Barston, 2014). Thus, diplomatic relations can exist between states and between states and non-state actors. From the perspective of the state and other actors, it is a means by which states through their representatives, envoys or officials from wide range of domestic ministries or agencies in international organizations negotiate or influence issues that affects the interest of the state (Barston, 2014).

At the state level, diplomacy is the means by which states through their formal representatives such as embassies or consulates as well as other actors are able to negotiate and secure particular interests through lobbying, visits, private talks etc. (Barston, 2014). The Vienna convention of 1961 by UN provides rules and regulations that governs the establishment of interstate diplomatic missions (United Nations, 1961). Article 3 of the convention provides that the main functions of the diplomatic mission among many other things include, representing the sending state, protecting the interest and nationals of the sending states, negotiating with the government of the receiving state, promoting friendly relations, ascertaining by lawful means development and projects in the receiving states (United Nations, 1961). From the realists' perspective, the convention has legitimized the use of diplomatic relations by states to pursue their self-interest in the developing states. This is because article three (b) of the convention allows states to protect their interest within the receiving states. In most cases because of the high cost of establishing and maintaining diplomatic mission, developed and wealthy states have the advantage because they have the capacity to establish missions in the developing countries. This explains why China has established diplomatic missions in many African countries.

In recent times, there have been a widening content of diplomacy to include oil diplomacy, resource diplomacy, knowledge diplomacy, transition diplomacy etc. but this thesis will

narrow or restrict diplomatic relations to the relations between states and also between states and international organizations and how states are able to use such relations to achieve self-interest.

2.6.1 Diplomacy and Self-interest

Diplomacy has emerged as an important tool by states to negotiate international treaties and to also gain strategic advantage in other states through the state's formal diplomats (Barston, 2014). States through diplomatic relations pursue their economic and security interest in the international arena but the key question is how does state use diplomatic relations to pursue self-interest in the international arena? This can be examined from either the perspective of interstate diplomatic relations or from the perspective of state and international organizations diplomatic relations.

From the level of interstate diplomatic relations, states strengthen diplomatic ties and pursue self-interest through the establishment of diplomatic missions in other states. State opened up diplomatic missions with another state because it has become economically important to the state because of trade and investment. Embassies and consulates have emerged as agencies that are used by the state to promote core interests and bilateral coordination of a country (Barston, 2014). That is, states through their diplomatic missions are able to negotiate better trade deals and gain disproportional advantage over concessions for its commercial interest.

State seeks to gain disproportional support of the receiving state over international issues that affect their interest through the establishment of diplomatic missions. The establishment of representation in other states provides the sending state with identity in the receiving state and recognition in the international system as a powerful state (Barston, 2014). Moreover, it creates the impression of friendly relationship between the states in the international arena. This means, it is a sign of friendly relationship between the states and draws more support for the sending state in the international arena. China has used this diplomatic representation in Africa to gain support against Taiwan and also over so many international issues that affects China's interest (Degnbol-Martinussen & Engberg-Pedersen, 2003).

Most states have a core group of countries or priority countries that fall within their diplomatic spectrum and this is mostly done on political and or economic considerations (Barston, 2014). This means that core group of states or priority states are strategically

important to the sending states, either because they have resources of interest or are geographically placed in environment that are important to the security of the sending state. Could economic and strategic considerations be the main motivation for Norway's priority countries in Africa and many years of diplomatic concentration with Eastern and Southern African countries? The priority countries according to Norwegian diplomats are countries with high rate of poverty and are prioritized by Norway for more share of Norwegian development assistance⁴. Realists' perspective will argue that the idea of prioritizing the countries because of their high rate of poverty is a camouflage for hidden economic and security interest. Realists' perspective will also explain the core group as alliance system through which the sending states can gain support of other states in the international arena especially over matters of the state's interest that require voting.

Again, states use diplomatic relations to pursue self-interest through changes in the diplomatic missions. Economic factors are major considerations leading to increasing or reducing diplomatic representation (Barston, 2014). That is, the decline of strategic economic importance of a state could lead to the closure of its diplomatic missions in another state. From the realist's perspective, interest is the main driving force of the state's actions in the international arena and this means that a state's decision to open or close its diplomatic mission is all motivated by interest. Since, national interest is the main driving force of a state's actions, the decline of a state's interest in the receiving change will change the behaviour of the sending state towards the receiving state. Changes in the diplomatic missions are therefore means of altering export performance, seeking new economic and political partners and forming new alliances of interest to the state

From the level of the diplomatic relations between states and international organizations, states through their support both human and material resources seek to gain disproportional power and greater influence over international matters that affect their interest. Realists argue that organizations are arena for state politics and states use organizations as instruments to legitimize their interest (Karns & Mingst, 2004). An example of such politics is in the IMF and World Bank that have no nationality quotas and decision-making are based on the voting power of the state (IMF, 2016a). As a result states like US, France, UK, Japan and China that have more voting power in the IMF gain disproportional power over international issues

⁴ Interview with Norwegian Diplomats

(IMF, 2016a). States therefore seek to gain more voting power in order to gain more influence over decisions that affects their interest in through the organization.

Another way by which states pursue self-interest through state-international organizations diplomatic relations is through greater role and representation both formally in the governing councils and agencies and informally among the technical staff of the organizations. Agencies and technical staff of the organizations do the day-to-day managements of the organizations and as such, states with greater number of role in the technical staff and agencies have a better chance of influencing the activities of the organizations. A study of the Policy, Research and External Affairs of the World Bank in 1991 revealed that 80% of the senior staffs were trained in the US and UK while 90% of the IMF staff had also obtained their Ph.D. from US or Canada (Clark, 1996). The implication is that states with higher percentage of technical and departmental staff have greater influence over the activities of the organizations because the activities are directed to suit the interest of the states where they had their professional knowledge. From realists' perspective, states will adopt policies such as more financial support to organizations and greater role within the various agencies in the organizations in order to influence the decisions that affect their interest. Because financial support give states the opportunity to have greater role within the organizations, states will channel large amount of support to international organizations in order gain greater role and influence policies of the organizations for its self-interest. Could this explain why Norway channels a huge amount of its support to multinational institutions? Is not Norway also seeking self-interest through multinational institutions?

3.0 METHODOLOGY

Systematic analysis of the principles and challenges of case study as well as sources and methods of data collection are very important for any dissertation. This chapter clarifies this analysis and provides insight for my choice of case study as research method for this thesis. I used case study method and data triangulation to collect my data and in this chapter, I discuss the advantages and disadvantages, especially when it comes to validity and reliability.

One question on which a great deal of discussion has centered concerns the trustworthiness of case study research, which includes generalizability, reliability and Objectivity (Berg et al., 2004). Credibility of the research is another important methodological consideration regarding generalization that needs to be considered. There must be a good match between the researchers observations and the theoretical ideas the researcher develops (Bryman, 2012). In order to assess the credibility of the research, researchers triangulate their data source that is, examining issues from different perspective. I used a combination of public documents, interviews and secondary literature, mainly based on research.

3.1 Case Study

To answer my research questions, I needed a research method that is exploratory in nature to analyze the questions and this is what the use of case study offers. Case study method has been defined as systematic investigation of an event or a set of related events with the sole aim of describing and explaining these phenomena (Berg et al., 2004).

Case study method offers an advantage to critically examine contemporary as well as past events and provide a clear description and explanation of how and why the events happened or is happening (Bryman, 2012). With Case study, I was able to critically describe and explain Norway's aid and diplomatic relations in Africa and examined whether and how they have changed as a response to the growth of China's engagements in Africa. Since case study method can deal with both contemporary and past events, the method helped me to take historical tour to examine if there have been changes within the Norwegian aid and diplomatic relations in Africa, which is the main focus of this paper.

Case study method can involve in-depth, qualitative studies of one or more cases (Hagan, 1997). Thus, the researcher is permitted to explore different cases within the research work. In dealing with topics that has not been explored by many researchers⁵, case study is a perfect method because case study is very exploratory in nature and creates opportunity for researchers to explore in areas where little or no research has been done (Yin, 1994). Thus, with case study, I can explore the nature, focus, interest and characteristics of Norwegian aid policies and practices before and after Chinese presence in Africa.

I do a case study of Norwegian aid in Africa before and after 2000 and explored changes in Norwegian aid and diplomatic relations in Africa after 2000. I also examined if the change over time in Norwegian aid and diplomatic relations is a response to or consequence of China's engagements in Africa, which grew tremendously from 2000. The focus of the period before 2000 is to identify the trend and nature of the Norwegian aid and how it manifested in Africa. This will be juxtaposition with the period after 2000, when Chinese presence grew in Africa, to identify changes and how these changes could be linked to Chinese presence. By Norwegian aid and diplomatic policies, I examined the Norwegian policy documents or government white paper regarding aid and foreign relations in Africa while by practices I examined how the policies are implemented within the recipient country.

Case study, thus helped me to address the topic from both contemporary and historical perspective, drove the research in achieving the objective of the research and finally served as a tool to answer the research question.

3.2 Generalizability

There is a debate over the generalizability of case study research on whether a single case can possibly be representative so that it might yield conclusions that can be applied generally to other cases (Bryman, 2012)? That is, the ability to use the findings of a case study research to express a generalizing conclusion to similar types of groups, individuals and events. Some scholars have criticized case study for lacking the ability to provide a solid basis for scientific generalization. According to them, one cannot depend on a single case study to express a generalizing conclusion (Berg et al., 2004). Their argument is based on the fact that case

⁵ Nye stormakter i Afrika, Utvikling eller utbygting? By Elling N. Tjønneland and CMI report commissioned by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and NORAD in 2006, which explored the possibility of the Chinese influence on Norwegian foreign policy, are the few works done on this topic.

studies cannot be used to enumerate frequencies and make statistical generalization (Yin, 1994).

On the other hand, Berg and Lune (2012) believes that there is still scientific value to gain from investigating a single case since it provides understanding over the case studied. On his part Yin (2003), argues that case studies are generalizable to theoretical understanding and not to statistical generalization. The purpose of using case study is to expand and generalize theories. I would like to argue that my intension for using case study method is not to make statistical generalization that is providing explanation that all donor countries in Africa are influenced by Chinese growing presence in Africa. The purpose of the case study is to suggest an explanation for if any and how donor countries are likely to be influenced by Chinese growing presence in Africa with reference to Norway as a case. Moreover, since this case is new the findings of this research can be used as an excellent start for much attention and research on how China's engagements in Africa has changed conditions of aid and diplomatic relations for some donor countries.

Even though I do not intend to generalize the findings of this research this research could be a strong basis for a comprehensive future research into other donor countries that adopt Western style of providing aid. Norway like some donor countries that are members of OECD adhere to Western aid practices or common rules and standards, portrayed as not interest driven. Findings on how China's enormous engagements has changed the conditions for aid and diplomatic relations of Norway in Africa could be used as a starting point for a research into how China's engagements has changed the conditions for other Western donor countries. This is not to say that all OECD members are photocopy of each other in aid provisions, however, this means that all the members like Norway have certain common standard, policies and practices. One specific nature of Norway in Africa is its self-portrayal as altruistic and delinks from interest. It is important to note that due to differences in the countries' national interest, objectives and experiences, Norway's aid policies and diplomatic relations may differ from other members of the OECD on some accounts. This thesis can form the basis for future research into the topic that can include more cases.

3.3 Data Collection, Interpretation and Triangulation

At the core of every research is the data that shall be analyzed before drawing conclusions on your findings. For the purpose of this research, it is important to make use of data collection method that can capture changes over time in order to identify the change. The change overtime can then be related theoretically from the realist perspective. A combination of primary and secondary sources was used for this research. That is, in addition to interviews with researchers, journalist and politicians, I also used academic literature, official policy documents, government white papers, statistical data from government department, media reports, organizational website and articles which share light on the topic of this research. Before looking at these sources in detail, it is important to look at how the data can be triangulated.

Triangulation is the use of more than one method or source of data collection in a research process so that the findings can be crosschecked or verified (Bryman, 2012). Thus eliciting data that are more complete by examining issues from different perspective using different research methods, sources and different research strategy. By combining several sources researchers are able to obtain a better and a more substantive picture of their case understudy (Berg et al., 2004). The use of different empirical sources to examine Norwegian aid policies and practices and how it has been influenced by China will to a large extent enhance the triangulation of the research. The thesis used qualitative research strategy by conducting interviews and supplemented the interview data with reference to government white paper, the statistical data from OECD, NORAD and statistics Norway on Norwegian aid flows to Africa. The purpose is to get comprehensive picture of Norwegian diplomatic relations as well as aid policies and practices in order to make accurate analysis and factual conclusions. That is the uses of different sources of data on Norwegian aid practices will not only provide me with substantive picture of reality but will also serve as a means of verifying these sources (Berg et al., 2004).

I also made extensive use of secondary sources by referring to books, articles and research work on China's aid and foreign policy. Since Forum for China-Africa Co-operation (FOCAC) has emerged as the chief instrument and mechanism for dialogue and co-operation between Africa and China, (Tjønneland et al., 2006), much of the Chinese engagement in Africa shall be referred from FOCAC website. I also made extensive use of secondary sources

by referring to books, articles and publications on China in Africa. Triangulating by the use of multiple sources of data collection also enhances the reliability of the research.

In terms of interpretation of data, which involves coding, management and analyzing the data, obtained from the interview. This is very important because they bring order, structure and meaning to the large number of collected data (Bryman, 2012). Moreover, data interpretation helps to obtain useful information for the research work. During the interpretation process, I described and summarized the data, identified relationships between the various categories of information, compared and identified the differences between the categories. I developed broad categories of my research focus in my interview guide and this assisted me in interpreting the data, using table coding as can be seen in **(Appendix 9.4)**. The process itself involves three stages. The first stage involves verbatim transcription of the interviews from the tape recording. The second stage involves verification of the transcribed interviews and here I listened to the tape and compared to what I have transcribed in order to avoid loss of information or biased. Researchers mostly give the transcribed interview and recorded tape to a third party for verification (Berg et al., 2004). I could not give the tape to a third party for verification since I promised by informants about anonymity and confidentiality during the interview process. In the final stage, I categorized themes of the transcribed interviews through table coding into four columns. First and second column: main theme and subthemes, third column ideas expressed (codes), fourth column data expressing same ideas (meaning units). The data coding has been tabled in appendix 9.4 and has been thoroughly discussed in chapters 5, 6 and 7. In terms of storage of data, I stored all the data in my Google drive and deleted them after the research.

One challenge I faced during the collection of data was the source of data for China's engagements. As noted earlier, China has no specific policy guidelines on its engagements in Africa and China's engagements and scattered in various sources, this made it difficult to get accurate information on China.

The definition, rules and standard of aid according to the OECD became another challenge I faced during the interpretation of the data. It became difficult to measure China's engagements in Africa by the OECD definition and standards of aid since China has different set of guidelines on its engagements in Africa. In dealing with this challenge, I focused on the nature and trend of China's engagements rather than using the OECD definition and standards as a yardstick for China's engagements.

3.4 Sources of Data Collection

3.4.1 Interviews

Interview refer to a conversation with the purpose of extracting information from a resource person (Berg et al., 2004). The researcher asks questions based on the topic of the research and the interviewee or the informant responds to the questions. There are three types of interviews: structured, semi structured and unstructured. I used semi-structured interview and my decision was motivated by the flexible nature of semi-structured type of interview. The semi-structured interview involves “the implementation of a number of predetermined questions and special topics” (Berg et al., 2004, p. 112). Since semi-structured interview allows interviewer to digress from his prepared questions, it gave me the freedom to probe far beyond the answers from the respondents. Thus using semi-structured interview offered me the opportunity to prepare some interview questions while at the same time probed deep into the topic base on the informants’ responses. I developed an interview guide (**Appendix 9.2**) with the help of the conceptual framework where key concepts needed for dealing with the topic have been explained. On the other hand, structured interview maybe rigid and will not offer me the opportunity to digress from the prepared questions when the need arises to probe further for details. Moreover, all my informants are learned and diplomats it is therefore important to prepare some set of questions in advance while at the same time have the freedom to probe further for clarification on their responses. The focus for the interview was Norway’s diplomatic relations and aid policies and practices in Africa.

In the choice of persons for the interview, I set a criterion to interview persons with practical knowledge and or experience on my topic. I developed a list of potential informants (**Appendix 9.3**) at the initial stage and later through snowball sampling, more informants were included. I chose to interview diplomats, staff of NORAD and MFA, researchers and journalist because they fitted into the criterion. Norwegian diplomats, NORAD staff, MFA staff as a result of their working experience with aid and diplomatic policies best fit into answering the research question. Snowball sampling was used to identify more informants especially researchers and journalists for the interview.

Since most of my informants are either directly involved in the formulation and implementation of aid or diplomatic policies or have extensive knowledge about aid and diplomacy, because of their long years of experience or research, I realized that elite interview should be the systematic method to explore the topic. Elite interview is used in state politics

research because it targets those informants who are directly involved in the political process (Beamer, 2002). Moreover, using elite interview gave me a rich, cost-effective and highly reliable and valid data for this thesis. Thus, I tapped into the direct source of data for my research by getting in touch with diplomats, researchers and staff who are directly involved with issues relating to the topic.

On issues of ethical considerations, I gave assurance to the respondents of their confidentiality and anonymity. Confidentiality and anonymity are very important because the research is dealing with issues of state policies and national interest and to avoid risking the position of respondents it is important to assure the respondents of their anonymity (Wiles, 2006). To get the best from the respondents, they must be in a position to provide all information necessary for the research without fear of losing their jobs or risking their positions. I pledged to remove from the research records and or any elements that might indicate their identity. I made sure that my respondents are nameless throughout the research work. All the discussions with my respondents were kept in strict confidence (Berg et al., 2004). I sought the consent of the respondents to have the interview record on a tape recorder and promised to erase and have every discussion kept in strict confidence. Due to the busy schedule of my respondents, I also informed them that they reserve the right to stop the interview at any time and we can continue some other free time on their schedule. The busy schedule of the Norwegian diplomats compelled me to interview them via phone. Although I did not use consent statement form, none of the respondents refused my request for the interview and they all never stop the interview. All the respondents gave me their 'implied consent' to the interview Berg & Lune (2012:92). In spite of the assurance on anonymity and confidentiality, most of the African diplomats I interviewed, declined to have the interview recorded on tape because they did not want to risk their jobs because of either previous experience with researchers or the press.

The first groups of informants for the interview were the Norwegian Diplomats who have been or are still representing Norway in Africa. Due to their experience in implementing Norwegian aid and diplomatic policies as diplomats, interviewing them helped to solicit their practical experience and personal reflections on whether and how Norwegian aid and diplomatic relations have changed as consequences of China's growing engagements in Africa. I also interviewed some African diplomats in Oslo and Stockholm to find out about whether and how China's presence in Africa has influenced some of the bilateral agreements

especially in aid politics with Norway or any donor country. Apart from focusing on bilateral agreements, I also inquired about the changes and the kind of diplomatic relations that exist between their countries and Norway, what factors have affected their relations with Norway and whether and how this could be linked to Chinese presence.

In selecting the diplomats for the interview I used convenience sampling strategy which is the selection of subjects based on those that are easily accessible (Babbie, 2007). Due to the busy schedules of diplomats and the time limit for this research work, relying on convenient sampling will offer me the opportunity to interview diplomats that will be available for the interview. Since there are about 11 African embassies and consulates in Oslo⁶ and 26 in Sweden⁷ I contacted these diplomats and interview those who were available for the interview. My target was to interview diplomats from about seven African countries but due to the busy schedules, only four were interviewed. I also interviewed other staff of the embassies where the ambassadors were not available for the interview.

The next groups of informants for this research were officials from NORAD and MFA who are responsible for Norwegian aid policies and diplomatic relations in Africa. In interviewing the officials from NORAD and MFA, the focus was Norwegian foreign aid and diplomatic policies towards their African counterparts, the focus of the policies and the conditions and the modalities. Even though they are not politically responsible for the direction of diplomatic relations, they are expected to work within the framework of the policies and can therefore share their experiences on any changes in their mandate and the changes in the conditions for aid, if any at all. As a result, four officials from NORAD and MFA who have been around over time especially from 2000 and can share their experience were targeted for this interview. This helped me to juxtaposition Norwegian aid and diplomatic policies and practices vis-a-vis the Chinese aid in Africa and identify how different or similar they are to each other.

A handful of researchers and journalist from Norway and other countries who have interest in Norwegian aid politics and have aired their views about the influence of China on Norwegian

⁶ Refer: <http://embassy.goabroad.com/embassies-in/norway>


⁷Refer: <http://www.aegis-eu.org/archive/ecas4/ecas-4/general-information/StockholmAfricanEmbassies-.pdf>

engagements in Africa formed the next category of informants for the thesis. Apart from their years of experience and extensive research in aid politics and diplomatic relations, some of them have also have their voices heard on the influence of China on Norwegian aid politics. In interviewing the researchers and journalist with interest in Norwegian aid politics and potential China influence, I used snowball sampling. In snowball sampling, the researcher after the interview with the initial subject asks for assistance from the informant to help identify people with similar interest and this continues until the researcher obtains sufficient number of subjects (Bryman, 2012). The key variable for this interview is why they argue that China's interest in Africa has had some significant influence on Norwegian engagement in Africa. This is to probe further into recent speculations by some journalist and researchers about the influence of China on Norwegian aid politics.

During the interview, I was guided by the 10 commandments of interview identified by Berg and Lune (2012). These included; *never begin an interview cold; remember your purpose; Present a natural front; demonstrate hearing awareness; think about appearance; interview in a comfortable place; don't be satisfied with monosyllabic answers; be respectful; practice and practice; be cordial and appreciative*. That is, I maintained confidence and boldness while at the same time treating my informants with the necessary respect they deserve. I practiced a lot with my classmates to ensure that there will be no room for errors before the first interview.

In terms of sequencing of the interview questions (**Figure 2**), I decided to follow the commonest interview sequence recommended by many researchers where you begin with fairly easy questions before sensitive and threatening questions (Grinnell Jr & Unrau, 2005).

Figure 2: Interview Sequence



3.4.2 Other Primary Sources

In addition to the interviews other primary sources including Norwegian aid policy document, government white papers, bilateral agreements, Oil for Development programme reports available on NORAD websites, reports of conferences and data from OECD, Statistics Norway, NORFUND, Innovative Norway and NORAD. In operationalized terms, this research will draw extensive data made available on web page and policy documents by NORAD. The research will expect to find in the various policy documents thematic focus of the Norwegian aid and diplomatic relations in Africa and identify if there are or have been changes in the trend of the Norwegian aid in Africa. This will help to support the data from the interviews on changes in Norwegian aid policies.

Since NORAD, MFA, NORFUND, Innovative Norway and Statistical Norway are all Norwegian government institutions and are expected to be pro-Norway, there is a possibility of biases in their reports especially on issues of motivation and interests for aid and diplomatic relations. It is therefore important that the reports are crosscheck with secondary data source. I resorted to secondary data source to avoid or minimize the possibility of biases of the primary sources of data.

3.4.3 Secondary Data

For reference, it is important to get a comprehensive understanding of China's engagements in Africa, and if that has changed the conditions for diplomatic relations and doing aid for Norway, thus, I collected information regarding Norwegian and China's engagements in Africa. This provided a clear picture of sector preferences, modalities, conditions and main interest of Norway and China in Africa. I extensively relied on secondary data, which involves the use of written documents such as scholarly literature, books, articles, magazines and objects by others that relate to a specific research interest (Rubin A. & Babbie, 2005), for data regarding Chinese engagements in Africa.

Scholarly articles and publications regarding Norway or China in Africa were used to gain more understanding of the background and to use for the analysis. Examining of scholarly work can lead to new discovery on the topic (Rubin A. & Babbie, 2005). This is very important because scholars usually have different opinions on topics based on their experiences, research and orientation. Elling N. Tjønneland's (2012), "Nye stormakter i Afrika, Utvikling eller utbytting?" and the CMI report "China in Africa. Implications for Norwegian foreign and development policies" (Tjønneland et al., 2006), which was commissioned by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and NORAD in 2006, were some of the key literatures. This is because these literatures explored the possibility of the Chinese influence on Norwegian foreign policy and served as a springboard for this thesis.

3.5 Reliability

Reliability refers to "the consistency of a measure of a concept" (Bryman, 2012, p. 149). The main objective in reliability is to minimize errors. To insure reliability especially when using elite interviews, the researcher must pay careful attention to question formats and wording, sampling and the process of data collection and analysis (Beamer, 2002). The first step to increase the reliability of an elite interview is to define the key concepts used in the research. After that, the research has to decide what type of person has to be interviewed and the valid questions for the interview (Beamer, 2002). In order to increase the reliability, all the steps were critically followed. After identifying my various concepts for this thesis, the chapter 2 was used to explain the concepts.

The ability to produce stable results at different times using different methods or sources of data collection makes the research work reliable (Bryman, 2012). I made use of different

methods and sources of data as can be seen above to make this thesis more reliable. In terms of data collection, reliable data of Norwegian aid flows to African counterparts that include geographical breakdown; recipient country and sector focus of aid were assessed from the NORAD and OECD official statistical database. On the other hand, assessing accurate figures of China's aid flows to Africa may pose some challenges and may give room for errors because of three main reasons.

First, information on Chinese aid flows to Africa are scattered in official newspapers, Chinese government website and in researched books. These are written in Chinese and I had to translate into English using Google translate and this gave room for some errors. Secondly, it is difficult to identify clear distinction between economic cooperation and aid flows. China's engagements in Africa are mostly characterized by a mixture of aid, trade and investment (Taylor, 2006). Export credits, non-concessional state loans or aid which are the main characteristics and which are used to foster China's investment do not fall into the category of ODA (Bräutigam, 2011). Finally, aid is regarded as sensitive information and Chinese government has been noted for not being transparent in their engagements in Africa (Davies, 2007). These factors made it difficult to obtain accurate figures of aid flows from China because different figures may be obtained and are highly difficult to authenticate these figures. The figures on Chinese aid flows in this research may therefore not be definite and allow for some errors. The focuses of China's engagements were not the figures but the characteristics and patterns of the engagements in Africa.

3.6 Issues of Objectivity

Objectivity “means that the conclusions arrived at as the result of inquiry and investigation are independent of race, colour, creed, occupation, nationality, religion, moral preference, and political predisposition of the investigator” (Pandey, 2014, p. 2). That is in objectivity, the researcher's findings and conclusions should not be influenced by his personal misconceptions and emotions. The main purpose of objectivity is prevent bias judgments and findings (Bryman, 2012). There is always a possibility of bias in a social science research process especially in the choice of setting, research method, formulation of design and theoretical framework, analysis and conclusions. This is research work is not different from any other research work and cannot be free, however, I maintained critical mind and did the best to triangulate my sources so as to minimize the threat of bias. Moreover, being an

African myself, I have maintained a necessary distance to the study since Africa is the main setting where Norwegian and China's aid and diplomatic relations are been explored.

One area where objectivity became a challenge for my research was the data collection, especially, the media sources of data. China's aid for instance is mostly published in state-owned news agencies that are expected to be pro-China. In order to examine the truthfulness in these data or avoid possible gaps between the publications in the newspapers and the actual disbursement, I triangulated the data from other sources from respected academics work by researchers or respected institutes.

Again, to ensure objectivity, researcher has to articulate the research procedures so that others can repeat the research and obtain the same results. Case studies like any other research method requires that the researcher clearly provide the areas he studied and the means of the studies (Berg et al., 2004). The purpose here is to create opportunity for scholars, individuals or other researchers who have doubt over the findings to replicate (Bryman, 2012). For this purpose, research design process, data collection method and coding schemes must be made visible to make it easier for individuals who have doubt over any part of the process to undertake the process again with corrected design for comparative analysis. If the research findings and analysis were valid, it will be confirmed by the subsequent research and vice versa (Berg et al., 2004).

I have provided the research design process that include data collection method and coding schemes for this thesis in **Appendix 9.1** so that individuals who have doubt over any part of the process can replicate with corrected design for comparative analysis. This case study like any other case study is susceptible to errors but I resorted to different sources and critical analysis to avoid or minimize errors.

4.0 BACKGROUND

4.1 Global Aid Trend

The development policies for foreign aid have vacillated back and forth during the past decades depending on change in priority, focus or better still national interest of the donor countries involve (Degnbol-Martinussen & Engberg-Pedersen, 2003). In view of this, I argued from the realists' perspectives that shifting aids paradigms are deceptive: the rationale for giving aid has always been the promotion of the donor's own interests. That is, the formulation and implementation of donor's aid policies and practices are driven and influenced by the donor's self-interest and that Norway has been using aid to pursue its self-interest. I challenge the altruistic portrayal of Norway in aid industry as deceptive and that Norway like China uses aid to pursue its national interest.

In this chapter, I explored the global trend of aid with special emphasis on aid in Africa. It is important to take historical tour of aid in order to understand the change overtime in the origin, focus and characteristics of aid by donor countries over the last 50 years. The chapter seeks to enhance historical understanding of global aid trend and identify changes over time especially before and after 2000. This will help to provide understanding of the changes in aid industry and whether and how China's growth from 2000 influenced the aid industry. I also explored how security, political and economic interest of donor states served as motivation for aid.

Global Aid trend for the purpose of this research have been broadly divided into two. These two broad divisions are distinguished by the characteristics, focus and the motivation for aid by the donor countries. The first is the period before 2000 when China's engagements in Africa had not been enormous but US and Russia were the dominant players of aid and diplomatic relations in the international arena. The second is the period after 2000, when the cold war had ended and China's engagements especially in Africa had increased expansively. USA, Russia and China have been key players in the global aid regime and have had significant influence over aid trend in the international system.

4.2 Global Aid before 2000.

Historically, modern aid emerged as an offshoot of the World War II in 1945 through the initiative of United States with the aim of giving massive aid to the European countries in order to rebuild them after the Second World War (Barakat, 2005). This began with the establishment of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Trade and Organization (ITO) (Moyo, 2009). The official motives for aid during this period were based on both national security and commercial considerations (Degnbol-Martinussen & Engberg-Pedersen, 2003). The US national interest of strengthening the Western European countries against the expansion of communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union and the benefits of rebuilding European market for American business were the key motivation for the establishment of these institutions (Degnbol-Martinussen & Engberg-Pedersen, 2003). From the realists' perspective, economic and security interest that are key to survival and attainment of hegemony in the international system were US's main motivation for aid. The US commercial and security interest for the introduction of aid was camouflaged with altruistic idea of reconstruction of Europe. Successive US government have emphasized that the US has moral and humanistic obligation to help poor countries develop economically (Degnbol-Martinussen & Engberg-Pedersen, 2003). The US through aid at the time formed allies with Western European powers while at the same time ensured stable European market for American goods.

By the end of 1950s, when aid for reconstruction had helped to ensure political stability and restored broken infrastructure in Western Europe, attention was drawn to other parts of the world specifically Africa (Moyo, 2009). The United States and the Western European powers who have benefited from the reconstruction aid saw Africa and the developing world as a prime target for aid because of its high rate of poverty, high illiteracy rate, poor access to global market and lack of infrastructural development (Warmerdam & de Haan, 2011). Aid therefore began to flow down to developing world from this period. The US and its Western allies emphasized moral and humanitarian considerations combined with enlightened self-interest that helping the developing countries will help donor countries in the long run however, the economic and national security interest remained central to foreign aid thinking (Degnbol-Martinussen & Engberg-Pedersen, 2003).

There were some events in the later part of 1950s through to the 1960s that cemented development aid as a feature of modern international relations. The 1950s and 60s witnessed the establishment of new multilateral aid organizations and institutions and a rapid growth of a number of industrialized countries (Riddell, 2007). The US spearheaded the establishment of multilateral aid organizations such as World Bank, IMF and the Organization for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC), precursor of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) with US economic and security interest at heart but camouflaged in humanitarian and moral motives. These organizations were and remain the main instrument for controlling development aid.

Realists argue that organizations are instrument for state politics (Karns & Mingst, 2004). From this perspective, the multilateral aid organizations were only to serve the interest of the donor states by establishing rules and standards to legitimize the interest of the donor states in the recipient's countries. Decision making within these institutions are based on amount of shares a state has and since US and her allies have greater shares their economic and security interest have become the direction of the organizations. The period also coincided with political independence of many African countries. About 31 African countries broke from the colonial fold between 1956 and 1966, to become independent states (Moyo, 2009). With political independence achieved, attention was then drawn to economic and social independence of the newly African states. Aid began to flow into the continent from this period of political independence with the humanitarian and moral motive of focusing on large-scale industrial projects of the developing world (Riddell, 2007). Such projects include railways, dams, roads, bridges, airports etc. An example of such aid was the construction of hydroelectric, concrete arch Kariba dam between the boarder of Zambia and Zimbabwe. About US\$100 million dollars in aid transferred onto the continent by the beginning of 1960s (Moyo, 2009). These "*moral and humanitarian*" driven aid meant for industrial development of the developing world has been described as *neocolonial aid* because the British, France and other formal colonial powers used aid to pursue their national economic and political interest formerly achieved by naked colonialism (Nkrumah, 1966). France for example was noted for allocating greater percentage of her aid to Francophone countries in Africa and this has sealed France's economic and political interest of accessing and controlling its former colonies (Alesina & Dollar, 2000).

Another important event that influenced the direction and motivation for aid was the strategic and security interests of USSR and US. The cold war began during this period and aid provision became a response to the cold war (Lebovic, 2005). The international system at the time was bipolarity where USSR and US had major influence over economic, military and diplomatic relations internationally. The threat of communism was to a greater extent an influencing factor in deployment of aid by US during this period. Aid was used as an instrument by which the US and Russian's interest of achieving global hegemony were pursued by maneuvering for support from African states through aid. The decision to offer or withheld aid was purely based on alliance with either USSR or US.

The period of 1970s saw a continues emphasis on moral and humanitarian motive of giving aid however, with a shift in focus from emphasizing on large-scale industrial development to emphasize more on poverty alleviation in the recipients' countries. The shift was instigated by the soaring of oil prices, which led to an increase in the prices of food and recession in many developing countries especially in Africa (Moyo, 2009). The multilateral aid organizations especially the World Bank emphasized the need to address the problems of extreme poverty in the developing countries (Riddell, 2007). Donor countries reoriented their strategies towards projects in agriculture and rural development, social services, mass inoculation programmes, adult literacy programmes and food for the malnourished. This increased the proportion of aid to social services from under 10 per cent in the previous to over 50 per cent by the end of the 1970s (Moyo, 2009). By 1975 the UK published a white paper entitled "*The Changing Emphasis in British Aid Policies: More help for the poorest*" (Riddell, 2007). The US also passed the International Development and Food for Peace Program that aimed at offering 75 per cent of its Food for Peace Program to countries with per capita income of less than \$300 (Maxwell & Singer, 1979). The shift in focused was characterized by more aid to poor countries even with poor credit facilities in Africa and this increased Africa's debt service from US\$ 2 billion in 1975 to US\$8 billion in 1982 (Moyo, 2009). The paradigm shift of aid from industrialization to poverty eradication can be argued as deceptive and that the real motive was economic and security interest of the donor countries. This is because the ideological war between Russia and US was a dominant factor in deciding aid recipients. UK and France on the other hand continued to satisfy their interest through aid to their former colonies. Moreover, the World Bank and the multilateral aid institutions that emphasized the need for poverty eradication are by realists' perspective, instrument for satisfying the interest of their founders.

In the 1980s following from increased aid to many developing countries and its subsequent increased debt of these countries in the 1970s, many African countries began to default in their debt obligations, as they were not able to service their debt on time. About 11 African countries namely Angola, Cameroon, Congo, Ivory Coast, Gabon, The Gambia, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Tanzania and Zambia suffered from this debt crisis (Panizza, Sturzenegger, & Zettelmeyer, 2009).

The 1980s witnessed the falling prices of raw materials such as oil and sugar, which led to the falling of the African states' trade income. Confronted with falling trade income coupled with enormous debt crises and high interest rates, the official aid agencies switch their main focus of aid to find solution to what they perceived to be the core impediments to growth (Riddell, 2007). Two new aid programmes were introduced to solve this economic challenges: first was the stabilization and then the structural adjustment (SAPs) (Moyo, 2009). While the stabilization was meant to deal with the developing countries imbalances SAPs was meant to promote greater trade liberalization and reducing price rigidities. The programmes provided defaulting African states with loans to help them service what they owned. The 1980s therefore saw change in the model of aid from project to program aid through the aggressive aid programmes launched by both the World Bank and the IMF. The World Bank and IMF became the highest providers of aid and architects of development policies to the developing countries. IMF support to Africa grew from US\$8 billion from the start of the debt crisis in 1982 to US\$12 billion in 1983 (Moyo, 2009).

Furthermore, aid became conditional to the implementations of some policies of IMF. Developing countries governments received loans and in return minimized the role of state, removing subsidizes on some goods, liberalizing trade, reducing the civil service and privatizing state owned enterprises across all sectors (Lienert, 1998). In embracing these programmes, six African states including Benin, the Central African Republic, Guinea, Madagascar, Mali and Uganda were able to shed 10 per cent of their civil service workforce according to Lienert (1998). The main purpose of the adjustment programme according to IMF and World Bank was to help developing countries deal with the debt crises, instead, the adjustment programmes were more beneficial to the economic interest of US and its allies who have been the principal force behind the adjustment programmes in the developing

world. The programme conditioned developing countries to liberalize trade and investment and that facilitated increased US trade and investment (Carol Welch & Jason Oringer, 1998.). The developing countries local industries collapsed due to inability to compete with the influx of goods from US companies. The adjustment programmes was motivated by the economic interest of its sponsors and not the humanitarian and moral motives as preached by IMF and World Bank.

The cold war was still an influencing factor of aid flows to developing countries. From the middle of twentieth century to the 1990s, the cold war had provided richer countries with geopolitical interest to give aid to even the most corrupt governments in Africa. Many African leaders, including Idi Amin of Uganda, Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire now DR Congo, Ethiopia's Mengistu and Liberia's Samuel Doe, enjoyed a substantial amount of aid based on their support for the West or for the East (Dunning, 2004). By the beginning of 1990s, the cold had subsided following the fall of the Soviet Union and this also affected aid flows to developing countries because a key motivation for aid had come to an end (Riddell, 2007). The US interest of global hegemony has been achieved, as the US became the Super power. Even though developing countries had huge debts and were wallowing in extreme poverty, those were not the interest of the "apostles of aid" namely US or its allies as well as the Soviet. The moral and humanitarian motive of helping the poorest people was no longer of interest. This supports the realists' claim that interest is the main driving force of a state's actions in the international system. States only take actions to satisfy their economic and security interest but mostly camouflage their interest in altruism.

From the 1990s into the new century, the dominant theme among scholars of aid was that the world was witnessing the end of "political aid" and the explanation was simply the end of the cold war (Riddell, 2007). The international state system changed to unipolar system with US as the super power. The US exercised most of the global economic and military influence and US interest controlled states within the international system (Waltz, 1964). The end of the cold war and the emergence of Unipolar system coupled with huge debt crises and high cost of servicing debts that confronted the developing countries by the end of the 1980s, crippled foreign aid from going into the developing World (Riddell, 2007). Donor countries, having noticed years of failure of aid based development programmes to turn the fortunes of the poorest, began to lay the blame of the economic decline and high rate of poverty on poor political leadership and weak institutions in the developing countries (Moyo, 2009). There

was even an argument that too much aid was detrimental to development because it encouraged developing countries to solely depend on aid as the main source of finance and this discourages them from generating income domestically (Riddell, 2007).

Realists argue that in a unipolar system there is only one great power and faces no competition (Waltz, 1964). The US and its allies used programme aid through US established multilateral institutions to control developing states' domestic politics and diplomatic relations with other states during this period. Under a pretext of the need for policy shift by the donor countries in the 1990s, it was agreed by the donor countries that, good governance, which was lacking in most developing countries is the main antidote for the economic growth of developing countries. Good governance was identified as a recipe for strong institutions, protection of human rights, rule of law and economies free of corruption (Moyo, 2009). Good governance and transparency emerged and still remains as conditionality for aid from OECD countries.

Democracy in the developing countries became another key conditionality for aid. The donor countries identified respect for democracy and democratic principles are key to changing the economic fortunes of the developing states. Western democracy and democratic institutions, if transplanted into the developing countries can change the poor economic path of the developing countries into prosperity (Dunning, 2004). Western democracy refers to a system of government where the political representatives are chosen through free and fair elections by all adults and characterized by rule of law, press freedom, civil and political liberties and judicial independence (Beetham, 1994). Democracy still remains conditional for aid especially among the OECD countries including Norway.

It is important to admit that the end of the cold war influenced greatly in this shift in aid flows and policy change. This is because during the Cold War, donors' geopolitical interest diminished the credibility of threats to condition aid on the adoption of democratic reforms, good governance and human rights. The fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, on the other hand, enhanced the effectiveness of Western aid conditionality that accompanied aid to the developing countries in the 1990s (Dunning, 2004). To the realists, these conditions to aid that emerged after the end of the cold war were signs of US and her allies victory over the Soviet. States need power to survive in the international system but they must also ensure that no state or group of states obtain relative power (Baylis et al., 2013). By controlling

political and economic policies of the developing countries the US demonstrated the changed in the international system from bipolar system whereby power was exercised by US and Soviet Union to unipolar system whereby power is exercised by US as the World Super power.

The deep falls in Official Development Assistance (ODA) to the developing countries in the 1990s introduced an important trend in aid that supports realists' explanation of national interest and power. While ODA funds that supports development in the developing countries contracted, funds for humanitarian assistance increased (Riddell, 2007). The post cold war was characterized by expanding number of local conflict especially within the former Soviet allies (Karns & Mingst, 2004). ODA funds in support of humanitarian intervention doubled because the US and its Western donors had an interest to restore political stability in the former Soviet allies that were confronted with local conflicts. Realists argue that states should acquire as much power as possible relative to other states within the system (Baylis et al., 2013). The US and its allies used humanitarian intervention in the former Soviet members in conflict to restore political stability in the former Soviet allies to acquire more power by attracting the states into US alliance symbolized by NATO. This, to the realists, is to weaken and prevent the rise of the Soviet Union.

In short, aid before 2000 was introduced and controlled by economic, security and geopolitical interest of the donor states camouflaged in different moral and humanitarian motives over time. International aid multilateral organizations were established to champion and legitimize the interest of the donor states. While former colonial powers used aid to maintain and accessed their economic and diplomatic interest in their former colonies the US and Russia's interest of global hegemony changed the international system into a bipolar system in which the decision to give or withheld aid in the developing countries was dominated by US or Russia's geopolitical interest. With the fall of the Soviet Union and the emergence of unipolar system, aid in support of development contracted but, the US and her allies continue to maximize power on the pretext of increasing humanitarian aid in support of political stability in the former Soviet states that were confronted with local conflicts.

4.3 Global Aid after 2000

At the turn of 21st century the global trend of aid to the developing countries was influenced by the emergence of some important events. Discussions over aid for development and poverty alleviation that had subsided, following the lack of donor interest in the developing countries and the fall of the Soviet Union, resurfaced. Numerous conferences and initiatives were organized by OECD/DAC, United Nations, IMF, World Bank etc. to regalanize interest in aid (Riddell, 2007). One of such initiatives was a publication in the later part of 1990s under the theme *Shaping the 21st Century: The Contribution of Development Co-operation* (Michel, 1998). The issues highlighted by this publication became an influencing factor in the Millennium Development Summit, organized by the UN in 2000, which shaped the global trend of aid.

The 2000 Millennium Development Summit shaped the trend and future of aid because the summit called on industrialized and donor countries to raise ODA in support of ridding the world of extreme poverty and in the following year a publication of 8 goals to be achieved by all countries by the end of 2015 known as the Millennium Development Goals (MDG's) (Poverty, 2015). The MDG's became a yardstick for measuring Development and Development-aid-giving efforts (Riddell, 2007). The publication of the MDG's coincided with the September 11th 2001 terror attacks in US that regenerated US security interest and the emergence of war on terror. The terrorist attacks increased ODA rapidly and aid giving once again became intertwined with political interest and security interest of donor countries especially, the US (Riddell, 2007). From the realist perspective, the US and its Western allies increased ODA to pursue their security and political interest camouflaged in the MDG's. The most rapid increases in ODA did not occur until after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks (Riddell, 2007). Security interest emerged as an important motivation for aid in the 21st Century.

Another initiative that has also shaped the aid-giving trend since the turn of the millennium is the Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS). The PRS was an economic and financial support programme initiated by IMF and World Bank in 1999 to condition developing countries for debt reduction (IMF, 2016b). Governments in low-income countries who are members of Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC), prepare documents through a participatory process

and which involves domestic stakeholders, development partners including the World Bank and IMF, to qualify for debt relief (IMF, 2016b). The IMF and World Bank cite enhancement of aid effectiveness in the developing countries as the main motivation for the PRS. Because according to the World Bank and IMF, the PRS will improve country ownership and better partnership with donor country (IMF, 2016b). The PRS instead of its supposedly aim of undoing the imposition of policy conditions from outside the developing country, the PRS has rather legitimize increased conditionality (Dijkstra, 2011). That is, the strategy has legitimized the controlling of the political, economic and security decisions of the developing countries by IMF and World Bank because by realists' explanation the IMF and World Bank were created to pursue the interest of the founding members. From the realists these 21st century aid-giving initiatives by the multilateral aid agencies are tools to satisfy the interest of the US and its Western partners. This perhaps explains why smaller countries like Norway contribute huge amount of support to these organizations to have opportunity to influence issues that affect its interest.

China's engagements in the developing countries especially in Africa has emerged as an important landmark that has further shaped and changed the trend of aid since the turn of the millennium. Following the fall of the main protagonist in aid industry that is USSR, China has emerged as another powerful player in aid story especially in the 21st century Africa. This was not the first time China has been in Africa or the developing countries, however their activities, in terms of volume, motive and style of given aid, since the turn of the millennium was massive and different from the conventional way of given aid (Moyo, 2009). China emerged at a time when conditionality-based aid were trumpeted through several initiatives by the traditional donors and when developing countries had little or no alternative source of assistance hence, bowing to all sort of political and economic conditions from the traditional donor countries orchestrated through their established multilateral institutions.

Like all other states, the national interest of China in Africa is acquisition of power. China's engagements have been motivated by ideological interest as well as economic interest. In addition to gaining stable control and access to Africa's primary goods, China aims at winning Africa support on global issues that affect China's interest (Rotberg, 2009). Even though China like all other states pursues power in the international system, China's style of pursuing its interest differs from the traditional donor countries. Unlike traditional donor countries that camouflage moral and humanitarian motive through aid to pursue their political

and economic interest, China mixes aid with investments which has become more attractive to many African states because it has promoted physical development in terms of infrastructure (Brautigam, 2008). Moreover, China's relationship with Africa has been described as a win-win relationship, a relationship that is mutually beneficial to both China and Africa (Naidu, 2007). China has emerged as a competitor in aid, trade and investment and this from realists' perspective means a end to the unipolar system. Realists argue that the emergence of a competitor changes the international state system and relationship between states (Waltz, 1964). In effect, the prominence of China's engagements and practice in Africa since the turn of the millennium has put Africa on the rise and has posed significant challenge that has affected political, economic and social norms that govern the international aid architecture and change the geopolitical reality for donors in Africa.

5.0 ANALYSING CHINESE ENGAGEMENTS IN AFRICA

In this chapter I examined the interest and characteristics of the Chinese engagements in Africa, how it has developed over the years and how different it is from the Western approaches to aid in Africa. The chapter further explores how China's engagements in Africa changes the geopolitical landscape for traditional donor countries like Norway to gain power and control in Africa. I examined the chapter from historical and contemporary perspective by first looking at the history and nature China's development assistance in Africa and link them to how the volume and style of China in Africa poses diplomatic and economic challenge to other traditional donors to gain power and influence in Africa.

5.1 History of Chinese Development Assistance in Africa.

Even though discussions on Chinese engagements in Africa have recently received scholars and international attention, China has a long-standing history in its engagements in Africa. Trade relations between China and Africa dates back to the Tang Dynasty (AD 618-907) but China's first diplomatic relations with first African country was in 1956 when China entered into diplomatic relation with Egypt (Le Pere & Shelton, 2007). From this period, China's engagement in Africa has grown so enormous and today stands as one of the largest new investor, trader, buyer and aid donor country to many countries in Africa (Rotberg, 2009). The historical engagements of China in Africa would be examined from 1950s when many African countries began to assert their political independence from the colonial powers. This will provide understanding of the main motivation for China in Africa and how this motivation has changed over time. Exploring this historical perspective will also provide understanding of how China managed to brake through both the strategic domination of the Soviet Union and the US as well as the paternal colonial forces in Africa to become an economic hegemonic threat in the international system.

The year 2000 marks an important chapter in China's relations with African states because in 2000, China initiated a permanent Forum for China – Africa Co-operation (FOCAC) that has become the chief instrument and mechanism for dialogue and co-operation between Africa and China (Tjønneland et al., 2006). China's engagements in Africa exploded from this period as China gained the reputation as huge investor, partner, trader and aid donor in Africa

(Rotberg, 2009). The big question is; how was China's engagements in Africa before this period? What was the motivation and how did China become a powerful force and "threat" to other big powers? How was China's engagement in Africa fueled by realists' explanation of national interest? Answers to these questions have been addressed in the next section.

5.2 China in Africa Before 2000

Chinese engagements in Africa before 2000 were purely dominated and driving by ideology and politically driven interest with the aim of establishing and strengthening diplomatic and political ties with the African states that were beginning to assert their independence from the colonialist and to also brake through both the strategic domination of the Soviet Union and the US (Sorensen, 2010). This indicates that China had an interest in Africa from the genesis of its engagements with African states. China had an interest to establish diplomatic ties in Africa to support its application for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, its entrance into the World Trade Organization (WTO) and friends who will back it in all international fora that affects China's interest (Rotberg, 2009). In the realists' explanation of national interest, alliances are very important for states to achieve their national interest because states with more allies have the possibility to get support of its allies against any rising power against its interest. China launched offensive diplomatic strategy through investment, trade and aid donation to Africa. Moreover, China began to establish its embassies in Africa in many African countries especially in states where China had specific economic interest and now has embassies in all forty-eight sub-Saharan African countries (Rotberg, 2009)

During the period between 1950s and 1960s China demonstrated a great deal of support for African states struggle against imperialism and colonialism. President Mao Zedong saw African states common allies of the oppression by the colonialist, hence the need for them to provide African countries with development assistance aimed at supporting independence. From the realists' perspective, China saw Africa as an opportunity to form alliance and a means to attain power. Realist argue that smaller states or states who see themselves as similar can come together in what realists refer to as self help, as a means against any powerful force or a common enemy (Baylis et al., 2013). The successive leadership of China also carried out support for African independence. Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai declared his support against imperialism when he said "our task is to support and promote the development of the national liberation movement in Africa" (Ping, 1999). One of such notable achievements was China's support for Algerian Front de Liberation National in the

1950s against the French (Sorensen, 2010). China provided Algeria with material aid and cash worth US\$ 28.4 million (Ping, 1999). China again demonstrated its support for the independence struggle in the 1960s as Mao frequently organized meetings with leaders of the independent African states as well as leaders of the independence movements to canvass support for African states that are still under colonialism (Davies, 2007).

China launched its first developmental project in sub-Saharan Africa in 1960 when the Chinese government agreed to provide funding for building match factory and cigarette factory in Guinea (Wenping, 2007). This was followed by funding projects such as railways, hospitals, roads and so many infrastructural developments in many newly independent African states according to Wenping (2007). China's support for Africa during the 1950s and 60s was not only motivated by the willingness to support African needs but also China needed Africa in order to survive within the international arena. China was confronted with security threat because of the Korean War in the north-east and the Vietnam War in the south, plus the split of the China-Soviet alliance (Sorensen, 2010). Realists argue that states can embark on alliance system when their national interest is under threat and China saw this opportunity in Africa that was increasingly gaining political freedom as an opportunity for a new alliance to increase its diplomatic space within the international system in order to ensure the nation's survival.

The Chinese engagements in Africa were at the time and are still guided by 8 principles that were made known by the Premier Zhou Enlai during his three visits to Africa between December 1963 and June 1965. According to these principles, Chinese engagements in Africa were to be based on the principles of *equality, mutual benefit and respect for the sovereignty* of the recipient. China will provide *interest free loans and non-conditional loans with flexible repayment terms*. China will provide support for *income-generating projects* constructed by top-quality Chinese *equipment and material* at international prices and standard. In terms of technical assistance, China shall ensure that the local people of the recipient's country are trained to master this technology fully (China Daily, 2010). It is important to note that unlike the OECD rules and standards that condition the behavior of the recipient countries, these Chinese principles disciplined China in its engagements in Africa. With these principles in place, Africa became the highest recipient of Chinese development assistance. Sixteen of the first twenty-three new countries to receive Chinese aid between 1961 and 1971 were from Africa (Brautigam, 2008).

China did well to facilitate the struggle for independence and provided freedom to many African states while at the same time China's alliance with Africa was paid off with China benefitting a great deal of support from African states in UN. For instance, in the twenty-sixth UN Assembly in 1971, 26 out of the 76 countries who voted to restore China's seat at the UN table were from Africa, making one third of the total votes (Sorensen, 2010). This clearly reinforces how realists self help system of achieving national interest can be beneficial to states with common interest.

5.2.1 From 1970: Economic Interest Driven

Chinese engagements in Africa began to take an extra dimension when China established good relations with the West and most especially the United State. In addition to increasing its diplomatic space in Africa for support over global issues, China began to pursue its economic interest in Africa. The main interest of China's foreign policy during this period were focused on ensuring world peace while at the same time seeking national economic interest (Sorensen, 2010) . China's interest of world peace could be motivated by enlightened self-interest because China needed a peaceful world for its economic growth. The Chinese premier Zhao Ziyang's visit to Africa in the early 1980's marks the beginning of this policy shift. During these visits, Zhao proposed four main principles derived from the eight principles put forward by the late premier Zhou Enlain in the 1960s, which will guide economic cooperation with the African states. These principles included *equality and mutual benefit, stress on practical results, diversity in forms of interaction and attainment of common progress* (Tjønneland et al., 2006). The principles aimed to gradually switch the Chinese emphasis on co-operative economic and technical relations from extending loans to developing co-operation which can benefit both partners (Brautigam, 2008). China encouraged Chinese enterprises to cooperate with their African counterparts and more importantly, China's investment and aid flow to Africa between 1982 and 1984 increased, surpassing that of Norway, Japan, UK and Sweden (Brautigam, 2008).

In the 1980s, China again engaged in new forms of economic cooperation aim at providing low profile co-operation projects requiring smaller investments and quicker returns (Alden & Alves, 2008). According to Sorensen (2010), this new development in the 1980s was as a result of China's need of huge resources for China's modernization projects. He argued that China had limited resources to fund large-scale projects in Africa as they have been doing

over the years. As a result, China in addition to the old model of giving loans, engaged in new forms of cooperation such as contracting projects, labour cooperation, joint ventures technological services etc. From the realists' explanation of power, China's effort in expanding its diplomatic space and economic growth in Africa are means by which China is seeking power.

Another important landmark in the Chinese engagements in Africa was the introduction of preferential loans as a reform in the China's aid policy in the 1990s. This was Chinese government assistance to Africa provided through financial institutions designated by the Chinese government to provide mid-term and long-term low-interest loans. By these loans,

“the government offers an official subsidy to the financial institutions for the margin between the preferential rate (2 per cent) and the base rate publicized by the People's Bank of China” (Sorensen, 2010, p. 144).

This enabled the Chinese enterprises to engage in profitable ventures with the local enterprises of the African countries. The Chinese government was using this to create opportunity for Chinese companies in Africa for more economic interest. The first of these preferential loan projects, according to Sorensen (2010), was an oil exploitation programme in Sudan in 1996. By the end of the 1990s, Chinese economic cooperation in Africa was growing rapidly and more focusing on policies that were directed towards Chinese economic interest. Four main issues were top of the agenda of the China's economic cooperation strategy with Africa including *the preferential loans, promotion of China-African enterprises cooperation, increment of Chinese Banks participation and project administration and finally combination of governmental effort with enterprises from Africa and China* (Mohamed-Mahmood, 2007). That is, the Chinese government commitment to the promotion of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)⁸ directly through the government assistance and indirectly through the promotion of private Chinese enterprise to cooperate or invest in Africa was incredible. From the realists' perspective China's engagements since its beginning in Africa has been motivated by its interest for power, to have influence over global issues and expand economic its interest. China uses realists' self-help or alliance system through diplomacy, investment and trade, aid donation and notion of equal partners and mutual benefits as means of

⁸ Foreign Direct Investment- defined by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development as 'an investment made to acquire a lasting interest in an enterprise operating outside the economy of the investor.

achieving its interest in Africa. These issues laid a foundation for a new chapter of greater Chinese engagements in Africa from 2000.

China's growth from 2000 could be linked to oil and gas booming from 2000 partly due to technological advancement. The current oil boom is argued to have started from 2000 following a sharp decrease in 1998 (Ossowski, Villafuerte, Medas, & Theo, 2008). China is interested in oil and the booming gave China a huge recognition in Africa since China needed massive oil and gas for its economic growth.

Although China invested a lot in Africa even before the turn of the millennium, China's engagements in Africa did not come on the land light until after the turn of the millennium. One possible answer could be that China's engagements before 2000 were overshadowed by the cold war politics between Russia and US. Scholars, media and governments were more concerned about the cold war politics and did little to publish or researched into China in Africa. With the end of the cold war the attention of the media, governments and researchers turned to China. It can be argued that the cold war politics gave China a leverage to establish more alliances in Africa and expand its economic interest. China managed to develop its political power through diplomatic alliances and economic power also through investment, trade and aid donations. By the fall of the Soviet Union China had gained enough power to survive and gain identity in the international system.

5.3 China in Africa From 2000

Since 2000, China's economic interest has tend to influence and taken supremacy of Chinese engagements in Africa. This is in response to the phenomenal growth of Chinese economy since the turn of the millennium. The Chinese economy has grown at approximately 10 per cent since the turn of the millennium and it desperately needed resources such as oil, minerals, food etc. that abound in Africa. China accounts for 40 percent of the total growth oil demand and in 2003, it overtook Japan as the second biggest consumer of petroleum products after US (Moyo, 2009). This growth of China's economy coupled with oil booming since the turned of the millennium has surged up the Chinese economic interest in Africa leading to the opening of a new chapter in the Chinese engagements in Africa.

The Chinese government officially demonstrated its commitment to the pursuit of economic interest in a spirit of cooperation with African states through the formation of Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in October 2000. The Forum, since its formation, has widened and diversified the scope of China's engagements in Africa to include among other things, technical cooperation, cooperation on human resource development, emergency humanitarian aid, debt cancellation etc. At the first FOCAC conference in Beijing in October 2000, African countries 156 overdue debt, totaling US\$1.3 billion, were cancelled by the Chinese government (Sorensen, 2010). Roads, pipelines, railways, sports stadium, power plants, hospitals, schools etc. in African countries such as Nigeria, Ethiopia, Sudan, Ghana, Zambia, Tanzania etc. are a tip of the Chinese engagements in its effort to become dominant force on the continent.

Jia Qinlin noted in his opening speech at the opening ceremony of the China-Kenyan Economic and Trade Co-operation in Nairobi April 25, 2007, that China had completed over 800 projects through its aid and still has over 800 companies engaging in trade, manufacturing, mineral resource exploitation, transportation, agriculture etc. in Africa (Xinhua, 2007). In 2006, China released its major policy documents regarding its engagements in Africa. The document further reiterates China's commitment to economic interest in Africa through trade relation, investments and co-operation as the focal point of China's millennium engagements strategy in Africa (FOCAC, 2006a).

China has established robust and reciprocal partnerships with African governments at the highest level of diplomacy and China's engagement has changed the diplomatic and geopolitical reality for the traditional Western donors (Rotberg, 2009). Some traditional donor countries like Japan have started policies and initiative to be able to survive within the changing diplomatic and geopolitical reality in Africa. Japan organized summit meetings with African leaders in 2008 and pledged to increase its support to Africa (Rotberg, 2009). One important question that needs to be explored is: what are the characteristics of China's engagements in Africa and how have these engagements change the diplomatic and geopolitical reality for trade and investment since the turn of the millennium for traditional donor countries especially Norway? This question has been addressed in the following characteristics of China's engagements in Africa.

5.3.1 Naturally Resource-Backed Projects

One of the notable elements of Beijing's economic entry into Africa is the financing of large-scale infrastructural development linked to natural resources that are needed in China. China has been committed in providing funding for African states to deal with the primitive transportation industry and poor road conditions that have crippled development by increasing cost of trade within and between African states as well as discouraging the flow of investments into Africa (Rotberg, 2009). The Chinese Exim bank, which was founded in 1994, has been very instrumental in providing funding for such infrastructural projects. It is estimated that out of the 259 projects that were been financed by the China's Exim Bank in 36 African countries by September 2006, 79 per cent of these were solely for infrastructural development (Sorensen, 2010). These projects included railways in Sudan, dams in Ghana and Zambia, thermal power plants in Nigeria and Sudan, Oil facilities in Nigeria, copper mines in Congo and Zambia (Rotberg, 2009).

Most of these projects are connected to getting natural resources that are vitally needed in the growing Chinese economy. For instance, the World Bank has noted that:

“most Chinese government funded projects in sub-Saharan Africa are ultimately aimed at securing a flow of sub-Saharan Africa's natural resources for export to China”(V Foster, Butterfield, Chuan, & Pushak, 2008, p. 44).

Countries like Sudan, Nigeria, Angola, Ghana and other African countries that have abundance of natural resources such as oil and minerals, which are vitally needed in modern China, are able to “use their resources to attract and guarantee infrastructure loan from China on better commercial terms that is not likely to get from commercial banks” (Bräutigam, 2010, p. 21). For instances, some countries like the case of Ghana and Nigeria use existing natural resources exports as security to guarantee repayment for China power plants and hydro electric dams. Chinese companies gained access to some natural resources in Democratic Republic of Congo that will be developed and use to repay the loan (Bräutigam, 2010). The consequence of these projects is that, they have helped to boost investors' confidence in Africa because energy, infrastructural and transportation development are key factors that are considered by investors to any country. Governments are motivated to encourage their domestic companies in Africa. Moreover, with improved infrastructural development, African states have a strong bargaining power on matters that affects their interest.

From the realists perspective, China's engagements though promoting infrastructural development in Africa, it is at the same time seeking its economic interest in Africa. States seek power which is measured by economic and military capability. China's enormous engagements in Africa's economic resources will strengthen China's power and influence over global issues.

5.3.2 Non-conditionality and Non-interference Engagements Policy.

China's engagements in Africa impose no policy conditionality and China does not interfere in the domestic politics of the recipient countries. As noted earlier on, one of the 8 principles that have guided China's engagements in Africa was the principle of *equality, mutual benefit and respect for the sovereignty* of African states. China's engagements policy to Africa has been anchored on non-interference in the domestic affairs of the African states. Having suffered years of colonialism and imperialism, the Chinese government attaches more dignity to sovereignty and does not want to interfere in the internal affairs of the African states. The Chinese special envoy to Africa in 2008 stated,

"we don't attach political conditions. We have to realize the political and economic environments are not ideal. But we don't have to wait for everything to be satisfactory or human rights to be perfect"(Morris, 2008).

China's non-conditionality and non-interference engagement policy differentiates China from the OECD/DAC countries. In chapter 3, we noted that the OECD donor countries have set of rules and standards for which the activities of all member-state must conform. African countries that need assistance must conform to a number Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) conditions established by the multilateral aid agencies. Bräutigam (2010 p.36) classified these standards into first, environmental and social rights standards such as rights in an irrigation, hydropower or road project that might involve resettlements and second has to do with country-level conditionality in which a country will qualify to access loan based on the quality of governance or economic policy in the country.

China's government does not impose conditions on governance and human rights before providing funding for any project because the Chinese government regard these as interference in the domestic affairs of the African countries. China is not a member of the OECD and is therefore not signatory to the OECD convention on corruption. It is held that this China's practice will either breed corruption because it facilitate the transfer of large funds

to poorly governed African states or help authoritarian regimes in Africa to escape sanctions by providing lifeline to such repressive governments who might have yielded to governance conditionality (Bräutigam, 2010). China's engagements in Zimbabwe that is perceived by the Western donors as repressive regime because of poor human rights record is an example of China's non-conditionality and non-interference engagement policy in Africa. While China is criticised for its engagements in Zimbabwe and Sudan, China argues that standards should not be externally imposed on the African government because African states can manage their own affairs (Rotberg, 2009).

On the Social and environmental standards, China has its standards which may not be directly the same as the OECD rules and standards. China, through private or government, use China's own standard or standard of the recipient's country in its engagements in Africa (Bräutigam, 2010). Several agencies and institutions in China that are involved in providing funding for China's projects in Africa and the developing countries have also provided some kind of policy guidelines regarding social and environmental impact. For instance, the Chinese Academy for Environmental Planning has drafted some kind of environmental guidelines for Chinese companies operating in overseas including Africa (Jing, 2008). Moreover, China Development Bank (CDB) and China Exim Bank have all pledged and taken steps in providing guidelines for Chinese creditors to ensure a more socially and environmentally responsible ways in their activities. Nevertheless, critics have maintained that it is one thing having guidelines and another applying the guidelines.

Again, it is difficult to measure the extent to which China applies these guidelines since Chinese engagements in Africa are shrouded in secrecy and lacks transparency (Bräutigam, 2010). For instance, International Business Times reported how the activities of the Chinese companies operating in Africa especially in the mines and oil industry destroy the environment and never respect the guidelines on the environment (GHOSH, 2013). In short, China's engagements in Africa do not follow the OECD standards and rules on governance, economic, social and the environment.

Despite these criticisms about China in Africa, China has given African states alternative source of financing their projects and African states now have the possibility to reject Western donors conditional loans for China unconditional support. With China as an alternative source, African states now have stronger bargaining power to accept or reject Western donors assistance if the conditions for such loans are not favorable.

China's non-conditionality and non-interference engagements policy can be linked to the realists' explanation of relative and absolute gains in the pursuance of national interest. Realists by relative gains argue that states are interested in increasing their power within the international system (absolute gains) and are therefore willing to cooperate with other states to increase their power (Baylis et al., 2013). China's unwillingness to interfere or impose conditions can be interpreted as cooperation with African states and this for realists will increase China's power within the system. From realists' perspectives, China's engagements that contradicts the traditional donors' style will pose a significant challenge that will affect political, economic and social norms that govern the international aid architecture because Western donors would be pushed to compromise their terms and conditions in order to have access and control in Africa.

5.3.3 Increased Support for Private Investment

Another landmark of China's engagements in Africa that was identified in the later part of the 1990s and since the turn of the millennium is its commitment to Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). Chinese government has been investing in Africa and promotes private Chinese companies to invest in Africa or cooperate with African companies. The first China-Africa Business conference was held in 2003 where over 500 Chinese entrepreneurs negotiated and signed 21 cooperation agreements with African counterparts worth over US\$1 billion (Sorensen, 2010).

As noted in the historical background of China in Africa, China provided preferential loans to Chinese enterprises to engage in profitable ventures with the local enterprises of the African countries. The preferential loan is seen as a covert way to open doors to concessions for Chinese companies that are operating in Africa. Although difficult to substantiate with evidence, the Chinese government is criticized for its under palm payment or greasing the palm payment to open doors for Chinese private companies in Africa.

China promotes Chinese businesses by also offering concessional export credits in a form of tied aid to support export. The tied aid refers to aid for which the motivation is significantly linked to promoting or exporting goods from the donor government's country (Kemp, 2005). Tied aid is not only limited to China in Africa, some OECD donor countries like Germany

and others are also noted for using ODA to support export however, there are rules binding the use of tied aid or ODA to support the export (Evans & Oye, 2001). The OECD by the 1978 Arrangements on Officially Supported Export Credits and the 1992 Helsinki Package required that first, members do not offer concessional export credits for wealthier countries above certain income level, secondly, commercially viable projects must not receive concessional export credits and finally concessional export credits must be given at least 35 percent as grant (Bräutigam, 2010). This means that, the OECD donor countries by these arrangements have the right to offer export credits (tied aid) to only non-viable projects in lower income countries. China does not follow these rules even though the rules are translated into Chinese. This is because, according to Bräutigam (2010), Chinese companies that are new in the global market will find it difficult to compete with companies from wealthier countries who receive greater support from their governments before these rules were established. One can criticise China's tied aid as been beneficial to China rather than the African states. African countries do not benefit from the project because the Chinese government use the tied aid to promote goods from China at the expense of the indigenous African goods.

From the realists' perspective, China does not follow the OECD rules of export credit because it is cheating. Realists argue that in a relative gains "the likelihood of states abandoning international cooperative efforts increased if participants see other states gaining more from the arrangements" (Baylis et al., 2013, p. 129). The OECD arrangements on export credits is more favorable to its donor countries and will make it difficult for China to compete on the same level field with the OECD members. Realists' explanation supports China to abandon this arrangement because the international system is all about struggle for power and states must be vigilant for cheating. States must focus on steps to pursue and protect their national interest and that is power.

China has gained a lot of influence and economic power from supporting and promoting its private investment in Africa. China's economy is growing and China has gained influence, access and control of African resources, making China an economic power within the international system. Realists' perspective suggest that Western donor countries will have to initiate steps that support and promote private and governmental investment in Africa in order to gain access and control of these resources because international system is about struggle for power and the national interest of every state is to have access and control of the source of power.

5.3.4 Mixed aid, trade and Investment

Mixed aid, trade and investment is another characteristics associated with the China's engagements in Africa. Chinese activities in Africa include aid, trade and investment. China's trade and investment relations with Africa trade accounts for 11 percent of the global trade and investment and growing at approximately 10 per cent per annum (Broadman, 2008). Scholars and policy makers have criticised that China does not separate aid from investment. The criticisms emerge when one tries to compare China's engagements in Africa with that of the traditional OECD donors because China is not a member of the OECD and its definition of aid will not fit into what the OECD defines as ODA. A large number of China's models of financing in Africa will not be accepted as ODA because China has different approaches in its engagements. For instance, the Chinese external assistance budget includes finance for military aid and loans in support of some joint venture investment by Chinese companies like the Friendship Textile Factory in Tanzania (Shinn, 2008). Meanwhile, military aid is not regarded as ODA by OECD/DAC.

China's external assistance is also characterized by grants, zero-interest loans and concessional loans, however, these concessional foreign aid programmes that are managed by the China's Exim bank and mixes diplomacy, development and business objectives (Bräutigam, 2011). The Chinese packages their engagements from different government ministries and institutions with some concessionality in nature while others are market rate and this makes it difficult to define what is aid with China and what is business.

The lack of transparency on aid and export credits in China's engagements in Africa creates further difficulty in separating China's aid from investment. Bräutigam (2011) noted that the China Exim Bank and the Angolan special state loan is a classical example of how China can bundle together aid and investemnt. This Angolan special state loan resembles ODA but it is not financed by any ODA-like instrument because the loan is guaranteed and secured with oil exports similar to oil-backed loans made by the Western banks in Angola. Meanwhile the interest rate of the LIBOR was 1.5 per cent, one percent below 2.5 per cent offered by the Standard Chartered consortium (Bräutigam, 2011). Moreover, it is speculated that Chinese companies had preferential treatment in the biding for the exploration concession of the Angolan oil according to Bräutigam (2011).

China's engagement in Africa is all about interest and separating aid from investment or trade has nothing to do with pursuance of national interest. In the realists' explanation of national interest, states must use whatever means to pursue power. Realists' explanation will not criticise China's method and style of engagements in Africa as long as such steps lead to acquisition of power. Instead, realists would expect Western donor countries to adopt China's style for power since the national interest of every state in the international system is power.

5.3.5 Emphasize on bilateral Aid

Emphasis on bilateral aid rather than multilateral aid is another hallmark of Chinese engagements in Africa. That is, China prefers to engage directly with its recipient partners in Africa to multilateral institutions such as World Bank, IMF and OECD. The Chinese preference of bilateral engagements in Africa could be linked to its successful years of bilateral engagements with African countries, which has made China an expert in bilateral relations. Moreover, Chinese understanding of equality with African countries makes it easier for China to engage directly with African partners (Wenping, 2010). China sees itself as an equally poor country that is willing to assist another poor country. The poor helps the poor model of aid that is pursued by China makes China to engage directly with African countries on the principle of partnership.

“China is still a developing country at the moment. Its aid to other developing countries, including Africa, is a kind of mutual assistance among friends and falls into the category of South-South cooperation. It's a kind of 'poor helps the poor' assistance, a developing country helping other developing countries” (Wenping, 2010, p. 146)

The Chinese government through its key ministries at home and special agency in the African countries organizes its foreign aid assistance in Africa. The Ministry of Commerce (MOC), the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Finance, China's Import and Export Bank (Exim Bank), the Ministries of Science and Technology, Education, Agriculture and Health etc. are all involve in different aspects of China's aid industry.

The Ministry of Commerce (MOC) is the main institution through which the Chinese government channels its development assistance to Africa. MOC through its three main departments, the Department of West Asia and African Affairs (DWAA), the Department of Foreign Economic Cooperation (DFEC) and the Department of Foreign Aid (DFA), provides

policy advice on Africa to policy makers, regulates all Chinese companies involved in overseas and regulates and administers all Chinese aid projects (Sorensen, 2010). The Chinese government respect for the African states and its willingness to engage bilaterally and on a mutual benefits can be interpreted as a fair play system or relationship. President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe in a meeting with China's Xi Jinping referred to China as a *true and dear friend* (QuartzAfrica, 2015),

"I am glad that Zimbabwe and China speak the same language on many issues." "We share the same conviction that only a fair, just and non-prescriptive world order, based on the principles of the charter of the United Nations, can deliver the development we all need." Mugabe (QuartzAfrica, 2015)

The Chinese government has established embassies in almost all sub-Saharan countries and has set up special agency in most of the Chinese embassies in Africa called Economic Counselor's Office of the embassy of China whose main duty is to implement the aid projects in host countries, maintains contacts with Chinese firms in African countries and provides updates on economic information to the MOC (Rotberg, 2009; Sorensen, 2010). These Chinese embassies in Africa have brought China closer to understand and appreciate the needs of the African states.

In the realists explanation of relative and absolute gains, the realists argue that even though states are always concern about the gains of other states, they will always cooperate with others as long as there is mutual benefit in the cooperation (Baylis et al., 2013). This means that China, by its mutually bilateral policy in Africa, will continue to gain sovereign control over stable supplies of raw materials and greater support of Africa over global issues that affect China's interest as long as China continues to cooperate with African states.

5.3.6 Strong Focus on Physical infrastructural Development

One of the lasting monuments of Chinese engagements in Africa is its hardware or physical projects. The Chinese focus on infrastructural development dates back to the 1970s when the Chinese built 1,860-km (1,160-mile) railway that connects Zambia through Tanzania to the Indian Ocean (Moyo, 2009). Moreover, the Chinese support to the infrastructural development in Africa has increased tremendously since the turn of the millennium. Roads, railways, bridges, Dams for energy, schools and hospitals are some of these Chinese monuments. Primitive and inaccessible transportation systems in Africa that have scared

many investors and retarded African development have all been given face-lift with the Chinese support. The Chinese focus on infrastructural development in Africa could be linked to China's own experience of how focus on infrastructural development has elevated China to become one of the economic power house of the globe (Wenping, 2010).

The World Bank in its report entitled, *Building bridges: China's growing role as infrastructure financier for Sub-Saharan Africa*, admitted to the role of China in the infrastructural development of Africa especially in hydropower and railway sector (Vivien Foster, 2009). According to the report China was providing at least US\$3.3 billion for the construction of 10 major hydropower projects in 2007 and this will increase hydro power generation capacity of Sub-Saharan Africa by 30 per cent if completed (Vivien Foster, 2009). It is obvious from this report that other powerful the World Bank has noticed the Chinese style of focusing on infrastructural development in Africa.

African states to a large extent embrace and appreciate the Chinese contribution to the infrastructural development in Africa and are committed to support China. President Robert Mugabe in an appreciation to China's role in Africans development during the recent China-Africa Summit 2015 said:

“Here is a man representing a country once called poor, a country which was never our colonizer. He is doing to us what we expected those who colonized us yesterday to do.... We will say he is a God-sent person” Mugabe (QuartzAfrica, 2015)

Mugabe's statement shows how some African leaders, if not all, are not interested in the Western donors approaches. They prefer China's brotherly and physical development through trade, investment and aid to Western paternalistic aid.

5.3.7 A win-win Economic Cooperation?

At the 2006 FOCAC Summit, President Hu Jintao in the declaration of the summit proclaimed the establishment of a new type of strategic partnership between China and Africa characterized by economic win-win cooperation (FOCAC, 2006b). By win-win economic cooperation, China aims at establishing economic cooperation that is mutually beneficial to both Africa and China. That is, China will “deepen and broaden mutually beneficial cooperation, encourage and promote two-way trade and investment” (FOCAC, 2006b). Some scholars have described this new Chinese partnership with Africa as a zero-sum game (a

relationship in which both Africa and China gain or lose equally) in Africa's interests (Naidu, 2007). However, some scholars and commentators have criticised this relationship and have labeled it as "second scramble for African resources" (Naidu, 2007). For these critics China-Africa relationship is more beneficial to China than Africa and that the long-term impact will be Africa's underdevelopment. The question is, is China's engagements in Africa a win-win economic cooperation?

As noted earlier on China has impressive records in Africa's infrastructural development such as roads, railway lines, electricity, hospitals, hydroelectric dams etc. These Chinese impressive development are spread across almost everywhere in Africa where China's presence have been felt. Economically, China's Foreign Direct Investment and trade has been phenomenal and China by 2013 was the Africa's biggest trading partner (The Economist, 2013). It was estimated that around \$200 billion worth of goods were trade between the two partners and this has helped African Gross Domestic Product (GDP) to grow at an average of 5.5% year (The Economist, 2013). China's impressive performance in Africa have been bartered for Africa's abundance natural resources. China needs Africa's natural resources for its growing economy while Africa also needs China for survival. Africa exchanges its natural resources for China's quality capital which is needed for investment, jobs for the people and other sectors of African countries development (Moyo, 2009). Is not Africa and China benefiting from each other?

Despite these Chinese impressive contributions to Africa, critics have maintained that China is only motivated by self-interest and that the relationship is not win-win but rather more beneficial to China (The Economist, 2013). China's investment in Africa is noted for its link to mostly resource rich countries and exchange for resources vitally needed by China. The implication is that China only considers how deals with African countries will benefit China and not African countries. Moreover, China's African investments and trade are mostly exchange of raw materials and this means that it does not help to diversify African economy (Moyo, 2009).

While it is true that China is interested in African resources and Chinese trade with African countries are mostly exchange of raw materials, the commodities boom has helped to improve Africa's GDP. One of the major factors for Africa's growing GDP since the turn of the millennium is the booming commodities with China (The Economist, 2013). Moreover,

China's investments in Africa in recent time have adopted a much broader approach that is helping to diversify African economy. China's investments in Africa has diversified into sectors such as textiles, tourism, road construction, agriculture and telecommunications (Moyo, 2009). In addition, China's impressive contributions to Africa's infrastructure especially in transportation and energy could be linked to the growing FDI of most developed countries to Africa. For instance as will be discussed in details in chapter 6, Norway's FDI in Africa has increased and this is partly link to the improved infrastructure by China.

Despite some of the negative headlines about China's engagements in Africa, the growing Africa's GDP, the diversification of African economy in recent times and the growing FDI from most developed countries are indications that the Sino-Africa relationship, I suggest, is more of win-win. Across the continent of Africa, positive views about China's engagements in Africa are more than the critical judgments by at least two to one (Moyo, 2009).

5.4 China and Rising Africa in the 21st Century

China's growth in Africa has changed the diplomatic power and economic interest in Africa. In terms of diplomatic power, China has worn the support of many African leaders on global issues and this means that other donor states like Norway will have to compete with China for the goodwill of African leaders support in international arenas such as the UN, World Bank etc. In terms of economics, China's style of trade, investment and aid in Africa has significantly changed the scenario for aid and investment in Africa in many ways. Moreover African states have welcomed China's style of investment and are willing to engage with China than receiving aid. Among some of the changes in Africa by China that have changed the geopolitical scenario are the following;

In the first place China's engagements has resulted in the growth of African economy since the turn of the millennium. The post-independence African economy was for years characterized by a long decline per capita, GDP, inflation was out of control, currencies crumbled, private investors ignored the continent and states ran out of foreign exchange (Eggen & Roland, 2013). However, Sub-Saharan Africa economy, particularly in the West, has grown over the last decades on the average of 6 per cent per year and is projected to continue on the same level for years (Eggen & Roland, 2013). The African economic growth could be linked to China's engagements on the continent because China African trade has

grown rapidly since the turn of the millennium and in 2013 China became the Sub-Saharan Africa's largest export and development partner (Pigato & Tang, 2015). The scope of China's trade in Africa is extensive and ranges from agricultural goods, oil and mineral resources. This diversification has spread China's trade across Africa and opening the way for many African countries, even countries that do not have diplomatic relations with China benefit from the China's enormous trade. Although South Africa, Zambia, Angola, Nigeria are some of the biggest trading partners of China in Africa, African countries across the north, south, east and west have all benefitted from China's enormous trade opportunities as China's trade is not limited to one sector of African economy but different sectors.

Again, China has changed the infrastructural fortunes of many African states through investment. China has invested heavily through investment in key sectors especially in transportation and energy in many African countries such as Nigeria, Sudan, Ghana, Angola and Ethiopia etc. (2013). China's FDI flow to Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) in 2013 reached US\$3.1 billion and represented 7 percent of global investment in SSA (Pigato & Tang, 2015). Improved infrastructural systems are key to attracting investments in any state. In fact one of the factors that was cited as a damming cause of Africa's under development before the turn of the millennium was poor infrastructural development that discouraged investors from Africa (Holloway, Nicholson, Delgado, Staal, & Ehui, 2000). Poor infrastructure coupled with kleptocracies and conflicts had devastating effects on African economies. Western donors were reluctant to invest or encourage their private companies to invest in Africa because of the risk (Eggen & Roland, 2013). Now with China's increased investment in Africa's infrastructure that were impediments to investment, many investors are been attracted into Africa. The risk of investing in Africa has been replaced by interest to invest in the continent. The consequence is seen in the growing FDI in countries such as Norway in Africa.

Another important structural changes in the international aid system as a consequence of China's increased engagements is the reduction of Sub-Saharan Africa's (SSA) dependence on OECD countries aid. For years, African economies were dependent on Western donors paternalistic and conditional loans for survival. The downturn in Western donors growth was a disaster for many African states, with years of declining per capita income (Eggen & Roland, 2013). China's increased engagements has changed this declining per capital income and the trend of African's dependent on the Western donors.

The change is demonstrated by increased per capita income from US\$7 billion in 2000 to US\$41 billion in 2012 (Eggen & Roland, 2013). Although Africa is a major aid recipient, the relative importance of aid to the African economy has reduced. From mid 1970s, Western aid occupied a major share of GDP in the African countries however; the situation changed despite increased aid volumes due to high economic growth on the African continent (Eggen & Roland, 2013). China's contribution to African's economic growth has provided African countries with several options for development and Africans development strategy can rely on China than Western aid.

More importantly, African governments have become increasingly interested in trade and investment than aid and are willing to interact with a more partner China than Western paternalist. Diplomat Veslemøy from Norway noted the same by showing how Tanzanians are interested to talk to the Chinese for trade and investment rather than Norway that is mostly aid⁹. To the realists this embracement of China indicates economic power shift and expects the traditional donor countries to act to prevent China from gaining economic power in Africa. Since China is gaining more economic power and influence through trade and investment, Western donor countries like Norway must promote trade and investment if they are to compete China in Africa.

In addition, China's engagements in Africa has led to increased prices and competition in African natural resources such as oil, gas and minerals. China is interested in African raw materials- petroleum, timber, cobalt, copper, platinum, diamonds and so on for its growing economy and this has led to a huge demand for such resources (Rotberg, 2009). China is not only interested in Africa's unprocessed materials but also invest in servicing and supplying of equipment to these extractive and manufacturing industries that add value to the African raw materials (Rotberg, 2009). The increased demand for the raw materials has led to competition over control and access to the African raw materials between China and other actors like Norway who saw Africa not as very economically interesting in the 1990s. These increased competition over the resources and the adding of value to Africa's raw materials has resulted in higher prices for the raw materials. Investors would be willing to invest irrespective of risk because of the profit.

⁹ Refer : http://blogg.regjeringen.no/norgeiverden/2012/01/19/lite_kos/
<http://www.bistandsaktuelt.no/kommentar/arkiv-kommentarer/hvor-mange-r%C3%B8de-elefanter>

In short, China has changed the geopolitical scenario and diplomatic power and other donors may have to compete for the goodwill of African leaders support in international arena. The new world order has profound implications for Western donors relations to the African countries that used to be dominated by aid. Although dominant Western aid policy makers are late to realize this change in the lesser importance of aid and growing importance of investment and trade because they misjudged China's capability to dominate in an otherwise Western countries dominated order (Eggen & Roland, 2013). China's engagement in Africa has resulted in increased competition over African resources, increased interests in investments and trade from foreign governments and entities, Africa now has strong consumer and increased purchasing power because of the increased prices in natural resources. Africans have become more interested in trade and investment than aid. China has made Africa more attractive and has increased Africa's bargaining power. China's engagement has changed geographical reality for European, American and Japanese capitalistic soft power and paternalistic approaches in many sub-Saharan African countries, "winning influence in countries where Western governments were conspicuous by their absence" (Rotberg, 2009, p. 4).

5.5 Realism and Chinese National Interest In Africa

The growth of Chinese engagements in Africa marks another landmark in realists' explanation of national interest that can be linked to the global trend of aid provision. Commercial interests of China pursue through geo-political and diplomacy has been the main driving force in Chinese engagements in Africa.

Politically, the Chinese interest of attracting political support on global issues and issues which affect China's interest has been influential in China's strategic engagements especially in Africa (Prybyla, 1964). Mao Zedong through China's engagements in Africa demonstrated China's support for Africa in the fight against imperialism and colonialism. By this support to Africa, China established good diplomatic relations with African states as a means of winning support over global issues of China's interest. This has been explained as an effort to counter diplomatic recognition of Taiwan in Africa (Centre for Chinese Studies, 2007a). From the realists perspective China needs the support of Africa especially in matters of global interest in UN and other organizations since decisions are arrived by voting. China's engagements and alliance with Africa was paid off with China benefitting a great deal of support from African states in the UN. Realists will view Africa's overwhelming support that restored

China's seat at the UN during the twenty-sixth UN Assembly in 1971 as a good example of how China's diplomatic strategy was paid off (Sorensen, 2010).

In terms of commercial or economic interest, China's economy has been growing at a faster rate and China needs to ensure regular supply of resources to feed its growing economy. Realists like Mersheimer has predicted that China will become economically powerful than US by 2020 if it continues its economic growth (Baylis et al., 2013). China sees Africa's abundance natural resources as a key to its commercial interest hence China's tremendous engagements in Africa. From the realists' perspective, China's entrance into the Africa's vast resources increases competition over control and access to those resources and therefore serve as a threat to other states who are involved in exploring Africa's resources. Realists argue that states can use whatever means including military to oppose the rise of a hegemonic state (Baylis et al., 2013). From realists' perspective one can assume that Norway will make policy changes in aid and foreign relations in Africa to protect its national interest in Africa.

National interest both political and economic are still crucial elements in world politics and states survival in the international system. China's growing engagements in Africa from realists' perspective will create uncertainty in other donor countries like Norway. This means that Norway will be dragged to pay attention to the growing Chinese engagements in Africa and seek to ensure the survival of Norwegian interest by adopting policies and taken initiatives meant to protect Norway's interest and survival in Africa.

5.6 Preliminary Observation

China's increased engagements in Africa presents an important example that fits into how states national interest dictates the pastes and actions of the state in the international system. China's economic and diplomatic interest in Africa has been the main driving force of China's increased trade, investment and aid to Africa. Even though China is declared a developing state, it has succeeded in attracting strong diplomatic support from African states through many years of trade, investment, aid and solidarity to the African states. China has become one of the biggest African trading partners and this has ensured regular supply of raw materials and resources that are vitally needed to feed the growing Chinese economy. China

has achieved these through mutual and equal support, friendship, unity and trust diplomatic relations with the African counterparts.

China's engagements in Africa is characterized by emphasis on bilateral aid, mixing of aid, trade and investment, emphasis on physical development, increased Chinese FDI, no conditionality or interference policy and natural resource backed loans. China's engagements has been embraced and praised by many African leaders and researchers. They argued that China's engagements have helped to change African economy, increased investment opportunities, increased African consumer and purchasing power and boosted livelihood through creation of employment. On the other hand, China has also been criticised by some Western governments and researchers that China's engagements lack transparency and openness, breed corruption, extensively tied to acquisition of African natural resources and the sale of China's goods and services. Thus, China's engagements have provided both opportunities for investment and economic growth of Africa and at the same time it has provided some challenges.

6.0 NORWEGIAN AID IN AFRICA

Aid occupies an integral part of Norwegian foreign relations and domestic politics. The Norwegian government has established Norwegian Agency for Development (NORAD) and Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) as the principal tools for its diplomatic and aid policies. While MFA is the part of government with responsibility of foreign relations NORAD is Norwegian institution established with a responsibility to provide advises on spending of aid funds, evaluation of development assistance, monitoring of development assistance etc. (NORAD, 2015a).

Unlike other Western donor countries like UK and France that have strategic interest in Africa because of their colonial history and use aid to control and maintain this interest, Norway has no colonial legacy to defend in Africa but aid relations have been instrumental in the Norwegian foreign relations in Africa. Although a small country, Norwegian development assistance and diplomatic relations to Africa in 2014 totaled 32051.1 million NOK with more than 50 African countries benefiting from diverse kinds of assistance (NORAD, 2014). Why is Norway interested in providing aid and establishing diplomatic relations in Africa? This is a question that comes to mind when you begin to reflect on Norwegian aid and diplomatic relations in Africa. While Norwegian government explains that its aid and diplomatic relations within the international system are motivated by altruism, realists' explanation of the actions and behaviour of states in the international system give different explanation of Norway's aid and diplomatic relations in Africa.

In this chapter I analyze the Norwegian aid policies and diplomatic relations in Africa from realists perspective and identify the central elements, determinants and characteristics. I also link the aid policies and diplomatic relations to the Chinese engagements in Africa and explore how Norway has been influence by China to make policy changes and initiatives to pursue Norwegian economic interest in Africa. Norway up till 2002, had never had a specific Africa policy but Norwegian foreign policy towards Africa has been a patchwork of diverse elements that have been compiled together by default (Tostensen, 2002). It is important to examine the policy documents in dealing with Norwegian aid and diplomatic relations because the aid policies of a state provide the core ideas, motivation and focuses that are used to rationalize the provision of development assistance to a developing state. That is the policy documents provide the guidelines on the actions of donor countries in the developing

countries and the motivation for such actions. The section therefore focused on examining the main interest, sector preferences and volume of aid and the characteristics of these policies. I also examine how the aid and diplomatic policies reflect themselves in Africa. Norwegian aid policies have years been perceived for its altruistic focus but as Stokke argued, “ideal (altruistic) arguments may camouflage selfish interest” (Stokke & Hoebink, 2009, p. 450). The actual motives behind the stated aid policies could only be identified when the policies are contradicted with the policy implementations.

I begin the section by first exploring the history of Norway in Africa. I then examine the nature and key features of Norwegian aid and diplomatic policies in Africa before and after 2000 and how the Norwegian national interests reflect in the policies.

6.1 History of Norway in Africa

Tostensen (2002) identified mission work, whaling and shipping as three types of historical interactions that have shaped Norway’s relationship with Africa and also influenced the Norwegian development policies towards Africa. Norwegian Missionary work began in the 19th century in KwaZulu-Natal (South Africa) before extending to many African countries including Tanzania, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Mali and other places (Jørgensen, 1990). Missionaries from Norway recruited through the Norwegian Missionary Society spread across the length and breadth of Africa during this period to spread the gospel (Tostensen, 2002). Their contributions were not limited to building of Churches but also extended to the educational development in Africa through the building of schools, provision of training and teaching of indigenous people reading and writing. Their reports over Africa as a ‘dark continent’ in need of help was used to justify the Norwegian altruistic motive of offering aid to Africa.

The second phase of Norwegian interaction in Africa according to Tostensen (2002) emerged from whaling in the Antarctic and the Southern Atlantic in the 20th century where ports on the Southern African countries like South Africa, Angola and Namibia became the home of Norwegian whaling industry. The ports were used for processing plants and sources of provision for whaling expedition by Norwegian whaling industries.

Tostensen (2002) attributes the third phase to the sailing expedition of Norwegian sailors in the merchant marine who have made numerous visits to the African's coastal line over the years. Though their visits were limited to the coastal towns, these expedition and reports from these sailors have contributed immensely in shaping the commercial interest of Norway in Africa (Tostensen, 2002). Moreover, their report over Africa created an image of a continent with resources and needs to be assisted.

The accounts from these three phases laid the foundation for Norwegian development assistance in Africa by creating an image of a vulnerable and poverty-ridden continent but blessed with material resources and needed assistance.

6.2 Norwegian Aid and Diplomatic relations in Africa Before 2000

Since its genesis in the 1950s, Norwegian development assistance has played a greater role than any other interaction on Norway's foreign policy towards Africa. The Norwegian government through bilateral and multilateral aid has supported Africa's development needs. Figures from NORAD on Norwegian development assistance show that before 2000, 40-50 per cent of Norwegian bilateral aid have been directed towards Africa with the Southern and Eastern African countries being the major beneficiaries (NORAD, 2014).

Being one of the original 51 members of UN by 1945 and a founding member of NATO, Norway became a member of the OECD in 1961. Norway supports critical global challenges such as poverty, diseases, conflict etc, hence its membership to key international organizations with such mandate to promote peace, development and prosperity for all. As part of its commitment to the global organizations Norway allocates a large amount of its budget to support the operations of these organizations. Norway's aid and diplomatic relations before 2000 were characterized by the following.

6.2.1 Project Based Development Assistance To Programme aid


One feature in the early part of the Norwegian development assistance was emphasis on project based development assistance which placed priority on the economic development, trade and the agricultural sector. Project aid is defined as "assistance whose disbursement is tied to capital investment in a separable productive activity" (Carlin, 1967). Data obtained from Norad web page (**Figure 3**) on sector distribution of aid to Africa between 1960 and 1998 shows that 42% of the development assistance were geared towards economic

development and trade. This sector included infrastructural and communication, agricultural and fishing, industry and mining, banking, financing and tourism etc.

Figure 4 is a breakdown of the economic development and trade and shows that a large portion of the project focused on agriculture and fishing as well as infrastructure and communication. Tanzania, Mozambique, Zambia, Botswana and Zimbabwe were the major recipients of these projects (Tostensen, 2002). That is, much of these projects focused on the Southern and Eastern African countries. During these periods every aspects of the project were designed and implemented by the Norwegian government with little trust for the recipient's priorities because the government of the recipient's country was excluded from the planning of the project. The role of Norway in the technical assistance in the Tanganyika project in 1962 whereby Norway, Sweden, Finland and Denmark sign agreement with Tanganyika (Later Tanzania) to establish a multi-institutional centre for health, education agriculture in Kibaha outside of Dar es Salaam upon the advice of the Nordic Council is an example of the project aid (Gerard Van Bilzen, 2015). Is not Norway seeking to gain disproportional support of the Southern and Eastern African countries by focusing much of the projects in these countries? From realists' perspective, Norway's focus of projects in the Eastern and Southern African countries will promote Norwegian diplomatic relations with these countries and gain disproportional support of the Southern and Eastern African countries in the international arena.


Project based development assistance began to change from the late 1980s to 1990s following the negative social effects of the structural adjustment programmes of the IMF and World Bank (Selbervik & Nygaard, 2006). Attention was drawn from project based development assistance to software programmes such as resource and capacity building. Much emphasis was given to education, health, water, sanitation, good governance and civil society (Selbervik & Nygaard, 2006).

Figure 3: Sector Distribution of Norwegian Development Aid to Africa from 1960-1998



Source: Norad

Figure 4: Breakdown of Norwegian Aid for Economic and trade in Africa from 1960-1998



Source: Norad

The change from project based development to programme aid can be linked to Norway’s interest in influencing global issues through multilateral institutions such as IMF, World Bank, UN etc. These soft programmes in the developing countries were introduced by the multilateral organizations as conditions for aid and Norway demonstrated its commitment to the multilateral organizations by implementing them in its aid and diplomatic relations with the developing countries (Stokke, 2013). Norwegian motivation for this change was promotion of global interest link to enlightened self-interest but from the realists` perspective,

Norway was seeking to gain disproportional power on global issues that affect Norway's interest by cooperating with the policies of the organizations in its policies towards Africa. To the realists, international organizations exist to fulfill the wishes of states because states use organizations instrumentally to achieve their self-interest (Karns & Mingst, 2004).

6.2.2 Donorship To Conditionality

As noted earlier on, a shift in Norwegian aid policy focus occurred in the mid 1980s due to introduction of the stabilization and structural adjustment programmes in Africa. By the mid 1980s, the IMF and the World Bank had introduced the structural adjustment programme in the developing world due to the economic downturn in most developing countries (Lall, 1995). In dealing with the downturn, a policy-based lending which required African countries to comply with certain policy conditions like privatization, reduction of trade barriers, etc. At the initial stage, Norway was not paying heed to the conditions and continued its development assistance to Africa without these conditions however, from the mid 1980s due to international pressure; the Norwegian government introduced macro-economic conditionality, democracy and human rights observance (Stokke, 2013). The end of the cold war and the triumph of Western democracy saw a growing emphasis on political conditions in the provision of development assistance in Africa by the donor countries. Norway was not an exception, for instance, Norway and Kenya broke diplomatic relations because of Kenya's human rights violation but restored diplomatic relations between Norway and Kenya later (Tostensen, 2002). These conditions could be argued as way of creating the necessary political and economic environment in Africa needed for trade, investment and commercial interest of the donor countries. This is because donor countries saw investment in Africa as a risk due to protracted conflict, poor consumer and purchasing power, weak security and government structure etc. The donor conditions such as good governance, human rights and free market were meant to rid Africa off the poor political and economic environment that had been preventing the donor countries from achieving their economic interest in Africa.

6.2.3 Focus on Liberation Struggle, Peace and Security?

Another area where Norway demonstrated a great deal of support in aid and diplomatic relations with Africa was peace, security, mediation and conflict resolution. The Norwegian government played a great deal of role in the liberation struggle in most African countries especially the Southern African countries. Indirectly through its position as an elected member of the UN Security Council between 1949 to 1950, 1963 to 1964 and 1970-1980 (UNSC, 2015).

Also through direct support to the liberation movements in South Africa, Namibia, Southern Rhodesia and the Portuguese colonies in the 1970s, Norway contributed to liberate these countries from imperialism and abuses. The Norwegian Council for Southern Africa and the Norwegian Civil Society played a great role in ensuring official activism while a separate budget line was also included to support the liberation movements (Tostensen, 2002). Norway's assistance through mediation and support to the refugees in Somalia, Sierra Leon, the Democratic republic of Congo and Sudan demonstrates its support to peace and Security in Africa. It is important to state that Norwegian contributions to the liberation movement, peace and security in Africa are mostly done through multilateral support and slightly through bilateral aid. The official motivation for Norway has always been altruism but to the realists it is all about Norwegian interest. From realists' perspective, conditions and policies of international organizations reflect the wishes and interest of the most powerful members who ensure the survival of the Organizations.

Norway uses the conditions of the aid donations to gain influence and control of the developing states and thereby legitimizing their influence over the states. Moreover, Norway is interested in promoting its fishing and oil industries that are important for Norwegian economic growth, however, the conflict situations in countries like Sudan that has both oil and important marine resource, made investment in Sudan a risk worth not taken. From realists' perspective, Norway indirectly uses its position in the UN and directly through bilateral aid to create the necessary environment needed to promote Norwegian oil and fishing industry in Sudan. Currently Norway supports Sudan oil sector through the OFD and also contributes \$3.4 million to the Sudanese project "Building institutional capacities for the sustainable management of the marine fisheries in the Red Sea State" (Royal Norwegian Embassy, 2016). The Norwegian incorporation of Sudan in the OFD and Norway's growing investment in Sudan marine and fishing sector raises questions on whether Norway's contribution to peace and security in Sudan was for altruism or a way to promote its economic interest by creating the necessary environment for Norway's fishing and oil industry in Sudan.

6.2.4 Less Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Africa

Norwegian diplomatic relation in Africa before 2000 was characterized by low foreign direct investment. Norway was mostly interested in giving aid and importing capital other than exporting capital to Africa (Tostensen, 2002). This means that Norway was buying some raw

materials from Africa but was not interested in investing huge capital in establishing industries or supporting its private companies to invest in Africa. There were a lot of economic, political and social factors such as poor African economy, poor infrastructural development, poor institutions and unpredictable investment climate in most African countries, conflict and autocratic leadership that were abounding in Africa before 2000, all accounted for low level of Norwegian foreign direct investment in Africa. In fact, Tostensen (2002) argued that Norwegian relationship with Africa before 2000 was characterized by ambivalence as a result of the poor market and volatile economic situations in Africa. Latin America and Asia have had the best share of Norwegian FDI according to Tostensen (2002). From a realists' perspective, we can say that Norway was mostly interested in using aid to create conducive economic and political environment needed to promote its economic interest in Africa.

The Norwegian government less support for FDI is seen in its minimal support for promoting private sector in the developing countries. Governments can support private either by supporting local industries in the developing countries or by providing support to Norwegian private companies to invest in the developing countries. Data obtain from NORAD on the distribution pattern of Norwegian aid to Africa between 1960 and 1999 indicates relatively less support to private sector and to public-private partnerships¹⁰. This indicates that the Norwegian government in the period before the Chinese growth in Africa was less positive towards the promotion of FDI in Africa because of the risk of investment in Africa. Does it mean Norway had no economic interest in Africa? Realists' perspective may say that Norway always have both economic and security interest in the international arena however, the risk of investment in Africa did not worth it. Norway needed the necessary environment to promote its economic interest. Norway was therefore more interested in using conditions of aid both bilateral and multilateral to create such environment needed for long-term self-interest.


6.2.5 Multilateral Support

Another feature of Norwegian aid and diplomatic relations was its devotion to multilateral support. Norway has traditionally been a great supporter of multilateral aid and has disbursed a larger portion of its aid multilaterally. In fulfillment of its altruistic interest to support global peace and security as well as its position as a small state Norway, has channeled a lot of its

¹⁰ For data refer <https://www.norad.no/en/front/toolspublications/norwegian-aid-statistics/>

aid through multilateral institutions. Norway as early as 1969 developed a guideline suggesting that ODA should be equally divided between bilateral and multilateral channels and this became effective in 1972 (Selbervik & Nygaard, 2006). Figures obtain from NORAD (Figure 5) on partner allocation of Norwegian aid between 1960 and 1999 further shows Norwegian strong support for multilateral aid before 2000.

Figure 5: Norwegian Development Aid from 1960-1999 by Partner



Source NORAD

With 42% of Norwegian aid between 1960-1999 allocated to multilateral aid, Norway was able to gain identity as an altruistic country in the international arena. A major factor for this strong support for multilateral aid was the desire of Norway to influence global issues and to help deal with global challenges such as conflict, health, education¹¹. A break down of the development aid allotted to multilateral institutions from 1960 to 1999 shows that the UN agencies and the World Bank were the biggest recipients of Norway’s support to multilateral institutions (NORAD, 2015b). Could the motivation for Norwegian support to the UN agencies and World Bank be linked with the desire of Norway to influence global issues through diplomatic relations and support to UN and World Bank? As noted in chapter 2, states through their support to international organizations seek to gain greater role and

¹¹ Interview with Norwegian diplomats and Staff of Norad and MFA.

influence over issues that affect their interest in the international arena. Is not Norway also seeking to gain disproportional power over global issues that affect Norway's interest?

The motivation for channeling foreign aid through the UN agencies was also linked with the idea that the UN could guarantee peace and security especially after the World War II. That is, security interest was a major consideration for Norway's enormous support for the multilateral institutions.

“Norway has always been a small country and we have to trust the support of bigger powers when it comes to military threat from others..... for decades Russia and Soviet Union have been the main challenges of Norway when it comes to security and because of that Norway links up to the NATO's security alliance through enormous support for multilateral institutions”¹²

Realists will view Norwegian strong support for Multilateral institutions as a means of pursuing its national interest because to the realists, multilateral institutions are instruments for state's politics and rivalry where smaller states like Norway can pursue their national interest by cooperating with other states to form a stronger alliance against any hegemonic power (Karns & Mingst, 2004). Norway was motivated by security interest, the threat of Russia in the international system influenced Norwegian support for multilateral institutions such as NATO and UN to secure its borders from the threat of Russia. If a state feels threatened it should seek to augment its own power capabilities by joining forces or forming alliance with other states and seek to preserve their own interest (Baylis et al., 2013). This is what realists referred to as balance of power.

Security interest using ideological considerations can also be linked to the Norwegian strong support for multilateral institutions during the cold war era. As noted from the history of aid in the previous chapter, ideological warfare between USSR and US was a major factor for the emergence of aid during the bipolar era with the US and USSR using aid as ideological weapon to war against each other to attain security, economic and political hegemony. Norway as a founding member of NATO since 1949 and a major contributor to NATO's operations during these periods before 2000 was also caught up using aid to throw its support for US through NATO and also promote its cherished norms such as democracy, rule of law,

¹² Interview with a journalist.

liberalism¹³. Norway's support for NATO can be considered as a shared US political ideology with the security interest as its main focus. That is, the ideological support was an instrument for pursuing Norwegian security interest in the international system. Moreover, the period coincided with the cold war and Norway sought to protect its borders against the threat of Russia through NATO.

Some researchers argue that enlightened self-interest was a major motivation factor for Norwegian support to the UN agencies¹⁴. The enlightened self-interest argument was based on the conviction that the multilateral aid through the UN and the World Bank while helping to promote development and peace in the developing countries, will also help to create economic stability and secured environment for the Norwegian industries to grow in the developing countries. However, most Norwegian diplomats, staff of NORAD and MFA projected global development and the maintenance of international peace and security with no strings of Norwegian self-interest, as the main motivation for Norwegian aid and diplomatic relations during this period¹⁵. Their views are supported by subsequent Norwegian government white papers and policy documents on the main motivation for aid and support to multilateral institutions. For instance, the 2011-2012 Norwegian report to the Parliament (white) on Norway and the United Nations stated that the main interest of Norway for its support to the United Nations since its creation in 1945 has been to promote democracy, human rights, peace and security in the developing countries (MFA Norway, 2012). On the other hand realists' perspectives explain it differently through the concept of interest. Norway's strong support for the multilateral institutions especially the UN can be viewed as an instrument for achieving security interest by supporting UN to deal with inter and intra state conflicts which were threat to trade and investment.

6.2.6 Bilateral Aid Focus On Africa

African countries have been major recipients of Norwegian development assistance since its emergence in the 1960s. Norway has directed a much higher share of aid to Africa in terms of percentage than other bilateral donors (Tostensen, 2002). Statistics from the OECD IDS database indicates an average of 52.8 percent of Norwegian aid to Africa around the 1990s¹⁶.

¹³ Interview with researchers

¹⁴ Ibid 2

¹⁵ Interview with diplomats, staff of MFA and NORAD

¹⁶ Refer OECD IDS database

Being a small development assistance country, Norway geographically concentrated in few countries and regions with African countries been the biggest beneficiaries of this principle of geographical concentration of aid. The main argument for this concentration of development assistance in few countries and few sectors is to facilitate effective aid and development (Stokke, 1989). Norwegian government operationalized its geographical concentration of development assistance in Eastern and Southern African countries by the selection of priority countries also known as partners of development, main recipients or programme countries and gradually also regions, such as South African Development Co-operation Conference (SADCC) (Stokke, 1989). Such countries and regions enjoyed a higher concentration of aid and long-term development co-operation with Norway. Among the priority countries in Africa were Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda, Mozambique, Zambia and Botswana. Norway has also established long term development co-operation with some African countries outside the priority countries such as Angola, Zimbabwe and Madagascar (Stokke, 1989).

The basic driving force for African focus of bilateral aid during this period was rooted in the Norwegian principle for development assistance to support the poorest people in the poorest country (Stokke & Hoebink, 2009). Successive Norwegian governments and parliament, according to Stokke (2009), during these periods maintained that altruistic motive is the main driving force for aid and diplomatic relations and that aid to the African countries was as a result of the moral obligation to promote international common goods such as economic stability, peace and security. Norwegian diplomats and staff of MFA also maintained this altruistic argument during the interview as the main motivation for Norwegian support to Africa. That is, Norway's main motivation was to assist African countries deal with conflict, colonialism, apartheid and human right abuses which prevailing in Africa at the time¹⁷. The nature of Norway's bilateral concentration of aid and diplomatic relations in Africa raises question over why aid and diplomatic relations in Africa was concentrated in the Southern and Eastern African countries?

It has been argued that concentration in Eastern and Southern African countries was partly as a result of the common use of English Language and also the early missionary contact with these countries (Selbervik & Nygaard, 2006). Since Norwegian development assistance at the time focused on providing support to the poorest people in the poorest countries, the

¹⁷ Interview with diplomats, MFA and NORAD staff.

missionary reports about these countries presented an ideal environment for achieving the mission and vision of Norwegian development assistance. If these assertions by Selbervik and Nygaard were true then one would ask whether the Southern African countries were the only English speaking countries in Africa?

Can we also argue from the realists' perspective that Norway was supporting the Southern African countries, many of which were still under colonial rule, so they could establish alliance and gain favorable control and influence over such countries? This is because, the Norwegian establishment of diplomatic missions in the Southern African countries after their independence gives room for question over why Norway concentrated on establishing its embassies in Southern African countries such as Zimbabwe, South Africa, Botswana, and Mozambique?

Table 1

Percentage share of allocable bilateral ODA (gross disbursements, constant 2002 prices, mill USD) by geographical region, Norway 1990-2003

Norway	Sub-Saharan Africa	North Africa	South and Central Asia	Far East Asia	Middle East	Europe	Other	Bilateral allocable	Un-allocated	Total bilateral ODA
1990	65.0	0.5	21.2	2.8	0.6	0.3	9.7	638	204	842
1991	65.3	0.2	19.2	5.2	0.9	0.4	8.9	644	181	825
1992	64.3	0.1	18.3	7.2	0.7	0.7	8.7	682	195	878
1993	61.3	0.2	17.8	5.8	0.6	6.9	7.4	613	183	796
1994	54.1	0.5	14.4	7.1	2.6	14.4	7.0	795	201	996
1995	52.8	0.2	13.8	8.1	6.8	10.1	8.1	747	207	954
1996	51.7	0.7	16.0	6.6	8.0	8.8	8.3	766	207	972
1997	52.4	0.5	13.5	8.2	7.8	8.8	8.8	783	221	1,004
1998	51.9	0.5	13.2	7.3	8.7	9.7	8.7	802	321	1,123
1999	42.0	0.3	12.2	7.2	8.4	22.1	7.8	841	311	1,151

Source: OECD IDS database

In chapter 2, we noted that political and economic benefits are the main factors that influence states establishment of formal diplomatic missions or establishment of core groups or priority countries. Through these diplomatic ties, donor countries are able to negotiate trade deals and gain disproportional support of the receiving country in the international arena (Barston, 2014). Moreover, the establishment of diplomatic mission gives Norway identity in the Southern and Eastern African countries and recognition in the international arena. Was Norway not seeking to gain disproportional power and support from the Southern and Eastern African countries in the international arena by concentrating aid and diplomatic relations in these countries and also by the establishment of priority countries?

6.2.7 Emphasis On Development And Poverty Eradication?

Another important feature of Norwegian aid during the period before 2000 is its emphasis on development and poverty eradication. One of the reasons for the establishment of Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD) in 1968 was to oversee state to state official development assistance and the management of aid especially in the poor countries (Selbervik & Nygaard, 2006). Development assistance to the poor countries was seen by the Norwegian government as a tool to promote economic stability, international common goods such as international stability and peace¹⁸. The main White Papers of the Norwegian governments up to the late 1980s also emphasised this argument of using development assistance to promote international development, for instance the Norwegian government White Paper in the 1975 emphasised the moral obligation to help human beings in distress as the main powerful incentive behind Norwegian aid (Stokke & Hoebink, 2009).

A higher share of Norwegian aid during this period was allocated to the Low Income Countries (LICs) as well as the United Nations agencies. The main argument for a higher support for the UN agencies as noted earlier on was based on the conviction that aid channeled through the UN agencies would strengthen the capacity of UN agencies to tackle challenges such as conflict, health, education. From the 1990s, security and environmental concerns became additional argument for Norwegian development assistance (Stokke, 1989). On the LIC countries, the Norwegian government channeled on the average 50% (**table 1**) of its development assistance to the LIC countries most especially in Africa. The Norwegian establishment of the Ministry for Development on 1st January 1984 further demonstrated Norway's commitment to development of the developing countries. The Ministry was empowered to provide and implement policies which focus on the developing countries¹⁹. Stokke (2009) has argued that Norway was the OECD country that provided the most development assistance in relative terms in the 1980s and 1990s and its development policies at the time were framed as an enlightened self-interest of a small country. Stokke's argument was supported by some researchers during the interview who argued that Norway's support for poverty eradication and development in African countries was a long term interest of Norway. On the other hand, some Norwegian diplomats questioned what Norway stands to

¹⁸ Interview with diplomats

¹⁹ For details of the Ministry of Development, refer <https://www.regjeringen.no/en/the-government/previous-governments/governments/modern-times/the-council-of-state-since-1945/id438700/>

gain from helping countries that are either in extreme poverty or experiencing negative effects of conflict or war?

“if you look at our history in Africa, poverty and development of the African states have always been our priority. We always support the fight against extreme poverty, conflict and insecurity through our presence in Africa or through the UN, World Bank Do you think we were in Africa because of the resources?Go to our history and you will realised that we have contributed a lot to poverty eradication and insecurity in many African countries like Sudan, Congo,²⁰”

In deed, many African countries during this period were confronted with conflict, high inflation, colonialism, human rights abuses, famine and extreme poverty and Norwegian aid in support of development and poverty eradication was a great relieve to many African countries that received such assistance. Realists explanation of interest does support Norway’s strong emphasis on Development And Poverty Orientation as the main motivation for aid and diplomatic relations at the time because to them interest is the motivation behind states’ actions in the international system.

6.3 Preliminary Observation

It can be observed from the above that Norwegian aid to Africa in the period before 2000 were channeled through either bilateral or multilateral means. Norwegian aid and diplomatic relations in Africa were concentrated in the Eastern and Southern African countries. The main motive behind these support according to succesive Norwegian government was the moral obligation to help the poor in the poor countries. That is Norway’s main interest for the billateral support was to help the development of these countries and also contribute to eradication of poverty. Diplomats and staff of MFA supported this argument but the researchers and journalist during the interview believed that the government explanation for offering of aid to African countries was combined with some sort of enlightened self interest. Realists perspective through the concept of interest stands that Norway was motivated by the desire to gain dispropotional support from the African states through alliance system in order to increase its power within the international system.

²⁰ Interview with a Norwegian diplomat

In terms of multilateral, the UN agencies, NATO and the World Bank were major recipients of Norwegian support and this has been linked to enlightened self-interest by some researchers during the interview, as a major motivation factor for the Norwegian multilateral support before 2000. Norwegian diplomats, staff of MFA and NORAD also emphasized Norwegian commitment to support the organization was based on the conviction that the organizations have the capacity to ensure peace, stability and development in the developing countries. Realists perspective however argue that Norway's support to the multilateral institutions was motivated by security interest. The threat of neighbouring Russia, the cold war and the fear of another world war motivated Norway to seek shelter from NATO and UN. In short, Norwegian development assistance before 2000 was motivated by security interest and an interest to gain disproportional support from some African countries over global issues which affect Norway's interest. Economic interest was given little attention because of the high risk of trade and investment in Africa.

6.4 Norwegian Development Assistance After 2000

The Norwegian development assistance took some critical changes during the later part of the 1990s and to the 2000s. Aid became an important tool for political gains while economic interest emerged as a motivation for aid and diplomatic relations. This tendency whereby aid is used by the Norwegian government for political gains grew during Stoltenberg II government (Elling N. Tjønneland, 2012). The changes could be linked to the dramatic changes in the international aid environment and diplomatic relations as a result of the enormous growth of China in the aid industry especially in Africa. As noted in chapter 5, China emerged during the turn of millennium as a economic power in the international arena and the nature its engagements especially in Africa changed the poor economic environment that had prevented the investment in Africa.

The changes resulted in the emergence of a new security situation, a new ideological power balance involving economic policy, a lost rationale for aid, a shrinking ODA etc. The changes in the global aid environment affected the nature of the Norwegian aid policies and diplomatic relations in Africa that need to be explored for this studies. Even though economic and security interest has become important motivation for aid, the donor countries have often played the notion down. Donor countries like Norway continue to preach their altruistic

motive as the main reason for offering of aid to the developing countries especially in Africa (Degnbol-Martinussen & Engberg-Pedersen, 2003). With the fall of the Soviet Union and growing importance of China in aid and diplomatic relations, new characteristics came to be associated with Norwegian aid and diplomatic relations in Africa.

6.4.1 Focus On Programme aid

One of the characteristics of Norwegian aid from 2000 is its focus on Programme Aid (PA). This is an aid that is not meant for a specific projects but come in the form of import support or debt relief, or budget support and is usually attached to policies for implementation in the recipient countries (Dijkstra & White, 2013). They mostly target sectors such as education, health, civil service and other social service. IMF and World Bank provided preconditions for loans and support and Norway mostly ensure that its recipient partners are on track with IMF/World Bank programme. Unlike the years before 2000 where strategic, geopolitical and security interest made donor countries to a large extent overlook the political situation in the developing countries, donor countries became increasingly concern about the political situation in the developing countries especially in Africa (Dijkstra & White, 2013). Economic and political conditons such as good governance, human rights, democracy became major preconditions for aid.

Focus on programme aid in Norway such as resource and Capacity Building began during the later part of the 1990s as noticed from above. In 2003, Norway allocated more than 40% (**Table 2**) of its billateral aid to social infrastructure and social services which include education, health, water, sanitation, good governance and civil society (Selbervik & Nygaard, 2006). As noted in the background chapter, programme aid was not high on Norway's agenda for aid in the 1970s and 1980s however this changed following the negative social effects of the IMF and World Bank structural adjustment programme in Africa and the changing trend in international aid enviroment. The Norwegian government in helping African countries to deal with these challenges allocated much of their billateral aid into social infrastructure and social services such as education, health, good governance, water and civil society.

Even though Norway started enssuring that its recipient partners are on track with the IMF and World Bank programmes or pre conditions for aid in the 1990s, one significant change from the 2000s is the dramatic increased in the aid support to these programmes.

As can be seen from the **table 2** below, in 1990 the figure for Norway's support for social infrastructure /service was 17.6% of the total aid and this increased to 41.9% by 2003. This raises question over why such a sudden attention to these programmes?

Table 2

Percentage of bilateral ODA by main sector (commitments/gross disbursements, current prices, mill USD), Norway, 1990 and 1995-2003

<i>Norway</i>	1990	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
Social infrastructure/service	17.6	26.7	30.9	28.0	33.0	45.3	38.8	49.0	60.2	41.9
Education	4.6	3.0	7.0	8.5	5.4	10.7	6.2	7.8	11.7	9.2
Health	3.0	4.6	2.8	4.6	3.8	6.0	2.7	11.8	6.8	6.9
Water/sanitation	5.4	3.4	0.7	1.8	4.3	3.1	2.1	4.6	2.4	1.4
Gov./civil society	0.3	6.5	4.9	6.4	10.4	13.2	18.0	15.1	25.3	15.7
Other social	4.2	9.2	15.5	6.7	9.2	12.3	9.7	9.7	14.1	8.8
Eco infrastructure/service	24.9	23.3	14.6	12.1	10.0	6.7	10.7	15.2	6.9	7.7
Transp./storage	14.2	5.4	2.2	0.5	0.9	0.8	0.8	2.4	0.5	1.4
Communications	0.8	0.6	1.7	1.3	0.0	1.0	0.6	3.0	0.4	0.3
Energy	7.3	15.5	9.1	9.1	7.8	3.2	5.5	7.7	3.5	4.3
Other economic	2.6	1.9	1.5	1.2	1.2	1.8	3.8	2.1	2.5	1.7
Production sectors	14.1	9.0	7.4	5.3	5.1	6.9	7.3	7.7	6.5	4.6
Agri./forestry/fishing	9.3	6.2	4.4	3.7	2.3	5.3	6.1	4.5	5.5	3.9
Industry/mining/constr.	3.9	2.8	2.9	1.4	2.4	1.4	1.0	3.0	0.7	0.1
Other production	0.9	0.1	0.0	0.2	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.6
Cross-cutting	4.8	8.6	10.4	12.7	10.0	10.3	5.8	7.8	9.3	9.4
Other	38.5	32.3	36.7	41.9	41.9	30.7	37.4	20.3	17.1	36.4
<i>Alloc. Bilat. ODA (mill USD)</i>	<i>617</i>	<i>909</i>	<i>839</i>	<i>677</i>	<i>680</i>	<i>1120</i>	<i>781</i>	<i>983</i>	<i>1069</i>	<i>1444</i>

Source: OECD IDS database

The increased support for soft programmes from 2000s could be attributed to the launching of the Millenium Development Goals following the millenium summit of the UN in 2000. As noted earlier on, global development linked to enlightened self-interest is one of the motivation given by subsequent Norwegian government for aid and diplomatic relations. Increased support to these programmes like good governance, civil society, health etc. in Africa means helping to achieve the UN Millenium Development Goals while at the same time creating secured and stable enviroment for Norwegian companies operating in Africa. For instance, stable political and economic environment in Angola and Nigeria is necessary for growing Statoil operations that began in 1991 and 1992 respectively (Statoil, 2014).

The economic conditions, through the programme aid, required African countries to liberalize their economies and open to influx of products from donor countries companies could also be linked as motivation for Norwegian attention to programme aid. That is, the programme aid in a way will create bussiness opportunities for donor countries through the removal of trade barriers.

The main motivation for the programme aid was capacity building and helping to ensure economic and political stability in African countries²¹. However, realists hold additional explanation through the concept of interest. From the realists perspective, the economic conditions such as liberalization of the developing countries economy will open up their market for Norwegian fish and oil industry. The period also coincided with the growth of China in the oil and gas sector in Africa and perhaps Norway needed a trade liberalization policy that will ensure Norway's economic interest in Africa. With liberalization Norwegian oil companies can explore African oil industries with limited restrictions. Economic interest of Norway could be viewed as another motivation for Norway's adherence to programme aid since the turn of the millenium.

6.4.2 Bilateral Aid: Africa Focus And Expansion Beyond Priority Countries.

Africa was still high on Norwegian agenda as can be seen from the OECD IDS graph (**Figure 6**) on Norwegian global support between 2001 and 2014 below. One important hallmark during this period was the expansion of support beyond the priority countries in Africa. Unlike the period before 2000 where Norwegian aid was highly concentrated in the Southern and Eastern African countries this period has witnessed a tremendous support for more countries such as Malawi, Ethiopia, Congo DR etc. Eventhough countries in Southern and Eastern Africa continued to enjoy relatively lions share of Norwegian aid and diplomatic relations, the aid and diplomatic relations has been expanded to cover some countries in the western, central and northern part of Africa. Economic considerations are important motivation when states expand their diplomatic relations (Barston, 2014). That is, states mostly consider economic benefits before establishing diplomatic ties with other staes. Could Norwegian government extension of support beyond the priority countries be linked to Norway's economic interest mainly in energy, shipping and fishing industry? A researcher during the interview argue that economic interest is the main motivation for extension of priority countries:


“the mechanisms intended to support Norwegian business interests are another illustrations of aid being extended beyond the priority countries” ²².

²¹ Interview with some Norwegian diplomats

²² Interview with a researcher.

Thus the main motive for extension of Norwegian aid support beyond its priority countries is to promote commercial and business interest beyond the priority areas. This argument could also be linked to security interest. Norwegian interest of protecting its bussinesses in Africa has motivated it to support unstable parts of Africa that are gradually becoming safe haven for terrorist organizations.

Figure 6: Norwegian Global Support from 2001-2014



Source: OECD IDS database

In another argument by a journalist during the interview,

“there is a shift in Norwegian aid and diplomatic relations in Africa from emphasis on Southern and Eastern African countries to Northern and some western African countries. The main idea is emphasis on unstable parts of Africa because of the threat of terrorism which can disturb Norwegian bussinesses like Statoil in the Africa”²³.

The turn of the millennium also coincided with the 9/11-terror attack in the United States and this has increased the importance of security considerations in the global aid and diplomatic relations. Moreover, the terror attacks on Statoil gas plant in Algeria in 2013, and 2016 has further heightened Norway’s consideration of security interest in its aid and diplomatic relations (Berglund, 2016).

²³ Interview with a journalist

Realists perspective support growing Norwegian economic and security interest in the international arena. To the realists, security and economic interest should be the main focus of states within the interantional arena because they key to obtain power.

The extension of aid support beyond the priority countries in Africa has been argued to be in tuned with the developmental motive of promoting international peace and security as well as economic stability²⁴. Norway aims at reducing poverty in Africa and extending such extensive aid beyond the priority countries will help to expand Norwegian support to poverty reduction in many Africa countries²⁵. Although Norwegian support to Africa has expanded beyond the prority countries, the principle of geographical concentration in Southern and Eastern African countries reamains high on Norwegian development Assistance to Africa. Perhaps Norway is maintaining its comparative advantage within those regions because of many years of diplomatic relations.

The expanded bilateral relations in Africa could be linked to the growing Chinese activites in Africa and its influence over geopolitical reality in aid and investment in Africa. China has increased competition over African resources, increased interests in investments and trade from foreign governments and entities due to the booming oil prices and these have changed situation in Africa. One could argue that Norway might have increased its priority countries in order to enjoy growing commercial benefits of Africa because of China. Norwegian diplomats do not agree that extension of priority country is for economic interest but realists' perspective would agree.

6.4.3 Growing FDI And Norwegian Controlled Enterprises

Another emerged characteristic of Norway in Africa since the turn of the millennium is the growing interest in Foreign Direct Investment and increased operations of Norwegian controlled enterprises in Africa. For years, Norway was very skeptical in investment in Africa and concentrated most of its investment largely in Europe and to some extent America (**Figure 7**). However, Foreign Direct Investment from Norway to Africa has increased tremendously since 2000. This is noticeable in the growing number of Norwegian private companies operating in Africa and the growing direct Norwegian government investment in Africa.

²⁴ Interview with some Norwegian diplomats

²⁵ Ibid

As can be seen from **Figure 7**, ODA from Norway that constituted the highest percentage of Norway's support to Africa in 1990 has reduced while FDI to Africa has increased substantially by 2013.

There have been some important developments by the Norwegian government and policy makers in their effort to boost investment and encourage Norwegian private companies to invest in Africa. One of such development is the establishment of Norfund in 1997 that has become an important instrument for combatting poverty through private sector development with the objective of contributing to sustainable businesses in the developing countries (Norfund, 2015). Innovation Norway established in 2004 is another important initiative by the Norwegian government that has promoted investment in the developing countries. Innovation Norway was established with the objectives of “building competitive Norwegian enterprises at both domestic and international markets” (Innovation Norway, 2015). These two institutions have become the main driving wheels for Norwegian investment and promotion of private cooperation in Africa.

Norfund commenced its operations in 1998 and it is empowered to invest in profitable and sustainable enterprises in any OECD DAC recipient country with a GDP under USD 5290 per capita. Norfund can invest in most sectors of the economy such as energy, agriculture, banking, industrial, etc. as long as the investment offers opportunities for growth, profitability and local development (Norfund, 2016). Examples of such direct Norwegian investment through Norfund in Africa include the construction of a hydroelectric plant at Bugoye in Western Uganda, Bio2Watt biogas project outside Pretoria South Africa etc. By the end of 2014, a total of NOK 6,04 billion had been invested in 490 companies in Africa alone and 81 percent of Norfund's new investment globally were concentrated in Africa (Norfund, 2016).

The Norwegian government through its various embassies in Africa and innovation Norway promotes investment opportunities for Norwegian private companies in Africa.

“As ambassadors, we represent the national interest of our country and one of such interest is to promote the development and investment opportunities for our Norwegian companies. We used national and internationally approved channels to promote investment in Africa”²⁶.

²⁶ Interview with a Norwegian diplomat

The Norwegian government released of its white paper Meld. St. 35 (2014–2015) named, “*Working together: Private sector development in Norwegian development cooperation*”, has intensified its willingness to invest and also support private sector to invest in poor countries including Africa (White Paper, 2014). The 2014 white paper attributes the growing FDI in Africa to China’s engagements that have resulted in the economic growth in the African countries (White Paper, 2014).

“Economic growth has been particularly strong in China, and to some extent in India, and it has had a major impact on the economies of other countries. Growing demand for natural resources has contributed to increased growth in many African countries, especially following major discoveries of coal, oil and gas. But investments in infra- structure, agriculture and tourism have also been important for this growth” (White Paper, 2014, p. 10).

The white paper clearly stated that the growth of China has changed the game of aid and investment in Africa and Norway is now interested in promoting investment in Africa. According to one Norwegian diplomat,

“I can say that China has taught us a lesson that we can reduce poverty and promote development in Africa by increasing investment and supporting Norwegian companies to grow in Africa, but we do not seek to promote our commercial interest at the expense of the African resources as China has been accused of. Our aim is to help reduce poverty in Africa”.

Some Norwegian diplomats seem to be linking the increased FDI to win-win relationship between Africa and Norway. That is, Norway benefits from its investment in Africa and at the same time helping to reduce poverty in Africa by creating employment. One journalist supported the argument of a win-win relationship during the interview when he stated that Norway is benefiting a lot from its investment in Africa and that returns from Statoil in some African countries like Angola is more than the aid to that country.

There is also what appears to be a case of conflict of interest from the assertion by some diplomats that China’s engagements in Africa is at the expense of the African resources but Norway does not promote its commercial interest at the expense of the African resources. Is it not conflict of interest when Norway is benefiting from Statoil investment in African oil and gas resources in Angola, Nigeria, Algeria and Libya but accused China of promoting its commercial interest in Africa?

Some other Norwegian diplomats however, attributed this growing interest of Norway’s investment in Africa to Africans own economic and political development and disagree that it is because China has changed the game in Africa. They argued that, Norwegian lack of

motivation to invest in Africa some years back was as a result of the political and economic risk such as conflict, poor infrastructure, poor market etc. With the growing infrastructural development in Africa, less conflict and economic and political stability in Africa, Africa has grown to attract investment hence the Norway’s growing investment in Africa²⁷.


Some researchers during the interview argued that Norwegian growing investment in Africa is motivated by commercial and political interest instigated by China’s investment in African’s infrastructure.

“China has invested hugely in Africa’s infrastructure such as energy, roads, electricity etc. that are key attractive mechanisms for investment. Norway is now interested in Africa because China has set Africa in a stage that has attracted Norway”²⁸.

China’s engagement in Africa that has resulted in increased competition and prices over African resources has changed the geopolitical reality and increased interests from Norwegian government to promote investments and trade in Africa. Norway still maintains altruistic motive as the main official interest for Norwegian government support for the private sector and promotion of FDI and in developing country²⁹. The government altruistic interest and commitment to support poverty reduction in Africa could also be noticed in the main purpose for its renewed support for private investment in poor countries as stated in the white paper:

“The goal of Norwegian development policy is to contribute to democratization and the realisation of human rights and to help people work their way out of poverty. Private sector development and sustainable economic growth are essential for achieving this goal” (White Paper, 2014, p. 5).

Figure 7: Norway’s ODA levels, Personal remittances and Foreign Direct Investments, by region (1990-2013)



Source: (White Paper, 2014)

²⁷ Interview with Norwegian ambassadors.
²⁸ Interview with a researcher
²⁹ Interview with Diplomats and staff of Norad and MFA

On the other hand, according to a research by CMI, Norwegian government is motivated to support private sector through aid with the aim of “promoting Norway’s own private sector, supporting the building of alliances, or achieving geopolitical goals” (Espen, 2015, p. 5).

The Norwegian government maintenance of altruistic motive as the main motivation for promotion of FDI is contrary to realists’ explanation through the concept of economic interest. Realists’ perspective will maintain that Norway is seeking to promote its economic interest in Africa through the promotion of FDI. The national interest of every state is to gain power that is measured in terms of economic or military capability hence Norway is seeking to gain disproportionate power by promoting its economic interest in Africa. Moreover, as Lomøy (Director Norad) in *Bistansaktuelt* (2016) argued, aid has become less important for power within the international system and Norway would have to promote its economic interest through investment rather than aid. One former Norwegian diplomat during the interview also agreed that investment has become more important in Africa and that has affected Norwegian aid to Africa.

6.4.4 Strategic Growth Energy, Oil And Export Cooperation

In the previous section, we saw a growing Norwegian government interest to directly invest in Africa and to also promote Norwegian private investment in Africa. One specific sector that has received a greater Norwegian government attention and investment is the oil, gas and energy sector. Even though Norway through Statoil was in Nigeria and Angola before the turn of the millennium, the scale of its growth in oil and gas in African countries such as Algeria, Mozambique, Tanzania, Lybia and its recent 35% share in South Africa’s Tugela South exploration became an important considerations for this research. The volume and scale of the growth is an indication of how Norway has changed from a small oil operating country in Africa to become an important player in African oil and gas resources. Norway for instance has a long history of bilateral relations with Tanzania but it was in 2007 that Statoil signed a production agreement with (PSA) for block 2 with Tanzania Petroleum Corporation (TPDC) (Statoil, 2014).

Moreover, the Norwegian government has demonstrated its interest in Africa’s oil, gas and energy resources by building strategic partnership through the Oil for Development Programme (OFD) with its African partners. So far, Angola, Ghana, Mozambique, Sudan, South Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda have been enrolled in the programme (NORAD, 2011).

According to the Norwegian government, the programme aim for the sustainable development of oil in the partner countries. That is “economically, environmentally and socially responsible management of petroleum resources which safeguards the needs of future generations” (NORAD, 2011). While the programme maybe viewed as a covert way by which the Norwegian government is trying to win contract in the oil and gas sector for Norwegian companies in Africa, Norwegian ambassadors viewed the OFD as an effort to help the newly discovered oil countries in Africa to manage petroleum resources in a sustainable manner. One diplomat argued,

“Oil and gas are important factor in generating economic and social development and improved welfare of citizens through wealth creation. Many countries including African countries want to learn from the Norwegian experience of petroleum management and this is the main reason why the programme was introduced in 2005”³⁰.

From the above statement, it seems the programme was introduced with mainly needs of African countries, but some Norwegian diplomats see the programme from a win-win perspective where there are mutual benefits for the African countries and Norwegian companies in Africa. It is true that the demand and request from African countries to learn from the Norwegian model of oil exploration and management is genuine and well demonstrated. Some African diplomats who are benefiting from the programme during the interview praised Norway for the introduction of the programme as they claimed; the OFD has been very beneficial to Africa in terms of learning from the Norway’s experience in the oil sector.

One question that needs to be explored is, how does Norway as a country benefit from the programme? One fact about the programme is that, the OFD was introduced at a time when Chinese presence in African oil and gas sector had grown so much. From the realists perspective, since oil and gas resource forms part of Norwegian economic interest, the Chinese presence in the African oil is a threat to Norwegian interest, hence Norway been a small country in the oil field can only counter China’s presence through alliance with equally small countries in the oil field. Realists’ perspective will therefore view the OFD as an alliance system by which Norway is trying to counter China in Africa. One researcher during the interview raised an important question about another way by which Norway can benefit from the OFD. He asked: “*Don’t you think Norway can use the OFD programme to*

³⁰ Interview with a Norwegian diplomat

experiment oil policies in Africa?” He argued that Africa has in most cases become experiment ground for Western policies and that Norway may through the OFD experiment new policies or programmes in Africa. Some of the researchers and journalist during the interviewed also viewed the OFD as a covert way of gaining trust for the Norwegian model of oil management and thereby winning concessions for the Norwegian oil companies that wish to or are operating in Africa.

“There may not be a direct benefits from the oil for development programme at the moment but I believe that the programme is way of building more trust in the Norwegian skills and knowledge in oil exploration and management. Norway through the oil for development programme is gaining identity in Africa as a successful oil producing countries. This will create more opportunities for Norwegian companies to gain trust from African countries that have oil and even those that are yet to discover oil. In a way the companies gain advantage if they have to bid for any concession in Africa”³¹

This argument whereby OFD is been viewed as a covert way of gaining disproportional trust and influence for Norwegian oil companies and business in Africa maybe supported by the role of Norwegian government support to Ghana through OFD in the awarding of South Deep Water Tano block oil and gas exploration in Ghana. “The Norwegian government support in restructuring the oil and gas industry together with their support for training of Ghanaian staff” influenced the decision to award the contract to Aker ASA (Daily Guide, 2013; Sonecto Institute, 2013). The OFD was a key consideration that influenced Ghana to award oil and gas contract to the Norwegian company according to the news report. Judging from this report, Is not Norway using the OFD to gain disproportional influence for Norwegian companies?

Another way by which Norway is strategically positioning itself in the African energy, oil and gas is growing Norfund and private Norwegian companies investment in African energy such as power, gas exploration, mineral and oil (thinglink, 2015). Some of these investments include building of power plants and hydro power plant in Tanzania, Ivory Coast, South Sudan, Uganda, Rwanda, Kenya, Mozambique, and South Africa etc. (thinglink, 2015). In Kenya for example

*“Norfund har investeringer i **Kinangop Wind Park** – med 60 MW kapasitet. Vindmølleparkenskal bygges i år og vil kunne gi 150 000 husholdninger strøm”* (thinglink, 2015). (Translate: The institution has investments in Kinangop Wind Park with 60 MW capacities. Vindmøllepark Shall be built this year and will provide 150,000 households power)

³¹ Interview with a journalist

This means that, Norfund has investments in Kinangop Wind Park - with 60 MW capacities. The wind farm will provide 150,000 households electricity in Kenya. One significant about these investments is that most of them are located in Eastern and Southern African countries where Norway has comparative advantage because of many years of development cooperation and partnership.

One journalist argued,

“China has enlarged and improved Africa’s market because China has invested hugely in energy, which has yielded so much economic growth for China”... “This has perhaps triggered interest of Norway to also encourage investment in Africa’s oil and energy sector. China is investing in places and sector where Norway has comparative advantage, energy in Eastern and Southern African countries this perhaps explain Norwegian huge investment in Eastern and Southern African countries in recent times”³².

This discussion shows that the Chinese growing presence in African oil, gas and energy that have increased oil price, increased competition over oil resources and increased consumer and purchasing power of the African governments and people may have played a key role in influencing Norwegian strategic partnership with oil resource African countries.

6.4.5 Changing Geographic and Diplomatic Relations

Changing of geographic and diplomatic relations is another trend of Norwegian diplomatic and developmental co-operation in Africa. There have been changes in the Norwegian diplomatic presence in Africa since the turn of the millenium. Norway is closing down some of its embassies in former priority countries and some countries like Zambia, Eritrea and Zimbabwe that have hitherto enjoyed long term diplomatic and developmennt cooperation with Norway. At the same time, Norway has opened new embassies in some African countries like Ghana, Algeria, South Sudan, etc. The trend and nature of the changes within the geographic and diplomatic relations of Norway in Africa raises questions over the motive for such changes. The RORG-network for instance debates over whether Norwegian foreign policy choices is for development purposes or self interest with reference to foreign Minister Børge Brenden statement:

“Vi må definere tydelig hva som er i norsk interesse. Vi må velge vekk det som ikke er det. Vi må innse at vi ikke kan gjøre alt. Og vi må ha vilje og evne og et kraftfullt diplomati for å forfølge våre interesse” (RORG-network, 2016) (English Translation: We must define clearly what is in Norwegian interest. We must opt out of what is not that. We must realize

³² Interview with a journalist

that we can not do everything . And we must have the will and ability and a powerful diplomacy to pursue our interest)

According to the Foreign Affairs Minister, Børge Brende, in a press released:

“the Ministry must adapt to the changes that are taking place in the world, taking into account the resources available to run missions abroad. The structure of the foreign service, and the location, the size, tasks and priorities of the missions abroad must be constantly be assessed”(UK Bureau/Agency, 2015, p. 1).

Questions could be asked on the motive behind closing down diplomatic mission in countries like Zambia, Eritrea and Zimbabwe which were priority countries or have enjoyed many years of development co-operation with Norway. Is it because these countries have no resources of interest to Norway? China is huge in Zimbabwe diamond industry but this resource is of no interest to Norway. Is Norway closing down these missions so it could concentrate and compete for oil in their newly established and oil resourceful countries like Algeria, South Sudan and Ghana? Is Foreign Affairs Minister, Børge Brende statement above referring to resources as a justification for closing down these missions? Is not Norway becoming more interested in how much resources they can get from establishing diplomatic missions in relation to how much they can loose?

In conceptualizing diplomacy in chapter 2, we noted how economic interest considerations influences the establishment and closing of diplomatic relations.

One can argue that economic interest considerations might have played some role in the opening and closing down of some of the missions. For instance Norway moved its embassy from Tunisia to Algeria on a request by Statoil because of its huge investment in Algeria oil (Solholm, 2007). One significance about these new Norwegian embassies in Africa after 2000 is their link to energy and natural resources that Norway is interested. Ghana and South Sudan have oil in commercial quantities while Statoil has invested in Algeria oil resources. According to under secretary of State at the Foreign Office, Sven Syedman, Norway “has economic interest in oil and gas, particularly in Algeria and Libya. Statoil is an important part of this” (Solholm, 2007). This indicates how Norwegian interest in oil and energy resources has become an important aspect in affecting changes in its diplomatic presence in Africa.

The changes in diplomatic relations of Norway in Africa can also be linked to the growing Chinese engagements in Africa since the turn of the millenium. China's growing presence in oil and gas resources for its growing economy and which have boosted the prices of oil and gas in the global market might have influenced Norwegian diplomatic space in Africa. I suggest that Norway has become interested in seeking to establish strong diplomatic relations with the newly discovered oil countries to ensure control, support and opportunitites in African oil and energy resources for Norwegian bussinesses.

6.4.6 Shifting Development?

Norwegian development assistance has been noted for its many years of focusing on the development of the developing countries. As noted earlier and **Figure 7**, ODA in support of programme aid was enormous in the 1990s and early part of the millenium. However, questions could be aksed if Norwegian aid is gradually diverting from its focus of promoting development in Africa.

The Norwegian government scraping of Ministry of Development³³ raises questions over whether Norway is gradually changing from its focus on development. As noted in chapter 2, when a state creates a department or ministry and staff it with both human and material resources, it is an indication that such department or ministry is very importan to the state. The scraping of such ministry indicates that such ministry might have served its importance or is no longer important to the state (Lancaster Carol, 2007). Is not Norway becoming less focused on the development of the developing countries with the scraping of the development ministry?

Moreover, Norway seems to have reduced focus in the Least developed countries (LDC) who were biggest recipient of Norwegian development assistance. Least Developed countries that used to be the focus and priority of Norwegian poverty oriented aid appear to be loosing such considerations. In 2003, 3 of the top 6 recipient of Norwegian aid were not on the list of the LDC countries (Selbervik & Nygaard, 2006). These have triggered doubts about Norwegian government commitment to support development of the developing countries. One important question that the thesis sought to answer was why the Norwegian government appears to be shifting focus in prioritizing development of the developing countries?

³³ For changes in the Norwegian Ministries refer <https://www.regjeringen.no/en/the-government/previous-governments/governments/modern-times/the-council-of-state-since-1945/id438700/>

Some Norwegian diplomats during the interview asserted that the Norwegian government is still prioritizing the fight against extreme poverty and development of the developing countries however there is Economic growth in the developing countries in Africa and this has created the need for new roles and change of support for the African countries. They argued that many African countries are now among the fastest growing economies while others have even attained middle-income status. It is very logical for Norwegian diplomats to argue that Africa is doing well base on the growth of the African economy, however this growth of the African economy has had little impact on poverty in Africa. Most poor are in middle-income countries and despite Africa's impressive aggregate growth poverty is still very high in Africa (Ahluwalia, Carter, & Chenery, 1979).

Two of the researchers and a journalist during the interview argued that the government is less and less prioritizing development needs in favour of immediate economic and self-interested goals. They argue that the government is focusing on taking initiatives and adopting policies that will provide Norway with economic or security benefits³⁴. Their argument has been supported by a recent report commissioned by the Norwegian Church Aid, Finn Church Aid, Dan Church Aid and Church of Sweden that concluded that Nordic countries support towards development of the developing countries which has earned their image as Nordic exceptionalism is now at a crossroad (Hansen, 2015). The Nordic exceptionalism, characterized by idealistic and altruistic motivations, focusing on high levels of development aid, delink from the donor country's political or economic interests, directed at reducing poverty and promoting social welfare, good governance, democracy and human rights is gradually on the verge of ending according to the report.

One journalist during the interview suggested that the notion that Norway's interest and focus in Africa has always been development and poverty eradication could be perceived as rhetoric and that self-interest is the main motivation. He argued that,

“One thing is the rhetoric that you read on the web pages, government documents or when you listen to speeches from government officials. The rhetoric is always some kind of altruistic approach but Norway has some kind of economic interest. This does not mean that Norway is not supporting poverty eradication or development in Africa, but it means that

³⁴ Interview with researchers and journalist.

there is win-win situation that benefit both Norway and Africa. Norway gets economic benefits from Africa, hahahaha, Africa gets development and support to deal with poverty”³⁵

Realists’ perspective will agree with this idea that development and poverty eradication is rhetoric and that Norway’s main interest in the developing countries has always been self-interest.

6.4.7 Shifting Focus on Russia Threat?

In the period before 2000, a huge percentage of Norwegian development assistance was channeled through multilateral institutions such as the UN and NATO. One motivation for this support may be security interest. The threat of Soviet Union compelled Norway to support NATO security alliance to guarantee its military support against any threat from East. The fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the cold has shifted the attention from the security threat of the East as a motivation for Norwegian aid and diplomatic relations. This is because the fall of the Soviet Union shifted the cold war to less aggression. One would therefore expect to see decline of Norway’s support for multilateral institutions like NATO and UN since support to these institutions during the period before 2000 was largely dominated by the threat of the soviet alliance. Data from NORAD however indicates that multilateral institutions enjoyed 47% of Norway’s development assistance from 2000 to 2015 (NORAD, 2016). Although Norway still allocates substantial amount of support to the multilateral organizations, the focus has shifted from been dominated by threat of Russia aggression to increasing emphasis of terrorism and fragile states that are perceive as threat to Norwegian economic interest abroad. The emphasis on terrorism is based on the conviction that, terrorism can be a huge disaster to Norwegian economic interest abroad, most especially in Africa.

“Norway has huge investment and economic interest in African oil resources. There is huge income from Statoil engagements in Angola and Algeria. Norwegian income from Statoil engagements in these countries is bigger than Norwegian aid to these countries and the only big threat to this economic resources is terrorism”³⁶.

Multilateral organizations still enjoy substantial support of Norway because as a small country Norway trusts the capacity of the multilateral institutions to guarantee its security.

³⁵ Interview with a Norwegian journalist

³⁶ Interview with a journalist

Some researchers argued that, today in a globalized world, there is the need to look at security interest. When Norway engages in peace and stability in other countries, they are also reducing security threat from terrorism that are threat to Norwegian trade, investment and businesses in other countries³⁷. Norway in its effort to ensure security interest, is redefining what is self-interest to include global self-interest according to an interview with a journalist.

“At the moment there is a kind of redefinition of what is self-interest and this started during the last government (referring to Stoltenberg II). They defined self-interest to include global self-interest and that could be stability, terrorism and climate change”³⁸

The redefinition of self-interest by Norway could be perceived as a tactics by Norway to receive the support of the Norwegian public in the pursuit of security interest. As a country famous for hosting Nobel Peace Prize and labeled as peace-loving state, war on terrorism that is mostly through aggression would receive strong criticism from the Norwegian public. Norway must therefore adopt some form of propaganda in order to convince the public for support when participating in a war against terror. Norway’s participation in Libya bombing in 2011 is an example of how Norway redefines self-interest using propaganda to win the public support (Stefánsson & Rudmin, 2016). The reality is, Statoil has been in Libya since 2006 and the insecurity in Libya was a threat to Statoil’s operations in Libya.

Could the Security threat to Statoil’s operations in Libya be the main motivation factor for Norway’s Libya bombing? Norwegian diplomats during the interview maintained altruistic stand as the main motivation for their support to global security. They argued that, the huge support to the multilateral institutions is motivated by the moral and humanitarian motive of helping to deal with terrorism and poverty that are threat to the citizens of the developing world³⁹.

With huge profits coming from Statoil engagements in Africa, Norway needs to ensure regular access and control of these resources and this has necessitated the emphasis on security interest. Moreover, the international order has changed and Russia is now less of aggressive threat to Norway than terrorism and fragile states that are becoming safe havens for criminals and terrorist. From the realists’ perspective, Norway is seeking disproportional power at the multilateral institutions over its security interest by allocating more support to

³⁷ Interview with the researchers

³⁸ Interview with a journalist

³⁹ Interview with Norwegian diplomats

the organizations with emphasis on fragile states and threat of terrorism. Stable environment is needed for trade and investment and Norway trusts the capacity of the multilateral institutions to deal with the threat of terrorism and promote stability in the fragile states, hence its enormous support to the organizations.

6.5 Preliminary Observation

The period after the turn of the millenium saw a shift in the focus of Norwegian aid and diplomatic relations in Africa. China's growing engagements in Africa and its effects in the oil, gas and energy sector in Africa and the global market changed the geopolitical scenarion in aid and investments especially in Africa. These changes also affected Norwegian aid and diplomatic relations in Africa as Norway became more interested in pursueing its economic interest using FDI, aid and diplomacy as a tool. Economic interest

7.0 CONCLUSION

I set out to explore whether Norwegian aid and diplomatic relations in Africa has changed since 2000 and secondly to investigate how the changes have been influenced by China's expansive engagements in Africa. I sought to explore the topic from the realists' perspective through the concepts of interest that Norwegian aid has and always been motivated by interest. I argued that rather than moving from altruism to self interests as argued by some researchers and diplomats, Norwegian aid has shifted in character, and *kinds* of interests behind aid. Norwegian aid has shifted from being dominated by diplomatic and security interests to economic interests as a consequence of growing China's engagements that have changed geopolitical scenario in aid and investment in post 2000 African states for economic and security interest.

In this chapter, I sum up the thesis by answering the research question(s) that have guided this thesis throughout the affording chapters. I also sum up how the topic was explored from realists' perspective.

➤ **How has the Chinese engagements in Africa changed the conditions for Norwegian pursuit of international power and self interest through aid in Africa?**

In chapter 4 and 5, I explored the global trend of aid and China's engagements in Africa from the period after the end of the World War II to the period after 2000. The Chinese engagements in Africa, characterized by strong emphasis on bilateral aid, mixing of aid, trade and investment, strong emphasis on physical development, increased FDI, no conditionality or interference policy and natural resource backed loans has changed geographical reality for aid and investment. African economies that used to depend on Western donors aid for survival no longer depend on aid for survival. Aid has become less important to many African governments and they are more interested in investment. China's growing engagements in trade and investment has changed the declining per capital income and the trend of African's dependent on the Western donors aid for their economic growth. The change implies that countries like Norway whose diplomatic relations with African countries were dominated by aid as an instrument for pursuing self-interest would have to formulate different strategy and adopt policies and initiatives that are attractive to the Africans. The fact that Norway has

increased FDI suggests how China's engagements have changed the geopolitical scenario for aid and investment.

Again, China's engagements in Africa, until the price fall in 2014, increased prices and competition in African natural resources such as oil, gas and minerals. The prices of raw materials such as oil and gas has boosted extensively since the turn of the millennium due to China's growing economy and the need for these materials to feed the growing China's economy. African countries such as Sudan, Angola, and Nigeria etc. have become major sources of oil and gas for China's industrial growth. The increased price coupled with increased technology has made petroleum resources more accessible, competitive and interesting. The implication here is that, Norway which is an oil exploring country will have to compete with China for access and control of the oil and gas sector in Africa for Norwegian companies and businesses. China uses diplomacy as a tool to reach out to African states that are abundant in resources vitally needed by China. China has built diplomatic missions in many African countries and this has improved closer cooperation and diplomatic relations with such countries. The changes in Norwegian diplomatic missions in Africa, since the turn of the millennium, could be linked to the growing China's engagements in Africa because Norway's diplomatic missions in Africa are been directed closer to African states with abundance of oil resources or where the operations of Statoil have become enormous. The fact that Norway moved its diplomatic mission in Tunisia upon the influence of Statoil suggest that diplomacy has become an important instrument for expansion and pursuance of Norwegian economic and business interest in Africa. Moreover, there has been increased presence of Statoil in many African countries such as Tanzania, Mozambique and Libya. Already, Statoil was in Angola and Nigeria. The increased presence of Statoil in Africa is a suggestive of the competition and increased demand for oil resources.

Furthermore, China's enormous investment in African's infrastructural development has changed the investment interest from Western governments and businesses. For years investment in Africa was perceived by Western donors as a risk not worth taken. FDI from Western donors like Norway was very insignificant during the period before China's expansive engagements due to the risk of poor infrastructure in Africa. However, China's enormous investment in African's infrastructure and huge profits from this investment in Africa has lessened this fear. Now investment in Africa is seen as a smaller risk worth taken by many Western countries in Africa. African leaders have become more interested in trade

and investment than aid. China has made Africa more attractive and profitable for investment. African economy, bargaining, consumer and purchasing have changed because of the increased prices in natural resources that has resulted in the competition for control and regular supply of African natural resources. Moreover, African countries have alternative buyer of its resources and this has increased Africa's bargaining power.

In the diplomatic field, China has gained strong trust and support of many African states in the international arena over issues that affect China's interest. This means that Western donor states like Norway will have to compete with China for the goodwill of African leaders support in international arena such as the UN, World Bank where support of other states are key to decision making. Alliances are important instrument for dominance and power in the international arena. Norway's OFD and choice of priority countries in aid could be seen as an alliance system by which Norway can get the goodwill and support of the African states in the international arena. Moreover, Norway's continues concentration of aid and diplomatic relations in the Southern and Eastern African countries can be seen as a means of gaining identity and competitive advantage in these countries as a trusted friend in the international arena. The Norwegian aid and diplomatic relations in Africa have changed as a consequence of Chinese engagements in Africa that have changed the geopolitical reality in aid and investment in Africa. The changes in Norwegian aid and diplomatic relations and how they are shaped by Chinese engagements are summarized in the next section.

- **In what ways has the Norwegian aid and diplomatic relations to Africa changed since 2000?**
- **How has the changes in Norwegian aid and diplomatic relations in Africa been shaped by the changing geopolitical scenario in Africa by China?**

In chapter 6, I explored Norwegian aid and diplomatic relations in Africa from both historical and contemporary perspective and identified trends of Norwegian development assistance in Africa since the Norwegian missionaries explored Africa. I examined Norwegian aid and diplomatic relations before 2000 when China's engagements in Africa were not massive and after the turn of the millennium when China's engagements in Africa grew massively. A critical examination of the two periods, before and after 2000, reveals that Norwegian aid and diplomatic relations in Africa has shifted from being dominated by Security and diplomatic interest to economic interest.

I explored from realists' perspective that Norway's national interest is and has been the driving force of its aid and diplomatic policies in the international system with specific reference to Africa. I linked the changes in Norway's shifting from been dominated by security and diplomatic interest to economic interest in Africa to China's engagements in Africa and argued that the changes in Norwegian aid and diplomatic relations can be linked to China's growth in Africa since the turn of the millennium.

One of these changes in Norway's aid and diplomatic relations in Africa that indicates the changing geopolitical scenario in aid and investment in Africa by China is increased FDI and Norwegian controlled enterprises in Africa. In the period before 2000, Official Development Aid constituted the highest percentage of Norway's support to Africa with FDI receiving little attention from the Norwegian government. Norway's FDI used to be concentrated in Latin America and some parts of Asia. Norway's insignificant FDI in Africa was attributed to poor infrastructural development such as road network and energy. However, with the growth of China at the turn of the millennium, there has been a tremendous increased in Norway's FDI in Africa. ODA levels, personal remittances and FDI of Norway between 1990-2013 are shown on **figure 7** and that indicates this change in Norway's FDI to Africa since the turn of the millennium. Norway demonstrated its commitment and interest in FDI to Africa through some important initiatives. These include establishment of Norfund in 1997 and Innovation Norway in 2004 that have become the main driving wheels for Norwegian investment and promotion of Norwegian private cooperation in Africa. Through these initiatives, the government has invested either directly or providing funding to support Norwegian companies in Africa which is an indication of how Norway has become economically interested in Africa. The publication of white paper Meld St. 35 (2014–2015) by Norwegian government that focuses on private sector development in Norwegian development cooperation is another indication of Norway's interest in promoting FDI in Africa.

The increased Norway's FDI can be linked to Africa's infrastructural development, which is attributed to China's enormous investment in Africa's infrastructure. African countries could not attract investments because of poor road network and energy that are key to industrial investment. In chapter 5, I show that China has contributed to infrastructural development in Africa through building of roads, railways, pipelines, plants, hydroelectric dams etc. These contributions by China in Africa have eroded the risks of investing in Africa that hindered Norway in the period before 2000.

China's growing economy and Chinese growing engagements in Africa, especially in oil and energy sector since the turn of the millennium, has boosted international oil prices and increased Africa's consumer and purchasing power. These developments have changed the game of aid and geopolitical scenario in Africa. Norway has shown interest in venturing into Africa's enormous and booming oil and energy sector. Norway is adapting to this changing geopolitical scenario through the establishment of embassies in the interest of its businesses. That is, Norway sought its economic interest in Africa through diplomatic relations with some oil resourceful countries. The Norwegian establishment of embassies in Algeria through the influence of Statoil is an indication of how Norway's economic interest influences its diplomatic decisions from realists' perspective. Through the OFD programme Norway has created diplomatic relations with some oil resourceful countries in Africa and thereby building trust for Norway's technical skills in oil management, exploration and administration. This will build strong trust for Norwegian oil industries in Africa and create opportunities for Norwegian companies in Africa.

Another important change in Norway's aid and diplomatic relations in Africa since the turn of the millennium is strategic growth in energy, oil and export cooperation through strategic partnership with oil resourced countries in Africa. Norway had little or no diplomatic relations in some oil resourced countries in Africa until 2000. Even though Statoil was in Nigeria and Angola before the turn of the millennium, the scale of its growth in oil and gas in African countries such as Algeria, Mozambique, Tanzania, Lybia and its recent share in South Africa's Tugela South exploration is an indication of how Norway has changed from a small oil and gas operating country in Africa to become an important player in African oil and gas resources.

Moreover, Norway through the establishment of diplomatic missions and the OFD programme has strengthened its bilateral relations with some African countries and this has promoted Norwegian investment and identity of Norway's success story in oil in such countries. Even though the main aim of OFD is for economically, environmentally and socially responsible management of petroleum resources which safeguards the needs of future generations in the partner countries, it can also be viewed as a covert way of creating bussiness oportunitites for Norwegian companies in such countries. Norway through the OFD programme is building strong trust in Norwegian technical and managerial skills in oil management and administration in the African countries. This in effect will create more

opportunities for Norwegian companies in the African oil industry as the African countries will trust the Norwegian oil companies experts. This strategic growth was linked to the growth of China in Africa because China's engagements especially in African oil industry has boosted the prices of international oil and gas, increased African countries consumer and purchasing power and this has triggered Norway's interest to establish strategic diplomatic relations with some countries. The growth of Norway in African oil and gas resources and the OFD are indications of how Norway is adapting to changing trend in the oil industry by ensuring sovereign control, support and opportunities for Norwegian businesses.

Changing of geographic and diplomatic relations is another trend of Norwegian diplomatic and developmental co-operation in Africa since the turn of the millennium. I explored the establishment and the closing down of some diplomatic missions in Africa as important cases of reference. In the period before 2000, Norway's diplomatic interest of enjoying African countries support over global issues that affect Norway's interest reflected in Norway's enormous support and solidarity to Southern and Eastern African countries like Zimbabwe and Zambia in the fight against colonialism. Norway sealed its diplomatic relations with most Southern and Eastern African countries with the establishment of diplomatic missions following the independence of these countries. The closing down of some Norwegian diplomatic missions in some of its former priority countries and countries that have had long term diplomatic and development cooperation with Norway like Zambia, Eritrea and Zimbabwe became an important issue of considerations for this research. At the same time, Norway has opened new embassies in some African countries like Ghana, Algeria, South Sudan, etc. One significance about some of these new Norwegian embassies in Africa is their link to energy and natural resources that Norway has an interest in investing. This shows how Norway has become more interested in opening up its embassies in oil resourced countries in Africa while closing down its embassies in countries like Zimbabwe that has no resources of interest to Norway.

The Changing of Norway's geographic and diplomatic relations could be linked to growing China's engagements in Africa that has boosted oil prices. I explained that China's growing presence in oil and gas resources for its growing economy and which have boosted the prices of oil and gas in the global market might have influenced Norwegian diplomatic space in Africa. Being a successful oil exploring country Norway has been influenced by the increasing oil profits to ensure regular access and supply of oil. That is economic

considerations seems to be playing some role in the diplomatic missions of Norway in Africa. For instance the role of Statoil in the opening of Norwegian embassy in Algeria shows that economic interest has become an important consideration in Norwegian diplomatic missions in Africa.

In exploring the topic from realists' perspective using national interest as the main argument, I began with realists' explanation of interest and how states can pursue interest in the international system from historical and contemporary perspective. In chapter 2, I presented realists' understanding of interest and explored how interest can play a key role in aid and diplomatic relations of states in the international system. Realists define interest in terms of power and measure it in terms of military or economic might of a state. Realists argue that interest is the main driving force of a state's actions and behaviour within the international system. Realists identify economic and military or security as two main kinds of power that states can pursue within the international system. I argued from a realist perspective that there is also ideological/diplomatic/political power that may not be a separate form of power or interests but a disguised form for pursuing military and economic interests of states within the international arena.

In terms of how states should pursue power or interest within the international system, realists argue that states should use whatever means including military if necessary. That is, a state's ultimate aim in the international system is to gain power or hegemony and states should use whatever means to gain power. Smaller states that cannot pursue their interest unilaterally must adopt a self-help system where they form alliances with other states to protect or pursue their interest.

In chapters 4, 5 and 6 I linked realists' explanation of interest or power to China and Norwegian interest in Africa. Economic and security interests pursued through geo-political and diplomacy are the main driving forces in China's engagements in Africa. In terms of diplomacy and security, China has an interest in attracting political support from Africa over global issues that affect China's interest. China has used diplomacy to restore its seat at the Security Council and gained diplomatic support against Taiwan in Africa. China's interest in attracting political support from Africa was very dominant in its diplomatic relations especially in the period before 2000 when China enormously supported African struggle against colonial powers. The restoration of China's seat at the Security Council and the support

of China in Africa against Taiwan show how China's diplomatic or security interest in Africa paid off.

China sees Africa's abundance natural resources as a key to gaining power in the international system, which is the main interest of every state. China through the promotion of FDI, mixing aid with trade and investment, non-conditionality and non-interference policy, strong focus on physical infrastructural development, has promoted its commercial interest in Africa and has also changed the geopolitical realities in aid and investment for European, American and Japanese capitalistic soft power and paternalistic approaches in many sub-Saharan African countries. China's economic interest in Africa has paid off as China businesses have also gained identity and influence over commercial resources in countries where Western governments were enjoying monopoly. That is, China has given Africa an alternative source and a strong bargaining power.

Norway rather than moving from altruism to self interests as argued by some researchers and diplomats, Norwegian aid and diplomatic relations have shifted in character, and kinds of interests behind aid and diplomatic relations. Norway has shifted from been dominated by diplomatic and security interests in pre 2000 to economic interest and this is related growing to Chinese engagements that has changed geopolitical scenario in aid and investment in post 2000 African states and the international system.

In terms of security interest, Norwegian aid and diplomatic relations before 2000 was dominated by the pursuit of its security interest. Through multilateral support to UN, NATO and other international multilateral organizations, Norway sought disproportional power and protection of its borders against the Soviet. Norway again sought disproportional power and influence over global issues that affect its interest through its support to liberation struggle in many Southern African countries and this gave Norway an identity and trusts of friendship in these countries. Norway's motive for its enormous support to the multilateral organizations and its support to the Southern African countries liberation struggle according Norwegian white papers, policy documents, Norwegian diplomats in Africa, NORAD and MFA staff are based on altruistic motive, however, the researchers and journalist during the interview linked Norway's enormous support to enlightened self-interest of both broader national interests related to objectives of mutual benefit across borders.

Realists' perspective also shows that, Norway's support to multilateral organizations or Southern African states are all motivated by interest. Norway through bilateral aid to African countries is seeking to gain disproportionate support from African countries. Norway through bilateral aid and diplomacy supported African countries especially the Southern African countries against imperialism and apartheid. After 2000 Norway still concentrates its support to Southern African countries and I suggest this is due to Norway's interest to maintain its competitive advantage of many years of interactions with these countries.

In the period after 2000, we saw a shift in the motivation for Norwegian aid and diplomatic relations in Africa following the growing Chinese engagements that changed geopolitical scenario in aid and investment in post 2000 African states. Norway has become more interested in pursuing its economic interest in Africa through strategic bilateral relations in Africa. The increased Norwegian FDI in Africa, innovative Norway, NORFUND and diplomatic changes linked to oil and gas resources are some of the indications of Norway's shift from more of security and diplomatic interest to more of economic interest.

In conclusion, Norwegian aid and diplomatic relations in Africa has been and still is primarily motivated by self-interest. The official rhetoric humanitarian and moral motive by Norwegian government for aid and diplomatic relations in developing countries should be seen as camouflage for economic and security interest. However, Norwegian aid and diplomatic relations since its inception have shifted in character, and kinds of interests for aid and this could be linked to the changes in the international order. In the early interactions of Norway's contact with the Southern African countries, Norwegian aid and diplomatic relations was not only driven by missionary activities but the interest of Norwegian fishing businesses by Norwegian seamen. During the colonial era in Africa especially in the Southern African countries, Norwegian development assistance and diplomatic relations was dominated by solidarity for the African states under colonial rule but with an interest of gaining sovereign support of the African states in the international arena. Through its role and influence in the UN, aid and diplomacy to the Southern and Eastern African countries, Norway was able to assist in the liberation struggle and establish strong and long term diplomatic ties with many Southern and Eastern African countries. When the international order changed into bipolar order characterized by cold war between USSR and US as the super powers, Norwegian interest became more dominated by security interest. Norway through its support to NATO sought to augment its military capability against the rising threat of Russia and the Soviet Union during the cold war. With the end of the cold war and the emerging unipolar order,

Norwegian aid and diplomatic relations shifted to be dominated by gaining disproportional power in the international arena. Through various programme aid initiated by World Bank and UN, Norway sought to promote economic and political stability in various African countries with enlightened self-interest that economic and political stability of the developing world will create the necessary environment for Norwegian economic interest. The increased China's engagements in Africa that has boosted prices of oil resources, improved African infrastructure, attracted investment and increased Africans consumer and purchasing power since the turn of the millennium has changed the global order from unipolar into multipolar system and triggered changes in the Norwegian aid and diplomatic relations in Africa to be dominated by economic interest. I would like to conclude that the shifting of Norwegian aid and diplomatic relations can be seen as camouflage, the rationale for giving aid and establishing diplomatic relations, I suggest, has and remains the pursuance of Norway's self-interest.

It is important that future research into the topic that includes more Western donor countries is considered to get deeper understanding of how China's increased engagements has changed the geopolitical scenario for Western model of aid. This is because Western donor countries are labeled as driven by "altruistic interest" while China is modeled as driven by "self-interest". Future research that includes more Western donor will help to identify how the increased Chinese engagements has changed the geopolitical scenario in aid and diplomatic relations in Africa for the Western donor countries. Moreover, it will help to identify whether and how the Western altruistic model of aid has changed.

Bibliography

- Ahluwalia, M. S., Carter, N. G., & Chenery, H. B. (1979). Growth and poverty in developing countries. *Journal of Development Economics*, 6(3), 299-341.
- Alden, C., & Alves, C. (2008). History & identity in the construction of China's Africa policy. *Review of African Political Economy*, 35(115), 43-58.
- Alesina, A., & Dollar, D. (2000). Who gives foreign aid to whom and why? *Journal of economic growth*, 5(1), 33-63.
- Babbie, E. (2007). *The practice of social research* Thomson Wadsworth. Belmont, CA.
- Barakat, S. (2005). *After the conflict: reconstructions and redevelopment in the aftermath of war* (Vol. 1): IB Tauris.
- Barston, R. P. (2014). *Modern diplomacy* (Fourth Edition ed.). New York, NY, 10017, USA: Routledge.
- Baylis, J., Smith, S., & Owens, P. (2013). *The globalization of world politics: an introduction to international relations*: Oxford University Press.
- Beamer, G. (2002). Elite Interviews and State Politics Research. *State Politics & Policy Quarterly*, 2(1), 86-96.
- Beetham, D. (1994). *Defining and measuring democracy* (Vol. 36): Sage.
- Berg, B. L., Lune, H., & Lune, H. (2004). *Qualitative research methods for the social sciences* (Vol. 5): Pearson Boston, MA.
- Berglund, N. (2016, March 18, 2016). Statoil gas plant attacked in Algeria. *News in English.no*. Retrieved from <http://www.newsinenglish.no/2016/03/18/statoil-gas-plant-attacked-in-algeria/>
- Bistandsaktuelt. (2014, 23/05/2014). Hvor mange røde elefanter? *Bistandsaktuelt*. Retrieved from <http://www.bistandsaktuelt.no/arkiv-kommentarer/2014/hvor-mange-rode-elefanter-/>
- Brautigam, D. (2008). *China's Foreign Aid in Africa: What Do We Know?* Paper presented at the prepared for Conference on China in Africa: Geopolitical and Geoeconomic Considerations.
- Bräutigam, D. (2010). *China, Africa and the international aid architecture*: African development bank.
- Bräutigam, D. (2011). Aid 'With Chinese Characteristics' : Chinese Foreign Aid and Development Finance Meet the OECD - DAC Aid Regime. *Journal of international development*, 23(5), 752-764.
- Broadman, H. G. (2008). Chinese-African trade and investment: The vanguard of South-South commerce in the twenty-first century. *China into Africa: Trade, Aid, and Influence*. Ed. Robert I. Rotberg. Washington: Brookings Institution P, 87-108.
- Bryman, A. (2012). *Social research methods*: Oxford university press.
- Carlin, A. (1967). Project Versus Programme Aid: From the Donor's Viewpoint. *The Economic Journal*, 48-58.
- Carol Welch & Jason Oringer. (1998,). Structural Adjustment Programs. *Foreign Policy in Focus*.
- Cathrine, K. H. (2007, 02.12.2007). Etterlyser upolitisk bistand. *Bergen Tidende* Retrieved from <http://www.bt.no/nyheter/innenriks/Etterlyser-upolitisk-bistand-1866941.html>
- Centre for Chinese Studies. (2007a). China's engagements of Africa: Preliminary Scoping of African Case studies, . South Africa: Rockefeller Foundation.

- China Daily. (2010). Zhou Enlai announces eight Principles of foreign aid. *China Daily*, p. 5. Retrieved from http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010-08/13/content_11149131.htm
- Clark, I. D. (1996). Inside the IMF: comparisons with policy - making organizations in Canadian governments. *Canadian Public Administration*, 39(2), 157-191.
- Daily Guide. (2013). Dark Clouds Over Tano Oil Block. *Daily Guide*. Retrieved from <https://http://www.modernghana.com/news/503455/dark-clouds-over-tano-oil-block.html>
- Davies, P. (2007). *China and the end of poverty in Africa: towards mutual benefit? : Diakonia Sundbyberg*.
- Degnbol-Martinussen, J., & Engberg-Pedersen, P. (2003). *Aid: understanding international development cooperation*: Zed Books.
- Dijkstra, G. (2011). The PRSP approach and the illusion of improved aid effectiveness: Lessons from Bolivia, Honduras and Nicaragua. *Development Policy Review*, 29(s1), s110-s133.
- Dijkstra, G., & White, H. (2013). *Programme Aid and Development: beyond conditionality* (Vol. 29): Routledge.
- Dunne, T., Kurki, M., & Smith, S. (2013). *International relations theories*: Oxford University Press.
- Dunning, T. (2004). Conditioning the effects of aid: Cold War politics, donor credibility, and democracy in Africa. *International Organization*, 58(02), 409-423.
- E. Lammers. (2007.). How will the Beijing Consensus benefit Africa? China and Africa. Retrieved April 6, 2015, from The Foundation for International Development Publications (IDP), <http://www.thebrokeronline.eu/Articles/How-will-the-Beijing-Consensus-benefit-Africa>
- Enggen, Ø., & Roland, K. (2013). *Western aid at a crossroads: The end of paternalism*: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Elling N. Tjønneland. (2012). *Nye stormakter i Afrika. Utvikling eller utbytting? . Oslo*: Oslo: Scandinavian Academic Press/Spartacus.
- Espen, V., Lars Ivar Oppedal Berge., (2015). Private sector development for poverty reduction
Opportunities and challenges for Norwegian development aid
. Bergen: CHR. MICHELSEN INSTITUTE.
- Evans, P. C., & Oye, K. A. (2001). International competition: Conflict and cooperation in government export financing. *The Ex-Im Bank in the 21st Century*, 154-155.
- FOCAC. (2006a). *China's African Policy*. No. 2, Chaoyangmen Nandajie, Chaoyang District, Beijing, 100701: Ministry of Foreign Affairs Retrieved from <http://www.focac.org/eng/zt/zgdfzccwj/t230479.htm>.
- FOCAC. (2006b). Declaration of the Beijing SummitOf the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation. Retrieved 24 April, 2016, from <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/zflt/eng/zxxx/t280370.htm>
- Foster, V. (2009). *Building bridges: China's growing role as infrastructure financier for Sub-Saharan Africa* (Vol. 5): World Bank Publications.
- Foster, V., Butterfield, W., Chuan, C., & Pushak, N. (2008). *Building Bridges: China's growing role as infrastructure financier for sub-Saharan Africa* (Washington DC: World Bank): Africa.
- Gerard Van Bilzen. (2015). *The Development of Aid*: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.

- GHOSH, P. (2013). Fool's Gold: Chinese In Ghana Resented For Running Illegal Mines, Destroying Environment. *International Business Times*. Retrieved from <http://www.ibtimes.com/corporate/about>
- Grinnell Jr, R. M., & Unrau, Y. (2005). *Social work research and evaluation: Quantitative and qualitative approaches*: Cengage Learning.
- Gunnar Zachrisen. (2010). Vi må tåle å bli politisert. *Bistandsaktuelt*. Retrieved from <http://www.bistandsaktuelt.no/nyheter/nyheter---tidligere-ar/2010/-vi-ma-tale-a-bli-politisert/>
- Hagan, F. E., Romano, C., & Nollkaemper, A. . (1997). *Research methods in criminal justice and criminology*. Boston: Allyn and Bacon
- Hansen, M. E., Torbjørn Gjefsen,. (2015). The end of Nordic Exceptionalism. In Kjersti Kanestrøm Lie (Ed.). Norway: Norwegian Church Aid, Finn Church Aid, DanChurchAid and Church of Sweden.
- Holloway, G., Nicholson, C., Delgado, C., Staal, S., & Ehui, S. (2000). Agroindustrialization through institutional innovation Transaction costs, cooperatives and milk - market development in the east - African highlands. *Agricultural economics*, 23(3), 279-288.
- IMF. (2003). *Glossary of Statistical Terms: Gide for Compilers and Users-Appendix III*. Washington DC: IMF Retrieved from <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/eds/Eng/Guide/index.htm>.
- IMF. (2003,). *External Debt Statistics: Guide for Compilers and Users – Appendix III, Glossary, IMF*, . Washington DC.: IMF Retrieved from <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/eds/Eng/Guide/index.htm>.
- IMF. (2016a). IMF Members' Quotas and Voting Power, and IMF Board of Governors. Retrieved 21 January, 2016, from <https://http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/members.aspx>
- IMF. (2016b). *Poverty Reduction Strategies in IMF-supported Programs*. Washington, D.C: Retrieved from <http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/pdf/prsp.pdf>.
- IMF and World Bank. (2005). Operational Framework for Debt Sustainability Assessments in Low-Income Countries—Further Considerations Retrieved Spetember 2 2015, from INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
- AND
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION
<https://http://www.imf.org/External/np/pp/eng/2005/032805.pdf>
- Innovation Norway. (2015). Innovation Norway: Our Mission. Retrieved 23 January, 2016, from <http://www.innovasjon Norge.no/en/start-page/>
- Jing, L. (2008). Environmental Guidelines for Firms Investing Abroad. *China Daily*, September, 12.
- Jørgensen, T. (1990). *Contact and Conflict: Norwegian Missionaries, the Zulu Kingdom, and the Gospel, 1850-1873*: Solum Forlag.
- Karns, M. P., & Mingst, K. A. (2004). *International organizations: the politics and processes of global governance*: Lynne Rienner Publishers London.
- Kemp, M. C. (2005). Aid tied to the donor's exports. *Pacific Economic Review*, 10(3), 317-322.
- Kingsley, I. (2013). China in the heart of Africa. *AfricaRenewal*,.
- Lall, S. (1995). Structural adjustment and African industry. *World development*, 23(12), 2019-2031.

- Lancaster Carol. (2007). "Chapter 8: Conclusions and Conjectures," in Lancaster, Carol, *Foreign Aid: Diplomacy, Development, Domestic Politics*, . Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- Le Pere, G., & Shelton, G. (2007). *China, Africa and South Africa: South-South co-operation in a global era*: Institute for Global Dialogue.
- Lebovic, J. H. (2005). Donor positioning: development assistance from the US, Japan, France, Germany, and Britain. *Political Research Quarterly*, 58(1), 119-126.
- Lienert, I. (1998). Civil service reform in Africa. *Finance & Development*.
- Lin Jones, C. P. i. F. (2009). China return to Africa. *China Policy in Focus*.
- Maizels A. and Nissanke M. K. (1984). "Motivations for Aid to Developing Countries," *World development*, 12(NO. 9), 879-900.
- Maxwell, S. J., & Singer, H. W. (1979). Food aid to developing countries: a survey. *World development*, 7(3), 225-246.
- MFA Norway. (2012). Norway and the United Nations: Common Future, Common Solutions. Oslo: Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
- Michel, J. H. (1998). SHAPING THE 21st CENTURY THE CONTRIBUTION OF DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION. *Sustainable Development OECD Policy Approaches for the 21st Century: OECD Policy Approaches for the 21st Century*, 29.
- Mohamed-Mahmood, Y. (2007). *Chinese Development Assistance and West African Agriculture: A Shifting Approach to Foreign Aid?* , Lund University.
- Morgenthau, H. J. (1985). *Politics Among Nations*, revised by Kenneth W. Thompson. New York: KnOpt.
- Morris, H. (2008). China Defends Africa Aid Stance. *Financial Times*, 2.
- Moyo, D. (2009). *Dead aid: Why aid is not working and how there is a better way for Africa*: Macmillan.
- Naidu, S. (2007). China-African Relations in the 21st Century: A Win-Win Relationship. *China in Africa*, 41-47.
- Nkrumah, K. (1966). NEO—COLONIALISM: The Last Stage of Imperialism. 1965. New York: *International*.
- NORAD. (2011). Oil for Development Programme. Retrieved 20th November, 2015, from <https://http://www.norad.no/en/front/thematic-areas/oil-for-development/oil-for-development-programme/>
- NORAD. (2014). Norwegian Aid Statistics: Norwegian development aid 2014, geographic distribution. from <https://http://www.norad.no/en/front/toolspublications/norwegian-aid-statistics/>
- NORAD. (2015a). Norad's five main tasks. from <https://http://www.norad.no/en/front/about-norad/five-main-tasks/>
- NORAD. (2015b). Norwegian Aid Statistics: Norwegian development aid 1960 - 1999 by partner. Retrieved 20th January, 2016, from <https://http://www.norad.no/en/front/toolspublications/norwegian-aid-statistics/>
- NORAD. (2016). Norwegian Aid Statistics: Norwegian development aid 2000 - 2015 by partner. Retrieved 3/02/2016, 2016, from <https://http://www.norad.no/en/front/toolspublications/norwegian-aid-statistics/>
- Norfund. (2015). About Norfund. Retrieved 22 January, 2016, from <http://www.norfund.no/about-norfund/category296.html>

- Norfund. (2016). Norfund investment sectors. from <http://www.norfund.no/investments/category306.html>
- OECD. (2012). OECD Recommendations (Common Approaches). Retrieved August 16, 2015, from <http://www.oecd.org/tad/xcred/oecd-recommendations.htm>
- OECD. (2006). DAC Guidelines and Reference Series. Retrieved August 15, 2015, from <http://www.oecd.org/dac/dacguidelinesandreferenceseries.htm>
- OECD. (2009a). "Implementation of the 2001 DAC Recommendation on Untying ODA to the LDCs: 2009 Review," Paris: OECD.
- OECD. (2009b). OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions. Retrieved 15 August, 2015, from <http://www.oecd.org/corruption/oecdantibriberyconvention.htm>
- OECD. (2012). RECOMMENDATION OF THE COUNCIL ON COMMON APPROACHES FOR OFFICIALLY SUPPORTED EXPORT CREDITS AND ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL DUE DILIGENCE COMMON APPROACHES.
- Ossowski, R., Villafuerte, M., Medas, P., & Theo, T. (2008). Managing the oil revenue Boom: The role of Fiscal Institutions,|| IMF Occasional Paper No. 260.
- Pandey, K. (2014). Objectivity in Social Sciences. Available at SSRN 2399299.
- Panizza, U., Sturzenegger, F., & Zettelmeyer, J. (2009). The economics and law of sovereign debt and default. *Journal of Economic Literature*, 651-698.
- Pearson, L. B. (1969). Commission on International Development, Partners in Development. *Report. Praeger, New York*.
- Pigato, M., & Tang, W. (2015). China and Africa: Expanding Economic Ties in an Evolving Global Context. *World Bank Group Working Paper, Washington DC*.
- Ping, A. (1999). From proletarian internationalism to mutual development: China's cooperation with Tanzania, 1965-95 *Agencies in Foreign Aid* (pp. 156-201): Springer.
- Poverty, E. (2015). Millennium development goals. *United Nations*. Available online: [http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/\(accessed on 23 August 2011\)](http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/(accessed on 23 August 2011)).
- Prybyla, J. S. (1964). Communist China's Economic Relations with Africa 1960-1964. *Asian Survey*, 1135-1143.
- QuartzAfrica. (2015, 04 December, 2015). Robert Mugabe: China is doing everything that Africa's colonizers should have done, Politics. *Quartz Africa*. Retrieved from <http://qz.com/565860/robert-mugabe-china-is-doing-everything-that-africas-colonizers-should-have-done/>
- Regjeringen.no (Producer). (2016, 14 March, 2016). Svar på spørsmål om definisjonen av offentlig u-hjelp. [Foreign Affairs] Retrieved from https://http://www.regjeringen.no/no/aktuelt/svar_uhjelp/id2476425/
- Riddell, R. C. (1987). *Foreign aid reconsidered*. London: James Currey/Overseas Development Institute.
- Riddell, R. C. (2007). *Does foreign aid really work?* : OUP Oxford.
- RORG-network (Producer). (2016, 14 April, 2016). Veivalg i utenriks- og egeninteressepolitikken. [Political] Retrieved from <http://www.rorg.no/Artikler/3355.html>
- Rotberg, R. I. (2009). *China into Africa: Trade, aid, and influence*: Brookings Institution Press.
- Roy, D. S. (2013). China and India, "Rising Powers" and African development: Challenges and opportunities. Uppsala Sweden: The Nordic Africa Institute.

- Royal Norwegian Embassy. (2016). Norway supports the fisheries sector in Sudan [Press release]. Retrieved from [http://www.norway-sudan.org/News_and_events/Press-releases/Norway-supports-the-fisheries-sector-in-Sudan/ - .VyWIN6vRvjA](http://www.norway-sudan.org/News_and_events/Press-releases/Norway-supports-the-fisheries-sector-in-Sudan/- .VyWIN6vRvjA)
- Rubin A. & Babbie, E. (2005). *Research Methods for Social Work*. Balmont, CA: Thomson/Brooks/Cole.
- Sautman, B., & Hairong, Y. (2007). Friends and interests: China's distinctive links with Africa. *African Studies Review*, 50(03), 75-114.
- Schraeder, P. J., Hook, S. W., & Taylor, B. (1998). Clarifying the foreign aid puzzle: A comparison of American, Japanese, French, and Swedish aid flows. *World Politics*, 50(02), 294-323.
- Selbervik, H., & Nygaard, K. (2006). Nordic exceptionalism in development assistance? Aid policies and the major donors: the Nordic countries. *CMI Report*, 2006(8).
- Shinn, D. H. (2008). Military and Security Relations: China, Africa, and the Rest of the World. *China into Africa: Trade, Aid, and Influence*, 155-156.
- Solholm, R. (2007, 19 January). Norway moves embassy to Algeria. *The Norway Post*. Retrieved from <http://www.norwaypost.no/index.php/news/latest-news/11990>
- Sonecto Institute (Producer). (2013). "KICKBACK" exposé by Anadarko. Retrieved from <https://sonetco.wordpress.com/2013/07/18/npp-and-corruption-kickback-expose-by-anardarko/>
- Sorensen, J. S. (2010). *Challenging the Aid Paradigm; Western Currents and Asian Alternatives*: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Statoil. (2014). Statoil Worldwide. from <http://www.statoil.com/en/about/worldwide/niger/pages/default.aspx>
- Stefánsson, J. K., & Rudmin, F. W. (2016). NATO's Propaganda War. A case study on Norwegian propaganda in Libya. *The Indicter Magazine*.
- Stokke, O. (1989). The Determinants of Aid Policies: General Introduction. *Western Middle Powers and Global Poverty: The Determinants of the Aid Policies of Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden*. Upsala: The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 9-31.
- Stokke, O. (2013). *Aid and political conditionality*: Routledge.
- Stokke, O., & Hoebink, P. (2009). *Perspectives on European development co-operation: policy and performance of individual donor countries and the EU* (Vol. 1): Routledge.
- Taylor, I. (2006). China's oil diplomacy in Africa. *International Affairs*, 82(5), 937-959.
- The Economist. (2013). China and Africa: Little to fear but fear itself.
- thinglink. (2015). Norsk" kraft i Afrika. from <https://http://www.thinglink.com/scene/632507633823121410>
- Tjønneland, E. N., Brandtzæg, B., Kolås, Å., & Le Pere, G. (2006). China in Africa. Implications for Norwegian foreign and development policies. *CMI Report*, 2006(15).
- Tostensen, A. (2002). Norway's Africa Policy. *Lennart Wohlgemuth (ed)*.
- Tull, D. M. (2006). China's engagement in Africa: Scope, significance and consequences. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 44(03), 459-479.
- UK Bureau/Agency. (2015, 26 January, 2016). Norway to shut Zimbabwe Embassy off to Haiti, India. *New Zimbabwe*. Retrieved from <http://www.newzimbabwe.com/news-25301-Major+donor+Norway+to+shut+Harare+embassy/news.aspx>

- Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (1961).
- UNSC. (2015). Countries Elected Members of the Security Council. Retrieved 01.01, 2016, from <http://www.un.org/en/sc/members/elected.asp>
- Waltz, K. N. (1964). The stability of a bipolar world. *Daedalus*, 881-909.
- Warmerdam, W. w., & de Haan, A. (2011). 'The roles of aid in politics: putting China in perspective'. *Annotated bibliography*.
- Wenping, H. (2007). The balancing act of China's Africa policy. *China Security*, 3(3), 23-40.
- Wenping, H. (2010). China's Aid to Africa: Policy Evolution, Characteristics and Its Role *Challenging the Aid Paradigm* (pp. 138-165): Springer.
- Wheeler J. and Booth. K. (1992). *The security dilemma of world politics*, in J. Baylis and N. J. Rengger (eds), *Dilemmas of world politics: International issues in a changing world*, . London: Oxford University Press.
- White, H. (2005). "Aid" pp.18-20 in Forsyth, T. (ed.) *Encyclopedia of international development*, . London Routledge.
- White Paper. (2014). *Working together: Private sector development in Norwegian development cooperation*. Norway: MFA Retrieved from <https://http://www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/e25c842a003d4892986ce29678102593/en-gb/pdfs/stm201420150035000engpdfs.pdf>.
- Wiles, R. C., Graham Heath, Sue Charles, Vikki. (2006). Anonymity and confidentiality. *ESRC National Centre for Research Methods*.
- Xinhua. (2007). Jia Qinglin's four African nation tour. from News of Communist Part of China <http://english.cpc.people.com.cn/81780/81781/5660780.html>
- Xinhuanet. (2011, 21/04/2011). Full Text: China's Foreign Aid. *N news*. Retrieved from http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-04/21/c_13839683_10.htm
- Yin, R. (1994). *Case study research: Design and methods* . Beverly Hills: CA: Sage publishing.

APPENDIX 9.1
Research Design

Sub-RQs or main issues	Data Collection Methods	Collected Data	Sample. Unit Categories/Sizes
How has the Chinese engagements in Africa changed the conditions for Norwegian pursuit of international power and self interest through aid in Africa.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Semi-structured qualitative interview: Interview of Norwegian Diplomats in Africa, African Diplomats, researchers, Journalist, staff of OECD, MFA and NORAD. 2. Government documents 3. Secondary Data 	Notes and recorded transcripts of each interviewee's ideas and experience, government documents, other literatures about how Norwegian aid and diplomatic relations has changed since 2000	A total of 21 interviewees including: 3 NORAD staff 6 MFA (Staff & Diplomats) 6 African (Diplomats & Embassy staff) 3 Researchers 2 Journalist 1 OECD
In what ways has the Norwegian aid and diplomatic relations to Africa changed since 2000?	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Semi-structured qualitative interview: Interview of Norwegian Diplomats in Africa, African Diplomats, researchers, Journalist, staff of OECD, MFA and NORAD. 2. Government documents 3. Secondary Data 	Notes and recorded transcripts of each interviewee's ideas and experience, government documents, other literatures about how Norwegian aid and diplomatic relations has changed since 2000	A total of 21 interviewees including: 3 NORAD staff 6 MFA (Staff & Diplomats) 6 African (Diplomats & Embassy staff) 3 Researchers 2 Journalist 1 OECD
How has the changes in Norwegian aid and diplomatic relations in Africa been shaped by the Chinese engagements in Africa?	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Semi-structured qualitative interview: Interview of Norwegian Diplomats in Africa, African Diplomats, researchers, Journalist, staff of OECD, MFA and NORAD. 2. Government documents 3. Secondary Data 	Notes and recorded transcripts of each interviewee's ideas and experience, government documents, other literatures about how Norwegian aid and diplomatic relations has changed since 2000	A total of 21 interviewees including: 3 NORAD staff 6 MFA (Staff & Diplomats) 6 African (Diplomats & Embassy staff) 3 Researchers 2 Journalist 1 OECD

APPENDIX 9.2 INTERVIEW GUIDE

Interviewee Information

Gender:.....Occupation.....
Years of experience.....

Purpose of the Study

The main purpose of this study of this thesis is to analyze changes in Norway's engagements in Africa and to identify if and how these changes could be linked to the increased in China's engagements in Africa since 2000.

Questions

1. Broad invitation question:

I am interested in finding out the changes in Norwegian aid and diplomatic relations in Africa and to identify if and how these changes could be linked to the increased in China's engagements in Africa since 2000 but first of all can you tell me about your experience with Norwegian/China's engagements?

2. Guiding questions on China

- What would consider as the main focuses of China in Africa?
- How beneficial are the Chinese activities to Africa?
- What important developmental changes in Africa economic infrastructural,
- How would you evaluate the activities of China in Africa?

3. Norway

What do you consider as Norwegian national interest?
How is Norway able to achieve these national interests?

Norway in Africa

- Can you give me a brief historical background of Norway in Africa?
- What is Norway's main policy focus to Africa?
- How do Norway benefits from these specific policies to Africa?
- How do you see Norwegian engagements in Africa now compare to the past in terms of: policy focus, Determinants, Volume of aid, Sector preferences?

Policy Changes

- What has accounted for increased Norwegian FDI?
- How has the changes in Africa's economic and infrastructural development influenced Norway's policies towards Africa?
- What factors has accounted for specific policy initiatives in Africa eg. OFD, innovative Norway, Norfund, increased diplomatic missions?
- How has the Chinese expansively engagements in Africa affected these policy changes and initiatives?

APPENDIX 9.3
A list of Interviewees

ID	Organization	Position	Nationality
1	CMI	Senior Researcher	Norway
2	SUM	Senior Researcher	Poland
3	NORAD	Staff	Norway
4	NORAD	Staff	Norway
5	Embassy	Ambassador	African
6	Development Today	Journalist/Editor	Norway
7	Embassy	Ambassador	African
8	Embassy	Staff	African
9	Embassy	Staff	African
10	Bistandsaktuelt	Editor/Journalist	Norway
11	OECD	DAC Chairman	Norway
12	Embassy	Ambassador	African
13	MFA	Ambassador	Norway
14	MFA	Senior Adviser	Norway
15	Embassy	Ambassador	African
16	MFA	Ambassador	Norway
17	MFA	Ambassador	Norway
18	MFA	Ambassador	Norway
19	NORAD	Senior Staff	Norway
20	MFA	Ambassador	Norway
21	University of Ghana	Researcher	African

APPENDIX 9.4
4 Data analysis/coding

MAIN THEME	SUB-THEME	CODE	MEANING UNIT			
Changes in Norwegian aid and Diplomatic relations in Africa as a consequence of China's expansively growing engagements in Africa	Norwegian aid and diplomatic relations in Africa	Nature of Norwegian aid and Diplomatic relations in Africa before 2000	Project based to programme aid			
			Less Foreign Direct Investment			
			Donorship to conditionality			
			Strong multilateral support			
			Strong bilateral aid focus on East Africa			
			Strong emphasis on development and poverty orientation?			
		Focuses on Security and diplomatic interest				
		Nature of Norwegian Aid and diplomatic relations after 2000	Increased Foreign Direct Investment			
			Expansion of bilateral aid in Africa			
			Strategic cooperation with oil resourceful countries			
			Changing diplomatic priority			
			Shifting Focus on Development?			
	Mixing aid with business interest?					
	China's engagements in Africa	Nature of China's engagements in Africa	Nature of China's engagements in Africa	High FDI		
				Naturally resource-backed projects		
				Non-conditionality and non-interference policy		
				Increased support for private sector		
				Mixed aid, trade and investment		
				Self-interest driven/ win-win?		
				Emphasize on bilateral aid		
				Strong Focus on physical infrastructural development		
China and changes in Africa				China and changes in Africa	China and changes in Africa	Increased prices of natural resources
						Improved infrastructural
						Increased consumer and purchasing power
						Increased competition over African natural resources
		Increased investment form private and governments				
		Through multilateral organizations				
		Bilateral aid focusing on Eastern African countries				
Realism Perspective of Norwegian Aid and Diplomatic relations in Africa		Before 2000: Diplomatic and Security interest	Before 2000: Diplomatic and Security interest	Increased FDI		
				Strategic cooperation		
				Special initiatives e.g establishment of OFD, innovative Norway, Norfund		
		Economic interest	Economic interest	Economic interest	Changes in diplomatic missions	



Norges miljø- og biovitenskapelig universitet
Noregs miljø- og biovitenskapelige universitet
Norwegian University of Life Sciences

Postboks 5003
NO-1432 Ås
Norway